A SOCIAL NETWORK ASSESSMENT OF GENERALIZED TRUST: TURKEY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Sabancı University

January 2012

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DATE OF APPROVAL: 5 January, 2012

Genç yaşlarında kaybettiğimiz
Dayım Mahir Yurtsever,
Kuzenim Mahir Yurtsever, ve
Kayınpederim Aydın Özek'e
Sizi çok seviyoruz ve özlüyoruz.

ABSTRACT

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Political Science, Phd. Dissertation, 2012

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Keywords: Democracy, political culture, social networks, Turkey, quantitative analysis

Generalized trust is about trust in people we do not know. It refers to a general optimism and faith in the good will of people at large. It is among the significant civic attitudes that relate to democratic performance because it allows for citizen level association and participation. Turkey ranks low in terms of generalized trust.

The present dissertation aims to test the hypotheses set forth by the social capital literature regarding the social network underpinnings of generalized trust for the Turkish case. It employs social network measures which are based on tie level information. The dissertation seeks to answer questions such as: "Do social networks influence generalized trust? Can we talk about the relevance of social networks and relational ties for low trust countries such as Turkey? How do country level differences interact with social network influence on generalized trust?" In order to answer these questions, a survey analysis which was conducted in 2008-2009 and was representative of Turkey's urban population, is used. Findings from the Turkish case are discussed within a comparative framework. A cross-country analysis, which is based on the International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) survey of 2001 on social networks, is used for comparison.

The study shows the relevance of social networks for generalized trust however, it further points out the need for qualifications of social networks according to the network boundary and the tie properties. Also, it emphasizes the importance of the socio-political context to make better sense of social network influence on generalized trust.

ÖZET

GENELLEŞTİRİLMİŞ GÜVEN ÜZERİNE SOSYAL AĞ DEĞERLENDİRMESİ: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

Işıl Cerem Cenker Özek

Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora Tezi, 2012

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu

Anahtar kelimeler: Demokrasi, siyasi kültür, sosyal ağlar, Türkiye, kantitatif analiz

Genelleştirilmiş güven tanımadığımız kişilere duyulan güven ile alakalıdır. İnsanlarla ilgili genel bir iyimserliğe ve insanların genelde iyi niyetli olduklarına dair inanca işaret eder. Genelleştirilmiş güven demokratik performans ile ilişkilendirilen önemli bir eğilimdir. Güven duygusu vatandaşların ortak amaçlar için bir araya gelebilmesini kolaylaştırır ve siyasi katılımcılığı teşvik eder. Türkiye kişiler arası güvenin düşük olduğu ülkeler arasındadır.

Bu çalışma, sosyal sermaye literatürünün, kişilerarası güvenin sosyal ağ belirteçleri ile alakalı öne sürdüğü hipotezleri test etmeyi amaçlar. Analiz Türkiye örneği üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Çalışmanın yeniliği sosyal ağ ölçümünü kişilerarası bağlar seviyesinde değerlendirmesidir. Çalışmanın cevap aradığı sorular şu şekilde sıralanabilir: "Sosyal ağlar kişilerarası güveni etkiler mi? Kişilerarası güvenin düşük olduğu Türkiye gibi ülkelerde sosyal ağ etkisinden bahsedilebilir mi? Ülkeler arası sosyo-politik farklılıklar sosyal ağların kişilerarası güven üzerine etkisini ne şekilde değiştirir?" Bu sorular 2008-2009 yıllarında Türkiye'de gerçekleştirilen ve şehirli nüfusu temsil eden bir anket çalışmasına dayanarak araştırılmıştır. Bulgular, Uluslararası Saha Araştırmaları Programı'nın (ISSP) 2001 yılında sosyal ağlar üzerine gerçekleştirdiği benzer bir anket çalışması kullanılarak karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Çalışma, sosyal ağların genelleştirilmiş güven üzerinde etkili olduğunu göstermiştir. Bununla beraber araştırılan sosyal ağların, ağ sınırları ve bağ özeliklerine göre değerlendirilmesinin önemine dikkat çekilmiştir. Ayrıca, sosyal ağların genelleştirilmiş güven üzerine etkisinin sosyo-politik bağlamla birlikte ele alınması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır.

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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Turkey has proven more successful in economic terms, less ambitious in democratic terms, and a failure in terms of citizens' worthy regard of one another. Political analysis seldom accounts for this last feature, although the widespread pessimistic operational code of Turkish citizens regarding the trustworthiness of people in general may well underscore Turkey's long delayed quest for democratic institutionalization.

The present dissertation focuses on the social network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey. Political science interest in civic attitudes such as generalized trust and tolerance has increased in recent decades due to worldwide democratization efforts, which have accelerated since 1970s. Sweeping institutional reforms have guided democratic transitions, yet they have frequently fallen short of giving rise to a liberal democratic order in cases when the citizens lacked cultural resources to make democracies work.

Culture matters for democratization, though it changes slowly. Hence it is important to uncover those cultural features which are in abundance across well-institutionalized democracies in comparison with under-institutionalized democracies as well as non-democracies. Research based on individual and/or country level attitudinal and behavior data proves well equipped for this task.

The emphasis on culture democratizes the arena for political analysis as well. More often than not, scholars mention the significance of citizens' support for the survival and sustenance of democratic regimes before they lapse into research restricted mostly to political institutions and the political elite. Notwithstanding the important contributions this line of research has made in understanding the political aspect of societies, citizens' side of politics is important as well. After all, information regarding

citizens' attitudes and behaviors towards the political regime, political actors and fellow citizens closely relates to much-praised citizens' support.

The dissemination and discussion of this type of information is relevant to the citizens' participation in politics in an informed way too: this may even be the most relevant issue for citizens whose countries have stagnated in the electoral democracy track for decades. Citizens in those countries have undergone wave after wave of democratic reforms only to be faced with a new sequence of reforms. It is only natural to expect citizens to be critical of their countries' persistent failures in democratization efforts if the distinctiveness of democratic regimes lies in the extent they recognize the agency of the individual citizen. This distinctiveness demands an account of mass level attitudes and behaviors of the citizens themselves besides their demands of accountability from the political elites and institutions. All aspects of the citizens' accounts relate to questions of political culture. The particular question "Why have *we, as a society*, consistently failed in our democratization effort?", in turn, relates to whether or not the society under question is endowed with generalized trust.

Generalized trust relates to the general optimism and faith in the good will of people at large. Hence it does not concern with trust in people we know; on the contrary, it is about trust in people we do not know. We exhibit such trust to strangers because we regard them as fellow men. Though they are strangers, we choose to extend trust because we find them familiar. We regard them not only as harmless, but also worthy of respect for association and co-operation as well as deliberation and competition. In short, generalized trust is an operational code, which relates individual citizens to one another as fellow citizens, and to the larger society as political and economic agents.

Trusting individuals make up trusting environments in which public goods are better attended, economic transactions become more sophisticated, and political institutions function more responsively and effectively. The contrary case is that of an environment with pervasive distrust whereby individuals refrain from each other and retreat into their worlds of local importance. In these environments, citizens only attend their individual affairs, and bonds for common undertakings are impaired for good. Economic transactions shrink and both the public goods and the responsiveness of political actors and institutions cease to be common concerns for the citizens.

Turkey is among the countries which ranks low in terms of generalized trust. According to the World Values Survey (WVS), between 1989 and 2007, only

approximately ten percent of the respondents in Turkey agreed with the statement that most people can be trusted, compared with the corresponding figures of more than sixty percent in Norway and Sweden and nearly fifty percent in Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In addition, across the EU's new member states of Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria, generalized trust levels range between twenty-five and thirty-five percent. Turkey is in the same league as Brazil, Cyprus, Malaysia and Peru.[1]

Although comparatively lower levels of generalized trust in Turkey are frequently mentioned as a curious feature of Turkish democracy, the reasons for this low figure and its possible implications have not been the subject of many studies. In his study on political culture in Turkey, Esmer, for instance, mentioned low generalized trust, though his analysis did not go as far as to situate generalized trust within the Turkish political context.[2] Likewise, in his 2002 study, Kalaycıoğlu compared generalized trust levels in Turkey with a host of democratic countries, and Turkey emerged as the country with the lowest generalized trust levels together with Brazil.[3] Despite the author's discussion about the possible influence of socialization process on low generalized trust, the suggested hypotheses were not tested because the study focused on generalized trust only as a feature of associability.[4] Hence generalized trust was discussed only in relation to civil society participation in Turkey. This relationship, however, was significant because it was among the pioneering accounts on generalized trust in Turkey, which provided an explicit link to social capital.[5]

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[1] See Table 3.3 in Chapter 3, which lists generalized trust levels for all countries included in WVS for the 1981-2007 periods.

[2] Yılmaz Esmer, *Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye'de Sosyal, Siyasal ve Ekonomik Değerler* (İstanbul: TESEV, 1999), 22-26.

[3] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?" in *Turkish Transformation: New Century-New Challenges,* ed. Brian W. Beeley (Huntington, Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 2002), 64.

[4] Ibid., 71-72. Early socialization in the family and at school, and lifetime influence of the media were mentioned as the possible reasons for low levels of generalized trust. It is argued that these agents of socialization in Turkey reinforce an image of unknown people as unpredictable and unreliable which, in turn, breeds a culture of lack of trust in the fellow man.

[5] Ibid., 74. In its concluding section, the author explicitly mentioned generalized trust as a feature of social capital.

The advent of social capital literature in the 1990s has proven a breakthrough for studies in political culture in general, and generalized trust in particular. Although Bourdieu[6] and Coleman[7] had used the concept in sociological studies earlier, Putnam and his collaborators gave the concept a particularly political meaning. They used social capital to denote the widespread availability of generalized trust and networks of civic engagement in a given polity, which had significant bearings on democratic and economic institutional performance.[8] The concept gained immediate attention because it pointed to democracy's behavioral foundations with implications for democratic institutional performance as well.

Making Democracy Work was published at a time the once-authoritarian Latin American and Southern European regimes collapsed and many of the former communist states completed their democratic transitions. During this period, discussions about the challenges of democratic institutionalization intensified. The accumulated experience showed that the mass level positive behavioral and attitudinal orientations towards a democratic regime were as important in democratic institutionalization as were the constitutional and the institutional reforms. Indeed the behavioral and attitudinal component was found to be crucial in order to render democracy "the only game in town".[9]

Social capital fit neatly into this line of research, though its implications went beyond the account of individual level pro-democratic values; it concerned the

[6] See Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education,* ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 241-261.

[7] See James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," in *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective,* eds. Partha Dasgupta and Ismael Serageldin (Washington: The World Bank, 2000), 13-40.

[8] Robert Putnam, Rafealla Nanetti, and Robert Leonardi. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[9] Democratic consolidation literature was keen about the behavioral and attitudinal component of democratic institutionalization. Citizens' regard of democratic regime as the "only game in town" is widely accepted as a short hand definition of democratic consolidation. Linz and Stepan first used this expression. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, eds. Larry Diamond et.al. (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University, 1997), 15.

aggregate societal resources which tie individuals together and ease their associability for common purposes. Putnam and his collaborators regarded norms of trust, reciprocity and co-operation, and networks of civic engagement as among those resources. According to the authors, they were instrumental in crosscutting the existing societal cleavages and they therefore enhanced the feelings of solidarity among the citizens.

The unfolding research agenda resulted in a multiplicity of social capital indicators which ranged from generalized trust to informal relations with family and friends and formal relations of civil society activism. Social capital literature proves inattentive at best towards the conceptual confusion these multiple indicators have created, but despite its conceptual shortcomings, the significance of this literature for the present dissertation is twofold.

The first significant contribution of social capital literature is its account of societal relationships in order to understand the political phenomenon. These relationships, in turn, render individuals more visible within their social milieu. As a result, these individuals cease to be atomistic. On the contrary, their multiple relationships are assumed as significant variables for social and political mobilization. In other words, filling the gap between the individual and the political, the social capital literature pointed to the micro-macro linkage which is missing in much of the social science research.[10]

The second significant contribution of the social capital literature – which also relates to the first - is the account of social network underpinnings of generalized trust. Once societal relationships in which individuals are embedded have come under closer scrutiny, different types of social networks are designated, which exert varying influence on generalized trust. In social capital literature, this varying social network influence has been conceptualized under the more general labels of bonding and bridging social capital respectively.

Bonding social capital refers mostly to primordial relations of the strong ties such as with the family and relatives. These types of relations expose individuals to similar others and this exposure is likely to breed normative pressure for conformity at the group level. An individual's constriction only to ascriptive relations, in turn, is argued

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[10] Granovetter discussed the lack of the social science account of the micro-macro linkage and he suggested the study of social networks as intermediary structures of the micro-macro divide. See Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no.6 (1973): 1360-1380.

to influence generalized trust negatively. An alternative is the bridging social capital, which refers to the individual's relations with different others through an extension of their weak ties. Relations which are induced by modern institutions such as the work place, education, and the civil society, are among the stocks of bridging social capital. Individuals socialize into variable human conditions through these types of relations, which encourage feelings of familiarity with the fellow men. Hence bridging social capital is argued to influence generalized trust positively.

Although social capital literature frequently accounts for these hypotheses regarding social network influence, their tests remained limited. Rather, it has focused more intensely on civil society involvement in order to operationalize societal relationships. Moreover, the empirical studies which operationalized social networks, relied on various social groups such as the family and the peer group relations rather than tie-based information. The latter, however, is crucial because the conceptual definition of social capital and its variants rely on relational ties.

The present dissertation aims to test the hypotheses set forth by the social capital literature regarding the social network underpinnings of generalized trust. It focuses on Turkey as the case study, and employs social network measures derived from the sociological literature, which are based on tie level information. In that capacity, it significantly diverges from mainstream social capital literature. The dissertation seeks to answer questions such as: "Do social networks influence generalized trust? What types of relational ties induce trust in the fellow men? Can we talk about the relevance of social networks and relational ties for low trust countries such as Turkey? How do country level differences interact with social network influence?"

Not surprisingly, social networks are not the only determinants of generalized trust; on the contrary, generalized trust has multiple determinants. Country level dynamics, for instance, have significant bearings on generalized trust. After all, the conceptual basis of generalized trust boils down to citizens' willingness to live together so that they will crosscut the differences easily when needs be. Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that long-lasting societal divisions such as a conflictual and divisive historical heritage[11], religious, ethnic, and economic differences prove

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[11] Many authors associated pervasive distrust across South Italian regions to foreign domination of first Spanish, then French rule. Both powers pursued a divide and rule policy to sustain extractive policies. See Putnam, Nanetti and Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work.* Also see Anthony Pagden, "The Destruction of Trust and Its

detrimental to generalized trust.[12] Besides country level macro dynamics, individual level optimism is positively related to generalized trust.[13] This means that individuals assume a more positive outlook towards the people at large when they are content with themselves and their circumstances.

Notwithstanding the significance of these alternative indicators, the present dissertation focuses on social network underpinnings of generalized trust not only because this aspect is under-tested, but also because its implications are especially curious for long-lasting electoral democracies such as Turkey. Although the conceptual roots of social capital lie in the individuals' social relationships, this literature only gives lip service to the discussion of these relationships, let alone its frequently used concepts such as the strong and weak ties and the bridging relationships. On the other hand, sociological accounts of social networks have discussed these concepts for quite a long time. Hence the adoption of social network measures, which are used in sociology to test the social capital literature's hypotheses about social network influence on

Economic Consequences in the Case of Eighteenth-century Naples," in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations,* ed. Diego Gambetta (New York, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), 127-142 and Diego Gambetta, *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[12] In their cross-country study of sixty countries, Delhey and Newton designated Protestantism and ethnic divisions as significant exogenous determinants of generalized trust. Religion was used to operationalize the historical heritage. Protestant culture was positively related to generalized trust. On the other hand, ethnic divisions influenced generalized trust negatively. The authors also tested the influence of a series of endogenous variables. Good government and wealth influenced generalized trust positively, whereas income inequality influenced generalized trust negatively. See Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?" *European Sociological Review* 21, no.4 (2005): 311-327. A similar study was conducted by Christian Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison," *Public Choice* 130, no.1 (2007): 1-21. Similar to Delhey and Newton, Bjornskov accounted for the influence of religion to operationalize historical heritage. In his analysis, Catholic and Muslim cultures and income inequality were found to exert negative influence on generalized trust. Though the analysis found constitutional monarchies as positively related to generalized trust, most of the constitutional monarchies included in the dataset were the Western European countries with well-institutionalized competitive and liberal systems. Lastly, in his analysis of generalized trust, Uslaner showed negative influence of economic inequality on generalized trust. See Eric Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust* (New York, Madrid, South Africa: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[13] Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 94-100.

generalized trust, has the potential to provide new information about this relationship. Yet why do individuals' social network relations matter for democratic political orders?

Political science is mostly concerned with constitutional orders, political regimes, institutions and actors. Studies which focus on elite level interactions within the institutionally constricted arena, are quite distanced from individuals' daily undertakings. Though individuals become more visible in attitudinal research, this line of research also strips individuals of their daily social relationships, because the data are frequently collected at the individual level and translated into country level summary information about cultural trends. Both strands of research set political science away from individual face-to-face interactions and social relationships, and this distance is further widened through the analytical differentiation made between the modern and the traditional society.

From Simmel to Giddens, the modern society is associated with the progressive decrease in the weight of individuals' primordial ties and ascriptive relationships, and a corresponding increase in new types of ties based on secondary and rational relationships. This assertion is frequently an acknowledgement of the interference of the ever more complex bureaucratic and economic institutions in individuals' daily life. After all, modern democratic society is as much about the changes at the individual level such as occupational diversity, increase in literacy and education levels, urban settlements, media exposure, and personal income as it is about the organizational sophistication at the abstract systems levels. The latter aspect concerns political, economic, and social systems, which demand both the direct and indirect participation of citizens for effective functioning. Being so, in modern societies, individuals are in constant relationship with the agents of the impersonal political system when they vote, pay their electricity bills, or issue a complaint about the lack of municipal services. Likewise, they relate to the economic system when they sign a business contract, apply for a bank loan, or form an occupational association. However, why do those undertakings necessarily result in a decrease in individuals' face-to-face close relationships?

The point is that modernization theory relies on abstract systems so assertively that it neglects the possibility that individuals' daily encounters with their immediate social associates are agents of the modern processes as well. The critical question is: How do individuals familiarize complex modern systems? For political scientists, this question boils down to: How do the individuals' social networks influence their political

information, knowledge, and opinions? What role do relations with family and friends play in this process? What about the alternative networks of colleagues and civil society associates? Such questions have been explored more vigorously in the last decade thanks to the availability of social network measures that count on tie-based information at the level of individuals' social relations. Studies of this strand are already indicative of the fact that relational ties are significant agents of attitude and opinion formation.[14]

Familiarizing the complex through individuals' relations is closely related to generalized trust as well. After all, what social capital regards as bridging relations is an enquiry into the extent to which individuals succeed in diversifying their relational ties. The diversity of ties, in turn, is argued to influence generalized trust positively because they make individuals aware of the variable human condition. Hence it is worth exploring the possible social network influence on generalized trust in order to designate the extent to which bottom-up initiatives of more varied connections may help in the generalization of the good will about human agency. Such good will is expected to bring people together for more effective undertakings regarding common problems, which is imperative for democratic institutionalization.

Explorations of the potential for bottom-up initiatives are especially relevant for long standing electoral democracies such as Turkey. Limitations put on political and civil liberties hinder Turkey's status as a liberal democracy. Students of Turkish politics are well familiar with the structural reasons for the delay in basic liberties such as the historical strong state tradition, the deep-rooted cleavage between the modernizing elite and their more traditional adversaries, the military's frequent intervention in politics and the ensuing constitutional instability, the weak party system, and the ethnic insurgence related to the Kurdish population. These structures divide the citizens along the lines of existing political cleavages as well. Coupled with the challenges of socio-economic modernization, uncertainties amount to some degree of paralysis on the citizens' side.

This paralysis is reflected in civil society, which remains weak in Turkey. Although civil society is regarded as important for citizens' connectedness on the one

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[14] See for example Diana A. Mutz, "The Consequences of Cross-cutting Networks for Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (2002): 838-855. Also James L. Gibson "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no.1 (2001): 51-68.

hand, and their account for the performance of the political actors and institutions on the other, only approximately ten people out of a hundred are involved in some type of civil society institutions in Turkey. These institutions are frequently professional organizations such as political parties and trade unions, but rights-based and self-expressive organizations attract only marginal attention.

This general picture of the state of democracy in Turkey partly explains why generalized trust is low in Turkey. The structural problems Turkey has faced since its inception in 1923 seem to deepen the existing cleavages and to create new ones, which act as the fault lines that keep citizens apart from each other. In such a political order, it is, at best, difficult for the citizens to relate to each other in a meaningful way. The state of the civil society in Turkey is a further indicator of this situation.

The present dissertation aims to expand the structural analysis on Turkey and it focuses on individuals' discussion network structures. The designation of these networks will make Turkish citizens more visible within the boundaries of their daily relationships. Moreover, the focus on those relationships will allow us to determine whether social networks have any influence on generalized trust. This focus is important to test a series of hypotheses set forth by social capital literature on the one hand and to argue about bottom-up initiatives to build trust relations on the other. Besides the analysis on Turkey, the cross-country analysis will also be helpful to discuss the generalizability of findings about social network underpinnings of generalized trust.

1.1. The Research Design: The Method, Strengths and Weaknesses

The research relies on statistical analysis to discern the influence of social network on generalized trust. This type of analysis is suitable for large-N studies and it accounts for the influence of the variables of interest while controlling for rival variables and demographic properties. As noted in the previous section, two analyses will guide the dissertation, and both rely on individual level data collected about individuals' tie-based relationships. For the Turkish case, the important matters discussion networks are focused on in order to test the network influence on generalized

trust. In the cross-country analysis, network measures are based on tie relationships with a series of family members and friends.

The first strength of the study is its account of the social network influence on democratic attitudes: generalized trust in this case. As has already been noted, social network accounts of political knowledge, opinions, and participation have increased in the last decade, although social network influence on civic participation has remained more limited. The present study is an attempt to discuss the relevance of individuals' daily relationships for generalized trust. This enquiry, in turn, is important to discern the potential for bottom-up initiatives for conceptual and behavioral connectedness among the fellow man, which may significantly relate to democratic institutionalization.

The second strength of the study relates to its single study focus on one of the electoral democracies in which generalized trust is a scarce social resource. Turkey made the transition to democracy in 1946 and it has qualified as an electoral democracy since then, despite the fact that its democracy was suspended following three direct and two indirect military interventions. Though the military's role in Turkish politics has decreased in the last decade and this trend is likely to continue, obstacles to full institutionalization of basic political and civil liberties seem to be still in effect.

Students of Turkish politics frequently mention the structural reasons likely to delay Turkey's quest for democratic institutionalization. The present dissertation takes a behavioral stance and it relates Turkey's under-institutional democracy to scarcity of generalized trust among the fellow men. Notwithstanding the role political institutions and the political elite have played in Turkey's democratization process, the study raises the possibility that the lack of a common societal vision in Turkey based on the recognition of the unknown others as the fellow men may explain the country's unending trial with electoral democracy.

The third strength of the study is its unique focus on social networks. As has been noted, social capital literature frequently gives reference to different types of networks. The present dissertation is novel among the studies which strive to test this literature's hypotheses about the social network influence because its account for social networks is informed by tie-based information rather than group-based relations. This methodological novelty is not only important in order to discuss the network influence within a larger framework, but it is also imperative to elicit features of social networks

in Turkey. Network research is new in Turkey at best, and the present research is among the pioneering studies on this topic.[15]

Despite these strengths, a series of limitations of the study are also in order. The first limitation relates to the social network boundaries in multi-item surveys. These types of surveys focus on different items and they are under time-constraints; hence they do not allow collection of complete egocentric data, which asks for all types of ties individuals possess. Rather, the social relationships are designated through the analysis of either the important matters or the political discussion name generators, which, at minimum, asks three alters with whom important matters or political matters are discussed. The present dissertation employs one of the first series of surveys which applied important maters name generator/interpreter items in Turkey. The network module of this survey is limited to three discussants. In addition, another series of questions asked about the number of close friends from the workplace, neighborhood and other places. These questions cannot claim to elicit individuals' social relations exhaustively, but despite this shortcoming, they account for substantial information about individuals' relations with certain social associates, which are found significant for the purposes of the present dissertation.

A second limitation concerns the comparison of the findings from Turkey with findings of the cross-country data. The dissertation relied on the International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) detailed study on social networks, which was conducted in 2001. Unfortunately Turkey was not included in this data set. Hence the comparison will not be endogenous to the cross-country analysis. Nevertheless, Turkey is comparable to countries in the ISSP data in several respects. First of all, Turkey shares OECD membership with many of the countries and G-20 membership with a significant number which are included in ISSP survey. Also, it has been a candidate country for EU membership since 2005; hence it is also comparable with new EU member-states of the ISSP data. Hence Turkey stands as a comparable case with countries that are included in the ISSP data.

The last limitation also relates to the comparison between the Turkish and the ISSP data. Network measures in Turkish data rely on name generator/interpreter items;

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[15] See Ali Çarkoğlu and Cerem I. Cenker, "Learning from name generator/interpreters in mass surveys: findings from Turkey," *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* 10, (2011): 160-171, accessed July, 18, 2010, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/articl/pii/S1877042811000206

however, in the ISSP data, network measures are based on tie relationships with a series of family members and friends. Additionally, in the ISSP data, a series of exchange name generators are asked in order to elicit types of contacts in a series of social exchanges. Alternatively, the common network questions in both data sets concern the number of close friends one has from the workplace, neighborhood and other places. Notwithstanding the differences, the present study opted for the comparison based on the fact that both datasets accounted for individuals' relational ties. Since network measures are founded on tie level information, it proved possible to construct similar network measures, which are informed by the same conceptual tenets concerning the tie properties.

Keeping these strengths and limitations in mind, the present dissertation is an attempt to unveil the social network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey, which is an under-institutionalized democracy and where generalized trust is a scarce commodity.

1.2. Organization of the dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows: The following chapter initiates the discussion about generalized trust by focusing on the more general literature on democracy and democratization. It aims to explain why political culture studies in general, and generalized trust in particular, are significant for democratic institutionalization. This chapter also draws attention to the primacy of the social capital literature, which pioneered the emphasis on generalized trust.

The third chapter focuses on the concept of social capital in detail and it disentangles social networks and generalized trust as two significant and inter-related indicators of social capital. A close examination of this literature reveals an individual's social networks as significant determinants of generalized trust. Although the social capital literature has not fully discussed the conceptual and empirical implications of this relationship, it has set forth a series of viable hypotheses about the relationship between social networks and generalized trust.

The fourth chapter assumes a social network approach and it carefully discerns discussions about the strong, the weak and the bridging ties, and their importance for

different social network measures. The insights of social network studies and their applications in political science are used to revise the hypotheses designated in the third chapter.

Once the hypotheses and the measurement tools are obtained, the following chapter focuses on Turkey. The objective of the fifth chapter is to situate Turkey in its political context. Possible macro level socio-political determinants which delay Turkey's democratic institutionalization are discussed. This discussion is crucial because it brings to light the main fault lines which set Turkish citizens apart, and hence contribute to conceptual and behavioral distance among the people as fellow citizens.

The sixth and the seventh chapters present the empirical analyses. The sixth chapter relies on a nation-wide study conducted for the urban population in Turkey in 2009. The social network module, which was incorporated into a survey on informal economic activity in Turkey, informed the network measures of the present dissertation. These measures allow for the detailed examination of core discussion networks in Turkey and their subsequent influence on generalized trust. The seventh chapter, then replicates a similar study for the cross-country dataset on social networks. As has been noted, the ISSP 2001 data is used for this purpose. The last chapter concludes the dissertation with a discussion about the general findings.

CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL CULTURE AND GENERALIZED TRUST

Liberal democracy has gained prominence with the advent of the third wave of democratization. As one country after another was declared democratic, qualities of democratic regimes have come under closer scrutiny. These qualities focused on institutional set-up on the one hand, and cultural and attitudinal features on the other. Notions of the rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness are discussed more rigorously within the former camp, whereas citizens' support for democratic regime, self-expressive values, civil society activism and civic attitudes have become concerns for the latter camp.

Among the civic attitudes, generalized trust comes to the fore as one of the most important features of democratic quality and sustenance. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the importance of generalized trust within studies of democracy and democratization.

2.1. From institutions to political culture

Democratic transitions across Latin America throughout the eighties, and ex-communist states throughout the nineties, resulted in worldwide euphoria about democracy. One of the major questions of the nineties was the extent to which democratization efforts would be sustained. Scholars discussed the possibility of a widened playground for democratic regimes on the one hand, and the possibility of a

reverse authoritarian wave on the other. Hence, whether democratic transitions would translate into institutionalized democratic orders became a crucial research question.[16]

Closer examination of the new democracies revealed the variance in democratic experience across the countries. Accordingly, a differentiation was made between an electoral and a liberal democracy. Electoral democracy referred to the institutionalization of free and fair elections while, liberal democracy was concerned with the extent to which a plural democratic order *a là Dahl* was established.[17]

Dahl formulated the institutional determinants of democratic rule as early as the seventies.[18] According to Dahl, democratic rule was as much about free and fair elections as it was about a pluralistic society. The former provided citizens' direct participation in politics through their rights to get elected and to vote in elections; the latter accounted for institutions that provide an indirect, yet an on-going participation in politics. Citizens' involvement in interest groups and organizations and their access to alternative sources of information were cases in point. As a result, institutions which guarantee freedom of expression and freedom to form and join organizations were also regarded as significant.[19]

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[16] Huntington is among the first scholars to write extensively about worldwide democratization efforts. Please see Samuel Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no.2 (1991): 12-34. In this article Huntington labeled thirty democratic transitions by 1990 -, which started with the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal in 1974 -, as the third wave of democratization. The author compared this wave to prior waves of democratizations and focused on prospects of democratic deepening across the then recent democratic transitions as well as on the possibility of a reverse authoritarian wave. Studies which focus on the third wave of democratization can be found in Larry Diamond et.al., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives* (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997).

[17] Diamond, for instance, discussed electoral and liberal democracy in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no.3 (1996): 20-37. Electoral democracy is frequently associated with Schumpeter, whereas liberal democracy is associated with Dahl. A good discussion of both Schumpeter's and Dahl's conceptions of democratic rule is provided in David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1991).

[18] Robert Dahl elaborated extensively on procedural criteria of democratic rule in Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1971), 2.

[19] Ibid., 2,3.

At the time Dahl formulated the pluralistic conception of democratic rule, the number of democratic regimes was highly limited. Hence, Dahl's discussion rested mostly on the democratic experience of the US and Western Europe. As noted, the third wave of democratization resulted in a sharp increase in the number of democratic regimes, and one consequence of such an increase was a similar increase in the democratic experience.

Table 2.1 for instance, employs the Freedom House data set and shows the number of electoral and liberal democracies for the 1989-2010 period.[20]

Table 2.1. Number of democratic regimes, 1989-2010			
Time period	Electoral democracy	Liberal democracy	Difference
2010	116	89	27
2009	119	89	30
2008	121	90	31
2007	123	90	33
2006	123	89	34
2005	119	89	30
2004	117	88	29
2003	121	89	32
2001-2002	121	85	36
2000-2001	120	86	34
1995-1996	115	76	39
1990-1991	76	65	11
1989-1990	69	61	8

A striking feature of Table 2.1 is the substantial increase -at around 65%- in the number of electoral democracies from 1989 to 1996. Yet, during the same period, the increase in the number of liberal democratic regimes was only about twenty-five

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[20] The author's compilation using Freedom House data. For information on electoral democracies see "Number and Percentages of Electoral Democracies FIW 1989-90-2011". For information on liberal democracies see "Freedom in the World, Country Ratings". The number of countries indicated as "Free" are accepted as liberal democracies and are contrasted with electoral democracies, accessed July, 18, 2011, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010

percent. Moreover by 1995-1996, the difference in number of electoral and liberal democracies was nearly five times more than the difference in 1989-1990.

Variance in democratic experience by the mid-nineties resulted in more rigorous discussion about the qualities of democratic regimes. These discussions underscored electoral democracy as a distinct category of democratic rule. Alternatively, discussions about liberal democracy started with accepting Dahl's conception of democracy as the "minimum procedural criteria". Yet new procedures were also added to those criteria to discuss *what democracy is and what it is not.*[21] Focus on procedures, in turn, resulted in more emphasis given to democratic institutions than democratic culture.

Schmitter and Karl, for instance, discussed two further criteria to draw a line between an electoral and a liberal democracy. The first criterion was about the necessity to ensure the independent and sovereign character of the state. The second one dealt with the right of the elected officials to rule without pressures from unelected state officials such as the military, the civil service and the like.[22]

The influence of state officials, especially the military, was discussed frequently within the context of democratization in Latin America. Schmitter and Karl wrote that, until 1991, civilians were not in control of the military in a series of Central American states, although the US government treated them as democracies on the basis of the electoral criteria.[23] Similarly, Collier and Levitsky mentioned Chile, El Salvador and Paraguay, which lacked effective power to rule due to "the persistence of 'reserved domains' of military power."[24]

Likewise, O'Donnell elaborated in more detail the meaning and mechanisms of democratic accountability. He drew attention to the lack of horizontal accountability especially between the executive and other branches of government. This problem was found to be more acute in the presidential democracies of many Latin American states. Chosen for a fixed term in office and burdened with difficulties of simultaneous

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[21] This expression refers directly to Schmitter and Karl's article with the same title. See Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is…And Is Not," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 49-63.

[22] Ibid., 55, 56.

[23] Ibid.,, 55.

[24] David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics* 49, no.3 (1997): 443.

economic and political liberalization, many elected presidents in Latin America attempted to undermine both legislative and judiciary controls over the government, which resulted in authoritarian one-man-rule tendencies. As a result, horizontal accountability, along with its vertical counterpart, began to be acknowledged as another significant criterion of liberal democracy.[25]

In his article, *Is the Third Wave Over?* Diamond acknowledged the importance of the analysis of any reserved domains and the institutionalization of both horizontal and vertical accountability in procedural definitions of liberal democracy. Besides these conditions, however, Diamond made the strongest argument for political and civil pluralism as a condition of liberal democracy.[26] Although Dahl also discussed political and the civil rights, democratic practice across third wave democracies demanded a more detailed account.

Diamond first mentioned a series of electoral institutions which barred smaller groups or parties from formal representation. The high threshold of ten percent in Turkey was given as an example. Also, the civil rights and liberties of the cultural, ethnic and/or religious minorities were emphasized. Diamond further argued that citizens should not fall victim to aggression by either state or anti-state forces for demanding or exercising their rights. The author designated the rule of law and an effective judiciary as the guarantee of political and civil rights as well as freedoms.[27]

Focus on institutional and procedural determinants of democratic rule revealed the rule of law as a significant research area to evaluate the extent of democratization of a given polity. Rule of law was related to all institutions mentioned so far. It concerned

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[25] O'Donnell discussed horizontal accountability in Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no.1 (1994): 55-69. He further elaborated on the concept in Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no.2 (1996): 34-51. O'Donnell defined those democracies which lack horizontal accountability at the expense of the legislative and the judiciary, as delegative democracy. This feature of many Latin American democracies also invited discussions on whether presidential democracies were more prone to instability, populism, and authoritarian tendencies. For these discussions please see Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no.1 (1990): 51-69.

[26] Larry Diamond, "Is the Third wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no.3 (1996): 20-37, accessed August, 18, 2011. http://icproxy.sabanciuniv.edu:2221/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.3diamond.html

[27] Ibid.

democratic constitutional design as well as the extent of law enforcement to preserve democratic order. Hence, electoral institutions, civil-military relations, horizontal relations among different branches of government, and the extent of political and civil rights and freedoms were associated with the rule of law.

Rigorous discussions about democratic institutions and the rule of law of the mid-nineties resulted in a renewed interest in political culture as well. Discussions of behavioral and attitudinal features of democracies became crucial because new democratic constitutions and ensuing institutions were, at best, slow to bring about a well-functioning democratic order. This discrepancy between the constitutional and the institutional design and their actual workings in practice, was the main reason why democratic consolidation became a serious research concern once many of democratic transitions were completed.

Democratic consolidation was concerned with both the constitutional and the behavioral features of democratic regimes. Linz and Stepan gave the following detailed definition:

> *Behaviorally*, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede from the state. *Attitudinally*, democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe political and economic crisis, the overwhelming majority of people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures. *Constitutionally*, democracy becomes the only game in town when all of the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict within the state will be resolved according to established norms, and the violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly. In short, with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations to achieve success.[28]

It should be noted that Linz and Stepan strongly underlined the attitudinal and behavioral aspect of democracies. Even their constitutional criterion reflected this aspect through its emphasis on citizens' habituation to democratic processes. Citizen support for democracy and their involvement in the democratic order in a democratic manner, then, was found crucial for democratic sustenance. This emphasis, in turn, underscored a renewed interest in political culture.

As early as the sixties, Almond and Verba defined political culture as citizens'

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[28] Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 15, 16. My emphasis.

psychological orientations towards political objects.[29] Political culture is therefore about individuals' attitudinal and behavioral dispositions towards the political regime and its constituent institutions; political elite; and each other as citizens.

Democratic consolidation literature frequently discussed political culture as the runner-up to institutional reform.[30] Linz and Stepan, for instance, sequenced institutional and behavioral determinants of democratic consolidation and the former was given prominence.[31] This sequencing resulted in a linear and progressive regard of the democratization process, whereby transition to, and institutionalization of, liberal procedures were assumed to be followed by behavioral and attitudinal habituation to democratic processes.

However, most third wave democracies underwent rapid changes, which demanded instantaneous behavioral and attitudinal adaptation on many fronts. Elections demanded a responsible and engaged citizenry; newly elected governments and legislatures were expected to be checked by active citizens; and economic liberalization reforms were assumed to quickly awaken the long dormant entrepreneurs. Discounting the exaggeration implicit in these statements, the point is that democratic transitions took place on many different levels simultaneously, hence sequencing of institutional and behavioral criteria was just too orderly to be observed in real life.[32]

At around the same time, the democratic consolidation paradigm identified political culture as a significant, yet lesser determinant of democratic sustenance, a series of studies focused particularly on the citizens' side of democratic rule. The

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[29] Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (California: Sage Publications, 1963), 12-16.

[30] Besides the study of Linz and Stepan, you may also see Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1999).

[31] Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies", 14-34.

[32] Democratic consolidation paradigm is not without critics. For instance Shedler was critical because the term became overloaded once it attempted to account for institutional, behavioral, and economic aspects of democratization all at once. See Andreas Shedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* 9, no.2 (1998): 91-107. Conceptual overload also resulted in methodological weakness since multiple and varying parameters demanded distinct specializations in political science and public administration. Another challenge from the conceptual front came from O'Donnell, who focused on the teleological nature of consolidation studies. See O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation".

increasing availability of public opinion surveys proved instructive for these studies; thanks to these surveys, citizens' support for democracy as well as democratic and civic attitudes came under closer scrutiny. As more extensive data became available, studies about the relevance of citizens' level mass attitudes towards democratic rule increased. The next section will examine these studies.

2.2. From Political Culture to Generalized Trust and Social Capital

The relationship between citizens' attitudes and behaviors and democratic sustenance were not unknown to political research before the third wave democracies.[33] On the contrary, the pioneering studies of Almond and Verba, Verba and Nie, and Barnes and Kaase among others, can well be claimed to have set the agenda for later studies, which were concerned with citizens' political participation and its implications for democratic rule. Notwithstanding their contributions, prior studies, however, focused mostly on Western societies due to difficulties associated with conducting survey research across authoritarian and/or military regimes. However, as has been noted, public opinion surveys have become more available in the last three decades, so the citizens' side of politics has been examined more in detail and three inter-related research agendas have emerged.

The first research agenda focuses on citizens' democratic support, the second focuses on individual level pro-democratic self-expression values, and the third agenda concerns social capital and generalized trust as its most significant determinant. Among these research agendas, the last one proved to be both novel and interesting because it does not only consider individual level attitudes and behaviors, but is also concerned with the social environment in which individuals are embedded. Before getting into the details of the social capital literature, it is worth exploring the other two agendas as well.

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[33] See for example Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Sidney Verba and Norman Nie H., *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972); and Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, *Political Action* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).

Citizens' support for democracy is regarded as a significant variable of democratic sustenance.[34] Recent studies show that citizens' support for democracy is generally high across the globe,[35] a finding which may be promising for the widened scope of democratic rule. Yet there are two points of contention about the studies on democratic support: the first pertains to its conceptual clarity, and the second contention is related to the varying implications of this variable for both democratic and undemocratic regimes.

In survey research, citizens are frequently asked the extent of their support for democracy. Yet, this question falls short of eliciting what individual respondents understand by *democracy*. Is democracy a general label for a certain political regime, or does it refer to specific democratic performance? In other words, is it possible that individuals refer to incumbents and/or their performance when they evaluate their support for democracy rather than democracy as an ideal regime type? These questions become more complicated once they are asked across undemocratic regimes, let alone the democratic ones. In the former cases, the democratic support variable is more about citizens' democratic aspirations than their actual knowledge and experience of democratic rule. Given this difference, how far can we argue for comparability of democratic support data across democratic and undemocratic countries? These questions make interpretations of the worldwide increase in citizens' democratic support all the more difficult.[36]

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[34] Easton, for instance, argued that regime sustainability is possible only when citizens are positively oriented towards the existing regime. He defines this type of popular support as diffuse support and it is argued to accord legitimacy to the overall system. For a more detailed discussion see David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no.4 (1975): 435-457.

[35] See Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in *Critical Citizens*, ed. Pippa Norris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31-57. Ronald Inglehart, "How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy-and How Can We Measure It?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36, no.1 (2003): 51. Larry Diamond, "Introduction," in *How People View Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), ix-xviii.

[36] For an excellent account of those questions which provides a wide range of case studies, see Diamond and Plattner, *How People View Democracy*.

According to Welzel and Inglehart, for instance, citizens' individual level attitudes and behaviors are more relevant for democratic sustenance than their self-reports of democratic support. They wrote:

> Endorsement of democracy is not necessarily accompanied by the interpersonal trust, tolerance of other groups, and political activism that are the core components of self-expression values, and empirical analysis demonstrates that these are far more important to the emergence and survival of democratic institutions than is mere lip service.[37]

From the seventies onwards, Inglehart has argued for the relevance of individual level attitudes, values, and behaviors for democratic regimes. His initial research rested on Western democracies, and value change across these countries from material needs such as economic security to post-material needs such as ascetic and intellectual fulfillment was explained by socio-economic modernization. These values, in turn, were associated with democratic rule.[38]

According to Inglehart, pro-democratic values can generally be called the self-expressive values. Tolerance, civic activism, liberty aspirations, generalized trust, and subjective well-being are prominent among these values as opposed to survival values, which reflected individuals' search for economic security accompanied by their submissive attitude towards the state authority. Inglehart related self-expressive values to socio-economic modernization because as societies become economically more affluent, individuals' security needs are fulfilled and they subsequently move away from state authority to individual autonomy.

Besides socio-economic modernization, Inglehart also argued for the relevance of historical heritage for self-expressive values. In cross-country analyses, cultures based

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[37] Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, "The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization," in *How People View Democracy* eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 22. See also Inglehart, "How Solid Is Mass Support" 51-53. Also, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Country Linkages," *Comparative Politics* 36, no.1 (2003): 61-79.

[38] Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: The Inter-generational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no.4 (1971): 991-1017. Also, Ronald Inglehart "Value Priorities and Socio-economic Change," in *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* eds. Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1979), 305-343. Also, Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review* 82 no.4 (1988): 1203-1230.

on religion, ideology and/or colonial legacy were frequently used as the proxy variable of historical heritage. On the one hand, countries with predominantly Protestant cultures were argued to incline more strongly towards self-expressive values; on the other hand, countries with communist and colonial legacies were found negatively related to those values. More importantly, national level cultural differences proved stronger than different cultural zones to situate an individual along the survival-self-expression dimension.[39]

The account of the relationship between individual level values and democratic sustenance posed a direct challenge to institutional and procedural accounts of democracy. The emphasis on values showed that even the most democratic constitutions would prove ineffective unless citizens possessed supporting values and attitudes towards the regime. This emphasis, in turn, strengthened the political culture approach:

> The basic claim of the political culture school is that political institutions and mass values must be congruent in order to produce stable and effective regimes. Thus, an authoritarian regime is unlikely to function effectively if it is under strong pressure from social forces that seek to institutionalize human autonomy, choice, and self-expression…Similarly, liberal democracy is unlikely to be consolidated or to operate effectively if it exists in a culture dominated by survival values, which subordinate human freedom to social conformity and state authority. Under such conditions, charismatic leaders find it easy to foment threat perceptions among the public, to nourish social group pressures, and to foster compliance with authoritarian rule - even to the point that people support the abolition of their own liberties.[40]

It should be noted that this perspective poses a direct challenge to democratic consolidation literature, which argues for a sequence of habituation into pro-democratic values once democratic institutions are introduced. Rather, the culturalist account acknowledges the fact that all types of institutional and/or economic reforms take place within a cultural milieu, which influences the prospects of those reforms. This cultural milieu, in turn, is instructed by prior levels of socio-economic modernization on the one

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[39] See Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-Modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). Also Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65, no.1 (2000): 19-51.

[40] Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 158.

hand, and historical heritage on the other. According to the culturalist school, then, democratic institutionalization is likely to the extent to which a given polity has embraced a series of self-expressive values. Inglehart and Welzel gave the ex-Soviet states as cases in point:

> Since [most of the Soviet successor states'] dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, the people of most of these societies have *not* become more trusting, more tolerant, happier, or post-materialist…Russia and the eastern group of ex-communist countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Ukraine) rank even lower on self-expression values than *any* of the Islamic countries…and far lower than the more advanced Islamic societies such as Turkey or Iran.[41]

The political culture approach is important because it underlines the filtering effect of culture. Yet, aggregating a series of different values together as the self-expressive values and summarizing those values as the national averages also has a series of drawbacks.

The first drawback concerns the separate items which make up the self-expressive values. As noted, the most prominent among self-expressive values are tolerance, civic activism, liberty aspirations, generalized trust, and subjective well-being. Yet in their analyses, Inglehart and colleagues accounted for more items which highly correlated with these values. Accordingly, the total number of items which corresponded to self-expressive values, were multiple and all those values were considered as "a syndrome of political attitudes towards the world one lives in".[42] Notwithstanding the contribution of designating such a syndrome for democratic sustenance, this summary approach to a series of values undoes the differences among those values as well. For instance liberty aspirations and subjective well-being are about individual level attitudes, whereas generalized trust and civic activism also relate to individuals' social relationships. Accordingly, separate accounts of these values matter to understand, in more detail, how values and culture contribute to democratic rule.

A second drawback concerns cultural determinism implicit in these accounts. From earlier studies onwards, Inglehart designated socio-cultural modernization and Protestant culture as two significant determinants of self-expressive values. Given this insight, one may well question what is left for the democratic prospects of the third

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[41] Ibid., 159.

[42] Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," 1215.

wave democracies, which either lag behind in socio-economic modernization or which are not Protestant?

This question loses its relevance once social engineering geared towards fitting societies into democratic rule is put aside and the focus is given to what the cross-country data says about the relationship between values and democratic rule. The analyses do not say that countries cannot become democracies if they are not rational and modern or Protestant; rather, they say that democratic institutionalization becomes more likely with certain values and behaviors. Hence culturalist accounts ask about the problematization of certain cultural values, demanding an enquiry into their determinants and further analyses across cases where they are both in abundance and in scarcity. Seen from this perspective, focusing on separate self-expressive values and their determinants become more important.

From earlier studies on political culture onwards, generalized trust is among the most important self-expression values. Its importance does not only relate to the fact that countries with high levels of generalized trust generally fare better in terms of democratic institutionalization, but, different from other self-expression values, generalized trust also has implications for one's relationship with his/her social environment. In other words, the focus on generalized trust makes the individual more visible within his/her social milieu. The individual's decision to invest or decline trust in the fellow man accounts for the link between the individual and his/her social relations as well as the larger society. This link makes generalized trust significant among the self-expression values.

Generalized trust is studied in detail by social capital literature, which has gained prominence since *Making Democracy Work* was published. Although studies within the political culture camp which focus on democratic support and self-expression values are relevant for democracy studies, the emphasis on generalized trust is more interesting because it embeds the individual in his/her social milieu so that the influence of societal relationships on political systems is accounted for. Accordingly, the next section will enquire into the relationship between generalized trust, social capital and democracy more closely.

2.3. Generalized Trust, Social Capital and Democracy

Generalized trust is about an individual's regard of the other as the fellow man, so that co-operation with those others outside one's primordial relations and close associates becomes more likely. This co-operative spirit, in turn, is expected to encourage citizens' participation in different social systems. Hence, across trusting societies, citizens are expected to be better endowed with political and civic activism.

Trust is widely defined as a risk-taking behavior concerning the actions of other people. The risk arises due to free human agency, hence the trustee may disappoint the trusting behavior. Luhmann writes: "Trust, then, is the generalized expectation that the other will handle his freedom, his disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping with his personality - or rather, in keeping with the personality which he has presented and made socially visible."[43] Along similar lines, Dunn defined trust as "a device for coping with the freedom of other persons[44]" and Sztompka wrote "trust is a bet about future contingent actions of others."[45]

The relationship between trust and free human agency, in turn, makes trust more relevant with the advent of modernity. Besides the focus on free human agency, modern functional differentiation also demands more trust. In modern societies, individuals are enmeshed in multiple roles and they are subjects to ever more complex social organizations. Complex society overburdens individuals with more uncertainty at present and more possibilities about the future. To escape the paralysis of uncertainty and unpredictability, individuals make choices at their own risk. Trust, then, is an

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[43] Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), 39.

[44] John Dunn, "Trust and Political Agency" in *Trust: Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations,* ed. Diego Gambetta (New York, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1998), 80.

[45] Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 25.

inseparable feature of modern societies and it concerns individuals' relationships with each other as well as with different institutions.[46]

Accordingly, trust may be about people we know, or those we do not know. Likewise, it may relate to institutions of different sorts. Among different types of trust, generalized trust corresponds to trust in people whom we do not know. We reveal such kind of trust to strangers because we regard them as the fellow men. Though they are strangers, we choose to extend trust because we find them familiar to ourselves. We regard them as not only harmless, but also worthy of association and co-operation. This positive attitude towards the fellow men lies at the heart of generalized trust. Accordingly, generalized trust is different from particularized trust, which refers to trust in people we know. It is also different from institutional trust, which pertains to confidence individuals have in a series of institutions.[47]

Political science in general and democracy studies in particular focus on generalized trust because people's co-operation and association for common interests as well as public goods are necessary conditions for functioning democracies. Generalized trust provides an enabling social environment in which individuals easily connect with each other. This potential of instant connectivity is what lends generalized trust significance to underscore a good portion of democratic sustenance. Inglehart's empirical analyses were cases in point. Besides, in-depth case studies also showed how the absence of generalized trust fostered either individual isolation and social anomie, or the emergence of mafia-like organizations, which prove detrimental for democratic regimes.

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[46] For the relationship between modernity and trust, see Luhmann, *Trust and Power;* Niklas Luhmann, "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives" in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), 94-109; Adam Seligman, *The Problem of Trust* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997); Barbara Mistral, *Trust in Modern Societies* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996). Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990).

[47] For discussions on different types of trust see Luhmann, *Trust and Power*; Luhmann, "Familiarity, Confidence, and Trust"; Mistral, *Trust in Modern Societies*; Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* and Russell Hardin, *Trust* (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press: 2006).

One such study is Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*.[48] In this anthropological study Banfield examined a village in South Italy in the late fifties and one of his most prominent findings was the individual solitude and loneliness due to lack of generalized trust between the fellow men. Banfield's designation of the hard-learned premise of the Montegranese about life is much quoted: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family (*interesse*); assume all others will do likewise".[49] This state of mind was labeled the "amoral familism", which pointed to a life of stagnation on all social, political, and economic fronts. Indeed, the problem for this remote village of the Italian South of 1955 was that they were living together without the feeling of belonging to a society. It was a life in solitude. It was a society where distrust of the fellow men reigned.

Gambetta labeled life in Montegrano as "miserable"[50]. His study on the Sicilian Mafia showed that social anomie was one of the social disorders deep-rooted distrust could bring about, but it was not the only social disorder. According to Gambetta, the emergence of the Mafia in Sicily was also a direct consequence of distrust. Its social consequences were no better than the case in Montegrano: "…sky-high murder rates, higher transaction costs, lower incentives for technological innovation, migration of the best human capital, higher cheating rates, poorer quality of goods and services"[51].

The cases of Montegrano and Sicilian Mafia showed how pervasive distrust re-produced adverse social circumstances in societies. These studies focused on historical legacy as well as political order as significant determinants in the emergence of trust as well as distrust. Yet, they also showed how individual agency tied these structural factors together and worked through different social systems, at times to their detriment. The way this agency perceived the systemic properties as well as the other agents, thus proved imperative either in "virtuous circles" of trusting individuals, sophisticated cooperation and effective institutions or in "vicious circles" of distrusting individuals, retreat from cooperation and institutional decay. The point here is the relevance of trust

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[48] Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958).

[49] Ibid., 83.

[50] Gambetta, *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*, 78.

[51] Ibid., 173.

for the political order and the persistence of the systemic properties as long as the attitudinal bases of these systems remain uninterrupted.

Notwithstanding the contribution of these studies, the real breakthrough, which crystallized the relationship between generalized trust and democracy, came with the publication of *Making Democracy Work*. Similar to Banfield and Gambetta, Putnam and his collaborators also focused on Italy as the case study. Their research puzzle concerned the differences of democratic institutional performance between North and South Italian regions, which was found consistently better across the former.

Once again, historical legacy emerged as a significant variable to explain the differences between North and South Italy. The vertical bonds of authority and submission across the South Italian regions were associated with long-lasting colonial legacy, and it was underscored as the reason for their under-development in comparison with the once Renaissance Republics of the North Italian regions. Yet, besides the weight of history, Putnam and his collaborators also underlined the persistency in individuals' attitudes towards each other for provision of public goods; in other words, the authors argued for the positive influence of individual civic behavior on institutional performance. In the analysis, differences between more civic and less civic regions were noteworthy. Accordingly, the authors underlined the impelling influence of social context on democratic institutional performance.[52]

In their study, social context referred in particular to the extent of " 'civic community,' that is, patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity".[53] This emphasis on civic community was especially significant for democratic regimes, because the institutional discussions about citizens' political and civic activism rested, in essence, on the extent to which they were willing to come together to pursue their common interests, and/or to reflect political discontentment. When the behavioral and the relational foundations of civil society involvement are not discussed, the citizens in democratic regimes are treated only as the aggregates to be counted upon as *the civil society*. Alternatively, Inglehart's emphasis on self-expressive values underscored the behavioral and attitudinal aspect of the civic community, yet his analyses fell short in relating the individual's attitudes to the existing social milieu. Also, as has been noted,

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[52] Putnam, Nanetti and Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work,* 8.

[53] Ibid., 83.

Inglehart's lists of self-expression values were rather comprehensive; hence individual level civic attitudes were not the only focus of interest.

Contrary to these different approaches, the emphasis on the civic community concerned individual attitudes *in relation to* their social environments. Putnam and his collaborators found citizens of North Italy more trusting and more active in the civil society than their counterparts across South Italian regions. On the basis of their findings, the authors conceptualized the civic community as one which "inherited a substantial stock of social capital", which, in turn, was defined as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions".[54] Hence the significance of trust was discussed within the larger conceptual framework of social capital.

A series of drawbacks can be mentioned regarding this influential study. One drawback was the authors' elaboration of social capital only in the study's concluding section. Another drawback concerned the relationship between social capital, generalized trust and civicness. Though generalized trust was mentioned as a significant feature of social capital, the empirical part of the study rested on a composite measure of civicness rather than generalized trust.[55] In addition, although civicness, generalized trust and networks of civic engagement were introduced as features of the so-called *social capital*, the relationships among these features were not specified.

Indeed Putnam repeated this stance in his-follow up study, *Bowling Alone*, which concerned the decline of civic attitudes in the US.[56] He noted in this study:

> Other things being equal, people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations, serve more readily on juries, give blood more

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[54] Ibid., 167.

[55] Preference voting, associational membership, newspaper readership and participation in referenda variables were used for the civicness variable. During the period, the Italian electorate was allowed to indicate a candidate from the party list and the extent of preference voting was argued to reveal factionalism. This variable correlated negatively with the civicness variable. Likewise, lower density of associational membership was given higher scores. As a result, this variable also correlated negatively with the civicness variable. Newspaper readership and participation in referenda correlated positively with the civicness variable. Please see Putnam, Nanetti, and Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work*, 91-99.

[56] Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2000).

frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue…In short, people who trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are more trusting and more trustworthy. Conversely, the civically disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and feel less constrained to be honest themselves. The causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti.[57]

What Putnam referred to as "well-tossed spaghetti" has become the soft underbelly of social capital since it referred to many different concepts at once; social capital has been criticized widely for its lack of conceptual clarity.[58] Yet the concept was also found interesting for the link it established between the social relations, the society, the culture and the democratic order. Also, multiple social capital indicators invited a series of new hypotheses and their ensuing tests in order to discuss its relevance for democratic regimes more in detail. Accordingly, the next chapter will focus on disentangling the concept of social capital, which relates to the social network underpinnings of generalized trust.

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[57] Ibid., 136-137.

[58] For the critics of the concept, see, for example Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection On Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," *American Political Science Review* 90, no.2 (1996): 389-397. John Harris and Paolo DeRenzio, " 'Missing Link' or Analytically Missing?: The Concept of Social Capital. An Introductory Bibliographic Essay," *Journal of International Development* 9, no.7 (1997): 919-937. Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, "Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam," *American Behavioral Scientist* 42, no.1 (1998): 124-139. Ben Fine, "The Developmental State is Dead - Long Live Social Capital?" *Development and Change* 30, no.1 (1999): 1-19. For contemporaneous studies, which found social capital as a promising concept, see Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin eds., *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective* (Washington: The World Bank, 2000).

CHAPTER 3

DISENTANGLING SOCIAL CAPITAL: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND GENERALIZED TRUST

Once political science literature developed an interest in social capital, social networks were also mentioned more frequently apart from the generalized trust. The reasons for this interest were threefold. First, Putnam and his collaborators included networks of civic engagement in the definition of social capital. These networks mostly implied horizontally organized civil society organizations such as community development, rights based, recreation and leisure groups. The second reason was related to sociological accounts of social capital, which pointed to the network underpinnings of the concept. This strand relied more heavily on informal rather than formal networks, such as friendship and kinship groups. The third reason was the comparison between the political science and the sociological definitions of social capital, which made the focus on social networks more explicit.

Any study of political science which focuses on the influence of social capital on democratic sustenance, institutional performance and/or economic development frequently refers to the work of Coleman briefly, before discussing, in detail, the work of Putnam.[59] Fewer references than these two studies are made to Bourdieu, and these are more of an acknowledgement since his work regarded cultural features as a form of capital for the first time along with the much accepted physical and human capital.[60] Coleman, however, is the first scholar to focus explicitly on the conceptualization of social capital by drawing attention to its foundation in relational networks on the one hand, and to features which make it another form of capital on the other.

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[59] Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," 13-40. Putnam, Nanetti and Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work.*

[60] Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," 241-261.

According to Coleman, social capital was a relational concept whose value accrued within the relations of agents in a given social structure. Being so, Coleman's regard of social capital was contextual. In his work, social resources such as information and norms like trust and reciprocity, which resided in the relationships of agents, became capital only when these resources were mobilized for a certain purpose. Hence, social capital is defined in functionalist terms. In the words of Coleman:

> Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of entities in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but maybe specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others.[61]

This definition was conceptually different from Putnam's definition. Coleman related social capital to those co-operative norms, attitudes and behaviors which were generated within the small and the closed networks. Hence in Coleman's definition, a given network constituted the structural boundary of the research.[62] Alternatively, Putnam regarded the national level polity as the structural boundary; hence, social capital referred to different types of networks as well as the aggregate level co-operative norms generated within this larger structural boundary.

Besides the concept's relational boundaries, the two definitions also differed in their regard of trust as a significant social resource. In Coleman's definition, the concern was about particularized trust, because the focus was on small, familiar networks. In Putnam's definition, on the other hand, the emphasis fell on generalized trust, which was generated at the societal level through the workings of many different types of networks.

In addition, in Coleman's definition, social capital benefited only the members of the given network. Accordingly there was the possibility that while facilitating certain actions for a given individual or a network of individuals, social capital may

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[61] Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," 16.

[62] Ibid., 16-18. Coleman's analyses on social capital, for instance, focused on closed networks such as the diamond market in New York, South Korean radical activist students, Jewish mothers with children, and the market in Cairo.

simultaneously be harmful to those others outside of the network. However, Putnam expected social capital to benefit the whole society. No bad sides were assigned to social capital; all associations were deemed alike and expected to make democratic institutions as well as economies work.

Interestingly, this difference regarding the expected benefits of social capital also pointed out a commonality which concerned with both authors' functionalist approach to the concept. For Coleman, social capital became relevant once it was used for a certain purpose of action. Likewise, Putnam regarded social capital relevant to the extent that it contributed to collective action. This functionalism was criticized on the basis that it conflated the foundation of social capital - which was the social networks - with social capital's assumed outcome of trust, or related co-operative norms.[63] Sabatini, for instance, argued: "Research reliant upon an outcome of social capital as an indicator of it will necessarily find it related to that outcome. Social capital becomes tautologically present whenever an outcome is observed".[64] Similarly, Lin criticized similar functional definitions because,

> social capital is identified when and if it works; the potential causal explanation of social capital can be captured only by its effect, or whether it is an investment depends on the return for a specific individual in a specific action. Thus, the causal factor is defined by the effect.[65]

Accordingly, Lin suggested conceptualising and measuring social capital "relative to its root", which lay in social networks and social relations.[66]

These criticisms called for separation between social networks and those social resources which resided within these networks. Yet, rather than focusing on the suggested relationship between social networks and the given social resource, many of the political science studies counted on these variables as multiple indicators of social capital.

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[63] See for example, Charles Sobel, "Can We Trust Social Capital?" *Journal of Economic Literature* 40 (March 2002): 139-154. Fabio Sabatini, "The Role of Social Capital in Economic Development" *The Social Capital Gateway*, 2005, accessed August, 20, 2011, http://www.socialcapitalgateway.org/. Nan Lin, "Building a Network Theory of Social Capital" in *Social Capital* eds. Nan Lin, Karen Cook and Ronald S. Burt (New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 2007).

[64] Sabatini, "The Role of Social Capital", 5.

[65] Lin, "Building a Network Theory", 11.

[66] Ibid.,12.

Table 3.1 on pages 38-39, for instance, reports a series of well-known studies on social capital. Social capital was defined in terms of different types of social networks and associations as well as a series of civic norms. Generalized trust was recurrent among these norms. Table 3.1 shows that social capital concerned the informal relations with the family and friends, more formal civil society involvement and, lastly, with co-operative norms such as trust and reciprocity as well as different civic and individual attitudes such as tolerance and optimism. Variance across definitions also pointed to selective use of the multiple indicators of social capital. One study, for instance, could define social capital as generalized trust levels and civil society involvement, whereas another study could focus on relations with family and friends.

Table 3.1 shows that social capital is an overloaded concept. Notwithstanding this overload, the concept can well be argued to prove viable in political science because it draws attention to the social and cultural side of democratic rule, which relates to individuals' social networks as well as the civic norms of generalized trust and reciprocity. In particular, the criticisms of the functionalist definitions of trust set forth a hypothesis about the possible relationship between social networks and generalized trust. Additionally, the account of Coleman's elaboration on social capital shows the relevance of informal networks for the generation of trust besides Putnam's networks of civic engagement. The account of different types of networks, in turn, cautions us about Putnam's initial assumption pertaining to the benign contribution of all types of social networks to social systems and their institutions.

Given these insights, the next section will examine the hypotheses regarding the relationship between social networks and generalized trust.

Table 3.1. Diverse conceptualization and operationalization of social capital in selected works after Coleman and Putnam				
Author	Title of the study	Conceptual definition	Operational definition	Research finding(s)
Knack S.; Keefer P. (1997)	Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation	Trust, cooperative norms, and associations	Generalized trust and civicness variables from WVS; density of associational activity	Trust and norms of civic cooperation are associated with economic performance. These variables are stronger in countries which effectively protect property rights and have less fragmented societies. Associations do not correlate with economic development.
Stolle, D; Rochon, T. (1998)	Are All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type and the Creation of Social Capital	Networks and norms facilitating collective action	Membership in voluntary organizations; political action; generalized trust; political trust; efficacy; optimism; tolerance; civicness; credit slips; political interest, community engagement	Members of associations are more trusting, yet they are neither more tolerant nor optimistic. Cultural associations are found richer in social capital than rights groups and leisure and social associations.
Narayan, D; Pritchett, L. (2000)	Social Capital: Evidence and Implications	Some aggregation of the relationships between the nodes, which represent abstract definition of society as either households or individuals.	Associational activity	Social capital is found instrumental in innovation diffusion and informal insurance

Table 3.1 Continued…				
Author	**Title of the study**	**Conceptual definition**	**Operational definition**	**Research finding(s)**
Rose, R. (2000)	Getting Things done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia	The stock of formal and informal social networks that individuals use to produce or allocate goods and services	Informal networks or networks within formal organizations invoked to get things done in certain situations	People employ both formal and informal networks to get things done. Associations and generalized trust are not found as good indicators of social capital.
Knack, S. (2002)	Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from States	The social structures that provide resources to individuals: networks, cooperative norms and trust	Generalized trust, volunteering, census response, activity in associations, informal socializing, attendance at club meetings, membership in 'good government' groups	Generalized trust, volunteering and census response are significant for better government performance, yet civic activity- associations and informal socializing- are unrelated to performance
Tavits, M. (2006)	Making Democracy Work More? Exploring the Linkage between Social Capital and Government Performance	Trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement	Generalized trust, formal and informal meetings, membership in associations, voluntary community work, confidence in local government	Social capital is significant for policy activism, but not for administrative efficiency

3.1. Social Networks and Generalized Trust: Hypotheses of Social Capital Literature

Discussions within the social capital camp set forth a general hypothesis about the relationship between social networks and generalized trust. This general hypothesis can be written as:

Social networks significantly influence generalized trust.

This hypothesis, nevertheless, needs to be detailed further, in order to designate the type of influence social networks could exert on generalized trust. Before doing so, however, a conceptual recap would be helpful. The above hypothesis is relevant because generalized trust is about the overall optimism and faith of good will that we vest in the fellow men. Accordingly, it demands familiarity with the variable human condition. Individuals' involvements in different types of networks, in turn, are likely to provide that type of familiarity.

Modern society is complex and it consists of many different systems, institutions as well as relationships. Further, in order to function properly, modern complex society demands people's participation, and this demand is higher in democracies because the system itself is defined by citizens' participation. Hence, the complexity of social systems, institutions and relationships is much more intricate and multi-layered in democratic regimes. Given this complexity, trust in the fellow men provides the link between the familiar and the complex. Individuals become more likely to extend trust to strangers because they expect the trustee's dispositions to be similar to their own.

Yet, how is this link established? In other words, how and why would people extend trust to strangers? What are those structures which familiarize the complex, and hence make us comfortable even when we are with strangers of different social environments?

Social networks are likely to provide a plausible answer to those questions. Since the time we are born, we are involved in many different types of networks. First come our primordial relations such as with family members, relatives, and/or our kin group. Then come our relations with our friends and neighbors. Education, workplace, marriage, civic activism and civil society involvement enlarge the pool of relationships

beyond our primordial relations. These types of relationships can be multiplied, yet the point is that one of the ways to learn about the human condition is through our lifetime experiences with other people. This knowledge accrues in different types of social networks through relations with many others. Variability of social networks, then, may result in different dispositions towards the fellow men. Indeed, the acknowledgement of this probable variance of social network influence lies at the heart of the differentiation made between the *bonding social capital* and the *bridging social capital.*

Different from his initial regard of social capital as necessarily benign, in his following work, *Bowling Alone*, Putnam made such a differentiation. Accordingly bonding social capital concerned primordial and close relations such as those with the family, relatives and close friends. This type of social capital was generally associated with negative externalities because individuals, constricted with their strong ties, were hypothesized to owe allegiance to their small networks rather than to the society at large. The alternative was the bridging social capital, which implied individuals' involvement in different types of networks besides their close and primordial relations. In general, people relied on their weak ties rather than strong ties to establish such types of relations. Bridging social capital was found imperative in linking to different others as well as reaching alternative sources of information.[67] Based on this difference, Putnam wrote: "…bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves."[68]

Accordingly, bonding social capital is likely to inhibit generalized trust, whereas bridging social capital is likely to foster it. The general hypothesis on the relationship between social networks and generalized trust is thus refined as:

> *Bonding social capital influences generalized trust negatively.*
>
> *Bridging social capital influences generalized trust positively.*

It should be noted that Putnam's elaboration of the differentiation between bonding and bridging social capital rested on the strength of relational ties.[69] Despite this emphasis, however, political studies did not go as far as to discuss, in detail, the

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[67] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 22-23.

[68] Ibid., 23.

[69] In *Bowling Alone,* Putnam explicitly refers to Mark Granovetter, who differentiated for the first time between the weak and the strong ties in his seminal study *The Strength of Weak Ties.* The next chapter focuses on this study in more detail. See Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 22, 23. Also Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1360-1380.

conceptual and operational definitions of social networks based on individual tie level relationships. This neglect was in part related to conceptual confusion about social capital. As has been noted, more often than not, social capital was conflated with social networks. This was also the case for the so-called bonding and bridging social capital. It should be made clear that both terms relied exclusively on the nature and the intensity of relational ties at the network level. Yet, still, they were accepted as types of social capital. Hence, once again, social networks and social capital were used as synonyms.

In order to measure bonding and bridging social capital, scholars frequently relied on the extent of relationships with certain social groups rather than the relational foundations of social networks. More informal relations with groups such as the family, friends, and neighbors constituted the measure for the bonding social capital. Bridging social capital, in turn, was concerned more with relationships within more formal, institutional contexts such as relations with colleagues and/or co-activists of the civil society.

Frequency of contact with different types of social groups was often used to measure both the bonding and bridging social capital. In their analysis, Farole and his collaborators, for instance, used the WVS question of the time spent with close friends as the variable for bonding relations and with work or professional colleagues as the variable for bridging relations.[70]

A series of studies also focused on informal socialization, rather than bonding social capital. Alesina and Guiliano, for instance, focused on the influence of family relations. A series of questions from the WVS, regarding the importance individuals accorded to their families in general, were used for the measurement.[71] Uslaner also examined the influence of informal socialization on trust. In his study, variables of informal relations were wide-ranging from going to bars and restaurants, playing cards to visiting friends and families, and talking to neighbors.[72] Likewise, Dekker examined

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[70] In the analysis, WVS data of 1989 and 1999 periods were used. For details of measurement, see Farole Thomas, Andres Rodriguez-Pose and Michael Storper, "Social Capital, Rules, and Institutions: A Cross-Country Investigation," *Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.* Working Paper 12 (2007): 39-41.

[71] Alberto Alesina and Paola Giuliano, "The Power of the Family," *NBER Working Paper 13051* (2007): 4,5.

[72] Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 123-125.

the extent of informal socialization through questions of the frequency of neighbor visits, neighbors' help in cases of illness and need for transportation, and neighbors' perceived propensity to protest in case of an adverse local government plan.[73]

It should be noted that none of these measures relied explicitly on relational ties measured at the individual tie-level. Rather they regarded the overall relationships with the given social groups such as the family, neighbors and colleagues as *the* network. Frequency of contact, importance of the given group or its use for instrumental and/or recreational purposes, in turn, instructed the strength of the relationship at the aggregate, group level. Accordingly, although the social capital research in political science makes references to social networks and their possible influence on generalized trust, those networks are not accounted for in detail.

The most frequent type of relationship which is examined more in detail within this camp, is the civil society involvement. The focus of social capital studies on civil society involvement owed a great deal to Putnam's emphasis on the so-called *networks of civic engagement*. Civil society involvement has frequently been used as both, an indicator of social capital and a determinant of generalized trust. Once again, the conceptual link between civil society involvement and generalized trust lay in the former's influence in bringing people from different walks of life together for common purposes.[74]

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[73] Paul Dekker, "Social Capital of Individuals: Relational Assets or Personal Quality?" in *Investigating Social Capital*, eds. Sanjeev Prakash and Per Selle (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), 94-95.

[74] A series of scholars mention the possibility of reverse causality between civil society involvement and generalized trust. In her comparative study, Stolle underlines the possibility that people who already trust others tend to become members of civil society institutions. See Dietlind Stolle, "'Getting to trust': an analysis of the importance of institutions, families, personal experiences and group membership," in *Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life,* eds. Paul Dekker and Eric M. Uslaner (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 118-134. In Uslaner's analysis on generalized trust in the US, trust is found as a significant indicator of membership in secular institutions, whereas membership in these institutions were not found significant on trust. See Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 130. In her study, Paxton also acknowledges the possible reciprocal relationship between generalized trust and associational membership. However counting on a series of research conducted on the question, she underlines that the causality is more likely to run from associational membership to generalized trust. See Pamela Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multi-level Model Across 31 Countries," *Social Forces* 86, no.1 (2007): 54.

In relation with this focus, social capital studies accounted for a third hypothesis dealing with the network underpinnings of generalized trust, which was concerned with the expectation of a significant and positive influence of the civil society involvement on generalized trust. This hypothesis was detailed further, on the basis that different types of civil society institutions could exert different influence on generalized trust.

Earlier studies on civil society involvement frequently differentiated between institutions with political and non-political purposes. Studies by Almond and Verba and Verba and Nie are cases in point.[75] This differentiation was informed by the research interest in political participation. They found participation in civil society institutions with political purposes the more relevant to explain political participation.[76]

Social capital literature brought forth a novel differentiation. Knack and Keefer were the first authors to differentiate between the Olson and the Putnam type of institutions[77] In his 1982 study, Olson wrote on collective action and argued that a series of civil society institutions such as professional organizations, trade unions, and political parties were more likely to display rent-seeking behavior.[78] Knack and Keefer defined these types of hierarchically organized modern institutions as Olson type civil society institutions. They contrasted these with networks of civic engagement mentioned by Putnam. The latter were more horizontally organized and had post-modern concerns such as the community work, recreational, and rights-based activism. Being so, the likelihood of Putnam type institutions entering into distributional coalitions was found low.[79]

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[75] Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*. Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*. For contemporary examples for a similar differentiation, see Stephen Knack, "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from States," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no.4 (2002): 772-785. René Bekkers, "Participation in Voluntary Associations: Relations with Resources, Personality, and Political Values," *Political Psychology* 26, no.3 (2005): 439-454.

[76] Almond and Verba, 249-265; Verba and Nie, 186-194.

[77] Stephan Knack and Philip Keefer, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off? ACross-Country Investigation," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no.4 (1997): 1271-1274.

[78] Mancur Olson, *The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

[79] Knack and Keefer, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off?" 1271-1274.

The differentiation made between Olson and Putnam type institutions was directly related to generalized trust. Due to their rent-seeking tendency, Olson type institutions were regarded as exclusionary. Hence, they were hypothesized to influence generalized trust negatively. Alternatively, Putnam type institutions were induced mostly by provision of public goods; hence they were argued to influence generalized trust positively. Thus, the relationship suggested between civil society involvement and generalized trust was detailed further as:

> *Olson type institutions influence generalized trust negatively.*
>
> *Putnam type institutions influence generalized trust positively.*

Despite the broad differentiation made between Olson and Putnam type institutions, it is difficult to argue for standardization especially for the measurement of Putnam type institutions. The Olson type institutions were frequently measured as membership in trade unions, political parties, and professional associations.[80] Alternatively, Knack and Keefer regarded religious institutions, cultural, music, education and arts institutions, and youth work institutions as the Putnam type institutions. In their analysis, Farole and his collaborators, spared religious groups from the Putnam type groups on the basis that motivation to take part in religious groups may be different than other Putnam type institutions.[81] In addition, they included a wider group of institutions in the Putnam group, which were of social, local/community, arts/education, youth work, sports, the Third World, environment, women, peace and health organizations.[82] Lastly, in his analysis, Knack examined institutions, which were active in issues such as poverty, employment, housing, racial equality, youth work, sports and recreational activities.[83]

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[80] See Knack and Keefer, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-Off?" 1273,1274; Farole, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, "Social Capital, Rules and Institutions," 39; Knack, "Groups, Growth, and Trust: Cross-country Evidence for Olson and Putnam Hypotheses," *Public Choice* 117, no.3-4 (2003): 341-355.

[81] With a similar motivation, in their analyses, Knack and Keefer also conducted a second series of analysis excluding the religious groups from the Putnam type institutions. Research results did not change. See Knack and Keefer, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-Off," 1274.

[82] Farole, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, "Social Capital, Rules and Institutions," 39.

[83] Knack, "Groups, Growth and Trust," 345-347.

It should be noted that Putnam type institutions covered a wide range of institutions, from those dealing with local recreational activities to those active on global issues such as the Third World and peace. Not all researchers found this wide range of institutions convincing. Uslaner, for instance, found it likely that institutions for recreational activities "may simply lead nowhere".[84] Rather, his conceptual differentiation rested on the homogeneity/heterogeneity of members.[85] Alternatively, Paxton focused on the connections among civil society institutions through multiple memberships. Her research indicates a positive and significant influence of better-connected institutions on generalized trust than the isolated ones.[86]

Besides the types of civil society institutions, Uslaner also suggested a differentiation in the types of civil society involvement. This differentiation was reminiscent of the earlier studies in political science which differentiated between active and passive participation in civil society institutions.[87] Accordingly, Uslaner argued that volunteering and giving to charity were more likely to contribute to generalized trust because these types of involvements were more demanding.[88] Similar to Uslaner, Knack and Keefer also questioned types of involvement in civil society institutions. They argued that, though membership data was valuable, it fell short in providing information about the depth of involvement in those institutions.[89] Given these studies, the influence of the civil society involvement on generalized trust can further be detailed:

More active types of civil society involvement influence generalized trust positively.[90]

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[84] Uslaner, *Trust,* 130.

[85] Ibid., 130.

[86] Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust," 47-76.

[87] See for example Almond and Verba, 256-263; and Verba and Nie,184-186.

[88] Ibid., 135-140. In Uslaner's analysis, volunteering was about spending time for a given civil society institution and charity was about contribution in money for charity purposes. Those activities were found more demanding because they demand either time or money from their participants.

[89] Knack and Keefer, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off?" 1272.

[90] Civil society members who volunteer time, participate in meetings or making donations, can be accepted as active members. Though Uslaner argues for the relevance of charitable donations for generalized trust, participation only through donations may

The hypotheses mentioned thus far can be grouped together into two general categories of social networks. The first category concerns the bonding relations of informal settings, and the second category is about the bridging relations of formal, institutional settings. Table 3.2 shows the hypotheses generated on the basis of this differentiation:

Table 3.2 Hypotheses suggested by social capital literature	
Bonding relations of informal settings	Bonding social capital influences generalized trust negatively.
Bridging relations of formal settings	Bridging social capital influences generalized trust positively.
	Olson type institutions influence generalized trust negatively.
	Putnam type institutions influence generalized trust positively.
	More active types of civil society involvement influence generalized trust positively.

It should be noted that social capital literature frequently refers to social networks and tie relationships in order to argue for the above-mentioned hypotheses. However, these hypotheses are either discussed only at the conceptual level, or they are under-tested. Most significantly, despite the lip service given, neither the accounts of the bonding and bridging social capital, nor the civil society involvement reflect a social network approach. The relationships are frequently measured at the group level rather than the individual tie-level. Despite these weaknesses, a series of studies examined the above-mentioned hypotheses. Accordingly, the next section will focus on the empirical findings of the social capital literature regarding the social network underpinnings of generalized trust.

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fall short of fostering trust because it may imply a hands-off rather than hands-on approach to civil society participation. Accordingly, such donations would not bring different people together to facilitate a wider range of connections beyond one's communal relations. Hence, from a conceptual point of view, members who volunteer time and/or participate in meetings are more likely to build trusting relations, which go beyond the communal boundaries.

3.2. Social Networks and Generalized Trust: Empirical Findings of Social Capital Literature

3.2.a. The Empirical Measurement of Generalized Trust

The standard generalized trust question in empirical research is: "Generally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" According to Uslaner, trusting "most people" entails an acknowledgement of common bonds with the fellow men. These bonds, in turn, rest upon the assumption about the good will of free human agency.[91]

An alternative measure of generalized trust is derived through three inter-related questions. Zmerli and Newton pose these questions as:

- Generally speaking, would you say that most people are trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
- Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair?
- Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out for themselves?[92]

It should be noted that the standard generalized trust question and the first item of its alternative version are identical. The first version was used by Noelle-Neumann in 1948. Rosenberg added two items to this original question in 1956-1957.[93] It is possible to come across both versions of the generalized trust question. The WVS, for instance, uses the first simpler version. Alternatively, the European Social Survey (ESS), US Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy (CID) surveys, and the ISSP survey on social networks use the longer version. [94]

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[91] Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 52-56.

[92] Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton, "Social Trust and Attitudes Toward Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72, no.4 (2008): 709

[93] Ibid., 709.

[94] Ibid., 709.

In his book, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, Uslaner examined the stability of responses to the generalized trust question over time. Time-series data of the US case were used, and the analysis revealed generalized trust as an enduring value.[95] Similar to Uslaner, Bjornskov also enquired into the stability of generalized trust, but rather than a single case, he focused on cross- country data of the WVS for 1981-2000 periods. His analysis showed that generalized trust scores at the national level "fluctuate around stable levels".[96] On the basis of this finding, the author argued "that apart from weak differences across the waves, generalized trust can indeed be treated as a time-invariant feature of national cultures".[97]

This feature of national cultures is found relevant for the effective functioning of democratic regimes. Accordingly, low trust countries are more likely to experience difficulties in democratic institutionalization than high trust countries. In the event that generalized trust is a public good that benefits democratic regimes as well as their citizens, then understanding its determinants is well advised. Using the WVS, Table 3.3 shows the percentage of those respondents who said that most people can be trusted for periods between 1981 and 2007. The table is sorted in descending order based on the percentages for the periods between 2005 to 2007.[98]

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[95] Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 57-68.

[96] Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust,"4.

[97] Ibid., 5.

[98] World Values Survey, accessed August, 22, 2011, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp?Idioma=I

Table 3.3 Generalized trust levels, World Values Survey, 1981-2007					
Country	**1981-1984**	**1989-1993**	**1995-1998**	**1999-2003**	**2005-2007**
Norway	60,9	65,1	65,3		74,2
Sweden	56,7	66,1	59,7	66,3	68,0
Finland		62,7	48,8	58,0	58,9
Switzerland		43,2	41,0		53,9
China		60,3	52,3	54,5	52,3
Vietnam				41,1	52,1
New Zealand			49,1		51,2
Australia	47,8	31,7	39,9		46,1
Netherlands	43,6	53,1		59,8	45,0
Canada	49,1	52,4		38,8	42,8
Indonesia				51,6	42,5
Thailand					41,5
Hong Kong					41,1
Iraq				47,6	40,8
United States	40,5	51,5	35,6	35,8	39,3
Japan	40,8	41,7	46,0	43,1	39,1
Germany		31,8	33,3	37,7	36,8
Jordan				43,1	30,9
Great Britain	43,9	43,6	31,0	29,7	30,5
Italy	25,4	34,2		32,6	29,2
Uruguay			22,1		28,4
South Korea	38,0	34,2	30,3	27,3	28,2
Ukraine			31,0	27,2	27,5
Russia		37,5	23,9	23,7	26,2
Ethiopia					24,4
Taiwan			38,2		24,3
India		35,4	37,9	41,0	23,3
Bulgaria		30,4	28,6	26,9	22,2
Romania		16,1	18,7	10,1	20,3
Andorra					20,1
Spain	34,4	34,3	29,8	36,2	20,0
Poland		31,8	17,9	18,9	19,0
France	24,0	22,8		22,0	18,8
South Africa		28,3	18,2	11,8	18,8
Egypt				37,9	18,5
Slovenia		17,4	15,5	21,7	18,1
Georgia			18,7		18,1
Moldova			22,2	14,7	17,9

Table 3.3 continued...					
Country	1981-1984	1989-1993	1995-1998	1999-2003	2005-2007
Argentina	27,0	23,3	17,5	15,4	17,6
Mali					17,5
Guatemala					15,7
Mexico		33,5	31,2	21,3	15,6
Serbia				25,8	15,3
Burkina Faso					14,7
Columbia			10,8		14,5
Morocco				23,5	13,0
Chile		22,7	21,9	22,8	12,6
Zambia					11,5
Iran				65,3	10,6
Cyprus					9,9
Brazil		6,7	2,8		9,4
Malaysia					8,8
Ghana					8,5
Peru			5,0	10,7	6,3
Turkey		10,0	6,5	15,7	4,9
Rwanda					4,9
Trinidad Tobago					3,8
Denmark	51,3	57,7		66,5	
Saudi Arabia				53,0	
Belarus		25,5	24,1	41,9	
Iceland	41,2	43,6		41,1	
Northern Ireland	45,4	43,6		39,5	
Ireland	41,6	47,4		35,8	
Austria				33,9	
Pakistan			20,6	30,8	
Belgium	28,7	33,2		30,7	
Luxemburg				26,0	
Nigeria		23,2	17,7	25,6	
Lithuania		30,8	21,9	24,9	
Albania			27,0	24,4	
Czech Republic		27,4	28,5	23,9	
Greece				23,7	
Bangladesh			20,9	23,5	
Israel				23,5	
Estonia		27,6	21,5	22,8	
Puerto Rico			6,0	22,6	

Table 3.3 continued...					
Country	**1981-1984**	**1989-1993**	**1995-1998**	**1999-2003**	**2005-2007**
Hungary	33,1	24,6	22,7	21,8	
Malta	10,0	24,0		20,7	
Croatia			25,1	18,4	
Latvia		19,0	24,7	17,1	
Singapore				16,9	
Kyrgyzstan				16,7	
Venezuela			13,7	15,9	
Bosnia Herzegovina			28,3	15,8	
Slovakia		22,0	27,0	15,7	
Macedonia			8,2	13,5	
Zimbabwe				11,9	
Algeria				11,2	
Portugal		21,4		10,0	
Philippines			5,5	8,4	
Tanzania				8,1	
Uganda				7,6	
Azerbaijan			20,5		
Armenia			24,7		
Dominican Republic			26,4		
El Salvador			14,6		
Germany-West	30,7				
Serbia & Montenegro			30,2		

Table 3.3 shows that not all high trust countries are democracies. Based on 2005-2007 figures, the percentages of individuals who indicated trust in the fellow men in China, Iraq and Vietnam were close to those in Norway, Sweden and Finland. It should be noted that the former group of countries are of authoritarian regimes; hence, across those countries, citizens live under the heavy-hand and thick shadow of the state. High trust among the citizenry may reflect a potential for collective action once the citizens are allowed to decide for themselves. Alternatively, it may reflect parochial inter-dependence among the people against the state's constriction of citizens' participation. The point is that high trust citizens across undemocratic regimes need further enquiry. However, empirical research based on public opinion surveys is somewhat more

challenging across undemocratic regimes; hence the above-mentioned enquiry is not easy at best.

Another interesting feature of Table 3.3 is the persistence of low trust across some of the long-standing electoral democracies, which have constantly fallen short of liberal democracies. The Philippines and Turkey are cases in point. Based on the relevance of generalized trust for functioning democratic institutions, the enquiry into the determinants of generalized trust may well prove instrumental, especially for those electoral democracies which aim at democratic institutionalization.

As noted, social capital literature brought forth the social network underpinnings of generalized trust. In the event that the hypotheses introduced in the previous section are viable, then, individuals' investment in their social connections may result in the provision of a public good; that of generalized trust. The proposition is both simple and straightforward. All we need is to show the relevance of social networks for generalized trust. Yet this empirical part poses an important challenge because although political science mentions social networks in an increasing fashion, the social capital accounts shy away from an extensive conceptual and operational discussion about social networks. The previous section already underlined these problems; the next section will present the research results of this literature, which focused on the relationship between social networks and generalized trust.

3.2.b. Social Networks and Generalized Trust: Empirical Findings

As has been stated, much of the political science research of the social capital camp has focused on the civil society underpinnings of generalized trust. In these studies, civil society involvement has frequently been conceptualized as a type of individuals' formal, institutionalized relationships. Accordingly, the emphasis fell on the influence of the networks of civic engagement on generalized trust. The hypotheses that were generated related both to different types of the civil society institutions and of the civil society involvement.

The results of this research are mixed at best. Knack and Keefer, for instance, found no influence of civil society participation on generalized trust. Their examination of civil society institutions in terms of Olson and Putnam types respectively yielded interesting results. Contrary to initial expectations, Olson type institutions were

positively related to generalized trust and Putnam type institutions were found unrelated to trust.[99] In his 2003 study, Knack replicated this analysis. This time Putnam type institutions were found as significant for generalized trust.[100] Farole and collaborators reported different results as well. In their analysis, both Olson and Putnam type institutions proved positive and significant for generalized trust, whereas religious institutions were found to exert negative influence on trust.[101] Different from variance in types of civil society institutions, in his analysis Uslaner also found that volunteering and charity were significant determinants of generalized trust; hence different types of involvement also mattered.[102]

Among these studies, only Farole and collaborators accounted for the influence of bonding and the bridging social capital. Their analysis verified the hypotheses: bonding relations were found to exert negative and significant influence on generalized trust and bridging relations were found positive and significant determinants of generalized trust.[103] Along similar lines, Alesina and Giuliano designated a negative and significant influence of strong family relations on generalized trust.[104] Contrary to these findings, Dekker found no influence of informal socialization at the neighborhood level on generalized trust.[105] Likewise, Uslaner argued that informal socialization was unrelated to generalized trust.[106]

All this research fell short in attempting to prove the viable influence of social networks on generalized trust. Yet, based on these examples, it is also difficult to argue the contrary case. Especially weak were those accounts of bonding and bridging relations because they were not only few in numbers, but they also lacked appropriate measures based on relational ties. Rather, these studies relied on social groups, which

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[99] Knack and Keefer, "Does Social Capital Has an Economic Pay-off?" 1281, 1282."

[100] Knack, "Groups, Growth and Trust," 351, 352.

[101] Farole, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, "Social Capital, Rules, and Institutions," 22.

[102] Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 135-140.

[103] Farole, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, "Social Capital, Rules, and Institutions," 22.

[104] Alesina and Giuliano, "The Power of Family," 10.

[105] Dekkers, "Social Capital of Individuals," 102.

[106] Uslaner, *Moral Foundations of Trust*, 121-125.

potentially generate either bonding or bridging relations such as the family and neighbors, or colleagues and co-activists respectively.

In sum, although political studies which focus on social capital set forth a series of hypotheses as to the social network influence on generalized trust, these hypotheses fell short of viable tests due to the lack of conceptual and measurement clarity about social networks.

Despite the recent interest of political science in social networks, sociological research has had a longer interest in the subject. Its account can bring in conceptual and measurement clarity about social networks; hence, their potential link to generalized trust can be better established. The next chapter will examine the sociological accounts and will also present a series of political studies which are informed by this literature. On the basis of this examination, the hypotheses of the social capital literature will be re-considered.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL NETWORKS

4.1. Social Networks in Sociological Research: From Simmel to Granovetter

Sociological studies have long developed an interest in social networks. Among the earlier sociologists, Simmel's *Web of Group Affiliations* proved particularly relevant for conceptualization of social networks in sociology.[107] Yet, similar to studies of the social capital camp in political studies, this study also focused on social groups and associations rather than on social networks. The novelty of Simmel's study lay in his conceptualization of modernity as the change in individuals' relationships and their ensuing diversity.

According to Simmel, the traditional and the modern society differed in the extent to which the latter was of the more diverse types of group memberships based on individuals' interests. These groups were regarded differently from primordially ascribed groups and identities such as the family, the local community and gender.

Simmel argued that "society arises from the individual and that the individual arises out of association".[108] The availability of choice was what differentiated modern man from his predecessors and it determined one's individuality. This individuality, in turn, rested at great length on individuals' exposure to different interests and positions based upon membership in multiple social groups.

It should be noted that Simmel's emphasis on the society as the association of the fellow men is reminiscent of Putnam's argumentation for the civic community. The interesting feature in Simmel's writing was that individuals were expected to distance

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[107] Georg Simmel, *The Web of Group Affiliations* (The Free Press: Illinois, 1955).

[108] Ibid., 163.

themselves from their primordial relations once social groups of the modern society multiplied beyond those earlier types of relations. Simmel wrote:

> An advanced culture broadens more and more the social groups to which we belong with our whole personality; but at the same time the individual is made to rely on his own resources to a greater extent and he is deprived of many supports and advantages associated with the tightly-knit, primary group. Thus, the creation of groups and associations in which any number of people can come together on the basis of their interest in a common purpose, compensates for that isolation of the personality which develops out of breaking away from the narrow confines of earlier circumstances.[109]

Indeed this differentiation between the primordial groups and modern associations comes close to the differentiation made between bonding and bridging social capital. They both suggest a straightforward and an easy relationship, which simply says that the modern world demands individuals to connect beyond their primordial relations. Social capital literature further says that the abundance of such kind of connectivity relates to generalized trust, which makes democratic institutions work. Yet, both differentiations are ideal types; hence, we do not know for sure to what extent people give up their primordial relations in order to actively take part in relationships of the modern structures. Further, less often do we question why people would have to give up their primordial relationships once they involve themselves in multiple modern institutions and ensuing relationships.

The bulk of the anthropological and sociological research which laid the foundations of the formal social network analysis, did not regard primordial relations as significantly less important. On the contrary, the initial relational analyses were conducted on the small-scale community level interpersonal relations of the family, kinship and neighborhood. The term "network" first began to be used systematically by the so-called Manchester anthropologists of the 1950s in order to refer specifically to relational structures.[110]

In his book, *Social Network Analysis,* John Scott provided a detailed analysis of earlier sociological studies on social networks. Table 4.1 summarizes those studies.[111]

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[109] Ibid., 163.

[110] John Scott, *Social Network Analysis* (London: Sage Publications: 1991)

[111] Scott, *Social Network Analysis*, 7-38.

Table 4.1 An Overview of Earlier Sociological Research on Social Networks			
	Sociometric analysis	**Harvard researchers**	**Manchester Anthropologists**
Time periods	**1930s**	**1930s and 1940s**	**1950s and 1960s**
Researchers	Jacob Moreno, Kurt Lewin, and Fritz Heider who were prominent gestalt theorists and who fled from Nazi Germany to the US.	Lloyd Warner & Elton Mayo	John Barnes, Clyde Mitchell, and Elizabeth Bott
Main focus of research	Influenced by "gestalt" psychology, the research focused on influence of group organizations on individual perceptions	The research focused on the decomposition of large-scale social systems into cohesive sub-groups of informal relations	Rather than integration and cohesion, the interest was on configuration of relations that result from the use of conflict and power
Main questions of research	Moreno: How "social configurations" relate to psychological well-being; How small-scale interpersonal configurations relate to large scale "social aggregates" such as the economy and the state. Lewin: How group perceptions construct the environment in which the group is embedded. Heider: How individuals' attitudes towards others are balanced.	Warner & Mayo: How economic action is structured by non-rational elements such as group solidarity.	Barnes: How interpersonal relations of kinship, friendship, and neighboring relate to larger "total network" of relations. Bott: What types of different networks are formed of the kinship relations? Mitchell: How can society be conceptualized as the "total network?

	Sociometric analysis	Harvard researchers	Manchester Anthropologists
Table 4.1 Continued…			
Time periods	**1930s**	**1930s and 1940s**	**1950s and 1960s**
Research Method	Sociometry.	Application of sociograms in anthropological fieldwork research.	Sociometry and anthropological field work
Findings/Contributions	Moreno: Sociogram allowed for graphical representation of the flows of interest such as information and reciprocity. Also it allowed for the analysis of the more central as well as the more isolated individuals. Lewin: Mathematical models are used by later researchers. Heider: His emphasis on cognitive balance of attitudes was generalized to interpersonal balance in groups.	Both Warner and Mayo labeled the term "clique" which refers to non-kin, informal groupings. Warner designated the cliques as the second important channel after the family which helps individuals' integration into larger society.	Barnes & Bott conceptualized the social structure as the "total network"; hence social relationships and configurations are explicitly labeled as "networks". Mitchell: the study of the partial networks by focusing on the ego-centered networks. According to Mitchell, this represented one way of exploring the "total network" since ego-centered networks account for all possible types of social relations of particular individuals. Mitchell also argued that partial networks can be examined by focusing on content of the relations such as political ties and work relations.

It should be noted that the focus of these earlier studies ranged from the social network influence on psychological wellbeing to individual and group level perceptions, as well as to the workings of macro-structures such as the economy and the state. In particular, the Manchester anthropologists of the 1950s and 1960s attempted to account for the society as the complete network; hence small-scale, primordial relationships were conceptualized as constitutive parts of that larger network.[112] Scott also underlined the breakthrough in social network analysis with the work of Granovetter, which provided an analytical differentiation between the strong and the weak ties.[113] In addition, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, Putnam's discussion about bonding and bridging social capital was also informed by this study.

According to Granovetter, social network dynamics were crucial in order to "relate micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns".[114] The strength of inter-personal ties, in turn, was deemed an important aspect of small-scale interaction, which was likely to have a significant bearing on macro phenomena such as "diffusion, social mobility, political organization and social cohesion in general".[115]

In his analysis, Granovetter recognized the fact that relations with the family and friends were more likely to display the strong ties. He also suggested the primacy of the workplace as well as the organizational membership as structures, which were likely to accrue the weak ties. Despite the importance given to certain role labels, however, tie properties determined the tie strength. Indeed, the examination of tie strength at the individual tie level is one significant difference between the sociological and the social capital accounts of social networks.

The next section will discuss Granovetter's elaboration on tie strength. This discussion is important because the collection of social network data as well as a series of network variables rely on tie-level information, and tie strength provides significant information in the analyses.

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[112] Ibid., 27-33.

[113] Ibid., 33-36.

[114] Granovetter, *The Strength of Weak Ties*, 1360.

[115] Ibid., 1361.

4.2. Social Networks: An Enquiry at the Tie Level

Granovetter's differentiation between the strong and the weak ties lay in his hypothesis, which argued: "Weak ties are more likely to link members of *different* small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups."[116] Elaboration of this hypothesis also brought a closer examination of yet another concept in network research; that of the bridge. A bridge was defined as the "line in a network which provides the *only* path between two points."[117]

Granovetter acknowledged the fact that in many large networks, there existed more than one link between any given two points. In these instances, ties which provided the shortest route between two given points, were defined as the local bridges and they were argued to be instrumental for information diffusion.[118]

Two important points arose from the discussion of the bridges: The first point was the fact that not all weak ties were bridging ties, yet all bridging ties were of the weak ties.[119] The second point was that "the significance of weak ties, then, would be that those which are local bridges create more, and shorter, paths…The contention here is that removal of the average weak tie would do more "damage" to transmission probabilities than would that of the average strong one."[120] Accordingly, weak ties were instrumental to the extent that they provided pools of bridging ties and more often information diffusion relies on these types of ties.

Granovetter made a similar type of argument for social cohesion at the community level. The abundance of strong ties had the potential to break down the community into isolated cliques "unless each person was strongly tied to *all* others in

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[116] Ibid., 1376.

[117] Ibid., 1364.

[118] Ibid., 1364.

[119] Ibid., 1364.

[120] Ibid., 1365-1366.

the community."[121] Moreover, in cases whence the community under question was "marked by geographic immobility and lifelong friendships"[122], the weak ties would also fall short in connecting the cliques, unless they were bridges. In other words, in the absence of bridging ties, the weak ties were designated as equally likely to provide redundant ties like the strong ties. Hence, the friends of friends, in some instances, only enlarge the number of individuals of a given clique rather than acting as the bridges across cliques. "It is suggested, then, that for a community to have many weak ties which bridge, there must be several distinct ways or contexts in which people may form them."[123] According to Granovetter, the workplace and the organizational membership provided such contexts in which bridging ties are likely to be established.[124]

Granovetter's emphasis on organizational membership as a potential structure of bridging relations is reminiscent of the social capital literature's emphasis on the civil society involvement. This literature also discusses workplace relations, yet its emphasis falls on relations with the colleagues. The difference in Granovetter's discussion is the designation of both the workplace and the organizational membership as the structures with potential bridging ties. These structures, then, can well be named *the bridging structures* and they are likely to enlarge one's social circles beyond relations with close circles of the family, relatives and best friends.

The discussion on the differentiation among the network ties on the basis of tie strength is also related to its measurement: "the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie."[125]

As already mentioned, Granovetter argued for the measurement of the tie strength at the tie level, which is different from the measurement of the social capital literature. In his empirical study on the information diffusion in the labor market, he used frequency of contact as the measurement of the tie strength. In this study, he found that

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[121] Ibid., 1374.

[122] Ibid., 1375.

[123] Ibid., 1375.

[124] Ibid., 1375.

[125] Ibid., 1361.

those who sought professional, technical, and managerial jobs in a Boston suburb had either occasional or rare contact with the person through which the job was found.[126]

However, Granovetter's reliance on the frequency of contact did not mean that primordial relations were unimportant for the measurement of the strong ties. For instance, in his elaboration of the tie influence on community level cohesion, ties with the family circles and friends were regarded as the strong ties.[127] Likewise, he designated the role labels of "friend" and "acquaintance" used in Milgram's well-known study as the "strong" and the "weak" ties respectively.[128] Lastly, in his own study, those occasional and rare contacts happened to be contacts "such as an old college friend or a former workmate or employer."[129] All these examples provide ample evidence for the viability of the social capital literature's regard of family relations as the strong ties and of the relations with the colleagues as the weak ties. As noted, one significant challenge to this literature is Granovetter's measurement at the tie level by also counting on other determinants of tie strength such as the frequency and duration of contact.

In sum, from Simmel onwards, individuals' relations with primordial and secondary groups seem to raise curious questions. Social capital literature also counts on this differentiation in its discussion of bonding and bridging social capital and their respective measurements. Yet, different from social capital accounts, sociological studies which focus on social networks, count on individual tie properties in order to make inferences about the tie strength. Nevertheless, this literature also regards the family and close friends as structures with potential strong ties. Likewise, workplace and organizational membership are mentioned as the bridging structures with the potential for weak as well as bridging ties.

Sociological accounts examine social networks as the structures of relational ties. As a result, the examination of social networks at the individual tie-level as well as the differentiations made about the tie strength are instructive for both data collection and analysis.

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[126] Ibid., 1371.

[127] Ibid., 1375.

[128] Ibid., 1368.

[129] Ibid., 1371.

4.3. Social Networks: Data Collection

Marsden argued that surveys are used the most frequently to elicit network data followed by archival sources. Besides these, "diaries, electronic trace, observation, informants, and experiments" are also used.[130] The type of network questions, in turn, is dependent on the research interest. If the emphasis is on the structural properties of a given small network, complete network data is collected, which requires eliciting of all possible ties of a given network; alternatively, the emphasis may be at the level of the individual actors, which is also suitable for probability sample surveys.

> Here, analysts may seek to explain differences across actors in social position, or to link such differences to variations in outcomes (e.g. well-being)...Variously known as egocentric, personal, or survey network data, this method samples individual units, or stars, and enumerates the local networks surrounding them...this approach gives representative samples of the social environments surrounding particular elements and is compatible with conventional statistical methods of generalization to large populations.[131]

Marsden designated boundary specification as a problem common to the collection of both complete and egocentric network data because an arbitrary delimitation of a given network may distort the research results. For complete networks, a series of specifications were noted, such as the reliance on attribute properties like membership in formal organizations or on behavioral properties such as participation in various events like "publications in scientific journals or Congressional testimony".[132]

In the case of egocentric data, the researcher had to determine which alters would be included in the network. Barnes labeled the account of only the direct contacts of the ego as *the first-order zone*.[133] Most of the egocentric research used this specification for

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[130] Peter V. Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," *Annual Review of Sociology* 16, no.1 (1990): 440.

[131] Ibid., 438.

[132] Ibid., 439.

[133] Ibid., 439.

reasons related to data collection convenience.[134] However, Granovetter argued that when the research concerned the ego's manipulation of his/her network, ties through intermediaries would prove significant as well. Indeed, the first-order contacts would be more likely to elicit the strong ties, whereas the contacts of the first-order contacts would more likely to include the weak and the bridging ties.[135] Granovetter's suggestion seems viable for a narrower research focus. Yet it may prove quite challenging for probability sample surveys.

In general, name generators are used to collect egocentric network data, which ask the respondents the names of his/her contacts of various social exchanges.[136] These social exchanges are multiple, such as talking about family problems and weekend socialization, to borrowing money and finding a job.[137] Yet, on the basis of individuals' purpose of action, they could also be classified under two broad categories of expressive and instrumental action respectively.[138] Expressive actions, then, are for "preserving and maintaining resources"[139] and they "have physical health, mental health, and life satisfaction as returns".[140] Alternatively, instrumental actions are for "searching for and obtaining resources"[141] in order to increase one's "wealth, power and reputation".[142] Based on the researcher's interest, name generator questions can be focused on the ego's contacts for items related either to expressive or instrumental action, or both.[143]

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[134] Ibid., 439.

[135] Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1370.

[136] Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," 439.

[137] Ibid., 441. See Ruan Danching, "The Content of the General Social Survey Discussion Networks: An Exploration of General Social Survey Discussion Name Generator in a Chinese Context," *Social Networks* 20, no.3 (1998): 247-264

[138] Lin, "Building a Network Theory," 17-20.

[139] Ibid.,10.

[140] Martin Van der Gaag and Tom Snijders, "The Resource Generator: Social Capital Quantification with Concrete Items," *Social Networks* 27, no.1 (2005): 21.

[141] Lin, "Building a Network Theory," 10.

[142] Van der Gaag and Snijders, "The Resource Generator," 21.

[143] Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," 441.

Despite the detailed information name generators are able to elicit, the use of multiple name generators without an upper limit to the network size is not possible in multi-item surveys due to time restrictions. In his 1984 study, Burt suggested a condensed version of the name generators for multi-item surveys, which focused on important matters name generator.[144] Accordingly, the respondent is only asked about the contacts with whom important matters are discussed. Besides the names, questions about the given tie strength as well as its attribute properties are used to elicit the structure of individuals' core discussion networks.[145] This version of the name generator is widely known as the name generator/interpreter. It was first used in the 1985 US General Social Survey (GSS) and re-administered in the US in the 1987 and the 2004 GSS.[146]

For the purposes of the present dissertation, network data collected for probability sample surveys are more relevant. The brief enquiry thus far has revealed that different types of name generators are the most suitable for this type of research. When surveys focus primarily on social networks, a series of name generators for different social exchanges can be used. Cross-country surveys of the International Social Science Program (ISSP) of 1987 and 2001 respectively, are cases in point. In multi-item surveys, on the other hand, the name generator/interpreter module *a lá Burt* seems more convenient. One significant common feature of all types of network data collection methods is their focus on relational ties and networks associates' attribute and attitude properties. The consequence of this commonality is the shared interest over a series of network variables.

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[144] Ronald S. Burt, "Network Items and The General Social Survey," *Social Networks* 6, no.4 (1984): 293-339.

[145] Burt, "Network Items" 293-339. Also see Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," 441,442.

[146] For research modules of the US General Social Survey see, http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Collections/ , accessed December, 18, 2011.

4.4. Social Network Variables

One significant social network variable is the *network size,* which concerns the extensity of a given network. Marsden wrote that network size is used to measure "integration, popularity, or range".[147] In network terminology, the range referred to "the extent to which a unit's network links it to diverse other units".[148] Accordingly, the possibility of diverse ties increases with the increase in the network size. Hence the network size and the range are directly proportional.[149]

Figure 4.1 Operationalization of Network Size

Conceptual definition:
The number of indicated ties
⬇
Unit of measurement: each indicated tie

The researcher may put an upper limit to the number of the network size, especially in cases of time restrictions. Limits in multi-item surveys are stricter. One exception is the 1985 GSS, in which no limitations were introduced for the important matters name generator. However, name interpreter questions were asked only to the first five alters mentioned. [150] Burt suggested three alters as the minimum to be asked in order to reveal variation in inter-alter relations.[151]

Another frequently used network variable is the *network density*, which concerns the weight of the indicated ties. Density can be measured in two ways: the first density measure is for the dichotomous data, which is based on whether or not a tie exists

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[147] Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," 453.

[148] Ibid., 455.

[149] Ibid., 455
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[150] Ibid., 442.

[151] Burt, "Network Items," 314.

between the indicated alters. It is calculated by dividing the sum of the existing ties by those possible.[152]

An alternative measure of network density is calculated when data about tie strength are collected. Marsden stated that closeness, frequency, and duration of the contact were among the most frequently used measures of the tie strength. Yet duration was argued to overstate the relations of kinship, and frequency was stated to emphasize the relations with co-workers and neighbors.[153] A second measure of network density, then, can be calculated as the mean strength of the indicated relationships.

Figure 4.2 Operationalization of Network Density

Conceptual definition:
1) The proportion of links present relative to those possible
OR,
2) The mean strength of connections among units in a network
⬇

Unit of Measurement:
1) Dichotomous measure of whether or not a tie exists between alters
OR,
2) Strength of each tie between alters
⬇

Variables of Tie Strength:
Closeness of the relationship
Frequency of contact
Length of acquaintance

According to Burt, the network density was inversely proportional to the network range, since denser networks were expected to display less diversity. Burt's discussion of the network range also relates to the third frequently used network variable, which is the *network diversity*.[154]

Network diversity can only be calculated when data about alters' attributes and attitudes are collected. Hence network diversity concerns the attribute/attitude similarity/difference at the network level. The attribute variables are multiple such as sex, age, education level, role relationship, and the like.

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[152] Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," 453. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1370.

[153] Marsden, "Network Data and Measurement," 455.

[154] Ibid., 455.

Attitude variables, on the other hand, are subject to research interest. In the 1987 GSS, political affiliations were asked for.[155] A series of political research also enquired into the frequency of political discussion, besides the political affiliation.[156] There are also studies which focused on respondents' trust in their alters[157] and the closeness of views in certain topics.[158] Variance of a given attribute and/or the extent of similarity/difference of a given attribute/attitude at the network level inform the calculation of network diversity.

Figure 4.3 Operationalization of Network Diversity

Conceptual definition:
The extent of similarity/difference of the given attribute/attitude at the network level
⬇

Unit of measurement: Each indicated attribute/attitude
⬇

Variables of Network Diversity
⬇   ⬇

Attribute variables	**Attitude variables**
Sex	Any attitudes of interest such as:
Race	Particularized trust
Gender	Political affiliation
Religion	Closeness of the worldview
Education	Frequency of political discussion, etc.

Different from the social capital literature, a series of recent research in political science employs the sociological framework in order to account for the social network influence on political information and political and civic attitudes. These studies are

[155] David Knoke, "Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction," *Social Forces* 68, no.4 (1990): 1041-1063.

[156] See Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague, "Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information," *American Political Science Review* 81, no.4 (1987): 1197-1216; Bruce C. Strait, "Bringing Strong Ties Back In: Interpersonal Gateways to Political Information and Influence," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 55, no.3 (1991): 432-448; Diana A. Mutz, "The Consequences of Cross-cutting Networks for Political Participation"; Lilach, Nir, "Ambivalent Social Networks and Their Consequences for Political Participation," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 17, no.4 (2005): 422-442.

[157] Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," 51-68.

[158] Diana A. Mutz, "Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice," *American Political Science Review* 96, no.1 (2002): 111-126.

significant in order to understand the relevance of the network variables, which rely on tie-level information.

4.5. Relevance of Social Network Variables in Political Research: Examples from Recent Studies

As explained in detail in the previous chapter, the interest in social networks has arisen in political research with the studies on social capital.[159] One earlier study in political science - which was an exception, however - was Lazarfeld, Berelson and Gaudet's *People's Choice.*[160] This study investigated the determinants of the individuals' voting behavior. It was conducted in a small US county, Erie County, during the US presidential elections campaign in 1940.[161]

Social network influence on vote choice was designated as an unexpected finding of the study. This influence surfaced during the research whence the respondents mentioned particular individuals who provided short cut political information about the candidates as well as their issue positions. These individuals were labeled as the opinion leaders, who were keenly interested in politics and who professed a good deal of political knowledge. They were more exposed to media influence as well.[162]

Besides the opinion leaders, *People's Choice* also mentioned another type of network influence, which concerned the information the ego received from his/her

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[159] This statement is not to underestimate a series of influential studies in political science which focused on the influence of the family, the school, the workplace and the civil society organizations on political and civic attitudes. See for instance Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba and Nie, 1972; Huntington and Nelson, 1976. Yet, these studies focused primarily on political socialization; hence the interest was to discern the authority structures embedded within those institutions. As such, the studies lacked a social network approach, which demands a concern for interpersonal relationships within the given social groups and institutions.

[160] Paul F. Lazarfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968).

[161] Ibid., 1-9.

[162] Ibid., 49-51.

network alters. Accordingly, the increase in the variety of political opinions was found to expose individuals to cross-pressures, which delayed their vote choice.[163]

Lazarfeld and his collaborators conceptualized cross-pressures both at the level of different social groups/categories and of interpersonal relations. The conflict between one's religious identification and socio-economic status; one's occupation and his/her self-identification of class were examples of the former. The discrepancy of opinion between the individual and his/her family members and/or close associates were examples of the latter. Among these different types of network influence, the lack of complete agreement within the family was found as the strongest of cross-pressures.[164]

Lazarfeld and his collaborators' cross-pressure thesis was both significant and novel. Although the study was published as early as 1944, however, the cross-pressures thesis has been explored more vigorously only in the last two decades. The systematization of the measurement of individuals' social networks through the name generator/interpreter can well be given credit for the re-vitalization of this rather dormant research area. Prior analyses relied on membership of different social categories as the proxy of cross-pressures, because these types of memberships were assumed to be potentially conflictual. Mutz informs us that the research in this strand vanished by the 1970s, because substantial evidence contra Lazarfeld was accumulated.[165] Once the surveys become better equipped to account for individuals' social networks however, the cross-pressures thesis regained importance. The network diversity variable, which is derived from the name generator/interpreter, proved particularly relevant in this regard.

In her study, Mutz, for instance, enquired into whether or not cross-pressures hindered participation in election campaigns as well as voting decision. The author operationalized cross-pressures as the extent of one's exposure to dissonant political views within one's discussion networks.[166] Besides the exposure to the dissonant views

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[163] Ibid., 60, 61.

[164] Ibid., 138-145.

[165] Mutz, "The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks," 838, 839.

[166] Two nation-level representative surveys were used in the study. The first survey used political discussion name generator/interpreter as the network module, and the second survey employed important matters name generator/interpreter. Also in the first survey, the following five items were used to discern the extent of individuals' exposure

variable, another network diversity variable was also used which measured the frequency of political discussion indicated for the network alters.[167] Lastly, network size variable was computed as the total number of indicated discussants.

Mutz's analysis provided evidence for the relevance of Lazarfeld's cross-pressures thesis. Individuals' exposure to dissonant political views was found to decrease participation in the election campaign and it influenced the decision to vote. Alternatively, networks of more frequent political discussion were found to influence both dependent variables positively.[168] In a subsequent analysis, Mutz further showed that crosscutting networks were also significant in explaining individual ambivalence towards the running candidates.[169]

Along Mutz's lines, Nir also tested Lazarfeld's cross-pressures thesis.[170] According to Nir, there were both external and internal sources of cross-pressures. Social networks were related to external sources, whereas individual level ambivalence was designated as the internal source of cross-pressures.[171] In line with this framework, in her analysis, Nir computed the relative influences of the individual and the network level of ambivalence. Once again, the network ambivalence was a network diversity variable which accounted for the extent and the intensity of different political views at the network level.[172] Network size was also included in the analysis.[173]

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to dissonant political views: (1) the extent to which the political views of the respondent and the discussant resemble each other, (2) whether or not the alter favors Democrats, Republicans, both, or neither, (3) the favorite presidential candidate of each alter, (4) the extent to which each alter share most of the respondent's political views, (5) the extent of disagreement with each alter during a political discussion. In the second survey, an item which measured the extent of disagreement about the presidential candidate, was used to measure cross-pressures at the network level. See ibid., 841-843.

[167] Ibid., 842.

[168] Political interest, strength of partisanship, and education levels were also found significant in the analyses. Network size did not reveal a robust influence. See ibid., 844.

[169] Ibid., 849, 850.

[170] Nir, "Ambivalent Social Networks," 421-442.

[171] Ibid., 424, 425.

[172] Accordingly, both Mutz and Nir operationalized cross-pressures differently. Mutz was interested in the extent of dissonant political views in comparison with the

In Nir's analysis, network level ambivalence was not found significant for either the campaign participation or voting. However, it proved significant for the vote decision time once it was entered into the analysis as the interaction variable with individual level ambivalence.[174] The interaction pattern revealed that network ambivalence delayed voting decision time for ambivalent individuals, whereas, non-ambivalent individuals were likely to decide their votes earlier.[175]

A recent study by Baker, Ames and Renno which was conducted in Brazil, also utilized similar questions.[176] The authors argued that notwithstanding valuable research done on social network influence on political participation across stable democracies, network influence may be more pronounced across new democracies, because political preferences were more volatile due to unstable party systems and weak political attachments. Brazil was considered an under-institutionalized democracy with only approximately thirty or forty percent of the electorate with partisan attachment.[177]

The authors posed the research question as follows: "What factors can help explain why some Brazilians were more likely to change their minds than others during

respondent, whereas Nir focused on the extent and intensity of dissonant views at the network level. She named this variable the network ambivalence.

[173] The study was based on two-wave panel data set of the 2000 American National Election Study. A political discussion name generator up to four people instructed the network data. The network level ambivalence variable was derived from the post-election survey and it was computed as follows: First, dummies were formed to reflect the dyads of agreement and disagreement between the respondent and the discussant about the respondent's preferred candidate. From these dummies, the summative scales of agreement and disagreement were computed. The balance of agreement and disagreement, then, was calculated by applying the modified version of Griffin's individual ambivalence index to the network-level ambivalence variable. For other variables used in the study, see ibid., 428-431.

[174] Individual level ambivalence proved significant for campaign participation. In the analysis, political involvement variables of political knowledge and political interest were found significant for both campaign participation and voting. Strength of partisanship was significant only for voting, ibid., 433-437.

[175] Ibid., 434-437.

[176] Andy Baker, Barry Ames, and Lucio R. Renno, "Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil's 2002 Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no.2 (2006): 382-399.

[177] Ibid., 385, 386.

the 2002 campaign? And how, if at all, did networks and neighborhoods exert an influence over preference volatility?"[178] Similar to Mutz and Nir, network diversity variables, which were informed by the political preferences of the network discussants, were instructive in Baker and his collaborators' analysis. Two such variables were used. Network disagreement referred to aggregate disagreement of discussants' vote preferences from the respondent's preference. Network heterogeneity, alternatively, was the number of different presidential candidates present in a given respondent's network.[179] The authors also went for a similar differentiation at the neighborhood level.[180]

The analysis found that disagreement at both the network and the neighborhood levels increased the likelihood of vote switching, whereas vote switching became less likely with increase in network heterogeneity. According to the authors, this finding indicated that while network heterogeneity exposes a given respondent to alternative views, it also falls short of persuading the respondent to change his/her vote preference in one certain direction.[181]

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[178] Ibid., 387. In order to account for the research question, a three wave panel-study of eligible voters in two mid-sized Brazilian cities was conducted in the year 2002 about the first round presidential elections. Those respondents who changed their vote decisions from the pre-election survey in August to first round elections of the 2002 presidential race constituted the dependent variable of the analysis. Network variables relied on political discussion name generator/interpreter. See ibid., 387, 388.

[179] This differentiation proves insightful especially for multi-candidate and/or multi-party contexts. In Baker and his collaborators' study for instance, four presidential candidates were running in the first round of elections in 2002; hence a network of three disagreeing discussants could take a value of three as the network disagreement variable. However, the network heterogeneity variable would vary according to how many different candidates were expressed in one's network. See ibid., 388.

[180] The neighborhood disagreement variable was the share of the neighborhood residents who disagreed with the respondent. Alternatively, neighborhood heterogeneity referred to the effective number of candidates supported in a given neighborhood. Besides the variables of network and neighborhood influence, media exposure, strength of partisanship, party contact and political knowledge were also included in the analysis. Gender, education, income and age were counted upon as demographic variables. See ibid., 388, 389.

[181] Neighborhood heterogeneity was also found to increase the likelihood of vote switching, yet its influence was lower than both the network and the neighborhood disagreement variables. Political knowledge and education were also two other positively significant explanatory variables of vote switching. For results of the analysis, see ibid., 389-393

Further examples of studies which focus on social network influence on political participation can be provided. [182] These studies share a series of common features. First, the analyses focus on the relational data to discern the social network influence. Second, largely due to the research interest in political information, much of this research uses political discussion name generators in their analyses. The third common feature relates to the network variables. The network size and the network diversity variables are frequently used, and network diversity variables prove particularly relevant for this strand. As the examples also showed, the researchers have come up with novel measures in order to account for the influence of network diversity on political outcomes.

Are there any studies which relate these social network measures to civic attitudes? The answer to this question is an affirmative, although their numbers are fewer. Mutz, for instance, enquired into the social network influence on tolerance; Price and collaborators focused on social network influence on civility, and Gibson wrote on the relationship between social networks and generalized trust as well as democratic support.[183]

In her study, Mutz questioned whether the extent of one's exposure to different opinions contributes to his/her awareness of the oppositional views as well as tolerance. This question was related to democratic institutionalization because citizens' tolerance towards competing views acted as the guarantee of the individual rights and freedoms.[184] Mutz used the same datasets and similar network diversity variables as her

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[182] See for example Huckfeldt and Sprague, "Networks in Context," 1197-1216; Robert Huckfeldt, Jeanette Morehouse Mendez, "Disagreement, Ambivalence, and Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks," *Political Psychology* 25, no.1 (2004): 65-95; Robert Huckfeldt, Ken'ichi Ikeda, and Franz Urban Pappi, "Patterns of Disagreement in Democratic Politics: Comparing Germany, Japan, and the United States," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no.3 (2005): 497-514; Robert Huckfeldt and Jeanette Morehouse Mendez, "Moths, Flames, and Political Engagement: Managing Disagreement with Communication Networks," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no.1 (2008): 83-96.

[183] Diana C. Mutz, "Cross-cutting Social Networks," 111-126; Vincent Price, Joseph N. Cappella, and Lilach Nir, "Does Disagreement Contribute to More Deliberative Opinion?," *Political Communication* 19, no.1 (2002): 95-112; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," 51-68.

[184] Mutz, "Cross-cutting Social Networks," 111, 112.

prior study on political participation. The variable which measured the extent of one's exposure to dissonant views, was identical in this study. In addition, Mutz also explored one's exposure to consonant views based on the extent of the similarity of network discussants' political views with the respondent.[185]

Besides the network diversity variables, Mutz also included network size and network density variables in her analysis. Network size was measured by the number of discussants. The network density variable, alternatively, was measured by asking the respondent the closeness of the relationship: whether the discussant was an acquaintance, friend, a close friend, or spouse/family member. By using the network diversity question that counted on the extent to which each alter shared the respondent's political views, Mutz further sorted network density variable into three separate variables of closeness within politically dissonant, consonant, and neutral dyads.[186]

Mutz's analysis showed that exposure to dissonant views played a significant role both in one's awareness of rationales for oppositional views and political tolerance. Closeness within dissonant dyads proved also significant for the latter dependent variable.[187] Counting on this last premise, Mutz argued for the primacy of the affective and close ties for funneling possibilities of contentions into tolerant behavior.[188]

Along Mutz's lines, Price and collaborators enquired into the influence of political disagreement on civility.[189] The authors defined civility as the capability associated with others' understandings of some public matter.[190] Civility, in turn, was

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[185] Ibid., 114-116.

[186] Ibid., 117, 123, 124.

[187] Ibid., 116-120. In all analyses, Mutz employed political interest, political knowledge, extremity of opinions, issue-specific awareness, and partisanship as controls along with the network measures.

[188] Ibid., 119, 122, 123.

[189] Price, Cappella, and Nir, "Does Disagreement Contribute to More Deliberative Opinion," 95-112.

[190] Ibid., 97. Civility was operationalized through respondents' "argument repertoire" which was defined as "the range of arguments people hold both in support of and against their favored position on a particular political issue or toward some political object" (p.97). The sample was the February and March 2000 survey of a year long panel study, which was conducted before the 2000 US presidential elections. The respondents were asked how favorable or unfavorable they were towards the

deemed significant for democracies because it allowed for more active citizenry and better-informed civic deliberations.[191]

The political conversation variable was derived from a modified version of political discussion name generator/interpreter. In this version, the authors asked up to two political discussants of close friends or family members and up to two people of acquaintances with whom politics was discussed.[192] Hence the authors structured the discussion networks based on the respondents' role relationships with the discussants. This differentiation also instructed the network diversity variables.

Four network diversity variables were used: frequency of discussion with family and close friends; frequency of discussion with acquaintances; disagreement with family and close friends and disagreement with acquaintances.[193]

Price and collaborators' analysis revealed that disagreement with acquaintances in political conversation, rather than family/friends, influenced individuals' awareness of their own opinions.[194] Positive and significant influence of political disagreement on awareness about given opinions was in line with Mutz's findings of the similar research concern.

Gibson's analysis also dealt with the social network influence on civic attitudes. It enquired into the extent of political discussion and particularized trust across Russian social networks. Gibson regarded this inquiry as significant because he regarded

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Democratic and Republican parties. Once this information was collected, four open-ended questions followed as to the reasons why they were favorable or unfavorable towards the indicated parties. Two variables were derived from these questions which made up the two dependent variables of the study: the number of reasons for one's own opinion index and the number of reasons for why others might disagree index.

[191] Ibid., 95-97.

[192] Ibid., 100

[193] Ibid., 102-104. Respondents' political involvement variables of the strength of partisanship, political knowledge, political interest, and political participation as well as the influence of media exposure and media attention were also included in the analysis. Age, level of education in years, gender and race were the demographic controls.

[194] Besides network variables, political involvement variables of political knowledge, political participation and political interest were also significant and positively related to awareness of one's opinions as well as others' opinions. Education was found to be the only significant demographic variable and mass media was found to have only a limited role in both models. See ibid., 103-107.

extensive weak ties of politically relevant social networks which also displayed high particularized trust levels, as solid foundations for a future vibrant society as well as the ascendancy of generalized trust. Hence social networks were argued to be a possible remedy for the Russian democratic deficit of weak civil society as well as low generalized trust.[195]

Gibson's study employed important matters name generator/interpreter to discern the network information. Name interpreter questions focused on the role relationship between the respondent and the discussants, the frequency of political discussion with each discussant, respondents' particularized trust in discussants, and the extent of political agreement between the respondent and the discussant.[196] The descriptive analyses of these variables showed that "Russians have extensive social networks that are highly politicized and that often transcend the family unit".[197]

Gibson used the role relationships to differentiate between the strong and weak ties. Accordingly, the indicated family ties were regarded as the strong ties, and all non-family ties were accepted as weak ties. By using this information as well as the frequency of political discussion variable, Gibson came up with a network variable, which reflected the political capacity of a given network:

> Capacity is the ability of the social network to transmit political information and to provide experience at politics through political discussion. Networks with high capacity are broad (including many members), are politicized (in the sense of talking about politics being common), and are "weak" (network ties transcend family boundaries).[198]

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[195] Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," 51-55. The study was based on the 1996 wave of a panel study, which lasted from 1996 to 2000. It was representative of the Russian population. Gibson's study also presented comparative data on social networks based on a seven country survey the author conducted in 1995, ibid., 55,56.

[196] Ibid., 56-60.

[197] Ibid., 59.

[198] Ibid., 58, 59. The political capacity index took values between 0 and 9. 0 stood for social isolates, who lacked network partners, and 9 stood for people of high political capacity because their networks were broad and politicized, and their ties were weak.

Gibson showed the significant influence of network political capability on democratic support; hence networks were designated as significant structures for learning about politics and political processes.[199]

In his analysis, Gibson also enquired into the relationship between particularized and generalized trust. Accordingly, network trust and generalized trust were found to be unrelated.[200] However, a relationship was discerned between trust in acquaintances and generalized trust. Gibson regarded this finding as important on the basis that political discussion hardly took place with total strangers. Since the Russians' networks were more of the weak ties, high trust in acquaintances was argued as strategic for Russian democracy to the extent that Russians were good at converting strangers into acquaintances. Notwithstanding the novelty of this hypothesis, Gibson relied on correlation analysis to test the relationship between trust in acquaintances and generalized trust.[201] Hence the suggested causal relationship demanded further research.

As noted, the number of studies focusing on social network determinants of civic attitudes are fewer in number than studies on determinants of political participation. Yet, all of these studies relied on name generator/interpreter items, which generally focus on up to three network discussants. Despite the limitation imposed on the network size, variations in discussants' features yield significant and interesting findings. Similar to the case for studies on political participation, the network diversity variable of individuals' exposure to dissonant views surfaced as a significant variable for studies on civic attitudes as well. Accordingly, having discussants of different views in one's networks seem to aid in understanding opposing ideas. This capability, in turn, increases tolerance. Frequency of discussion proved another common and significant

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[199] Support for the democracy variable was an index derived from the factor analysis of the following items: "1) the relative value of social order and individual liberty; 2) support for a free and pluralistic media; 3) support for competitive elections and a multi-party system; 4) support for dissent; 5) rights consciousness," ibid., 63. Gibson also argued that in order for a politically capable network to influence democratic support decisively, democratic ideals should flow within the network as well. Hence high political capacity at the network level was argued to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for dissemination of democratic ideals. After all, what type of political information flowed within Russian discussion networks was not known, ibid., 64.

[200] Ibid., 61.

[201] Ibid., 61.

network variable in studies conducted both on political participation and on civic attitudes.

Different from the studies on political participation, studies on civic attitudes also underlined the importance of the role relationships as a measure of intimacy and closeness. Mutz showed how more intimate ties such as with a family member or a close friend eased the tension created by dissonant views, which, in turn influenced tolerance positively. On the other hand, Price and collaborators showed the primacy of disagreement with acquaintances to provide reasons for one's own ideas as well as others' criticisms of his/her ideas. Acquaintance relationships were also found strategic for Gibson, who hypothesized trust in acquaintances to influence both generalized trust and civil society participation positively.

All these studies show the relevance of treating social network influence at the individual tie-level. This approach seems viable to differentiate between individuals' immediate, close and familiar environments from their more varied relationships established through participation in bridging structures such as the workplace and the civil society.

On the basis of the insights the sociological approach and the following political research present about the social network data collection and analyses, the next section will revise the social capital literature's hypotheses regarding the relationship between social networks and generalized trust.

4.6. Revision of Social Capital Literature's Hypotheses about Social Networks and Generalized Trust

As has been noted, social capital literature frequently uses social capital and social networks as synonyms. Also, although bonding and bridging social capital are defined on the basis of the tie strength, this information is inferred from the group level properties rather than the individual tie-level information. Accordingly, the following two hypotheses of the social capital literature have not yet been tested with a social network approach:

Bonding social capital influences generalized trust negatively.

Bridging social capital influences generalized trust positively.

Bonding and bridging relations are concerned with individuals' social interactions. Bonding relations are those with close associates such as the family and relatives. Alternatively, bridging relations are more likely to relate individuals to different others; hence, they accrue in modern structures such as schools, the workplace and civil society institutions. These assertions focus on relations with different social groups such as the family, relatives and friends.

However, the social network approach is not as comfortable as the social capital literature about group-based relationships. Rather, it deals with the influence of individuals' social relations by relying on three variables, which are informed by tie-level data. These variables are network density, network size and network diversity. How are they related to generalized trust?

Network density reflects the mean tie strength at the network level. Strong ties are argued to close individuals off from alternative sources of information. Since generalized trust is about familiarity with the variable human condition, then the increase in the weight of the strong ties is likely to influence generalized trust negatively. Hence the first hypothesis is:

H1: Higher network density influences generalized trust negatively.

Burt argued for a negative relationship between the network density and the network size. It is likely that the tie strength would loosen as the network expands because each newly added tie would demand time to sustain the given relationships. Also additional ties are more likely to make people more familiar with different others. Besides, the extensive network ties would be expected to provide safety nets for people on which they could rely in order to take more risks about others. Hence generalized trust is as much about the awareness of the variable human condition as it is about the readiness to take risks about the possibility of disappointment by the trustee. The second hypothesis, then, relates to the network size:

H2: Larger network size influences generalized trust positively.

The hypotheses so far have not dealt with the content of the relationships. For instance, in general, the tie strength relates to the role label: relations with family and relatives are more likely to be stronger than friendship relations. Only the network data can tell us the extent to which this assertion proves viable. Also, even if we show that relations with family and relatives are stronger, we still need to account for the extent to which individuals possess these types of relations compared with friendship relations. Not least, we further need to test whether these different types of relations exert

different influence on generalized trust. These considerations bring us to yet another measure, which is the network diversity.

Network diversity deals with the similarity/difference at the network level. This similarity/difference may concern the role labels, worldviews, age or education groups. The point is to explore individuals' diverse relationships, which are more likely to expose individuals to different life-worlds and experiences. Indeed, the diverse relationships are what the social capital literature regarded as the bridging social capital and this diversity is likely to influence generalized trust positively. The third hypothesis can then be stated as follows:

H3: Higher network diversity influences generalized trust positively.

Besides the network variables, another insight of the social network approach is related to the differentiation it made between ties for expressive action and those for instrumental action. Individuals, in general, rely on the former for individual well-being and support, whereas, the latter are frequently mobilized for power and reputation purposes. It is logical, therefore, to expect opposite influences from the social networks in which ties for both the expressive action and the instrumental action rely either on the strong family ties or the weak friendship ties. The fourth and the fifth hypothesis, then, can be written as follows:

H4: Reliance mostly on family ties for both expressive and instrumental action influence generalized trust negatively.

H5: Reliance mostly on friendship ties for both expressive and instrumental action influence generalized trust positively.

It should be noted that the fourth and fifth hypotheses are related to the three prior hypotheses. A social network which relies mostly on ties with family and relatives, is likely to be dense. The size of such a network would also be limited to one's primordial relations; hence it would be rather constricted both in size and diversity. Delimitation within primordial relationships, in turn, would make people suspicious, at best, about those others whose lives are known only from a distance.

A contrary case is a social network which is diverse in terms of friendship ties. Besides their expected diversity, these types of networks are likely to be less dense and more extensive. Once people start relying on relations of their own making for both expressive and the instrumental action, they will be more aware of the variable human condition.

Besides the direct influence of the familiar and close ties on generalized trust, Granovetter also underlined the instrumentality of modern structures in which individuals are more likely to forge bridging relations. These structures are labeled *the bridging structures.* Granovetter postulated the workplace and the civil society institutions as two viable examples of these structures. Education can also be added to this list. Accordingly, individuals' participation in these structures is expected to diversify their weak ties and some of these weak ties are likely to act as bridges across different social networks. Hence they are hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively.

H6: Higher education influences generalized trust positively.

H7: Having a job influences generalized trust positively.

H8: Civil society participation influences generalized trust positively.

It should be remembered that social capital literature has already discussed civil society participation. Accordingly H8 can be replaced by more detailed hypotheses generated by this literature regarding the influence of civil society participation. These hypotheses are:

H8a: Olson type institutions influence generalized trust negatively.

H8b: Putnam type institutions influence generalized trust positively.

H8c: More active types of civil society involvement influence generalized trust positively.

Table 4.2 on the next page shows the revised hypotheses regarding the social network underpinnings of generalized trust. Once the hypotheses are generated, the analysis will focus on the case study, Turkey, in the following two chapters. The fifth chapter will provide socio-political contextual information on Turkey, which is to account for the fault lines which structure the way the citizens in Turkey relate to each other. The sixth chapter will focus in particular on the tests of the above hypotheses for the Turkish case.

Table 4.2 Revised hypotheses as to social network influence on generalized trust	
Tie based relationships	**Structure based relationships**
H1: Higher network density influences generalized trust negatively	H6: Higher education influences generalized trust positively.
H2: Larger network size influences generalized trust positively	H7: Having a job influences generalized trust positively.
H3: Higher network diversity influences generalized trust positively	H8a: Olson type institutions influence generalized trust negatively.
H4: Reliance mostly on family ties for both expressive and instrumental action influence generalized trust negatively	H8b: Putnam type institutions influence generalized trust positively.
H5: Reliance mostly on friendship ties for both expressive and instrumental action influence generalized trust positively	H8c: More active types of civil society involvement influence generalized trust positively

CHAPTER 5

TURKEY: THE CASE STUDY

Starting from the founding fathers of the Republic in 1923, the governments in Turkey have attached great importance to socio-economic development. However, the pace of this development has changed tremendously since the market liberalization reforms of the early 1980s. It took two decades for Turkey to adjust to the liberal economy. The country struggled with high inflation and the recurrent financial crises especially throughout the 1990s, and it underwent a series of IMF sponsored stabilization packages and the World Bank directed structural adjustment programs. Many scholars attribute the present stability of the Turkish economy to sweeping institutional reforms, which were implemented after the 2001 financial crisis.[202]

Turkey is a dynamic economy today. According to the 2011 World Development Indicators, the Turkish economy is the seventeenth largest in the world.[203] It is a member of G-20 together with other emerging markets such as China, Russia, India, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa.[204]

The economic structure of the country has changed tremendously from the 1950s to today. The percentage of agriculture in economic production fell from 49% in 1950

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[202] Two significant books on Turkish economy are Alpay Filiztekin and Sumru Altuğ eds., *The Turkish Economy: The Real Economy, Corporate Governance and Reform* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006) and Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses eds., *Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-crisis Era* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

[203] The World Bank, *2011 World Development Indicators* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank), 12, accessed July, 17, 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

[204] For information on G-20 and its members, see http://www.g20.org/index.aspx, accessed July, 17, 2011.

to 9% in 2009. This trend has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the share of industry from 15% to 26% and of services from 36% to 65%.[205] The change in economic activities is also reflected in the urbanization and literacy levels. In 1950, only 14.5% of the population lived in urban centers.[206] This figure rose to 69% in 2009.[207] McLaren reported 43.5% illiteracy as late as 1970.[208] Primary school enrollment rose to 99% in 2009[209] and illiteracy fell to 9% for the 2005-2009 period.[210]

Turkey seems successful in economic terms, although it is less ambitious in democratic terms.[211] Competitive politics started in Turkey as early as 1946, however it still falls short of qualifying as a liberal democracy. In 2011, the Freedom House qualified Turkey as a "Partly Free" country on the basis of a series of deficiencies in the

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[205] 1950 figures are from Lauren McLaren, *Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Italy, Spain, and Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 87. 2009 figures are from The World Bank, *2011 World Development Indicators*, 200.

[206] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005), 80

[207] The World Bank, *2011 World Development Indicators,* 168.

[208] McLaren, *Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe,* 39.

[209] The World Bank, *2011 World Development Indicators,* 82.

[210] Ibid., 90. The World Bank reported the literacy level as 91%. Illiteracy is inferred from the difference of the literacy level from a hundred.

[211] This statement does not imply that the Turkish economy is without structural problems. According to the 2009 figures, female participation in the labor force, for instance, was only 24%, whereas the male employment amounted to 70%. Also the percentage of women in non-agricultural wage employment is 22%, which indicates high female employment in the agricultural sector. The labor market rigidities against female participation become clearer with the high female unemployment rate (14.3%). However, unemployment is not a problem unique to females. Between 2006 and2009, unemployment in Turkey was recorded as 14%. Within this figure primary school graduates were the most disadvantaged, which made up 52.3% of the unemployed. Lastly, in 2009, 18.1% of the population lived below the national poverty line. This figure rose up to 38.7% for the rural population. As a result, it seems that the gender, education and settlement type are among the structures of uneven socio-economic development in Turkey. See The World Bank, *2011 World Development Indicators,* 26-61.

institutionalization of both political and civil liberties.[212] Freedom House's longitudinal data on Turkey indicate even worse performance in those liberties prior to 2003.[213] The relative betterment since 2003 is related to a series of constitutional reforms enacted in Turkey during the 2002-2004 periods.[214]

Freedom House designated the influence of the military in Turkish politics as an impediment to full democratization, although its influence has decreased substantially in the recent decade. In addition, the national electoral threshold of 10%, which was instituted by the 1980 constitution, was considered to effectively deprive significant amounts of voters of representation in the Assembly. Party closures, which generally punish the Kurdish parties, were also found to be interpreted too broadly; hence, they are frequent.[215]

Freedom House also mentioned problems about civil liberties. Despite the betterment in the last decade, Article 301 of the 2004 revised penal code and an anti-terrorism law enacted in 2006 were mentioned as impediments to freedom of expression. Another law, which came into force in 2007, and which gave the state the right to block certain websites was also found worrying for freedom of the press and

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[212] Freedom House ratings range between 1 and 7. Higher rates indicate poor performance. The ratings measure the extent of both political and liberties. Political liberties concern freedoms related to participation in political processes and civil liberties are the basic individual freedoms such as the freedom of expression, religion, and association. Countries, which score between 1-2,5 are rated as "Free"; between 3-5 are rated as "Partly Free"; 5,5-7 are rated as "Not Free". For more information on those ratings see,
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010
For ratings on Turkey, see "Country Ratings and Status FIW 1973-2011".
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 , accessed July, 17, 2011.

[213] Freedom House, "Country Ratings and Status FIW 1973-2011".
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, accessed July, 17, 2011.

[214] For the overview of constitutional reforms in the last two decades, see Ergun Özbudun, "Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004," *Turkish Studies*, 8, no.2 (2007): 179-196. In particular, the reforms enacted during the initial years of the 2000s were to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership. Until recently, the EU was a powerful anchor of reform in Turkey. Since the declaration of Turkey's candidateship for the EU in 2005, however, the accession negotiations have continued only in a piecemeal fashion.

[215] Freedom House, "Country Report: Turkey (2010)"
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7937&year=2010,
accessed July, 17, 2010.

expression. Along similar lines, intimidation of Kurdish newspapers despite the 2009 law - which allowed broadcasting and publication in Kurdish - was noted as another infringement of basic individual rights. The status of women was also mentioned with reference to the 2009 Global Gender Gap Index. According to this index, Turkey ranked 129 out of 134 countries. Impediments against women with headscarf in education and public employment were also found contrary to rights of expression. Lastly, Turkey did not fare well either, in terms of its compliance with international labor standards. Although labor unions are allowed, union activism remained low.[216]

Turkey's full democratic institutionalization is possible to the extent that it handles the above-mentioned problems of political and the civil liberties. Yet, one peculiarity remains: Turkey is among the few countries with a "Partly Free" Freedom House ratings among comparable cases in terms of its socio-economic development levels and/or experience in democratic politics. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in which the military was once influential in politics, qualified as "Free" countries at least throughout the 2000s. These countries are comparable to Turkey in socio-economic terms as well along with Central and Eastern European countries, South Korea, and South Africa. Similar to the Latin American cases, all these latter countries are free democracies too. In terms of its Freedom House rating, Turkey is comparable to Russia, Mexico and the Philippines.[217] Seen from a comparative perspective Turkey's position becomes all the more curious: why does Turkey constantly lag behind in terms of the institutionalization of political and civil rights?

The present dissertation argues that low generalized trust in Turkey - which indicates the lack in individuals' worthy regard of each other as the fellow men - stands as a viable explanation for the delay in Turkey's quest for full democratization. In other words, citizens in Turkey do not seem interested in the question, "Why have *we, as a society*, consistently failed in our democratization effort?" This question is relevant when citizens regard themselves as significant constituent elements of the society in which they live. Hence they share the feeling of a society. In the absence of this feeling, the citizens at large would only be interested in their own business and would refrain from collective provision of the public goods. Indeed political and civil liberties are

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[216] Freedom House, "Country Report: Turkey (2010)".

[217] Ibid.

among those public goods which are particularly sensitive to citizens' ability to stand up for those liberties and not for individual gain alone, but also for their own worth.

A closer look at Turkish society seems necessary in order to have a better understanding of the socio-political environment in which people at large relate to each other. The focus on the structural and the cultural fault lines of Turkish society, in turn, is likely to unravel the extent to which the social cleavages situate people away from each other. Once Turkish citizens become more visible, the questions about their low regard of each other as the fellow men, and hence low generalized trust in Turkey, can be better attended. More importantly, a detailed account of the influence of the social networks on generalized trust is possible only when the larger societal structures are clearly delimited.

5.1. Historical Roots of Political Modernization and Cultural Cleavages

The establishment of the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923 was a new beginning for the people who inhabited the last remaining territories of the once glorious Ottoman Empire. Although the inauguration of the Republic marked the official end for the Empire, its legacy has been enduring. First of all, Turkish modernization had its roots in the late Ottoman period of the nineteenth century.[218] Second, the uncontested authority of the Ottoman ruling classes was translated into the strong state tradition of the Republican era, which has proven suspicious, at best, towards any interest group and civic activism that diverted from the official line.[219]

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[218] See Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Erik Jan Zürcher*, Moderleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995); Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil eds. *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

[219] See Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, UK: Eothen Press, 1985); Nilgün Toker and Serdar Tekin, "Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasi'ye," in *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık,* eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 82-106; and Alper Kaliber, "Türk Modernleşmesini Sorunsallaştıran Üç Ana Paradigma Üzerine," in *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 107-124.

Third, the social and the cultural cleavage between the Ottoman center - the Ottoman modernizing bureaucratic and the military elite - and the Ottoman periphery - the provincial notables and the bureaucrats who opposed the positivist weight of the modernizing reforms - has proven a long lasting socio-cultural structure with serious implications for Turkey's political regime and its institutions.[220]

Ottoman political modernization aimed at increasing the control and domination of the central state over its territories, institutions, and subjects. For this purpose, starting with Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) a series of military, administrative, legal, economic and educational reforms were put into place.[221] The initial piecemeal reforms became systematized during the so-called Tanzimat reforms (1839-1871). These reforms opened the way for the first, short-lived, constitutional period (1876-1878) and the succeeding second constitutional period (1908-1914).[222] Given the initial Ottoman trial with the constitutional state, the inauguration of the Turkish Republic on 23 April 1920 can well be claimed to be a continuation of the reformist spirit that had taken hold in the Empire.

The Ottoman modernizing reforms were far reaching, from the legal and administrative arenas to the military and economic ones. Recognition of the Muslim and the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire as equals, granting protection to all Ottoman subjects' life and property[223], and the proportionality sought between crime and punishment[224] were ground breaking reforms in the legal arena. These changes put an

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[220] See Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102 no.1 (1973): 169-190; Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no.3 (1969): 258-281. For the influence of the positivism see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "From Culture of Politics to Politics of Culture: Reflections on Turkish Modernity," in *Remaking Turkey*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2007), 47-75; Doğan Özlem, "Türkiye'de Positivizm ve Siyaset," in *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık,* eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 452-464

[221] Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 11-17.

[222] For the political modernization of the late Ottoman period, see Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995).

[223] Ibid., 94, 95.

[224] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across the Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), 19.

end to the Sultan's arbitrary power. Reforms on the military and administrative fronts were no less important. On the military front, the objective was to institute a new army under central state control, and to equip this army with weapons of the latest technology. Likewise, the administrative reforms were geared towards the creation of a centralized and rational bureaucratic hierarchy. The secular schools became the medium for the military and the administrative cadres of the modernized Ottoman state, which placed emphasis on faculties related to rational thinking and the mastery of foreign languages.[225]

As the Ottoman state apparatus was centralized, bureaucratized, rationalized - hence modernized - the once patrimonial Ottoman state was challenged for good. According to Mardin, before the modernizing reforms, the Ottoman realm consisted of two entities: the ruling elites and the masses. Slave administrative and military cadres were among the ruling elites. They were regarded as the forces of the center and the Sultan, who wielded uncontested power, headed them. Alternatively, the rest of the society constituted the peripheral forces, and despite their heterogeneity in terms of religious, ethnic and regional differences, they displayed similarity in terms of their distance to the Ottoman ruling circles.[226]

Modernization reforms and the ensuing ideational currents challenged this so-called center-periphery structure and the vertical relationship between the ruling elite and the masses underwent a major transformation. Rationalization of the bureaucracy and the military, the demand for a constitutional order, and the increased emphasis on secular and positivist ideas brought about a split within the elite circles, which contested the direction of the modernizing reforms as well as their influence on the larger society and culture.

Besides the changes at the elite level, the once well-protected distance between the center and the periphery was shortened due to central state's more assertive penetration into the periphery. In this process, the notables became the center's first tier contacts in the provinces.[227] The shortened distance between the center and the

[225] Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi,* 88-92; 96, 97. Also Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across the Troubled Lands,* 19.

[226] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", 173.

[227] Ibid., 178-179.

provincial notables, however, did not necessarily imply closeness in objectives and ensuing action and behavior. In the Ottoman parliament, the notables "stood for more administrative decentralization and for a continuation of local control over culture."[228] Their first objective ran against the centralizing impulse of the modernizing elite. Alternatively, the second objective was related to the peripheral reaction towards increased secularization in daily life.

Mardin has written that the modern educational institutions benefited only a small group of students, whose fathers were also among the reformist elite and, hence, the men of the center. In other words, these modern institutions were slow to penetrate into the periphery. The result was the lack of cultural integration, which showed itself with the rise of Islam as a strong reference used especially by the notables of the provinces to criticize the secular contents of the enacted reforms.[229]

More dramatic change than the relations with the notables was observed in the center's relations with different *millets*.[230] By the nineteenth century, the rising tides of nationalism were at shores of the Ottoman Balkans. Though modernizing reforms shattered the *millet* system, the Ottomans' centuries-old reliance on religion as the strongest source of identity resulted in a religio-ethnic nationalism across Balkans.[231] As a reaction to separatist demands, the Ottoman elite initially resorted to Ottomanism, and later Pan-Islamism.[232] Yet, the dual processes of territorial dissolution and modernization forced the Ottoman reformist elite to search for their own national

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[228] Ibid., 178.

[229] Ibid., 178, 179.

[230] Before the Tanzimat reforms which recognized Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman realm as equals, non-Muslim subjects were paying a special tax and they were considered lower status subjects compared with the Muslim population. The Ottoman state recognized these non-Muslim communities as distinct; hence, they enjoyed certain autonomy for community level jurisdictions and their religious leaders represented the community members vis-a-vis the state. This system is largely known as the millet system. Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 25.

[231] Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 22.

[232] McLaren, *Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe*, 37.

identity as well. The result was the emergence of Turkish nationalism, which became an influential policy imperative by the early twentieth century.[233]

In sum, the Ottoman Empire underwent significant changes once the modernizing reforms started to be put in place. These reforms altered the centuries-old structure between the center and the periphery. During the modernization period, the intra-elite unity was broken and the modernist elite gained the upper hand in the government. In response, the central religious bureaucracy entered into an alliance with the peripheral forces of the notables and the lower ranking religious bureaucracy in the provinces. Opposition to the secular content of the modernizing reforms under the pretext of Islam constituted a common denominator for this group. Indeed this cultural cleavage became the main political fault line of the Turkish Republic as well.

Another cultural cleavage with long-term implications was the modernizing elite's adoption of Turkish nationalism as a unifying identity. As has been noted, before the narrower ethnic identity, the elite resorted to more general sources of identity such as Islamism and Ottomanism. However the emphases on the latter were to no avail in the face of growing tensions within the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. Indeed it would not be wrong to suggest that the elite adopted and promoted Turkish nationalism as a reaction to separatist movements based on the nationalist tide of the nineteenth century.[234] Whatever the reason for its foundation, once Turkish nationalism was crafted, it remained as the integral element in the nation-building program of the young Republic.[235] The official emphasis on one people and one nation - which is officially defined as the Turkish nation - has become a significant arena of contention especially

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[233] Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 20-26.

[234] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "İslami Vatanseverlikten İslam Siyasetine," in *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, eds.* Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 265-272; Masami Arai, "Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği," in *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, eds.* Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001),180-195.

[235] For Republican policy on Turkish national identity see Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

in the last twenty-five years, when the Kurdish population's demand for recognition has become both more assertive and visible.[236]

5.2. The Turkish Republic: The Political Regime and The Culture

5.2.a. The Political Regime

The Ottoman Empire was among the Central Powers during the First World War. The Empire was defeated and it signed the *Mudros Armistice* on 30 October 1918 with the Entente Powers. Sultan Mehmed VI signed the final peace treaty, the *Sevres Treaty*, on 10 August 1920. However, in those two brief years between Mudros and Sevres, the national resistance movement had already started in Anatolia.

The opening of the Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920 in Ankara preceded the *Sevres Treaty* by only few months. It brought the central and peripheral forces together under one over-arching objective: Independence. Despite the temporary coalition between these two rival groups, the modernizing elite of the center led the Turkish national liberation movement. Mustafa Kemal Pasha emerged as the leader of this movement.[237]

The interim 1921 Constitution was already indicative of the challenge ahead of the crumbling Ottoman imperial system. This constitution was different from the prior Ottoman constitution because "for the first time it proclaimed the principle of national sovereignty, calling itself the "only and true representative of the nation".[238] The reference to the national sovereignty provided the pretext for abolishing the Ottoman

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[236] For the relationship between Turkish national identity and the Kurdish question see Svante E. Cornell, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics," *Orbis* 45, no.1 (2001): 31-47; Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London, Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1997).

[237] Zürcher, *Moderleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 207, 208.

[238] Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey," in *Perspectives and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 10.

Sultanate on 1 November 1922, and the declaration of a republican form of government instead on 29 October 1923, once the Independence War ended in victory.[239]

Since its inception until the present day, the Republic has had three constitutions, which have never been based on broad consensus. As Özbudun has written:

> None of the three republican constitutions (those of 1924, 1961, and 1982) or the Ottoman constitution of 1876 were written by a Constituent or a Legislative Assembly broadly representative of social forces or through a process of negotiations, bargaining, and compromise. Consequently, they all had weak political legitimacy.[240]

The lack of consensus and compromise relates at great length to the sustained divide between the forces of the center and the periphery on the one hand, and their suspicions towards each other on the other.

The 1924 Constitution was found "democratic in both letter and spirit".[241] However, it put strong emphasis on the legislative imperative and it lacked effective systems to check and balance the legislative power. In this sense, the 1924 Constitution was similar to the 1921 Constitution; the difference concerned the members of the Assembly between two time periods. The Assembly between 1920-1923 was composed of more diverse groups. Peripheral forces were present along with the central forces. However in the 1923 elections, the modernist elite of the center, led by Mustafa Kemal, dominated the Assembly through the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was the first political party of the Republic.[242]

Having secured the parliamentary majority, the RPP government accelerated the reformist spirit, which targeted in particular, the cultivation of a modern society based on ties of common citizenship, nationality, rights and responsibilities. Old ties based on

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[239] The Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on 24 July 1923, replaced the prior Sevres Treaty. This treaty accepted the Turkish Republic as the legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire. See Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 45.

[240] Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner, 2000): 52.

[241] Ibid., 52.

[242] The initial name of the party was the People's Party. Its name was changed in 1924 to the Republican People's Party. See http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=67 (18 July 2011).

primordial religious, ethnic, and regional identities were regarded as the anti-thesis of the modernizing reforms.[243]

Between 1923 and 1946, Turkey was ruled by single-party governments despite two attempts at multi-party politics.[244] The 1924 Constitution's emphasis on legislative supremacy eased the RPP's one-sided reform implementation. However, it also deepened the Ottoman tradition of the strong state which, in turn, postponed the center's encounter with the peripheral forces on equal footing under the roof of the Assembly.

Transition to multi-party politics in 1946 further showed that the lack of consensus and compromise was not unique to the central political establishment. On the contrary, shutting the competing forces out of the political arena, or - in cases when such closure was out of question - limiting the playing ground of the opposing groups proved to be a deep rooted mind-set of the Turkish ruling elite, irrespective of whether they represented the center or the periphery.

The Democratic Party (DP) emerged as the opposition party in 1946 and it assumed power in 1950. Mardin has suggested that the DP secured eighty-one percent of the seats in the Assembly by cultivating a political ideology which appealed to the disaffected rural masses and their patrons. Hence the DP was associated with the peripheral forces.[245]

Similar to the RPP, once the DP assumed the majority, it took advantage of the 1924 Constitution and became increasingly intolerant towards the RPP, which became the opposition party. According to Özbudun, the lack of constitutional checks and balances prepared the way for the first breakdown of Turkish democracy in 1960:

> In the absence of effective legal guarantees of basic rights and judicial review of the constitutionality of laws, the DP government passed a series

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[243] The reforms aimed at reducing the weight of religion in government as well as in daily life; hence, it aimed to create a more secular public sphere. The abolishment of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924, the ban on dervish orders, the establishment of a secular education system and the adoption of the Swiss civil code were among the significant reforms. See McLaren, *Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe*, 37-38.

[244] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "From Parliamentary uni-partyism to fragmented multi-partysim: The Odyssey of political regimes in the Turkish Republic," in *Course Reader POLS 550 Turkish Politics*, Sabancı University (2010): 4,5. Also published in *Turkey in the Twentieth Century,* ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2008): 89-116.

[245] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," 184.

of laws that severely restricted the rights of the opposition, which, in turn, caused the opposition to develop a harsh attitude towards the government.[246]

Whether the military would have intervened in Turkey's first trial with competitive politics if the RPP rather than the DP was the ruling party is a hypothetical question with no definitive answer. Yet the question is relevant and it underlines the relationship between the military and the RPP.

The RPP ruled the country single-handedly between 1923 and 1946. Hence, it was among the state elite for a long time. The military was also among the state elite, which regarded itself as the guardian of the Republican regime due to its allegiance to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who was the celebrated commander-in-chief during the Independence War and the founder of both the Republic and the RPP. Hence the military and the RPP had a common descent and represented the modernizing elite of the center. On the other hand, the DP represented the concerns of the periphery, such as the hardships peasants experienced, the emphasis on traditional rural values, a concern for religion, and the demand for less bureaucracy and more private enterprise.[247] Being its structural rival, it is likely that the military was especially concerned about growing authoritarianism of the DP, in particular, rather than authoritarianism per se.

The 1960 coup was short-lived. A new constitution was enacted and parliamentary elections resumed in 1961. The 1961 Constitution undid the legislative supremacy of the 1924 Constitution. Yet the institutions to check and balance the legislative power were motivated by the military's suspicion towards elected politicians. The 1960 coup legitimized the military's presence in Turkish politics, but once again, the constitution was far from being a result of broad societal coalition. The DP, which secured the support of nearly half of the electorate, for instance, had no representation in the Constituent Assembly of the 1961 Constitution.[248]

The military's presence in Turkish politics continued thereafter. The military gave a memorandum to the ruling Justice Party (JP), which was the successor of the DP, on 12 March 1971. This was followed by a more fundamental coup on 12 September 1980. Polarization among the parties and the eruption of political violence provided the

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[246] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 53.

[247] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," 184.

[248] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 54.

pretext for the intervention.[249] The consequence was once again the military's self-inflicted role in shaping and re-shaping the Turkish political landscape through writing and re-writing the rules of the political game.

The 1982 Constitution is military's last brainchild. This time around, the Constitutional Assembly was much less representative than the 1961 Assembly. It had no representatives from political parties and the National Security Council (NSC), which was composed of the high-ranking military officers, had the final say on the constitutional draft. Also, different from the 1961 Constitution, it was quite intolerant towards civil liberties.[250]

Different from the 1960 coup and the 1971 memorandum, the military stayed in power for a more lengthy three years after the 1980 coup. The reason was their objective of a wholesale transformation of the political system.[251] By 1980, the military had lost confidence both in the RPP and the civil bureaucracy, both of which were once its close allies of the center.[252]

According to Heper, socioeconomic differentiation and ideological polarization of the period from 1961 to 1980 were two significant reasons which challenged the unity of the central modernizing elite;[253] Kalaycıoğlu added the change in the electoral system by the 1961 Constitution from multi-member majority rule to proportional representation, which allowed for the entry of the smaller parties into the Assembly.[254]

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[249] Kalaycıoğlu, "From Parliamentary uni-partyism to fragmented multi-partysim," 17.

[250] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics,* 57-58.

[251] Ibid., 57.

[252] For military-civil bureaucracy relations see Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Officers in Turkey: Dilemmas of a New Political Paradigm," in *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change,* ed. Ahmet Evin (Leverkusen, Germany: Opladen 1984), 64-83. For military-RPP relations see Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in *State, Democracy, and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s,* eds. M. Heper and A.Evin (Berlin, New York: Wlater de Gruyter, 1988), 137-158.

[253] Heper, "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Officers in Turkey," 69,70.

[254] For number of parties in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) between 1961-1980 period see William Hale, "Democracy and the Party System in Turkey," in *Turkish Transformation: New Century-New Challenges,* ed. Brian W. Beeley (Huntington, Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 2002), 165-197.

This meant more vocal representation for the minority positions and ideologies. Between 1961 and 1980, the communists and socialists, the nationalists, and the Islamist conservatives found themselves a place in the Assembly.[255]

The increase in the number of political parties meant fragmentation of the political party system and the politicization of the civil bureaucracy. It is true that the 1961 Constitution made the political game fairer, yet the fairness came at the expense of governability.[256] After the politicization of the civil bureaucracy, the tension among the political elite also spilled over into the streets. Towards the end of the seventies, political violence reached its climax.

Between 1960 and 1980, socio-economic and ideological divisions became more explicit and these divisions also found representation in both mainstream and minority parties. A fragmented party system was frequently blamed for increased tension within both the political elite and the masses. Yet with a culture of compromise rather than conflict, a much fairer representative system provided by the 1961 Constitution accompanied with extensive civil liberties could have molded the center-periphery dichotomy into a democratic culture of trust and tolerance towards competing political ideas and positions. However, the cultural divide that this dichotomy was rooted in proved the more influential. By the 1990s, this dichotomy re-asserted itself in Turkish politics under the renewed label of the seculars versus the Islamists.

In contrast to the desire of the military to smooth the ideological polarization and party fragmentation in Turkey through, first, banning the pre-1980 parties from active politics and, second, re-writing the rules of the electoral game with a relatively high 10% national threshold, the numbers of parties mushroomed throughout the 1990s.

After the 1980 coup, the first elections were held in 1983. The military allowed only three parties to run for the elections. The Motherland Party (MP), led by Turgut Özal and which was the only party not supported by the military government, won the majority of votes in the elections. Once the ban on the leaders of the pre-1980 political parties was lifted in 1987, the number of parties running for the elections increased to

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[255] Turkish Workers Party (TWP), the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), National Order Party (NOP) and the succeeding National Salvation Party (NSP) were the new minority parties, which were represented in the Assembly between the 1961 to 1980 period. See Kalaycıoğlu, "From Parliamentary uni-partyism to fragmented multi-partysim," 14.

[256] Ibid., 14.

seven. Three of these parties entered the Assembly. In the 1991 elections, this number had increased to five. [257]

None of the elections held throughout the nineties resulted in a majority government. On the contrary, the Turkish party system of the 1990s was defined by high fragmentation and volatility. [258] The MP and the True Path Party (TPP) competed for the center-right, and the Democratic Left Party (DLP) and the RPP competed for the center-left votes. Besides the fragmentation of the center, largely due to the lack of effective rule by any of these parties, the aggregate support for parties of the center fell gradually. Rather, the extremist parties started to appeal to the masses.[259] The pro-Islamist Welfare Party (WP) secured the majority of votes in the 1995 elections. The nationalist NAP became the second party in the 1999 elections. The pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (PDP) received the highest amount of votes in a series of eastern and southeastern regions in both the 1995 and 1999 elections, although it could not achieve the ten percent threshold to enter the Assembly.[260]

Sayarı underscored the change in the Turkish party system throughout the nineties from one that was defined along the left-right ideological spectrum to one surfacing the conflict between the seculars and the Islamists.[261] Similar to Sayarı, Hale also accounted for the secularist-Islamist divide as a new dimension in Turkish politics. Further, he acknowledged this new divide as the reflection of the old center-periphery dichotomy with certain limitations.[262]

The limitation Hale pointed out related to relatively bridged differences between the urban and the rural masses after decades of modernization and the ensuing rapprochement through education, communications and infrastructural development as

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[257] William Hale, "Democracy and the Party System in Turkey," 169.

[258] Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," in *Politics, Parties and Elections,* eds. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 17-18.

[259] Ibid., 19.

[260] Ibid., 19-20.

[261]Ibid., 20.

[262] Hale, "Democracy and the Party System in Turkey," 179.

well as the more widespread use of the mass media.[263] Similar to Hale, in his analysis of the center-periphery divide in Turkish politics, Kahraman focuses on the transforming influence of the socio-economic modernization from the seventies onwards.[264] Notwithstanding the influence of this modernization, after the electoral victory of the WP in the 1995 elections, the cultural divide between the so-called seculars and the Islamists has proven the more assertive. The heightened mutual suspicion between the so-called secular elite and its followers on the one hand, and the Islamist elite and its followers on the other, revealed the remarkable continuation and mass dissemination of the cultural divide between the modernizing elite and their revisionist conservative adversary since the late Ottoman period onwards. Kalaycıoğlu aptly summarized this divide as follows:

> …What looked like a neat division between a compact and coherent coalition of various elites versus the heterogeneous amalgam of values and lifestyles of periphery has now evolved into a cultural cleavage that widely separates people who experience different lifestyles throughout the country. The rapid social mobilization and democratization, seemed to have contributed to a confrontation of the disparate and parochial lifestyles, values and beliefs. Those who used to live separate lives in different locations in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace have now found themselves as sharing the same streets and resources of the metropolitan areas. They also seem to regularly interact in the same political and administrative contexts provided by the institutions and agencies of the state and local government. When lifestyles and values differ, conflicts often emerge as people start to confront each other to elicit respect for their different styles of life. The bureaucratic norms often come to clash with such demands emanating from the socio-cultural differences of the employees. Consequently, the previous

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[263] Ibid., 179.

[264] Kahraman's analysis is important because he points out the dissolution of the grand coalitions within both the center and the periphery since the seventies onwards due to the transformation induced by socio-economic modernization. Besides the social cleavages of the center and the periphery, Kahraman mentions two new cleavages: the *periphery in the center* and the *center in the periphery*. For instance, the immigrants to metropolitan areas, who supported left-leaning RPP under Ecevit's leadership throughout seventies, were the examples for *the periphery in the center*. Alternatively, throughout eighties and nineties, the right-leaning MP appealed to business groups of both the metropolitan areas and the periphery, while severing its ties with the peasants. Kahraman labels the dynamic and assertive groups in the periphery which support the party in government as *the center in the periphery*. Indeed Kahraman underlines the efforts of the JDP (Justice and Development Party) to embrace this group as its main constituency since the 2000s onwards. See Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi-I: Kavramlar, Kuramlar, Kurumlar* (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2008): 163-237.

cultural division of the center and the periphery has become much more pervasive, perceptible, and constantly present in every nook and cranny of the Turkish polity and society of the 1990s.[265]

The cultural divide that the center-periphery represented was heightened throughout 2000s. With the end of the Cold War, politics resting on ideologies based on economic production and consumption relations lost their appeal. Rather, identity politics gained ground. In the Turkish political scene, parties which argued for the Islamic and the Kurdish identities respectively, have become more visible. Hence, once marginal parties have become influential and dominant during the 2000s. Among the old establishment parties, only the RPP and the NAP are able to attract significant votes.

The Justice and Development party (JDP) was a moderate disciple of the Islamist parties.[266] Despite the JDP's assurance that it supports the secular nature of the Turkish state, its link to Islamist parties has made it suspect in the eyes of both the secular elite and the masses.[267] This suspicion, in turn, had fed the centuries old division between the center and the periphery. However, the electoral victory of the JDP in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections started a period of weakening of the state elites to the extent of their replacement by the peripheral forces.

First, after the 2007 elections, the former foreign minister in JDP government, Abdullah Gül, became the President of the Turkish Republic. Between 2002 and 2007, both President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Constitutional Court acted as "institutional sources of counter-majoritarianism in Turkish politics".[268] The forces of the center, namely the military, the RPP, and the Constitutional Court objected staunchly against Abdullah Gül's candidacy for the presidency. People of the few metropolitan centers,

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[265] Kalaycıoğlu, "From Parliamentary uni-partyism to fragmented multi-partysim," 23.

[266] The Constitutional Court closed WP in 1998 and the Virtue Party (VP) was established instead. This party also proved short-lived and the Constitutional Court closed it in 2001. The succeeding Felicity Party (FP) is still active in Turkish politics. Yet the more important is the split of its members under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan to establish the Justice and Development Party (JDP). Hence JDP was the descendant of the WP tradition. See Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," 19.

[267] William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (Routledge, 2010), 3-29.

[268] Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System," *Turkish Studies* 8, no.2 (2007), 203.

who came together in "Republican rallies", also supported them.[269] This event proved to be the last concerted effort of the central forces to re-design Turkish politics. The following 2007 national elections ended with the JDP's landslide victory, with nearly 47% of the votes. The party increased its vote share in all seven regions in Turkey[270], which also revealed the limited popular appeal of the Republican rallies.[271] Abdullah Gül became the President after the elections; hence, what the secular state elites considered as the "last citadel" was lost.[272]

Another blow fell on military only a year after in 2008 when the Istanbul Prosecutor's Office opened a court case against the so-called *Ergenekon* criminal network - which included retired army officers as well - on the grounds of "attempting to overthrow the government and to undermine its operations by use of violent means."[273] This was the first time the military was held accountable for its actions. The investigations have been widened since 2008. The European Commission's 2010 Progress Report on Turkey indicated that 270 people were charged with being members of Ergenekon, of whom 116 were military officers.[274]

The coalition of the central forces was challenged further when the composition of the Constitutional Court and of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors were changed after the JDP initiated constitutional amendments were accepted in the referendum of September 2010.[275] Indeed, the forces of the center led by the military

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[269] Ali Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory for the "Pro-Islamists" or the "New Center-Right"? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* 12, no.4 (2007): 507-511.

[270] Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey ,* 42.

[271] Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory," 507.

[272] Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey,* 40.

[273] European Commission, *Turkey 2008 Progress Report,* accessed July, 5, 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf, 6

[274] European Commission, *Turkey 2010 Progress Report*, accessed July 5, 2011. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, 7.

[275] Ibid., 7.

lost their relevance just before the June 2011 elections. Further, the JDP secured 49.9% of the popular vote in this election and emerged as victorious for the third consecutive time.[276]

Another winner of the June 2011 elections was the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (PDP). For the central establishment, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which started the Kurdish insurgence across southeastern cities in late 1970s, constitute a direct threat to the Turkish state. The military has been involved actively in the combat against the PKK for nearly three decades.[277] Once Kurds resorted to the legitimate political arena by forming their own parties since the mid-nineties, the ten percent national threshold became the first impediment against their demands for representation.[278] A second impediment was posed by the Constitutional Court, which joined the military in its suspicion of Kurdish intentions. The Constitutional Court closed every Kurdish party which entered the elections since 1995 onwards.[279] As a result, the Kurds entered the elections in 2007 as independents and won 20 seats in the Assembly.[280] In the 2011 elections, they repeated the same strategy and increased the number of their seats to 36.[281]

The 2011 elections championed Islamists and the Kurds, which were once regarded as the peripheral forces by the central establishment. In the meantime, the

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[276] For June 2011 Turkish election results, see http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, accessed July, 6, 2011.

[277] M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party," *Middle East Policy* 13, no.1 (2006): 102.

[278] Kurdish parties targeted representation in the Assembly more seriously when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested in 1999. See Çarkoglu, "A New Electoral Victory," 505, 506.

[279] The People's Democracy Party (HADEP) ran for the 1995 and the 1999 elections before the Constitutional Court banned it. The Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) which replaced it, ran for the 2002 elections. DEHAP was closed as well and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) was established in 2007. The DTP was also closed in 2009. See Sayarı, "Towards a New Party System" 198. For DTP's closure see Cuma Çiçek, "Elimination or Integration of Pro-Kurdish Parties: Limits of the AKP's Democratic Initiatives," *Turkish Studies* 12, no.1 (2011): 15-16.

[280] Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory," 512.

[281] Ruşen Çakır, "BDP Boykotu Fazla Uzatamaz" *Vatan* 01.07.2011, accessed July, 10, 2011 http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Haber/386405/1/Gundem

central establishment has been dissolved. As of 2011, the military, which proved influential in Turkish politics since the first coup in 1960 onwards, has been forced out of the political arena.

In the last decade, these institutions, which were designated as the forces of the center, have lost substantial power. However, this change has not yet translated into a change in the policy-making style of the Turkish political elite. Conflict and polarization rather than deliberation and consensus underscore Turkish policy making culture. Also, as the lengthy quote of Kalaycıoğlu pointed out, the cultural divide - the center-periphery dichotomy - rooted in society seems to continue; this last feature, in particular, is important because it shows the citizens' side of the story. The next section will focus on mass political culture in Turkey and deals with the ways Turkish political structure has influenced the citizens' orientations towards the political actors and institutions on the one hand, and each other as fellow citizens on the other.

5.2.b. Mass Political Culture

Data concerning Turkish citizens' attitudes and behaviors have substantially increased in the last three decades. Though the data were less systematic before, it can well be claimed that Turkish citizens' support for democracy and multi-party competition has proven continuous.[282] Two studies which relied on 1974 nation-wide data, for instance, documented such support at a time when political violence - hence potential political disaffection with democracy as a consequence - was at its height. Further, these studies attested to the divisive policymaking style of the political elite as the reason for regime instability rather than citizens' attitudes.[283]

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[282] For earlier studies, see İlter Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey," in *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change,* ed. Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Lesle Verlag and Budrich, 1984): 84-112. Also Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Political Culture and Regime Stability: The Case of Turkey," *Boğaziçi University, Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies,* 2, no.2 (1988): 149-79. For contemporary studies, see Esmer, *Devrim, Evrim, Statüko,* 74-83. Also Mark Tessler and Ebru Altınoğlu, "Political Culture in Turkey: Connections Among Attitudes Toward Democracy, the Military and Islam," *Democratization* 11, no.1 (2004): 21-50.

[283] Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey,"112, Kalaycıoğlu, "Political Culture and Regime Stability," 165-166.

Things do not seem to have changed much in nearly four decades. Turkish democracy still struggles with hurdles of the long lasting center-periphery dichotomy the political elite has nurtured over decades. The previous section drew attention to the continuous mutual suspicion between the forces of the center and the periphery. The contending forces situated themselves against the other because they claimed unbridgeable differences between what they envisioned as *the Good Society*.[284] Perhaps ironically, however, those forces were structurally equivalent in the manner they projected their ideas despite their claimed differences in the content.

As early as 1975, Frey designated the elite political culture in Turkey as follows:

Possibly the most striking and important characteristic of elite political culture in Turkey is a pronounced tendency to view the world in in-group versus out-group terms…The main impact of this slant on political life has been the chronic degeneration of all attempts at open and legitimate political competition into outright, no-holds-barred political war.[285]

The previous section is a case in point for the continuation of this culture until today, which has bearings for the mass political culture as well. First, a conflict-ridden elite political culture influences the masses' view of democracy negatively. In Esmer's study on mass political culture which relied on 1997 World Values Survey data, the majority of the respondents accorded support for democracy (92%). However, they also designated indecisiveness as an undesired feature of democratic regimes in general. Also, alternatives to democracy such as the rule by a strong leader (41%); technocrats (55%); and even the military (33%) garnered support. According to Esmer, the simultaneous support for both democracy and its authoritarian alternatives begged for explanation, which was given as the citizens' disaffection with the state of democracy in

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[284] Kalaycıoğlu made this conceptualization, which draws attention to the constructed division between the worldviews of the center and the periphery respectively. Accordingly, the forces of the center projected a *Good Society* based on science and rationality, whereas the forces of the periphery set the opposing view based on religion and tradition. See Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics,* 20.

[285] Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in *Political Elites in the Middle East,* ed. G. Lenczowski (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), 65. Also quoted in Kalaycıoğlu, "Political Culture and Regime Stability," 150.

Turkey despite its theoretical appeal. The disaffection, in turn, was associated with the lack of a culture of consensus and compromise at the elite level.[286]

Another implication of the conflict-based elite political culture on mass level attitudes and behaviors was the imprisonment of the micro-level, bottom-up citizens' demands, especially for the individual rights and expressions, into macro-level divisions along cultural and ideological lines. It should be noted that the history of Turkish democracy neatly fits into the narrative of the divide between the center and the periphery. The political elite of all walks should be given credit for the salience of this simple, yet instructive divide. This salience has been achieved despite tremendous socio-economic development and its mobilizing capacity since the inception of the Republic in 1923, which accelerated especially after the economic and political liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s respectively. Only between 1960 and 1980, was the ideological divide along the left-right continuum able to challenge the center-periphery divide. Yet, it re-asserted itself during the 1990s with the new division between the seculars and the Islamists.

Is it not interesting that the history of Turkish democracy relies just too heavily on elite level concerns and discussions? Where do the citizen level demands and expressions enter the political picture? More often than not, Turkish citizens reproduce the elite level divisions at the mass level by aligning themselves along the divisions guarded and deepened by the political elite. However, this situation does not necessarily indicate a passive attitude on the citizens' side. On the contrary, there have been periods of heightened citizens activism in modern Turkish history which have been silenced with the curious alliances among the most unexpected elite forces once such activism started to crosscut the constructed divisions.

The military's curtailment of the individuals' rights of expression and freedom of association with the 1971 memorandum in line with the position of the JP, which was the representative of the peripheral forces in the Assembly between 1961 and 1980, was a case in point.[287] The alliance between the military, the nationalists and the Islamists in crafting the *Turkish-Islamic synthesis* as an antidote for left-wing ideologies and parties

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[286] Esmer, *Devrim, Evrim, Statüko*, 74-79.

[287] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 56-57. Also Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi-I*, 220, 221.

after the 1980 coup is another example.[288] More recently, during its first tenure between 2002 and 2007, the JDP aligned itself with the military, the RPP and the nationalists, which represented the center, in response to Kurdish demands for cultural rights.[289] The same alliance also silenced the demands for the reform of the Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which was found contrary to individual freedom of expression.[290]

All these examples show that the unbridgeable differences between the forces of the center and the periphery vanish against the citizens' activism for enhanced individual rights and freedoms. The consequence of the poor political regard for citizens' activism, which couples with the political elites' zealous defense of the cultural and ideological divisions, has been the delimitation of the political space that is available for the masses. Present day implications of this situation for mass level political culture are twofold. The first implication is the *rising tide of conservatism in Turkey.*[291] The second implication, which also relates to the first one, is the weak civil society involvement. Both implications, in turn, are related to low levels of generalized trust in Turkey.

In their 2009 study, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu designated conservatism as a widespread behavioral and attitudinal code of Turkish citizens. The study is important because it does not limit conservatism to religiosity alone due to rise of political Islam in Turkey since 1990s onwards.[292] Though religiosity proves to be a significant determinant of conservatism, different facets of conservatism such as authoritarianism, dogmatism, anomie, and lack of tolerance are also accounted for.[293] The multi-faceted approach to conservatism, in turn, showed that Turkish citizens at large are under its

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[288] Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey* (New York, N.Y: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009): 8-10.

[289] Çiçek, "Elimination or Integration of Pro-Kurdish Parties," 22, 23. Also see Nora Onar, "Kemalists, Islamists and Liberals: Shifting patterns of Confrontation and Consensus, 2002-06," *Turkish Studies* 8, no.2 (2007): 284, 285.

[290] Ibid., 280-284.

[291] The expression is a direct reference to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu's book with the same title.

[292] Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, *Rising Tide of Conservatism*, 141.

[293] Ibid., 27-63.

spell irrespective of party preferences and ideological positions. Though the RPP constituency was found religiously more liberal than the JDP and NAP constituencies, for instance, no meaningful difference was observed across different party constituencies in terms of dogmatism. Further, the RPP constituency scored higher-than-average anomic tendencies than the JDP constituency, though the latter proved more politically intolerant along with the NAP constituency.[294]

Widespread authoritarian and dogmatic attitudes coupled with anomie and political intolerance is no good news to any democracy striving for liberal democracy; on the contrary, such a conservative behavioral code is likely to impede some of the demands for further individual rights such as the Kurdish demand for education in one's native language; to ignore others like the demands for the reform of Article 301 of the Penal Code; and to consider only those relevant to its own operational code such as the controversy between the seculars and the Islamists about women' headscarves in universities and public employment. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu noted:

> The rise of conservatism not only resulted in the systematic shift of voter choice to the right, but also changed the major political issues, and the very contours of public debate in Turkey from class issues, left-right conflict, distribution of land, mineral resources, property rights, economic growth and development to the role of religions in public space, the meaning and role of secularism in the Republican era, ethnic identity of the Turkish population, and the ethnic conflict between those who purport to know that they are Kurds and all the rest who they designated as Turks.[295]

The superimposition of a deeply divided political elite - which sporadically come together only to smash citizens' activism for enhanced rights and freedoms - onto a highly conservative populace leaves a very constrained space for civic initiatives and civil society activism as well.

Studies on civil society in Turkey have drawn attention to an increase in numbers of associations especially since 1990s.[296] Kalaycıoğlu has pointed out the likely relationship between accelerated urbanization during the time period and the increase in

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[294] Ibid., 32-54.

[295] Ibid., 99.

[296] See for example E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, "Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses," *Citizenship Studies* 7, no.2 (2003): 221. Also Sefa Şimsek, "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality," *Turkish Studies* 5, no.3 (2004): 48.

numbers of associations by counting on the higher intensity of the mushrooming associations in metropolitan centers.[297] Despite the increase, however, the nation-wide representative data show low levels of overall membership in voluntary associations, which amounts to no more than seven percent.[298] The likely influence of such low levels of civic activism remains suspect at best, once the weight of the different types of associations is considered separately.

In their 2011 study, Çarkoğlu and Cenker reported that the highest membership was in political parties, followed by sports clubs and chambers of commerce.[299] This situation changes when civil society involvement other than membership, such as voluntary activity, meeting attendance, and giving donations is considered. The participation levels through these alternative types are around approximately 6%, 4%, and 18% respectively.[300] This means that Turkish citizens' most preferred type of civil society involvement is through giving donations. The dominant association type also changes across these alternative types of civil society involvement. Religious organizations like mosque building associations outnumber political parties across all non-membership type of civil society involvement.[301]

Çarkoğlu and Cenker also group associations as the Olson type associations if they display potential rent-seeking potential such as political parties, chambers of

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[297] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "State and Civil Society in Turkey: Democracy, Development, and protest," in *Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspective*s, ed. Amyn B. Sajoo (London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2002), 252-254.

[298] Ibid., 255. Kalaycıoğlu's data are from the Turkish Values Survey of 1990 and 1997. In their article on civil society in Turkey, Çarkoğlu and Cenker also reported overall membership of associations as around seven percent. See Ali Çarkoğlu and Cerem I. Cenker, "On the Relationship between Democratic Institutionalization and Civil Society Involvement: New Evidence from Turkey," *Democratization* 18, no.3 (2011): 757.

[299] Ibid., 757, 758. This finding is in line with Kalaycıoğlu's findings, which reported highest membership in political parties followed by professional organizations and sports clubs. In their study Çarkoğlu and Cenker treated professional clubs separately as trade unions and chambers of commerce. If they were considered together, then their reported sequence of associations with highest membership would be identical to the one Kalaycıoğlu reported. See Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey," 63.

[300] Çarkoğlu and Cenker, "On the Relationship between Democratic Institutionalization and Civil Society Involvement," 757.

[301] Ibid., 758.

commerce and trade unions, or as the Putnam type associations when they are of the more community and rights based, self-expressive associations such as religious associations and human or women' rights groups. Not surprisingly, political parties dominate the former Olson type group (30%) and religious associations dominate the latter Putnam type group (43%).[302] The authors related citizens' participation in Olson type associations to clientelistic relations because the political space is too narrowly defined to meet demands for autonomous initiatives.[303] The relatively marginal position of associations related to the youth, environment, arts, human or women' rights within the Putnam type group also supports this commentary.[304] All these different associations constitute only 6% of Putnam associations, which is found worrisome for the potential contribution of Turkish civil society to further liberalization and democratization.[305]

The weakness of civil society in Turkey is also accounted for by Toros, whose study focused on civil society associations. A sample of different types of such associations was examined along four dimensions, which were the formational, the legal, the value-based and the impact-related dimensions.[306] These dimensions attempted to reveal the perceptions of the associational members about the institutional depth and breadth, legal rights and freedoms, organizational culture, and institutional capability and the impact potential of civil society associations in Turkey.[307] The objective of the study was to evaluate the aggregate likely influence of civil society in Turkey on democratic institutionalization.[308]

The majority of respondents found associations in Turkey poor on all dimensions. The study showed that associational members are well aware of the limited breadth of

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[302] Ibid., 757-759. Percentages are calculated by using Table 1. and Table.2.

[303] Ibid., 763-765. In his article "Civil Society in Turkey," Kalaycıoğlu also related high levels of membership in political parties to clientalistic purposes, p.73.

[304] Ibid., 758.

[305] Ibid., 766-767. The percentage is calculated by using Table 1. and Table.2. on pages 757 and 759 respectively.

[306] Emre Toros, "Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for Democratic Consolidation: The Turkish Case," *Turkish Studies* 8, no.3 (2007): 398.

[307] Ibid., 399-402.

[308] Ibid., 395-398.

civil society associations in terms of the membership levels as well as the issue coverage.[309]   Especially noteworthy was the majority of the respondents' (66%) designation of the under-representation of such groups like ethnic minorities and women in the Turkish civic landscape.[310] The perceived limitations on individual liberties are a likely cause of such under-representation:

> …more than 77 percent of the respondents think that, in practice, freedom of the press is not established in Turkey, and around 60 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations cannot freely criticize the government. Furthermore, 72 percent of the respondents think that there are obstacles to the enjoyment of basic political rights in Turkey, and around 60 percent of the respondents think that the actions of international civil society organizations are hampered in Turkey.[311]

Despite the respondents' poor evaluation of the civil society associations in Turkey, Toros remains optimistic about the potential contribution of civil society to democratic institutionalization. This optimism owes a great deal to increased civic initiatives in the last few decades, which, according to the author, are likely to continue.[312] Although not mentioned explicitly, however, a cautious tone is felt between the lines, which provided explanations for citizens' poor evaluations of the civil society associations in Turkey.[313] Indeed Toros's caution can well be generalized to the students of Turkish politics at large, who underline the role of the state in the under-development of civil society in Turkey.[314]

The present study also acknowledges the role of the state in the ills of the civil society activism in Turkey. The point it departs from similar studies is its focus on all

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[309] Ibid., 405.

[310] Ibid., 405.

[311] Ibid., 406.

[312] Ibid., 412, 413.

[313] Except the impact-related dimension, the role of the state tradition in Turkey is accounted for as an explanation for respondents' poor evaluation of the respective dimensions. See ibid., 404-412.

[314] See for example Kalaycıoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey," 259-262; Şimşek, "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey," 68,69.; Keyman and İçduygu "Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey," 223.

political elites, and not solely the state elite and the strong state tradition, as acting in detriment to civic activism.

As noted in the previous section, in its third uninterrupted tenure in government, the JDP has proven effective in neutralizing the once dominant state elite. However, issues pertaining to individual rights and freedoms have not yet found an enlarged space for expression. Sunni Muslims may not feel under the threat of the state anymore, yet the state, let alone the elected political elite, is not particularly attentive towards the demands of the Alewis, Kurds, students, and workers either. Indeed the latter issues have no place in the political agenda, which is too pre-occupied with discussions of secularism and Islam. The continuity of the center-periphery dichotomy subsequently seems to be nurtured by the elected political elite, which restricts the political arena to issues of the respective parties' liking, and which are thus rendered controllable. Despite their increase in the last few decades, civil society institutions remain only anecdotal to Turkish democracy, especially on issues of individual rights and freedoms. In that capacity, their influence on democratic institutionalization is marginal at best.

A closer look at the Turkish political context in terms of its historical legacy, the political regime, as well as the culture shows that politics in Turkey has left quite a constricted space for citizens' activism. The sustenance of the historically relevant cleavages until today seems to inflict the public space with uncompromising partisanship and increasing doses of conservatism. The political system in Turkey seems to restrain the citizens' attempts to be involved in issues such as political and civil liberties, which crosscut the existing cleavages, the consequence being the impaired ties among the citizens, which is likely to have significant negative bearings for generalized trust.

Given this socio-political state of the Turkish citizens, what is the influence of societal relationships on generalized trust? The present dissertation aims to uncover the bottom-up structures which may contribute to bridging the existing fault lines among fellow citizens. In this regard, a closer look at the social network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey is crucial. The next chapter will undertake this enquiry.

CHAPTER 6

TURKEY: THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

The previous chapter showed that the socio-political structure in Turkey is divisive and conflictual, and this structure is also likely to influence civic activism negatively. The Turkish historical, political and the societal contexts seem to situate the fellow citizens at a distance from each other; hence, more often than not, collective goods, especially individual and civil liberties, lack due attention.

What about societal relationships? What are the influences of bottom-up relational structures on generalized trust? What role do primordial relations play in an individual's decisions to trust the fellow men? What about the role of friendship relations? Or, can we talk of the social isolation of Turkish citizens, which leaves too little room to discuss the social network underpinnings of trust?

A nation-wide survey will be used in order to show the relational potential for the creation of generalized trust in Turkey. This survey is representative of Turkey's urban population.[315] It was focused in particular on informal economic activities in Turkey and it counted on different items related to this general theme. The World Bank funded the survey and the fieldwork lasted from November 2008 to February 2009. For simplicity, the survey will be referred to as INFORMALITY in the rest of the analysis.

INFORMALITY is among a series of surveys, which employed name generator/interpreter items in Turkey for the first time. The author helped in the design of the network modules in those surveys and she took an active role in INFORMALITY. Because the surveys covered a range of items, core discussion networks rather than more comprehensive ego-networks were investigated. The

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[315] The sample was drawn from the urban population of Turkey. For this purpose, the cities were clustered on the basis of socio-economic criteria and political party preferences. For details of the sample methodology see Fikret Adaman, Ali Çarkoğlu and Burhan Şenatalar, *Hanehalkı Gözünden Türkiye'de Yolsuzluğun Nedenleri ve Önlenmesine İlişkin Öneriler* (Istanbul: TESEV, 2001).

respondents were first asked the initials of the name of the discussant with whom important matters were discussed. Up to three names were collected in this way and this information elicited the tie-based relationships. It was supplemented further with a series of questions about the nature of the relationship between the respondent and the discussants as well as the discussants' demographic features, which were related to network diversity.

In general, name generator/interpreter elicits close and intimate relationships. Being so, they are more likely to account for the strong rather than weak ties. However, both the social capital and the social network literatures argued for the differences between the primordial and secondary relations; in addition, the fourth chapter introduced a series of studies in political science, which used role relationships as an indicator of tie strength. In INFORMALITY, the discussants' role relationships with the respondent as well as with each other were asked. They are categorized as the family, the relatives, the friends, and the acquaintances.

Besides the role relationships, a series of further questions were introduced to further understand the nature of the relationship between the discussant and the respondent. These questions were the respondents' level of trust in his/her discussants, the extent of the similarity in worldviews, and the availability of financial help in times of need. These questions were used as the network diversity measures. The discussants' education and age groups were also asked for as the alternative network diversity measures.

Although the opportunity of involvement in the research design allowed for a series of detailed questions on networks, there were also restrictions because social networks were only one among many items investigated in the survey. For instance, the survey did not include questions to differentiate ties on the basis of purpose of action; hence, the analysis on Turkey does not test the hypotheses related to tie purpose. A second restriction concerned the civil society involvement. The present analysis regarded the civil society as one of the bridging structures; however, questions related to civil society involvement were not posed in INFORMALITY. Yet, other bridging structures of the education and the workplace were accounted for.

In short, INFORMALITY elicited detailed information about core discussion networks in Turkey, which allowed for testing the majority of the revised hypotheses introduced in the fourth chapter. Besides the core discussion networks, INFORMALITY asked about the extensity of close friends from the neighborhood, the

workplace/the school and the other place, which were important to test the relationship between network size and generalized trust. Table 6.1. below presents the hypotheses, which were tested for the Turkish case.

Table 6.1 Revised hypotheses for Turkey	
Tie based relationships	**Structure based relationships**
H1: Higher network density influences generalized trust negatively	H4: Higher education influences generalized trust positively.
H2: Larger network size influences generalized trust positively	H5: Having a job influences generalized trust positively.
H3: Higher network diversity influences generalized trust positively	

Nine questions of the INFORMALITY were used to test these hypotheses. Table 6.2 on page 117 presents the questions asked for the core discussion networks in Turkey. Alternatively, Table 6.3 on the following page accounts for the question about the network extensity of close friends. Once the hypotheses and the relevant survey questions to test these hypotheses have been introduced, the following section will present the descriptive statistics for both the generalized trust, which is the dependent variable, and the network variables, which are the independent variables of the present analysis.

Table 6.2 INFORMALITY Questions for Core Discussion Networks[316]		
1)	People sometimes talk about important matters with others. Thinking about the last six months, who are the people with whom you talk about important matters?	(Only the first names or initials)
2)	What is the relationship of each person to you?	Family
		Relative
		Friend
		Acquaintance
3)	Would you tell us how much you trust each of these people along 1-10 scale? "1" means you do not trust this person at all, and "10" means complete trust.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4)	In case your household income is cut for some reason, and you need help after a while, would you ask for help from this person?	Yes, I can ask for help
		No, I would not ask for help
5)	Ok, can you tell us how close your worldview is to each person you mentioned?	Very close
		Close
		Not very close
		Not close at all
6)	Can you also tell us the approximate ages of each person you mentioned?	18-24
		25-34
		35-44
		45-54
		55-64
		65 and above
7)	Can you also tell us the education of each person you mentioned?	Not literate
		Literate
		Primary school
		Secondary school
		High school
		University and higher
8)	(IF MORE THAN ONE PERSON IS NAMED) Can you also tell us the relationship- if any- between these people?	Family
		Relatives
		Friends
		Acquaintance
		Do not know each other

Table 6.3 INFORMALITY Question for Close Friends Network Extensity	
9) Apart from family members and relatives, how many people would you regard as close friends in the following places I will cite?	IF WORKING At the workplace: IF A STUDENT At the school: Neighborhood: Other places:

6.1. Descriptive Statistics of Generalized Trust and Social Networks in Turkey

INFORMALITY surveyed 1004 respondents. The present analysis is based on 1002 respondents because two respondents, whose ages were below 18, were not included in the dataset. INFORMALITY posed the following question to decipher generalized trust:

In every society, some people trust each other, while some do not. Now I will ask you questions about trust and co-operation. Generally speaking, do you think most people can be trusted? Or, should one be careful in dealing with people?

The respondents who indicated that most people can be trusted were coded as "1". Alternatively, the respondents who said that one should be careful in dealing with people were coded as "0". Table 6.4 below shows the frequency table of generalized trust.

Table 6.4 INFORMALITY Generalized trust variable		
Generalized trust	Frequency	Percentage
Most people can be trusted=1	69	6,9
One should be careful=0	933	93,1
Total	1002	100,0

INFORMALITY verified once again the low generalized trust levels in Turkey. Only approximately seven people out of a hundred indicated trust in the fellow man.

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[316] The first question, which is the name generator question, asked for up to three discussants. The name interpreter questions, which came after the name generator, were asked for all indicated discussants.

Table 6.5 shows the Chi-squared significance of the demographic variables for generalized trust.

Table 6.5 Chi-squared significance of demographic variables on generalized trust		
Generalized trust	Sex	0,93
	Education	*0,04*
	Work status	0,72
	Turkey's cities	*0,00*

According to Table 6.5, the tendency to extend trust to the fellow men seems to change across different demographic values. Level of education and the city where one resides are likely to significantly influence the decision to trust. This finding is in line with the assumption that education is indeed among the bridging structures which influence individuals' attitudes through exposing them to different others as well as providing them novel opportunities. However, a similar assumption was also made for the workplace, although work status does not seem to make a difference in terms of generalized trust. Notwithstanding these insights, multivariate analysis is needed to elaborate more in detail on whether the variables of Table 6.5 are significant determinants of generalized trust.

Once the descriptive statistics about generalized trust were introduced, the analysis focused on the network variables. The first of these variables is the network size, which is the number of discussants each respondent indicated. Because INFORMALITY focused on core discussion networks in a multi-item survey, the maximum numbers of discussants were limited to three. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of respondents over the network size variable. According to this figure, the frequency of respondents with three discussants is the highest for INFORMALITY. The total number of indicated discussants amounted to 1822.

Figure 6.1 Distribution of INFORMALITY network size

A second network variable of interest is the network density. Though there are different measures of network density which are introduced in the fourth chapter, the present analysis will follow the footsteps of the political research on social networks and will count on the role relationships in order to differentiate among the tie strengths. This approach assigns the stronger ties to relations with the family and relatives rather than friends and acquaintances. The values of this variable changes between "1 (acquaintance)" and "4 (family)".

Out of 1822 discussants, the respondents did not indicate the closeness of only six discussants. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage distribution of the closeness variable. According to this figure, friends were indicated as the most frequent core discussants (51,7%) followed by the family members (31,7%).

Figure 6.2 Distribution of INFORMALITY closeness between the respondent and the discussant

Table 6.6 below shows that only for the one discussant networks, the percentage of ties to family members (41,5%) comes close to the percentage of ties to friends (43,3%). In both two and three discussants networks, the percentages of ties to friends well surpass ties to family members. This information tells us that the core discussion networks in Turkey are not necessarily confined to family circles; on the contrary, it seems like friends rather than family members are preferred when discussing important matters.

Table 6.6 Percentage distribution of closeness between the respondent and the discussant over the values of network size			
	One Discussant	**Two Discussants**	**Three Discussants**
Family	41,5	34,7	28,7
Relative	12,5	11,0	14,5
Friend	43,3	52,0	53,3
Acquaintance	2,7	2,3	3,4
Total %	100	100	100
Total #	224	429	1163

Besides the closeness between the respondent and the indicated discussant, INFORMALITY also accounted for closeness between the discussants. The same sequence of values was assigned together with the additional value of "do not know each other". The values of the closeness between discussants, then, change between "0 (do not know each other)" and "4 (family)". This variable is relevant only for the two

and the three discussants networks. Table 6.7 shows column percentage distribution of closeness between discussants.

Table 6.7 Column percentage distribution of closeness between discussants for two and three discussants networks				
	Two discussants	Three discussants		
	1&2	1&2	1&3	2&3
Family	24,2	21,9	19,8	20,31
Relative	8,4	12,3	13,1	12,60
Friend	34,0	37,5	33,9	33,93
Acquaintance	15,8	16,2	17,5	18,77
Do not know each other	17,7	12,1	15,7	14,40
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total #	215	389	389	389

Similar to the closeness between the respondent and the discussants, the closeness between the discussants is also dominated by friendship ties. Table 6.7 is also interesting in terms of the relative increase in the percentage of acquaintance ties. It should be noted that friends and acquaintances ties make up at least fifty percent or more of all ties for both the two and the three discussants networks. This finding reveals the difference between the structures of the one discussant networks on the one hand, and the two and the three discussants networks on the other. In the one discussant networks, family ties rival friendship ties. However in the two and the three discussants networks, the network ties are diversified not least because the friendship ties between the respondent and the discussants are more frequent for those networks, but also because the discussants themselves are likely to be linked through friendship as well as the acquaintances ties. This situation is indicative of the likelihood that the two and the three discussants networks are less dense than the one discussant networks. Also, more ties to friends and acquaintances gives rise to the potential for bridges outside of the primordial circles.

Once the closeness variables are discussed in detail, the network density can be computed. Figure 4.2 of the fourth chapter introduced one of the definitions of network density as "the mean strength of connections among units in a network". In other words, INFORMALITY network density corresponds to the mean closeness for the given network. The formula is:

Network density $= [\Sigma_j x_{ij}] / N$ where N is the total number of indicated ties (Eq. 6.1)

Network density is a continuous variable and its values change between 0 and 4. Those respondents who did not indicate any discussants, take the value of zero. Alternatively, those who indicated only the family members as the core discussants take the highest value of the closeness variables, which is four. The mean network density is 2,2. 20,2% of the discussion networks are of the highest density (See Table A.1 in Appendix A). The cross-tabulation of this variable with the network size verifies the above preliminary finding regarding the inverse relationship between these two variables. Indeed, Burt mentioned this relationship as a logical consequence of the increase in the network size.

Table 6.8 Mean estimation of the network density by closeness over the values of the network size[317]			
	Mean	Std. Error	[%95 Conf. Interval]
Network size=1	2,92	0,07	2,79 - 3,05
Network size=2	2,67	0,06	2,56 - 2,79
Network size=3	2,54	0,04	2,45 - 2,62

The third network variable of interest is the network diversity. As noted, INFORMALITY posed a series of questions about the nature of the relationship between the respondent and the discussants as well as the questions about the discussants' demographic features. The former questions were: the respondents' trust in their discussants; the extent of similarity in their worldviews; and the availability of financial help in times of need.

The first network diversity variable is the respondents' trust in their discussants. Since it concerns trust in people we know, this variable is the particularized trust variable. It is measured along the 1-10 scale. On this scale, "1" corresponds to "no trust at all" and "10" corresponds to "complete trust". Respondents did not indicate any trust levels for only five discussants; hence trust levels are provided for 1817 discussants. Figure 6.3 below shows the percentage distribution of particularized trust. In general, respondents display high levels of trust in their network discussants. According to the figure, 73,2% of the respondents indicated complete trust in their discussants and only 3,4% indicated trust at point five or lower.

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[317] The mean score for the network size changes between 2,5 and 2,9. However the mean network density is reported as 2,2. This difference is due to the respondents who did not indicate any discussants. Their network size as well as network density is zero, which is not shown in Table 6.8.

Figure 6.3 Distribution of particularized trust

Complete trust	73,20
9	8,48
8	9,35
7	4,07
6	1,54
5	2,09
1 to 4	1,26

(%)

Who are those discussants that were assigned complete trust? Are they more likely the family and relatives rather than friends and acquaintances? Does the distribution of particularized trust over values of the network size display a similar trend to the case of the network density? If so, is it likely that the respondents indicate less trust as their discussion networks get larger? These questions demand cross-tabulation of the particularized trust variable both with the closeness and the network size variables.

Table 6.9 Column percentage of particularized trust across closeness by role labels				
	Acquaintance	**Friend**	**Relative**	**Family**
Trust=1 to 7	14,3	12,3	7,8	3,7
Trust=8	12,5	14,2	9,0	1,4
Trust=9	1,8	12,7	6,1	3,0
Trust=10	71,4	60,9	77,0	92,0
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total #	56	938	244	574

Table 6.9 shows that complete trust accorded to family members (92%) well surpasses the rest of the relationships. Particularized trust proves more dispersed for friendship relations: only 60,9% indicated complete trust in their discussants. This finding is in line with the prior assumption that family relations are stronger. However our interest in particularized trust is not limited to this check alone. On the contrary, this variable was included in the survey in order to understand the extent of the diversity of relationships at the core discussion networks level. Table 6.9 shows us that different role labels influence this diversity. However the extent of the influence should not be

exaggerated either. After all, more than ninety percent of the respondents indicated particularized trust in their discussants between the 8-10 range, which is quite high. What about the network size? Is it likely that the respondents assigned lower particularized trust scores as their networks got larger?

Table 6.10 Column percentage of particularized trust across network size			
	Network size=1	Network size= 2	Network size=3
Trust=1 to 7	12,5	9,9	8,0
Trust=8	7,6	12,2	8,7
Trust=9	9,4	6,8	8,9
Trust=10	70,5	71,1	74,5
Total %	100	100	100
Total #	224	426	1167

Different from the network density, particularized trust does not seem to decrease with an increase in the network size; in fact, the percentage of complete trust is the highest in three discussant networks. We already know that friendship ties become more frequent as the network size increases. This brings us to the possibility that the respondents assigned higher particularized trust scores to their friends when they are in larger networks. In order to test this assertion, the probability of naming only friends with complete trust was calculated for all network sizes. From the one discussant to the three discussants networks, these probabilities were found to be 0,281; 0,285; and 0,333 respectively.

The enquiry into particularized trust showed that respondents, in general, displayed high trust in their discussants. They extended complete trust more readily to family members than to other types of relationships. However, friends also received complete trust especially in three discussant networks. In sum, core discussion networks in Turkey are rich in terms of particularized trust.

A similar descriptive enquiry was conducted for the other two network diversity variables, which also concerned the nature of the relationship between the respondent and the discussants. The first of these measures was the similarity of worldviews between the respondent and the discussant. The values of this variable change between 1 and 4, where "1" stands for the worldviews which are "not close at all" and "4" stands for "very close" worldviews. Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of this variable.

Figure 6.4 Distribution of the similarity of worldviews

Figure 6.4 is not very surprising. Nearly eighty-five percent of the respondents indicated at least close worldviews with their respondents. Did they accord the very close worldviews to the family and relatives? Who were assigned not very similar worldviews? Does the similarity of worldviews loosen with larger network size?

Table 6.11 Column percentage of similarity of worldviews across closeness by role labels				
	Acquaintance	**Friend**	**Relative**	**Family**
Not close at all	5,4	3,8	5,1	4,6
Not very close	16,1	11,8	8,5	13,6
Close	42,9	49,9	52,1	44,9
Very close	35,7	34,5	34,3	36,9
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total #	56	925	236	566

For all types of relationships, close worldviews are found to be the most frequent. Table 6.11 shows that the relations with the family and the relatives do not necessarily mean more congruence in worldviews. As a matter of fact, approximately eighteen percent of the family discussants were mentioned to hold worldviews which are either not very close or not close at all to the respondent's worldviews.

Table 6.12 Column percentage of similarity of worldviews across network size			
	Network size=1	Network size= 2	Network size=3
Not close at all	2,7	8,2	3,1
Not very close	7,3	16,5	11,4
Close	46,6	39,2	52,2
Very close	43,4	36,1	33,3
Total %	100,0	100,0	100,0
Total #	219	413	1156

Table 6.12 shows that close worldviews are also the most frequent across all network sizes. Less than ten percent indicated not close relationships for the one discussant networks. This percentage increases to nearly twenty-five for the two discussants networks and falls down to fifteen percent for the three discussants networks. Hence, although the worldviews are more similar than dissimilar for the one discussant networks, we cannot claim a progressive increase in dissimilar views as the network size increases.

Similar to the case of particularized trust, the commentary on the similarity of worldviews should take into account the relatively greater presence of friendship ties for all network sizes. Table 6.11 further shows that the respondents indicated close worldviews the most frequent for the friendship relations. Those two features together explain the relatively higher frequency of close worldviews for all network sizes. However, the frequency of the close worldviews is the highest for the three discussants networks. What may explain this figure?

This question can be answered once the probabilities of naming only friends with close worldviews are calculated for all network sizes. They are 0,2; 0,230; 0,279 respectively. This means that respondents who indicated three friends are more likely to accord close worldviews to their discussants. This situation not only results in higher frequency of close worldviews for friendship relations, but it increases the close worldviews frequency for the three discussants networks as well.

INFORMALITY also enquired about the extent to which the respondents could ask for financial help from their discussants in times of need. This question had a binary "Yes (1)" and "No (2)" answer. 91% of the respondents said that they could ask for such help from their discussants. The distributions of this variable across closeness and network size variables are provided in the following Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 respectively.

Table 6.13 Column percentage of availability of financial help across closeness by role labels				
	Acquaintance	Friend	Relative	Family
Yes	80,4	88,9	92,9	95,4
No	19,6	11,1	7,1	4,6
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total #	56	928	241	566

Similar to the case of particularized trust, Table 6.13 shows a difference between the family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. It seems as though the respondents approach their family and relatives more comfortably for financial help than their friends and acquaintances.

Table 6.14 Column percentage of availability of financial help across network size			
	Network size=1	Network size= 2	Network size=3
Yes	90,4	87,2	92,6
No	9,6	12,8	7,4
Total %	100	100	100
Total #	219	423	1155

Table 6.14 shows that the availability of financial help does not decrease with the increase in the network size. On the contrary, financial help seems more available in three discussants networks. Once again it is likely that this figure relates to three discussants networks of friendship relations. The probability of naming a friend from whom financial help could be asked is 0,399 for the one discussant networks. It increases to 0,436 for two discussants networks and to 0,481 for three discussants networks.

Close examination of the INFORMALITY network diversity questions showed that the core discussion networks in Turkey are mostly populated with the friendship ties. Also, the respondents reveal high trust in their friends; they are more likely to share close worldviews with them and, more often, they could ask for financial help in times of need. Moreover, the probability of complete trust, close worldview, and the availability of financial help of friendship relations increase in three discussants friends' networks. This means that the extensity of the friendship networks results in closer relationships with the network associates. Although friendship ties proved the stronger in three discussant networks, the family and the relatives' ties surfaced as strong, irrespective of the network size.

Descriptive analyses have so far designated family relations as the strongest in terms of particularized trust as well as the availability of financial help. Relations with the relatives were the runner-up in both variables. This trend did not fit neatly to the similarity of the worldviews variable. Respondents mentioned neither the family's nor the relatives' ties as sharing very close worldviews with them; rather they indicated sharing close worldviews with both types of relationships. Interestingly, the frequency of not close worldviews was higher for family's ties than the relatives' ties. This means that although the respondents had the strongest ties to the family members, they did not necessarily share very similar worldviews with them. However, it is likely that they chose those relatives with whom they shared closer worldviews as their discussants. Respondents mentioned highest frequency of not close worldviews for the acquaintances. Nearly twenty percent of the acquaintances were also indicated as not suitable to ask for financial help.

Detailed examination of the network diversity measures of particularized trust, similarity of worldviews, and availability of financial help revealed differences between the relationships with the family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. Relations with the former emerged as the stronger. This finding supports the account of the network density based on the closeness by role labels.

Among these network diversity measures, the extent of similar worldviews is used to generate the network heterogeneity of worldviews variable.[318] The presence of alternative worldviews in one's network is likely to familiarize the person into variable human condition. This familiarity, in turn, is expected to influence generalized trust positively.

To generate the variable, the similarity of worldviews was re-coded in the reverse order so that the higher values indicated more dissimilarity. Each of these values was squared to underscore the distance between worldviews. The last step was to average all those values at the network level. This variable measures the average

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[318] In more than ninety percent of the cases, the discussants in Turkey were accorded high levels of trust and they were relied on for financial help. Hence, network level variables generated on the basis of these variables are closely associated to the network size variable. As a result, the multivariate analysis only relies on one network diversity measure, which is the similarity of worldviews variable.

worldview difference in comparison with the discussant. The formula for the network worldview heterogeneity variable can be written as:

Worldview heterogeneity $= [\Sigma_j (x_{ij})^2] / N$ where N is the network size.[319] (Eq. 6.2)

The values of this variable change between 0-16 and its mean is 3.26. Eighty percent of its distribution lies between 0-4, which shows rather close worldviews at the network level (See Table A.2 in Appendix A).

There are two alternative network diversity measures which deal with discussants' demographic features. The first measure concerns the age groups and the second the education levels of the discussants. Since network diversity is positively related to generalized trust, discussants with both different ages and education levels are hypothesized to influence generalized trust. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is the assumption that people become more familiar with diverse others through their daily, face-to-face interactions. This familiarity, in turn, is assumed to orient people towards the variable human conditions and hence, the fellow men becomes more comprehensible. Subsequently, the account of individuals' exposure to different age and education groups tests whether or not the diversity of relationships has any bearing on generalized trust.

Before getting into details of the age and the education differences at the network level, the distributions of the discussants' tie-level age and education would be useful. Figure 6.5 on the next page gives the distribution of the discussants' age groups together with the distribution of the respondents' age groups. The former information is given for 1816 discussants; hence the respondents did not report the age groups of six discussants.

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[319] Thirty-four respondents did not indicate similarity of worldviews for their discussants. Hence network size in this formula corresponds to sum of ties for which respondents indicated worldview similarity.

Figure 6.5 Distribution of age groups of the respondents and the discussants

Figure 6.5 shows that the respondents' most frequent age group is 25-34 (25,9%), whereas the discussants' most populated age group is 35-44 (26,8%). Also, approximately seventy percent of both the respondents and the discussants cluster between the ages of 25-54. Figure 6.5 presents the age groups of the respondents and the discussants together, yet it does not account for the extent of similarity between the age groups of these respective groups: How do the role relationships influence the discussants' age groups? Are discussants of the family and relatives more likely to be older than the respondents? What about friends? Are they more likely to be at the same age as the respondent?

Table 6.15 The extent of similarity of age groups between the respondent and the discussants according to role labels

	Discussant > Respondent		Discussant = Respondent		Discussant < Respondent	
Respondents' age groups	Friends & Acqu.	Family & Rel.	Friends & Acqu.	Family & Rel.	Friends & Acqu.	Family & Rel.
18-24	6,8	10,9	12,1	2,6	-------	-------
25-34	15,3	24,9	21,8	8,8	3,9	3,9
35-44	8,3	14,3	16,9	8,6	7,3	11,2
45-54	5,7	6,8	9,8	6,8	11,8	17,3
55-64	4,7	2,3	5,9	3,3	12,7	13,9
65 and above	-------	-------	1,8	1,7	6,9	11,2
Total % within groups	40,8	59,2	68,2	31,8	42,6	57,4
Total % across groups	21,4		49,8		28,8	

Table 6.15 shows that the respondents are more likely to name discussants with identical age groups (49,8%) rather than naming either older (21,4%) or younger (28,8%) discussants. Also, within the identical age group, the percentage of friends and acquaintances (68,2%) well surpasses the percentage of the family and relatives (31,8%). A reverse situation is in order for both the younger and the older discussants than the respondents. For these groups, the percentages of the family and relatives are found to be higher than the percentages of friends and acquaintances.

A similar analysis can also be conducted for education levels. Figure 6.6 below depicts the distribution of the education levels of both the respondents and the discussants. According to this figure, the frequency of primary school graduates is the highest for both the respondents and the discussants. This is followed by high school graduates.

Figure 6.6 Distribution of education levels of the respondents and the discussants

Table 6.16 The extent of similarity of education levels between the respondent and the discussants according to role labels						
	Discussant > Respondent		**Discussant = Respondent**		**Discussant < Respondent**	
Respondents' education level	**Friends & Acqu.**	**Family & Rel.**	**Friends & Acqu.**	**Family & Rel.**	**Friends & Acqu.**	**Family & Rel.**
Not literate	4,1	6,9	0,8	0,6	-------	-------
Literate	2,2	4,1	0,2	0,4	0,9	0,9
Primary school	22,9	26,8	23,4	24	3,9	7,1
Secondary school	10	11	3,5	2	8,6	12,8
High school	8,2	3,7	18,2	7,9	16,6	20,8
University or above	-------	-------	16,6	2,4	12,8	15,7
Total % within groups	47,4	52,6	62,7	37,3	42,7	57,3
Total % across groups	26		55		19	

Similar to the descriptive analysis of the age groups, the respondents name discussants with identical education levels for more than fifty percent of all discussants (55%). Once again the friendship and acquaintanceship relations are more frequent within this group (62,7%) than the family and relatives' relations (37,3%). This group also reveals the tendency to name an identical education level in cases when the respondent is either a high school or university graduate; hence he/she is well-educated.

The least populated among the three groups is the one that shows the discussants with lower education levels than the respondent (19%). This part of Table 6.16 shows that as the respondent's education level increases, the tendency to name a discussant with a lower education level also increases. Moreover, the indicated discussant is more likely to be either a family member or a relative, since this group is dominated by relations with the family or relatives (57,3%).

The group, which shows better-educated discussants than the respondent, makes up 26% of all respondent-discussant education relationships. The percentage difference between different role labels is the smallest for this group. As the respondent's education level decreases, he/she tends to name discussants with better education levels. This is especially pronounced for the respondents who are: not literate; literate; and secondary school graduates.

Substantial variability emerged from the analyses of the relationship between the respondents and the discussants' age groups and education levels. As noted before, the extent of this variability is expected to influence generalized trust.

In order to test this expectation, two network diversity variables are generated. The first one is the heterogeneity of age variable and the second, the heterogeneity of education variable. The same formula was used to compute both variables:

$$\text{Age/education heterogeneity} = [\, \Sigma_j \,(x_{ij}\text{-}M)^2\,]\,/\,N$$

where M is the mean age/education group including the respondent
N is the network size plus the respondent   (Eq. 6.3)

The first part of the above formula reveals the extent of the differences in age/education groups from the mean age/education group. It also includes the respondent's age/education in this calculation, because the aim is to account for the extent of age/education variance among the respondents and the indicated discussants. The second part of the formula rests on standardization for the network size, which is obtained by adding the respondent to the network size of the discussants. Both age heterogeneity and education heterogeneity are continuous variables. The values of age

heterogeneity range between 0 and 6,25 and the values of the education heterogeneity range between 0 and 5,5 (See Table A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A).

As mentioned before, INFORMALITY posed two categories of network questions. Thus far, the data obtained from the name generator/interpreter questions have been examined. Another category concerned the extensity of the respondents' close friends networks. The respondents were asked to name the approximate number of close friends from the workplace or the school, from the neighborhood and from other places. The extensity of network size is expected to influence generalized trust positively. As a result, the last network measure is the extensity of the close friends' network and it is computed through the simple summation of respondents' friends from the workplace/school, neighborhood and other places. The value of this variable changes between 0 and 210. Although 210 seems quite an exaggerated figure for the numbers of close friends, the survey did not have any opportunity to verify this. However, the frequency of likely inflated figures is also low. 95% of this variable lies between 0 and 30.

6.2. Other Variables of Interest

Besides the network variables which were derived from the tie level data, the present analysis also mentioned the bridging structures that may prove significant for generalized trust. These structures were the school, the workplace, and the civil society where the potential for alternative ties other than kinship relations was high. INFORMALITY did not account for the civil society relations, but it asked about individuals' working status and education levels. This information is used to operationalize the bridging structures.

The working status variable is a binary variable which takes the value of "1" in case the respondent has a permanent or a part-time job or self-employed. This variable is labeled as *employment*. The education variable is also a binary variable and it is coded as "1" for university graduates. This variable is labeled as *university*.

Another variable of interest is subjective happiness, which is found to be a significant individual level variable for generalized trust. In INFORMALITY, this variable was measured along the 1-10 scale, where "1" stood for "not happy at all" and "10" stood for "very happy". It is included in the analysis because happier people are, on the whole, found to be optimistic towards life in general, and other people in particular. The latter, in turn, is likely to positively influence individuals' regard of the fellow men.   Since our interest focuses on Turkey, the place of residence also emerges as a significant variable. As noted, INFORMALITY counted on a representative urban population in Turkey. Despite the survey's representativeness, however, in some of the cities, only a few respondents were surveyed due to lower population density in comparison with the bigger cities included in the survey. Table 6.17 on the following page shows the distribution of the respondents across Turkey's cities.

Table 6.17 Cities in INFORMALITY		
City	Frequency	Percent
Istanbul	428	42,7
Ankara	163	16,3
İzmir	132	13,2
Bursa	78	7,8
Konya	46	4,6
Mersin	40	4,0
Gaziantep	32	3,2
Kocaeli	28	2,8
Denizli	20	2,0
Malatya	17	1,7
Adıyaman	9	0,9
Trabzon	9	0,9
Total	1002	100,0

The three biggest cities in the sample are included in the multivariate analysis as the dummy variables. In this way, the influence of living in bigger and more populated cities in Turkey on generalized trust will be computed.

The respondent's sex, age, and the household size are included in the analysis as the usual demographic background variables. Table 6.18 below presents the descriptive statistics of all variables, which will be utilized in the multivariate analyses. Table 6.19 on pages 139-140 presents the correlation analysis between these variables. The bold figures in this table indicate statistical significance at the five percent threshold or lower.

Table 6.18 Summary statistics of INFORMALITY independent variables					
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Network size	1002	1,8	1,1	0	3
Network density	1002	2,2	1,3	0	4
Worldview heterogeneity	1002	3,3	3,3	0	16
Age heterogeneity	997	0,4	0,8	0	6,3
Education heterogeneity	993	0,4	0,6	0	5,6
Extensity of close friends	1002	9,3	16,6	0	210
Employed	1002	0,4	0,5	0	1
University	993	0,1	0,3	0	1
Subjective happiness	1000	6,1	2,5	1	10
Sex (man=1)	1002	0,5	0,5	0	1
Age	997	42,2	14,9	18	87
Household size	1002	3,7	1,6	1	14
ISTANBUL	1002	0,4	0,5	0	1
ANKARA	1002	0,2	0,4	0	1
IZMIR	1002	0,1	0,3	0	1

Table 6.19 Correlation table of INFORMALITY variables							
	Generalized trust	Network size	Network density	Worldview heterogeneity	Education heterogeneity	Age heterogeneity	Extent of close friends
Generalized trust	1,00						
Network size	0,02	1,00					
Network density	0,02	**0,50**	1,00				
Worldview heterogeneity	-0,03	**0,37**	**0,32**	1,00			
Education heterogeneity	-0,03	**0,26**	**0,32**	**0,16**	1,00		
Age heterogeneity	0,04	**0,27**	**0,45**	**0,20**	**0,36**	1,00	
Extent of close friends	0,04	**0,18**	0,03	**0,06**	0,06	0,00	1,00

Table 6.19 continued…							
	Generalized trust	Network size	Network density	Worldview heterogeneity	Education heterogeneity	Age heterogeneity	Extent of close friends
Employed	0,01	**0,08**	-0,04	**0,07**	**-0,09**	**-0,17**	**0,11**
University	**0,09**	**0,12**	-0,02	0,02	-0,02	-0,04	**0,08**
Subjective happiness	**0,07**	-0,02	-0,03	-0,03	-0,02	-0,06	**0,07**
Sex	0,00	0,04	**-0,08**	0,06	**-0,08**	**-0,13**	**0,15**
Age	0,02	**-0,08**	0,03	**-0,07**	0,07	**0,14**	-0,01
Household size	0,00	0,01	-0,05	-0,03	0,01	**-0,08**	0,03
Istanbul	-0,06	**0,14**	-0,01	-0,03	0,01	0,01	0,04
Ankara	-0,06	-0,05	**-0,09**	-0,06	-0,04	-0,06	**-0,10**
Izmir	-0,04	**0,15**	**0,19**	**0,18**	**0,09**	**0,18**	0,01

Table 6.19 continued….									
	Employed	**University**	**Subjective happiness**	**Sex**	**Age**	**Household size**	**Istanbul**	**Ankara**	**Izmir**
Employed	1,00								
University	**0,20**	1,00							
Subjective happiness	**0,00**	**0,09**	1,00						
Sex	**0,49**	**0,15**	0,03	1,00					
Age	**-0,33**	-0,06	-0,03	0,04	1,00				
Household size	0,05	**-0,19**	**-0,09**	0,00	**-0,24**	1,00			
Istanbul	0,05	**-0,06**	0,00	-0,01	-0,05	**0,11**	1,00		
Ankara	-0,01	**0,15**	0,04	-0,01	-0,05	**-0,10**	**-0,38**	1,00	
Izmir	-0,05	0,05	**-0,10**	0,00	**0,08**	**-0,09**	**-0,34**	**-0,17**	1,00

6.3. The Multivariate Analyses

Logistic regression is better suited to dependent variables with binary outcomes, and in INFORMALITY, generalized trust is investigated as a binary variable with rare event outcome. In other words, the number of respondents who said they would rather be careful in dealing with people - hence, who were coded as "0" on generalized trust - well surpassed the number of trusting respondents. King and his collaborators suggested the employment of the rare events logistic regression for cases when one value of a binary variable dominates the other.[320] In line with this suggestion, this method is used to test the hypotheses which were introduced in Table 6.1 of this chapter.

Table 6.20 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses: Model I			
	Model I		
	Coefficients	**Robust Std. Err.**	**P> |z|**
Network variables			
Network size	0,17	0,15	0,25
Closeness density	0,07	0,14	0,60
Extent of close friends	0,01	0,01	0,41
Worldview heterogeneity	-0,05	0,05	0,32
Age heterogeneity	***0,21***	***0,15***	***0,05***
Education heterogeneity	-0,38	0,25	0,12
Bridging structures			
Employed	*0,15*	0,33	0,65
University	***1,09***	***0,36***	***0,00***
Individual level features			
Subjective happiness	0,10	0,06	0,07
Control variables			
Sex (Man=1)	-0,22	0,33	0,51
Age	0,01	0,01	0,32
Household size	0,10	0,08	0,24
Istanbul	***-1,10***	***0,30***	***0,00***
Ankara	***-1,55***	***0,43***	***0,00***
Izmir	***-1,25***	***0,47***	***0,01***
Constant	***-3,69***	***0,82***	***0,00***
Number of observations	**987**		

[320] Micheal Tomz, Gary King and Langche Zeng, RELOGIT: Rare Events Logistic Regression, Version 1.1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999) http://gking.harvard.edu/. Also Gary King and Langche Zeng, "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data," *Political Analysis* 9 (Spring, 2001): 137-163.

According to Table 6.20, neither the network size nor the network density measures are significant determinants of generalized trust. Also, although the network density was hypothesized to influence generalized trust negatively, it seems to exert positive influence in the Turkish context.

The interesting finding of Table 6.20 relates to the network diversity variables. Both worldview heterogeneity and education heterogeneity are found to be insignificant; however, age heterogeneity surfaced as a positive and significant determinant of generalized trust. Initially, the experience with people of different views, education and age groups was hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively. Yet Model I displays variable influence of the network diversity measures. Especially curious among the findings is the positive influence of age heterogeneity on the one hand, and the negative influence of education heterogeneity on the other. How can we explain these two findings?

Closer examination of Table 6.15, regarding the distribution of the discussants' age groups with respect to the respondents' age groups and role labels, shows that respondents whose ages varied between 25 and 34 tended to name discussants with older ages. Also, respondents between 45 and 64 were more likely to name younger discussants. The percentage of discussants younger than the respondent (28,8%) was also found greater than the percentage of the older discussants (21,4%). Hence age heterogeneity at the network level is likely to reflect relations of seniority and hierarchical respect. These features are likely to ease tensions which may arise due to disagreements. Hence deliberations within such networks would not only be informative about different opinions due to different life experiences, but possible conflict and ensuing cognitive dissonance would also be smoothed out with the familiar code of behavior in the hierarchical relationship between the younger and the older individuals.

While the societal morals about role relationship across generations are likely to moderate the tension exerted on the respondent due to exposure to different ideas and opinions, different education levels seem to aggravate similar tensions. Table 6.16 shows that those respondents who were secondary school graduates or less educated tended to name discussants who were better educated. The education heterogeneity variable was also populated with the respondents who were either high school or university graduates and who named discussants with lower education levels. Although the percentage of the former group among all discussants (22,9%) is higher than the

latter group (12,4%), the education heterogeneity variable accounts for both groups of relationships. Divergence of education groups at the network level in Turkey does not seem to ease possible differences in opinions towards a general understanding about the human condition at large; on the contrary, such diversity tends to underscore the differences between people. An explanation for the possible impermeability of opinions within educationally heterogeneous networks may be the unbridgeable differences in people' life styles due to educational differences, which are also reflected in the way people relate to each other at the societal level.

In their study on economic inequality, Duygan and Güner, for instance, pointed to education as a significant determinant of income differentials as well as income inequality. According to 2002 data, seventy percent of the household heads - in other words the man - at the bottom of the per capita income distribution had at most a primary school education, whereas, this percentage rose to ninety-five percent for the mothers - or the women. These poor households were also the more crowded ones; hence both education and income disadvantages are found likely to persist over generations.[321] This study is significant because it shows the link between education and social status. Educational differentials have implications not only for the well-being of the current generations, but also for the future generations. The present analysis brought forth education as an important fault line for discussion networks in Turkey. However, the influence of this variable on generalized trust is found insignificant.

Contrary to education heterogeneity, university education proved a positive and highly significant determinant of generalized trust. The present study accepted education as one of the bridging structures, and high education was hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively. Table 6.20 shows that university education in Turkey makes people more likely to extend trust to the fellow man.

University education is expected to socialize people into environments different from the ones with which they are familiar. In other words, bridging ties would become more available with higher education. These ties, in turn, are likely to make people more aware of the others, reason more about variable human conditions, and deliberate more with different others. In this sense, the positive and significant influence of a university education is not unexpected. However, Model I also says that even university

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[321] Burcu Duygan and Nezih Güner, "Income and Consumption Inequality in Turkey," in *The Turkish Economy*, eds. Sumru Altuğ and Alpay Filiztekin (London and New York, Routledge, 2006), 70-86.

graduates are vulnerable to educational differences at the network level. Those two findings together underscore education as a significant fault line in Turkish society.

Education may provide us a viable structure to forge bridging relationships, yet, in cases when education remains a scarce resource, the bridges within this structure may turn into strategic strongholds which buttress the existing power asymmetries. This seems to be the case for Turkey and this situation becomes all the clearer when the analysis focuses on all education levels.

Table 6.21 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses: Model II			
	Model II		
	Coefficients	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|
Network variables			
Network size	0,18	0,15	0,22
Closeness density	0,07	0,14	0,62
Extent of close friends	0,01	0,01	0,37
Worldview heterogeneity	-0,05	0,05	0,32
Age heterogeneity	*0,32*	*0,15*	*0,04*
Education heterogeneity	-0,43	0,24	0,08
Bridging structures			
Employed	0,13	0,22	0,70
Primary school	-0,89	0,48	0,06
Secondary school	-1,02	0,60	0,09
High school	-0,72	0,53	0,18
University	0,26	0,60	0,66
Individual level features			
Subjective happiness	0,11	0,05	0,06
Control variables			
Sex (Man=1)	-0,17	0,33	0,60
Age	0,01	0,01	0,49
Household size	0,10	0,08	0,23
Istanbul	*-1,13*	*0,30*	*0,00*
Ankara	*-1,58*	*0,43*	*0,00*
Izmir	*-1,24*	*0,47*	*0,01*
Constant	*-2,81*	*0,98*	*0,00*
Number of observations	987		

In Model II of Table 6.21, the base education category is respondents with less than primary school education. The analysis shows that the influence of education is not progressive; in fact, those primary, secondary and high school graduates, who are better educated than the base category, proved to be less trusting. Only the university graduates appeared as more trusting than the least educated, yet the difference between the two groups is not significant, either.

The comparison of Model I and Model II further shows that university attendance is significantly different for trust relationships in comparison with all other education levels. Hence, at least for the Turkish case, only university education makes a significant difference in people's tendency to trust others. The implication of this finding is that those bridging structures which are designated as beneficial for generalized trust, are also likely to bring about power asymmetries as well as to sustain the existing ones. Hence their influence is likely to interact with the given social and political context.

The contextual features also come to the fore once the analysis focuses on the influence of city differences. Model I and Model II show that living in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in comparison to other smaller cities in Turkey influences generalized trust negatively. Living in a big city would expose one to more diverse people; however, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with bigger cities would also be higher. Hence, it seems that the socio-political context in which the diverse relationships take place is also important in order to comment on trust relations. When people rate the potential risks associated with these relations higher than potential opportunities, they may well refrain from trust behavior. This is the case for the people who are primary, secondary or high school graduates, as well as for those living in the three big cities in Turkey. These findings show that generalized trust has to do with individuals' experiences, yet the influence of both network relations and bridging structures are not uniform, and are, in addition, much more complicated than is hypothesized by the social capital literature.

What about those variables which are found insignificant in the analyses? Is it likely that the age and the education heterogeneity are highly related to the age and the education variables respectively, hence distorting the findings? What about the sex variable? In their analysis of the application of the name generator/interpreter items in mass surveys in Turkey, Çarkoğlu and Cenker showed that women were more likely than men to name no discussants; they were also more likely to designate a family member or a relative as the discussant than a friend or an acquaintance.[322] Is it likely that the network size and network density variables capture the influence of sex, since men's networks are likely to be more extensive and women's networks denser?

In order to answer these questions, a series of separate analyses were conducted. Table 6.22 on page 147 presents Model III and Model IV, which show the analyses

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[322] Çarkoğlu and Cenker, "Learning from name generator/interpreters in mass surveys: findings from Turkey," 170.

without the network variables. The first of these models contrasts university education with all education groups. Model IV, in turn, contrasts different education levels with those who had lower than primary school education.

Alternatively, Table 6.23 on page 148 presents the analyses without the inclusion of age and education heterogeneity variables. This table also reports two models, which counts on different education groups.

Table 6.22 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses without network variables: Model III & IV						
	Model III			Model IV		
	Coefficients	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|	Coefficients	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|
Bridging structures						
Employed	0,14	0,34	0,67	0,15	0,34	0,65
Primary school	-0,72	0,48	0,13			
Secondary school	-0,86	0,62	0,16			
High school	-0,51	0,54	0,35			
University	0,50	0,59	0,40	*1,14*	*0,35*	*0,00*
Individual level features						
Subjective happiness	0,10	0,05	0,06	0,10	0,05	0,08
Control variables						
Sex (Man=1)	-0,23	0,32	0,47	-0,27	0,31	0,38
Age	0,01	0,01	0,30	0,01	0,01	0,20
Household size	0,09	0,08	0,27	0,08	0,08	0,30
Istanbul	*-1,00*	*0,28*	*0,00*	*-0,98*	*0,28*	*0,00*
Ankara	*-1,51*	*0,43*	*0,00*	*-1,50*	*0,44*	*0,00*
Izmir	*-1,09*	*0,45*	*0,01*	*-1,10*	*0,45*	*0,01*
Constant	*-2,75*	*0,91*	*0,00*	*-3,42*	*0,75*	*0,00*
Number of observations	987			987		

Table 6.23 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses without age and education heterogeneity: Model V & VI	Model V			Model VI		
	Coefficients	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|	Coefficients	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|
Network variables						
Network size	0,15	0,14	0,28	0,14	0,14	0,32
Closeness density	0,11	0,12	0,37	0,12	0,12	0,34
Extent of close friends	0,00	0,01	0,51	0,00	0,01	0,52
Worldview heterogeneity	-0,05	0,05	0,31	-0,05	0,05	0,32
Bridging structures						
Employed	0,12	0,34	0,71	0,14	0,34	0,68
Primary school	-0,73	0,47	0,13			
Secondary school	-0,88	0,61	0,15			
High school	-0,51	0,53	0,33			
University	0,43	0,58	0,46	*1,08*	*0,36*	*0,00*
Individual level features						
Subjective happiness	0,10	0,05	0,06	0,10	0,06	0,07
Control variables						
Sex (Man=1)	-0,20	0,33	0,54	-0,24	0,33	0,46
Age	0,01	0,01	0,34	0,01	0,01	0,23
Household size	0,08	0,08	0,31	0,08	0,08	0,33
Istanbul	*-1,09*	*0,29*	*0,00*	*-1,07*	*0,29*	*0,00*
Ankara	*-1,55*	*0,43*	*0,00*	*-1,54*	*0,43*	*0,00*
Izmir	*-1,18*	*0,46*	*0,01*	*-1,19*	*0,46*	*0,01*
Constant	*-3,05*	*0,98*	*0,00*	*-3,74*	*0,81*	*0,00*
Number of observations	**987**			**987**		

Table 6.22 and Table 6.23 show that the network variables do not capture the independent influence of the sex, age and education levels variables. The analyses thus far revealed that both the women and the older people are more likely to trust unknown others. However neither influence is significant both with and without the network variables. Also, only the comparison of the university graduates with all other education levels shows a significant and positive influence on generalized trust.

What about the influence of the alternative measures to age and education heterogeneity? The analysis showed the positive influence of age differences on generalized trust. This result was related to the individual's familiarity with different life experiences as a result of age differences. Is it likely that this influence is more related to age heterogeneity among the discussants only? Or, is it possible that generalized trust becomes more likely with the increase in discussants' ages?

What about the differences in education levels? It is argued that these differences result in increased suspicion towards the unknown others. Is it likely that we observe a similar result for education heterogeneity only among the discussants? Or, can this suspicion be more related the better-educated discussants than the respondent? In order to test these alternative hypotheses, a series of analyses were run. Table 6.24 on the next page shows the results of these analyses. Accordingly neither the discussants' age and education heterogeneity nor the extent of the older and the better-educated discussants explained generalized trust. Hence, only the age heterogeneity measure, which includes the respondent's age as well, emerged as a positive and significant determinant of generalized trust. Though insignificant, the negative influence of worldview and education heterogeneity further showed the unease regarding the influence of discussants' diverse features on generalized trust.

Table 6.24 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses with alternative measures to age and education heterogeneity: Models VII, VIII, IX						
	Model VII			Model VIII		
	Coeff.	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|	Coeff.	Robust Std. Err.	P> |z|
Network variables						
Network size	0,16	0,15	0,30	0,19	0,15	0,21
Closeness density	0,09	0,13	0,48	0,12	0,12	0,33
Extent of close friends	0,00	0,01	0,47	0,00	0,01	0,48
Worldview het.	-0,05	0,05	0,31	-0,05	0,05	0,30
Discussants' age het.	0,26	0,17	0,13			
Discussants' education het.	-0,25	0,25	0,31			
The extent of older discussants				-0,18	0,11	0,11
The extent of better edu. diss.				0,09	0,10	0,39
Bridging structures						
Employed	0,15	0,33	0,66	0,16	0,33	0,63
University	*1,00*	*0,38*	*0,01*	*0,93*	*0,36*	*0,01*
Individual level features						
Subjective happiness	0,10	0,06	0,07	0,11	0,06	0,06
Control variables						
Sex (Man=1)	-0,24	0,32	0,44	-0,26	0,32	0,42
Age	0,01	0,01	0,17	0,02	0,01	0,12
Household size	0,09	0,08	0,30	0,07	0,08	0,37
Istanbul	*-1,11*	*0,30*	*0,00*	*-1,09*	*0,29*	*0,00*
Ankara	*-1,58*	*0,43*	*0,00*	*-1,57*	*0,43*	*0,00*
Izmir	*-1,23*	*0,45*	*0,01*	*-1,24*	*0,83*	*0,00*
Constant	*-3,71*	*0,84*	*0,00*	*-3,89*	*0,83*	*0,00*
Number of observations	987			987		

The analyses thus far point to the relevance of the discussion networks for generalized trust. Despite the small numbers of discussants INFORMALITY was able to question, a wealth of information became available as to the types and nature of people's relationships at the community level. The positive influence of age heterogeneity and the negative influences of both worldview and education heterogeneity on trust emerged as a research puzzle. The positive influence of a university education further showed that the proposed straightforward relationship between the network diversity measures and bridging structures on the one hand, and generalized trust on the other, is neither straight nor forward!

What about the tie-level relationships? Descriptive analyses on discussion networks already revealed quite close relationships irrespective of the role labels of the discussants. Yet, some differences were also in order between the relationships with the family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. Despite these differences, the analyses thus far focused on the network level variables which are concerned with both the kinship and non-kinship ties. Is it likely that these different types of ties exert different influence on generalized trust?

In order to answer this question, the discussion networks are partitioned into different types of ties. These ties are the family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. Every network variable was re-generated for these different types of ties. Table 6.25 below provides the descriptive statistics of the variables, which are generated with the separate kinship and the non-kinship ties of the discussion networks. The following Table 6.26 on the next two pages presents the correlations between all variables of interest.

Table 6.25 INFORMALITY summary statistics for kinship and non-kinship ties					
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Size: kinship ties	1002	0,82	1,04	0	3
Size: non-kinship ties	1002	0,99	1,14	0	3
Density: kinship ties	1002	1,48	1,82	0	4
Density: non-kinship ties	1002	0,80	0,93	0	2
Age heterogeneity: kinship ties	997	0,37	0,78	0	6,25
Age heterogeneity: non-kinship ties	997	0,11	0,31	0	4
Education heterogeneity: kinship ties	993	0,26	0,58	0	5,56
Education heterogeneity: non-kinship ties	993	0,16	0,41	0	4,25
Worldview heterogeneity: kinship ties	1002	1,84	3,11	0	16
Worldview heterogeneity: non-kinship ties	1002	2,07	3,08	0	16

Table 6.26 INFORMALITY correlation analysis of kinship, non-kinship and other variables

	Size: kinship	Size: non-kinship	Density: kinship	Density: non-kinship	Extent of close friends	W.view: kinship	W.view: non-kinship	Age het.: kinship	Age het.: non-kinship	Edu. het.: kinship	Edu.het.: non-kinship
Size: kinship	1,00										
Size: non-kinship	**-0,47**	1,00									
Density: kinship	**0,79**	**-0,52**	1,00								
Density: non-kinship	**-0,53**	**0,81**	**-0,65**	1,00							
Extent of close friends	0,04	**0,14**	-0,01	**0,07**	1,00						
Worldview heterogeneity: kinship	**0,55**	**-0,26**	**0,55**	**-0,35**	0,03	1,00					
Worldview heterogeneity: non-kinship	**-0,26**	**0,54**	**-0,30**	**0,51**	**0,08**	0,05	1,00				
Age heterogeneity: kinship	**0,55**	**-0,29**	**0,50**	**-0,32**	-0,03	**0,38**	**-0,14**	1,00			
Age heterogeneity: non-kinship	**-0,14**	**0,31**	**-0,15**	**0,26**	**0,07**	0,04	**0,31**	**-0,07**	1,00		
Edu. heterogeneity: kinship	**0,47**	**-0,25**	**0,43**	**-0,27**	0,01	**0,31**	**-0,14**	**0,46**	-0,05	1,00	
Edu. heterogeneity: non-kinship	**-0,19**	**0,36**	**-0,19**	**0,31**	**0,09**	**-0,10**	**0,29**	**-0,12**	**0,41**	**-0,09**	1,00

Table 6.26 continued…

	Size: kinship	Size: non-kinship	Density: kinship	Density: non-kinship	Extent of close friends	W.view: kinship	W.view: non-kinship	Age het.: kinship	Age het.: non-kinship	Edu. het.: kinship	Edu.het.: non-kinship
Employed	**-0,14**	**0,21**	**-0,11**	**0,18**	**0,11**	**-0,08**	**0,18**	**-0,16**	-0,04	**-0,12**	0,01
University	**-0,09**	**0,19**	**-0,13**	**0,19**	**0,08**	-0,04	**0,08**	-0,05	0,02	-0,02	-0,01
Subjective happiness	-0,05	0,03	-0,04	0,02	**0,07**	-0,04	0,02	**-0,06**	0,00	-0,01	-0,01
Sex	**-0,12**	**0,14**	**-0,09**	**0,08**	**0,15**	-0,06	**0,13**	**-0,12**	-0,04	**-0,08**	-0,03
Age	0,04	**-0,12**	**0,10**	**-0,15**	-0,01	0,01	**-0,14**	**0,09**	**0,12**	**0,08**	-0,02
Household size	0,03	-0,02	0,01	-0,05	0,03	0,00	0,00	**-0,07**	-0,02	-0,02	0,05
Istanbul	**0,09**	0,06	0,02	0,00	0,04	0,02	-0,02	0,02	0,01	0,04	-0,01
Ankara	**-0,15**	**0,09**	**-0,14**	**0,12**	**-0,10**	**-0,13**	0,02	**-0,08**	0,02	**-0,08**	0,03
Izmir	**0,22**	-0,05	**0,18**	**-0,08**	0,01	**0,22**	0,06	**0,18**	-0,01	**0,11**	-0,02

Table 6.26 continued…

	Employed	University	Sub. Happiness	Sex	Age	Household size	Istanbul	Ankara	Izmir
Employed	1,00								
University	**0,20**	1,00							
Subjective happiness	0,00	**0,09**	1,00						
Sex	**0,49**	**0,15**	0,03	1,00					
Age	**-0,33**	-0,06	**-0,03**	0,04	1,00				
Household size	0,05	**-0,19**	**-0,09**	0,00	**-0,24**	1,00			
Istanbul	0,05	**-0,06**	0,00	-0,01	-0,05	**0,11**	1,00		
Ankara	-0,01	**0,15**	**0,04**	-0,01	-0,05	**-0,10**	**-0,38**	1,00	
Izmir	-0,05	0,05	**-0,10**	0,00	**0,08**	**-0,09**	**-0,34**	**-0,17**	1,00

The above-mentioned variables are regressed over the generalized trust variable and this analysis revealed differences between relations with family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. Table 6.27 on the next page presents this analysis. According to this table, age differences have a significant influence on trust only for the non-kinship ties. It should be remembered that the majority of the respondents in Turkey named friends and acquaintances discussants with identical age groups (38,5%). The percentage of respondents who named younger friends and acquaintances as discussants was 15,2 percent and the percentage who named older friends and acquaintances as discussants was 11,5. Both of these latter groups seem to make significant influence on people's tendency to trust.

The primacy of the non-kinship relationships comes to the fore with the significant influence of the network size variable on non-kinship ties as well. In the prior analysis, the extent of discussion networks was found to be unrelated to generalized trust, yet Table 6.27 shows a positive and significant influence of network size for friends and acquaintances.

In Turkey, age heterogeneity among friends and acquaintances is found to be a positive determinant of generalized trust. This may be related to culture in Turkey, which puts emphasis on seniority and hierarchical relations. Hence, different life experiences are likely to influence generalizations made about the unknown others when they are contextualized within the older-younger age relationships.

The situation is the contrary for both the worldview and the education heterogeneity variables. These variables influence generalized trust negatively for both the kinship and non-kinship ties. Although both types of variables are not significant, these findings are still important because they show us that the influence of relational ties on generalized trust varies according to diverse tie properties.

The focus on diverse tie properties, in turn, provides clues about the lack of significant relationship between the extent of close friends and generalized trust. Initially, the extent of close friends' networks was hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively. However, even the smaller discussion networks in Turkey displayed substantial variability in terms of tie properties, which influenced generalized trust differently. Hence, more variability is likely for more extensive friends' networks. As a result, more detailed enquiries on close friends' networks besides their size are necessary to comment more decisively about the influence of the more extensive close friends' networks on generalized trust.

Table 6.27 INFORMALITY multivariate analysis for tie-based relationships			
	Model X		
	Coefficients	**Robust Std. Err.**	**P>|z|**
Tie based relations			
Size: kinship ties	-0,11	0,22	0,60
Size: non-kinship ties	*0,49*	*0,23*	*0,03*
Density: kinship ties	0,13	0,15	0,41
Density: non-kinship ties	-0,41	0,32	0,20
Extent of close friends	0,01	0,01	0,32
Worldview het.: kinship ties	-0,01	0,06	0,93
Worldview het.: non- kinship ties	-0,02	0,05	0,66
Age het.: kinship ties	0,26	0,15	0,08
Age het. : non-kinship ties	*0,73*	*0,34*	*0,03*
Edu. het.: kinship ties	-0,09	0,26	0,73
Edu. het.: non- kinship ties	*-0,76*	0,40	0,06
Bridging structures			
Employed	0,09	0,33	0,79
Attended university	*1,13*	*0,36*	*0,00*
Individual level features			
Subjective happiness	0,10	0,06	0,07
Control variables			
Sex	-0,27	0,33	0,41
Age	0,01	0,01	0,44
Household size	0,10	0,09	0,25
Istanbul	*-1,11*	*0,31*	*0,00*
Ankara	*-1,58*	*0,44*	*0,00*
Izmir	*-1,24*	*0,47*	*0,01*
Constant	*-3,50*	*0,86*	*0,00*
Number of observations	**987**		

What about the magnitude of the influence of these variables? Two scenarios are examined in order to discuss the weight of the influence of the given variables. The first scenario compares the influence of the family and friends networks for different values of age heterogeneity; the second shows the change in probabilities to trust across Turkey's cities.

Table 6.28 on the next page shows the values for the first scenario. This scenario uses the coefficients obtained from Model X of Table 6.27 and it compares the influence of age heterogeneity separately for the kinship and non-kinship ties. Only the family ties are examined for the kinship relations, and only the friendship ties for the non-kinship relations. Also, the maximum number of ties for each group, which is three, is considered. The rest of the continuous variables were set to their mean values. As to the binary variables, the scenario displays predicted probabilities for the man who had less than university education, was employed and lived in smaller cities than Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The smaller cities are small in terms of their populations rather than geography.

Figure 6.7 INFORMALITY Scenario 1

Table 6.28 INFORMALITY Scenario 1: Probability calculations across different values of age heterogeneity for all family or all friends networks											
	Scenario 1a: Set values when the values of age heterogeneity for non-kinship ties change						Scenario 1b: Set values when the values of age heterogeneity for kinship ties change				
Variables											
Size: kinship	0	0	0	0	0		**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**
Size: non-kinship	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**		0	0	0	0	0
Density: kinship	0	0	0	0	0		4	4	4	4	4
Density: non-kinship	2	2	2	2	2		0	0	0	0	0
Extent of close friends	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3		9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3
Worldview het.: kinship	0	0	0	0	0		1,8	1,8	1,8	1,8	1,8
Worldview het.: non-kinship	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1		0	0	0	0	0
Age het.: kinship	0	0	0	0	0		**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Age het.: non-kinship	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**		0	0	0	0	0
Edu. Het.: kinship	0	0	0	0	0		0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3
Edu.het.: non-kinship	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2		0	0	0	0	0
Employed	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1
University	0	0	0	1	0		0	0	0	1	0
Subjective happiness	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1		6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1
Sex	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1
Age	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2		42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2
Household size	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7		3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7
Istanbul	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
Ankara	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
Izmir	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
Pr (Trust=1)	**0,14**	**0,25**	**0,43**	**0,59**	**0,75**		**0,10**	**0,12**	**0,15**	**0,18**	**0,22**

Figure 6.7 shows that when there are no age differences among the discussants, having only the friends' ties increases the likelihood to trust by only four percent. However, this difference rises to more than fifty percent for the maximum value of age heterogeneity.

Differences across the values of age heterogeneity within each group are also striking. As age heterogeneity of the family ties increases from zero to four, the probability to trust increases by twelve percent. This percentage is much higher for the friends' ties and it amounts to nearly sixty percent. Hence, although the kinship and non-kinship relations are likely to exert different influence on generalized trust, age differences within the networks emerge as a more significant determinant.

Another set of significant differences in probabilities to trust is observed across Turkey's cities. Figure 6.8, below, presents the second scenario. Table 6.29 on the next page presents the values for this scenario. These values rest on the maximum size of the friendship ties and it computes the probability to trust across different cities for the minimum and the maximum value of the age heterogeneity. As noted earlier, the smaller cities which are referred to in the figure, underscore size in terms of population rather than geography.

Figure 6.8 INFORMALITY Scenario 2

Table 6.29 INFORMALITY Scenario 2: Probability calculations across Turkey's cities for the minimum and maximum age heterogeneity of the non-kinship relations	Scenario 2a: Set values when Turkey's cities change for age. het.=4				Scenario 2b: Set values when Turkey's cities change for age. het.=0			
Variables								
Size: kinship	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Size: non-kinship	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**
Density: kinship	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Density: non-kinship	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Extent of close friends	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3	9,3
Worldview het.: kinship	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Worldview het.: non-kinship	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,1
Age het.: kinship	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Age het.: non-kinship	**4**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
Edu. Het.: kinship	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Edu.het.: non-kinship	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Employed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Attended university	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subjective happiness	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1	6,1
Sex	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Age	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2	42,2
Household size	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7
Istanbul	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**
Ankara	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**
Izmir	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
Pr (Trust=1)	**0,74**	**0,48**	**0,40**	**0,47**	**0,14**	**0,05**	**0,03**	**0,05**

Figure 6.8 shows that living in smaller cities than the major metropolitan areas increases the likelihood to trust by nine percent when age heterogeneity is zero. Among the metropolitan cities, the differences in probabilities to trust change between one and two percent. However, the differences become pronounced when probabilities are calculated for the maximum value of age heterogeneity. The probability to trust increases to nearly seventy-five percent for people who live in smaller cities and it decreases by more than thirty percent for those who live in Istanbul or Izmir. The probability difference is even greater for those who reside in Ankara.

The analysis has thus far revealed non-kinship relations and the age heterogeneity of those relations as significant determinants of generalized trust. Yet the negative influence exerted by education heterogeneity on the one hand, and the positive influence of university education in comparison to other education levels on the other, pointed to salient power asymmetries in Turkey as well. These asymmetries, in turn, are likely to interfere in the ways individuals connect to each other.

In other words, diverse relationships seem to influence generalized trust, yet these relations do not take place in a vacuum, either. Socio-economic variables of education and age proved to be significant structures which influence the way individuals relate to each other; these relationships, in turn, exert different influence on generalized trust. Besides the relational ties, the socio-political context - the city of residence in this case - was also designated as a significant determinant of generalized trust as well. Hence it would not be wrong to suggest that the influence of the relational ties become more meaningful once they are contextualized within the given socio-economic and/or socio-political milieu.

Given these analyses, can we talk about the potential for bottom-up generation of generalized trust in Turkey? Data on core discussion networks do not point to isolated individuals. Non-kinship ties are quite abundant in Turkey and they are found as significant determinants for generalized trust. These types of ties have the potential to bring people from different walks of life together; hence they may act as the foundations for civic activism as well.

However the analysis also showed the variable influence of network ties. The weaker non-kinship ties with age differentials proved positive and significant for generalized trust, whereas education exerted negative influence. Also, network density is found unrelated to trust. The variance about both the tie properties and their influence

on generalized trust shows that the social network influence on generalized trust is not unidirectional as it is often claimed by the social capital literature.

Moreover, the socio-economic and the socio-political contexts in which individuals relate to each other seem important as well. The present data showed that the socio-economic differences both at the network and the individual levels influence generalized trust significantly.

How far can we generalize findings for Turkey to other democracies? The next chapter will continue the enquiry regarding the influence of relational ties on generalized trust within a cross-country context.

CHAPTER 7

THE CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES OF SOCIAL NETWORKS AND GENERALIZED TRUST

This chapter analyzes the ISSP cross-country data of 2001 on social networks in order to discuss the extent to which the findings from Turkey are comparable with other countries. Turkey was not included in the ISSP 2001 study; hence the comparison with the Turkish case will not be endogenous to the analysis. However, the countries which were included in the ISSP data, provide a wide range of variability in terms of democratic institutionalization and socio-economic development. This variability, in turn, is expected to shed further light on the relationship between social networks and generalized trust, which is deemed important to better understand the Turkish case.

Table 7.1, Table 7.2, and Table 7.3 on the following pages compare ISSP countries with Turkey across a range of variables. Egypt, Pakistan and Iran are also included in the comparison because, in general, Turkey is compared with these countries on the premise of sharing high percentages of Muslim populations. The objective of the comparisons is to discern the extent of comparability of the Turkish case with countries that were included in the ISSP data.

Table 7.1 shows countries' membership of OECD, G-20 and the EU. Turkey is a founding member of OECD, a member of G-20, and a candidate country for the EU. According to the table, Turkey shares at least one membership in an organization with all countries, except the Philippines, Egypt, Pakistan and Iran.

Table 7.1 Membership in International/Regional Organizations[323]			
Country	**OECD**	**G20**	**The EU**
Turkey	X	X	
Australia	X	X	
Austria	X		X
Brazil		X	
Canada	X	X	
Chile	X		
Cyprus			X
Czech Republic	X		X
Denmark	X		X
Egypt			
Finland	X		X
France	X	X	X
Germany	X	X	X
Great Britain	X	X	X
Hungary	X		X
Iran			
Israel	X		
Italy	X	X	X
Japan	X	X	X
Latvia			X
New Zealand	X		
Norway	X		
Pakistan			
Philippines			
Poland	X		X
Russia		X	
Slovenia	X		X
South Africa		X	
Spain	X		
Switzerland	X		
United States	X	X	

[323] For OECD members see,
http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, for G-20
members see, http://www.g20.org/index.aspx, and for the EU members see
http://europa.eu/ , accessed August 10, 2011.

Table 7.2 on page 166 compares countries across a range of economic indicators.[324] According to this table, Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines are economically the worse off countries. Turkey shares the 10,000-15,000$ range income with countries like Iran, Brazil, South Africa and Chile. Although Turkey and Chile are the better off countries within this group, Turkey scores worse in terms of the ranking based on the human development indicator index along with South Africa. This index is a composite indicator that accounts for educational attainment and life expectancy besides the income per capita. Economic inequalities are the highest in Brazil and South Africa. Turkey is in the same league as Iran, the US, Israel in terms of the Gini index.

Lastly, Table 7.3 presents the Freedom House political and civil liberties scores.[325] Among all countries, Egypt and Iran emerge as the only "Not Free" countries. Russia, Pakistan and the Philippines are "Partly Free" along with Turkey. Freedom House designate Brazil, Latvia and South Africa as "Free"; although their scores indicate some problems regarding the extent of both the political and civil liberties in terms of comparison with the other "Free" countries. Indeed Turkey is closer to this group and the Philippines than it is to Russia and Pakistan.

In sum, comparisons from Table 7.1 to Table 7.3 show that the ISSP countries are, in general, better institutionalized democracies and economies than Turkey. However Turkey is not completely out of the league of the ISSP countries either. Turkey shares overlapping membership of various international and regional organizations with many of these countries. Especially important among these countries, are the ones which recently became members of the EU, because Turkey is also an EU candidate country. In terms of economic indicators, Turkey compares closely with Brazil and South Africa. Their democratic indicators together with the

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[324] The shaded rows show the economically worse off countries. GNI ranking, income per capita, and Gini index data are taken from The World Bank, *2011 World Development Indicators*, 10-12. GNI ranking and income per capita for Cyprus is derived from another World Bank source, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf The World Bank data did not provide the Gini index for Cyprus and it is taken from the EUROstat:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi190&plugin=1. Lastly, the Human Development Index ranking is taken from UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/, accessed August 3, 2011.

[325] The shaded rows show the "Not Free" countries. Data is from Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, accessed August 3, 2011

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Philippines are also similar to Turkey. Russia is a worse off case than Turkey in terms of its democracy. Lastly, among the Muslim countries, which are not included in the ISSP data, Iran emerges close to the Turkish case only in terms of the economic indicators.

Given the relationship between generalized trust and democratic institutionalization, it makes sense to account for the social network underpinnings of generalized trust for a series of countries with democratically elected governments. ISSP data provides this opportunity, and includes a series of countries with which the comparison with the Turkish case seems relevant.

Table 7.2 Cross-country comparison of economic indicators				
Country	**Gross National Income Rank**	**Gross National Income-PPP Per capita ($)**	**Gini index**	**Human Development Indicator Rank**
Turkey	17	13.500	39,7	83
Australia	15	38.510	35,2	2
Austria	25	38.410	29,1	25
Brazil	8	10.160	53,9	73
Canada	10	37.280	32,6	8
Chile	48	13.420	22,6	45
Cyprus	40	30.290	28,4	35
Czech Republic	43	23.940	25,8	28
Denmark	28	38.780	24,7	19
Egypt	45	5.680	31,1	101
Finland	33	35.280	26,9	16
France	5	33.950	32,7	14
Germany	4	36.850	28,3	10
Great Britain	6	45.640	36,0	26
Hungary	51	19.090	31,2	36
Iran	26	11.470	38,3	70
Israel	40	27.010	39,2	15
Italy	7	31.870	36,0	23
Japan	2	33.440	24,9	11
Latvia	88	17.610	35,7	48
New Zealand	53	27.790	36,2	3
Norway	24	55.420	25,8	1
Pakistan	46	2.680	32,7	125
Philippines	47	3.540	44,0	97
Poland	21	18.290	34,2	41
Russia	12	18.330	42,3	65
Slovenia	72	26.470	31,2	29
South Africa	31	10.050	57,8	110
Spain	9	31.490	34,7	20
Switzerland	18	47.100	33,7	13
United States	1	45.640	40,8	4

Table 7.3 Cross-country comparison of democratic indicators			
Country	**Political Liberties**	**Civil Liberties**	**Status**
Turkey	3	3	Partly Free
Australia	1	1	Free
Austria	1	1	Free
Brazil	2	2	Free
Canada	1	1	Free
Chile	1	1	Free
Cyprus	1	1	Free
Czech Republic	1	1	Free
Denmark	1	1	Free
Egypt	6	5	Not Free
Finland	1	1	Free
France	1	1	Free
Germany	1	1	Free
Great Britain	1	1	Free
Hungary	1	1	Free
Iran	6	6	Not Free
Israel	1	2	Free
Italy	1	2	Free
Japan	1	2	Free
Latvia	2	2	Free
New Zealand	1	1	Free
Norway	1	1	Free
Pakistan	4	5	Partly Free
Philippines	3	3	Partly Free
Poland	1	1	Free
Russia	6	5	Partly Free
Slovenia	1	1	Free
South Africa	2	2	Free
Spain	1	1	Free
Switzerland	1	1	Free
United States	1	1	Free

7.1. ISSP Survey on Social Networks

ISSP conducts annual cross-national surveys. It was founded in 1983 by the joint efforts of the US, Great Britain, (then) West Germany and Australia. The survey theme focused on social networks both in 1986 and 2001, and the present analysis is concerned with the latter survey. By the time this survey was conducted, ISSP had thirty-eight member nations. The analysis accounts for countries rather than nations, hence the Northern Ireland sample is not included in the analysis. Moreover, East and West Germany are coded as the single country of Germany. Likewise, Israeli Jews and Arabs are coded as a single country of Israel. Subsequently, the present analysis counts on twenty-seven countries for its enquiry into the social network influence on generalized trust.[326]

ISSP surveys are funded and administered by participating countries; hence, variations are observed in survey methods. For instance, different survey methods such as face-to-face interviews, mail interviews or telephone interviews were used in different countries. In addition, some countries employed simple random sampling from the census data or the electoral rolls, whereas others went for multistage probability sampling. Variability is also observed in terms of post-survey weights. Table 7.4 on the next page shows the countries, their sample sizes as well as the sample methodologies. The ISSP codebook lacked country descriptions for Brazil, Israel and New Zealand. Since no weighting factors were used for these cases, their samples were assumed to be nationally representative. This assumption is based on similar cases which did not use any weights because they mostly relied on simple random sampling from the census data.[327]

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[326] *ISSP Codebook for 2001 Survey on Social Networks*, 7. See http://www.issp.org/, accessed August, 7, 2011.

[327] Ibid., 22-100.

Table 7.4 ISSP Countries, sample sizes, sampling and weight information				
Country	**Sample Size**	**Percent**	**Sample type**	**Weight by**
Australia	1352	3,79	Simple random from the electoral roll	No weight
Austria	1011	2,84	Stratified multistage clustered random	Sex, age, province of residence
Brazil	2000	5,61	No information provided	No information provided
Canada	1114	3,12	Stratified random	Provincial population
Chile	1504	4,22	Probability multi-stage cluster	Gender, age and urbanity
Cyprus	1006	2,82	Stratified random	No weight
Czech Republic	1200	3,37	Stratified random	Region, sex, education, age, size of community
Denmark	1293	3,63	Simple random sample from the Central Population Register	No weight
Finland	1376	3,86	Simple random sample from population register; implicit geographic stratification	Gender, age, municipality, type of community
France	1398	3,92	Random equal probability	Post stratification
Germany	1369	3,84	Two stage random sample	Weight factor for East and West Germany
Great Britain	912	2,56	Stratified random probability	Address, household and the individual
Hungary	1524	4,27	Two stages random sample	Sex, age, highest education level, type of place of residence
Israel	1207	3,39	No information provided	No information provided
Italy	999	2,8	Representative of adults	Education level
Japan	1276	3,58	Two stage stratified random	No weight
Latvia	1000	2,8	Multistage stratified random	No weight
New Zealand	1146	3,21	No information provided	No information provided
Norway	1560	4,38	Simple random sample from the Central Register of Persons	No weight
Philippines	1200	3,37	Multistage probability sample	Population weight for area domains

	Sample Size	Percent	Sample type	Weight by
Country				
Russia	2000	5,61	Multistage stratification	Regional population, gender, age, education level
Slovenia	1077	3,02	Two stage stratified random	region and type of settlement
South Africa	1563	7,19	Stratification by province and population	SAS Procedure Survey Select
Spain	1214	3,41	Representative of adults	Sex and age groups
Switzerland	980	2,75	Stratified random	Sex, age, size of household, employment status
United States	1149	3,22	Multi-state area probability	No weight
Total	34651	100	--------	---------

Table 7.4 Continued...

ISSP did not include any name generator/interpreter questions; rather, the survey posed detailed questions about relations with the family, the friends, and the relatives. ISSP survey also included questions on civil society involvement. As has been noted, different types of network questions posed in ISSP and INFORMALITY respectively, challenge the comparability of the two analyses. However, both surveys derive the network information from tie-level relationships. Moreover, in both analyses, the emphasis falls onto the enquiry into the influence of both the kinship and non-kinship relations on generalized trust. Hence, data availability in both surveys regarding the tie-level relationships with family and friends, render them comparable.

The ISSP survey of 2001 focused nearly exclusively on social networks. This means that it had detailed questions about relations with the family members, relatives and friends. Similar to the previous chapter, these questions were used to gauge the influence of the network size, network density and the network diversity on generalized trust. Moreover, the influence of civil society involvement would also be accounted for. Hence, all revised hypotheses which were presented in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 are tested with the ISSP data. The next section, then, starts the analysis with the presentation of the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable as well as the social network variables of interest.

7.2. ISSP Generalized Trust and Social Network Variables

The ISSP posed a three item question to account for trust in people.

Table 7.5 ISSP trust module					
	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
There are a few people I can trust completely	1	2	3	4	5
Most of the time you can be sure that other people want the best for you	1	2	3	4	5
If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you	1	2	3	4	5

The third statement comes close to the generalized trust question, which was asked for in INFORMALITY. In this survey, the response for lack of trust was related to the proposition that one should be careful in dealing with others. Likewise, the third statement above underscored a general suspicion towards the intentions of other people. The explicit reference given to the "other people" was also important because generalized trust concerns individuals' orientations towards the general others. Hence, those respondents who agreed with the statement "if you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you" were treated as respondents who lacked trust in the fellow man. The higher values of this variable, then, indicated more trust. Table 7.6 on the next page shows the percentage distribution of this variable. The following Table 7.7 presents the chi-squared significance of demographic variables on generalized trust. Lastly, Table 7.8 displays the distribution of generalized trust levels across countries. For presentation purposes, in Table 7.8, the five-point scale of the generalized trust variable has been reduced to three values of Trust (percentage for Disagree strongly and Disagree), Neutral (percentage for neither agree nor disagree) and No Trust (Agree and Agree strongly) respectively.

Table 7.6 ISSP Generalized trust question		
If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you		
	Frequency	**Percentage**
Agree strongly	8702	25,49
Agree	13343	39,08
Neither agree nor disagree	6258	18,33
Disagree	4522	13,25
Disagree strongly	1316	3,85
Total	34141	100

Table 7.7 Chi-squared significance of demographic variables on generalized trust		
Generalized trust	Sex	*0,00*
	Education	*0,00*
	Work status	*0,00*
	Age	*0,00*
	Countries	*0,00*

Table 7.6 shows that nearly sixty percent of people agreed that people should be careful in dealing with others. Yet nearly sixteen percent disagreed with this statement, which indicates trust in the fellow men. Although this figure is more than double the percentage of people who trusted others in Turkey, it is still low in comparison with those who were skeptical about others' intentions.

Table 7.7 shows that values of sex, education, work status, age and country made significant differences in the decision to trust or not to trust. Yet the direction and magnitude of the influence of these demographic variables can only be discerned once the multivariate analysis is conducted.

Table 7.8 on the next page is interesting and it shows striking differences across countries in terms of generalized trust. More than forty percent indicated trust in the fellow man in Finland and Denmark. This corresponding figure is lower than five percent in Poland and Hungary and less than ten percent in Spain, South Africa, Chile, Slovenia, and Brazil. Given the noticeable discrepancy in trust levels, whether and to what extent the societal relationships influence generalized trust emerges as an interesting question.

Table 7.8 ISSP row percentage distribution of generalized trust for individual countries			
	Generalized trust		
	Trust (3)	**Neutral (2)**	**No trust (1)**
Finland	47,9	20,6	31,5
Denmark	41,3	22,6	36,0
Switzerland	38,9	19,1	42,0
France	30,2	27,1	42,7
Norway	26,9	36,0	37,1
Australia	26,7	26,2	47,1
Japan	24,9	30,2	44,9
New Zealand	23,4	21,2	55,4
Canada	21,3	20,2	58,5
Israel	17,5	17,7	64,8
Great Britain	17,3	18,3	64,5
Cyprus	16,5	25,9	57,7
Czech Republic	15,3	22,3	62,4
Philippines	15,2	8,3	76,5
Russia	15,1	26,2	58,8
United States	13,7	15,9	70,1
Latvia	12,5	23,7	63,9
Italy	12,4	20,6	66,9
Germany	11,6	15,8	72,7
Austria	11,4	14,3	74,3
Spain	9,4	15,1	75,5
South Africa	6,6	8,4	85,1
Chile	6,4	8,2	85,3
Slovenia	6,2	16,0	77,8
Brazil	5,3	6,8	87,9
Poland	4,6	11,3	84,1
Hungary	4,3	12,0	83,7

The analysis can now turn to the social network variables. ISSP posed detailed questions about respondents' ties to brothers/sisters and the sons/daughters, who were older than eighteen years old, hence, adults. Besides these, the relations with the mother and the father were examined. Table 7.9 presents these questions.

Table 7.9 ISSP questions about family ties
1) We would like to begin with your brothers and sisters. How many adult brothers and/or sisters- we mean brothers or sisters who are aged 18 or older- do you have? (We mean brothers and sisters who are alive. Please include step-brothers and sisters, half-brothers and -sisters, and adopted brothers and sisters)
2) Of your adult brothers and sisters, with whom do you have the most contact?
3) How often do you see or visit this brother or sister?
Lives in the same household as I do
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
4) How often do you have any other contact with this brother and sister besides visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail?
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
5) Now some questions about your children who are aged 18 or older. How many children age 18 or older do you have? (We mean children who are still alive. Please include step-children and adopted children)
6) Of your children aged 18 or older, with whom do you have the most contact?
7) How often so you see this son or daughter?
Lives in the same household as I do
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
8) And how often do you have any contact with this son or daughter besides visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail?
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often

Table 7.9 Continued…
9) And now some questions about your father. How often do you see or visit your father?
Lives in the same household as I do
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
Never
My father is no longer alive
I do not know where my father lives
10) And how often do you have any contact with your father besides visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail?
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
Never
11) And what about your mother? How often do you see or visit her?
Lives in the same household as I do
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
Never
My mother is no longer alive
I do not know where my other lives
12) And how often do you have any contact with your mother besides visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail?
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
Never

It should be noted that ISSP questions accounted for either the presence or the absence of the tie on the one hand, and the tie strength on the other. The latter was measured with the frequency of contact questions.

Adult family network size and network density variables are computed from the above questions. The adult family network size corresponded to a respondent's total number of ties to his/her brothers/sisters and sons/daughters, who are eighteen or older as well as ties to the mother and the father. 54,1% of all respondents had lost their fathers and 38,5% of the respondents had lost their mothers. Ties to mother and father are included in the computation of the adult family size with the assumption that the numbers of ties for emotional support would increase if both parents were alive.

Adult family network size is a continuous variable, which ranges between 0 and 36. The mean of this variable is 4,6 and 95% of distribution lies between 0 and 10. The first column in Table 7.10 on the next page shows the mean distribution of this variable across countries, and the second column shows whether the mean is statistically different from the base country. Finland is designated as the base country because the trusting individuals were found to be the highest in this country. In the rest of the analysis, the presentation of the mean distributions follows the same pattern; hence, the country means will be compared with respect to the mean of the given variable in Finland. The weighted data is used for all of the mean calculations.

According to Table 7.10, the adult family size is the highest in the Philippines (7,42), followed by Brazil (6,91), Chile (5,98), Israel (5,54) and Canada (5,35). Both Brazil and Chile are Latin American countries, but other than these, this group of countries does not seem to fit into a geographical/historical and/or religious block. On the other hand, the mean adult family network size is the lowest in Latvia (3,01), Russia (3,45) and Hungary (3,49), all of which are the ex-communist states. Yet this group is followed by Italy (3,77) and Switzerland (3,91) and they do not have much to do with the communist legacy. Lastly, the mean adult family network size emerged as similar to the case in Finland (4,17) in Great Britain (4,08), Austria (4,02), Poland (4,12), Cyprus (4,15) and Denmark (4,01).

Table 7.10 ISSP mean distribution of adult family network size across countries and significance of mean differences with respect to Finland		
	Adult family network size	
Country	**Mean**	**p>t**
Australia	**5,02**	**0,00**
Germany	**3,71**	**0,00**
Great Britain	4,08	0,36
United States	**4,95**	**0,00**
Austria	4,02	0,15
Hungary	**3,49**	**0,00**
Italy	**3,77**	**0,00**
Norway	**4,65**	**0,00**
Czech Republic	**3,53**	**0,00**
Slovenia	**3,97**	**0,04**
Poland	4,21	0,72
Russia	**3,45**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**5,25**	**0,00**
Canada	**5,35**	**0,00**
Philippines	**7,42**	**0,00**
Israel	**5,54**	**0,00**
Japan	**4,64**	**0,00**
Spain	**4,49**	**0,00**
Latvia	**3,01**	**0,00**
France	**4,50**	**0,00**
Cyprus	4,15	0,77
Chile	**5,98**	**0,00**
Denmark	4,01	0,06
Switzerland	**3,91**	**0,01**
Brazil	**6,91**	**0,00**
South Africa	**4,55**	**0,00**
Finland	**4,17**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	4,61	

The second variable of interest is the family network density variable. The frequency of contact with the father, mother, and the most contacted brother/sister and son/daughter is computed for this variable. Yet, it should be noted that the ISSP frequency of contact questions accounted for both the face-to-face contact and contact through telephone, fax or email. The present analysis deemed both types of contacts significant because the concern is to account for the influence of the weight of the given relationship on generalized trust. Hence the sustenance of the contact through any means is of concern.

In order to capture this influence, a series of new variables were generated which took into account the highest frequency of contact through any indicated means. These variables were labeled as *the brother/sister contact; the son/daughter contact; the father contact; and the mother contact* respectively. Values of these variables ranged between 0 to 7: zero corresponded to lack of any contact, and seven corresponded to living in the same household, hence the most frequent contact. The frequency of lack of any contact was found quite low for brother/sister contact and son/daughter contact because the relevant questions asked about the most contacted brother/sister and son/daughter. People were also found to contact their fathers and mothers quite frequently. Yet, as noted, the bulk of the respondents had lost their mothers and fathers. Table 7.11 on the next page reported the means of all the frequency of contact variables and it accounts for the mean frequency of contact for the fathers and the mothers who were still alive.

The mean brother/sister contact is 4,06. The most frequent contact is found in Israel (5,11), Cyprus (5,06), Spain (4,92), Italy (4,88), and Slovenia (4,62). The lowest figure is in Japan (3,34) followed by Finland (3,44) and Australia (3,52). The means of brother/sister contact are not statistically different among the latter countries.

The mean son/daughter contact is 5,48. This shows that people in general contact more with their adult children than their siblings, which is not a particularly interesting finding. Mean son/daughter contact is the highest in Italy (6,16), Spain (6,14), Slovenia (6,11), Cyprus (6,08), and Israel (6,02). The mean differences are not significantly different from Finland (4,87) for New Zealand (4,83), Denmark (4,89), and France (4,93). All these countries also score the lowest for son/daughter contact.

The mean for father contact is 4,59. The highest scores are observed in Cyprus (5,77), Spain (5,74), Italy (5,64), Israel (5,61) and Slovenia (5,02). The lowest scores are in the US (3,74), Finland (3,80), Canada (3,87), New Zealand (3,91) and Australia (3,99). The mean differences across this group are not significant either.

Lastly, the mean for mother contact is 4,94. The countries with the highest mean values are Israel (5,82), Cyprus (5,81), Spain (5,80), Italy (5,79), and Slovenia (5,41). It should be noted that these countries score the highest across all variables of the brother/sister contact, the son/daughter contact, the father contact, and the mother contact. Hence family relations emerge as denser across these countries. One striking point is that Table 7.10 showed Italy as one of the countries with the lowest mean for adult family network size. According to Table 7.11, Italians had strong ties to their most contacted brother/sister, son/daughter as well as father and mother. This means that

Italians, in general, have a small family in terms of size, but they forge strong relations within the family.

Table 7.11 ISSP mean distribution of the most contacted family members across countries								
	Brother/Sister contact		Son/Daughter contact		Father contact		Mother contact	
Country	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	3,52	0,15	**5,16**	**0,00**	3,99	0,10	4,25	0,38
Germany	**3,85**	**0,00**	**5,40**	**0,00**	**4,36**	**0,00**	**4,69**	**0,00**
Great Britain	**3,78**	**0,00**	**5,26**	**0,00**	**4,26**	**0,00**	**4,77**	**0,00**
United States	**3,96**	**0,00**	**5,12**	**0,01**	3,74	0,55	**4,54**	**0,00**
Austria	**4,29**	**0,00**	**5,57**	**0,00**	**4,83**	**0,00**	**5,12**	**0,00**
Hungary	**4,42**	**0,00**	**5,90**	**0,00**	**4,92**	**0,00**	**5,28**	**0,00**
Italy	**4,88**	**0,00**	**6,16**	**0,00**	**5,64**	**0,00**	**5,79**	**0,00**
Norway	**3,57**	**0,01**	**5,04**	**0,03**	**4,11**	**0,00**	**4,49**	**0,01**
Czech Republic	**4,05**	**0,00**	**5,74**	**0,00**	**4,76**	**0,00**	**5,09**	**0,00**
Slovenia	**4,62**	**0,00**	**6,11**	**0,00**	**5,02**	**0,00**	**5,41**	**0,00**
Poland	**4,15**	**0,00**	**5,83**	**0,00**	**4,67**	**0,00**	**5,08**	**0,00**
Russia	**3,98**	**0,00**	**5,77**	**0,00**	**4,65**	**0,00**	**5,26**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**3,30**	**0,02**	4,83	0,67	3,91	0,27	4,17	0,07
Canada	**3,61**	**0,01**	**5,08**	**0,01**	3,87	0,56	4,30	0,84
Philippines	**4,13**	**0,00**	**5,78**	**0,00**	**4,43**	**0,00**	4,37	0,57
Israel	**5,11**	**0,00**	**6,02**	**0,00**	**5,61**	**0,00**	**5,82**	**0,00**
Japan	3,34	0,11	**5,52**	**0,00**	**4,66**	**0,00**	**4,74**	**0,00**
Spain	**4,92**	**0,00**	**6,14**	**0,00**	**5,74**	**0,00**	**5,80**	**0,00**
Latvia	**3,93**	**0,00**	**5,48**	**0,00**	**4,39**	**0,00**	**5,05**	**0,00**
France	**3,62**	**0,00**	4,93	0,48	**4,03**	**0,01**	4,36	0,56
Cyprus	**5,06**	**0,00**	**6,08**	**0,00**	**5,77**	**0,00**	**5,81**	**0,00**
Chile	**4,63**	**0,00**	**5,94**	**0,00**	**4,56**	**0,00**	**5,17**	**0,00**
Denmark	**3,60**	**0,00**	4,89	0,74	3,93	0,14	4,44	0,06
Switzerland	**3,78**	**0,00**	**5,07**	**0,02**	**4,11**	**0,01**	4,44	0,15
Brazil	**4,04**	**0,00**	**5,48**	**0,00**	**4,78**	**0,00**	**5,29**	**0,00**
South Africa	**4,37**	**0,00**	**5,24**	**0,00**	**4,78**	**0,00**	**5,07**	**0,00**
Finland	**3,44**	**0,00**	**4,87**	**0,00**	**3,80**	**0,00**	**4,32**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	4,06		5,48		4,59		4,94	

The lowest scores for the mother contact variable are found in New Zealand (4,17), Australia (4,25), Canada (4,30), Finland (4,32), Philippines (4,37), Denmark (4,44), and Switzerland (4,44). The means differences are not statistically different across these countries either. Table 7.11 revealed Finland, Denmark, Australia and Canada as countries in which primordial relations are not as strong. In particular, the former two countries score the highest for generalized trust. Hence do the findings so far support the hypothesis of the inverse relationship between the strong family ties -

hence dense networks - and the generalized trust? This question needs to await the multivariate analysis. Although less dense relations found in high trust societies seem to support such relationships, the least trusting societies such as Hungary, Brazil, South Africa and Chile were not found to display denser relations either. Hence the relationship between network density and generalized trust may not be as straightforward as it is suggested by social capital literature. Multivariate analysis will be helpful to comment more definitely on this question.

The family network density variable is computed on the basis of the above frequency of family contact variables in order to account for the influence of the tie strength on generalized trust. This variable accounts for the mean frequency of contact at the family network level.[328] Its formula is:

Family network density = $(\Sigma_i$ Frequency of contact$_i$) / N where i is contact with
of the most contacted   brother/sister; father,
                                                                 son/daughter; mother
                                                                 N is the total size of the
                                                                 contact variables (Eq. 7.1)

The family network density variable is a continuous variable and its values range between zero and seven. Table 7.12 below shows the mean distribution of this variable across countries. In line with Table 7.11, the densest family networks are found in Italy, Spain, Cyprus, Israel and Slovenia and the least dense family networks are found in Finland and New Zealand.

Table 7.12 ISSP mean distribution of family network density across countries		
	Family network density of the most contacted	
Country	**Mean**	**p>t**
Australia	4,22	0,00
Germany	4,27	0,00
Great Britain	4,17	0,00
United States	4,24	0,00
Austria	4,70	0,00
Hungary	4,97	0,00
Italy	5,50	0,00
Norway	4,11	0,00
Czech Republic	4,77	0,00
Slovenia	5,25	0,00

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[328] The network boundary is the most contacted family members.

Table 7.12 Continued…		
	Family network density of the most contacted	
Country	**Mean**	**p>t**
Poland	**4,78**	**0,00**
Russia	**4,68**	**0,00**
New Zealand	3,90	0,94
Canada	**4,09**	**0,00**
Philippines	**4,47**	**0,00**
Israel	**5,52**	**0,00**
Japan	**4,35**	**0,00**
Spain	**5,35**	**0,00**
Latvia	**4,53**	**0,00**
France	**4,11**	**0,00**
Cyprus	**5,59**	**0,00**
Chile	**4,99**	**0,00**
Denmark	**4,09**	**0,00**
Switzerland	**4,09**	**0,00**
Brazil	**5,00**	**0,00**
South Africa	**4,58**	**0,00**
Finland	**3,90**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	4,60	

ISSP posed questions about friendship ties as well. One set of the friendship questions concerned close friends from the workplace, the neighborhood and other places. These questions were very similar to the ones asked in INFORMALITY. A second set of questions asked about the role relationship as well as the frequency of contact with the best friend. Table 7.13 on the next page shows these questions.

The extent of the close friends variable is computed by summing the number of close friends from the workplace, the neighborhood and the other places. Alternatively, the frequency of contact with the best friend variable is computed similarly to the other frequency of contact questions. Hence, the higher frequency of contact score either through visits, or through other means, was taken as the value for the frequency of contact with the best friend variable.

Table 7.13 ISSP questions about friendship ties
1) Now we would like to ask you about people you know, other than your family and relatives. The first question is about the people at your workplace. Thinking about people at your workplace, how many of them are close friends of yours?
2) Thinking now of people who live near you-in your neighborhood or district: How many of these people are close friends of yours?
3) How many other close friends do you have-apart from those at work, in your neighborhood, or family members? Think, for instance, of friends at clubs, church or the like
4) Now think about your best friend, the friend you feel closest to (but not your partner). Is this best friend…
A male relative
A female relative
A man who is not a relative
A woman who is not a relative
5) How often do you see or visit your friend (the friend you feel closest to)?
Lives in the same household as I do
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
Never
6) And how often do you have any other contact with this friend besides visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail?
Daily
At least several times a week
At least once a week
At least once a month
Several times a year
Less often
Never

It should be noted that the frequency of contact with the best friend concerns only one tie. Hence, it is not a network variable but it accounts for tie-based relationships. Another question, which arises regarding this variable, concerned the role label of the best friend. ISSP asked whether the best friend is a relative other than the family or a non-relative. More than seventy percent of the respondents provided non-relative friends. Also, more than eighty-percent of this figure was of the same sex for both the male and the female respondents. These figures showed that in general, people' best friends are different from the kinship relations and they tend to be of the same sex.

In sum, ISSP questions on friendship ties are used to generate one network variable and one tie-based variable. The extent of close friends is a continuous variable

and its values change between 0 - 294. Nearly 95% of distribution lies within the 0 to 33 range. Alternatively, frequency of contact with the best friend variable is an ordinal variable and its values change between zero and seven. The details of these variables across countries are provided in Table 7.14 below.

Table 7.14 ISSP mean distribution of the extent of close friends and the frequency of the best friend contact across countries				
	Extent of close friends		Best friend contact	
Country	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	15,02	0,00	3,97	0,02
Germany	10,18	0,00	4,29	0,00
Great Britain	13,53	0,00	4,30	0,00
United States	12,84	0,00	4,44	0,00
Austria	10,67	0,00	4,61	0,00
Hungary	5,25	0,00	4,85	0,00
Italy	5,60	0,00	4,82	0,00
Norway	15,66	0,00	4,18	0,06
Czech Republic	9,84	0,00	4,49	0,00
Slovenia	15,17	0,00	4,78	0,00
Poland	8,76	0,00	4,47	0,00
Russia	6,45	0,94	4,82	0,00
New Zealand	13,01	0,00	3,93	0,00
Canada	10,52	0,00	3,87	0,00
Philippines	10,40	0,00	4,85	0,00
Israel	13,03	0,00	5,13	0,00
Japan	13,23	0,00	4,16	0,23
Spain	6,82	0,24	4,93	0,00
Latvia	4,43	0,00	4,49	0,00
France	9,36	0,00	3,83	0,00
Cyprus	6,10	0,03	5,54	0,00
Chile	7,09	0,15	4,62	0,00
Denmark	10,92	0,00	4,16	0,17
Switzerland	14,59	0,00	4,40	0,00
Brazil	27,72	0,00	5,38	0,00
South Africa	5,68	0,01	5,06	0,00
Finland	6,47	0,00	4,09	0,00
Mean (all countries)	10,73		4,56	

According to Table 7.14, the respondents in Brazil have the most extensive close friends' ties (27,72), which is followed by Norway (15,66), Slovenia (15,17), and Australia (15,02). The fewest close friends' ties are found in Hungary (5,25), Italy (5,60), Russia (6,45), Finland (6,47), Spain (6,82) and Chile (7,09). The mean

differences in close friends' ties across the latter four countries are also found statistically not significant.

The mean distribution of close friends' ties revealed a series of interesting results. First, close friends were the most abundant in Brazil, though generalized trust was found scarce in this country. Hence the relationship between extensity of friendship ties and generalized trust may not be as direct as the social capital literature argues for. The comparison of Table 7.12 and Table 7.14 also shows that the less dense relations with family members do not directly translate into more extensive ties with friends. Finland is a case in point. However, Italy and Spain introduce a different case, which is more in line with the expectation of the social capital literature. Family network density is found high in both countries, whereas the extensity of close friends is found low. A more definitive answer as to the influence of the close friends' ties on generalized trust awaits the multivariate analysis.

The mean frequency of contact with the best friend is 4,56 for all countries. This figure is the highest in Cyprus (5,54), Brazil (5,38), Israel (5,13), and South Africa (5,06). Frequency of contact with the best friend is low in Australia (3,97), New Zealand (3,93), Canada (3,87), and France (3,83). The means for Denmark, Norway, Finland and Japan are not statistically significant. Indeed a Scandinavian pattern has emerged for the first time for this variable. Although Scandinavian countries score high in terms of generalized trust, their relations with family members and friends fall short of revealing similar patterns, except for the frequency of contact with the best friend variable.

Besides the extent and the strength of the community level relationships, ISSP also posed a series of questions about ties for social exchanges. These questions are provided in the following Table 7.15.

Table 7.15 ISSP questions of ties for expressive and instrumental action
1) Now we would like to ask you how you would get help in situations that anyone could find herself or himself in. First suppose you had the flu and had to stay in bed for a few days and needed help around the house, with shopping and so on. Who would you turn to <u>first </u>for help?
2)And who would you turn to <u>second</u> if you had the flu and needed help around the house?
a) husband, wife, partner b) mother c) father d) daughter e) daughter-in-law f) son g) son-in-law h) sister i) brother j) other blood relative k) other in-law relative l) neighbor m) someone you work with n)someone at a social services agency o) someone you pay for help p) someone else r)no one
3)Now suppose you needed to borrow a large sum of money. Who would you turn to <u>first</u> for help?
4) And who would you turn to <u>second</u> if you needed to borrow a large sum of money?
a) husband, wife, partner b) mother c) father d) daughter e) son f) sister g) brother h) other blood relative i) other in-law relative j) god parent k) close friend l) neighbor m) someone you work with n)employer o) government or social services agency p) a bank or credit union r) a private money lender s) someone else t)no one
5) Now suppose you felt just a bit down or depressed, and you wanted to talk about it. Who would you turn to <u>first</u> for help?
6) And who would you turn to <u>second</u> if you felt a bit down or depressed and wanted to talk about it? a) husband, wife, partner b) mother c) father d) daughter e) son f) sister g) brother h) other blood relative i) other in-law relative j) close friend k) neighbor l) someone you work with m) priest or member of the clergy n) family doctor o) a psychologist or another professional counselor p) a self-help group r) s) someone else t)no one
7) There are many ways people hear about jobs-from other people, from advertisements or employment agencies and so on. Please indicate how you first found out about work at your present employer (IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY WORKING FOR PAY, PLEASE ANSWER THIS QUESTION FOR YOUR LAST JOB)
a) I have never paid for work b) from parents, brothers, and sisters c) from other relatives d) from a close friend e) from an acquaintance f) from a public employment agency or service g) from a private public employment agency h) from a school or university placement office i) from an advertisement or a sign j) the employer contacted me about a job k) I just called them and went there to ask for work

ISSP provided a long list of role labels for its questions on the above social exchanges. In line with Lin's definition, these social exchanges can be grouped according to purpose of action. Lin conceptualized the social exchanges which concerned individual well-being and support, as the expressive action. The questions in Table 7.15, which are about the first and the second choice of ties in times of illness and feeling of depression, provide examples of such a kind of action. Alternatively, the

purpose of action can be geared towards individuals' urge for power, reputation, or wealth. Lin labeled these types of actions as instrumental action. Questions about borrowing large sums of money or finding a job of Table 7.15 are examples of instrumental action.

The present analysis used the above ISSP questions on both expressive and instrumental action to generate a series of variables which concerned the use of kinship and non-kinship ties for both types of actions. It should be noted that the choices to the questions of Table 7.15 allow for the focus on kinship and non-kinship ties[329]. In INFORMALITY, non-kinship ties of the important matters discussion network proved a positive and significant determinant of generalized trust. How far can we generalize this finding to other types of social exchanges? Do individuals' non-kinship ties always exert a positive and significant influence on generalized trust? Or, does their influence change when they are employed for different purposes of action? What is the influence of non-kinship ties on generalized trust when they are used for expressive action? Alternatively, what about their influence once they are mobilized for instrumental action?

Similar types of questions can be posed for kinship ties as well. INFORMALITY designated a negative influence of the kinship ties on generalized trust. However that influence was not significant in the Turkish context. How far can we generalize this finding? What is the influence of kinship ties on generalized trust when they are used either for expressive or instrumental action?

Four variables accounted for these questions. Two of them concerned kinship ties. These family and relatives' ties, which were used in times of illness and feeling depressed, were used to generate the *kinship ties for expressive action variable.* Alternatively, when these types of ties were mobilized for borrowing large sums of money and finding a job, they made up the *kinship ties for instrumental action variable.*

Similar variables were generated for the non-kinship ties as well. The tie count of friendship and acquaintanceship for illness and feeling depressed constitute the *non-*

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[329] Spouse, mother, father, daughter, son, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, brother, sister are accepted as family. Other blood relatives, other in-law relatives and god-parents are accepted as relatives. Though god-relative may not be a relative, it is likely that this person will be close to the respondent's parents. Hence he /she is different from one's friends. God-parent is coded as relative because he/she is as close as parents but not from the immediate family. Close friends, acquaintances, neighbors, someone from work, and someone else are coded as friends and acquaintances.

kinship ties for expressive action variable. Lastly, the employment of these ties for borrowing large sums of money and finding a job was labeled as *non-kinship ties for instrumental action variable.* Table 7.16 below gives the mean values of these variables across ISSP countries. Similar to all other descriptive tables for country mean scores, the table also shows the statistical significance of the mean difference from Finland in bold. The values of the kinship and the non-kinship ties for expressive action range between 0 and 4, whereas the values of the kinship and the non-kinship ties for instrumental action range between 0 and 3.

Table 7.16 ISSP mean distribution of kinship and non-kinship ties for expressive and instrumental action								
	Kinship: Expressive		Kinship: Instrumental		Non-kinship: Expressive		Non-kinship: Instrumental	
Country	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	2,64	0,00	1,14	0,00	0,76	0,00	0,28	0,00
Germany	2,80	0,00	1,09	0,00	0,88	0,00	0,31	0,00
Great Britain	2,82	0,00	1,10	0,00	0,82	0,00	0,26	0,00
United States	2,71	0,00	1,32	0,00	1,04	0,00	0,61	0,02
Austria	2,79	0,00	1,15	0,00	0,85	0,00	0,18	0,00
Hungary	2,73	0,00	0,93	0,00	0,62	0,00	0,49	0,00
Italy	2,91	0,00	1,40	0,00	0,77	0,00	0,37	0,00
Norway	2,76	0,00	1,05	0,00	0,76	0,00	0,27	0,00
Czech Republic	2,97	0,00	1,20	0,00	0,65	0,00	0,51	0,00
Slovenia	3,05	0,00	1,23	0,00	0,67	0,00	0,52	0,00
Poland	3,18	0,00	1,24	0,00	0,62	0,00	0,52	0,00
Russia	2,82	0,00	1,03	0,00	0,86	0,00	0,77	0,00
New Zealand	2,57	0,00	0,94	0,00	0,85	0,00	0,26	0,00
Canada	2,83	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,76	0,00	0,28	0,00
Philippines	3,11	0,00	1,66	0,00	0,55	0,00	0,61	0,00
Israel	2,75	0,00	1,18	0,00	0,76	0,00	0,48	0,00
Japan	3,09	0,00	1,41	0,00	0,70	0,00	0,26	0,00
Spain	3,08	0,00	1,54	0,00	0,50	0,01	0,36	0,00
Latvia	2,33	0,00	0,83	0,00	1,06	0,00	0,78	0,00
France	2,50	0,00	1,06	0,00	0,74	0,00	0,28	0,00
Cyprus	2,93	0,00	1,19	0,00	0,89	0,00	0,39	0,00
Chile	2,99	0,00	1,28	0,00	0,54	0,00	0,54	0,00
Denmark	2,78	0,00	0,89	0,00	0,84	0,00	0,23	0,00
Switzerland	2,59	0,00	1,31	0,00	1,15	0,00	0,39	0,00
Brazil	2,77	0,00	1,15	0,00	0,62	0,00	0,50	0,00
South Africa	2,64	0,00	1,07	0,00	0,98	0,00	0,56	0,00
Finland	1,95	0,00	0,54	0,00	0,41	0,00	0,14	0,00
Mean (all countries)	2,78		1,14		0,76		0,43	

Table 7.16 shows that individuals often rely on their kinship ties for both expressive and instrumental action. Kinship ties seem to be mobilized more frequently

for both types of action in the Philippines, Japan, and Spain. The mean scores of those countries for expressive ties are 3,11; 3,09; and 3,08 respectively, which are well above the mean score of all countries (2,78). Alternatively, their scores for instrumental action are 1,66; 1,41; and1,54. Those scores are also higher than the mean score for kinship instrumental ties for all countries (1,14).

Non-kinship ties seem less prevalent for both expressive and instrumental action. Switzerland (1,15), Latvia (1,06), and the US (1,04) score the highest for the non-kinship ties for expressive action. Alternatively, mean scores for non-kinship ties for instrumental action are well above the average for all countries (0,43) in Latvia (0,78), Russia (0,77), and the US (0,61).

What about the institutional contacts? ISSP questions on expressive and instrumental action also provide choices for institutional contacts besides the kinship and the non-kinship ties. Only less than two percent of discussants contacted institutions in times of illness. This figure was found a little higher - at around five percent - for the cases of feeling depressed. Hence institutional contacts remained quite marginal for expressive action. However, nearly twenty-six percent of the respondents indicated institutions as the first contact to borrow large sums of money. This figure fell to approximate seventeen-percent for the second contact. Institutional contacts scored the highest for finding a job. Nearly fifty-five percent of the ISSP respondents indicated that they found their most recent jobs through institutional contacts.

These figures make the enquiry about institutional contacts curious: what is the influence of institutional contacts for expressive and instrumental action on generalized trust? This is a crucial question because it focuses on the influence of the difference between the tie-based relations and the societal institutions on generalized trust. Two variables of the institutional contact were generated in order to focus on this question: the *institutional contact for expressive action* and the *institutional contact for instrumental action*. Similar to other variables of expressive and instrumental action, the values for institutional contact for expressive action range between 0 and 4 and the values for instrumental action range between 0 and 3. Table 7.17 on page 189 presents the mean values of these variables across countries.

Table 7.17 ISSP mean distribution of institutional contacts for expressive and instrumental action				
	Institutional: Expressive		Institutional: Instrumental	
Country	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	**0,12**	**0,00**	**1,15**	**0,00**
Germany	**0,11**	**0,00**	**1,15**	**0,00**
Great Britain	**0,11**	**0,00**	**1,18**	**0,02**
United States	0,04	0,08	**0,67**	**0,00**
Austria	**0,11**	**0,00**	**1,08**	**0,00**
Hungary	0,06	0,84	**0,74**	**0,00**
Italy	0,09	0,06	**0,75**	**0,00**
Norway	**0,19**	**0,00**	**1,33**	**0,01**
Czech Republic	**0,14**	**0,00**	**0,87**	**0,00**
Slovenia	0,08	0,08	**0,81**	**0,00**
Poland	**0,03**	**0,00**	**0,76**	**0,00**
Russia	**0,02**	**0,00**	**0,30**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**0,20**	**0,00**	**1,27**	**0,79**
Canada	**0,23**	**0,00**	**1,35**	**0,00**
Philippines	**0,02**	**0,00**	**0,25**	**0,00**
Israel	0,07	0,40	**0,87**	**0,00**
Japan	0,05	0,19	**0,99**	**0,00**
Spain	0,07	0,39	**0,59**	**0,00**
Latvia	0,05	0,30	**0,81**	**0,00**
France	**0,36**	**0,00**	**1,13**	**0,00**
Cyprus	**0,09**	**0,01**	**1,15**	**0,00**
Chile	**0,12**	**0,00**	**0,57**	**0,00**
Denmark	**0,17**	**0,00**	**1,46**	**0,00**
Switzerland	**0,12**	**0,00**	**0,86**	**0,00**
Brazil	**0,16**	**0,00**	**0,55**	**0,00**
South Africa	**0,15**	**0,00**	**0,63**	**0,00**
Finland	**0,06**	**0,00**	**1,26**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	0,12		0,88	

The mean score of institutional contacts for expressive action for all countries (0,12) is very low. As noted, only very few respondents indicated institutions as contacts in times of illness and feeling depressed. In France (0,36), Canada (0,23), New Zealand (0,20), and Norway (0,19), this figure is relatively higher. Alternatively, the mean score of all countries for institutional contacts for instrumental action (0,88) surpasses the same variable for the non-kinship ties (0,43). Hence, individuals seem to

prefer institutions to borrow large sums of money and to find jobs rather than relying on their non-kinship ties.[330]

Among all variables of expressive and instrumental action, the non-kinship ties are expected to influence generalized trust positively because these types of ties are more likely to make different others known to people. Hence, they become more informed about the variable human condition, which is expected to familiarize the complex modern world so that the fellow man would be accorded trust. Likewise, the institutional contacts are among the bridging structures in which new relationships can be forged. It is likely that these new relationships are more of the weak and bridging ties. Hence, institutional contacts for both expressive and instrumental action are expected to influence generalized trust positively as well. Different from these variables, kinship ties for expressive and instrumental action are hypothesized to influence generalized trust negatively. The reason is their delimitation of individuals' relationships to close circles of the similar others. Those hypotheses will be tested with a series of multivariate analyses once other variables of interest are introduced.

7.3. Other Variables of Interest

ISSP posed questions about relations with a series of relatives as well as civil society involvement. Both types of questions relate to community level relationships; however, they are not asked on tie-level as well. Hence the frequency of contact with a series of relatives such as the uncles/aunts, brother-/sister-in laws, cousins, nephews and the like are requested. Likewise, ISSP asked about respondents' frequency of participation in a series of civil society institutions. The present analysis labels relations with the relatives as group-based relations, while the civil society involvement is examined as bridging structures, along with the education and the employment variables. Table 7.18 on the next page provides the ISSP questions about the relatives.

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[330] This assertion invited for further test of Granovetter's study as well, since this study claimed weak friendship ties to be more strategic for finding jobs than institutional contacts.

Table 7.18 ISSP question on relations with the relatives	
Now some questions about your contact with other relatives. Please indicate how often you have been in contact with any of the following types of relatives in the last four weeks	1- More than twice in last 4 weeks 2-Once or twice in last 4-weeks 3-Not at all in last 4 weeks 4- I have no living relative of this type
a) Uncles and aunts	
b) Cousins	
c)Parents-in-law	
d)Brother-or sisters-in-law	
e) Nieces and nephews	
f) [OPTIONAL] God-parents	

The frequency of contact with the godparents was not requested in nine countries, since the choice was optional. Out of the eighteen countries in which the godparents were asked about, more than the half of the respondents said that they did not have relatives of this type. Hence, the ensuing analysis focuses on relations with all types of relatives except the godparents.

As Table 7.18 shows, ISSP asked this question along a 1 - 4 scale, which indicated higher values for less frequent contact. This scale is re-coded along 0 - 3 so that the higher values indicated more frequent contact. Table 7.19 on the next page shows the means distributions of the contact with the relatives variables.

Table 7.19 ISSP mean distribution of the relations with uncles/aunts, cousins, parents-in-law, brother-/sister-in-law, nieces and nephews						
	Uncles/aunts		Cousins		Parents-in-law	
Country	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	**1,08**	**0,00**	**1,24**	**0,00**	**1,02**	**0,00**
Germany	1,25	0,46	1,40	0,59	1,16	0,29
Great Britain	1,22	0,80	**1,31**	**0,03**	1,23	0,91
United States	**1,41**	**0,00**	**1,59**	**0,00**	**1,03**	**0,00**
Austria	**1,11**	**0,01**	**1,28**	**0,01**	**0,94**	**0,00**
Hungary	**1,12**	**0,00**	**1,53**	**0,00**	**0,96**	**0,00**
Italy	**1,30**	**0,06**	**1,56**	**0,00**	**1,08**	**0,02**
Norway	**1,50**	**0,00**	**1,62**	**0,00**		
Czech Republic	1,27	0,28	1,40	0,65	**1,04**	**0,00**
Slovenia	**1,44**	**0,00**	**1,70**	**0,00**	**1,06**	**0,00**
Poland	1,29	0,06	1,39	0,80	**0,98**	**0,00**
Russia	**1,08**	**0,00**	**1,30**	**0,00**	**0,85**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**1,00**	**0,00**	1,38	0,98	1,22	0,97
Canada	**1,33**	**0,01**	1,44	0,06	1,24	0,68
Philippines	**1,55**	**0,00**	**1,94**	**0,00**	**1,11**	**0,03**
Israel	**1,46**	**0,00**	**1,60**	**0,00**	**1,11**	**0,04**
Japan	1,18	0,10	**1,22**	**0,00**	**1,04**	**0,00**
Spain	**1,36**	**0,00**	**1,60**	**0,00**	**1,00**	**0,00**
Latvia	**0,92**	**0,00**	**1,22**	**0,00**	**0,88**	**0,00**
France	**1,33**	**0,00**	**1,48**	**0,00**	**1,48**	**0,00**
Cyprus	**1,51**	**0,00**	**1,90**	**0,00**	1,17	0,37
Chile	1,23	0,95	1,32	0,08	**1,06**	**0,00**
Denmark	1,16	0,06	**1,30**	**0,00**	**1,39**	**0,00**
Switzerland	1,16	0,11	**1,31**	**0,02**	**0,86**	**0,00**
Brazil	**1,64**	**0,00**	**1,81**	**0,00**	**1,64**	**0,00**
South Africa	**1,45**	**0,00**	**1,68**	**0,00**	**0,97**	**0,00**
Finland	**1,23**	**0,00**	**1,38**	**0,00**	**1,22**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	1,29		1,49		1,09	

Table 7.19 continued…

Country	Brother-/sister-in-law		Nieces & nephews	
	Mean	**p>t**	**Mean**	**p>t**
Australia	**1,58**	**0,00**	**1,50**	**0,00**
Germany	**1,52**	**0,00**	**1,48**	**0,00**
Great Britain	**1,61**	**0,00**	**1,55**	**0,00**
United States	**1,58**	**0,00**	**1,73**	**0,00**
Austria	**1,39**	**0,00**	1,34	0,73
Hungary	**1,53**	**0,00**	**1,48**	**0,00**
Italy	**1,74**	**0,00**	**1,90**	**0,00**
Norway	**1,95**	**0,00**	**1,70**	**0,00**
Czech Republic	**1,44**	**0,00**	1,39	0,12
Slovenia	**1,46**	**0,00**	**1,51**	**0,00**
Poland	**1,46**	**0,00**	**1,45**	**0,00**
Russia	**1,04**	**0,00**	**1,48**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**1,70**	**0,00**	**1,64**	**0,00**
Canada	**1,79**	**0,00**	**1,75**	**0,00**
Philippines	**1,85**	**0,00**	**2,28**	**0,00**
Israel	**1,66**	**0,00**	**1,70**	**0,00**
Japan	**1,29**	**0,01**	1,33	0,87
Spain	**1,58**	**0,00**	**1,59**	**0,00**
Latvia	**0,94**	**0,00**	**1,00**	**0,00**
France	**1,78**	**0,00**	**1,60**	**0,00**
Cyprus	**1,75**	**0,00**	**1,61**	**0,00**
Chile	**1,50**	**0,00**	**1,75**	**0,00**
Denmark	**1,71**	**0,00**	**1,43**	**0,01**
Switzerland	**1,40**	**0,00**	1,32	0,95
Brazil	**2,01**	**0,00**	**2,23**	**0,00**
South Africa	**1,28**	**0,01**	**1,48**	**0,00**
Finland	**1,18**	**0,00**	**1,32**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	1,54		1,59	

The mean scores of all countries show that brothers-/sisters-in-law and nieces and nephews are among the most frequently contacted relatives, whereas relations with parents-in-law emerged as the least frequent. These scores are likely to reflect the influence of age, since the older age relatives like parents-in-laws as well as the uncles and aunts prove to be the least contacted.

It is predictable that relations with the relatives are stronger in Brazil since it is in the highest scoring countries for relations with all types of relatives. Brazil is followed by the Philippines in terms of strong relatives relations, except its mean score for relations with the parents-in-law. Latvia stands at the opposite pole; it is among the lowest scoring countries for all groups of relatives. Japan follows Latvia in terms of the least frequent relations with the relatives. Russia scores better for relations with nieces and nephews though its scores for the remaining groups are among the lowest as well.

How did the analysis account for the relations with the relatives? A single variable was computed by summing up all frequency of contact scores across the relatives variables. In Norway, the relations with the parents-in-laws were not asked, hence this variable was not entered into the computation. The new variable is labeled as *the relations with the relatives* and its values changed between 0 and 12. The mean distributions of this variable across the countries can be found in Table 7.20 on the next page.

In line with the previous Table 7.19, Table 7.20 discerned more frequent relations with the relatives for Brazil (7,03) and the Philippines (7,62) and the least frequent relations for Latvia (4,09), Finland (4,55), Russia (4,87) and Japan (4,90).

Table 7.20 ISSP mean distribution of the relations with the relatives variable		
	Relations with the relatives	
Country	Mean	p>t
Australia	5,28	0,00
Germany	5,26	0,00
Great Britain	5,14	0,00
United States	6,30	0,00
Austria	5,07	0,00
Hungary	5,65	0,00
Italy	6,20	0,00
Norway	6,11	0,00
Czech Republic	5,38	0,00
Slovenia	6,11	0,00
Poland	5,49	0,00
Russia	4,87	0,00
New Zealand	4,98	0,00
Canada	6,12	0,00
Philippines	7,62	0,00
Israel	6,38	0,00
Japan	4,90	0,00
Spain	6,03	0,00
Latvia	4,09	0,00
France	5,40	0,00
Cyprus	6,78	0,00
Chile	5,75	0,00
Denmark	5,10	0,00
Switzerland	5,05	0,00
Brazil	7,03	0,00
South Africa	5,59	0,00
Finland	4,55	0,00
Mean (all countries)	5,66	

Another ISSP question which is important for the present analysis, relates to the civil society involvement. The exact wording of this question is provided in the following Table 7.21. A 1 to 4 scale was used to indicate participation in each of the given institutions. One stood for "I have participated more than twice" and four corresponded to "I do not belong to such a group". Those variables were re-coded along a 0 to 3 scale in an order whereby the higher values indicated more frequent participation. Table 7.22 on page 197-198 presents the means distribution of civil society participation across countries.

Table 7.21 ISSP question on civil society participation				
People sometimes belong to different types of groups or associations. The list below contains different types of groups. For each type of group, please tick a box to say whether you have participated in the activities of this group in the last 12 months.	I have participated more than twice	I have participated once or twice	I belong to such a group but never participate	I do not belong to such a group
A political party, club, or association	☐	☐	☐	☐
A trade union or professional association	☐	☐	☐	☐
A church or other religious organization	☐	☐	☐	☐
A sports group, hobby or leisure club	☐	☐	☐	☐
A charitable organization or group	☐	☐	☐	☐
A neighborhood organization or group	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other associations or group	☐	☐	☐	☐

Table 7.22 shows that the mean civil society participation across countries is between the 0 to 1 range; hence, more often, the respondents either belong to an institution but do not participate or they do not belong to the given institution. The highest mean frequency of participation is found for the sports, hobby, and leisure club (0,77) and for the church or other religious organizations (0,66). Both types are the Putnam type institutions, which concern more community level, non-hierarchical civic activism.

The highest mean score for sports and leisure clubs is found in New Zealand (1,73), followed by Finland (1,47), France (1,39), and Denmark (1,33). Indeed, after the frequency of contact with the best friend, this is the second instance a Scandinavian pattern is designated. Hungary (0,20), the Philippines (0,36), and Spain (0,48) scored the lowest for this group of institutions.

Table 7.22 ISSP mean distribution of civil society participation						
	Political parties or clubs		**Trade union or professional org.**		**Church or other religious group**	
Country	**Mean**	**p>t**	**Mean**	**p>t**	**Mean**	**p>t**
Australia	**0,52**	**0,00**	**0,40**	**0,00**	**0,78**	**0,00**
Germany	0,22	0,41	**0,32**	**0,00**	1,02	0,77
Great Britain	**0,14**	**0,00**	**0,34**	**0,00**	**0,66**	**0,00**
United States	**0,54**	**0,00**	**0,50**	**0,00**	**1,53**	**0,00**
Austria	0,26	0,62	**0,37**	**0,00**	**0,55**	**0,00**
Hungary	**0,03**	**0,00**	**0,20**	**0,00**	**0,19**	**0,00**
Italy	0,22	0,44	**0,26**	**0,00**	**0,41**	**0,00**
Norway	**0,35**	**0,00**	**0,80**	**0,00**	**0,68**	**0,00**
Czech Republic	0,22	0,57	**0,30**	**0,00**	**0,39**	**0,00**
Slovenia	**0,11**	**0,00**	**0,41**	**0,00**	**0,49**	**0,00**
Poland	0,03	**0,00**	**0,19**	**0,00**	**0,17**	**0,00**
Russia	**0,05**	**0,00**	**0,23**	**0,00**	**0,12**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**0,45**	**0,00**	**0,56**	**0,00**	0,92	0,10
Canada	**0,53**	**0,00**	**0,76**	**0,00**	**1,18**	**0,01**
Philippines	0,21	0,31	**0,12**	**0,00**	**0,76**	**0,00**
Israel	0,27	0,41	**0,29**	**0,00**	**0,76**	**0,00**
Japan	**0,17**	**0,01**	**0,30**	**0,00**	**0,24**	**0,00**
Spain	**0,11**	**0,00**	**0,13**	**0,00**	**0,31**	**0,00**
Latvia	**0,02**	**0,00**	**0,15**	**0,00**	**0,17**	**0,00**
France	0,20	0,19	**0,36**	**0,00**	**0,38**	**0,00**
Cyprus	**0,34**	**0,00**	**0,55**	**0,00**	**0,16**	**0,00**
Chile	**0,07**	**0,00**	**0,19**	**0,00**	**0,60**	**0,00**
Denmark	**0,19**	**0,07**	**0,82**	**0,00**	**0,75**	**0,00**
Switzerland	**0,48**	**0,00**	**0,40**	**0,01**	**0,58**	**0,00**
Brazil	**0,18**	**0,02**	**0,30**	**0,00**	**0,59**	**0,00**
South Africa	**0,66**	**0,00**	**0,24**	**0,00**	**1,67**	**0,00**
Finland	**0,24**	**0,00**	**0,93**	**0,00**	**1,01**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	0,26		0,37		0,66	

Country	Sports, hobby, or leisure club		Charitable org. or groups		Neighborhood ass. & groups		Other ass. & groups	
	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	**1,31**	**0,00**	**0,70**	**0,00**	**0,48**	**0,00**	0,73	0,53
Germany	**1,34**	**0,02**			0,31	0,37	**0,52**	**0,00**
Great Britain	**1,21**	**0,00**	**0,48**	**0,00**	0,26	0,69	**0,47**	**0,00**
United States	**1,02**	**0,00**	**0,80**	**0,00**	**0,44**	**0,00**	0,68	0,79
Austria	**0,82**	**0,00**	0,23	0,71	**0,18**	**0,00**	0,43	**0,00**
Hungary	**0,20**	**0,00**	**0,06**	**0,00**	**0,05**	**0,00**	**0,10**	**0,00**
Italy	**0,65**	**0,00**	0,27	0,42	**0,14**	**0,00**	**0,21**	**0,00**
Norway	**1,32**	**0,01**	**0,38**	**0,00**	0,65	**0,00**	0,96	**0,00**
Czech Republic	**0,74**	**0,00**	**0,14**	**0,00**	0,22	0,12	0,31	**0,00**
Slovenia	**0,66**	**0,00**	**0,32**	**0,03**	0,32	0,20	**0,36**	**0,00**
Poland	**0,17**	**0,00**	**0,07**	**0,00**	**0,08**	**0,00**	**0,15**	**0,00**
Russia	**0,17**	**0,00**	**0,04**	**0,00**	**0,05**	**0,00**	**0,06**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**1,73**	**0,00**	**0,80**	**0,00**	**0,59**	**0,00**	0,93	**0,00**
Canada	**1,29**	**0,01**	**0,84**	**0,00**	**0,45**	**0,00**	0,90	**0,00**
Philippines	**0,36**	**0,00**	0,27	0,39	**0,36**	**0,02**	**0,24**	**0,00**
Israel	**0,69**	**0,00**	**0,44**	**0,00**	0,28	0,95	**0,28**	**0,00**
Japan	**1,00**	**0,00**	**0,11**	**0,00**	**1,08**	**0,00**	0,45	**0,00**
Spain	**0,38**	**0,00**	**0,12**	**0,00**	**0,20**	**0,01**	**0,14**	**0,00**
Latvia	**0,48**	**0,00**	**0,04**	**0,00**	**0,08**	**0,00**	**0,11**	**0,00**
France	**1,39**	**0,21**	**0,41**	**0,00**	**0,41**	**0,00**	0,79	0,09
Cyprus	**0,25**	**0,00**	**0,16**	**0,00**	**0,05**	**0,00**	**0,13**	**0,00**
Chile	**0,42**	**0,00**	0,20	0,19	**0,20**	**0,01**	**0,16**	**0,00**
Denmark	**1,33**	**0,02**	0,26	0,61	**0,76**	**0,00**	0,73	0,53
Switzerland	**1,24**	**0,00**	**0,40**	**0,00**	**0,18**	**0,00**	**0,44**	**0,00**
Brazil	**0,25**	**0,00**	0,21	0,23	0,24	0,20	**0,11**	**0,00**
South Africa	**0,53**	**0,00**	0,19	0,10	**0,39**	**0,00**	**0,14**	**0,00**
Finland	**1,47**	**0,00**	**0,24**	**0,00**	**0,28**	**0,00**	**0,70**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	0,77		0,29		0,32		0,38	

Although the mean for participation in church or other religious groups is among the higher means, the differences between the countries are also striking. Respondents in South Africa (1,53), the US (1,53) and Canada (1,18) are likely to be quite active in religious organizations, whereas in Russia (0,12), Cyprus (0,16), Poland (0,17), Latvia (0,17), and Hungary (0,19), people do not seem very interested in this type of organization. It should also be noted that most of the countries with the lowest mean scores are the ex-communist countries.

Political parties or clubs seem to attract fewer participants than the other types of civil society institutions (0,26). Charitable groups and organizations follow this group (0,29). Respondents in South Africa (0,66), Canada (0,53), the US (0,54), and Australia (0,52) emerged as active in political groups. Alternatively, respondents in the US (0,80), New Zealand (0,80), and Canada (0,84) proved active in charitable organizations. These figures remain at very low levels across the ex-communist states of Latvia, Russia, Poland and Hungary.

Lastly, activism in trade unions and other professional organizations are the highest across the Scandinavian states of Finland (0,93), Denmark (0,82), and Norway (0,80). The lowest scores are found in the Philippines (0,12), Spain (0,13) and Latvia (0,15).

The present analysis regarded civil society as one of the bridging structures in which individuals of different walks of life come together; hence, it provides a means to familiarize the complex modern world and its institutions. This familiarity, in turn, is hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively.

However, the analysis also differentiated among different types of civil society institutions. According to this differentiation, the Olson type civil society institutions, which are hierarchical groups with likely rent-seeking behavior, are hypothesized to influence generalized trust negatively due to their potentially exclusive character. Alternatively, Putnam type community level, non-hierarchical institutions are argued to influence generalized trust positively. Besides the types of civil society institutions, the more active type of involvement is also argued to change the likelihood of trust since non-active types of participation would fall short of exerting any influence on the people about the fellow men.

In order to test these hypotheses, the frequency of contact across all types of organizations is summed up. This summation reflected the number of groups the respondents participated in on the one hand, and the extent of their activism within

these groups on the other. The civil society participation variable is a continuous variable and its values range between 0 and 18.

Variables for Olson and Putnam type participation are computed similarly. The *Olson type participation* variable is the sum frequency of contact for political parties and clubs as well as trade unions and professional organizations. Its values range between 0 and 6. On the other hand, two variables are generated for Putnam type participation. The first variable includes religious organizations and it is the sum score for religious organizations, sports and leisure clubs and neighborhood associations. Participation in charitable organizations was not asked about in Germany, hence this variable is omitted from the calculation for the Putnam type participation variable and from the ensuing analysis. This variable is labeled as *PUTNAM1* and its values range between 0and 9. The second Putnam type variable repeats the same formula, but it does not include religious organizations in the summation. This alternative variable is called *PUTNAM2* and its value range between 0-6. The mean distributions of these variables can be found in Table 7.23 on the next page.

In line with the above Table 7.22, Canada (4,98), the US (4,71), New Zealand (4,51), Denmark (4,13), Australia (4,08), Finland (4,08), and Norway (3,93) emerged as countries which are richer in terms of civil society participation. The US, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Finland score high both for the Olson groups and the Putnam groups with the religious organizations (PUTNAM1). Once the religious organizations are omitted from the Putnam type groups (PUTNAM2), the high score of the US falls. However, the mean score for this latter group remains high for New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Finland. Japan emerges as an interesting case as well. Though it scores low on Olson groups, its mean scores are among the highest for both types of Putnam groups.

The ex-communist states of Russia (0,68), Poland (0,78), Hungary (0,76) and Latvia (1,00) scored the lowest for the total sum of civil society participation. Their scores for both the Olson and Putnam type groups are also low. Although the Czech Republic was also an ex-communist state its scores are not as low. Spain (0,23) and Chile (0,26) score especially low for the Olson group of institutions. Alternatively, the score for Cyprus (0,45) is among the lowest for PUTNAM1 groups; it is even the lower (0,26) for PUTNAM2 groups.

Table 7.23 ISSP mean distribution of total civil society participation and participation in Olson and Putnam groups								
	Total civil society participation		Olson type participation		Putnam type participation (PUTNAM1)		Putnam type par. except the religious groups (PUTNAM2)	
Country	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t	Mean	p>t
Australia	4,08	0,60	**0,91**	**0,00**	2,52	0,65	1,76	0,52
Germany	**3,48**	**0,00**	**0,53**	**0,00**	2,56	0,99	1,62	0,16
Great Britain	**2,83**	**0,00**	**0,47**	**0,00**	**2,05**	**0,00**	**1,44**	**0,00**
United States	**4,71**	**0,00**	1,03	0,13	**2,99**	**0,00**	**1,46**	**0,00**
Austria	**2,60**	**0,00**	**0,63**	**0,00**	**1,54**	**0,00**	**1,00**	**0,00**
Hungary	**0,76**	**0,00**	**0,22**	**0,00**	**0,44**	**0,00**	**0,25**	**0,00**
Italy	**1,85**	**0,00**	**0,47**	**0,00**	**1,19**	**0,00**	**0,78**	**0,00**
Norway	**3,93**	0,48	1,11	0,77	**2,38**	**0,03**	1,85	0,06
Czech Republic	**2,15**	**0,00**	0,52	**0,00**	**1,34**	**0,00**	**0,96**	**0,00**
Slovenia	**2,36**	**0,00**	**0,53**	**0,00**	**1,47**	**0,00**	**0,98**	**0,00**
Poland	**0,78**	**0,00**	**0,22**	**0,00**	**0,42**	**0,00**	**0,25**	**0,00**
Russia	**0,68**	**0,00**	**0,28**	**0,00**	**0,34**	**0,00**	**0,22**	**0,00**
New Zealand	**4,51**	**0,00**	**0,98**	**0,02**	**2,98**	**0,00**	**2,22**	**0,00**
Canada	**4,98**	**0,00**	**1,27**	**0,05**	**2,89**	**0,00**	1,73	0,90
Philippines	**2,05**	**0,00**	**0,33**	**0,00**	**1,47**	**0,00**	**0,72**	**0,00**
Israel	**2,57**	**0,00**	**0,56**	**0,00**	**1,73**	**0,00**	**0,97**	**0,00**
Japan	**3,17**	**0,00**	**0,46**	**0,00**	**2,28**	**0,00**	**2,05**	**0,00**
Spain	**1,25**	**0,00**	**0,23**	**0,00**	**0,87**	**0,00**	**0,57**	**0,00**
Latvia	**1,00**	**0,00**	**0,17**	**0,00**	**0,72**	**0,00**	**0,56**	**0,00**
France	**2,81**	**0,00**	**0,54**	**0,00**	**1,95**	**0,00**	1,69	0,71
Cyprus	**1,47**	**0,00**	**0,89**	**0,00**	**0,45**	**0,00**	**0,29**	**0,00**
Chile	**1,62**	**0,00**	0,26	**0,00**	**1,21**	**0,00**	**0,61**	**0,00**
Denmark	4,13	0,34	**1,00**	**0,01**	2,68	0,18	**2,01**	**0,00**
Switzerland	**3,29**	**0,00**	**0,88**	**0,00**	**1,99**	**0,00**	**1,41**	**0,00**
Brazil	**1,66**	**0,00**	**0,48**	**0,00**	**1,08**	**0,00**	**0,49**	**0,00**
South Africa	**3,54**	**0,00**	**0,89**	**0,00**	2,55	0,94	**0,91**	**0,00**
Finland	**4,01**	**0,00**	**1,13**	**0,00**	**2,56**	**0,00**	**1,72**	**0,00**
Mean (all countries)	2,64		0,62		1,71		1,08	

Besides civil society participation, education and the workplace are also designated as the bridging structures through which individuals come across different others. Hence, similar to INFORMALITY, both variables are included in the multivariate analyses. *University attendance* is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one for the cases of university attendance.[331] Likewise, *employment* is also a dummy

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[331] In INFORMALITY, respondents' last completed schools constituted the education variable. Yet in ISSP, data was available for those who still attended to university.

variable, which accounts for the cases of full time and part time employment as well as self-employment.

Similar to INFORMALITY, ISSP also included a question about subjective happiness. Different from INFORMALITY, this question was asked along a 1- 4 rather than a 1-10 scale. This variable is also included in the analysis and it is re-coded so that 1 corresponded to "not happy at all" and 4 corresponded to "very happy".

Sex and age are also included in the analyses as the usual demographic background variables. The sex variable took the value of one for the male respondents. The age variable is a continuous variable. The descriptive statistics of all variables which are used in the ensuing analyses is reported in Table 7.24 below. The correlation table between those variables are provided in Table B.1 in Appendix B.

Table 7.24 Descriptive statistics of ISSP variables					
Variable	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Adult family network size	35562	4,62	2,86	0	36
Family network density	35476	4,58	1,56	0	7
Extent of close friends	35148	10,66	17,70	0	294
Kinship: expressive	35293	2,77	1,11	0	4
Kinship: instrumental	35377	1,13	0,90	0	3
Non-kinship: expressive	35293	0,76	0,90	0	4
Non-kinship instrumental	35377	0,42	0,63	0	3
Institutional: expressive	35293	0,12	0,00	4	
Institutional: instrumental	35377	0,88	0,82	0	3
Relations with relatives	35056	5,66	2,64	0	12
Frequency of contact: best friend	30194	4,56	1,32	0	7
Total civil society participation	35049	2,65	3,11	0	18
Olson type groups	33791	0,61	1,21	0	6
PUTNAM1 type of groups	34578	1,72	2,10	0	9
PUTNAM2 type of groups	34333	1,08	1,60	0	6
Religious groups	33630	0,67	1,13	0	3
Other civil society groups	33210	0,38	0,93	0	3
Subjective happiness	34458	3,01	0,76	1	4
Age	35439	45,86	17,13	18	101
University Attendance	35153	0,29	0,45	0	1
Employment	35262	0,52	0,50	0	1
Sex	35614	0,46	0,50	0	1

Since higher education is hypothesized to influence generalized trust, those attending to university are also accepted as part of the better educated respondents.

7.4. ISSP Multivariate Analyses

The present analysis used the ISSP agreement scores to the following statement as the generalized trust variable: "If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you". This statement was asked along an ordinal scale and its values range between 1 and 5. Because most of the variables of interest violated the parallel regression assumption, a multinomial logit model (MNLM) is used to compute the cross-country social network underpinnings of generalized trust.[332] For this purpose, the five point ordinal scale was re-coded into three outcomes. Those who strongly agreed or agreed with the above statement are coded as "No Trust"; those who neither agreed nor disagreed are labeled as "Neutral"; and those who strongly disagreed or disagreed with this statement are named as "Trust". In all analyses, "No Trust" is used as the base category and its comparison with "Trust" reported. Hence, the ensuing tables show the effect of each independent variable on trust in comparison with its influence on lack of trust. Comparisons between "Neutral and No-trust" and "Neutral and Trust" are provided in Table B.2 and Table B.3 respectively of Appendix B.

Table 7.25 on page 204-205 presents three models, which are only different in terms of the civil society participation variables. Although the frequency of contact with the best friend was examined in detail in the previous section, the inclusion of this variable in the analyses resulted in a substantial loss of cases due to missing variables. Also, this variable is found to be insignificant so, as a result, the models of Table 7.25 do not take into account this variable. This table does not report the country coefficients, either. In all three models, the country coefficients are found significant except for Denmark.

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[332] Ordinal regression model (ORM) is used when the dependent variable is ordinal. This model computes parallel regression functions for all cut points, but the base category. It assumes identical coefficients for the separate binary regressions. This assumption is called the parallel regression assumption. In cases when this assumption is violated, an alternative model is used to account for the analysis of interest. In the present analysis, a Wald test is employed and it is found that many of the variables violate the parallel regression assumption. For ORM and parallel regression assumption, see J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata* (Texas: Stata Press, 2006), 197-200.

Table 7.25 Multinomial analyses of Trust versus No-trust						
	Model I			**Model II**		
	Coeff.	**exp (b)**	**P> |z|**	**Coeff.**	**exp (b)**	**P> |z|**
Network/ tie-based variables						
Adult family network size	*-0,02*	*0,98*	*0,02*	*-0,02*	*0,98*	*0,02*
Close friends network size	0,00	1,00	0,14	0,00	1,00	0,16
Family network density	0,00	1,00	0,87	0,00	1,00	0,86
Kinship ties: Expressive	0,04	1,04	0,22	0,04	1,04	0,22
Kinship ties: Instrumental	*0,09*	*1,09*	*0,00*	*0,09*	*1,09*	*0,00*
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	*0,11*	*1,11*	*0,00*	*0,10*	*1,11*	*0,00*
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	*-0,08*	*0,92*	*0,03*	*-0,09*	*0,92*	*0,03*
Group level relations						
Relations with the relatives	-0,01	0,99	0,32	-0,01	0,99	*0,30*
Bridging structures						
Total civil society participation	*0,05*	*1,05*	*0,00*			
Olson type participation				0,02	1,02	0,12
PUTNAM1 type participation				*0,06*	*1,06*	*0,00*
PUTNAM2 type participation						
Church or other religious org.						
Other associations or org.				*0,04*	*1,04*	*0,03*
Employment	*0,14*	*1,15*	*0,00*	*0,14*	*1,16*	*0,00*
University attendance	*0,41*	*1,51*	*0,00*	*0,42*	*1,52*	*0,00*
Institutional contact: Expressive	*-0,12*	*0,89*	*0,05*	*-0,12*	*0,89*	*0,05*
Institutional contact: Instrumental	-0,04	0,97	0,29	-0,03	0,97	0,31
Individual level variables						
Subjective happiness	*0,27*	*1,31*	*0,00*	*0,27*	*1,31*	*0,00*
Control variables						
Sex	*-0,40*	*0,67*	*0,00*	*-0,39*	*0,68*	*0,00*
Age	*0,02*	*1,02*	*0,00*	*0,02*	*1,02*	*0,00*
Constant	*-1,47*	*----*	*0,00*	*-1,48*	*-----*	*0,00*
Number of observations	29446			29446		

Table 7.25 continued…			
	Model III		
	Coeff.	**exp (b)**	**P> |z|**
Network/ tie-based variables			
Adult family network size	*-0,02*	*0,98*	*0,02*
Close friends network size	0,00	1,00	0,16
Family network density	0,00	1,00	0,86
Kinship ties: Expressive	0,04	1,04	0,22
Kinship ties: Instrumental	*0,09*	*1,09*	*0,00*
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	*0,10*	*1,11*	*0,00*
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	*-0,08*	*0,92*	*0,03*
Group level relations			
Relations with the relatives	-0,01	0,99	0,31
Bridging structures			
Total civil society participation			
Olson type participation	0,02	1,02	0,12
PUTNAM1 type participation			
PUTNAM2 type participation	**0,06**	**1,06**	**0,00**
Church or other religious org.	**0,06**	**1,06**	**0,00**
Other associations or org.	*0,04*	*1,04*	*0,03*
Employment	*0,14*	*1,16*	*0,00*
University attendance	*0,42*	*1,52*	*0,00*
Institutional contact: Expressive	*-0,12*	*0,89*	*0,05*
Institutional contact: Instrumental	-0,03	0,97	0,31
Individual level variables			
Subjective happiness	**0,27**	**1,31**	**0,00**
Control variables			
Sex	*-0,30*	*0,68*	*0,00*
Age	*0,02*	*1,02*	*0,00*
Constant	*-1,47*	*----*	*0,00*
Number of observations	29446		

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Table 7.25 yields very interesting results. First, it should be noted that the three different models are different only in terms of the civil society participation variables. Model I shows that civil society participation influences generalized trust positively. Hence it is likely that the civil society acts as one of the bridging structures in which different people come together and forge relationships for common purposes.

Model II and Model III further show that different types of civil society institutions exert different influence on generalized trust. According to these models, only the community level, less-hierarchical and more self-expressive Putnam type institutions are significant for trust relations. This finding is in line with the initial hypothesis. Although Olson type institutions were hypothesized to influence generalized trust negatively, Table 7.25 does not display this type of influence. Further, participation in Olson type institutions does not exert any significant influence on trust, either. Hence the analysis underscored only the community level civil society activism as a significant determinant of generalized trust. Model III also showed that participation in religious organizations is as influential in generalized trust as other Putnam type institutions such as sports and leisure groups, as well as the neighborhood associations.

These findings are important because they show us the fact that individuals who are ready to come together with the fellow men for common purposes at the community level are more likely to be open to different others as well. This type of civil society participation seems different from the one which is induced by modern production structures, such as professional organizations and/or trade unions.

The comparison between the Putnam and the Olson type civil society institutions become all the more interesting once the analysis focuses on the tie-based variables. It should be noted that the coefficients, signs of influence and the significance of those variables do not change across the models. Tie-based variables show the significant influence of individuals' relations on generalized trust.

First, as the adult family size increases, the tendency to trust the fellow men decreases. This is a finding in line with the social capital literature's emphasis on the constricting role of strong family ties. It also shows that the network boundary should be considered when hypotheses are generated about the possible social network influence on trust. The present study, for instance, hypothesized a positive influence of network size on generalized trust. However it seems as though in family networks, the size can run counter to trust relationships.

The relationship between social ties and generalized trust becomes more puzzling once the analysis focuses on ties that are used for different purposes of action. Table 7.25 shows the negative influence of adult family size on the one hand, and the positive influence of kinship ties for instrumental action on the other. What do those findings tell us? They tell us the fact that the purpose for which the given ties are used is a significant determinant for generalized trust. As family ties extend, they may constrict relationships beyond the familiar circles. However, when family ties are used for instrumental action, the tendency to trust the unknown others also increases.

This finding brings forth the possibility that the availability of a safety net which allows one to embrace risks about the fellow men may prove more significant than their awareness of different others for individuals' decision to trust or not to trust. Once individuals feel that they can act on their close kinship ties for instrumental action, they may become more pro-active in social life as well.

Because the variables for kinship and non-kinship ties as well as the institutional contact for expressive and instrumental action are derived from the same series of questions, the findings of these variables complement each other. A reliance on kinship ties for instrumental action would crowd out reliance on both the non-kinship ties and on institutional contact for the same purposes. This situation explains the negative coefficients of the latter variables as well.

The picture becomes the more complicated - yet the more interesting - once we also consider the positive and the significant influence of the non-kinship ties for expressive action. The influence of the kinship relations for expressive action is also positive, yet insignificant. Lastly, the variable for institutional contacts for expressive action proves to be a negative and significant determinant of generalized trust.

All findings of social network and tie-based relations tell us that we are subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting influence(s) from our kinship and non-kinship ties. An extension in family network size may prove detrimental to forging relations with others based on trust. Yet, reliance on family for instrumental action may make us more confident about embracing risks about others; hence, we choose to trust. It is interesting that if a certain amount of kinship ties for both expressive and instrumental action is absent, the sole reliance on non-kinship ties or the institutional ties for instrumental action would not help to build trust relationships. Institutional contacts for expressive action would further make us more suspicious about the fellow men. Hence, it seems that people become quite skeptical and perhaps uneasy without the safety net provided

by community level relationships. Both kinship ties for instrumental action and non-kinship ties for expressive action are positive and significant findings of the present study which explain generalized trust. All in all, the social network and tie-based relations variables say that people need each other and individuals' relations with each other forge trust relations.

However, these interactions do not take place in a vacuum. Modern institutions induce a series of bridging structures which connect people to potential diverse others. Table 7.25 revealed employment and education as two significant bridging structures together with civil society involvement, which influenced generalized trust positively. In line with the prior research, subjective happiness also emerged as a significant determinant of generalized trust. Among the demographic control variables, women proved more likely to trust than men, and old age emerged as a positive and significant determinant of trust. It is likely that old age makes people more mature and experienced about different others, which may provide an optimistic orientation towards the world one inhabits in general, and the fellow men in particular.

What about the magnitude of influence? How strong are the variables of social networks, tie-based relations, and bridging structures? Table 7.26 on the following page displays the marginal and discrete change the variables of Model III in Table 7.25 exert on predicted probability to trust the fellow men in Finland (See Table B.4 in Appendix B for the discrete change in probability to trust across countries, other than Finland).

Table 7.26 ISSP Marginal and discrete change the variables of Model III exert on predicted probability to trust the fellow man					
	Min->Max	-+1/2	-+sd/2	Marginal change	0->1
Network/ tie-based variables					
Adult family network size (0-36)	-0.11	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-
Close friends network size (0-294)	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
Family network density (0-7)	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
Kinship ties: Expressive (0-4)	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
Kinship ties: Instrumental (0-3)	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.02	-
Non-kinship ties: Expressive (0-4)	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	-
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental (0-3)	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-
Group level relations					
Relations with the relatives (0-12)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
Bridging structures					
Olson type participation (0-6)	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
PUTNAM2 type participation (0-6)	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.01	-
Church or other religious org. (0-3)	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-
Other associations or org. (0-3)	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-
Employment					0.03
University attendance					0.06
Institutional cont.: Expressive (0-4)	-0.09	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	--
Institutional cont.: Instrumental (0-3)	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	--
Individual level variables					
Subjective happiness (1-4)	0.15	0.05	0.04	0.05	--
Control variables					--
Sex					-0.08
Age (18-101)	0.27	0.00	0.05	0.00	--

Table 7.26 shows that the negative influence of adult family size is much smaller than the influence exerted by both kinship and non-kinship ties. It seems that having a few kinship ties on which individuals can rely for strategic instrumental action, and a few non-kinship ties for well-being and expression increase the probability of trust by around twelve percent. In the event that individuals also get involved in community level civil society institutions, this percentage rises further. Hence, different types of social interactions in general, and individuals' community level relational ties in particular, emerge as significant determinants of generalized trust.

Besides relational ties, the bridging structures of the workplace and education add another ten percent to the probability of trusting. Table.26 also shows that the men's probability to trust is lower than the women's by around eight percent, which is quite a high amount. Alternatively, feeling "very happy" adds fifteen percent to the probability to trust.

Table 7.26 displays the influence of the marginal and the discrete changes on probability to trust for the case of Finland. How far do these probabilities change as the country changes? In other words, what is the influence of the cross-country differences on generalized trust? As noted, all country dummy variables, except for Denmark, proved significantly different from the base category of Finland. Hence country differences are significant determinants of generalized trust as well.

Figure 7.1 on the following page presents the cross-country differences in predicted probabilities to trust for the employed man who did not attend university. The rest of the variables, apart from those dummy variables, are set to their mean scores. Figure 7.1 shows substantial differences across the countries. Holding all the network and tie-based variables constant at their mean values, the likelihood to trust in Finland (0,38), Denmark (0,36), Switzerland (0,29), and France (0,25) emerged as the highest among all countries. Alternatively, the country level dynamics in Poland (0,04), Hungary (0,04), Slovenia (0,05), Brazil (0,05) and South Africa (0,05) are likely to hinder trust relations.

Figure 7.1 Cross-country differences in predicted probability to trust for the employed man who did not attend the university

Country	Value
Finland	0,38
Denmark	0,36
Switzerland	0,29
France	0,25
Norway	0,23
Australia	0,19
Japan	0,18
Cyprus	0,16
New Zealand	0,15
Russia	0,15
Canada	0,14
Israel	0,14
Czech Republic	0,13
Great Britain	0,13
Philippines	0,12
Latvia	0,11
Italy	0,09
Austria	0,08
Germany	0,08
United States	0,08
Spain	0,08
Chile	0,05
South Africa	0,05
Brazil	0,05
Slovenia	0,05
Hungary	0,04
Poland	0,04

Given the substantial difference in trust levels across countries, how far can we talk about the relevance of relational ties on generalized trust? Does the influence of these ties remain steady across countries, or does it vary with either the more or the less enabling socio-political environments? In order to answer these questions, a cluster analysis was run, and the countries were divided into three groups on the basis of their mean trust scores. These groups were labeled High Trust, Medium Trust, and Low Trust countries respectively (See Table B.5 in Appendix B for those groupings). One country in each group whose mean trust score was closest to the cluster mean, was selected as the representative country of the given group. Switzerland emerged as the representative of the High Trust countries, Canada the Medium Trust countries, and Chile was representative of the Low Trust countries. Two scenarios were run for these three countries.

The first scenario displayed the mean trust scores in each country when individuals' non-kinship ties for expressive action increase from 0 to 4. The values used in this scenario are provided in Table 7.27 on the following page. Figure 7.2 shows the probability values across the countries.

Figure 7.2. ISSP Scenario1

Table 7.27 ISSP Scenario 1: Probability calculations for representative countries over the values of non-kinship expressive ties										
	Scenario 1a: Change across values of non-kinship expressive ties for Switzerland					Scenario 1b: Change across values of non-kinship expressive for Canada				
Variables										
Adult family network size	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Close friends network size	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6
Family network density	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Kinship ties: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kinship ties: Instrumental	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relations with the relatives	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8
Olson type participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PUTNAM2 type participation	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01
Church or other religious org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other associations or org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Employment	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
University attendance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional cont.: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional cont.: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subjective happiness	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sex	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Age	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9
Switzerland	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pr(Trust=1)	**0,30**	**0,32**	**0,30**	**0,36**	**0,37**	**0,15**	**0,20**	**0,20**	**0,20**	**0,20**

Table 7.27 continued…					
	Scenario 1c: Change across values of non-kinship expressive ties change for Chile				
Variables					
Adult family network size	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Close friends network size	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6
Family network density	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Kinship ties: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0
Kinship ties: Instrumental	3	3	3	3	3
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0
Relations with the relatives	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8
Olson type participation	0	0	0	0	0
PUTNAM2 type participation	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01	1,01
Church or other religious org.	0	0	0	0	0
Other associations or org.	0	0	0	0	0
Employment	1	1	1	1	1
University attendance	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0
Subjective happiness	3	3	3	3	3
Sex	1	1	1	1	1
Age	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Pr(Trust=1)	**0,05**	**0,06**	**0,07**	**0,07**	**0,08**

According to Figure 7.2, the probability to trust increases by seven percent in Switzerland when non-kinship expressive ties increase from zero to four. This figure is five percent in Canada and three percent in Chile. Hence, the overall influence of relational ties seems to remain at a minimum within low trust socio-political contexts rather than the high trust ones.

The possible relationship between the micro-level relational determinants and the macro-level socio-political determinants of generalized trust become clearer if we

continue the analysis for different countries across values of PUTNAM2 institutions. Figure 7.3 does this. In this figure, the non-kinship ties for expressive action are set to the maximum value of four. Other values for this second scenario are indicated in Table 7.28 on the following pages.

Figure 7.3 ISSP Scenario 2

Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 together show that an increase in individuals' non-kinship ties for expressive action and Putnam type civil society participation from the minimum to the maximum values increases the likelihood to trust in Switzerland at around fifteen percent. This figure is an approximate ten percent in Canada and only five percent in Chile. Hence the focus on the socio-political context in which micro-level social interactions take place seems important in order to make better sense of social network underpinnings of generalized trust.

Table 7.28 ISSP Scenario 2: Probability calculations for representative countries over the values of PUTNAM2 type participation							
	Scenario 2a: Change across values of PUTNAM2 for Switzerland						
Variables							
Adult family network size	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Close friends network size	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6
Family network density	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Kinship ties: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kinship ties: Instrumental	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relations with the relatives	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8
Olson type participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PUTNAM2 type participation	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Church or other religious org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other associations or org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Employment	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
University attendance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subjective happiness	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sex	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Age	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9
Switzerland	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pr(Trust=1)	**0,36**	**0,37**	**0,39**	**0,40**	**0,41**	**0,43**	**0,44**

Table. 7.28 continued…							
	Scenario 2b: Change across values of PUTNAM2 for Canada						
Variables							
Adult family network size	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Close friends network size	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6
Family network density	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Kinship ties: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kinship ties: Instrumental	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relations with the relatives	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8
Olson type participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PUTNAM2 type participation	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Church or other religious org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other associations or org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Employment	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
University attendance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subjective happiness	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sex	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Age	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pr(Trust=1)	**0,19**	**0,20**	**0,21**	**0,21**	**0,22**	**0,23**	**0,24**

Table 7.28 continued...							
	Scenario 2c: Change across values of PUTNAM2 for Chile						
Variables							
Adult family network size	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Close friends network size	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6	10,6
Family network density	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,6
Kinship ties: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kinship ties: Instrumental	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Non-kinship ties: Expressive	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relations with the relatives	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8	5,8
Olson type participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PUTNAM2 type participation	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Church or other religious org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other associations or org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Employment	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
University attendance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Expressive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional contact: Instrumental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subjective happiness	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sex	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Age	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9	45,9
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Pr(Trust=1)	**0,07**	**0,08**	**0,08**	**0,09**	**0,09**	**0,10**	**0,10**

Although substantial cross-country differences in generalized trust scores revealed macro-level socio-political determinants as significant, the relational ties still deserve special attention. The present analysis has shown that ties for different purposes of action significantly influence generalized trust. Another finding was the different influences exerted by kinship versus non-kinship ties. The third interesting finding was the diverse influence exerted by similar types of ties. For instance, as the family network size increases, generalized trust decreases, yet in the event that family ties are used for instrumental action, then the tendency to trust increases. Lastly, the bridging structures such as university attendance, employment and participation in Putnam type institutions emerged as significant determinants of generalized trust; on the other hand, participation in Olson type institutions was not a significant determinant of trust. The institutional contacts for expressive action are also found as negatively related to generalized trust. All these findings show that societal relationships are relevant and significant for trust relations.

CONCLUSION

Hypotheses of the social capital literature about generalized trust are quite straightforward: strong ties of the bonding relations influence generalized trust negatively and weak ties of the bridging relations influence generalized trust positively. The present study tried to accommodate these hypotheses within the social network approach and its method, which counts on individual level tie-based information. The survey analyses for both the Turkish and cross-country contexts showed that social network influence on generalized trust is not as straightforward as is assumed by the social capital literature.

First of all, the network boundary emerged as a significant contextual feature in which social relationships take place. The focus on the influence of network size and network density on generalized trust makes sense only when the network boundary is clearly specified. Even when this specification is made, it is likely that different aspects of individual level relationships will exert diverse and sometimes contradictory influence(s) on generalized trust. For instance, in the cross-country analysis, on the one hand, the adult family network size was found as a significant and negative determinant of generalized trust. On the other hand, kinship ties which are used for instrumental action, proved to be significant and positive determinants of generalized trust. Along similar lines, the network size of the Turkish discussion networks was not a significant determinant of generalized trust. However, when those networks were partitioned on the basis of kinship and non-kinship ties, the network size of the non-kinship ties surfaced as a positive and significant determinant of generalized trust. The specification of the network boundaries is important because they display different aspects of societal interactions.

A second finding of the research relates to the comparison of the influences of the network size, the network density and the network diversity variables on generalized trust. Network diversity measures, which focused on various tie properties, yielded

more interesting results than both the network size and network density measures. For instance, in both the Turkish and cross-country research, the extensity of the close friends is found as insignificant. It is likely that this finding relates to multiple pressures different close friends' ties exert on individuals. Analyses of Turkey showed that individuals are subject to varying influences from their associates' multiple features such as their ages and/or education levels. Likewise, cross-country analyses discerned different pressures put on trust relations by ties for different purposes of action. Hence it seems that the diversity of network ties matter more than both the numbers and the weights of those ties.

This brings us to the third important finding, which relates to the extent of tie diversity. The extent of the kinship and the non-kinship ties on the one hand, and the purpose for which the tie is mobilized on the other, emerged as significant determinants of generalized trust. In both survey analyses, qualitative and quantitative differences emerged between the kinship and non-kinship ties. Ties to friends and acquaintances within one's discussion networks in Turkey were found to be positive and significant determinants of generalized trust.

The cross-country analysis was also able to analyze both the kinship and the non-kinship ties with an emphasis on purpose of action. The analysis showed positive and significant influence of the kinship ties for instrumental action and of the non-kinship ties for expressive action. These findings become more meaningful when they are considered with the positive and significant influence of participation in Putnam type civil society institutions. They all point to the relevance of an active community life for trust relations. It can well be claimed that those people who are social and participating in their communities, who have friends to rely on for emotional well-being, and who possess family ties to mobilize for power and wealth are also the ones who are more likely to trust people at large.

Indeed these latter findings deserve special attention. Social capital literature prioritizes the relations which are used for strategic and instrumental action. The emphasis on bridging social capital - hence potentially the weak and bridging ties - is a case in point. However, this conceptual framework reduces individual level relationships to a strategic fellow hunt, which apparently only reflects one side of the story; the present study shows the other side too, which is about people' need for the fellow men. Individuals seem to become more familiar with different others through emotional connections to their friends. A series of bridging structures such as the

workplace, education, and civil society involvement seem to breed this process of familiarization as well. Hence knowing about others who provide emotional support seems crucial for trust relations and friends seem to matter more than the utilitarian count.

Alternatively, the kinship ties prove more strategic for trust relations. In general, people rely on their primordial relations for emotional support. The present study also affirmed this point, yet, going one step further, it also showed that reliance on kinship relations for emotional support does not crowd out their instrumental use as well. This finding also underlines a much-neglected aspect in the operational definition of trust. Generalized trust is about familiarity with variable human conditions, as it is about being willing to embrace risks about those unknown others. This willingness, in turn, boils down to an ability to deal with possible disappointment as a result of one's decision to trust. The safety net family ties provide emerges as significant to ease the risk-taking tendency.

The acknowledgement that relations with the unknown people involve certain risks brings us to the fourth finding of the present study. People do not forge social relationships in a vacuum. On the contrary, their relationships are structured within given socio-economic and socio-political contexts. In Turkey, education differences seem to set people apart from each other, whereas age differences ease connections with the fellow men. The influence of socio-economic differences on generalized trust proved to be more pronounced in the metropolitan rather than smaller cities, which points to the relevance of socio-political environment for trust relations. In Turkey, people's tendency to trust the fellow men decreases more substantially across the metropolitan cities than the smaller cities. Cross-country analyses also show the relevance of socio-political environment for trust relations. The influence of the relational ties become more pronounced in high trust contexts. Hence social networks and relational ties influence generalized trust. Yet these networks and ties do not come into existence in a vacuum; they are bound to the given socio-political environment.

This brings us to the study's fifth finding, which relates to the influence of the bottom-up relational ties on generalized trust in Turkey. A persistently divisive socio-political structure frames individual level social relations in Turkey. Turkish modernization, which dates back to the late Ottoman period of the nineteenth century, has created an enduring political contestation about the proprietorship of both the modern state and the citizenry between the forces of the modernizing elite and their

more traditional corollaries. The present day cleavage between the so-called seculars and Islamists is a continuation of this more than a century-old political controversy. An examination of the general political and civic attitudes in Turkey also shows that the citizens are readily aligned along this deep-rooted cleavage, which breeds conservatism too. Irrespective of religiosity, citizens of all political walks display dogmatic and intolerant attitudes towards change and difference. How can people become familiar with the variable human condition when both partisanship and conservatism close them off from others' ideas?

Turkey is among the low trust countries and its socio-political context is likely to influence generalized trust in the country. The present study has shown that the discussion of the social network underpinnings of generalized trust within the Turkish context is not irrelevant, either. The analysis focused on important matters discussion networks in Turkey; hence, the network boundary was rather limited. Moreover, the survey on Turkey did not differentiate between ties for expressive and instrumental action respectively. It also did not include any questions on civil society participation. However, the survey was detailed in terms of tie-based properties at the discussion networks level.

Turkish discussion networks are mostly populated by friendship ties, though family ties are also important. Hence, it is difficult to argue for social isolation in the Turkish case. However, celebrating the diversity of the community level relationships on the basis of this limited data would also be a stretch. The analysis of the social network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey points out the relevance of the friendship ties for discussion, which proved significant for generalized trust. The influence of these ties increases with the increase in age differences at the discussion network level.

Although age differences influence generalized trust positively, education differences are found to exert negative influence on generalized trust. Moreover, university graduates emerged as a more likely group than other educational groups to display trust in unknown others. These findings underscore education as a structural impediment in Turkey which influences the way people relate to each other.

Once the socio-economic cleavages in Turkey are considered together with the prevalent political cleavages, low participation levels in civil society institutions and a series of deficiencies in terms of the political and the civil rights, people in Turkey seem

to be set far away from each other. As a result, the potential to extend trust to unknown others in Turkey remains low.

The examination of the Turkish case within a comparative framework showed that individuals' social networks are quite diverse; hence, it is not very easy to generalize about the social network influence on generalized trust. Despite the multiplicity of social networks, the differentiation between the kinship and the non-kinship ties proved important. The examination of relational ties in terms of their purpose of action also yielded interesting results. Lastly, the emphasis on tie diversity, based on both the attribute and attitude characteristics, related significantly to generalized trust. However, the magnitude of the influence of social networks remained rather limited in both the Turkish and the cross-country analyses.

Democratization literature in general, and political culture studies in particular, put emphasis on the primacy of the cultural features which are deemed crucial for democratic institutionalization. Social capital literature, in particular, argues for the importance of the civic community and solidarity among the fellow citizens as important determinants of democratic regime performance. In this regard, the present study considered the focus on the individual in relation to his/her social relationships as significant. The research revealed dynamism at the level of individuals' social relationships both, for the Turkish case and for the cross-country analysis. This dynamism, however, seems to be multi-faceted. Hence, the present study does not lend support to the rather straightforward and simplistic relationship the social capital literature seems to have established between the negative influence of the bonding and strong ties on generalized trust on the one hand, and the positive influence of the bridging and weak ties on generalized trust on the other. Moreover, rather than reducing generalized trust to an apolitical phenomenon by relying too heavily on different configurations of relational ties, the present analysis points to the possible impelling influence of the socio-political context on relational ties, which may, in turn, influence generalized trust in different ways.

For the Turkish case, this last assertion invites further enquiry into the ways the existing socio-political and socio-economic cleavages interact with individual's social networks and relational ties: How do the social ties established within the civil society institutions influence generalized trust? Do social ties in different types of civil society institutions have different bearings on generalized trust? What about the role of religiosity and/or ethnic identity in social network formation and how do these networks

influence generalized trust? How does political partisanship influence individuals' discussion networks, and do political diversity and knowledge influence generalized trust?

All these questions are relevant to, and invite further comment on the social network underpinnings of generalized trust. Following the traces of trust, in turn, is related to the larger question regarding the ways individuals who are embedded within their social relationships, familiarize the complexity of the modern world. This familiarity is significant because it underscores the way people as fellow men and citizens relate to each other. Only then, could people be expected to take an interest in their own fate as members of a political community. By rendering the citizens attentive to each other and the public goods at large, generalized trust constitutes the link between the citizens and democratic institutionalization.

In sum, generalized trust is significant for democracies, and societal interactions prove significant for generalized trust. In-depth comparative analyses of the social network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey has shown that what is seen as static and unchanging at the macro socio-political level may be quite diverse and dynamic at the community level. More detailed social network accounts and tie-based relationships are likely to provide detailed information about the bottom-up relational potential for generalized trust, as well as democratic institutionalization. Without this focus, political analysis will be incomplete at best.

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