

HABERMAS AND VIROLI ON CONSTITUTION AND
PATRIA: A DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

by

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HABERMAS AND VIROLI ON CONSTITUTION AND PATRIA: A DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to explore Viroli's republican patriotism and Habermas's constitutional patriotism by starting off from the fundamental question what makes constitutional patriotism different from republican patriotism. The main motivation of such an examination comes from Viroli's argument that Habermas's constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism. Against Viroli's claim, the main argument of this thesis is that Habermas's theory of constitutional patriotism cannot be incorporated and assimilated into a form of republican patriotism. Firstly, republican patriotism, the one constructed by Viroli, is highly based on the republicanism of Machiavelli and Rousseau, while Habermas's constitutional patriotism draws mostly from Kant and Hegel. The second point explored is the distinction between republican patriotism which aims to bring back *pre-national* form of attachment, and constitutional patriotism that represents the search for *post-national* allegiances. The next emphasis is on the republican patriotism of Viroli that suggests *rhetoric* to reach citizens' hearts to instill love and passion for a country and pride for its history. Habermas, on the other hand, tries to apply his "communicative reason" and "discourse ethics" to construct a rationally oriented post-conventional community organized under the umbrella of constitutional patriotism in which citizens publicly confront their traumatic past. Finally, whereas Viroli's republican patriotism can be considered as an answer given from the republican tradition to the question of how to overcome national identity, Habermas's constitutional patriotism can be read as a critique of this tradition although he does not completely isolate himself from republicanism. Hence, recognizing the similarities and overlaps between these concepts, the main purpose of this paper is to point out in what respects constitutional patriotism is distinguished from republican patriotism.

ÖZET

HABERMAS VE VİROLİ ANAYASA VE YURT ÜZERİNE: ANAYASAL YURTSEVERLİĞİN BİR SAVUNMASI

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Anahtar Kelimeler: cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik, Maurizio Viroli, cumhuriyetçilik, Jürgen Habermas, anayasal yurtseverlik

Bu çalışma anayasal yurtseverliği cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlikten farklı kılan nedir temel sorusundan yola çıkarak Viroli'nin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik ve Habermas'ın anayasal yurtseverlik kavramlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Viroli'nin savunduğu, Habermas'ın anayasal yurtseverliğinin, cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğin bir biçimi olduğu iddiası bu tezin ana motivasyonunu teşkil eder. Viroli'nin iddiasına karşı bu tezin temel argümanı Habermas'ın anayasal yurtseverlik teorisinin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik içerisine dahil edilemeyeceği ve bu kavram altında düşünülmemeyeceğidir. Öncelikle, Viroli'nin inşa ettiği haliyle cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğin başlıca dayanakları Machiavelli ve Rousseau iken, Habermas'ın anayasal yurtseverliği, kaynağını bilhassa Kant'tan ve Hegel'den alır. İkinci olarak, cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik bir tür *ulus-öncesi* [*pre-national*] bağlanmayı geri getirmeyi amaçlarken, anayasal yurtseverlik *ulus-ötesi* [*post-national*] aidiyetlerin arayışının bir temsilcisidir. Değinilecek bir diğer önemli nokta ise, Viroli'nin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğinin *retorik* yoluyla yurttaşların kalbine ulaşarak, onlara ülkelerine karşı sevgi ve tutku beslemelerini ve tarihleriyle gurur duymalarını önermesi, ve buna karşılık Habermas'ın, “iletişimsel akıl” ve “söylem etiği” teorilerini uygulayarak, anayasal yurtseverlik şemsiyesi altında kendi travmatik tarihiyle kamusal olarak yüzleşebilen yurttaşlardan oluşmuş rasyonel bir gelenek-sonrası toplum [*post-conventional community*] inşa etmesidir. Son olarak, Viroli'nin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğini ulusal kimliği nasıl aşabiliriz sorusuna cumhuriyetçi gelenek içerisinden verilen bir yanıt olarak düşünebilirken, Habermas'ın anayasal yurtseverliğini, Habermas kendisini bu gelenekten tamamen soyutlamasa da, cumhuriyetçiliğin bir tür eleştirisi olarak okuyabiliriz. Dolayısıyla, kavramlar arasındaki benzerliklerin ve örtüşmelerin farkında olarak, bu çalışmanın asıl amacı, anayasal yurtseverliğin hangi açılardan cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlikten ayrılabilceğini ortaya koymaktır.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This study is an analysis of two different conceptions of patriotism: 1) republican patriotism, and 2) constitutional patriotism. The main motivation of this thesis comes from Viroli's argument that Habermas's constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism.¹ As a scholar "loosely affiliated"² with the Cambridge School, Viroli draws from a method of *contextualism* developed by the historians of this school, such as Pocock and Skinner, and reconceptualizes republican patriotism by studying the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Rousseau. By equating love of *patria* with love of liberty, he argues that this kind of patriotism can be presented as an antidote to nationalism.³ For Viroli, republican patriotism and nationalism use different languages but the same method, which is rhetoric, instead of purely rational arguments. Therefore, he *rhetorically* suggests that people should not be "good Italians" or "good Germans;" rather, "they should become Italian or German *citizens*."⁴ Hence, he not only thinks that patriotism is an antidote to nationalism, it is also an alternative for nationalism.

¹ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 171.

² McCormick, John P. (2003). Machiavelli against Republicanism: On the Cambridge School's 'Guicciardinian Moments'. *Political Theory*, 31(5), p. 615.

³ Although the purpose of this paper is not to discuss how Viroli's patriotism is distinguished from nationalism, it is still necessary to point out the way Viroli perceives and conceptualizes nationalism. In *For Love of Country*, he describes nation as oneness, a cultural unity grounded upon history, language, literature, religion, art, and science that all together form "the people" as a single body with a particular soul, faculties, and forces. Drawing on Herder and Fichte, nationalism for Viroli is "love of our national culture," which is considered as natural and spiritual. See: Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, pp. 118-122. For a discussion between Viroli and his critiques on ethnic and civic dimensions of nationalism, see: Viroli, Maurizio (1998a). On civic republicanism: Reply to Xenos and Yack. *Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society*, 12(1-2), pp. 187-196.

⁴ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 9.

Viroli's arguments raise some critiques that what he is presenting is actually a version of civic nationalism.⁵ In other words, his critiques assert that republican patriotism is not different from nationalism. Viroli counters such critiques by suggesting that republican patriotism is not only different from but also against nationalism. He thinks that those critiques are mistaken due to "the lack of a historically accurate distinction between patriotism and nationalism."⁶ Hence, by placing patriotism into a historical context, he tries to recover and reinstate the pre-national republican form of patriotism to surpass the discourses of nationalism. Apart from his own scholarly wrestle with nationalism, he also presents some other thinkers differentiating patriotism from nationalism. According to him, Habermas is one of those who seek to put barriers between patriotism and nationalism by introducing a theory of constitutional patriotism.

This thesis takes up Viroli's discussion on republican and constitutional patriotism. Instead of affirming Viroli on this point, the main purpose of this thesis is to counter his argument, which places constitutional patriotism under republican patriotism. To this end, referring to Viroli, in this thesis, I argue that Habermas's constitutional patriotism cannot be incorporated into Viroli's version of republican patriotism. To prove this argument, I will lead a discussion with a simple question in mind: what makes constitutional patriotism different from republican patriotism? With this question, I also aim to change the focus of scholars who study constitutional and republican patriotisms together with nationalism; and put a question mark in the minds of those who think that these two different patriotisms share the same grounds with only slight differences.

Patriotism, namely love of country and a special concern for its fellow members, is a modern concept the meaning of which, however, has a very long tradition. The origin of the concept comes from a Latin word, *patria* or *terra patria*, the land of the fathers. In the Roman Republic, *patria* was the sacred city of people with its particular

⁵ Xenos, Nicholas (1998). Questioning Patriotism: Rejoinder to Viroli. *Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society*, 12 (1-2), pp. 197 – 201; Yack, Bernard (1998). Can Patriotism Save Us From Nationalism? Rejoinder to Viroli. *Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society*, 12(1-2), pp. 203 – 206.

⁶ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 5.

culture, tradition, religion, and faith.⁷ As Arendt suggests, the meaning of *patria*, as a city that symbolizes moral, religious, ethical, and political values, largely developed in Rome.⁸ Since *patria* was much more than a piece of land but a land of an ethical community, it was also the place where individuals developed their identities as well as the community identity through the land in which they lived. As a city, *patria* had its own God and a particular system of morality. In order to show loyalty and devotion to their God and its land, people made rituals, ceremonies, and sacrifices. We can see this in the words of Cicero: “What good citizen would hesitate to welcome death if it were profitable to *patria*?”⁹ Besides its sacred aspect, it had a political meaning in the name of *res publica*. *Res publica*, which means public things or things in common, was the political organization of Rome in which citizens were *required* to actively engage in the administration of their city-state.

After the expansion of the Roman Empire and due to the transformative influence of Christianity, the secular-political meaning of *patria* was replaced with a more religious-philosophical understanding, which emphasized the universe and humanity as the locus of love and loyalty, rather than a particular worldly territory.¹⁰ For this purpose, Christian philosophy came up with a bond between people, which is strong enough to replace the world; and they proposed “brotherhood” of all humanity ruled by the principle of charity.¹¹ Hence, instead of treating people as equal citizens of the republic, Christianity taught them to be brothers of the same family.¹²

Starting from the late Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance, political significance of *patria* reappeared in the writings of historians and philosophers. Either

⁷ In the ancient Greece, however, this word, *patriotai*, referred to barbarians/foreigners instead of citizens. See: Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism. In T. Ball, J. Farr, and R.L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 178.

⁸ Arendt, Hannah (1958). *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 120.

⁹ Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism, p. 178; Kantorowicz, Ernst (1957). *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Thought*. NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 242.

¹⁰ Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism, p. 179.

¹¹ Arendt, Hannah (1958). *The Human Condition*, pp. 53-54.

¹² *Ibid.*

against the arbitrary power of the Church and the despotic rulers, or corruption, these thinkers sought to recover the old meaning of citizenship to provide justice, stability, and order in the society and state. Moreover, since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Italian city-states had already established republics with a link to the ancient republican experience. And these societies of the early modern period started to problematize traditional religious legitimation. Thus, Machiavelli conceptualized his republicanism and patriotism with an emphasis on active and virtuous citizenship in the service of *patria*. In order to suggest a better organized republic, he underlined the secular meaning of *patria* in terms of laws and institutions that citizens should work to build and maintain.¹³ Therefore, his writings on republicanism, especially in *The Discourses*, rendered him one of the key figures in the republican tradition.

The movement that Machiavelli started in the fifteenth century in Florence easily circulated around Europe, from Italy to England and Dutch Republic, then, France and finally to the American continent. Many thinkers, such as Harrington, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville, were influenced by his republicanism. However, it was Rousseau, who made a major innovation to Machiavelli's republicanism and idea of citizenship. Rousseau introduced the principle of popular sovereignty, that is, the idea that citizens will be their own masters by obeying the rules and laws that they deliberately create. Moreover, while Machiavelli was emphasizing the instrumental benefit of the pursuit of the common good, that citizens can meet their interests only if they serve for the well-being of the republic, Rousseau brought up the concept of general will as the will above all private wills. In this respect, in Rousseau's republic, there is no difference between "good man" and "good citizen" because good man is a man in the state of nature, which does not exist anymore; but good citizen is a citizen that successfully adopts moral and ethical values of the community s/he lives.

Especially after the French Revolution, due to the rise of nation-states with capitalist market structures, republican tradition lost its prominence against liberal political philosophy. Similarly, patriotic discourses of republicanism converged with nationalist discourses. Therefore, until the second half of the twentieth century, republicanism and patriotism were largely neglected by scholars of political philosophy.

¹³ Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 137.

However, because liberalism failed to find a cure for the pathologies of the twentieth century, some historians from the Cambridge School applied their contextualist method to the early modern thinkers of republicanism in order to come up with a new definition of freedom. Among them, Pettit introduced his conception of liberty, which is “liberty as non-domination.”¹⁴

Following the Cambridge School and its contextualism, and based on the definition of liberty introduced by Pettit, Viroli suggests that patriotism of the early modern republics signified love of liberty. In order to justify his argument, he reexamines the texts of Machiavelli and Rousseau. Viroli believes that if we return to the pre-national attachments, and if we use a rhetoric that revitalizes this old understanding of patriotism, we can both overcome nationalism, and create an inclusive and peaceful society. Therefore, Viroli’s patriotism is presented as an alternative to nationalism. He also believes that patriotism and nationalism are completely different attachments. In this respect, in order to reinforce his argument, he brings up Habermas’s constitutional patriotism as an example of republican patriotism.

In this thesis, I aim to reveal that Viroli’s patriotism and Habermas’s constitutional patriotism are different forms of allegiances. Viroli’s attempt to assimilate constitutional patriotism into republican patriotism is due to his shallow reading of Habermas’s political theory. Therefore, with a careful analysis of Habermas’s constitutional patriotism, I will set down in what respects it diverges from republican patriotism drawn by Viroli. Looking through Viroli’s republican patriotism and Habermas’s constitutional patriotism, in this thesis, I address four differences. First of all, as opposed to Viroli’s yearning for *pre-national* attachments other than national citizenship, Habermas’s constitutional patriotism is based on a *post-national* citizenship. Habermas does not only introduce constitutional patriotism to erase nationalism and bring a new allegiance; but he also thinks that due to globalization and mass movements in the world, nationalism has already become impotent for creating socialization and solidarity in multicultural societies.¹⁵ Therefore, he points out that regardless of diversity of cultures in societies, they need another form of allegiance to socialize into a

¹⁴ Pettit, Philip (1998). *Cumhuriyetçilik: Bir Özgürlük ve Yönetim Teorisi*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.

¹⁵ Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, p. 508.

common political culture.¹⁶ However, what kind of allegiance is it, if it is not pre-national republican patriotism? And here lies another fundamental difference between their perspectives.

Second, although Viroli defines love of *patria* as love of liberty, he still ties his patriotism to particularities, such as common culture, common ethnicity, and common history. In this respect, he criticizes Habermas's constitutional patriotism. He claims that constitutional patriotism of Habermas requires bonds of citizenship through "identification with values that are part of the particular culture of a people."¹⁷ In other words, tying citizenship to formal-legal concept of constitution cannot be adequate to stimulate civic solidarity.¹⁸ Therefore, in a way, he talks about patriotism for a "concrete" historical community, such as "Italians," "Germans," and "Turks." He comes up with patriotism for an already-constructed conventional community.

However, instead of attaching ourselves to *pre-political* values, such as family, *ethnos*, and/or nation, which are imagined to exist prior to opinion and will-formation of citizens, Habermas suggests a post-conventional collective identity, which is "an identification with the norms and procedures that constitute the idealized 'unlimited communication community.'"¹⁹ Drawing on Kohlberg and Mead, he argues that post-conventional ego identity of individuals enable them to free themselves from their traditional attachments. If a mature individual is able to overcome her conventional identity, Habermas believes that mature politics can also uncouple itself from pre-political grounds.²⁰

The third difference between Viroli and Habermas is concerned with the bases that they construct republican and constitutional patriotism. Viroli's patriotism is a *rhetoric* that targets citizens' emotions with an emphasis on their common history. In

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 500.

¹⁷ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 174.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁹ Markell, Patchen (2000). Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On "Constitutional Patriotism." *Political Theory*, 28(1), p. 42.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

this respect, he thinks that Habermas's constitutional patriotism is built upon Germans' particular *pride* for having been able to construct democratic institutions that could successfully dismiss Nazism after the Second World War.²¹ However, Habermas's constitutional patriotism is supposed to be based on *reason*. Constitutional patriotism is not a sentiment that people should rhetorically be convinced to feel for their country, but a result of "communicative reason." Therefore, while individuals establish solidarity among each other in a society, they also develop a disposition for self-criticism about their past.²²

Finally, I will focus on in what sense constitutional patriotism can be against republican patriotism. Here, I will examine Habermas's critiques of republicanism. As opposed to Viroli, Habermas does not think that republicanism lost its influence with the rise of nationalism; on the contrary, he argues that the former became a path for the latter: "National consciousness and republican conviction in a sense proved themselves in the willingness to fight and die for one's country. This explains the complementary relation that originally obtained between nationalism and republicanism: one became the vehicle for the emergence of the other."²³ But it by no means implies that Habermas totally rejects the republican tradition; republicanism constitutes one side of his "co-originality" thesis, which is, as I will explore, the core of his constitutional patriotism.

I shall divide my analysis into two main chapters. In the first chapter, I will first explore republican patriotism. To this end, I will start with Machiavelli to establish the grounds of patriotism that will continue up to Rousseau. Then, I will continue with Rousseau's republicanism and patriotism. Finally, I will discuss the revitalization of republican patriotism through the works of the Cambridge School and Viroli. In this part, I will explore how Viroli comes to the conclusion, out of Machiavelli and Rousseau, that republican patriotism signifies love of liberty. However, I will leave my

²¹ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 172.

²² Müller, J. Werner (2009). Seven Ways to Misunderstand Constitutional Patriotism. *Notizie di POLITEIA*, 25(96), p. 23.

²³ Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, p. 495.

critiques on Viroli to the last chapter, where I compare his republican patriotism with Habermas's constitutional patriotism.

In the second chapter, I will turn to constitutional patriotism. In this chapter, I emphasize how constitutional patriotism comes to imply engaging in a rational relation with the laws and institutions of a political society. Here, I will first look at how constitutional patriotism as a concept was introduced in political philosophy. This kind of patriotism can be found in one of the most significant, but in our context often neglected, philosophers of the early nineteenth century, Hegel. I will examine Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, particularly the part on "Constitutional Law," where he most elaborately expresses and defines patriotism as "political *disposition*" based on *truth* and a *habitual* volition, which can only be realized through the rationality that citizens habitually know that "the community is the substantial basis and end."²⁴ Since he ties political disposition to truth, he suggests that patriotism must address a concrete institution, which has actuality, for disposition. Hence, for Hegel, it must be the constitution where citizens give allegiance.

Nevertheless, since Hegel has a political philosophy which requires more space than this thesis, I will limit my discussion on how Hegel's political philosophy had an influence on Habermas's constitutional patriotism. In this sense, I will underline two points. The first one is that Hegel suggests that justice and solidarity can be possible if individuals rationally identify themselves with the state in the ethical life [*sittlichkeit*]. This is one of the things that Habermas later takes up to form his "discourse ethics," which is a rule for argumentation in the public sphere, and which is supposed to bring about both justice and solidarity. Second, unlike Machiavelli and Rousseau, Hegel constructs his patriotism on the basis of consciousness: "the highest consciousness of freedom is the consciousness of this membership," that he calls "political disposition" or "patriotism."²⁵ His patriotism does not require metaphysics or religion. Similarly, it

²⁴ Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. In G. W. F. Hegel, A. F. Wood, and B. H. Nisbet (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 288-289.

²⁵ Wood, Allen (1995). Editor's Introduction. In G. W. F. Hegel, A. W. Wood, and H. B. Nisbet (eds.), *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xxv.

does not require extraordinary sacrifices for the *patria*; for him, patriotism is an everyday activity, it is a volition and habituation. Moreover, his patriotism is not towards an abstract entity; he obviously asserts that citizens should give allegiance to the state as the *abstract actuality* but more concretely, political disposition should be towards the *political constitution*, “which proceeds perpetually from the state, just as it is the means by which the state preserves itself.”²⁶

After Hegel, I will dwell on the contemporary debates on constitutional patriotism, starting from the constitutional debates in Germany. Finally, I will examine Habermas’s constitutional patriotism in comparison with Viroli’s republican patriotism. In this part, I will present a republican patriotism in line with Machiavelli and Rousseau versus a constitutional patriotism which relies on the political philosophy of Hegel and Kant. Habermas’s constitutional patriotism is not only influenced by Hegel, but also it is a critique of him. Unlike Hegel, who argues that the state is the Universal Idea, “an absolute and unmoved end in itself,”²⁷ Habermas reinstates Kantian project of cosmopolitanism that establishes an ethical life beyond nation-states through his constitutional patriotism. Therefore, for Habermas, constitutional patriotism is not just another theory of nation-states; societies constructed on the basis of constitutional citizenship and a liberal political culture is a key towards world citizenship.

Finally I would like to remark that the order of chapters and general outline of the thesis have a logic. In the first part, I start with examining republican patriotisms of Machiavelli and Rousseau. By doing this, I aim to provide a short genealogy of republican patriotism via two of the most important figures on this matter. In Machiavelli and Rousseau, we can easily see the flow and patterns of the tradition of republican patriotism. Besides this, these two figures have a direct impact on Viroli’s conceptualization of republican patriotism. Hence, the first part will be a presentation of a republican patriotism deriving from Machiavelli and Rousseau. In the second part, I explore another conceptualization of patriotism which is in line with Hegel and Kant, and is formulated by Habermas. In so doing, I will reveal the contrasts between Viroli’s republican patriotism and Habermas’s constitutional patriotism.

²⁶ Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 290.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

CHAPTER 2: ON REPUBLICAN PATRIOTISM

I. Machiavelli: A Republican Citizen or the Author of *The Prince*?

“When evening comes, I return home and enter my study... I enter the ancient courts of men of old, in which I am received affectionately by them and partake of the food that properly belongs to me, and for which I was born. There I do not hesitate to converse with them, and ask them why they acted as they did; and out of kindness they respond... I have written down what has been valuable in their conversations, and have composed a little book *On Principalities*...”²⁸

This is a part of the famous letter to Francesco Vettori, a Florentine diplomat, from Machiavelli, who was a sixteenth century Florentine citizen, one of the most influential and controversial Renaissance humanists, and a political thinker of republicanism. He served to the Florentine republic as a public servant and diplomat between 1498 and 1512.²⁹ During his service, he was sent to many places for diplomatic purposes, contacted with various political leaders whom he later examined in his books, such as Louis VII of France, Cesare Borgia, Pope Julius II and the Emperor Maximilian.³⁰ His missions for the Republic of Florence enabled him to formulate his political ideas based on the events of his time. However, as the quotation from his letter to Vettori shows, while explaining the political phenomena of his time, he was mostly influenced by the philosophers of the ancients that he goes by jumping over the medieval philosophy. He transcends the Christian tradition of natural law of St. Thomas Aquinas and reaches to Aristotle’s *Politics*, Cicero’s *Republic*, Greek historian Polybius, and Livy’s *History of Rome*.³¹

²⁸ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*. In N. Machiavelli, Q. Skinner, and R. Price (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 93.

²⁹ Black, Robert (1993). Machiavelli, servant of the Florentine republic. In G. Bock, Q. Skinner, and M. Viroli (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 71.

³⁰ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. ix.

³¹ Crick, Bernard (2003). Introduction. In N. Machiavelli, and B. Crick (eds.), *The Discourses*. London: Penguin Books, p. 25.

It is very certain that Machiavelli breaks with the medieval thought which was immensely fuelled with Christian doctrines. Instead, he turns to the ancients, and studies their political life and philosophy. Particularly, as Crick suggests, “He is best understood if one starts with Aristotle” rather than other ancient philosophers.³² It means that instead of dwelling on the ideal or imagined political life, his motives in writing his books are mostly driven by the events of his lifetime or his empirical observations. This point is very clear in his own words: “But because I want to write what will be useful to anyone who understands it, it seems to me better to concentrate on what really happens rather than on theories or speculations. For many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist.”³³ In what follows, he argues that the way people live is different from how they ought to live.³⁴ His approach certainly addresses the empirical world to explain politics. Hence, albeit reproachable, many of his interpreters, especially the theorists of international relations, consider him as a classical realist thinker.³⁵

³² Ibid.

³³ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. 54.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Forde, Steven (1992). Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli. *The Journal of Politics*, 54(2), p. 372. Mindle, for example, opposes this common opinion. He argues that praising Machiavelli as a realist thinker, many scholars misses the point that his predecessors were also “realistic” and “moderate;” and due to his compelling rhetoric, they fail to notice how “unrealistic” and “immoderate” Machiavelli’s teaching is. See: Mindle, B. Grant (1985). Machiavelli’s Realism. *The Review of Politics*. 47(2), p. 212. Machiavelli’s such an approach in his books, especially in *The Prince*, also directs some of his interpreters to consider his intention as “scientific.” Strauss, for example, suggests that *The Prince* is a scientific book since it carries a general teaching based on reasoning from experience. See: Strauss, Levi (1957). Machiavelli’s Intention: The Prince. *American Political Science Review*, 51(1), p. 13. On the other hand, Viroli argues that considering Machiavelli as a thinker of the science of politics in any sense, be it science as “empirical,” “demonstrative,” or experimental, is not true since he does not offer any of these approaches. See: Viroli, Maurizio (1998b). *Machiavelli*, pp. 1-2. Yet, whether Machiavelli was doing science or not is not the only debate among his interpreters. Whether he was a realist thinker or not was another discussion I have just mentioned above. As Cochrane earlier puts it, “Every generation since the time of Machiavelli himself has claimed to have found a ‘new’ Machiavelli different from the one discerned by its predecessor.” See: Cochrane, Eric W. (1961). Machiavelli: 1940-1960. *The Journal of Modern History*, 33(2), p. 113. Similarly, Berlin states that apart from dozens of scholars (re)interpreting Machiavelli, there is now a growing literature of theories on how to interpret his works, particularly *The Prince* and *The Discourses*.

One of the most significant debates on “different Machiavellis” arises out of his two books: *The Prince* and *The Discourses*. For many of his readers, Machiavelli is generally known only as the author of *The Prince* or as a thinker who advises princes and kings on how to maintain power over the territories they rule. However, readers of his other works, especially *The Discourses (Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio)*, also view him as a thinker who regenerates the ancient Roman republicanism for the modern era. Therefore, his only influential book was not *The Prince*, but *The Discourses* can also be considered just as significant. However, reading *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, one comes up with two different views, and thus develops two different interpretations of Machiavelli. This duality of interpretations is thought to arise due to these two different works in which whereas he brings back the republican stance based on Roman sources in *The Discourses*; he draws up ways to establish a sort of absolutist rule in *The Prince*.³⁶ In that respect, while for some, he has been the “teacher of evil”³⁷ for he emphasizes that “a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary,”³⁸ some others, including me, consider him as a thinker who stands “beyond good and evil.” Between these two readings of Machiavelli, which gives us “the best Machiavelli” is still a discussion topic. However still, either Machiavelli was the founder of modern republican thought or he is only the advisor of rulers is not yet a settled dispute that continues in our time. Therefore, it is not surprising that Hans Baron describes him both as “the republican citizen” and “the author of *The Prince*.”³⁹

For a more detailed discussion on different interpretations of Machiavelli, see: Berlin, Isaiah (1972). The Originality of Machiavelli. In Myron P. Gilmore (ed.), *Studies on Machiavelli*. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, p. 25.

³⁶ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi : Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük* . İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınlar, p. 149.

³⁷ Crick, Bernard (2003). Introduction, p. 16.

³⁸ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. 54.

³⁹ Baron, Hans (1961). Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen and the Author of The Prince. *The English Historical Review*, 76(299), p. 217.

In this thesis, rather than examining Machiavelli's alleged formulation of absolute authority,⁴⁰ and dualities of his various interpretations, I will dwell on how Machiavelli attains his name as a neo-Roman thinker.⁴¹ In other words, I will explore Machiavelli's theory of republicanism in which he studies the complex ties and relationships between individual character, political life, and institutions.⁴² To this end, I underline two important points that Machiavelli addresses. Firstly and heavily based on contemporary interpretations of Machiavelli, I examine his republicanism as the building and protection of free way of life pursued by internally and externally non-dominated citizens. Secondly, I discuss Machiavelli's republic as a secular *patria*, sacredness of which is notably diminished compared to his medieval republican predecessors.

I.I. *The Prince* and Machiavelli's Understanding of Republic [*Repubblica*]

Machiavelli's *The Prince* starts with a sentence "All the states, all the dominions that have held sway over men, have been either republics or principalities"⁴³ After that,

⁴⁰ This argument is also highly contentious and still open to debate. Putting forth my opinion against this argument, and siding with the view that sees Machiavelli as a "republican citizen," a discussion of Machiavelli's "two faces," as described by Hans Baron can still be an interesting topic for another paper. In this respect, looking at the way Hans Baron presents the puzzling aspects of Machiavelli's two books could be a good starting point. On the other hand, it is also misleading to argue that Machiavelli presents two different and opposing views in *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, that he destroys in the former and rediscovers in the latter the republican political tradition. For a discussion against this opinion, Viroli's reading of *The Prince*, where he argues that Machiavelli uses republic and liberty interchangeably, and places political activity into republics by distinguishing the political from the state, is worth serious consideration. See: Viroli, Maurizio (1993). Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics. In G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 144.

⁴¹ Maynor, John W. (2003). *Republicanism in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity; Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi : Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük* ; Skinner, Quentin (1993). Pre-humanist origins of republican ideas. In G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121 – 141; McCormick, John P. (2007). Machiavelli's Political Trials and 'the Free Way of Life'. *Political Theory*, 35(4), pp. 385 – 411.

⁴² Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*. London: Routledge, p. 48.

⁴³ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. 5.

the rest of his book mostly analyzes various forms of principalities; and how a prudent leader should deal with situations that he faces, through his virtue [*virtù*]. The other things that he also discusses are the composition of military, and the role of fortune [*fortuna*] and necessities [*necessità*] in shaping humans' lives. In this sense, *The Prince* does not seem to have much to say about Machiavelli's republicanism. However, for the purposes of this paper, at least two important points can be derived from this book: 1) what he means by the term "republic," and 2) his emphasis on human reason both as a ruler and a citizen. Hence, it is important to examine *The Prince* first, and look for the consistencies in his philosophy, before dwelling on his republicanism and patriotism in *The Discourses*. Unlike what some scholars argue, reading *The Prince* merely as advises to princes is nothing but interpreting the book with a subversive manner.⁴⁴ In this respect, I follow Viroli's analytical distinction of the two books: he suggests that *The Prince* is a theory of state, which is about effective and efficient rule, whereas *The Discourses* is a theory of the political [*vivere politico*], which is a task that belongs to free citizens of a republic.⁴⁵

In the chapter V of *The Prince*, where he describes how to rule cities that used to live under their own laws, and in the chapter IX, where he discusses the civil principalities, he uses republics interchangeably with "free way of life,"⁴⁶ "governing themselves,"⁴⁷ and liberty [*libertà*].⁴⁸ According to this usage of the term, he seems to have "life in liberty" in his mind when he talks about republics. For him, republic is a state whose rules and institutions are constituted by its citizens. In other words, citizens enjoy their freedom [*vivere liberi*] by actively engaging in the construction and maintenance of their free state. Yet this understanding of republic as *vivere liberi* is not Machiavelli's own conceptualization. According to Rubinstein, this conceptualization of republic has its roots in the thirteenth and fourteenth century Italian city republics, where it acquired the opposite meaning of despotic rule: "the fundamental antithesis between despotic rule and the 'populi che vivono in libertà', the 'libertas populi', a term

⁴⁴ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 151.

⁴⁵ Viroli, Maurizio (1993). Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics, p. 160.

⁴⁶ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. 18.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

which, in the fifteenth century, the humanists replaced with the classical one for the commonwealth, *res publica*.⁴⁹ However, since Machiavelli does not talk much about republics in *The Prince*, one can get only what he means by the term “republic.” As Machiavelli himself points out, he discusses republics not in *The Prince* but his other work, *The Discourses*: “I shall not discuss republics, because I have previously treated them at length.”⁵⁰

Another important contribution of *The Prince* to our study is Machiavelli’s emphasis on human reason in shaping our lives. In the chapter XXV of the book, Machiavelli discusses and undermines the power of fortune on human affairs, where he also mentions about the power of God: “I am not unaware that many have thought, and many still think, that the affairs of the world are so ruled by fortune and by God that the ability of men cannot control them. Rather, they think that we have no remedy at all; and therefore it could be concluded that it is useless to sweat much over things, but let them be governed by fate.”⁵¹ It is quite clear from this passage that he questions this viewpoint. In the following sentences, in order to justify his argument, he makes some comparisons. One of them is the comparison between fortune and dangerous rivers. He explains that when rivers flood the plains and cause destructions, the guilty is not bad fortune but people themselves who did not take precautions.⁵² Therefore, such a natural event does not cause harm to people because of fortune or God’s will; it turns out to be harmful only because humans fail to take measures in case of such natural disasters.

Furthermore, in the chapter XXIV of the book, he makes another comparison, and this time, he compares fortune with the prudence of a leader. He argues that when a leader loses its power and his principality after having ruled it for a long time, he should not put the blame on his bad luck but his indolence because of which he fails to observe, in quiet times, that things could change.⁵³ He, therefore, believes that if a ruler loses his

⁴⁹ Rubinstein, Nicolai (1993). Machiavelli and Florentine Republican Experience. In G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

territory, it is not related to his bad luck or the wishes of God but his lack of virtue. Likewise, if he successfully acquires a territory and establishes his authority over the inhabitants of those lands, nothing but only his prudence and virtue is credited. In these two examples, Machiavelli attributes human reason a central position in worldly affairs. He explains that our fortune or God do not rule our lives; whether we achieve our purposes or not does not completely depend on these things but they are under the control of human beings: “I am disposed to hold that fortune is the arbiter of half of our actions, but that it lets us control roughly the other half.”⁵⁴ Moreover, he argues that the power of fortune declines or rises according to the amount of virtue that a country has.⁵⁵ Therefore, Machiavelli asserts that worldly affairs are not under the control of fortune or God alone but humans, as long as they act in a virtuous or prudent way.⁵⁶

Thus, although *The Prince* exclusively focuses on the principalities rather than republics, as I have tried to show in the above paragraphs, we can trace certain conclusions on his conceptualization of republics and citizenship. He gives us clues about how he considers republics. He uses the term “republic” interchangeably with free way of life or people who live under their own laws and institutions. He also attributes men an active position in terms of their worldly affairs. However, this part will be more clarified in his other book, *The Discourses*, which I will examine now.

I.II. *The Discourses* and Political Life [*vivere politico*]

Based on biographical evidence, Crick suggests that Machiavelli was working on *The Prince* and *The Discourses* at the same time.⁵⁷ He wrote *The Prince* in 1513, when a part of *The Discourses* either had already been written or was planned. In 1516, he revised *The Prince*, while he was still working on *The Discourses*; and in 1519, he paused writing them in order to start writing the *Art of War*, and then, he wrote the

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ At this point, what Machiavelli means by “virtue” [*virtù*] should be clarified. In his works, virtue has several meanings but it generally means “ability,” “skill,” “energy,” “determination,” “strength,” and/or “courage.” See: Machiavelli, Niccolò (2000). *The Prince*, p. 103.

⁵⁷ Crick, Bernard (2003). Introduction, p. 20.

Florentine History.⁵⁸ Contrary to *The Prince*, Machiavelli talks entirely about republics in *The Discourses*. Through a historical and comparative perspective, he examines some of the ancient republics, such as Rome, Sparta, and Venice. On the other hand, he writes about these republics only to compare them with the Republic of Rome, of which he presents us a detailed analysis. Hence, this book is the one where Machiavelli's idea of republics is crystallized.

However, it should also be noted that Machiavelli deviates from the common understanding that uses republics as the antidote of monarchies or one-person rule. His conceptualization of republic allows for a single-ruler as well. In *The Discourses* he argues that there are six types of government, three of which are good in nature but can easily become bad, and the rest are bad in nature: 1) *principality*, which can easily turn into *tyranny*, 2) *aristocracy*, which can lead to *oligarchy*, and 3) *democracy*, which can convert to *anarchy*.⁵⁹ Among them, principality, aristocracy, and democracy are good forms of governments; but they are not satisfactory because their lives are too short. They are also the forms that every newly established state must adopt according to which serves best for their interests (ibid.). On the other hand, tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy are inherently malignant.⁶⁰

For Machiavelli, republic is certainly not a type of government; his conceptualization of republic is not related to governing or ruling. Therefore, maintaining Viroli's analytical distinction, it can be stated that while governing or ruling as a shrewd leader, which Machiavelli describes in *The Prince*, is his art or theory of state; republic is where citizens enjoy their political lives, and where Machiavelli's art of politics finds its true meaning. For Viroli, "state" and "politics" have opposite meanings that can best be observed in the language that Machiavelli uses in *The Prince*

⁵⁸ Ibid. On the other hand, Isaiah Berlin underlines that the chronological order of these books are not certain. See: Berlin, Isaiah (2008). *Kirpi ile tilki : seçme makaleler* (M. Tunçay and Z. Mertoğlu, Trans.). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, p. 138.

⁵⁹ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*. In B. Crick (ed.), *Machiavelli: The Discourses*. London: Penguin Books, p. 106.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

and *The Discourses*.⁶¹ He points out that the term “politico” or any of its equivalents is not found in *The Prince*.⁶² He remarks that *vivere politico* is a “specific form of political organization which precludes tyranny and despotic rule and is incompatible with the state of somebody: if a citizen or a party succeeds in dominating over the laws and the magistrates, one can no longer speak of republic.”⁶³ However, political organization of any form, including republics, is considered as states. It can be seen in *The Prince*, where Machiavelli describes the Turkish Kingdom (*lo stato del Turco*) as a despotic state, “kingdoms ruled like France” (*lo stato di Francia*) as a moderate kingdom, and “states...accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom” as republics.⁶⁴

There is no evidence of the term “politics” or a similar word in *The Prince* simply because, in this book, Machiavelli was not talking about the political life, but the art of the state, “the art of preserving and reinforcing the state of the prince.”⁶⁵ On the contrary, *vivere politico* is the art of establishing and preserving necessary institutions for and by the free citizens of a free republic. The use of the word *politico* was confined to the sphere of the city; perpetuating the conventional meaning of politics, in Machiavelli’s language, it means the art of the city.⁶⁶ In this respect, his reference point is mostly the ancient Republic of Rome. In the beginning of *The Discourses*, he makes derivations out of the Roman experience: “Those who read of the origin of the city of Rome, of its legislators and of its constitution, will not be surprised that in this city such great virtue was maintained for so many centuries, and that later on there came into being the empire into which that republic developed.”⁶⁷ Then, he comes to the

⁶¹ Viroli, Maurizio (2001). *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250-1600*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Viroli, Maurizio (1993). Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics, pp. 160-161.

⁶⁷ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*, p. 100.

conclusion that all cities are established either by native inhabitants or foreigners.⁶⁸ And in either case, these cities are founded as free cities in the beginning.⁶⁹ By free city, he simply means that they are not dependent on other cities or states but it is rather a place of collective self-dependence. In order to maintain their freedom, these cities should also be established in fertile places, and fertility of those places should be kept in bounds by laws.⁷⁰

On the other hand, defining “free citizen” is not that straightforward in Machiavelli. His understanding of “free citizen” is not a person who is able to act according to his own choices. A free citizen is certainly someone who is not dependent on others,⁷¹ but Machiavelli does not think that freedom of choice concerning the political life is a good idea; he argues that between work by necessity and work by choice, there is greater virtue where work out of necessity prevails because choice may cause discord and idleness among citizens while they need to be united.⁷² His pessimistic view on human nature makes him think that “men never do good unless necessity derives them to it.”⁷³ He asserts that when people are too free to choose and free to act according to their choices, this creates only confusion and disorder.⁷⁴ Hence, necessity renders people industrious; and laws out of necessity make them good since legislation is not required only because there is something wrong in the society, and it is necessary to fix the problem.⁷⁵

Therefore, *free* citizenship for Machiavelli is rather *active* citizenship, that citizens take part in building the laws and other institutions of a state. Their freedom enables them to create new institutions or laws when it is necessary. In this respect,

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 102.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 103.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 101.

⁷² Ibid., p. 102.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 112.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Machiavelli gives an example from history of the Roman Republic. He states that the establishment of tribunes of plebs was the outcome of such a necessity. He points out that through the establishment of the tribunes of the plebs, Roman Republic reached its perfection especially when the tribunes of the plebs started to be appointed as an opposition to the senate.⁷⁶ Plebs had needed to raise their voices to the ruling elites in the republic. To this end, and out of a big struggle, they established their tribunes against the senate. In this way, they gained a right to have a say in the legislation. From then on, all legislation was made after long discussions and quarrels between the plebs and the senate. This historical event seems to fascinate Machiavelli so much that he comes to the following conclusion: he argues that, unlike the discord among citizens, discord between the plebs and senate made the Roman Republic free and powerful; that is, the clash between the populace and the upper class brought about legislations favoring liberty and thus good laws.⁷⁷

This clash can be summarized as a tension between those who desire to dominate, and who do not want to be dominated, as described by Machiavelli.⁷⁸ On the one hand, those who desire to dominate come from the upper class, the senate, and thus, they are the “haves.” They hold power to govern in their hands and they do not want to lose it. On the other hand, those who resist being dominated come from the lower class, the plebs; they are the “have-nots.” They have nothing but their liberty, and they want to maintain their freedom. Out of this conflict, against the critiques of this clash, Machiavelli argues that Rome made laws for the common good; and it was only through this way that they created and maintained their liberty: “To me those who condemn the quarrels between the nobles and the plebs, seem to be caviling at the very things that were the primary cause of Rome’s retaining her freedom...nor do they realize that in every republic there are two different dispositions, that of the populace and that of the upper class and that all legislation favorable to liberty is brought about by the clash between them.”⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 111.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 213.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 116.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 113.

The idea of discord or tumults is normally something alien to the classical republican thought. In this sense, while Machiavelli was deeply inspired by his ancient predecessors, especially by Cicero, he brings an original contribution to republicanism. Indeed, beyond being a contribution, Machiavelli makes a critique of the classical republican thought which over-emphasizes unity and concord as inextricable dimensions of republicanism. Thus, through Roman experience of republic, he puts a question-mark against too much emphasis on republican unity and harmony. In this respect, although Machiavelli shares the same opinion with the classical republicanism in terms of political meaning and purpose of republicanism,⁸⁰ he also makes an immanent critique of it.

This Machiavellian revolution, as it is called by some of his interpreters, is not about republican ends, but the contents of the means to reach these ends.⁸¹ In this respect, Skinner argues that there is a further point on the republican tradition where Machiavelli seems to make his critique: he states that Machiavelli's formulation of the notion that political actions should be judged by their effects rather than their intrinsic rightness also tosses the belief that common good can be attained only if rulers act in a completely just manner.⁸² In *The Discourses*, Machiavelli explains that if a prudent organizer of a state has an intention to govern not for his own purposes but for the common good, and even if he takes extraordinary actions for the service of the kingdom or republic, he should not be blamed; because "it is a sound maxim that reprehensible actions may be justified by their effects, and that when the effect is good, as it was in the case of Romulus, it always justifies the action."⁸³ Therefore, as long as our actions serve for the common good, whether it is moral or immoral is not a very big concern. This in turn implies that if our actions that derive from morality do not serve for the common good, they should be avoided. Hence, in terms of the primacy of common good, Machiavelli follows the classical republican tradition.

⁸⁰ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 153.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Skinner, Quentin (1993). Pre-humanist origins of republican ideas, p. 136.

⁸³ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*, p. 132.

Therefore, Machiavelli's republicanism preserves the classical republican thought but with a critical eye on it. As I have examined above, while trivializing the discord among citizens, surprisingly for classical republican thought that he values conflict between the nobility and commoners. He asserts that free cities are established out of this conflict. On the other hand, he also remarks that safeguarding of liberty should be entrusted to the plebs rather than the upper class for the latter would easily turn this power into corruption.⁸⁴ This is the most significant component of the *vivere politico* for citizens. They are required to engage in political life by actively participating with every means into the affairs that are related to liberty of the city. It is not only important for the liberty but also for the greatness [*grandezza*] of the city.⁸⁵ Indeed, Machiavelli makes a connection between liberty and greatness of republics: "It is easy to see how this affection of peoples for self-government [*del vivere libero*] comes about, for experience shows that cities have never increased either in dominion or wealth, unless they have been independent."⁸⁶

Having said considerably about Machiavelli's conceptualization of republics, we can conclude that in the center of Machiavelli's republicanism resides "free way of life." In order to preserve this freedom, each citizen should actively participate into political life; they should act with virtue and place the common good above their private interests. If citizens act in this way, their republics can be maintained as powerful and wealthy. However, by active citizenship Machiavelli does not mean a sort of participatory democracy at all. In other words, civic engagement is not something valuable in itself but for Machiavelli it is rather a duty. In this respect, civic engagement is not about ruling the republic but making a division of labor to serve for the good of the republic.⁸⁷ And this requires a particular attachment, a special love or patriotism for the *patria* where citizens live, so that they put the interests of the republic prior to their

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 116.

⁸⁵ Skinner, Quentin (1993). Pre-humanist origins of republican ideas, p. 138.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 275.

⁸⁷ Çelebi, Aykut (2012). Demokratik Bir Anayasanın Siyasal Yapıtaşları: Halk Egemenliği ve Siyasal Temsilin Demokratikleştirilmesi. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 124(1), p. 37.

own interests or ambitions. Hence, an examination of how Machiavelli describes his *patria* and the duties of citizens for their homelands will make this point more clear.

I.III. Secular *Patria* and Patriotism of Machiavelli

Patria in the works of Machiavelli is another controversial topic for various scholars. For some, he uses *patria* to emphasize his native city, Florence. In contrast, for others, he uses the term for the liberation and unification of the Italian peninsula. In either case, what is clear is that the political life and political affairs in Machiavelli's *patria* is free of religious doctrines. As I have tried to show with reference to *The Prince*, fortune or God does not manipulate worldly affairs which are predominantly of humans. It is the human reason and virtue that give shape to our political life. This is generally considered as the emancipation of politics from morality and religion.⁸⁸ Hence, in Machiavelli's republic, there is no hand of God but only citizens'. However, this is not the end of story about Machiavelli and his opinion of religion. First of all, what is meant by religion and morality that Machiavelli opposes is the Christian morality. Contrary to his medieval predecessors, Machiavelli thinks that Christian teachings do not help citizens to enjoy their civic freedom but render people reluctant, weak, and indolent instead of motivating them to act.

Machiavelli was not an anti-religious person. Nor was he against the power of religion in shaping the *patria*. In *The Discourses*, where he discusses religion, he talks about the importance of taking account of religion, and accuses the Roman Church of causing the lack of religion that finally led to the ruination of Italy.⁸⁹ By this kind of religion he references the religion of ancient Roman citizens. He believes that what kept the Roman people united and in prosperity were the institutions and laws that were shaped by religious customs of citizens: "This is easy to understand provided one knows on what basis the religion of a man's homeland is founded, for every religion has the basis of its life rooted in some one of its main institutions."⁹⁰ He suggests that the rulers

⁸⁸ Berlin, Isaiah (2008). *Kirpi ile tilki: seçme makaleler*, p. 158.

⁸⁹ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*, p. 142.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

of a republic or kingdom should keep the main principles of the religion that citizens practice; in so doing, they will be able to keep citizens religious, good, and united.⁹¹

Therefore, rather than being against religions and morality, Machiavelli presents us two different conceptions of morality. On the one hand, he praises the ancient Roman religion, which is a type of pagan religion. The values of this religion are courage, power, solidity, order, discipline, and virtue.⁹² In the opposite direction of these values, however, stand the Christian morality, ideals of which are compassion, charity, generosity, love of God, forgiveness of enemies, belief in life after death, and belief in eternal salvation of human soul which is above all worldly, political or societal ends.⁹³ Whatever the values innate in Christianity are, they are impediments for the ideal society that Machiavelli wishes to (re)build. A life loaded with Christian morality leads to political weakness. Therefore, he suggests that if Italy wants to recover its glorious ancient times, it should get rid of its Christian education, and replace it with a better education that serves for the greatness of the republic.⁹⁴

However, reading *The Discourses*, one can see that his biggest anger is not to the Christianity itself, but the Roman Church and its teachings. As I have stated above, he is not against being religious; but Christian morality, together with the Roman Church, took away citizens' religious customs and practices: "Many are of opinion that the prosperity of Italian cities is due to the Church of Rome. I disagree...By the Court of Rome, Italy has lost all devotion and all religion...The first debt which we, Italians, owe to the Church and to priests, therefore, is that we have become irreligious and perverse."⁹⁵ Moreover, he argues that it is the Church, which kept Italy divided. He states that since Church had temporal power, and its headquarters were in Italy, it

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Berlin, Isaiah (2008). *Kirpi ile tilki: seçme makaleler*, p. 158.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 159.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 160.

⁹⁵ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*, p. 144.

attempted to occupy Italy. However, it was neither powerful enough to occupy whole Italy, nor weak enough to let anyone do it.⁹⁶

The most important reason for Machiavelli to be against the Church is that its teachings rendered citizens weak, and ascribed them less ambition for worldly honor. For him, just as anything in a republic should be organized to maintain stability and liberty, religion also should serve this purpose. On the other hand, what he observes in the Christian teachings is the opposite of this. That is why he praises the pagan religion of the ancient Rome while criticizing the Christian religion:

If one asks oneself how it comes about that peoples of old were more fond of liberty than they are today, I think the answer is that it is due to the same cause that makes men today less bold than they used to be; and this is due, I think, to the difference between our education and that of bygone times, which is based on the difference between our religion and the religion of those days. For our religion, having taught us the truth and the true way of life, leads us to ascribe less esteem to worldly honor. Hence, the gentiles, who held it in high esteem and looked upon it as their highest good, displayed in their actions more ferocity than we do.⁹⁷

What Machiavelli wishes to see is not a man of contemplation and inaction, but man of action, who is strong and ready to defend his homeland. It is only from those who are active that freedom can be gained and maintained. However, as he states, Christian education glorifies “humble and contemplative men” whose highest good is “humility, abnegation, and contempt for mundane things,” whereas the religion of Rome was identified with “magnanimity, bodily strength, and everything else that conduces to make men very bold.”⁹⁸ Hence, he is not against Christianity in its original form, but Christian education, which demands from its citizens to be strong to suffer instead of doing bold things.⁹⁹

For Machiavelli, this kind of education makes people pursue a life on the way to achieve a place in paradise, and teaches them “how best to bear, rather than how best to

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 145.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 277-278.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 278.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

avenge, their injuries.”¹⁰⁰ And this teaching is not originally Christian; it is only the misinterpretation of the Church, which interpreted Christianity in terms of *laissez faire*, instead of *virtù*.¹⁰¹ His conception of religion does not teach people to live for life after death, but to work and fight for the liberty of their homeland, have wisdom of the worldly affairs, passion for glory, wealth, and power. The Roman Church teaches the opposite and wrong interpretation: “For, had they borne in mind that religion permits us to exalt and defend the fatherland, they would have seen that it also wishes us to love and honor it, and to train ourselves to be such that we may defend it.”¹⁰²

Hence, Machiavelli believes that religion serves not only for the unity of citizens but it also train them to love and defend their homeland. In this respect, as Viroli suggests, Machiavelli’s patriotism is not irreligious or anti-Christian; it is only anti-clerical.¹⁰³ But this religion is not the religion of Christians, but the religion of Romans. Since he values independence and liberty of the republic above everything, he also instrumentalizes religion for the sake of maintaining the civilized state. He explains that citizens of Rome were more afraid of breaking an oath than breaking the law because they respected and feared the power of God more than the power of man.¹⁰⁴ In this respect, he compares two rulers of the Roman Republic: Romulus and his successor Numa. Between them, although Romulus was the person who introduced a constitution for Rome, he thinks that Numa was more prudent, for he introduced religion into the city, and successfully turned religion into an instrument to keep people united.¹⁰⁵ Religion was the most important factor in the maintenance and prosperity of the Roman Republic because it helped to control armies, encourage the plebs, produce good men, and shame the bad.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, he concludes that “the religion introduced by Numa

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 278-279.

¹⁰³ Viroli, Maurizio (1998b). *Machiavelli*, p. 165.

¹⁰⁴ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*, p. 139.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 140.

was among the primary causes of Rome's success, for this entailed good institutions; good institutions led to good fortune; and from good fortune arose the happy results of undertakings."¹⁰⁷

I.IV Conclusion: Love of *Patria*

In short, Machiavelli asserts that the highest esteem of citizens should be the common good and liberty rather than their own interests. It is justified for them to do it in any necessary means because the most important thing is the maintenance of the common good. Therefore, they should always be active and united in establishing their laws and institutions, and defending them whenever necessary. They should put the common good beyond their own ambitions and interests, "for it is not the well-being of individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all the promotes it is carried out; and, however much this or that private person may be the loser on this account, there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in consequence."¹⁰⁸ Hence, for the sake of the common good, citizens must be ready to sacrifice themselves as well.

However, this requires a sentiment or feeling in people to be able to do these things. It is where Machiavelli's patriotism comes to the fore. As I have examined above, people should be trained properly that love of *patria* and thus love of liberty will be instilled in them. Since the Christian Church destroyed all the old religious institutions and customs of Romans, peoples of Italy lack such a feeling to defend their liberties. Their love of God, and desire to have a seat in paradise, prevent them from working for their worldly affairs. And Christianity evolved in this direction only because of the misinterpretation of the sacred texts by the Roman Church. Hence, he suggests that the source of such patriotic feeling resides in the proper education of religion, which would teach citizens to love their homeland, and fight for it whenever this becomes necessary.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 275.

Patria, for Machiavelli, signifies the political institutions and a particular way of life which cannot be distinguished from culture and customs. It is a particular way of life in liberty [*vivere libera*] which is not the individual but common liberty.¹⁰⁹ In a famous letter to Vettori, where he says that “I love my *patria* more than my soul,” he underlines, by *patria*, a particular way of life in particular liberty, which belongs to him as much as anyone else.¹¹⁰ Out of this love, citizens serve for the well-being of their republics. On the other hand, when love of country and laws of the country is not enough to keep people united to defend their homeland, religion comes to help, as it was the case in Rome, thanks to Numa.¹¹¹

After all, Machiavelli’s good citizens are patriotic citizens, who value the common good and common liberty more than their own well-being. It is their duty to serve for the republic, and when necessary, die for it. Citizens should serve in the military while defending their countries, and work in the institutions of the republic in order to maintain their liberty. In the course of serving for the republic, they should be in pursuit of the common good. If necessary, they should use immoral measures to achieve his/her purposes because justice is of secondary importance compared to the common good. Hence, s/he should protect the republic with anything necessary to do it. However, his/her primary duty is to obey the laws in any circumstances. The most striking example Machiavelli gives in this respect is the killing of the sons of Brutus: “He who establishes a tyranny and does not kill ‘Brutus’, and he who establishes a free state and does not kill ‘the Sons of Brutus’, will not last long.”¹¹²

Therefore, according to Machiavelli, service for the *patria* is valuable than anything else, and above all, it is the duty of every citizen who feel love of country; because only if citizens defend independence of their country in a prudent way, they can enjoy their civic freedom. Citizenship is not a matter of membership to a community or state, but it is defined by the civic duty, the service that citizens perform for the well-being of their community. Machiavelli’s citizens work for the common good instead of their private interests, because they know that as long as they work for the well-being of

¹⁰⁹ Viroli, Maurizio (1998b). *Machiavelli*, p. 170.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003). *The Discourses*, p. 140.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 393.

their *patria*, they can satisfy their private interests as well. However, if their homeland is under internal or external threat, be it corruption internally or war externally, they cannot pursue their interests either. Therefore, they should feel love for their country, have disposition to its laws and institutions which are the building stones of liberty. Citizens can be free only as long as their *patria* is secure and independent. They should harmoniously work for and take care of their *patria*.

However, since men are bad in nature, it is very easy for them to corrupt and go out of this way. In case they turn to their private dispositions, they should be trained and educated to become good citizens. In this respect, religious training is required to instill love of *patria* and fear of God in citizen's hearts. This religion is not the one that the Roman Church teaches but the "true Christianity" or what Beiner calls "paganization of Christianity,"¹¹³ which maintains the ancient Roman religious customs that would keep citizens active. It is also the starting point of the notion of "civil religion" which will later be taken up by Rousseau, who also emphasizes this notion to create strong bonds among citizens.¹¹⁴

As a member of the republican tradition, Rousseau moves Machiavelli's conception of citizenship and patriotism one step further by adding a moral value to the community embodied in the organization of a state. In this respect, instead of resorting to Aristotle, unlike Machiavelli, he is influenced by Plato in terms of conceptualizing the community and society as the chief moralizing agency, where not men but citizens can achieve justice and freedom.¹¹⁵ It is only the society in which individuals develop their mental and moral capacities. For him, being a "good man" can be important only in the state of nature. After the evolution of complex societies, however, people moved away from their state of nature, and formed an artificial political organization. Then, people started to acquire their mental and moral faculties from this artificial community. Since human faculties can only develop in the community that people live, there is no

¹¹³ Beiner, Ronald (1993). Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau on Civil Religion. *The Review of Politics*, 55(4), p. 621.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Sabine, George H. (1961). *A History of Political Theory*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 581.

moral qualities outside of it.¹¹⁶ Hence, “good man” in nature coalesces into “good citizen” in the community of which people belong.¹¹⁷

In terms of historical development of republican tradition, Rousseau is considered as one of the cornerstones within republicanism. He takes the classical definition of republicanism as the rule of citizens who are limited and bound by the laws and institutions through which the common good is reflected and protected, and synthesizes this understanding with the idea of human rights originating from the natural law theory.¹¹⁸ Hence, Rousseau’s republic is a body politic, a social order, in which citizens acquire social justice as well as political legitimacy through laws and institutions. However, laws and institutions are not enough for a republic to maintain its existence; it primarily requires active citizens as guardians of their republic. In other words, it requires a republican patriotism through which citizens devote themselves to their nation and republic by putting aside their factional interests that would be dangerous for the unity and harmony of the society.¹¹⁹ To do this, citizens must be given a pedagogical training starting from their childhood to become virtuous citizens. But most importantly, they require a religious teaching. In this respect, Rousseau follows Machiavelli but he even goes further by suggesting a truly secular religion, which he calls “civil religion.”¹²⁰ Indeed, Rousseau’s patriotic education itself becomes the religion of citizens.¹²¹ Thus, the rest of the thesis will continue with Rousseau’s republicanism and patriotism. To this end, first of all, I will dwell on his idea of popular sovereignty as citizens’ right of democratic self-determination and self-rule. It is a new dimension that Rousseau brings to the republican tradition, which will soon be

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 582.

¹¹⁷ Kateb, George (1961). Aspects of Rousseau’s Political Thought. *Political Science Quarterly*, 76(4), p. 522.

¹¹⁸ Sezer, Devrim (2012). Çoğulluk ve Politika: Rousseau, Arendt, Cumhuriyetçilik. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 124(2), p. 8.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*. In J. J. Rousseau and D. A. Cress (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., pp. 220-227.

¹²¹ Sezer, Devrim (2012). Çoğulluk ve Politika: Rousseau, Arendt, Cumhuriyetçilik, p. 9.

embraced by Kant as “people as law-giver.” Then, I will explore Rousseau’s conception of patriotism as civil religion.

II. Rousseau: Citizen of Geneva

Rousseau, an eighteenth-century thinker, is one of the most influential philosophers contributing to European intellectual history along with his contemporaries, such as Hume, Kant, and Montesquieu. The issues he addressed from democracy, civic equality to political autonomy have so far had a profound impact on the moral and political theory. Just as Machiavelli, he has been subjected to various interpretations, for his political theory allegedly contains elements of totalitarianism and individualism. Russell, for example, argues that those who called themselves reformers follow two lines: Rousseau and Locke. And he further claims that Hitler was the outcome of Rousseau, whereas Roosevelt and Churchill were of Locke.¹²² That he almost removes the boundaries between the individual and the society through his concept of general will (*voloné générale*), and his emphasis on civil religion (*religion civile*), make him a pen of totalitarianism, who beats a path to Hegel, the thinker of absolute state.¹²³

On the other hand, there is another view that considers Rousseau as a defender of natural law theory because of his theory of *social contract*. In this respect, especially John C. Hall even goes further to argue that Rousseau’s citizen was an economic man; and he seeks to present Rousseau as an advocate of utilitarian individualism.¹²⁴ Rousseau’s these two extreme interpretations show that his writings are not easy to grasp; nor are they very straightforward. However, reading Rousseau and interpreting him as a “father of totalitarianism” does not sound valid; it can only be considered as a consequence of the search for a scapegoat in the history to explain the “dark times” of the twentieth century. Nor is it plausible to conclude that Rousseau was a liberal thinker; again, it can only be a weak attempt to rescue his name from the label of

¹²² Russell, Bertrand (1946). *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 684-685.

¹²³ Nisbet, Robert A. (1943). Rousseau and Totalitarianism. *The Journal of Politics*, 5(2), p. 102.

¹²⁴ McCormick, John P. (1974). Rousseau: An Introduction to His Political Philosophy by J. C. Hall. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 7(1), p. 190.

totalitarianism. Therefore, as Pettit suggests, interpreting Rousseau requires an approach that is dismissive of the sounds of populism.¹²⁵

Rousseau was neither the intellectual father of totalitarianism, nor the philosopher of liberalism. What he tries to do, however, is a sort of reconciliation between moral freedom or moral self-determination of individuals, and ethical self-realization or popular sovereignty of citizens.¹²⁶ In his engagement with the puzzle of rights versus duties, he points out an everlasting debate between liberal and republican traditions, which goes all the way back to Locke and is still continuing with the deliberative model developed by Habermas. The competing arguments between liberal and civic republican strands on the primacy of human rights or popular sovereignty underpin the tension between moral-private autonomy of individuals and ethical-political autonomy of citizens. These two ideas, whether mutually exclusive or mutually complementary, have been at the center of constitutionalism debates, and thus, had a constitutive impact on constitutional democracies. Rousseau is one of the key intellectual stands contributing to this debate. He mainly seeks to find an internal connection between human rights and democratic self-legislation. This is a task which is later undertaken by Kant, and finally arrived to Habermas. Both Rousseau and Kant seek to establish internal relation between human rights and popular sovereignty with a claim that they *mutually* shape and interpret each other. On the other hand, in search of a solution for this puzzle, Habermas explains, they fail to find a balance between private and public autonomy: whereas Kant resorts to the liberal reading of political autonomy, Rousseau makes its rather republican reading.¹²⁷

Yet, the intention of this thesis is not to discuss political philosophy of Rousseau at length; rather it has a more modest purpose: in search of the patterns in modern republicanism, whose foundation was set down by Machiavelli, I will discuss in what respects Rousseau follows Machiavelli, and in what respects he diverges from him. In so doing, I aim to point out Rousseau's conception of citizenship, and his idea of patriotism as the soul of citizenship. To summarize in a few words, and again only in

¹²⁵ Pettit, Philip (1998). *Cumhuriyetçilik: Bir Özgürlük ve Yönetim Teorisi*, p. 40.

¹²⁶ Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, pp. 94-100.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

terms of the purpose of this paper, 1) what I find new in Rousseau compared to Machiavelli's republicanism is the idea of popular sovereignty; 2) what I find in Rousseau as a sort of critique of Machiavelli is the emphasis on harmony and unity, and thus homogeneity in all respects; 3) and what I find in Rousseau as a continuity with Machiavelli is the notion of "civil religion" to provide civic attachment among citizens. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, I will dwell on these aspects of Rousseau's republicanism.

II.I Search for a Well-Ordered Society

What can be the ideal "form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before?"¹²⁸ This is the main puzzle or question that Rousseau investigates in order to construct a well-ordered society in which citizens, united around the common good, find justice and freedom. His solution for this fundamental problem is the *social contract* through which individuals give up their natural liberty to gain their civil or conventional liberty.¹²⁹ Outside the social contract, there is the state of nature where humans neither engage in moral relations nor perform duties for others; they can neither be good nor evil since there is no idea of virtue or vice.¹³⁰

In the state of nature, humans are not very different from that of animals with some exceptions. One of the exceptions that distinguish humans from animals is humans' faculty of self-perfection or *perfectibility*. Rousseau describes this faculty as the source of all people's misfortunes.¹³¹ Self-perfection renders humanity progressive in the sense that they finally go out of the state of nature and "pass tranquil and innocent days; that this is what, through centuries of giving rise to his enlightenment and his errors, his vices and his virtues, eventually makes him a tyrant over himself and

¹²⁸ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 148.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 45.

nature.”¹³² Unlike animals, due to the faculty of self-perfection, humans are able to accumulate knowledge and transmit it through generations. This is also the faculty, which led the person, who enclosed a plot of land and took it as his property, to say “*this is mine.*”¹³³ Hence, self-perfection directly or indirectly created an environment in which people moved from absolute equal conditions with unrestrained natural liberty towards the first moments of inequality.

Development of human faculties let people discover both themselves and others around them. Through their contacts with each other for various reasons, they develop a sentiment that Rousseau calls “self-love” [*amour propre*], which is distinguished from “love of well-being” [*amour de soi*]. Unlike *amour de soi*, as humans’ concern for self-protection and self-sufficiency, *amour propre* is the sentiment that connects individuals with each other, bind them, and render them interdependent because this sort of self-love is reflected only in the eyes of others. Therefore, it is also a desire for reputation and honors, which make “all men competitors, rivals, or rather enemies.”¹³⁴ This sentiment also drives people to gain power over humans, and increase the gap of inequality among them, since their desire to have reputation gives them a passion to gain more power and more wealth against others.¹³⁵

Rousseau explains that it is not material self-interest but *amour propre* which is the main cause of corruption in a society. People are so much obsessed with seeing themselves in the eyes of others that they lose their self-sufficiency and become dependent on others. Hence, they start to look for the ways to establish superiority over others. The search for more power in the name of force, glory, wealth or reputation, goes even further to the point that even the expansion of science, art and commerce bring about more artificial inequalities instead of diminishing them.¹³⁶ It eventually creates so much disorder, fights, wars, and thus corruption that they require to form a political organization. In the end, through the process of rupture from the state of nature

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 61.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 78.

¹³⁵ Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 87.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

towards an artificial society, power and differences among people lead to various types of government from monarchy and aristocracy to democracy.¹³⁷

Since humans have lost touch with the state of nature by forming various types of governments, and by going through endless process of perfection, Rousseau argues that human passions, together with our faculties to direct these passions, lead to the final stage of inequality, the extreme point where only the strongest one's will becomes the law; and all private individuals turn to be equals again.¹³⁸ In this situation, since masters will not rule with justice but only with their passions, the notions of good and justice vanishes to the point in the state of nature. Thus, this is the stage what Rousseau calls "a new state of nature," which is different from the previous one, in the sense that whereas the latter was "the state of nature in its purity, and this last one is the fruit of an excess of corruption."¹³⁹

This is briefly the main reason, which Rousseau describes in *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, for him to begin his *On the Social Contract* with the following sentences: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. He who believes himself the master of others does not escape being more of a slave than they."¹⁴⁰ As individuals come to be dependent on each other in the process of socialization, their passions, self-interests and ambitions pull them into corruption. They had absolute freedom in the state of nature, which they left there through socialization and interdependence, but they could not replace another freedom in this new stage. That is why although they are born free, and no matter how much power they hold over others, they are still in chains. Hence, his proposal of social contract comes with a claim to replace this natural freedom with the fullest one, moral freedom. This moral freedom, which is also called autonomy, is better than the one in the state of nature, because natural freedom simply

¹³⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 76.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

means absence of interference from others but autonomy brings this freedom up to a level of self-mastery.¹⁴¹

Social contract is his first moment of founding a well-ordered society, which will prevent people from turning to the sphere of extreme corruption that he calls the new state of nature. By social contract, he means people's act of forming an association in which each member, under perfectly equal conditions, give itself and his private rights to the entire community: "Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."¹⁴² Through this social contract, individual persons become public persons establishing a *republic* or *body politic*; and since they are the participants of the sovereign authority, they are called *citizens*.¹⁴³ In this way, they exchange their corrupt dependence with a legitimate dependence in the community.¹⁴⁴

Social contract is the transition of humans from the state of nature to the civil state. In this political organization, people replace their instincts with a notion of justice; physical drives with duty; and appetite with right. In this way, their behaviors attain a moral quality.¹⁴⁵ People also lose their natural liberty and unlimited right to everything but in return, gain civil liberty limited by the general will. In other words, by sacrificing their natural liberties, people, in a state, gain an artificial environment in which they can exercise and develop their faculties, and expand their imagination and ideas; and through this process, their actions are driven by liberty with a moral quality, which "makes man truly the master of himself."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 87.

¹⁴² Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 148.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

¹⁴⁴ Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 89.

¹⁴⁵ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 150.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

Unlike Machiavelli's republic, where citizens actively engage in preserving the common good by building necessary laws and institutions, and allow the prudent leaders to rule the republic, Rousseau's active citizenship requires individuals to melt their individual selves in the general will, and through their actions towards the formulation of the common good, they become the sovereign self of the state, which is indivisible and inalienable.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, this general will does not represent the will of all or the interests of each individuals but the common interest. In this respect, they are perfectly equal in expressing their ideas related to the principles of the general will through public deliberation. Finally, out of public deliberation, they create laws that represent the general will. Therefore, while the common good becomes the general will, people become subject to the laws that they decide to obey; they become the sovereign of the state.

This idea of popular sovereignty, which Rousseau brings up as an innovation to the classical republican tradition, however, does not leave room for partial associations although he admits that there can be small differences. He argues that he is in line with Machiavelli in this point, for he quotes from Machiavelli that "'It is true' says Machiavelli, 'that some divisions are harmful to the republic while others are helpful to it. Those that are accompanied by sects and partisan factions are harmful. Since, therefore, a ruler of a republic cannot prevent enmities from arising within it, he at least ought to prevent them from becoming sects.'"¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, as I have discussed above, Machiavelli argues that liberty in the Roman Republic could be preserved only thanks to the clash between the plebs and the nobility. In Rousseau's republic, however, the meaning, content and value of the general will is the same for every citizen without exceptions: "For the general will to be well articulated, it is therefore important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind."¹⁴⁹ Hence, with a sharp break with Machiavelli, Rousseau emphasizes the absolute unity and harmony.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 153-155.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

However, Rousseau's idea that people should give up their partial interests and actively engage in public deliberation to extract the general will and thus the common good of a society is not only a suggestion. There must be a motivation for citizens to act in this way. And this motivation will be given to people by the institutions of a state. These institutions will provide citizens with a pedagogical training through which each individual "believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole. A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a Roman."¹⁵⁰ Hence, for him, social institutions will "denature" people in order to take his absolute being and transform it into the common unity,¹⁵¹ because it is only those citizens who could transform their self into the self of the whole can be eligible to make and obey their own laws.

This is also related to Rousseau's attempt of reconciliation between human rights deriving from natural law and the common good. As Froese rightly suggests, the social contract Rousseau proposes sits on a balance between a disposition to separate oneself from the community, and the disposition to integrate into it.¹⁵² Between these two neither mutually exclusive nor easily reconcilable directions that people are driven, they develop their faculties to become both masters of themselves and part of a larger whole. In this ambivalent situation, therefore, people can neither completely feel home in the community, nor they completely feel alienated from it; in order to get rid of this ambivalence, they must continuously work for reconstructing their bonds.¹⁵³

In this sense, social institutions play a major role in the process of motivating citizens to feel that they belong to the community that they live. Instead of forcing people to perform their citizenship duties, these institutions educate citizens to love their duties and compatriots. Here, what Machiavelli has initiated as "paganization of Christianity" reappears in the republicanism of Rousseau with a more concrete program and a name, which he calls "civil religion." In Rousseau, the secular training of

¹⁵⁰ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1979). *Emile: or, On education*. New York: Basic Books, p. 40.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Froese, Katrin (2001). Beyond Liberalism: The Moral Community of Rousseau's Social Contract. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 34(3), p. 580.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

patriotism itself becomes a religious practice of the republic.¹⁵⁴ In so doing, it occupies the heart of republicanism and acquires a very significant position. Through civil religion, citizens obtain the appropriate character as a result of which they will get into civic engagement as compatriots. Hence, civil religion reflects what Tocqueville calls “habits of the heart,” what Machiavelli calls good laws, and what Rousseau calls *moeurs*.¹⁵⁵

II.II Molding Citizens: Rousseau’s Patriotism and “Civil Religion”

Social contract and civil laws guide citizens to virtuous actions. However, it is only one part of the story. In the other part, social contract requires virtuous citizens.¹⁵⁶ In other words, a genuine contract requires virtuous citizens, whereas it is also this contract that makes citizens virtuous. To solve this dilemma, Rousseau asks how citizens can be virtuous. The answer resides in Rousseau’s conception of patriotism as a sentiment: “Do we want people to be virtuous? Let us begin then by making them love their country.”¹⁵⁷ But this time another question arises: “how can they love it?”¹⁵⁸ Rousseau answers this question from two different angles: 1) “Let the homeland...show itself as the common mother of all citizens;”¹⁵⁹ and more importantly 2) as a state, make “each citizen have a religion that causes him to love his duties.”¹⁶⁰

Through an instrumental reasoning, Rousseau thinks that if a citizen cannot enjoy civil welfare; that is, if her life, liberty, and property depend on the mercy of

¹⁵⁴ Sezer, Devrim (2012). *Çoğulluk ve Politika: Rousseau, Arendt, Cumhuriyetçilik*, p. 19.

¹⁵⁵ Oldfield, Adrian (1998). “Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World.” In Ershon Shafir (ed.), *The Citizenship Debates*. London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 87.

¹⁵⁶ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p.218.

¹⁵⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 122.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 226.

powerful masters, then the word “country” can only have ridiculous meaning for her.¹⁶¹ Therefore, the first condition for citizens to love their country is to provide them with goods and opportunities, as well as liberty, to meet their needs and satisfy their private interests. For him, it is not against the principle that the common good must have primacy over private interests of individuals, because he asserts that the welfare of each citizen can be a common cause as much as the welfare of the state.¹⁶² Above all, the state must respect the inviolable rights of all citizens. In this respect, he suggests that “if someone were to tell us that it is good that one person should perish for all, I would admire this saying when it comes from the lips of a worthy and virtuous patriot who dedicates himself willingly and out of duty to die for the welfare of his country. But if this means that the government is permitted to sacrifice an innocent person for the welfare of the multitude, I hold this maxim to be one of the most despicable that tyranny has ever invented...”¹⁶³ Therefore, if a state wishes its citizens to love their country, the first thing it must do is to create a proper environment in which they can enjoy the advantages of being a member of that particular state. In other words, individuals should have the consciousness of the benefits that they obtain by being a part of the state. The best way to do it is to reserve them enough positions in the public administration so that “they can feel that they are at home.”¹⁶⁴

On the other hand, this instrumental reasoning to love one’s country does not alone keep citizens loyal to the state; it should be supplemented by intrinsic reasons of sentiment.¹⁶⁵ To this end, Rousseau argues that *amour propre* should be cultivated, and put under the command of reason so that it can serve for the good purposes, rather than cause corruption. He states that citizens must live “under the eyes of their compatriots, seeking public approbation.”¹⁶⁶ He states that providing citizens with everything they

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁶⁵ Barnard, Frederick M. (1984). Patriotism and Citizenship in Rousseau. *The Review of Politics*, 46(2), p. 244.

¹⁶⁶ Rousseau in Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 94.

need and expect them to become good citizens is not sufficient; they must be taught how to be virtuous citizens. And virtue in citizens can only be created by the sentiment of love of country: “the greatest support for public authority lies in the hearts of citizens.”¹⁶⁷ Here, *amour propre* as self-love comes into picture together with taught virtue and becomes “the most heroic of all the passions.”¹⁶⁸ Through social institutions, the state must teach citizens to change *amour propre* into a passion for the well-being of a state and compatriots. In this respect, public education plays a significant role in shaping citizens.¹⁶⁹

However, the most essential part of shaping citizens is to change the tone and content of the religion that citizens believe. Indeed, Rousseau’s thought on religion is where his patriotism gets crystallized. In the beginning of the chapter, titled “On Civil Religion” in *On the Social Contract*, he argues that “at first men had no other kings but the gods, and no other government than a theocratic one.”¹⁷⁰ Hence, Rousseau states that there is no state in history, establishment of which is not based on religion. From this point of view, he asserts that social spirit, shared feelings and solidarity that a republic relies on, cannot be provided solely by laws and institutions; even life-long civic education can be insufficient unless it is reinforced by a religious education.¹⁷¹ Therefore, in Rousseau, we see the rise of patriotism to the level of religion.

Rousseau defines civil religion as “a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it belongs to the sovereign to establish, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject.”¹⁷² In this sense, civil religion diverges from other religions. In general, he asserts that there are two types of religions, namely the religion of man and citizen.

¹⁶⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 119.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁶⁹ Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 95.

¹⁷⁰ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 220.

¹⁷¹ Sezer, Devrim (2012). *Çoğulluk ve Politika: Rousseau, Arendt, Cumhuriyetçilik*, pp. 18-19.

¹⁷² Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 226.

Whereas the former is merely about the eternal duties of morality, based on the Gospel, and thus called “natural divine law,” the latter belongs to particular countries in the sense that it has its own dogmas, rituals, its own gods, and cult prescribed by laws.¹⁷³ Apart from these religions, there is the third kind of religion which Rousseau describes as the most bizarre. In this religion, people are given two sets of legislation, two leaders, and two homelands which cause confusions and contradictory duties among people.¹⁷⁴ An example of this bizarre type is Roman Christianity, which is “so bad that it is a waste of time to amuse oneself by proving it.”¹⁷⁵

These two sorts of religions, that of men and citizen, are good in nature but they have some faults. First of all, the religion of citizen, whose rules are coded as positive divine law, is a decent one in uniting citizens around a divine cult, with a sacred homeland for which dying means being martyrs. In this religion, serving for one’s country is the same as service to the God. Therefore, Rousseau describes this religion of a particular country as a sort of theocracy in which disobedience to laws makes a citizen nothing but impious.¹⁷⁶ These features of this religion are good in terms of uniting citizens around a single purpose. However, it is also bad for the very same reasons making it good: it is based on errors and lies that deceive people, and make them believe in superstitions. It gets even worse under a tyrannical rule because it is so exclusive that people become intolerant and bloodthirsty.¹⁷⁷

Second, the religion of men, which Rousseau means Christianity not of our day but of the Gospel, is good in nature as well. It is the true religion, which makes people acknowledge each other as brothers, and thus children of the same God. However, this religion has no affairs in the world. It detaches the love of country from hearts of citizens and ties it to the homeland in the other world. In this sense, since it has nothing to do with this world, believers of this religion would not care for the well-being, and arrange their lives according to the rules of God and heaven. If a war breaks out,

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 223.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 224.

citizens unquestionably go to war but not to fight, but to die since they have no passion for victory. Hence, Christianity in its pure form leads to indifference to the earthly affairs such as prosperity and safety of the citizens, and because of this, it makes citizens vulnerable to seizure of public authority, since “in this vale of sorrows, what does it matter whether we are free men or serfs?”¹⁷⁸ Therefore, Christianity also fails to create virtuous citizens who feel love of their countries.

After that, Rousseau presents us his own conception of religion. This religion is designed to unite citizens in love of country and loyalty to it, and create respect for the laws and institutions of a state.¹⁷⁹ Its dogmas are simple, few in number, clearly and well written that requires no explanations. These positive dogmas prescribe “the happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked; the sanctity of the social contract and of the laws.”¹⁸⁰ As a negative dogma, Rousseau excludes intolerance. He points out the fact that there can no longer be any exclusive national religion. For this reason, citizens must tolerate each other as long as their dogmas are not against the duties of their citizenship.

Thus, against Christian teaching that harms citizens’ passion of liberty, Rousseau envisages a civil religion which would reinforce social bonds in the society and loyalty to the laws and institutions of republic. It will make citizens love their duties, and render them “good citizens.” Rousseau’s civil religion is a secular religion of a nation which gathers citizens around one general will and common good, and thus, guarantees free way of life.¹⁸¹ Therefore, civil religion can be considered as the codification of his patriotism; he sets down principles and dogmas on how to become virtuous citizens who feel love of country. Hence, in Rousseau, patriotism itself becomes the civil religion: citizens who believe in this religion are all but compatriots. Those who claim to acknowledge the rules and dogmas of civil religion but do not act in this way, however, should be put to death for they lied before the laws, which is the

¹⁷⁸ Dent, Nicholas J. H. (2005). *Rousseau*. London: Routledge, p. 173.

¹⁷⁹ Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 95.

¹⁸⁰ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 226.

¹⁸¹ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 221.

worst crime for them.¹⁸² In this sense, Rousseau sacrifices plurality and opposition for the sake of a sense of belonging and unity in the community; his republicanism turns into a community life in pathologies.¹⁸³

II.III Conclusion: From Machiavelli to Rousseau

Although we can find many differences and divergences between the republicanism of Machiavelli and Rousseau, in terms of their conception of patriotism, we can rather find much continuity. Unlike Machiavelli, who partly instrumentalizes citizens' participation to political life not only for the common good but also to secure their private interests, political participation becomes a keystone of Rousseau's republicanism. Rousseau's republic depends on the participation of virtuous citizens. Again, while Machiavelli's republicanism allows for pursuit of private interests, albeit in the framework of laws, Rousseau's republicanism underlines the unity of individual opinions around a single general will.

However, when it comes to the question of "why citizens should love their *patria*," they more or less give the same answer. For Machiavelli, citizens should love their country partly because they can live a prosperous life or become powerful only in the community that they belong; and partly because if they do not love and protect the liberty of their country, they cannot enjoy their freedom either. This question finds a similar answer from Rousseau's republicanism. For Rousseau, first of all, a country must give its citizens a reason to make them love their country. It must at least provide them with something that they cannot find or attain outside of the country. However, he further suggests that citizens should love their country because they are united with it as its sovereign and subject at the same time. They enjoy their moral freedom and autonomy inside the community that they belong, and when they go outside of it, they find themselves in the state of nature. Moreover, if they do not feel love of country, but obsessed with the primitive instinct of *amour propre*, they eventually find themselves in a new state of nature caused by corruption and disorder. Therefore, their pursuit of good

¹⁸² Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). *Basic Political Writings*, p. 226.

¹⁸³ Sezer, Devrim (2012). *Çoğulluk ve Politika: Rousseau, Arendt, Cumhuriyetçilik*, p. 19.

life must merge with the good of the country so that they can correspond to their both moral and material need.

As for the question of “how citizens can love their *patria*,” Machiavelli and Rousseau also follow similar lines by bringing up a secularized form of religion, which teaches citizens how to become virtuous. We can observe that both thinkers are against the Christian teachings. And both of them suggest the virtues of the ancients to include in the religious teaching. However, on this matter, there is a slight difference between them: whereas Machiavelli asserts that religious teaching will instill in people a fear of God as well as love of *patria*, Rousseau’s civil religion is “a deliberate construct” which is “designed to encourage ‘sentiments of sociability’” rather than fear.¹⁸⁴

In conclusion, although there are many thinkers contributing to debates in republicanism, such as Harrington, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville, I briefly examined the republicanism of Machiavelli and Rousseau, because as I will try to reveal in the next part, the return of republicanism as a new solution to societal problems, was conducted by the contemporary thinkers who are deeply inspired by them. By reexamining their works with a new method, they claim to prove that republicanism is still a valid suggestion that deserves attention.

In addition to this, there is another reason for selecting these philosophers rather than others. The main purpose of this paper is not to trace the origins and development of republicanism. If it was so, I would have to dwell on almost each republican thinker; because the historical journey of republicanism, from ancient Greece to Italy, from Italy to the Netherlands, England, and France, and eventually to the New World, requires more careful exploration. On the other hand, I examined Machiavelli to reveal the secular foundations of patriotism in the works of one of the first “Renaissance men.” Next, I investigated the contributions of Rousseau, “one of the last and latest Renaissance men,”¹⁸⁵ to republican patriotism, foundations of which were laid down by Machiavelli. In so doing, I aimed to show that although we can observe sharp divergences among philosophers on republicanism, when it comes to patriotism, they

¹⁸⁴ Honohan, Iseult (2002). *Civic republicanism*, p. 95.

¹⁸⁵ Riley, Patrick (2002). Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In S. Nedler (ed.), *A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Company, p. 587.

tell us similar things; because for them, whatever their republic looks like, it requires patriotism for its viability.

III. Revival of Republicanism: The Cambridge School and Viroli's Patriotism

From the nineteenth century onwards, modern republicanism lost its influence in political philosophy. One of the reasons for disappearance of republicanism is the ever-alluring power of liberalism *vis-à-vis* the former in terms of responding the demands of the nineteenth-century commercial and democratic society. This “formidable success” of liberalism, as Viroli puts it, brought it an autonomous and superior position against republicanism.¹⁸⁶ It even went further with the liberal critiques attacking on republican conception of freedom that republicanism, in the end, became devalued due to its alleged position, seemingly being against freedom of individuals.¹⁸⁷ Another reason for the decline of republican tradition from political philosophy is the rise of Marxism starting from the first half of the twentieth century. Against individualism and utilitarianism of liberal school, Marxism used the concepts of “collective responsibility,” “common interest” and “virtuous citizenship,” which were some of the components of modern republicanism.¹⁸⁸ In this process, while republicanism lost its place in political philosophy, and liberalism established its domination; republican notion of patriotism was also subsumed in the boundaries of nation-states, and merged with the arguments of nationalism.

However, in the second half of the twentieth century, through in-depth and careful studies of historians and philosophers from the Cambridge School, republicanism gained a new momentum. In the 1960s, some leading thinkers of the Cambridge School, such as Pocock, Skinner, Dunn, and Laslett, developed a new method to analyze historical concepts within their social and political environment. They rejected making textual analyses of the works of philosophers in history. Instead, they put these works into a context by asking how and why those philosophers wrote such things; and why they used such language or concepts. Hence, they call themselves *contextualists* in the sense that they try to find out how and why concepts, which

¹⁸⁶ Viroli, Maurizio (2002). *Republicanism*, p. 57.

¹⁸⁷ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 4.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

philosophers of the past invented and are still in use today, were developed in those times.

The invention of contextualism motivated some scholars to reconsider the works of ancient and early modern thinkers such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. They also reexamined the classical republican thought to find a cure for the pathologies of the twentieth-century. Particularly, and maybe surprisingly, they looked for the meaning of liberty in the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes, who had usually been considered as the theorists of the absolute state. Skinner, for example, tried to find a republican conception of freedom in his book, *Liberty before Liberalism*; sought for Hobbes's idea of liberty in *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*; and contextualized Machiavelli in his famous work, *Machiavelli – A Very Short Introduction*. Similarly, Pocock investigated the republican spirit in Machiavelli in *Machiavellian Moment*. Viroli explored Machiavelli's republicanism and patriotism in *Machiavelli and Machiavelli's God*. He also applied the same method to Rousseau's political philosophy in *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the 'Well-Ordered Society'*. And finally, Philip Pettit, another member of the Cambridge School, wrote a book, titled *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, which reconceptualized and reconstructed the idea of liberty based on the republican tradition in an analytic and compact way. In the book, Pettit defined liberty as *non-domination* as opposed to Isaiah Berlin's definitions of negative and positive liberty. Through this "new but republican" definition of freedom, republicanism regained its chair, which had been empty for a long time, in the room of political philosophy.

III.I The Cambridge School: The Idea of Freedom as Non-Domination

"Consider the fact that so great a political philosopher as Jean Bodin believed there to be witches in league with the devil. Or the fact that so great a student of nature as Aristotle believed that bodies change quality whenever they change place."¹⁸⁹ In times of Jean Bodin, the *truth* or *reality* was that there were witches. Similarly, Aristotle believed that quality of bodies change whenever people change their places. In our day, however, these beliefs do not sound *rational* although they were perfectly rational in the

¹⁸⁹ Skinner, Quentin (2002). *Visions of Politics. Volume 1, Regarding Method*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 28.

past. Nevertheless, we still consider that Bodin and Aristotle were great philosophers, because we select what we find rational in their philosophy and skip the rest. If one asks why we find rational the things that we select in Aristotle and Bodin as rational, we give *our* causal explanations. In order to explain why we find the rest irrational, again we come up with that conclusion from our causal explanations; and while we skip the things we find irrational in their teachings, we also skip their causal explanations.

Starting from the 1960s, this approach to history of philosophy seemed inappropriate by some of the most prominent historians from the Cambridge School. They came up with a new method for historical explorations with a justification that “if the belief proves to be one that it was rational for the agent to have held, we shall need to investigate the conditions of that achievement.”¹⁹⁰ In doing so, members of the Cambridge School do not merely investigate and examine historical texts as a part of history of thought; rather, they problematize political life by considering that historical texts, which are parts of history of politics, are also “political actions” which had an impact on the political life of their inditement.¹⁹¹

The intellectual background of the methodology of the Cambridge School was very deep but historians of the school were mainly influenced by the philosophy of history developed by Robin Collingwood, and speech act theory of John Austin.¹⁹² Based on these two dimensions of their method, the Cambridge School historians put ideas and concepts into context with a purpose that they could explain the present from the past. For this purpose, Pocock and Skinner returned to the texts of Hobbes and Machiavelli with a new question in mind: considering, for example, Machiavelli’s *The Prince* as a conclusion, how did Machiavelli come to this conclusion? In this way, against the idea that concepts should be carried to a sphere beyond time and space to analyze (*textualism*), they explore such texts in their historicity. The reason for this is that while analyzing texts beyond time and space, we understand the concepts that we

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁹¹ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 78.

¹⁹² Kulkarni, Mangesh (2012). Text and Context: Methodological Debates in the Study of Political Thought. *CAS Occasional Paper Series: No. 5*, p. 7.

encounter from today's perspective. However, their meaning can be different from what we understand from these concepts.

With this methodology in mind, a thinker influenced by the Cambridge School, Philip Pettit, revitalized the tradition of republicanism. The essential contribution of Pettit to the republican tradition is his (re)conceptualization of republican liberty. He points out that republican conception of liberty relies on three axioms: "the reality of personal choice; the possibility of alien control; and the positionality of alien control."¹⁹³ Based on this framework, against Isaiah Berlin's two conceptions of freedom, he comes up with another definition of freedom, which he claims is ultimately republican: "freedom as non-domination." He argues that Berlin's conceptualizations – freedom as absence of interference, and freedom as self-mastery – amount to different meanings.¹⁹⁴ By taking elements from each conceptualization of Berlin, Pettit defines liberty as "non-domination," which means "absence of mastery."¹⁹⁵

According to Berlin, the difference between liberal conception of liberty and republican one is that whereas the former means negative freedom as absence of interference, the latter underlines positive freedom as being master of oneself.¹⁹⁶ In this sense, liberal freedom emphasizes that as long as individuals have freedom of choice in their actions, that is, as long as their actions and choices are not interfered by any outside force, then individuals enjoy their negative freedom. On the other hand, republican freedom derives its meaning from the wish of individuals to become their own masters. In other words, the republican conception of freedom looks for the factors or external forces that direct individuals to make their choices in a particular way. In this respect, Berlin argues that liberal and positive conceptions of freedom are originally

¹⁹³ Pettit, Philip (2008). Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems. In C. Laborde & J. Maynor (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 104.

¹⁹⁴ Pettit, Philip (2002). *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁹⁶ Berlin, Isaiah (1969). Two Concepts of Liberty. In Isaiah Berlin (ed.), *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 8.

not totally different from each other; but they have just developed in divergent directions.¹⁹⁷ In this sense, Berlin's classification of positive and negative freedom looks very similar to Benjamin Constant's conceptualizations as "liberty of ancients" and "liberty of moderns."¹⁹⁸

Pettit argues that self-mastery and non-interference are not the same things. However, one can still develop a third alternative out of these definitions of liberty. Based on Berlin's two conceptions, he reconceptualizes liberty as "non-domination." Although this conceptualization takes elements from Berlin's two conceptions of liberty, Pettit suggests that non-domination neither means self-mastery, nor non-interference.¹⁹⁹ To clarify what he means by these things, he gives two examples. First, he argues that domination does not mean interference because, for example, one can be a slave owned by a master, and dominated by her without being exposed to her interference. Hence, domination can take place without interference. Second, a person may not be a slave but he may be exposed to interference by others.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, liberty as non-domination avoids these possibilities, and he finds this "best alternative" in the classical republican tradition, which he studies through the texts of Skinner, Price, and Priestley, carrying him through history up to Machiavelli and Harrington.

Following the Cambridge School of thought, which defines republican liberty as non-domination, Viroli, by using the same method with the Cambridge School historians, looks for the *meaning* of patriotism in the ancient and early modern texts. His main objective with this task is to reveal that patriotism and nationalism are different attachments. Travelling into the pre-national state formation, he concludes that love of *patria* actually means love of the *particular* free way of life provided by the republic, since "*patria* and liberty part company."²⁰¹ However, although patriotism and

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Constant, Benjamin (1988). *Political Writings*. Oxford: Cambridge University Press; Pettit, Philip (2002). *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, p. 18.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

²⁰¹ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 45.

nationalism are different attachments, it is still a “formidable opponent” for nationalism because they compete on the same ground of passions and particularity, and with the same method, which is rhetoric.²⁰²

III.II Viroli’s Patriotism: “Love of Liberty”

Viroli in his *For Love of Country* criticizes the common opinion that patriotism and nationalism are similar and indistinguishable attachments. He seeks to distinguish these two concepts through a historical analysis of patriotism. Beyond this, he tries to bring “patriotism as an antidote to nationalism.”²⁰³ In this two-fold argument, that patriotism is different from and an antidote to nationalism, lies the claim that “love of country” and “loyalty to the nation” are two different attachments: whereas the former has been used for centuries in order to reinforce a love for political institutions in which citizens sustain their liberty, the latter came into being in the late eighteenth-century Europe to defend and strengthen the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of a people.²⁰⁴ However, this does not mean that the only concern of patriotism is the liberty that citizens enjoy in a republic while the only concern of nationalism is to protect the unity of a people; these are indeed common concerns of both patriotism and nationalism. The difference stands on which one gives priority over what. According to Viroli, the primary value of patriots is the liberty framed and provided by the republic, while nationalism emphasizes spiritual and cultural unity of a people.²⁰⁵ However, as I will discuss later, this difference set by Viroli oscillates between universalism and cultural belonging or attachment, and remains unclear.

Although Viroli aims to read patriotism in the republican sense as a virtue rather than a vice, he on the other hand admits that love of country and civic action for the

²⁰² Ibid., p. 8.

²⁰³ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 8; Barnard, Frederick M. (1997). Patriotism as an Antidote to Nationalism. [Review of the book, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, by Maurizio Viroli]. *The Review of Politics*, 59(1), p. 141; Yack, Bernard (1998). Can Patriotism Save Us From Nationalism? Rejoinder to Viroli, p. 204.

²⁰⁴ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 1.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

common good can lead to dangerous outcomes as well. In other words, patriotic love and passion may not create a pursuit of life on the string of common liberty under the republic, but it may turn to a love of monarchy or an authoritarian regime.²⁰⁶ Hence, he underlines that people should find a way to decide the *right* love and passion for country, and choose the *right* common good to pursue.²⁰⁷ To do this, he suggests that we re-examine the works of republican political thinkers who describe love of country as love of common liberty and the institutions under which it is sustained.²⁰⁸ Out of a grasp of prominent thinkers of republicanism in the ancient and modern history, he defines patriotism as “a particularistic love, as it is love of the common liberty of a particular people, sustained by institutions that have a particular history which has for that people a particular meaning, or meanings, that inspire and are in turn sustained by a particular way of life and culture.”²⁰⁹ Since this love is particularistic, Viroli asserts, it by no means implies that it is exclusive; it can easily pass beyond national boundaries and translates into solidarity.²¹⁰ The language of patriotism, which Viroli admits that it is weak when compared to the language of nationalism, should be patriotism of liberty and republic; if one wants to challenge the particularistic language of nationalism, for Viroli, we need another such language.²¹¹

In his historical examination of modern patriotism, Viroli goes back to the ancients to find its legacy. He looks at Greek and Roman sources in which patriotism had religious and political meanings. In terms of religious understanding of ancient patriotism, love of country meant devotion to *terra patria*, land of the fathers, a sacred soil through which one finds its property, faith, security, and laws.²¹² Therefore, *terra patria* in the ancient Greece and Rome was of critical place in the construction of a

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 17.

²¹² Ibid., p. 18.

person's identity. It is the place where a person finds her Gods, faith, and culture. Since this form of patriotism has a strong religious aspect, it requires certain activities to show devotion. In this respect, it can hardly be explained by love in a passive sense but an unquestionable, strict and strong devotion to the soil through which a person identifies herself. As Viroli explains, she must "love it as she loves his religion, and obey it as she obeys his Gods. She must give herself to it entirely. It is a demanding love that admits no distinctions, no conditions."²¹³

However, rather than dwelling on religious patriotism, and despite similarities and connections, Viroli concentrates on political patriotism, which he seeks to separate and distinguish from the religious one. Based on the texts of ancient Roman thinkers, such as Cicero, Sallust, Livy, Quintilian, and Augustine, he equates *patria* with *respublica*.²¹⁴ He stresses that political patriotism – the love of *patria* – is a political virtue since the love that citizens establish with their country is a rational one.²¹⁵ This form of patriotism gives us a feeling that if the country is corrupted, or if there are injustices in the country, the individual's life also gets impoverished. Therefore, what citizens ought to do is to fight against injustices and recover the good quality of life under the republic.²¹⁶ This understanding of political and republican patriotism, which I call "patriotism of ancients," is what Viroli aims to recover and bring into our times. He underlines that among many definitions and conceptualizations of patriotism, we must rely on the Roman republican notion that prioritize the common good as liberty under

²¹³ Ibid., p. 19.

²¹⁴ In his book, Viroli gives various examples from the texts of these philosophers of the ancient and medieval era. From *Tusculanae disputationes* of Cicero, he shows how Cicero links *patria* with liberty and laws. He also addresses Sallust's construction of *patria* and liberty against oligarchic government in *De coniuratione Catilinae*. Based on some passages in Livy's *Ab urbe condita*, he quotes a report of an oration speaking of sacred armies, *patria*, liberty, and lustral gods. From Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* he emphasizes the distinction between *natio* as the customs of people, and *patria* as the laws and institutions of the city. Finally, from Augustine's *De civitate dei*, he underlines how republican equation of *patria*, republic, and common good is condensed and transmitted to the Middle Ages. See: Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 19.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

the republic. Hence, his understanding of the common good is the liberty and institutions that foster republican freedom.

Viroli's definition of republican patriotism, which emphasizes the love of liberty provided by a particular republic, can be read as a model of living together for a heterogeneous society sharing the same land. Unlike a liberal/cosmopolitan standpoint, republican patriotism, the one that Viroli describes, *recognizes* particularities such as religion, ethnicity, and culture, but it does not suggest allegiance or special affection to any of these pre-political identities. Instead, it suggests a political perspective by supporting a way of life in which freedom prevails.²¹⁷ In this respect, it is also distinguished from nationalism since the language of republican patriotism does not take pre-political values as a reference point.²¹⁸ In other words, whereas republican patriotism is a pre-national and political understanding of allegiance to a country, nationalism requires attachment to pre-political values.

Viroli claims that we can observe in the intellectual context of the Italian city-republics that the classical Roman understanding of *patria* was fully recovered, and it constituted the core of the modern republican language of patriotism.²¹⁹ In the literary texts of the Italian writers, *patria* as a free city regains its moral and existential value.²²⁰ However, it was in the works of Machiavelli that patriotism becomes "a kind of love that he would like to see flourishing in the hearts of his compatriots."²²¹ In this respect, Viroli reads Machiavelli's *virtù* as his patriotism, which means a republican sense of love of common liberty.²²² Therefore, what Machiavelli means, when he says that a republic requires virtuous citizens, is that he wants to see compatriots serving with the sentiment of love, which is for the *patria*.

²¹⁷ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 290.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 24.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 25.

²²¹ Ibid., p. 31.

²²² Ibid.

After Machiavelli, Viroli also examines the works of Rousseau. He argues that if we want to have a grasp of what Rousseau means by the concept of virtue, “we must remember that for him, too, *patrie* means above all else the common liberty.”²²³ Through Rousseau’s texts, such as *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, *Social Contract*, and *Émile*, he tries to find connections between love of country and love of liberty. To this end, he puts Rousseau’s works into context by comparing the language that he uses with his contemporaries and the political events of his time. In this respect, Viroli suggests that Rousseau is a true citizen and a true patriot of Geneva, who gave up his citizenship; because he felt that the *patrie* he loved did not exist anymore.²²⁴ Indeed, Geneva was still there with its people, culture, language, laws and institutions; but as Viroli suggests, Rousseau left his country because there was no longer republic and liberty.²²⁵

For Viroli, Rousseau was one of the last intellectuals talking about patriotism in its pre-national sense. After him, the language of patriotism started to be relegated by the language of nationalism, although it achieved to survive in the language of some intellectuals, and people who were seeking for rights and emancipation in their societies.²²⁶ Since republican patriotism has lost its eminence due to the strength of nationalist discourses, he then looks for how to bring back this old version of patriotism against nationalism in our day. He points out that there are good studies that historically and theoretically important in terms of reconstructing the language of patriotism without nationalism; but he suggests that “more work needs to be done; the search is unfinished.”²²⁷

One of the examples that Viroli gives for these works is his “compatriot,” “Italian anti-fascist martyr,” Carlo Roselli. By reexamining Roselli’s works, he comes to the conclusion that he clearly distinguishes patriotism from nationalism: “He identified the former with claims for liberty based on respect for the rights of other

²²³ Ibid., p. 82.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 84.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 140.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 161.

peoples; the second with politics of aggrandizement pursued by reactionary regimes.”²²⁸ Another example that he gives for a rediscovery and reworking of the language of patriotism is Simone Weil’s *L’Enracinement*, which she wrote in 1943, while she was working for Free France in London. Viroli explains that Weil looked for the possibilities of a powerful reinterpretation of patriotism that would come to mean liberty and compassion with a cultural and spiritual rootedness, which is at the same time exempt from the language of nationalism, “turning love of country into blind identification of pride for the uniqueness of our own nation.”²²⁹

Finally, Viroli asserts that one of the most significant contributions to his idea of reinstating the republican patriotism against nationalism is from Habermas’s analysis of national identity and citizenship. Viroli explains that in Germany, nationalism prevailed over republican spirit and even turned into racism that justified the Holocaust. Until 1945, the concept of nation referred to the unity and pure homogeneity of German people, which led to “the expulsion or confinement of the enemies of the people (*Voxsfremde*): social democrats, Catholics, ethnic minorities, and then Jews, democratic radicals, the left, intellectuals, and so on.”²³⁰ Hence, against this conception of nationalism, Viroli remarks, Habermas comes up with “patriotism of the Constitution” (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), which ties patriotism or loyalty to “the universalistic political principles of liberty and democracy embodied in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.”²³¹

Viroli states that Habermas separates his constitutional patriotism from republican tradition for he thinks that the intellectual tradition of republicanism derives from Aristotle that regards citizenship primarily in terms of “membership in a self-governing ethical and cultural community.”²³² Therefore, for Habermas, republicanism considers citizenship as integration of parts to the community to the extent that each individual can develop his personal and social identity only in these particular traditions

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 162.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 163.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 169.

²³¹ Ibid., pp. 169-170.

²³² Ibid., p. 170.

and political institutions; and thus, in highly pluralistic societies, this theory of citizenship cannot work and offer a ground for patriotism that would fit for national citizens.²³³ Nevertheless, Viroli claims that that Habermas finds the intellectual source of republicanism in Aristotle is a “gross historical error” he “probably” borrows from Charles Taylor, because modern republican theories of citizenship mostly appeals to Roman republican authors, rather than Aristotle.²³⁴ For the Roman thinkers, republicanism did not consider citizenship as integration to the ethical and cultural community, but obtaining and maintaining civil and political rights as a member of a republic; and republic is, after all, a political community that enables its citizens to live in justice and freedom.²³⁵

On the other hand, according to Viroli, although Habermas does not identify himself as republican, and although he criticizes republicanism from his own but wrong standpoint, Viroli claims that because of this misunderstanding, Habermas is not aware that his constitutional patriotism is also a kind of republican patriotism: “Habermas’s *Verfassungspatriotismus* does not break at all with republican tradition; it is instead a new version of it.”²³⁶ Moreover, with a “one singular clearly identifiable” definition of republicanism in mind,²³⁷ Viroli does not seem to consider Charles Taylor as republican; but he thinks that Habermas *is* a republican thinker.²³⁸ Hence, he suggests that beyond all the shortcomings of Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism, it is a version of republican patriotism, albeit unknowingly. But he also claims that

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Viroli thinks that Charles Taylor makes a wrong conceptualization of republican freedom. Taylor explains that freedom in republicanism does not mean negative liberty; rather it means the opposite of despotism. Contrary to this argument, Viroli suggests, by drawing from Livy, Machiavelli, and Rousseau, that “republican theorists place the highest value on liberty understood as ‘negative’ liberty under the shield of just laws.” See: Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 171.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ “...which is in fact false.” See: Vincent, Andrew (2002). *Nationalism and Particularity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 124.

²³⁸ Ibid.

Habermas's constitutional patriotism should put more emphasis on stronger ties with particular history and culture, and thus, with a particular identity – but with a hoarse voice to avoid a loss of political liberty – because without these particular values, “universal political principles cannot live and survive.”²³⁹

III.III Conclusion: Love of Liberty

Viroli's definition of republican patriotism as “love of liberty” draws from a *contextualist* method introduced by the Cambridge School historians. He applies the same method to regenerate the idea of patriotism as a model for today's world, which therefore sounds archaic and in some respects anachronistic. To this end, he returns to the patriotic sentences of the classical and modern republican tradition, particularly of Livy, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. He also compares these texts with political events and contemporaries of these thinkers. Reinforced by the works of the Cambridge School, he reinterprets classical and modern republican thinkers in such a way that their conceptualizations of patriotism can be revitalized and brought to this time.

Engaging in a struggle with the language of nationalism, Viroli seeks to suggest a coherent form of patriotism with as strong discourse as nationalism, and sources of which come from a pre-national context. He believes that patriotism written in the texts of modern republicanism can be the best alternative for nationalism, which societies must overcome. For him, republican patriotic discourse can do it because both nationalism and patriotism use the same method to “construct” a society, which is rhetoric, against purely rational arguments. Although nationalism and patriotism use two different languages, they use the same method. Besides, patriotism also tries to create bonds of solidarity, and it does not have any claim for universality: “It does not say to the Italians or the Germans who want to remain Italian or German, that they should think and act as citizens of the world, or lovers of an anonymous liberty and justice; it tells them that they should become Italian and German *citizens* committed to defend and improve their own republic, and to live freely in their own way, and it says

²³⁹ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 172.

so by using poignant images that refer to shared memories and by telling meaningful stories that give color and warmth to the ideal of the republic.”²⁴⁰

These words of Viroli easily catch the eyes of some scholars due to its similar sounds with *tamed* versions of nationalism. Viroli’s patriotism is selective in the sense that it tells citizens the *kind* and *strength* of the feelings that they should bear for their country. Citizens should love their country because it is their own country, in which they live freely; but not only for liberty that they enjoy in their particular country, should they also feel attachment to their culture and history, though without exaggerating this feeling. These ambivalent suggestions of Viroli raise critiques from some scholars who argue that Viroli’s conceptualization of patriotism only seems to suggest a tamed version of nationalism;²⁴¹ and he puts too much trust on the republican thinkers in terms of their so-called emphasis on liberty.²⁴²

In order to clarify what he means by republican patriotism, Viroli turns to Habermas’s constitutional patriotism. As I have written above, according to him, constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism; and Habermas is a republican thinker, though he does not know it. Departing from this point, in the next chapter, I will dwell on the concept of constitutional patriotism in order to verify my argument that indeed, Habermas’s constitutional patriotism is not only different but also against republican patriotism. To this end, I will first look at where Habermas originates his conceptualization. Then, I will briefly examine the contemporary debates of the concept, together with its development in the constitutional debates of Germany. Finally, I will set down the differences between Habermas’s constitutional patriotism and Viroli’s republican patriotism.

²⁴⁰ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, pp. 8-9.

²⁴¹ Xenos, N. (1998). Questioning Patriotism: Rejoinder to Viroli.

²⁴² Yack, Bernard (1998). Can Patriotism Save Us From Nationalism? Rejoinder to Viroli.

CHAPTER 3: ON CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

IV.I. Hegel: “Good Citizen” versus “Good Laws”

Hegel, the nineteenth century philosopher, is one of the most important but often neglected figures opening the way for Habermas’s constitutional patriotism. Although Habermas criticizes Hegel for various reasons, he is also influenced by him. He finds the solution to the problem of mutual existence of “right” and “good” in Hegel’s political philosophy, which Hegel discusses as a critique of Kant, which he finds too individualist, and Rousseau, who sounds too communitarian. Hence, Habermas argues that Hegel is the first philosopher who pointed out that we misunderstand the basic moral phenomenon whose task is to solve the tension between the principles of justice and solidarity.²⁴³ Hegel argues that the *right of individuals* in terms of their self-determination can be fulfilled only if they belong to ethical actuality, which is the state with good laws.²⁴⁴ Here, Hegel makes a critique of Rousseau, who aims to construct “good citizens” by giving them pedagogical training and indoctrinate them with “civil religion.” Hegel asserts that “those pedagogical experiments in removing people from the ordinary life of the present and bringing them up in the country have been futile, because one cannot successfully isolate people from the laws of the world.”²⁴⁵ Hence, he suggests that instead of making good citizens, they must be made citizens of “a state with good laws.”²⁴⁶ Only in this state, individuals can maintain their rights by becoming a citizen.

On the other hand, since they are citizens, they also have duties. For Hegel, it is a natural outcome of being a free citizen: “The slave can have no duties; only the free human being has these.”²⁴⁷ Therefore, *right* and *duty* merges in the identity of the

²⁴³ Habermas, Jürgen (1990). *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 200-201.

²⁴⁴ Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 196.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 197.

universal in the ethical life, since “a human being has rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights.”²⁴⁸ Thus, ethical life [*Sittlichkeit*] is the realm of citizens where individuals gain subjective freedom in the state. It is also the *idea of freedom*, knowledge and volition of which can be attained through self-consciousness.²⁴⁹ In this respect, Hegel distances himself from the social contractarians as well. He thinks that freedom is not something given to individuals; it has to be mediated.²⁵⁰ And self-consciousness is gained in the historical process through individuals’ interaction with the world.²⁵¹

By placing self-consciousness into a historical process, he gives history a teleological meaning. In this process, subjectivity and naturalness of people are educated so that people gain formal freedom and formal universality of knowledge.²⁵² Here, one of the most important concepts of Hegel comes into picture, which is *Bildung*. *Bildung* is a process of maturation through education and culture.²⁵³ According to Hegel, this education is also *liberation* and *work* towards a higher liberation, because through education, subjectivity and our immediate desires pass beyond its immediate and natural form to take the shape of universality.²⁵⁴ He suggests that it is a training of individuals to render them ethical by giving them a second (spiritual) nature, and making this nature *habitual*²⁵⁵: “it is the absolute transition to the infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical life.”²⁵⁶

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 189.

²⁵⁰ Avineri, Shlomo (1972). *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State*. London: Cambridge University Press, p. 130.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 132.

²⁵² Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 224.

²⁵³ Inwood, Michael J. (1999). *A Hegel Dictionary*. Great Britain: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, p. 37.

²⁵⁴ Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 225.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 195.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 225.

Although *Bildung* looks like Rousseau's pedagogical training to make "virtuous citizens" by teaching them to unite their wills with the general will, in fact, the purpose of Hegel's education is to make truly original citizens having subjective freedom. It aims to educate people to make their conducts in harmony with their will: "True originality, by which the [universal] thing is produced, requires true education, whereas false originality assumes tasteless forms which occur only to the uneducated."²⁵⁷ Hence, *Bildung* can be considered as a training of individuals to teach them how to use their reason to control their immediate desires.

In short, ethical life is the realm that individuals gain self-consciousness, as well as the consciousness that their concrete freedom can be actualized through personal knowledge and volition.²⁵⁸ As I have examined above, in the ethical life, people merge their rights with duties to others because they can only actualize their right as a citizen of a state with good laws. In this respect, according to Habermas, it is an implicit criticism of Hegel to those who consider justice and solidarity in an isolated way.²⁵⁹ It is also the starting point of Habermas's "discourse ethics," which replaces the famous categorical imperative of Kant, the *a priori* universal-moral principles valid for all humanity, by a procedure of moral argumentation.²⁶⁰

According to Habermas's discourse ethics, individuals develop their identities only through socialization (individuation through socialization). Mostly based on the theory of Mead and Hegel, he explains that individuation through socialization makes personal identities fragile and insecure, that is, this kind of identity formation requires mutual recognition. Therefore, individuals cannot create their identities when they live separately from their society; they are dependent on interpersonal relationships. Thus, they linguistically and behaviorally need to socialize with others to construct an

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 226.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 282-283.

²⁵⁹ Habermas, Jürgen (1990). *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 201.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 197.

intersubjectively shared lifeworld; and through communication with each other, individuals establish the lifeworld of a language community.²⁶¹

Since individuation through socialization makes people vulnerable, morality is appropriated to solve two tasks at once: 1) it emphasizes the inviolability of individuals establishing a rule for equal respect for human dignity; and 2) it must also secure the grounds for intersubjective relations, through which individuals gain mutual recognition.²⁶² In this respect, whereas the former signifies justice, the latter underlines the principle of solidarity, which means “the well-being of associated members of a community who intersubjectively share the same lifeworld.”²⁶³

Therefore, discourse ethics undermines Kantian categorical imperative for universal morality, and brings a procedure of moral argumentation in which individuals engage in communicative action without any inside or outside coercion, except “the force of the better argument.”²⁶⁴ His discourse ethics, which is a rule for engaging in argumentation with others, requires *universal pragmatics*, that is, individuals engaging in argumentation must have competences and skills to be able to communicate.²⁶⁵ Under these circumstances, he identifies three levels of rules of discourse: 1) every subject who has competence is allowed to take part in the discourse; 2) everyone is allowed to ask questions, make claims, and express attitudes; and 3) nobody is prevented by internal and external coercion except the force of the better argument.²⁶⁶

IV.II. Hegel’s Rational Patriotism

Bernstein is one of the first thinkers diagnosing a connection between Hegel’s patriotism and Habermas’s constitutional patriotism. He points out that the notion of political identity presented in Hegel’s *The Philosophy of Right* is encapsulated by the

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 199.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 200.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 198.

²⁶⁵ Edgar, Andrew (2006). *Habermas: the key concepts*. London: Routledge, p. 163.

²⁶⁶ Habermas, Jürgen (1990). *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 89.

notion of constitutional patriotism, which is adopted by Habermas.²⁶⁷ However, he does not explain in what respects Habermas's constitutional patriotism and that of Hegel overlap; he "terminates" his argument "in an aporia."²⁶⁸ In fact, a careful reading of Hegel's patriotism can easily reveal that at least his conceptualization is a clear break with the republican tradition. Moving from this point, one can also find continuity between Hegel's patriotism and Habermas's.

Firstly, Hegel's patriotism is a person's *subjective* substantiality, which is her political *disposition*, based on *truth* and a volition that has become *habitual*.²⁶⁹ This political disposition is mostly about *trust* or consciousness that citizens' interests are preserved in the interest and end of the state.²⁷⁰ In this respect, it can clearly be noticed that Hegel does not link patriotism with sentiments of love and passions, but to habituation, volition, and reason. Therefore, what he presents as patriotism is rather a synthesis of desire and reason. As I will examine below, Habermas also does not think that patriotism as a sentiment is an appropriate form of attachment, since it easily takes us to pre-political allegiances. In this sense, Habermas is following Hegel by grounding his constitutional patriotism in political terms rather than sentiments.

Secondly, Hegel thinks that political disposition must be based on concrete institutions rather than to an imagined or abstract notion. In this respect, he emphasizes that the objective reality of political disposition is the *political constitution*.²⁷¹ Similarly, Habermas asserts that patriotism should develop around the constitution, which reflects the political culture of a given society.²⁷²

²⁶⁷ Bernstein, J. M. (2001). Constitutional Patriotism and the Problem of Violence. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 39(1), p. 97.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 288.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

²⁷² Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, p. 500.

V. Habermas: A Citizen-Philosopher

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most influential intellectuals of the twentieth century. Having grown up during the Nazi period, he has developed political and social theories that were partly shaped by the events of his childhood. His academic life started when he became the research assistant of Theodor Adorno at the Frankfurt School. At the Frankfurt School, he was influenced by various scholars. Among them, for example, Plessner, taught him how to be a part of German culture and traditions while keeping a certain distance from them with a self-critical spirit.²⁷³ Therefore, keeping his critical distance, he could associate himself with the society he lives, as well as the global public sphere through his critiques toward his own society and citizens of the world; and for the very reason that he is considered “a citizen-philosopher.”²⁷⁴

Throughout his academic life in Frankfurt School and elsewhere, he became one of the most widely read philosophers of his time. Although he was taught in the Frankfurt School, he also became one of the strongest critiques of it. Habermas criticizes that the pessimistic views of Adorno and Horkheimer, the leading scholars of the Frankfurt School in the 1950s, on the project of modernity make them unable to differentiate between the pathologies of modernity and gains from it.²⁷⁵ Therefore, he believes that we still have to look into the Enlightenment project of modernity, for which Critical Theory can be used in order to uncover this ambivalent structure within it. To this end, he aims to reinstate the philosophy of Kant, who was largely neglected by the Frankfurt Scholars.²⁷⁶ In this respect, while he maintains his critical stand against liberalism; based on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, he suggests that we make a constitution out of international law together with normative cosmopolitan principles, previously proposed by Kant.

²⁷³ Habermas, Jürgen and Dews, Peter (1992). *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas*. London: Verso, p. 46.

²⁷⁴ Sezer, Devrim (2010). Yurттаş-Filozof Olarak Habermas: Kantçı Projenin Eleştirel Gücü. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 110(1), p. 47.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

In this paper, my intention is not to examine Habermas's political and social philosophy at length: rather, I will limit my discussion to his theory of constitutional patriotism. In this respect, I will start with a question: how does Habermas construct constitutional patriotism, which is supposed to provide a particular attachment together with a universal claim? In order to give an answer to this question, I will focus on his "co-originality thesis" in which he argues that liberal claims of human rights and republican claims to popular sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. They are equally original but they complement each other; "one is not possible without the other, but neither sets limits on the other."²⁷⁷ Then, I will continue with his idea of deliberative politics, which is different but still based on republican and liberal models.²⁷⁸

According to Habermas, pre-political attachments are no longer sufficient for political legitimation. After the French Revolution, nationalism became a very good source for the establishment of liberal democratic nation-states but the present situation reveals that nation-states cannot solve the problems posed by the global trade, communication, economic production, spread of technology and weapons, and ecological and military risks.²⁷⁹ He also argues that in today's more and more globalized world, we can no longer rely on the uniting force of ethnically based notion of citizenship; instead we suffer from a normative deficit of it.²⁸⁰ Therefore, he suggests that we find a way to establish a system in which citizens from various backgrounds will be able to communicate, and deliberate for democratic opinion and will-formation, which will be reflected in the procedural principles of constitution. Only in this way, "diverse forms of life can coexist equally" and it can be open to "impulses from new forms of life."²⁸¹ In this respect, constitutional patriotism, which is suggested by Habermas, is an alternative solution to the question of "how to live together."

²⁷⁷ Habermas, Jürgen (2001a). Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?. *Political Theory*, 29(6), p. 767.

²⁷⁸ Habermas, Jürgen (1998b). *The inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory*. In J. Habermas, C. Cronin, and P. De Greiff (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 239.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

²⁸¹ Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, p. 514.

This question finds several responses from different camps, such as liberals, communitarians, and republicans. Habermas's response, however, does not depend entirely on any of these camps; it takes elements from them. He suggests that citizens' attachment should not be based on a particular nation, but a constitution which underlines popular sovereignty and human rights.²⁸² In this sense, Kadiođlu describes Habermas' account of constitutional patriotism and constitutional citizenship as an attempt to break the ties between political attachment and nation. She points out that Habermas was seeking to find a new ground for citizenship in Germany, and to this end, he brought the idea of "constitutional citizens" instead of "national citizens."²⁸³ Constitutional patriotism in this approach serves as an umbrella term under which peoples from different origins and identities live together without being subjected to any particularistic discrimination in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion, or race. Yet, the concept of constitutional patriotism was not originally invented by Jürgen Habermas; he reintroduced the concept with his own terms into the current citizenship debates. Therefore, in the next part, I will explain how this concept came into being and being discussed by Habermas and others.

V.I. Development of Constitutional Patriotism

At first sight, the concept of constitutional patriotism sounds like an oxymoron which seeks to bring universality and particularity together. In this respect, Göztepe argues that it does not have any meaning either in semantics or in the terminology of law.²⁸⁴ She states that this concept was produced during citizenship debates in the Federal Republic of Germany in the name of "*Verfassungspatriotismus*."²⁸⁵ After the Second World War, people in the Federal Republic of Germany were very hesitant to mention about nationalism, which is the most powerful unifying ideology of the modern

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Kadiođlu, Ayşe (2009). Türkiye'de Vatandaşlığın Anatomisi. In F. Keyman, A. İçduygu, and B. Ulukan (eds.), *Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşıma ve Türkiye'de Vatandaşlık*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları: p. 127.

²⁸⁴ Göztepe, Ece (2004). Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve 'Gömen forumu' Örnekleri. In Meral Özbek (ed.), *Kamusal Alan*. İstanbul: Hill, pp. 321 – 340.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 321.

era. Hence, in the 1960s, scholarly debates were centered on the questions of how to keep the German state together, and how to establish institutions that would give people a sense of belonging to a political system. It was during these debates that a liberal-conservative jurist, Dolf Sternberger, for the first time, came up with the concept of “*Verfassungspatriotismus*” as an alternative to the destructive power of German nationalism.²⁸⁶ Drawing highly on Karl Jaspers, who called “the true German as world citizen,” Sternberger introduced the concept of *Staatsfreundschaft*, which means friendship towards the state, to create “a patriotic sentiment in the constitutional state.”²⁸⁷ Finally, on the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979, he suggested “constitutional patriotism” as the true form of attachment that would tie the German community together, and make them loyal to the democratic state.²⁸⁸

However, although this concept was brought into the literature by Sternberger, it was not created by him. Milfull explains that since 1949, the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany have been required by law to be “constitutional patriots,” which implies that people must be loyal to the constitution rather than the state.²⁸⁹ Therefore, constitutional patriotism was the concept used by the Federal Republic of Germany to hold its citizens together without the ideology of nationalism. It assumed that citizens, as the authors and addressees of the laws they create, must be loyal to the constitution, and protect the values that their constitution represented.²⁹⁰ Hence, constitutional patriotism of the post-war era was, at first, particular for the citizens of West Germany. It was not a universalist response to nationalism; it was only created as a form of

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 322.

²⁸⁷ Müller, J. Werner (2006). On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 1(5), p. 283.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Milful, John (2007). The Rebirth of an Oxymoron: The Genesis and Functions of ‘Constitutional Patriotism’. *Debatte*, 15(1), p. 108.

²⁹⁰ Göztepe, Ece (2004). Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve ‘Gömen forumu’ Örnekleri, p. 322.

political attachment, and a “supplement for particularity.”²⁹¹ The most prominent thinker and defender of this particular constitutional patriotism was Dolf Sternberger.

Müller explains that Sternberger’s idea of constitutional patriotism was based on Aristotelianism, Hannah Arendt’s republicanism, and a civic engagement based on reciprocity.²⁹² Although the history of patriotism is generally traced back to the Ancient Roman tradition, Sternberger stretches it back to Aristotelian writings, which do not link patriotism with nation but love of laws and liberties.²⁹³ It is because of this fact that current conceptions of constitutional patriotism are generally considered as a return to pre-national republicanism, which I will discuss later.²⁹⁴ However, although Sternberger’s account of constitutional patriotism claims to be different from nationalism, Göztepe argues that his understanding of “allegiance to constitution” fails to go beyond the assumption of one homogenous culture, and one German nation.²⁹⁵ Therefore, Sternberger’s constitutional patriotism does not bring a cure for the problems of the twentieth century, that is, it does not help to develop a project or model for creating a political unity in which peoples live together.²⁹⁶ Hence, although he sought to transcend the nation-state, his account of constitutional patriotism was heavily based on German *statism*.²⁹⁷

Sternberger’s description of constitutional patriotism is thus unable to eliminate particularistic notions of allegiance; it does not even aim to do so. He was mostly trying to eliminate those who are against the German constitution, and to avoid all forms of extremism within the country. Müller argues that what Sternberger suggests is a “protective constitutional patriotism” which draws a line between “friends and

²⁹¹ Müller, J. Werner (2006). *On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism*, p. 279.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 283.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Göztepe, Ece (2004). *Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve ‘Gömen forumu’ Örnekleri*, p. 322.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Müller, J. Werner (2006). *On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism*, p. 284.

enemies.”²⁹⁸ Protective type of constitutional patriotism was designed to fight against internal and external enemies through, if necessary, anti-democratic or authoritarian measures. In this sense, Müller explains that protective constitutional patriotism was associated with “militant democracy,”²⁹⁹ which puts “anti-democratic measures” to preserve the functioning of a democratic state.³⁰⁰ Therefore, constitutional patriotism in the Federal Germany was an effort to destroy fascist movements in the country; and to prevent communist movements from leaking into the country. In this respect, banning of the Nazi Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party in the 1950s are good examples which could be justified by protective constitutional patriotism of German “militant democracy.”³⁰¹

However, although this form of constitutional patriotism seems to have some negative aspects that I have discussed, it does have a very important merit. Constitutional patriotism in the Federal Republic of Germany merely aimed at preventing the rising of ethnic nationalism. Therefore, constitutional patriotism can also be regarded as a different projection of an idea of “good life.” It is much more inclusive and tolerant than ethnic nationalism. Moreover, it does not root the sense of belonging and allegiance to a particular culture, but to the liberal democratic constitution. It stands against the belief that one is born with a nationality and with certain characteristics of a particular nation; and instead, it brings the idea that one “chooses” to live within a

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 285.

²⁹⁹ “Militant democracy” is a concept which was first developed by Karl Loewenstein in 1937 against uncontrollable totalitarian and fascist movements in Europe. Loewenstein argues that democracies are incapable of fighting against these anti-democratic movements. Therefore, these movements must be stopped through political and legislative measures, such as closing off political parties and militias. For a more detailed discussion on militant democracy, see: Loewenstein, Karl (1937). Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I. *American Political Science Review*, 31(3), pp. 417-432; Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights II. *American Political Science Review*, 31(4), pp. 638-658.

³⁰⁰ Müller, J. Werner (2006). On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism, p. 285.

³⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 282-285.

political community by her rational consent. It is in this respect that some scholars consider constitutional patriotism as a civic understanding of a national community.³⁰²

Conceptualizing civic nationalism is an effort by contemporary liberals, who seek to distinguish between *ethnos* and *demos*. They look for possible ways to channel national sentiments in a direction that is more inclusive, open to “others” and respectful to individual rights.³⁰³ Unlike ethnic nationalism, which considers identity and culture as given and inherited, civic nationalism underlines that they are rather chosen.³⁰⁴ This ethnic/civic dichotomy is most commonly studied by comparing Germany, Japan, and most East European countries, which are labeled as bearing ethnic understanding of citizenship, with France, the United States, and Canada, whose perception of citizenship addresses more of a civic definition. In that respect, Habermas’s constitutional patriotism is thought as just another way of saying “civic nationalism.”

Although constitutional patriotism seems to have similarities with civic nationalism, one should also separate these concepts from each other. It is true that similar to civic nationalism, constitutional patriotism is also created to avoid the rise of ethnic nationalism, but it does not render this concept a member of civic nationalism. Behind Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism, there is his conception of “post-conventional identities” that he draws from Kohlberg. According to Kohlberg’s psychological models of post-conventional identities, individuals learn to adopt an impartial stand against their own desires and conventional social expectations through which institutions of society confront them.³⁰⁵ In this way, individuals can compare and synthesize their desires and society’s demands from them through wider moral considerations, and thus, identity becomes “de-centered.”³⁰⁶

³⁰² Yack, Bernard (1999). *The Myth of the Civil Nation*. In Ronald Beiner (ed.), *Theorizing Nationalism*. New York: SUNY Press, pp. 109 – 132; Calhoun, Craig (2007). *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream*. London: Routledge.

³⁰³ Yack, Bernard (1999). *The Myth of the Civil Nation*, p. 104.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³⁰⁵ Müller, J. Werner (2007). *Constitutional Patriotism*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 27.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

Habermas applies Kohlberg's individual level analysis to the level of society. He points out that legitimacy, or the exercise of coercion on citizens, cannot be justified through sacred or quasi-sacred sources, such as religion or nation any more.³⁰⁷ In this picture, "conventional morality,"³⁰⁸ such as religion, tradition, and "family values," is reinterpreted under the guidance of universal moral principles that find expression as civil rights and constitutional norms.³⁰⁹ Hence, in this account, "unconditional, or even unreflective, identification is then supposed to be replaced by dynamic and complex processes of identity-formation — that is, by open-ended political and legal learning processes."³¹⁰ This requires a web of communication processes, and for this reason, Habermas addresses public sphere as the ultimate ground for developing collective identities.³¹¹ Therefore, unlike civic nationalism, Habermas's constitutional patriotism is established upon this post-conventional community.

Since the concept of constitutional patriotism, which was developed after the Second World War, has certain features that reject pre-political, ethnic identity, Habermas reintroduces this concept in order to provide a solution for ethnic conflicts that took place especially in the Balkan Peninsula after the Cold War. He also used this concept to provide political legitimacy for German reunification and the supranational political entities, such as the European Union; and to suggest a solution for the "problem"³¹² of mass migration from countries outside Europe. Yet, his conception of

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ However, it should also be noted that conventional does not necessarily mean pre-political.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Today, mass migration towards European countries is generally regarded as a threat and problem that must be avoided. For this reason, Arendt's argument for a "right to have rights" is still necessary. Although immigrants can have civil and social rights to some extent, they are deprived of having political rights in many countries. In this respect, it can be argued that Marshall's description of citizenship is not appropriate for the status of immigrants. He explains that citizenship consists of three axes that have developed in historical sequences: civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century, and social rights in the 20th century. See: Marshall, Thomas H., Bottomore, Tom B., and Kaya, Ayhan (2006). *Yurttaşlık ve Toplumsal Sınıflar* (A. Kaya, Trans.),

constitutional patriotism is very different from his precedents. He explains, in *The Postnational Constellation*, that nation-states have lost their claim of full legitimacy on their territories, and they are historically outdated. Thus, there is a need for imagining post-traditional and post-national societies under such political systems that are legitimated by supranational political institutions.³¹³ For this reason, his projection of constitutional patriotism serves as “glue” that can create solidarity among people even under a supranational authority beyond nation-states. As the most prominent thinker on this topic, it is necessary to dwell on his conception of constitutional patriotism in a more detailed way. To put it simply, his theory of constitutional patriotism consists of morality and universality, historicity, pragmatism, democratic procedures and juridical principles, and popular sovereignty.

V.II Habermas’s Constitutional Patriotism

In *The Postnational Constellation*, Habermas explains the development of nation-state and its limits from a historical perspective. He suggests that the emergence of the territorial state by the seventeenth century superseded the city-states because of its better definition of sovereignty over a specific territory.³¹⁴ This form of state later turned into the modern state which is a tax-based and administrative state with a capitalist economy. In the nineteenth century, the administrative state, as a modern nation-state, began to implement democratic forms of legitimation; this modern-nation state was, in the beginning, very successful in regulating the market economy without much interference, but it led to the development of global economy which is now not under the influence of nation-states.³¹⁵ Therefore, this loss of power of nation-states comes in the name of globalization. Thus, it is important to examine how, for Habermas, globalization affects the nature of nation-states.

İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları , p. 6. However, today, neither legal immigrants nor immigrants without proper documents can freely and fully enjoy political rights in most European countries.

³¹³ Habermas, Jürgen (2001a). *Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?*, p. 766.

³¹⁴ Habermas, Jürgen (2001b). *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*. In M. Pinsky (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, p. 52.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Habermas argues that democratization of nation-states took place in four steps: 1) birth of administrative and tax based state, 2) birth of territorial state, 3) birth of nation-state, and 4) birth of democratic and social welfare state. Then, it was followed by the rapid process of globalization.³¹⁶ However, the globalization phase, which geared up after the 1970s, does not mean the end of nation-states but a continuing process through which technology and means of communication gave birth to a network of dense relationships.³¹⁷ The most important dimension of this process is the globalization of economy which Habermas calls “denationalization of economic production.”³¹⁸ In this respect, he argues that globalization is a world-wide development which is independent from nation-states but has a direct and negative impact on the power and legitimacy of nation-states.³¹⁹ He explains that the process of globalization undermine the conventional and traditional forms of identities. Therefore, it is a historical development that societies start to construct post-national and post-traditional identities. Therefore, development of post-national societies is not a coincidence but a historical process. In this respect, Habermas uses Hegel as a reference, who argues that every historical formation is destined to decline when it reaches maturity.³²⁰

Cavallar focuses on the pragmatic arguments of Habermas for the creation of post-national societies with the notion of constitutional patriotism.³²¹ He explains that Habermas’s pragmatic argument is based on three developments in Europe: national conflicts, a new mass migration that reinforces the support for universal democratic and juridical principles, and European integration.³²² These developments are beyond the

³¹⁶ Habermas, Jürgen (2008). *Küreselleşme ve milli devletlerin akîbeti* (M. Beyaztaş, Trans.). İstanbul: Bakış Yayınları, p. 81.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Habermas, Jürgen (1998a). The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship. *Public Culture*, 10(2), p. 411.

³¹⁹ Habermas, Jürgen (2008). *Küreselleşme ve milli devletlerin akîbeti*, p. 86.

³²⁰ Habermas, Jürgen (1998a). The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, p. 398.

³²¹ Cavallar, Georg (1999). *Kant and the theory and practice of international right*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

³²² Ibid., p. 135.

control of nation-states and therefore, we need post-national political communities in which people have allegiance only to the liberal democratic constitution that they have created or given consent. In this respect, Habermas reveals his divergence from other theorists on constitutional patriotism that he tried to find a solution for the crises of political legitimacy and representation in nation-states by bringing up the principle of “loyalty to the constitution” beyond nation-states and inclusive of all multicultural societies.³²³

For Habermas, the principle of “loyalty to the constitution,” rather than the state, nation or administration brings about “abstract” patriotism since it concentrates on the abstract democratic procedures and juridical principles.³²⁴ Therefore, Habermas describes constitutional patriotism as the proper attitude of citizens in a democratic state under rightful laws.³²⁵ In other words, democracy and laws, together with popular sovereignty, constitute Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism. In this sense, popular sovereignty does not serve as a “principle” but a procedure of self-legislation that he takes from Rousseau and Kant. For this reason, Cavallar calls his theory of constitutional patriotism “procedural patriotism,” *Verfahrenspatriotismus*.³²⁶ What is more important in his theory is that Habermas does not exclude universal concepts, such as human rights. He suggests that universal moral principles, which are based on Western liberal traditions,³²⁷ are the only grounds for the harmonization of national cultures; these principles are based on the Western liberal traditions.³²⁸ However, it is misleading to suggest that Habermas’s cosmopolitanism relies solely on the Western tradition. On the contrary, Habermas seeks to reinstate the Kantian ideas of “perpetual peace” and “world citizenship” *against* a hegemonic liberalism, which is today headed

³²³ Göztepe, Ece (2004). *Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve ‘Gömen forumu’ Örnekleri*, p. 322.

³²⁴ Cavallar, Georg (1999). *Kant and the theory and practice of international right*, p. 134.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 137.

³²⁸ Ibid.

by the ideologues of the United States that impose a new liberal world order, named “Pax Americana.”³²⁹ Hence, against a world order of liberal states, Habermas suggests a world society based on rule of law.³³⁰ Thus, as Müller suggests, Habermas brings a stronger universalist element to Sternberger’s conception of constitutional patriotism.³³¹

Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism is not only an alternative form of allegiance in the Western Germany or Germany after reunification, but for him, it can also be a project for the European Union. In his theory, he was obviously trying to transcend national citizenship or the idea of belonging to nation-state. Moreover, it was not limited to the boundaries of the European Union. His main object with constitutional patriotism is to form a “decentered world society” with effective institutions in which democratic opinion and will-formation could achieve a binding rule that is beyond nation-states.³³² In this respect, Canovan names Habermas’ theory as “cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism” due to its vision of a new form of allegiance to a supranational polity.³³³ Canovan argues that Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism can be regarded as “new patriotism” since it is distinct from the traditional republican patriotism that she calls “rooted republicanism.”³³⁴ Therefore, in the next part, I shall endeavor to explain the differences between republican patriotism and constitutional patriotism. In this part, I will lead a discussion against Viroli’s argument that constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism. In so doing, I will try to prove my argument that constitutional patriotism is not only different, but also against republican patriotism.

³²⁹ Habermas in Sezer, Devrim (2010). *Yurттаş-Filozof Olarak Habermas: Kantçı Projenin Eleştirel Gücü*, p. 57.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³³¹ Müller, J. Werner (2006). *On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism*, p. 288.

³³² Habermas, Jürgen (1998a). *The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship*, p. 416.

³³³ Canovan, Margaret (2000). *Patriotism Is Not Enough*. *Political Theory*, 30(3), p. 416.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

VI. Constitutional Patriotism versus Republican Patriotism

In this thesis, I aimed to point out that there is a tension between republican patriotism and constitutional patriotism, which is often neglected. Standing against Viroli's assumption that constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism, I sought to set down in what respects these two conceptualizations differ from each other. To this end, I gave a short genealogy of republican patriotism through the works of Machiavelli and Rousseau, who are also the sources of Viroli while he claims that love of *patria* is love of liberty. After that, I analyzed how Viroli constructs his understanding of patriotism. Then, I turned to the origins of constitutional patriotism to reveal that their origins are not the same. Moreover, I analyzed Habermas's conceptualization of constitutional patriotism. Finally, I concluded with the main points that constitutional and republican patriotisms differ from each other.

Maurizio Viroli, through his writings on Rousseau and Machiavelli with the method of *contextualism*, has become one of the most prominent thinkers of republicanism and republican patriotism. His significance within the debates on contemporary republicanism is due to his search for a republican patriotism that can be an antidote and an alternative to nationalism in the modern world. As I have mentioned above, he mainly builds his theory on Philip Pettit's theory of republicanism, which identifies republicanism with "freedom as *non-domination*."³³⁵ According to Viroli, this freedom can only be protected by patriotism.³³⁶ Although Viroli traces the history of patriotism back to the Roman Republic, he mainly draws on Machiavelli and Rousseau.

Viroli points out that Roman Republican tradition of patriotism has lost its meaning or significance in the Medieval Era, but during Renaissance in the republican cities of Italy, *patria* reappeared as a political virtue.³³⁷ In this time, love of *patria* as a

³³⁵ Pettit, Philip (1998). *Cumhuriyetçilik: Bir Özgürlük ve Yönetim Teorisi*.

³³⁶ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 289.

³³⁷ Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 24.

political virtue was a “rational” love for the free city; it was rational in the sense that people were conscious of what they had and they wanted to protect it.³³⁸ However, after the sixteenth century, the ancient understanding of patriotism, love of republic and common liberty, lost its meaning and it came to mean loyalty to the state or monarch.³³⁹ In the eighteenth century, patriotism regained its meaning against the politics of states, kings and princes; *patria* again meant *respublica* in which people live together under the laws that they created.³⁴⁰

Although Viroli mentions about “patriotism without nationalism” for the modern nation-states, he fails to give a comprehensive analysis of the differences between this type of patriotism and nationalism. As Canovan suggests, Viroli tries to separate patriotism from nationalism, but he does it only through Habermas’ theory of constitutional patriotism.³⁴¹ On the other hand, he places constitutional patriotism under the umbrella of republican patriotism; and claims that constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism.³⁴² However, there are significant differences between republican patriotism and constitutional patriotism.

Tunçel explains that Viroli’s republican patriotism is specific for particular republics and their particular citizens.³⁴³ She precisely reveals that Viroli’s theory of republican patriotism is particularistic because it assumes that this love of country requires loyalty to the institutions of republic and the way of life in a particular country.³⁴⁴ Moreover, Viroli’s patriotism includes certain duties that citizens should carry out for the country, since he claims that citizens morally owe their countries their

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 63.

³⁴¹ Canovan, Margaret (2000). *Patriotism Is Not Enough*, p. 417.

³⁴² Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, p. 171.

³⁴³ Tunçel, Ahu (2010). *Bir siyaset felsefesi: Cumhuriyetçi özgürlük*, p. 289.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 290.

lives, education, language, and more importantly, their freedoms.³⁴⁵ Therefore, republican patriotism is based on the idea that there must be a strong sense of attachment that would keep citizens together; otherwise they would not perform their duties for their country.

Apart from differences, Tunçel also gives some similarities between republican and constitutional patriotism which can become more crystallized if one compares them together with nationalism. She explains that both republican and constitutional patriotism avoids xenophobia and chauvinist nationalism.³⁴⁶ In this sense, they reject ethnic nationalism, albeit not necessarily for the same reasons. Moreover, both types of patriotisms are associated with civic nationalism for some scholars. In this respect, Yack assumes that Habermas' defense of constitutional patriotism is largely a civic description of German reunification.³⁴⁷ Similarly, Calhoun suggests that the theory of constitutional patriotism proposed by Habermas is basically an idealization of "civic nationalism" model, since there is a tacit "natural" notion of nation which is always there.³⁴⁸ However, these comparisons are far from careful analysis. Tunçel makes some criticisms of republican patriotism but she ignores the fact that constitutional patriotism is a different concept. Moreover, other scholars associating constitutional patriotism with various forms of nationalism also fall short of clarity. Since my intention in this thesis does not include such a comparison, I will leave that discussion here; a coherent and analytical distinction between them goes way beyond the purposes of this thesis. On the other hand, for the purposes of this thesis, it is important to clarify the main tensions between constitutional and republican patriotisms.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 291.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 295.

³⁴⁷ Yack, Bernard (1999). *The Myth of the Civil Nation*, p. 107.

³⁴⁸ Calhoun, Craig (2007). *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream*, p. 114.

Republican Patriotism	Constitutional Patriotism
Pre-national form of citizenship	Post-national citizenship
Machiavelli, Rousseau	Hegel, Kant
Sentiments	Rational
Love, passion	Reason
Conventional community	Postconventional community
Pride	Self-critical

Viroli reconstructs a republican patriotism on the basis of Machiavelli and Rousseau. He uses the method of *contextualism*, which was introduced by the prominent historians of the Cambridge School, and reexamines the texts of these philosophers within a political and historical context. Then, he comes to the conclusion that both Machiavelli and Rousseau equate love of *patria* with love of liberty. Based on this assumption, he also claims that if we understand love of country as love of liberty, we can apply this old tradition to nation-states as well. In this way, he assumes that nationalism can be replaced with a more inclusive but equally strong attachment. For Viroli, it is possible because although nationalism and patriotism use different languages, at least they use the same method to convey their discourses. In this respect, he suggests rhetoric to fight against nationalist discourses.

On the other hand, looking back into Habermas's sources of inspirations, as I have written, one can find out that he does not establish his theory on the philosophy of Machiavelli or Rousseau, but Hegel and Kant. Again based on this difference, we can also see that whereas Rousseau's and Machiavelli's patriotisms involve deep emotions and a love of *patria*, Hegel's and Habermas's constitutional patriotisms have a claim to purely rational political dispositions. Whereas the former loves its country because of the traditions, cultures and history through which citizens grow up, Hegel and Habermas underline individuation through socialization which will create mutual recognition as well as respect.

Viroli aims to replace nationalism with a *pre-national* understanding of patriotism. However, Habermas's constitutional patriotism is based on a post-national attachment. In this sense, whereas Viroli's patriotism is rooted in a specific culture and history, and thus imagines a conventional community, Habermas suggests a post-

conventional community and communication structures. Moreover, since Viroli's patriotism has deep cultural and historical roots, it does not tell people to distance themselves from their past to keep a critical eye on their history. In a sense, this form of patriotism requires a sense of pride for the history of a particular community. On the other hand, Habermas, as a philosopher-citizen, suggests that citizens be able to stand self-critical about their past.

To conclude, although Viroli asserts that constitutional patriotism is in the same family with republican patriotism, as I have tried to analyze, these two concepts have very different grounds, features, and components. However, it by no means imply that Viroli is totally wrong in his assumption. Certainly, constitutional patriotism and republican patriotism have family resemblance, that is, they both come from republican tradition, albeit based on different philosophers, and they are both alternative models of living together. These concepts are also created for the purpose of overcoming the dangers of nationalist discourses. It is the reason for all comparisons between these two forms of patriotisms with various forms of nationalism. On the other hand, due to too much focus on the possible differences and similarities between constitutional patriotism, republican patriotism, and nationalism, scholars have so far neglected the possible tensions between these two patriotisms. In this thesis, instead of studying patriotism with nationalism, I tried to concentrate on the tension between republican and constitutional patriotism. Therefore, I also hope that this thesis will lead to further investigations and debates between these two different patriotisms of Viroli and Habermas.

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