

SPEED, SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS' INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS

by

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: United Nations, peacekeeping, personnel contribution, deployment promptness, composition.

The first few months of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are critical stages for achieving stable peace, and the speed, size, and composition of the initial deployments have a vital importance for the UN to signal its commitment to the mission. This thesis is the first systematic analysis on the factors that determine the speed of forming resolutions and deployments, initial contribution levels, and composition of the UN peacekeeping operations.

We collected original data on the UN peacekeeping operations. We tested hypotheses drawn from Realist and Liberal theories of international relations. We find that self-interest of the contributing countries do not increase the contribution rates or accelerate the deployment process, but the conflicts that pose a threat to international security are more likely to receive quicker deployments.

For the Liberal accounts, we find that democracies contribute more than non-democracies. Recipient countries with long-standing intense conflicts are more likely to receive slower formed resolutions and slower deployments with lower participation rates. However, as a new measure to the literature, if a recipient country experiences a spike in deaths prior to the establishment of the operation, then this humanitarian crisis leads countries to contribute more with a prompt deployment.

As a geographical factor, contributions to the operations decrease with the increase in distance between contributor and recipient countries. Lastly, the operations established after the Brahimi Report (2000) are more likely to receive faster formed resolutions and increased initial contributions mainly from non-democracies with prompt deployments.

ÖZET

BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER BARIŞI KORUMA OPERASYONLARI BAŞLANGIÇ KONUŞLANDIRMASININ HIZI, BOYUTU VE KOMPOZİSYONU

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, barışı koruma, personel katılımı, konuşlandırma çabukluğu, kompozisyon.

Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barışı koruma operasyonlarının ilk birkaç ayı istikrarlı barışı sağlamak için kritik süreçlerdir, ve ilk konuşlandırmanın hızı ve boyutu BM'nin kararlılığını göstermekte çok önemlidir. Bu tez, BM barışı koruma operasyonlarının çözümünün oluşturulma ve konuşlandırmanın hızını, ilk katkıların düzeylerini ve kompozisyonunu belirleyen faktörler üzerine ilk sistematik analizdir.

BM barışı koruma operasyonlarının orijinal verilerini topladık. Uluslararası ilişkilerden alınmış Realist ve Liberal teorileri test ettik. Katılımda bulunan ülkelerin çıkarlarının katılımını fazlalaştırmadığını ve de konuşlandırma sürecini hızlandırmadığını, fakat uluslararası güvenliğe tehditte bulunan çatışmalara daha hızlı konuşlandırma yapılmasının olasılığını daha yüksek bulduk.

Liberal ele alışı için ise, demokrasilerin demokrasi olmayanlardan daha fazla katılımda bulunduğunu bulduk. Uzun zamandır süren şiddetli çatışmaları olan alıcı ülkeler büyük olasılıkla yavaş oluşturulan çözümler ve az katılım oranı olan yavaş konuşlandırmalar alacaktır. Fakat, literatürde yeni bir ölçü olarak, operasyonun kuruluşundan önce alıcı ülkeler çatışmayla alakalı ölümlerde hızlı bir artış yaşarsa, bu insanlık krizi ülkelerin daha fazla katılım yapmasını ve daha hızlı konuşlandırmasını sağlar.

Coğrafi bir faktör olarak, katılımcı ve alıcı ülkeler arasındaki mesafe uzadıkça operasyonlara katılım azalır. Son olarak, Brahimi Raporu'ndan (2000) sonra kurulan operasyonların daha hızlı oluşturulan çözümlere ve çoğunlukla demokrasi olmayan ülkelerin katılımıyla daha fazla katılım alma ve daha hızlı konuşlandırma olasılığı daha yüksektir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MINURCA: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UN: United Nations
UNAVEM I: United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEM II: United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNAVEM III: United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSAS: Standby Arrangements System
UNSMIS: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
UNTMIH: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti

For Figures and Tables:

Authorized, or Aut.: Authorized personnel number
Delay R-D: Delay between resolution and deployment
Delay S-D: Delay between suggestion and deployment
Delay S-R: Delay between suggestion and resolution
Log. Total Pers. C., or L. T. P. C.: Logged total personnel contribution
Log. Tot. Troop Cont.: Logged total troop contribution
Log. Troop Cont., or L. T. C.: Logged troop contribution
Mandate: Fulfilled mandate percentages

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations peacekeeping operations have been one of the preferred tools to help create sustainable peace in countries that are torn by conflict. Since its establishment, the United Nations (UN) has undergone a series of transformations and changes in visions. These reforms, which were constituted through lessons learned from the previous operations, led UN to mostly apply multidimensional peacekeeping instead of traditional peacekeeping in recent decades. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping encompass maintaining peace and security, humanitarian causes such as protecting civilians and promoting human rights, assisting in restoring the rule of law, and facilitating political process (Fortna, 2008; Daniel, 2013). With multidimensional peacekeeping, the UN peacekeeping operations came to be regarded as successful and effective in many respects (Bellamy and Williams, 2010; Fortna, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

Scientific research on UN peacekeeping operations show that peacekeeping operations matter for many outcomes. First of all, as Fortna (2004) indicates, peacekeeping operations' most costly and important task is to create durable peace that is self-sustainable without the peacekeepers on field. Most of the recent peacekeeping scholars, such as Fortna (2004, 2008), and Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), have reached a consensus on the fact that peacekeeping operations are effective in many respects and they increase the duration of peace after civil wars. However, scholars have not reached an agreement regarding peacekeeping's effect on democratization and war duration. Although there are various contestations and gaps among the literature, one major finding is that, even though the UN tends to deploy its missions to difficult conflicts, the UN peacekeeping operations have a positive impact on the duration of peace (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004, 2008).

Research also shows that the size and composition of peacekeeping operations matters. The UN, as a credible intervening third-party, signals credible commitment through deploying a great number of peacekeeping personnel (Holt et al., 2009). In addition, the amount of troop personnel and duration of peace after a civil war are positively correlated (Hultman et al., 2013).

Initial deployment of UN peacekeeping operations is still an open question in the peacekeeping literature and this research aims to fill this gap by revealing the factors that determine the speed and size of initial UN peacekeeping operations' deployments. Unlike most of the literature that focuses solely on troop contributions, this study examines all contribution types, which are troop, police, military observer, and expert. Also, as another new focus in this research, we take into account both the delay of deployment and the duration of forming of a resolution after the peacekeeping operation is suggested. With these aspects at hand, this thesis will be the first systematic analysis of deployment and resolution speeds, and initial contribution levels of the UN peacekeeping operations.

The research question at hand is crucial for the UN peacekeeping operations, because as it is indicated by the UN, "the first few months after a cease-fire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and bolstering the credibility of a new operation" (2008, p. 62). In other words, the first few months of the operations are critical stages for achieving stable peace after the UN forces leave the field. By solely examining initial deployments, this research will reveal the trends in contribution and deployment to the UN peacekeeping operations and present how the peacekeeping operations can be developed from deployment and contribution perspectives.

In order to present what affects and determines the speed of forming resolutions and deployments, and initial contribution levels, we tested Realist-inspired arguments and Liberal accounts of the peacekeeping operations by depicting both previously studied variables and our novel variables to the literature. As our method, we used ordinary least squares regression analysis to estimate the relationship between these variables, and predict both the UN and the contributing countries' actions.

For these purposes, we collected data on UN peacekeeping operations through UN's monthly released factsheets for deployment numbers and dates, and we only collected the initial deployment numbers from the UN peacekeeping operations' factsheets. We collected the time passed between suggestion, authorization, and deployment for every mission. We only cover post-1990 period because the number of UN peacekeeping operations has increased immensely, the data on deployment can be publicly accessed, and with the ending of the bipolar Cold War, it is possible to assume an ideal setting where all the countries can participate without political obstacles.

Starting with Realist-inspired hypotheses, we find that self-interest of the contributing countries do not increase the contribution rates or accelerate the deployment, and the conflicts that pose a threat to international security are more likely to receive quicker deployments. Secondly, we tested Liberal account of the UN peacekeeping operations, which argues that democratic states are more likely to participate in interventions. By testing liberal theory through democracies' contribution rates and deployment promptness, we find that democracies contribute more than non-democracies, but we could not reach a significant result for their deployment promptness.

We then proceed with testing the conflict intensity's effect on our variables, which is also a test for humanitarian argument of longer and more deadly conflicts being more likely to receive intervention from deployment and quickness perspective. Although the fear of potential spillover increases the contribution rates of the geographically proximate countries, intense conflicts that are long-standing with high battle-related deaths are more likely to receive slower formed resolutions and slower deployments coupled with lower participation rates. However, we find support for the humanitarian argument with our novel measure in the peacekeeping literature. If a recipient country experiences a spike in battle-related deaths prior to the establishment of the peacekeeping operation, then the humanitarian crisis created by the sudden increase in deaths forces countries to initially participate more with a prompt deployment.

We then tested other relevant factors that determine the speed and size of initial UN peacekeeping operations' deployments. We significantly find that increase of the recipient country's area corresponds to an increase in authorized personnel

number, but the population of the recipient country does not have any significant effect. We also tested if the first peacekeeping operations or the follow-up ones that are repeatedly established for the same conflict at the same recipient country received more contributions, and we find that follow-up operations' fulfilled mandate percentages are more than the firstly established ones. We hypothesized that regions' democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping operations' contributions, but we could not find support for this argument.

Lastly, we tested what has changed after the Brahimi Report's suggestions for more efficient and successful UN peacekeeping operations (Bellamy et al., 2010). We find that the newly established peacekeeping operations are more likely to receive faster formed resolutions and higher initial contribution rates with prompt deployments. We also find that the nature of UN troop contributing countries shifted in the 21st century with respect to receiving initial deployments more from democratic to non-democratic countries. Therefore, we present an optimistic future vision of the UN peacekeeping operations with higher contribution rates, faster deployments, and more complex missions with a broad spectrum of goals to achieve.

An important implication of this research is that it reveals UN peacekeeping operations' trends in deployment and contribution rates, how different democracy levels are inclined to act, and what has changed after the Brahimi Report. In addition, this research offers a policy contribution by stating that quick deployment, and deploying large numbers of troops signal credible commitment to the insurgents, and consequently lead the UN to show willingness in maintaining peace and security in the post-civil war period.

The rest of the paper proceeds first with a literature review on related topics of the UN peacekeeping operations. We then elaborate on the theories of peacekeeping operations and generate our testable hypotheses under the theoretical framework section. Afterwards, we discuss our data and methodology, and present our results. The final section concludes with providing the implications of this thesis and the ways for future research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has proliferated significantly in recent decades. Although the literature has grown into thematic strands, this literature review will only focus on some of the relevant major topics, which are the UN peacekeeping operations' effect on peace, democratization, and war duration. Lastly, the effect of size and composition of the UN peacekeeping operations will be discussed.

2.1. Peacekeeping Operations' Ability to Maintain Peace

One major argument among the scholars is the UN peacekeeping operations' effect on peace. Peacekeeping operations' most costly and important task is to create durable peace that is self-sustainable without the peacekeepers on field (Fortna, 2004). As Fortna (2004) indicates, "true success is not just preventing another war, but the ability to go home and still have peace hold; to create a self-sustaining peace" (p. 284). Since this issue has an utmost importance and it is basically the reason for the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping operations' effect on peace is an overwhelmingly studied topic in the peacekeeping literature.

On the one hand, several case studies have found peacekeeping operations as ineffective in their tasks (e.g. Jett, 1999; Jones, 2001; Diehl, Reifschneider, Hensel, 1996). On the other hand, most of the recent peacekeeping scholars like Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2005), Fortna and Howard

(2008), Fortna (2004, 2004b, 2008), Walter (1997, 2002), Haas (1986), Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), and Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) have tested UN peacekeeping operations' effectiveness with different datasets and methods, and they jointly reached a different conclusion. These scholars have agreed upon the fact that the UN peacekeeping operations are effective in their tasks, and these operations are successful in increasing the duration of peace after civil wars. As stated by Fortna (2008, p. 116), in fact, if peacekeepers are deployed to the field, peace is at least 55%-60% more likely to last.

As Fortna (2003) indicates, "peacekeeping does contribute to more stable peace and suggest, ..., that peacekeeping is no less effective at keeping peace between belligerents in civil wars than between sovereign states" (p. 98). Therefore, it is not just civil wars that the UN peacekeeping operations are successful in, but they are also successful in creating stable peace in interstate conflicts. So, even though the UN tends to deploy its missions to difficult conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations have a positive impact on the duration of peace (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004, 2008).

Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) state that, "in theory, peacekeepers fill the gap in the transitional period following a civil war until trust can be reestablished and self-enforcing domestic political institutions can take over" (p. 7). During the transitional period, Fortna (2004b) poses the questions of how and why peacekeeping works in establishing stable peace. As Walter (1997, 2002) and Fortna (2004b) specify, in post-conflict peacekeeping operations, a special emphasis is given to the monitoring of disarmament. In addition, Fortna (2004b) provides a systematic argument on enhancing stable peace through four mechanisms. First of all, peacekeepers can increase the benefits of peace while raising the cost of returning to war. Secondly, peacekeepers can reduce uncertainty by monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Thirdly, peacekeepers can prevent certain triggering events that may lead to a return to warfare. Lastly, peacekeepers can prevent abuses that may arise through the reconstruction of the political sphere. Other main arguments for the important aspects in forming self-sustainable durable peace are economic reconstruction (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Collier, 2007), institutional reform (Von Hippel, 2000), and security sector reform (Collier, 2007).

2.2. Peacekeeping Operations' Ability to Establish Peace

Just like democratization, UN peacekeeping operations' effect on war duration is contested among the scholars as well. Basically, scholars who agree that the UN interventions have an effect on the duration of wars are divided into two as having an effect of shortening or prolonging the conflict. However, there is a lack of research on UN peacekeeping operations' effects on war duration and this may be due to the fact that peacekeeping operations are generally assumed to be implemented after an agreement is signed.

Focusing solely on the UN interventions, Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) could find no causal effect of interventions in shortening the war. Betts (1994) focuses only on the UN peacekeeping operations as well, and he suggests that if the UN undertakes the role of an imperial impartial, which is actively overpowering both sides, then interventions may reduce the duration of a civil war. In addition to Betts' (1994) suggestion for the neutral role of the UN, if the UN peacekeeping operations are regarded as neutral interventions, Regan (2002) hypothesizes that rather than biased interventions where only one of the conflicting parties is supported, neutral interventions lead to shorter wars. This is due to the assumption that neutral interventions "distribute resources in a manner that increases equality" (Regan, 2002, p. 64).

From the contribution perspective of UN peacekeeping operations though, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) posit that when the UN peacekeeping operations are deployed into active conflicts with larger numbers of armed military troops, combat hostilities between the belligerents effectively reduce. As it is evident, scholars have not reached an agreement yet for the effect of UN interventions on the duration of conflicts, and this is partly due to the causality problems of not being certain that the UN intervention is the sole causer of war duration to be longer or shorter.

Rationalist explanations of war can be applied to civil wars, and therefore this literature is highly related to the UN peacekeeping operations. As a rationalist explanation of war, Fearon (1995) argues that although wars are costly, wars may

occur, endure, and recur because of information asymmetries and commitment problems. Conflicts are in a sense ways to learn about the other party's resolve, and combatants may easily misrepresent information in order to reach a more beneficial agreement (Wagner, 2000; Fearon, 1995).

As noted by Fearon (1995), commitment problems can lead to war, but it is also a major issue in civil wars as well (Powell, 2002, 2006). For instance, states usually require insurgent groups to declare ceasefire and give up arms in order to reach a negotiated agreement, but since their weapons are the only power they have, insurgent groups prefer fighting to giving concessions in an agreement. Due to the commitment problems, insurgents cannot trust the government officials for renegeing on the terms of the agreement. Therefore, an intervening third party should be able to share privately held information between the parties, and help combatants commit peaceful settlements. Thus, with the involvement of a trustable third-party, which is in this case the UN, combatants may indeed accept the termination of war (Walter, 1997, 2002).

2.3. Peacekeeping Operations' Effect on Democratization

Some scholars have argued that democratization is one of the crucial goals of peacekeeping operations. However, the viability of developing democracy through peacekeeping is contested among scholars. On the one hand, some scholars support the notion that the UN peacekeeping operations are likely to lead to democratization at the recipient countries. While Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) were testing the success rates of peacekeeping operations, they posed democratization as a measure for success, and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) consequently argued that the peacekeeping operations are not only successful in keeping peace, but they establish a minimal level of democracy as well. In addition, Pickering and Pecency (2006), and Heldt (2011) determine that the UN interventions promote transition to democracy.

On the other hand, other scholars propose that the UN peacekeeping operations do not have a relation with democratization. For instance, Gurses and Mason (2006, 2008) did not find any effect of peacekeeping operations on

democratization. Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) assert that the UN interventions are unlikely to lead to democracy. From a different point of view though, Fortna (2008b) suggests that peacekeeping does not have any explicit effect on democratization, because the positive and negative effects, respectively promoting peace and blocking democratization by crowding with local processes of political development, cancel each other out. Results on peacekeeping operations' effect on democratization differ due to their different statistical models and measures in their research designs. Therefore, a consensus is not reached regarding the peacekeeping's effect on democratization among the scholars, and the literature has yet to provide a tenable answer.

2.4. Size and Composition of Peacekeeping Operations

Research on UN peacekeeping operations from a rationalist perspective reveals that the size and composition of peacekeeping operations matters. According to Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009), the UN, as a credible intervening third-party, signals credible commitment through deploying a great number of peacekeeping personnel, and consequently, more troops increase the capacity of missions against insurgent groups.

From a rationalist bargaining perspective, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) argue that the UN is able to mitigate information asymmetries and commitment problems. Hence, by examining the operations' compositions for their influence on the duration of peace from a rationalist bargaining model perspective, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) indicate that "larger UN troop commitments reduce the risk of civil conflict recurrence. ... As the amount of UN troop personnel increase, the duration of peace after a civil war increases" (p. 16). However, they could not find any support for having large numbers of UN observer personnel making informational assistances in order to overcome the information asymmetries. Thus, Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009), and Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) argue alike and signify the importance of size and composition of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping literature can still be considered as a recent literature, but it has proliferated immensely in recent decades. Throughout the evolution of the peacekeeping literature, scholars have focused on different dimensions and concerns of the UN peacekeeping operations. These dimensions can be summed up in three main topics. First topic focuses on understanding thoroughly how the UN peacekeeping operations work both in theory and practice. Secondly, the UN peacekeeping operations' effectiveness is a major issue that has been overwhelmingly worked on. Last major focus is on how to improve the UN peacekeeping operations through providing various suggestions. Some of these concerns that are depicted in this literature review are the effectiveness of the operations, operations' effect on democratization and war duration, and operations' size and composition's importance on the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations.

The literature evolved from a pessimistic stance to an optimistic one where recent research has reached a consensus on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations with the UN peacekeeping operations' ability to create durable peace. However, for the UN peacekeeping operations' effect on democratization, a consensus is not reached yet among the scholars. Also, for the UN peacekeeping operations' effect on war duration, most of the scholars study general third party interventions, not specifically the UN peacekeeping operations. However, those who solely focus on the UN peacekeeping could not reach a consensus on peacekeeping's effect on war duration partly due to the causality problems. Besides, the lack of research on this issue may be due to the assumption that peacekeeping operations are usually implemented after an agreement is signed. Lastly, recent studies emphasize that size and composition of the UN peacekeeping operations matter for reducing the risk of civil war recurrence and creating an environment of durable peace.

The next section will focus on the theoretical framework, and we will discuss theories on peacekeeping operations with their advantages and shortcomings. In the meantime, we will form our hypotheses.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section provides a theoretical framework that identifies the Realist and Liberal accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Hypotheses that will both test the arguments of these theories and other relevant arguments will be formed and stated after a brief introduction to the theories and their arguments.

3.1. Realist Accounts

Realist-inspired accounts explain states' contributions to peacekeeping with self-interest (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). There are two variants of the self-interest argument. First, states whose interests are in favor of preserving the status quo are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations as an exercise of foreign policy (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Second, as a more recent argument, states are likely to participate in peacekeeping operations in order to preserve or increase their position and prestige in the world (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Neack, 1995).

Self-interest arguments apply to both Western and non-Western states. For instance, peace operations were dominated by Western middle powers during the Cold War due to the states' interest of gaining prestige and consequently enhancing their position in world politics (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Bruneau, 2004). Bellamy and Williams (2013) argue likewise for non-Western countries, such as India, in the sense that their contributions to peacekeeping operations are explained through their enhanced international status. Lastly, Neack (1995) suggests that states

contribute to peacekeeping operations in order to influence UN's decisions in their interests.

Realist accounts of peace operations have been overwhelmingly studied in the literature. However, previous research has not established a common finding for Realist-inspired self-interest arguments, and most of them studied the likelihood of establishing a peace operation. On the one hand, Fortna (2008) claims that peacekeeping is less likely in former colonies of Permanent-5 members, and strategic resources, such as oil, has no significant relationship with peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, de Jonge Oudraat (1996) argues otherwise and states that an intervention is likely if it engages Permanent-5 member states' interests. De Jonge Oudraat (1996) defines interests of Permanent-5 members as target countries having a strategic or economic importance for a Permanent-5 member, former ally of a Permanent-5 member, or involving a party that a Permanent-5 member has close ties with (p. 517).

We will test the self-interest argument by using the same measures of contributor interest through recipient countries being former colonies or having strategic resources, such as oil. Thereby, we will be testing self-interest argument for the initial contribution rates by taking into account countries' colonial and trade-based relationships.

Instead of analyzing the likelihood of establishing a peace operation though, we elaborate the self-interest argument with a focus on the Permanent-5 member states' likelihood of participating in the initial deployment. Permanent-5 members are significant to the UN peacekeeping operations both for their ability to establish a peacekeeping operation and for their contributions to the operations. Since the major powers try to preserve the status quo (e.g. USA), and since the growing major powers try to enhance their position (e.g. China), we believe that the Permanent-5 members are more sensitive to self-interest than non-Permanent-5 members. Therefore, we reach our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Permanent-5 countries are more likely to participate in UN peacekeeping operations that are of interest to them compared to non-Permanent-5 countries.

Unlike previous research, in addition to Permanent-5 countries' contributions, we will also examine democracies' participation incentives by testing self-interest argument for democracies separately. We believe democratic countries may act accordingly with their interests in fuel exports and colonial ties in order to enhance their position in the world. Although self-interest may not be the sole factor in participation to peacekeeping operations, it may still be a significant factor in participation rates. Therefore, we expect to find support for both hypotheses of Permanent-5 and democracy. In order to see if democratic countries contribute more to the peacekeeping operations where there is a self-interest situation for them, we formed a hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Democracies are more likely to participate in UN peacekeeping operations that are of interest to them compared to non-democracies.

International security threat's impact on the likelihood of a peacekeeping operation is another major issue of contention in the Realist accounts. Previous research has not reached an agreement on this issue either. Fortna (2008) proposes this factor by examining the threat of a civil war through spilling across borders. She then finds that a civil war's threat to international peace does not lead to a peacekeeping operation. Unlike Fortna (2008), de Jonge Oudraat (1996) looks into other factors as well and reaches a different conclusion. He considers a conflict as a threat to international peace and security if the internal conflict "is not contained within the territory of the state from whence it sprang ... [and] if it engages the interests of more distant powers" (p. 518). So, de Jonge Oudraat (1996) asserts that if an internal conflict involves neighboring states by sending large numbers of refugees, and if it threatens to lead to violence elsewhere in the region, peacekeeping operations are more likely (p. 518). From another perspective, Bove and Elia (2011) argue that threat to global and regional stability, and the number of displaced people are some of the robust explanations of when states choose to intervene.

Rather than analyzing the international security threat's impact on the likelihood of a peacekeeping operation as Fortna (2008) and de Jonge Oudraat (1996) did, we examine international security threat's impact on the duration of forming of a UN Security Council resolution, duration of deployment of the initial forces, and initial participation rates. We measure international security threat by the refugee population of the recipient country. Since international security threat is a significant

issue both for the UN and the participating countries, we expect to find support for the following hypotheses. These hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 3: If a conflict poses an international security threat with large numbers of refugees, then the resolution will form faster.

Hypothesis 4: If a conflict poses an international security threat with large numbers of refugees, then that UN peacekeeping operation will deploy faster.

Hypothesis 5: If a conflict poses an international security threat with large numbers of refugees, then the contribution to that UN peacekeeping operation will be higher.

3.2. Liberal Accounts

Liberal peace theory is the most influential theory in peacekeeping operations (Bellamy et al., 2010). At the interstate level, liberal peace theory, or democratic peace theory, is based on the observation that democracies tend not to fight with each other (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Bellamy et al., 2010). Advocates of this theory propose several reasons to explain this observation. First, normative theory of the democratic peace argues that the reason for the democratic peace is the shared norms of negotiation, compromise and cooperation held by democracies (Dixon, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Owen, 1994). This account is also supported by democracies' joint membership in the international organizations and democracies' shared economical interests in trade (Oneal and Russett, 1999; Hegre, 2000).

Secondly, structural account locates democratic peace's reason in the democracies' institutional constraints imposed through their judiciaries, legislatures, and electorates (Owen, 1994; Bellamy et al., 2010; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004). As an underlying assumption of the structural account, inevitably, executives of democracies must gain approval from their legislatures and electorates. So, as Bueno de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson (2004) argue, in order not to risk losing the support of the electorate and the winning coalition, democracies engage in wars when the

wars are cheap and short, and since democracies' fight with each other would neither be cheap nor short, democracies tend not to fight with each other.

Contemporary peacekeeping operations are mostly informed by liberal peace theory, in the sense that peace operations try to create stable peace through creating democratic societies and enabling liberal free market economies (Bellamy et al., 2010). As former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) indicates, “there is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order” (para. 59). In addition, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005) also states that “the United Nations does more than any other single organization to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world” (para. 151).

The Liberal account of peacekeeping operations argues that democratic states are more likely to participate in peace operations than non-democratic states (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Democratic peace theory emphasizes three reasons for democracies' incentives for providing peacekeepers. First, democracies derive their legitimacy from liberal principles, and therefore they readily accept the position that inalienable rights of individuals must be protected and promoted (Doyle, 1996; Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Lebovic, 2004). Secondly, democratic leaders believe that democratic practices can be exported and humanitarian objectives can be pursued because these principles are inalienable from self-interest (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Lebovic, 2004). This is due to the democratic governments' shared interest in creating “economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and democracy can thrive” (Lebovic, 2004, p. 912). Third, democracies are more likely to join international organizations and cooperate with each other to achieve their shared goals like peace and security (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Pevehouse, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006).

The Liberal account of peacekeeping operations argues that democracies tend to participate in peacekeeping because they believe it fosters peace and spreads democracy and human rights (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Owen, 1994). However, as Bellamy and Williams (2013) state, although it seems as if there is a link between democracy and contribution to peacekeeping operations, it is a probabilistic one, because these dispositions do not always translate into contributions. We will test this

argument for initial deployments, and we expect that the result will support the Liberal account of UN peacekeeping operations. In order to answer this question, we reach our hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: Democracies contribute more personnel than non-democracies.

Previous literature has tested the effect of liberal factors on the likelihood of establishing a peacekeeping operation. Humanitarian impulse argument supports the fact that longer and more deadly conflicts are more likely to receive intervention (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Regan, 2000; Beardsley, 2004; Jakobsen, 1996; Bove and Elia, 2011). However, Fortna (2008) specifically tests this argument for peacekeeping operations and she comes to the opposite conclusion that a more deadly war does not increase the likelihood of establishing a peacekeeping operation.

In line with previous research, we test the humanitarian impulse argument by looking at the effect of battle-related deaths on the duration of forming resolutions and of deployment, and participation rates. These hypotheses will test the UN and the participating countries' willingness to deliver their commitment to the humanitarian principles. In the case of high battle-related deaths, we hope to find promptly formed resolutions and deployments, and higher participation rates, especially from democracies. However, as a counter argument, costs of sending troops to the UN peacekeeping operations may be more than the gains, in the sense that recipient countries with high battle-related deaths may mean a more dangerous mission, and may lead contributing countries to lose their citizens. Therefore, we expect to find that the UN peacekeeping operations that are established at recipient countries with high battle-related deaths may suffer from longer deployment durations and insufficient participation rates. Therefore, we reach our hypotheses:

Hypothesis 7: The higher the battle-related deaths, the quicker a resolution will form.

Hypothesis 8a: The higher the battle-related deaths, the quicker the deployment.

Hypothesis 8b: The higher the battle-related deaths, the slower the deployment.

Hypothesis 9a: The higher the battle-related deaths, the higher the participation.

Hypothesis 9b: The higher the battle-related deaths, the lower the participation.

In addition, we will test the humanitarian argument with the duration of conflict. We want to test the conflict duration's relation to the duration of forming resolutions and deploying forces, and participation rates of all countries and democracies specifically. We expect to find positive correlations between our variables. Accordingly, we present our three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 10: If the conflict has lasted a long time, then a resolution forms faster.

Hypothesis 11: If the conflict has lasted a long time, then the deployment is faster.

Hypothesis 12: If the conflict has lasted a long time, then the participation rate is higher.

We wanted to test the humanitarian argument of the Liberal account with a new measure to the peacekeeping literature as well. Although battle-related deaths spread over the years may be significant for the UN peacekeeping operations, we believe that a steep rise in battle-related deaths in a short period of time may alert both the UN and the participating countries, and may eventually impel the quick formation and deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. Spike in battle-related deaths is measured through taking the average of battle-related deaths prior to the peacekeeping operation's establishment, and if the year before the peacekeeping operation has more deaths than average, then we say that there is a spike. By testing battle-related deaths, conflict duration, and spike in battle-related deaths, we will also be testing the conflict intensity's effect on delays in resolution and deployment, and participation rates. In case of a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country, although we hope for prompt formation of resolutions and deployment of initial forces, and high participation rates, since costs of sending troops may be higher than the gains, we expect low participation rates. We present four other hypotheses:

Hypothesis 13: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then the resolution is formed faster.

Hypothesis 14: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then deployment is faster.

Hypothesis 15a: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then participation is higher.

Hypothesis 15b: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then participation is lower.

According to the Liberal account of the UN peacekeeping operations, democracies are more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations. However, since the first deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is of vital importance, the difference between democracies' and non-democracies' deployment rates has to be taken into consideration as well. We believe that democracies may protract the process and spend more time in deploying personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations, and non-democracies may act quicker, because advanced democracies have more complex decision-making processes than autocracies or developing democracies. Therefore, we reach our last hypothesis on the Liberal account:

Hypothesis 16: Non-democracies deploy faster than democracies.

3.3. Geography

Previous literature finds that states choose to intervene when the conflict area is proximate to their territories (Bove and Elia, 2011). In line with this robust finding, we believe that one of the other important factors that determine the contributing countries' contribution rates to the UN peacekeeping operations is the geographical proximity of the conflict area. We argue that countries are more likely to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in countries that are geographically closer to them. This is partially due to cheaper and easier transportation, and especially due to the fear of spillover. As Bove and Elia (2011) state, "geographic proximity to the country in conflict increases the utility a neighboring country expects to get from the cessation of the hostilities. Sharing a border with a country at war means an increase in the probability of instability in the surrounding area (spillover effects)" (p. 703). For this reason, our hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 17: Geographically proximal countries are more likely to participate in the initial deployment.

Since we believe that geographically proximal countries are more likely to contribute to the UN peacekeeping operations, we argue that regions' democratic compositions may reflect the UN peacekeeping operations' contributions. In order to see the relationship between democratic compositions of regions and operations, we compare the averages of Polity 2 scores of the countries at the region and the initial contributing countries at the operations. We expect to find a positive correlation between regions' and operations' democratic compositions. Previous research has lacked this notion of regions' democratic compositions being related to the UN peacekeeping operations' democratic compositions. Jonah Victor (2011) indirectly supports our hypothesis at hand only for Africa by stating that both UN and non-UN peace operations' contributions in Africa are composed mainly of non-democracies. However, our finding will encompass all the regions, and thus it will be novel to the literature. Our hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 18: The more democratic the region, the more participation by the democratic countries.

3.4. Population

We believe that the recipient countries' population and area may affect both the mandate sizes and consequently the initial participation rates of UN peacekeeping operations. We expect to find a positive correlation between these variables. So, we propose two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 19: The greater the recipient country's population and area, the higher the mandate requirements.

Hypothesis 20: The greater the recipient country's population and area, the higher the participation.

3.5. Follow-up Peacekeeping Operations

The UN peacekeeping operations can be distinguished by the nature of their formation. The operation can either be formed for the first time for a conflict or it can be a follow-up operation established after an operation that was also established for the same conflict at the same recipient country. For example, United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) is a follow-up operation of UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), and likewise, UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) is a follow-up mission of UNAVEM II. Follow-up missions may have different issues and goals at focus, but the key point is that they are established for the same conflict at the same recipient country.

We argue that there is a gradual decrease in contribution rates for follow-up peacekeeping operations. Participant countries' hope for follow-up operations to be successful may have decreased with the establishment of another peacekeeping operation at the same target country, or another operation may have been established because of more intense recurring conflicts at the same target country and the contributing countries may be reluctant to send their citizens to an intense conflict. For follow-up peacekeeping operations' contribution rates, we do not take into account the takeovers from previous operations, and only measure the initial deployment for the newly established peacekeeping operation. Our hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 21: First UN peacekeeping operations receive more contribution than follow-up ones.

3.6. The Effect of the Brahimi Report

In 2000, the “Brahimi Report,” which is the common name for the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, was a response to a combination of factors, including the institutional failings and demand for new peacekeeping operations (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 129). The Brahimi Report (2000) made robust recommendations to improve the UN peace operations. First, the report calls for

improved decision-making at UN headquarters with a better flow of information (p. 12). Secondly, it suggests clear mandates with realistic advices from the Secretariat, and clear wording of the requirements (p. 10-11). Besides, the Panel recommends the mandates to be authorized only if it is applicable, and the forces to be financed before it is deployed in order to have the contributing countries' commitment beforehand (p. 10-11).

Third, rapid and effective deployment during the critical period of the first several weeks following a ceasefire is the key to “establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers” (p. 15, para. 87). In accordance, “the Panel thus proposes that the United Nations develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days” (p. 15, para. 88). So, the UN should be able to use forces at the Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), where required personnel are available in short notice (p. 17). In addition, the UN should have its own logistics in order to send the forward elements of a peace operation (p. 28). As the last suggestion of the Brahimi Report, the deployed forces should be effective with peacekeepers having basic training and equipment (p. 19).

The Brahimi Report converted the UN strategy from traditional peacekeeping to complex multidimensional peacekeeping, and it was also a turning point for the literature (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010). As a consequence of more precise methodologies and theoretical works in mid-2000s' peacekeeping literature, recent studies embraced an optimistic stance and revealed that the peacekeeping operations are effective policy tools despite their limitations (Fortna and Howard, 2008).

According to Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010, p. 143-6), certain things have changed after the release of the Brahimi Report. First, post-Brahimi operations encompass many types of peace operations, with a broad spectrum of traditional monitoring to more complex operations. Second, both UN and non-UN peace operations grew in number and size. Third, post-2000 missions are willing to fulfill all embracing mandate requirements that range from monitoring to establishing rule of law with the help of multiple personnel types of troops, military observers, police

forces, and experts on conflicts. Lastly, the UN's ongoing operations are relatively strong compared to the previous ones.

With the Brahimi Report's suggestions and following changes in the UN peacekeeping operations, we believe that there will be differences between periods of 1990-2000 and post-2000 operations. First, with the Brahimi Report's suggestion of rapid deployment, we believe that the deployments will be faster in the post-2000 peacekeeping operations. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 22: UN peacekeeping operations are deployed more rapidly after the Brahimi Report.

Second, as it is noted earlier, there is a strong willingness among the contributing countries to fulfill the mandate requirements and deploy various types of personnel in order to cover the broad range of tasks. Therefore, we argue that initial deployments will fulfill mandates' requirements in the post-2000 period better than the 1990-2000 period. Our hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 23: UN peacekeeping operations are better at reaching initial mandates' requirements with first deployments after the Brahimi Report.

Contributing countries in the 1990s are mostly democracies and middle powers, and non-democracies started to contribute more in the post-2000 peacekeeping operations (Andersson, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2010; Luck, 2006). In addition, as the Brahimi Report (2000) states, "in contrast to the long tradition of developed countries providing the bulk of the troops for United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Organization's first 50 years, in the last few years 77 per cent of the troops in formed military units deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as of end-June 2000, were contributed by developing countries" (p. 17). In accordance, we will test this shift in the nature of UN troop contributing countries with only focusing on initial deployments, and we expect to find support for these arguments. Hence forth, we present our last hypothesis:

Hypothesis 24: The nature of UN troop contributing countries shifted in the 21st century with respect to receiving initial deployments more from democratic to non-democratic countries.

Next section will explain the data and methodology that we used in this thesis.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. Methodology

As our research method, we used ordinary least squares regression analysis in order to estimate the relationship between our dependent and independent variables, and predict future UN and contributing countries' actions. Regression analysis is very important for our research because its results indicate the effect of independent variables with their directions and sizes on the dependent variable.

We use different units of analysis for our varying questions at hand. When we measure our variables' effect on the speed of forming resolutions and deployments, we analyze the data at the mission level. However, when we test the hypotheses on contributors, we study our variables at the contributor level. The research design is based on descriptive statistics and cross-sectional analysis of the dependent and independent variables that will be mentioned below. However, we only have fifty cases, and we realize the limitations of a small sample size.

4.2. Data

Post-1990 period has witnessed more than fifty UN peacekeeping operations, and our dataset contains most of them.¹ We only cover the post-1990 period because

¹ We could not find any contribution data on three UN peacekeeping operations, and therefore we did not include them in our dataset. These operations are UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), UN Aouzou Strip Observer

the number of UN peacekeeping operations has increased immensely in the post-Cold War period, and with the ending of the bipolar Cold War, states were fully free to participate in peacekeeping operations without any political obstacles. In addition, post-1990 data is publicly accessible, and this fact eases the accuracy of the analysis and paves the way for a replicable research. The first peacekeeping operation that we included in our data is established in 1991, and the last one is formed in 2013. Therefore, our research covers the recent trends in the UN peacekeeping operations and provides new insights to the peacekeeping literature.

We collected data on UN peacekeeping operations' deployment numbers and dates through UN's monthly released factsheets. Unlike previous research that examine all the troop contributions, this study only takes initial deployment facts in consideration due to our research question. Also, unlike most of the previous research that focuses solely on troop contributions, this study examines all contribution types, which are troop, police, military observer, and expert.

This research is the first systematic analysis to study the promptness of forming UN Security Council resolutions and deployments of UN peacekeeping operations. Except for the deployment dates, all other information on UN peacekeeping operations are retrieved from the UN peacekeeping operations' official website for every mission. In addition, we checked all the resolutions that established the UN peacekeeping operations at hand, and it is seen that except some cases, the UN usually requests support from all member states and international organizations. Therefore, as another novelty to the literature, our main dataset not only includes the countries that participated in the UN peacekeeping operations, but also incorporates the countries that could participate but chose not to. By including 195 such states in the sample, we will be able to clearly estimate the differences between contributing state characters for the UN peacekeeping operations.

Group (UNASOG), and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) that are established accordingly in 1992, 1994, and 2014.

4.2.1. Dependent Variables

When we analyze the speed of the UN peacekeeping operations, we have two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the duration between suggestion and resolution, which shows the delay of forming of a resolution, and secondly, the duration between resolution and deployment, which indicates the delay of deployment. We also test the duration between suggestion and deployment in order to indicate the total amount of time passed for an operation to be formed and deployed. We measure the duration between these variables by coding the number of months passed between the two events for every mission. For example, in 1998, United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was suggested in February, its resolution (S/RES/1159) was formed in March, and it was deployed in April. So, we code the months' numbers as "2, 3, 4" accordingly to suggestion, resolution, and deployment. We measure the time passed to form a resolution by subtracting 2 from 3, which is equal to the duration between suggestion and resolution. Likewise, we measure the delay of deployment by subtracting 3 from 4, which equals to the amount of time in between resolution and deployment. Lastly, we measure the time passed for MINURCA to be formed and deployed by subtracting 2 from 4. Since the data on delays are coded for every mission, we test these dependent variables in our mission level dataset.

Our second set of dependent variables contains the size of the peacekeeping operations. These include fulfilled mandate percentages, and troop and total personnel contributions. Fulfilled mandate percentages are equal to the proportion of deployed personnel in relation to the authorized personnel by the UN. For example, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is established with UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010). The Security Council "*authorizes* that MONUSCO shall comprise, (...), a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units" (S/RES/1925, 2010, p. 3, italics in original). The authorized personnel for MONUSCO is 22,016, and 19,685 personnel is initially deployed. So, when we take the ratio of the deployed to authorized personnel number, we find that 89% of the mandate requirements are fulfilled. Since this information is for missions, this dependent variable is at the mission level.

For troop and other personnel contribution types though, since these data correspond to a country, the main dataset that encompasses all contributing and non-contributing countries are used. For example, for United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), France sent ten troop and seven military observers, and Egypt sent one troop, nineteen police, and ten military observers. In addition to these two countries, fifteen countries contributed personnel to MONUA, and their contributions are coded likewise. When we are analyzing troop contributions, we only take troop contributions into account; however, when we are analyzing total personnel contribution, we take all the personnel contributions into account. In addition, when we are testing the mission level related independent variables for contributors, rather than using troop and other personnel contribution coded for every country, we use total troop and personnel contribution coded for every mission. Also, troop and other personnel contributions are logged because logging reduces the effect of outliers.

Summary Table:

Dependent Variable	Data Source	Operationalization
Duration between Suggestion and Resolution	UN's monthly factsheets	Number of months between suggestion and resolution
Duration between Resolution and Deployment	UN's monthly factsheets	Number of months between resolution and deployment
Duration between Suggestion and Deployment	UN's monthly factsheets	Number of months between suggestion and deployment
Fulfilled Mandate Percentages	UN's monthly factsheets	Deployed Personnel/Authorized Personnel
Troop Contribution	UN's monthly factsheets	Number of troops at the first deployment
Total Personnel Contribution	UN's monthly factsheets	Total number of personnel at the first deployment

4.2.2. Independent Variables

We proposed several independent variables that might have an effect on our dependent variables of delay and contribution rates. First, we created a dichotomous variable *P-5* to determine the Permanent-5 countries. As the Permanent-5 members, only Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America, France, and China take the value of 1 and the other countries are coded 0.

We created another dichotomous variable *Democracy* to indicate which contributing and non-contributing countries are categorized as democracies or non-democracies. We used Polity IV dataset to measure member states' democracy levels during their participation in the peacekeeping operations. Polity IV dataset attributes weighted scores to countries from 1800 onwards that enables researchers to analyze the selected countries' status in each year. As Munck and Verkuilen (2002) state, although Polity IV dataset has weaknesses as all of the existing datasets on democracy have, it is for now one of the best ones. According to the Polity IV dataset, regime types are full democracy (10), democracy (6 to 9), open anocracy (1 to 5), closed anocracy (-5 to 0), and autocracy (-10 to -6). The participant countries are categorized according to the Polity IV dataset's regime types with a little twist. We categorized democracies from 6 to 10, mixed regimes from -5 to 5, and autocracies from -10 to -6. For our dichotomous variable *Democracy*, while democratic countries take the value of 1, non-democracies take 0.

We measure self-interest with the recipient country being a former colony or having fuel exports. Therefore, the dichotomous variable *Colony* is coded 1 if the recipient country is a former colony, and if not, it is coded as 0. We used CEPII's dyadic GeoDist database (2011) to determine the colonial links. Data on the recipient country's fuel exports come from the World Bank's data of fuel exports as percentages of merchandise exports, and we code the data of the year before the UN peacekeeping operation is established to account for possible endogeneity. For example, UNAVEM II is established in 1991 and the recipient country is Angola. We thereby code Angola's fuel exports data for 1990.

We measure international security threat by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) data on total refugee population by origin because, as Bove and Elia (2011) and de Jonge Oudraat (1996) state, large numbers of

refugees put a financial and social burden on neighboring states and become a threat to international peace and security. As in the fuel exports data, refugee data is coded for the year before the UN mission was established. In order to overcome the effect of outliers, refugee data is logged.

We measure a conflict's intensity by its duration, battle-related deaths, and the presence of a spike in battle-related deaths. We used UCDP Battle-Related Deaths dataset (version 5.0, 2014) for these variables. For conflict duration variable, we measure the relevant conflict's duration that the UN peacekeeping operation is established for. For battle-related deaths variable, we sum up the number of deaths for the years before the peacekeeping operation was established. In the meantime, we check the battle-related deaths dataset for every mission so that we only take into account the relevant data for our cases at hand. The battle-related deaths data is logged. Lastly, we code spikes in battle-related deaths in three steps. We start by calculating the total relevant battle-related deaths prior to the UN peacekeeping operation and then we take the average of it. If the battle-related deaths of the established UN peacekeeping operation's previous year's data is above the average, then we denote that UN peacekeeping operation to be established after a spike in battle-related deaths. For instance, two of the UN peacekeeping operation cases in the Middle East, which are UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), have been established after a spike in battle-related deaths. The dichotomous variable *Spike* takes value of 1 for both of these Middle East cases.

Another independent variable is the geographical proximity between the recipient and contributing countries. We used CEPII's dyadic GeoDist database (2011) to determine the distance between the capital cities of the recipient and participating countries, and we logged the distance data to reduce the effect of outliers. Population and area of the recipient country is also another independent variable, and these variables are logged as well. We used Gleditsch's expanded trade and GDP dataset (2002) for population and area data. We check every peacekeeping operation cases that we have for the peacekeeping operation being a follow-up one or not. We find this information from the UN's official websites for every operation, and code the first peacekeeping operations as 1 in our dichotomous variable *First PKO*.

Lastly, we created a dichotomous variable *Year 2000* in order to test what has changed in the peacekeeping operations after the Brahimi Report. Peacekeeping operations that are established after 2000 take the value of 1, and the other operations that are established in between 1990-2000 take the value of 0. The only mission that is established in 2000 is UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). However, UNMEE is established in June, which is before the Brahimi Report's adoption on November. Therefore, we include UNMEE in the period between 1990-2000, and it takes the value of 0.

Summary Table:

Independent Variable	Data Source	Operationalization
<i>Permanent-5*</i>	UN	Permanent-5 countries (UK, USA, China, Russia, France)
<i>Democracy</i>	Polity IV dataset	Democracies: 6 - 10 Mixed regimes: 5 - (-5) Autocracies: (-10) – (-6)
<i>Colony</i>	CEPII's dyadic GeoDist database	Former colonies
Fuel	World Bank	Fuel exports as percentages of merchandise exports
Refugee	UNHCR's Total Refugee Population by Origin dataset	Refugee population by origin (logged)
Conflict Duration	UCDP Battle-Related Deaths dataset	Sum the number of years with deaths before the operation
Battle-Related Deaths	UCDP Battle-Related Deaths dataset	Sum the number of deaths before the operation (logged)
<i>Spike</i>	UCDP Battle-Related Deaths dataset	The battle-related deaths of the year before the operation is above the average number of deaths
Distance	CEPII's dyadic GeoDist database	Distance between capital cities of recipient and contributor countries in kilometers (logged)

Population	Gleditsch's expanded trade and GDP dataset	Population of the recipient country (logged)
Area	Gleditsch's expanded trade and GDP dataset	Area of the recipient country in square kilometers (logged)
<i>First PKO</i>	UN (hand-coded)	First peacekeeping operations are established for the first time for a conflict
<i>Year 2000</i>		Operations established after 2000 are coded as 1

* Variables in italics are dichotomous variables.



RESULTS

5.1. Speed of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

5.1.1. Duration of Forming Resolutions

Table 1 shows the regression analyses that were conducted to analyze the relationships between duration of forming resolutions and the factors that may have an effect on it. As seen in model (2), the bivariate regression analysis indicates a statistically significant result that forming resolutions take longer time when the battle-related deaths are high. If battle-related deaths increase by one percent, we expect delay between suggestion and resolution to increase approximately by 0.0007 months, which is a small effect size. Therefore, hypothesis 7, which suggests that higher battle-related deaths are associated with quicker resolutions, is not supported.

Refugee, conflict duration, spike in deaths, population and area, and the peacekeeping operation being the first do not have any statistically significant effect on the time takes to form a resolution. The positive, but statistically insignificant, estimate for conflict duration goes against hypothesis 10, which predicts that longer standing conflicts are associated with promptly formed resolutions. Also, for the other independent variables of refugee and spike, we find insignificant evidence for hypotheses 3 and 13, which accordingly state that resolutions are formed quicker when there are large numbers of refugees and a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country. As for the multiple regression analysis, none of the predictor variables provide significant results. One reason for the lack of statistical significance may be the small number of observations.

Table 1
OLS Analysis of Time to Form a Resolution

Dependent Variable: Delay between Suggestion and Resolution (in months)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Logged Refugee	-0.012 (0.05)						-0.082 (0.08)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths		0.068** (0.03)					0.110 (0.07)
Conflict Duration			0.026 (0.03)				0.004 (0.04)
Spike (1=Spike)				-0.155 (0.25)			-0.451 (0.30)
Logged Population					0.312 (0.19)		0.117 (0.21)
Logged Area					-0.170 (0.15)		-0.103 (0.13)
First PKO (1=First)						0.433 (0.28)	0.274 (0.37)
Constant	0.757 (0.57)	0.219 (0.14)	0.530*** (0.15)	0.679*** (0.21)	-0.162 (1.52)	0.250 (0.24)	1.042 (2.15)
R-squared	0.001	0.066	0.019	0.007	0.045	0.030	0.170
N. of cases	47.000	49.000	49.000	49.000	45.000	49.000	44.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

5.1.2. Duration of Deployment

Table 2 shows the regression analyses of deployment's delay. None of the variables are significant in bivariate analyses, however in model (8), the multiple regression analysis shows that both refugee population and battle-related deaths are significant at the 10% level with refugee variable being negative and battle-related deaths variable being positive. If numbers of refugees increase by one percent, we expect delay between resolution and deployment to decrease approximately by 0.004 months, holding other variables constant. In addition, if the number of battle-related deaths increases by one percent, the predicted delay between resolution and deployment would increase by 0.003 months, holding other variables constant. Basically, these results tell us that while the large numbers of refugees quicken the deployment, higher battle-related deaths slow down the deployment.

We insignificantly find in models (1) and (4) that large numbers of refugees, and a spike in deaths at the recipient country are associated with faster deployments. Moreover, in model (2), the positive but statistically insignificant estimate for battle-related deaths goes against hypothesis 8a, and supports hypothesis 8b by denoting longer time passed for deployments. In other words, hypotheses 4, 8b, and 14 find insignificant support. In model (3) though, we find insignificant evidence against hypothesis 11 that posits faster deployment rates if the conflict is long-standing.

In Table 2, we also tested hypothesis 16, which argues for non-democratic countries' ability of deploying faster than democratic ones. Since the UN's factsheets on force deployments only indicate the month the forces were deployed, we cannot separate which countries' forces were deployed at what time specifically. Hence, we measured democratic and non-democratic countries' promptness of deployment by taking the averages of contributing countries' Polity 2 scores for every mission, and observing Polity 2 scores' averages' relation with the duration between resolution and deployment. We find insignificant evidence against hypothesis 19 in model (5), where the higher Polity 2 score averages predict quicker deployments.

Table 2
OLS Analysis of Duration of Deployment

Dependent Variable: Delay between Resolution and Deployment (in months)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Logged Refugee	-0.079 (0.14)							-0.384* (0.22)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths		0.102 (0.06)						0.276* (0.14)
Conflict Duration			0.069 (0.06)					0.035 (0.07)
Spike (1=Spike)				-0.573 (0.57)				-1.001 (0.77)
Polity 2 Average					-0.180 (0.13)			-0.266 (0.17)
Logged Population						0.627 (0.44)		0.232 (0.46)
Logged Area						-0.394 (0.32)		-0.354 (0.32)
First PKO (1=First)							0.304 (0.50)	-0.386 (0.69)
Constant	2.300 (1.66)	0.803** (0.34)	1.170*** (0.36)	1.621*** (0.49)	2.406*** (0.88)	0.551 (3.26)	1.125*** (0.33)	8.568 (5.25)
R-squared	0.010	0.028	0.022	0.017	0.025	0.038	0.003	0.222
N. of cases	48.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	45.000	50.000	44.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

5.1.3. Duration between Suggestion and Deployment

Table 3 shows the regression analyses of the time passed from suggestion to deployment and variables that may have an effect on it. In model (2), the effect of battle-related deaths on the duration between suggestion and deployment is significant at the 5% level with a positive coefficient. If battle-related deaths increase by one percent, we expect the time it takes to form and deploy an operation to increase by 0.002 months. So, as in other stages of the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, we find that high battle-related deaths delay the deployment of UN forces.

In model (7), large numbers of refugees, battle-related deaths, and spike in battle-related deaths have statistically significant effects. Both large numbers of refugees and spike in battle-related deaths predict quicker deployment rates that are statistically significant accordingly at the 1% and 5% levels. In fact, for recipient countries with spikes in deaths, the predicted time that takes to form and deploy an operation would nearly be 2 months shorter than where there is no spike, holding all other variables constant. In addition, if refugee numbers increase by one percent, we expect the time it takes for the formation and deployment of an operation to be shorter by 0.005 month, holding other variables constant. However, just like in model (2), higher battle-related deaths predict longer time passed in between suggestion and deployment at the 5% significance level. Holding other variables constant, one percent increase in battle-related deaths of the recipient country would prolong the formation and deployment of an operation by approximately 0.004 month. So, although battle-related deaths and large numbers of refugee variables are statistically significant, their effects are too small to be practically significant. However, spike in deaths is both statistically and practically significant with a large estimate. Therefore, we find significant support for 4, 8b, and 14.

We did not find any significant effect of refugees, conflict duration, and spike in deaths in bivariate regression analyses. As in model (7), in models (1) and (4), negative but statistically insignificant estimates show that with large numbers of refugees and with a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country, deployment

Table 3
OLS Analysis of Duration between Suggestion and Deployment

Dependent Variable: Delay between Suggestion and Deployment (in months)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Logged Refugee	-0.172 (0.19)						-0.489*** (0.18)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths		0.181** (0.07)					0.352** (0.15)
Conflict Duration			0.070 (0.06)				0.056 (0.08)
Spike (1=Spike)				-1.214 (0.74)			-1.965** (0.91)
Logged Population					1.217** (0.59)		0.725 (0.51)
Logged Area					-0.756* (0.40)		-0.605* (0.32)
First PKO (1=First)						0.765 (0.79)	-0.134 (0.96)
Constant	4.283* (2.32)	1.226*** (0.42)	2.047*** (0.50)	2.786*** (0.67)	0.480 (3.64)	1.625** (0.62)	7.452 (4.65)
R-squared	0.019	0.049	0.014	0.045	0.085	0.010	0.294
N. of cases	47.000	49.000	49.000	49.000	45.000	49.000	44.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

tends to be faster. However, long-standing conflicts at the recipient country do not indicate a faster deployment rate, and instead, we find insignificant evidence that long-standing conflicts tend to receive slower deployments.




Figure 1: Bar graphs of means of duration between suggestion and deployment divided to with and without spike.

Figure 1 shows the bar graphs of means of duration between suggestion and deployment. Clearly, UN peacekeeping operations are formed and deployed promptly in the case of a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country. While it takes approximately one and a half months for an operation to be formed and deployed in the case of a spike in deaths at the recipient country, it takes nearly three months for an operation to be deployed when there is not any steep rise in deaths.

Tables 1, 2, and 3 have resulted in interesting findings. These results suggest that higher numbers of battle-related deaths in a target country are more likely to be related to slower resolutions and deployments. However, recipient countries with large numbers of refugees and a spike in battle-related deaths are more likely to receive quicker deployments. So, these results demonstrate the importance of the international security threat's impact on the promptness of the UN peacekeeping

operations' behavior. Also, humanitarian impulse arguments are not supported for their promptness in deployments. From a novel perspective though, if a spike in battle-related deaths is assumed to be one of the humanitarian arguments of the UN peacekeeping operations, then the humanitarian arguments are provided with partial support from the spike in battle-related deaths perspective.

5.2. Percentage of Mandate Fulfilled and Individual Contribution Levels

5.2.1. Realist Accounts

Table 4 shows the regression analyses of our hypotheses on the Realist-inspired arguments on UN peacekeeping operations. Overall, our results do not support these hypotheses. Although Permanent-5 and democratic countries contribute highly significantly with both troop and other personnel types at the 1% level, neither Permanent-5 members nor democracies participate more where the recipient country is a former colony or has fuel exports. In fact, for Permanent-5 countries, we expect troop and total personnel contribution to increase accordingly by 145 percent and 258 percent, holding other variables constant. For democracies, we accordingly expect ten percent and seventeen percent increase in troop and total personnel contribution.

As robust findings, all the countries, including the Permanent-5 and democratic countries, contribute less troops and all personnel types where the recipient country has fuel exports, but the effect size is small. Although recipient countries being former colonies respond to an increase in contribution of all personnel types at the 1% significance level, as insignificant evidences, both Permanent-5 and democratic countries' contributions to the former colonies decrease. Also, we do not find a significant effect for refugees. However, since the coefficient is negative, we find insignificant evidence contrary to hypothesis 5, which argues for high participation rates in the case of large numbers of refugees.

In Table 4, we cannot find support for hypotheses 1 and 2, which propose increased contribution rates from Permanent-5 and democratic countries in the case of self-interest. In addition, we find evidence against hypothesis 5, but the estimate is not

Table 4
OLS Analysis of Fuel Exports and Colonial Ties

	Log. Troop Cont.	Log. Total Pers C.	L. T. C.	L. T. P. C.	Mandate	Log. Tot. Troop Cont.	L. T. P. C.
P-5 (1=P-5)	1.450*** (0.24)	2.582*** (0.23)					
Fuel	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)			
P-5 # Fuel	-0.017*** (0.01)	-0.020*** (0.00)					
Colony (1=Colony)	0.249 (0.17)	0.675*** (0.22)	0.629 (0.44)	0.950** (0.48)			
P-5 # Colony	0.959 (0.65)	-0.425 (0.61)					
Democracy (1=Dem.)			0.104*** (0.01)	0.170*** (0.02)			
Democracy # Fuel			-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)			
Democracy # Colony			-0.029 (0.50)	-0.048 (0.54)			
Logged Refugee					-0.015 (0.03)	-0.141 (0.17)	-0.095 (0.11)
Constant	0.112*** (0.01)	0.199*** (0.01)	0.095*** (0.01)	0.177*** (0.01)	0.733** (0.36)	5.278*** (1.94)	6.433*** (1.18)
R-squared	0.043	0.076	0.009	0.015	0.003	0.013	0.011
N. of cases	8505.000	8505.000	7210.000	7210.000	48.000	48.000	48.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

statistically significant. Therefore, the Realist-inspired accounts of the UN peacekeeping operations that we tested only for initial deployments are not supported with these results.

5.2.2. Liberal Accounts

Table 5 shows the regression analyses of fulfilled mandate percentages of the initial deployments. Our results in model (3) indicate that long-standing conflicts have less fulfilled mandate percentages at the 10% significance level, and this fact does not support hypothesis 12, which states that the participation rate is higher when the conflict is long-standing. For every unit increase in conflict duration, we expect an approximately 0.03 point decrease in the fulfilled mandate percentages. None of the other bivariate regression analyses' results indicate a significant relationship.

We do not find a statistically significant effect for battle-related deaths, and spike in deaths at the recipient country. The coefficient variable is negative for battle-related deaths. Therefore, while we cannot find support for hypothesis 9a, hypothesis 9b is insignificantly supported with its argument of lower participation rates in the case of high battle-related deaths. In addition, we find insignificant support for hypothesis 15b, which proposes lower contribution rates in the case of a spike in battle-related deaths, and insignificant evidence against hypothesis 15a, which argues to the contrary.

We also tested the follow-up UN peacekeeping operations' effect on the fulfilled mandate percentages with the dichotomous variable *First PKO* as an indicator of peacekeeping operation being the first to be established for a conflict at a recipient country, or the operation being a follow-up one with several peacekeeping operations established for the same conflict at the same recipient country. In model (5), the negative but statistically insignificant observation goes against hypothesis 21, which states that first peacekeeping operations will fulfill mandate percentages more than the follow-up ones. In model (7) though, we find the same result at the 10% significance level. We can simply interpret model (7)'s results as first peacekeeping operations fulfilled mandate percentages being approximately 0.7 points lower than the follow-up operations.

Table 5
OLS Analysis of Fulfilled Mandate Percentages

Dependent Variable: Fulfilled Mandate Percentages

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Logged Refugee	-0.015 (0.03)						0.016 (0.04)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths		-0.059 (0.04)					-0.083 (0.09)
Conflict Duration			-0.032* (0.02)				0.015 (0.03)
Spike (1=Spike)				-0.304 (0.21)			-0.005 (0.23)
First PKO (1=First)					-0.563 (0.36)		-0.736* (0.42)
Logged Population						-0.057 (0.19)	0.162 (0.21)
Logged Area						-0.088 (0.16)	-0.192 (0.15)
Constant	0.733** (0.36)	0.894*** (0.31)	0.658*** (0.15)	0.687*** (0.18)	1.032*** (0.34)	2.173** (0.87)	2.330* (1.27)
R-squared	0.003	0.066	0.035	0.034	0.064	0.044	0.189
N. of cases	48.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	45.000	44.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 6
OLS Analysis of Total Troop Contribution

Dependent Variables: Log of Total Troop Contribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Logged Refugee	-0.141 (0.17)						-0.260 (0.24)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths		-0.128 (0.14)					-0.124 (0.19)
Conflict Duration			-0.012 (0.10)				0.164 (0.14)
Spike (1=Spike)				-0.281 (1.00)			0.964 (1.04)
First PKO (1=First)					-3.182*** (1.07)		-4.303*** (1.53)
Logged Population						-0.927 (0.87)	-0.326 (0.95)
Logged Area						0.375 (0.43)	-0.178 (0.50)
Constant	5.278*** (1.94)	4.455*** (0.93)	3.772*** (0.59)	3.854*** (0.64)	6.409*** (0.94)	7.642 (6.05)	15.220** (7.43)
R-squared	0.013	0.017	0.000	0.002	0.117	0.028	0.185
N. of cases	48.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	45.000	44.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

As part of our participation hypotheses, in addition to the fulfilled mandate percentages, we also test for troop and total personnel contributions. In Table 6's bivariate and multiple regression analyses, we find that first peacekeeping operations receive fewer troops and this effect is practically and statistically significant at the 1% level. For first peacekeeping operations, we expect troop contribution to decrease by 430 percent, holding other variables constant. This result once more does not support hypothesis 21. We also find some evidence that total troop contribution decreases where there is a spike in battle-related deaths, and when refugee population, battle-related deaths, and conflict duration increases, but these estimates are not statistically significant.

In Table 7, in addition to the total personnel contributions, we also test for the authorized personnel number and predictor variables that are what we thought to be effective in the UN's decision-making for the peacekeeping operations' personnel requirements. By having two dependent variables of authorized and total deployed personnel number in Table 7, we can clearly see which aspects are more important for the UN Security Council while establishing peacekeeping operations and how the contributor countries react to these aspects. Note that we refer the UN as a single, unified decision-making organism, and therefore we do not differentiate between the various decision-making processes and structures within the UN.

Table 7's total personnel contribution results are similar to the troop contribution results in Table 6. In Table 7, battle-related deaths at the recipient country correspond to a more significant result, in which it indicates that higher battle-related deaths lower the total personnel contribution at the 10% significance level. If battle-related deaths increase by one percent, we expect total personnel contribution to decrease by 0.1 percent. In other words, while we find significant support for hypothesis 9b, we do not find support for 9a. In addition, both in bivariate and multiple regression analyses, Table 7 indicates that first UN peacekeeping operations receive less total personnel contribution at the 5% significance level. For first peacekeeping operations, we expect total personnel contribution to decrease by 289 percent, holding all other variables constant. Therefore, we once more do not find support for hypothesis 21.

Table 7
OLS Analysis of Authorized Personnel and Total Personnel Contribution

	Authorized	Log. T. P. C.	Aut.	L.T.P.C.	Aut.	L.T.P.C.	Aut.	L.T.P.C.	Aut.	L.T.P.C.	Aut.	L.T.P.C.	Aut.	L.T.P.C.
Logged Refugee	0.001 (0.10)	-0.095 (0.11)											-0.069 (0.13)	-0.063 (0.18)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths			0.007 (0.08)	-0.144* (0.08)									0.019 (0.12)	-0.077 (0.15)
Conflict Duration					0.064 (0.07)	-0.038 (0.07)							0.113 (0.08)	0.101 (0.09)
Spike (1=Spike)							0.160 (0.62)	-0.542 (0.73)					0.451 (0.86)	0.634 (0.80)
First PKO (1=First)									-0.970 (0.72)	-2.071** (0.78)			-1.508 (1.01)	-2.891** (1.18)
Logged Population											-0.545 (0.50)	-0.910 (0.64)	-0.570 (0.53)	-0.517 (0.78)
Logged Area											0.463* (0.23)	0.252 (0.31)	0.235 (0.27)	-0.152 (0.37)
Constant	7.047*** (1.05)	6.433*** (1.18)	7.050*** (0.42)	6.186*** (0.48)	6.893*** (0.32)	5.493*** (0.40)	7.021*** (0.38)	5.604*** (0.42)	7.903*** (0.63)	7.116*** (0.68)	6.270* (3.47)	10.495** (4.53)	10.637** (4.56)	14.808** (5.80)
R-squared	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.043	0.021	0.006	0.001	0.012	0.029	0.097	0.057	0.054	0.139	0.180
N. of cases	48.000	48.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	45.000	45.000	44.000	44.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

Other variables in Table 7, which are refugee population, conflict duration, and an occurrence of spike in battle-related deaths predict lower total personnel contribution, but these are not statistically significant. For hypothesis 20, which proposes higher participation rates related to the increase in population and area of the recipient country, we find insignificant evidence that while the increase in population indicates lower contribution rates, the increase in area of the recipient country responds to higher contribution rates.

There is only one significant result in Table 7 for the bivariate and multiple regression analyses on authorized personnel numbers. As expected, increase of the recipient country's area corresponds to the increase in authorized personnel at the 10% significance level. If the area of the recipient country increases by one percent, we expect authorized personnel to increase by 0.005 personnel. So, we find partial significant support for hypothesis 19, which expects higher mandate requirements for recipient countries with a greater population and area. Although authorized personnel number increases with the increase in the area of the recipient country, the increase in population of the recipient country insignificantly indicates a less authorized personnel number. Therefore, we can argue that while deciding the authorized personnel number for peacekeeping operations, compared to the population of the recipient countries, the UN prioritizes and decides according to the size of the recipient countries.

We do not find a significant effect for refugee population and conflict duration, and spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country. However, we find some evidence that while these predictor variables increase the authorized personnel number, they also correspond to a decrease in total personnel contribution. We therefore see that only the area of the recipient country significantly increases the UN's decisions in authorized personnel numbers.

In sum, what we can surely estimate out of these results on participation rates is that, firstly established UN peacekeeping operations receive less contribution than the follow-up operations, and this does not support hypothesis 21. For fulfilled mandate percentages, long-standing conflicts receive less contribution, and this result is contrary to hypothesis 12, which proposes higher participation rates in long-standing conflicts. For total personnel contribution, higher battle-related deaths correspond to smaller contributions, and in line with the previous findings, while this

result supports hypothesis 9b, it does not support hypothesis 9a. Lastly, authorized personnel numbers are significantly related to the size of the recipient country.

Until now, we tested our hypotheses on participation by measuring participation rates through fulfilled mandate percentages, and individual contribution levels on troop and all personnel types. Now, we will test democratic countries' contribution levels as well. As mentioned above, democracies are more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations due to the democratic leaders' belief that humanitarian objectives are inalienable from self-interest (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Lebovic, 2004). Therefore, we will first present our bar graphs of total personnel contribution divided to regime types. Then, by interacting democracy with our participation predictor variables, we will test the Liberal arguments of peacekeeping operations.




Figure 2: Bar graph of total personnel contribution divided to regime types.

Figure 2 shows the bar graph of total personnel contribution divided to regime types of democracy, mixed regime, and autocracy. Clearly, when the total personnel contributions to all the fifty peacekeeping operations are calculated, democracies

contributed more personnel than non-democracies, and autocracies are the least personnel contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations.

Table 8 shows the regression analyses of troop contribution. Just like in the previous regression analyses, democratic countries contribute significantly at the 1% level, and therefore we find robust support for hypothesis 6. Different than the previous regression analyses, model (5) indicates a significant increase in contribution rates in the case of a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country with a 5% significance level. If there is a spike in deaths, we expect a six percent increase in troop contribution.

For the interaction terms of democracies and predictor variables, only conflict duration and distance variables provide statistically significant results. Contrary to hypothesis 12, in model (4), with the increase in conflict duration, democratic countries' contribution rates decrease at the 5% significance level, and this is in line with the earlier findings in longer conflicts receiving lower fulfilled mandate percentages. In model (6), an increase in distance lowers the contribution at the 1% level, and the same observation applies for democratic countries' contribution rates as well.

In Table 8, we do not find significant effects for the interaction terms of democracies and refugees, battle-related deaths, and spike in deaths at the recipient country. With the positive coefficients in refugee and spike in deaths, we find some support for hypothesis 5, and 15a. We also find some support for hypothesis 9b, with the negative but statistically insignificant coefficient variable.

Table 9 shows the results of regression analyses that have the same variables as Table 8 but with total personnel contribution as the dependent variable. We once more see that democratic countries' contribution rates are significantly high at the 1% significance level. In model (4), with longer conflicts, democratic countries' contribution rates with respect to all personnel types decrease at the 1% significance level. Furthermore, model (6) indicates another robust support to hypothesis 17, in which farther recipient countries receive less contribution from all of the contributor countries, including the democratic ones.

Table 8
OLS Analysis of Democratic Countries' Troop Contribution

Dependent Variable: Log of Troop Contribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democracy (1=Dem.)	0.096*** (0.02)	-0.001 (0.08)	0.181** (0.09)	0.128*** (0.02)	0.086*** (0.02)	0.796*** (0.19)
Logged Refugee		-0.009* (0.00)				
Democracy # L. Refugee		0.008 (0.01)				
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths			-0.011 (0.01)			
Democracy # L. BRD			-0.011 (0.01)			
Conflict duration				-0.001 (0.00)		
Democracy # Conf. Duration				-0.009** (0.00)		
Spike (1=Spike)					0.061** (0.03)	
Democracy # Spike					0.024 (0.04)	
Logged Distance						-0.067*** (0.02)
Democracy # L. Distance						-0.080*** (0.02)
Constant	0.100*** (0.01)	0.201*** (0.06)	0.178*** (0.06)	0.104*** (0.02)	0.078*** (0.02)	0.666*** (0.13)
R-squared	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.018
N. of cases	8035.000	7713.000	6106.000	8035.000	8035.000	7210.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 9
OLS Analysis of Democratic Countries' Total Personnel Contribution

Dependent Variable: Log of Total Personnel Contribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democracy (1=Dem.)	0.169*** (0.02)	0.151 (0.09)	0.263** (0.11)	0.229*** (0.03)	0.176*** (0.03)	1.324*** (0.23)
Logged Refugee		-0.006 (0.01)				
Democracy # L. Refugee		0.001 (0.01)				
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths			-0.012 (0.01)			
Democracy # L. BRD			-0.013 (0.01)			
Conflict duration				0.000 (0.00)		
Democracy # Conf. Duration				-0.018*** (0.00)		
Spike (1=Spike)					0.003 (0.03)	
Democracy # Spike					-0.017 (0.05)	
Logged Distance						-0.096*** (0.02)
Democracy # L. Distance						-0.133*** (0.03)
Constant	0.196*** (0.01)	0.271*** (0.07)	0.277*** (0.08)	0.196*** (0.02)	0.195*** (0.02)	0.998*** (0.16)
R-squared	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.011	0.007	0.029
N. of cases	8035.000	7713.000	6106.000	8035.000	8035.000	7210.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

We do not find significant effects for the other predictor variables in Table 9. Different than Table 8, in Table 9, we find some support for hypothesis 15b, but the estimate is not statistically significant. Other insignificant results in Table 9 indicate different sizes but same directions for coefficient observations as in Table 8.

Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of troop contribution and distance. In Tables 8 and 9, and Figure 3, we see that not only democracies are sensitive to distance, but all the participant countries are contributing significantly less at the 1% significance level when the distance between contributor and recipient countries gets longer. Furthermore, compared to troop contribution, total personnel contribution is getting even less contribution with a larger negative coefficient variable. Thus, we find robust support for hypothesis 17, which states that geographically proximal countries are more likely to participate in the initial deployment.




Figure 3: Scatterplot of troop contribution and distance.

Since geographically proximal countries are more likely to participate in the initial UN peacekeeping operations' forces, as stated in hypothesis 18, we expect regions' democratic compositions to reflect the UN peacekeeping operations'

contributions. In order to measure peacekeeping operations' democratic compositions specifically for each operation, we divided democracies' total personnel contributions by the total personnel contributions for every mission, and the result of this division equals to the percentage of personnel only from democracies. We chose total personnel contribution instead of a certain type of personnel because of two reasons. First, since the notion of total personnel contribution includes all types of personnel, we avoid any region-wise bias that may arise by choosing a certain type of personnel. For instance, military observers are mainly deployed to Europe. Secondly, all personnel types are not requested to every operation. For example, out of fifty UN peacekeeping operations, there are only thirty-three operations with troop contribution and twenty-two with police contribution. Therefore, we take into account all the fifty peacekeeping operations at hand by analyzing total personnel contribution.

There is a minor deficiency in our way of measuring the democratic compositions of the UN peacekeeping operations through taking the ratio of the total personnel contribution by democracies. There are operations with very few initial contributions, and these operations are seen as having a full percent if only democracies sent that personnel. For example, there are five UN peacekeeping operations that initially received less than ten personnel, and while three of these operations received all the personnel from democracies, the other two operations received half of the personnel from democracies.

Figure 4 is a scatterplot of total personnel contribution percentages of democratic countries per mission and regions' democracy score averages as an indicator of regions' democratic compositions. Figure 4 does not clearly show evidence that regions' democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping operations' contributions. Instead, this figure indicates that both democratic and non-democratic countries contributed personnel without differentiating between regions' democratic compositions. In spite of this fact, in regions with higher democracy score averages (i.e. from five to ten), it is evident that democracies take the lead in personnel contribution. On the other part of the graph though, UN peacekeeping operations that are established at regions with lower democracy score averages (i.e. lower than five) receive contributions from a wide range of democracy levels. Overall, we see from Figure 4 that both democratic and non-democratic countries participated in all regions, but the democratic countries overwhelmingly participated more than non-

First, as stated in hypothesis 22, we will test if the UN peacekeeping operations after the Brahimi Report have been more rapidly deployed or not. Figure 5 shows the before and after 2000 means of duration between suggestion and resolution, resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment. Contrary to our expectations, post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations are formed and deployed slower than pre-2000 operations. While there is a tiny difference between before and after 2000 bars of delay between resolution and deployment, there is a huge difference between bars of delay between suggestion and resolution. Overall though, resolutions are formed within a month after the suggestion, and deployments take much longer time compared to forming resolutions.

It has to be noted that, although the durations increase in the post-2000 period, post-2000 duration between suggestion and deployment bar seems slightly higher than the before 2000 bar, and this is due to United Nations Mission in South Sudan's (UNMISS) missing information on its duration between suggestion and resolution. That case is not included in duration between suggestion and resolution, and suggestion and deployment.




Figure 5: Bar graph of pre- and post-2000 means of duration between suggestion and resolution, resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment.

Table 10
OLS Analysis of Delays and Fulfilled Mandate Percentages

	Delay S-R	Delay R-D	Delay S-D	Mandate
Spike (1=Spike)	-0.617 (0.44)	-0.980 (0.88)	-2.394** (1.18)	0.024 (0.25)
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths	0.121 (0.08)	0.191 (0.12)	0.390** (0.17)	-0.087 (0.08)
Logged Refugee	-0.103 (0.08)	-0.448* (0.23)	-0.612*** (0.22)	0.024 (0.05)
Year 2000	-0.319 (1.60)	-5.485* (2.91)	-8.798** (3.36)	-0.312 (0.72)
Spike # Year 2000	0.310 (0.66)	-0.120 (1.41)	1.032 (1.41)	-0.361 (0.32)
Log. BRD # Year 2000	-0.045 (0.11)	0.040 (0.19)	-0.171 (0.23)	0.066 (0.08)
Log. Refugee # Year 2000	0.075 (0.17)	0.483* (0.27)	0.837** (0.33)	-0.006 (0.06)
Constant	1.211 (0.77)	5.746** (2.79)	7.890*** (2.71)	0.840 (0.67)
R-squared	0.180	0.217	0.297	0.102
N. of cases	47.000	48.000	47.000	48.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 10 shows the multiple regression analyses of delay between suggestion and resolution, resolution and deployment, suggestion and deployment, and fulfilled mandate percentages with the predictor variables and the interaction variables of the dichotomous variable *Year 2000* to see the changes in the 21st century. Contrary to the results in Figure 5, Table 10 indicates at the 10% and 5% significance levels that duration between resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment are more likely to be shorter after 2000. In fact, for post-2000 peacekeeping operations, durations between resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment shorten by 5.5 and 8.8 points, holding other variables constant.

As significant results, an occurrence of spike in battle-related deaths and an increase in refugee population at the recipient country shorten the duration between suggestion and deployment accordingly at the 5% and 1% significance levels. In line with the previous findings, for recipient countries with spikes in deaths, the predicted time that takes to form an operation and deploy it would be more than 2 months shorter than where there is no spike. If numbers of refugee increase by one percent, we expect duration between resolution and deployment to shorten by 0.005 months, and duration between suggestion and deployment shorten by 0.006 months.

Furthermore, increase in battle-related deaths at the recipient country prolongs the duration between suggestion and deployment at the 5% significance level. If battle-related deaths increase by one percent, we expect delay between suggestion and deployment to increase by 0.004 months. When *Year 2000* interaction terms are analyzed, we see that after 2000, increase in refugee population are more likely to prolong the time between both resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment accordingly at the 10% and 5% significance levels. Unfortunately, other variables do not provide a significant result.

With the Brahimi Report's suggestion in rapid and effective deployment, and clearer mandate requirements, we also posed hypothesis 23 in order to test if post-Brahimi Report UN peacekeeping operations are better at reaching initial mandates' requirements with the initial deployments. However, in Table 10, we could not find any significant result.

As seen in Figure 6, we then did a bar graph of before and after 2000 means of UN peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages. It is clearly evident that the UN peacekeeping operations in the post-2000 period witness a decline in fulfilled mandate percentages.

We did another bar graph that specified UN peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages for regions with comparing the two periods. Figure 7 needs some explanation. First of all, with the fifty peacekeeping operation cases at hand, compared to the thirty-four UN peacekeeping operations that were established in between the 1990-2000 time period, post-2000 period witnesses only sixteen newly established UN peacekeeping operations. So, UN peacekeeping operations that are established in the post-2000 period are as much as half of the ones established in between 1990-2000.

Secondly, not all regions have several UN peacekeeping operations in both periods. While there is not any UN peacekeeping operation in Europe after 2000, there is only one UN peacekeeping operation in the Americas region after 2000. Interestingly, most of the pre-2000 UN peacekeeping operations in the Americas region were close to reaching the initial mandate requirements, and one of these operations, which is the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) that was established in 1997, even quadrupled the requirements. However, established in




Figure 6: Bar graph of pre- and post-2000 means of UN peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages.




Figure 7: Bar graph of pre- and post-2000 means of UN peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages specified for regions.

2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as the fifth mission in Haiti and the only mission in the Americas region for the post-2000 period, could barely reach three percent of the mandate requirements at the initial deployment. Also, as another region that has few UN peacekeeping operations, the Middle East region has one UN peacekeeping operation for each period.

So, although Americas and Middle East regions' UN peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages have decreased in the 21st century, Africa and Asia and the Pacific regions' fulfilled mandate percentages have increased. No matter the increase in fulfilled mandate percentages of two of the regions, and the decrease in number of established UN peacekeeping operations in the 21st century, there is an overall decrease in fulfilled mandate percentages of the post-Brahimi Report UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, we find evidence against hypothesis 23, and it seems like the recently established UN peacekeeping operations are faced with a slowly diminishing support.

Which democracy levels declined their contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations in the post-2000 period? Can there be a shift in the nature of UN troop contributing countries in the post-2000 period? As the Brahimi Report (2000) states, post-2000 peacekeeping operations are mostly contributed by developing countries. As our last hypothesis, we propose that the nature of UN troop contributing countries shifted in the 21st century with respect to receiving initial deployments more from democratic to non-democratic countries.

First, we test our hypothesis with a bar graph that shows the non-democratic countries' means of troop contribution percentages differentiated to before and after 2000. We measure non-democracies' troop contribution percentages by getting a percentage of the total troop contributions by non-democracies in the initial deployment for every mission. Figure 8 shows the means of these contribution percentages for both periods. As seen in this bar graph, democratic countries used to contribute more than the non-democratic ones in the 1990-2000 period. However, in the 21st century, non-democratic countries' troop contribution percentages have risen, and they are contributing more than democratic countries. Hence, Figure 8 signifies the declining contributions from democratic countries in the post-2000 period.




Figure 8: Bar graph of means of non-democracies' troop contribution percentages divided to pre- and post-2000.

Secondly, we test our last hypothesis with multiple regression analyses of logged troop contribution and logged total personnel contribution. Table 11 provides significant results. First, as repeatedly seen in other tables as well, democratic countries' significant effect in increasing the troop contribution rates is once more undeniable at the 1% significance level. In fact, we expect democracies to increase contributions by thirteen percent, holding all other variables constant. Secondly, as robust findings, both troop and total personnel contribution rates increase in the post-2000 period at the 1% significance level. Post-2000 peacekeeping operations are expected to receive eleven percent and thirty percent increase accordingly in troop and total personnel contributions while holding other variables constant. Lastly, we find robust support for hypothesis 24, in which the interaction term of *Democracy* and *Year 2000* show that democratic countries' troop contributions have declined in the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations.

Table 11
OLS Analysis of Troop and Total Personnel Contribution

	Log. Troop Cont.	Log. Total Pers. Cont.
Democracy (1=Dem.)	0.130*** (0.02)	-0.002 (0.06)
Year 2000	0.110*** (0.03)	0.308*** (0.09)
Democracy # Y. 2000	-0.112*** (0.04)	0.102 (0.13)
Constant	0.067*** (0.01)	5.251*** (0.04)
R-squared	0.006	0.005
N. of cases	8035.000	8035.000

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.

It seems as if Table 11 and Figure 6 indicate contradictory results. Table 11 shows that troop and total personnel contributions have increased in the 21st century, but Figure 6 suggests that the fulfilled mandate percentages of the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations have decreased. It has to be noted at this point that, while sixteen post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations have a mean of 7965 authorized personnel and 3012 initial total personnel contribution, the period between 1990-2000 has witnessed thirty-four UN peacekeeping operations with a mean of 3527 authorized personnel and 1263 initial total personnel contribution. If the proportions of contributed personnel to authorized personnel are calculated, it is seen that the post-2000 peacekeeping operations' contributions comprises a bigger ratio than the pre-2000 operations. As a result, compared to the peacekeeping operations of the previous era, 21st century UN peacekeeping operations have indeed transformed into more complex operations, and consequently these peacekeeping operations require more contributions with a broad spectrum of goals to achieve.

In addition, we know from Figure 8 that non-democratic countries' contribution rates passed democracies' contributions in the post-2000 period, and we also see in Table 11 that all contribution types increased in the last decade. So, we can clearly estimate that non-democratic countries' contributions in the post-2000 period overpassed democratic countries' contributions from the 1990-2000 period. All of these results provide a potential future vision on by whom the UN peacekeeping operations are more likely to be contributed by, and how these operations are becoming even more complex.

5.4. Potential Areas for Future Research

The UN peacekeeping operations have many interrelated factors that cannot be quantitatively tested at this thesis. In addition, we cannot explain some of the results or irregularities that we encounter without in-depth case studies. Therefore, we want to mention some of the potential future research topics that will contribute highly to the peacekeeping literature.

As the main argument of this research, we believe that the promptly and readily deployed initial forces will establish credibility of the operation, and thereby increase the likelihood of achieving a stable peace. For that reason, we aimed on revealing the trends in initial contribution numbers and initial deployment speeds to the UN peacekeeping operations. As a highly important potential research topic, we should determine the deployment speeds' relationship with the success rates of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, we cannot thoroughly explain why follow-up peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages are higher than the first ones. This might be due to the know-how aspect. However, for further improvements, these operations can be studied as case studies. Thirdly, we could not find a clear result for democratic and non-democratic countries' deployment speeds. Likewise, applying case studies can reveal these democracy levels' trends in deployment speeds.

Interestingly, although recipient countries with fuel exports receive lower contribution rates, we find that the UN peacekeeping operations established at former colonies receive higher total personnel contributions from all the countries. This issue is another finding that we cannot explain.

Lastly, we argued that regions' democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping operations' contributions, but we could not find a clear correlation between regions' democracy score averages and peacekeeping operations' democratic compositions. This issue can be studied in future studies by including all the contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations.

The main difference between Realist and Liberal arguments of the peacekeeping operations is their different explanations for the countries' incentives in contributing to the operations. Fundamentally, these theories depart at the question of why countries contribute to peacekeeping operations. On the one hand, the Realists propose that contributor countries see contribution to the peacekeeping operations as an opportunity; on the other hand, the Liberals suggest that countries contribute because they are willing to. For now, we cannot give a certain answer to this fundamental question.

For instance, we cannot explain the increase in troop contribution of non-democracies to the 21st century peacekeeping operations. As Bellamy and Williams (2013) note, top contributors to the 21st century peacekeeping operations are all poor countries, such as Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, and in fact, most of the top ten contributor countries to the recent operations are faced with internal conflicts themselves. Also, Bellamy and Williams (2013) note that the top contributors' personnel are frequently untrained and insufficiently equipped, and the contributor countries receive financial rewards for their participation. So, rather than states contributing for financial rewards the UN provides, it might be the fact that poor and internally conflicting countries are sending poorly trained and equipped personnel in order to reduce the financial burden these personnel create to the national accounts. The relationship between countries that are experiencing internal conflicts and their personnel contributions is another potential future research topic that might unveil some inner processes to the UN peacekeeping operations.

In sum, previous theories largely rely on several factors, but in fact, there are a lot more interrelated factors that cannot be explained within a single study, or a theory. These factors range from domestic interests to global factors. Although we are aware of the existence of such factors, here, we tried to provide a general framework of the trends in contributions and deployment speeds to the UN peacekeeping operations.

Next section will be on conclusion where we will sum up all the significant results, and present our interpretations on how all of these results will provide future knowledge on UN peacekeeping operations. In the meantime, we will offer ways for the future studies to improve the notions of what this thesis introduced to the peacekeeping literature.

CONCLUSION

This thesis offers the first systematic analysis of deployment and resolution speeds, and initial contribution levels of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. In order to present the relations of these variables, we did ordinary least squares regression analyses with predictor variables that included both new and previously studied ones in the literature.

For the Realist-inspired arguments of the peacekeeping operations, we find that both Permanent-5 and democratic countries contribute highly significantly in the initial deployments with all personnel types. However, neither Permanent-5 members nor democratic countries participate more where there is a self-interest situation, which is measured by the recipient country being a former colony or having fuel exports. Interestingly, while all countries' participation rates are lower to the recipient countries with fuel exports, total personnel contribution rates to the former colonies are high. Also, in order to measure the international security threat's impact on our variables of speed and contribution, we looked at our variables' relations with the refugee population of the recipient country. We find that recipient countries with large numbers of refugees are more likely to receive quicker deployments. However, we could not find any significant result for the other variables.

We then proceeded with our hypotheses on Liberal accounts of the peacekeeping operations. We first checked the fundamental argument of Liberal account by testing democratic countries' contribution rates in the initially deployed forces and we argued that democratic countries would contribute more than non-democratic ones. As a completely new addition to the previous studies, we also tested democracies' and non-democracies' deployment promptness. We argued that democratic countries would deploy slower than non-democracies due to the advanced

democracies' complex mechanisms in decision-making processes. We significantly find that democratic countries initially contribute more than non-democracies, but we could not reach a significant finding for their deployment rates.

Secondly, we tested the conflict intensity's effect on our variables of deployment and resolution speeds, and initial contribution levels. We find that recipient countries with higher battle-related deaths are more likely to receive slower formed resolutions and slower initial deployments with lower participation rates. If the intervened conflict is long-standing at the recipient country, then participation to the peacekeeping operation is likely to be low. Surprisingly, with our new measure to the peacekeeping literature, if there is a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country, we find that the deployment is likely to be fast and the troop contributions are likely to be more.

As Bellamy and Williams (2013) state, one of the main reasons for democracies' incentives on providing peacekeepers is due to the belief of democratic leaders that democratic practices can be exported and humanitarian objectives can be pursued. A part of our results however provide a counter-argument to the Liberal account of the peacekeeping operations. If the UN and the contributing countries have acted accordingly with the proposed belief, then the recipient countries with high battle-related deaths would receive quicker resolutions, prompt deployments and higher participation rates. Slowly formed resolutions can be explained by the UN's careful decision-making process in a serious conflict. However, low initial participation rates directly suggests that the costs of sending troops are higher than the advantages of sending troops, which clearly means that the participating countries are afraid to lose their citizens.

Albeit these facts, we cannot strictly oppose the arguments of the Liberal account and the rooted belief in humanitarian objectives of the UN peacekeeping operations. Although the total of battle-related deaths spread over a time period may not accelerate the deployments or increase the participation rates, a sudden rise in battle-related deaths may indeed speed up the forces' deployments and increase the initial participation rates. Hence, conflict duration and battle-related deaths of a conflict spread over years may not seem that much urgent to both the UN and the participating countries, but a sudden increase in deaths evidently creates a humanitarian crisis and consequently creates higher initial participation rates coupled

with a prompt deployment. Therefore, we believe we find support for the Liberal account of peacekeeping operations with our new measure of spike in battle-related deaths.

We also tested what is significant for the UN in preparing mandate requirements by including all the independent variables that we looked at. We significantly find that increase of the recipient country's area corresponds to an increase in authorized personnel number. However, we could not find any significant result for the authorized personnel number's relations with population, battle-related deaths, conflict duration, refugee population, and spike in battle-related deaths. So, these results solely indicate that the UN prioritizes and decides according to the size of the recipient countries in order to increase the forces' ability in covering the whole range of the country.

We tested the effect of the peacekeeping operation being the first to be established or a follow-up one with several peacekeeping operations established for the same conflict at the same recipient country. We find that follow-up peacekeeping operations' fulfilled mandate percentages are more than the first peacekeeping operations, and this may be due to the know-how aspect of the follow-up operations. As a possible future research topic, we believe that successful first peacekeeping operations' follow-up operations may receive more contributions, but the first peacekeeping operations that were terminated with unsuccessful results may receive fewer contributions in their follow-up missions.

We also tested geographical proximity's effect on contribution levels. We find that all the countries are sensitive to distance, meaning that the proximate countries participate highly at the initially deployed forces with a fear of potential spillover, and accordingly, contribution to the peacekeeping operations decreases with the increase in distance between contributor and recipient countries. With this expected finding on the effect of distance on contribution rates, we argued that regions' democratic compositions would reflect UN peacekeeping operations' contributions. Although we could not find a clear positive correlation between regions' democracy score averages and peacekeeping operations' democratic compositions that are measured through taking the ratio of the total personnel contribution by democracies, we reached interesting findings. It is seen that both democratic and non-democratic countries contributed personnel without differentiating between regions' democratic

compositions. While democracies evidently participated more than non-democracies to the operations that are at regions with high democracy score averages, democracies also participated high in lower democracy score averaged regions as well. Therefore, we cannot claim that the regions' democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping operations' initial contributions. This issue can be studied in future studies by including all the contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations.

As the last topic of this thesis, we tested what has changed after the Brahimi Report (2000). Although the bar graphs of before and after 2000 means indicate slower forming of resolutions and deployments in the post-2000 period, the regression analyses indicate that it is more likely for the resolutions to form and initial forces to deploy faster in the 21st century compared to the 1990-2000 period.

We also tested the change in post-2000 contribution rates with two measures of fulfilled mandate percentages and individual contributions of two democracy levels differentiated as democracy and non-democracy. The regression analysis on fulfilled mandate percentages has not resulted with a significant finding, but the bar graph clearly shows that the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations lack the required contribution levels with a steep decline in fulfilled mandate percentages.

Lastly, we checked if the nature of troop contributing countries has changed in the 21st century for the initial deployments. The regression analyses and bar graphs clearly indicate that democratic countries' contribution rates decreased and non-democratic countries are contributing more troops than the democratic countries in the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations. We also find that both troop and total personnel contribution increased in the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations.

It seems as if we encountered contradictory results with two facts of decreased fulfilled mandate percentages and increased contribution rates, but these results should be interpreted before reaching any conclusions. First of all, for our cases at hand, the post-2000 period witnessed sixteen UN peacekeeping operations until now, which is as much as half of the thirty-four operations in the 1990-2000 period. When these periods' proportions of contributed personnel numbers to authorized personnel numbers are calculated, then we clearly see that the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations' contributions comprise a bigger ratio of the authorized personnel numbers. As a result, as Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010) argue, the increase in

authorized and contributed personnel numbers indicate that compared to the peacekeeping operations of the previous era, 21st century UN peacekeeping operations have included more complex operations by mostly applying multidimensional peacekeeping rather than traditional peacekeeping, and consequently these operations require more contributions with a wide array of goals to achieve. The Brahimi Report indeed changed the vision of the UN peacekeeping operations.

This thesis provides an optimistic potential future vision for the UN peacekeeping operations by analyzing how the UN and the contributor countries reacted to certain variables, and what has changed after the Brahimi Report. We learn that the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations are more likely to receive faster formed resolutions and increased initial contributions mainly from non-democratic countries with prompt deployments. Also, although democratic countries are inclined to participate highly in peacekeeping operations that are at regions with high democracy score averages, both democracies and non-democracies are participating at every region without differentiating between their democratic compositions.

When we test the main arguments on peacekeeping operations, we come across interesting results. We see that self-interest situation is not associated with higher contribution rates or quicker deployments. However, international security threat with large numbers of refugees is associated with prompt deployments. For the Liberal arguments of peacekeeping operations though, we see that a spike in battle-related deaths creates a humanitarian crisis, and the contributor countries consequently respond to the humanitarian crisis in an urgent manner with higher contribution rates and prompt deployments. However, since total amount of battle-related deaths spread over a time period do not alert the UN and the contributor countries, the costs of sending troops are higher than the advantages, and therefore we see less contribution rates and slower deployments in the case of high battle-related deaths and long conflicts at the recipient countries. So, we find some evidence to both Realist and Liberal accounts of peacekeeping operations. In sum, if a country in conflict experiences a spike in deaths, and creates an international security threat with a potential spillover, both geographically proximate and other countries are more likely to participate more personnel with a prompt deployment. Basically, what we can interpret for the countries' contribution characteristics is that countries contribute

at a minimum level or do not contribute at all if the conflict does not need an urgent intervention or if the conflict does not threaten its security.

Prompt deployments, in addition to Hultman, Kahtman, and Shannon's (2013) arguments on deploying large number of personnel, certainly signals credible commitment, and with the UN's seen willingness in maintaining peace and security in the post-civil war period through these two aspects, the UN peacekeeping operations pave the way for a stable peace. In short, we expect quicker and more readily deployed forces in the newly established UN peacekeeping operations, and we believe that the complexity of the 21st century multidimensional peacekeeping operations will lead to more successful and efficient operations with more committed goals that range from humanitarian causes to facilitating political process.

Since the initial deployments' promptness and readiness with the necessary contribution rates is argued to be vital for the signal of the UN peacekeeping operations' commitments in their goals, further studies can improve the notion of deployment speeds by analyzing their relationship with the success rates of the UN peacekeeping operations.

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