

“BRUTES” AND “PACIFISTS” MEET POLITICS OF THE ACT:  
VIOLENCE, NONVIOLENCE AND PREFIGURATION

by

İlkim Karakuş


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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### “BRUTES” AND “PACIFISTS” MEET POLITICS OF THE ACT: VIOLENCE, NONVIOLENCE AND PREFIGURATION

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Keywords: Violence, nonviolence, prefiguration, militancy, resistance

In an attempt to problematize the violence/nonviolence binary and the dogmatic forms they take in the context of resistance, this thesis starts by exploring the literature on nonviolence, and violence in revolutionary rhetoric. After a critical review of the literature, it turns to current debates on violence in confrontational militant praxis, which refers to nonlethal use of violence in the context of protest, such as property destruction and clashes with the police. This thesis argues that the confrontational militancy produces a “hardcore habitus” and sacrificial subjectivities fed by valorized notions of suffering. Identifying the dependence on the opponent – mostly, the state – and its violence within confrontational politics as the necessary conditions for the emergence of “hardcore habitus”, sacrificial subjectivities, and dogmatic forms of associations disabling critical commitments, this study then introduces prefiguration as an alternative approach. It argues that prefigurative politics secures the room for criticism, and precludes the ontological dependence on the opponent due its direct-action-orientation and emphasis on micropolitics. Finally, drawing on the different configurations of success, temporality and the denial of an instrumental reasoning in prefiguration, this thesis discusses militancy within the prefigurative frame.

## ÖZET

### “AYILAR”, “PASİFİSTLER” VE EYLEM ODAKLI SİYASET: ŞİDDET, ŞİDDETSİZLİK VE PREFİGÜRASYON

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Anahtar sözcükler: Şiddet, şiddetsizlik, prefigürasyon, militanlık, direniş

Bu tez, direniş bağlamında ortaya çıkan şiddet/şiddetsizlik ikiliğini ve aldıkları dogmatik formları problematize etmek amacıyla devrimci retorikte şiddet ve şiddetsizlik literatürlerini incelemektedir. Literatürün eleştirel incelemesinin ardından protesto bağlamında öldürme amacı taşımayan mülke zarar ve polisle çatışmaya tekabül eden yüzleşmecî militan praksisteki güncel şiddet tartışmalarına dönmektedir. Bu çalışmada, yüzleşmecî militanlığın acı çekmeyi yücelterek “*hardcore habitus*” ve fedai öznellikler ürettiği öne sürülmektedir. Yüzleşmecî politikanın öngördüğü bir karşıta – çoğunlukla devlete- ve onun şiddetine bağımlı olma halini “*hardcore habitus*”, fedai öznellikler ve eleştirelliğe alan bırakmayan dogmatik ilişkilene biçimlerinin gerekli koşulları olarak tanımladıktan sonra, alternatif bir yaklaşım olarak prefigürasyon önerilmektedir. Prefigüratif politikanın doğrudan eylem odaklılığı ve mikrosiyaset vurgusu sebebiyle eleştirel bakış açısına alan sağladığını ve bir karşıta olan ontolojik bağımlılığı engellediği öne sürülmektedir. Son olarak, prefigürasyonun araçsal gerekçelendirmenin reddi ile zamansallığı ve kazanımı farklı şekillerde tanımlamasından yola çıkarak, prefigüratif çerçevede militanlığa dair bir tartışma yürütülmektedir.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

“For how many of you is politics a responsibility? Something you engage in because you feel you should, [...] out of a sense of obligation? [...] Could it be that is, above all, a feeling of guilt that drives you to fulfill your ‘duty’ to be politically active? Perhaps you spice up your ‘work’ by trying (consciously or not) to get in trouble with the authorities, to get arrested: not because it will practically serve your cause, but to make things more exciting, to recapture a little of the romance of turbulent times now long past.”

Nadia, C., *Your Politics Are Boring as Fuck*

“We come to love our left passions and reasons, our left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them.”

Wendy Brown, *Resisting Left Melancholy*

“Gezi”<sup>1</sup> came at a time when my involvement in activism resonated with what Nadia C. depicts above, a duty, an obligation to get out, confront the police, run or fight, come back home. The political field as such resembled a ritual site, where we reciprocated affirmation of activist identities. While at times our “ritualized confrontations” (Sullivan, 2005a) had results, more often than not, I felt that all we did was to show each other that we cared, cared enough to get out, walk and shout.

And given what counted as “resisting” was defined by our clashes with the police and the extent of our pushing them off, affirmation was a violent affair. The revolutionary rhetoric constructing our actions as parts of an unfolding history, through which we accumulated towards the emancipated future, bonded emancipation with suffering inflicted on our bodies. Yet, it seemed to me, the violence inflicted by the

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<sup>1</sup> See Özkırımlı, 2014 and Fraksiyon Gezi Kitabı (2014).



police on our bodies, *ceteris paribus*, did not really change anything, except the scars and the injuries. And at some point, the regular resistance sports of being gassed and chased, on my part, certainly felt neither emancipatory nor revolutionary. It was not that I was a “pacifist”, in the pejoratively used sense of the word, but occasionally I was tired, exhausted, overwhelmed and ultimately alienated by these never-ending confrontations and the revolutionary rhetoric surrounding it. Should our actions be always accumulating towards a future end, which, we probably won’t live long enough to see anyway? Should politics be necessarily negative, a big “NO!” and emerge from guilt, dissent, contention?

Then came Gezi, bringing along the “many yeses” following the big “NO!” (Sitrin & Azzelini, 2014). Therapeutically washing away the residues of “left melancholy” in my activist psyche, Gezi presented itself not only as the embodiment of a different world, but also a different political praxis. All the familiar notions engrained in my political vocabulary were there, tested through experimentation: mutual aid, reciprocity, autonomy, commons, diversity, participatory democracy, voluntary divisions of labor... Problems were there of course, as they usually are. Yet, it was nothing like the activism that I was accustomed with. Still, “it felt politically excellent” (Mason, 2014:151).

A few steps down the road from the park, on the other hand, was rather familiar. Women and men fighting with the state’s police forces at the barricades. But this familiarity felt different. Not like the rallies, marches and demonstrations that I had been part of, which (almost) everyone knew would end up in confrontational street fighting. *This was different*. But how? What made it different? I remember thinking to myself, because now this violence has an actual task, we are defending Gezi, making it possible. To me, along with many others, it was common sense that Gezi would not be possible without the barricades, and those standing there, telling the state that we weren’t willing to leave without putting up a fight.

Yet, for some, Gezi was an act of “civil disobedience”, one that operated through nonviolence. A flyer was put into circulation, roughly translated as “Don’t come here you brute!”:

To those who,  
Are throwing rocks to the police,  
Are tearing up their surroundings,  
Are committing partisanship,  
DON’T COME HERE YOU BRUTE!

We are in the right,  
We don't want to lose our rightness.  
Don't go along, but warn!  
#thisisacivildisobedience<sup>2</sup>

The authoritarian dictation of the flyer was so severe that my share of criticism for militant praxis swiftly evaded. What convinced these people that they had a right to define what “Gezi” was? Who were they to decide who could come, let alone kicking people out? To my perception, without *us*, the “brutes” Gezi would not have been possible.

Suffocated by the assertiveness of the flyer, which was widely circulated, I walked towards the barricades, feeling the urge to show my solidarities, where I found other fellow “brutes”, with their faces turned white with the solution used to neutralize pepper gas's effects, and their hoarse voices. The crowd around the barricades was rattling, a bit more than the usual. As I was moving down the street, I heard an exhilarated young man, declaring that we were about to take Beşiktaş.<sup>3</sup> But what were we supposed to do with Beşiktaş? Not only were the police more violent around Beşiktaş, increasing the risks of losses and injuries, of which we already had too much, but also Beşiktaş was strategically useless. Gezi Park already had a functioning system, in which we all could find a space to be. We didn't need more space. And to my perception, we definitely didn't need to “take” Beşiktaş. Not being able to keep it to myself, I asked to a friend nearby, “But why? Why do we need to take Beşiktaş?”. “To kick the police out, and expand” answered my friend signaling the coming of yet another familiar discussion, “we are fighting here, this is not like playing in the garden”. “But then what?”, I asked back, “Are we going to expand till we cannot?”.

Then came a long speech, about the presumptuousness of “pacifism”; the right to and the necessity of violence; and that it was treason to the cause (whatever the cause was) to question the right to and the necessity of violence.

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<sup>2</sup> Polise taş atanlara  
Çevreye saldıranlara  
Partizanlık yapanlara sesleniyoruz!  
SEN GELME ULAN AYI!  
Haklıyız, haksız duruma düşmek istemiyoruz.  
Uyma, uyar!  
#bubirsivildirenis

<sup>3</sup> Beşiktaş was at the time the location of then prime-minister Erdoğan's residence.

There was nothing I disagreed about his critique of nonviolence, our right to violence against the police, and about the contexts that could evoke the necessity of it. But why was it treason? Was our “cause” so fragile that it would shatter with a simple question? How come my questioning of the necessity to “take” Beşiktaş had made me a “pacifist”? And finally, what was wrong with “playing in the garden”? Need political praxis always be heroic, militant and confrontational?

And there I was. Unable to decide whether to feel guilty as *they* were fighting an honorable war, and *we* the “pacifists” were playing in the garden; or to be mad at these “brutes” who knew nothing but violence, and who kept infantilizing other means of political praxis. The positions for nonviolence and violence, it seemed, were solidified, disabling a supportive *and* critical commitment, and I had to make a choice. The options I had were limited with “brutes” and “pacifists”, and the contract said, “no questions asked”.

But why was a position, while acknowledging the necessity and legitimacy of violence in some instances, that could also keep the right to question it was not possible? When did being critical of exclusive nonviolence become substitution for uncritical defense of exclusively violent means? Why were the options limited to either violence or nonviolence? Could we not have some of both?

Coinciding with the phase that I should start thinking about my thesis, I was intrigued by this binary of violence/nonviolence.<sup>4</sup> Even if my interest in this binary materialized in Gezi, I did not want to study Gezi. It was not Gezi that I wanted to understand. I was interested in the affective and discursive associations of violence, which somehow produced a binary, which then initiated an “activist refusal” to criticize, ask questions and a rather reflexive position, echoing what Ortner called as “ethnographic refusal”: “the impulse to sanitize the internal politics of the dominated” (1995:179). And there emerged the questions that inspired what this thesis draws on: What is it about the political framings and approaches to violence that enables this binary? What is it about the way violence is allowed/disallowed that produces this “activist refusal” and the dogmatic forms of commitment? And would it be possible to

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<sup>4</sup> What I refer to as violence accords with the context from which the questions driving this thesis are born: nonlethal violence in protest, clashes with the police and selective property destruction. What I refer to as nonviolence is not the deployment of means that are not violent, but the generalization of nonviolence norms as prohibition of violent means.

initiate a different approach that goes beyond this binary and provides room for commitment without giving up critical assessments?

Chapters 2 and 3 trace the question of what enables the binary and the accompanying dogmatic forms of violence/nonviolence. The binary is first and foremost sustained by construction of violent and nonviolent means as exclusively separate paths. For proponents of nonviolence, such exclusion is overt; it works through the open prohibition of violent means (Chapter 2). The exclusion of nonviolent means within defense of violence, on the other hand, is achieved rather subtly. Through the discursive associations between violence and radicalness, and the revolutionary rhetoric, militant praxis appropriates a priori revolutionary credentials, rendering alternative means inferior. The argumentations made on behalf of violent acts as accumulating towards revolution, in collaboration with the “inevitable instinct to identify with the most radical [read: violent] option” (Graeber, 2009:225), initiate a dogmatic form of militant praxis (Chapter 3). In either case, binary produces dogmatic forms of commitment, hierarchical positions, and partisan silences. The ethical reasonings behind the commission or prohibition of violence, in other words, besides establishing a binary that precludes and limits critical assessments, also produces hierarchies among alternative means, and subjects deploying them.

Besides the two spectrums of a binary, both of which have problems of their own (detailed in Chapter 2 and 3), as this thesis opened up, another theme became significant; the dependence on the opponent and its violence for defining what constitutes success. For nonviolent praxis, the search and desire for nonviolent forms of protest offers two options. First, to limit actions beforehand with what the law and the state have given permission for (and hope that they won’t break it). Second is to break the law, and receive the police violence in hopes that the suffering they inflict would contribute positively, either through producing compassion in police forces or third parties, or polishing the higher ground of righteousness, as in “not having returned their violence back”. The problem with the first option is that it limits agency beforehand. It reduces the political field to “what has been permitted”, which sounds counter to the idea of resistance as an act aiming for liberation. In presupposing docility, it tames the emancipatory potential beforehand. With the second option, police violence assumes an affirmative task, a ground upon which the subjectivities could be validated. Put differently, police violence becomes an essential part of what affirms the righteousness. Constructing a discursive link between victimization and righteousness, it comes to a

point where the violence inflicted contributes positively to what is defined as a successful political act.

For militant praxis, the discursive link between radicalness and violence similarly presupposes the opponent, the reciprocation of whose violence lies at the core. The centrality of the sporadic clashes with the police to the configuration of what constitutes politics, in other words, posits the police as an equally necessary part of resistance, of the emancipatory process. The violence inflicted upon resistant bodies then assumes a similar affirmative task, rendering the opponent and its violence central. In short, the activist habitus, formed through confrontational encounters, promotes sacrificial subjectivities and works towards the construction of the state as an inextricable component of political praxis, and its violence as an affirmative ground. The political conduct is then conceptualized as intrinsically dependent on the opponent and its violence. And in either case, it comes to a point that “the parameters of protest are inexorably set, not by the challengers, but by the state itself” (Peterson, 2006:73).

Taking a step back, then, the formation of the binary as choosing among the limited options of either to reciprocate, receive or evade state’s violence is dependent on the reliance on confrontation. That is, it is the confrontational framing that makes the violence/nonviolence binary possible: since it is, more often than not, evident that confrontation will result in state’s violence, the question inevitably becomes how to respond to it. The problem for politics then becomes how to manage state’s violence, and how to articulate the response into a positively contributive force. The articulation of response as contributive, either militant or nonviolent, takes dogmatic forms, denying critical approaches. If the dogmatic forms disabling room for critique are enabled by the binary, which in turn is enabled by a confrontational frame, would a move beyond confrontational praxis, an alternative mode of politics, perhaps make solution unnecessary?

If, in other words, confrontation produces the conditions for the emergence of the violence/nonviolence binary and their dogmatic forms, then a different frame that does not presuppose the opponent for articulating what constitutes success should be *conceptually* able to forestall the emergence of monolithic and binary configurations of violence and nonviolence. But since politics does not necessarily abide by their conceptual formations, inclusion of principles that ensure room for critique at the *empirical* level would still be necessary. And this is what Chapter 4 and 5 work on respectively. Chapter 4 outlines prefigurative politics, which operates through the idea

of “acting as if one was free” and enacting the ideals in the present through experimentation. Chapter 5 analyzes militancy within the prefiguration frame, and argues that, despite being incapable of providing an ultimate solution, prefiguration offers a ground that secures the right to ask questions. As a form of engagement that does not presuppose confrontation, prefiguration conceptually precludes the conditions for the emergence of the ontological dependence on the opponent and its violence. Due to the inclusion of autonomy and anti-oppression as part of the ideals and relevant criteria, prefiguration also secures the ground for a critical commitment and room for questions. Acknowledging the discrepancies between the conceptual and empirical levels, the chapter concludes by highlighting potential problems associated with violence within the prefiguration framework.

As it has been clear by now, this thesis does not attempt to offer an answer to the question of violence/nonviolence. The question of violence/nonviolence is inevitably contextual, making a final and definite answer impossible and the claim of having found one sound absurd. Even with the relatively less complicated matter of property-damage, “the question can only be answered by asking other questions. We must ask: What objects will be damaged? For what purpose? Using what kind of force? Will any living being be injured in any way?” (Jones, 2006:324).

While this thesis is ultimately about a critique of violence, this critique is oriented towards a principled defense of militant political praxis. Differing from the conventional defenses of nonviolence, the criteria adopted for the critique of violence is one that looks at the social conditions of the possibility of violence. I adopt “social conditions of the possibility” perspective from Bourdieu’s *The Scholastic Point of View* (1990), where he uses it to highlight the unequal conditions of access to the scholastic point of view. Rather than simply pointing to the social conditions, he also adds the possibility, which is significant, because it allows us to go beyond the notion of stable positions, and also to take the process in which those positions are formed into account. The social conditions of the possibility of violence intends to evoke a sense that not only pays attention to acts of violence at a particular moment, but also keeping the question of what enabled their emergence in mind and asking: “under what conditions did the possibility for the destruction of property as a confrontation with capital arise?” (Cross, 2003:8).

The social conditions allow for an approach that does not take violence in a vacuum, which is most of the time the case for the critique of violence by defendants of

nonviolence. The different subject positions bring along different social conditions and possibilities, rendering nonviolence possible for some, as making it impossible for others. The focus on social conditions and the possibilities designated by them, in this sense, ensures the inclusion of context as opposed to a decontextualized critique derived from a generalized application of nonviolence criterion. Within this frame, the criticism oriented towards violent resisters, for instance, misses the state's violence in the name of the capital, which has made the resistant violence possible in the first place. Taken as such, the social conditions of the possibility of violence against capitalism is dependent on the capital and the state.

The focus on context, or social conditions, on the other hand, risks initiating a frame that disregards the possibility aspect. Particularly relevant for the defenses of violence is the tendency to translate the social conditions into a non-negotiable license for violence. While the emphasis on social conditions succeeds in allocating state's and capital's responsibility for the emergence of violence, it comes at the expense of agencies and agents' responsibilities. The social conditions of the *possibility* of violence, however, implies the existence of alternatives. While it is one thing to say that the social conditions of the possibility of resistant violence is dependent on the state and capital, it is quite another to construct resistant violence as knee-jerk reactions to an over-determining context.

An approach that pays attention to the social conditions of the possibility of violence, then, allows a better allocation of responsibilities, where neither state nor the resistant actors are exempted from accountability, responsibility, and accordingly criticism. It also offers a position that, while remaining critical of violent political conduct, does not adhere to a rather abstracted, sterile critique of violence that disregards the social conditions of the possibility of its emergence.

## CHAPTER 2

### NONVIOLENCE

“If you turn the other cheek, you will get a harder blow on it than you got on the first one. This does not always happen, but it is to be expected and you ought not to complain if it does happen.”

George Orwell, *Lear, Tolstoy, and the Fool*

Defenses of nonviolence are conventionally divided into two lines; “principled” and “instrumentalist” uses of nonviolence (Atack, 2011; Martin, 1989; Mueller, 2004; Sharp, 1959). Principled arguments for nonviolence “claim validity independent of action’s outcome or concrete circumstances” (Mueller, 2004:140) whereas instrumental arguments for nonviolence “depend for their validity on a consideration of the outcome of the action” (ibid.:141). Stated as such, principled use of nonviolence, mostly linked to Gandhi and King Jr, is more concerned with the means adopted and the moral quality of the means adopted. Instrumental use, mostly linked to Gene Sharp, on the other hand, focuses on the ends and the efficiency of nonviolent means. However, neither arguments about means and ends, nor morality and efficacy are mutually exclusive or mutually exhaustive within these two lines. The argument that nonviolence is more open to participation, for instance, is both supported with claims regarding efficacy and morality. The moral aspect focuses on the democratic nature of nonviolence, and the efficacy aspect focuses on the impact of broader participation on the chances of success.

Since my concern is to tackle the arguments, rather than defining the two camps of nonviolence, this chapter is organized with regard to the ways in which the arguments about efficacy and moral quality are grounded, rather than situating them into analytically separate categories of “principled” or “instrumental”. For instance, while the inseparability of the means and ends is conventionally located into the



principled camp associated with morality, here, I consider the inseparability of means and ends as a matter of efficacy. The way I use efficacy refers to nonviolence's capacity to work as well as to its practical contributions to the desired outcome. Moral quality is used to include arguments that situate nonviolence as morally superior, and the moral code that "violence is always wrong".

## **2.1 Consent Theory of Power (Dear Power, Can I please take my consent back?)**

The articulation of nonviolence works through "consent theory of power" according to which a society consists of "rulers" and "subjects", and power of the rulers derives from and depends on the consent provided by the subjects in the form of "obedience and cooperation" (Sharp, 1973:12). Nonviolent action is construed as a "method of waging conflict" by the means of withdrawing consent (Martin, 2001:29). The idea is to introduce a conflict using the threat force of depriving the ruler of consent, and hence of power.

The ways in which the ruler is deprived of consent include acts of omission and commission. Acts of omission constitute the disruption of obedience and refer to the refusal to perform acts "expected by custom, or required by law" (Sharp, 1959:44). Acts of commission constitute the disruption of cooperation and refer to taking part in actions that are prohibited by custom or law (ibid.:45). These acts work through the mechanisms of conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Conversion refers to "changing the opponents' opinion or beliefs"; accommodation is "compromising to gain part of one's objectives"; nonviolent coercion is "forcing the opponents to grant the demands"; and disintegration is "causing the opponents' system or government to fall completely apart" (Sharp, 1996:234).

These mechanisms, however, are not pre-defined goals or strategies, rather they refer to the ways in which nonviolent actions work. Therefore, it is safe to argue that all mechanisms operate within the current frame of order and aim to provoke changes without necessarily introducing a challenge to the basis of the structure. Even if "disintegration" implies a challenge to the structure or the system, it is ultimately taken to be an extreme application of coercion working through the use of "threat power", that

is, the expression of the “capacity to exercise coercive power” (Atack, 2011:122). The system, and its contribution to the problems at hand, is not part of the agenda. What this mechanism enables is located in the threat function of its ability to disintegrate the system. Consent theory, accordingly, even when works through the disintegration of the system, is interested in “transforming it (and converting the people in power)” (Gelderloos, 2007:24) rather than eliminating the system as a whole.

The understanding of power in consent theory uses individuals, their consent and agencies as the basis for analysis. Despite the rulers-subjects classification’s implication of power as “a monolithic entity residing in the person” (Martin, 1989:214), for consent theory of power, power is pluralistic and resides within social groups and institutions. According to consent theory, various social groups hold power, to which Sharp refers to as “loci of power” (2005:27) and it is their cooperation and consent that accumulates power in the ruler. The subjects’ decision to deprive the ruler of their consent challenges the regular functioning of the loci of power and forces the opponent, the ruler, to alter their behavior. However, despite the argument that power does not reside in the ruler as a material possession, consent theory still relies on an individualist, voluntaristic, actor-based understanding because of its emphasis on consent and choice (Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 1993). Even if power is not taken into hand as something the rulers possess, the actions are ultimately constructed as dependent on the subjects and rulers. Power, taken as such, is an individual matter.

Understanding of power as deriving from individuals and consent initiate three problems. First, power, understood as functioning through threat force and capacity to convince or enforce, assumes a communicable opponent and a shared moral/political view, which are qualities of individuals. The relations of power are also constituted through structures, such as capitalism, and patriarchy, which do not necessarily provide an observable opponent to be deprived from the consent (Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 1993). The form of action proposed by consent theory fails to provide a compelling picture of the ways in which structural components are to be taken into consideration. More importantly, in constituting the opponent as communicable, consent theory in a way de-politicizes power. The idea that convincing or enforcing the opponent, mostly the state, could achieve the objectives obscures the power imbalance, as well as falls short in explaining the ways in which relations of power are constituted.

Second, power construed as results of the choices of the individuals disregards structures’ relation to agency (Atack, 2006; Atack, 2011; Martin, 1989; McGuinness,

1993; Ryan, 2002). Production of consent as an individual matter overlooks the ways in which structures or systems “limit the capacity for individual decision-making” (Burrowes, 1996:90, quoted in Atack, 2006:91). The production of consent, that is to say, cannot be taken into hand as a sole matter of individual choice. Even if attempts have been made to incorporate Gramscian notion of hegemony to deepen the understanding of consent (Atack, 2006; Martin, 1989), Gramsci’s approach is not compatible with the individualistic approach of consent theory. Hegemony, according to Gramsci, produces consent through normalizing the current order, or by rendering the alternative impossible. Consent in Gramscian understanding is *manufactured* socially, politically and historically by the dominant social class; it is not a matter of individual choice. As opposed to the authentic form of consent offered by consent theory that could be given and taken back; Gramsci situates the formation of consent into the socio-political relations between social classes, power relations and structures surrounding them (1971).

Finally, the rulers-subjects classification disregards the complex relations through which subject positions are constituted (Atack, 2006; Atack, 2011; Ryan, 2002). The subject positions are constituted by the intersections of different relations of power and structures, such as class, race, gender, ability, sexuality etc. (See Bernstein, 2005; Collins, 2009; Naples, 2008). Yet, the formulation of subject-ruler classification within nonviolence is incapable of working through the multiple axis of relations, where the positions of subjects and rulers are, accordingly, multiple too. The rigidly defined positions of subjects and rulers, in other words, are inadequate for representing the complexity of the formation of subject positions. Such static formulation inevitably necessitates a particular line of power (or structure) to be designated as the criteria for the definition of positions. Which line of power (or structure) will be used to assign the subject-ruler position, however, remains an important, yet unanswered, question.

## **2.2 Violence is always wrong; nonviolence is morally superior (Dignity of the bruise)**

Arguments for nonviolence attempt to situate nonviolence as more than the negative definition of sole opposition to violence. These arguments not only degrade the

use of violence, but also posit nonviolence as superior. While the arguments against violence in themselves work to constitute nonviolence as the better option, the emphasis on the “strengthening of the capacity for popular power and popular resistance against oppression and injustice” works to provide a positive definition (Atack, 2011:8). Besides the problems associated with the use of violence, focusing on the superiority of nonviolent means work against the representation of nonviolence as the passive rejection of violence. Focus on the positive qualities of nonviolence besides and beyond its critique of and opposition to violence, in other words, construes nonviolence as an active form of political engagement. In this line, the moral superiority of nonviolence is situated as more than the act of refraining from violent actions. The arguments “for nonviolence” and “against violence”, in other words, work simultaneously to reject violence and to posit nonviolence as the better option. The moral superiority of nonviolence includes arguments that (1) violence is always wrong, (2) nonviolence provides room for error, (3) suffering and self-sacrifice are redemptive tools, (4) nonviolence is open to everyone and hence more democratic, and (5) violence is the tool of the enemy, which would eliminate the differences between the “moral us” and the “enemy”, and would only contribute to the opponent’s system.

The first and most basic argument against violence almost goes without saying: violence is morally wrong. What makes it important in terms of the defendants of nonviolence is the adding of the “always”. Drawing on religious, ethic, and moral concerns, the proponents of nonviolence conclude that *violence is always morally wrong*. As the proponents of violence argue that violence in particular circumstances may not necessarily be wrong, the proponents of nonviolence oppose such legitimization to different extents. Circumstances or context, in this understanding, cannot be considered as relevant criteria to render violent means morally appropriate. Violence, in short, is considered as morally wrong regardless of the context and adherence to nonviolence is asserted as the sole possible course of action within the limits of morality.

As sometimes room is provided for violence in the cases of self-defense and for the benefit of third parties at stake, the dominant tendency is to focus on the alternatives of violence, such as acts of omission, commission and self-sacrifice (Sharp, 1959). The approaches of Gandhi and King Jr regarding self-defense and circumstances in which 'innocent' third parties are at stake do not provide a coherent position. Both have different, sometimes contradicting statements regarding self-defense and “innocent”

third parties. Gandhi, for example, has argued that what is of importance is the intentions behind the act and if one acts violent out of compassion, then the act is not violence in the sense of “evil” (Haksar, 2012). However, he has also argued that the nobler thing to do would be let oneself get killed than to harm the aggressor regardless of the consequences it would bring, which includes harm to third parties (ibid.). King Jr, in a similar vein, insistently argues for “turning the other cheek”, yet, he not only argues that self-defense is considered as “moral and legal” by all societies, but he also states that “self-defense, even involving weapons and bloodshed, has never been condemned by Gandhi, who sanctioned it for those unable to master pure nonviolence” (King Jr, 1959:3). Only Tolstoy provides a coherent stance regarding self-defense and third parties at stake by calling for a complete pacifism on the grounds that it is never quite possible to know whether the “aggressor will carry out his [sic] intentions” (Tolstoy, 1986:30-31, quoted in Haksar, 2012:309).

The claim that violence is always wrong is also supported by a kind of “ethical and epistemological humility” (Atack, 2011:18), which argues that since no one can be entirely and absolutely sure whether their actions are rightful or not, by voluntary self-suffering, nonviolent action makes sure that only the agent suffers in the case of a wrongdoing (Gandhi, 2001:17; King Jr, 1991:47). Because violence is wrong, and because “what appears as truth to one may appear to be error to the other” (Gandhi, 2001:6), refraining from violent acts provides room for error by making sure that no one other than the person acting out would embrace the possible suffering as a result of possible errors.

But more importantly, such moral claim works through decontextualization, which refers to disregarding different material, affective and social possibilities that different subject positions entail. While decontextualization is the whole point of the claim that “violence is *always* morally wrong”, the differences in the severities of the extents of being the recipient end of violence is the grounds for the criticism that nonviolent thought obscures the fact that nonviolence is a luxury not available to everyone (Churchill, 2007; Gelderloos, 2007 & 2013). As some subject positions may afford nonviolent forms of resistance, for others stakes are high and nonviolence as a form may not be available. Taking a position towards violence in a vacuum trivializes the social conditions of the possibility of violence, that is, the context in which violence becomes possible. The trivialization occurs through rendering the underlying structural inequalities bringing about such different conditions and possibilities irrelevant. For

instance, the application of same criteria at the expense of context in both cases of a police attack with tear gas and a military attack with bombs makes it harder to talk about the significant patterns through which some get the tear gas whereas some get the bombs. Decontextualization, in other words, risks obviating the discussion of the social, historical and political aspects designating different experiences to different subject positions. Nonviolence, first, constructs the different experiences as irrelevant, and second, disallows the discussion of how these different experiences have been possible in the first place.

Nonviolence theory forestalls this tension by extolling suffering and self-sacrifice. The suffering is taken to evoke compassion, which denotes privilege (Berlant, 2004:4), which in turn further normalizes the unequal subject positions and the power imbalance enabling them. The premise that violence is always wrong is incorporated into the argument that it is better to be the recipient rather than the perpetrator of violence (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; Gregg, 1960; King Jr, 1957 & 1959; Sharp, 1959). But similar to the way in which nonviolence was formed as more than the opposition to violence, the positive value of being the recipient of violence is also constructed as more than a choice between perpetrating or receiving violence. Suffering and self-sacrifice, within nonviolence thought, are not by-products or risks to be taken into consideration; rather they themselves are tools for initiating change. Referred to as “redemptive suffering” (Atack, 2011), bearing with, if not welcoming, the consequences<sup>5</sup> of one’s actions fulfill two tasks; first, it represents “the sincerity of commitment to the case”, and second, “becomes a major component of the impact of nonviolent action upon the opponent or the oppressor” (ibid.:17). The redemptive force located in suffering as a way to “‘melt the hearts’ of the opponents” (Martin, 2001:33), however, turns into a process of glorification of suffering that romanticizes, valorizes and normalizes subordination and relations of power. Together with the discourse of choice and the constitution of “moral self”, the understanding of redemptive suffering

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<sup>5</sup> I am hesitant to call the suffering coming from the opponent as “consequence” for it implies a cause-effect relation and situates the receiving end of the violence as sharing the responsibility. Such conceptualization also relies on an understanding of “legitimate authority” which holds the right to act in return. Despite the fact that such framing contradicts to the one I adopt, the proponents of nonviolence conceptualize it as “outcome” or “consequence” and I stick to their conceptualization.

“perpetuates submissive and dependent orientations that have been imposed on subordinate groups for too long” (ibid.:33-34).

The discourse of choice within consent theory works further to normalize the violence of the opponent for in particular circumstances acts of omission and commission equals directly to self-sacrifice. Together with the focus on choice within consent theory, the value attributed to suffering performs a hegemonic function. The criticisms regarding the differences in terms of the severity of “consequences” are discarded by constructing suffering as a choice with a positive outcome rather than a negative one. Detaching the negativity from suffering further contributes to the ways in which nonviolence disables the discussion of different contexts, subject positions and social conditions. So the idea of redemptive suffering not only reinforces decontextualization, but it also discards the critique of decontextualization beforehand. Because suffering is considered as desirable, rather than a problem, the criticisms deriving from the different experiences of suffering fall short. In other words, the problematization of differences in terms of the severities, as in “some suffer more” becomes irrelevant because suffering’s connotation is constructed as positive.

Decontextualization and redemptive suffering are also crucial to the argument that nonviolence is open to everyone, is more democratic and accordingly morally superior. As opposed to violent forms of resistance, which require some form of expertise, weapons etc., nonviolence solely requires adherence to the moral code of nonviolence. The argument stated as such is compelling, but, it has limits that may go unnoticed. Even if nonviolence is more open to participation, not everyone is subjected to same risks. While participation may be available to all, survival is not. Sharp argues that subjects are ultimately capable of choosing whether to obey or to face the consequences of disobedience (1973:21-23). But the differences in terms of the consequences of disobedience challenge the idea that nonviolence is open to everyone.

The moral superiority of nonviolence is also constructed through defining violence as the “tool of the enemy”. “Enemy” here is used to refer to the opponent, which may be a group, state, structure, conditions or power holders. Because nonviolence thought emphasizes “love for the other” as the guide for action, and urges to win the opponent, rather than winning over the opponent (King Jr, 1957), at first, the phrase “enemy” seems alien. However, what translates the opponent into enemy is its adherence to violence. The position of enemy is already defined in relation to violence, and the opponent falls into that category only after adhering to violence. The defining

quality of the enemy, in other words, is violence. The agents are not against the enemy per se, but rather are against violence making the translation of the opponent into enemy possible.

Relatedly, use of violent means is construed as diminishing the differences between the moral agents and the enemy, and “blurring the us/them distinction” (Mueller, 2004:141). Since violence is an immoral tool adopted by the immoral enemy, rejection of it is a ground for the construction of a moral self. Rejection of violence in this sense is a manifestation of a categorical separation between the evil enemy and the moral us. Because violence is considered as a necessary rule of the enemy’s game, violent means inevitably lead to the reproduction of the system opposed. Adopting the tool of the enemy, in other words, is construed as playing the enemy's game, and thereby reproducing of the system that the agent is acting against. Refusing to adopt these tools not only manifest the differences between the agents and the enemy, but also mean depriving the opponent and the system/game of the conditions for its reproduction (Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1963).

Because consent theory is based on individuals as initiators of change, the way in which the self is taken into consideration, the “moral self”, is a crucial point in nonviolence thought. The moral commitments of the agents are taken as signifiers of the justness of the cause. The emphasis on nonviolent action as the “last resort” when conventional, constitutional and lawful means have failed, for instance, is prevalently used as a way to suggest the rightfulness of the action (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1957). The discursive link between the moral self and the legitimacy claim for the act rely on the idea is that the cause must have been just, or otherwise law-abiding citizens would not have violated the law. While the agents recognize the legitimacy of the order and the just laws, in other words, they are against the unjust ones. King Jr, for example, stated that people taking part in civil disobedience “are not anarchists<sup>6</sup> [...] they do not seek to defy the law, they do not seek to evade the law” (1991:49). The emphases on disobedience as being “civil, not criminal”, and that it is aimed at changing specific laws deemed unjust, rather than aiming to violate the law (Atack, 2011: 82-83) presupposes the legitimacy of the order and its law. But it also establishes

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<sup>6</sup> While it is appropriate to argue that anarchists do seek to defy the law of the state, here, King Jr refers to the discursively negative connotations of anarchists as initiators of violence, chaos and disorder.



a discursive distinction between “normally law-abiding citizens who are rightfully acting out to right a wrong” and the “criminals”. Such distinction fulfills two tasks; first, it criminalizes people who do not adopt nonviolence and leaves them in a position prone to police/state brutality (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a), and provides a relatively positive representation of nonviolence compared to the one of the criminalized depiction of alternative means. And second, it incorporates the discursive force of the morality claims regarding the order into the morality of nonviolence. The legitimate and moral qualities of nonviolence actions and nonviolent actors are knitted into the established narrative of the order’s legitimacy and morality. The morality attributed to the docility and respect for the order, in other words, is discursively transferred to nonviolent action.<sup>7</sup>

The constitution of a “moral self” and the understanding of “redemptive suffering” allow generalization of a subjective condition to a broader body of political subjects for the judgment of the experience. In other words, the valorization of the suffering and the establishment of a “moral self” enable the grounds for the translation of a particular social reality - and the truth formed through it - to a universal one. The legitimacy and morality claims establish a hierarchical position that assumes the right to define and assert what is “right” and “good” and even what is “necessary” (Gelderloos, 2007). But the assumed right to define “what is good, evil, right or wrong to do” works through a paternalistic hierarchy that assumes “a sublime arrogance in its implicit assumption that its adherents can somehow dictate the terms of the struggle” (Churchill, 2007:47).

Affirming the authoritarian potential in nonviolence, Pearlman theorizes “broad-based participation, *discipline* and strategic *coherence*” as essentially necessary for the successful deployment of nonviolent means (2012:29, emphasis mine). The coherence conceptualized in this frame is not a consensual unity, but one that is shaped by

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<sup>7</sup> At first sight, the distinctions between the “self” and the “enemy”, and the respect for the order seem contradicting especially because the enemy is broadly defined as including both persons, state, structures and power holders. But it is important to remember that nonviolence relies on the capacity of the enemy to turn into an ally, and that consent theory of power is built on individuals. Even when state is defined as the enemy, for example, what is referred is not the state as a structure. The idea is to introduce an impact on the *people* who happen to run the state. Therefore, when the actions are aimed at the state, they are not opposing the idea of the state, but rather are aimed at actual people deemed responsible for the injustices defined.

discipline. Coherence, in other words, is not an outcome of egalitarian relationships, but of the movement's ability "to centralize authority and institutionalize command and control" (ibid.:42). The subjects, in this sense, inherit the moral superiority associated with nonviolence, and arm themselves with the authority to, not only dictate, but also enforce the forms of the struggle with the common practices of "citizen's arrest", where nonviolent protestors arrest the "criminals" and wait until the police officers come and do the official arrest, or "peace marshals" as participants appointed by the central authority to monitor the "troublemakers" (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a: 63-6; Gelderloos, 2007:41-7).

### **2.3 Nonviolence works, violence does not/cannot (Dear Power, let's talk this through)**

The effort to establish nonviolence as more than opposition to violence also represents itself within arguments regarding nonviolence's efficacy. The arguments regarding nonviolence's efficacy, as it was the case with morality claims, are a combination of arguments for nonviolence and against violence. The conventional separation of principled and instrumental tends to situate the matter of efficacy into the instrumental camp, however, here, the understanding of efficacy is not limited to practical contributions of nonviolence to the outcome of the act, but also includes the capacity of nonviolence to work. Going beyond the understanding of efficacy as pure instrumentality, here, the arguments located in principled approach, such as the intricate relationship between means and end, is also taken into hand as a matter of efficacy, that is, nonviolence's *capacity* to work. The arguments explicating why nonviolence works include (1) violence does not have the capacity to work, (2) nonviolence has transformative power (political jiu-jitsu) and allows broader participation, and (3) violence leads to increased repression.

The rejection of violence as a legitimate means towards an ideal end, apart from violence being always morally wrong, is also situated in arguments regarding *the lack of capacity of violence for reaching the ideal ends*. As violence, almost alchemically, is incapable of achieving desired outcomes, nonviolence possesses the necessary ingredients both in form and content. Within such understanding, besides its moral

inferiority, violence *cannot* work. The lack of capacity of violence to work relies on the understanding of the inseparability of means from ends. The idea is that means cannot be taken into consideration as separate entities from the ends pursued, and hence, ends should be reproduced in the means adopted (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1963). Gandhi, for instance, argues that:

“If I want to deprive you of your watch, I shall certainly have to fight for it; if I want to buy your watch, I shall have to pay for it; and if I want a gift, I shall have to plead for it; and, according to the means I deploy, the watch is stolen property, my own property, or a donation. Thus we see three different results from three different means.” (2001:25).

Because means define ends, violence cannot be thought of as an appropriate means for the achievement of the ideal end, which is not violent. Just as it is not possible to “get a rose through planting a noxious weed” (ibid.:22), one cannot achieve a nonviolent end through violent means. Since nonviolence thought embraces nonviolence not solely as a means but as an ideal in itself, the ends achieved via violent means would then jeopardize and contradict with the ideal. Accordingly, nonviolence thought not only opposes the idea that violent means could be justified for a nonviolent future, but also states that a nonviolent future cannot be achieved via violent means. Within such understanding, violence is both wrong *and* discordant/futile.

Nonviolence, on the other hand, besides its moral superiority, also has a *capacity* to work. Besides the unity between the means and ends, by refusing to deploy violence, nonviolence deprives the opponent of the violence it requires as a way to secure her/his position. As violence, the tool of the enemy, is doomed to bring nothing but more violence, nonviolence is seen as a way to disrupt the chain of violence. The disruption is not limited to one’s own refraining from violence, but also occurs through the transformative power located in “redemptive suffering”. Particularly in the cases of severe repression, due to the observable power imbalance between the perpetrators and the recipient ends of violence, nonviolence “backfires” and the opponent’s violence works to nonviolent agents’ benefit. This process is called as “political jiu-jitsu”, where “the violence of the opponents may rebound to undermine their own position” (Sharp, 1996:235).

Political jiu-jitsu highly relies on “redemptive suffering”, because its functioning relies on the visibility of power imbalance between the opponent and the receiving end of violence. The functions of redemptive suffering (representing the sincerity and

working as a transformative force) are enhanced in relation to the severity of the opponent's adherence to violence. The formation of a moral self sticking with the moral code despite the opponent's violence is considered as a mechanism with a capacity to undermine the opponent's power by the way of allowing loyalty shifts and broader participation. Loyalty shifts and broader participation include potential allies, otherwise indifferent parties, and "pillars of support" - the "organizations and institutions, [...] which supply the necessary sources of power to the opponent group" (Sharp, 2005:35). The increasing severity of the suffering, it is argued, would bring about more support for the cause by challenging the legitimacy of the opponent, and invoking compassion in third parties and turning them into allies (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; Sharp, 1959 & 1973 & 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

The idea of "backfiring" is that just as people would be inclined to intervene in the case of a strong person attacking a weak one not fighting back, the practice of redemptive suffering would similarly initiate broader participation and support (Gandhi, 2001; Gregg, 1960:43-46). However, there are several possible scenarios that alter the articulation of the way in which political jiu-jitsu works. Consider A the strong one, B the weak, and C the third party. C may concur with A that B should be hit; C may not concur with A, but may benefit from B's suffering; C may not concur with A, but may fear becoming a target and remain silent; C may concur with A, but still oppose the hitting and may or may not act about it. C's actions ultimately rely on the relationships and relations of power between A, B and C. And more importantly, the complexity of the relations between social agents, groups, states etc. are far more complicated than the one in an example of 3 people. Even with an example of three individuals, the formulation of political jiu-jitsu does not work, making it even less convincing when translated into social relations of power.

While invoking compassion in third parties may lead them to oppose the violence of the opponent, it is one thing to oppose violence, and yet quite another to actually support the cause behind the act. Political jiu-jitsu, particularly in the cases of loyalty shifts among "pillars of support" as "mechanisms of coercion and enforcement" such as police force and law officials (Atack, 2011:113), may in fact prove useful for the cause. However, this may both be about pillars of supports' transition into allies, as well as their refusal to obey orders they deem unfair or disproportionate. In the first case, the loyalty shift would increase the mobilization potential and enhance the chances of success. Yet, it is not possible to tell with precision whether this shift is

about the cause or redemptive suffering. And in the second, even if it may not necessarily point to an increased participation, it would still increase the chances of success for it would limit the opponent's capacity to coerce and enforce violently. But this limitation would only be relevant for the short term since as soon as the opponent's violence disappears, the effect of political jiu-jitsu would be reversed and the opponent's capacity would be restored. In either case, it is not possible to neatly locate the contribution of redemptive suffering to the outcome. It does not sound quite convincing that support for the cause would emerge from redemptive suffering. While it makes sense to argue that the concept of political jiu-jitsu, when achieved, is advantageous for the movement, whether the advantage is limited to opposition to the opponent's severe violence or includes a change of opinion and commitment to the cause remains unclear.

For political jiu-jitsu concerning third parties, nonviolence thought ties the opposition to opponent's violence and commitment to the cause together by extending the critique of violence to the delegitimization of the opponent. By observing the severe violence and oppression of the opponent, third parties would question the legitimacy of the opponent, and support the nonviolent group's cause. However, while severe violence may have a potential to initiate delegitimization of the opponent, its direct translation into support for the cause is only possible if the cause is aimed at the opponent's position. Just because people question the legitimacy of the opponent, in other words, does not necessarily mean that they would support causes in conflict with the opponent regardless of cause's content.

But even if the third parties would be sympathetic to the cause, such articulation is still prone to criticism because of its one-dimensional understanding of power as an individual matter. The presented scenario of the breakthrough of power relations between the subject and the ruler works only "when there is an obvious oppressor" (Martin, 1989:217) encompassing all forms and relations of power. But power is reproduced and maintained through various nodes (Foucault, 1972), and this mechanism incorporates the agents into the nets of power. Within the nets of power, in relation to the complexity of their constitution, relations of subjugation *and* benefit/privilege are diverse. Therefore, in the absence of an obvious oppressor with a singular form of oppression, consent theory falls short in providing a convincing picture. While the concept of "loci of power" attempts to cover this diversity, it ultimately fails to acknowledge the "possible supportive relationships between the loci ('various social

groups’), and dominant social groups, and conflicts between the loci themselves” (Martin, 1989:218). Subject positions, in other words, are more complex than a one-dimensional understanding of “rulers and subjects” and most, if not all, subject positions entail both ruling *and* subjection. Considering that power is productive and its operation includes benefits as well as repression (Foucault, 1978) weakens the idea of sympathy for the cause’s translation into active support.

A comparative study of 323 cases of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 by Stephan and Chenoweth, in fact, concludes, “nonviolent resistance methods have insignificant effects on security force defections” (2008:20-21).<sup>8</sup> The study also concludes that deployment of nonviolent methods is more likely to succeed (2008:42). Working on the criteria regarding use of violence, external support, and loyalty shifts, the study defines success as the achievement of the objective within a two-year period. The resistance campaigns are defined as “a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective” (ibid.:16) and the data pool for the campaigns is defined as “conflicts between nonstate and state actors” (ibid.:8). However, the contents of the political objectives are not specified. To what extent the differences between the radicalness of the objectives account for the results is not taken into consideration. While “violent campaigns” are set to include wars, counterinsurgencies, and acts of armed combatant groups, such information about “nonviolent campaigns” is also missing. Even if the study provides important statistical analysis of how violent repression, internal and external support, and security force defections contribute to the achievements of the objectives within nonviolent and violent campaigns separately, the study’s ground for comparison is not solid.

Besides political jiu-jitsu, nonviolence is also granted the capacity to increase mobilization potential by providing room for “people with lower risk-acceptance” (Mueller, 2004:141). This claim situates nonviolence as the safer choice, but the safety is limited to the absence of violence on the participants’ part since nonviolence cannot ensure that the opponent would not attempt to violently oppress the movement. The grounding of the claim relies on the arguments that deployment of violent means leads to increased oppression and that “unlike during violent resistance, the oppressor will not be able to easily justify his [sic] repression in the face of a nonviolent protest” (Samad, 2008:21). The argument that nonviolence provides a safer environment, then, is two-

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed (and rather hostile) critique of Stephan & Chenoweth’s work, see Gelderloos, 2013:43-6.

folded. First, refraining from violent acts, nonviolence provides a safer environment. And second, this refraining is also constructed as “reduc[ing] the pressure on the opponent to be defensively aggressive” (Sharma, 2008:91). Stated as such, the establishment of nonviolence as the safer choice resonates with the presupposed legitimacy of the order and the law, and the confirmation of the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of violence (Atack, 2011:89). The idea is about the state’s capacity to *justify* the use of violence, that is, to posit that particular use of violence into the room provided for the “legitimate use of violence”, implying the justifiability and affirmation of the state’s violence. Limiting the actions to the cases that would not “provoke” the state to act violent, within such understanding, is also constructed as the participants’ responsibility, which exempts the state from the nonviolent norm. The violence opposed remains limited to that of the participants, and the state’s violence, constructed as “inevitable, neutral and beyond reproach” (Gelderloos, 2007:39) is further normalized.

However, it is important to say that I do not mean to argue against that nonviolence, when also conformed to by the state, provides a more convenient environment for people with lower-risk acceptance. Rather, I aim to scrutinize why and how that may be the case, and to clarify the premises on which such argument relies. While the claim that nonviolence provides a relatively safer environment is valid, it is also important to point out that state’s monopoly on violence is off target for nonviolence’s critique of violence. As there have been attempts to include state’s violence into the nonviolence thought (Atack, 2011: 88-99; Gregg, 1960-103-112) they do not resolve the tension of nonviolence thought’s dependence on the presupposition of the legitimacy of the order, law and the state. How “disobedience as the last resort”, or the construction of the nonviolent agents as responsible for ensuring a nonviolent space relate to such critique are not resolved. The state, however violent, is still constructed as a communicable, moral and paternal entity that can be called into reason. The inclusion of the critique, then, is still more about working for the conditions in which state does not act violent than problematizing the conditions of the possibility of state’s violent actions.

## **2.4 Conclusion**

The defense of nonviolence is articulated by arguments of efficacy and moral superiority. As efficacy claims posit nonviolence as better equipped with the tools capable of achieving desired outcomes, morality claims draw on the restrictions to the use of violence. Yet, the conceptualization of success for nonviolent actions is limited to the achievements within the system. Because nonviolence thought presupposes the legitimacy of the order, in addition to being incapable of achieving radical transformations, nonviolence is actually oriented towards ameliorating the conditions within the current order. This then means to being, not solely incapable of but unwilling to achieve transformatory outcomes.

This is in line with the consent theory of power, where the focus is on individuals as the basis for theorization. Power in consent theory, and within nonviolence, is taken to be an individual matter where individuals are dividable into distinct categories of subjects and rulers. The problems, accordingly, could also be solved at the individual level, without necessarily initiating a challenge to the structures (or the system as a whole). The mechanisms associated with nonviolence accord with the individual focus, where politics is similarly reduced to different forms of “convincing”. Such an approach to power, however, is highly simplistic. It not only misses the availability of multiple positions disabling a neat ruler-subject distinction, but it also remains quite incapable of explaining the ways in which power operates.

Decontextualization is another problem with nonviolence theorization, where nonviolence is asserted regardless of the different material, affective and social possibilities and limitations that different subject positions may entail. The dismissal of differences in terms of the risks and availability of forms of resistance from the picture as relevant criterion establishes a positional superiority. The generalization of subjective criteria deriving from subjective conditions to a broader body of political subjects embodying different subject positions limits the discussion of alternatives.

The normative frame of nonviolence then takes a doxic/dogmatic form, where the commitment to nonviolence principles holds an authoritarian tone (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:64). In dictating the norms of the struggle, nonviolence also has a potential to criminalize other means of struggle, and thereby rendering the social actors deploying other means vulnerable to the oppressor’s violence. This sometimes goes even further, where agents favoring nonviolent means materialize their positional superiority. The vulnerability initiated by the “good protestor – bad protestor” categories are performed



on “bad protestors” on behalf of the state through the practices of “peace marshals” or “citizen’s arrest” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a; Gelderloos, 2007).

Finally, the place attributed to violence of the opponent deems nonviolence as highly dependent on the opponent. Due to the transformative capacity attributed to suffering deriving from the violence of the opponent, without the opponent and its violence, nonviolence loses its ground for the achievement of desired objectives. And because suffering is glorified, nonviolence risks producing an environment where victimhood, “being recognized as a victim can be[come] a valuable psychological commodity” (Noor et al., 2012:359). Invoking the discourses of martyrdom, the notion of “redemptive suffering” has a potential to create a habitus where suffering, victimhood and sacrifice are approbated.



## CHAPTER 3

### VIOLENCE

“The distinction that really matters is not between violence and non-violence, but between having and not having an appetite for power.”

George Orwell, *Lear, Tolstoy, and the Fool*

Compared to nonviolence, it is relatively harder to provide a coherent map of the arguments for the defense of violence. In nonviolence, nonviolence comes first. That is, the theory is articulated in relation to nonviolence, with the explicit purpose of situating nonviolence as the proper course of action. Violence, on the other hand, is mostly theorized in relation to grand narratives, such as Marxism, that have already been established. Violence, in other words, is not theorized on its own, rather, it is mostly theorized in relation to a particular strand of thought. As nonviolence is construed as a line of thought in itself situating nonviolence as the core of practice and thought, violence is mostly theorized in relation to different articulations of the ways for changing the society.

My aim in this chapter, following the chapter on nonviolence, is not to provide a complete account of how violence is theorized within particular strands of thought, but to locate different forms of argumentations for the defense of violence. These lines include end-orientation, instrumentality, expediency, essential necessity and entitlement claims to the use of violence. But it is important to note that these lines, and the approaches shaped by them are not mutually exclusive as the categorization of this chapter may suggest. In most cases, they work to support each other. Fanon, for instance, drawing on contextual limitations, invokes instrumental necessity, as he also provides a defense of violence on essential necessity terms. In a similar vein, the

essential necessity approach includes instrumental defenses of violence, which, however, are not end-oriented. The chapter, in short, while acknowledging the difficulty of a neat categorization, is organized according to different clusters of argumentation.

The first three sections of this chapter draw on the theorization of violence in revolutionary rhetoric, defenses articulated for revolutionary contexts and for revolutionary purposes. The first section, looks at arguments focusing on violence's expediency that provide an instrumental and end-oriented defense of violence. Violence is either justified through its expediency, or is excused due to contextual limitations rendering violence inevitable for the achievement of the end. The second section, essential necessity, is still end-oriented and relates to expediency, but establishes the defense of violence on non-instrumental terms. Violence's necessity is constructed on the grounds of its pedagogic contribution to the formation and the emergence of the revolutionary subjectivity. In the third section, violence as response, the defense of violence is articulated by the claims of entitlement to violence. Widening the definition of violence to include capitalism, colonialism, exploitation and oppression allows the actions taken to their dismissal to be constituted as rightful reactions, invoking the logic of self-defense. The final section briefly outlines the current debates on violent means within the confrontational militant praxis.

### **3.1 Violence as instrumentally necessary (Waiting for the revolution: the country for old men)**

The foremost argument for violence, as it was the case with nonviolence, is that violence works. But because violence is acknowledged as evil, its use requires explanations further than its efficacy. Instrumental necessity arguments work to buttress the efficacy claims through the end-oriented defense of violence, which includes justificatory and excusatory approaches (Finlay, 2006; Frazer & Hutchings, 2007 & 2008; Hewlett, 2012). The justification approach adheres to "ends justify means" principle, and the excuse approach focuses on the permissibility for the use of violence on the claims of necessity and the limitations forced by the context. Even if both approaches conclude that violence is effective and necessary, the ways in which they construct their defense is different. Both, however, have a specific notion of an end

towards which present actions are oriented. With the constitution of a determinately defined end, as “a future moment what is forever drifting towards infinity” (Springer, 2014:407), politics become

“paradoxically the end the political, or the end of the political as a creative act. The creation has already taken place: we already have the image of the world where we want to be, whether we call it ‘communism’, ‘anarchy’, or ‘capitalism’. Creativity exists only for the means not for the end. [...] Transitional politics is a utilitarian politics, both in the sense of offering a deferral of moral and ethical justification in the name of the outcome (‘you have to break eggs to make an omelette’; ‘we must sacrifice a generation to build communism’) and in reducing the politics in the present to ‘administration’ pending the development of the new world where a ‘new politics’ become possible.” (Tormey, 2005:399-400).

For the justification approach, means, as already defined as distinct from ends, are taken as justified to the extent of their efficiency towards achieving the end. Its application in revolutionary theorization with regard to violence refers to “overcoming of the traditional ethical constrains” (Mantena, 2012:2) rather than initiating a new ethical reading of violence. Violence is still taken as an evil, but because it works to secure a just end, its use in revolutionary context is not subjected to the usual reading. Violence, in other words, remains a dubious instrument, but the conventional moral/ethical judgment associated with its use is suspended temporarily for the course of its deployment. The promised future, especially compared to the present, obviates the means’ subjection to moral/ethical scrutiny, since violence -as evil- is deployed for a better future. What is at stake is to present an image of a just future, which then will be the ground upon which means will be justified.

While what constitutes a just end may differ,<sup>9</sup> within (orthodox) Marxism, “which expresses the historical interests of the proletariat, the end is justified if it leads to increasing the power of man over nature and to the abolition of the power of man over man [sic]” (Trotsky, 1973:25). The use of violence, then, is justified to the extent that it is able to “bring a new and better or at least a putatively better order” (Nielson,

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<sup>9</sup> “The historical interests of the proletariat” is highly limited for a “just” end”, and is incompatible with the framework I adopt throughout the thesis. But since my aim here is to dwell on the ways in which violence’s defense is constructed, I abstain from the discussion of whose account counts for the establishment of what constitutes “just”. For the feminist interferences to such conceptualization, see Sargent, (1981); MacKinnon (1982); James (2012).

1981:214). However, Trotsky warns us, this does not necessarily mean that all means are permissible. What is of importance is “not the question of subjective motives but that of objective expediency” (1973:24). So not only the end has to be just, but also the means’ capacity to achieve it has to be secured. In order for the justification approach to work, then, first, the justness of the end has to be established, and second, the particular acts’ efficacy has to be accounted for.

In the case of violence, the first is established by constructing the use of violence for the elimination of violence, which constitutes the better future. The revolution, in initiating a classless society free of exploitation, is taken to constitute a just end. Exploitation here is defined as violent, and the use of violence aimed at its removal endorses the better and just future to come about. Compared to the current violence of the order, the proposed end’s superiority supports the justification claims. This allows the exclusion of means, as the future and the present are established as the leading criteria for the judgment. The second, on the other hand, is rather complex for “objective expediency” is hard to evaluate beforehand. Because of the “sheer unpredictability of action” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:181), the means’ “justification loses plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future” (Arendt, 1970:52).

Leaving the problems initiated by the difficulty of assessing the objective expediency and the unpredictability factor aside for a moment, even if the end would be foreseeable and objective expediency would be assessed and affirmed, the justification approach still poses problems for lacking a limiting criterion regarding the use of violence. Even if the end was foreseeable, because the justification of the end relies on efficacy, just-ends approach risks justifying “whatever violent methods are required to achieve it [end] without setting any natural limit” (Finlay, 2006:8). Because the comparison is between the present and the promised future, the means deployed for the transition is subjected to no criterion other than efficacy that would impose limitations to its use.<sup>10</sup>

While his intention was not primarily to provide a solution to the limitation problem of the revolutionary use of violence, Buchanan’s application of Just War

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<sup>10</sup> From a position that takes the environmental cause a just one, and granting that the humans are responsible for environmental destruction, and several measures to stop them from doing so have failed, the argumentation would then follow that it is perfectly just to build a nuclear bomb for a genocide that would eliminate the human race off the earth.

Theory to the ethics of revolution (2013)<sup>11</sup> provides insights regarding the problems of justification through efficacy. Building on the criteria of (1) Just Cause, (2) Reasonable Likelihood of Success, (3) Proportionality, and (4) Discrimination, he argues that the revolutionary forces would face difficulties in satisfying all criteria simultaneously. This is particularly important for the Just Cause and Likelihood of Success, for the severity of the oppression is directly proportionate to the Just Cause, as it is inversely proportionate to the Likelihood of Success. As the opponent's violence increases, the legitimacy of initiation of a revolution for the overthrow of the opponent increases with it. However, as the severity of the opponent's violence increases, the likelihood of revolutionary success dramatically decreases. Thereon, Buchanan argues, the morally prima facie wrong actions may be justified granted they aim to solve collective action problems. In relation to the severity of opponent's violence, otherwise wrong actions may be rendered justified for "compensating for inferior military capacity" (ibid.:297-8) or ensuring broader participation (ibid.:290-303). Coercing the "fellow victims of oppression to solve the collective action problem of widespread participation" (ibid.:323) or "manipulation of popular sentiment by *provoking* harsh measure by the regime" (ibid.:313, emphasis mine), for instance, may be morally justified for they are objectively expedient. Keeping in mind that Trotsky's approach did not explicitly (or implicitly) refer to these principles that would set limitation to use of violence<sup>12</sup>, the end- and efficacy-oriented approach still relies on a slippery ground even when limitations are introduced. The articulation that morally problematic actions "*must* be performed if the revolution is to have significant chance of succeeding" (Buchanan, 2013:294, emphasis original) renders any criteria other than efficacy or expediency irrelevant. Even with the limitations, justification through "objective expediency" remains highly susceptible to providing an open cheque for the use of violence.

Going back to the problem of unpredictability, the risks mentioned above become even more important when one considers that the actions taken in the name of the end may not necessarily lead to the end proposed. The end-oriented justification combined with the difficulty of precisely predicting the ends initiates a paradox:

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<sup>11</sup> In the rest of the article, Buchanan argues that the justification criteria should be separated for the initiation and continuation phases and that even when the initiation of the revolution may not be justified, participation may in fact be just.

<sup>12</sup> While Trotsky inhibits "individual terror", he does so on the grounds that it fails to satisfy the expediency criteria (1973:24).

“justifying violence in terms of the ends to which it is a means, but at the same time acknowledging that the consequences of violence are not, after all, foreseeable” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:183). This difficulty poses a challenge for the satisfaction of the second criterion of “objective expediency”. If the means is justified to the extent of its “objective expediency”, but if this objective expediency is not easy to set forth neatly beforehand, the argument loses its plausibility.

An alternative defense of violence, excusatory approach, bypassing the unpredictability problem, invokes violence’s instrumental necessity on empirical grounds (Beauvoir, 1948; Fanon, 1961; Engels, 1962; Hewlett, 2012). The excusatory and justificatory approaches concur that, first, the proposed end is superior to the current order and, second, that violence will work. The difference is that, here, necessity of violence is not established in terms of its expediency, that is, its leading to the just end. Rather, its convincing quality lies in its inevitability, which is a different force. Because the focus is on necessity and contextual inevitability, rather than on efficacy or expediency, the argument is not that “violence works”, but is that “violence is inevitably necessary”. The inevitability is related to the “context of the structural and systemic violence of the modern, capitalist and colonial state” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:186). Accordingly, violence, within this approach, is not taken as a justified means to secure the proposed end, rather, here, violence is considered as a necessary evil compelled by the circumstances, and thereby is excused (Finlay, 2007; Frazer & Hutchings 2007 & 2008; Hewlett, 2012). In opposition to the violence of the opponent, along with its willingness to deploy it for the social conditions of the possibility of its endurance, adhering to violent means becomes inevitable for the achievement of the end. And through the inevitability, violence, while not being justified per se, is excused.

As excuse refers to “admission of fault”, whereas justification refers to “denial of fault and [...] assertion of innocence” on part of the act (Walzer, 1973:170, quoted in Finlay, 2006:5), at first glance, excuse sounds less compelling compared to justification. However, excuse approach in fact reinforces the argument by disabling criticism. Since excuse already assumes the wrongdoing, the discursive function of excuse renders the critique of “violence as evil” irrelevant. And because the excuse approach does not necessarily pinpoint a particular point in time or refer to a particular action, whereas it was easier to question justification approach’s claims regarding expediency, it remains quite a hard job to refute excuse approach’s claim that violence *at some point* will be necessary. It is exactly this ambiguousness that makes the argument stronger against

criticism, which also renders it quite a dangerous one to adopt. The argumentation in its future orientation, but also in not providing clear criteria about the timing and contextual necessity of violence “makes it easier to overlook the actual, immediate consequences” of violence (Hollander, 2013:519).

Apart from the conceptualization of violence as necessary, common in both approaches is the assumption that violence is, and can remain, instrumental. In the justification approach, violence is abstracted as an instrumental and separate means that has no bearing on the end. Instrumentality is an attempt to secure the ends from being tainted by the evil means. Excusatory approach, on the other hand, with regard to contextual necessity, while expressing hesitations about a neat distinction between means and ends, still provides a defense of instrumental use of violence. While at times the instrumentality is taken into hand as a categorical separation of means and ends (Trotsky, 1973); most proponents of violence’s instrumental necessity are critical of such sharp distinction since “one can no more judge the means without the end which gives it its meaning than he [sic] can detach the ends from the means which defines it” (Beauvoir, 1948:65). But, this awareness on part of the intricate relationship between means and ends does not necessarily translate into a critical reading of the instrumentality of violence. Particularly evident in the excuse approach is to “invoke supplementary arguments to justify the ineradicability of violence from politics” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:185).<sup>13</sup> Subordinating means to ends, or rendering the constitutive relationship between them secondary by promoting the instrumental use of violence on the grounds of necessity, however, particularly in the case of violence, undermines the productive aspect of violence. While the categorical separation of means and ends is in itself not quite possible, it is also hardly ever the case that violence remains as an instrumental tool that does not alter or challenge the ends as well as the subjects deploying violent means.

Along with the correlative relationship between means and ends that disallow an abstracted instrumental use of violence for the destruction of the chosen order (Arendt, 1970; Hewlett, 2012; Hollander, 2013), violence also has a productive function. It produces new subjects, subjectivities and relations. And this productive function brings

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<sup>13</sup> These arguments include approaches that construct links between violence and politics at both conceptual and empirical grounds (See Frazer & Hutchings 2007 & 2008 & 2009). But since a detailed analysis of the relationship between violence and politics is beyond the scope of this thesis, here, I only refer to empirically situated argumentations.



the risk of challenging the end, for the differences it initiates may either be incompatible with the end, or they may devalue the justness of the end. Through the use of violence, in other words, not only the end is prone to deterioration, but also are the subjects deploying them. Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*, as one of the foremost studies that promote instrumental use of violence, also provides significant insights regarding the socially and psychologically destructive long-term effects of violence on both the perpetrators and victims (1961:181-234). Peteet shows the ways in which men taking part in Palestinian Intifada, after returning home, adopt a masculine identity that assumes a hierarchically superior position. Relying on an economy of sacrifice, men who return home having been perpetrators and victims of violence, "acquire masculine and revolutionary credentials" (1994:40). This position is then translated into domestic violence and attempts of increased control over women's mobility (1994). Darici's work on Kurdish youth in Adana, Turkey presents how "the long years of armed conflict have transformed Kurdishness into a new political subjectivity" (2011: 476). This new political identity does not only manifest itself in the guerilla forces, but it is also evident in the young Kurdish men who are not part of the guerilla forces in the conventional sense. Young men, according to Darici, mimic this emerging political subjectivity in forms available to them, which renders violence as a defining feature of the identification process. And similar to the cases referred above, acts of violence against family members are common as an extension of this process (ibid.:472). Nicholson, drawing from his experience, also talks about the ways in which violence becomes part of the identification (1999). Referring to spontaneous fights at the street, the school or church he has witnessed or has taken part in, he talks about the ways in which violence becomes part of the social life. The black youth, he tells, had "*little except their bodies to celebrate life*, [and] violence became part of that celebration" (1999:174, emphasis mine<sup>14</sup>).

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<sup>14</sup> I refer to Nicholson because his narrative is exemplary of the ways in which violence is socialized into daily life. However, valid for the other cases referred as well, it is also important to recognize the social conditions of the possibility of resistant violence. That is, it is important to take the structural limitations that deprive people from means to celebrate life, or the conditions that enable the emergence of violence possible into account. My aim is to underline the ways in which violence has a potential to be engrained into the socialization process and to become a communicative force. But in doing that, it is of utmost necessity to stress the structural components making this outcome possible. In other words, I do not mean to contribute to the position that asserts the dismissal of resistant

Violence, it seems, cannot remain a mere instrumental means to an end; rather, it becomes a communicative force. It becomes constitutive part of the identification process, not only through which identity is constructed, but also relationships are formed. Its use does not remain instrumental as opposed to the implication of instrumentality formation, which constructs the use of violence as similar to picking up and then dropping a tool. Violence as a means, however, is hardly capable of remaining instrumental, more often that not, subjects remain “trapped in the violence they have inflicted and suffered” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2008:98). The use of violence for achieving a defined end risks becoming a habitual form, that is, it becomes a learned form of action. Violence, in other words, does not remain as a tool exclusively used for a particular end, but its use has a potential to be generalized to a form that becomes constitutively part of both the subjects and the outcome realized. Even subjects who do not themselves inflict violence, embody it by the extension of the identification process that they are part of. In order for the instrumental necessity of violence to be defended, then, the establishment of justness of the end, and the contextual necessity are not enough.

The defense of violence through the comparison of current order’s violence to the superior future to come about, in short, does not suffice. Because the means adopted cannot be abstracted as pure instruments devoid of effects on the subjects or on the ends, assuming that such comparison is possible, the productive effects of violence has to be introduced to the comparison ground. In other words, a comparison between future and present is not enough for validating the use of violence, since, violence, as a means is a dynamic force rather than a static means of transformation.

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violence on the grounds of its potential risks. What I intend to do is to refer to risks associated with the use of violence, without necessarily either rejecting its use, or rendering the social conditions of the possibility of violence invisible. The critical remarks on violence here, in short, do not aim to be translated directly into a call for nonviolence, but rather is to point the weaknesses of and the potential risks associated with the use of violence within instrumental arguments. While it would not be accurate to assert that violence could *never* be instrumental, it is still hard to make a case for the instrumentality of violence that remains purely instrumental.

### **3.2 Violence as essentially necessary (The story of how the fist meant for the boss ended up in women's head)**

The second articulation of necessity takes violence as an essentially required part of the revolutionary process. The necessity evoked here differs from the instrumental necessity, where the necessity stems from the contextual limitations, or violence is constituted as an efficient means towards the end. While the end is still relevant, in this approach, violence's necessity is not instrumentally or exteriorly articulated. Rather, the necessity of violence stems from its intricate relationship to the revolutionary process. The transformative effects of violence, which constituted a vulnerability to the instrumentality account, are taken as positively contributive to the defined end. Violence, either through its educative, pedagogic function (Finlay, 2006:17), which refers to the crystallization of the antagonistic interests of the oppressor and the oppressed, or from its reference to the emergence of a new subjectivity is constructed as essentially necessary for the achievement of the end (Fanon, 1961; Finlay, 2006; Sorel, 2004; Žižek, 2006 & 2008). Violence, taken as such, still has an expedient value, in that it *works* for the achievement of the end. But the expediency is not constructed in terms of an exterior instrument; rather, violence is a constitutive and an essential part of the revolutionary process. The handling of violence as such, differing from the former account of instrumental necessity, construes the necessity not as an inevitable and sad choice, but as an essential and appreciated one. As instrumental necessity proposed the temporary suspension of ethical constraints for the judgment of violence, here, the conventional ethical norms' applicability to revolutionary violence are denied altogether.

The pedagogic function of violence is primarily related to its contribution to the revolutionary subjectivity. Revolutionary subjectivity entails the desire for the revolution, as well as the awareness of the antagonistic relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor. Violence deployed by the oppressed, in also invoking violence of the oppressor, assumes the role of a condensing lens that allows the ultimate realization of the antagonism. The peaceful state of order sustained by compromises on

behalf of the oppressor, reforms, enable the endurance of the power imbalance by making the current state friendlier, which works to soothe the anger of the oppressed (Fanon, 1961:89-93, 183; Sorel, 2004:74-82, 105-6, 182-4). In the course of severe violence, however, “the risk of being disarmed through concession” (Fanon, 1961:90), or the risk of being “satisfied inside the bourgeois world” (Sorel, 2004:123) is undermined. Not only is violence a necessary part of the revolution in enabling the real nature of the relationship between oppressor and the oppressed to be realized, but also the lack of violence is equally disruptive for the revolutionary process since “social peace” eradicates the “violent impulse to rebel” (Finlay, 2006:25). The constitutive necessity of violence, then, lies in its contribution to the perfection of the “cleavage” between the oppressed and the oppressor (Sorel, 2004:182). The engagement in violence on both parts, the oppressor and the oppressed, contribute to the conditions that make revolution possible. Only through the violent encounters would the rupture between the oppressed and oppressor be complete. Such articulation situates violence, regardless of by whom they are deployed, as a precondition for the revolutionary consciousness to emerge. Violence is not defended on the grounds that it would bring the revolution, but that it enhances, if not produces, the revolutionary subject and the will to the revolution.

Violence working “to decipher social reality” (Fanon, 1961:96), or to “unmask the forces behind” (ibid.:40), still has an instrumental tone. But this instrumentality is not end-oriented. That is, violence is not an abstracted tool whose deployment would bring about the end. Rather, violence is an essential component for the achievement of the end. Violence, in its contribution to the revolutionary subjectivity, allows the conditions of the possibility of revolution. End of violence is not revolution; end of violence is more violence (Finlay, 2006:18).

But violence’s essential necessity is not limited to its *contribution* to the formation of a revolutionary subjectivity. Violence is also set to signify the *embodiment* of the revolutionary subjectivity. Since it is quite unlikely to “go *directly* from capitalist to revolutionary subjectivity” (Žižek, 2002:252, emphasis original), realization alone, cannot enable the transformation to the revolutionary subjectivity. The violence of the oppressor is not limited to physical violence, but is also embedded in the psyche of the oppressed. The positions of the oppressed and the oppressor, that is to say, are not shaped seldom with brute force. Rather, they also include the definitions of the relationship between them. On part of the oppressed, as explained above, the true nature

of this relationship has to be realized. Violence, apart from the role it plays in this realization, also has a therapeutic function; it has a ritualistic value in enabling a rite of passage. Revolutionary violence, in this sense, is not “a present hardship to be overcome” (Žižek, 2002:260); but itself is “an authentic act of liberation” (ibid.:261). Violence is the “cleansing force” (Fanon, 1961:51), through which the oppressed assumes a new subjectivity. Violence is “a liberating end in itself” (Žižek, 2006:380).

Because violence is taken as the mark of the emergence of a new subjectivity, an outside criterion for its evaluation does not exist; violence becomes “self-validating” (Finlay, 2006:14). Since violence in itself is liberating, and its mere existence is the embodiment of the revolutionary subjectivity, in other words, violence becomes “its own ontological proof” for validation (Žižek, 2002: 260). The current order, along with its ethics, is rendered incapable of judging actions. Violence is considered as “part of the superstructure that will soon disappear anyway, [and will] be overtaken in an entirely new reality” (Hewlett, 2012:887). This, then, means violence “creates its own values, actions and limitations” (Finlay, 2006:27), to which no exterior criterion is applicable. Whether violence actually fulfills the task it promises becomes an irrelevant/impossible question, since the possibility of an objective criterion for the judgment is denied beforehand. It becomes similarly impossible to differentiate actions that serve freedom from the ones that perpetuate oppression.

The constitution of the necessity of violence as such constructs the inevitability in a way that the decision to use violence is ultimately to choose between the current order and the desired future end. Such articulation establishes a discursive relationship between radicalness<sup>15</sup> – an act’s capacity to bring about change- and violence. Because revolution cannot be imagined without violence, and is self-validated, violence and radicalness become interchangeably equivalent. A violent act that lacks factual capacity to bring about change may then risks being deemed revolutionary and radical for the mere fact that it is violent. Because violence is validated in advance, the essentially necessity approach does not allow for the scrutinization of the use of violence. Similar to the excusatory approach, where the vaguely defined necessity did not provide any limitations to the use of violence, the essentially constituted necessity too poses a great risk for providing “a blank cheque for the commission of violence” (Finlay, 2006:29).

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<sup>15</sup> Such discursive equivalence applies to necessity and end-oriented arguments in general.

But even if violence would indeed have a pedagogic and therapeutic function for the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor, the complexity of the ways in which the positions of oppressed and the oppressor are formed poses a threat to the integrity of the essential necessity approach. As Sorel and Žižek focus on class relations, Fanon draws on the colonial context. However, the positions of the oppressed and the oppressor are not limited to the definitions deriving from class or colonial relations. Considering the different axis of power intersecting for the constitution of subject positions, such as ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, the positions of the “oppressed” and the “oppressor” are not easy to define. The “violence of the oppressed towards the oppressor is liberating” argument, then, invites the question of which line of oppression to render as primary ground for liberation. The argument ultimately relies on a hierarchical order of the structures that contribute to the formations of the positions of the oppressed and the oppressor. The social constitution of subject positions, in other words, in being unable to offer neat categories of the “oppressed” and the “oppressor”, translates the liberation argument to a state in which almost everyone is licensed to inflict violence against everyone else. Since this is not a plausible position to defend, the tendency is usually to initiate a hierarchical order, where some forms of oppressions are privileged over others through “an official pluralism which ultimately denies the hierarchies associated with difference” (Vogel, 1991, quoted in Mann & Huffman, 2005:64). The outcome of such ranking between different sources of problems, mostly end up in cases where the lines of oppression that relate to LGBTIQ, women, children, animals, disabled and the environment always remain secondary.

### **3.3 Violence as response (Rhetoric made me do it)**

The approach that defends violence as response, while concurring with the instrumental necessity approach on violence as evil that requires explanation, adopts a different route. By widening the definition of what constitutes violence, adopted violent means are constructed as rightful responses to opponent’s violence. Invoking the notion of self-defense, the formulation is that the oppressed hold the right to act violent against their oppressors. Such defense of violence is not built on the good that will come

through its use, but rather is built in terms of a right to use it. The justification ground, in other words, is not about the end to which violence is a means; here, violence is a rightful response/reaction that the subjects claim entitlement to.

The primary ground for this articulation involves widening the definition of what constitutes violence. The definition of violence is set to include depriving people of their capacity to choose and limiting their autonomy (Garver, [1973] 2009:170-182); omission, failing to avoid harm that could have been prevented (Harris, [1974] 2009:185-206); and conditions that do not directly inflict harm to people but indirectly leads to harm (Engels, 1958). Inclusion of oppression, injustice and exploitation render the current conditions as violence and thereby allow the constitution of violent actions as a defensive response.

The instrumental and essential necessity defenses of violence use future as the reference point for evaluating the current use of violent means. The use of violence, within these approaches, is end-oriented. By comparing the current conditions to the superior future, the good to come about is taken as overwhelming the harm caused. Violence as response articulation, on the other hand, focuses on the present. Compared to the violent state of the present, the actions taken against them remain “a drop in the ocean” (Goldman, 2011:9). Keeping the focus on the current conditions, and construing the current state as violent is used as the grounds for rendering violent actions as self-defense. Defining current conditions as violence, unlike the justificatory and excusatory approaches, in other words, the response approach does not aim to compare them to the proposed better future. What it accomplishes is to transfer the legitimacy of self-defense to the revolutionary and resistant uses of violence, which relieves the argument of the unpredictability burden. Because self-defense presupposes the right to act in one’s defense, here, the convincing force is built on that right to violence, rather than what violence may accomplish. Whereas the end-oriented approaches necessitate a certain amount of clarifying the means’ relations to ends, within self-defense, the focus is on the act itself. However, this does not necessarily refer to exclusion of future altogether on part of the response approach. While what the response may accomplish in the future is not taken into consideration, the possibility of further attacks from the opponents is included.

The commonsensical understanding of self-defense implies an instant, almost reactive response to an observable opponent; yet, the definition of violence adopted here does not presuppose an action or a subject. Violence being reacted to, in this sense,

is more of something that occurs rather than an action partaken by an observable agent. Exploitation, for example, is “as violent as if they [workers] have been stabbed or shot” (Engels, 1958:108). Exploitation as violence, then, provides the grounds for a rightful violent response as self-defense. But exploitation as violence does not have an agent acting deliberately violent in the conventional sense of the term self-defense implies. The notion of self-defense, then, is expanded to be compatible with the adopted conceptualization of violence.

The legitimacy/justification ground of self-defense, as suggested by the naming, heavily relies on one’s right to defend oneself against an opponent aiming or inflicting harm. But because violence defined here lacks both the opponent and an observable action, “how to defend oneself from violence” becomes a difficult question. In the case of exploitation, for example, capitalism is defined as responsible for violence. But, granted the right to react violently to its violence, how does one exactly act violent against capitalism? Due to the ambiguity of acting violent against capitalism, the notion of self-defense necessitates a modification. Since the existence and endurance of capitalism ensures exploitation, acts taken against the social conditions of the possibility of capitalism are included into the definition of self-defense. The re-definition of what constitutes self-defense, then, incorporates future into the present. But, as mentioned above, the future’s relevance to justification ground is not about its superiority to the current conditions as it was the case with excusatory and justificatory approaches. It is not the elimination of capitalism that responsive approach promotes; the focus is on the right to respond to capitalism violently. As the end-oriented necessity approaches argue that “in order to get rid of capitalism, we have to use violent means”, the response approach argues that “capitalism *is and will be* violent, and we have a right to act violent in return”. The inclusion of the future, in other words, fulfills the purpose of securing the right to act violent.

Due to the difficulty of elaborating what violence against capitalism or exploitation may entail, the response approach risks “personalizing rather anonymous institutions and structures” (Iser, 2014:15). While it is possible to designate a group of exploiters as responsible for the exploitation, it is not quite possible to neatly point to particular persons as the recipient end of rightful defensive violence. Even when violence has actual agents, such as state’s military forces killing in the name of the state, it is still not possible to attribute *all* the responsibility to the soldiers. State, as a structure, indeed produces and, in fact, in its very existence, embodies, violence. Yet,



the violence of the state is neither reducible to the agents executing violence on its behalf, nor would state –or its violence- wither away by the elimination of members of the military forces of the state.

Another relevant problem is evident in terms of the right to violence defined that blurs the lines between retaliation and self-defense. As self-defense gets its ground from the right to defend oneself, retaliation does not consider defense as a relevant criteria. The mere fact that harm has been done in itself provides the right to act back. Similarly, self-defense has a specific time frame for its ultimate aim is to avoid harm. Retaliation, on the other hand, does not have any limitations as such. But these differences here do not fit, for the conceptualization of violence adopted here is something that occurs, rather than an action that has a beginning and an end. The difficulty of assessing to what extent particular acts of violence perform defensive or retaliatory tasks remains a problem within response approach (Gordon, 2008:104-8; Iser, 2014). While it is possible to argue that retaliation is also a legitimate ground for the justification of violence, the articulation of response approach does not conceptualize it as such. As it makes sense to use self-defense over retaliation, for the former has a relatively better connotation, it is still necessary to clarify the potential differences.

A particularly powerful aspect of the response approach lies in its capacity to construct one's use of violence as dependent on the opponents'. Depicting the severity of the opponent's violence in the forms of either "they do it all the time" or "they did it first" marks the subjects' actions as response, making them dependent on the opponent's actions. Construing one's actions as reactions transfers the responsibility to the opponent party since without the initial action there can be no reaction:

"I'm nonviolent with those who are nonviolent with me. But when you drop that violence on me, then you've made me go insane, and I'm not responsible for what I do." (Malcolm X, 1999:170).

Even if self-defense in itself does not alter the negative meaning of violence, the subject becomes entitled to act violently without being contaminated by violence's negativity. While this is a viable articulation that provides a legitimate subject position free of the responsibility for the harms brought about violence, due to the broad definition of violence, almost everyone is licensed to act violent against everyone else. Since this is not really a viable position to defend, the problem of the hierarchical order of grievances then again introduces itself.

### **3.4 Current debates on violence (Rock-ing the way to the revolution)**

As the approaches outlined above refer to revolutionary contexts and the organized mass armed insurrection aiming to “overthrow an existing regime and replace it with a new one” (Buchanan, 2013:291), the current discussion of violent means mostly refer to “use of non-lethal violence during protests: scenes of property destruction and confrontations with police on the streets” (Gordon, 2008:80).

While the confrontations with the police lack the overthrowal capacity organized mass armed insurrections have, they in no way fall short of producing “*Valdsromantiker*”s, subjects “captured by the romanticism of the of violent struggle, [...] and the existential positioning of physical confrontation” (Mueller, 2004:135), i.e. subjectivities glorifying violence. These subjectivities, in turn, produce “riot porn” (Razsa, 2013) or “ritualized confrontation” (Sullivan, 2005a), where violence becomes a vital part of what constitutes resistance.

Related to the discursive association of violence and radicalness, violence risks taking on a fetishized, hegemonic and dogmatic form (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a; Gelderloos, 2007 & 2013; Juris, 2005; Mueller, 2004; Nappalos, 2013; Sullivan 2005a; Razsa, 2013). Such discursive association produces a normative frame that establishes the limits of viable and preferred means beforehand. The valorization and radicalization of violence evaporate the questions of what the violent confrontations enable and disable. The distinction between opposing nonviolence as the prohibition of violence, and opposing nonviolence as lack of violence similarly vanishes. While it is one thing to oppose the prohibition of violence *altogether*, it is quite another to oppose the idea of nonviolence as deployment of means that are not violent. Yet, the dogmatic form violence takes operates in a frame where violence and nonviolence are constructed as binaries: it is either violence or nonviolence. Such binary produces an absolutism and disables a “*functioning* diversity of tactics” (Gelderloos, 2013:237, emphasis mine), where everyone ideally has the room to choose the means they see fit.

The doxic association of radicalness with “street fighting gymnastics” (Cross, 2003:8) and the “prestige associated with violence” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:58) establish a

hierarchical relationship between alternative means of struggle on the accounts of their adherence to violence, and produce an undemocratic environment. The valorization of combative practices in primarily working through the images of male and able bodies, perpetuate “hegemonic notions of masculinity” (Razsa, 2013:514) and ableism (Morrigan, 2012). The potential translation of “the ‘meaningful’ political act into the boring violence of the everyday” (Sullivan, 2004:29), echoing the productive aspect of violence, challenges the liberation claims associated with violence. However, it is important not to take this criticism as one that essentializes gender, where violence is inherently associated with masculinity and nonviolence is associated with femininity.<sup>16</sup> While it makes sense to pay attention to the ways in which violence contributes to the gendered modes of power, this does not necessarily mean that violence is inherently part of a masculine domain. In fact, it is also quite possible that violent means “might effect a liberating reconfiguration of the pacified female gender identity that is part and parcel of bourgeois patriarchal social organization” (Sullivan, 2005a:28). Yet, this potentiality only disables an essentialized criticism, but not necessarily nullifies the valorization of “culturally dominant idioms of maleness: brute force and guile, determination and sang foid, bravado and brotherhood” (Cross, 2003:9). The creation of a “hardcore *habitus*” (Sullivan, 2005a:9, emphasis original) also downplays the questions of who can take part in this type of activism and who can afford what risks. The ideal subject constructed must have sufficient conditions first, to be able to participate, and second, have the luxury to afford the potential consequences.<sup>17</sup> Such conditions, however, apply only to a limited group of participants, and an environment that fosters the “hardcore *habitus*” risks producing a hostile, exclusionary and undemocratic environment.

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<sup>16</sup> Care feminism, for instance, associates violence with male virtues, and care with female virtues. Seeing violence as inherently part of “men’s wars” (Roy, 2009), care feminism defines nonviolence as the only viable option suitable with feminism (Churchil, 2005; Peach, 1994; Roy, 2008; Ruddick, 1989). For a detailed analysis of feminist ethics and the question of political violence see (Frazer & Hutchings, 2014; Hutchings, 2007; Sjoberg, 2012).

<sup>17</sup> Morrigan (2012) defines the sufficient criteria in US context as being (1) single and without family obligations, (2) healthy, able-bodied and not dependent on special medical care, (3) US-born American citizen, (4) White, (5) economically privileged, (6) having job security, (7) having a clean or semi-clean record, (8) male, straight and straight-looking, (9) not being a member of persecuted or prejudiced against social, cultural or religious group, (10) not be unsheltered.

The affirmative function violence assumes for group identification, besides promoting taking risks, also operates through an exaltation of sacrifice. Similar to the martyrdom logic invoked in nonviolence, “activist politics is alienated into a fetishized, masochistic and circular confrontation with police” (Sullivan, 2005a:36). Violent confrontations then become tools for soothing “activist guilt – the sense of never doing enough to ‘change the world’” (ibid.:9).<sup>18</sup> Equipped with a capacity it lacks (‘changing the world’), receiving the violence of the opponent takes on a satisfactory function. The satisfactory role violence assumes leads to a scenario where by “multiple forms of power are ignored and the liberating potential of some emancipatory gestures are exaggerated” (Cross, 2002:8).

Taking part in riots, some have argued, works to solidify relations of solidarity (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a & 2010b; Gelderloos, 2010 & 2013; Juris, 2005 & 2008; Razsa, 2013). Resonating with the awakening potential of violence as articulated by Sorel, the “common experience of state violence” (Razsa, 2013:513) produces a shared “sense of liberation” (Gelderloos, 2013:216). However, such formulation in being dependent on confrontation necessitates the opponent for the validation of the emergence of “affective solidarity” (Juris, 2005:63). That is, since it is through state’s violence that the “affirmation of common struggle – of an insurrectionary intimacy” (Razsa, 2013:513) is achieved, the state and its violence assume a central role for the configuration of resistant subjectivities. Along with the centrality of violence for the definition of actions as radical, it comes to a point in which resistance, or politics, cannot be defined without the state and its violence. Resistance as an act of claiming and asserting agency, in depending on the opponent’s actions to validate itself, subversively provides recognition to the opponent, as well as undermines and limits the agency of the actors.

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<sup>18</sup> Such articulation of guilt as motivation highly pertains to the discussions of privilege and the hierarchical order of grievances. The form of hierarchical order of grievances mentioned before in this chapter referred to the scenarios where particular lines of oppression were deemed more urgent and important. Here, on the other hand, such ranking is affirmed from outside. That is, the guilt derives paternally from the incapability of saving those whose problems are more urgent. Relying on the subversion (or misinterpretation) of the idea that “those most directly affected by oppression must lead their own struggle” (Gelderloos, 2010:15), the role for the privileged (defined arbitrarily rather than contextually) is limited to the position of “ally”. In such account, privilege is taken into hand as a static, measurable quality. This produces subject positions that “have nothing to fight for and inevitably tokenize or paternalize those whose struggles are deemed (more) legitimate” (ibidi.:16).

The articulation of political praxis as confrontation, in other words, inevitably becomes contingent on the opponent for validation.

A similar trait is also evident in the argumentations that promote violence on the grounds that state promotes nonviolence (Churchill, 2007; Gelderloos, 2007). The idea is that whatever the state wants – as if state is an agent with deliberate intentions, motivations and wills-, the preferable course of action should be defined in opposition to it. Such an approach, beyond its simplistic construction of the state as an entity with clear motivations- similarly provides the state a central role. It promotes an understanding that generates itself as the negation of the opponent, rather than articulating its own agendas, actions and strategies.

Another argument for confrontational militant praxis is that it provides better publicity by “hijacking’ the [...] media” attention (Juris, 2008:62). Because violence “sells”, the actions are given broader place in mainstream media, which then allows room for broader communication of the messages and discourses produced through action. The broader communication is taken to encourage broader participation (Dupuis-Déri, 2010b; Juris, 2005) by “galvaniz[ing] them [fellow citizens] into action” (Goodway, 2012:10). While it is substantiated that violent forms of protests indeed attract broader attention of the mainstream media, whether they produce positive or negative effects is still an ongoing discussion (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a).<sup>19</sup> Even if broader media coverage is taken to produce positive effects, however, this alone is a dangerous ground to adopt for deployment of violent means. The instrumental reasoning, though not in the same scope, is still prone to escalating violence without limitations through its end-orientation, as it is the case with formerly depicted instrumentalist accounts.

Even if confrontational militant praxis involves risks, black bloc, as nonlethal militant practices, such as “sporadic property destruction and fleeting confrontations with the police” (Thompson, 2010:23), is a relatively better choice. Also defined as means of “drawing attention to capital’s omnipresent symbols by targeting them with destructive actions” (Sullivan, 2004:16) through decisions taken collectively, deliberately and consensually (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a & 2010b), black blocs offer a

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<sup>19</sup> It is important to emphasize that both arguments are open to contestation due to their reliance on the composition part of these narratives, which means the ways in which they are framed, and not on the reception part, which refers to the ways in which these narratives are interpreted. It is quite possible that different framings by different agents of mainstream media may have quite different interpretations by different audiences.

different conduct of confrontational militant praxis. As opposed to common misconceptions of them as groups (e.g. Mattos, 2012; Zúquete, 2013), black bloc “is not a group or a movement; it is a *tactic*” (Paris, 2010:321, emphasis original). The militancy enacted within black blocs, differing from riots, street fighting, and ““random vandalism””, violence deployed by black blocs is actually “highly political and usually carefully targeted” (WOMBLES, 2003, quoted in Sullivan, 2004:16). The violence of black blocs, that is to say, is an informed one, oriented towards pre-defined objects, emerging out of deliberations among the participants.

Black blocs have both “practical *and* performative dimensions” (Juris, 2008:72, emphasis original), on the one hand, they are “the physical embodiment of a political vision” (Juris, 2005:421), and on the other they also have quite practical implementations such as “running barricades and forcing the police to withdraw” (Albertani, 2010:583), or “de-arresting”, freeing participants who have been arrested. What gives the black bloc the superior capacity attributed here, however, is not about what they enable as all of the above are quite possible without necessarily deploying black bloc tactics. The significance of black bloc, along with the forms in which decisions are made, lies in situating what actions stand for beforehand. Rather than loading actions with capacities they lack, which is the case for the defense of street fighting as revolutionary violence for instance, black block, ideally, acknowledges the rationale behind the deployed violence for what it is: to “communicate directed messages” (Juris, 2005:421).<sup>20</sup> The black blocs, in this sense, are both educated and educative. Educated, because their violence is conscious, informed, selective and processual, and educative because it makes a point, a point of “a targeted and strategic expression of the emotion of anger, as well as an ethical assertion of the *right to be angry*” (Sullivan, 2004:24, emphasis original).

Black bloc in being a tactic deployed by affinity groups on consensual terms, but not a defined group with membership, cannot be said to be exclusionary on its own (Paris, 2010). However, it is still essential to keep in mind the question of who can and who cannot adopt that tactic, as well as the issue of “turning [nonviolent protesters] – without their consent- into targets of police violence” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a:63). It is,

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<sup>20</sup> I do not mean to downplay symbolic forms resistant violence takes. What I intend to do is to oppose the translation of symbolic forms of violence to revolutionary ones. The discursive construction of symbolic forms of violence as revolutionary (in themselves) falsely attributes a wholesome transformative capacity, which then disrupts the ground for their evaluation.

therefore, important to emphasize that while black blocs offer a better start, they do not necessarily eliminate the problems of “the constitutive power at play in the construction of militant subjectivities” (Cross, 2003:9); the normative frame that devalues alternative means, thereby reducing the diversity of tactics to violent means alone (Albertani, 2010; Dupuis-Deri, 2010a; Gelderloos, 2007 & 2013; Sullivan, 2004); contributing to the formation of an undemocratic environment; and a confrontational loop through which opponent and its violence are reproduced endlessly.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

The defense of violence in the revolutionary frame includes arguments that rely on the of necessity and responsiveness/self-defensiveness of violence. The defense of violence on the grounds of necessity is established through end-orientation, where violence is either instrumentally or essentially necessary. As instrumental necessity refers to limitations forced by the context rendering violence an unfortunate but necessary means, for essential necessity approach, violence is inherently necessary for the desired end, as well as for the emergence of the subjects desiring that end. The approach that articulates violence as responsive, on the other hand, relies on the claim of the right to act back.

Arguments of necessity work through prioritization of the achievement of the desired ends over the means deployed, and adopt expediency as the criterion for the sanction of violence. Expediency, adopted means’ capacity to bring about the desired ends, however, is quite difficult to assess neatly due to the improbability of precisely predicting what the outcome would be. The overemphasis on the end subordinates the present to the future. This, for the commission of violence, constitutes a great risk since the actions taken in the name of the ideal end may in fact produce quite distinct outcomes. More importantly, the construction of violence as expedient for the end produces a discursive association between violence and radicalness. Since violence is loaded with the capacity to bring about the desired changes, violence then becomes relative criterion upon which a particular act’s capacity for change is judged. Due to this association, and the “terms [...] mediated by ‘necessity’ or by some over-arching

instrumental consideration” (Tormey, 2005:402), violence inherits a priori expediency credentials, which inhibit limiting criteria for the commission of violence.

Besides the potential discordancy between the pursued and achieved results, the instrumental necessity approach renders violence’s secondary effects irrelevant. Violence, as opposed to its articulation in instrumental necessity approach, more often than not, is incapable of remaining instrumental. Rather, violence produces subjects and subjectivities. While the instrumental necessity approach deals with this problem through justification or excusal of violence, for the essential necessity approach, these effects are in fact welcome. In essential necessity approach, it is through the subjects produced by/through violent encounters that the desired end will be achieved. The celebration of violence without specification or limiting criterion, however, in essentializing violence as liberating in itself, obscures the question of “whose interests are served by this version of liberation” (MacKinnon, 1982:523). Combined with the discursive association between radicalness and violence, where militancy is taken “to indicate the progressive or revolutionary nature of a movement” (Nappalos, 2013:1) the necessity approaches risk producing violence in vain along with subjectivities that valorize violence for its own sake.

The current discussions on violence, though not necessarily exclusively so, refer to street politics and confrontations with the police, as opposed to revolutionary contexts. The arguments for confrontational militancy includes broader media attention and publicity; construction of “affective solidarities” (Juris, 2005) and “insurrectionary intimacies” (Razsa, 2013); and the implementation of “the right to be angry” (Sullivan, 2004).

The confrontational militant praxis, following the former accounts of revolutionary defenses, similarly risks producing a discursive association between violence and radicalness. While black bloc, as a tactic, offers a better potential, this is, more often than not, a mere potential that is not actualized at the empirical level (Sullivan, 2004 & 2005a). The right to violence “as an expression of dignified rage” (Memos, 2009:219), valid for black blocs as well, has a proclivity to reproduce the dogmatic form violence takes in confrontational politics that initiates a hierarchical order of legitimacy between alternative means, and whereby violent means benefit from the “cool-factor” (Zúquete, 2013:105). The militancy adopted further promotes a gendered power imbalance, not because violence is inherently phallic, but because of the established “affective vocabulary” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:196), through which



the qualities associated with violence (bravery, bravado, guile, heroism) resonate with values constructed as masculine.

The construction of violent confrontations with the police as “doing something to change world”, finally, gives violence of the opponent a central role. The association of radicalness and violence, combined with the satisfactory role violence assumes, produces sacrificial subjectivities, which are reinforced by the opponent and its violence. The reliance on the opponent sets the way for the tendency of “creating situations where an excessive police response was predictable” (Hammond, 2015:305), escalating the overall violence. All in all, when violence is equipped with affectively satisfactory capacity within confrontational politics, which by definition, depend ontologically on the opponent, the opponent’s violence becomes a central theme for emancipation.

## CHAPTER 4

### POLITICS OF THE ACT

“In contrast with faith, hope is not for a future in the name of which we should sacrifice ourselves. No, it must be born from the very collective process as it *happens*. We should never sacrifice anything in the name of tomorrow – because it is poison.”

Isabelle Stengers, *A 'cosmo-politics' – risk, hope, change*

“Are we who live in the present doomed never to experience autonomy, never to stand for one moment on a bit of land ruled only by freedom? Are we reduced to either to nostalgia for the past or nostalgia for the future? Must we wait until the entire world is freed of political control before even one of us can claim to know freedom?”

Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z.*

The approaches to violence outlined in the previous chapter draw on the revolutionary contexts and confrontational militant praxis. The aim of this chapter is to introduce prefigurative politics and set the way for the next chapter, which offers a reconsideration of the prevalent frames for the approaches to violence in light of the prefigurative politics. After a (very) brief review of the literature on social movements and the major shifts within it, this chapter lays out the conceptual composition of prefiguration, (1) action orientation, (2) different articulations of temporality and success, (3) means/ends and instrumentality, and (4) approaches to power and organization.

#### **4.1 From revolution to reform to prefigurative politics**

Within the social movements literature, there is a distinction between forms of politics that aim total transformation of the system, conventionally called as Old Social Movements (OSMs), and New Social Movements (NSMs), which focus on improving the conditions within the current order (Crossley, 2002:149-191). OSMs, mostly referring to the period prior to 60's, "privilege the transformatory role of the working class" (Mayo, 2005:73, quoted in Lederman, 2015:246), and look for an overall transformation. NSMs, on the other hand, acknowledge the availability of different axis of power other than class relationships, such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, race, environmental relations etc. (Buechler, 1995; Johnston et al., 1994; Melucci, 1980; Touraine, 1992; Offe, 1987). The distinction, at times leading to the disparagement of NSMs as "a new hedonistic culture' of 'personal freedom'" (Bagguley, 1992:14, quoted in Day, 2004:722), presents itself with a binary attachment of NSMs with reform, and OSMs with revolution (Touraine, 1992:143). The idea of a successful revolution for OSMs means the overtaking of the state power enabled by mass upheavals. NSMs, on the other hand, are more concerned with ameliorating the conditions of existence within the current order. Rather than posing a threat to the basis of the order, in other words, what they seek is to introduce a challenge to the power imbalance. Even if NSMs, like prefigurative praxis, insist on the coherence of the means and ends (Offe, 1987) and deny "accommodation to existing power and resist standard forms of co-optation" (Buechler, 1995:448), the ultimate focus is still on "politics of demand", that is the attempt of "persuading an existing hegemonic formation to alter" its behavior (Day, 2004:727). Stated as such, as OSMs are interested in replacing/taking the power, NSMs are interested in shifting its concentration. Common in both is "a strong orientation to the state" (ibid.:723): OSM seeking to become it, NSM seeking to change its behavior.

A different form of politics, influenced by both OSM and NSM, emanated during 90's that seeks neither to achieve nor to ameliorate state power.<sup>21</sup> Called as prefigurative politics,<sup>22</sup> this new form relies on an understanding of "direct action", which refers to enacting the ideal in the present by "acting as if one is already free" (Graeber, 2006:214). While many have pointed out the "anarchist currents" within these movements (Arditi, 2007; Cross, 2003; Day, 2004 & 2005; Dixon, 2012; Epstein, 2001; Graeber, 2002 & 2006; Lederman, 2015; Luchies, 2012), a reading of these forms as (re-emergence of) anarchist politics would be misleading. Not only self-identification as "anarchists" among participants of prefigurative politics is highly rare (Day, 2005; Graeber, 2002), more importantly, prefigurative politics, to differing extents and among others, are influenced primarily from "feminist, ecologist, anti-racist, and queer struggles" (Gordon, 2008:32; Luchies, 2012; Williams, 2007).

#### **4.2 Prefigurative politics (DIY Revolution)**

The defining principles of "newest social movements" (Day, 2004 & 2005) is the rejection of "a politics, which appeals to governments to modify their behavior" (Graeber, 2002:62); commitment to prefiguration, that is, enacting the ideal in the present through action (Yates, 2004); affinity-based organizing and the focus on "autonomy and self-determination rather than a politics of dissent or demand" (Shantz, 2012:3).

The centrality of the emphasis of the process over outcome, and the experience/experimentation over demand has been criticized as a major weakness of

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<sup>21</sup> I do not mean to imply that prefigurative forms of politics did not exist prior to 90's. Rather, I use emanated to refer to the popular adoption of prefiguration, which, temporally, corresponds to 90's.

<sup>22</sup> Different names are available for this type of political action, such as direct action (Graeber, 2002 & 2006 & 2009); prefigurative politics (Gordon, 2008; Jeffrey & Dyson, 2014; Luchies, 2012; Sancho, 2014; Yates, 2015); horizontalism (Ancelovici, 2015), anti-oppression (Bevington & Dixon, 2007; Dixon, 2012; Cross, 2003; Luchies, 2012 & 2014); autonomism (Alcoff & Alcoff, 2015); and Newest Social Movements (Day, 2004 & 2005). I will be using prefiguration and prefigurative politics interchangeably.

prefiguration. The criticisms about the lack of precise demands include that prefigurative politics (1) lack the capacity for achieving a broader effect (Disalvo, 2015; Giri, 2013; cf. Yates, 2015); (2) due to the lack of conventional (read: hierarchical) organization, they are prone to disintegration (Farber, 2014; Giri, 2013; cf. Ancelovici, 2015:5-6); and (3) either by creating comfort-zones within the current order (Disalvo, 2015; cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006:111-120), by obsessing over “minor” issues of anti oppression within groups (Giri, 2013; cf. Luchies, 2012 & 2014), or by sticking to forms that will not last, prefiguration steals time and energy from *the* Revolution (Disalvo, 2015; Young & Schwartz, 2012; cf. van de Sande, 2013 & 2015).

What these criticisms miss, however, is that prefiguration alters the frames in which these criticisms are relevant. Prefiguration operates in a different frame where the conventional understandings of “either revolution or reform”; the relationship between means and ends; the distinction between present and future within a “linear view of social change” (Maeckelbergh, 2011:15); and the approaches to power do not hold. Following sections dwell on (1) action-orientation; (2) different articulations of success and temporality; (3) means/ends and instrumentality; (4) approaches to power and organization.

#### **4.2.1 (Direct-) Action-orientation, politics of the act (Freedom 2.3 (beta version))**

Prefigurative politics, broadly defined as “enacting the ideal in the present”, refers to the processes aimed at “building alternative political, economic and cultural infrastructures within existing oppressive contexts” (Luchies, 2012:11). Experimentations that stem from the idealized conceptions of social relations lie at the core of prefigurative politics. Experimentation, or enacting the ideal in the present is used to refer to both actual creation of alternatives, and the “politically inflected way of doing protest” (Yates, 2014:3) such as adopting egalitarian, non-totalizing and consent-based decision-making mechanisms. The definition of prefigurative politics as the “politics of the act” rather than “politics of demand” (Day, 2004 & 2005; Shantz, 2012) similarly reflects the dual conceptualization of what constitutes the “act”. Act may refer to forms that “act out a vision and to build” alternatives (Epstein, 1991:123), as well as

to the forms of (horizontal and egalitarian) organization within the movement (Ancelovici, 2015; Graeber, 2013).

The former narrow conceptualization is set to be limited to the forms that “act out a vision” through construction of observable/material projects (Beyer-Arensen, 2000; Breines, 1989; Epstein, 1991).<sup>23</sup> Such as projects include, but are not limited to, alternatives to capitalist market, production (Gibson-Graham, 2006) and consumption (Portwood-Stacer, 2012; Wilson, 2013); circulation of locally produced paper currencies defined by labor replacing “money” (North, 2014); building alternative sites, such as the ecofeminist landdyke movement (Anahita, 2009); or entirely alternative communities, such as Zapatistas (Stephens, 2002; Kingsnorth, 2003:1-48); and (mostly squatted) political community centers for activism which also house alternative relations of production, consumption and distribution (Chatterton, 2010; Yates, 2014). The latter, on the other hand, includes the actualization of the desired “social relations within the activities and collective structures of the revolutionary movement itself” (Gordon, 2008:35) into the definition of prefiguration. For this second broader conceptualization, horizontal forms of organization; consensus based decision-making processes; attention to minority rights and autonomy; and constant negotiation of inner-group dynamics prefigure the idealized form of sociality. The understanding of prefiguration adopted in this chapter accords with the broader second conceptualization since the forms of organization, or the ways in which protests are conducted constitute a “concrete model for one’s vision of a free society” (Graeber, 2009:210). Enacting the idea of “acting as if one was already free” *within* the political community is also a form of prefiguration for “the political practices the movement itself develops are part and parcel of the movement’s aims” (Maeckelbergh, 2012:211). The forms adopted, in other words, are not instrumental or separate, but are constitutive for the definition of the ideal (discussed in more detail in the following sections).

The action-orientation is accentuated by the “direct” coming before it. That is, prefiguration does not simply evolve around the action, but through the ideals’ direct implementation. This, as opposed to “politics of demand”, refers to a direct involvement where action *directly* realizes the ideal. Differing from the “traditional narratives of emancipation” (Arditi, 2015:118) where actions are state-oriented, within prefiguration,

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<sup>23</sup> See Graeber (2005), Maeckelbergh (2011 & 2012), Portwood-Stacer (2012) and Yates (2014) for a detailed account of the debate regarding what constitutes/counts as prefiguration.

“the point [is] to engage in a politics of emancipation *despite* the state instead of against it” (Arditi, 2007:220, emphasis original). As a “powerful rebuttal of false dichotomy” of “reform versus revolution” (Young & Schwartz, 2012:233), prefigurative politics offer the grounds for the creation of an alternative sociality without appealing to the state or the government (Day, 2004:78; Graeber, 2002:9; Razsa & Kurnik; 2012:240-2; Wood, 2014:3-4).

In the case of the politics of demand, the “state-directed claimsmaking” (Wood, 2014:4) relies on the “the current hegemonic formation [to] recognize the validity of the claim [...] and to respond in a way that produces an event of emancipation” (Day, 2004:734). The politics of demand, or reform, in ultimately relying on the response of the opponent, inevitably works to “reproduce the conditions of its [demand’s re-] emergence” (ibid.:734). Prefiguration, on the other hand, “invent[s] a response that *precludes* the necessity of the demand and thereby breaks out the loop of the endless perpetuation of desire for emancipation” (ibid.:734, emphasis mine). Rather than inflicting changes by intervening to the regular functioning of the relations of power, in other words, the idea is to *create* alternatives through action without resorting to the state or other institutions. While at times (particularly in self-proclaimed anarchist fractions) depriving the state of the recognition is a deliberate agenda or a core principle, this is not necessarily always a pre-given and deliberately shared concern. Rather, the distance between institutions or “established channels” (Luchies, 2012:5) is more likely to derive from (be a by-product of) the prioritization of actions and experiences over narrowly defined equivalence of success as the outcome (rather than the process).

#### **4.2.2. Temporality & Success (From “Not now, comrade.” to “Right now, comrade!”)**

Relying on a notion of “politics as becoming”, prefiguration offers a different temporal configuration of the relationship between future and present. Rather than an understanding that “postpone[s] the good for after the struggle” (Stengers, 2002:256), for prefigurative politics the motivation is to “make ‘now’ work” (Jeffrey & Dyson, 2014:27). Such articulation of temporality in which present and future converge, “actively subvert[s] the politics of waiting by embracing the immediate possibilities of

here and now” (Springer, 2014:408, emphasis original), and initiate the need to reconsider what constitutes “success” or “victory”.

For prefiguration the criteria for success is “neither the outcomes, initial intentions, or the ends invoked” (van de Sande, 2013:237), but the experience itself. As the “either revolution or reform” frame takes success into hand as a matter of short- or long-time outcomes, prefiguration prioritizes process over outcome (Maeckelbergh, 2011:6-8). Drawing on the occupation of Tahrir Square, for instance, van de Sande argues that Tahrir Square “housed a complete alternative ‘society-under-construction’” (2013:234), where “equality and democracy was *lived*” (ibid.:236, emphasis original). The significance of Tahrir Square within prefiguration frame is not limited to whether it lasts or what outcome it brings about. The significance also lies in its occurrence, and the forms it takes during its occurrence. The fact that democracy was lived in Tahrir Square, in mimicking the desired form of sociality, shifts the focus from the outcome to the process, which leads to the rejection of the outcome as the ultimate criterion for success. Experiment- and process-oriented success initiates a conceptualization that is defined in terms of the construction of “new intersubjective relations” (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:249); opening up possibilities (Arditi, 2015); and embodying alternative ways of being in the present (Graeber, 2002; Luchies, 2012; Sancho, 2014).

The different conceptualization of success calls for different articulations of present and success than the ones in “either revolution or reform” frame. For the revolution, the significance of the actions partaken in the moment lies in their contribution to the ultimate end in the future. For the reform, on the other hand, the motivation is to make present relatively bearable through the compromises of the powerful opponent. Within such understanding, either present is rendered secondary for the future or vice versa: one either has to give up of the present and to focus on the eventual grand revolution to come –which, by the way, may never come at all-, or to focus on the present and condone oneself with partial achievements through the compromises of the opponent at the expense of the future.

The inclusion of the future within prefiguration takes a different form, in which future and present are taken not into hand as distinct categories. Within prefiguration, the future ends are actualized in and incorporated into the present by attempting to “achieve the goals of revolution and reform here and now rather than putting them off to some distant future” (Day, 2005:215). As opposed to the former articulations where either future is prioritized over present, or vice versa, in other words, within



prefiguration, the relationship to the future is established through experimentation, where future and present merge in the course of action. What is defined as a weakness or deficiency, then, is actually a deliberate attempt for the “actualization of a future ideal in the ‘here and now’, thus bridging a temporal distinction between the two” (van de Sande, 2013:230).

However, this does not necessarily mean that within prefiguration future’s sole relevance is limited to the actions in the present. The embodiment of the future ideals in the present, “like rabbit holes of the *Alice in Wonderland*” works to “negotiate passageways between incommensurable worlds, to connect existing and possible ones” (Arditi, 2015:121-126). This not only “remove[s] the temporal distinction between the struggle in the present and a goal in the future” (Maeckelbergh, 2011:4), but also, quite materially, manifests the common phrase that “a different world is possible”. It is through experience that the creations of “new subjectivities that *desire* and *are capable of democratic relations*” (van de Sande, 2013:191, emphasis mine) are produced. The creation of comfort-zones within the current order, then, rather than stealing time and energy from the Revolution, actually creates revolutionary experiences and subjectivities (Arditi, 2015; Day, 2005, Luchies, 2012).

Related to the understandings of what constitutes success, another difference is the acknowledgement of the multiplicity of revolutions rather than a totalizing notion of a/the revolution. Rather than a grand narrative with specific routes, directions, and goals, what prefiguration offers, as experimentation implies, is a loose frame that is open to constant negotiation and renewal. As opposed to grand narratives of revolutions, where the future is pre-determined – as it is the case with particular strands of Marxism, for instance-, prefiguration abstains from providing a concrete picture of the ideal future (Day, 2005). While the convergence of future ideals and present conduct is essential, their coming together does not take the future as the starting point. It is not that a stable, clear, materially visualized “ideal” as “a blueprint, a map, a *masterplan*” (Springer, 2014:412, emphasis original) comes first according to which actions are shaped. Rather, ideals exist, emerge and materialize in the present, and through actions and experimentations. The ideal, in short, does not connote a blueprint for the predetermined vision of a future society. Because the concern is “not just the *content* of current modes of domination, but also the *forms* that give rise to them” (Day, 2005:4, emphasis original), the problematization of the forms, along with the content, implies a broader definition of the ideal. What ideal, then, refers to is more of a cumulation of

codes shaped by virtues (Franks, 2010:135-160) and values, such as anti-authoritarianism, egalitarianism, anti-oppression, autonomy etc.

The refusal, rather being unable, to come up with specific demands (van de Sande, 2013:227), reflects the inclination to initiate a form politics that emphasizes self-determination and autonomy (Cross, 2003; Sancho, 2014; Wood, 2014). The dynamicity allowed by loosely defined agendas enable and foster experimentation central to prefiguration.<sup>24</sup> The vision of the future and the articulation of the relationship between present and the future, similarly, accord with the underlying concerns about refraining from a totalizing understanding of revolution.

#### **4.2.3 Means/ends & instrumentality (Against the omelette: a note from the eggs)**

Rather than an understanding that relies on the separation of means and ends, for prefiguration, the constituted relationship between ends and means is that of concordance. Due to the focus on directness and action within prefiguration, actions themselves are goals rather than instruments deployed for distinct goals/ends. In resemblance to “vanishing mediators” rendering the “medium as the message”, within prefiguration, means become ends in themselves (Arditi, 2015:113-115). Acts of resistance, in other words, are not mere tools adopted for grander achievements, but in themselves are representative *and* part of further goals. The political conduct and means/ways of organization, then, are not instrumental but rather are considered as spaces for experimenting with and enacting the ideal (Maeckelbergh, 2011). This is also why prefiguration is not “abandoned when it is not strategically valuable” (Jeffrey & Dyson, 2014:7) for the motivation behind its deployment is not purely instrumental or strategical.

Because of the configuration of the action as central, this is not necessarily an exteriorly articulated criterion. The notion of “experie[n]c[ing] what you are fighting for *while* you are fighting for it” (Arditi, 2015:119, emphasis mine) inevitably facilitates the satisfaction of the consistency criteria. Since actions are already at the center, and are

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<sup>24</sup> Ancelovici (2015), Sancho (2014), van de Sande (2013) argue that the horizontal forms of organization in allowing “individualized participation” (Sancho, 2014:392) lead to broader participation of “new-comers”, who have remained distant to politics/acvitism (cf Yates, 2014).

not deemed as mere instruments but as parts *and* reflections of broader motivations, the correlative nature of means and ends is more of a description than an enforced dictum. The approach to means and ends, in other words, is not a predetermined recipe but rather is a reflection since an instrumental distinction between means and ends, actions and goals is not evident in the first place. Prefiguration, in its reliance on the centrality of action, in other words, presupposes consistency. The relationship between means and ends for prefiguration, then, -almost tautologically- aims to secure consistency between the actions and what is considered as ideal. This means that if anti-oppression is a relevant concern for the ideal, then, the political actions partaken should be consistent and conform to/concord with the anti-oppression norms, as in means and ends within prefiguration frame “*should* be of the same substance” (Gordon, 2008:98, emphasis mine).

However, such conceptualization comes at the risk of a simplified and reductive depiction since means and ends are multiple; not all means are ends in themselves; and attributing prefiguration capacity to each and every act would not make much sense. Therefore, it should be emphasized that the concordance, or being of the same substance does not necessarily present itself in the form of a strict guideline for action. What prefiguration offers is “an alternative approach to externally imposed means ends analysis” (van de Sande, 2013:237) rather than a straightforward code of “be the change you want to see” (ibid.:233).

A common practice of painting walls, for example, clearly does not “mirror” the changes desired (Yates, 2015:17-18). This is why prefiguration does not simply correspond to “be the change you want to be”. In such formulation of “be the change you want to be”, the desired change comes first, it is already evident and clear, according to which action is shaped. What prefiguration offers is not the imposition that “let your every action replicate your ideal”. The ideal enacted/mirrored in the present is not a rigidly defined picture according to which actions are shaped, but rather is a “continuous but never permanent” process (Maeckelbergh, 2012:231). Since ideal, or the change desired is not pre-given, but is constantly negotiated in and through experimentation with regard to the codes, values and principles at the present moment, there does not exist a concrete, materially constructed ideal that could be used as the reference point in the first place. Actions, then, are prefigurative, and conform to the consistency principle to the extent of their adherence to *norms* comprising the ideal.

The primary importance for the articulation of consistency as opposed to the instrumental construction of means towards distinct ends is the initiation of a different conceptualization that promotes “principle over expediency” (Cross, 2003:4). The emphasis on consistency first and foremost works to deny articulations that render means as secondary compared to the ends they are deployed for. The denial of a consequentialist moral frame, where actions are judged by the outcomes they lead to, accords with, if not relies on, the correlative construction of means and ends (Franks, 2010). Such framing disables the legitimization of otherwise unacceptable actions. The consistency criteria, in other words, not only provides a positive reference ground for actions, but more importantly inhibits “ends justify means” rationale. This is different from arguing that “ends do not justify means” for such objection presupposes a *neat* distinction between ends and means. What is opposed here is the underlying assumption that means and ends are factually separate, and accordingly could be separately judged. The argument, in other words, is neither that “ends do not justify means”, nor simply that “ends and means are not separate” as either assertion could be easily refuted with examples. It is not that means and ends are essentially, inherently and inextricably connected; since similar means may bring about quite distinct ends just as similar ends may be achieved by quite distinct means. Neither it is safe to argue that ends do not justify means, since several instances may be provided where a particular means, such as cutting off someone’s arm, unjust on its own, may become justified in a scenario where it is done for the purposes of medical care.<sup>25</sup>

Rather, what the consistency criteria does is to problematize the abstracted separation of means and ends, point to the constitutive relationship between them disabling a neat separation, and to offer an alternative approach for their adoption in politics (Ancelovici, 2015; Luchies, 2012; van de Sande, 2013). The argument is that means and ends, while having the potential to be separate to some extent, *should* “become effectively indistinguishable” in politics (Graeber, 2009:210). This not only provides a limitation for means, but also presupposes a different conceptualization of

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<sup>25</sup> While this example is not quite suitable for an analogy of the means-ends relationship within prefiguration, in the case of cutting someone’s arm, the consistency criteria is interested in *the way* in which mutilation is performed. With the fixed desired ending as saving the person’s life, for instance, there are still multiple ways of doing it. What prefiguration frame underlines is that how you perform the mutilation is relevant. If the underlying principle in saving the person’s life is the “respect for life”, then the way in which procedure is performed should stick to that code.

ends as ideals as argued above. Because means are ends in themselves, and because ideal ends are defined in relation to principles, the conventional separation of means and ends falls short within the prefiguration frame. What coherence principle offers, then, is initiation of criteria for the judgment of actions on their own terms.

#### **4.2.4 Approaches to power, organization & micropolitics (Shitting on all vanguards of this planet collectively)**

The approach to power within prefiguration is established in great relation to the consistency principle and action-orientation. The inclination towards experimentations that accord with the ideal, works as a defining ground for the forms of organization. The attempts to engage in politics that concord with the ideals, in other words, lead the way for micropolitics, decision-making processes, divisions of labor and assignments, distribution of resources etc.

The modus operandi of prefiguration, in its formation and application, ultimately aims to “redesign power’s operation” (Maeckelbergh, 2011:13). Also referred to as “de-centralization”, the idea is not to abolish power per se (Arditi, 2007; Holloway, 2002:19-41), but to distribute it in a way that promotes equality and autonomy over hierarchy. De-centralization, similarly, “means not fewer centers but more” (Gordon, 2008:66). In line with understanding of power as a relation that accumulates through nodes, rather than a possession (Foucault, 1972), in other words, the idea is not to let power go away but to re-organize its accumulation in a fashion that disallows relations of oppression. The political conducts in prefigurative politics reflect such endeavor of a multi-centered organization of power (Cross, 2003: 4-5; Graeber, 2002).

Forms of organization primarily aim to construct “radically inclusive and empowering forms of political communication” (Luchies, 2012:1). Direct or participatory democracy is a common/central demand enacted and experimented with (Hardt & Negri, 2004; Maeckelbergh, 2009 & 2011; van de Sande, 2013: 227 – 232; Sancho, 2014:387; Wood, 2014:2; Yates, 2015:3). Commitment to principles of anti-oppression, which is set to embody different combinations of a full range of anti-‘s, such as sexism, heteronormativity, authority, racism, capitalism, imperialism, ableism, speciesism etc., is enacted in the forms of organization, which are horizontal, “egalitarian, participatory, deliberative and consensual” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:41). The

focus on anti-oppression, rendering power concentration itself as a form of oppression, relies on an intersectional analysis and provides room for “creative coalition-building attuned to the ways in which race, class, gender, ability and sexuality are interwoven with the power of the state, market and culture” (Luchies, 2014:108). The assemblies, workshops, small groups are formed with the intents of forestalling “ideological monolithisms [...] imbued with sectarianism”, which have been taken as sources that perpetuate oppressive relationships (Memos, 2009:226). The decision-making processes, relatedly, work on consensual terms aiming to maximize freedom, without enforcing a totalizing unity and the overrepresentation of particular axis of power at the expense of others.<sup>26</sup>

While “quite different textures” of horizontal organizations emerge in different contexts (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:251), consensus is central to the decision-making processes (Luchies, 2012:13; van de Sande, 2013:232). Consensus, however, does not directly correspond to the aim of “making everyone agree”. The idea is to establish a sort of equilibrium between autonomy and consensus, in hopes to allow room for everyone to act as they see fit without providing a loose frame in which “anything goes”. Echoing the directness aspect of prefiguration and its critical approaches to totalizing narratives of a revolution over revolutions, the underlying concern for the organizations of decision making processes is to come up with ways “to incorporate conflict, not to subsume it under a semblance of forced consensus” (Nunes, 2004:8, quoted in Maeckelbergh, 2012:??), without giving up of the core principles (the anti-‘s).

Affinity groups, workshops, councils, forums and assemblies constitute the backbone of the organization structure (Dupuis-Déri 2010; Jeffrey & Dyson, 2014; Maeckelbergh, 2011 & 2012; Razsa & Kurnik, 2012). While it is not possible to universalize a particular form, usually, decisions are made within smaller groups and taken to the broader group. Ideally, the broader groups, or the spokes-councils do not hold a coercive power over the decisions of smaller groups (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:52). Even if in Occupy Wall Street (OWS), for instance, all decisions were subjected to general assembly’s approval (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:244), this does not necessarily mean that general assembly in OWS had a delegation authorization; decisions were still

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<sup>26</sup> Sullivan (2005) offers a deeply engaged and striking account on the ways in which vertical forms of organizations produced “abuse of power” and “abusive” relationships at the ESF (European Social Forum) organizational process, emblematical of the forms of organization that are not attuned to inner-hierarchies.

taken on a consensual manner. The primary function of workshops in OWS was to develop proposals that would then be carried to the general assembly. The proposals in 15 May (15M) Movement in Barcelona similarly emerged from smaller working groups, taken to the general assembly and open to discussion. In the case of objections and interventions, the proposal is sent back to the working group (Maeckelbergh, 2012). In Occupy Montreal as well, the working committees and affinity groups, while “being relatively autonomous”, were still “accountable to the [General Assembly] (Ancelevici, 2015:7). In Occupy Slovenia, on the other hand, each group – or individual – had the space to organize the way they saw fit. The assembly was not the “primary-decision unit”, rather was a space for intercommunication between different autonomous workshops (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:244). As these examples imply, the relationship between autonomy and consensus is not a strictly defined one, but rather emerges out of a dynamic process in relation to specific contexts that gives rise to them.

### **4.3 Conclusion**

This chapter has introduced prefiguration, the form of politics that relies on the idea of enacting the ideal in the present, which constitutes actions as central. Differing from the prevalent rhetorics of social transformation that set out a blueprint for future ideals, within prefiguration present, future and ideals merge in action through experimentations. Ideals, in the lack of a future as the arrival point, are defined through norms, codes and principles, mostly constituted by “anti-‘s’”, as specified forms of axis of power that produce oppression, such as sexism, capitalism, racism, ableism, heteronormativity etc.

Prefigurative politics also initiates a different analysis of means and ends, and offers a coherency principle. The coherency principle refers to the rejection of instrumental reasonings tending to subjugate means to the ends. The rejection is not only because instrumentality undermines the means’ relevance, but also because an understanding of a definitive end for whose sake actions are partaken is not evident in the first place. Coherency principle, however, is also different from the understanding that calls for a unity between means and ends. Rather, coherency, as suggested by the name, relies on the idea of concordance between actions and ideals, defined by the

codes of anti-'s. The approaches to power and forms of organization are shaped in ways that abide by the coherency principle. Micropolitics, consent, deliberation, and direct democracy are central concerns, which are informed by an understanding of autonomy, but also are limited by the anti's, ensuring the relevance of current problems.

Due to different configurations pertaining to action, temporality, means/ends relationship and power relations, the formerly depicted defenses of violence become incompatible for the prefiguration frame. Valid for both instrumental and essential necessity accounts is an end-oriented theorizing, which falls short in the lack of an instrumental logic, and a pre-defined end as the arrival point. The emphases on "here and now" over "then and there", and the constitution of actions in themselves interlocutors of change rather than instrumental steps taken towards a determinate future, in other words, run counter to the formations within end-oriented approaches.

As for the violence as self-defense approach, the ground for action within self-defense approach is inevitably constructed as *reactive* to the harm done, which presupposes the opponent. For prefiguration, however, the idea is to initiate a proactive form of political conduct, which relies on an ethical reasoning grounded on the right to live a good life here and now, and by implication renders the opponent politically irrelevant. This irrelevancy, however, is mostly valid for conceptual level, since the opponent, mostly the state, inserts itself to the spaces of prefiguration, making irrelevancy harder to generate at the empirical level. But even so, next chapter argues that violence emerging within the prefigurative frame offers a better ground for the preclusion of the problems associated with former defenses of militant praxis, and secures a ground for their problematization.



## CHAPTER 5

### VIOLENCE AND PREFIGURATION

“[A] revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous.”

Mao Tse-tung, *Report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan*

“Washing the dishes is revolutionary.”

Yvonne Yen Liu, *Where is the color in Occupy?*

The accounts of violence and nonviolence outlined in previous chapters operate in a way that is dependent on the opponent and its violence. Their formation of separate ends in a two-sided spectrum works to provide dogmatic forms of association, which does not leave room for criticism and alternatives. In both cases, received or perpetrated violence assumes a central role for the achievement of desired ends. Due to the reliance on the opponent in the theorization of violence and nonviolence, confrontation becomes vital. The formulation of political conduct as such is trapped into the “politics against X”, whereby X becomes central to the articulations of what constitutes the act and success. The configuration of opponent’s violence as positively contributive to the outcome, in turn, perpetuates the valorizations of victimhood and suffering.

Prefiguration, on the other hand, operates in a mode that is incompatible with the ethical reasonings of formerly depicted accounts, such as instrumentality, the idea of a unitary, universally applicable truth, and the constitution of political acts as accumulating towards a determinate future. The rejection of these ethical reasonings enable the preclusion of problems deriving from them, such as the subjugation of present (problems) for the sake of a future to come; instrumental, end-oriented and necessity based defenses that disable critical commitments; and a unitary, generalizable

notion of a revolution. The action-orientation, in a similar vein, has a potential to forestall the construction of sacrificial habitus and the centrality of violence by operating in a frame that renders the opponent irrelevant. The emphases on autonomy, micropolitics, and the approach to power, finally, beforehand deny the dictation of a particular means (either violent or nonviolent) as the possible course of action, and thereby offering room for both violent and nonviolent means. Yet, all of these are conceptual limitations, which are not necessarily effective at the empirical level. Due to the state's willingness and ability to make itself relevant, the potential problems associated with confrontation and militancy still arise within prefigurative politics. Differing from former accounts, however, prefiguration allows room the contestation of problems.

This chapter, in short, argues that violence within prefiguration frame, while being quite incapable of eliminating potential problems associated with militant praxis, at the very least, has a potential to impede some of them. But more importantly, when it does fail to impede them, it secures the ground for criticism and reflexivity, and reflection. The problems that still remain unresolved are referred to in the final section.

### **5.1 Why defense of violence, and not nonviolence?**

Common sense implies a unity between prefiguration and nonviolence for both knit values and actions together, and offer a different analysis of means and ends than the instrumental logic, calling the question of “how come a defense of violence, and not nonviolence, is feasible within the prefiguration frame?”.

First of all, dogmatic nonviolence as a form that prohibits particular forms of action beforehand contradicts with autonomy and self-determination, which are central to prefiguration. Autonomy and self-determination acknowledge that people are capable of deciding what works for them, and promote the understanding that everyone should act as they see fit.<sup>27</sup> Yet, nonviolence, by definition, excludes violent forms of action

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<sup>27</sup> This, as argued in previous chapter, is not a frame in which “everything goes”, but one with certain limitations. But these limitations do not assert “what is to be done”, rather, are aimed to secure the room for everyone the act as they see fit in a way implemented by the anti-‘s. Sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, in this vein, are not included into the definition of “acting as one sees fit”.

beforehand; whereas there is room for nonviolence within the defense of violence, such space does not exist within nonviolence. Taken as such, nonviolence comprises a dogma, setting strict limitations for the catalogue of permitted actions.

The dogma, first and foremost, traverses the “epistemological humility” claims of nonviolence (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1991). Proponents of nonviolence argue that due to the impossibility of a neat certainty that one’s actions comply with the “truth” and the forms of action dictated by it, by abstaining from violent conduct, in case of a wrong doing one only risks causing harm to oneself. While the argument seems to acknowledge the unavailability of the truth, it still operates in a frame that assumes a particular universal truth. The uncertainty refers to the confirmation of the truth rather than its existence, which assumes the possibility of a unitary truth. The rejection of violence, in this sense, is an example of a unitary truth, which is taken as a universal dictum applicable everywhere and to everyone. Prefiguration, however, relies on the availability of multiple truths. In the words of the participant GA7 in Dupuis-Déri, (2010a:64);

“I know perfectly well that I don’t have all the answers on the subject of violence/nonviolence, so I’m not going to prevent people from doing what they want to do; I don’t want that sort of power.”

Taken as such, the prefiguration frame enhances the ethical and epistemological humility by including the assertions of nonviolence to the partial and multiple truths. More importantly, the quote above underlines the power associated with setting limitations. The idea of setting the ground for what is acceptable is taken as a form of power. Called by Foucault as “subjugated knowledges”, in relation to the constitution of the supremacy of nonviolence discourse, alternative means are “disqualified as inadequate to their task” (Foucault, 1972:82). The disqualification, in defining the limits of the norm, works to “validate the ‘true’ definition of radical politics” (Dorfman, 2011:6), and reinforces the authoritarianism of nonviolence discourse (Dupuis-Déri, 2011; Gelderloos, 2013). But it is important to underline that the authoritarianism does not come from the adherence to nonviolence, rather from its generalization. The assumed “positional superiority” (Cross, 2003:8) and the authoritarianism associated with it are sustained through the disregard for the different subject positions, and the different contexts designated by them.

The supposed legitimacy of the order and the criminalization of alternative means constitute a second incompatibility between the binding of dogmatic nonviolence

and prefiguration. The reliance on the “acting as if one was already free” cannot be realized within the nonviolence frame because of the legitimacy of the order discourse inherent to nonviolence thought. The formulation of nonviolence as exempting the state of the nonviolence restrictions affirms the state as a legitimate opponent and does not problematize the state, its violence, and the social conditions of the possibility of state violence. Setting the viable options as limited to the established channels, a form of action that operates outside the conventional political field cannot fit into the nonviolence frame.

Yet, it has been argued that violence should be alien to prefiguration, and that nonviolence is more compatible with the means/ends configuration in prefiguration (Carter, 2005; Martin, 1989 & 2001; Springer, 2011). The argument is that since prefiguration promotes the inseparability of means and ends, violence should have no place within prefiguration. However, while it is true that nonviolence is part of the ideal, such simplistic binding of prefiguration and nonviolence does not hold on several accounts.

First, the relationship between means and ends within prefiguration differs from the one in nonviolence. Nonviolence argues for “be the change you want to see” drawing on the idea that the means and ends are inherently/essentially inseparable. Prefiguration, on the other hand, does not construct the act as the blueprint of the ideal. The ideal, as opposed to a clearly visualized version of a sociality, comprises of particular norms and values. Rather than being subjected to a test of whether they directly represent the idealized future, actions are judged by their adherence/accordance to these codes. But if equality and egalitarian social relations are part of the ideal, and given the hierarchy producing potential of violence, should it not by nature follow that violence should be rejected?

While it is true that violent means are prone to contributing to the formation of hierarchical relationships, it is a potential risk, negativity about violence. The problem with the formulation of the question above is that it “mistake[s] the negativity of violence for its defining feature, instead of it being of a *property* of that feature” (Gordon, 2008:87, emphasis original). Violence always brings about risks, but these are potentialities, which may or may not be realized. Particularly because of the configuration of the ideal as more than a blueprint, and the emphasis on experimentation, prefiguration –while incapable of eliminating the risks wholly–provides the grounds for scrutinization and problematization of the risks. The relevance

of violence for prefiguration then is about the ways in which negative potential of violence is managed.

Second, the binding of prefiguration and nonviolence works only if the ideal is reduced to a particular form of nonviolence. Yet, the desired form of nonviolence, as lack of violence, refers to a “*voluntarily* non-violent society”. “If lack of violence were the only issue”, Gordon further argues,

“a hypothetical totalitarian state, in which the threat of Draconian sanctions is so effective that all citizens obey the law and the state consequentially does not need to ever actually use violence”

would correspond to the satisfaction of the ideal (ibid.:98, emphasis original). However, not only nonviolence is not the only goal, but also the desired form of nonviolence is voluntary. Even in ideal conditions “violence would still exist [...] if someone chose to perpetrate it” (ibid.:98). What is relevant for prefiguration is more about the elimination of the social conditions of the possibility of violence than the elimination of violence per se. In other words, the desired form of nonviolence relates to the context in which the systematic violence does not exist, and thereby eliminating the conditions for the possibility of resistant violence.

This relates to the final discrepancy for the binding of prefiguration and nonviolence, which is about the contextual limitations disallowing a generalized realization of the desired form of nonviolence. The conceptualization of nonviolence that excludes the state’s violence for the satisfaction of nonviolence criteria, puts burden of nonviolence is only on the resistant parties. Prefiguration, however, means “acting as if one was free” and not “acting as if state’s violence does not exist”. It is particularly about the creation of spaces where state does not exist. And in those settings, the ideals pertaining to nonviolence are already enacted within the group, and thereby conform to the coherence principle. Because the focus is on the ways in which ideals are reconstituted here and now, the relationships formed between participants in being nonviolent indeed comply with the ideal.

All of these, however, do not necessarily mean that the idea of nonviolence is incorrigibly incompatible with prefiguration. What does not fit is the dictation of nonviolence as the sole course of action; ignoring the availability of different subject positions; assuming the legitimacy of the state and the order; and sustaining a positional superiority. What is opposed here, then, is not the idea of nonviolence per se, but the

ways in which nonviolence is conceptualized as the categorical, dogmatic and assertive rejection of violence. Accordingly, what prefiguration, ideally, offers is a frame in which neither violence nor nonviolence are dictated as binary and mutually exclusive means of political conduct.

## **5.2 Dependence on violence and the opponent**

The definition of success in nonviolence as convincing the powerful to abstain from abusing its power, first and foremost, normalizes the power imbalance. Without problematizing the power imbalance in which some rule whereas some are ruled over, the concern for nonviolence is to ameliorate the relations of power between these two abstract categories of rulers and subjects. Rather than aiming to challenge the positions of rulers and subjects, in other words, nonviolence is aimed at alleviating the relationship between them. This refers to a conceptualization of power and politics reduced to the relations of compassion and convincing through redemptive suffering. The valorization of suffering as central mechanism for nonviolence risks initiating a habitus, where subjectivities are affirmed through self-sacrifice and victimhood.

For the defenses of violence, on the other hand, particularly in the cases where defense of violence takes a dogmatic form, whereby diversity of tactics is translated into violent means alone, violence similarly risks assuming a central role. The discursive associations between radicalness and violence imply a reduced form of politics as “a reactive opposition that [...] reinforces the power that is, by definition, present in opposition to its resistance” (Sullivan, 2004:29). The activist habitus formed in such context also fosters sacrificial subjectivities that situate violent confrontations as ritual experiences of cleansing from the activist guilt. The willingness for confrontation with the police then becomes affirmative for the activist identifications, as markers of commitment. The configuration of the ground for action as deriving from guilt, dissent and victimhood produces subjectivities fed by narratives of “underdog heroism” (Jansen, 2009:398) and sacrifice. Within such “hardcore habitus” (Sullivan, 2005a), not only participation is limited to particular –and limited- subject positions, but also the political sphere is defined in terms of opposition, which presupposes the opponent.

Valid for both accounts is a formulation where the dependence on the opponent and its violence produces an “affective pedagogy” (Allen, 2009:170, quoted in Razsa, 2015:144) that perpetuates, if not promotes, victimhood and suffering. The “pride in confronting the police and being arrested” (Hammond, 2015:305)”, sustained by the affirmative function of the opponent, initiates a process of identification built on victimhood and heroism. Victimization, “an act [of harm] perpetrated against a person or a group”, deriving from the opponent’s violence, translates into victimhood, defined as “a form of collective identity based on that harm” (Jacoby, 2015:513). Without the harm, the collectivity cannot define itself. The actors, in this vein, are reduced to “perpetual victims” (Ruins, 2002: 4) assuming the role of the “tragic hero”, a subject incapable of controlling the ends, but yet “is able to recognize and accept responsibility for his [sic] actions” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:192).

The willingness to bear with the consequences with pride as affirmative and constitutive of resistant subjectivities creates an ontological link between the actors and the opponent. Either through “redemptive suffering” or the ritual cleansing function violence assumes, the opponent and its violence become central. The place attributed to the violence of the opponent as positively contributive to the outcome, in other words, encourages sacrifice and suffering. Validation, in both accounts, comes exteriorly and violently.

The action-orientation within prefiguration provides the necessary framework for the preclusion of such construction of violence –whether deployed by agents or the opponent- as central for validation. Due to the proactive nature of prefiguration, neither opponent, nor its violence is predetermined as necessary; actions are pivotal on their own terms. The reactive subjectivities, which by definition rely on the opponent, similarly are denied beforehand. The ground for actions within prefiguration is defined through the hope, imagination and experimentation of alternatives, which prioritize subjects of the action over the objects of the action. Action defined as enacting the ideal, in other words, relies on the “right to live a good life here and now” and initiate a different articulation of the relationship between actors and the opponent.

It is primarily due to the idea of “acting as if one was already free” that the preclusion of a mutually constitutive relationship between the actors and the opponent is secured. However, it is important not to mistake such disregard for the state as a delusionary form of ignoring it. The idea is not to assume its absence, but rather is a denial to recognize its legitimacy claims, which are confirmed and perpetuated through

the politics of demand. While acknowledging its existence, in other words, its existence is deemed illegitimate. Actions, similarly, are not formed by thinking about the ways in which to deny recognition, which would mean still defining actions in relation to the opponent. The motivation is to act out as one desires, whereby the denial of recognition incidentally comes as a by-product. The course of action, as performative freedom, renders the state irrelevant.

However, more often than not, state and its military forces insert themselves due to their willingness and ability to violently suppress the zones of performative freedom. Despite the formulation that excludes the state from the picture, it is to some extent true that “utopian experiments survive only while the rulers tolerate them” (Disalvo, 2015:282).<sup>28</sup> And when the state performs its existential tasks, confrontation becomes inevitable. So even if prefiguration implies a disregard for the state, and offers the grounds for the preclusion of the emergence of discursive forms of sacrificial and redemptive violence at the conceptual level, such aspiration is not easily satisfied empirically. This means that even if action-orientation disables a form of engagement where violence becomes central for validation, it is not feasible to argue that it precludes the emergence of confrontational violence altogether. Yet, I argue, this form of violence is a by-product that has no essential value for the actors deploying them and the actions for which they are deployed. Because violence assumes no central value for validation, in other words, its emergence takes the form of a by-product, which may or may not emerge.

First of all, the resistant violence’s emergence is contextually dependent on oppressive violence. Since either type of violence does not assume a central value for validation, their emergence has no determinative function. That is, no meaning is lost on behalf of the action, if the oppressive violence does not emerge. This is primarily different from the former articulations of militant praxis, where the definition of resistance becomes ontologically dependent on the oppressive violence. Here, resistant violence emerges quite materially with the intent of “literally defend[ing] these spaces”

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<sup>28</sup> I have reservations for the use of “tolerance” here, since it assumes a power concentration that is inconceivably unchallengeable. When the actions gain a ground that pose a threat to the constitution of ruler positions, it is definitely not toleration.



of experimentation (Maeckelbergh, 2011:14).<sup>29</sup> The resistant violence here aims to secure the duration of the “liberation of a particular area (of land, of time, of imagination)” (Springer, 2014:412). The liberation potential, then, is still located in the liberated area, and not on violence.

Such formulation of resistant violence as defending a liberated area, however, tediously evokes nation-state rhetoric with the notions of a glorified territory and the military forces fighting on its behalf. Yet, the territory is defined on different terms from the one in nation-state rhetoric on two important points. First, here, as it is the case with resistant violence, territory does not have an intrinsic, essential value.<sup>30</sup> The territory, thought not necessarily always arbitrary, particularly so for the occupation movements, nevertheless does not constitute the priority of the engagement. While symbolic meanings and histories associated with the territories of action usually exist, what constitutes the core of the action is not the material (re-)seizure of the space but the forms of sociality enacted there. This also relates to the second point, whereby whether the endeavor of saving the space has succeeded or failed does not count as a criterion for the success of the action as a whole. Even when the state succeeds in scattering the territory, what it disrupts is the endurance of the experimentation, rather than its succession. The processes that “re-cast territory as a tool of political praxis produced and contested through *relations*” (Ince, 2012:1646, emphasis original), initiate a conceptualization of success that preexists state’s intrusion. Since success is defined through the process, which preexists confrontation, in other words, the seizure of the territory by the state does not mean failure. The territory, in having its significance from the relations, the form of sociality experienced there, could easily be enacted somewhere else, which is not the case for nation-state rhetoric.

Because actions within the prefiguration frame are not taken towards the future, but rather aim to revolutionize the present, emerging forms of violent confrontations are

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<sup>29</sup> The emerging resistant violence still has the potential for the reproduction “boring violence of the everyday”, which is discussed in further detail in the following section.

<sup>30</sup> The form of territory evoked bears remarkable resemblance to the analysis Candan & Kolluoglu (2008), where, adopting the term from Augé (1995), they define gated communities as “non-places”: “non-places; that is, places that lack history, do not have distinguishable markers of identity, and perhaps more importantly are *places that can be replicated endlessly in different places*” (32, emphasis mine).

less prone to producing the problems associated with formerly depicted accounts. As instrumental defenses of violence take future as a stable point towards which actions are hoped to accumulate, for prefiguration such future does not exist. The prioritization of “here and now” over “then and there”, disallows the emergence of violence taken in the name of the (unpredictable) future. While here too use of violence is grounded on end-oriented terms, such as disabling, first, provides a shorter time-span for the judgment of expediency and necessity. Emerging from immediate contexts, the decision to take part in violent confrontations derives from actual conditions, allowing a clearer picture of options and their costs. The immediacy, in short, makes it easier to evaluate the risks and possible outcomes of the decision to whether to adhere to violent means or not. And second, because success is defined through the current experimentations, and not through the actions’ contribution to the future, the likelihood of a discursive association between radicalness and violence decreases. The understanding of success, in relying on actualization of ideals, initiates a different definition of radicalness, which is not necessarily located in actions’ capacity to bring about a better future. The focus on present, in other words, forestalls the grounds for the emergence of a discursive construction of violence as substitution for radicalness.

The focus on present and the emphasis on autonomy and anti-oppression also provide the grounds for scrutinization of current problems. Due to the multi-faceted approach to power, along with the focus on micropolitics, not only possible problems associated with violent means have room to be voiced, but more importantly their deployment is also open to contestation. Rejecting a unified course of action, prefiguration frame allows participants to “collectively define what is or is not politically ‘efficient’” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a:54), or to decide whether efficiency is the primary concern.

As argued in the following section, this does not necessarily mean that violent forms remain devoid of problems. However, what is of importance here is the room provided for the contestation of problems associated with violence. Differing from the argumentations defending violence on future-oriented terms, which tend to construct current problems as obstacles to be endured, preferably silently, the emphasis on autonomy and micropolitics within prefiguration secures the grounds for voicing objections and allows room for alternative, nonviolent means.

### 5.3. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined conceptual formations of prefiguration that works towards avoiding the problems associated with violent means as well as the problems enabled by the ways in which violent means are allowed. The temporal configurations, action-orientation, and the emphases on autonomy and micropolitics within prefiguration allow for an approach in which neither the opponent, nor its violence is presupposed for the course of action. The idea of success within prefiguration further allows room for both objections to militant praxis, as well as alternative means.

Despite the conceptual configurations pointing in the opposite direction, however, violence emerging as a contextual by-product may not necessarily remain so. Even if prefiguration offers preventive measures for an approach that valorizes violence for its own sake, establishes a discursive link between violence and radicalness, and a confrontational loop where the actors and the opponents reproduce each other, the risks are not necessarily eliminated completely at the empirical level. The problems associated with ritualized confrontations such as “hardcore habitus” (Sullivan, 2005a); hierarchical divisions of labor; and risk/responsibility management for participants and non-participants still have currency within prefiguration frame. Rather than a complete dissolution of these problems, which due to the messy nature of politics is not really possible anyway, what prefiguration allows is room for the critique of problems.

Violent confrontations emerging from the context of prefigurative experimentations still have a tendency to become a fetishized form of masculinity display. “Show of force”, originally generated as explicatory of “an operational tactic of intimidation” used by the police forces (Vittrup, 2002, in Peterson, 2006:68), here again risks becoming a habitual form, and politics becomes “an encounter between two opposed performative entities” (Jeffrey & Candea, 2006:290). The allurements of the “cathartic release and momentary self-indulgence” (Sullivan, 2004:15) may then leave the underlying reasonings of violent confrontations aside. It may easily translate to the form within confrontational frame, where violent means are valorized over others. The

formation of hierarchical orders between means and practices, in turn, collaborate with other axis of power. The following anecdotes from OWS in this sense are telling:

“What is characterized as real struggle is the most militant kind of struggle; what is devalued is the areas of care. Jail support is not glamorized, not sexy, not like taking to the streets. It’s also very gendered: jail support was mostly women” (Holmes & Presto, 2012, quoted in Hammond, 2015:303).

“He remembered being in the Occupy Wall Street kitchen one day, where a young woman of color asked a white man to clean the dishes he left in the sink. ‘The young white man said to her, ‘You do it, I’m doing important work.’ But who’s going to do the important work of washing dishes?’” (Liu, 2012:79).

And this is not the only form the division of labor that may take. Particularly in the cases of severe state violence, a division emerges between those deploying violence to open up a space, and those who enjoy the space and then get to define the experience. The Tahrir Square Occupation, in stark contrast to its representation within Western audiences “as a sort of huge hippy festival” (van de Sande, 2013:236), was not really a peaceful “Twitter Revolution”: “Those who tweeted about Tahrir”, Abul-Magd strikingly states, “were not the ones who occupied it, fought bloody battles against the state thugs on its frontiers, died in it, and made the revolution happen” (2012:565). Yet, it was the “westernized, middle-class youth in jeans an T-shirts” who defined the movement to the broader public by circulating their own experience and interpretations, and not the ones fighting on the front lines, most of which “came from lower classes of Cairo”, and “had some form of fighting experience” (ibid.:566). This creates a hierarchical division of labor between the militants opening up the space for the experimentation, and those who conduct the experimentation; “the former create the stage, the latter write most of the play” (Mueller, 2004:146).<sup>31</sup>

Albeit in a different form, here too the division of labor mirrors the embedded relations of power within the social fabric. In the former case, the militant work’s association with masculinity perpetuated gendered hierarchies and “the masculinized ‘hardness’ that so often dominates the left” (Dixon, 2012:44); in the latter, the division of labor perpetuates the disposability of particular bodies over others (Butler, 2004:32-

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<sup>31</sup> This is particularly problematic for those who define the experience may then criminalize the militants, which was certainly the case for the “The first 3 days of Gezi was fine but then...” rhetoric as well as the flyer mentioned in introduction.

8). Knowing that “different axis of power operate and feed each other” is not quite an original point to make, this collaboration of intersection is important to underline when it is about violence, and thereby of life and death, accordingly when the stakes are high.

Another problem refers to risk and responsibility management. Despite the measures taken by the participants in hopes to allow everyone room for acting within their comfort-zones, such as dividing the space and time to fit to the preferred means (Albertani, 2010; Dupuis-Déri, 2010a & 2010b; Gelderloos, 2007), such divisions are rarely respected by the state and its military forces. While I definitely do not mean to align with the position that shifts the responsibility of police violence to the militants, as in “provoking police violence and endangering innocent third parties”,<sup>32</sup> the anticipation, deriving from experience, of possible scenarios initiate the need to consider the responsibilities that participants have towards not only each other, but also non-participants. For non-participants who do not have convenient means to assert their choices, by which I also mean non-humans including animals and plants, the issue of responsibility and risk management becomes even more complicated.

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<sup>32</sup> First, such position affirms the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence. The formulation as “provoking” implies the right to violently suppress, whereby the police violence is constituted as a rightful, disciplinary reaction to “unruly subjects”. The position adopted in this thesis, however, not only rejects the legitimacy claims of the state and its violence, but more importantly posits the consideration of “the social conditions of the possibility of (resistant) violence” as an essential criterion for the allocation of responsibilities.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

“The trouble is that we have a bad habit, encouraged by pedants and sophisticates, of considering happiness as something rather stupid. Only pain is intellectual, only evil interesting. This is the treason of the artist; a refusal to admit the banality of evil, and the terrible boredom of pain.”

Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas*

“[A]n affirmation of desire, meaning, mystery and creative play – *jouissance* – as central to the experience and possibility of being human; a brave embrace of the logic of uncertainty.”

Sian Sullivan, *An Other World is Possible?*, 2005b

This thesis started with problematizing the lack of room for critical engagements, which lead to violence/nonviolence binary, which then lead to the question of what enables violence/nonviolence binary, and which, finally, lead to the ethical reasonings underlying the ways in which violence is allowed or disallowed.

Chapter 2 looked at the disallowance of violence through arguments of morality and efficacy, and argued that nonviolence assumes the legitimacy of the order and the state; reduces politics and power to the relations of compassion and convincing between individuals; decontextualizes violence and its social conditions of the possibility; and in valorizing suffering, risks forming of a sacrificial habitus. Chapter 3, first, traced the ethical reasonings for the defense of violence in revolutionary rhetoric, and argued that instrumental and end-oriented defenses lack limiting criteria for the commission of violence; disable en-route criticism; and constructs a discursive association between violence and radicalness. Drawing on current debates, second part of Chapter 3 argued that confrontational militant praxis produces a hierarchical order between militant and non-militant conducts; contributes to the solidification of oppressive relations; and

initiates a sacrificial “hardcore habitus” where suffering becomes affirmative of resistant subjectivities.

The formulation of politics as ontologically dependent on the opponent, and valorization of suffering were then identified as common traits for articulations of violence and nonviolence. Taking cue from the approach that pays attention to social conditions of the possibility of violence, the track of the thesis went towards a frame that disabled the conditions for the dependence on the opponent and the affirmative function of suffering. Chapter 4 introduced prefiguration as politics of the act, which relies on alternative configurations of temporality, instrumentality and power relations. Chapter 5, finally, argued that former accounts are incompatible with prefigurative politics; that prefiguration offers the conditions for a frame in which the opponent was not central, and thereby precluding the construction of suffering as redemptive at the conceptual level; and that prefigurative frame allowed room for critical engagements. Chapter 5 and the thesis concluded by referring to potential problems not eliminated/resolved at the empirical level.

The unfolding of final chapter and the empirical problems, however, does not necessarily make this thesis a futile attempt/failure, for offering a final recipe has never been among purposes of this thesis. Apart from the impossibility of an inherently coherent, and sterile form of politics, this thesis has exactly ended up with the question it has started: room for critical engagements.

A picture of politics as inherently coherent that encapsulates all aspects of life is not only quite impossible (and deadly boring), but also undesirable. It is undesirable, because it is productive in the Foucauldian sense, producing knowledges, which are armed with the power, the power to discard/subjugate other knowledges, the power to form and limit what counts as truth and the true form of life. Applied to politics, the beforehand limitations of what forms of action comply with autonomy, for instance, becomes itself a restriction undermining autonomy. Taken in its broader sense, autonomy includes the *choice* to partake in actions that disallow full enjoyment of autonomy. Autonomy for prefiguration, then, does not pre-exist, it is enacted and experimented with in the current context. Taken as such, autonomy is an aspiration, a tendency worked on, not an absolutist and abstract principle (Alcoff & Alcoff, 2015:239-240).

Ideas, ideals, principles, imageries, and accordingly political conduct emerge contextually, and are “conditioned and constrained” by the environments surrounding

them (Luchies, 2012:2). This necessitates a flexible ground for the definitions of political conduct, and an insistent reflection on the dynamicity of meanings associated with them. The adherence to principles, in short, need not be taken as strict guidelines to follow, but as aspirations. Mistaking principles and aspirations for absolutisms may produce scenarios like this one, worthy of a long quotation:

“In the classical left and/or anarchist world imaginations of the Western activists, [...] Cola Cola has a different representative power. Coca Cola is not only the symbol of American imperialism, but at the same time it represents capitalism’s colonization of everyday life and its construction of new addictions through the ideology of consumption. To refuse to drink Cola Cola is imagined not only as a symbolic resistance but also a practical one. For example, in anti-globalization forums to drink mate –the traditional herb tea of South America- instead of Coca Cola has become a signifier of alternativeness. Western activists who have been equipped with such imaginations were shocked to see the abundant consumption of Coca Cola when they came to second ‘inter-galaxies’ meeting organized by the Zapatistas in July 2007. They even expressed the discomfort they felt. The response of Subcomandante Marcos of The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was something like: ‘Because water has been privatized in Mexico its price is 10 pesos. Coca Cola, on the other hand, because it is being imported from USA as a product backed by the American capital, is sold for 6 pesos, meaning Coca Cola is cheaper than water. How can I tell the indigenous people to drink water instead of Coca Cola? Moreover, to criticize Zapatistas who are all struggling to construct alternative modes of production, solely for their consumption preferences, to attempt to teach them a lesson on morals, is a great disrespect!’” (Gambetti, 2009:11).

Implied in the anecdote above is the assumption of a positional superiority, similar to the one in nonviolence. More interesting is the colonial residues embedded in colonialism’s critique; it is an understanding that operates through “whatever is right for me should be universally applicable”. The reduced form of anti-capitalist politics as “refusing to consume Coca Cola” is a perfect example of the absolutism and formalism that this thesis has strived to undermine. Enabled by the (desperately destined to be failed) expectations of a sterile, stable, and universal politics, the obsession on form reduces the contextual formation of amorphous contents and risks subjugating alternative modes and modalities, such as one in which consuming Coca Cola is not *decisively* antagonistic to radical politics.<sup>33</sup>

The reason I am talking about these at length is because a similar formalism may emerge from the emphasis of this thesis on the “disregard for the state”, deriving from

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<sup>33</sup> Comandante Marcos has also hilariously said, “We have a way to get rid of Coke, we will drink every last bottle”.



the endeavor to move beyond the “dependence on the opponent”. The disregard for the state, however, should also be taken as an aspiration, one that would not necessarily challenge the integrity of the act when not satisfied. Feminists, for instance, have come up with ways to manage state-less aspirations in state-d settings, inspired by an understanding of “principled pragmatism” (Maiguascha, 2011). Rather than constituting state as a monolithic entity to be destroyed, inverting the parasitical relationship, they adopt forms and strategies to situate state as an instrument to be exploited for their purposes. This refers to a conscious formation of a context-bound relationship with the state, and yet managing to produce measures for “maintaining integrity and critical stance” (Siltanen et al., 2015:263). CrimethInc Ex-Workers’ Collective, in “No Gods and No Masters Degrees” (2007), takes a step further, and offers to turn the (mostly unavoidable) relations with the state to infiltrating into the enemy’s ground, whereby a Masters Degree translates into an opportunity to exploit the privileges it brings about for the revolutionary cause, or becoming a prison guard, for instance, becomes a perfectly revolutionary option. This shows that even what this thesis has identified as a central problem is not to be considered as an absolutist principle, that creative and/or prefigurative ways are possible for the affairs with the state.

As for prefiguration and violence, I do not mean to contribute to a discursive formation that states “if it is prefigurative, it is legitimate”. Since prefiguration is defined as enacting the ideal in the present, if ideals are illegitimate –such as homophobia-, their enactments would also be illegitimate, however prefigurative. Accordingly, arguing that a particular form of action is prefigurative is incapable of substituting a coherent defense of violence on its own. Similarly refuting the arguments about the prefigurativity of actions would not suffice for defining the use of violence as illegitimate, a case still has to be made about why is that case. An act may be prefigurative and illegitimate, as it could be legitimate and yet not prefigurative. Producing an abstract notion of a determinative relationship between prefiguration and legitimacy, in short, is not only not among the aims of this thesis, but also is quite contradictory to them.

This thesis, then, could be read as an attempt to contribute to the literature on “politics of resistance” (Maiguascha, 2011), and to move beyond absolutisms, producing hierarchies and corroding room for critical engagements by initiating a criticism of dogmatic forms of engagements that disregard the messy, contradictory and contextual modes in which politics is bound to operate.

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