FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF LEADERS' MEDIATION ATTEMPTS

by

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the requirements for the degree of
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FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF LEADERS' MEDIATION ATTEMPTS

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ABSTRACT

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ELİF GİZEM DEMİRAĞ

How do a state's political regime type and power status influence leader's mediation attempts? This study develops an explanation as a response to this question derived from the democratic peace theory which underlines the role of democratic norms in motivating state leaders to play a third party role in peace processes. Based on this approach, the expectation is that democratic country representatives are more likely to mediate especially in the early stage of their careers. In addition, I argue that the frequency and timing of leaders' mediation attempts are influenced by the state's regime types and power status. To conduct this research, I analyze the mediation activities initiated by state leaders between 1933 and 1999. The findings suggest that leaders of both democratic and anocratic regimes attempt for mediation sooner than the leaders of autocratic regimes. The study also found that major powers have the highest number of mediation attempts only if the mediator is representing a democratic state. The main finding is that effect of regime type may change based on power status.

ÖZET

LİDERLERİN ARABULUCULUK GİRİŞİMLERİNİN SIKLIĞI VE ZAMANLAMASI

ELİF GİZEM DEMİRAĞ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Arabuluculuk, siyasi rejimler,güç durumu, devlet liderleri, zamanlama

Siyasi rejim vegüç durumu bir liderin arabuluculuk girişimlerini nasıl etkiler? Bu çalışma demokratik normların, liderlerin barış süreçlerinde üçüncü taraf olabilme girişimlerini etkileyen faktörler olduğunu öne süren, demokratik barış teorisinden türetilen bu soru üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Demokratik barış teorisine dayanarak, demokratik ülke liderlerinin göreve geldikleri zamandan itibaren daha sık ve daha çabuk arabuluculuk yapmaları beklenmektedir. Bu çalışma,liderlerin yapmış olduğu arabulucuların sıklığının ve zamanlamasının, liderlerin içinde bulunmuş oldukları siyasi rejimden ve devletin güç durumundan etkilendiğini öne sürmektedir. Bu çalışmayı yürütmek için, 1933 ve 1999 yılları arasında devlet liderleri tarafından gerçekleştirilmiş olan tüm arabuluculuk girişimleri incelendi. Çalışmanın bulguları, demokrasi ve anokrasi ile yürütülen ülkelerde liderlerin otoriter ülke liderlerine göre, göreve geldikleri zaman sonrasında daha hızlı bir şekilde arabuluculuğa başladıklarını ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışmanın sonuçlarıayrıca, ülkelerin güç durumunun liderlerin arabuluculuk girişimleri üzerindeki etkisinin siyasi rejimlere göre farklı olduğunu da göstermektedir.

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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research is to analyze the role of political regimes and the power status of a country in its leaders' involvement in mediation processes. Much of the third party conflict management literature focuses on whenmediation takes place and whether it is successful. Seeking answers these questions;part of the conflict resolution literature investigates the role of mediators, such as individuals, states or international organizations. Only a few studiesaddress why some states are more likely to attempt mediation. Those who concentrate on these aspects generally devote much attention to democratic countries' mediation attempts without analyzing the role of power status.

Thepresent study attempts to develop further explanations for the existing studies. However, in the present study,I adopt a more mediator-centered approach by which my attempt is to identify the role of political regime type and state's power status in leaders' decisions to mediate. Moreover, I will try to explain the timing and frequency of the political leaders' mediation attempts considering the regime type and power status.

This research is driven by the literature on the democratic peace theory and mediation. Democratic peace theory suggests that political regime is one of the main factorsin potential peacemaking processes. This theory also claims that democratic country leaders are more involved in peace processes than non-democratic ones.Based on this argument, I expect that the characteristics and norms of different regimes impact the leader's decision to mediate.

To analyze the frequency and timing of mediation attempts, I have collecteddata on all mediation attempts initiated by state representatives between 1933 and 1999by combining three datasets. The first one is Jacob Bercovitch's International Conflict Management dataset, which provides the list of all conflict resolution attempts in the world from 1933 to 1999. The second dataset is the Polity IV Project, which provides the regime type for the period between 1800 and 2013. The third one is the Archigos dataset,which provides information on entry and exist dates of leaders between 1875 and2004.

Thesignificance of thepresent research derives from its addressing a significant gap in relatedliterature by testing novel hypotheses. Using new data, the study provides empirical support to reveal the relationship between regime type, power status and mediation.

The first chapter of this thesis comprises the literature review, whichis a deeper analysis of existing literature on mediation ofstates. The second chapter lays out the theory and testable hypotheses. The third chapter describes the research design and data sources. The fourth chapter presents the main findings. The fifth chapter provides discussion of research findings. The final chapter presents the conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing literature on states'mediation attempts in relation to regime types provides background information to conduct the present research. However, most studies in the literature rarely refer to the relationship between mediation and the regime type factors that enforce state leaders to mediate. As stated by Bercovitch and Schneider (2000, 146) "unfortunately, we do not know the reasons why certain actors become more active in the mediation market, nor whether features such as impartiality are an important asset in a mediator's inventory of attributes." Referring to this gap in the literature, I aim to reveal the existing theoretical information on political regimes and mediation.

In this review, the first part focuses on the concept of mediation with specific reference to leaders' mediation attempts. The second part analyzesthe relationship between regime type and mediation. The third part investigates the interaction between power status and mediation. Subsequently, the hypotheses are presented based on the existing studies on this subject.

2.1 Mediation

Mediation has become an important subject for the growing literature on conflict resolution. Although mediation was introduced as a part of the conflict resolution field in the 1990s, one can even find references to mediation practices mentioned in the*Qur'an* and the *Bible* (Bercovitch 1993).In general terms, mediation can be defined as a peaceful intervention of third parties in a conflict. However, it is possible to encounter different definitions of mediation in the literature. Moore defines mediation as "the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has not authoritative

decision making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in disputes" (Moore 1996, 14). Accordingly, mediation is a third party activity that brings parties together to generate a solution to the problem at hand without any bias towards the disputants.

Different from Moore, according to Bercovitch (1997, 130), mediation is "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behavior, and do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law." Therefore, Bercovitch (1997) emphasizes the importance of changing the perceptions of parties about each other while mediating for a peaceful outcome.

Scholars in the field of conflict resolution have sought to answer the question "who mediates?" To do so, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) analyzed the total number of mediation attempts during the Cold War period. They identified that neutral countries are more likely to mediate and mediation is not restricted to only permanent members of the Security Council of the UN (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). Going beyond this study, Crescenzi et al. (2008) analyzed the number of existing mediation attempts in addition to identifying the potential mediators who were chose not to mediate. Therefore, they identified the potential conflicts which could have been mediated, analyzed the conflicts which were actually mediated and set the criteria for determining potential mediators (Crescenzi et al.2008).

While seeking an answer the question "who mediates?" scholars emphasized that mediation is a peace making activity that can be initiated by different kinds of third parties. These actors would be individuals, states and international or non-governmental organizations (Bercovitch 2004).State representatives generally launch the "states mediation," which is the main concern of this thesis. Whether it is a large or small state, such as the US or Norway,

state mediation became common in international conflicts. The use of power and leverage give states the ability to conduct mediation processes (Bercovitch 2004).

Scholars studying state mediation emphasize the interest and motives of the mediator. Fisher argues that states mostly bring their own interests to the mediation setting in order to improve the national security or economic interests or to maintain the status quo or develop ties with the allies (Fisher 2010). Similarly, Mitchell believes that when states mediate, these motivations can be at both individual and institutional level. In any case, the mediator can get benefit from either the process or outcome of the mediation (Mitchell 1988). According to Mitchell (1988), the mediator has its own interests while accepting the offer to be a mediator in a particular conflict. To illustrate, it is argued that the United State's President Jimmy Carter was pursuing his personal and national interests while mediating between Egypt and Israel in the Camp David Accords.

The literature investigates the reason why states mediate. It asserts that states use mediation as a foreign policy tool. It is certain that states use different tools to achieve foreign policy objectives. The existing theoretical literature on willingness and capabilities of the states contributes to our understanding of their foreign policy and mediation. The maneuver in a state's foreign policy is influenced by its willingness to achieve some interests. The capabilities of a state play a significant role in achieving its goals. States have their own interest in the international arena. These interests influence the role they take in peace processes. Having an active third party role in peace processes provides states the means to achieve their goals. Only if the states have strong willingness and enough capabilities can secure their interests. "Two-good" theory of foreign policy suggests: "change in a country's foreign policy is contingent upon its willingness and capability to actively promote its interests" (Hatipoglu and Palmer, 2014).

The goals of the state can be determined based on the state's needs and power. Some states can boost their achievement of strategic and geopolitical goals (such as ensuring the status-quo) by taking an active role in the conflicts. On the other hand, some states aim to improve their foreign policy by taking more active roles in conflict resolution. In both of these situations, states need to have strong willingness and capabilities. For instance, in the former, the military and economic power of a state is one of the vital factors that provide the capability to defend its interests in the conflict. In the latter, states effectively use the soft power strategies in the international arena in addition to other resources because they hope to be more attractive for the parties of the conflict. This may create status and reputation for those states in the international arena.

Ramsbotham et al. (2012) suggest that governments take an active role in peace processes due to their national interests. Ramsbotham et al. argue that "governments are not always willing to shoulder a mediating role when their national interests are not at stake, and, where they are, mediation readily blurs into traditional diplomacy and statecraft" (Ramsbotham et al. 2012, 184). Similarly, Kamrava emphasizes that states mediation is motivated by the combination of international prestige and survival strategies (Kamrava2011).

While addressing the mediation from the foreign policy perspective, Touval takes a realist approach about the motives of states. Touval (2003) asserts that "instead of limiting our inquiry to how the mediator influences the relationship between the disputants, we deal with the broader perspective of how goals and strategies of states lead them to mediate in a conflict" (Touval 2003, 91). Touval suggests that the mediator's perceptions of the international system, domestic needs and foreign policy objectives and strategies should be analyzed to understand why states mediate (Touval, 2003).

2.2 The Role of Regime Types in Mediation

The state's motivation to mediate is one of the foreign policy strategies that is shaped by its willingness and capabilities. In this respect, the regime type influences state's decision to mediate in the conflicts. The characteristics of the regime type affect the state leader's choice of mediating domestic and international conflicts. Democracies and autocracies may have different goals but similar willingness and capabilities. Democracies take more active roles in mediation due to their strong norms and institutions. However, autocracies also take an active role in mediationby providing strong resources to the parties, since their strategies are mostly driven by survival and international prestige.

In the literature, regime type is accepted as one of the factors that influence state leaders' decisions to mediate. Melin suggests that the form of government influences the frequency and likely success of mediation (Melin 2013). He argues that "democratic third parties are more likely to be accepted as mediators and democratic disputants are more likely to accept the mediation" (Melin 2013, 85). In addition, the global democratic community promotes using of third party mediation. Therefore, when the level of democracy increases, mediation occurrence increases. If disputants and the mediator are both from democratic countries, they share similar norms and culture (Melin 2013. This increases the likelihood of generating an agreement. Hence, when the level of democracy increases, the outcome of mediation is more likely to be a successful.

Scholars argue that domestic political norms are also implemented in international politics.Compromising is an important issue also for Kinsela and Rousseau, who argue that the democratic political elites come to power in a system in which the principles of "non-violence and compromise" are forefront (Kinsela and Rousseau, cited in Bercovitch 2008). Democratic norms including the competitive and formal elections, restricted government power and freedom of expression influence the approach of state representatives when dealing

with interstate disputes. Following the norms of democracy, democratic country leaders solve their disputes with the assistance of a third party in international politics (Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994). Therefore, to solve their own disputes, democratic country leaders are expected to prefer peaceful resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, good offices support, and arbitration (Raymond 1994; Dixon 1994; Bercovitch and Houston 2001; Mitchell 2002).

As representatives of the state, leaders put great emphasis into achieving foreign policy objectives. The right diplomatic decisions not only secure or guarantee the position of the leaders at the domestic level but also increase their reputation in the international arena. Being active in the international sphere by advancing mediation attempts in different places in the world seems to be a strategy utilized by leaders. When democratic leaders are elected, they have limited time to achieve their goals until the following election. As Tomz and Weeks (2013) put forward, "leaders know that citizens care about foreign policy, that foreign policy often plays a role in electoral campaigns, and that foreign policy mistakes can hurt leaders at the ballot box" (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989, Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003).

In mediation, parties resort to a third party mediation in order to resolve their problems. Crescenzi et al. (2011) argues that transparency formed by the systemic and institutional democratic processes influence the behaviors of potential mediators. Transparency can be a factor that encourages a mediator to be more neutral and impartial. Since the conflict resolution requires a truthful and credible exchange of information between countries, autocratic country leaders are found less likely to have an "open system and transparency" due to "insecure hold of power" (Olson 1993;Böhmelt 2011). Therefore, for disputants, democratic leaders seem to be a more attractive choice as mediators in their conflicts (Dixon 1993, Crescenzi et al. 2011, Melin 2013). Upon the increase in demand from both democracies and non-democracies for democratic country leaders to become involved as a third party in conflict resolution processes, democratic leaders may be more likely to play an

active role in peace processes (Crescenzi et al. 2011).

From the realist point of view, political survival plays an important role in the decision-making processes of leaders for any situation. Leaders have to identify their enemies and ally both in domestic and international politics. In all regimes, politics can mean competitiveness and challenge for leaders. Therefore, they have to calculate possible waysto survive in the system. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. state, "the ambition to remain in power encourages political leaders to behave more responsibly than if they viewed the holding of office as a burden rather than as a prize" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1995, 843).

Scholars have established a consensus on the idea that "leaders act to stay in power" (Downs 1957, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001 and Chiozza and Goemans 2004). The leaders have limited time period to demonstrate their willingness to stay in power to the public, other members of the government and the international community. For this reason, the ambition to remain in power can boost leaders' consideration of their own interests while taking a mediator position. Based on this point of view, it can be expected that when both democratic and non-democratic leaders come to power, they seek a chance to initiatemediation, since it is one of the tools that can ensure survival in the system.

2.3 Role of Power Status in Mediation

The power status of states is another factor in the analysis of leaders' mediation attempts. The state's regime can be an influential factor in answering the question of who mediates. However, when a number of mediation attempts in the last couple of years are taken into consideration, it can be deduced that both democracies and non-democracies may have an active role in resolution of conflicts. In this respect, power status appears as another significant factor that needs to be addressed. Affiliation with international organizations,

power and size are among the main characteristics in analyzing the role of major powers. Power status, in this research, refers to the position of the states in the international community. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are widely accepted as the major or great powers.

In their analysis of the role of power status, some scholars establish a connection between mediation attempts and the state's ties with international organizations. Crescenzi et al. (2011, 1069) develop a theory named "supply side of third-party conflict management." Based on supply side theory, they argue "mediation occurrence depends on the potential mediator's regime and is highly influenced by the increase in the global democracy level as well as the disputants' number of shared International Organizations." They also point out that powerful states mediate more frequently and when they mediate, they achieve successful outcomes (Crescenzi 2011).

The major powers pursue different ways while dealing with conflicts; they would be either a single third party or part of a coalition. When they are in a mediation team, they may pursue different conflict resolution mechanisms. Maoz argues that while playing a peacemaker role, the great powers may cooperate with other great powers and pursue concerted diplomacy (Maoz 1997). Furthermore, they may use their accommodative or coercive power (Maoz 1997).

International pressure, responsibility and international prestige can be thought as the main motives behind great powers' mediation attempts. Furthermore, there would be a significant demand for major powers from the disputants. However, according to Melin (2013), the main expectation that major powers mediate almost in each and every dispute would have exceptions. The common belief to think that this is the obligation of Great Powers would be wrong. In his research on the frequency of state-led mediation and disputes,Melin(2013, 81) showed that since 1945,there has been a large gap between the

number of disputes and the number of mediation efforts. As he suggests "the data does not seem to support the proposition that Great Powers feel any significant obligations to mediate by virtue of their leadership role in the global community" (Melin 2013, 82).

Melin's research also suggests that a significant number of conflicts have occurred without the state-led mediation since 1945.Based on his research, it can be argued that states strategically choose the conflicts which they want to mediate. In other words, if states are involved or not involved in any conflict, as Touval suggests, they may have their own motivations and interests to achieve their goals (Touval, 2003).According to Touval (1992), the superpowers mediate to achieve their goals. The mediator can have both defensive and expansionist interests. Whatever the reason is, mediation can be thecorrect instrument to extend a state's influence. For this reason, since 1945, the US and Russia have been involved in the mediation of a number of conflicts (Touval, 1992). The superpowers wisely adapt the leverage that comes from parties' need for a solution. Their political influence and ability to provide a wide range of resources make them an attractive mediator choice. In that way, they can also secure the improvement of reputation and international image (Touval, 1992).

CHAPTER 3

3. THEORY

The theory that this study utilizes is "democratic peace theory." Scholars who are advocates of the democratic peace theory discuss what influences the state leaders' decisions to be involved in peacemaking processes. Democratic peace theory establishes a support for those who argue that democratic and non-democratic states are different in theirways of attempting mediation.

Institutions and norms in political systems can also determine the position of state representatives in international conflicts. Democratic leaders face a higher level of pressure in regardsto accountability. As Böhmelt states, "the authoritarian leaders can anticipate being in a power indefinitely, while democratic leaders face strict institutional constraints" (Böhmelt 2011). Democratic leaders may need to explain the reasons why they are involved in a conflict (Keohane 1983, 162). Scholars also argue that transparency in democratic institutions creates greater credibility (Fearon 1994; Smith 1996; Schultz 1998). Credibility not only shapes democratic states' foreign policy behavior but also leads to greater audience cost in case of states' failure. The situation would be different in non-democratic countries as credibility and accountability might be insignificant to remaining in power.

Frequent executive turnover is another important factor in democracies. In democracies, when the leader comes to power, he or she is aware of the political competition and necessity of leaving the position due to accountability. On the other hand, in authoritarian states, executive turnover can be less informed and unknown. As Weart (1994) indicates, "we could isolate anocratic and authoritarian regimes as those where demands for loyalty are so concentrated on a leader (or family or clique) that any citizen who works to have the leader

replaced is risking severe punishment" (cited by Goemans et al. 2009, 435). Therefore, in comparison to non-democratic countries, democratic country leaders face a higher level of risk in losing their office (Goemans et al. 2009).

Kinsela and Rousseau assert that in democracies, losing a war does not indicate the end of a leader's political rights or his/her exclusion from power. Leaders are generally expected to leave office in a democratic way. When interests clash in a system, log-rolling or negotiations are usually adopted rather than violence or coercion (Kinsela and Rousseau, cited in Bercovitch 2008). On the other hand, in non-democratic states, loss in elections or battle does not necessarily lead to the leader's removal from office. Furthermore, coercive decisions and violence can be adopted as a legitimate use of power by political elites (Kinsela et al, cited in Bercovitch 2008). The use of coercive decisions in politics creates different ways of losing office for non-democratic and democratic state leaders. Goemans states that "the process whereby a democratic leader loses office is well institutionalized while the nondemocratic leaders often lose office through violent means; rebellions, civil wars, and coups" (2008, 435).

Scholars are in consensus that democratic norms and institutions place democratic country leaders in an advantageous position in terms of playing the role of a mediator. Dixon (1993, 43) considers the main democratic norm as "the willingness to accept compromise solutions to contentious public issues." Sharing similar positions on many issues allows democratic leaders to take joint democratic peace initiatives (Oneal and Russett 1999, Böhmelt 2011). Therefore, establishing mediation coalition with other democratic leaders is easier than doing so with authoritarian leaders since they have "a common background and common political culture which gives these kinds of regimes more inclusivity, a higher level of transparency and it promotes common understanding that induces shared norms" (Onealand Russett 1999, Böhmelt 2011). As the democratic peace theory also suggests,

democratic leaders can have the chance to establish a coalition with other democratic leaders in the long term. Therefore, if they start mediation early in their leadership period and become unsuccessful by acting individually, they can have the capacity to initiate a joint mediation with other leaders.

In addition, scholars also point out the important role of stability in regimes in terms of state leaders' motivation to mediate. Stability is a significant factor for leaders in both non-democratic and democratic countries. Democratic leaders experience more pressure than authoritarian leaders if they come to power in an unstable situation. As Beardsley asserts, "the democratic leaders with a short tenure or unstable polities will be more likely to mediate, whereas the authoritarian leaders with long term tenure in a stable regime will be less likely" (Beardsley,2011). Therefore, in contrast to non-democratic countries, democratic country leaders are expected to mediate in an early stage of their career especially if the state is in an unstable situation.

These propositions establish the grounds for the hypotheses of the present study:

Hypothesis 1: Democracies are more likely to attempt mediation.

Hypothesis 2: Democratic country leaders mediate sooner than other leaders.

Hypothesis 3: Regime type's influence on the frequency and timing of mediation changes based on the power status.

CHAPTER 4

4. METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this paper is to understand the influence of political regime and power status on leaders' mediation attempts. For this purpose, I have collected data on the frequency and timing of mediation attempts and combined it with information on state leaders. This chapter concentrates on the methodology which has been adopted to conduct this research.

The main aims of this chapter are (1) to give information about the research design; (2) to explain the procedure in collecting the data and (3) to present the statistical analysis of the collected data.

4.1 Research Design

In the current research, I have adopted a descriptive research methodology. The goal of this study is to "present a detailed picture of a phenomenon, a picture of specific details of a situation, social setting or relationship" (Neuman 2006, 35). That is, the study is an attempt to address and expand our knowledge on international mediation by exploring the interactions between leader behavior, political regime type and power status. Based on the views of scholar in literature on mediation, exploratory research does not seem to essential. Finally, it appears that statistical relationships in this study are not necessarily causal. Hence, the conclusions drawn in this study are limited to descriptive rather than explanatory research.

4.2 Data Collection Procedures

4.2.1 Large-sample Statistical Analysis

This research aims to describe patterns that characterize all the actors in the international system during the period between 1933 and 1999. The large geographical and temporal range allows me to conduct a large sample statistical analysis and provide general empirical information. In this research, I adopted the deductive approach. Snieder and Larner (2009) state that the deductive approach follows the path of logic most closely. The reasoning starts with a theory and leads to a new hypothesis. This hypothesis is "put to the test by confronting it with observations that either lead to a confirmation or a rejection of the hypothesis" (2009, 16).

4.2.2 Secondary Analysis of Data

In this research, I benefited from the secondary data sources. The main advantage of using secondary sources is its being time saving. In addition, although primary sources provide us with firsthand information, secondary sources can enable the collection of data even after the event. According to Neuman, "primary sources have realism and authencity, but the practical limitation of time can restrict research on many primary sources to a narrow time frame and location" (2006, 416).

I conducted the secondary analysis by using the existing datasets and reanalyzing the data provided by them. In order to conduct this research, I had to combine information on international mediation attempts, political regimes and leaders' entry and exit dates to office. I have used STATA data analysis and statistical software. Each dataset provides information which I can take and apply to my research. The following datasets are used in

the present study:

(1) International Conflict Management Dataset (ICM)

(2) Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders

(3) Polity IV Project: Country Reports

4.2.3 Limitations of the Data

The first limitation in data collection process was that although I have used reliable secondary sources, some information was missing in the datasets. For instance, in the Polity IV dataset, some countries' polity scores were not coded. Specifically, 30 countries polity scores were not coded. The second limitation is based on the fact that the data sets I used did not provide information related to the periods before 1933 and after 1999. For this reason, the current research had to be limited to a specific time period: the period between 1933 and 1999.

4.3.3 Data Preparation

In this research, my goal was to analyze the number of conflicts which were mediated and the timing of state leaders' mediation attempts. The following section provides the initial steps that were taken to merge the datasets.

Frequency and Timing

Most studies on the topic of mediation have used the International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset.The ICM dataset is provided by Bercovitch Data Centre for Conflict, Mediation and Peacebuilding which provides the core information for the present research. ICM is the most comprehensive and contemporary dataset including quantitative data which provides very detailed information about the nature of the conflict, parties,

issues and outcomes between 1933 and 1999. The most important benefit of using the ICM dataset is that it includes very extensive information about third party conflict management.

The first goal of my empirical work was to keep mediation by taking out other entries coded in the conflict management type variable. This was an essential step to take in order to concentrate specifically on mediation attempts. As previously indicated, the ICM dataset provides information about various types of conflict management attempts. They include six main categories, which are no conflict management activity, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, referral to international organization and multilateral conference. After the other types of conflict management were omitted, I was left with 455 observations.

The second step was to code the leaders' mediation attempts. In the ICM dataset, the identity of the third partieswas coded by assigning each leader a code number. Therefore, for each mediation attempt, information regarding who conducted the mediation process could be reached. However, in the dataset, the information about all mediators is given as one entry. To illustrate, if a mediator comes from a single state, the name of that state is written together with its codeasone entry. If the mediators come from more than one state or they are associated with a non-state actor (e.g. the Pope), they are all listed in the same entry with their codes. This made it necessary to re-code each mediator listed manually with their country equivalent.

After disaggregating separate state representatives and omitting non-state actors, I was left with 1413 observations. Using the "conflict management date" information in ICM, I assigned each mediation attempt to the national leader who was in power at the time.

Duration

The second major step in my empirical work was to find a way to analyze the time span between the date of the state leader's mediation attempts and thesame leader's date of entry to office. Finding the duration between these two dates enabledthe calculation of how

much time had passed between a state leader's entrance to office and his/her first attempt to mediate. Information regarding a leader's dates of entry and exit from officeis derived from the Archigos dataset. Archigos is a data set providing empirical information on political leaders in 188 countries from 1875 to 2004 (Goemans et al., 2009).

Regime Type

Data on regime type was derived from the Polity IV data set. Ted Gurr's Polity IV Project provides political regime characteristics and transitions between 1800 and 2006 (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).The project is the most common resource to analyze "the regime and effects of regime authority" (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).

Polity IV has certain indicators for both institutionalized democracy and autocracy. The main indicators for the institutionalized democracy include "the presence of institutions and procedures, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation" (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 13). Both democracy and autocracy indicators have developed a polity score for each country based on an eleven-point scale (0-10). While the score of +10 indicates being strongly democratic and the score of -10 indicates being strongly autocratic. The polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score.[1]

In order to identify the regime types of the state leaders who mediated, it was necessary to match them with the polity scores. For this reason, I incorporated the Polity IV data set into my own data set, which I had previously generated by combining ICM and Archigos. First, if a state's polity score was higher than 6, it is coded as a democracy. Second, if the state's polity score was between -6 and6, thenit was coded as 1, which referred to anocracy. Third, if the state's polity score was lower than -6, it was coded as 0, indicating autocracy.

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[1]Polity scores: Autocracies (-10 to -6), Anocracies (-6 to 6), Democracies: (6 to 10)

Power Status

In the present study, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia) are accepted as the major powers.[2]Based on this, mediation attempts of major powers were coded as 1, and others were coded as 0.

Cold War

The Cold War has an important place in conflict resolution literature. In the literature, scholars debate over whether mediation attempts have increased since the end of the Cold War. Druckman and Stern (2000) argue that change in the geopolitical context led to "modification and refinement" of the understanding of conflict resolution. Some other scholars focused more on mediation and figured out strong empirical support to show this change. According to Bercovitch, since World War II, more than half of 1334 mediation attempts have occurred after the Cold War (Bercovitch 1999). Therefore, a dramatic increase is expected in state-led mediation after the Cold War.[3]Due to the reasons mentioned, as a control variable, I have created a dichotomous variable for the Cold War. If the leader attempted to mediate before and during the year 1990, these entries were coded as 0. If the attempt was made after 1990, it was coded as 1.

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[2]Some scholars categorize major powers according to the COW dataset's definition, which also includes Germany and Japan in the post-World War 2 period. In our dataset Japan has no mediation attempts and Germany has only a few. Our results are robust to including Germany and Japan as major powers.
[3]In this research, the end of Cold War is taken as 1991.

CHAPTER 5

5. **DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS**

In this study, the research question is how a state's political regime and power status influenced its mediation attempts. Based on the democratic peace theory and mediation literature, I developed three hypotheses. In this part of the study, I will present my findings based on the quantitative analysis.

I first provide a descriptive summary of the data. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables. The total number of observation was 1152, which indicates the total number of mediation initiated by the leaders between 1933 and 1999. As previously mentioned, the dependent variable is the duration between the leaders' date of first entrance to office and the date of the leaders' mediation attempt. The results show that the shortest duration of time to initiate mediationwas 1 day, while the longest was 15,225 days. The longest duration of timeshows that one of the country leaders mediated approximately after 41 years of entering office. The mean is 2044, which a little over 5.5 years. This indicates the average time which has passed after the leaders entered office. Regime type, power status and Cold War are the ordinal variables in the dataset; therefore, the means are less than 2 points.

Table 2 shows the number of mediation attempts by categories of regime type. According to my data, the number of mediation activities launched by the state leaders of democratic countries is 467 (Table 2). The number of mediation activities of authoritarian and anocratic country leaders is 418 and 237, respectively. Although the democratic countries seem to have the highest number of mediation activities, these numbers would not make sense without calculating how many leaders from each regime type came to power during the period

under study. Therefore, based on the analysis driven from these statistics, I have found limited support for the first hypothesis, which links the mediation attempts and the mediator's regime type.

In order to analyze the mediation attempts based on the regime types, I have calculated the number of mediation attempts that fall into specific regime type. The aim was to understand whether the duration of each regime type was the same throughout the period from 1933 to 1999. To do so, I needed to have information about two things. First, I needed to know how long each regime continued between 1933 and 1999. Second, I needed to know how many attempts were done in these regime years. To create the number variable of the number regime years, I used the information in the Polity IV data set. I already had the information concerning the second question in my dataset.

I first generated a new variable called *regime*. I analyzed the distribution of the*regime* variable between the years 1933 and1999. The statistical analysis provided me with the number of total country-years for each regime type. I found that while the total country year for autocracy was 2881, it was 2568 times for the democracy. In addition, total country year was 1266 for anocracy, which has the lowest total country years among others. Identifying this information was important since it provided me with the numbers which were to be divided by the number of mediation attempts.

Figure 1 presents the average number of mediation attempts per year for each regime type under the column of mediation attempts per regime year. I calculated these numbers dividing the number of mediation attempts by the number of total country-years foreach regime type. Mediation attempts per regime year are observed to be very close for anocratic and democratic countries and it is about 0.18. Autocratic countries have the lowest ratio, which is 0.15. These numbers indicate how many mediation attempts fall in the different regime years during the time period between 1933 and 1999.Comparing these ratios, we can

assert that democratic and anocratic country leaders made almost the same number of mediation attempts between 1933 and 1999. In addition, it can be concluded that while the democratic countries attempt mediation most often, autocratic countries have the lowest number of mediation attempts between 1933 and 1999.

Figure 1: The Number of Mediation Attempts per Year by Regime Type

The results suggest that to analyze how many mediation attempts were made by leaders in different regimes, proportions should be analyzed. The reason is that when looking at the number of mediation attempts without considering the proportions, anocratic country leaders seem to have the lowest total number of mediation while the democracies have the highest number of mediation attempts. However, when we analyzed the proportions of mediation attempts based on the regime years, we have seen that autocratic country leaders have the lowest total number of mediation between 1933 and 1999 while the anocracies and democracies have almost the same number of mediation attempts.

In addition to total number of mediation attempts based on regime types, I also analyzed the frequency of mediation attempts based on power status and regime year. To do so, I used information on Polity IV data set again. I created a new variable on Polity IV data set, which is called *power status.* I coded five major powers as 1. Using this variable, I

identified how many regimes that fall in the category of non-major powers and major powers. Table 3 provides the ratios for both non-major powers and major powers. I found the values in the column of mediation attempts per regime year by dividing number of mediation attempts by the number of regime years.

Table 4 in the appendix provides the descriptive statistics of the power status and regime type. It separates the leaders' mediation activities into two groups: major powers and non-major powers. The results demonstrates that 579 of 1152 mediation attempts were made by the non-major powers while 543 of 1152 mediation attempts were performed by the major powers (Table 4). Therefore, the total number of mediation attempts of major powers is less than non-major powers between 1933 and 1999. Based on the results, I can hardly confirm the general expectation that major powers are more likely to mediate. Considering the role of power status, I found that the frequency of major power's mediation attempts depend on the regime type. The statistical analysis demonstrated that major powers are more likely to mediate only if the country is also democratic. Therefore, anocratic and autocratic country leaders can have higher number of mediation attempts even if they are not the major powers. The analysis suggests that the influence of power status on leader's mediation attempts may change based on the regime type. In other words, the regime type could not have a vital effect if the country is one of the major powers.

Figure 2 shows the ratios of non-major powers with respect to regime type. The autocracies have the highest mediation attempts per regime year which is about 0.10. The democracies and anocracies have very similar mediation attempts per regime year which is about 0.05. The results indicate that if the country is a non-major power and autocratic at the same time, it mediates more than democratic and anocratic countries. This validates the information that I have found and presented in Table 4 as well.

Figure 2 displays the ratios of major powers with respect to regime type. Considering the mediation attempts per regime years, I found that anocracies have the highest number of

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mediation if the country is democratic. Figure 2 shows that while the ratio is 2.79 for anocracies, it is 2.39 for democracies. This information contradicts with the results that I have found in the previous analysis (Table 2). In the first analysis, the anocracies have the lowest number of mediation. However, the second analysis indicated that countries fall into anocratic country repeats 24 years in my data set (Table 3 in the appendix). For this reason, the ratio became higher for anocracies in the second analysis (Table 3 in the appendix).

When we compare the mediation attempts of major powers and non-major powers on Figure 2, we can see very interesting results. For instance, autocratic countries have the highest number of mediation attempts when they are non-major powers, while they have the lowest number of mediation when they are major powers. In addition, anocracies have the lowest number of mediation if they are non-major powers while they have the highest number of mediation when they are major powers. The findings suggest that to identify which regime leaders have the highest number of mediation attempts among major powers, we need to check how many regime years fall into the category of major powers between 1933 and 1999.

Figure 2: Number of Mediation Attempts per Year, by Regime Type and Power Status

I also checked timing of mediation attempts in different regimes controlling the Cold War. The end of Cold War led to the normative change which transforms techniques to deal with the conflicts (Druckman and Stern 2000). In this research, for this reason, the control variable-*Cold War* was created since we need to understand dynamics which may have an influence on the analysis of data. In order to conduct this analysis, I divided the number of regime years (before and after 1991) by the number of mediation attempts (Figure 4). Figure 4 indicates that before 1991, democracies have the highest ratio which is 0.05. It means they have the highest number of mediation attempts before 1991. On the other hand, Figure 4 also shows that the autocracies have higher number of mediation than other countries after 1991. In addition, while anocracies have the lowest number of mediation attempt before 1991, democracies have the lowest number of mediation attempts after 1991. Figure 4 also suggests that before 1991, total number of mediation attempts of all regimes were close, after 1991, the gap was extended among the number of countries' mediation attempt because autocracies almost doubled the mediation attempts of other countries. Therefore, the answer of "who mediate" may change when we control the Cold War.


Figure 3: Number of Mediation Attempts, per Year, by Regime Type and Cold War

In this study, I also explored the timing of mediation attempts based on the regime type. As previously mentioned, democratic peace theory scholars suggest that democratic norms and institutions including transparency, credibility and frequent turnovers create a political environment in which the democratic country leaders take a peacemaker role at the earliest. To test this claim, I calculated the duration between a leaders's first day at office and the date of the first mediation attempt. The findings already mentioned suggest that the average number of mediation activities for state leaders in democracies is higher than non-democracies (Figure 2).The results mentioned provide an average number of mediation activities of leaders in different regimes.

To understand how soon leaders launched their first mediation attempts after entering office, we check if, on average, leaders from different regime types (democratic/ anocratic/ autocratic) differed in how quickly they made their first mediation attempts. Table 4 shows the date of the first mediation attempts based on the regime type. The data shows that the anocratic country leaders have the lowest number of first mediation attempts after entering the office, which is 64. While democratic country leaders have 71 first mediation attempts, authoritarian leaders have 80 first mediation attempts. Therefore, on average, authoritarian country leaders have a higher number of first mediation attempts than the leaders in other regimes.

I also found the average timing of the first mediation attempts based on the regime type. Figure 2 shows the average time passed to launch the first mediation after the leaders entered the office. Autocratic countries launched their first mediation attempts approximately 1981 days later. The average time to launch mediation was approximately 1133 days for anocratic leaders. On the other hand, the average time to start mediation for democratic leaders was found to be 863 days.

Figure 4:Time Until Leader's First Mediation Attempt, by Regime Type

The results indicate that democratic country leaders launched their first mediation attempts earlier than leaders in non-democratic regimes. On average, we may expect that whereas the democratic country leaders mediate about 2.5 years later, autocratic country leaders mediate approximately 5.5 years later. Considering these results, evidence has been found in the previous study to indicate that democratic country leaders tend to mediate earlier than leaders of anocratic and authoritarian countries.

I also found the average time to launch the first mediation attempt based on the regime type and power status. To explain how soon the leaders launch their first mediation attempts after entering office, we analyze if, on average, countries which have different power status (major powers/non-major powers) differ in how quickly they make their first mediation attempts. Figure 5 provides the statistical analysis of first mediation attempts based on the power status. Among the non-major powers, those who have the democratic regimes mediated approximately 1037 days later after they entered the office. Anocratic countries launched their first mediation attempts on about 1263rd days on average after entering office. And, autocratic countries mediated the first time after about 1878 days passed of their entrance to the office.

Figure 5:Time Until Leader's First Mediation Attempt, by Regime Type and Power Status

Therefore, the results imply that democratic country leaders launched the first mediation sooner than other regimes regardless of power status. This result is in the same direction with the previous analysis which I provided on table 3 as it also suggested that democracies mediate sooner.

Figure 5 also shows the numbers for the first mediation attempts of major powers. The figure suggests that among the major powers, democratic country leaders actualized the first mediation attempts after 447 days on average. However, among major powers, anocratic countries' first mediation attempt is sooner than democratic country leaders' first mediation attempt. On average, the anocratic country leaders mediated on the 344th day of their entrance to office. The average for autocratic countries is about 3251 days. Thus, if the leaders represent one of the major powers, among them, democratic country representatives mediated earlier than others.

The results mentioned were also tested by controlling the influence of Cold War. The findings indicate that democracies mediated sooner than non-democracies before and after 1991. To have more concrete results, I also checked timing of mediation attempts in different

regimes controlling the Cold War. In order to conduct this analysis, I divided the number of regime years (before and after the Cold War) by the number of mediation attempts (Figure 6). Table 10a (in the appendix) indicates that democracies have the highest ratio refering that they have the most number of mediation attempts before the Cold War in my data set. On the other hand, Table 10b shows that the autocracies have the higher number of mediation after the Cold War. In addition, while the anocracies have the lowest number of mediation attempt before the Cold War, democracies have the lowest number of mediation attempts after the Cold War. Therefore, the answer of "who mediate" changes when we control for the Cold War.

Figure 6: Time Until Leader's First Mediation Attempt by Regime Type and Cold War

The next step of my research is to provide more detailed analysis about the mediation attempts based on the geographical regions and regional powers. To do this analysis, first, I identifyregional powers thathave the highest number of mediation attempts in a particular region.Hence, I determined the geographical regions based on the categories of Correlates of War Project. Therefore, the regions in my dataset are Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania. Since my dataset includes countries from other regions, I added the Middle East and

Post-Soviet regionsas well.

In order to identify the most powerful countries in a particular region, I merged the National Material Capabilities Dataset withthe dataset that I previously used. The National Material Capabilities Dataset provides Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score. The CINC score provides six indicators,which contain "annual values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members" (COW, 2016). After calculating the CINC score of all countries, I identified three countries in each geographical region that have the highest CINC score in every ten years period between 1933 and 1999. The Figure 7 shows the distribution of mediation attempts of these countries calculated based on the CINC score. The Figure 7presents that the total number of three powerful countries' mediation attempts in all regions consist of almost half of all mediation attempts between 1933 and 1999.

Figure 7: Number of Mediation Attempts by the CINC Score

Figure 8 shows the frequency distribution of theregional power's mediation attempts in different regions. Specifically, this figure presents the distribution of regional power's mediation attempts which was provided on Figure 7. Figure 8 suggests that the powerful

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countries in the region of America have the highest number of mediation attempts in comparison tothenumber of mediation attempts by regional powers in other regions.Those countries are the United States, Canada and Brazil. On the other hand, Oceania's regional powers haverelatively lower mediation attempts.The countries in this category are Australia and New Zealand. (See Table 14 in the Appendix for countries in other regions.)

Figure 8: Number of Mediation Attempts byRegional Powers and Regions

I also analyzed the frequency of regional power's mediation attempts based on the regime type. Figure 9 indicates the distribution of mediation attempts of regional powers and non-regional powers with respect to regime type. Similar to previous analysis, I calculated only three regional power's mediation attempts while analyzing their relations to the regime type. In the Figure 9, I analyzed total number of mediation which is all mediation attempts launched by three regional countries in each geographical region. Figure 9 suggests that regional powers had higher number of mediation attempts in comparison to non-regional powersin democracies.On the other hand, non-regional powers launched mediation more thanregional powers if they are both autocracies.

Figure 9: Number of Mediation Attempts by Regional Powers and Regime Type

AdditionallyI analyzein which type of the conflicts the leaders were more likely to get involved as a mediator. I used Bercovitch's ICM Dataset as the dataset provides detailed information about third parties involvement in different types of conflicts. In the ICM Dataset, the type of conflict is separated into two categories, which are 'civil/internal conflict that has been internationalized' and 'interstate conflicts'.I calculated how many mediation attempts fall in the categories of civil conflict and how many in the category of interstate conflict. To do so, I first identified the number of regime years and number of mediation attempts in civil/interstate conflicts. Next, I divided regime years by the number of mediation attempts.

Figure 10 shows the number of mediation attempts by regime type and conflict type. The proportions suggest that democracies mediated more than non-democracies in the interstate conflicts. On the other hand, anocracies attempted mediation more than other regimes ifthe type of conflict was civil.In addition, the analysis suggests that autocracies mediated less than all others in both interstate and civil conflicts.

Figure 10: Number of Mediation Attempt by Regime and Conflict Type

CHAPTER 6

6. DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

In this chapter, the main results of the study will be discussed in detail. Two main goals of this chapter are to answer: a) to what extent this study supports the existing studies and b) how the findings differ from than other studies.

The study's results may contribute tothe existing literature in two ways. This study aimed to contribute to the existing literature on democratic peace theory and mediation. Firstly, it aimed to fill the gap in the mediation literature. Very few scholars were interested in understanding "who attempts mediation". In the present study, to understand "who mediate", I analyzed the regime type and power status of the state.To do so, this study also established additions to the arguments of democratic peace scholars who suggest that democracies are more involved in peace settlements as third parties.

Thepresent study hasslightly different empirical claims for the period from 1933 to 1999. Considering the change in the regime types throughout the years, we may not be able to suggest that democratic countries are more likely to attempt mediation. Indeed, taking regime years into account the results show that anocratic countries mediated as much asdemocratic countries between 1933 and 1999. Furthermore, while analyzing timing and frequency of mediation attempts, the main assumption was that democratic countries launch their mediation attempts in early period of their leadership.The features of democratic institutions including transparency, credibility and frequent turnover would lead to state leaders in democracies to take quick actions in the international arena. The results of the present studyconfirm this claim. The results show that democratic leaderslaunch the mediation attempts sooner than leaders in other regimes after they enter office.

In the literature, the power status was also considered as a crucial factor to take an active role in peace processes. Focusing on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the present study tried to analyze the mediation attempts of major power state leaders. Given that these countries have a great responsibility in the international community, there was a higher expectation in the number of their mediation attempts especially if the country was both democratic and a major power. The empirical analysis result that was yielded showed that being a democratic country may not be crucial to have a higher number of mediation attempts. If the country is one of the major powers, its regime type would not be a deterministic factor to determine the number of mediation attempts.

Therefore, the study suggests that the major powers who mediate would not be democratic country leaders in all situations. For instance, the US and China has different regime types. However, they have a higher number of mediation attempts than those who have higher polity scores. Therefore, Touval's understanding of motivations to mediate can help to explain these cases. These countries' major power positions in the international community would lead them to bemediators in peace processes. Their decisions to take an active role as peacemakers can be shaped by their own interests or demands from parties in conflict or other actors in the world.

The study also confirmed scholars' arguments about the change in peacemaking activities after the Cold War. The number of mediation activities increased after the Cold War. Although democracies tended to mediate more frequently before the Cold War, autocracies mediated more than democracies after the Cold War. Therefore, the influence of regime type on the decision to mediate changed during the post-Cold War period.

CHAPTER 7

7. CONCLUSION

Driven by the democratic peace theory and mediation literature, this study analyzed the influence of regime types and power status on timing and frequency of leaders' mediation attempts. This thesisaimed to contribute to the existing literature in two ways.

First of all, this study showed that political regimes would be an important explanatory variable to understand the frequency and timing of mediation attempts.The results of this studyshowed that timing and frequency of mediation attempts were different for democracies and non-democracies during the period between 1933 and 1999. During this period, democratic state leaders were involved in mediation activities more than non-democratic state leaders. The democratic leaders' mediation attempts were mainly initiated before the Cold War. Furthermore, considering the duration between the leader's first day at office and the same leader's mediation attempt, the study found out that democraticleaders tended to mediate in early period of their leadership.

Secondly,this study showed thata state's power statusis another important factor to understand the timing and frequency of mediation attempts. The research found that major powers tended to mediate earlier than non-major powers between 1933 and 1999. The result indicates that regime type isnot of significance if the country is one of the major powers. This argument is valid for all mediation attempts before and after the Cold War.

Overall, this study suggests thatunderstanding timing and frequency of leaders' mediation attempts can be one ofthe ways to answer the following questions: "Who mediate?" and"When do they mediate?"In the light of the current study's outcomes, future studies can analyze deeply the question, "Why do they mediate?"

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APPENDIX

Table 1:Descriptive Statistics for Duration, Regime, Power Status and Cold War

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Duration	1152	2.044.711	2389.644	1	15225
RegimeType	1122	1.043672	.8874484	0	2
Power Status	1152	.4756944	.4996258	0	1
Cold War	1152	.5911458	.4918358	0	1

Table 2:Number of Mediation Attempts per Year by Regime Type

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Autocracy	418	2881	0,1450
Anocracy	237	1266	0,1872
Democracy	467	2568	0,1818

Table 3: The Number of Mediation Attempts by Major Powers and Non-Major Powers

a) Non-major Powers

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Democracy	103	2416	0,0426
Anocracy	170	1242	0,0058
Autocracy	306	2784	0,1099

b) Major Powers

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Democracy	364	152	2,3947
Anocracy	67	24	2,7916
Autocracy	112	94	1,1914

Table4:The Number of Mediation Attempts by the Regime Type and Power Status (without regime year)

Regime	Power Status		
	Non-major Power	**Major Power**	**Total**
Democracy	103	364	467
Anocracy	170	67	237
Autocracy	306	112	418
Total	579	543	1,122

Table 5:Time Until Leader's First Mediation Attempts

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Autocracy	80	**1981.925**	2504.06	8	14251
Anocracy	64	**1133.984**	1441.983	1	8252
Democracy	71	**863.0704**	1158.592	4	7090

Table6:Time Until the Leader's First Mediation Attempt by the Regime Type and Power Status

a) Non-major Powers

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democracy	50	1037.76	1283.281	4	7090
Anocracy	55	1263.145	1514.58	1	8252
Autocracy	74	1878.973	2126.934	8	8913

b) Major Powers

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democracy	21	447.1429	636.8273	5	2453
Anocracy	9	344.6667	273.5708	30	713
Autocracy	6	3251.667	5561.592	31	14251

Table7: The Number of Mediation Attempts Based on the Cold War and Power Status

	Before Cold War	After Cold War
Major Power	181	355
Non-Major Power	254	326

Table 8: Time Until the First Mediation Attempt by Regime Type and Cold War

Before the Cold War

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years Before the Cold War	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Democracy	196	3310	0,0592
Anocracy	93	3965	0,0234
Autocracy	132	4813	0,0274

After the Cold War

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years After the Cold War	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Democracy	262	694	0,3775
Anocracy	138	295	0,4677
Autocracy	267	281	0,9501

Table 9:Number of Mediation Attempts by the Cold War and Regime Type

Regime	Before Cold War	After Cold War
Democracy	196	262
Anocracy	93	138
Autocracy	132	267
Total	421	667

Table 10: Mediation Attempts by Type of Conflict

Civil Conflicts

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Autocracy	298	2881	0,10
Anocracy	171	1266	0,13
Democracy	304	2568	0,11

Interstate Conflicts

Regime Type	Number of Mediation Attempts	Number of Regime Years	Mediation Attempts per Regime Year
Autocracy	119	2881	0,04
Anocracy	66	1266	0,05
Democracy	163	2568	0,06

Table 11: The Mediation Attempts of Autocratic Countries 1933-1999

Country	Freq	Percent
Afghanistan	9	2.15
Algeria	14	3.35
Angola	4	0.96
Brazil	2	0.48
Cambodia	2	0.48
Chad	1	0.24
China	2	0.48
Djibouti	2	0.48
Egypt	21	5.02
ElSalvador	2	0.48
Eritrea	1	0.24
Ethiopia	3	0.72
France	5	1.20
Gabon	5	1.20
Germany	3	0.72
Ghana	4	0.96
Guinea	5	1.20
Indonesia	7	1.67
Iran	23	5.50
Italy	3	0.72
Japan	1	0.24
Jordan	5	1.20
Kenya	11	2.63
Kuwait	9	2.15
Liberia	3	0.72
Libya	19	4.55
Mali	3	0.72
Mauritania	1	0.24
Mexico	1	0.24
Morocco	6	1.44
Mozambique	1	0.24
Niger	2	0.48
Nigeria	16	3.83
Norway	1	0.24
Oman	2	0.48
Pakistan	3	0.72
Panama	1	0.24
Portugal	4	0.96
Qatar	1	0.24
Romania	2	0.48
Russia	105	25.12
Saudi Arabia	17	4.07
Sierra Leone	1	0.24

Somalia	1	0.24
Spain	2	0.48
Sudan	9	2.15
Syria	19	4.55
Tanzania	24	5.74
Thailand	4	0.96
Togo	7	1.67
Tunisia	5	1.20
Turkey	3	0.72
Turkmenistan	1	0.24
Uganda	2	0.48
Yugoslavia	1	0.24
Zambia	6	1.44
Zimbabwe	1	0.24
Total	418	100.00

Table 12: The Mediation Attempts of Democratic Countries 1933-1999

Country	Freq.	Percent
Australia	8	1.71
Austria	3	0.64
Belgium	4	0.86
Canada	5	1.07
Colombia	1	0.21
Costa Rica	7	1.50
Cyprus	1	0.21
El Salvador	1	0.21
Finland	3	0.64
France	27	5.78
Gambia	6	1.28
Germany	2	0.43
Ghana	1	0.21
India	13	2.78
Italy	7	1.50
Japan	3	0.64
Madagascar	1	0.21
Namibia	2	0.43
New Zealand	3	0.64
Nigeria	4	0.86
Norway	2	0.43
Pakistan	1	0.21
Portugal	4	0.86
Russia	1	0.21
South Africa	4	0.86
Sri Lanka	2	0.43
Sudan	7	1.50
Sweden	1	0.21
Switzerland	5	1.07
Uganda	1	0.21
United Kingdom	53	11.35
United States	283	60.60
Venezuela	1	0.21
Total	467	100.00

Table 13: The Mediation Attempts of Authoritarian Countries 1933-1999

Country	Freq.	Percent
Algeria	2	0.84
Austria	1	0.42
Bolivia	1	0.42
Brazil	1	0.42
Burkina Faso	3	1.27
Canada	2	0.84
Chile	2	0.84
China	1	0.42
Colombia	2	0.84
Costa Rica	1	0.42
Cuba	1	0.42
Dominican Republic	1	0.42
Egypt	15	6.33
El Salvador	3	1.27
Ethiopia	10	4.22
France	12	5.06
Gabon	2	0.84
Gambia	1	0.42
Germany	1	0.42
Ghana	2	0.84
Guatemala	1	0.42
Indonesia	6	2.53
Iran	1	0.42
Iraq	3	1.27
Italy	5	2.11
Japan	1	0.42
Jordan	1	0.42
Kazakhstan	3	1.27
Kenya	10	4.22
Lebanon	1	0.42
Liberia	4	1.69
Malaysia	2	0.84
Mexico	2	0.84
Nigeria	3	1.27
Pakistan	9	3.80
Panama	1	0.42
Peru	3	1.27
Portugal	3	1.27
Russia	6	2.53
South Africa	36	15.19

Spain	2	0.84
Sweden	1	0.42
Syria	4	1.69
Tanzania	3	1.27
Thailand	1	0.42
Togo	2	0.84
Tunisia	1	0.42
Turkey	1	0.42
Uganda	4	1.69
United Kingdom	31	13.08
United States	17	7.17
Zambia	3	1.27
Zimbabwe	2	0.84
Total	237	100.00

Table 14: Regional Powers by the Highest CINC Score

Africa	South Africa Nigeria Algeria
Americas	United States Canada Brazil
Asia	India Japan China
Europe	United Kingdom France Germany
Middle East	Iran Egypt Turkey
Oceania	Australia New Zealand
Post Soviet	Russia Kazakhstan