

**TO FRAME OR NOT TO FRAME?: THAT IS THE QUESTION**  
**EXPLAINING THE IMPACT OF MEDIA ON SOCIAL INTOLERANCE IN RUSSIAN**  
**FEDERATION**

by

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Abstract:

This thesis examines the role of media-resources and the framing of the Chechen conflict by media on the social intolerance and xenophobic tendencies in Russian Federation in the context of two phases of Chechen armed conflict: 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict (1994-1996) and 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict (1999-2009). This thesis predicts that different ways in which 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict and 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict was framed in public discourse and communicated via media has had different impact on social tolerance in Russian society. It was found that the framing of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict magnifies “threat” emanating from separatist forces of Chechen rebels and introduces discriminatory rhetoric, which in turn leads to increased intolerance and xenophobia in the society towards minority ethnic group (i.e. Chechens).

The study is based upon comparative-case study implemented by experimental methodology. Thus, the main goal of this research is to illuminate and to understand the role of media in conflict and its impact on social tolerance in general.

ÇERÇELEVEMEK Mİ VEYA ÇERÇELEVEMEMEK Mİ?: BÜTÜN SORUN BU  
RUSYA FEDERASYONUNDA SOSYAL TOLERANS ÜZERİNE MEDYA ETKİSİNİN  
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Özet:

Bu tez, Çeçen silahlı çatışmanın iki aşaması (1. Çeçen çatışma (1994-1996) ve 2. Çeçen çatışma (1999-2009)) bağlamında, medya kaynaklarının Çeçen çatışmasını çerçelemenin sosyal hoşgörüsüzlük ve yabancı düşmanlığı eğilimleri üzerine olan etkisini inceliyor. Bu tez, 1. Çeçen çatışmanın ve 2. Çeçen çatışmanın kamusal söylemde farklı şekilde çerçelenmesinin ve medya aracılığı ile tebliğ edildiğinin, Rus toplumunda sosyal toleransı farklı şekilde etkilediğini tahmin ediyor. 2. Çeçen çatışmanın çerçelenmesinin, Çeçen isyancıların ayrılıkçı güçlerinden kaynaklanan “tehdidi” büyüterek ve ayrımcı söylemi tanıtarak, sırasıyla toplumda azınlık etnik gruba (örneğin Çeçenler) doğru artan hoşgörüsüzlük ve ksenofobiye neden olduğu bulunmuştur.

Bu araştırma, deneysel yöntem tarafından uygulanan karşılaştırmalı-vaka çalışması üzerine kuruludur. Bu araştırmanın temel amacı çatışmadaki medyanın rolü ve genel olarak toplumsal tolerans üzerindeki etkisini aydınlatmak ve anlamaktır.

*To my mother Seviye Bilalova  
and my father Denislam Nuriakhmetov*



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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### **Authorities scramble to curb ethnic violence in North Russia**

“Hundreds of people gathered in the center of Kondopoga, in Russia's Karelia Republic, on Saturday to demand that all Chechens and other ethnic minorities from the North Caucasus region be expelled from the area following a fatal clash in a city restaurant Wednesday night”

*(RIA Novosti, September 4, 2006)*

### **Autumn - 2006: Under the Kondopoga Banner**

“There are virtually no differences in the way the events are reported - diners in a local restaurant provoked a massive fight by their offensive behavior; the fight was obviously a "criminal showdown" involving ethnic Chechen bandits; two people were killed and six seriously injured. This, and blatant inaction of the local police, caused massive protests and numerous, lasting for many days, arson attacks against the property of local residents of the Caucasus origin. There were at least 20 arson attacks in the city of Kondopoga and neighboring districts in the first week of September. By unofficial data, at least eight people whose appearance suggested their Caucasus origin were injured in the pogroms”

*(SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, January 4, 2007)*

### **Ethnic riots in Moscow: Dangerous games played by children**

“On December 11, as we remember, several thousands of young people arranged an unauthorized action on Manezhnaya Square. The action developed into mass riots very quickly, although it was supposed to be held in memory of Yegor Sviridov, a fan of Spartak football club. The participants of the meeting started chanting nationalist slogans; dozens of innocent people were beaten in the riots”

*(Pravda, December 20, 2010)*

### **The Phantom of Manezhnaya Square: Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Counteract It in 2010**

“Moscow and Moscow Region remain traditional hotbeds of racist violence, and tension rose even further after the 11 December riots – altogether 22 people were killed and 174 were injured over the year; St. Petersburg and Leningrad region (two killed, 47 injured) and Nizhniy Novgorod (two killed, 17 injured). In 2009 these areas respectively reported 38 killed and 131 injured, eight killed and 36 injured, and six killed and 21 injured”

*(SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, May 5, 2011)*

The events of 2010 on Manezhnaya Square caught everyone in Russian off guard when on December 11, 2010, 5,000 young men gathered in the center of Moscow for a meeting in honor of fan of “Spartak” football club Yegor Sviridov, who was shot to death in a fight that broke out between football fans and young men coming from North Caucasus at night on December 6, 2010. Meeting grew out into mass riots, leaving many people injured.

According to the survey done by radio-station “Russian News Agency” (“Russkaya Sluzhba Novostei”), 87% of participants expressed support for the demonstrations on Manezhnaya Square in 2010<sup>1</sup>. Another radio-station “Finam FM” also reported that overwhelming majority of 83% of its listeners were supporting demonstrators and only 17% were thinking that Manezhnaya Square demonstration was an action undertaken by radical groups<sup>2</sup>. “Politeh” NGO in coauthorship with Russian Academy of Sciences published a research, according to which 76% of interviewees felt sympathetic to the demonstrators of Manezhnaya Square, whereas 78% of respondents did not consider these riots as being ultra-nationalist in nature, although main mottos during demonstrations were “Russia for Russians” and “Moscow for Moscovites”<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, results of the survey undertaken by Levada-Center reveal that 65% of population in Russia support the motto “Stop feeding Caucasus!” and 56% of respondents support the motto “Russia for Russians”<sup>4</sup>.

All these figures mentioned above point to the fact of increasing intolerance and xenophobia in the Russian society, especially among the youth. Given the polyethnic societal structure of Russian Federation, it is of vital importance to understand the causes of this troublesome tendency in Russia.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://regions.ru/news/2329772/>

<sup>2</sup> <http://finam.fm/archive-view/3438/3/>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=6952>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.apn.ru/news/article27846.htm>

How does media play a role in the emergence or exacerbation of xenophobic attitudes in society? The media is “one of the most effective cultural conductors”, which has “power to promote diversity, but also to promote hatred. When media acts irresponsibly or carelessly it can trigger, foster and intensify already existing hostility and racism”<sup>5</sup>. This necessitates detailed analysis of the role of media in shaping popular attitudes and perceptions, especially in the domain of inter-ethnic relations.

### **1.1. Aim and significance of the study**

The potential for the escalation of the inter-ethnic tension into an armed conflict is the main motivation of the author to undertake this study. The attempt is to demonstrate how media resources as channels for communicating the official discourse and rhetoric affect popular attitudes and perceptions of inter-ethnic relations in Russian Federation. To put it broadly, this study aims at examining the relationship between media and xenophobia.

The topic of Russo-Chechen conflict has received vast attention from the scholars, and to list articles and books devoted to the subject here seems an impossible task (Lieven, 1998; Evangelista, 2002; Malashenko and Trenin, 2002; Russell, 2002; Kramer, 2005; Russell, 2005; Sakwa, 2005). However, the main focus of the previous research was on the armed conflict between Federal Center in Moscow and armed rebels in Chechnya, whereas the socio-psychological ramifications of this conflict were by and large neglected. The present study fills this gap by analyzing how representation of the conflict in media affects popular attitudes and social tolerance of towards members of ethnic out-group in the context of domestic conflict.

Previous studies have studied how different framings impact people’s attitudes and decisions differently (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011; Lakoff, 2004; Zhang, 2007; Zillman et al., 2004). The unique contribution of this study lies in the fact that it provides quantitative empirical evidence on the role of media on social tolerance and

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<sup>5</sup> Retrieved from [http://www.nefretsoylemi.org/en/nefret\\_soylemi\\_nedir.asp](http://www.nefretsoylemi.org/en/nefret_soylemi_nedir.asp)

popular attitudes towards ethnic minority group in Russian Federation in the context of Chechen conflict by utilizing experimental design. In light of mentioned above, this explanatory study intends to:

- a) empirically demonstrate the role played by media-resources in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations and social tolerance in Russian Federation;
- b) offer explanatory mechanism that accounts for the relationship between media and xenophobia by combining social-psychological theorizing in the area of intolerance and xenophobia, on the one hand; and framing theory, on the other hand;

The structure of this study is as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction and covers the purpose of and motivation behind this study. Chapter 2 presents literature review covering previous research and theorizing on xenophobia and intolerance and framing theory. It also provides a short overview of the history of Russo-Chechen conflict. Chapter 3 describes method and design of the study. Chapter 4 reports the results and discusses the findings. Chapter 5 concludes the main line of reasoning and presents substantive conclusions based on the findings.

## **Chapter 2: Literature review**

The present chapter provides a literature review. It is necessary to anchor the subject of the study in the literature in framing and xenophobia. To that end, it provides a review of literature on i) frames and framing theory and ii) xenophobia and discrimination.

Then the chapter will provide a detailed description of the xenophobia in Russia, which is a hypothesis-generating case for this thesis. This chapter begins with the definition of the concepts.

### **2.1. Definitional problem: Framing and xenophobia**

This study is grounded on the assumption that reality is socially constructed. Our perceptions are volatile and are subject to frequent changes. Our comprehension of the reality surrounding us depends on the information we receive through different types of communication. The way in which facts are presented to us can determine our opinions, thus, power to present facts in a specific light grants the ability to different social actors to achieve their goals and aims.

The main proponent of the theory of the social construction of reality is Kenneth Burke (1969a; 1969b). Burke (1966, 3) defines man as “symbol using animal”, whose reality is “clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present . . . a construct of our symbol systems” (1966, 5). His special focus is on the language (1966, 45): “Even if any given terminology is a *reflection* of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a *selection* of reality”. Burke names this mechanism through which we constantly select a particular reality as “terministic screens”: “[A]ny nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others” (1966, 45). He illustrates this point by discussing his experience of seeing different photos of the same object. Different color filters, Burke argues, resulted in significant differences in texture and even in form for even “something so “factual” as a photograph” (Ibid).

Burke contends that “[T]he ‘same’ act can be defined ‘differently,’ depending upon the ‘circumference’ of the scene or overall situation *in terms of which* we choose to locate it” (1966, 360). In other words, terministic screens are a set of symbols which filter the outside information and through this process of filtering we can make sense of the world surrounding us.

Gergen (1985, 268) emphasizes that the sustainability of certain understanding of the world is more dependent on the way in which facts are presented rather than on the degree of their empirical authenticity.

According to Zaller (1992), mass opinion is shaped predominantly by the exposure (via the media) to elite discourse on a certain issue. He points out that “the impact of people’s value predispositions always depends on whether citizens possess the contextual information needed to translate their values into support for particular policies or candidates” (1992, 25).

Goffman (1974, 83) introduces the notion of the process of “fabrication”, which is “intentional effort of one or more individuals to manage activity so that a party of one or more others will be induced to have a false belief about what it is that is actually going on”.

Schneider and Ingram (1997) argue that content and substance of public policy are shaped by the social context through the process of framing dynamics. Framing, in other words, provides elites with a tool to change, modify or abandon specific policies, since it allows elites to construct social context as they wish. For instance, Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) study the role of press in shaping US foreign policy during Bosnian crisis. They conclude that critical assessments of US foreign policy and emphasis on humanitarian and security frames by mass media pushed Clinton’s administration to adopt more active foreign policy during the Balkan wars. By using meaningful and familiar metaphors, it is suggested that media played significant explanatory role to shape and direct public opinion.

Furthermore, Herman and Chomsky illustrate how biased representation in media blocked the possibility to critically assess the legality of Vietnam War, whereas Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan was vehemently criticized as act of aggression. Also, the term “genocide” was quickly applied to refer to massive violence in Kosovo, while greater violence like occupation of East Timor by Indonesian troops was ignored (2002, 252).

Similarly, Loizides (2009) studies the impact of elite framing in Turkey on national identities, crisis escalations and conflict transformation. Whereas Turkish-Kurdish conflict is framed in adversarial terms without any serious challenges to nationalist discourses; framing of Turkish-Greek disputes is diverse, with moderates emphasizing the necessity of cooperation with Greece and hardliners opposing this idea. He concludes that diverse framing of Greek-Turkish disputes facilitates shifts in Turkish foreign policy, whereas monolithic and adversarial representation of Kurdish-Turkish conflict renders such shifts improbable (Loizides, 2009, 291-292).

Entman (1993) notes how Conservatives were successful to persuade public to engage in the Gulf War: issue was framed as a question of attacking sooner or later. Possibility of not attacking was not mentioned at all. Media framed the issue in similar vein, thus guaranteeing the Conservatives implementation of their preferred course of actions (Entman, 1993, 51).

Furthermore, research also highlights the role of framing in the response of US administration after the attacks of 9/11 (Lakoff, 2004; Zhang, 2007). Initially terrorist attacks of 9/11 were framed as crime by the Bush administration. However, shortly afterwards, presentation of attacks as crime gave way to “War on Terror” allegory. Whereas criminals should be brought to justice and then sentenced, the metaphor of war implies military campaign on enemy’s territory (Lakoff, 2004, 56).

Thus, the social construction of reality is closely related with power politics. For a certain policies to be implemented it is necessary to make it clear to masses why alternative policies are not feasible. In other words, to gain support for its actions, elites constantly have to create and recreate specific “terministic screens” that would legitimize a certain course of action and not the



other. The process of creation of “terministic screens” is thoroughly studied by proponents of framing theory. Thus, I now turn my attention to framing theory.

### **2.1.1. Framing**

Frames, Gitlin (1980, 7) writes, are "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretations, and presentation, of selection and emphasis... [that] are largely unspoken and unacknowledged.. [and] organize the world for both journalists [and] for those of us who read their reports."

Druckman and Nelson (2003) consider framing to be one of the fundamental instruments of elite influence.

Consequently, elites use framing to garner support for their policies that satisfy their interests (Chong and Druckman, 2007, 120). As Entman (1993, 55) eloquently puts it, “frame in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text.”

According to Edelman (1993, 231), governments “win public support for [their] actions only by creating and spreading beliefs about those who are deserving and those who are threats and about which policies will bring desirable results and which will be painful, unfair, or disastrous”. Frame is defined as “schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al., 1986, 464). The framing, then, is a “process by which a communication source... defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy” (Nelson et al., 1997, 567).

There are two dominant definitions of the frames and framing, which come from sociology and psychology, respectively. From the vantage point of sociology, framing is a catalyzer of the process of the construction of social reality and frame is a "schemata of interpretation" that enables individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large" (Goffman, 1974, 21). Sociological approach to framing can be characterized as more holistic; its focus is on language as a channel of symbolic

communication (Goffman, 1974); social movements as carriers of beliefs, “engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for protagonists, antagonists and bystanders” (Snow et al. 2004, 384); and the cultural context in which frames operate (Snow & Benford, 1988; Somers, 1995; Gamson et al., 1992).

Psychology views framing as an instrument capable of altering people’s preferences when the same issue or problem is presented in different ways (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981); it conceptualizes framing as changes in public opinion on a particular issue produced by the definition of the problem (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). Frames have the power to accentuate certain facts and omit the others, which affects public opinion on a particular issue (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Edelman, 1993; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991; Iyengar, 1991; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2003).

Research (Price et al., 1997; de Vreese, 2002) suggests that three particularly frequent frames in media are conflict, human interest and economic consequences frames. The power of conflict and agony (human-impact) frames to attract more attention was highlighted by several studies (Neuman et al., 1992; Zillman et al., 2004). Neuman et al. (1992) find that human-impact frame is the second most frequent frame in the news after the conflict frame, whereas findings by Zillman et al. (2004, 62) indicate that framing in terms of conflict or agony attracts more attention from readers than framing in terms of economic consequences, misfortune or plain actual framing.

Entman (1993, 52) contends that to frame an issue is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”. Thus, selection and salience are two key factors in the process of framing.

Entman (2007, 166) notes that media can produce prejudices and “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote the influence of one side in conflicts over

the use of government power”. Similarly, Callaghan & Schnell (2005, 7) postulate that framing process initiated by dominant actors in society can give them even more power, thus undermining the principles of pluralist democracy. Study by Blackledge (2005) suggests that media bias and framing can justify discriminatory discourses and practices.

According to Entman, “[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (1993, 52). Thus, frames possess enormous power, since they provide a ready set of answers and prescriptions for action. A detailed analysis of frames presented in the public sphere and mass media is important, since frames as a tool for political persuasion and manipulation can mobilize people very efficiently and around distinct sets of beliefs, including xenophobia.

### **2.1.2. Xenophobia**

Previous studies have shown that xenophobia is closely related with ethnocentrism. Sumner defines ethnocentrism as “the technical name for the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” (1906, 13), but he also emphasizes that ethnocentrism may lead to negative feelings like contempt towards foreigners. He contends that “Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without – all grow together, common products of the same situation” (Ibid).

Similarly, Dennen argues that belief in the superiority of one’s own group and culture, which is an inherent characteristic of ethnocentrism, “(psycho)logically implies inferiority of other groups and cultures. And viewing other groups/cultures as inferior empirically appears to imply some degree (however small) of contempt, stereotyping, discrimination and dehumanization of, and at least a modicum of hostility toward, members of those other groups/cultures” (1995, 446). As a consequence, ethnocentrism “appears to be intimately

connected with xenophobia, a complex attitude system-cum-sentiment structure involving dislike, distrust, aversion, revulsion, fear and antagonism vis-à-vis strangers/foreigners/aliens and everything the stranger/foreigner/alien represents” (Ibid).

Scholars working in different fields offer several definitions of the xenophobia. Nyamnoj (2006, 5) conceptualizes xenophobia as the “intense dislike, hatred or fear of Others”. According to Berezin (2006, 273), xenophobia is “fear of difference embodied in persons or groups”. Stolcke (1999, 28) defines it as “hostility towards strangers and all that is foreign”.

Each of definitions provided above catches certain parts and dimensions of the phenomenon to which we refer as “xenophobia”. However, opting for more exhaustive definition, this study will define “xenophobia” along the lines of UNDP research paper by Crush and Ramachandran (2009, 6) as associated with four features.

Firstly, xenophobia consists of highly negative perceptions and practices that discriminate against non-citizen groups on the basis of their foreign origin or nationality. It affects all categories of migrants, immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Different migrant groups may, however, experience xenophobia to varying degrees depending on their cultural, racial and ethnic make-up, class composition, and migrant status.

Secondly, xenophobia is perpetuated through a dynamic public rhetoric that actively stigmatizes and vilifies some or all migrant groups by playing up the “threat” posed by their presence and making them scapegoats for social problems. Xenophobia is not simply an attitudinal orientation. Hostile and skewed perceptions of migrant groups generally go hand in hand with discriminatory practices and poor treatment of such groups. Acts of violence, aggression and brutality towards migrant groups represent extreme and escalated forms of xenophobia.

Thirdly, xenophobia is not a ‘natural’ response by native populations to the presence of foreigners. Like racism and nationalism, it is a social and political phenomenon that contributes to the marginalization and/or exclusion of migrant groups in social and national settings.

Last but not least, xenophobia is crucially linked to nation-building and nationalism, in particular, its aggressive forms.

#### **2.1.2.1. Causes of xenophobia.**

- **Ethological/Biological explanations**

Some scholars from the field of ethology<sup>6</sup> point to the biological determinacy of xenophobia (Dolnik, 2003a). It is observed that animals may sometimes favor ethological isolation, which is expressed through the aggression towards closely related species or subspecies. The biological expediency of such behavior is not to allow the formation of mixed couples, i.e. mutation (Dolnik, 2003a). Dolnik (2003b) contends that xenophobia is a failure of genetic mechanism, which explains its irrationality.

De Dreu et al. (2011, 1262) suggest that ethnocentrism may be mediated by oxytocin hormone, peptide that promotes cooperation among members of in-group and which also “creates intergroup bias because oxytocin motivates in-group favoritism and, to a lesser extent, out-group derogation”. According to Dawkins, “Blood-feuds and inter-clan warfare are easily interpretable in terms of Hamilton's genetic theory<sup>7</sup>” (1989, 99).

- **Rational choice/Game theoretical approach**

Game theoretical perspective offers valuable insights into the causes of ethnocentrism (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Shultz et al., 2008). For instance, Hammond and Axelrod (2006) suggest that cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game simulation is a by-product of evolution; however, this cooperation tends to be ethnocentric rather than universal. Shultz et al. conclude that their study “shows that it is plausible that the pervasive human proclivity for ethnocentrism could have evolved” (Shultz et al., 2008, 1248). The explanatory mechanism is

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<sup>6</sup> **Ethology** (from Greek: ἦθος, *ethos*, "character"; and -λογία, *-logia*, "the study of") is the scientific study of animal behavior, and a sub-topic of zoology.

<sup>7</sup> Hamilton W.D. described mechanism of the capacity of kin recognition, and consequently, capacity to discriminate on the basis of kinship. Kin recognition and discrimination become important among “higher” forms of life (Hamilton, 1964).

pretty straightforward: from the rational actor perspective, ethnocentric behavior is the most effective strategy compared to humanitarian (i.e. cosmopolitan) strategy, since it allows overcoming the free-rider problem in large communities or groups: “Humanitarianism succeeds early, before groups have much contact, benefitting from cooperation and not being hurt much by interaction with defectors. But as the world fills in, humanitarian agents begin to lose PD games to defectors with consequent relative decrements in reproductive potential, including especially losses to agents from continually expanding ethnocentric populations” (Ibid., 1247).

However, both ethological/biological and game theoretical explanations were criticized on normative grounds. The problem with these explanations is that they justify xenophobia by conceptualizing it as a “natural” behavior, developed in the course of objective process of evolution. In other words, these approaches validate perpetuation of discriminatory attitudes and xenophobia. Thus, above-mentioned approaches justify marginalization and exploitation of out-groups (Fekete, 2001; Jalusic, 2002).

- **Individual traits and variables**

- *Religious affiliation*

The role of religious affiliation in formation of prejudices is also studied. Batson et al. (1993) conclude that religious involvement highly correlates with different forms and types of prejudice: “religion is not associated with increased love and acceptance but with increased intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry” (Batson et al., 1993, 302). In similar vein, Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) argue that religious people are prone to be more prejudiced than non-religious people. Hood et al. go as far as to suggest that “the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced that person is” (1996, 359).

However, it is necessary to distinguish between the degree of religiousness of individuals and the ways in which individuals are religious (Whitley & Kite, 2010). Allport eloquently emphasizes this need: “[b]elonging to a church because it is a safe, powerful, superior in-group is likely to be the mark of an authoritarian character and to be linked with prejudice. Belonging to a

church because its basic creed of brotherhood expresses the ideals one sincerely believes in, is associated with tolerance” (Allport, 1954, 452-453). Following this line of argument, researchers distinguish two types of religious orientation, *intrinsic* and *extrinsic*.

Intrinsic religious orientation is characterized as a sincere belief and following of the teachings of one’s faith. Allport and Ross argue that intrinsic believers “find their master motive in religion.... Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he *lives* his religion” (Allport & Ross, 1967, 434). Extrinsic believers, on the other hand, adhere to religion “to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit [nonreligious] needs” (Ibid., 434). Studies estimate that intrinsic believers do not show significant correlation for racial prejudice (Batson et al., 1993); however, they demonstrate positive correlation for anti-gay prejudice (Whitley, 2009). According to the research by Hunsberger and Jackson (2005), extrinsic believers show strong positive correlation both for ethnic/racial and gay/lesbian intolerance.

- *Political orientation*

Another determinant of formation of prejudice and stereotypes that scholars differentiate is political orientation. More specifically, research finds that strong correlation exists between conservatism and prejudices (Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Similarly, study by Lambert and Chasteen (1997) examines differences between conservatives and liberals in terms of attitudes they hold towards older people and African Americans. Findings suggest that whereas liberalism is correlated with positive attitudes both towards older people and African American, conservatism correlates strongly with negative attitudes towards African Americans and positive attitudes towards older people.

However, the proposition about the correlation of conservatism with negative attitudes and the absence of such correlation in case of liberalism faces some challenges. Duckitt (1994), for instance, contends that the mere existence of such a correlation between conservatism and

prejudice does not matter much; what is more interesting is why there is such a link between conservatism and prejudice. Explanation is put forward by Skitka et al. (2002), which can be summarized as follows: one endorsing conservative values tends to fall a prey to fundamental attribution error more so than one endorsing liberal values. In other words, conservative is more likely to attribute negative outcomes that an out-group experiences to the factors under the control of the members of that out-group (i.e. dispositional attribution), whereas liberal tends to attribute negative outcomes to factors beyond the control of individual (i.e., situational attribution) like harsh economic situation.

Yet, scholars further challenged the political orientation explanation of prejudice. As some studies (Whitley & Lee, 2000; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) suggest, the relationship between conservatism and prejudice may be spurious. Whitley and Lee (2000) contend that conservatism correlates strongly with SDO (social dominance orientation) and RWA (right-wing authoritarianism), which are themselves precursors of the prejudice. Van Hiel and Mervielde (2002) also conclude that the relationship between conservatism and prejudice ceases to be straightforward when SDO and RWA are controlled for.

- *Social dominance orientation & Right-wing authoritarianism*

Social dominance orientation is defined as “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (Pratto et al., 1994, 742). Thus, SDO as an individual feature leads individual to believe that his own group should be located at the top of the societal hierarchy, whereas out-groups should be at the lowest ranks (group-based dominance); and that those disadvantaged out-groups should stay where they are, i.e. at the bottom (opposition to equality) (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Individuals scoring high on SDO tend to believe that the world is “competitive jungle characterized by a ruthless and amoral Darwinian struggle for survival” (Duckitt, 2001, 51). Research findings reveal strong correlation between SDO and prejudices (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Cohrs et al., 2005; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Levin & Sidanius, 1999).



Right-wing authoritarianism is also an individual variable and is defined as a cluster of three traits “authoritarian submission - a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives; authoritarian aggression - a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities; conventionalism - a high degree of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities” (Altemeyer, 1994, 133). People scoring high on RWA tend to be “prejudiced against groups that authority figures condemn and that are perceived to violate traditional values” (Whitley & Kite, 2010, 236). Studies find strong correlation between high scores on RWA and prejudice against broad spectrum of out-groups, including gays and lesbians, immigrants and ethnic minorities (Whitley & Lee, 2000; Cohrs et al., 2005; Quinton et al., 1996; McFarland et al., 1996).

- **Socio-psychological explanations**

- *Social Identity Approach*

Scholars from the discipline of social psychology offer alternative explanations. Previous studies discovered that hostile and unsympathetic attitudes towards out-groups are in strong positive correlation with in-group favoritism (Adorno et al., 1950, 1982; Levine & Campbell 1972; Brewer 1986). This phenomenon was thoroughly studied by the proponents of *Social Identity Approach* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Turner, 1982). According to this approach, individuals “strive for a positive self-concept” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 40). It was found that in their quest for positive self-concept, individuals would prefer distribution of resources that would maximize positive distinctiveness of their in-group (Turner, 1978). Individuals, thus, “have the fundamental need to perceive their in-group as superior to ethnic out-groups” (Coenders et al., 2003, 8). They attach positive characteristics to their in-groups via the mechanism of *social identification*; and they value negatively out-groups in order to increase their self-esteem via the mechanism of prejudices and negative stereotypes. One can infer from the above that Social Identity Approach focuses exclusively on the negative effects of social

identity on the inter-group relations. However, some researchers also investigated into the positive impact of social identity. For instance, Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) suggest that social identity may lead to greater tolerance between groups if an in-group does not consider their own values as more valid than those of the out-group. They discuss the example of Germans visiting Turkey for holidays: “during their holidays they are on Turkish territory and in the Turkish culture, they may to a lesser extent represent Turks and themselves as [being governed by the same set of values] and thus experience strange habits and customs as less of a norm violation or deviance” (Ibid., 169). Another study of this kind by Roccas and Brewer (2002) emphasizes that individuals may have multiple social identities. The more complex social identity one possesses, the more tolerant she/he would be towards other groups, since complex social identity ameliorates tendency to self-categorize oneself and also reduces the threat to one’s social identity, thereby decreasing inclination towards in-group bias (Ibid.).

- *Realistic Conflict Approach*

Another approach can be labeled as *Realistic Conflict Approach*, which holds that prejudices, discrimination and intergroup hostility are caused by the inter-group competition over scarce resources (Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Whitley & Kite, 2010). Empirical studies by the adherents of this approach illustrate how competition over the limited resources increases solidarity within the groups and leads to the escalation of hostility among the groups (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, 1979). Earlier theorists (Coser, 1956) contend that every social system is characterized by the struggle between the social groups over both tangible, i.e. material resources and intangible, like power or status.

In this strand of thought, important analytical distinctions are made between actual (i.e. socio-economic) and perceived competition (socio-psychological) (Blalock, 1967). Blalock argues that members from different ethnic groups with similar social status are in actual competition over scarce resources like employment and housing. Consequently, the actual competition influences the perception of such competition by majorities.

- *Ethnic competition theory*

Realistic Conflict Approach, on the one hand, offers a valuable explanation of conditions under which conflict between groups arises, but neglects the psychological dimension of the processes of inter-group behavior, like self-image and image of ethnicity. Social Identity Approach, on the other hand, catches important psychological dynamics neglected by the Realistic Conflict Approach, but fails to address the question of which circumstances lead to inter-group conflict. These two approaches, consequently, were synthesized into *Ethnic Competition Theory* (Coenders, 2001; Olzak, 1992; Coenders et al., 2003).

The core proposition of Ethnic Competition Theory holds that “competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism” (Coenders et al., 2003, 9). In this line of thought, “contextual level” is characterized as macro-social conditions of competition; “individual level” refers to perceived threat of competition and social conditions of the members of the dominant group (Ibid, 9). Olzak argues that when macro-social conditions (immigration flows, economic contraction) or meso-social conditions (low ethnic segregation in disadvantaged job positions) present a threat, majority groups will tend to react with exclusionary measures (1992, 35).

- *Integrated Threat Theory*

An explanation for the emergence of prejudices towards out-groups is offered by Stephan et al. (2000) called *Integrated Threat Theory*. Integrated Threat Theory holds that prejudices and discriminatory attitudes towards out-groups are caused by the perception of threat emanating from the out-group. Consequently, three types of threat are identified: realistic threats (i.e. threats to body and possessions), symbolic threats (threats to the way of life), intergroup anxiety (feelings of discomfort and anxiety when interacting or anticipating to interact with the members of an out-group).

According to the Integrated Threat Theory, perceptions of realistic threats are caused by the inter-group competition; perceptions of symbolic threats derive from the feeling that out-group differs from the in-group “in terms of values, attitudes, beliefs, moral standards, and other symbolic, as opposed to material, factors” (Whitley & Kite, 2010, 350). Finally, inter-group anxiety refers to “the feelings of discomfort many people experience when interacting with, or anticipating an interaction with, members of other groups” (Ibid., 174). Causal mechanism outlined by Stephan and Stephan is the following: greater in-group identification leads to more acute perception of realistic and symbolic threats and inter-group anxiety, which, in turn, results in more prejudice towards an out-group (2000, 37).

Empirical studies support propositions laid down by the Integrated Threat Theory. Research by Hagendoorn and Sniderman (2001) suggests that in the Netherlands population is far more concerned with the threat that immigrants pose to the national identity than to economic well-being and safety, that is, symbolic threat outweighs realistic threat. Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2009) assessed the effect of national identification (Swiss) and perceived threat to group identity on discrimination against foreigners. Both variables (i.e. national identification and threat to group identity) highly correlate with discrimination against foreigners/ethnic minorities.

- *Frustration-Aggression-Displacement hypothesis*

Alternative explanation comes from the frustration-aggression-displacement (hereinafter referred to as FAD) theory (Whitley & Kite, 2010), which was developed by John Dollard and colleagues (Dollard et al., 1939). The basic proposition of the *FAD hypothesis* is that aggression is caused by frustrating a person’s efforts to attain a goal (Friedman & Schustack, 1999, 204-207; Dollard et al., 1939, 1). Further, it is supposed that “[T]he strongest instigation aroused by frustration”, is to direct aggression against “the agent perceived to be the source of the frustration” (Dollard et al., 1939, 39). However, it is also noted that the fear of punishment may result in the displacement of aggression on innocent/substitute targets (Dollard et al., 1939, 41-44) and/or in the indirect forms of displacing this aggression (Ibid., 32-34).

Some scholars of the FAD theory emphasize explanatory power of economic hardships as the source of frustration leading to the increase of prejudice and violence against out-groups (Poppe, 2001; Hovland & Sears, 1940). Study by Hovland and Sears (1940) indicates that poor economy leads frustrated White people to project their anger and despair on Blacks. Findings by Poppe (2001, 1701) indicate that changes in the stereotypes of the morality of foreigners are positively correlated with the function of economic deterioration in perceiver's country, measured in terms of GNP per capita, exchange rates and PPP.

The FAD hypothesis is criticized for inability to explain why some out-groups are chosen as scapegoats and others are not; moreover, FAD hypothesis expects prejudiced individuals to displace their aggression towards the out-groups that they are prejudiced against, but studies show that frustration leads individuals to be more aggressive against everyone (Duckitt, 1994). Furthermore, the frustration-aggression-displacement theory is also criticized on methodological grounds – it seems that the theory is plagued by ecological fallacy: the unit of analysis of FAD theory is an individual behavior; thus, it is problematic to explain how and why individual frustration transforms into scapegoating of the groups (Glick, 2002; 2005). In addition to the above-mentioned criticisms, the findings of the study by Hovland and Sears (1940) are refuted by Donald Green and colleagues, who use modern statistical tools and find no correlation between economic indicators and lynchings (Green et al., 1998).

- *Relative deprivation theory*

FAD theory, as previously noted, is concerned with the individual behavior. Is it possible to use this theory to explain aggression and violence on a group level? Ted Robert Gurr (1970) offers his explanation of collective politico-social violence on the basis of FAD hypothesis. Since Gurr operates on a higher level of analysis, the concept of frustration is transformed into the concept of relative deprivation, which is defined as “[a]ctors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capacities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the

goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping” (Gurr, 1970, 24). He posits the main hypothesis in the following manner: “[T]he potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity” (Ibid.). According to Gurr, the relationship between relative deprivation and collective violence is equivalent to the relationship between frustration and individual aggressive behavior.

- *Ideological theory of scapegoating*

In this regard, ideological theory of scapegoating developed by Peter Glick (2002, 2005) complements Gurr’s macro-level explanation of collective politico-social violence. The core proposition of this theory is that during the period of shared frustration, members of the majority group in the society gravitate towards ideologies that point to specific social groups as the source of the frustration (Ibid.). Further, the set of negative stereotypes developed as the result of such pointing to specific groups in the society become an ideology for the groups “who seek an explanation to their fate” (Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010, 236). In other words, when a certain group experiences relative deprivation but there is no clear cause for it, it is driven to search for one. According to this model, out-groups that have little power, which are visible, disliked and seen as threat and which are appropriately stereotyped are chosen as scapegoats (Glick, 2002, 126). Despite the fact that it is very new (Whitley & Kite, 2010), the ideological model of scapegoating was used to explain several phenomena of scapegoating and massive political violence across a variety of times and contexts, like Germany during the Weimar Republic, Holocaust, Rwandan genocide, the Young Turks in the early twentieth century (Glick, 2002; 2005) or anti-Semitism in Ukraine and Poland (Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010). Further, it is suggested that xenophobic attitudes drive individuals to blame immigrants for various reasons like crimes or unemployment (Joly, 1998). Also, the role of media and state is highlighted with an emphasis that scapegoating is a social process (Glick, 2005).

- *Media framing and xenophobia*

The destructive role played by media in Rwandan genocide is highlighted by several commentators (Thompson, 2007). It is also noted how radio-stations in Rwanda misrepresented the facts about the death of the President of Burundi to provoke the fear among Hutu population: “The president was actually killed by a bayonet blow to the chest, but RTLM reported details of supposed torture, including castration of the victim”; thus, “false report of the castration of the Burundi president was intended to remind Hutu listeners of this practice and to elicit their fear and repulsion; it did so with great success” (Des Forges, 2007, 45). RTLM sent its staff to the areas near Kigali with the aim of interviewing ordinary citizens; as a result, such “confirmation by ordinary people of the 'rightness' of what they were doing contributed to the legitimacy of the genocide for radio listeners” (Ibid., 50). Role of the newspaper “Kangura” was also formidable, especially the publishing of “Hutu Ten Commandments”, which polarized Rwandan society, and also “The Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu”, which promoted hatred against Tutsi ethnicity (Thompson, 292).

In the Turkish context, the role of hate speech in light of xenophobic tendencies is also studied. Göktaş (2010) explores how prominent Armenian journalist and social activist Hrant Dink was targeted by the media, and how this eventually resulted in his assassination. Likewise, Kutlutürk (2010) analyzes the role of various media sources in Turkey, both national and local, in the brutal act of murder in Malatya region of Turkey in 2007, when three employees of Zirve Publishing House were killed. Erten (2010) emphasizes the role of tribunes as the locus for dissemination of the discourse of hate and violence among soccer fans community, providing examples of the attack against “Diyarbakır” soccer team supporters and also “Leeds” (soccer team from UK) fans.

Exclusive and divisive rhetoric as a result of scapegoating is characterized as a “discriminatory discourse” (Graumann, 1995). Discriminatory discourse can be characterized as having the following features: it separates and distances (“we/they” dichotomy); it accentuates

and exaggerates differences (“global Jewish conspiracy”); it degrades, fixates and assigns traits to other groups (“Lazy/dirty” etc.); and it categorizes certain groups as “typical” (“woman driver”) (Graumann & Wintermantel, 1989, 194). Discriminative discourses adapt to social changes and can mutate very easily. Prejudices against scapegoats as “criminals” and “job-stealers” can evolve into threats to “national identity” or “national security” (Bigo, 2002).

It is now evident that the media plays a crucial role in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. Let me now present a brief overview of the history of the Chechen conflict and xenophobic tendencies in Russia.

### **2.1.2.2. Chechen conflict and xenophobia in Russia**

Conflict between Russia and Chechnya has deep historic roots. Systematic conquest of the Caucasus started with Peter the Great in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Evangelista, 2002; Hughes, 2007). Russian troops faced strong resistance from the local independent tribesmen and the region witnessed constant rebellions: Sheikh Mansur’s resistance in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Imam Shamil’s in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a series of conflicts during the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries, anti-Bolshevik movements in 1930s, and guerilla warfare in the 1940s (Ibid).

It should be noted that the historical trajectory of Russo-Chechen conflict is marked by at least two episodes of what Volkan conceptualizes as “chosen trauma”<sup>8</sup> (Volkan, 1997). First episode refers to ruthlessly brutal campaign and rule of General Yermolov marked by ethnic cleansing, scorched earth policy, expelling local Muslims to Ottoman Empire and destruction of villages (Hughes, 2007, 8). It goes without saying that General Yermolov was hated by Chechen people. Lieven refers to the attempt to blow up the monument to Yermolov in Grozny in 1969 as an embodiment of this historical hatred (Lieven, 1998, 307).

Second episode refers to the Soviet period during the Second World War, when hundreds of thousands of Chechens were deported into Central Asia between 23 February and 9 March

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<sup>8</sup> Concept coined by Vamik Volkan that refers to “the shared mental representation of a large group’s massive trauma experienced by its ancestors at the hands of an enemy group, and the images of heroes, victims, or both connected with it”, retrieved from <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trauma,-the-Political-Ideology-of-Entitlement-and-Violence.php>



1944. On 31 January 1944 The National Defense Committee of USSR issued a decree №5073 that abolished the Chechen-Ingush autonomous region and envisioned deportation of local population on the grounds of “collaboration with fascist occupants” (*Postanovlenie GKO SSSR №5073 ot 31.01.1944*). At least 100,000 died between 1944 and 1948 (Gall & de Waal, 1998; Zemskov, 2005).

Autonomous status of Chechnya was restored in 1957 (Evangelista, 2002). Despite the fact that the region is rich with crude oil resources, Chechnya remained one of the poorest regions in the Soviet Union. 1980’s witnessed the rise of national demands on the part of Chechen people for the protection of Chechen language and culture, i.e. introducing primary and secondary education in Chechen language, maintaining the status of Chechen language as official language of Chechnya, establishment of the sovereign Republic of Chechnya (Lieven, 1998).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev, former Soviet officer, carried out *coup d’etat*, won presidential elections and later, on November 1 1991 proclaimed the independence of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In 1992 Dudayev refused to sign the Federation Treaty. Later attempts in 1993 to come to a negotiated agreement with Russian delegation, on the one hand; and Supreme Council of Chechen Republic, on the other hand, failed.

The consequences of Dudayev’s rule in economic terms were disastrous: in 1993, gross domestic product was 65% less than that of 1991; trade declined by 68%, production of manufactured goods by 58% and agricultural production by 52% (Shakhrai, 1994). Under these conditions, Dudayev’s rule was challenged by opposition led by Umar Avturkhanov, Doku Zavgayev, Beslan Gantemirov, and Ruslan Labzanov. Dudayev’s troops crushed armed formations of the Chechen opposition and martial law was declared in Chechnya by Dudayev.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict started on December 31, 1994 with the siege of Grozny by Russian troops. The operation to “restore constitutional order” prolonged and presumably short and victorious military campaign became a protracted and exhaustive war (Pokalova, 2011). The

1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict came to an end with the signing of Khasavyurt Agreement by General Lebed' from the Russian side and Aslan Maskhadov from the Chechen side (Ibid.).

Efforts put forward by Maskhadov to find a peaceful solution to the conflict guaranteed his victory in 1997 presidential elections in Chechnya (Eismont, 1997). Shamil Basayev won 30% of the votes and became a prime-minister. As a result, the Chechen independence movement fragmented into moderate wing led by Maskhadov, which emphasized peaceful solution to Chechen issue; and radical wing led by Basayev, which insisted on military campaign as the only way to resolve the question of the status of Chechnya (Malashenko & Trenin, 2002). Interwar period of 1996-1999 was characterized by “warlordism, rampant criminality, hostage takings, chaotic violence, grisly attacks on foreign aid workers and general lawlessness” (Kramer, 2005, 210). Kidnappings became an especially difficult problem to deal with: at least 76 kidnappings were reported to occur in 1997 (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 1997).

The benchmark of the second Chechen conflict is August 1999, which was marked by the invasion of Chechen guerillas led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab into the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. According to the Russian government accounts, clashes between local police forces and guerillas claimed 279 soldiers and officers dead and 800 wounded on the Russian side; and 2500 guerillas dead on the Chechen side (Krivosheev, 2001; *RBC*, 1999). Large-scale military involvement of Russian troops in Chechnya followed after series of apartment bombings in three Russian cities of Moscow, Volgograd and Buinaksk. The responsibility for the bombings was assigned to Chechen guerillas; however, this information remains controversial (Pokalova, 2011, 121). The Khasavyurt Agreement was declared as a failure and was denounced. 100,000 Russian troops entered into Chechnya on September 30 1999. In October 1999, Putin declared that Maskhadov's rule is illegitimate. He appointed Akhmat Kadyrov as a head of government in June 2000. After the referendum of 2003 in Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov became a president of Chechnya.

Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in bomb blast in 2004. His office was temporarily held by Alu Alkhanov, and in 2007 son of Akhmat Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov became the president of Chechnya (Pokalova, 2011, 123). Fighting in Chechnya continued throughout early the 2000's, and only in 2009 director of the Federal Security Service Aleksandr Bortnikov declared termination of the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya (*RBC*, 2009).

Links between Chechen conflict and persistence of negative stereotypes and prejudices against Chechen people is highlighted by several scholars. Russell, for instance, analyzes how Russian press demonized Chechen resistance by using such derogatory categories as “mujahideen”, “mafia” and “madmen” (Russell, 2002). Remnick eloquently summarizes Russian perception of Chechen issue: “In the Russian imagination... Chechnya is an obsession, an image of Islamic defiance, an embodiment of the primitive, the devious, the elusive” (Remnick, 2007, 266).

Pain (2007) suggests that factors like disintegration of Soviet Union and Soviet society and the decline of communism played role in the emergence of aggressive nationalism. It is argued that in times of such “traumatic transformation” as Russians have experienced, “identity crisis” is almost inevitable to occur. Identity crisis leads people to adhere to “primary”, i.e. primordial communities, like ethnic group; as a result, surge in xenophobic attitudes is witnessed (Pain, 2007, 902). Pain contends that underlying reason for these processes in Russian society is “the perception... by a considerable part of Russian society, of recent history as one of national defeat and humiliation or as historical trauma”, which, accompanied by unjust economic privatization, Chechen campaigns and federalization (perceived as one step further towards disintegration of the state), developed into “a complex of grievances” (*Ibid.*, 903).

According to a 2002 UNCHR survey in Moscow, 58 percent of male Afghan asylum-seekers were attacked in the past 12 months, 27 percent claimed that they were hospitalized with an average period of 22 days (Colville, 2006, 10). Another report by the UNCHR reveals that violence against African asylum-seekers has taken a form of routine and that many of them

wanted to relocate to a third country (*UNCHR News Stories*, 2003). Some NGOs report the increase in the level of xenophobic violence by third in 2007 compared to previous year and number of fatalities increased by 20 percent (Moscow Bureau of Human Rights, 2007).

Furthermore, a report by Doudou Diene, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, notes a significant increase in the number of far-right radical groups who engage in hate crimes. Whereas state officials estimate their numbers not exceeding 20,000, human rights groups estimate them as 50,000 (Ibid; Pain, 2007). Reports by SOVA Center for Information and Analysis (SOVA Database) confirm that xenophobic attitudes increased significantly<sup>9</sup>.

One of the questions asked by “Levada Center”<sup>10</sup> consistently throughout years is “Do you think that presence of some nationalities on the territory of Russian Federation should be limited?” In 2004, 44% of respondents wanted the presence of people from the North Caucasus to be limited; from 2004 to 2010, people of North Caucasus were on the top of this list (Levada Center, 2004-2010). Moreover, survey undertaken in August 2010 (“To what extent are you ready to deal with the people of Chechen origin?”) illustrates that 38% of respondents think about not allowing Chechen people into Russia (Levada-Center, 2010).

However, it is also suggested that rhetorical campaign of the “war on terror” has contributed significantly to “the rise of anti-Chechen sentiments and, in a broader sense, xenophobia against native peoples from the Caucasus” (Souleimanov and Ditrcyh, 2008, 1203). This suggestion is shared by Russell (2005, 112), who argues that popular support among ethnic Russians for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen campaign came with the cost of increasing xenophobia against native people of North Caucasus.

Pokalova (2011) analyzes how 9/11 attacks influenced the conflict in Chechnya. She argues that the 9/11 attack on WTC was a focusing event, thus, enabling countries, which have

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>

<sup>10</sup> Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) is a Russian non-governmental research organization. The Centre regularly conducts sociological research.

ethno-nationalist conflicts to reframe them as a terrorist threat (Ibid, 65). In her research, Pokalova (2011) conducts critical discourse analysis and supplements it with the content analysis of Russian newspapers in order to construct the framings of the conflict by Russian government, opposition and Chechen separatists. She finds statistically significant differences between the framing of the 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict (Ibid, 150).

Despite the recognition of the role of media in the persistence of negative stereotypes and hostile attitudes towards Chechens, above-mentioned studies do not provide strong empirical data for a causal relationship between these two variables. This study contributes to the previous research by filling this gap.

## **Chapter 3: Methodology**

This chapter presents methodology undertaken in this thesis and the research question. Mainly, it consists of sub-sections: i) research question and research methodology ii) experimental method and design of the study iii) procedures iv) data and research hypotheses

### **3.1. Research question and research methodology**

This thesis addresses the following research question: How and in what ways the shift that occurred in media framing of Chechen conflict has affected xenophobic tendencies in Russia? In this study I empirically investigate whether using different portrayals of the conflict indeed leads people to reason about the conflict differently. I will focus on two contrasting framings of the Chechen conflict: conflict in Chechnya as “a restoration of constitutional order on the territory of the republic of Chechnya” (1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict); and conflict in Chechnya as “a counter-terrorist operation” (2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict).

Above-mentioned typology is inspired by and based on the study by Pokalova (2011). In her study, Pokalova analyzes how 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict were framed differently in the media by utilizing CDA (critical discourse analysis) and content analysis by looking at publications covering the Chechen conflict in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, an official Russian government daily newspaper, including 197 articles for the 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict (1994-1996) and 341 articles for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict (1999-2009) (Pokalova, 2011). In her analysis, Pokalova focuses on five broad themes: status of Chechnya, the definition of the conflict, the definition of the actors in conflict, the justification for the means of dealing with the conflict, and the presence of foreign forces in the conflict. The reason for such focus is that “these themes reflect Russia’s stance on the Chechen issue, reveal the official framing of the conflict, and indicate the discourses which the government used to justify the military involvement in the republic”

(Pokalova, 2011, 81). Tables summarizing findings by Pokalova are in the appendix A part of the thesis.

The “war on terror”, Jackson argues, is not an objective representation of the counter-terrorist reality, but rather “a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge – it is a carefully constructed discourse” (Jackson, 2005, 2). Several scholars point out that “war” metaphor places importance with use of military force and military victory (Decaux, 2008; Howard, 2002; Lakoff, 2004; Zhang, 2007).

Furthermore, a number of studies emphasize the polarizing effect of the “war on terror” rhetoric (Jackson, 2005; Solheim, 2006; Chantarawandi, 2008; Weintraub, 2007; Cronick, 2002). Jackson, for instance, cites the statement by John Ashcroft that “the attacks of September 11 drew a bright line of demarcation between the civil and the savage” (Jackson, 2005, 62). US state officials characterized ‘terrorists’ as barbarians, mad, twisted and perverts, having no faith, and more importantly, hateful and evil (Jackson, 2005, 62-73). Cronick analyzes the rhetorical mechanisms used by George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden. Among such mechanisms are creation of emotionally tagged (good vs. evil) dichotomy between “us” and “them” and description of the conflict as a confrontation not only between cultures or civilizations but between “good” and “evil”.

Thus, the discourse of the “war on terror” creates a discriminatory discourse: “we”/“they” dichotomy is established; differences are accentuated and exaggerated (“crusade against terrorism”); and degrading traits are fixed and assigned (‘terrorists’ as “barbarians”, “treacherous”, “twisted”, “hateful” and “evil”).

Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 summarize Pokalova’s findings:

Table 1.1 Words used in reference to the Chechen conflict

“Restoration of the constitutional order in the republic of Chechnya” (1 <sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict)	Counter-terrorist operation in the republic of Chechnya (2 <sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict)
Conflict – 29%	War – 22%
War – 15%	Terrorism – 21%
Constitution – 15%	Anti-terrorism – 18%
Law/Lawful 13%	Conflict – 10%

Table 1.2 Words used in reference to the actors in the Chechen conflict

“Restoration of the constitutional order in the republic of Chechnya” (1 <sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict)	Counter-terrorist operation in the republic of Chechnya (2 <sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict)
Fighters – 39%	Fighters – 46%
Dudayev’ supporters – 11%	Terrorists - 39%
Terrorists – 11%	Bandits – 27%
Bandits – 10%	Bandit formations – 21%
Separatists – 10%	Separatists – 7%

Table 1.3 Words used in reference to the presence of foreign actors and religious extremism

“Restoration of the constitutional order in the republic of Chechnya” (1 <sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict)	Counter-terrorist operation in the republic of Chechnya (2 <sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict)
Extremism – 1%	Khattab – 15%
Muhajideen – 1%	Wahhabism – 11% (Muhajideen – 3%)
Khattab – 0%	Extremism – 9%
bin Laden – 0%	Bin Laden – 5%
Al Qaeda – 0%	Al Qaeda - 3%

As one can see from the tables above, portrayals of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict are drastically different. For the 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict, references to foreign forces and religious extremism are practically non-existent, whereas they gain prominence during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict. Furthermore, Table 1.1 shows dramatic increase of the use of words “terrorism” and “anti-terrorism” in news coverage during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict. These differences signal a change in the nature of perceived threat. Actors in the 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict are portrayed as a portion of Chechen people, who are separatist fighters/bandits and support Dudayev and engage in illegal activities on the territory of the republic of Chechnya; actors in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict



are portrayed as terrorist fighters, including mercenaries from abroad (Khattab, for instance), who are supported by the international Islamist radical terrorist networks in funds and weaponry.

Table 1.4 presents this difference.

Table 1.4 Nature of threat

“Restoration of the constitutional order in the republic of Chechnya” (1 <sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict)	“Counter-terrorist operation in the republic of Chechnya” (2 <sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict)
A portion of Chechen people, who are separatist fighters/bandits and support Dudayev and engage in illegal activities on the territory of the republic of Chechnya	Terrorist fighters, including mercenaries from abroad (Khattab, for instance), who are supported by the international Islamist radical terrorist networks in funds and weaponry.

As I mentioned above, integrated threat theory distinguishes 3 types of threat, namely realistic, symbolic and inter-group anxiety. I argue that “counter-terrorist operation in the republic of Chechnya” conflict frame magnifies all three types of threat. Reference to religious extremism and foreign Wahhabi mercenaries exacerbate the symbolic threat perceived by Russian people, who are predominantly Orthodox Christians<sup>11</sup>. Video and photo materials (images of violence and death) of the news coverage of the counter-terrorist operation magnify the realistic threat. Consequently, inter-group anxiety also increases.

In other words, this thesis outlines two explanatory mechanisms for the relationship between media framing and xenophobia. First mechanism is offered by integrated threat theory which states that media framing of the conflict determines the magnitude of the perceived threat. Second mechanism has to do with the type of the discourse that “counter-terrorist” frame produces, i.e. “discriminatory discourse”. Consequently, I expect differences in negative attitudes and prejudices between participants exposed to “a restoration of constitutional order on the territory of the republic of Chechnya” conflict frame, on the one hand; and participants exposed to “counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya” conflict frame, on the other.

Thus, following hypotheses are put forward:

<sup>11</sup> 63% of Russian population consider themselves as Orthodox Christians, retrieved from [http://www.religare.ru/2\\_42432.html](http://www.religare.ru/2_42432.html)

*H.1. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in perceived symbolic ethnic threat from minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

*H.2. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in perceived realistic ethnic threat from minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

*H.3. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in perceived social distance from minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

*H.4. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in conative negative prejudices towards minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

*H.5. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in cognitive negative prejudices towards minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

*H.6. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in affective negative prejudices towards minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

*H.7. Participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame will demonstrate greater change in inter-group discrimination attitude towards minority ethnic group than participants, who are exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.*

### **3.2. Experimental method and design of the study**

#### ***Method***

It is important to clarify what kind of research this project has undertaken and introduce methodological approach before going into sub-sections below. According to Neuman, the purpose of explanatory research is to explain, i.e. to know why things are the way they are (Neuman, 1997, 20). Explanatory research “builds on exploratory and descriptive research and to identify the reason why something occurs” (Ibid., 20-21). Thus, this research is an explanatory case study research. It is implemented using experimental methodology.

According to Neuman, “experimental research is the strongest for testing causal relationships” (Neuman, 2006, 247). It is “usually best for issues that have a narrow scope or scale” (Ibid., 247). Several types of experimental design exist (Ibid., 254-259); however, this thesis adopts classical experimental design, since it is the most analytically rigorous type of experimental design.

#### ***Participants***

Participants were 99 undergraduate students from Sabancı University and 44 undergraduate students from Marmara University with an average age of 20.5. They were all Turkish nationals, participated voluntarily, and each student was randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions (“restoration of constitutional order frame” or “counter-terrorist operation frame”).

Sample of participants was drawn from Turkish students, since Turkey and Russia are quite similar with regard to the research question investigated in this thesis. For instance, after terrorist attacks of 2003 in Istanbul, Turkey claimed that these attacks are the action of international terrorism and was able to persuade the West that PKK and Al-Qaeda are cut from the same cloth (despite the fact that PKK has no religious agenda and is a secular organization).

Egemen Bağış, who is foreign policy advisor to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and a member of Justice and Development Party (AKP), stated that “There should be no distinction between terrorist organizations. The PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, is the same as al Qaeda and Zarkawi” (*Hürriyet Daily News*, 2005).

Turkey was successful in persuading its Western partners. President Bush stated that the US and Turkey “have cooperated on the global war on terror and stand together to advance freedom and peace throughout the region” (Bush, 2005). In similar vein, US State Department official Nancy McEldowney argued: “It makes no difference whether the bomb explodes in Istanbul or in New York. It makes no difference what slogan of hatred or distortion the terrorists hide behind. And it makes no difference whether the name is Osama bin Laden, or Abdullah Öcalan, Al Zarkawi, or Karayılan” (McEldowney, 2005).

Consequently, “war on terror” metaphor was used to justify Turkish incursion in Iraq in 2008. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) supported military operations on the grounds that it is “necessary to drain the swamp which is a fertile ground for terrorism” (*NTVMSNBC*, 2007). If before September 11, 2001, the Western allies of Turkey were pressing Turkish government to find a political solution to the Kurdish issue, after 9/11 this attitude shifted drastically – Joseph Ralston, Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), during his speech in Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM) in Istanbul urged: “I want to be clear on this point: The US will not negotiate with the PKK. We will not ask Turkey to negotiate with the PKK. And I pledge to you that I will never meet with the PKK” (Yıldız & Breau, 2010, 172).

Furthermore, unlike Russian/Chechen students, Turkish students will not be able to relate the experiment to the Russo-Chechen conflict; this addresses the issue of history as a threat to internal validity. Finally, since this study operates with imaginary/abstract actors and conflict, its external validity is strengthened.

## *Design*

Experimental design of this study is independent measures design, i.e. when different participants are used in each condition of independent variable (i.e. framing of the conflict) and consists of three stages: O<sub>1</sub> (pretest), X (treatment), O<sub>2</sub> (post-test). Each stage is described in detail below:

### *Pre-test*

All participants were presented with a brief general history of the country and conflict until the beginning of the time period of the study. After reading it, participants were asked to fill the survey. Survey questions and brief general history can be found in appendix B part of the thesis.

### *Treatment*

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions – “restoration of constitutional order frame” or “counter-terrorist operation frame”. In each condition, participants are presented with an article about the current conflict. One article frames conflict as a “restoration of constitutional order”; other frames conflict as a “counter-terrorist operation”. Articles for each experimental condition were composed of excerpts of speeches of President Boris Yel'tsin during 1<sup>st</sup> Chechen conflict and President Vladimir Putin during 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict.

More specifically, following Pokalova's study (2011), I focused on five broad themes in presidential speeches, namely, status of Chechnya, the definition of the conflict, the definition of the actors in conflict, the justification for the means of dealing with the conflict, and the presence of foreign forces in the conflict. Whereas both framings define Chechnya as an integral part of Russian Federation, they differ on other 4 themes. Articles for simulation can be found in appendix C part of the thesis.


It was mentioned above that this study operates with imaginary/abstract actors and conflict, i.e. the real names of actors, country and ethnic groups are changed. Thus, in general brief history, treatment articles and survey “Chechen” was changed to “Vanad”, “Russian” to “Pilay”, “Russian Federation” to “Pilay Federation” and likewise. Full legend and imaginary map can be found in appendix D part of the thesis. Imaginary map was introduced to facilitate participants’ understanding of the dynamic of the conflict and relationship between various ethnic groups.

Furthermore, time lag of one week was introduced between pretest and treatment. In other words, participants were exposed to treatment one week after pre-test. Time-lag was introduced between the pretest and treatment to address the problem of testing effect as a threat to validity: individuals tend to be consistent with their answers, thus, putting pretest and treatment chronologically close to one another may give clue to the participants about the goal of the research and, thereby, jeopardize collection of valid data.

#### Post-test

After reading the article, participants were asked to fill the survey. Then, participants were debriefed and collected data were analyzed. Pre-test and post-test surveys were identical, except for questions 1-10, which measure demographical variables (age, gender, monthly income, religious affiliation, religiosity, conservatism and importance of national identity for self-identification) and, thus, were left out of the survey in the post-test phase.

Schematically, then, design can be illustrated as follows:



### 3.3. Procedures.

I conceptualized “xenophobia” as having 4 components: perceived ethnic threat, perceived social distance, prejudices towards out-group and inter-group discrimination. The operationalization of variables for the analysis in this thesis is provided below:

#### Measures:

Unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured on scale that range from 1 to 5. For variables that were measured by asking multiple questions, I took the mean score, i.e. if a respondent had scores of “3”, “4” and “5” for each three questions measuring variable X, respectively, his/her overall score for variable X would be counted as “4”. Change in dependent variable X is measured according to the following formula:

$$\text{Variable } X_{\text{post-test}} - \text{Variable } X_{\text{pre-test}} = \text{Change in Variable X}$$

#### *Dependent variables*

*Perceived ethnic threat (questions 11-14).* Perceived ethnic threat is disaggregated along two dimensions, namely, perceived realistic ethnic threat and perceived symbolic ethnic threat.

Question 11 measures perceived realistic threat. It is borrowed from the report by Hanquinet et

al. (2006) and is slightly modified (original wording is “Do immigrants make (COUNTRY’S) crime problems worse or better?”):

**Question 11:** How do you think Vanads in this country affect things like the physical safety, security, or health of other people in Pilayya?

Symbolic threat is assessed by asking three questions:

**Question 12:** Vanads contribute to the depreciation of the image of Pilay people.

**Question 13:** A high rate of Vanads is a threat to Pilay national identity.

**Question 14:** Vanads threaten our way of life.

Questions 12 and 13 are borrowed from the study by Falomir-Pichastor (2009). Question 14 is borrowed from the report by Hanquinet et al. (2006) and is slightly modified (the original wording is “The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life”).

*Social distance (questions 15-18).* This is assessed by asking 4 questions. Question 15 is a modified Bogardus scale<sup>12</sup>. Original Bogardus scale contains 7 answer options. In this study, two answer options are left out, namely, “As my close personal friends” and “As co-workers in the same occupation”, in order to standardize measures to 5-point scale. Question 16 is borrowed from General Social Survey (2000). Question 17 is drawn from the report by Zick et al. (2011). Question 18 is borrowed from the report by Hanquinet et al. (2006). Exact wordings are:

**Question 15:** To what extent would you accept people of Vanad origin?

**Question 16:** Now I’d like you to imagine a neighborhood that had an ethnic mix you personally would feel most comfortable in. Here is a blank card, which depicts some houses that surround your own. Using the letters V for Vanad, P for Pilay, D for Dimeh

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<sup>12</sup> Bogardus social distance scale is psychological testing scale created by Emory Bogardus, which measures willingness of people to interact with the members of other groups.



and H for Hibek, please put a letter in each of these houses to represent your preferred neighborhood where you would most like to live. Please sure to fill in all of the houses.

**Question 17:** One should be reluctant to send his children to a school where the majority of pupils are Vanads.

**Question 18:** In my opinion, Vanad people are very different than Pilays, thus, they can never be fully accepted members of the Pilay society.

*Prejudices (19-23).* Earlier research has argued that disaggregating the concept of “prejudice” for empirical analysis is necessary (Triandis, 1967, 245). There are 3 components of prejudice distinguished in the literature: cognitive (beliefs about an out-group), conative (behavior orientation) and affective (emotions felt towards an out-group) (Jackson, 1977). Thus, questions 19 and 20 measure affective dimension:

**Question 19:** In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Vanads?

**Question 20:** Vanad people cannot be trusted.

Jackson (1977) argues that questions about specific policies towards out-groups are better measures of behavior orientation, i.e. conative component of prejudice towards out-group rather than questions asking individual-level predisposition. In line with this argument, question 21 and 22 ask about general policy preferences; exact wordings are:

**Question 21:** Bilingual education programs should be eliminated in public schools across whole Pilay Federation.

**Question 22:** Please indicate your preferences on the further policies that should be adopted by Pilay Federal Government in Vanadiya.

Finally, question 23 considers cognitive component:

**Question 23:** Vanads are responsible for starting the war.

*Inter-group discrimination (question 24).* This is assessed according to the study by Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2009) by asking participants to imagine that they have to decide on an increase in funds for four social benefits (i.e., social security, minimum wage, education grants, and housing allowance). For each social benefit, they are to distribute a total of 100 points between the ingroup (Pilays) and the outgroup (Vanads) using an interdependent scale (i.e., allocation to ingroup vs. outgroup: 0/100, 10/90, 20/80, 30/70, 40/60, 50/50, 60/40, 70/30, 80/20, 90/10, 100/0).

### ***Demographical variables***

*Age (question 1).*

*Gender (question 2)*

*Monthly income (question 3).*

*Religious affiliation (question 4).*

*Religiosity (questions 5-7).* This is assessed in the following manner: questions 5 and 6 are borrowed from the study by Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975), exact wordings are:

**Question 5:** When you have a serious personal problem, how often do you take religious advice or teachings into consideration?

**Question 6:** Do you agree with the following statement: “Religion gives me a great amount of comfort and security in life”?

**Question 7** is borrowed from the Gallup Daily tracking survey (Newport, 2011). The exact wording is: “All in all, how important would you say that religion is to you?”

*Conservatism (question 8).* This is assessed according to Sidanius et al. (1996) by asking participants to identify themselves on the Liberal-Conservative 5-point scale (Very liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, very conservative).

*Importance of national identity for self-identification (questions 9-10).* This is measured by asking 2 questions:

**Question 9:** National identity is one of the most important parts of human identity.

**Question 10:** People should be proud of seeing their national flag.

## **Chapter 4: Data analysis and discussion of the findings**

Before proceeding into the analysis of findings, it should be noted that question 16 was omitted from the analysis due to the fact that there were too many missing values for this question. In other words, majority of respondents did not reply to the question, preferring not to fill in blank house-boxes. Thus, perceived social distance is measured by three questions (questions 15, 17 and 18).

### **4.1. Demographical information on the sample**

The demographical questions asked in the questionnaire included the age, monthly income level, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, conservatism and importance of national identity for self-identification.

As can be seen from the Figure 1.1 almost half of respondents are between 19 and 20 years old (28% and 22.4%, respectively), while the average age of 143 respondents is 20.5. Figure 1.2 reveals that a clear majority of them consider themselves to be Sunni Muslim (64.3%), whereas 32.2% attributed themselves to the category “Other” (some respondents indicated whether they considered themselves as Atheists or Deists, whereas others left the brackets blank). The distribution of religious affiliation can be seen in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.1





Figure 1.2



When we look at the income levels of the respondents (Figure 1.3), it can be seen that majority of respondents have monthly income higher than 2001 TL (2001-3500 TL – 23.1%; 3501-6000 TL – 19.6%; more than 6000 TL – 36.4%), while most picked answer choice is “more than 6000 TL”. Figure 1.4 demonstrates roughly equal distribution of males and females among respondents (49% female and 51% male).

Figure 1.3<sup>13</sup>





Figure 1.4



<sup>13</sup> Author of this study erroneously assumed that respondents, who are undergraduate students, do not have a job. Thus, this question in fact asks two different questions (personal monthly income vs. family's monthly income) in one sentence, which undermines its reliability. If this study would be performed anew, author would certainly take this into account and frame the question accordingly.

Figure 1.5.




Figure 1.5 presents information on conservatism, demonstrating that clear majority of respondents consider themselves as liberal or middle of the road. Mean score for conservatism is 2.44, median is 2. Figure 1.6 demonstrates distribution of respondents according to religiosity. Mean score for religiosity is 2.43, median is 2.33. As can be seen from Figure 1.7, majority of respondents consider national identity to be important for self-identification. Mean score for importance of national identity for self identification is 3.34, median is 3.5.

Figure 1.6




Figure 1.7






Table 1.5 provides an overview of demographical characteristics of sample population for each experimental condition in frequencies and percentages.

	“Restoration of constitutional order framing” condition	“Counter-terrorist operation framing” condition
Sample size	66	77
Gender distribution	Male = 33 (50%); Female = 33 (50%).	Male = 40 (51.9%); Female = 37 (48.1%).
Age distribution	18 = 2 (3%); 19 = 16 (24.2%); 20 = 18 (27.3%); 21 = 11(16.7%); 22 = 10 (15.2%); 23 = 7 (10.6%); 24 = 2 (3%).	18 = 9 (11.7%); 19 = 24 (31.2%); 20 = 14 (18.2%); 21 = 6 (7.8%); 22 = 8 (10.4%); 23 = 11 (14.3%); 24 = 3 (3.9%); 25 = 2 (2.6%).
Monthly income	Less than 1000 TL = 4 (6.1%); 1001 – 2000 TL = 7 (10.6%); 2001 – 3500 TL = 15 (22.7%); 3501 – 6000 TL = 13 (19.7%); More than 6000 TL = 27 (40.9%).	Less than 1000 TL = 9 (11.7%); 1001 – 2000 TL = 10 (13%); 2001 – 3500 TL = 18 (23.4%); 3501 – 6000 TL = 15 (19.5%); More than 6000 TL = 25 (32.5%).
Religious affiliation distribution	Sunni Muslim = 42 (63.6%); Alevi Muslim = 1 (1.5%); Other = 23 (34.8%).	Sunni Muslim = 50 (64.9%); Alevi Muslim = 4 (5.2%); Other = 23 (29.9 %).
Religiosity	Mean = 2.46 Median = 2.33	Mean = 2.40 Median = 2.33
Conservatism	Mean = 2.45 Median = 2	Mean = 2.43 Median = 2
Importance of national identity for self-identification	Mean = 3.43 Median = 3.75	Mean = 3.27 Median = 3.50

Table 1.5 Demographical characteristics of sample population for each experimental condition

## 4.2. Results

### *Demographical variables*

Literature review in this study has specified several variables that are closely linked with xenophobia and intolerance, among which are religiosity, political orientation and ethnocentrism. Thus, a bivariate correlation analysis was performed for three demographical variables, namely, religiosity, conservatism and importance of national identity for self-identification to see whether any of these variables has an impact on the dependent variables.

### *Religiosity*

Correlation analysis of religiosity and dependent variables revealed no significant correlation. There is no correlation between religiosity and change in perceived symbolic threat ( $r = -.008$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ) or change in perceived realistic threat ( $r = .007$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); likewise, religiosity does not correlate with change in perceived social distance ( $r = .001$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ). Also, correlation analysis reveals that religiosity and change in prejudices towards out-group do not correlate: conative prejudices ( $r = .030$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); cognitive prejudices ( $r = .149$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); affective prejudices ( $r = .001$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ). Finally, religiosity and change in discrimination towards out-group also do not reveal statistically significant correlation ( $r = -.066$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

### *Conservatism*

Correlation analysis of conservatism and dependent variables reveals no statistically significant results: conservatism is not correlated with change in perceived symbolic ethnic threat ( $r = -.004$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ) or change in realistic ethnic threat ( $r = .124$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); likewise, conservatism does not correlate with change in perceived social distance ( $r = .074$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ). There is no correlation between conservatism and change in negative prejudices towards out-group: conative prejudices ( $r = -.054$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); cognitive prejudices ( $r = .024$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); affective prejudices ( $r = .030$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

Finally, correlation analysis reveals statistically significant, but low correlation between conservatism and change in discrimination towards out-group ( $r = .193$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

### *Importance of national identity for self-identification*

Correlation analysis of importance of national identity for self-identification and dependent variables reveals no statistically significant results: importance of national identity for self-identification is not correlated with change in perceived symbolic ethnic threat ( $r = -.102$ ,  $n$

= 143,  $p > .05$ ) or change in realistic ethnic threat ( $r = -.143$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); likewise, importance of national identity for self-identification does not correlate with change in perceived social distance ( $r = -.083$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

There is no correlation between importance of national identity for self-identification and change in negative prejudices towards out-group: conative prejudices ( $r = -.164$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); cognitive prejudices ( $r = -.050$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ); affective prejudices ( $r = -.036$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ). Finally, importance of national identity for self-identification and change in discrimination towards out-group do not correlate ( $r = -.109$ ,  $n = 143$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

### *Dependent variables*

Since this study operates with an independent measures design and single independent categorical variable that has two levels, an independent-samples t-test is conducted to compare the mean changes in dependent variables between the participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame and participants exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame. Results reveal that there is a statistically significant difference in scores between the participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame and participants exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame.

On average, respondents in “counter-terrorist operation frame” group experienced greater change in perceived symbolic ethnic threat ( $M=.7797$ ,  $SE=.08945$ ), than participants in “restoration of constitutional order frame” group ( $M= -.0050$ ,  $SE=.05997$ ). This difference is significant,  $t(141)=-7.041$ ,  $p < .05$ ; moreover, it represents a medium sized effect  $r = .510$ .

In similar vein, participants in “counter-terrorist operation frame” group exhibited greater change in perceived realistic ethnic threat ( $M=.6234$ ,  $SE=.08873$ ), than participants in “restoration of constitutional order frame” group ( $M=.0000$ ,  $SE=.07480$ ). This difference is significant,  $t(141)=-5.271$ ,  $p < .05$ ; with a moderate effect size  $r = .405$ .

As expected, participants in “counter-terrorist operation frame” group demonstrated greater change in social distance ( $M=.7008$ ,  $SE=.07590$ ), than in “restoration of constitutional order frame” group ( $M=-.0002$ ;  $SE=.04869$ ); difference is significant  $t(141)=-7.490$ ,  $p < .05$ ; medium effect size  $r = .533$ .

In accordance with hypotheses, participants in “counter-terrorist operation frame” group also demonstrated higher level of change in negative prejudices than in “restoration of constitutional order frame”.


On average, “counter-terrorist operation frame” group exhibited greater change in conative prejudices ( $M=1.4610$ ,  $SE=.09186$ ) than “restoration of constitutional order frame” group ( $M=.1667$ ,  $SE=.07506$ ); difference is significant  $t(141)=-10.684$ ,  $p < .05$  with medium effect size  $r = .668$ .

Likewise, change in cognitive prejudices in a “counter-terrorist operation frame” condition was greater ( $M=1.1039$ ,  $SE=.09532$ ) than in a “restoration of constitutional order frame condition” ( $M=.2879$ ,  $SE=.11976$ ),  $t(141)=-5.394$ ,  $p < .05$  with a medium effect size  $r = .413$ .

Change in affective prejudices in “counter-terrorist operation frame” condition was higher ( $M=.8506$ ,  $SE=.07398$ ) than in “restoration of constitutional order frame” ( $M=.1288$ ,  $SE=.06231$ ); moreover, it is significant –  $t(141)=-7.323$ ,  $p < .05$  with a medium effect size  $r = .524$ .

Finally, participants in “counter-terrorist operation frame” condition demonstrated greater change in inter-group discrimination ( $M=14.7565$ ,  $SE=2.68289$ ) than in “restoration of constitutional order frame” ( $M=.2331$   $SE=1.94319$ ); difference is significant –  $t(141)=-4.258$  with a moderate effect size  $r = .337$ .


Figures 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13 and 1.14 demonstrate 95% confidence interval error bar graphs for each condition (i.e. “restoration of constitutional order frame” vs. “counter-terrorist operation frame”). Confidence interval is used to calculate range of values for a specific parameter (arithmetic mean or the difference between two means) (Greenfield et al., 1998); in this case the desired parameter is the difference between two means, post-test and pre-test for each group, “counter-terrorist operation” frame and “restoration of constitutional order” frame. 95% confidence interval means that confidence interval covers the true value in 95 out of 100 studies implemented. Error bars are included to demonstrate the direction of the difference between sample means of participants exposed to a “restoration of constitutional order” frame and participants exposed to a “counter-terrorist operation” frame. It can be inferred from these figures that differences between groups in each condition are statistically significant, since error bars do not overlap (Payton et al., 2003; Cumming and Finch, 2005).



*Figure 1.8* Change in perceived symbolic ethnic threat


As can be seen from the Figure 1.8, the mean change in perceived symbolic threat in “restoration of constitutional order framing” condition practically equals zero, whereas for

“counter-terrorist operation framing” condition mean change in perceived symbolic threat equals 0.8.




*Figure 1.9* Change in perceived realistic ethnic threat

Figure 1.9 demonstrates drastic difference in the mean change in perceived realistic threat among two conditions. “Restoration of constitutional order framing” condition does not alter perceived realistic threat, whereas for “counter-terrorist operation framing” condition mean change in perceived realistic threat equals 0.6.



*Figure 1.10* Change in perceived social distance


From Figure 1.10 we can see that whereas in “restoration of constitutional order framing” condition average participants’ perception of social distance remains unaltered, the average shift in perceived social distance for participants in “counter-terrorist operation framing” condition equals 0.7.



*Figure 1.11* Change in conative negative prejudices


For change in conative negative prejudices, the contrast between two conditions is even more striking (practically 0 for “restoration of constitutional order framing” condition and approximately 1.5 for “counter-terrorist operation framing” condition).






*Figure 1.12* Change in cognitive negative prejudices towards out-group

Average shift in negative cognitive prejudices in “counter-terrorist operation framing” condition is almost fourfold that of in “restoration of constitutional order framing” condition (1 and 0.25, respectively).



*Figure 1.13* Change in affective negative prejudices towards out-group

Figure 1.13 also reveals stark differences in mean change in affective negative prejudices between two conditions (approximately 0.2 for “restoration of constitutional order framing” condition and 0.9 for “counter-terrorist operation framing” condition).



*Figure 1.14* Change in inter-group discrimination

Finally, Figure 1.14 allows us to infer significant difference in average change in inter-group discrimination between two conditions (0 for “restoration of constitutional order framing” condition and 15 for “counter-terrorist operation framing” condition).

### 4.3. Discussion

In sum, the results of this study support all hypotheses that are put forward. More specifically, results suggest that “counter-terrorist operation” framing of the conflict magnifies and exaggerates threat emanating from the ethnic out-group and introduces discriminatory discourse; consequently, ethnic majority group experiences more negative stereotypes and prejudices towards ethnic out-group. Furthermore, members of ethnic majority groups also tend to be more willing to discriminate against ethnic minority group.

Thus, the impact of media on social intolerance in the context of domestic conflict is obvious. Findings suggest an inextricable link between media representation of the conflict and

xenophobic attitudes in the society. Whereas some types of media framing, i.e. “counter-terrorist operation” frame, exacerbate intolerance and xenophobic attitudes towards members of ethnic out-group; other types, i.e. “restoration of constitutional order” frame enhance social tolerance.

Interesting finding of this study is that religiosity, importance of national identity for self-identification or conservatism do not have a significant impact on the intolerance towards members of ethnic out-group. Even single statistically significant correlation between conservatism and inter-group discrimination is still very low and does not allow for a credible conclusion about the relationship between these two variables.

One possible way to think about this is that conservatism, religiosity and importance of national identity for self-identification tend to be constant, and they are not subject to a rapid change. In this regard, they can be compared to gravity: gravity causes apples to fall down from the tree, but it does not cause apples to fall in the first place. For apples to fall, one has to shake the tree. In line with this metaphorical reasoning, then, media framing is the act of the shaking of the tree.

## **Chapter 5: Conclusion**

This study investigated the role of media in conflict and with a focus on how the portrayal of the internal conflict in media can affect popular attitudes and perceptions towards out-group. More specifically, it was hypothesized that portraying the conflict as a counter-terrorist operation would likely exacerbate intolerance and xenophobia towards the members of out-group than portraying the conflict as a restoration of constitutional order. The following taxonomy of framing is inspired and based on the study by Pokalova (2011). Overall, the hypothesis-generating case for this study was the Chechen conflict in Russian Federation. Thus, this chapter will present both substantive and theoretical conclusions.

On substantive side, the findings laid out in this study suggest that whereas framing conflict as a “counter-terrorist operation” may boost popular support for repressive policies against ethno-nationalist movements, it can have long-term transaction costs of exacerbating xenophobia in the society. Especially in the context of strict governmental control of all influential media resources, as was the case in Russia during 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen conflict, the magnitude of the “framing” effect can be huge, which in turn may jeopardize further the socio-political stability at least in two ways.

First, “framing” effect leads to increasing intolerance and xenophobia towards minority ethnic groups. Second, the resulting increase in xenophobia and intolerance jeopardizes post-conflict reconstruction program in Chechnya, which is financed directly from the federal budget, by rendering such policies widely unpopular among ethnic Russians. Thus, Kremlin finds itself between the hammer and the anvil – financing post-conflict reconstruction of Chechnya infuriates ethnic Russians; decision not to finance post-conflict reconstruction brings the risks of the recurrence of the separatist conflict in the Caucasus.

It still remains to be seen how Kremlin will solve the problem of ethnic tension in Russian Federation. This study demonstrates that partial cause of increasing intolerance in Russian society is full-fledged campaign to delegitimize and demonize ethnic separatist movement in Chechnya undertaken by Kremlin during 2<sup>nd</sup> Chechen campaign. Kremlin was successful in this endeavor, marked by appointing Akhmat Kadyrov as the President of Chechnya in 2005 and termination of counter-terrorist operation in 2009. However, this success came with a certain price of triggering inter-ethnic tension in the society, a problem, which may be even more difficult to resolve than previous one.

On theoretical side, this study is a valuable contribution to the previous research, which has shown that the rhetoric of “war on terror” was effectively used by several countries, including Turkey, Sri Lanka, China and Russia (Pokalova, 2011). In this study, sample of respondents was drawn from Turkish nationals, which adds to the external validity of the findings of this study.

The significance of this study lies in the fact that by utilizing experimental method it adds to the body of empirical evidence on the important relationship between media and framing, on the one hand; and xenophobia and intolerance, on the other hand. Media framing is a powerful instrument for shaping popular attitudes and perceptions. In this study specifically, the destructive role of media framing using metaphors of “war on terror” is illustrated by demonstrating how this language magnifies collective threat perceived by domestic audience from the members of out-group and introduces discriminatory discourse. This, in turn, leads to increase in social intolerance and xenophobia.

Furthermore, this study identifies that domestic conflict can be framed in such a way so that intolerance and xenophobia would not be exacerbated. “Restoration of constitutional order” frame left participants’ attitudes and perceptions of an ethnic out-group practically unaltered.

Considering implications for future research, it would be a fruitful endeavor to implement comparative cross-country analysis among countries that utilized the rhetoric of “war on terror” in their struggle with ethno-nationalist separatist movements to see what commonalities but also differences and how the differences affected the policies adopted regarding separatist movements.

Another line of research is closely related with peace journalism, relatively fresh terrain for research, which aims “to allow opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict” (Lynch, 2008, 147). Future research should strive to identify different types of media frames of the conflict, which, instead of fuelling xenophobia and intolerance, would enhance empathy towards the members of out-groups.

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## APPENDIX A.

**Table 4.1. Most common references to the actors involved in the first Chechen conflict.**

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

\* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

	<b>Government (<i>Rossiiskaia Gazeta</i>) %</b>	<b>Opposition (<i>Izvestiia</i>) %</b>	<b>Separatists (<i>Kavkaz Center</i>) %</b>
fighters ( <i>boeviki</i> )	39	29*	24*
terrorists ( <i>terroristy</i> )	11	11	22*
Dudayev's supporters ( <i>dudayevtsy</i> )	11	11	0*
bandits ( <i>bandity</i> )	10	3*	2*
separatists ( <i>separatisty</i> )	10	5*	15
criminals ( <i>prestupniki</i> )	7	3*	7
bandit formations ( <i>bandformirovaniia</i> )	7	5	0*
bands ( <i>bandy</i> )	6	2*	0*
IBF (illegal bandit formations) ( <i>NVF</i> )	3	0*	0
volunteers ( <i>dobrovol'tsy</i> )	3	4	2
people's guards ( <i>opolchentsy</i> )	1	7*	7*

**Table 4.2. The government usage of terms “separatism” and “terrorism” over time (according to *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*).**

	December 1, 1994 – June 13, 1995 (June 14 – Budennovsk attack) %	June 14, 1995 – January 8, 1996 (January 9 – Kizliar/ Pervomaiskoe attack) %	January 9, 1996 – August 31, 1996 %
separatists, separatism	9	6	38
terrorists, terrorism	10	44	38

**Table 4.3. Words used in reference to the first Chechen conflict.**

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

\* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

	<b>Government (<i>Rossiiskaia Gazeta</i>) %</b>	<b>Opposition (<i>Izvestiia</i>) %</b>	<b>Separatists (<i>Kavkaz Center</i>) %</b>
conflict ( <i>konflikt</i> )	29	27	24
constitution, constitutional ( <i>konstitutsiia</i> , <i>konstitutsionnyi</i> )	15	8*	5*
war ( <i>voina</i> )	15	35*	68*
law, lawful	13	6*	14
terrorism ( <i>terrorizm</i> )	5	4	20*
separatism ( <i>separatizm</i> )	4	1*	0
criminal ( <i>kriminal'nyi</i> )	2	0*	17*
extremism ( <i>ekstremizm</i> )	2	0*	0
antiterrorist, counterterrorist ( <i>antiterroristicheskii</i> , <i>kontrterroristicheskii</i> )	0	0	0

**Table 4.4. Most common references to religious extremism.**

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

\* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

	<b>Government (<i>Rossiiskaia Gazeta</i>) %</b>	<b>Opposition (<i>Izvestiia</i>) %</b>	<b>Separatists (<i>Kavkaz Center</i>) %</b>
extremists ( <i>ekstremisty</i> )	1	1	0
mujahedeen ( <i>modzhakhedy</i> )	1	2	0
Al Qaeda	0	0	0
bin Laden	0	0	0
Islamism ( <i>islamizm</i> )/Islamists ( <i>islamisty</i> )	0	0	2*
Jihad	0	0	0
Khattab	0	0	0
Wahhabism ( <i>wahhabizm</i> )/Wahhabis ( <i>wahhabity</i> )	0	0	0

**Table 5.1. Most common references to the actors involved in the second Chechen conflict.**

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

\* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

	Government Conflict II ( <i>Rossiiskaia Gazeta</i> ) %	Government Conflict I ( <i>Rossiiskaia Gazeta</i> ) %	Opposition Conflict II ( <i>Izvestiia</i> ) %	Opposition Conflict I ( <i>Izvestiia</i> ) %	Separatists Conflict II ( <i>Kavkaz Center</i> ) %	Separatists Conflict I ( <i>Kavkaz Center</i> ) %
fighters ( <i>boeviki</i> )	46	39	49*	29	38	24
terrorists ( <i>terroristy</i> )	39*	11	29*	11	43*	22
bandits ( <i>bandity</i> )	27*	10	10*	3	13*	2
bandit formations ( <i>bandformirovaniia</i> )	21*	7	6	5	0	0
bands ( <i>bandy</i> )	6	6	4	2	1	0
separatists ( <i>separatisty</i> )	7	10	13*	5	9	15
criminals ( <i>prestupniki</i> )	4	7	4	3	10	7
volunteers ( <i>dobrovol'tsy</i> )	2	3	2	4	7	2
IBF (illegal bandit formations) ( <i>NVF</i> )	1	3	1	0	0	0
people's guards ( <i>opolchentsy</i> )	1	1	0*	7	2	7
Dudayev's supporters ( <i>dudayevtsy</i> )	0*	11	0*	11	0	0

**Table 5.2. The government usage of terms “separatism” and “terrorism” over time (according to *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*).**

	August 1, 1999 – October 22, 2002 (October 23 – Dubrovka) %	October 23, 2002 – August 31, 2004 (September 1, 2004 – Beslan) %	September 1, 2004 – April 17, 2009 %
separatists, separatism	12	21	19
terrorists, terrorism	68	82	71

**Table 5.3. Words used in reference to the second Chechen conflict.**

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

\* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

	<b>Government Conflict II (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</b>	<b>Government Conflict I (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</b>	<b>Opposition Conflict II (Izvestiia) %</b>	<b>Opposition Conflict I (Izvestiia) %</b>	<b>Separatists Conflict II (Kavkaz Center) %</b>	<b>Separatists Conflict I (Kavkaz Center) %</b>
war ( <i>voina</i> )	22*	15	31	35	82*	68
terrorism ( <i>terrorizm</i> )	21*	5	14*	4	46*	20
antiterrorist, counterterrorist ( <i>antiterroristicheskii, kontrterroristicheskii</i> )	18*	0	18*	0	4	0
conflict ( <i>konflikt</i> )	10*	29	9*	27	23	24
law, lawful ( <i>zakon, zakonnyi</i> )	7*	13	6	6	44*	14
constitution, constitutional ( <i>konstitutsiia, konstitutsionnyi</i> )	7*	15	7	8	20*	5
extremism ( <i>ekstremizm</i> )	4	2	4*	0	4	0
criminal ( <i>kriminal'nyi</i> )	1	2	0	0	33*	17
separatism ( <i>separatizm</i> )	1*	4	3	1	4	0



**Table 5.4. Most common references to religious extremism.**

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

\* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

	<b>Government Conflict II (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</b>	<b>Government Conflict I (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</b>	<b>Opposition Conflict II (Izvestiia) %</b>	<b>Opposition Conflict I (Izvestiia) %</b>	<b>Separatists Conflict II (Kavkaz Center) %</b>	<b>Separatists Conflict I (Kavkaz Center) %</b>
Khattab	15*	0	10*	0	8*	0
Wahhabism ( <i>wahhabizm</i> )/Wahhabis ( <i>wahhabity</i> )	11*	0	11*	0	6	0
extremists ( <i>ekstremisty</i> )	9*	1	3	1	8*	0
bin Laden	5*	0	8*	0	7*	0
mujahedeen ( <i>modzhakhedy</i> )	3	1	3	2	44*	0
Al Qaeda	3*	0	3*	0	6	0
Jihad	2*	0	3*	0	21*	0
Islamism ( <i>islamizm</i> )/Islamists ( <i>islamisty</i> )	1	0	2*	0	4	2

## APPENDIX B.

### English translation

**Briefing:** You are ethnic Pilay living in the Slok province of Pilay Federation (look at the map).

#### **Brief general history:**

Pilay Federation, also often referred to simply as Pilayya, is a federal state. Whereas majority of the population is of Pilay ethnic origin, historically, other ethnic groups, Vanads, Hibeks and Dimehs live in the territories of Pilay Federation as well. According to the Constitution of the Pilay Federation, Vanads, Hibeks and Dimehs each have their own national republics, Vanadiya and Dimehiya, respectively, that enjoy some degree of autonomy (cultural and linguistic). These national republics are bilingual: in Vanadiya, both Pilay and Vanad languages have status of official languages of the Republic of Vanadiya; in Dimehiya, Pilay and Dimeh languages are official languages. In the rest of the territory of Pilay Federation, Pilay language is the official language. Hibeks speak Pilayyan language. Pilays, Hibeks, Vanads and Dimehs are four major ethnic groups in Pilayya. Overwhelming majority of Pilays and Hibeks profess Oplet religion; for majority of Dimehs and Vanads, traditional religion has been Hamra religion.

The region of Vanadiya was forcibly incorporated into Pilay Kingdom in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Pilay troops came to the region. While the first Pilay attempts to settle in Vanadiya go back to as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> century, a more systematic conquest of the region started in the 1720s.

The attempts to control the region faced fierce resistance, and the Vanad population engaged in several revolts against Pilay rule throughout the years: Sheikh Luyan resistance in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Imam Kirun's movement in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a series of confrontations in the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries and in the 1930s, and guerilla warfare of the 1940s.

Revolution of 1915 brought about the collapse of the monarchical rule and dictatorial regime was established throughout the country. Tumultuous years followed, which ended when in 1922 Vanadiya received the status of an autonomous region. Vanadiya enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy during the early the situation changed with World War II.

The Second World War resulted in the loss of autonomy of Vanadiya and deportation of hundreds of thousands of Vanads out of their homeland. Many deportees died of hunger and disease on the way.

As dictatorial regime collapsed, a *coup d'état* was carried out in Vanadiya. On September 24, 1990 the Vanad Supreme Council ceased its operation. A Temporary Supreme Council was formed in its place until the elections. On September 28, the Vanad National Congress headed by Dozak Veda dismissed the Temporary Supreme Council and started the campaign for presidential and parliamentary elections in the republic. In reaction to the events, the Federal Government in Slok on October 8 issued a declaration in which it asserted that the only legitimate government body in the republic was the Temporary Supreme Council.

Disregarding Slok's declaration, the Vanad National Congress held elections on October 27, 1991. Dozak Veda won the elections. However, Federal Government declared that the elections were unconstitutional and illegal. On November 1, 1991 Dozak Veda declared the sovereignty of the Vanad Republic. On November 2 Vanadiya was pronounced an independent state.

In response to the proclamation of independence Raf Burai, president of Pilay Federation declared a state of emergency in the republic on November 7. Pilay troops were sent to Vanadiya. However, on November 11 Burai's decree was annulled by the Supreme of Pilayya.

In 1992 Vanadiya declined to sign the Federation Treaty. In January 1993 the Pilay delegation signed a protocol on delineating authorities with the Supreme Council of the Vanad Republic. The document was meant to become the foundation of the agreement with Vanadiya, but was not approved by Dozak Veda.

Beginning on 5 December 1994, Pilay forces openly carried out heavy aerial bombardments of Vanadiya. On 11 December 1994, five days after Veda and Burai agreed to "avoid the further use of force", Pilay forces entered Vanadiya in order to "establish constitutional order in Vanadiya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Pilayya".

### Survey questions

**1. Sex**

( ) Male

( ) Female

**2. Age.....**

**3. Monthly income/Family's monthly income**

( ) Less than 1000 TL

( ) 1001 – 2000 TL

( ) 2001 – 3500 TL

( ) 3501 - 6000 TL

( ) More than 6000 TL

**4. How would you describe yourself in terms of religious affiliation?**

( ) Sunni Muslim

( ) Alevi Muslim

( ) Other (please indicate).....

**5. When you have a serious personal problem, how often do you take religious advice or teachings into consideration?**

- ( ) Always
- ( ) Almost always
- ( ) Usually
- ( ) Sometimes
- ( ) Never

6. Do you agree with the following statement: “Religion gives me a great amount of comfort and security in life”?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

**1 = Strongly disagree**

**2 = Disagree**

**3 = Neutral**

**4 = Agree**

**5 = Strongly agree**

7. All in all, how important would you say that religion is to you?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

**1 = Not important at all**

**2 = Not too important**

**3 = Fairly important**

**4 = Quite important**

**5 = Extremely important**

8. In which of the clusters below you would locate yourself in terms of your political attitudes?

- ( ) Very liberal
- ( ) Liberal
- ( ) Middle of the road
- ( ) Conservative
- ( ) Very conservative

**Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements**

**1 = Strongly disagree**

**2 = Disagree**

**3 = Neutral**

**4 = Agree**

**5 = Strongly agree**

9. National identity is one of the most important parts of human identity.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

10. People should be proud of seeing their national flag.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

11. How do you think Vanads in this country affect things like the physical safety, security, or health of other people in Pilayya?

They make things

*1 – Much worse*

*2 – Slightly worse*

*3 – No effect*

*4 – Slightly better*

*5 – Much better*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

12. Vanads contribute to the depreciation of the image of Pilay people

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

*1 = Strongly disagree*

*2 = Disagree*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Agree*

*5 = Strongly agree*

13. A high rate of Vanads is a threat to Pilay national identity.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

*1 = Strongly disagree*

*2 = Disagree*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Agree*

*5 = Strongly agree*

14. Vanads threaten our way of life.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

*1 = Strongly disagree*

*2 = Disagree*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Agree*


*5 = Strongly agree*

15. To what extent would you accept people of Vanad origin

- As close relatives by marriage
- As neighbors on the same street

- As citizens in my country
- As only visitors in my country
- Would exclude from my country

16. Now I'd like you to imagine a neighborhood that had an ethnic mix you personally would feel most comfortable in. Here is a blank card, which depicts some houses that surround your own. Using the letters V for Vanad, P for Pilay, D for Dimeh and H for Hibek, please put a letter in each of these houses to represent your preferred neighborhood where you would most like to live. Please sure to fill in all of the houses.



17. One should be reluctant to send his children to a school where the majority of pupils are Vanads.

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

18. In my opinion, Vanad people are very different than Pilays, thus, they can never be fully accepted members of the Pilay society.

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

19. In general, how warm or cold do you feel towards Vanads?

*1 = Very cold*

*2 = Cold*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Warm*

*5 = Very warm*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

20. Vanad people cannot be trusted

*1 = Strongly disagree*

*2 = Disagree*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Agree*

*5 = Strongly agree*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

21. Bilingual education programs should be eliminated in public schools across whole Pilay Federation.

*1 = Strongly disagree*

*2 = Disagree*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Agree*

*5 = Strongly agree*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

22. Please indicate your preferences on the further policies that should be adopted by Pilay Federal Government in Vanadiya.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

(launch  
peaceful  
negotiations)

(continue with  
military operation)

23. Vanads are responsible for starting the war.

*1 = Strongly disagree*

*2 = Disagree*

*3 = Neutral*

*4 = Agree*

*5 = Strongly agree*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 24.** Now I would like you to imagine that you have to decide on an increase in funds for four social benefits (i.e., social security, minimum wage, education grants, and housing allowance). For each social benefit, you have a total of 100 points to distribute between the Pilays and the Vanads using an interdependent scale (i.e., allocation 0/100, 10/90, 20/80, 30/70, 40/60, 50/50, 60/40, 70/30, 80/20, 90/10, 100/0).
- a. Social security: Pilays (    )    Vanads (    )
  - b. Minimum wage: Pilays (    )    Vanads (    )
  - c. Education grants: Pilays (    )    Vanads (    )
  - d. Housing allowance: Pilays (    )    Vanads (    )



## Turkish translation

**Brifing:** Siz, Pilay Federasyonun Slok ilinde yaşayan Pilay etnik grubu üyesisiniz (lütfen haritaya bkz.)

### **Kısa tarihçe:**

Pilay Federasyonu, (yada Pilayya olarak adlandırılan), federal bir devlettir. Nüfusun çoğunluğu Pilay etnik kökenli, ama tarihsel olarak diğer etnik gruplar da, Vanad, Hibek ve Dimeh etnik grupları Pilay Federasyonu topraklarında yaşamaktadır. Pilayyanın Anayasası'na göre, Vanadlar ve Dimehler kendi ulusal özerk cumhuriyetlerine sahiplerdir. Bu özerk, Vanadiya ve Dimehiye olarak adlandırılan cumhuriyetler, bazı kültürel, dil ve iktisadi özerklik derecesi ile yetkilidir. Vanadiya ve Dimehiye iki dilli cumhuriyetlerdir: Vanadiya cumhuriyetinde Pilay ve Vanad dili, Dimehiye cumhuriyetinde ise Pilay ve Dimeh dili resmi dillerdir. Hibekler ise Pilayca konuşur. Pilay, Hibek, Vanad ve Dimehler ülkenin dört temel etnik gruplarıdır. Pilay ve Hibeklerin ezici çoğunluğu Oplet dini ikrarındadır; Dimeh ve Vanadların ezici çoğunluğu Hamra dini ikrarındadır.

Vanadiya bölgesi, Pilay Krallığına 19. yüzyılda zorla dahil olmuştur. Vanadiya bölgesinde yerleşmek amacıyla ilk Pilay girişimleri 16. yüzyıl gibi tarihe geri gitmektedir, ama bölgenin daha sistematik bir fetih 1720'lerde başlamıştır.

Vanadiya bölgesini kontrol etme girişimleri şiddetli bir dirençle karşılanmış ve Vanadlar Pilay yönetimine karşı birkaç isyan çıkarmışlar: 18. yüzyıl Şeyh Luyan isyanı, 19. yüzyıl İmam Kirun direnci, 19-20 yüzyılların arası çatışmaları ve 1940'ların gerilla savaşı.

1915 Devrimi, Monarşik yönetimin çöküşüne ve diktatörlük rejiminin kurulmasına sebep oldu. Sarsıntılı yıllar, 1922.yılında Vanadiya özerk bölge statüsünü aldığına sona erdi. Vanadiya, yüksek derecede özerkliğe sahipti, ama İkinci Dünya Savaşı ile durum değişti.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı, Vanadiyanın özerklik kaybı ve yüzbinlerce Vanadların anavatanlarından sınır dışlanmasıyla sonuçlandı. Birçok sınırdışı yolda açlık ve hastalıktan öldü.

Diktatör rejim dağıldığında, Vanadiya içinde bir darbe gerçekleştirilmiştir. 24 Eylül 1990 tarihinde Vanad Yüksek Konseyi faaliyeti durduruldu. Onun yerine, genel seçimlere kadar Geçici Yüksek Konsey kuruldu . 28 Eylül, Dozak Veda başkanlığında Vanad Ulusal Kongresi, Geçici Yüksek Kurulu görevden azletti ve cumhurbaşkanlığı ve parlamento seçimleri için kampanya başlattı.

Bu olaylara tepki olarak, 8 Ekim tarihinde Slok'ta yerleşen Federal Hükümet, Vanadiya'nın tek meşru hükümet vücut Geçici Anayasa Konseyi olduğunu iddia ettiği bir bildiri yayınladı.

Slok beyanları göz ardı ederek, Vanad Ulusal Kongresi tarafından, Ekim 27, 1991 tarihinde cumhurbaşkanı seçimleri yapıldı. Dozak Veda seçimleri kazandı. Ancak, Pilay Federal Hükümeti, seçimlerin anayasaya aykırı ve yasadışı olduğunu ilan etti.

1 Kasım 1991 tarihinde, Dozak Veda, Vanad Cumhuriyeti'nin egemenliğini ilan etti. 2 Kasım 1991 tarihinde, Vanadiyanın bağımsız bir devlet olduğu ilan edildi.

Bağımsızlık ilanına yanıt olarak, Pilay Federasyonun Cumhurbaşkanı Raf Burai, 7 Kasım 1991 tarihinde, Vanadiya'da olağanüstü hal ilan etti. Pilay askerleri Vanadiya iline gönderildi. Ancak, Kasım 11 tarihinde, Raf Burai kararı, Pilayya Yüksek Konseyi tarafından iptal edilmiştir.

1992 yılında Vanadiya, Federasyon Anlaşması'nı imzalamayı reddetti. 1993 yılı Ocak ayında, Pilay delegasyonu ve Vanad Cumhuriyeti Yüksek Konseyi yetkilileri, barışçıl çözüme yol

açacak protokol imzalamasını başarmıştı; fakat, bu protokol Dozak Veda tarafından onaylanmadı.

5 Aralık 1994 tarihinden itibaren, Pilay güçleri, Vanadiya bölgesinde ağır bombardımanlar yürütmeye başladı. 11 Aralık 1994 tarihinde, Pilay güçleri "Vanadiya'nın anayasal düzenini geri getirmek ve Pilayya toprak bütünlüğünü korumak" amacıyla Vanadiya bölgesine girdi.

### Anket soruları

1. Cinsiyetiniz

( ) Erkek

( ) Kadın

2. Yaşınız.....

3. Aylık geliriniz / Aile 'nin aylık geliri

( ) 0 - 1000 TL

( ) 1001 – 2000 TL

( ) 2001 – 3500 TL

( ) 3501 - 6000 TL

( ) 6000 TL'den daha çok

4. Kendinizi ait hissettiğiniz dininiz ve mezhebiniz nedir?

( ) Sünni (Hanefi veya Şafii) Müslüman

( ) Alevi Müslüman

( ) Diğer (yazınız).....

5. Ciddi bir kişisel sorun yaşadığımızda, dini tavsiye veya öğretileri ne sıklıkla dikkate alırsınız?

( ) Her zaman

( ) Çoğu zaman

( ) Genellikle

( ) Bazen

( ) Hiç

6. "Hayatımda, din bana büyük bir miktarda konfor ve güvenlik verir" görüşüne katılıyor musunuz?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum  
2 = Katılmıyorum  
3 = Kısmen katılıyorum  
4 = Katılıyorum  
5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

7. Sonuçta, din sizin için ne kadar önemlidir?

- 1 = Hiç önemli değil  
2 = Çok önemli değil  
3 = Oldukça önemli  
4 = Önemli  
5 = Çok önemli

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

8. Aşağıdaki kümelerden hangisi sizin siyasi tutumları daha iyi tarif eder?

- ( ) Çok liberal  
( ) Liberal  
( ) Tarafsız  
( ) Muhafazakar  
( ) Çok muhafazakar

**Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar katıldığınızı belirtiniz**

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum  
2 = Katılmıyorum  
3 = Kısmen katılıyorum  
4 = Katılıyorum  
5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

9. Ulusal kimlik, insan kimliğinin en önemli parçalarından biridir

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

10. İnsanlar kendi ulusal bayrağını görmekten gurur duymalı.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

11. Sizce, bu ülkede, Vanadlar, fiziksel güvenlik veya Pilayya'daki diğer insanların sağlığı gibi şeyleri nasıl etkiliyorlar?

- 1 = Çok kötü  
2 = Biraz daha kötü  
3 = Etki yok  
4 = Biraz daha iyi  
5 = Çok daha iyi

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

12. Vanadlar, Pilay insanların görüntüsünün değer kaybına katkıda bulunmaktadır.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

**1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum**

**2 = Katılmıyorum**

**3 = Kısmen katılıyorum**

**4 = Katılıyorum**

**5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

13. Vanadların yüksek oranı Pilay ulusal kimliğini tehdit ediyor.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

**1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum**

**2 = Katılmıyorum**

**3 = Kısmen katılıyorum**

**4 = Katılıyorum**

**5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

14. Vanadlar, yaşam tarzımızı tehdit ediyor.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

**1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum**

**2 = Katılmıyorum**

**3 = Kısmen katılıyorum**


**4 = Katılıyorum**

**5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

15. Vanad kökenli insanları ne ölçüde kabul edersiniz?

- Çok yakın akraba olarak
- Aynı sokakta komşu olarak
- Ülkemin vatandaşları olarak
- Ülkemde sadece ziyaretçi olarak
- Ülkemden dışlardım

16. Şimdi, etnik karışım yönünden en rahat hissedeceğiniz bir mahalleyi hayal etmenizi istiyorum. Pilay için P, Vanad için V, Dimeh için D ve Hibek için H harflerini kullanarak boş evleri doldurunuz. Evlerin tümünü doldurmanız rica olunur.



17. Birisi, çocuklarını, öğrencilerin çoğunluğu Vanad kökenli olan bir okula göndermek için isteksiz olmalıdır.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
- 2 = Katılmıyorum
- 3 = Kısmen katılıyorum
- 4 = Katılıyorum
- 5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

18. Benim düşünceme göre, Vanadlar Pılaylardan çok farklıdır, bu nedenle, Vanad kökenli insanlar Pılay toplumun tam üyeleri olarak kabul edilemez.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
- 2 = Katılmıyorum
- 3 = Kısmen katılıyorum
- 4 = Katılıyorum
- 5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

19. Genel olarak, Vanadlara karşı ne kadar sıcak veya soğuk hissediyorsunuz?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Çok soğuk
- 2 = Soğuk
- 3 = Nötr
- 4 = Sıcak
- 5 = Çok sıcak

20. Vanadlar güvenilir olamaz.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum**  
**2 = Katılmıyorum**  
**3 = Kısmen katılıyorum**  
**4 = Katılıyorum**  
**5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

21. İki dilli eğitim programları, bütün Pilay Federasyonu genelinde devlet okullarında ortadan kaldırılmalıdır.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum**  
**2 = Katılmıyorum**  
**3 = Kısmen katılıyorum**  
**4 = Katılıyorum**  
**5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

22. Vanadiya ilinde, Pilay Federal Hükümet tarafından yapılan politikaların üzerinde tercihlerinizi belirtiniz

1-----2-----3-----4-----5  
(barışçıl müzakere başlatılmalı) (askeri operasyon devam etmeli)

23. Savaşın başlangıcı için Vanadlar sorumludur.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum**  
**2 = Katılmıyorum**  
**3 = Kısmen katılıyorum**  
**4 = Katılıyorum**  
**5 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

24. Şimdi, dört sosyal faydaların (sosyal güvenlik, asgari ücret, eğitim bursları ve konut yardımı) bir artış üzerinde karar vermek zorunda olduğunuzu hayal etmenizi istiyorum. Her sosyal fayda için, birbirine bağlı bir ölçek kullanarak (yani 0/100, 10/90, 20/80, 30/70, 40/60, 50/50, 60/40, 70/30, 80/20, 90/10, 100/0) Pilaylar ve Vanadlar arasında dağıtmanızı istiyorum.

- a. Sosyal güvenlik: Pilaylar ( ) Vanadlar ( )  
b. Asgari ücret: Pilaylar ( ) Vanadlar ( )  
c. Eğitim bursları: Pilaylar ( ) Vanadlar ( )  
d. Konut yardımı: Pilaylar ( ) Vanadlar ( )

## APPENDIX C.

### **“Restoration of constitutional order” frame**

#### English translation

Today, one of the most disputed questions in our society is the conflict in Vanadiya. Opinions on the conflict are abundant and very different. So, what is it that we call the Vanad conflict?

Pilayya and Vanadiya do not have disputable issues. Pilays and Vanads do not have contradictions. The question regarding the status of Vanadiya is not disputable, because Vanadiya is integral part of the Pilay Federation. Declaration of independence of the so-called Vanad Republic by the so-called Vanad leadership is unconstitutional. The regime established nowadays in Vanadiya under the rule of Veda is a regime that breeds mafia cliques and brings devastation to Vanad people.

So, what nowadays is termed as “Vanad conflict”, is, in fact, a normal reaction of the state government to lawlessness within one of the state’s territories. We are fighting not against Vanads, but against illegal armed formations. Responsibility for the volatile and dangerous situation in the republic should fall exclusively on the shoulders of criminal regime of Dozak Veda.

While different illegal armed groups are involved in the power-struggle among themselves, ordinary Vanads suffer. Thus, the reason behind sending troops to Vanadiya is to help Vanad people. Involvement of troops in Vanadiya aims to restore constitutional order, law and peace in Vanadiya; to cleanse Brok from illegal armed formations and fighters and disarm them. Conflict is not between Vanadiya and Pilay Federation, conflict is between Pilay Federation and illegal armed formations, which have to be disarmed irrespective of their national composition or location.

Criminal regime established nowadays in Vanadiya is a threat to the unity of our country, security of our citizens both in Vanadiya and outside its borders. It destabilizes political and economic situation in the region and there is a danger of a civil war breaking out if nothing is done to fix this problem.

During the previous three years the federal government was trying to persuade the so called 'Vanad leadership' that it was impossible to live in Pilayya and not be part of it. But the further, the more aggressive and insulting were the actions of Brok. Negotiations fell through. However, this does not mean that importance of peaceful negotiations has withered away. Negotiations must be held, but only to discuss the procedures for disarming bandit formations, laying down arms, civic integration of the Vanad society within Pilayya, to determine the extent of aid that Pilayya is ready to provide for Vanadiya in order to overcome the devastation brought about by the Veda regime.

#### Turkish translation

Bugün, toplumuzda en çok tartışılan sorulardan biri Pilay-Vanad çatışmasıdır. Konuyla ilgili görüşler çok bol ve çok farklı. Peki, Vanad çatışma dediğimiz nedir?

Pilayya ve Vanadiya arasında tartışmalı sorunlar yoktur. Pilaylar ve Vanadlar arasında da çelişkiler yok. Vanadiy Pilay Federasyonu ayrılmaz parçası olduğundan dolayı, Vanadiya durumuyla ilgili soru tartışmalı soru değildir. Sözde Vanad Cümhuriyetinin sözde Vanad liderliği tarafından ilan edilen Vanad Cümhuriyeti'nin bağımsızlık beyanı Anayasaya aykırı olduğu tartışılmaz bir gerçektir. Dozak Veda egemenliği altında kurulan rejim, mafya çeteleri doğuran ve Vanad halkına yıkım getiren bir rejimdir.

Peki, günümüzde ise, "Vanad çatışma" olarak adlandırılıran, aslında devletin, kendine ait olan topraklarındaki bir ilinde oluşan kanunsuzluğa karşı, eyalet hükümetinin normal bir tepkidir. Biz Vanadlara karşı değil de, ancak yasadışı silahlı oluşumları karşı mücadele ediyoruz.



Vanadiya özerk cümhuriyetinde oluşan uçucu ve tehlikeli durumun sorumluluğu sadece ve sadece Dozak Veda egemenliği altındaki suçlu rejiminin omuzlarına düşmektedir.

Farklı yasadışı silahlı gruplar kendi aralarında güç mücadelesi içinde yer almakla birlikte, sıradan Vanadlar muzdarip oluyorlar. Böylece, Vanadiya'ya asker göndermenin nedeni, Vanad halkına yardım göstermektir. Asker birliklerin katılımı amacı ise, Vanadiya'ya anayasal düzen, hukuk ve barış geri getirmektir; ülkenin bölgesini yasadışı silahlı oluşumlardan ve savaşçılardan temizlemek ve onları silahsızlandırmak içindir. Çatışma, Vanadiya ve Pilay Federasyonu arasında değil, çatışma Pilay Federasyonu ve yasadışı silahlı oluşumlar arasındadır. Ve bu oluşumlar, ulusal bileşimleri veya konumları ne olursa olsun, yok edilmeli.

Vanadiya'da günümüzde kurulan yasadışı rejim, hem ülkemizin bütünlüğünü, hem Vanadiya'da ve ülkemizin başka bölgelerinde yaşayan vatandaşlarımızın güvenliğini tehdit ediyor. Bu rejim, bölgedeki siyasi ve ekonomik durumu istikrarsızlaştırıyor; ve bu sorunu düzeltmek için hiçbir şey yapılmazsa eğer, ülkemizde iç savaş ortaya çıkmanın nedeni olabilir.

Önceki üç yıl boyunca Federal Hükümet, sözde 'Vanad liderliğini' Pilayya'da yaşamak ve ülkenin bir parçası olmamasının imkansız olduğuna ikna etmeye çalışıyordu. Ama Brok, bunlara karşı daha agresif ve hakeret eylemlerle tepki verdi; sonuç olarak, müzakereler çöktü. Ancak bu, barışçıl müzakerelerin hiç anlamsız olduğu anlamına gelmez. Barışçıl müzakereler devam etmeli, ama konuşulacak konular, haydut oluşumların silahtan vazgeçme prosedürleri; Vanad toplumun Pilayya içinde uyumu; ve Dozak Veda rejimi tarafından yapılan tahribat üstesinden gelmek için gereken maddi yardım hacimi olmalı.

## **“Counter-terrorist operation” frame**

### English translation

Recent invasion of illegal armed formations from the territory of the Vanad Republic into the territory of the neighboring republic of Dimehiya is an especially dangerous form of terrorism with the involvement of foreign citizens. The perpetrators responsible for this tragedy have the main purpose of causing secession of the Republic of Vanadiya from the Pilay Federation.

Peaceful negotiations, which led to signing of a ceasefire, were a huge mistake made by Pilay government. The main conditions laid down by ceasefire were deliberately not fulfilled by the Vanad side from the moment of ratification. This caused enormous harm to the national security of Pilay Federation; it created favorable conditions for gaining strength and training illegal armed formations for the invasion into the territory of the Republic of Dimehiya and spreading terror on the entire territory of Pilayya.

Our Western partners (US and EU) press our government to negotiate a peaceful solution. However, the issue is not about the future status of Vanadiya, it is about eradicating terrorism in the republic. Even though the West fails to see it as such, Pilay involvement in Vanadiya is a part of international efforts to combat terrorism. One is left to wonder why our Western partners fail to draw parallels between apartment bombings in Slok, Kuji and Sibi and terrorist attacks of 9/11.

By blowing up the homes of our countrymen, the bandits are blowing up government and authority – nor presidential, municipal or parliamentary authority, but authority as such in the country. What we are dealing with here are gangs of international terrorists. During three years that followed after negotiations Vanadiya became a seemingly lawfully existing huge terrorist camp. Today, Vanadiya became a safe haven for extremists and a nest of international terrorism, where hundreds of extremists from many foreign countries were educated and trained to carry

out terrorist attacks. They carried out horrible acts of terrorism both inside and outside of the Republic of Vanadiya.

The status of Vanadiya is not disputable; it is inherent part of Pilay Federation. There is no difference between separatists and terrorists or bandits, because they have common aim of dragging Dimehiya into war with Pilayya so that Vanadiya could then proceed to build a state based upon Hamra religion not only on the territories of Vanadiya and Dimehiya, but which would encapsulate the whole country.

Secret services identified perpetrators who are responsible for the apartment bombings and loss of lives in Slok, Kuji and Sibi. They were led by Hisur, a Hamra extremist, who is supported by international terrorist networks. Apartment bombings and invasion into Dimehiya are part of the aggression that had been planned in advance, thoroughly prepared, and generously financed by international centers. The investigation by Federal Security Service found that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were also involved in the invasion of Dimehiya. Bin Laden provided 25 million USD for this operation. Moreover, according to anonymous source in the Federal Security Service, investigation of apartment bombings in Slok, Kiju and Sibi and invasion of Dimehiya has also revealed involvement of mercenaries and monetary from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Yemen.

All these facts point to the conclusion that what are we faced with in Vanadiya are not just disjointed criminal elements, but well organized bands of international terrorists. Negotiations with terrorists are off the agenda! Pilayya has to strike against the terrorist nest, eliminate bases and camps of fighters, and eradicate the criminal infrastructure.

Thus, we are forced to revert to the use of military force. It is not a caprice of government. In order to protect the security of our fellow citizens, government has to employ

military force against terrorists. If our Western partners want us to get to the negotiation table with the terrorists, why don't they become a role model for us?

### Turkish translation

Vanadiya topraklarından Dimehiya cümhuriyeti topraklarına geçen yasadışı silahlı oluşumlarının son işgali, yabancı vatandaşların katılımı ile, terörizmin özellikle tehlikeli bir türüdür. Bu trajediden sorumlu olan faillerin temel amacı, Vanad cümhuriyetin Pilay Federasyonu'ndan ayrılmasıdır.

Ateşkes imzalanmasına yol açan barışçıl müzakereler, Pilay Federasyonun hükümeti tarafından yapılan büyük bir hata'ydı. Ateşkes tarafından ortaya konulan temel koşullar, onaylanmış andan itibaren Vanad tarafından bilerek karşılanmadı. Böylece, Pilay Federasyonu'nun ulusal güvenliği büyük bir zarar gördü; yasadışı silahlı oluşumların güç kazanması ve eğitim görmesi için elverişli koşullar yaratıp, Dimehiya bölgesinin topraklarını işgal etme çabalarına yol açtı. Sonuç olarak, Pilayya topraklarının tamamı üzerinde terör yaymak için elverişli koşullar yaratılmıştı.

Bizim Batılı ortaklarımız (ABD ve AB), bizim hükümeti barışçıl müzakere yolunun çözüme ulaşmak için tek bir yol olmasına ikna etmeye çalışmışlardı. Ancak konu, Vanadiya'nın gelecek durumu hakkında değil; Vanad cümhuriyetinden terörizmin tamamen ortadan kaldırılması ile ilgilidir. Batı bunu göremiyor, ama Pilay askerlerin Vanadiya'da tutulması, terörle mücadele için uluslararası çabaların bir parçasıdır. Batılı ortaklarımızın Slok, Kuji ve Sibi şehirlerinde daire bombalanması; ve 9/11 terör saldırıları arasında paralellik kuramadıkların nedeni ise büyük bir bilmecedir.

Bizim vatandaşlarının evlerini havaya uçurarak, haydutlar devlet otoritesine saldırmış oluyorlar - bu hem başkanlık, hem belediye, hem parlamenter otoritesine saldırı. Vanadiya'da uğraştığımız, uluslararası teröristlerin çeteler karşı müdahaledir. Ateşkes imzalanmasından


itibaren, Vanadiya bölgesi görünüşte yasal varolan büyük terörist kampına dönüştürüldü. Bugün, Vanadiya aşırılık ve birçok yabancı ülkeden teröristler yüzlerce eğitilmiş ve terörist saldırılar yürütmek için eğitilmiştir uluslararası terörizm, bir yuva için güvenli bir sığınak haline geldi. Onlar (uluslararası teröristler), hem Vanadiya için hem dışında korkunç terör eylemleri yürütmektedir.

Vanadiya durumu tartışmalı değildir, çünkü Vanadiya Pilay Federasyonu'nun doğal bir parçasıdır. Separatistler, teröristler yada haydutlar arasında hiçbir fark yoktur, çünkü ortak hedefleri, öncelikle Dimehiya ve Vanadiya bölgelerini el altına geçirip, sonra ise ülkemizin bütün topraklarında sadece Hamra dine dayalı bir devlet kurmaktır.

İstihparat, Slok, Kuji ve Sibi şehirlerinde apartman bombalamaları için sorumlu failleri tespit etti. Bunlar, uluslararası terör şebekeleri tarafından desteklenen Hisur adında Hamra dininde ekstremist tarafından yönetildi. Dimehiya işgali ve apartman bombalamalar, önceden planlanmış, iyice hazırlanmış ve cömertçe uluslararası merkezler tarafından finanse edilmişti saldırganlık parçasıdır. Ayrıca, Dimehiya işgaline, Usame bin Ladin ve El Kaide dahil olduğu tespit edildi: Bin Ladin, bu işlem için 25 milyon dolar sağladı. Dimehiya işgali için gelen para birçok kaynaktan gelmiş: Afganistan, Mısır, İran, Ürdün, Kuveyt, Libya, Pakistan, Suudi Arabistan, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Katar ve Yemen.

Tüm bu gerçekler tek bir sonuca yol açıyor: Vanadiya meselesi, ayrı ayrı yasadışı unsurlar meselesi değil, ama iyi organize edilmiş teröristlerin bantları meselesidir. Teröristler ile müzakereler yapılmaz! Pilayya, bu terör yuvaları, terör savaşçıların kamplarını ve cezai altyapısını yok etmeli! Bizim vatandaşlarımızın güvenliğini korumak için, hükümetimizin teröristlere karşı askeri kuvvet kullanma her türlü hakkı vardır. Batılı ortaklar bizi teröristlerle müzakere yapmamızı istiyorlarsa, neden bizim için bir örnek olmuyorlar?

APPENDIX D.



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**LEGEND:**

Chechen = Vanad

Russian = Pilay

Dagestani = Dimeh

Ukrainian = Hibek

Chechnya = Vanadiya

Dagestan = Dimehiya

Russia/Russian Federation = Pilayya/Pilay Federation

Dzhokhar Dudayev = Dozak Veda

Boris Yeltsin = Raf Burai

Moscow = Slok

Grozny = Brok

Volgodonsk = Kuji

Buinaksk = Sibi

Makhachkala = Daloh

Khattab = Hisur

(Sheikh) Mansur = (Sheikh) Luyan

(Imam) Shamil = (Imam)\_ Kirun

Oplet = Orthodox Christian

Hamra = Islam