

**MILITARY MASCULINITIES IN THE MAKING:  
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY**

by  
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**ABSTRACT**

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Supervisor: Ayşe Gül Altınay

Keywords: military, education, masculinity, neoliberalism, Turkey.

Military schools have historically been the black boxes of the Turkish Armed Forces. The subjects who make up the military and their education in military schools have largely remained outside of academic inquiry. Since the establishment of the Republic, the military has been consolidating its power over political processes, the legal system and everyday life through various coups and interventions. Yet, we witness a historical shift in political, social and cultural positionality of the military since the *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz* [Sledgehammer] trials, beginning in 2007 and 2010 respectively. Based upon participant observation, modest historical research, and in-depth interviews with former cadets of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy who were students between the years 2003 and 2013, this study aims to trace the links between my research participants' narratives and the military's falling from grace. This thesis argues that this shift ranges from internal restructuring of power in professional military education to changes in ideological, ethnic, and class composition of the military. It is argued that this allegedly homogeneous entity is made up of diverse bodies, subjects and ideologies that are dynamically being restructured in this process. Trying to transcend the artificial distinction between the institutional representation of the military and the agents who compose it, this thesis, draws attention to the importance of academic research on the professional military, not only through the decision-making processes of a high ranking minority of military officers but also through the heterogeneous subjectivities and layers of complication within the institution.

**ÖZET**  
**ASKERİ ERKEKLİKLER OLUŞURKEN:**  
**BUGÜNÜN TÜRKİYESİ'NDE PROFESYONEL ASKERİ EĞİTİM**

Elif İrem Az

Kültürel Çalışmalar, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014

Tez Danışmanı: Ayşe Gül Altınay

Anahtar sözcükler: Ordu, eğitim, erkeklik, neoliberalizm, Türkiye.

Askerî okullar tarihsel olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin kara kutusu olmuştur. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ni oluşturan özneler ve bu öznelerin nasıl yetiştirildiği üzerine akademik çalışmalar yok denecek kadar azdır. Türkiye tarihindeki askerî darbe ve müdahaleler, ordunun siyasi karar alma süreçlerindeki, hukuki alandaki ve gündelik yaşam pratiklerindeki gücünü ve etkisini yeniden üretmiştir. Ne var ki, sırasıyla 2007 ve 2010 yıllarında başlayan Ergenekon ve Balyoz davalarından bu yana, ordunun ülke içindeki siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel konumunda tarihsel bir değişime tanık olunmaktadır. Bu araştırma için, 2003 ve 2013 yılları arasında Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi ve Deniz Harp Okulu öğrencisi olmuş, eski askerî öğrencilerle derinlemesine görüşmeler ve katılımcı-gözlem yapılmıştır. Aynı zamanda mütevazı bir tarihsel araştırma yürütülmüştür. Bu çalışma, görüşmecilerimin anlatılarıyla ordunun değişmekte olan gücü ve konumu arasındaki bağlantıları araştırmaktadır. Burada bahsedilen değişim sürecinin; profesyonel askerî eğitimin yeniden yapılandırılmasından ordunun ideolojik, etnik, sınıfsal, yapısal ve güç ilişkileri bakımından dönüşümüne kadar uzandığı iddia edilmektedir. Homojen bir yapı olarak algılanan ve sivil-asker ilişkileri literatüründe homojen bir yapı olarak ele alınan ordunun farklı bedenler, erkeklikler, öznellikler ve ideolojilerden oluşan karmaşık bir yapı olduğu ve bu yapının da söz konusu değişim sürecinin etkisiyle dönüşmeye devam ettiği ortaya konmaktadır. Ordunun kurumsal ve homojen temsili ile orduyu oluşturan gerçek özneler arasındaki suni ikiliği aşmaya çalışan bu çalışma, profesyonel orduya dair akademik çalışmaların önemine işaret etmektedir. Zira ordu, yalnızca karar alma pozisyonlarında bulunan yüksek rütbeli bir subaylar azınlığından oluşmamakta ve çok katmanlı bir kurum olarak içerisinde heterojen öznellikler barındırmaktadır.

*To my family and to Murat akmak*

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Entering the field before the fieldwork.....	1
1.2. Methodological considerations .....	3
1.3. Research participants .....	5
1.4. The terminology and organization of professional military education.....	17
1.5. Landmark impacts of the military’s falling from grace on Turkish Naval Academy .....	20
1.6. Possible contributions and the outline of the thesis.....	28
<b>CHAPTER 2: HISTORICIZING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN TURKEY: WHAT ABOUT THE CADETS? .....</b>	<b>33</b>
2.1. A brief review: civil-military relations in Turkey .....	35
2.2. Professional military education from the late 18th century onwards .....	44
2.3. The history of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy.....	55
2.4. Ergenekon and Balyoz [Sledgehammer] trials, and military’s falling from grace .....	62
2.5. Quantitative repercussions of macro-level shifts in civil-military relations in military schools: from 2007 onwards .....	68
<b>CHAPTER 3: MASCULINITIES IN MILITARY SCHOOLS: PUNISHMENT, EXHAUSTION, FRATERNITY .....</b>	<b>75</b>
3.1. The Routine.....	77
3.1.1. Growing up still standing: Tabur hours .....	82
3.1.2. Punishment and Anxiety.....	86
3.1.3. Weekends: The good reason to comply .....	88
3.1.4. Exhaustion and bodies .....	89
3.2. Men’s Friendship and Class Unity [Sınıf Birliği].....	92
3.3. “Lady Students” [Bayan Öğrenciler] and Fraternal Contract.....	99
3.4. Homophobia, legally “asexual” masculinities, and sexism .....	104
3.5. Imposition of penalty by senior cadets [Ceza talimi]: Traditional disciplinary bargain .....	112
3.6. Broken selves, composed selves .....	118
3.6.1. The child self and violence in professional military education .....	118
3.6.2. The “heroic” self.....	122
3.7. New distinctions .....	126
3.8. Melting unities, centralization of authority and remaking military masculinities .....	128
<b>CHAPTER 4: AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEOLIBERALISM AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION .....</b>	<b>131</b>



4.1. Neoliberalism in Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces .....	133
4.2. A military career for new generations .....	145
4.2.1. Neither poor nor rich: Dissatisfactions and appreciations of elder former cadets .....	146
4.2.2. Younger cohorts and new distinctions: at the intersection of Kemalism, class, and ethnicity .....	170
4.3. Diverse justifications of the discrepancy between expectations and circumstances .....	176
<b>CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>179</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>185</b>

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Entering the field before the fieldwork

My grandfather brought my father to Istanbul for military high school entrance examinations in 1970. He took both Land and Air Force exams. He answered only some of the questions so that his father would think he could not succeed, although the children of military officers were positively discriminated and given extra points<sup>1</sup>. When asked why he did not want to enter a military high school, my father responded with a rhetorical question: “What happens when you set gunpowder on fire?” He did not want to speak further on this memory, and he said he leaves the rest to my interpretation. Metaphorically, I think he is the gunpowder, and military school is the fire. He expected to “explode” if he had gone to military high school.

In 2003, one of my elementary school friends, Ali decided to enroll in Turkish Naval High School [Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi] in Heybeliada. I was surprised by his willingness. His parents were wealthy people who did not have a positive look on boarding schools. Moreover, I was probably affected by my father’s negative perception of military officers and policemen. During one of our meetings while we were both in high school, Ali came with a friend from school, Selim. In our conversations that day, his unhappiness and criticisms about professional military education struck me, an

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<sup>1</sup>This regulation was lifted only in 2005. See “‘Babam subay’a ek puan yok”. *Yeni Şafak*, November 5, 2005, accessed May 15, 2014. <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/kasim/05/g06.html>.

unhappiness which a couple of years later drove me to ask him for an interview for the term paper of one of my courses.

Where and when did my field begin? Although the largest part of my ‘fieldwork’ was actualized between December 2013 and April 2014, I think several memories from my past life became a part of ‘the field’ of this research. In retrospect, I understand that not only my interest in Selim’s emotions about the experience of professional military education but also my memories or post-memories of my grandfather whom I knew as a retired Captain of Land Forces, and his impact on my father is reflected in the subject and textual outcome of this study.

Sandra Harding suggests, “The beliefs and behaviors of the researcher are part of the empirical evidence for (or against) the claims advanced in the results of research. This evidence too must be open to critical scrutiny no less than what is traditionally defined as relevant evidence.” (Harding 1987). In a similar vein, Ruth Behar writes a quest for a genre recognized also by Clifford Geertz as missing: “the language to articulate what takes place when we are in fact at work.” (Geertz 1995, 44; cited in Behar 1996, 8-9) Since these discussions took place in anthropology in the 1980s and 90s, the involvement of the researcher’s beliefs, behaviors, and emotions during the ethnographic practice have become acceptable, if not expected, aspects of ethnographic analyses. Navigating back and forth between ‘the field’ and my personal life, which relates in different ways to the subject under study, the question of where the field begins has been interwoven with my aspiration to embed my related ‘personal’ stories within the accounts of the lives of my research participants. Thus, I aim at locating my subjectivity as well as my pre-fieldwork expectations and prejudices in this thesis. It has been far from easy for me to think up interesting ways to draw deeper connections between my own life as a young woman student in Turkey and the experiences of former cadets. Thus, I try my best to use “(self-) reflexivity as an important tool to access and develop” knowledge (Breuer, Mruck and Roth 2002), to incorporate, at least, my presence within the field in this thesis.

Based upon participant observation, modest historical research, and extensive interviews with seventeen former cadets of Turkish Naval High School and/ or Turkish Naval Academy who were students between the years 2003 and 2013, this study aims to trace the links between my research participants’ narratives and macro process of the military’s changing power and position from 2007 onwards. I track down a recent historical shift in the military that ranges from internal restructuring of power in

professional military education to changes in ideological, ethnic, and class composition, to the military's changing reputation in the public sphere. First, I aspire to locate this unprecedented shift in the history of civil-military relations and professional military education in Turkey. Secondly, I seek for the ways in which children and adolescents are composed as both productive and subjected bodies and masculinities through internal discipline. While professional military education continues to have a routinized, standardized and disciplinary training, I argue that this allegedly homogeneous entity is made up of diverse bodies, subjects and ideologies. This heterogeneity produces a plurality and dynamism of military masculinities, which has its corollary in the historical shift the military is undergoing. While the power is restructured in military schools in parallel to the military's falling from grace, my research participants state experiencing and witnessing changes in desired military masculinities of TAF. Thus, trying to transcend the artificial distinction between the institutional representation of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the agents who compose it, this study aspires to propose a different "way of knowing" the military, as our perceptions are characterized "not only by rules and values but also by ways of knowing" (Escobar 1995, 13). This thesis, hopefully, draws attention to the importance of critical approaches to the professional military, not only through the decision-making processes of a high ranking minority of military officers but also through the heterogeneous subjectivities and layers of complication within the institution.

In this introduction, after discussing my methodological considerations, I individually introduce my research participants. Afterwards, the terminology and internal organization of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy are presented. I later discuss the impacts of the military's shifting position in macro politics on Turkish Naval High School, and especially on Turkish Naval Academy. Finally, I move on to the possible contributions and the outline of the thesis.

## **1.2. Methodological considerations**

To accomplish this research, I conducted semi-structured, open-ended, and in-depth interviews with fifteen individuals and a group of two who were students of Turkish Naval High School located in Heybeliada, and Turkish Naval Academy located in Tuzla, Istanbul, between the years 2003 and 2013. Due to the scope and limits of this study, and the concerns about access to the former cadets of other military schools, I chose to narrow down this research with the two schools of Turkish Naval Forces.

Except one interview with two research participants at the same time, I conducted individual interviews in three different cities/ towns of Turkey. Some of my research participants kindly called me when they visited Istanbul, and made the process much more easier for me. Therefore, this study can be described as a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995).

While entering the field in December 2013, I was assuming that my ability to reach former cadets will be determined by Selim's willingness to introduce me to his friends. However, Selim happened to be my first gatekeeper before I got in contact with Rıdvan, and Hakan. While Selim and the research participants with whom I contacted through him are from the cohorts who are born between 1987 and 1990, Hakan and Rıdvan come from other cohorts that are significant for this thesis in different ways.

Hakan was from one of the cohorts born between 1990 and 1992, among whom there are cadets who went through investigations as a result of the anonymous advice letters received by Turkish Naval Academy administration in 2008-2009. After our interview, he helped me contact with three other friends of his. Yet one of them did not want to meet me not because he is "afraid of anything" but because he does not "want to remember," as stated by himself. Rıdvan on the other hand, was a contact who found me rather than vice versa. While we were discussing my thesis topic with friends in a public place, he overheard us, and said he would like to speak with me and help me with finding other contacts. Rıdvan and the two research participants whom I reached thanks to his willingness to help are from the cohorts born between 1992-1994. While I introduce my research participants in detail below, I shall mention here that I do not share from which cohort they originate or any personal information that would make it easy to identify them for the sake of their anonymity.

Though I had three gatekeepers, Selim, Rıdvan, and Hakan respectively, I benefited from participant-observation by courtesy of Selim. He took me to social meetings with his friends from Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy, where I had the chance to observe their interactions, meet former cadets, and arrange interviews. During the writing process, he was always available to answer my questions.

Important reflections of my subjectivity in this study stem from the positionalities I take in the eyes of my research participants. Some spoke with me as a close friend of their dear high school and academy friends Ali and Selim. Some others who are younger than me showed me the respect one would show to an *abla* [elder

sister] who is a graduate of Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University, and a teaching assistant at Sabancı University. Combined with this, another challenge was my gender. A young woman who is trying to understand the transformations in professional military education and asking questions about men's masculinities, friendships and sexualities, was, a source of anxiety, at least for the younger research participants who shared a great deal of anxiety about making an interview with me. Since they stated facing mobbing and discrimination in school or getting through hard times of administrative investigations or court cases, I was very much empathetic to their concerns.

An additional challenge was dealing with the knowledge of my feminist and anti-militarist positionality, which was familiar to the research participants who were friends with Ali and Selim. While some of my younger interviewees spoke about the value of being patriotic for a cadet and a military officer, I tried my best to be an empathetic listener. When they asked my opinions, I answered without hiding or trivializing my own political positionality, but also stating my respect for their stance. As my first anthropological research, this process and the research participants taught me how to stay respectful and empathetic in disagreement, which was one of my major ethical considerations before the fieldwork.

My interactions with Ali, Selim and my other formerly cadet friends 'before' entering the field shaped my tentative guesses to a great extent about the outcomes of this research. Yet I tried my best to utilize the afore-acknowledgement of these guesses in order not to let them shadow my perceptions on their narratives and my observations in the field.

### **1.3. Research participants**

My first gatekeeper Selim accompanied me throughout the fieldwork process and I benefited from his insights on professional military education, particularly in my analysis in chapter four. The interviewees who were willing to participate because they trusted Selim, who prepared the social environment for me to tell his friends about my research several times, are from the cohorts born between 1987 and 1989, with one elder exception, Kerem. I will categorize these ten interviewees as the first group, when it is relevant to do so. Hakan and the two interviewees I reached through him are from the cohorts born between the years 1990 and 1992, and will be called the second group. The last group of participants was born between 1992 and 1994, and they will be

referred to as the youngest or third group throughout the thesis. These categories are shaped according to the outcomes of the interviews, despite the fact that they appear to be based on age difference. Starting from the first interviewee, I introduce my research participants in the order of the above-listed three groups. Unless indicated otherwise, the cadets went both to naval high school and the academy.

*First group, born between 1987 and 1989, cadets between 2001 and 2011*

### **Kaan**

Kaan is a military officer who currently does not have an assigned position because of his health problems. As the other members from the first group, he mentioned the randomness of his enrollment in naval high school. His father is a civil servant in the field of education, and his mother is a civil servant in health care service. He said there are not any military officers or non-commissioned officers (NCO) in his family, and explained his decision to enter the examinations of Naval Forces as follows:

Kaan: [...] was a naval officer. He is a family friend. He is closer to me than an uncle or an aunt, think that way. He told me that they would make me a military officer in a school on Heybeliada. And I was aspired, of course. There is no soldier in our family. My father is against it. He is so against that... You know they make us wear costumes at kindergarten; one becomes soldier, one doctor, one nurse. I was going to be a soldier. Or was it a cop? It was either a soldier or a cop. Yeah, it was a soldier I think, since my mom worked at military, a costume could have been arranged, you know... Something amateurish. However, my father is, in fact, a rightist, nationalist man. He somehow feels antipathy against uniforms. Or rather, he didn't want us, me, to be inside one from the beginning.<sup>2 3</sup>

His parents, especially his father who is a Turkish nationalist according to Kaan, did not desire a military career for Kaan, although they did not disapprove, either. It was striking for me to notice that he does not count his mother as working in the military,

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<sup>2</sup> All the interviews were conducted in Turkish. Unless indicated otherwise, the translations of both the interviews and the originally Turkish resources from which I make quotations belong to me, of course with the generous help of Müjde Yılmaz.

<sup>3</sup>Kaan: [...] deniz astsubayıydı. Aile dostumuz. Bana amcadan teyzeden yakın, öyle düşün. O bana dedi ki seni, Heybeliada'da okul var, seni subay yapacağız. Ben de tabii özendim. Benim ailemde hiç asker yok. Benim babam da karşı. Babam o kadar karşı ki hani kreşte herkese kıyafetler giydirilir ya biri asker olur, biri doktor olur, hemşire olur. Ben asker olacaktım. Polis mi olacaktım? Ya asker ya polis ikisinden biri. Ha asker galiba, annem askeriye çalıştığı için oradan kıyafet ayarlanabilir falan gibisinden, anladın mı? Amatör bir şey yani. Halbuki babam benim aslında milliyetçi, sağ görüşlü bir adamdır. Ama üniformaya antipatisi var adamın. Daha doğrusu, bizim, benim içeride olmamı istemiyordu en başta.

although she does in a well-known military institution with a civil status, nor did he mention her influence on his decision.

### **Oğuz**

Oğuz left the naval academy of his own volition. He recently graduated from the university he was transferred to after the academy. There is a military professional in his family who did not want Oğuz to enroll in a military high school. Remaining a student after his classmates in the academy became military officers, with good salaries, disturbed him. However, he expressed his self-complacency outside the military. Like Kaan and Onur he emphasized the subjectivity of his unhappiness in military schools:

Oğuz: These are, of course relative troubles. I mean, I might find it difficult while another one does not. Something that bothers another one may not bother me at all. I mean, in conclusion, it depends on how you look at it or what kind of a person you are. I didn't find these difficult. I might have but I thought like this... I could do this job better than most people, I mean, perhaps better than most people who work at this profession right now, because I had this thing in me... I might have stronger sense of patriotism than others. But I... To be honest, under these circumstances I see some kind of people. I said "I can't do this job" in the end. Frankly speaking, I had trouble.<sup>4</sup>

### **Burak**

Burak quit military education when he graduated from naval high school. Not because he has a military officer in the family but because he was successful enough to be ranked among the first hundred in the high school entrance examination, he entered the naval high school with an exceptional degree. His parents did not want to send him to one of the top high schools of the country, according to Burak, because they thought they did not possess the necessary cultural capital:

Burak: I took it as a trial, to have some testing experience. I came out with a good degree. [...] And after high school placement test, I took enough points to go to one of the best Anatolian high schools in Istanbul. They might have thought if I had gone to that school, it would have put them in

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<sup>4</sup>Oğuz: Bunlar tabii kişiden kişiye değişen zorluklar. Yani bu bana göre zor gelir, başkasına zor gelmeyebilir. Yani başkasını zorlayan şey bana zor gelmeyebilir. Yani sonuç olarak nereden baktığım, nasıl bir karakter olduğuna bağlı. Bana bunlar zor gelmedi. Gelecekti açıkçası, şöyle düşündüm ben. Ben açıkçası çoğu insandan belki şuanda mesleği yapan çoğu insandan daha iyi bu işi yapabilirdim çünkü benim içimdeki hani şey... Vatan sevgisi belki diğerlerinden daha güçlü olabilir. Ama benim... Ben açıkçası bu şartlar altında bir takım gördüğüm insanlar oluyor. "Bu işi yapamam" dedim ben yani. Sıkıntı yaşadım açıkçası yani.



cultural and financial trouble. My father said “Will you study here? Look at those long haired boys with earrings, will you be like them?” in a despotic way. Yes, the teachers are appointed by the government. The woman asked if I had a foreign language, I said no. She assumed that I had English but not French. I thought that I would really be crushed there. I was a chubby boy. Dad also said that “I want to see you strong as a nail, in front of me.” This was another blow to me, do you understand? Though I hadn’t even thought about it once till that time, all of a sudden I found myself obliged to go to the military high school.<sup>5</sup>

He recently started to work in a private company in Istanbul. He expressed no regret about leaving the military, although he was quite unhappy because he had to take the university entrance examination with a serious disadvantage<sup>6</sup>.

### **Efe**

Efe works as a military officer in a Mediterranean city. He graduated from both naval high school and naval academy. There is a non-commissioned officer in his family. Among my interviewees from his groups he had the most positive approach to the military as an institution. I interpret his distinguishing motivation to arrange our interview in line with his stated presupposition that my other interviewees most probably would have negative perceptions of professional military education and the military. I did not ask about how they identify themselves to my research participants, class or ethnicity wise. Efe implied not yet needing a guaranteed salary, and thus working as a military officer not out of obligation but desire. He narrates his first night

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<sup>5</sup>Burak: Deneme olsun, sınav tecrübesi olsun diye girdim. Dereceyle girdim, [...] Lise giriş sınavına girince de İstanbul’daki en iyi anadolu liselerinden birini kazandım. Kültürel açıdan o lisede okumamın kültürel ve maddi olarak onları zorlayacağını düşünmüş olabilirler. Babam “burada mı okuyacaksın, bak şu küpeli uzun saçlı çocuklara, böyle mi olacaksın?” demişti despot bir şekilde. Öğretmenleri devlet mi atıyor, evet. Kadın yabancı dilin var mı diye sordu, hayır dedim, kadın İngilizce bilip Fransızca bilmediğimi düşündü. Ben burada hakikaten ezilirim diye düşündüm. Biraz tombik bir çocuktum. Babam bir de “Serhat ben senin çakı gibi karşımda olmanı istiyorum” demişti, buradan da vurdu beni, anladın mı? O ana kadar aklımdan geçmezken, ben bir anda kendimi askeri liseye gitmek zorunda buldum.

<sup>6</sup>At the time, one’s weighted high school grade point average was determined by the overall success of the students of a high school in that particular year. Since the graduates of military high schools do not take the university entrance exam but pass on to the Academy automatically, Burak had a very low weighted high school gpa, which narrowed his possibilities down albeit his considerable success in the exam. For the details of the updated regulations see “YGS Puan Hesaplama.” *meb.gov.tr*, January 23, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014. Last updated on October 11, 2013. [http://mebk12.meb.gov.tr/meb\\_iys\\_dosyalar/42/02/216195/icerikler/ygs-puan-hesaplama\\_290103.html](http://mebk12.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/42/02/216195/icerikler/ygs-puan-hesaplama_290103.html).

in Heybeliada as an expression of the resoluteness he showed not to quit professional military education:

Efe: At my first night there, people were like that, crying, complaining or so. Then, I went to sit at a place with a very beautiful view. I just sat there. [...] I was on my own. I said that I would stay. So far, I have never thought about leaving. I mean, I am alright. I would stand behind that. Perhaps that is why I like navigation. If I hadn't made that decision back then, I would have probably had nothing to do with marine but I like standing behind the things I do very much. I mean, if I won't be able to do something, I don't even mention it. After that, I have never gone through that again.<sup>7</sup>

### **Tarik**

Tarik lives in an Aegean city working as a military officer. He likes his job as he works in a quite specific unit of Naval Forces. There is a military officer in his family. He is content with his ongoing life except the limited socialization opportunities he can access because of his job, and the gated military zone he works in. Like Efe, he did not leave the school although his parents are able to afford the compensation penalty for quitting. First, he said he never wanted to become a burden to his parents, and then asked "Most young people outside don't worry about their future until they graduate from the university, right? I have no idea why we were like that."

### **Ümit**

Ümit was one of the comfortable interviewees expressing the 'normality' of hierarchy, violence, and suffering as indispensable parts of military education. There is not a military member in his family, and he stated learning about military high school from a teacher in his elementary school. He left the military after the academy graduation, and found a good job almost immediately. He defined his experience of military school as simultaneously the best and worst thing that has ever happened to him. His emphasis on the positive impacts, I think, is a reflection of his contentment about his current life:

#### **Why did you say "both the best and the worst"?**

Ümit: 'cause it is so, it had many contributions on us. Everyone at school saw themselves as the standard people. Why? Military says that people under some standards cannot come in, they eliminate them from the beginning. Then again, they cannot hold themselves over some standards. I

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<sup>7</sup>Efe: İlk gün gittiğim akşamı millet şey yapıyor, ağlayanlar zırlayanlar falan. Sonra oturdum böyle, çok güzel yer vardı böyle manzaralı. Oturdum böyle. [...] Kendi kendimeydim. Kalacağım dedim. Bir daha da hiçbir zaman gitmek aklıma gelmedi. Memnunum yani. Onun arkasında da dururum yani. Belki de onun için seviyorum denizciliği. O gün o kararı vermesem denizle alakam olmayacak belki ama ben yaptığım şeylerin arkasında durmayı çok severim. Bir şeyi yapamayacaksam söylemem yani. O günden sonra hiç bir daha o konuyu açmadım kendime.

mean a boy was a very good sportsman, a national oarsman and he quitted, a national chess player quitted. These kind of extremes have got themselves out. So, people at school look at those in lower degree and say: man, he is an inch lower, I am the standard. And from time to time some urban legends like “the questions of whatever course outside was such but ours were such...” You always compare yourself to the life here. [...] We were educated well compared to the outside. The school taught how to learn, how to use our brain in a better way.<sup>8</sup>

### **Berk**

Berk found himself in a military high school as a fait accompli presented by his parents. Although he won a very prestigious high school in Istanbul, his father enrolled him in the Turkish Naval High School because he went bankrupt. After he left the academy, he was transferred to a good university. During his undergraduate studies, he worked in several companies doing things related to advertisement, and now he works for a very famous advertising agency. He expressed respect for military officers several times throughout our interview, as he was describing himself as fitting perfectly in the capitalist market economy. He was very enthusiastic while telling me about his job and his future plans. His emphasis on his ‘distinguishing abilities’, on which he trusted while taking the risk of leaving the military, served to legitimize his detachment from the academy albeit having a great deal of respect for military professionalism. There is no military officer, NCO or civil servant working for the military in his family.

### **Mahmut**

Mahmut was a *kabak* in the Turkish Naval Academy, yet a loved one for the “originals”<sup>9</sup>. He works as a military officer. His socio-economic background is significantly different from the rest of first group. His father works in an underpaid freelance job, and his mother is a stay-at-home housewife. He did not made any mention of his ethnic background. He was born and grown up in the eastern Turkey unlike the rest of my research participants. While expressing his dissatisfaction with his

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#### <sup>8</sup>Niye “hem en iyi şey hem kötü” dedin?

Ümit: E öyle, birçok şey kattı bence. Okulda herkes kendini standart kişi olarak görüyordu. Niye? Askeriye diyor ki, bu seviyenin altındaki giremez, diyor; onu baştan eliyor. Ondan sonra belli bir seviyenin üzerinde kendini tutamıyor. Yani adam çok iyi sporcu milli kürekçiydi ayrıldı, milli satranççiydi ayrıldı. Böyle çok uç kişiler de attı kendini. Okulda millet o yüzden alttakine bakıyor: ulan bir tık aşağıda, ben standartım. Arada bir şehir efsanesi: “ulan dışarıdaki bilmem ne soruları olsa şöyleymiş de, bize bu sorular”... Kendini hep burayla kıyaslıyorsun. [...] Dışarıya göre iyi yetiştirmişiz kendimizi. Nasıl öğrenebileceğin, kafayı çalıştırma konusunda iyi yetiştirmiş okul.

<sup>9</sup>The adjective, or name, *original* is used for the cadets who are have also been the students of Turkish Naval High School.

occupation, he was the only one from the first group who stated seeking for a guaranteed job, and the privileges of a military career:

Mahmut: The real purpose to it was not a special one like “I was born to be a soldier” or so, not like this. It was the worries about the future, the attraction of officialism, a guaranteed job, etc. Yes.<sup>10</sup>

### **Kerem**

Kerem is a military officer in the Black Sea region. He was born between 1981 and 1983, and was a cadet approximately between 1996 and 2005. Yet his narrative is not distinct from the memories and perceptions of the first group in terms of the various sites of transformation I trace. Our interview with him was quite uncomfortable as we were in a room without a door. Furthermore, we were having the interview right after we met, which was the case only for Ali and Mert except for Kerem, and I think this had a distancing effect as well. Consequently, he did not share as much as did the other interviewees on how he remembers professional military education and perceives being a military officer. However, he mentioned being raised by a single parent, at least for a while before he enrolled in naval high school. I thought after this and his other statements that he comes from a relatively disadvantaged family like Mahmut when compared to the others.

### **Onur**

Onur was expelled from the academy, by intentionally committing several offenses, so as to exhaust his disciplinary points<sup>11</sup> in order to be transferred to a university<sup>12</sup>. He stated his regret over his decision because of the financial burden he put on the shoulders of his parents, and because he felt lost in the civilian world. While

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<sup>10</sup>Mahmut: İřin aslı çok öyle özel bir maksat deęildi yani, “ben asker olmak için doğdum” vs., bu deęil. Gelecek kaygısı, memuriyet peşinde kořma, garanti iş vs... Evet.

<sup>11</sup>Each cadet enters the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval Academy with a full disciplinary point of 120. As they get punished due to their disrespectful behaviors to their seniors, or because of their other misdemeanors such as dirty shoes or hats, they consume these points. Even in the academy, when a cadet falls under a certain amount of points, the family of the cadet is invited to the school, even if they have legal capacity and do not need a guardian. First, the cadets are not seen as capable individuals. Second, his or her parents are those who will pay the compensation penalty for their military education if one gets expelled from the school. Exhausting the entire 120 points results in being expelled from the school no matter how successful one is in his or her courses.

<sup>12</sup>The related law of the time was allowing only the former cadets who are expelled from a military school to be transferred to a university decided by the Higher Education Council, in accordance with the cadet’s general point average.

stating his appreciation of the military as an institution and nationalism as an ideology, he said his detachment was a result of increasing pressure on the cadets after the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations:

Onur: After passing to the military academy you start asking yourself “What am I doing? I am following a path and I will step into that profession” and after you finish 4<sup>th</sup> class in the academy, you have a time till 30<sup>th</sup> of July. Until that time, you have to decide whether you will quit or not. Because if you don’t, there will be a compulsory service of 15 years. And, since after 3<sup>rd</sup> year I would start having difficulties, I didn’t want to do that compulsory service for 15 years and I didn’t want to choose military as my profession, I quitted military academy. But the time I quitted was such, as an excuse of the operations Ergenekon and Balyoz, many people were arrested. [...] Till that time, I had been in military school for 5 years and I hadn’t seen such pressure... When those incidents emerged, I was at military academy and I was being punished for nonsense, silly reasons and things began to get really bothersome.<sup>13</sup>

As Onur put, the increasing pressure on the cadets from 2009 onwards was observed by the first group to a certain extent. However, it was the cohorts succeeding them who faced mobbing and discrimination, or observed their friends being harassed by the commanders, as claimed by my younger research participants.

*Second group, born between 1990 and 1992, cadets between 2004 and 2013*

### **Hakan**

Our acquaintance with Hakan dates back to 2007, when he was still a cadet. When I called him in April 2014, he was very helpful with arranging the interview. Enrolled in a prestigious university by taking the student selection examination after leaving the naval academy, he is very happy with his life. He comes from a lower middle class family, living in small town of Anatolia. There is not a military professional in the family. His sibling has a bright career, which set a precedent for Hakan while he was considering leaving the military. Our interview was a turning point

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<sup>13</sup>Onur: Harp okuluna geçtikten sonra da artık diyorsun “Ben ne yapıyorum, bir yola doğru gidiyorum, artık ben mesleğe adım atacağım ve Harp 4’ü bitirdikten sonra 30 Temmuz’a kadar bir zaman var. O zamana kadar karar vermen lazım okuldan ayrılacak mısın, ayrılmayacak mısın. Çünkü eğer ayrılmazsan on beş sene kadar zorunlu hizmet var. Ben de işte üçüncü sınıfta şey olacağı için, bundan sonra artık zorlanacağım için, 15 sene zorunlu hizmet yapmak istemediğim için ve askerliğin mesleğim olmasını istemediğim için askeri okuldan ayrıldım. Ama benim ayrıldığı dönem şöyle bir dönemdi, bu işte Ergenekon ve Balyoz soruşturmalarını bahane edip birçok insanı tutukladılar. [...] Ben o zamana kadar beş senedir askeriyeydim ve ben o zamana kadar görmediğim baskıyı... Biz işte harp okulundayken böyle bir olay olunca ben de artık antin kuntin şeylerden ceza almaya başladım ve canım çok sıkıldı artık böyle durumlara.

in the fieldwork: First, he narrated the story of how he decided to take the military high school examinations. Second, he personally knows the two cadets who were apprehended while having a sexual affair, and the following investigations began with the anonymous accusation letters received by the academy administration.

I was astonished to hear that Hakan became a part of the *Hizmet* Movement<sup>14</sup> while he was attending one of their training centers [*dershane*] for student selection examination for high schools [Temel Öğretimden Orta Öğretime Geçiş, TEOG], and he enrolled in Turkish Naval High School with the encouragement of the community. His brothers<sup>15</sup> were saying that Naval Forces is morally the most corrupted body among all military forces; thus, religious people like Hakan shall contribute to its transformation:

Hakan: At secondary school I wanted to have more science courses. So I attended one of private institutions of *Cemaat* [Gülen community]. I met some of those famous “brothers”. After some invitations to their home and such things, I started to visit them regularly. It was usually a group of two or three people. [...] You regularly meet with three people at a house and so on. After that they made military school such... They made me want to attend it. [...] Naval Forces was being considered as the worst part of this thing. The most Kemalist one... I mean, they saw it as a crap and the most Kemalist part, the most opposing part was naval office. *Cemaat* wanted to change Naval Forces the most. The ones referring me to the naval high school were them. I also wanted it but it was mostly their doing. A few times, I had second thoughts like “should I choose the air?” but they had mostly canalized me towards naval high school.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>“The Gülen community that mainly identifies itself as *Hizmet Hareketi*<sup>14</sup> or *Nur Cemaati* is one of the widely recognized Islamic groups in Turkey and internationally. [...] Whether it is a successor of a *Nurculuk* movement led by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi or an extension of this movement is debatable. However, it can be argued that Nursi was one of the influential figures who shaped Gülen’s thoughts on the Islamic revivalism. Still accentuating on the revitalization of faith, the current leader of the movement, Fethullah Gülen who resides in the USA since 1999, appropriates modernist discourse. Differently from other Islamic movements and other *Nur* groups, the *Hizmet* movement constantly negotiates and engages with secularist processes and expands its activities internationally [...] The decentralized organization, informal membership and lack of transparency of the community makes it impossible to provide the exact number of the followers and sympathizers of the movement.” (Saparova 2014, 8)

<sup>15</sup>The *Hizmet* Movement has a system of “brothers” and “sisters.” According to one’s gender, particular brothers or sisters mentor him or her. They also help with one’s courses if necessary.

<sup>16</sup>Hakan: Yedinci sınıftayken falan daha çok fen lisesi istiyordum. Sonra cemaatin dershanelerinden birine gittim. Orada meşhur abilerle falan tanıştım. Onlar evlerine çağırma olayları falan derken, yavaş yavaş gidip gelmeye başladım. İki üç kişilik gruplar halinde oluyordu. [...] Üç kişi sürekli bir eve gidiyorsun falan filan. Ondan sonra askeri liseyi iyice şey yaptılar. İster duruma getirdiler beni. [...] Deniz Kuvvetleri en pislik yeri olarak görülüyordu bu şeyin. En Atatürkçü... Yani onlar en pislik

His contact with the movement continued until the first years of the academy. Because he started to feel bad about answering the questions of brothers about his friends and commanders from the school, he stopped answering their calls, and after several months, told them he do not want to see them anymore. Hakan provided me with three other contacts from his group among which only one did not want to make an interview with me.

### **Eren**

Like the other interviewees introduced thus far, Eren won a good high school in his city. There is not a military officer or a NCO in his family but he decided to enroll in the naval high school after taking the advice of his relatives and family acquaintances. “It was a quickly made decision, I can even say a coincidence”, he said. In 2009, the academy administration received anonymous letters about some eight to ten cadets including Eren. Although he left the academy because of his exhaustion of the accusations and administrative investigations he went through, he stated that he finds military professionalism very hard in this specific historical context. He also stated thinking that the military approximates to the police force, which has negative connotations in his perception:

Eren: I think it is a very difficult profession in today’s world, being directed by others and living in the pattern you are supposed to live in and all. I don’t believe that people live there has much saying on their own lives. Because even their vacation days are predetermined, not personal. You should know, too. While you have, at least the chance, right, to say that “I won’t go to work today, enough” if you are a civilian, you don’t have that right here. Very simple, in my head being military officer is restrictive in regard to one’s freedom and it does not give you chance to develop yourself or so. Even after retirement, you have a limited list of occupations to follow, I don’t know much about the financial part. Probably it is in middle level taking Turkey’s conditions into consideration. I mean, perhaps it is lower than the salary of a person working after graduating from a fine university. [...] Before, it wasn’t like this in Turkey. Everybody is aware of that. In the past, the military could play an active role in international relations in the direction it wished. This is my opinion. But now, I don’t think that it is possible. Both the condition of the world and the transformation Turkey

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görüyordu ama en Atatürkçü, en şey olan, her şeye karşı çıkan Deniz Kuvvetleri’ydi. En çok Deniz Kuvvetleri’ni değiştirmek istiyordu cemaat. Beni Deniz Kuvvetleri’ne özellikle onlar sevk etti. Ya ben de deniz istiyordum ama onlar da şey yapmıştı. Birkaç kere fikrim değişir gibi oldu havaya mı gitsem falan diye, ama Deniz’e daha çok yönlendirmişlerdi.

faced for the last 10 years brought this about. I mean, I do not think of it as very different from being a cop.<sup>17</sup>

### **Arda**

There is no one from the military in Arda's family. He entered only the naval high school entrance examination, as he wanted to be a seaman rather than a soldier. He mentioned the common perception in the society and within the military that marines are regarded as lesser soldiers than those in the army and air force. He said his parents' guidance also impacted his decision although they did not pressure him. Arda was very successful in his courses like Hakan and Eren. He shared the same faith with Eren and went through investigations because of the accusations about him received by the administration. While neither Eren nor Arda shared the details of their particular cases, the changes in perceptions on a military career as a result of these processes were perceptible throughout our interviews. Arda comes from a middle class family like Eren, and his parents were willing to afford the compensation penalty after his detachment from the academy since they were informed about the mobbing and investigations faced by their son.

*Third group, born between 1992 and 1994, cadets between 2006 and 2013*

### **Rıdvan**

Rıdvan left the naval academy very recently, a couple of years after the start. He was transferred to a university, and is still a student. He has a military officer in family with whom he is angry, because this person did not take any action while Rıdvan was discriminated by his company commanders, facing mobbing and extra psychological and physical training. He said he did not want to leave the military but he was forced to by the harassments of his commanders. He mentioned his non-need for a guaranteed

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<sup>17</sup>Eren: Şu gün çok zor bir meslek olduğunu düşünüyorum. Sürekli birileri tarafından yönlendirilip kalıplar çerçevesinde yaşamak yani. Hayatının çok da fazla kendi elinde olduğunu düşünmüyorum orada yaşayanların. Çünkü izin günleri bile sonuçta belirli yani, şey değil. Sen de biliyorsundur. Sivilde en azından bir gün ben bugün işe gitmeyeceğim ya yeter dediğin bir hakkın şansın varken, öyle bir şansın yok. En basit, kafamda subaylık çok fazla özgürlük kısıtlayıcı ve çok fazla kendini geliştirme de olanak çok fazla tanımayan bir meslek olarak görüyorum. Meslek değiştirmeye de izin vermiyor. Emekli olduktan sonra da yine olabileceğin meslekler sınırlı yani. Maddi durumu da çok fazla bilmiyorum. Herhalde Türkiye şartlarında ortalama bir seviye yani. İşte iyi bir üniversiteden mezun olup çalışandan belki daha da düşük olabilir. [...] Eskiden Türkiye'de o şekilde değildi. Herkes de farkındadır. Eskiden ordu kendi karar verdiği doğrultuda uluslararası ilişkilerde bir aktif rol oynayabiliyordu. Bu benim görüşüm. Ama şu an öyle bir şey olmasına imkan yok olarak görüyorum. Hem dünya şartları buna getirdi hem Türkiye'nin bir on senelik dönüşümüyle de bu duruma girdi. Benim gözümde bir polisten çok da farklı bir konumda değil yani.



salary and job provided by a military career through the economic well-being of his parents. He also highlighted his Turkish identity several times by expressing the strange presence of Kurdish cadets coming from civilian high schools in naval academy. Unlike the other groups, he emphasized his passion to enroll in military high school, distinguishing himself and his friends from the rest:

Rıdvan: There were students thinking like me too: cadets who are in military school for having professional pleasure in the future but not for job warranty.<sup>18</sup>

### **Ali and Mert**

Ali and Mert are two former cadets who recently left the academy, sharing the same faith with Rıdvan. They agreed to meet me on the condition of being interviewed together. Only when we met could I understand their anxiety. Then I felt worried and uneasy about having the interview. I realized, they decided not to call each other by name while I was recording. Yet in retrospect, I do not regret my decision to continue anyway since at the end, they were content with sharing what they have been through, and I thought this was the reason why they agreed to meet me in the first place. They both had military professionals in their families. Mert's father did not want him to 'waste himself' in military schools, with his words. They emphasized that they did not 'leave' the academy but they were 'pushed out' as a consequence of the commanders' harassments and mobbing. Thus, they stated they were very proud to be cadets while still in naval high school and the academy. Like Rıdvan, they mentioned being passionate about becoming a military officer, not because they need a guaranteed salary but with nationalist feelings.

### **Furkan**

Furkan left the military when he finished the naval high school. Thus he was not subjected to mobbing or extra disciplinary training like Rıdvan, Ali and Mert. However, the military's declining 'prestige' in domestic arena affected his decision to quit, he said. There are many military officers and NCOs in his family. Whilst they supported his entrance to the naval high school, they supported his detachment as well, because of the military's 'loss of prestige', according to Furkan. Like the others from the third group, he highlighted the economic and social prosperity of his parents, implying he left

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<sup>18</sup>Rıdvan: Ama benim gibi öğrenciler de vardı. Sadece meslek sahibi olmak için değil de mesleki haz almak için giden öğrenciler de vardı.

the military not because he is a betrayer running from a sinking ship but because of increasingly irrational discipline within the schools.

#### **1.4. The terminology and organization of professional military education**

“*Hem mahpus hem lise hem asker arkadaşı:*”<sup>19</sup> wrote a former cadet while sharing a photo from their class reunion in Summer 2014. ‘Class’ refers to a particular cohort in Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy. ‘Class unity’ requires solidarity among classmate cadets, and secrecy of the internal debates of the cohort. It is a value that shapes the perceptions of my research participants on professional military education to a great extent. Meanings that are attributed to it usually change from cohort to cohort but sometimes even from individual to individual.

Classmates are first of all “prison friends.” The hierarchy between cohorts reinforces the class unity as well as the isolation of a cohort from the others. Secondly and most importantly, the physical isolation of the military schools from civilian life make cadets ‘prisoners’ in their memories. The expressions ‘closed inside’ and ‘imprisoned’ were widely used by all of my interviewees, even by those who championed the disciplinary techniques of professional military education for the sake of a stronger military.

Thirdly, not only the physical isolation but also financial concerns imprison many cadets, as they have to pay a large amount of compensation penalty if they quit or get expelled from the school. While the children or adolescents enroll in a military high school or a military academy, a contract is signed between TAF and the parents, and the latter become the guarantor of the expenses that will be made for their children. Selim stated that the penalty was approximately one hundred thousand Turkish liras but it was decreased gradually since the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. Most recently in 2013, the pocket money, stationary costs, medical and service expenses have been removed from the list. Additionally, the guarantor will compensate only fifty percent of the food cost.<sup>20</sup> The cadets automatically become a party of the contract when they turn eighteen. Because one’s parents sign the binding contract when

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<sup>19</sup>“Prison, high school, and military friends at the same time:”

<sup>20</sup>“Askeri okuldan ayrılana tazminat müjdesi!”. *Sabah*, November 9, 2013, accessed 15 May 2014. <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Egitim/2013/11/09/askeri-okullardan-ayrilanlarin-odedigi-tazminat-miktari-dusuruldu>. For more, please see Av. İlknur Sezgin Temel. “Askeri Öğrencilik Dönemine İlişkin Yönetmelik Değişikliği”. <http://ilknurtemel.av.tr/bilgi/makalelerim-2/askeri-okullar/>.

s/he is thirteen or fourteen, s/he can refuse the deal once became a legally capable citizen. In that case, parents as the guarantor of the contract have to pay the compensation penalty. However, the children do not have the capacity to understand the content of the contract at the time of initial deal. If this is not a violation of the child's rights<sup>21</sup>, it certainly creates a great deal of pressure on cadets, especially if their parents are not wealthy enough to pay the penalty. Secondly, there is another binding contract signed between the new graduates of the academies and TAF. After they take the military officer's oath on August 30 Victory Day, right after their graduation, and sign this contract, they do not have the right to quit until they finish obligatory service time, which was reduced to ten years in 2012<sup>22</sup>. Though not all the working conditions of military officers are within the scope of this research, these two binding regulations have a great deal of impact on the perceptions of my interviewees on professional military education.

Classmates are high school friends since they spend three years of their adolescence eating, studying, sleeping and suffering from disciplinary power together. Among my research participants, there were some who had left military school. In our conversations, they highlighted the difference between their friendships from the military, and from civilian life by expressing overwhelmingly positive feelings about the former. Yet when it comes to the educational experience, their narratives on the daily routine in high school and in the academy, which are analyzed in chapter three, show that the experience of schooling has hardly left any traces in their memories. Making it all the way from the beginning of high school till the end of military academy has great importance for many former cadets. Those who come from civilian high schools are labeled as *kabaks*<sup>23</sup>. Even cadets who promote to junior class as a result of

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<sup>21</sup> "Convention on the Rights of the Child". <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>.

<sup>22</sup> "Subay ve Astsubayların Mecburi Hizmet Süresi Kısılıyor". *TRT Haber*, March 14, 2012, accessed May 15, 2014. <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/subay-ve-astsubaylarin-mecburi-hizmet-suresi-kisiliyor-32422.html>.

<sup>23</sup> *Kabak* means both courgette and bald in Turkish, yet the word is used by former cadets of military high schools for those who directly come to naval academy from a civilian high school: as some of them put "those who are not ready, tough enough for military education; those who are unripe". Some of my interviewees stated that in the past, the cadets coming from civilian high schools mostly did not know how to swim. Thus they were having special trainings with swimming floats called *kabak*, and this is the origin of their title. Though many cadets from civilian schools enter the naval

their already advanced English are deemed to be ‘less soldiers’ than those who went through the preparation class:

Efe: What I mean is, that man says “I’ve suffered from this for a year during the first year of the high school”, that is his mentality. He says, “This man came without going through the first year and now he is looking down upon us”. Do you know what I mean? You are at first class, you finished a year at high school, you brag about being a soldier, and this man comes directly. Why? Because his English is good. Then you teach him how to walk, you make fun of him bla bla, a million things.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, the significance of missing a year in high school because one’s English is good comes from the hierarchy of suffering/ soldiering rather than of education.

Based on our interviews with former cadets, I argue that they have a very powerful sense of military friendship based on common suffering, which forms an integral part of military masculinity. As they believe they have had to become individuals far earlier than their peers in civilian schools, professional military education is regarded as a military experience rather than a high school or university experience.

The military is compartmentalized as companies, battalions, and regiments, from smaller to the bigger respectively. The Chief of the school is a Staff Colonel. This means that Turkish Naval High School is conceptualized as a battalion. The design of a military school is organized according to the rank of its Chief. Thus, the Chief of Turkish Naval Academy is an admiral<sup>25</sup>, and the academy is his regiment. Selim stated the assignment of a vice-admiral, for the first time, as the military’s Chief of Education of Turkish Naval Forces, responsible of all the schools of the force<sup>26</sup>, was a surprise for

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academy by knowing how to swim, Mahmut said there are still special/ extra swimming trainings for those who did not, including him.

<sup>24</sup>Efe: Öyledir yani adam “ben lise birde bir sene bu acıyı çektim” diyor, o mantalitede. Bu adam bir sene okumadan geldi de bizi eksik görüyor diyor, tamam mı? Sen lise birsin, bir sene okumuşsun, askerlik yaptım diyorsun, gaza geliyorsun, adam direk geliyor. Niye? İngilizce’si iyi diye. Sonra ona yürümeyi öğretiyorsun, dalga geçiyorsun falan filan, milyon tane şey.

<sup>25</sup>The level of admiral is composed of four sub-ranks: Rare admiral, Vice admiral, Admiral, and Admiral of the Fleet. The rank of the Chief shall be the highest ranking officer serving in a military school by rule. Therefore, if a Colonel is from the same cohort with the new Chief of the school who is high ranking because s/he is a staff officer, the Colonel is reassigned.

<sup>26</sup>These are Turkish Naval High School, Turkish Naval Academy, Naval Non-commissioned Officers College [*Deniz Astsubay Meslek Yüksekokulu, DAMYO*], and Karamürsel Bey Training Center –where the military officers get trained for three to six

the cadets. Due to the arrests of high-ranking military officers following the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, the force could not appoint an admiral to the academy<sup>27</sup>.

Cadets face mostly what I will call “company commanders” [*bölük komutanları*] throughout the thesis. As a class is composed of four companies, which make a battalion, four company commanders are responsible for a class, or cohort. In high school, which is a battalion, class officers [*sınıf subayı*] are in charge of four classes in the school: namely, orientation class [*intibak sınıfı*], juniors, second class, and seniors. Therefore, military schools are organized as a set of military units rather than high schools and universities.

The use of the term “cadet” is rather problematic for the students of military high schools since they legally are not cadets but cadet candidates [*askeri öğrenci adayı*]. However, for the purposes of simplicity, I will call the students of both Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy as cadets.

A final note is on the English names of the two schools. “Turkish” is not an adjective before their names in Turkish as they are called *Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi* [Heybeliada Naval High School] and *Deniz Harp Okulu* [Naval Academy]. However, Naval Forces obviously prefer their schools to be known with the adjective of ‘Turkish’ by the international audience<sup>28</sup>, thus I stick to the official naming throughout the thesis.

### **1.5. Landmark impacts of the military’s falling from grace on Turkish Naval Academy**

Since 2012, there have been news regarding the mobbing and discrimination against particular groups of cadets in Turkish Military Academy [Kara Harp Okulu, Harbiye], Air Force Academy [Hava Harp Okulu], and Turkish Naval Academy<sup>29</sup>.

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months after graduation, and contracted military officer candidates get Officer Basic Training [*Subay Temel Eğitimi*] –before their first assigned position.

<sup>27</sup>See Regulations on Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Assignments [Subay ve Astsubay Atama Yönetmeliği]. Published in the Official Gazette on December 8, 2005. <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.9704&sourceXmlSearch=&MevzuatIliski=0>.

<sup>28</sup> For Turkish Naval Academy see: <http://www.dho.edu.tr/indexen.html>. The same difference between Turkish and English namings of the schools is valid for the schools of Land Forces: For Turkish Military Academy see: [http://www.kho.edu.tr/eng\\_mainpage.html](http://www.kho.edu.tr/eng_mainpage.html).

<sup>29</sup> “Harbiyeli olmak istemiyorlar.” *Sözcü*, April 14, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014. <http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gundem/harbiyeli-olmak-istemiyorlar-268945/>, and “Harbiye’de neler olmuş neler!”. *Sabah*, August 13, 2012, accessed May 15, 2014. <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/08/13/harbiyede-neler-olmus-neler>.

Because I had friends from the naval academy by that time, the parallelism between the military's falling from grace from 2007 onwards, and the changing perceptions of my friends on professional military education was perceivable for me. Yet, I realized the differences between the perceptions and experiences of my interviewees from different cohorts during the fieldwork. The above listed three categories reflect significant differences between each group's perceptions and experiences of professional military education. After my last interview with Furkan, I thought the perception of unfamiliar changes taking place, especially in the naval academy, becomes widespread among former cadets, increasingly from the eldest group to the youngest one.

The first group of former cadets felt a transformation mostly in the disciplinary regime, unwritten rules and values of the academy:

Mahmut: For instance, there was a transformation process. Before this process the higher classes was dominant at the school. What I mean is the school was ruled according the pressures coming from the higher classes. But afterwards, the authority of higher classes was diminished and the company commanders started to make the deal. Of course this created both advantages and disadvantages. The worst of those disadvantages was that, an offence which could have been handled very differently, was being handled by apologia, giving everybody an apologia. The more apologia was given, the lesser the points got. When the points were decreased, separations, disposals began. While it had been very difficult to quit school or get expelled before, we started to see many friends grabbing their bags and going as the days passed.<sup>30</sup>

The new and more oppressing rules of the academy were obviously very heavy even on *original* cadets who survived the disciplines of the naval high school. Many former cadets connected their experience with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials:

Onur: They did it also to three or four boys at military academy. They put sex doll and porn CDs to their houses and found them at raid. All of the people caught during Ergenekon or Balyoz operations are like this. The evidence is put by the police and then the prosecutors of the same rank find

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<sup>30</sup>Mahmut: Mesela bir dönüşüm süreci vardı. Bu dönüşüm sürecinden önce okulda hakim olan üst sınıftı. Üst sınıf baskısıyla okul idare edilirdi diyeyim sana. Ama sonraki süreçte üst sınıfın etkisi azaltılarak bölük komutanları vasıtasıyla bu iş yapılmaya başlandı. Tabii bunun getirileri, götürüleri oldu. Götürülerinden en beteri çok daha farklı şekillerde halledilebile<sup>30</sup> kabahatler diyeyim sana, artık savunmayla, herkese savunma verilmesiyle halledilmeye başlandı. Savunmalar verildikçe puanlar düştü. Puanlar düştükçe ayrılmalar, atılmalar başladı. Öncesinde okuldan ayrılmak, atılmak çok zor şeyken sonraki süreçte, her geçen gün bir arkadaşımızı daha çantasını almış giderken görüyorduk yani.

those evidences. During that time there was a kind of pressure in the military academy; but we weren't subjected to that kind of pressure personally... The officers at the academy started to do that, thought that as a precaution: the more they kept us in, the less we went out, the lesser would be the possibility for us to be related to those kinds of crimes, as I understood. They put an unbelievable pressure on us regarding punishments.<sup>31</sup>

Onur and many others from the first group said that their cohorts did not go through the most efficacious period of this transformation except a few exceptions. Yet they experienced the increasing pressure on their shoulders in varying degrees.

Hakan, Eren and Arda are from the same cohort with two male cadets whose relationship was apprehended by their classmates. Afterwards these two cadets were forced to leave the school instead of being expelled, with a 'disgraceful offense' on their records. Hakan, Eren and Arda were friends with them. Hakan stated feeling very lucky because he left the naval academy after this incident, and just before the academy administration started to receive anonymous letters about eight to ten cadets who were somehow connected to these two former cadets. Eren and Arda were among those who were blamed for several 'offenses'. Without sharing the details of his investigation, Eren listed the accusations written in the letters as follows:

Eren: I will talk generally; I won't give specific, private information on that subject. [...] Especially the things related to male-female student relations. The things about homosexuality. Then some extreme cases like someone having intercourse with his girlfriend from outside and her getting pregnant... Some information claiming that some students had relations to leftist organizations. A great number of denounces in which, in our class only almost the half of the students were included. As a result of this there were cases of constantly going through and through investigations.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Onur: Şu an işte bizim Harp Okulu'ndan üç dört tane çocuğa da yaptılar. Evlerine işte şişme kadın koydular, porno CD'ler falan koydular, onları yakaladılar. Bütün Ergenekon, Balyoz davalarında yakalanan insanlar böyle yani. Delilleri polis koyuyor, sonra yine aynı zümrenin savcılarını yakalıyor bu delilleri. O dönemde harp okulunda şöyle bir baskı oldu: Biz birebir böyle bir baskıya maruz bırakılmadık ama... Harp okulundaki subaylar şunu yapmaya başladı, önlem olarak şöyle düşündüler: Bizi ne kadar içeri tıkarlarsa, ne kadar az dışarıya çıkarsak o kadar az bu tarz suçla ilişkilendirme yüzdemizi düşürürler, diye düşündüler anladığım kadarıyla. İnanılmaz bir baskı yaptılar bize ceza konusunda.

<sup>32</sup>Eren: Şöyle, genel konuşayım, birebir özel bilgi vermeyeceğim o konuda. [...] Özellikle bayan-erkek öğrenci ilişkileriyle ilgili şeyler. Eşcinsellikle ilgili şeyler. Daha sonra çok uç örnekler, dışarıdan birisinin kendi kız arkadaşıyla girdiği ilişki sonucunda hamilelik boyutuna gelmesi ile ilgili şeyler. Ondan sonra bazılarının, bazı [sol] örgütlerle bağlantısı olduğuna dair bilgiler. Ciddi boyutta ihbar edilen insanlar topluluğu ki bunun sayısı bizim sınıf için neredeyse yarı yarıya vuran bir şeydi. Sürekli

This group of eight to ten cadets went through an exhausting process of administrative interrogations during which they were asked many questions relevant or irrelevant to the blames laid on them, such as their consumption of alcohol. The parents of all the cadets of their cohorts received letters about them with an additional list of approximately forty cadets. The letters were ‘warning’ the families to be aware of the ‘corrupted’ educational environment of their children. Eren and Arda expressed their disappointment with most of the military officers in administrative positions. These officers took the accusations in the anonymous letters as serious allegations if not as facts. They did not even launch a comprehensive investigation about who send them to the school. Eren and Arda stated feeling humiliated not because of the investigations per se but because most of their commanders did not stand behind them. As Eren put it, they decided to leave the academy because this situation, and the attitudes of their commanders led them to worry about their futures in TAF:

Eren: Since these kinds of incidents increased and I was included in some of them, since I thought I would find myself in a bad situation if I continued there, I would get dismissed or worse, get through some investigations including prosecutors, etc, and my future... Already going through all the stuff I mentioned, when also those happened I decided not to be in this anymore. It was a decision made in 3-5 months.<sup>33</sup>

Hakan’s relation with the *Hizmet* Movement has several implications in regard to the anonymous letters, and the succeeding interrogations within the academy. To claim that it was the cadets who are members of the movement who leaked information about their classmates or commanders to the people who wrote and sent these letters would be presumptuous. However, I think his perception on the accusations about his friends is shaped majorly by his experience with the brothers from the movement while he was in naval high school. He said he thinks there were over eighty cadets in naval high school, only in his cohort. When asked how he knows, he told me about how he was making practice interviews for the military high school entrance process, he was

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bunlar sonucunda soruşturmaya girip çıkma, soruşturmaya girip çıkma şeklinde gelişen olaylar oluyordu yani.

<sup>33</sup>Eren: Bu tarz olayların sayısının artması ve benim de bazılarının içinde yer almam sebebiyle daha fazla ilerlersem kötü duruma düşebileceğimi ya da atılma ya da ne bileyim daha ileriki boyutlarda savcılık boyutunda, ciddi bir soruşturma çerçevesine girebileceğimi düşündüğüm için, geleceğimi bu kadar... Zaten bahsettiğim şeylere katlanıyorken bir de ekstra üstüne bunlar eklenince, daha fazla kendimi bu işin içinde tutmamaya karar verip, öyle belki üç beş ay içerisinde aldığım bir karardır yani.



taught to perform five time namaz[salaat] in a day just by using his eyes, and his brothers were not telling him the names his classmates from the movement on purpose:

Hakan: They prepared lots of people but nobody knew each other. Because they don't have just one thing in their system. They have lots of houses. For instance, I was in one of [...] 's municipality. There, for instance there were 20-30 houses. They each have three students. I just knew those 2 other students but later I found out there was a lot more. I guess in our term, how many people went to navigation school? Around 200 and at least 80-90 of them were so.

**How can you guess?**

Because you catch it, they have some things. They teach performing *namaz* prayers at school without being noticed; you do it with your eyes. [...] I mean, anticipating from their personality or style, I suppose there were 80-90 people. It must be more after our term. That was the hard period. After AKP-Cemaat relations, they were more relieved. I guess the number increased after that. And back then, the interviews of military schools were very... there were legendary questions mentioned like "You are on a boat, Mohammed and Atatürk are fallen, who would you save?" don't you know that? (Laughing) [...] Yes, they told us in Cemaat that we might come across such things and they made... We were going through rehearsal interviews to be prepared.<sup>34</sup>

He said he wanted to end his relationship with the brothers because, as he grew older, he became conscious about the possible outcomes of the answers he was giving to their questions. When asked how often he was seeing these brothers, he replied as follows:

Hakan: They arranged meetings at the weekends. In some houses mentioned before. We met at ... and at ..., irrelevant places like these (he names various districts of Istanbul). If we went out with uniforms on us, we stopped by somewhere to change. We went and read books, read Koran, things like that. That continued for a while. But I was so bored, you know.

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<sup>34</sup>Hakan: Bir sürü kişiyi hazırlıyorlardı; ama hiç kimse birbirini bilmiyordu. Çünkü bir tane şey yok onların sisteminde. Bir sürü evleri var. Mesela ben [...] 'in bir ilçesindeydim. Orada mesela yirmi otuz tane ev var. Hepsinde böyle üçer tane öğrenci var. Ben sadece diğer iki kişiyi biliyorum ama daha sonradan öğrendiğim bir sürü kişi de var. Ki benim tahmin ettiğim, bizim dönemde, Deniz Lisesi'ne kaç kişi girdi?.. 200 civarı kişi girdi, en az 80-90 kişinin öyle olduğunu tahmin ediyorum.

**Nasıl tahmin ediyorsun?**

Anlıyorsun çünkü onların bazı şeyleri var. Okulda şey olarak, kimseye belli etmeden namaz kılmayı öğretiyorlar, gözünle falan namaz kılıyorsun. [...] Yani kişiliğinden, tarzından bir şekilde tahmin ettiğim 80-90 kişi var. Bizden sonra daha da fazladır kesin. O dönemler tam sıkıntılı dönemlerdi. AK Parti-cemaat şeyleriyle falan daha rahat oldular. Ondan sonra daha fazla olduğunu tahmin ediyorum. Ki o zamanlar asker okulların mülakatlarında çok şeyler vardı, işte "Kayıktasın, Hz. Muhammed düşmüş, Atatürk düşmüş hangisini alırsın? " Öyle efsane mülakat soruları falan dolaşır, biliyor musun onları? (Gülüyor) [...] Evet, cemaat kanalında böyle şeylerle karşılaşabilirsiniz diyorlar ki o zaman şey yapıyorduk biz... Prova mülakat falan yapıyorlardı bize, hazırlıklı oluyorduk.

Military school has a different mentality; they have a very different one. And it is during puberty, I was overwhelmed. I didn't know what to think, who to believe, do you understand? And I started to think that the Cemaat had malicious intentions. Because they were constantly asking questions about people.

**Were they about your friends, or about the commanders?**

Both about my friends and the commanders. All kinds. For instance, They were asking about each of my classmates. What does he do, does that take alcohol, does this have a girlfriend, what kind of a person is that and so on. I started to suffocate. Then I never see... I did this, for 5-6 months, I didn't take or return their calls. Then I met them and said I didn't want to see them anymore.<sup>35</sup>

While he was narrating the anonymous letters, he also raised rhetorical questions about how the senders of these letters acquire the true information that decorates the false accusations about his friends. Claiming that there are many whistle-blower cadets and officers within the school, in contact with the movement, he questioned the unknowns of this process such as how they found the addresses of the parents of all cadets to send the aforementioned 'warning' letters. While Eren's statements on whistle-blowers were in line with Hakan's claims, Eren said he cannot know who planned this process in the first place, and it is too easy to blame it on the *Hizmet* Movement:

Eren: I think, well, these are exterior things, in the end. A letter or something else... Because these written things are fictional as I said. If there is a truth rate of 10%, the rest 90% is made up. But, well, how can I say, they are not totally imaginary, do you understand? They were written according to some information, it seems. I link it to insiders, whatever kind of an evil-minded group they are... Let me mention the parallel structure... (Laughing) I don't know, the insiders may be a student group, or maybe they are officers. I guess they are students. If this kind of incidents happened more in our term during registrations... In short, if there were ten

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<sup>35</sup>Hakan: Haftasonları görüşme ayarlanıyordu. Daha önceden konuşulmuş bir yerde, bir evde. ...'de buluştum, ...'da, böyle alakasız alakasız yerlerde. [İstanbul'un çeşitli semtlerini sayıyor] Üniformalı çıkarsak falan gidip bir yerde kıyafetlerimizi değiştirip öyle gidiyorduk. Gidiyorduk, kitap okumaktır, şeylerdir, Kur'an okumalardır falan. Öyle devam etti bir süre. Artık ben çok sıkıldım ama yani... Askeri okulda çok farklı bir düşünce yapısı var, orada çok farklı bir düşünce yapısı var. Bir de ergenlik dönemindesin, ben iyice bunalmıştım yani. Ne düşüneceğimi bilmiyordum, neye inanacağımı bilmiyordum yani, anladın mı? Ve cemaatin de niyetinin kötü olduğunu düşünmeye başlamıştım. Çünkü insanlarla alakalı sürekli sorular soruyorlardı.

**Arkadaşlarıyla ilgili mi komutanlarla ilgili mi?**

Arkadaşlarımızla ilgili de komutanlarla ilgili de. Her türlü. Mesela benim sınıftaki insanları tek tek soruyorlardı. Şu ne yapıyor, şu içki içer mi, kız arkadaş var mı, şu nasıldır falan filan diye. Artık iyice bunalmıştım. Bir daha görüş... Böyle şey yaptım 5-6 ay cevap vermedim telefonlarına. En son gittim ben görüşmek istemiyorum sizinle artık dedim.

or fifteen rotten people in those two hundred students which was called a class, it might have been easier for them to do that things inside, to carry information to the things they provide service. Maybe they weren't able to reach that much specific information about the upper classes.

[...] While I was thinking of it more like a bogeyman at first, now a little more... Looking from outside, I don't think that I was in a degree to recognize. Well, I think saying that is taking the easy way out, I mean AKP, Cemaat... Then they were close but now AKP and Cemaat are separated. AKP is shooing Cemaat. This is what being shown to Turkey, after all. Now everyone can say that, make that comment. Therefore, I don't want to talk so straight on that subject. I think they are more complicated structures, with those relations, interests... (Laughing)<sup>36</sup>

Rıdvan, Ali, Mert, and Furkan did not witness this process of interrogations within the academy, unlike the majority of my interviewees. However, while Furkan left the military right after the high school, Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert stated being subjected to discrimination and mobbing in the academy. They said there was a group thirteen or fifteen cadets from their cohort, which was targeted by the company commanders. Getting punishing for offenses that are normally overlooked, or being subjected to extra discipline, or military, training after the bedtime gradually became a part of their life in the academy. They explained that the commanders gathered this group and told them they are short in discipline compared to their classmates, and thus, they need extra training. However, the content of these 'trainings' was nothing but scolding and yelling at them. Rıdvan said they came together with this group at school and discussed their common traits:

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<sup>36</sup>Eren: Bence şey sonuçta bunların dışarıda, dış kaynaklı şeyler. Bu mektup bilmem ne. çünkü bu yazılan şeyler dedim ya kurgusal. İçinde yüzde 10 doğruluk payı varsa yüzde 90 sıkma. Ama şey, nasıl denir, tamamen de hayal ürünü değil, anladın mı? Bilgiler dahilinde anlaşılan yazılmış bir şey. Şeye bağlıyorum bunu yapanlar da içeride bulunan nasıl bir art niyetli gurupsa... Paralel yapıdan bahsedeyim... (Gülüyor) İçeride bulunan herhalde bir öğrenci grubu mu artık, belki subay grubudur bilmiyorum. Öğrencidir diye tahmin ediyorum. Bizim senemizde giriş kısmında daha fazla sayıda bu tarz bir şey olduysa... Kısaca o sınıf denilen iki yüz kişilik şeyin içerisinde on, on beş tane böyle çürük insan varsa onların servis ettiği ve içeride yaptığı şeyler, bilgi uçurmaları falanlarla herhalde daha kolay yapabilmişlerdir. Bir üst sınıflarla ilgili bu kadar çok, net bilgiye ulaşamıyor olabilirler yani.

[...] İlk başlarda böyle öcü şeklinde düşünürken şimdi biraz daha böyle... Fark edebilecek seviyede de olduğumu düşünmüyorum dışarıdan bakarak. Ya şey demek için kolayına kaçmak bence işte, AKP, cemaat... O zaman yakındı, şimdi AKP ile cemaat ayrıldı. AKP cemaati kışlıyor. Türkiye'ye gösterilen bu zaten. Şu an bunu herkes diyebilir, bu yorumu yapabilir. Öyle o yüzden direk böyle net konuşmak istemiyorum bu konuda. Daha karmaşık yapılar olduğunu düşünüyorum ben, ilişkiler, çıkar ilişkileri... (Gülüyor)

Rıdvan: I also started to feel that I was being treated differently and I decided to investigate this situation. We were group of 10 or 15 students. We were getting a different treatment and we were going to investigate its roots, why such a thing happened? What did we do? We tried to think about our common traits. What were those common traits? We all had a military officer in the family. And those officers, those in the family, were raised starting from high schools. Apart from that we were all Kemalists. We all had the ability of analytical thinking, we weren't robots. We were kind of people who did not just do things but questioned some things. In the end, as much as I wanted to continue... We all wanted this job; it is not something you can do reluctantly. When we look at the student type, usually poorer families, not the wealthy ones, choose the profession because it has a job warranty. My term was such. But there also were students like me. There were students who did not come just to have a job but to have professional pleasure. And one of the common traits of this group was that, after all.<sup>37</sup>

Supporting Rıdvan's narrative, Eren from the second group, stated that:

Eren: When I think about it now, look at the friends outside, they are always flashy types, free thinkers... I don't know, what can be their common traits? Their being Kemalist can be counted. Their taking alcohol... Because in that investigation, even this was a subject to be mentioned.<sup>38</sup>

The second and the last groups of my interviewees agreed on the commonalities of the cadets who have been investigated, or exposed to mobbing, discrimination, and extracurricular discipline training, or say violence. However, the reactions of the two groups differ to a great extent. While Eren and Arda went through intense processes of interrogations, giving testimony, and striving to be absolved, their current reaction is rather apathetic towards the ongoing transformations in both micro and macro levels of

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<sup>37</sup> Rıdvan: Ben de kendi üzerimde farklı bir muamele gördüğümü hissetmeye başlamıştım ve bu konuyu araştırmaya karar verdim. Biz on, on beş kişilik bir gruptuk. Bize farklı bir muamele söz konusuydu ve biz bunun kökenini araştıracaktık, acaba niye böyle bir şey var? Ne yaptık? Ortak özelliklerimizi birazcık şey yapmaya çalıştık. Ortak özelliğimiz neydi? Hepimizin ailesinde subay vardı. Ve bu subaylar, ailedeki subaylar, liseden yetişme subaylar. Onun dışında hepimiz Atatürkçüyüz. Hepimiz analitik düşünme yeteneğine sahibiz, robot değiliz. Sadece emirleri uygulayan değil, aynı zamanda bazı şeyleri sorgulayan tipleriz. Sonunda ben ne kadar devam etmek istesem de... Hepimiz bu işi istiyorduk, bu iş istemeden yapılacak bir iş değil. Öğrenci şeyine baktığımız zaman, genelde varlıklı aileler değil de ihtiyaç sahibi aileler, meslek garantisi olduğu için seçiyor. Benim dönemim de öyleydi. Ama benim gibi öğrenciler de vardı. Sadece meslek sahibi olmak için değil de mesleki haz almak için giden öğrenciler de vardı. Bu grubun da ortak özelliklerinden biri de buydu zaten.

<sup>38</sup> Eren: Şimdi de düşününce dışarıdaki arkadaşlara falan bakınca hep şeyler daha böyle parlak tipte, özgür düşünceli... Ne bileyim ortak özellikleri ne olabilir? Atatürkçü olmaları denebilir. Alkol almaları denebilir. Çünkü o soruşturmalarda bunun bile konusu geçiyordu yani.

the military. With a retrospective look taken as civilians, they were making sense of what they have experienced in the naval academy with apathy rather than anger.

On the contrary, Rıdvan, Ali and Mert expressed feeling anger with a strong sense of being treated unfairly. They assertively emphasized the socio-economic prosperity of their parents, their distinguishing educational achievements in the Turkish Naval High School, their attachment to Kemalism and nationalism, and their passion to become a marine while they were cadets. All of these stresses, I argue, served to prove ‘the unfair treatment’ they received, and their ‘rightful anger’ towards those who were responsible from their detachment from the military. These differences between the three groups of research participants will be further analyzed throughout the thesis.

### **1.6. Possible contributions and the outline of the thesis**

Professional military education has not been critically explored by social scientists and independent researchers not because of a lack of intellectual or journalistic curiosity but mainly because of the military’s closeness about its ‘own’ affairs to outside scrutiny. As Catherine Lutz suggests, in relation to the silence on the Vietnam War in the US: “Silence is also a strategy of confinement” (Lutz 2001, 132). While there is a large civil-military relations literature in Turkish and English on Turkey, which will be reviewed in chapter one, there is still a gap about the subjects who make up the professional military (officers and NCOs) and their education, in the burgeoning critical studies on the military and militarism in Turkey.

Beyond the literature on civil-military relations, which takes TAF as a homogeneous entity, and as a macro-level actor, first of all, the narratives of former conscripted soldiers are brought into view, although very recently. Nadire Mater’s much-debated collection of the narratives of former conscripts who ‘served’ in the southeast Turkey during the most painful process of the war between PKK (Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan/ Kurdistan Workers Party) and TAF is the first outstanding example of this literature (Mater 1998). In Pınar Selek’s *Sürüne Sürüne Erkek Olmak* [Crawling to Become a Man], the oral histories of former conscripts who did or did not involve in armed conflict are conducted. Thus, Selek delivers to the reader, the stories of becoming a man, overwhelmed by the myth of ‘masculinity’ (Selek 2008, 13) through the memories of ‘regular’ military service, which include various duties from serving tea to the officers and their wives to peeling potatoes to armed conflagration. Ayşe Gül Altınay’s work is one of the rare historically engaged studies on militarism in

Turkey from a gender perspective, historicizing the myth of the ‘military-nation’ in various militarized fields (Altınay 2004). Most recently, Pınar Ögünç’s *Asker Doğmayanlar* [Not Born A Soldier] rendered the voices of those who refuse to kill, and to complete their passage to “being a real man” through military service visible: Conscientious objectors (Ögünç 2013).

Navigating between macro analyses on civil-military relations and participant-observation among military individuals and groups, I think Levent Ünsaldı’s research is a very comprehensive one. His study is based not only on a broad literature and studies of international institutions that monitor military spending, arms industry and military strategies but also on his participant-observation while he was a cadet in Artillery and Missile School in 2000-2001, for almost a year (Ünsaldı 2008, 17). His text provides important data and interpretation on the internal organization of the military with regards to the institutional differences between Land, Naval and Air Forces as well as social, political and economic differences between officers, non-commissioned officers and military men and women holding other positions (Ünsaldı 2008, 194-229). He also floats challenging opinions on overrated significance of Kemalism in shaping civil-military-society relations in Turkey (Ünsaldı 2008, 190-193).

Fortunately, beside those who collected the narratives of conscripts or conscientious objectors, there are many other researchers who have moved beyond “methodological militarism” to develop critical analyses of the military, soldiering and militarism in everyday life. As reviewed by Altınay, the first comprehensive research along these lines is done by independent researchers but not in the academia of Turkey as a result of the tabooized status of the military in the public space and academia. Starting from the 1996 book *Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Modernizm* [Armed Forces and Modernism], Serdar Şen’s insistence on interpreting the military’s role as an ideological apparatus in militarizing and nationalizing the lives and perceptions of the people of the newly established Turkish Republic is, in many respects, a first in the literature, (Şen 1996; 2000; 2011). İsmet Akça on the other hand, writes on the economic presence of the armed forces. According to Akça, TAF is not a supporting actor but a power in macroeconomic balances of the country, mainly through the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund [*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu, OYAK*] since 1960s.

Following Cynthia Enloe’s call to explore the acknowledgement of hegemonic norms of femininity and masculinity in the processes of militarization (Enloe 2000b, 220), many researchers increasingly dwell upon the intersections of ordinary

experiences and perceptions, military, militarism, motherhood, femininities, and masculinities. While Özlem Aslan and Senem Kaptan interpret, respectively, the experiences of mothers of PKK guerillas, Mothers of Peace [Barış Anneleri] and mothers of the conscripts, Sertaç Kaya Şen's thesis on the lives of children raised in military families and within the military complex draw the historical lines between family, militarism, military, and the state (Şen 2014, 7). Concerning the purposes of my research, Şen's and Ömer Turan's reflexive texts are especially outstanding since they are based also on the personal experiences of the researchers, respectively, as the son of a military judge father and as a former conscript<sup>39</sup>.

The only study that is based upon the narratives of the cadets, commanders, and officer-teachers of military schools is Mehmet Ali Birand's *Emret Komutanım* [Your Order, Sir]. Written in 1986, right after the introduction of an ideological synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islam, and neoliberalism by the 1980 military coup, Birand's journalistic research was meant to respond to a rightful curiosity of the public about military officers. On the other hand, his research was confined mostly to praises of the military and its "devoted and honorable" members, without voicing critique. Since he normalizes and legitimizes the existence of the military, soldiering and militarism by picturing them as indispensable parts of life and politics in Turkey, his book stays within the borders of "methodological militarism" (Altınay 2009, 1248). Leaving aside the absence of critical studies, the silence of the professional members of the military still continues to a great extent, as Ali Bayramoğlu and Ahmet İnel argues:

Turkish Armed Forces is an institution that speaks out loud more than the armies of other countries but an institution that is also more disturbed than them about being spoken about. In democracies, the military is usually expected to be mute about political and societal issues. However, when it comes to the authoritarian democracy of Turkey, the society is expected to be mute about the military or to praise it. (Bayramoğlu and İnel 2009, 9)

This study does not only attempt to partially fill a gap in the literature but also seeks answers to questions of importance for our specific historical context. In chapter one, after providing a review of the large literature on civil-military relations in Turkey, I historicize professional military education from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century of the Ottoman Empire onwards, focusing particularly on the Turkish Naval High School and the

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<sup>39</sup> For another study on masculinities and the military in Turkey see Sinclair-Webb 2000. For more on militarism, military, motherhood and gender see Sancar 2001, Biricik 2006, Gedik 2008, Şentürk 2009 and Akgül 2011.

Turkish Naval Academy. Then I direct my attention to the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, and the military's falling from grace from 2007 onwards (i.e. since the commencement of the Ergenekon case). Finally, based on quantitative data, I aim at interpreting the repercussions of the changes in power and positionality of TAF in relation to the JDP government, on military schools. Focusing on military high schools and academies, I review the changes in the number of applications and graduations since 2007, and comment on the applications to contracted positions created by TAF only recently.

In chapter two, I explore the disciplines of professional military education that deform and reform the subjectivities and masculinities children and adolescents as both productive and subjected bodies. I argue that the often-neglected diversity of military masculinities produced through these disciplines, challenge the representation of TAF in civil-military relations as a homogeneous entity. I suggest that the historical shift in the military and in civil-military relations echoes as the restructuring of power and disciplines in professional military education. I argue that there is a parallelism between the power struggles within military schools, and the declining reputation the changing position of TAF in our political and social context: the authority centralizes at the top of the hierarchy, and oppression and violence of the disciplines increase within the education institutions of the military.

In the final chapter, I focus on the connections between the rising neoliberalism since the 1980 military coup, and the perceptions of former cadets and military officers on professional military education and military professionalism. First, I review the military's historical relations to the market economy in Turkey. As military officers have historically been from middle or upper-middle class families, I argue that there is a social and economic discrepancy between the future expectations of my research participants, created during military education, and the life style they attain after graduation. The military's declining 'prestige' and global trends of flexibility and uncertainty in professional arena contribute to increasing social and economic future expectations of my interviewees. They mostly come from middle or upper-middle class families, and were considered successful according the criteria of educational system in Turkey. I was unable to acknowledge the privileges of a military career, partially because of my memories about my colonel grandfather, and his impacts on my father, and partially because of my friendships with most of the research participants from the first group who were, or still are, discontent with the military. However, the privileges of a military career are visible in the accounts of former cadets who need a guaranteed



job and social security. Finally, based on the narratives of the youngest group, I argue that new distinctions along the axes of Kemalism, class, and ethnicity emerge, especially within the Turkish Naval Academy. Whilst the military reorganizes itself by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing, these new distinctions remake military masculinities in accordance with this specific historical context. All of my research participants expect a decrease in the socio-economic backgrounds of future military officers. Their predictions are questionable with regard to the limits of this research and the partiality of their perspectives. However, TAF has historically recruited relatively privileged and Kemalist Turkish men in decision-making positions. If this prototypical military masculinity is changing, this study is also a quest for further research on the present and future of the agents who compose the professional military of Turkey.

This thesis aims to contribute to critical military studies and the “civil-military relations” literature, with a focus on men who have been permanent or temporary insiders of the military. An interpretation of the changing techniques of making the prospective military officers in relation to the macro transformation processes suggests another “way of knowing” the military institution – not as a homogeneous entity research on which remains a taboo, but as an institution among other institutions that has its own layers of complication, history, and responsibility for accountability.

## CHAPTER 2: HISTORICIZING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN TURKEY: WHAT ABOUT THE CADETS?

*Absolutely stay out of politics during this period. If we find ourselves in it today, it is because we think it is our duty to save our country from a disaster... Each time the army gets involved in politics, it starts to lose its discipline... In close history, we can see the sample of this situation in Balkan War. Therefore; I ask you again not to take our present intervention as an example, don't ever get involved in politics... I want to draw your attention to that point: We maintain this task as a commanding group composed of five people (i.e. National Security Council). We make every possible effort to prevent our subordinates from getting involved.<sup>40</sup>*  
Gen. Kenan Evren<sup>41</sup>

Military schools have historically been the black boxes of the armed forces. Indeed, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is a sum of black boxes for the ‘outsiders’. Professional military education has not been critically explored by social scientists and independent researchers not because of a lack of intellectual or journalistic curiosity but mainly because of the military’s closeness about its ‘own’ affairs to outside scrutiny. Beside the official statements and notorious coups and interventions (1960, 1971, 1980,

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<sup>40</sup> Gen. Kenan Evren: Bu devirde katiyen siyasete bulaşmayın. Biz bugün siyasete karıştıksa, ülkemizi bir felaketten kurtarmanın görevimiz olduğunu düşündüğümüz içindir... Ordu siyasete girdiği her seferinde disiplinini kaybetmeye başlamıştır... Yakın tarihimizde, Balkan Savaşı’nda bunun en büyük örneğini görebiliriz. Bu nedenle, tekrar şu andaki müdahalemizi kendinize örnek almamanızı sizden tekrar istiyorum, asla siyasete bulaşmayın... Dikkatinizi bir noktaya çekmek istiyorum: Beş kişiden oluşan bir komuta kuruluşuyla [yani, MGK] bu işi yürütüyoruz. Bizim altımızdakilerin bu işe bulaşmasını önlemek için her çabayı harcıyoruz.

<sup>41</sup> National Security Council. 1982. *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, 301-304. Ankara: National Security Council Office of Secretary General.

and 1997), the subjects who make up the military have been a mystery. Ahmet İnsel argues that power and privileges that comes with the membership of TAF are not personal but denominational or exclusive to the coterie [*zümresel*] (İnsel 2009, 45). The military has been producing itself as a distinguished and privileged ‘coterie’ in Turkey, since the establishment of the new Republic. This mystery, thus, is a strategy rather than a necessity for ‘national security’. As Catherine Lutz suggests, in relation to the silence on the Vietnam War in the US: “Silence is also a strategy of confinement” (Lutz 2001, 132).

In this chapter, firstly, I aim to make a humble review of the large civil-military relations literature in Turkish and English on Turkey. I continue with a brief history of professional military education, focusing particularly on the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval Academy. Afterwards, I proceed to the Ergenekon and Balyoz (also known as the Sledgehammer) trials, and the military’s falling from grace from 2007 onwards (i.e. since the commencement of the Ergenekon case). Finally, based on quantitative data, I seek for an interpretation of the repercussions of the changes in power and positionality of TAF in relation to the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, on military schools. Focusing on the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval Academy, I review the changes in ‘the number of applications and graduations since 2007. In other words, this chapter aims to historicize the narratives of my research participants in the present-day of the country with a "relational mode of thinking" (Bourdieu 1989, 15).

The educational institutions of TAF have historically been a relationally constructed and ever transforming "field of power" (Bourdieu 1989, 16), which have played a major but often neglected role in civil-military relations, and in politics. However, the existing literature on civil-military relations often takes the structures that produce the military as the military itself, thus as a stable and homogenous entity. Despite acknowledging its changing relations to the civilians and politicians, this literature does not scrutinize the agents who make up the military and their education, except a minority of high ranking military officers who are dominant in decision making processes. Fortunately, recent research has begun to fill this significant gap<sup>42</sup>.

Based on my research with military cadets, I argue that the transfigurations

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<sup>42</sup>This growing literature has been reviewed in the introduction of this thesis.

within military schools have historically and politically been parallel, and sometimes coming prior, to macro-level changes in civil-military relations. Trying to transcend the artificial opposition between structures, and ordinary experience and perceptions of individuals and groups (Bourdieu 1989, 15), I argue that this synchronicity is historically and presently valid, albeit in significantly diverse ways in different periods. Before passing on to interpret how the macro processes are presently reflected in the transformations of military masculinities, disciplinary power, and the relations between neoliberal economy and professional military education in the following chapters, I note that this thesis presents a *partial* account on civil-military relations by trying to construct a history of the present.

## **2.1. A brief review: civil-military relations in Turkey**

Modern Turkey is often deemed to be a product of the efforts of several military officers, and a plan in their minds starting from the Military Academy [Harbiye] years of the radical group, led by Enver Pasha, within Committee of Union and Progress [İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti] (Akmeşe 2005, 188-190). Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and their friends are considered to be the producers and protectors of new secular values of the country. Thus, the commencement of modernization in the country is also attributed to the military officers. Altınay and Bora, nevertheless, assert the contrary. Referring to a lecture by Halil Berktaş delivered at Sabancı University in 2001, they state that the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the most ‘civilian’ century in the history of the Ottoman Empire in terms of the developments in education, culture, literature, law and politics, culminating in the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 (Altınay and Bora 2002, 141). Hence, they suggest that the modernization attempts of the Committee of Union and Progress should be read within the larger militarization of the Empire and its political regime in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century and that the preceding process of “civilian” modernization be also taken into account in the histories of modernization. In line with Altınay and Bora, Gül Tokay claims that modernizations in the military and security policies was already started during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II (Tokay 2010, 35-46).

With the “War of Independence” led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the establishment of the new Republic, the military was established as an institution that not only protects the national unity from external and internal threats but also produce opinions on domestic and foreign politics. This is the first component of what

Bayramođlu calls the ‘wartime regime’ of the War of Independence [Kurtuluş Savaşı] (Bayramođlu 2009, 60). *Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye*<sup>43</sup> was placed under the authority of *İcra Vekilleri Heyeti*<sup>44</sup> in 1920, which meant the establishment of what is today called the General Staff. When some members of the new parliament criticized this suggestion, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk responded as follows:

Military organization is as closely (as military affairs) related to internal and external politics as it is to the necessary defense of our county in various fronts. And it has been proposed to work together with them to be concerned by The Chief of General Staff and to be acquainted with the views of other responsible people, as well as to have the vote of The Chief of General Staff and other concerned people like Executive Deputies on a subject.<sup>45 46</sup>

This perspective later subjected the Ministry of National Defense to the General Staff, and made the military gain priority over other bodies responsible for the national defense, which, according to Bayramođlu, was the second character of the ‘wartime regime’. The third one is the highly centralized organization of internal structure and decision-making processes (Bayramođlu 2009, 60-62). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself became *Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye* in 1921 as the proxy holder<sup>47</sup>. When his proxy was annulled in 1924, Turkish General Staff became an almost completely independent body, which was not inspected by the government. Until 1944, Commander Fevzi Çakmak was the chief of *Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye*. He worked as the prototype of the National Security Council [Milli Güvenlik Kurulu] of post-1960 all by his own, intervening to the decision-making processes of ministries about issues from state investments in iron and steel industry to educational, public and industrial investments in eastern and southeastern Turkey. The General Staff was legally bound to the Prime Ministry only when Fevzi Çakmak retired because İsmet İnönü was discontent with Çakmak’s independent actions during World War II. At the time İnönü was enjoying

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<sup>43</sup> The legal body that served as the “ministry of war” in the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>44</sup> The board embodying legislative, executive, and judiciary powers during the war of independence.

<sup>45</sup> Teşkilatı askeriye vatanımızı esbabı müdafaası ve muhtelif cephelerde icra edilecek (askeri işler kadar), siyaseti dahiliye ve hariciye ile (de) yakinen alakadar bulunuyor. Ve mesailde Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi’nin mütealası bulunmak ve diğer haizi mesuliyet olan zevatın noktai nazarlarına yakinen vakıf olmak için onlarla birarada çalışmak ve bir mesele hakkında Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi’nin rey ve mütealası olan zevat gibi İcra Vekilleri meyanında olması teklif edilmiştir.

<sup>46</sup> TBMM Gizli Zabıt Ceridesi 1, 163-164.

<sup>47</sup> His title was *Başkumandan*, Commander-in-Chief.

the title of *Milli Şef* [National Chief]. In 1949, General Staff was placed under the authority of Ministry of National Defense to comply with the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Bayramoğlu 2009, 70).

The 1960 military junta, composed of relatively young, lower ranking military officers, established the National Security Council. The organization of the NSC was set to fulfill the requirements of NATO while enabling the committee to act as swiftly as possible. Therefore, its members were an aggregation of politicians and officers: Chief of Turkish General Staff; representatives of three main forces of the military; and the ministries of National Defense, Internal Affairs, Transportation, and Labor along with the President, the PM, and his deputies. The 1960 military coup carried distinguishing features from the subsequent interventions of 1971, which was signed by the NSC, and of 1980. The presence of the military in political decision-making processes became 'institutional' with the 1960 military coup, legitimized by the support of social groups that previously formed the bases of opposition against the authoritarian rule of the DP (the intelligentsia and civilian/ military bureaucracy) (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1992, 717). This period marked also a conceptual shift from the perspective of 'national defense' to 'national security' (Şarlak 2009)<sup>48</sup>.

Eleven years later after the 1960 coup, the military intervened in parliamentary politics once again on March 12, 1971. This intervention is still not called a 'coup' but a *muhıtıra* [memorandum], because, on the surface, the military did not take over the government this time. However, even the naming of the intervention as a 'memorandum' reflects the increasing degree of militarization in the society since the 1960 military coup. The 'memorandum' itself, which was announced on the radio at 1 pm on March 12, 1971, was as follows:

1. With their ongoing attitude, view and actions, the assembly and the government have put our country in anarchy, civil war, social and financial troubles; in public view, lost the hope to reach the civilization degree Atatürk aimed for us and put the future of the Republic of Turkey into a great danger by not realizing the reforms envisaged by the constitution.

2. It seems necessary for Turkish nation and Military Forces embodied by it to constitute a strong, reliable new government, within democratic rules, which will restore reforms envisaged by the constitution with a Kemalist point of view and implement revolutionary laws with a nonpartisan approach, by being evaluated in our assemblies, to end this sad and

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<sup>48</sup>For a critical account on the mythologized national security concept in Turkey see Cizre 2003.

hopeless, desperate environment and to finish the present anarchical situation.

3.If this matter is not realized immediately, Turkish Military Forces is determined to do its task provided by law, which is preserving and protecting the Republic of Turkey, by taking on the administration directly. For your information...<sup>49 50</sup>

According to Hale, who writes extensively about the legitimacy of the underlying reasons behind the 1960 and 1980 interventions, the exact grounds of this one are still benighted (Hale 1996, 161). There are indeed several issues explaining the chaotic socio-political atmosphere in the country, if not the military intervention, before March 12, 1971. The growing strength and influence of the student and labor movements, factionalism in the Justice Party and in left<sup>51</sup>, the conflict between İsmet İnönü's and Bülent Ecevit's supporters, and the succeeding factionalism within the PRP are among the internal issues that lie in the background of the 1971 "memorandum." On the other side, the government of PM Süleyman Demirel was in a conflictual position with regard to the US demands from Turkey to stop the implantation of opium. Moreover, the government had sided with the Palestinians in the occupation of Palestine by Israel, and the flights of the US U-2 planes from Adana Incirlik Air Base to the USSR were not permitted since Demirel considered this as a threat to the country's international independence. (Sunay 2010, 161)

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<sup>49</sup> 1.Meclis ve hükümet, süregelen tutum, görüş ve icraatlarıyla yurdumuzu anarşi, kardeş kavgası, sosyal ve ekonomik huzursuzluklar içine sokmuş, Atatürk'ün bize hedef verdiği uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmak ümidini kamuoyunda yitirmiş ve anayasanın öngördüğü reformları tahakkuk ettirememiş olup, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin geleceği ağır bir tehlike içine düşürülmüştür.

2.Türk milletinin ve sinensinden çıkan Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin bu vahim ortam hakkında duyduğu üzüntü ve ümitsizliğini giderecek çarelerin, partiler üstü bir anlayışla meclislerimizce değerlendirilerek mevcut anarşik durumu giderecek anayasanın öngördüğü reformları Atatürkçü bir görüşle ele alacak ve inkılâp kanunlarını uygulayacak kuvvetli ve inandırıcı bir hükümetin demokratik kurallar içinde teşkili zaruri görülmektedir.

3.Bu husus süratle tahakkuk ettirilemediği takdirde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri kanunların kendisine vermiş olduğu Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni korumak ve kollamak görevini yerine getirerek, idareyi doğrudan doğruya üzerine almaya karardır. Bilgilerinize...

<sup>50</sup>“12 Mart 1971 Muhtırası Araştırma Raporu.” *Hürriyet*, November 21, 2012, accessed May 15, 2014. [http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/haber\\_resim\\_3/12\\_mart\\_raporu.pdf](http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/haber_resim_3/12_mart_raporu.pdf).

<sup>51</sup>After the Worker's Party of Turkey [*Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP*] gained seat(s) in the Parliament for the first time in 1965, and for the second time in 1969 general elections.

There have been fewer studies that analyze the ways in which the military structure and organization affected and was itself affected by the 1970 “memorandum.” Gen. Muhsin Batur writes in his memoirs that, before the intervention, a group of high ranking officers, including himself, were planning to take over the government. Indeed, offices such as the presidency, prime ministry, vice prime ministry, and the presidency of General Staff were already distributed among the group for the post-intervention interim government (Batur 1985, 233). However, Cengiz Sunay argues that there were two concerns behind this group not overtaking the government but forming a ‘civilian’ one under their control instead: First, the restlessness of young officers was a great source of anxiety for the high ranking officers, which constituted a major motivation for intervention. They were concerned that they would not be able to keep a tight rein on the younger officers if the existing government and political chaos continued. The experience of 1960 had obviously had a significant impact on the internal paradigms of the military, and the lower ranking officers were deemed to be a boiling threat against the command echelon. Secondly, the high ranking officers were worried that the relatively low ranking officers such as Celil Gürkan and Vedii Bilget who were popular figures at the time, would stage another coup if the command echelon overtook the government. (Sunay 2010, 164-165) Thus, Sunay agrees with Nazlı Ilıcak about the complexity of the 1971 intervention, not only with regards to its effects on civil-military relations but also considering the internal dynamics of the military:

In Republic period, we faced three military interventions in Turkey. There is no doubt that 12th March was the most complicated and intractable one, because in 12th March, various juntas sometimes worked intimately and sometimes worked as detached separate groups.<sup>52 53</sup>

With the 1971 military intervention, though it remained a limited one, the political realm was further militarized. The 1980 military coup was one more step backwards for the hardly surviving democratic components of the regime. The coup and the 1982 Constitution made the military an absolute legislative, executive and judicial power for three years until a civilian government was formed. The constitution was “to protect the State from the actions of its citizens rather than to protect the fundamental

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<sup>52</sup>Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet döneminde üç askeri müdahale gördük. Bunlardan 12 Mart muhakkak ki en karışık ve içinden çıkılması en güç olanıydı. Çünkü, 12 Mart’ta çeşitli cuntalar, içiçe bazen de birbirinden ayrı müstakil gruplar olarak çalışmıştı.

<sup>53</sup>Nazlı Ilıcak (Undated), “Elyazısı İtirafıyla 12 Mart Cuntaları”, 5; as cited in Sunay 2010, 164.



rights and liberties of the citizen from the State's encroachment" (Özbudun 2007, 179). The duty of the NSC was redefined as 'protecting the peace and security of the society', which led the institution to become more militarized and powerful in its organization and involvement in the political processes. William Hale recapitulates how political institutions were restructured after the 1980 coup (Hale 1996, 218-221), although without transcending the intellectual borders of "methodological militarism" (Altınay 2009, 1248). With its new structure, the NSC started to operate in guidance, surveillance, and policymaking of broader fields from economy to non-governmental organizations. The 1980 military junta added a notorious story to the 'military tutelage' [askeri vesayet], which was rebuilt by the 1960 coup after the Democrat Party (DP), by ignoring the 1961 Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. Some of the legal ways in which a great power was given to the executive branch and security forces over civilian bodies, and the supervision of military spending was lifted were as follows: State Auditing Board of the Presidency, Council of Higher Education, High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Council of State, Regional Administrative Courts, Martial Law, the laws that rearrange the auditing and appointment powers of the President (Bayramoğlu 2009, 83). Among these, the law no. 3162, which was amended in 1985, is especially striking as it lifted all the surveillance over military spending. Herewith the 1982 Constitution, the military became more centralized as to first prevent any coup attempts against the already staged coup. The high ranking military officers were already legally well equipped to enjoy political decision-making by the constitution, and the junta did everything to pull the plug on another possible intervention of younger officers. The processes of centralization and specialization of the internal affairs and structure of the military (Bayramoğlu 2009, 98) has not been quite available to researchers. Yet the speech of the leader of the coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, delivered in Turkish Military Academy in 1982, shed light on the perspective behind the changes<sup>54</sup>.

Yet the military could not keep its distance from politics since it was already institutionally involved through the means of the NSC. The February 28 'post-modern intervention' was announced as a result of a meeting of the NSC in 1997. The council interpreted certain acts of the PM Necmettin Erbakan and his fellows as 'provocative' and threatening against secularism. Erbakan's visits to Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria; his

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<sup>54</sup>The relevant part of his speech is quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

dinner with the leaders of religious orders and sheikhs; and the anti-Alevi and pro-Sunni speeches of the Minister of Justice and a mayor from the Welfare Party were among these perceived threats. All in all, this process made TAF an exhorter actor during ‘peace’ times, or say, non-coup times. TAF moved on to a more active style in terms of its psychological operations to reinforce the already rife perceptions of Kurdish identity and Islamic extremism as the internal enemies (Cizre 2004, 214), and the military’s contacts with business, media and judicial authorities to influence politics.

The independent, journalistic or scholarly research has historically approached civil-military relations in Turkey as mostly centered upon military coups and interventions. As the review above is conducted from such a literature, it lacks a significant part of the history, including the tortures, arbitrary imprisonments, losses, and other types of military violence as well as the militarization of everyday lives and the civilian institutions in the country. Moreover, sexual and gender-based violence is almost always silenced in the written memories of those who faced torture after these two interventions with a few exceptions, which adds yet another level of silence.<sup>55</sup> Here I shall note that scholars such as Taha Parla, Murat Belge, Ümit Cizre, and Serdar Şen who write on civil-military relations from a critical perspective were exceptions in this literature until early 2000s (Parla 1991a, 1991b, and 1992; Belge 1992; Cizre 1992 and 1997; Şen 1996 and 2000). As Altınay argues, “methodological militarism” (Altınay 2009, 1248) has long been dominating the literature on civil-military relations through subtle or open statements. First, the military coups are legitimized to a great extent in this literature. The 1960 military coup is considered a ‘revolution’ that contributed to democracy rather than a ‘coup’ against it. The 1980 military coup is deemed to be ‘successful’ in ending political violence and recovering the crawling economy. Secondly, military violence and torture experienced by many segments of the society are either ignored or trivialized by authors such as William Hale and Metin Heper<sup>56</sup>.

Before the JDP came to power, the 2001 law no. 118 of the 1982 Constitution that organizes the structure and functions of the NSC had been partially modified. Though the number of civilians in the council was increased to outnumber the military

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<sup>55</sup>For the narratives, and the studies on the narratives and silences of women and men who faced torture in prison during one or more military interventions, see bibliography.

<sup>56</sup>For more of this academic literature and the writings of former military officers as respectively mentioned by Altınay see: Karpat 1970, Heper 1987, Ahmad 1981, Öztürk 1993, Brown 1989, Özbudun 1966, Özdemir 1989, İnalçık 1964, Özdağ 1991, Göktaş ve Gülbay 2004, Kafesoğlu 1976, Lerner ve Robinson 1960.

officers, and the expression “the Ministerial Cabinet will primarily consider” was changed to “the Ministerial Cabinet will evaluate the decisions of the National Security Council”, the balances in civil-military relations was not affected in practice (Bayramođlu 2009, 107). The Seventh Harmonization Package, aimed at adapting Turkey to EU *acquis*, introduced more fundamental changes that shifted the balance in the relations between the military high command and the executive branch of the government:

- The position of the General Secretary of the MGKGS [General Secretary of the National Security Council] was radically modified. The majority of his executive powers were removed and only mostly administrative duties stayed in his hands.
- After the reform, the General Secretary could also be recruited from non-military persons and not only from full generals or admirals.
- The MGKGS was deprived of the possibility to request non-classified or classified documents from ministries, public institutions, organizations and private persons.
- The frequency of the MGK meetings was decreased –the National Security Council would meet once every two months instead of once every month.
- The secrecy surrounding the MGK was removed, and transparency of its functioning was enhanced. the package stipulated that the regulation on the functions of the Secretariat of the Council should be published in the Official Gazette.
- The seventh harmonization package also made it possible for the Court of Accounts to exercise financial oversight in the state properties in the hands of the TSK.
- The jurisdiction of the military courts was narrowed. (Crimes regulated by Article 58 of the Military Criminal Code committed by non-military persons in times of peace would not be tried by military courts.) (Danek 2011, 33-34)<sup>57</sup>

The latest significant institutional-legal change in civil-military relations regarding governance at the state level was the annulment of the Security and Order Cooperation Protocol [*Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma Protokolü, EMASYA*] on February 4, 2010<sup>58</sup>, which had been signed in 1997 between Turkish General Staff and Ministry of Internal Affairs bestowing the autonomy of the Gendarmerie to intervene in riots. Although the new regulations place the Gendarmerie under the control of local civilian

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<sup>57</sup> For more details see Özbudun 2007; Cizre 2008, 137-140.

<sup>58</sup> "EMASYA Protokolü kaldırıldı", *CNN Türk*, February 4, 2010, accessed June 5, 2014. <http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/02/04/emasya.protokolu.kaldirildi/562324.0/>.

administrations, to what extent this is implemented at the local level in rural areas remains a question.<sup>59</sup>

Since the European Union declared Turkey candidate country for membership after the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, the first decade of the twenty-first century has been a process of transformation in civil-military relations. This transformation is related to three interlinked factors according to Akça and Balta-Paker: “the presence of international conditionality, a decrease in the level of internal threats, and the emergence of a domestic political actor with the capacity and will to challenge the military establishment.” (Akça and Balta-Paker 2013) As argued by many commentators, the level of internal and external threat faced by a society affects the strength of civilian control over the military dramatically. They suggest that the capture of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, became a turning point for the high levels of militarization experienced due to the conflict in the predominantly Kurdish southeast part of Turkey, in the 1990s. Moreover, they explain the significance of the successive electoral victories and consolidating will of the JDP to challenge the military establishment, along with the international conditionality, as follows:

Finally, and most importantly, it was the emergence of a political actor with the capacity and will to challenge the military establishment that enabled the transformation of civil–military relations. Since 2002, the AKP has won three successive elections with increasing electoral and popular support. This electoral support is exceptional, given that the post-1980 period was marked by a protracted crisis of political hegemony, where no single party was able to govern alone.[...] The AKP’s project has revitalized the neoliberal hegemony by absorbing Islamism into the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-oriented secular neoliberalism. In doing this, the AKP has reinvented the populist strategies of Turkey’s center-right and promoted a restricted political reformism within the limits of its authoritarian populism. (Akça and Balta-Paker 2013, 78)

According to the authors, the most recent period of this transformation was marked by the Ergenekon trials. After winning 46.6% of the vote and gaining 62% of the parliamentary seats, the JDP intensified its efforts to further change the balance of

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<sup>59</sup> Ali Bayramoğlu, "EMASYA'dan Jandarma'ya...", *Yeni Şafak*, April 11, 2012, accessed June 5, 2014. <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/AliBayramoglu/emasyadan-jandarmaya/31905>. For a detailed discussion of the power fields of the Gendarmerie before the recent annulment of the EMASYA, see Aksoy 2010.

power between the civilian government<sup>60</sup>.

When it comes to the militarization of the society and of politics, military coups and interventions constitute only part of the history. As Altınay argues, the widespread perception that Turkish nation is a ‘military-nation’ has been constructed since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, and survives through the militarization of everyday life, education, and gender regimes (Altınay 2004). Yet, until recently, the militarization of society has not been studied rigorously, and has been almost absent in the literature on civil-military relations in Turkey. One can argue that the neglect of close analysis of the agents composing TAF (officers, conscripted soldiers, and other constituents) for the sake of institutional explanations is an important component of this gap in the literature, keeping “the human” and the many levels of complexity that constitute the military and its relations with the rest of the society uninterrogated<sup>61</sup>.

## **2.2. Professional military education from the late 18th century onwards**

In June 28, 2014, President Abdullah Gül celebrated Turkish Land Forces’ 2223<sup>rd</sup> foundation anniversary<sup>62</sup>. This date means that Land Forces was established in 209 B.C.:

The Hun Emperor Mete Khan had acceded to the throne in 209 B.C. and this date was taken as the foundation of the army.

In the Turkish regular army which was established in 209 BC. by Mete Khan, the largest unit comprising of 10.000 horsemen was named “division”. Divisions were broken down into units of thousands, thousands to hundreds, hundreds to tens. Each were assigned a Division Commander, Major, Captain or Corporal as a commander and interconnected within the chain of command.<sup>63</sup>

This history continues with the Seljuk Empire, the Anatolian Seljuks, the Egyptian Turkish Mamelukes, and the Ottoman Empire, ‘proving’ the skills of Turkish peoples in creating great armies. This “mythical” history of the Turkish military, adopted only

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<sup>60</sup>For a great overview of the ongoing judicio-legal and socio-political shifts in civil-military relations from 2002 to 2013, see Akça and Balta-Paker 2013.

<sup>61</sup>For more on civil-military relations in Turkey see Canan-Sokullu 2013; Bayramoğlu, Insel and Laçiner 2009; Göktaş and Gülbay 2004; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1997; Cizre 2004.

<sup>62</sup>"Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, Kara Kuvvetleri'nin 2223. kuruluş yıldönümünü tebrik etti.", *Cihan*, June 28, 2014, accessed July 5, 2014. [http://www.cihan.com.tr/news/Cumhurbaskani-Gul-Kara-Kuvvetleri-nin-2223-kurulus-yildonumunu-tebrik-etti\\_0322-CHMTQ5MDMyMi8xMDA1](http://www.cihan.com.tr/news/Cumhurbaskani-Gul-Kara-Kuvvetleri-nin-2223-kurulus-yildonumunu-tebrik-etti_0322-CHMTQ5MDMyMi8xMDA1).

<sup>63</sup>"History of Turkish Land Forces.", *Turkish Land Forces Official Website*. <http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/EN/>.

recently, constitutes a part of the prominent myth of ‘military-nation’ which has constituted the official ideology since the 1930s (Altınay 2004). However, when the subject is military schools, official historiography takes a different form.

The histories of military high schools and academies go back “only” to the late Ottoman period. Turkish Military Academy is known to be established in 1834, and military high schools in 1845:

In recognition of intense demands of science and technology on modern warfare, the Ottoman State abolished the Janissaries and founded Military Academy in Istanbul in 1834 as an institution devoted to the arts and science of warfare by the order of Sultan Mahmut II. The Academy produced its first graduates in 1841. After the foundation of military high schools in 1845, the Academy continued to give education with a four-year curriculum. The Academy had primarily trained artillery and cavalry officers until 1908. The Military Academies that were founded in five army centers in Edirne, Manastir, Erzincan, Damascus and Bagdad were closed after a short while. Later, only the Military Academy in Istanbul continued education and training.<sup>64</sup>

The establishment of Turkish Naval Academy and Turkish Naval High School goes back to 1773. Though Air Force Academy was established only in 1951, the first aviation school [Hava Okulu] was founded in 1912 to train the cadets of Turkish Military Academy. While there is an effort to claim the history of our “military-nation” as being more than 2000 years old, the history of military schools parallels the history of modernization and dates back to the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, constituting a part of the larger history of “modernization”. What is of particular significance is that both histories predate the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

According to Gül Tokay, the reforms concerning the military forces of the Ottoman Empire had two façades: reforms of the emperorship driven by the internal dynamics and observed improvements in the militaries of European countries; and reforms imposed by the European states (Tokay 2010, 35-36). Many commentators and scholars mark the beginning of modernization in the Ottoman Empire’s land based and naval forces with the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, and the ruling period of Selim III between 1879 and 1808 (Tokay 2010, 36; Zorlu 2011). During the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, Selim III carried a series of reforms “to catch up” militarily with the European countries, which were called the *Nizam-ı Cedid* [New Order] (Zorlu 2011, 160-166). Selim’s reformation attempts were ceased by his dethronement by the Janissaries.

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<sup>64</sup> "History.", *Turkish Military Academy Official Website*. [http://www.kho.edu.tr/eng\\_about\\_tma/history.html](http://www.kho.edu.tr/eng_about_tma/history.html).

Mahmud II executed Mustafa IV who came to power after Selim III, and became the emperor, in 1808. Mahmud's successful disbandment of the Janissaries for good, which was called the Auspicious Event, marked his emperorship as a successful one. In June 1826, after the Auspicious Event, a new army was established based on the system offered by Selim's *Nizam-ı Cedid*: the army was sectioned as companies, battalions and regiments, which still constitutes the way each military force is organized.

Tokay argues that modernization of the military had been the priority of the rule of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and the Second Constitutionalist Period. Despite the difference between the managerial understandings of these two periods, two factors played important roles in these modernization attempts. The first is the impact of German Military Mission [Alman Askeri Misyonu] on the military. Secondly, newly applied formal education begot a new class of military officers [*mektepli* subay sınıfı] along with the existing, direct-entry soldiers. What directed Abdulhamid II to prioritize radical reforms in the military was another defeat in the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 [known as *93 Harbi*, the 93 War, according to the hijri calendar]. Since Prussia had an internationally prominent military force and was not posing a threat to the Empire, Abdülhamid II requested military assistance from Prussia. Tokay argues that this Prussian-German hand in the reformatations in the Ottoman military later ended up having impact on the Committee of Union and Progress, which believed in a radical change in the regime to save the country, especially after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). (Tokay 2010, 38-45)

After the declaration of the Second Constitution [İkinci Meşrutiyet] in 1908, the curriculum of the school was reshaped in accordance with the program of Naval Academy of the United Kingdom.<sup>65</sup> The dominance of the impacts of Prussian-German military system on the Ottoman army, and of the British naval model on the navy and naval education lasted until World War I<sup>66</sup> (Rooney 1998).

According to Gencer Özcan, the significant impact of the Prussian-German model on the military is an understudied issue in Republican military historiography. Because the Committee of Union and Progress is held responsible for the alliance with Germany, and thus for the defeat in World War I, the reforms put into practice by

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<sup>65</sup> "Tarihçe.", *Turkish Naval Academy Official Website*. [http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00\\_Anasayfa/01\\_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html](http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00_Anasayfa/01_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html).

<sup>66</sup> In 1914, the German navy takeovers the command of the Ottoman Navy from the British. See Güvenç and Barlas 2010, 234.

German officers who came to the Ottoman Empire for assistance is intentionally ignored, suggests Özcan. (Özcan 2010, 176) As the military went through radical changes between Balkan Wars and World War I, the official historiography has noted the Union's "inefficacy" in executing German instructions properly, thus downplaying their influence in shaping military organization and education institutions: "Ordunun kalkınmasını Almancadan Türkçeye çevrilen üç beş talimname ve talimatla çözümleneceğini sananlar, bütün iyi niyetlerine ve fedakar çalışmalarına rağmen tam olumlu bir sonuç elde edememişlerdir."<sup>67</sup>

Özcan states that General Freiherr Colman von der Goltz had a special impact on Ottoman military officers, among all Prussian officers who served in the Ottoman Empire for military assistance starting from 1909. Goltz and his students who later became professors in military academies helped the creation of a military coterie, composed of officers who perceive themselves as members of an elite class of high characters (Özcan 2010, 186-189; Ünder 2001, 45-53). Thus, the education of the prospective military officers was also organized according to the Prussian-German system. For instance, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was educated by the officer-teachers who were trained by Goltz Pasha. As Özcan also quotes, General Mittelberger, who also helped the necessary information for the plan of Turkey's occupation by Germany written in September 1940, writes that the Military Academy was totally operating according to the German system (Koçak 1996, 512).

The dominating effects of the Prussian-German system on professional military education in Turkey lasted until 1948. The military started to send some teachers to the US in order to prepare them to serve in Turkish Military Academy in 1947, with the Truman Doctrine declared on 12 March 1947. In May 1947, a US military committee came to Turkey and stated that the infrastructures of transportation and communications shall be ameliorated first. This first committee also announced that the US proposes reforms that will be geared towards forming a defensive military in Turkey.<sup>68</sup> The main problem of the military was the same as it was under the rule of Abdulhamid II, in the Ottoman Empire: the number of soldiers was more than enough but the military guns and equipment necessary for war were absent. According to the US Military Aid Committee, the two major problems regarding the development and modernization of

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<sup>67</sup>Selahattin Karatamu, *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi*, 296-455; as cited in Özcan 2010, 176.

<sup>68</sup>"Communications First Task", *The New York Times*, May 18, 1947.



the military were rates of literacy among conscripts who were supposed to use the military guns and technology, and the underdevelopment of the transportation infrastructure. The former was meant to be resolved by special education centers for the conscripts but the US officers were worried that the military lacked officers and non-commissioned officers who could work at these centers. As a result, three divisions were formed just for the education of the conscripts in 1954. (Güvenç 2010, 267) The financial aid of the US to the military was considered to be a very small amount -100 million dollars- and it was argued that it was nothing compared to the amount necessary for an overall transformation of the military, in the US media<sup>69</sup>. The first military aid was composed of surplus guns and equipment, leftovers of World War II. However, the impacts of the US Military Aid Committee operating in Turkey on military schools, and thus, on the future internal organization and ideologies of the military were massive. Among them, the impacts on professional military education have resonated until today.

Low ranking officers who were trained in the US started to provide technical education to their commanders, which was a first in the history of the military forces of the Republic. The increasing level of sophistication was observed by the high ranking officers as well as by the US committee. The committee suggested insertion of political science, Turkish politics, and international relations in the curriculum, which are fields gaining increasing importance for the future military officers especially in terms of issues concerning NATO. (Güvenç 2010, 269-270) The most significant challenges, according to the US Military Aid Committee, had to do with the military mentality of TAF, which created differences between elder and younger officers. Some of these were as follows:

1. In 1953, the high levels of centralization of authority in Turkish military was severely criticized by the US committee of officers: In some divisions, even the work permits of vehicles were required to be signed by the head of division (Güvenç 2010, 180). While I was asking Selim about this issue, he said this is still the case.
2. The low numbers of NCOs in the military also struck the attention of the US officers. The committee's insistence resulted in the recruitment of 30.700 NCOs between 1950 and 1953.

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<sup>69</sup>Lloyd Norman, "Arming Turks would Cost 1.8. Billion", *Chicago Tribune*, May 20, 1947.

The previous resistance to recruit more NCOs, and the extreme centralization of authority were impacts of the Prussian-German tradition.

3. As such, there has been a transformation from the Prussian-German military system to the US military model, as low ranking officers were educated according to the latter (Güvenç 2010, 280).

Güvenç argues that there were major differences between the Prussian-German and the US military systems and understandings. The former was based on absolute obedience and a strict discipline, which required high levels of centralization of authority; the conceptualization of ‘military-nation’; the priority of warfare over civilian politics; the priority of land based military power; operative maneuvers in order to move to succeed in the short run with low risk of defeat; the fundamentality of tactic, operative and strategic levels in military doctrine; initiative of the commander in warfare; and the education of military officers in intellectual fields and sciences along with the military ones. The US military paradigm, however, was based on collective warfare of all forces rather than on the priority of land, naval or air force; the fundamentality of tactic and strategic levels of military doctrine; instrumentalization of warfare/ the military as a tool or a part of politics; detailed planning of the combat missions rather than trust on the initiatives of commanders in making good decisions during conflicts; and the priority of applied military practice over academic development in professional military education. (Güvenç 2010, 256-257) In the end, Güvenç argues that there has not been a total transformation from the Prussian-German military system to the US model albeit the significant impacts of the latter on military technologies and technical education of the military personnel. The Prussian-German model survived in TAF in terms of military thinking and conceptualization of war until the 1980s, Güvenç states. (Güvenç 2010, 283-284)

While the educational sophistication of low ranking officers is deemed to have resulted in the takeover of the military by Enver Pasha, the leader of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1908, the transformation initiated through US Military Aid after 1947 seems to have found its expression in the 1960 military coup. Not only the low ranks of the officers who staged the coup but also the ways in which the concept of ‘national security’ was applied to the historical context of Turkey were markers of this transformation. The concept was drawn from the US attempts to reformulate and reconceptualize civil-military relations after World War II (Özcan 2010, 348), and when applied to Turkey, it had hybrid reflections in the actions of the 1960 military junta. For

instance, while the introduction of the concept of ‘national security’ was in line with the US military understanding in terms of conceptualization of the military as a security and defense force, the often neglected political powers given to the military through the establishment of the National Security Council after the 1960 military coup was not depicting the military as outside of politics but as an integral part of it – not unlike the Prussian-German system.

To take a glance at military schools before the 1960s, let us stress here the impact of this hybridity of the Prussian-German and the US models on professional military education. The cadets of the most famous military school, Turkish Military Academy [*Kara Harp Okulu*, also known as *Harbiye*] of the land forces made a historically significant march to the parliament before the 1960 military coup. To raise artillery and engineering officers, Turkish Military Academy was first established in 1795, with the name of *Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun* [Imperial School of Land Engineering], and later in 1834 with the name of *Mekteb-i Harbiye* [Military College] by Sultan Mahmud II.<sup>70</sup> The school has raised some of the best known commanders including the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The fame of the school in near history of Turkey however, stems from the march of the cadets of *Harbiye* to the parliament on May 21, 1960, right before the coup, which was organized by very young military officers of ranks such as colonels, lieutenant colonels, squadron leaders [*binbaşı*] and even lieutenant commanders [*yüzbaşı*].

As the cadets of *Harbiye* expressed their discontent with the DP government of the time, this initiated heated debate among members of the government and of the General Staff. Their silent march on Atatürk Boulevard in Ankara was first planned to end with the kidnapping of PM Adnan Menderes while in the car with the PM of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Then the cadets decided not to pursue this plan lest it creates a bad impression about the TAF on the international scene. The succeeding debates were quite more interesting, and show the significance of this action of cadets for the politicians. The President of the Republic Celal Bayar, PM Menderes, and the Commander of TAF, Rüştü Erdelhun had a meeting after the march, and the news

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<sup>70</sup> "Kara Harp Okulu Tarihiçesi.", *kho.edu.tr*.  
<http://www.kho.edu.tr/hakkinda/tarihce.html>.

immediately spread afterwards that the cadets would be executed.<sup>71</sup> According to the notes of Erdelhun, these rumours about the content of the meeting became a part of the psychological operations of the military officers who later staged a coup.

Later after the coup, President Bayar, PM Menderes, the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) Refik Koraltan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Undersecretary of the PM Ahmet Salih Korur, and other members of the government were taken to the military academy on the first day of the coup. They were battered and interned by the cadets according to the memories of then Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who were later discharged and exiled among the ‘fourteen’ hardliners of the junta. (Turgut 1995, 140) Cemalettin Taşkıran, a former officer-teacher who is not a graduate of military schools but was a professor and researcher of TAF, states that the military officers of the junta wanted *Harbiye* to become a part of the unrest before they staged the coup. However, he puts, “the wrongful acts and attitude of the politicians” were also effective in the involvement of the cadets in politics. (Taşkıran 2009, 112-113)

Güvenç argues that because of the Prussian-German military system and understandings that survived by mixing with the US model in TAF up until the 1980s, it is hard to mark a sharp change in military high schools and academies as well as in different military forces with the 1980 military coup either. The attempts to shift from the Prussian-German model’s approach to the US model about the academic education of the cadets continued during the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, whilst Turkish Military Academy offered bachelor’s degrees in Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Management between the years 1974-1991, the Academy made a gradual transition to Systems Engineering program, in which each and every cadet was graduating with the same degree. In the meantime, in 1991, the Air Force Academy started to give engineering formation to its cadets. The period of study was raised from two to three years in 1969, and from three to four years only in 1974.<sup>72</sup> After the 1980 military coup, the International Relations program was shut down in the Naval Academy while engineering degrees remained, which I interpret as an attempt towards depolitization of future military officers by the military junta to

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<sup>71</sup> "Rüştü Erdelhun: Savunma Bakanı'nı ikna edip Başbakan'ı kandırdılar", *Zaman*, May 28, 2012, accessed on June 15, 2014. [http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem\\_rustu-erdelhun-savunma-bakanini-ikna-edip-basbakani-kandirdilar\\_1295176.html](http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_rustu-erdelhun-savunma-bakanini-ikna-edip-basbakani-kandirdilar_1295176.html).

<sup>72</sup> "Tarihçe.", *Air Force Academy Official Website*. <http://www.hho.edu.tr/GenelBilgi/Tarihce.aspx>.

avoid another military coup against the values and the Constitution imposed by the already staged one. A detailed review of this process for Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy will be conducted in the next section.

At the moment, there are nine military colleges and five high schools, highly structured by the central authority within TAF. For an overall view of the educational institutions of the military the list below (from the Human Resources website of the General Chief of Staff), shall be useful<sup>73</sup>:

1. Military Academies
  - Turkish Military Academy
  - Turkish Naval Academy
  - Turkish Air Force Academy
2. Gülhane Military Medical Academy
  - Medical Faculty
  - Gülhane Military Medical Academy of Nursing
3. Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) Colleges
  - Land Forces NCO Vocational School
  - Naval Forces NCO Vocational School
  - Air Forces NCO Vocational School
  - Gendarmerie NCO Vocational School
  - Gülhane Military Medical Academy NCO Vocational School of Health
4. Military High Schools
  - Kuleli Military High School (on behalf of Turkish Land Forces)
  - Maltepe Military High School (on behalf of Turkish Land Forces)
  - Turkish Naval High School (on behalf of Naval Forces)
  - Işıklar Military Air High School (on behalf of Air Forces)
5. Non-commissioned Officer Band Training High School

There are quite different military understandings in different military academies, which are not within the scope of this study. Levent Ünsaldı writes one of the rare comments available on the diverse distinctions within the military. He suggests that the categories of ‘the military’, ‘military officers’ or ‘soldiers’ are illusionary with regard to the distinctions based on age, generation, rank, political ideologies, and membership of different forces (Ünsaldı 2008, 202). As I argue in the next chapter through the narratives of my research participants who have been the cadets of same military schools, this diversity holds even for the prospective members of the same force, from the same cohort.

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<sup>73</sup> "Askeri Okullara Başvuru." under the section Human Resources [*İnsan Kaynakları*], *tsk.tr*.  
[http://www.tsk.tr/7\\_insan\\_kaynaklari/7\\_2\\_askeri\\_okullara\\_basvuru/askeri\\_okullara\\_basvuru.htm](http://www.tsk.tr/7_insan_kaynaklari/7_2_askeri_okullara_basvuru/askeri_okullara_basvuru.htm).

The military officers of Naval Forces have historically been considered ‘ballroom officers’ [*salon subayı*] within the military. Unlike the officers of Land Forces who serve in each and every city and town of the country, and face armed conflict more often than others, ‘marines’ [*denizciler*] have better conditions. They work in their ships and bases, away from the socio-economic and political conflicts in the society. Especially since the late 1940s, they have been sent abroad, especially to the US for education or purchase of ships, unlike the army and aviation officers. They are paid better as well, according to the table created by Ünsaldı based on the data collected from the Ministry of Finance and Supreme Court of Public Accounts, on 19 March 2002 (Ünsaldı 2008, 203). Ünsaldı also points out the fact that Naval Forces and Air Forces have been participating in administrative duties of TAF much less than the Land Forces: All the presidents of General Staff have been the members of Land Forces, mostly from the Artillery Unit [Topçu Sınıfı]. Because they are considered to be ‘ballroom officers’, military officers of Naval Forces are deemed less ‘soldierly’, especially in comparison to army officers. One of my research participants confirmed this perception when he talked about his reluctance to use the term ‘soldiering’ to define his experience of professional military education:

Efe: Since I am not a person who commands others, I cannot call myself “a soldier” anyway.

**How so?**

I have navigation abilities. My knowledge on law is pretty good. I know very much about legal rules [...]. But I am a zero when it comes to soldiery.

**What you mean with soldiery?**

Making people do something, rushing them, do you understand? There were such things in high school. A guy, for instance, was smoking. A very close friend of mine... They found cigarettes on him, they could report it, but they didn’t. Not being reported suited his book as well. He was beaten at the night.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Efe: Ben kimseye laf söylemeyen bir insan olduğum için, “asker” diyemiyorum ben kendime zaten.

**Nasıl?**

Denizciliğim var. Hukuk alanında bilgim çok iyidir. Kanunları falan çok iyi bilirim [...]. Ama askerlikte sıfırım.

**Askerlikte derken?**

Birine bir iş yaptırmak, birini sıkmak. Tamam mı? Lisede böyle şeyler vardı. Adam mesela sigara içiyordu. Çok yakın arkadaşım. Adamın üstünde sigara buluyorlardı, rapor edebilirler, rapor etmiyorlardı. Onun da işine geliyordu rapor edilmemek. Adam gece dayak yiyordu.

As such, the reaction of a university student I recently met, who had to leave the Turkish Military Academy because he was in the ‘shock group’ [*şok mangası*] of his cohort was hardly surprising: “It had been better if you wouldn’t do your research with naval cadets, even aviation cadets are better. Naval cadets don’t even count as soldiers.” [Denizcilerle yapmasaydın keşke ya, havacılar bile daha iyi. Denizciler asker bile sayılmaz.] The members of the Air Forces who are better than naval ones in terms of soldiering according to this former army cadet are taken to be the most conservative part of the military by Ünsaldı. He argues that one reason for that might be the absence of an air force military high school. Selim, however, stated that though Air Force Command did not have a military high school from 1974 to 2008, the Air Force Academy was recruiting its cadets from Kuleli, Maltepe, Işıklar and Turkish Naval military high schools. Therefore, the perceived conservatism of aviation officers can have other reasons. As a proof of their conservatism, Ünsaldı also gives the number of officers, NCOs and cadets who have been expelled from each force between 12 March 1971 and 1 June 1972, accused of being involved in the leftist movement: 388 members from Air Forces, 268 from Land Forces, and 120 from Naval Forces (Ünsaldı 2008, 204). Yet, when I shared this information with some of my research participants while asking their opinions on the conservatism of the Air Forces, they drew my attention to the proportion of these numbers within the total number of personnel of each force. Thus, they said, the numbers of removals do not necessarily mean that Air Forces was more conservative and prone to exclude those who were accused of being involved in leftist politics. Unfortunately, I could not reach the numbers of personnel of each force in the years 1971 and 1972.

Additionally, there are distinguishing social and political characteristics of the Gendarmerie, which constitutes a part of the Land Forces. Moreover, there is a deep hierarchy between the schools of military officers and non-commissioned officers since the latter are trained to work under the former without a chance to climb the ladder. One of the former cadets I encountered during my fieldwork explained the ‘legitimacy’ of this inequality of opportunity by making an analogy with engineers and technicians.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>For details on the political, social and cultural differences between being the member of Land Forces, Naval Forces, or Air Forces see Ünsaldı 2008, 202-229. For more on the economic, social and political distinctions created between officers and non-commissioned officers see Ünsaldı 2008 194-201.

For the study in hand, a deeper focus on the histories of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy is necessary to locate the narratives of my research participants historically. While discussing the distinguishing features of the Naval Forces within the military with Selim, I realized that some of Ünsaldı's analyses on the institutional culture of the force lost validity. First of all, Selim stated that the marines, NCOs and even conscripts were sent to the US to purchase ships or for temporal education programs before 2000s. Since the navy stopped purchasing ships from foreign countries and started to order ships from Turkish shipbuilding yards, very few people from the Naval Forces are sent abroad –and only for master's degrees. Secondly, which shall be valid for all forces in different degrees, he told me how a vice-admiral [*tümgeneral*] became the Chief of Education in the Naval Forces because all there was no admiral for this position due to the Balyoz trials. Selim also mentioned other changes about the widely known precedents about Naval Forces from 2007-2008 onwards, which I further elaborate on later. Before analyzing the quantitative repercussions of these changes on military schools, a focus on the history of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy is necessary to locate the narratives of my research participants in these macro processes of transformation.

### **2.3. The history of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy**

*Sea makes a nation live, enhances and enriches it. Turkish race tasted that thousands of years ago and they marched towards river and seaside when they left their homeland.*

*Blessed Anatolia of 20th century Turks, who are the most vivacious descendents of Turkish world which was found thousands of years before the beginning of the history, is surrounded by this natural asset's blue and fertile lines at three sides. Since before Islam, Turks who were in China, India and Iraq went down to seaside and worked in marine, it can be said that the first field Turkish sailors walked into was vast and stormy sea (Ertuğrul 194-?).<sup>76</sup>*

The destruction of the Ottoman fleet by the Russian one in the bay of Çeşme on 6 July 1770 exerted both a shocking and motivating impact on the Ottoman Navy. This defeat became the force behind the reform movements that would continue until Selim

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<sup>76</sup>Deniz bir millet yaşatır, yükseltir ve zengin eder. Türk ırkı bunun tadını binlerce yıl önce tatmış, ana yurdundan çıktıktan sonra hep su ve deniz kıyılarına doğru yürümüştür. Tarihten binlerce sene evvel kurulan Türk dünyasının bugün en canlı varisi olan yirminci asır Türkünün kutlu anadolusu da üç taraftan bu tabii varlığın mavi ve verimli kuşağı ile sarılıdır. İslamiyetten önce Çin, Hint ve Irakta deniz kıyılarına inen Türkler, oralarda denizciliğe başladıklarına göre Türk denizcilerinin yürüdükleri ilk saha engin ve fırtınalı denizlerdir (Ertuğrul 194-?).



II ascended the throne in 1789 (Zorlu 2011, 10). However, the first school for the marines was established in 1773<sup>77</sup>, under the rule of Mustapha III who is also known as the first innovative Sultan, by a French military officer of Hungarian origin, Baron de Tott. Rear Admiral Upper Half Fahri Çoker states that the memoirs of Baron de Tott are the only source of information about the foundation of Naval Academy (Çoker 1977, 12). In 1941, Ertuğrul suggests that the first naval school was established by Chief Admiral and Algerian war veteran Hasan Pasha in 1776 (Ertuğrul 194-?, 7). After the first school was closed down with a joint decision of Mustafa III and Baron de Tott, the second was founded in 1776. Yet, not only by Hasan Pasha but also with the efforts of Baron de Tott –Ertuğrul does not recognize this.

Appointed by Sultan Mustafa III, de Tott explains his role in the creation of what he calls a ‘Mathematical School’ after the defeat of Ottoman navy in Çeşme, İzmir [Smyrna] by the Russian navy (1770) as follows:

The sultan, not content with a few useful improvements, which might remedy, for a time, the Vices that infested every branch of Administration, was defurious to extend Knowledge of every kind, and requested me to found, and direct, a Mathematical School. The Body of Mathematicians, instituted by Soliman, exclaimed against this Innovation, which seemed to accuse the Muhendis (Mathematician) of Ignorance, for whose Knowledge their Chief was ready to answer. His Highness ordered these Geometricians should be previously admitted to an Examination, in the presence of two of the Ministers, appointed Commissioners for that purpose. (De Tott 1786, 171)

This School, principally intended to promote maritime Knowledge, as established at the Arsenal; but none could be admitted, except persons old enough to serve those views of present Advantage with which it was undertaken. Captains of Ships, with white beards, and other scholars of mature age, left me no occasion to forbid Playfulness, and boyish Tricks. I every day dictated the Lesson in Turkish, each Scholar wrote it down in his book, and I appointed one to repeat it to the whole School the following day. (De Tott 1786, 176)

Naval academy, although in a very different form than we know it today, was founded on the old arsenal at Kasımpaşa, Beyoğlu, with the name of *Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Hümayun*. It was deemed to be the result of the visionary insistence of Sultan Mustafa III, after the previous unfortunate trials of Ahmet III (1727), and Mahmud I (1734), which failed due to the oppositions of the guild of janissaries (Çoker 1977, 11). This was, however, more like a periodical training for aged and experienced captains than a

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<sup>77</sup> "Deniz Lisesi Tarihçesi.", *Turkish Naval High School Official Website*. <http://www.denizlisesi.k12.tr/orta/liseTarihce.html>.

school that raises new ones. After the student-captains acquired necessary education about plane geometry and marine navigation calculations, Mustapha III and Baron de Tott decided to close the school down and follow the improvements of the former students in the field.

With the advice of Baron de Tott and the efforts of Chief Admiral Algerian war veteran Hasan Pasha, the first naval school on lands of the Ottoman Empire was established in Kasımpaşa, in 1776 (Turkish Naval Academy Official Website; *Deniz Mektepleri Tarihçesi* 1931, 47). The curriculum of the school was changed according to the program of Naval Academy of the United Kingdom, after the Second Constitution, in 1908.<sup>78</sup> The impacts of the British naval model on the navy and naval education continued until World War I.

As the school was extending both in number of captain-students and physically with its new buildings in Camialtı, in 1834, one department of the school (called ‘Ship Sailing’ [*Gemi Seyir*]) was moved to Heybeliada (formerly named as Halki in Greek), one of the Princes’ Islands in Istanbul. The area on which it was established was known as *Kalyoncu Kışlası* [Galleon Barracks], and was built by Mahmud II in 1828. Later in 1838, Algerian Hasan Pasha’s Mansion [*Cezayirli Hasan Paşa Konağı*] was purchased by the Sultan, and the School of Naval Engineering was reopened to incorporate all the members and departments of the institution. Along with the Imperial Edict of Reorganization in 1839 [Tanzimat Fermanı], some significant changes were conducted in the education of the school and its name became *Mekteb-i Bahriye-i Şahane* [Great School of Naval Sciences]. After 1839, the school operated in Kasımpaşa for around 12 years. In 1850-1851, the school was moved back to Heybeliada for the second and last time, to *Kalyoncu Kışlası* [Galleon Barracks]. Only in 1853, a separate *idadi* (high school) was created<sup>79</sup>. There is not detailed information about the changes took place between 1853 and 1928 on the official websites of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy. Though, the existence of a mosque until 1934<sup>80</sup> within the naval school in Heybeliada is an interesting detail (*Deniz Mektepleri Tarihçesi* 1931, 27). This is not mentioned on the official website of Naval Academy. Only during the

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<sup>78</sup> "Tarihçe.", *Turkish Naval Academy Official Website*. [http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00\\_Anasayfa/01\\_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html](http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00_Anasayfa/01_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html).

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> For pictures of Turkish Naval High School in 1934 and in 1935 with the difference of the mosque see Cem Özmeral, “Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi 1932-1936.”, *istanbullite.com*, 2008. <http://www.istanbullite.com/tarihtenkapaklar/heybeliadadenizlisesi.html>.

Balkan Wars (1912-1913), some changes were brought about to the curriculum, and young officers were exacted to take three years of engineering training after graduation.

After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, first in 1924 new cadets were enrolled in the school under three different classes: Ship board, machinery, and clerkship [Güverte, makine ve katiplik]. The period of study was four years, including one year of preparation courses. With the command of Turkish General Staff, the name of the schools were changed once again to *Deniz Harp Okulu ve Deniz Lisesi Komutanlığı* [Naval Academy and Naval High School Command] from *Bahriye Mektebi* in accordance with the reform of the Republicans from Arabic alphabet to Latin alphabet. Whilst the schools were carried to Mersin, a city at the Mediterranean end of southeast Turkey, between 1941 and 1946, during the Second World War, it was relocated back in Heybeliada on September 9, 1946. On the official websites and written histories of the schools, it is not stated that before this removal to Heybeliada, the Greek Commerce Academy and the monastery [known as Panayia (Mother Mary) Kamariotisa] was extorted by the state and given to Naval Forces (Ertani 2012). The date of this extortion is meaningful since the 1940s have witnessed increasing levels of racism in the society as a result of the impacts of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, and the government's compliance to this trend with its actions and discourses (Maksudyan 2005).

A parenthesis about the foreign influence on the navy after the Republic is necessary at this point. While the German navy took over the command of the Ottoman Navy during World War I, early Republican politicians and military officers never let the command of the navy or the army to foreign militaries. During the first years of the Republic, from which country the new battleships and naval assistance should be taken was debated. The newly established parliament in Ankara preferred the German navy for the education and assistance of Turkish marines. Throughout the years from the 1920s to the 1950s, Germany, Britain, France and Italy had different degrees of impact on and involvements in the Republic's navy. (Güvenç and Barlas 2010, 233-253) However, the influence of the British military education system continued in naval high school and academy by hybridizing with the legacy of the Prussian-German military system. After the Truman Doctrine, the US impact set out a gradual transition in professional military education as argued above, which gained pace after the 1980 military coup.

Until 1953, the education period of naval academy was only two years: one year for theoretical training, and one year for training in practice in the navy. Afterwards, the administration decided to switch this to a four-year license program. After several changes in the organization of the curriculum of these four years until 1974-1975, the academy was reshaped around the disciplines of International Relations, Machinery, Electric-Electronic, Control Systems, Operational Research/ Management, Naval Architecture, and Oceanography.

After the 1980 military coup, the education was revised and narrowed down to four programs: Operational Research/ Management, Machinery, and Electric-Electronic (including sub-disciplines of Communications, Computer Science, Control, Electric). The 'Our History' section of the website does not bother explaining why programs such as International Relations or Naval Architecture were lifted after the 1980 military coup. Even the paragraph that shortly states this revision lacks content integrity. Though it is not the intent of this study to interpret this change, this may be a result of TAF's accelerating transformation from the Prussian-German military system to the US military model in terms of the academic and intellectual equipment. Since the US understanding gives priority to military/ bodily training and practice over academic and intellectual improvement, it is not a surprise that the military decided on such a change after the 1980s. The same line of thinking can be traced in the gradual transition of the Military Academy from a multi-disciplinary structure to a single and management centered program, called Systems Engineering, in 1991. This transition overlaps with the escalation of war between TAF and the PKK, a period when military action, or armed conflict, was deemed more important than military thinking and political resolutions in solving 'the problem of terror'. The curriculums of military academies were reshaped in 1990s, according to the criteria of the Higher Education Council, established after the 1980 military coup. These criteria were based on the engineering programs of universities such as Boğaziçi, Middle East Technical, and Istanbul Technical universities. Thus, the cadets of military academies gain the right to obtain a Bachelor's degree in engineering along with the Military Officer's degree [*Subay Diploması*] from 1996-1997 onwards.

At the beginning of the 1990s, TAF initiated a discussion on the juridical status of military academies, and particularly the Second Article of the Law of Military Academies no. 1462. As a result, the General Staff ordered a radical change in the educational status and content of professional military education. By the 1992-1993

academic year, military academies had started to accept female students from civilian high schools<sup>81</sup>. In accordance with The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW-95), the courses of vocational education, foreign language, meteorology, and intelligence were inserted to the curriculum. Physical training was taken to be a part of the academic program as a course entitled ‘Warfare Physical Training’ [*Savaş Beden Eğitimi*], which also overlaps with the abovementioned transition to the US model in terms of the academic objectives of professional military education. In 1995-1996, naval academy started to accept male students from civilian high schools to raise them for TAF’s departments of military engineering and marine corps<sup>82</sup>. One year later TAF decided not to accept students specifically for these purposes but the academy started to produce military officers for military engineering and marine corps starting from 1997-1998.

The Naval High School was physically separated from the Naval Academy in 1963, and started the 1963-1964 term in a building of Naval Education Command. This building was legally left to the Naval High School Command in 1971. On July 28, 1977, the then President of the Republic Fahri Korutürk who is himself a 1923 graduate of *Bahriye Mektebi* officially brought the new facilities of naval academy on Tuz Burnu Peninsula in Tuzla, Istanbul into use. The new Turkish Naval Academy was inaugurated by General Kenan Evren the President of the Republic in 1985<sup>83</sup>.

After 1985, all of the buildings in Heybeliada were left to the use of the Naval High School Command. Some of the new buildings among the facilities in Heybeliada were demolished after the August 17, 1999 earthquake in Turkey. The Naval High School continues to accommodate young cadets with its new and historical buildings in Heybeliada since January 8, 2004<sup>84</sup>.

As I learned about the extraction of the Greek Commerce Academy by Naval Forces after my fieldwork, I was able to ask whether they knew about this only to two of my research participants. Neither replied affirmatively. They were actually surprised

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<sup>81</sup> Turkish Military Academy, Naval Academy and Air Force Academy have gone through surprisingly different processes about the acceptance of female cadets. For details please check their websites.

<sup>82</sup>The acceptance of male cadets from civilian high schools to naval academy continues with ons and offs, and there is an information pollution about the details.

<sup>83</sup> "Tarihçe.", *Turkish Naval Academy Official Website*. [http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00\\_Anasayfa/01\\_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html](http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00_Anasayfa/01_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html).

<sup>84</sup> "Deniz Lisesi Tarihçesi.", *Turkish Naval High School Official Website*. <http://www.denizlisesi.k12.tr/orta/liseTarihce.html>.

and quite disturbed. From a different angle, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were three higher education institutions of the Ottoman Empire in Heybeliada (Χάλκη [Halki])<sup>85</sup>, in Istanbul: Greek Commerce Academy [*Rum Ticaret Akademisi*], Halki Seminary [*Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu*], and Naval Academy [*Bahriye*] (Ertani 2012). Yet only the naval high school, and later the separated academy, have survived until today, and this information is obviously unavailable even to former cadets of the school. According to the official website of Adalar [Prince's Islands] district, the school was moved to the Greek Commerce Academy, Halki Seminary and Panayia for the first time in 1917, for a year during World War I:

In this context, Hüsrev Paşa, the Marine Commander of Selim III, was transferred to the building which was built in past as Marine Barrack in Heybeliada with the name of Mühendishanei Bahri (Marine Engineering) (1824). During Crimean War, Naval School was restored with a new mentality. For three-quarter century, it naturally remained at its old place as Marine School. However, it was replaced again during World War I (1917) and was settled into Turkish Orthodox School of Theology, the Holy Trinity, Greek Trade School and the ruins of Panayia. After a year, it was removed to its old place.<sup>86 87</sup>

In accordance with the Law of Military Academies no. 4566, the Directorate of Education of military schools was reorganized on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2000. The President of Education became the 'Dean'. The disciplines that give Bachelor's degree of engineering were legally established as departments, and the number of departments was increased to nine from four. From 2001-2002, the Naval Sciences and Engineering Institute started to operate as the graduate institution of Naval Academy, which overlaps with the time Naval Forces stopped purchasing ships from the US<sup>88</sup>.

In April 2004, the academy became a party of the Erasmus Exchange Program of European Union. However, as I have learned from my interviewees, it has not been

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<sup>85</sup>I could not find when exactly was the name of the island changed from Halki to Heybeliada. It is not even written on the official website of Adalar [Prince's Islands] Municipality: <http://www.adalar.bel.tr/tur2.asp>.

<sup>86</sup> Bu meyanda Padişah III. Selim'in Kaptanıderyası Hüsrevpaşa zamanında Mühendishanei Bahri adı ile Heybeliada'da evvelce Bahriye Kışlası olarak inşa edilen binaya nakledildi (1824). Kırım Harbi sırasında, Bahriye Mektebi yeni zihniyetle ele alındı. Üç çeyrek asır müddetince Deniz Mektebi normal olarak eski yerinde kaldı. Fakat i. Cihan Harbi sırasında (1917' de) bir defa daha yer değiştirdi ve Türk Ortodoks İlahiyat Mektebi'nde ve Mukaddes Teslis ve Grek Ticaret Mektebi'nde ve Panayia'nın kalıntılarında yerleşti. Bir sene sonra tekrar eski yerine döndü.

<sup>87</sup> "Heybeliada.", *Adalar Belediyesi*. <http://www.adalar.bel.tr/tur2.asp>.

<sup>88</sup> "Türkiye artık kendi savaş gemisini üretecek.", *Hürriyet*. June 11, 2004, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=232648>.

put into practice. As the Turkish Coast Guard Command became a separate command (separate from Naval Forces) in 2005, the Naval Academy started to enroll cadets who have already chosen to work for Coast Guard Command whilst in Naval High School. My research participants who work for Turkish Coast Guard Command state that the cadets of Naval High School cannot choose Coast Guard Command since 2008-2009. Because the number of students of Naval High School decreased dramatically during the years 2007-2010, Naval Forces do not want to let Turkish Coast Guard Command to recruit cadets who were raised in a military high school.

Naval Forces made a transition to LINE system in 2011. For the US military LINE is a combat system and the name stands for *Linear Infighting Neural Override Engagement*. Though how the military officers experience the system in a non-combat period is explained by Selim as follows: The system requires each and every military officer of a command (Naval Forces and Turkish Coast Guard Command), coming from the same cohort, to serve in the same positions, although their time in the same duty might be in different years. While this means unification of the professional experiences of military officers, it also points to the further centralization of authority, lightening academic program and intensifying bodily military training in military schools from 2007 onwards.

#### **2.4. Ergenekon and Balyoz [Sledgehammer] trials, and military's falling from grace**

This research is conducted in a period where the relations between the military, politics, and society have been changed dramatically, especially since 2007. A review of the milestones of this change shall lay the base for the analyses of the following chapters.

The Ergenekon case was the first shock for the society, which showed military officers as citizens who can be arrested. What later came to be known as the Ergenekon trials began in July 2007, when police were tipped off about a stash of 27 hand grenades in a shanty house in the Istanbul district of Ümraniye. A retired non-commissioned officer was accused of the property of the grenades.<sup>89</sup> The trial however, with the name of Ergenekon, started in 2008 the first of four indictments submitted to a special court in

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<sup>89</sup>Rengin Arslan, "Dokuz soruda Ergenekon davası". *BBC Turkish*, February 2, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. [http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/ozeldosyalar/2013/02/130217\\_rengin\\_ergenekon.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/ozeldosyalar/2013/02/130217_rengin_ergenekon.shtml).

Silivri, an adjacent town of İstanbul.<sup>90</sup> Arrests of retired and active military officers and civilians, including journalists, writers, and businessmen sympathetic to the Kemalist opposition, quickly followed. Retired Commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie Command Full Gen. Şener Eruygur, retired 1. Army Commander Full Gen. Hurşit Tolon, Ankara representative of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* Mustafa Balbay, and Doğu Perinçek, the General President of Workers' Party of Turkey, were among the reputed arrestees. Many current and former military officers were individually charged with criminal deeds, which involved links to Turkey's felonious underworld.

The arrestees were claimed to be members of a "terrorist" organization, named "Ergenekon" after a mythical Central Asian valley connected to Turkish nationalist lore. It was described as consisting of mostly high ranking members of TAF and civilians in the media, academia, and opposition political parties. They were accused of being part of a secret "deep state", responsible for several extrajudicial killings that created chaos and state of non-confidence in the country. They were said to view themselves as the protectors of Turkish national identity and the secular values of the country's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.<sup>91</sup> The Ergenekon trial lasted five years. It eventually grew to include 275 defendants, and 23 other cases, including the shooting of a judge at Turkey's Council of State building in 2006. On August 5, 2013, 19 current and former military officers were sentenced to life in prison by a court in Silivri, found guilty of being part of a cadre that aimed to overthrow the JDP.

Large segments of society duly saw the trial as a way to come to terms with Turkey's violent past. An important group called 'liberal democrats' at the time, including academicians, leftists, and artists, supported the trial for a long time. But supporters of the defendants claimed that PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Gulen Movement, an international Turkish Islamic group that threw its weight behind the JDP in several elections, used the case as an excuse to take their revenge from the Kemalist military, journalists, and famous intellectuals. In time, it was argued that especially the arrested military officers were not accused of their publicly known but never proven violent acts towards leftists and Kurdish people between the 1970s and 2000s, were charged mainly with organizing a coup against the government. However, it is

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<sup>90</sup>"Timeline: Turkey's 'Ergenekon' trial.", *Aljazeera*. August 5, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/08/20138512358195978.html>.

<sup>91</sup> Justin Vela. "Analysis: Turkey's divisive Ergenekon trial". *Aljazeera*. August 12, 2013, accessed 15 June 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/201381175743430360.html>.



noteworthy that some convicts were accused of the Council of State attack (2006), and the massacre of *Zirve Yayınevi* (2007), an Islamist publishing house, wore out TAF's grace to a great extent. Only in March 2014, many of the previously sentenced arrestees who spent 5 years in prison were released because the Supreme Court ruled that they are arrestees but not convicts: special courts [özel yetkili mahkemeler] were lifted with the law no. 6526, and the maximum period of arrestees who have not been charged with a final sentence became 5 years with the law no. 5271.<sup>92</sup>

Besides, the accused were denied a fair trial according to their lawyers and supporters, and faulty and in some cases fabricated evidence was presented. Pınar Doğan and Dani Rodrik were among the public figures who worked hard to make the fabricated evidences visible in international and domestic media. As the son-in-law of one of the arestees of the Sledgehammer case, General Çetin Doğan, Rodrik was attacked by media organs such as *Zaman* and *Taraf*, known to be close to the Gülen movement. He was even described as "a self-hating Jew in law with his executioner" (Rodrik 2014, 5). Seçkin Albayram, the lawyer of one of the defendants, said because twenty-three cases were merged together, there were four million pages of documents and it was impossible to read them properly for anyone in the process. Those accused of holding leadership positions in this 'terrorist' organization were only allowed 30 minutes to present their defence, and Albayram said "These durations include the time that was used by them and their lawyers together." He also claimed that fabricated evidence was presented:

For instance, an Air Force officer named Ali Celebi had his phone confiscated by the police. Later, 139 contacts were found to have been loaded into the phone and presented as evidence. It was later proven that at the time the contacts were entered, the phone was in the possession of the police.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>Zeynep Güranlı, "Tutukluluk süresi 5 yıllla sınırlanırsa...", *Hürriyet*, February 3, 2014, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/25729047.asp>. For the coverage of the law no. 5271 and no. 6526 in Turkish: Abdülkadir İlhan, Member of Penal Department No. 5 of the Supreme Court. "Tutuklama ve Tutuklama Süreleri". *anayasa.gov.tr*, March 17, 2010, accessed June 15, 2014. [http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/files/insan\\_haklari\\_mahkemesi/sunumlar/ym\\_1/Ilhantutuklama.pdf](http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/files/insan_haklari_mahkemesi/sunumlar/ym_1/Ilhantutuklama.pdf); and "5 yıl kimlere yarayacak?", *memurlar.net*, February 4, 2014. <http://www.memurlar.net/haber/454015/>.

<sup>93</sup> Justin Vela, "Analysis: Turkey's divisive Ergenekon trial", *Aljazeera*, August 12, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/201381175743430360.html>.

The police later stated this was a mistake, Albayram said to the press<sup>94</sup>.

TAF forced out four civilian governments between 1960 and 1997. This is a big number especially considering it was a one-party regime before 1950, and People's Republican Party constituting mostly of former military officers occupied the government. Almost 8 years after the JDP, which advertised itself as the representative of moderate Islam was elected for the first time in 2002, an alleged military plot named "Balyoz" [Sledgehammer] that aimed to create chaos inside Turkey to justify a coup was discovered in December 2010.<sup>95</sup> The Sledgehammer coup plan [Balyoz Harekat Planı] was revealed to the public through three journalists (Mehmet Baransu, Yasemin Çongar, and Yıldırım Oğur) of the newspaper *Taraf*, which is known by its fondness for the Gülen community.

The verdict for the conviction of 330 defendants was announced in 2012: they were convicted for preparing a plan to overthrow the democratically elected government of PM Erdoğan in a meeting at 1.<sup>96</sup> Army Command, in 2003. Although they accepted the voice records of the meeting in which the top chiefs of the military make 'suggestions' about how to intervene to the state of affairs led by the JDP government. They were also accused of plotting to bomb mosques and trying to trigger a war with Greece to prove a widespread civil unrest to justify an intervention. Though they accepted the voice records, the defendants, and their lawyers argued that the most of the evidence was fabricated as in the case of Ergenekon, and the trial was 'unfair and unlawful'. The former head of the land forces, Gen. Çetin Doğan; the former head of the naval forces, Adm. Özden Örnek; and the former head of the air force, Gen. İbrahim Firtina, received 20 years. Those terms were reduced from life in prison because the plot was never carried out.

On June 18, 2014, the Constitutional Court delivered a landmark ruling stating that the rights of a majority of the convicted defendants have been violated, after 230

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<sup>94</sup>For more on the discussions around the evidence provided for the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases see: Jenkins 2009; Ertür 2011; Avşar, Özdiş and Kırmızıdağ 2013; Kaptan 2014.

<sup>95</sup>Doğan Akın, "30 soruda her yönüyle Balyoz davası süreci", *t24.com.tr*, September 24, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/dogan-akin/30-soruda-her-yonuyle-balyoz-davasi-sureci,5655>.

<sup>96</sup>Şebnem Arsu, "Turkish Court Convicts 330 From Military in Coup Case.", *The New York Times*, September 21, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/europe/turkish-court-convicts-330-military-officers-in-coup-plot-trial.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/europe/turkish-court-convicts-330-military-officers-in-coup-plot-trial.html?_r=0).

separate individual appeals. This decision paved the way for retrial.<sup>97</sup> Some 81 convicts applied to a heavy penal court in Istanbul on June 19 for a release, but the court then released all 230 convicts in the same day, a day after the Constitutional Court's rule.<sup>98</sup> While I am writing these lines, the last arrestee of the case, military prosecutor of Air Forces Command Ahmet Zeki Üçok, has been released.<sup>99</sup> Many former military officers, such as Colonel Ali Türkşen, who have been acquitted, connect their unexpectedly easy releases to the conflict between the JDP and the Gülen community, as the evidence for the operations was deemed to be a job of the Gülen movement.<sup>100</sup> In any case, it has been discussed since then in international and domestic press, whether the trial is to do justice to the Sledgehammer military plot along with the other non-democratic plans and previous violent acts of the convicts, or it is a show off of the Islamist wing in Turkey to take its revenge from the military.<sup>101</sup>

JİTEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Unit) trial is another case in which TAF's illegal operations have become a juridical issue. JİTEM was established in 1987 and known to be the responsible of many murders by unknown assailants and missing persons. The case started in 2006 in Diyarbakır with the confessions of Abdülkadir Aygan, former member of Kurdistan Workers' Party who turned informant and later became a member of JİTEM.<sup>102</sup> In 2012, Colonel Cemal Temizöz confessed

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<sup>97</sup>"Top Turkish court paves way for retrial of Balyoz coup case convicts.", *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 18, 2014, accessed July 5, 2014. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/top-turkish-court-paves-way-for-retrial-of-balyoz-coup-case-convicts.aspx?PageID=238&NID=67961&NewsCatID=339>.

<sup>98</sup>"Court rules for release of all Balyoz convicts after Constitutional Court verdict". *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 19, 2014, accessed July 5, 2014. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/court-rules-for-release-of-all-balyoz-convicts-after-constitutional-court-verdict.aspx?pageID=238&nID=68009&NewsCatID=339>.

<sup>99</sup>"Balyoz'da Ahmet Zeki Üçok da tahliye oldu.", *Radikal*, June 30, 2014, accessed July 5, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/balyozda\\_ahmet\\_zeki\\_ucok\\_da\\_tahliye\\_oldu-1199534](http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/balyozda_ahmet_zeki_ucok_da_tahliye_oldu-1199534).

<sup>100</sup>"17 Aralık olmasa Paşa paşa yatıyorduk.", *Hürriyet*, June 29, 2014, accessed July 5, 2014. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26705497.asp>.

<sup>101</sup>Simon Tisdall. "Turkey's Sledgehammer Coup verdict: justice or Soviet-style show trial?", *The Guardian*, September 25, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/turkey-sledgehammer-coup-trial-verdict>.

<sup>102</sup>"JİTEM informant Aygan Testified in Sweden", *bianet.org*, October 8, 2010, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.cnnturk.com/2009/turkiye/10/19/abdulkadir.aygan.cnn.turke.konustu/548288.0/index.html>.

the foundation of ‘execution squads’ by JİTEM, constitutive of people to be executed by the military without any records.<sup>103</sup> The case went back and forth between a special court and a military court. Finally in February 2014, the military court ruled a decision of lack of jurisdiction, stating the defendants are military officers but the accusations are not related to the military.<sup>104</sup>

On December 28, 2011, 34 Kurdish civilians on the southeastern border were murdered by a Turkish military air strike.<sup>105</sup> There are no efforts on the sides of the government or the military to determine the responsible of this massacre. Neither TAF not the government still do not take their responsibility for accountability.

According to the quantitative research done by Kadir Has University in 2013, even from 2011 to 2013, trust in the military decreased from 59.9% to 51.7%.<sup>106</sup> This percentage was 63.2% in 2011.<sup>107</sup> Those who said the most effective way to ‘solve the problem of terror’ in Turkey is in the hands of the military declined from 44.2% to 35.9, whilst those who chose the politics over military, economic, social, and cultural solutions increased dramatically from 29.5% to 40.1%.<sup>108</sup> Intriguingly, 2011 witnessed a rise in the reliance on the military against terror since the conflicts between TAF and PKK, and the attacks of TAF on civilian Kurdish people were in rise, including the Roboski Massacre. Looking back at the situation in the 1990s, the research conducted by Yılmaz Esmer in 1997 shows that the trust to the military increased from 60.7% of

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<sup>103</sup> "Albay Temizöz'den 'JİTEM infaz mangası' itirafı.", *Birgün*, December 21, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014.

[http://birgunabone.net/actuels\\_index.php?news\\_code=1356083492&year=2012&month=12&day=21](http://birgunabone.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1356083492&year=2012&month=12&day=21).

<sup>104</sup> "JİTEM'de 7 yıl sonra görevsizlik kararı.", *Milliyet*, February 18, 2014, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/jitem-in-askerlikle-ilgisi-yokmus-/gundem/detay/1838196/default.htm>.

<sup>105</sup> "Timeline: What happened in Roboski?", *bianet.org*, December 31, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/143200-timeline-what-happened-in-roboski>.

<sup>106</sup> "Kurum Değerlendirmeleri", *Kadir Has Üniversitesi Türkiye Sosyal-Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırması* 2013, February 2014, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.khas.edu.tr/uploads/pdf-doc-vb/news/05022014-1siyasal-egilimler.pdf>, 23.

<sup>107</sup> "Terörün çözümü asker diyenler artışta.", *Radikal*, January 18, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/terorun\\_cozumu\\_asker\\_diyenler\\_artista-1075981](http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/terorun_cozumu_asker_diyenler_artista-1075981).

<sup>108</sup> "Terör.", *Kadir Has Üniversitesi Türkiye Sosyal-Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırması* 2013, February 2014, 7, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.khas.edu.tr/uploads/pdf-doc-vb/news/05022014-1siyasal-egilimler.pdf>.

the society in 1991<sup>109</sup> to 71% in 1997. In the same period, the trust to the parliament decreased 28.8% to 17%. (Esmer 1999, 41-52) The most furious times of the war between the government and the PKK took place in the 1990s, in the predominantly Kurdish southeast part of Turkey. Therefore, the recent decrease as well as the increase in the 1990s to the military might be considered as signs of how the decisions of macro-level actors affect the perceptions of the people.

It would be of course overstepping the mark to claim that this research shows the declining trust in the military in Turkey, and thus in the militarization of perceptions on issues such as terror, politics, and social course of affairs. However, it is quite reasonable to argue that TAF became a questionable institution for large segments of the society, and public confidence in the military has actually been eroding.

## **2.5. Quantitative repercussions of macro-level shifts in civil-military relations in military schools: from 2007 onwards**

My youngest research participants, born between 1992 and 1994, made a special emphasis on the decrease in the number of graduates of Naval High School, and the disproportionately high difference between the number of Naval High School and civilian high school graduates in Naval Academy. Whilst the number of cadets decreases who finish Naval High School and enrolled in Naval Academy, the number of students accepted by civilian high schools, or in the words of TAF, ‘outsourcing’, was increasing, they stated. They interpreted this as an attempt of “unidentified powers” that want to change the profile of future military officers of the Naval Forces: because the graduates of Naval High School are disciplined and grew up according to the rules and values of a historically Kemalist institution from a very early age, they are not preferred by the new administration of Naval Academy, claimed Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert.

The last available explanation about this issue is made by the Minister of Defense İsmet Yılmaz in August 2012, as a response to the People’s Republican Party’s (PRP) [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)] parliamentary question about military schools. Proving the official statement of TAF, made in July 2011<sup>110</sup>, to be wrong, Yılmaz stated

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<sup>109</sup>For the research of Esmer, Ergüder and Kalaycıoğlu conducted in 1991 see the bibliography.

<sup>110</sup>“Deniz okulları öğrenci sıkıntısı çekmiyor.”, *Deniz Haber Ajansı*, July 12, 2011, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.denizhaber.com.tr/dzkk-sgk/36180/deniz-okullari-ogrenci-sikintisi-cekmiyor.html>.

that there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of applicants to military schools from 2007 onwards.

The applications to military high schools of Turkish Land Forces Command declined to 45.367 in 2011 from 66.487 in 2007, with a 33% decrease. While the two Turkish military high schools of Land Forces, Kuleli Military High School and Maltepe Military High School, produced 895 graduates in 2007, the number of graduates in 2011 was 305 in 2011, with a 65% decrease. The applications to Turkish Military Academy [Kara Harp Okulu] decreased 30% in one year: the number of applications declined to 18.247 in 2011 from 26.043 in 2010. The number of graduates decreased to 576 in 2011 from 761 in 2007.

The situation is slightly different in the cases of Naval Forces and Air Forces. In parallel to military high schools of Land Forces, there has been a decrease close to 30% in the applications to Turkish Naval High School from 2007 to 2011. The number of graduates, which was only 76 in 2011<sup>111</sup> with a 55% decline. Even though Turkish Naval Academy witnessed an increase in applications during the same period, the graduates of the academy decreased 35%, and only 130 second lieutenants [teğmen] graduated in 2011, among whom some of my eldest research participants existed. Recent surprising attempts of Turkish Naval High School to advertise itself in the press give a hint for the institution's request for more applicants.<sup>112</sup>

Işıklar Military High School that raises cadets for Air Force Academy since 2008, received 29% less applications in 2011 than in 2007. In that vein, it produced 39% less graduates in 2011, numerically speaking 125. However, the situation is much different for Air Force Academy, which witnessed an increase both in applications and in graduations in the same period.

There has been a severe decrease of 46% in the applications to The Vocational School of Gendarmerie Non-commissioned Officers, which is legally bound to Gendarmarie General Command<sup>113</sup>. I could not reach an accurate number for the

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<sup>111</sup>“Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi 2010-2011 Mezuniyet Töreni.”, *Haberler.com*, July 5, 2011, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.haberler.com/heybeliada-deniz-lisesi-2010-2011-mezuniyet-toreni-2845282-haberi/>.

<sup>112</sup>“Deniz Lisesi kapılarını ilk kez basına açtı.”, *Deniz Haber Ajansı*, February 27, 2014, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.denizhaber.com.tr/deniz-kulturu/54079/deniz-lisesi-kapilarini-ilk-kez-basina-acti.html>.

<sup>113</sup>Meriç Tafolar, “Askeri okula eskisi gibi rağbet yok.”, *Milliyet*, August 14, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/askeri-okula-eskisi-gibi-ragbet-yok/gundem/gundemdetay/15.08.2012/1581104/default.htm>.

applications to military schools from 2012 onwards since there is not an official statement of the Ministry of National Defense or Turkish General Staff since 2011.

An important note should be made on the relations between the numbers of applications and graduations. The former can be interpreted as one of the repercussions of the military's falling from grace, while we should also acknowledge the possibility of some other reasons for this dramatic decrease. However, how can we interpret the decrease in the number graduations in such a context? Some of my research participants suggest there are many cadets who left the school because of the discrimination and mobbing they encountered. This issue appears also in the news since 2012<sup>114</sup>. Moreover, the parliament has been involved in this matter, and formed a commission to investigate the claims of former cadets who request revoking of their compensation penalty since they were forced to leave.<sup>115</sup> Herewith, one can think of several factors serving to the decrease in graduations: the detachments of such cadets who faced mobbing and discrimination, drop outs motivated by the military's falling from grace or increasing economic expectations of cadets<sup>116</sup>, or new situations such as decreasing academic success of cadets that have less or no connections with the macro level transformations. As it is practically impossible to reach the necessary data and narratives to confirm most of these possibilities, they are definitely worth keeping in mind while discussing the quantitative impacts of macro processes on military schools.

There is another side of this coin. TAF has participated in “outsourcing,” a trend that defines the contemporary economic system in Turkey and globally, and began to employ ‘professionals’, meaning graduates of civilian high schools or universities; as specialized trained enlisted men [*uzman erbaş sınıfı*], gendarmerie specialized sergeants [*jandarma uzman çavuş sınıfı*], regular non-commissioned officers [*muvazzaf astsubay sınıfı*], regular military officers [*muvazzaf subay*], and most recently as contracted enlisted men [*sözleşmeli er*] since 2011.<sup>117</sup> The latter was initiated with the motto of ‘professional soldiering for war on terror’. Yet despite the high salary offered and low expectations on the educational background of the applicants, only 783 men applied to

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<sup>114</sup>“Harbiye’de neler olmuş neler!”, *Sabah*, August 13, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/08/13/harbiyede-neler-olmus-neler>.

<sup>115</sup>*TBMM Dilekçe Komisyonu Genel Kurul Cetveli* Vol. 13. Term 24. Legislative year 2. Published on June 27, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014.

<sup>116</sup>This will be further discussed in the fourth chapter.

<sup>117</sup>For detailed information on the specifics of these positions see Chapter 4 of this thesis.

Turkish Land Forces while the quota was 5.103. Turkish General Staff was surprised by the situation, according to the news in 2011.<sup>118</sup> After a year, in a news piece stating only the professional soldiers from all positions above-referred will go to the conflict zones in the eastern Turkey, it was stated that approximately 1500 men applied for the position of specialized trained enlisted men [*uzman erbaş sınıfı*] although the quota allowed for the all professional positions in TAF was 50.000<sup>119</sup>, and the salary offered to specialized trained enlisted men was 3.100 Turkish liras, which is a very high salary for a secondary school graduate. It is also very intriguing how TAF's plans to leave the conflict zones, and thus the possible 'martyrdoms' inside the country only to professional soldiers are mentioned smoothly in the news.<sup>120</sup> Whilst the bemusement about the number of soldiers who died in conflict was discussed in 2012, it was also debated whether TAF precludes the families of contracted enlisted men who lost their lives in conflict from making a statement to the press, with the contracts previously signed by their sons.<sup>121</sup>

The Minister of National Defense İsmet Yılmaz, answering a parliamentary question of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in 2012, stated that only 956 professional soldiers were employed albeit a total quota of 25.000.<sup>122</sup> This dissatisfaction drove TAF to make a significant raise in the salary of contracted enlisted men (adding possible extra payments such as 'operation compensation' to be paid in the

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<sup>118</sup>“Sözleşmeli er’de Genelkurmay şaşkın.”, *Radikal*, December 1, 2011, accessed June 15, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sozlesmeli\\_erde\\_genelkurmay\\_saskin-1071175](http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sozlesmeli_erde_genelkurmay_saskin-1071175).

<sup>119</sup>Metehan Demir, “Çatışma bölgelerine profesyoneller gidecek”, *Hürriyet*, November 21, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21976926.asp>.

<sup>120</sup>“İrak sınırı ve terror profesyonele emanet.”, *Hürriyet*, July 15, 2010, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=15319388>; “Zorunlu askerlik yapanlar çatışma bölgesine gitmeyecek.”, *bianet.org*, November 21, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/militarizm/142262-zorunlu-askerlik-yapanlar-catisma-bolgesine-gitmeyecek>; “TSK sadece dış tehdide bakacak.”, *Yeni Şafak*, May 7, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/tsk-sadece-dis-tehdide-bakacak-07.05.2013-518535>.

<sup>121</sup> Ezgi Başaran, “Şehit sayılarındaki muamma.”, *Radikal*, September 13, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi\\_basaran/sehit\\_sayilarindaki\\_muamma-1100118](http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/sehit_sayilarindaki_muamma-1100118).

<sup>122</sup>“25 in kişilik kontenjana 956 profesyonel asker.”, *Habertürk*, July 24, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/761405-25-bin-kisilik-kontenjana-956-profesyonel-asker>.



cases of armed conflict), and to reduce the criteria of application.<sup>123</sup> However, it shall be noted that there is a great deal of confusion about these numbers since the news does not give detailed information on the quotas of each different professional position, and how many people applied to which one. It would be interesting to see, for example, if enough applications were made to higher ranking positions but not to the positions such as specialized trained enlisted men and contracted enlisted men, or vice versa. Murat Belge states that TAF resists the JDP government's increasing encouragement for a gradually professionalizing military because institutionally, it sees the ideological educational transmission through compulsory military service as more important than efficiency or international standards, in teaching male citizens the 'absolute importance' of the military (Belge 2013, 186). Altınay and Tanıl Bora argue that not only the importance of the military but the militarist-nationalist doctrine is transmitted especially to men from the rural parts of the country during their military service. Though having lost its strength to a certain level after the 1980s, when Turkey gradually became an internationally more open country since the coup, but this transmission still operates in the complex relations between the military, soldiering, manhood and culture (Altınay and Bora 2002, 141-144). Belge gives the example of the US military (Belge 2013, 182) although without mentioning how mostly men and women from lower classes and especially migrants' children prefer professional soldiering as a career. However, there seems to be a resistance, or rather say, apathy towards a possible professional military, or a military career, on the side of the majority of the male citizens in Turkey, at least for now.

Linking back to the military schools, the Vice President of People's Republican Party (PRP) [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)] Umut Oran, made the same arguments with my research participants in July 2013.<sup>124</sup> There are many other unanswered questions about military schools besides the decrease of applications and graduations, he argued, relying on 'the speculations he heard'. He asked why the graduates of military high schools fail to finish the military academies more than those who are enrolled in military academies after civilian high schools. Thus he questions the number

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<sup>123</sup>“Profesyonel asker için devlet kesenin ağzını açtı.”, *Asker Hakları*, February 1, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.askerhaklari.com/genel/profesyonel-asker-icin-devlet-kesenin-agzini-acti>.

<sup>124</sup> For Umut Oran's press release see: “CHP: Harp okulları ve askeri liselerde neler oluyor?”, *chp.org*, July 9, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.chp.org.tr/?p=120014>.

of graduates of military academies from military high schools in comparison to those from civilian high schools. He queried whether the ‘shock groups’ [şok mangaları] really exist –cadets in military academies who are from military high schools and who face severe policies of intimidation from their commanders. He questioned the number of cadets who left military academies since 2007, which is 1439, although this number was only 1764 during the ten years before 2007. He has specific questions concerning particular cadets of Turkish Naval Academy, among whom there are people who took part in this research:

6- In 2010, some of the students who graduated from Naval High School and went to Naval Military Academy were cast aspersions on, they were claimed to be “homosexuals” in some websites. It was proven that they were cast aspersions. What kind of legal transactions were applied to the newspapers or broadcasting corporations which put such claims forward?

7- It is claimed that, some CDs including expressions like the students of Naval High School and Naval Military Academy were “immoral” and “homosexual” were sent to the houses of candidates who applied for those schools. How did they get the addresses of the people who applied to the school? Why the responsables of those assaults aimed at Naval High School and Naval Military Academy were not revealed?

[...]

2- In 2010, the newspapers like Akit, Yeni Şafak, etc, and some internet sites wrote that some students who graduated from Naval High School and went to Naval Military Academy were homosexuals by also giving the names of those students. After that news, the students were subjected to investigations, their testimonies were taken and they were examined. Although, mentioned students were proven to be clear, they were subjected to punishments at school for various reasons and apart from banishments via disciplinary board; they quitted the school willingly to save themselves from those aspersions. Were those newspapers or internet sites subjected to any legal transactions?<sup>125 126</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> 6- 2010 yılında Deniz Harp Okulu’nda eğitim görmekte olan bazı Deniz Lisesi mezunu öğrencilere yönelik iftiralara atılmış, bazı internet sitelerinde “eşcinsel” oldukları iddia edilmiştir. Söz konusu öğrencilere iftira atıldığı ortaya çıkmıştır, bu iddiaları ortaya atan gazeteler ve yayın kuruluşlarına karşı hangi hukuki işlem yapılmıştır?

7- Deniz lisesi ve Deniz Harp Okulu için müracaatta bulunan adayların evlerine, bu okullarda okuyan öğrencilerin “ahlaksız”ve “eşcinsel” olduğu yönünde birtakım ifadeler içeren CD’ler gönderildiği iddia edilmektedir. Müracaatta bulunan adayların adreslerini kim almıştır, Deniz Harp Okulu ve Deniz Lisesi’ne yönelen bu saldırının sorumlularını neden ortaya çıkartılmamıştır?

[...]

2- 2010 yılında, Deniz Harp Okulu’nda Deniz Lisesi’nden mezun öğrencilere ilişkin Akit, Yeni Şafak vb. gazetelerle çeşitli internet sitelerinde öğrencilerin isimleri verilerek eşcinsel oldukları haberi yayınlanmıştır. Bu haber üzerine soruşturma açılmış; öğrencilerin ifadeleri alınmış ve muayeneleri yapılmıştır. Söz konusu öğrenciler temize

The issue of how many children and adolescents apply to military high schools and military academies, and how many of them graduate as second lieutenants are linked to the discriminations my younger interviewees stated to have faced. This is not a debate to be publicized for them since most do not want to remember their bad times in the naval academy and some of them are fearful of what might happen to them if they publicly state their experiences, even though left the academy. However, Kemalist politicians such as Umut Oran from PRP, and especially two newspapers that share the same anxieties about the future of TAF's professional staff, *Sözcü*<sup>127</sup> and *Aydınlık*<sup>128</sup> try to make an issue of military schools, especially since the beginning of Ergenekon and Balyoz operations.

In sum, my research participants who went through the processes of discrimination and/ or investigations as a result of anonymous letters received by naval academy as well as PRP and Kemalist nationalist press argue that there are serious repercussions of the macro level changes in the positionality of TAF in Turkish politics to military schools. The public discussion on the issue starts from the numbers of applications to and graduations from the military schools because of the ongoing darkness about the internal affairs of TAF. However, the discrimination and/ or investigations that are confronted by some of my research participants reflect the effects of this transformation process in civil-military relations, especially of the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations, on professional military education, and thus, on the cadets. The diverse impacts of these macro processes on micro level will be further elaborated on in the following chapters.

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çıkmalarına rağmen okulda çeşitli sebeplerle cezalandırılmaya başlamış, disiplin kuruluyla uzaklaştırılmalarının yanında bu iftiraldan kurtulabilmek için kendi isteğiyle ayrılanlar olmuştur. Adı geçen gazeteler ve internet siteleriyle ilgili hukuki işlem yapılmış mıdır?

<sup>126</sup>Ibid.

<sup>127</sup>“Deniz Lisesi için şok iddia!”, *Sözcü*, July 9, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gunun-icinden/deniz-lisesi-icin-sok-iddia-331732/>.

<sup>128</sup>“Tasfiye Harbiye’ye uzandı.”, *Aydınlık*, March 12, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. <http://aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/19927-tasfiye-harbiyeye-uzandi.html>.

### CHAPTER 3: MASCULINITIES IN MILITARY SCHOOLS: PUNISHMENT, EXHAUSTION, FRATERNITY

*"Using the same clay, we craft a fine vase at the military schools. Civilian schools produce jugs of poor quality." (Birand 1986, 36; quoting from a commander)*

*They tell you "Man, we don't give a shit about what features you have. We have a pattern, a grinder and we will throw you into that. No matter what function, what significant characteristics you have or what talents you want to develop, you will grind all of them here and be the model we want you to be." (Berk)<sup>129</sup>*

*"This is not a school, this is a life style."  
(Selim, quoting from a commander)*

The making of military masculinities in Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy is ethnographically inaccessible to me: not only because I am a non-military person and a woman but also because the "field" of this study, conventionally conceived, is inaccessible to all except the cadets and the military personnel working in the schools. Yet, the military personnel –military officers, officer-teachers, conscripts and civil servants–experience professional military education in simultaneously similar and different ways. Therefore, this research, which attempts to study professional military education via the narratives of former cadets, is limited in terms of both the

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<sup>129</sup>Berk: Sana diyorlar ki "Kardeşim, senin ne özelliğin olursa olsun bizim sikimizde değil. Bizim bir öğütücümüz var, bir kalıbımız var, seni onu üstünden atacağız. Senin ne kadar uzun varsa, ne kadar dışarı çıkan özelliğin ve kendine katacağın yeteneğin varsa bunların hepsini burada öğüteceksin ve bizim istediğimiz modele dönüşeceksin.

subjectivity of the researcher and in terms of the time gap, which exists between the lived experiences of the interviewees and their narratives. This chapter aspires to uncover both the making of military masculinities in Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy and the changing dynamics of this making between 2003 and 2013 based on the narratives of former cadets.

Where can we begin to analyse the dynamic processes of the making of military masculinities as perceived and remembered by my research participants? The first surprise to me was the plurality of military masculinities among the former cadets. As the students of highly masculinized and militarized schools, many people would think of cadets and professional military men as homogeneously masculinized, nationalized and militarized. I too considered my gatekeeper Selim as an exception who somehow developed an alternative masculinity. However, as I continued by study, I observed that one could neither spot a singular version of military masculinity nor claim that cadets are manipulable bodies, “vases” merely crafted by military education, as the above-cited commander claims (Birand 1986, 36). During the fieldwork, I realized that military masculinities are not fixed in any way (Higate 2003): their multiplicity and diversity have to be taken into account for a “thick description” (Geertz 1973). As Connell argues, multiplicity as well as relationality of the social construction of masculinities matters in our social world (Connell 2005, 34-35). This diversity and relationality should be recognized to make a thicker description of how diverse military masculinities are possible despite a very homogenizing and oppressive military education:

“Masculinity” to the extent the term can be defined at all, is simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experiences, personality and culture. (Connell 2005, 34)

The narratives and body languages of my research participants, to the extent that I was able to know them, provided me with a broader perspective that forced me to acknowledge this diversity and relationality. Therefore, I examine the construction of diverse military masculinities as processes realized by meticulous control of details, of bodily experiences, time and space (Foucault 1984, 185), and as processes intermingled with past lives, bodies and personalities of each cadet.

As I draw attention to the diverse perceptions and relationships through which the masculinities of different former cadets were “crafted”, the changing circumstances

of different cohorts will play a major role in portraying this diversity and in building its connections to macro processes of the military's falling from grace, namely, the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Thus, I interpret the narratives of former cadets by focusing on the making of military masculinities, in accordance with the landmark impacts of the military's falling from grace on Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy, which were summarized in the introduction of this thesis. I argue that the making of military masculinities gradually became a more and more centralized process: the commanders increase the level of discipline and time management of the cadets' daily routine, and they eliminate the alternative authorities of elder cadets and solidarity among fellow cadets. In the mean time, the new distinctions among cadets, which appear along the lines of Kemalism, class and ethnicity created a sense of insecurity within the school, especially in the naval academy. I argue that these distinctions serve to increase the discipline and to centralize the authority. They appear to be outcomes of the macro transformations took place in civil-military relations between 2003 and 2013, and change the perceptions of former cadets on professional military education.

### **3.1. The Routine**

The daily routine in the Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy, in Mahmut's words, leaves "nothing personal" to cadets:

Mahmut: It was impossible for us to spare some quality time. We didn't have time for ourselves. We didn't have a room for ourselves. We had nothing belonging to us.<sup>130</sup>

The day starts approximately at 06:20 and ends between 23:00 and 00:00 depending on the decision of the sentinel military officer. The sentinel officer is one of 16 company commanders [bölük komutanı] in the academy and one of many officers responsible of different compartments of high school. It is a very tight program during which the only "free time" is the short intervals left for personal hygiene, including the cleaning of uniforms. Meal times are strictly controlled as well. Senior cadets arrive to the dining hall later than freshman and junior cadets. The latter wait for seniors to come and allow them to sit at ease (or in a lined up position if the atmosphere is tense in the school).

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<sup>130</sup> Mahmut: Kendimize vakit ayırmamız imkansızdı. Kendimize ayıracak vaktimiz yoktu. Kendimize ait bir odamız yoktu. Kendimize ait hiçbir şeyimiz yoktu.

This time and waiting hierarchy is the same for almost every part of the daily routine. For example, *tabur* hours are hierarchically organized, granting senior cadets 5 to 15 minutes more than others before every meal. *Tabur* means battalion or troop in Turkish, and it is the name given to the members of one cohort in the context of Turkish Naval Academy. Yet among cadets, it also refers to the time period during which cadets of a cohort wait before and after every meal and before bedtime [yat saati] to get their “shape” (uniform, shoes, hair, facial cleanliness) checked and to be present *if* a company commander comes and takes attendance. One never knows for sure whether someone will show up. Mahmut described how this works before breakfast as follows:

Mahmut: We woke up at 06:20 a.m. on weekdays. As soon as we wake up we dealt with personal hygiene, etc. We ran to shave hastily. Before breakfast we went to battalion. Firsts classes 20 minutes, seconds 15 minutes, thirds 10 and fourths 5 minutes earlier. Breakfast is given at 7:00.<sup>131</sup>

This rigid time management is vividly remembered by my research participants. The present time was experienced fully with intense bodily and mental exhaustion. This shows the significance of “being in the present”, or “intensity of the present”, in professional military education:

Mahmut: I mean, though there were nothing to be dealt with, we had to fill the spaces. You know, there are some bosses at factories who say the workers should not idle, they should work constantly, if they are empty, there will be trouble, they better work even if it is bubble work, even if they roll a rock... I think this was the mentality there.<sup>132</sup>

Burak: Even eating is a phenomenon. You can come across lots of trouble after just waking up and going to breakfast. For instance, you may oversleep or diarrhea or something like that and you may not be able to clean your shoes for that. [...] Or, I don't know, your friend says something during battalion. You are a kid, you may laugh. [...] The order off the school already requires the younger classes to be inferior. I mean, first classes are located at the highest flat, their dormitories. You pass to the dining hall going down all that way. When you get to the third classes' flat, you have to bow your head, as a rule, you cannot have eye contact with them. When you face any of those students, the case is “he came eye to eye with me, he will come here immediately”. They already know you. [...] When passing

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<sup>131</sup> Mahmut : Haftaiçi saat 06.20 gibi uyanıyorduk. Uyanır uyanmaz kişisel temizlik tıraş falan, hemen koştur koştur tıraş oluyorduk falan. Tabura geçiyorduk kahvaltıdan önce. Birinci sınıflar 20 dakika, ikinci sınıflar 15, üçüncü sınıflar 10, dördüncü sınıflar da 5 dakika önce. Kahvaltı 7'dedir.

<sup>132</sup> Mahmut: Yani ortada hiçbir şey olmadığı halde sürekli bir boşluk doldurmaca. Hani böyle bazı fabrika patronları olur ya işçi boş durmasın çalışsın, boş durursa sıkıntı çıkar, çalışsınlar iyidir, boş iş de olsa, kaya yuvarlasa yine iyidir... O mantık diye düşünüyorum.

through third classes, you must bow your head and run. You cannot pass walking. For instance, when you go down as two hundred people you cannot, you know what I mean, you get stuck and can't run. Then you must jump at your place. They shout "Those who can't run will jump!" One third class shouts "Those who can't run will jump guys!" for instance. They ask "what you have gone through at school, did anything happen?" No, nothing happened, but something just happens, something always happens.<sup>133</sup>

"Being present in the present time" with the appropriate shape, and at the assigned time and place throughout the day is central to military education. This strict physical intensity is remembered the primary hardship experienced in the military. Even according to one of the most nationalist former cadets, who in theory found most of the disciplinary regulations necessary to create a powerful military, the time schedule was hard to manage:

Oğuz: I mean there is also something like that, now, the mentality is that – I mean that is what I think in my own way. If you leave someone alone, he begins to think. It is the mentality at military school. They try not to leave you time, because then people begin to judge, to question: "Why am I here, what am I doing here?" or so. And when you question, I mean they tire you physically and so you get tired mentally as well and you can't think after that. You start not thinking and that feeling of pain, the pain you feel after being physically exhausted, makes you stop thinking.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>Burak: Yemeğe gitmek bile bir olaydır. Sabah kalkıp kahvaltıya gidene kadar başına bin türlü şey gelebilir. Örneğin o sabah geç kalmış, ishal olmuş falan filan olabilirsin, o yüzden ayakkabını temizleyememiş olabilirsin. [...] Ya da ne biliyim taburda arkadaşın bir şey söylemiştir. Çocuksun, gülersin gülebilirsin. [...] Okulun da düzeni zaten en alt sınıflar en alt katta olacak şekildedir. Yani lise bir sınıfı okulun en üst katındadır yatakhane olarak. Yemekhaneye de oradan böyle aşağı inerek geçersin. Aşağı inerken lise üç katına geldiğinde kural olarak başını öne eğmeli ve lise üçlerle göz göze gelmemelisin. Herhangi bir lise üçle göz göze gelmen zaten anında "o benimle göz göze geldi, hemen buraya gelecek" şeklinde olur. Zaten seni tanıyor olurlar. [...] Lise üç katından geçerken oradan koşarak ve başın öne eğik geçmelisin. Yürüyerek geçemezsin. Örneğin mesela bazen iki yüz kişi beraber aşağı indiğin için şey olur, ne diyeceğimi biliyorsun, iki yüz kişi beraber aşağı inerken bazen orada sıkışıklık falan olur, koşamazsın. O zaman da zıplarsın yerinde. "Koşamayanlar zıplasin" diye bağırılır. Lise üçlerden biri bağırır. "Koşamayanlar zıplasin beyleer!" diye bağırır biri mesela böyle. Okulda ne yaşadın, bir şey oldu mu diye soruyorlar. Yoo olmadı ama bir şeyler oluyor işte, sürekli bir şeyler oluyor.

<sup>134</sup>Oğuz: Yani bir de şöyle bir şey var şimdi mantık şudur –yani ben öyle düşünüyorum yani kendi açımdan. Eğer boş bırakırsan insanı, insan düşünmeye başlar. Askeri okulda da mantık bu. Böyle çok boş bırakmamaya çalışırlar çünkü insan yargılamaya, sorgulamaya başlıyor: "Niye ben buradayım, ben ne yapıyorum burada" diye sorgulamaya başlıyor. E sorguladığın zaman da yani adam seni bedenen yoruyor ki zihnen de yoruluyorsun, ondan sonra düşünmüyorsun. Düşünmememeye başlıyorsun; o acı duygusu fiziksel olarak yorgunluktan sonra hissettiğim acı da seni düşünmemeye sevk ediyor.



All courses are compulsory. Skipping courses is next to impossible as there is nowhere to run away from them within the grounds of the military compound. Former cadets have no memory of absconding from school. Additionally, their memories of the daily routine are centered around bodily/ military training rather than on the courses. This reflects the severity of disciplinary/ military training in shaping one's experience of professional military education. Indeed, most of my interviewees did not talk about the content of their courses but rather the high or low quality of them.

After the 2009-2010 term, the length of standard courses was reduced from 50 minutes per day to 45 minutes. As such, the "inspection and applications *tabur*" [muayene-müracaat taburu], which was previously held after lunch, was shifted to after breakfast. These changes were implemented to extend the time for fitness and sports after the courses. However, extended sports time did not bring more freedom to cadets. In fact, the meticulous control of how they spent their sports time began with this change. Before this period, members of a sports team were going to their particular trainings, while the rest was running or performing other basic sports activities during the same slot. Afterwards, they were allowed to join the social group [*faaliyet kolları*] they had previously chosen, such as the music band or theatre community of the school. By the new rule though, everybody was obliged to join the collective, basic sports activities before they move on with their own particular training or social activity. My gatekeeper Selim commented that being a member of a sports team lost value after this change. While the commanders were respecting the time spent with one's team before, they started to express their doubts about how "recklessly" the sports time is "wasted" when not under their control.

In addition, the rules about reading materials that one is allowed to bring into the school became more rigid. Although it was not difficult for cadets to have an authorized commander approve these reading materials, those who failed to get this stamp of approval started to be harshly punished. Burak tells his experience with the regulations during high school as follows:

Burak: Being constantly watched over by someone is very disturbing, disturbing on its own. I read on a newspaper while coming here, the number of books a prisoner can keep is decreased and for instance, I can understand their situation. Someone can say, "so what of it? Will he read twenty books at the same time, after all?" Indeed it is so, will he read twenty books simultaneously? Having a few books is enough for a person, and then he can change. But it is just not the case. The case is the fact that someone can limit

the number of books you can keep. It is a kind of violence, I mean, this is even the worst kind of violence.<sup>135</sup>

In terms of time management, there seems to be at least some freetime left to cadets before 2009, according to many interviewees. The most important change in terms of time was the ban on staying up after bedtime, which was rigidly implemented after 2009-2010. Selim indicated the negative significance of this change in the daily lives of cadets as follows:

Selim: Before 2009, you could stay up till the morning if you wanted, keeping your table lamp on. The punishments for even going to toilet began after 2009. With the grounds of breaking “dormitory order” or so...<sup>136</sup>

Selim stated that many cadets were sharing their opinions with the commanders, on the unnecessary physical exhaustion caused by the last *tabur* of the day, held right before bedtime [*yat taburu* – bedtime *tabur*]. Nonetheless, the commanders did not listen to them. In fact, this interaction between cadets and commanders about educational issues was possible also only before 2009-2010. Afterwards, even this already hierarchical dialogue became impossible since the commanders stopped asking the opinions of cadets.

Other examples depicting the intensifying discipline within the schools concern the extent to which cadets can access educational materials and technology, such as Internet, MP3 players, and laptops. Selim indicated that the administration of the naval academy could establish the technical infrastructure for Internet access only during the second half of the 2008-2009 term. However, all technological devices and Internet were banned at the beginning of the next academic year, 2009-2010. Afterwards, they could listen to music only with walkmans, although it was quite hard to find cassette tapes in the market. After a while, the administration allowed the use of discmans with

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<sup>135</sup>Burak: Sürekli biri tarafından izleniyor olma durumu çok rahatsız edici, başlı başına rahatsız edici. Şimdi gelirken gazetede okuyordum, cezaevlerinde mahkumların elindeki kitap sayısı belirli bir seviyeye düşürülmüş ya mesela ben onları o zaman anlayabiliyorum. Ne olmuş ki diyebilir bir tanesi, sanki yirmi kitabı aynı anda mı okuyacak? Hakikaten öyle, aynı anda yirmi kitap mı okuyacak? Bir iki tane kitap olması yeterlidir bir insan için sonra değiştirir. Ama durum öyle değil işte. Durum birinin senin kaç tane kitap bulunduracağını sınırlandırıyor olması. Bu da bir şiddettir yani, bu şiddetin alasıdır hatta.

<sup>136</sup>Selim: 2009’ dan önce kendi masa lamban açık, istersen sabaha kadar oturabiliyordun. Tuvalete gidene bile ceza vermeler 2009 sonrası başladı. “Yatakhane düzenini” bozma gerekçesiyle falan...

the precondition of getting your CDs signed by the respective commander. “Before this bullshit, we could even check our e-mails,” Selim stated.

Therefore, the significance of physical military training increased in comparison to the weight of courses in overall daily routine with the 2009-2010 academic year: not only basically because the courses became 5 minutes shorter, but also in terms of one’s hardening bodily experience of the daily routine. If discipline is “the political anatomy of detail”, “little things” became even more important after the above-listed changes in rules and in the practice of discipline. The mystique of everyday routine joined with “the discipline of minute” more keenly than before (Foucault 1984, 183-184).

### **3.1.1. Growing up still standing: *Tabur* hours**

According to David Couzens Hoy, Pierre Bourdieu argues that reflexive sociology itself can be a form of critical resistance with an honest recognition of “the complexity of the phenomenon of the complicity of the dominated in their own domination” (Hoy 1999, 18). Bourdieu himself states that,

If it is fitting to recall that the dominated always contribute to their own domination, it is necessary at once to be reminded that the dispositions which incline them to this complicity are also the effect, embodied, of domination. (Bourdieu 1989, 12; in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 24, Wacquant’s translation)

My gatekeeper Selim said that a disturbing sense of visibility, or “nakedness”, was shaping his weekends outside the school. While talking with many former cadets during the fieldwork, I thought he was disturbed by feeling incorporating an effect of professional military training: his complicity in his own domination. The organization of *tabur* hours sets a lucid example to the dispositions, or embodied effects of domination.

*Tabur* hours, which take approximately four to five hours a day, are narrated as the most exhaustive part of the daily routine by each and every interviewee. During *taburs*, cadets of all cohorts wait in line to give attendance. Different from other *taburs*, the *tabur* that they have after lunch is called “inspection and applications *tabur*” [*muayene-müracaat taburu*]. Therefore, they wait for someone to come and check cleanliness of their shoes, hats and all other parts of their uniform—the cut of their hair, the absence of their facial hair. They could make applications ranging from a request to go to infirmary to ask to leave a little early on Saturday morning if one’s parents are coming or if one has a doctor appointment outside the school. Like Tarık and Rıdvan,

all the interviewees expressed how “meaningless” these standing still and waiting hours were:

Tarık: Battalion is very common, you mean?

Very much, extremely!

**What do they tell during battalion?**

Nothing, you just wait idly.

**Does someone talk?**

No, I mean generally no... Generally 80% of the battalions are empty; you wait standing on your feet. If he bothers, the duty officer comes to count you.<sup>137</sup>

Rıdvan: Bedtime *tabur* lasted longer, like an hour and a half.

**Why?**

No reason. The only thing need to be done is counting the attendants. It takes 10 minutes. They report it to the duty officer of the day. But we waited for one hour and a half. (Laughing)<sup>138</sup>

I interpret the narratives of my interviewees about *taburs* as an expression of how absolute obedience was taught to them. Standing still and waiting for commander or representative company commander from senior cadets to come, without knowing until when and without being able to move from the exact spot one stands, serve as an educational tool, or as a disciplinary technique. Standing still during *tabur* hours for 4 to 5 hours a day, without access to knowledge and management of time, is a powerful way of investing the body with relations of power and domination.

But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labor power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political

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<sup>137</sup>**Tabur çok oluyor yani?**

Tarık: Çok oluyor, aşırı oluyor bizde!

**Taburda ne anlatılıyor?**

Hiçbir şey. Boş boş bekliyorsun.

**Biri konuşuyor mu?**

Hayır yani, genelde yani... Genelde taburların %80'i boş hani, sessiz bir şekilde ayakta beklemekle geçiyor. Nöbetçi subay lütfedip gelirse seni sayar.

<sup>138</sup> Rıdvan: Yat taburu daha uzun sürüyordu. Bir buçuk saat falan.

**Neden?**

Bir nedeni yok. Tek yapılması gereken mevcutlar alınacak. On dakikada alınıyor. O günün nöbetçi subayına rapor ediliyor. Ama bir buçuk saat bekliyorduk. (Gülüyor)

instrument meticulously prepared, calculated, and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. (Foucault 1984, 173)

The regulation of *taburs* makes bodies of cadets both productive and subjected, most visibly when some senior cadets join the *tabur* organization [tabur teşkilatı]. Those who join *tabur teşkilatı* become representative company commanders [temsili bölük komutanı]. They hold the duty of doing all the checks of shape when demanded by the commander. They ask questions about Turkish politics, the history of Turkish Naval Forces, Turkish Naval High School, and Turkish Naval Academy or of naval and other military affairs of the Republic.

The mere hierarchy between different cohorts makes the bodies of cadets both productive and subjected since the hierarchical superiority and power constantly approach towards younger cadets. The making of simultaneous productivity and subjection, thus, already operates through the knowledge of younger cadets that they will become a senior soon, and they can take part as a representative company commander in the school hierarchy, in a couple of years. Mahmut who was very critical of waiting during *taburs* without a purpose, told that he became a representative company commander as a senior:

**What they do during the battalion then?**

Mahmut: In battalion, as I said, they check if your cap is ironed, if your pants are ironed, if your cap is clean, you jacked is like that or so...

**Who controls it?**

Forth classes. They had a battalion team at forth class. They had the duty of putting you in order, because they were in order!

**Was that ironic?**

Of course! (We laugh) I was one of them. (I get surprised and we laugh) At the second term of fourth class, I also went in. But, for instance... No, no I didn't have any trouble though... I was the company commander, representative company commander. I mean, I didn't have trouble with those bad behaviors, didn't have to.

**When you say didn't have trouble, do you mean you didn't do it?**

I didn't do it. Doing is also experiencing it, I think. When you do it, you do it to yourself as well.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>139</sup>**Taburlarda ne yapılıyor peki?**

Mahmut: Taburlarda işte bahsettiğim işte, senin şapkan ütülü mü, yok pantolonun ütülü mü, şapkan temiz mi, ceketin şöyle mi falan...

**Kim geliyor kontrole?**

Dördüncü sınıflar. Dördüncü sınıflardan tabur teşkilatı vardı. Onlar seni hizaya sokmakla görevli kişilerdi çünkü onlar hizadaydı!

Ümit who was not a member of *tabur teşkilatı* expressed this in another way:

Ümit: The part named courses was ok already. It passes casually, we have lunch break, after lunch we have a battalion called examination and inspection, where the officers responsible for us want to meet us, spend some time, etc. Meanwhile, they examine you, your shape, the whiteness of your cap, and fourth classes command the process.<sup>140</sup>

How Mahmut expressed his experience of “playing the commander”, the pauses and intonation of his narration, and the bashfulness that visits his body language for brief seconds made me think that he sees his part in *tabur teşkilatı* justifiable by creating a distinction between himself and the majority of representative company commanders: He did not treat younger cadets harshly but he tried to give them good advice about their courses and military discipline. His role as a representative company commander may seem as a self-contradiction. Yet I think, how his negative narration of *taburs* was followed by his role in them as a senior cadet reflects the complexity of the phenomenon of the complicity of the dominated in his/ her own domination. To explain Bourdieu’s argument, Hoy suggests that:

[...] the dominated can resist by trying to efface the signs of difference that have led to their domination. But this strategy has the same effect as assimilation, and thus looks like submission. Or the dominated can instead try to dominate their own domination by accepting and accentuating the characteristics that mark them as dominated. But this too does not look much different from giving in to domination. (Hoy 1999, 18)

Regulations such as *tabur teşkilatı* which allow cadets to “play the commander” during their military education, produce the relations in which cadets are complicit in their own domination. The strict hierarchy between different cohorts functions in the

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### **Bu ironikti galiba?**

Tabii canım (Gülüyoruz). Ben de onlardandım. (Ben şaşırıyorum, gülüyoruz) Dördüncü sınıfta, ikinci dönemde ben de gittim. Ama mesela... Yok ya ben hiç sıkıntı yaşamadım ama... Ben bölük komutanıydım, temsili bölük komutanı. Yani o kötü davranma açısından hiç öyle bir şey yaşamadım, yaşamak zorunda kalmadım.

### **Yaşamadım derken yapmadım diyorsun?**

Yapmadım. Ya yapmak da yaşamaktır ya bence. Yapan kendine de yapar bence.

<sup>140</sup> Ümit: Dersler denilen kısım zaten yani iyiydi. Rahat geçiyor, hani öğle yemeği aramız var, öğle yemeğinden sonra böyle muayene ve denetleme taburu denilen bir şey var başımızdaki subayların bizle görüşmek istediği, vakit harcamak istediği vs. O arada işte muayene yapıyorlar seni; şekline bakıyorlar, şapkanın beyazına bakıyorlar, bir de dördüncü sınıf öğrencileri komutanlık oynuyor.

same direction as well. For example, the shortening of the time one spends with his particular sports team by inserting a collective sports hour into the routine was not only to standardize and centralize the whole program: among the members of a team who are from different cohorts, there is almost no hierarchy. Therefore, not only the regulation of *taburs* that allow certain cadets to “play the commander” but the hierarchical order itself create grey zones in which cadets can be both productive by beleaguering and disciplining their youngers, and subjected by obeying their seniors. This complicity, thereupon, function as a powerful means of professional military education

### **3.1.2. Punishment and Anxiety**

Punishment is central to the experience of military education. It is an indispensable part of professional military education. Tarik’s words, cited in the previous section, show that the bodies of cadets are meant to be meticulously and strictly controlled with punishment and the anxiety created by the constant possibility of it. However, bodies resist this control in many instances such as disruption of the daily routine by “inappropriate” bodily fluids. These resistances result mostly in punishment. For instance, Tarik could not leave the school for three weekends in a row as a price of his bleeding nose.

In the narratives of all my interviewees, the anxiety of getting reported and having to stay at school during one or more weekend(s) is a constant fear for cadets:

Kaan: And constantly you are struggling to be survivor like did that happen, did this happen, should I do that like this, should I do that like that, should I do that from here, should I do that from there, should I do that in there at that hour... Do you understand? And what happens then? Always “will anything happen?” This time you start to get paranoid. “did they catch that?” For instance, you are reading a book. You bring it in at Sunday night and you need to get it signed in Monday morning. You forget it and it has to wait for the next day but what if you get caught? In the end, there will be a book without approval when they check your cupboard. Even if the book is not a forbidden one, you need to have it signed. The company commander must approve it and sign. You cannot bring whichever publication pops into your head. Because this is not a high school like the ones you know, not a university, either. This is the simplest example. After all, you start to get paranoid constantly. And as I said, if you have small, trivial misbehaviors; did this happen, did that happen...<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Kaan: Ve sürekli şu mu oldu, bu mu oldu, şunu şöyle mi yapsam, bunu böyle mi yapsam, şurdan şunu mu yapsam, buradan bunu mu yapsam, burada bu saatte bunu mu

Kaan referred to the anxiety, fear, or a exhausting sense of not being able to control the consequences of your actions as “paranoia”. This was expressed with different wordings by all of my research participants. As Foucault argues, “The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*.” (Foucault 1984, 195) The fact that Kaan managed to graduate from Turkish Naval Academy and become a military officer seems to be the “fruit” of his normalization of punishment, and of the fear of punishment as a regular part of his daily routine.

Foucault argues, “the art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression.” It brings rather, he states, five distinct operations into play:

It refers to individual actions to a whole that is once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and a principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an optimum toward one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value, the abilities, the level, the “nature” of individuals. It introduces, through this “value-giving” measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal (the “shameful” class of Ecole Militaire). (Foucault 1984, 195)

As such, my interviewees narrated how this perpetual penalty compares, differentiates, homogenizes, hierarchizes and excludes through diverse techniques and degrees of punishment. Before discussing these techniques, and particular motives of students to obey them and to become perpetrators of physical violence themselves in many cases, please note that each cadet enters the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval Academy with a full disciplinary point of 120. As they get punished due to their disrespectful behaviors to their seniors, or because of their other misdemeanors

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yapsam, sürekli bir survivor halindesin, anladın mı? Bu sefer ne oluyor? Hep “bir şey olur mu”? Bu sefer paranoyaklık başlıyor. Acaba şunu yakalamışlar mıdır? Atıyorum kitap okuyorsundur. Getirmişsindir Pazar akşam, pazartesi sabah imzalatman lazımdır, unutursun, ertesi güne kalır ama yakalanırsan ne olur? Sonuçta dolabını kontrol ederken imzasız kitap. Kitap yasak olmasa bile imzalanması lazım. Bölük komutanının bu uygundur deyip imzalaması lazım. Okula öyle kafana göre yayın getiremezsin yani. Bu bildiğin gibi bir lise değil çünkü, üniversite de değil. Bu en basit bir örnek. Sonra sürekli paranoyaklaşıyorsun. Bir de dedim ya ufak tefek haytalıkların varsa şöyle mi oldu böyle mi oldu...



such as dirty shoes or hats, they consume these points. Even in the academy, when a cadet falls under a certain amount of points, the family of the cadet is invited to the school. The parents are those who will pay the price of their military education if they consume the total of their disciplinary points and get expelled as a result. Exhausting the entire 120 points results in being expelled from the school no matter how successful one is in his/ her courses.

Since the disciplinary rules tightened after 2009-2010, the number of punishments given by commanders and seniors, and thus, the anxiety of getting punished increased significantly. Selim stated that this anxiety led cadets also to self-censor more, to obey the rules more carefully by reframing obedience to the disciplinary rules as precaution rather than oppression. Weekends are the most important source of motivation to obey during weekdays, both before and after 2009-2010.

### **3.1.3. Weekends: The good reason to comply**

When he was in the Turkish Naval Academy, Selim once told me he hated himself because he was doing everything “right”, obeying each and every rule to go out at the weekends. Herewith, the issue of “the complicity of the dominated in their own domination” reappears. Deniz Kandiyoti conceptualizes the “tactic” or choice of women to accommodate and uphold patriarchal norms to maximize their power and options in the future as “patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988). One can consider the obedience of cadets prompted by the dream of a weekend outside as a bargain with disciplinary power. However, even when one goes out on Friday and comes back on Sunday<sup>142</sup>, the weekend is never a weekend as such. Military education is remembered as a very claustrophobic experience by all of my interviewees.

#### **When you say “I gave my youth away” do you mean just being closed down there?**

Oğuz: You are closed down, of course, 5 days of a week you are closed down. I mean... Closed down as you know. You attend the courses, get out of them, trainings and so happen... Of course it is not so easy. Difficult... I mean, I don't know, the environment is totally inconsistent with the perceptions you had when you got into that school. It is not like that: hang in there for five days and then go out at Friday night. You can't think like just leaving on Saturday and Sunday because you have to come back on Sunday night. I mean, as happy as you are when leaving at Friday, you get

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<sup>142</sup>This means he is a weekly boarder [*evci*] because he has a relative in the city of the school and he is very lucky according to my interviewees who were not –the state of not being *evci* is called *bekar*, meaning “single”, “farmworker” or “loafer” in Turkish.

as much upset when you get back to school on Sunday. At least, it was so for me because going through the same thing on every Sunday, every Friday and having those complicated feelings is so... It affects you deeply.<sup>143</sup>

Kaan: It is desperation, in the end. You are one person, there is just one brain and one psychology and you are trying to divide it into two. Why do you divide it into two? Because you are restless inside, you are always in a closed place, constant training, difficult courses... Daily activity program begins in the morning...<sup>144</sup>

Imprisonment, or with a word for word translation, “being closed inside the school” [içeride kapalı olmak], and thus isolation from the city outside, is expressed as a painful bodily experience by my research participants. With the revised disciplinary rules of TAF<sup>145</sup>, room confinement—called *disko* [ward of discipline, *disiplin koğuşu*] among conscripted soldiers and as room confinement [oda hapsi] among cadets— is not used as a punishment anymore. It is out of use at least in practice. However, being forced to stay within the borders of the school, albeit not in a single room, still appears to be a very “effective” and painful punishment, and a very powerful source of motivation to one’s complicity in his/ her own domination “not to be dominated” at least at the weekends. Therefore, the good reason to obey became harder to achieve as the standards of compliance began to increase by the 2009-2010 academic year.

### 3.1.4. Exhaustion and bodies

Within the overall picture of the daily routine, exhaustion as a dynamic bodily state is what almost never goes away:

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<sup>143</sup> **Peki sen şeyi mi kastediyorsun, “gençliğimi verdim” demekle, yani sadece orada kapalı olmayı mı kastediyorsun?**

Oğuz: Ya kapalısın tabii haftanın beş günü kapalısın. Yani... Bildiğin kapalısın. Derse geliyorsun, dersten çıkıyorsun, eğitim oluyor bir şey oluyor falan... Ya tabii ki çok kolay olmuyor yani. Zor... Yani öyle yani ne bileyim okula girerkenki mantığınla kesinlikle ve kesinlikle uyuşmuyor ortam yani. Şöyle değil; hafta içi beş gün zaten takıl ondan sonra Cuma akşamı çık. Cumartesi-Pazar git olmuyor çünkü o Pazar akşamı okula dönüş yani. Cuma akşamı nasıl bi sevinçle dışarı çıkıyorsan Pazar akşamı onun tam tersi bir üzüntüyle geri dönüyorsun okula yani. En azından ben öyleydim, çünkü bunu her Pazar akşamı yaşamak, her Cuma ve her zaman o kadar karmaşık duygular yaşamak o kadar bir şey ki insanı çok etkiliyor.

<sup>144</sup> Kaan: Umutsuzluk yani sonuçta... Tek bir insansın, tek bir beyin var, tek bir psikoloji var ama sen bunu ikiye bölmeye çalışıyorsun. Niye ikiye bölmeye çalışıyorsun? Çünkü içeride huzursuzsun, sürekli kapalı bir ortamsın, sürekli eğitim, dersler zor. Günlük faaliyet programı sabah başlıyor...

<sup>145</sup>“Parliament approves law on TSK disciplinary rules”, *Today’s Zaman*, January 31, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014.

[http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail\\_openPrintPage.action?newsId=305731](http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=305731).

Kaan: The life inside always has a monotone, a routine. I shouldn't say monotone, it sounds slow. There is a routine movement, do you understand? Physically and mentally you are already tired, you are always in the middle of a hurry. There are always rules you have to obey. You are tired, after all, do you understand? And after a while, you get bored whether you want or not. Because there is no extra activity you do just for yourself. I mean, for instance, sport teams, whatever else, this and that, they all get into that routine. Do you understand?<sup>146</sup>

Burak emphasized how they were always sleepy although it was forbidden to sleep anywhere other than one's own bed, and any time other than between bedtime and waking time:

Burak: We were very very tired, always tired, I mean. I remember that, during course breaks, I have never gone through such things later in the university or so. [...] I guess it wasn't a normal thing. [...] For a kid to get that tired everyday can't be a healthy thing. [...] I don't think that in a civilian high school or university people put their heads on the desks and sleep at 5-minute-breaks.<sup>147</sup>

As Burak mentioned the "undesirable" possibility of diarrhea, Tarık was punished to stay in the school for three weekends because he arrived two minutes late to *tabur* because he was washing his bleeding nose. He stated that this type of irrational punishment led him to question the logic of educational disciplines:

Tarık: When I went down, I said I was one or two minutes late. When I said that, he said "Write it in your apologia", I said I was writings all the explanation needed, etc. Wrote something so and gave. Then I checked and what: three weekends! Two or three weekends, something like that. Ok, I was late but that shouldn't be, I mean. There was a logical reason; after all, it wasn't intentional. I went there, though, usually I didn't bother. I said "Sir, what does three weekends mean? Ok, I know I was late; I don't have a thing to say for that, I also got the apologia. But what was the purpose of that apologia, then? What are you doing?" For the first time I questioned...for 8 years, this was the only thing I questioned. I said "If not

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<sup>146</sup>Kaan: İçerideki yaşantıda sürekli bir monoton var, rutin var. Monoton demeyeyim, monoton yavaş kalıyor. Rutin bir hareketlilik var tamam mı? Fiziken ve ruhen zaten yoruluyorsun, sürekli bir koşturmaca içinde sin. Uyman gereken sürekli bir kurallar var. Yorgunsun yani anladın mı? Ve canın bir yerden sonra ister istemez sıkılıyor. Çünkü kendin için yaptığın ekstra bir faaliyet yok. Mesela atıyorum spor takımı, bilmem ne, cart curt, şudur budur, onlar da rutine giriyor aslında. Anladın mı?

<sup>147</sup>Burak: Çok yorgunduk, çok, sürekli yorgunduk yani. Şeyi hatırlıyorum, ders aralarında, ben hiç üniversitedeyken falan öyle şeyler yaşamadım sonra, [...] Bu normal bir şey değildir sanırım. [...] Bir çocuğun her gün bu kadar yoruluyor olması sağlıklı bir şey değildir. [...] Ben sanmıyorum ki sivil bir lisede ya da üniversitede her 5 dakikalık arada herkes kafayı sıraya vurup uyasun?

this, what do you accept, Sir?” And he said “Look T., it is not like that, we do that...” or so. I said “Sir, what could I do, my nose bled, you already know that, you yourself sent me to the infirmary. It bleeds with no reason, what can I do? I was 2 minutes late, alright, but what happened after all, I didn’t even run after the battalion, I was down there not 5 minutes but 3 minutes earlier.”<sup>148</sup>

Former cadets’ memories about such cases are positioned in distinct ways within their overall narratives. While Burak did not continue onto naval academy of his own volition, Tarık is working as a military officer. In Burak’s narrative, the experience of being exhausted by military education is one of the main reasons why he left. For Tarık on the other hand, getting punished because of his nosebleed marks one of the rare moments he questioned the logic of power relations and domination within the school. Throughout his narrative, only what he ‘did’ unintentionally (such as having a nosebleed) justified his questioning. As a military officer on duty, his bodily exhaustion during military education could find voice only with the moments his body acted beyond his control.

Exhaustion thus plays a key role in the construction of military masculinities because social construction of the body not only forms it but also *deforms* it (Hoy 1999, 4). This deformation through exhaustion was expressed by most of my interviewees. Obviously, it produced resistance too: sometimes as a positive energy that disturbs the commanders and that always returns as a negative feedback, and sometimes as resistance not to sleep to create time to think:

Kaan: Now, do you know what it is like in there? People are weary, finished, exhausted. I, to the contrary walk nose in the air, for example, eyes looking upwards, chin not lowered, raised; and my arms move little too

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<sup>148</sup> Tarık: Aşağı indiğimde bir dakika ya da iki dakika gecikmişim dedim. Bunu söylediğimde de “savunmana yazarsın” demişti, ben de savunmamda gerekli açıklamayı yapıyorum falan dedim. Öyle bir şey yazdım, verdim. Sonra bir baktım, bir geldi, üç haftasonu! İki haftasonu mu üç haftasonu mu, öyle bir şey. Tamam geç kaldık da şey yapılır hani. Mantıklı bir şey çünkü ben keyfimden geç kalmadım. Gittim ben, normalde şey yapardım, böyle sallamazdım. Dedim komutanım üç haftasonu ne oldu ya dedim. Hani anladım tamam geç kaldım da, ona bir şey demiyorum, savunmayı da aldım. Bu savunmanın amacı ne dedim ya o zaman?! Siz ne yapıyorsunuz?! İlk defa sorguladığım şey... 8 sene boyunca sorguladığım tek şey odur yani. Bu kabul olmuyorsa neyi kabul ediyorsunuz komutanım ya dedim. O da bak T. öyle değil falan, biz şey yapıyoruz falan... Dedim komutanım ne yapayım yani, burnum kanadı, siz de biliyorsunuz, kendiniz gönderdiniz hastaneye dedim. Durduk yere kanıyor, ne yapayım dedim. İki dakika geç kaldım da bir şey mi oldu dedim, taburun arkadasından da koşturmadım dedim, sadece 5 dakika kala yerine 3 dakika kala indim aşağıya.

much. I walk comfortably, do you understand? When walking casually, you know, I have big gestures, mimes... [...] It is eye catching. If you catch attention in that school, it has a feedback whether good or bad. It will definitely have.<sup>149</sup>

Kerem: Because, the marathon that begins in the mornings didn't end with courses. After courses, there were conferences or other activities, a kind of rush until 10 or 11 p.m. There is no time you can spare for yourself, so there is no time to think. To be honest, I also had the concerns about getting robotized, so I couldn't sleep at night. I also didn't sleep purposefully. Because when they say "sleep" you may not sleep at all as a reaction, doing other activities...<sup>150</sup>

This penetrating deformation and exhaustion works in complex ways. The tightness of discipline inevitably creates brief moments of resistance when the body acts on its own even if the cadet is a very docile one. It gives a break on weekends in return for obedience and compliance. Thus, it produces productivity within subjection. Therefore, tightening the rules, and increasing discipline intensify exhaustion too after 2009-2010. More exhaustion serves to the same purpose with a higher, more detailed and bodily consuming level of control.

### **3.2. Men's Friendship and Class Unity [*Sınıf Birliđi*]**

#### *Men's friendship or fraternity*

Friendship is the only common good memory of my interviewees about military education. In parallel to Scott Swain's study of college men's intimate behavior in same-sex friendships and their standards of assessing intimacy (Swain 2001, 131), former cadets pointed out the significance of shared action in building intimacy. Efe

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<sup>149</sup>Kaan: Şimdi orada nasıl biliyor musun? İnsanlar bezgin, bitik, yorgun. Ben de aksine çıktığım zaman, ben mesela böyle burnum havada, gözlerim böyle yukarıda, çenem aşağıda değil, çenem yukarıda, bir de kollarım biraz fazla sallanıyor. Rahat yürüyorum yani anladın mı? Normal yola yürürken, benim biliyorsun zaten el kol hareketlerim, mimiklerim falan... [...] Dikkat çekiyor ya. Sen o okulda dikkat çekiyorsan, iyi ya da kötü kesinlikle bir geri beslemesi olur onun. Kesinlikle olur yani.

<sup>150</sup>Kerem: Çünkü hani sabah başlayan bir maraton dersler bittiğinde bitmiyordu. Dersler bittikten sonra da konferans ya da başka faaliyetler, akşam 10-11'e kadar süren bir koşuşturmaca. Kendi başınıza kalacağınız bir zaman yok, dolayısıyla düşünmeye de zamanınız yok. Açıkçası bende biraz robotlaşma kaygısı da vardı, o yüzden gece uyuyamıyordum. Özellikle de uyumuyordum. Çünkü "uyu" dendiği zaman tepki olarak uyumayabiliyorsunuz, başka faaliyetlerde olup...

expressed a feeling of peace only when he was talking about their friendships. He emphasized the intimacy produced through shared action and shared pain:

Efe: Friendship is there, though, the friendship in high school cannot be replaced. [...] Friendship is something else. Even if I had lived with 200 girls as a guy, I would have had the same feelings; if we don't count the sexuality. You share the same feelings when you live with boys, as well. There is no difference for me, I mean. But what happens there, you became friend, rather, you become brothers. Because you suffer. That feeling is really important. If you meet 200 girls like this, perhaps then you will marry one of your best friends, one that you get on well the most. You meet 200 people in that case. They all become close friends to you. You hang out with the ones you feel closer to yourself. That common taste, common share is developed this way.<sup>151</sup>

Along the same line, Onur and Ümit differentiate friendships inside from friendships outside the military school:

Onur: I mean, because of those detentions, you get closer. Those punishments set huge barriers to your social life, it withholds you, and you get punished for silly reasons. Of course you get punished when you skip courses, etc, this is normal, but, I don't know, for instance you may get detention for two weeks if you miss polishing your shoes. This kind of stuff... There is also a group who gets detention with you. [...] The friendships you raise when going through such troubles are much stronger. In the end, when you leave the school, you see that you cannot experience the same things in a civilian university. There is no way to find that same harmony with other people.<sup>152</sup>

Ümit: I didn't have a friend outside who was as reliable as those from school. I mean, my best friends forever were those from school, and they still are. [...] If you try to build that friendship environment of school

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<sup>151</sup>Efe: Arkadaşlık orada yani, lisedeki arkadaşlık hiçbir yerde yok. [...] Arkadaşlık bambaşka bir şey. Bir tane erkek 200 kızla yaşasam da aynı duyguları paylaşırdım, eğer cinselliği çıkarırsak. Erkeklerle de yaşasan aynı duyguları paylaşırsın. Benim için hiçbir farkı yok yani. Ama orada ne oluyorsun, arkadaş oluyorsun kardeş oluyorsun daha çok. Acı çektiğin için. O duygu gerçekten önemli bir şeydir. Belki 200 tane kızı aynı şekilde tanısan bu sefer belki en yakın arkadaşlarından, en kafan uyduğu kişiyle evleneceksin bu sefer. Orada da 200 kişiyi tanıyorsun bu sefer. 200'ü de çok yakın arkadaşın oluyor. Sana en yakın gelenlerle takılıyorsun. Ortak paydaların, ortak eğlendiğin şeyler böyle oluyor.

<sup>152</sup>Onur: Yani şöyle, cezalardan dolayı daha da yakınlaşıyorsun aslında. Cezalar senin sosyal hayatına çok büyük bir engel -ket vuruyor yani- ve saçma sapan şeylerden alıyorsun cezayı. Tabii ki derse girmezsen falan bunların ceza alıyorsun, bu normal de hani ne bileyim işte; ayakkabın boyasız mesela bu yüzden iki hafta ceza alıyorsun. Bu tarz şeyler... Senle birlikte ceza alan bir ekip de var. [...] Bu zorlukları yaşarken edindiğin arkadaşlıklar çok daha büyük oluyor. Sonuçta okuldan çıkınca, sivil üniversitede falan bu arkadaşlıkları yakalayamadığını görüyorsun. İnsanlarla bu ahengi tutturamıyorsun hiçbir şekilde.

outside, you get cheated. Because in military school, you have the feelings that left pure and clean since the age 14... Because outside everybody tries to take you down, I didn't have a person with whom I shared everything about myself, like I did at military school; I felt that I had to be strong against them. In any minute they can backstab me, so they don't know about my weaknesses, and I don't tell them.<sup>153</sup>

Most of my interviewees were very liberal about expressing affection to each other. I witnessed many phone calls and social meetings during which former cadets from the same cohort expressed their love to each other very comfortably:

Berk: You can get on well with everyone in our school. Everyone without exception, whether they are good or bad, they know how to speak or not, close to your character or not, you have to like them unconditionally, have to respect them and adopt them as your friends. That obligation is binding for the first year; after second year, it is not a necessity anymore. You really like those guys.<sup>154</sup>

Without being questioned, many interviewees shared how they demonstrate affection to each other physically in a distinctively "masculine" style. A practical joke Kaan made to his friend at the Turkish Naval Academy, which he narrated as an expression of closeness, was interpreted, albeit never explicitly named, as a homosexual tendency. This joke was seen by their company commander and reported. They were punished with 7 days of room confinement, which consumes one's 28 discipline points. Then, because of the "serious" implication of their commander's accusation, the defense that they wrote was taken seriously and their punishment was reduced to 3 weekends in school, 6 discipline points. This is a distinct example of the anxieties around homosexuality in military schools. Homosocial intimacy stands on a thin line between close friendship, or comradeship, and homosexuality. It becomes a problem when it comes to physical/ bodily intimacy:

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<sup>153</sup> Ümit: Dışarıdaki arkadaşarımdan öyle okuldaki kadar güvenebileceğim bir arkadaşım olmadı. Yani benim ebedi arkadaşlarım okuldakilerdi, hala da öyle. [...] O askeriyedeki dost ortamını dışarıda kurgulamaya çalışırsan kazık yersin. Askeriyede çünkü gerçekten 14 yaşından beri çok saf temiz kalan duygular... Dışarıda millet birbirinin ağzına çıktığı için, okuldaki kadar benim her şeyimi paylaştığım kişi yok çünkü onlara karşı güçlü olmak zorunda olduğumu hissediyorum. Hançeri her an benim sırtıma saplayabilirler, o yüzden benim güçsüz taraflarımı bilmezler ben de söylemem.

<sup>154</sup> Berk: Herkesle anlaşabilmek diye bir şey var bizim okulda. Herkesle istisnasız, iyi de olsa kötü de olsa, konuşmayı da bilmeseyse, senin tarzına hiç uygun da olmasa, onu koşulsuz şartsız sevmek, saygı duymak ve arkadaşın olarak benimsemek zorundasın. Bu zorunluluk bir sene için böyle, ikinci seneden itibaren bu zorunluluk ortadan kalkıyor. O adamı gerçekten seviyorsun.

Kaan: We, I mean me and my friend, the last time before graduation, was it third year or fourth year... We were in danger of dismissal, then we wrote petition to a superior. But in a very... after taking some risks... [...] I will write this and get expelled, or won't write and get expelled. At least if I write this I will be satisfied, I will say "I wrote that, I claimed my right." Perhaps it would yield result. And in the end, it gave result; our claim was found rightful... [...] We were like drunk, it was a very interesting incident (he means getting victory drunk, we laugh). However, it was nonsense, we stayed in for the same period of time, the content of the punishment was changed, and it got lighter.

[...] Of course, it was an ethical accusation but had nothing to do with ethic. Just, as you know... You are in a boarding school, after all. As you know, if you are graduated from there, even if you meet as old, retired people, there would be hand jokes, rough-and-tumble, do you understand? A close, saucy relationship, you know... There, in the hall, I just pushed him, holding his collar like this. The incident got crazy, went too far, but thanks God there were cameras put to observe the students and the witnesses, everything was brought to light...<sup>155</sup>

Nonetheless, as many other regulations and unwritten rules, men's friendships started to change after 2009-2010. Eren had to leave the school because of the interrogations he went through as a result of anonymous advice letters received by the administration of the naval academy. He described the friendships as a home in which one can take shelter from the discipline and oppression in the school. Eren stated that their friendships were very strong before the emergence of fear and insecurity among cadets with the start of these interrogations:

Eren: In class, especially during high school in class, everybody composed a unit, they liked each other... You know, like "we should be a unity for the

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<sup>155</sup>Kaan: Biz işte, arkadaşım ile beraber en son mezun olmadan, üçüncü sınıfta mıydı, dördüncü sınıfta mıydı... Atılma potasına falan girmiştik, o zaman hani dilekçe yazmıştık bir üste. Ama onu da böyle bayağı bayağı, artık bir şeyleri göze aldıktan sonra... [...] Ben bunu yazacağım atılacağım ya da yazmayacağım atılacağım. En azından bunu yazarsam kendimi tatmin edeceğim, ben bunu yazdım diyeceğim yani, hakkımı aradım en azından diyeceğim. Belki de sonuç gelecek. Ki nitekim sonuç da geldi, haklı da bulundu dilekçemiz. [...] Biz bildiğin zaten sarhoş olmuştuk, çok ilginç bir şeydi o. [Zafer sarhoşu olmayı kastediyor, gülüyoruz] Halbuki alakasız yani, gene aynı süre kadar içeride kaldık, cezanın içeriği değişti hem de hafifledi.

[...]Tabii, ahlaki bir şekilde suçlamıştı yani, ama ahlaki hiç alakası yok. Sadece orada bildiğin... Zaten yatılı okuldasın, anladın mı? Yani sen de bilirsin, oradan mezun olsan, aynı yaş grubu emekli adamlar bir araya gelse el kol şakaları olur, bilmem ne olur, anladın mı hani böyle, itiş kakış olur. Enseye şaplak göte parmak yani, anladın mı? Orada biz koridorda sadece böyle bir, ben tuttum ittim onu, yakasından. Olay sapıttı başka yerlere gitti falan ama sonrasında zaten Allah'tan öğrencileri gözlem altında tutmak için tuttukları kamerasından şahidine kadar her şey patır patır döküldükten sonra...



same goal... Do not cheat each other, do not snitch on each other” it is a notion called class unity, after all, we always acted together. You can hear it from anyone; you must know it, too. A relationship built upon one common thought, that notion called class unity, not very real but still so... Because of those incidents which occurred in later years. That is military school, where everyone gained new dimensions with their latest breaking points... But this way is better. At least that class spirit serves as a strength source for people. It becomes a support, a welcoming home against the problems you face with superiors, inferiors or officers.<sup>156</sup>

### *Class unity [Sınıf birliđi]*

What Eren called “home” refers to “class unity” among cadets. Class meaning a particular cohort, class unity is told to be one of the most important values of military schools. According to Hakan, Eren and Arda, from the second group, this unity started to be disrupted after several anonymous letters full of accusations about certain cadets were found. Although these letters and interrogations started after their two gay friends were apprehended by their friends and had to leave the school as a result<sup>157</sup>, they stated that this “incident” was not the reason of the start of the attacks on particular cadets but an excuse and opportunity to initiate them:

Eren: I think this is the reason they caught homosexuality. The reason they said “let’s try this means now.” Such an incident happened in school. After these two people left, think like “linkedin”, to everyone they may have a connection with, everyone they can link in the story, as I just said, homosexuality, etc... They tried to set that kind of links, as well. [...] But before that, I guess, that kind of incidents here and there were not known much. Since it was a case creating sensation in school... And then, taking this as an opportunity, they added many different things into that investigation. I have just told, haven’t I? I think I can make a comment like this.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>156</sup>Eren: Sınıf içinde özellikle lise zamanı sınıf içinde herkes birlik, herkes birbirini seven... İşte “Birlik olmalıyız, aynı amaç doğrultusunda... Birbirimizi satmayalım, birbirimizi ispiyonlamayalım.” falan ve hep beraber birlikte hareket edilen, sınıf birliđi denilen bir kavram zaten. Herkesten duyarsın, hatta biliyorsundur da. O sınıf birliđi denilen kavram etrafında herkesin tek düşünce etrafında yoğunlaştığı bir ilişki, aslında pek de gerçek olmayan ama o şekilde... O da daha sonraki yıllarda ortaya çıkan olaylardan ötürü. Bu harp okulu, en son kırılma noktalarında herkesin farklı farklı boyutlar kazandığı... Ama öyle olması daha iyi. En azından insana bir güç noktası oluyor sınıf arkadaşlığı ruhu. Alttır, üsttür ya da subaylarla yaşadığın sorunlarda insanlara bir dayanak noktası, ona sahip çıkan bir ev olarak da duruyor yani.

<sup>157</sup> Murat Utku, “Deniz Harp Okulu ve ‘Gey’ler.”, *bianet.org*, August 20, 2010, accessed April 1, 2014. <http://www.bianet.org/biamag/bianet/124271-deniz-harp-okulu-ve-gey-ler>

<sup>158</sup>Eren: Eşcinselliđi bence yakalama sebepleri de o yani. Bir de bu koldan yürüyelim demelerinin sebebi bu. öyle bir olay yaşandı okulda. O iki kişinin ayrılmasından sonra onları böyle, linkedin gibi düşün, onları bağ kurabildikleri herkese, hikayeyi

Hakan: Why it started in our term... Indeed, it started just after that incident. Homosexuality case broke out. Those things were truly exaggerated, anonymous letters or so... It became very normal, do you understand? Letters were sent to all newspapers. To everyone's family... How could they find them? In our term, everyone's family received CDs, etc. There said to be videos, pictures, etc. I don't know, I didn't see the content. [...] These happened after I left. How could they find everyone's address? And after that, it broke out. Most probably it started at our term. <sup>159</sup>

Hakan, Eren and Arda stated that with these anonymous letters, administrative interrogations and military court cases, started with their cases, started to transform men's friendships and the sense of fraternity, and convulse class unity with fear and insecurity. The first reason behind this fear was the basic tendency of cadets, whose name was not involved in any of these letters, towards not being seen with the accused lest they catch the attention of company commanders. Second, the main accusations were "decorated", or framed, with true details about the life of the accused, which can be known only by one's classmates:

Eren: I think, well, these are exterior things, in the end. A letter or something else... Because these written things are fictional as I said. Grabbing something from somewhere... If there is a truth rate of 10%, the rest 90% is made up. But, well, how can I say, they are not totally imaginary, do you understand? They were written according to some information, it seems. I link it to insiders, whatever kind of an evil-minded group they are... Let me mention the parallel structure... (Laughing) I don't know, the insiders may be a student group, or maybe they are officers. I guess they are students. If this kind of incidents happened more in our term during registrations... In short, if there were ten or fifteen rotten people in those two hundred students which was called a class, it might have been easier for them to do that things inside, carry information to the things they

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birleştirebildikleri herkese işte az önce dedim zaten, eşcinsellik falan. O tarz bağlantılar da kurmaya çalıştılar. [...] Ama onun öncesinde de herhalde tek tük olaylar olduğunda duyulmuyordu. Daha böyle okul çapında sansasyon yaratan bir olay olduğu için. İşte bunu fırsat bilerek o soruşturmanın içine birçok farklı şeyleri kattılar. Az önce bahsettim ya. Herhalde öyle bir yorum yapabilirim.

<sup>159</sup>Hakan: Niye bizim dönemde başladı... Aslında o tam şey olaylarından sonra başladı. Eşcinsel olayı patlak verdi. O şeyler iyice abartıldı, isimsiz mektuplardır bilmem nelerdir. Çok normal hale geldi, anladın mı? Bütün gazetelere mektuplar gitti. Herkesin ailesine gitti. Nereden bulabiliyorlar? Bizim dönemdeki herkesin ailesine CD'ler falan gitti. Görüntüler varmış, resimler varmış falan filan. Bilmiyorum içeriğini görmedim de. [...] Ben ayrıldıktan sonra oluyor bu olaylar. Bütün herkesin adresini nereden bulabiliyorlar? Bundan sonra işte patlak verdi. Bizim dönemde başlamıştır büyük ihtimalle.

provide service. Maybe they weren't able to reach that much specific information about the upper classes.<sup>160</sup>

Eren described the insecurity he was feeling which led him to leave the school as follows:

Eren: About my departure, at first years, I think for most people it is like this, though lots of incidents happen inside the military; thinking like, far away two or three people experience it, not something general, the year I left I started to feel it nearby, at my right, at my left, in front of me, at the back of me then. Insecurity, I mean, battalion commander getting arrested, regimental commander getting arrested, lots of investigations...<sup>161</sup>

Even Ümit, from the first and eldest group, stated to feel this insecurity during his last years in the naval academy:

Ümit: Since officers don't catch it themselves and they do the same shit for 20 years, this time it is more practice. In that period, the change incident, you know. People were afraid of saying it to the ones nearby because "what if the officer hears it?" And if the officer hears, he says "If it goes to Ankara and I don't punish him then someone else will come and ask why I didn't do that." Then, I mean, the trust people felt for each other was ruined. In fact, the basic point was friendship and it started to get spoiled. People felt distrustful for each other. Because things that very few knew were being heard from outside. But you... That remaining 9 people are very close friends, you don't know who the one is and then you prefer not to tell anyone.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>160</sup>Eren: Bence şey sonuçta bunların dışarıda, dış kaynaklı şeyler. Bu mektup bilmem ne. çünkü bu yazılan şeyler dedim ya kurgusal. Bir yerden bir şeyi tutup... İçinde yüzde 10 doğruluk payı varsa yüzde 90 sıkma. Ama şey, nasıl denir, tamamen de hayal ürünü değil, anladın mı? Bilgiler dahilinde anlaşılan yazılmış bir şey. Şeye bağlıyorum bunu yapanlar da içeride bulunan nasıl bir art niyetli grupsa... Paralel yapıdan bahsedeyim... (Gülüyor) İçeride bulunan herhalde bir öğrenci grubu mu artık, belki subay gurubudur bilmiyorum. Herhalde bence öğrencidir diye tahmin ediyorum. Bizim senemizde giriş kısmında daha fazla sayıda bu tarz bir şey olduysa... Kısaca o sınıf denilen 200 kişilik şeyin içerisinde 10-15 tane böyle çürük insan varsa onların servis ettiği ve içeride yaptığı şeyler, bilgi uçurmaları falanlarla herhalde daha kolay yapabilmişlerdir. Bir üst sınıflarla ilgili bu kadar çok, net bilgiye ulaşamıyor olabilirler yani.

<sup>161</sup>Eren: Benim ayrılmama gelince ilk bir iki sene, herhalde birçok insan için de öyledir, birçok olaylar yaşanıyor ama askeriye içerisinde; sanki uçta üç beş kişi yaşıyor, daha genel bir şey değil diye düşünürken, benim ayrıldığım sene artık yanibaşımda, sağımda, solumda, önümda, arkamda hissetmeye başladım. Güvensizlik, işte tabur komutanının tutuklanması, alay komutanının tutuklanması, birçok soruşturmalar...

<sup>162</sup>Ümit: Çünkü subaylar bunu kendisi yakalamadığı için ve 20 yıl boyunca aslında kendisi de aynı boku yediği için, hani bu kez daha uygulama. O dönemde, değişti olayı o hani. Millet yandakine söylemeye korkuyordu, çünkü ya "Subayın kulağına giderse". Ve eğer subayın kulağına giderse, o da diyor ki "Bu Ankara"ya gittiyse ve ben de buna ceza vermezsem başka biri gelir ve der ki "niye ceza vermedin". Artık yani milletin birbirine karşı güveni kirlendi. Aslında en temel noktası arkadaşlık bağıydı, o kopmaya

This insecurity was reflected less like an unpleasant surprise and more like an expected consequence of the macro processes in the narratives of Rıdvan, Ali and Mert, from the youngest-third group. They told they were among the 12-15 cadets who were forced to leave the school with company commanders' continuous mobbing. They said class unity and intimacy within the cohort became a dream especially for them:

Mert: At some point, I remember sitting in the conference hall with my both sides empty. Nobody wanted to sit by me, be seen talking to me. <sup>163</sup>

In sum, the deformation of class unity and men's intimate friendships/ fraternity within the cohorts was an impact of the transformation of the disciplinary power and written or unwritten values and principles of professional military education from 2009 onwards. The only common good memories of military school for my elder research participants became insecure and estranging relationships for younger ones.

### 3.3. "Lady Students" [*Bayan Öğrenciler*] and Fraternal Contract

The female cadets of naval academy were referred as "lady students" by all of my interviewees. Even those those who use the word "kadın" [*woman*] without inclining towards the word "bayan" [*lady*]<sup>164</sup> said "lady students are lady students" but not women. Marginalized and discriminated, "lady students" are remembered as a homogeneous category and non-relevant to the experience of military education by my research participants. Even when fear and insecurity among male cadets were in rise, female cadets were not deemed to be "friends" or "fellow soldiers" by their male counterparts. As Higate argues, "Although failing to achieve the intense levels of camaraderie characteristic of army life, men's company was nevertheless considerably safer and easier than that of women." (Higate 2003, 38).

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başladı. Millet birnirine güvensiz olmaya başladı. Çünkü çok az insanın bildiği şey dışarı yansımaya başlıyor. Adam ama... O geriye kalan 9 kişi de çok yakın arkadaşı, kimin şey olduğunu bilemiyor ve o yüzden hiçbirine söylememeyi tercih ediyor.

<sup>163</sup>Mert: Bir noktada, konferansa gittiğimizde iki yanımın da boş kaldığını hatırlıyorum. Kimse yanıma oturmak, benimle muhabbet ederken görülmek istemiyordu.

<sup>164</sup>The word "bayan" [*lady*] is commonly used to avoid the distinction of "girl" and "woman" [*"kız" ve "kadın"*] in Turkish language, which implies the presence or absence of virginity.

First of all, my research participants mentioned the common perception that almost all the female cadets are “ugly” in the naval academy. This perception was not exclusive to male cadets: though their existence is precious to a modern military<sup>165</sup>, female cadets are treated accordingly neither by their male counterparts nor by their commanders:

Efe: They always get ugly girls into Naval Military School. Company commander called her “horse thief” in front of me, “what a look is this, you are like a horse thief” he said. [...] She hadn’t done make up, hadn’t done anything, hadn’t tied back her hair or so. I mean, she was a shabby girl, didn’t care for her looks. Tall like this... [...] But she cried, still a kid, do you understand? She doesn’t care much about her look or so. In the morning, you get scared of her, looking like she just got out of the bed. There was something like inspection battalion. We are preparing ourselves. They don’t know about it. She should care more, tie her hair back. She should use different hairpins; she can wear a slight make up. Then she came like that, he said “what is this, like a horse thief”. (Laughing) In front of the whole battalion...<sup>166</sup>

Secondly, positive discrimination of female cadets by officer-teachers is considered to be unfair and vexatious. Many interviewees voiced their negative feelings about “lady students” both bodily (such as a grimace forming on their face followed by turning their face away) and verbally. Oğuz articulated his hatred towards positive discrimination of women and of women themselves very openly:

Oğuz: To be honest, I don’t think that those girls would be officers. They usually don’t anyway; they somehow go to sea, get married, two years later become pregnant, lie down to give birth. I mean it will sound – let’s say despotic – a despotic idea but woman to be military officers, at least at marine... There can’t be woman officers at marine. Even if they will, it is more logical to get in on contract, rather than graduating from military academy. Better get involved from outside. [...] There will be running, for example, heaven knows how, they are always on period on Mondays. They cannot say “Open and let me see it” so they just say “ok, go.” Positive

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<sup>165</sup>“Kadın öğrenciler: ‘Sayımız az olduğu için çok değerliyiz’.”, *Milliyet*, September, 4, 2010, accessed June 5, 2014. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-sayimiz-az-oldugu-icin-cok-degerliyiz-/pazar/haberdetay/06.06.2010/1285145/default.htm?ref=haberici>.

<sup>166</sup> Efe: Deniz Harp Okulu’na hep çirkin kızlar alıyorlar. Bölük komutanı gözümün önünde “at hırsız” dedi ya, “bu tipin ne, at hırsız gibisin” dedi. [...] Makyaj yapmamış, hiçbir şey yapmamış, toplamamış saçlarını falan filan. Yani çok paspal bir kızdı, kendine bakmazdı. Uzun boylu böyle. [...] Ama ağlıyor, çocuk daha, tamam mı? Böyle bakmaz falan filan çok fazla kendine. Sabahları korkarsın, yataktan uyandığı gibi falan filan. Denetleme taburu mu ne vardı işte. Hazırlık yapıyoruz. Bunlar da bilmiyorlar. Biraz daha bakması lazım, saçını toplaması lazım. Değişik tokalar takması lazım, çok hafif makyaj yapılabilir. Geldi böyle ondan sonra, “bu ne böyle, at hırsız gibisin” falan filan diyor. (Gülüyor) Bütün taburun önünde.

discrimination it is. My friend, on the other hand, what was the name... He has a wet dream at night, but when changing the sheets... He gets shower or so, for instance, and gets detention. I don't think that girls are able to handle this job. I will never think so, anyway.<sup>167</sup>

As I discussed earlier about men's intimate friendships, "being with boys", or homosociality, is one of the rare things that all interviewees remember as a warm memory of military education. Yet, female cadets were never included in men's friendships or class unity, according to the narratives of my research participants. I partially agree with Carol Pateman that the social construction of homosocial relationships, or say fraternities, is realized through the exclusion of women. From a historical perspective Pateman argues that:

When I first began to think about these matters from a feminist perspective, I assumed that the social contract was a patriarchal contract because it was made by fathers whose agreement was taken to bind their families. Certainly, "individuals" in the universal sense in which the category is usually mean anyone and everyone, do not make the social contract. Women have no part in it: as natural subjects they lack the requisite capacities and abilities.[...] The contract is made by brothers, or a fraternity. It is no accident that fraternity appears historically hand in hand with liberty and equality, nor that it means exactly what it says: brotherhood. (Pateman 2002, 124)

On the other hand, I would argue that female students are in fact included in fraternal contract with their "different" bodies. As Begoña Aretxaga argues for the states, the disciplinary power in military institutions need constant exclusions: "Those who are excluded are included through their exclusion." (Aretxaga 2003, 407). Not only their bodily differences and positive discrimination by commanders mark the borders of fraternal contract, but also those who engage in further (further than saying hello and answering if they ask anything) contact with female students are deemed to be

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<sup>167</sup> Oğuz: Açıkçası o kızların subay olacağını da düşünmüyorum. Zaten subay olmuyorlar; gidiyor ıttırı vittırı denize gidiyor, evleniyor, 2 sene sonra hamile kalıyor doğurcam diye yatıyorlar. Yani çok şey gelecek -hani despot diyeyim- despot bi fikir diyeyim ama kadınlardan subay olmasını en azından denizden... Denizci olarak kadın subay olmaz. Olursa da harp okulu mezunu olmasın, sözleşmeli alsınlar daha mantıklı. Dışarıdan alsın. [...] Koşu oluyor mesela, ne hikmetse bunlara her Pazartesi özel günler. Adam da "Aç bakayım göster" diyemiyor, "E tamam git" diyor. Pozitif ayrımcılık işte. Ama benim arkadaşım, işte sen söyle adını... Gece işte rüyasında rüyalanıyor ama çarşafalarını değiştirirken... Duşa muşa gidiyor çocuk mesela, o ceza aldı. Ben kızların bu işi kotarabildiğini düşünmüyorum. Hiçbir zaman da düşünmeyeceğim zaten.

“hypocritical”. Therefore, female students also “function” in determining who can join the contract.

Oğuz: Let me say this, I also do not believe in their sincerity. “We are friends, we are talking” or so but after a while it seems more attractive to talk to a girl in that heap of guys, attractive for the one who talks with her. Then you get distanced to your other friends, it is like you are getting into a relationship. I don’t want that. I am already with my girlfriend in the weekend, what can I talk about with a girl?! I am in military, what will I talk about?! When you talk to your friends, after all, the subject is politics, or matches, football, or courses. It is not my thing; I already don’t get involved with girls outside... It wasn’t my thing. Outside, well, I just meet my girlfriend, my friends or so. Just for she is a girl, I mean, I find it additionally pointless. [...]

They really change people’s fate. I have a friend, a very close one. The boy is a ten, I saw him as the commander of the future; he passed directly to the military academy. There was a girl, they hung out, etc, incidents happened. Having relationship is forbidden, you know... Not physically, just in means of being together. After then, while thinking this may happen, that may come out, detentions, etc, they kicked the man out of school all of a sudden. People don’t take it well. Unfortunately they don’t. [...] And still the ones who get involved are like this: you see the people around them and you understand. The guy doesn’t have a social environment outside, for instance. He thinks of the girl like, “We might do something at the weekend”, perhaps he really has good intentions; but if you hang out with them at weekend, a relationship will start eventually. [...] Five days... They both are in that military environment, it doesn’t fit in I think... Not nice. I don’t take it well.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Oğuz: Şöyle diyeyim, bir de ben samimiyetine de inanmıyorum yani. “Arkadaşız, konuşuyoruz falan bir şekilde bir yerden sonra o erkek yığınının içinde kızla muhatap olmak insana daha cazip geliyor o insana, muhatap olana. Bu sefer o diğer arkadaşlarından kopuyorsun; bir ilişki başlıyormuş gibi oluyor. İstemem ben. Zaten hafta sonu kız arkadaşım ile beraberim, bir kızla ne konuşabilirim ki ben?! Askeriyedeyim, ne konuşacağım?! Zaten arkadaşlarla oturunca ya siyaset konuşuyorsun ya da maç konuşuyorsun, futbol konuşuyorsun, ya da ders konuşuyorsun. Bana göre değil bu; ben zaten dışarıda çok böyle kızlarla muhatap... Bana göre değildi. Dışarıda da ben işte kız arkadaşım, arkadaşlarım falan var onlarla görüşüyorum. Sadece kız olarak, hani ekstradan gereksiz görüyorum. [...]

gerçekten insanların kaderini değiştirirler. Benim arkadaşım var tamam mı, çok samimi arkadaşım. Çocuk on numara geleceğin en iyi komutanı diye bakıyordum çocuğa, net adam harp okuluna geçti. Bir tane kız vardı onunla takıldı falan filan, olaylar oldu. İlişki yaşamak yasak ya... Fiziksel olarak değil; birlikte olmak anlamında. Ondan sonra işte şöyle olur, böyle olur cezalar mezalar falan filan derken tak diye o herifi okuldan attılar. İnsanlar hoş bakmıyor. Karşılamiyor ne yazık ki. [...] Gene de zaten muhatap olan insanlar şöyle: görüyorsun onların etrafındaki insanları ve anlıyorsun. Adamın bir sosyal çevresi yok mesela dışarıda. Kızı “Belki hafta sonu bir şeyler yaparız” diyor, belki sadece çok gerçekten iyi niyetli düşünüyor ama sen hafta sonu onlarla gezersen ister istemez bir ilişki başlıyor. [...] Beş gün... İkisi de o ortam askeri ortamda, olmuyor bence ya. Hoş olmuyor. Ben hoş olduğunu düşünmüyorum.

As made obvious by Oğuz's narration of how one of his friends was expelled from the school as a result of his relationship with a female cadet, "lady students" are also considered to be "sexual beings" although all of my interviewees except two, emphasized the impossibility of any emotional and sexual relationship with a female cadet. From a different angle, I think what Ruth Miller argues about women's containment by the state as citizens through their reproductivity and sexuality in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey is in accordance with Aretxaga's argument on social exclusion:

It is precisely when women are made equal to the male norm, when political rights become emphatically uniform, that women's different sexuality becomes crucial, that the womb becomes an inviolate place possessed not by an individual woman but by each and every citizen in the modern nation-state. (Miller 2007, 361)

Each year, only six women enroll in the Turkish Naval Academy. They have the same legal status with men as cadets and prospective military officers. However, male cadets think of themselves as suffering more than female cadets during military education and therefore have difficulty in recognizing the equal status of women in the military. Miller's argument falls short for the case of professional military education. It is such a bodily/ physical and masculinized process that the uncontrollable female bodies, giving birth to babies or menstruating, cannot be "tolerated" by their "fellow soldiers".

Oğuz: They usually don't anyway; they somehow go to sea, get married, two years later become pregnant, lie down to give birth. [...] There will be running, for example, heaven knows how, they are always on period on Mondays. They cannot say "Open and let me see it" so they just say "ok, go." Positive discrimination it is.<sup>169</sup>

Female cadets are included through their exclusion, or say, through their "different and unrestrainable biology". In Miller's words, it is precisely when women are legally made

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<sup>169</sup>Oğuz: Zaten subay olmuyorlar; gidiyor ıttırı vittırı denize gidiyor, evleniyor, iki sene sonra hamile kalıyor doğurcam diye yatıyorlar. [...] Koşu oluyor mesela, ne hikmetse bunlara her Pazartesi özel günler. Adam da "Aç bakayım göster" diyemiyor, "E tamam git" diyor. Pozitif ayrımcılık işte.



equal to the male norm of the military “that women’s different sexuality becomes crucial”. However, because of the masculinized and physicalized content of military education, this sexuality is not embraced as the modern nation-state appropriates its female citizens, but it is scraped along with policies such as minor positive discriminations. In the end, the policy of taking six women per year to “modernize” the institution as the military of a modern nation-state, positive discrimination of women in bodily training creates hatred towards female cadets.

With the changes emerging with the 2009-2010 academic year, almost nothing has changed about the inclusion of female cadets through their exclusion. However, when I asked Selim about this after the fieldwork, he responded indecisively. He stated that a woman from his cohort was punished again and again until her discipline points were exhausted and she was expelled, only because “she is more beautiful than she should have been.” He perceives this incident as an intentional act of the commanders to eliminate everything that might distract male cadets. However, other interviewees did not mention this kind of a change about the increasing preference of “less beautiful” women or elimination of “beautiful” ones after 2009-2010. Most of them stated that the commanders were approaching female cadets according to their looks also before this period.

### **3.4. Homophobia, legally “asexual” masculinities, and sexism**

Heterosexism and homophobia are integral parts of professional military education at the naval academy, as the exclusion of female cadets is. When I asked my interviewees about their sexual experiences in the naval high school and the academy, their answers were always very short. My interviewees told me that how people were sharing their sexual experiences depended on their personality. While some were bragging about how they “banged a girl last weekend” some were sharing their experiences only with their closer friends —the same as how non-military men would act.

In one of two exceptional interviews, Hakan admitted that he and his friends used to watch porn with groups of 15-20 cadets in the Turkish Naval High School. After he says this, I cannot resist asking more questions about this experience:

Hakan: There was that thing, at first years of the high school, there were things like watching porn as a group.

**I get it.**

Secretly, as 15 or 20 people.

**There were computers than, of course?**

There were no computers, CDs, etc (laughing)

**How did you watch the CDs?**

On TV.

**In TV room?**

Yes, it was pretty exciting. [...]

**Was anyone caught during those incidents?**

There was for a few times, I think, but they didn't make it a big deal. [...]

But in high school I mean, as you get older I think... Yes, at first years of the high school... During prep class we were alone upstairs. [He means that the building of preps was different and there weren't any higher classes.] Since there was only one term at school, that happened a lot. After that, I don't recall that kind of things, to be honest.<sup>170</sup>

When I was listening to the problems of my friends from military schools about their relationships, learning about the rules restricting cadets' romantic and/ or sexual affairs, this appalled me. If the school administration somehow detects that a cadet cohabits with a woman or a man without being legally married, he or she is expelled from the school. The same applies when a male cadet gets a woman pregnant. A cadet is not allowed to stay at a hotel at the weekends. It is strictly forbidden to have any kind of relationship except a limited friendship with female cadets.<sup>171</sup> Considering the fact that cadets have to stay in the school during weekdays, it is almost as if they cannot have any kind of sexual/ romantic relationships. The tolerance of commanders towards naval high school students watching porn finds meaning then. This actually means that cadets

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<sup>170</sup>Hakan: Ya şey de oluyordu, lisenin ilk yıllarında toplu porno izleme tarzı şeyler oluyordu.

**Anladım.**

Kaçak bir şekilde, 15-20 kişi.

**Tabii bilgisayar var o sıralar?**

Bilgisayar yok. CD'den falan... (Gülüyor)

**CD'yi nereye koyuyorsun?**

Televizyona.

**Televizyon odasında?**

Evet. Bayağı heyecanlı oluyordu. [...]

**Yakalanma oluyor muydu hiç öyle durumlarda?**

Oldu galiba birkaç kere de çok ses çıkarmamışlardı. [...] Ama lisede yani, büyüdükçe herhalde şey... Evet lisenin ilk yıllarında. Hazırlıkta biz şeydik, yalnızdık yukarıda [Hazırlık sınıfının binasının ayrı olmasını ve üst dönemlerin olmayışını kastediyor]. Okulda tek bir dönem olduğu için o zaman çok olurdu. Ondan sonra çok hatırlamıyorum açıkçası.

<sup>171</sup>“Harp Okulları Yönetmeliği”, September 27, 2001, accessed September 15, 2013. <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5848&sourceXmlSearch=&MevzuatIliski=0>

are breaking the rules of daily routine since they watched porn after the bedtime as Hakan stated later, during the time they should have been in their beds. Such a violation would be harshly punished as demonstrated with several examples by my interviewees, if they had been doing something else. Even going to the toilet after bedtime is punished, as Rıdvan experienced once. On the other hand, as narrated by Oğuz, although female cadets' bodily fluids was a legitimate excuse not to join some physical trainings, men's involuntary orgasm during sleep was not tolerated:

Oğuz: My friend, on the other hand, what was the name... He has a wet dream at night, but when changing the sheets... He gets shower or so, for instance, and gets detention.<sup>172</sup>

The other exceptional narrative is of Burak, who left the military at the end of high school. He referred to physical intimacy of male cadets as he spoke of accusations with sexual content towards military officers in the Ergenekon courtcases:

Burak: A closed group in the end, with their leisure centers, jobs and everything... [...] This also causes people to make up many things about them (soldiers). You usually make up more about the things you don't know of. Did you heard about that story, for instance? I talked much, much about sexuality. But there are really many stories on this. For example our, I heard such a story; in America some nights, men and women come together some nights and change their car keys. Whichever key of the car you take, you get the owner's wife for the night. When going to the university entrance exam, I heard the same story from a boy, about military officers. Because it is a closed place, do you see? The same trump was used in Ergenekon operations, sexuality was used a lot, you would remember, homosexuals came out; it was said that women were arranged, secret documents were sent out via prostitutes. The same was done to religious ones in military during 28<sup>th</sup> February cases. [...] And we did many things in high school, what would happen if those were found out?! I mean, between the legs, jumping on each other...<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>172</sup>Oğuz: Ama benim arkadaşım, işte sen söyle adını... Gece işte rüyasında rüyalanıyor ama çarşaflarını değiştirirken... Duşa muşa gidiyor çocuk mesela, o ceza aldı.

<sup>173</sup>Burak: Kapalı bir grup yani, sosyal tesisleri, işi, her şeyiyle. [...] Bu insanların onlar [askerler] hakkında çok fazla uydurmasına da sebep oluyor. Bilmediğin şey hakkında daha çok uydurursun genelde. Mesela şu hikayeyi duydun mu? Çok cinsellikten, çok fazla bahsettim. Ama böyle hakikaten çok fazla bahsediliyor. Mesela bizim, ben şöyle bir hikiaye duymuştum, Amerika'da bazı akşamlar adamlarla kadınlar bazı akşamlar bir araya gelip araba anahtarlarını değiştiriyorlarmış, hangi arabanın anahtarını çekerse akşam onun karısıyla beraber oluyormuş. Ben bu hikayenin aynısını üniversite sınavına girerken bir çocuktan subaylar hakkında duydum. Çünkü kapalı bir yer tamam mı? Aynı koz Ergenekon davalarında kullanıldı, çok cinsellik üzerinden vuruldu yani, hatırlarsın,

Michael S. Kimmel argues, “Homophobic flight from intimacy with other men is the repudiation of the homosexual within –never completely successful and hence constantly reenacted in every homosocial relationship” (Kimmel 2001, 276). As expressed by a few interviewees and as I observed during some social meetings, verbal and physical demonstrations of affection, mostly love, such as physical jokes or big hugs, are common in military schools and among former cadets. At first glance, a homophobic flight from intimacy is not intuited. Trying to develop a hegemonic masculinity in the absence of physically present femininities during their childhood and adolescence, I think, former cadets negotiated with the intimacy and love they feel for each other, which is the only feeling that make them feel home as Eren expressed it, by engaging in homophobic and sexist joking behaviors (Swain 2001, 141). Such behaviours range from “metaphorical” goals they score between the legs of another to jumping on a friend’s body en masse and shouting “I fuck you now!” I find these jokes both sexist and homophobic because when performed by men who try to build a heterosexual, normative masculinity, the repetitive mockery of homosexual intercourse, or putting the mocked man in a “passive, female” position clearly reinforce sexism and homophobia.

Reflecting back upon the practical joke Kaan made to his friend, physical intimacy is not always appreciated by the commanders. As swearing is punished when heard by commanders because it is not appropriate for a prospective military officer to speak unpolitely in public, physical jokes that go “too far” are also formally charged, which is a reflection of homophobia within the schools.

Briefly commenting on swearing among cadets, I shall give reference to my gatekeeper, Selim again. He said swearwords were unacceptable and a major cause of fights among cadets of same class when they first came to Turkish Naval High School. For example, when someone swore to another’s mother, father or sister, it was definitely a legitimate reason to get involved in a fight. Yet, as time progressed and a class unity was formed, swearing at each other’s mother, father, sister or other family members became surprisingly tolerable. Selim thinks this is not the case among men

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eşcinseller çıktı işte, kadınlar ayarlanıyormuş, gizli belgeler hayat kadınları aracılığıyla dışarı çıkarılıyormuş gibi şeyler uyduruldu. Aynısını 28 Şubat sürecinde askeriye, dincilere yaptılar mesela. [...] Ki biz neler neler yapıyorduk lisede, onlar çıksa neler olur?! İşte bacak araları, birbirinin üzerine atlamalar...

outside. He also sees this as a consequence of becoming “like a family.” I observed the closeness of cadets with the parents of their classmates too. It is almost like they make one huge family that tolerates swearwords and fights inside, like the majority of heteronormatively-structured families today. As Swain argues, swearing serves as a developmental credential (Swain 2001, 134) among cadets. Like the gradual normalization of swearing to each other’s (mostly female) family members, bluntness and profanity legitimize masculinities by toughening the language. My interviewees also stated thinking that this language is more appropriate around other former cadets (not necessarily around other men who would be offended when someone swears at their family). This explains why I have not heard almost any swearwords while hanging out with former cadets. In sum, as Swain interprets joking behavior as an expression of attachment rather than a distancing gesture and hostile act (Swain 2001, 142), I interpret joking behavior and swearing among (former) cadets during and after military education both as an expression of attachment and as a mechanism to cope with this homosocial and affectional environment “thanks to” the sexist and homophobic content of the jokes and swearwords.

Rareness of the voice of misogyny (with the “exception” of female cadets of course) in the narratives of my interviewees was one of the most unforeseen outcomes of my fieldwork. Knowing quite a few former cadets as friends, I could not but realize that some of them are surprisingly “anti-sexist” compared to the majority of non-military men I know. However, I gradually realized that I was prejudiced towards cadets and military men: I was thinking of them as mostly sexist and misogynist men. Therefore, I was considering my friends who are mostly not as exceptions. I have learned that this is not the case. As my friends, many other former cadets are critical of patriarchal order if not of heterosexism. There is indeed heterogeneity among former cadets in terms of sexism and misogyny as Burak asserted:

Burak: When I look at my friends who studied there, I see a wide spectrum. Just as when I look at any other male group. There are those who perceive the world with a very male-dominant view, but of course people are at that side usually. But of course the general tendency is that, you can see that from general tendencies.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>174</sup>Burak: Orada okumuş arkadaşlarıma baktığımda geniş bir yelpaze görüyorum. Tıpkı herhangi bir erkek topluluğuna baktığımdaki gibi. Çok erkek egemen bir gözle dünyaya bakanlar da var, ama tabii daha çok o tarafta insanlar. Ama tabii genel eğilim de o yönde, genel eğilimden görebilirsin.

This though, does not necessarily mean that they are anti-sexist and they have feminist tendencies. As mentioned above, first of all, the perception of “lady students”, who can never be “actual military officers”, as an ugly, homogeneous entity reflects the ways in which they are a part of patriarchal gender regime within military schools. Secondly, many interviewees such as Oğuz, Efe, and Mahmut expressed their negative feelings about positive discrimination of female cadets.

Mahmut is the only *kabak* among my interviewees. Among all, he is also the only one who reported having minimum but decent friendships with some female cadets explicitly. Even then however, at the end of his answer about “lady students” he asserted that female cadets should learn how to get tougher:

Mahmut: [...] That is my view: that female students took the chances when they got in, they should adapt to the same circumstances, I mean. They should learn living under same conditions, under that stress. (Laughing) Whenever they hear a noise, a voice or whenever someone shouts at them, they shouldn't leave the battalion crying. I don't know, well, whether I am too harsh. No no, I am not. I don't think that I am too harsh. I don't know, whatever...<sup>175</sup>

I was inclined to perceive positive discrimination of female cadets as positive until very recently. I did change my mind completely but I realized, one can perceive the intended or unintended usage of periods of menstruation by women in professional military education as a patriarchal act. One can interpret the same situation also as a survival strategy of women in a highly militarized and masculinized environment. On the other hand, if a female cadet prefers to be treated equally with her male counterparts, does this necessarily mean she masculinizes for purposes of integration and approval? How does masculinization and militarization of female bodies differ from the utilization of women's certain differences from men by women, in order to receive positive discrimination? Most importantly to me, how to answer these questions and approach critically the very existence of women soldiers from a feminist and anti-militarist perspective? These are very hard questions to answer in this study. Rare researchers such Cynthia Enloe critically locate female soldiers within the wider context of

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<sup>175</sup>Mahmut: [...] benim düşüncem şu: Bayan öğrenciler de göze alarak oraya geldiler, onlar da aynı şartları taşımaları yani. Aynı şartlarda, o stres altında kalmayı bilmeliler. (Gülüyor) Bir gürültü duyduğunda, bir ses duyduğunda, biri ona bağırdığında ağlayarak taburu terk etmemeliler. Bilmiyorum hani, çok mu sert düşünüyorum. Yok ya değil bence. Çok sert düşünmüyorum bence. Ne bileyim, öyle işte.

international politics of militarizing women's lives, and provide answers to some of these questions while raising new ones (Enloe 2000a and 2000b).

Another fact that has surprised me is most of my research participants' ability to maintain long-term heterosexual relationships. Although I never asked my interviewees about their romantic relationships, the subject of one's girlfriend usually came up during our conversations. Despite this openness to discussing one's relationship, on the other hand, Berk's statement offers a different opinion on cadets' relationships. He stated that former cadets have long-term relationships only because they never had the social capital that would allow them to "choose" who they want to be with. Thus, they fell in love with whoever impresses them first and stay with that person until they are married. He claimed that the experience of same-sex schools creates a frailty for women [zaaf]:

Berk: As military high school students, about girls we have, since we had very little or no relationship with girls between the ages 13 and 18, we feel something different for girls. And we always want to have a girl in our lives. [...] A normal guy can go to school, graduate, live without having a girl, a girlfriend in his life. He may not have a girlfriend. But for us, military high school graduates, whether you become a military officer or quit and do another job, what you need is a connection with women, etc. We have a big interest on girls, as military school graduates. Because we are aware that, that pressed feelings are on the vertical rise for all our lives. Let me give a very simple example. Even if I have a girlfriend, I can have a very different connection with another girl, if I admire her. This is not about loyalty, for every military officer... [...] It can be a one night stand, for instance.<sup>176</sup>

Berk explained long-term relationships of former cadets with this frailty. Efe, who is a military officer on the other hand, has a quite different approach to relations with women. He expressed his need for affection in every relation and his aversion to sex with sex workers:

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<sup>176</sup>Berk: Biz askeri lise öğrencileri olarak, bizim kız konusunda, sadece 13-18 yaş arasında hiçbir kızla muhabbetimizin olmaması ya da çok az olması sebebiyle biz mesela kızlara karşı ayrı bir şey duyarız. Ve hayatımızda her zaman bir kız olsun isteriz. [...] Normal bir insan hayatında bir kız olmadan, kız arkadaşı olmadan da hayatını devam ettirebilir, okuyabilir, mezun olabilir. Adamın kız arkadaşı olmayabilir. Ama biz askeri lise mezunları, ister subay ol, ister ayrıl başka bir iş yap, ihtiyaç duyduğün şey kız münasebetleri vesaire. Kızlara çok ilgiyle bakarız biz askeri liseden mezun olan öğrenciler olarak. Çünkü o bastırılmış duygunun hayatımız boyunca dikine bir yükselişte olduğunun farkındayızdır yani. Çok basit bir örnek vereyim. Kız arkadaşım olsa bile başka bir kızla münasebetim çok daha farklı olur, eğer kızını beğendiysen. Bu sadakatle ilgili değildir, her subayda... [...] Tek gecelik bir ilişki olabilir mesela.

Efe: Setting my relationship on a serious base... Most probably I won't begin a relationship unless it is earnest. I try to know them for a while. After two or three months, perhaps I will start something somehow. And later, I most probably get married if it continues that way. I think so. I like kids a lot. For me to marry there are lots... The person I will marry should be a woman after my own heart. And she should talk and laugh a lot (we laugh). Or, well, I can get married just because of my love for kids. [...] It is senselessness against the person you live through such things... I can't be like normal guys, I mean. My sense of morality is a little different than those other people. [...] The guy thinks just not doing that thing is being moral. He is married, has kids. Morality lies in the way you think. He thinks not going to a woman is being moral. He tells me about his thoughts, he shouldn't. [...] If I don't like a person, there is no way I tell them that I like them. I can't meet my needs with them. The same applies for a prostitute... I find it very wrong, meaningless. They say "you are single, why don't you go to them" etc.<sup>177</sup>

There are also a few interviewees who have never been in a romantic relationship. Hence, the diversity of military masculinities holds also for their romantic and/ or sexual relationships with women and the values they attribute to these relationships.

Kimmel asserts that the great secret of American manhood is that men are afraid of other men. Men's fear is the fear of humiliation, and they are ashamed to be afraid. (Kimmel 2001, 277) The absence of fear from each other, or the fear of being humiliated in front of a classmate is replaced by physical demonstration of affection, swearing or joking behavior. Fear powerfully shapes the experience of military education through impositions of penalty to younger cadets by seniors. As an unwritten rule, especially of military high schools, these penalties have a crucial part in the

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<sup>177</sup> Efe: İlişkimi ciddi bir şey üzerine kurup... İlişkiye ciddiyet olmadan başlamam büyük ihtimalle. Bayağı tanırım. İki üç ay geçtikten sonra belki bir şeye başlarım bir şekilde. Sonra da zaten büyük ihtimalle evlenirim o şekilde devam ederse. Öyle düşünüyorum. Çocukları çok seviyorum. Evlenmemin zaten çok... Evleneceğim kişinin çok kafa dengim olması lazım. Benimle gezecek tozacak, acayip kafa dengim olması lazım. Bir de çok konuşması gülmesi lazım. (Gülüyoruz) Ya da çocuk sevgimden evlenebilirim ya. [...] Öyle bir şey paylaşacağım insana karşı duygusuzluk hani... Normal erkekler gibi olamam yani. Ahlak yapım biraz daha değişiktir yani diğer kişilere göre. [...] Adam sadece o işi yapmamaya ahlak olarak bakıyor. Evli, çocuğu var. Ahlak düşünce tarzındadır. Kadına gitmemeyi ahlak olarak değerlendiriyor. Düşüncelerini söylüyor bana, söylememesi lazım. [...] Sevmiyorsam birisini ona hiçbir şekilde seviyorum falan diyemem. Bir ihtiyacımı onunla gideremem. Aynı şekilde bir hayat kadınına da... Bana çok yavan, anlamsız geliyor. Onlar diyor hani bekarsın, sen niye şey yapıyorsun falan...



making of military masculinities. I call this tradition “traditional disciplinary bargain”, for reasons I will explain in the following part.

### **3.5. Imposition of penalty by senior cadets [*Ceza talimi*]: Traditional disciplinary bargain**

The penalties imposed upon younger cadets by senior cadets are addressed under this section but not under the section “Punishment and Anxiety”. I chose to strictly cover punishments inflicted by officers/ commanders before addressing the established tradition between younger and elder cadets especially in the naval high school, because the recent changes in traditional disciplinary bargain spill out a great deal of shifting paradigms of professional military education.

The relationship between senior and younger cadets traditionally involves a certain loyalty to the unity of all cadets of a school against the commanders in administrative positions and officer-teachers. If a senior cadet spots an inappropriate and disrespectful behavior or statement of a younger cadet, he can call him to the floor of seniors after bedtime, “to be inspected in uniform” [*denetlemelik gitmek*], and impose any form of penalty he likes. These penalties are generally called *sikiş*<sup>178</sup>.

Efe: At high school after work hours. Since company commanders are everywhere during work hours. And because you have a closed program during work hours, I mean there is yacht battalion at 10 and after that the action begins.<sup>179</sup>

This is a question of “report or sport” as framed by Rıdvan. By imposing a penalty on a junior by his own terms, the senior cadet becomes the authority himself. He prefers the criminal justice of cadets rather than of commanders. Along with this preference, he practices to act at will to punish a misdemeanor [*kabahat*], and thus, he plays the commander. He also saves the “faulty” [*kabahatli*] from the lawful criminal justice of the commanders/ of the school.

Misdemeanors that are punished by seniors range from a crooked soldier salute to a senior high, to a messy pair of shoes or a dirty hat. Some forms of punishments the senior highs prefer are as follow: waiting as if sitting on an imaginary chair with arms

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<sup>178</sup>*Sikiş* means “fucking” or “to screw” in Turkish. Additionally, it has very sexist connotations as *sik* means “dick” and *sikiş* implies a single-sided act.

<sup>179</sup>Efe: Lisede de mesai saatinden sonra. Mesai saati boyunca bölük komutanları her yerde olduğu için. Mesai saati boyunca senin de kapalı bir programın olduğu için yat taburu oluyor işte 10’da, ondan sonra hani olaylar başlar.

raised forward; push-ups; climbing and descending a ladder carrying heavy suitcases<sup>180</sup>; hitting on the head with the thick plastic edge of a hat; pressing or hitting on the hard bottoms of the uniform on the chest to bruise the covered parts of one's body. Only in extreme cases, the senior(s) take the part of their uniform that indicate their grade and call the "faulty" to fight on an equal ground by saying "Take'em off if you have the balls!" [*Yiyorsa rütbeyi çıkar!*]. There are some other forms of punishment as well but many interviewees stated that their awe stems mainly from the fear of an unexpected form or degree of penalty rather than from the possibility of physical pain.

Hakan: Well, they make you jump over the berth. Make you fight each other, etc. Like playing a game... Throw your right punch, left punch or things like that. Those are a bit enjoyable parts. You also have fun but when there is an aggressive person in front of you, you have the risk of getting beaten, it is much worse.<sup>181</sup>

Burak: If you ask whether we got beaten badly, thrown to left from right, broken a leg or so, no. But this fear is enough for a person; that possibility gets into your brain. Being watched over by someone constantly is very disturbing, disturbing on its own.<sup>182</sup>

As Burak and Rıdvan shared, a senior high usually comes with his friends to punish the younger cadet, or say, he is sent with other people from his class if he is a 'diesel' [*dizel*]. Diesel is the adjective for seniors who are physically very big and known with their extreme tendency to use violence. Classmates of such a senior do not send him alone to punish someone in order to prevent incidents that would cross the line, and inflict more harm than a certain limit.

Senior cadets also enforce mass punishments upon younger groups of cadets too. If class unity means solidarity and love among classmates, it also means sharing the responsibility of a classmate's misdemeanor. One of the most striking examples of mass punishment is the "bang-bang week" [*sikiş haftası*]. A week becomes a bang-bang

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<sup>180</sup> This is why the senior highs call the "faulty" to the suitcase room for his penalty where suitcases of cadets wait the end of the semester, and where no commander ever visits.

<sup>181</sup> Hakan: İşte ranzaların üstünden falan atlatıyorlar. Birbirimizle kavga falan ettiriyorlardı. Oyun oynar gibi. Sağ yumruk at, sol yumruk at falan filan tarzı. Onlar biraz eğlenceli kısmı olayın. Sen de eğlenerek yapıyorsun da karşında sinirli bir insan olunca, dayak yeme korkusu olunca çok daha kötü.

<sup>182</sup> Burak: Böyle çok büyük dayaklar yediniz mi, sağdan sola vurulup ayağınız bacağıңыз kırıldı mı dersene, hayır. Ama zaten bu korku insana yetiyor, olma ihtimali beynine işliyor. Sürekli biri tarafından izleniyor olma durumu çok rahatsız edici, başlı başına rahatsız edici.

week when, for example, a junior cadet gives a physical or verbal response to the senior high who has used violence against him. If seniors decide that all juniors carry the responsibility of this “insolence”, the bang-bang week begins. Everything becomes harsher. The written or unwritten rules that are not in use under normal circumstances come into rule. For example, younger cadets wait lined up rather than at ease each and every time they wait for seniors, such as before every meal. Burak remembers bang-bang weeks very graphically although it has been eight years since he left the military school. I will make a long quotation since his narration leaves me no place to make further analysis:

Burak: [...] For example you may come across such a thing, a boy says it is enough, I am pissed off, damn you, or he may swear or so; this incident for example is paid out of the whole class. The polish of your shoes is not proper, but this kind of thing is seen as a huge indiscipline and taken out of the whole class. For example, if such a thing happens at night, next morning whole third classes know about it and they take a decision together like “we will keep first classes under pressure this week” and the expression is “we will fuck them”. Indeed it is “they will be fucked”, yes, “this week they will be fucked”, this is the expression. This means we will be kettle fish that week; you put extra attention on everything you do. If such a thing happens, you will stand at attention on dining table. At 5 past 7 first classed come down, at 10 past 7 second classes come and sit on their tables again running and so. Third classes wake up at 7, after all. For them everything is relaxed and loose. It is very interesting, they also have a role in the hierarchy but since they are the oldest group of students, officers bestowed a big privilege on them. I don’t know why. When we were third class, this didn’t happen, it was put away, and that was another blow for us. [...] Third classes come at 20 past 7 for the breakfast and since without them the breakfast won’t start, we wait. I mean, you stand in vain for 15 minutes on your feet, whether at attention or at ease. Since you’ve just woken up, your body aches. [...] You won’t talk, you wait in silence, for 15 minutes, you don’t talk; you wait with your hands tied back, without making any noise, no sound to be heard. At that time you may want to say something as a kid and then you are in trouble. Because third classes are inspecting you. Whether you are talking or not, moving or not... You wait with warnings like “stand in order guys!”, “don’t move guys!”, “don’t talk!” or so. After all, third classes come and breakfast begins; were they saying “bon appetite” or what, without that saying, the breakfast won’t start. Something like “you can start” is said. There are certain rules at table, as well. You cannot put your elbows on the table. When you ask something to a third class, you put your hands down. They can’t stand on the table; you stop eating, put your fork and knife down and put your hands below.

**Is it a third class on your table?**

Of course, you are asking to a third class on your table. The questions are like “Can I take the left over tea?”, “Can I take more bread?” or there is cheese left on the table “Can I take that left over cheese?” Or, for instance,

we had a dessert, we made up a dessert by pouring honey on biscuits and pouring some tea on it, it was tasty; then you ask “Can I put some honey on the biscuit, sir?” Because it is out of rules, do you understand? You will eat the biscuit, drink the tea, won’t you? This is expected of you. Then what you do? Put the biscuits on your table, pour down honey and pour tea...

**Have they ever refused to give permission for that?**

Of course that might happen. But usually they gave, not so... Not that much (we laugh). They usually said ok but as I said if it was fuck week, I am using their expression right now, if that is fuck week they won’t allow such things and you won’t ask anyway.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>183</sup>Burak: [...] Mesela başına böyle bir şey gelmiştir, çocuk der ki yeter işte, bıktım da bilmem ne de, lanet olsun size, ya da küfür etmiştir bir şey demiştir, bu mesela bütün sınıfa patlatılır bir olaydır. Ayakkabının boyası patlamaz da böyle bir olay olduğunda, büyük bir itaatsizlik olarak geçecek bir şey olduğunda bütün sınıfa patlatılır. Örneğin bir önceki gece böyle bir şey olduğunda, sabah bütün lise üçler bundan haberdardır ve sabah karar almışlardır kendi aralarında, bugün biz, bir hafta boyunca lise birleri baskı altında tutuyoruz, bunun da tabiri “sikiyoruz”. Tabiri söyliyim, “sikiş var”, ha evet, “bu hafta sikiş var”, böyle bir tabir vardır mesela. Bu hafta yandık demektir bu, her şeyine daha çok dikkat edersin. Böyle bir durum olduğunda masa başında [yemek masası] artık hazır olda bekliyordundur. Saat yediyi beş geçe lise birler iner aşağıya, saat yediyi on geçe lise ikiler gelir masalarına dağılırlar, yine koşarak vs. yine aynı durumlar. Lise üçlerse zaten yedide falan kalkmışlardır. Onlara her şey, olay çok gevşektir. Çok enteresan zaten, onların da hiyerarşide bir yeri var fakat okulun en üst sınıfı oldukları için subaylar onlara müthiş bir iltimas geçerlerdi. Niye öyle olurdu bilmiyorum. Biz lise üç olduğumuzda olmadı, o drum kalktı, o da bize patladı. [...] Lise üçler yediyi yirmi geçe falan gelir kahvaltıya ve kahvaltı onlar gelmeden başlamayacağı için başlamaz. Yani sen on beş dakika boyunca ayakta boşuna beklersin, hazır olda ya da rahatta. Sabah yeni kalkmışsındır, her tarafın ağrır. [...] Konuşamazsın, sessizce beklersin, on beş dakika boyunca konuşamazsın, ellerin arkada, hiç ses çıkarmadan beklersin, çıt çıkmaz. O ara çocuk olarak bir şeyler söylemek isteyebilirsin, başın yanabilir. Çünkü o esnada bazı lise üçler seni denetliyordur. Konuşuyor mu konuşmuyor mu, hareket ediyor mu etmiyor mu, “beyler düzgün durun”, “beyler kıpraşmayın”, “beyler konuşmayın” gibi ikazlarla beklersin. Neyse lise üçler gelir ve yemek başlar, lise üçler “afiyet olsun” mu diyordu, bir şey diyordu, onu demeden başlayamazsın. “Başlayabilirsiniz” gibi bir şey denir. Masada da çeşitli kurallar vardır. Dirseklerini masaya koyamazsın. Lise üçe bir şey soracağın zaman ellerini aşağı indirirsin. Masada durmaz ellerin, yemek yemeyi bırakırsın, çatalını bıçağını masaya koyarsın, ellerini aşağı indirirsin.

**Senin masandaki lise üçe?**

Tabii senin masandaki lise üçe bir şey soracaksın. Sorduğun soru da şudur: “Fazla çayı alabilir miyim?”, “Fazla ekmeği alabilir miyim?”, ya da peynir artmıştır masadaki, “Fazla peyniri alabilir miyim?”. Ya da işte böyle mesela bir tatlımız vardı, bir tatlı uydurmuştuk kendimiz, bisküvinin üzerine bal döküyorduk, onun üzerine çay döküyorduk, böyle güzel tatlı bir şey oluyordu, işte “böyle böyle bisküvinin üzerine bal koyabilir miyim efemim?” Çünkü bu kural dışı yani, anladın mı? Bisküviyi yiyeceksin, çayı içeceksin, değil mi? Bunu yapman bekleniyor senden. Ama sen ne yapıyorsun? Tabacağına bisküviyi koyuyorsun, üzerine biraz bal döküyorsun, üzerine çay döküyorsun.

**İzin verilmediği oluyor muydu buna?**

According to Rıdvan the majority of impositions of penalty by seniors, if not bang-bang weeks, is a win-win situation for cadets. If reported to a commander, one has to spent one or more weekends at school:

Rıdvan: [...] there was such a thing: Report of sport. Everyone likes sport, after all, when you are reported your discipline grade is taken and you have to stay at school at weekend, in the end. The only motivation source for us is weekend. Therefore, generally sport was chosen and both sides left happy. But this system is changed. A little tougher at Military Academy. At the slightest mistake, statements were taken down and reports were given.<sup>184</sup>

However, Rıdvan and my other research participants from his cohort are an exception in this respect. The perception of this tradition differs from cohort to cohort. Most of the former cadets from the first group value this tradition to a great extent. Though, most of the younger cadets do not.

The commanders decided to start enforcing the already existing regulations to prevent the impositions of penalty by senior highs to younger cadets in 2006-2007. Clearly stating that those who are reported to punish younger cadets or who are caught in the act will be expelled from the school was obviously an efficient precaution. According to my interviewees, this transformation commenced after a major incident between two classes. Some cadets made complaints about their seniors to the commanders while leaving the school. The incident took place when all the cadets were at a basketball court for an event. The eldest cohort attacked the younger cadets en masse, and the younger cohort responded to this. This turned into a mass fight of almost 400 children. My interview with Eren offers a different perspective on this subject:

Eren: When we were at ... class, higher classes were caught. Someone leaving school told everything in detail. And even in Forces scale... Like "there is lots of tormenting in this school." Again, the information given outside was the same as given to class officers without letting anyone know,

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Tabii olabilir. Genelde veriliyordu, o kadar da... O kadar da (gülüyoruz) yokmuş. Genelde veriliyordu ama mesela dediğim gibi o hafta sikiş haftasıysa, tabirleri öyle kullanıyorum şu anda, o hafta sikiş haftasıysa böyle bir şeye izin verilmez, sen de sormazsın zaten.

<sup>184</sup>Rıdvan: [...] hatta şöyle bir şey vardı: Rapor mu spor mu gibi. Herkes sporu seviyor, sonuçta rapor edildiğinde disiplin puanın kırılıyor ve haftasonu okulda kalmak zorunda kalıyor. Sonuçta elimizde tek motivasyon kaynağı haftasonu. O yüzden genelde spor seçiliyordu, iki taraf da memnun ayrılıyordu. Ama değişti bu sistem. Harp okulunda biraz daha sert. En küçük bir hatada tutanak tutuluyor, rapor ediliyor.

etc. I think the school board took that decision, like, “We should stop it know, such things shouldn’t happen anymore”. And we were warned as “Such things will absolutely not happen and ones caught will get expelled” or so. It is a very simple precaution, in the end, when you say that nobody disturbs the other.

**You say it has been better, does the majority think so?**

Generally everyone thinks so. In the end it is not a good thing, it harms your psychology. (Laughing) Especially, I had some friends who went through these personally, more than adequate. Though we weren’t so close in the class... These events affected both their success and psychology. People doing that were already people who experienced such things in the past, so that way, the chain was broken. [...] Perhaps if you ask older ones, they will ask why this happened. Then there was such a saying, “the school became gay” saying. Then, probably it was said “In the past those things were handled manly, now officers are into everything, always reporting”.<sup>185</sup>

As many others, Eren also told that these punishments given by the senior cadets suddenly stopped when they enter naval academy:

Eren: When you pass to Military Academy after high school everybody gets mature all of a sudden and these things start to be seen childish. Though in academy nobody was so, such things wouldn’t happen.<sup>186</sup>

The impositions of penalty by seniors though, differ from the punishments that can be inflicted by the commanders in a distinctive form. Those who are punished by the seniors are saved from the commanders justice, and thus, from wasting weekends in school. Young cadets also know that someday they too be seniors and will be able to

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<sup>185</sup>Eren: Biz lise ...deyken üst sınıfların yakalanma olayı olmuştu. Okuldan ayrılan birinin çok ayrıntılı olayları anlatması olmuştu. Taa kuvvet çapında falan. Bir sürü böyle eziyet var bu okullarda falan diye. Yine herhalde dışarıya verilen bilgiler, içeride sınıf subaylarına kimseye söylemeden verilen bilgiler falan. Herhalde okul yönetimi şey kararı aldı: Artık bu işe bir dur diyelim, böyle olmasın dendi. Bize de şey uyarısı yapıldı: Kesinlikle böyle şeyler olmayacak, yakalanan okuldan atılır falan filan gibi. Çok basit bir önlem aslında, onu dediğin takdirde kimse bulaşmıyor birine.

İyi oldu dediğin, çoğu kişi öyle mi düşünüyordu?

Genelde herkes öyle düşünüyordu. Sonuçta iyi bir şey değil yani. psikolojiye zarar verecek bir şey. (Gülüyor) Özellikle bunu birebir çok fazla seviyede yaşayan arkadaşlarım da vardı yani. Sınıf içerisinde çok yakın olmasa da... Onların hem derslerini de etkiliyordu bu olay, belki psikolojisini de etkiliyordu. Zaten genelde bunu yapanlar geçmiş senelerde kendine yapılan tipler olduğu için, o da kırılmış oldu yani. [...] Belki eskilere sorsan, niye böyle bir şey yaptınız diyorlardı. O zaman öyle bir muhabbet vardı. “Okul top oldu” muhabbeti vardı mesela. “Eskiden daha delikanlıydı bu işler, şimdi her şeye subaylar karışıyor, rapor ediliyor” falan filan muhabbeti oluyordu herhalde o zamanlar.

<sup>186</sup>Eren: Liseden harp okuluna geçilince herkes bir anda olgunlaşır ve o tarz şeyler çocukça görülür. Harp okulunda kimsenin şey olmamasına rağmen hiç öyle şeyler yaptırılmazdı.

impose their own punishments. Further, there is another advantage one can take from this tradition: those who are punished the most by senior highs are chosen to hold prestigious representative positions by their classmates in the following years of high school. Hence, this tradition can be defined as a bargain of discipline and punishment between different cohorts: a traditional disciplinary bargain. This reinforces the complicity of the dominated in their own domination, just like *tabur teşkilatı* and the strict hierarchy itself.

### **3.6. Broken selves, composed selves**

#### **3.6.1. The child self and violence in professional military education**

While listening to these stories of violence and domination, I often forgot that my research participants, who are adult men at the time of my interviews, were children whilst they were experiencing professional military training. They experienced physical and other types of violence both as victims and perpetrators. In regards to this subject, I ask a question similar to the one Haydar Darıcı asks about politicized Kurdish children in urban Turkey (Darıcı 2011, 8): Is it possible to talk about “childhood” when the lives, words, and memories of children under siege of an austere discipline, perpetual penalty and political violence? Because some cadets become perpetrators, first when they become senior, then when they are military officers, can we overlook the violence they face as children during high school? I think we must not. As in the case of Kurdish children, bodies, time and spaces are given meaning by violence within military schools, and violence is a constitutive part of the order and a (bodily) disposition of cadets.

As the cadet suffers from the constant fear of violence, violence itself creates a source of constructing the self. This source requires the knowledge and embodiment of the meticulous details of all these punishments and rules surrounding them. To acquire this knowledge, one should stop “being a child” when he becomes a cadet, and one should stop “being a women”, i.e let go of all “feminine” characteristics, which signify a sign of weakness (Segal 1995). How Efe narrated the *tabur* during which a female cadet cried when the commander scolded and humiliated her by saying that “What the hell are you doing skulking around with this looks?!” [“Bu ne hal böyle at hırsız gibi?!”], reflects the importance in differentiating male military men from women and

children. Being a man means not acting “like a woman”, “like a child” or “like a homosexual” (Nagel 2000):

Efe: She hadn’t done make up, hadn’t done anything, hadn’t tied back her hair or so. I mean, she was a shabby girl, didn’t care for her looks. Tall like this... [...] But she cried, still a kid, do you understand?<sup>187</sup>

That is also why those who enter the naval academy without the experience of military high school are labeled as *kabaks*. *Kabaks* are excluded from men’s friendships and fraternity/ class unity, albeit not as irreversibly as female cadets:

Efe: In normal pumpkins, also, I usually don’t get involved in the ones who didn’t go to high school. Not only girls. If they are thirty in number, I talk to two of them. I see two of them as high school graduates, I mean, I take them to that class, my class. I, for example, call that two. [...] the others, whole girls and boys are not high school graduates, for me.<sup>188</sup>

Eren: Culturally it is set. However higher classes suppress lower classes, there is a perception that female students cannot be accepted as one of us.

**What about pumpkins?**

The same... Nobody coming from civilian background was accepted in; girls were a step more away from that.<sup>189</sup>

Even those who come one year later to military high schools are denied friendship and the comfort of inclusion for a while:

Efe: What I mean is, that man says “I’ve suffered from this for a year during the first year of the high school”, that is his mentality. He says “this man came without going through the first year and now he is looking down upon us” do you know what I mean? You are at first class, you finished a year at high school, you brag about being a soldier, and this man comes directly. Why? Because his English is good. Then you teach him how to walk, you make fun of him bla bla, a million things.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>187</sup>Efe: Makyaj yapmamış, hiçbir şey yapmamış, toplamamış saçlarını falan filan. Yani çok paspal bir kızdı, kendine bakmazdı. Uzun boylu böyle. [...] (Gülüyor) Ama ağlıyor, çocuk daha, tamam mı?

<sup>188</sup>Efe: Ben normal kabaklarla da, liseyi okumamış olanlarla da çok muhattap olmam zaten. Sadece kızlarla değil. Aralarından otuz tane varsa, iki tanesiyle konuşurum. Şu an iki tanesini lise okumuş gibi görürüm, onu da o sınıfa alırım yani, kendi sınıfıma alırım. O ikisini mesela ararım. [...] Diğerleri, bütün erkekler, bütün kızlar, lise okumamışlardır benim için.

<sup>189</sup>Eren: E kültür olarak şey yerleşmiş. Nasıl üst sınıf alt sınıfı ezer kültürü varsa bayan öğrenciler de içimize alınmaz gibi bir algı var.

Peki kabaklar?

Onlar da aynı şekilde. Sivilden gelen hiç kimse içeri alınmıyordu, kızlar bir adım da daha dışarıda tutuluyordu yani.

<sup>190</sup>Efe: Öyledir yani adam “ben lise birde bir sene bu acıyı çektim” diyor, o mantalitede. Bu adam bir sene okumadan geldi de bizi eksik görüyor diyor, tamam mı? Sen lise birsin, bir sene okumuşsun, askerlik yaptım diyorsun, gaza geliyorsun, adam direk



Whilst those who left the schools at different ages stated or implied being victimized, especially those who are military officers used a language of callousness rather than a narrative of total victimization. However, there are different “choices”, if it is possible to call them “choices”, made by former cadets to survive military education. Some like Burak choose to report the violence of senior highs to the commanders from the beginning of high school and expect commanders to protect him as long as he obeys their rules. Many others like Rıdvan, Eren and Efe try very hard not to be punished at all, by seniors or by commanders. Some others dare to sacrifice what makes them the object of violence during military education: their bodies. Jesse argues “Sacrifice does not waste power in order to replace it. Instead, sacrifice conjures a subversive sovereign existence, a life beyond utility and reification” (Goldhammer 2005, 23; cited by Darıcı 2011, 24). Yet, sacrifice does waste power in order to replace it in professional military education. Military schools are institutions raising children to become military officers who are ready to be exposed to violence and to use violence at the same time. As Selim quoted from their commanders, cadets shall live under war-like conditions so that they are able to react quickly, and adapt to combat when there actually is a war. Some cadets intentionally make themselves vulnerable to physical violence of seniors by breaking the rules, in order to become the perpetrator of physical violence in following years:

Efe: For me it was ok generally. But there is this thing: There were the ones who were beaten at high school, for example. There is that kind of... Since it is not ok with my character, I didn't get beaten. If it was so, I would also get beaten. The guy says “I will crush my inferiors in the future”, “I also have to show disobedience”. There were those kinds of guys, for example. The guy smoked for instance.

**Why?**

I mean, the guy says he will crush people, so he needs to suppress the inferiors now.

**Does that give him legitimacy?**

He says, for example, there are ones who say, nobody said to me, I didn't do anything to anyone, as well; “you” he says “were very lame at second class of high school, why do you crush that people?” or so... There are odd things among themselves. Since I cannot say anything to anyone, I don't call myself a soldier, after all.<sup>191</sup>

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geliyor. Niye? İngilizce'si iyi diye! Sonra ona yürümeyi öğretiyorsun, dalga geçiyorsun falan filan, milyon tane şey. (Gülüyor)

<sup>191</sup>Efe: Benim iyiydi yani genel olarak. Ama şöyle bir şey var mesela: Lisede dayak yiyenler de vardı mesela. Şey tipler var... Benim karakterime hiç uymuyor da onun için ben dayak yemedim. Öyle olsa ben de dayak yerdim. Adam diyor ki yani “ben diyor

The violence experienced as children and adolescents in Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy is integral to the institutional structure of the military. The institutionally recognized hierarchies and the regulations of punishment include both psychological and physical violence –such as bodily and mental exhaustion, forced physical training, violation of many children’s rights or violation of the right to privacy. Yet, only senior cadets exert bare physical violence. The systematization and structurality of violence originate in the dynamism of military hierarchy within military schools. In other words, the means of oppression passes from hand to hand as everybody becomes senior sooner or later.

For instance, to become a legitimate perpetrator of physical violence, the cadet sacrifices what is left from his (bodily) integrity, which is constantly being broken down by disciplinary power. Behaving insubordinately on purpose, in order to subordinate and violate other cadets in the future, is an extreme version of the traditional disciplinary bargain. The moment when all comprehension breaks down and the self falls apart is the moment when those who waste power in order to replace it compose *a* subjectivity/ *a* self: the subjectivity that military education toils to form, a subjectivity that is both productive and subjected. The requirement of being subjected to physical violence in order to become a legitimate perpetrator is also another face of the hierarchy of suffering –which makes up the class unity while excluding those who suffered less (i.e. female cadets and *kabaks*), as argued above.

From the moment one becomes a part of violence in professional military education as a child, he or she starts contributing somehow to the blurry lines between the categories of perpetrator and the victim of physical violence –which makes it hard to break down the agents of violence into two narrow categories. Cadets contribute to this blurriness by avoiding (like Efe) calling themselves “soldier” but acting like one in both

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gelecekte çarpacağım astlarımı” diyor, “benim de asilik yapmam lazım” diyor. Mesela bu tipte adamlar vardı. Mesela adam sigara içiyor...

**Neden?**

Ya adam diyor ki ben çarpacağım millet diyor, onun için de şimdi asi gezmeme lazım diyor.

**O ona meşruiyet mi sağlıyor?**

Diyor ki mesela şey diyenler vardı, bana kimse demedi, ben kimseye bir şey yapmadım da, “sen” diyor işte “lise ikide çok coftun, sen niye çarpıyorsun adamları?” falan filan diye... Kendi aralarında değişik şeyler var. Ben kimseye laf söylemeyen bir insan olduğum için, “asker” diyemiyorum ben kendime zaten.

cases, by sacrificing their (bodily) integrity to become a reputable perpetrator next year, or by their complicity in their own domination to oppress the younger cadets of the future years “legitimately”. This involvement in turn, helps laying the ground for violence integral to the institutional structure of the military, or for “enabling conditions of structures that are both ‘sinful’ and ostensibly ‘nobody’s fault’” (Farmer 2004, 307). My research participants expressed still experiencing the psychological consequences today.

### **3.6.2. The “heroic” self**

The role of nationalist and heroic feelings in the making and transformation of military masculinities in the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval Academy started to change in 2009-2010 as well. The question of “what is the role of nationalist and heroic feelings in the making and transformation of military masculinities in military schools?” was a question I forgot during the first month of my fieldwork. After my third interview during which Rıdvan made a special emphasis on how nationalism and Kemalism were major subjects during high schools whereas not in naval academy, I started to pose “did nationalism and Kemalism play a role in your education in high school and/ or in academy?” This flaw in my questions was a consequence of my prejudice that former cadets and military officers are *discursively* not as nationalist and Kemalist as most would consider them to be, again, because my friends who are cadets were not of this opinion. Raised to be “the sophisticated professionals” of an institution reestablished on nationalist and Kemalist values, and on the myth of the military-nation (Altınay 2004), I thought former cadets as an entity are less “enthusiastic” about nationalism and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, the truth of the matter is different and it connects to the military’s falling from grace, and the succeeding transformations in professional military education.

I argue that the narratives of former cadets about nationalism, Kemalism as abstract ideologies, and their physical experience of military education do not genuinely overlap. All of them stated experiencing military education as a gendered, claustrophobic, disciplinary and exhaustive physical place in which they were closed for years. Yet when asked about what they think of being a military officer as a profession, or about nationalist and Kemalist content of military education, they pointed out to an abstract, nonexistent space where patriotic values and future protectors of the nation are raised. According to Rachel Woodward, “The construction, operation and reproduction

of military masculinities are processes operating across space (in the abstract) and in place (as physical location)” (Woodward 2003, 45-46). As such, while the military masculinities of my research participants were constructed in the physical locations of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy, their perceptions on professional military education were affected not only by this physical experience but also by abstract values of nationalism and Kemalism.

As my interviewees stated, they were almost always unhappy, exhausted and sick of unquestionable, meticulous details of disciplinary power. Yet, according to many such as Kaan and Oğuz, their discontent is subjective/ personal since this is more or less how the military order should be:

Kaan: Yes, I was very unhappy, but there is a system there and this system has gone on for years; it raised our elders, it raised me and it still continues raising... Of course in this conjuncture the things are handled very differently but still the same system. And this system is necessary for the maintenance of the army, with army I mean Turkish Armed Forces. It is different for our army, do you understand? We cannot be the Swedish Army, a European army. They already are people living in a cocktail environment.<sup>192</sup>

Onur: I left because I realized that I didn't want to live under that oppression, all the time. I raised the courage for that during military academy but only later I could do that. And normally, there were lots of people who thought about leaving. They hesitate because there is the concern “will I be successful at civilian life?” [...]

**I understand. Then, what do you think about military officership? I am a little confused now...**

About military officership... Why are you confused?

**Well you said “I didn't want to live under that oppression, all the time” and you said “it is a sacred mission in fact”...**

With oppression, I mean, your life is always limited with some duties. If you are working at coast guard, for example, you can never leave the garrison. Well, there are rules. Then, I won't say “under oppression”; the rules and regulations are very strict and they have to be implemented.

**Do you think they are necessary?**

I think they are necessary. If an officer became an officer, if he chose that profession himself, if he didn't quit – because this option is put in front of you after all, you can choose it...

**But there is also the money issue...**

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<sup>192</sup>Kaan: Ben evet çok mutsuz oldum, ama orada bir sistem var ve o sistem çok uzun yıllardır devam eden, bizim büyüklerimizi de yetiştiren, beni de yetiştiren, şu an da hala yetiştirmekte olan... Tabii ülkenin şu döneminde çok daha farklı geliyor olaylar ama aynı sistem. Ve bu sistem bu ordunun devamlılığı için gerekli, bu ordu dediğim Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri için. Bizim ülkemiz için farklı anlamın mı, biz bir İsviçre ordusu olamayız, bir Avrupa ordusu olamayız. Onlar zaten kokteyl havasında yaşayan insanlar.

There is money issue but it is, well, an amount you consume. In the end, the government puts an investment on you and does this for you to reach somewhere. I mean, let's say, it can put investment on a X person passing by at the street without expecting some results and then it won't want any return. But it invests on you expecting you to serve as a military officer but you decide not to be a military officer. At first it was so unfair with 120.000 TL; after all, you can go to a private school or a foreign collage with that money. When you look that way it was a ruthless amount but now it is decreased. [...] I mean, don't get it wrong, by "oppression" I mean since its duties and responsibilities are tied with strict rules, well, I thought I would be unhappy but I have friends who graduated, doing their job and are happy about it. Well, "are you proud of this job"; I am both proud with my friends and think that it is a very honorable and good job.<sup>193</sup>

### **Then what do you think about military officership as a profession?**

Hakan: God help them (laughing). [...] When I think like if I did it, well, I can't. But I respect the ones who do it because it is a sacred job. In fact, I don't want to put such value on it. It is a result of... Well, country, nation,

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<sup>193</sup>Onur: Ben her an o boyunduruk altında yaşamak istemediğim için ayrıldım. Bunun da cesaretini harp okulunda kazandım ama sonradan buna cesaret edebildim. Ayrılmayı düşünen çok fazla da insan vardı normalde. İnsanlar ayrılmaktan çekiniyor, çünkü "sivil hayatta başarılı olacak mıyım" kaygısı var. [...]

**Anladım, peki subaylık hakkında ne düşünüyorsun? Benim biraz kafam karıştı da...**

Subaylık hakkında... Neden kafan karıştı?

**Hani şey dedin "ben sürekli boyunduruk altında yaşamak istemiyorum" dedin, "aslında kutsal bir görev" dedin...**

Boyunduruk altında derken, senin hayatın sonuçta belli görevlerle sınırlandırılmış durumda. Sonuçta sahil güvenlikte çalışıyorsan mesela garnizonu terk edemiyorsun mesela. Hani böyle kurallar var yani. Hani "boyunduruk altında" demeyeyim; kural ve kaideler çok sıkı ve bunların uygulanması gerekiyor.

**Gerekli olduğunu mu düşünüyorsun?**

Gerekli olduğunu düşünüyorum. Subay bir insan subay olduysa ve bu görevi kendi de seçtiyse, ayrılmadıysa –çünkü bu seçeneği önüne sunuyorlar, böyle bir opsiyonun var sonuçta...

**Para mevzusu da var ama...**

Para mevzusu var ama, para mevzusu senin atıyorum, tükettiğin bir meblağ. Sonuçta devlet sana böyle bir yatırım yapıyor ve senin belli bir şeye ulaşman için yapıyor bu yatırımı. Yani atıyorum, sonuçta sokaktan geçen X kişisine de bu yatırımı yapar belli bir sonuç beklemeden yapacaksa, sonuçta bir geri dönüşüm beklemez. Ama sana bir yatırım yapıyor ve ona subay olarak hizmet etmeni bekliyor ve sen subaylık etmeme kararını alıyorsun. İlk başta çok haksızdı 120 milyar; o parayla özel bir okulda ya da yurt dışında o parayla okuyabilirsin yani. Öyle baktığında çok acımasız bir ücret, ama şimdi o düşürüldü. [...] Hani yanlış anlaşılmasın "boyunduruk", hani görev ve hizmetleri çok katı kurallara bağlı olduğu için hani ben mutsuz olacağımı düşündüm ama şimdi mezun olup, bu işi yapan ve mutlu olan arkadaşlarım da var. Ama "bu işten gurur duyuyor musun"; ben hem arkadaşlaımla gurur duyuyorum, hem bu mesleğin de çok onur verici güzel bir meslek olduğunu düşünüyorum. Tabii yapısına uyan, seven, severek yapan için tabii ki güzel bir meslek yani.

emboldening... In reality it is not such an important thing. In no country of world soldiers are this respected, in our country, too... Again, how can I say...

[...] Well, it is a sacred job indeed. Because I respect them for being devoted. But I think, it doesn't need to be so... Generally there is that perception in our nation, like, military is a, well, sacred profession or so; in fact it shouldn't be like this, I think, it shouldn't be such a sacred job.

**Why?**

Why, because war is not something good, after all. Even if you defend your country, weapons or so, fire, these things...<sup>194</sup>

Most of my research participants, from the first group, have a double perception like Kaan, Onur and Hakan. However, younger cadets clearly have a more overlapping view of nationalism and military education. This situation, I think, stems from the factors they explained as the reasons of their secession from the academy. Rıdvan stated that:

Rıdvan: And there is one more thing. Let's put aside that big quotation. There was constantly an Ataturk in high school, always Ataturk being mentioned, Ataturk...

**How, for example?**

Well... (Hesitating) Our handbook needed to be *Nutuk*, since it is Ataturk's, after all... In military academy education, we realized a little decrease in the mention of the name Ataturk. They just gave us a *Nutuk* summary as homework. But that thing happened; we put such an effort, summarized the book nicely, handled it but there was no return.

**Is there normally?**

Normally it has to be. Like "we didn't like it, improve that part" etc. Nothing like that happened. We, as a group of 10-15 people, expected our

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<sup>194</sup> **Peki meslek olarak subaylık hakkında ne düşünüyorsun?**

Hakan: Allah yardımcıları olsun. (Gülüyor) [...] Kendim yapmış olsam diye düşünüyorum, yapamam yani. Ama yapanlara da saygı duyuyorum çünkü kutsal bir meslek. Aslında o kadar değer yüklemek de istemiyorum. Şeyin olayı, işte... Bu vatan millet, gaza getirme... Aslında o kadar önemli bir şey değil yani. Dünyanın hiçbir ülkesinde askerler bu kadar saygı görmüyordur, bizim ülkemizde de... Yine de nasıl diyeyim...

[...] Ya kutsal bir meslek aslında. Çünkü saygı duyuyorum bağlı oldukları için. Bu kadar da şey olmaması lazım bence. Genel olarak milletin bizde şey algısı var ya askerlik böyle, işte kutsal bir meslek olayı vary a. aslında olmaması lazım bence, bu kadar kutsal bir meslek olmamalı askerlik.

**Neden?**

Neden çünkü sonuçta savaş güzel bir şey değil yani. ülkeni korumak için de olsa insan, silah falan, ateş, böyle şeyler...

homework not to be accepted. Because they weren't usually, they were tore apart and done again. We were waiting for disapproval.<sup>195</sup>

Rıdvan, Ali, Mert and Furkan, my youngest interviewees, are the only ones who strongly emphasize how nationalist and Kemalist they are, just like they are the only ones who emphasized their passion for the military, and that they did not enroll in military high school for a life-long guaranteed salary.

I suggest that both the double perception of elder cadets and the more nationalized perceptions of younger ones who were discriminated by their commanders confirm Ayşe Gül Altınay's argument that the linkages between the military and the nation are not automatic or natural but are productions of *culturalized, masculinized and militarized* political processes (Enloe 2000a; cited in Altınay 2004, 6). I argue therefore, the ongoing transformations in military schools in simultaneity with the military's falling from grace masculinize and militarize professional military education and political subjectivities/ selves of (former) cadets even more than they were already.

### 3.7. New distinctions

As our interview with Rıdvan made me realize the importance of asking about the significance of nationalism and Kemalism in military education, I also noticed the reference of younger cadets to new distinctions among their classmates and among all cadets, unlike my elder research participants. These distinctions cluster around three issues: Kemalism, economic and ethnic backgrounds. Since I attempted to elaborate on the distinctions created with Kemalism and nationalism in the previous section, I will continue with the latter subjects.

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<sup>195</sup> Rıdvan: Bir de şöyle bir şey vardı. O büyük ayrıntıyı da geçtim. Lisede sürekli bir Atatürk vardı, sürekli bir Atatürk geçiyor, Atatürk...

#### **Nasıl mesela?**

İşte... (Duraksıyor) Başucu kitabımızın Nutuk olması gerektiği, Atatürk'ün sonuçta... Harp Okulu eğitiminde birazcık Atatürk adının kaybolmaya başladığını fark ettik. Sadece bir Nutuk özeti ödevi verdiler. Ama şöyle bir şey oldu, o kadar uğraştık ettik, Nutuk kitabını özetledik gayet güzel bir şekilde, verdik ama sadece verdik. Herhangi bir geri dönüş olmadı.

#### **Normalde olur muydu?**

Normalde olması gerekirdi. Beğenmedik, şunu biraz daha geliştir falan gibi. Hiç öyle bir şey olmadı. Biz bu 10-15 kişilik grup olarak bizimkinin beğenilmemesini bekliyorduk. Çünkü yaptığımız ödevler genelde beğenilmiyor, yırtılıp tekrar yaptırılıyor falan. Beğenilmemesini bekliyorduk.

Nobody except Rıdvan, Ali and Mert mentioned being Kemalist, the economic background of their family, ethnic background of some other cadets, their passion for being a military officer, or being positively different from their classmates in any respect without my related questions. For instance, the eldest-first group of my interviewees emphasized how coincidentally they enrolled in Turkish Naval High School or Turkish Naval Academy. This does not mean none of them were passionate about being a military officer. Yet, they did not highlight their passion towards the military as a career field unlike Rıdvan, Ali and Mert.

On the one hand, elder cadets constantly referred to the unity of classmates, the love they feel for each other and the continuing solidarity between classmates after the school. On the other hand, Eren, Arda, and Hakan from the second group differentiated those who were confronted with severe accusations and interrogations including themselves. However, Rıdvan, Ali and Mert made other distinctions among cadets. Two of them are the passion one holds for a career in the military, and one's economic background. These are perceived as intrinsically interlinked:

Rıdvan: Only people who like it can do it. I was having pleasure, to be honest. [...] to develop our commandship skills, they gave commandship duties at small boats. I was having pleasure doing that, frankly. Money was not a big deal for me, as I said the condition of my family is good. My father earns more than most military officers; it is God's honest truth.<sup>196</sup>

Another one is ethnic background:

Rıdvan: Of course everybody is like brothers as I said. Nobody has problems. Even if there is, student union detects it and tries to reconcile them. Or, there were two friends who fought, our commanders put them in the same double room, saying "you two will stay here now, talk to each other and compromise." But there was this thing, look, in military academy, there was a large group speaking in Kurdish among themselves. 10 people or so would close themselves in a room and speak loudly in Kurdish. Interesting. They called us things like Turkey soldiers. [...] It is like joking but there can't be such a joke, how?... Even as a joke it is horrible, they call us Turkey soldiers. When I hear this, the first thing coming into my mind is PKK, to be honest.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Rıdvan: Sadece seven insan yapabiliyor. Ben haz alıyordum açıkçası. [...] bizim de komutanlık şeyimizi geliştirmeye yönelik, küçük gemilerde komutanlık görevi veriyorlardı. Ben bunları yaparken haz alıyordum açıkçası. Para benim için bir şey değildi yani. dediğim gibi ailevi durumum da iyi benim. Benim babam çoğu subaydan çok daha fazla para kazanıyor açıkçası, doğruya doğru yani.

<sup>197</sup> Rıdvan: Tabii, herkes birbiriyle kardeş gibi dedim ya. Kimsenin arasında bozukluk yok. Olsa da öğrenci birliği tespit edip onları kaynaştırmaya çalışıyor. Ya da kavga eden



It is neither the purpose nor the place of this research to make claims about the truthfulness of these narratives. However, I assert that these new distinctions helped cadets who had to leave the school because they were treated in a negatively different way to distinguish themselves positively from the rest. They distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, in which their position in the “objective” classifications “is expressed or betrayed”, as Bourdieu frames it. (Bourdieu 1984, 6) The economic well being of the families of Rıdvan, Ali and Mert, their Turkishness, and strongly emphasized, non-need based Kemalism and passion for a good career in the military appear as powerful lines of new distinctions. Not only because these “qualities” distinguish them from other cadets and make a statement about what the military is losing but because they consider some of these qualities as reasons of their discrimination and forced detachment from the academy.

While new distinctions are sources of anxiety for the “qualified” and discriminated if one is still inside, they are reasons to find comfort if one is already pushed out of the school. These distinctions operate in order to individualize and subjectivize cadets, and centralize the authority along with other changes in disciplinary power, but they also respond to “the necessity of creating sense through the subjective reorganization of the conduct of self and of others” (Hildebrand-Nilshon, Motzkau, and Papadopoulos 2001, 289) as they appeared in the narratives of Rıdvan, Ali and Mert.

### **3.8. Melting unities, centralization of authority and remaking military masculinities**

Suffering from perpetual fear of violence and physical violence itself is integral to the institutional structure of professional military education –in this case, of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy. The hierarchies of suffering created

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iki arkadaş olmuştı, komutanlarımız onları aynı iki kişilik odaya koymuşlardı: “Siz artık burada kalacaksınız, birbirinize şey yapın, anlaşın konuşun” falan diye. Ama şey vardı bak, Harp Okulu’nda aralarında Kürtçe konuşan büyük bir kesim vardı açıkçası. 10 kişi falan biro dada kapanıp Kürtçe bağıra bağıra konuşuyorlardı. İlginç. Şey diyorlardı bize T.C. askeri falan diyorlardı yani. [...] Dalga geçer gibi ama böyle dalga geçemezsin ki, nasıl..? Şakası bile bunun korkunç. T.C. askeri diyor bize. Benim bunu duyduğumda ilk aklıma gelen şey PKK açıkçası.

by cadets determine who is more *original*<sup>198</sup>, or say, who is more militarized. However, not even the *originals* among my interviewees construct similar masculinities. The diversity of military masculinities finds expression in the narratives of my research participants as an effect of the cadets' will to contribute to the making of their military masculinities.

My research participants pointed out to major changes in the disciplinary techniques and organization of professional military education starting from the 2009-2010 academic year. This commencement date overlaps with Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, and with the overall falling of grace of the military. As stated before, it is beyond the limits and intentions of this research to draw a normative picture of all the micro level impacts of macro level processes and actors, such as the trials against high ranked military officers or *Hizmet* Movement, on professional military education. Yet, my research participants narrated some crucial repercussions of the ongoing process of transformation in military schools, and they indicated paradigmatic shifts in the making of military masculinities.

The deformation of traditional disciplinary bargain between elder and younger cadets, and class unity/ fraternity together with the intensifying discipline shape this transformation process on the side of cadets. Those who suffered from the consequences of anonymous letters, administrative interrogations, military court cases, and discrimination and mobbing consider these changes in the relationalities within the schools as "side" effects of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. This comprehensive deformation and recomposition is realized through increasing centralization of authority and discipline within the schools by eliminating comfort, solidarity and power zones of cadets. Thus, the making of military masculinities gradually become a more and more hierarchically and centrally organized process. As this process was already shaped by violence that is the logic of professional military education with its earlier version, along with the increasing centralization and discipline, violence intensifies since 2009 with the increasing complicity of cadets in their own domination.

New distinctions that emerge since the beginning of this transformation process produce new and structurally grounded forms of compliance for cadets in their own domination: ideological, ethnic and class distinctions create new forms of violence and

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<sup>198</sup>As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the term *original* refers to the cadets who went both to Turkish Naval High School and to Turkish Naval Academy –without skipping a year.

domination in professional military education, and thus, disciplinary order within the school by individualizing, subjectifying and deforming “the selves” of cadets. Subjectification and individualization create a necessity of making sense “through the subjective reorganization of the conduct of self and of others.” (Hildebrand-Nilshon, Motzkau, and Papadopoulos 2001, 289) While unities, solidarities and former encompartmentments of selves melt, the authority of commanders empowers and reform new military masculinities much more easily by responding to this necessity of making sense.

Therefore, I argue that these new distinctions either created by commanders or cadets, or both, serve to increase discipline and centralization of authority within the school as well. As a feeling of insecurity is created among cadets, new distinctions deform some crucial features of military masculinities, and contribute to the composition of new ones. These distinctions appear to be major outcomes of the macro shifts in civil military relations such as Ergenekon and Balyoz trials on how cadets experience the simultaneous transformations in professional military education.

## **CHAPTER 4: AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEOLIBERALISM AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION**

One of my strongest tentative guesses while designing this research was that there is a strong impact of neoliberalism, especially after the JDP came to power, on the nationalist and militarist values attributed to military education and the professional military in Turkey. The first draft of this chapter was prejudiced by my empathy with the unsettling experiences of my friends, and thus was based mainly on the unfavorable repercussions of neoliberalism on my interviewees' perceptions of military education and a military career. The reviews of my advisor and my friends, fortunately, led me to reconsider the impact of my personal relations particularly on this chapter. Hence, the challenge here is to balance the significance of some of the negative narratives of my research participants with the positive perceptions of others all while discussing a very important intersection: how have the perceptions of former cadets on military education and military careers been informed by rising neoliberalism in Turkey? What do these changing perceptions tell us about the future of the military professionals, and thus, of the military as an institution?

In this chapter, after a brief summary of the emergence and consolidation of neoliberalism in Turkey, and of TAF's position in this process, I interpret the narratives of my interviewees from the first and second groups, around the issues of military education, military professionalism, and neoliberalism in Turkey. Afterwards, in the section titled "Younger cohorts and new distinctions", I proceed to the perceptions of younger cohorts in order to understand the differences and resemblances between the two groups whose experiences of military education show a great deal of dissimilitude.

However, I do not draw a sharp line between the narratives of elder and younger cohorts, as there is heterogeneity even among the narratives of former cadets of the same cohort. This heterogeneity in the perceptions on the intersection of neoliberalism, socio-economic context and military education is kept in the background throughout the chapter, attempting to challenge both the assumptions of homogeneity regarding military professionalism and my own initial prejudices.

This chapter also draws attention to some other ways in which the narratives of my research participants from different cohorts combine to a great extent, either with predominantly negative or positive insights. Their diverse but interconnecting perceptions suggest a pattern leading to new subjectivities among military professionals as I argued in the previous chapter. An additional finding that I discuss in this chapter is the overwhelming expectation that the prospective cadets of TAF will increasingly come from low-income families with lower social and cultural capital<sup>199</sup>. Whilst new distinctions among cadets at the intersection of nationalism, militarism, Ergenekon and Balyoz operations, and neoliberalism remake military masculinities, former cadets expect increased access to the military profession by economically, ethnically disadvantaged groups, which they do not necessarily perceive as a positive development. Some former cadets, referred to the “threat” of “even Kurds” becoming military professionals. Needless to say, one cannot generalize from these narratives by mainly Turkish interviewees coming from middle class families. However, given the historical background of recruitment by TAF, my research findings might be interpreted as clues for a changing profile. .

In the end, I discuss one of my strongest assumptions at the beginning of the fieldwork. The rise of neoliberalism under the rule of the JDP contributes to the discrepancy between the future expectations of a cadet during his education and the life style he attains after graduation. However, most of my research participants expressed the primary significance of the military’s loss of political and social prestige in creating this discrepancy. In shaping the changing perceptions of former cadets on military professionalism and professional military education, economic concerns are situated secondary for most of my interviewees.

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<sup>199</sup>For the terms “social capital” and “cultural capital” see Bourdieu 1986.

#### 4.1. Neoliberalism in Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces

The process of neoliberalization was initiated by a military coup in Turkey in 1980, as in several Latin American countries. This makes David Harvey's comprehensive definition of the neoliberal state of the US only partly valid for Turkey:

The assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking, and it has long dominated the US stance towards the rest of the world. What the US is evidently sought to impose by main force on Iraq was a state apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital. I call this kind of state apparatus a *neoliberal state* [his emphasis]. The freedoms it embodies reflect the interests of private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital. (Harvey 2005, 7)

The political, social and economic transformations following the 1980 military coup were imbued with a mixture of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and increasing freedom of the market economy. Yet individual freedoms were not in the equation since the 1982 Constitution is aimed at protecting the state “from the actions of its citizens rather than to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizen from the States encroachment” (Özbudun 2007, 179). A mention of this somehow extant constitution and constitutionally unprotected individual freedoms is essential while starting a brief summary of the emergence of neoliberal measures in Turkey and their impacts on civil-military relations.

The term “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearts [Aydınlar Ocağı] in the 1970s (Zürcher 2000, 419). After the coup, this synthesis rose to become the hegemonic state ideology. Although the Kemalist military had long posed as secularism's last line of defense in Turkey, it incited, if not initiated, the rise of political Islam with the military-supported policies to “Islamify” the state (Eligür 2010). As Banu Eligür states the plan was to create “an Islamic sense of national community and preventing a recurrence of ideological clashes and the political violence of the 1970s” (Eligür 2010, 95), mainly to circumvent socialist movement.

Many analyses claim that the help of TAF to the rise of political Islam, and eventually to the rise of the JDP and its Islamist forerunners, was inadvertent. Yet, the creation of an Islamic sense of national community required more than just General Kenan Evren recounting Quranic verses during public speeches. After the coup, the

budget for the Religious Affairs Directorate was increased immensely. This led to the rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses. Mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam) were introduced. Religious bureaucrats were tolerated more than ever. The educational and professional opportunities for graduates of *imam hatip* [prayer leader and preacher] high schools were widened. “In this way, the military tactically opened up a social and political space for Islamist mobilization in Turkey.” (Eligür 2010, 24). Therefore, the aftermath of the 1980 military coup was one of the moments in which the military has played paradoxical historical roles (Armstrong 2014).

In this process, imprisonment and torture were widespread, targeting both the members of leftist/ socialist groups, and ultrapatriotic, right wing extremists:

[...] 650,000 people were arrested; 1,683,000 prosecutions were prepared; 517 people were sentenced to death (49 of these sentences were carried out); 30,000 were fired from their jobs for holding political views incompatible with the state; 14,000 had their citizenship revoked; 667 associations and foundations were banned; torture was widespread (Armstrong 2014).

The members of the *ülküci*<sup>200</sup> movement/ right wing extremists were imprisoned as well, although they were very close to the newly forming hegemonic state ideology. However, as Alparslan Türkeş, the founder and former president of the Nationalist Movement Party [*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*] once stated, they were in prison while their ideology was in power: “Biz içerideyiz ama fikrimiz iktidarda.”<sup>201</sup> According to Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, the military junta reinterpreted Kemalism with an authoritarian and fascist lens by utilizing its large wardrobe of “mottos”, “principles” and “excerpts” from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was important to fill the gaps in Kemalism’s eclectic structure since its “coldness” as an ideology almost completely identified with the state authority was not sufficient for the production of an ideological consensus on a totalistic sense of national community (Bora and Can 2004, 147-148).

This Islamic sense of national community was in progress not only to prevent a recurrence of the political violence in 1970s but also to pave the way for free market economy, which was supposed to build up without the threat of political violence, strong unions, and socialist movement. Due to increasing political violence, two International Monetary Fund (IMF)–based economic stabilization programs failed to

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<sup>200</sup> *Ülkücü* is the adjective with which the members of NMP identify themselves. It can be literally translated as idealist.

<sup>201</sup> “We are inside but our political view is in power.”

implement “several IMF resolutions to devalue the national currency and institute tight monetary policies” (Eligür 2010, 112) before the coup. A new IMF austerity package, also known as The January 24 Measures, was prepared by Turgut Özal, the undersecretary of the Prime Ministry at the time, with the order of PM Süleyman Demirel in 1979. The government was not able to adopt the program due to political violence and economic instability in the country. To rectify the economic situation, the January 24 Measures was declared to the public only in January 24<sup>th</sup>, 1980, right after the coup. Özgür Müftüoğlu, from the Labor Economics and Industrial Relations Department of Marmara University, harshly criticizes the program:

Looking at the period after the decisions, Turkey's black market activity rose sharply and public expenditures fell rapidly, for the sake of encouraging the private sector. We could also see that the January 24 decisions meant the end of social state, or welfare state, policies of subsequent Turkish governments.<sup>202</sup>

TAFs constitutive role in this neoliberal shift is quite noticeable but how the institution itself started to transform is not. However, I shall first briefly reflect back upon the period between the establishment of the Republic and the 1980 military coup.

In a 1970-dated publication of TAF, the joining of the military and the Peoples Republican Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP] in their identification with the state during the one-party regime is purported as follows:

Republic of Turkey has continued to implement the program of modernization under the auspices of the Republican People's Party in the areas civil law, culture, economy and education. Many of the national leaders relied on military history.<sup>203</sup> (*Türkiyede Ordu* 1970, 20-21)

The proudly expressed collaboration between the state-PRP and the military in law making, culture, economy and education was aiming at modernization of the newly established Republic (Şen 2010, 45-49). The fundamentals of this modernization were all defined under the Six Arrows: Republicanism, populism, secularism, reformism, nationalism, and statism. Also known as the tenets of Kemalism, Six Arrows were

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<sup>202</sup>“Economists discuss milestone of Turkey’s market economy. ”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, January 25, 2011, accessed May 5, 2014.

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=economist-discuss-mile-stone-of-turkeys-market-economy-2011-01-25>.

<sup>203</sup> Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin sivil himayesi altında hukuk, kültür, ekonomi ve eğitim alanlarında çağdaşlaşma programını uygulamaya devam etmiştir. Milli liderlerden birçoğu askeri bir geçmişe dayanıyordu. (*Türkiyede Ordu* 1970, 20-21)



identified later with the state-PRP as the one-party rule lasted for 27 years<sup>204</sup>. In *Askerin Bilgi Kitabı* [Soldiers Pocket Book], Necdet Uluboy describes this situation:

People's Party's unchanging principles found the basis of the Turkish revolution. Those principles of People's Party are described very well at the holidays with their flags carrying six arrows. These six arrows remind us of the following: 1<sup>st</sup> we are republican, 2<sup>nd</sup> we are nationalists, 3<sup>rd</sup> we are populist, 4<sup>th</sup> we are statist, 5<sup>th</sup> we are secular, 6<sup>th</sup> we are revolutionary. All Turks must know and understand these very well.<sup>205</sup> (Uluboy 1945, 83)

Reckoning my own experience of primary and elementary education, I remember the arrow of “statism” was told to connote the independence of the state economically as well as politically: for the rapid and independent development of the national economy, the state shall hold the responsibility of making large investments within the country. This economic initiative of the state, of course, would be supported by its initiatives and social engineering in cultural, social, political and military fields (Dinç 2004, 2). Therefore, until the Democrat Party, the state-PRP in collaboration with the military was the ruler of the economy as of the other fields.

The ten-year period of the DP in power was very important in terms of the relations between the economic condition of the country and the military, both domestically and internationally transformed. Ömer Laçiner draws attention to the catalytic function of the involvement of TAF in the Korean War, in shaping the 1950s national and international proceedings for economic “development”:

When empowered middle class – DP – put itself forward through the way of economic recovery and growth with American aid and capital investments; the army started to pursue the modern equipment the “national economy” could not provide with American surplus of used weapons and equipment. That “developmentalist” truce which lasted until the end of the year 1950 was catalyzed by Korean War. The condition of US-led “western alliance” to accept Turkey in was that. Both sides – DP government and the army – ran eagerly for this prerequisite for their own “development”. The blood of thousands of soldiers who died in the Korean territory, provided the DP

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<sup>204</sup> Although the first general elections were held in 1946 and the result was a victory for the PRP, the elections was considered to be shady since the openly given votes was counted behind closed doors. Only in 1950, after 27 years of one-party regime, the Democrat Party formed a government as a result of the 1950 general elections, which was the first time the method of secret ballot-open counting was in practice.

<sup>205</sup> Türk inkılabının temelini; Halk Partisinin değişmez prensipleri kurar. Halk Partisinin bu esasları bayramlarda üzerinde altı ok bulunan bayraklar çok iyi anlatır. Bu altı ok bize şunları hatırlatır: 1. Cumhuriyetçiyiz, 2-Milliyetçiyiz, 3-Halkçiyiz, 4-Devletçiyiz, 5-Laikiz, 6-İnkılapçiyiz. Bunları her Türk bilmeli ve çok iyi anlamalıdır. (Uluboy 1945, 83)

government with the political rant of millions of dollars of US aid, and thus a 4-5 year period of economic prosperity and success.

And the Turkish Army which suffered heavy casualties in Korea and so rescued American troops from giving heavy casualties, as a result obtained the payee of being the most loyal allies with the United States and won its generous military aid as well as secure U.S. support for the coups and interventions it will realize after "within the chain of command " in 27<sup>th</sup> March, 12<sup>th</sup> March and 12<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>206</sup> (Laçiner 2009, 31)

On the other hand, Serhat Güvenç writes this history by attempting to understand how the US military aid to Turkey challenged, if not transformed, the military's internal affairs and understandings between 1942 and 1960. He put that, drawing from the history of the Ottoman army, TAF embraced the Prussian-German military system<sup>207</sup> for a long while<sup>208</sup>. The Law of Loan and Rent [Ödünç Verme-Kiralama Kanunu] was amended during the World War II, and it rendered the first US aid in 1942 possible. Since the content and quantity of this aid was determined by Britain as the mediator between the US and Turkey, and Turkish military officers were resistant towards the US military system, the British military effected TAF between 1939-1945, for a short while. (Güvenç 2010, 259-260) Only the Truman Doctrine announced in 1947 paved the way for the possible challenges of the US military understanding towards TAFs internal organization. Though started with humble amounts of financial aid in quantity, and continued with the second hand ammunition shipped

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<sup>206</sup>İktidara geçen orta sınıf -DP- iktidarı Amerikan yardımı ve sermaye yatırımları ile ekonomik canlanma ve büyüme yoluna koyulurken, ordu da Amerikan ihtiyaç fazlaları ve ikinci el silâh ve teçhizat ile, "millî ekonomi"nin ona sağlayamadığı modern donanımın peşine düşmüştür.

1950lerin son yıllarına kadar süren bu "kalkınma"cı mütarekenin katalizörlüğünü yapan "Kore Savaşı"dır. ABD önderliğindeki "Batı ittifakı"nın Türkiyeyi kabul koşulu idi bu. Her iki taraf -DP hükümeti ve ordu- da kendi "kalkınma"larının bu ön şartı için hevesle koşurdular. Kore toprağında ölen binlerce askerin kanı, DP hükümetine milyonlarca dolarlık ABD yardımı ve bu sayede 4-5 yıl süren bir ekonomik bolluk ve başarı dönemi yaşatmanın siyasal rantını sağladı. Korede verdiği ağır zayıyla Amerikan birliklerini çok ağır bir zayıt vermekten kurtaran Türk ordusu da böylece ABDye en sadık müttefik payesini edinip, hem onun cömert askerî yardımını hem de bundan böyle "emir komuta zinciri dahilinde" yapacağı -27 Mayıs, 12 Mart ve 12 Eylül gibi- darbe ve müdahalelerde ABD desteğini güvenceye almış oldu. (Laçiner 2009, 31)

<sup>207</sup>For more on the Prussian-German General Staff System see: Millotat, Christian O. E. (German Army). 1992. *Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System*. Strategic Studies Institute. Accessed online July 3, 2014. URL: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a249255.pdf>.

<sup>208</sup>Güvenç also put that while Land Forces and Air Forces took the Prussian-German General Staff System as a model, the British navy was the main source of inspiration for the construction of the Turkish Navy. (See Güvenç 2010, 255; Barlas and Güvenç 2010, 223-253)

from the US, this process created important changes in the internal affairs of the military as well as in the perceptions of its military officers. While the US Military Aid Agency was impressed by the human power of TAF, the members of the agency drew attention to several weaknesses of TAF. Some of them were the low rates of literacy among conscripts, the transportation infrastructure of the country that would prevent improvement even if TAF had advanced military technologies, low numbers of non-commissioned officers in each force, education of military professionals that lacks training in political science and international relations (Güvenç 2010, 263-283). Although bodily training is prioritized over the intellectual sophistication of the military officers in the US model, the institutional neglect of educational deficiencies was deemed as a weakness of the professional military of Turkey.

Güvenç puts that the economic aid and the advices of the US military officers about the internal structure and educational affairs of TAF did not turn the face of the military completely towards the US model but created a composition of the US with the Prussian-German military understanding (Güvenç 2010, 283-284). However, one of the most important consequences of the US military aid and assistance was the flourish of young and lowly enlisted military officers. They were educated in the US or by the US military officers to be able to take initiative and risk in order to succeed, unlike what the Prussian-German system imposes by valorizing hierarchical military values over end results. (Güvenç 2010, 280-282)

In sum, the economic involvement of the US in Turkey through the channels opened by the DP government, and the military's role in the DPs maneuvers for economic development were very transformative both for macroeconomics of the country and for the military. Whilst the military was challenged by the US military aid and allowed young officers to shine, the noun missing was laid open for the liquidation of high ranked officers, faithful to long-outdated military values of the early Republican period, by lowly enlisted officers with the 1960 military coup.

The holding company of the military officers, The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK) was the most important economic development after the 1960 military coup, regarding the relations between the military, militarism, and free market economy. It was initiated by the National Unity Committee, which came immediately after the first military coup on May 27, 1960 (Official Gazette 1961). OYAK is a compulsory savings institution, a supplementary social security and welfare organization, and a holding company (Akça 2010a, 9). Thus the question “What is

OYAK?” raises many following ones about its legal status and about whether it is a civilian institution or a military one. İsmet Akça explains OYAKs legal status as follows:

OYAK is bound by its special law and falls under the jurisdiction of either private or public law depending on the context. According to the first article of Law No. 205, OYAK is an administratively and financially independent legal entity attached to the Ministry of Defense and subject to special legal provisions. Article 37 states that all assets, revenues, and claims of the organization are eligible for the rights and privileges attached to state property and that violators/ offenders are subject to similar charges received by violators of state property. Apparently, special laws govern OYAKs relationship with third parties, and this arrangement facilitates its pursuit of revenue-generating activities. On the other hand, one can also deduce from the OYAK Law that this fund is also a public legal entity because it is endowed with public rights, authorities, and privileges. In other words, OYAK has a legal status that allows it to benefit from the privileges of both private and public law. For example, the relationship between OYAK and its beneficiaries is placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Military Administrative Court (SMAC); on cases against OYAK for claims on “the distribution of benefits to former beneficiaries” and “the unconstitutional character of compulsory membership to OYAK,” SMAC ruled against the plaintiffs. Evidently, the double-headed nature of the judiciary in Turkey, due to the existence of a separate military judiciary, poses a significant problem in the case of OYAK as well. (Akça 2010a, 8)

Akça also answers the question of whether OYAK is a military institution or a civilian one. He states that a review of the membership and administrative structure of the institution reveals that the military is indeed in control. (Akça 2010a, 9) As to OYAK as the military holding company, it is a massive one that contained 60 companies, 29 of which it totally owned, in July 2010. Additionally, these investments are never used on military spending and projects: “OYAK invests in industrial production and the financial and services sectors. OYAKs investments are concentrated in the automotive, cement, and iron-steel industries and are also distributed across the following sectors: finance, energy, mining, agricultural chemicals, food, construction, transportation-logistics, domestic-foreign trade, private security, technology-IT, and tourism.” (Akça 2010a, 10) As Akça argues in another article, even the Marxist explanations to the connections between the military and class relations, handle the military as a collateral phenomenon and disregard its constitutive role in the mechanisms between militarism and class conflicts (Akça 2010b, 360-361). Yet one can easily deduce that the military does indeed play a very constitutive role in economy and class relations starting from the establishment of the Republic. This finding is based

firstly on the ongoing existence of OYAK, and the companies of Turkish Armed Forces Foundation [*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı*]<sup>209</sup>. Secondly, it is based upon TAFs historical contributions in supporting the government plans to transform the economy.

The works of Ayşe Buğra, Cihan Tuğal, and Yüksel Taşkın, and the articles published by the journal *Birikim* are important sources to understand the contemporary scene of politics in Turkey, the eleven years of JDP in power, its assertive policies and discourses shaped around neoconservatism and neoliberalism (See Buğra 2011[2008]; Taşkın 2013; Tuğal 2011[2010]; *Birikim* 283). Since 2003, there have been dramatic shifts in the civilian-military relations and in the relationship between the once strongly Kemalist military and Islamist movement(s). One of the most obvious power struggles between the government and the military took place around the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations. In 2009, Bayramoğlu argues that one can see the military's area of power narrowing while the governments area of power expands (Bayramoğlu 2009, 15). Ergenekon and Balyoz operations are among the most important determinants of the changing macro-politics since 2003. On the other hand, the JDP government consolidates the hegemony of neoliberalism in macroeconomics, which was first cleared by the 1980 military coup. This economic consolidation process is another major source of change since the first victory of JDP.

The repercussions of the JDP government's ability to effect economy upon the military, and the military's constitutive role in this ability are not exclusive to Turkey. Catherine Lutz draws attention to how the US military reorganized itself "in the manner of American business" by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing during the 1990s, with the subsequent threat "to make soldiering less masculine." (Lutz 2001, 219). Similarly, TAF has participated in "outsourcing" in recent past, a trend that defines the contemporary economic system in Turkey and globally. Erman Güngör, who should be a squadron leader by now if still a military officer, reviews the international trends of outsourcing and privatizing the militaries especially through the examples of the New

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<sup>209</sup> Established in 1987, Turkish Armed Forces Foundation have six associated partner-companies: ASELSAN Electronics Industry and Trade Inc., Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI), Hava Electronic Industry Inc., Rocket Industrial Trading Inc., İŞBİR Electric Industrial Inc., ASPILSAN Inc. The foundation is located in Ankara, and has regional representatives in İstanbul, İzmir and Mersin. It has publicity committees in 78 cities, and 715 towns of Turkey. For more see: <http://www.tskgv.org.tr/tskgv/?lang=en>.

Zeland and the US militaries in his MA thesis (Güngör 2007, 32-45). Then he explains the beginning of outsourcing trend in TAF as follows:

The first implementations regarding outsource use at Turkish Armed Forces began via the adjudication of service channels to civilian sector in 1992 for GATA Commandership units and in 1994 for Naval Forces Commandership units. Expansion of service channels with this method was envisaged in 23th January 1998 with the project called Turkish Armed Forces Staff Shuttle Bus Service Reform. This way, it was aimed for Armed Forces to get rid of the burden of manpower, vehicle purchases and vehicle maintenances where it had to transfer sources. [...] Second field where outsource use implementation began was kitchens. Board service overall, covers the stages like procurement, storage, distribution and cooking and extremely intense labor, equipment, and personnel allocations are used to serve. And for all these activities to be carried out, quite extensive time and resources are spent.<sup>210</sup> (Güngör 2007, 48)

He suggests for downsizing and outsourcing other fields of the institution as well, such as tailoring workshops, local and private education centers, officers clubs and military messes, air supply maintenance centers, arsenals, and navy yards (Güngör 2007, 53-57). Some of these units and others were already privatized by the year 1998<sup>211</sup>. Especially since the Supreme Court of Public Accounts started to audit officers clubs, post exchanges and military barracks<sup>212</sup>, in accordance with the law amended in December 2010 by the JDP government, the incredibly cheap and fine services provided for military personel by TAFs previously unsupervised budget opened to be outsourced and became more expensive<sup>213</sup>.

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<sup>210</sup> TSK da dış kaynak kullanımı ile ilgili ilk uygulamalar 1992 yılında GATA K.lığı ve 1994 yılında Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığına bağlı birliklerde servis hizmetlerinin sivil sektöre ihale yolu ile verilmesi suretiyle başlamıştır. Servis hizmetlerinin bu yöntemle yapılmasının yaygınlaştırılması 23 Ocak 1998 tarihinde TSK Personel Servis Otobüs Hizmetlerinin İyileştirilmesi adlı proje kapsamında öngörülmüştür. Bu yolla Silahlı Kuvvetlerin kaynak aktarmak zorunda kaldığı; insan gücü, araç alımı ve araç bakımı yükünden kurtulmak hedeflenmiştir. [...] Dış kaynak kullanımı uygulanmasına başlanan ikinci alan mutfaklar olmuştur. İaşe hizmeti genel olarak; tedarik, depolama, dağıtım ve pişirme safhalarını kapsamakta ve hizmet için son derece yoğun emek, araç gereç, ödenek ve personel kullanılmaktadır. Bütün bu faaliyetlerin gerçekleştirilebilmesi için de oldukça geniş zaman ve kaynak harcanmaktadır. (Güngör 2007, 48)

<sup>211</sup>“Silahlı Kuvvetlerden özelleştirme bilançosu.”, *Hürriyet*, July 28, 1998, accessed April 5, 2014. <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-31115>.

<sup>212</sup>“Orduevine Sayıştay denetimi geliyor.”, *Milliyet*, August 9, 2011, accessed April 5, 2014.

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/orduevine-sayistay-denetimi-geliyor/gundem/gundemdetay/09.08.2011/1424392/default.htm>.

<sup>213</sup>“Orduevine Sayıştay denetimi geliyor”. *Bugün*, January 18, 2012, accessed April 5, 2014. <http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/yuzde-500-zam-yapildi-haberi/181446>.

On the other, or rather complementary, side of the coin, the JDP government amended a very important military law that provide the military with more autonomy in downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing in February 2014<sup>214</sup>. One of many striking parts of this law is the new regulation that allows the ministries of National Defense or Internal Affairs to sublet military fields and facilities to public or private, and national or foreign companies. According to Adnan Keskins review of the law no. 6596 in the newspaper *Taraf*, TAF obtained this wider autonomy also with exemption from tax. Keskin interprets the law as the hush payment of the government to the military<sup>215</sup>. In short, while the government and the Supreme Court of Public Accounts involve more and more into the internal affairs of TAF, in order to increase privatization of military properties and to reduce military expenses, TAFs autonomy is sustained although in a different character.

My gatekeepers Selim and Rıdvan also addressed to these debates around outsourcing and privatizing the services and personel of the military. Their emphasis however was more on the recruitment of military personnel from outside military schools. Along with their reference, I have learned that Turkish Land Force<sup>216</sup>, Turkish Naval Force, Turkish Coast Guard Command, Turkish Air Force, and Gendarmerie General Command offer diverse employment opportunities to the graduates of civilian elementary schools, high schools or universities<sup>217</sup>, even for the position of military officers. Different forces started to outsource certain categories of personnel in different times<sup>218</sup>, and there are several categories of outsourced recruitment:

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<sup>214</sup>The Law No. 6596. “Askerlik Kanunu ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun.”, date of amendment: February 2, 2014, accessed April 5, 2014.

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/02/20140222-1.htm>.

<sup>215</sup>Adnan Keskin, “Hükümetten TSKya sus payı.”, *Taraf*, February 23, 2014, accessed April 5, 2014. <http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-yazdir-149002.html>.

<sup>216</sup>For an example application and recruitment guide, see the official website of Turkish Land Forces:

<http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/PerTem/PERSONEL%20TEM%C4%B0N%20FAAL%C4%B0YETLER%C4%B0.htm>. The guide is available also on: <http://ilan.memurlar.net/common/documents/4580/kilavuz.pdf>.

<sup>217</sup>For the links to the personnel recruitment announcements of all the forces, see: <http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/PerTem/ana1.asp>.

<sup>218</sup>There is a great deal of information pollution on the beginning dates of outsourcing of each force and for each position. Yet it is reported that TAF started to recruit contracted enlisted men very recently in November 2011, Air Forces participated in outsourcing trend only in 2014. See “İlk kez Hava Kuvvetleri Sözleşmeli Er Alıyor”,

1. Specialized trained enlisted men [uzman erbaş sınıfı] (formerly named as “specialized sergeants [sözleşmeli çavuş] –because “sergeancy is a rank of non-commissioned officers [astsubay], they opposed to the naming of this group of contracted personnel, and obviously their opposition caused this change): employed with periodic contracts since late 1990s, graduated at least from high school, bereft of several rights enjoyed by all the other military personnel. They constitute 22.47% (46.299 members) of the professional army (*Asker Hakları* 2014, 9).
2. Gendarmerie specialized sergeants [jandarma uzman çavuş sınıfı]: regular staff of Gendarmerie General Command, graduated from a specific type of two years long military school, designed only for this particular position, after a civilian high school. They have the right to use officers clubs [orduevleri] unlike the contracted specialized trained enlisted men of other forces. They are paid ¼ less than non-commissioned officers. They constitute 11.8% (24.084 members) of the professional army (*Asker Hakları* 2014, 9).
3. Regular military officers [muvazzaf subay sınıfı]: employed after 6 months long basic military training as regular staff, graduated from a 4-years university. This means they attended neither a military high school nor a military academy, yet they work in the same status with those who did. As they work under contract, though not repealed unless a very extreme circumstance occurs, they are not allowed the promotion to the position of general staff officer [kurmay subay].
4. Regular non-commissioned officers [muvazzaf astsubay sınıfı]: employed after 6 months long basic military training as regular staff, graduated from a 2-years university. This means they did not attend 2-years military schools that raise non-commissioned, yet they work in the same status with those who did.
5. Contracted enlisted men [sözleşmeli er]: graduated at least from elementary school, employed as periodically contracted personnel, bereft of several rights enjoyed by all the other military personnel just like specialized trained enlisted men [uzman çavuş sınıfı]. They constitute 0.63% (1.305 members) of the professional army (*Asker Hakları* 2014, 9).

As I put in the second chapter, despite the high salary offered and low



expectations on the educational background of the applicants, only 783 men applied to Turkish Land Forces while the quota was 5.103 for the position entitled contracted enlisted men. Turkish General Staff was surprised by the situation, according to the news in 2011.<sup>219</sup> Moreover, 3.149 specialized trained enlisted men were appointed to civil service jobs upon their own request<sup>220</sup>. Examples as such might be interpreted as low demand for outsourced military positions. However, even the percentages of outsourced military personnel reflect the existence of a great deal of demand if not as much as TAF expects. The latest numbers released by the military show the high percentages of specialized (outsourced) staff and contracted enlisted men in the overall number of military personnel.<sup>221</sup>

There is an association called *Uzmanlar Derneği* (UZDER) [Specialized Mens Association]<sup>222</sup>, targeting both gendarmerie specialized sergeants and specialized trained enlisted men. Yet I gather from the website of the association the educational difference between the two classes is a major source of discrimination against specialized trained enlisted men who do not attend military school for two years as gendarmerie specialized sergeants. The association however, describes its aim as fighting to end discrimination against both of the specialized classes. While the percentage of specialized personel is 35 in the grand total of 652.38, the number of contracted enlisted men is 2.412. The Turkish Coast Guard Command and the Gendermerie General Command opened applications for the position of contracted enlisted men in the last two years: thus, the number of their contracted enlistees is not reflected in this statement.

In respect to the yearly military/ defense budget, there has not been any significant reduction from 2003 to 2013. Last year, there has even been an increase. Besides, OYAKs annual profit has been increasing since 2007, reaching 1.951.51

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<sup>219</sup>“Sözleşmeli erde Genelkurmay şaşkın”, *Radikal*, December 1, 2011, accessed January 5, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sozlesmeli\\_erde\\_genelkurmay\\_saskin-1071175](http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sozlesmeli_erde_genelkurmay_saskin-1071175).

<sup>220</sup> <http://www.haberler.com/msb-3149-uzman-erbas-kendi-istegiyle-devlet-5056983-haberi/>

<sup>221</sup> “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Personel Sayıları (Mevcutları) Mart 2014”, *sozlesmelierler.net*, March 3, 2014, accessed May 5, 2014. [http://www.sozlesmelierler.net/?pnum=178&pt=T%C3%BCrk%20Silahl%C4%B1%20Kuvvetleri%20Personel%20Say%C4%B1lar%C4%B1%20\(Mevcutlar%C4%B1\)%20%20Mart%202014](http://www.sozlesmelierler.net/?pnum=178&pt=T%C3%BCrk%20Silahl%C4%B1%20Kuvvetleri%20Personel%20Say%C4%B1lar%C4%B1%20(Mevcutlar%C4%B1)%20%20Mart%202014).

<sup>222</sup> *Uzmanlar Derneği* (UZDER) [Specialized Mens Association] Official Website, <http://www.uzder.org.tr>.

million in 2012 (OYAK 2012 Annual Report). OYAK has become one of the largest holdings of Turkey (Akça 2010a, 19). Somehow, the military holding continues strengthening itself in an increasingly neoliberal context (Akça 2010a, 18-23; Ünsaldı 2008, 252-256). Thus, I think the military tries to make baby steps toward a privatized and less expensive way of recruiting military officers, sub-commissioned officers and soldiers. Certainly, there is an institutional and economic transformation in the military as there is in its political and economic relations with the government. However, as Akça argues specifically through the current situation of OYAK and the recently amended law no. 6596 show, it is quite impossible for now to claim that TAF is losing power in terms of institutional autonomy over its economic revenues or its state-sponsored budget.

#### **4.2. A military career for new generations**

What to expect from the future in this socio-economic context then, if one is a cadet? Knowing the exact salary you will earn at each succeeding level of your career and the cities you might work in, how to create a sense of your future expectations? What does it mean not being able to choose where you will work? How many young graduates are able to choose their workplace anyway? Most of my elder research participants addressed the duality in their expectations from the future back when they were in military high school or academy. On the one hand, the military authorities quite transparently determine the future of a cadet: their salary, the cities they might work in depending on their specific force, and even the time they can quit or get retired. On top of this, cadets are raised with a discourse of approaching privileges with a very high social status in the society, and this discourse help them make sense of their suffering from the violence comprised by professional military education. On the other hand, the immobility and inflexibility of military careers gives a sense of unpredictability to cadets: they are raised for a career over which they will not have any authority in terms of time and place management. Such a career has been deemed to be dissatisfying in several respects by most of the former cadets, either they are military officers on duty or working in private sector.

Under this subtitle, I argue that there is a discrepancy between cadets future expectations shaped during professional military education, and the social and economic conditions awaiting them after graduation as military officers. However, the content of this discrepancy is not identical, although similar, for everyone. While

former cadets from eldest-first group highlight their dissatisfaction with socio-economic conditions of military professionals, my research participants from younger cohorts, who suffered from discrimination and mobbing of their commanders, emphasize their socio-political anxieties in making the decision of leaving naval academy. There are of course varying narratives among the members of elder or younger cohorts, yet a majority of each group is on the same page.

#### **4.2.1. Neither poor nor rich: Dissatisfactions and appreciations of elder former cadets**

After the establishment of the Republic, a middle class of government employees forms gradually with the support of etatism, one of the Six Arrows. There is an adage in Turkish, describing the economic situation of the government employees who are not in high ranks: *Eşek kuyruğu gibi ne uzar ne kısalır.*<sup>223</sup> The narratives of my elder research participants coincide with the message of this adage to a great extent. Most of them think that a military career is economically not as satisfactory as it used to be in the past.

Oğuz thinks that many people who left the military school from his generation believed that they would do better outside, economically speaking:

Oğuz: The simplest thing, sometimes you work on the ship and you don't even have weekends. You are tied to a place. There may not be such liabilities in a private company. Well, of course it has some conditions. Regarding vacations, you might be at more ease but in terms of salary there is nothing satisfactory I think. At most you can win 4000 or 5000 TL. I mean, the man outside wins it at his thirties, why should I wait till I am 45? [...] Now we live in such a society that you are as man as the money you make, unfortunately the society is in such a condition now.<sup>224</sup>

Berk: The only thing I rely on, I believe that: I am valuable. That is not self confidence or impertinence. I am a different person. I rely on my feelings and I said "outside, I will be a happier person than I am now and I will make more money" and left.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>223</sup>“A donkeys tail neither grows nor shrinks.”

<sup>224</sup>Oğuz: En basitinden gemide çalışıyorsan bazen haftasonun bile olmuyor. Bir yere bağlı kalıyorsun. Özel şirkette bu kadar şeyin olmayabilir. Ya tabii ki bazı şartları var. İzin olarak daha rahat alabiliyorsun ama aldığın maaşın tatmin eder bir tarafı yok bence. En fazla dört bin lira, beş bin lira para kazanırsın. Yani dışarıdaki adam bunu otuz yaşında kazanıyor, niye ben kırk beş yaşına kadar bekleyeyim? [...] Artık öyle bir topluma geldik ki ne kadar paran varsa o kadar adamsın, toplum maalesef öyle bir hale geldi.

<sup>225</sup>Berk: Tek güvendiğim şey, şuna inanıyordum: Değerli biriyim. Bu özgüven ya da şımarıklık değil yani. Değişik bir insanım. Hislerime çok güveniyorum ve dışarıda

What Oğuz and Berk explain as their personal stories of leaving military school was one of my tentative guesses before the fieldwork. Although I was relying upon my observations among my former cadet-friends, I was aware that this is a very strong opinion and it could made me direct my research participants, albeit unconsciously. Yet, it did. While transcribing, I realized I put my opinion on the table before my research participant, fortunately only in my first couple of interviews. Afterwards, my interpretations of their answers to my question on their opinions about economic well being of military officers slightly changed.

Burak: For most people, the salary military officers get is really high. [...] I talk like that because I see myself in a different place, in a place I can gain a different financial success. [...] Well, I guess they tried to change the student profile, because when they took me and students like me, we were dissatisfied. We were just dissatisfied. Then I thought; do I endure this entire ordeal for 3500 TL?<sup>226</sup>

When Burak addresses his “different expectations from the future, he does not only refer to becoming wealthy but also to having a “different social environment than a military officer might ever have. Leaving aside the importance of making decisions about ones own life, Burak gained back the possibility of imagining future when he left the school.

Needless to prove, the youth who comes mostly from middle or upper middle class families learn to dream about a bright future during their educational life. Especially if graduated from one of the top universities of Turkey, people believe that they can do better than her parents and most people around them. Especially after the 1980 military coup, education has been the most valued investment for middle class families in order to give their children the chance to move up the social ladder (Rutz and Balkan 2013). Concerning the educational background of my interviewees, I argue that their dissatisfaction stems from both economic and social reasons.

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olduğum zaman şu anki halimden hem daha mutlu olacağım hem de daha fazla para kazanacağım, dedim ve çıktım.

<sup>226</sup>Burak: Çoğu insan için subayların aldığı ücretler gerçekten yüksektir. [...] Sadece ben kendimi farklı bir yerde gördüğüm için, farklı ekonomik başarıları elde edebilecek bir yerde gördüğüm için böyle konuşuyorum. [...] Ya hani diyorum ya öğrenci profilini değiştirmek istediler, çünkü ben ve benim gibi öğrenciler aldıkları zaman biz memnuniyetsizdik. Memnuniyetsiz yani. Düşünüyorum şimdi ben, bu kadar çileyi üç buçuk milyar için mi çekiyorum?

Burak, for instance, was ranked within the first 100 students among over a million students who took the high school entrance examination [*Temel Eğitimden Orta Öğretime Geçiş Sınavı, TEOG*] at the time. Most of my research participants come from middle class families and do not perceive the salary of a military officer as insignificant. However, as they had very good results in the high school entrance examination, they developed higher expectations from the future than Turkish Armed Forces can provide, both economically and socially. There is a duly widespread illusion among the graduates of top universities that they will be able to find the best jobs with best salaries. Accordingly, Burak holds on to the possibility of earning more than a military officer one day, although he makes much lower than 3.500<sup>227</sup> in his current job.

Secondly, there is another and sometimes more significant layer to this issue for the cadets of military academies. If they went to a military high school as well, they are taught to perceive themselves as “superior to everyone and everything as Birand quotes from a commander of a military school: “Always bear in mind that you are superior to everyone and everything and that you are trained here to have superior knowledge and superior qualities.” (Birand 1986, 44) When I asked Selim whether this discourse still maintains by reading this quotation, he said no. The emphasis was more on the equal intelligence and success of cadets with the students of top civilian universities rather than on superiority. He remembered one of the regiment commanders of naval academy saying “You could have enrolled in the top universities of this country, the only difference between you and those students who are in Bogazici University is that you chose to serve to your country.” Though seemingly softened, the same understanding survives with a different discourse: patriotism to sacrifice the social life that would come during and after the education of a top university is put forward to distinguish cadets positively from the students of top universities. If not assertively trained to perceive themselves as “the protectors of the nation and as “superior to everyone and everything, cadets are obviously taught to expect more than they would actually acquire after graduation.

As almost always valid, their expectations, and dissatisfaction if became a military officer, are shaped not only by the hegemonic discourse and institutional

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<sup>227</sup> A second lieutenant of Turkish Naval Forces or Turkish Coast Guard Command makes approximately 3.500 Turkish liras starting right after the oath-taking ceremony in the summer of his/ her graduation. The amount changes depending on his particular duty, which may also change at times, though not radically.

atmosphere of military schools but also by the past lives and experiences of cadets. To reflect this diversity while arguing that all of my research participants expressed this discrepancy and dissatisfaction albeit with different perceptions and arguments, I will proceed firstly by focusing on the narratives of Kaan, Berk, and Mahmut. Afterwards I will move on with my four research participants from younger cohorts, and their expectation that the prospective cadets of TAF will increasingly come from low-income families with lower social and cultural capital.

#### **4.2.1.1. Kaan and the repercussions of immobility, inflexibility, and hierarchy**

Mobility and flexibility are raising values of our global society. Needless to say, when I use the expression “global society, I mean a certain segment of the society that actually has access to information technologies and global employment opportunities. I think this immobility and inflexibility is a great source of anxiety for those who work as military officers, while it is one of many socially grounded reasons why most of my interviewees left naval academy.

Approximately every two years, military officers are appointed to their new work places in a different city. Last May, three military officers I know were inducted to their new places. Among them, I was unable to secure an interview with Ali. After his recent reappointment, he is quite worried about moving to a smaller city than the one he was working in. Not only his social environment will change, he thinks he will get very bored in a small city and he is afraid that his tedium will lead him to drink more alcohol than he already does. Ali says he will quit when he finds an opportunity.

One of my interviewees, Kaan, was working in a very small city before he was inducted to a big city almost a year ago. When I visited him last year, he brought me to a restaurant where he and his commander eat and drink alcohol almost everyday. During that day, I was trying to find a break to interview him. We entered the restaurant at 2 pm. I met his commander, the owner of the restaurant who is friends with almost all military personnel in the city, and other civilian people who hang out with them. Then, we found a break and made a short interview, which was interrupted by the owners shouting “lunch is ready. We started by having lunch at 3-4 pm and ended up leaving the place at 2 am. I was quite uncomfortable as the only woman at the table. Sexist and homophobic jokes and stories were all over the place together with with *raki*, fish and *mezes*. His commander was a very assertive man whose wife was living in a different city because of her work.

Kaan: That was its contribution to me, well, I got old earlier. I could live a more comfortable life and I wanted that, too. I could also want to have an egg war on the report card day like my peers at the age 14. I could want having a long vacation instead of a short one in summers. I could want to be with my mom and dad in the evenings. Especially between ages 14 and 18, and even university can be included. Especially, between the ages 14 and 18, well, I should be with my parents. I think it would have been healthier, I wanted that. [...] And besides that, you are a young guy, after all. There is also that side, I mean, if you were outside... Do you understand? Well... (Taking a deep breath) I don't know...

[...]

Well, do you know what that means? You do not arrange your job according to yourself, your life; you arrange yourself, your life according to your job.<sup>228</sup>

According to Kaan, a lonely and inflexible working life follows a childhood in a highly disciplinary institution, away from the family and joys of being a schoolboy. Kaan and many other research participants think that immobility and inflexibility bring unhappiness and boredom.

One of the military officers on the table who was working in a nearby city and drove to where we are to hang out with Kaan's commander was a very talkative man. He narrated how he drove fast after getting drunk, why he works as a military officer although his family is rich, and why he cannot get married and settle down. In the mean time, my drunken friend Kaan was shouting me to take notes and use these observations in my thesis. At the end of the night, when I was quite drunk too, I think the 12 hours I spent with several military officers and military-friendly local men was full of boredom and sadness. Of course the circumstances of Triqui farmworkers in the U.S.A. and military officers in Turkey cannot be compared but I cannot resist thinking how similar the vicious circles in the lives of these two groups are.

Seth Holmes, in his book *Fresh Fruit Broken Bodies*, narrates Crescencios headaches as the anguish of insult. Crescencio is one of the Triqui farmworkers with

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<sup>228</sup>Kaan: Bana onu kattı yani, erken yaşlandırdı beni. Daha rahat yaşayabilirdim ve bunu isterdim de. On dört yaşındaki yaşlıtlarım gibi ben de okulun karne gününde yumurta savaşı yapmayı isteyebilirdim. Yazın çok kısa tatil değil de uzun tatiller yapmayı isteyebilirdim. Akşamları annemin babamın yanında olmayı isteyebilirdim. On dört-on sekiz yaş arası özellikle ya da üniversite de dahil buna. Özellikle on dört-on sekiz arası ben annemle babamla olmalıyım yani. Bence daha sağlıklı olurdu, bence, ben onu isterdim. [...] Bunun yanında bir de sonuçta genç adamsın. Bir de işin o kısmı var yani, dışarıda olsan... Anladın mı? Yani... (Derin bir nefes) Bilmiyorum ya... [...] Yani ne demek bu biliyor musun? Sen kendine göre, hayatına göre işini kuruyorsun, sen işine göre hayatını kendini ayarlıyorsun.

whom Holmes works in strawberry fields in the US. When Crescencio asks Holmes for medicine for his headaches, Holmes learns about his pain. Crescencio explains that “everytime a farm supervisor called him names on the job, made fun of him, or reprimanded him unfairly, he developed one of these severe headaches. (Holmes 2013, 97) He also explains that he feels more prone to anger with his wife and children during his headaches. After seeing several doctors and Triqui healers who cannot find any solution, Crescencio finds his own remedy: drinking 20-24 beers. Holmes states that:

These socially constructed headaches lead him to get angry with his family and get drunk, thus involuntarily embodying the stereotype of Mexican migrants as misogynists and alcoholics. This stereotype serves to legitimate the ethnic-citizenship hierarchy on the farm as well as the racist treatment the migrant workers receive. This symbolic violence, embodied so precisely by Crescencio, works to make invisible the racism and xenophobia underlying the disrespect that he and other Mexican migrants are seen to deserve. Finally, this disrespect is added to the forces positioning migrant berry pickers at the bottom of the farm hierarchy. (Holmes 2013, 98)

Holmes draws attention to a violence continuum from racist insults to violence against women and children. It may sound very disturbing to many, even to compare the conditions of Triqui farmworkers in the US with the conditions of military officers in Turkey. However, as Bourdieu argues in *Masculine Domination*, both the dominated and the dominant can be victims of symbolic violence, although quite differently under different circumstances.

The effect of symbolic domination (whether ethnic, gender, cultural or linguistic, etc.) is exerted not in the pure logic of knowing consciousness but through the schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are constitutive of habitus and which, below the level of decisions of consciousness and the controls of the will, set up a cognitive relationship that is profoundly obscure to itself. (Bourdieu 2001, 37)

In line with Holmes and Bourdieu, I argue that the repercussions of immobile, inflexible, and hierarchical working conditions are reflected in Kaan’s consumption of alcohol. I cannot elaborate further on the perceptions of his commander or other co-workers as I had very little contact with them and I do not have any observation on their relationships with their wife, children or other family and friends. Yet Kaan thinks they have been treated unfairly as cadets and he deserves better than his existing working conditions. He also expressed feeling very aggressive and prone to violence in his personal relationships. I interpret Kaan’s inclination to aggression and alcohol



consumption as a manifestation of the impacts of his educational past and current working conditions as well as of the problems he has with his family.

*“I wish the best of luck to the person who will marry me!”*

The feeling of disappointment and being treated unfairly stems mostly from the future anxieties of former cadets about their personal lives. Reminding me the motto of radical feminism, “the personal is political, Kaan was very worried about his future romantic relationships. He had a relationship at the time of our interview, yet he and his girlfriend were living in different cities:

Kaan: Now, I am arranging myself all over in a new city. I will leave this place and go somewhere else, rearrange my life again there. And now I am alone, single. What will happen if I decide to get married in the future? God help the person I am going to marry! I will call in the morning and say, “gather our stuff, I am appointed.” She has to be someone who will collect the boxes in the evening when I am home and won’t be unhappy about it. Apart from that, how will she work? Now, people are not packages, should we marry teachers only just because there are schools everywhere? Do you understand? Let’s say her work is about finance and she gets into a bank and gets promoted; for that she needs to be in Istanbul or Ankara. I will say “come to that city with me.” Or she is a chemist. Where will she work? Constantly drifting from some place to another... I have friends, for instance, woman says “I won’t leave this place” and so won’t the kid. What will they do? At best he could work for five years and try turning back but one day he will go again. A guy at civilian high school, for instance, wouldn’t think of that at my age. Well, do you know what that means? You do not arrange your job according to yourself, your life; you arrange yourself, your life according to your job.<sup>229</sup>

Many military officers, among whom I have been doing participant-observation, carry the same anxieties about their future. The immobility and inflexibility brought by the

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<sup>229</sup> Kaan: Ben şimdi bir şehirde yeni baştan hayat kuruyorum. Ben şimdi buradan çıkacağım, başka bir yere gideceğim, yeni baştan orada hayat kuracağım. Artı şu an ben tek başımayım, bekarım. Yarın bir gün evlenmeye kalksam nasıl olacak? Benim evleneceğim insana Allah kolaylık versin! Ben sabah arayacağım diyeceğim ki “kolileri topla, benim tayinim çıktı”. Akşam geldiğimde kolileri toplayıp bundan da mutsuz olmayacak bir insan olması lazım. Onu da geç, ne iş yapacak? Şimdi insanlar paket değil, öğretmen mi alacağız her yerde okul var diye, anladın mı? Diyelim ki ekonomiyle ilgili bir yerde çalışıyor, atıyorum bankaya girdi, yükseldi, yükselebilmesi için İstanbul ya da Ankara. Ben diyeceğim ki gel şu şehre. Ya da kimyager. Nerede çalışacak? Sürekli oradan oraya, oradan oraya. Arkadaşlarım var işte, kız diyor ki “ben buradan ayrılmam”, e çocuk da gidemez. Ne yapacak? Taş çatlasın beş sene çalışıp dönmeye çalışsın, yine bir gün gidecek. Bunu mesela sivil lisede okuyan bir adam benim yaşımdayken düşünmez. Yani ne demek bu biliyor musun? Sen kendine göre, hayatına göre işini kuruyorsun, sen işine göre hayatını kendini ayarlıyorsun.

current conditions of a military career, even for the military officers of Turkish Coast Guard Command who work only in seaside cities, creates a perception that they deserve better. As most of the military officers among my research participants share this perception, those who left or were expelled from the military school feel free to reveal their complacency about being outside the military, especially in regard to their personal lives:

Oğuz: Before, these cases were more flexible. There weren't many troubles. Well, for me... These are, of course relative troubles. I mean, I might find it difficult while another one does not. Something that bothers another one may not bother me at all. I mean, in conclusion, it depends on how you look at it or what kind of a person you are. I didn't find these difficult. I might have but I thought like this... I could do this job better than most people, I mean, perhaps better than most people who work at this profession right now, because I had this thing in me... I might have stronger sense of patriotism than others. But I... To be honest, under these circumstances I see some kind of people. I said "I can't do this job" in the end. Frankly speaking, I had trouble. I thought, if I had trouble, that would also affect my private life and so, well, I quitted.

[...]

Now, where you would go is unclear, on which ship you would be is unclear, most probably you won't be in Istanbul, you will be out of Istanbul; and as a result you won't be able to have a family life in the future, well, it is distressing, I mean, because you won't step on to land in that five or six years. Well, I mean, I didn't think that I could do it; to be honest, it is because I didn't think that I could work under those circumstances. Otherwise, it is not because of psychological pressure or something like that.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Oğuz: Öncesinde biraz daha esnekti bu durumlar. Çok sıkıntılı durumlar yoktu. Ya benim... Bunlar tabii kişiden kişiye değişen zorluklar. Yani bu bana göre zor gelir, başkasına zor gelmeyebilir. Yani başkasını zorlayan şey bana zor gelmeyebilir. Yani sonuç olarak nereden baktığım, nasıl bir karakter olduğuna bağlı. Bana bunlar zor gelmedi. Gelecekte açıkçası, şöyle düşündüm ben. Ben açıkçası çoğu insandan belki şuanda mesleği yapan çoğu insandan daha iyi bu işi yapabiliyordim çünkü benim içimdeki hani şey... Vatan sevgisi belki diğerlerinden daha güçlü olabilir. Ama benim... Ben açıkçası bu şartlar altında bir takım gördüğüm insanlar oluyor. "Bu işi yapamam" dedim ben yani. Sıkıntı yaşadım açıkçası yani. Sıkıntı yaşarsan bu benim özel hayatımı da etkiler diye düşündüm ondan dolayı bıraktım ben yani. [...]

Şimdi nereye gideceğin belli değil, hangi gemide olacağım belli değil, İstanbulda olmayacağım büyük ihtimal İstanbul dışında olacaksın; sonuç olarak bir aile hayatın olmayacak ilerde yani sıkıntı o hani beş sene boyunca, altı sene boyunca ayağın karaya basmayacağı için. Yani ben yapabileceğimi düşünmedim açıkçası yani ben bu şartlar altında çalışabileceğimi düşünmediğim için. Yoksa öyle büyük psikolojik baskı ya da öyle bir şeyden dolayı değil.

The anxieties of military officers and contentment of the former cadets who left the school hold for many issues besides personal/ romantic relationships, which I will further elaborate on under following subtitles.

#### **4.2.1.2. Berk: The soul of a military officer, the money of an advertiser**

“Experience is nothing, creativity is everything said Berk while I was trying to follow his fast and passionate narrative my eyes open. His utter reliance on what he considers the values of the “capitalist order whilst explaining the reasons behind his detachment from the military logic ignited the idea for this chapter. His narrative impressed the pre-fieldwork outline of this chapter more than it should have as I thought of his perceptions on the contradictions between the military and neoliberal economic orders not as “perceptions but as proofs. After my fieldwork, I comprehended that Berk’s narrative on the differences between military and neoliberal work ethics is based also on his particular perceptions of professional military education and advertisement business.

Berk: And I said, instead of selling my life and my freedom in return of such an amount of money as a lieutenant, I could make more money and achieve a very different status in life outside by being only me [Berk] and using only my personal abilities.<sup>231</sup>

He put forward a strong opinion that selling ones freedom is worse than selling ones talents and capabilities. It is worse not only because of the possibility of earning more money but also because of the promise of “freedom and social statue outside the military zones. Therefore, there are three apparent sides to this contradiction according to Berk: Freedom, social statue, and money/ economic well being.

What constitutes this “freedom? The discourse of neoliberal global mobility promises freedom and mobility to white-collar workers, even if one goes abroad once a year and only for a couple of days. Although many white-collar workers suffer from flexible working hours and absent overtime payments both economically and psychologically, there is a widely shared sense of “mobility/ freedom among former cadets, at least discursively. In that sense, Ümit’s way of explaining why he left naval academy supports Berk’s narrative, although more moderately:

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<sup>231</sup> Berk: Ve ben dedim ki bir teğmen olarak böyle bir miktar paranın karşılığında hayatımı ve özgürlüğümü satmak yerine, ben [Berk] olarak dışarıda sadece bende olan özelliklerimi kullanarak hem daha fazla para kazanırım, hem de çok daha farklı bir statü elde ederim hayatta.

Ümit: Since there would be a better life outside... I mean, frankly, I don't have that many reasons. I was at ease in school, didn't get punished much, didn't, well, itch for trouble; I was comfortable, in that sense didn't have much... Only, well, I saw some officers and think "Man, how that guy became an officer?" Or saw some friends and "Man, how will that guy become an officer?"... There were that kind of people; he would only use his rank. Since, most probably, everything would depend on me outside... That's why I quitte.<sup>232</sup>

Predictably, military hierarchy and normative military masculinity requires respect and absolute submission to the experience of the elders/ higher ranked military officers. However, Berk disagrees with this principle and advocates the work ethics of, what he calls, "the capitalist order:

Berk: The thing I feared most was that. You will say something to someone, and that someone will patronize you although he has no authority. Or people who you wouldn't even look at on the street will see themselves authorized to tell you things just because he got into the school before you, he will graduate before you. This is also something offensive. I believe that this world, yes, it has an order, should be ruled with intelligence. I mean, I support that smart people should rule the stupid ones. A fool cannot rule a smart person. Then there is only one way left: the smart will rule the fool. And for the smart one to rule the fools, you have to infuse that responsibility and consciousness into that person. Not, "My friend, you are very intelligent, very smart but stay where you are." "You are intelligent, very smart: You will fuck them all." You will give that thing, that authority to him and so after that those people who are ten years older than him won't be able to patronize, get smart with him just because they are older. The order of the world, the present, capitalist order is founded on that. The smarter one wins. And it is poles apart with the whole system of the army, Turkish Armed Forces.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>232</sup>Ümit: Dışarıda daha güzel bir hayat vardır diye. Yani aslında öyle çok da bir nedenim yok. Okulda rahattım, çok fazla ceza almıyordum, çok fazla böyle kaşınmıyordum; rahattım o konuda bir şeyim yoktu. Bir tek hani bazı subayları görüyordum, "ulan bu adam nasıl subay oldu" diye... Ya da bazı arkadaşlarımı görüyordum "ulan bu nasıl subay olacak"... O tarz kişiler vardı; adam sadece rütbesini kullanacaktı. Dışarıdayken her şey benim elimde olur büyük ihtimalle diye... O yüzden ayrıldım.

<sup>233</sup>Berk: En çok korktuğum şey buydu yani. Birine bir şey söyleyeceğim, biri sana kalkıp hiçbir yetkisi olmamasına rağmen üstlük taslayacak. Veya yolda yürürken suratına bakmayacağıın insanlar sırf senden önce o okula girdiği için, daha önce mezun olduğu için sana bir şeyler söylemekte kendini yetkili görecek. Bu da çok ağır bir şey. Ben bu dünyada, evet dünyanın bir düzeni var, zekayla yönetilmesinden yanayım. Yani zeki olan insanların aptal olan insanları yönetmesi taraftarıyım. Aptal olan insan zekiye yönetemez. O zaman tek bir şey kalıyor: Zeki olan aptalı yönetecek. Zeki olanın aptalı yönetmesi için de bu adama bu sorumluluğu, bilinci aşılaman lazım. Kardeşim çok akıllısın, çok zekisin ama olduğun yerde kal, değil. Çok akıllısın, çok zekisin: Hepsinin anasını sikeceksin. Buna o yetkiyi ve o şeyi vereceksin ki ondan sonra senden on yaş büyük olan adamlar, sadece yaşça büyük olduğu için sana gelip bilmişlik

As to Berk's perception, neoliberal work ethic does not respect hierarchy based on experience, and thus, it contradicts with the logic of the military hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, he thinks the individual is responsible for whatever happens to her/him and whatever s/he succeeds in. Not only experience but also owning more money does not make one special:

Berk: If this is the order for this work, I support it. If stupid people will lose, fuck them, they can lose. Because everything is in their own hands. I could have been an idle person. Life dragged me to this way and this kind of a person I became. It was my luck, yes, I am this kind of a person and I am standing up for it. But you, my friend, live in beer and skittles, don't give a fuck about the world, if you will come and show off just because you have extra 30.000 TL money in your pocket, I will roll that 30.000 TL and stick it to your ass. Money, experience, they are nothing. The only thing which matters is whether you can create a new thing and whether you can be different than other people. I think most people catch this in a period of their lives and say "Man, nobody around ma can do that but me. Then here we go!" And this is the point I support. With smart, I don't mean people with higher IQ rates. I mean people who want to create something new, make an effort and use their mind for just themselves. Otherwise there are lots of smart people, who can handle math very well, who are physic professors; I don't put those in that circle. There are people who see and realize that system and, call it a pyramid or call it a ring, try to climb at the highest point of that. I am talking about them.<sup>234</sup>

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taslayamayacak, bilginlik taslayamayacak. Dünyadaki düzen, şu anki halihazırdaki kapitalist düzen, bunun üzerine kurulmuştur. Zeki olan kazanır. Ve ordunun, şu an Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin bütün sistemiyle taban tabana çelişir.

<sup>234</sup> Berk: Bu işin düzeni buysa ben o düzeni destekliyorum abi. Aptal insanlar kaybedecekse siktirsin kaybetsin. Her şey herkesin kendi elinde çünkü. Ben avare bir insan da olabilirdim. Hayat beni buraya sürükledi ve böyle bir insan oldum. Benim şansımdı, evet ben böyle bir insanım ve bunu savunuyorum. Ama sen kardeşim laylaylom bir hayat yaşamışsın, dünya sikinde değil, kalkacaksın sadece cebinde benden 30 bin lira fazla paran var diye bana şekil yapacaksın, o 30 bin lirayı kıvırıp senin götüne sokarım. Para, tecrübe, bunların hiçbiri önemli değil abi. Tek önemli şey, ortaya çıkardığın yeni şey ve diğer insanlardan farklılaşabildiğin bir nokta var. Bunu bence herkes hayatının bir evresinde yakalıyor ve diyor ki ulan bunu benim etrafımda hiç kimse yapamıyor, bir tek ben yapıyorum. O zaman hadi! Dediği yer var ya, hep onu savunurum. O zekadan kastım IQsu yüksek insanlar değil. Ortaya yeni bir şeyler çıkarmak isteyen, çabalayan ve aklını sadece kendine yoran insanlardan bahsediyorum. Yoksa çok zeki insanlar da var abi, matematiği çok iyi becerne, çok iyi fizik bile profesörler de var, onları bu dairenin içine sokmuyorum. Bu sistemin ve bu sürecin farkında olup bir şekilde o piramitse piramit, halkaysa halka, onun en yükseğine çıkmaya çalışan insanlar var, onlardan bahsediyorum.

Berk does not hold intelligence or intellect over money and experience. He rather values awareness and nimbleness: awareness of surrounding economic and social hierarchies, and willingness to climb the social ladder with whichever means available. The valorization of experience per se in military hierarchy, and respecting someone just for his/ her age, is not acceptable for Berk's understanding of freedom and human dignity, which he put into words as the "rule of this system.

The social statue that is promised by the neoliberal economy is already imbued with the idea of freedom and human dignity according to him. Outside the military zones, one can choose where to live, how much to pay for a dinner, and how to respond to a senior as opposed to the conditions of military officers:

Berk: But when I look from the professional dimension, not spiritual but professional and physical dimension, military officership is more than a job, a lifestyle, a way of living. You cannot be both a military officer and a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. They cannot come together. You cannot want to have a normal life like an ordinary person and serve this country as a military officer at the same time. You have to choose one. Whatever you become you are tied to somewhere, there are some people above you, there is a government upon them; I mean there is a nation. For instance someone will... Someone, a son a bitch will come and say "you motherfucker, we give your salary." You cannot say "the fuck you give" because they really are the ones paying you but perhaps the work you do has nothing to do with them. The thing I feared most was that. You will say something to someone, and that someone will patronize you although he has no authority. Or people who you wouldn't even look at on the street will see themselves authorized to tell you things just because he got into the school before you, he will graduate before you. This is also something offensive. I believe that this world, yes, it has an order, should be ruled with intelligence.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>235</sup>Berk: Ama için mesleki boyutuna bakarsam, manevi boyutuna değil de, mesleki ve maddi boyutuna bakarsam, subaylık bence bir meslekten öte bir hayat şekli, yaşam biçimi. Hem subay olup hem Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde yaşayan bir birey olamazsın. İkisi aynı anda yürüyemez. Hem normal bir insan gibi bir hayata sahip olmak isteyim hem de subay olarak bu ülkede görev yapamazsın. İkisinden birini tercih edeceksin. Ne olursan ol bir yere bağlısın, senin üstünde birileri var, onların üstünde devlet var. bir millet var yani. birinin kalkıp mesela... Biri, bir orospu çocuğu kalkacak ve bana şunu diyecek, "ulan amına kodumunun çocuğu senin maaşını biz veriyoruz Ananın amını veriyorsun diyemezsin çünkü hakikaten o veriyor maaşını ama belki senin yaptığın işin belki onunla hiçbir alakası yok. En çok korktuğum şey buydu yani. Birine bir şey söyleyeceğim, biri sana kalkıp hiçbir yetkisi olmamasına rağmen üstlük taslayacak. Veya yolda yürürken suratına bakmayacağın insanlar sırf senden önce o okula girdiği için, daha önce mezun olduğu için sana bir şeyler söylemekte kendini yetkili görecek. Bu da çok ağır bir şey. Ben bu dünyada, evet dünyanın bir düzeni var, zekayla yönetilmesinden yanayım.

Ironically, he thinks it is the military as a working environment in which one cannot easily oppose his seniors because of money related concerns. TAF pays the salaries of military officers in the name of the nation and high ranked military officers embody the will of the nation. What TAF and its professional members do constitutes a life style rather than a job, both professionally and economically. Therefore, a military officer cannot stake out a claim on his labor and his salary as an individual, and cannot oppose his commanders. On the other hand, in accordance with this perception on the differences between military and civilian jobs, he said that in private sector, he never did and never will submit to his seniors if he is right:

Berk: I do not respect any people who are 60 years old, for instance, I don't respect a 100-year-old, either. Let them go and fucking die, they have no use to me. Who cares, really, who cares?! What is it to me if you get 200 years old, go fuck yourself. Or I don't respect the people who are 5 years older than me just because they are 5 years older. This, for instance, may be the only reason I won't do that job. I do not respect. Because the work they do... Though they came to school just a year before me and... Think it, he is coming to school a year before me, we are getting the same education, he idles for a year. Then he lords it over! What the fuck! Now outside, nobody can do that to me. Now, I am a copywriter in one of the best ad agencies of Turkey. No writer who is 5 years older than me or who worked 5 years more than me can give a revision to a text, filming, radio broadcast I write. [After that he talks while hitting the table in a rhythm.] He can't, I would get the shit out of him! He has no such authority. Experience is nothing. Anything put forward is created from zero. Both for him and for me. It is that simple. That is why I am doing this job, perhaps.<sup>236</sup>

I argue that Berk's passionate emphasis on freedom and human dignity (not being subjected) in work place is in line with David Harveys claim for "the central values of civilization. Harvey argues that "the founding figures of neoliberal thought took

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<sup>236</sup>Berk: 60 yaşındaki hiçbir insana saygı duymam mesela, 100 yaşındaki hiçbir insana saygı duymam. Siktirsin gitsin ölsün, bana hiçbir faydası yok. Bana ne abi, bana ne yani?! 200 yaşına gelsen nolur, siktir git. Ya da benden 5 yaş büyük insanlara sadece benden 5 yaş büyük olduğu için saygı duymam. Bu benim mesela o mesleği yapamamamın yegane sebebi olabilir. Saygı duymuyorum. Çünkü yaptıkları işi... Sadece benden bir sene önce o okula girmelerine rağmen ve... Düşünsene benden bir sene önce giriyorsun, aynı eğitimi alıyoruz, bir seneyi öyle avare gibi geçiriyorsun. Bana artistlik taşıyorsun! Hassiktir! Şu an dışarıda bunu bana hiç kimse yapamıyor. Ben şu an Türkiye'nin en iyi reklam ajanslarından birinin yazarıyım. Benden 5 yaş fazla, 5 sene fazla çalışmış bir yazar kalkıp benim yazdığım hiçbir metne, ne metne ne filme ne radyoya kalkıp bir tane revizyon veremiyor. [Bundan sonrasını ritmik bir şekilde masaya vurarak anlatıyor] Veremez, ağzına sığarım. Öyle bir yetkisi yok. Tecrübe hiçbir şeydir. Ortaya çıkarılan her şey sıfırdan çıkarılmıştır. Onun için de benim için de. Bu kadar basit bir şey. O yüzden belki de bu mesleği yapıyorum.

political ideals of human dignity and freedom as fundamental (Harvey 2005, 5). From individual to society, Berk agrees with these values sincerely. Through his personal success story, he pointed out the differences between the military order and neoliberal order, and the lack of freedom and human dignity in the former. However, his nationalist and militaristic feelings are not diminished because of his disagreement with the logic of military hierarchy. Right after his claims on the contradictions between military and capitalist logics, he continued with how the experience of military school provides him with a great advantage in advertisement. Thus, I interpret his attempt to dignify professional military education right after his criticisms towards military hierarchy as a way to make sense of his detachment from the military without demeaning nationalism and Turkish Armed Forces.

Berk narrated his struggle of leaving the school despite his fathers fierce opposition, and of climbing the ladder very quickly in advertisement by periodically reminding me that he is a nationalist but he just did not get along with the military's understanding of work. His recallings of nationalism and good parts of professional military education throughout our interview were expressed through the key role of the experience of military education in his success.

Berk: It is a big advantage. But not for everyone, of course... The man who is an officer now... It is no use to him, I mean. Since I behave like a sociologist and I do a job like a sociologist, a job which is directed to attract people, change their shopping habits, I see the benefit of it. Because I know that a man from Istanbul will perceive it that way... I divide them into socio-economical classes. Like A, B, C, D, E: according to their salary, their income. When I look, I have friends from all socio-economical classes! Presently I have. Then that A, B, C, D, E seems like this to me: A Ahmet, B Burak, C Cumhur, D Deniz, E Engin. I divide them all according to their socio-economical classes and I think "What would Ahmet do if he heard of that campaign?" Well, he would show such a reaction, then we should change that. If the campaign is something that will involve E, Engin, I say "Man, Engin wouldn't get any of that, we are too, well, sophisticated. We should simplify that and reinforce it with more amateurish visuals and ideas." And I organize the campaign accordingly. This is an advantage for me, an advantage nobody else has.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Berk: Bu büyük bir avantaj. Ama herkes için değil tabii. Şu an subay olmuş adamın... Onun için bir faydası yoktur yani. Bir toplumbilimci gibi davranıp bir toplumbilimci gibi bir meslek icra ettiğim için, insanları etkilemeye yönelik, onların alışveriş alışkanlıklarını değiştirmeye yönelik bir iş yaptığım için ister istemez bunun bana faydasını görüyorum. Çünkü biliyorum ki İstanbullu bir adam bunu böyle karşılayacak... Onları sosyo-ekonomik sınıflara ayırıyorum. A, B, C, D, E gibi: Aldıkları maaşlara, kazançlarına göre. Bakıyorum, bütün sosyo-ekonomik sınıflardan arkadaşlarım var! Halihazırda da var. Sonra o A, B, C, D, E bende şöyle oluyor: A



The notions of “class unity and “mens friendship, mentioned in previous chapter, turn out to have an exchange value, as defined by Karl Marx. Friendships of cadets, established without discriminating anyone from the same cohort, already are products of human labor. As put by many interviewees, cadets of a particular cohort make a big effort to protect class unity by solving the conflicts between classmates. They have a great deal of use value since they provide protection from violence of any kind, which may be directed by commanders, officer-teachers, or elder cohorts. However, Berk added a certain kind of exchange value on this. His friendships with other cadets were deemed to be “commodities by reason of the fact that they had been produced for other (Marx 1887[1867], 29). Not only Berk’s friendships with other cadets but also the whole experience of such a disciplinary institution have an exchange value in Berk’s current life:

Berk: Not just exams, there are also some rules they make you obliged to, or you have to obey. When you submit, you can get out at the weekend, it is a reward. Think of it like being trained with food. They tell me “Be a good boy in the weekdays and you can go out at the weekend then.” They feed me. And with that feeding, I behave and do those. This becomes a habit. I do not link it to a condition then. I say “Man, from now on I should always try for better, try for much better and get rewarded for that.” When I do it systematically, the work becomes all about this.<sup>238</sup>

As he situated the source of his malleable creativity in his friendships with cadets coming from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, the roots of his efficiency was based on carrot and stick approach of professional military education.

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Ahmet, B Burak, C Cumhur, D Deniz, E Engin. Hepsini sosyoekonomik sınıfına göre ayırıyorum ve diyorum ki Ahmet bu kampanyayı duysa ne yapardı? Haa şöyle bir tepki verirdi, o zaman şöyle değiştirelim. Eğer kampanya Eyi, Engini kapsayacak bir kampanyaysa “Ulan Engin bundan hiçbir şey anlamazdı, çok şey kaldık, sofistike kaldık. O zaman bunu daha basite indirgemeli ve daha amatör görsel ve amatör fikirlerle desteklemeliyiz deyip kampanyayı ona göre organize ediyorum. Bu benim için bir avantaj, hiç kimsede olmayan bir avantaj.

<sup>238</sup>Berk: Sırf sınavlar değil, seni mecbur tuttukları belli kurallar da var ya uymak zorunda olduğun. Onlara uyduğun zaman haftasonu dışarı çıkıyorsun, bu bir mükafat ya. Yemekle eğitmek gibi düşün bunu. Bana diyorlar ki haftaiçi yaramazlık yapma haftasonu izne çık. Beni yemiyorlar. Ben de o yemle beraber yaramazlık yapmıyorum ve şey yapıyorum. Bu da bir alışkanlığa dönüşüyor. Bunu bir şarta bağlamıyorum. Diyorum ki kardeşim benim artık sürekli iyiyi çabalamam lazım, daha iyiyi çabalamam lazım ve bunun karşılığında mükafat almam lazım. Bu sisteme bağladığım zaman da iş buna dönüşmüş oluyor.

A use value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labour in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it. How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labour, contained in the article. The quantity of labour, however, is measured by its duration, and labour time in its turn finds its standard in weeks, days, and hours. (Marx 1887 [1867], 28)

As Berk, many other research participants who currently work in a civilian job stated similar opinions about the affects of the military education on their lives:

Ümit: Outside, the number of people who haven't improved themselves is very high, I mean the number of people you cannot even have a talk with is very high. For that reason, I see that those 8 years gave a magnificent education to us, no matter what people say, I don't know. [...] There are people who are 22 years old and still their mamma's boys; we got ahead of that, we got our feet on the ground, we maintain our own lives. I mean, we learned living with 200 people, living in a community. Outside, people – and especially at these times – are unable to get involved in the society, are afraid of that. We, as 200 people, learned how to talk there, when TV was at minimum; I mean, we talked, made jokes. Now outside, people are with computers... They are hanging out ridiculously, I mean neat and nice times we spent there is not common outside... More precisely, it is boarding school culture, I think; because people I talk with about boarding schools say that it is a common thing in boarding schools. [...]

**“What do you mean with improving yourself? Like warm human relations and...”**

All kinds: Time management, work discipline – as you see I don't care much about appearance management. There is time management, work discipline, ability to look from different angles to a case, managing some situations easily; because another thing we are taught on was the ability to lie quickly in the military. Because sometimes you have to, like “why did you do that?”... I mean, your mind begins... You cannot say “I didn't care and did that”, there is no such answer. “Sir I did it because of that, these happened and then that... For that reason I did it”... There is also that thing, stress management; I mean, people are whining, weeping about things and they say “Man, how can you be so relaxed?” I say “It will clear up” relaxed, I mean... “We went through many worse things, never mind that one...”<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>239</sup>Ümit: Dışarıda kendini geliştirememiş insan sayısı çok falza, yani dışarıda muhabbet edemeyeceğin bile insan sayısı çok fazla. O yüzden o 8 yıl hani muhteşem bir eğitim olmuş, kim ne derse desin, bilmiyorum... [...] 22 yaşında hala böyle anne kuzusu olan kişiler var dışarıda; biz onları falan aşmışız, biz daha yere sağlam basıyoruz, kendi hayatımızda kendimizi idame ettiriyoruz. İşte 200 kişiyle yaşamayı, toplulukla yaşamayı öğrendik. Dışarıda insanlar -hele şu dönemde- toplumun içine giremiyor, yani korkuyor beceremiyor. Biz orada 200 kişi televizyon minimumken cidden konuşmayı monuşmayı görmüşüz; yani konuşmuşuz, geyik yapmışız. Şimdi millet dışarıda bilgisayar... Saçma sapan takılıyor, yani bizim ordaki gibi temiz güzel takılma dışarıda... Daha doğrusu bu yatılı okul kültürü bence; çünkü yatılı okul konusunda görüştüğüm kişiler yatılı okulların genel şeyi olduğunu söylüyor. [...] “Kendini geliştirmek” derken neyi kastediyosun? Böyle çok sıcak insan ilişkileri ve... Her türlü:

How, then, is the magnitude of the value of the experience of professional military education to be measured? How to measure the labor he put in military education if he embodies and utilizes it in a very different environment? These questions are obviously rhetorical ones. However, I think Berk challenged his own claim of “experience is nothing, creativity is everything by explaining how he utilizes his embodiment of the experience of military education within neoliberal market economy. Although it is quite impossible to measure the labor he put in professional military education as a cadet, the impacts of his educational labor on his current labor are obvious.

At this point, I shall bring Akças macro level analysis of the constitutive role of the military and militarism in shaping and reproducing class relations to a very micro level. According to some former cadets who left the military schools willingly or unwillingly, professional military education has a use value, and thus a constitutive role for them, in free market economy. They think that many people coming from middle or upper class families who work in private sector are raised as “sisies (loved and taken care of by their parents and attended regular civilian schools) when compared to the highly hierarchical and disciplinary structure of professional military education. That is why they are less of “crusaders than former cadets in the wild market conditions. In a sense, Berk and Kaan’s perceptions of professional military education served in their narratives to relocate themselves in social and class relations. However, these perceptions and appreciations of some former cadets do not prove any generalizations about the relations between the military values and neoliberal work ethic right.

These constructions are not effected in a social vacuum, as some ethnomethodologists seem to believe: the position occupied in social space, that is, in the structure of the distribution of the different species of capital, which are also weapons, governs the representations of this space and the stances adopted in the struggles to conserve or transform it. (Bourdieu, 1994, 28)

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Zaman yönetimi, iş disiplini -şekil yönetimini ben pek sallamıyorum gördüğün gibi. Zaman yönetimi, iş disiplini var, olaylara farklı konulardan bakıyor olma olayı var, bazı olayları iyi kıvrırma olayı var; çünkü askeriyede bize öğretilen bir şey de çok hızlı yalan söyleme olayıdır. Çünkü ona mecbur kalıyorsun bazı konuda “niye böyle yaptın”... Ona artık kafan hani... “Ulan sallamadım o yüzden yaptım” diyemiyorsun; öyle bir cevap yok. “Efendim biz onu şimdi şu yüzden, şuradan şu olmuştu ya da ondan... O yüzden öyle yaptım”... Yani o var bir de, şey, stres yönetimi yani; şimdi bu millet ağlıyor sızlıyor, ediyor, şu bu. “Oğlum” diyor “sen ne rahatsın”. Ya diyorum “Halloluyor”, yani rahat... “Biz neleri gördük boşver salla ya!”

Although I never openly asked about the economic conditions and ethnic backgrounds of their families, I know from our social meetings that Berk and Kaan come from middle class Turkish families who might have sent their children to some of the top high schools of the country both because they could afford it and because their children were successful enough. Their class, ethnicity, gender, and other categories that intersect with their past lives and experiences construct their perceptions, appreciations and actions “in the structure of the distribution of the different species of capital” (Bourdieu, 1994, 28). Their perceptions and appreciations govern the stances they adopt in the struggles to conserve or transform their conditions, which is also valid for different positions of other former cadets in this structure.

#### **4.2.1.3. Privilege of silence, Mahmut, and voicing privilege**

Silence is privilege in some cases. To requote Lutz, “Silence is also a strategy of confinement” (Lutz 2001, 132). The predominantly negative perceptions of Kaan, Berk and others who think similarly occupy a position in social space, and this position also contains particular silences. The privileges of a military professional, especially a military officer, are silenced in their narratives. When I asked my elder research participants about the significance of Kemalism in their education, they had to stop to remember it. Similarly, the privileges of military officers are taken for granted by most of my interviewees to the extent that they are outside of the perception and appreciation.

First, privilege is a special advantage: it is neither common nor universal. Second, it is granted, not earned or brought into being by ones individual effort or talent. Third, privilege is a right or entitlement that is related to preferred status or rank. Fourth, privilege is exercised for the benefit of the recipient and to the exclusion or detriment of others. Finally, a privileged status is often outside the awareness of the person possessing it. (Black and Stone 2005, 244)

The sense of inclusion, belonging, well being and even the categories of social hierarchies such as gender, race or ethnicity are imperceptible to the privileged. Yet structural privilege is not an entirely passive phenomenon (Borell et al. 2009, 41). Privilege is performed as well, probably as much as it is structured. I do not claim that voicing dissatisfaction about professional military education and military professionalism is a performance of privilege. However, silencing privilege certainly is, either consciously or unconsciously performed.

Not only the high salary of a military officer but also the services and facilities maintained by the military and the state create the privileged status. İnsel calls military officers as the power holders of the pretorian regime in Turkey<sup>240</sup>, and as a privileged “coterie (İnsel 2009, 45), in the historical context before the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. After I started to ponder more on the privileges of my research participants who work in the military, I asked Selim what he recalls as the advantages of a military officer. He said because they were acquired before the military’s recent falling from grace, officers clubs are in very good locations. Although many services given in clubs are privatized and outsourced<sup>241</sup>, they are still very cheap and fine. Military lodgings leased for moderate prices are available mostly for married officers in many cities. Military housing is a great advantage in big cities, Selim stated, since they are usually located in very expensive neighbourhoods such as 4. Levent or Balmumcu. While non-military people pay extremely high rents in such districts, military officers pay approximately around 600 Turkish liras. However, because the rents of military lodgings are standard in all the cities, they are not necessarily beneficial in small cities and towns where rents are already very cheap in comparison to Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir. What he did not mention was the material fact that life is much more cheaper in small cities than in big ones, which probably compensates the relatively “high rents of military officers. Selim also noted that while almost all military personnel lives in military lodgings in eastern and southeastern Turkey since “the outside is considered dangerous in cities where the presence of PKK is palpable<sup>242</sup>, single officers can benefit from military housing only if the military families left any in other regions. Military vacation camps are the sites of cheap and very fine holidays only for high ranked officers, Selim put, lowly enlisted officers almost never seize this chance<sup>243</sup>. Additionally, Selim stated that an ever-guaranteed salary is a very important privilege, although not high in comparison to the standards of private sector for graduates of top

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<sup>240</sup> Ahmet İnsel, “Devletin Sahipleri”, *Radikal İki*, May 13, 2007, accessed January 1, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/devletin\\_sahipleri-874968](http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/devletin_sahipleri-874968).

<sup>241</sup> Prior to this process, conscripted soldiers were working in service positions in officers clubs.

<sup>242</sup> For an elucidative discussion of how the PKK is the most notable actor that marks the ruptures between inside and outside military lodgings, and between the times of peace and conflict in perceptions and ordinary experiences of the children of military officers, see Şen 2014, 78-103.

<sup>243</sup> Only as of 2012, the spatial segregation of general officer (general), high officer (üst subay) and officer (subay) in officers clubs and military vacation facilities was abolished.

universities. This guarantee is valid also for almost all government employees, he added.

As the granddaughter of a colonel, I reminded him the advantages acquired by first-degree relatives of military officers with the military identification card. Depending on the degree of kinship, the family of an officer can take advantage of the abovementioned services and facilities with or without the company of him/her. Moreover, the regulation that was “awarding the children of military officers in military schools entrance examinations with a standard number of extra points was abolished only in 2005<sup>244</sup>.

“History is always produced in a specific historical context.” (Trouillot 1995, 22) A military officer has many advantages and privileges in contemporary Turkey, albeit not as much as s/he would before the military’s recent falling from grace. Among social privileges of military officers that are considered to be threatened after the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, Selim recollected the general respect and courtesy shown to them by almost everyone who did military service, especially in small cities and towns. He said even first lieutenants [*üstteğmen*] who get to be a part of the protocol with the district governor and other high ranked state officials in state ceremonies and official gatherings.

When I asked about the travel allowance paid to military personnel if reassigned to another city or transferred on duty for a short period of time, he said white-collar workers of private companies are in better conditions in those terms, mentioning the high amounts they are paid for business travels. He also added that when a white-collar worker is transferred to a bigger city permanently, her/his salary increases automatically in most of the companies, which is not the case for military officer who move from city to city in short intervals. Although he is very critical of the military as an institution “filled with unreasonable pursuits and people, he felt a need to make comparisons between the privileges of the military personnel and of white-collar workers with relatively well-paid jobs. He also ponderingly figured out the “eliteness of the officers of Naval Forces as they work only in seaside cities, hardly facing conflict situations. After this conversation, I regretted my choice of a rather general interview question about my interviewees’ opinions on being a military officer. I wonder how they would react and what they would recall if asked “the privileges of military officers.

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<sup>244</sup>“Babam subaya ek puan yok.”, *Yeni Şafak*, November 5, 2005, accessed on June 15, 2014. <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/kasim/05/g06.html>.

Mahmut and Kerem were coming from economically and socially less advantaged families than the others, if not from low class. Our interview with Kerem was rather strange since we were in a room without a door, and he did not answer my questions openly as I gathered from his careful and slow selection of words. Therefore, he did not share enough for me to elaborate on his narrative in respect to how he perceives and makes sense of his privileges as an officer. Yet we had a very communicative interview with Mahmut.

While his father works in an underpaid freelance job, his mother is a stay-at-home mother, whom I would call a fulltime mother with more than two children. As he did not made any mention of his ethnic background, I did not ask whether he has a Kurdish or other ethnic identification. I only know he is from eastern Turkey and grown up there unlike the rest of my elder research participants. On the particularity of his hometown in naval academy, he only mentioned how his classmates were making fun of his accent although not with bad intentions or to bully him:

**Was it important or a question subject whether someone was more religious, Alevi, Cherkess, Kurd or whether their mother tongue is Kurdish or Laz?**

Mahmut: I will call it race discrimination, race discrimination like that... Well, no... You do not recognize that in all that turmoil. (Laughing) I mean it. Which... you don't recognize at all. It somehow streams. I, for example, couldn't do, like this and that to anyone. Couldn't say this has to be so. Maybe you can tell it from tongue, from accent. Mine was so, for instance, back then.

**How?**

My accent was stronger. The accent of [the city he was born and grew up] is strong. (He imitates his throat use) Do you understand? [He says which consonant is especially emphasized.] I, for instance, used that a lot when I talked. That happened, for instance, my friends used to say "man, talk decently, this is not ... any more" or so. Do you understand? Like that. But, well, in that level, like insulting, no, such a thing never happened. And I never saw anyone being insulted. Yes. Not in an insulting level. At most, it was making fun of it. But not a mocking that would hurt. That I can say. I didn't observe that, I mean, I never came across.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> **Atıyorum mesela, örnek veriyorum, birinin daha dindar olması, Alevi, Çerkez, Kürt olması ya da anadilinin Kürtçe, Lazca olması... Bunlar bilinir ya da mevzubahis olur muydu?**

Mahmut: Mesela ırk ayrımı diyeyim ona, o şekilde bir ırk ayrımı... Yok ya... O hengamede fark etmiyorsun. (Gülüyor) Harbiden. Hangi ... hiç fark etmiyorsun. Akıyor gidiyor bir şekilde. Ben mesela hiçbirine böyle şöyle diye hiç şey yapamadım. Böyle olsa gerek diye diyemedim. Belki dilden, ağızdan diyebilirsin. Benim de öyleydi hatta o zamanlar.

Mahmut is also the only one who explained his entrance to naval academy with material motives:

Mahmut: The real purpose to it was not a special one like “I was born to be a soldier” or so, not like this. It was the worries about the future, the attraction of officialism, a guaranteed job, etc. Yes.<sup>246</sup>

Knowing him also as a friend, Mahmut is one of the less complaining military officers I know. He stated that professional military education is imbued with unreasonable physical and psychological challenges, and violence:

Mahmut: I don't think that any person can be happy about going to the military school. Because there is an unnecessarily intense program, I mean, an intensified program. Well, though there is nothing needed to be done, there is a constant effort to fill the gaps.<sup>247</sup>

However, he was the only one expressing his hard work as a second lieutenant after stating he finds his salary satisfying like a few other interviewees:

Mahmut: I, well, much before, thought the salary is good compared to the other salaries of present day. I thought it was average. It is an officer's salary, in the end; I won't leave you starving but it won't make you rich, either. I thought it was good. But because of brand obsessions, etc, of course you have more difficulty. But as an income, frankly it is pretty well, enough to get by. [...]

If it is not going well, I am the responsible for it; but if it is going well, it is the success of the commander. That is the case. If something is wrong it is my mistake but if something is good, it is the commander's goodness. That

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### Nasıl?

Ağzım biraz daha sertti. [Doğup büyüdüğü şehir]in ağzı biraz daha serttir. (Gırtlak kullanımını taklit ediyor) Anladın mı? [Hangi harfin özellikle sert kullanıldığını söylüyor] Ben mesela konuşurken çok kullanırdım. Mesela bu şey olurdu, “oğlum şey konuş falan derlerdi bizim arkadaşlar, “oğlum dur lan düzgün konuş derlerdi, “burası ... değil artık falan. Anladın mı? Onun gibi. Ama hani öyle aşağılayacak derecede, hiçbir zaman öyle bir şey olmadı. Ben kimsenin aşağılandığını da görmedim. Evet. Aşağılanacak derecede olmadı. En fazla dalga geçme oldu. Ama o incitecek dalga geçme bile değil. Öyle söyleyeyim sana. Ben gözlemleyemedim yani, bana hiç denk gelmedi.

<sup>246</sup> Mahmut: İşin aslı çok öyle özel bir maksat değildi yani, “ben asker olmak için doğdum” vs., bu değil. Gelecek kaygısı, memuriyet peşinde koşma, garanti iş vs... Evet.

<sup>247</sup> Mahmut: Harp okulunda okumaktan memnun olabilecek bir insan olabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Çünkü çok gereksiz bir şekilde yoğun bir program var, yani yoğunlaştırılan bir program var. Yani ortada hiçbir şey olmadığı halde sürekli bir boşluk doldurmaca.



is the case, I mean, I try not to make any mistakes. Try to direct people. Try not to leave a lacking part, a hole.<sup>248</sup>

Though this may appear like overinterpretation, I think his silence about (or actual absence of) the moments he considered leaving while in military school, despite his frankly expressed unhappiness in the military as an officer, stems from his socio-economic background, partially if not completely.

Mahmut: I got over the school process somehow but after starting to work, I saw it wasn't what I was hoping for. I had many sad moments. I saw that you cannot be that happy. Then I said what makes me so unhappy was... It is time really, I mean, I am really upset. For some work that makes you so unhappy... I mean, it is a job in the end, though it affects your whole life, it is just a job. Just for bread and butter. After seeing that you can make that money much more easily, yes, I was sad. [He hits the table with his knife or something, while saying the last sentence, the hits get stronger] I would like being a registrar, enjoy being a registrar. I was in municipality recently. I just went to the guy for a signature, though. He signed. He took a receipt, said "here you are". His task is composed of just this. (Laughing) He is a clerk. (Laughing) It is great! I think it is a very sad thing for a person to envy such a stupid job. Do you understand? There is no excitement, do you see? There is nothing in that job, really nothing. You go in the morning, open your office and sit there. You sit till 5. Tea and coffee... Someone comes, sign the receipt, do something alike and "here you are". In a day, 10 people might come, or even less. After that "I did my job, earned my money and now I can go home." After he is home, no one would call or ask something; there is weekend, etc. I mean, I ogle that. [The hit sound gets faster and stronger in these last sentences] I get called incredibly much, don't take it light! They call me for everything [from work]. (We laugh)<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>248</sup>Mahmut: Ben hani çok önceden, günümüz maaşlarına oranla yine aynı oranda iyi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ortalama olduğunu düşünüyorum. Memur maaşı sonuçta, aç bırakmaz, zengin etmez. İyi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ama biraz marka takıntıları vesaire olduğu için tabii ki biraz daha zorlanıyoruz. Ama maaş olarak hakikaten gayet güzel geçinilebilecek bir maaş. [...]

Düzenli işlemezse sorumlu benim, düzenli gidiyorsa başarılı komutan. Olay bu. Bir şey yanlışsa benim hatamdır, bir şey iyiyse o komutanın iyiliğidir. Olay bu yani. hata yapmamaya çalışıyorum. İnsanları yönlendirmeye çalışıyorum. Bir eksik bir gedik bırakmamaya çalışıyorum.

<sup>249</sup>Mahmut: Okul sürecini bir şekilde atlattım ben de işe başladıktan sonra hayal ettiğim gibi olmadığını gördüm. Çok üzüntüler oldu. O kadar da mutlu olunamayacağını gördüm. Ondan sonra dedim yani beni bu kadar mutsuz eden... Zaman hakikaten, acayip mutsuz oluyorum yani. bu kadar mutsuz eden iş için... Yani iş sonuçta ya, tüm hayatını etkilese de bir iş sonuçta. Ekmek parası yani. Çok daha rahat bir şekilde bu ekmek parasının kazanılabileceğini gördükten sonra evet üzuldüm yani. [Bıçağı ya da bir şeyi masaya vuruyor, bu son cümleyi söylerken sertleşiyor vuruşları] Bir nüfus memuru olmayı sevdim yani, hoşuma gitti nüfus memuru olmak. Geçen belediyedeydim. Adama sadece bir imza götürdüm. İmzaladı. Makbuz çıktısı aldı, buyurun dedi. Adamın işi sadece bundan ibaret. (Gülüyor) Adam memur. (Gülüyor)

He compared his job with the conditions of a registrar, who works in a more peaceful environment with more time to spend with her/his loved ones as Mahmut appreciates it, but not with a well-paid white-collar worker. When asked his opinions about being a military officer in general, he replied:

Mahmut: Believe me I am getting old, sea makes a person old. Honestly. Sea, ship, stress... A constant stress. I couldn't have lunch since this morning, just from running for everything. From answering a sudden phone call... Stress... It makes you get old. Being an officer is a good job for the person who wants it. (Laughing) But I am not that much now, that [Mahmut] in the first class is not here anymore. I am also looking for a way out, no need to lie.<sup>250</sup>

Though while transcribing our interview, I realized we spoke very much about his girlfriend and their future plans, which actually depend on Mahmut's salary, while he never mentioned the alternatives he considers for leaving the military in short run.

Although Mahmut did not articulate the privileges of military officers loudly and clearly, quite like his mates, the privileges of a military career were not profoundly obscure to him as Bourdieu argues for dominant classes. His awareness found voice in his narrative through his silence about how he looks for a way to outside the military, through his talkativeness about his future plans with his girlfriend, or through the missing expression of the times he considered leaving during military education –either he ever thought about this or not. I interpret this awareness as a consequence/ impact of his relatively lower socio-economic background and dispositions “in the structure of the distribution of the different species of capital” (Bourdieu, 1994, 28).

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Çok iyi ya! İnsanın bu salak işe böyle iştahla bakması çok üzücü bir şeydir bence. Tamam mı? Heyecan yok, tamam mı? O işte hiçbir şey yok, gerçekten hiçbir şey yok. Gidiyorsun sabahtan dükkanı açıyorsun oturuyorsun oraya. 5e kadar oturuyorsun. Çay kahve. Şu geldi, makbuz imzala bir şey yap, tamam buyurun. Günde 10 kişi belki gelir belki gelmez. Ondan sonra ben iş yaptım, paramı hak ettim, hadi evime gidiyorum. Evine gittikten sonra da arayan olmaz, soran olmaz, haftasonu var, vesaire vesaire vesaire. Ona iştahla bakıyorum işte. [Vurma sesi bu son iki-üç cümlede de sertleşti ve hızlandı] Acayip aranan biriyimdir ha, bakma sen! He rşeye beni ararlar. [İşten] (Gülüyoruz)

<sup>250</sup>Mahmut: Vallahi yaşılanıyorum ya, deniz insanı yaşılandırıyor ya. Vallahi. Deniz, gemi, stres. Sürekli bir stres. Sabahtan beri öğlen yemeği yiyemedim ben, sağa sola koşturmaktan. Bir anda gelmiş bir telefona cevap vermekten. Stress... Yaşılandırıyor insanı. Subaylık yapmak isteyene güzel iş. (Gülüyor) Da ben öyle acayip şey değilim artık ya, o birinci sınıftaki [Mahmut] yok yani. Ben de çıkış yolları arıyorum, yalan yok.

#### 4.2.2. Younger cohorts and new distinctions: at the intersection of Kemalism, class, and ethnicity

As argued in previous chapter, some former cadets from the second group went through painful processes of investigations in naval academy. A few of them fought to prove their innocence in court, as my interviewees Hakan, Eren and Arda put. Eren and Arda were among those who faced allegations about their personal lives because of the anonymous letters received by the administration. Eren addressed the commonalities among those who had been investigated as follows:

Eren: I think that's it, then I also said that they are Kemalist people, with a fired up point of view, I don't know... When I think about it now, look at the friends outside, they are always flashy types, free thinkers... I don't know, what can be their common traits? Their being Kemalist can be counted. Their taking alcohol... Because in that investigation, even this was a subject to be mentioned. You hang around all the weekends, or so. I can give that example for that change. While they told us that at first years, I mean alcohol was not like something forbidden, and even someone from higher rank, a vice admiral said "Of course you will get familiar with all kinds of environments, a marine officer knows everything, you will sit and drink at weekends, but won't exaggerate" or so; at last years, a person could get detention for seven or fourteen weeks for just tasting alcohol.<sup>251</sup>

Eren, Arda and Hakan pointed out that Kemalism and expressing ideological closeness to secular nationalism were definitely commonalities of beleaguered cadets. Yet they were not as passionate as the four youngest former cadets I have interviewed, about this observation. These youngest former cadets were Rıdvan, Ali, Mert, and Furkan. To repeat myself, Rıdvan, Ali and Mert defined their detachment from the naval academy as "being pushed out rather than a self-decided leave. They said the unjust treatment they received from the commanders and officer-teachers of naval academy forced them to leave the school because they were worried about their futures.

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<sup>251</sup>Eren: Bence bu o zamanlar şey diyordum ben de daha böyle gaz bir düşünce tarzıyla Atatürkçü kişiler diyordum da bilmiyorum ya... Şimdi de düşününce dışarıdaki arkadaşlara falan bakınca hep şeyler daha böyle parlak tipte, özgür düşünceli, ne bileyim ortak özellikleri ne olabilir? Atatürkçü olmaları denebilir. Alkol almaları denebilir. Çünkü o soruşturmalarda bunun bile konusu geçiyordu yani. Siz böyle işte sürekli haftasonları geziyorsunuz falan. Onu da şöyle aslında örnek verebilirim, o değişimi. İlk sınıflarda bize şey denirken, yani alkol yasak değil gibiydi, hatta üst seviyedeki, koramiral rütbesindeki biri diyorken "Tabii ki siz her ortama gireceksiniz, deniz subayı her şeyi bilir, oturup haftasonu içeceksiniz, ama abartmayacaksınız bilmem ne falan gibi konuşmalar yapıyorken en son senelerde alkolün asını alana, yedi haftasonu mu on dört haftasonu mu, ceza veriyorlardı yani.

Rıdvan put that the commanders accused ten to fifteen cadets from his cohort by being undisciplined and forced them to extra military training after the bedtime. Although they were decided not to leave, after witnessing what happened to a very successful senior cadet they thought their futures are very shadowy too:

Rıdvan: There is that thing: “You showed indiscipline” statement. But as the justification, they said I was unable to stand the gaff, was a little more a social person and could be more comfortable outside. Because were seriously resisting, we weren’t going to leave. We, as those 10 or 15 people would go till the end, wherever it went. They saw that we wouldn’t go, I guess, then they took me aside and said “You can be more successful outside; your grades are good anyway, you are a social person, we saw that you are at dance club, you dance, play basketball, you care about social activities...” They tried that way. I mean, that my life would be miserable in those four years, worse things would wait for me in the navy, I would not be able to handle that life, they said. We, as I said, was not going to leave, would continue, but later I heard, at the end of the year, that a friend was expelled, after studying [...] years together with high school; he always had good grades, he was very successful at [...] field but couldn’t rank higher degree because of his discipline grade; after I found that out, it was over for me. [...] When there was just a month left, he was expelled, his diploma was given. [...] They dismissed him. After hearing of that I thought my future could be like that, after studying for four years, I didn’t know when they would send me out... I mean that I might not have a good ending, what I would do if I was expelled at last stage; that I had to study for high school placement tests again... And there is that thing, being labeled as getting expelled from military school for discipline notes; I recognized that a little earlier and decided to quit. My friends were already leaving one by one. Usually at [...] year people decided to quit. I have many friends who are thinking about quitting now. The thought that this place’s goose was cooked, however passionate we were, it wasn’t more important than our future was beginning to get in people’s heads.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>252</sup>Rıdvan: Şey var: “Disiplinsizlik yaptın söylemi. Ama bunun gerekçesini benim sıkıya gelemediğim, birazcık daha sosyal bir insan olmam, dışarıda daha rahat edebileceğimi söylüyorlardı. Çünkü ciddi bir direnç gösteriyorduk, ayrılmayacaktık. Biz o 10-15 kişi ayrılmayacaktık, sonuna kadar gidecektik, nereye giderse artık. Ayrılmayacağımızı gördüler mi artık ne, beni çekip öyle konuşuyorlardı: Sen dışarıda daha başarılı olursun, senin ders durumun da iyi zaten, sosyal bir insansın, bakıyoruz dans kolundaymışsın, dans ediyormuşsun, basketbol oynuyorsun, sosyal aktivitelere katılmayı çok şey yapıyorsun... Böyle bir noktadan girdiler. İşte dört senenin senin hayatın için zehir olacağını, donanmada da seni daha kötü şeylerin bekleyeceğini, sen bu hayata şey yapamazsın dediler. Biz dediğim gibi ayrılmayacaktık, devam edecektik ama ben daha sonra sene sonunda liseyle birlikte [...] sene okuyup, her zaman ders durumu iyi olup, [...] bölümünde ortalaması yüksek olup ama disiplin puanı yüzünden dereceye giremiyordu, o arkadaşın atıldığını duyduktan sonra benim için bitmişti. [...] Son bir ay kala okuldan atıldı, diploması verildi. [...] İlişğini kestiler. Ben bunu duyduktan sonra benim de sonumun böyle olabileceğini ve hani dört sene okuyup ya da kaçınıcı senede atılacaksam bilmiyorum... Yani sonumun pek parlak olmadığını, son aşamada atılırsam

Therefore, according to them, accomplishment in courses is another commonality among the badly treated. The third one is having a high-ranked military officer in the family as mentioned in the introduction. These three commonalities of former cadets who were “pushed out are closely connected the new distinctions created within naval academy, mentioned in the third chapter.

Moreover, Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert kept referring to the economic well being of their families throughout our interviews. This was something I never heard from my other research participants.

Rıdvan: Yes, in the end, also my family’s condition is... in a level to afford university expenses. I wasn’t that in to graduating from there and having 2500 TL salary, 4000 for colonels I think. My other friends were keeping the track of salaries or so. But the life in sea... We took short courses and it is not a life you can endure for that salary. Only people who like it can do it. I was having pleasure, to be honest. [...] to develop our commandership skills, they gave commandership duties at small boats. I was having pleasure doing that, frankly. Money was not a big deal for me, as I said the condition of my family is good. My father earns more than most military officers; it is God’s honest truth.<sup>253</sup>

If one is in need of a guaranteed job, his/her nationalism is not a sincere one according to Rıdvan. As such, the willingness of a person to become a military officer is questionable if s/he is seeking for a guaranteed salary. Hence, nationalism and the “quality of a military officer are linked to ones socio-economic background. Rıdvan’s evaluation of the situation of his classmates who need a guaranteed job is strikingly in line with the historical self-understanding of the military officers as a privileged, “preatorian coterie (İnsel 2009, 56).

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dışarıda ne yapacağımı, tekrar LYS sınavına hazırlanıp sınava girmem gerektiğini... Ve disiplin yüzünden askeri okuldan atılmış damgası yemek var yani, o yüzden bunu biraz erken sezip ayrılma kararı aldım. Zaten teker teker ayrılıyor o arkadaşlar. Genelde [...] sınıfta ayrılmaya karar veriyor insanlar. Şu anda ayrılmayı düşünen bir çok arkadaşım var. Artık bu işin suyunun çıktığını, ne kadar bir tutku olsa da geleceğimizden ya da hayatımızdan önemli olmadığı düşüncesi artık kafalarda yer etmeye başladı.

<sup>253</sup> Rıdvan: Evet, sonuçta benim ailevi durumum da ... Üniversitesinin şeyini karşılayabilecek bir seviyede. Ben oradan mezun olup 2.5 maaşa, albay olanlar 4 alıyor galiba, şeyim değildi. Diğer arkadaşlar takip ediyorlardı maaşlar şöyle falan. Ama denizdeki hayat... Kısa seyirlere çıktık ve o hayat o maaşa çekilebilecek bir hayat değil. Sadece seven insan yapabiliyor. Ben haz alıyordum açıkçası. [...] bizim de komutanlık şeyimizi geliştirmeye yönelik, küçük gemilerde komutanlık görevi veriyorlardı. Ben bunları yaparken haz alıyordum açıkçası. Para benim için bir şey değildi yani. dediğim gibi ailevi durumum da iyi benim. Benim babam çoğu subaydan çok daha fazla para kazanıyor açıkçası, doğruya doğru yani.

Then the issue of ethnicity rises to the surface, albeit indistinctly, in the perceptions of my youngest research participants. Burak, from an elder cohort, also made a mention of ethnicity. Nonetheless, he only told that he heard the trips of their commanders and officer-teachers to the eastern cities of the country to publicize military high schools. Although uncertain about this information, he was sure that his generation of cadets was mostly ill-pleased [memnuniyetsiz] about professional military education and its promises:

Burak: Well, I guess they tried to change the student profile, because when they took me and students like me, we were dissatisfied. We were just dissatisfied. Then I think; do I endure this entire ordeal for 3500 TL?<sup>254</sup>

Rıdvan, however, was certain about the ethnic and lingual difference of particular cadets and he was very much annoyed by their “abnormal existence in naval academy:

Rıdvan: Nobody has problems. Even if there is, student union detects it and tries to reconcile them. Or, there were two friends who fought, our commanders put them in the same double room, saying “you two will stay here now, talk to each other and compromise.” But there was this thing, look, in military academy, there was a large group speaking in Kurdish among themselves. 10 people or so would close themselves in a room and speak loudly in Kurdish. Interesting. They called us things like Turkey soldiers.

**How so?**

I don't know, weird...

**Is it like joking?**

It is like joking but there can't be such a joke, how?... Even as a joke it is horrible, they call us Turkey soldiers. When I hear this, the first thing coming into my mind is PKK, to be honest. [...]

**Did you have friends from high school among them?**

No, there weren't. [...] One of my friends slapped one's neck, as a joke. He said “Turkey soldier has hit me”. He said that laughing but even if it is a joke there is a grain of truth, I think. There is something lying under that statement. In high school there weren't such things. You are rich, you are poor, you are Alevi, you are Kurd... I heard nothing like that. Perhaps it was because I wasn't interested in, I don't know. It didn't catch my eyes. In military academy, I also wasn't interested but I saw. There were people who didn't know National Anthem. I know it certainly. When they asked about National Anthem... They asked some questions, as I said. “Can you say the first quatrain of the National Anthem?” they asked. He said something odd like “korkma sönmez bu şafaklarda yüzen al sancak, ne bu şiddet bu celal

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<sup>254</sup>Burak: Ya hani diyorum ya öğrenci profilini değiştirmek istediler, çünkü ben ve benim gibi öğrenciler aldıkları zaman biz memnuniyetsizdik. Memnuniyetsiziz yani. Düşünüyorum şimdi ben, bu kadar çileyi üç buçuk milyar için mi çekiyorum?

(*Fear not, for the crimson flag that proudly ripples in this glorious twilight, shall not fade; why the anger, why the rage*). He couldn't continue, of course. In the end, coming for being an officer to Turkish Armed Forces and not knowing the National Anthem is not something very normal for me. I mean who didn't know was some, sorry one of those friends who spoke in Kurdish. Well, I don't think the others did... When I told this to my family, they said "Why do you discriminate against people for their ethnical background?" I don't discriminate them, they have Turkish id after all; they live in Turkey. Even if they are so, they are Kurds, they have to fulfill some tasks I think, if they are living on this territory. If they are getting in Turkish Armed Forces, they have to know these things, I don't know. If they don't feel themselves as Turks... After all, the nationalism description of Atatürk is also like that: Anyone who feels like a Turk, defines himself as a Turk, calls himself as a Turk is Turk. Our ethnical background does not matter. But it seems they do not feel as Turks and so they don't know our National Anthem.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>255</sup>Rıdvan: Kimsenin arasında bozukluk yok. Olsa da öğrenci birliği tespit edip onları kaynaştırmaya çalışıyor. Ya da kavga eden iki arkadaş olmuştı, komutanlarımız onları aynı iki kişilik odaya koymuşlardı: "Siz artık burada kalacaksınız, birbirinize şey yapın, anlaşın konuşun falan diye. Kavga olmayacak falan diye. Ama şey vardı bak, Harp Okulunda aralarında Kürtçe konuşan büyük bir kesim vardı açıkçası. 10 kişi falan bir odada kapanıp Kürtçe bağıra bağıra konuşuyorlardı. İlginç. Şey diyorlardı bize T.C. askeri falan diyorlardı yani.

**Nasıl yani?**

Bilmiyorum, garip...

**Dalga geçer gibi mi?**

Dalga geçer gibi ama böyle dalga geçemezsin ki, nasıl..? Şakası bile bunun korkunç. T.C. askeri diyor bize. Benim bunu duyduğumda ilk aklıma gelen şey PKK açıkçası.

[...] **Onlar arasında liseden olan arkadaşlarınız var mıydı?**

Hayır yok. [...] Benim arkadaşım bir tanesinin şaka babında ensesine vurmuştu galiba. Demişti ki "T.C. askeri bana vurdu demişti yani. Gülerek demişti ama sonuçta şaka bile olsa bence bir gerçeklik payı var yani. bir şey yatıyor o söylemin altında. Lisede herhangi bir şey yoktu yani. sen zenginsin, sen fakirsin, sen Alevisin, sen Kürtün... Ben hiçbir şey duymadım. Belki de ilgilenmediğim için duymamışımdır bilmiyorum ama. Gözüme çarpmadı. Harp okulunda da ilgilenmiyordum ama gördüm. İstiklal Marşını bilmeyen insanlar vardı. Çok bir net bir şekilde biliyorum bunu. İstiklal Marşını sorduklarında... Demiştim ya sorular soruyorlardı bize. "İstiklal Marşının ilk kıtasını okur musun? demişti, "korkma sönmez bu şafaklarda yüzen al sancak, ne bu şiddet bu celal gibi öyle değişik bir şey demişti. Sonra da devamı gelmemişti tabii ki. Sonuçta Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine subay olmaya girip de İstiklal Marşından bihaber olmak çok normal bir şey değil bence. Yani bu Kürtçe konuşan arkadaşlar bazıları, bir tanesiydi pardon, bilmeyen. Diğerlerinin de şey yaptığını sanmıyorum da... Ben bunu aileme anlattığımda "niye insanlara şey yapıyorsun, etnik köken ayrımcılığı yapıyorsun? demişlerdi. Ben öyle bir ayrımcılık yapmıyorum, sonuçta Türk kimlikleri var, Türkiyede yaşıyorlar. Şey olsa bile Kürt olsa bile bazı şeyleri yerine getirmeleri gerekiyor diye düşünüyorum, yani bu topraklarda yaşıyorlarsa. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine gireceklerse bunları bilmeleri gerekiyor bence, bilmiyorum. Kendini Türk olarak hissetmiyorsa... Sonuçta Atatürkün milliyetçilik tanımı da öyle: Kendini Türk hisseden, Türk olarak tanımlayan, Türküm diyen herkes Türktür sonuçta. Etnik kökenin

Rıdvan put that there are cadets whose mother tongue is Kurdish, and who do not know the Turkish National Anthem by heart.

Most of my research participants from different cohorts agree on Rıdvan, Ali and Mert's expectations about the ideological, ethnic and economic backgrounds of the prospective cadets, and thus, military officers: they think the military officers will gradually become people coming from low class families with lower social and cultural capital. Some like Rıdvan, Ali and Mert also assert that prospective cadets will be from diverse ethnicities unlike the current situation, in which the majority is from Turkish families. Moreover, regarding the long-lasting war between armed Kurdish movement and the governments, Kurdish cadets are deemed to be the most important threats towards the historically approved identity of Kemalist, Turkish and middle class military officer. Turkish Alevi community that has a widespread sympathy for Kemalism due to its secular envisagement of the state is not a threat to the military. Non-Muslim communities have always been considered as less of citizens than Muslim majority. While there are no legal obstacles before a Catholic, Protestan, Greek Orthodox, or Jewish citizen if s/he wants to become a military professional, it is still unimaginable in Turkey<sup>256</sup>. Ethnic minorities such as Georgian, Gypsy, Circassian or Laz are not even a matter of mention in hegemonic discourses of the military and the state as well as in the narratives of my youngest interviewees.

All in all, the threats felt and implied by my research participants are centered on the intersection of Kemalism, class and ethnicity. These perceived threats are directed towards the historical privileges of the "praetorian coterie (İnsel 2009[2004], 56) according to many, and thus, towards the ideal (middle class, Turkish and Kemalist) military masculinity. Therefore, in the narratives of younger cohorts, the discrepancy between their expectations while in military school and current circumstances of military professionals find voice through these new distinctions, which started to emerge among cadets after the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, as argued in the third chapter.

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bir önemi yok. Ama demek ki bir kendilerini Türk olarak hissetmiyorlar ki İstiklal Marşımızı bilmiyorlar.

<sup>256</sup>Ayça Örer's interview with author and researcher Rıfat Bali on his book *Gayrimüslim Mehmetçikler: Hatıralar – Tanıklıklar*, "Subay olmak hiçbir gayrimüslimin aklına gelmez.", *Radikal*, September 19, 2011, accessed January 5, 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/kultur/subay\\_olmak\\_hicbir\\_gayrimuslimin\\_aklina\\_gelmez-1063738](http://www.radikal.com.tr/kultur/subay_olmak_hicbir_gayrimuslimin_aklina_gelmez-1063738). For more see Bali 2011.



### 4.3. Diverse justifications of the discrepancy between expectations and circumstances

Whether they currently are military officers or not, almost all of my research participants stated their frustration about the life style required by a military career. As some left military school because of social and economic concerns, some others – especially those from younger cohorts– left because they were forced to leave. Not only the material working conditions but also the social and emotional burdens of military professionalism are sources of the perceived discrepancy between the expectations cadets develop during professional military education and the existing socio-economic conditions of military officers. In the same vein, those who left or were expelled from Turkish Naval High School or Turkish Naval Academy are content with their current situation when they compare it with the working conditions of a military officer.

Former cadets who left military school with social and economic anxieties or merely because they could not stand the disciplinary rules are content with their state of affairs. Yet I shall mention some of the differences between the contentment expressed by elder and younger cohorts. Rıdvan, Ali, Mert and Furkan expressed only their disturbance by the financial burden that is taken on by their parents with their detachment from the academy. On the other hand, as a person who made the hard decision of leaving in the face of his fathers disapproval and the financial burden he will take on his own, Berk pointed out the struggle of being inside or outside while wishing to be the opposite in either case:

Berk: You should either not get in at all or not let the idea get into your head. When you get in, getting out is a problem; when you don't, thinking like why I didn't get in, I would have been like this is another problem. You will never get in [or] never think about it. When you do either of them it is a swamp. [...] For example, I could have been an idle university graduate now who couldn't earn money and couldn't manage himself. Then I would have said "I wish I had gone to naval high school. Now, I could have been an officer, could had that much salary, could do that..." Because I would have known nothing about that place and this would be a thorn in my flesh. I went in and now I still swear it saying "man, my life is fucked". This is also a weight. Therefore, there are two conditions: you won't get in and won't ever think about it. You will do neither of them. This is a must.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Berk: Ya hiç girmeyeceksin ya hiç aklından geçirmeyeceksin. Girdiğin zaman çıkmak problem, aklından geçirdiğin zaman ulan niye girmedim, girseydim böyle olacaktım diye aklından geçirmek başka bir problem. Hiç girmeyeceksin, [ya da] hiç aklından geçirmeyeceksin. İkisinden birini yaptığın zaman bataklık. [...] Atıyorum ben şu an üniversite mezunu aylak bir herif olabilir ve para kazanamıyor olabilir ve kendi kendimi çeviremiyor olabilirdim. O zaman şöyle derdim: Ulan deniz lisesine girseydim,

Becoming a military officer was not “the dream of most of my research participants except for Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert who were “pushed out from the school and angry at the institution. The immobility and inflexibility of a military career cannot provide the “freedom that is deemed to exist in neoliberal market as asserted by the eldest-first group of interviewees. Since they were raised as “the future protectors of the nation to be the privileged coterie of the society, those who became officers find themselves feeling disappointed after graduation. Not only their professional lives but also their personal lives and emotional states continue to be under the effect of their career, as is the case during military education. There is thus a widely perceived discrepancy between the future expectations they have developed while in military schools, and the life style that awaits them after graduation. Those who left or were expelled from the school observe and articulate the disappointment of their classmates, and express their contentment about being outside the military in one way or another. Although most of them still value military professionalism with nationalist drives, they are glad to be outside, again, except Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert.

Mahmut is the one interviewee, among those from elder cohorts, who distinguishes from the others with his socio-economic background “within the structure of the distribution of the different species of capital” (Bourdieu, 1994, 28). Although he did not mention the advantages of military personnel explicitly, several reasons lead me different species to the conclusion that his awareness of the privileges of a military career is a structural impact of his relatively lower socio-economic background and dispositions.

Militarism and the military itself act an essential role in the neoliberal state, and in class relations. As Akça argues, militarism is a constitutive part of the neoliberal market and ever changing class relations (Akça 2010b, 360-361). This chapter was meant to illustrate that the military holds its constitutive role not only through macro structures but also within and through micro processes. While the majority of my elder interviewees state experiencing dissatisfaction because of the abovementioned discrepancy for mainly socio-economic reasons; Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert indicated the

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subay olsaydım şu an şu kadar maaşım vardı, şunu yapıyordum. Çünkü oradaki hiçbir şeyi bilmeyecektim, o benim hayat boyu içime dert olacaktı. Girdim, ulan hayatım sikildi diye hala beddua ediyorsun, o da bir dert. O yüzden iki ayağı var: girmeyeceksin, aklından bile geçirmeyeceksin. İkisini de yapmayacaksın. Şart bu.

social and political background of the discrepancy they experience, namely the military's recent falling from grace. That is why the narratives of my research participants overlap to a great extent on the existence of such a discrepancy although with diverse justifications. As the elder cohorts addressed a loss of power on the side of the military in the neoliberal market and state, youngest-first group of interviewees expressed their expectation of the rising significance of political, ethnic, and class distinctions in shaping the future of military professionalism in Turkey. Whilst the military reorganizes itself by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing, mainly with the incentives of the JDP government, it also holds on to its historical autonomy in "internal affairs. In the mean time, the transformations of perceptions on professional military education and military professionalism in respect to the rising neoliberalism and the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials signal major changes in the ideal identity and background of military officers.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

“All knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field”, says Donna Haraway (Haraway 1988, 577). Powerfully challenging the ideological doctrines of disembodied scientific objectivity, she states that feminist objectivity means simply *situated knowledges*. It is “about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object” (Haraway 1988, 583). This thesis is aimed at presenting an objective vision, as redefined by Haraway, with a partial perspective on the military institution, and civil-military relations in Turkey, in this specific historical context.

In Chapter 2, I attempted to historicize the links between the military’s falling from grace and the structure and subjects of professional military education. I tried to cover the large literature on civil–military relations in Turkey, and the past and present of military education, especially of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy, from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century of the Ottoman Empire to the latest developments in Ergenekon and Balyoz [Sledgehammer] trials. The military’s anti-democratically powerful ideological and physical existence in politics, if not in our social world, gradually recedes approximately since 2007. The ‘scientifically objective’ accounts on civil-military relations neglect the micro level ramifications of this macro transformation process. However, the military’s changing roles in domestic and international arena have historically shaped and been shaped by the subjects who comprise the military and their education. Not only the narratives of my research participants but also quantitative data show that there has been serious repercussions of TAF’s declining reputation and changing position in the public sphere on professional military education. While the dramatic decrease in number of applications to and graduations from military academies reflect a paradigmatic shift in popularity of military schools in our historical context, this does not necessarily mean that military

professionalism might lose its power and socially constructed ‘absolute importance’ in the long run.

I met a young man who left Turkish Military Academy while I was approaching the end of this thesis. He asserted that the current cadets of the Naval Forces did not face even half of the mobbing, and psychological and physical violence that they had been exposed to. However, according to my research participants and many public figures and journalists, Turkish Naval Academy receives a significant share from these ‘changes’ in professional military education. In Chapter 3, I traced the impacts of this process on the Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy along different axes by focusing particularly on the disciplines through which military subjectivities and masculinities are made up.

Suffering from perpetual fear of violence, hierarchies of suffering, and the daily routine of bodily disciplines deform the understanding of the ‘self’, as a means of producing both productive and subjected bodies through military education. However, I argued that this allegedly homogenous entity is made up of diverse subjectivities, bodies, and ideologies in spite of this routine, standard, and disciplinary training that military education continues to have. There are thus different modes of subjection and subjectivation, and these different modes create different military masculinities. On the other hand, the kinds of disciplines military education involves and the making of subjectivities are in a process of transformation. I suggest that the historical shift in the military’s positioning in Turkish context ranges from its declining reputation in the public sphere to internal restructuring of power, and of the forms of making military masculinities in military schools. That is why, the authority has been gradually centralizing and concentrating in the hands of the governing military officers since 2008 and 2009, as perceived by my interviewees. In order to achieve this, the administrative commanders eliminate solidarity, comfort, and power zones of the cadets.

Finally in Chapter 4, I argue that there is a significant economic side of the impacts of the military’s falling from grace on professional military education. First, militarism and the military play constitutive roles in neoliberal market through its concrete bodies such as the companies of Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and OYAK. As this is a two-sided story, the market shapes the military institution as well. TAF has been participating in global and domestic trends of downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing, especially since the 1990s. This also challenges the ways in which military subjectivities are constructed. Together with the declining political and social

‘prestige’ of the military, the emerging values of neoliberalism such as flexibility, uncertainty, and freedom challenge the perceptions on military education and military professionalism, according to most of my research participants. If the first reason of increasingly negative perceptions of former cadets on military professionalism is the military’s loss of power and ‘prestige’, the second is the perceived conflicts between the burgeoning values of neoliberal market, and the military values and rules such as hierarchy of experience, inability to choose one’s work place, or dependence of all the members on the institutional decisions taken by a few high ranking military officers.

For a long time throughout the fieldwork, and even the writing process, I was quite prejudiced by the abovementioned negative perceptions of some interviewees, some of whom are also my friends, and by my memories about the impacts of my Colonel grandfather’s on my father’s life and decisions. However, I gradually realized the privileges of a military career silenced in the accounts of the middle or upper middle class former cadets. While only a few interviewees voiced these privileges, I hope that I was able to reflect upon them in Chapter 4.

Three groups of research participants perceive and make sense of these changes quite differently, which is in itself a part of my argument on the unprecedented historical shift in the military and military education. The elder former cadets consider the process as deformation of the values that construct military masculinities. Yet the interviewees who suffered either administrative investigations or mobbing and extracurricular violence channel their anger towards the unfair treatment they received into macro actors, such as the Gülen movement or the JDP. With regard to the inside of the naval academy, they do not connect this Foucauldian story of centralization of authority and intensifying discipline to macro level processes since they did not witness the earlier state. However, they point out new distinctions emerging among the cadets, which did not exist before according to my elder interviewees who appreciate class unity and close friendships as integral parts of professional military education. These distinctions appear along the lines of Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, class, and ethnicity. They put that the economic background of future cadets will gradually deteriorate because a military career becomes less and less attractive, for several reasons, for children or adolescents who come from similar backgrounds with them. The youngest group referred to the ‘threat’ of Kurdish men’s existence in the military since they know cadets from their cohort speaking Kurdish in naval academy. Regarding the examples such as the US military which is completely based upon

professional soldiers who mostly come from lower class and migrant families, their overwhelming expectations about the future of the professional military give hints of the possible consequences of the military's falling from grace, and fitting in the neoliberal market by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing. In short, beyond what I have observed along the differences between three groups of my research participants, the younger group calls attention more than the rest to changing modes of making military masculinities in military schools. The prototypical subjectivity and masculinity of a military officer have historically been Kemalist, Turkish and mostly middle class, since the establishment of the Republic. As my research participants claim, this image might be in a transformation process in this specific historical context.

All in all, the unprecedented historical shift in the military extends to internal restructuring of power to serious changes in ideological, ethnic, and class composition in military education. Neither the military nor the military schools are composed of homogenous subjectivities and a standard military masculinity. Thus, this heterogeneity continues to take new forms in our historical context.

There are of course several shortcomings and further prospects offered by this thesis. First of all, my interviewees were born between 1987 and 1994, a generation, which did not witness even the February 28 military intervention in 1997 as adults. The JDP government had been in power throughout their adolescence. This fact prompts many questions: What would be their reactions to anonymous letters about them received by the academy if they had been cadets before the JDP rule? Would they leave the academy with increasing concerns about their future in the military, or would they act differently? Would there be such letters in the first place? Secondly, while the fathers of many of them were military officers or NCOs, they were also military children whose lives were, and probably still are 'encompassed' by the military's material assets, incentives, prestige, security and care (Şen 2014, 8). Almost all of those who were not military children were raised by Kemalist families who knew the military institution as a powerful and prestigious actor in politics and social life of Turkey. The military's falling grace started after all of my participants were already in naval high school or academy. Moreover, all of the interviewees have grown up in a neoliberal context in which everything turns into commodities, and material assets gradually erase the value of historically and socially prestigious occupations. One wonders whether or how these two specific historical conditions factor in the silence in their narratives regarding the privileges provided by the military. What would be, for instance, the

repercussions of a similar process of transformation if one of these conditions had not been valid?

Some further prospects offered by this research are intentionally not discussed throughout the thesis in order not to be speculative about such a tender issue. The first one is the question of whether the ongoing changes in military schools are a part of kind of a planned shift in the profile of the future professional military. Are these changes only efforts of commanders who want their students to stay out of the chaos the high ranking officers were facing? Or is there a decision-making on the higher levels of the military institution about the internal restructuring of military schools and military masculinities? Although further research is required to be able to answer these questions, there are a few points marked in this thesis that hint at the latter: the decrease of compensation penalty in the past years, in cases of voluntary detachment or dismissals, and the serious investigations that some of my interviewees and many other cadets went through despite the fact that the accusation letters were anonymous and might not have been taken this seriously.

Secondly, the content of these changes ‘strangely’ includes the punishment or at least questioning of alcohol consumption outside the school or having heterosexual sex. This research also raises a question about whether there is a nontransparent power in the cadre of TAF. Most of my research participants stated their belief that there is. While most avoided identifying this power, many research participants such as Hakan, who has been a cadet of Turkish Naval High School as a part of the Gülen community, claimed that Gülen movement is organized within the military since the middle of the 2000s. Their claims bring forth an outburst of questions about the future of the professional military: writing on the history of the impacts of German-Prussian and the US military models on the Turkish Armed Forces, I wonder whether one can speculate about a new model in the military in the near future. The ongoing changes in the structure and the bureaucracy of military schools might as well have corollaries in the high ranks of the military. What kind of a professional military awaits us? An increasingly Islamist one with the alleged impacts or internal organization of the Gülen movement, a military with lower class, ideologically more diverse (differing from the old Kemalist tradition of the military) and non-Turkish professionals, a totally professional military as in the case of the US or the UK, or a combination of all these changes? These are only some of the new questions that emanate from this research, although the scope of the research is not adequate to answer them. What this research



does show is that there is a major transformation taking place, not only in civil-military relations in general, but at all levels of the military institution itself. I hope that this partial account on professional military education and civil-military relations will lend support to the growing field of studies on the military institution and military members.

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