

**ETHNO-PLURALISM ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN UNION: ANALYSIS OF
RISE OF RIGHT WING PARTIES AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES**

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To my dearest; Emel,
My beloved granny, who was the arch of my soul

ABSTRACT

ETHNO-PLURALISM ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN UNION: ANALYSIS OF RISE OF RIGHT WING PARTIES AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES

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Keywords: Right wing parties, European Elections, Post-industrialism.

For the recent decades, it has been observed that there is an increasing support for populist radical right wing parties, which became apparent especially in European Elections. This thesis examines the rise of populist radical right wing parties in several European countries through taking the 2014 European Elections as its central election example while considering two theoretical explanations; Post-industrial Phenomenon and Master Frame Theory. In order to create a better understanding on this rise, six European countries; Austria, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece included in this research as example countries. Within these countries, radical right parties of each country; Freedom Party of Austria; Front National; Danish People's Party; Party For Freedom; True Finns and Golden Dawn will be analyzed through their electoral success particularly in the last European Elections of 2014 with a brief comparison to previous European elections and national elections in respective countries. Theoretical classification of these parties will also be taken place in this research in order to prevent a possible conflict due to vast literature on the classification in which there are too much definitions and categorization exists.

ÖZET

Avrupa Birliđi'nde Etnik Çođulculuk Analizi: Sađ Partilerin Yükseliři ve Destek Gruplarının Analizi

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Avrupa Çalıřmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, Ocak 2015

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Sađ partiler, Avrupa Seçimleri, Post-endüstriyel teori

Son yıllarda özellikle Avrupa Seçim'lerinde popülist radikal sađ partilerin desteđini arttırdıđı gözlemlenmektedir. Bu arařtırmanın temel maksadı; 2014 Avrupa Seçimleri sonuçlarını merkeze alarak, popülist radikal sađ partilerin "post-endüstriyel teori" ve "potent çerçeve teorisi" üzerinden deđerlendirilmesini yapmaktır. Son yıllardaki bu yükseliři açıklamak üzere altı Avrupa ülkesindeki; Avusturya, Fransa, Danimarka, Hollanda, Finlandiya ve Yunanistan'daki söz konusu sađ partilerin 2014 Avrupa Seçimleri sonuçları üzerinden deđerlendirilecek, bir önceki Avrupa Seçimleri ile ilgili kısa bir karşılařtırma da yer alacaktır. Mevzu bahis radikal sađ partilerin teorik olarak sınıflandırılması ve açıklaması da olası bir terimsel karıřıklıđı engellemek maksadıyla ayrı bir bölüm olarak incelenecektir.

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Introduction

In the most recent elections for the European Parliament in 2014, we witnessed a significant rise of populist radical right wing parties across many European countries. This rise of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP's)¹ especially in the last several decades, might not be considered as the most significant development in European political arena as this rise has not resulted in determining conclusions for the political system. In addition to yet relative success of these parties in different countries, it is observed that there is an open tendency towards underestimation of such electoral support and the success of these parties particularly in media, since these right wing party votes has not reached a critical level that can conclude in disruptive results for European political system. Yet, an analysis on recent rise of the populist radical right parties implies considerable messages and signs. Although the parties in question have become one of the stable features of European political system throughout the history; in which they were existent in the European political system for a long time, rise of such votes requires a deeper investigation for current period in order to understand the grievances, discontent and some structural changes in European societies on one hand. On the other hand, a deeper investigation could be useful to understand the lacking efficiency of current dominant political parties and deficits in the European political system that might also gave boost to the rise of populist radical right wing parties.

Throughout this thesis, I will try to find a plausible answer to the question of; what are the possible reasons behind the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe's most developed countries? Through asking this question, it is claimed to find reliable answers to understand the conditions and developments in European societies and in European political arena that give rise to the populist radical right parties and increased their electoral support especially in last several years. The 'most developed countries' phrase in the research question especially mentioned here since, the data on the countries that is used as empirical means in this research shows that these countries are among the most

¹Here, PRRP (populist radical right parties) definition and term taken from Cas Mudde's two works and will be in this research within the context that Mudde explain, as it is explained within this thesis.

Cas Mudde, "Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change", *Party Politics*, 1(10), 2014. pp.2.

Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe", Cambridge University Press, 2007.

wealthy ones in Europe with having rather small proportions of economic problems in comparison to most of the Southern European countries and rest of the world.

For the countries that are included in this research, it might be better to observe some empirical data at this point in order to understand the emphasis on ‘developed countries’ as mentioned above. These numbers below are particularly chosen since besides the fact that there are several different indicators and categories that could also point out a country’s level of development; most PRRP’s mentioned in this thesis addresses especially these numbers in their elections campaigns and programmes. As of 2012; net migration rate (migrants/1,000 population)² calculated as 1.79% in Austria; that puts the country in 39th place in the world ranking³; unemployment rate calculated as 4.2% with 106th place in the world ranking and; GDP (per capita in US\$) calculated as 42,400 for the same year which means that Austria has 19th highest GDP amount in world ranking.⁴ For France, net migration rate calculated as 1.1%, which puts France in 48th place in world ranking; unemployment rate appears as 9.3% that means the country is in 96th place in world ranking and GDP (per capita in US\$) is 35,600\$ that makes the France as having 36th highest GDP amount in world ranking.⁵ For Denmark, net migration rate appears as 2.36% that puts the country at 31th place in world ranking, unemployment rate calculated as 6.0% which means Denmark is 139th country in the world ranking and GDP (per capita in US\$) is 37.600\$ in which Denmark appears as the

²Net migration rate gives “the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving the country during the year of calculation per 1,000 persons. This rate indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of population change in the same year”.

“Net migration rate”, Indexmundi, 2012. <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=27&l=en>

³World ranking calculated from the highest net migration rate, unemployment rate and GDP (per capita) to lowest one in which the ranking of the countries given above in order to see the place of countries in question in clearer lenses.

⁴For Austrian results of unemployment rate and GDP (per capita) rates:

“Economy: unemployment rate”, Indexmundi, 2012. <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=74>

“Economy: GDP (per capita in US\$)” Indexmundi, 2012. <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=67&l=en>

⁵For France results of net migration rate, unemployment rate and GDP rate:

“Demographics: net migration rate”, Indexmundi, 2012.

<http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=27&l=en>

“Economy: unemployment rate”, Indexmundi, 2012.

<http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=74>

“Economy: GDP (per capita in US\$)” Indexmundi, 2012.

<http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=67&l=en>

30th country in ranking.⁶ For Netherlands; net migration rate calculated as 2.02% eventually puts the country in 36th place in world ranking, unemployment rate is 4.4% (157th place), and GDP (per capitain US\$) is 42.700\$ in which Netherlands takes the 18th place in ranking.⁷ For Finland; net migration rate is calculated as 0.62% (57th place in world ranking) which seems quite low; unemployment rate calculated as 7.8% (110th place in world ranking) and; GDP (per capitain US\$) appears as 36.700\$ (51th place in world ranking).⁸ Greece taken into consideration in this thesis as an exceptional case in which the populist right party considered as on more extremist in comparison to other parties in question as mostly caused by the financial problems occurred in 2008-2009. Therefore therates of unemployment and GDP (per capita) refer to position of Greece clearly within this context. Net migration rate calculated as 2.32% for Greece puts the country in 57th place in world ranking; unemployment rate is 7.8% (110th place in world ranking) which seems quite high in comparison to above-mentioned countries and GDP (per capitain US\$) is calculated as 26.600\$ that seems much lower in comparison to other countries in question.⁹ These rates are added here as mentioned above; since PRRP's are always eager to talk particularly about unemployment rates and immigration rates and usually built their party programme based on these subjects. These numbers are important to see radical right parties' amount of politicization of many issues as campaign tools; even the indicators are proving a very good performance of a country in question, these radical right parties addresses such topics as the biggest of their respective country and in fond of exaggerating these topics in order to get higher levels of electoral support through boosting the general sensitivity or discontent in respective societies.

The last European Elections of 2014 posited as the central focus point, since it shows the latest developments in this subject and relative or complete success of the parties in question, consequently remaining debate on radical right will be determined in the framework of this election since it is quite not possible to gather all European and national election results of the parties within a limited space. Through the chapters of this thesis, I claim to shed a light on the re-emergence of these radical parties within the

⁶*Ibid.*,

⁷*Ibid.*,

⁸*Ibid.*,

⁹*Ibid.*,

context of last European elections, in supposedly different forms as a response to the transformations within western societies as a result of changing social, economic and political circumstances. This subject is worth to observe and analyze since I humbly consider this slowly rising tendency towards PRRP's constitute results of a particular development in European societies that is generally explained through post-industrialization phenomenon¹⁰, which will be examined in further chapters in detail. This transformation inmost of the European societies created a tendency towardsin society as being anti-immigration, anti- multiculturalism relatedly, and some of other anti- positions towards several new conditions that are basically brought by high levels of globalization, economic challenges that occurred in last several decades within Europe and slowly sharpening identity positions that are becoming more apparent both within minority groups and within 'native' populations.

Additionally, it is concluded by several academic researches¹¹ that the increasing support for PRRP's is not only emerging because of the structural transformation that European societies had to face with throughout the last few decades let's say, it is happening also because there also emerged new ways of representation through the vast development of communication technologies and branding skills which became significant in order to create a sense of change in party positions on many subjects. Although this development constitutes a relatively small proportion of the reasoning of rise of new challenges from radical parties, there are academics which also will be considered in further chapters, that put emphasis on these new opportunities because of the fact that without emergence of these new opportunities the rise in question might not necessarily experience a visibility at this level.

It could be also meaningful to add that the last European Elections of 2014 is also posited as the central focus point for examination of populist radical right parties since it is observed that 2014 elections gained higher relevance in comparison with past

¹⁰For a detailed reading on Post-industrialization phenomenon; Ronald Inglehart, "Globalization and postmodern values", *The Washington Quarterly*. 23(1), 2010, 215-228.

Piero Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypothesis on the emergence of the extreme right-wing parties in Europe", *European Journal of Political Research*. 22, 1992, 3-34.

¹¹Jens Rydgren, "Is extreme Right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the Emergence of new party family", *European Journal of Political Research*. 44, 2005, 413-417.

European Elections.¹² Academic and non-academic commentators highlighted this higher relevance of last European Elections in most of their comments as a distinctive character that emerged in last years. There has been observed a lower turnout for European Elections generally in which there is a clear decreasing trend towards the event by years. For the last elections of 2014, turnout percentages are emerged as significantly similar with previous elections of 2009, which marked a difference, or change of attitude towards European Elections in societies. With the facts that will be analyzed in detail in further chapters; there might a rather slowly increasing interest towards European Elections related with the increasing unrest among European societies. This development constitutes another important factor about the inclusion of European Elections in this research as a central focusing point.

Therefore, this thesis is organized in four sections; chapter 1 will provide a brief overview on the topic including a literature review and theoretical framework on the classification and brief historical development of radical right wing parties in order to prevent a possible conflict on the understanding of the term ‘populist radical right wing parties’ and in order to create a better understanding on, under which circumstances does the parties in question developed; chapter two will consider the empirical study on the radical right parties through making analysis on six European countries including Austria, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece with a claim of establishing a rather detailed analysis through examining the development of such parties in several European countries; chapter three will provide theoretical explanations of the rise of populist radical right wing parties in which there will be a brief explanation on the two dominant theories; post-industrialization phenomenon and master frame theory that are examining the causes and conditions behind the rise of these parties in question; and in chapter four will provide an informational section on the last European Elections of 2014 which constitutes the ground and a focusing point for this thesis in which the election results of the above-mentioned countries gathered around the last European Elections through a brief comparison with results of 2009 European Elections in order to make it more clear to see the latest performance of these parties in respected countries and will include an evaluation of this performance.

¹²Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele & Nicola Maggini, “The European Parliament Elections of 2014”. CISE: Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali, 2014, 1-329.

CHAPTER 1

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Aftermath of the Second World War, the existence of extreme right wing parties and related phenomena did not constitute a major part or central position in the academic debates and politicians although there was happening significant developments on the right spectrum of the politics in general.¹³ What was happening especially during 1990's and aftermath briefly summarized as a period in which liberal democracies enjoying significant degree of social and political stability and seems to appeared as the universal governmental principle that was practiced by multi- party electoral politics in many Western European countries.¹⁴Extremist solutions represented both by Left and Right seemed out of the political agenda through development of sustained economic growth and expansion of the welfare state in which individuals enjoyed great degrees of social stability relatedly.¹⁵The development and expansion of liberal democracy as a universal form of government and related economic and social progress celebrated as "universal victory of democracy"¹⁶ as CasMudde puts it however that was an early prediction if one could carefully consider the today's developments along with the dynamism within right side of the political spectrum. Mudde emphasized that new millennium is facing with new kinds of developments within the extremism sphere even in the Western European countries that are considered as the most democratic systems. The most apparent example given in several academic works is the rise of Le Pen's Front National in France which is still representing a challenge in the French political system although the party's support could not reach at a level that allow Front National to become a part of governing elite.

Hans- George Betz in his great work on radical right wing populism stated, "the optimism had all but evaporated"¹⁷ about the new kinds of challenges that are becoming

¹³Roger Eatwell, CasMudde, "Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge". Routlage, 2004.pp.1

¹⁴*Ibid.*,pp.i.

¹⁵Hans- Georg Betz, "Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe".St. Martin's Press, 1994.pp.1.

¹⁶Roger Eatwell, CasMudde, "Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge". Routlage, 2004. pp.2.

¹⁷Hans- Georg Betz, "Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe".St. Martin's Press, 1994.pp.2.

even more apparent today. He argues that there emerged major changes within political system especially during 1980's that brought by social, economic and political transformations in society during that period. He emphasized that these new kinds of political issues emerged partly as a result of rising new social actors that advocates an anti-position against the established political institutions along with increased awareness on ecological problems, which created a protest relatedly. Besides, same period witnessed a growing demand for social equality, for woman and minority rights in all spheres of life. All of these developments expected to be effective especially in the Left, which did happen indeed. This progress ended up in growing fragmentation of the Left where several kinds of Left-wing parties established like Left- libertarians, Greens and others, which were succeeded to create a support behind them. However, the series of increasing awareness and demands on several social and political issues also created an impact on the developments of the new kinds of Right-wing parties especially after 1990's. Betz call them as radical Right in this context, and argues that these radical Right parties also succeeded to re-emerge in supposedly different sets of agendas during 1990's.¹⁸

About the development of radical Right parties and their continued progress for 20 years at least, Roger Eatwell states that there are several significant aspects that should be taken into consideration about the rise of PRRP's which might be causes of growing concern. First, even though there is a tendency towards exaggerating the increasing support behind PRRP's, it is also apparent that there is an actual increase in the support for such parties in many countries in Europe whether it is a slow increase in numbers or not. On one hand he argues that the electoral support for PRRP's seems volatile in many cases, which support might emerged and risen as a result of some issue-based grievances thus, this increase might not conclude in a total success of such parties. On the other hand, he also argues that there is a general consensus that this rising support for PRRP's cannot be simply underestimated as a form of protest vote since there are growing awareness and discomfort among European societies on the issues of immigration and law and order especially, which are strongly promoted by radical right parties that could turn into a loyal electoral basis.¹⁹ Secondly, he argues that there is a recent trend of

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp.3.

¹⁹Roger Eatwell, Cas Mudde, "Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge". Routledge, 2004. pp.1.

practicing violent expressions towards ethnic and religious minorities in European societies, Muslim groups in particular, becoming a scapegoat for rising grievances. Although this trend arisen as two folded development; both promoted from widespread fundamentalist approaches among religious minorities and from ‘native’ population who have already feel a discomfort about such groups, this violent trend might end up in supporting radical Right who would not refuse an appeal like this for practical reasons such as vote maximizing claim.²⁰

According to Eatwell’s argument, the developments among ethnic minorities in European societies should also be taken into consideration while making an analysis on this topic. He states that there is an increasing tendency towards expressing identity issues while becoming more aware of this identity feeling among minorities mostly as a result of staying as ‘aliens’ on the edges of societies and political systems in question.²¹ This alienation might result in deepening problems within society and in political system relatedly. Radical Right wing parties inclined to seek some opportunity from such situations. In today’s political context, due to the fact that they cannot represent themselves as openly racist parties, they are representing such affiliations through softer terms like being anti-immigrant party, which is not asserting a racist propaganda against minorities but defending the cultural unity of ‘native’ populations in the countries in question. Consequently, the populations who are already feeling a discomfort about minorities and variety of groups would turn their faces to PRRP’s in elections. Lastly, there is also a current debate on the future of democracy and this debate has some aspects that can be linked to the rise of PRRP’s. Although majority of the voters does not constitute an anti-position against democracy and democratic ideals, there is a distrust and antipathy for established parties and politicians who were once responsible from well-being of populations but could not take necessary steps for the newly emerged and developed problems such as increasing levels of immigration and crime rates. Within these circumstances, populations might find PRRP’s more reliable where they represent themselves as the true representatives of the ‘people’ in response to above-mentioned distrust for established political organizations.²²

²⁰*Ibid.*,pp.2.

²¹*Ibid.*,pp.2.

²²Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy”, *Political Studies*.47,1999, 2-16.

1.1. Theoretical Explorations On Classification of Radical Right Wing Parties

On the classification of right wing parties, it could be found a broad literature for this subject. Although these parties in question once determined within the right wing party family, there are significant differences both between these parties and terms that are used in order to characterize them (i.e. extreme, populist and radical in particular).²³ Many academic researches agreed to state that there is no such consensus on the classification especially for the ones that re-emerged in last decades since it could be mistaken to put them under one classification as extreme or populist simply because; they have some characteristics that could fit with a combination of these radical, extreme or populist terms. It could be possible to talk about a more common approach on the classification of these parties, which draws a distinction between ‘new extreme right’ or ‘radical right’ and ‘old’ ones.²⁴ Relatedly, Cas Mudde emphasized that there are more than 26 different kinds of definitions in this classification terminology in order to describe right-wing extremist ideology that were collected.²⁵ Therefore, in this thesis I decided to call them as Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP’s) as Cas Mudde puts²⁶ because variety of reasons that will also be explained. Therefore in this section, I will try to elaborate on classification on PRRP’s through explaining different definitions.

About the classification of political parties, there are few more points worth to mention. The essential claim on the classification is to create a broader sense of definition for the parties that could be gathered into one group through determining some of the important characteristics of such groups that parties share in common.

²³ It is also observed that the terms extreme and radical for these parties used interchangeably especially by newspaper clippings and by academic works although there are differences between two terms theoretically.

²⁴ Piero Ignazi, “The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypothesis on the emergence of the extreme right-wing parties in Europe”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 22, 1992, 3-34, Herbert Kitschelt, A.J. McGann, “The Radical Right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis”. University of Michigan Press, 1995.

²⁵ Cas Mudde, *Right-wing extremism analyzed: A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86)*. *European Journal of Political Research*, 27, 1995, 203-224.

Cas Mudde, “The war of words defining the extreme right party family”. *West European Politics*, 9(2), 1996, 224-248.

²⁶ Cas Mudde, “Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change”, *Party Politics*, 1(10), 2014, pp.2.

Which means, study of political parties primarily takes a group of parties as a larger group (i.e. right-wing parties), or focuses on a smaller group within the larger group (i.e. extremist right wing political parties). In which, a consensus on a dominant perspective on the studies of political parties did not emerge so far.²⁷Besides, this attempt to put parties in a group which is called party families basically created on the basis of party ideologies in which parties are differentiated and classified according to their ideologies.²⁸I would like to add my humble opinions at this point. Although party families once created on the basis of ideologies of such establishments, in the current context, salience of ‘the ideology’ decreased at remarkable levels. Of course, while examining the political parties which once constructed through the influence of ideologies, one must take the historical linkage between parties and their roots into consideration however, in today’s fashion, several remarkable developments that emerged as a transformation in social structure and political arena relatedly, created an impact on the construction of political parties. There are many scholarly works dedicated to understand how these developments in social structure reflected in the political arena and changed the political parties and their both rhetoric and programmes, which will be analyzed in further chapters. Therefore, an analysis or classification of political parties according to their basic core values, which refers mainly to their ideologies, is no longer applicable in order to understand whole picture about the parties in question.

First of all, it should be mentioned that the parties in question sometimes classified as extreme not just because of their historical roots which refers to fascist affiliations, but because they stand on the margins of political system. However, in order to prevent a possible conflict on the terminology, it must be underlined that one should prefer to use ‘marginal’ instead of ‘extreme’. At this point, it must be also underlined that the parties in question lost their marginal character since their position in the political system became mainstream as they started to seek for maximizing their votes as much as possible through insisting upon their agendas.²⁹ Therefore, they started to considered as

²⁷William Crotty, “The Theory and Practice of Political Science”. Northwestern University Press,1991. pp.145.

²⁸Cas Mudde, “The Ideology of the Extreme Right”, Manchester University Press,2000. pp.3.

²⁹ Susi Meret, “The Danish People’s Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support”, 2010,Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold, 2010. pp.24

mainstream parties already by many academic resources in which their radical or extreme features does not constitute an exclusive characteristic which puts them on the margins of political system. On the issue of making discrimination between radical and extreme features, there are a few important points to mention. On one hand, in some of the academic researches, the extreme characteristic associated with studies of fascism, which is no longer relevant for the parties that are in consideration since, this ‘extreme’ term basically refers to the refusal of parliamentary system and anti-Semitic stance in classical literature on this subject.³⁰ On the other hand, in today’s terminology the extreme right became a commonly preferred term in order to describe parties such as Front National, with a different kind of motivation. Within this context the major characteristics of ‘recent’ extreme right are; their anti-democracy stance, strong state emphasis, racism³¹ and nationalism.³²

There is another definition that preferred by scholars in order to describe the parties in question which is ‘anti-immigration parties’ in which these parties are considered as single-issue establishments. Therefore, advocates of this definition interpret the increase in support for such parties as increasing importance of issue voting which is mainly related to rising significance of immigration issue. However, the parties in question are not necessarily fit with major characteristics of single-issue parties. Single-issue parties are taking their support from an electorate that is not belonging to a certain social structure; single-issue parties generally supported by its electorate on the basis of a single issue; they do not necessarily have a stable ideological programme and they underline only one all-encompassing issue.³³ Therefore, it would be mistaken to classify all PRRP’s, which are predominantly raised in recent decades, as single-issue parties since these establishments are not founded or developed on the basis of such characteristics that mentioned above. Although they generally benefitted from raising importance of issue voting, mostly for the issues of immigration and law and order, they

³⁰Piero Ignazi, “The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypothesis on the emergence of the extreme right-wing parties in Europe”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 22, 1992, 3-34.

³¹In this context racism does not necessarily refers to the ethnic racism in classical understanding, but rather emerges in the shape of ethno-pluralism, which mainly constructed upon cultural discrimination.

³²Roger Eatwell, Cas Mudde, “Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge”. Routledge, 2004. pp.8.

³³Cas Mudde, “The single issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue”. *West European Politics*, 22(3), 1999. pp.184.

do have an ideological programme in general and they do not structure their agenda as all-encompassing.

A vast terminological debate maintained by Mudde's several works on this subject yet of course, he is not the only one who took these parties into consideration. It is stated above that his term; populist radical right parties (PRRP'S) will take place in this thesis in order to make a generalization for all parties in question since I humbly decided that this term might partly reflect all of the characteristics of such parties in relevance with today's circumstances. His terminology sounded important and relevant for several accounts. In his own article on PRRP's, Mudde states that these parties are sharing a core ideology that is including; nativism, authoritarianism and populism. By nativism he refers that there is xenophobia element as a form of nationalism in these party programmes, that advocates a single culture within a nation state is the ideal form of unity in which non-native cultures considered as a threat. By authoritarianism he states that these parties hold a strong belief in law and order which would provide the discipline in society through strict enforcement of such laws. And by populism, he argues that the parties in question have a perspective that divides society into two homogenous groups; the corrupt elite and the pure people, who are in constant conflict in which this conflict must be fixed through making the 'general will' of the people as the main source of motivation.³⁴ In Pedahzur and Perliger's work on this subject; defining the boundaries of party families; they also refer to Mudde's earlier work³⁵ in which he wrote about broader characteristics of the new radical right parties. These characteristics are basically; xenophobia, traditional ethics, nationalism, extremism, welfare chauvinism and an emphasis of strong state. Authors, the authors underlines that all of these features not necessarily appears at the same time in equal importance on party programmes however, they are all significant features while defining such parties if they appear.³⁶

In this literature, it is also stated that PRRP's could be considered as anti-system

³⁴Cas Mudde, "Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change", *Party Politics*, 1(10), 2014. pp.2.

³⁵Ami Pedahzur&AriePerliger, "An Alternative Approach for Defining the Boundaries of 'Party Families': Examples from the Israeli Extreme Right- Wing Party Scene". *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 39(2),2004, 285-305 in Cas Mudde, "The Ideology of the Extreme Right", Manchester University Press,2000. pp.3.

³⁶*Ibid.*,pp.3.

particularly if their position lean towards extremist (in traditional terms) ideals. This anti-system position defined clearly in Sartori's work in which the author points out that in order to call a party as anti-system, this party in question must undermine the legitimacy of the regime that it opposes.³⁷ With respect to author's argument, PRRP's could not be called as anti-system parties since they are not undermining the legitimacy of democracy in most cases. However, it is also possible to put these parties under anti-system category just because they are generally position themselves against some key characteristics of liberal democracy such as minority rights and pluralism.³⁸ Therefore, at this point, one can classify PRRP's under anti-system title through bearing their opposition to fundamental elements of liberal democracy in mind.

While making an analysis on classification of the parties in question, it is also important to mention that, major academic works on this subject³⁹ makes a distinction between traditional extreme right parties and new extreme right parties that are marked and partly shaped by postindustrial societies which is why Ignazi named them as new post-industrial extreme right parties.⁴⁰ The major difference between new postindustrial extreme right parties and traditional ones has emerged in relation to remarkable structural social and political changes in many Western societies, which were mainly brought by globalization as well as advanced industrial developments.

³⁷Giovanni Sartori, "Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis". Cambridge University Press, 1976.pp.133.

³⁸Cas Mudde, "Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change", *Party Politics*, 1(10), 2014. pp.4.

³⁹Piero Ignazi, "L'estremadestra in Europa: (da Le Pen a Haider).Il Mulino,2000.

Hans- Georg Betz, "Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe".St. Martin's Press, 1994.

⁴⁰Susi Meret, "The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support", 2010,Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold, 2010. pp.26

CHAPTER 2

An Empirical Study of the Right Wing parties across Europe

In this chapter there will be an attempt to examination and empirical study of six countries with their related populist radical right wing parties as mentioned before. FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) in Austria, FN (Front National) in France, DPP (Danish People's Party) in Denmark, PVV (Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands, PS (True Finns) in Finland and XA (Golden Dawn) in Greece will be posited in the further sections in order to make an even more detailed analysis on different kinds of parties that are considered in the populist radical right parties group. These countries and their respective PRRP's are particularly included in this work both because of their similarities and differences. Freedom Party of Austria, Front National and Danish People's Party considered being as the most settled and similar ones in which they constitute classical examples of populist radical right wing parties thus, they has to be mentioned in this work as the oldest ones. Party for Freedom in Netherlands, as being in the same category appears mostly because of its anti- Islam and anti- immigrant position, which are the party's distinctive characteristics, affiliated with its radical stance. True Finns included in this research because of its unexpected success in both European and national elections. For the case of Golden Dawn, both party's extreme radical ideology and Greece's distinctive condition attracted scholarly research; within this context Golden Dawn could be considered as the most extremist example in populist radical right wing parties.

2.1. Austria: Freedom Party of Austria

In the last European elections, Austria became one of the EU countries that has encountered with rise of populist radical right-wing party; FPÖ (Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs)⁴¹ Freedom Party of Austria, increased its votes by 7.01 per cent from the previous elections and took the third place in national results. For the last European elections of 2014, FPÖ succeeded to gain 19.72% of the votes with a 7.01% increase in which they were able to gain 12.71% of the votes as a result of 2009 European

⁴¹ "Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs", FPÖ, 2014.
<http://www.fpoe.at/dafuer-stehen-wir/leit Antrag/>

Elections.⁴² Before making an analysis on FPÖ's campaign discourse, and fundamental electoral basis, it seems necessary to put some brief information on Austrian national politics and dominant parties within a broader perspective of Austrian politics in order to understand FPÖ's position in national level with clearer lenses. Thereafter, more detailed discussion on FPÖ's position in political party classification, party discourse along with its historical roots and reasons behind its increased vote share will be emphasized as following parts. For the current discussion on FPÖ's position in national political system, 'popular radical right wing' term will be used in this context as mentioned at the beginning chapters of this thesis.

Austrian politics constructed and defined as stable two- party system. Major political parties in Austria SPÖ and ÖVP especially between 1945- 1990 were able to remain in power interchangeably and also established successful coalitions. SPÖ (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs)⁴³ Social Democratic Party of Austria positioned as the major left political party in the country and ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei)⁴⁴ Austrian People's Party positioned as major conservative political party; which are also forming the current grand coalition government as the result of 2013 national elections in Austria.⁴⁵ At the same elections FPÖ emerged as the third major political party in country while increasing its vote by 2.97 per cent and gained 20.5% of the votes.

FPÖ is the political establishment founded in 1956 that has strong nationalist affiliations whose first leader was an Austrian Nazi leader. During the leadership of Jörg Heider, FPÖ gained significant support from several different groups in society and increased its popularity among Austrian people. The highest electoral success came in 1999 for FPÖ in which party gained 26.91% of the votes and became second party in the country ranking. At the same election ÖVP came first out of ballot box and gained 33.15% of the votes. At the beginning of February in 2000, ÖVP and FPÖ formed a coalition consequently.⁴⁶ During these years, leader of the FPÖ, Jörg Heider considered

⁴² "European Parliament Results of the 2014 European election", European Parliament, 2014. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-at-2014.html>

⁴³ "Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs", SPÖ, 2014. <http://spoe.at/>

⁴⁴ "Österreichische Volkspartei", ÖVP, 2014. <http://www.oevp.at/Home.psp>

⁴⁵ "Bundesministerium Für Inneres", BM.I. <http://wahl13.bmi.gv.at/>

⁴⁶ "Austria: Parliamentary Chamber: Nationalrat Elections held in 1999", IPU, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2017_99.html

as an extremist right-wing politician as an opinion poll indicated.⁴⁷ Along with Heider's sympathy for extremist policies, party rhetoric in 1999 election campaign period, could be considered as a clear sign of party's core values and its basic characteristics. Heider underlined anti-foreigner stance of the party for many cases during the campaign period through offering a policy that suggests freezing immigration to Austria along with initiating campaigns, which were emerging as an opposition against further enlargement of European Union.⁴⁸ In the same election period, FPÖ also put a remarkable emphasis on family, which is defined as the nucleus of Austrian society and proposed a new policy, which would increase state aid for families. Although current discourse that FPÖ politicians prefer seems softened and transformed into a more plausible rhetoric, this transformation could be considered as a re-shaping of the wording just because; a general change in the party discourse did not emerge as a result of a real transformation in the party politics.

It is stated that FPÖ became the winner of 1999 Austrian national elections since the party adopted anti-immigration campaigns successfully.⁴⁹ FPÖ's success at adopting and advocating anti-immigration policies while having a clear stance against this particular issue still constitutes one of the important reasons behind its support. In 2002 elections, FPÖ had to face with dramatic electoral failure since the party could not use its influential position in parliament effectively as a partner of government, and could not be able to take enough responsibility and could not be able to spend the necessary effort about its pre-election promises during this time period.⁵⁰ It is also mentioned that the failure came after the party's governing period emerged partly as a result of intra-party conflicts along with its ineffective use of its position.

In latest European elections, FPÖ's enjoyed electoral success in comparison to its earlier results, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The current party leader is Heinz Christian Strache who came to the leadership position in 2005. On one hand, it is stated that some of the ideological expressions has replaced by him with softer versions

⁴⁷Zöchling Christa, *Haider: Licht und Schatteneiner Karriere* (Wien: Molden Verlag 1999)

⁴⁸“Austria: Parliamentary Chamber: Nationalrat Elections held in 1999”, IPU, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2017_99.htm

⁴⁹Plasser Fritz and Ulram A. Peter, “The changing Austrian vote”. Signum Verlag, 2000.

⁵⁰Heinisch, Reinhard, “Success in opposition – failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office”. *West European Politics*. 26(3), 2003, 91-130.

while many essential statements remain very similar to previous ones.⁵¹ On the other hand, it is also emphasized by academic commentators that under leadership of Strache, party added more radical right perspective to its campaigns especially on immigration, integration of foreigners and multi- culturalism issues.⁵² According to Phillip Decker's analysis on FPÖ, party leadership "combined its anti- establishment discourse with a critique of the current economic system identified with European Union".⁵³ Within this analysis, Decker points out that the party's classification as radical right appears as a result of FPÖ's anti- immigrant, anti- Islam, anti- Semitic language which forms the ideological core of the party. As mentioned above, the basis of FPÖ's ideological core founded especially on German nationalism ideals, which turned into exclusionary nationalism eventually continues with advocating polarization of society on the basis of 'othering' the foreigners in the country. Conceptualization of the 'other' emerges through the critics on the basis of ethnicity and religion constituted by FPÖ.⁵⁴ There are also several comments that agree with above-mentioned analysis, and states that FPÖ strongly polarize public opinion, as the other successful right- wing populist parties.

FPÖ's 2014 election campaign discourse predominantly embraced immigration, asylum and integration subjects as central topics while adopting intense anti- feelings against non-European immigrants. During election campaign period, party politicians mainly asserted that there should be stricter laws and policies on immigration and asylum thus, there must be taken stricter measures against the threat of Islam. FPÖ also accusing two dominant parties; ÖVP and SPÖ for not preventing the flow of immigrants into the country and letting more foreigners to come in to Austria which will seize

⁵¹Phillip Decker, "The European Parliament elections in Austria will be the latest battleground in the far-right's challenge to the country's EU consensus", LSE, 4 February 2014.

<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/02/04/the-european-parliament-elections-in-austria-will-be-the-latest-battleground-in-the-far-rights-challenge-to-the-countrys-eu-consensus/>

⁵²Thomas Baumgartner, "Austria and the European elections: Why so many young voters are so keen on the FPÖ", FUTURELABEUROPE, 21 May 2014.

<http://www.futurelabeuropa.eu/blog/austria-and-the-european-elections-why-so-many-young-voters-are-so-keen-on-the-fpo/>

⁵³Phillip Decker, "The European Parliament elections in Austria will be the latest battleground in the far-right's challenge to the country's EU consensus", LSE, 4 February 2014.

<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/02/04/the-european-parliament-elections-in-austria-will-be-the-latest-battleground-in-the-far-rights-challenge-to-the-countrys-eu-consensus/>

⁵⁴*Ibid.*,

Austrian jobs and will damage the educational system.⁵⁵ In the FPÖ's party program, it can be clearly observed that there is a strong emphasis on cultural origins of Austrians as a part of cultural region of Europe. Over and above it is clearly stated that European culture predominantly shaped by Christianity with influence of Judaism.⁵⁶ On the basis of this observation, FPÖ's oppositional stance against Islam become evident along with party's election statements which were blaming Islam as not being a natural part of European Judeo- Christian cultural values.

Classification of Austrian Freedom Party as right- wing Populist Party altered by newspaper clippings, which are also important to take into consideration in order to understand the party's influence both on media and on the eyes of population through media representation. Time magazine called FPÖ as "far- right party" in its; "March of the Far Right in Austria" headline, along with party leader Strache's statement about women in burqas as "female ninjas".⁵⁷ In addition to party leader's statement particularly on Muslim woman, this clipping also puts emphasis on Strache's expressions on European economic problems in which he promises to "cut off the funds for bankrupt EU countries". Time magazine is not the only one who called FPÖ as far-right political party. In relation to this classification, there are several newspapers that called FPÖ as far- right party while explaining its electoral success in 2014 European elections.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ "Austrian Freedom Party Exploits Fear of Foreigners, EU distrust ahead of Elections", Associated Press, 15 May 2014. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/15/austria-freedom-party-exploits-fear-foreigners-eu-distrust-ahead-eu-elections/>

⁵⁶ "Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)", FPÖ, 18 June 2011. http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/Content/portal/PDFs/2012/2012_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf

⁵⁷ Sonia Van Gilder Cooke, "Europe's Right Wing: A Nation-by-Nation Guide to Parties and Extremist Groups", The Times, 29 July 2011. http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2085728_2085727_2085702,00.html

⁵⁸ Markus Salzmann, "Austria: Far-right FPÖ gains support in Austria: European elections", World Socialist Web Site, 4 June 2014. <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/06/04/aust-j04.html>, Benjamin Dodman, "Far- right leaders vow to 'save Eruope' at French Gathering", France 24, 1 December 2014. <http://www.france24.com/en/20141130-france-national-front-europe-far-right-leaders-marine-le-pen-wilders-russia/>

According to opinion polls as mentioned in an analysis on FPÖ, %32 of the voters under age of 29 supported FPÖ in Austria.⁵⁹ Driving from this fact, newspaper commentators, suggests a deeper analysis on these votes especially coming from younger generations in order for a better understanding of growing discontent among young population. Le Monde news agency calls FPÖ's increasing votes as pushing of the far right in Austria with the headline of "Fears of Growing Protest Vote"⁶⁰ in which the newspaper highlights FPÖ's discourse on rejection of 'Brussels' as an electoral campaign. The news agency underlined the opinions of a political scientist, Dominique Reyni in which he explains this rise of far right votes as; "European Parliament have traditionally favored marginal parties, they are characterized by proportional representation and high level of abstention especially among moderate votes". In relation with Le Monde's description of such support as 'protest vote' an analysis on Policy Network site also defines support for FPÖ as a rising of protest votes and attempts to explain this support. Analysis argues FPÖ give voice to most popular and debated topics for population such as immigration, crime rates accordingly, loss of national identity and future dangers that immigration might bring. Besides, FPÖ suggested a creation of preferential treatment for Austrian workers.⁶¹ As analysis concludes, rise of vote for FPÖ should be considered as a reflection of general opposition and discontent in population for above-mentioned subjects that boosts the feelings of fear and discontent among people.

There are also other comments in the same analysis about the support for FPÖ. In this brief analysis, author lay stress on the young voters who supported FPÖ in last European elections and creates a link between dissatisfied young population who feels that they are abandoned or underrepresented by mainstream parties or political system in general, and who are also feel uneasy about doubtful future developments that might

⁵⁹Thomas Baumgartner, "Austria and the European elections: Why so many young voters are so keen on the FPÖ", FUTURELABEUROPE, 21 May 2014.

<http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/blog/austria-and-the-european-elections-why-so-many-young-voters-are-so-keen-on-the-fpo/>, Markus Salzmann, "Austria: Far-right FPÖ gains support in Austria: European elections", World Socialist Web Site, 4 June 2014.

<http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/06/04/aust-j04.html>

⁶⁰Alain Salles, "Fears of growing protest vote", Le Monde, 7 October 2013.

<http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/4201931-fears-growing-protest-vote>

⁶¹Sylvia Kritzing, "Austria: What contributed to the FPÖ's protest vote", Policy Network, 27 May 2014. http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4654&title=Austria-What-contributed-to-the-FP%C3%96s-protest-vote

happen as a result of high flows of immigration and free movement of workers for this case. FPÖ successfully presented itself as the defender of young people and concerned population against “them at the top” as the author states.⁶² According to this brief analysis, there emerged a common opinion on increased votes of FPÖ in which authors draw attention especially to young voters whose support for FPÖ considered as a protest vote as a result of above-mentioned factors. As opposition to this common opinion about vote of protest there is also an analysis that is arguing increasing electoral support for FPÖ should not be perceived as protest vote. As Policy network analysis indicates, increasing vote for right- wing parties as in the example of FPÖ called as protest votes since many corruption scandals about grand coalition in country uncovered especially by Greens in Austria. Yet, author states that these corruption scandals cannot be the major reason of this support for FPÖ since the party “is probably the most corrupt party of all”. Therefore, analysis argues that it was not a vote of protest but it was “vote of fear”.⁶³ FPÖ campaigns during the election period gave rise to such slogans as “the lazy southern Europeans” which was a reference Eurozone crisis that also emerged as a common campaign slogan for all of the populist parties. Another newspaper clipping from FT news agency refers to Strache’s talk in which he triggers the crowd’s unease about economic concerns and immigrants. Strache blames the grand coalition for not taking serious precautions against economic crisis. At the same public talk, Strache also shows a clear hostility towards immigration while especially addressing Turkish immigrants he states that; “If there are immigrants, from Turkey, who complain there is a cross hanging in the classroom at school, then I say to them ‘go back home’”.⁶⁴

For a better understanding of Austrian Freedom Party agenda and about their own stances on certain subjects, it could be useful to point out a couple of statements from the party programme in accordance with discussions above. In the first part of the party programme, FPÖ puts strong emphasis on the history of Austria and origins of

⁶²Thomas Baumgartner, “Austria and the European elections: Why so many young voters are so keen on the FPÖ”, FUTURELABEUROPE, 21 May 2014. <http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/blog/austria-and-the-european-elections-why-so-many-young-voters-are-so-keen-on-the-fpo/>

⁶³Sylvia Kritzinger, “Austria: What contributed to the FPÖ’s protest vote”, Policy Network, 27 May 2014. http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4654&title=Austria-What-contributed-to-the-FP%C3%96s-protest-vote

⁶⁴James Shotter, “Far-right Freedom party exploits Austrian unease”, FT, 20 May 2014. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b14024be-d692-11e3-b251-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Lb8bfAQd>

Austrian people, which appears as a common feature of the discourse of most far right parties.⁶⁵ Under the Liberal Policy Guidelines title, the second article it is clearly stated that Austrian Freedom Party is committed to protect Austrian national identity along with protection of homeland and autonomy of Austria.⁶⁶ On one hand, these statements could be considered as an eventual result and natural expression of being on the right side of the political spectrum. On the other hand, party programme includes stronger expressions in further parts on the issue of diversity and multi-culturalism. Consequently, the articles that addressed above should be taken into consideration in relation with latter articles that will be mentioned as following, along with Strache's discourse and party campaigns during the election period.

On the chapter of Europe of Diversity in the party programme, it is stated in the first paragraph that; Austrian Freedom Party “firmly reject any artificial synchronization of the diverse European languages and cultures by means of forced multiculturalism and globalization and mass immigration. Europe shall not be reduced to a political project of the European Union.”⁶⁷ Through this expression, party position on issues of multiculturalism, immigration and “artificial synchronization of European languages” becomes clearer. It can be argued that, FPÖ adopted an ideology in which even free movement of European citizens and immigration of ‘foreigners’ shall not be tolerated as the natural outcome of globalized world. It is also possible to talk about an oppositional mindset towards European Union as a broader composition including high levels of multiculturalism. At this point, it can be stated that the party programme is not drawing a clearly defined framework or oppositional position against European Union project yet while arguing lacking of a clear stance against EU, nationalist position of FPÖ and nationalist discourse of party leader should be kept in mind in order to have a better perspective about party's possible tendency on such topics.

⁶⁵This emphasis on cultural origins of the nation- state in question emerges as a common characteristic among most of the PRRP's that take place both in their discourse and party programme predominantly. The cultural emphasis considered as the major value of ethno plurality phenomenon which PRRP's advocates in most of the cases.

⁶⁶“Program of the Austrian Freedom Party”, FPÖ, 30 October 1997.

http://www.fpo.e.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_eng.pdf

⁶⁷“Program of the Austrian Freedom Party”, FPÖ, 30 October

1997. http://www.fpo.e.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_eng.pdf

2.2. France: National Front

For the last European elections, results from France became one of the most debated topics among the election news. National Front (FN) gained 24% of the vote share and took the first place in France⁶⁸ while the current strongest and moderate parties of France; UMP (Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire) and PS (Parti Socialiste) faced with substantial decrease of votes.⁶⁹ Besides, in comparison to previous European elections in 2009 in which National Front gained only 6% of the vote share, 2014 elections appears as even more significant.⁷⁰ Depending upon such statistics, this absolute victory of FN emerged as a remarkable outcome for several accounts.

First of all, 2014 European Elections is the first time that National Front could be able to reach this much of vote share since its formation, which eventually constitutes FN's first time of being the largest party of all in national level.⁷¹ Besides, FN is considered as the largest extreme-right party in Europe while holding strong oppositional position against European Union, also commonly known as Eurosceptic. Through this considerable increase of its vote share, FN has high possibility to push for an expansion of other right-wing Eurosceptic parties of Europe as having a lauder voice among them. Besides the fact that the last European election results created a change in balance on the right side of politics in France as a consequence of FN's higher vote share in comparison to UMP⁷², FN's voter profile has also shows an important change in which National Front could be able to gain the voter groups that are generally associated with left-wing political parties. According to IPSOS researches on voter profile for the last European Elections, FN supported mostly by manual workers with 43% percentage, also supported by; 38% of the low-skilled non-manual employees, 37% of the unemployed voters and 30% of the low-income households.⁷³ Additionally, FN has a

⁶⁸“European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fr-2014.html>

⁶⁹Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini, “The European Parliament Elections of 2014”. *Centro Italiano Studi Electtorali*, 2014, 1-335, pp.182.

⁷⁰“European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fr-2014.html>

⁷¹Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini, “The European Parliament Elections of 2014”. *Centro Italiano Studi Electtorali*, 2014, 1-335, pp.183.

⁷²*Ibid.*, pp.183.

⁷³James Shields, “The Front National: From systematic opposition to systematic Integration?”. *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22(4), 2014, pp.503.

voter profile constituted by mostly a young electorate group who are under 35 years according to researches.⁷⁴

Along with these aspects mentioned above, the change in FN's party profile, leader and discourse should be also noted under this topic. Academic and non-academic resources highlighted the general change in party's stance on several issues especially on immigration, which helped the rise in FN's support as mentioned. Yet, the change in the discourse or party program is still open to debate, as it could not convince academics that Marine Le Pen softened such policies.⁷⁵ Although there is a current consensus on Le Pen's efforts to bring a wave of reform especially to party discourse, most commentators refer to use "re-branding" concept in order to explain the changes that FN underwent which might not enough to claim a fundamental change in party program.⁷⁶

Academic and non-academic commentators made a significant effort to analyze such outcome in order to reveal the impetus behind FN's support, party's increasing success for last several elections both on national and European level, and tried to find out what might be the further possibilities of this outcome. Along with a deeper examination on FN's electoral success and European election victory, it is also important to put some emphasis on party's general portrait, party affiliations, current party program, political discourse and campaigns that party leader initiate since FN stands as a prime example of extreme right party family in western European political system.⁷⁷ Although some of the newspapers and magazines call FN as far right political party⁷⁸, according to academic and non-academic resources, there is also a consensus on the classification of National Front as extreme right political party, which seems more

⁷⁴Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini, "The European Parliament Elections of 2014". *Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali*, 2014, 1-335, pp.183.

⁷⁵James Shields, "The Front National: From systematic opposition to systematic Integration?". *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22(4), 2014, pp.499.

⁷⁶"France: Marine Le Pen a presidential favorite, poll shows", *i24 News*, 31 July 2014.
<http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/38803-140731-france-marine-le-pen-a-presidential-favorite-poll-shows>

⁷⁷Roger Eatwell, Cas Mudde, "Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge". Routledge, 2004, pp.8.

⁷⁸Helen Lock, "Councillor from French far-right party Front National converts to Islam- and urges others to follow", *The Independent*, 26 October 2014.
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/councillor-from-french-semifascist-party-front-national-converts-to-islam-and-says-his-party-should-too-9818874.html>

relevant within the current context. A debate over classification of FN through a theoretical perspective will take place after brief information on party's general portrait and development of its current rhetoric.

While examining on FN's last election victory, it must be kept in mind that leader change happened in 2011 and election of Marine Le Pen as the new leader played significant role on Front National's success as scholars indicates. Marine Le Pen took her father's place as new leader during 2011, which drew the attention of many newspapers along with her declarations. BBC News, while classifying FN as 'far right party' cites Le Pen's words after her election in which she explained that there is a need for a change in the party image and position and also she claims that they seek for a break with former image of FN as xenophobic, anti- Islam and anti- immigration party. She also mentioned that through such changes they claim to be a mainstream party rather than staying as extreme.⁷⁹ Another clipping from The New York Times represents Marine Le Pen as having a softer image in contrast with her father Jean- Marie Le Pen, and portrays her as a person who is difficult to dislike. According to this interview with Marine Le Pen, she has ideas about immigration policies in parallel with her father's however; she is successful at framing these ideas within a softer image, which also underpins FN's popularity among younger generation.⁸⁰ About the leader change and change in the discourse, New York Times refers to director of French Polling Agency, F. Micheau in which he portrayed that FN's supposedly new image as "something totally new" in FN's history. Besides, newspaper clipping touches upon Le Pen's statement on immigration that she conceptualizes party program on immigration not as "xenophobic but rather commonsensical" whereas only two years after her election to party leadership, her claims on changing party's xenophobic, anti-Islam image seems failed after her comments on Muslim prayers as The Telegraph and Daily Mail states. According to clipping from The Telegraph, she compared Islamic prayers in the street with Nazi occupation through mentioning that Muslim Prayers are "occupation of

⁷⁹ "Marine Le Pen 'chosen to lead France's National Front'", BBC News, 15 January 2011.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12198370>

⁸⁰ Russell Shorto, "Marine Le Pen, France's (Kinder, Gentler) Extremist", The New York Times, 29 April 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/magazine/mag-01LePen-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&

territory”.⁸¹ The Guardian shared the same news asserting that Le Pen expressed “so let’s talk about occupation because that’s what happening here” while mentioning Muslim prayers in the street.⁸²

While examining about FN’s latest victory, Marine Le Pen’s attempt to change the image of the party must be analyzed within a deeper perspective. From a classical point of view on political party classification, former profile of FN could be defined as “anti-system” as Sartori puts in which he refers a party as anti-system when the party in question “undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes”.⁸³ However, under current circumstances, FN’s position might not fit into such definition. As it mentioned, many commentators agreed that Marine Le Pen attempt to create a shift in party’s position from being an anti-system party to a mainstream party which would adopt an agenda claims to maximize its votes.⁸⁴ Since former rhetoric and party program was under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen was even more extremist especially on immigration topics. During the 1990’s party program was based on extreme radical propositions such as deporting three million non-European immigrants, reintroduction of death penalty, and suggestion of restriction of the nationality principle to blood right.⁸⁵ Until the year of 2002, party program and leader’s rhetoric remain basically the same with its extremist policy ideals. In 2002, presidential election has taken place in France in which Jean-Marie Le Pen was a candidate for presidency. Apart from the fact that Jean Marie Le-Pen’s success at first round of election which he gained about 17.02% of the votes, that puts him in the second place in the runoff elections as a second round, Jacques Chirac

⁸¹Barney Henderson, “Marine Le Pen ‘loses immunity’ over comparing Islamic prayers to Nazi occupation”, The Telegraph, 1 June 2013.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10092939/Marine-Le-Pen-loses-immunity-over-comparing-Islamic-prayers-to-Nazi-occupation.html>

⁸²Peter Allen and Steve Nolan, “Far Right leader Marine Le Pen to be prosecuted for racism after comparing Muslim praying in Street to Nazi occupation of France”, Mail Online, 27 July 2013.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2353506/Far-right-leader-Marine-Le-Pen-prosecuted-racism-comparing-Muslims-praying-street-Nazi-occupation-France.html>

⁸³Giovanni Sartori, “Parties and Party Systems”. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁸⁴William M. Downs, Carrie L. Manning & Richard, N. Engstrom, “ Revisiting ‘Moderating Effects of Incumbency’: A Comparative Study of Government Participation and Political Extremism”. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17(2), 2009.pp.151- 169.

⁸⁵James Shields, “The Front National: Fromsystematicoppositioontosystematic Integration?”. Modern & Contemporary France, 22(4), 2014.pp496.

defeated Le Pen with an overwhelming percentage (82.20%).⁸⁶ This defeat revealed that there is a need for transformation both on party rhetoric and party program that was clearly understood by Marine Le Pen as the developments aftermath of this election shows. Even though Marine Le Pen attempted to make a shift in party rhetoric and party program in which she seems to be successful according to last European election results proved, there are two aspects that need to be taken into consideration while analyzing the rise in FN's votes. Firstly, as academic commentators point out, although it might seem as a de-radicalization of party program at some policy areas⁸⁷, a deeper analysis on party program shows that it is not a total transformation or softening of party program especially in immigration policies but rather a re-framing of some policies to a limited extent and a successful representation of such changes. Secondly, the increase in the votes of FN must not be considered as the sole success of Marine Le Pen's representation in a new style since there are several accounts that should be taken into consideration on analysis of rise in the right-wing votes in general, such as change in order of the European societies, changing economic conditions and increasing concerns relatedly. On this point, there will be a deeper investigation at the end of this chapter through broader lenses.

Above-mentioned changes in the party program and rhetoric, which are successfully represented by Marine Le Pen worth to mention in order to create a better understanding on through a question; is that really the change in party program that shifted former preferences of voters who supported FN in last European elections? Besides, latest party program of FN is necessary mention in order to see on which accounts that FN is considered as right wing or populist or even far right political party.⁸⁸ A relevant debate on classification of FN will be introduced at the end of this part reserved for French case. The latest party program introduced in 2012 by Marine Le Pen, purposed a change in Nationality code in which party suggested that the Nationality code should not give right to get citizenship through residence for non-Europeans. It also purposed that current arrangements that allow illegal immigrants to regularize must

⁸⁶ "April 21, 2002 Presidential Election Results- France Totals", Election Resources on the Internet, 2002.

<http://www.electionresources.org/fr/president.php?election=2002>

⁸⁷ James Shields, "The Front National: From systematic opposition to systematic integration?" *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22(4), 2014, pp 499.

⁸⁸ "La Project fu Front National", Front National.

<http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/>

also abolished and additionally, medical aid for immigrant should also be removed.⁸⁹ As Ivaldi mentioned, Le Pen stated her stance clearly through advocating that there should taken several measures in order to take French Nationality back from the naturalized citizens who are convicted of crime once.⁹⁰ On law and order subjects, Marine Le Pen's suggestions seems remained the same as the measures that she advocated were once advocated by her father. FN adopted a strategy of "tolerance zero" on law and order topic, which offers creation of 40,000 new prison places with restoration of police forces. For this offer, Shields comments that this suggestion was an attempt that claims to intensify fight against Islam and a strong sign of party's position as being opposed to immigration, multi-culturalism and Islamization of France.⁹¹ From all of these proposals, it would not be mistaken to say that party rhetoric is still can be considered as discriminatory, exclusionist and obviously not in favor of egalitarian principles. Besides, both academic and non-academic commentators agree that there cannot be seen a real transformation in the core values and principles of FN whereas there is a successful re-introduction of same ideals in a softer and plausible way. As Shields successfully explained, Le Pen legitimizes her party's "discriminatory policy agenda as a defense of liberal values and personal rights".⁹²

Apart from FN's agenda considering social issues, the party also adopted an agenda covering economic issues that also strongly emphasized by academics. The main emphasis is on the agenda's left-leaning position in which Le Pen created a shift towards anti-capitalist discourse. Anti-capitalism and social welfare is considered as major topics that should be taken into re-consideration in favor of the population who cannot get enough protection from current governments according to new political agenda.⁹³ In the current context, Betz also stated that new agenda adopted such position within nationalist perspective in which through only re-gaining the national sovereignty, the French citizens be protected against the devastating effects of globalization.⁹⁴ On the

⁸⁹Font National, 2012a.

⁹⁰Ivaldi, Gilles, "Permanences et évolutions de l'idéologie frontiste." In *Le Front national*. Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2012, pp.99.

⁹¹James Shields, "The Front National: From systematic opposition to systematic Integration?". *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22(4), 2014, pp.501.

⁹²*Ibid.*, pp.502

⁹³Hans-Georg Betz, "Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe". St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp.8

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, pp.8

same account, Shields also puts emphasis on this increasing demand of social and economic protection from population that FN attempts to hold on for increasing its support. Another comments on the economic side of this FN's policy shift, made by Evans and Ivaldi that they asserted in the context of an economic crisis and popular dissatisfaction about mainstream political parties, right-wing parties such as FN will likely to increase its vote capacity even further.⁹⁵ Another commentary on FN's possible victory for the last European Elections written by Partusot&Rittelmayer in February, states that FN election campaign successfully turned its face to European issues rather than national problems in order to keep that doubtful environment about EU among voters since Le Pen realized that the effects of economic crisis in Europe and unpopularity of political leaders might help her for the victory.⁹⁶ The Authors also mentioned that European Elections would occur in an environment of slowly developing economic conditions with high unemployment levels, which actually helped Le Pen in both campaign period and elections. Along with these facts, according to public opinion polls, most of the correspondents of a survey on the effects of European Union on France have a tendency towards answering this question with negative answer. According to the results, most of the correspondents think that European Union has a negative effect on France's current situation⁹⁷ which also helped Marine Le Pen to arrange her party's campaign discourse towards criticism of European Union that was already existent among the population.

If we turn directly back to the success of FN during the last European elections, media coverage on National Front and especially Marine Le Pen could give further information about FN's general portrait. Reuter's news covered the story with the title that mentioning FN as far-right party in which they also put emphasis on party's anti-immigrant character through stating " it was the first time that anti-immigrant, anti- EU party had won a nationwide elections in its four-decades history". In the same news coverage, authors also put Le Pen's comments after her victory in which she declared

⁹⁵Ivaldi, Gilles, "Permanences et évolutions de l'idéologie frontiste." In *Le Front national*. Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2012, pp.99.

⁹⁶Plasser Fritz and Ulram A. Peter, "The changing Austrian vote". Signum Verlag, 2000.

⁹⁷"La Française et l'union européenne", Sondage de l'institut CSA pour Terrafammina, October 2013.

<http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2013/opi20130904-les-francais-et-l-union-europeenne.pdf>

that the French society no longer desire to be governed by those authorities who are not elected. As many other academic and non-academic commentators assumed, Reuter's authors also highlighted that FN is especially popular among working class voters and among relatively younger population just because they are dissatisfied about mainstream political elite since the mainstream political elite could not be able to understand the general concerns of population about increasing immigration, crime rates and decreasing living standards⁹⁸. According to The Economist news, FN portrayed as a populist party and the latest victory of FN created "shock" in France. Authors of this article stated that FN's latest victory in European Elections is remarkable for several reasons. Firstly, FN pushed the center right UMP in the second place which supposed to be the main opposition party. Secondly, FN also "crushed" Hollande's socialist party who emerged as the third party in elections. Lastly, with such results FN quadrupled its previous score in European Elections in 2009. While The Economists' authors' wording tends to underestimate FN's victory through claiming that Le Pen's only major action is to "irritate and undermine the mainstream parties" however, several polling agencies states that; FN's support is increasing⁹⁹.

2.3. Denmark: Danish People's Party

⁹⁸Mark John and Leila Abboud, "Far-right National Front stuns French elite with EU 'earthquake'", Reuters, 25 May 2014.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/25/us-eu-election-france-idUSBREA400CP20140525>

⁹⁹"The National Front's Victory: France in shock", The Economist, 26 May 2014.

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/05/national-fronts-victory>

One of the most prominent topics among election results was the case of the success of Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)¹⁰⁰ that emerged as the first party among its rival parties in Denmark. DPP gained 26.60% of the vote share during the 2014 European Elections while the biggest two parties of Denmark; Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne)¹⁰¹ which gained 19.10% of the vote share and Venstre¹⁰² (DenmarksLiberale Parti) with 16.70% of the vote share became second and third parties.¹⁰³ DPP's success in last European elections represented by newspapers and academic commentators as rise of the right wing in Denmark (reference), which was an already existent trend in the country such as in France and Austria. Additionally, again both academic and non-academic sources put relevant effort to explain about the importance of this rise and causes of this rise for several accounts.

Briefly, due to the fact that DPP is relatively young political party in comparison to other political establishments in Denmark, although it is a split from old political party (Progress Party), DPP succeeded to increase its votes consistently in recent period, which makes it worth to analyze in deeper perspective. Along with this reason, academic researches also put emphasis on Denmark's country profile through considering the economic conditions, life standards, and especially immigration rates with other several factors which are making DPP's increasing support more unexpected. Before elaborating on DPP's European election success and causes accordingly, there will be a brief chapter* on the party's general profile as following.

Danish People's Party (Danish Folkeparti) established in 1995 as a split from Progress Party by Pia Kjærsgaard who was also a member of Progress Party in Denmark.¹⁰⁴ According to statistics, DPP has steadily increased its support by years beginning from its foundation, which made the party one of the largest party in Denmark. Since the year 2011, DPP kept its position as the third in national results

¹⁰⁰“Dansk Folkeparti”, DF, 2014.

<http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/>

¹⁰¹“Socialdemokraterne”, SD, 2014.

<http://socialdemokraterne.dk/>

¹⁰²“Venstre”, V.(V), 2014.

<http://www.venstre.dk/>

¹⁰³“European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-dk-2014.html>

¹⁰⁴Uwe Backes, Patrick Moreau (Ed.) The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives, Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts, 2012, pp.101.

while having increased number of seats in parliament.¹⁰⁵In 1998 national elections, DPP emerged as the fifth party in results through having 7.4% of the votes that brought 13 seats in parliament. In 2001 national elections, DPP increased its vote share to 12.0% and also increased its number of seats to 22. 2005 elections witnessed further increase in which DPP gained 13.3% of the votes thus its number of seats became 24. According to 2007 national elections, DPP gained 13.9% of the vote share. Although DPP experienced a slight decrease of votes during 2011 national elections (12.3%), as 2014 European Elections proved, the party still enjoying electoral take off.¹⁰⁶As in national results, DPP also enjoyed increased vote share in European election results as mentioned earlier while emerged as the first during last elections. This steady increase of DPP underlined by commentators as a sign of both its further potential and pushed the researchers to elaborate on party's success and causes behind this support.

Although many of the newspaper commentators unintentionally agreed to consider DPP as a far-right political party, academic sources usually tend to classify DPP as right-wing Populist Party. As in earlier chapters for other European countries, the political party classification of DPP on a theoretical basis will be taken place at the end of this introduction part. Nevertheless, it is also worth to underline some of academic comments on party's affiliation at this point while having a perspective on party program accordingly. Backes and Moreau's article states that DPP member's rhetoric and party program shows several tendencies such as right-wing populism, national conservative discourse and euro-skepticism.¹⁰⁷While J. Rydgren finds it more appropriate to put DPP in right-wing Populist Party category for several accounts.¹⁰⁸ At this point, it would bring a better understanding to make an analysis of party program since DPP's program draws a relatively clear frame about the party's position. DPP's party program puts strong emphasis on Danish culture, and cultural heritage in which party claims to guarantee the protection of this Danish culture against any intervention from other cultures so to speak. Therefore, while strengthening Danish culture, party

¹⁰⁵“European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-dk-2014.html>

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*,

¹⁰⁷Uwe Backes, Patrick Moreau (Ed.) *The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives*, Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts, 2012, pp.101.

¹⁰⁸Jens, Rydgren, “Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right- Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark”. *Western European Politics*, 2007, 27:3, pp. 474- 502.

also claims to reject any kind of transformation to a multi-ethnic society with clear statement. Besides, it is clearly stated that, Denmark is not an immigrant society and there should be taken stricter measurements against further flow of immigration to Denmark. In a similar manner, ‘Denmark belongs to Danes’ expression can be found in the party program, which seems like one of the prominent characteristics of right-wing parties. Euro-skeptic stance of the party comes from the fact that DPP’s openly opposition against European Union in order not to allow Denmark “to surrender its sovereignty” as expressed in the party program.¹⁰⁹ Although, authors such as S. Meret argues that DPP’s rhetoric towards EU has shifted over time and became more pragmatic stance as a result of DPP’s position in current parliament as the third largest party.¹¹⁰ Expression in the DPP’s party program showed no sign of a change over this time period.

Along with underlying the most prominent expressions in the party program, general framing of DPP in media coverage is also important to understand simply because of two reasons as in other right-wing parties in different countries that mentioned in earlier parts. On one hand, media coverage of such parties is relevant to see how they represented by media to society since in a broad sense; media tools are tended to express such parties’ increasing success through negative intentions. Although there are commentators who try to elaborate on this issue through an objective perspective, it could be observed that general attitude in media towards such parties does not imply a welcoming message. On the other hand, even though the media tools represent this development through objective lenses, which seems not existent, their definitions of right-wing parties might seem narrow and mistaken so to speak on a theoretical basis as in other countries too. Still, media coverage on DPP is worth to mention at this point in order to see party’s general image. In addition to media coverage on DPP, which will be taken into consideration as following, it is also significant to refer an opinion poll in Denmark on political party support. As a local news agency from Denmark reports, “far-right DPP” emerged as the largest party of the nation according to

¹⁰⁹“Party Program of the Danish People’s Party”, Dansk Folke Parti, 2002.

http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/The_Party_Program_of_the_Danish_Peoples_Party

¹¹⁰ Susi Meret and Ole Borre, “Boosted by electoral success, the Danish People’s Party adopted a more pragmatic line ahead of next year’s general election in Denmark”, LSE, 13 October 2014.

<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/11/13/boosted-by-electoral-success-the-danish-peoples-party-has-adopted-a-more-pragmatic-line-ahead-of-next-years-general-election-in-denmark/>

an opinion poll. As news agency states, DPP gained even further support than it gained in national elections, which represented as “a massive increase” by the authors of the agency. Reliance of the poll might be open to debate and due to the fact that it is not a real election result, numbers might seem exaggerated nevertheless, is still constitutes an opinion about DPP’s popularity. According to the opinion poll results, DPP’s vote share emerges as 21.2% while DPP got 12.3% in 2011 national elections where the strongest two parties of Denmark Venstre and Social Democrats seems to experiencing a decrease in their electoral support. (As opinion poll suggests, Venstre emerges as second largest party with 20.9% support which gained 26.7% in 2011 national election and Social Democrats emerges as the third party with 19.8% that gained 24.8% in 2011 national elections).¹¹¹

The Guardian news agency as in the previous one called DPP as far-right political party and underlined Euro-skeptic character of DPP in its news about the result of last European elections.¹¹² Whereas, RT news agency represented DPP’s anti-immigration stance as the party’s major characteristic while reporting the results along with mentioning DPP’s call for deportation of refugees. The news agency reported that DPP is much more straightforward than any other political party in the country on the issues of immigration through calling Danish authorities to stop accepting refugees to Denmark.¹¹³ According to The Economist news, classified DPP with other two Scandinavian political parties as far-right parties while asserting that these parties seems more popular by staying out of government. This newspaper clipping indicates that there is three common characteristic of Scandinavian far-right parties, which are; “a deep-rooted suspicion towards immigrants and European Union, a taste for old- fashioned law and order and a fondness for patriotic symbols”.¹¹⁴ According to Euractive news agency,

¹¹¹“Danish People’s Party support hits historic high”, The Local dk, 28 November 2014.

<http://www.thelocal.dk/20141128/danish-peoples-party-support-reaches-historic-high>

¹¹²Lars Eriksen, “Far-right takes victory in Danish European elections”, The Guardian, 25 May 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/danish-peoples-party-triumphant-in-european-elections>

¹¹³Christian Charisius, “Not welcome in Denmark? Right-wing parties call for deportation of refugees”, Reuters, 10 October 2014. <http://rt.com/news/194788-denmark-refugees-parties-proposals/>

¹¹⁴“Danish Politics: Reticent populists: the far right may be more popular by staying out of government”, The Economist, 13 December, 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21636058-far-right-may-be-more-popular-staying-out-government-reticent-populists>

Danish People's Party could be identified as far-right Euro-skeptic party whose dominant strategy is to reduce the immigration and refugee inflow to the country.¹¹⁵ As Euractive agency mentioned, EU Business news described DPP as a far-right political party and underlined the anti-immigration stance of DPP while emphasizing the party's call for tightening the border control regime¹¹⁶.

For the case in Denmark, the rise in the support for DPP seems more unexpected when the country profile taken into consideration. Academic researches on this case points out such characteristics of Denmark while examining the success of DPP as mentioned earlier. According to Backes and Moreau, Danish political system could be considered as settled and stable while democracy is well functioning. As an opinion poll proves, %90 of the Danish population is satisfied with this well-functioning system. Besides this fact, Backes and Moreau also underlines that economic situation in Denmark is well, unemployment rates are considered as low (2014: 6.4%)¹¹⁷, inflation is under control and as of 2014; the ratio of immigrants to total population is 11.5% which seems small according to the authors. As well as economic conditions, social security system of Denmark works flawless and trade unions are accepted as strong social actors as two Authors indicated.¹¹⁸ According to this extensive work on extreme right-wing parties in Europe, Danish People's Party's rapidly increasing support might be the result of several factors. First of all, it has been observed that ideological variety of political parties in Denmark eroded therefore it created a decrease in the support of mainstream parties. It is argued that Social Democrats in the country lost its former connection with trade unions and working class in which DPP appeared as an alternative political establishment that presents a different political option to those classes. Secondly, starting from 1990's Danish society has become more anxious about the future of welfare state mostly because of increasing levels of immigration to country, which also became a highly popularized topic. DPP appeared as the only party who seems

¹¹⁵“Danish far right party wins in EU elections, doubles mandate”, Euractive News, 25 May 2014, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/danish-far-right-party-wins-eu-elections-doubles-mandate-302363>

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*,

¹¹⁷“Denmark unemployment rate: 2013- 2014”, Country Economy. <http://countryeconomy.com/unemployment/denmark>

¹¹⁸Uwe Backes, Patrick Moreau (Ed.) *The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives*, Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Institut, 2012, pp.102.

concerned about this immigration issue for a long time. Besides, still DPP seems like the only political party who is advocating that there should be taken stricter measures against possible high levels of immigration. Therefore, DPP became more popular among voter population through such statements and policy proposals.¹¹⁹

Above-mentioned causes on the raising success of DPP especially in recent years that are suggested by two academics might constitute a seminal perspective about the reasons behind this rise however, these causes might seem insufficient to understand the whole picture. What is meant by the whole picture is basically refers to a broader perspective on the rise of right-wing parties in recent years especially in western European countries through considering the changes in the social structure of these societies in question, if this change is existent, and the changes in economic conditions which are interconnected with social changes consequently. Therefore, further chapters will be dedicated to understand such fundamental causes that might result in rise of right-wing parties in the countries that are examined.

2.4. The Netherlands: Party for Freedom

The elections results came from the Netherlands was not an exception considering the rise of far right parties in Europe. Although the far right party in

¹¹⁹Uwe Backes, Patrick Moreau (Ed.) *The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives*, Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts, 2012, pp.103.

Netherlands PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid) Party for Freedom¹²⁰ witnessed a slight decrease of its votes in comparison to last European Elections, the popularity of the party is still high and its position in national parliament is still strong. Besides the popularity of the PVV among society as a far right party, the party leader Geert Wilders enjoys a high degree of media attention partly because of his controversial; mostly xenophobic and Islamophobic statements.

In the last European Elections in 2014, PVV gained 13.32% of the votes and emerged as third largest party in the Netherlands.¹²¹ In comparison with European Elections in 2009, in which PVV gained 16.97% of the votes and emerged as the second largest party¹²², the party has lost 3.65% of its votes however, as mentioned above PVV continue to keep its position as the third largest party in national parliament. According to national election results, the popularity of the party could not be underestimated even if the party has a swinging vote share. The rising support in question comes from the fact that; in 2006 parliamentary elections PVV could gain only 5.69% of the votes whereas in 2010 parliamentary elections the party was able to raise its votes to 15.45 per cent.¹²³ In the 2012 parliamentary elections PVV again witnessed a decrease in its vote share while having 10.08% of the votes, still it is the third largest party in parliament.¹²⁴ In the national context, PVV's rise must be taken into consideration since the political system in the Netherlands is stable where three big parties; social democrat PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid), Christian democrat CDA (Christen Democratische Parti) and liberal VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)¹²⁵ shared the power in national parliament interchangeably. In such system, PVV's success particularly in 2010 elections appears as a more important occasion in which Koen Vossen underlines that PVV was the only party that could benefitted from 2010 parliamentary elections through

¹²⁰“Political Parties”, European Social Survey, 2012 ed. 2.0.

http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/survey/ESS6_appendix_a3_e02_0.pdf

¹²¹ “European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-nl-2014.html>

¹²² “European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP,

2009. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-nl-2009.html>

¹²³“Dataset: Netherlands: Parliamentary Election 2012”, European Election Database, 2012.

http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2Fnedpa2012&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2Fcube%2Fnedpa2012_C1&top=yes

¹²⁴*Ibid.*,

¹²⁵Vossen, Koen, “Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom”. *Politics*, 2011, 31(3), pp.179.

increasing its vote and states that PVV became an important player in the process of establishing a new coalition government.¹²⁶

According to Merijn Oudenampsen, it is possible to talk about a substantial increase in the support for right-wing populism since 1990's in which a remarkable rise became more apparent with 2010 parliamentary elections that the author defines this rise as a 'new climax' for the political system.¹²⁷ Oudenampsen underlines this development particularly since this climax gave a relative power to PVV as a coalition partner where VVD and CDA formed a minority government that needs support of PVV in order to maintain parliamentary majority.¹²⁸ Since then, right-wing populism which is represented by PVV in respective country, slowly included in the mainstream politics as an accepted feature. At this point it could be argued that PVV's identification as a party that positioned itself in the margins of political system might be mistaken within the whole context.

On the classification of the Party for Freedom, academic sources usually tends to consider PVV as right-wing populist party since PVV includes some of the common characteristics of right-wing populist parties although party programme consists several expressions that could be labeled as far right statements particularly about the subjects of immigration and protection of culture.¹²⁹ As in the other cases, media representation of PVV does not follow a particular way about defining the party in which variety of news agencies labeled PVV as far-right and even sometimes defines as extreme right party however identification by media tools would be mistaken since for most of the cases, these sources does not construct their discourse on the basis of academic arguments. Whereas, it is still worth to mention about news agencies' wordings while talking about such political establishments in order to create a broader perception on their portraits both in the eyes of media sources and in the eyes of society. Before talking about the representation of PVV in the news particularly, there are few more arguments on the classification of the party, which is important to understand for several reasons.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 180.

¹²⁷Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik& Brigitte Mral, "Right Wing populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse". Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, pp.191.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*,

¹²⁹Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik& Brigitte Mral, "Right Wing populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse", Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. pp.191.

As mentioned in the literature examination chapter, it would be best way to put the parties in question into Mudde's general classification; populist radical right parties (PRRP's) for the motives that stated in that chapter. For the Party for Freedom, this classification seems relevant when the party programme and leader's rhetoric taken into consideration. Academic commentator's are generally seems reluctant to define PVV as a part of PRRP since there is lack of common characteristics that PRRP's share for the case of PVV. This reluctant attitude towards putting PVV in the PRRP group comes from the fact that there cannot be observed a clear representation of many subjects that Wilders serves or depicts, which subjects are very clear in representation for other populist radical right wing parties. As Mudde puts in a short article, it would not be relevant to put PVV within the PRRP group basically for two reasons. First, PVV does not advocates ethnic nationalism or ethno-pluralism as other academics underlined, which ideology can be seen as a core value in many radical right wing parties such as FN in France, FPÖ in Austria and DPP in Denmark. And secondly, Mudde argues that Wilders should be perceived as a 'mainstream politician' who is mostly interested in maximizing party's votes as much as possible with the claim of having more power in the parliament.¹³⁰

In the same parallel, Paul Lucardie agrees with this opinion that PVV does not fit in this party group that includes FN, DPP and FPÖ since these parties does not seems to follow same political arguments o the basis of ethno-pluralism and ethnic nationalism. In order to depict the differences of PVV; Lucardie called the PVV as 'right-wing halfhearted- liberal nationalist populist' which not or course not an existent category for the political parties in question.¹³¹ While making an analysis on the classification of PVV, Vossen argues that the development and the current position of PVV should be mention within the context of 'new right' perspective in which he explained such phenomenon through central claims of this wave that are briefly; attempt to increase critics regarding the welfare state, and increasing the discontent considering the rising

¹³⁰Cas Mudde, "The Geert Wilders Enigma", Open Democracy, 23 June 2014.

<https://www.opendemocracy.net/cas-mudde/geert-wilders-enigma>

¹³¹A.P.M. Lucardie, "Rechts-extremisme, populisme of democratischpatriottisme? Opmerkingen over de politiekeplaatsbepaling van de Partij voor de Vrijheid en Trots op Nederland". Jaarboek 2007 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Universiteit Groningen, 2007, pp.181.

numbers of Muslim immigrants in the country and a criticism towards Islam.¹³² As the author refers to Andrew Heywood's arguments at this point in which he also explains that PVV should be evaluated within the 'new right' perspective, that is majorly offering the "preservation and restoration of old communal values and construction of morally evil enemy".¹³³

In the same article it is also argued that the possible reasons of PVV's or Wilder's rhetoric labeling as populist radical right wing or national populist. Vossen arrived that possible reasons based upon the Wilder's publication of an ideological document in in 2006¹³⁴ in which Wilders strongly emphasis a necessity of a restoration of cultural and moral values in order to protect the national identity from the attack of 'outsider cultures'¹³⁵ brought predominantly by Muslim immigrants which protection would maintained by discipline.¹³⁶ Therefore, Wilder's strong opposition against immigration and cultural diversity relatedly, his strong emphasis on national identity along with his rejection of supranational co-operation which represented through his clear opposition against European Union could be analyzed within the framework of PRRP's since; the main themes that used by populist radical right-wing parties (which are characterized as authoritarianism, nativism and populism as mentioned at the chapter on classification) shows strong similarities with Wilder's statements. At this point, it is also worth to mention Ben Stanley's argument on the populist feature of such parties in which he states that populism does not necessarily emerges as a distinctive characteristic in which populism element could be apparent in any party regardless of the ideology¹³⁷.

The representation of PVV in the media is basically constructed upon Wilder's controversial speeches; predominantly his strict opposition against Islam and Muslim community in the country. There are several news agency and scholarly articles that

¹³²Vossen, Koen, "Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom". *Politics*, 2011, 31(3), pp.182.

¹³³A. Heywood, "Political Ideologies: An Introduction", Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp.88-95.

¹³⁴ Wilders, 2006, p.65-85.

¹³⁵ Although these are not the exact words that Wilders chose in his publication, the message that he conveys through his statements refers to such conclusion mainly through his hardliner critics about Islam and muslim population lives in the Netherlands. He consistently prefer to use Islamic culture as 'the enemy' in his public speeches and in several statements.

¹³⁶Vossen, Koen, "Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom". *Politics*, 2011, 31(3), pp.184.

¹³⁷B. Stanley, "The thin ideology of populism". *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2008, 13(1), pp.108.

refers the party programme and Wilders' speeches or publications in order to analyze his stance on the main subjects that party advocates. As Koen Vossen states; among the main themes that party uses for opposition, the anti-Islamic stance is the strongest one and Wilders becoming even more critical on Muslim society in the Netherlands and he conceptualize Islam as the basis for all problems including the youth criminality and high percentage of unemployment.¹³⁸ Along with critics of Islam, party programme seems radical about immigration in general. It is underlined in the party programme that the importance of law and order in relation mostly with criminality among immigrants therefore Wilders suggested extra police officers in order to obtain order in society. Party programme offers a full ban on immigration from Islamic countries, closure of Islamic schools and preventing the building of more mosques in the country. Wilders also suggests that unemployed foreigners must find a job or go back to their own countries in the party programme.¹³⁹ It is also emphasized that there would be ethnic registration of Dutch citizens and abolishment of the first article of Dutch constitution which is guaranteeing the equality of all races, sexes, religions and political perceptions of people.¹⁴⁰

In the several news agency websites, classification of PVV varies as mentioned above. This is also worth to mention although these news are not part of the theoretical debate of classification of Party for Freedom in order to see party's general portrait¹⁴¹. For the theoretical debate, it is not possible to say that there is a consensus about the classification of PVV whether it is belong to PRRP or in another category. On one hand, within a general perspective on this classification of so-called 'party family' for the parties in question could not reach a joint solution for labeling. For this reason basically it is difficult to draw a clear picture of PVV within this debate. Secondly, in a more detailed examination it is also not possible to put PVV in a defined group under the

¹³⁸Vossen, Koen, "Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom". *Politics*, 2011, 31(3), pp.183.

¹³⁹"What does Wilders Freedom Party Want?", Waza Online, 16 June 2010.

<https://wazaonline.com/en/archive/what-does-wilders-freedom-party-want>

¹⁴⁰Markha Valenta, "Why Geert Wilders is not Liu Xiaobo", *Open Democracy*, 5 November 2010. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/markha-valenta/why-geert-wilders-is-not-liu-xiaobo>

¹⁴¹"Netherlands: How Strong is the Far Right?", *European Journal*, 26 May 2010.

<http://www.dw.de/netherlands-how-strong-is-the-far-right/a-5611749>,

"Anti-Islam politician Wilders faces prosecution for Moroccan comments". *Reuters*, 18 December 2014. <https://ca.news.yahoo.com/anti-islam-politician-wilders-face-prosecution-anti-moroccan-085623496.html>

general title of right-wing parties since the party does not necessarily share some common characteristics of PRRP if Mudde's general definition taken into consideration as mentioned at the beginning of this section. Yet, I humbly suggest that Wilders' party could be perceived as an example of populist radical right-wing parties since there are expressions that are referring to the basic three characteristics of PRRP's. Besides this debate on classification, PVV stands as an example of rise of right-wing parties in Europe that could gain non-negligible support both for the last European Elections and in parliamentary elections in respective country. While making an examination within a general framework on such rise, it should be underlined that parties and their central affiliations differs through country since the profile of respective country might not be similar with other European countries in question. Therefore, this fact creates variety of the most salient themes that parties prefer in their country. This is why PVV in the Netherlands taken into consideration while making an analysis on the recently 'even more rising' right-wing parties in many European countries.

2.5. Finland: True Finns

Finland constitutes another example of the countries that witnessed a rise of the populist right-wing party mostly in recent years. True Finns (PS) in its former name, and The Finns as currently changed (Pressuomalaiset)¹⁴² increased its votes in the last European Elections of 2014; succeeded to gain 12.90% of the votes and emerged as the third largest party in the country¹⁴³. The party also increased its support remarkably in

¹⁴²“ “True Finns” Name their party “The Finns” ”, YLE Uutiset, 21 August 2011.

http://yle.fi/uutiset/quottrue_finnsquot_name_their_party_quothe_finnsquot/2807245

¹⁴³ “European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections”, EP, 2014.

national election especially in the last general elections, which attracted great deal of attention both from media and from academic commentators. In 2007 general elections of Finland, True Finns was able to gain only 4.1% of the overall votes and was not an important player in the political arena. Whereas, in 2011 general elections PS could be able gain 19.1% of the votes in which this great increase needed to be elaborated on carefully. It could be mistaken to label the PS or other parties in the Finnish parliament as ‘largest’ ones since Finland’s political system based on a stable multi-party system in which there are basically eight political parties that six of them represented in the parliament. In such conditions, the governmental parties are not like their counterparts in other countries since they are generally middle-sized parties.¹⁴⁴ Yet this fact does not change the importance of the support that PS could be able to get in recent elections along with the Finland’s general decision-making culture, which is based upon the principle of consensus. In relation with this culture and with the existence of stable multi-party political system, rise of the True Finns seems a bit more unexpected in such a mild political environment.

For the classification issue, again there are controversial arguments about the True Finns’ position in political spectrum and in media representation however, it seems that PS would fit in the PRRP group based upon the party’s general attitude, party discourse and policy proposals. Although most of the newspapers labeled PS as far right party in the clippings, this labeling would not explain the position of party in theoretical terms. Besides, it has observed that news agencies have an attitude towards putting the PS in the same group that they also put Golden Dawn (XA) in Greece for example under the name of far right parties, which is a party (XA) that advocates violence and openly express itself as a neo- Nazi. This could show that it is not relevant to classify PS simply as a far right party without making a more detailed analysis on the party programme and leader’s rhetoric.

In his work written in 2007, Herbert Kitschelt emphasized that in the countries such as Finland; the radical right parties could not be able to gain electoral success

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fi-2014.html>

¹⁴⁴Joanna Korhonen, “ The Crumbling of Finland’s consensus culture: silence into rumpus”, Open Democracy, 30 November 2010.

<https://www.opendemocracy.net/johanna-korhonen/crumbling-of-finland%E2%80%99s-consensus-culture-silence-into-rumpus>

which prediction is non-valid for the current situation.¹⁴⁵ But besides, Kitschelt's argument is also explains why PS's increase is rather unexpected. If the party programme taken into consideration, especially the strong emphasis on immigration issues, make it more interesting as a case since Finland is one of the countries that has low foreign citizen population and having (increasing) but low rates of immigration¹⁴⁶. Most of the academic sources define PS as a part of the populist radical right party group with having lack of extremist stances on immigration through xenophobic expressions. However, lack of xenophobic expressions and extremist stances on immigration does not pull PS out of the general framework of PRRP's. As mentioned several times, the most common characteristics that PRRP's shares are populism, nativism and authoritarianism in which PS include all of these features at different levels. For the populism element, Shedler argues that populism emerged in very different forms through anti-feelings, which might be in the form of anti-elite, anti-modern, anti-establishment and so.¹⁴⁷ For the case of PS, populism through anti-feelings constructed upon a discourse that appear as an opposition towards political elite, which is also existent in many of its counterparts. According to party leader; Timo Soini's rhetoric the political elite in the country underestimates the capacity of ordinary citizens in decision-making and counting them as stupid people who are all the same which Soini declared in the 2003 election manifesto.¹⁴⁸

For the nativism element, it is not possible to talk about an extremist or xenophobic rhetoric that Soini or party programme expresses however PS clearly opposes integration of Finnish culture with any other culture's values as Jan Sundberg argues. He states that PS shows no such tolerance towards non-native cultures and he states that although Finland is officially bilingual, True Finns' nationalism would not like to accept this fact in moderate terms and the party have a tendency towards exclusion of even Swedish culture as it is not seen as a natural part of the Finnish

¹⁴⁵Herbert Kitschelt, "Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Post-Industrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research". *West European Politics*, 30(5), 2007, pp.1177.

¹⁴⁶David Arter, "The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of True Finns". *Government and Opposition*, 45(4), 2010, pp.499.

¹⁴⁷A. Schedler, "Anti-Political-Establishment Parties". *Party Politics*, 2(3), 1996, pp. 291–312.

¹⁴⁸David Arter, "The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of True Finns". *Government and Opposition*, 45(4), 2010, pp.499.

culture¹⁴⁹. Although Soini's language and attitudes do not appear in the form of extremism or xenophobia, party manifestos and general rhetoric opposes the increasing immigration into the country in which they framed their policy on immigration as a reasonable immigration policy. On the other hand, as David Arter mentions in his article; according to Soumen Gollup poll established before 2008 local election, 12% of the respondents identify Soini as 'openly racist' and 28% of the respondents identify Soini as 'a racist who try to hide'¹⁵⁰. Therefore, the reliability of party manifesto and Soini's supposedly moderate declarations might not be perceived as consistent within the public.

As mentioned in other sections too, media representation of the parties in question constitutes a rather additional information channel in order to create a better understanding on party's general attitudes. According to The Guardian News agency, Soini follows 'a harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric' although academic commentators define it as more moderate than its counterparts. In the same newspaper clipping, there is emphasis on the party manifesto in which PS states that Finns should decide on the immigration issues and be able to choose who would come to Finland and reside in the country. This clipping also mentions that through such statements, Soini and his party create an image of 'enemy' in which the immigrants are in the role of this enemy for most of the cases including the populist radical right parties.¹⁵¹ Social Europe news agency makes an analysis on the profile of party leader; Timo Soini and introduces him as the charismatic leader and anti-establishment advocate.¹⁵² In the same clipping it is stated that the True Finns follows a policy of welfare chauvinism¹⁵³, which is considered as a common characteristic between PRRP's.

¹⁴⁹“True Finns' nationalism colours Finland election”, BBC News Europe, 15 April 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13091920>

¹⁵⁰David Arter, “The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of True Finns”. *Government and Opposition*, 45(4), 2010, pp 498.

¹⁵¹Jon Worth, “The True Finns followed a very well-known recipe for success”, *The Guardian*, 21 April 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/21/true-finns-nationalist-populists-european-parties>

¹⁵²Antti Alaja, “In Finland we Experience this Thing Called ‘Jytty’”, *Social Europe*, 29 April 2011.

<http://www.socialeurope.eu/2011/04/in-finland-we-experienced-this-thing-called-jytty/>

¹⁵³David Arter also put emphasis on this term; welfare chauvinism while making his analysis on True Finns and argues that welfare chauvinism is a salient feature of PS. This term introduced by Mudde in his *Popular Radical Right Parties in Europe* book in which Arter refers this term as;

The main motivation behind taking True Finns case into this research is to show examples from different countries as much as possible in order to create a broader perspective on the nature of these PRRP's within the country context. As mentioned in earlier sections, it is not possible to create concrete measurements or strict characteristics for such parties in which they might differ according to conditions of their respective countries. Although there are common features that these parties share, their major claim of such parties is to respond to the significant demands, which they assume that are expressed by their respective societies. Thus, in relation with the salience of particular issues in the countries that parties emerged; their form or style of discourse could vary in accordance with the nature of political system. True Finns included into this category; PRRP's according to many scholars as emphasized in this section although the party identified in different terms by news agencies. But after all, True Finns constitutes an example of populist radical right parties through its programme and through party leader's rhetoric.

2.6. Greece: Golden Dawn

Greece was another country that witnessed an increase in the radical right party in the last European Elections of 2014. Golden Dawn (XA) was able to gain 9.39% of the votes and emerged as the third largest party in this election¹⁵⁴. Besides its

taking the native population as priority and an attempt to prevent any possible damage that might be brought by immigration to services of the state to its native population. David Arter, "The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of True Finns". *Government and Opposition*, 45(4), 2010, pp. 499.

¹⁵⁴"European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections", EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-el-2014.html>

considerable success in the European Parliament elections, Golden Dawn was also able to gain 6.97% of the votes in Greek Legislative Elections in 2012 in which the party had only 0.29% of the votes in 2009 elections¹⁵⁵. The rise of Golden Dawn was not exactly occurred under the same conditions in comparison with many other European countries and the classification of XA is not the same with the parties that mentioned in this thesis however, both academic and nonacademic commentators take this development into consideration while making analysis on this subject with Greece's particular conditions. Golden Dawn mostly identified the violent protests and attacks which put the party not in populist radical right party group but rather makes the party an extremist, far right or neo-Nazi type as many sources indicate¹⁵⁶. Although example of Golden Dawn shows great deal of differences among other right-wing party analyses, there are several scholars that take this issue within the framework of rise of right-wing parties¹⁵⁷. Therefore, as an example of an openly extremist or far right party, Golden Dawn might be proper example to examine.

Golden Dawn is not a new party that emerged as a result of the Greece's outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in the claim of responding the increasing discontent in society but this financial crisis has a huge impact in the rise of the party. Golden Dawn established in 1983 by Nikos Michaloliakos who is the current leader of the party with a nationalist motivation as stated in the party manifesto¹⁵⁸. It is noted that Golden Dawn stayed in the margins of political system in Greece until the emergence of recent financial crisis¹⁵⁹. As mentioned above, the party could not reach any particular electoral success until the local elections that took place in 2010. Besides the fact that Golden Dawn and its members associated with violent protests and violent attacks especially

¹⁵⁵ Antonis A. Ellinas, "The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece". *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 2013, pp.547.

¹⁵⁶ Cas Mudde, "The far right in the 2014 European elections: of Earthquakes, cartels and designer fascists", *The Washington Post*, 30 May 2014.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/>

¹⁵⁷ Cas Mudde analyzed the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece in his rather short article published in *Washington Post* that he classify the party as 'more or less openly neo-Nazi party' within the framework of last European Elections where he examined about the radical, extremist, far, populist right wing parties. Complete article is available online in the following link; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/>.

¹⁵⁸ GD, 2012a, pp.2 .

¹⁵⁹ Antonis A. Ellinas, "The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece". *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 2013, pp.548.

against immigrants in country¹⁶⁰, the party leader and other members rejects the labeling of party as National Socialist or neo-Nazi. However, it is apparent that both party manifesto and speeches of party members reflect racist affiliations in several cases. According to party documents, as Ellinas states in his article on Golden Dawn; there is an emphasis on such expressions, which claims the people born from a particular ‘race’ naturally. Besides as the party member Elias Panogiotaros stated; Greek ‘race’ has exact standards¹⁶¹. It might be argued that these expressions of party manifesto and party MP’s could be interpreted in the scope of the common features of populist radical right party family; nativism or nationalism as scholars explained however, these two features does not include the ideologies which has a biological emphasis on identification of the nation¹⁶². Besides, it was mentioned several times that the current conceptualization of such parties as ‘radical’ or ‘far’ right, does not necessarily creates a linkage with the old type of extremist, radical or far right parties which refers basically the use of violence as an extremist element that preferred as a tool for political success. Whereas, Golden Dawn’s extremism element comes mostly from its tendency towards use of violence as tool for political achievement, which does not constitute a common characteristic of PRRP’S.

Besides, as mentioned in earlier sections, current PRRP’s ‘populism’ feature emerges through several forms of anti-feelings; anti-establishment, anti-elite and so. In order to identify a party as anti-system, Mudde refers to Sartori’s definition of anti-system¹⁶³ in which the party in question must underestimate the legitimacy of the existing government and the political system that government operates. At this point, Mudde underlines a difference between the ‘new’ PRRP’s and the ‘old’ ones in which the new radical right wing parties do not construct their positions as anti-system in which they do not necessarily rejects liberal democracy as the political system although they make criticism some of the features of liberal democracy. For the case of Golden Dawn, they construct their rhetoric, if it would be taken within the populism framework,

¹⁶⁰Michael Safi, “Golden Dawn: Australian branch of far-right part raises cash”, The Guardian, 29 September 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/golden-dawn-australian-branch-of-far-right-greek-party-raises-cash>

¹⁶¹Antonis A. Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece”. *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 2013, pp.550.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, pp.550.

¹⁶³Giovanni Sartori, “Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis”. Cambridge University Press, 1976.pp.133.

as anti-system clearly. Ellinas points out that, in the party manifesto Michaloliakos defines the Greek political system as ‘pseudo- democracy’ and he suggests for the party members to reject the political authority in the country including ‘dictatorship of parliamentarism’ which could be the proof of their position as anti-system where this expressions creates the difference between the current PRRP’s in question and Golden Dawn.¹⁶⁴

On the subject of immigration, besides the fact that the party associated with the violent attacks against immigrants in country, the party manifesto draws a clear stance of opposition towards increasing immigration. As party manifesto states, Golden Dawn proposes to deportation of all illegal immigrants and suggests that illegal entry to Greece should be subjected to punishment in the form of social work. Besides, party suggests that ‘only people with Greek descent and Greek conscience should have political rights while rest should only have civil rights’.¹⁶⁵ As mentioned above, there are some factual reasons that make Golden Dawn different from its so-called counterparts in other European countries. Firstly, the party strongly attached to National Socialist ideology through constructing a basis upon racial inequality. Secondly, the party does not stand against the violent expressions among society; on the contrary, the party members participated in violent incidents as Ellinas explained.¹⁶⁶ In parallel, Alexandros Geogopoulos explains that Golden Dawn uses a discourse of hatred and boost the fear in society thorough propagating strong xenophobic feelings. The author also explains that Golden Dawn could be classified as radical nationalist, homophobic or anti-Semitic and Golden Dawn’s counterparts would be Ataka in Bulgaria or Jobbik in Hungary¹⁶⁷.

As many academic and non-academic sources explains the rise of extreme right in Greece did not emerge under the same conditions in comparison with other European countries. The foreign debt crisis made huge impacts on the society and in political system relatedly. This financial crisis in Greece along with several effects gave impetus to the realignment of the Greek electorate as Ellinas argued, since crisis affected the

¹⁶⁴ GD 2012b, in the Antonis A. Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece”.South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 2013, pp.550.

¹⁶⁵ GD 2012c, Antonis A. Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece”.South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 2013, pp.551.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.551.

¹⁶⁷ Kyriaki Karadiamanti, Alexandros Georgopoulos, Georgios Blionis: Populism, Political Ecology and the Balkans p.102

whole political nature in the country¹⁶⁸. Greek electorate lost its trust to existing government during the crisis in which traditional parties who shared the power lost their credibility in the eyes of the electorate, which also resulted in strongly decreasing levels of loyalty of electorate to their general preferences in political arena. Additionally, mostly as a result of foreign debt crisis, a wave of de-legitimization of Greek political system emerged within the society in the past few years. This de-legitimization process found its representation in the violent, non-violent protests that erupted several times, in which the existing politicians insulted publicly.¹⁶⁹ Financial crisis in Greece was not the only reason that pushed the impetus behind the rising of Golden Dawn. As mentioned in academic sources, Greek society lost its trust to existing political authorities and discredited them in relation with the increasing levels of concerns about immigration. Society put the blame on political authorities, as they could not control the inflow of illegal immigrants, which is increasing year by year where Greece basically emerged as a hub country, which is seen as a way to enter into European Union by immigrants¹⁷⁰.

The conditions as mentioned above benefitted the rise of Golden Dawn in recent elections as they pretend to respond newly arising demands from society that are emerging in harsher forms as a result of the circumstances mentioned above. Besides, academics also give credit to ‘chronic dysfunction’ of Greek state that affected the de-alignment of Greek electorate long with economic crisis and increasing concerns about immigration issues¹⁷¹. Because of all above situated reasons, the feelings of fear and insecurity within Greek society have risen especially among unemployed, low paid, unskilled and young population who are tend to be more furious upon this insecure environment which also emerged as a fertile ground for Golden Dawn in order to take the role as the protector of insecure population.¹⁷²

The inclusion of Golden Dawn in this attempt to analyze about the rise of populist radical right wing parties preferred with a motivation of increase the variety of such parties in order to widen the perspective on rising right-wing parties, while taking

¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, pp.555

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, pp.556.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp.557.

¹⁷¹Kardiamanti, K., Georgopoulos, A., Blionis, “Populism, Political Ecology and The Balkans. Greece”. GreenInstituteGreece, 2012, pp. 105.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, pp.106.

not only the mainstream ones within the framework of PRRP's but also extreme ones which could be to increase its support for recent European Elections and in national election such as Golden Dawn. Although Golden Dawn predominantly benefitted from the controversial events and the change in political system respectively, it would be mistaken the underestimate its vote since it is not possible to make a precise foresight whether Golden Dawn will increase its votes in future or not in relation with changing conditions in Greece. It is also important to remind an above-mentioned point on such rise that the political environment and developments in respective countries have huge effects on the emergence and therefore increase or decrease of these right-wing parties which creates the major differences between the parties in question.

Next Chapter will address the theoretical explanation about radical right parties particularly about their existence in the current context.

CHAPTER 3

Theoretical Explanations of the Rise of The Populist Radical Right Wing Parties

There is a wide range of literature devoted to understand the rise of the populist radical right wing parties in different European countries; that have been constructed upon finding the possible reasons behind this rise in very broad framework. About such reasons, there are central theories that are referred by nearly all of the academic researches in order to define the development process of these parties in question within a historical perspective and analyze this process through considering the possible

reasons in relation with societal, political and economic changes. Most of this literature put strong emphasis on post-industrial phenomenon, which will be taken into consideration in following parts, as the most relevant theory that might explain the overall process in this context since, previous theories that tried to explain the rise of right-wing parties has lost their ground and became deficient for current conditions. As Mudde states; the theories that attempt to explain this rise through changing economic conditions in which it is emphasized that the increase in the support for right-wing parties emerges as a following process of economic crisis in different countries, is lacking ‘empirical scrutiny’. He supports his argument by pointing out the last European Elections in which; in only one of the bailed out countries electoral support for radical right wing increased.¹⁷³ What was also apparent in the last European Elections is that the rise of radical right wing parties is not directly connected with the rising social or political problems in variety of European societies but rather the essence of these ‘problems’ are actually not problems but basically ‘changes’ in the respective societies which ended up in creating wide range of impacts on political and cultural arena.

What was Daniel Bell once suggested in 1973; there will be political developments with respect to change in the societies that will go beyond socialism, which will mark by the emergence of post-industrial society after long series of developments. He argued that the emergence of post-industrial society is connected and emerged as a reflection of change in industrial structure in which the social structure or several European countries was expect to change fundamentally. This transformation to post-industrial society will have impacts on the political system too. As such transformation happens, there will also emerge new necessities, which could not be satisfied with old ways of politics accordingly.¹⁷⁴ In parallel with Bell’s theory, Ronald Inglehart explained that transformation which Bell mentioned, with a slightly different focus. Inglehart argued that this major transformation in advanced industrial societies develops in connecting with the value change in such societies. As Inglehart suggests, the value preferences of Western public have been shifting towards post-materialist

¹⁷³Cas Mudde, “The far right in the 2014 European elections: of Earthquakes, cartels and designer fascists”, The Washington Post, 30 May 2014.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/>

¹⁷⁴David Bell, “The coming of post-industrial society”, 1973, Basic Books.

values in which public concerns overwhelmingly emphasize the quality of life, freedom of expression or autonomy issues rather than previous materialist demands such as economic well being.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, the change in the value structure would eventually resulted in the transformation of social structure as many of these scholars suggested, which will reflect as also a change in the political structure too. As new post-materialist values become more salient, political establishments would respond them through change on one hand. On the other hand, the traditional cleavage structure would also eventually have to change as a result of such social transformations in Western publics in which, this shift in the traditional cleavage structure would also affect the traditional political party cleavages as long as the political party differences was once shaped as a reflection of societal divisions. In this respect, structural transformation in societal level will give birth to emergence of new political structure and new political movements that are to respond new demands of publics.

Many of these grand theories tried to explain the rise in the radical right-wing populism through connecting this rise with structural transformation of Western societies in which the new structure called 'post-industrial' and the value change in respective societies called 'post-materialism'. With respect to such argument, Inglehart once stated that the rise of radical right-wing parties emerged as a manifestation of "fundamentalists who correctly perceive that many of their central norms rapidly eroding".¹⁷⁶ This erosion of central norms therefore, created a renewal among the radical right-wing parties in which they could pretend like they are the ones who would successfully understand the new demands from society while using the main themes of that current context which was not existed until than, as a mean for political success. The strong emphasis of immigration and strong resistance to multi-culturalism are the central subjects that new radical right-wing parties prefer to scratch in this context. In parallel, Hans-Georg Betz argued that this new radical right could be perceived as " very much like the authoritarian materialist counterpart to left-libertarian post-materialism on the new politics axis defined by a new political conflict over the question which values

¹⁷⁵Ronald Inglehart, "The silent revolution".1977, Princeton University Press.

¹⁷⁶Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization". 1987,Princeton University Pressi pp.72.

will ultimately prevail in post-industrial age”.¹⁷⁷ Ignazi added one more aspect to such theoretical debate while referring to political developments occurred especially after 1980’s. Betz explained these developments as “ the political climate of 1980’s was characterized by disenchantment with the major social and political institutions and deep distrust in their workings, the weakening and decomposition of electoral alignments, and increased political fragmentation and electoral volatility”¹⁷⁸ that such developments gave rise to emergence of new issues among society such as growing awareness of environmental destruction which created a protest wave; growing sensitivity towards equality of minorities and woman which gave birth to new demands from politics. All of these changing dynamics was expected to benefit and create a change in the left of political spectrum as Betz noted.¹⁷⁹ What Ignazi added to this debate was his emphasis on the developments occurred in the right of the spectrum with respect to above-mentioned process. He stated that “it could be said that the Greens and ERP’s (extreme right parties) respectively, the legitimate and unwanted children of new politics; as the Greens come out of silent revolution, the ERP’s derive from a reaction to it as ‘silent counter-revolution’ ”.¹⁸⁰

Above-mentioned theories constructed with the claim of creating a relevant and reasonable framework in order to understand the rise of ‘new’ right in the political arena. Susi Meret argues on this subject that these major structural transformations that changed the society and politics accordingly, emerged mostly as a result of globalization and advancement of industrial countries. Therefore she states that all of these processes “favored the decline of traditional established parties; resulted emergence of new groups of voters who are more generally inclined to listen to political messages emphasizing problems of rising immigration, crime rates, increasing cultural and religious diversity and growing independence of labor markets”.¹⁸¹ Besides, she also emphasized that the growing importance of identity and cultural value positions

¹⁷⁷Hans- Georg Betz, “Postmodern politics in Germany: The politics of resentment”. 1991, St. Martin’s Press, pp.113.

¹⁷⁸Hans-Georg Betz, “Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe”. 1994, St. Martin’s Press, pp. 2.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰Pierro Ignazi, “The silent counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe”. *European Journal of Political Research*, 22(3), pp. 6.

¹⁸¹ Susi Meret, phd series, p.26

emerged in relation to growing diversity in cultural sphere, are also became determinant in the party positions in the right spectrum.¹⁸²

All of these theories on the growing role of radical right wing populism more or less touches upon the same processes in Western societies, which resulted in the emergence of new issues and new alignments in political arena. As mentioned earlier, the major transformation of Western societies brought or boosted mostly by growing intensity of globalization and advancement of industrial countries. The wide-range consequences of these two important factors found a reflection in the political arena, which seems strongly connected with the rise of populist radical right parties. Karapin argues that both of these processes, created a basis for ‘political alienation’ in which established traditional political parties could not be able to respond such evolvments as quick as possible. Therefore, a general dissatisfaction about such traditional political parties emerged in societies in which these political establishments could not present reasonable solutions to increasing problems such as corruption, immigration, crime, economic growth and unemployment respectively. This impotence of traditional political parties gave rise to feelings of protest among populations where radical right turned this situation into an advantage for them and ‘exploited’ the dissatisfied electorate¹⁸³. He argues that Betz and Kitschelt¹⁸⁴ based their theories on the rise of radical right wing in a same parallel. As Karapin basically summarizes these two scholars’ debate on this issue as emphasizing that the potential reasons behind the rise of radical right might be apparent when both traditional parties and challenging political parties (radical right parties) taken into consideration. The responses of these both types of parties; to current social and political changes was able to alter conditions of electoral competition.¹⁸⁵ In Karapin’s argument, he also emphasize about the additional reasons that might gave rise to radical right parties as; “these causes include the breakdown of traditional cleavages and rise of issue voting, the crisis of welfare state, perceived failure

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, pp.27.

¹⁸³Roger Karapin, “Radical-right and neo-fascist political parties in Western Europe”, *Comparative Politics*, 1998, pp.216.

¹⁸⁴Hans-Georg Betz, “Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe”. 1994, Macmillan; Kitschelt Herbert, McGann Anthony J., “The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis”. 1995, The University of Michigan Press.

¹⁸⁵Roger Karapin, “Radical-right and neo-fascist political parties in Western Europe”, *Comparative Politics*, 1998, pp.215.

of established parties to resolve major problems such as unemployment, corruption, crime and immigration”.¹⁸⁶

Along with above-mentioned theories which tried to based their arguments on the so called post-industrial phenomenon that emphasizing the major structural changes in western societies mostly as a result of globalization and advancement of industrial countries as an explanation for the rise of radical right wing parties; there is also an elaborate work of Jens Rydgren in which he tries to alter the post-industrial phenomenon through widen its perspective with his theoretical framework. He basically based his argument upon emergence of a new ‘master frame’ that current PRRP’s use in order to increase their electoral support.¹⁸⁷ As other scholars argued, Rydgren also states that extreme, radical, far right parties has lost their legitimate ground especially after the Second World War as they promoted the most extreme stances such as biological racism, anti-Semitism during that period and all of these positions that they’ve once advocated have been stigmatized.¹⁸⁸ The innovation of new master frame in his theory could be able to gave a new legitimate ground for extreme right-wing parties in which he explains that this new master frame:

“Combining the ethno-nationalism based on ‘cultural racism’ (ethno-pluralist doctrine) and a populist (but not anti-democratic) anti-political establishment rhetoric, the extreme right was able to free itself from enough stigma to be able to attract voter groups that never would have considered voting for an ‘old’ right-wing extreme party promoting biological racism or anti-democratic stances”.¹⁸⁹

Rydgren argues that the theories (post-industrial phenomenon), which focus on macro-structural transformations mainly, could be less satisfactory when all of the countries that this new party family emerged taken into consideration. Simply because, there are exceptional cases which does not fit with the post-industrial phenomenon in explaining the rise of radical right parties therefore, he argues that scholars should seek for a ‘causal mechanism’ that can be applicable for all countries in question, rather than

¹⁸⁶ Roger Karapin, “Review: Radical- Right and Neo- Fascist Political Parties in Western Europe”. *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), 1998, pp.216

¹⁸⁷ Jens Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family”. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, 2005, pp.413-437.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.413.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.416.

creating grand universal theories for this case.¹⁹⁰ Along with the innovation of the new master frame, Rydgren also emphasize that this master frame is not enough to explain whole process that radical right emerged within. He strongly supports that the expanding of political opportunities during this process also allow these parties in question to increase their electoral support which constitutes a very important aspect since with lack of such opportunities, PRRP's would not be able represent and spread their ideologies through this master frame. While explaining these new chances, the relation between the outcomes of macro-structural changes and new political opportunities must be taken into consideration where, without the existence of outcomes of such structural changes, new political opportunities might not emerge within this context.

Rydgren argues that the emergence of new radical right parties along with expanding political opportunities resulted basically in for outcomes; a) PRRP's increased the variety of interests of certain groups, b) these parties emerged in a context that some voter groups becoming more alerted about the threats to their identity through increasing diversity in which PRRP's could easily exploited such feelings, c) PRRP's boosted the already existent discontent among society about politicians and established political parties since these political actors could not be able to solve 'anomalies of post-industrial society', d) PRRP's benefitted from a situation in which voter groups started to understand that old type of frames are not effective any more in understanding the reality of that day¹⁹¹. The author states that all of these conditions together, fueled the emergence and development of radical right wing parties and created new spaces for these parties to establish their ideologies including ethno-nationalism, xenophobia and cultural racism within a new framework along with facilitating from existing discontent in society¹⁹². Within this debate, it is not possible to mention all of the political opportunities that Rydgren analyzed in detail however in a brief summary; the political opportunities that the author emphasized are; realignment and de-alignment processes¹⁹³ in which he explains the changing preferences of voters; degree of convergence in political space¹⁹⁴ through emergence of new party families and radical right parties in

¹⁹⁰Roger Karapin, "Review: Radical- Right and Neo- Fascist Political Parties in Western Europe". *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), 1998, pp.415.

¹⁹¹*Ibid.*, pp.420.

¹⁹²*Ibid.*, pp.420.

¹⁹³*Ibid.*, pp.420.

¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*, pp.423

this framework; agenda setting and politicization of new issues¹⁹⁵ in which Rydgren explains how new issues are posited as major themes and politicized by these radical parties; and availability of new potent master frame¹⁹⁶ which is the major point of Rydgren's theory.

For the master frame theory that Rydgren constructed in order to create a causal mechanism that would be applicable to all examples in which the radical right parties could emerge and flourish; he argues that the party family could be able to advocate their ideologies that includes extreme stances on nationalism, xenophobia, ethnic discrimination and others, through only innovation of this new master frame which reflected these old-fashioned and mostly extreme ideologies as new and moderate ones which are established by radical right parties as these stances responding to the newly emerged demands and discontent among societies. The new master frame that Rydgren talks about is a combination of 'ethno-nationalism, cultural racism, and anti-political establishment populism' in which he explains the ethno-nationalism and cultural racism elements within the ethno-pluralism doctrine that advocates; cultural values and national characteristics are unique to particular nations and they should be kept separate without mixing with other cultural values. According to this doctrine; the superiority or inferiority of particular cultures is not necessarily promoted, it is just emphasized that cultures are separate and unique entities, which should stay in that form¹⁹⁷. Although ethno-pluralism doctrine might seem innocent and objective to a limited extent, the new populist radical right parties used this frame in order to mobilize and widen their xenophobic and racist ideologies.

As a second feature of the new master frame Rydgren stated these parties in question used anti-political or anti-establishment rhetoric in order to separate themselves from established political parties through positing themselves as the opposition against existing political parties with a role of a 'defender' who seeks for the

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.422.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.426.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.427.

interest of will of the ordinary people. Therefore, PRRP's are able to prevent arguments that label them as anti-democratic parties¹⁹⁸.

In this chapter, the claim is to explain the rise of populist radical right parties within a theoretical framework through emphasizing the existing literature's mostly debated and accepted theories on this issue. On one hand, the rise of this new party group analyzed by several scholars as mentioned above through post- industrial phenomenon. Through this framework; the emergence and rise of the populist radical right parties analyzed as an outcome of major transformation that most European societies experienced mostly because of growing intensity of globalization and its effects on societies and advancement of industrialization of European societies have to face with that has far reaching impacts in every aspect of life which is not possible to summarize in a limited space for this research. On the other hand, there is a second theoretical framework, which is mainly constructed by Jens Rydgren in order to create a causal mechanism for explanation of rise of radical right wing parties within a broader perspective along with post- industrial phenomenon. He uses the master frame theory as examined above, explaining both the emergence and development process of PRRP's in current context.

Searching for broader theories to understand and analyze this rise of PRRP's is a necessary process, since it is not possible; to classify all the parties that mentioned into the same group because of the fact, the respective countries are differing in several accounts. The development levels, development paths, transformation aspects in society, political culture, social environment and conditions are only a few of these accounts. Besides, it is not possible to explain the emergence of PRRP's in each respective country with same theoretical framework because of the same reasons. Although it is possible to create wider theories or causal mechanisms in order to explain the general picture of emergence process, again, the variety of dynamics in different countries and their respective effects on societies have a potential of creating exceptional cases. Therefore, with this chapter it is attempted to create a combination of the broadest theories in order to understand the emergence and development process and reasons behind the rise of PRRP'S as clear as possible.

¹⁹⁸JensRydgren, "Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family".European Journal of Political Research, 44, 2005, pp.428.

In the next chapter, there will be a brief analysis on the European Elections in general and elections of 2014 in particular. European Elections included in this research as a limiting prospect as mentioned earlier with other aspects too. Some of the scholarly works underlines the importance of the last European elections through decreasing support for European Union among its citizens; European Parliament is the only organ that is directly elected by the European citizens and generally it becomes the target when it comes to direct demands of citizens. Decreasing levels of trust among European citizens towards Brussels emerged as an increasing relevance towards European Parliament elections as a voice of protest through increasing the support behind radical right parties. Besides, recent financial problems and instability on the possible solutions of this problem might also triggered the distrust in society which again reflected in the last European Parliament elections of 2014 in which the financial crisis and following instability deserves a special attention within this election context.

CHAPTER 4

The 2014 European Parliament Elections

The European Elections considered as having a rather symbolic meaning in which EU citizens elect their representatives for European Parliament. Although the

Parliament has several powers in the legislative process of European Union, its general effects on political structure of countries is limited. With the entrance of the Lisbon Treaty into power, Parliament's position has strengthened in the decision making process, as an equal of the Council through introduction of the co-decision process as the principal decision making method¹⁹⁹. The limited role of the Parliament in political process has been a topic of arguments by nonacademic sources in the framework of Parliament elections in which national parties contested. In this thesis, the importance of the last European Elections of 2014 could be explained in several reasons.

There is a growing importance of the role of the European Elections in my humble opinion not in the functional terms but rather in symbolic terms because of several reasons. Firstly, along with national elections, European elections appear as a more determinant character in following the political trends of the countries. Although it is not the exact parameter that show what kinds of political affiliations are rising or declining in respective countries, it is also important to understand the topics that are popular in national discussions through voter preferences for the parties that are elected in the Parliament. Secondly, contesting political parties are attempting the increase their popularity and visibility through European Elections; especially the ones that could not get enough electoral support in national elections. This was the case for France for the last European Elections in which National Front emerged as the largest party in country with its 24.86% vote share and gained 24 seats in parliament²⁰⁰ whereas in current situation, FN has only two seats in French national assembly, and two seats in Senate. From this fact, European Elections give a chance to such parties in order them to raise their visibility both in European level and in national level.

The distinctive characteristic of the last European Election of 2014 comes from the fact it was the first election that emerged after the financial crisis or so called Eurozone crisis in the European Union, which created a controversial environment especially the countries that hit hard by the economic problems. This is an important fact because; the Eurosceptic parties increased their support through using this theme while

¹⁹⁹ Michael Shckleton, *The European Parliament: the major winner of the Lisbon Treaty?* Maastricht Monnet Paper Series, 4, 2011.pp.6.

²⁰⁰ "European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections", EP, 2014.
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fr-2014.html>

boosting distrust among societies. Besides the Eurosceptic parties, the populist radical right parties also strongly emphasized these series of financial problems and respective discontent in European societies in order to rise their electoral support along with using other significant issues such as immigration, crime, law and order which are already created anti-feelings and concerns among the populations in question. I humbly prefer European Elections as a central subject while making analyses on the increasing popularity of radical right wing parties since it could not be possible to analyze all election result for the radical right in a limited space. Therefore, I tried to draw a rather general picture of these parties through considering their last European election performance. The particular countries and respective parties that is preferred above, are the ones that could be able to increase their electoral support in comparison with previous elections. Another motivation behind this preference is again to limit this research within a reasonable framework while making analyses.

European Elections provided a broader level of examination for this research through not staying in the national boundaries for the particular parties that explained in earlier chapters. I assume that European Union play a major role in the agendas of PRRP's for one important reason. The most common issue that nearly all of the populist radical right parties prefer, as their central theme is the immigration issue and its related problems. The free movement of people principle within the EU countries created enormous opportunities for populations however, the growing discomfort among the 'native' populations especially in the most developed countries of European Union as a result of this mobilization increased in recent years. In addition to this, the immigration rates from the non-member countries are still increasing and continue to help PRRP's in several ways. PRRP's put strong emphasis on the immigration problems and they continue to politicize this issue combining it with the mobilization within EU, particularly taking the newcomers from southern European countries, which in turn gave rise to discomfort in European societies.

The countries above and respective political parties (FPÖ in Austria, FN in France, DPP in Denmark, PVV in the Netherlands, PS in Finland and XA in Greece) preferred as the examples since again it would not be possible to summarize all of the PRRP's in member countries in a limited space and perspective. Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), National Front (FN) and Danish People's Party (DPP) have chosen since,

according to several academic researches²⁰¹ they could be considered as the best examples of Populist Radical Right Parties, and with no doubt, they fit with all of the major characteristics of this party family as Mudde²⁰² states. Besides this fact, they all were able to increase their visibility and popularity in the last European Elections with their risen electoral support as statistics prove²⁰³. Therefore, these three parties constitute relevant examples of PRRP family. For the case of True Finns (PS) in Finland and Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, is not the same with above-mentioned parties. Although True Finns founded after split from its precedent Finnish Rural Party, both PS and PVV are younger parties in comparison with FPÖ, FN and DPP. The two parties PS and PVV could be able to found a relative electoral support for recent elections in both European Elections and national elections to a limited extend. The electoral increase in these two parties found rather unexpected by academic and non-academic commentators since both countries; Finland and the Netherlands, usually known with their stable political system, high levels of welfare and also high levels of tolerance towards non-native populations. Whereas, increasing electoral support for both parties might refer a potential discomfort in the society for the issues that PS and PVV advocates, particularly immigration issue and related problems.

Golden Dawn within this framework constitutes a different perspective since it could be mistaken to consider this party as a proper example in the PRRP party family. The reason behind Golden Dawn's inclusion within this research is to both draws a broader picture on the limits of radical right parties and to make a comparison between the ones with extreme ideologies and moderate ones in this context. Golden Dawn labeled as extreme or neo- Nazi in several academic and non-academic sources in relation with its association of violent incidents in Greece as mentioned in earlier chapters. None of the parties in question associated with violent means and biological racism ideology in their respective countries, which makes the Golden Dawn as extremist party and different from its 'counterparts' in other European Countries. Golden Dawn's increase is highly connected with the recent conditions of Greece especially after the financial crisis, however it is still important to understand the nature

²⁰¹ As CasMudde, Hans- GeorgBetzandHerbertKitscheltmentioned in earliersections.

²⁰² CasMudde; commonthree characteristics of PRRP's; authoritarianism, populismandnativisim.

²⁰³ EuropeanParliament: Results of the 2014 EuropeanElections", EP, 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fr-2014.html>

of such political establishments that can vary in accordance with the political environments. Golden Dawn also mentioned in this thesis as the electoral increase of the party marked an important development for the last European Elections of 2014 in which, for the first time in its history, a neo-Nazi party could be able to elected to the European Parliament.

Table 1.1: Vote percentage of radical right parties for the elections of 2009 and 2014.

| Country | Party | 2009 | 2014 |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>Austria</i> | <i>FPO</i> | <i>12.71</i> | <i>19.7</i> |
| <i>Denmark</i> | <i>DF</i> | <i>15.28</i> | <i>26.6</i> |
| <i>Finland</i> | <i>True Fins</i> | <i>9.79</i> | <i>12.9</i> |
| <i>France</i> | <i>FN</i> | <i>6.34</i> | <i>24.9</i> |
| <i>Germany</i> | <i>NDP</i> | <i>n/a</i> | <i>1</i> |
| <i>Sweden</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>3.27</i> | <i>9.7</i> |
| <i>UK</i> | <i>UKIP</i> | <i>16.09</i> | <i>26.77</i> |
| <i>Greece</i> | <i>Golden Dawn</i> | <i>0.5</i> | <i>9.4</i> |
| <i>Austria</i> | <i>BZO</i> | <i>4.57</i> | <i>0.47</i> |
| <i>Belgium</i> | <i>VB</i> | <i>9.85</i> | <i>4.14</i> |
| <i>Bulgaria</i> | <i>Ataka</i> | <i>11.96</i> | <i>2.97</i> |
| <i>Greece</i> | <i>LAOS</i> | <i>7.14</i> | <i>2.7</i> |
| <i>Hungary</i> | <i>Jobbik</i> | <i>14.77</i> | <i>14.68</i> |
| <i>Italy</i> | <i>Lega Nord</i> | <i>10.2</i> | <i>6.2</i> |
| <i>Netherlands</i> | <i>PVV</i> | <i>16.97</i> | <i>13.2</i> |
| <i>Slovakia</i> | <i>SNS</i> | <i>5.56</i> | <i>3.61</i> |
| <i>Romania</i> | <i>PRM</i> | <i>8.66</i> | <i>2.7</i> |
| <i>UK</i> | <i>BNP</i> | <i>6.3</i> | <i>1.09</i> |

Source: European Parliament Election Results Page²⁰⁴

CONCLUSION

A general picture after all of this research seems more apparent in clearer lenses. The last European Elections of 2014 witnessed a general increase in the electoral support for populist radical right parties in most of the European countries also in the countries that are not mentioned in thesis. The rise of such parties considered as

²⁰⁴“EuropeanParliament: Results of the 2014 EuropeanElections”, EP, 2014.
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fr-2014.html>
 “EuropeanParliament: Results of the 2009 EuropeanElections”, EP, 2009.
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-at-2009.html>

important by academic commentators too.²⁰⁵ As mentioned earlier, Mudde explained that previous theories that are tried to explain the rise of PRRP's within an economic framework is not applicable any more since, in the most industrial and developed countries in the European Union also witnessed this rise in the European Elections which makes these economic based theories unsatisfactory for the current debates. Because of this fact, I tried to explain the rise of PRRP's for current context, with more relevant theories; post-industrial phenomenon²⁰⁶ and new master frame theory²⁰⁷ in order to create a wider perspective on the subject.

Additionally, I tried to give different examples from the political parties that are included in the populist radical right party family on one hand, in order to limit this research and on the other, I tried to give the most relevant examples that have emerged and developed within different political environments while staying in the boundaries of this party family. About the whole research about PRRP's, it could be relevant to add some further notes. The relative rise of radical right parties does not give very clear messages about the future of respective political systems and power of such parties in the context of European Union since, it could be observed that the rise and decline of these parties can be rapid in relation with conditions that gave electoral support to such political establishments. Besides, the relative success of radical right parties is rather tend to be underestimated if their overall electoral success taken into consideration. However, their substantial increase could be important to understand since; the most common topics that PRRP's promotes in their agendas becoming more important in the current context such as immigration, economic implications that can derive from intense flow of migrants, the issues concerning identity and cultural values and controversial debates about multi-culturalism respectively. Therefore, the largest mainstream parties in national governments and European Union authorities keep these problems unsolved, it might create a further increase in electoral success for radical right parties. In this respect, both European authorities and the largest parties in national governments would take the increase in support for radical right parties in consideration in order to analyze

²⁰⁵ Detailed information in; Cas Mudde, Hans- Georg Betz and Herbert Kitschelt's that mentioned in earlier footnotes.

²⁰⁶ Especially in Ignazi's and Inglehart's academic articles.

²⁰⁷ Jens Rydgren's works; particularly the ones that referred in earlier chapters.

and create relevant solutions with a motivation of preventing further controversies in European societies.

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