

**THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONCERNS AND ATTITUDE
TOWARD IMMIGRANTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GREECE AND
SPAIN AT THE EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL**

by

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ABSTRACT

Immigration has always considered as one of the most important issues of the European Union by the politicians at the national level. While some of the countries strongly oppose to immigration and immigrants, others consider immigrants as necessity and follow integration policies toward immigrants. As a significant literature argues, immigration policies and attitudes toward immigrants are mostly shaped by the economic concerns of natives and national politicians. The other literature explains different attitudes toward immigrants in different countries with sociological, ideological, and identity concerns rather than economic, rational explanations. This thesis aims to explain whether the economic concerns or non-economic concerns are more effective in the generation of attitudes toward immigrants. The Sovereign Debt Crisis within the European Union enables me to make a comparison between the pre-crisis and post-crisis period in Greece and Spain, the countries that have been affected most by the crisis. By analyzing the voting of Greek and Spanish parliamentarians at the European Parliament for migrant-related documents, I will figure whether economic concerns are more effective than the non-economic concerns, as a huge literature argues.

EKONOMİK ENDİŞELER VE GÖÇMENLERE KARŞI TUTUM ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: YUNANİSTAN VE İSPANYA’NIN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ DÜZEYİNDE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

Fatma Hazal İnce

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Anahtar Kelimeler: göç, Avrupa Borç Krizi, Yunanistan, İspanya, göçmenlere karşı tutum, Avrupa Parlamentosu, Sivil Özgürlükler, Adalet ve İçişleri, oy verme davranışı

ÖZET

Göç konusu, Avrupa Birliği üye ülkelerindeki siyasetçiler tarafından her zaman Avrupa Birliği'nin en önemli huşularından biri olarak görülmüştür. Bazı ülkelerde göçe ve göçmenlere karşı sert bir muhalefet görülürken, diğerleri göçmenleri bir ihtiyaç olarak görüp entegrasyon politikaları izlemektedirler. Kayda değer bir literatürün öne sürdüğü üzere göç politikaları ve göçmenlere karşı tutum çoğunlukla yerlilerin ve milli siyasetçilerin ekonomik endişelerinden etkileniyor. Bir başka literatür ise göçmenlere karşı farklı ülkelerde görülen farklı tutumları ekonomik ve rasyonel nedenlerdence, sosyolojik, ideolojik ve kimlik bazlı nedenlerle açıklıyor. Literatürdeki bu zıtlıktan yola çıkarak bu tez, göçmenlere karşı tutumun oluşmasında ekonomik nedenlerin mi, yoksa ekonomik olmayan nedenlerin mi daha etkili olduğunu açıklamaya çalışıyor. Avrupa'da gerçekleşen Borç Krizi, Yunanistan ve İspanya gibi krizden en çok etkilenen iki ülkenin göçmenlere karşı tutumu açısından kriz öncesi ve kriz sonrası dönemini karşılaştırabilmeme olanak sağladı. Avrupa Parlamentosundaki Yunan ve İspanyol parlamenterlerin, Parlamento'ya gelen göçle ilgili dokümanlara verdikleri oyları analiz ederek, büyük bir literatürün iddia ettiği üzere göçe karşı tutumun oluşmasında ekonomik düşüncelerin ekonomik olmayan düşüncelerden daha etkili olup olmadığını araştıracağım.

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INTRODUCTION

“Necesitamos esa fuerza laboral, necesitamos trabajadores [inmigrantes]”
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, El País, 17.01.2010

In 2010, ex-Prime Minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero states that since the population of Spain, and Europe, is aging, those countries need more labor power from the other countries. In other words, Zapatero foresees the demographic problems of Europe and considers the immigrant labor force as necessity for Spain and other European countries. On the other hand, in 2012, during the presidential election debates, the previous President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy states that France has too many foreigners, which constitutes problem for the country because of the inconsistencies in the integration system. In the same continent, from different countries, political actors and natives display different attitudes toward immigrants. Thus, the literature that clarifies the reasons of different attitudes toward immigrants in different countries is huge. One of the main branches of those theories assumes that economic reasons of natives and political actors shape attitudes and policies toward immigrants and the other theory focuses on the non-economic reasons, such as the identity.

Related to those main theories, my research question focuses on the effects of economic factors on the formation of attitudes toward immigrants. My research question examines whether there is a relation between the economic outlook of the country and attitudes of citizens of that country toward immigrants. Since my research question is too broad, in order to narrow it, I limit my question with a specific region and time period. Therefore, I take the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 in the European Union as a natural breakpoint and analyze the attitudes of EU member states toward immigrants. Rather than looking at twenty-eight countries in the European Union, I choose Greece and Spain, the countries that have been affected most in terms of their economic outlooks due to the sovereign debt crisis. Also, rather than the national attitudes toward immigrants in Greece and Spain, my concern will focus on the attitudes of those countries at the European level. I will question whether the attitudes of those countries have changed or not at the EU level after the sovereign debt crisis. In the conclusion, after analyzing my results, I will find whether the economic factors are more effective than the non-economic concerns or not. My hypothesis is shaped as the following:

Hypothesis: In Spain and Greece, anti-migrant attitude at the European Union level increases after the sovereign debt crisis due to the worsening of national economic outlook in those countries.

In terms of the formation of the thesis; in the first chapter, I will summarize the literature on the formation of attitudes toward immigrants. I will touch upon both the theories that explain the attitudes toward immigrants with rational, economic factors, and non-economic factors. In the second chapter, I will emphasize the methodology of my research. I will explain the specific reasons that I have chosen the sovereign debt crisis as a natural breakpoint, Greece and Spain as sampling countries, and the European Parliament as the organ that allows me to analyze the voting of the members of parliament on migration-related documents. In the third chapter, I will find migration-related documents that come to the European Parliament for voting. By looking at the contents and the explanations of the members of the parliament on their voting, I will decide whether a particular document is migrant favoring or anti-migrant. In the last chapter, I will analyze the voting of Greek and Spanish parliamentarians on those documents and by looking at the analysis, I will conclude whether economic factors, more prominently the national economic outlook of the country, or non-economic factors play a more critical role on the formation of attitudes toward immigrants.

CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on attitude formation toward immigrants is extensive. In my thesis I will focus the relation between the economic concerns and attitude toward immigrants, but also there is a number of scholars, who work on the non-economic factors that affect attitudes of natives toward immigrants. In 1971, Girard touches upon the importance of economic conditions in shaping the public opinion toward immigrants in the host country with specifically emphasizing France (Girard, 1971). Harwood, on the other hand, writes on the United States, and claims that the main reason of the opposition in the host countries toward both legal and illegal immigration is the economic concerns (Harwood, 1983). After them several scholars start to write on the very same topic focusing on different economic models in order to clarify the relation. Scholars differ from each other with regard to the explanations they use. The most prominent models that illustrate the relation between economic concerns and opinion on immigration are labor market competition and welfare state models. While some scholars (Borjas 1990, Passel 1994, DeFreitas 1991, Muller 1993, Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Espenshade and Belanger 1998) mainly focus on the labor market competition model and aim to analyze the rise of anti-migrant attitude in certain countries with the increase in unemployment etc., others (CIRES 1991, Facchini and Mayda 2009, Borjas 1999) touch upon the effects of immigration flows on the welfare system of the host country which make natives to pay more taxes. As well as those two main models, the relation between the economic concerns and opinion on immigration is analyzed with other factors, such as the economic conditions of the host country (Money 1999, Burns and Gimpel 2000).

On the other hand, Chandler and Tsai (2001) find that while economic outlook and income of natives have some effects, the most important factors that determine the type of attitudes of natives toward immigrants are education and perceived cultural threats. Burns and Gimpel (2000) argue that the main rational behind the attitudes toward immigrants is nativist or racist sentiments, although many scholars believe that the economic concerns are the main factors that affect anti-migrant or migrant-favoring attitudes. Fetzer (2000) analyzes the public attitudes toward immigrants in the United States, France, and Germany by looking at three important factors; cultural marginality,

economic self-interest, and natives' contact with immigrants. Although all three factors are important in terms of the creation of attitudes toward immigrants, Fetzer emphasizes the importance of the cultural marginality of the native more than economic self-interest or contact with immigrants in terms of attitude formation toward immigrants. In this chapter, I will mention the theories that explain the attitudes toward immigrants with economic and non-economic factors.

1.1.The Literature on Non-economic Factors and Anti-migrant Attitude

Similar to her arguments on the opposition of the Western European countries toward European integration due to the fear of losing their national identity (McLaren, 2004), in her article in 2003, McLaren argues that even though the effect of the welfare state model is important, natives' contact with immigrants determine the attitudes toward immigrants. The author touches upon the fact that as natives have good relations with minorities, the threat that they perceive decreases, and they become less prone to exclude immigrants.

Dustmann and Preston (2000) explore the relation between economic concerns of natives and opposition toward immigrants by using British National Attitude Survey. They claim that the real rationale behind the anti-migrant attitude is intuitions, rather than basic economic theories. Ortega (2000) argues that immigration has a positive impact on employment and immigration restrictions prevent profits and advantages that immigrants can create. Thus, looking at those arguments based on economy, it is expected that natives will be in favor of immigrants. However, the increase in the opposition toward immigrants should be explained by prejudices and intuitions of natives in accordance with the labor market equilibrium because for natives rather than real numbers, which sometimes favor immigrants, perceptions of immigrants matter with regard to the creation of public opinion. The authors argue that in order to understand the public opinion toward immigrants, we should understand the differences between immigrant and native populations. In order to understand the differences, the authors emphasize three distinctions; immigrants with different capital endowments, immigrants with different human capital, and demographic composition of immigrants. By looking at those factors, the authors will be able to understand the labor market and welfare system considerations of natives.

First of all, the immigrant with different capital endowments is interpreted as the change of the ratio between the labor and the capital. When this ratio changes, wages change, too, due to the fact that while the level of capital stays stable, the level of the labor changes because of immigration flows. Since there are more people looking for jobs in the job market, they decrease the wages. Change in the wages also affects the change of the level of unemployment. All those incidents affect natives differently based on their position in the labor market. Perceived job security, which is the perception of native workers that they will/will not lose their jobs or their wages will be/not be decreased even a large number of immigrants come, change the attitude of natives. If natives believe that their occupation is secure enough not to let immigrants to take jobs from natives, they will not oppose to immigrants. However, when natives are not exact about their position in the labor market and they are threatened by immigrants because of their insecure situation, they tend to have anti-migrant attitude.

Second point is based on the idea of aggregate level of human capital. If the skill or occupation of the immigrant is complement to the skill or occupation of the native, the immigrant does not threat the job security of native. In other words, if the immigrant has a job or skill different from the aggregate skill of natives, the native does not consider the immigrant as a threat. However, if the immigrant is the substitute to the native workers by having the same skills or doing the same job, this type of immigrant poses a threat to the native and experiences opposition by the native. For example, if the average number of natives in the host country is low skilled, when there is an inflow of low-skilled immigrants, those immigrants are regarded as a threat to the labor-market equilibrium and natives will oppose to immigrants. However, in a host country where each and every native is high skilled, since there is a need for a low-skilled labor, when low-skilled immigrant come, natives will welcome them and there will not be anti-immigrant attitude. The third and last difference may be caused by demographic composition of immigrants. If the demographic composition of immigrants is depended on social services provided by the government of the host country, cost of the welfare system increases. For example, if the majority of immigrants are disabled or sick, the government of the host country should spend more on social services in order to provide benefit for those immigrants. In other words, as the dependency ratio increases, cost of the social security system increases, too. Since immigration affects the spending on

educational and health system of the host country, those social services demand more taxes to be paid by natives, which will breed opposition toward immigrants.

From their research on British National Attitude Survey, Dustmann and Preston find that both welfare system concerns, which are based on paying tax and receiving benefit from the government, and labor market concerns, with regard to the job security issue, affect opinions toward immigrants, but more importantly perceived threat to welfare state and labor-market determine the attitudes toward immigrants. Rather than the real numbers and statistics, perceptions and intuitions matter more. For example, the authors find no evidence on the idea that economically most disadvantaged natives with regard to the labor market concern and competition within the labor market tend to show greater hostility toward immigrants. On the contrary, they find that more educated and high-skilled natives are more prone to have hostility toward immigrants due to the welfare system concerns. Manual and low-skilled workers, who generally constitute the economically most disadvantaged population, breed opposition toward immigrants due to the racial prejudices, rather than economic concerns. Thus, the authors conclude that restrictions and interventions to economic policies regarding immigrants do not favor manual and low-skilled natives because they are more concerned with the racial composition of immigrants, rather than capital endowments, human capital or demographic composition of immigrants.

The main question of the article by Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun (2002) is whether economic strain and unemployment in the host country or racial prejudices and racism cause anti-migrant attitude. By economic strain, the authors mean stagnant or collapsing income of natives or increased level of unemployment. Although it is thought that immigrants will be blamed due to the economic hardships in the host country, actually there is a small relation between the economic resentment and anti-migrant attitude among natives. On the contrary to the general belief that immigrants are the real reason for economic downturn, there is a theory, which claims that, the increased level of immigrants increase the level of employment within natives, if the jobs of natives are complementary to the jobs of immigrants. When the average number of immigrants and natives has different skills and different occupations, which are complementary to each other, natives do not consider immigrants as a threat due to the imagined or real economic resentment.

The authors claim that even if there is no real relation between economic downturn and the number of immigrants, the perceived threat that is posed by immigrants is sufficient to create anti-migrant attitude. The sources of perception are numerous, such as rumors created and spread by natives who are affected by immigration flows, biased stories, which are based on immigrants who steal jobs and are supported by not only natives but also the media. Although Krueger and Pischke (1997) find that the increased level of violence and crime against immigrants in Germany is because of the location based on the ratio between immigrants and natives, and economic strain based on high unemployment and low wages, the idea of economic strain is based on perception on economic conditions of the country, rather than the reality. The most important finding of the survey of the authors that is based on the Eurobarometer surveys from 1988 to 1997 on the opinions toward immigrants in the European Union countries is that regardless of the employment level of natives, both employed and unemployed may be affected by the economic hardships that are caused by immigrants. Although it is difficult to state whether the unemployed or the employed is affected most due to the immigration flows, it is clear, according to the authors, that natives who directly compete with immigrants in the labor market have more anti-migrant attitude than those who do not compete directly. Thus, even though the authors cannot differentiate between employed and unemployed natives with regard to the effect of economic strain on them, the authors claim that, natives whose jobs are substitute to the jobs of immigrants are hurt more due to the increased level of competition in the labor market and decreased level of wages.

1.2.Literature on Economic Factors and Anti-migrant Attitude

1.2.1.Labor Market Competition, Welfare System and Anti-Migrant Attitude

George Borjas, one of the most reputable immigration economists in the United States, touch upon the economic impacts of immigration on American citizens and the policies that the US government should implement in order to decrease the negative effects of immigration in the *Heaven's Door* (1999). Borjas finds that that economic effect is distributional and largely changes due to the skills of immigrants. Low-skilled immigrants, for example, are more prone to be welcomed by the agricultural sector. Since the agricultural sector does not look for a high-skilled or high-educated labor,

low-skilled immigrants who are ready to work for lower wages are more than welcomed. However, while low-skilled immigrants contribute to the agricultural sector, they hurt poorer citizens, because the latter should pay more taxes for immigrant benefits. Since the population grows with immigration flows, additional schools, hospitals, housing and social services expenditures are needed and only citizens pay for those services. Thus, while few sectors, such as agricultural sector, get benefit from immigrants, citizens should pay additional taxes and poorer citizens are affected more due to those additional taxes.

Also, taking into consideration the idea that wage and employment are determined in the free market based on the desire of the unemployed to find jobs and needs of firms looking for labor, increase in the number of workers due to the immigration flow increases the competition between workers, which leads to the decrease in the wages. Hence, points out those poorer citizens are hurt because the wages are lowered due to the immigration flows. Also, while low-skilled immigrants pay less tax and receive more benefits than the domestic citizens, their children are prone to be low skilled and continue to receive benefits from the governments. Therefore, children of the low-skilled immigrant persist to be low skilled, which crates higher burden on the poorer citizens.

On the one hand, low-skilled workers prevent low-skilled citizens to find jobs, decrease the wages and get benefit from the social services, which are paid by citizens; on the other hand, high-skilled immigrants' impact on economy is reverse. As the skill of the immigrant increases, his wage increases, too. Since there is a positive correlation between the skill of the immigrant and the wage, high-skilled immigrants pay more taxes while receiving fewer benefits. Thus, high-skilled immigrants contribute more to the economy of the host state than the low-skilled immigrants by paying more taxes and benefiting from the social services less. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) based on the same argument; claim that the low-skilled and low-income citizens, who are threatened more by low-skilled immigrants who decrease wages and increase the cost of social services, are more prone to embrace anti-migrant attitude. Since there is a difference between impacts of low-skilled immigrants and high-skilled immigrants on the economy of the US as Borjas argues, he concludes that rather than restricting immigration flows, embracing a Canadian style immigration policy, in which the entrance of immigrants is based on the point system, is the most beneficial form for the US. Only by this system,

he claims, the government can control the number of the low-skilled immigrant and decrease the burden on the poor citizens.

Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann (2000) explore the link between economic concerns and opinion toward immigration by using the international transferability of human capital theory, which separates this article from previous works. According to this theory, the more immigrants transfer their human capital to the host country, the less the gap between the immigrant and native earning at the initial point where the immigration has happened. When immigrants transfer the human capital, they can easily find jobs and earn money. As the time of residence of those immigrants increases, the capital they own increases, even though it never achieves to natives' level of capital. As the authors claim, human transferability is based on the skill levels of the individual, whether their skills are complementary or substitute to the skill levels of natives, and the similarity of sending and receiving countries in terms of language or labor needs. Thus, when the immigrant's country and the host country share the same language, immigrants become more advantaged in the host country; they can adopt easily, and transfer their human capital without any constraint. When immigrants transfer their human capital, they can contribute to the labor market, which according to the authors ease the assimilation of immigrants because immigrants can bring labor success. The easier immigrants are assimilated, the more pro-immigrant attitudes emerge within the host country due to the immigrants' contribution to the economy. While immigrants who migrate due to the economic reasons can easily transfer their human capital to the host country and are easily assimilated, immigrants who leave their countries because of humanitarian needs, such as a civil war, cannot transfer their human capitals as easy as the former, and so their assimilation to the host country is difficult.

The authors compare Canada and the Netherlands, and they find that since Canada constructs its immigration policy based on the labor market needs, pro-immigration feelings are dominant in the country. While Canada decides who will migrate and who will not based on the skill levels of immigrants and the needs of the labor market, each and every immigrant, who comes to Canada, can easily find a job in consistence with their skills. Thus, those immigrants in Canada can transfer their human capitals, be complementary workers, rather than substitutes to natives, and opposition toward immigration decreases. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, which is a refugee-pulling country, immigrants cannot transfer the human capital, cannot contribute to the

economy, and thus the opposition toward immigrants increases. By looking at the twelve OECD countries, the authors conclude that, in those countries, which select immigrants based on their skill levels, such as Canada, the possibility of opposition toward immigration is low. When countries decide whether low-skilled or high-skilled immigrants will migrate, natives think that those immigrants will be good for the economy of the host country and they can benefit from those immigrants, rather than paying more for their social services. Although those natives whose skills are substitute to immigrants are discontent with immigration flows, since they are few in number, the average of the population has pro-immigrant attitudes.

Kessler (2001) claims that not only non-economic, but also economic concerns affect public attitude toward immigrants. He argues that opinions on immigrants are created based on the individual self-interest of natives, regardless of economic or non-economic interest. However, in this chapter, I will focus more on the part where Kessler touches upon the impact of economic concerns and opinion on immigrants. Kessler argues that there is a significant relationship between the economic conditions of the US and the percentage of respondents who favor decreased immigration. In other words, in times of economic downturns and recessions, natives are more prone to be opposed to increased number of immigration flows. Kessler, also, focuses on the skill cleavages, which is one of the notions of economic concerns. By referring to skill cleavages, Kessler makes a distinction between low-skilled and high-skilled immigrants and claims that immigrants with different skill levels are affected by the anti-migrant or pro-immigrant attitudes in different levels. Thus, as a difference from the previous scholars, Kessler uses objective measures in order to measure economic concerns rather than referring to the subjective ideas, such as perception and prejudice. Kessler, based on objective measures, argues that people, who are employed in specific occupations which experience adverse effects on the wages due to the increase in the labor population with the migration flows, are more opposed to immigrants than people, who are employed in jobs and not experience such a threat of decrease in the wages.

Kessler constructs a relation between the skill levels and opposition to immigrants based on the trade hypothesis. According to the hypothesis of trade, when two countries start to trade, producers who produce in the same sector lose, because of the competition. While those producers, who are in the same sector and start to compete with each other, lose due to the decrease in the prices while the cost is stable, consumers

of that specific product gains thanks to the decrease in the prices. We can adopt the same hypothesis to immigration. When immigrants with the same skill levels with natives start to migrate, due to the increase in the population of the labor market in that specific sector, wages decrease and natives, who work in that sector, are hurt because of immigrants and embrace anti-migrant attitude. Those natives, whose skill levels are different from the skill levels of immigrants, are not affected by the immigration flows since immigrants do not have any impact on the labor market or wages. Also, since the wages are decreased, the prices are decreased, and people, who buy those products who immigrants and natives produce together in that sector, gain. Hence, based on the fact that immigrants are low skilled, low-skilled immigrants are in favor of restrictions immigration policies. High-skilled workers, who are not faced with the threat of the decrease of wages and who gain due to the relative decrease in the prices of products in specific sectors in which immigrants work, on the other hand, favor liberalizing immigration policies which enable more immigrants to enter. Particularly, while the low-skilled natives are more opposed to increased immigration flows, high-skilled natives, with some exceptions, have more pro-immigrant attitudes.

McLaren (2003) focuses on the impact of economic-based threats on the anti-immigrant attitude in Europe. She points three points with regard to the economic threats that are posed by immigrants. The first is the rise in the population of the host country with immigration flows, which increase the number of children in schools, especially in the long run. With family reunification, immigrants are able to bring their families to the host country as immigrants, and at the initial point, this situation increases number of children who have education in the schools of the host country. In the long run, also, the second and third generation immigrants are educated in the host country. With the increase in the population of schools, the quality of the education decreases. Based on the argument that the more educated people are, the more they favor immigration and oppose to expel immigrants. Thus, when the quality of education decreases in the country, natives blame immigrants and since natives cannot be educated enough to have pro-immigrant feelings.

The second point McLaren argues is based on the welfare system. When immigration flows are huge, there is a competition in the labor market. Hence, natives are obsessed with the increased unemployment due to immigrants migrate to the country and the idea that immigrant will steal natives' jobs. Although each and every native does not become

unemployed due to immigration flows, the idea that the level of unemployed in the country has increased, is enough to be against immigration. The third point is also related to the increased population in the host country. As well as there is a probability that natives lose jobs or wages decrease, also immigrants may stay unemployed since they cannot find any jobs in accordance with their skills and education levels. Thus, unemployed immigrants, or those who need social services may be dependent on benefit from the government. Even immigrants are not unemployed, since with the increase of population new transportation services should be built, the burden on the welfare state increases, which should be paid by taxes that come from natives. Hence, according to natives, immigrants abuse the social services system. As the author argues, rather than personal economic concerns, such as losing a job, dissatisfaction with the life or earning lower wages, the outlook of the national economic is more important in the creation of opinions and attitudes toward immigrants. For example, even if the native does not lose his job and is satisfied with his life, by looking at the national economy and increased levels of unemployment, he can relate the economic downturn of the country to immigration and breed anti-migrant attitude toward immigrants. If the national economy gets better with immigration flows, people tend to be more pro-immigrant.

In order to understand the attitude of natives toward immigrants, Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2005) make a survey. They argue that immigration has two different consequences in the labor market. First of all, the immigration flow increases the total supply of the labor in the host country relative to the other inputs of production, such as the capital. While the capital or other inputs stay constant, since the supply of labor increases, the balance changes in favor of the capital owners, rather than employers. Secondly, immigration flow changes the supply of some workers with specific skills, which will eventually change the balance between labor supplies of different skills. Since the authors state the fact that there is not sufficient data to prove the relation between the immigration flow and decrease in wages, they form a more plausible argument. They claim that low-skilled natives tend to have more anti-migrant attitudes toward immigrants on the belief or perception that immigrants will decrease the economic opportunities.

In order to understand whether economic prosperity of the host country have any impact on the opinion toward immigration, the authors analyze the GDP per capita of the host countries based on the European Social Survey. The authors find a weak relation

between the GDP per capita and opinion toward immigrants, which displays that the relation between the economic conditions of the host country and opinion toward immigrants is not statistically significant. The reason behind the analysis of the unemployment rate of host countries and they find a weak relation is to understand whether there is relation between labor market conditions of the host country and attitudes toward immigrants,. The findings prove that neither economic prosperity of the host country, nor the labor market conditions affect the attitudes of natives toward immigrants.

While some of the economic concerns cannot be proved by the data from the European Social Survey, the authors make some country specific claims based on the demographic conditions of the host country and immigrant populations. For example, they claim that countries with rapidly aging population are in favor of immigration due to the fact that immigrants increase the labor supply in the country. Also, immigration from richer countries than the host country is welcomed, while the immigration from poorer countries are faced with opposition based on the idea that those immigrants who come from poor countries will receive benefits from the government without paying taxes while immigrant from richer countries will contribute more to the national economy by paying more taxes and receiving fewer benefits. Also, rather than economic concerns, the authors state that immigrant population is significant in the creation of public opinion toward immigrants. For instance, they claim that, those countries where natives and immigrants have a degree of contact because of certain similarities, such as the language, will have less opposition toward immigrants.

As the last article that I mention in this chapter, Facchini and Mayda (2009) makes a detailed analysis on whether welfare state of the host country has an impact on the public attitude toward immigrants or not. The authors summarize the notion of economic concerns of natives in two points, as the labor market competition and welfare system. In accordance with the idea of labor market competition, Facchini and Mayda state that native workers welcome immigrants whose jobs are complementary to theirs. Similar skill levels and jobs between natives and immigrants increase the competition, create uncertainty and decrease the income. Henceforth, immigrants with similar skills to natives increase anti-immigrant attitude among natives, while immigrants with distinct skills with decrease it. The second model, welfare system, assumes that when immigrants are unskilled and unemployed, they create a burden on

natives in terms of welfare benefits, such as health and unemployment benefits, and increase opposition to immigration. On the contrary, skilled and employed immigrants will increase pro-immigration. With regard to the cost-benefit calculation of the welfare system, the inflow of unskilled immigrants create net cost for the welfare system, while the inflows of skilled immigrants cause net benefit for the welfare system.

Since welfare system is concerned not only with taxes, but also benefits that natives receive; the authors enlighten the relation between welfare system and opinion toward immigrants by analyzing two models of welfare system distinctly. The first model is the tax-adjustment model, which is based on the redistributive fiscal system. According to the welfare system model, unskilled immigrants cause costs for the welfare of the host country. Tax-adjustment model steps forward and claims that higher income natives are affected more negatively by the unskilled immigration than the lower income natives. Since taxes are adjusted in order to balance the budget of the government, when there is an inflow of unskilled immigrants, higher income natives pay more additional taxes than poor natives. In the same manner, when immigrants are skilled, higher income natives gain more than the lower income natives.

The second model of the welfare system is benefit adjustment model, which focuses on the welfare benefits keeping tax, rates constant. Considering the change in the per capita welfare benefits, when natives are more skilled than immigrants, immigrants use the benefits of the welfare system and the bottom of the lower class is hurt the most. The burden is on the lower class when natives are more skilled than immigrants, since immigrants receive benefits that should have been given to the lower class when immigrants did not migrate. On the other hand, when immigrants are more skilled than natives, they will make a contribution to the welfare system, or at least they will not use the welfare benefits of the host country, which will be used more by the lower income natives. Therefore, when immigrants are skilled, they benefit to the lower class natives more than higher class natives in terms of the social services. To sum up, according to the tax adjustment model, under the specific condition that immigrants are less skilled than natives, as the individual income increases, pro-immigration feelings decreases, due to the fact that the richer has to pay the more taxes. When immigrants are more skilled than natives, as individual income level increases, people tend to have more pro-immigrant attitudes. According to the benefit adjustment model, on the other hand, when immigrants are less skilled than natives, as the individual income increases, pro-

immigrant feelings increase, as opposed to the tax adjustment model. When immigrants are more skilled than natives, when level of income increases, people have more anti-migrant feelings.

Based on the data from 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Program that is a cross-country survey, the authors have some conclusions. The authors find that when natives on average are more skilled than immigrants, as the level of individual income increases, pro-immigration feelings decrease and when the level of individual skill increases, pro-immigration feelings tend to increase. Although the first finding can be considered as an impact of welfare system and the latter is an impact of labor market competition, the authors emphasize that both are in accordance with the welfare system models. While the former is based on tax adjustment model, the latter has characteristics of the benefit adjustment model. Also, Facchini and Mayda explain the reason that they look at the relation between the welfare system and opinion toward immigrants as the importance of the issue of public finance and the idea that labor market competition models are actually related to the welfare system models. Thus, explaining a phenomenon on attitudes toward immigrants only with labor market competition model is not sufficient; scholars should also clarify the welfare system. According to the authors, when it is claimed that skilled natives are less opposed to unskilled immigration, it cannot be explained through the lowness of the probability of unskilled immigrants to steal the jobs of skilled natives. The real explanation can be based on benefit adjustment model, which supports the claim by asserting that skilled immigrants do not use public services, and their usage is not limited with an increased level of unskilled immigrants who use social services.

1.2.2. Economic Conditions of the Host Country and Anti-Migrant Attitude

Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong (1997) emphasize the role of economic considerations on the public policies toward immigration. They point out that politicians and people, who want to restrict the number of immigration flows and the rights of immigrants, usually touch upon the some economic concerns, such as immigrants taking natives' jobs and immigrants receive services without paying taxes, which causes fiscal drain. Hence the authors use 1992 and 1994 National Election Survey in order to understand de facto relation between economic motivations and public attitudes toward immigrants. As Foner (1964) argues anti-immigrant attitudes toward immigrants in the United States

are generally caused by economic downturns in which natives put the blame of increased level of unemployment and shortage in the wages to immigrants. The authors refer to the model of ethnic competition by Olzak (1992), which argues that economic threat regardless of real, or perceived, create anti-immigration attitudes in the individual level. The authors touch upon the role of immigrants on the labor market, housing market and government benefits in the creation of economic vulnerability of the natives, which eventually creates anti-migrant attitude.

In order to construct an economic model of the opinions on immigration, the authors operationalize economic concerns in four main points. By using 1992 and 1994 National Election Surveys, the authors aim to enlighten the relation between each point and opinions on immigration. The first point is the “financial resources” which claims that the fear of immigration increases with financial stress. Since the resources are scarce, an increase in the number of population with migration flows endangers the availability of resources for natives. Thus, the insecurity about the future due to the increase in the population and the increase in the scarcity of resources also increase the economic vulnerability of natives. As natives become more vulnerable in economic terms, they become more hostile toward immigrants. The second point is the idea of “pessimism” which is based on the perception of natives, rather than de facto situation. Although there is not any real economic downturn, a belief or perceived threat of economic worsening and downward sloping increase the anti-migrant attitudes among natives.

The third point is “labor market competition” which is based on the idea of “job threat.” Since natives feel anxiety and fear about not finding an occupation or losing the jobs that have because of the high immigration flows, they are more prone to feel opposition feelings toward immigrants. As well as the anxiety that stems from losing their occupations to immigrants, natives are also anxious about the depression in wages in some of the occupations. As Borjas (1990), Passel (1994), and DeFreitas (1991) argue immigrants are generally low-skilled and they occupy lows-waged jobs, which prevent low-skilled workers to find jobs easily and even they had jobs before, immigrant may decrease the wages and natives may lose their jobs to immigrants. These situations based on the labor market competition between natives and immigrants increase the opposition opinions toward immigrants. The last point is the issue of tax burden, which is related to the idea of welfare state. The perception that taxes paid by natives are used

in favor of immigrants and the resentment that immigrants receive benefits even though they do not pay taxes, create an opposition toward immigrants within the native population. Since natives think that they pay more taxes in order to make immigrants receive benefits from the governments, which creates tax burden on natives, increase anti-migrant attitude in the host country. The research that the authors conduct proves that the relations between the anti-migrant attitude and notions of “pessimism,” “labor market competition,” and “fiscal burden” are not statistically significant. In other words, the authors find that the perceived downturn of economy, anxiety about one’s job security, being employed or unemployed or depression in the wages due to immigration flows, and resentment about the amount of taxes that natives should pay for benefits of immigrants do not have relation with the increase in opposition toward immigrants. Although three of the four points are proved to be insignificant in terms of the effect of those points on opinions of immigrants, the authors find a relation between the financial stresses that natives feel because of economic insecurity and anti-migrant attitudes in the host country. According to their research, while pessimism about the economy, losing job, decrease of the wages, and paying more taxes do not have any effect, financial stress and the economic vulnerability is positively correlated with opposition toward immigrants. The authors also find that rather than the individual economic conditions and perceptions of natives, collective ideas and the stress about the national economy have more effect on the opposition against immigrants.

Burns and Gimpel (2000) question an important argument supported by respected scholars, such as Huber and Espenshade (1997), that the main reason behind the opposition against immigration is economic. Burns and Gimpel claim that the reason of the creation of public opinion toward immigrants does not stem from only the idea of economic self-interest or the notion of symbolic prejudice toward immigrants who have different ethnicities and languages. The authors argue that those two ideas, economic self-interest and symbolic prejudice are complementary, not rival. Thus, they state that in order to understand the rationale behind the public opinion toward immigrants, we should consider both notions because economic security partly reinforces prejudice toward immigrants. Their main argument stands as that the prejudice is based on the economic conditions of citizens and the reason of anti-migrant attitudes within the society is economic anxiety. In order to test this hypothesis, they use American National Election Survey (ANES) from 1992 to 1996. They operationalize economic conditions

in five points; one's financial position, one's forecast on national economy, education level, income level, and welfare use. By looking at those five points, they clarify the relation between economic concerns and prejudice, which form the public opinion toward immigrants.

Between the years 1992 and 1996 by looking at ANES results they find different correlations between five points and public opinion toward immigrants. First of all, there is a moderate relation between one's personal economic outlook and opinion toward immigrants. Contrary to the general thought, as the financial position of the native decreases, he becomes more prone to favor the increased immigration, based on the data from 1992. On the other hand, as the forecast on the national economy of natives decreases, people less favor increased immigration. In other word, although the personal economic conditions of natives do not have an impact on the opinion toward immigrants, if natives start to think that the national economy suffers, they tend to have anti-migrant attitude. This finding is in accordance with the argument of Simon and Alexander (1993), which claims that the opposition to immigration increases because of economic recessions and downturn. Thus, rather than the relation between the economic position of each and every individual in the country and anti-migrant attitude, the relation between the whole economic situation of the country in national level and opposition toward immigration is statistically more significant. In terms of the level of education, the authors find that as the level of education of the native increases, he earns more money, which at the end makes him less vulnerable to economic downturns. Since the level of education decreases the threat of economic downturn, educated natives are less prone to oppose to increased immigration.

The authors, also, find that natives with higher incomes do not favor increased level of immigration flows. Although the reason behind the increased anti-migrant attitudes within higher-income natives can be explained with the welfare system, the authors explain the attitude toward welfare use with negative racial stereotyping. Thus, rather than the income levels, the most important reason of the attitude toward welfare use is the race of immigrants. Burns and Gimpel, at the end of their research, find that, rather than solely racial factors, economic concerns also have an impact on opposition to immigrants. Economic downturns, especially in the national level rather than the personal economic concerns, activate prejudices against immigrants, which reestablish the relation between economic hardships and anti-migrant attitude.

Sides and Citrin (2007) make a new point to the argument on attitudes toward immigrants and they introduce the interest-based theory. Interest-based theory assumes that immigrants pose a threat to the economic prosperities of natives due to an ethnic competition between immigrants and natives over scarce resources of the country. According to this theory, the problem stems from the differences between identities of natives and immigrants that in turn display itself in material well-being of natives. In order to test this argument, the authors construct some hypothesis and analyze them by using the data of European Social Survey. The first hypothesis that the authors form is that the native who has negative assessments about not only his own economic well-being, but also the national economic outlook, will be against immigration. The first hypothesis assumes that economic condition of the whole nation is as important as the personal economic prosperity and so the negative assessments on both will cause anti-immigrant attitude. The authors find that as the economic satisfaction increases, opposition to immigration decreases, which is in accordance with the hypothesis. When natives are satisfied with the economic prosperity of the nation and their households, they become less opposed to immigration. The authors support the same hypothesis by analyzing the relation between economic anxiety and opposition to immigration and they find a negative correlation. As economic anxiety of natives increase, they are more prone to opposition toward immigration. Thus, the first hypothesis is supported by the evidence from the European Social Survey and they conclude that the negative assessment of natives on their personal material well being and national economic outlook as a whole create anti-migrant attitude.

The second hypothesis claims that natives who experience direct competition with immigrants are more opposed to immigration. The authors construct a relation between being in a direct competition with immigrants and income, and they state that natives who directly compete with immigrants in the labor market are lower-income natives. Hence, they analyze the relation between the level of income of natives and their opinions toward immigrants. Their findings display that the level of income of natives does not have impact on their attitudes toward immigrants, so they cannot conclude that lower-income natives are more opposed to immigration. The third hypothesis related to economic concerns is based on the relation between economic hardships and anti-migrant attitude. The hypothesis assumes that a greater economic hardship, which is explained as the level of unemployment in the country, increases the opposition toward

immigration. Although this is a well-known hypothesis among scholars due to the idea that competition between natives and immigrants in the labor market, the authors do not find any relation between unemployment and opposition to immigration. Based on the data, the authors also find that the more the GDP of the country, the less hostile natives become toward immigrants. In order to clarify the importance of the idea of economic concerns in the creation of public attitudes toward immigrants, the authors make an important contribution. They say that economic concerns are more significant than racial or identity-based concerns in poorer countries. The poorer the host country is, the more economic concerns count for anti or pro-immigrant attitudes.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

As I have illustrated in the first chapter, there is a considerable number of scholars who study the relation between economic concerns of citizens of the host country and their attitudes toward immigrants. Although the notion of economic concern is defined with different models, such as labor market competition model and welfare state model, in my thesis, I will focus on the national economic outlook as an indicator of economic concerns. Based on my hypothesis, which assumes anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament level has increased in Greece and Spain due to the worsening of national economic outlooks of those countries with sovereign debt crisis, my independent variable becomes the sovereign debt crisis and the national economic outlooks of Greece and Spain, while the dependent variable becomes the change in the voting of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians for the documents related to immigration issue. In this chapter, I will first conceptualize the notions that I have used while forming my hypothesis in order to test the hypothesis clearly in the previous chapter. I will analyze the Euro zone crisis; its emergence, evolution and effects to the European Union. Then, I will explain why I have chosen Spain and Greece. Then, I will give information about the effects of the Euro zone crisis on Spain and Greece while giving reference to the data that displays how Spanish and Greek economies have changed after the crisis. Then, I will conclude the chapter pointing out which research method I will use in order to test my hypothesis.

2.1. The Emergence and Evolution of Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe

Although scholars, who write on the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, cannot unite on the policies and reforms that the European Central Bank (ECB) or the national states should follow in order to get over the crisis, they all agree that the crisis in Europe have been severely affected by the financial crisis in the United States in 2007. Thus, without understanding the reasons and effects of the financial crisis in the United States, it is difficult to explain the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Therefore, in this part, I will explain the causes and the results of the US financial crisis, in other words, “mortgage crisis.” Then, I will touch upon different views on how financial crisis in the United

States contaminate to Europe and starting with Greece, affected national economies of Europe, as well as the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Carmassi, Gros and Micossi (2009) present the reasons of the global financial crisis that started in the United States in their article. They categorize the reasons of the crisis in two branches; the first is the historical perspective and the other is a quantitative indicator. According to the authors, from historical perspective, one of the reasons of the speculative bubble, which caused global financial crisis, is the existence of large payment imbalances between the main countries and other, peripheral regions. As Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Pauly (2009) argue, too, the lack of the appropriate global financial markets increases the payment imbalances within the global market. Thus, the combination of current payment imbalances and the lack of necessary financial markets to overcome those imbalances is one of the reasons of the global financial crisis from the historical perspective. The second reason is the credit boom, especially in the housing market, which eventually leads leverage, which signifies higher return with higher risk (Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003). The third reason from the historical perspective is high levels of financial innovation and financial intermediaries, which aim securitization that will lead higher return with lower risk. Credit expansion and increase in the asset prices are the quantitative indicators, which aim to explain the emergence of global financial crisis from the quantitative perspective, rather than historical one. According to the authors, from the quantitative perspective, increase in leverage due to the expansion in credits and unusual increase in the asset prices, together, emerge global financial crisis.

From the historical perspective and with quantitative indicators, the authors explain the basis of the global financial crisis with the fault of banks by giving high mortgage bonds to riskier lenders, who may not pay their debt back to the bank. Risky lending and explosion of derivative contracts, which is a form of financial intermediary, generate the basis of the US financial crisis. According to the authors, excessive leverage creates a vicious circle. As the level of leverage increases, asset prices increases, too. High level of asset prices causes high level of securitization, which eventually increases the level of credits. Since the level of credits increases, the level of leverage increases more. Since banks think that they will get more return despite the risk is higher due to the high leverage, they tend to lend money recklessly to those people who may not pay their debts. This was the situation in the United States in 2007, which caused financial crisis.

The increase in the financial innovation and the lack of regulation on financial intermediaries increase the asset prices and the level of leverage, which eventually made banks to make reckless lending. When banks lend money to those people who had no chance to pay the debt of their mortgage credits, the banks bailed out and the country became face to face with financial crisis.

Crotty (2009) claims that the real reason behind the global financial crisis is the new financial architecture, which is described as the integration of financial markets with light regulations, especially with the deregulation trend after 1980s. The author argues that the new financial architecture creates a circle that starts with financial innovation and the creation of financial intermediaries. Financial innovation causes financial booms, which ends with crisis. In order to rescue from the crisis, countries bail out and this enables new expansion, then again results with crisis and bailouts. As the amount of crisis increases, financial markets grow larger and the level of leverage increases, which at the end makes the financial crisis more threatening. The culminating point of this circle is the financial crisis that started in 2007 in the United States. According to Crotty, new financial architecture creates more risks, which cause crisis and booms. Financial innovation enables the creation of financial products, but since they are too complex, it is difficult to price them. Regulators allow banks to measure their own risks due to the light regulations and banks can set their own capital requirements, which increase the system-wide threat of the financial crisis due to the increase in the asset prices and leverage.

Claessens, Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2010) categorize the reasons of the global financial crisis that started in the United States, based on similarities to the previous financial crisis. Pre-crisis conditions that are similar to the previous crisis are sharp increase in the asset prices, credit expansion, which lead to excessive debt burdens due to the reckless lending and inability of lenders to pay their debts, marginal loans, systemic risks, and increase in leverage and decline in lending conditions, which eventually cause increased level of debts. While those characteristics are similar to the previous crisis, there are some conditions, which are newly emerged with 2007 financial crisis. Those are; financial intermediaries and instruments, which is named as financial innovation by Carmassi et. al, increased interconnections between financial markets in different countries, and household indebtedness. Global financial crisis, as different from the previous financial crisis, started in households. Since the households

overextended due to the increased mortgage loans, people cut their consumption in order to pay their debts to the banks, which indirectly led to unemployment. Despite Rose and Spiegel (2009) claim that global factors, rather than country specific conditions play role in financial crisis, the authors argue that there are some exceptional countries, which are more tend to experience crisis due to their conditions. For example, from the cross-country analysis, the authors find that countries with larger current account deficits and countries that have run-ups in the asset prices are more likely to experience crisis harder than the other countries. Also, higher credit growth before the crisis increases the level of severity of the crisis in that specific country.

The global financial crisis, started in the United States, contracted the global GDP for the first time after the Second World War (Hodson and Quaglia 2009). While the reasons and the effects of the crisis in the United States are huge, the main question is how it can easily spread to the other regions in a very short time, especially to Europe? Due to the global financial crisis, the GDP of the European Union fell four percent in 2009, which signifies the first recession of the Union since 1990s. Also, unemployment in the Union increased to 5.4 million people between Marc 2008 and May 2009 (Hodson and Quaglia 2009). Claessens et. al claim that the reason of the expansion of the 2007 financial crisis in the United States to most of the countries in the other regions, especially to Europe, is the international financial connections. Since advanced or newly emerged economies are more integrated to the financial markets and trade in the global level, they are the most hurt countries from the crisis. From the cross country analysis, the authors argue that the reasons of being hurt from the crisis are home grown vulnerabilities, rapid credit growth, high leverage, increase in the asset prices, and large account imbalances. The economies that satisfy the majority of those conditions are tend to be affected more from the financial crisis.

Also, due to the global financial connections, those countries which have close economic and financial relations with the United States, such as countries that are directly exposed to the asset backed securities, are more likely to experience the crisis and this becomes the reason why Europe was affected directly by the US financial crisis. Through the direct exposure to the US backed assets and funding problems in the European countries made the jump of the financial crisis to Europe easier. First, banks in Germany and France were affected from those US originated assets and from those countries, crisis spread to other European countries through “common lender effects.”

(Claessens et. al, p.274) To sum up, the authors analyze the reasons of the effect of the US financial crisis on the non-US countries as direct exposure to the US originated assets, vulnerability of the non-US economies due to the dependency on external funding and household indebtedness, and being a small economy which is dependent exports through trade linkages with the United States.

Similar to the argument of Claessens et. al, Raddatz (2009) claims that the emerging markets, which are dependent on external financing, such as exports or funding, are affected due to capital account and bank funding pressures. Carmassi et. al also argue that financial stress within the European banks and their vulnerability, EU banks became more open to the exposure to the losses from the US assets. Also, Crotty argues that new financial architecture creates interdependency, which generates the contagious effect of the possible booms and crisis and forms a systemic risk. Accordingly, Hodson and Quaglia claim that since German and French banks had bought US loans and assets, when mortgage market was collapsed in the US due to the credit expansion, high asset prices, high leverage and unregulated financial innovation, those European banks were affected heavily. The financial interconnectedness between the European and US banks enabled the financial crisis in the United States to spread to Europe easily. As well as German and French banks in Europe, Iceland, which was heavily dependent on the external funding and foreign assets, was severely affected from the financial crisis and could not find any alternative policy options to be rescued from the crisis. In the same manner, the reason why Hungary was affected heavily due to the financial crisis in the United States is high debt levels and current account deficit it has, as well as domestic borrowers' dependency on foreign loans (Hodson and Quaglia, p. 942).

Lane (2012) roots the sovereign debt crisis in Europe to 2007 global financial crisis. He argues that global financial crisis in the United States cause rapid credit growth and external deficits in the periphery countries of the Euro zone. Thus, in those periphery countries, after the global financial crisis; domestic recession, distress in the banking sector, losses of loans, and decrease in the foreign investment, which all together led to the sovereign debt crisis, occur. Nelson, Belkin, Mix and Weiss (2012) argue that the initial point of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is late 2009, when new Greek government reveals that the previous governments did not inform the European authorities correctly about their budget. When the misinformation is revealed, it is clarified that the deficit level of Greece is higher than the expected level. Thus, investor

confidence to Greece decreases while the bond spreads increases, which cause Greece to receive a financial assistance package from the other Euro zone countries, dominantly Germany and France, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2010. The same year, Ireland and in 2011, Portugal receive financial assistance, too. Then, the sovereign debt crisis spread to Italy and Spain, two of the biggest economies of the Euro zone.

The first reason of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is high levels of public debt and government deficits (Nelson et. al 2012). Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2011) approve that the main reason behind the crisis in Greece, Portugal and Italy is high fiscal deficit and public debt. Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Spair (2011) represent the large current account deficits and spending beyond the budget by expanding the level of public and private debt as the common reasons of the crisis in the periphery Euro zone countries like Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. In the Euro zone periphery countries, with the introduction of euro as a common currency, capital inflow and public and private debt of the governments have increased. Despite public and private sector in those countries took advantage of the cheap credit that have come from the core countries of the Euro zone, periphery countries were unable to use those capital inflows for productive investments. Thus, those capital inflows increased their debts rather than help them to pay their debts to the core economies of Euro zone. During the global financial crisis, since capital markets are frozen, households, public or private sectors roll over their debts.

Lane also considers the debt level of the countries in the Euro zone is an important reason for the start of sovereign debt crisis. He argues that rather than the aggregate level; the ratio of public debt to GDP in some countries is significant. He claims that in Italy, Greece, Spain and Ireland the ratio of public debt to GDP has always been higher than the other countries. Although according to the European fiscal rules, debt to GDP ratio should not exceed 60%, the ratios of Italy and Greece were over 90% in the early 1990s, and never became less than 60%. As well as the level of debt of countries, the level of government deficits is another important reason. As Lane argues, with the introduction of the euro, there has been an increase in the persistence of current account imbalances in some of the Euro zone countries. Between 2003 and 2007, for instance, the percentage of external deficit is -9.1% in Greece and -7% in Spain. Current account imbalances in some of the countries increased the reallocation of resources from the high-income countries of the Euro area to capital-scarce low-income countries, which

according to Nelson et. al, led to the political crisis, while provoking protests against austerity measures in the periphery countries and trigger resentment within the citizens of stronger economies.

The second reason of the sovereign debt crisis is the weakness of the European bank system. Lane argues that, the reason of the severe effect of the global financial crisis on the periphery countries of Euro area is the dependency of the European banks on the US money market as a source of dollar finance. Also, through financial intermediaries, European investment banks buy the financial derivative instruments of the US banks with high leverage. When global financial crises occur, some of European banks, which have bought US assets, are bailed-out. Also, as Hodson and Quaglia argue that the integration of European banks prevents rescuing banks within the EU, which poses another challenge to the bank system in Europe. Carmassi et. al argue that weakness of the European banks stems from the problem that the European banks reduce the capital requirements. Akdoğu (2012) indicates in her article that the real reason behind the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is credit default swaps (CDS) and increased bond spreads and her explanation to the contagious nature of the crisis from the periphery countries to whole Europe is the close linkages and interconnectedness between the ECB and national banks. According to the author, the risk and the threat posed by the sovereign debt crisis has been spread due to the integrated financial and banking system in the European Union.

The third reason is the lack of economic growth and the increase of unemployment. Prokopijevic (2010) claims that poor economic conditions in the periphery countries in the Euro zone restrain those countries to manage and regulate the crisis. Also, indebtedness of the US households is observed in the periphery countries in Europe. Since households are the main debtors due to the credits and banks lend those people with few conditions, when global financial crisis hit Europe, households cannot pay their debts and limit their consumption. When consumption is limited in those countries, they start to display poor economic performances, which in turn affect the unemployment level. As households limit their consumption, economic growth of those countries is hurt and the level of unemployment increases, such as in Spain.

The fourth reason of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is the lack of competitiveness and trade deficits in the countries, which are hurt by the crisis. As Nelson et. al claim

that the increasing level of prices in the periphery countries decreases the level of their competitiveness. Since the prices of the products that are produced in the periphery countries, the other Euro zone countries do not prefer them. Thus, the level of competitiveness of the periphery countries decreases and those countries face with external deficits. At the end, those countries have to lend from the other Euro zone countries or other institutions. However, as long as they cannot decrease the prices of their products, they cannot increase their competitiveness and cannot pay their debts to those lenders. As Prokopijevic argues PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) lose their competitiveness due to the fast-grown prices, which divert foreign investment to the other countries and obstruct the recovery of the PIIGS.

The fifth reason of the sovereign debt crisis is about the structure of the Euro zone. Prokopijevic considers that the main reason for the Euro crisis stems from the instability of the euro. He claims that the problems related to the euro have been observed since the emergence of the European Monetary Union. The author argues that the lack of fiscal policies in some of the countries in the Euro area and the lack of ability of European Central Bank and the other authorities of the European Union to discipline and control the member states, give rise to the sovereign debt crises and increase the effect for some countries, especially the periphery countries. Prokopijevic, also, questions the common currency, which was first thought in The Hague in 1969, realized in 1999 and come into circulation in 2002. In order to become a member of the European Monetary Union and adopt the “euro” as a currency, a nation-state should adopt 5 criteria, which are named as convergence criteria. The first criterion dictates that the inflation rate of the country should not exceed the sum of 1.5% and the average inflation rates of three EMU countries with lowest rankings. The second criterion requires budgetary deficit to be below 3% of the GDP of the country. The third point is on the public debt and it requires the country’s public debt to be under 60% of the GDP. The fourth criterion requires the long-term interest rate should be lower than the sum of 2% and the average of the three member countries with the lowest interest rates. The last criterion dictates that the currency of the country, which will become a member of the EMU, should not fluctuate more than $\pm 15\%$.

Prokopijevic states that those convergence criteria are problematic in two senses. First of all, fulfilling the second and the third criterion does not make a sense economically. Requiring the budgetary deficit to be under 3% of the GDP and public debt to be lower

than 60% of the GDP at the same time is not appropriate economically. Secondly, in 1999 only seven countries out of fifteen members of the EMU fulfill those requirements to be a member of the EMU and adopt common currency. Also, after the introduction of the euro, there has always been at least one country that violates the criteria. For example, except for 2006, Greece has violated the budgetary deficit rule each and every year. Thus, in 1997, with the emergence of the Stability and Growth Pack, fine has been introduced for those countries that have violated the budgetary deficit rule. Regarding the violation of other criteria, European Community or the European Central Bank has the authority for only public warning. According to the author, only fining or warning publicly member countries, rather than excluding them from the Euro zone increases the risk for the whole Euro area, as we have observed in the sovereign debt crisis.

Bolton and Olivier (2011) explains the real reason of the sovereign debt crisis as the presence of the monetary union without fiscal integration within the European Union. Lane analyzes the relation between the “euro” and sovereign debt crisis in three points; first of all, the institutional design of the “euro” inherently amplifies fiscal risks, especially in the pre-crisis period. Second point is that the same institutional design of the “euro” increases the impacts of the crisis when it occurs. The third point is on the post-crisis period. The author argues that the restricting policies of the monetary union shape the duration and effect of the recovery period after the crisis. Nelson et. al touches upon the significance of the introduction of common currency on the sovereign debt crisis. The authors argue that the “euro” prevents national authorities to depreciate their currencies so they cannot come over their trade deficits. Also the “euro” as a common currency restrains national governments to raise their interest rates. To sum up, since a common currency within the euro-area prevents depreciating the currency and increasing the interest rates, the structure of the Euro zone precludes periphery countries to increase their competitiveness and decrease trade deficits.

As well as the structure of the Euro zone, the key policy makers in the Euro area are considered as one of the important reasons of the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis and the inability to recover the countries that are severely hit by the crisis. For example, De Grauwe (2010) points the Euro zone authorities as one of the three actors of the crisis, between Greece and the financial markets. De Grauwe blames Greece because of the Greek authority’s mismanagement of the budgetary issues and blames financial markets due to their destabilization role, errors of the rating agencies, which cause the

booms of budget deficits and government debt levels. According to the authors, the Euro zone authorities are as guilty as the other actors for the emergence and mismanagement of the pre and post-crisis period because of the hesitation of those authorities (national government authorities and ECB) to support Greece. Nelson et. al argues that the disagreement among the key players within the Euro area prevents taking an appropriate measure for the crisis and increases the impact of the crisis on the Euro zone. Begg (2009) considers the real reason of the crisis is the failure of the regulatory policies in the Euro zone. Similarly, Pauly (2009), also, argues that the unwillingness of the national authorities to cope with the crisis together and their reluctance to cooperate with the other authorities, while Hodson and Quaglia praises the ad-hoc cooperation between the United Kingdom, which is not a member of the Euro area, and the other Euro zone members states.

The last reason for the emergence and evolution of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is the specific conditions of those countries, which have been affected most, possess. Although all those reasons that I have touched upon above are important indicators for the sovereign debt crisis, country-specific factors, which change from one state to another, are also significant and change the effect and duration of the crisis in those countries. As Nelson et. al argues, Greece was hit by the sovereign debt crisis mostly because the poor management of the financial resources by Greek governments. As Greece spends more on public sector jobs and benefits, people in Greece are more tend to have a job that is affiliated with the government. Thus, young population inclines to the public sector job, while the private sector remains lacked of entrepreneurs, which will increase the private investments in the country. The increase in the government spending on public sector decreases the private spending and investment in the country, which will eventually cause a decrease in the taxes. The absence of investment and tax erosion prevents Greek governments to pay their debts and so external deficit of the country increases. Marzinotto et. al (2010) emphasizes the Greek public debt to the mismanagement of the public finances and the 150% overrun of the debt/GDP ratio, while explaining the difference of Greece from the other countries in Europe in the process of crisis.

Nelson et. al explains the country-specific conditions of Ireland as “oversized banking system” (Nelson et. al, p.4) while Portugal was hit due to the absence of competitiveness in the country. Since the prices in Portugal are high, it cannot compete

with the other countries in trade, so the level of competitiveness of Portugal decreases, which will end with an increase of external deficits and a decrease in the economic growth of Portugal. Thus, Portugal becomes one of the slowest growing countries in Europe. The most significant reason of why Italy has been hit by the crisis is its high public debt and Spain, the country-specific factor is observed as the real estate bubble, similar to the United States. According to Lane, with an increase in the housing sector and a credit boom, the construction activity increases. When securitization boom in the global financial market affects Spain, the construction activity falls dramatically and fiscal revenues that are sensitive to the taxes, which are taken from the construction sector, decrease. Eventually, a debt accumulation due to the real estate bubble prepares the appropriate conditions for Spain to be hit by the sovereign debt crisis.

2.2. Why Greece and Spain?

In my hypothesis, I specifically focus on two periphery countries of the Euro zone; Greece and Spain. Although there are other countries, such as Ireland and Portugal, which have been severely affected by the crisis, I choose Greece and Spain for explicit reasons. I will point those reasons separately as national economic outlooks of those countries, which I consider as an indicator of the notion of economic concerns, political situation in Greece and Spain after they have been hit by the crisis, history of those countries in the European Union (since I focus on the anti-migrant attitude at the EU level), their geographical conditions and the history of Greece and Spain as an immigration country.

2.2.1. National Economic Conditions of Greece and Spain

Although country-specific conditions show varieties between Greece and Spain, they are both hit by the sovereign debt crisis due to the common factors that cause the crisis in the Euro zone, such as the structure of the euro or the weak banking system. In this part, I will analyze the national economic outlooks of Greece and Spain focusing specifically on the period during and after the crisis. Taking the initial time of the sovereign debt crisis as 2009, I will compare the national economic outlooks of Greece and Spain for a ten-year period. I will analyze the national data on the percentage of

unemployment, GDP per capita, the percentage of public debt, the percentage of economic growth and the percentage of budget deficit.

In terms of the unemployment rate, the statistics of both Greece and Spain have increased in ten years. Especially after the sovereign debt crisis in 2009, the increase in the percentages of unemployment is dramatic in both countries. According to the World Bank Indicators, in 2003, unemployment rate of Greece was 9.7 %, while in Spain it was 11.3%. From 2004 to the first quarter of 2013, unemployment rate for Greece is as follows; 10.5% in 2004, 9.8% in 2005, 8.9% in 2006, 8.3% in 2007, 7.7% in 2008, 9.5% in 2009, 12.5% in 2010 (World Bank Indicators), 17.7% in 2011, 24.3% in 2012 (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) and 26.8% as of March 2013 (Eurostat). According to the World Bank Indicators, from 2004 to 2010 unemployment rate in Spain changes as follows; 11.0% in 2004, 9.2% in 2005, 8.5% in 2006, 8.3% in 2007, 11.3% in 2008, 18.0% in 2009, and 20.1% in 2010. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe indicates that the unemployment rate in 2011 is 21.6%, 25.0% in 2012, and according to Eurostat, unemployment rate in Spain increases to 26.6% in March 2013. While until 2008 unemployment rates for both countries evolve around 10%, after the sovereign debt crisis in 2009, data have increased dramatically as it is shown in Figure 2.1. Thus, we can conclude that in both countries, after the crisis, unemployment rates have increased, but the unemployment rates in Spain have always been higher than the unemployment rates in Greece for ten years.




Figure 2.1: Unemployment percentages in Greece and Spain between 2003 and 2013 (Data is supplied from the World Bank Indicators (2003-2010), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2011-2012), and Eurostat (2013))

With regard to the data on GDP per capita until 2012, a similar trend in the change of the unemployment rate is observed. According to the World Bank statistics, GDP per capita in current US dollars in Greece changes as follows; 17.494 in 2003, 20.607 in 2004, 21.621 in 2005, 23.475 in 2006, 27.288 in 2007, 30.399 in 2008, 28.452 in 2009, 28.851 in 2010, 25.631 in 2011, and 22.083 in 2012. In Spain in 2003 GDP per capita in US dollars is 21.042, while in 2004 24.469, 26.056 in 2005, 28.025 in 2006, 32.118 in 2007, 34.977 in 2008, 31.714 in 2009, 29.956 in 2010, 31.985 in 2011, and 29.195 in 2012. While both in Greece and Spain GDP per capita increases steadily until 2009, in 2009, due to the sovereign debt crisis, both countries face a dramatic decrease in the GDP per capita as it can be observed in Figure 2.2. From 2009 to 2012, in Greece experiences a steep decrease without any increase, while GDP per capita in Spain witnesses an increase in 2011, which can be explained as the increase in exports (Eijo Cánovas, 2011).




Figure 2.2: GDP per capita in terms of US Dollars in Greece and Spain between 2003 and 2012 (Data: World Bank Indicators)

Based on the Eurostat data, percentage of general government gross debt to GDP varies differently among years. Percentage of public debt to GDP in Greece, starting from 2003 is as follows; 97.4% in 2003, 98.6% in 2004, 100.0% in 2005, 106.1% in 2006, 107.4% in 2007, 112.9% in 2008, 129.7% in 2009, 148.3% in 2010, 170.3% in 2011, and 156.9% in 2012. Percentage of public debt in Spain to the GDP is 48.8% in 2003, 46.3% in 2004, 43.2% in 2005, 39.7% in 2006, 36.3% in 2007, 40.2% in 2008, 53.9% in 2009, 61.5% in 2010, 69.3% in 2011, and 84.2% in 2012. As Figure 2.3 indicates, while the percentage of public debt to GDP increases before the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, in Spain the ratio of public debt tends to decrease before the crisis. However, starting with 2007, a dramatic increase is observed in the ratios of public debt to GDP.

In terms of economic growth of Greece and Spain, Figure 2.4 displays that although there are increases and decreases in terms of the economic growth in both countries, between 2007 and 2009, both countries experience a sharp decline. Whereas the decline of the economic growth in Spain is steady, the percentage of the annual change of Greek GDP continues to decline. While it is 3.5% in 2007, it sharply declines to -0.2% in 2008, and continues to decrease to -7.1% in 2011. An increase in the economic growth of Spain from 2009 to 2011 can be explained by the increase in exports between those years in Spain as El Pais claims.




Figure 2.3: Percentage of public debt to GDP in Greece and Spain between 2003 and 2012(Data:Eurostat)




Figure 2.4: Economic growth (annual GDP growth percentage) of Greece and Spain between 2003 and 2012 (Data: World Bank Indicators)

In terms of the budget deficit, Eurostat data demonstrates that since 2003, Greece has budget deficit rather than surplus, but the ratio of government deficit to GDP varies in ten year-period. In Greece, from 2003 to 2012, there is not any sign for budget surplus. The values have always been on the negative side since 2003. However, even though

the values display budget deficit, in 2009, the rates change significantly. While before the sovereign debt crisis, budget deficit ratio to GDP changes over -5%, in 2009, a sharp increase to -15.6% is observed in Greece. In Spain, while before the sovereign debt crisis, the economic environment is more hoping compared to Greece, with the ratio of budget deficit to GDP not exceeding -0.3% (observed in 2003) in Spain, in 2009 it jumps dramatically to -11.2%. Before 2009, Spain has barely experienced budget deficits, but with the sovereign debt crisis, it witnessed the ratios over -10%. As Figure 2.5 demonstrates, sharpest declines are realized in 2009 in both countries. After 2009, both countries cannot realize the ratios of their budget deficit before the crisis.




Figure 2.5: The ratio of budget deficit/surplus to GDP in Greece and Spain between 2003 and 2012 (Data: Eurostat)

Although unemployment rates, GDP per capita, ratios of public debt to GDP, percentages of annual GDP change (economic growth), and ratios of budget deficit/surplus are different in Greece and Spain, the trends that they have witnessed in ten year-period, from 2003 to 2013, are similar. They experience the sharpest declines with regard to GDP per capita, ratio of public debt, and economic growth with the sovereign debt crisis, which coincides with 2009. Also, in both countries the most dramatic increases in the unemployment rate and budget deficit are observed in the same year, 2009. Whereas 2009 is the break point in terms of the negative change in the national economic outlooks of Greece and Spain, in some cases the signals of significant changes display themselves before the initial time of the sovereign debt

crisis, starting in 2007 and intensifying in 2008. Since, both Greece and Spain have affected in similar ways from the crisis and their national economic outlooks have changes dramatically after 2009, sovereign debt crisis becomes a natural break point for this study and paves the way to compare Greece and Spain.

2.2.2. Political Situation in Greece and Spain after the Sovereign Debt Crisis

While analyzing the political situation in Greece and Spain after 2009, the most important indicator that I will look at is the elections after the crisis and whether they would bring change in the national parliaments or not. Thus, rather than a period before the sovereign debt crisis, I will more focus on significant political changes with a special emphasize on the elections. Since in both countries, there are national elections after 2009, I will analyze the consequences of those elections and the political ideologies of the dominant parties in new Greek and Spanish national parliaments.

Greece has witnessed one of its more tempestuous political environments in its history with the sovereign debt crisis. Although, the country has witnessed military coups, such as, 1922 coup d'état, which is called as a Revolution since the Greek monarch was collapsed and 1967 coup d'état (Veremes, 1997), which continued as a military junta for seven years, the frequent and rapid changes in the Parliament are relatively new. The last election before the crisis hit Greece are done in 2007, in which New Democracy Party under the leadership of Karamanlis became the first party with 41.8% of the votes. The second party is PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) with the 38.1% of the votes and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) stands for the third party with 8.1% of total votes. In 2009, Prime Minister Karamanlis calls for early elections due to the scandals of the government, which can be considered as the first signal of the sovereign debt crisis on Greek politics (Smith, 2009). In 2009 elections, PASOK, the second party of 2007 elections, wins 43.9% of total votes and Papandreou becomes the new Prime Minister of Greece, while New Democracy gets 33.4% of votes and becomes the second party. KKE protects its third position though its votes decrease to 7.5% of total votes. Due to the decrease in the votes of New Democracy, Karamanlis leaves his status as a president of the party to Antonis Samaras.

Election in 2009 is not the only early election in Greece after it is hit by the sovereign debt crisis. In 2012, due to the criticisms by Samaras, the leader of the opposition party, New Democracy, on the second aid package that Greece has received, and an early

election takes place (Wearden, 2012). According to the elections in May 2012, New Democracy under the leadership of Samaras takes 18.8% of the votes and followed by SYRIZA, which is a coalition party of the Radical Left-Unitary Social Front, with 16.7% of total votes. PASOK, the previous incumbent party, gets 13.1% of the votes and becomes the third party under the leadership of Venizelos, who is preceded by Papandreou, who leaves his office to Venizelos in March 2012. Since the votes of top three parties are too close to each other, there cannot be a dominant incumbent party in Greece, so a coalition is needed. However, since those parties cannot form a coalition, based on the Constitution the President dissolves the government and calls for another election. In June 2012 elections, New Democracy with Samaras gets 29.6% of the votes, while SYRIZA gets 26.8% of the votes. The third party again becomes PASOK with 12.2% of total votes. As it is in the case in May 2012 elections, since any party can achieve the necessary percentage for an overall majority, the biggest party, New Democracy, calls all parties to form a government which will respect the agreement of bail-out that Greece has signed. Thus, the new government excludes Golden Dawn, which is a nationalist, extremist right wing party, although it has almost 7% of total votes and gets 18 seats in the Parliament.

As well as the early elections due to the critics to the incumbent parties on economic issues, such as debt or austerity measures, the significant rise of an ultranationalist party like Golden Dawn in June 2012 elections is an important indicator for the change in Greek politics after the sovereign debt crisis. As Greece, which has several military regimes and coup attempts, Spain has witnessed an enduring military regime headed by General Franco from 1939 to his death 1975. After the dictatorship of Franco, Spain experiences a more stable democracy, lack of any military rule, compared to Greece. For example, the first Prime Minister of Spain after the Franco regime is Adolfo Suarez, who is affiliated to CDS (Democratic and Social Centre), which is a centre party, and he serves for five years. After Suarez, Felipe Gonzáles Màrquez, from a socialist PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) is elected as the Prime Minister and serves for fourteen years. The dominance of PSOE to the Spanish politics is followed by the majority of PP (People's Party) in the Parliament, which is a conservative party, under the leadership of José María Aznar. While in the first terms of Aznar, a two party Parliament is formed because PP cannot fulfill the overall majority due to the lack of twenty seats, in the second term, with 2000 elections, PP achieved the overall majority.

Although the political ideologies of incumbent parties in Spain change in 30 years in Spain, none of them are extremist parties and their endurance is more compared to the Greek political parties' existence in the Greek Parliament as incumbent parties.

In 2004 national elections in Spain, PSOE, headed by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, takes 42.6% of the votes while People's Party gets 37.7%. Since PSOE cannot achieve overall majority, it forms a hung parliament (Magone, 2004). In 2008 elections, PSOE increases its votes to 43.9% and votes of PP increase to 39.9%. PSOE forms a minority government and Zapatero becomes the Prime Minister for the second term. With the increased effects of the sovereign debt crisis in Spain and the real estate bubble, in 2011 elections, PSOE faces a sharp decline in its votes and deteriorates to 28.8% due to the criticisms to the party and Zapatero on their failure to manage the crisis, while PP under Mariano Rajoy Brey gets 44.6% of votes. PSOE experiences the worst election results whereas PP gets an absolute majority of the Parliament (Martín & Urquizu-Sancho, 2012). Despite the political changes in Spain are not as striking as the changes in Greece, decrease of the votes of PSOE are rooted to the economic conditions of the country. With the introduction of austerity measures and increased unemployment, especially among young, create resentment within the society, which brings the end of the incumbency of PSOE in Spain in 2011 elections.

2.2.3. History of Greece and Spain in the European Union

In this part, I will focus on the European Union's enlargement to Greece and Spain. First, I will emphasize the enlargement policies and history of the EU in order to understand the dynamics behind the enlargement. Then, I will give the historical background of the accession of Greece and Spain. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) defines, enlargement is "*a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalism*" (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, p. 503). Regarding the EU enlargement, the notion of horizontal institutionalism is taken as "widening" rather than "deepening." Authors emphasize the lack of theoretical foundations of the EU enlargement and analyze the widening process in the EU from different theories. According to the rationalist hypotheses, preferences of applicants and the member states of the EU with regard to the accession are shaped by the cost benefit analysis of the individual states. According to those countries, if the benefit of the enlargement exceeds the cost, then they tend to favor enlargement. In terms of the macro level, from the

perspective of the EU, if marginal benefit of the widening of the organization is more than the marginal cost, for both the applicant and member states, then EU follows an enlargement policy, otherwise both member and applicant countries and the EU, as an organization rejects enlargement. Based on the constructivist hypotheses, the more the applicant country defines itself in the international arena in accordance with the ideas of the organization, the more the member states approve the accession of this country. If the applicant states share the same values, norms, and identities, the possibility of the accession of those countries to the EU increases since the member countries would prefer them to be accessed.

Both rationalist and constructivist hypothesis affect the enlargement policy of the EU. In the first enlargement in 1973, in which the United Kingdom, despite the rejections by Charles de Gaulle, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway (later was not accessed since the public did not approve in the national referendum) are accessed, rationalist hypothesis is more predominant. For example, the application of the United Kingdom to the EU is due to the Suez Crisis (Cini, 2003). The other states, Denmark, Ireland and Norway apply for the membership because of their close economic relations with the UK. The second set of enlargement is called as Mediterranean enlargement, which enables Greece to join in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Mediterranean enlargement is shaped with constructivist ideas, rather than rational. Although in terms of the applicant states, membership of the EU brings more benefits than costs, the perspective of the EU, as an organization, is closer to the constructivist hypotheses, which is based on the shared identities of the EU countries with Greece, Spain, and Portugal.

As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue EFTA enlargement, which comprise Austria, Finland and Sweden, is best explained with rational factors, while the Eastern enlargement, the accession of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, is more emphasized on constructivist ideas. The accession of Malta and Cyprus in 2004 along with the Central Eastern European countries, and the enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, are better explained by constructivist hypotheses, especially shared culture and identity. Thus, since Greece and Spain are accessed to the EU in the same enlargement process and the reason behind their accession is similar, the history of those countries within the EU shows parallels.

2.2.4. Geographical Locations of Greece and Spain

The geographical locations of Greece and Spain are very significant with regard to their immigration population. Since both countries locate in the Mediterranean region, they become a first-entry country for especially African immigrants. Greece and Spain attract African immigrants by location at the Mediterranean border of the European Union. Thus, even immigrants will pass through the core countries of the EU; they have to first entry through those countries along with Portugal, France and Italy. As well as the geographical proximity to Africa, Spain has a significant number of Latin American immigrants due to its colonial past (Escribano, de Lera, & Buján, 2003). Spain is one of the EU countries, which are preferred by the Latin American immigrants. As Blanco Romero touches upon, in Spain, following Latin American immigrants, the larger immigration population comes from Africa, especially from Morocco, the neighbor country of Spain (Blanco Romero, 2012). For example, in 1996, based on the data from based from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística- National Statistics Institute) there are 5,332 African immigrants in the Canary Island, a set of islands in the south of Spain, while in 2008 this number increases to 23,301, and in 2010 to 31,498 and the Moroccan constitute almost 18,500 of this population. Based on the same data, in Andalusia, while in 1996 the number of African immigrants is 21,093, in 2008 it increases 116,196. In 2010, the number of immigrants in Andalusia increases to 148,958 with 11,867 Moroccan immigrants.

As well as Greece attracts African immigrants as a gateway to the Schengen area due to its location as a border country of the EU, it also attracts lots of immigrants from non-EU Balkan countries, such as from Albania, or especially Turkey (Rovolis & Tragaki, 2006). Besides immigrants from Albania and Africa, such as Somali, increased number of immigrants from Asia and Middle East, such as Bangladesh or Iraq, has started to immigrate to Greece for the same reasons: to reach the European Union. Those Middle Eastern immigrants generally use Turkey as a transit country and reach Greece clandestinely on foot through the land border or on boats. To conclude, even though the geographical distributions of immigrants show variance between Greece and Spain, it is observed that the density of immigrants from the non-European countries, either from Balkan or African countries, displays similarities. Despite the fact that immigrants in Greece and Spain come from different continents and countries, there are a considerable number of non-European immigrants in both countries because of their geographical

position. Since those countries are located at the southern border of the European Union, Spain becomes open to the immigrants from Africa, who wants to enter the Schengen area, while Greece becomes vulnerable due to immigration flows from Africa, Balkan countries, Middle East and Asia. Therefore, they show similarities in terms of their geographical locations, which pave the way for non-European immigrants to immigrate Greece and Spain.

2.2.5. Immigration History of Greece and Spain

Immigration backgrounds of Greece and Spain are similar in terms of the change in trends. Until the last decades, both countries are considered as emigration countries, which signify that both Greece and Spain were pushing its citizens to the other countries, rather than immigration countries, which are defined as the countries, which pull immigrants. In Greece, there were two important emigration movements from Greece to the other countries (Fakiolas & King, 1996). The first happened at the end of the 19th century due to the economic crisis in Greece. Due to the economic reasons, between the end of the 19th and in the first decade of the 20th century, lots of Greek people emigrated to the United States and Egypt. The second mass movement of emigration was motivated not only economic, but also political reasons. The most important economic reason of the mass emigration was the developing of the Central and Northern European countries. As those countries became more developed than Greece, Greek people, especially from the rural areas started to migrate to the core European countries, as well as Australia and Canada. Also, civil war between 1946 and 1949, and military rule from 1967 to 1974 motivated a number of people to migrate predominantly to Germany, Australia, the United States, and Canada. The collapse of the military rule and the consolidation of democracy in Greece, and later on, the membership of Greece to the European Community in 1981, enabled lots of Greek emigrants to return their home country. As well as return immigrants, there were a significant number of immigrants from the other countries due to the stable political situation of Greece and its membership to the European Community, European Union later, in addition its geographical location, as a gateway to Europe, especially by Asian and African immigrants.

With the collapse of the Soviet regime in the Eastern Europe, Greece became more tempting for the immigrants from those countries. Although Greece was considered one

of the less developed countries in Europe, in the beginning of the 1990s, it witnessed lots of immigrants from the ex-Soviet countries due its emerging economy and the need for high numbers of labor force. With its membership to the EU, the living standards and education in Greece increased, which were the reasons of Greece to turn to an immigration country from an emigration country. Since its economy was considered as an emerging economy of Europe, it required more flexible labor force in especially agriculture, tourism and construction. However, with the decrease of the need of the labor force and the increased level of unemployment in the country in the last decade, immigrants started to migrate to Greece as a way to pass core European countries, such as Germany.

Similar to Greece, Spain has a transition from an emigration country to an immigration country in 1980s (Bover & Velilla, 1999). One of the massive emigrations that Spain has ever witnessed happened in the 1900s to the Latin American countries. The exploration of the Americas and the increased trade of agricultural products to Europe led to an economic crisis in Europe, especially in Spain, and due to the increased wage gaps between Spain and the Latin American countries triggered emigration of the Spanish to Latin American countries. During the First World War, since Spain did not enter the war, it became one of the main suppliers of some products, so the number of emigration decreased. As the civil war and the military rule increased emigration in Greece, the Spanish Civil War increased the number of the Spanish who left their countries and migrated to other countries. As opposed to the mass emigration in the 1900, the emigration during the civil war was related to the political reasons.

While the Spanish migrated to the European countries not only because of political reasons, but also due to the increased need for labor force in core countries after the Second World War, such as Germany, after the oil crisis in 1973, the wage gap between the core European countries and Spain decreased. Due to the sharp oil crisis that the core European countries suffered, they implemented more restrict policies toward immigrants. Thus, the Spanish immigrants started to turn back their countries following the oil crisis. Due to the economic factors, many Spanish emigrants started to come back their home countries from the European countries. Also, sustained economic growth that started in the mid-1990s led many Latin American people migrate to Spain in order to have low-skilled jobs for better wages compared to their home countries. As well as the economic growth, the aging of the native population in Spain triggered the

immigration and enabled the officials to welcome immigrants from Europe and Latin America (Arango, 2013). Besides those Spanish emigrants, who had migrated to Europe, started to return to Spain, with the economic growth, foreigners from the other European countries started to migrate to Spain. The boom in the construction industry generated low-skilled jobs for immigrants, not only from Latin America, but also from the poor economies of Europe.

Adding to the economic growth and the need for labor force in Spain, its membership to the European Community at the end of the 1980s led to a new kind of immigration: immigrants from poorer countries from Asia and Africa. As Asian and African people use Greece as a gateway to the European Union due to its geographical location, a significant number of African immigrants from poorer countries, such as Morocco, started to migrate to Spain. Some of the Asian and African immigrants migrate to Spain in order to participate in the labor force, work for better wages relative to their home countries, and to live in a country with higher living standards, such as in education, that came with the membership to the European Union. Different from the first type, some of those immigrants migrate to Spain, as it is in the case for Greece, to pass through the core European countries. Since Spain is located at the Mediterranean border of the European Union, a significant number of immigrants from other continents enter Spain by boats in risky situations in order to enter to the soil of the European Union and pass to other European countries.

Although with the sovereign debt crisis, the immigration trends in both Greece and Spain have changed, their histories, in terms of the immigration and emigration movements, are similar. Both countries have experienced almost same movements in similar time periods. Moreover the reasons of immigrants to migrate or emigrate show similarities during time. Thus, I can control the migration history of those countries while I am testing my hypothesis.

2.3.Methodology

In this part, I will touch upon the methodology that I will use in order to test the hypothesis. In order to understand the change, if any, between the attitudes toward immigrants in Greece and Spain at the EU level before and after the sovereign debt

crisis, I will look at the voting of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians in the European Parliament. In this part, I will first define immigration within the EU context and I will indicate which specific type of immigration I will construct my hypothesis on. Then, I will explain the reasons why I have chosen the European Parliament in order to understand the voting behavior change of the Greek and Spanish change at the EU level.

2.3.1. Definition of Migration within the EU context

The most common and basic definition of migration is the movement of people from one place to another. Regardless of the number of people who migrate or the distance between two places, all movements can be defined as migration basically. However, as time passes, new theories are produced in order to define migration and categorize people who move from one place to another. For example, with the increase of migration flows from economically deprived countries to economically more developed countries; neoclassical economic theory of migration is developed. In order to understand the dynamics behind migration flows, as well as economic factors, such as the economic development of the host country, the need for high skilled/low skilled labor in the host country etc., political factors are important, too. In an emigration country, which is defined as a migrant-sending country, push factors vary from loss of job and lack of economic and social opportunities in the country to political fear in one's home country, death threats or insecure environment. The latter factors are considered as the conditions to fulfill the requirements to get a refugee status according to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. According to the 1967 Amendment of the Convention, people who have a well-proved threat to be persecuted in their home country due to their "*race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group or political opinion*"(UNHCR)and unable to receive protection from the state can be granted the refugee status.

Although refugees and asylum seekers are considered as immigrants since they move from one place to another, I will ignore them while testing my hypothesis. Since my hypothesis is based on the effect of the sovereign debt crisis, rather than asylum seekers and refugees, who are under the protection of the host state and whose residence or working permits are approved by the host government, I will more focus on immigrants, regardless of their status as documented or undocumented, who migrate due to the lack of job opportunities in their home countries and come to Greece and Spain in order to

earn money. While analyzing the voting in the European Parliament, while voting for the proposals regarding refugees and asylum seekers may be given based on political concerns, proposals regarding economic immigrants will be given based on the economic conditions of the host country, which will provide a better testing and understanding for my hypothesis.

Also, based on the definition of migration, in the EU, those people who are citizens of the member states and move to the other member states are considered as immigrants, too. However, with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the idea of EU citizenship is formed, which makes all citizens of each and every member state and EU citizen (Maas, 2007). Thus, based on the notion of EU citizenship, even if people from one member state move to another member state, they can vote in the European Parliament elections in the host country. Also, thanks to the Schengen Agreement, which is first generated in 1985 and grants free movement to the member state citizens within the Union, EU citizens can easily travel to other member states without any restrictions (Georgiev, 2010). The introduction of the notion of EU citizenship and the Schengen Agreement, EU citizens, who can freely move within the borders of the Union, cannot be defined as immigrants anymore. They have more advantages than international immigrants, such as the former does not need any visas to enter an EU member state while immigrants from the third countries (non-EU countries) need visas to enter and residence permits to stay. Also, due to the notion of shared identity that is encouraged by the EU citizenship, citizens of the other EU member states are not considered as immigrants in the host EU countries.

In order to ameliorate the conditions of immigrants of the third countries, there are several Programs are made by the European Union after the Amsterdam Treaty; the Tampere, Hague and Stockholm Programs. However, due to the changes in the political contexts, those five-year Programs cannot be steady. For example, while the Tampere Program (1999) brings benefits to immigrants, such as integration facilitations, due to the Madrid and London bombings which happened in the times of the Hague Program (2004), the Hague focuses more on the securitization of immigration and prevention of “illegal” immigration. Due to the unstable process that the third country nationals experience in the European Union territories as immigrants, even though the number of immigrants from the EU member states to other EU countries is increasing, such as the Romanian in Spain and the Polish in the United Kingdom, I will not be concerned with immigrants, who are also EU citizens. To conclude, in my hypothesis I will ignore both

asylum seekers and refugees, and citizens of EU member states who migrate to Greece and Spain and I will only focus on immigrants from non-EU countries, who migrate predominantly because of economic reasons.

2.3.2. The European Parliament

In order to test my hypothesis and to understand whether there is a change in the attitudes toward immigrants in Greece and Spain at the EU level after the sovereign debt crisis, I will deal with the European Parliament (EP), as a supranational organ of the European Union. In this part, I will give a brief historical background to the European parliament and explain the evolution of the European Parliament as a way to decrease the democratic deficit in the European Union. Then, I will juxtapose the reasons of why I have chosen the European Parliament in order to analyze the change in the attitudes of the Greek and the Spanish.

Since the formation of the European Community until 1979, the EP was composed of national parliamentarians and was considered as a forum (Corbett, Jacobs, & Shac, 2007). The Commission was the initiator of proposals and the Council decided whether they should have been adopted or not. The EP was only assigned to give its consent to the Council in few areas before the adaptation of the proposals. Also, it had the right to dismiss the Commission if the two third of the majority within the Parliament was ensured. The insufficiency of the European Parliament in terms of executive powers was overcome step by step. For example, as Corbett et. al argues with the treaty amendments between 1970 and 1975, the EP gained the budgetary authority along with the Council. In 1975, the notion of conciliation was introduced in order to abolish the conflicts between the Council and the Parliament on budgetary issues. In 1979, for the first time elections were organized and the citizens of the member states elected the Parliamentarians, so a step to reduce democratic deficit was taken (Hagemann, 2009). Single European Act in 1986 introduced two new procedures that increased the competence of the Parliament in the execution; the cooperation procedure, through which the EP gained the authority to reject, approve or change the position of the Council for a number of treaty articles, and assent procedure, which gave equal weight to the decisions of the Parliament with the Council. Thanks to the assent procedure, proposals in specific areas would not be adopted without the approval of the EP.

The Maastricht Treaty increased more the authority of the Parliament. It introduced the co-decision power, in other words ordinary legislative procedure, which was similar to the cooperation power, but differently introduced a formal conciliation committee and gave the Parliament the right to rejection of the proposals approved by the Council after the conciliation procedure. EP also started to vote the President of the Commission and the areas that the assent procedure was experiences were enlarged. Nice Treaty in 2004 extended the number of areas in which the EP could use its co-decision power and settled the numbers of the seats each and every member state had. Parliament gained the right to take other EU institutions to the European Court of Justice with the Nice Treaty. With the last Treaty, Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the range of the co-decision power that the EP could exercise was extended to different areas. Also, in 2009, the authority of the Parliament in the international area was increased (EPC, EGMONT, & CEPS, 2010).

The reason that I have chosen the European Parliament rather than the Council or the Commission is the formation of the former. Although until 1979, the EP was consisted of the representatives of the members of the member states' national parliaments, after 1979, direct elections were organized in order to elect the members of the European Parliament (MEP) directly by the citizens of the member states. The introduction of the direct elections for the EP is an important point that distinguished the Parliament from the Council. If the MEP were continued to be chosen from the members of the national parliaments of the member states, then there would not be any difference between the European Council and Council of Ministers, which represent the member states, and the EP. As Simon Hix touches upon (1999), the Council represents the states, while the Parliament represents the citizens. Although there are different political groups within the European Parliament and the majority of researches support the idea that the members of the European Parliament vote in accordance with their political groups ideologies rather than based on their national backgrounds, such as the article by Hix, Noury and Roland (2009), there is a number of scholars, who think that voting preferences of the MEPs are determined by their political groups only when the issues that they have to vote are on the European Community (Aalberts, 2009). Thus, according to the former perspective, their political parties in the EP generally determine the votes of the MEPs due to the fact that voting as opposed to the political groups would decrease the trust to the "rebel" MEP in the group. However, the latter theory supports that while the MEPs vote based on their political party ideologies when they

vote on the supranational issues, when the voting is on the issues that have more effects on the member states, the national backgrounds of the MEPs surpass their political group ideologies and they vote based on their nationalities.

Since in my thesis, I will be interested in the change of the EU-level-attitudes of Greece and Spain toward immigrants after the sovereign debt crisis, I should analyze an EU body, which will be based on the citizens of the member states, rather than the states. Thus, based on the argument that the members of the European Parliament vote in accordance with their national background rather than political party ideologies when the issues are about the nation states, such as immigration, I will research the change in the votes of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians at the European Parliament. Rather than making a discourse analysis, I will look at their voting preferences, whether they vote for or against for those issues regarding the immigration to the EU, integration of immigrants, rights of third country nationals etc. By analyzing the voting behavior, instead of the discourse analysis, I will have more concrete and objective results, which display the change of the attitudes toward immigrants at the EU level.

2.3.3. Method

As a methodology, I will choose the documents that are related to the immigration issue, which need voting by the MEPs. I will find the documents from the VoteWatchEurope, which is an independent organization that works to provide better knowledge and transparency on the voting of the Council and the Parliament members. Although VoteWatchEurope supplies all documents that are under the policy area of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and renders the voting preferences of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians for each proposal, the organization only focuses on the roll call votes. Since the roll call method, in which the Parliamentarians use an electronic device to vote and those votes are recorded by the Parliament, is not the only method that is used within the Parliament at the times of voting (there is also 'show off hands' method which prevents any kind of recording and so transparency), some of the MEPs criticize the VoteWatchEurope by only using those roll call votes. According to the organization, the criticism is gratuitous since all the voting at the EP should be done with the roll call voting in order to increase the transparency and enable the citizens to be informed about the voting preferences of the MEPs, for who they vote at the European Parliament elections.

By using the documents that the VoteWatchEurope supplies, I will analyze the all documents from 2004 until 2013 (almost two terms of the European Parliament) that are related to the immigration to the European Union, integration of immigrants, fight against 'illegal' immigration etc. I will eliminate the documents that focus on the refugees and asylum seekers since I am not concerned with immigrants, who migrate due to primarily political reasons. From motion for resolutions to legislative resolutions, I will analyze all documents that require voting. Then, in order to compare the voting of the Greek parliamentarians before and after the sovereign debt crisis, I will study the voting of Greek MEPs on the documents related to immigration, first from 2004 to 2009 and then from 2009 until the latest current document. I will look whether they vote for or against for the documents, which provide benefits or disadvantages for immigrants. I will conclude that if MEPs vote for the document that supports the immigrants within the EU or immigration to the EU, they will be in favor of immigration. If the average numbers of MEPs vote in favor of immigrants, then I will conclude that for the specific document, the Greek MEPs do not show anti-migrant attitudes. However, if I find that the average number of Greek MEPs vote against the documents, which are in favor of immigration, I will claim that Greek MEPs display anti-migrant attitude. I will repeat the same method for each year from 2004 to 2013. Then I will replicate the same procedure for the voting of Spanish MEPs. At the end, based on the results of the votes of Greek and Spanish MEPs for immigrant-related documents, I will see whether there is a change in the attitudes toward immigrants in Greece and Spain after the sovereign debt crisis. If I find a change in voting of the MEPs of Spain and Greece in the European Parliament, I will fail to reject my hypothesis.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA

In this chapter, I will analyze the voting of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians at the European Parliament on the documents directly related to the migration to the European Union or immigrants in the European Union. In order to understand whether those documents are directly related to the immigration or not, I will make a content analysis for the documents. I will analyze their contents, and if I find any connection with migration, I will evaluate the voting behavior of the Greek and Spanish MEPs. First, I will focus on the documents from 2004 until the beginning of 2009, the initial year of the sovereign debt crisis according to my hypothesis. Then, I will examine the documents in association with immigrants and immigration from 2009 until the last document that I can acquire from the VoteWatchEurope organization. Rather than separating this chapter in accordance with the terms of the European Parliament, I will separate them according to the initial year of the sovereign debt crisis, which I take as the natural breakpoint and independent variable of my hypothesis. While analyzing the documents, in order to understand whether they are in favor of immigration or opposed to immigration and immigrants, I will look at their contents and the explanation of the MEPs on their voting preferences. I believe that both examining the contents of the document and the contents of the explanations of the members of the Parliament will give me the attitude of the document toward immigrants. Thus, examining the voting of the Greek and Spanish MEPs on those documents will display the attitudes of the Greek and Spanish toward immigrants at the European Parliament level.

3.1. Migration-related Documents at the European Parliament from 2004 until the beginning of 2009

The first document related to the immigration issue that has come to the European Parliament for voting on 14 October 2004 is a report including a proposal for a recommendation of the European Parliament to the Council and to the European Council on the Future of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice¹. The point that I

¹2004/2175(INI)

will focus on is §2 a) indent 3, which is about the social, cultural, and political integration of immigrants to the host EU member state. The proposal recommends to the European Council and to the Council to take the appropriate measures and funding in order to enable the integration of immigrants. Since this point requires the member states to ease the integration of immigrants, I evaluate this document as a migrant favoring text. The voting on that specific point of the proposal for recommendation was as the following: from 24 Greek MEPs, 11 approved, 1 did not vote, 1 was absent, and 11 reject, while from 54 Spanish MEPs, 25 approved, 6 did not vote, 3 was absent, and 20 rejected.

The other document is on 8 June 2005 was a motion for a resolution for a whole text on the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice². The text primarily urges the member states to adopt a common immigration policy which is in accordance with the international human rights and which enables immigrants to equally participate to the labor market, to have the right to education, and access to health services in the host country. Also, the text requires the member states to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1990) and to take proper measures to prevent the discrimination of immigrants in the labor market. The text recommends to find the root causes of immigrants after a dialogue with the third countries and rather than illegal deportation techniques, the text urges for proper readmission agreements with the third countries. The document wishes all member states to be respectful for the fundamental rights of all immigrants, regardless of their races, ethnicities, or religions. Taking into consideration of those points that I have mentioned above, the text is in favor of the rights and fair treatment by the authorities of the member states, so I consider this document as migrant-favoring. For this document, 20 Greek MEPs gave approval, while 4 rejected it (in total 24 Greek parliamentarians), while out of 54 Spanish MEPs, 48 gave approval, 5 did not vote, and only 1 rejected.

On the same day, 8 June 2005, a motion for resolution on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe as a whole was presented to the

²B6-0327/2005

voting of the European Parliament³. The text calls the member states to prevent discrimination against minorities with immigrant origins, and enable integration and naturalization of immigrants to the host countries. The document especially focuses on women immigrants, who suffer from gender based discrimination and urges member states to prevent this kind of discrimination against immigrant women. Also, taking into consideration of the children of immigrants, the member states are recommended to take the further steps to integrate those children to the national education system of the host countries, so I will take the motion for resolution as migrant favoring. Out of 24 MEPs from Greece, 10 approved, while 3 abstained and 11 rejected the document as a whole. 30 of the Spanish MEPs approved the document, while 21 rejected and 3 did not vote out of 54 Spanish parliamentarians.

The members of the European Parliament vote a joint motion for resolution on common immigration policy as whole on 28 September 2005⁴. The document remarks the humanitarian costs of migration, especially those who have died in the summer of 2006 in the Mediterranean Sea in order to enter the European Union from the southern borders. The document, also, points out the problem of undocumented migration with regard to their employability in the host states without any social insurance, which cause detrimental effects for the immigrants. However, the document realizes the fact that whether those undocumented immigrants are regularized, this will not be a solution in the long run. Thus, in order to ameliorate the conditions of undocumented immigrants and in order to understand the root causes of immigration and the push factors at the third countries, the European Parliament stresses the importance of the common immigration policy. The EP defines the leading push factors as the failing economies in the home countries, the wage gap between the host and the home countries (poorer compared to the host countries); human rights breaches, and corruptions. Although there are safeguards and strict checks at the external borders in order to prevent undocumented immigration, the Parliament recommends the Commission to provide humanitarian measures in accordance to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

³2005/2008(INI)

⁴B6-0508/2006

European Union and the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

MEPs, who rejected this joint for resolution, generally presented the idea that a common immigration policy would decrease the control of the national governments on their immigration policies and borders. While claiming this, some of them, such as Marine Le Pen from France as a Non-Inscrit, argued that rather than creating a common immigration policy, national borders should have been strengthened in order to prevent further immigration inflows. Another Non-Inscrit, Koenraad Dillen from the Netherlands, rejected the joint for resolution because there would be no room in Europe for Islamic fundamentalists, who would not assimilate into the European culture and society. Thus, rather than letting immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, to enter the European Union, those who would not been assimilated should have been prohibited. Thus, since those who rejected the joint for resolution focus on conservative and nationalist claims, I consider this document favored immigrants and their rights within the European Union. Taking into consideration that this joint for resolution is migrant-favoring, the voting of Greek and Spanish MEPs is shaped as the following: out of 24 Greek parliamentarians at the EP, 6 approved, 10 rejected and 8 was absent, while out of 54 Spanish parliamentarians, 24 approved, 19 rejected, 10 was absent and one did not vote.

The report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) required voting of the MEPs for a legislative resolution on 26 April 2007⁵. The report focuses on the undocumented immigration to the European Union member states from the third countries and stresses that the “combating” against “illegal” migration lays on the authority and control of the member states. However, the report emphasizes the fact that in some situations, especially large undocumented migrant inflows, if member states are unable to give immediate responses, Rapid Border Intervention Teams have the right to provide effective assistance in order to prevent migrants. Andreas Mölzer, a German MEP from the ITS group, voted for the report, and his explanation focuses on importance of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams in order to prevent threat posed by

⁵A6-0135/2007

immigrants. He argued that while deploying troops at the southern borders as a part of RABIT would strengthen the borders and the same emphasis should have been given to the eastern borders, as well. On the other hand, Portuguese MEP from GUE/NGL group, voted against the report because he claimed that RABIT would increase the military nature of the European Union. The emphasis on the security by the EU authorities would criminalize the immigration issue, which would break fundamental human rights. Thus, I will take the report on the deployment of RABIT as a migrant-opposing report. 12 Greek MEPs voted for the report, while 2 rejected, 9 were absent, and one did not vote out of 24. Regarding 54 Spanish MEPs; 41 approved, one rejected,, 11 were absent and one did not vote.

Another report is on a policy plan on legal migration that was presented to the voting of the members of the European Parliament as a whole on 26 September 2007⁶. This report emphasizes the importance of the integration of immigrants, but since acknowledges that the integration process happens in two ways; as well as the host countries should strengthen their integration policies, immigrants should be willing to integrate to the host society, the report points out the importance of the integration of the families and children of immigrants. Also, the report acknowledges the immigrants, who are not given refugee status, but cannot return their countries of origins for several reasons. The report recommends member state to take proper measures to provide immigrants' acquired welfare rights and pensions during the time they have worked at the host country, even if one day they turned back to their home countries. As well as the immigrants, the report urges the European authorities and the member states to grant immigrants' wives, who have come as a result of family reunification, legal status. In order to prevent undocumented immigration, rather than deploying military forces at the borders, the report supports a dialogue with the countries of origin of the immigrants and training of immigrants at their home countries in accordance with the demands of the EU labor market, so they can integrate and adjust better.

While some MEPs, such as Frank Vanhecke from the Netherlands, rejected the report due to the fact that he claimed that immigrants would destroy the culture and values of the European society, the majority approved the report, since it enabled the economic

⁶A6-0322/2007

migration, especially the high-skilled immigrants, who came with the 'Blue Card'⁷, to Europe from the third countries possible and made integration easier. For example, a Spanish MEP, Antonia Masip Hidalgo from PSE (Party of European Socialists), used a metaphor in order to represent the current situation. He referred to Don Quixote and his friend, Sancho, and Mr. Hidalgo argues that since Don Quixote could not have been a hero without Sancho, Sancho would represent immigrants in the European Union. Thus, the European Union would not have been successful without economic immigrants. Regarding those explanations, I will consider this report a migrant-favoring report and the voting was realized as the following: out of 18 Greek MEPs, 12 approved, 9 was absent, 2 rejected and one did not vote, while out of 53 Spanish MEPs, 42 approved, 7 did not vote, 3 was absent, and one rejected.

The European Parliament voted the other report, which is on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third country nationals, on 26 September 2007⁸. The report recalls that immigrants should not have been treated as criminals and they should have been treated with regard to the fundamental human rights, especially those unaccompanied minors. Since many immigrants risk their lives in order to enter the soil of the host country, in the reception centers their fundamental human rights should have been granted. The report repeats its opposition against the creation of reception center outside the territory of the European Union to hold undocumented immigrants. Also, the report gives priority to the health conditions of immigrants, who are in need of medical treatment. As well as the contribution of immigrants to the host country, the report iterates the importance of immigrants in the development of their countries of origin through the remittances. The report also emphasizes the importance of the communication with the third countries and transit countries in order to prevent undocumented migration. The report calls the RABIT and FRONTEX forces to be active in certain situation when lives of immigrants are under risk. Also, the report acknowledges the human smugglers, who generally work under a mafia, and the exploitation of undocumented immigrants in the labor market because of their illegal situation and calls member states to take proper actions against those who exploit

⁷ Based on the Council Directive 2009/50/EC, Blue Card enables highly skilled workers to work and live within the EU, except than the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.

⁸A6-0323/2007

undocumented immigrants, especially women, who are more vulnerable in terms of security.

David Martin from the PSE approved the report and his explanation was on the emphasis of the report on the cooperation of the European Union with third countries based on fundamental human rights. Koenraad Dillen from the Netherlands, on the other hand, explained his rejection based on the regularization of undocumented immigrants. He claimed that, if undocumented immigrants were regularized, it would not decrease the number of undocumented immigrants, as the report proposes, on the contrary, it would create a pull effects and encourage more undocumented immigrants. Although the report had some points, which may be considered as opposition to immigration, considering the explanations of the voting of some of the MEPs and the continuous emphasis on the integration and the fundamental rights of the report, I will take it as a migrant-favoring report. Out of the 18 Greek MEPs, 8 approved the report, while 2 rejected, 6 did not vote, and 2 were absent. The voting of 53 Spanish MEPs is represented as the following: 36 approvals and 3 were absent. While 14 of the Spanish MEPs did not vote, there was not anyone who voted against the report within the Spanish parliamentarians.

The following report is on the proposal for a Council decision establishing a European Migration Network that was voted by the EP on 10 April 2008⁹. The report was on the creation of a European Migration Network, which would be composed of non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and central administrations. The aim was to ensure a cooperation and collaboration in the field of migration between the national, European, and international governmental and non-governmental organs. With the network and its personnel from different backgrounds, such as universities, the target was to produce relevant expertise on law, statistics, and public policy regarding the migration issue. The data that would be provided by the European Immigration Network should be exchanged publicly in order to enable the immigrants to benefit from it. The major amendment of the Parliament was to add the asylum status to the network and to create European Immigration and Asylum Network.

⁹A6-0066/2008

A Polish MEP, Genowefa Grabowska from the PSE argued, a network for collecting and exchanging data on the issue of immigration was important and beneficial, while French MEP Bruno Gollnisch found the Network unnecessary, because there were various organizations that had the same purposes with the European Migration Network. Thus, according to the latter view, the Network was not required due to the fact that it would not bring any innovation, but creates duplicity among different organizations. Although, the latter perspective is reasonable in terms of the existence of multiple organs, which are assigned with the same duty, since the European Migration Network would aim to ameliorate the conditions of the immigrants and enable member states to take appropriate measures toward immigrants in accordance with the fundamental rights and Conventions, I will consider the report as migrant favoring. With regard to this categorization, the voting of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians were shaped as the following; out of 24 MEPs, 20 approved, 3 was absent, 1 rejected, while out of 54 Spanish MEPs, 44 approved, 4 was absent, and 6 did not vote.

The European Parliament votes the report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals on 18 June 2008. While the report emphasizes the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the “illegally” staying third country nationals in the member states while they are returning back to their countries, it creates discrimination between third country nationals who have a valid residence permit from a member state and EU citizens. The report stresses that while EU citizens can freely travel to and work in another EU member country other than his home country, third country national should only reside in the countries that they are permitted residence. Otherwise, when third country nationals are found in another member states other than the member state where their residence permit or any other permit that offers their staying, they are categorized as “illegally staying third country national”, and should return to the member country where their residence permit is given. Also, the report enables the member states to remove third country nationals based on the perception that those immigrants pose a threat to their national and public security. The report stresses that when member states are forced use coercion as a last resort to the “illegally” staying third country nationals, who reject to return, it should be based on fundamental human rights. Also, the report acknowledges that international and non-governmental organizations, which are related

to immigrants, should be ready during the removal process of “undocumented” migrants. Undocumented immigrants should be informed in a proper language that third country nationals could understand during their removals. Also, the report acknowledges the “illegally” staying undocumented immigrants with their other rights while taking into custody or during the removal and return procedures, such as informing undocumented immigrants with available legal remedies.

As Portuguese MEP from the PPE-DE (European People’s Party) group Maria de Assunção Esteves touched upon that the report on the proposal for directive on common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third country nationals created an impossible dilemma. On the one hand the report on the proposal for directive enabled those EU member countries without appropriate immigration laws to adopt this directive and have proper and humane laws with regard to the return and removal procedures of undocumented immigrants, on the other hand, the report itself criminalized undocumented immigrants within the EU by referring exactly same rights as criminals had while they were taken into custody. In other words, the rights that are given to the undocumented immigrants while they are removed or returned back to their countries of origin; they have the same rights as criminals while they have when they are taken into custody. Thus, although the report aimed to create a common return and removal policies of “illegally” staying third country nationals and prevent the inhumane and vague treatments they have, it, by nature, criminalized immigrants by representing them as criminals. Thus, despite the fact that the report brings new facilities to immigrants, since it causes deep discriminations between the third country nationals and EU citizens, and criminalize undocumented immigrants, I take the report on the proposal for directive as anti-migrant document. Out of 24 Greek MEPs; 10 approved, 10 rejected, one was abstain, and 3 did not vote, while out of 54 Spanish parliamentarians; 39 approved, 5 rejected, 3 did not vote, 2 was abstain, and 5 was absent.

On 2 September 2008, the European Parliament votes a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards to the use of Visa Information System (VIS) under the Schengen Borders Code¹⁰. Although there was not an explicit

¹⁰ A6-0208/2008

reference to immigrants in the text regarding the use of VIS under the Schengen Borders Code, since it is closely related to the aim to decrease the security threat that is posed by immigrants, I have taken this document in order to investigate the voting behavior of Spanish and Greek parliamentarians at the European Parliament. The proposal for a regulation stresses the security of the European Union and focuses on the checks at the external borders in order to increase the national and European level security and prevent undocumented immigrants to enter to the EU territory. Thus, Visa Information System is planned to be used with regard to the VIS Regulation, which enables third country nationals' visa numbers and fingerprints not to be taken each time they cross the EU border. The legal basis of the use of biometric data of the visa applicants will be created in order to decrease the queues in front of the external borders, especially in times of tourism and holidays, for the EU citizens and third country nationals, who do not need visa. The board guards are still assigned to check whether the third country nationals fulfill all requirements to attain a visa, when there is no risk for national security and "illegal" migration, waiting time at the border crossings is excessive, and all the resources, staff, technology etc. of the member state are exhausted, border guards can apply a derogation, in which they apply to VIS. Also, thanks to the biometric identifiers, fingerprints, visa sticker etc., border guards can apply to those existing information any time they need in order to provide the highest security for the EU against undocumented immigrants and to decrease the time spent at the borders.

A German MEP from PPE-DE group, Hubert Pirker, stated that the proposal for regulation on the use of VIS would decrease the number of the visa abuses within the European Union. He stressed that he voted for the proposal, because there was a considerable number of undocumented immigrants within the EU, who continued to stay at the member countries even if their visas were expired. A Romanian MEP, Marian Zlotea, from PPE-DE group emphasized that 50% of undocumented immigrants entered the EU territories legally, but later on as Mr. Pirker argued, since their visas expired, they remained to stay at the EU territories. Thus, Mr. Pirker and Mr. Zlotea touched upon the importance of the VIS and fingerprints and visa stickers of visa applicants in order to detect those undocumented immigrants within the member states. On the other hand, another German MEP from the Non-Inscrit, Andreas Mölzer, stressed that if the future Schengen visas would require face scans etc. in order to grant visas to third country nationals, since the majority of embassies were not equipped with appropriate

staff and technology to realize this, they would outsource the visa process to companies. Thus, rather than the embassies, private companies with specific technological facilities and staff, would deal with visa procedure, which as Mr. Mölzer suggested, would prevail visa scandals. In line with Mr. Mölzer's point, in my opinion, the storage of fingerprints and visa stickers of third country nationals by border guards would lead human rights violations. Thus, while the aim of the proposal was to decrease the waiting times at the borders and to be able to easily check those immigrants and their visas, since it posed a threat to the security of the private data of those third country nationals, I will consider the proposal as anti-immigrant. The voting of the Greek and Spanish MEPs is as the following: out of 24 Greek MEPs, 18 approved, 3 rejected, one was absent, one was abstain, and one did not vote, while out of 54 Spanish MEPs, 42 approved, 3 rejected, one was abstain, 3 was absent, and 5 did not vote.

On 20 November 2008, the EP voted the report on the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment¹¹. In a globalised world in which economic immigration is one of the hottest topics, the EU tries to catch up with the top immigration countries, such as the United States and Canada. While those countries attract highly skilled workers and increase their economic prosperity, the EU should increase its development, employment, and integration policies in order to attract more highly skilled workers. The report specifically emphasizes on the recruitment of highly qualified immigrant workers from the third countries in health and education sectors. The main rationale behind the call for highly skilled immigrant workers is both the development of third countries and satisfaction of the needs of the European Union labor market. The report calls for the creation of a new procedure, called Blue Card, which enables the mobility and immigration of highly skilled workers to the European Union. The Blue Card facilitates highly skilled workers from third countries easily come to the European Union, find jobs, stay in the member states, work there, and return to their countries of origin whenever they want. As well as the satisfaction of the needs of the EU labor market, the EU, by proposing this report on legislation, aims to develop third countries through remittances and the report calls for an agreement between the Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. In addition to the

¹¹A6-0432/2008

recruitment of highly skilled workers, the report urges the Union to contribute to the training of professionals in their countries of origin.

Philip Claeys, a Dutch MEP, from the Non-Inscrit, voted against this report, because he considered the creation of Blue Card as a short term policy, which would not bring economic prosperity in the long run, and moreover he argued that the attraction of highly skilled workers would increase the already high levels of unemployment within the EU countries. Also, he stressed the social perspective of the issue and thought that immigrant workers from the third countries would destroy the European culture and the social cohesion. On the other hand, Swedish MEPs, who were also the members of the PSE, voted in favor of the Blue Card and the proposal with regard to the decreased discrimination it would lead between immigrant and native workers. Italian MEP Alessandro Battilocchio, a PSE member, voted in favor of the proposal due to its contribution to the development of the third countries as well as the highly skilled immigrant workers within the European Union. He pointed out that the attraction of immigrant workers, who have expertise on certain fields, would bring professional skills and human capital to the Union, which would generate real EU spirit, in his opinion. Thus, I will treat the proposal as a migrant-favoring proposal, due to the improvements it brought for immigrant workers, such as prevention of discrimination and increasing their rights. In light of this categorization, let us look at the voting of Greek and Spanish parliamentarians in the European Parliament. 12 Greek MEPs approved, 2 rejected, 2 did not vote, and 8 were absent out of 24 Greek parliamentarians. Out of 54 Spanish MEPs; 36 approved, 13 were absent, 2 did not vote, 2 abstained, and none of them rejected the proposal.

Report on the proposal for the EP votes a Council directive on the single application procedure for residence and work on 20 November 2008¹². Since the economic and social development of the Union is highly dependent on the immigration flows from the third countries to the EU, the Blue Card directive and this proposal are complementary in order to create a comprehensive immigration policy. Single application procedure signifies that those third country nationals, whether seeking to work in the EU member states or self-employed in the EU, are granted residence and work permit easily. Thanks

¹²A6-0431/2008

to this directive, while all third country nationals are subjected to the protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms, only those who will work within the Union will live and work based on a single permit. As the previous proposal, this proposal aims to increase the economic competence of the European Union in the region by both attracting immigrant workers from the third countries and contributing the development of the third countries. Since this proposal is similar to the previous one and supports workers' rights by easing their application procedure, I will consider this document as migrant favoring, too. In terms of voting of the Greek and Spanish MEPs; out of 24 Greek MEPs, 11 approved, one was abstain, 2 did not vote, 8 was absent, and two rejected; out of 54 Spanish MEPs; 38 approved, 13 were absent, 1 did not vote, 2 was abstain, and again nobody rejected it.

The last document before 2009 that I will examine is a report on the evaluation and future development of FRONTEX and EUROSUR on 18 December 2008¹³. The report urges the member states to support the FRONTEX and its actions to fight against “illegal” immigration. As well as the member states, the report calls for the cooperation with third countries, which are considered as countries of origin and transit, in order to decrease the number of undocumented migrants. In order to combat against “illegal” immigration, the report stresses the importance of the increase competence and structural development of FRONTEX. Frank Vanhecke voted in favor of the report, because he thought that the top priority of the Union should have been the security issues, and the report juxtaposed the necessities and ways to fight against “illegal” immigration, which was considered as a threat to the national security, as well as the threat to the welfare state and the European identity. On the other hand, some of the MEPs, such as Portuguese MEP Pedro Guerreiro, from GUE/NGL (European United Left/Nordic Green Left) group, touched upon the inhumane actions of the FRONTEX. Although respect to human rights of immigrants, even they were undocumented, was emphasized several times in the report, practically, some of the actions of FRONTEX, especially in the Mediterranean Sea, were not in accordance with fundamental human rights. Despite the report stresses that the actions of FRONTEX would not cause a risk to human lives, there had been several deaths and inhuman activities (Fekete 2004, Human Rights Watch 2011). Therefore, I will take this document as anti-migrant. With

¹³A6-0437/2008

regard to voting, out of 24 Greek MEPs; 16 approved, 2 rejected, 3 did not vote, and 3 were absent, while out of 54 Spanish MEPs; 39 approved, 3 rejected, 10 were absent, and 2 did not vote.

3.2. Migration-related Documents at the European Parliament from the beginning of 2009 to the latest document in 2013

The first document that I will touch upon in a new period, the emergence of the effects of the sovereign debt crisis, in the Union, is a report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third country nationals on 19 February 2009¹⁴. The explanatory statement of the report stresses that according to the estimations, there are between 4.5 and 8 million undocumented migrants within the borders of the Union. Most of them are economic migrants, who enter the Union in order to work and earn money, especially in agricultural and service sectors. However, their status as undocumented creates lots of problem. For instance, since they are undocumented, they become more vulnerable due to the probability that they may be deported and lost their jobs. Also, the risks they have due to the possibility of removal enable the discrimination of wages and decrease the competition between those sectors, which also prevent undocumented immigrants to benefit from health and social insurances. Despite the fact that undocumented immigration causes loss of economic prosperity within the Union by diminishing the level of competition the report does not mainly focus on the sanctions against those employers, who employ undocumented immigrants. Thus, the report focuses on the common measures that should be implemented on employers who infringe the prohibition of employing undocumented immigrants. The report foresees a comprehensive approach by not directly removing undocumented immigrants, but sanctioning employers who benefit from their undocumented and vulnerable situation.

A German MEP, Jörg Leichtfried, also a PSE member, voted in favor of the report, because he thought even though undocumented immigrants should be prevented, the most important issue was to prevent undocumented immigrants from exploitation of lower wages, long working hours without any benefits and social services by the employers. He underlined the argument of the report by referring that rather than those

¹⁴A6-0026/2009

immigrant workers who work without an authorization, employers, who employ and exploit, them should have been punished due to the fact that the latter was in a stronger position. Although the report was approved with a great majority from the European Parliament, there were also lots of criticisms to its long term achievements. For example, French MEP Bruno Gollnisch claimed that despite the report was in favor of undocumented immigrants and their exploitation, he was afraid that this report would not decrease mass immigration flows. Thus, those MEPs, who did not want immigrants within the European Union, criticized the report, since it was not necessary to stop the immigrant influx. Taking into consideration the content of the report and explanations of the MEPs, I will take the report as a migrant-favoring document. Out of 24 Greek MEPs; 18 approved, 2 rejected, 3 were absent, and one did not vote, while out of 54 Spanish MEPs, 42 approved, 4 rejected, 6 were absent, and 2 did not vote.

On 12 March 2009, the EP voted European Parliament resolution on migrant children left behind in the country of origin¹⁵. Immigration from third countries to the European Union creates benefits for both sides; it contributes to the economic development of EU countries and personal development of EU citizens, and enriches the economies of third countries through remittances. However, as the report claims, immigration has some disastrous effects in the countries of origin of immigrants, such as the children of immigrants left behind in the home countries. Despite immigration benefits both the home countries and host countries, the potential risks of immigration should be diminished in order to get the maximum benefit. For instance, while children are left by their parents, who migrate to the other countries in order to work and send remittances to their home countries, general lack of mental and physical health, child abuse, and lack of school education can pose severe threats for children of immigrants. Although the Union and its organs pay attention to the children and other family members, who migrate to the host country, and their integration to the Union, children, who have been left by their parents, who migrate, attracts little attention. Thus, the report underlines the importance of social and educational development of children of immigrants in the third countries in order to reduce the disadvantages of immigration. Also, the report calls non-governmental organization to work on this subject and contribute to the immigration phenomena by diminishing the risks for children.

¹⁵B6-0112/2009

Romanian MEP, Flaviu Calin Rus, from PPE-DE, voted in favor of the motion for resolution and he explained the reasons as his support for the improvement of conditions of those children, who were left by their immigrant parents. Since each and every person had the right to complete a family and education, he approved the report that aimed to the improvement of the conditions of children of immigrants. On the other hand, Non-Inscrit French MEPs, Carl Lang and Fernand Le Rachinel, voted against the motion for resolution on the basis that improving the conditions of children of immigrants would cause lots of immigrants to enter the Union. With this motion for resolution, those parents in the third countries, who could not leave their children, could easily leave them and migrate to the European Union. Thus, according to the view of Mr. Land and Mr. Le Rachinel, children of immigrants, should not have been the recipient of the help, but the Union should have taken appropriate measures for families and whole populations of third countries in order to make them stay at home. Hence, I will treat this document as migrant favoring. Out of 24 Greek MEPs; 21 approved, one was absent, one was abstain, one did not vote, and nobody rejected the motion for resolution. Out of 53 MEPs; 39 approved, 7 were absent, 7 did not vote, and nobody rejected.

On 22 April 2009, the European Parliament voted the report on a common immigration policy for Europe, its principles, actions, and tools¹⁶. The report stresses the fact that since the internal borders have been abolished with the Schengen Agreements, the external borders should be protected from “illegal” immigration from the third countries and a common immigration policy should be framed. While the EU population is aging in years, immigrants may become an important solution to this problem, but policies on regular immigration should be hand in hand with combating against “illegal” immigration. The report reiterates that immigration is not only the problem of developed countries, but also it affects countries of origin. While the report welcomes regular migration, it is opposed to undocumented migration, which sometimes creates human tragedies while people are trying to enter territories of the Union. Implementing sanctions on the employers, who employ undocumented immigrants, as one way to combat against “illegal” immigration as the report stresses, but also the same report emphasizes the actions of FRONTEX, EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance

¹⁶A6-0251/2009

System), and external border guards to take measures against undocumented immigrants.

Since the report is a mixture of migrant-favoring and anti-migrant points, the best way to categorize the document is to look at the explanations of MEPs on their voting. Dutch MEP, Philip Claeys, for instance, voted against the report, because he found it insufficient to fight against “illegal” migration and to decrease the number of undocumented immigrants, who had already been within the Union. Also, since the report called for not restricting the acquisition of Blue Card only highly-skilled immigrants, Mr. Claeys opposed to the report. Carlos Coelho, on the other hand, a Portuguese MEP from PPE-DE, voted in favor of the report, because the report supported the acquisition of core political rights of immigrants who had been living in the member states currently. Through those political rights, Mr. Coelho, as well as Edita Estrela, a Portuguese MEP from PSE, thought that immigrants could more participate to the political and civic life of the society in political parties, trade unions etc. Thus, despite the report had some anti-migrant points, especially in its discourse and continuous emphasis on the necessity of FRONTEX, since it supports fundamental rights of immigrants, I will consider the report as migrant favoring. With regard to the voting of Greek and Spanish parliamentarians; 17 Greek parliamentarians approved, while 2 rejected, 4 did not vote, and one was absent out of 24. Out of 54 Spanish MEPs; 40 approved, one rejected, 9 did not vote, and 4 were absent.

The first document of the new term of the European Parliament is a report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards of movement of persons with a long-stay visa on 9 March 2010¹⁷. For third country national, long-stay visas are generated as regularization of immigration. Although long-stay visas are not granted for more than one year, by renewing the visa, third country national can increase their time of stay at the Union. Also, when those immigrants get long-stay visa, they have the right of free movement. In terms of the residence permit, the member states’ decisions to grant a residence permit to immigrants should be in accordance with Schengen Information System, and whether the system find a particular immigrant risky or not to enter the Union territory. Since the long-stay visa,

¹⁷ A7-0015/2010

residence permit, or re-entry visa need some requirements to be granted to immigrants, by satisfying those requirements and getting those formal visas and permissions, immigrants are regularized. Thus, this is a policy on increasing the legal immigration by regularizing immigrants with more than one option. By creating multiple visas, the Union increases the possibility of immigrants to become “legalized” and rather than one type of visa, those multiple visas enables documented immigrants to enter to the Union.

Lithuanian MEP from S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Vilija Blinkevičiūtė voted in favor of the proposal, because she stated that long-stay visas prevented the problems that documented immigrants had been suffering from, such as free movement within the Union. While people with residence permits could travel within the Schengen area, immigrants with long-stay visas were not permitted to do the same. Thus, in terms of the free movement within the Union, the distinction between residence permits, which were more difficult to get by immigrants and long-stay visas, was abolished. French MEP Bruno Gollnisch voted against the report, because he thought that considering the long-stay visa, which was generally given stays for more than six months, as a residence permit would enable lots of immigrants to enter to the Union for purposes, other than tourism. He found unacceptable that this would increase within the number of immigrants within the European Union, even if they were documented. Under these explanations and the content of the report, I will consider it as a migrant-favoring document. Since the new term started on 2009 September, the number of Greek and Spanish MEPs changed. The number of Greek MEPs decreased from 24 to 22, while the number of Spanish MEPs decreased from 54 to 50. Out of 22 Greek MEPs; 8 approved, 10 was abstain, 2 did not vote, and 2 were absent the report, while out of 50 Spanish MEPs; one was absent, 3 did not vote, nobody rejected, and 46 approved.

The other document that was voted by the European Parliament is the report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network on 14 December 2010¹⁸. Immigration liaison officers are assigned to collect information on “illegal” immigrants and use them in strategical and operational levels when needed. Information and Coordination Network

¹⁸ A7-0342/2010

for Member States' Migration Management Services has to provide necessary information concerning the undocumented immigration to the immigration liaison officers. At the operational level, immigration liaison officers cooperate with the FRONTEX, the external border agency. The report urges immigration liaison officers to be in cooperation with related agencies and also inform the European Union bodies in specific regions, where the number of undocumented immigrants is high based on statistics.

Lithuanian MEP from S&D, Zigmantas Balcytis, voted for the report on the basis that the increased number of immigrants within the EU territory required the creation of immigration liaison officers network and its cooperation with the agencies, which were assigned to combat against undocumented immigration. Since there were more immigrants in the Union, those liaison officers should have had sufficient information about the undocumented immigration and return of "illegal" immigrants. On the other hand, Greek MEP, from GUE/NGL, Nikolaos Chountis, voted against the report, because he stressed that the creation of immigration liaison officers network would enhance the competence of FRONTEX, which aimed a Fortress Europe. The idea of Fortress Europe was basically based on the idea of the protection of external border from the undocumented immigrants, who posed threats to the security of the member states, as well as the whole Union. Mr. Chountis emphasized the disastrous and ineffective policies of the FRONTEX by not respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms and risk people's lives. Thus, since the report and the creation of immigration liaison officers, which aimed to contribute to agencies that fight against "illegal" immigrants, criminalized immigrants and immigration, I will take the report as anti-migrant. Out of 22 Greek MEPs; 17 approved, 3 rejected, 2 were abstain, and 2 did not work, while out of 50 Spanish MEPs; 47 approved, one was absent, and 2 did not vote.

Due to the fact that there has not been a migration-related document from the end of 2010 until the beginning of 2013, the last document is voted on 6 January 2013, by the European Parliament. It is a report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the increasing the co-financing rate of the external border funds for particular member states, which have been threatened problems with regard to the financial crisis¹⁹. The report stresses that because of the severity of

¹⁹ A7-0433/2012

financial and economic crisis; some of the member states cannot manage to control their borders. Due to the sovereign debt crisis, some of the member states try to recover their budget deficits, so they cannot direct their public finances to the management of the borders against “illegal” migration. The report emphasizes that those member states that have been affected severely should be supported by the funds that come from the General Program of Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows. The member state can get the fund in order to protect its borders with regard to the common immigration policy if one of the following requirements have been satisfied; if the member state has received medium-term financial assistance, if financial assistance has been provided to that country under the Council Regulation (EU) No: 407/2010, which established the European financial stabilization mechanism, or if the member states has received financial assistance thanks to the European Financial Stability Facility or the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.

Since the main rationale of the increasing the funds of member states, which have been affected from the economic and financial crisis, is based on the control of the external borders against undocumented immigrants and combat against “illegal” immigration, I will consider the report as anti-migrant. However, due to the fact that both Greece and Spain satisfy at least one of the points that I have mentioned above, Greece and Spain will more likely to be in favor of this report. As a result of the funding, those countries will be able to ameliorate their technical, financial, and personnel facilities at the external borders in order to protect the borders against undocumented immigrants. In accordance with this prejudice, the voting of Greek and Spanish parliamentarians is represented as the following: out of 22 Greek MEPs; 18 approved, 2 were absent, one did not vote, and one rejected, while out of 50 MEPs; 46 approved, 2 rejected, one was absent, and one did not vote. In both countries, an anti-migrant report was approved with majority due to the fact that both countries would receive an increase in their funds due to the disastrous effects of the sovereign debt crisis.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This chapter will analyze the data that has been presented in the last chapter. I will take the ratios of the sum of approval votes for anti-migrant and rejections to migrant-favoring proposals and reports to the total votes of both Greek and Spanish parliamentarians at the European Parliament before and after the sovereign debt crisis. I will consider that voting in favor of the anti-migrant documents and voting opposed to the migrant-favoring documents as an anti-migrant attitude of the MEPs. Since migrant favoring documents support the amelioration of the conditions of both documented and undocumented immigrants and the integration of immigrants to the European society and politics, I will regard the opposition votes to those documents as a representation of anti-migrant attitude. In the same manner, due to the fact that anti-migrants documents aim the securitization of the EU against undocumented immigrants and against mass immigration flows to the EU territories based on the perception that immigrants pose threat to the security, welfare, economics, and identity to the European Union, I will take the approvals to those anti-migrant documents as negative attitudes to immigrants. Thus, in this chapter, I will argue the change of the attitudes toward immigrants between the period before 2009 and after 2009 based on the means of the voting preferences of Greek and Spanish MEPs. By this way, I will display whether the sovereign debt crisis has any effect on the change of the voting of Greek and Spanish MEPs at the European Parliament with regard to the attitudes toward immigration. Based on the analysis, I find that in both countries, Greece and Spain, I find an increase in the sum of the approval votes for anti-migrant documents and rejection votes for migrant favoring documents; I will fail to falsify my hypothesis and conclude that worsening national economic outlook increases anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament level, which displays itself with the votes.

4.1. Analyzing Data

Before 2009, the year when the effects of the sovereign debt crisis started to be experienced by the EU countries, I found thirteen documents related to immigration issues from the policy area of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. I consider four of those thirteen documents as anti-migrants, while the rest, nine documents, as migrant favoring. The number of total votes of Greek MEPs is 96 for anti-migrant documents.

While there are 56 approval votes by the Greek for those anti-migrants texts, 17 votes were opposed to those documents. Since the rest, 23 votes, is the votes of those who did not vote, were abstained or absent, I will ignore them while analyzing the aggregate of the approval and rejection votes. While in total there are 96 votes by the Greek parliamentarians at the European Parliament before 2009 there are 204 total votes for migrant favoring proposals. 140 votes approved those migrant favoring documents, while 45 rejected, and again I will ignore the rest of the votes. Based on those calculations, out of 300 total votes that the Greek MEPs had, 101 votes were given based on anti-migrant purposes, while 157 votes were given based on migrant favoring attitude.

From the beginning of 2009 until 6th February 2013, I find six documents related to the issue of immigration. One of the most significant reasons of a small number of immigration-related documents that come to the European Parliament between those years is relatively low effect of supranational organs of the European Union on immigration. Although the pillar system was abolished with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, since immigration is still considered as a third pillar issue in which member states are more effective, the role of the supranational bodies, such as the European Parliament, is low, which in turn causes small number of immigration-related documents as the European Parliament. I consider two out of six proposals as anti-migrant based on their contexts and four documents as migrant favoring. There are 44 votes for anti-migrant documents from the Greek parliaments and 35 of those votes were approval, while 4 was rejection. Out of 94 total votes that the Greek MEPs had for migrant favoring documents, 64 of those were used as approval, while 4 was used as rejection. In other words, while there are 35 approvals for anti-migrant documents, there are 64 approvals for migrant favoring documents, and as 4 votes were used as rejection of anti-migrant documents, another 4 votes were used for rejection of migrant-favoring documents. When I sum the rejections of migrant favoring documents and approval for anti-migrant documents in order to understand the number of total votes that display anti-migrant attitude, the number becomes 39. On the other hand, the sum of rejection for anti-migrant documents and the approval for migrant favoring documents is 68. In these calculations, I ignore the votes by the MEPs who were abstained, absent, or who did not vote. Out of 138 total votes of the Greek parliamentarians on the migration-related

documents after 2009, 39 votes display anti-migrant attitude, while 68 votes were given based on migrant favoring attitude.

Before 2009, Spanish MEPs had 216 votes for anti-migrant documents and 161 of those 216 votes were approval, while 12 were rejection. In terms of migrant favoring proposals, reports, and resolutions, Spanish MEPs' total votes were 484. 323 of 484 votes were approval votes and 63 votes were rejections to migrant favoring documents. Thus, before 2009, when I sum the approvals for anti-migrant documents and rejections to migrant favoring documents, the total number of the votes is 224 out of 700, which is the total number of votes of the Spanish MEPs for both anti-migrant and migrant favoring documents. 335 votes, on the other hand, is the sum of rejection votes to anti-migrant documents and approval votes to migrant favoring documents. Therefore, ignoring the votes of Spanish MEPs, who were abstained, absent, or did not vote, out of 700 total votes; 224 were votes that displayed negative attitudes toward immigrants, while 335 votes can be categorized as migrant favoring.

From the starting of 2009 until the date of the last immigrant-related document that I have found, while Spanish MEPs had 100 votes for anti-migrant documents, 93 of those votes were given as approval and 1 was given as rejection to an anti-migrant proposal. The number of votes that the Spanish MEPs used for migrant favoring documents is 211. While they had 211 votes in total, 167 of those votes were given as approval, while 5 were given as rejection. In order to understand the anti-migrant attitude, when I sum the approvals for anti-migrant documents and rejections for migrant favoring documents, the total of number of votes becomes 98 out of 311, which is the total number of the votes that the Spanish parliamentarians use at the European Parliament both for anti-migrant and migrant favoring documents. 168 votes, the sum of the rejection vote of anti-migrant document and the approval votes for migrant favoring documents, do not display an anti-migrant sentiment.

Based on the findings and my conceptualization of anti-migrant attitude of the Greek and Spanish at the European Parliament level, which is represented as the rejection to migrant favoring and approval to the anti-migrant documents at the same time, I will calculate the ratios of votes that have anti-migrant attitude for both Greece and Spain for the periods from 2004 to the beginning of 2009 and 2009 to the last document in 2013. For the first period, the ratio of anti-migrant votes to total votes of the Greek

parliamentarians at the European Parliament is 0,336²⁰ (33.6 percent). After 2009 until 2013, the ratio of votes that represent the anti-migrant attitude of the Greek parliamentarians to total votes is 0,282²¹ (28.2 percent). From 2004 to 2009, the ratio of anti-migrant votes to total votes of the Spanish parliamentarians at the European Parliament is 0, 32²²(32 percent). After 2009, the ratio of votes that represent anti-migrant attitude of the Spanish MEPs to the total votes of the Spanish for migrant-related documents is 0,315²³ (31.5 %).




Figure 4.1: The change of the anti-migrant voting by the Greek and Spanish MEPs from 2004-2009 to 2009-2013 (Data: TheVoteWatch)

While in the period before 2009, the percentage of the voting of Greek MEPs with anti-migrant attitudes to total voting is 33.6%, after 2009, it decreases to 28.2%. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, between two periods, voting of the Greek MEPs for anti-migrant documents decreases 5.4%. Since the voting of the MEPs from Greece for anti-migrant

²⁰ 101 (the sum of rejection for migrant favoring and the approval for anti-migrant documents) / 300 (the total number of votes of the Greek MEPs from 2004 to 2009 in migrant-related documents)

²¹ 39 (the sum of rejection for migrant favoring and approval for anti-migrant documents) / 138 (the total number of votes of the Greek MEPs from 2009 until the latest document in migrant-related documents)

²² 224 (the sum of rejection for migrant favoring and approval for anti-migrant documents) / 700 (the total number of votes of the Spanish MEPs from 2004 to 2009 in migrant-related documents)

²³ 98 (the sum of rejection for migrant favoring and approval for anti-migrant documents) / 311 (the total number of votes of the Spanish MEPs from 2009 until the latest document in migrant-related documents)

documents decreases, my hypothesis is falsified for the Greek. My hypothesis claims that the bad economic conditions of the country increase the anti-migrant attitude within the European Parliament and anti-migrant attitude is represented with the voting for documents that have anti-migrant contents. Based on the data I have found from the Vote Watch Europe, Greek MEPs' voting has not increased from the first period to the second period, and so do not show an increase in the anti-migrant attitude despite the fact that the economic outlook of Greece has been affected severely by the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, opposite to my hypothesis, due to the economic crisis and worsening of the national economic outlook, rather than an increase, we see a decrease in the voting of the Greek MEPs for anti-migrant documents at the European Parliament.

Before 2009, the percentage of anti-migrant voting of the Spanish MEPs for migration-related documents at the European Parliament was 32%. After the sovereign debt crisis, and the national economic outlook of Spain has worsened severely due to the economic crisis and high unemployment, despite an increase of the anti-migrant attitude at the voting for proposals, motion for resolutions, and reports is expected based on my hypothesis, after 2009, the voting with anti-migrant attitude decreases to 31.5%. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, even the decrease is 0.5%, rather than an increase, there is a decrease of anti-migrant attitude at the voting for EP documents. Since the Spanish case falsifies my hypothesis, too, I deduce that both in Spanish and Greek cases and their voting at the European Parliament, the worsening of national economic outlook does not cause an increase in the anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament.

According to my analysis, the best explanation of the decrease of anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament despite the economic conditions of Greece and Spain have been worsened after the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 is about the nature of the European Parliament. Since the European Parliament is the representative of the European Union and its values, such as human rights, rule of law, and the respect for minority rights, the members of the European Parliament do not vote against European values as long as the issues are not related to their national interests. Although the issue of immigration in certain aspects can be related to the national security, welfare and identity of member states, for some MEPs, being loyal to the European values and ideals are more important for the voting at the European Parliament, which is coined as rhetorical entrapment and shaming by Schimmelfennig (2001). Hence, those parliamentarians, who prefer to vote on the basis of European ideas and supranational

values, they take immigration as a human rights issue and so do not prefer to vote against immigration. Due to the fact that some of the MEPs do not vote against documents that favor immigration in order to respect minority rights, European values, and to represent their country as a country that demonstrates all the ideas and values that a “European” country should have, after the sovereign debt crisis, we observe a decrease in the voting for anti-migrant documents, rather than a decrease. Therefore, the reason of the decrease in the anti-migrant attitude of Spain and Greece after 2009 may be Greek and Spanish MEPs’ demonstration of their respect for human rights, minorities, immigrants, and other European ideas and values. Although the attitudes of citizens toward immigrants have affected by the sovereign debt crisis, at the European Parliament level, the outcome is different due to the biased representations they display through voting in order to display that Greece and Spain have become “European” countries.

When I compare the levels of voting for anti-migrant documents of Greek and Spanish MEPs, I find that, as Figure 4.1 shows, while before 2009, anti-migrant attitude in Greece was 33.6%, it was 32% in Spain. In other words, before the sovereign debt crisis, Greek MEPs tended to show higher anti-migrant attitude in their voting at the European Parliament than the Spanish fellows. However, after the sovereign debt crisis, the percentage of anti-migrant voting of the Greek MEPs decreased to 28.2%, while the percentage of anti-migrant voting of Spanish parliamentarians decreased to 31.5%. To put in other words, after the sovereign debt crisis, although in both countries, the percentages of the approval for anti-migrant documents decreased, Spain demonstrated a smaller decrease compared to Greece. Thus, despite before 2009, Greece has more anti-migrant attitudes than Spain at the European Parliament in terms of the percentage of approval for anti-migrant documents, after 2009, Spain became more anti-migrant than Greece.

Although as I demonstrated in the second chapter, the sovereign debt crisis caused similar impacts on the national economies of both Greece and Spain, the unemployment rates in Spain has always been higher than Greece. Unemployment among the youth (under the age of 25) in 2013 is 57% in Spain, which is the highest rate within the European Union youth unemployed population (Tremlett, 2013). Thus, despite the national economic outlook of both countries are similar and they have experienced similar economic trends after the sovereign debt crisis, the reason of a higher decrease

of anti-migrant attitude among Greek MEPs compared to the Spanish MEPs can be explained with unemployment rates based on the labor market competition model. As I have touched upon in the first chapter, scholars, who claim that economic concerns have effects on anti-migrant attitude, are separated among different models; labor market competition model, welfare system model and the model based on national economic outlook. The labor market competition model assumes that immigrants with similar skills, education levels, and backgrounds with natives, pose a threat to the natives, who are seeking jobs, because since immigrants will be ready to work for lower wages, they will increase the competition and “steal natives’ jobs.” Thus, when unemployment in the host country increases, rather than the worsening of the national economic outlook of the country, the model of labor market competition model may precede and anti-migrant attitude increases in the country. The reason of the high level of unemployment is related to immigration flows to the host country and the unemployed shift the blame on immigrants for high levels of unemployment in the host country. Therefore, since the unemployment levels in Spain have always been higher than unemployment levels in Greece in ten-year period, labor market competition can explain that Greece has experienced a sharp decrease on the anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament after the sovereign debt crisis, while Spain has experienced only a 0.5% decrease after 2009 on the anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament.

4.2. Conclusion

The literature on the effect of economic and non-economic concerns to attitudes toward immigrants is extensive. While some of the scholars defend for a positive correlation between the economic concerns, especially in times of global economic crisis, and anti-migrant attitude not only within the society, but also at the political level (Kessler 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Borjas 1999; Simon and Alexander 2003), some claims that rather than economic concerns, socioeconomic conditions affect the existence of anti-migrant attitude (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmerman 2000; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Fetzer 2000; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; McLaren 2003). In my thesis, I examined a well-known and disputed hypothesis at the European level. I took the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 as a natural breakpoint and researched the relation between economic concerns and anti-migrant attitude. While investigating this relation, I focused on the national economic outlook of the countries, rather than touching upon the labor market

competition or welfare system models. After explaining all models in the first chapter, I propose my hypothesis, which is on the relation between the national economic outlook and attitudes toward immigrants in the second chapter. In order to test this hypothesis, I took Greece and Spain; European Union countries that have been affected by the economic crisis. Except they have been economically affected by the sovereign debt crisis in terms of their unemployment levels, public debts etc, they also have other common points, such as their history at the European Union, the immigration trends in those countries, the political situation in ten-year period. Thus, other than their worsened economic outlooks Greece and Spain have, I also control the politics, immigration history, and their background at the European Union, to make a more descent research.

In order to understand whether there is a relation between the national economic outlook of the host country and the attitudes toward immigrants, rather than at the national level, I examined the attitudes toward immigrants at the European Union level. Since the European Union becomes more supra nationalized, it becomes more effective and significant even in the national politics of the member states. Also, due to the fact that after the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, with special programs on migration and asylum, such as Tampere in 1999, Hague in 2004, and Stockholm in 2009, common immigration policy through the European Union has started to be implemented. Thus, immigration issue at the European Union cannot be thought only a national issue, but also a supranational issue, which made me to look at the voting of the Greek and Spanish parliamentarians for migration-related documents at the European Union in order to examine their attitudes toward immigrants at the EU level.

In third chapter, I examined the migrant-related documents at the European level. By looking at the contents of the documents, such as motions for resolutions, reports etc, I decided whether they were migrant favoring or anti-migrant. Also, the explanations of voting of the MEPs on certain documents enabled me to determine the attitude of the document toward immigrants. Also, I ignored the documents related to asylum seekers and refugees, since I did not put them in the same category with immigrants. After determining whether the documents were anti-migrant or migrant favoring with giving references to their contents and the explanations of the MEPs, I gave the approval and rejection numbers of the Greek and Spanish MEPs for those documents.

In the last chapter, I analyzed the results in order to understand the change of the voting attitudes of Greek and Spanish MEPs for anti-migrant and migrant favoring documents from the period that is between 2004 and 2009, to the period from 2009 until today. I summed the approval votes for anti-migrant documents and rejections for migrant favoring documents in order to understand the negative attitudes toward immigrants at the European Parliament level. The analysis displayed that both in Greece and Spain; an increase in voting with anti-migrant attitudes was not realized. Although my hypothesis claimed that as the national economic outlook of the country got worsened, anti-migrant attitude in the host country would increase. However, despite both Greece and Spain experienced sovereign debt crisis and faced serious economic downturns, an increase of anti-migrant attitude in the voting at the European Parliament from the period before 2009 to the period after 2009 was not observed. On the contrary, the percentage of the anti-migrant attitude decreased from 2004-2009 to 2009-2013. Although the decrease of Spain is lower than the decrease of Greek anti-migrant attitude, both countries displayed a decrease in the anti-migrant attitude at the European Parliament level, which falsified my hypothesis. Thus, I conclude that at the European Parliament level, since parliamentarians of the member states want to represent themselves as “European” countries and dedicated to the European ideas and values, such as the respect for immigrants, I cannot find any relation between the worsening of the national economic outlooks of the member states and their voting for anti-migrant documents. To conclude, for migrant-related documents, anti-migrant attitude of the parliamentarians are shaped more by non-economic factors rather than the economic factors. Their voting may be affected by the representation of the countries as the European Parliament or sociological, historical conditions of the member states, which can be examined in further studies.

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