

**MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SECTORS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES OF
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES**

By

TÜRKAN YOSUN

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**MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SECTORS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES OF
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES**

APPROVED BY:

Prof. Dr. Dilek Çetindamar.....
(Dissertation Supervisor)

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Öncü.....

Ass. Prof. Dr. Kıvılcım Döğerliođlu Demir.....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nihan Yıldırım.....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuran Acur.....

DATE OF APPROVAL: 20/07/2016



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ABSTRACT

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TÜRKAN YOSUN

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Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. Dilek Çetindamar

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Through a qualitative study of the field of supplementary education of the disabled in Turkey, this research first explores the changing field dynamics after marketization. I find that the practices of the profit-maximizer new entrants, and the changes in the beneficiaries and the workforce, coupled with institutional weaknesses lead to the degeneration of the sector. Second, I analyze the pressures exerted on the social enterprises and present a framework showing the differing levels of vulnerability to those pressures based on particular organizational characteristics. Later, I elaborate on the strategic responses of 10 incumbent social enterprises through comparative case studies. The responses vary from proactive acts of scaling, increasing free services, increasing high-income beneficiaries, creating alternative resources, to reactive strategies of decreasing free services, decreasing quality investments, cost cuttings in expenses, reducing high-cost beneficiaries, seizing, and finally quitting the market. Reasons for the differing responses are vision and cohesion of the board, imprinting effects and legitimacy of the organization, entrepreneurial orientation, escalation of commitment, level of engagement, frame of reference, and pro-social values of the founders, as well as the socioeconomic situation of the region. A mission drift, on the other hand, occurred in a situation when the organization was found with equal emphasis on profit and social value rather than a pure social aim, when its ownership structure became fragmented, when exposed to pressure from small shareholders for profit coupled with a pressure on the main shareholder to stay in the business, and when it embedded itself in profit-maximizers' network.

ÖZET

SOSYAL SEKTÖRLERİN PİYASALAŞMASI VE SOSYAL İŞLETMELERİN VERDİKLERİ STRATEJİK TEPKİLER

TÜRKAN YOSUN

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Piyasalaşma, sosyal işletme stratejisi, sosyal girişimcilik, melez örgütler, misyon kayması

Türkiye’de engelli bireylerin destek eğitimi alanında gerçekleştirilen nitel bir çalışma vasıtasıyla, bu araştırma öncelikle alanın piyasalaması ile değişen dinamikleri incelemektedir. Karını maksimize etmek isteyen yeni katılımcıların uygulamaları, ve faydalanıcılar ve işgücünde meydana gelen değişikliklerin, kurumsal zayıflıklar ile bir araya geldiğinde alanın yozlaşmasına sebep olduğunu buluyorum. İkinci olarak, sosyal işletmeler üzerinde uygulanan baskıları inceliyor ve belirli örgütsel özelliklere dayanarak bu baskılardan yaralanabilme seviyesini gösteren bir çerçeve sunuyorum. Sonrasında, yerleşik 10 sosyal işletmenin karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi ile stratejik yanıtlarını açıklıyorum. Bu yanıtlar, ölçekleme, ücretsiz hizmetleri artırma, yüksek gelirli faydalanıcıları artırma, değişik kaynaklar yaratma gibi proaktif stratejiler ile, ücretsiz hizmetleri azaltma, kalite yatırımlarını azaltma, harcamalardan tasarruf, yüksek maliyetli faydalanıcıları azaltma, küçülme, ve son olarak, pazardan çıkma arasında değişmektedir. Farklılaşan yanıtların sebepleri, yönetim kurulunun vizyon ve birliği, örgütün meşruiyeti, basımlama etkileri ve girişimcilik yönelimi, kurucuların artan bağlılığı, katılım seviyesi, referans çerçevesi, ve toplum yanlısı değerlerine ek olarak bölgenin sosyoekonomik durumudur. Misyon kaymasının ise, örgütün saf bir sosyal amaçtan ziyade kar ve sosyal değer üzerine eşit bir vurgu ile kurulduğu, ortaklık yapısının parçalara ayrıldığı, ana hissedarın üzerindeki alanda kalma baskının küçük hissedarların kar beklentisi ile birleştiği ve örgütün kendisini karını maksimize etmek isteyen örgütlerin ağına yerleştirdiği durumda ortaya çıktığı görülmüştür.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BoD	Board of Directors
EMES	European Social Enterprise Research Network
EU	European Union
GM	General Manager
GRC	Guidance and Research Center
HNWI	High-Net-Worth Individuals
MoE	Ministry of Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
R&D	Research and Development
RBV	Resource-Based View
SE	Social Enterprise
SERC	Special Education and Rehabilitation Center
SSCPA	Social Services and Child Protection Agency (of Turkey)
WB	The World Bank

INTRODUCTION

Non-profit and for-profit organizations have traditionally been regarded as quite distinct entities; non-profits relied mainly on grants and donations in order to survive and achieve their missions (Hall, 2006), which set them apart from commercial enterprises. However, decreases in available funding opportunities and the pressure on non-profits towards being self-sustaining have, in part, replaced the traditional non-profits with social enterprises (Dees, 1998; Fowler, 2000)- business ventures pursuing a social purpose and aiming to create social value through engaging in commercial activity (Thompson, 2002; Mair and Schoen, 2007).

In addition, mission-based organizations historically operated in the areas where governments failed to serve the societal needs and where for-profits did not chose to operate due to the limited profit opportunities- a phenomenon attributed to the market failures (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Steinberg, 1987, Weisbrod, 1977). This fact has also been changing for the past few decades, such that social enterprises and profit-seeking firms increasingly co-exist in the same fields (Dees and Anderson, 2003). The decreasing involvement of governments in the economy and society has created markets attractive to both social and commercial enterprises (Sharir and Lerner, 2006). Coupled with the public management arrangements of governments which create and support market mechanisms (Kaboolian, 1998), more and more social sectors have been subject to marketization, whereby the organizations adopt market or quasi-market practices (Salamon, 1997; Hall et al.; 2012). As a result, several sectors formerly dominated by public and non-profit organizations are evolving into mixed-form markets where social enterprises and commercial enterprises compete (Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000; Marwel and McInerney, 2005).

Enterprises established by non-profit organizations and profit-seeking organizations have historically co-existed in some markets, e.g., health care and education, attracting the

attention of welfare economists (Arrow, 1963; Hansmann, 1980), who study the phenomenon under the title of non-profit and for-profit competition. These scholars mainly focus on the impact of the market composition and the density of competition on the quality and price of the goods and services offered (e.g., Schlesinger et al., 1997; Mark, 1996; Hirth, 1999; Brown, 2005). The models they develop assume that all non-profits, as well as for-profits, will behave the same under particular conditions. Therefore, they denote homogeneity to all members of an organizational form in their intentions and actions, neglecting the organizational differences.

Social enterprises are hybrid organizations bringing together two institutional logics; the commercial (or market) logic and the social welfare logic (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013; Lee and Battilana, 2013). Thus, they combine the altruistic motivations of philanthropy with the economic motivations of business and markets (Dees and Anderson, 2006). As different institutional pressures create the potential for fragmentation, conflict, goal-ambiguity, and organizational instability (Kraatz and Block, 2008), social enterprises need to find ways of managing several internal tensions (Smith et al., 2013). While there are a few empirical studies that focus on managing their hybrid nature (e.g., Pache and Santos, 2013; Battilana and Dorado, 2010), the attention has so far been limited to the structural arrangements and some practices such as site governance, branding, and professional affiliation. Moreover, majority of these studies use social enterprises as a context for contributing to the literature on institutional logics. Therefore, they focus on the institutional pressures and the symbolic meanings of organizations' actions for gaining legitimacy from different actors associated with each logic, rather than evaluating their strategic reactions to market forces. What is lacking in the literature is theorizing on the decisions of social enterprises pertaining to e.g.; their product/service mix, quality, pricing, and the targeted beneficiary segments, under the economic as well as institutional pressures.

As the commercial logic diffuses into the social enterprises to find place in their organizational practices, making them more 'business-like' (Dart 2004; Weisbrod, 1998a), social enterprises face the threat of a mission drift (Dees, 1998) whereby they forget the premises of the social welfare logic and act like their profit-seeking counterparts. Despite being vastly pronounced in the last decades, there is a lack of theorizing and empirical research on the topic except a few recent attempts (e.g.; Chambers, 2014; Garrow and

Hasenfeld, 2012). The ambiguity on the loosely defined concept of mission drift signals to be a cause for the neglect of the study of strategic management of social enterprises. More specifically, there is an inclination to bundle the changes regarding the product and service quality, price, and targeted beneficiary segments, as well as particular choices of growth strategies, under the concept of mission drift. Yet, there is a need to analyze the various pressures exerted on social enterprises and their strategic reactions, rather than simplifying their strategic actions to a dichotomy of mission drift vs no mission drift. In essence, this approach can also contribute to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of mission drift.

Through a longitudinal study of the field of supplementary education of the disabled in Turkey, this study first explores the changing field dynamics as it is exposed to marketization. Doing so, it explores the mechanisms operating at multiple levels as well as the particular pressures exerted on social enterprises. Second, it analyzes the responses of the incumbent social enterprises to the pressures and explains the causes of their varying reactions. While initially dominated by few mission-oriented organizations, this field saw the invasion of profit-seeking organizations after the legislative changes which brought gradual increases in the profit opportunities. By 2016, the special education and rehabilitation centers (SERCs) in the field have reached a total 1975 organizations. The comparative analysis of 10 cases enabled me to identify new variables and causal mechanisms for the undertheorized topics (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007) and provided the opportunity to employ multiple levels of analysis (Yin, 1984).

The first output of this research is a model explaining changing dynamics in the field as a consequence of marketization, which ends with the degeneration of the social sector. I first describe the characteristics of incumbent organizations and the new entrants, and explicate the different competitive acts of the new entrants who are mainly motivated by profit. Later, I explain the two interesting emergent mechanisms occurring with marketization, other than the rise of profit-maximizers; the changes in the beneficiaries and the workforce. I then evaluate the macro level effects and weakening of social enterprises, which serve as moderators in the emergent framework. Following this, I introduce the emergent concept of degeneration of the social sector and summarize the mechanisms operating at multiple levels to cause this consequence.

The second output of the study is a framework exploring the multiplicity of the responses of social enterprises in the mixed-form market as well as the antecedents to those responses. I first explain the mechanisms by which the pressures arising from marketization effect the social enterprises; namely, the resource, time and labor constraints, and the exerted psychological pressures. Following this, I present a framework showing the differing levels of vulnerability to those pressures based on particular organizational characteristics. Later, I provide summaries for the 10 cases analyzed, elaborating the strategic actions taken, and comparing and contrasting the behaviors and characteristics of social enterprises to assess reasons for different reactions. The reactions vary from proactive acts of scaling, increasing free services, increasing high-income beneficiaries, creating alternative resources, as well as acts to manage risks, to reactive strategies of decreasing free services, decreasing quality investments, cost cuttings in expenses, reducing high-cost beneficiaries, seizing, and finally quitting the market. The reasons for the differing reactions are, on the other hand, vision and cohesion of the board, imprinting effects and legitimacy of the organization, entrepreneurial orientation, escalation of commitment, level of engagement, frame of reference, and pro-social values of the founders, as well as the socioeconomic situation of the region.

The case summaries also elaborate the acts which are denoted as mission drift in the literature. Analysis reveals that, increased prices in one organization did not indicate a mission drift, but a deliberate strategic change in order to create more value in the new circumstances by becoming a model organization and creating knowledge spillovers. Decreases in quality, on the other hand, were not aimed at making (more) profits, but were the results of the financial constraints and the changes in the nature of employees after marketization. The only case suffering a real mission drift was an organization that eliminated the heavy disabled beneficiaries for cost reduction under the increased financial pressures. The reasons for the drift are found to be; a) its equal emphasis on profit and social value at its initiation, rather than pure social aim or social aim over profit as is in most of the organizations, b) its increasingly fragmented ownership structure including merchants in addition to specialists, c) pressure from small shareholders for profit coupled with a pressure on the main shareholder to stay in the business by his family for altruistic reasons, d) the organization's attempt to discipline the profit-maximizers by taking the role of their leader in the region, yet embedding itself in their network leading to a change in frame of reference.

LITERATURE REVIEW

I start this chapter by explaining the rising interest on social enterprises and providing the conceptual definition. Next, I explicate their hybrid nature and review the literature related to their management. I later provide an overview of the phenomenon of the marketization of social sectors and review the research on the mixed-form markets where social enterprises compete with their profit-seeking counterparts. I conclude the chapter by indicating the research gap and identifying my research questions.

2.1 The Rise of Social Enterprises

Starting with 1990s, social enterprises and social entrepreneurs have increasingly become popular phenomena across many countries in the world. The rising attention of individuals and the non-governmental organizations has been accompanied by the interest of governments in supporting the spread of social ventures as remedies to the contemporary societal and environmental problems. While organizations such as Ashoka and Schwab Foundation are working to promote social entrepreneurship across the world, more and more governments, particularly lead by the US and UK, are working to create new regulatory frameworks and funding mechanisms for the social ventures.

This rising interest in the phenomenon has also been followed by the attention of academics and university administrations. Initiated by the leading institutions such as Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Insead, and Oxford, universities across the world are increasingly offering elective courses, organizing training programs and competitions, and establishing special centers. Moreover, some universities have founded chairs, and initiated master's degree programs and even PhD tracks on the management of social ventures. While research

on social ventures started to find place for themselves in the established scientific journals in the management field, specific journals such as Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, International Journal of Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Social Enterprise Journal, and Social Business are also increasing in number. Similarly, while the established international conferences in management open tracks for research in this area, many well-reputed universities are organizing annual conferences for the newly forming sub-field such as Harvard Social Enterprise Conference, Social Entrepreneurship Conference organized by NYU and Northeastern University, and International Social Entrepreneurship Conference of Insead.

The increasing number of social enterprises and the rising attention on them can be explained by three main trends. First, particularly in Europe, the decline in economic growth followed by increased unemployment has led to a growth in the social economy (Kerlin, 2006), which focuses on the satisfaction of human needs that cannot be adequately fulfilled by the for-profit enterprises, nor by the state (Moulaert and Ailenei, 2005). Meanwhile, while the state involvement in the economy has been decreasing in most parts of the world, paving the way for more free markets, many social problems stay unsolved and many needs are unsatisfied by the market (Nicholls, 2006) as the profit-seeking firms refrain from operating in the sectors where they cannot make profits (Santos, 2012).

Second, the nature of many nonprofit organizations has been changing gradually, making them more 'business-like' (Pache and Santos, 2012). *"Faced with rising costs, more competition for fewer donations and grants, and increased rivalry from for-profit companies entering the social sector, nonprofits are turning to the for-profit world to leverage or replace their traditional sources of funding"* (Dees, 1998; pp. 55). Thus, they give up their old structures and ways of working to adopt business models and practices which can make them more sustainable in the contemporary environmental conditions.

Third, the wave of capitalism has turned into a tsunami on which the capital holders surf, while many others suffer or die. Inequality in income and access to resources, both within and across countries, continues with a dramatic rise. In addition, those inequalities have been more visible given the increased communication across the globe. As neither the market, the state, nor the traditional NGOs have been able to solve the world's problems, social enterprises have been recognized as a potentially effective socio-political and

economic link between government and free market enterprise (Harding, 2004; Wallace, 1999). Therefore, many individuals and organizations are increasingly seeking entrepreneurial solutions to the social problems through means of business. A perfect example is Nobel Laureate Mohammed Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank and the micro-credit system, who aptly says (2006):

“We need to reconceptualize the business world to make sure it contributes to the creation of a humane society, not aggravate the problems around us. We need to recognize two types of businesses, not one, and offer equal opportunities to both. These two types of businesses are: One which is already known, business to make money, that is conventional business, the principle of whom is to maximize profit. And the other new kind, business to do good to people, or social business.”

2.2 Conceptual Definition

Given the recent rise of both practical and academic interest on social business, there are several emerging definitions and conceptualizations in the field, which make it necessary to first provide a larger picture of those studies and then clarify the conceptual definition.

The literature on social entrepreneurship is in a pre-paradigmatic stage (Nicholls, 2006). There are two schools of thought theorizing on social business; the social enterprise and social innovation schools of thought (Dees and Anderson, 2006). The newly popular, yet nascent, literature feeds from both of them. However, albeit the surge of articles discussing the meaning of social entrepreneurship, the social entrepreneur, and the social enterprise, there is a lack of coherent definition (Short et al., 2009). Moreover, the unit of analysis in the articles that are put under the umbrella term social entrepreneurship is not clearly defined; whether it is the organization, the individual, the society, the societal problem, or the business model (Santos, 2012). While some scholars focus on the characteristics of a social entrepreneur (Alter, 2004; Thompson, 2002); some focus on the process of social entrepreneurship (Martin and Osberg, 2007, Sharir and Lerner, 2006); and some on the social change model (Mair et al., 2012; Swanson and Zhang, 2010). In addition, there is a lack of conceptualization of social entrepreneurs' economic role and logic of action (Dacin et al., 2010).

One attempt to answer the need for clarification comes from Santos (2012). He distinguishes social entrepreneurship from commercial entrepreneurship by its focus on value creation to solve neglected problems in society rather than a focus on value capture, similar to the roles historically attributed to non-profit organizations (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990). He defines its main domain as localized areas and the powerless segments of the population, its main goal as seeking sustainable solutions rather than sustainable advantages, and the logic of this solution as empowerment rather than control. As per its role, he states that “*the process of social entrepreneurship enables the second invisible hand of the economic system, this one based on other-regarding rather than self-interest.*” (pp. 350). This approach, along with other scholars conceptualizing it as a process (e.g., Mair and Schoen, 2007), sets the unit of analysis for social entrepreneurship studies as the innovative solution to a social problem and its underlying business model. A widely accepted definition is that of OECD’s (1999): “*any private activity conducted in the public interest, organized with an entrepreneurial strategy but whose main purpose is not the maximization of profit but the attainment of certain economic and social goals, and which has a capacity of bringing innovative solutions to the problems of social exclusion and unemployment*” (pp. 10).

The studies building on the social enterprise school of thought, focus on the enterprise as the unit of analysis, rather than the entrepreneurship process, as I do throughout this research. Social enterprises are organizations involved in commercial activities; however, with the aim of accomplishing a social mission rather than profit maximization of the shareholders. Social enterprises are not bound to any legal form; they can be associations, foundations, co-operatives, corporations...etc. However, they are bound to a social form. The European Social Enterprise Research Network (EMES) defines an ‘ideal type’ for the social enterprises (Defourny, 2001). On the economic dimension of this ideal type, similar to the traditional commercial enterprises, social enterprises are composed by a continuous activity of production and sale of goods and/or services, a high degree of autonomy, a significant level of economic risk, and a minimum amount of paid work. However, different than traditional commercial enterprises, an ideal social enterprise has the following social dimensions; an initiative launched by a group of citizens, a decision making power not based on capital ownership, a participatory nature to involve the persons affected by the activity, limited profit distribution, and an explicit aim to benefit the community.

Theoretically, the main separation point between commercial and social enterprises is that, while the latter is also involved in commerce, it prioritizes social objectives over financial ones (Mair and Marti, 2006). Thus, commercial activities are means for achieving social objectives rather than means for an ultimate goal of profit (Dees and Anderson, 2006). To also clearly distinguish social enterprises from the traditional non-profits, it is beneficial to note that, they share the same social aims such as poverty alleviation and education of the disadvantaged populations (Cho, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2007). They can also share the same norms of organizing, depending on how close they are to the ideal social enterprises type. However, different than the traditional non-profits those rely on grants and donations for their revenues, social enterprises rely mainly on market resources (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010).

2.3 Hybrid Nature of Social Enterprises

Social enterprises create value by (1) providing the goods and services that the market or the state is unwilling or unable to provide, (2) developing skills, (3) creating employment to socially excluded individuals, (4) fostering civic involvement (Smallbone et al., 2001). They accomplish their social missions through a business model, rather than relying solely on grants and donations. Doing so, they combine the affiliative, altruistic, or expressive motivations common to philanthropy with the economic motivations commonly associated with business and markets (Dees and Anderson, 2006). For this reason, social enterprises are seen as hybrid organizations bringing together the commercial (or market) logic and the social welfare logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013; Battilana and Lee, 2014).

The concept of hybridity has its roots in institutional theory, which conceptualizes organizations as instruments designed to achieve specified goals, albeit being affected by the characteristics of their members and the institutional pressures imposed by their environments (Selznick, 1948). New institutional theory states that, through imposing restrictions on legal, moral, and cultural boundaries, and shaping the cognitive frameworks, institutions exert high influences on organizational characteristics and actions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1991; Scott, 2008). In addition to material resources and technical

information, organizations need legitimacy for their survival; thus, they need to show that their actions are appropriate within the institutionalized norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). In pursuit of legitimacy, organizations comply with the coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures; a process leading to isomorphism in the organizational fields, which is defined as the structural and strategic similarity of the organizations to each other (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

One of the main tensions in organizational research throughout its history has been between the roles of environmental determinism versus individual agency (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). Compared to the institutional perspective, the strategic choice view gave more room for managers' preferences or political considerations when deciding on organizational actions (Child, 1972). Despite the high environmental determinism in the early version of new institutional theory, two later streams of it brought in the potential for agency. The first was the reconsideration of the possibility of active agency by the organizations, initiated by Oliver (1991) who asserted that organizations can respond strategically to institutional pressures, ranging from passive conformity to active resistance, depending on the nature and context of the pressures.

Another stream of work, institutional logics, brought agency more to the front, while also introducing the opportunity for pluralism (rather than isomorphism) and room for change in the fields (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). Institutional logics are the socially constructed, historical patterns of values, beliefs, rules, assumptions, and practices by which individuals provide meaning to social reality (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Contradictions of different institutional logics constitute the opportunity for the transformation of individual identities, organizations, and society (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Organizations face institutional pluralism when they operate in fields which are subject to multiple institutional logics. Different institutional pressures create the potential for fragmentation, conflict, goal-ambiguity, and organizational instability (Kraatz and Block, 2008). Universities, professional arts organizations, and hospitals are some examples to organizations operating in pluralistic institutional environments (Denis et al., 2001; Whetten, 2006).

Social enterprises, relentless of the sector they operate in, own a hybrid nature as they inherit institutionally imposed pressures of both social and market (commercial) logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2012). Because of this hybrid identity, they

face difficulties with respect to a single organizational form. First, they are more difficult for the audience to evaluate, thus carrying the risk of being less appealing for the actors who cannot fit them in one established category (Zuckerman, 1999). Moreover, the organization will need to devote resources to be attractive for different audiences regarding components of its hybrid identity (Hsu, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009). Second, they face multiple environmental demands (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Minkoff, 2002) from their stakeholders and key actors pertaining to each logic. Last but not the least, they experience the tensions between the constituents of social and market logics within the organization (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos 2012; Smith et al., 2013).

2.4 Managing Social Enterprises

2.4.1 Managing Tensions within Social Enterprises

Scholars have recently shown a rising interest in explaining how organizations manage hybridity. Pratt and Foreman (2000) posit 4 possible ways for managing multiple identities; deleting one of the identities, preserving multiple identities as separated from each other, maintaining multiple identities by creating links between them, and merging identities into a distinct new whole. Similarly, Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest 4 strategies for managing multiple institutional logics: denying the validity of external claims that are placed upon it, separating identities and relating independently to institutional constituencies, trying to balance different demands by playing constituencies against each other or seeking cooperative solutions, and creating durable identities of their own to emerge as institutions in their own right. With a more nuanced discussion of hybridity, Pache and Santos (2010), differentiate between the nature of institutional demands; a) the demands that include conflict at the goal level and b) demands that are in harmony at the goals level but lead to conflict over the means of achieving them. In order to make predictions on the way organizations respond to the competing institutional demands, the authors later integrate the moderating effect of the nature of the demands and the representation level of the logics within the organization into Oliver's (1991) strategic reactions to institutional pressures framework.

Greenwood et al. (2011) also elaborate on the topic positing that their structure, ownership, governance, and identity affect how they experience the complexity and respond to it.

Those frameworks, in fact, posit similar ranges of behavior; annulling one of the logics, letting them exist separately, or combining them. Yet, while giving room for strategic reactions to institutional pressures, the basis of these frameworks is institutional theory, whose main argument is that organizations seek legitimacy for survival, hence they need to show that their elements are appropriate within the institutionalized norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). More specifically, its proponents assume that the organizational actions are motivated by a concern for legitimacy, mostly neglecting the market forces. Yet, several studies indicate that technical considerations of organizations may subvert institutions. An example is the work of Kraatz and Zajac (1996), who found that liberal art colleges changed their curricula to offer business degrees in response to the shifting market demand.

In addition, the implicit assumption of these frameworks is that complying with the elements of both logics provides legitimacy for the organization in the eyes of different key actors. While this may be the case for particular combinations of logics, this argument may not find strong support in the case of social vs market logics. The market logic is regarded as illegitimate by the majority of actors in the inherently social fields such as the education of disabled people; yet, the market mechanism may be technically necessary in some situations. Thus, while the organizations may consider making changes in accordance with the market logic, their main concern cannot be legitimacy, but particular market forces. It is therefore important to reveal what those forces are and how they operate, and elaborate on the strategic reactions of social enterprises given those market forces.

Besharov and Smith (2014) state that, when the multiple logics are core to the organizational functioning, and when they provide contradictory prescriptions for action, this makes the organizations contested, causing extensive conflict. Social enterprises can be considered as contested organizations due to incompatibility of the social and market logics in terms of both goals and means. With their hybrid and potentially contested nature as combiners of commercial and social welfare logics, social enterprises have increasingly become an attractive organizational form for the scholars who study the tensions between different logics within organizations (e.g.; Pache and Santos, 2012; Battilana and Dorado, 2010).

Building their discussion on social enterprises, Battilana and Lee (2014) develop the concept of hybrid organizing, defined as “*the activities, structures, processes, and meanings by which organizations make sense of and combine aspects of multiple organizational forms.*” They posit that hybrid organizing is at play in five areas: core organizational activities, workforce composition, organizational design, inter-organizational relationships, and organizational culture. Smith et al. (2013) conceptualize the social-business tensions in social enterprises in 4 groups: performing, organizing, belonging, and learning. The organizing and belonging tensions pertain to the structural arrangements and adoption of practices prescribed by different logics, as mentioned in the frameworks I summarized in the above paragraphs. Performing and learning tensions, on the other hand, are related to the tensions in goals (whether concerning a broad eco-system of stakeholders or a narrow group of shareholders), performance metrics (social vs financial), definition of success (long-term social impact vs short term gains), and growth (the risk of value violations during scaling).

Dees (2012) elaborates the compatibility of two cultures embedded in social enterprises, charity and problem solving cultures, and lists the potential tensions that social entrepreneurs and social enterprises face: spontaneous caritas versus reasoning, sacrifice versus investment, giving versus markets, relieving suffering versus solving problems, and caring people versus empowering them. He later states that the aim should be to channel the charitable impulse toward more effective problem solving while also minimizing norms of charity which decrease effectiveness.

There are also empirical studies performed on social enterprises on managing internal hybridity tensions. Mair et al. (2015) examine how social organizations establish their governance structures and practices. Building on surveys conducted on 70 social enterprises, they identify two types: conforming hybrids those prioritize a single logic and dissenting hybrids those use defiance, selective coupling and innovation to combine and balance the prescriptions of different logics. To shed more light to the management of conflicting institutional demands, Pache and Santos (2012) performed a comparative case study of four work integration organizations in France. They focus on the adoption and implementation of organizational practices for which social welfare and commercial logics provide different prescriptions. For example, the social welfare logic requires designing and controlling practices at the local sites, while the commercial logic entails centrally designed standard

procedures and central monitoring. Authors find that all four organizations enacted both logics in the organizing practices by selectively coupling from a pool of competing alternatives in order to satisfy symbolic concerns. Interestingly, the two enterprises founded by business actors in a for-profit legal form, adopted practices offered by the social welfare logic (even more than the other two organizations founded by individuals with social sector origin in non-profit form did) claiming that they needed to do so as they lacked legitimacy, a strategy named as “Trojan horse” by the authors.

Pache and Santos’s (2012) study provides empirical evidence for the “blurring boundaries” (Dees and Anderson, 2003) between for-profits and nonprofits and indicates that social enterprises are embracing business-like practices (Dart, 2004) in an increasingly commercializing social sector. Yet, it focuses on the symbolic meaning of adopting particular practices such as governance, branding, and professional affiliation with an eye on legitimacy, rather than their impact on the social welfare created. While the word strategy vastly exists in the summarized frameworks and empirical studies, it pertains to the strategy of denying, complying with, or blending the practices and structures prescribed by particular institutional logics. Therefore, those frameworks focus on the organizing aspect of hybrid organizations, rather than their strategic management per se. In fact, structure can follow strategy (Chandler, 1962), and, if we take Pache and Santos’s study (2012), for example, the local management of the sites in some work integration organizations may be a reflection of their strategic decisions for enabling superior service by better understanding local needs, rather than signaling more like a social organization. Yet, while the authors may be aware of this fact, they are not interested in this aspect as those articles are targeting at contributing to the institutional logics literature by using social enterprises as a fruitful context.

Similarly, a social enterprise may adapt some practices in line with the market logic, such as establishing a sales and marketing department. While the frameworks built in the last decade denote these structural arrangements to legitimacy concerns, it is much likely that social enterprises may be establishing a sales team in order to increase their customer base, thus increasing their social impact and/or survival chances through increasing the provision of services. Yet, as hybrid organizations, they may then face corresponding internal tensions; e.g., the need to integrate the social welfare logic into the sales team. A striking example is the case of micro-credits in India. The media has recently covered stories of women

committing suicide because of their accumulated loans which they cannot pay back, as they did not use the money for starting a business. In order to realize their performance targets, sales teams of some micro-credit organizations had provided loans to those women, despite knowing they would not start a business, and wanted them to pretend as if they are doing business if their boss had checked. Tapping into this issue, Battilana and Dorado (2010) explore how two microfinance organizations develop and maintain their hybrid nature through hiring and socialization processes. While one organization only hired new graduates with blank templates and made them focus on operational excellence, the other organization mixed experienced employees with backgrounds in development and banking logics. The authors comment that, while both strategies have unique pros and cons, the former approach may potentially be more suitable for abandoning internal tensions. Yet, the field needs more studies on the management of internal tensions with implications on the welfare created.

2.4.2 Strategic Management of Social Enterprises

The mainstream strategy literature is not readily applicable to social enterprises, as it is based on the notion of wealth creation and capture. For example, through his Five Forces Model, Porter (1980) outlines a framework for assessing an industry's attractiveness. The suggestions for the firms are selecting a profitable industry and then seeking a competitive advantage with strategies such as low cost leadership, differentiation, and focus for coping with the competitors (1980, 1985). Resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991), similarly problematizes how firms can make more profits via competitive advantages. It, however, focuses on achieving sustainable advantages through a value-creating strategy that cannot be duplicated by others through assessing valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources.

The aim of social enterprises, on the other hand, is maximizing their social impact, rather than profits. Thus, while they have a will to survive in order to achieve their missions, and thus need to compete with others for resources, the other enterprises in the sector are not necessarily rivals to beat but are actors who can potentially serve to create a larger social impact. Yet, the profitability of the industry is not relevant to the social enterprises, nor capturing more profits than that of others. Moreover, the notions of sustained competitive advantage and acquiring non-imitable resources posed by the RBV, if applied by social

enterprises, may decrease the social impact they create by abandoning the spillovers of social innovations for solving societal or environmental problems as well as limiting the transfer of best practices for better serving the disadvantaged populations.

The nascent literature on social enterprises lacks a substantive theory for their strategic management combining the market mechanisms with their social goals. Particularly, there is a need for theorizing on their product/service mix, quality, and pricing, as well as their targeted beneficiaries considering both the market forces and the social value created. In the following paragraphs, I first review the main studies on the strategic management of traditional non-profits and later provide an account of the newly emergent theory building attempts on the strategic management of social enterprises.

2.4.2.1 Studies on traditional non-profits

Salamon (1987) states that, in their pure form, nonprofits typically have insufficient resources, inadequate levels of professionalization, tend to focus on narrow communities, and may embrace paternalistic attitudes toward beneficiaries. When deciding on their strategic actions, non-profit organizations need to make two calculations: they should be sure that they are producing the value defined by their mission and their financial performance should ensure their survival, hence their future value-creating capacity (Moore, 2000).

While the scholars of non-profit organizations have also paid attention to strategy, they historically had a narrow focus on the adoption and use of formal strategic planning rather than broader questions of strategic management regarding decision-making processes and competition (See Stone et al., 1999, for a review). The few early studies on content of strategy, on the other hand, typically focused on the ability of nonprofits to raise funds and survive in different environments, e.g., through legitimacy gaining strategy (Bielefeld, 1992, 1994; York and Zychlinski, 1996), and cost-cutting strategy (Palmer, 1997). The interest was then shifted to the application of some established constructs in the for-profit management literature to non-profits and testing the proposed relationships, e.g., market orientation and performance (Shoham et al., 2006).

A recent interest of scholars of non-profit management was finally the analysis of their competitive strategies. Through the case study of United Way, an established fund raising organization in the U.S., Barman (2002) states that, when its monopoly position was

challenged by other nonprofits, the organization attempted to differentiate itself from the competitors in order to be able to raise more funds. While focusing on the impact of competition, this study is, still, on the ability of securing resources in a nonprofit competition, rather than a focus on strategic positioning.

Chew and Osborn 2009 analyze the key factors influencing positioning strategy in British charitable organizations with 53 surveys followed by analysis of 4 selected cases. They find that, strategic positioning of charities is influenced mainly by a) organizational factors including mission, corporate plan, assets and capabilities (including organizational culture), b) external factors including governmental influence, economic conditions and technological and sociodemographic changes, and competitor influence (the increasing competition for both financial and other resources). In addition, internal stakeholders (Board and CEO) and external stakeholders (government agencies and volunteers) influenced the strategic positioning. Internal stakeholders' level of impact was parallel to their knowledge of charity's operations and to their support in their management, while the impact of external stakeholders was parallel to the degree to which the organization was dependent to them on resources such as funding. Lastly, they note that unanticipated external or internal events ('critical trigger events') such as a major change in organizational leadership, a sudden shift in governmental policy, or changes in the legal framework for the provision of services could cause changes in the organization's positioning.

Some studies, on the other hand, sought the applicability of mainstream firm strategies to social enterprises. Brown and Iverson (2004) applies to the nonprofits Miles and Snow's (1978) organizational strategy typologies based on the level of aggressiveness: prospector, defender, analyzer, and reactor. There is no distinction on traditional nonprofits and the ones engaged in commercial operations in this study, and the aim was to assess the relationship between board structure and strategy, finding that prospectors have broader and more inclusive structures than defenders.

2.4.2.2 Studies on social enterprises

Some scholars have tested marketing orientation -generation of market intelligence, disseminating across departments, and being responsiveness to it (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990)- and entrepreneurial orientation- organizational decision-making tendency favoring

entrepreneurial activities (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996)- on the social and economic performance of social enterprises, finding positive relationships. For example, on their study on 237 top hospital administrators, Wood et al. (2000) have found a strong relationship with market orientation and performance, measured by the perception of managers on improvement of quality of care, increase in revenues, improvement in financial position, and improvement of patient satisfaction. In their research on 534 British and Japanese social enterprises, Liu et al. (2012) show the positive significant impacts of market and entrepreneurial orientations on social and economic performance, mediated by market effectiveness and consumer satisfaction.

Weerawardena and Mort (2012) explore competitive strategy in “socially entrepreneurial nonprofit organizations.” In nine case studies on enduring and successful organizations, authors state that all nine organizations saw their environments as turbulent and pursued a product differentiation strategy (Porter, 1980), and smaller organizations made incremental innovations while medium and large-sized ones made more incremental innovations. This study suffers from selection bias as well as subjectivity; authors focus on already successful organizations which are likely to be innovative and do not use objective indicators for assessing innovation. Moreover, the organizations are from different sectors making a within sector comparison with other organizations impossible. Chew (2010) examines 4 community interest companies (a legal form for social enterprises in the UK) founded by charities, stating that they had weakly defined strategic positions and unspecified positioning with respect to their parent charities. Yet, he notes that this may be due to their young age as all were established during the past two years

Young et al. (2010) build a framework for pricing decisions of social enterprises. Building on James (1983) and Weisbrod (1998b), they distinguish between the services that directly impact the mission, and the ones that the organization engages in to generate profits for subsidizing mission-related activities and services. While social enterprises do not encounter pricing tensions in the latter, pricing the services related to the missions inherits a choice among the target beneficiary groups. The authors suggest that SEs can embrace a mission emphasis on the services with below-cost prices subsidized by revenues from other sources, or they can have a mixed mission/market emphasis with a break-even target where the enterprise makes no losses from commercial operations. In both options, a sliding scale

strategy can be used, in which rich customers are charged higher prices for the same service or are offered extra paid-services, so that the lower-paying poor customers can be cross-subsidized with those revenues.

Santos et al. (2015) create a typology of social enterprises by a 2X2 matrix to classify them as market, blending, bridging, and coupling hybrids. The first dimension distinguishes between transactions that create value spillovers automatically (e.g., selling a green product) or contingently (e.g., for women to truly benefit from micro-loans, social enterprises need to give them trainings). And the second dimension distinguishes between transactions where clients are beneficiaries and where clients are other parties. The authors state that, when the clients are beneficiaries, social enterprises can face 3 main transaction obstacles: inability to pay, difficulty of access, and unwillingness to pay. They later suggest specific remedies such as re-designing the production value chain to reduce costs, giving micro-franchises by involving customers in the process, and bundling together products that customers want with the ones they need but cannot perceive the value. In addition, they provide prescriptions for the management of the 4 types of social enterprises. Regarding the market type, which is the most common form, they suggest the employing staff with business expertise and use of operational key performance indicators as well as regular checks by the Board on the focused client segments and the social impact created for avoiding mission drift.

The last two articles take steps to build frameworks for the strategic management of social enterprises with a consideration of price, quality, the targeted segments, and some key resources and capabilities. Yet, they do not integrate a competitive lens; thereby making the viability of those strategies within a mixed-form market where social enterprises operate with profit-maximizing firms questionable. In fact, the lack of substantial theorizing and empirical studies on the strategic management of social enterprises can be traced to the inclination of scholars to reduce it to the phenomenon of mission drift, which will be covered next.

2.4.3 Mission Drift

Dees (1998) argues that *“the drive to become more businesslike holds many dangers for nonprofits. In the best of circumstances, nonprofits face operational and cultural challenges in the pursuit of commercial funding. In the worst, commercial operations can*

undercut an organization's social mission" (pp.56). Similarly, Weisbrod (1988) states that, the motive for profit challenges nonprofits with losing sight of their social goals. Furthermore, Eikenberry et al. (2004) posit that civil society may be at risk, because of the marketization of the nonprofit sector.

As combiners of social and economic objectives, social enterprises must maintain a balance between the two in order to avoid mission drift, "*a focus on profits to the detriment of the social good,*" which may cause them to charge higher prices or target wealthier and more profitable segments (Battilana et al., 2012). While scholars have long been claiming about this threat to the core mission, there is a clear lack of theorizing on and empirical investigation of the causes of the mission drift.

Main discussions on mission drift have evolved around microfinance industry, which was traditionally dominated by NGOs funded with government grants along, donations and client fees, but later saw a conversion of many NGOs to private enterprises and also attracted the interest of funders with a "private sector ethos" (Epstein and Yuthas, 2010). Wagenaar (2012) finds that, microfinance institutions those transformed from non-profit status to for-profit status have significantly higher average loan sizes and a lower percentage of female borrowers than non-profits, while Mersland and Strøm (2008) had found no such evidence. Some researchers question whether there is mission drift in microfinance institutions in the sector by checking the average loan sizes and beneficiary segments across years (e.g., Mersland and Strøm, 2010), yet do not tap on the organizational level differences. Based on field experience relating to microfinance institutions, Epstein and Yuthas (2010) assert that mission drift arises from commercialization and conversion activities of those organizations aimed at increasing their ratings in the eyes of investors and achieving scale. However, authors do not substantiate the propositions with empirical analysis. In a following article, Epstein and Yuthas (2011) repeats these propositions and advises the microfinance organizations to clarify their mission along with effective corporate governance and performance management systems, and a research function to develop new products and processes. Yet, again, this article remains limited to generic advice without substantiated empirical analysis, similar to the work of Copestake (2007) which suggests improved social performance management through goal setting and strategic planning, routine monitoring of

the poverty status of clients, and follow-up research into the reasons behind observed changes.

There is also a rising interest by organizational theorists for explaining mission drift. Following a theoretical discussion, Ebrahim et al. (2014) stress the importance of accountability and the role of governance for assessing whether activities are reaching the right beneficiary segments for avoiding mission drift. Ramus and Vaccaro (2014) performed case studies on two work integration enterprises which suffered mission drift as result of increased competition in the sector and efficiency pressures by funders, such that they could not employ the marginalized people anymore. The study finds that, Beta organization which tried to overcome mission drift only through social accounting was not successful. The continuing market pressures and short-term commercial objectives did not leave space to increase social performance. The Alpha organization, on the other hand, combined social accounting with a strategy of engaging external stakeholders. As a result, they were able to initiate new projects by partnering with other nonprofit organizations and socially oriented ventures, made their employees realize the core objectives and gain new skills; thus, reintroducing the socially oriented motivations.

Jaquette (2013) analyzed the transition from a liberal arts college to a university, with a 1972-2010 panel dataset of all liberal arts colleagues in the US, defining this divergent change as mission drift. He finds that declining freshmen enrollments, prior adoption of curricula associated with the university model, and the network contacts those previously became universities increase the likelihood of the colleges to become universities, whereas organizational age and strong market position lowered its probability. Garrow and Hasenfeld (2012) performed research on 12 work integration enterprises concluding that those organizations face mission drift when they commodify their clients by selecting the ones which will create them more revenue rather than the more disadvantaged ones. They assert that, commodification is determined by being embedded in a market logic, indicated by the share of commercial revenue compared to donations. This statement, however, does not entail new information as it is evident from the conceptualization that the risk of mission drift increases with the growing share of commercial operations, arising from the definition.

In an attempt to explain the deeper organizational characteristics and mechanisms lead to mission drift, Chambers (2014) develops the concept of the hybrid identity hierarchy

(HIH) of normative and utilitarian identities in social enterprises. Through an investigation of 10 organizations, he asserts that the more stable the HIH, the less susceptible to mission drift. He operationalizes the HIH by the ratio of relative discourse in verbal protocol analysis and mission drift by a grouping of the growth strategies of those organizations, and its stability as consistence of managers' answers in different sessions. He denotes the growth strategies of organic growth, strategic alliances and partnerships, franchising, licensing or acquisitions/sell-outs as organizational growth strategies, whereas coding the strategies of dissemination and open-source change-making, branching and replication, affiliation and smart-networks, lobbying and advocacy as impact scaling strategies. This operationalization of mission drift is, however, quite problematic as it supposes that a social enterprise that increases its beneficiary base through organic growth without a branching strategy suffers mission drift, which is necessarily not the case. Similarly, social enterprises may engage in alliances to increase their resources and to reach new beneficiaries, rather than a profit motive to the detriment of social good.

Another recent study, by Stevens et al. (2015) may also provide insight for developing theory on mission drift, although the authors chose to speak to the attention allocation literature. The study analyzes allocation of attention to social and economic goals in social enterprises with surveys conducted on 148 social entrepreneurs, measuring attention allocation with a forced choice scale on social/economic/legal/ethical orientations. The authors find that, the level of other-regarding values of CEO and level of slack resources increase attention to social goals- the relationship strengthened when financial performance is higher. In addition, a higher utilitarian identity decreases attention to social goals- an effect fostered when financial performance is lower. The study has several methodological pitfalls such as common method bias, common source bias, and social desirability bias. Yet, it empirically shows the proposed relationships.

2.5 Marketization of Social Sectors

In his discussion of the changes in the welfare regimes in advanced western capitalist states, Jesson (1999) posits a restructuring of what he terms as Keynesian Welfare National

State (in 1950s-1970s) into a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime. He claims four main shifts; (1) from Keynesian aims and modes of intervention to Schumpeterian ones, (2) from a ‘welfarist’ mode of reproduction of labor power to a ‘workfarist’ mode; (3) from the primacy of the national scale to a post national framework in which no scale is predominant; (4) from the primacy of the state in compensating for market failures to an emphasis on networked, partnership based economic, political and social governance mechanisms. The fourth shift regarding the governance of welfare indicates a decreased direct involvement of the state in the provision of public services, and resulted in their marketization, which is defined as “*the adoption of market or quasi-market practices with the aim of generating greater efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of public services.*” (Hall et al.; 2012, pp.734).

Marketization indicates existence of private and non-profit providers in a mixed economy of welfare provision (Powell, 2007) and market-type relationships gradually penetrating a country’s welfare system (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). In the US, the “new public management” ideology starting in 1980s included cuts in federal funding for non-profits and supported the market mechanisms through making payments to both non-profits and for-profit private firms based on particular performance criteria and compliance with administrative standards. This approach was characterized by two assumptions: 1) markets are efficient and competition improves organizational performance, 2) private-sector practices are superior and management is a generic practice (Kaboolian,1998). However, the viability of those assumptions in the social sectors as well the effects of marketization on the welfare created has been a controversial issue.

2.5.1 Impacts of Marketization

Marketization of education has been a long debated phenomenon across scholars of welfare governance and management of education. The field saw a worldwide rise of for-profit charter schools and private universities, as well as experiencing states’ cuts from the budgets of the public universities pushing them to be more cost-efficient and organize in a liberal way through targets, indicators and evaluations to increase their competitiveness (Ball, 2003; Kwiek, 2010). In their critical paper, Lawrence and Sharma (2002) discuss the new

managerialism entering the universities; the new practices such as the total quality management (TQM) and the balanced scorecard (BSC), as well as the pressure upon unit cost reinforced by the quasi-market funding mechanisms. They posit that, although the state supposes such applications to be promoting efficiency and effectiveness, they jeopardize the essence of education and result in the commodification of students and academic labor, thus causing a degradation of universities' function in society.

Wilmott (1995) argues that, the pressures exerted by the dynamics of capitalism lead to the commodification of work of academics by favoring its exchange value over the use value. Education is claimed to have transformed from a space of knowledge and identity formation to a commodity bought and sold through the rules of the market (Klees, 2008; Robertson, 2009), also giving rise to increasingly segregated societies (Balarin, 2014; Barlett et al, 2002) as well as decreasing the ability of students on abstract and critical thinking (Natale and Doran, 2012). In addition, there is evidence that the apparent increases in student achievements were secured by the educational organizations through skimming underachieving and poor students (Arreman and Holm, 2011; Gorard, 2009; Lim and Tan, 1999). In their study on liberal arts colleges, Kraatz et al. (2010) examined the adoption of enrollment management offices by those organizations. Authors posit that enrollment management offices disrupt organizational values because core processes such as admissions and financial aid are rearranged so as to increase enrollments from high income, high achieving students.

In his comparative study of 19 for-profit charter schools and 8 public schools at secondary level in Sweden, Fredriksson (2009) finds that employment with a for-profit charter school influences teachers' behavior with regard to market orientation; making them perform on the basis of the mission of the school, the guidelines from the principal, and with the aim of increasing the reputation of the school among students and parents. While the study does not tap onto the implication of this emergent orientation, it notes that the years of experience and education level of the teachers at charter schools were lower than those of public schools, which, if considered as proxies for quality, indicate that for-profit charter schools do not provide stronger incentives than public schools for increasing quality.

Despite being led by the developed countries, marketization of social services also became widespread in the developing countries, albeit with poorer results. Balarin (2014)

explores that, in Peru, the institutional weaknesses (the lack of proper accreditation and control mechanisms on the private education providers as well as the lack of information and solid criteria provided to families) coupled with the inadequate training of local officials paved the way to the increasing supply of private education with low quality. In addition, it fostered the corrupt tendencies in the use of public resources.

Institutionalists theorists have also devoted attention to the phenomenon of marketization with an interest on to the diffusion of market (commercial) logic in the fields originally dominated by other institutional logics such as health care and education (D'Aunno et al., 1991, Kraatz et al., 2010; Murray, 2010; Thornton, 2002), as well as the occurrence and persistence of the hybrid organizational forms and identities (Can, 2013; Glynn, 2000, Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Yet, the concern of these camp of scholars is to explain the likelihood that practices of a new logic will be adapted despite the institutionalized templates, and whether the practices of different logics co-exist or replace each other, sometimes accompanied by an interest on the effects of hybridity on organizations' survival. While some studies note the treat of those practices to value realization, e.g. through the decreased centrality and power of key actors (Kraatz et al., 2010; Scott, 2000), they do not aim at explaining the effects of those changes on the social value created.

For example, in their study on 631 U.S. liberal arts colleagues, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found that, despite operating in a highly institutionalized environment, liberal art colleges realized divergent changes in their curricula (e.g., offering business degrees) in response to the shifting market demand. Murray's (2010) study on the adoption of patenting practices by academic geneticists shows that those practices, originally part of the market logic, were incorporated into scientific practices in ways that preserved the distinctive institutions, rather than replacing or removing them. Reay and Hinings (2009) investigate the rivalry of competing institutional logics in the field of health care in Canada, wherein the physicians defended their medical professionalism logic against the business-like health care logic imposed by the government. They find that, while the Regional Health Authorities formed by the government were formerly a "mouthpiece to its agenda," they in time developed a separate identity and collaborated with the physicians to achieve collective goals, despite still belonging to the business-like health care logic. In addition to the neglect of the

social welfare created, those studies also do not focus on the competition among the organizations with different dominant institutional logics.

2.5.2 Competition in Mixed-Form Markets

While decreases in available funding opportunities pushed non-profits towards being self-sustaining and replaced many traditional non-profits with social enterprises (Dees, 1998; Fowler, 2000; Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000), the decreasing involvement of governments in the economy has created markets attractive to both social and commercial enterprises (Sharir and Lerner, 2006). Added on to these, governments supported market mechanisms in the social sectors through new legislations and regulations (Jesson, 1999; Powell, 2007). As a result, many formerly non-profit dominated social sectors are facing the coexistence of social enterprises and commercial enterprises (Dees and Anderson, 2003), giving rise to mixed-form markets (Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000; Marwel and McInerney, 2005).

Several scholars argue that the increasing for-profit competition and the emphasis of funders on performance measurement, cause the non-profits to neglect less quantifiable accomplishments such as advocacy work while also pushing them away from the more difficult clients on whom it is harder to achieve or to demonstrate effective performance (Gray and Schlesinger, 2002; Smith, 2002; Stewart et al., 2002). Through a survey on the nonprofit human service agencies in Arizona, McMurtry et al. (1991) find evidence for declining revenues, increased competition with other agencies, and a rising demand for their services from clients who cannot pay. The organizations responded to the pressures with strategies ranging from small-scale productivity improvements to complete restructuring, as well as cutbacks in client services.

On a survey on 124 non-profits in Ohio, Alexander (1999) found that marketization of the social sector created several pressures on nonprofits such as decreased revenues, increased administrative load, and loss of the key staff to private firms that paid higher salaries. They were forced to make mission-related compromises such as raising prices, eliminating some services, and reducing emphasis on research and advocacy. In addition, they faced the dilemma of serving the neediest or shifting to the better-off client segments where they could create more revenues and increase their funding by showing the

government a more effective performance. The author notes that the most cited strategies to cope with the pressures were reduction in staff levels, increased reliance on volunteers, engaging in management reforms, mergers or consolidations among a set of choices provided to them in the survey. In a follow up paper, Alexander (2000) documents nonprofits' possible adaptation strategies to marketization through focus group studies with a total of 56 participants. Main adaptation strategies included: expansion of services and client bases, networking to acquire and stabilize revenue streams and resources, increased use of business techniques and technology, and using the income generated from revenue-generating programs and expanded client base for serving to the lower-paying customers. Yet, those focus groups were aimed at identifying best potential strategies through discussing pros and cons of available options, independent of whether the organizations actually employed them.

Grohs, S. (2014) analyzes the introduction of quasimarket principles in the mid-1990s in Germany, in youth welfare and old-age care fields. He compares the number of private and non-profit organizations by years to conclude that the old-age care market has seen more entrance by for-profits, as it is centrally regulated with quality standards and accountability measures. (A strong alternative explanation, the shrinking of the youth-care market despite the fast growing old-age care market is not considered). Without empirical analysis, he makes some predictions such as, in the youth care market, which experienced the quasi market reforms under a decentralized regulation, the private firms may have had disadvantages as they did not have ties to local managers. The author lastly states that the non-profits in the centrally regulated market were dehybridized by putting the market logic in front of the social logic, because some of them formed accounting departments. In fact, this is only an indication to increased bureaucracy, not a decrease in value orientation, as the author wrongly asserts.

While some of the mentioned studies explore the general effects of marketization in the social sector, they focus only on the nonprofits, excluding the social enterprises in firm status. Moreover, they mostly rely on surveys and secondary data sources, and do not clearly explain the mechanisms functioning in the field. Lastly, they do not elaborate which kinds of organizations are more prone to the market pressures and what factors affect their responses.

In a mixed-form market, social enterprises may have unique advantages and disadvantages brought in by their nature. Frumkin and Andre-Clark (2000) state that, non-profit human service organizations generally lack large scale information technology and

management experience, the ability to raise capital from the market, recruiting and retaining best professionals, and political influence, as well as being bounded by missions in commercial actions. Following this, they suggest that, rather than getting into an efficiency battle with the for-profits, which they are likely to lose, non-profits must focus on their unique resources: their ability to raise funds by charity and a better understanding of social needs. They urge them to shift to a niche for a specific group's needs, where the social problem is more complex, the clients are more disadvantaged compared to others and where for-profits will avoid operating because of their economic incentives. The authors also add that, while a narrow efficiency competition with the for-profits may be disastrous for non-profits, it should remain as a goal for all organizations and that non-profits should put more emphasis to tracking their performance. However, "rather than abandon the values that lie at the heart of their operations in pursuit of a new bottom-line approach, nonprofits may need to focus even more clearly on their distinctive missions." (pp. 157) Building on Porter's (1980) Five Competitive Forces, Tuckman (1998) suggests that, in a mixed-form market non-profits better focus on reputation for high-quality, favorable cost structures, economies of scale, and/or product differentiation. He also adds that they can form joint-ventures, may acquire a for-profit subsidiary, or may partner with direct competitors.

The applicability of these normative advices is, however, questionable for several reason. First, the suggested strategies bring the social enterprises back to the beginning of the problem; the resource constraint. Second, as, I mentioned at the beginning of this section, applying the mainstream strategy frameworks such as 5 Forces, may not be feasible and/or may not work to generate the maximum social value in the sector. Even more importantly, we need to go beyond normative advice and theorize on their behavior considering their actual environments and the strategies they come up with when faced with for-profits in the sector. We need research for building theory; "what is actually happening, how and why?"

Marwell and McInerney (2005) have analyzed dynamics of two mixed-form markets; community development and technology assistance to non-profits. In the former sector, the nonprofit based initiator of the sector was pushed to a smaller segment where it focused on protecting the rights of the most disadvantaged tenants, when the for-profits entered the field. However, in its last project, it was not able to keep its promise that most of the houses would go to the low income local Latinos, signaling a shift from its mission for its survival. In the

second market, the nonprofits lost their bigger customers to the large for-profit firms such as Accenture and McKinsey and continued serving for smaller customers where they competed with smaller for-profits. Yet, the entrance of for-profits to this market was quite recent at the time of the study, making it hard to make strong inferences. In addition, authors do not speculate on any organizational responses, other than nonprofits' loss of big customers. In the conclusion part, they claim that three kinds of market structure may occur after the entrance of for-profits to the social need markets: 1) a stratified market where nonprofits and for-profits coexist, but nonprofits focus on poorer customers 2) a displaced market where nonprofits are pushed out, 3) a defended market whereby nonprofits fight back the incursion of for-profits. They later state that "identifying which of these three potential pathways a mixed-form social needs market takes requires attention to the multiple dimensions of its changing environment and the distinctive capacities of NPOs and FPOs to respond." (pp. 24). And, they make a call for future studies to track the development of a mixed-form market by collecting data on historical changes in the environment and the responses of nonprofit and for-profit providers over time.

The dynamics of competition between social and commercial enterprises also taken the attention of welfare economists, who study the phenomenon under the topic of for-profit and non-profit competition (what they refer to as nonprofit is a social enterprise founded by a nonprofit organization). Their main focus has been the impact of the market composition on the social welfare created, which is a function of the quality and price of the goods and services offered. Nonprofit organizations are deemed to have advantage over for-profits when there is high information asymmetry between customer and service provider, such as in health care sector, the nonprofit status signals a higher quality for the customer, thus giving it an advantage (Arrow, 1963; Hansmann, 1980). Hirth (1999) models this uncertainty problem stating that a larger market shares of nonprofits in the sector forces for-profits to deliver the promised quality. Several other studies model the impact of nonprofits' assumed quality and pricing levels in a mixed-form market on the total welfare created (e.g., Brown, 2005; Kopel and Brand, 2012), under specific environmental conditions. While some note the possibility of differing intentions for value creation and capture across organizations, the theories they develop rely mostly on abstract models with unique assumptions which treat a particular organizational form as uniform in their intentions and actions.

Suda and Guo (2011) show that, among the organizations providing long-term care in Japan, non-profits accept seniors with the most serious need levels whereas for-profits focus on people who allow them to be more cost-effective. Nonprofits are also found to be providing more uncompensated care than for-profits (Kuttner, 2006); however, when competition increases, the difference between nonprofits and for-profits decrease (Schlesinger et al., 1997). Mark (1996) found that they are increasing the quality as competition increases while for-profits are decreasing it. The evidence is mixed though; as some studies find no significant quality differences between for-profit and private not-for-profit hospitals, albeit noting that profit-seekers may do shortcuts on the beneficial but hard to measure outcomes (e.g.; Sloan et al. 2001). Overall, these empirical studies, denote a homogenous behavior to all nonprofits in the market, reflecting a main difference between economics and management field; they are “*neglecting the intricacies of organizations*” (Nag et al., 2007).

2.6 The Research Gap and the Aim of the Study

A comprehensive review of the literature indicates that, despite the surge of attention on the organizing aspect of social enterprises, their strategic management has been under-researched and under-theorized. The conceptual and empirical articles on social enterprises mostly focus on social enterprises as an interesting context for studying organizational hybridity. While a few studies problematize the effective management of their internal tensions, most of the studies on hybridity analyze the adoption of particular practices prescribed by the market and social welfare logics. While focusing on the institutional pressures to the neglect of the market forces, those works also load a symbolic meaning to organizational strategies with an assumption that they mainly act to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of different actors. In order to explain the behavior of social enterprises, which try to reach social ends through commercial means, we need to 1) consider the market forces, rather than sticking to the institutional pressures 2) analyze their strategic actions aimed at creating value and generating revenue, rather than the symbolic meaning of organizational arrangements.

The conventional theories of strategic management, on the other hand, are not directly applicable to social enterprises, as they assume value capture as the main motivation in organizational behavior. The literature on the management of conventional non-profit organizations, does not also to provide a strong base for the strategic management of social enterprises due to their limited consideration of strategic positioning, competition and revenue generation. A substantial theory on the management of social enterprises should be pertaining to the social value created, as well as considering the market dynamics. While there are recent attempts to build theory on the management of social enterprises considering both their commercial operations and value creating motivation (e.g.; Santos et al., 2015), they focus on the enterprise in isolation from its environment, neglecting the competition.

Given the fact that social enterprises do not operate in isolated circumstances, but increasingly compete with other organizations, there is a need to analyze their behavior in mixed-form markets. The studies of welfare economists on the competition between the commercial enterprises established by non-profit and for-profit organizations, on the other hand, denotes the same behavior to the members of an organization form; thus, they neglect the firm level differences. In addition, while the phenomenon of marketization has been subject to analysis by welfare governance scholars, most of these articles are critical elaborations of the issue pertaining potentially negative outcomes based on personal thoughts and observations. The few empirical studies, do not explicitly analyze the changing dynamics in the sectors, but make shortcuts to most visible outcomes.

Given these gaps in the literature, it is necessary to first reveal the mechanisms operating in the social sectors as they are subject to marketization through in-depth grounded analyses. An account of the emergent mechanisms will reveal the pressures exerted on social enterprises, and enable a better understanding of the process of marketization and the dynamics of competition in the mixed-form market. Second, there is also an evident gap in the literature regarding the strategic management of social enterprises under competitive environments. Analyzing their actions and reactions in an increasingly pressing environment of marketization can both inform theory about the effects of marketization, as well as contributing to theory on strategic management of social enterprises.

In a mixed-form market where profit-seeking enterprises join the social sector, there are several, potentially conflicting demands operating on the social enterprises. After

revealing those pressures, the following questions to answer are: “What are the differing responses to marketization among different social enterprises, and what are the causes for the differences in their reactions?” An analysis of the potential changes in their behaviors can also shed more light to the concept of mission drift. “As they embrace some commercial practices or change their strategic positions, do they perform those to the detriment of the social value they create?” And, “Which kinds of organizations are more prone to this treat of mission drift?” Moreover, a review of the literature indicates that the concept of mission drift is quite loosely operationalized in the few related empirical papers. For example, a rise in the prices of products and services of social enterprises is regarded as mission drift without further examination and consideration. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the changing strategic behaviors under particular pressures can also inform theory on mission drift.

Some strategic responses to choose from may be: acting as direct competitors versus shifting to niche markets, focusing on the less disadvantaged beneficiaries or differentiating by high quality, offering lower prices or higher quality with higher prices, defending the market by several strategies or welcome for-profits or become similar to them. Some enterprises may also quit the market when they can no longer achieve their missions in the new circumstances, or they may be pushed out of the market under particular pressures. How they strategically respond to the market pressures given their hybrid identity, which preserves a social welfare logic, can also contribute to the literature on hybrid forms of organizations by extending the focus from institutional pressures to broader mechanisms in the field.

The consequences of their strategic choices will be reflected to their strategic positions in the sector including product and service mix, target scope of beneficiaries, and the prices and quality of products and services. Those will, in turn, affect the social welfare created in the sector, both directly through the focal organization’s organizational outputs and (potentially) indirectly through their effects on other actors in the sector. Therefore, without a sufficient understanding of the internal and external mechanisms leading to the particular choices of the nonprofits among alternative organizational actions, one cannot also adequately speculate on the impact of nonprofit and for-profit competition on the social welfare created. In this regard, it is necessary to have a deeper understanding of the process, and come up with a theory capable of explaining their actions, rather than building models relying on several assumptions.

In sum, this dissertation attempts to contribute to these gaps in the literature through in-depth analysis grounded at two levels (Figure 1). First, how does the nature of the field change with marketization, and what kinds of pressures operate on the social enterprises in the sector? Second, how do the social enterprises respond to marketization, including a potential for mission drift, and which factors affect their reactions?

Figure 1 Research objective and questions



Through a qualitative study of the field of supplementary education of the disabled in Turkey, I first explore the changing dynamics as the field is exposed to marketization. I explain the several pressures exerted by key actors including the state, competitors, beneficiaries, and the workforce in the field. I later illustrate the dynamics resulting from the interactions of those pressures and the hybrid nature of the incumbent social enterprises with the case studies of 10 organizations. Finally, I explicate their differing strategic responses together with their antecedent factors.

METHODS

Given my interest in theory-building, and answering research questions with “how” and “why” in unexplored research areas, case studies would be a proper method (Edmondson & Mc Manus, 2007). Case studies are “in-depth investigations of some particular social setting with a focus on the events that occur in and over time in that arena” (Van Maanen, 1999, pp 28). They enable the researcher to identify new variables and causal mechanisms as the detailed examination of cases provides an opportunity to come across concepts that are not obvious in the first place (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Therefore, case study methodology is deemed as a suitable method when there is a lack of plausible existing theory on the topic and an insufficient background for making propositions based on existing theorizing (Siggelkow, 2007).

While theory can be induced from single cases, comparative case studies provide stronger base for theory building. First, the embeddedness in varied empirical data makes building theory from comparative cases more likely to produce theory that is robust, interesting, and testable (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This is because they provide more accurate definitions of the constructs and the relationships among them with appropriate levels of abstraction (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Second, comparative cases let the theory emerge from patterns of relationships among constructs within and across cases with their underlying logics (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), hence allowing the researcher clarify whether an emergent finding is idiosyncratic to a single case or replicated in several cases (Eisenhardt, 1991). Yin (1994) states that multiple cases can be considered like a series of related lab experiments, which serve as replications, contrasts, and extensions to the emerging theory. Moreover, while the lab studies isolate the phenomena from their context, thus decreasing the construct validity and generalizability to real world settings, case studies provide the rich, real-world context.

Another advantage of using case study methodology for my research questions was that, cases can employ multiple levels of analysis within one study (Yin, 1984). For the aims of my research, I first needed to open the black box of marketization to find out the field level changes revealing at various actors and explain the pressures they exert on the social enterprises. I also needed to gather information on the organizational level changes and link them to their potential antecedents at the sectoral, organizational and individual levels. Therefore, the mobility brought with the case study methodology would help me achieve my research objectives.

Eisenhardt (1989) suggests a framework for building theories from case studies by synthesizing Glaser and Strauss's (1967) grounded theory principles such as emergence of theoretical categories from evidence, constant comparison of data, theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation with Yin's (1981, 1984) replication logic in multiple case analysis to increase validity and reliability of case study research design, and Miles and Huberman's (1984) strategies to manage and present qualitative data. I adopt this framework outlined by Eisenhardt, also combining the strategies outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998), Charmaz (2006), and Saldana (2009) on qualitative analysis and coding.

Glaser and Strauss (1967) urge the scholars to start their research with a broad research question and to forget their prior knowledge of the literature as much as possible, as this can force the researcher into preexisting conceptualizations. Suddaby (2006), however, states that, grounded theory approach has an inherent limitation as the interpretive work is always a function of the researcher's background and interests, and that here is no real solution except being aware of this limitation. This viewpoint provides support to Eisenhardt (1989), who advocates the early identification of the research question and possible constructs informed by the existing literature, as this eases the work of the researcher throughout the process.

To sum up, with the aim of creating a theoretical framework to answer my research questions, I performed an inductive study through multiple comparative case studies. To control for extraneous variation, I decided to focus on a specific sector, supplementary education of the disabled in Turkey. In the following section, I provide an overview of the context and explain why I chose this context for my research. Next, I describe the methods and processes I employed in order to gain a better understanding of the context, select the

cases, and collect data. In the third section, I explain the data analysis procedures. I lastly discuss the validity and reliability concerns of the employed methods and the techniques I used for addressing them.

3.1 Research Context

The Disability Survey in Turkey (2002) carried out by The State Institute of Statistics, The State Planning Organization and The Presidency of Administration on Disabled People shows that, 12.29% of the population of Turkey is disabled. 2.58 % of this ratio are the orthopedically, seeing, hearing, speaking and mentally disabled people, whereas 9.70 % are the people with chronic illnesses who are in need of constant care and treatment. My focus of interest in this study is the education of the orthopedically, seeing, hearing, speaking and mentally disabled people, which constitute 1.25%, 0.60%, 0.37%, 0.38%, and 0.48% of the total population consequently. Within this focus group, workforce participation rate is 21.7% (32.2% for men and 6.7% for women), and the illiteracy rate is 36.4% (25.6% for men and 51.3% for women).

Table 1- Education level of orthopedically, seeing, hearing, speaking and mentally disabled population (The disability survey in Turkey, 2002)

%	Illiterate	Literate	Literate but not finished a school	Elementary school	Secondary school	High school	Higher education
Turkey	36.37	63.62	7.69	40.97	5.64	6.90	2.42
Rural	27.40	72.58	6.85	42.75	8.00	10.62	4.36
Urban	45.36	54.64	8.54	39.17	3.31	3.16	0.47
Men	25.75	74.22	7.95	47.21	6.98	8.98	3.10
Women	51.26	48.74	7.32	32.22	3.78	3.97	1.45

The education of the disabled in this geography started in 1889 with special classes for the visual and hearing impaired in Ticaret Mektebi, which were then turned into a separate school and survived until 1919 (Enç, 1972). In 1921, a new school for the visual and hearing

impaired was opened in Izmir, and was tied to the Ministry of Health and Social Aid in 1924, after the establishment of the republic (Akçamete and Kaner, 1999). In 1950, the planning and execution of special education was transferred from the Ministry of Health and Social Aid to the Ministry of Education. In addition to opening a number of new schools for the education of the visual and hearing impaired in the following years, Ministry of Education also opened a research center and started special classes for the mentally disabled in two elementary schools in Ankara, in 1955 (Özsoy, 1990).

The following years saw the rise of the gradually more inclusive laws and bylaws on the education of the disabled. In 1957, “Korunmaya Muhtaç Çocuklar Hakkında Kanun” (numbered 6972) guaranteed that Ministry of Education takes necessary actions for the education of the disabled children among the children in need of care. In 1961, “İlköğretim ve Eğitim Kanunu” (numbered 222) stated that all disabled children at the age of mandatory education should be able to take education services. In 1983, “Özel Eğitime Muhtaç Çocuklar Kanunu” (numbered 2916) defined the terms and conditions for the detection of the children in need of special education, their placement and monitoring. Starting in 1952 with Gazi University, departments to raise teachers for the disabled were opened in universities across Turkey (Enç et al., 1987).

In 1960s, the Ministry of Education opened a few special classes for the disabled in public schools. There was no opportunity for the education of the disabled except those few classes. In addition, the children with an IQ level below 50 were regarded as uneducable and the methods to educate were not developed until Makbule Ölçen, herself a mother of mentally disabled, initiated it in 1970s within Öğretilebilir Çocukları Koruma Derneği in Ankara. She later founded Zihinsel Yetersiz Çocukları Koruma ve Geliştirme Vakfı (ZİÇEV) in 1982. In a similar vein, by 1972, there was no education and rehabilitation opportunity for the individuals with cerebral palsy other than a small number of therapists in a few hospitals. This situation alerted Prof. Dr. Hıfzı Özcan to found an association named Türkiye Spastik Çocuklar Derneği (converted to a foundation in 1989) for providing therapies to more kids as well as informing and rehabilitating their families.

These initial attempts to start the education of the disabled individuals were later followed by the opening of other associations and foundations as well as a few social enterprises founded by the specialists in this area. Some of the foundations and associations

were running special education schools with a public-nonprofit partnership while some operated on their own. Those education centers were initially accredited by the Institute of Social Services and Protection of Children, later also having the option to be accredited by the Ministry of Education (MoE) -with some differences in permission requirements). As consistently declared by the informants I interviewed, the dominant norm on payments for services was based on the availability of the family. The foundations and associations charged them based on family income providing free service if they are poor. Similarly, the social enterprises in the form of a firm had price lists those were flexible according to the income of the family and generous quotas for free services to the poor families. In 1990s, a bank started paying for the education of their employees' disabled kids at SERCs, followed by other big corporations.

Meanwhile, the rising pressures by the NGOs for increased education opportunities for the disabled, later coupled with the requirements of the European Union and the financial support of international organizations to Turkey for this aim, motivated the state to take gradual steps. However, rather than increasing the number of few public schools for the education of disabled and the special classes for the disabled in regular public schools and increasing the education quality¹ at state's schools, its move was towards paying for some limited hours of services of SERCs. (See Figure 3 for the process of special education and rehabilitation in Turkey)

In 1996, state payments started for the disabled kids of citizens with social security, giving rise to the opening of more SERCs, reaching around five hundred² by 2005. While this first wave of marketization increased the number SERCs to some extent, the portion belonging to associations and foundations was still non-negligible. In addition, as declared by various informants of this research (discussed in detail in findings section), the founders of many SERCs were people connected to the field either by heart or by profession. Thus, even some of them could also seek profit, they had the motivation or knowledge to provide proper education. However, the ratio of these socially minded and capable actors in the sector

¹ By November 2013, half of the required capacity for teachers of mentally disabled are still empty in public schools as a consequence of the limited capacity at the universities for this department (Noted by a government official in the Engelsiz Türkiye İçin Yolun Neresindeyiz Conference held by Sabancı University)

² There are 45 still-operating SERCS accredited by the Ministry of Education by 2005 in the list I gathered from the ministry. And as seen in the list in the answer to the written question in Turkish Grand National Assembly, the number of SERCs accredited by SCHEK by Aug 2004 was 472.)

gradually declined as others started to see a profit opportunity. Later, on the first of July, 2005, came a stronger wave of marketization, through a new law (law number 5378) which ruled out the contingency of parents' having social security in order for the state to pay for their children's' education at the SERCs. This new development paved the way for the opening of numerous SERCs (1975 by March 2016), mostly by merchants unrelated to the field who were excited about the profit potential. Below quotation indicates the reaction of Makbule Ölçen (2005), founder of ZİÇEV, to this situation:

“Our state promotes and supports the organizations which are established with profit aim - in fact making trade over disability and increasing like fungi, and it does not inspect the education level they provide. Doing so, it makes disability open to exploitation. Mental disability should not turn into commercial profit. No country in the West has gone through such a wrong way”

In addition to the quoted concern of Makbule Ölçen on the ethical aspect and the quality of education, another facet of the marketization of the sector reflected in the media, has been the corruption scandals both on part of the SERC owners and the state officials (which in fact continue to date, see; e.g. <http://goo.gl/3Mypxc> , <http://goo.gl/40SJU5>). Due to space concerns, I am not excerpting any articles from newspaper archives; however, excerpting part of the State Supervisory Council Audit Report dated 27.08.2009 (pp 203) to provide a summary of the occasions:

“In order to reach more customers, some of the private special education schools and special education and rehabilitation centers serving the disabled even use the way of providing interest to officials in relevant agencies and organizations in order to obtain the identity and address of the disabled. In addition, they also try to offer some benefits to the families of disabled people. This has become a "promotion race" among some organizations. This situation, described as "disabled hunt" by interested persons and families, raises the security of data on persons with disabilities as a sensitive case.... Some organizations, on the other hand, are trying to get an unearned gain from the state with some unrealistic statements. On the spread of such abuse in the special education and rehabilitation center providing education to people with disabilities, inspections were conducted in 2008 by the Ministry of Education Supervisory Board and it has been detected that a large number of centers are obtaining an unearned gain.... According to the findings in the reports prepared by the inspectors; it has been found that a total of 86,325,952 TL unwarranted amount was received from the state for reasons such as; making repeated student registration, arranging false report, the use of invalid reports, teachers shown as employed in multiple organizations at the same dates, unauthorized

teachers' entering the lessons/sessions, making records out of the program, employing fewer staff than is stipulated by the legislation. Part of this amount has been repaid by those organizations before the conclusion of the court process, while the judicial process continues for crimes related to the announcement.”


There are several reasons for selecting this context for answering the proposed research questions. First, it is a large sector with 1975 organizations in the country (by March 2016) and 330 organizations only in the city of Istanbul (numbers retrieved from <http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr/>). The kinds of services offered in the sector are similar and the legal framework is the same for all organizations making them more comparable to each other. Focusing on the organizations operating in a particular sector eliminates environmental variation (Eisenhardt, 1989), thus enabling the researcher to induce more robust theory.

Although there is a shared legal framework for those organizations, there is also room for variance across them, creating the opportunity to generate rich theoretical insights. First, the regulations are concerned with some physical characteristics of SERCs and the existence of some key personnel; the actual quality of education provided by those centers is not measured nor inspected by the state. In addition, while the centers invoice the state for hours of education provided (for maximum 8 hours of individual + 4 hours of group classes) according to the need of the disabled people on the Guidance and Research Center (GRC) report, these centers can offer the beneficiaries additional class hours for which themselves set the price³. Moreover, the facilities of the centers differ from each other above the basic legal requirements; e.g., some have gardens while some do not, some have swimming pools for physical therapy, some have sports rooms or even sports halls, some have music rooms etc.

Similar to the differences in facilities, the SERCs provide some complementary services, either paid or non-paid, in differing levels such as theatre groups, dance sessions, music hours, sports teams, and even yoga sessions. Likewise, they differ in their level of adoption on different (extra) therapies such as sensory integration and space therapy. The centers also vary in terms of the in-service training they provide for their personnel, and/or

³ I had confirmed this variation in prices via phone calls to several SERCs before I decide on this sector. Similarly, I had detected other several ways they can differ through the analysis of the web pages of some organizations and reading discussions on forums.

Figure 2 The process of special education and rehabilitation in Turkey



the expertise of the teachers, as well as the family education sessions or conferences they organize. Moreover, some (not only SERCs of foundations but also ones in firm status) go much beyond the legal requirements to engage in awareness raising activities such as preparing and delivering booklets on preventing sexual abuse to the disabled people, or online education kits for families.

Added on the above mentioned differences, one key variance is on their organizational forms; there are SERCs run by both firms with for-profit legal status as well as the nonprofits, which both fit into the definition of social enterprise as long as they pursue social aims while having none or limited profit distribution. The characteristics of the founders of the organizations in this context also vary such that there are SERCs opened by the families of the disabled people, by physiotherapists or teachers of disabled, by social service specialists or psychologists, but also by the actors quite irrelevant to the field such as contractors. In fact, many of the interviewees complained that “even butchers” or “even greengrocers” can open a SERC as there is no legal limitation on the characteristics of the founder.

Last but not the least, in addition to the invasion of actors pursuing profit aims and the pressures brought along, the competitive and financial pressures on the focal enterprises have increased even further with the state’s decreasing the payments per class hours (through making raises less than the inflation rate and also increasing the individual hours from 6 to 8 in year 2008 while leaving the total amount of payment nearly unchanged⁴).

The findings of this research in this particular context are expected to be relevant in other sectors which were traditionally dominated by public or non-governmental organizations but increasingly turning into mixed-form markets such as, education, health-care, disabled care and elderly care. In essence, the implications of this study are relevant to any social enterprise pursuing social aims through engaging in commercial activities, and has to compete with profit-seeking enterprises. Examples to those enterprises can be some green enterprises, elderly care organizations, women-cooperatives selling traditional products... etc.

⁴ Payment per hour: 41 TL in 2006, 43 TL in 2012.

3.2 Data Collection and Procedures

3.2.1 Gaining Access to and Knowledge on the Field

In the initial phase of the research process, my aim was to gaining access to the field and gathering more information on its dynamics; specifically, learning the regulations and processes, identifying key actors who can serve as gate keepers, and obtaining knowledge on the kinds of organizations and a deeper understanding of the variations in practices. With these purposes, I made participative observations and built ties in the field by finding contacts and communicating my aim efficiently so that they gave importance to my research (Lofland and Lofland, 1995).

3.2.1.1 Participative observations

I did one-week participatory observations at two SERCs, which were chosen to vary by size. During those periods, I observed the physical conditions, registration and education processes and analyzed the documents provided such as example disabled reports of the hospitals and the reports of the Guidance and Research Centers (GRC). I also joined some classes when the teachers contended that the particular student would not be adversely affected by my presence and the family was there to give their consent. In addition, I visited various administrative departments such as accounting, public relations and evaluation to learn about their tasks and roles. I had the lunch and tea breaks with the employees, and after building rapport, I talked to them on their daily work, the kinds of organizations in the field, and how they differed from each other. I also talked to some parents who were waiting during their kids' class hour to better understand the process. and observed their behaviors and interactions with the teachers.

3.2.1.2 Expert interviews and archival resources

I interviewed several actors in the field including two teachers, the managers of two SERCs (one was also a former state official in the field), and the founders of two other

SERCs, which were not later included in the sample. During the expert interviews, I asked questions about the evolution of the field, the special education process (from the diagnosis phase to the evaluation of the progress in the students), the main actors and their roles, and the general differences among the organizations in the field. Later, as two of the founders in my sample organizations had held managerial positions in the associations of SERCs, I was also able to benefit from their wider views on the evolution and state of the field and utilized the documents such as presentations and their speech texts in some meetings, which they kindly provided.

In addition to those actors, I conducted 4 interviews with the academics at the special education departments of two universities, one located in Istanbul, the other in Eskişehir. Those academics regularly collaborate with the SERCs for their research on the education of the disabled people, send their students to those organizations as interns, serve as experts to the courts for legal cases, and prepare reports on the state of the field in collaboration with the officials in the associated ministries. Other than their comments on the transformation of the field, those academics also acknowledged me of the potential quality indicators for the SERCs, which I used for triangulating parts of the interview data. Following the interviews with academics, I participated in the conferences on the education of the disabled organized in Ankara and Istanbul, where I was able to gain more field knowledge, observe main discussion points and interactions of actors, and meet other key contacts including employees of the ministries, who suggested several readings and sources of data regarding the evolution and dynamics of the field.

I also read several reports and other archival documents such as newspaper archives on the web and discussion forums, as well as skimming the dissertations written in the special education departments of universities, which I found from the database of the Higher Education Council. While those dissertations were not problematizing the management of the SERCs, they were a good source of information for better understanding the context. Also, through the end of my data collection, I was able to interview the managers of two GRCs in different districts of Istanbul. (My aim in visiting the GRCs was to better triangulate some data on the organizations in my sample. However, the managers hesitated to make any comments due to the fragility of the issue- the previous corruption scandals including GRC officials- but made general comments.)

During and after these interviews, I took jotted notes (recorded when the environment permitted) and wrote new insights in my research diary. Analyses of my notes from the expert interviews and the jotted notes from participatory observations, coupled with the articles and reports on special education in Turkey, provided me the necessary field knowledge to prepare more relevant and meaningful questions for the semi-structured interviews, the surveys, and the dataset I would request from the organizations.

3.2.2 Selection of Cases

As my aim was building theory through case studies, the sample selection standards of the positivist approach such as statistical representativeness and statistical sampling were not applicable (Siggelkow, 2007; Van Maanen, 1999). In case studies, cases are selected for theoretical reasons such as extension of theory, replication and contrary replication of the theory under construction, and elimination of alternative explanations (Yin, 1994). Therefore, I chose the cases according to their contribution to theory development. I added new organizations which extended the findings from others, helped reveal the logics between the constructs in the emerging theory as well as eliminating alternative explanations.

As there is a limit to the number of cases which can be studied, it is fruitful to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types (Pettigrew, 1988). I initially identified some cases such that they varied in their age, the legal form (for-profit vs non-profit), and the characteristics of the founders (parents of the disabled vs specialists) - due to the expected potential of those differences to contribute to the theory after analyzing my initial notes from expert interviews. My objective was to include SERCs with similar characteristics (in terms of size, ownership structure etc.) to ensure saturation in observations, as well as SERCs with diverse characteristics in order to maximize variance in the data collected (Yin, 2003).

Though not coding the interview data immediately, I noted what I learnt from the interview of that day comparing it to previous interviews. I jotted down the preliminary words and phrases and the key factors and mechanisms emphasized by the interviewees in order to use those for both adding new cases until theoretical saturation. One additional important factor, with a potential moderating effect in the theory, surfaced as the socioeconomic

situation of the location of the SERC; therefore, I added cases from districts varying in this aspect.

To aid me in the selection phase, I compiled a dataset that included the opening dates and districts of all the SERCs in Turkey. To do this, I benefited from a list of the SERCs including their opening dates, district, and contact information, which I solicited from the Ministry of Education. In this list; however, the SERCs which were originally opened with the permission of SHCEK were included with the dates in which they were transferred to MoE. To solve this, I skimmed the organizations listed in the Country Report for Disabled, 1995-2000 prepared by the Prime Ministry Department of the Administration of the Disabled (2001). Later, I found a list in answers to the written questions in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, by Aug 2004, which also helped me depict the real opening dates. For the short remaining period, Aug 2004- 2006, I manually searched the real opening dates.

In addition to the cases selected with a systemic approach, three cases were identified opportunistically- based on their interesting situations which can sharpen the theory- through snowball sampling. An interviewee in one organization told me about a SERC in which s/he was a partner and that they sold the SERC after the changing dynamics in the field. I solicited her to put me in contact with the founder to include this case in my sample. Later, in the interview with that founder, I learnt about another organization that was opened within the same time period by a person similar to this founder in terms of profession and age- they had actually partnered for a short period. In order to compare and contrast why one chose to stay in the market while the other quit and how it was able to survive, I wanted that interviewee to put me in contact with that founder. The third case I added opportunistically again emerged from the interviews of another case. I was told by an interviewee that s/he had worked there in the past and that they had state-of-art applications for ensuring quality and that the organization later grew very fast opening other branches, but eventually seized. Yet another interviewee told me that s/he was friends with the founder of this particular organization and that it would be interesting for me to analyze this case, also kindly putting me in contact with that organization. This flexibility during the sampling was beneficial both to extend and sharpen the theory as well as enabling triangulation of their data from outside parties, which were historically associated with those organizations.

I continued adding cases until I believed I reached theoretical saturation, when I felt that the theoretical insights gained from new cases had diminished a lot. The number of cases was initially 11. However, I later dropped one case, as my reason for choosing that organization (the interesting situation of a firm opening an association) also surfaced in another case which provided other fruitful information as well. Table 2 presents the basic information for the ten cases included in the final sample. In line with my statement in the ethical committee approval for this research and the consent forms of the participant, I am using their information in a covered way which will abandon the association with the organizations and people.

Table 2- Demographics for selected cases

Name	Founding Year	Founder/s	Legal Form	# of Branches
Mercury	Before 1990	Parents of disabled children	Foundation	more than 5
Venus	Before 1990	Academics with high-net-worth individuals	Foundation	1
Jupiter	Before 1990	Specialist	Firm	between 1-5
Eris	Before 1990	Specialist	Firm	0 ⁵
Pluto	Btw 1990-2000	Parents of disabled children	Foundation	0 ⁶
Earth	Btw 2000-2005	Parent of disabled child with high-net-worth individuals	Foundation	1
Mars	Btw 2000-2005	Parents of disabled child	Firm	between 1-5
Saturn	Btw 2000-2005	Specialists	Firm	1
Uranus	Btw 2000-2005	Specialist	Firm	1
Neptune	Btw 2000-2005	Specialist with businessperson	Firm	1

The number of cases in a multiple case study design depends on the level of certainty that the researcher wants to have about the findings, similar to the idea of ‘power’ in quantitative research. However, there is a trade-off between the depth and scope of the research. A larger number of cases provide more evidence on the robustness of the theory while also offering information on variations across cases, thus bringing the potential to fine-

⁵ Sold before 2006.

⁶ Closed after 2014.

grain the theory. However, it is hard to get in-depth information on more number of cases as well as the limited capacity of the researcher to process the huge amount of information. Eisenhardt (1989) recommends having between 4 and 10 case studies, stating that (pp. 545); “With fewer than 4 cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases within it... With more than 10 cases, it quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity and volume of the data.” Thus, I believe that the number of cases included is also in line with the research standards, and it was the maximum number I could handle within the process.

I first contacted those organizations by telephoning (except the cases where first calls were done by the referents) and explained to the managers/founders a brief overview of the research. I made a general statement that I was doing research on the changes in the field and their effects on the organizations, rather than giving the exact title, as I did not want to influence their answers in the interviews in any way. There was only one instance which accepted participating after a long written approval process, others accepted on the phone. A few organizations I initially picked refused to participate, stating they don't have time, and I replaced them with other cases with similar characteristics according to my selection criteria. At the beginning, I did not tell the organizations about all the interviews, surveys, datasets, documents I would request, as the associated time and work load could make them hesitate to participate. I rather requested those gradually as I built more rapport, saying, e.g., “*May I also interview the other founder?*”, “*Could you also fill in this dataset?*”

No direct compensation was offered to any of the participants on the phone; except promising to share with them the findings of the study. However, as I stated in my ethical committee approval, during the interviews, I told them that I can either help them on writing an impact report or give trainings on the subject. Upon their interest, I gave trainings at two of the participating organizations. Those trainings also provided me additional observations and knowledge on many details pertaining those organizations.

3.2.3 Sources of Data

Each case study was built on multiple sources of data; multiple interviews, observations, employee surveys, data sets provided by the organizations, and archival

sources. The reason for using multiple sources of data was to achieve “triangulation”, a stronger substantiation of findings from different sources of information (Eisenhardt, 1989), which is crucial for building rigorous theories based on case studies. I compared the information gathered from different sources with each other, in order to ensure that the events or facts of the case studies have been supported by more than a single source of evidence (Yin, 2003). This approach increased robustness of my evidence and also helped decrease biases related to subjectivity or forgetting. The following sections provide further details on specific data sources used for collecting case study evidence.

3.2.3.1 Semi-structured interviews with managers and founders

At the first round, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the general managers of the SERCs (See interview questions in Appendix). Before visiting each organization, I collected information from their web sites and social media accounts, as well as skimming the info I face when googling the organization and the founder/s. In addition to the interview questions common to all cases, I also asked about the occasions I deemed interesting. If the manager did not work in the organization for a long enough time to assess the changes, I tried to interview another employee/former employee in a managerial position with sufficient experience in the organization. The manager interviews were partly analyzed before I proceed to the founder interviews. I compared my notes across the cases to find out the fundamental differences and develop some preliminary theoretical insights.

For the founder interviews, I modified some questions in manager interviews and added new questions in light of the gained insights, taking advantage of the flexibility and opportunistic nature of data collection procedures in case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989). Before I visited the founders, I listened to the manager interviews one more time and noted the points I should ask for clarification. In cases when the general manager was the founder/one of the cofounders, thus already interviewed in the first round, I tried to arrange one more interview with the same person.

Table 3 Description of interview data

Name	# of interviews	Interviewee's profile	# of coded interviews	Duration of coded interviews
Mercury	6	General Manager Members of BoD Branch Managers	4	472 mins
Venus	6	General Manager Branch Manager Former Vice General Manager First Evaluation Manager Public Relations Specialist Education Coordinator	3	215 mins
Jupiter	1	Founder & General Manager	1	141 mins
Eris	1	Founder & General Manager	1	95 mins
Pluto	5	Co-founders & members of BoD Branch Manager	3	326 mins
Earth	3	Co-founder Branch Manager Education Coordinator	2	142 mins
Mars	2	Co-founder Education Coordinator	2	273 mins
Saturn	2	Co-founder & General Manager	2	156 mins
Uranus	2	Founder & General Manager	1	111 mins
Neptune	4	Co-founders Branch Manager	3	303 mins

Total number of interviews conducted	32
Number of interviewees involved	26
Number of coded interviews	22
Average duration of coded interviews	1 hour 42 min
Number of pages of coded interviews	765 pages

The semi-structured interviews let me gather comparable data from the cases while also leaving space for emergent themes and concepts from the interview data. The interviews were organized around 4 general topics: (1) changes in the field across time; (2) history of the organization; (3) management of the organizations; and (4) changes in the organizations mission, strategy and several aspects of the services offered. While it is recommended that the researcher does not start inductive studies with predefined concepts and theories in mind,

an early identification of possible constructs which already exist in the literature may also help the researcher assess the constructs more accurately (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this reason, the interviews also included questions inquiring constructs such as organizational identity and corporatization.

All parts of the interviews started with general questions, both serving as warm-up questions and giving more free space to the interviewee, then continued with more specific ones. Several times within the interviews, I wanted them to compare past and now, trying to make them think of the differences. I also asked the same/similar phenomena in different ways, such as “what is effectiveness for this organization”, “do you have goals...” In addition, when I wanted them to rate some practices with respect to the average of the field, such as quality, I later asked how they ensure quality, why they have higher/lower quality...etc. During the interviews, I was also keen on showing an acceptable incompetence on the subject and the organization, such that people gave me information (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). In addition, I paid attention to not using loaded terms for not affecting their responses; for example, I never used the term marketization myself, before they themselves used it.

3.2.3.2 Field observations and memos

In almost all settings, I had the opportunity to walk around with the interviewees to observe the physical conditions and the general atmosphere while also having lunch with the interviewee and other employees. In addition, in four of the organizations, I was able to participate in some classes and the events hold during my presence. Therefore, my field notes included both notes from the interviews as well as other observations from my several visits to those organizations. Those informal interactions were also useful for supporting or challenging my inferences from the formal interview data collected.

I later utilized the insights from the field notes while evaluating and comparing other information. For example, in some settings, the disabled kids entered the room to invite the manager out for playing, or to say good bye (which is not in the job definition of the manager, but is an indication of the value given to and intimacy with the kids- triangulating the other sources of information, e.g. my codes from the interview of those organizations such as

“tender to the kids”). Those observations also added new data not mentioned/emphasized in the interviews. For instance, in one setting, the parent of a disabled person called the founder of a big foundation from her personal cellular phone, this showing me the intimate care she herself puts, despite not mentioning in the interview. Without those observations in my several visits to those organizations, my analysis would be incomplete and/or biased, as some participants tend to emphasize some facts in the interviews but others don't although they also have those characteristics/applications.

Another interesting instance was when I visited a different branch of an organization, despite having done several interviews at the headquarters and another branch. The facility was quite rich in terms of the physical conditions; separate rooms for several purposes, different education methods, sports facilities, music rooms etc. While the other informants had told me that their other branches have better facilities than where I visited, I had not given much credit to this information, as I had not seen in person. Moreover, this organization does not use social media and their website as effectively as some others do, which had put me back from assessing their superior facilities. This and other experiences with different cases, in fact, made me contend that, what was reflected to media/social media about those organizations as well as their websites was more of a function of their marketing capability or their will to market themselves through these channels rather than a robust indicator of the variety and quality of their services.

3.2.3.3 Datasets filled by the organizations

I prepared a set of questions to be filled by the organizations for the years 2006, 2010 and 2014, by year-end. The reasons for selecting those years are as follows. The legislative changes in 2006 create the stronger wave of marketization to which the effects and reactions would start to reveal after some time elapsed. I therefore wanted to see the situation just before they were had been affected. I collected this dataset in 2015, and I wanted to see situation by 2014-end, to compare data with the interviews. I also requested the data for 2010, because the organizations were not affected linearly; e.g., seizing after growth. To gather this dataset, I made new interviews with the founders in most of the cases, in which I also asked

about the open issues. For the rest, I sent the file via e-mail. If the SERCs had more than one branch, I wanted them to provide information for all.

The questions in the dataset pertained to several aspects (See Appendix), such as the number of specialists per student and their experience, trainings to teachers supported by the organizations, prices charged, services offered...etc. While compiling the questions which would serve as indicators of quality, I benefitted from the report of Assessing the Efficiency of Supplementary Special Education Services Project conducted by the Ministry of Social and Family Policies (2014), the dissertations I had skimmed, and the suggestions of the academics and other experts I had interviewed in the initial phase of the research.

I gathered the datasets for 7 of the cases. One of the cases had sold the SERC prior to 2006, within the first marketization wave, therefore no dataset was requested from that organization. In one case, the founder was experiencing a severe burnout as a result of the pressures in the field (will be discussed in the findings) and was not willing to commit more time energy for the research on the field. While not having the dataset, I was able to triangulate the interview data of these two organizations through other informants in the sample who had historical connections. The third case I could not gather the data kept promising that they would prepare it, but yet no dataset has been sent. Luckily, in addition to multiple interviewees from that organization, 13 of its employees participated in the survey, enabling the compensation of some information in the dataset.

3.2.3.4 Employee surveys

In order to further triangulate parts of the interview data and reduce the potential subjectivity bias, I conducted online employee surveys (see questions in Appendix). The survey included multiple choice and forced choice questions for measuring specific constructs as well as a set of questions where participants rated particular organizational practices (price, quality, differentiation, level of extra services, disability level of students) and an open-ended question on their organizational identity. If the participant declared that s/he had been working in the organization for more than 9 years, the survey opened up an additional section, requesting them to think about the applications in the past for one minute and later answer the questions regarding strategic positioning again. The embedded scales

(See table 4) were derived from the existing literature on potentially important constructs after a preliminary analysis of interview notes. The scales those had not been validated in Turkey were translated and back-translated by my cohorts in order to ensure the right translation.

Table 4 Scales used in the employee survey

Construct Name	Scale	
Formalization	Oldham and Hackman (1981)	5 point Likert 5 item scale
Organizational Identification	Mael and Ashforth (1992)	5 point Likert 6 item scale
Customer orientation	Narver and Slater (1990)	5 point Likert 6 item scale
Enactment of social welfare & commercial logics	Lee and Battilana (2013)	5 point Likert 12 item scale
Entrepreneurship orientation	Covin and Slevin (1989)	7 point semantic 9 item scale
Social/economic/legal/ethical orientation	Stevens et al. (2015) (Adapted from Aupperle et al., 1985)	Forced choice, 10 points allocated to 4 items in 4 groups
Global service climate	Schneider et al. (1998)	5 point Likert 7 item scale

Before sending the link for the survey to the managers to share with their employees, I conducted 6 pilots with employees of 3 SERCs which were not included in my sample. During the first 3 pilots, I sat near the participants and wanted them to ask any confusing or annoying points. Their answers made me realize that I needed to adapt the wording of some scales to the context of my study. I performed the rest of the pilots after associated changes and made a few final corrections.

As mentioned earlier, one SERC had closed a long time ago, and another SERC in the sample was closed during the research process; so these two had no employees. 4 out of the remaining 8 organizations participated in the survey, with a total of 39 valid surveys. Only one founder (with severe burnout) stated that he does not want the employees to spend time for research or alike purposes anymore, due to his resentment. 2 of the organizations had started to be bored by my several demands and said “we will look,” but the fact that no one

participated from those organizations may indicate they did not share it with the employees- perhaps due their annoyance of the survey questions, e.g. the commercial/social orientation scale that directly ask fragile topics. The other non-participating organization was one of the most helpful organizations that far, even collecting a lot of data for me from their several branches. I am not aware of any specific reason for their non-participation, maybe the work load of the general manager; however, I hesitated to ask again after reminding once.

There was only one response from an organization, which I evaluated it with caution, only as weak evidence. There were 22, 13, and 3 responses from the remaining organizations, those numbers being proportional to their number of employees. I aggregated the responses to the scales, calculating scores for each organization on associated dimensions. For the items on rating quality, price, extra activities, and level of disability of students, I calculated averages for 2014 and 2006. I also tabulated the definitions on organizational identity to corroborate interview evidence.

3.2.3.5 Secondary sources

I collected several archival data including annual reports and organizations' publications (where available), and bulletins and histories from websites. I also googled the news on the organizations and founders for additional information. In addition, I examined the contents of the web pages, and social media accounts. I used the information from the archival sources for several purposes; first to prepare for the interviews, second to connect parts of the case histories, and thirdly to complement and confirm the evidence from the interviews. In order to correctly evaluate the archival data and rule out potential biases, for each archival document, I considered what purposes it was created for. (As explained earlier, the content in social media and web pages of some organizations such as photos of several activities, was not a reliable source of data as some organizations could not / did not chose to use those channels densely. Therefore, I did not make any structured content analysis or cross tabulations based on these sources)

3.3 Data Analysis

The data analysis was conducted by following the framework outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) for building theory from multiple case studies. Following her method, I first made within-case analysis to gain familiarity with data and start preliminary theory generation. During this phase, the main resource for theory generation was the qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts, iteratively validated by the other data sources. The founder and manager interviews were transcribed and open-coded for inducing theory, together with my field notes and the analytical memos I wrote after each interview (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). (I provide the details of this coding process in the next section).

After assessing the unique patterns for each case, I started comparing the findings from different cases with each other, to see if there are consistent patterns among cases. In this process, evidence confirming emergent conceptualizations and relationships increase confidence in the validity of the emerging model, while the disconfirming data across cases should be interpreted to refine the emerging model (Eisenhardt, 1989). Theory building in case studies “occurs via recursive cycling among the case data, emerging theory, and later, extant literature” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; pp. 25). Therefore, this was an iterative process whereby I went back and forth between the data and the theory asking the ‘how’ and “why” questions searching evidence for the causal relationships among emergent concepts. I continued this induction process until I believed I reached the theoretical saturation, the point at which incremental learning and the necessary refinement is minimal (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

This kind of theory building grounded in data produces a strong theory, because it is empirically valid (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However, in order to increase the generalizability of the theory, the challenge in case studies is to come up with a framework that does not 'over-determine the phenomenon' by the particular details of cases. While the specifics of each case may appear to be crucial to the researcher, s/he has to make choices and simplifications in order to create a generalizable theory (Siggelkow, 2007). Keeping in mind this inherent challenge, I was keen on the level of abstraction, making sure that I am not creating a very narrow-range theory.

3.3.1 The Coding Process

The coding was performed in AtlasTi – a software extensively used by scientists for qualitative data analysis. The coding of data was conducted in the original language (Turkish) to eliminate the risk of misinterpreting the data by translating it first into English and then coding. Prior to starting coding, I listened to audio recordings of interviews once again, correcting any mistakes in the transcriptions, which also enabled me to “digest and reflect on the data” (Clarke, 2005).

3.3.1.1 Open coding

Open coding is the process of breaking down qualitative data into separate parts, examining them comparing for similarities and differences, and assigning codes to these parts while remaining open to all possible theoretical directions emerging from the data (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). To generate an integrated, consistent, plausible and data-driven theory, it is essential to follow the constant comparative method of qualitative analysis- continuously comparing and contrasting data- as well as preserving a theoretical sensitivity- asking how and why at each phase of the analysis to find the underlying patterns (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

I was keen on not imposing any theory during the coding process- letting the theory emerge from the data-, and in order to remain alert on the most important elements for my research aim, I put my research questions to a visible place and occasionally skimmed them during the coding. I always compared the text I read to the previous codes, evaluating whether it was mentioned a different phenomenon and how it differed. I kept memos on my thoughts, to keep the freshness of my theoretical notions and to relieve conflicts in my thoughts (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

Following Saldana’s (2009, p. 15) method for coding the interviews and field notes, I coded what rises from the data corpus to the surface; the “relevant text” as named by Auerbach and Silverstein (2003). I coded the unrelated text, the short passages scattered throughout the interviews which are distant from the topic of interest, as N/A-not applicable. While doing this, I was keen on not losing any potentially fruitful data. For example, some interviewees were inclined to comment on the ideal type of education the students should be

getting (socializing with their peers, the importance of repeating what they learn at school at their homes... etc.) While not coding their details, I coded those passages as N/A-technical info. I later checked those codes to see if they provide any meaning for my analysis; e.g., whether particular participants were speaking more technical language or made more comments on the ideal education process- as supplementary evidence to the depth of their technical knowledge and importance given to quality of education.

As the coding proceeded, I felt the need to create a form of “eclectic coding” (Saldana, 2009) to help me better organize the data around my research questions, logistically handle the high number of codes and also be able to cognitively process the complicated events and processes at different levels of analysis. Therefore, I created a broad coding scheme explaining the level of analysis and the dimensions I would seek to code within each level. This scheme had emerged from the data analysis that far and was modified several times throughout the process until I felt I captured all the key elements feeding the theory.

Table 5 Coded elements

Actors	Coded elements
Macro Environment	The situations, events and processes affecting the field or particular organizations
State	
Field	
Workforce	Key motives and actions of these actors Changes in their motives and actions The processes exerting pressure on SEs
Pool of beneficiaries	
Organizations in the field	
The Organization	Reason of birth, mission, identity, activities, key historical events, elements of strategy and structure, strengths and weaknesses, pressures felt and reactions Changes caused by other (potentially confounding) factors
Organizational characteristics	
Founder/s	
Employees of the organizations	
Beneficiaries of the organizations	Actions, motives, values, emotions, beliefs and key changes in these dimensions (associated with marketization) exerting pressure on the organizations and affecting their reactions

At this stage, this was not a theoretical categorization, but only a descriptive coding embedded in the open coding, such that: “Level of analysis_ coded element y_ code 1.” When

there was manageable number of codes under a particular level of analysis, I did not indicate the name of the element, but coded as “level of analysis_ code 1.” To give substantial examples; the codes looked like:

- Org_ reaction_ stopping investing in employee
- Org_ mission_ being an exemplar org
- Field_ profit maximizers_ not competing on quality
- Field_ beneficiaries_ requesting bribe
- Macro_ increase in the number of NGOs

As seen from Table 5, I coded both the actions, and the social meanings which are infused into them: intentions, motives, beliefs, and values (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p.7). I incorporated InVivo codes (own words of the interviewees), and process codes (with “-ing”) into the open codes that arose from my analysis of the data (Saldana, 2009). While letting the codes emerge from the data, I also sought for statements on some specific organizational elements such as reason of birth, mission and identity. These elements also rose from the data and emergent theory. For example, I figured out that, while all organizations in the sample wanted to create social value, their reasons of birth varied; such that some were aiming both social value and an amount of profit at founding while others only had the social impact in mind. Those differences were later reflected to their strategic reactions. Thus, I was keen on catching and coding any statement related to reason of founding and the starting mission for all cases. Similarly, after realizing that the organizations were affected at differing levels by the pressures exerted by marketization and that their organizational strengths and weaknesses protected them or made them more vulnerable, I tried to figure out which specific strengths and weaknesses they had from the interview data- later triangulating it with other sources of data.

In addition to the emergent codes, I coded the specific complementary activities they performed other than education and rehabilitation to the students; e.g., organizing conferences, publications. One question asked whether there were differences in the range of the complementary activities and/or the importance given to some of them. I coded any mentioned change as an emerging process code; e.g., decreasing social activities, which I would seek to explain with emerging concepts and mechanisms asking the “why” question in the second cycle coding (provided that the change was a consequence of marketization, as later inquired in the interview). At the same time, I tabulated the static codes (the activates

themselves) in an excel file and noted any mentioned changes, later triangulating the data from other sources. For example, the answers in the datasets on the number of conferences organized in that particular year, related statements in their annual reports, and the information in their web pages enabled me to compare the evidence on organizing conferences activity. Another set of codes not directly used in inducing theory but for supplementary analytic purposes were the historical events codes. (I explain the use of those codes in associated sections.)

During this open coding process, I tried not to lump nor split the data excessively- as I would lose information in the former and not be able to manage the huge number of codes in the latter. Although there is no optimum number of codes for qualitative analysis, it is suggested not to exceed 200 codes due to the cognitive limitations of human mind (Saldana, 2009). After coding each interview, I revisited the code list for detecting redundant codes and any unfitting quotes within individual codes. As new data was analyzed, new codes also emerged. I repeated the elimination and reorganization process (including new emerging and old ones) until I was convinced that the new data analyzed was not providing any novel insights (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Staying within the advised limit of 200 codes was not possible for my analysis as there were two articles embedded in the research at different levels of analysis, the field level and organizational levels. In addition, I coded the elements regarding several actors at both levels of analysis. Moreover, I not only coded the processes, actions, motives, values, emotions, and beliefs which would be directly used as focused codes in theory building, but had supplementary codes such as main characteristics of different types of organizations in the field (for accurately grouping them), activities, and historical events. Therefore, in order to cope with the high number and variety of emergent codes, I started “adding structure” to the codes, following the advice on AtlasTi Manual. This also enabled me to better manage the task of working with the higher and lower order codes. As some categories emerged and some codes were evidently sub codes for them, I wrote the category name followed by the sub code. And they were preceded by the level of analysis from my eclectic coding scheme. I also created main category codes, which I utilized for the quotations which were under the main category but did not fit into a sub code yet, and reviewed later with all related codes, such that:

Field_profit maximizers_ corruption_ officials as hidden partners
Field_profit maximizers_ corruption_ fake disabled reports
Field_profit maximizers_ not investing in quality

After I finished coding all transcriptions, I iterated the modifications two times, with one week intervals. Within this process, I read the texts to ensure that I recoded the texts those were coded before a particular new code emerged according to the new codes and also made several new arrangements such as reorganizing and merging or splitting some codes, and eliminating redundant codes. While there were substantial changes in the first iteration, minor changes were necessary at the second one.

Analytical memos are informal analytical notes which prompt a qualitative researcher to analyze data and codes earlier in the research process. They form the core of grounded theory, as they help increase the level of abstraction of ideas (Charmaz, 2006). “The purpose of analytic memo writing is to document and reflect on: your coding process and code choices; how the process of inquiry is taking shape; and the emergent patterns, categories and subcategories, themes, and concepts in your data—all possibly leading toward theory.” (Saldana, 2009; p 32). While coding or analyzing the data, I wrote memos whenever something significant came to my mind either on potential remedies to the coding, surfacing theoretical mechanisms, arising possible concepts and categories, unanswered and pondering questions, insightful connections between events... etc. I also noted the plausible alternative explanations and the confounding factors whose effects I needed to rule out. Through the end of this stage of coding, some emerging concepts and mechanisms had already surfaced, which would help me in the next phase.

3.3.1.2 Second cycle coding

Second cycle coding in qualitative research is a focused, selective phase in which the researcher uses the most significant and frequent codes to sort, synthesize, integrate, and organize large amounts of data Charmaz (2006). In this stage, I first downloaded all codes and separated them as field level and organizational level. At the field level, I initially subdivided the codes according to the actors involved and later grouped the codes related to each actor according to the emergent mechanisms such as increased mobility of beneficiaries, decreased morality of beneficiaries, and decreased dependence of beneficiaries on SEs,

which all had unique effects on the sub-dimensions of the emergent concept of “degeneration of the field.” This process was fed by the categories that already started to emerge through the end of first cycle coding and my analytical memos written after the interviews and during open coding. I also determined the codes which served as moderators, such as ineffective inspections of the state, as I was trying to come up with a theory generalizable to other contexts. During these processes, I did more modifications in the codes by checking whether there were unexplained connections in the framework. In some instances, I realized that I had grouped the quotes explaining a situation and a related process under the same category, and split them into different codes accordingly.

At the organizational level, I scattered and compared all the categories to see whether there were overlaps either between the codes under the same category or between different categories in general. This data to data comparison helped me develop focused codes, which were further compared with data for further refinement (Charmaz, 2006). I made the necessary modifications by splitting or merging some codes as well as recoding some group of codes under different categories, while at the same time making sure that the quotes of particular codes were all coherent. As I proceeded to create a framework explaining the relationships across emergent concepts, I also refined some codes with the same motivation at the field level; to make sure there were not unexplained processes as a result of aggregating a situation and process in a static code.

As I wanted to compare and contrast each case, for establishing a more robust and rich theory, I created separate excel files for each organization. I downloaded a codes-primary documents matrix and grouped all the interviews for each organization to reach all the codes passing in a particular case. In one sheet, I put all the codes that under their categories and grouped them according to the sequence of the effects. Therefore, I was able to see the differential levels and ways of being affected by the pressures of marketization, different structural and strategic elements, strengths and weaknesses of each organization which were safeguarding or increasing their vulnerability, their strategic reactions, and other changes (ruled out effects and explanations).

The next stage at the organizational level was generating theory to explain variations in the reactions of the organizations. Axial coding is a strategy for identifying conditions, actions/ interactions, and consequences by asking ‘*when, where, why, who, how, and with*

what consequences' (Charmaz, 2006), which seemed as a perfect strategy for my research aims. However, whether the researcher should impose a structure to the analysis at this stage or should s/he totally let the theory emerge freely is a contradictory issue among the pioneers of grounded theory, namely Glaser and Strauss. While their seminal book did not provide an analysis framework, Strauss, together with Gorbin (1998), suggested an axial coding framework in their book named "Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory." There are supporters of the axial coding framework among researchers as well as some who find it cumbersome (Saldana, 2009). Therefore, I embraced a theoretical coding at this stage, in which substantive codes related to each other as mechanisms to be integrated into a theory. As suggested by Charmaz (2006), throughout the theoretical coding, I kept asking "What's happening here, what are the basic social processes, what are the basic social psychological processes?" I revisited my analytical memos and noted the gaps and the contradictory points, so that I could revisit the data and modify the theoretical relationships. While not being bound to the axial coding paradigm, the resultant framework was similar in structure; showing the causal conditions, phenomena, strategies and consequences together with moderating factors.

I revisited the code list for detecting redundant codes and any unfitting quotes within individual codes. As new data was analyzed, new codes also emerged. I repeated the elimination and reorganization process (including new emerging and old ones) until I was convinced that the new data analyzed was not providing any novel insights (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

At the end of the iterative process of coding, recoding, eliminating redundant codes, adding newly emergent codes, and reorganizing existing codes, there remained 421 codes. 20 of them were not used in the analysis due to their limited relevance to the topic, but served as additional information to reflect on the data. Of the remaining 401 analyzed codes, 142 were at the field level, and 259 were at the organizational level. 63 of the 259 codes at the organizational level were related to key historical events, founding mission or activities. These were not used to construct categories, but provided information for the case analysis. (Code lists are provided in Appendix)

3.3.2 Analyzing Key Historical Events

I coded the key historical events which could pose potential alternative explanations to the emergent theoretical framework. I listed those codes for each organization to create a major events history, also complementing with other resources such as the histories in their websites and annual reports. Seeing the big picture and the historical evolution, I re-evaluated the changes they were subject to after 2006 with an aim to assess whether an action was a reaction to or consequence of marketization or was caused by other factors.

For example, in two cases, there were restructuring and corporatization processes starting after the second wave of marketization. While there were no specific references to them as reactions to marketization in the interviews, I was undecided- thinking perhaps participants failed to explain the connection explicitly- because of the fit of the timing of those acts. However, a reconsideration of the interview data strengthened with historical information made clear that those were not reactions to marketizations. One of them, for instance, started the process as consequence of the operational mistakes in the branches and the huge financial burden the organization faced afterwards. In addition, as participants stated more explicitly, the law making payments to the SERCs for all disabled people was also tying them to the MoE and assuring to comply with MoE's regulations would be harder in the previous structure. The second rationale was related to the same law bringing the marketization, but in a different sense, unrelated to my interest on the effects of marketization. And the latter rationale was totally endemic to the history of that particular organization. Therefore, I ruled out corporatization as a strategy; however, putting it under the strengths category, as this helped relieve the effects of marketization from the organizations (to be explained in detail in the findings section.)

Another such instance was a case which historically had several disputes within the board of directors and with particular stakeholders. Therefore, I traced the associated transcripts in detail with an aim to distinguish the effects of those instances from the pressures and effects of marketization on this organization. Yet another example where I benefited from the historical events was a case in which I was undecided to label the organization as a balanced or social first category according to my clustering scheme. The historical splits from two partners at different points in time and the reasons behind these, which were consistently

explained in the two interviews helped me make a more robust judgement, which I later triangulated from the employee survey data.

3.3.3 Analyzing the Surveys

As mentioned earlier, using the survey data, I calculated scores for 4 organizations on formalization, identification with the organization, customer orient, commercial vs social logic, service climate, entrepreneurial orientation, economic-social-ethical-legal orientation. In 3 of those cases, there were multiple participants; 3, 13, and 22 employees. To check whether the data was compatible for aggregating the results of different participants into scores for the organization, I calculated interrater reliabilities in SPSS statistics program. All 3 cases yielded very high and significant intra-class correlation coefficients as shown in Table 6.

Table 6 Intra-class correlation coefficients among survey respondents

	N of Items	Intra-class Correlation	95% Confidence Interval		F Test with True Value 0		F Test with True Value 0	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Value	df1	df2	Sig
Case x	3	0.753	0.585	0.86	4.044	40	80	0.00
Case y	13	0.831	0.677	0.931	5.908	15	180	0.00
Case z	22	0.894	0.8	0.956	9.393	15	315	0.00

The survey data also provided ratings on the 5 strategic positioning dimensions for 4 cases (in 3 cases, before and after marketization scores available as some participants had worked there for more than 9 years). I used these ratings in conjunction with the scores I collected in the interviews, first aggregating the survey responses for each organization and then comparing with the average of the ratings from the interviews of the particular case. Lastly, the surveys included identity claims by the participants, where they wrote up to 8 identity claims in an open-ended question. I plotted these claims and corroborated with the related codes in each case.

3.3.4 Analyzing the Datasets

The datasets enabled the verification of several changes in the organizations throughout the years I focused for the research. They included items on number of students, branches, capacity, educational and other services, conferences organized, number of students with scholarship, trainings provided for employees, trainings supported by the organization, availability of school bus, as well as many quality indicators. As explained earlier, the quality indicators were determined through discussions with experts and readings of publications. The items related to quality were: number of teachers with graduate degree and double majors, average years of experience of the teachers, number of teachers per student, number of students coming from other districts, and most importantly, the distribution of teachers according to their area of education. The ratio of specialists (e.g.: teachers for mentally disabled, teachers for hearing impaired, speaking therapists, physiotherapists) was explained as a key indicator quality by the experts. Due to the scarcity of specialists in the field, MoE permits other teachers (pre-school teachers and elementary school teachers) as well as psychologist to educate particular sessions. It also sometimes organizes trainings for elementary school teachers, making them “certified teachers” who can educate the courses reserved for specialists. However, while the certified teachers can technically offer these courses, their backgrounds are much weaker than the original specialists, who are really scarce and more expensive to employ. Therefore, the change in the ratio of specialists within all teachers is a strong indicator of the change in the education quality.

3.4 Validity and Reliability

Although validity and reliability are ideas born quantitative research, they are equally important for ensuring the scientific rigor of case studies. However, research based on qualitative studies has endemic ways of establishing validity and reliability throughout the design, data collection and analysis phases (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Kirk and Miller, 1986). Whereas the types of validity relying on positivist assumptions, such as concurrent validity, predictive validity and convergent validity are not seen as relevant to qualitative research,

descriptive, interpretive, theoretical validity, and external validity constitute concerns (Maxwell, 1992). Theoretical validity, as posited by Maxwell (1992), is actually a combination of construct validity and internal validity, and many qualitative researchers also use these terminologies by noting that ways of establishing them differ in qualitative research. Therefore, I evaluate the scientific rigor of my research in terms of reliability, descriptive validity, interpretive validity, construct validity, internal validity, and external validity categories.

There is an inherent threat of “researcher bias” in qualitative research, which can result from selective observation, selective recording of information, and allowing personal views to affect how data are interpreted (Johnson, 1997). I had several strategies to ensure that the research process and the findings were not affected by my personal tendencies, as will be discussed in the following sections. However, as there is no real remedy for the potential subjectivity of the researcher, being constantly aware of this threat and having a critical self-reflection on his or her potential biases, world-views and assumptions are suggested (Johnson, 1997; Suddaby, 2006). In addition, it is recommended that the qualitative researchers inform their audiences about their background, experience, assumptions, and any personal agenda. With this aim, I am attaching my curriculum vitae in Appendix to the attention of the audience and summarizing my personal perspective with a few sentences.

I am both upset about and critical of many societal and environmental issues in the world today particularly fostered by the ideas and practices of capitalism. Following a personal enlightenment period, I shifted my area of interest from strategic management and international business to social entrepreneurship and the management of social ventures. I did and do wish that my academic work both contributes to theory and practice, serving to create a better world. With this agenda, one question I wanted to help answer was “can social ventures beat profit-seeking ventures within the market mechanism?” Translating this question to appropriate levels of analysis to my area of study and later finding the context of this research to my chance, which actually provided a natural experiment, have shaped the final research question.

3.4.1 Reliability

The term reliability pertains to the quality level of measurements, more specifically, their consistency and repeatability. This reveals in case studies as ensuring that the data collection and analysis procedures can be repeated with the same results (Yin, 2003).

While data collection process in case studies entails flexibility and catching opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989), developing a protocol, which describes all procedures and general rules to be followed in collecting the data increases the reliability (Yin, 2003). Throughout the data collection phase, which yielded to nearly two years, I kept in mind the concern for reliability, but also tried to stay open to opportunities. I had a draft protocol at the very beginning to outline the types of basic documents and data I would seek to collect from each organization, but I also tried to gather any potentially useful data such as booklets and brochures in the interview settings. One specific strategy to establish reliability in data collection was during the interview phases. Although new insights emerged as I started the manager interviews and I saw a need to modify part of content and sequence of some questions, I kept using the same interview protocol with all managers- so that the answers would be comparable. Later, before starting the founder interviews, I made the required changes and did not make any modification later on during founder interviews. The case-specific questions for clarification and comparison were, of course, unique to each case.

Retrospective bias occurs when informants cannot accurately remember the past and/or when they are inclined to present a socially desirable image of themselves or their organizations (Golden, 1982; Huber and Power, 1985). I believe that this research did not suffer from this bias due to the following reasons. First, I did not ask the informants about distant past (the dynamics are actually increasingly affecting them and shaping their actions) and I motivated them to provide accurate information by ensuring the confidentiality of information and explaining the importance of the research (Huber and Power, 1985). In addition, I interviewed multiple informants in six of the cases, thus checking the facts they provided with each other. In two of the cases where I interviewed one informant, I conducted multiple interviews with the same person. Moreover, in 3 out of the 4 cases with one informant, there were outside informants; I was directed to those organizations via snowball sampling and thus had the opportunity to ask questions pertaining those cases to my informants in other organizations. I also conducted multiple interviews with 5 of the

interviewees. In addition, 2 of those repeated interviews were in the houses of the interviewees, creating a different physical setting. Finally, I also sought to reduce the potential retrospective bias by verifying the validity of the retrospective facts stated in the interviews with observations of practices and sites, the information in the datasets filled by organizations, employee surveys and secondary sources (Philips, 1981).

The other reliability concern in case studies is related to data analysis; whether different researchers would interpret and explain the phenomenon similarly. This can be achieved by coding the data twice after some time has elapsed, and by involving several coders to analyze the data independently. My coding process was designed to enhance reliability; I recoded the data two more times after one-week breaks following each open coding period. The codes scheme changed in all repetitions, as I merged codes, changed their names, separated some codes to sub codes, etc. When I finally I skimmed the codes and their content after those iterations, I saw the need for only minor changes and finalized the process after making those modifications. Later, in the second cycle coding, I iterated the modifications even one more time with the focused codes.

3.4.2 Descriptive Validity

Descriptive validity refers to the factual accuracy of the researchers' reports, meaning that they are not making up or distorting what they heard and saw either intentionally or unintentionally (Maxwell, 1992). I attempted to ensure this concern through recording all the interviews as long as the situation permitted and taking field notes during the interviews and visits or right after, so that I would not reconstruct the reality after some time passed. Before analyzing the interviews, I listened them to each of them to correct the mistakes in the transcriptions, which were actually plenty despite being transcribed by a firm specializing in this work. I even corrected the punctuations to make sure the text reflected the accurate meaning in the speech, as even a comma could sometimes change the meaning.

3.4.3 Interpretive Validity

Interpretive validity refers to the degree to which the researcher accurately understands and reports the real meaning attached by the participants including their feelings, thoughts, intentions, viewpoints and experiences (Maxwell, 1992). Being cautious of this threat, I tried to make sure that I am not imposing my meaning rather than the participants' in several ways.

First, I situated myself in the community for nearly three years starting with the brainstorming phase through the end of data analysis. I conducted several interviews with various actors, participated in their conferences, did a total of two weeks' participative observations in two organizations, joined some classes in several organizations, had lunch with the founders, managers and employees where I had informal discussions and analyzed their daily speeches, organized workshops for measuring their social impact, and became friends with many of the interviewees in Facebook. Thereby I was able to get a solid understanding of the actors' viewpoints. In addition, I read several forums on the web and joined the groups in Facebook founded by actors in the field where they had informal discussions.

Secondly, I sought clarifications during the interviews on the concepts the participants mentioned by probing questions such as "what do you exactly mean by this", "could you open this a little more?". I also asked about any confusing points in my following visits to clarify the intentions of the actors for specific actions. In addition, to enhance the relevance of my findings, I requested feedback from the participants (Johnson, 1997), by explaining them about my perceptions about some situations and events in the informal talks following the interviews. In many cases, the interviewees themselves asked about my perceptions, and how their organization differed from others, thus opening fruitful discussions those strengthened my interpretations.

Lastly, where appropriate, I also inquired particular occasions and situations in some cases with the interviewees from other organizations (staying in line with confidentiality agreements and not mentioning the names of those organizations). Here, my aim was to make sure that I was not making irrelevant judgements through the help of the feedback from the actors in the field. For example, I detected that a few SERCs (under a firm status) founded associations, one of them being in my sample. This was quite a strange occasion, and I did not want to be bound to my interpretation but asked several actors how they interpret it.

3.4.4 Construct Validity

Construct validity' refers to the quality of the conceptualization or operationalization of the relevant concept. Construct validity of a procedure is the extent to which a research investigates what it claims to investigate (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In case studies, construct validity is achieved through data triangulation, establishing a 'clear chain of evidence' (Yin, 2003). As described in the analysis section, I benefited from several sources of information, such as internal and publicly available documents, multiple interviews, employee surveys, and datasets. Moreover, I operationalized potentially key constructs through several measures. For example, I had multiple objective indicators for quality within the datasets, in addition to having it rated by the interviewees and employee surveys. Similarly, for assessing the social and commercial orientations, I created composite measures of enactment of social or commercial logics and social/economic/legal/ethical orientation scales, also supported by customer orientation and service climate scales as indicators of social orientation.

3.4.5 Internal Validity

Internal validity in qualitative research pertains to the logical validity of the induced theory and necessitates clear causal relationships between the constructs of interest and the results (Gibbert et al., 2008). Main threats to internal validity are ignoring nonconforming evidence and failing to consider alternative explanations of the phenomena (Maxwell, 1996). For not ignoring potentially important evidence, I corroborated all the data collected from different informants and archival resources for each case.

As the theory started to emerge during initial data analysis phase paralleling the data collection, I was able to ask the interviewees questions pertaining some causal relationship and the alternative explanations. For example, while all cases complained about being "tired, their resentment, high stress...etc." at varying levels, one of the founders did not make any such statement related to psychological burnout. Therefore, I questioned this by asking "Everyone is stating some sort of burnout, but you did not. Why do you think you do not suffer from it?" Her explanation afterwards was really insightful for refining the theory. In addition, to increase the robustness of the theory in the qualitative analysis phase, I kept going

back and forth between the data and the theory and continued asking the ‘how’ question until I reached a saturation of ideas (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

Another technique for increasing internal validity in case studies is ‘pattern matching’, which refers to comparing empirically observed phenomena with theoretically plausible explanations (Yin, 2003). With this aim, I thought of explanations those could disprove the evolving theory and tried to rule them out. As explained earlier, I detected the key historical events posing alternative explanations to be able to sort out their effects. I also attempted to ensure that I am not including the effect of macro level changes in the field level theory. For example, due to some scandals in Turkey, the legitimacy of all NGOs were hampered, as also mentioned by an interviewee. To rule out this alternative explanation, I compared the situation of the social enterprises which were in firm status. Many of the interviewees in those cases had also mentioned that their legitimacy had decreased in the eyes of several stakeholders including the general public, state officials, and beneficiaries as a consequence of marketization. Therefore, I concluded that, while there was a diverse effect of those scandals to decrease legitimacy, marketization also decreased the legitimacy of social enterprises

In addition, using various sources of data for each case, I prepared separate theoretical frameworks emerging from each of them and replicated the pattern-matching exercise across multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The commonalities helped build a more robust theory, while the differences enriched the theory with contingencies. For example, the socioeconomic situation of the beneficiaries rose as a contingency shaping the behavior of the social enterprises. Last but not the least, I explained each significant step in the causal sequence that lead to the strategic reactions (George et al., 2005), thus clearly showing the relationships.

3.4.6 External Validity

In its common use in quantitative research, external validity indicates the generalizability of the findings to other samples and contexts. Case studies do not aim statistical generalization, as they do not involve randomly selected large samples but entail theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Instead,

generalizability from cases is concerned with the usefulness of the theory in making sense of similar events rather than drawing conclusions from a sample to a wider population (Maxwell, 1992). Therefore, external validity for case studies is achieved through ‘analytic generalization’ using the replication logic across cases (Yin, 2003), which enables generalizations from empirical observations to theory.

In line with this recommendation, replication of the 10 cases in this study provided literal and theoretical replications, in which theory developed from particular cases were compared with the empirical results of other cases. As more cases supported the theory whereas not supporting rival theories, I considered it to be replicated. As the theoretical sample in this study is quite large for a multiple case study design, I believe to have enough replications, which enhance analytic generalizability. Moreover, as the cases chosen vary in dimensions such as age, size, socioeconomic condition of the location, and the characteristics of founders, the resultant theory may also provide some level of statistical generalizability-when the population is defined as social enterprises in the sector, rather than all SERCs.

FINDINGS

Presenting findings in multiple-case studies is a quite challenging task, as Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007; pp 29) explicate:

“Presenting a relatively complete and unbroken narrative of each case is infeasible for multiple-case research, particularly as the number of cases increases. If the researcher relates the narrative of each case, then the theory is lost and the text balloons. So the challenge in multiple-case research is to stay within spatial constraints while also conveying both the emergent theory that is the research objective and the rich empirical evidence that supports the theory. The best way to address this challenge is to develop a theory in sections or by distinct propositions in such a way that each is supported by empirical evidence. Thus, the overarching organizing frame of the paper is the theory, and each part of the theory is demonstrated by evidence from at least some of the cases.”

Following this advice, I will be presenting the findings within tables and organizing the text around the theory in the subsequent sections. I also provide figures for the frameworks explaining the functions of emergent mechanisms. In addition, to use the advantage of grounded theory regarding the richness of data at the same time, I insert exemplar narratives from the empirical evidence.

As explained earlier, I combined various evidence for each case; first analyzed them separately to establish within case patterns and then compared them across cases to generate richer and stronger theory. I present short analysis of each case regarding the effects they felt, the strategic actions they took, and their particular characteristics connected to their actions. Due to my confidentiality agreement with the organizations, I am covering some information that can lead to the association of the cases with particular organizations by the audience.

The chapter is organized in two main parts; findings at the field and organizational levels. First part explains the changes in the nature of the field as a consequence of marketization at multiple levels. It also outlines the pressures exerted by marketization on

social enterprises. The second part of the chapter first posits that social enterprises are vulnerable to the pressures at varying levels, depending on their particular characteristics. Later, it elaborates the strategic actions taken by the social enterprises, comparing and contrasting their behavior to each other to find clues to the reasons for their different responses. The acts denoted as mission drift in the literature are also evaluated within the cases, to assess whether their true nature as well as the causes to them in case of a real mission drift.

4.1 The Changing Field Dynamics

In the following sections, I explain the changing dynamics in the field as a consequence of marketization. I first describe the characteristics of incumbent organizations and the new entrants, and explicate the different competitive acts of the new entrants who are mainly motivated by profit. Later, I explain the two interesting emergent mechanisms occurring with marketization, other than the rise of profit-maximizers; changes in the beneficiaries and the workforce. I then evaluate the macro level effects and weakening of social enterprises, which serve as moderators in the emergent framework. Following this, I introduce the emergent concept of degeneration of the social sector and summarize the mechanisms operating at multiple levels to cause this consequence. I conclude by explicating the various pressures exerted on the social enterprises in the new state of the sector after marketization.

4.1.1 The Good Enterprises Facing Bad Enterprises

There is a clear divide in the minds of actors in the field, such that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ enterprises operating in the field of special education and rehabilitation. This both reveals from their discussions of the issues and from the answers to one interview question, where I wanted them to form any number of clusters from the organizations in the field according to any criteria they would like. While most of them named the organizations with these exact words, as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, some participants used more specific labels such as ‘the ones who do their job’ vs ‘the ones who do not do their job’ or ‘the ethical ones’ vs

‘unethical ones.’ However, the explanations they later provided for the two groups they formed were quite similar, whether they used a generic or more specific label. Therefore, two broad categories of organizations emerged, being divided to sub categories in themselves by some participants. Using the language of the participants, at this point I name them the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ organizations, and later label them with a management terminology based on their characteristics.

A few participants also made a second categorization based on managerial capability, size, and availability of resources, independent of the first categorization. These categorizations did not later surface as mechanisms shaping the market forces, but emerged among the factors affecting social enterprises’ level of being affected by the pressures exerted by marketization and the reactions they gave. Moreover, all kinds of organizations vary by size and management capabilities. Therefore, I continue with explaining the characteristics of the two broad categories, good and bad organizations, by focusing on the associated codes (Charmaz, 2006).

4.1.1.1 The “good” enterprises

While the participants did not consistently distinguish the organizations according to their legal forms, non-profit vs for-profit, a clear distinction existed between the organizations solely seeking profits and the ‘good’ organizations, which are stated to constitute a minority in the field - with statements like “one in each 10 organizations.” The base for the separation is the intent; the good organizations are social service centered, they have either good quality or the intention to serve with good quality. In addition, they either have no competition orientation or attempt to compete by increasing education quality. Besides, their founders love for the profession and act ethically. One interviewee explains this categorization as follows:

“We can say good organizations and bad organizations. I mean the organizations those provide good service and those provide bad service. I mean the organizations functioning ethically, and the ones functioning unethically with a concern for through whichever ways they can make money. The organizations with commercial aim and the social service centered ones...”

As stated earlier, in addition to intent, SERCs also vary in size, resources and managerial capabilities (Table 7). Therefore, the quality of education varies among the good organizations; some providing very high quality, even creating and transferring new knowledge, while others serve with high to moderate quality. However, the quality of education in good organizations is always higher than the ‘bad’ organizations whose reason of being is maximizing their profits. One may argue that, profits may also come through charging high prices for high quality service, and that at least some of the profit-seeking enterprises would focus on quality for this reason. This is totally true, and to define clearly, I should note that the enterprises seeking profits through high quality are still considered among the good organizations as long as they act ethically (I create sub-groups of the good organizations based on their will-for-profit in the next chapter).

I should also note that, making high profits while serving with high quality is considered an unlikely scenario by the actors in the field, given the high cost of education, the decline in the state payments and the low willingness or ability of the families to pay high prices for higher quality or extra services. Yet, the wealthiest people are stated to hire teachers for private lessons in their homes or in the offices of some therapists, and also send their children to a few expensive sports complexes designed for the disabled individuals. While the room for profits might be higher in those businesses, they are a different organizational form and are not included in the sample. Also not included in the sample are health centers offering physiotherapy, a service also provided by many special education and rehabilitation centers. State makes much higher payments to the health centers for the same physiotherapy services, a situation mentioned as unfair by many interviewees. Again, the room for profits may be higher in the health centers; however, they are a different organizational form with one common service with the SERCs, and are excluded from this study.

Table 7 Common and varying characteristics of ‘good’ enterprises

Common Characteristics	Varying characteristics
Ethical Loving the profession Knowledgeable founders Social service centered Moderate to good quality	Size Managerial capabilities Competition orientation Level of seeking profits Level of knowledge creation

4.1.1.2 The “bad” enterprises

Marketization not only increased the number of organizations in the field, but also introduced a group of ‘bad’ actors to the scene, which I label as ‘profit-maximizers’ representing their reason of being. While contrasting with the ‘good’ organizations in main motivation, they also differ in other several characteristics. The founders of the profit-maximizers usually had backgrounds in other various businesses; therefore, lacked knowledge on special education, as one participant explains:

“A grocer or baker can open (a SERC) as well. But the aim of opening... If there is no professional management leading, unfortunately the service provided remains limited with the money. If you ask whether everyone coming from within the field is successful, no. Because there is also personality involved, the personality characteristics. You may be coming from the field, but your mind may be merchant. However, this ratio is much lower at the people coming from the field. The main point here is; the people entering this field from other fields should not just approach like “hmm, this is a business with the state, this should be a good business.” They should first learn about this business. They should consider their qualifications; what is needed, is it feasible, what are the difficulties, what personnel is necessary, how they can be successful... They should evaluate those, and question whether they can provide this service and later join this field.”

Not being tied to the field by heart nor by profession, the profit maximizers tended to “*see the disabled people as commodity to be bought and sold*” as one interviewee describes. A striking example to this commodification was a story told by a manager of a SERC (an expert from outside of the sample). He explained that some SERCs intentionally do not make a physically disabled kid walk; because if s/he walks, the disabled report will not be renewed meaning they will lose a customer. He mentioned the case of his current boss who used to work as a specialist at another SERC and resigned to found his own center following a quarrel with his employer. The issue was that, he wished to give proper education to a child whose situation was promising to walk, but his employer opposed this saying “will you pay instead of him when he leaves here?” Another interviewee explains this commodification by these words:

“I think they do not see (the disabled people) as part of the society and as a community that should receive the education they deserve. I mean, they think like this: “state pays for this and I will open this center. I can get this money by invoicing the state, no matter the quality of education I provide. Because it is not

worth serving good. How much can (the disabled) change?” The people investing in the sector are not people who give their hearts to this task. This is what I think. They don’t see (the disabled) as individuals.”

Table 8 – Characteristics and acts of profit-maximizers

Main Characteristics	Competitive Acts
<p><u>Founders:</u> Unrelated to the field Lacking knowledge Many of them unethical Some engaged in corruption</p> <p><u>Motive:</u> Not caring about impact Seeing disabled people as commodity</p> <p><u>Quality</u> Not investing in quality Not competing on quality Non-qualified employees Excessive student per teacher Not proctoring the employees</p>	<p><u>Fierce sales & marketing:</u> Free school bus Offering different activities Emphasizing additional therapies Doing families' legal duties Tea & cookies to families Employing sales people</p>
	<p><u>Unethical sales practices:</u> Bribing families Making deals with doctors Lying to the families Offering more hours (with no quality) Salesforce waiting at hospitals & schools</p>
	<p><u>Unethical cost reduction:</u> Merging classes to reduce cost Heavy cases not accepted Paying less employee tax</p>
	<p><u>Unethical attacks to competitors:</u> Approaching to students of other SERCs Causing legal trouble for competitors Not deleting records to prevent transfers Transferring teachers for their students</p>
	<p><u>Corruption:</u> Bribing officers Fake disabled reports Officials as hidden partners Invoicing without providing service</p>

The profit maximizers have high competition orientation. However, they do not chose to compete with quality. They hire unqualified employees and do not invest in training their employees. They also do not function in a well-structured way by assigning teachers for each student, but in a haphazard way in which the available teacher lectures the next child in line.

Moreover, they are characterized by excessive student per teacher ratio (either staying within the limits of the MoE, or even faking the system by hiring diplomas of retired specialists but employing high school graduates to teach the classes), and they do not proctor the education the teachers provide. Many among these actors are stated to engage in unethical conduct and corruption, as well as the existence of a group of SERCs solely operating through corruption.

Table 8 summarizes the main characteristics and acts of profit-maximizers. There emerged 5 categories of competitive acts, ranging from sales and marketing strategies those are ethical yet unconventional to the field to pure acts of corruption. Between the two ends of the continuum lie the unethical acts regarding sales, ways of cost reduction and attacks to the competitors. The titles in Table 8 represent the emergent categories for competitive acts and the items listed below are the associated code names in the data analysis. In what follows, I elaborate on those dimensions providing explanations as well as quotations from the transcripts.

4.1.1.2.1 Fierce sales & marketing

Profit-maximizers had several sales and marketing activities most of which were historically unusual to the field. They employed personnel specifically for sales and marketing purposes. Those people, named as “public relations”, engaged in proactive sales behaviors ranging from ethical acts for increasing visibility to quite unethical conduct such as bribing officers. They were so proactive to knock the doors of the families of the disabled individuals for whom they have the information. As the disabled people are usually unable to assess the education quality and communicate it to their families, those centers focused on “*selling the package*,” as well as pleasing the families by serving snacks, cookies, tea and coffee in the waiting room.

The marketed ‘package’ included an emphasis on the social activities performed outside of the classroom such as trips and picnics with families. While similar activities were also done by the good organizations as long as their budgets permitted, they were not emphasized over the education nor marketed. Moreover, the profit-maximizers promoted some complementary therapies with unproven or slight effects, such as putting the children in oxygen pressure rooms, as promising new solutions. This way, they not only registered

their children to their centers but also charged the families high additional amounts for those therapies. One participant, herself a mother of a disabled person, criticizes the phenomenon as follows:

“There emerge new therapies with music, with animals such as horses and dolphins. These are not the cure for autism. Let me state like this: You have a kid and you want him/her to be raised well. You make him/her receive a good education, also on the hand you send him/her to violin or piano lessons for developing a gusto, a feeling of art..... Those have such an impact on autism. Of course, they have positive effects, but they are not a form of education. The right kind of education is through the individual and condensed special education. Others (such therapies) are entirely for increasing socialization. However, people request enormous amounts of money (for them), that is a different sector (in itself). And families see them as source of hope...”

The marketed “package” also included free school bus, which was quite an appealing service for the families, as they would not have to take their kids themselves. However, this also meant that as the families did not accompany their kids, they would not get feedback from the teachers on the things they should practice at home with their children. In addition, rather than providing the necessary education, those centers tended to cover in class what the families wanted, just to please them. For example, families would wish their kids to learn reading and writing, or to learn math, when the level of the kid was in fact not appropriate for those. And trying to teach the topics the children were not able to comprehend resulted in not covering the convenient topics.

Another appealing service the profit-maximizers offered to the families was following up their tasks for taking disabled reports or for renewing the reports and individualized education plans. As the parents had to be present in the visits, the employees of the SERCs took them from their homes and carried to the hospitals and GRCs. They also followed the whole process, which is at times complicated and tiring, families and children being transferred to different doctors and hospitals. The process was, however, shorter and easier if the employees of the SERC bribed the officials, as will be mentioned next.

4.1.1.2.2 Unethical sales practices

The ‘bad’ organizations frequently bribed the officials at the hospitals, gaining an unfair advantage over the SERCs who did not. While the disabled reports of the students from other centers could delay several months due to the inadequate services and inefficient operating of the public organizations, the reports of their students did not delay. Many profit-maximizers also made deals with the doctors and GRC officers, wanting them to direct the students to their centers by providing interests. Furthermore, the sales people waited at the hospitals and GRCs to pick the families who just got the reports themselves and took them to their centers.

These sales people also wandered around at Muhtars’ offices, leaving brochures and asking for information. With lists of the disabled people at hand, that they acquired either from the Muhtars, from the bus drivers of other centers, or the employees they just transferred, they paid visits to the homes of those potential customers. In those visits, they tended to exaggerate their qualifications as well as offering more hours of education for the amount that state pays. However, as the quality of education they provide was low or non-existent, more hours of education would mean more hours of no education.

The most striking unethical act was bribing the families through various ways, or making promises for providing them some interests, which they at times did not keep. They paid the electricity bills, offered aid packages, promised taking them to vacation, and even directly paid to the family part of the payment the state made. In one expert interview, I was told about a man living in the neighborhood. He had 3 disabled kids and left work after starting to get half of the payment for each kid from a SERC. In many instances, the kids did not even attend any classes, but the family handed in the disabled report and the GRC report, which were usually taken with the directing of the SERC itself. These acts were frequently mentioned by the interviewees in all cases with a disappointment and anger to the situation, with expressions like:

“%90 (of the SERCs) buy the kids from the families. The families are poor. They tell the families “Register your child to our center, you do not need to send him/her, do not bother, we will give you 200 TL each month.” The families are poor and illiterate. They think like “what will happen if I send this (the child) to education? Will he be a man? I better send the other one (non-disabled child) to school and s/he will take care of this one.””

“There are organizations paying visits door by door and making false promises. There are approximately 10 organizations in each district. Two of them work ethically. The other eight organizations steal each other’s students. They make promises such as giving them coal. They later do not keep the promises either.”

4.1.1.2.3 Unethical cost reduction

In order to reduce their costs so as to maximize their profits, the bad organizations paid less employee tax by declaring the wages of the employees lower in official documents. In addition, they did not accept the heavily disabled people as they were costlier to serve (e.g., hard to transport) and as other families sometimes hesitated to send their kids when they saw the heavily disabled children in a center. Furthermore, as the profit opportunity declined with decreasing state payments, they increasingly started merging the classes those were supposed to be on different days, in order to decrease the cost of school bus. As the capacity of the disabled kids are limited, and as they need to practice at home and digest what they learnt that day, merging the classes meant decreasing the effectiveness of the education.

4.1.1.2.4 Unethical attacks to competitors

The fourth category of competitive acts emerging from the data is unethical attacks to the competitors. The profit maximizers transferred the teachers from other SERCs, bargaining with them on the number of students they could bring with them. They also directly approached the students of other centers, whenever they found information about them. While doing this, they tended to tell lies about the center the kid was attending as well as giving false information and unrealistic hopes to the families regarding the potential development of the kid, relentless of the actual level of development his/her disability may permit. They not only transferred students of other SERCs through such lies and false hopes, but also urged the families to make a call to the MoE for the inspection of their case. Having such an inspection meant that the time and energy of that competitor would be spent on this instance as well as a lowered reputation. Some organizations in my sample had also suffered from such inspections upon false claims. While they were found “clean” at the end, they had

lost months of energy and suffered the associated stress. An interviewee explains this experience as:

“The father came and said “you cheated me. I learnt that my kid should have walked but you did not make him walk.” We said “Your kid is spida bifina. He is a very heavy case. He came to us at a very bad condition, now he cannot walk but can use some muscles. We have the camera records; you can watch all of them.” But he said that he would make a complaint. Why? The other SERC told him to do so. The aim is to discredit us, to hurt us, to make us deal with it. Later my teachers called him and he said he would complain if we don’t make him a payment..... He then filed a paper to the inspection committee. He would not know how to do this under normal circumstances. An organization arranges this; they write the paper and take him there...”

In addition, when the families wanted to transfer their kids to another SERC, some unethical SERCs did not delete their record from the electronic system of the MoE. Therefore, the child could not be officially registered to another SERC.

4.1.1.2.5 Corruption

Many profit-maximizers are stated to engage in some form of corruption at varying levels, once they had the opportunity. In addition, participants (as well as the news in press, and the reports of MoE) explain that some SERCs were found only for corruption purposes, the center not even functioning in reality. Those centers were widespread especially in the East of Turkey, where the socioeconomic situation of the families were low, and there were less inspections. There were also several instances when the SERC owners, doctors and the officers formed criminal organizations which prepared fake disabled reports and invoiced the state, as well as registering an individual to multiple SERCs in different cities.

While such totally corrupt organizations were common in the East, later decreasing to some extent after the news in media and the increasing inspections, other forms of corruption also existed in the West of Turkey, particularly at the rural areas. These included fake disable reports, bribing officials and/or having them as hidden partners to SERCs, and invoicing the state without providing any service. The sales personnel sought disabled kids in the poor districts, where they were more likely to find poor and uneducated families they could bribe. They took their children to the hospital to get disabled reports, together with other kids “*who were not disabled but looked like a bit mentally retarded due to being raised in an illiterate*

family without proper attention” as defined by an interviewee. Those newly identified disabled children, however, did not receive proper education, but were “*bought and sold*” to make the families and SERCs earn money.

4.1.2 Changes in Beneficiaries

The analysis revealed interesting mechanisms operating at multiple levels. Marketization did not only change the composition of organizations and the intensity and nature of competition in the field. These developments had further effects on the characteristics and attitudes of the beneficiaries and the employees, which had both direct effects on the social value created (e.g., through the quality of education the teachers were willing to provide) as well as indirect effects through various pressures on social enterprises.

There emerged 6 categories of changes regarding the beneficiaries; inclusiveness, mobility, family profile, their morality, their dependence on social enterprises and attitudes towards them (See Table 9). While the disabled people are the ones who receive the special education and rehabilitation services, most emergent categories pertain to the changes in characteristics and attitudes of their families. This is simply because the families make the decision as their children are mentally disabled, or both mentally and physically disabled. In cases when the individual is only physically disabled, the decision-maker is still the family, as their children are not adults. In addition, while the children receive the education and the parents only get psychological support services provided at differing levels by particular centers, the parents are still considered among the main beneficiaries. This is due to the fact that, as their children develop better social and personal skills, the burden on the family regarding the intensity of necessary care decreases. For example, when their children can walk, they do not have to use a wheel-chair anymore, or when the children develop the abilities to eat on their own, or make-up their beds, the necessary care level of the family declines. Similarly, as their children learn to wait or not to scream, the families can attend social events with their children, thus themselves can socialize more.

Table 9 – Characteristics and attitudes of beneficiaries

	Before Marketization	After Marketization
Inclusiveness	Limited number of beneficiaries	<i>Enlarged pool of beneficiaries</i>
Family Profile	Conscious families	<i>Less conscious:</i> Less attentive to their kids Lacking knowledge Not willing to learn Believing in the "package"
Family Morality	Ethical	<i>Less ethical:</i> Seeking interest through their kids Requesting bribe from SERCs Not using state's payment for the kid
Mobility	Low mobility	<i>Increased mobility:</i> Having more alternatives Seeking hope at different orgs Seeking hope in new therapies Transferred with the teachers
Dependence	Dependent to social enterprises	<i>Decreased dependence to SEs:</i> Having more alternatives Having free alternatives
Attitude towards SEs	Appreciating the SEs Willing to volunteer Willing to pay if they can afford	<i>Less willing to contribute:</i> Less appreciating the SEs Seeing as public service Less willing to volunteer Less willing to pay/donate

4.1.2.1 Inclusiveness

As the new entrants fiercely sought more customers for increasing their revenues, they attempted at both transferring students attending other SERCs and identifying new disabled kids who did not initially have disabled reports. Through those acts, the profit-maximizers served to increase the inclusiveness of the education services provided to the disabled people, however offering low quality education or sometimes no education at all. On the other hand, many interviewees noted the positive side of this situation stating that “*at least the disabled kids started to go out of their homes for some hours of the week.*” In addition, as more people

learnt what special education is and that the state paid for it, there was a catalyzer effect; they told their friends and relatives, so that the inclusiveness increased further.

4.1.2.2 Changing family profile

As the number of beneficiaries increased, their composition did not remain unchanged. Before marketization, the disabled people benefiting from the services were the children of conscious families, who had taken their children to doctors for diagnosis and also learnt about the special education opportunity that was little known in the society. Although the social enterprises were applying fees according to the parents' income and were providing scholarships for the children of poor families then, the beneficiaries before marketization also had higher income on average due to following reasons. The profit-maximizers entering the field saw a larger potential for new customers at the suburbs where the socioeconomic situation of the parents were lower. Lower income and education level signaled that, there potentially existed more unconscious parents in those regions whose children's disability were not yet diagnosed. Those families were also less likely to question the quality of education than the conscious families would do, meaning that it was easier to market the 'package' to those families. In addition, the children of the poor families were easier to "buy" with direct payments or help packages. The new group of less conscious and less attentive families, on the other hand, were not willing to increase their knowledge, a topic which will be discussed later as a factor demotivating the social enterprises to organize family trainings after marketization.

It is beyond the aims of this research to question whether the previously conscious families also became less attentive to their kids as the profit-maximizers started to follow up their tasks at the hospitals and carried the children with school buses as part of their sales strategy, or whether they also accepted bribes from those centers. Some interviewees made statements such as "*they (profit-maximizers) made families get used to bribes.*" However, these statements were not necessarily pointing at changes within particular individuals, but were related to the current situation of beneficiaries compared to the period before marketization. Therefore, while it may be another interesting facet of the phenomenon, I cannot claim that the behaviors of particular individuals also changed, as my analysis is not

adequate for such a conclusion. However, I state that the changes in the socioeconomic composition of the beneficiaries and the associated attitudes in the field were among the mechanisms effecting the social value created.

4.1.2.3 Changing morality level of families

Accompanying the change in the consciousness level of the parents was the change in their average morality level. The participants explain the rise of a large group of parents who were seeking interest through their disabled children.

“There are families who see their disabled children as a source of income, because the state pays for home-care and education. These payments are efforts to help the families. (But) the families get those and do not look for jobs; they pay their rent from this money and spend livelihood expenses from this money. They say “Oh, I have a disabled child, I am comfy.” Some parents have 4 disabled children and the 5th is on the way..... They see it as an insurance. Through their kid, they are valued as they were never valued before. Because, again due to the competition, the centers offer them money, they value them highly, they behave extremely well, they take them around. Families have their personal tasks done by those centers.”

While the practice in the field regarding the families getting benefits for registering their children to particular SERCs was initiated by the profit-maximizers, some families later perpetuated this by themselves asking for benefits. Many participants explained that parents come to ask them what the organization could provide (direct payment, paying electricity bills etc.) if they registered their children. Interestingly, those families not only asked for benefits to the centers run by individuals but also approached the centers run by foundations in the same way. One manager in a foundation explains this transformation in the pool of beneficiaries as follows:

“Especially in the East, in the Southeast regions, and in rural areas, abuse is very high. And this abuse comes even through the families..... Unfortunately, the parents of the disabled are abusing disability. There has been this kind of a change. If you asked me years ago, I would not think like this, but today, I can say this with confidence.”

As an extreme example to this decreasing morality, indicating that even rich parents may be inclined to abuse their child's disability, was an occasion experienced by a friend of

one interviewee. A man is told to have visited a SERC with his Mercedes and asked what they would give him in return for registering his child. I should note at this point that, while a group of people abusing their children's disability rose after marketization, there were still some parents who were willing to "*sell their jackets and pay large amounts for the alternative therapies*" those were marketed by some profit-maximizers as promising solutions despite their complementary nature.

4.1.2.4 Increased mobility of beneficiaries

As the alternative centers to send their kids increased, many families wanted to try different SERCs, with the hope that their children may develop better at another center. Participants mentioned that the families of disabled people are much prone to being abused with unrealistic hopes, as they want to believe that their child will recover. However, while the quality of education is quite important in the development the child shows (in addition to the intervention age), there are limits to the level they can go beyond depending on the specific kind of disability and its severity. As the profit-maximizers tended to market their services with over-claims, many families wanted to try their chances as they were permitted by the state to shift between two centers per year. One participant told that some families even enjoy the task of transferring the child across centers. Moreover, as new therapies started to emerge, parents wanted to try those therapies and transferred their kids to the centers which offer those therapies. The records on the developmental histories of these children were, however, not transferred with them to their new centers, which caused a loss of information reflected to the effectiveness of the education.

Another mechanism increasing the mobility of the students was the increased transfers of specialists across centers, a topic I will cover in the section on employees. When the families liked one teacher, they tended to follow the teacher, thus transferring their children to his/her new workplace. In addition, the teachers often made promises to their new workplaces to bring several students with them, thus encouraged the family to follow them. Similarly, when the employees founded a center for themselves, they phoned and invited the families they knew from their previous workplace.

4.1.2.5 Decreased dependence to social enterprises

As the number of SERCs increased, the families had more alternatives to send their children. Moreover, all those alternatives were free as the state was paying to the SERCs. The new situation decreased their dependence on the social enterprises for providing education to their kids, hence decreasing the level of appropriation. Therefore, their willingness to make the centers run by the social enterprises survive declined, as explained by a founder:

“The family is not dependent on us anymore. State already pays an amount, and we are not providing them a service above that amount. They can bring (the child) to us or take to Ayşe’s center. They can take anywhere. There is no problem left to the family. We (families of disabled people) were formerly dependent on the few centers. Families may support the center for that reason. Now, they don’t need to.”

4.1.2.6 Changing attitudes towards social enterprises

Following the decline in their dependence to the social enterprises, the level of appreciation the families showed to the social enterprises also decreased. Being less appreciated both affects the motivation of the social entrepreneurs as well as indicating a decline in the support the families provide. Families increasingly refused providing financial support or volunteering for the organization’s activities such as selling concert tickets to generate income. Moreover, participants indicate that, families started to see the service as a public service because the state was paying to the SERCs. Even in the social enterprises those either provided the beneficiaries a good education costing more than what the state pays, or extra hours of education for free as well as several complementary services and social activities, the beneficiaries did not want to understand their financial needs anymore. One foundation manager summarized the attitude of the beneficiaries as follows:

“They see us as a commercial organization. They in fact know that we are volunteers, but this is far beyond among their priorities. They say “you get a lot of money; the state gives you. Why do you want (support) from me? You will provide this service!” There are people who are angry with us. The way people look (at us) changed. We tell them that we need volunteer mothers and invite them to help us. They say “the state is paying you, what do you want from me?” They say “I cannot sell tickets.” Because what they think behind is this: “they take money from the state, why do they still sell tickets?” The reason we sell

tickets is because we receive payment for 12 hours from the state; however, we provide education for 140 hours. How will we finance the remaining 128 hours?"

Moreover, the willingness of the parents for paying is stated to decrease because they see that others are getting the service for free. As explained earlier, the family profile changed to include a larger ratio of low-income parents after the marketization, who are naturally less able to pay. However, participants state that, compared to the previous situation, the families with high income are also less likely to donate or pay for extra hours of education. This is both because of their decreased dependence to the few social enterprises but also because they see that others (most people benefiting from the services) do not pay, as one interviewee mentions:

“Because now people got used to (free services). Now the state pays for all. Now, the families actually do not want to give a penny from their pockets. I mean, neither the people who cannot afford nor the ones who can afford want to pay. In the past, the ones who had money used to pay (for the education of the disabled child), but not anymore. Because now, someone is paying while the others do not; they then said “why would we pay at all”.”

This decline in the willingness to pay across the high income families is also exemplified in instances when some families attempt to show their annual income lower, so that the foundation that requests an amount relative to their income (for providing longer hours of education on top of what the state pays for the 12 hours per month) will not want to make them pay.

4.1.3 Changes in the Workforce in the Field

Another interesting finding is regarding the changes in the workforce in the field of education of the disabled. The analysis revealed three main categories of change, which either affected the social welfare created in the field directly through the quality of education, or indirectly through their effects on the existing socially oriented centers.

Table 10 - Characteristics of the workforce

	Before Marketization	After Marketization
Popularity of the job	Not popular Low demand Low wages	<i>The job becoming popular:</i> Increased scarcity of specialists Increasing wages
Nature of specialists	Idealist Choosing the job full heartedly Many enthusiastic first graduates from new departments	<i>Decreased idealism:</i> Unwilling to put effort Unwilling to add more value Unwilling to learn more Money main concern Individuals with improper traits joining
Mobility	Low	<i>Increased mobility:</i> Enlarged pool of employers Themselves opening SERCs Transfers to state schools Transferred to SERCs that pay more Unwilling to sign special contracts

4.1.3.1 Popularity of the job

Before marketization, being a teacher of disabled was not a ‘popular’ job. There was neither high demand to the specialists in the field nor high wages were offered. Preferring a quite difficult job with limited employment opportunity and low wage levels, the few specialists who had selected related departments in the university had mostly made this choice out of their hearts. After marketization, however, the demand for the specialists rose sharply with the increasing number of SERCs and the regulatory requirement for them to employ specialists. Thus, even if the profit-maximizers did not have concern over the quality of education they provided, they needed to employ a number of specialists to be able to offer particular classes to the disabled. Given the limited number of specialists in the field, the sharply increasing demand created a scarcity of specialist also giving rise to the wages; thus, the job became popular and attractive for many individuals.

“Firstly, working with disabled people is a special thing. I mean it requires some personality traits. As there is scarcity of specialists in Turkey, and as those specialists find jobs easily, some university students (candidates) show a high

demand for it. I mean they enter the departments with high scores etc. Because, there is no problem of unemployment. For that reason, sometimes their characteristics do not match (with the job). When I entered this field years ago, the people with more compatible characteristics used to prefer it. Because it was not a field with much job opportunity. It was not a highly known field. I mean the job opportunities were not that developed. But now, your diploma is “selling out quickly,” unconditionally. That is the case.”

4.1.3.2 Nature of specialists

As the wages in the market rose sharply along with the enormous demand from the newly opening centers, this newly popular job was preferred by individuals seeking a guaranteed job with high income. This situation, in turn, caused a “decreased idealism” in the workforce in the field, which is characterized by employees who are mainly motivated for earning money, unwilling to put effort or add more value as well as unwilling to develop themselves in their profession.

“The ideals were different. They were more ambitious, they had more willingness to develop themselves. But now, perhaps most of them are entering those departments (of universities) by chance and find themselves in the field of special education. And now the people (employees) are looking for their worktime to finish so that they can go home. Therefore, I think that the quality of special education also decreased because of this factor.”

Says one participants. One occasion I experienced during a class observation was also indicative to this. The mobile phone of the teacher rang and she left the classroom telling me to continue playing with the child. This was quite an irresponsible act, as the child was autistic and I did not have the knowledge to cool him down nor teach him properly. I eventually had hard time as the child wanted to go away. And after persuading him to sit down and play, I made a wrong thing, as I later figured out. The real aim of that play was teaching him to wait and that kid’s mental ability was in fact superior. Unaware of those, I had been so happy to see him finding pieces quickly and kept clapping rather than wanting him to wait his turn.

This instance clearly showed the vulnerability of special education and the importance of the knowledge and attention of teachers, which is stated to decline after marketization. In addition, contrasting with the before-marketization period, the personality traits of the new kinds of employees were not compatible with the job requirements such as being passionate and having high others-regarding values. As a consequence, the teachers are said to be

inclined to abuse being one-to-one with a disabled child in a room, playing with their phones instead of giving education, or at some extreme cases hitting the students. One participant acknowledges this as follows:

“I lost my trust in the people here. I mean, through my business administrator lens, teachers are quite valuable people. But the valuable ones are quite few now. (They are) passing to another classroom during their class hours to play with their phones, gossiping with each other... I mean, I think they are doing acts which do not suit their identity. I also tell this to their face. We generally try to pick (the good ones), but I think that too little of the teacher identity is left (in the field)”

Under these circumstances, proctoring the employees was quite an important task. While the profit-maximizers did not have a concern for proctoring their employees, it was becoming more difficult for the social enterprises with a high concern for quality, given the fragile dynamics. During a lunch I had with the employees, some of them were complaining among themselves that a manager was watching from the glass window and that they were irritated. As the scarcity of specialists increased in the field, it also became a critical task to retain them. The need for pleasing the employees, on the other hand, usually limits the amount of feedback they can be given:

“There is nothing as being like a boss in our organizations. You just survive as long as you keep the dialogs good. Because the teachers can start working in another center as they step out of here. Because there is a high search for them. Therefore, you cannot bother anyone. Even if the parents come to us and tell that they are not content with a teacher, you cannot easily say anything to the teacher.”

I should also note here that, although there are little glass windows on the doors and cameras in some centers, I realized during my observations that the parents sit in a waiting room (if they go to the center with their children at all), rather than standing by the window to monitor the class. As the windows are small, inside of the classroom cannot be seen from where they sit. In addition, even in the social enterprises I made observations, the screens of the cameras were located inside the managers' rooms, when they had a camera system. Only in one center, there were screens visible to the parents in a separate waiting room in each flat. The parents, however, preferred sitting with other parents at the main entrance downstairs.

I was not able to make observations in the profit-maximizers, as they reacted badly even when I visited some of them by picking random SERCs to make pilots for the employee interviews. But the inconvenience of the settings for the families to proctor the classes even

in the social enterprises indicates that families cannot assess what is happening in class in the profit-maximizers unless they detect that their child does not show any development in the long term- if they are conscious and attentive to their kids at all.

4.1.3.3 Mobility of employees

Another important change in the field arising with marketization was the increased mobility of teachers. As the pool of employers enlarged with too many centers opening continuously, those centers needed employees and made offers to the employees of other centers. They typically paid higher wages for transferring them, particularly to some specialists who were necessary to be able to legally operate a center. One direct implication of this situation was that, when their teachers changed frequently, the development of the children retarded as the new teacher needed to learn about the child and the child needed to get used to him/her. On the other hand, the incumbent organizations fell short of employees, explained by an interviewee as:

“The teachers started to shift to the center whoever pays more. I mean you start with a teacher, you work with him/her for three months, then 3 months later the other center pays more and the teacher can leave here and go there. S/he does not care, there is no thinking like “I have responsibility here.” There has been such a reflection.”

In addition, many specialists quit their jobs in the centers they work to start their own center. In some cases, a group of specialists working in a particular center came together to open a new SERC, thus leaving their previous workplace in a very difficult situation. The organization then had to find several new employees in a very tight market as well as having to find new students in the place of the ones who left with their teachers. While some organizations sought to sign special contracts with the employees in order to guarantee that they will not leave soon, this was not possible as the employees did not accept it given their high power and low dependency to particular employers.

4.1.4 Macro Level Effects

The impacts of marketization on field dynamics were moderated by a number of factors; mainly, the weak institutional infrastructure, state's deterrence policy, and its poor mentality on social enterprises.

4.1.4.1 The weak institutional infrastructure

First of all, the participants explain that the infrastructure was not ready when the state issued the law which paved the way for marketization of the sector; thus, the following years saw plenty of new arrangements to fix the deficiencies. This situation was also evident from the high number of new regulations I faced when collecting data on the field. The lack of a solid infrastructure opened the room for more corruption and unethical behaviors. For example, the electronic system used to let registering the same disabled individual to centers in different cities at the same time, which was to be fixed years later. Several new amendments e.g., on the physical characteristics of the space, the kinds of lessons particular teachers can teach or on the reporting and documenting system are stated to create both ambiguous situations and required allocating time and financial resources to comply with them. The ambiguity was fostered as the authorities at the Ministry of Education were less knowledgeable on disability compared to ones in the Social Services, which previously regulated the sector.

The weak institutional structure also surfaced as the continuous scarcity of specialists and ineffective inspections. While there were very limited number of specialists in the field, the few universities who had those departments did not increase their capacities nor the Higher Education Council directed other universities to open those departments. The state time to time organized some training programs for a limited number of participants and entitled their graduates as certified teachers. However, while having the legal permission to teach as specialists for particular classes, those certified teachers did not have the background and knowledge of the specialists. In addition, the state schools vastly lacked the teachers for the disabled people as well, and as the state opened employed new teachers, the scarcity of teachers also increased because of employee transfers to the state.

Least but not the least, the weak institutional infrastructure did not permit a healthy inspection system. Due to the scarcity of related personnel at the MoE, the inspectors assigned to the task were not knowledgeable on special education and rehabilitation. The evaluation scheme on the other hand, was based on the very details of the physical setting and existence of some materials or documents. All participants mentioned the ineffectiveness of the inspections such that it did not tap on the quality of the education provided, such as;

“I always said this to the inspectors. I am not afraid of control. Control is always a mechanism enabling my development. But do this control well. I mean, instead of writing down the absence of one pencil in my physical setting, inspect the quality of education.”

4.1.4.2 State’s “deterrence policy”

Another emergent effect was the state’s “deterrence policy” as named by several interviewees. This included increasing red-tape, irrational new inspections, delaying payments, making unfair cuts, and decreases in the hourly payments, which is evident from the comparison of hourly payments across years with the inflation rate. Below quotations summarize their main concerns:

“As I said, there were funds provided to Turkey (on this topic). At those times, they (the state) used to pay well. But when those funds finished, they started to do whatever they can for not paying. The inspectors come, they search, they find an open point, and they fine... A new thing each day, as to make it more difficult. I say this; when they put their heads to the pillow at nights, they think of what to do for not paying. Next day, they wake up and find something.”

“At the beginning, people earned a lot of money. The payments were high and inspections were low. As the people who jumped into this business seeing the high return started to abuse it, and when the abuse increased, the state started to show more sensitivity. But when showing this, the organizations like us, which would do this business in reality, were harmed.”

“The centers in the East used to make double records for some students. Now, this is not possible. There was no (control) system; they could show the same identity number at two places. We lost trust (after those). State continuously bears down on us. We are very bad organizations from the perspective of the state, as organizations only earning money without doing much thing. However, we put our day and night’s work here.”

“You are like a Palestinian firm trying to do business in Israel. How much work could you do? How much trust would you have? How much room for movement would you have? They would always look at you as if you are terrorist. Similarly, they (state) always see us as devious.”

4.1.4.3 Institutions not supporting social enterprises

The organizations in the sample express the lack of support from the state and posit that “*it lumps the organizations which try to work correctly together with others.*” Firstly, there is no tax exemption for the social enterprises neither in for-profit nor non-profit legal forms, which is mentioned with reproach:

“The state should have provided support. At least, they should research who did what, who is doing what. At least they should have supported those (doing good jobs). I don’t have any difference from the man who buys for 1 (TL) and sells to 5 (TL). He is a commercial enterprise and so I am. There is no discount in my electricity, water, gas. The same for me and for the man who buys for 1 and sells for 5.”

“When they have visitors from abroad, all the state organizations bring them to us. But they still do not see us as a school. They see us as private. We could not make them accept this: we are a foundation, at least do not get value added tax from us.”

Most of the time, managers at the municipalities or officials of the provincial districts want to charge an amount to provide space for the musical or dance shows of the disabled people organized by the social enterprises. This is both the case for the privately owned social enterprises and the ones operated by foundations and associations. One foundation manager explains that the officials tell them “*You are a private enterprise as well. You also receive payments. Why would I give you (for free)? It will be unfair competition then.*”

In addition, as is also the common case across the world, social enterprises with a for-profit legal status have difficulty in raising funds. They cannot apply to the grants because they are not a foundation or association. On the other hand, they do not usually qualify with the requirements of the funds for the private enterprises, as explained by an interviewee:

“They say, “You are an SME.” I say, “Yes I am an SME.” There is no such thing (funds) for the service sector. You should produce something, you should own a factory, you should develop something (product). This is the perception. There is no fund for the service sector. I go apply to the World Bank or European

Union funds. No! They say “you are not an association.” Do I have to be a foundation or association?”

The regulations, on the other hand, rely on the assumption that all organizations in the field are potential cheaters, and they restrict the discretion of the social enterprises along with others. The current regulation states that, the special education and rehabilitation centers cannot use any room for any other purpose within the same facility. Therefore, if the social enterprises do not have any other facility adjacent to the center or in another location, they have to cancel those services. For example, one of the participant organizations had to open a separate family consultancy center by making several physical, personnel and internal regulatory arrangements to be able to offer paid therapy services to families.

Moreover, the state makes payments only for the specific classes stated in the GRC reports. However, participants declare that, the schedule formed at the GRCs may often be mistaken as they evaluate the child in only 45 minutes, which is quite a limited time for making a good judgement. Moreover, the disabled children tend to behave differently *“according to their mood that day, the weather conditions, the approach of the correspondent...etc.”* as one specialist explains.

As the social enterprises want to provide the right education, many of them have their own evaluation processes for the disabled children. While trying to provide the necessary education in practice, on paper, they need to comply with the GRC report. This decoupling creates two kinds of difficulties. First, they have hard time “fitting it to the official” in the electronic reporting system as they need to allocate different kinds of specialists according to the content the GRC reports which differ from the practice. Second, what they do for enabling the right education is considered as unconformity by the inspectors. Moreover, when the student cannot come to the center due to reasons such as illness, they provide compensation hours at another time. This application is again considered as nonconformity in the inspections. All those arrangements require additional labor and create costs as well as the stress and risk they add. The profit-maximizers, on the other hand, do not have these burdens given their low concern for quality of education.

4.1.4.4 Other macro level changes

In addition, a few participants mentioned the general degeneration of the society as macro level changes. Moreover, some participants appointed to the worsening economic situation of the country and its potential effect on the parents' ability to pay for superior quality or extra services. While those factors may have accompanied the changes in the field, they do not reveal as plausible alternative explanations. This is because the same participants also clearly mentioned the mechanisms I explained in related sections as effects of the marketization process, thus the effects also exist separately. Nevertheless, the socio economic situation of the beneficiaries (which captures the differing income levels) is already included in the whole framework, as it emerged from the data as a moderator for the acts of the parents, e.g. poor and illiterate parents compared to others. Therefore, this effect is included in the framework and shown separately from the main mechanism as a moderator.

4.1.5 Degeneration of the Field

The most easily visible effect of marketization was the sharp increase in the number of organizations in the field. This increase was mainly caused by the new entrants from unrelated areas who were seeking to maximize profits. In addition to their motives and knowledge levels, the actions of those actors also differed from the incumbent enterprises and they were mostly regarded as unethical. Moreover, marketization caused several changes in the characteristics of the beneficiaries and the pool of employees, which highly contrasted with the prior situation. Most of the participants of the study evaluated these transitions by referring to degeneration of the field. They usually used this phrase, also sometimes describing with more striking expressions such as:

“Unfortunately, the system broke down.”

“The field has been polluted, because it turned into trade.”

“There is a saying as “The gun was invented and manliness was deteriorated.” In Turkey, now there are unfortunately nearly 2000 centers and who is doing what is not definite “

“It sort of turned into cooking pot merchandizing. You know, people used to come to your door and sell pots. Then its handle would dislocate and remain in your hand. “

This degenerated state of the field is mainly characterized by unfair competition, less idealistic employees, low quality of services, commodification of beneficiaries, disputes among organizations, and low legitimacy of the organizations (See figure 2). Although I mentioned some of those results while discussing the changing dynamics, I define them more clearly in the following paragraphs.

4.1.5.1 Unfair competition

The entrance of a large number of profit-maximizers to the field brought along a type of competition, which was defined by the participants with words such as “ugly,” “bad,” and “unfair.” The new entrants had aggressive sales and marketing strategies which could be unethical at many times. In effect, the aim of the competition was registering more number of students through whichever ways possible, and no matter the quality of education provided to them.

“It (marketization) brings a lot of unfair competition. There is competition. At the end, the private sector invests in this and they rightfully want to fill in their capacity. However, I think the way many rehabilitation centers compete is wrong. Competition should be based on quality, based on the service you provide.”

Under this type of competition, the more unethical organizations had an unfair advantage over the others, a fact that further motivates the organizations to focus on those acts rather than the quality of services. Added on the unconsciousness of the families, their inclination to believe in unrealistic hopes, and the seeking of personal benefits by a group of them, the high information asymmetry embedded in this particular kind of service also paves the way for an environment favoring the unfair competition. This is because it is hard for families to know beforehand the quality of education and requires a long time to access it after starting to take the service. In addition, each disabled individual is a unique case, limiting the ability of the family to compare their children’s development to those of others.

4.1.5.2 Low quality of services

All participants state that this kind of competition did not increase the level of quality in education, but even decreased the field-wise quality. While not aiming quality in their own services, the profit-maximizers also caused a deterioration in the service quality of incumbent organizations through their sales and marketing strategies. For example, losing plenty of students to other centers, many incumbent organizations had to mimic the practices such as free school bus and following up families' tasks at hospitals. These practices, however, had a trade-off: incumbent enterprises allocated their financial and other resources as well as more of their attention to those practices for keeping their students rather than being able to focus on quality. In addition, the increased mobility of students across centers in the new situation served to decrease the effectiveness of the education.


4.1.5.3 Less idealistic employees

As explained earlier, the rising wages and increasing demand for the specialists made the job popular; thus, attracted the individuals who were seeking high income to the field. The decreased social orientation and the love for the profession among the workforce was directly reflected to the quality of education provided. In some cases, the teachers even physically abused the disabled students.

4.1.5.4 Commodification of beneficiaries

The profit-maximizers tended to see the disabled individuals as commodity upon which they perform their trade operations, rather than a group of people with the right to get proper education. Moreover, many parents, particularly the ones with low socio-economic situation, also commoditized their children. They not only accepted the benefits offered by the profit-seeking organizations, but also proactively sought personal benefits through their children.

Figure 3 Degeneration of the field



4.1.5.6 Disputes across organizations

The “dirty” competition included transferring the students from other centers through unethical tactics, referred to as “stealing students” by some participants. In addition, the profit-maximizers both attacked each other and the social enterprises with unethical acts such as lying about them to potential customers and trying to cause legal troubles for the competitors. Given those occasions in the field, there emerged high disputes between the centers as one participant notes:

“The relationships across the organizations deteriorated a lot. For example, we used to gather as organizations in Istanbul. After our meeting, the ones with urgent tasks would go and the remaining ones would stay to eat and chat together. After 2006, it is nearly impossible to bring people together. I mean no one talks to each other. They even experienced very bad occasions. Everyone within the regions are enemies. They score points by discrediting others.”

4.1.5.7 Decreased legitimacy

As those unethical acts spread in the field, the public image of the special education and rehabilitation centers was damaged as well as their status in the eyes of the state officials (See an exemplar discussion in a public web forum here; <http://goo.gl/7IW4LK>). As the corruption scandals were reflected in the media, the legitimacy of SERCs decreased as a form of organization. In addition to the increased inspections following those instances, which were nevertheless not on the education quality, the respect shown for the SERCs decreased sharply.

“Before 2006, we were held in much more esteem. After 2006, now everyone sees us as thieves. “Over the disabled people’s back...” This is the sentence I cannot tolerate most. I mean if they refer to stealing, I am absolutely against it. But “earning money over the disabled people’s back...” This is my job! I don’t earn money by making disabled people work, right? I am giving education to them, and (earning) in return to it. But unfortunately this happened after 2006. Let me state it more clearly. While seeing respect from the administrative chief in my region before 2006, while I could visit without an appointment, now even the servant’s looks to me are different. It is even hard to communicate with the servant there.”

Although the level of corruption decreased following the increased sensitivity of the state on the issue and some profit-maximizers left the field after the decline in state payments,

the field composition and dynamics never turned back to the before marketization period. A decade after marketization, it is still dominated by profit-maximizers who are now operating with lower profits. Most participants of the study stated that they only communicate with the social enterprises, except the two organizations which are in contact with the others, trying to unite the centers within the region and develop some ethical norms. Regaining the legitimacy, lack of which effects both the unethical and ethical enterprises, is a difficult task given the structure of the field, as declared by an interviewee:

“When more than half of the people in the sector come from outside, when some identities and personalities from out of the sector rise, there occur difficulties for the sector to form a unity and to explain and express itself.”

4.1.6 The Moderating Role of the Power of Social Enterprises

Due to the several pressures exerted by marketization, the group of social enterprises lose power in the sector by a decrease in their number, seizing in the number their branches or total number of students, limiting the types of their services, as well as experiencing decline in their service quality. Their power in the sector, on the other hand, serves as a moderator between the initial effects of marketization and the resultant degeneration of the field. More specifically, their power in the sector determines the extent to which the field is prone to degeneration.

This is firstly because of their role in the field on raising well-equipped specialists. When they have adequate financial resources, rather than distributing the income to a group of shareholders, social enterprises invest in the development of their employees either by providing on the job trainings or supporting their participation in the external trainings and conferences. In essence, those employees both become more knowledgeable and have higher respect and dedication to their job by seeing the right applications.

“Many of our specialists left here as their spouses were appointed to other cities. Or, even at times when other centers transferred our specialists, I always thought like this: they at least took our disciple; them touching another kid there is at least something for us.”

In addition to spreading quality through their former employees, social enterprises also collaborate with universities for accepting their students as apprentices. Many organizations in the sample explained their mission on raising high skilled workforce to the field, one of them even accepting about 60 apprentices per year despite its small size.

Another role of the social enterprises in the field emerges as increasing the consciousness level of the families. While they are preferred by the most conscious families who seek the best quality, they have beneficiaries from quite diverse socioeconomic situations and levels of consciousness. After attending the seminars organized by the social enterprises for themselves and also seeing their best applications in education, the awareness of the parents on the importance of proper education and their knowledge on methods of education increases. This also has a spillover effect; as they leave that social enterprise for some reason, they are less prone to be abused by unrealistic statements and they demand better quality in education from other centers. Yet, the existence of influential social enterprises in particular regions serve to raise the quality in that region. One interviewee clearly explicates this mechanism in these words:

“The GRC manager of X district said to me: “We are very content that you are located in X district and that you run a SERC. Because you are here, the other SERCs in X district are working more ethically and with higher quality. You are pushing up the quality of this district.” I think it is because of this: our capacity is limited. While we can serve many more students, we prefer staying with a limited capacity; because we don’t want to do mass production, we want to serve with high quality. Of course, the families in this district have either been our beneficiaries or are waiting in the line to be able to come to us. But meanwhile, for not losing time, they attend other SERCs in the region. And they (other SERCs) automatically raise their quality for not losing them. Because they have the concern for losing the them (families) when their turn comes here..... or, there are some families going from us, they demand (quality). When the families come here, their knowledge level increases, their demands become more specific in time. They know what to demand when they go somewhere else, they don’t accept what is offered to them. I think this makes a difference in the quality in this region.”

This mechanism, however, becomes less powerful when the social enterprises decrease in number in the field, or seize in size, or themselves unintentionally decrease the level of quality under the pressures exerted by marketization. As Hirth (1999) posited, the larger

market shares of nonprofits in the sector forces for-profits to deliver the promised quality in a mixed-market form. Therefore, as the social enterprises weaken in the sector, they do not constitute a critical mass to be able to effect the behaviors of others, and the field becomes more vulnerable to further degeneration.

4.2 Pressures on Social Enterprises

The changing dynamics in the field posed several threats for the survival and effectiveness of the incumbent social enterprises. “The old ones, the organizations those come from within this field and those have digested and embraced this business, suddenly fell into difficulties at the point of unfair competition,” notes one interviewee. The unfair competition caused a decline in the number of students of the incumbents, therefore in their revenues, as well as increasing their average operating expenses. Besides, the decreased legitimacy of the special education and rehabilitation centers in the eyes of the officials and the decreased dependency of the beneficiaries on them decreased the in-kind aid and financial support the social enterprises could receive. The decreased idealism of the employees, on the other hand, was eventually reflected to the quality of education. These effects are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. (See Table 11 for a summary).

4.2.1.1 Resource constraints

After the marketization of the sector, social enterprises faced declines in their resources as a result of decreasing revenues and donations, rising costs, and the unwillingness of the families of disabled to volunteer for their activities.

Table 11 Pressures on social enterprises

<p>Resource Constraints</p>	<p><i>Decreasing revenues</i> Decreasing students Beneficiaries less willing to pay/donate</p> <p><i>Decreasing support</i> Beneficiaries less willing to volunteer Authorities less responsive</p> <p><i>Increasing costs</i> Increasing wages Costs of mimicked sales & marketing acts Costs of non-mimicking unethical acts</p>
<p>Time & Labor Constraints</p>	<p>Time lost on false claims Time lost on red-tape Difficulty in finding & retaining specialists Unable to be selective on specialists</p>
<p>Psychological Pressures</p>	<p>Being less appreciated Increased financial concerns Burdens of unethical attacks</p>

4.2.1.1.1 Decreasing revenues

Due to their ethical nature and their emotional ties rising from being parents of disabled individuals or the respect for the profession, the social entrepreneurs did not engage in the unethical sales acts performed by the profit-maximizers. As the families were provided personal benefits and/or believed in the unrealistic hopes and exaggerated claims of the profit-maximizers, many of them tended to choose the new organizations over the incumbent social enterprises. Even the conscious families whose children had been receiving education from particular organizations and who were content with the services wanted to at least try those new centers, seeking hope in what they could offer. Besides, as the profit-maximizers provided benefits to the doctors, the doctors directed the parents to those centers relentless of their quality. Moreover, the proactive sales force of the profit-maximizers located at the schools and hospitals instantly reached the families and took them to their centers, limiting their search for the good enterprises. Even the conscious families willing their children to

receive a decent education had an illusion on their service quality being flattered by the attention paid by their sales personnel. One participant noted:

“To whom comes to our door, we explain the issue (education of the disabled) and then we accept them. But at the other places with a commercial aim, they visit door by door and collect students. There is such a difference.”

In addition to not performing the unethical acts, as will be discussed in detail later, most social enterprises lacked the commercial mindset as well as the sales and marketing skills of those of the profit-maximizers. In fact, many of them saw the act of proactively seeking beneficiaries or engaging in marketing behaviors as unethical or as clashing with their identity. They on the other hand, wanted to focus on the quality of education they provided, with a will to create higher social impact. Their passivity in marketing combined with the unethical acts of the profit-maximizers set them back in the newly raised competition for finding students. While many of their old beneficiaries turned back to them after trying a new center for a couple of months or years, the number of students of the social enterprises continued to decline, as the places of the growing and graduating children were not completely filled with new coming students.

The decline in their number of students brought along the decline in the revenues of the social enterprises. This decline was even fostered by their decreased ability to get payments from the parents of their students. As discussed earlier, under the new dynamics of the field, the parents were less dependent to a few social enterprises, because they had plenty of free options. This situation decreased their need and motivation to make them survive. Their expectations from the social enterprises; however, did not decline under the new state of the field. *“As we are a foundation, their expectations are higher from us”* says one participant, while another participant notes that some families tend to show their income lower so as not to pay for additional classes and other services.

4.2.1.1.2 Decreasing support

The families’ decreased willingness to support social enterprises not only surfaced as unwillingness to pay for extra classes. They also did not donate money nor volunteer to spare their time for the activities of the center. *“Previously, there was more embracement”* says a

foundation manager, expressing the decreased engagement of the families. In addition to the loss of support from the beneficiaries, social enterprises also started to suffer from the decreased responsiveness of the authorities. While they used to be of the few centers working for a social aim, after marketization, they belonged to a large group of organizations which dominantly sought profits. Thus the authorities were less willing to help them by, for example, providing municipality's busses for their picnics, or rent their concert halls for free. At this point, the social enterprises in firm status start with a disadvantage. However, the analysis reveals that the authorities could be equally distant to the centers run by the foundations, stating they could not favor their center as this would cause unfair competition with others. When the SEs could not use those facilities for free, they needed to either pay for them, or cancel the social events if they cannot afford paying or cannot find other opportunities to perform such events for free.

4.2.1.1.3 Increasing costs

The financial pressures exerted on the social enterprises through declining revenues and the support of families and officials were augmented by the rises in their costs.

“For example, while I was paying 2.000 TL, as this was the sector average, the centers that cannot find teachers offered 2.500 TL in order to persuade them to transfer to their center. Eventually, five to six months later, I also had to increase it. This is how it (wage level) increased. It (marketization) gave such sort of harms. Then the school bus occurred, because of the competition. There was no school bus, everyone could bring their children. In addition, everyone could get their GRC reports (for the children). However, we had to do this as well. While we used to spend our labor and capital for other things before... I mean although we need to buy education materials, we had to limit the education materials and spend the money on such things.”

As mentioned in this quotation, the wage levels increased sharply as a consequence of high demand for the workforce in the field, especially for the scarce specialists. The incumbent organizations, on the other hand, were pressured to either mimic some services of the profit-maximizers, or they lost several students. When they mimicked those services to preserve their students, such as the free school bus or doing the families' tasks at GRCs, their costs increased even further. Moreover, while many incumbents mimicked the ethical sales

activities, which increased their costs, they did not imitate the unethical acts those could reduce their costs or increase revenues. Therefore, they ended up with deeper financial pressures. For example, as they did not bribe to the officials at the hospitals, they lacked the advantage of quick service; the yearly repeated disabled reports for their existing students were delayed for several months. Therefore, they had the financial burden of providing service without being able to invoice to the state until the reports are issued.

4.2.1.3 Time and Labor Constraints

As also mentioned in the above quote, those unethical attacks created labor losses for the social enterprises and limited their ability to focus on the quality of education instead. The attention of the founders and managers are directed to the issues other than their main task of providing good service. Meanwhile, they also face the problem of scarcity of specialists, allocating high energy for finding and then retaining them. Despite willing to be selective on the qualifications and the personality of the specialists they recruit, the tight labor market occurring after the quick marketization limits their ability to do so. This ability is further hampered by the decreased idealism of the employees in the field, and is in turn reflected to the quality of service social enterprises can themselves offer.

The pressures posed by marketization on the field were accompanied by the decrease in state payments, unfair cuts and delays in payments, increased red-tape, and some irrational new inspections, which were reactions of the state to the corruption in the field as well as its own decreasing resources. The changing regulations and the uncertainty of state's acts, on the other hand, posed additional stress factors as well as financial burden.

4.2.1.2 Psychological pressures

“For instance, as they stole our student that day, I was nervous; I mean I could not deal with other tasks well...” says one co-founder. As the profit-maximizers transferred their students, the social enterprises needed to operate with lower revenues. The fixed costs, on the other hand, did not become lower but increased after marketization. Their ethical stance, when not combined with particular strategies as pressure relievers, caused some social

enterprises to fail or experience the treat of bankruptcy every day, thus, creating a heavy psychological load. One interviewee expresses this as follows:

“Because of those (unethical) things I am resisting to, of course we have the danger of failing financially. The biggest is the concern of this. Sometimes its effects can even reach to the extent of depression.”

On the other hand, being less appreciated by the beneficiaries and the officials in the new form of the market decreases the motivation of the social entrepreneurs who are already working in a psychologically challenging and trying task of education services to the disabled people. Added on to this, the unethical attacks from the competitors and some false claims against them through the families directed by other centers even causes health problems, as one manager explains:


“I mean because of those false claims on our parts, we face serious labor losses, face stress, and we experience a resentment to the sector. Had I not been in this sector for years, had I not been an experienced manager... I mean, someone new to this business would face a depression, would quit this job and not come back. Believe me, it causes health problems even on me. This job I do is stress in real terms.”

4.3 Vulnerability to the Pressures

Figure 4 explicates the mechanisms by which the pressures arising from marketization effect the social enterprises. The reason I explain this process prior to their reactions is to distinguish between their intentional acts and what comes automatically through changing market dynamics. This clarification is particularly important as it helps enfold the concept of mission drift, as will be discussed later in detail.

Among the pressures exerted by marketization, the resource constraints lead to decreased quality, mediated by a poor financial situation. In addition, time and labor constraints also affect the quality of services provided by social enterprises. On the other hand, the psychological pressures work to create a psychological burn out on the founders and managers of social enterprises, who make decisions on their strategic responses. This process starting with the marketization, and reflected to financial situation, quality of services, and

Figure 4 Vulnerability to the pressures



the psychological state of social entrepreneurs is moderated at four points, which are indicated with subsequent numbers in Figure 4. More specifically, social enterprises vary in the level of being effected by marketization's pressures, based on their particular characteristics, resources and capabilities, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The region's economic condition, reputation and strategic positioning of the organization, as well as the commercial skills, affect the vulnerability of social enterprises to the emerging pressures. First, in the urban areas, compared to rural areas, there is less of corruption due to more often inspections. In addition, in the high-income regions, families are less inclined to accept bribes as well as being more selective on the quality of education given their higher level of consciousness. Second, a higher reputation of the center in terms of quality attracts the families which are knowledgeable and highly attentive to their children's education. Yet, the moderating effect of reputation is weaker in low income regions. Third, the commercial skills of the founder and managers of the social enterprises affect the ability to attract students in a competitive environment, also decreasing the financial concerns.

Organizations in the sample suffer from financial problems at varying levels. Some have difficulty in paying the salaries, some survive with bank loans, and some have debts to several parties including severance pay to former employees and tax debts to the state. Several participants describe their situation with words such as "being on a knife-edge":

"We are trying to bring it into balance by keeping the social (value) aspect good, while on the other hand trying to take the precautions which will minimize our loss. We are, of course, on a knife-edge."

Some organizations in the sample, have higher ability to raise funds through, e.g., public donation campaigns, domestic and international project grants, donations from high-net-worth individuals. This is best exemplified in the case of Mercury, whose several SERCs experience operational losses each month. Some of these losses are compensated with the funds raised by the branches themselves, and the remaining deficit in their budgets are closed with the funds transferred from the headquarters, which itself generates revenues through fund raising activities. The ability to raise funds, on the other hand, is a function of reputation and the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the donors, its network structure, and the associated skills of the managers in the organization. While all are foundations, for example, Pluto had a quite limited ability to raise funds compared to Earth, Venus, and

Mercury, who have professional public relations personnel and better established networks. Another moderator at this stage is the savings of the founders, which they use to close the financial deficits; e.g., in the case of Mars and Neptune.

A poor financial situation of the organization leads to declines in their quality of survives, as they cannot afford to buy teaching material, invest in new education methods, nor to increase the number teachers per students. Constrained in their personnel selection by the scarcity in the field, social enterprises at many times had to opt for non-idealist or low-skilled employees, which also decrease the quality of their services. On the other hand, constrained by time, organizations cannot arrange internal trainings for the employees, which are not much costly as employees usually teach each other but necessitate devoting their time. In addition, organizations were less willing to invest in the development of their employees, as they were frequently transferred to other centers.

There are; however, moderators to the mechanism decreasing the quality. First one is the employee identification. Some organizations have well-structured recruitment and control systems. While all organizations face the scarcity of good quality employees, some of them emphasize that they seek idealist, good-hearted, and open-to-feedback teachers, if not highly qualified, while some organizations give priority to being presentable. In addition, some of them have sophisticated internal regulations and peer control mechanism that work to guarantee a level of quality. Another moderator is employee identification. Data regarding the identity claims in the interviews as well as the employee surveys indicates that, some of the social enterprises are “like a family,” which is even reflected to the photos and comments in the social media pages of the founders. Those organizations have a low employee turnover, which enables the accumulation of knowledge and experience in the organization. On the other hand, they can reap the benefits of keeping their employees despite paying below-market wages.

A drastic effect of marketization is on the founders and managers of the social enterprises themselves; most of them experience a psychological burnout. They have quite frequently explained how, tired, stressed, and hopeless they are. Their tiredness is also rooted in the difficult nature of the education of the disabled people and support to the families. However, the psychological pressures rising after marketization more than double this effect, as the interviewees explain. Several social entrepreneurs also explained their resentment for

not being adequately appreciated. In addition, they all have an anger to the degeneration of the field relentless of their organization's degree of being subject to the pressures of marketization. This is exemplified by expressions such as:

“They turned the families into beggars. For example, (they say) “if you come Mr. X's center, if I get 500 TL from the state, I will give 100 TL of it to you.” (Giving) money started! I said, damn it! I cannot deal with those.”

“We, as a foundation, are reactive to the situation that those children have been turned into commodity!”

On the other hand, a higher degree of corporatization emerges as a stress-revealer mechanism. The founders who delegate several tasks to the professionals that they trust, rather than trying to do everything themselves, are better manage the pressures. For example, one interviewee says,

“We are very tired. But we have very good professional staff. For example, we have a social tasks manager. This year we recruited a project specialist. Similarly, a part-time social media specialist. She helps me for instance.”

4.4 The Differing Responses of Social Enterprises

The varying reactions of the organizations to marketization are summarized in Figure 5. Not all organizations offered all the free services nor did R&D before marketization. Therefore, to avoid any misunderstanding, I shaded the areas with grey if the act was not already performed by the organization before marketization. In addition, some actions were taken recently at the time of data collection. For example, Pluto added the school bus in its last year before closing the center; therefore, the potential effect of this act to increase the demand was not fully realized. To provide a better understanding of the acts and connections between them, I wrote “Late” to those cells when the organization performed the acts lately, and wrote “Early” if the actions were taken at the first few years following 2006. Lastly, I signed the cell as with “o” rather than “x” if the change happened, yet not as a reaction to marketization but for other reasons. In the following sections, I provide brief information regarding the effects of marketization on each organization and their strategic reactions.

Table 12 Responses of social enterprises

		Earth	Venus	Mercury	Mars	Jupiter	Saturn	Uranus	Neptune	Pluto	Eris
Scaling	Opening new branch/es (after 2006)				Early		Early	Early	Early		
Increasing free services	Adding free school bus		o	Late	x			x	x	Late	
	Doing families' legal tasks								x		
	Increasing social activities			x	x						
Increasing high-income beneficiaries	Increasing prices		o								
	Reserving capacity for high payers		o								
Creating alternate resources	Extensively using volunteers			x	x						
	Recruiting employees who will volunteer			x							
	Extensively using sponsors	o	o	x	x						
	Volunteer arrangements with schools			x	x						
	Firm founding association					Late					
	New fundraising techniques	o	o	x							
	Offering new services		o			Late					
Risk management	Employee contracts to ban student transfer								Late		
	Forming collaboration groups						Late		Late		
Decreasing free services	Decreasing social activities		o			x			x	x	
	Decreasing free complementary therapies							x	x	x	
	Decreasing free education to the poor				x	x				x	
	Decreasing organized seminars			x	x	x		x	x		
Decreasing quality investments	Decreasing R&D					x					
	Stop investing in new methods						x	x	x	x	
	Decreasing employee trainings					x	x	x	x	x	
Cost cuttings in expenses	Cutting operating expenses		o	x	x				x		
	Paying below-market wages			x	x						
	*Merging classes to reduce transport cost								x		
Reducing high-cost beneficiaries	*Eliminating heavy disabled							x			
Seizing	Seizing the branch/es					x	x				
	Closing / handing over branch/es		o	o	o		x	x	x		
Quitting	Quit									Late	Early

4.4.1 Eris

Eris is among the first organizations in the field and was the first to leave the field, even before the second wave of marketization hit the sector. It was particularly affected by the market forces, as two more centers opened in the same street, which specifically targeted Eris's students by offering extra benefits to the families if they were transferred. Added on to this, while the state payments were not enough to cover the expenses of high quality service provided by the center, the families did not want to pay any amount, explained by the founder as follows:

“Before, there were people who came to you and asked “I want to bring my child to you, what is the price of it?” Now, they don't ask. They directly bring the report and say I will bring my child to you. But what the state pays does not cover your expenses.”

The founder of Eris vastly mentioned the degeneration of the field, and his resentment and anger to that situation, stating that he “wanted to get out of the system.” In fact, he decided to sell the center after one specific instance:

“Because one day somebody came to me. He held the (disabled) report like this. (here he imitates the man holding up the piece of paper with his fingertips) And he is holding it like this to me! Think of it! I am not someone else. He said “I will bring my child to you, what will you give me?” I said “we will give education.” He said “No, no what will you give to me?” And I remember sending him away by pushing him. I told him to go to the rehabilitation center at the other corner and that I did not want to see him again.”

As he was a highly reputable specialist himself, and one of the initiators of the field, the founder of Eris would not decrease the quality in order to reduce the costs and become similar to profit-maximizers. When I asked him about how he could compete in the new circumstances had he not quit, he explained that he would do new investment to move to a better facility with superior physical conditions, so that he could provide better education. However, he lacked the necessary capital, and did not want to use bank loans in an environment where he could not freely determine the price of services.

4.4.2 Pluto

Pluto, on the other hand, resisted to stay in the market until it had to close the center following some financial problems that it could not cope with. This kind of quitting is actually not an intended reaction but rather a consequence of its inability to strategically react to the pressures exerted by marketization. As seen in Table 12, Pluto did not take any of the actions that several other organizations took, other than decreasing the extent of free services and employee trainings due to financial constraints. Despite reducing the costs to an extent, those passive precautions served to decrease the demand for its services even further. While the conscious families have an inclination to choose the centers of foundations over others, and while Pluto used to have students from even neighboring cities before, not investing in quality and annulling the free services made it less attractive to those conscious families. Many of the less conscious ones, on the other hand, had shifted to profit-maximizers following their promises or the personal benefits offered. Pluto thought that actively seeking students is unethical, and did not realize any acts for this purpose. In addition, as the profit-maximizers did not accept the heavy disabled, Pluto's student portfolio shifted to over the average disabled students, who are costlier to serve. Losing several students, and not being able to compensate the loss in revenues by creating alternative resources, the finances of Pluto deteriorated gradually, to finally reach zero level. The income of the SERC, at times when it could make profit in the past, were never accumulated but donated to a public school on disability, a situation fixed with a protocol.

Different than the other foundations in the sample, Pluto also did not restructure the organization to establish internal regulations for quality control. It suffered from being "personalized" by the board of directors (BoD), who did not want to step back despite being less engaged in the activities. The board also wanted to do everything themselves, rather than hiring professional staff for the managerial activities. Yet, they increasingly spared less of their time. This inertia made Pluto nonresponsive to changes, while the lack of cohesion limited some board members' wish to invest in new education techniques.

Only in the last year the center operated, increasingly facing financial constraints, Pluto started to take strategic actions to revitalize the center. The BoD was also renewed meanwhile. Some non-idealist teachers were sent away to increase the quality of education.

Yet, the organization had to pay severances to those employees, and even worse, those teachers took away their students to other centers, causing further decline in the number of students and revenues of Pluto. The organization later added a school bus to make itself more attractive to families, which further increased its costs. The school bus, was not enough for increasing the demand, as the center had nearly no visibility as well as a decreased reputation. The managers were planning to more actively promote the center by preparing brochures and renewing the foundation's webpage. However, as it could not pay the wages after an unexpected cut in state's payments, many employees left immediately and the center was shut. Despite all the unfortunate experiences they had and all the psychological burnout, the founders of Pluto are still highly motivated to start a new center, this time differentiated with higher education quality and different services, if they can raise funds. *"As long as there are those (disabled) children, we are here,"* says a member of the board, herself a mother of a disabled child.

4.4.3 Earth

Earth was not affected by the pressures of marketization at all. The only effect reflected to them was the scarcity of specialists, because of which they cancelled a particular kind of therapy. A co-founder stated that the demand for their services even increased after marketization. This is because the pool of beneficiaries is expanding and the people who realize that the service quality is low at other centers increasingly bring their children to Earth. As there is excess demand, the center accepts students based on a lottery. There is both a full-time school and a SERC operated by the foundation, along with other activities for awareness raising and developing the quality and scope of education of the disabled in Turkey. The foundation is managed quite professionally with an increasingly corporatized structure, employing specialists for different set of tasks such as public relations. It is able to raise high amounts of funds by several state-of-art fundraising techniques. Those funds; however, are not solely used for compensating the losses from the education services, but also used for the various activates such as preparing online education kits that the families of disabled individuals can benefit.

Until its foundation, Earth has positioned its education services distinct from others. Its prices are quite high, given the intensity of education both in terms of class hours and the number of teachers per student. While providing full-time education at their school, they also accept students to their SERC who will take at least 24 classes per month, as they believe that a lower number of classes will not serve their purpose of effective education. When one calculates the hourly price for education, it is the same with what state pays per hour at the full-time school. Yet, the state does not compensate full-time education of the disabled, and Earth has to find resources when a family wants to register their child but cannot pay for it. They provide a number of scholarship based on the availability of their resources each year. The hourly price for the SERC, on the other hand, is much higher than what the state pays. Thus, when a family wants registers their child to Earth's SERC, they need to pay a big sum, both because of the high hourly price and because of the number of minimum classes the child needs to take. The foundation wants the SERC to be self-sustaining, while also generating some surplus to be transferred to the full-time school to provide scholarship to the poor.

The business model of Earth is an example to creating cross-subsidies across different segments of beneficiaries. Yet, the organization is vastly criticized by other actors in the field for charging high prices and providing education for only very few children. Earth, sometimes along with Venus, have been referred to as “luxury,” “visible,” or “resourceful” foundations by several participants in the study. Some interviewees, while appreciating their work and especially their corporatized structure, noted that their service is limited to few individuals, comparing with themselves to state that they have a broader coverage. In addition, some participants were inclined to state that their education is no worse than “some popular foundations.” However, my data triangulation methods make it clear that those resourceful foundations have higher quality; in terms of, e.g., the number of teachers per students, the ratio of specialists to all employees, the education level of the employees, the trainings provided for employees and families. In fact, the cofounder of Earth explicitly states that they wanted to create a “*model*” (rather than providing education to a broad set of beneficiaries), “*a laboratory that could show how this task needs to be done,*” as well as showing to the public that “*if you give proper education starting at the early ages, some of those children can be saved completely, and some can achieve several successes.*” In effect,

Earth also collaborates extensively with the state organizations to transfer their knowledge and helps the state to initiate pilot projects with new models in the schools for disabled.

4.4.4 Venus

Similar to Earth, the demand for the services of Venus has not been effected by the pressures of marketization. Yet, the scarcity of specialists limits their ability to be selective in recruitment along with all organizations in the sample. The reason Venus could keep itself away from the pressures of marketization was its early strategic moves to update their mission and restructure the organization. It had historically collaborated with the state to financially and academically support the education provided in foundation's facilities by the public personnel, as well as a disability care center. However, following the regulatory changes in 2006, the collaboration on education services ended, and Venus opened a SERC that itself operated independent from the state.

Being aware of their limited commercial and managerial capabilities at that time, the organization decided to hire a consultancy firm to establish a robust organizational structure and to build a new road map. After several meetings and discussions, a new mission was clarified: *“to be a model organization, which is also self-sustainable.”* The starting aims of the foundation on doing and supporting scientific research, raising personnel, organizing conferences and trainings, and collaborations with universities for accepting apprentices were remained unchanged. Yet, they needed to replace the aim of guiding and helping the state on the education state provides, with a new aim. Rather than defining an aim similar to that of many other organizations in this sample, which is providing good quality education, they had a specific target; *“to be a model.”* Interestingly, the managers of both Earth and Venus used the very same words when defining their missions, which were clearly separated from other organizations in the sample. General manager of Venus explains this as follows:

“We are a reference organization on X disability in Turkey. We are an organization whose door the families and academics can knock. Our target is to be a reference organization at international level. We follow international developments, we inspect them, and we try to adapt them to Turkey. And the kitchen we build the models is our SERC and the school... We also aim to spread

these (education and rehabilitation) models. And we do this by publications, seminars, meetings, opening our doors to apprentices.”

The social business model of Venus is quite similar to that of Earth; a special education and rehabilitation center and a full-time school serving only few children, some of which are provided scholarships at varying levels. While Earth can use the surplus created at the SERC to subsidize the full-time school, the SERC run by Venus is not yet self-sustaining given its average hourly price level that is less than that of Earth. The organization aims to make the SERC sustainable in itself; therefore, in addition to raising the hourly prices for extra classes, it limited the amount of services that it provides for the children coming with the GRC report. Doing so, in contrast to Earth, they also serve the poor families who cannot pay any amount to the SERC, with a high quality. However, the hourly cost of the education it provides is higher than what the state pays them per hour. Therefore, they are trying to limit the number of poor beneficiaries to a ratio at which the higher revenues they generate from high income families are able to subsidize the poor.

While the limited number of empirical studies on the topic use a rise in the price level as a proxy to mission drift, the case of Venus clearly illustrates that, this can be the result of a deliberate mission change, rather than mission drift. After evaluating the developments in its environment, Venus decides that it can best contribute to the field by being a model organization and creating knowledge spillovers, similar to what Earth has been doing since its inception. Moreover, by still serving for a significant number of lower income customers with high quality, it serves as a close competitor for the other SERCs in the region, creating a motivation to increase their quality.

4.4.5 Mercury

In contrast to Earth, which was established with a high quality-high price positioning, and to Venus, which also later situated itself to that position, Mercury operated in the same segment with the rest of the SERCs in the market, as did Pluto. In contrast to Pluto; however, it was able to restructure the organization to form cost and quality control systems, as well as hiring professionals for its management. It also started to aim self-sustainability, albeit

with an emphasis on the sustainability of the foundation, rather than making the units sustainable in themselves. This has a main implication; in contrast to Venus, it did not increase the average price of services, but only tried to raise more funds with project grants and public donation campaigns in order to subsidize its branches that need funds from the headquarters to survive. In contrast, while also Earth and Venus engage in new and even more innovative ways of fund raising, and are abler to do so given their higher visibility and connections to high-net-worth-people, they do not aim at using these funds for subsidizing their SERCs, but use for their broader research and awareness raising activities.

The social business model for the SERCs run by Mercury is not sustainable in itself, but continuously needs to be backed by foundation's other resources. It provides full-time or half-day education to a high number of students who come with the GRC report, for which the state pays 8 to 12 hours per month. For the extra education hours, it has a flexible pricing system depending on the income level of the family, not charging any amount for several students at all. While a few branches are self-sustaining, the foundation has to subsidize many of its branches with high amounts each month. The highest price charged in the most expensive city is 600 TL per month for full-time education of a child, which is less than 1/10 of the price of Earth's. However, Mercury's education is not as dense and costly as Earth's. After providing the classes written in the GRC reports, Mercury mostly offers socialization classes for the children, rather than one-to-one sessions with the teachers all day.

The facilities belong to Mercury; thus they pay no rents. The organization also has the advantage of extensively using volunteers for their activities; e.g., some volunteer teachers come for the music and dance hours. However, the additional fees they can charge for the extra hours of education barely compensate the lunch expenses of the children, if they can charge any. As their hourly cost is not more than what the state pays, when the branches operate with higher capacity usage ratio in terms of the students with GRC reports, their finances can be better. Yet, despite the high care Mercury shows to the students and to their families, marketization has caused sharp decreases in their number of students, a situation fostered by the limited commercial skills of Mercury as well as their assessment of actively seeking students as unethical. Moreover, as the profit-maximizers do not prefer the heavy disabled students, and as Mercury does, their student portfolio shifted to more heavy disability. The heavy disabled children (and many grown up disabled individuals in the case

of Mercury) are costlier to serve, and the families refrain from sending their children to the centers where they see the heaviest cases. Mercury does not wish to change this naturally occurring shift to the more disadvantaged, but seeks ways to increase its resources mainly by financial and in-kind donations. The organization also employs the personnel who will volunteer for the foundation's activities in addition to teaching and administrative tasks. Yet, it is still prone to pressures to reduce its costs, which constraints the capability to increase the quality of education by, e.g., limiting the ability to buy more teaching material and increase number of teachers per student. Mercury also pays below-market wages to their employees, but can attract them, as it is a plus for their CVs to work there.

4.4.6 Mars

Mars is unique among the enterprises with a private ownership in the sample with an increased demand for its services after marketization. It has been established by the parents of a disabled child, the father having a commerce background. As they could not find a good center to send their child in the region they lived, they started their own center, also with a wish that this could be self-rehabilitation especially for the mother. As the sector changed into a market with the state's payments, Mars combined its entrepreneurial orientation and commercial knowledge to grow by opening several branches, which also included two partnerships in other cities. In time, it also increased its education quality as the knowledge accumulated in the organization with investments in new methods and therapies. It did not decrease investment in education methods even in the hardest financial situations. The organization is very high on entrepreneurial orientation, both evident from the results of the employee surveys, the interviews, and the visible courageous actions taken in its history.

Thanks to its family-like atmosphere, the employee turnover is low despite the below-market wages in the organization. The founder states that, he uses the savings from paying below-market wages again for the employees, e.g., organizing dinners, which both motivate the employees and increase their identification with the organization. Some employees left for higher paying centers or to open their own SERCs, also taking away some students. Yet, a high ratio of them stayed in the organization.

Overall, Mars was not hit by marketization at a high degree. Thanks to the founder's commercial knowledge and skills, it can both work efficiently (e.g., he uses loans to pay taxes earlier, and gets a tax discount higher than the interest paid) and it can promote the organization to always find students. Its visibility in the field declined with marketization, as it could not organize seminars in the schools anymore, which used to raise public awareness on disability as well as promoting the center. *“As there are now several people trying to hunt families of the disabled in front of the schools, you cannot do this anymore”* says the founder. However, Mars prepares monthly bulletins and booklets on specific topics on disability, through which the organization both raises awareness on several issues regarding disability, while also making itself visible.

Branches of Mars are located in regions with above average socioeconomic conditions, with many conscious disabled families. The reputation for high quality education and the intensity of social activities attract those conscious families. Yet, several children are also carried with free school buses from lower income regions. While many incumbent organizations suffered from decreased legitimacy after marketization, Mars was able to set itself apart; e.g., in the eyes of the officials in the MoE.

“I don't request anything from them, I don't go to their doors. Plus, seeing me dressed well etc., they think that I am a very rich man who does not need their help. So, when I happen to go there, they invite me in by buttoning up their jackets while they turn back the other SERC owners.”

While Mars does not often request help from the officials, so that it is responded when it happens to do so, it increasingly benefits from extensive sponsorships for its activities. In fact, Mars is the only organization in the sample with a firm status, that can extensively exploit some resources which are usually deemed for non-profits. When I make an in-depth analysis of this interesting situation with cross-comparisons across cases, the only non-eliminated explanation of this additional legitimacy is the founder's being a father of a disabled child. For example, Jupiter has even a higher reputation for quality than that of Mars, as well as a longer history and an entrepreneurial founder. However, Jupiter lacks the legitimacy for the support of high-net-worth individuals and corporations because it is in firm status. While using the dynamism of being a firm, Mars can also reap several benefits of

those of foundations'. The organization even makes volunteer arrangements with the schools and projects with international NGOs, just as the foundations do.

In addition, the founder has a high commercial orientation, which the foundations lack. "*Commerce is like that. You should not cut investments in times of crisis; it is the best time to invest,*" says the founder, which is a quite interesting statement with a clear emphasis on trade, compared to the speeches of many other participants. Despite this high emphasis on trade, Mars was scored very high on social orientation and very low on economic orientation by its large number of employees taking the survey. The organization could make profits in the past, most of which was invested back in the business while a part being distributed to the founder. Albeit being able to preserve, and even increase, its number of students after marketization, the organization suffers financial problems. This is both because of the rising wage levels after marketization, as well as the state's decreasing payments. The founder once sold his car to pay the salaries on time, and says that he can even sell his house for not losing the trust of the employees.

Mars took a very proactive stance to competition, rather than reactive. The ratio of free extra education provided to the poor families naturally declined with decreasing profits. However, it did not decrease the quality investments in times of crises. The seminars organized for the families at schools were cancelled not because of financial or time pressures, but because they did not want to look like the profit-maximizers camping in front of the schools. Yet, the teachers at Mars continued to directly coordinate with the disabled child's teacher at public schools, if the child also attends a public school, to raise the effectiveness of the education the child receives there. As the teachers at public school are mostly not specialists, they also learn a lot from Mars, a mechanism that creates value spillovers. The organization also has high number of apprentices. While providing them an opportunity to learn the practice, Mars also benefits from their work in its small daily care center for the disabled children. Similar to Mercury, Mars has flexible pricing for additional hours of education over the hours paid by the state. In contrast to Mercury, the base level and average income from those services is much higher; label price is 200 TL per hour, but arranged according to the income of the family.

Added on its several awareness raising activities, Mars also started several projects such as a center which would both educate and provide job opportunity to the disabled

children. Many of these projects were; however, are now suspended as the founder was very tired at the end and decreased his level of engagement. In addition, he quit from partnerships in other cities as he could not visit those SERCs often. The founder was also involved other commercial business to generate him income, which better explains his level of tiredness. While Mars has some internal rules and controls, and mentioned as being “corporatized” by its employees for this reason, many managerial tasks are not given to professional staff employed for particular purposes. *“You cannot corporatize much in this emotional work,”* says the founder. Yet, there are no employees who develop and run after projects in the organization, and as the founder decided to take more time for himself and work less, the projects are suspended.

4.4.7 Jupiter

Jupiter is unique in the sample with the education methods it developed as well as several patents for educational tools. The brochures of the organization showing some of their techniques were even used as teaching materials at the universities. In a similar vein, the organization is unique among the enterprises owned by private individuals in the sample by investing nearly each cent it earned back to business. The founder does not own a house despite very long years of running big enterprises those saw quite high demand throughout its history, up until marketization. The organization’s strategy including continuous investments in new techniques, extensive trainings for the employees, and adapting each new technological development related to the education of disabled first was not possible after marketization. The demand for its services declined sharply thereafter, and its founder lacking a commercial mindset, Jupiter never saw days without debts. The organization survives with extensive bank loans. The wages are sometimes paid late, but the staff who loves and trusts the founder remain. Yet, a team of them had left together to open their own center. This, of course, also contributed to the seizing of the organization.

Jupiter and Eris are like twin organizations with extensive similarities at their founding. However, there are some important differences causing Eris to quit the sector at an early stage of marketization, while Jupiter insisted on remaining despite financial problems. First, although both were established in two big cities, Eris had difficulty finding specialists in its

first years, as the only department graduating specialists was in the city of Jupiter at those years. While Eris had to opt for some other teachers in addition to the specialists it hired, Jupiter employed many new graduate specialists and created a knowledge hub. Added on the high availability of specialists at its founding years, Jupiter invested in their training extensively, and also eliminated those who were not idealist enough. Eris, on the other hand, did not invest extensively to the development of its employees nor to build quality control systems in the organization. The founder himself was engaged in proctoring the development of the children. After several years, Jupiter had plenty of highly skilled specialists, its own innovations on methods, quality control systems for education, and extensive reporting standards regarding each child. While Eris was also among the pioneers to adapt some new technologies, such as education with computer games, it lacked a well-developed quality control structure and highly skilled employees. These extensive investments Jupiter made, served to escalate the commitment of its founder. Moreover, a deeper cause for those differing paths they took was the ambitious character of Jupiter's founder; as explained by the founder of Eris. Last, but not the least, while both founders loved the kids, the founder of Jupiter literally lives for them, a fact evident from the case narratives.

However, despite his tight attachment to his work from heart, and not distributing profits, Jupiter suffered a legitimacy problem arising from its legal form. Several high-net-worth individuals who extensively donated to foundations on disability or sponsored the education of several disabled children refrained from helping Jupiter throughout its history. Having those doors shut, the founder of Jupiter found a solution by founding an association. While it historically provided free education to several disabled children, the financial problems following marketization made this impossible. Through the association, the organization seeks sponsors for some poor disabled children who promise high development if they receive dense therapies. Another strategic action recently taken by Jupiter is a new service offered; consultancy and training for other SERCs. This seems like good opportunity to increase its revenues while spreading its knowledge to the sector. Yet, the service is quite newly added on the organization's web page, and I could not speak to the founder to ask the level of demand for it in the market.

In addition to those newly taken steps to increase its resources under the new circumstances, Jupiter has a deliberate change in its strategy. It does not invest in R&D

anymore. The main reason is the financial constraints, also accompanied by a resentment for not being appreciated. The founder has a high level of burn out and is very angry to the new shape of the field. He had not found financial support for his big investment projects for the disabled in the past, and has now totally stopped even dreaming about them.

4.4.8 Uranus

Having worked at a SERCs in a central region and seeing that families brought their children from very distant locations, the founder of Uranus wanted to open his center to a region closer to some of those families. Uranus was the only center in a large area for several years, serving alone a few districts. But the later years saw the entrance of so many organizations that, 17 centers occurred only in his district, and 18 centers in the nearby district. Uranus was able to make profits in its initial years, and used them for scaling the business. He made extensive investments by opening a second SERC as well as two full-time private schools for the disabled. He had opened those schools, trusting to a whisper that the state would pay for the full-time education of the disabled in private schools, which later turned out not to be the case. In addition, the state decreased the hourly payments, as well as not paying for the group classes if the disabled child also attended a public school, even if it was written in the GRC report. Starting to suffer from big financial losses, Uranus started to seize until it remained only one small SERC. Similar to Mars, the founder ran after all the business himself, not delegating any work. In the meanwhile, he had also started producing special education materials. When the profits in the sector declined after state's cuts, the centers did not buy any materials and he had to close that business.

Uranus did not offer free classes to the poor in its history, but worked with a high quality. The founder has a high respect for the profession, regularly emphasized in the interviews. A former employee of Uranus told that she did not see the high quality applications and social activities they had offered in Uranus in the other organizations she later worked for.

In addition to the decline in state payments, revenues per students decreased as the families did not want to pay anything extra after marketization- despite the center being located in moderate-income region. Added on to this, the rising wages and the cost of free school bus increased financial pressures. Allocating his attention to financially save the

business, the seminars organized for the families of the disabled were suspended for several years. The founder took the reactive strategies of closing branches, and cancelling free complementary therapies such as music and sports classes. He is upset that he cannot get grants due to the firm status. Yet, he did not take the proactive actions taken by, e.g., Mars and Jupiter, to find resources through other means. He now has no ambition to increase the number of students and wishes to work in a boutique structure, in which he will gradually buy new teaching materials to improve quality if he has finances. His level of engagement in the business declined sharply, the founder now sparing his time for other several activities.

4.4.9 Saturn

The founders of Saturn are three social service specialists. In the past, one founder had split from a partnership when he thought the partner was not adequately socially oriented.

“As I come from the profession, my feelings on the professional are at the front. I mean, you have to do some expenditures for the work, you have to organize some things for the children to receive a good education. On the other hand, if the people you partner with have only commercial mentality, these are much for them.”

The second branch they opened, in time, “*turned into a market firm*” (“*piyasa kurumu*”) the co-founder says, by adding free school bus and employing the sales personnel that the profit-maximizers had. They split the partnership from the co-founder who managed that branch, leaving that branch to him. When I asked about why might have that partner changed his attitude, a co-founder replies as:

“In fact, if you ask him, he will probably say he did not change, that his idealism continues. But the environment that he is in... possibly that... That district is like Texas. Being established there... Because there everything is very aggressive. The acts for finding children were done at the most aggressive level there. Probably, as our partner breathed that air...thinking the work does not go otherwise...”

Saturn was established with two goals; being a highly reputable organization and later opening a vocational training school for the disabled. While the first goal was achieved, as declared by the co-founder, the second goal has been suspended as they have no financial strength nor energy left given the pressures exerted by marketization. Saturn’s number of

students fell by one third after marketization. It took none of the proactive actions as a response. It even did not add school bus, stating that, besides its cost, adding a school bus makes the families less attentive. The organization wants to have attentive families as beneficiaries, and is selective in this sense. Among the organizations in the sample, also Mars and Neptune are selective on the families, not serving to non-attentive or problematic ones. However, this selection criterion is higher in Saturn, who says;

“I am not a hypermarket, so I don’t think like I should carry here more customers. We are providing a service with high quality here, the ones who want to benefit from this should come and apply us.”

This high idealism, however, worked to decrease the revenues of the organization, with a lower capacity usage ratio. On the other hand, Saturn is located in a low income region. My observations tell that, the managing co-founder himself controls the quality of education tightly, following the development of each child. But, in order to increase the quality further, Saturn needs to buy materials and decorate classrooms for new methods as well as finding specialists certified in those methods. As it cannot charge the expenditures to the poor families, and cannot subsidize with other sources, investments in quality are suspended. Yet, the co-founder is very sensitive, such that he cannot accept money from some poor families without GRC reports even if they attempt to pay.

Saturn is one of the “family-like” organizations in the sample, as also declared by its employees, and benefits from low employee turnover. As the pressures in the market increased, it cancelled the employee trainings, because they are too busy with “*saving the day*.” The co-founder is overly stressed and is not sure whether the center can survive the next day. The social activities offered to the children, on the other hand, continue. As the SERC cannot earn money with the co-founders’ high idealism in a low income region, and as the co-founders need living income, they opened a preschool for non-disabled children, partly decreasing their level of engagement in Saturn.

One interesting occasion is that, there are collaboration groups formed in Saturn and Neptune’s districts initiated by the founders of these organizations, who run the most reputable organizations in their regions. Most SERCs have joined those groups, to organize monthly meetings or brunches. In Saturn’s region, they also invite the GRC manager to explain their technical problems, such as missing documents.

4.4.10 Neptune

Neptune is located in one of the lowest income regions, where the market pressures are highest. In addition to adding free school bus, different than all organizations in the sample, it also follows families' tasks at the hospitals and GRCs for taking the disabled reports and education programs. In fact, it also employed the sales personnel for a while in the past. A co-founder stated that those people do not work decently, laying at some place and telling that they were at the hospital. He, therefore, has not employed such personnel for 5 years. The co-founder explains that, when he says he does not employ sales personnel to other SERC owners in the region, they are quite surprised.

The mission of Neptune changed in time, as explained by a co-founder:

“We were planning to do this work with very very high quality and opening new branches in different regions. This one is the first branch we opened. It is the first SERC opened in X district. Two years later, we opened a second branch in Y district. But as we did not see much future in this business, I mean, as we don't know what may happen at any time, we cancelled this mission. Rather than opening other branches, two years later, we sold the second branch in Y district.”

He also notes that, in the future, he can open a center specifically for the hearing impaired, because they are the ones who are most easily educable, who appreciate the organization's work and attend classes regularly, even not requesting school bus. In fact, all participants from Neptune complained about their insensible family profile, which decreases their motivation. The organization decreased the seminars organized for the families, noting that they do not attend. When faced with increasing financial pressures, Neptune requested small amounts of payment for some services, which were previously free. Yet, as none of the families wanted to pay, they cancelled the free service those were much costly to them.

As easily visible from Table 12, Neptune did all the reactive acts to reduce costs, but none of the proactive acts for increasing its resources. When it has cash deficit, the main shareholder, who earns income from his other businesses closes the gap. In addition to cancelling free services, decreasing investments in quality, and cuts in operating expenses, Neptune also merged the class hours for some students in order not to carry them to the center twice a week, but only once a week. The co-founder is aware that this act may reduce the effectiveness of education, but states that they did this to only lightly disabled ones who can

handle consequent class hours. However, Neptune also eliminated the heavy disabled beneficiaries who lack some gross motor skills, as well as heavy autistic children. The manager stresses that they do not comprise from their education quality, and that they do not seek many students but provide good education to a mediocre number of students. But they are selective on the beneficiaries, excluding the most disadvantaged:

“Our heavy disabled students that we call gross motor. They need too much support during their transport. Both in the school bus, both the need for hostess... We eliminated some of the physio students, strategically. We needed to relax a little bit. And now, perhaps it is wrong, it is like discrimination, but I don’t prefer the students with only gross motor module. This is also the same in other organizations; they don’t accept (them). Why don’t we accept them? We need to give a lot of things. Physiotherapists are expensive, they are costly to us... Thus, now, in order to survive, most of the organizations unfortunately accept the student if s/he has fine motor. But the ones who are totally gross motor- perhaps some organizations may be preferring- we do not prefer much.”

“I accept if s/he is convenient to me. We are a selective organization in that sense. I sent away some of the very heavy autistics, and I don’t accept very heavy students. Because they affect the quality of education negatively. I direct them to other organizations who accept them. (Because) the instructors cannot cope with them, their motivation and energy declines. And as we don’t have large space... In very heavy autistics, there are serious problems such as spitting, attacking, messing around. Therefore, we go at a specific concept.”

Table 13 Changes in strategic positioning

	Founding motivation	Change in Price	Change in Quality	Change in Disability level
Pluto	Pure social	-	--	+
Earth	Pure social			
Venus	Pure social	++	+	
Mercury	Pure social	-		+
Mars	Social > Profit	+	+	
Jupiter	Social > Profit	-	-	
Saturn	Social = Profit	-	-	
Uranus	Social = Profit	-	-	
Neptune	Social = Profit	-	-	-


In fact, Neptune's elimination of the heavy disabled is the only act among the reactions in the sample, that is clearly mission drift. As Table 14 indicates, most organizations suffered a decline in their quality through the effects of marketization; yet, they did not shift to the less costly beneficiaries. There are some more interesting differences between Neptune and other organizations in the sample, which shed light on this differing reaction.

First, in contrast with many of the organizations in the sample, it was founded by an equal emphasis on profit as well as doing social good. Second, it is the only center in which merchants have shares, in fact, majority of the shares. The pressure for making profits at these financially difficult times does not rise from the merchant main shareholder, but from the small shareholders. Neptune's ownership structure is scattered. It was founded by 3 partners, one specialist who knew the task, one big shareholder who provided the capital, and a third partner who was the manager. The third partner later sold the shares to three other individuals, two of them specialists and one unrelated partner. Moreover, the co-founder who knows the task has been disengaged from the SERC, stating he now quickly goes mad with the family profile served. He is engaged in other business that they also started with the main shareholder in the SERC. The specialist co-founder did not mention eliminating the heavy disabled, perhaps not aware of the situation, if he did not try to hide consciously. The main shareholder mentions that he wants to quit because he is really tired and stressed in this business under these circumstances. However, his family resists this as they deem the business as good deed. On the other hand, the small shareholders, who are not financially well-off, expect some income from the SERC, creating pressure on the main shareholder.

Another interesting difference is that, participants from Neptune always took the organizations in their low socioeconomic region as reference points throughout the interviews, comparing themselves with those to conclude that they provide very high quality and work idealistically. Neptune manager states that they are a model "for that district," while Earth and Venus stated they are models for Turkey, Venus even wishing to be a model internationally. Moreover, the organizations in the sample are not in contact with the profit-maximizers, even not becoming member to SERCs' association for not being put within the same category, except for Saturn and Neptune. Saturn's cofounder attends the monthly meetings, that himself initiated, to discuss the problems of SERCs in that region. He also

helps other organizations if they need his technical help. Neptune’s case is a little different, as they state that they are the president in the district. They try to help other SERCs in technical problems as well as representing them to solve the problems within the district regarding mistakes in the hospitals, retarded payments etc. In addition, they impose some norms regarding competition, to which some profit-maximizers started to obey, partially, if not fully. In sum, Neptune is highly embedded in its low socioeconomic environment and is in close contact to profit-maximizers, and compares itself with only those centers.

Figure 5 Resources of social enterprises



Under the forces of marketization, it cannot choose a high quality-high price strategy in its low income region. The remaining options for this organization are, either operating with lowered quality and no profits as long as it can (as Saturn does), try to create alternative resources (as Mercury, Mars, and lately Jupiter does), or to close the center. (See Figure 5 for a clearer exhibition of the balance between resources of social enterprises and their allocation. As the total resources of the organization decline, it has to decrease some of the items in the resource allocation). Given the income expectation of some shareholders and the decreased psychological capital of the others, the only option now discussed by Neptune is

selling or closing the center. However, while Neptune eliminated the less disadvantaged, it is still the highest quality and most ethical center in its region. Its mission drifted to an extent. Yet, if it quits, the quality in the region may decrease further, as the rest of the SERCs are motivated by profit maximization and compete by providing personal benefits to the families rather than increasing quality. Neptune attempted to change the profit-maximizers' attitude by taking the role of their leader; imposing them normative pressures in return for representing them in front of state officials. (The other SERC owners in the region are stated to lack the ability to speak properly and represent themselves to protect their rights in times of unfair cuts and delays in payments.) This, "leader of the region" role, on the other hand, embedded Neptune in their system, to make it normalize its act of eliminating heavy disabled stating that everyone does this and only the centers who cannot find any students accept them.

4.3 Reasons for Different Reactions

There emerge several factors as reasons for the differing responses to marketization from the cross case comparisons provided above. (Also See Table 13 for a comparison of particular strengths and weaknesses of the organizations). These emergent factors are explained in the following paragraphs.

- **Vision and cohesion of the board:** First of all, not all organizations in the sample were able to see the big picture regarding the changing dynamics in environment and how their financial situation as well as the social value created may be affected in the future. A quite good internal and external assessment, for example, came from Venus, which changed its mission to shift to a "model organization" form, as well as restructuring for sustainability. Venus has a broad variety of members of BoD; e.g., business persons, academics, high-networth-individuals. Mercury, similarly restructured to be able to control the quality level as well as putting an emphasis on creating alternative resources for sustainability. In Pluto, while the leading co-founder had wide vision and saw many

challenges to the organization, she could not persuade the BoD to take actions for working more professionally, later leading her to disengage, as she explains.

- **Imprinting effects:** Two evident shifts in the sample regarding strategic positions are Mercury and Venus. While, Venus changed its mission to focus on educational excellence and being a reference organization, to the expense of increasing the prices, Mercury shifted to the more disadvantaged. We are “*a child of the public*” (halk çocuğu), says the manager of one of its branches. Mercury was founded by the families of the disabled with moderate income levels. As parents of disabled, they experience what it means to have a heavy disabled child, and the financial and physical difficulties those increase as the child grows. While a co-founder of Earth also has a disabled child, she has a business background and comes from an above the average income family. The business knowledge brought an emphasis to professionalism at the founding, while not being a low income family enabled to be able to set aside emotions for creating excellence to the expense of excluding poor beneficiaries, except for the few scholarships provided. This situation is much contrast to Pluto, which did not welcome Earth’s initial offer to create special high quality classes with high-prices within the organization. Board of Pluto, mostly mothers of disabled with no business background, evaluated this as discrimination, while Earth sees it as a sustainable business model. Those examples, among many other in the sample, indicate that the imprinting factors affects the direction that the social enterprises take.
- **Pro-social values of the founders:** While all founders in the sample are high on pro-social values, some of them are visibly more so. A co-founder of Saturn, for example, explained several emotional moments in which he could not accept the money that the poor families wanted to pay. While increasing the share that the poor families get from the services of the organization, this orientation, on the other hand, limits the quality level as the founder cannot invest in new materials. The organization also increasingly suffers financially, as it cannot raise funds such as, e.g., Mercury can do with its foundation legal form.
- **Legitimacy of the organization:** The organizations in firm status generally lack legitimacy compared to the foundations and associations. This is actually the reason Jupiter founded an association to be able to find scholarships for its students. However,

legal form is not the only determinant of legitimacy. While Mars and Jupiter are similar in many aspects, the latter having an even higher quality in addition to high reputation, Mars can find support from various parties. Some wealthy people even want to donate cash, so that Mars will allocate it to poor disabled families, an offer that the founder did not accept. This additional legitimacy basically arises from the founder of Mars being a father of a disabled child. In addition, Mars is keen on not being put in the same category with the profit-maximizers, which are also in the firm status. The organization, for example, cancelled the seminars it organized at the schools, as the sales personnel of profit-maximizers were located in front of the schools, seeking potential customers from the families of the disabled who attend special classes or inclusive education at public schools. It however, found other ways, which would both raise awareness on, e.g., sexual abuse to disabled children, while making the organization more visible.

- **Entrepreneurial orientation:** As seen from Table 12, some social enterprises took only reactive steps while others proactively sought new resources. For example, Mars extensively uses volunteers for social activities as well as benefiting from the apprentices in the daily care unit, always seeking opportunities to create alternative resources. It also had several innovative projects in its history, with its entrepreneurial orientation that is also verified with the employee survey results. The founder is a risk taker; he says “*You should invest in times of crises; after the crises, when the others fail, more students will come here,*” while many others chose to cut costs in hardest times. This contrast is also evident from a comparison of Eris and Jupiter. While Eris quit the market, stating he cannot get loans to invest in an uncertain environment, Jupiter stayed to continue its investments. “*He is very ambitious, as ambitious as he was when we first graduated,*” says the founder of Eris for Jupiter’s founder.
- **Escalation of commitment:** The impact of escalation of commitment is most obvious, again in the comparison of Eris and Jupiter. The founder of Jupiter extensively invested in quality and new techniques. In addition, he spent each cent back for the organization, bringing in the last technology with camera systems, computer systems, and so on. When he compares his organization to Eris, which quit the market, the founder of Jupiter emphasized these differences in the past investments. Similarly, not in terms of physical

investment, but regarding the psychological commitment, an old member of the BoD of Mercury says, “*We initiated the education of the disabled in Turkey. We cannot leave.*”

- **Level of engagement:** Many of the social entrepreneurs in the sample suffer from high psychological burnout, and decrease their level of engagement in the organization by putting it to the periphery of their lives. Moreover, some of them seek alternative businesses in order to earn money to make a living, thus further decreasing their engagement in the social enterprise. The level of engagement effects their behavior on seizing the organization (e.g., Saturn) vs seeking new resources (e.g. Mercury). There are some factors emerging from this study as determinants of their level of engagement.
 - **Putting realistic goals:** In addition to having a continuing high engagement, the cofounder of Earth even did not mention being tired, offended etc. in the interview. When I questioned the reason behind this, she replied as “*I am not tired nor offended,*” adding that she accepts the realities of Turkey and puts small realistic goals which can gradually extend in time.
 - **Past failures:** The past commercial failures of the organizations in their growth attempts, especially in the case of Uranus, served to decrease their level of engagement. “*There is no need for adventure anymore*” says the founder of Uranus. He is rather involved with politics and managerial positions in associations now, putting the SERC at a peripheral role in his life.
 - **Level of appreciation:** The social entrepreneurs want to be appreciated by either their beneficiaries, the state, or the public in general. The specialist cofounder of Neptune suffered high burnout as a consequence of marketization’s pressures coupled with the attitudes of the inattentive family profile they served. He finally disengaged himself, not dealing with daily works despite keeping his shares, stating that the families do not know their value.
 - **Association with the cause:** Both the professional association (being a specialist on the topic) and personal association (being a parent of a disabled child) motivate the social entrepreneurs, in addition to their high pro-social values. However, a personal association with the cause has a larger effect on preserving the engagement of the social entrepreneurs. This is most evident in the case of Pluto, founded by the parents of disabled, compared to e.g.,

Uranus, whose founder is a highly idealist specialist, but put the center at the periphery after his entrepreneurial failures. He says that he knows no other business he can do and will continue doing this job with a small size and not any ambition to grow anymore. On the other hand, the founders of Pluto, who have suffered even worse disappointments throughout its history, both in their collaborations with the state and the failure of their SERC at the end, are willing to do even more. “*We can reborn from our ashes,*” says one co-founder, while another co-founder says “*we hit the bottom but we are now trying to raise again.*” They have plans to open a new, big and differentiated, center and seeking funds for it.

- **Socioeconomic situation of the region:** The socioeconomic situation of the location limits the set of options available for social entrepreneurs in terms of strategic actions. While they can charge higher prices to some individuals in moderate or high income regions and use those revenues to subsidize the most disadvantaged beneficiaries, the ones in low income regions are not able to do this. of the beneficiaries limits the prices the organization can charge. discretion of social enterprises.
- **Frame of reference:** As it was discussed in detail in the case of Neptune, an increasing embeddedness in the network of profit-maximizers made the organization normalize its unethical acts which increasingly looked like theirs. In case of Saturn, for example, their previous partner was the manager of the second branch they opened in a Texas-like district, where all kinds of unethical acts were vastly performed. He, in time, added the sales personnel which sought disabled children, which the other partners working in another district still saw unethical. The network that the organization is embedded in also determines their frame of reference in terms of quality. The organizations that are in contact with international organizations deem their quality as moderate, while it is much superior than the rest of the organizations in the sample, given the objective quality indicators in the data collected. The regionally embedded ones, on the other hand, compare and contrast themselves with the other organizations nearby, to conclude that they are much better than the profit-maximizers, perhaps a threat to their motivation to increase the quality further.

Table 14 Strengths and weakness of social enterprises

	Strengths	Weaknesses
Pluto	Expertise	No commercial skills & public relations. Inertia in board. Limited ability to raise funds. No internal regulations. Donating all income in past
Earth	High ability to raise funds, high reputation. High income region. Internal regulations & external audit. strong public relations, connections to several high-net-worth people	None. (Yet also suffers from the labor constraints in the sector and high employee turnover)
Venus	High ability to raise funds, high reputation, high income region, internal regulations, strong public relations, connections to some high-net-worth people, superior facilities	None. (Yet also suffers from the labor constraints in the sector)
Mercury	Moderate ability to raise funds, high reputation, internal regulations, high employee identification, superior facilities, superior social activities	Mostly low income regions, limited commercial skills
Mars	Entrepreneurial orientation & commercial skills. High reputation. Ability to find sponsors to activities. Extensive socialization for students. Savings of the founder used when needed	Decreased engagement of the founder. No managerial work delegation
Jupiter	Entrepreneurial orientation. High reputation. Internal regulations. High expertise. Innovativeness. Own techniques and patented education tools.	Low commercial knowledge & ability to raise funds. No savings of the founder to close working capital deficit. No connections to high-net-worth people. High burnout of the founder. Bank loans
Saturn	Good reputation. High employee identification. Low employee turnover	Decreased engagement of the founders. Low income region. No transport offered. no managerial work delegation
Uranus	Reputation, good facility	No ability to raise funds, no connections to high-net worth people. Decreased engagement of the founder. No managerial work delegation
Neptune	Commercial skills. Personal savings of the cofounder. Using municipality's buses for social activities	Low income region. High burnout. Decreased engagement of the specialist partner. High employee turnover. No ability to raise funds. Several partners
Eris	Expertise. Reputation	No ability to raise funds. No managerial work delegation. Specifically targeted by competitors. High burnout

Figure 6 Illustrative quality-price configurations after marketization





Figure 7 Illustrative quality-price configurations before marketization



DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

I start this chapter by explaining the contributions of this dissertation to the literature, followed by the practical implications of the findings. I later describe the limitations of this research and suggest related future research topics.

5.1 Contribution to Theory

This study contributes to the literature on 3 theoretical research streams. First is the marketization of social sectors mainly studied by the welfare governance scholars. Second is the strategic management of social enterprises, which is quite a nascent area of study. Finally, the third research stream this dissertation contributes to is the concept of mission drift, a much discussed but under-researched and theorized topic related to the management of social enterprises.

5.1.1 Marketization

This study firstly contributes to the research stream on marketization through an in-depth analyzes of the process. While existing studies focus directly on the changes occurring at the organizations; e.g., embracing TQM practices, and discuss their impact on the social value created, I provide a framework explaining the changing mechanisms in the field at multiple levels of analysis. Doing so, I show the micro processes operating in the field with the entrance of large numbers of profit-maximizers, with their connections to the social value

created. In addition to the acts of the profit-maximizers that are unconventional for the field, I explore the changes occurring in the nature and attitude of the beneficiaries as well as the workforce in the field, which altogether cause degeneration of the social sector, characterized by unfair competition, low quality of services, commodification of the beneficiaries, less idealistic workforce, disputes across the organizations, and decreased legitimacy. The pressures exerted on social enterprises by several actors, on the other hand, make them lose their influence in the field, and paves the way for increased degeneration. This research is performed in a context characterized by a weak institutional infrastructure, including poor regulative framework and inspections, ineffective functioning of state organizations such as hospitals, inadequate planning on raising workforce for the field, and limited knowledge of the officials on the education of disabled. The analysis also explores the role of those factors in facilitating the degeneration of the field.

5.1.2 Social Enterprise Strategy

The nascent literature on the management of social enterprises has so far been mainly interested on how they manage internal tensions by focusing on their adaption of practices and structures prescribed by the commercial and social welfare logics. A few recent attempts to theorize on their strategic management pertaining to their decisions on the product or service mix, quality, pricing, and the targeted beneficiaries, are not based on in-depth empirical examinations. Moreover, despite focusing on the survival of social enterprises while preserving their social impact, they neglect the phenomenon of competition.

The findings of this research at the organizational level first provide a framework explaining the vulnerability of social enterprises to the market forces given their particular characteristics; the socioeconomic condition of their location, their commercial skills, reputation, level of corporatization, recruitment and control practices, and employee identification, as well as the ability to raise funds and the financial resources of the founder/s. Later, the findings illustrate the varying reactions of particular organizations ranging from strategic acts to increase their number of beneficiaries and revenues, acts to create alternative resources, acts to decrease costs through various means, to voluntarily or non-voluntarily quitting the market. The social enterprises that stay in the market have particular strategic

positions, either chosen deliberately or by being pushed to that position by the market forces. Their strategic positions, in fact, point to a typology of social enterprises according to their role in the mixed-form market:

- a) **Knowledge generator:** Those organizations generate knowledge in the sector by either their own research and development activities, or by transferring the knowledge created elsewhere and applying it to the context. Their scope is limited in terms of the number of direct beneficiaries of their services. Their main goal is to constitute a model for other organizations by showing the best practices, accompanied by the aim of raising public awareness on the success is achievable in the beneficiaries (e.g., that the mentally disabled children can achieve many successes when provided good education). They enable knowledge spillovers through collaborations with the state, universities, and with other organizations in the field to raise high-quality workforce to the field, to support research, and to disseminate quality by guiding other actors. They reserve capacity for high paying beneficiaries; the surplus generated from them is used for subsidizing the financial loss from the other beneficiaries. Examples to this type are Earth and Venus among the organizations in the sample, that are in not-for-profit status, and can raise funds.
- b) **Quality enforcer:** While knowledge generators charge high prices on average and serve a small number of individuals, quality enforcers have moderate prices and a larger pool of beneficiaries; e.g., Mars and Jupiter. While not reserving capacity for the high payers, they have flexible pricing for extra services depending on the income level of the beneficiaries. This type constitutes a competitive treat for the profit maximizers, pushing them to increase their quality. The strength of this role, however, is determined by the consciousness level of the beneficiaries, such that unconscious beneficiaries may not value their quality and easily prefer other organizations that trick them with unrealistic promises or provide other benefits. In order to be more attractive for the beneficiaries and to pose a higher threat to profit-maximizers, quality enforcers need to invest in continuous development. Moreover, they need a competitive orientation, not necessarily trying to beat the competitors but being able to promote their organizations. Yet, when they fail to attract a high number of beneficiaries, they neither pose a big threat for the competitors,

nor can sustain their quality level given the decline in their revenues, becoming obsolete in the market.

c) **Includer:** This type of social enterprises includes a high ratio of the most disadvantaged individuals among their beneficiaries. In a mixed-form market, the least disadvantaged beneficiaries are typically excluded by profit-maximizers as they do not provide profit opportunity. Among the social enterprises, the knowledge generators and quality enforcers also accept them in principle. However, the knowledge generators have very limited capacity and serve to a few least disadvantaged beneficiaries when they find extra funds; e.g. sponsors for each of these beneficiaries. Quality enforcers, on the other hand, subsidize the cost of some least disadvantaged beneficiaries through the surplus from the less disadvantaged beneficiaries, hence they need to balance their ratio. Like quality enforcers, the includer type may apply a flexible pricing strategy. Yet, the prices are significantly lower on average, with also a high ratio of free services. While they are also keen on catching a certain quality in their services, they invest in the development of quality when they catch specific opportunities; e.g., a donor wishing to build a new better facility, or part of it. Includers offer some amount of services at higher quality by their professionals, but also benefit from volunteers or apprentices to provide them extra free services. Their business model needs to be backed by external funds as well as a well-managed pool of volunteers. Therefore, they need a very high level of legitimacy, which usually comes with a not-for-profit status, as exemplified by Mercury in the sample.

As they get far away from these typologies, the social enterprises in this study suffered higher financial problems, as well as decreasing social impacts. The organizations do not necessarily stick to the characteristics of one type strictly, but can integrate some practices of other types into their operating model. However, while they benefit from a limited borrowing from another type, an increased borrowing may be difficult to achieve and/or detrimental to success. For example, Mars is a quality enforcer, but can also benefit from volunteers in some of its extra services, thanks to the additional legitimacy the founder brings with him. It benefits from the volunteers for the social activities they perform with the disabled children such as going to cinema. Mercury, an includer, on the other hand, can also find volunteer teachers for, e.g., music and dance classes. Mars also successfully benefits from the apprentices in its daily care center. Yet, if it increases their ratio, its quality may

decline, causing it to lose its competitive power against the profit-maximizers. In addition, while a type of social enterprise can embrace some practices of another type, not all acts are compatible. For example, Earth and Venus, with their attention on excellence in quality, cannot get use of the apprentices in their services, but only train them.

When judging the role of the organization, one cannot compare the social enterprises in a field directly with the other, but needs to consider regional characteristics. More specifically, one social enterprise may be a quality enhancer in one region, but may be obsolete in terms of social impact, and/or financially not sustainable in another region. Saturn, for example, would be obsolete had it served with its the same quality in the regions served by Mars. Because, in the higher socioeconomic regions, the existence of conscious and wealthier families forces the organizations to increase their quality to some extent, rather than accepting or requesting personal benefits for registering their child. Mars, with its higher quality and continuous investments, is a treat for the profit-maximizers in the region, pushing them to increase the quality of their services. Yet, the actual quality of Saturn may be even less than some profit-maximizers in those regions. Similarly, Mars would not be successful, had it attempted to operate with the same price and quality in Saturn's region. This is because, most of the potential beneficiaries would not want to or be able to pay for the expensive extra classes, which enable Mars to survive by creating additional revenues.

The mainstream strategy literature is not readily applicable to social enterprises, as it is based on the notion of wealth creation and capture. The aim of social enterprises is to create positive social impact, accompanied by the goal of being financially sustainable, or in some cases, distributing limited profits to their shareholders. Thus, while they need to compete with others for resources, the other enterprises in the sector are not rivals to beat but are actors who can potentially serve to create a larger social impact. In contrast to the typologies of Porter (1980) those focus on the profitability of firm, and in contrast to the RBV (Barney, 1991) that focuses on sustained competitive advantage and acquiring non-imitable resources, the typologies emerging out of this research focus on creating a high social impact (by direct services, quality enforcing mechanism, the knowledge spillovers, and inclusiveness) while being financially sustainable.

The roles of the social enterprises were not clearly separated before marketization, as they were the few organizations trying to answer a high demand with munificent resources

and limited competition. The findings of this research indicate that, reactions of social enterprises to the pressures exerted by the market are influenced by particular characteristics at the individual (founder/board of directors) and organizational levels, as well as its location, which shape the cognitions of the decision makers and constrain or enable the availability of particular resources. First, a larger vision of the Board of Directors enables the social enterprises to be able to more responsive to the pressures, moderated by their cohesion. The imprinted elements on the organization, founders pro-social values, entrepreneurial character, escalation of commitment, level of engagement, and the frame of reference effect their inclination to choose particular actions. The legitimacy of the organization, as well as the socioeconomic situation of the region, on the other hand, effect the availability of resources, thus the feasible set of strategic actions.

5.1.3 Mission drift

This research also reveals important findings regarding the concept of mission drift, both on its conceptualization and its antecedents. First, many organizations included in this study embraced business-like practices, but did not suffer mission drift. Embracing a more corporatized structure enabled them to better control their quality, decrease work load and stress on the founders, and aided the continuity of projects in the long run. Mission drift also did not rise because of relying more on commercial resources for income.

On the other hand, mission drift occurred because of these factors: a) the aim of both profit and social value at founding, compared a purer aim of creating social value through commercial activities b) change in the reference points of managers and shareholders as they become embedded into the network of profit-maximizers c) a stratified ownership structure with differing backgrounds and priorities d) the pressure on the main shareholder (in this case by his family) to stay in the business, coupled with an expectation of income from small shareholders despite decreasing profit opportunity. The in-depth analysis in this study also revealed that a misconception of mission drift is prevalent in most of the few empirical studies on the topic. Specifically; there a need to separate inability from intention and to distinguish between mission drift and mission change, as well as a better conceptualization of social enterprises themselves.

Drift vs inability to achieve mission: While the mission of many organizations in this study did not drift, in the sense that they did not focus on profits to the neglect of the social good, their ability to serve with high quality declined under the market pressures. Their poorer financial situation did not allow them to buy new teaching materials and invest in new teaching methods, as well as limiting the ratio of free services they could offer to the poor beneficiaries. The rising time constraints and psychological pressures after marketization also directed their attention away from service quality as well as limiting their time for organizing social activities and family trainings. Their missions were unchanged, and they were aware that they could not serve with the high quality they deemed necessary as well as the decreasing ratio of free services. Rather, their social impact declined in the field.

Drift vs change in mission: A rise in the price level and serving more to the higher income beneficiaries does not necessarily indicate a mission drift, but may be the result of a deliberate mission change, which may help create a larger social impact under the changing environmental conditions. In the case of Venus, for example, the managers of the foundation discussed what their role should be given the new circumstances, deciding to serve as a model for other organization as well as aiming self-sustainability of the enterprise for its long term survival. Therefore, its role in the field changed from serving several beneficiaries with moderate quality to disseminating knowledge through their applications in their center which serves only few beneficiaries. By still serving some lower income beneficiaries, it also posed a competitive treat for the organizations in its region, forcing them to raise their quality.

Drift vs not being a “true” social enterprise: The reasons why the organizations were established at the first place vary across the organizations in this study, to form three categories: a) founded with only social motives and the founders do not gain any financial benefits, b) (stated to have been) founded for creating social value, while the founders are distributed a small amount of, c) founded for both creating social value and making profits. Yet, all three categories can be included in the wide conceptualization of social enterprise, as they aim at achieving social missions by engaging in commercial activities, and not aim at maximizing their profits. Even Neptune, which suffered mission drift by eliminating heavy disabled beneficiaries, can still be labeled as social enterprise as it does not do the several unethical acts the profit-maximizers in the field do. However, perhaps it is an ethical organization which also wants to create high value, so that it can capture a higher value, and

simply decreases the value created as the value capture declines. Even if we get a more conservative conceptualization; for example that of Mair and Mair (2006), which adds that social enterprises prioritize social objectives over financial ones, it is still not possible to distinguish between an ethical organization operating in a social field from a social enterprise. Again, even Neptune, which eliminated heavy disabled, prioritizes social objectives over financial ones. For example, they organize conferences for the families and train them on how they can help the development of their children, even if the families do not value this, only 5% attending the seminars.

To my knowledge, none of the articles on social enterprises clearly report on their level of profits and profit distribution, at best stating whether they distribute profits or not. I selected the participants of this study from the old organizations in the field that were founded by either the families of the disabled, by academics in the field, by specialists, or at least by the partnership of a specialist. However, there is no such concern in the stream of research on social enterprises, as long as they operate in a social sector. For example, researchers consider all work integration enterprises as social enterprises. Yet, this study shows that, operating in an inherently social field does not indicate that those organizations pursue social goals at the first place, as most of the organizations operating in the field of supplementary education of the disabled in Turkey are profit-maximizers. Moreover, given the rising interest on social enterprises, there is an inclination in the organizations to label them as social enterprise, as well as an inclination in the researchers to package their work under the popular social enterprises category. Even organic chocolate producers are conceptualized as social enterprises by some scholars.

While it is difficult to distinguish the c category from an ethical organization in the field, it is even difficult to differentiate between an organization that *cannot* make profits (e.g. due to inefficiency) and an organization which *does not* make profits intentionally. Moreover, it is nearly impossible to know whether an enterprise is investing back in the business with an expectation of higher profits in the future, or because of serving best to the mission. In sum, the definition of a social enterprise is itself problematic, making it hard to explain and assess mission drift. More clearly defining the profit distribution aspect can help form a more robust base for the study of social enterprises, which even determines the maximum wage level the social entrepreneur can pay him/herself.

5.1 Contribution to Practice

The findings of this research have implications for the social and economic policy makers, as well as the social entrepreneurs, and the managers in the social enterprises, and the institutions supporting social ventures.

5.2.1 For policy makers

- This research firstly provides a deeper understanding of the dynamics in a social sector after its marketization. Reading this study, policy makers can better understand the mechanisms that either decrease quality, increase corruption, or exclude the most disadvantaged and can devise and implement appropriate regulations.
- Second, policy makers can consider the roles of the social enterprises in a mixed-form market as knowledge generators and spillers, quality enforcers, and includers of the most disadvantaged. Clearly seeing how they differentiate from the other organizations and have unique roles in the ecosystem, they can consider providing some privileges such as tax exemptions, as well as financial support mechanisms, especially for the ones in firm status lacking access to grant options. While providing support to social enterprises, state can encourage their distribution in different regions, rather than accumulation in some districts while some districts lack them. This may, in fact, ensure that they fulfill their roles in the mixed-form market more effectively.
- In addition, state can consider supporting the social enterprises that serve the most disadvantaged by making more payments for the heavy cases considering their transportation costs, need of more personnel, the cash needed for the construction of convenient physical settings for them...etc. In fact, making payments based on the disability level of the beneficiaries to all enterprises in the field may also seem a good strategy to prevent the exclusion of the most disadvantaged. However, given the dynamics in the field explained in this study, the expected could be that the profit-maximizers will this time seek the heavy cases that they exclude in current situation. And, with the lack of a well-functioning

inspection and quality control system, they can reimburse to the state without providing them a proper education, partly distributing it to some families as personal benefits.

5.2.2 For social entrepreneurs

- Social enterprises need to make sure that they are producing the social value defined by their mission while also ensuring their survival through a sustainable income stream. This study indicates that, they may become obsolete in changing circumstances if they do not continuously screen their environment and adjust their business models and strategic positions. Pluto, for example, became obsolete in the market as its quality declined with decreasing revenues, which later caused it to lose even more students. It was not able to get out of this vicious circle by neither promoting the center, if not actively seeking students, nor by creating alternative resources to compensate its financial losses. Mars, on the other hand, was able to promote itself by its commercial capabilities, invested in quality even in financially difficult times with a large vision, and also created alternative resources, thereby rising as a quality enforcer for its competitors. Screening its environment and modifying its mission to become a model organization, Venus shifted to the position of knowledge generator after marketization. In line with its new goal, it also changed its revenue structure for becoming more self-sustainable, while taking acts to enlarge its revenue base from donations.
- The cases in this study show some interesting failures in terms of managing the financial resources of the organization, from which social entrepreneurs can take lessons. Pluto, for example, donated all of its surplus from the SERC to a public school for the disabled, at times when it could have some. While doing good in the short-run, by not investing the surplus in quality, it prepared its end in the mixed-form market. Despite its advantage that conscious families were inclined to prefer it due to foundation status, not being able to increase its quality level, its beneficiary base decreased. Jupiter, on the other hand, invested extensively in quality, which was perhaps “too much,” such that it did not have any slack resources and had to use bank loans, incurring interest expenses.
- This study also stresses the importance commercial knowledge as well as a commercial mindset. In a mixed-form market, social enterprises should accept that they are in a

competitive environment even if they do not have competitive orientation. When they see seeking beneficiaries as unethical, they may lose their beneficiaries to other enterprises which serve them with less quality, e.g. the case of Mercury and Saturn. They may refrain from doing the same acts with the profit-maximizers to find beneficiaries, yet they may employ innovative tactics (See the case of Mars) which both create social impact and increase the visibility of their enterprise.

- None of the corporatized social enterprises suffered a mission drift in this study. Moreover, they were able to establish better quality management systems, performed better public relations that turned back as donations, as well as their founders suffering less of psychological burnout. Furthermore, how entrepreneurial and successful can a social entrepreneur be, if there are no established work delegation mechanisms and associated professionals in the organization, the organization starts to stagnate as its founder disengaged to some extent after a period of time. In a similar vein, an aging Board of Directors causes inertia in the organization, making it hard to keep up with the developments in its environment. However, if the organization can establish a corporatized structure and employ young professionals, it can combine the experience of the aging BoD with the dynamism of the young employees. While having a corporatized structure is important for success, so is to have a family-like atmosphere, from which many organizations in the sample benefitted by being able to retain their employees in the tight market, even with below-market wages. Therefore, social enterprises need to be keen on not losing the family-like identity when embracing business-like practices.
- This research also provides some guidelines for the social enterprises to increase their resources in competitive environments (See the strategic actions of the cases). The findings demonstrate that the organizations which took a reactive stance by only decreasing their costs were limited in their ability to fulfill their missions at the end, by suffering financial problems and decreasing pool of beneficiaries. The ones who both focused on decreasing some costs and at the same time increasing their resources were more successful in the competitive environment. Not compromising from the quality investments during cost reduction enabled the social enterprises to eventually catch a desired number of beneficiaries, while the ones compromising from it suffered bigger losses. On the other hand, another take-away from the findings is not to be over-proactive to make investments building on market expectations.

For example, Uranus, which opened full-time private schools for the disabled upon hearing that the state may start making payments suffered huge financial losses.

- Last but not the least, social enterprises seeking capital need to be careful when selecting investors. This is particularly important given the increased attention to impact investing both from social entrepreneurs and investors. It should be kept in mind that, the mission drift in one organization in this study did not occur because of the attitude of the main shareholder, but through the small shareholders who expected returns at financially difficult times.

5.2 Limitations

There are some limitations of this study which are inherent to case study research. Firstly, it cannot assess how much the variables affect the outcome (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, as my aim was to build theory to explain the changing sector dynamics and the behaviors of social enterprises after marketization, I do not see this limitation as an important treat for my study. Based on the findings of this research, follow up studies may be designed to test the importance of the variables on the outcomes. Second, case methodology is subject to critiques regarding the potential subjectivity of the researcher. A well-designed and systematically performed study, on the other hand, can overcome this treat to validity. As I discussed in detail in the methods chapter, I believe that I have sufficiently eliminated this potential bias. However, despite using several techniques in light of the literature, such as triangulation of data and coding the text multiple times after some time intervals, I was not able to have the interview texts coded by other coders. While having multiple coders for at least some of the interviews could further eliminate the treat of subjectivity, I could not find a volunteer to dedicate to this task given the high number of codes to be dealt with.

Case studies are approached with suspect in terms of generalizability of the theory to different organizations. The use of multiple case studies and making both within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons; however, improves generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). I believe that my case selection techniques based on a diverse set of characteristics of social enterprises in terms of e.g., location, size, age, and ownership, makes the findings applicable to many organizations. However, there still remains some limitations of the study on

generalizing the findings to other mixed-form markets for two reasons; country factors and the nature of the service in this research.

First, the Turkish context is characterized by weak institutional infrastructure. Although I included this as a moderator in the framework, stating that it effects the level of degeneration after marketization of the social sectors, further in-depth research needs to be done in the countries with better developed infrastructures to compare the market forces and the reactions of social enterprises. Other than the weak infrastructure, Turkey is characterized by low level of education as well as moderate income per capita. The market dynamics may differ in high education and high income societies. However, by selecting the cases from districts with both high and low socioeconomic situations, I integrated this variance and its effects in the frameworks I developed. Yet, there may still be cultural differences to make people in different regions around the world act differently in a mixed-form market. For instance, the Japanese people with a face culture may be less inclined to engage in corruption or unethical acts mentioned in this context.

Second, the context for this study is the education of the disabled, a service that the beneficiaries can hardly assess the quality, and they cannot know it before trying for a long time period. Moreover, as each disabled individual is considered a unique case, the parents of the disabled cannot easily compare their child's development to others for judging the quality of services. The sectors in which the services have more easily measurable outcomes as well as the sectors with tangible products may differ in their vulnerability to degeneration after marketization.

5.3 Future Research Directions

First of all, following the above mentioned potential limitations for generalizing the findings of this study can be seen as promising avenues for future research. Studies replicating this research in other developing countries may help build more robust theory. In addition, replicating this study in the developed countries and in other social sectors both in developed and developing country contexts may test the generalizability of the findings and help enrich theory by adding contingencies. Another interesting contingency factor to test

may be the impact of the speed of marketization. The context of this study saw the sudden entrance of large numbers of profit-maximizers following regulatory changes, which provided me natural experiment to compare the before and after situation. Yet, a slow shift rather than a rapid shift to a mixed-form market may entail different dynamics; e.g., the labor market may not be tight and the wages may not see such an artificial rise

Second, the outputs of this study, especially regarding the multiplicity of the strategies of social enterprises in a mixed-market form, may be used as inputs by other fields such as welfare economists, to enrich their assumptions and economic models. Moreover, by integrating the findings of this study, the welfare governance scholars can develop a tool to measure the level of degeneration across different social sectors.

Another emerging question from this research is that how the profit-maximizers are affected from the existence of social enterprises, in the same district, city... etc. While this study partly mentions the phenomenon, I do not base the discussion on this topic directly to the declarations of profit-maximizers, but to other actors. Further research including the profit-maximizers can bring additional insights, as well as with the families to clarify the mechanisms and bounding conditions. For example, under which configurations are profit-maximizers more pushed to increase quality or decrease their prices, thus increasing the social welfare created. Moreover, how can the knowledge spillovers occur from the social enterprises to other social enterprises and organizations in the field in an effective way?

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APPENDICES

Interview Questions for Managers (Translated to English)

1. How long have you been working here?
2. When you look at the historical development of the field of special education and rehabilitation in Turkey, what kinds of changes do you observe?
3. (If not mentioned in the answer to the above question):
How do you interpret the legislative changes in 1996 and 2006? What were their causes?

When we look at the history of your organization...

4. How was it founded? When, where, by whom, with which specific aim?
5. How did the activities change over time? E.g., new activities, change in the importance given to some activities, the disabled groups you serve... What were the reasons for the changes?
6. Have there been any modifications in the mission (either written or unwritten)?
7. Organizational identity means: "Who we are, what do we do, what are the core values, which adjectives define the organization- what is distinctive about it?" How would you define your organizational identity?
8. Do you depict any changes in the way the public/stakeholders see you over time? If so, what do you think are the reasons?
9. Did you experience any changes in the amount of donations you collect, and the number of volunteers you attract? If so, why do you think this happened?

Now, I have some questions regarding the management of the organization...

10. What is effectiveness for this organization? (When would you deem it as successful?)
11. Do you have a defined long term strategy?
12. Do you have measurable goals at organization level? Do you track and report your performance?
13. According to what criteria do you select your employees?

14. Do you track the performance of the employees? What are the main criteria?
15. Did the strategy, goals, and performance criteria change over time? How?
16. If you were to cluster the organizations in special education and rehabilitation field, what would those clusters consist of, according to which criteria?
17. How were the clusters before those changes in the field?
18. How is your organization positioned with respect to others on: the content of education, quality, prices, characteristics of beneficiaries (Severity of the disability, education/income of the family...)
19. Were there changes in your organization on those dimensions over time? How, why?
20. Do you have relationships with other education centers? What kind of relationships?
21. Who are your benchmarks?
22. Is there competition in the field? Who competes with whom, on what? Who are your competitors?
23. What percent of the revenues come from the government?
24. Which additional services do you provide above what the government pays? With fee, or free? How do you determine the fees?
25. (If the SERC is operated by a foundation)
 - a) What are the sources of income for the foundation? How did your income portfolio change over time?
 - b) Can the SERC sustain financially and create funds for the foundation, or do you transfer funds from the foundation? How did this situation change? What is the target in long run?
26. As a social enterprise, you have both social and financial goals. Do you experience competing demands by those goals? Can you give examples? How do you balance them?
27. Lastly, could you tell me about your future plans? E.g. growth, scope of activities, financial issues?

Interview Questions for Managers (in Turkish)

1. Kaç yıldır burada çalışıyorsunuz?
2. Türkiye'de özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanının geçmişine baktığımızda, zaman içinde ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlemek mümkün?
3. (Önceki soruya cevap olarak değinmedi ise) 1996 ve 2006'daki kanun değişikliklerini nasıl yorumluyorsunuz? Ne gibi sonuçlara yol açtı?

Kurumunuzun tarihçesine baktığımızda...

4. Nasıl kuruldu? Kimler tarafından, hangi özgün amaç ile?
5. Bugüne geldiğimizde, faaliyetlerde ne gibi değişiklikler oldu? Örneğin yeni faaliyetler, iptal edilenler, önem artması/azalması, içerilen engelli grupları... Değişikliklerin sebepleri nelerdi?
6. Misyonunuzda, yazılı veya yazılı olmayan, değişiklikler oldu mu?
7. Örgütsel kimlik kavramı şudur: "biz kimiz, ne yaparız, temel değerlerimiz nelerdir, hangi sıfatlar kurumu tanımlar- onu diğerlerinden ayıran nelerdir?" Kurumun örgütsel kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
8. Sizce zaman içinde toplumun/paydaşların size bakışında değişiklikler oldu mu? Oldu ise, bu neden olabilir?
9. Zaman içinde topladığınız bağışlarda, veya gönüllü sayısında değişiklikler saptadınız mı? Bu neden olabilir?

Şimdi kurumun yönetimi ile ilgili bazı sorularım var...

10. Bu kurum için "etkin olmak" nedir? (neleri yapabilirse başarılı olmuş sayılır?)
11. Tanımlı bir uzun vadeli stratejiniz var mı?
12. Örgüt seviyesinde ölçülebilir hedefleriniz var mı? Performansınızı takip edip raporluyor musunuz?
13. Çalışanlarınızı hangi kriterlere göre seçiyorsunuz?
14. Çalışanlarınızın performansını izliyor musunuz? Ana kriterler nedir?
15. Zaman içinde strateji, hedefler ve performans kriterlerinde değişiklikler oldu mu? Ne gibi?

16. Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanında faaliyet gösteren örgütleri kümelemenizi istesem, bu kümeler ne olurdu, hangi kritere göre?
17. Alanda bu değişiklikler olmadan önce bu kümeler nasıldı?
18. Diğerlerine göre kurumunuz nasıl konumlanmış durumda? Eğitim içeriği, kalitesi, fiyat, faydalanıcıların özellikleri (engelin derecesi, ailenin eğitimi/geliri...)
19. Bu boyutlarda kurumunuz zaman içinde değişti mi? Nasıl, neden?
20. Diğer özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezleriyle ilişkileriniz var mı? Nasıl ilişkiler?
21. Örnek aldığınız kurumlar kimler?
22. Bu alanda rekabet var mı? Kim kimle rekabet ediyor? Ne için? Sizin rakiplerinizi kimler?
23. Gelirlerinin ne kadarı devletten geliyor?
24. Devletin ödediğinin üzerine ek olarak nasıl hizmetler sunuyor? Ücretli, ücretsiz? Ücretleri nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
25. (Eğer bir vakıfa bağlı merkez ise)
 - a) Vakfın gelir kaynakları neler? Zaman içinde gelir portföyü nasıl değişti?
 - b) Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezi kendini kurtarıp vakfa gelir yaratabiliyor mu? Yoksa vakıftan mı fon aktarımı var? Bu zamanla nasıl değişti? Hedef nedir?
26. Bir sosyal girişim olarak, hem sosyal hem finansal hedefleriniz var. Bu hedefler üzerinizde birbiriyle çelişen baskılar yaratıyor mu? Örnek verebilir misiniz? Nasıl başa çıktınız bu durumlarla?
27. Son olarak gelecek planlarınız neler? Büyüme, faaliyetlerin kapsamı, finansal konular...?

Interview Questions for Founders and Board Members (Translated to English)

1. When you look at the historical development of the field of special education and rehabilitation in Turkey, what kinds of changes do you observe? (e.g., number of schools, quality of education, accessibility, price, number of available teachers...)
2. (If not mentioned in the answer to the above question): How do you interpret the legislative changes in 1996 and 2006? What were their causes?
3. Is there much competition in the field? Who competes with whom? For what?
4. If you were to cluster the organizations in special education and rehabilitation field, what would those clusters consist of, according to which criteria?
5. What kind of clusters were there in the field before the changes?
6. How do you think the changes effect the organizations in the field? How did they respond to the changes?

When we look at the history of your organization...

7. How was it founded? By whom, with which specific aim?
8. Which activities did the organization perform in the initial years? Were there any changes across time in the scope of activities?
9. Did the relative importance of some activities increase/decrease over time? (e.g., education, seminars, research, commercial activities...)

Could we now talk a little bit about the management of the organization...?

10. What is the mission of the organization? Have there been any modifications in the mission (either written or unwritten)? Why?
11. What is effectiveness for this organization? When would you deem it as successful?
12. Do you have specific strategic goals? What are they?
13. Did the organizational goals change over time? How?
14. Organizational identity means: "Who we are, what do we do, what are the core values, which adjectives define the organization- what is distinctive about it?" With which adjectives would you define your organizational identity?
15. Do you think there have been changes in organizational identity over time? If so, why?
16. What is the level of bureaucracy in the organization? Do you have many written rules and procedures?

17. Do you have relationships with other SERCs? What kind of relationships?
18. Who are your competitions?
19. Who are your benchmarks?
20. May I want you to rate your organization on following aspects:
 - a) Education quality (1-low, 5-high) (compared to others in the field)
 - b) Originality of the education methods (1- not different, 5- much different)
 - c) Intensity of extra services offered (theatre, music, trips, workshops...etc.)
 - d) Price level (1- low, 5- high)
 - e) The disability level of beneficiaries (1-relatively light, 5-heavy cases)
21. Can we talk more about their details?
 - a) How do you maintain quality in education?
 - b) How do you provide the differentiation of education methods?
 - c) What kinds of extra services do you offer? Which of the are paid services?
 - d) What portion of the revenues come from the state? What is the hourly rate for extra classes? How do you determine these rates?
 - e) Do you consider the level of disability when recording the students?
22. Is this positioning your preference? What factors make you position like this?
23. How was your organization positioned in those dimensions before the changes in the field? How did the changes affect your organization?
24. Did you take any precautions in order to survive? What were they?
25. Can the organization make profits? How did the profitability change over time?
26. (If operated by a foundation)
 - a) What are the revenue sources of the foundation? How did they change in time?
 - b) Can the SERC sustain and create funds for the foundation, or do you transfer funds from the foundation? How did this situation change? What is the target in long run?
27. As a social enterprise, you have both social and financial goals. Do you experience competing demands by those goals? Can you give examples? How do you balance them?
28. Lastly, could you tell me about your future plans?

Interview Questions for Founders and Board Members (Turkish)

1. Türkiye'de özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanının geçmişine baktığınızda, zaman içinde ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlemek mümkün? (örn: kurum sayısı, eğitim seviyesi, erişebilirlik, fiyat, öğretmen sayısı...)
 2. (Önceki sorunun cevabında değinmedi ise) 1996 ve 2006'daki kanun değişikliklerini nasıl yorumluyorsunuz? Ne gibi sonuçlara yol açtı?
 3. Alandaki kurumlar arasında rekabet çok mu? Kim kiminle ne için rekabet ediyor?
 4. Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanında faaliyet gösteren örgütleri kümelemenizi istesem, bu kümeler ne olurdu, hangi kritere göre?
 5. Alandaki değişiklik öncesi nasıl kümeler vardı?
 6. Sizce alandaki değişiklikler genel olarak eski kurumları ne yönde etkiledi? Ve değişikliğe nasıl tepkiler verdiler?
- Sizin kurumunuza bakacak olursak...
7. Nasıl kuruldu? Kimler tarafından, hangi özgün amaç ile?
 8. Kuruluş yıllarında hangi faaliyetler vardı, zaman içinde değişiklik oldu mu?
 9. Önemi artan/azalan faaliyetler oldu mu? (örn; eğitim, seminer, araştırma, ticari...)
- Şimdi, kurumun yönetimi ile ilgili birkaç soru soracağım
10. Kurumun misyonu nedir? Misyonunuzda, yazılı veya yazılı olmayan, değişiklikler oldu mu? Neden?
 11. Bu kurum için "etkin olmak" nedir? (Neleri yapabilirse başarılı olmuş sayılır?)
 12. Belirli stratejik hedefleriniz var mı? Varsa bunlar neler?
 13. Zaman içinde örgütsel hedeflerde değişiklikler oldu mu? Ne gibi değişiklikler?
 14. Örgütsel kimlik kavramı şudur: "biz kimiz? Ne yaparız, temel değerler nelerdir, bizi diğerlerinden ayıran nelerdir?" Kurumunuzun örgütsel kimliğinizi tanımlamanızı istesem, hangi sıfatlarla tanımlarsınız?
 15. Sizce örgütsel kimliğinizde zaman içinde değişiklikler oldu mu? Öyleyse neden?
 16. Kurumda bürokrasi ne seviyede? (çok sayıda yazılı kural ve prosedür var mı?) Bu zaman içinde değişti mi? Neden?
 17. Diğer özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezleriyle ilişkileriniz var mı? Ne tip?
 18. Rakipleriniz kimler?
 19. Örnek aldığınız kurumlar kimler?

20. Kurumunuzu Őu konularda 5 üzerinden notlamanızı istesem
- Verilen eđitim kalitesi (1-düşük, 5-yüksek) (alandak diđer kurumlara göre)
 - Eđitim yöntemlerinin diđer kurumlardan farklılıđı (1- farklı deđil, 5-çok farklı)
 - Farklı ek hizmetler sunulması (tiyatro, müzik, gezi, atölye çalıřmaları...vb)
 - Fiyat seviyesi (1- düşük, 5- yüksek)
 - Faydalanıcıların engel derecesi (1-göreceli olarak hafif, 5-ađır engelli)
21. Bunların detayına bakarsak...
- Eđitimde kaliteyi nasıl sađlıyorsunuz?
 - Eđitim yönteminde farklılařmayı nasıl sađlıyorsunuz?
 - Hangi farklı hizmetleriniz var? Bunlardan hangileri ücretli?
 - Gelirlerinin ne kadarı devletten geliyor? Devletin ödediđi dışında verilen derslerin ücreti ne kadar? Ücretleri nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
 - Öđrenci kabul ederken engelin ađırlık derecesine de bakıyor musunuz?
22. Bu Őekilde konumlanmak özel bir tercih mi? Hangi unsurlar böyle konumlanmanıza yol açıyor?
23. Alandaki deđiřiklik öncesi bu boyutlarda kurumunuz nasıldı? Deđiřiklikler kurumunuzu bu boyutlarda nasıl etkiledi?
24. Kurumun hayatta kalması için stratejik önlemler aldınız mı? Bunlar neler?
25. Kurum kar edebiliyor mu? Karlılık zaman içinde nasıl deđiřti?
26. (Vakıf ise)
- Vakfın gelir kaynakları neler? Zaman içinde gelir portföyü nasıl deđiřti?
 - Kurum kendini kurtarıp vakfa gelir yaratabiliyor mu? Yoksa vakıftan mı fon aktarımı var? Bu zamanla nasıl deđiřti? Hedef nedir?
27. Bu alanda bir kurum olarak, hem sosyal hem finansal hedefleriniz var. Bu hedefler üzerinizde birbiriyle çeliřen baskılar yaratıyor mu? Örnek verebilir misiniz? Nasıl başa çıktınız bu durumlarla?
28. Son olarak gelecek planlarınız ve hedefleriniz neler?

Dataset Requested from the Organizations (English)

(The data was requested for years 2006, 2010 and 2014)

Total number of branches:

(Please answer below questions by considering all branches)

Total number of paid workers:

Total number of volunteer workers:

Total student capacity (as stated in MoE's approval):

Total number of students:

Total number of teachers:

Number of teachers with double majors:

Number of teachers with a graduate degree:

Average years of experience of teachers (in years):

Mark the groups of disability the organizations served

- Mental disability
- Pervasive developmental disorder
- Hearing impairment
- Visual impairment
- Special learning difficulty
- Physically disabled
- Cerebral palsy
- Speech and language difficulties
- Attention deficit and hyperactivity
- Other (please indicate)

Allocation of employees (write numbers in the boxes)

- Special education teacher
- Mentally disabled teacher
- Hearing impairment teacher
- Visual impairment teacher
- Class teacher
- Class teacher with certificate

Child development and education teacher
 Physiotherapist
 Psychologist
 Psychological consultant/ Guidance teacher
 Speech and language difficulties specialist
 Speech and language therapist
 Speech and language pathologist
 Audiology and speech difficulties specialist
 Educational audiologist
 Preschool teacher
 Social services specialist
 Ergo therapist (Occupational therapist)
 Doctor
 Nurse/ Assistant health personnel
 Social services specialist/ Social worker
 Physical education teacher
 Music teacher
 Art teacher
 Education programmer
 Other

Please mark the activities other than education

Art workshops
 Theatre
 Music activities
 Sports activities
 Dance activities
 Other (please indicate)

On average, how many hours of education do you provide for a student in a month, except the mandatory hours?

Please note the hourly price for the mandatory hours if you charge more than what the state pays:

What is the average hourly fee for the extra hours of education provided?

Allocation of the revenues of the special education and rehabilitation center (in percentages)

Education revenues invoiced to the state

Education revenues not invoiced to the state (extra classes, art therapy etc.)

Commercial revenues unrelated to education (other services and products)

Direct donations to the special education and rehabilitation center, sponsorships

(If run by a foundation) Funds transferred by the foundation

Extra services that support special education and rehabilitation

Application of measurement tools aiming at diagnosis

Application of various tests to the children and families

Application of educational diagnosis tools

Keeping records of and following up the students' health

Providing psychological consultancy and guidance services to the families

Application of systematic family education programs

Providing systematic in-service training for the employees

Maintenance of the orthoses, prosthesis, and tools the students use

Application of first aid in cases or emergency

Other.....

Number of students which get services for free from your organization:

Percentage of the students which come from other districts:

Is school bus offered?

If school bus offered, is it a paid service?

Number of in-service trainings organized in the organization (per year)

Seminars organized out of the organization (per year)

A teacher of the organization has on average been sent to a conference/training in another country
for days.

A teacher of the organization has on average been sent to conference/training within the country
for days.

Dataset Requested from the Organizations (Turkish)

The data was requested for years 2006, 2010 and 2014

Toplam şube sayısı:

(Lütfen aşağıdaki soruları tüm şubeleri göz önüne alarak yanıtlayınız)

Toplam ücretli çalışan sayısı:

Toplam gönüllü çalışan sayısı:

Toplam öğrenci kapasitesi (MEBin onayda belirttiği):

Toplam öğrenci sayısı:

Toplam öğretmen sayısı:

Çift anadal yapmış öğretmen sayısı:

Lisansüstü derecesi olan öğretmen sayısı:

Öğretmenlerin ortalama iş tecrübesi (yıl olarak):

Hizmet verilen engel gruplarını işaretleyiniz

Zihin Engelli

Yaygın Gelişimsel Bozukluk

İşitme Engelli

Görme Engelli

Özel Öğrenme Güçlüğü

Bedensel Engelli

SerebralPalsi

Dil Konuşma Güçlüğü

Duygu ve Davranış Bozukluğu

Dikkat Eksikliği ve Hiperaktivite

Diğer (belirtiniz)

Çalışanların dağılımı (kutulara sayı yazınız)

Özel Eğitim Öğretmeni

Zihin Engelliler Öğretmeni

İşitme Engelliler Öğretmeni

Görme Engelliler Öğretmeni

Sınıf Öğretmeni

Sertifikalı Sınıf Öğretmeni
Çocuk Gelişimi Ve Eğitimi Öğretmeni
Fizyoterapist
Psikolog
Psikolojik Danışman/Rehber Öğretmen
Dil ve Konuşma Bozuklukları Uzmanı
Dil ve Konuşma Terapisti
Dil ve Konuşma Patoloğu
Odyoloji ve Konuşma Bozuklukları Uzmanı
Eğitim Odyoloğu
Okul Öncesi Öğretmeni
Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı
Ergoterapist (İş-Uğraşı Terapisti)
Hekim
Hemşire/Yardımcı Sağlık Personeli
Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı / Sosyal Çalışmacı
Beden Eğitimi Öğretmeni
Müzik Öğretmeni
Resim Öğretmeni
Eğitim Programcısı
Diğer

Eğitim dışı aktiviteleri işaretleyiniz

Resim atölyesi
Tiyatro
Müzik faaliyetleri
Spor faaliyetleri
Dans faaliyetleri
Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz)

Zorunlu saatler dışında bir öğrenciye ayda ortalama ne kadar eğitim veriyorsunuz?

Zorunlu saatler için devletin ödediğinin üzerinde bir ücret alıyorsanız saat ücretini belirtiniz:

Verilen ek eğitim saatleri için talep edilen ortalama saat ücreti nedir?

Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezinin gelir kaynaklarının dağılımı (% olarak belirtiniz)

Devlete fatura edilen eğitim gelirleri

Devlete fatura edilmeyen eğitim gelirleri (ek ders, sanat terapisi vb.)

Eğitim ile ilgili olmayan ticari gelirler (dışarıya ürün ve hizmet satışı)

Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezine direkt bağışlar, sponsorluklar

(Vakıf okulu ise) Vakıfça aktarılan fonlar

Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon hizmetlerini destekleyici ek hizmetler

Tanılamaya yönelik ölçme araçlarının uygulanması

Çocuğa ve aileye yönelik çeşitli testlerin uygulanması

Eğitsel tanılama araçlarının uygulanması

Çocukların sağlığıyla ilgili kişisel kayıtların tutulması ve takibi

Ailelere psikolojik danışma ve rehberlik hizmetlerinin sunulması

Sistemli aile eğitimi programlarının uygulanması

Personelin sistemli hizmetiçi eğitimden geçirilmesi

Öğrencilerin kullandığı ortez, protez ve cihazların bakımı

Acil durumlarda ilkyardım uygulamalarının yapılması

Diğer.....

Kurumunuzdan ücretsiz yararlanan öğrenci sayısı:

Kuruma ilçe dışından gelen öğrencilerin yüzdesi:

Servis mevcut mu?

Servis mevcut ise, ücretli mi?

Kurumda düzenlenen hizmet içi öğrenme seminerleri sayısı (yılda)

Kurumun düzenlediği kurum dışı seminer sayısı (yılda)

Kurumda çalışan bir öğretmen, kurumca ortalama gün yurtdışı eğitim/seminere gönderilmiştir

Kurumda çalışan bir öğretmen, kurumca ortalama gün yurtiçi eğitim/seminere gönderilmiştir

Employee Survey Questions (English)

Please forward the survey to the employees who work as a teacher, psychologist or manager in your organization.
Your age:
Education level: High school/University/Master's degree/PhD
The department you graduated from at university:
Your total experience in the field of special education (years):
How long have you been working for this organization?
Your position in the organization:
Teacher/therapist/psychologist
Manager/assistant manager
Other (please indicate)
Are you the owner or a shareholder of the organization? Yes/no
The organizational identity construct, answers questions such as "who are we?", "what does this organization do", "what are its core values?", "what distinguishes from the others?". Please write 3-5 adjectives to define the identity of your organization.
Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally agree)
The organization has a very large number of written rules and procedures except the requirements of the Ministry of Education.
The organization has a very large number of written rules and procedures
The rules and procedures of the organization are accessible to everyone.
There are written job descriptions for most jobs in this organization.
The organization keeps a written record of nearly everyone's job performance.
There is a formal orientation program for the new members of the organization.
Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally agree)
This organization's successes are my successes.
When someone praises this organization, it feels like a personal compliment.
If a story in the media criticized this organization, I would feel embarrassed.
I am very interested in what others think about this organization.
When I talk about this organization, I usually say 'we' rather than 'they'.
When someone criticizes this organization, it feels like a personal insult.
Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally agree)
Our business objectives are driven by student and family satisfaction.
Our competitive advantage is based on understanding student and family needs.
We are committed to serving student and family needs.
Business strategies are driven by the goal of increasing value for students and families.
We frequently measure customer satisfaction.
We pay close attention to our service quality after we register the students.

Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally agree)
This organization addresses an opportunity to make money.
I am personally working in this organization in order to make money.
The shareholders provide financial capital to this organization in order to make money.
Employees work for this organization in order to make money.
The students to be accepted to the organization are selected based on financial gains.
The service providers work with the organization in order to make money.
This organization addresses an opportunity to positively impact society.
I am personally working in this organization in positively impact society.
The shareholders provide financial capital to this organization in order to positively impact society.
Employees work for this organization in order to positively impact society.
The students to be accepted to the organization are selected based on the potential benefit they can get from here.
The service providers work with the organization in order to positively impact society.
Please rate your organization on below statements between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally agree)
The job knowledge and skills of employees to deliver superior quality work and service.
Efforts of the management to measure and track the quality of the work and service.
The recognition and rewards employees receive for the delivery of superior work and service
The overall quality of service provided by your organization.
The leadership shown by management in supporting the service quality effort.
The effectiveness of the communications efforts (to both employees and customers)
Adequacy of the tools, technology, and other resources provided to employees to support the delivery of superior quality work and service?
How is your organization positioned with respect to the average of other organizations in the field on below issues?
Quality of education (1-low, 5-high)
Differentiation of education techniques from other organizations (1- not different, 5- very different)
Variety and intensity of services other than education (theatre, music, trips, workshops...etc.) (1-few, 5- much)
Average price of education in the organization (1- low, 5- high)
Average disability level of the students in the organization (1-relatively light, 5-heavy disabled)
You stated that you have been working in this organization for more than 9 years. We now solicit you to think of the organization in 2006 and the previous years. How was your organization positioned with respect to the average of other organizations in the field on below issues in those years?
Quality of education (1-low, 5-high)

Differentiation of education techniques from other organizations (1- not different, 5- very different)	
Variety and intensity of services other than education (theatre, music, trips, workshops...etc.) (1-few, 5- much)	
Average price of education in the organization (1- low, 5- high)	
Average disability level of the students in the organization (1-relatively light, 5-heavy disabled)	
Thinking of their relative importance in your organizations, please allocate 10 points to each group of four items. (You can assign zero as well)	
-It is important to our organization that:	
legal responsibilities are seriously fulfilled.	
long-term return on investment is maximized.	
we have the possibility to participate in activities that address social issues.	
when securing new business, promises are not made which aren't intended to be fulfilled.	
-Our organization is successful when:	
it is consistently profitable.	
it fulfills its legal obligations.	
it fulfills its ethical and moral responsibilities.	
it fulfills its philanthropic and charitable responsibilities.	
-It is important that the organization is committed to:	
being as profitable as possible.	
addressing societal problems.	
abiding by laws and regulations.	
moral and ethical behavior.	
-It is important to:	
allocate resources on their ability to improve long-term profitability.	
comply with new laws.	
examine regularly new opportunities and programs which can result in an increase in value for society.	
recognize and respect new or evolving ethical/moral norms adopted by society.	
Please rate below item from 1 to 7, such that 1 means the statement on the left is most accurate, 7 means the statement on the right is most accurate.	
Our organization...	
Is very seldom the pioneer organization to introduce new products or services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.	Is very often the pioneer organization to introduce new products or services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.
Typically responds to actions which competitors initiate	Typically initiates actions to which competitors then respond
Is mostly inclined to follow the competitors and the leader when marketing new products and ideas.	Is inclined to be ahead of the competitors and being the pioneer when marketing new products and ideas.

In the past 3 years ...	
Changes in product or service lines have been mostly of minor nature	Changes in product or service have usually been quite dramatic
The organization marketed no new lines of products or services	The organization marketed many new lines of products or services
Top management has preferred emphasizing the marketing of tried and true products or services	Top management has preferred emphasizing R&D, technological leadership, and innovations
In our organization, top management...	
Has a strong proclivity for low risk projects (with normal and certain rates of return)	Has a strong proclivity for high risk projects (with chances of very high returns)
Believes that, owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to proceed via timid, incremental behavior.	Believes that, owing to the nature of the environment, bold, long-term oriented acts are necessary
Typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes preferring a "live-and-let live" posture when making decisions in uncertain environments, in order to reduce the potential loss.	Typically adopts a brave and aggressive posture when making decisions in uncertain environments, in order to reduce the potential loss.

Employee Survey Questions (Turkish)

Lütfen anketi eğitimci, psikolog veya yönetici konumundaki çalışanlara yönlendiriniz.
Yaşınız:
Öğrenim durumunuz: Lise/Üniversite/Yüksek Lisans/Doktora
Üniversiteden mezun olduğunuz bölüm:
Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanındaki toplam tecrübeniz:
Kaç yıldır bu kurumda çalışıyorsunuz?
Kurumdaki göreviniz?
Öğretmen/terapist/psikolog
Müdür/müdür yardımcısı
Diğer (belirtiniz)
Kurumun sahibi veya ortağı mısınız? Evet/hayır
Örgütsel kimlik kavramı, "biz kimiz?", "bu kurum ne yapar", "temel değerleri nelerdir", "onu diğerlerinden ayıran nelerdir?" gibi soruları yanıtlar. Lütfen çalıştığınız kurumun örgütsel kimliğini tanımlayacak sıfatlar yazınız (3-5 tane)
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-tamamen katılıyorum)
Kurumun, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının getirdiği gereklilikler dışında, çok sayıda yazılı kuralı ve prosedürü vardır.
Kurumun çok sayıda yazılı kuralı ve prosedürü vardır.
Kurumun yönetmelikleri ve kuralları herkesin erişimindedir.
Kurumdaki pozisyonların çoğu için yazılı görev tanımları vardır.
Çalışanların çoğunun (ya da hepsinin) performansı yazılı olarak kaydedilir.
İşe yeni başlayanlar için hazırlanmış bir oryantasyon programı vardır.
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-tamamen katılıyorum)
Çalıştığım kurumun başarısını kendi başarım gibi görürüm.
Herhangi bir kişi çalıştığım kurumu övdüğünde, bunu kendime yapılmış bir övgü gibi hissederim.
Medyada çalıştığım kurum ilgili kötü bir haber çıksa üzüntü duyarım.
Başkalarının çalıştığım kurum hakkındaki düşünceleri benim için önemlidir.
Çalıştığım kurumdan bahsederken, "onlar" değil, "biz" diye konuşurum.
Herhangi bir kişi çalıştığım kurumu eleştirdiğinde üzüntü duyarım.
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-tamamen katılıyorum)
Kurumumuzun temel hedefi öğrenci ve aile memnuniyetidir.
Rekabet stratejilerimizin temel hedefi öğrenci ve aile ihtiyaçlarını anlamaktır.
Öğrenci ve aile ihtiyaçlarına hizmet etmeye, kurum olarak kendimizi adanmış durumdayız.
Stratejilerimizi belirlerken, öğrenciler ve aileler için daha değerli hizmetler sunmaya odaklanıyoruz.

Öğrencilerin veya ailelerin bizden ne kadar memnun olduklarını sürekli ve sistematik olarak ölçeriz.
Öğrencinin kayıt işlemi yapıldıktan sonraki süreçte, hizmet kalitemize çok dikkat ederiz.
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-tamamen katılıyorum)
Bu kurum, bir maddi kazanç fırsatını değerlendirme çabasıdır.
Bu kurumda para kazanmak için çalışıyorum.
Kurumun ortak/ortakları bu işe para kazanmak için yatırım yapmaktadır.
Çalışanlar bu kurumda para kazanmak için çalışmaktadır.
Kuruma kabul edilecek öğrenciler, maddi getirileri göz önünde bulundurularak seçilir.
Kurumun hizmet aldığı paydaşlar, para kazanmak için bu kuruluş ile çalışmaktadır.
Bu kuruluş, bir sosyal fayda yaratma fırsatını değerlendirme çabasıdır.
Bu kuruluşta, topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için çalışıyorum.
Kurumun ortak/ortakları bu işe topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için yatırım yapmaktadır.
Çalışanlar bu kurumda topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için çalışmaktadır.
Kuruma kabul edilecek öğrenciler, kurumun onlara sağlayabileceği fayda göz önünde bulundurularak seçilir.
Kurumun hizmet aldığı paydaşlar topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için bu kuruluş ile çalışmaktadır.
Kurumunuzu aşağıdaki konularda, 1 ile 5 arasında notlandırınız. (1-zayıf, 5 - mükemmel)
Çalışanların, yüksek kalitede hizmet sunmak için gerekli olan bilgi ve beceri seviyeleri
Yönetimin, verilen hizmetin kalitesini ölçme ve takip etme çabaları
Çalışanların, üstün hizmet sağladıklarında aldıkları takdir ve ödüller
Kurumun faydalanıcılarına sağladığı hizmetin genel kalitesi
Üst yönetimin, hizmet kalitesi çabalarını desteklemede gösterdiği liderlik
Kurumdaki iletişim çabalarının etkinliği (hem çalışanlar hem faydalanıcılar için)
Çalışanlara, iyi kalitede hizmet üretebilmeleri için sağlanan araçlar, teknolojiler ve diğer kaynakların yeterliliği
Kurumunuz aşağıdaki konularda, alandaki diğer kurumların ortalamasına göre nasıl konumlanmıştır?
Verilen eğitimin kalite seviyesi (1-düşük, 5-yüksek)
Eğitim tekniklerinin diğer kurumlardan farklılaştırılmış oluşu (1-farklı değil, 5-çok farklı)
Eğitim dışı hizmetlerin çeşitliliği ve yoğunluğu (tiyatro, müzik, gezi, atölye çalışmaları...vb) (1-az, 5- çok)
Kurumdaki derslerin ortalama ücreti (1- düşük, 5- yüksek)
Kuruma devam eden öğrencilerin ortalama engel derecesi (1-göreceli olarak hafif, 5-ağır engelli)

Bu kurumda 9 yıldan fazla süredir çalıştığınızı belirttiniz. Şimdi sizden, 1 dakika için, 2006 yılı ve önceki yıllarda kurumu düşünmenizi rica ediyoruz. O yıllarda kurumunuz, aşağıdaki konularda, alandaki diğer kurumların ortalamasına göre nasıl konumlanmıştı? 5 üzerinden notlandırınız.	
Verilen eğitimin kalite seviyesi (1-düşük, 5-yüksek)	
Eğitim tekniklerinin diğer kurumlardan farklılaştırılmış oluşu (1- farklı değil, 5-çok farklı)	
Eğitim dışı hizmetlerin çeşitliliği ve yoğunluğu (tiyatro, müzik, gezi, atölye çalışmaları...vb) (1-az, 5- çok)	
Kurumdaki derslerin ortalama ücreti (1- düşük, 5- yüksek)	
Kuruma devam eden öğrencilerin ortalama engel derecesi (1-göreceli olarak hafif, 5-ağır engelli)	
Aşağıdaki maddelerin çalıştığınız kurum için göreceli önemlerini düşünerek, her dört maddelik gruba toplam 10ar puan olacak şekilde, maddelere puanları paylaşınız. (maddelere sıfır da verebilirsiniz)	
Kurum için şunlar önemlidir:	
Yasal yükümlülüklerin ciddiyetle yerine getirilmesi	
Yapılan yatırımın uzun vadeli ekonomik getirisinin artırılması	
Sosyal sorunlara yönelik faaliyetlere dahil olma imkanımızın olması	
Kurumun yeni bir anlaşma yaparken, yerine getirmeyi düşünmediği sözler vermemesi	
Kurum, şunları yapabilirse başarılı olarak görülür:	
İstikrarlı olarak kar edebilirse	
Yasal yükümlülüklerini yerine getirebilirse	
Etik ve ahlaki sorumluluklarını yerine getirebilirse	
Hayırseverlik ve yardımseverlik sorumluluklarını yerine getirebilirse	
Kurumun, şunlara bağlı kalması önemlidir:	
Mümkün olduğunca karlı olmak	
Sosyal sorunlara hitap etmek	
Kanun ve yönetmeliklere uymak	
Ahlaklı ve etik davranışlar	
Kurumda şu hususlar önemlidir:	
Kaynakları, uzun vadeli karlılığı arttıracak şekilde dağıtmak	
Yeni kanunlara uyum sağlamak	
Sosyal değer yaratabilecek yeni fırsatları ve projeleri incelemek	
Toplumca benimsenen yeni ahlaki/etik normları anlamak ve saygı göstermek	
Aşağıdaki maddelerde, sol taraftaki ifade en doğru ise 1, sağ taraftaki ifade en doğru ise 7 olacak şekilde, 1 ile 7 arasında puan veriniz	
Kurumumuz...	
Çok nadir olarak, yeni ürün/hizmetlerin ve idari/teknik yeniliklerin pazara sunulmasında öncü kurum rolünü üstlenir.	Çok sık olarak, yeni ürün/hizmetlerin ve idari/teknik yeniliklerin pazara sunulmasında öncü kurum rolünü üstlenir.

Genel olarak rakipleri takip eder ve onların hamlelerine cevap verir.	Genel olarak rakiplerin daha sonra takip edeceği, yeni ve öncü uygulamaları başlatır.
Yeni hizmet ve fikirlerin pazara sunumunda, büyük oranda rakipleri ve “lideri” takip etme eğilimindedir.	Yeni hizmet ve fikirlerin pazara sunumunda, büyük oranda rakiplerin önünde, öncü olma eğilimindedir.
Geçmiş üç yılda kurumumuzda...	
Ürün/hizmet bazındaki değişiklikler daha çok ufak çaplı iyileştirmeler şeklinde olmuştur.	Ürün/hizmet bazındaki değişiklikler genellikle büyük çaplı değişimler şeklinde olmuştur.
Hiç yeni ürün/hizmet sunumuna başlanmamıştır.	Çok fazla yeni ürün/hizmet sunumuna başlanmıştır.
Üst yönetim, denenmiş ve başarılı olmuş ürün ve hizmetleri sağlamayı tercih etmiştir.	Üst yönetim, araştırma-geliştirme faaliyetlerine, teknik liderliğe ve yenilikçiliğe önem vermeyi tercih etmiştir.
Kurumumuzda...	
Üst yönetimin düşük riskli (getirisi normal düzeyde ve kesin olan) projelere güçlü bir yatkınlığı vardır.	Üst yönetimin, yüksek riskli (yüksek getiri oranlarını yakalama şansı bulunan) projelere güçlü bir yatkınlığı vardır.
Üst yönetim, en iyi davranış biçiminin faaliyet gösterdiğimiz çevreyle de ilişkili olarak, küçük ve yavaş adımlarla ilerlemek olduğuna inanır.	Üst yönetim, kurum hedeflerine ulaşmak için, faaliyet gösterdiğimiz çevreyle de ilişkili olarak, gözüpek ve uzun vadeli davranışların gerektiğine inanır.
Belirsizlik içeren durumlarda karar verilirken, olası zararı en aza indirmek amacıyla, temkinli, “bekle ve gör” yaklaşımı uygulanır.	Belirsizlik içeren durumlarda karar verilirken, olası yüksek getiriye en üst düzeye çıkarmak amacıyla, cesur ve <u>girişken</u> bir tutum takınılır.

Code List - Field Level

F_beneficiaries_capricious
F_beneficiaries_decreased dependence to SEs
F_beneficiaries_decreasing dependence to SEs_having free alternatives
F_beneficiaries_enlarged pool of beneficiaries
F_beneficiaries_increased mobility
F_beneficiaries_increased mobility_having more alternatives
F_beneficiaries_increased mobility_seeking hope at different orgs
F_beneficiaries_increased mobility_seeking hope in new therapies
F_beneficiaries_increased mobility_transferred with the teachers
F_beneficiaries_less conscious
F_beneficiaries_less conscious_believing in the package
F_beneficiaries_less conscious_families not willing to learn
F_beneficiaries_less conscious_lacking knowledge
F_beneficiaries_less conscious_less attentive to their kids
F_beneficiaries_less ethical_not using state's payment for the kid
F_beneficiaries_less ethical_requesting bribe from SERCs
F_beneficiaries_less ethical_seeking interest through their kids
F_beneficiaries_less willing to contribute_less appreciating the SE
F_beneficiaries_less willing to contribute_less willing to pay/donate
F_beneficiaries_less willing to contribute_less willing to volunteer
F_beneficiaries_less willing to contribute_seeing as public service
F_beneficiaries_more expectations from foundations
F_beneficiaries_more trust to foundations
F_beneficiaries_rich ones choosing luxury centers
F_corruption_bribing officers
F_corruption_fake disabled reports
F_corruption_invoicing without providing service
F_corruption_officials as hidden partners
F_degeneration
F_degeneration_abusing the beneficiaries
F_degeneration_disputes among the orgs
F_degeneration_low legitimacy_decreased respect by officials
F_degeneration_low legitimacy_decreased respect by public
F_degeneration_low legitimacy_decreased trust by the state
F_degeneration_low quality_quality decreasing
F_degeneration_low quality_quality not improving
F_degeneration_low quality_students' info not transferred with them
F_degeneration_no profit opportunity for ethical
F_degeneration_unable to unite for solving problems
F_degeneration_unfair competition
F_fierce sales&marketing_doing families' legal tasks
F_fierce sales&marketing_emphasizing additional therapies
F_fierce sales&marketing_employing sales people
F_fierce sales&marketing_free school bus
F_fierce sales&marketing_offering different activities

F_ fierce sales&marketing_ tea and cookies to families
 F_ increasing number of orgs
 F_ moderator_ corruption common in poor districts
 F_ moderator_ educated families keen on quality
 F_ moderator_ weak institutional infrastructure
 F_ orgs_ big and ambitious orgs
 F_ orgs_ boutique orgs
 F_ orgs_ competitors except SERCs_ health centers
 F_ orgs_ competitors except SERCs_ independent centers
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ competing with quality
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ corporatized
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ elite board
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ keen on PR
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ luxury
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ powerful networks
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ resourceful
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ serve few kids
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ ethical
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ few in number
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ good quality
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ loving the profession
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ social service centered
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ some creating &/transferring knowledge
 F_ orgs_ good orgs_ some lacking managerial capabilities
 F_ pressures_ costs of mimicked acts
 F_ pressures_ decoupling to tailor education
 F_ pressures_ have to mimic some sales&marketing acts
 F_ pressures_ uncertainty
 F_ profit maximizers entering
 F_ profit maximizers_ excessive student per teacher
 F_ profit maximizers_ founders lacking knowledge
 F_ profit maximizers_ founders unrelated to the field
 F_ profit maximizers_ low quality
 F_ profit maximizers_ many founders unethical
 F_ profit maximizers_ non-qualified employees
 F_ profit maximizers_ not caring about impact
 F_ profit maximizers_ not competing on quality
 F_ profit maximizers_ not investing in quality
 F_ profit maximizers_ not proctoring the employees
 F_ profit maximizers_ seeing the disabled as commodity
 F_ profit maximizers_ some engaged in corruption
 F_ profit maximizers_ some weakly managed
 F_ SEs financially troubled
 F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ approaching to students of other SERCs
 F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ causing legal trouble for the competitors
 F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ not deleting records to prevent transfer
 F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ transferring teachers for their students

F_unethical cost reduction_ heavy cases not accepted
 F_unethical cost reduction_ merging classes to reduce cost
 F_unethical cost reduction_ paying less employee tax
 F_unethical sales acts_ bribing families
 F_unethical sales acts_ lying to the families
 F_unethical sales acts_ making deals with doctors
 F_unethical sales acts_ offering more hours (with no quality)
 F_unethical sales acts_ salesforce waiting at hospitals & schools
 F_workforce_ decreased idealism
 F_workforce_ decreased idealism_ individuals with improper traits joining
 F_workforce_ decreased idealism_ money main concern
 F_workforce_ decreased idealism_ unwilling to add more value
 F_workforce_ decreased idealism_ unwilling to learn more
 F_workforce_ decreased idealism_ unwilling to put effort
 F_workforce_ increased mobility
 F_workforce_ increased mobility_ enlarged pool of employers
 F_workforce_ increased mobility_ themselves opening SERCs
 F_workforce_ increased mobility_ transferred to SERCs paying slightly more
 F_workforce_ increased mobility_ transfers to state schools
 F_workforce_ increased mobility_ unwilling to sign special contracts
 F_workforce_ job becoming popular
 F_workforce_ job becoming popular_ increased scarcity of specialists
 F_workforce_ job becoming popular_ increasing wages
 Macro_ country getting poorer
 Macro_ donations becoming success based
 Macro_ funds more based on projects
 Macro_ general poor management of the country
 Macro_ increase in the number of NGOs
 Macro_ increased acceptance of the disabled in society
 Macro_ people becoming less sensitive
 Macro_ technological developments
 Macro_ unethical NGOs reducing others' legitimacy
 state_ "deterrence policy"
 state_ being abused
 state_ decreasing payments per hour
 state_ delaying payments
 state_ excluding the SEs
 State_ fast changing regulations
 state_ GRCs and hospitals functioning poorly
 state_ hard physical standards
 state_ increasing bureaucracy
 state_ inspections not effective
 state_ irrational new inspections
 state_ making unfair cuts
 State_ new authorities less responsive
 state_ not favoring SEs over merchants
 state_ poor mentality regarding disabled

state_ poor planning on raising teachers
state_ regulations limiting SEs discretion
state_ unfair pricing (serc vs health center)

Code List- Organizational Level

- O_ Activity_ awareness raising activities
- O_ Activity_ contributing to scientific studies
- O_ Activity_ defending rights
- O_ Activity_ developing education methods & devices
- O_ Activity_ education & rehabilitation to families
- O_ Activity_ financial aid to the public school
- O_ Activity_ fundraising through concerts, kermes
- O_ Activity_ influencing lawmakers
- O_ Activity_ inspection of kids by SERC's doctors
- O_ Activity_ mobilizing state with new projects
- O_ Activity_ no social activities (intentional)
- O_ Activity_ organizing conferences
- O_ Activity_ publications
- O_ Activity_ raising teachers to the field
- O_ Activity_ social activities for the students
- O_ Activity_ teaching work skills to the disabled
- O_ Activity_ transferring its knowledge to other actors
- O_ Activity_ transferring knowledge from abroad
- O_ belief_ "people want to exploit us"
- O_ belief_ "state is exploiting us"
- O_ belief_ concern for control
- O_ belief_ not feasible to invest
- O_ belief_ we help to whoever "comes and asks for"
- O_ belief_ we should have better quality than FPs
- O_ belief_ you cannot corporatize in this field
- O_ beneficiaries_ many heavy cases
- O_ beneficiaries_ poor
- O_ BoD_ disabled families not wanted
- O_ BoD_ from HNW individuals
- O_ BoD_ from low-ego people
- O_ BoD_ not willing to step back
- O_ BoD_ seeing their position as a rank
- O_ BoD_ willing to do everything themselves
- O_ change_ corporatization
- O_ change_ creating central authority
- O_ change_ emphasis to efficiency
- O_ change_ enlarging revenue stream_ commercial products
- O_ change_ increased emphasis to PR
- O_ change_ increasing prices

- O _ change _ reserved capacity for high payers
- O _ change _ sustainability orientation
- O _ effects felt _ costs of non-mimicking unethical acts
- O _ effects felt _ decreased donations
- O _ effects felt _ decreasing profits
- O _ effects felt _ decreasing quality
- O _ effects felt _ decreasing revenues
- O _ effects felt _ decreasing students
- O _ effects felt _ increased financial concerns
- O _ effects felt _ increasing demand
- O _ effects felt _ not effected by market forces
- O _ effects felt _ poor financial situation
- O _ effects felt _ time lost on false claims
- O _ effects felt _ unable to be selective on specialists
- O _ effects felt _ unable to buy teaching material
- O _ effects felt _ unable to compete
- O _ effects felt _ unable to find specialists
- O _ effects felt _ unable to increase teacher per student
- O _ effects felt _ unable to invest in new methods
- O _ effects felt _ unable to retain employees
- O _ effects _ other _ time lost on red-tape
- O _ founders _ altruistic
- O _ founders _ ambitious
- O _ founders _ catching opportunities
- O _ founders _ decreased engagement of BoD
- O _ founders _ decreased engagement _ engaging in other business
- O _ founders _ decreased engagement _ seeking different role in the system
- O _ founders _ emotion _ anger to degeneration
- O _ founders _ emotion _ hopeless
- O _ founders _ emotion _ resentment
- O _ founders _ emotion _ stressed
- O _ founders _ emotion _ tired
- O _ founders _ escalation of commitment
- O _ founders _ having secured their kids
- O _ founders _ leader
- O _ founders _ limited time new projects
- O _ founders _ loving kids
- O _ founders _ no managerial work delegation
- O _ founders _ no skill in other business
- O _ founders _ professional orientation
- O _ founders _ putting realistic goals
- O _ founders _ respect for the profession
- O _ founders _ risk taker
- O _ founders _ sacrifice and dedication of BoD
- O _ founders _ self-rehabilitation
- O _ founders _ sustained engagement
- O _ history _ operational mistakes

- O_history_ arbitrary acts of branches
- O_history_ board arrangement for resources
- O_history_ closing branch/es
- O_history_ disputes with state during collaboration
- O_history_ fail to do PR
- O_history_ fail to invest in survival
- O_history_ foreign funds
- O_history_ founders' kids growing
- O_history_ high quality
- O_history_ loss from operational mistakes
- O_history_ no managerial knowledge
- O_history_ separating from drifted partner
- O_history_ timely precautions
- O_identity_ "halk cocugu"
- O_identity_ altruism
- O_identity_ continuous development
- O_identity_ creating holistic solutions
- O_identity_ democratic
- O_identity_ developing the employees
- O_identity_ dignity
- O_identity_ door open to everyone
- O_identity_ exemplar organization
- O_identity_ family-like
- O_identity_ hardworking
- O_identity_ high quality education
- O_identity_ including the poor
- O_identity_ innovative
- O_identity_ leader
- O_identity_ long-suffering (cefakar)
- O_identity_ no profit aim
- O_identity_ pioneer
- O_identity_ profit aim secondary
- O_identity_ scientific orientation
- O_identity_ secular
- O_identity_ selective
- O_identity_ self-sustainable
- O_identity_ specialization
- O_identity_ strong
- O_identity_ tender to families
- O_identity_ tender to the kids
- O_identity_ trusted
- O_identity_ universalism
- O_identity_ valuing employees
- O_identity_ valuing families
- O_identity_ volunteer based
- O_mission_ being a highly reputable org
- O_mission_ being an exemplar org

- _mission_ caring for the disabled who lost parents
- _mission_ changing the perception of the society on mentally disabled
- _mission_ doing R&D
- _mission_ doing scientific research
- _mission_ enlighten families
- _mission_ guiding the state to solve problems
- _mission_ helping the kids
- _mission_ integrating the disabled to the society
- _mission_ making the students happy
- _mission_ preventing the occurrence of disability
- _mission_ providing best service
- _mission_ providing early education
- _mission_ providing good service
- _mission_ providing jobs for the disabled
- _mission_ psychological support to family
- _mission_ raising teachers to the field
- _mission_ reaching the most disadvantaged
- _mission_ supporting scientific research
- _moderator_ region's economic condition
- _moderator_ savings of founder
- _price_ flexible
- _price_ free extra classes to the poor
- _price_ free full time education to the poor
- _price_ high
- _price_ low
- _price_ moderate
- _quality_ coordinating with the teachers at schools
- _quality_ coordination btw teachers
- _quality_ external evaluation
- _quality_ feedback from families
- _quality_ high
- _quality_ moderate
- _quality_ tracking performance
- _reaction_ adding new therapies
- _reaction_ cancel a therapy (no specialist)
- _reaction_ cutting operating expenses
- _reaction_ decreasing employee trainings
- _reaction_ decreasing free complementary therapies
- _reaction_ decreasing free education to the poor
- _reaction_ decreasing research
- _reaction_ decreasing social activities
- _reaction_ doing families' legal tasks
- _reaction_ eliminating heavy disabled
- _reaction_ employee contracts banning student transfer
- _reaction_ extensively using volunteers
- _reaction_ firm founding association
- _reaction_ forming collaboration groups

- _ reaction_ merging classes to reduce transport cost
- _ reaction_ mission change_ being a model
- _ reaction_ mission change_ high quality to moderate quality
- _ reaction_ mission change_ many branches to one branch
- _ reaction_ mission change_ no more R&D
- _ reaction_ new fundraising tech_ project grants
- _ reaction_ new fundraising tech_ public donation campaigns
- _ reaction_ offering new services
- _ reaction_ paying below market wages
- _ reaction_ quit by bankrupt
- _ reaction_ quit voluntarily
- _ reaction_ recruiting employees who will do extra tasks
- _ reaction_ seizing_ closing branch/es
- _ reaction_ seizing_ decreasing # of employees
- _ reaction_ stop organizing conferences
- _ reaction_ suspending growth
- _ Reason of birth_ earn money & social good
- _ Reason of birth_ helping kids and families
- _ Reason of birth_ no good place to send founder/s' kid
- _ Reason of birth_ no place to send founder/s' kid
- _ Reason of birth_ seeing the need
- _ role_ example for the region
- _ role_ leader in the region
- _ role_ raising quality in its region
- _ strategy_ acts to increase employee identification
- _ strategy_ continuous development
- _ strategy_ engaging the families
- _ strategy_ follow ups to donors
- _ strategy_ high quality with manageable size
- _ strategy_ investing in employees
- _ strategy_ no competition orientation
- _ strategy_ selecting attentive families
- _ strategy_ selecting employees open to feedback
- _ strategy_ selecting idealist employees
- _ strategy_ selecting presentable employees
- _ strategy_ selecting qualified employees
- _ strctr_ control mechanisms for branches
- _ strctr_ corporatized
- _ strctr_ internal regulations
- _ strctr_ no internal regulations
- _ strctr_ no professional staff
- _ strctr_ not corporatized
- _ strctr_ professional management
- _ strength_ ability to find sponsors for social activities
- _ strength_ collecting donations without permission
- _ strength_ differentiated methods
- _ strength_ excess demand

- strength expertise
- strength extensive socialization for students
- strength founders as example to the employees
- strength good hearted employees
- strength good reputation
- strength having commercial knowledge
- strength high attention to kids
- strength high teacher/student ratio
- strength low employee turnover
- strength preferred over other employers
- strength superior facilities
- strength teachers going home when necessary
- strength technical knowledge
- strength trusted by employees
- strength wide vision
- unable to realize new projects
- weakness aging BoD
- weakness disputes within the board
- weakness inertia
- weakness late for precautions
- weakness no commercial knowledge
- weakness no effective communication to donors
- weakness no grants due to firm status
- weakness no tax exemption status
- weakness no tight connections to HNW people
- weakness no transport offered
- weakness non-idealist employees
- weakness retiring into itself
- weakness supporters losing economic power
- weakness unable to catch technology
- weakness unable to raise funds
- weakness unfaithful employees

Coding Example

Sub-codes of the higher-order code named “decreased idealism”

The Code	Code Definition	Example Quotations
Unwilling to put effort	Statements declaring that the employees refrain from putting effort during work.	"I know so many people, who locate the kid to a (practice) tool, open their laptop, then facebook" "Deterioration of human quality...The desire of the workforce to earn money without putting effort" "Now, the precious ones are very few; they are like students. They pass to another room during their class hour, playing with their phones, gossips..."
Unwilling to add more value	Statements declaring that employees are less willing to do a task in the best way.	"You need to do this to them (the teachers); there should always be someone proctoring them, directing them, telling them "do this like that, do that like that" "There was an excitement as perhaps "I should do the best." Now, it is not like that. Now, there are so many organizations that, they (employees) think like "if they don't want me here, I can go find a job wherever I want tomorrow.""
Unwilling to learn more	Statements about the decreased willingness of employees on professional development.	"We used to organize summer schools. The apprentices did not go in the summer and worked with us. "Let's work there, be with more number of students, learn some things." This was their concern. We used work with them in the summer, with the youth, with the students. I mean, the ideals were different; they were more ambitious, more willing to develop themselves.
Money main concern	Statements on the increased importance of financial gain to the workforce, rather than the altruistic or professional motivations	"Teachers started to transfer to whoever pays more. You start with a teacher, you work for 3 months, after 3 months another center pays more, and the teacher can leave within 3 months. S/he does not care; there is no such thing as "I have responsibility here." There has been such a reflection." "I get angry on the phone; s/he asks "how much will you pay me?" yet on the phone. I ask "did you ever heard of our organization?". S/he says "No, I didn't." S/he makes a job application, but has not done any inquiry about the organization. His/her only concern is how much it pays.
Individuals with improper traits joining	Statements on the entrance of individuals to the field with personal characteristics incompatible with the job	Firstly, working with disabled people is a special thing. I mean it requires some personality traits. As there is scarcity of specialists in Turkey, and as those specialists find jobs easily, some university students (candidates) show a high demand for it. I mean they enter the departments with high scores etc. Because, there is no problem of unemployment. For that reason, sometimes their characteristics do not match (with the job). When I entered this field years ago, the people with more compatible characteristics used to prefer it. Because it was not a field with much job opportunity.

