NEGOTIATING DIVERSITY, RECIPROCITY AND CIVILITY: AN EXAMPLE OF A WOMAN'S COALITION IN TURKEY

by

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NEGOTIATING DIVERSITY, RECIPROCITY AND CIVILITY: AN EXAMPLE OF A WOMAN'S COALITION IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

NEGOTIATING DIVERSITY, RECIPROCITY AND CIVILITY: AN EXAMPLE OF A WOMAN'S COALITION IN TURKEY

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This dissertation is based on the analysis of a women's coalition in Turkey called "Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz". The coalition is composed of women who are pitted against each other in popular depictions, namely feminists and religious women. This coalition is the first attempt to bridge different factions within the larger women's movement.

The dissertation aims to answer three interrelated questions with respect to this coalition. The first task is to answer how women with different views on gender relations arrive at a consensus on the topic. The second task is to answer how coalitions can be sustainable in the absence of a common unifying identity. The third task is on how coalitions can alter social orientations of actors. Through a careful analysis of internal deliberations of the coalition and in-depth interviews with coalition members, dynamics of this interaction as well as points of consensus and disagreement are depicted.

The analyses reveal that as long as the coalition defines its motivation as questioning male privileges in society, it is able to function cohesively. The analyses also reveal that in the absence of a unifying identity, the coalition became more reliant on acts of reciprocity that demonstrated a willingness to embrace others' life style concerns. Lastly, by facilitating a debate between different enclave women, the coalition altered conceptions of its members on discrimination and disadvantage which in turn modified their social orientations vis-à-vis other groups. The dissertation evaluates the importance of these findings for multiculturalism, civil society and gender studies.

ÖZET

ÇEŞİTLİLİK, KARŞILIKLILIK VE SİVİLLİĞİN MÜZAKERESİ: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ BİR KADIN KOALİSYONUNDAN ÖRNEK

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Bu tez Türkiye'de bir kadın koalisyonu olan "Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz"'un analizine dayanmaktadır. Koalisyon popüler tasvirlerde birbirine zıt olarak gösterilen feminist ve dindar kadınlardan oluşmuştur. Bu koalisyon geniş kadın hareketi içindeki farklı fraksiyonları biraraya getirmenin ilk çabasıdır.

Bu tez, bu koalisyonla ilgili olarak birbiri ile bağlantılı üç soruyu yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Birinci amaç toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkileri ile ilgili birbirinden farklı görüşlere sahip kadınların nasıl bir uzlaşıya vardığını cevaplamaktır. İkinci amaç ortak ve birleştirici bir kimlik olmadan bir koalisyonun nasıl sürdürülebilir olabileceğini cevaplamaktır. Üçüncü amaç koalisyonların aktörlerin sosyal yönelimlerini nasıl değiştirebileceği ile ilgilidir. Koalisyonun kendi içindeki müzakerelerini analiz etmek ve koalisyon üyeleri ile derinlemesine görüşmeler yapmak yoluyla bu etkileşimin dinamikleri ve uzlaşı ve anlaşmazlık noktaları tasvir edilmektedir.

Analizler göstermektedir ki koalisyon motivasyonunu erkek ayrıcalıklarını sorgulamak olarak belirlediğinde uyumlu bir şekilde çalışmaktadır. Analizler ayrıca göstermektedir ki koalisyon, ortak bir kimliğin eksikliğinde, başkalarının hayat tarzlarını kucaklayabilmenin göstergesi olarak görülen mütekabiliyeti vurgulayan eylemlere ihtiyaç duymaya başlamıştır. Son olarak, değişik anklavlara mensup kadınların kendi aralarında münazara etmesini sağlayarak, koalisyon onların ayrımcılık ve dezavantajlılık ile ilgili bakış açılarını değiştirmiş; bu da onların başka gruplara karşı olan sosyal yönelimlerini dönüştürmüştür. Tez, bu buluntuların çokkültürcülük, sivil toplum ve toplumsal cinsiyet çalışmaları açısından önemini irdelemiştir.

To my father who is always watching over me

Acknowledgements

Anyone who had completed a PhD knows what a solitary business it is. You are so much on your own. Your inner voice that tells you to keep going on can so easily be frustrated. You also go through quite a bit of questioning of your life choices. All that is to say a PhD is not a linear path. There are endless derailments and distractions. Mine was not an exception to this pattern. However, I had an exceptional luck in the sense that there had been so many special people who supported me in my long endeavor.

The first and the most crucial support I received was unquestionably from my advisor Ayhan Akman. He not only gave me excellent guidance throughout my dissertation, he also made me regain my fate in the work I was doing and the intrinsic value of it. Without him, this dissertation would not have been possible. No matter how many times I thank him, I will fall short of doing justice to his mentorship. I feel blessed to have a professor like him. I would also like to thank other members of my jury, Betül Çelik and Ayşe Parla for their constructive criticisms.

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My dissertation is about women's movement in Turkey and there had been so many women who supported my work which makes it all the more special for me. A crucial support came from women activists who accepted being interviewed and quoted in this work. I will not cite their names for reasons of confidentiality but I would like to thank all of them for sharing their views and experiences with me in an open hearted fashion. They represent the very force for a more egalitarian and just future for Turkish women and society. Their devotion also motivated me to be more involved in women's struggle in Turkey and I feel honored to get the chance to know them while doing the field work of my study.

There are other very special women who helped me stay in my course and finalize my studies. My mother is at the top of this list. She listened to my worries for hours and for countless times. She always listened, answered and motivated me till the very end. I can say without hesitation that she is the reason why I feel a stronger woman now. My sister never got tired of listening to my- sometimes very petty- anxieties and always gave me such rational advice and encouragement that made me question whether she really is eight years younger than me.

My close friends Evrim Altıntaş and Evrim Taşkın put up with my every anxiety attack I had along the way. They were always understanding and a great source of motivation when I felt down. I also would like to thank my colleagues and friends Ethem Yenigün, Songül Aslan and Fikret Toksöz for all the encouragement they gave me during one of the most stressful periods of my dissertation.

This dissertation is about women and was made possible by the support of very special women. However, I want to dedicate it to one special man, who thought me the most about life: my father. He showed me in his own living what being a virtuous person entails and what real wisdom is all about. My major motivation in life is to continue his own legacy in my own life through deeper reflection on what real happiness is all about: My deepest reflection so far has told me I am the happiest for being the daughter of Osman Uluçay. I love you father and I know you are always watching over me.

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AK-DER: Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği

     (Association For Women's Rights Against Discrimination of Women)

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

     (Justice and Development Party)

BSÇ: Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz

     (We Bet for One Another)

CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi

     (Republican People's Party)

KADER: Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği

     (Association for Promoting Women Candidates)

KAOS GL: Kaos Gay ve Lezbiyen Kültürel Araştırmalar ve Dayanışma Derneği

     (Kaos Association for Gay and Lesbian Research and Solidarity)

LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender

NSM: New Social Movements

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

Özgür-der: Özgür Düşünce ve Eğitim Hakları Derneği

     (Free Thinking and Education Rights Association)

ÖDP: Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi

     (Freedom and Solidarity Party)

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UN Women: United Nations Women

WASP: White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant

YAZKO: Yazarlar Kooperatifi

     (Publication and Production Cooperative of Writers and Translators)

Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis is based on the analysis of a women's coalition called "Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz" that was set up by women with very different backgrounds. The coalition was set up in 2008 initially to show solidarity with veiled women in their fight against veil ban in universities which was still very much in force at the time. Gradually, the coalition attempted unifying different factions within the larger women's movement with the purpose of showing that women activists in Turkey can show solidarity with each other in areas spanning from regulation of female body to improving the capabilities of women in the public sphere, despite having different life styles and world views. The peculiarity of the coalition stems from the fact that this was the first woman's coalition in Turkey that brings together women activists who are pitted against each other in popular depictions.

Most of the analyses on women's movement in Turkey focuses on the activism of one segment of activist population, which is usually the secular, pro-Western, (upper) middle class Turkish women. Although women's movement gained strength especially as it became liberated from the leftist struggle after the 1980 coup, it had been speaking with a rather unitary voice. This situation has only gradually changed with the rise of religious women to the scene of political activism. Starting with 1990s, Turkish public has witnessed the entry of the veil issue to political circulation. The entry of veil ban into political discussions magnified the division lines within the women's movement even more. While veiled women were using idioms such as right to education and right to work, feminist movement was mute about how such demands can be conceptualized from a feminist framework. It was such ideological divisions which prevented us from talking about a women's movement that could handle diversity.

One of the primary motivations behind the analysis of this coalition is to see how the diversity of claims within the wider women's movement can be reconciled. This has particular importance in the Turkish context where the separate struggles of different groups of women have not intersected or provided support to each other. Having a good account of what worked or did not work in this coalition will be illuminating about the longer term potential of such coalitions to bring about more concerted action in the women's movement. The fact that this coalition produced more rhetoric than action is not seen as a discouraging sign for the possibility of future collaborations because joint civic activism necessitates a common language to begin with. For this reason, the focal point of my analysis has been the frames produced within the coalition. These frames hold the key to understanding which mental switches are necessary in order to align different civic struggles under a common umbrella.

What distinguishes framing analysis in this study from many others is that unlike the traditional use of framing to analyze the public face of a coalition, this thesis focuses on how meaning making evolves out of discussions behind the scenes. By virtue of being a heterogeneous coalition that has multiple groups in its rankings, the coalition is a rich laboratory setting to test how common reference points emerge in the absence of a single identity. While framing analyses have largely focused on instrumental aspects of a movement such as efficiency and effectiveness, my focus has been on how the dialogue between competing visions on gender relations, recognition of identities and inter-group relations produces more fine-grained perspectives on these topics. In that sense, by staying in the kitchen of frame production and by observing the iterative process through which frames are crafted, I gained insights into the frame making process that is largely absent from conventional ways of analyzing coalitional rhetoric.

The deliberations analyzed here are more about consensus building internally, rather than collective action externally. This is because of the nature of the group. Having started out as a campaign to end the veil ban in universities, in subsequent discussions the platform turned into a forum to increase the reflexivity of participants on inter-group relations and identity. In this sense it is more of an opinion making forum than an activist platform. However, this does not decrease the value of their efforts. On the basis of my literature review on Turkey, I have clear confidence to say that this is the only platform in Turkey that has brought diverse segments of the larger women's movement together for a critical scrutiny of their ideological premises and the

urgency/relativity of their claims on discrimination. As such, it holds a potential- if not in this case, for subsequent alliances- for transforming relations of identity categories which are pitted against each other in popular depictions.

With respect to gender relations, despite holding very different opinions on private/public distinction and gender equality, the coalition members arrive at important points of consensus related to regulation of female bodies. By way of differentiating self-regulation (i.e. veiling) from male regulation of female bodies (i.e. harassment), the coalition aligned the perspectives of women who exert different levels of control on their bodies. The same consensus is evident with respect to the discussion on how male dominance operates through various ideologies. Members are in agreement as to how various political ideologies are used in a way to serve male interests. As an example, from the perspective of religious and non-religious members alike, conservatism as it is understood in Turkey today is utilized by men to increase their wealth and opportunities all the while suppressing the life choices of women. In sum, by arguing how political ideologies are in reality male ideologies that work to the disadvantage of women, the coalition achieves a more critical re-reading of political tools of propaganda. What comes to the fore in such discussions is the selective appropriation of fruits of modernity and privileges in society by men who use such ideologies to further their control on the life choices of women.

What emerges from all the above points of consensus on gender relations is that as long as the discussions can be turned into a discussion of what enhances the public presence and capabilities (i.e. work, education) of women, the members are able to align their frames.

Having stated some of the major frame alignments with respect to women's empowerment, it has to be stated that a thorough analysis of this coalition has relevance beyond the context of Turkish women's movement and gender studies.

The ability of various social movements to come to terms with and handle their internal diversity is becoming a highly relevant topic especially with respect to discussions on multicultural democracy. Multicultural democracy theorists argue that mediating various struggles through the prism of multiple intersecting identities and linking of various social movements is the necessary step to achieve an inclusive and plural definition of citizenship.

To arrive at this inclusive definition however, social movements need a decisive shift in the ways they strategize, do activism but above all think about social relations between groups. They should come to terms with their internal diversity or possible points of convergence with other movements. They should be able to attest to intersectionalities of identities and possibilities for regroupings across movements.

Through the analysis of this coalition, I tried to answer how this actually plays out in a real life setting. How the dynamics of identity negotiation take place in heterogeneous environments where activists with different backgrounds have to interact with each other is the focal point of my analysis. Any attempt at identity negotiation or cross-fertilization across social divides necessitates a coming to terms with one's position in the social hierarchy. In order to do this, I paid attention to the internal deliberations of the group rather than how it presented itself to the public. The internal deliberations within the group provide a more fertile ground to see the how group positions are evaluated or modified. It is this internal deliberation that has a potential to modify norms of reciprocity and civility that makes mutual recognition and cross-fertilization possible.

If we think of coalitions primarily as sites of self-reflection and mutual accommodation rather than sites of strategic cooperation, we will have to be attentive to the ways in which this accommodation can take place without requiring coalition members to conform to a unitary identity. How do coalitions where diverse identities have to exist side by side actually guarantee that all these constituent identities are actually accommodated? In other words, are identity differences within coalitions bridgeable and if so how are such differences reconciled?

My main finding emerging from this case study is that despite setting common targets pertaining to women's interests this coalition still had to formulate a way to handle its inner diversity. Even when coalitions show the parallel ways in which various groups are discriminated, this in no way guarantees that the constituent elements of the coalition cherish each other's identity or life style. This very problem also surfaced in the internal deliberations of the coalition I am analyzing. As deliberations continued, it became certain that at least some of the members expected various performances from others for proving their life-style or identity was accepted by others. For these members, the performative yardstick was participating to daily activities or civic/political performances of others who were different from themselves. Based on the disagreements and reactions this type of a demand received in the

coalition, I made a classification of the types of reciprocity that can be performed in a coalition and the possible problems or openings this type of reciprocity brings to the group.

On the basis of my observations with respect to this coalition and other studies on coalition building, my conclusion is that more personalized forms of reciprocity could have worked in this coalition. What is meant by personalized reciprocity can acquire two forms: one is to acknowledge intersectional identities and hybridity which would rule out pitting identities against each other. This is because admitting intersectionality enables one to envision cohabitation of different identity traits within the same individual which would rule out making rigid assumptions or talk with an exclusive rhetoric about one's civic counterpart. If individual identities are acknowledged to be multivalent rather than uni-dimensional, there is always room to accommodate those who are presumably different than oneself. The other route to personalized reciprocity is to admit the fluidity of identities themselves and to let each person define one's identity through his/her prism. To give an example, if the juxtaposition of the categories of men/women is dissolved, there would be an opening for a more fluid definition of sexual orientation which can ease the tension on both feminists by not locking them into prescribed role definitions. This is the reason why queer activism is seen as emancipatory as it lifts the burden of defining masculinity/femininity from the shoulders of civic activists.

These conclusions carry special importance for multicultural democracy theories as they speak to the heart of the matter with respect to whether identity politics is necessarily divisive or whether there is a potential to craft multi-stakeholder coalitions that both speak for multiple groups and that value the distinctive identities of those groups at the same time.

Another angle through which this thesis makes a contribution to multicultural democracy theories is its appraisal of inter-group relations. Multicultural democracy theorists underline the importance of drawing on different experiences of social groups to claim a more inclusive definition of citizenship however how this can be done if those social groups do not consider their inter-relations as one of equals is left unanswered. The analysis of the internal deliberations within this coalition can provide an answer to this debate by way of showing how norms of engagement with other groups can successfully be altered if there is a diverse enough coalition to cross-check the excesses of dominant discourses in society.

What civility requires is an understanding on the part of a relatively privileged group of its own standing in that society and the likely effects of that position on other groups in society. If social actors see social relations based not on opposition but relationality, they would be in a better position to come to terms with the distribution of privilege and discrimination in society. In other words, if they know that the fate of one group is not independent of another's but involves a negotiation and bargaining on the distribution of status and cultural value than they would be in a better position to acknowledge their own responsibility or stake in this negotiation.

I argued throughout the thesis that civility is only enhanced meaningfully when this relational aspect is grasped. The value of heterogeneous publics is important due to precisely this reason. In the absence of countervailing rhetoric, it is very hard for a group to discover its own situatedness and privilege. For this reason, spheres where diverse actors can talk with each other gain extra importance. This coalition by way of bringing diverse actors under its umbrella provides a setting to test whether my assumptions on civility actually hold.

Theorists on deliberation underline the importance of giving marginal groups a space to air their grievances and concerns without fear of being suppressed by the views of dominant groups in society. However, whether being shielded from the views of dominant groups gives marginal groups an ability to speak with a less extreme voice is uncertain.

Checking the excesses of one dominant discourse can best be done in heterogeneous settings where there is enough diversity so that each group's voice is balanced by the other. This coalition by way of bringing women who have been marginalized in their own civic circles provides such a setting where each woman brings her unique counter-rhetoric to the dominant (and usually masculine) rhetoric of the public sphere. Hence another contribution of this study is its elaboration of how formulations on inter-group relations are shaped by who takes part in discussions. Depending on how an individual/group is positioned vis-a-vis dominant groups in society, the definition of discrimination/disadvantage is crafted in a different fashion. Later in the analysis section, I will argue that norms of civic engagement (which I will call civility) are highly dependent on who takes part in public deliberations.

1.1. Outline of The Thesis

Following this introduction, second chapter will be a literature review that is composed of two sections. Section 2.1 will be a discussion of the theoretical tools used to analyze the case study of this dissertation. Coalitions as a special case in the study of social movement research will be introduced. The value of coalitions will be discussed from two theoretical viewpoints: one from the perspective of multicultural democracy theories, the other through the prism of theories of deliberation. Lastly I wil introduce the framing methodology as it is understood and used in this dissertation. Section 2.2 of the literature review will be the introduction of the background to this coalition, namely Turkish women's movement scene. I will introduce the ascendance of religious women to the scene of civil society and larger women's movement as well as the trajectory followed by feminists since 1980s.

Chapter 3 will be composed of two sections. Section 3.1 introduces the particular coalition that I am analyzing in this dissertation. Member profile, major activities, topics discussed as well as major controversies are all parts of this introduction. In the following section 3.2, I introduce the main methods utilized in the thesis. I make a brief introduction to the novelty of online etnograhpy methods and how I made use of this method in my research. I also explain the mixed methodology adopted in the dissertation in the form of in-depth interviews, textual analysis and participant observation where it was possible to use them.

Chaptes 4, 5 and 6 introduce the main findings of my research. These findings are organized on the basis of three sections that tackle three inter-related questions.

Chapter 4 is on Framing Gender Relations and is focused on how members can build consensus on gender relations despite holding different opinions on the topic. This chapter is dedicated to explaining the ways in which the coalition members arrive at a consensus on gender relations without necessarily aligning every member with feminist principles. In other words, this chapter explains in which ways women with diverse identities are able to align their gender specific demands by way of constructing

common strategic targets. These strategic targets are moving targets. In some cases the target turns out to be the state "as a field of contest for brave men". In other cases, it is the societal conventions that permit men to regulate women's dress codes and life choices in the public sphere.

The important thing to be remembered in all these points of consensus is that members actively seek a way to accommodate each other's differing perspectives on gender relations that reflect their particular background. This shows coalitions can accommodate diversity through framing if they can set their targets appropriately. It also shows that there can be solidarity within the wider women's movement in Turkey despite deep ideological (left-right) and life-style (religious-secular) differences. This runs contrary to previous observations which depict a more bleak picture about the solidarity of women who feel allegiance to different –isms in Turkey.

Chapter 5 on Framing Group Diversity and Identity, taking the issue from another angle, questions how coalitions can be sustainable in the absence of a single unifying identity. Coalitions are usually depicted as having very instrumental reasons for being formed. Defining and fighting strategic adversaries is depicted as the bread and butter of coalitions. However, there are other aspects of coalition building which are equally vital for their sustainability. How coalitions promote and accommodate internal diversity is an important aspect of any maintenance work.

What guarantees that coalitions do not disintegrate or become obsolete when it comes to dealing with internal diversity? This section deals with this question in more detail. Here, identities other than womanhood and how they are negotiated within the coalition gain prominence. Negotiations that take place within the coalition with respect to how platform members try to create solidarity without undermining the distinct identities of its members takes the center stage of my analysis. I show that acts of reciprocity become the primary vehicle through which solidarity can be manifested. Activists know they are not of the same identity or they do not share similar lifestyles but they consider acts of reciprocity as compensatory mechanisms. The important question for this coalition and many similar coalitions that do not exhibit one single unifying and tight solidarity among its participants is: What is the right type of reciprocity for maintaining a coalition of this sort? I will have preliminary answers to this question in this second chapter.

Chapter 6 on Framing Inter-Group Relations and Civility is about how heterogeneous coalitions can alter the social orientations of actors. If we think of coalitions as unique fora to bring different group perspectives into contact with each other, this encounter can help members acquire a different take on how to visualize inter-group relations. Whereas in Chapter 5, the emphasis was on how to accommodate different identities and life-styles within the same coalitional framework, here the emphasis is on how to approach the grievances and demands of groups in the wider civil society. Juxtaposing the grievances of different groups to draw similarities may prove fruitful in the short run but will surely fall short of streamlining the aspirations and expectations of groups from each other. Coalitions are the unique fora to streamline different groups' perspectives on discrimination and disadvantage. They also provide civil society actors with a unique chance to come in contact with groups which may hold an alternative explanation to their version of marginalization and discrimination in society. This encounter, which would not have taken place if members only talked with like-minded individuals has an influence on their social orientations vis-à-vis other groups.

The analyses in Chapter 6 centers on how the social orientations of the actors change in ongoing discussions towards a more self-critical and self-reflexive appraisal of the situatedness of identity and the structure of privilege in society. Here, I call this specific instance of reflexivity as civility. This is because if social actors can admit their own situatedness and the myriad of privileges they do/may acquire from the discriminations of other groups in society, their social orientations will become more altruistic and based on mutual care and respect. In fact, here I make reference to multicultural democracy theorists who believe that a hardening of identity is a degeneration of civility. Multicultural citizenship requires a willingness to believe that when people are acting citizens, they care about, or should care about, the fates of diverse identity groups at the same time. (Lichteman, 1999:134)

In all three chapters, through the narratives utilized by platform members, I will try to depict the changes in framing in ongoing discussions and their implications for civil society, civility, recognition, multicultural democracy and self-identity building.

The dissertation ends with a conclusion chapter which is a general appraisal of the significance of this work for social movement and civil society research

Chapter 2. Literature Review

This thesis is based on the case study of a coalition of women activists called Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz (BSÇ from now on). The members who make up this coalition are coming from very different trajectories of civic activism. While a group of members have emerged initially out of leftist movement in Turkey, they later evolved into the feminist movement especially after the coup of 1980. Another group has emerged out of the religious movement but acquired its distinctive character due to the veil ban and the ensuing rights struggles of veiled women. It would not be accurate to argue that each member joined this coalition in order to represent a particular group. However, it is safe to argue that each woman had a personal trajectory anchored in the history of a particular movement.

Feminist movement in Turkey although rooted in the leftist movement of 1960s and 1970s went through an emancipation after the coup of 1980 and established itself more firmly in the social movements scene. It went through certain transformations which made coalition building with other movements an integral part of its strategy. The same is true for the struggle of veiled women. Although coming from a totally different tradition and having different sensibilities, they also went through a transition that made them more sensible to other rights struggles. If we are to understand the alliance building that is the case study of this thesis, we have to know the background of this rapprochement.

The second part of the literature review will introduce the reader to the specific case study of the thesis. Since the coalition under study is a women's platform, this part will elaborate the factors and historical transitions that brought different segments of women's movement to engage in networked and coordinated activism. This second part

will be useful in understanding the particular historical trajectories of the different women's movements that made this coalition possible.

BSÇ because of the participation of women coming from different histories and networks of collective activism can be called a coalition. Unlike monolithic and vertical organizations that characterize the collective activism of class based models, a coalition is made up of loose connections that can accommodate a more diverse set of positions and perceptions. The downside of relying on loose connections on the other hand is that there is less commitment to a stable identity and the alliance may have difficulties in sustaining a coherent message.

Arguably, there has to be certain advantages in taking part in coalitions that represent a more diverse spectrum of ideologies and value systems. There must be clear advantages that outweigh the disadvantages of diverging viewpoints and priorities. For this reason, the first part of this chapter which is the theoretical section of my literature review will start with elaborating on why and how coalitions emerge in social movements. What type of activism are they engaged in? What are the types of grievance they raise? Answering these questions would entail digging deeper into social movement literature. Whether such coalitions are endemic to New Social Movements will be given a special emphasis.

There are two important angles through which coalitions will be analyzed. One is through the prism of multicultural democracy theories. Multicultural democracy theorists consider cross fertilization among movements as an expansion of the liberty space for all groups in society. They believe in the possibility of joint initiatives that bring together different identities under a banner. Can groups with different backgrounds unite solely on the basis of a common goal or a strategic adversary? How sustainable would such a coalition be? Under which conditions different identities become less of a burden and more of an asset for a coalition?

These observations about what multiculturalism entails have high relevance for my case study as well. Instead of arguing which groups of women in this coalition are more vulnerable or are in need of special treatment, coalition members engage in a more fruitful discussion on how to reconcile differences. They debate on how to craft a political solidarity that does not ignore difference and that is based on relying on and drawing strength from the diversity of claims within the wider women's movement. These discussions provide me with ample resource to tackle the basic premises of multicultural democracy theorists.

The other angle through which I want to approach this case study has to do with how the internal talk within a coalition can change the social orientations of its actors. What is meant by social orientations is the quality of the interactions between individuals and groups in society. The nature of interactions can be based on mutual trust, respect, recognition or it could also be based on hatred or suspicion. While social orientations of actors may have certain identifiable ideological or sociological backgrounds, there are reasons to believe these are subject to change under certain circumstances. Depending on whom one talks to in the larger public sphere and the heterogeneity of the debating publics involved, attitudes and orientations of actors will take a different shape.

I am interested in this literature mainly because this coalition has a potential to modify the perceptions of its members on the relations between groups in society. The potential of this coalition stems from the fact that it represents groups which were marginalized from mainstream public sphere as well as from their ideological backyards be it the leftist movement or the Islamist movement. By bringing the voice of groups, which are less tainted by the dominant discourses of hegemonic public forms, together the coalition gives us an opportunity to test our assumptions about how counter-public spheres can create new imaginaries for the groups and issues they represent and how these representations offer an alternative account on inter-group relations in society. This will become the topic of my analysis chapter on framing inter-group relations and civility.

While making my analysis about these questions, I paid particular attention to the frames put into circulation in the inner deliberations of the coalition and how these frames were modified in ongoing conversations. A focus on frames is necessary if we want to understand how identities and inter-group relations are conceptualized and re-defined in coalitions. For a long time, only the narratives social movements provided to the outside world, to the public, has been analyzed and discussed under the rubric of framing. However, coalitions do not just engage in narrative construction vis-à-vis outside publics, they also engage in an intense internal persuasion and creation of new imaginaries for the groups and issues they want to represent. For this reason, the theoretical part of my literature review will end with a critical discussion of framing literature in a way that will take into account the internal deliberations of coalition members into account.

2.1. Theoretical Background

2.1.1. Coalitions in Social Movement Research

Coalitions are becoming more widespread in the current organizational structure of collective action (Beutz Land, 2009, Schlosberg, 1999; Diani and Bison, 2004; Carruthers, 1996; Underwood, 2009, Diani, 1995). They mostly refer to loose alliances/networks of activists that may be maintained together by a common purpose but that are not bound singularly by one movement, who are dispersed spatially, and that do not operate within highly formal organizational structures. This is a departure from old modalities of movement organization such as professional associations or trade unions where there is an explicit hierarchy, a single purpose and formal tactics of social activism. The reduction in barriers to communication, (i.e. the rise of online communities) facilitates the emergence of such loose coalitions.

Scholars argue that it has become the rule rather than the exception to talk about social movements as networks. (Diani, 1996, p. xiii; Gerlach and Hines, 1970; Bullard ,1993; Schlosberg, 1999) Schlosberg (1999) argues this fact was first observed and mentioned by Gerlach and Hines (1970) on the loose, dispersed networks of social movements in the 1960s.

Among the reasons cited for such a change in organizational structure, we could first cite the disillusionment by big, monolithic and mainstream organizations which have become ineffective in campaigning and controlled by major funding organizations rather than membership, which promote hierarchy and centralization and professionalization of the movement that impede accountability to the membership and local communities (Schlosberg, 1999, p. 122).

In addition, movements when they turn into highly hierarchical and professional organizations, also carry the potential of becoming insensitive to the demands of low income or minority groups in its rankings. Lack of attention to diversity becomes a major problem in such movements.

For some students of social movements, horizontal and vertical linkages, networks, coalitions and other forms of alliance are a manifestation of a thickening civil society (Carruthers, 1996; Fuentes and Günter Frank, 1989). There are numerous examples in social movement literature that point towards alliance building around common purposes and recruiting activists from diverse networks for this purpose.

A good example is the environmental justice movement which according to Bullard (1993) works through a network of civil rights, social justice and environmental groups. According to Capek (1993) as they work through a coalition of organizations, environmental justice groups incorporate ideas and themes from the groups joining this coalition. "In the various organizations and networks that make up the environmental justice movement, there is no insistence on one singular point of view, one policy that will solve all problems, or one tactic to be used in all battles. There is no one 'environmental justice,' 'minority', or 'grassroots' view of the environment" (Capek quoted in Schlosberg, 1999, p.124). According to a report of Environmental Careers Organization (1992, p.391), there are varied motivations for organizing and a basic belief in the heterogeneous nature of the movement. While the concerns within the movement are more or less the same, "the particular experiences of these issues, and the formulation of understandings and responses, differ according to place. Rather than one particular frame, there is a coexistence of multiple beliefs as to the causes, situation of, and possible solutions for issues of environmental justice. The movement is constructed from differences such as these and revels in that fact." (Schlosberg, 1999, p.124)

Another observation with respect to the networked movement of environmental justice is that people are recruited into the movement through pre-existing movements, be it churches, neighborhood support groups and the like. The movement is successful to the extent that it is able to recruit from other social justice groups. Networking with other groups means networking with their issues. Schlosberg in his account of networking in environmental justice movement explains how the issue linkage evolves:

Activists battling computer chip plants often have to deal not only with issues of contamination, but also with the politics of public subsidies of private corporations. Organizers working on health problems of strawberry pickers in California arc inevitably brought into the contested terrain of immigration law (Schlosberg, 1999:127).

This quote reveals the dynamism of a networked social movement and how it differs from a conventional understanding of political mobilization that relies on a common goal, a common identity and common narrative. In fact, networked movements do not imply uniformity by any means. Networks and alliances rely as much on differences and autonomy as they do on unity. In the words of Schlosberg:

In the formation of networks of solidarity, there is not necessarily one single unifying commonality, a single glue or mortar. Instead a network holds itself together along the common edges of its pieces. The resulting mosaic itself-the movement-becomes the major commonality. Within a network there remains both multiplicity and commonality. Some networks and alliances are very much conscious of this issue. Groups that share environmental concerns may still have radical differences. Yet, the commonality of environmental concerns serves as the mortar even when there are differences in culture, style, ideology or tactics (Schlosberg, 1999, p.128).

Another example of this is from Mexico where environmental movement merged with indigenous movement. In fact, there are important overlaps between indigenous movements and environmental movements all over Latin America, especially in regions rich in bio-diversity which are also important for the livelihoods of many indigenous cultures. In such places, preservation of bio-diversity coincides with the preservation of living space of indigenous cultures. Such cultures are as engendered as the wild life around the Amazon. There are numerous examples of this overlap of struggles in countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia.[1]

In the case of Mexico we observe that, "new environmental groups, largely urban, educated and middle class, have found a convergence of interests with indigenous

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[1] The term used by Carruthers for the environmental and indigenous movements that work together is "indigenous ecology" which refers to the alliances between environmental and indigenous social movement organizations- These linkages have taken root in a shared hope that traditional knowledge, embedded in indigenous and peasant culture and practice, might provide a living model of sustainability (1996:1007).

organizations, representing the poorest and most marginalized segment of Mexico's rural peasantry." (Carruthers, 1996, p.1007) Not only are there links between grassroots indigenous organizations with intermediary organizations located in big cities, hence creating the rural-urban linkage, there are also linkages with global environmental coalitions to make the case of indigenous cultures heard in the entire world and bring global support.

At this point, we have to dwell on whether all types of networked activism should be considered "social movements". Social movements do not exhaust the whole picture called collective activism and they should be treated as a sub-field within the broader collective action literature. I will rely on the classification developed by Diani and Bison (2004) where they treat social movements and coalitions as different and specific instances of networked activism. Their definition of a social movement is "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity."

There are three types of criteria they use to differentiate social movements from other types of collective action. These are:

> •presence or absence of conflictual orientations to clearly identified opponents;
> •dense or sparse informal exchanges between individuals or organizations engaged in collective projects;
> • Strong or weak collective identity between members of those networks (Diani and Bison, 2004, p.283)

For Diani and Bison (2004, p.283), social movement processes are instances of collective action, characterized by clear conflictual orientations to specific social and political opponents, conducted within dense inter-organizational networking and which links social actors through a shared identity and solidarity.

They identify two other forms of collective activism which are important for the purposes of this thesis: coalitional processes and organizational processes. To illustrate their classification they come up with a typology of collective action (Diani, Bison 2004: 284).

Table 1: Typology of collective action

Dense vs. sparse networks	Network identity	Type of collective action
Dense	Strong	Social movement
Dense	Weak	Coalitional processes
Sparse	Weak	Organizational alliances

For Diani and Bison (2004), in coalitions (or alliances) "collective actors are densely connected to each other in terms of alliances, and may identify opponents explicitly, but those alliances are not backed by strong identity links. The networks among actors mobilizing on a common goal take a purely instrumental nature" (p. 285). Their prediction is that once the actors have achieved their aims or once it becomes clear there is no way to achieve that aim, the coalition terminates.

How do such loose coalitions maintain their networks and sustain their activism? Many would argue that such loose connections would destroy an emerging movement rather than strengthen it. There are various arguments in support of this thesis.

Firstly, coalitions are mobile arrangements. They may easily dissolve after a loss, a victory or a major disagreement. Without sustained resistance, successful pressuring of public authorities is rare. Schlosberg (1999) argues that "governmental agencies and corporations are influenced by longevity; while they can often wait out sporadic protests, they have a much more difficult time ignoring community organizations and networks that have become established and coordinated" (p.140). Having said this however, such networks also exhibit an advantage in this sense. Even when they dissipate, they remain dormant and can be ready for getting mobilized anew.

Second difficulty is with respect to keeping relations intact. Some participants of a particular network may come to see themselves as part of a larger movement, while others may think the pressing issue that the networked group deals with is the only concern of the group. Solidarity is understood differently by group members. This means, a network can become an "amalgamation of numerous decentered struggles, incapable of dealing with big issues of power"

Contrary to this particular critique, Schlosberg (1999) believes, multiple, localized oppositions are what sustains coalitions in the contemporary era. He applies this thinking to environmental coalitions in the US where the targets of the movement are diverse which makes the movement decentered and multiple. The issues and abuses that form the motivations of the movement need to be targeted at the local level in the

multiplicity of places where it emerges. Hence, "the multiplicity of experiences, issues, and resistances that have developed in the environmental justice movement call for and exemplify diverse approaches to change in varied venues. The basis of the movement is this composite character and the plurality of levels of attack" (p.141)

For him, the plurality of a movement, its diverse tactics, and its numerous resources are understood as strategic advantages in organizing (p.142). The distinctive feature of a coalition is its ability to own multiple issues and to speak for multiple constituencies. For this, it has to forge narratives that capture the state and desires of these multiple constituencies. Coalitions, by virtue of representing more dispersed constituencies are more fluid and disorganized. For this reason, they may be short-lived or dormant at various periods of their activism. Coalitions also have to rely on non-conventional methods of organization of space as they have to recruit activists from multiple places, groups and identities. Online communities are a response to this space barrier. Currently, most of the networked movements rely on the extensive use of online media to stay connected. This fact will be explained in more detail in the methodology chapter with a discussion on the rise of online communities and the advantages and challenges posed to social science research by this new medium.

Another feature of the coalitions is that by virtue of connecting formerly disconnected groups around issues of common concern, they also start catering to multiple needs and issues. This is mostly because as the participants to the coalition get more diverse in purpose and background, the alliance also starts adapting to this diversity. For this reason unlike traditional social movements, most coalitions are also multiple-issue alliances. The women making part of this study also belong to multiple networks and maintain their solidarity through these diffuse networks rather than tight and unitary organizational structures. By being part of such diffuse networks they also bring the diverse issues in various other platforms to BSÇ for further discussion. In this fashion, not only are they expanding the issue ownership of the coalition, they are also linking issues to each other in new and novel ways.

Although this introduction gives a comprehensive overview of coalitional attributes, strengths and weaknesses and various tactics and strategies that bring success, it still does not address the importance of coalitional politics in the current era. What are the conditions that make coalitions important and prevalent today? It is the aim of this thesis to have a reflection on coalitions in a new light. There are two important reasons why a closer study of coalitions will bear important results:

Coalitions as Sites For Critical Multivalent Identity Talk: Multicultural democracy theorists put a strong emphasis on forms of civic engagement that bring a variety of groups into its orbit, that speak for and across multiple intersecting identities. Instead of stressing the instrumental aspects of coalitions such as fighting certain strategic targets, such theorization prioritizes the investigation of how identities are negotiated in coalitions. Such analyses are less outcome oriented and more process oriented. This means the primary aim of such analyses is not to find out what type of campaigns or slogans come to fruition and prove effective. The aim is rather to find out how different identity claims are accomodated, given value and weight in discussions, how the particularities of constituent members of coalitions are respected and reconciled. If we are to argue that such coalitions have a potential to become multicultural public forms that recognize a plurality of different, equally valuable ways of being human, we should be able to pinpoint how recognition across identity groups takes place within a coalitional setting. This aspect of coalitions needs to be highlighted and it is one of the motivations of this dissertation to do so.

Coalitions as Sites for Changing Social Orientations of Civic Actors: Coalitions are unique fore in that they bring different groups of individuals into their orbit. Each constituent element of the coalition brings his/her particular pre-conceptions of others in society. The way people view groups other than one's own reveals important information as to the social orientations of actors. A fine grained analysis of the quality of civil society is nothing other than the measurement of the social orientations of its actors. An important question in the study of coalitions is then: How are modes of civic engagement and social orientations of actors modified within coalitions? What guarantees that civic actors will alter their conceptualizations of relations between groups in a way that takes into account more marginal voices in society? What type of civic deliberation will produce this type of outcome?

The remainder of the literature review will elaborate coalitions from these two angles. For this reason, the remainder is dedicated to the discussion of coalitions both from the perspective of multicultural democracy/identity politics as well as deliberation theories.

2.1.2. Coalitions as Sites for Critical Multivalent Identity Talk:

The study of coalitions has a potential to provide important extensions to the debate on identity politics and multicultural democracy. Many scholars think coalitional processes, unlike social movements, are not backed by significant identity links and are doomed to disintegrate sooner or later (Diani and Bison, 2004:281). These scholars also stress the contingent and instrumental nature of relations given the lack of a tight common bond.

The study of coalitions can give convincing answers to the question of whether all forms of civic activism should be based on a common unitary identity. Since the attacks of critics of identity politics center on the exclusionary and monolithic nature of identity politics, coalitions provide us with an ideal setting to observe what happens in the absence of common identity bonds. What happens when groups making part of a coalition have to reconcile their competing identity claims? If civic groups can operate without the existence of a single bond, or if there are ways to reconcile clashing identities within a larger coalition we could potentially argue against the assumption that a single overarching identity is necessary to maintain bonds or engage in meaningful civic action.

The study of coalitions would help us assess whether the promises of multicultural democracy can indeed be realized within the framework of new social movements (Fraser, 1997, p.181). In order to make the connection between coalitions and multicultural democracy theories clear, I will first start with new social movements and the various transformations identity struggles went through since the emergence of NSM. This overview will help the reader establish the connections between coalitions and the current aspirations of multicultural democracy.

New Social Movements (NSM is used here in a generic sense, as a single phenomenon) is based on the idea that contemporary movements are struggles over the production of meaning and the constitution of new identities. As has been put succinctly by Eduardo Canel (2004) "it stresses the expressive aspects of social

movements and places them exclusively in the terrain of civil society, as opposed to the state". NSM theory is known for its attack on the economic reductionism of classical Marxism which argues all collective action is due to economic crisis, exploitation and class struggle. Most of the first examples of NSMs appeared in affluent Western countries which have a plural and democratic regime with a powerful civil society. To argue that these movements emerged because of a structural crisis or a suppressed grievance would be misplaced. Such movements involve a desire to redefine their collective identity and to become part of the public space with these newly acclaimed identities.

For this reason, their terrain of battle is cultural rather than economic.[2] NSM theories argue that struggles over the means of production have been replaced with control over the process of symbolic production and the redefinition of social roles. Habermas views the current social movements as defensive reactions seeking to retain or re-create endangered life-styles. They operate at the level of social integration and are less concerned with redistributional issues than with the grammar of forms of life (Habermas, 1981, p.33).

Another distinctive feature of such movements is their emphasis on difference rather than equality. The old social movements had a yardstick- a certain bourgeoisie standard of life- that they wanted to reclaim for themselves. The class struggle involved an element of sharing the fruits of modernity on a par with the owners of the means of production. For this, the movement had an umbilical cord with labor parties that they saw as the primary means to achieve their demands for equality. Even the feminist movement that coincides with the peak of class struggle was more concerned with the equality with men and the reclamation of the same privileges with men than emphasizing female difference.

The NSMs, in stark contrast to the above picture, does not define modernity in homogeneity, sameness or equality. All the natural categories of modernity are under intense scrutiny by the NSMs such as environment, womanhood, religiosity etc...The terrain of this new meaning making is civil society rather than the state. The NSMs according to Touraine (1985) are more involved in redefinition of social relations and

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[2] Theorists such as Fraser (1992) and Young (1996, 2006) would find this account incomplete as they believe identity politics needs a strong social equality commitment and redistributionist agenda in order to claim complete equality of worth of social groups.

cultural forms within society. In this way, such movements question the established norms of normality. For Giddens (1991), NSMs represent the passage from emancipatory politics to the life politics. As explained above, emancipatory politics aim the acquisition of same rights and privileges with the group that establishes the norms, i.e. bourgeoisie, the Kemalist elite etc... However, the preoccupation of NSMs is usually how we should envision a society that goes beyond such ascriptive categories. This involves a process of thinking unto itself and reconstruction of identities (which usually involves a deconstruction of identities to begin with). The politics that is being waged is the recognition of such new identity claims. But unlike the politics of "equality in sameness" of the previous era, this new politics involves "equality in difference", the right to exist as autonomous and different.

However, identity politics that mark the essence of NSM also went through significant transformations. To take the example of feminism, we can see that in many Western countries it went through three distinct phases. While the first phase included a rigorous discussion of gender difference (and whether gender equity in the strictest sense is desirable), the second phase was focused on differences among women whereas in the last (current) phase, the attention shifted towards "multiple intersecting identities" (Fraser, 1997, p.175).

In the first phase, the main discussion took place between feminists who argued that men and women should be equal in every sphere of life, and those who believe that men and women can be different but still possess their own peculiar value and make their own contribution to public life. Those are defined as equality feminists and difference feminists. This debate continued without a decisive victory for either side. While equality feminists were criticized for taking male behavior as the norm and project this onto the female, hence reproduce the androcentric conceptions of cultural standards, difference feminists were attacked for locking women into feminine roles that produced the same gender hierarchies that they were trying to eradicate.

Before this debate was settled, the entire focus of the discussion shifted as the "marginals" of women's movement entered the scene. This shift is largely attributed to the work of lesbians and women of color (Fraser, 1997, p.178). For the first time, women started discussing the implications of other intersecting identities for the female experience. For the first time, women of color, minority women, working class women and others aired the view that what feminism defended so far was an Anglo-Saxon white middle class female aspiration. This was not feminism for all women. By

repressing differences among women, the movement also suppressed an account of different ways in which marginalization plays out for women of color, of different sexual orientations, immigrant women, etc…Women with intersecting identities had multiple allegiances to other movements and this also complicated the picture of women's struggle.

This was not only true for feminism. Many other NSMs also came to a point of awareness where it was impossible to essentialize identities and treat them as distinct phenomena amid the intersectionalities and hybridity that were so evident. NSM activism entered a new era with this realization. Many movements, including feminism, found cross-cutting commitments and shared problem areas with other movements.

Lyndia Burns (2006) in her book called Feminist Alliances argues that feminist separatism has been on the decline as the movement had been in alliance with various other movements in the last few decades including gay rights, environmentalists, socialists and other left wing activists. For her, there are two practical advantages in doing this. One is the advantages of unity with other groups. In her words:

> Where a range of past gains are under threat (including abortion rights, equal pay and even human rights) obvious advantages exist in a regrouping and combining of resources. In fact, isolationism does not pay off. Second and more subtle reason is the recognition of difference by the movement, and the inadequacy of the assumption of some common ground such as the experience of a common oppression of all women. If feminist movement recognizes diversity, then it is likely to share common issues with groups of men. Perspectives on justice, power, and social oppression can also be aligned with other groups if no identifiable social situation shared by all women exists. Recognition of difference has led to such alliances (Burns, 2006, p.1-2)

Given the realization that different identity struggles are not self-contained but inter-connected, social movements needed a reorientation. Fraser thinks this is a must for feminist movement. She says:

> Only if feminists were willing to abandon an exclusive focus on gender difference could we cease interpreting other difference claims as threats to the unity of women. Only if we were willing to grapple with axes of subordination other than gender could we theorize our relation to the other political struggles surrounding us (Burns, 1997, p.180).

Fraser argues that at least in the case of US, the realization of multiple intersecting identities and subsequent reorientation meant a decisive shift in the ways activism was carried out. What looked like turning inward (let us focus on differences between women) eventually meant turning outward (we should focus not on gender alone but other intersectional identity claims). Hence came feminist theorization of race, ethnicity, nationalism, sexuality etc.

According to Fraser (1997, p.181), "radical democracy" today is being proposed as a rubric for mediating various struggles over "multiple intersecting identities" hence for linking various social movements (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Fraser, in line with Laclau and Mouffe uses radical democracy claims and multicultural democracy claims in an interchangeable manner. For her, both terms reject hegemonic understandings of democracy and the determination of cultural value on the basis of this hegemonic reading. They both became the rallying cry for a potential alliance of social movements. The goal of each is to promote multicultural public forms which recognize a plurality of different, equally valuable ways of being human (Fraser, 1997, p.184).

There are different theorizations about how multiculturalism should be envisioned. Multiculturalism is usually depicted as a political principle that is based on envisioning a citizenship that is not abstracted from its cultural, ethnic and subnational components. It requires a willingness to recognize the cultural difference among citizens and the unique identity of the individual (Soutphommasane, 2005, p.403).

However, the usual pre-occupation of multicultural democracy theorists had been mostly on how to envision minority and group differentiated rights. Radical versions of this model (Fraser, 1997; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) deal more with a differentiated citizenship model that reserves special rights for oppressed minority groups through measures such as affirmative action. Liberal versions of multiculturalism, on the other hand, try to mediate the relationship between the individual, identity groups and the state through a less rigid framework in the sense of leaving individuals the freedom to choose a meaningful life across the full range of human activities including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life (Kymlicka, 1995:76). The liberal position calls for the protection of societal cultures in order to secure the 'intelligible context of choice' for individuals (Kymlicka 1995: 150).

While these models focus more on how a political system should handle the existence of different identity groups and how minority and group differentiated rights should be formulated, there are other theoretical contributions to multiculturalism that

try to frame the universal rights and obligations of citizenhip. Soutphommasane (2005) promotes a civic pluralist model of multiculturalism in which cultural difference is expressed within the limits of a common civic culture. He argues that:

> A civic pluralist model of multicultural citizenship must meet two tests; it must not only recognize cultural difference in the public sphere but must also provide a new basis for political belonging. This requires an 'open' political culture or 'deliberative democracy', in which political institutions and practices are exposed to scrutiny and re-interpretation, and a sense of belonging based less upon shared political values and more upon common membership of public debate within a political community (Soutphommasane,2005, p.401).

In his formulation, multicultural citizenship is not possible if political institutions uphold a dominant public culture that puts diverse cultural groups under pressure to conform. In a sense, multicultural citizenship is based on a common civic culture that is based less on an allegiance to shared political values and more on the character (inclusiveness, non-domination etc.) of the public debate in a given polity (2005, p.413). He goes on to argue that:

> Multicultural citizenship offers a new basis of political belonging based on citizens' shared experience in negotiating difference. What all this seems to require is a form of deliberative democracy. Multicultural citizenship calls upon citizens to deliberate upon questions of difference and such deliberation, in turn, needs to find expression in the institutions of government and the associations of civil society (Soutphommasane, 2005, p.413).

This is the basic reason why analyses of coalitions are especially important for questioning the assumptions of multicultural democracy theorists. We have to see whether the proposition that various social movements can and should work through multiple intersecting identities actually works on the ground. Whether coalitions actually provide a corrective to the splintering effects of identity politics and whether they have the necessary theoretical and practical richness to come up with a new synthesis across social movements is yet to be seen. Multicultural democracy theorists make a huge emphasis on promoting multicultural public forms, as depicted in the civic pluralist model of Soutphommasane, but it remains yet to be seen whether and how such public spheres do actually function.

Young thinks the most important question we have to answer on coalitions is whether we have to transcend difference in order to forge a successful coalition. She thinks attempting unity under a simple banner is misleading.

For her, the only way to forge a successful coalition is to do this in the scope of a politics of difference. The preconditions for workable political coalitions require drawing on different experiences of oppressed groups such as single mothers, illegal immigrants, the unemployed, indigenous people, gays and lesbians etc (Young, 2006). However bringing them under a simple banner is not the solution here. Young (2006) thinks an inclusive movement cannot emerge from the common good but rather from a careful attention by each vulnerable social segment to the vulnerabilities of the others (p.12).

Young (2006), in an attempt to respond to both leftist and conservative critics of identity politics who claim that the various civic movements since 1960s have only contributed to a hardening of boundaries between groups, argues that a careful reading of these movements would reveal an initial hardening of boundaries, followed by a reflexive questioning of those boundaries and then increasing interaction, fusion and exchange (p.12). Gender, race, ethnic and sexual preference movements arose in the late 1960s in the USA as people in the larger Leftist movement reflected on their specific experience of oppression. According to Young, the hardening of boundaries took place because of the more-oppressed-than-thou competition (Young, 2006, p.13). They needed separate organizational spaces to build their narratives, develop solidarity with one another. This was a time when movements were essentialist and exclusionary. According to Young, in the current period, such movements draw less rigid boundaries around themselves.

Young argues the way to counteract divisive bickering is not as Leftist critics of identity politics claim "to transcend their differences of culture and social position and unite under the banner of people before profits". To the contrary, the way to fight the assault of neo-liberalism requires a coalition that draws on particular experiences of each and every group making up the coalition so that we can construct an enlarged understanding of the depth of society's injustices and ways to address them (Young, 2006, p.17).

As an example, she talks about the common depiction of poor people as lazy, irresponsible, black, single mothers, whereas the real circumstances of poverty are always variable. Latino and Asian movements and groups can explain one face of

poverty, feminist analyses shows another, a rural perspective another, African-American or racist exclusion another, reservation Native American Indians another, older-working class white men in the former industrial heartland yet another. If each of these constituencies does not communicate its specific situations to the others, then the ruling powers can continue to co-opt one by using another as scapegoat (Young, 2006, p.18).

In a discussion of Young's work, Fraser (1995) argues that we need to differentiate between differences that we wish to abolish because they are the result of oppression, differences which should be universalized because they are crucial and differences that should be enjoyed as expressions of diversity (p.158). Fraser (1995) calls her position post-socialism in an attempt to take into account contemporary concerns related to identity. Her view is that Young treats all differences as diversities that we should celebrate.[3] She believes that working against the gendered division of labor and working against women's cultural oppression would be in conflict with each other because in one case, we are trying to abolish difference and in the other case we are celebrating it. Distinguishing between different differences appears like a necessary refinement of the politics of difference. Fraser thinks we do not have to celebrate all qualities associated with oppressed groups but that we ought to recognize that different social groups have a unique contribution to make to public life (Fraser, 1995, p. 159).

This differentiation process also reveals important clues as to the nature of alliance building within new social movements. Groups can work more easily on the basis of differences that should be abolished or differences that should be universalized than working on the differences that should be enjoyed as expressions of diversity. This may be because the urgency of remedying discrimination (differences that should be abolished) and/or securing entitlements (differences that should be universalized) almost always outweigh the value of diversity in and of itself. While analyzing the platforms and alliances theoretically and also practically on my case study, one should always bear in mind these nuances. This will later help readers understand why this coalition has been able to successfully wage a politics that is based on working against discrimination of different women (i.e. opposing the ban on headscarf in universities

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[3] Fraser (1992) also argues that women do not necessarily constitute a group in the sense of shared affinity. Young (1996) addresses this problem by arguing that we can think of women as a group without thinking of women as a homogeneous group since groups are partially formed by how they are seen by others or by a set of structural constraints.

and public institutions) but why it could not show the same level of commitment or success in defending the rights of different women to promote different life-styles (i.e. the right of lesbian women to wage gay politics).

This can be attributed to the fact Diani and Bison (2004) explained about coalitional processes. Unlike social movements which are based on a shared sense of collective identity, coalitions rely on an amalgamation of groups that strive for a common objective that is unifying enough despite differences in allegiances and identities. This common goal usually takes the shape of a difference that needs to be abolished so that the different groups making part of this coalition can benefit from a universal scheme. The importance of differences that needs to be cherished may come secondary in such schemes.

If that is the case however, we fall short of realizing the claims of multicultural democracy theorists. Because, according to their account, the promise of multicultural democracy stems from the fact that different identities can strive for common ends all the while respecting and cherishing the particularity and uniqueness of the cultural value of constituent groups of a society. A multicultural ideal can never be solely strategic in that sense. This discussion reveals that there are important drawbacks in relying too much on strategic adversaries but not relying enough on internal differences. Having strategic adversaries usually indicates that there is a common grievance that needs to be remedied, which corresponds to "differences that need to be abolished" according to Fraser's classification. Although such a goal can garner support from individuals with different backgrounds and identities, not having enough emphasis on differences that need to be cherished may cause the eventual disintegration of a coalition. This is because constituent elements of a coalition would want the elimination of a common grievance not solely to achieve a leveling of status with other groups but also and maybe more importantly to achieve a revaluation of their own identity. Remedies would signify that the group in question is valued in and of itself and that is why impediments in front of its self-realization should be removed. If this element is missing in coalitions, they tend to degenerate into pragmatic and short-sighted alliances that disregard the value of their constituent elements.

This is the basic reason why analyses of coalitions have become especially important. If coalitions can craft common targets all the while being respectful to their constituent elements they would be longer lasting. One way in which diversity within a coalition can be more easily embraced is through discovering multiple intersecting

identities that is, the intersectional identities inherent in the backgrounds of constituent elements of the coalition. If coalition members come to admit that they do not exist as discrete identities but as a combination of different identities they may start to see the links in their own identity concerns and that of others.

We have to see whether the proposition that various social movements can and should work through multiple intersecting identities actually works on the ground. Whether coalitions actually provide a corrective to the splintering effects of identity politics and whether they have the necessary theoretical and practical richness to come up with a new synthesis across social movements is yet to be seen. Both radical democracy and multicultural democracy theorists make a huge emphasis on promoting multicultural public forms but it remains yet to be seen whether and how such public spheres do actually function.

2.1.3. Coalitions as Sites for Changing Social Orientations of Actors

Civil society literature has for a long time been mainly pre-occupied with the relations between discrete social movements and the state. The antagonisms between state and interest groups grabbed the attention of civil society theorists and issues with respect to the autonomy of civil society groups from state regulation were thought to be a more important measure of quality and vibrancy of civil society. Later studies, showed (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Fiorina, 1999; Kopecky, 2003; Bieber, 2003; Muddle, 2003; Casquete, 2005; Foley and Edwards, 1996) the quality of civil society depended more on the social orientations of the actors making up its space. Social orientations refer to the quality of the interactions and engagements of groups with each other. How social actors come to trust one another, how they develop attitudes about other groups in society and how they relate to one another are all part of this concept. To be more explicit, positive attitudes such as trust, tolerance, altruism or negative attitudes such as hatred, xenophobia are all types of social orientations groups may exhibit in their relations with one another.

Social orientations of actors may change a great deal according to their degree of interaction with individuals and groups different than one's own. Network theorists

pioneer in studies showing how inter-personal trust changes as people move in and out of particular networks but their studies also seem insufficient to account for how the mental switch takes place in altering the social orientations of actors vis-à-vis other groups. A focus on processes, especially narrative processes, seems crucial to account for these modifications.

A focus on narrative processes and deliberation necessitates discerning which groups' voice is heard or listened to more than others. In any given society, more hegemonic groups have the means and the ideological tools to make their own propaganda more efficiently. In the absence of countervailing rhetoric it is very easy for them to set the tone and the rules of the debate. This means any attempt to change the social orientations of groups in a way that will have a positive impact on marginal groups should first of all attempt to make public deliberation as inclusive as possible. Interactions between different minded groups are crucial to alter pre-conceptions and prejudices in inter-group deliberations.

That is why a study of coalitions could potentially reveal the ways in which social actor's evaluations of one's position in social hierarchy and one's assumptions about the distribution of privilege can change significantly as actors interact with each other in ongoing negotiations. It helps us achieve a more fine grained perspective into the mechanisms through which actors may modify their conceptions and/or eliminate their misconceptions about other groups. Coalitions provide the researchers on civil society a rich laboratory to test their assumptions on how social orientations of actors may be altered. A focus on the processes of deliberation is necessary to uncover this modification however. In other words, an obsession with end results cannot show how actors change their attitudes about the self and other groups. It is the interactional deliberative processes that have a potential to have an effect on attitudes which may require a longer time span to analyze. The dialogical nature of interaction and the particular narratives that resonate or not resonate with different members of a coalition reveal points of consensus and antagonism.

For this reason, an important task in front of any research focused on how coalitions can alter social orientations of actors would be to unearth the dynamic process of deliberation. The type of actors taking part in the deliberation, their distance to more mainstream or marginal voices within the wider public sphere, the level of reflexivity that is achieved within conversations would be revealing as to the potentials of coalitions in decreasing tensions and polarizations that may be prevalent within the

larger public. The study of modes of deliberation and framing literature will help us make sense of this aspect of coalition building. The ability of coalitions to influence and modify social orientations of actors will be assessed through an analysis of ongoing discussions and deliberative processes.

In discussing the goals of multicultural democracy, I have argued that the goal of each is to promote multicultural public forms which recognize a plurality of different, equally valuable ways of being human (Fraser, 1997, p.184). However what needs to be secured to turn this goal into reality is to prevent the formation of hegemonic public forms which may prevent more marginal public forms to speak for themselves.

To clarify what I mean by the problem of hegemonic public forms, I have to get into the literature on public sphere and deliberation. This literature will clarify the ways in which more marginal identity struggles can be excluded from airing their concerns in the public sphere and what kind of remedies are suggested to create spaces of discussion for such groups.

The concept of public sphere was first articulated by Habermas in his "Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere". The concept refers to the spaces in which citizens can air their concerns about public (and private) affairs, deliberate on various solutions to problem areas; hence it is an institutionalized area of discursive interaction. This arena is conceptually distinct from the state and can in principle be critical of the state. It also provides a distinction from official economy which is not a space of deliberation of ideas but trading of goods. Hence, it helps us separate democratic associations from both state apparatus and economic markets (Fraser, 1997, p.70).

Of course, since it's' first articulation, the concept while reclaiming fame and wide usage, also received various criticisms and correctives for very important reasons. Historians and political theorists rightfully pointed out that Habermas' public sphere as it is articulated for the case of Europe after the decline of absolutism refers to one form of public sphere: that of the bourgeoisie. Habermas' was also aware of this problem but he did not give a convincing answer as to how to counteract the exclusionary tendencies inherent in his usage of the term. The concept was referring to the emergence of spaces of public discussion that was clearly associated with the rise of a single class and was not addressing how the subsequent rise of the working class or women's movement or student movement could be accommodated. All in all, Habermas stopped short of articulating a post-bourgeoisie model of public sphere and never adequately problematized the assumptions of his liberal model.

The revisionist historiography made it clear the bourgeoisie public sphere had more trapping than Habermas accounted for. It functioned to legitimate a particular class interests to the expense of other emergent but marginal classes. That said other political theorists were quick to fill the vacuum with their alternative conceptualizations that would make the concept more inclusive and less lop-sided due to its liberal assumptions.

I do not want to engage in an extensive discussion on public sphere but rather to point out how it relates to the deliberations in coalitions of the sort of I am analyzing. For this reason, I will just focus on the assumptions of the liberal public sphere concept that are problematic from the perspective of radical democracy coalitions and how the concept was modified to accommodate these new forms of articulation.

I will refer to Fraser (1997, p.76) on which aspects are problematic from the perspective of such coalitions. Fraser thinks there are four important reasons why public sphere is a deficient and non-inclusive term of which three are very relevant for my research .These are:

i. The assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket status differentials and to deliberate "as if" they were social equals, the assumption that social equality is not a necessary condition for political democracy.

ii. The assumption that the proliferation of a multiplicity of competing publics is necessarily a step away from, rather than toward, greater democracy, and that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always preferable to a nexus of multiple publics.

iii. The assumption that discourse in public spheres should be restricted to deliberation about common good, and that the appearance of "private interests" and "private issues" is always undesirable.

The first of these assumptions have been challenged on many occasions. Both empirical and theoretical studies point out to the ways in which informal impediments to participatory parity function to the detriment of less equal members of a polity. For example, many BSÇ participants admitted feeling alienated in NGOs or forums where men and women mingled. They felt excluded by a language they called "masculine language". So, the appropriate remedy in public sphere is not to act as if we are all social equals but on the contrary, to un-bracket those inequalities and make them explicit.

But how does one make such social inequalities in the public sphere explicit if that public sphere functions to the advantage of dominant groups. Those voices which try to make the inequalities explicit will be suppressed. These effects will be exacerbated when there is a single dominant public sphere which is the essence of assumption 2. Members of more subordinated groups do need alternative spaces where they can articulate their concerns without fear that they will be silenced and absorbed into a false sense of collectivity (Fraser, 1997, p.81). Assumption 3 is also tied to the understanding of public sphere as a single entity since only this form of public space can generate common good as opposed to multiple publics that produce their own particular and opposing private interests.

As opposed to this model, many theorists believe in the merits of multiple publics that can deliberate and promote their version of good life and that can articulate them without interference of a mainstream dominant group perspective. History shows that members of subordinated social groups, even during the times about which Habermas thought a single bourgeoisie public sphere was in operation, have constituted alternative publics.

These alternative publics helped dominated groups secure a breathing space where they can stay united with like-minded individuals. Hence they secured the conditions of non-domination. This is what Nancy Fraser (1992) called sub-altern or counter-public spaces and what Mansbridge (1996) referred to as enclaves of resistance. The virtue of such places is that they help groups develop their arguments in a sheltered fashion before they enter the public stage of contestation. Secondly, such spaces promote political activism in a more rigorous way.

Both Mansbridge's (1996) "enclave politics" and Nancy Fraser's (1992) "sub-altern publics" involve an appreciation of the decentered public sphere and pluralistic civil society model that comes into being in such multi-issue platforms. Mansbridge (1996) argues:

> For groups and social movements seeking to express diversity, the goals of such counter-publics would include understanding themselves better, forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the memories of past injustices, interpreting and re-interpreting the meaning of injustice, working out alternative conceptions of self, of community, of justice and universality…deciding what alliances to make both emotionally and

strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and deciding how to act, individually and collectively (p.58).

The major drawback of enclave model of democratic deliberations is that members of enclave groups may only speak to one another. They may not know how to put what they want to say in words that others may understand or may want to hear (Mansbridge, 1996, p.58). In Mansbridge's (1996) words:

> The enclaves, which produce insights that less protected spaces would have prevented, also protect those insights from reasonable criticism. Yet, most people, and particularly those disadvantaged in the larger society, need some such protection in order to think more critically and carefully. We also need this protection to help us develop confidence in our ideas, marshal our forces and feel supported by others (p.58).

The dilemma here is that while we need spaces where subordinated groups can articulate their opinions we also have to assure that those articulations do not degenerate into extreme viewpoints that can only be binding and reasonable for the groups in that particular enclave. What guarantees that such groups do not only articulate their very peculiar opinions but also that those opinions can enter into circulation of ideas. Here, we have to get into the specifics of deliberative processes in more detail.

Contrary to idealization of deliberation by political theorists (Elster, 1998; Gutmann et al, 1996; Habermas, 1996) who believe deliberation helps individuals refine their own opinions, develop greater tolerance for different opinions and identify common ends and means, the success and sophistication of deliberation is greatly conditional on the network structure of the discussing group/groups (Lawrence, Sides and Farrell 2010, p.141).

Even in the presence of a common objective, certain alliances are more likely to have a deliberative advantage over others. The setting of the deliberative space, the heterogeneity of the groups taking part in discussions, all have an effect on the likelihood of finding common arguments within coalitions.

Problems of domination, argumentative paralysis, polarization within groups with diverse backgrounds could all arise. Which type of environment is more conducive to consensus building and which type of spaces fall prey to argumentative paralysis is important to distinguish if we want to see which alliances are more likely to succeed.

For giving a more theoretically succinct description of how such deliberation differs in different settings, I make use of the model developed by Klemp that explains the level of contestation and consensus building in different types of information spaces. The term Klemp (2009) uses to describe groups that only talk with themselves is "one-sided informational spaces". These are contexts that allow a single political, religious or ethical perspective to prevail. For him, there are two major problems associated with one-sided informational spaces: one is the problem of one-sided persuasion; the other is the problem of rhetorical corruption. The first problem emerges due to the inability to hear the arguments of different perspectives, the second is related to unchecked dissemination of manipulative rhetoric due to lack of interaction with outside groups.

In environments where groups speak within themselves rather than with outside audiences, the effects of deliberation do not always produce the desired outcome. In experiments made about the likely effects of deliberation, Cass Sunstein (2000) found out that members of groups ended up with more extreme positions after they spoke with one another. This study showed that deliberation within like-minded groups has polarizing effects (Sunstein, 2000, p.20). Such polarization is due to the unchecked adherence to conclusions which have not been tested by different reasoning or arguments. Bad informational outcomes are pushed to extremes and ossify in such spaces.

The same applies to virtual space. In a research that tries to uncover the degree to which liberal and conservative bloggers are interacting with each other, it was discovered that of the 1400 blogs that were part of the study, 91 % of the links are to like-minded sites (Sunstein, 2006). The general conclusion is that blogosphere is divided into identifiable communities. Liberals and conservatives do not link to each other. They do not even discuss the same topics. While social media is considered a democratizing and liberal force, on the basis of above research, it would not be an exaggeration to say that many readers are obtaining one-sided information.

Sunstein (2006) thinks information cocoons and echo chambers are a real problem for democracy because the blogosphere is a fertile ground for amplification of errors, hidden profiles, cascade effects, and polarization (p.191). In a similar fashion, two important studies of prominent political blogs conclude that bloggers exhibit homophily, the tendency to associate with others who are similar to them (Lawrence et. al, 2010, p.142). These empirical findings also feed into the general fear that increased

communication does not always lead to increased interaction between people with differing viewpoints.

Habermas is equally pessimistic about internet communication arguing that "horizontal and informal networking of communication undermines the achievements of traditional publics in democratic regimes" and that "internet tends to fragment debate, giving rise to a huge number of isolated issue publics" (Sunstein, 2006, p.142).

For Klemp (2009), the only way one sided-information spaces can be moderated is through engaging in discussions in "**richly contestatory spaces**" where a diversity of views are exchanged under conditions of fair competition. For him, this is the only way to enhance democracy. This helps one sided information spaces to adjust their arguments after having considered the rationale of other groups in society. This may help the emergence of morally legitimate forms of strategic and even manipulative speech. The manipulative rhetoric of different groups in society is balanced by the transparency of open deliberations.

His model can be visualized in the following fashion (Klempt, 2009, p.33):

Figure 1: Models of deliberation according to Klempt

The first model called the insulated enclave model is about very closed groups that rarely enter into public deliberation. It enables them to form strong narratives of resistance and to engage in political action. Examples could be groups such as Al Qaida, Hezbollah, Klu Klux Klan, the mafia etc… whose members only speak between themselves. Yet such isolation creates various social ills such as intolerance and

polarization. Robert Putnam (2000) referred to enclave model as an extreme version of bonding social capital. These are inward looking networks that define social relations through in-group, out-group categories.

The second model which is the purely contestatory model takes place when groups lose their distinctiveness and the public debate intrudes into the internal arguments of groups. The virtue of such spaces is that the contestatory nature of relations discourages manipulative forms of speech endemic to one sided information spaces. It promotes bridging ties rather than bonding ties. Such members are more prone to reaching out and tolerating alternative life views. However, public contestation is so well entrenched into the workings of such groups that it diminishes the coherence of the group and blocks group specific arguments and formulations. It immobilizes members for political action due to conflicting networks and lacks a clear message or has a message that becomes hallowed out due to having to speak for multiple groups at the same time.

Klemp (2009) successfully shows the virtues and vices of one sided information spaces in his study. He does not believe in the unqualified democratic virtues of robust contestation for this reason. For him, in many cases contestation prevents one-sided persuasion and discourages manipulation. Yet, bringing contestation into the internal deliberations of groups and associations diminishes their ability to formulate counter-narratives and resist domination by mainstream discourse. It also discourages their political participation.

This shows there is the need for a third approach that balances the benefits of public deliberation with in-group interactions. In this model, the groups within society have a private space where they formulate their arguments but they also take part in the richly contestatory public spaces. This model promotes groups to engage with one another while also paying attention to the major points raised by significant rival groups.

For this reason, Klemp (2009) argues that the right question is "when should we encourage robust contestation and when should we discourage one-sided information spaces?" His answer is that there should be a mix of the following sort: In the public arena of deliberation there should be robust contestation, in the internal deliberations of groups there should be a mixture of in-group deliberation in one-sided information spaces and out-group deliberation in more public contestatory spaces (p. 32).

Sunstein's argument for checking the excesses of enclave deliberation arrives at a very similar conclusion. He (2000) argues that in a world where the voice of the marginalized is most of the times brutally suppressed, the enclaves may represent the only alternative for such groups. But he goes on arguing that "even in such a nation, enclave deliberation is unlikely to produce change unless the members of different enclaves are eventually brought into contact with others. In democratic societies, the best response is to ensure that any such enclaves are not walled off from competing views, and that at certain points, there is an exchange of views between enclave members and who disagree with them. It is total or near-total self-insulation, rather than group deliberation as such, that carries with it the most serious dangers, often in the highly unfortunate combination of extremism with marginality (Sunstein, 2000, p.113).

For this reason, it is of extreme importance to structure public debate in a way that will not wall off enclaves from hearing other points of view. This is actually the whole point of the term "public sphere", a domain in which multiple views can be hear by people with multiple perspectives.

The biggest argument of Sunstein (2000) is that deliberating groups tend to depolarize if they consist of equally opposed subgroups and if members have a degree of flexibility in their positions (p. 90). Depolarization also occurs when a group consists of individuals drawn from two extremes (Sunstein, 2000, p.93). Depolarization will occur in groups with equal subgroups having opposite tendencies provided that i) subgroup members do not have fixed positions ii) subgroup members do not think they are members of identifiable groups and do not also think their discussants are members of different identifiable groups (Sunstein, 2000, p.94).

Mansbridge (1996) also suggests spending time both in an oppositional enclave and also outside world to weigh the lessons of each venue against the other. This would help enclave members to garner outside support but also to test their own arguments with the criticisms of outside opposition. She argues there may even be a division of labor where some of the enclave members immerse themselves into the full spectrum of viewpoints in the outside world while others stay in their enclaves. She (1996) thinks the danger is when enclave members only want to live in their own conceptual world, "reinforcing each other in their mutual folly" (p.58).[4]

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[4] However, the implications of operating through multiple networks for political activism reveals a pitfall: Studies on networks show that people with diverse social networks, by virtue of being part of more crosscutting ties and by being exposed to

Fraser (1997) also thinks that we should not think of subaltern counter publics as spaces of withdrawal. She thinks such spaces do militate against separatism in the long run, because they have a publicist agenda. This is because, no matter how limited a counter-publics potential sphere of influence in the larger public sphere, members still understand themselves as part of a larger public at large that they will occasionally want to influence. While their enclave will function as spaces of withdrawal, from time to time they will use those enclaves as bases for agitational activities to shape public opinion (Fraser, 1997, p.82).

If we apply the theory of deliberation explained above to this platform, I will call the type of deliberation between these different groups of women as enclave deliberation. Women of this coalition, irrespective of the type of background they possess, were marginalized in their own circles by men and were made an outcast in their ideological backyards. An added and very important reason why they should be seen as enclaves is that, feminists by collaborating with veiled women and veiled women by engaging with feminists and/or lesbian women are running against the presumptions and expectations of their "presumed" ideological backyards. This also adds to their enclave character. The particular trajectories of members of the coalition and how they were alienated from their previous social circles will be explained in the chapter on Coalition History.

Unlike homogeneous enclaves where a single political view prevails, the deliberation in this platform represents deliberation between different types of enclaves.

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conflicting and oppositional views, are less likely to engage in political action compared to more isolated and homogeneous groups. (Diana Mutz, 2006: 111) This means the rigor with which a group propagates its views in the public arena is a direct result of being insulated from confusion that comes with contestation. Mutz argues that "political activists are likely to inhabit an informational environment full of like-minded others who spur them on to additional political activity."(2006:74) Academics base their arguments on the benefits of one sided information spaces on political activism on two foundations: One is the limited argument pools that are due having minimal contact with alternative views and having a strong confidence in their own belief systems (Sunstein, 2000) The second reason is reputational. When people are in multiple groups, an activism that conforms to the values of one group may be in conflict with those of another network, which paralyzes the individual. However, those in one sided public spaces rely on their reputation in one network, hence they have to show their fate in the movement by taking actions. In fact, not doing that could be considered a betrayal of the movement. (Mansbridge, 1986:181)

For this reason, I will call the activism of these women as "heterogeneous enclave deliberation".[5]

When I say enclave deliberation, I do not mean to imply that the participants to this platform aimed a total withdrawal from public deliberative arena for the sake of achieving a more cohesive narrative. It is true that they wanted to formulate their arguments in a sheltered fashion without the influence of dominant public sphere which they later wanted to put into circulation in the public sphere. The circumstances did not allow for a better public communications as the objective of achieving narrative coherence gained supremacy in the coalition. This is understandable, given the fact that different women within the coalition had reservations vis-à-vis each other and had a history of refraining from meaningful interaction for a very long time. However, this does not negate the fact that, this coalition has a clear "publicist" agenda a la Fraser, in that it aims to subvert the dominant forms of polarization and antagonism that exist in society which is seen as divisive and counter-productive for women's movement in Turkey by the participants of BSÇ. The degree to which they have been able to counter-act that dominant discourse is entirely another matter and the topic of discussion in the analysis chapter. At this point it is safe to say that, the heterogeneous enclave deliberation in this coalition has a publicist agenda.

The model developed by Klemp (2009) reveals the pitfalls and potentials this alliance has for creating bridges between alternative visions. If the groups deliberating with each other are completely engulfed by the public deliberative arena, then they risk losing touch with each other. If they engage in intense inner deliberations they may come up with plausible arguments that have inner consistency for the coalition but which may not resonate very well with the arguments in the public deliberative arena. If we are to use Klemp's terminology, I consider this alliance "a partially contestatory model" in general. This deliberation takes place in a rather secluded manner. However, the alliance is also eager to enter into public discussions; it makes certain declarations, attracts criticism and responds. In that sense, it is engaging in an interactive process with other opinion makers and groups in the public space.

I have started this section arguing that the dominance of hegemonic public forms may prevent marginal voices to be heard which is the only way to modify groups' social orientations. For deliberations to have an impact on social orientations, diverse

marginal groups should be able to enter discussions with other groups without fear of interference or suppression. Only in this way, can we come to observe changes in attitudes and perceptions about other groups. This platform will provide us with a means to assess how this change in social orientations takes place.

2.1.4. How to Make Sense of Deliberative Processes in Coalitions: Framing

So far, I have talked about the value of inclusive deliberation. Deliberation can change social orientations of actors by way of bringing enclaves' viewpoints to the attention of more mainstream groups or by way of trimming the extremist viewpoints of enclaves by putting them into discussion with other enclaves/groups in society. However, I have not dwelled on how to approach and analyze this deliberation. In order to claim that deliberation produces more inclusive outcomes or that enclaves can modify dominant views in the public sphere, one should have concrete evidence. Framing literature will help me fill this gap.

Frames are constructed meaning schemas of social movement actors. Framing is an active, ongoing process that does not inevitably flow from the aims or values of the actors. Collective action frames are the work of evolving processes and they involve negotiation. It is the work of agency rather than ideologies or value systems and it evolves out of contentions (Benford and Snow, 2000). As has been stated by Gamson "a crucial feature that distinguishes collective action frames from schema and other related cognitive constructs is that "[c]ollective action frames are not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning" (Gamson, 1992, p.111).

Framing is not a direct reflection of either culture or ideology. Changes in the symbolism of a movement are neither derived from culture nor directly the product of ideology, but are the result of its strategic interactions in various settings (Tarrow, 1998, p.109). In this sense, it is a learning experience for activists who do the framing.

Since frames are not the direct result of culture or ideology, they have a rhetorical quality (Kuypers, 1997, 2009). They arise according to the issues raised in the public sphere. Understanding frames in this fashion is very close to the "rhetorical public

sphere", a term advanced by Hauser (1999). Hauser, unlike most of the claims of new social movement studies, proposes that public spheres are formed around the dialogue surrounding issues, rather than the identity of the population that is engaging in that discussion. He, in that sense, is emphasizing the rhetorical nature of the public sphere. Hauser considers that publics are formed by active members of society around issues. He says (1999):

> Publics may be repressed, distorted, or responsible, but any evaluation of their actual state requires that we inspect the rhetorical environment as well as the rhetorical act out of which they evolved, for these are the conditions that constitute their individual character (p.81).

People form rhetorical public spheres that are based in discourse, not necessarily orderly discourse but any interactions whereby the interested public engages each other. This interaction can take the form of institutional actors as well as the basic "street rhetoric" that "opens a dialogue between competing factions" (Hauser, 1999, p.81). The spheres themselves form around the issues that are being deliberated. The discussion reproduces itself across the spectrum of interested publics "even though they lack personal acquaintance with all but a few of its participants and are seldom in contexts where they directly interact, they join these exchanges because they are discussing the same matters. In order to communicate within the public sphere, those who enter any given arena must share a reference world for their discourse to produce awareness for shared interests and public opinions about them. This world consists of common meanings and cultural norms from which interaction can take place (Hauser, 1999, p.69).

So, unlike network theory that makes a special reference to how well or diffusely connected individuals are, Hauser's theory bases participation on issues that matter to the public, no matter how disconnected they are from each other. The ability to discuss together rests more on how well an argument resonates well with other discussants than with sharing the same social class, identity or network.

Hauser's extension to the theory is very liberating in the sense that it helps us understand the freedom with which different publics enter and exit discussions in the public sphere without having to be part of a solid or diffuse network. This is more convincing given the fact that most women's organizations usually do not have the resources or the connections more conventional and mainstream civic actors have in the

public sphere. In this sense, his theory speaks to such sites of participation in a convincing manner. There is an added reason why Hauser's theory fits this study in that most of the analyses with respect to the coalition I am analyzing pertain to the online community blog, another deliberative arena where members do not know each other well and have the liberty to enter or exit discussions at their wish. This is something they would not have been able to do if the coalition was based primarily on face-to-face interaction. The pros and cons of online communication will be deliberated in more detail in the methodology section. At this point it should suffice to say that the minimal barriers to entry to online world makes communication based on this medium more open to participation. However, it may be hard to claim identity differences would not be an issue just because participants do not know each other. The initial thrust of this communication is, as Hauser argued, finding shared interests, common meanings on which interaction is based. In that sense, these discursive interactions in online communities have a deliberative quality of their own that is beyond having a common identity. However, in time identity differences do become an issue as will be explained in the analysis chapters.

Hauser's theory also makes an emphasis on the importance of crafting a common reference while entering public discourse. If actors can agree on the underlying assumptions, they do not have to have very tight networks or feel the same identifications, according to his theory. This resembles what frames achieve in inter-movement collaborations. In order to resonate with potential members, frames have to be modified in a fashion that will speak to the majority of new comers.

A significant emphasis in framing analysis has been on how movements frame their public action. The ways in which movements engage with their adversaries and the language used while doing that has attracted the biggest attention. As Steinberg (2002) argues "challengers often create oppositional discourses by borrowing from the discourses of those they oppose: in protracted conflicts, both dominant and challenging discourses can mix together having unanticipated and contradictory results (p. 208).

However, there is an important deficiency in limiting the study of frame analysis just to this relationship between the movement/coalition and the establishment being challenged (Cathcart, 1972, p.87). This focus on what is happening in front of the public prevents us from exploring what is happening in the kitchen of civic activism, while the coalition is being forged or frames are being aligned.

Stewart (1991, p.68) noted this deficiency when he stated that we know a great deal about the rhetoric of the streets when movements are at the heights of their power and visibility and are publicly challenging and confronting established institutions'' and went on to argue that this emphasis meant getting only a partial picture of social movement activity as looking at "internal rhetoric" in addition to public rhetoric proves vital in understanding the inner workings of a movement (Stewart quoted in Chaves, 2011, p.2).

This lack of attention on the internal workings of a movement has some identifiable reasons. Despite a recent surge in interest in coalitions, much of social movement scholarship has focused on specific kinds of public action which can be defined as single-issue movements (Chaves, 2011). These analyses were usually interested in what these single issue movements brought to public attention and which types of their campaigns have become successful. Turning inward to see the inner workings of a single movement proved less useful, for a scholarship that was interested in the functions of frames for outside audiences.

Except for the works of a few scholars (Bennett, 2006; Jackson and Miller, 2009; Chaves, 2011) the function of framing in generating coalitions has not been thoroughly studied. This could be understandable since much coalition building happens behind the scenes. This is especially true if we consider the fact that the enclaves which are protected spaces for marginalized publics are spaces of withdrawal so that they can develop their arguments without the influence of dominant discourses in society. This makes them less amenable to rigorous analysis. While the withdrawal of such groups makes them less amenable to research, it is precisely those factors that cause them to withdraw from mainstream public sphere that triggers their coalition building and reach out activities towards other marginalized groups. For this reason, what is happening behind the scenes gains importance as these bridging activities constitute the essence of the survival mechanisms of enclaves. Chaves (2011) argues that:

> For activists who engage in coalition building on behalf of multiple or broad social justice and human rights causes, rhetoric functions in two primary ways within enclaves. First, activists interpret external rhetorical messages that are created about them, the constituencies they represent, or both. In the case of coalition-building, these meaning-making processes serve as the rationale to build bridges with allies. Second, activists use enclaves as the sites to invent rhetorical strategies to publicly challenge

oppressive rhetoric or to create new imaginaries for the groups and issues
they represent and desire to bring into coalition (p.3).

This desire to invent a new imaginary for the groups and issues the coalition aims
to represent is the focal point of my research as well. The rhetorical strategies employed
to speak in the name of all the diverse actors in the coalition, to speak about their
common and at times different concerns and the ways in which different identity
concerns and grievances are balanced within the coalition are important aspects of this
coalition building.

Whereas framing analysis in the traditional sense has shown how narratives in
movements creates and sustains a single identity, the study of coalitions pushes past a
preoccupation with either singular issues or identities toward what Carillo (2008, p.10),
labeled ''coalitional subjectivity''. The adoption of a coalitional subjectivity moves
away from seeing one's self in singular terms or from seeing politics in terms of single
issues toward a complicated intersectional political approach that refuses to view
politics and identity as anything other than always and already coalitional (Chavez,
2011, p.3).

If framing analysis is done with the purpose of uncovering alliance building and
the emergence of coalitional subjectivities, how are we to approach frames? What
would a more fine grained framing analyses attempt at doing? Rather than analyzing
frames as divided between discrete spheres of culture or ideology, we should be able to
observe the dialogical nature of frame construction.

Dialogical approach to frames is quite different from how frames have been
handled in the literature so far. Frames, in their more mainstream analyses, have been
depicted as internally cohesive packages of meaning readily passed from one actor to
another. As frames are already well developed, the task for such analyses is to be able to
sell it to adherents and sympathizers through alignment processes which are not real
distortions in original frames but minor adjustments. (i.e. an environmentalist frame can
easily make use of a leftist slogan without much distortion in its political message, in an
effort to increase its support base among the leftists). Such analyses also assume that
when actors use the same words, they mean the same things or they have the same
assumptions in mind while using those words. This is also a very simplistic assumption.

By ignoring the multivocality of social movement discourse, the ways in which
words and phrases can be interpreted in different ways by different people, framing

studies often overlook the often dialectic and two-sided nature of culture (Steinberg, 2002, p.210). Coming from different traditions and factions in the larger social movement spectrum, activists who do not necessarily share similar identities and world views would surely need a more open hearted and interactive attempt at narrative construction. This dissertation wants to fill this lacuna in framing literature by way of showing how the dialogical nature of framing processes in coalitions differs from accounts of frames as reflecting a particular position or world view of a single movement.

How does our conceptualization of frames change if we think of discursive practices as involving relationality? If meaning arises between people in conversation, then a frame will have a double directionality, one involving both shared conceptualizations and tensions. Bakhtin (1986) is the father of dialogic theory. He argued that discursive practices paralleled the patterned nature of social life, which he called speech genres. Later conceptualization of speech genres by Burkitt (1988) draws attention to the "given sets of statements involving positions, world-views, ideologies and linguistic styles which usually find their expression in certain practices in the everyday world (p.164).

What theorists call dialogic is in essence how well or under which conditions such speech genres can become congruent with each other. If a repertoire development is dialogic it relies on "the mutual appreciation of the applicability and interpretability of a genre for a conflict as well as a shared recognition of the actors capacity to use these genres" (Steinberg, 2002, p.212).

Repertoire development depends on which genres can be combined to provide mutually interpretable meanings and how this combination can be accomplished in a given field. For example in some cases, genres of religious sanctification might have mutual interpretability with genres of citizenship rights, but not in others (Steinberg, 2002, p.212).

According to Steinberg (2002), dialogism offers a more fully relational and contingent analysis of cultural practices than framing studies. Rather than looking for distinct frames or ideologies that challengers pit against dominant frames, dialogic analysis argues that much contention occurs within a discursive field heavily structured by the dominant genres. New genres can emerge through resistance but as a result of a process of ferment with dominant ones (p.213).

This thesis is based on the assumption that frames and dialogical analyses are not necessarily mutually exclusive and frames can be analyzed via a dialogical analysis. The important thing to keep in mind is which actors are involved in the negotiation, what kind of world views they represent, how the narratives are modified in ongoing discussions and what the exit points in the debate are.

Heterogeneous groups pose interesting challenges to framing literature. By having multiple groups in its rankings each with a competing view on social reality, such groups provide us with a rich laboratory to test our assumptions about how common reference points are created in the absence of a single identity or world view. Heterogeneous groups, by virtue of this diversity, produce important alternatives and extensions to narratives that a single social movement can produce. By way of airing competing claims to social justice, recognition or civility, such encounters produce more fine-grained and sophisticated accounts as to how these concepts can be formulated and put into circulation.

Heterogeneous groups have the potential to bring an important extension to framing literature as well. Framing analyses has largely focused on instrumental aspects of social movement narratives. For a long while the question of "which frames mobilize more adherents and maximize the influence of movements?" has received greater attention. Steinberg (2002) argues that most social movement analysts have focused on framing as multi-level strategic persuasive communication by which activists or social critics make an issue ideationally and empirically salient to potential supporters and bystanders (p.209). This thesis is based on an understanding of framing analysis that does not necessarily see frames as strategic constructs but rather as tools for the construction of a coalitional self that is congruent with the many multivalent identities within that coalition. Accomplishing this task necessitates adopting a dialogical model. This is because frames that are crafted within a heterogeneous setting should be the product of a dialogue that pays attention to the different needs of its constituent members.

The case study of this thesis poses unique opportunities and challenges for initiating a framing analysis based on a dialogic model. While it points towards more fluid forms of narrative construction as will be exemplified in the numerous attempts of participants to leave their own stamp, hence their own world view on frames, it will also show how frames have a flexible form of existence as the participants to the debate are not hegemonic groups who can determine the course of the debate.

The importance of framing literature for this thesis stems from the fact that through ongoing discussions between different enclave members, we will be able to observe how heterogeneous enclaves can formulate more sophisticated arguments with respect to civility, identity construction, reciprocity and gender.

So far, frames were always defined as fluid arrangements that are not the direct result of ideologies. However, the applications proved otherwise in that frames seemed like the manifestation of a particular world-view, identity or ideology. This thesis will attempt to show how frames evolve out of contentions and the shape they take in ongoing discussions. This study is one of the few attempts at showing how frames change shape after ongoing discussions. It is novel in showing the flow of argumentation and different exit points and the different potentials each exit point offers to civic actors. Hence, the end result is rich in implications and accommodates a diversity of potentials for collective activism.

2.2. Case Study Background: Women's Movement in Turkey

2.2.1. Diversity Within Women's Movement in Turkey

In order to understand the factors that made the emergence of this coalition possible, we have to know more about the particular trajectories of separate women's struggles in Turkey. This first part of the literature review will provide the reader with information as to the major transformations that separate wings of the women's movement went through in Turkey. It ends with a discussion of factors that made the current rapprochement possible.

2.2.2. Emergence of Veiled Women to the Stage of Civic Activism in Turkey

The treatment of Islamist movements within the social movement literature has initially been skewed to the political opportunities model. This was because Islamist movements were for a long time depicted as a political strategy to capture the state. Such interpretations always involved an element of seeing the success of Islamist movements as a result of bad economic and political circumstances (Çayır, 2000, p.42). The cases of Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt always conform to this standard explanation. The failure of the political system, economic hardships and instability in those countries are the prime reasons for the wide-spread popularity of such movements. Such interpretations almost always take women actors as secondary to the movement, as appendages that carry out the duties of their movement.

Unlike models that emphasize state failure and state capture developed mostly for the Middle East, Göle (2000, p.29-30) considers Islamist movements on a par with the NSMs that came about as a critique of the Enlightenment Modernity in the West, such as feminist, environmentalist and ethnic movements. Islamist movement just as any of these movements proposes an alternative to the universalist and exclusive definition of modernity. Just as feminism questions the category of the universalist and egalitarian human being and brings forward womanhood as a viable alternative, Islamists also criticize the Western civilization's universalist claims for being exclusionary towards other identities. Feminists think the universalist human being symbolizes nothing other than "men", while Islamists think the universal human being is supposed to be mute with respect to showing signs of religiosity in the public sphere, which they consider highly restrictive. This is a non-apologetic position vis-a-vis modernity. This also means a re-appreciation of cultural practices of Muslims, such as marriage, family and dressing. Additionally, this non-apologetic position also meant bringing concepts such as belief, male-female relationships, privacy (mahrem) from the private sphere to discussions in the public sphere.

This study also considers Islamist movements in Turkey can be understood from the prism of NSM school. An additional reason for evaluating the Islamist movement from an NSM perspective is that unlike the rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East that give a partial answer to state failure, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the movement in Turkey is more occupied with expressing and representing religious lifestyles in the public space.

Arat (2001, p.33) argues that in the contemporary Turkey, just as the Islamist movement has never been one monolithic bloc but represented great diversity, the women within the Islamist circles cannot also be reduced down to one category based on institutional allegiance (political party vs. NGOs), their attitude towards gender equality (those who feel closer to feminism and those who do not), their loyalty to a traditional reading of Islam especially with regards to women's role in society and their relation with men (orthodox vs. reformist) and the diversity of their interests (single issue groups vs. multi-issue groups). In fact, one could find individuals that would fit the options in one or more of the dichotomies mentioned. For this reason, it would extremely reductionist to reduce women in this category single-handedly to headscarf issue or to the quest for an Islamist state.

There is a conceptual difficulty related to how to name such women. There are different terms with very different meanings and implications. Religious women, veiled women, Muslim women and Islamist women are some of the terms that both the interlocutors and the women themselves use to describe this group. The problem related to the use of such terms is that they have a tendency to essentialize and separate these women from others who could be feeling religious, but due to not sharing some of the attributes, may not be seen fit to be called with these terms. Not being veiled, being an Alevi or identifying with feminism are some of the reasons which could disqualify a woman from being called in these terms.

When such terms are used, there is a stereotypical image in people's minds. A woman who is veiled, who is Sunni, who holds certain grievances due to not being part of education or labor force is fit for joining this category.[6] In reality, however, there is a great diversity within this category. The most important diversity within this category is that some women refrain from explicitly associating themselves with women's movement, others do not hide the fact that they care about women's rights and amelioration of the situation of women above anything else in their activism. Some individuals who fall into this category do not even refrain from calling themselves Islamist feminists.[7]

For this reason, when I use the word religious women in this thesis, it is not to imply they are totally a separate category of women or that other women are disqualified from calling themselves religious. It is rather used to refer to a particular type of identity struggle, one that wants to increase the visibility of such women in the public sphere and put their ideas into circulation just like other actors within the larger women's movement.

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[6] In this thesis I mostly use "religious women" as most of these women referred to themselves as "dindar kadınlar" in the interviews as well as online discussions. However, I am aware of the implications of using a single term to cover all that diversity. However, the same limitations exist for the term "feminism" as there are different feminisms with very different assumptions. The diversity within both movements will be part of my analysis in the Analysis Chapter.

[7] A foundational text for any Islamist feminist would be Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal's "Kadın Karşıtı Söylemin İslam Geleneğindeki İzdüşümleri".

The depiction of religious women has gone through significant transformations both among the academics and the larger public due to various reasons which will be explained shortly.

The initial depiction of women in Islamist networks had been the devoted party worker type, such as the depiction by Arat (1999) of female Welfare Party supporters. Turam's (2010) depiction of the women in Gülen movement is similar in the sense of depicting women as subservient servants of the movement even at the sake of their own ideals and personal preferences. Gülen movement is also known for its arguments supporting unveiling during headscarf ban due to its concessionary attitude towards the state. Such stories portray women as highly subjugated by their political party or movement.[8]

Saktanber (2002, p. 75) calls this trend as the symbolic feminization of the political right in Turkey, which basically refers to the recruitment policies of Welfare Party. It is true that most of these women idealized their role in the political party as the perseverant supporters of their husbands and brothers. Even Sibel Eraslan, who was to coin the term "Islamist women ghettos" (Çakır, 2000) to refer to the separation of political activities within the movement as that of women's and men's and as putting the former as an auxiliary and subordinate position to the latter, thinks this is not problematic. The reason for the cohesive relationship between men and women in the movement was that many female recruits of the party were getting a spiritual satisfaction from working for the party which they equated with working for the path of God (Arat, 1999, p.36). Jenny White makes similar observations with respect to the commitment of female party activists who enlarged the support base of their movement through informal ties of solidarity (White, 2000, p.197-199).

When the Islamist movement started its ascendancy in the early 80s, Islamist men admitted women into the discussions on Islam and the role of women. This was necessary because of the legitimacy enhancing effects of including women into arguments that formulate the thesis that there is no gender issue in Islam and gender roles are cohesive and complementary if strictly implemented according to the maxims of Islam. It is in fact true that despite the visibility of efforts of women, this period is depicted as one where women assumed and accepted their subordinate roles.

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[8] Sibel Eraslan calls the separate organization of Islamist women for the party as "Islamist women ghettos".

However, as the prohibitions on the entry of veiled women to the public sphere intensified especially in the 1990s and leading up to the 28th of February, religious women (most specifically veiled religious women) quickly turned into an object of political discussion (Çakır, 2000; Aktaş, 2000). Nevertheless, despite objectification of veil issue by the Islamist men, this was the first time religious women were speaking and demanding just for themselves. This activist role puts the stereo-typical depiction of religious women as submissive agents especially in the Kemalist-secularist circles at odds with the reality as it unfolded (Aslan Akman, 2008).

In fact, the most transformative experience for such women is claimed to be 28th of February. The religious/secular divide in Turkey which has become the most polarized in 1997 had hit the women hardest and (for some) exclusively (Çakır, 2000). Veiled women were both expelled from universities and work places. Many religious women for whom this meant being even more dependent on domestic realm, have started reflecting on their trauma and writing about this situation. There emerged many female writers in the media channels with Islamist leanings that gave accounts of what it feels like being a veiled woman in Turkey (Eraslan, 2004; Keskin, 2002). Göle's work on Modern Mahrem (1998) was the first attempt from an outsider perspective, to show how such women gained their consciousness and individuality. However this consciousness was still being waged from the perspective of the veiled, within the contours of the veil ban and for the veiled women.

This was also the time when different factions and diversities among the religious women were becoming more apparent (Aslan Akman, 2008). These factions were roughly termed as orthodox Islamist women and reformist Islamist women (Acar, 1991; Sallan-Gül, 2000), The former category emphasized the feminine roles of a woman such as motherhood and domestic duties and was arguing against working in the labor market unless it is extremely necessary (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2005, p.114). The latter category supported the presence of women outside their homes and their public visibility and was arguing that the veil was what made the inclusion of women into the public life possible, hence in a way it was emancipatory for them. What united these women, despite differences in their conclusions was that they both thought Islam provided a unitary system and a flawless solution for the management of modern day problems which included but was not limited to the amelioration of gender relations in the public sphere.

Towards the end of 1990s, a group of religious female intellectuals who were not affiliated with a political party or association started sharing their reflections on the situation of Muslims under a secular state, the meaning of headscarf for the identity of a Muslim woman, and the perceptions of Islamist men about the position of religious women in public life (Aslan Akman, 2008). These women were critical about both the secular women who stigmatized religious women and ignored their individuality but also the attitude of Islamist-nationalist males who kept their patriarchal and alienating position when it comes to attesting the individuality of women (Şişman, 2004). By reducing such women to sisters, religious women were purposefully objectified and marginalized by such movements. The worst case scenario for Aktaş (2005) is that women by virtue of being reduced to "bacı" only perceive their existence through the veil and become alienated to the issues and concerns that are shaping the public discussions other than the veil.

For writers like Aktaş (2005), Islamist women are waging a battle on two fronts. By waging a battle against the secular public sphere while claiming their rights to enter education and labor force with their veil, they are forcing feminists who were not very much preoccupied with demands of Islamist women to reconsider their position with respect to veil. They are also forcing the traditional Islamist movement to reconsider its position with respect to the role of women in society. They are not only in defense of a particular life-view, that of women and their liberties in the public space, they are also demanding the expansion of such liberties to women disenfranchised by the women's movement itself, the veiled women. Their activism forces a re-evaluation of positions on both fronts, both the larger Islamist and women's movement.

Whether these religious women intellectuals can be rightfully called movement members is a question to be answered. Unlike members of a brotherhood or large scale movement such as Gülen movement, Nurcu or Süleymancı movements, women who fit the above depiction show too much of a subjectivity to be rightfully called movement members. However, this, in no sense, demeans the importance of their rhetoric and political positions. Although their numbers are very few, they hold positions in media necessary to shape public opinion. Nevertheless, we have to attest to the fact that their numbers imply they are more of a group of influential writers and thinkers than a mass movement with a solid grassroots support such as in Iran where there is a solid based feminist movement among the religious women. In fact their most important transformative power does not stem from being the arms and legs of any particular

movement but from reaching wide audiences through works of literature, mass media and by virtue of being opinion makers.

Çayır's work (2007) on the Islamic literature in Turkey reveals the transformative power such works of art has for religious women. Autobiographies show us the rupture from a radical tradition on what Islam dictates. What comes in its place is a critical reading of all the limitations of an essentialist reading of Islam for women. This transition is called "from epic to novel". The epic stage signifies the idealization of Islam and the comforts and privileges it offers to women. The roles of men and women are perfectly harmonious and complementary. The novel stage signifies a transition for female writers who critically engaged with the harmony and complementarity thesis and started questioning the double burden on religious women: one because of the exclusion from public sphere due to secularist prejudices, the other because of the insensitivity of religious men about the lack of opportunities for their female counterparts. This transition also signifies isolation from traditional Islamist circles and a move towards more individualist expressions of femininity for such women. This is also a period where female religious scholars start to engage critically with Islamic texts and question the sexist readings of Islam.

What does this transformation signify for the potentials of collaboration between religious women and feminists? Çayır (2007, p.2-3) in his book on Islamist Literature argues that critical social science research should not divide the population into two homogeneous blocs of strictly religious and strictly secularist. As a proof, he argues that there is significant support to the rights of veiled women to enter universities and workforce from liberal and leftist circles. In the same vein, there is hybridization in mass media, in the sense that major newspapers and other media channels give a voice to Islamist writers and thinkers and liberals and leftists at the same time.

Despite this fact, he points to the tendency in the mass media to portray a conception of Islam that is stripped from time and space. In that case, the discussion turns into a contest between those that see Islam in conflict with modernity and those who see Islam as the only panacea for the illnesses of modernity. Both perspectives have an essentialist reading of Islam. They refuse to acknowledge the importance of the actor and the potentials her praxis brings to a reformulation of Islamic practice and focus on Islam as a fixed set of beliefs based on scripture. Here an a priori conception of Islam determines the actions of the actor, which is reduced to a dependent variable.

Arguably, such a definition can never explain why for instance female Islamist writers are moving away from epic novels and moving towards individualist novels. A more sophisticated analysis would focus on not what Islam presumably says but what the actor does. This makes religious women the focal point of contemporary Islamic practice in Turkey precisely because their understanding of women's role and gender relations in society is significantly different than that of their male counterparts.

To give a striking example, when Ali Bulaç, wrote a highly derogatory article on feminism in 1987 in Zaman, he met with unexpected criticism, not from feminists but from religious women writers. A series of writings by prominent female writers explained how the mentality of Bulaç and his likes refuse to acknowledge feminism because they do not want to lose their patriarchal gains and their tight grip on women's role in social life.

These are the same female writers who have kept a certain distance to feminism although they also got inspiration from some of its theories. Although the exchanges between feminists and religious women were very few, some of religious women writers were portrayed as Islamist feminists. Most of these women reject this juxtaposition as they are critical of the positions taken by feminists on family and body. However, these same women also want to reflect on the secondary role of women in Muslim societies and bring a perspective that prioritizes the needs of women in modern day societies. Patriarchy is a very pressing problem for such women who are portrayed as Islamist feminists. Most of these women believe the problem of patriarchy can be addressed while being loyal to Islam. The rationalizations on eradicating poverty are based on one of two assumptions:

i.   There is a problem of patriarchy in current Islamic practices. However, this is not about the essence of Islam, it is about how Islam is actually practiced in those societies. The essence of Islam is compatible with the equality of sexes and a true reading of Islam will guarantee that.

ii.   There is no essence of Islam but there are historical readings of it. The practices of a historical period can be abandoned for better ones. Our goal should be to achieve that.

Both of these assumptions necessitate a closer look at the readings on Islam and Islamic societies and their practices. However, the limited access of religious women to İlahiyat and male hierarchy in that institution as well as Diyanet does not permit much flexibility for such women.

Nevertheless, Islamist female writers also have a few advantages that have to stated. One is that, unlike many parts of the Muslim world, Turkey did not go through a colonial tradition. Post-colonial feminism has to deal with all the repercussions of colonial understandings of women's place in oriental cultures and has to give an answer to such misperceptions. This also creates experiential antagonism between Islamist women and Western feminism. This is not the case in Turkey. There can be objections to this on the grounds that Kemalist project very much resembles the colonial style in that it also had attributes reminiscent of a white (wo)men's burden. It also possessed a willingness to teach backward and ignorant women the value of upholding secularism in public life. However, it still has one important contribution to the struggles between reformist Islamist women. The women's movement in the Middle East has to deal with Sharia law and come up with interpretations of it that is more gender balanced especially with respect to civil code that is the foundation of gender relations in Muslim societies. Reformist Islamist women in Turkey do not have to deal with this situation because of the secular civil code. In fact there are many cases where such women collaborate with feminists in removing the patriarchal implementations of the civil code, i.e. honor crimes.

Since the mid-1990s, there is another striking trend among religious women. Until that time period, the only institutional setting that such women were depicted in was the women branches of political parties or cemaat. For the first time there emerged women associations that were independent of any political affiliation. Most of these associations do not have legal nature and operate as platforms, initiatives and fora. However, this gives them more flexibility and creativity as they are not bound by rigid organizational rules. These associations represent the face of urban, educated and employed religious women. Some of these platforms, after receiving enough publicity, membership base and networks opted for formal registration which is a sign of maturity and tradition (Çayır, 2000; Akşit, 2004).

Another important novelty of these platforms is the diversity of topics discussed in these associations. When Göle wrote Modern Mahrem she was referring to the process through which veiled women acquired their individuality and reflexivity. However this consciousness was still being waged from the perspective of the veiled, within the contours of the veil ban and for the veiled women. What we have witnessed in the last decade has been an expansion of concerns and claims made by veiled women on many fronts. In the current period, we are witnessing a new breed of veiled women

having higher public visibility and actually using that visibility for arguing for causes beyond their own immediate concerns. These associations work as efficient mechanisms through which such women collaborate with other movements and organizations, engage in discussions and build coalitions.

This additionally puts them at a more distinctive position within the larger Islamist movement. By bridging their own demands for more liberties with those of other groups they are bringing their alternative vision of civil society. Having given this background on religious women, let us have a look at the trajectory of feminist movement in Turkey and subsequently where and when the two movements intersect.

2.2.3. Feminist Movement in Turkey

While such new developments were happening in Islamist circles that indicated a new direction or a departure point for more autonomous female writers and thinkers, the feminist movement was also experiencing an awakening. In order to understand how both groups of women started interacting, let us get into the specifics of the transitions and turns the feminist movement went through in Turkey. This will put the platform under study into better perspective.

The women's movement in Turkey had a protracted history. It also went through periods of decline followed by periods of rejuvenation. State guidance also played a crucial role on the aims and targets of the movement as well as its autonomy.

The first period extends back to Ottoman times. This epoch was largely absent from feminist literature until the 1990s arguably because of a state policy to portray the image that promotion of women's rights coincides with the establishment of Kemalist state, not before. However during 1990s we see feminist researchers unearthing what has taken place in late 19th and early 20th century in Ottoman Empire (Çakır, 1996; Demirbirek, 1993; Zihnioğlu, 2003). That period is now called the first wave of feminism in Turkey, as it was primarily occupied with the mobilization of women around suffrage rights, the right to education as well as demands to limit polygamy.

As can be predicted, at the time women's sexuality or the patriarchal limitations on women were non-issues. Instead, activism revolved around basic legal and citizenship rights and targeted the state rather than society or men. However, this activism came to a halt as the Turkish Republic has already conceded to women what most of the first wave feminism had demanded from the Ottoman Empire. Tekeli argues that "this phase of earning their rights from the single party regime created an illusionary feeling of success in women and resulted in their retreat from the public arena (Tekeli, 1998, p.338).

Granting of rights from above without having to invest in substantial rights struggles created a false illusion that state was the sole protector of rights hence what women needed the most was subservience to the state. For this reason, by way of claiming to represent the sole protector and grantor of women's rights, the new regime reduced the women's movement into auxiliary arms of state propaganda.

The appropriation of the gender issue by the Kemalist regime limited the ability of women's movement to wage an autonomous struggle. What is more, by targeting only the urban/bureaucratic elite women, it limited the ability of women's movement to become more grassroots (Kandiyoti, 1982). Despite the fact that the litmus test of modernization was the status of women in the eyes of the Republican elite, this status was very much subservient to the interests of male breadwinners of the house. Women were defined according to their duty to further the ideals of the Turkish revolution which was to be the guardians of national interests by way of being the social and biological carriers of the community (Arat, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1982).

Scholars such as Cindoğlu (1997) point out topics such as sexuality, virginity, chastity and morality were as vital as any other patriarchal system. Women, at that time, were encouraged to participate in the public sphere of life only if they obeyed certain moral and behavioral codes as well as displayed modesty in their attire. That is, they needed to preserve the 'respectability' and 'honor' of their families and nation through their chastity (Ellialtı, 2008). Many writers emphasize that this great patriotic burden on women reduced them to minor figures in the public sphere (Durakbaşa, 1987, 1998; Berktay, 2003; Kadıoğlu, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1997; Sirman, 2000).

This period, which was portrayed by state authorities as emancipatory for Turkish women, was later interpreted as being quite regressive. This is because their social and political role was reduced to their reproductive role. Many scholars point out to the

gendered nature of citizenship in Turkey due to this reason (Arat, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1991).

Because of the state centric understanding of women's issues, the period between 1930s and 1980s were not very productive for feminist movement (Tekeli, 1998). The emergence of an independent women's movement coincides with the coup of 1980. The suppression and trial of leftists after the coup meant a political opening for leftist women who also had a feminist consciousness. By way of organizing their gatherings as rather amicable meetings, they were able to break the barriers in front of collective action that came as a result of the restrictive constitution of 1981. By working through friendship networks, they were able to maintain their collective spirit and regain their motivation. Yeşim Arat considers the women's movement as the only autonomous movement after the coup when all other political action was prohibited (Arat, 1994).

This partially explains why women's movement should primarily be analyzed through the prism of enclave deliberation as explained in the theoretical chapter. The atmosphere of post 1980 as well as having seen their comrades put in jail necessitated that these women adopt a more insulated conversation among themselves first to regain their strength and motivation that was near to depletion and to shield themselves from political prosecution by the militaristic regime. For this reason, during the 1980s, women with a feminist consciousness organized in small groups to discuss the issues of importance mostly in intimate surroundings such as the homes of participants. As they started developing their arguments more clearly, they were able to leave the comfort of their homes and organize mass campaigns and petitions. They opened feminism to discussion first under the auspices of YAZKO (Publication and Production Cooperative of Writers and Translators). This initiated mushrooming of feminist journals such as Somut and Kaktüs.

One of the initial and most important mass campaigns was a petition signed by 7000 women for the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This campaign was important because here was a mass movement that was not satisfied with the adoption of CEDAW and was determined to monitor how government is actually doing in terms of the realization of this treaty. This campaign became the antecedent of many other initiatives that specifically called for the adoption of certain legislations or the amelioration of the standards of implementation of women specific legislation. Some of the most important demonstrations in this tradition were campaigns against the battering of women in

Solidarity Against Battering Campaign, on May 17, 1987, against sexual harassment in the Purple Needle Campaign in 1989, against the Article 438 of Turkish Criminal Code in 1990 (Savran, 2005).

What distinguishes this period from prior periods for women's activism is not their intense political involvement. Women were very active in leftist organizations during 60s and 70s. However, their activism was more geared towards being the sisters or wives of leftist men. They were not doing activism for themselves. Additionally, the distorted understanding in the leftist tradition impeded the emergence of an autonomous women's movement because it was believed that the benefits of socialism would eventually trickle down to women, so all they had to do was to work for socialist cause first (Aytaç, 2008; Çakır, 2005). So the distinguishing characteristic of 1980s was the fact that women left behind doing activism for male causes and decided to work only for women (Sirman, 1989; Arat, 2008).

This second wave feminism was not only working just for women, it was also focusing on issues not dealt before. As it is general for feminist movements around the world, the first type of demands that gain prominence whenever women's issues are at stake is suffrage and legal rights. It takes time for women's movement to reach maturity and start questioning the personal aspects of gender inequality that perpetuate it in a more subtle manner. The challenge of breaking the public/private dichotomy is important if feminist movements want to make a meaningful change in securing gender equality. The second wave of feminism in Turkey, by predominantly focusing on the private aspects of gender relations and by making them a topic of public discussion moved in that direction. Of course, the center piece of making the personal political was the prevention of violence against women. Women's solidarity centers and shelter houses became the focal demands of the women's movement. Such centers and shelter houses also point towards a demand for institutionalization of women's struggle.

For a movement that started out from informal friendship networks, the demand for institutionalization is a sign of a level of maturity (Arat, 1999). The pioneers of such institutions were Mor Çatı in Istanbul and Ankara Dayanışma Merkezi.

Arat argues that this is a creative way to channel feminist demands for individual autonomy into institution building. She underlines that women successfully created their own institutions by "acting as women for women" rather than something that was granted to them by the state (Arat, 1997, p.106).

The state responded to demands of institutionalization by opening up a separate directorate for status of women under the Ministry of Women. The Directorate of Social Services started operating women's guest and shelter houses. Women's Status Units were opened in various provinces. The women's movement has also been successful in the institutionalization of gender equality institutions in public administration starting with the Gender Equality Commission of Turkish Grand National Assembly which was set-up in 2010. There followed equality commissions in local governments and other public bodies. These institutions are a direct result of lobbying by women's NGOs and international and national donors such as UNDP and UN Women.

One important difference of the women's movement of 1990s from the prior era is its ability to link other areas of concern with the concerns of women's movement. For example 1990s is the time period when the military campaigns against PKK gained prominence in Turkish politics. This struggle which is exclusively a struggle between the army and PKK gained a special meaning for many feminist organizations. This time period is the beginning of the realization among women's organizations that continued war and violence feed into militarism which they believed is another form of patriarchy. In other words, this is the period in which militarism was rejected on the basis of being a different face of patriarchy. Scholars of women's studies will be cognizant of the fact that this idea was already well developed by scholars such as Cynthia Cockburn (2007) who calls patriarchy, nationalism and militarism as brother ideologies. In her words:

> "Patriarchy, nationalism and militarism are a kind of mutual admiration society. Nationalism is in love with patriarchy because patriarchy offers it women who will breed true little patriots. Militarism is in love with patriarchy because its women offer up their sons to be soldiers. Patriarchy is in love with nationalism and militarism because they produce unambiguously masculine men." [9]

For scholars like Cockburn, violence reinforced through military values is a highly effective way to keep gender inequality in place. Nevertheless, this realization also meant firm steps could be taken by the women's movement to counter this trend. There are numerous examples of women's NGOs or alliances working on this specific link of militarism and patriarchy. In the same vein, KAMER, a women's NGO, was set

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[9] Retrieved from http://cynthiacockburn.typepad.com//Blogfemantimilitarism.pdf on 06.06.2011

up in the midst of violence in Diyarbakır to minimize the effects of patriarchal attitudes on women of the region which were reinforced by militarism and violence.

In the following decade, the same trend continued within the women's movement to stop unjust military interventions. Platforms such as "Barış İçin Kadın Platformu" became popular fora for women who wanted to oppose military operations. Since Turkey's neighborhood has become the focal point for various military incursions such as the invasion of Iraq by USA or the operations of Israel in Gaza in 2000s, such fora became the meeting ground for various women activists who saw clear connections between militarism, violence and gender inequality. This is also a period when women from different backgrounds started talking to each other for this common cause. For instance, almost all of the women in the platform I am analyzing refer to "Barış İçin Kadın Platformu" as the place where they had their first encounters with other groups of women.

Creating linkages between militarism, nationalism and patriarchy is an important step for women's movement for various reasons. Firstly, having objections to militarism and nationalism helped women's movement put a certain distance to the foundational ideology of the state which relied on total subservience to national interests which made the concerns of women secondary. The gendered nature of citizenship at the establishment of the Republic was testimony to the fact that an independent women's movement that excludes national pride and focuses on gender concerns alone would not be approved. This was the basic reason why women's movement at the establishment of the Republic was weak and elitist. With the turn of events that made women's movement realize the logical connections between militarism, nationalism and patriarchy, allegiance to an official ideology was impossible for an autonomous feminist movement. Of course, this realization was mainly instigated by 1980s coup which showed the real face of militarism for many feminists who primarily came from leftist movements and paid the price dearly for their leftist activism.

This transition is particularly important in order to understand how feminist movement had a rapprochement with other movements or women activists of different backgrounds. For instance, as the victims of 28th of February, veiled women now had a similar objection to the militarist culture as it unleashes its punitive force only on women but not on religious men. This also served as a wake up call for a group of feminists who only dealt with problems of women from a rather unitary perspective. It became clear that tragedies of militarism can hit any type of women, religious or not.

Currently, we see three dominant types of feminism in Turkey. One is Kemalist feminism, which is more statist and middle class. It excludes struggles of both religious women as well as minority women. For this reason, Kemalist heritage meant being statist and leaving aside the radical elements in feminism. Turam (2010) sees great similarities between the role of women in Kemalism and Islam, "veiled women" and "modern women" were all needed images of a new political vision.

Socialist feminism still preserves the leftist streak in their vision and prioritize a materialist conception of relations between sexes just as they prioritized class issues during 1960s and 1970s. It is hard to claim they have a special sensitivity to issues related to the case of religious women, as their material conception of life sees religiosity an impediment in front of the true liberation of women.

There is a third wing of feminism in Turkey which is not as politically aligned as Kemalist or socialist feminism in Turkey. This type of feminism prioritizes the concerns of women above other ideological concerns. For this reason, this civil feminism is more inclined to admit different types of women's concerns into its agenda. This more civic form of feminism, although an offshoot of leftist women of the 70s, is a product of significant transformations. For this reason, the women's movement after the coup of 1980 exhibits a peculiarity.

In fact following the coup, the women's movement which was a spin-off from leftist movements of the 1970s established its autonomy and acted as an initiator of more inclusive rights struggles due to changes in political opportunity structures. The women of the post 1980s era were more capable of linking their marginality within the larger leftist or pro-liberties movements of the prior era with the current marginality of other segments of society such as the veiled women. Although we cannot say that the Kemalist or socialist wings of the feminist movement was as outspoken about this problem as some of the more radical wings of the women's movement, it is safe to say that a wing of women's movement was able to engage in issue linkage to an extent which other movements refrained from doing. What motivates such women to link issues that seem disparate to the actors waging those struggles is to be understood within the context of the strategies employed by feminist women to make their voices heard.

Bodur (2005) claims that although feminist women represent a narrow segment of a society's women, they help expand the public discourse and they help the creation of a more comprehensive and inclusive representation. The inclusiveness of the language of

feminist women stem from their marginal position within society and within the movements that make rights claims. Any move to open a public space for themselves necessitates adopting a more inclusive language that will open up new spaces for negotiation of the rights of the most marginal. For this reason, their language is the most liberal and most extreme in rights claims. For instance, such women can put the demands of gays/lesbians and veiled women as two sides of the same coin which could be considered outrageous by Islamist movement. However, this is a direct result of their desire to expand the public space for alternative life worlds that would also give them their own breathing space. This is the basic reason they can be considered as a counter-public site. Within social movements they are the ones to say the most unthinkable, to claim the rights of those most at odds at the same time and to be situated at the most non-aligned position possible to preserve their neutrality to different rights-claimers.

What we see is a radical feminism that tries to create ties for the first time with gays, lesbians, anti-military groups and at times reformist Islamist women. This type of feminism can be considered post-Kemalist feminism, owing its critical edge and rigor to its opposition to the restrictionist policies of the state.

Given this background information on NSM in general and the women's movement in Turkey in particular, what propels the women under study to join such multiple issue coalitions? Why did veiled women start to engage in activism beyond the veil issue? Why did feminist women start to talk more about the rights of gays and lesbians than before? Betting for other groups has very much to do with how much of an affinity is drawn between one's state and other's conditions. To the extent that this affinity can be drawn, women can start talking about issues that are not primarily related to their initial concerns.

Embracing other identity struggles by women has very much to do with what Gouz described for the case of women's movement after 1980s. She was arguing that:

> The marginalized status of women in the leftist movement in 1970s kept them away from arrest during the 1980s coup and that provided the unique opportunity to organize separately after the coup. The military intervention, while temporarily disabling access to political arena provided new opportunities for women and created a space for women to frame their demands in a way that transcends other movement struggles of class and ethnicity that were being dominated by men (Bodur, 2005, p.177).

The same opportunities seem to have emerged for Islamist women under a different guise. Their partial isolation from male dominated Islamist movements and their disillusionment about the priority of veiled women's demands within Islamist politics forced them to seek refuge in other networks and solidarities. This brought them closer to both women's issues in general, i.e. harassment, violence, honor killings and other issues such as peace, minority issues etc…To the extent that they found a refuge in such networks and issue groups, they started to produce arguments and messages for different audiences as well.

2.2.4. First Encounters

As argued above, 1980s brought about a resurgence of feminist movement. Çakır (2000) in "Direniş ve İtaat" describes the three wings of the feminist movement in early 1980s as 1) Statist feminism with a prominent Kemalist tone 2) Socialist feminists 3) Civil feminism in the tradition of NSM

Despite all the differences between these three currents, Çakır argues that the strongest streak was coming from the socialist/revolutionary feminism of the generations of 1968 and 1978. All these currents were similar in their appraisal of religious movements as something to be fought against if we are to talk about the liberation of women. Kemalist feminists, while arguing they were not against Islam, were saying that they were fighting against fundamentalism. Socialist feminists were favoring a materialist and at times an atheist perspective on life, despite the fact that they were for freedom of conscience. Civil feminists, according to Çakır (2000), were mostly confused so they remained neutral (p.43).

Çakır (2000) through a series of interviews with prominent Muslim female writers tries to uncover how the feminist movement tried to accommodate the perspectives of religious women. In an interview with Mualla Kavuncu, the interviewee explains how feminists were more orientalist than their European counterparts in terms of seeing religion and specifically Islam as an impediment in front of women's liberation (Çakır, 2000, p.47).

Despite amicable interactions between the two groups of women especially after the reactions given by religious women to Ali Bulaç, the relations came to a halt as feminists started arguing that Islam and women's movement cannot go hand in hand. This was also the period when feminists were turning a blind eye to the cause of veil. In the words of Yıldız Ramazanoğlu:

> Veiled women could never see the feminists on their side during their struggles in 1980s. While the discourse of Islamist men who invited women to stay at their homes and the discourse of Kemalists who said "If you want to put a veil, stay at your home" were intersecting in an ironic way, feminists did not see a problem in participating to this conservative discourse (Çakır, 2000, p.152).[10]

The interactions turned sour as religious women essayed an article titled The Attitude of "For the Women, Despite the Women" (Kadınlar için Kadınlara Rağmen tavrı) in the socialist feminist magazine "Kaktüs" (December 1988) where they criticized the jacobin, monolithic and ultra-secularist attitudes of feminists.[11]

Despite these bitter encounters certain events made a break-through in the language of both of these women. The post-modern coup of 28th of February and the ensuing unequal punishment of veiled women compared to religious men caused certain feminist activists to re-consider their position. Of course this reconsideration came much as a result of veiled women's determination to discuss this problem in venues where feminists are also present.[12] Peace movements that were set up to protest foreign occupations such as the one in Iraq also decreased the distance between these two groups of women.

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[10] 1980'li yıllarda tesettürlü kadınlar verdikleri mücadelede feminist kadınları hiçbir aşamada yanlarında bulmadılar. O dönemde İslami değerleri ileri sürerek kadını eve çağıran erkeklerle, "örtüneceksiniz evinize" diyen Kemalist yazarların yolları garip bir tecelliyle çakışırken durumu görmezden gelen feministler bu ortak tutucu söyleme katılmakta, rüzgarlarını onlarla birleştirmekte bir mahzur görmemişlerdir" (2000:152)

[11] By socialist they refer to the fact that they only accept a materialist conception of history and reject religious interpretations on gender roles.

[12] One such venue was CEDAW, where NGOs such as Ak-der were able to include a shadow report on veil ban and its implications for women's education and work opportunities.

Another area in which these two groups of women cooperated was the changing of Civil Code where women lobbied together for legislation that would ensure gender equality. Another important cooperation took place with respect to increasing the number of female politicians. One of the signs that there is a rapprochement between the two groups is that for the first time an NGO that is known to be secular (KADER) included a veiled women's image into its campaigns which promotes candidacy of women in politics during 2011 general election campaigns.

This is not to say that there is still significant tension and gaps between these two groups as exemplified in the meetings of CEDAW where veiled women prepare shadow reports that try to prove veil ban as a kind of gender inequality. At this point we have to underline the fact that veil ban as a kind of gender equality never got the attention and support needed from women's movement in CEDAW meetings other than the efforts of religious women (Aslan Akman, 2008).

Nevertheless, all the above encounters and joint activism is an attestation to the fact that we might have entered a phase in women's movement where religious women are not exclusively focused on veil issue and feminists are not solely pre-occupied with the concerns of a particular life-style. The diversity within both camps opens up a space that is ripe for cross-fertilization, inspiration and coalition building.

The section on group history will also unearth additional factors as to why these two groups of women started frequenting each other and other groups' rights struggles. What is important for the purposes of this study and other studies on civil society is that such cross fertilization holds the potential for increasing tolerance and trust among heterogeneous groups in the wider public. An analysis of BSÇ will reveal whether this potential is real and promising.

Chapter 3. Coalition History and Methodology

3.1. Coalition History of Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz

This short section is to provide the reader with background information on Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz (BSÇ from now on). In this section, I introduce the reader to the member profile and the type of activists who join this coalition. In order to be able to substantiate that this coalition constitutes deliberation between different enclaves, I pay attention to what makes the members of this platform different from mainstream social activists. I try to show what differentiates a religious member of the movement from a more mainstream actor in the Islamist women or a feminist woman from a more mainstream member of a leftist movement. The types of organizations they become part of, the activist history of the most prominent members of the platform will be illustrative to give a more accurate picture of the coalition.

I will also discuss the major declarations and demonstrations of the platform, the major topics that were discussed within the coalition as well as major controversies that arose during discussions. Since this platform represents deliberation between different enclaves of women, the topics that were debated and the agreements and disagreements about those topics constitute the main focus of my analysis.

3.1.1. Background to the Coalition

As was argued in the literature review, I consider the women making up this coalition as enclaves. Their enclave position stems from their critical distance to more mainstream movements they were/are associated with. During my interviews, members explained their gradual marginalization and alienation from larger movements they were once/or are still part of. Consequently they have become keen actors to say their own words in their own ways, without feeling as appendages to any mass movement.

I consider the veiled women taking part in this platform as an enclave within the larger Islamist movement for various reasons. Although carrying some of the fundamental sensibilities of Islamist circles on the protection of family values, display of body in the public space, Gaza blockade and positions taken vis-à-vis gays/lesbians, veiled women of this alliance also share certain other sensibilities that put them at a rather distinct, or even marginal, position in the larger Islamist movement.

First, these women are the first to take swift and decisive action against Islamist circles when they see their action as contrary to their convictions. These women are the only Islamist group to protest against newspaper Vakit for protecting a writer alleged to harass a minor. They also vehemently opposed its anti-Semitic stance.

The women of the platform are also the most critical of ruling party because they consider it is paying lip service to their cause (lifting the veil ban) but not taking decisive action because of political calculations. They are aware of the fact that, despite having ideological proximity with the Islamist movement, they have to work for themselves to reclaim and get their rights. In the words of I.K (a pseudonym):

> If we feel like a victim all the time, cry and talk about how oppressed we are, if we let the men protect us, speak in our place, interrupt or even silence us for our sake, then we are very respectable women. However, when we act independently showing we are neither AKP's backyard, we are women who can vote for CHP if they have a veiled candidate, or independent candidates for that matter. Our power is very evident. So when they sense this power, they want to divide it.

We always had a battle on two fronts. On one front, a battle against the jacobin, elitist people who have orchestrated all these bans and the social structure that is based on hierarchy and the privileges of them. A battle to craft a living where the rights and freedoms of every citizen are maintained in an equal manner. On another front, a battle against an understanding that tells women their place is in the family, that a women's job is to become a mother and not talking about what fatherhood requires at all. This is a grave picture (interview, 27.04.2011).[13]

Another peculiarity of such women is that they have a wider network than a purely Islamist background would suggest. They move in and out of different types of activisms and meet and mingle with people from different backgrounds. The types of networks they are keen to be part of are mostly liberal networks that are opposing militarism, nationalism and that ask for a more minimalist state.

The feminists in this study are those who can be delineated from a Kemalist interpretation of feminism in the sense of cooperating with other women's groups irrespective of their political leanings.[14] Additionally, these feminists are involved in a larger network of social movements where they also support minority causes of Kurds, Armenians, Alevis and gays/lesbians. They do have certain affinities with leftist groups and liberals on the basis of being pro-liberties, but they do not fit nicely within any

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[13] "Biz devamlı mağdur olursak, sürekli gözyaşı dökersek, sürekli ezildiğimizden bahsedersek, birtakım erkekler de çıkıp bizi koruyup kollamak, sözümüzü ağzımızdan alıp söylemek isterse, sözümüzü kesmelerine, bizi susturmalarına izin verirsek, o zaman biz muteber ve iyi kadınlarız. Ama ne zaman ki biz bağımsız, biz ne Ak Parti'nin arka bahçesiyiz, eğer başörtülü bir vekile ilk sıralardan yer verecek olursa biz CHP'ye de oy verecek kadınlarız; bağımsız adaylar çıkarıp onların hepsini destekleyebilecek kadınlarız. Bu gücümüz çok ortada. Dolayısı ile bu güç fark edildiği anda, bertaraf edilmek isteniyor.

Bu her zaman böyleydi. Çünkü biz her zaman iki cephede mücadele verdik. Bir yandan bütün bu yasakları örgütleyen, tepeden inmeci, elitiz insanlarla mücadele, onların bu eşitlikçi olmayan yaklaşımları, sürekli bir ast üst ilişkisi, imtiyazlar ve ayrıcalıklar olan bir toplumsal yapı. Eşit, özgür, demokrat, herkesin hakkını hukukunun, yurttaşlık bilinci içerisinde teslim edildiği bir şey arzusu, orada mücadele, bir yandan da İslam'da kadının yeri budur, sürekli haddini bildirme, kalın çizgilerle senin görevin şu, seni bir annelik içine hapsetmek, ve babalık diye bireyin hiç olmaması, gibi şeyler, bunlarla mücadele ediyorsunuz. Aslında çok açık bir şekilde, ağır bir tablo diyebilirim."

14 One exception to this would be the case of fascists. Most members expressed they would refrain from collaborating if these groups in question are fascists. However, they have not specified what being fascist would entail.

category as they are adamant supporters of equality between men and women and homosexuals which other groups refrain from supporting to the full extent.

To give a more accurate picture of the full gamut of networks and relationships, I map out the affiliations of some of the most networked members of the alliance. The reason for analyzing the most networked and most prominent members is because 90 % of the time the discussions are initiated and continued by these members. They are also prominent civic activists in their own organizations or movements, so they are quite representative of what the platform is trying to achieve: to make different enclaves talk and transform each other.

In the below diagram, you can see four activists of the platform with very diffuse networks. These are some of the most active members of the platform in terms of the number comments they made in the online community. Each circle represents an activist member of the platform and her memberships to multiple groups and information sources (yahoo groups, blog spots and website memberships). The upper circle on the left hand side represents a feminist member who is also a gay/lesbian activist. The lower circle on the left hand side represents a feminist who is a leftist and a member of green party in Turkey. Her leftism is more dominant than her other identities given the distribution of her networks.

The upper circle on the right hand side is a veiled woman activist who has membership to multiple networks on issues ranging from veil ban to anti-military campaigns and to Gaza issue. The lower circle on the right hand side represents a veiled woman activist who has membership to networks not necessarily associated with those of veiled women such as "Baskı Altındayız" or "Gazze İçin" but also those more leftist ones such as "Özgürlükçü Sol", "Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe Dur De Girişimi", "Küresel Bak and İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu".

An important caveat here is that I have identified these networks as "primarily leftist" or "primarily Islamist" according to the self-definition of the members who represent those circles. In other words, those circles do not rigidly represent the networks a leftist or Islamist person would want to be affiliated with under all circumstances. There can be individuals who identify themselves as Islamists and who would not see a contradiction in being part of feminist networks. In that sense, my figure does not claim to exhaust social reality. It rather gives an idea about the types of networks frequented by prominent members of the coalition in an attempt to show the types of issues that are of concern for the members of this coalition other than BSÇ.

Figure 2: Classification of networks of most active members

Primarily Feminist Member   **Primarily Islamist Member**

Kaos GL   Istanbul Feminist Kolektif
Feminist Diyalog

TCK_Kadın
Hala Tanığız Kadın Platformu

Pınar Selek'le Dayanışıyoruz
Feministler Uyumuyor

AK-DER
Filistin Günleri
Vicdan Sahibi Müslümanlar
Mazlum-Der
Baskı Altındayız
28 Şubat 1000 Yıl Süremez
Buluşan Kadınlar
Henüz Özgür Olmadık

Cinsel Şiddete Karşı Kadın Platform

Gazze İçin

Feminist Kadın Çevresi

Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz   **Genç Siviller**

Amargi

70 milyon Adım Koalisyonu
Küresel Bak
İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu

Yeşiller Partisi

Yüzleşme Derneği

Beyoğlu Yeşilev
Özgürlükçü Sol

Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe
Dur de Girişimi

Primarily Leftist Member   **Primarily Leftist Islamist Member**

BSÇ stands out as distinctive among all these coalitions and networks for one basic reason: It is an alliance by and for women with very different world views and life styles. One can observe that the other platforms and coalitions that bring leftist and Islamist women together are mostly on issues other than womanhood, i.e. racism, nationalism, civilianization. This is not to say that there are a few exceptions such as "Pınar Selek'le Dayanışıyoruz" which brings both feminists and Islamist women together.

Most of the networks and platforms in this figure are about single issue campaigns with very specific targets. This is more true for issue coalitions such as "Darbeye Karşı 70 Milyon Adım" and "Pınar Selek: Hala Tanığız" with very specific and identifiable targets. This is less evident in the case of BSÇ, which started out from solidarity around veil issue but got more complicated and comprehensive in attitude in time.

If one takes a closer look at around which issues the women of the alliance have worked before, one sees that they are mostly on racism, nationalism, peace movement and anti-military campaigns. Such exercises do give the women of this alliance a preparation on working for women's issues later. This also shows that the

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rapprochement of different wings of the larger women's movement depended on establishing networks in other areas of social activism. In other words, the networks built in the initial stages of social activism can later adapt to other types of activism. However, there is a clear difference between peace coalitions and BSÇ. In the first, the aim of the coalition does not necessitate a reshuffling of identities or positions, as peace is a target that has very justifiable premises irrespective of the ideological positioning of different elements of the coalition. However BSÇ is more ambitious in that sense, since it aims to put womanhood and woman's subjectivity above other convictions and ideological positions. In that sense BSÇ aims a reshuffling of priorities which is harder to achieve.

Before getting into the specifics of the BSÇ, it would be important to emphasize the dynamics of the rapprochement between a more "Muslim" audience and more liberal pool of activists. Encounters in groups like "Genç Siviller, Darbeye Karşı 70 Milyon Adım Koalisyonu, İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu, Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe Dur De Girişimi, Küresel Barış ve Adalet Koalisyonu" could be considered exercises for different counter-hegemonic spheres to craft a common language around certain issues. For this reason, the arguments used in such networks and platforms may have an effect on the formulation of frames by women activists of BSÇ. Such spill-over effects should always be kept in mind. When we deal with issues such as nationalism, the role of military, war and conflict or racism against minorities, experiences in these other platforms should also be taken into account.

The diversity of networks and previous collaborations are evident from the above diagram. But what was the foundational moment for mainstream feminists and veiled women? How such women made the first encounters is of importance for understanding cross-movement dynamics. Most of the women I interviewed, when asked what their first encounter with their counterparts in BSÇ, made reference to the movement called "Barış İçin Sürekli Kadın Platformu".[15] That platform was made of women's groups that worked against the rise in global violence after September 11. The role of women's groups in Peace movements is not new, however the novelty of this movement in Turkey was that this was the first movement in Turkey that brought groups as diverse as KAOS GL, AK Parti and Başkent Kadın Platformu together. There were also feminist

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[15]http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1066:-baris-icin-surekli-kadin-platformu-cagri-metni&catid=30:ortak-baslamalar&Itemid=80

groups such as Uçan Süpürge and Bağımsız Feministler as well as leftist women's groups such as Emekçi Kadınlar. When such cross-movement alliances are forged, there is an expansion in social networks that facilitate further movement activity and new alliances. However, the importance of this movement from the perspective of more marginal players like KAOS GL was summed up nicely in the words of a prominent figure in the gay/lesbian movement, H.I, who also is part of this case study:

> I have observed that they have maintained the same distance from us (lesbians) and them (veiled women). I have seen that they also feel very sorry when we are not listened to. I had a supportive talk about the veil issue in one of those encounters. Kaos GL also supported me in my effort. We may not have had formal collaboration but that incident created empathy. We are women who do not fit those pre-given frameworks. They are too. Leftist women did not give me the same sense of solidarity (interview, 02.10.2010).[16]

These comments show that feeling marginal brings previously uncooperative groups together. Irrespective of the issue content or issue positions, empathy emerges due to being at the outskirts of larger movements.

This initial encounter culminated in the creation of the platform that makes the basis of this study. The roots of the platform go back to Amargi[17] Conversation Workshops (Amargi Muhabbet Atölyesi) where different ways of being woman in Turkey were discussed. The discussions aimed a larger spectrum of women including those who did not identify with feminism. The discussions in this workshop led to the creation of the platform under study. H.I stresses the importance of "muhabbet" as a good basis to initiate dialogue and mutual understanding and how it has a transformative power on political positions as well:

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[16] Başörtülü kadınlara ve bize aynı mesafeyi koyduklarını gördüm. Onların biz ayrımcılığa uğradığımızda canımızın yandığını hissettiğini gözlerinden anlıyordum. Orada başörtüsü ile ilgili tepkili bir çıkış olmuştu. KAOS GL olarak onlara destek olduk. Oturup dayanışmadık ondan sonra ama aramızda bir empati oluştu. Biz orada çizilen çerçeveye uymayan insanlardık. Onlar da. Soldaki kadınlar bende o hissi uyandırmadı.

[17] Amargi is a feminist NGO based in Istanbul. For more information check: www.amargi.org.tr

The foundations of BSÇ were laid in Amargi Conversation Studio. We came together as women who had a sort of inspiration from a feminist framework to discuss different ways of womanhood. The individual experiences have a chance of being converted into political capital because what is individual is actually political. If there is empathy involved no one would stay silent in the face of a situation like this (referencing physical attacks on a gay person). If there was no chance to speak in an informal manner, there would be no BSÇ (interview, 2.10.2010).[18]

The same interviewee also stresses the importance of creating a language that is not dichotomizing and separating and argues that the aim of BSÇ was to create a language beyond those binary oppositions:

"The position of BSÇ was like this: Can we live together while other people see us as poles? The rhetoric of the state is not important for us at all. We were after crafting a language that would become popular in society. We were a formation that was rejecting dichotomies coded in people's minds such as Muslim vs. feminist, Muslim vs. homosexual."[19]

3.1.2. Member Profile

The women making up this coalition come from very different backgrounds. There are those who started as extreme leftists, have witnessed the process of the disintegration of leftism during 1980s, especially after the coup and who turned into anti-militarist feminists. There are those who started their activism during the university years due to veil bans and joined other networks once they were energized by this initial

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[18] BSC'nin temelleri Amargi Muhabbet Atölyesine dayanmaktadır. Farklı kadınlık hallerini konuşmak için feminist çerçeveye bulaşmış kadınlar olarak bir araya geldik. Kişisel deneyimlerin politik bir sermayeye dönüşme şansı var. Çünkü öncelikle kişisel olan politiktir. Empati kurduktan sonra bir daha böyle bir şey daha yaşanırsa (bir eşcinsele saldırıyı kastediyor) sessiz kalmayacağını düşünüyorum. Eğer karşılıklı sohbet etme şansımız olmasaydı BSC de kurulmazdı.

[19] BSC'nin duruşu şöyleydi: Biz bir arada yaşayabiliriz, insanlar bizi birer kutup olarak görürken biz bir arada yaşayabiliriz. Devlet söylemi burada bizim için hiç önemli değildi. Biz toplumsal olarak egemen olacak bir söylem yaratmak peşindeydik. Müslüman vs feminist, Müslüman vs eşcinsel olarak kodlayan bir dünyada bu kategorilere karşı çıkmak ve varlığını sürdürmeye çalışan bir yapıydı.

threat. There are also those who followed an intellectual/academic route and joined this alliance because of their intellectual convictions. In this sense, it is hard to say all the women of the platform exhibit similar trajectories. Having said this, there are similar processes of transformation and shifts in mentality among platform participants which deserves mentioning. There are also similar experiences among groups of women in the platform. For instance, leftists turned into anti-militarist feminists in similar fashions and veiled women joined multiple networks and became quite autonomous within the Islamist movement through similar thought processes. These need to be elaborated if we want to understand the foundation of their alliance.

The most important element common to most of the interviewees was their aversion towards highly institutionalized forms of civic activism which they consider to be crushing their personality. Another reason why they do not enjoy such activism is the subtle patriarchy involved in most of civic organizations. Because women are downplayed in such organizations, most decided to follow a more independent, non-aligned activism that works through passive networks. They also express a desire to stay away from the disciplinarian aspects of such organizations, meaning that organizations crush the personalities of members and hence become too suffocating. In the words of D.E:

> I cannot feel that happy in Özgür-der. Why? First of all, they are so extremist. I expressed to them that I do not look at religion in that fashion. Beyond that, even if I had the same views, I would not want to be with people who hold views similar to mine. No way. I think there is the need for cross-fertilization. No good work would come out if you do not have a humane outlook (interview, 23.03.2011).[20]

Here is another interviewee who expresses her dislike of tight organizational membership that confines individuals to pre-determined forms of speech and conduct. She also expresses that despite the motivation in the platform to create a new form of

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[20] Ben tutup da kendimi Özgür-der'de kendimi çok çok rahat hissedemem. Neden? Birincisi çok marjinal bir topluluk, ben dine bakış olarak da orada olamayacağımı ifade ettim. Bundan öte, aynı görüşte olsam bile, sürekli benim gibi düşünen insanlarla beraber siyaset yapamam. Mümkün değil. Ortaklaşma, bir dirsek teması olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Tabi insani bir bakış açısı olmadan ortaya bir eser çıkarılmıyor.

solidarity that surpasses former allegiances; their grip on members joining the platform is still evident for her. L.M explains her disappointment in the following words:

Even the idea of being part of an organization disturbs me. I feel like one cannot be himself/herself if she stays within a group. There are still no groups in Turkey where you can freely express yourself. We cannot call BSÇ an organization in that sense; we can call it a formation. Even though it is not an organization, I have come across certain hierarchies there. I have seen that when I write something it can remain unanswered. But what disturbed me the most was people saying they want to go to their own backyard at the sight of first disagreement. This made me think a lot. I realized I do not have my own backyard. I felt so isolated. I have no residence it seems, I thought. If everybody can talk about going back to their own backyard, then everyone came here temporarily. I had no backyard (interview, 16.03.2011).[21]

F.G admits finding a safe haven in multi-issue coalitions at an early age where they were admitted to engage in politics regardless of their political background:

I have been at the management of "Genç Siviller". In other NGOs, women tend to stay out of politics. This is because the veil is seen as a political symbol. For this reason, veiled women tend to think we should stay out of politics. I, on the other hand, wanted to be in a formation where I could openly talk about politics, be part of a political movement. The slogan "Genç Siviller are disturbed" really caught my attention. We protested against national days. What kept me there? I wanted to be part of a political union incorporating my identity as a Muslim. My sensitivities were also taken into account. No one was disturbed by my presence. We had a demonstration called: Let's become Kurdish…it was about having education in the Kurdish language. We had a meeting after the memorandum of 27th of April. We had a headscarf event: Against the argument that our grandma's did not veil themselves like we do today, we

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[21] Ama bir örgütün içinde olma fikri bile şu anda beni çok rahatsız eder. Bir grubun içinde olunca kendin olamıyormuş gibisin geliyor bana. Halen Türkiye'de kendini rahatça ifade edebileceğin bir grup oluşmuyor. BSÇ'ye bu noktada bir örgüt denemez, bir oluşum denebilir. Bir oluşum olmasına rağmen, ben orada da bir takım hiyerarşiler gördüm. Bir akademisyenin ağırlığı ile benim ağırlığımın aynı olmadığını gördüm. Ben ortaya bir şey yazdığımda, cevapsız kalabildiğini gördüm. Ama beni rahatsız eden, daha ilk çatışmada ben mahalleme dönüyorum denmesi. Bu beni çok düşündürdü. Benim mahallem yok diye düşündüm. İlk defa kendimi çok mahallesiz hissettim. İkametgahım yokmuş, dedim, ortada kalmış hissettim. Herkes mahalleme dönüyorum dediğine göre, herkes buraya geçici olarak gelmiş, herkesin bir mahallesi varmış. Ama benim mahallem yoktu.

had the slogan of "No, it should be my grandma's way (interview, 10.03.2011).[22]

The above remark reveals that for veiled women, these new venues of participation were a way to express themselves and feel part of politics which they were excluded from by virtue of being veiled and not being admitted to the public space.

The second pattern that emerges among coalition members is their disillusionment with their prior movement history. This emerges in various forms among platform members. For example, some of the leftists criticize the way they have acted during the soft coup of February 28th as well as their approach to the Kemalist heritage especially prior to 1980s. They are also critical of the way they interpreted secularism and its exclusionary form implemented in Turkey. G.H says:

> After I became an atheist, my curiosity about Muslims began. I have seen it with my own eyes how veiled women were downgraded and patronized after the 28th of February. Veiled women kept distant from us as well. Before, most of us were Kemalists. Not like CHP though. Not a statist Kemalism. It is more about Kemalist principles. Then we had the coup of 12 September. I looked at the socialism that we had; hierarchies and all that... When I went in (to the prison) I realized so many things about it. It was not humanist enough. It was a hegemonic, industrializing, progressive ideology. When I decided to abandon socialism, my horizons expanded. I deconstructed myself. I decided saying: I am not a socialist, I am a feminist. I found so many important questions once I gave up being reductionist. If I continued behaving in the old socialist logic, I was going to understand neither heterosexism nor the veil issue.
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> I have become a member of ÖDP. I became a member of an independent women's collective, a platform where there were Kurdish, Armenian, socialist and homosexual women. We prepared brochures for Konca. I started thinking a lot then. I was not that different from the Republican clan at the time. I started thinking more after the Konca Kuriş incident. We are

[22] Genç Siviller'in yönetiminde bulundum. Bizim STK'lardaki kadınlarda siyaset dışında kalma eğilimi görülür. Başörtülüler siyasal simge olarak görüldüğü için olur bu. Başörtülüler de bu sebepten "Biz siyaset dışıyız" diye düşünmek isterler. Ben açık açık siyaset konuşabileceğim, siyasal bir sürecin içinde olabileceğim bir oluşum içinde olmak istiyordum. "Genç Siviller Rahatsız" mesajı çok hoşuma gitti. Milli bayramları protesto ettik. Beni orada tutan ne idi? Müslüman kimliğimle yer alabileceğim bir siyasal birliktelikti. Benim de hassasiyetlerim göz önünde bulunduruluyordu. Varlığımdan rahatsız olunmuyordu. "Biraz da biz Kürtleşelim", diye bir eylem yaptık mesela..Kürtçe eğitim üzerine….27 nisan Muhtırası'nın ardından Taksim'de toplandık. Başörtüsü toplantısı yaptık: babaannelerimizin başörtüsü siyasi değildi argümanına karşılık "Hayır benim babaannem gibi olsun" diye sloganlar attık.

calling ourselves oppressed; I have seen that they could also be oppressed. Whoever objects is crushed. Konca is a good example of this. I learned more about oppression from Kurdish women there. I kept a distance from women for a long time because of the hierarchical leftist organizations. The independent women's initiative was very good for me. I learned a lot and started changing myself fundamentally (interview, 14.03.2011).[23]

3.1.3. Generational Dimension

Although, one cannot make generalizations out of a small sample, I observed certain differences between interviewees that can be attributed to differences in age.

The representatives of older and younger generations in this study have different interpretations on politics, gender and social relations. For example, patriarchy is more readily discredited by older generation since some have experienced divorce, or had more encounters with the opposite sex. Secondly, older generation had been in and out

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[23] Ateist olmamla Müslümanlara ilgim başladı. 28 Şubat sonrası gözlerimle tanık oldum başörtülü kadınları aşağılamayı, laf atıldığını. Başörtülü kadınlar da bizden uzak durdular. Eskiden çoğumuz Kemalist idik. CHP gibi değildik. Devletçi Kemalizm değil, Kemalist ilkeler. 12 Eylül oldu. Sosyalizm denen şeye baktım. Hiyerarşiler vs. İçeri girip uzaklaşınca bir yığın şeyi farkettim. İnsan merkezli bulmadım. Egemen bir ideoloji, ilerlemeci, sanayileşmeci bir ideoloji. Sosyalist olmaktan vazgeçince, o zaman ufkum çok açıldı. Yapı bozumuna gittim. Kendimi bozdum. Sosyalist değil feminist demeye başladım. İndirgemeci yerden bakmayı bırakınca birçok yeni sorun keşfettim. Eski sosyalist mantıkla hareket etseydim heteroseksizmi de başörtüsü sorununu da anlayamayacaktım.

İktidar meselelerine kafa yormasaydım başörtülü kadınların halini anlayamazdım. Ama onlar için 28 Şubat'ta hiçbirşey yapmadım. Hiç ilişkimiz olmadı. O sınavı çok iyi vermemiştik. Baskılara karşı hiçbirşey yapmadık. Sonra Konca Kuriş sayesinde düşünmeye başladım.

İstanbulda ÖDP'li oldum. İstanbulda Bağımsız Kadın İnisiyatifi. Kürt, Ermeni, sosyalist kadınların ve eşcinsel kadınların olduğu bir platforma girdim. Konca ile ilgili afişler yaptık. Çok düşünmeye başladım o zaman. Cumhuriyet klanının çok farkında değildim o zaman. Orada Konca Kuriş sonrası daha fazla düşünmeye başladım. Biz kendimizi mağdur diyoruz ya, onların da mağdur olabildiğini gördüm. Kim karşı çıkıyorsa ezilir, Konca bunun iyi bir örneğidir. Orada Kürt kadınlardan da çok şey öğrendim ezilmek konusunda. Ben uzun süre kadınlardan uzak durdum, hiyerarşik sol yapılardan. Bağımsız Kadın İnisiyatifi çok iyi geldi. Çok şey öğrendim, takır takır değiştirdim kendimi."

of more diverse networks, spanning from ultra-nationalism to brotherhoods, which shows they had a less idealistic vision of Islam. In the words of E.F:

I find the younger generation more fundamentalist. We have started from elsewhere, we started from Ülkücü movement. I did not come from other Islamic groups or brotherhoods. I made myself a Muslim through my own readings. They are born into these things; that is why they have a more holistic view.

Is it about being the younger generation?

There is the effect of Iranian evolution on them. Their portrayal of religion is more political and more this worldly. There is also an additional factor about their attitude towards feminism or about being a woman: "being young". You can have a consensus with older women about these issues because they have lived through a lot. Younger ones are more perfectionists. Difference in experience, in other words (interview, 24.03.2011).[24]

The views of the younger generation on the other hand complement this picture in a different way. L.M thinks:

When Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu died, there were very strong disagreements. There were people who expressed their condolences while others called him a killer. We had such divisions. I told to the middle aged women in our group that their generation and our (younger) generation do not think alike. There is a generational issue here. For me, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu does not have the meaning he has for religious women, the meaning that middle aged generation attaches to him. They think of him as a good Muslim who was oppressed. When you look at his history, you see a man who was used by the state. I do not consider him as a hero. That generation was more tough, divisions were sharp (interview, 16.03.2011).[25]

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[24] Yeni kuşağı daha tutucu buluyorum. Ya çünkü, biz başka bir yerden girdik ya, ülkücü hareketten girmiş olmak sebebiyle. Ben, hiç İslamcı grupların, tarikatların içinden gelmedim. Kendi okumalarımla kendimi Müslüman yaptım. Onlar bu şeyin içine doğuyorlar ve daha bütüncül bakıyorlar.

Bu yeni kuşak olmakla mı alakalı başka bir şeyle mi alakalı?

Bir de onlarda şeyin etkisi var, İran Devrimi'nin. Daha siyasi, din anlayışları daha dünyevi. Bir de şeyle alakalı galiba, feminizme bakışları, ya da kadın olmakla alakalı, gençlikleri ile alakalı. Halktan daha yaşlı kadınlarla daha rahat bu konuları konuşup, uzlaşıyorsunuz. Çünkü hayatında yaşadığı şeyler var. Gençler daha mükemmeliyetçi oluyor. Deneyim farkı yani."

[25] Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu'nun ölmesinde sert tartışmalar oldu. " Allah rahmet eylesin" dendiğinde, "O bir katildir" diyenler oldu. İşte öyle ayrışmalar oluyordu. Orta yaş

While the older generation considers being part of a wider network in one's lifetime as a sign of flexibility and tolerance, the younger generation considers this as ideological confusion or compromise.

However, the value of having been part of loose and diverse networks is a value in itself for this coalition. If, women making part of this platform could identify themselves with a more monolithic bloc they would not have tried to ally with women from different backgrounds. Loose networks also have an advantage; participants do not have to commit themselves to the fullest, they can be in and out of these networks.

3.1.4. Coming from a Leftist Tradition Versus Right Wing Tradition

There are studies which show that activists coming from a left-wing tradition are more readily and easily mobilized. For example, a study by Lawrence, Sides and Farrell (2010) point out that there are different agendas of left wing and right wing bloggers. In their study, left wing bloggers often focus on political mobilization, identifying progressive candidates and encouraging them to donate and work for them whereas right wing bloggers often serve as forums of commentary (p.150). They also point out to a similar study by Wallstein (2007) where he finds left wing blogs mobilize twice as much as right wing blogs.

The ability of women coming from the leftist tradition to organize and mobilize faster was mentioned both by feminists coming from the leftist tradition and those who were not. F.G attributes this to the perceptions about the state among the leftists:

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grubuna, "sizin nesil ile bizim nesil aynı düşünmüyor" demiştim. Bu konuda nesiller arası fark var. Benim için Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, dindar kadınların yüklediği anlama sahip değil. O yaş grubunun yüklediği anlamı yok. Onlar çok daha mazlum, iyi bir Müslüman diye düşünüyordur. Sürece bakınca devlet tarafından kullanılmış bir insan portresi çıkıyor, ben ona bir kahraman gözüyle bakmam. O kuşak daha sertti, taraflar daha keskindi. O yüzden biz diğer grupla biraradayız, diye bakıyorlar. Eskiden sağcı solcu şimdi dindar gayri dindar ayrımlar. Mesela dindarların çoğu aynı zamanda ülkücü; halbuki babam dindar olmasına rağmen en nefret ettiği şey de ülkücülüktü. Eski nesilde ağır basıyordu Osmanlıyı dindar kabul etme.

The attitudes of the left and religious groups about the state differ. Religious groups are not that skeptical about the state. They think military might have been a wrong doer but police is one of us (interview, 10.03.2011).[26]

The same interviewee also admits that Islamists were not as excluded from mainstream politics as the leftists and that is the reason why leftists can mobilize more easily against the state:

Islamic groups were thought of as oppositional groups since the establishment of Republic but as a group making up the majority of this country, they are marked but included in the political system. There is a perception like, this state is ours, and we are the constituent members of this state. There is no such attitude among the left. There is no way they can be included into the political system because they are in conflict with the state. People say, Milli Görüş is the most marginalized of the right. But you have seen in the funeral of Erbakan. You have seen that the political system includes them through the funeral procession: a funeral with flags, a hero of this nation. Islamic groups would never be marginalized like the left.[27]

G.H, a leftist woman, tries to explain this situation with respect to the ontological difference between the left, which is always more anti-statist than the rest of ideologies. She also thinks leftist women have been able to insulate themselves from male dominance in their organizations by stepping to feminist movement while most of the religious women still consider working for conservative political parties and stay within mixed groups which decrease their mobilizational ability:

The reflexes and organization of women coming from a leftist tradition is firmer. Left means action, protest, when it comes to reacting. Where does this difference come from? It comes from different modalities of opposition. Muslim women do not have an independent means of organization apart

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[26] Solcu kesimle dindar kesimin devlet algısı: dindar kesim polise o kadar negatif bakmayabilir. Asker dindar kesime kötü davranmıştır ama polis daha halktan biridir.

[27] İslami gruplar TC'nin kuruluşundan beri muhalif olup dışladığı bir grup ama çoğunluk olduğu için bir grup içleyerek etiketleyerek dışladığı. Bu devlet bizim biz bu devletin asli unsurlarız bakışı var. Solda öyle bir duruş yoktur. Devletle çatışma halinde olduğu için içlenmesi mümkün değildir. En çok dışlanan Milli Görüş denir. Ama Erbakan'ın cenazesini gördünüz. Cenazesi ile içlendiğini görüyoruz: bayraklı cenaze, vatan kahramanı muamelesi. İslami kesim sol gibi dışlanmaz hiçbir zaman."

from the political party. That is why Muslim women are more at ease in hybrid environments (interview, 14.03.2011).[28]

Another peculiarity of members who are coming from a leftist tradition is their aversion to being called civil society actors. For them, civil society has a misleading effect on actors whose aim is to have a political impact. This can be largely attributed to the revolutionary ideal of leftists and their desire to overhaul the political system from its foundations. Here is what C.D said:

> Do you see yourself as a civil society actor?
>
> No, I don't. I am doing politics. What you call civil society is a rather passive thing that tries to understand life rather than try to change it. And it is really not independent, it is affiliated with somewhere else or ideologically dependent. It is, in italics, a thing that wants to promote "goodness "and to understand life. As a person who is also a socialist Marxist, what is important for me is, as Marx said, not only to understand reality but also to change it. If we are to talk about these terms straightforward, then I am not a civic actor, I do politics.
>
> Are you against the term activist then?
>
> No, I like the term activist, the word militant as well. I am not against terms that evoke action. I think these terms determine lots of things (interview, 05.08.2011).[29]

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[28] Sol gelenekten gelen kadınların refleksleri, örgütlenmesi daha sağlam. Solculuk demek eylem direniş demek, harekete geçmek noktasında. Bu fark nereden geliyor? Farklı muhalefet etme biçimlerinden geliyor bu. Siyasi parti dışında Müslüman kadınların örgütlenme şansı olmuyor zaten. Karma muhalif yapıların içinde daha rahat rol aldı Müslüman kadınlar.

[29] Kendini sivil toplum aktörü olarak görüyor musun?

Görmüyorum. Ben siyaset yapıyorum. Sivil toplum örgütü dediğimiz şey biraz daha pasif olan hayatı değiştirmek yerine anlamaya çalışan sadece bir oluşum. Ve mutlaka hiç bağımsız değil, başka bir yerlere bağımlı, ya da bir ideolojiye yakın ya da bağımlı daha çok iyilik (tırnak içinde iyilik) yapmaya anlamaya çalışan görmeye çalışan bir şey. Ben aynı zamanda Sosyalist Marksist biri olarak da Marx'ın dediği gibi benim için önemli olan hayatı anlamak değildir sadece, hayatı anladıktan sonra değiştirmeye çalışmaktır. O yüzden ben sivil toplumdan, gerçek anlamda bahsetmek istiyorsak çünkü bu kavramlar çok karıştı… o yüzden sivil toplumculuğu değil siyasetçi biri olarak görüyorum.

Aktivist kelimesine karşı mısınız?

G.H who is coming from a leftist tradition also refuses to call herself a civil society actor. It is interesting to observe that she refuses to be acknowledged to operate in the same terrain of battle where militarists or nationalists are also operating. For her, civil society is a perfect place to conflate terms and actors which are in reality perfectly opposed to each other:

> What is civil? It is such an elusive term. What you call civil is civil hegemony. It means nothing. The beginning and end are not clear. What do we mean? Is it anti-militarism, anti-statism? But those terms lump employer associations and feminists together. I am against putting these into the same basket. We will never stand next to TİSK, ever. I do not believe in calling political opposition as "civil society". It is not clear what it is trying to say. I am an anti-militarist feminist.

> I am not saying activist either. When there are so many differences, this term melts all those differences in the same pot. How can I be next to an association affiliated with MHP? Opposition is something else. Opposition is being against hegemony. What do you mean by hegemonic? Hegemony of the state, hegemony of men, those who want war, heterosexist violence, military these are all hegemonic, including heterosexism (interview, 14.03.2011).[30]

A re-reading of her comments also confirms why calling such initiatives "enclaves" is appropriate. The commentator thinks the civic actors which are not opposing dominant and mainstream ideologies may feel at home within the contours of civil society, but as her engagement refuses any allegiance to such ideologies, she is placed outside of civil society. I interpret her comments as an attestation to the fact that

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Hayır, aktivist kelimesini severim. Militan kelimesini de. Eylemci kelimesine karşı değilim. Bunların belirleyici olduğunu düşünüyorum.

[30] Sivil nedir? İpe sapa gelmez bir kavram. Sivil dediğiniz sivil iktidardır. Hiçbir şey ifade etmiyor. Ucu bucağı belli değil o yüzden bana bir neyi kastediyoruz: askeriye karşıtlığı, devlet dışılık mı? O terimde işveren sendikası da dahil, feministler de dahil, bunların harmanlamasına karşıyım. Benim için TİSK ile hiçbir zaman yan yana gelemeyeceğiz. Muhalefetin sivil kavramı ile ifadesini kabul etmiyorum. Ne ifade ettiği belli değil. Ben bir anti-militarist feministim.

Aktivist de demiyorum: bir sürü ayrılık varken o ayrılıkları bir potada eritiyorsunuz. Ben MHP'li bir dernekle nasıl yanyana anılabilirim? Muhalefet başka bir şey. Muhalefet demek egemen olana muhalif olmaktır. Egemenden kastınız nedir? Devlet egemenliği, erkek egemenliği, savaş isteyen mihraklar, heteroseksist şiddet, askeriye hepsi egemen. Heteroseksizm de dahil.

there is a dominant public sphere which such enclaves are opposed and the latter do not see themselves as part and parcel of this public sphere. That is exactly what makes them enclaves. This is not to say that such enclaves are totally occupied with their own vision and their imaginary world. They surely have an ideal that they are fighting for and they are trying to influence this dominant public sphere. However, they refuse to do this in conventional ways and as part and parcel of mainstream civil society. In clear contrast to this vision, there are others who use the term "civil society" in a less critical way. For example, F.G, a veiled woman, thinks civil society is the only place where they can engage in politics and their rights struggles:

> The struggle for rights and putting political pressure happens inevitably in civil society. My entry into civil society was out of a necessity. I was not able to wage politics because I was not able to work in public institutions. We cannot take part in local or national parliaments. I am forced into civil society in a way. Civil society is the only plane I can operate. We can give the services we want to give through this route as well. Recently they set up an association named "The Rights of Patients". These friends give services through this channel because they cannot give those services via public institutions. Lawyers are preparing their files in these associations because they cannot participate in lawsuits. This is the reason why veiled women are active in civil society. It is a realm we have been forcefully directed to (interview, 10.03.2011).[31]

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[31] Siyaset yapma ve hak mücadelesi alanları mecburen sivil toplumda oluyor. Benim sivil toplumda olmam mecburendir. Resmi kurumlarda çalışamadığım için siyaset yapamıyorum. Meclise ya da yerel yönetimlerde, rol alamıyoruz. Sivil topluma itilmiş oluyorum. Sivil toplum bizim için tek alan. Kamuda verilecek hizmetleri de bu alanda yapabiliyoruz. Daha yeni hasta hakları aktivistleri derneği kuruldu. Bu arkadaşlar, kamuda rol alamadıkları için buradan hizmet veriyorlar. Avukatlar davalara giremedikleri için burada dosyaları hazırlıyorlar. Başörtülü kadınlar bunun için aktif sivil toplumda. Sivil toplum zoraki yönlendirilen bir alan oldu.

3.1.5. Major Activities and Declarations of the Platform

Unlike other social movements or alliances that are mostly occupied with joint mobilization and less with sorting out identity differences, this particular alliance started out with joint declarations and a few demonstrations but later turned its attention more towards an internal deliberation on civility, recognition and identity differences. For this reason, we observe less action in the spotlight and more talking in the enclave. Due to this, most of the framing analysis revolves around the interpretation of this inner deliberation than what is spoken out loud in the public deliberative arena. However, it is still useful to consider what was collectively produced and shared in the public sphere to get a sense of the motivations of the coalition.

The alliance was formally set up in September 2008 after a wave of university expulsions of veiled students. The launch of the platform relies on the following declaration. This declaration also explains the purpose of this particular collaboration:

The title of the kick-off declaration is "A public sphere that we cannot walk arm in arm is not our public sphere".[32] The opening paragraph clarifies who the women of the alliance consist of:

> "We, as women who are believers and non-believers, veiled or not-veiled, those who act within the frame of women's rights and liberties and thus who do not claim "if you are here, then I ain't" are against the following."[33]

As can be understood from the title and the opening remarks, the platform attempts to define an all-inclusive collaboration of women. The inclusivity of the coalition stems from the fact that it considers and mentions the marginalization of different women in collective imagery and mentions them as legitimate partners in this collaboration:

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[32] http://groups.yahoo.com/group/birbirimizesahipcikiyoruz/

[33] Bizler inançlı- inançsız, örtünmeyen-örtünen, kadın hak ve özgürlükleri anlayışı içinde "sen varsan ben yokum" demeyen kadınlar olarak;

"We oppose the racist subjection of veiled women as Islamist robots by such adjectives as ignorant, bigoted, mischievous, and disingenuous, opportunist, and fuddy-duddy. We oppose the sexist consideration of non-veiled women as if they are sexual commodities, exhibitionists, seducers. We know that the oppression and exploitation of women are facilitated by the divisions created among them."[34]

This initial manifesto is not very explicit about whether it is the state policies or the general sexist attitudes within society which is considered as the biggest enemy although there is a formal emphasis on the role of state in shaping general public opinion on womanhood and the consequences of this for women:

"We, the women who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions of the state as "a field of contest for brave men" which ignores our existence by relying on the understanding that the place of woman is by her husband's foot, which makes discrimination by the regulations of public morality, which aims at delimiting women's liberties. We, the women reject the control over our bodies in the name of secularism, republic, religion, tradition, custom, morality, honor or freedom. We, the women are not suspicious of each other, we bet for one another!"[35]

The alliance made three important declarations that form the backbone of their collaboration. One is the initial declaration that explains the purpose of collaboration. The other is the declaration made by the movement for protesting the rulings of the Constitutional Court on veiling in universities. The third is the declaration on sexual

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[34] Başörtülü kadınların; cahil, yobaz, fesat, takiyyeci, fırsatçı, örümcek kafalı gibi sıfatlarla bir "islami robot" imajıyla değerlendirilerek, ırkçı yaklaşımlarla şiddete maruz bırakılmalarına karşı çıkıyoruz. Başörtüsüz kadınların; cinsel meta, teşhirci ya da bir tahrik mekanizması gibi cinsiyetçi yaklaşımlarla değerlendirilmesine karşı çıkıyoruz. Kadınlar arasında yaratılan uçurumların kadınların ezilmesini ve sömürülmesini kolaylaştırdığını biliyoruz.

[35] Biz her türlü ayrımcılığın ve adaletsizliğin karşısında olan kadınlar, "kadının yeri kocasının dizinin dibi" anlayışıyla bizleri yok sayan, "genel ahlak" düzenlemesiyle ayrımcılık yapan, kadın özgürlüğüne sınırlar getirmek isteyen bir "er meydanı" olarak devletin kadınlara yönelik her türlü yasağını ve baskısını reddediyoruz. Biz kadınlar; birilerinin bedenimizi modernite, laiklik, cumhuriyet, din, gelenek, görenek, ahlak, namus ya da özgürlük adına denetlemesini istemiyoruz. Biz kadınlar birbirimizden kuşku duymuyor; birbirimize sahip çıkıyoruz! Çünkü biz kadınlar, farkında olduklarımızla yan yanayız

violence against women that came after the ruling on a harassment case committed by a prominent Islamist writer.

The second declaration was made on the veil ban in universities and the declaration was accompanied by demonstrations in certain universities. The symbolic language of the declaration defines the root of the problem as "totalitarian secularism":

"We Bet for One Another Until All of Us is Free

The school term starts again and we see the same scenes all over again.

A group of women, while staying at the outer side of the wall, feel the anxiety of not being able to enter the schoolyard that their friends can freely go, feel the torture of being pointed at by the officials at a very young age, and carry the shaming weight of a system that puts the most basic human rights such as freedom to education and work out of their reach. Beyond everything else, these women who are barely in their early 20s are having a hard time standing upright in a freedom battle.

Those who have implemented this discrimination that comes close to racism in this country, just because these women want to live a life without hypocrisy, should know this:

We are supporting them as women coming from different beliefs, world views and life styles

We feel ashamed in your place for putting them into the shape they have to be in at school.

We feel ashamed in your place for forcing us to wear the hair of your totalitarian secularism such as wigs, hats and berets."

We reject those pledges that say "I am guilty for having wanted an education. I know this and sign it."

None of us is free, where one of us is a hostage
None of us is happy with what she has, while one of us is feeling deprived
None of us has any dignity, while one of us is being insulted
In this test of resistance, we the veiled and non-veiled women will walk together
Until all of us are free
We bet for one another."[36]

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[36] Hep Birlikte Özgür Oluncaya Kadar Birbirimize Sahip Çıkacağız

Yine okullar açılıyor, yine aynı görüntülere şahit oluyoruz.

Some of the non-veiled women found the term "hair of your totalitarian secularism" as a blanket term that put themselves into same category of pro-ban citizens which they consider inaccurate and unjust. However, no one was against the making of this declaration as everyone considered the ban on veil as a pressing problem.

The other declaration was prepared in protest of the decision by forensic medicine that a small girl was not mentally affected in a high profile sexual harassment case. The declaration titled "Do not kill our soul" was written to protest the patriarchal mentality behind most of the court rulings involving sexual violence against women. The declaration identifies patriarchy as the prime force behind sexual offenses as well as the nature of court rulings and findings of forensic medicine. It first identifies the following:

> "None of the harassments or rapes is coincidental and isolated; they are all a form of male violence.
>
> The mentality that gave a 5 months sentence to the woman fishing on the bridge on the basis of "public morality" for wearing inappropriate dress is the same mentality that gives the forensic report that a child who was sexually molested was not mentally affected by this incident.
>
> Male hegemony considers any form of violence on women appropriate and this violence is reinforced and legitimized by the law and the implementers of it.

Bir grup kadın duvarın berisinde arkadaşlarının serbestçe girip çıktığı okula girememenin sıkıntısını; gencecik bir yaşta yetkili parmaklarca işaret edilmenin eziyetini; kalabalıklar içerisinde yalnız kalmanın hüznünü; eğitim, aş, iş gibi en temel insan haklarını kendisi için ulaşılmaz kılan sistemin utanç verici ağırlığını yaşıyor. Ve her şeyin ötesinde, daha belki yaşları yirmilere henüz varmış genç kadınlar bir özgürlük mücadelesinde ayakta kalmaya zorlanıyor. Kadın oldukları için, inandıkları gibi riyasız yaşamak istedikleri için, onlara yıllardır bu ırkçılığa varan ayırımcılığı yaşatanlar bilmeliler ki: Farklı inanç, düşünce ve yaşam pratiğinin içinden gelen kadınlar olarak biz onların yanındayız. Her gün bir kapıdan geçerken onları "olması gereken" kılıklara sokan ayırımcılığınızdan siz değil biz utanıyoruz! Peruk, şapka, kapüşon gibi totaliter laikliğin saçlarını dayatma hakkını kendinizde görmenizden siz değil biz hicap duyuyoruz! Önlerine sürdüğünüz "eğitim almak istediğim için suçluyum, bunu biliyor ve imzalıyorum" vesikalarını vicdanlarımız önünde biz reddediyoruz!

Birimizin tutsak olduğu yerde hiçbirimiz özgür değiliz. Birimizin mahrum olduğu yerde hiçbirimiz sahip olduklarımızla mutlu değiliz. Birimizin hakaret gördüğü yerde hiçbirimiz itibar sahibi değiliz. Bu direnç ve özgürlük sınavında başörtülü-başörtüsüz kadınlar yan yana yürüyeceğiz. Ta ki hepimiz özgür oluncaya kadar. Birbirimize sahip çıkıyoruz!

Harassment and rape are male crimes which cannot be hidden behind explanations such as mental disturbance or evil. Violence against women does not end because the courts, forensic medicine and police which are supposed to prevent this are ignoring the problem. Women cannot make the violence against them public. Media is not doing its responsibility either. Violence against women stays as a third page story and usually made tabloid news.

The declaration ends with the following testament:

We will not keep silent against the male hegemony on our bodies in the form of harassment, rape, beating, virginity control and juvenile marriages![37]

There were certain defections from this declaration on the basis of the assumed man-hating attitude involved in some of the statements. A few of the religious women were supportive of the declaration but did not take part in it as they did not consider such sexual violence as male violence per se.

Such minor disputes as exemplified in the disputes over the terms "hair of totalitarian secularism" or "male violence" show some of the division lines between

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[37] "Ruhumuzu Öldürmeyin Basın Açıklaması

Tacizlerin tecavüzlerin hiçbiri tesadüf ya da münferit değildir; bir erkek şiddetidir.

Köprüde balık tutan kadına "genel ahlak" bahanesiyle uygunsuz kıyafetli denilerek 5 ay ceza verenle cinsel istismara uğrayan çocuğa ruh ve beden sağlığı yerinde raporu veren ve bu rapor nedeniyle tecavüzcüyü serbest bırakan zihniyet ayni zihniyettir.

Erkek egemenliği kadınlara her türlü şiddeti reva görürken erkekleri koruyan yasalar ve uygulayıcılar eliyle bu şiddet güçlenerek, meşrulaşarak artmakta.

Tecavüz ve taciz ruh hastalığının, şeytanın ardına gizlenemez bir erkek suçudur. Mahkeme, adli tıp, emniyet gibi kadına yönelik şiddeti engellemekle sorumlu olan tüm kurumların, görevlilerinin yaşanan şiddete göz yummaları nedeniyle, kadınlara yönelik şiddet bitmiyor. Kadınlar yaşadıkları şiddeti açığa çıkaramıyor. Medya da kadınlara yönelik şiddet konusunda üstüne düşeni yapmıyor. Şiddet üçüncü sayfa haberi olarak yer alıyor ve çoğu zaman magazinleştiriliyor.

Kadınların yıllar yılı verdikleri mücadeleler sonucunda elde ettikleri kazanımların yok sayılmasına izin vermeyeceğiz. Bizler bedenlerimiz üzerinde erkek egemen sistemin denetimine, taciz ve tecavüze, dayağa, bekâret kontrolüne, küçük yaşta evlendirilmeye karşı susmayacağız!

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veiled and non-veiled women, although the lack of complete consensus over the terms did not impede the making of this declaration.

Generally speaking the cross-movement collaboration agrees on combatting sexual and domestic violence as well as veil ban. Despite certain disputes over the terms used to make these declarations, the movement was nevertheless able to come up with a joint statement and action.

Although the movement is not in complete agreement on the nature of male hegemony, there is more or less a consensus to work for the empowerment of women in the public space, veiled or not. This is a common ground they are able to work on.

3.1.6. Discussion Topics

Although the members of this platform came together primarily to defend the rights of the veiled women in opposition to bans on headscarf in universities around the Fall of 2008 and later became a collaboration on women's rights in general, there was no limit to the range of topics discussed during the internal deliberations of the group. For illustrative purposes, I provide the reader with a list of topics discussed in 2008, the peak year for the platform in terms of the frequency and the variety of discussions. One can see that the interests of the platform cover a wide variety of topics and touches upon most of the right's struggles of civil society activists in Turkey. For this reason, the platform exhibits a rich source for analyzing enclave deliberation in heterogeneous settings where members come from very different backgrounds.

Table 2: Classification of topics discussed in 2008

Masculinity	7
class struggle/ worker's issues	5
minority issues	5
a. Kurdish	2
b. Armenian	1
c. Sexual min.	2
femininity/sexuality/body	10
Conservatism	3
headscarf issue	24
harassment/domestic violence	5
Militarism	3
Secularism	3

What this classification reveals is that BSÇ does not only talk about womanhood. Other concerns related to minorities, militarism and secularism serve as a common ground from which they can forge their solidarity. For example, as these women develop common arguments related to the treatment of minorities in Turkey, they establish a basis from which they can do joint activism for other causes. Hence their joint position in these other domains implies reconciliation and consensus building for their subsequent activism in other issue domains. For example by way of building a consensus on militarism and nationalism, they are more at ease in attacking patriarchy or the rights of minorities. The richness and diversity of topics discussed, although giving the researcher a hard time to pin down common patterns and themes, eventually helps us see important connections and issue linkages that facilitated the emergence of this coalition to begin with. Discussions reveal that most platform members try to find commonalities and intersectionalities between others' misfortune and theirs and start constructing a narrative of nationalism, militarism or patriarchy on the basis of careful analyses of all these experiences.

This shows that Fraser and Young were right in arguing that the route to multicultural democracy goes through building coalitions. They represent a passage from highlighting a crude dichotomy of "difference vs. equality" to intersectionalities and similarity in fate.

3.1.7. Controversies

In order to understand the fracture lines in enclave deliberation, case analysis becomes very illustrative. Immersion into the most important controversies of the platform will provide the reader with a perspective as to what divides the alliance. There were various important controversies that caused significant fracture within the platform. I will only mention two of them as they will become part of the analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Withdrawal of signatures of KAOS GL from a petition prepared by veiled women: Another conflict arose when an NGO that fights for the rights of veiled women and whose members are also part of this alliance, has published a statement protesting the ban on veil in universities. Another NGO that fights for the rights of gay/lesbians signed this declaration as well. The NGO that issued the statement was then put under intense pressure by some Islamist circles as the name of the gay/lesbian NGO appears on the declaration. The NGO finally gave up and kindly requested the removal of the name of this NGO, but opted for putting the individual signatories along with their institutional affiliations. This provoked another round of arguments within our alliance.

Controversy over Meeting place: Platform members usually meet in places where alcohol is not served so that veiled women can also come. When the issue of where to meet for the next meeting was being discussed; one platform member suggested meeting for iftar (breaking the fast). However, other members reacted by saying that the willingness to meet for iftar should be reciprocated by being able to meet at a place where alcohol is served. This was taken as an attempt to embrace different life styles, including those who consume alcohol.

Criticism was made by other members who argued that the schism between religious women and women who drink alcohol is too reductionist and dichotomizing. There are too many different preferences and life styles that cannot be reduced to this dichotomy.

Despite such arguments, the symbolic meaning of the choice of the meeting place seems to be decisive for many of the women who consume alcohol. Whether veiled women could meet in places where other members can drink alcohol is seen as a level of maturity needed to claim this coalition is really a working one.

3.2. Methodology

3.2.1. Online Communities as a New Site of Research

This dissertation is about a group which was mostly active in an online community although occasionally the members had face-to-face meetings as well as joint political activism. The study of online communities is a relatively new topic in qualitative work. The virtual sites, due to the changes in the urban lifestyles have come to constitute an important venue for participation and counseling. Researchers working on online communities usually study the interaction patterns between participants, be it the linguistic cues or the importance of emotional support. The actual content of messages serves as the primary unit of analysis in such research (Pfeil and Zaphiris, 2010, p.2). The characteristics of computer mediated interactions, the lack of visual cues and the importance of anonymity are important elements that need to be considered in online community research.

Some researchers claim, the lack of non-verbal cues disguises the real intentions of senders or impairs the understanding of receivers which causes conflict. However, there are other scholars who believe there may be positive value in having mediated conversations than face-to-face conversations. They also believe, people make up for ways to compensate for the lack of such cues in other novel ways such as emoticons. (Pfeil and Zaphiris, 2010, p.2)

Another peculiarity associated with online research is the anonymity. The fact that people may not know one's identity for sure may reduce the anxiety of respondents about social approval and allow them to speak more freely. People can also escape uncomfortable situations more easily by simply logging off. The feeling of anonymity in conversations is also a special advantage in conducting my field work. Since people believe they can be shielded from the scrutiny of the public space, they give more natural reactions to the events, while in in-depth interviews there is always an element

of appealing to the researcher. Some of the answers I got during interviews did not match with how people reacted in the online setting due to this reason.

In the literature review section, we have observed that online communications has become the breeding ground for new forms of deliberation, alliance building and political participation. Although there is a surge in interest in social media and the potentials of online communication as exemplified in the latest Arab Spring and other demonstrations under repressive regimes, empirical political scientists have become rather skeptical about the potentials of this new medium.

It is true that online communication has opened the way for freer forms of interaction. It is arguably very different from print media in that it provides the technological ability for networking with a more diverse public. Print media on the other hand held the key for more homogenizing projects such as developing a sense of nationhood. Anderson (1983) makes reference to the power of print media in creating the sense of "imagined communities" (O'Connor and MacKeogh, 2007, p.97).

Some scholars think online communication has created a reverse pattern in that "horizontal and informal networking of online communication undermines the achievements of traditional publics in democratic regimes" and that "internet tends to fragment debate, giving rise to a huge number of isolated issue publics" (Habermas, 2006, p.142).

Sunstein (2006) thinks information cocoons and echo chambers are a real problem for democracy because the blogosphere is a fertile ground for amplification of errors, hidden profiles, cascade effects, and polarization (p.191).

Certain studies have pointed out to the polarizing effects of online platforms. Lawrence, Sides and Farrell (2010, p.141) find out that political blog readers gravitate towards blogs that accord with their political beliefs. They are more polarized than either non-blog readers or consumers of various television news programs, and roughly as polarized as US senators. These empirical findings also feed into the general fear that increased communication does not always lead to increased interaction between people with differing viewpoints.

The above studies constitute a strand of online research that measures the effects of deliberation with like-minded people versus diverse people. Another strand in online research investigates how identity, both individual and collective are formed and maintained in online venues. The underlying question in this strand of research is whether online media can constitute alternative fora for identity formation.

There are conflicting explanations with respect to how identity formation is facilitated in online communities. There are researchers who argue that "identity is often times more fluid and ephemeral online than offline (Antaki, Ardèvol, Nùñez, and Vayreda, 2005; Cornetto and Nowak, 2006).

Earlier investigations of online identity were often framed within post-modern conceptions of the self as a fractured entity, no longer strongly bounded and often times difficult for both the individual and others to discern (Underwood, 2009, p.34). This is because despite the polarizing effects of online communication, it also provides participants with a degree of anonymity to mask aspects of their identity such as gender, age, ethnicity etc. and to become authors of themselves (Turkle, 1995; Markham, 1998 quoted in O Connor, MacKeogh, 2007, p.99).

As a result of this approach, much of this early investigation focused upon the construction of identity online and celebrated the online realm as a place where individuals had limitless freedom to construct any identity desired and as a space in which individuals could play with and subvert dominant definitions of gender, race, and sexuality (Rybas and Gajjala, 2007 quoted in Underwood, 2009, p.34).

Arguably, this is a very post-modern definition of self, highly interactive and fragmentary (Sand, 2007). This also leaves the question of whether individuals prefer to pick and choose as they wish to build their online identities while maintaining their true offline identities. Scholars like Sand who believe in the transformative powers of identity construction in the online world come to think that online identities are highly experimental and often divorced from an individual's offline identity. Further research shows this is not necessarily true. Online identities do not generally exhibit a total break from offline identities, in fact online identities can be an extension or idealized version of a person's offline self (Ellison, Heino and Gibbs, 2006).

As research continued, this initial excitement over the potentials of online communication faded as it became clear that people often brought existing, dominant definitions of acceptable and desired identities with them from offline settings applying them to the online world and using them to shape their online selves (Schiano, 1999). Despite the revolutionary potential of online settings, actual online interaction often reproduces offline power structures and dominant norms (Crowe and Bradford, 2006).

For example, Burkhalter (1999) showed how race and ethnicity are expressed online, and how identity becomes an important badge of belonging, and similarly how diasporic groups maintain their connections (Miller and Slater, 2000; Hiller and Franz,

2004). The commonality in such research is that it is not so easy to fabricate identity online and that building trust in a virtual space is often bound up in the performance of authenticity of embodied identity. With this realization, scholars began to shift focus away from the potential of online interaction and toward empirical observation and study of actual interaction in online settings (O'Connor and Mackeogh, 2007).

3.2.2. What Use is an Online Community?

With respect to the discussion about whether online communications can really create the communities of the sort we see in the offline world, Bakardjieva (2003) has a different answer:

> 'There has been no consensually accepted definition of its meaning' (online communities) and different actors have interpreted the concept in line with their own goals and interests. The association often made between face-to-face communication and 'genuine' community is misplaced and we should accept that most communities today are, in fact, mediated. Virtual communities cannot be declared inferior to real-life communities simply because they lack face-to-face materiality'. Neither, can they be 'celebrated as liberating or empowering by nature as people bring to them stocks of knowledge and systems of relevance generated throughout their unalterable personal histories and social experience. Our main research purpose, therefore, should be to establish what specific kinds of community, users are creating through their Internet practice (p.292-294).

Bakardjieva (2007, p.294) prefers the concept of 'virtual togetherness' (of which community is one form) to describe the new social forms of 'being and acting together' which are enabled by Internet technology. In this participatory mode of 'virtual togetherness' users produce something of value to others - content, space, relationship and/or culture. She contrasts this mode with the use of the Internet for a 'narrowly private existence' and specifically the 'isolated consumption of digitized goods and services'. She suggests that we might regard Internet use as forming a continuum between the 'consumption' and 'community' poles.

Maintaining existing identities or constituting new identities serve as an important drive for online communities. Some online communities may serve as vehicles for preserving offline identities and strengthening them (Zhang, 2008) while other online communities may help forging of new identities.

There is a wide reference to some social movements such as the environmentalist groups' adoption of online communications technologies in a way that enriches their existing strategies and repertoires of action. Pickerill argues that these groups do not abandon their offline activities; they rather use the internet to better coordinate these activities (Pickerill, 2001). Other research also confirms these findings (Kahn and Kellner, 2006; Rolfe, 2005; Underwood, 2009). However, there could be cases in the opposite direction, where groups form in the virtual world then spread their activities into offline world gradually. The platform that is the case study of this dissertation conforms to this second model. How the online dynamics play out and how they are translated into real life settings is a point of inquiry if we want to understand what novelty online communities bring to social movement research.

In a similar fashion to Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz (BSÇ), O'Connor and Mackeogh (2007) examined an online women's forum that served as a general discussion forum for a wide variety of issues from a woman's perspective. They found that the forum served primarily as a space for the performance of identity. "They noted that a stable definition of group identity was an important project on which the women worked. A key aspect of group identity was the construction of a gendered identity through discursive practices; particularly those revolving around the performance of gender" (O'Connor and Mackeogh, 2007).

3.2.3. Sites of Participation

The alliance I have analyzed in this study had an online community.[38] One of the basic difficulties of working on an online community is specifying the location of activism. This specification gets more complicated if the nature of the online

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[38] http://groups.yahoo.com/group/birbirimizesahipcikiyoruz/

community is more about deliberation than doing activism per se. In fact, the majority of the discussions in this community are more about establishing rules of reciprocity and a common language than doing activism. For this reason, the community serves as a site of deliberation rather than social activism.

Before using the terms community site or alliance space, it is important to specify this terminology in more detail. Hine (2000, p.64) notes that if it is not self-evident where an alliance is located spatially one should focus on the flow and connectivity rather than the location of virtual space. She also warns ethnographers to assume boundaries a priori but to explore them as the research unfolds.

It would have been a narrow an assumption to think that the online community was the only place members gathered in my case study. The persons who penned down the initial declaration were part of an Amargi (a feminist NGO in Turkey) orchestrated event called Amargi Muhabbet Atölyesi which involved meaningful face-to-face interaction and experience sharing between the initiators of this platform. Secondly, although most important deliberations took place within the online community, there were a number of important meetings and gatherings of the alliance, especially when the members felt there was an important impasse in their online involvement. Thirdly, most of the members of this alliance are part of specific NGOs with identifiable purposes.[39] Some have access to media and write weekly or occasional columns, while others are academics. When analyzing this online community, I also paid attention to the products of members in these other sites and venues. The online community gets continuous feeds from such other sites; members post each other's' writings in newspapers to get feedbacks from others.

Another trait of these activists is their rapid mobilization capacity in the face of new events. Within the life span of this alliance, the same activists created many other loose platforms or issue coalitions such as "Sınır Tanımayan Feministler, Feministler Uyumuyor, Henüz Özgür Olmadık, Baskı Altındayız" etc…These coalitions are short lived, single issue campaigns that aim to capture media attention for a short period of time. With the help of their diverse networks and access to media, these women receive wider media coverage than their numbers would suggest. For this reason, as a researcher I paid visit to the NGOs where they spend their time and I was exposed to

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[39] The most important of these are AKDER, Kaos GL, Başkent Kadın Platformu, AMARGİ etc.

their events and reports. However, the units of analysis in this study are the individuals making up this alliance rather than NGOs they are members of. This is because, the alliance was formed on the basis of the signatures of individuals rather than NGOs and the online community reflects all the diversity of opinions among women making up the platform. It would have been inappropriate to call this alliance "an alliance of NGOs" in that sense.

3.2.4. Participation History of Members

I joined the online community quite late in its life, on May 2010. I first approached the two administrators who helped me join the group. Both of them knew my intentions as to why I joined the platform. While analyzing and classifying the postings, I contacted those participants who attended discussions the most. I approached them telling the aim of my research and my intentions. Almost all of them were keen to talk and share with me their experiences. The in-depth interviews were complementary to discussions in the online community. What came out during those in-depth interviews was that, although the memory of this or that particular discussion was forgotten by most of the members, they remembered the basic points of disagreement and the major fault lines within the alliance.

There are still occasional exchanges of information and postings but the type of discussions that animated the online community no longer take place, although the members keep their amicable relations. For this reason, I did not find the opportunity to participate into the online discussions since the platform had become a dormant entity by then. I do not consider this as a major impediment to the quality of analysis in this research. This is because the archives of the platform give me the opportunity to observe this community in the most efficient manner.

The members of this alliance are very prominent activists in Turkey. Some are running important NGOs, some are important journalists, and others are leading academics. With this profile, one can say that they represent a minority of women in Turkey, but arguably a powerful one with the chance to influence public opinion on issues concerning gender relations. There are women from regular professions that do

not necessarily have an intellectual background, but one can confidently say they are all self-made women with heightened sensitivities with respect to the rights and liberties of women and minorities. The qualitative work on such a profile of intellectuals and prominent figures poses certain challenges to the researcher.

Not all members have been equally important for this research. This is mostly because of the 90-9-1 rule in internet participation research.[40] This rule follows that:

- **90%** of users are **lurkers** (i.e., read or observe, but don't contribute).
- **9%** of users contribute **from time to time**, but other priorities dominate their time.
- **1%** of users participate a lot and **account for most contributions**: it can seem as if they don't have separate lives because they often post just minutes after whatever event they're commenting on occurs.

This rule, although the percentages may vary holds true in our case as well. Although the membership of the alliance floated around 215-235 members, there is a core group of contributors who really initiate discussions, answer, give feedback, provoke thoughts and give life to the online community. Their number does not exceed 25 persons which correspond roughly to 11 % of the online community membership. This number is more or less on a part with the total of occasional contributors and heavy contributors (1 % + 9 %) in the internet participation research. These are also the more prominent figures within the women's movement and intellectual life of the country.

3.2.5. Ethical Issues

As in all research that relies on field work that retrieves information from private subjects, ethical issues arise. There are three important topics that have to be considered in dealing with ethical issues in studying an online community according to Pfeil and

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[40] http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html

Zaphiris (2010, p.4-5): these are the distinction between public and private citizens, anonymity of the respondents and informed consent.

The need for informed consent arises when the space that is used as the site of field work is considered a public space or a private space. If we consider the site to be public, there is no need for informed consent. The ProjectH Research Group which worked on ethical issues for internet research came up with the following declaration:

> "We believe the issue of informed consent of authors, moderators and/or archiving institutions does not apply to the ProjectH quantitative content analysis, as we intend to analyze only publicly available text. We believe public posts are public and their use is governed by professional and academic guidelines.
>
> In the quantitative content analysis data collection process, the ProjectH group as a whole will observe the following policy:
>
> - Informed consent will not be sought in advance for the quantitative content analysis of publicly available messages.
>
> - No individual writer will be identified by name in either data collection or data set, unless that writer has been contacted, and her/his consent was obtained in writing.
>
> - Except for short excerpts of 1 or 2 sentences, no messages will be quoted, in any data set, paper or publication, unless the author of the message was contacted and her/his approval was obtained in writing.
>
> - Statements and findings about groups of contributors will avoid identifying individuals.
>
> We will take all measures necessary to separate names of authors and groups from any data collected, measured, or assessed. Individual authors will be identified only by a number. The association of person and identifying number will be kept confidential."[41]

This declaration also serves as a basis for my content analysis. In my analysis, the participants are disassociated from their postings. There is no mentioning of names. For each quote given, I have informed my interviewees and acquired formal approval.

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[41] http://www.it.murdoch.edu.au/~sudweeks/papers/techrep.html

3.2.6. Methods Employed

Conventionally when a researcher analyzes a platform or a coalition, what is considered as an output includes official declarations, slogans, pamphlets, leaflets and/or brochures produced during demonstrations and/or meetings etc…

Whatever happened during the internal deliberations of such groups is usually skipped. However, since I am interested in framing conflicts and the way frames are negotiated, I have to consider the internal debates that lead to the creation of declarations or that simply break down without achieving a common narrative. I also consider the individual outputs of members as important since most of the discussions are initiated within the group thanks to the writings of individual members on various issues. These are mostly published in daily newspapers or magazines. The important caveat here is that I am more interested in the coalition rather than individuals that constitute it. So individuals are analyzed or interviewed to get a better picture of the coalition. They are not an end in themselves; however their thinking and writings contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of the coalition.

I consider the joint declarations as the outputs of the coalition. Conversations between platform members reveal the interactions and the dynamics of deliberation. Interviews with platform members serve as the reflections on those conversations. This gives the researcher an ability to pinpoint moments of break-down, despair or solidarity and how they are connected to the forging of frames. The study adopts a multi-source perspective with each source filling a gap in the argumentation of the research. None of the sources are enough on their own to make certain assumptions but their collective use gives the researcher an ability to make claims as to what increases the likelihood of success in framing in a multi-issue alliance.

The use of multiple sources necessitates using multiple methods. Using multiple methods is usually considered more reliable and this applies to our case as well, but there are also reasons that rule out the use of a single method. The research cannot rely on participant observation because the alliance is very much dormant at the moment although the members still come together for various occasions and maintain their

friendship. The analysis of the messages of the online platform of the alliance is the biggest source of evidence, however as the members are real individuals with different experiences within the alliance it is always better to reinforce the arguments advanced on the basis of archival research with an open minded discussion with members of the alliance. Textual analysis of declarations and newspaper articles help the researcher identify what kind of public face the members want to demonstrate to outside audiences while the internal messages within the online community demonstrate the framing battles going on within the movement that determine the fate of the alliance. That way one can also identify how well the frames adopted and publicized to other audiences really resonate with members of the alliance.

The methods used for this thesis can be grouped into four categories:

I.content analysis: analysis of messages of the online platform

II.   in-depth interviews with prominent figures of the alliance

III.   textual analysis of declarations, newspaper articles (of members) and press releases

IV.   participation to meetings (participant observation)

3.2.7. Content Analysis of Messages of the Online Platform

The principal method used in this study has been content analysis. Content analysis is the most utilized method in online community research. This can be done in two ways: qualitative and quantitative. Both approaches try to reduce every identifiable message into distinct codes. However, how such codes are handled is different in quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Quantitative content analysis involves statistical analysis of data that is reduced down into numbers and frequencies. Qualitative analysis involves the categorization of content into distinct themes and topics and the resultant relations of meaning between these primary categories.

I believe that reducing the texts of the sort I am dealing, those that are imbued with deep meanings and subtleties, into countable categories and frequencies means to miss the essence of the narratives under study. Thomsen (1998) argues that "the rigorous nature of quantitative content analysis does not account for meanings of the text that can be extracted by looking at the conversation as a whole". The qualitative method is the most suitable methodology in this field work since it is the only way to capture the richness and complexity of social life that might not be captured with surveys or interviews (Tuutti, 2010, p.35; Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995). Since the goal here is to understand the ways in which people interpret their issue positions and the ways they frame them, a qualitative frame analysis is the only means to achieve this.

Many researchers use virtual ethnography while making research on online communities. Hine (2000), Fernback (1999) and Ward (1999) believe in the merits of this method because of its superiority in acquiring a reflexive understanding of what it is like to be part of the virtual world. The application of traditional ethnographic techniques to communities in online settings, also known as "cyber-ethnography" (Fay, 2007) is an emerging field within qualitative research used by those studying online social interaction. For conducting ethnography I would have had to engage in the community as a participant, longitudinally. Since that was not possible for this work, I have selected to use qualitative methods drawing influence from ethnographic studies (Tuutti, 2010, p.35).

Ethnographic research involves describing the world as it is and from the viewpoint of the participants themselves. This requires the immersion of researcher into the life setting of a particular community. However, where is the community site in a virtual ethnography? Is it the same thing as the field work of an offline community? In virtual ethnography, the researcher does not share the lives of participants as it is possible in an offline community. Most of the immersion takes place at the desk and the data can be retrieved in an easy manner. In fact, the biggest advantage of conducting ethnographic research in an online setting is that as online communication often consists of written messages, the researcher has access to a verbatim transcript of each instance of communication among group members (Fay, 2007). In many cases, this record of communication is stored indefinitely on the host's server.

Another added advantage of cyber-ethnography has to do with the lack of time limitations on the researcher. One of the biggest challenges in traditional ethnography is the accurate recording of field notes necessary to document the experiences, thoughts,

and feelings of the researcher (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995). However, the social setting in which these observations are made may not let the researcher devote adequate time to both observation and the ideas provoked by those observations. This may largely be due to time constraints. The durable nature of online sites lets the researcher record her reflections as the record of interactions is already there (Underwood, 2009). The researcher has all the flexibility to slow down and re-read the records according to her own pace.

An added advantage of cyber-ethnography is that the researcher can easily eliminate the influence of her observation from the setting. Minimizing the impact of one's own presence on a research setting has long been an important goal of ethnographic researchers (Lofland et al, 2006). It is well established that human subjects may behave differently when they are aware that they are being observed. This effect is magnified when human subjects are aware of the true purpose of the observation (Lofland et al, 2006). Due to the anonymous nature of online interaction, impact of the presence of the researcher is eliminated. In fact, some of the answers I got during in-depth interviews were less reliable than what was said in the online community, as respondents can always try to sound nice to the interviewer which happened in this case as well.

Cyber-ethnography also carries certain pitfalls. Since, identity can be easily masked in online communication; it is hard to discern the identities of participants. Underwood (2009) and Nip (2004) argue that impersonation and identity theft may inhibit a more fine grained analysis of the effect of identities on online activism. In the case of BSÇ however, this was not a real threat, as the coalition had meetings in the offline world from time to time and those who were most active in the platform were already part of various civil society networks which reveal their identity.

Some scholars think it is not enough to be immersed with the online archives and one has to take part in the online activities of the members of an online community. However, there are others who think that immersion of the researcher into the online community can only take place by observing what is going on than actively taking part in discussions (Maloney-Krichmar and Preece, 2005) There are two important reasons why my ethnographic work also took this second direction. First is for reasons of feasibility, meaning the community is dormant and there is no way to animate discussions. Secondly, I want to analyze the interactions unhampered by the

manipulations of the researcher, in its natural course which I consider to be a more objective research style than intervening in those discussions.

3.2.8. Basic Statistics About Online Activism

The online community is more or less dormant, receiving occasional messages and exchange of opinions, but the most heated discussions took place between May 2008 and May 2010. May 2010 is the time when I started collecting the online material. The following charts represent the longevity and diversity of discussions. In the first chart, you can see the total number of posts by each individual member (irrespective of the topic) for each month since the alliance was formed in April 2008 to present. As can be seen from the numbers, there is a significant decrease in postings after June 2010.

Table 3: Frequency of messages in the online blog (January 2008-January 2011)

	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dev
2011	47											
2010	94	266	401	141	172	171	75	53	44	151	133	78
2009	1183	486	540	371	298	369	199	148	127	185	230	158
2008				82	254	479	290	272	855	1595	1452	797

However, I did a more fine grained classification since not all of the postings were related to discussions or had the purpose of discussing. Some were announcements, sharing of interesting news etc.. In the following charts, those postings that led to meaningful discussions were classified monthly. For this, any topic that provoked a discussion of at least four members were considered a meaningful topic and was recorded. For each month, one can observe the average number of posts, number of total posts and the number of topics. By dividing the number of topics to the number of days in a month, one can see the frequency of new discussions in the online community. For instance in the month of May 2009, there was a new topic discussed every 2,73 days, while during the month of October 2008, there was a new discussion every 0,88 days, meaning every day there was more than one topic initiated for discussion.

Below, you can also see the frequency of the topics for each month between May 2008 and December 2010, the time when my analysis ended. You can also observe that after May 2010, the online community became very much a dormant entity.

Table 4: Frequency of topic initiation in the online blog for 2008

2008	Average	Number of posts	Number of topics	Every X days
May	4,81	53	11	2,73
June	9,94	169	17	1,76
July	11,63	128	11	2,73
August	7,23	94	13	2,31
September	21,84	415	21	1,43
October	14,94	508	34	0,88
November	11,51	426	37	0,81
December	12,38	260	21	1,43
TOTAL		2053	165	

From these tables, one can get a more accurate picture about the longevity of the discussions in the online community.

Table 5: Frequency of topic initiation in the online blog for 2009

2009	Average	Total talks	Number of topics	Every X days
January	10,97	417	38	0,79
February	9,86	148	15	2,00
March	10,85	228	21	1,43
April	9,42	132	14	2,14
May	9,45	104	11	2,73
June	11,64	198	17	1,76
July	7,66	46	6	5,00
August	20,8	104	5	6,00
September	16,28	114	7	4,29
October	21,28	149	7	4,29
November	17,66	106	6	5,00
December	13	52	4	7,50
TOTAL		1798	151	

Table 6: Frequency of topic initiation in the online blog for 2010

2010	Average	Total talks	Number of topics	Every X days
January	0	0	0	0,00
February	10	90	9	3,33
March	16,4	164	10	3,00
April	9,5	19	2	15,00
May	0	0	0	0,00
June	9	36	4	7,50
July	9	1	1	30,00
August	0	0	0	0,00
September	0	0	0	0,00
October	15,33	46	3	10,00
November	7,33	22	3	10,00
December				0,00
TOTAL		378	32	

The difficulty with the frame analysis in this online community has been the diversity of topics discussed which leaves the researcher with a huge volume of unrelated comments and activities. For example the following classification of topics of 2008 reveals what is being discussed is not always about women's issues. The majority of online communities in the literature of virtual ethnography deal with single issue communities, such as post-partum stress, drug addiction etc. When the community under study engages in discussions that are so diverse in scope, the researcher inevitably has to go beyond the issue content or issue positions to find patterns that will apply to the majority of topics under analysis. For this reason, the examples I give throughout the Findings section are about very diverse topics, which may cause problems of traceability for the reader. To prevent this, at I have provided the readers with background information as to the biggest controversies in the "Group History" chapter.

In this study, I relied extensively on online textual material which provides the gist of my findings. I do not consider this as limited documentary evidence. This material is rich in content. However, to be able to substantiate my arguments in a more convincing fashion and to be able to clarify some of the points raised in online discussion, I opted for a multi-source, multi-method triangulation. This involves conducting interviews with prominent figures in the online community as well as supporting the claims raised in the thesis with documentary evidence from the declarations of the alliance and newspaper columns of some of the members, as well as

join as participant observation to meetings where most prominent members of BSÇ were present.

Figure 3: Number of discussions initiated in the online blog (2008-2010)

Number of discussions 2008-2010

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
3.2.9. In-depth Interviews with Group Members

There are two different sources for analyzing the outputs of group members. One is the in-depth interviews with the members; the other is the internal conversations with other group members. These two sources have very different dynamics and rationale. The internal deliberations of group members take place in the online community and they are mostly conversations on how to approach the issues of common concern,

whether to make a campaign or not and how to craft a common narrative be it in the form of a public declaration or a demonstration slogan. The analyses of these conversations reveal the internal dynamics of frame articulation processes. They reveal who makes what kind of compromises for the alliance. They reveal which constituencies are catered by such frames.

In-depth interviews on the other hand, reveal the reflections on the whole experience by the members themselves. They involve a very personal account as it conveys how the whole effort was perceived by members themselves. For this reason, it is an individual level of analysis. The study is on coalition building whereas one of the sources this research relies on is the individual level. For this reason, I consider in-depth interviews as complementary tools for assessing how the dynamics of the coalition were perceived by its participants. The in-depth interviews help the researcher understand the dynamics of deliberation. Although I gave an account of some of the individual attributes of platform members in the Group History Chapter, this was be done for understanding what kind of civic backgrounds and networks are conducive to the formation of multi-issue coalitions.

I used a semi-structured interview questionnaire that provided general guidance during the interviews, but I always kept a high degree of flexibility in posing my questions because the respondents were either remembering certain issues while forgetting others or they were fond of talking about some issues rather than others.

3.2.10. Textual Analysis of Declarations and Newspaper Articles

Most of the members of this alliance have public visibility. They are leading female intellectuals, columnists, scholars and activists in Turkey. Almost all of them have used media outlets to express their view about politics and society. Some of the most heated discussions within the alliance were also triggered by newspaper articles written by members. For this reason, I will be quoting these articles whenever they are pertinent to my analysis. Analysis of such posts should be considered as an attempt to understand issues of common concern, rather than an analysis of particular members and their take on certain issues.

Secondly, I quoted the press releases and the declarations to give a sense of the public image of the alliance. The downside of using such declarations however is, it gives the impression that all of the members of the alliance are in total agreement with whatever is being published. As the conversations in the online community reveal, although effort is being made in the alliance to achieve the highest degree of consensus, there are always fractures and disagreements on the basis of differences in ideological positions or belief systems. This means there is a duality between the public face and the internal dynamics of the alliance. Declarations could and did come out without complete consensus and the analysis of internal dynamics revealed a more nuanced picture about the true nature of relations within the alliance. This duality proves the necessity of employing a multi-source, multi-method triangulation. Only in this way can one eliminate inconsistencies in findings of one source through double checking through other sources.

3.2.11. Participation to Meetings

As I explained before, the meetings of the platform took place when the online discussions became deadlocked. There were calls made to have routine meetings, but this never truly materialized. Since those meetings took place before I started analyzing the alliance, I did not have the opportunity to participate to those heated discussions, although discussion notes were shared in the online community in a detailed fashion. I had the opportunity to participate to a few meetings after May 2010, but these were mostly on elaborating on what went wrong with the platform. The meetings after May 2010 never had the same purposeful quality the meetings before that date had.

However, I have participated to a discussion organized by Amargi on 7 April 2012 where some of the most prominent members discussed what went wrong in the coalition and the underlying reasons for the fractures in the coalition.[42] I also had the

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[42] http://www.amargi.org.tr/files/3.hafta_.jpg

chance to ask questions and clarifications to the platform members which I have made use of in the analysis section.

Chapter 4.   Framing Gender Relations:
Building Consensus on the Basis of Questioning Male Privileges

How do coalitions set their targets in the absence of a common, unifying identity? Is diversity necessarily an impediment in front of advancing common goals? These questions become important if we are to make sense of how this coalition furthers women's cause in Turkey despite the fact that it is made up of women with very diverse backgrounds.

This chapter is dedicated to explaining the ways in which this coalition defines and formulates its gender related frames without necessarily asking for every member to show their allegiance to feminist principles. In other words this chapter will explain how members can construct a common reference point without holding identical viewpoints on gender. I consider this effort important due to the deep seated conviction among feminists that women's empowerment can only go through showing allegiance to feminism. This thesis argues this is not necessarily the case. In fact, we need more studies and analysis that shows women's movement can accommodate more diversity than it has been claimed by feminists.

This coalition also provides us with an interesting test case to see whether it is possible for large collaborations to endure the splintering effects of identity politics and whether they have the necessary theoretical and practical richness to come up with a new synthesis across social movements. Both radical democracy and multicultural democracy theorists make a huge emphasis on promoting multicultural public forms but it remains yet to be seen whether and how such public spheres do actually function. When we apply this logic to our platform we see that this coalition exhibited immense diversity in opinions with respect to gender issues. However, it was still able to bring

members around common issues, common targets and was able to craft frames that served women's interests at the macro level. This observation is important as many critics think what divides women's movement in Turkey are precisely these diverging view points on gender relations (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005, Aslan Akman, 2008).

As can be recalled from the kick-off declaration explained in "Group History", the coalition determined its targets in a diverse fashion. Starting with the prohibitions and oppressions of the state "as a field of contest for brave men", the declaration also rejected the control of female bodies in the name of various ideologies and societal norms.[43] This chapter will show how setting the strategic targets appropriately facilitate cooperation between members of the coalition who in reality have diverging viewpoints on gender relations.

The important thing here is that members do not necessarily define themselves as feminists, in that sense there is no identity alignment. However, participants can still align their frames for the purpose of fighting various strategic adversaries. This will show coalitions can still accommodate diversity through framing if they can set their targets in a way that embraces the sensitivities of all the constituent members in the coalition. This also shows that there can be solidarity within the wider women's movement in Turkey despite deep ideological (left-right) and life-style (religious-secular) differences. This runs contrary to previous observations which depict a more bleak picture about the solidarity of women who feel allegiance to different –isms in Turkey.

Drawing bleak pictures on the incompatibility of certain values with women's empowerment has been a dominant theme in much feminist theorizing. This becomes more acute in the observations made by feminists about Muslim women's movement.

This fact has been put forward by Kandiyoti (1987, p.324) in her previous studies where she protests the way Western observers oversimplify when they conclude that an

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[43] We, the women who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions of the state as "a field of contest for brave men" which ignores our existence by relying on the understanding that the place of woman is by her husband's foot, which makes discrimination by the regulations of public morality, which aims at delimiting women's liberties. We, the women reject the control over our bodies in the name of secularism, republic, religion, tradition, custom, morality, honor or freedom." We, the women are not suspicious of each other, we bet for one another!

autonomous women's movement and feminist consciousness in the Western sense is prohibited by an "Islamically" mystified consciousness or reluctance to identify with "foreign" values.

As Kandiyoti (1987, p.317) says, "Concepts generated by Western feminists have rarely been applied to informed analyses of women in Islamic societies; conversely, the experiences of women under Islam have not been systematically used to critically evaluate feminist concepts." Kandiyoti (1987) further states that "there is a great deal of diversity and specificity in women's experiences in Islamic societies which vary with the nationalist histories and social policies of the countries in which women are located" (p. 320).

The consequence of this mutual prejudice is that even those women who associate themselves with activism related to empowering women gain a critical distance to feminist concepts. Kandiyoti (1987) proposes that this problem would be especially more acute in former western colonies where feminism is associated with "white women's burden".

Although Turkey may be freed from such fears as it does not have a colonization history, it still suffers from similar pressures as the Kemalist project has attributes reminiscent of a white (wo)men's burden. For this reason, for a long while when the issue was women's movement, it referred to the secular-Kemalist feminist movement in Turkey. This also has to do with the fact that scholars studying women's movement mostly came from a more secular background and believed in the merits of a more secular orientation towards women's issues. The divide between religious and secular world views and what it brings to the discussion on women's empowerment has only very recently started gaining importance (Göle, 2000; Aslan Akman, 2008; Çayır, 2000). However, previous gender research in Turkey has either exclusively focused on just one group within the larger women's movement and treated the issue of emancipation of women from that group's perspective or tried to show the unbridgeable divides between secular feminist movement and religious women (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005). Such studies although giving a very accurate depiction of the attitudes of different groups of women within the women's movement are unable to account for collaborations between them or the iterative process through which their interaction can feed and advance or modify the general assumptions of feminism.

One difficulty stems from the fact that such encounters and deliberations are rare. For a long time, collaborations between different factions within the women's

movement have taken place for other campaigns that are not necessarily gender-related. For example, anti-military campaigns were fertile ground on which different women could cooperate. Such campaigns helped women draw similarities between the fates of women who are affected by war and violence. Peace coalitions became effective platforms where women activists with different political backgrounds started working together to oppose various military operations such as the war in Iraq, the war in South East of Turkey and the war in Gaza. To illustrate the significance of this experience, almost all of the women in the platform I am analyzing refer to Barış İçin Kadın Platformu as the place where they had their first encounters with other groups of women. Such fora help women activists realize how war, violence and rising nationalism affect women in very different ways than men and how it limits their freedoms and defines their responsibilities as a citizen in a gendered fashion.

Coming to this conclusion has not been very straightforward neither for feminist movement nor for veiled women. Many of the feminists admitted having a leftist Kemalist streak in their background for many years which relied on not questioning the encroachment of the state into people's liberties. This questioning has been a relatively recent phenomenon whose origins can be traced back to 1980s coup. Alliances with conscientious objectionists as well as veiled women are a result of this internal questioning. This transition is important in order to understand how feminist movement had a rapprochement with other movements.

Veiled women on the other hand admitted during interviews they would not have had major problems with militarism if it was not for 28th of February and its selective punishment of veiled women. They drew attention to the fact that there is not a healthy and objective criticism of state power among religious intellectuals. While many religious individuals still believe army is the "Peygamber ocağı", even those who are critical of the army would not engage in the same level of criticism when it comes to police forces. By engaging in a more critical discussion with activists in peace coalitions and by drawing from their personal experiences, these women also arrived at similar conclusions with respect to the linkages between militarism-nationalism and patriarchy.

Creating these inter-linkages is important not just for this particular coalition but for women's movement in general. As I have argued in the literature review section, one of the most important reasons why Turkey did not have an autonomous women's movement until 1980s has to do with the fact that most feminists and other women's

activists have not put a certain distance between the official state ideology and policy towards women and the aspirations of women's movement. In fact for a long time the two were deliberately fused in an attempt to prove whatever women need in Turkey has been given to them by the state on a silver tray. This subservience to national interests was the main reason why women's movement was weak and elitist. While feminists have started seeing the incompatibility of a statist agenda that successfully utilized militarism and nationalism, with their own liberation agenda thanks to the 1980 coup, veiled women observed how different women suffer asymmetrically from a militarist agenda with 28th of February.

Peace coalitions and similar experiences with the state (i.e. 1980 coup and 28th of February) provided a rapprochement between different factions within the women's movement. They provided opportunities to reflect on similar experiences of different women. However, this rapprochement has not turned into concrete collaborations on gender issues. Other than the coalition I am analyzing, there have not been explicit attempts to align the gender perspectives of different groups of women activists. There have not been studies which question the possibility of such collaborations either.

An exception is the study by Aldıkaçtı (2005) which compares the views of feminists with what she calls orthodox Islamists and reformist Islamists. The study stems from the need to account for the circumstances and contexts that encourage or prevent the coalition of women's groups. This need becomes especially significant when researching why feminist and some right wing/religious groups, who generate similar views on women's issues, have little or no alliance with each other. Aldıkaçtı (2005) argues that "overlooking the question of why there is little or no dialogue perpetuates the polarized views on women's issues rather than producing commonly accepted policies that can address women's issues effectively" (p. 105).

In an attempt to delineate the standing of reformist Islamist women from that of orthodox Islamist women, she shows how veiling is used in an instrumental sense, as a facilitator of integration of Muslim women into public life by reformist Islamists. She also shows how reformist Islamists are in favor of paid work which she sees partly an attempt to adapt to the modernization process and a reaction to feminism. She thinks of such rationalizations as a selective receptiveness towards feminist views (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.113).

The novelty of reformist Islamists stems from the fact that they openly criticize the male dominated version of Koran and the distorted and unjust implications of this

version for women. Reformist women argue that because of this distortion, people misunderstood Islam as a backward religion that imprisons women in the home. Reformists emphasize that many traditional Muslim people believe that Islam commands women to stay at home, but, in reality, Islam does not restrict women to the home (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.115; Aktaş, 1996). Their ideal version of Islam does not restrict them to a secondary role and there is no contradiction in being religious and standing up for their rights as women.

As a group of women trying to find solutions to women's problems, reformist Islamists are quick to agree that women are indeed oppressed by men and feminist knowledge should be made use of in their quest for empowerment of women (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p,116). However, their solutions should always be constructed within Islam. Only Islam can provide better lives for women (Aktaş, 1991).

For Aldıkaçtı the basic difference between reformist Islamists and feminists is that while the former prioritizes collective harmony, the latter values and highlights individual autonomy (Bulbeck, 1998, p.74). She gives the example of paid work where reformist women celebrate women's role in labor market but also define the limits of paid work within Islam which prioritizes benefiting one's community and family in making a decision to work outside the home. By doing this, Aldıkaçtı argues that reformists are selectively appropriating feminist ideas in a communal Islamic way of life. Serving society makes the individual decision to work community oriented. She believes reformists have a chance of changing attitudes in Islamic circles by modifying such feminist views to fit their agenda (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.116).

However, she still thinks approaching issues within the frameworks of individual choice or communal harmony appears to push feminist and Islamist women to separate ends in Turkey. However, since reformist Islamist women have found a way to bridge individualism and community orientation by selectively appropriating feminist views, this factor alone is not enough to explain why meaningful dialogue between the two groups has not developed (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.117).

Studies such as that of Aldıkaçtı have one particular downside. They do not adopt an iterative framework. They cannot show what happens if groups of women with different convictions actually come together and discuss concepts and matters important for women's movement in general. What kind of extensions and transformations such an open ended deliberation would bring is absent from such analysis. One difficulty stems from the fact that such encounters and deliberations are rare. Another difficulty is

that scholars are eager to scrutinize and criticize non-feminist explanations to gender issues with a secular-feminist bias. So even when there is a critical give and take between different groups of women, the effort is not to unearth the potentials and implications of this interaction but to assess how close they can perform to being a feminist coalition.

The interesting observation related to gender work of this coalition is that, despite the fact that there is no consensus on taking "private as political" or on gender equality, women of different convictions are able to formulate frames that serve women's interests at the macro level. One such frame is on regulation of female bodies. By way of differentiating self-regulation (i.e. veiling) from male regulation of female bodies (i.e. harassment), the coalition is able to align the discourse of women who exert different levels and types of regulation on their bodies. While veiled women can be said to exert a more strict regulation on their bodies, non-veiled women can still align their discourse with them by way of differentiating self-regulation from male regulation. Another consensus emerges with respect to how male dominance operates through various ideologies to regulate not only the bodies but also the life choices of women. By showing how political ideologies are in reality male ideologies that work to the disadvantage of women, the coalition achieves a more critical re-reading of political tools of propaganda. Good examples are conservatism's upholding of female chastity as the foundation of family, or militarism's stress on women as the bearers of sons for the army etc.. These examples show that consensus does emerge from this coalition despite the fact that members are far from holding similar views on gender relations.

How this maturity and transformation in the women's movement came about in Turkey deserves deeper reflection. In the literature review chapter, I have noted that feminism went through three distinct phases that helped it achieve a certain degree of reflexivity vis-à-vis other movements. While the first phase included a rigorous discussion of gender difference (and whether gender equity in the strictest sense is desirable), the second phase was focused on differences among women whereas in the last (current) phase, attention shifted towards "multiple intersecting identities" (Fraser, 1997, p.175).

Realization of both "differences among women" and "multiple intersecting identities" thought two important lessons for the movement: "there is no single women's condition" and "isolationism does not pay off". The first lesson came about as the marginals of the women's movement entered the scene of civil society. Fraser

largely attributes this to the work of lesbians and women of color (Fraser, 1997, p.178). Of course her depiction tells more about the American case. However, there are corollaries of such exclusions in other parts of the world as well. In the case of Turkey, this played out mostly in the form of exclusion of veiled women from women's movement for various reasons. One is the fact that veiled women during 1990s operated as party supporters rather than women's activists as depicted by Yeşim Arat for Welfare Party and later AKP. Religious women's most important disappointment with men and their increased commitment to women's cause came about after 28th of February where they were punished for their veil while religious men could still continue their public life. This is the time when gender inequality became a more poignant issue for veiled women. This theme came up in my interviews as well. Many of the veiled women I interviewed expressed their disappointment with their male counterparts in neglecting the asymmetrical prosecution of women from education and labor markets during that period.

After this period, we have seen an increase in their public visibility and activism as exemplified in "CEDAW Shadow Report on Veil Ban as a Discrimination against Women", "Başörtülü Aday Yoksa Oy da Yok" campaign or their joint activism with other women's NGOs for changes in Civil Code.

Another reason why veiled women were priorly excluded from women's movement was the antagonism of state sponsored feminism towards religious ideologies. Kemalist feminism as well as many versions of materialist/socialist feminism thinks of religion as a form of male control on female bodies and a limitation on their public visibility. For this reason, for a long time there was great skepticism on the part of various wings of feminist movement towards religious women. Being religious made a person de facto an outcast in the women's movement. Liberal feminists were the only wing to embrace such women. By repressing differences among women, the movement also suppressed an account of different ways in which marginalization plays out for women of different ideological leanings, of different sexual orientations and ethnicities etc…

What is more, women with intersecting identities had multiple allegiances to other movements and this also complicated the picture of women's struggle. Just in other parts of the world and in other social movements, feminism found cross-cutting commitments and shared problem areas with other movements. The reason for embracing diversity can also be attributed to political opportunity structures. Before the

coup of 1980, leftist women were not able to frame their struggle in a way that transcends their leftist activism. Operating in male circles exerted a degree of pressure on their thinking and claims. Following the coup, the women's movement which was a spin-off from leftist movements of the 1970s established its autonomy and acted as an initiator of more inclusive rights struggles due to changes in political opportunity structures. The women of the post 1980s era were more capable of linking their marginality within the larger leftist or pro-liberties movements of the prior era with the current marginality of other segments of society such as the veiled women. Although we cannot say that the Kemalist or socialist wings of the feminist movement was as outspoken about this problem as some of the more radical wings of the women's movement, it is safe to say that a wing of women's movement was able to engage in issue linkage to an extent which other movements refrained from doing.

This coalition exhibits the most advanced attempt at establishing cross-cutting commitments within the larger women's movement. The coalition attempted at crafting a united front for advancing women's cause all the while operating through a diverse and heterogeneous public. The major difficulty stemmed from adopting a rhetoric that was not necessarily feminist but that was still serving women's interests at the macro level.

This debate is important because there are many feminists who claim women's cause can only be furthered if there is strict adherence to gender norms set by feminism. It is true that feminist movement had brought significant benefits to home crowds where it has been effective. However, in places where feminism had to collide with other parallel rights struggles or struggles that only marginally touch upon the gender cause, it can still reap significant benefits if it agrees to align its frames with those other movements. For example, for a long time the veil issue was the problem of veiled women who did not receive any support from feminist movement. Many feminists, who are mainly coming from very secular backgrounds, often thought of the veil as a restriction on female bodies and as a sign of backwardness. Hence, instead of being seen as a gender cause, for many it symbolized the subjugation of women. Only when women's movement starts seeing the veil ban as a restriction on women's education and employment, can we talk about a re-alignment of priorities of these two separate struggles. This coalition is a first attempt in that direction. Despite the fact that there are clear disagreements with respect to how gender relations are conceptualized, there are clear points of consensus which make joint action possible.

The remaining sections of this chapter have a dual purpose. While pointing out to the most important disagreements within the coalition with respect to gender equality, I will also try to illustrate which frame alignments give us reasons to argue that this coalition is a joining of separate women's struggles for the first time in Turkey. When I say that this coalition does not have a consensus on gender equality in the feminist sense what I mean is not all members of the platform are basically after the equality of men and women in every sphere of life or of the opinion that private matters which subjugate women in the domestic sphere should be dealt with the same vigor with public matters that concern women, such as right to education or work. These differences in opinion, although creating significant divisions within the group can still be reconciled by building consensus in other issue domains that I will try to illustrate in this chapter.

Before getting into the specifics of frame alignments within the coalition pertaining to gender issues, I would like to point out to the different ways in which members express their personal awakening to women's cause or the processes through which they discovered women's alienation from male dominated public sphere. This awakening has usually been depicted by my interviewees as a coming to terms with how women are downplayed, exploited, talked about but never given proper worth or due consideration in heterogeneous civic and professional environments.

Here is a quote by L.M who was previously a veiled woman and who had to remove her veil in order to continue working:

> I was bitterly disappointed by these attitudes during the 28th of February. The fact that the whole burden was put only on the shoulders of Muslim women, it being a republican coup, seeing that it posed no danger to men, seeing them even increase their wealth….There was a dersane that I used to work for. I was doing an internship; I was not getting any money. I thought I would have a job ready for myself when I finished my internship. I thought I could work with my veil. They offered me such a small amount of money. Exploitation is involved here. The double standards such as "we would let you work with the veil but you should remove it while entering and cover up when you are leaving the office" were because they were scared. I was so depressed for two years over this. I was never considering unveiling. They put me under such pressure. They did not give me my money. That was the time when I saw the differences between men's world and women's world but I was not part of any initiative yet. When did this happen? Until the year 2006, I still had a bad image of feminists in my mind. My friends told me: "Girl, your only concern since high school has been women's issues but you still have not got involved in anything yet." It

only occurred to me after these comments. I started reading feminist theory
and became part of BSÇ (interview, 16.03.2011).[44]

Another religious woman, D.E, who refuses to be identified with feminism, argues against the political system that objectifies veiled women and reduces them to a silent mass that the political authority can exploit whenever and however it wishes:

The declaration of BSÇ emerged like this: It was seen as a general need by women. People were talking about veiled women but they were talking about them as objects. The objectification really created a considerable pressure on us. From one side, people considered us to be the appendages of AKP, as did the party itself. These people come out and say things I would never consider saying. There is another type of pressure from the other side. Those people totally objectify you and regard you with deep prejudice. But we are not there to speak. We are being talked about but we are not part of the discussion. This declaration emerged out of those feelings of frustration. This is like a caricature, a person feels inevitably like the following: Who are you to tell me to say I can or cannot enter a university. Even people who support our cause have such a patronizing attitude. You should not consider yourself to be authorized to say such things. That's why I find this declaration very important (interview, 23.03.2011).[45]

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[44] 28 Şubat sürecinde bu tutumlardan dolayı çok duvara tosladım. Bunun sadece Müslüman kadınların üzerine yıkılması, Cumhuriyetçi bir darbe olması ve erkeklerin çok rahat olması, hatta gelirini arttırması… Benim çalıştığım bir dershane vardı mesela, stajyerlik yapıyordum para almadan çalışıyordum. Çıkınca da işim hazır olur sanıyordum, başörtüsü ile çalışabileceğimi sanıyordum orada…Bana çok cüzi bir para teklif ettiler, burada sömürü giriyor işin içine ve başı kapalı çalıştırırız ama, okulda açık, dışarı çıkınca kapalı olur şeklinde riyakarlıklara yatmaları aslında korktukları için…Ben o dönemde ciddi ciddi çok depresif iki yıl geçirdiğimi bilirim…Hiç de başımı açmayı düşünmüyordum. Ama beni öyle bir baskının içine soktular benim alacaklarımı vermediler, o zamanda erkeklerin dünyası ve kadınların dünyası arasındaki farkı çok net gördüm ama yine de kurumsal bir yapının içinde bulunmadım. Ta ki ne zaman oldu, işte 2006 yılında, o zamanlar hala feministlerin benim gözümde kötü bir imajı var. Arkadaşım bana dedi ki, "kızım senin liseden beri tek meselen kadın meselesi ve hala feministlere bulaşmadın". O zaman kafama dank etti, feminist kuramı falan da okumaya başladım, o zaman. O zaman BSÇ'ye de dahil oldum.

[45] O da (BSÇ bildirisi) şöyle çıktı. Genel bir ihtiyaç olarak görülmüştü, hep başörtülüler konuşuluyor ama hep nesneleştirilerek konuşuluyordu. Oradaki nesneleştirme bizim üzerimizde çok ağır bir baskı hissettirdi ve bu her türlü, orada da aynı tür gerilimler var. Bir taraftan biz Ak Parti'nin doğrudan uzantısı gibi görülüyoruz mesela, dolayısıyla Ak Parti de böyle görüyor zaten, bu insanlar çıkıp bizim adımıza konuşuyor mesela. Benim aslında hiç söylemeyeceğim şeyleri söylüyorlar. Diğer tarafta bu sefer farklı bir baskı sistemi var, onlar tamamen seni nesneleştiriyor ve çok önyargılı bir şekilde yaklaşıyorlar sana. Ama biz ortada yokuz, konuşulan biziz ama biz ortada yokuz. Daha çok o hissiyattan ortaya çıktı. Zaten bildiriler şeysi oldu ya o dönemde, önce kronolojik sırasını hatırlamıyorum ama üniversiteye giremezler, sonra

C.E, expresses her disillusionment with the socialists' dismissal of gender equality as "women's problem" and only problematizing the exploitation of female labor in the formal labor market which is the tip of the iceberg for her:

There was no consideration for women's emancipation in socialist circles. They were calling it women's problem. As I said, I am a materialist feminist so I discovered two fundamental issues between men and women. One is the domestic exploitation of women's labor. Women are being exploited for their domestic work by their domestic male relatives. One is the boss, the other is a laborer. There is also sexual exploitation. If you call labor exploitation and sexual exploitation women's problem I would think you are retarded. I started as a socialist. Then I saw that socialists started with the maxim "women's problems", and they refer only to the issues of women which occur in the public sphere, such as in a formal employment setting. However, only a small fragment of women are in the formal sector and receiving a formal wage for it. They work through the gears of capitalism and they are lucky women (interview, 05.08.2011).[46]

These quotes attest to the fact that each member's disillusionment forced her to seek solidarity with other women who had discouraging experiences in male dominated circles. This does not mean that each member felt marginalized or disillusioned for exactly the same reason. Some of the women felt marginalized from an economic standpoint. The economic exploitation of well-educated veiled women by Islamic firms is a case in point. Others felt more marginalized from a political perspective. Some of the veiled women explain how they were excluded from political representation while

girebilirler dendi ama bunu söyleyenler başkaları. Bir tarafta girebilir diyenler, bir tarafta giremez diyenler, bir tarafta şuraya kadar girebilir, şuraya kadar giremezler diyenler. Bu o kadar karikatürlük bir durum ki, insan ister istemez şunu hissediyor, "Ya siz kim oluyorsunuz, ne demek girebilirler ya da giremezler?". Destekleyen insanların da böyle bir tutumu var, en başta bunu söyleme yetkisini kendinizde görmemelisiniz. En çok da bu noktada bildiriyi önemsiyorum.

[46] Sosyalist çevrelerde kadın kurtuluşu gibi dertleri yoktu. Onlar kadın sorunu diyordu. Maddeci feministim dedim ya, ben kadınlarla erkekler arasında iki temel mesele olduğunu farkettim: Birincisi kadınların ev içi sömürüsü ve evin içinde akraba olan erkeklerle bir emek sömürüsü. Biri patron, biri işçi..biri işveren, diğeri sömürülen. İkinci şey, bir cinsel sömürü var. Yani emek sömürüsü ve cinsel sömürü olan yere kadın sorunu diyorsan orada aklından şüphe duyarım ben senin. Ben sosyalist olarak işe başladım. Sonra baktım sosyalistler kadın sorunu diye işe başlıyor ve kadın sorunu derken de kadının kamusal alanda yani bir patronun işverenin işinde çalışan kadınların sorunlarından bahsediyorlar. Oysa, onun dışında, yani kadınların çok küçük bir bölümü dışarıda çalışıyor. Ve bir ücret karşılığında çalışıyor. Ve kapitalist sistemin çarkları arasında çalışıyor. Ve bunlar şanslı kadınlar sahiden.

men who share similar views with them could easily become MPs. Leftist or socialist women were particularly sensitive to the lack of attention of their male comrades to women's exclusion from leadership positions in leftist civic organizations.

This shows, while marginalizations are not necessarily of the same nature or of the same gravity, the mechanisms of exclusion function as an effective means to create an image of "unison of fate". Here is what Z.A noted on this point:

> All these women are marginalized in their own circles. They are at the outskirts of every group. As the outskirts converge toward each other, they understand each other. They were all psychologically beaten up in their own community. To claim your own womanhood in this country is to seek trouble (interview, 22.09.2010).[47]

If marginalizations, no matter how different origins and natures they have, can still work as powerful tools of frame alignment in this coalition, they need more attention. This actually confirms the observations of Iris Young who believes that drawing on different types of marginalizations can add to the strength of a multicultural coalition.

So our next question becomes: How do members of the platform draw on different experiences of marginalization to make their case about how different women suffer in very similar ways? For answering this question, we have to take a look at the original framing strategy in the platform.

4.1. Original Framing Strategy: Emphasis on Differences in Life-Style

Platform's initial framing strategy was to show that women of different backgrounds can actively collaborate despite leading different life styles. While doing that, the intersecting identities with womanhood such as being veiled or not veiled,

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[47] Bu kadınların hepsi heryerin marjinalinde kalıyordu. Her grubun kıyısındaydılar. Kıyıdan kıyıya geldikleri için de birbirlerini anlıyorlardı. Hepsi kendi camialarında dayak yemiş insanlardı. Bu ülkede kadınlık claim etmek başınıza beladır.

were not thought as impediments. On the contrary, the contrasts served as powerful tools to convey the message that despite discernable differences women of different backgrounds are able to fight together. The message conveyed was: Women need recognition and rights and our other differences and sub-identities are a testament to the fact that we all suffer in different ways for the same reason: being woman. The kick-off declaration specifically attacks the different ways in which veiled and non-veiled women were discriminated:

> "We oppose the racist subjection of veiled women as Islamist robots by such adjectives as ignorant, bigoted, mischievous, and disingenuous, opportunist, and fuddy-duddy. We oppose the sexist consideration of non-veiled women as if they are sexual commodities, exhibitionists, seducers. We know that the oppression and exploitation of women are facilitated by the divisions created among them."[48]

The original framing strategy employed within the platform was to highlight the contrasts between platform members. Assumed dualities between women, such as veiled/non-veiled, straight/homosexual was constantly evoked in joint declarations. What does using this duality (veiled/non-veiled) signify for the group? It signifies that differences do not necessarily lead to isolationism; there are causes that can channel the sentiments in the same directions. The underlying message is despite differences, women with different backgrounds essentially suffer from similar pressures although emanating from different sources or rationalizations, i.e. secularism, patriarchy, morality etc…In that sense differences are empowering rather than weakening.

This runs contrary to claims of the first wave of women's movement which tried to construct a unitary and monolithic womanhood that draws on only some of the experiences of marginalization or only some life styles to the detriment of others. Unlike that time period, the subsequent waves of women's movement came to terms with internal diversity of the movement and invented ways to handle this diversity.

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[48] Başörtülü kadınların; cahil, yobaz, fesat, takiyyeci, fırsatçı, örümcek kafalı gibi sıfatlarla bir "islami robot" imajıyla değerlendirilerek, ırkçı yaklaşımlarla şiddete maruz bırakılmalarına karşı çıkıyoruz. Başörtüsüz kadınların; cinsel meta, teşhirci ya da bir tahrik mekanizması gibi cinsiyetçi yaklaşımlarla değerlendirilmesine karşı çıkıyoruz. Kadınlar arasında yaratılan uçurumların kadınların ezilmesini ve sömürülmesini kolaylaştırdığını biliyoruz.

Following this line of endeavor, the framing strategy employed in this coalition is to use those differences and contrasts in an empowering way. The platform is aware of the fact that with this much diversity, committing to a unitary definition of womanhood would be counter-productive and unrealistic. Instead of asking for more or better distribution of rights to a generic "woman", the platform asks for multiple ameliorations in various domains that will help improve the situation of different women. For this reason, this platform employs a strategy that comes closer to the achievements of the third wave of women's movement where differences within the movement are acknowledged, embraced and effectively utilized.

To illustrate how this is done, let's continue with the analysis of the kick-off declaration. The last sentence of the following excerpt points out to different ideological or cultural justifications for regulating women's freedoms. There is also an emphasis on the fact that no matter how different the source of discrimination could be, it is women who suffer at the end of the day. Hence, there is a double emphasis here: one on the multiple forms of discrimination affecting different women, the other on the fact that the ultimate target of these different sorts of discriminations happen to be women, although we cannot talk about a generic womanhood.

Hence, the initial framing strategy within the coalition is to emphasize that it is always women who suffer albeit for reasons that are multiple and diverse. In this way, there is also a rejection of one type of womanhood:

> "We, the women who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions of the state as "a field of contest for brave men" which ignores our existence by relying on the understanding that the place of woman is by her husband's foot, which makes discrimination by the regulations of public morality, which aims at delimiting women's liberties. We, the women reject the control over our bodies in the name of secularism, republic, religion, tradition, custom, morality, honor or freedom."[49]

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[49] Biz her türlü ayrımcılığın ve adaletsizliğin karşısında olan kadınlar, "kadının yeri kocasının dizinin dibi" anlayışıyla bizleri yok sayan, "genel ahlak" düzenlemesiyle ayrımcılık yapan, kadın özgürlüğüne sınırlar getirmek isteyen bir "er meydanı" olarak devletin kadınlara yönelik her türlü yasağını ve baskısını reddediyoruz. Biz kadınlar; birilerinin bedenimizi modernite, laiklik, cumhuriyet, din, gelenek, görenek, ahlak, namus ya da özgürlük adına denetlemesini istemiyoruz.

In fact, the more contrasting and puzzling this collective would seem to the outside world, the more powerful the message would be. This is the basic reason why in an attempt to highlight the contrasts between participants to joint demonstrations, some members suggested wearing wigs or covering their heads with rainbow colored veils. Here is what T.U said on this topic:

> I don't know if the protest would be sufficiently visible if we all veiled ourselves. This is because there are already people among us who are veiling. How are we going to show that there are people among us who are normally not veiled but are veiling just for this protest? To protest, we need some contrasts I suppose. Maybe we could all wear wigs? Both those who use veil and those who do not. Maybe we all go to university with a wig from now on (online blog, 06.06.2008)?[50]

O.P made the following suggestion:

> What if everyone wore rainbow colored veils? That would represent the freedom of both veiled women and homosexuals. Do you think people would be able to recognize (online blog, 06.06.2008)?[51]

Why would contrasts serve as powerful tools in conveying their messages? Why not just emphasize the womanhood or sisterhood as unifiers? As I argued above, trying to depict a picture of singular womanhood would be impractical for a coalition where womanhood is not understood in the same fashion or was not experienced in the same fashion. Highlighting contrasts has the advantage of claiming that not all women are the same yet still suffer from various societal or state induced pressures justifying joint action.

By saying that despite their differences, marginalized groups get the same sort of treatment from the state or suffer from similar patriarchal pressures, the women are able to claim that it is not through their group specific bias that they find the state or societal norms unjust and discriminatory. Rather, it is through their evaluation of many other

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[50] "Hepimizin başörtüsü takması tek başına protestoyu yeterli kadar görünür kılar mı bilemedim? Çünkü zaten aramızda başörtüsü takanlar var, normalde takmayan birilerinin takmış olduğunu nasıl anlatacağız? Protesto için sanki "kontrast" gerekiyor? Belki hepimiz peruk takabiliriz? Başını örtenler de örtmeyenler de. Hatta bundan sonra hepimiz üniversitelere perukla gideriz?"

[51] Gökkuşağı örtüler taksa herkes? Hem örtüyü hem de eşcinsellerin özgürlüğünü temsil etse? Anlaşılır mı ne dersiniz?

similar encounters and other life styles that they come to the conclusion that there is an objective injustice. The mis-treatment of other groups is a testimony to this. In an attempt to bridge differences that seemed divisive from the outside many members attested to the fact that they came closer to understanding each other's pain because they experienced a similar pain for a seemingly different reason which converges on their womanhood. A bisexual and veiled women may not find a job in the formal labor market for seemingly different reasons (one because of secularism, the other because of public morality), but in reality as women who are marginals to the defined norm hence experience similar pressures by society.

This is very close to the argument of Iris Young in her account of how different discriminated groups suffer from neo-liberal restructuring in the USA in their own way. Bringing all these examples together would increase the force of the arguments of each group making up an anti-right coalition.

Ş.T explained the purpose of underlining these distinctions succinctly:

I wanted us to emphasize the veiled/non veiled divide for a reason. Because the real problem emerges from the understanding that non-veiled women cannot understand what veiled women feel and that there are insurmountable barriers between the two. If we remove the distinction between "veiled and non-veiled" from the declaration, no one will know who is backing whom. They will most probably read it as if Islamists are supporting other Islamists. So in other words, we are objecting to this veiled/non-veiled division by backing one another despite that difference. We may not be rejecting this division verbally but through our action. I might not have been clear enough, but what I am trying to say is we are rejecting this dichotomy by way of emphasizing this difference and not by way of acting as if it does not exist (online blog, 24.09.2009).[52]

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[52] Ben başörtülü-başörtüsüz kadın vurgusunu özellikle yapalım istedim. Çünkü esas sorun, başörtüsüzlerin başörtülüleri anlayamayacağı, aralarında aşılmaz duvarlar oldugu savından çıkmıyor mu? O ifadeyi kaldırırsaydık emin ol birçok insan kim kime sahip çıkıyor anlamayacak ve İslamcılar İslamcılara destek veriyor gibi okuyacak metni. Yani şu noktada başörtülü-başörtüsüz ayrımına olan itirazımızı o ayrıma RAĞMEN birbirimize sahip çıkarak yapıyoruz, öyle değil mi? Ayrımı söylemsel anlamda değil, fiili anlamda reddediyoruz. Anlatamadım gibi ama demek istediğim: biz bu ayrıma vurgu yapmak suretiyle ayrımı reddediyoruz, ayrım yokmuş gibi davranarak degil.

To the extent that such contrasts are used to legitimate the claims of members of BSÇ, they serve a meaningful purpose. But there are clear pitfalls in using such contrasting scenarios for the sustainability of the coalition. These messages are crafted to convince outside audiences that women can act in unison despite stark differences in life style and other intersecting identities. However, the slogans of the coalition and the messages conveyed to the outside world have implications for the internal workings of the coalition as well. One such implication is whether life style differences are indeed not an impediment in front of effective political cooperation when it comes to showing solidarity with coalition members in their other civic struggles. How the coalition deals with the exigencies of group diversity will be dealt in more detail in the coming chapter.

Another implication is whether individuals do actually fit into rigid/schematized life style differences. In the following chapter, I will deal with the pitfalls of relying on rigid and schematized differences for the cohesiveness of the coalition. I will show how trying to focus on contrasts limits the ability of the platform to bring to light the eclectic nature of identity building for the activists of the coalition.

In this chapter, I want to talk more about how consensus is achieved with respect to problem areas concerning women and the basic tenets of this consensus. This analysis will bring to light how coalitions can still strive for common objectives even in the absence of a common identity or identical ideological positions vis-à-vis a problem area. Hence, the main objective of this chapter is to show how common rationalizations and justifications are formulated in the area of women's issues where the coalition members admit not possessing a uniform identity, allegiance and outlook on gender issues.

Before getting into the specifics of particular points of consensus, I will first illustrate the major points of disagreement with respect to gender issues and their implications for this coalition. Although the ultimate purpose of this chapter is to show how the coalition succeeded in frame alignment on women's interests amid diversity, a preliminary analysis of disagreements can still help the reader understand the contours within which the coalition members operate.

4.2. Basic Disagreements on Gender Issues

This coalition is made up of women with very different views on gender relations. Solidarity on the basis of womanhood has never been enough to sort out such differences even among activists who identify themselves with feminism. In our case, this fact is complicated by ideological divisions. The religiously motivated members of the platform clearly articulated that their reference point (the Koran) establishes that men and women are designed differently from each other, their relations are designed accordingly and any regression out of this design will make both sexes unhappy. In the words of D.E:

> There are points where Islam and feminism clash. Where am I to put all these clashes if I describe myself as a Muslim feminist? To begin with, feminism does not agree that male and female categories are biological. This is not the case in Islam. Islam accepts those categories. Ok, there is a fabricated part of this sexual difference, but it also admits there is a biological difference and from this point it determines the division of labor in the family. This division of labor can vary according to families, individuals, or time but it cannot ignore those differences between the sexes. Hence I do not describe myself as a feminist but as a Muslim woman. But I felt a pressure at BSÇ. It was as if I declared myself a feminist as soon as I entered the group (interview, 23.03.2011).[53]

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[53] Üstelik Feminizm ile İslam'ın çatıştığı noktalar var. Ben kendimi Müslüman Feminist olarak tanımlarsam bu çatışmaları nereye koyacağım. En başta işte, kadın erkek kategorilerinin hiçbir şekilde biyolojik olduğunu kabul etmiyor. Bu İslam'da böyle değildir. Bu kategorileri kabul ediyor, tamam bunun kurgusal bir kısmının da olduğunu kabul ediyor ama kurgusal olmayan biyolojik bir kısmı olduğunu da kabul ediyor ve bundan yola çıkarak aile içinde işbölümünü tahsil ediyor. Bu işbölümü belki kişilere göre değişebilir, ailelere göre değişebilir, zamana göre değişebilir ama sonuçta bu farkları görmezlikten gelmiyor. Dolayısıyla ben kendimi bir feminist olarak değil, Müslüman bir kadın olarak tanımlıyorum. Ama BDÇ'de yoğun bir şekilde hissettim. Sanki ben girdiğim anda feminist olduğumu deklare etmişim gibi bir algı oluşmuş.

There are other religious women such as E.F, who do not see major contradictions between what feminism or socialism says or what Islam says and who think both of these ideologies can mutually accommodate each other:

> I was not afraid. I was claiming to be a feminist in my circles (Islamist circles) as well. I came to such a point in life that I did not see any contradiction between Islam and feminism. The right of the subject (kul hakkı), equality in front of God, equal rights, and these all exist in my religion, so as in feminism. Then I looked at what feminism was saying in terms of gender relations. I did not see a difference between these two thoughts even then. The religious people are disturbed mostly by this: If you are Muslim, you do not need an additional etiquette. I don't find this right. There are lots of things happening around us and unless they clearly clash with Islam I do not see why we should not take inspiration from them (interview, 24.03.3011).[54]

4.2.1. Equality versus Hierarchy

Feminism is known for its stress on gender equality. It goes without saying that there are different sorts of feminisms, some emphasizing formal equality and others accepting difference only on the grounds of equal treatment of sexes. However, the bottom line is that men and women are equal (which does not rule out difference).

It would not be surprising to find out that those women with a more religious orientation tend not to believe in gender equality but "fıtrat". Here is how F.G, who describes herself as a Muslim woman, sees the conflict in opinion between feminists and Muslim women:

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[54] O dönemde çekinmedim, yeri gelinde Feminist olduğumu da söylüyordum, kendi camiamda daha çok. Öyle bir noktaya geldik ki…ya zaten, benim için İslamla çelişen bir yanı yok ki..Kul hakkı, Allah karşısında eşitlik, eşit haklar, bunlar zaten dinde olan şeyler. Feminizm de bunları söylüyor. Öyle bakıyordum, sadece o (feminizm) kadın erkek tarafındakini ele alan bir tarafı vardı, cinsler arasındaki boyutunu, onda da bir farklılık görmüyordum.

Onlar (dindarları kastediyor) şundan çok rahatsız oluyorlar: "Müslümandır başka bir tanımlamaya, etikete ihtiyacı yoktur şeklinde". O bana çok doğru gelmiyor. Bence yaşadığımız dünya, tamam İslam, orada bir sürü şey olup bitiyor ve ona karşı başka fikirlerden yararlanmakta, ters düşmediği sürece hiçbir şey görmüyorum.

They (feminists) want Muslim women to act as if Islam is secondary when it comes to women's issues. Those who call themselves Islamist feminists argue they are doing it for feminist ideals. They take it from Islam as long as it is not contradictory and when it is, they reject those Koran verses. They come to the point of rejecting the Koran. This is why I am not a feminist. Otherwise, there are so many things we have in common with the feminist movement. But I live for Islamic ideals. I cannot tame my Muslim identity to prioritize feminist ideals. For example, there is a definition of gender in Islam. Feminists, on the other hand, do not believe that differences between men and women are given. If I accept that, I will be rejecting the definition of woman in Islam, or the concept of family. Islamist associations prioritize family. Feminists see it as a prison. I do not see family as a prison that has to be demolished. They (feminists) do (interview, 10.03.2011).[55]

The question on equality goes deeper than sex differences. What is at stake is not whether a sex has more power, but whether that sex is exercising that power justly. Here we come across a position where maintaining "justice" is more important than establishing complete equality. D.E argues the following:

They think women like us (referring to reformist Islamist women) have a lot of largesse. They think we shape religion according to what we think it should be. You are bending and folding, meaning you are pushing the limits of religion or going beyond the rules of religion. That is not what we are doing. That is because we always talk within the limits of justice. We do not say, "Everyone should be free", or "Freedom deemed appropriate by religion will be distributed to every group in society". We also think every segment of society should live comfortably and justly but there is a difference between freedom and justice. The issue of veiling is not an issue of freedom. Ok, there is a ban but if we see it solely as a matter of freedom, then what we would say is: "Let people wear whatever they want to wear".

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[55] Müslüman kadınlardan İslamı ikincil addedmeleri isteniyor Feminist camiada. İslamcı feminist olanlar, feminist idealler uğruna yapıyorum, diyor. Uyuştuğu yerde İslam'dan alıyor, uyuşmadığı yerlerde Kuran ayetlerini reddettiler..Artık Kuran'ı bile reddeden bir konuma geliyorlar…Ben bu sebepten feminist değilim. Yoksa feminist mücadele ile ortaklaştığımız çok alanlar oluyor. Yoksa onlarla çok paralel giden duruşlarımız var. Ama ben İslami idealler uğruna yaşıyorum. Müslüman kimliğimi yontamam feminist idealler uğruna. Mesela, "gender"in tanımı İslam'da var. Feministler işe kadın ve erkek olarak yaratılmanın farklılığına inanmıyor, verili olmadığını kabul ediyorlar. Ben bunu kabul edersem, İslam'daki kadın kavramını reddetmiş olurum ya da aile kavramı. İslami dernekler aileyi ön plana çıkarır. Seküler feministler aile bir hapishane diye yola çıkıyor. Halbuki Müslümanların düştüğü kumpas şu. Hâlbuki anne çocuk ve velilerden oluşan aile, çekirdek aile. Müslümanlar, buna sahip çıkmaya çalışıyorlar. Halbuki çekirdek aile, hem kadının hem erkeğin hem de çocuğun hapishanesine dönüşüyor. Ben ailenin yıkılması gereken bir kavram olmadığını düşünüyorum. Onlar aileyi hapishane görüyor.

But that is an ambiguous term. How far do these freedoms go? Liberals say it goes as far as others' freedoms start. This sounds problematic to me. Justice on the other hand is this: Everyone should stay wherever they deserve. There is a fundamental difference between a Muslim and a Jew and a Christian. You cannot equalize everyone by ignoring those differences. No, so what is justice? If a veiled woman is being oppressed for her veil, oppression meaning to displace someone from his/her place, for example I want to be at school but cannot be because of this oppression. I can demand justice at this point. What is this? It is the reinstatement of my right. It is nothing more than that. It is not something whose boundaries are ambiguous. I have this capacity with the notion of justice (interview, 23.03.2011).[56]

Replacing justice with equality has wider repercussions for rights struggles than just working on gender equality. If different groups in society, different ethnicities and different sexes cannot demand formal equality but only just treatment, what kind of a polity would that entail? This type of a polity has a potential to become neo-traditionalist, where each group within society has a place within a hierarchy. If in a heterogeneous society, inter-group relations are to be evaluated from the perspective of a justice argument that does not rule out hierarchy, many arguments that accompany equality debate, such as equal rights and liberties become controversial.

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[56] Geniş mezhep diye bir kavram var ya, bizi öyle görüyorlar, özellikle dindar camiada. Böyle aşağılayıcı bir şey olmasının sebebi de dine kendini vakfediyorsun ama bu dini kuşa çeviriyorsun. Eğiyorsun, büküyorsun. Orada eğip bükmekten kasıt şu: Dinin sınırlarını zorlamak, ve kuralları aşmak, dışına çıkmak. Bizim böyle bir durumumuz yok. Neden? Biz sürekli adalet ekseninde konuşuyoruz. Biz şunu söylemiyoruz çıkıp da: "Ya herkes özgür olsun!". Ama evet, dinin öngördüğü özgürlük toplumun her kesimine gidecek. Biz de toplumun her kesiminin rahat ve adil yaşamasını istiyoruz ama adalet ile özgürlük arasına bir fark koyuyoruz. Şöyle, başörtüsü sorunu bir özgürlük problemi değildir. Tamam, bir yasak var ama biz bunu özgürlük meselesi olarak görürsek, şöyle düşünülür o zaman: "Bırakın insanlar örtünsünler veya açılsınlar". Ama bu muğlak bir kavram. Şöyle bir şey değil özgürlük, ama nereye kadar, bunun sınırı nedir? Şöyle söylüyor liberaller, başkasının sınırlarının başladığı yer falan, bununla sınır çiziyor. Bu bana sorunlu geliyor. Adalet şöyle bir şey: Herkesin haketiği yerde olması, haketiği yerde durması diye bir laf var ya, feminizmde de vardır ya, kadınla erkek aynı değildir ama eşittir, nedir bu? Bir Müslümanla Yahudi arasında, bir Müslümanla Hristiyan arasında dağlar kadar fark vardır, bu farkları görmezden gelerek, herkesi tek bir paydada eşitleyebilir miyiz? Hayır, ama adalet nedir? Başörtüsüz bir insan bu sebepten zulme uğruyorsa, ki zulmün kelime anlamı birşeyi yerinden etmektir, ben mesela okulda olmak istiyorum ama olamıyorum, bu engelden dolayı, bu bir zulümdür. Ben bu noktada adalet talep edebilirim. Nedir bu? Hakkın iadesidir. Bunun ötesinde bir şey değildir. Sınırları o kadar muğlak olmayan bir kavramdır. Makro siyasetten, mikro siyasete kadar bunu daraltıp genişletebilirim. Böyle bir imkanım var, adalet söz konusu olduğunda.

4.2.2. Private versus Public Distinction

Some of the most important gains for gender equality was achieved by rejecting the distinction between private and public. This was because most of the gender based inequalities in society emanated from the household and slowly found its way into the public space. Unless inequalities in the private sphere are addressed adequately, full gender equality is hard to achieve.

The ideational thrust to bringing private into the public sphere does not exclusively originate from feminism however. Tackling this public vs. private dichotomy is important for sexual identity struggles as well. Hence any consensus on the merits of making private public would have implications for other types of rights struggles running parallel to gender struggle.

In fact, the issue of homosexuality is a recurrent theme within the alliance. This issue usually comes up in the context of why some members of the coalition are not defending gay/lesbian rights to the extent that other members of the platform do. The conventional answer would be that since religion considers being gay as sinful there is no point in defending their rights. Of course, there has been a lot of argumentation along such religious lines. No matter how hard it would be for prominent religious women to go out in the public space and defend sexual liberties, the real problem with respect to homosexuality debate does not necessarily or solely lie in the sin/not sin divide. The argumentative distinction lies in the fact that making private (mahrem) public is not a legitimate strategy for the religious members.

The major problem with respect to homosexuality debate is that the demands of gays are considered liberal and defending other groups' rights is also considered a liberal act. This is because a demand based on one's sexual preferences is not fit for being a political demand. In the words of I.K:

Homosexuality is a sexual choice; it does not have to be public. It could be more private. But they (homosexuals) turn it into an existential issue (interview,

22.04.2011).[57]

    G.D, a socialist feminist interviewee, when asked about whether the desire for visibility in the public space is a liberal demand on the part of gays/lesbians says the following:

> When others are asked as to their reason for not supporting gays, people say their (gay people's) demands are too liberal…
>
> Normally, yes it may sound like choosing whom you want to sleep with is a liberal demand. But if, in a country, you can be killed for doing that then it becomes a radical demand. So far it could not become an issue to be discussed within the boundaries of liberalism. For it to become a liberal demand, that right must have been earned and used so many times…A woman would get killed for sleeping with another woman. Did they (Islamists) put themselves into fire when these people were getting killed? If they did, they would be on top of my head (author's note: an expression indicating sign of respect). These are not liberal but radical demands. It could be a liberal demand for a European gay. Not here. How many men have you seen kissing each other here? Then it is not a liberal demand because there is an incredible pressure on these people. For me, marriage is something to be rejected. But I cannot say the same thing to a lesbian. This is because she does not have that right yet. First she has to earn that right, later I will object to her marriage as well. But she cannot even want that for herself. In reality, people make it seem as if sexual liberation is a very liberal thing. However, we cannot sleep with the person we want, we cannot do whatever we want and this is causing murders in this society. If you cannot see that, shame on you. If these rights were already being exercised countless times and new problems emerged after these practices, then it can become a liberal demand. But not for Turkey. It is still a radical demand. To live with someone else without getting married, to be a single mum, or to have multiple partners are still radical demands (interview, 05.08.2011).[58]

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[57] Eşcinsellik bir cinsel tercihtir illa bir aleniyeti olması gerekmez. Biraz daha mahrem olabilir. Ama onlar bunu bir varoluş çabasına dönüştürebiliyor.

[58] Gey ve lezbiyenlere niye bir şey yapmıyorsunuz dendiğinde liberal talepler bunlar diyorlar.

    Normalde evet, birinin kiminle yatacağını seçmesi liberal bir talep olarak düşünülebilir. Ama bir yerde bunu yaptığın için öldürülebiliyorsan bu radikal bir taleptir. O daha liberallik zeminine gelmemiştir. Onun liberallik zeminine gelmesi için o hakkın kazanılmış defalarca kullanılmış ehheeey olması lazım. Türkiye'de bir kadın bir kadınla yattığı zaman öldürürler onu..Şimdi bunlar geylere lezbiyenlere bir şey olduğunda kendilerini ateşe attılar mı? Zaten o zaman başımın üstüne. Bunlar liberal değil gayet radikal taleplerdir. Avrupalı erkek için liberaldir. Burada değil. Sen kaç tane erkeğin öpüştüğünü gördün? Ha o zaman liberal değil. Çünkü sımsıkı bir baskı var

Most of religious figures in the alliance can go as far as arguing there should be no violence against homosexuals, giving stories from Koran as examples. Here is what K.L thinks on this matter:

We live in Turkey, which is a democracy. I cannot discriminate against these people. I can only say this: Just like seeing a man make love to a woman in public would disturb me, I don't mean kissing, I mean something more extravagant than that, seeing a man do that with another men would also disturb me. I don't want that. But gays want their identity to be visible. There is the example of Netherlands, Switzerland. The fall of societies who have become morally degenerated is fast. But if somebody is gay and living a life of this sort, what kind of a danger could it pose to me?

During the time of Caliph Omer, the Caliph receives intelligence that a man is having a homosexual affair with someone. The Caliph goes to his house, breaks the door, smashing things inside saying things like "I will punish you, I will kill you!". The other confesses that he had a homosexual affair but that took place in his privacy. He tells the Caliph that by breaking into his privacy the Caliph had committed a bigger crime than himself. The Caliph apologizes and leaves the house. I do not want people's interference into others' privacy (interview, 22.04.2011).[59]

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orada. Benim için evlilik reddedilmesi gereken birşeydir. Buna karşı olarak mücadele ederim. Evlilik karşıtıyım. Ama bir lezbiyen geldiğinde ben ona aynı şeyi söyleyemem. Çünkü onun daha evlenmeye hakkı yok ki. Önce onun hakkı olsun sonra ben o evliliğe de karşı çıkarım. Daha onu istiyemiyor bile ya. Aslında cinsel mücadelenin kendisi aslında çok liberal birşeymiş gibi gösteriliyor. İyi de yani yatamıyoruz, odaya giremiyoruz, istediğimizi yapamıyoruz. Ve bu bir toplumda toplumsal katliamlara neden olan bir şey sen bunu göremiyorsan yazıklar olsun sana. Bu haklar eğer elde edilmişse kullanılıyorsa ve orada o kullanmadan sonra ortaya başka başka sorunlar çıkıyorsa o zaman liberaldir. Türkiye için liberal değildir. Hala radikaldir. Nikahsız birlikte olmak, bekar anne olmak bir kadının çok eşli yaşaması gibi talepler ya da hiç eşli yaşaması gibi, radikal taleplerdir. Türkiye'de kadınların dayak yemeden yaşama talebi bile radikal taleptir. Dolayısı ile ben buna radikal talep diyorum."

[59] Şimdi burası Türkiye ve demokrasi var değil mi? Ben bu insanları öldüremem, dışlayamam. Tek bir şey diyebilirim. Nasıl ki bir kadın ile erkeğin sokakta sevişmesi rahatsız ediyorsa, öpüşmek değil daha ileri boyutta kastediyorum, bir erkekle bir erkeğin, bir kadınla bir kadının da sevişmesi beni rahatsız eder. Ben bunu istemiyorum. Ama eşcinseller de diyorlar ki "Hayır benim kimliğim görünür olacak". Hollanda örneği var, İsviçre örneği var. Bu tip ahlaki anlamda yozlaşan toplumların çöküşleri hızlı oluyor. Ama bir insan eşcinselse ve birlikte yaşıyorlarsa, bunun benim için ne gibi bir tehlikesi olabilir ki?

Bakın hz. Ömer zamanında, hz. Ömer bir istihbarat alıyor. Adamın biri eşcinsel bir ilişki yaşıyor. Hz. Ömer eve gidiyor, kırıyor falan yani, içeri giriyor, "seni öldürücem, senin cezanı vericem". Öbürü de diyor ki: "Ben yaşıyordum ama kendi mahremimde yaşıyordum. Sen benim mahremime izinsiz girerek, daha büyük bir

The crux of this debate is that civic activism based on sexuality (which is supposed to be kept private) is not only considered sinful but also unsuitable for doing rights' claims. There is also an implicit understanding that what is being demanded by homosexuals is rather optional or arbitrary because it involves recognition of a sexual choice. This difference related to public vs. private distinction is important not only because it limits, if not rules out, solidarity with respect to amelioration of the position of women in the domestic sphere, but also because it impedes solidarity with other rights struggles that rely on making private (and especially sexuality) a part of public discussion. Having said this, the stress on justice can still offer a remedy for some of the abuses taking place in the private sphere. If domestic violence is an area where all the members can collaborate, this proves that a problem taking place in the private realm can still be tackled through the justice principle that is upheld by some of the members who do not see themselves as feminists. However, the same does not hold for struggles based on sexual preferences since justice argument is used only when there is a threat to such people's lives.

4.3. Frame Alignments on Gender Relations

We have observed that preferring justice to equality and maintaining a strict separation of public and private are two important reasons why the coalition cannot be said to adhere to gender equality or feminist concerns in the strictest sense.

Despite above distinctions which prevent us from calling this alliance a strictly gender equality alliance, there are still convincing reasons to argue that this is a women empowering coalition. This is important to emphasize, since most feminist movements rely on the assumption that only if the premises of feminism are upheld can the situation of women be ameliorated. The following framing strategies will illustrate,

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günah işledin". Hz. Ömer özür dileyerek çıkıyor evden. Bakın mahrem ayrı bir şey. İnsanların mahremlerine kimse müdahale etsin istemiyorum.

even when the principles upheld are not strictly based on gender equality, there is still room for women's empowerment.

4.3.1. Framing Strategy I: Differentiating Self-regulation from Male Regulation

The regulation of female body is a highly sensitive topic in Turkey. The reason for this sensitivity stems from differing perspectives on who holds the ultimate say on what a woman can or cannot do with her own body. The famous feminist slogan "Bedenim Benimdir (This body is mine)" does not function as an effective means to align differing perspectives on women's control over their bodies. This lack of disagreement is aggravated by differing perspectives over veiling. While it is seen as a lack of control over one's body by many feminists, for veiled women, it is one of the most self-conscious decisions about what to do with one's body. This disagreement makes joint action over certain other topics related to women's bodies highly unlikely.

For instance, commodification of female bodies in the media and advertisement industry could potentially be a highly relevant discussion point for those who oppose marketing of female body according to male desires. However, just because this type of a criticism could open the doors for a more conservative interpretation of what a woman can do with her body, veiled and non-veiled women cannot have a proper discussion on this topic. The same applies to abortion. Although abortion can take place within a marriage setting, the fact that it also evokes a remedy for unwanted pregnancies in a pre-marital setting, hence intimately tied to what a woman would do with her own body, it again cannot be discussed for presumed differences in opinion on this topic.

Hence, any rapprochement on this topic can be seen as revolutionary and an immense achievement from the perspective of women's movement in Turkey. Theorization on female body has to be done with extreme care because of the sensitivity and divisiveness of this topic in Turkey.

Both veiling and wearing revealing clothes has been discussed within the coalition with all these reservations at the background. Initially, the basic tension between platform members stemmed from two factors: while being veiled is considered as male

regulation on female bodies from the perspective of non-veiled members, wearing revealing clothes is considered as another form of objectification by males according to more religious members.

To start with the first point of tension, some members admitted having a judgemental attitude vis-a-vis veiled women before the creation of this coalition. However, they came to realize that there can be many different ways of rationalizing veiling. Veil is banned, because it is equated with promoting sharia. This means others' rationalizations of why people dress in certain ways can be seriously flawed and restrictive. Additionally, if veiling was clearly a sign of being "namuslu" then veiled women would not have been cooperative with non-veiled women.

The platform starting from a perception that veiling is a form of male regulation, arrived at a compromise that embraces veiling as long as it is seen as a control exerted on one's body in the name of God. Here is what E.F thinks on this topic:

> I was kind of skeptical about this remark in the declaration which said we do not want regulation on female bodies by various things, including religion. Well, why does a veiled woman cover up? Eventually, it is for religion. But later I rationalized it in my mind like this: I am differentiating my own regulation of my body from its regulation by an outside force which uses religion as a pretext. I told the group that I would agree if we were thinking in this fashion (interview, 24.03.2011).[60]

This compromise shows the dynamics of frame alignment within the coalition. Members, as long as they can justify the basis of the coalition as rejection of restrictions imposed upon themselves from outside, rather than voluntary restrictions they impose upon themselves, are willing to carry out this coalition. This difference is important, as most of the religious practices involve a level of self-restriction. Hence, members have been able to achieve consensus when they are able to interpret objections to both veiling and wearing revealing clothes as regulations imposed upon women's bodies. This consensus comes up again and again in discussions.

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[60] Bu tabi şeye takmıştım ben, sonra başka birileri de takıldı, bedenimizi şunlar adına, tabi orada din de geçiyor ya, yani başörtülü bir kadın zaten bedenini ne adına örtüyor, din adına örtüyor zaten, bunu söyleyemeyiz gibi, düşündüm ben. Ama sonra şey dedik, birilerinin bizi denetlemesi. Yani biz kendimizi inandığımız şey için denetleyebiliriz ama dışarıdan başka birilerinin bizi dini bahane ederek, din adına, onu kafamda öyle yumuşattım. Gruba da yazdım, bu böyle düşünülebilir, o zaman katılırım diye.

With respect to the issue of women who wear more revealing clothes compared to other platform members, initially the same type of prejudice is played out. Just as veiling was interpreted as a form of male regulation, wearing revealing clothes is also considered another form of objectification whose rules are dictated by men. In fact, initially some of the members became alienated from the platform since they sensed a judgmental attitude in terms of dress codes. In the words of H.I:

In these discussions, in between the lines I sensed the hint that if you are not veiled, harassment is more likely. This disappointed me (online blog, 11.09.2008).[61]

Veiled women on the other hand rejected accusations that they put a certain responsibility on women who dress in revealing ways. Their argument was that, unlike feminists who argue they have the sole possession of their bodies, they believe their bodies belong to God and hence they cannot do whatever they want with those bodies, including wearing revealing clothes.

The response to this was that when the signatories signed the kick-off declaration of BSÇ they have already gone through an internal settlement (hesaplaşma) with regards to their understanding of veil and that veil is no longer specifically associated with male hegemony. The same reasoning however is absent with respect to why a woman is considered an object of seduction when she is dressed in certain ways.

Here, the discussion moves beyond veiling and into the display of body in the public space and the degree of it being decided by male hegemonic conventions. The same postulate on veil is being expected from veiled women when it comes to wearing as one wishes. The assumption that exists among veiled women and which is problematic is that "women by nature are an object of seduction which is related to the degree that they reveal their bodies".

There is an inevitable connection between revealing clothes and provoking desire for at least some of the members. This however is reproducing the hegemonic positions prevalent in society. As the discussion came to a deadlock, some veiled women extended the discussion by saying that the real problem is not whether women wear revealing clothes or not. It is about the streets belonging to the gaze of men rather than

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[61] Bu tartışmalarda satır aralarında veya ima yolu ile "Açılırsanuz taciz edilmek kolaylaşır" vurgusu hissettim. Bu beni hayal kırıklığına uğrattı.

women. Veiled women admitted getting intimidating looks by strangers when they walk in their neighborhoods unaccompanied by their husbands or elder males.

This means the discussion is not only one that involves sexuality and how it is imposed on women's bodies in the public space by men. It is also about men possessing the right to look, control and patrol the public space, a privilege which works to the detriment of female bodies both in terms of dress codes and in terms of free mobility. The streets are the hegemonic space of men; the gaze is brutal rather than aroused. Here is what P.R thinks on the topic:

> These harassing looks start from the following assumption: The streets are mine, you are a stranger, and if you want to wander in these streets you will have to put up with my gaze, my words, my visual examination of you from head to toe, everything. Sexual harassment is just one form of it. The man is saying: Go to your home or stay outside and be disturbed by my staring at you. What could be the reason we are not disturbed when we are accompanied by a men? The problem is an issue of hegemony.
>
> What I mean is, sexuality is part of the story but the real problem is the issue of authority in the streets. Even if the man likes you or not he will disturb you. This is not about falling for somebody, this is daring to disturb. Not every men stares at me because they find me likeable. I become able to be stared at and harassed by going out into the street. This is because I enter his territory. Hence he bullies me rather than harassing me (online blog, 22.09.2008).[62]

This extension to the debate is very telling. Although discussions started from a point where the responsibility is put on females about how to dress up, it slowly transformed into one where the problem is associated with male hegemony in the public sphere. The important caveat here was to emphasize neither veiled nor are non-veiled women exempt from the gaze of males. Hence, the male supremacy in the public sphere

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[62] Bence bu tacizkar bakışlar sadece ve sadece "Sokak benimdir, sen yabancısın, burda dolaşacaksan benim bakışıma, laf atmama, seni ince ince incelememe, herşeyime katlanacaksın" algısından çıkıyor. Cinsel arzuyla rahatsız etmek de bunun sonuçlarından biri sadece. "Ya evine dön, ya da benim hükmüm altındaki "sokak"ta bu şekilde rahatsız ol ve yine evine dön" diyor bu adam. Yanında bir erkekle çıktıysan sokağa rahatsız edememesi neden yoksa? Sorun bir iktidar sorunu. Sadece demek istemiştim ki, cinsellik var bu mevzunun içinde evet ama asıl mesele sokaktaki iktidar meselesi. Beğensin beğenmesin rahatsız ediyo adam seni. O zaman beğenmek değil de bi cüret söz konusu burda. Bana her bakan beni kadın olarak beğendiğinden bakmıyor. Ben sokağa çıkmakla yeterince bakılabilir ve taciz edilebilir oluyorum zaten. Onun egemenlik alanına girmiş oluyorum. O da zorbalıkla bakıyor, tahrikle değil.

operates irrespective of the dress codes of women. O.P says:

> I really get disturbed when people think the patriarchal pressure operates only when it comes to the dress codes of unveiled women. The thinking that veiled women do not feel disturbed in the streets is just a myth. No one is shielded from masculine pressures by being veiled, neither on the streets nor in business life. There are other mechanisms at play in business life where men try to rule you (online blog, 23.05.2008).[63]

For this reason both veiling and dressing up as one pleases can both be defended on the same grounds. The same member argues the following:

> The slogans "Do not touch my body" or "State! Remove your hands from my body!" are more appropriate than "Do not touch my veil". The veil is not my only concern. Because I think the voice that needs to be protested and silenced is the totalitarian voice that sees the female body as an object within the political arena, an object that can be regulated; talked about and prohibited. I am highly disturbed by being seen only as a veiled woman, why would I talk only in that tone? If what we want to do is be shocking (ezber bozan), let's talk about different situations together, let's talk about Gülcan Köse. Let's talk about things that will seem shocking for those who do not discuss these things (veiling and non-veiling) together (online blog, 19.10.2008).[64]

These quotes make it clear that women of the platform think of limitations on female choices about clothing as the output of the same type of patriarchy, regardless of which type of women it is exerted on. The regulation of female bodies works for

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[63] Ben bu konuşmalarda, eril baskının sadece örtüsüz kadınları hedef aldığı söyleminden/imasından çok rahatsız oluyorum. Örtülü kadınların sokakta rahatsız edilmediği sadece bir mit. Örtülü olduğu için toplumda eril baskılardan korunmuş olmuyor kimse. Sokakta da bu böyle, iş yaşamında da. Bu iş yaşamında, yine erkeklerden gelen, seni yönetmeye, yola getirmeye çalışan başka mekanizmalar çıkıyor karşına.

[64] Bedenime dokunma', 'Devlet elini bedenimden çek' teması bana cok daha sıcak geliyor, "Örtüme dokunma" demekten. Benim tek derdim başörtüsü değil. Çünkü işte, eni konu aynı totaliter ses, kadın bedenini siyaset arenasının nesnesine indiren, regüle edilebilir, hakkında konuşulabilir, yasak konabilir gören ses asıl susturulması ve protesto edilmesi gereken diye görüyorum ben. Ben türbanlı kadına indirgenmekten rahatsızım zaten niye aynı tonda konuşup bunu besleyeyim, üzerime yapıştırayım? Ezber bozmaksa yapılmak istenen, aynı ezberleri yanyana söyleyelim derim. Gülcan Köse'yi analım yanında. Beden-Örtme-Açma tartışmasında yanyana geldiğinde ezber bozacak şeylere bakalım.

different women in different ways with one crucial commonality: They are all manifestations of male control, and for this reason, these separate struggles need to be linked.

The novelty of this alignment has to be underlined. This is the first open hearted attempt at arriving at a consensus on the source of regulation of female bodies that does not involve the state (i.e. the veil ban). Previous demonstrations of veiled women mostly attacked secular state policies for deciding in their place what they could wear. Feminist demonstrations, on the other hand, usually excluded the perspective of veiled women, because veiled women were assumed to have accepted this male regulation over their bodies from the beginning. For this reason, the discussions were deadlocked between two perspectives that were irreconcilable: state pressure on veiled women vs. rejection of conservative social pressures on non-veiled women's bodies. This discussion is the first attempt to show there is an alternative route between these two alternatives and that both types of women suffer from societal/patriarchal pressures in different shapes and degrees.

4.3.2. Framing Strategy II: Political Ideologies as a Form of Male Hegemony

Another way in which the members of the coalition are able to align their frames on gender is their treatment of political ideologies which have currency in Turkey. For these women, most political ideologies serve masculine interests at a fundamental level and this is a solid basis on which consensus and frame alignment emerges.

Of course, there are different rationalizations and reasons at play for why those ideologies should be opposed. In each case, members also expose their peculiar reasoning for their opposition which is intimately tied to their world view. For example, more religious members of the coalition stress how conservatism started catering to capitalism and enriched the new conservative elite. They also stress the selective appropriation of the fruits of modernity by men (going after conspicuous consumption or wealth creation but still subjugating women to domestic life) as a consequence of a very dysfunctional understanding of which values deserve to be preserved.

The take on conservatism in this platform is quite different from conventional understandings of the term. The women of the platform are critical of the fact that conservatism usually works to the advantage of men and is used for improving patriarchal advantages in society. Here is an excerpt from what a member wrote on conservatism for a newspaper:

"Long before today, the nuances between being conservative and having an Islamic morality were less clear. However, the conservatism of the 21st century is busy drawing a wonderful (!) consensus with capitalism, economic liberalism, and the status-quo, an attitude that makes the bosses the head and the workers the feet. All the implications of conservatism have been withdrawn except for one final castle. The final castle being, women, family, how the daughters will be raised and how gender relations will be regulated. At this point that we have arrived, conservatism has become a very controversial topic. This is because while Turkish style liberal-conservatism contains a few religious rituals it is just a bad combination. Let's take the economic side of liberalism, one that sanctifies the owners of capital, downgrades laborers, the social Darwinist, laissez-faire, laissez-passer type of it, let's be afraid of anti-imperialism like crazy, let's ask for a reason for equality when the weak says "humans are equal". However, the cultural side of this conservatism so shabby! Let's forget the dimensions of liberalism that respects different life strategies, different ideas, ideas that may make those with high status and comfort unhappy,, even when these things are happening within our family and within our circles. Then let's take the side of conservatism that meddles into others' private lives, that judges women's religiosity, talent and intelligence positively only when they conform to the criteria of honor that applies only to women."[65]

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[65] Özlü sözü bir yana bırakalım; muhtemeldir ki bundan çok uzun bir zaman önce muhafazakar olmakla, İslam ahlakı ile donanmış olmak arasındaki nüanslar bugünküne oranla daha belirsizdi Fakat 21. yy.'ın muhafazakârlığı, kapitalizmle, ekonomik liberalizmle, statükoculukla, patronları baş, işçileri ayak sayan bir tasavvurla şahane konsensüsler yapıyor olmakla malul. Tüm düzenlemelerini geri çekildiği tek kaleye sığdırma çabası bundan. Tek kale; yani kadın, aile, kız çocuğunun nasıl yetiştirileceği, kadın-erkek ilişkilerinin tek ve mutlak şekilde düzenlenmesi, vs..Gelinen noktada muhafazakârlık tartışmaya son derece açık bir şey.Çünkü 'Türk usulü liberal-muhafazakârlık' dinî birtakım ritüelleri içermekle beraber, kötü bir kombinasyondan ibaret. Liberalliğin ekonomik yanını alalım, sermaye sahibini yücelten, emeği aşağılayan, 'iyi olan kazansın' 'bırakınız yapsınlar' yanlarını alalım, anti-emperyalizm kelimesinden ödümüz kopsun, 'insanlar eşittir' diyen 'zayıf'tan kendisini eşitlemeye değer bulmamıza imkân sağlayacak bir 'gerekçe' isteyelim. Ama 'kültürel' yanı da çok bir salaş bu liberalizmin! Farklı hayat stratejilerine, farklı fikirlere, konfor ve statü sahiplerini mutsuz edebilecek açılımlara, seçimlere kendi ailemiz, çevremiz içinde olduğunda 'da' saygı duyma boyutunu, es geçelim liberalizmin. Sonra, muhafazakârlığın özel hayatları denetleyen/didikleyen yanını alalım, yine bilhassa kadının dindarlığını, zekâsını, yetenekleri dahil bütün haşletlerini sadece kadına özgü namus kriterlerinin süzgecinden/sınavından geçmesi kaydı şartıyla önemseyelim.

This above piece is striking in its clarity about how the current form of conservatism as practiced by the ruling party is in perfect conformity with capitalism but very old fashioned in its perception of societal conventions on family and women. The double-sidedness of such politics attracts fierce criticisms from platform members.

The religious members highlight their disapproval of confounding religiosity with conservatism, which is nothing other than the preservation of the status-quo. The status-quo is what is defended by the state apparatus and patriarchy whereas being religious is being pro-justice which is equated with being radical or revolutionary.

Many of the veiled women in this alliance show a strong resistance to being associated with conservatism. In most of my interviews, even when I did not ask anything related to what they think on conservatism, veiled women were eager to explain why they cannot be called conservatives. Here is the comment of K.L on this topic:

> A real Muslim cannot be from the right. A Muslim is a leftist. I am not talking about the meanings attached to it in Turkey; let's talk about the left generally. The left has always been anti-status quo, pro-freedom and revolutionary. The left does not confirm to customs, it rejuvenates, and it is for egalitarian distribution. Well, when I think of it, if I am a Muslim, I should be a leftist a hundred percent. When you look at the word right, right is pro status-quo, conservative. Conservation is just trying to maintain the current situation. You know what that is, that is to close your eyes to change. You will be grateful for what you have. I am a Muslim, I cannot be a rightist. I can never be a conservative (interview, 22.04.2011).[66]

In many instances, what is associated with status-quo is Kemalism, hence who is more conservative is judged by who holds on to ancient privileges. A more theoretical stance on whether being religious necessarily implies being conservative, here is the take on by D.E:

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[66] Ben diyorum ki, müslümandan sağcı olmaz. Müslüman solcudur, çünkü genel anlamda bakın Türkiye anlamlarını konuşmuyorum. Genel anlamda sola baktığınız zaman, sol her zaman statükoya başkaldıran, özgürlükçü ve yenilikçi bir çizgidedir. Sol, genel teamülleri kabul etmez, yeniler kendini, eşit paylaşımdan yanadır. E, şimdi düşünüyorum, ben Müslümansam sapına kadar solcuyum kardeşim. Sağ kelimesine baktığınız zaman, sağ statükocudur, muhafazakârdır, muhafaza etmek var olan durumu muhafaza etmek, bu nedir biliyor musunuz? Yeniliğe gözünüzü kapatacaksınız. Olanla yetineceksiniz. Ben Müslümanım sağcı olamam, kardeşim, muhafazakâr hiç olamam.

Theoretically speaking, both capitalism and traditionalism can be serious problems. I always think there should be an alternative between these. I believe Islam also approaches it this way. Islam never says this: What is traditional is religious. The Koran never totally praises what is new or what is traditional. The past is not altogether bad, either. We can take positive examples from the past (interview, 23.03.2011).[67]

The desire to disassociate religion from conservatism is a factor in all these accounts. I.K describes being labeled as one of the worst forms of violence. For her, being Islamist is different from both conservatism and fundamentalism:

It is AKP which created this association between being Muslim and conservatism. What is there to conserve? It is getting really complicated at this point. The issue of conservative democrat, well there are no democrats left, it is all conservatives. I have nothing to do with conservatism. None of the people like me can. This is because it is something that narrows our horizons. There is nothing worse than being defined categorically by others. It sounds awkward when people call me "dinci" or conservative. But it does not sound weird when they call me an Islamist (interview, 22.04.2011).[68]

There are also many instances in which conservatism was defined in a way to include not just the ruling party, the religiously motivated, but also the Kemalists, the average citizen claiming to have a secular public persona. Conservatism is defined in a way to include anyone or group that resists what is different, unexpected or not mainstream. Here is what B.C thinks:

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[67] Teorik çerçevede işte, kapitalizm de bir sorundur, gelenek de ciddi bir sorundur. İkisinin ortasında bir alternatif olması gerektiğini düşünürüm. İslamın da bu şekilde yaklaştığını düşünüyorum. İslam hiçbir zaman şunu söylemez: "Geleneksel olan her zaman dinidir". Kuran'da hiçbir zaman ne tamamen yeni olan, ne de tamamen geleneksel olan övülmez de yerilmez de aynı şekilde. Geçmiş tamamen kötü değildir, geçmişten de iyi örnekler alınabilir.

[68] Müslümanların muhafazakâr olarak tanımlanması AKP ile gelen bir şey. Muhafaza etmek de, neyi muhafaza etmek? Bu noktada karmaşık herşey. Aslında muhafazakâr demokrat meselesi de, aslında demokratlık da kalmadı, sadece muhafazakâr var. Benim muhafazakârlıkla bir bağlantım olamaz. Benim gibi insanlar arasında da yok. Çünkü o bizi, ufkumuzu daraltan bir şey. Aslında tanımlanmaktan daha büyük bir şiddet yok. Dinci denmesi bana ne kadar garip geliyorsa, muhafazakâr denmesi de garip geliyor. Ama mesela İslamcı denmesi garip gelmiyor.

When we say conservatism, the first thing that comes to our mind is people who associate themselves with Islam and our ensuing prejudices about them. This is not what I intend to mean. For me, conservatism is to treat a person as non-existent because you cannot stand that person and meddling into his/her existence because of that. So in principle somebody who looks modern, secular and who claims to be a democrat may not restrain him/herself from saying a word when he/she sees a veiled woman. Alternatively, a religious person who knows how sinful it is to oppress others may interfere in the life of another person, when he thinks that person is off the track/derailed. The examples can be multiplied. I consider it very important to question what is considered norm/normal in different contexts and find a pool of values specific to each context (online blog, 23.05.2008).[69]

There is an important lesson in the above quote with regards to how to be successful in aligning different frames. If activists can find commonalities between different forms of conservatisms in different contexts, a strategy can be developed against all forms of status-quo defenders, be it Kemalists or other types of conservatives (including religious conservatives). One suggestion is to talk about conservatism involved in the application of secularism in this country. The implementation of secularism is conservative because it is restricting the liberties of not just one type of women (the religious) but also other outcasts which do not fit the official definition of an ideal female citizen. Here is what O.P thinks on the topic:

I support the definition of conservatism that relates to the pressures from the ultra-secular people. I also believe conservatism can marginalize not just veiled women but other women as well: Armenian women, lesbian women, Kurdish women…Why did I like the term ultra-secular? If you grow up in Turkey, even when you consider yourself religious, you are affiliated with secularism. Secularism is problematic when it is used not for protecting liberties but conscribing them. The type that is used to conscribe others'

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[69] Muhafazakârlık deyince genelde akla hemen dindar, kendini İslam'la özdeşleştiren insanlar ve onlar üzerine geliştirdiğimiz önyargılar silsilesi geliyor ki, benim kastettiğim hiç böyle bir şey değil. Bence muhafazakârlık bir insanın başkasının varlığına tahammül edemediği için onu yok sayması, hatta bir adım öteye giderek onun varlığına müdahale etmesi. Yani, son derece modern görünümlü, laik ve hatta demokrat olduğunu vurgulayan biri başörtülü (veya tesettürlü) birini gördüğünde kendini tutamadan karşısına 'en azından' bir laf etmeden duramayabiliyor veya dindar olduğunu, zulümle ilişkisini kesinlikle günah olduğunu sürekli vurgulayan biri karşısındakinin 'yoldan çıktığını' düşündüğünde ona müdahale edebiliyor. Örnekleri çoğaltmak mümkün. Bu noktada, değişik bağlamlarda norm/normal olarak kabul edileni bulup sorgulamanın ve hatta bu sorgulamadan bir "değer havuzu" yapmanın oldukça önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum.

liberties I call conservative secularism or ultra-secularism. We should emphasize the masculine nature of this conservative/ultra-secularism more (online blog, 23.05.2008).[70]

The commonality in all these different types of conservatisms is evident. It is targeting women, no matter how different they may be from each other. As long as these different conservatisms are restricting life practices of different women, they are ideologies equally worthy to be fought against by this coalition. Another interviewee argues all the ideologies in currency in Turkey have a stake in the status-quo and they actually overlap on many fronts. Different conservatisms have a commonality when it comes to nationalism or raison d'état. E.F says:

Conservatism is charged with very negative meanings for my generation. It is an ideology that is based on protecting the wealth, interests and status-quo of rich men. For later generations it seems to have other meanings. The preservation of important values is a very amorphous term. Which values? According to what criteria? It is all so apparent that leftist conservatives and conservatives on the right overlap on the basis of having the same values (secularism, nationalism, Kemalism, sacred state etc…) or fight each other on the basis of the values of the people, the republic etc… As expressed elsewhere, sometimes only the women and the family remain to be preserved. In reality, what we (Muslims) and leftists claim to hold in high esteem such as the rights of the poor, the orphan, the oppressed, equality, justice, to avoid conspicuous consumption, ethical and moral values of this sort can never be in conformity with conservatism, capitalism or liberalism. These are values that will remain as our moral values as long as humans are valued as human beings. These are the basic tenets of both religion and Marxism. Long live the union of morality and Marxism then (online blog, 08.08.2008)![71]

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[70] Laiklerden (ya da benim deyimimle ultra laik) gelen baskıyla ilgili, muhafazakârlık tanımlamasına katılıyorum. Ve o muhafazakârlığın sadece örtülü kadınları değil daha bir çok kadını marjinalize ettiğini daha önce çok kere söyledik (ama kiminle?) Örnekler: Ermeni kadınlar, lezbiyen kadınlar, Kürt kadınlar. Ultra-laik kelimesini niye sevdim? Türkiye'de yetişmişsek, dindar da olsak laikliğe bulaşıyoruz gibi geliyor. Laikliğin özgürlükleri korumak adına değil de sınırlamak adına kullanılması ile ilgili problemlerimiz var sadece. Sınırlamak adına kullanılmasına da muhafazakâr laiklik veya ultra laiklik demeyi tercih ediyorum. Bu sınırlayıcı muhafazakâr/ultra laikliğin eril kimliğine de değinebilir miyiz hazır çoğulluğundan bahsederken?"

[71] Muhafazakârlık, sanırım bizim kuşak için, (yanılmıyosam aynı kuşaktanız. 50'deyim ben) olumsuz çağrışımlarla yüklü. Mesela benim için servetinin, çıkarının, işine gelen mevcut durumun muhafazasının peşinde olan bir takım kalantor adamların ideolojisi. Sonraki kuşaklar için anladığım o ki, daha farklı anlamlar ihtiva ediyor. Değerli değerlerin muhafazası gibi. Böyle de olsa çok amorf bir kavram. Hangi

As the discussions reveal, conservatism is evaluated on three axes. One is its relationship to capitalism. Most members of the platform argued explicitly how conservatism serves the interests of capitalism. A very convincing example is with respect to the labor force participation patterns of veiled women. For veiled women, the commonsensical assumption that women may need the veil in order to find jobs easier in a male dominated environment is totally misplaced. Veiled women make it explicit how educated veiled women are exploited by Islamic firms. These women, since they cannot easily find employment in other venues, would settle for any salary offered and can easily be hired and fired at will. This example was also given by O.P as proof that male hegemony operates irrespective of one's dress codes:

> It was months ago. People put forward the weird idea that women started veiling because they wanted to find jobs more easily. Someone should explain how Islamic firms crush the educated, highly qualified veiled women. Let me do it myself: According to such firms, the veiled women who are graduates of engineering/business/economics programs of good universities cannot find a job elsewhere. They can be employed for a low wage at the same position for years (online blog, 23.05.2008).[72]

This strand of critique has a potential to align leftist progressive critiques of capitalism with Islamist leftism. Here is a quote by I.K, along this line:

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değerler? Kime, neye gore? İşte ortada. Sağ muhafazakâr, sol muhafazakar aynı değerlerde birleşiyor (laiklik, milliyetçilik, Kemalizm, kutsal devlet falan) veya kavgaya tutuşabiliyor, halkın değerleri, cumhuriyetin değerleri diye. Y'nin dediği gibi sadece aile ve kadın kalıyor bazan, muhafazaya değer. Oysa bizlerin, bizim İslam diye, sizin Marksizm diye sahip çıktığımız, muhafazasına veya dirilmesine çalıştığımız değerler, işte yoksulun, yetimin, mazlumun hakkı, eşitlik, adalet, israf-lüks tüketimden kaçınmak, etik değerler veya ahlak gibi, her neyse, evet ne muhafazakârlıkla, ne kapitalizmle, ne liberallikle bağdaşır. Aslında bunlar insan, insan olarak kaldıkça, insani değerler ve evet manevi değerler. Her dinin temel ilkeleri ve Marksizmin de. O halde sorunun cevabı, "Yaşasın maneviyat ve Marksizm birlikteliği!"

[72] Aylar önceydi, kadınların daha kolay iş bulmak icin örtünmeye başladığı gibi anlamakta güçlük çektiğim bir iddia ortaya atılmıştı yine. Türkiye'de özellikle kaliteli, eğitimli ve aynı zamanda örtülü kadınları, İslami kimliğiyle tanınan şirketlerin nasıl da ezdiğini anlatmak lazım. Hadi anlatayım: Türkiye'nin iyi üniversitelerinden mühendislik/işletme/ekonomi vb bölümlerinden mezun örtülü kadınlara bu şirketlerin bakışına göre, bu kadınlar zaten başka yerde iş bulamaz, düşük maaşla ve yıllarca aynı pozisyonda çalıştırabilirler.

I did some readings on Marxism and Leninism in my university years. We decided to do some reading on Marxism as Muslim women. Imam Khomeini had created economic policies with a leftist discourse. He said the following: "In Sunni tradition, if you are earning your money in legitimate ways, you can earn as much as you want. Can you save though?" For Khomeini, this is not possible. Even if you earn money in the most legitimate way, some of your earnings can be taken away. Because you have to give zakat until it remedies the inequalities in society. For example, it is said that you have to give 1/40th of your property as zakat. However, Khomeini said that even when you give this much, if the inequalities persist, then you have to give more so that equality is finally achieved. This is not being against property. You are just fine with giving three cents as zakat while your neighbor is sleeping on an empty stomach. What kind of philosophy is this? How are you going to be one of us with this philosophy? You will have to continue giving until that neighbor of yours also has a minimum level of decency in his life. Ali Şeriati also said things along this line. He analyzed the class society from an Islamic perspective really well. Let's look at Muslim's lives today. Look what a class society we have. Look how deep it is becoming. They patronize the poor girl at the textile sweatshop (overlokçu kız). It is as if they feel pity, but they want that girl to stay where she is. They live in mansions; go to shopping in Europe… This is a new bourgeoisie, intelligentsia. What kind of intellectualism is this? To exist by conquering and possessing more. What is being presented to us is just the wild urge to possess more (interview, 22.04.2011).[73]

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[73] Ben üniversite yıllarında Marksist okumalar yapmıştım, Lenin okumuştum. Son derece aşinaydım. B. A ile Müslüman kadınlar Marksist okumaları yapmaya karar verdi. İmam Homeyni tam bir sol söylemle ekonomi politikaları oluşturmaya başlamıştır. O şöyle demişti:"Sünni gelenekte, eğer sen meşru yoldan kazanıyorsan sonsuza kadar kazanabilirsin". Biriktirebilir misin? Humeyni ise "Hayır, asla böyle bir şey yok". Ne kadar helal yoldan da kazanırsan, belli bir kazançtan sonra senin kazandıklarına el konulabilir. Çünkü toplumda büyük bir eşitsizlik varsa bu eşitsizlik giderilene kadar zekât verilecektir. Mesela şöyle söylenir: Zekât verirsin, malının kırkta biri kadar. Tamam, ama bu zekat verildikten sonra hala toplumda eşitlik kurulamamışsa Humeyni olacak "Tekrar" dedi. Yeter ki o eşitlik tekrar sağlansın. Yani bu mülkiyet düşmanlığı değil ama bu "Komşun aç yatarken tok yatan bizden değildir". Bu nasıl gerçekleşecek? Peki, sen zekatını verdin, kafan rahat üç kuruş verdin diye. E bu nasıl felsefe? Nasıl komşusu aç yatarken tok yatan bizden olacak? O komşunun açlığı da giderilene kadar, o da asgari bir yaşam standardında yaşayana kadar sen vermeye devam edeceksin, mecbursun. Ali Şeriati de bu yönde inanılmaz şeyler yazdı. Bu sınıflı toplumu İslami açıdan çok iyi analiz etti. Müslümanların hayatına bakalım, hem de ne biçim sınıflı, hem de ne kadar giderek derinleşiyor, overlokçu kızlar aşağılaması. Güya acıyorlar ama bir yandan da birileri overlokçu kız olarak kalsın. Öte yandan o overlokçu kızın asla selam bile veremeyeceği asla biraraya gelemeyeceği villalarda yaşayan, Avrupa'da alışverişe giden bir kadın güruhu ve erkek guruhu türedi. Bu da burjuva, ya da entelijensiya. Ne alaka, entellektüellik bu mudur? Sahip olarak ele geçirerek varolmak. Takdim edilen şey tamamen sıradan vahşi sahip olma dürtülerine hitap eden bir şey.

The other nexus is between conservatism and Kemalism. For members, any ideology which is associated with preserving political and economic privileges of a segment of the population and which is exclusionary towards others who do not fit its standards is conservative. Kemalism fits this definition quite well as its principles of secularism usually worked to the detriment of a segment of the population, especially veiled women as they were the ones mostly excluded from education and labor market for this reason.

How is the discussion on conservatism linked to gender issue however? If analyzed deeper, one realizes that conservatism which is portrayed as in perfect harmony with capitalism or Kemalism is seen as a "male ideology". This means it works to the advantage of men and at the expense of women. How it works as a male ideology has been explained several times by members. With respect to how conservatism goes hand in hand with capitalism that benefits men, the article above was mentioning that conservative men in this country are quick to adapt to wealth accumulation and conspicuous consumption while they remain committed to limiting women to private sphere, hence restricting their capabilities.

This shows religious members of the platform are as critical of domestic arrangements that disfavor women as any other member. Their commitment to motherhood and family does not negate the fact that the control of women in the private sphere and how they are exploited economically is an equally grave problem for them.

In a similar fashion, Kemalist conservatism in its worst forms showed its effects on women, rather than men, especially after 28th of February in the form of expulsion from higher education and public service. Kemalist ideology, according to these women, shows its negative effects asymmetrically on women rather than men. Given this resemblance, many of the religious women admit having a battle on two fronts, one with Kemalists, and the other with religious conservatives.

The alignment with respect to the opposition to conservative ideologies proves solid ground on which the platform maintains solidarity. This also shows, as long as political ideologies are seen to benefit men rather than women, platform members are able to re-define and re-cast ideologies on the basis of their exclusionary implications for women in a similar fashion to their opposition to the regulation of public space and dress codes by males.

This finding resonates well with the arguments of Aldıkaçtı who argued that both reformist Islamist women and feminists have a potential to collaborate on the basis of empowering women. When one takes a look at the points of consensus with respect to conservatism, one sees that the main criticism is about how men use various ideologies to limit the capabilities of women, i.e. in the education and labor market. Hence improving the options of women in terms of making use of their capabilities emerges as the main theme on which there is agreement.

The question of what women would want to do with these capabilities is an entirely different matter. Aldıkaçtı argued that the basic difference between reformist Islamists and feminists stems from how such improved capabilities are put to use, for collective purposes in the case of the former and for individual autonomy in the latter case. We cannot make a generalization about the motivations of different women in demanding such improvements in their lives. However, we can clearly argue that restrictions on both public visibility (i.e. patrolling of the streets by the male gaze, harassment) and integration into public life through education and labor markets is a common ground from which these women attack male hegemony.

4.4. Frame Alignment on Gender Relations: Recapitulation

The usual depiction of the scene of women's activism in Turkey is one of ideological differences and identity divisions. Even those scholars who believe in the proximity in positions with respect to gender issues between different groups of women stress that allegiances to other identities are insurmountable barriers in front of women's solidarity.

Due to this reason, for a long time, collaborations between different factions within the women's movement have taken place for other campaigns that are not necessarily gender-related. For example, anti-military campaigns and peace coalitions were fertile ground on which different women could cooperate.

This platform proves an exception to this trend. Despite the fact that there is no consensus on taking "private as political" or on gender equality, women of different

convictions are able to formulate frames that serve gender interests at the macro level. The initial impulse for this rapprochement can be attributed to the disillusionment of women from their own social groups where they clearly observed how women and their interests always came secondary.

Some of the members realized even at times when their social group was under intense pressure by the state (i.e. 28th of February) men suffer the consequences marginally while the main burden is on women's shoulders. Others came to the conclusion that even the most progressive male comrades (i.e. in leftist organizations) who want rights and freedoms for the marginals of society are rather mute or unsophisticated in their ideas when it comes to the rights of the women.

While these parallel disillusionments can provide fertile ground to launch a common line of attack, the coalition still needed to acknowledge these diverse experiences of women. In an attempt to align their frames, we observe that women make use of their differences in an efficient manner. Differences in life style serve to show that women get the same treatment irrespective of what type of life they are leading.

The members are not claiming all women are the same or that they are dealing with the same social/state-induced pressures in their day-to-day interactions. However, they are still able to show that at the end of the day, they suffer the same regulations on their body, employment choices, domestic decisions etc…

What is common in the frames of the coalition is their ability to show how regulations on women's bodies and conduct, no matter how different reasons or ideologies they may be serving, ultimately benefit males. We have observed that in ongoing discussions, women are able to achieve a consensus at the theoretical level about the links between male regulation of female bodies; the economic regulation of female labor, how conservatism works through to control women's behavior both within the home and outside.

By delineating one's desire to put restrictions on self (veiling) from restrictions imposed by males (patrolling the streets), veiled women are approaching non-veiled women in their desire to lift restrictions on female bodies. By way of showing how conservatism furthers men's financial interests while exploiting women's labor, at least some of the members have an alignment on the side of a more re-distributionist agenda. On a more general note, by way of showing how conservative ideologies are used to hold on to ancient privileges of a political regime, members of the coalition show how

women can never be conservatives as they never benefited from any privileges under any political era or regime.

This analysis shows women of different backgrounds are able to bridge their differences when it comes to aligning against common targets that are disfavoring women. However, these targets are not set in stone. The platform, in order to cater to the needs of different groups of women, has moving targets. In one occasion the target can be as clear as a state policy that is limiting the choices of women: i.e. the veil ban. At other times, it can be the underlying patriarchy that is causing those state policies. The moving nature of the targets gives the coalition the flexibility to embrace the concerns and needs of different groups of women. This can be considered an explicit strategy to be able to accommodate the needs of different women.

Whether joint criticism of conservatism or male hegemony can be translated into concrete campaigns in the future is an important question that remains unanswered in this thesis due to the short time span of the activism of this coalition. For now, we do not know whether ideological re-alignment does necessarily imply joint activism. This means whether theoretical alignments would actually bring about a behavioral change that will ultimately show itself in concrete activism. There are indications that this is in fact possible. With respect to regulation of female bodies, both veiled and non-veiled women participated to a protest which was orchestrated against the police behavior to a woman who was accused of wearing improper clothing while fishing on Galata bridge.[74] This incident shows women do in fact protest regulation of female bodies by males irrespective of the degree to which they cover their bodies. Another joint activism has taken place recently in the campaign of KA-DER prior to general elections where veiled women were shown as candidates for MP positions in KA-DER advertisements as well as for the campaign named "Başörtülü Aday Yoksa Oy da Yok". Many of the activists of BSÇ have taken primary roles in both campaigns. These examples also show there is an alignment in activism that follows the alignment in frames on patriarchy and conservatism.

The importance of identifying targets and opponents clearly for the sustainability of a coalition was mentioned in the literature review (Diani and Bison, 2004, p.285). This ability is also evident in this coalition as exemplified in the analysis of frame alignments on gender relations. However, what is more important for the purposes of

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[74] http://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/108135-kadinlar-galata-koprusunu-terk-etmedi

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this study is to identify how the coalition deals with its internal diversity. The scholars who draw attention to the ability of coalitions to define their strategic adversaries also argue that the networks among actors mobilizing on a common goal take a purely contingent and instrumental shape (Diani and Bison, 2004). This proposition is true if coalitions exist solely for fighting strategic adversaries but not so much for discovering and valuing their own internal diversity. This distinction was mentioned when I talked about the transformation women's movement went through both in Turkey and abroad. When women's movement discovered the diversity within itself, it gradually turned inward to make sense of this internal diversity. This turning inward eventually helped it embrace other intersecting and parallel running rights struggles as these different struggles started being seen as complementary rather than rival.

This turning inward signifies that important talk within a coalition is not necessarily or solely strategic talk but could be a more reflexive and critical talk. This proposition will become evident in the next chapter where I will talk about how framing internal diversity takes place within the coalition. The debate on internal diversity and how it is handled will also reveal whether all coalitions are ultimately interest groups who pit themselves against a strategic adversary in a unitary fashion or whether there are coalitions which promote more personalized and authentic forms of alignments which rely on valuing particularities of its constituent members.

This analysis will also reveal whether coalitions can exist without the existence of a unitary identity and in the presence of discrete or intersecting identities through which the coalition has to craft its message through. The analysis has the potential to bear important results for the study of cross-movement mobilizations and multicultural democracy theories as well. Multicultural democracy theorists assert that if movements or coalitions draw on particular experiences of different groups, we will have a more nuanced perspective on the ways in which discrimination and oppression play out for different groups in society. However such theories usually fall short of explaining how a sense of we-ness or solidarity can be achieved amid diversity in the long run. The next chapter will be a discussion of this question in more detail.

Chapter 5. Framing Group Diversity and Identity:
Personalized Reciprocity as a Substitute for the Lack of a Common Identity

In the previous chapter I have shown how coalition members were able to identify targets and opponents with respect to gender relations. Despite leading different life styles and suffering from diverse societal/state induced pressures, the coalition members were still able to align their frames with respect to their strategic adversaries. While doing this, they were able to capitalize on the fact that despite leading different life styles, they were still suffering as women in this country.

Drawing on experiences of womanhood was the initial thrust behind the establishment of this coalition. However, this initial thrust gradually gave way to the more sensitive task of handling the inner diversity within the coalition. This shows, at least in this coalition, the sole purpose of setting up this initiative was not just fighting various adversaries but also coming to terms with difference. This gradual shift in attention also conforms to the general pattern within women's movement where the movement started with defining a generic woman's interest but moved into embracing other intersecting and parallel running rights struggles as these different struggles started being seen as complementary rather than rival to women's movement. Lyndia Burns, Fraser and Young all point out to the advantages of paying attention to parallel running struggles as well as the internal diversity within women's movement.

In line with this strand in the literature, this coalition also came to terms with and dealt with identity differences of its participants. This chapter will question how this task was handled, what type of problems emerged and elaborate on some of the available options for coalitions to overcome such pressures. The findings of this chapter have important repercussions for the analysis of coalitions in social movement research.

First of all, the findings will show that important talk within a coalition is not necessarily or solely strategic talk that is geared towards attacking adversaries but could be a more reflexive and critical talk that values and cherishes internal diversity. It will show that heterogeneous coalitions which promote more personalized and authentic forms of alignments and which rely on valuing particularities of its constituent members have a higher chance of surviving the pressures of conforming to a singular identity.

As argued at the end of the previous chapter, this analysis has the potential to bear important results for the study of cross-movement mobilizations and multicultural democracy theories as well. Multicultural democracy theorists assert that if movements or coalitions draw on particular experiences of different groups, we will have a more nuanced perspective on the ways in which discrimination and oppression play out for different groups in society. However such theories usually fall short of explaining whether drawing on different experiences of groups within a coalition actually meets the needs for recognition of its constituent members.

This chapter will be a discussion of this question in more detail. Negotiations that take place within the coalition with respect to how platform members try to create a sense of solidarity without undermining the distinct identities of members takes the center stage of my analysis. I will show that there are different types of reciprocity that can be used for this purpose and that they all have their advantages and drawbacks.

The important question for this coalition and many similar coalitions that do not exhibit one single unifying identity is: What is the right type of reciprocity for maintaining a coalition of this sort? Different types of reciprocity reveal important cues as to the degree of interaction with other groups as well as the level of reflexivity and critical distance achieved vis-à-vis one's identity.

The debate on whether identity politics has been divisive or potentially valuable for progressive social change has grown in importance especially with respect to new social movements in the last two decades. Prominent leftist critics of identity politics have long argued that, struggling for group specific rights has a divisive influence on achieving better living conditions for all (Hobsbawn, 1996; Gitlin, 1995). Such splintering of rights struggles detract attention away from the assault of neo-liberal ideology on the disadvantaged in general. By focusing on the particular group interest,

we lose track of the more macro processes at work that is harming a wider segment of society.[75]

This has most to do with the fact that identity struggles are seen as narrow minded, selfish and parochial. Groups which are concerned with the promotion of their specific identity are incapable of going beyond their own identity boundaries and make rights claims for other groups, or envision a broader solution for similar identity struggles.

In contrast to theorists who believe in the divisive influence of identity politics, theorists of multicultural democracy think citizens can engage issues across differences of identity while also articulating specific identity-based claims. Hence identity politics and inter-identity politics do not have to be mutually exclusive. To give an example, there can be "African-Americans in support of lesbian and gay rights, rejecting a false choice between pursuing essential group interests and upholding a generic common good (Lichterman, 1999, p.101).

Iris Marion Young (2006) is among the pioneers of political theorists who believe that we do not have to transcend difference in order to forge a more unified and effective movement. Trying to maintain a workable coalition while preserving diversity is easier said than done. However, she thinks there are clear benefits in opting in this direction. Through a careful analysis of radical movements in the USA she draws the conclusion that such coalitions are indeed doable and workable.

She attacks leftist critics such as Weinstein (1996) and Gitlin (1995) who think left has been impotent since 1960s because it has fragmented into gender, racial and ethnic groupings. Scholars like Weinstein and Gitlin believe group based political enclaves have eroded the unified left's commitment to equality and its ability to organize Americans against capitalist greed and misery (Young, 2006, p.12). While admitting that in 1960s and 1970s, groups within the general leftist framework were too much focused on their specific experience of oppression and each struggled to have his

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[75] Secondly, liberals attack identity politics on the grounds that rights should be distributed in an identity-blind fashion if we are to claim that a state is treating its citizens in a neutral fashion. State is not a responsible agent for caring about any particular community, it has to treat its citizens individually in a dignified fashion and this should suffice. More communitarian political philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel try to explain why celebrating diversity of communities/groups and creating special policies for their needs are desirable.

version be taken more seriously by the others, this initial hardening of boundaries gave way to a more nuanced understanding on the matrix of disadvantage and oppression currently. For her, in the current era, politics of identity is a misnomer and different groups within the larger Left have come to the maturity of recognizing the specificity of gender, race, and sexual oppression and modified their programs and analysis accordingly (Young, 2006, p.13).

What Young (2006) finds problematic in leftist critics of identity politics is their assumption that that specificity of experience in public life is the expression of narrow and rigidly defined group interest. As such leftist critics usually problematize the neo-liberal economic restructuring as their primary concern; they prefer a "people before profits" agenda as the ideal substitute for this divisive bickering between groups.

Young's argument (2006) is that a powerful alternative route exists between group specific interests and difference-blind common good agendas. She thinks a coalition that draws on particular experiences and perspectives of different groups will endow us with an enlarged understanding of the depth of society's injustices and ways to address them (p.17).

Young as well as other theorists of multicultural democracy (Fraser, 1997; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) are also known as radical democracy theorists because they envision an indefinite expansion of democratic participation in social life beyond the bounds of the modern liberal state (Lichterman, 1999, p.135). They believe in the virtues of open-ended critical conversations between identity groups. Multicultural democracy theorists also attribute great importance to Habermas' public sphere concept as it provides us with a generic explanation as to the social settings in which people debate issues and revise their positions. However, unlike the classic articulation of Habermas's public sphere concept they refine his theory to include multiple and fragmented spaces that are connected with each other at varying degrees.[76] Lichterman (1999, p.104) calls such spaces as "forum", that is interactional spaces allowing identity groups to discuss opinions freely, and for discussing critically the varied identities that activists claim. For him, a group contains a forum quality to the extent that "it values critically reflexive discussions about member's interests and collective identity, apart from

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[76] They also hear voices of diverse identity groups rather than generic citizen voice as explained by Habermas' original theory.

strategizing identity and interests to gain more members or influence. To the extent that a group is a forum, members converse and learn together as an end in itself."

As was mentioned in the literature review section, feminists discovered the merits of working with other groups when a range of past gains such as abortion rights, equal pay became under threat. Such examples stress the strategic aspect of joining other groups because isolationism does not pay off. However, communication with dissenting groups involves more than strategic talk about tactics (Lichterman, 1999; McAdam, 1992) Historical work shows that social movements have been crucial sites for Americans to discuss new opinions and try out new identities (Fraser, 1992; Cohen and Arato, 1992).

For instance, alliances within women's movement have emerged from a realization that there are intersectionalities and diversities within an identity category that rule out a single monolithic perspective on the interests of that particular group. Burns (2006, p.2) gives this example with respect to feminists who admitted the inadequacy of the assumptions of common oppression of all women. The type of oppression and the ways in which it is experienced can only make sense if we break down that particular womanhood into its proper ethnic, religious, age, sexual preference and even geography categories. With the acceptance that even the category of womanhood is not uniform, the movement has become more ready to embrace diversity and work through it.

Young's thesis was that if we draw on particular experiences of different groups, we will have a more nuanced perspective on the ways in which discrimination and oppression play out for different groups in society. This will give strength to our arguments and to our struggle. However, what is missing from this theory is that coalitions do not come into existence just by drawing on different experiences of various groups within its ranks but they also want to nurture solidarity across avenues of difference.

McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) argue that solidarity is accomplished across two levels of identity work. The first one is collective identity level. They think shared definitions of collective identity are facilitated not only through reinforcing commonalities but also in drawing boundaries that mark an "us" from a "them" (p.360). Much of the movement literature explains how solidarity is enhanced through targeting political enemies and hostile institutions. This task was covered in the previous chapter. By showing how different women could still align against various targets, be it the state

as a field of contest for brave men or societal customs that limit the life choices of women, I showed how this boundary drawing against strategic adversaries was accomplished.

The other level through which this solidarity is achieved is through engaging with the self. How participants align their own identity with the collective is the focus of analysis here. Members must modify their definition of the self to include the collective identity of the movement (Gamson, 1992, p.60). This does not mean that this collective identity determines 100 % who you are or the boundaries of your personality, but it should be able to say something about your aspirations, your attitude and perception about political issues. Movements provide a forum in which members experiment with new identities, reconstruct their biographies and relate to others who are differently situated (McCorkel and Rodriquez, 2009, p.361).

This study is based on the premise that how the self is envisioned in a coalition carries important repercussions for how inclusive and how progressive that coalition is. In line with McCorkel, if social movements leave enough room for participants to experiment with who they are and what they are capable of becoming, this experimentation will create an opening for mutual recognition and progressive social action. Whether this experimentation was successfully carried out in this coalition will become the focal point of analysis in the coming pages.

5.1. Original framing Strategy: Differences in Life-style as a Strength of the Coalition

As was explained in the previous chapter, the coalition members were able to utilize the differences among women as strength rather than a weakness. In other words, while determining their targets, the other intersecting identities such as being veiled or not, were not thought as impediments. They were in fact utilized in raising the point that women suffer in similar fashions despite having different intersecting identities.

In fact, for the women of the coalition, presenting differences as insurmountable barriers to collaboration only serves to divide women's movement. By way of

emphasizing those differences, members wanted to convey the image that even under the assumption that there are clear contrasts in life style among women activists, they still suffer in a similar fashion from various societal/state-induced pressure.

I argued that contrasts in life style can actually serve an important purpose for coalitions. By showing that despite discernable differences, marginalized groups are getting similar treatment from state and society; constituent members are able to draw important conclusions as to the nature of injustice as well as ways to attack it. If, for example, both lesbian women and veiled women are kept outside the labor force, then it is not so much the sexual orientation or religiosity of a woman that is the issue but rather how women, in their unique but parallel ways are discouraged from entering the labor market. A veiled woman may feel her expulsion is due to the interpretation of secularism in this country, a lesbian woman may blame public morality but they happen to be punished as a woman. This was the basic reason why both the kick-off declaration as well as ensuing discussions did not define a single target such the state or the veil ban but opted for designating moving targets such as public morality, secularism, patriarchy and conservatism. Although giving the impression that there is no clear sense of direction, the moving nature of their targets actually gives the coalition the flexibility needed to accommodate the interests of all the women taking part in this initiative.

So far, I have pointed out to the ways in which differences in life style were used strategically to serve the interests of the coalition. This framing strategy was used mostly to convince outside audiences hence it represents the public face of the coalition in a persuasive way. However, there is also a downside in using contrasts instrumentally and not making them items for negotiation on their own.

Differences in identity or contrasts in life style may not just be instruments for strategic cooperation but may start being perceived as markers of difference that have to be reconciled in order to secure the cohesive functioning of a coalition. Members may feel the need to prove that life style differences or different life choices are not an impediment in front of effective collaboration. The consequence of this type of thinking is the following: Members may want to disprove the damaging effects of such differences for the coalition by constantly making requests to each other to engage in symbolic acts of reciprocity related to matters of life style/daily practice. Now let us analyze how this problem unfolds during the internal deliberations of the group on the basis of two discussion topics. Each discussion topic ends with an appraisal of the

nature of the problem involved and what it tells about the larger debate on creating intra-group cohesion.

5.2. Going Beyond Strategic Cooperation: Meeting at a Place Where Alcohol is Served

I have argued that differences in life style were used instrumentally in the coalition in raising the point that women suffer from similar societal pressures despite leading different life styles. Veiled/non-veiled distinction was one such difference strategically used to show women suffer despite being different.

In time however, a tendency emerged within the coalition whereby at least some of the members expected confirmation that their life-style was not used in an instrumental sense, that it was accepted as a legitimate life-style. While initially contrasts were thought to add strength to the arguments of the coalition, in time they turned into highly schematized stories about the world views of members and life styles of members.

Members had different demands with respect to showing that differences in life-style did not cause fracture or tension within the coalition. The issue which gained a symbolic dimension within the coalition with respect to how well members accommodated each other's life styles was the debate over the meeting place of coalition members. Platform members usually meet in places where alcohol is not served so that veiled women can also come. When the issue of where to meet for the next meeting was being discussed; one platform member suggested meeting for iftar (breaking the fast). This was taken as a sign of least common denominator by some members. In the words of Y.Z:

> If I am able to accompany my friends' fasting, it is not a weird request that those who do not consume alcohol participate to another event where alcohol is served. Isn't there a place where everybody drinks whatever they

want? Or are those places going to be forbidden for BSÇ (online blog, 09.01.2009)?[77]

For some of the members, being able to meet with women who consume alcohol was a testing mechanism to see whether individuals can accommodate identities different than one's own. The same interviewee argues the following:

It seems after having been part of the environments of my religious friends for so many years, I also developed certain expectations. This is not necessarily a religious issue. If this group is going to be a pluralist group, religion is just one dimension of it.[78]

A more substantial criticism was made by A.B, who argued that the schism between religious women and women who drink alcohol is too reductionist and dichotomizing. There are too many different preferences and life styles that cannot be reduced to this dichotomy. She concludes by saying that there are graver tasks such as fighting against patriarchy, state oppression etc… which would bear more significant results for the coalition:

At whom is this question "Would you join us for an event where alcohol is served?" directed? It is as if you are speaking from one window to another. Who lives behind those windows? Where does the willingness to accompany each other in a fasting or drinking event correspond to in our attempts to support one another? These events can only be friendly gatherings. Those who do not find it appropriate can refrain from participating and we can talk about this. But what is more fundamental is to unite when there is a threat to any one of our lifestyles by the state, by the community, neighborhood, and patriarchy because these are targeting us for the same reason: because of our womanhood (online blog, 09.01.2009).[79]

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[77] Ben iftarı oruç tutmama rağmen oruç tutan arkadaşlarımla keyifle açıyorsam, rakı içmeyenlerin başka şey içerek başka bir sofra keyfine katılması örneği (ki tamamen bir örneklemeydi, istek ya da gereklilik değil) çok garip bir hayal olmaz diye düşünüyorum. Herkesin istediğini içebileceği birçok mekân yok mu? Yoksa oralar BSÇ için yasak bölge mi olacak?

[78] Demek ki, bunca yıl inançlı ve dini ibadetlerini yerine getiren arkadaşlarımın her türlü ortamına eşlik ettikten sonra, ben de bazı beklentiler oluşmuş. Bu bence hiç din meselesi filan da değil. Bu grup gerçek anlamda çoğulcu olacaksa, din bunun sadece bir boyutu.

[79] Ama farz-ı muhal rakı sofrası kursak gelir misiniz sorusu burada kime neden yöneltilmiştir? Sanki bir pencereden öbür pencereye sesleniyoruz. Karşı pencerelerde kim yaşıyor peki? Bir de düşünüyorum, birbirimize sahip çıkma arayışlarımız içinde iftar yahut rakı sofrasını paylaşmak nereye tekabül eder? Dediğim gibi bunlar en fazla

Here, we observe a desire to step back and concentrate on the strategic adversaries of the coalition and operate at a rather limited level of exchange, at the level of womanhood. As long as the women stay united against their adversaries, they do not have to celebrate the particularities of each woman in the platform. This is a more monolithic vision on collective activism that does not leave much room for talking about intra-group specificities and differences and what importance acknowledgement of those differences carries for the group.

Despite her arguments, the symbolic meaning of the choice of the meeting place seems to be decisive for many of the women who consume alcohol. Whether veiled women could meet in places where other members can drink alcohol is seen as a level of maturity needed to claim this coalition has achieved a significant level of solidarity despite differences among members.

Although initially the contrasts are used to imply that differences in life-style are not an impediment in front of women's solidarity, subsequent controversies illustrated that people's group affiliations would explain the limits of their recognition or approval of other groups in action.

There are important drawbacks in assuming group affiliations always conscribe what an individual would or would not do. The biggest drawback of such a stance is that it over schematizes individual identity by attributing to it a totally collective character. This is a blow on the authenticity of the individual. In the words of the same interviewee (A.B):

> We still could not escape this duality. Are there only women who fast and veil and women who know how to drink and who distance themselves from religious practices? Can there not be women who do not cover up but who fast, those who are confused about religious practices, religious but drinking alcohol, let's forget all of these can there not be women among us who really do not know when to stop drinking? We have excluded this group altogether. If we hold a meeting today they will be totally excluded. We talk about trying to understand each other but we are questioning whether we can reciprocate to others. We ignore different women, different life styles and our own experiences. Of course we had deep disappointments, but it is creating a deep disappointment in me when people say, "well, we tried with

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dostça paylaşımlar olabilir, ters gelen katılmaz, hatta eleştirir, konuşuruz. İyi olur. Ama esas olan birbirimizin hayat tarzına devlet, cemaat, mahalle, erkek baskı ve şiddeti yöneltildiğinde birbirimizin yanında durmak, çünkü bütün bunlar bizleri kadın olarak ortak bir yerden vuruyor, öyle değil mi?

religious women and it did not work". Has no one become self-representative in this group?[80]

We have observed the problems inherent in presenting the life styles of group members as contrasting one another. This type of juxtaposition brings about a need to prove that there is reciprocity within the group despite contrasts in life style. The basis of the reciprocal act is to show life style differences are not an impediment in front of being approved for one's way of living. This type of reciprocity requires being respected because of one's differences, rather than being respected despite one's differences. There is a demand for approving one's way of being, by way of participating to his/her daily practices.

This discussion brings forward an important problem inherent in a coalition that claims to bring different life-styles under a singular banner, which is womanhood in this case. Members may initially think the more fundamental task is to unite against threats to women. However, the heterogeneity of the coalition may bring about an equally important task such as handling internal diversity.

In this coalition and in the handling of this particular issue, we observe the clash of two important perspectives: one perspective focuses on the strategic aspects of the coalition. As one excerpt from the above quote depicts succinctly "what is more fundamental is to unite when there is a threat to any one of ours lifestyle by the state, by the community, neighborhood, patriarchy because these are hitting the coalition members (us) for the same reason: because of their (our) womanhood."

Even when women know their life-style differences are irreconcilable, they may still think it is worthwhile to fight on the basis of women's interests. They may deliberately narrow down the issues on the basis of which they want to carry out their joint activism. This is arguably an efficient but a more minimalist definition of

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[80] Bu ikilik tahayyülünden çıkamadık gitti. Bu grupta sadece oruç tutan başörtülü dindarlar ve karşısında da "adabıyla içen" inançsız/dini pratiklere mesafeli kadınlar mı var? Oruç tutan başını örtmeyen kadınlar, dini pratikler konusunda kafası karışık olanlar, dindar ve içen kadınlar, hadi bunları geçtim, adabı neyse öyle içemeyen kadınlar filan olamaz mı? (Bu son grubu tümden dışlamış olduk, içkili toplantı yaparsak onlar gelemeyecekler). Hala birbirimizin dünyasını anlamaktan filan bahsediyoruz, ama zaten belki de birçoğumuzun yapageldiği şeyleri acaba yapar mıyız üzerinden konuşuyoruz. Hala bir sürü kadını, bir sürü hayatı, bazen kendi deneyimlerimizi bile yok sayıyoruz. Tabii ki birçok hayal kırıklığı yaşadık ama dindar kadınlarla denedik, olmadı yargısı da bende ciddi bir hayal kırıklığı oluşturuyor. Herkes kendini temsil eder duruma gelemedi mi bu grupta?

cooperation in the sense that it only prioritizes the strategic aspects of the coalition: that of advancing women's concerns in the public sphere.

As opposed to this minimalist definition that focuses on one specific identity at the expense of all the other identities, members of a heterogeneous coalition who have other intersecting identities,, who exhibit different life styles and who take part in other civic struggles may look for confirmation of these other identities as well. Hence, a more maximalist definition of coalition building would not just entail fighting for certain strategic interests which reduce the scope of the coalition to a singular identity. It would also include ways of cherishing and embracing various other identity struggles as well as ways of accommodating other life-styles. The important question in this debate is whether heterogeneous coalitions should always live up to this maximalist yardstick.

Members of this platform were able to demonstrate together when a woman was detained by the police because she was fishing with "inappropriate clothing" on the Galata Bridge. There, they were embracing a life style politically for the sake of protecting the interests of women against conservatism and patriarchy. However, when the issue was socializing with those who drink alcohol, the same solidarity did not emerge as it did not signify a political solidarity for the amelioration of women's conditions.

Hence, when members made calls to each other to endorse each other's life style, as long as this endorsement was not primarily serving women's interests, there was a reluctance to go along with this demand. The fact that such demands were repeatedly made and there were disagreements on this basis begs the following question: Do coalitions based on so much difference and heterogeneity can survive by only stressing common goals but not embracing specificities?

I have argued elsewhere that coalitions like BSÇ are breeding grounds for multicultural democracy in that they manifest the possibility of collaborations across social groups and various identity groups. However, the nature of this solidarity also reveals the limitations and pitfalls of heterogeneous coalitions. We have observed on the basis of one example that endorsement of various other identity struggles or ways of living become a lesser priority in comparison to the strategic targets of a coalition. Depending on one's definition of what a multicultural democracy entails, this lack of endorsement of other identities may be interpreted as trivial or important. I will talk

about the implications of minimalist and maximalist definitions of solidarity within a coalition for multiculturalism at the end of this chapter.

In the following rebuttal, I will analyze one other issue which takes the nature of solidarity from a different angle. Unlike this issue where the problem emerges because solidarity is defined on the basis of strategic interests (i.e. womanhood), in the following issue the controversy arises because there is pervasive identity-blindness and cooperation is reduced to basic human needs, such as "right to live".

5.3. Identity Blind Cooperation or Recognition of Identity? Homosexuality as an (il)legitimate Identity Category

In the previous rebuttal, we have observed that at least some of the coalition members want to go beyond strategic cooperation that reduces members to a singular identity and they want to see the endorsement of their life style and other identity concerns by the coalition. There is a tension between the strategic aims and the diversity of identity claims that exist within the coalition.

The same tension emerged in another controversy. A conflict arose when an NGO that fights for the rights of veiled women and whose members are also part of this alliance, has published a statement protesting the ban on veil in universities. Another NGO that fights for the rights of gay/lesbians signed this declaration in support of the veil cause. The NGO that issued the statement was then put under intense pressure by some Islamist circles as the name of the gay/lesbian NGO appears on the declaration. The NGO finally gave up and kindly requested the removal of the name of this NGO, but opted for putting names of the individual signatories along with their institutional affiliations. The fact that some members of the coalition did not want to expose their links to gay/lesbian organizations provoked another round of quarrels within the alliance.

In order to understand how members approach the issue of homosexuality and identity politics waged on the basis of homosexuality, I asked a series of questions to my respondents both lesbian and non-lesbian. For example all of the religious women I

interviewed, stressed the importance of not interfering with the private affairs as the only legitimate liberty space of homosexuals.

However, by limiting liberties (which is seen exclusively as sexual liberties) to the private sphere, they run contrary to what most of the gay/lesbian activists are striving for: getting the fruits of institutional life such as employment, political representation, marriage etc... Here, an excerpt from the interview with I.K will be illustrative:

> Just as sexist policies bother me, homosexuality is like this: How does feel when one brings one's privacy into the headlines? How do you know who I am? Maybe I am a homosexual too. There can be some among veiled women as well. However, this is her privacy (mahrem), very private…But if you come to the chair (kürsü) and talk about homosexuality that would irritate me. You could be a homosexual but you should talk about Turkey's problems. Talk about the Kurdish issue, talk about something else. I do not want to talk about the veil issue. I only talk about it because it is forbidden. But there is nothing that forbids your entry to the parliament. Veil is punished because it is visible. Men who think like me can enter the parliament. I will never talk about the veil issue once the ban is over. No one should produce politics out of homosexuality. This sounds like violence to me, to tell something so private out in the public (interview, 22.04.2011).[81]

The conflict emerges from the fact that some of such institutional rights such as employment or entering politics are seen fit for gays not because they are gay but despite the fact that they are gay. They are expected not to make their homosexuality an issue while profiting from the institutional rewards of being a citizen. Just as veiled MPs should not wage politics for the veiled, such should be the case for homosexuals.

The knot here is with respect to whether to make private matters a part of public discussion. While veiling is a way to remove the private from the public eye, what gay

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[81] Cinsiyetçi politikalar beni ne kadar rahatsız ediyorsa, eşcinsellik de şöyle bir şey, ya insanların bunları gündeme taşıması nasıl bir duygu? Kalkıp da ben heteroseksüelim, belki ben de eşcinselim nereden biliyorsun? .Başörtülü kadınlar arasında olabilir. Ama bu onun çok özeli gibi geliyor, çok mahrem. Ama kalkıp da sen kürsüde hep eşcinsellik konuşacaksın o da rahatsız eder. Sen eşcinselsin, ama sen Türkiye için birşeyler konuş, Kürt meselesini konuş, başka şey konuş. Ben başörtüsünü konuşmak istemiyorum. Sırf yasak olduğu için konuşuyorum. Ama senin parlamentoya girmene engelleyen bir şey yok. Başörtüsü görünür olduğu için yasaklanıyor. Benim gibi düşünen erkekler giriyor. Ben bu başörtüsü yasakları kalktığı anda ben bu konuyu gündeme dahi getirmek istemiyorum. Eşcinsellik üzerinden giyim kuşam üzerinden politika üretilmesin. O bana şiddet gibi geliyor, kendi mahrem hayatını, kendi özelini orada anlatmak.

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movement is trying to do is to bring the private to the public eye. The doctrinal conflict is with respect to the desire to make sexuality part of public discussion which is not seen proper by this respondent.

Let us pay attention to what H.I, one lesbian member of the platform thinks on this issue. The interviewee first refers to how she finds the particular reasoning of religious individuals very problematic. If we have to start with religious maxims, the right approach would be to think of gays as one of the creations of God just like any other creation. By virtue of being God's children they are also entitled to the rewards of life. Then taking a different turn, she provides her own reasoning which is more secular and feeds from rights theory. She talks about not narrowing the liberty space of others as her maxim:

> I do not expect religious women to say that homosexuality is not a sin. Even if it is a sin, it is my sin. Do not limit my space, and that is enough for me. We can only talk through this scheme. If you are religious and if you want to be loyal to the scripture, you should be thinking in the following fashion: I (the lesbian) was created by God too. He must have created me because I had to exist. I did not come to this world to be a symbol of sinner. I think the yardstick should be not to narrow others' liberty space and not to harm others. In fact, I believe that those who harm others are autonomously being eliminated by society without the need for state punishment (interview, 02.10.2010).[82]

For her, drawing the line at the threshold of victimhood does not cover all the instances of life where gays are being discriminated. Because the "victimhood" here has the criteria set at "physical violence", it does not fulfill the demands made by gays:

> I do not think they can think something beyond not giving harm (zulüm yapmak). Not harming others does not correspond to my reality. There are so many things that I do without being necessarily harmed. How are we going to arrange our relations in society for situations where the matter is not about being physically harmed? This stance does not say anything

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[82] Ben dindar kadınların eşcinsellik günah değil, demesini beklemiyorum. Günah da olsa benim günahım. Benim alanımı daraltmayın yeter. Böyle bir çerçeveden iletişim kurabiliriz ancak. Dindarsan ve metine sadık kalman gerekiyorsa şöyle düşünmesi gerekir "Beni de (lezbiyen) Tanrı yarattı. Olması gerektiği için yaratmıştır." Ben dünyaya günahkâr sembolü olmak için geldiğimi zannetmiyorum. Bence ölçüt başkalarının özgürlük alanını daraltmamak ve başkalarına zarar vermemektir. Ben zaten devlete ihtiyaç kalmadan otonomsal toplumsal yollarla başkalarına zarar verenlerin elimine olduğunu düşünüyorum.

significant when it comes to these kinds of questions. I believe those who use the words such as oppressed (mazlum), oppression (zulüm) do think of themselves as more legitimate actors institutionally. I mean, they can benefit from the fruits of institutional life, for example, marriage. They never think everyone should be able to benefit from this arrangement. I believe our relationship is based on inequality due to this reason. I do not think they are bothered by the fact that we are not able to profit from the fruits of institutional life while they can (interview, 02.10.2010).[83]

While both a very religious and a very liberal person may be critical about the killing of a homosexual, they may not agree on the desirability of bringing this particular identity to the public light even after various rounds of discussion. In discussing recognition of certain identities, we realize that that recognition can at certain instances go only as far as condemning physical violence (killing of homosexuals). The only type of reciprocity that can be expected in this relationship is a generic reciprocity that is identity blind. Being against violence does not mean gay/lesbian identity is recognized. Being "mazlum" on the other hand does not solve the institutional problems that gays encounter or erase their invisibility in public life.

Hence while the problem in the previous issue was sticking to strategic interests (women's interests) at the expense of other life style concerns, in this issue the problem is taking and dealing with a particular identity struggle from an identity-blind perspective. In the following section, I will discuss the implications of these two perspectives for heterogeneous coalitions and an alternative route to deal with the shortcomings of these perspectives.

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[83] Oysaki zulüm yapmamanın dışına çıkabileceklerini sanmıyorum. Sadece "Zulüm görmek" benim gerçekliğimi ifade etmiyor ki. Benim zulüm görmeden yaptığım şeyler de var. Zulüm görmediğim durumlar da ilişkilerimizi nasıl tanzim edeceğiz? Bununla ilgili hiçbir şey söylemiyor bu anlayış. Ben mazlum, zulüm gibi kategorileri kullananların kurumsal olarak kendilerini daha meşru hissettiklerini düşünüyorum. Yani kurumsal hayatın meyvelerinden daha fazla yararlanabiliyorlar, mesela evlilik. Herkes gelsin, bunun parçası olsun diye düşünmüyorlar. İlişkimizin bu açıdan eşitsiz olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kurumsallaşmadan onların yararlanması, bizim yararlanamamamız onları ırgalamıyor gibi geliyor.

5.4. Negotiating Identity and Reciprocity in Heterogeneous Groups

Initially, objective contrasts in life-style served as a strength for the coalition. This is because despite contrasts in opinions and life-choices, women in this country were suffering from very similar reasons, be it the societal customs or state policies that punish women. This position comes closer to the arguments raised by Young who claims that politics of difference strengthens common causes if it can show how a similar problem is affecting groups differentially but in a parallel fashion.

Following the same logic, this coalition also had to come to terms with internal differences all the while subordinating this task to a higher cause, women's interests. Despite the fact that women acknowledge their differences, they still want other differences to be secondary when the issue is about womanhood. An important caveat here is that fighting for womanhood does not necessarily mean those other identities were positively recognized. At first, they were more passively recognized in an attempt to unite women. However, in time, it became evident that this group is not solely engaged with strategies to convince outside audiences of women's rights.

This runs contrary to some of the assumptions about coalition-building in civil society research. Coalitions are mostly seen as strategic alliances whose efficiency are measured with the rigor with which they oppose an adversary, the impact of their slogans and the effectiveness of their various campaign tactics. If we follow this criteria, the internal talk within a coalition for discovering internal diversity is a waste of time and an indication of undecidedness about coalitional goals.

However, as argued by Fraser elsewhere (1997), in the case of feminist movement and many other identity movements, the realization of diversities and multiple intersecting identities marks a decisive shift in the purpose and functioning of such movements. This shift is marked by turning inward to make sense of this diversity. This is not necessarily an exclusive focus on a single identity but an attempt to see its interconnections with other identities. In that sense, what looks like turning inward eventually brings turning outward and forging connections with other identity claims.

For this reason, unlike scholars who stress only the strategic aspects of coalition building, I argue that a coalition whose members have come to terms with such diversity will inevitably go through an internal questioning of assumptions, goals and tactics.

The coalition I am analyzing went through a very similar transformation as depicted by Fraser. Although the initial goal was to build a united front against adversaries that discriminated women, the coalition moved fast into an alliance that was more occupied with its inner diversity than the singularity of its target. This diversity was very evident from the start. The members knew from the start that they were trying something that was never done before. They were bringing together women who were thought to wage separate struggles. Hence, in contrast to women's movements elsewhere which failed because they claimed to speak for all women and for all times, this coalition knew from the start the intricacies of working through a diversity that was unbridgeable for many of their critics. There were two routes in front of the coalition to bridge differences. One would be to focus on strategic targets and treat every member on the basis of the unifying theme: womanhood. However, as a coalition that built itself on this diversity, a more plausible route was to show it was able to not only accommodate but also celebrate this diversity.

Each member, both as the bearer of a certain identity and as a woman wanted her unique identity to be respected by others. This respect could take the shape of acceptance of life style, supporting others' campaigns or simply affirming the rightfulness of their demands. However, this mutual accommodation was not so straightforward for all members. There were life style choices or identities that were not initially given primary place in an attempt to set targets appropriately but which nevertheless came back to discussion with a vengeance. For example, religiosity or sexual orientation which was treated as unimportant for the goals of the coalition later turned out to be quite divisive.

As the group moved from being a strategic coalition into one that expected more reciprocity and mutual accommodation the nature of conversations changed. In fact, it became certain that the more important task as a specific instance of enclave deliberation was to have an internal deliberation on issues that divided different enclave women. For this reason, the over-reliance on contrasts in life style, which were strategically used as a sign of the singularity of women's goals irrespective of other differences, become a burden in the subsequent stages of activism. The members begin

to ask whether such contrasts in life preferences are an impediment in front of engaging in acts of reciprocity and whether objective differences in life-style preferences translate into substantive differences in political action.

One other reason why contrasts in identity become a burden is the precarious nature of enclave deliberation. I have argued elsewhere that most of the members of this platform take pride in being part of diverse networks and operating through heterogeneous spheres. Some of the members have a more individualistic way of interpreting the issues raised in the coalition while others do express a group perspective. What makes this enclave deliberation precarious is precisely this connection. When women making part of this group feel restricted by a more dominant and more mainstream group perspective, they come into conflict with the objectives of this coalition.

Despite the fact that this particular enclave holds a potential to transform relations between different identities, the enclave, at crucial junctures, is suppressed by the views of external groups. The relations of individual members with the outside world cause a regression from the advancements made by the group. Dominant public sphere interferes with the healthy functioning of this experiment. In trying to understand the most important quarrels within the platform it is important to keep in mind the effect of external world on internal deliberation.

When we analyze those controversies more deeply, certain patterns emerge. The platform is oscillating between essentializing statements and identity-blind statements especially when it comes to discussing life styles or identities that are not evaluated positively at least by some of the members.

What I mean by essentializing are those types of frames that focus exclusively on the womanhood component at the expense of other important identities. As was explained before, contrasts in identities were instrumentally used to prove that women support one another despite their other differences by virtue of being women.

From the start, the platform was aware of the fact that with this much diversity, committing to a unitary definition of womanhood would be counter-productive and unrealistic. Instead of asking for more or better distribution of rights to a generic "woman", the platform asks for ameliorations in various domains that will help improve the situation of different women on the overall. This being said, above discussion points reveal that despite the fact that womanhood was a common denominator, other intersecting identities ruled out a feasible identity alignment. The substitute for the lack

of identity alignment was the creation of strategic adversaries (patriarchal state or restrictive societal customs). Although such adversaries are in a way necessary for the creation and initial vitality of coalitions, they are on their own are not enough to maintain them.

In this coalition, especially in cases where an identity concern was divisive or at least not desirable by some of the members, the platform reverted back to strategic goals of the coalition, which is sticking primarily to women's concerns. Reverting back to strategic goals of the coalition played out when the link between womanhood and the controversial identity concern was not clearly established.

Another strategy employed when the identity in question was divisive was to adopt an identity-blind rhetoric. By way of arguing that every person deserves right to protection or right to work without necessarily making an identity (i.e. homosexuality in this case) part of the discussion, it is silently pushed to the corners of a right based discourse that centers on right to live and right to be freed from violence.

This short analysis shows that individuals making up this coalition while working for their strategic goals can fall prey to both essentializing statements and also identity-blindness. This makes it harder to reciprocate others in their identity quests or in being part of their everyday life. The danger in this is to miss the chance of achieving a sense of solidarity while still retaining those identity differences. Then what is the right way to reciprocate others while also knowing you have different identities?

In the following section, I will depict different types of reciprocity and their implications for coalitions and multicultural democracy. At the end, I will propose my own version of reciprocity which I find most appropriate for heterogeneous coalitions.

5.5. What Kind of Reciprocity Suits Heterogeneous Coalitions?

5.5.1. General Reciprocity:

General reciprocity is to extend one's recognition and support without having any particular interaction with another group. This type of support can be extended even when there is not an effective public demand for it. This type of reciprocity is rather unilateral, in that it is based on certain pre-conceptions/pre-fixed positions. When there is not a significant give and take between civic groups, the type of recognition that one group will have about another will be largely based on such pre-conceptions. Since, the opinions of one about the other cannot easily be altered because of limited or no communication, this type of recognition is limited in scope.

However, unilateral recognition does not always have to be negative. For example in the case of gay/lesbian members of the platform, we observe that despite the fact that gay/lesbian organizations had a pre-fixed opinion about how religious individuals would evaluate gay activism, this did not impede them from collaborating with those individuals in the past, albeit at a rather limited level. This does not mean that religious individuals recognize those identities as legitimate. However, since they consider gays as having the right to security just as any other human being, this limited recognition functions as the common ground on which their collective action is based. In the words of H.I:

> We are two groups (referring to gays and religious groups) which have been put at opposing ends by others in society. However, we have gone through enough experience in life to see that homophobia is not limited to religion. Homophobia is fed by so many different channels such as nationalism, patriarchy etc…To try to talk about this issue only from the prism of religion, can also serve to cover up the homophobia in other realms. For this reason, as members of KAOS GL and LGBTT community, we have always come together on such platforms, knowing each other's

opinions on religiosity and homosexuality. Both sides have shown the maturity to act on the basis of each other's boundaries. For this reason, we never tried to persuade each other or change each other's position. We came together on the basis of opposing violence and discrimination. I believe there are not that many groups in the world who have shown the same maturity that we did on this matter (online blog, 10.03.2010).[84]

The same unilateral mechanism was at work with respect to the attitudes about veil by certain feminists:

I am against the headscarf. I see it as a means to regulate women's bodies. I consider it an injustice. But who am I to talk if a woman has decided to veil? From then onwards, I shall be on her side to defend her right to veil (interview with H.I, 02.10.2010).[85]

Hence what is problematic with unilateral recognition is not that there is no recognition of another identity. The real problem is one recognizes the other through the lenses of one's identity and justify his/her conduct towards the other on the basis of this identity difference. This is another way of saying "I recognize you despite the fact that you are X or Y".

The implications of unilateral recognition seem to be far more reaching and important for the coalition. Recognition of this form means approaching others from the moral lenses of another identity. Additionally, since this moral angle is usually made invisible when identities are deliberated, the basis for acceptance can be portrayed as

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[84] Şimdiye kadar yan yana geldiğimiz her platformda karşı karşıya getirilmeye çalışılan iki kesimiz. Oysa homofobi meselesinin dinle sınırlı olmadığını bilebilecek kadar deneyim yaşadık dünya üzerinde. Homofobi ataerkil, milliyetçi, militarist pek çok kanaldan besleniyor. Sorunu din çerçevesinden tartışmaya zorlamak, diğer alanlarda var olan homofobinin üstünü örtmeye de hizmet edebiliyor. Bu anlamda, Kaos GL bileşenleri ve diğer LGBTT oluşumlar olarak bizler çeşitli vesilelerle yan yana geldiğimiz platformlarda din ve eşcinsellik meselesi konusunda neler düşündüğümüzü bilerek yan yana geldik. Bu konuda yürütülecek tartışmalarda her iki kesim de diğerinin sınırlarının farkında olma olgunluğunu gösterdi diye düşünüyorum. Bu nedenle, birbirimizi ikna edip birbirimizi değiştirmeye çalışma yöntemini kullanmadık. Bir taraf diğer tarafı dönüşmeye zorlamadı. Biz yan yana gelişlerimizde kendi çerçevelerimizin farkında olarak ancak şiddet ve ayrımcılığa karşı çıkma noktasında birleşerek sürdürdük bir aradalığımızı. Türkiye'de ve dünya üzerinde pek çok kesimin bu olgunluğa erişememiş olduğunun bilincindeyiz."

[85] Başörtüsüne aslında karşıyım. Kadın bedenini denetleme kaygısı olarak görüyorum. Adaletsizlik olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ama örtüyorsa banane. O noktadan sonra onun hakkını savunmalıyız.

objective criteria whereas it is generally biased and depends on the supremacy of one type of comprehensive doctrine to the expense of another.

Hence, general reciprocity poses a very interesting puzzle for politics of recognition. As exemplified in the dialogues with respect to the recognition of homosexuality, as the identity in question conjures certain negative connotations, the way to deal with this identity is to assume a certain identity blind yardstick on the basis of which to extend one's support: i.e. being oppressed (mazlum), freedom from violence etc….

The same goes for veiling from the perspective of a secular liberal feminist. There can be a certain negative pre-conception about veiling in the mind of a secular liberal feminist as the quote above exemplifies. However, as part of this coalition, solidarity for veiled women can be justified on the basis of defending that person's right to choose her clothing.

Hence, what we can deduce from these rationalizations is that what we call universalism, both from a religious or secular maxim, in essence may reflect an inability and unwillingness to come to terms with the particularities and rationalizations of other identity concerns. Hence, one's particular perspective when coming in contact with other's identity claims ends up producing a particularistic universalism that aims at transcending different moralities and rationalizations so that one is not held accountable for these moralities. Just as a secular feminist prefers not to question why one is veiling but continues her support on the basis of basic rights, a religious woman does not want to question the basis of gay activism but extends support on the basis of being on the side of "mazlum".

These universalisms, which are clearly the result of different maxims, religious or secular, are like an escape mechanism from carefully reflecting on the claims of different identities. This is the main reason why declarations or actions that fit the framework of general reciprocity are usually identity-blind. One does not reciprocate on the basis of the value or specificity of a particular identity, one reciprocates on the basis of one's maxim that is universalized to encompass all the identity struggles.

Frames that rely on general reciprocity will emphasize the basic right of every individual to be free from violence or to have access to basic rights without invoking his/her identity struggle. The terms used may be different for each group, while group A may call it "fight against discrimination of individuals", group B may call it "to be on the side of mazlum". However, the general message is that one does not have to affirm

other's group specificity or other's claims to recognition in order to defend for the fulfillment of basic rights of individuals affiliated with those groups.

5.5.2. Strategic Reciprocity

Strategic reciprocity can best be illustrated by referring to a term invented by Spivak: "strategic essentialism". What strategic essentialism refers to is a strategy whereby groups present themselves in a rather unitary fashion and bring forward their group identity in a simplified way to achieve certain goals. It is not that there are no differences within the group employing this strategy or there is no discussion of these differences, it is just strategically more advantageous to essentialize group identity in the short run to make rapid gains.

Strategic essentialism has been taken up by feminist movement as a conscious strategy. Even in cases differences within the women's movement was obvious, in order to make certain rapid gains the movement consciously chose to accentuate similarity of fate among women rather than making an emphasis on differences.

Making recourse to strategic reciprocity can be attributed to a similar motivation. In this type of reciprocity, group members want to be supported on the basis of one dominant identity. Basing activism and support on one dominant identity does not have to operate at the expense of other particular identities. However, this may turn out to be the case in the majority of cases especially if the targets of the movement were initially set at supporting each other on the basis of this dominant identity concern.

If we want to depict how a transition from general reciprocity to strategic reciprocity can take place, we could give the example of a coalition that fights domestic violence without naming the victims of domestic violence, "women". This type of a coalition is based on solidarity between members who believe in the dignity of all human beings and their right to be freed from violence. When and if this coalition moves from naming the victims as a generic category, i.e. "victims of domestic violence" to a particular category "women who are victims of domestic violence", the solidarity takes on a different flavor. Here, the reciprocity is based on the essential

interests of women as a category and remedies as well as adversaries have to be adjusted according to this naming, as it changes the priorities as well.

Additionally, strategic reciprocity implies that the overarching aim of a coalition has supremacy over more particular concerns of its members. This is an acknowledgement of the fact that the ultimate aim of the coalition is to define a categorical gender interest to which women with other intersecting identities have to approximate. Having certain common targets is believed to be unifying enough for the immediate purposes of the movement. The danger here is that once a common gender interest is defined, it is harder to fit many multivalent female identities to this rigid framework. In other words, this type of a strategy does not leave much room for debating the specificities and particularities of group members and the value of diversity within the coalition. The strategy is based on ignoring that diversity and formulating a win-win situation for all members which makes the scope of the movement rather limited. If the group's sole purpose is to have an outside enemy that unifies them for their strategic purpose, this type of cooperation does not come close to a real heterogeneous enclave deliberation. The unique merit of operating in a heterogeneous enclave is to become sensitive to particularities and intersectionalities of identities and to reject monolithic and essentialist claims to representing identity interests.

When we apply this knowledge to the coalition we get a complicated and contradictory picture. While the initial kick-off declaration was attentive to differences among women (i.e. veiled vs. non-veiled), these differences were strategically used to give the message that despite their differences women essentially suffer in similar ways and due to similar reasons. The reasons range from restrictive state policies (i.e. veil ban) to societal customs (morality, patriarchy etc.) , however women in this country, irrespective of their differences get their fair share from these limiting practices and policies.

When the criteria is set at how women suffer in similar ways, the basis of reciprocity shifts from their other identity concerns (i.e. being a lesbian, being religious etc..) and focuses on their womanhood. Hence, the type of solidarity or reciprocity that is demanded is more focused on their womanhood than their other intersecting identities.

5.5.3. Personalized Reciprocity

We have seen that both general reciprocity and strategic reciprocity had their shortcomings for this coalition. General reciprocity is too undifferentiated and at times identity blind, reducing the members of the coalition to a group of individuals who are on the side of oppressed and who want freedom from violence irrespective of the nature of groups and their peculiarities. For a platform made up of diverse individuals with different life styles and reference points, this may seem like a plausible strategy but it has clear pitfalls when it comes to reciprocating each other. This is because at least for some of the members reciprocating is a sign of approval for individuals' life-styles.

Strategic reciprocity on the other hand can become too standardizing. Although it is based on a conscious choice for the sake of achieving efficiency, it falls short of addressing the diversity of demands within the coalition. While the coalition is apt at representing its diversity to the outside audiences, it falls short of accommodating this diversity with the same rigor internally.

As the discussions showed, there are differences between the discriminations faced by veiled women, Kurdish women, lesbian women, widows, women who stay unmarried in their entire life etc. To think, uniting under the banner of womanhood would solve all the issues related to reciprocating each other can be misleading.

In fact, the platform argued against both types of reciprocity on different grounds. The limitations of a generalized reciprocity which is reduced to not causing physical harm were discussed in the case of treatment of homosexuals. Frames based on such general reciprocity do not answer the specificity of the needs of a lesbian as illustrated above. Strategic reciprocity, which is based on uniting when the issue is about womanhood, but ignoring or not reciprocating when the issue is tied to embracing a different life style other than one's own, was also found problematic. By way of reducing the basis of collaboration to just women's concerns, strategic reciprocity does not serve the interests of a coalition that exhibits diversity, particularity and heterogeneity.

One way in which members could live up to the diversity, particularity and heterogeneity of the coalition was to admit the possibility that individuals can construct their identities and live their life without making recourse to rigid and dichotomizing categories. In other words, members could show their capacity and willingness to accommodate diversity in their daily life.

This was put very succinctly by L.M who felt really offended by the rigid and dichotomizing language of other members in the coalition:

I was really offended in one of the meetings of BSÇ. It was a meeting at AKDER. I really had a very bad moment. One woman said: "This is the first time I am sitting next to a gay person". Even when it was said as a joke, it was offensive. Then I looked closely. There were literally groups forming already, seculars and Muslims. I turned to the lady and asked: "In whose name are you speaking? I have worked at the Ministry of Education and never worked with a veiled woman (the speaker was veiled at the time) For whom are you speaking? This coalition is for producing a new politics. We are already living together in this society. If you are talking in the name of Muslims, where do you get the authority to speak in the name of Muslims like me." Then she asked me "What term am I going to use then?" I said, "Why don't you say "I"? Are you not on this platform as an individual? To speak in the name of everybody? "She responded: "Well if you do not consider yourself as one of us, eyvallah". I was really furious and thought for a moment that these people came there to polish their names. Life is really not that divisive for me. I do not have such rigid categories. OK, in certain situations I have my boundaries. Getting drunk at the age of 17, having my first sexual experience at the age of 18, these are not things I can know. OK, life styles are different but does that bother me? No. I am in a theatre group, my friends' lifestyle is so different in that group but we do things in common (interview, 16.03.2011).[86]

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[86] Ben BSÇ toplantılarının birinde çok rahatsız oldum. AKDER'de yapılan bir toplantıydı. Benden hiç beklenmeyen bir şekilde sert bir çıkış yaptım. …A.B dedi ki "ilk defa yanımda bir eşcinselle beraber oturuyorum." Espri gibi söylese de bana göre rahatsızlık vericiydi. Sonra baktım gruplaşılmış, laikler ve müslümanlar diye iki grup oluşmuş. "Siz kimin adına konuşuyorsunuz?" dedim. "Ben 6 yıldır Milli Eğitim'de çalışıyorum. Bir tane başı örtülü ile beraber çalışmadım. Kimin adına konuşuyorsunuz? Burada amaç yeni bir politika üretmektir, yoksa biz zaten beraber yaşıyoruz. Müslümanlar adına konuşuyorsanız benim gibi Müslümanlar adına konuşma hakkını kimden alıyorsunuz?" dedim. "Ne diyeceğiz o zaman?" dedi. "Ben kelimesini kullansanız, biz burada birey olarak bulunmuyor muyuz? Herkesin bizim adımıza konuşabilmesi?" " Sen" dedi, "kendini bizden sanmıyorsan, eyvallah" dedi. Orada herkesin kendi ismini parlatmak için bulunduğunu düşündüm ve çok sinirlendim. Gerçekten de hayat benim için bu kadar da ayrıştırıcı değildir. O kadar ciddi kategoriler yok. Bazı durumlarda var. 17 yaşında sarhoş olmak, 18 yaşında cinselliği yaşamak, bu benim bilebileceğim bir şey değil. Tamam hayat tarzı farklı, ama bu beni rahatsız

This tension between collective identity and individual authenticity lies at the heart of identity politics. A good appraisal of this has been done by Appiah (1996). Appiah (1996) asks the following question: If, the things that are most dear to me is my individual and authentic self, then why is all the talk about identities on the basis of sex, ethnicity, nationality, race and sexuality? What is the relation between the collective language and the individualist thrust of the concept of modern self? (p.162)

He provides a preliminary answer in the following fashion: There is a link between an individual identity and a collective identity. Every individual's identity possesses two dimensions: a collective dimension which is the intersection of all traits of a collective identity and an individual dimension that does not make part of the collective dimension but that is morally and societally important, such as intellect, charm, ambition etc..

The importance of collective identities stems from the fact that they provide individuals with certain scenarios which they can put to use in crafting a life plan or telling the story of their lives. What identity politics has tried to do so far has been to brand these scenarios in a new light: to transform them from being bad scenarios (i.e. homosexuals as "faggots") into good scenarios (i.e. "homosexuals as decent citizens just like anyone else"). With these new scenarios they try to move from "demanding respect despite being X" into "demanding respect because of being X".

However, Appiah (1996) is also aware of the dangers of relying too much on such scenarios. He considers an overreliance on them as a blow on the autonomy of the individual, and as replacing one type of tyranny (rejection of recognition of certain identities) with another (rejecting autonomy of the individual). His biggest claim is that politics of recognition necessitates that we take the color of a person's skin or his sexual body as political which makes it harder for those who want to treat those as personal dimensions of the self. By "personal" he does not mean "secret", he rather means "not being overly schematized" (Appiah, 1996, p.175).

This position brings us to the third form of reciprocity which I call personalized reciprocity. This typology comes very close to what other researchers call critical selves. Radical democracy and feminist theorists explain critical selves as those who are capable of mutuality of recognition, reflexivity, and responsiveness (Fraser and

ediyor mu? Yooo. Tiyatro grubundayım, oradaki arkadaşlarımın hayat tarzı çok farklı ama ortak işler yapıyoruz.

Honneth, 2003; Young, 1990). There are important differences between coalitions based on strategic reciprocity and those based on personalized reciprocity in the ways they handle group specific diversity.

Lichterman's (1999) study on two gay/lesbian organizations provide us with important insights into how groups can differ in the ways they promote or suppress identity differences. He calls the first organization QP, as a forum for personalized politics and the second group, NARA, as a community interest group. Although both coalitions included gay/lesbian members, the first one was set-up to advance the queer cause, while the second one is a coalition against the right.

However, the way negotiations unfold is fundamentally different for these two organizations. For QP, the word "homosexual" is a negative category as it conjures up a privatized identity, insensitive to power differences within the LGBT community and un-attuned to diversity (Lichterman, 1999, p.115). For QP, to identify as queer was to place oneself in ambivalent and sometimes antagonistic relation to leaders who claimed to speak for a unitary gay community. Queers would relate multivalent to LGBT claims and be willing to criticize them from the standpoint of other identities.

Unlike QP which posited itself as a group of radicalized individuals within the LGBT milieu, NARA identified itself as a generic LGBT or gay community. This has most to do with how NARA determined its strategic adversary as the Christian right and envisioned a bipolar World. Members taking part in this network were also expected to identify with this bi-polar identity. For this reason, from its inception, strategic talk about the community interest was more important than multivalent identity talk. Community interest politics also gave NARA members a difficult basis for talking through identities critically. Critical, multivalent talk about identity would not harm solidarity in QP as it might in a group such as NARA whose solidarity depended on a unitary interest posed against an undifferentiated adversary (Lichterman, 1999, p.120).

For Lichterman (1999), personalized solidarity is not a contradiction in terms. It does not mean a license for selfish expressions of individuality. On the contrary, this type of togetherness can help people carry on critical discussion that might threaten solidarity in a group whose unity depends more on affirming a single communal interest. Participants in the first forum were able to enact a personalized form of togetherness and members referred to one another on the basis of individual authenticity as well as on the basis of LGBT membership (p.117).

Personalized reciprocity comes very close to this depiction of Lichterman. This would mean the coalition values genuine individual exchanges between members as a source of political efficacy. The external face or external goals of the coalition do not erase the value of specificities and particularities inherent in being a heterogeneous group.

Personalized reciprocity is easier to achieve when individuals reject rigid and stereotypical identity markers and claim their authentic individuality. Platform members from time to time used the card of authentic individuality. This is based on proving that the person is not bound by rigid identity markers. This represents a more accurate picture of those who want to treat the covering of their heads or their sexual orientation, personal dimensions of the self and not a reflection of an overly schematized identity. This type of a description is truer for those members who explicitly admitted they feel less group bound and more at ease in operating in heterogeneous settings. This for them is a sign of liberty and a necessity to preserve their autonomy.

Authentic individuality can in principle suit enclave politics of this platform. This is because since enclaves are preserved areas for marginals who want to shield themselves from the suppression of the dominant public sphere, individuals who feel the pressure of overly schematized dominant identities that order them to behave in pre-determined ways would feel at ease in such environments. Conforming to dominant identities is a non-issue in enclaves.[87]

Given this detailed account, we know that neither the talk of general reciprocity which is based on the fact that we are all humans and deserve humanly respect, or

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[87] Authenticity dictates that a person's behaviour not be judged by the objective categories of sex, ethnicity,class etc.. she has been born into. The positive side of authenticity is that it does not assume pre-fixed dominant identities which is a state that is initially conducive to enclave building. However, there is another type of pressure in enclaves which could put individuals into another straight-jacket. Enclaves usually represent the extreme opposite of what the dominant public culture dictates. Hence, they also want to inculcate in individuals an overly schematized set of behaviours that is the complete opposite of that dominant identities have already inculcated. For doing this however, they exert a certain degree of pressure on their members to act in completely opposite ways to what dominant culture taught them to do. i.e one of the reasons why feminist enclaves do not want to admit male members to their ranks, or male participants to their events is because they want to reverse the patriarchal dominance in all spheres of all and go to another extreme for that purpose.

strategic reciprocity which is based on claims making on the basis of being woman do not suffice personalized reciprocity.

A more cohesive type of reciprocity is only possible if recognition is admitted qua difference rather than qua sameness. A recognition that is extended on the basis of claiming we are all human beings is counter-productive for many of the identity struggles. What is wanted by such struggles is the admittance of equality of human beings while retaining their differences and the equal acknowledgement of such differences by others rather than an emphasis on the sameness of individuals.

Then what could have worked in this coalition? Admitting intersectionalities would have certainly helped. By way of visualizing members in binary opposites to each other, the coalition omitted the possibility of crafting a unique language on identity differences that stressed hybridity and intersectionalities.

Here is a possibility to envision an identity beyond binary opposites in the words of H.I:

> There were two poles and we were having trouble finding a common language. If there was a category such as religious homosexuals, everything could be easier. We had to reduce everything to the category of "oppressed". We should have been able to say humans can be different from one another and we can live with our differences. We are already living reality in this way but we cannot name it. When we say it out loud it becomes a problem (interview, 02.10.2010).[88]

Here we see clearly the undesirability of both an identity-blind rhetoric (oppressed) and dichotomizing, essentializing rhetoric (religious vs. homosexual).

Transformation of existing relations between different groups could be another route. What is meant by transformation? Here, I will make recourse to Nancy Fraser's arguments on transformative remedies. Nancy Fraser (1995) in her article called "From Redistribution to Recognition" makes a clear distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies for misrecognition. Nancy Fraser (1995) argues that there is a

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[88] İki kutup var gibiydi ve ortak dil geliştirmekte zorlanıyorduk. Dindar eşcinseller diye bir kategori olsaydı daha kolay olurdu. Mazluma indirgemek zorunda kaldık. Hâlbuki insanlar farklı olabilirler ve farklılıklarımızla yaşayabiliriz demeliydik. Zaten böyle yaşıyoruz ama adını koyamıyoruz. Yüksek sesle söyleyince sorun oluyor.

fundamental flaw with current practices of affirmative remedies for cultural injustices, which have become the bread and butter of mainstream multiculturalism:

> This type of remedies attempt to redress disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underline them. Transformative remedies, by contrast, are associated with deconstruction. They would redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure. By destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations, these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem of the members of currently disrespected groups, they would change everyone's sense of self (p.24).

To make her point clearer, she compares gay politics which she associates with affirmative remedies and queer politics which she associates with transformative remedies. For her, gay identity politics treats homosexuality as a cultural positivity with its own substantive content much like an ethnicity. Queer politics, on the other hand, treats homosexuality as the constructed and devalued opposite of heterosexuality, they are the two faces of the same sexual fixity. For this reason, the transformative remedy inherent in queer politics is to deconstruct the homo-hetero dichotomy so as to destabilize all fixed sexual identities. The point here is not to dissolve all sexual difference in a single, universal human identity but rather to sustain a sexual field of multiple, de-binarized, fluid and ever shifting differences (Fraser, 1995, p.24).

Once she establishes this distinction, it becomes certain why she considers transformative remedies as appropriate for the multicultural politics of this era. Whereas affirmative recognition remedies tend to promote existing group differentiations, transformative remedies open the possibility for future regroupings.

The coalition I am analyzing has not engaged in a meaningful discussion on how to transform existing identities in a way that would permit future regroupings of the sort Fraser argues. Often times there were clashes within the platform because some of the members argued they see the differences between men and women as mostly biologically determined. This runs contrary to the assumptions of a transformative remedy that would start with questioning the very essence of identities. There were a few hints on how identities are constructs which can/should be altered. These remarks were mostly made with respect to how certain identities (particularly transgender identities) are forced to conform to pre-determined patterns of behavior as in the case of choosing women's only bathrooms. The discussion reveals that if female/male

categories were not that strictly imposed on people who want to make choices other than the ones made available to them, there could be different alternatives for self-construction. The importance of transformative remedies becomes clearer at this point as they provide individuals who want to promote more hybrid and/or fluid forms of identity construction an important conduit. One of the important highlights in that conversation was that LGBT movement is seen as the only movement to bring an alternative definition of self-construction when it comes to manhood/womanhood. G.H argues:

> I think we will be able to find a way out of our dichotomies such as womanhood and manhood thanks to LGBTT individuals. I would not want to go to men's toilet right now. But then again, I maintain my belief that these divisions will disappear and that we will all be renewed someday. Every human should have the freedom to define himself/herself in the fashion he/she feels. I would adjust my understanding of this person according to his/her self- definition (online blog, 04.10.2008).[89]

Transformative remedies have a potential to re-define self-identity and allow for formations of new groupings which would potentially make this coalition and similar coalitions to become less identity-bound and more open to diversity.

5.4. Personalized Reciprocity as a Substitute for Common Identity

I have started arguing in line with multicultural democracy theorists who believe in the possibility of civic engagement across identities as well as for particular identities. Identity politics and inter-identity politics do not have to be mutually

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[89] Sanırım bu kadınlık ya da erkeklik arasına sıkışmışlığımızı LGBT olan insanlar sayesinde aşmanın yollarını bulucaz. Umarım. Açıkçası ben de erkekler tuvaletine girmeyi istemem şu hayatta. Ama yine de günün birinde bu ayrımların ortadan kalkacağını ve yepyeni yesyeni olacağımıza olan inancımı sürdürüyorum. Bi de bi canlının kendini hissettiği gibi tanımlaması ve bunu istemesi onu öyle anlamama kâfi.

exclusive. In other words, we do not have to transcend difference in order to forge an effective coalition.

Conversations analyzed in this chapter reveal there is a tension between coalition building and identity talk. The ideal of multiculturalism is squeezed between essentialist community interest politics and identity-blind rhetoric. However, multicultural democracy theorists do not say much about how difference blind common agendas or group specific interests can be balanced in coalitions. While drawing on particular experiences and perspectives of different groups would surely empower a coalition, what happens in the absence of a common reference point is not answered by such theories.

As I have argued previously, one could adopt a minimalist and maximalist definition of what a multicultural coalition should live up to. A minimalist definition of solidarity may reduce the targets of the coalition to a strategic cooperation across identity groups. A maximalist definition on the other hand, would look for confirmation that each and every life style or identity concern is respected and cherished. My analysis of this coalition reveals that even in cases when a coalition starts from a minimalist definition of solidarity it may want to elevate its standards to a maximalist definition of a multicultural coalition.

I have started my analysis with examining how coalitions are built in the absence of a common identity. Despite the fact that womanhood was a common denominator, other intersecting identities ruled out a feasible identity alignment. The substitute for the lack of identity alignment was the creation of a series of strategic adversaries ranging from state to societal customs. Although such adversaries are in a way necessary for the creation of coalitions, they are on their own are not enough to maintain them. This chapter focused more on how intra-coalitional identities are negotiated within coalitions. Given the heterogeneous nature of the coalition, what are some of the possible ways in which the risk of disintegration and polarization can be thwarted? In what ways members can appeal to other identities all the while retaining their own?

The findings of this chapter point towards an alternative to forging a common identity for maintaining a coalition. While commonality usually begs common identity which may be harder to realize, an engagement with the self can produce more productive outcomes in the face of diversity. Personalized reciprocity seems the only way to help coalition members show their respect to others' particularity all the while

retaining one's distinct identity. This would mean coalition values individual authenticity of members as a manifestation of the heterogeneous nature of the coalition which deserves being preserved rather than suppressed or ignored. This would also mean each member is ready to recognize other member in the terms of that other member rather than according to a pre-defined identity construct. Hence diversity in this type of a coalition is not something to be endured but something to be cherished.

In the light of problems encountered in this coalition, I have come up with two ways to engage with the self in a more productive manner to achieve personalized reciprocity. One was to promote examples of hybrid/intersectional forms of identities as a manifestation of the possibility of building overlapping rights struggles. Admitting intersectionalities strengthens the fate of the coalition in the possibility of cooperation amid differences. The other was to promote more fluid forms of self-construction that relies on challenging established norms or dichotomies such as women/men and that aims at transforming them. This would destabilize existing identities and existing group differentiations which can provide openings for future regroupings.

In theory, we can imagine a political community that subtly combines multivalent, critical identity talk with strategic coalition building talk. However, if personalized reciprocity does not gain widespread currency within such coalitions, it is harder to accommodate more fluid forms of identity construction and intersectionalities. The challenge of multicultural democracy for both activists and engaged citizens is to create political initiatives that are public spirited and also effective for a variety of groups. If a group's vision of ties with other groups is limited solely to an additive solidarity between communities with pre-constituted interests, then that group will fall short of the multicultural, democratic ideal. A multicultural democracy needs not only multiple forms of identity talk but flexible forms of solidarity that sustain both unities and particularities (Lichterman 1999, p.134).

Building on these findings, the following chapter will ask a further question that is potentially more important for the cohesive functioning of civil society. How do coalition members envisage inter-group relations in society? What kind of argumentative extensions can enclaves bring to the debate on how social groups should approach each other? Multicultural democracy theorists argue that in a true democracy groups get inspired from each other by way of showing the similarities of their comparable grievances. An important refinement of that theory should include how groups envision their duties towards each other. If the ideal of radical democracy is an

expansion of the liberty space for all groups including the most marginal, this task cannot be limited to a change in state conduct, it has to include a change in social orientations of groups in civil society as well. By way of showing how social orientations of enclave members with respect to discrimination and disadvantage are modified in ongoing conversations, I will try to demonstrate the value of operating in heterogeneous publics for elevating the standards of civility.

The analysis in the following chapter will center on how the social orientations of actors change in ongoing discussions towards a more self-critical and self-reflexive appraisal of the situatedness of identity and the structure of privilege in society.

Chapter 6. Framing Inter-Group Relations and Civility

Redefining Discrimination and Complicity in Heterogeneous Coalitions

In the previous chapter I have tackled the question of how coalition members dealt with group diversity and how they negotiated the claims of different identities within the coalition. The task of handling diversity within the coalition was debated at a rather personal level in the sense that members of the coalition were individually reflecting on how to reciprocate each other to show they do accommodate other life styles and identities.

This chapter takes this issue from a more macro perspective and asks the question of how inter-group relations are negotiated in heterogeneous coalitions. In the previous chapter I focused on how members of the coalition accommodate identities other than their own. Reciprocity was the mechanism through which this was demonstrated.

Whereas the discussions with respect to handling diversity within the coalition involved an attempt to break down rigid group categories, negotiation of issues like discrimination and disadvantage re-establishes those group categories. This might seem like a contradiction. However, there are reasons for why group categories disappear and appear throughout discussions. This change in framing emerges according to the exigencies of the issue at hand. The way to sort out identity differences is to downplay rigid group constructs. That is why personalized reciprocity involves an attempt to break down rigid group categories and adopt more fluid forms of identity construction for individuals to accommodate other's lifestyles.

The way to debate discrimination and disadvantage, on the other hand, is to admit the asymmetry of relations between groups. Trying to ignore group differences when

the issue is about discrimination/disadvantage would do no justice to those groups who have been disadvantaged historically.[90]

Having provided the reasons why certain themes appear and disappear throughout the discussions, I would like to explain the particular merit of this coalition in changing the attitudes of its members about the nature of inter-group relations in society.

Heterogeneous coalitions such as BSÇ provide us with an important opportunity to find out whether the way members view inter-group relations in society can be altered in ongoing discussions. This is because heterogeneous coalitions provide civil society actors with a unique chance to come in contact with groups which may hold an alternative explanation to their version of marginalization and discrimination in society.

The analysis in this chapter will center on how the social orientations of the actors change in ongoing discussions towards a more self-critical and self-reflexive appraisal of the situatedness of identity and the structure of privilege in society. Here, I call this specific instance of reflexivity as civility. This is because if social actors can admit their own situatedness and the myriad of privileges they do/may acquire from the discriminations of other groups in society, their social orientations will become more altruistic and based on mutual care and respect.

The quality of civil society depends very much on the social orientations of the social actors that inhabit its space. Although for a long time civil society was appraised in a generic sense as the institutions, organizations and groups that occupied the space between the state and the individual (Shaw, 1994; Chatterjee, 1990; Wickham, 1994), contemporary research is more attentive to and intrigued by the qualities of the actors that make up this space. The most important of such qualities can be named as civility, toleration and inter-personal/inter-group trust (Akman, 2012). The major problem with a more generic conception of civil society is that by solely focusing on the relationship between the state and civil society, we can ignore the equally significant task of discerning the social orientations of actors that have a direct effect on the quality of civil society (Akman, 2012). Having an abundance of civil society organizations and their relative autonomy from the state is no guarantee that we will end up with a democratic, egalitarian and tolerant polity.

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[90] This mentality is evident in many cases such as ignoring the racial bases of socio-economic inequality in the US and claiming it is all a matter of educational differences as well as differences in work ethics.

In fact, there are growing numbers of studies that note the challenges of having a genuine civil society in the absence of civil social actors (Fiorina, 1999; Kopecky, 2003; Bieber, 2003; Muddle, 2003; Casquete, 2005; Foley and Edwards, 1996). They propose to confront conceptually as well as politically the problem posed by associations that promote hate, bigotry, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001, p.839-840).

For this reason, the social orientations of actors should have an important place in the discussions on the quality of civil society. Ayhan (2012) describes social orientations of actors as society's non-repressive engagement with other actors (p.17). Civil society is not a sum of engagements and interactions of social actors, but more specifically it is a result of their specifically non-violent, non-repressive and self-limiting interactions (Ayhan, 2012, p.17). The yardstick here is that these engagements should stop short of being violent.

This yardstick, which is refraining from physical harm, is rather straightforward and easy to measure. However, there can be more nuanced ways to measure how "civil" social actors are. What is the process through which they acquire that civility? How and why do groups differ in their tolerance and self-limitation? Are there higher forms of altruism and benevolence that indicate more refined versions of civility? These questions all need answers in civil society research.

There is a strand in empirical political sociology that tries to find out which groups have higher or lower levels of civility. The way civility is defined in these studies is rather legalistic in that it is based on whether a group is willing to grant civil liberties to its unpopular groups. For example, past research on American civil society reveals that conservative Protestants are less willing than most Americans to grant civil liberties to unpopular groups such as gays/lesbians (Reimer and Park, 2000). Explanations for this incivility ranged from a strict adherence to Biblical literalism (Wilcox and Jelen, 1990), belief in a cosmic conflict between good and evil (Ellison and Musick, 1993), distrust of human nature (Tamney and Johnson, 1997), separation from the world (Green, 1994, p.35). Institutional effects such as hierarchical structure and internal pressures toward conformity are also mentioned (Wald et. al, 1989; Welch et. al, 1993).

Such accounts of civility take groups and their civil attitudes as given which are usually a function of an essential trait of that group. These accounts are deprived from a relational view of social life.

To arrive at a more nuanced perspective on this relational aspect, which is fundamental for my conceptualization of civility, I will make recourse to Young's conception of difference. Young (1996, p.157) argues that historically, in group based oppression and conflict, difference is conceived as otherness and exclusion by hegemonic groups. This conception of otherness relies on logic of identity that essentialises and substantializes group natures.

Her version for difference is very different than otherness. In her words:

> A third ideal of a single polity with differentiated groups recognizing one another's specificity and experience requires a conception of difference expressing a relational rather than substantial logic. Groups should be understood not entirely as other, but as overlapping, as constituted in relation to one another and thus as shifting their attributes and needs in accordance with what relations are salient. This relational conception of difference as contextual, helps make more apparent both the necessity and possibility of political togetherness (Young, 1996, p.157).

A primary virtue of this altered conception of difference is that from it we can derive a social and political ideal of togetherness in difference. Young (1996) calls this the ideal of a heterogeneous public (p.161). How does Young's conception of difference help us in arriving at a more refined understanding of civility? What difference would that make if social actors became cognizant of relationality?

Let's try to give answers following Young's logic. If social actors see social relations based not on opposition but relationality, they would be in a better position to come to terms with the distribution of privilege and discrimination in society. In other words, if they know that the fate of one group is not independent of another's but involves a negotiation and bargaining on the distribution of status and cultural value than they would be in a better position to acknowledge their own responsibility or stake in this negotiation. This is arguably a finer grained and demanding conceptualization of civility. In this conceptualization, civility does not only involve whether a group approves another group's acquisition of civil liberties (as in the case of Conservative Protestants' attitude). This is because extension of rights is more of a matter between the state and that particular group. However, what civility requires is an understanding on the part of a relatively privileged group of its own standing in that society and the likely effects of that position on other groups in society.

Following Young, I argue that civility can be enhanced meaningfully when this relational aspect is grasped. The value of heterogeneous publics is important precisely due to this reason. In the absence of countervailing rhetoric, it is very hard for a group to discover its own situatedness and privilege. For this reason, spheres where diverse actors can talk with each other gain extra importance.

At this point, I would like to make a distinction between heterogeneous coalitions which are made up of more mainstream groups and those that are made up of enclaves. Dominant groups in society may have less motivation to come to terms with how their privileges are translated into more marginal groups' disadvantage.

A recent study by McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) shows the difficulties inherent in attempting self-critical appraisal of this relationality. In that study, the researchers analyze a pro-black abolitionist NGO which is lobbying for lifting of death penalty as it is seen as a vehicle to punish underprivileged black crime suspects. The primary concern of the researchers is to observe the behavior of members which are not directly implicated in the problem, the white volunteers and how they navigate within the group. They want to see whether the white participants of the movement do develop critical selves which they define as:

> a critical awareness and reflexivity regarding how one is situated relative to others in the movement and beyond, and a willingness to work toward redistributing power and valuing cultural forms in ways that honor and respect the political ideology and demands of the status-based movements of which they are a part (McCorkel and Rodriquez, 2009, p.362).

Their principal concern was to see to what extent the white members were able to recognize themselves as socially situated and supporting the political claims and interests of African Americans. For the researchers, developing a critical self involves more than signing a petition or showing up at a solidarity event. The white activists should be able to work together with Afro-Americans to challenge racial privilege and redistribute social power. This involves disrupting or challenging the broader social arrangements that advantage them (McCorkel and Rodriquez, 2009, p.363).

According to this study, civility can only be achieved if groups or individuals develop a critical awareness of their social location relative to others. The opposite of this is pervasive identity blind ideologies which refuse to acknowledge how this relativity takes place and whom it benefits.

McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) find out that, in the end their respondent did not develop a critical self so much as they developed a strategic self-one that facilitated access to black political and cultural spaces but that did not ultimately serve to undermine the structural advantages of whiteness (p.380). The authors think the dominant cultural codes invoking colorblindness erode the possibilities for mutual recognition and respect by denying the significance of race and white privilege. For example, whites in their study made recourse to colorblindness when they strategically drew on anti-racist rather than pro-black rhetoric when doing organizing work in the white community.

What is common in Young's and McCorkel and Rodriquez's thesis is that not admitting this relational aspect of group positions and group difference eventually undermines underprivileged groups' quest for redistribution of power and value in the cultural sphere.(as well as the economic field, as economic disadvantage most of the times goes hand in hand with cultural disadvantage).

The implication of this relational view for civility is significant. According to this perspective, the essence of civility is tied to admitting the ways in which marginal groups' misfortune goes hand in hand with privileged groups' advantages. Being indifferent and identity blind to the distribution of power and privilege in society translates into dominant groups' insensitivity to marginal groups' claims and grievances.

This is arguably a more elevated form of civility. We have started with a definition of civility that is based on not causing harm and arrived at one which is based on not being misguidedly neutral or indifferent (Akman, 2012). This trajectory needs explanation. What explains the variation in attitudes on civility? My argument throughout the thesis will be that if groups do not hold a relational perspective, they would only stop at the level of no harm principle. However, if they come to admit how groups differentially benefit from structures of power and how this indirectly implicates them in the misfortune of marginal groups, then they will adopt a more hands-on definition of civility.

Having said this, one should be cognizant of the fact that it is hard to expect from mainstream groups in society to hold this level of maturity when it comes to admitting their own privileges and how they are better off in relative and absolute terms compared to other groups. Relationality has a better chance of being grasped in heterogeneous enclaves rather than more mainstream coalitions.

This is because enclaves, by virtue of having been marginalized by more dominant groups in society possess an ability to envision social relations in more asymmetric terms. The awareness of their own marginalization gives them the ability to depict with rigor how disadvantage and privilege are two sides of the same coin. Hence, adopting this relational aspect is more possible in cases where the group in question already had its share of this asymmetry in its interactions with dominant groups.

Hence, we have to differentiate the civility that comes with the reflexivity of dominant groups about the asymmetry of their relations with enclaves and the horizontal civility that enclaves may acquire in evaluating the position of groups which are closer to their own status in society. In most cases, what will play out is this second type of civility as enclaves are more apt at discovering how marginalized groups' position is determined. Hence, enclaves would be in a better position to testify to that group's marginalization by a dominant group as well as how it is positioned vis-à-vis other marginals.

In the light of this introductory conversation on how we define civility in this thesis, the following conversation will gain a better perspective. At the last section, we discuss the importance of an extended understanding of civility both for group members and the society at large and how generalizable our conclusions are.

6.1. Framing Dynamics Within the Coalition with Respect to Civility

Initially, the underlying motive for the coalition was to craft a language that speaks about multiple forms of discrimination in society and that aims to manifest a joint opposition to these discriminations. When a group of activists want to join forces, they need a common enemy to begin with. For example, they can start from debating about how state policies have put them at a disadvantageous in similar ways. However, while attacking common targets such as a particular state policy or institution, members, as they are coming from very different activist backgrounds, also start discussing how they see groups in society and how these groups fare against each other. When they try to formulate arguments making use of inter-group solidarity against

common enemies, complicity of certain groups in the discrimination of other groups becomes an unexpectedly pressing issue.

This chapter deals with the question of how frames are modified if discrimination and disadvantage are defined in a way that involves a re-evaluation of the relationship between groups in society.[91]

The following steps summarize the initiation and changes in frames as a result of rebuttals. The conversations related to discrimination do not follow a specific timeline or order, they are rather fragmented and some framing strategies come about around the same time as others. The presentation was made in this fashion in order to facilitate reading and to bring a more holistic picture about all the options raised within the coalition with regards to how to respond to inter-group discrimination.

The alliance made recourse to various strategies on framing discrimination with varying results. These different strategies are not put as definitive or uniform for all members, they should rather be seen as attempts that yielded different results. It is the results of those strategies that seems more fruitful to analyses as they show the limits or the potentials of this coalition and similar coalitions in the future.

i. Initial Framing Strategy: Solidarity of marginal groups against common oppressions

ii. Rebuttal: Complicity of some groups in the discrimination of others

iii. Alternative Framing strategy: Re-defining privileged and under-privileged groups

iv. Modified Framing strategy: Being Apologetic for discrimination

v. Discussion: How is the Criteria for Civility Determined in Heterogeneous Enclaves?

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[91] As argued elsewhere, some coalition members openly confessed their allegiance to certain groups, while others held a more individualistic stance. In the following conversations, the argumentators may act like they are part of a group or they may act like neutral observers who are simply making observations. In either case, the point of interest is not whether a person feels part of a group or not but how she envisages the inter-group relations in society to be.

6.2. Initial Framing Strategy: Solidarity of Marginal Groups Against Common Oppressions

The initial framing strategy of the platform was based on highlighting how marginal groups get similar treatment both from state and society. Despite being depicted as very different from each other in terms of where they stand ideologically, all marginals are restricted or suppressed either by societal customs or state policies in a similar fashion. This resembles the framing strategy whereby contrasts were used effectively to prove that women suffer in similar ways despite being very different from each other.

Here is a remark by T.U that illustrates this framing strategy succinctly:

Even though they might be perceived as groups, institutions very far from each other DTP, Lambda and YouTube have one thing in common: They are marginal compared to the pre-defined Turkish identity. (Pre-defined identity being nationalist but pro-western, pro-state, father of the family, part of productive labor force) Any group who does not fit this definition is a candidate for marginalization (online blog, 23.06.2008).[92]

As can be seen from this excerpt, the fate of one group is tied to that of another group. The basic commonality of groups mentioned in this declaration is that they all suffer in similar fashions for being marginals to the pre-defined dominant identity. For this reason, it seems all the more compelling to act together as it would be a rejection of the positions assigned to enclaves. Here is what A.C thinks on this topic:

[92] Bugün Türkiye'de de 'kapatılma' tehdidi ile karşı karşıya olan ve hatta kapatılanları da bu fikre atıfta bulunarak tartışmak mümkün! Her ne kadar birbirlerinden çok uzak gruplar/kurumlar gibi algılansalar da; AKP, DTP, Lambda ve Youtube'un önemli bir ortak noktası mevcut: Tanımlanmış ortalama Türk kimliğine göre 'marjinal' kalıyorlar. (Tanımlanmış kimlik: Milliyetçi ama batıcı, devlet ahlâklı, üretime katkısı olan aile babası şeklinde özetlenebilir.) Bu tanımın sınırlı çerçevesi içinde yer almayan herkes marjinalleşmeye aday görülüyor.

I think it would a very good idea if we did something regarding the headscarf issue with Lambda. They are trying to position us somewhere on a spectrum. Veiling and homosexuality, bisexuality, transgender identities are two poles of their spectrum. If these two poles could do something, if we could do something for these two, it would be highly effective (online blog, 06.06.2008).[93]

Another plausible strategy was to show how different marginals were restricted by the state. For F.G, the willingness to use state to signify their own marginality initially seemed like a plausible strategy considering the wide diversity of groups which were made part of the discussion:

We are a mosaic made up of Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds and Armenians which the state oppressed in an equal distance. We would be closer to resolving our issues with the state if we started evaluating our own oppression through others' oppression (online blog, 07.09.2008).[94]

This type of framing strategy relies on an understanding of groups as symmetrically opposed to the state. The following comment comes very close to what Young refers to as an ideal multicultural coalition. Young (2006) was arguing that the way to fight the assault of a common enemy requires a coalition that draws on particular experiences of each and every group making up the coalition so that we can construct an enlarged understanding of the depth of society's injustices and ways to address them. (p.17). Here is what D.E says which echoes Young's claims:

The conclusion to be made from this (declaration?) should have been "we are experiencing different types of oppression with our different identities" instead of "we are all oppressed, we are all the same". Why should the fact that what make us come closer to each other is the different oppressions we experience with different identities, sound complicated? I wish we could have lived in a very mature society where everyone could share others'

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[93] Hele Lambda ile beraber başörtüsü icin bir şeyler yapmak bence çok iyi bir fikir. Bizi bir spektrumda bir yerlere koymaya çalışıyorlar. Başörtüsü ve eşcinsellik, biseksüellik, travestilik bu bizi koymaya çalıştıkları spektrumun iki ucu. Bu iki uç birlikte bir şey yaparsa, bu ikisi için beraber bir şey yaparsak çok iyi olur kanaatindeyim.

[94] Devletin eşit (ya da eşit değilse de belirli) mesafede durarak mağdur ettiği, birbirine de eşit mesafede duran bir Sünni, Alevi, Kürt, Ermeni mozağiğinden oluşuyoruz biz ve birbirimizin mağduriyetini diğeri üzerinden anlarsak da devletle sorunumuzu çözmeye daha çok yaklaşacağız"

agonies without suffering from similar agonies. But what we call humans are like this, only those who fall from the roof understand others who fall from the roof. The question of "Who pushed you from the roof" however can only be discussed when we come together and touch each other's hearts and talk (online blog, 09.09.2008).[95]

6.3. Rebuttal: Complicity of Some Groups in the Discrimination of Others

The above framing strategy, although useful in the short-run, proves rather limited in resolving problems inherent in a coalition that involves groups whose self-evaluation is not independent of how they evaluate other groups in society. Any collective effort that involves multiple groups within its ranks would start drawing comparisons of social injustices experienced by the constituent groups of the coalition. However, such comparisons can be hampered by the historical baggage that groups carry with their identities. The prior identity construction might be based on confrontations with the groups that are one's proponent's at this moment. It might become impossible to compare what one group suffered with that of the other, if the suffering historically is so much implicated in the power relations between these groups. For this reason, any type of claim or identity construction that relies on an approval from these other groups should take into perspective how one's identity fares against others historically.

This issue can be most vividly illustrated with the case of a newspaper article:[96]

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[95] Ancak buradan çıkacak sonuç, 'Hepimiz mağduruz, hepimiz biriz' gibi bir sonuçtan ziyade, hepimiz farklı farklı kimliklerde farklı farklı zulümleri yaşıyoruz şeklinde olmalıydı. Ve zaten tam da bu farklı farklı kimliklerde yaşadığımız farklı farklı zulümlerin bizi birbirimizi anlamaya iten sebep olması neden bu kadar kafa karıştırıcı bir şey olsun ki? Keşke kendisini aşmış, kemale ermiş bir toplumda yaşasaydık da birbirimizi benzer acıları yaşamadan anlayabilseydik. Ama galiba insan biraz da böyle bir varlık, damdan düşenin halinden en çok damdan düşen anlıyor yine. "Seni kim itti?" sorusu ise ancak bir araya gelip, birbirimizin acılarına dokunabildikten sonra, biraz dertleştikten sonra ortaya çıkıyor.

[96] http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?i=138046

"It is always said that we should look at history to understand the current situation. I want you to look at the present time to understand the past of Turkish-Armenian relations.

We are facing a mentality which can say to the veiled women, who make up 70 % of the female population in this country, "Go to Saudi Arabia", at a time when everybody says or does is under close scrutiny thanks to globalization.

I really do not understand how people still remain skeptical about the possibility of a forced evacuation of Armenians when there was no one to put pressure on states for their wrongdoings.

While the two mentalities may seem quite apart from each other historically, they are overlapping on the same soul-less plain, still hurting, oppressing and causing pain. The name of the oppressed can be Agop at one instance, or Ayşe in another instance but the name of the oppressor remains the same."[97]

This article is heavily criticized in the platform on the basis of forgetting the real power dynamics between communities that interacted with Armenians in the early 20th century. To be more explicit, while Kurds have to consider their role in killings and deportations of Armenians and confiscation of Armenian property, Sunni Muslims cannot dismiss the complicity of the ruling elite (who were Sunnis) while Armenians were deported or executed. For this reason, when such comparisons are made, any claims related to being a disadvantaged group in the present tense ends up bumping into

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[97] Hani hep "bugünü anlamak için geçmişe bakmak gerek" denir ya, ben de size Türk-Ermeni ilişkilerinin geçmişini anlayabilmek için tam tersini, yani geçmişi anlamak için bugüne bakmanızı önermek istiyorum.

Küreselleşme sayesinde yaşadığımız şu geçici diyardaki herkes az çok birbirinden haberdarken, iktidar sahiplerinin hemen her hareketi uluslararası camia tarafından gözlem altındayken, bu ülkenin kadın nüfusunun yüzde yetmişini oluşturan başörtülü kadın vatandaşlarına "İran'a git, Arabistan'a git" diyebilen bir zihniyetle karşı karşıyayız.

Bu zihniyetin bundan uzun yıllar önce, iktidarını denetleyip hesap sorabilecek kimse yokken nüfusun yaklaşık yüzde onunu oluşturan Ermeni vatandaşlarımızı bir yerlere 'göç etmeye' zorlaması nasıl olur da hâlâ bu kadar kuşkuyla karşılanır anlamakta zorlanıyorum.

Her ne kadar bu iki zihniyet birbirinden tarihsel olarak uzak görünse de aynı vicdan yoksunu düzlemin koordinatlarında birleşiyorlar ve hâlâ zulüm ediyor, can yakıyor, yaralıyorlar. Anlayacağınız mazlumluk halinin adı kimi zaman Agop kimi zaman Ayşe olsa da, zalimin adı her zaman ve kim olursa olsun Zalim.

claims of complicity in the past tense. In trying to align frames, the historicity of relations should always be dealt with either by acknowledging the complicity of one's group in the discrimination of other groups or by simply focusing on the moment.

To re-phrase this finding, one framing strategy that proves counter-productive is the attempt to support one's claims by way of drawing analogies or comparisons between groups which have not been so cooperative with each other historically. Finding commonalities on the basis of having endured similar types of oppressions by the state does not always create the sympathies needed to claim there is a successful frame alignment. This shows successful frames can only emerge if there is an acknowledgement of power relations involved in inter-group relations. Especially an acknowledgement of which groups historically profited from state privileges is needed in order to start a working conversation with different groups in society.

The major deadlock occurs when analogies drawn between groups do not represent what has taken place in history. Whereas ideally a successful frame bridging would rely on assuming there are symmetries between groups and that their agonies are comparable, an over-reliance on identities tilts the emphasis more towards the historical asymmetries of power between different groups.

When frames serve to cover up the historical relations between groups, they become more counter-productive. What minorities would want the most is the acknowledgement of the nature of inter-group relations and the naming of culpable parties rather than the simplistic assumption such as "Have not we all suffered in one way or another?" Any attempt to equate groups on the basis of their different ways of suffering does not get a positive reaction from group members. Because of fluidity of historical minority/majority positions or oppressor/oppressed categories, frames that lump groups under any one of those groups are tackled critically.

Leftists seem more critical of alliances and coalitions that conflate different ideological traditions for reasons of having a similar target. Here is what C.D, who identified herself as a socialist feminist says:

> There was a demonstration called: We are against coup d'états. There is Menderes on one side, Deniz Gezmiş on other side. Can there be a political union like this? Can there be a political current of this sort? Menderes should flow to Deniz…What kind of mentality is this? Who are you fooling? What kinds of democrats are these? These are the kitties of AKP but more dangerous than AKP. This is because they call you to socialist revolution. What kind of socialism is this? Were the fates of Adnan

Menderes and Deniz Gezmiş the same? They were both executed. But look closely at who executed whom and why. The people who executed Deniz Gezmiş were people like Menderes who had been ruling this country at the time. They tried to capture the state. How can you call them the same? You cannot account for 12th of September if you call them the same thing. You are creating an ideological sewage and then call it being a democrat. We are not so stupid as to not understand that (interview, 05.08.2011).[98]

This observation is important for this study. There are similar tendencies within this platform where different factions by virtue of having received similar treatment from the state are lumped into the same category of discriminated. However, this proves counter-productive as it covers up the historical relations between those groups.

What we learn from this discussion is that when dealing with discrimination against a group, the platform does not solely consider the issue as a matter of how state has treated a group. The issue is turned into an inter-group issue.[99]

What could be some of the reasons why groups are also implicitly held responsible for some of the blame? Is it because, they push for such an agenda or policy adoption by the state? Is it because, by virtue of enjoying freedoms and public goods others are not able to enjoy, they should feel guilty about this? Is it because, their

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[98] Mesela bir tane eylem vardı. Darbelere karşıyız. Bir tarafta Menderes var bir tarafta Deniz Gezmiş. Böyle bir siyasi birlik olur mu? Böyle bir siyasi akım olur mu? Menderesçiler Denizlere aksın? Böyle bir akıl olur mu? Sen kimi kandırıyorsun? Böyle bir demokratlık olabilir mi? Bunlar AKP'nin yavruları. Bunların AKP'den daha tehlikeli yanı insanı sosyalist devrime çağırıyorlar. Böyle bir sosyalistlik olur mu? Deniz Gezmiş ve Adnan Menderes'in kaderi aynı mı? İkisi de idam edildi. İyi de kim kimi idam etti, niye etti bir bak hele. Deniz Gezmiş'i idam edenler Menderes gibi olanlardı, bu ülkenin iktidarında olanlardı. Devleti ele geçirmeye çalıştılar. Nasıl bu ikisine aynı dersin? Aynı dersen 12 Eylül'den hesap soramazsın. Sen bilinç bulanıklığı, ideolojik bir lağım yaratıyorsun o lağımı da bize demokratlık diye satıyorsun. O kadar da aptalız yani.

[99] At this point, one may pose the question of whether not all discriminations involve an inter-group aspect. This is not always the case. If one takes the case of veil ban, this is a direct discrimination of the state against its veiled citizens on the grounds of implementing secular principles. However, one cannot see the same level of discrimination to veiled women in society. With the exception of a minority of fiercely critical secularists, society is either indifferent or approving veiled women. The discrimination cannot be depicted so much in inter-group terms. However, the same situation does not hold when questions related to relations with certain minorities, i.e Kurds or homosexuals come into play. Dominant public sphere may be as discriminatory as the state vis-a-vis such minorities.

privileged treatment gives them an asymmetric power which they can always make use of to the detriment of disadvantaged groups?

Discrimination can be used by other groups in a conscious manner to improve that group's life chances. (i.e. Kurds, in the case of confiscation of Armenian property) It could also be that state behavior and individual behavior are two complementary constructs that are not mutually exclusive or that do not exhibit conflicting rationale at all times. After all it is those same individuals who assume political positions. This is especially prominent in the discourse of feminists who claim that state is a patriarchal institution since it is men who fill most of the influential positions in state institutions. These themes all come up in subsequent discussions on complicity and how it is negotiated.

Moving attention away from state policies and towards inter-group relations causes mixed results. While some members question the assumptions behind culpability as misplaced, others think this gives them an opportunity to come to terms with the depth and complexity of inter-group injustices.

6.4. Modified Framing Strategy: Re-defining Privileged and Under-privileged Groups

One result of putting the burden of just treatment of groups on to other groups in society is that members try to distance themselves from the "privileged group" category. The privileged group can mean different things to different members. For some, this is being Sunni. These are usually less religious members of the platform. For others, it is being a Kemalist Sunni, which refers to those citizens who are willing to practice their religion in the private sphere. In trying to shift the blame from a group unto another, each member finds a further cleavage that can be appealing to others in convincing them that they are equally an outcast.

What is central to these attempts to find further cleavages is the strong conviction that there is a certain life style that was promoted by the state since its establishment, an equivalent of WASP in America, which some members call "Kemalist Sunni". These

are the citizens who fit the norms of "appropriate Turkish citizen" the best and consequentially they are the ones to enjoy the fruits of state recognition in the form of easier access to political, economic and cultural rights. Here is what D.E thinks on this topic:

> Relations of authority may exhibit diversity; however it is evidently Kemalism which is able to melt all the identities in its own pot. Just as what Kurds or Sunnis did in the case of Armenian issue can be a problem, the same is true for other groups in their approach to the veil ban. For this reason, what has to be done is to pin down the source of authority for all these different oppressions and hold it accountable for it. It is Kemalism which is producing these problems. It is this ideology which made people fight with each other. Neither of Muslims, Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds or Armenians can be pure enough under its influence. We can distinguish the real Muslim, real Armenian, Alevi or leftist by checking whether it has isolated itself from Kemalism (online blog, 09.09.2008).[100]

Hence, when there is a criticism of Sunnis, one of the tendencies is to associate the ills of being a Sunni majority with Kemalism. Mainstream Sunnism is associated with Kemalism and responsibility is left on to this type of mainstream Sunnism. P.R says:

> What is to be questioned is this nation state identity. This means questioning the majority. These days whenever I hear the word majority, I think of Turkish Kemalism. The type of Sunni Muslim who only practices his/her belief at home is part of this identity and it has to be questioned. The fact that the majority of this country is Muslim is disturbing me, because it is just one type of Muslim. The headscarf ban is also marginalizing us against this created norm. Our problem is not being able to adapt to the mainstream Islam (online blog, 07.09.2008).[101]

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[100] Ayrıca iktidar ilişkileri toplumsal anlamda çeşitlilik arzetse de, bugün bu ülkede iktidar olanın bütün kimlikleri kendi potasında istediği şekilde eritme kabiliyetine haiz Kemalizm olduğu aşikar. Ermeni meselesinde Kürtlerin, Sünnilerin yaptıkları nasıl zulümse, başörtüsü meselesinde de aynı şey başkaları için söz konusu olabilmekte. Bu yüzden öncelikle bütün bu zulümlerin kaynağı olan iktidarı tespit etmek, onunla hesaplaşmak gerekiyor. Bütün bu sorunları üreten Kemalizmin kendisi. Bu ülkede insanların iliklerine kadar işlemiş olan ve herkesi birbirine düşüren bu ideoloji. Ve onun etkisinden ne Müslümanlar, ne Sünniler, ne Aleviler, ne Kürtler, ne de Ermeniler ari değiller. Bu anlamda gerçek Müslüman'ı, Ermeni'yi, Alevi'yi, solcuyu vs. Kemalizm'den ne kadar arınmış olduğuna bakarak ayırt edebiliriz bence.

[101] Bu aralar çoğunluk lafını her duyduğumda altında TC Kemalizmi aramaya başladım farkında olmadan. Yaratılan Sünni Müslüman ama dinini sadece evinde yaşayan kimlik de bunun bir parçası ve bunu da sorgulamak gerekiyor. "Çoğunluk

This message does not resonate very well with other group members who want to see the complicity of each group in other group's suffering. Forgiveness goes through acknowledgement of complicity for at least some of the coalition members. For the following commentator, the dominant behavior among a group cannot solely be attributed to how it is aligned with the state. The same interviewee argues:

> I always thought about the Sunni pressure in this country in the following fashion: Issues such as the veil ban or Kurdish question are problems emanating from the state and finding their way to the larger public. So, the source of the problem is artificial. There is no correspondence with how the public feels about these issues. It is the high politics that is dividing the citizens into artificial categories which is responsible for these problems. Like the veiled/non-veiled dichotomy. And the solution will be found in state circles. It depends on the consensus between politicians. However, the pressure of Sunni Islam is different. No one is pushing the public to exert its ethical attitude in this fashion. This is an internalized ethics. The people are behaving in the way they deem appropriate. For this reason, we have to distinguish between state pressure and societal pressure and read the differences carefully. The Sunni pressure is being used and supported by the state at times or being suppressed or disapproved of at other times. This is actually a very complicated and difficult battle compared to the one we have with the state. We have to get engaged in a process with the public that needs a lot of labor. We have to do this without hurting the sensitivities of the public. We can tell the state that it should change, but it is harder to say to the society: Hey, public change your rules (online blog, 09.09.2008)![102]

Müslüman'dır" söyleminin altında aslında "Çoğunluk belli bir tarz Müslümandır" yattığı için bu bile rahatsız ediyor beni bir Müslüman olarak. Zaten başörtüsü yasağı bağlamında toplumdaki normal bir pratiğin marjinalleştirilmesi devreye giriyor, Yani o "istenilen, çoğunluk olduğu iddia edilen Müslüman tipi" kapsamına da girememek" ki A.B'nin işaret ettiği de bu.

[102] Sünni İslam baskısı konusunda da ben hep şöyle düşünmüşümdür: Mesela bir başörtüsü sorunu, bir Kürt sorunu devletten halka doğru giden sorunlar. Dolayısıyla sorunun yapay temelleri var. Halk arasında bir karşılığı yok. Hatta devletten halka geçen ve halkı da olmadığı çizgilerle zoraki ayıran siyasetler sorunlu burda. Başörtülü başörtüsüz ayrımı gibi. Ve çözümü devlet masalarında. Siyasilerin karşılıklı anlaşmalarına dayalı falan. Ama Sünni İslam baskısı biraz daha farklı. Kimse doğrudan zorlamıyor halkı sen toplumda etik anlayışını şu şekilde kur diye. Bu artık oturmuş bir değer olmuş. O inandığı şekilde davranıyor sadece. O yüzden devlet baskısıyla, toplumsal baskı arasında fark var ve bunları okurken de o şekilde okumak gerekiyor. Sünni baskı da devlet tarafından zaman zaman kullanılan desteklenen, zaman zamansa bastırılan sevilmeyen birşey olabiliyor. Bence bu devletle verdiğimiz mücadeleye göre çok daha karmaşık ve mücadele edilmesi zor bir durum. Toplumun kendisiyle çok emek isteyen bir sürece girmek ve bir de toplumun hassasiyetleri olduğu için onu incitip kırmadan yapmak gerekiyor. Devlete değiştir dediğimiz gibi halka da "bu kuralını değiştir ey halk" denmiyor.

All these formulations have a point in common. There is a fair amount of criticism of the dominance of Sunnism in this country, the way it is practiced and it is projected on to other minorities. For this reason, how Sunnism is assessed within the coalition gains a bigger importance for the success of frame alignments.

What this section tells us is that in the minds of alliance members there is a need for acknowledging the groups they belong to are not on an equal footing with each other, some have suffered both at the hands of the state and at the hands of other groups. For this reason any framing that tries to establish symmetry between groups attracts criticism. Here is what A.B thinks:

> I find the category "Muslim" very problematic. I always said this. We all know it but never pay attention to it. In Turkey, no one has ever been tortured for being a Sunni Muslim. For this reason, when we are to talk about Muslims, let us not forget to refine what we mean in social, cultural and political terms and not generalize with a generic term such as "Muslims".
>
> Sunni Muslims in this country should really come to terms with how hegemonic they are. There are no hierarchies of oppression. However if you start speaking, "we the Muslims", you will be covering up the nature of this hegemony in a dangerous manner. This argument is very fashionable among Sunni Muslims and AKP has based its popularity on this narrative as well (online blog, 07.09.2011).[103]

Here we observe a tension between two conflicting rationales. While there is an urge to associate privilege with one type of citizen (a Kemalist Turkish Sunni), which makes all the other groups in society outcasts on a par with each other in terms of marginalization, the counter-trend within the platform is to acknowledge that there are binary dichotomies which divide groups into different camps depending on the criteria.

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[103] İkincisi, "Müslüman" kategorisini çok sorunlu buluyorum, hep söyledim yine söylüyorum. Aslında hepimizin de bildiği birşey bu ama yine de pek dikkat etmiyoruz. Türkiye'de hiç kimse "Sünni Müslüman" olduğu için eziyet görmemiştir" desem abartmış olur muyum bilmiyorum. Orada daha sosyal, kültürel ve siyasal tespitlerle konuşmak ve Müslümanlar diye genellememek gerekir sanırm.

Halbuki Türkiye'deki Sünni Müslümanların ne kadar hegemonik olduklarını farketmeye ciddi şekilde ihtiyaçları var. Mağduriyetler arası hiyerarşi yok ama "biz Müslümanlar" diye bir mağdur kitleden bahsedersek bu hegemonyanın üstünü çok tehlikeli biçimde örtmüş oluruz ki bu anlatı Sünni Müslümanlar arasında çok satıyor, AKP de kendi iktidarını bunun üzerinden sürekli güçlendiriyor.

Whereas Sunnis might claim disadvantage when it comes to the comparison with Kemalist Sunnis (which refers to those individuals who only practice their religiosity in the private sphere), they are advantaged when it comes to their comparison with Alevis, Kurds or Armenians. There are examples of such relative advantage throughout discussions. Hence bracketing such ethnic, cultural and sectarian differences when talking about identities do not pay off in the coalition.

What does this tell us about the limits of multicultural coalitions? Young was optimistic about the potentials of such coalitions provided that they can represent different ways in which distinct groups are harmed by state policies, be it neo-liberal restructuring as in her case studies, or as in the case of discriminatory state policies vis-à-vis different minorities in Turkey. However, what we observe in this case is that, coalitions may turn inward as well as work outward and question the different ways in which each is implicated in the fate of another. While doing this, each group is evaluated from the prism of one particular dichotomy. In the case of comparison with Kurds, Kemalists and religious Sunnis are on a par with each other in terms of complicity, while in the case of Alevis, it is mostly the religious Sunnis which are under attack. Instead of underlining the fluidity and intersectionality of positions, each discussion brings another division line according to which each group's historical track-record is evaluated.

On the one hand, this is a useful exercise. While one group claims to have suffered in one instance, in another instance it sits in the place of a culpable party. In this fashion, reflexivity on the situatedness of positions (depending on the criteria of a binary comparison) is achieved. This also shows, despite claims to common fate, there are historical circumstances and experiences which makes groups culpable on the basis of having profited from another groups' plight, intentionally or unintentionally.

This shows multicultural coalitions can be fluid arrangements at best. Depending on the topic, groups may shift positions and take on different responsibilities. This also shows identities are negotiated in a flux. They are not fixed and rigidly situated compared to each other. The positive side of such initiatives is that they help achieve a fuller account of the relativity of group positions and help groups avoid making essentializing statements about victimhood or oppression. The downside on the other hand is that there is a possibility for such coalitions to descend into a competition of "who oppressed whom?" where the objective of understanding different experiences of identity categories is ignored.

6.5. Modified Framing Strategy: Being Apologetic for Discrimination

Because frames started evolving from a more state-centered point into one where inter-group relations are questioned, the ensuing framing strategy has a more apologetic tone. Having an apologetic tone could mean feeling guilt or feeling conscious about the responsibility one has by virtue of being privileged.[104]

This could be manifested in the form of formally apologizing to minorities or in the form of rejecting certain privileges bestowed on oneself by virtue of being a Turkish citizen. With regards to the formal apology, it is important to analyze what it signifies for the group. Many of those who see this strategy as fruitful argue that confronting one's history is something we owe to those who had been discriminated. R.S argues:

> I don't see myself exempt from apologizing. Not until long ago, when I was a kid especially, I used to think the word "Armenian" was a swear word. I did not know that what was meant by the term was a public. After I have read and observed more, I started coming to terms with this truth. We all have to come to terms with our past; otherwise we would not do much good to those people who are still carrying that past on their shoulders. For this reason, I consider an apology as a courageous attempt to come to terms with one's past (online blog, 22.12.2008).[105]

One does not become an individual totally devoid of privileges, if she or he has not suffered what the minorities have suffered historically. This is because by virtue of

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[104] How privilege is defined will become more certain at the last modified framing strategy.

[105] Özür dileyecek kişiler biz miyiz değil miyiz, tartışması üzerine düşününce, özür dileme fikrinden uzak görmüyorum kendimi. Çünkü Ermeni kelimesini küçük sanılmayacak bir yaşıma kadar küfür zannederdim. Kastedilenin bir halk olduğunu bilmezdim. Sonradan bilgim, görgüm artınca yavaş yavaş öğrenmeye başladım geçmişi. Hepimiz tarihle yüzleşecek, o tarihi günümüzde sırtında taşıyarak yaşayan insanların yüklerini hafifletecek pek bir şey yapmış olamayız. Bu nedenle bu özür dileme tavrı, aslında yüzleşme konusunda atılmış cesur bir adım diye düşünüyorum.

not being part of the disadvantaged, that person does start life quite ahead of others which makes the argument that one should not feel personally responsible for the wrong-doings of the past an obsolete argument. M.N argues:

> I believe that every man in this society is benefiting from male dominance intentionally or unintentionally. I also believe the people of this country have benefited from the rent and privileges emanating from the elimination of Armenians, directly or indirectly: materially or psychologically. We have moved to a more privileged position even if we have not asked for it. I also believe if we are not Kurds or Alevis, we happen to be the part of a more privileged situation economically, politically, ideologically and psychologically (online blog, 22.12.2008).[106]

There are also those such as Ş.T, who believe an apology can still serve its purpose by forcing each individual to confront the founding rationale of the state, to take the individual responsibility to reflect on the implications of the founding ideology of the state which is a contemporary duty, not a duty of the past:

> I believe there is a momentum not to be missed here. This is the possibility to come to terms with ourselves. I am talking about the possibility to oust the obsession with identities, the implicit and explicit racism starting from ourselves right now. Collective responsibility has never taken root in this country. Responsibility has always been shifted on to others. However, once a crime has been committed there is no turning back the clock. That is the disastrous part. I believe the way to heal the past is not to bring some people to their knees but to feel responsible for one's past. The apology that comes with this feeling of responsibility means we take the blame of the past onto ourselves.

> I am not apologizing from Armenians. I am not apologizing as a Turk either. I do not believe identities, roots can create a real source of solidarity, and they can only act as a substitute for solidarity. The condition for living together on the same political plane is to take the blame of a genocide that constitutes the implicit condition, the covert basis of the political plane that is affecting us all. I am apologizing not because i am responsible for the past

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[106] Ben inanıyorum ki, bu toplumda her erkek erkek egemenliğinden yararlanmaktadır kendi istenci dışında bile olsa.Yine inanıyorum ki bu toplumda Ermeni olmayan herkes bir buçuk milyon Ermeninin yani o zamanki ülke nüfusunun onda birinin ortadan kaldırılmış olmasından ortaya çıkan ranttan ve ayrıcalıktan doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak yararlanmıştır. Maddi ya da manevi. İstese de istemese de daha avantajlı bir yere geçmiştir görece. Yine inanıyorum ki, Kürt değilsek, Alevi değilsek, onlara göre üstün ve egemen sayılan bir ekonomik, politik, ideolojik ve psikolojik durumun parçasıyızdır, istemesek de.

but because i am responsible for the current political basis (online blog, 22.12.2008).[107]

The justifications provided above, if read very carefully, have different rationales. The first two reasons have a certain awareness of one's identity and what having that particular identity brought to oneself in the form of better treatment and privileges. The last justification on the other hand, instead of identification with a certain background and having to make an apology from the perspective of that background considers an apology as a foundational principle on which a healthy political union can be based.

It is an important discussion whether demand or provision of apologies is based on having very rigidly defined identities. One could argue that if there was not a strong attachment to identities, there might not have been a demand for an apology. The same goes for the provision of it. It could be all the more irrelevant to apologize if one does not feel deeply attached to a group which is held culpable. It may become harder to admit certain wrong-doings if such wrong doings are turned into one's constitutive traits, the things that makes that person himself/herself.

Despite this fact, there had been a lot of confessions in the platform with respect to not having been sensitive enough to past injustices to other groups in society. Some of these confessions were about not understanding the plight of Kurds properly, that of ignoring the existence of Muslim sects other than Sunnis, that of ignoring the implications of 28th of February for veiled women etc. These should be seen as sincere

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[107] Burada yakalanması ve korunması gereken bir ivme olduğunu düşünüyorum. O da kendimizle yüzleşme olasılığıdır. Burada hemen şimdi kendimizden başlayarak bu toplumsallığı, bu köken takıntısını, bu kimlikleri, bu açık veya örtük ırkçılığı sorgulayarak değiştirme imkanından bahsediyorum. Kollektif sorumluluk bu topraklarda asla yeşermemiş bir düşünce. Sorumluluk hep ötelenen, başkalarına atfedilendir. Oysa suç bir kez işlendi mi, zamanı geri almak mümkün olmuyor. Feci olan da bu. Geçmişi onarmaya başlamanın, birilerini diz çökertmekle değil, ona karşı kendini sorumlu hissetmeye başlamakla gerçekleşeceğine inanıyorum.Sorumluluk hissinin bir özürle ifade bulması, geçmişin suçlarının kendi üzerimize alınması anlamına geliyor.

Ben Ermenilerden özur dilemiyorum, bir Türk olarak da özür dilemiyorum. Kimlik ve kökenlerin gerçek bir dayanışma (= ortak aidiyet) ilişkisi yaratamayacağını düşünmüyorum (olsa olsa "dayanışma-ikamesi" yaratabilirler). Hepimizi etkileyen bir siyasal alanda birlikte yaşamaya devam etme kosulu, o siyasal alanın temelini, örtük şartını, zımni kaidesini oluşturan bir soykırımın sorumluluğunu üzerimize almaktır. Ben dün değil, bugün bundan sorumlu olduğum için özür diliyorum.

attempts to come to terms with, albeit late, what other groups might have gone through in Turkey. Here is what G.H thinks:

> If I did not spend time on relations of hegemony, I would not have come close to understanding the situation of veiled women. However I did nothing for them during 28th of February period. We had no interaction at the time. We did not pass that exam really well. We did nothing against those pressures. Then I started thinking harder after the Konca Kuriş incident (interview, 14.03.2011).[108]

One other symbolic gesture that is seen as a compensation for the discrimination of minorities is lifting the Turkish Oath. The Turkish Oath, despite having the potential to signify a civic citizenship is seen as a sign of a certain prerogative. Emphasizing one's Turkishness is seen as an insult on groups who suffered from various discriminations.

The Turkish Oath could, in principle, be considered as the symbol of the covenant between the state and its citizens. If the language of the Oath made less reference to being a Turk, it could also be considered as a declaration that inculcates civic virtues in children in their formative years. In other words, if the Oath could be used in a way that would downplay nationality and accentuate dutiful citizenship, it would do more good than harm. Here is a quote by S.Ş along this line:

> The text (referring to the Turkish Oath) was written to give us an identity. You need such things as a kid. The kid looks for a meaning as to who he/she is. They look for an identity beyond individual character. Elders, through an oath written as if it is from the kid's mouth, invite the kid to claim this identity. The Oath has been a successful tool in the creation of Turkish identity. The image of a kid, who is righteous, respectful to elders, compassionate to youngsters, loving the nation, is not a bad image at all. I would like to do whatever I can for this nation. I was educated through the taxes of this nation. I feel I owe some things. I try to respect the cultures which lived and live here, even when it is not that easy to do it. I really find it hard to love this country sometimes. I think what is disturbing is to attach all the good personal qualities to Turkishness. If we change the oath in the following fashion, there would be no trouble: I am a human, I am righteous, Hardworking, My Law…..My soul is a gift to humanity…Here it is, totally

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[108] İktidar meselelerine kafa yormasaydım başörtülü kadınların halini anlayamazdım. Ama onlar için 28 Şubat'ta hiçbirşey yapmadım. Hiç ilişkimiz olmadı. O sınavı çok iyi vermemiştik. Baskılara karşı hiçbirşey yapmadık. Sonra Konca Kuriş sayesinde düşünmeye başladım.

universal situation, no nationalism involved. It can be valid for anywhere in the world (online blog, 10.12.2008).[109]

The real concern is not the oath itself, but how to craft a new concept of citizenship that guarantees that those elements of the Turkish state who do not feel as the constituent elements because of historical reasons (i.e. minority status) come to feel that they are treated as equal citizens. The same interviewee argues the following:

I would like to do whatever it takes to remove the discomfort of those who have a hard time naming themselves with this name (Turkish), currently or in the past. If we are the foundational element, we have a responsibility to others. The others, are those who do not think they were given equal status and who think they have been faulted historically. Even if we do not have racial purity, this responsibility to others can be conceptualized as the ability to create a political environment where for those who consider themselves ethnically and culturally pure can feel their differences will not be assimilated but will be given equal weight under the banner of a human identity. How can we live as equal citizens? How can I regain and revalue a name (Turkishness) all the while not closing my eyes to the oppressions it committed? How can I make my existence a gift to humanity? These are all constitutional problems and we need a new concept of citizenship. This is really not that easy. We need to walk a longer distance and we need more courage (online blog, 10.12.2008).[110]

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[109] Metin bizi vatandaş olarak kimliklendirmek için yazılmış bir metindi. Çocukken böyle şeylere ihtiyaç var. Çocuk kim olduğunu arıyor. Kişisel karakterinin ötesinde bir kimlik arıyor. İşte andımızda da, büyükler onu, onun ağzından yazılmış bir şiirle bir kimliği üstlenmeye çağırmaktadırlar. Andımız Türk kimliğinin kuruluşunda başarılı ve esaslı bir araç olmuştur. Doğru, çalışkan, büyüklerini sayan, küçüklerini seven, yurdunu ve milletini özünden çok seven birisi imgesi bugün de fena gelmiyor bana. Mesela ben Türkiye için elimden gelen iyi bir şey varsa yapmak isterim. Bu milletin vergisiyle okudum. Kendimi borçlu hissediyorum herşeyden önce. Üstünde yaşayan kültürlere saygı duymaya çalışıyorum, bu her zaman kolay olmasa da. Zaman zaman bu ülkeyi sevmek için bir sebeb bulmakta çok zorlansam da. Sanırım rahatsız edici olan tüm iyi sıfatların "Türk" olmaya raptedilmiş olması. Meselâ şöyle değiştirsek andımızı: İnsanım, doğruyum, çalışkanım, yasam, varlığım insanlığa armağan olsun. İşte tamamen evrensel bir durum, milliyetçi bir tarafı da kalmamış oluyor. Dünyanın her yerinde okunabilir oluyor.

[110] Kendisini geçmişte veya şimdi bu adla anmakta zorlananların rahatsızlıklarını gidermek için ne gerekiyorsa yapmak isterim. Madem ayrıcalıklı kurucu öge biziz, bir sorumluluğumuz var ötekilere karşı. Öteki: Kuruluşta bizimle eş statüye sahip olmadığını düşünen, tarihsel haksızlıklara uğramış olanlar. Bizim bir etnik saflığımız olmasa da, kendilerini etnik ve kültürel olarak saf sayanlar için Anadolu ozanlarının düşündükleri gibi "insan" kimliğinde tüm farklılıkların asimile olmadan eşit olacakları bir ortamı siyaseten varetmeye çalışmak biçiminde düşünülebilir bu sorumluluk. Yoksa burayı yoketmek, bölmek, emperyal güçlere açmak filan değil istediğimiz. Nasıl eşit

At the opposing end of the debate, there are those such as U.Y who believe that the Turkish oath symbolizes all the prerequisites of having a strong Turkish state that caused so much trouble for minorities in this country. If Turkish citizens are requested to apologize for their state's behavior in the past then the Oath has no function of unifying those citizens anymore:

> Don't get me wrong, I have no problems with living in a Republic. However the exigencies of becoming a state have been carried out without hesitation in this Republic. Sometimes this has taken the form of extinction of an ethnicity; at other times people's religion or language has been prohibited. If all these necessities are now called oppressions and I am held accountable for it, then I should be against the militarism that is the real villain behind all this. If people are holding me accountable for crimes I have not committed, then the motto of "How happy is the one who says "I am Turk" is no longer a unifying motto for me (online blog, 10.12.2008).[111]

Proposal to lift the Turkish Oath follows a similar pattern to the proposal to apologize from minorities. There is a desire to make those identities which feel discriminated, feel equally constituent elements of the Republic. This is very different from a demand of recognition which is based on being different and authentic. A stress on common good would require every citizen to be proud of being equals and to limit one's political demand to this equal treatment. To the extent that demand for recognition is based on signifying a distinction or a difference, the Turkish Oath would not resonate well with such demands.

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vatandaşlar olarak yaşayabiliriz? Ben bir zamanlar seçilmiş bir adı, zulme ve gerçeklere gözlerimi kapamadan nasıl yeniden kazanabilirim, anlamlandırabilirim? Yani varlığımı insanlığın varlığına nasıl armağan edebilirim? Şimdi bunlar siyasi anayasal sorular aslında, belki de yeni bir vatandaşlık anlayışı kurmamız gerek. Hiç kolay değil elbette, daha çok yol, daha çok cesaret lazım.

[111] Yanlış anlaşılmasın Cumhuriyet'le bir sorunum yok ama Cumhuriyet sonrasının yeni kurulan bir devletinde devlet olmanın gereklilikleri her daim yerine getirilmiştir. Bu yeri gelmiş bir etnisitenin yok sayılması olmuş, yeri gelmiş bir inancın veya dilin yasaklanması ile olmuş ve ben şimdi bu gerekliliklerin zulüm halinin özrünü dilemek zorunda bırakılıyorsam o zaman bunlara sebep olan her türlü militarizmin karşısındayım demektir. İşlemediğim suçların özrü benden soruluyorsa "Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene" artık masum bir birleştirici unsur olmaktan çıkıyor.

The tension in both proposals is similar. One view sees relations between identities as a zero-sum game where assimilated identities insist on being compensated for discrimination either in the form of an apology or the symbolic removal of signs of distinction for being a Turk. The other view claims to hold a "universalist" stance that takes criticisms of the disadvantaged seriously but not necessarily to make their case a basis from which to negate universal citizenship but from which to build a more inclusive conception of citizenship, one that acknowledges past injustices.

Depending on one's perspective one could opt for more recognition of difference or for more inclusion into the mainstream. These turn out to have very different implications for both rights claims and policy making. Does the symbolic removal of distinctions for one group, or a formal apology serve to bracket the differences and co-opt marginalized groups into the mainstream? Or does it confirm the possibility of recognition of diverse identities and their positive value for public life. From the flow of discussions, we observe that there is no automatic connection between attestation of past discrimination and a positive evaluation of the worth of an identity at present. This debate is important for understanding whether civility necessarily translates into positive recognition of identities. I will come back to this debate at the end of this chapter and elaborate on its significance for politics of recognition.

6.6. How is the Criteria for Civility Determined in Heterogeneous Enclaves?

What I want to do in this section is to discuss why an analysis of this sequence is important, what it reveals about the more fundamental questions with respect to civility and recognition in particular and civil society in general. I will first start with the discussion of the nature of more specific questions raised in the coalition. Gradually I will extend my analysis into more general and deeper implications of my observations of the group dynamics.

As the sequence of conversations make clear, although being disadvantaged or discriminated was thought to be solely a matter of state conduct, eventually inter-group comparisons played a bigger role in discussions. The desire to show how inter-group

relations have played out asymmetrically and to the detriment of some groups became the primary theme in discussions. Starting from a state centric definition of complicity and fairness, the group ended up acknowledging the importance of inter-group relations.

Discussions centered on defining complicity in relational terms, which is to say that whether a group is complicit in the misfortune of another group is decided by looking at how privileges are distributed in society. Of course, there was also an evident counter-trend in the coalition that tried to promote inter-group solidarity by juxtaposing all groups against dominant state ideology and the mainstream citizen proto-type promoted by the state. However, this attempt was counteracted by the claim that this type of we against the state attitude masks how groups are positioned vis-a-vis each other.

Another important realization within the platform is that, if we are to talk about any type of political togetherness in Turkey, those relations have to be reconfigured in a way that will be seen just and inclusive by the historically disadvantaged groups in society.

How do these discussions tie to civility? By way of admitting that true responsibility of a group resides not only in condemning physical violence against minorities but also in admitting that the group directly or indirectly benefits from all the arrangements in society that work to the detriment of that minority, the group achieves a more sophisticated version of civility.

6.7. How can Complicity be Conceptualized by Civil Society Actors?

What the sequence of the discussion reveals about the group is that there is a deep concern about how to define complicity. As argued in the beginning of this chapter, the group started out claiming inter-group solidarity but gradually descended into quarrels over who has what type of responsibility in the suffering of other groups. It was pointed out both in the methodology section as well as the beginning of this chapter that discussants of the platform feel varying degrees of allegiance to the groups they are

speaking about. One could argue that to the extent that one feels a strong allegiance to a group it could become harder to admit complicity of that group. However, the following observations are made regardless of who makes claims, more group attached ones or more individualistic ones. This is because, the discussion gains a momentum and character of its own despite different levels of attachment discussants feel towards the groups in question. This also shows the dialogical nature of the discussions have a transformative power over the content of arguments with or without group allegiance.

To illustrate the gradual upgrading of arguments employed by group members, I will start with an echelon that shows different levels of attribution of responsibility to groups in society. These different levels of attribution of responsibility will be evaluated with respect to what type of potential extensions they provide to group members in negotiating culpability. This will also show the argumentative evolution of the group in a vivid fashion. The levels make use of historical victims in Turkish history: Armenians, Alevis and Kurds. These victims were not chosen arbitrarily. They refer to the victims most heavily utilized in discussions of the platform.

Level I: Denial of complicity: I (or my group) have lived with Armenians/Alevis/Kurds side by side without major problems or discriminations on any of those groups.

This type of frame has never been used by platform members. Everybody agrees these groups have suffered/were discriminated in one way or another. There is no denial of discrimination or victimhood of these groups.

Level II: State as the culpable party: The Armenians/Alevis/Kurds of this country have all suffered in the hands of the state

The discussions of the group actually start at this level. However by defining the state as the only culpable party, the need for evaluation of historical inter-group relations becomes impossible. This is an easy and incomplete account of how discrimination and victimhood operate in societies.

If the platform stayed at this level and did not gradually move into discussing the complicity of social actors, we could have easily argued that the platform had no transformative role and that it stayed rather strategic, in the sense of just aiming the

state, than fulfill a more substantive role of defining culpability and complicity in inter-group terms.

Level III: Complicity of other groups in society: Armenians/Alevis/Kurds not only suffered in the hands of the state but also had to endure physical and psychological harm in the hands of dominant/privileged groups in society.

This type of argument admits that wide-scale discrimination of a group of people is not possible without the tacit or active consent of other groups in society. The nature of this consent is crucial. It could be that the privileged groups intentionally caused physical harm (i.e. inter-group ethnic cleansing) or explicitly profited from the victim's plight (re-allocation of wealth and property of the victim). It could even be the case that the group caused indirect harm by fueling a political climate that is based on negative perceptions of the victim.

It is of extreme importance what is considered harmful: physical harm, indirect privileges or discriminatory attitudes. The following scale flows from immediate and observable harm to more subtle forms of discrimination. The definition of moral responsibility changes according to the definition of complicity. In the following levels of argumentation, the reader will find different versions to the question: **Am I responsible for what happened to the victim?**

Level IV: No, I am not responsible because: I have not caused physical harm and I have not concretely profited from the plight of the victim

This argument might be based on the perception that to be held accountable for what happens to a group in society, one must have obtained an objectively definable gain by the victim's loss. It becomes evident that the criteria for complicity in this case are rather concrete or physical. This is a more limited, albeit justifiable account of what harm constitutes.

Some of the platform members belong to this level of argumentation in that they see themselves equally marginalized and prosecuted. Hence, they are equals in terms of receiving harm. The usual line of self-defense is having suffered similar types of discriminations. Such individuals justify their own position by saying they demand the same type of retribution from the state.

Another line of defense for some discussants is that the culpability of a group should be determined by analyzing how much it was aligned with nation state ideology. If a group has historically been in the category of non-favored groups there is no point in accusing that group.

The types of arguments provided in support of non-culpability of platform members all point toward an understanding that sees harm as physical harm.

Level V: Yes, I am responsible because….

There are various lines of arguments in support of why an individual might consider herself responsible for the victimhood of another:

i. I become part of this complicity and profit from this situation:

This reasoning assumes that even when a person does not openly cause harm to another group, by not taking any pre-emptive measures within her own capacity to protect the marginalized group, the person profits from whatever the victim is deprived of. This could be an increase in wealth/property of a group to the detriment of the victim. i.e. the handover of the property of minorities to Turkish citizens after their departure.

This type of reasoning emerges within the coalition after extended rounds of discussion. This type of attribution of responsibility is different than the previous case in that it does not look for inflicting physical harm to be qualified for responsible. The yardstick for holding accountable is a lot more subtle. The persons in this category hold themselves accountable for what they have not done instead of what they have done. As can be observed, the standard for being just is more demanding.

ii. because without knowing I reproduced the same prejudices in my actions and in my speech.

Another line of thought that holds individuals accountable even when they do not cause physical harm is the case where the person in question is reproducing the same pattern of prejudices and biases in society in her actions and in her speech therefore unintentionally contributing to the negative atmosphere towards the victim. This type of

accountability stems from the inability to whole-heartedly admit one's own submission to dominant belief sets in society that work against the survival and well-being of a disadvantaged group.

There were members who used this reasoning to hold themselves accountable. They admitted their failure to weed out the biased and pejorative overtones about the minorities in their own discourse. Here again, we observe a move away from causing physical violence to victims to causing psychological harm through language.

iii.   because by being silent I do not become part of a political future which acknowledges the equality of groups

This type of reasoning is different than the previous ones in that the primary responsibility on the part of individuals is to have a vision on citizenship that is inclusive and that accommodates the wishes of all groups in society. For this reason, any indifference on the part of a citizen about the political demands of others is considered insensitive. The terms for the negotiation of a more inclusive political regime should be decided by the free interaction of citizens belonging to different groups who evaluate each other from a point of equality.

Hence culpability in this instance is the failure to abide by the principle of equality in evaluating the positions and demands of disadvantaged groups. This is a future oriented discourse about responsibility and carries great potential for re-structuring relations between groups on the basis of equality.

There are group members who take this point of view about responsibility. This is the most upgraded and refined version of taking responsibility for the faults of the past. However, unlike the previous levels which force a re-evaluation of past positions, this level makes an attempt to forge a political future based on the equality of demands of groups. A failure to acknowledge this equality results in discrimination of disadvantaged groups. For this reason, failure is the indifference to what others are engaged in terms of rights struggles.

6.8. Grading Civility in Heterogeneous Coalitions

What is the purpose in classifying different frames on complicity? What use do we derive from having an echelon or grading that begins with no culpability and that gradually makes its way into more subtle forms of accountability?

This type of grading is important for our purposes since it sets standard/criteria for what is called civility. In the words of Akman (2010):

> Because the notion of civility is so central to the alternative perspective on civil society, it may be desirable to try to explain and elaborate what is meant by it…(As a strategy) let us begin with a strategy of trying to pin down what is meant by civility by trying to specify its opposite: Incivility. Perhaps, in some respects, this will be a less contentious procedure by which we can at least hope to eliminate certain types of phenomena and to delineate the proverbial "bottom line" in terms of civil conduct that is conducive to a truly civil society. Such an indirect (and in some ways, minimalist) procedure may turn out to be a more practical way of comprehending civility than trying to determine the lofty standards of civility directly and maximalistically (p.1).

The same strategy has been used in this dialogical construction of complicity. The conversations give way to definitions of different ways in which a social actor can be called "uncivil". Each level has a different proposition as to what constitutes incivility. The potentials each definition carries for civil society is different. Whereas we have started from a point where incivility is strictly tied to having caused harm, which is "malicious incivility", as the debate has progressed we have arrived at accounts where incivility is portrayed as having a "misguided neutrality" or "indifference". Failure to act to stop harm or not condoning but witnessing harm being done is a form of complicity for at least some of the group members. The following statement by U.Y illustrates how staying neutral and the failure to act is considered shameful for some members of the platform:

As a self-criticism, a Kurdish friend of mine said that Muslims shout and mourn when the issue is Palestine but when it comes to Kurdish issue they are just mute. He was right. Cursing Jews, defending Palestine did not cause any harm to the system that was the foundation stone. However, to speak of the Kurdish issue is to plug a bullet to the heels of nationalist-conservative-Muslim identity which is an integral part of this political system. It is still partially like that. The elimination of nationalism from Muslim identities does not go very far back in time and the Kurdish issue is still being evaluated through such comparisons (online blog, 07.09.2011).[112]

This confession says a lot about what constitutes civility. This is the type of reflexivity McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) were talking about in their discussing on developing a critical awareness of one's location in society. To be critical about discrimination could mean taking a critical stance against one's own identity. The integrity of that identity might have been formulated in juxtaposition to the marginalized identity and it takes great courage to speak against discrimination in that instance.

The following quote also employs a rather pro-active or preventive attitude vis-à-vis harm caused by others. The criteria for civility in this instance is not only condemning the violence against victims but also taking personal steps to assure their life is not in danger.[113]

"At a time when Sunni Muslims are held responsible for an oppression (The arson of Madımak) that is beyond human comprehension and while I was revolting against those accusations, (in a state of shock) I was not responsible enough to define and re-examine the nature of that oppression. That fire has touched me and hurt me too. If there was a chance of going back to the 2nd of July, I would have wanted to stand by the doors of Madimak Hotel and make myself a human shield. I dream of a country where no one is taken away from their beloved ones in an unjust and untimely manner. I want a country that embraces life not death. I mourn for

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[112] Bir özeleştiri olarak, Kürt bir arkadaşım, Müslümanların konu Filistin olunca bağırıp çağırdıklarını ama yanı başlarındaki Kürt sorununa gözlerini kulaklarını kapattığını söylemiştir. Haklı idi, zira Filistin'i savunmak Yahudilere istediğin kadar küfretmek "temel bir taş" olarak görünen içinden yaşanılan sisteme bir zarar vermemekte idi, Ama Kürt sorununu dile getirmek bizzat sistemin bir vazgeçilmezi olarak görünen "milliyetçi-muhafazakar-Müslüman" kimliğin kendini topuğundan vurması demekti. Ki kısmen hala öyledir maalesef. Müslümanların milliyetçi çizgiden kendilerini arındırmalarının tarihi çok geriye gitmese de bugün de Kürt sorunu dile getirilirken aynı şekilde bir kıyas üzerinden gidiliyor.

[113] http://sivasyasindabulusankadinlar.blogspot.com/

the victims of Sivas, their families and beloved ones on the 17th commemoration.[114]

What does this elevated form of civility imply for the group? What kind of potential does it carry for civic actors in particular and for the flourishing of civil society in general?

The particular value of a heightened standard of civility is great when there is significant polarization in society and the inter-group trust is on the decline. Such confessionalism as exemplified in the dialogues carries the potential to break the ice between previously hostile groups. However, precisely due to living in a polarized society, an upgraded form of civility is all the more difficult to achieve. Polarization between groups means that taking on the blame will look concessionary and appeasing by one's own group.

Deliberation between heterogeneous enclaves becomes more important at this point. If enclaves, which position themselves in juxtaposition to dominant and more mainstream groups in society, take up this task and initiate a conversation with other enclaves in society they may start a precedent for elevating the standard of civility for the larger public.

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[114] Sünni Müslümanların, boyutları insan havsalasına sığmayan bir zulmün sorumlusu olarak gösterildiği bir dönemde; bu yüzden karşılaştığım suçlamalara isyan ederken, bir tür şok hali içinde o zulmü tanımlamakta ve sorgulamakta yeteri kadar sorumlu davranamadım. O yangın bana da değdi, dağladı beni. Eğer bugün 2 Temmuz'a dönebilme imkanım olsaydı, Madımak otelinin kapısında durup bedenimle bir duvar olmak isterdim. Şimdi bütün varlığımla bir daha hiçbir zulmetin kitleleri esir edemediği, kimsenin sevdiklerinden zamansız ve haksız koparılamadığı bir ülke hayal ediyorum. Ölümü değil, hayatı kucaklayan bir ülke! 17. Yılında Sivas mazlumlarını anıyor, ailelerinin ve sevenlerinin acısını paylaşıyoruz.

6.9. The Value of Heterogeneous Enclaves for Elevating the Standards of Civility

Groups in civil society literature are evaluated as to the degree of trust they show to others, the degree of altruism they have, tolerance to others etc…However, such accounts are lop-sided if the degree of deliberation of such groups with other groups are not taken into account. Although political theory gives special importance to deliberative democracy, the empirical findings for what exchanges between people with competing views brings to the quality of democracy or civil society has been lacking (Sunstein,2000:p.73)

Sunstein's work (2000) on why groups go to extremes is an exception. Sunstein's primary occupation is with the phenomenon of group polarization and the role of deliberation in the public sphere on the potential of groups to go to extremes. Sunstein's approach to enclave deliberation is particularly important for the purposes of this study. Sunstein sees (2000) "enclave deliberation as simultaneously a potential danger to social stability, a source of social fragmentation and a safeguard against social injustice and unreasonableness" (p.75). The reason why enclave deliberation is seen as a threat is because social homogeneity which is a prominent trait of enclaves is quite damaging to good deliberation. He argues and empirically proves that when people are hearing echoes of their own voices, the consequence is further polarization.

However, there is also a very convincing reason for why enclaves are very important for the functioning of democracy. "Participants in heterogeneous groups tend to give least weight to the views of low status members." These low status members are precisely those groups which produce enclave deliberation as a remedy for the suppression of their voices: women, minorities, poor people etc…Enclave deliberation is the only way to make their voice heard.

Different theorists have different names for such spaces. Nancy Fraser calls them sub-altern counter-public spaces and Mansbridge refers to them as enclaves of resistance. Both theorists see immense value in promoting the healthy functioning of such places because they help disadvantaged groups develop their arguments in a

sheltered fashion before they enter the public stage of contestation. Secondly, such spaces promote political activism in a more rigorous way.

For these reasons, enclave deliberation is both an asset and a liability. They are in the words of Sunstein (2000) "breeding grounds both for the development of unjustly suppressed views and for unjustified extremism, indeed fanaticism" (p.76). So if enclaves are to make any meaningful contribution to public debate their voices should be shielded from the voices in the dominant public sphere but their tendency to go to other extremes should also be thwarted.

I have argued throughout this chapter that enclaves can make a meaningful impact on how inter-group relations are perceived in civil society. But how do enclaves ensure the critical awareness and reflexivity needed to perceive how one group is situated relative to others in society? How can they create a willingness to redistribute power and cultural value?

We have seen in the numerous accounts of theorists of deliberation that enclaves are the trenches of resistance to dominant public sphere and its power-blind and identity-blind rhetoric about citizenship and rights. By showing how society operates through excluding some of its members from structures of deliberation and by creating a false sense of formal equality in public debate it shows how certain groups' voices are marginalized. Dominant public sphere is not the right place to show how one groups' disadvantage turns into another's advantage. It is also not the right place to attempt a re-valuation of cultural forms despised by dominant groups. By virtue of being under the control of more privileged segments of society, this sphere operates according to the logic of dominant group perspective. It operates mostly with an identity blind rhetoric refusing to acknowledge how relativity of social positions benefit some and harm others.

For this reason, enclaves are the only spheres where situatedness of groups can be unearthed. However, due to the extremist nature of enclaves, this situatedness will most likely be binary, hence lop-sided. If enclaves only stay in their circle, they can reinforce each other in their mutual folly and self-righteousness. It will rely on the juxtaposition of one marginal group to the dominant group. However, if different enclaves get to talk with each other, the network/matrix of relations of different groups and their position vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis dominant groups gains a better perspective. For this reason, it is of extreme importance to structure public debate in a way that will not wall off enclaves from hearing other's point of view.

BSÇ provided us with a setting to test whether these claims about enclaves hold true. Although it is hard to make generalizations from one case study, it gives us an indication about the merits of enclave politics. BSÇ is a coalition of different enclave women who had different experiences of marginalization. It provides a shielded space for representatives of different enclave women to develop their arguments without the encroachment of dominant public sphere. It also helps them engage in a deliberation that rules out the possibility that any perspective gains an extreme version.

A counter-public is usually envisaged to be a marginal group that positions itself against the state or a hegemonic group. However, what we have witnessed in this alliance is that different enclaves are constantly comparing each other on the basis of what they have endured. This is due to the fact that the alliance is a coalition of different factions which prevents the group to descend into what Klempt calls "one-sided information space". By virtue of working as a coalition of enclaves, the alliance has to arrive at consensus only through contestation. However, since the group is insulated from outside pressure and male presence, it has its own inner logic that does not necessarily follow what public arena of deliberation dictates. For this reason, it is a partially contestatory space.

What difference does that make? What changes when a group evolves from being a one-sided information space into partially contestatory? The groups making part of the coalition have to move away from a conceptualization of their politics that juxtaposes state and their own group, and start questioning every relation in society. By keeping the definition of "groups with privileges" and "discriminated groups" flexible, it helps the alliance achieve a more balanced perspective on discrimination and a more elevated standard for civility.

Such an alliance also alters our conceptualization of a counter-public. A sounder definition of a counter-public should not only talk about the dominant group vs. discriminated group dichotomy but should also question every dyad in society. This can only be achieved in a partially contestatory scheme such as that of BSÇ. This is actually what has happened in BSÇ. When individuals from diverse backgrounds started to discuss with each other repeatedly on one particular issue, the requirements of civility increased to the point of condemning indifference.

A more general finding on the basis of this case study would be that "what civility requires changes according which groups interact with other groups". If enclaves have

more chance to interact they may come up with a more sophisticated definition of civility that takes into account the viewpoints of marginal groups in the public sphere.

Once this interaction is secured, it becomes easier for groups to develop a critical awareness of their social location relative to others. It is the argument of this thesis that civility can only be achieved if groups or individuals develop a critical awareness of their social location relative to others. Admitting this relational aspect of group positions and group privileges is the first prerequisite for redistributing power and value in the cultural as well as the economic sphere. The essence of civility is tied to admitting the ways in which marginal groups' misfortune goes hand in hand with privileged groups' advantages. Being indifferent and identity blind to the distribution of power and privilege in society translates into dominant groups' insensitivity to marginal groups' claims and grievances.

When we take the issue of complicity in the internal conversations of this platform, we observe that through ongoing discussions, the platform moved from a "inflict no physical harm to the victim" attitude to a "to remain silent is to be responsible" type of thinking. In other words, "misguided indifference" is as grave as inflicting physical harm. Of course, we cannot say with full force that this has become the norm for every participant but we can clearly observe a tilt in that direction. The reason why "to remain neutral" or "being indifferent" becomes a sign of incivility is because this indifference is seen as a sign of the fact that a group is unaware of its privileges and its social location relative to more marginalized groups. It refers to not knowing that one's neutrality or indifference may be serving the maintenance of cultural codes and social practices that undervalue marginal groups. Lacking that self-reflexivity, would not serve the interests of marginalized groups which are looking for a re-valuation of their practices and existence. A form of civility that only forbids physical violence is not a way to fulfill those demands.

6.10. What are the Implications for Civil Society Literature?

I have started this chapter by arguing that the quality of civil society depends very much on the social orientations of the social actors that inhabit its space. However, what we call civility has very different meanings according to scholars. Some call it having conciliatory attitudes vis-a-vis unwanted groups, i.e. approving the extension of same rights and freedoms one enjoys. Others think it can be limited to not harming other groups physically.

What is missing in those accounts is how groups form their ideas about other groups. The norm for civility is usually assumed to be pre-formed even before encountering those groups in question. It is also very much related to belief-sets or ideological inclinations of groups. The degree to which one can exhibit civility is pre-given according to the content of one's belief or ideology.

The argument of this chapter is that what civility requires changes according to the degree to which groups interact with other groups. Those that had more chance to interact feel more responsible when it comes to civility. The reason for this is that interaction with other groups helps groups achieve a relational perspective that is important for understanding the distribution of privileges and disadvantages. Reflexive/critical perspective needed to understand how one group's fortune can translate into another's misfortune can most easily be acquired in an environment where heterogeneous publics can talk and debate about their experiences. Those experiences will reveal the incomplete accounts of relatively more privileged segments about their treatment of other groups. These accounts are not necessarily based on misleading others or falsifying what has taken place. However, due to being at an advantaged position, it may be harder for more privileged groups to acknowledge their true relation to another group.

Another argument of this thesis is that if groups do not hold a relational perspective, their conception of civility would only stop at the level of no harm principle. However, if they come to admit how groups differentially benefit from

structures of power and how this indirectly implicates them in the misfortune of marginal groups, then they will adopt a more hands-on definition of civility. As explained previously, "no harm" principle is an identity-blind principle. It begs a non-violent, non-repressive understanding of inter-group relations irrespective of the content of the identities of those groups in question. However when "indifference" and "neutrality" in the face of discrimination of certain groups are considered equally grave as physical harm, we arrive at an identity-conscious definition of civility. This is because, indifference and neutrality become most disturbing when those who are indifferent/neutral have something to gain from this indifference. The discussion with respect to the confiscation of Armenian property is a case in point. There indifference means the groups in question are both indifferent and gaining (materially) from this situation.

Hence arriving from an identity-blind perspective to a reflexive/critical perspective on the implications of having a neutral stance requires adopting a relational perspective on inter-group relations. Having argued that heterogeneous publics is the right realm to acquire a relational perspective because one will be better exposed to different perspectives on privilege and marginalization, I have to make clear why enclaves create a unique environment for acquiring a relational perspective.

Enclaves are positioned in opposition to dominant public sphere. Dominant public sphere (or mainstream civil society) is usually where the most privileged segments of society can air their concerns. It is also the space which operates according to a rather exclusionary logic, where the discourse of rights are aired in an identity-blind manner which in reality reflects one type of world view at the expense of another. A good example would be the recent health care reform and the criticisms aired by Republican candidates in the run up to elections. Most of the candidates think of health care reform as an encroachment on freedoms. However, freedoms are expressed in an identity blind manner which makes it sound as if everybody's freedom is at stake. In reality, it refers to the freedom of just a segment of the population which is well-off enough to choose its own private health care provider. Here, unless enclaves such as black single mothers, immigrants or unemployed talk, the debate turns into one between freedom lovers and those which are for a leviathan state. If we apply this logic to our debate on civility, unless enclaves talk, there would be no way of knowing whether a difference blind conceptualization of discrimination and harm can really serve the interests of more marginalized groups or expose their take on what harm actually constitutes.

Of course, the important question here is whether the standard developed in this particular enclave interaction can be generalized to other groups. In the absence of wide-spread approval for such a standard, the call for ending indifference and neutrality in the face of discrimination of others may fall on deaf ears. If we consider the fact that enclaves usually do not have wide chances of interacting with more mainstream groups in society, this specific group's interaction may be rather experimental than generalizable. If such encounters only happen between rather secluded groups who seek support to their rather marginalized thesis, this type of interaction may be interpreted as doomed to remain at the sidelines of civic interaction.

However, as was mentioned in the literature review, we should not think of enclaves/counter-publics as necessarily spaces of withdrawal. As Fraser (1997) argued, such spaces do militate against separatism in the long run, because they have a publicist agenda. This is because, no matter how limited a counter-publics' potential sphere of influence in the larger public sphere, members still understand themselves as part of a larger public at large that they will occasionally want to influence. While their enclave will function as spaces of withdrawal, from time to time they will use those enclaves as bases for agitational activities to shape public opinion (p.82). Then the problem is not about having separate agendas, it is about how to convince the wider public sphere about the implications of this agenda.

6.11. What are the Implications for Politics of Recognition and Multiculturalism?

The assumption behind a more fine-grained notion of civility- one that condemns indifference and neutrality- is that if we want to go beyond "no harm" principle, we should have an identity-conscious reflection on inter-group relations and how one identity is positioned next to the other. A related question to this notion of civility is whether it translates into a positive recognition, which is valuing identities in and of themselves.

There are several questions to be answered to make the necessary connections between civility and recognition. One is whether the type of relational perspective

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adopted in this platform that relies on redistributing privilege and status means all identities are recognized as richness and cherished in that fashion.

The second question is; what are the conditions under which the adoption of this relational perspective and redistribution of power and status can serve the ideals of a multicultural democracy? Young was arguing that having an enlarged understanding of society's injustices requires drawing on particular experiences of different groups which is the only way to serve the ideals of multicultural democracy. Whether this contributes to a redistribution of power and status and to a positive recognition of identities is an entirely different matter. We have to grapple with these points more clearly if we want to give a convincing answer.

The puzzle posed by the relational perspective is the following: we do not know whether the remedies proposed for a more egalitarian distribution of power and status means cherishing the value of each and every group or whether it implies a more egalitarian yet uniform society. Some of the members talk about how they envision a uniform citizenship that values citizens of this country not on the basis of their identity but on the basis of their humanhood.[115] This does not perfectly correspond to a politics of difference and positive recognition of identities.

Hence for a type of civility to translate into positive recognition, the underlying motif should not be exclusively homogenization of groups' status but valuing the cultural significance of each and every group in society. If a coalition's aim is homogenization then it does not serve multicultural democracy. Multicultural coalitions are based on the claim that there can be multiple intersecting identities which have

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[115] Ben Ermenilerden özür dilemiyorum, bir Türk olarak da özür dilemiyorum. Kimlik ve kökenlerin gerçek bir dayanışma (= ortak aidiyet) ilişkisi yaratamayacağını düşünüyorum (olsa olsa "dayanışma-ikamesi" yaratabilirler). Sanırım rahatsız edici olan tüm iyi sıfatların "Türk" olmaya raptedilmiş olması. Meselâ şöyle değiştirsek andımızı: İnsanım, doğruyum, çalışkanım, yasam....varlığım insanlığa armağan olsun... İşte tamamen evrensel bir durum, milliyetçi bir tarafı da kalmamış oluyor. Dünyanın her yerinde okunabilir oluyor.

"insan" kimliğinde tüm farklılıkların asimile olmadan eşit olacakları bir ortamı siyaseten varetmeye çalışmak biçiminde düşünülebilir bu sorumluluk. Ben bir zamanlar seçilmiş bir adı, zulme ve gerçeklere gözlerimi kapamadan nasıl yeniden kazanabilirim, anlamlandırabilirim? Yani varlığımı insanlığın varlığına nasıl armağan edebilirim?Şimdi bunlar siyasi anayasal sorular aslında, belki de yeni bir vatandaşlık anlayışı kurmamız gerek. Hiç kolay değil elbette, daha çok yol, daha çok cesaret lazım."

similar demands and positions vis-à-vis hegemonic groups. This intersectionality may align their demands. However, if the coalition turns into a falsely homogenizing entity then it does not serve politics of difference.

So even in the presence of a very refined version of civility (one that acknowledges the importance of not being indifferent to injustices against another group) this does not necessarily translate into valuing identities in and of themselves. The end result could still be a homogenizing coalition.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

Women's movement in Turkey, for a long time, was only preoccupied with the emancipation of women only from a particular world view that could be seen as elitist and exclusionary, especially by the outcasts of women's movement, i.e. the veiled women, Kurdish women. Just as in the first phase of feminist movement in the West, which was after a generic formal equality between the sexes but which was not cognizant of the internal diversity of the movement, the women's movement in Turkey was dominated by similar views. Coming to terms with different life styles and with different vulnerabilities was a very recent phenomenon for feminist movement. In that sense, we can expect a trend of turning inward and soul searching by the movement in an attempt to come to grips with this diversity and ways to address it.

This dissertation is based on the internal deliberations of a coalition that had a potential to accomplish this ambitious task. Unlike the feminist activism of the previous era, what BSÇ tried to accomplish was to become as inclusive and as attentive to different types of marginalization of women as possible. In that sense it is the first attempt to create a more diverse women's movement that is not necessarily under the monopoly of feminism. This is easier said than done. Coalitions, irrespective of the reasons why they were set up, have important tasks to accomplish if they want to become effective and sustainable. The initial task is to come up with a substitute for the lack of a common identity. The reason why the coalition was set up usually gives us a hint as to what this substitute would be. This usually takes the form of a common adversary. Secondly, coalitions also have to deal with their internal diversity. Common adversaries are instrumental in setting up coalitions, but in the absence of mechanisms to handle internal diversity, they would not be longer lasting. Third task is to inculcate a

certain perspective on inter-group relations in society, so the coalition members exhibit similar social orientations in their dealings with other groups in society.

My analyses have centered on these three important tasks. Each task became the focus of one analysis chapter. However, the analyses of these tasks have repercussions beyond whether this coalition has accomplished them or not. The findings and observations related to those tasks are tied to larger debates on politics of recognition, women's empowerment, multicultural democracy and civility. For this reason, they should not be narrowly read as accomplishments of this or any particular coalition but as antecedents of larger debates on civil society and identity politics.

In this conclusion part, I would like to summarize the key findings of each task explored in this thesis. To recap, I will talk about the general significance of these findings for civil society literature.

7.1. Framing Gender Relations

One chapter centered on how women positioned themselves against various strategic adversaries, be it the "state as a field of contest for brave men" or "the patriarchal society/masculine values". The interesting puzzle posed by conversations with respect to womanhood is that although participants did not use identical narratives with respect to gender issues they were able to optimize the women empowering rhetoric.

The narratives used by members to depict gender relations reveal different rationalizations at play. One perspective holds that public/private distinction is desirable and that justice is something other than equality. Another perspective is based on the view that public/private distinction should be abolished and that justice requires gender equality.

These are very fundamental differences in world view. The major difference stems from the fact that some members of the platform think gender is determined by God, so there is an essence to womanhood. If this essence dictates those sexes are different and hence unequal in certain respects, this should be accepted. A natural corollary to this

debate is: What is important in relations between men and women is not equality but justice. Whether being just entails accepting certain hierarchies in society and constructing one's understanding of justice on the basis of these hierarchies is not thoroughly debated but there are hints in that direction.

Another distinction is with respect to views on public/private dichotomy. At least some of the members of the platform are disturbed by confounding these two realms as they consider the private realm as a place that should be kept out of public scrutiny. However, such exclusion, as was debated by feminists for many decades now, sweeps the debate on sexuality of women as well as sexual orientations of individuals under the carpet of privacy. Many inequalities emanating from this distinction continue to show their face in the public realm without being scrutinized. In this coalition, it works more to the detriment of the struggles of gays/lesbians as their activism is thought to have an inappropriate basis.

One could think that such stark differences would make a coalition based on women's rights highly unlikely. Given such differences, how is it that frames of these contrasting perspectives can actually become congruent? The congruence is most easily achieved when the issue is about regulating women's public presence/visibility or women's life choices especially if they are related to limiting women's capabilities (i.e. education and work). These matters can in fact be discussed without necessarily evoking (or selectively evoking) public/private distinction or the equality vs. justice debate.

For instance, in the case of regulation of female bodies, members were able to arrive at a consensus about how the public space is regulated by the male gaze, regardless of one's dress style. The women arrived at this compromise partially because improving one's capability as a woman is intimately related to being publicly visible. Without having a public persona, one's life chances (having an education or finding a job) is quite limited. This finding is in conformity with Aldıkaçtı's claim (2005) that reformist Islamist women do want to profit from the fruits of modernity and think of veil as a facilitator rather than an inhibitor for achieving this. She also thinks they selectively appropriate concepts of modernization for this purpose.

At this particular consensus on the regulation of female bodies, veiling, instead of being seen as a form of male regulation on female bodies came to be seen as a form of self-restraint on one's body. Likewise, not veiling or (a more extreme version of it such as) wearing revealing clothes is not seen as a reason justifying male harassment. Male

regulation of female bodies is taking place regardless of one's degree of dressing up, which means each and every woman qua woman is under the same threat. It is an extremely limiting act as it discourages women's participation to public life.

In a similar vein, in the discussion on conservatism, the major criticism is selective appropriation of fruits of modernity by men (becoming richer, conspicuous consumption etc.), while furthering the control on the life choices of women. Both Kemalism and religious conservatism are seen on par with each other on this scale, as they do not exert their authority on men and their life choices but they do that about what women can or cannot do.

All these points of consensus reveal a deep dissatisfaction among women about the type of choices made available to them by the state and society so far. It is true that the linkages between the domestic and public realm are not (deliberately) very clearly made. However, the dissatisfaction with widely accepted societal customs is clear.

What this discussion reveals is that if the discussion can be turned into one where the concern is more about improving the public presence and increased capability/life choices (work, education) of women, in ongoing discussions members develop frames that are critical about male control of public life.

This is an accomplishment given that different wings of the women's movement have long been thought to have irreconcilable positions with respect to gender. This also has long-term implications as to whether such cooperation can be improved and extended into other issue domains. Examples such as KADER's campaign on increasing the number of female politicians that utilizes images of veiled women is a testament to the future directions this collaboration can take.

One limitation of this study has been that there were not enough incidents to show whether the consensus on gender relations actually led to any concrete campaigns. The kick-off declaration was a declaration of support to the struggle of veiled women. The other declaration called "Ruhumuzu Öldürmeyin"[116] was against male harassment. It would have been easier to show how frame alignments actually lead to concrete cooperation had the coalition lived longer.

Another limitation of this study with respect to gender is that it aims to define a minimalist standard for consensus building within women's movement. What I mean by a minimalist standard is that it aims to bring forward the least common denominator for

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[116] You can check Declarations in "Group History"

all the women taking part in the coalition. This is an inevitable tendency given that members are far from holding very identical viewpoints on gender relations. However, the downside of sticking to this minimalist consensus is that it leaves the question of which groups would suffer from this arrangement. For example, the particular downside of the consensus that emerged from this coalition is that, as long as public/private distinction is upheld by some while downgraded by others, those groups that make demands based on sexual orientation will not have a meaningful dialogue with women's movement. This is because sexuality is thought to be private and not a matter of public discussion for those who believe in the virtues of public/private distinction.

Progressive feminism is known for its alliances with other rights struggles. In Turkey, there are many women activists who think true emancipation of women can only be accomplished if sexuality is not regulated in a heterosexual and misogynist framework. For this reason, such feminists have been in a strong alliance with gay/lesbian cause. Given the disagreement on private/public distinction, it becomes difficult to maintain a coalition that embraces sexual orientation as a legitimate battleground for women's emancipation.

Further research on alliances within women's movement can also take up these aspects of collaboration with other liberation struggles such as with gay/lesbian movement and try to unearth points of convergence and divergence and the possible effects of this type of solidarity with these other struggles for women's movement.

7.2. Framing Group Diversity and Identity

As was explained in the literature review, scholars usually stress the instrumental and strategic nature of coalition building. After all, why would civic actors who did not have meaningful prior contact with each other decide to undertake joint action? In contrast to such theorization and in line with a strand in multiculturalism, I argued throughout this thesis that what happens within coalitions can never be solely reduced to a strategic calculation on the part of participants for higher impact and effectiveness. While these are equally important, coalitions provide participants with a unique

opportunity to test their own claims to social justice and inter-group relations. Coalitions provide them with the opportunity to see themselves through the lens of others, who are different than one's own social circle.

The ensuing question to this claim is: if coalitions evolve from being strategic alliances into sites of self-reflection what kind of expectations emerge? If raison d'etre of the coalition is not limited to an additive solidarity in the face of a common adversary but becomes more about an affirmation of different identities represented in the coalition what kind of possibilities and problems emerge? These questions were answered in this second chapter on group diversity.

In a nutshell, the second chapter focuses on how identity claims are aired within the platform. After all, the coalition is made up of women with different identity claims at times opposing each other and at other times intersecting with each other. Whether identity differences are bridgeable and how such differences are reconciled is the focal point of my analysis.

Such encounters within coalitional settings are like laboratory settings. They are a replica of what takes place in the broader social context. In that sense, they provide us with invaluable insights into the mechanisms of mutual recognition. The most important finding emerging from this analysis is that coalitions which exhibit great diversity cannot be based on just common interests. It is true that initially this coalition based its foundation on the needs of women. Both male hegemony and patriarchal state were questioned and tackled from unique and innovative angles.

However, as inner deliberations continued, it became apparent that some members expected a more explicit affirmation of their life-style and identity by other members. The difficulty with this type of expectation is manifold. First, the major drawback emanates from the fact that life style differences are thought to be dichotomous and divisive by many in the coalition. This has to do with members' inclination to think there are packages of life style preferences that individuals conform to and there are no "in between" cases where individuals can borrow from these different packages to shape their own life styles. Some members reacted to this assumption by saying this type of an attitude rules out the reality of many different combinations of life style choices both within the coalition and in daily life.

Secondly, even if members could think of individuals as having more hybrid personalities, not every member was agreeing with the idea that each and every identity in the coalition has to be cherished. For some, cherishing the distinct identities of

constituent members of the coalition is optional and secondary to the goal of showing the unique but parallel ways in which women are discriminated. At this particular instance, it is important to distinguish between the external goals of coalition building and the unique expectations that come with encounters between different life-styles. Multicultural democracy is usually portrayed as promising because it is based on political initiatives that are public spirited and also effective for a variety of groups. However, if effectiveness is defined solely as an additive solidarity that does not question how individuals approach each other, then we fall short of defining what multiculturalism encompasses in the true sense. Expectations from this kind of solidarity go beyond showing parallel discriminations and extend into accommodating particularities of citizens. These particularities are not to be depicted solely as opportunities for joint action but also acceptance/affirmation and re-valuation of diversity.

Of course not all coalitions come into being with such a high yardstick. Some coalitions may have a more limited scope and members have lower expectations from each other. In order to depict what types of coalitions emerge in the public sphere and the particular expectations that come with these types, I developed a classification of forms of reciprocity expected in a coalition. These forms are indicative of the type of coalition at hand.

There could be coalitions that are identity blind. In such coalitions reciprocating other members is based not on their identities and their particular expectations on the basis of those identities but is based more on a certain moral imperative, religious or secular. I called this type of reciprocity as "general reciprocity". Examples include peace coalitions where members seek freedom from violence for various groups or nations. Here, the identity of members is irrelevant for the objective of condemning violence.

Alternatively, there could be coalitions that rely on an essential identity such as womanhood and that reduce coalition members to this singular trait. Hence reciprocating others in the coalition is reduced to their interests as women. I called this type of reciprocity as strategic reciprocity.

If the coalition is one that values the diversity and particularity of its members and if at least some of the members want to be acknowledged for their authenticity, then neither general reciprocity nor strategic reciprocity would be enough. At that instance, personalized reciprocity comes into the picture.

For this to happen, members should develop an understanding that relies on not taking individuals solely as group members but as unique individuals with propensities to engage in fluid forms of identity construction. Personalized reciprocity can be acquired via two routes: one would be to admit the possibility of intersectional identities that would rule out pitting identities against each other. Admitting intersectionality entails an ability to envision cohabitation of different identity traits within the same individual. If this fact is admitted, there are fewer grounds to rule out reciprocating others who are presumably different from oneself but who in essence may combine similar traits with others in personal identity construction. The other route is to leave the liberty of experimenting with different identities to individuals and not impose rigid group identities. If for example, individuals are given the liberty to define their womanhood or manhood according to their own vantage point, then there is no gender relation to be defined or ameliorated. If categories such as "woman" and "man" are deconstructed and gender relations are defined in a way to accommodate more fluid definitions of sex and sexual orientation by individuals, most of the antagonisms between groups emanating from dichotomous life preferences would be resolved. This is because these life choices are not assumed to exhaust social reality. This route is rather revolutionary and harder to realize as it topples our stereotypical assumptions about identity groups altogether.

The particular problem in this coalition was passing from strategic reciprocity (and to a lesser extent, general reciprocity) to personalized reciprocity. Members were acknowledging the fact that what brought them together were their similar types of marginalization as women. However, as soon as other identity concens of members were brought into the picture and the social or political acceptance of these identities were made part of the negotiation, the coalition started disintegrating. Members were not able to reciprocate each other at a personal level that acknowledges the depth and diversity of demands made by other members. Individuals were thought of belonging to identifiable and dichotomous identity groups (i.e. gays vs. believers, as if homosexuals are de facto non-believers or drinkers vs. religious individuals, as if none of the religious individuals can be drinkers). Individuals were not promoted in their efforts to define their unique and intersectional identities.

What multicultural democracy theorists should tackle is exactly this particular dilemma. How can coalitions that start with rather singular goals move into cherishing multivalent identities and concerns of their constituent members? I gave a few

directions through which this impasse can be removed. However, the basic limitation of my study is that, I do not have the means to depict how the activism of the coalition would have played out if personalized forms of reciprocity are adopted. Whereas I am able to point out to the basic limitations of general and strategic reciprocity for this coalition, I could not do the same thing for personalized reciprocity as this type of reciprocity was my prescription rather than what actually took place in the coalition.

Further studies that focus on heterogeneous coalitions of this sort can verify whether personalized forms of reciprocity would actually be a workable and efficient way to handle diversity within a coalition.

7.3. Framing Inter-group Relations and Civility

The last chapter centered on how members interpreted inter-group relations in society. This evaluation is important due to several reasons. Firstly, this is a group that brings together various different elements within the women's movement. Given this fact, this coalition is fertile ground to test assumptions about how multicultural democracy would play out with groups having different grievances. Multicultural citizenship requires a willingness to believe that when people are acting citizens, they care about, or should care about the fates of diverse identity groups at the same time (Lichteman, 1999, p.134).

Caring about the fates of other identity groups reveals important information as to the social orientations of actors in a given polity. Most research considers this type of self-reflexivity as an important indication of the quality of civil society in a given polity. Theoretically, we could have a very vibrant civil society with numerous NGOs and very assertive social movements but without much self-reflexivity about how these different groups and movements are positioned vis-à-vis each other, we could end up with an environment where relations between social actors are defined by bitterness or enmity.

We have to move away from a conception of civil society that juxtaposes state and society into one that evaluates the vibrancy of civil society on the basis of how reflexive

groups become as to their relation with other groups. In my research, I called this specific instance of reflexivity as civility. This is because if social actors can admit their own situatedness and the privileges they do/may acquire from the discriminations of other groups in society, their social orientations will become more altruistic and based on mutual care and respect.

Civility has been conceptualized in the literature on civil society in different ways. Akman (2012) describes social orientations of actors as society's non-repressive engagement with others (p.17). He thinks civil society is not a sum of engagements and interactions of social actors, but more specifically it is a result of their specifically non-violent, non-repressive and self-limiting interactions.

However, there are grades to what self-limiting interactions of groups could mean. A minimalist conception of civility would only require groups to stay away from harming others. A more maximalist definition would require them to be more attentive to injustices and discriminations that prevail in society and to take action when necessary. This definition goes beyond not doing something harmful in that it takes neutrality as non-sufficient criteria for civility. This is a more pro-active definition of civility.

What does arriving at this form of civility require of groups? I argued throughout my analysis that this requires groups to have a relational understanding of group difference. If groups can be understood as constituted in relation to another, they would be in a better position to come to terms with the distribution of privilege and discrimination in society.

In other words, if they know that the fate of one group is not independent of another's but involves a negotiation and bargaining on the distribution of status and cultural value than they would be in a better position to acknowledge their own responsibility or stake in this negotiation. I also argued that having a relational view of social groups has important implications for civility. According to this framework, the essence of civility is tied to admitting the ways in which one groups' misfortune goes hand in hand with another groups' advantages. Being indifferent and identity blind to the distribution of power and not admitting this relational aspect of group positions and group difference eventually undermines underprivileged groups' quest for redistribution of power and value in the cultural sphere.

I also argued throughout the analyses that arriving at a more elevated standard of civility, one that starts from not harming others and that arrives at not being neutral or

indifferent to others' misfortune would only take place in heterogeneous publics. This is because, if there is no countervailing rhetoric to dominant discourses in society it is extremely hard for groups to discover how they are implicated in other groups' fortunes or misfortunes. Only in the presence of spheres that bring together diverse actors can groups come to understand this implication. Deliberation between heterogeneous enclaves becomes more important at this point. If enclaves, which position themselves in juxtaposition to dominant and more mainstream groups in society, take up this task and initiate a conversation with other enclaves in society they may start a precedent for elevating the standard of civility for the larger public.

This platform provided me with a suitable setting to test these claims. In ongoing conversations, I was able to observe how group positions shift and how concepts such as complicity, responsibility and privilege were conceptualized in more comprehensive and nuanced ways. The conversations started from a rather simplistic assumption that all marginal groups get a similar treatment from the state. This is a traditional way of doing social activism that relies solely on pitting groups against the state. However, as discussions progressed, the historical and current positions of groups vis-a-vis each other started gaining importance. This also pushed members to consider how they might have been implicated in power relations without necessarily having thought about the consequences of their own indifference for furthering discrimination of certain marginals. This brought members from a position where incivility is associated with giving actual harm to groups to one where incivility is not being aware of the consequences of one's neutrality and indifference.

Starting from a state centric definition of injustice and discrimination, members arrived at an understanding of how groups are positioned vis-à-vis each other in a society based on an unequal distribution of privileges. Throughout ongoing discussions, they achieved a more fine-grained and critical appraisal of their own situatedness and their own complicity in the misfortune of others. The criteria for civility increased through deliberation in a heterogeneous public that includes different enclaves.

The findings of this chapter are quite significant and promising for theorists on deliberation as well as for understanding norms of engagement in civil society. This chapter shows how deliberation produces more informed opinions on inter-group relations and sources of discrimination and disadvantage provided that there is a heterogeneous public that gives room for enclaves to present their opinions. This in turn

has a potential to alter the social orientations of actors that is an important input for a cohesive civil society.

7.4. Significance of the Work

On the basis of one coalition building experience I have tried to answer important questions related to how groups and individuals handle diversity in heterogeneous environments. This question is important not only for civil society activists who already happen to have diverse networks and who operate through heterogeneous publics. The question has also practical relevance for the larger public because no society is immune from animosities and tensions that may arise from inter-group relations. In this sense, although the coalition is novel for bringing together separate actors of the women's movement scene in Turkey for the first time, it also has a value for discussions related to politics of difference and multiculturalism. This is the main reason I did not intend to confine the accomplishments of this coalition solely to what it had been able to accomplish for women's empowerment.

Having said that, the primary merit of this kind of a coalition for women's movement is that it proves ideological cleavages can be sorted out when it comes to protecting women's interests. Scholars for a long time argued that differences in opinion on gender relations are too wide in Turkey to make a unified women's movement possible (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005; Aslan Akman, 2008). However, women of this coalition do align their frames on the basis of improving women's visibility in the public space as well as their capabilities (education, work). This is not to deny the fact that there is significant variation in attitudes related to gender equality, public versus private distinction and sexuality. Nevertheless, there are grounds on which solidarity can be based especially with respect to selective appropriation of fruits of modernity by men. Women can align their frames on the basis of improving the capabilities of women in the public space. This is an important finding in the sense that if different factions within the women's movement want to make advancements in the situation of women, this is a handle that can be efficiently utilized.

Having stated the importance of this coalition for women's movement in Turkey, I underline the second and equally important reason why this and similar coalitions have an important function for civil society. By bringing heterogeneous publics together, they have a potential to change social orientations of actors on many matters ranging from recognition of identities to the distribution of (dis)advantages among groups in society. Individuals have a tendency to stay in their own circle and debate with like-minded others. Bringing them in contact with individuals with an alternative definition of inter-group relations would have a destabilizing effect whose outcome can potentially be positive if the deliberating individuals'/groups' initial position is based on mutual respect. Being enclaves could be a potential reason why such groups would listen to each other. As groups positioned at the sidelines of mainstream public sphere, such groups can modify each other's claims to discrimination and disadvantage by showing how each and every group is implicated in the fate of the other.

Such encounters have a potential to produce more responsible and progressive rhetoric. Of course, it would be a far-fetched claim to say every enclave has a potential to adopt such progressive rhetoric. There are enclaves which are extremist and whose rhetoric could only get worse if put in contact with other marginals of society. In our case however enclaves feel equally vulnerable and need each other's support to advance their claims. Hence, they are more inclined to have a reconciliatory attitude vis-à-vis each other.

The importance of this talk between enclaves resides in the fact that as marginals tell their grievances more, the relationality of positions are discovered. Groups come to comprehend that no group's position in society is disassociated from other groups' position. Hence demands to justice and fairness necessarily involve a reconfiguration of privileges. This means no group can act as if it is not associated with the discriminations inflicted on another group. This understanding, as argued in the thesis, has a potential to elevate the standards of civility; that is the non-repressive engagement of groups with each other.

Contrary to what might be expected, the biggest disagreements and controversies in the coalition did not arise from differences in opinion on gender or inter-group relations. Although, controversies on these topics were plenty, there were still grounds on which frames could be aligned by drawing similarities on the basis of similar forms of marginalization. The most divisive issues turned out to be those which involved attesting different life style concerns of members.

The expectations revolved around how members living a particular life style would behave if they are put in contact with other members' life styles or political demands. Whether solidarity involves joint political acts or whether it also entails cherishing the multivalent identities of coalition members remained an unresolved issue. The existence of this problem for the coalition is very telling about how difficult it is to make multiculturalism work on the ground. Despite bringing diverse groups of women together and framing their joint concerns as women, the coalition still fell short of endorsing the particular identities of its members. Participating to daily performances of other members or showing solidarity with their political demands with them were seen at least by some of the members as ways to cherish the pluralism of the coalition. These themes came up both in the discussion on socializing with those who consume alcohol as well as showing solidarity with homosexuals.

Whether heterogeneous coalitions should stick to a minimalist definition of solidarity (general or strategic reciprocity) or whether they should prove their ability to embrace the particular identities of their members remains an unresolved issue. This is also a puzzle that should be elaborated further by multicultural democracy theorists.

Multicultural democracy is usually portrayed as promising because it is based on political initiatives that are public spirited and also effective for a variety of groups. However, this coalition shows that even in cases where concerns of women with different backgrounds are taken into account, other intersecting identities equally beg recognition or at least due consideration. What multicultural democracy theorists should tackle is exactly this particular demand. Do we fall short of the ideals of multicultural democracy if this demand is not met? What would coalitions gain or lose if they try to accomplish that? And how can coalitions that start with various strategic goals move into cherishing multivalent identities of their constituent members?

The existence of such questions shows there is a minimalist and maximalist definition of what multicultural democracy entails. A minimalist definition of it would suffice with citizens having a general reciprocity vis-à-vis fellow citizens or strategic reciprocity on the basis of defending certain over-arching identity interests (i.e. gender), whereas a maximalist definition would be attentive to all the other intersecting identities as well as the un-fixed/fluid nature of identities as exemplified in personalized reciprocity.

This coalition could have been longer lasting if the maximalist definition was upheld. While some members argued general or strategic reciprocity could have been

enough, others openly looked for a type of solidarity at the scale of cherishing the diversity of identities within the coalition. Further studies should question whether multicultural democracy can only be furthered with such a maximalist agenda

8. Appendix

Interview Dates and Pseudonyms Used

Pseudonym	Interview Date
A.D	01.June.10
Z.A	22.September.10
A.E	25.September.10
A.F	25.September.10
H.I	02.October.10
B.D	04.October.10
Ş.T	14.October.10
F.G	10.March.11
G.H	14.March.11
L.M	16.March.11
D.E	23.March.11
E.F	24.March.11
B.C	29.March.11
I.K	22.April.11
K.L	22.April.11
B.E	26.April.11
A.B	16.May.11
B.F	25.May.11
C.D	05.August.11
O.P	23.May.2012

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