

A CATEGORIZATION OF STATE-NGO RELATIONSHIPS IN  
HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY:  
THE CASE OF IHH IN THE PHILIPPINE PEACE PROCESS

by

AHMET FARUK DEMİRCİOĞLU


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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### A CATEGORIZATION OF STATE-NGO RELATIONSHIPS IN HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IHH IN THE PHILIPPINE PEACE PROCESS

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**Keywords:** Nongovernmental Organizations, Humanitarian Diplomacy, Track 1.5

Diplomacy, Turkey, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation

This study aims to explore the various patterns of relationships IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation developed with the Turkish state during IHH's involvement in the Philippine (Mindanao) Peace Process as a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team. This research puts forward a new categorization model for the study of NGO-state relationships. The threefold categorization model that is suggested by Cooper & Hocking (2000) -which consists of Agent, Joint Manager, and Kickstarter patterns- is expanded upon with two additional categories that are suggested by the author of this thesis. Semi-structured interviews with various IHH executives provided the data for this research. This thesis found that although the Agent pattern of relationship is absent in the Philippine case, other forms of cooperative relationships, namely the Joint Manager, and the Kickstarter, do exist. Moreover, IHH is found to establish two distinct patterns of relationships with the Turkish state that lie outside of the threefold categorization of Agent, Joint Manager and Kickstarter as a consequence of the civil society culture of Turkey. These two distinct patterns of relationships are identified in this study as Stakeholder, and Representative.

## ÖZET

### İNSANİ DİPLOMASİDE DEVLET-STK İLİŞKİSİNİN BİR SINIFLANDIRMASI: FİLİPİNLER BARIŞ SÜRECİNDE İHH ÖRNEĞİ

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**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, İnsani Diplomasi, Track 1.5 Diplomasi,  
Türkiye, İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı

Bu çalışma, Bağımsız Gözlemci Heyetinin bir üyesi olarak Filipinler (Mindanao) Barış Süreci'ne dahil bulunan İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı'nın bu süreçte Türk Devleti ile geliştirdiği ilişki biçimlerini araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu çalışma, STK-Devlet ilişkileri için Cooper & Hocking'in (2000) önerdiği üçlü kategorilendirme biçimini iki yeni kategori ile geliştirerek, STK-devlet ilişkisi çalışmalarına *beşli kategorilendirme modelini* teklif etmektedir. İHH'nın farklı seviyelerden yürütücüleri ile yapılmış olan yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar bu araştırmanın temel verisini oluşturmaktadır. Bu tez, Filipinler örneğinde *Vekil* (agent) ilişki şeklinin mevcut olmamasına rağmen, diğer işbirliği türlerinin, yani *Ortak Yönetici* (joint manager) ve *Harekete Geçirici* (kick-starter), var olduğunu bulmuştur. Buna ek olarak, İHH'nın Türkiye Devleti ile Türkiye'nin sivil toplum kültüründen doğan farklı ilişki biçimleri geliştirdiği görüşmüştür. Bu farklı roller bu çalışmada *Paydaş* (stakeholder) ve *Temsilci* (representative) olarak tanımlanmıştır.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD:	The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (of Turkey)
ARMM:	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
CAB:	Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
FAB:	Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro
GPH:	The Government of the Philippines
ICG:	International Contact Group
IDB:	The Independent Decommissioning Body
IHH:	IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IMT:	International Monitoring Team
iNGO:	International Non Governmental Organization
MILF:	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF:	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD:	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
NGO:	Non Governmental Organization
OIC:	The Organization of the Islamic Conference, <i>and as later renamed</i> The Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPAPP:	The Philippine Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process
TIKA:	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TPMT:	The Third Party Monitoring Team
UN:	The United Nations
YTB:	The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

# CHAPTER 1

## RESEARCH DESIGN

---

### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1. Summary

The Southern Philippine Island of Mindanao has been the scene of separatist insurgencies for five decades. The government had engaged in mediated negotiations with the two main insurgent movements of the region, namely the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, during different time periods and consequently signed agreements with both. Although the implementation of the agreements has been problematic, the Mindanao peace process of the Philippines is a significant case in that the parties of the conflict have preferred diplomatic interactions instead of armed struggle as the primary means of peacemaking.

The Mindanao conflict provides a fruitful example for third party involvement in peace processes. The negotiations have been mediated by multiple third parties, and the implementation has been closely monitored by international governmental and nongovernmental actors. It is one of the examples in which civilian humanitarian actors have engaged in official diplomacy together with grassroots peacebuilding.

The literature on peacebuilding suggests that NGOs have advantages over states on conflicts in which (1) one of the parties is an insurgent group and hence harder to access through diplomatic means, (2) the process requires persistence and presence in the field, (3) the active fighting is over and establishment of long term positive peace is on the agenda.

Nonetheless, scholars also add that NGO involvement must be accompanied by official diplomacy in order to be effective. Although the literature acknowledges that NGO diplomacy and state diplomacy must go hand in hand, the various forms such a

relationship can assume has not been studied adequately. A study of the NGO involvement in the Mindanao peace process might enable us to explore unconventional ties between NGOs and, what I would call, their ‘home states’, in other words the states on which they are based.

Against this background, this study aims to explore the agency of NGOs during peace processes and their effect on the making of the foreign policy of their home state. To this end, the question ‘why and through which channels do NGOs become officially involved in peace processes’ will be discussed through an analysis of the relevant literature.

For the purposes of this research, the involvement of IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation -a Turkey-based Humanitarian NGO- in the Mindanao peace process and its effects on Turkish foreign policy will be examined.

## **1.2. Context: Changing Conflicts**

The face of conflicts has changed significantly with the end of the Cold War. The increase in number of weak states and the subsequent power vacuum, paved the way for effective insurgencies (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 6). Consequently, intrastate conflicts replaced the destructive interstate clashes of the past centuries (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, pp. 86-87; Helgesen, 2007, p. 6) not only in frequency but also in terms of causalities and duration (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 75) In addition, the rapid globalization that followed the Cold War engendered new substate actors with global connections and capacities such as Al-Qaeda.

The proliferation of intrastate conflicts made the guerilla warfare a dominant tactic of violent conflict. As a consequence the once well defined line between combatant and civilian as well as battlefield and settlement has become blurred, resulting in a devastation of all aspects of civilian life.

The transformation of conflicts, destruction of civilian life and introduction of new sub-national actors with global contacts necessitated new strategies for conflict resolution. The conventional diplomatic efforts of peace building that consists of state level official involvement have proven inadequate on various long-standing insurgencies, as the new type of conflicts requires a multifaceted involvement for conflict resolution (De Vries & Maoz, 2013, p. 63; Fisher, 1989; Richmond, 2003, p. 2; Saunders, 1996). Accordingly, the conventional diplomats stretched their boundaries to

involve activities that had so far been regarded outside of the culture of diplomacy (Chataway, 1998, p. 271).

Likewise, the United Nations (UN) embraced a new multifaceted and multifunctional approach to peacekeeping after 1989, changing its traditional peacekeeping operations that were in effect between 1948-1988 (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 106). With this new approach the UN assumed new roles that it had not assumed before, e.g. public information and electoral supervision (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 106), and commissioned various roles (such as monitoring, mediation, and facilitation) to different actors such as Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and ad hoc committees.

States also adopted their foreign policies in a way to include a spectrum of new tools and actors. To express this diversity of actors, the then-Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu wrote,

Turkey's understanding of humanitarian diplomacy is multifaceted and multi-channelled; there have been contributions from several of Turkey's public institutions and NGOs, ranging from Turkish Airlines to TIKA, Kızılay [Red Crescent], TOKI and AFAD (Emergency Disaster Management Presidency) (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 867).

Official diplomats, however, didn't immediately welcome the introduction of new actors and levels to the scene of diplomatic affairs. Research by Cynthia Chataway shows that the initial reaction of conventional diplomats to the new actors of diplomacy was based on distrust on the competence and intention of the actors, accompanied by a fear of losing control of the diplomatic process due to the involvement of outsiders. However, since then, diplomacy evolved in such a way that multiple actors and different levels are often seen necessary for a successful diplomatic process (Chataway, 1998, pp. 271-272).

In the last two decades nongovernmental organizations have come forward as effective actors of diplomacy due to their access to conflict zones and conflicting parties (Branco, 2011, p. 79; Richmond, 2003, p. 1). Not only they assumed complementary roles along with the traditional actors of peacekeeping but they also enabled new forms of long-term conflict resolution mechanisms (Richmond, 2003, p. 1). NGOs are operating in numerous conflict prone areas; interact with victims of conflicts, claim neutrality and impartiality while operating in state/insurgent-controlled conflict zones. NGOs have been gradually assuming diplomatic roles in line with the multiplication of

the functions they fulfill in conflict zones. Now a one-dimensional role that only includes humanitarian aid is inadequate and unsustainable for humanitarian civil actors in ameliorating the living conditions of the recipients of humanitarian aid.

These relatively young institutions of international affairs find themselves more and more in the realm diplomacy. It is not unusual to see an NGO negotiating with parties of a conflict (state or non-state) for hostages, for accessing to certain zones, for implementation of certain humanitarian policies and so on. The increasing roles of NGOs in conflict zones as opposed to the static and limited nature of the conventional diplomatic actors enabled us to re-imagine NGOs as the new actors of conflict resolution. Insomuch that, the scholars argue that the NGOs can play certain roles that are not available to states (Richmond, 2003, p. 1).

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1. Multi-track Diplomacy: The New Actors of Changing Conflicts**

Scholars have identified different tracks of diplomacy in order to differentiate between actors and roles in international relations. In the scholarly jargon Track-one diplomacy refers to the official diplomacy that is conducted by state actors (Lerche & Said, 1979), while Track-two diplomacy refers to the unofficial diplomacy of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, companies or persons. Track-two diplomacy, although classified as a form of diplomacy, not necessarily consists of actions that are done with diplomatic intentions. As Graham and Kelley suggests, any event that open up or facilitate new ways of communication between the parties is a part of Track-two diplomacy (Graham & Kelley, 2009, p. 82). One of the key differences between Track-one and -two diplomacies is that while the former is constrained with diplomatic rules of engagement the latter operates in a freer environment that provides it with more room for maneuver. A famous example of track-two diplomacy, for example, is the visit of the US Ping-Pong team to China on April 1971. The trip that took place at a time when US-China relations are tense and the Chinese borders are impassable by the US citizens, eased the tensions between the countries, opened up new ways of communication including US presidential-level visit to China (Graham & Kelley, 2009, p. 83). Nonetheless, the research on track-two diplomacy focuses

overwhelmingly on intentional grassroots efforts by specialized actors. These efforts include focus groups, conferences and seminars, public forums and so on.

Apart from Track-one and -two, scholars also identified a Track-three diplomacy, which is different from the first two tracks in that it takes place in societal level without the involvement of any decision-making or public-opinion-shaping institution or people. This form of diplomacy is also referred to as Public Diplomacy (Graham & Kelley, 2009, p. 86).

All the diplomatic conducts, however, are not confined within three tracks of diplomacy. There are activities that fall in between categories. For that reason the tracks of diplomacy are better understood as a continuous scale, which allows middle ranges in terms of actors and methods. A widely recognized middle range of diplomacy is termed as Track 1.5 Diplomacy. This type of diplomacy includes features of both the Track-one and -two diplomacies: it resembles Track-one by being an official diplomatic effort and hence following diplomatic protocols, however it is carried out by non-governmental actors as in Track-two diplomacy (Branco, 2011, p. 81).

The tracks of diplomacy do not only refer to the agents but also the methods used by the agents (Chataway, 1998, p. 270; De Vries & Maoz, 2013, p. 62). For example when one talks about track-one diplomacy one usually does not only refer to the involvement official agents but also to official meetings, conventional diplomacy and mediation. Likewise when one mentions track-two diplomacy one usually talks about informal meetings, focus groups, round table discussions and other prevalent methods used by unofficial actors.

Track-one diplomacy is usually associated with a coercive or directive power, a power stems from the leverage of a state, while track-two diplomacy is associated with facilitative power. When non-governmental organizations are involved in diplomacy they do not have any coercive power so they aim to open the channels of dialogue and facilitate the understanding of the actors the interests and needs of the other. Studies suggest that a successful third party intervention involves different actors playing different roles, i.e. facilitative and coercive roles, separately (Chataway, 1998, p. 283).

However the roles defined for official and unofficial actors are not very definitive and vary from time to time. While this thesis will talk about non-governmental actors of diplomacy it won't limit their roles to track-two diplomacy and will acknowledge the possibility of wide variety of roles official and unofficial alike.

The ‘tracks of diplomacy’ is not the only tool of classification. Scholars also use another classification to point out the differences in the conduct of diplomacy: Low Level vs. High Level Diplomacy. The former refers to grassroots interactions while the latter refers to the official diplomacy (Aras & Akpınar, 2015; Spencer, 1998). While the ‘levels of diplomacy’ classification provides a simple tool based on the type of involvement, the ‘tracks of diplomacy’ classification makes a clearer distinction on the basis of actors of diplomacy.

But notwithstanding, both classifications have the risk of misleading the researcher to overlook the different forms that a relationship between the different levels of conducts and actors can take. The classifications might blind us to possibilities such that a track-1.5 agent can unintentionally represent the official diplomacy of its home state although its decision-making mechanism is independent from the state, or that a track-two agent can create new avenues of official involvement for its home state while operating at the grassroots level. To be sure, although the classifications of diplomacy are useful analytical tools, they present a danger of preventing us from observing the ties between official and unofficial diplomacy as well as public and private agents.

## **2.2. Why Single Track Is Not Enough?**

Before going through a study of NGO-state relationships in peace processes, it is necessary to understand why have unofficial actors, especially NGOs, gained importance in peace processes. For this purpose, the factors that cause a shift of preference from the official actors to unofficial ones in peace processes will be analyzed. Furthermore, the limits of NGOs will also be studied to illustrate that NGOs are unlikely to be the sole actors of conflict resolution and that involvement of various level actors in peace processes is needed for a successful resolution.

### **2.2.1 The issues that favor nongovernmental actors**

The literature on peace processes has identified several issues that favor nongovernmental actors over official ones as third parties. These issues can be summarized as following:

### *Sovereignty*

The main concern that rises with track-one mediation between a state and non-state actor is that sovereign states are reluctant to involve other states in their domestic affairs (Rupesinghe, 1998, p. 170). When a state is in conflict with an insurgent group, involving a third party state as mediator might entail limiting the sovereignty of the state in which the conflict takes place. Involving a supranational entity, on the other hand, simply might not be favorable, for it might result in internationally binding consequences for the state. Höglund & Svensson (2009, p. 181), for example, argued that in the case of Norway's mediation in Sri Lankan conflict although the government agreed on a state mediator in order to accommodate insurgents' demand for official involvement, a "... *more high-stake involvement*, such as by the UN, would be unacceptable for the government side. (*Emphasis added*)"

The conventional approach to international relations that holds state sovereignty as the highest principle makes it nearly impossible for states to access conflict zones where they are not wanted. Only with the development of Humanitarian Intervention regime, which also holds human security important along with the traditional notion of state security (Richmond, 2003, p. 6), did international organizations and coalitions start to be able to break this barrier. However, the involvement of third party states still heavily relies on the consent of the state that is having the conflict. Vidar Helgesen (2007, p. 7), the former Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed the ineffectiveness caused by the sovereignty and non-interference principles, stating, "The very same principles and practices that had been designed to prevent conflict *between* states, rendered the international community ineffective in preventing conflict *within* states."

As opposed to states, NGOs do not pose a threat to state sovereignty, as they are not sovereign actors of international relations. Therefore it is easier for a state to grant access to NGOs rather than official actors, when there is a concern about sovereignty. Furthermore, NGOs also enjoy a greater flexibility in accessing the countries where they are not welcomed. The international humanitarian law (e.g. UN resolution 688) has established the legal basis for NGOs to operate under unfriendly conditions (Richmond, 2003, p. 4). NGOs have the legitimacy under the international law to provide assistance and humanitarian aid without the consent of the state if they are invited by a group of residents of the country (Rupesinghe, 1998, p. 170). With the establishment of international NGO rights, Peter Willets indicates, "NGOs can often gain access to



intergovernmental proceedings even when the political climate turns against them” (Willets, 2000, p. 205).

### *Presence in the Field*

The first step towards third party involvement in a peace process is trust building, as parties only nominate or accept mediators who they know and trust. Consequently, being out in the field increases the chances for a third party to get appointed as mediator, since daily interactions and continuous dialogue are effective ways for building rapport and trust.

For states, maintaining such a presence in conflict zones is costly, dangerous, and not desired due to sovereignty concerns mentioned above. NGOs, on the other hand, can easily maintain presence in the field through humanitarian activities even before undertaking any role in peacebuilding.

### *Access to the Conflicting Parties*

The formal conduct and regulations of diplomacy prevent official actors from accessing crucial information and network in conflict zones that are accessible to agents that act in the grassroots level (Chataway, 1998, p. 272). The official label that follows diplomats throughout their employment prevents them from getting involved in creative and unrestricted dialogue (Chataway, 1998, p. 274).

Being in the field as unofficial actors, NGOs have a greater advantage in accessing all parties of the conflict (Aall, 1996, p. 434; Richmond, 2003, p. 5; Rupesinghe, 1998, p. 171). In his article on NGOs in Algerian Conflict, Kumar Rupesinghe argues that the advantage of presence and access of NGOs over the track-one actors enables them to build trust with insurgencies easier than the track-one actors. However, the advantage is reversed when it comes to building trust with the government side. In that case, NGOs face greater difficulties proving themselves trustworthy. Accordingly, Rupesinghe (1998, p. 171) asserts that the best way to reach out to all the conflicting parties is cooperation between track-one actors and NGOs.

### *The Cost of Having a Mediator*

State mediation comes with a price. The literature on mediation suggests that the motive of the mediators is to advance their interests. For instance, Mitchell (1988) and Touval & Zartman (2001) establish in their seminal works that the mediators act for

political profit. Höglund & Svensson (2009, p. 176) writes, "... states ... basically pursue mediation as a policy tool for the advancement of specific interests." Still more, Touval (2003, p. 92) suggests that mediation is in fact a foreign policy tool for states and the success of state mediators should be assessed not only by their effectiveness in conflict resolution but also how they profited from it in terms of domestic and foreign policy.

That being said, the motives of mediators are not always clear to outside observers. There are many ways a state mediator can profit from mediation. To illustrate, third party state involvement in a peace process might result in strengthening the hand of the mediator state in future diplomatic exchanges. Likewise, the third party state might profit from its involvement by establishing an area of influence within the state that is having conflict. Owing to the fact that state mediation might come with a price, single-track mediators might not be desired in state-versus-insurgent conflicts.

The obscurity of objectives is likewise an issue for NGO mediation. The motives of NGOs are not clear to scholars as well as outsiders (Richmond, 2003, p. 4). However, the leverage an NGO might gain through mediation is most certainly no match for the leverage a state might gain.

### *Being in the Spotlight*

Involving a state or a supranational actor as mediator makes the conflict and the peace process much more visible to outsiders. Each bilateral or multilateral meeting during the peace process is likely to get national or even international coverage. Diplomatic gatherings considered newsworthy, after all. Although being in the spotlight might be preferable at times (e.g. when it is politically profitable for leaders to show that they are for peaceful resolution), it is not always the case. Negotiating with insurgents is often an unpopular policy as it implies that the state is conceding to rebels and not powerful enough to end the insurgency through fighting. Moreover, this 'weakness' is often attributed to the incompetence of the leader. Thus, politicians do not always desire being in the spotlight during a process that involves making concessions.

Involving a non-state actors as a third party, on the other hand, provides more secrecy when needed and hence is more desirable when keeping a low profile is critical.

### *Risk of Association with Terrorism*

States do not always favor getting involved in internal conflicts even if they are invited as third parties. Since mediation involves meetings, discussions and other interactions with an insurgent group, states may refrain from it, fearing such close contact with a non-state actor might associate them with terrorism. Liz Philipson (2005, p. 70) argues “Peacemakers working directly with listed groups risk being labelled [sic] terrorist sympathizers. Peacemakers are also in danger of operating outside the law if they meet representatives of a listed group in certain circumstances, even if it is to advocate peace or mediate.” Indeed, states are often accused of legitimizing rebels when they contact with them as third parties (Rupesinghe, 1998, p. 171).

Although labeling opposition movements as terrorists has a longer history, the effect this label created changed drastically with the September 11 attacks as Vidar Helgesen claims. After 9/11 states have been eager to present insurgencies as a subcategory of global terrorism. Which provided the states with more international legitimacy in taking harsh measures against insurgent groups (Helgesen, 2007, p. 11). It, furthermore, intimidated international actors in taking a critical stance against the state policy towards rebel groups. Höglund & Svensson argue that third party states had become extra cautious and reluctant to become associated with non-state armed actors after the establishment of paradigm of global fight against terror (Höglund & Svensson, 2009, p. 180).

### *Spillover Effects*

Moreover, third party states are more likely to be influenced by spillover effects of the conflict due to their involvement. The spillover effects might include refugee flows, terror attacks, decrease in trade and tourism, creation of illegal markets, and so on (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 88).

### **2.2.2. The limitations of NGOs**

Although the NGOs have advantages over states in certain aspects as third parties, they are not qualified to be sole actors of peacebuilding. The same unofficial nature that provides NGOs with benefits in peacebuilding also constitutes an obstacle for them to operate without the involvement of track-one diplomacy.

The limitations of NGOs as third party mediators can be summarized as following:

### *Credibility and Authority*

First and foremost, nongovernmental organizations lack the authority and credibility that the states offer as mediators. The absence of power of enforcement and leverage over the parties renders NGOs ineffective mediators in situations in which each party needs to be ensured about the other party's compliance with the process. This problem, however, is not reserved only to nongovernmental organizations. Saadia Touval (1994) argues that international organizations such as the United Nations are also negatively effected by the absence of leverage over the conflicting sides when they are mediating.

Nevertheless, Dalia Kaye (2005, p. 7) suggests that track two actors, in fact, might reflect the authority of official diplomacy through their connections with policy makers. Hence, although credibility and authority is an issue to be addressed by nongovernmental actors, it can be overcome through borrowing power from track one.

### *Partiality and Dependence*

Since conflict resolution is a long and expensive process the actors of conflict resolution needs to have adequate capacity (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 98). Yet, NGOs generally do not have the economic capacity that would enable them to sustain long-term peace building activities. This fact often leads NGOs to seek outside funding for their long-term involvement in peace processes. As a result most NGOs depend on private donor funding. Although these institutions might claim neutrality and impartiality on the field, their behavior is likely to be effected by the preferences of the donors. In order to extract more money from the donors the NGOs are obliged to allocate their resources in line with the preferences of the donors and to advertise activities in a way to please them. The donor pressure on NGOs limits their ability to behave and appear neutral and impartial in a conflict setting. Accordingly, it is not rare to see NGOs operating in the international arena favoring one religious group, race, gender, or a politically affiliated group to another conforming to the preferences of their donor base. Furthermore, some NGOs work as extensions of for-profit organizations, states and interest groups. Bebbington, Hickey, & Mitlin (2008, p. 6) warn the researchers not to consider all NGO activity well meant, stating "civil society is also a realm of activity for racist organizations, business-sponsored research NGOs or other organizations..." Even when the NGOs are operating solely on humanitarian basis it is not surprising to find them supporting one of the parties of conflict directly or indirectly usually due the asymmetrical nature of conflicts (Richmond, 2003, p. 5).

Establishing impartiality is a serious concern for NGOs if we are to consider them sustainable actors of peacebuilding. Even when NGOs claim neutrality, their support base may cause suspicions. Aras & Akpınar implies such a suspicion in their article on Turkish Humanitarian NGOs stating, “Although most of their funding comes from people who are religiously motivated and concerned about helping fellow Muslims and promoting Turkey, the HNGOs [Humanitarian NGOs] claim that they do not have a genuinely nationalist agenda” (Aras & Akpınar, 2015, p. 11).

Additionally, scholars do not seem to be convinced on the independence of NGOs from the political agenda of their home states in diplomatic conduct. In his article on mediation of Turkish NGOs Hüsrev Tabak (2015, p. 197) argues that the new political perception of Turkish state led NGOs to embrace humanitarian diplomacy almost to the extent that they have become the very tools for this new foreign policy. He writes, “...Turkey’s so-called “civilizational” responsibilities has provided religiously-oriented nongovernmental organizations with the cognitive and intellectual tools to direct their attention and effort *to the realization of Turkey’s internationalist role.*” (*Emphasis added*)

#### *Official Status*

Another limitation of NGO Mediation is that insurgent groups who fight for some degree of autonomy or independence might not prefer any third party mediator less official than a state since recognition is of utmost importance for them. Involving a state or a supranational entity already grants them a form of recognition and has much greater potential for future official recognition as compared to involving a non-state actor.

According to Höglund and Svensson (2009, p. 181), the recognition factor was the main factor for Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to accept Norway as the mediator. They argued that the “... less official actors in the field of conflict resolution, such as various non-governmental organizations, were probably not acceptable by the LTTE.”

#### *Limited Scope*

Official actors often criticize NGOs by not seeing the greater picture when mediating (Chataway, 1998, p. 280). Unlike track-one actors NGOs do not have the responsibility to consider the implications of their actions on other areas of diplomatic relations.

Although this fact on the one hand brings about the risk of political gridlocks during mediation, on the other hand it is a strong point of NGO mediation. NGOs can focus excessively on narrow issues when getting involved in diplomacy and are more likely to follow the process more effectively compared to the state actors who is obliged to focus on multiple issues at the same time.

#### *Lack of Expertise*

Since the conflict environment is a delicate one, all the actors must behave with utmost care in order not to further complicate the matters. To this end, expertise is an invaluable asset for a peace agent. NGOs who have specialized in peacebuilding have a clear advantage to the official actors by the virtue of their focused attention and efforts (Richmond, 2003, p. 5). However, NGOs who lack such an expertise and experience run the risk of creating new grievances and complicating the resolution process (Okumu, 2003, p. 131).

Liz Philipson (2005, p. 69) suggested that although NGOs are getting involved in diplomacy more and more, their expertise on the diplomatic norms and the rules of the international system is still lagging behind the states, which developed diplomatic traditions over centuries.

### **2.2.3. State-NGO relationships in peace processes**

As discussed above, both the official and unofficial actors face a series of limitations when mediating. The literature on mediation has a near consensus on that the effective peacebuilding must include multiple actors from different levels, official and unofficial alike, as conflicts are multi-layered (Branco, 2011, p. 93; Diamond & McDonald, 1996; Rupesinghe, 1998, p. 174). Not only theoreticians but also the agents on the field share this opinion. Oliver Richmond (2003, p. 6) claims that NGOs also hold that their diplomatic activities are more effective when supported by a wide range of actors undertaking complementary roles, including official ones.

Yet, although the need for multiple actors on peace processes have been acknowledged and different roles have been practiced; scholars have yet to identify all the different relationships that are formed between various actors in peace processes. The nature of the relationship between NGOs and their home states in conflict resolution, for instance, has not been studied adequately. The significance of such a

study has been increasing as the growing involvement of NGOs in peace processes has blurred the lines between state roles and NGO roles (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 361).

### 3. Theoretical Framework

The conventional understanding on the relationship between NGO and state holds that states are the primary actors in any setting in which they interact with NGOs (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 361). In this state-centered perception, NGOs play a subordinate role to the state in a way that their functions in peace processes are directed or facilitated by the state.

Likewise, NGOs and states are considered to act in different platforms of diplomacy, having limited –if any- role to play in each other’s realm. Andrew Cooper & Brian Hocking (2000, p. 361) explains the perception on NGO-state relationship in diplomacy, stating:

State and non-state actors are viewed as inhabiting different environments, working to different rule-books and occupying very different positions on the scale of importance in world politics. They exist, therefore, in two solitudes with little or no interaction between their worlds.

However, the conventional perception of diplomacy is not satisfying in a post-Cold War/post-Westphalian setting. Now, we observe different types of state NGO interactions that are not confined in a condition in which states are conducting the NGO behavior.

Based on this premise, this thesis aims to explore different forms such interactions can assume. For this purpose, this study takes the classification of NGO-state relationship that Cooper & Hocking (2000) introduced, as the theoretical basis. Cooper & Hocking have identified three main categories of NGO-state interaction; namely, kick-starter, agent, and joint manager.

1. *Kick-starter*: Cooper & Hocking (p. 370) identifies this category as “a pattern by which the activity of NGOs stimulates corresponding or complementary activities by governments.” In kick-starter pattern NGOs create new avenues for state activity in peace processes.
2. *Agent*: The *agent* form interaction is identified as “a pattern by which NGOs take on a sub-contracting/facilitative role that supports the work of government” (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 372).

3. *Joint Manager*: It is “a pattern by which the activity of NGOs lend themselves to some type of institution-building with governments” (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 373). In this third type, NGOs and government share their expertise and resources with each other and act in cooperation in peace processes.

The classic view on state-NGO interface emphasizes the *agent* role of NGOs. *Joint manager* role is also familiar to the classic perception with the condition that the state leads the way and establishes the rules for this strategic cooperation. The *kick-starter* role, on the other hand, is a pattern often overlooked by track-one actors as well as scholars.

The three-category distinction that Cooper & Hocking provide enables us to evaluate the reality in the field with higher accuracy than the state-centered theories. However, as the authors acknowledge, these categories are not definitive and by all means not exhaustive. The more the relationships are studied the more categories will be identified (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 374).

Having stated that, Cooper & Hocking have not studied the *agency* of the actors in the identified patterns of interaction. In other words, whether these forms of relationships are intended interactions between the actors or just a result of autonomous acts that are understood as meaningful patterns by outside observers is not clear in their research. The problem mainly arises around the *agent* role that they have defined. When we see an NGO in the *agent* role, should we automatically assume that both the NGO and the state are aware of this role and act accordingly with the responsibility of the role? Or is there a possibility that the NGO was operating considering only its own projects and the coincidence between its acts and the state's is interpreted as the NGO playing an agent role? The question also opens up the possibility that the agent role might again be the victim of state-centered perception that Cooper & Hocking were criticizing. Can we safely assume that an NGO that works in accordance with its home state's interests have been led by the state, or should we also be open to the possibility that the NGO was the one that led the state to position itself accordingly? This question is important because if we indeed observe that NGOs assume the roles of kick-starters, agents, and/or joint managers without any intervention of the state in the decision-making mechanism or without any consideration of the state's preferences during decision-making process than we can more strongly argue that NGOs do share the same platform of diplomacy as states, although their roles, capacities and methods are



different. In that case, we can assert that NGOs participate in the making of the foreign policy in a more direct way than what they have been given credit for.

#### **4. Research Questions**

Based on the theoretical framework that has been presented, this research aims to answer the following questions:

1. Which patterns of relationship between the Turkish government and IHH do we observe in the Mindanao peace process? Is there a pattern that lies outside of the threefold categorization of *kick-starter*, *agent*, and *joint manager*?
2. How do the perceptions of the actors and stakeholders define the relationship between a state and an NGO? Do perceptions transform the relationships from their originally intended form?

#### **5. The Significance Of The Research Questions**

The significance of the first question lies in that a study of the relationship between IHH and the Turkish government in Mindanao peace process will present a real life application of Cooper & Hocking's classification, strengthening the theory's explanatory power. Moreover, the research might result in the identification of new categories that have not yet been identified in the literature.

The second question enables us to explore the dynamic between the intentions of the NGOs as agents in peace processes and how the outsiders perceive NGO acts. Furthermore, we can investigate whether the perceptions of the outsiders transform the relationship between track-one actors and NGOs and lead them to behave in accordance with one another without initially intending to do so.

#### **6. Hypotheses**

Based on the relevant literature and a study of Mindanao case, this study aims to test the following hypotheses:

1. We can observe all three types of NGO-state relationships, *namely kick-starter, agent, and joint manager*, in the Mindanao peace process between IHH and the Turkish state.

2. We can identify new categories of relationship between IHH and the Turkish state that lies outside of the three-fold categorization of Cooper & Hocking (2000).
3. Outsiders' perceptions on IHH's activities transform the patterns of relationship that the NGO develops vis-à-vis the state.

## **7. Case Selection Strategy**

The conflict in the southern Philippines, in the island of Mindanao, offers a fruitful case study to students of third party involvement in peace processes. Spanning over four decades, the peace process has involved international organizations (Such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), states (such as Libya, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, and Turkey), and non-governmental organizations (such as IHH, and the Asia Foundation) as third parties.

The Philippines case contains the features that bring NGOs forward as efficient mediators: One of the parties in the conflict is an insurgent group and hence harder to access by diplomatic means, currently the peace process requires persistence and presence in the field, and the conflict is at a phase in which violent conflict have left its place to negotiations and implementation of signed agreements.

The Turkish state has been involved in the Mindanao peace process since 1970s (Sema, 2015). IHH, a Turkey based humanitarian NGO, has been active in the field since 2007. Over the years the roles of the Turkish state and the IHH in the peace process has varied rendering the relationship between the two a clear case to study State-NGO relationships in peace processes.

Additionally, since the Mindanao conflict is in a latent phase at the moment, the actors are easy to access and the case is relatively more convenient to study.

For the purposes of this thesis, 'the Mindanao peace process' refers to the negotiations that had started in 1975 between the government of the Philippines and the Moro insurgencies -namely, Moro National Liberation Front and later Moro Islamic Liberation Front- and has been ongoing by the time this thesis is being written. Since the Mindanao peace process has not yet been concluded, the effects of success or failure of peace processes are not covered in this case study. Rather, this thesis aims to discover the relationships NGOs develop with states *during* peace processes.

## **8. Scope And Limitations**

This research aims to explore the relationship between IHH and the Turkish state throughout their involvement in Mindanao conflict. Being a case study, the research is limited in scope with the particulars of the case. The findings of this research is time and context-specific. Moreover the relationship between the Turkish state and a Turkish NGO is surely a reflection of the diplomatic culture of Turkey and might vary from country to country. Nonetheless, since this research intends to contribute to the identification of all the various possible relationships between NGOs and states in peace processes, the context-specific nature of the research do not constitute a drawback for the purposes of this research.

This research is an attempt of exploration and do not claim to exhaust all the forms of NGO-state relationship. Future studies are needed to identify other varieties of state NGO relationship in peace processes.

Moreover, this study gives equal space to different types of relationships that are found between states and NGOs regardless of the frequency of the form of relationship. This should not, however, cause an exaggeration of rare and context-specific events. The reader must beware that some forms of state-NGO relationships that are discussed here might be more prevalent than others.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE BACKGROUND

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#### 1. The Roots of the Conflict

The Mindanao conflict has taken place in the second largest island of the Philippines, the Mindanao Island, between the government of the Philippines and the two main separatist Moro insurgencies, namely Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The conflict has lasted over 46 years, claimed more than hundred thousand lives (*Timelines: The Jabidah Massacre, and the MNLF/MILF peace processes*, 2013) and displaced 2 millions of people ("It Could Be Peace; the Philippines' Southern Insurgency," 2012).

The conflict has its roots back in the first colonization of the Philippines by the Spanish in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The Spaniards arrived at the archipelago in 1521 as a part of the famous explorations of Magellan. Few decades later the Spaniards took control of Manila and established a colony in the newly 'discovered' archipelago, which they named the Philippines after the king Philip II of Spain (Lewis & Scott, 1998, p. 6).

The Spaniards succeeded in colonizing the Northern Islands of today's Philippines while southern islands remained under the Muslim sultanates. For around 300 years the Muslim sultanates fought against the Spanish colonizers and maintained their independence while the mainland Philippines developed a new culture under the Spanish rule embracing Catholicism and the Spanish language. The elapsed centuries culturally separated the Muslims of the south from the Catholics of the north not only by the virtue of religion but also by every aspect of life (Jubair, 1984). The animosity between the north and the south resulted in creation of distinct identities. The Spaniard

called the northern natives who quickly converted into Catholicism ‘Filipino’s while they named the southern Muslims ‘Moro’s after the Muslim Moors of Spain.

In 1898 the USA took control of the Philippines from Spain. The American colonial rule followed a different strategy for penetrating the southern islands. Americans controlled Mindanao through agreements and cooperation with the local leaders. The Muslim inhabitants of the southern islands, the Moro people, resisted against the new colonial rule. The USA dealt with the public unrest by taking harsh military measures together with assimilation policies such as forced migration of the Moro people and settlement of Filipinos in the southern islands (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014). The USA aimed to reduce the percentage of Moro people in the southern islands while increasing the percentage of the Filipinos to hinder the public unrest. These policies were effective until the decolonization of the Philippines.

After years of colonial rule, in 1946 the Americans left the country as one united Philippines under the governance of the Catholic majority living in the northern islands. The non-pluralistic policies of the central government deepened the ethnic division between the people of Mindanao (Bangsamoro) and the Filipinos (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014). Moreover, the Republic of the Philippines was established as a winner-takes-all presidential system, that turned the politics into a zero sum game (Linz, 1990), therefore the Moro people was destined to become a persistent minority who can never have a high-level representative in the politics.

## **2. The Birth of Moro Insurgencies**

The Moro people started establishing organizations as early as 1930s. However, virtually all of these organizations were local and focused on one aspect of life such as education or religion (Jubair, 1984, p. 145).

The first organized movement against the Filipino government was established in 1968 under the name of Moro Independence Movement. The movement had aspired for self-determination of the Moro people and the exercise of Islamic tenets and teachings over Moro territory (Jubair, 1984, p. 134). Mohagher Iqbal, the chief negotiator of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, states in his insightful book on Moro conflict that although there have been smaller local attempts against the Philippine government, the Moro Independence Movement is the first organization that caused fear and unrest in the governing elite of the country (Jubair, 1984, p. 145).

The Moro Independence Movement was short-lived however. The government pacified the movement in December 1971 (Jubair, 1984, p. 145). Nevertheless, despite its short lifespan it was effective in raising awareness about organizing around Moro ethnic identity among a wider public in the Southern Philippines. And thus, it established the basis for subsequent Moro insurgencies (Jubair, 1984, p. 135).

## **2.1. Moro National Liberation Front**

Following the Moro Independence Movement, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established in 1969. The MNLF was established on secular nationalistic grounds and appealed to a more diverse population as opposed to the later Moro insurgencies who identified the struggle as a religious one (Jubair, 1984, p. 150). The MNLF did not only use armed struggle as a means but also organized itself as a political movement and gained wide popular support from the Moro people.

The MNLF had started sending delegations and letters to third party states to seek support just after its establishment. Libya and Malaysia (through Sabah) was the first countries that responded positively and supported the insurgency both logistically and diplomatically (Jubair, 1984, pp. 173-174).

In 1972 the government of the Philippines declared Martial Law in an attempt to suppress the Moro Insurgency. However, the harsh measures were counterproductive for the government as they resulted in wide global media coverage of the insurgency and raised awareness especially among the Muslim countries.

The MNLF, which saw the necessity of involving third parties to the conflict since the early years of its establishment, sent a representative to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1972, just after the declaration of Martial Law, in order to seek support from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which had been established a little less than a year ago (Jubair, 1984, p. 152). The result was a series of resolutions passed by the OIC between 1972 and 1993 calling for amelioration of the conditions of the Muslims in the Philippines as well as diplomatic trips of the member states to the Philippines to monitor the conditions of the Muslims and to force the government into taking positive steps towards the resolution of the conflict.

The involvement of the OIC was fruitful in that in 1975 the parties sat on the negotiation table in Jeddah with the mediation of OIC Secretary General. The first

round of negotiations did not lead to any conclusions. The agreement could only be reached in the last days of 1976, almost two years later, during the second round of negotiations in Libya again with the mediation of the OIC. The Tripoli Agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government granted “establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines” (*The Tripoli Agreement*, 1976). The agreement, however, was not put into effect by the government and the hostilities renewed towards the end of the following year.

The negotiations that led to the 1976 agreement signified the change in Moro insurgency aspirations. The MNLF (and consequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) changed its agenda from independence to autonomy at the onset of negotiations in 1975 (Jubair, 1984, p. 176 & 193). It is understood from the words of Mohagher Iqbal, who was Chief Negotiator for the MILF as well as a high-ranking officer in the MNLF, that the OIC has a role to play in convincing the Liberation Front to adjust its claims for autonomy rather than independence (Jubair, 1984, p. 193).

After the failure of the implementation of the Tripoli agreement the OIC continued pressuring the parties for continuum of the negotiations. The following twenty years was off-and-on negotiations accompanied by periods of armed struggle. Finally the government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996 in Malacanang Palace in the capital. Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia along with the OIC were influential third parties in negotiations that led to the agreement (Fisas, 2012, p. 123). The 1996 agreement was the end of the three-decade long struggle between the MNLF and the government. The agreement granted the establishment of an autonomous region for Muslims. However, the conditions of autonomy did not allow the establishment of an effective government and remained no more than a proposal on a paper. Consequently, the agreement was far from ending the struggle however it led to the weakening of the MNLF structure and paved the way for Moro Islamic Liberation Front to become the main actor of the conflict.

## **2.2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front**

A disagreement with the leadership of MNLF started rising in the following years of the establishment of the MNLF and peaked at 1977 when the peace talks between the government and the MNLF had failed (Jubair, 1984, p. 154). A group of high-ranking

officials gathered around “*Islamic-oriented*” Salamat Hashim and opposed the leadership of “*secular-educated*” (Jubair, 1984, p. 154) Nur Misuari who had been the leader of the MNLF since its establishment.

In the last days of 1977, Hashim declared that he took over the leadership of the MNLF. He wrote a letter to the OIC to declare his new role and to explain his action. He identified the main reason as: “The MNLF leadership was being manipulated away from Islamic bases, methodologies and objectives, and was fast evolving towards a Marxist-Maoist orientation” (Jubair, 1984, pp. 154-155).

Until the 1984 the Hashim-led MNLF operated as “the New Leadership” while Misuari continued chairing the MNLF. In 1984 the New Leadership declared its decision to exist as a separate organization from then on under the name of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Jubair, 1984, p. 156). The new group embraced the name ‘Islamic Liberation’ as opposed to ‘National Liberation’ in order to emphasize their devotion to Islam rather than to Nationalism.

The MILF became the main actor of the conflict when the MNLF is pacified after the 1996 agreement. The MNLF had split into numerous fractions over time and the combatants of the MNLF who did not want to stop fighting joined the MILF or other smaller insurgencies operating in Mindanao region. Remaining the largest group actively fighting against the government, the MILF have gained wide support from Moro people who were upset with the previous peace attempts with the government.

The MILF reports that it has preferred negotiations to armed struggle as a policy since its establishment (Jubair, 1984, p. 193). Despite that, the formal negotiations between the government and the MILF did not start for almost 20 years, until the 1996 agreement between the government and the MNLF. Until then, there were attempts on both the MILF side and the OIC side to involve the MILF in the negotiations but the government avoided this and exclusively negotiated with the MILF (Jubair, 1984, pp. 184-186). The Chief Negotiator for the MILF Mohagher Iqbal states that the MILF’s response to being left out of the negotiations was full-scale offensives that are designed to demonstrate that the MILF is a formidable party in the conflict (Jubair, 1984, p. 186 & 194).

The MILF also expresses that it supported the peace process going on between the MNLF and the government and did not want to further complicate the negotiations. This attitude led the MILF to keep a low profile until an agreement between MNLF and the government is reached in 1996 (Jubair, 1984, p. 198).



### **3. The Peace Processes between the MILF and the Philippine Government**

The formal peace talks between the MILF and the government have started in 1996 (*Timelines: The Jabidah Massacre, and the MNL/MILF peace processes*, 2013). Between 1996 and 2004 the peace talks had continued on and off with frequent interruptions of armed violence. Throughout this period there has been several ceasefire agreements in which the parties reaffirmed their resolution to establish peace through dialogue. However, the implementation of the agreements has not been successful. Consequently the cycle of violence repeated.

In 2004 the parties signed an agreement to establish the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in order to monitor the implementation of the signed agreements and thus restore the trust that has been severely damaged by failures in implementation of previous agreements. The continuing negotiations paved the way for Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in 2008.

#### **3.1. MOA-AD (2008)**

Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was reached between the government and the MILF in 2008 as the result of negotiations facilitated by Malaysia. The agreement granted the establishment of Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, which is based on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the addition of six municipalities and hundreds of villages. The agreement allocated a greater autonomy to Bangsamoro Juridical Entity when compared to ARMM in terms of jurisdiction, security and finance (*Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001*, 2008).

The agreement is met with significant public discontent in the Philippines due to the fear that it signifies the first step towards autonomy ("What Went Before: The proposed MOA-AD," 2012). Political action followed the popular opposition and the agreement was sent to the Supreme Court, which declared the agreement unconstitutional. Thus the MOA-AD got cancelled before it got any chance of implementation. A deadlock in the peace process ensued resulting from the distrust of the Moro side in the process created by the cancellation of the mediated agreement (Hofmann, 2011).

The loss of trust between the parties led the MILF side demand an additional third party monitoring mechanism to International Monitoring Team (IMT) in order to guarantee the implementation and follow up of the negotiated agreements. This situation led to the establishment of the International Contact Group (ICG) that consists of third party states as well as international NGOs as a monitoring mechanism.

### **3.2. The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro**

The next serious set of peace talks after the failure of MOA-AD has started in January 2011 under the newly elected president Benigno Aquino III (Mastura, 2011, p. 3). Malaysia mediated the peace talks. The International Contact Group attended the negotiations and acted as a second facilitator (Arnado, 2011).

The first meeting between peace panels of the new government of President Aquino and the MILF took place in Kuala Lumpur in January 2011. In August of the same year the president met with the MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim in person in Japan to show the sincerity and devotion of the government in the peace process.

After a series of explanatory talks, the MILF and the government have signed the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro (FAB) in October 2012. The agreement was a significant step in achieving long lasting peace (Aquino, 2012). However, the negotiations continued the following two years in order to finalize the topics such as transitional process, normalization, power and wealth sharing and territorial arrangements. Finally, in March 2014 the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is signed as the final agreement that consolidates and affirms all the previous agreements since 1997, mainly the FAB and its annexes (*Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2014, pp. 1-2).

The CAB regulated the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and the Bangsamoro Basic Law that will serve as a constitution to the new autonomous entity. The agreement also arranged the decommissioning of the MILF combatants and identified and established transitional mechanisms for the new autonomous entity.

The CAB text indicated that an exit agreement would mark the finalization of the peace process that will be signed by both parties after the implementation of all the signed agreements (*Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2014, p. 4).

#### **4. Third Party Involvement in the Peace Processes**

The Mindanao peace process, which had started in 1975 and continued to this day, is a well-functioning example of a complex third party support mechanism. The third parties that are involved in Mindanao peace process include states, international organizations as well as local and international NGOs working in unprecedented structures.

The third parties in Mindanao peace process are: The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Malaysia (Mediator/Facilitator), The International Monitoring Team, The International Contact Group, The Third Party Monitoring Team, and The Independent Decommissioning Body.

##### **4.1. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation**

The Mindanao case has been brought to the attention of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as early as 1972, within the first year of its establishment (Jubair, 1984, p. 152). The OIC took the matter seriously and assumed a mediating role between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF. For this purpose the OIC has established a Peace Committee for Southern Philippines.

The OIC did not only put pressure on the government of the Philippines to start the negotiations but also convinced the MNLF to replace the idea of independence for autonomy (Jubair, 1984, p. 193). The Philippine Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP) wrote:

The OIC on its part informed the parties concerned that its objective is to help the Bangsamoro people achieve their aspirations for a just solution to their problems through peaceful means. One of the principles governing the OIC position in this regard is strict respect for territorial integrity of the countries where the Muslim Minorities belonged. The OIC delegation made it clear to the parties concerned that it will never accept or tolerate any separatist movement or any calls that may touch upon the territorial integrity of the Republic of Philippines ("OIC makes historic step towards peace in Southern Philippines," 2014).

The OIC played a determinant role on the signature of the peace agreement between the MNLF and the government in 1996.

Notwithstanding, the conflict continued with the rise of MILF and its taking the lead in Moro struggle. Subsequently, a separate track of negotiations developed. The negotiations with MILF had Malaysia as the mediator instead of the OIC. Nevertheless, the OIC attended the negotiations between the MILF and the government of the Philippines as observer (*Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2014, p. 3).

In the new peace track the OIC has assumed the role of a mediator between the MNLF and MILF. The OIC has aimed to bring together the MILF and MNLF positions vis-à-vis the government in order to make the peace process incorporate the demands of all the parties to the conflict. For this purpose the OIC has initiated the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum. The forum brought together the leaderships of the MNLF and MILF in a series of meetings that are mediated by the OIC in order to find the common ground ("OIC makes historic step towards peace in Southern Philippines," 2014). The Bangsamoro Coordination Forum is today still a work in progress.

#### **4.2. Malaysia**

Malaysia had mediated the peace talks between the government and the MILF since 2001 (*Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2014, p. 1). And worked as the head of mission for the International Monitoring Team since its establishment in 2004.

The Philippine government was initially unhappy with the facilitator choice as the first facilitator Datuk Othman bin Razak used to be the head of Malaysian secret service (Mastura, 2011, p. 3) and perceived as partisan (Arguillas, 2010). Malaysia fixed the problem by replacing the facilitator in 2011 after 9 years of service with a mutually agreeable name, Tengku Dato' Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed ("New Malaysian facilitator for GPH-MILF talks named," 2011).

Malaysian mediation was fruitful. Negotiations yielded the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and later, Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. President Aquino expressed his gratitude to the Malaysian mediation during his announcement speech of Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro:

Again, on behalf of the entire Filipino nation, I thank Prime Minister [of Malaysia] Dato' Sri Muhammad Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak and his countrymen, whose commitment to our peace process shone as a beacon of peace to the international community. Again, let me thank Tengku Dato' Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed, the Malaysian facilitator whose wisdom and experience served as a bridge towards mutual

understanding. They approached this process devoid of personal aggrandizement, and acted with the honesty, earnestness, and resolve that brought both panels closer and closer to each other until consensus was reached (Aquino, 2012).

### **4.3. The International Monitoring Team (IMT)**

The International Monitoring Team is established in 2004 with the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on Peace, signed in 2001 by the government and the MILF (Abubakar, 2005). The IMT has special focus on security, socio-economic assistance, civilian protection, and humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects (*Terms Of Reference Of The International Monitoring Team (IMT)*, 2011).

The IMT is headed by Malaysia as the facilitating country. The other country members of the IMT are Libya, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway and the EU. Together with countries the IMT has a Civilian Protection Component that is composed of non-state entities, namely, Mindanao Human Rights Action Center, Mindanao People's Caucus, Moslem Organization of Government Officials and Professionals, and Nonviolent Peaceforce (*Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2014, p. 3).

The IMT has a permanent office in Cotabato, the capital of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

The communication between the International Monitoring Team and the International Contact Group is stated in the terms of reference of the IMT as thus: "The IMT shall submit their reports directly to the GPH-MILF Peace Panels and the Facilitator, copy furnished the International Contact Group (ICG), in the event that the party violating fails to take appropriate action to penalize the responsible person or elements" (*Terms Of Reference Of The International Monitoring Team (IMT)*, 2011).

### **4.4. The International Contact Group**

The long list of failed negotiations created distrust between the parties. Especially when the Supreme Court declared the negotiated MOA-AD agreement unconstitutional, the MILF insisted upon continuing negotiations only under the scrutiny of third party observers (Hofmann, 2011, p. 2). Hence, the International Contact Group (ICG) was established as the mutually agreed solution to restore the trust between the parties in

implementing the negotiated agreements (*Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process*, 2009).

The ICG is established in 2009 as a monitoring body consisting of states along with international NGOs. The framework agreement on ICG did not name any states or iNGOs as members of the group however it mentions being a member of OIC or the European Union (EU) as a criterion of preference for states to become a member of the ICG. The iNGOs, however, are nominated by the parties with the approval of the third party facilitator, i.e. Malaysia (*Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process*, 2009).

While the main aim of the ICG is to exert leverage on the parties and hence guarantee compliance with the peace process and consequently restore the trust (*Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process*, 2009), the iNGOs in the group are assigned to mainly a communicator role. The duties of NGOs as mentioned in the framework agreement on the ICG are as such:

- “1. To engage and act as a bridge between the Parties, ICG, Facilitator and their local partners and civil society in support of the peace process;
2. To exchange views, provide research inputs, give feedback and advice to the Parties in coordination with the Facilitator; and
3. To establish communication channels in furtherance of peace process advocacy” (*Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process*, 2009).

The ICG worked as a facilitator along with Malaysia during the negotiations between MILF and the government of the Philippines. The states that were invited as members of the ICG are Turkey, United Kingdom, Japan and Saudi Arabia. Along with states, five NGOs assumed responsibility in the ICG, namely, The Asia Foundation, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources, Muhammadiyah, and Community of Sant’Egidio (*Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2014).

The ICG is a permanent body that monitored the negotiations in Kuala Lumpur. It is the first ever formal and permanent peace body that provides NGOs to work together with track one diplomats (Arnado, 2011).

Conciliation Resources, an iNGO member of the ICG, assesses the utility of having governmental and nongovernmental actors together in the ICG as: “International NGOs have technical expertise and also the flexibility to engage with a wide range of actors

and explore new ideas; at the same time diplomats provide essential leverage and political and economic support for the peace process” (Arnado, 2011).

The facilitator/mediator (Malaysia), the IMT and the ICG together formed a tripartite guarantee and support mechanism during the negotiations between the MILF and the government. The IMT and ICG have continued their monitoring and facilitating role after the signature of the Framework and Comprehensive Agreements on the Bangsamoro, during the implementation phase.

#### **4.5. The Third Party Monitoring Team**

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro of 2012 called for establishment of a Third Party Monitoring Team in order to monitor the implementation of all signed agreements (*Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro*, 2012, pp. part VII, article 11). The terms of reference of the TPMT is signed three months later in January 2013 by the parties, and the TPMT held its first meeting the same year.

The TPMT consists of five non-governmental members: two international and two local NGOs together with an eminent person as the chairperson. Each party to the conflict recommended one national and one international NGO to the Third Party Monitoring Team. The government of the Philippines recommended the Asia Foundation as the international NGO, and Gaston Z Ortigas as the local NGO; while the MILF recommended IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation as the international, and The Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MinHRAC) as the local NGO. As for the chairperson, the former EU ambassador to the Philippines, Alistair MacDonald, is assigned with the mutual consent of the both parties.

The Third Party Monitoring Team gathers together in the Philippines regularly in every two months, for the duration of two weeks for evaluating the compliance of the parties with the signed agreements (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014, p. 24). To this end, the team meets with the officials from both the government side and the MILF side during its visits. Likewise, the team also engages with the local population and conducts field visits to monitor the normalization process (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014, p. 24). With all its activities, the Third Party Monitoring Team presents a successful example of track 1.5 diplomacy.

#### **4.6. The Independent Decommissioning Body**

The Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) is created in 2014 with the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB), in order to regulate and execute the decommissioning of the MILF troops<sup>1</sup> and private armed groups.<sup>2</sup> The decommissioning is planned as a long and gradual process that follows the developments in the implementation of the CAB. The IDB is responsible for setting a time frame for decommissioning; creating an inventory of arms, which the combatants possess; and collect them in the scheduled time frame (*Protocol On The Implementation Of The Terms Of Reference (TOR) Of The Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB)*, 2015).

The IDB consists of 3 international and 4 local experts. The international experts come from the Kingdom of Norway, Brunei Darussalam, and the Republic of Turkey; the latter of which chairing the IDB.

Since the implementation of the CAB is moving slower than expected<sup>3</sup>, the IDB could not start working effectively. So far the Decommissioning Body only conducted a ceremonial decommissioning. Further decommissioning is on hold until advancements are made in the implementation of the CAB (Calica, 2016).

### **5. The NGO Involvement in the Mindanao Peace Process**

Both local and international NGOs have an active involvement in the Mindanao peace process. The involvement of the civil society is not only welcomed but also sought after by the Philippine government. This is a picture one does not frequently observe in internal conflict settings. The NGOs are invited to be members of monitoring teams that assume vital roles in the peace process such as International Monitoring Team, International Contact Group, and the Third Party Monitoring Team. Furthermore, unlike many other conflict settings, here the role of NGOs is not confined to unofficial diplomacy, which operates only in the societal level. The NGOs in the Mindanao peace

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<sup>1</sup> The MILF armed forces are named as Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). But in order to prevent confusion of terms, the BIAF is referred as 'MILF troops' within this text.

<sup>2</sup> The Independent Decommissioning Body is created in the Annex on Normalization that is signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 25th of January 2014.

<sup>3</sup> The rejection of the legislation of Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) in the parliament of the Philippines slowed down the peace process as the BBL is one of the main components of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.



process often undertake official roles and engage in track 1.5 diplomacy as demonstrated above.

The NGOs have been playing a facilitative, communicative, informative, and monitoring role in Mindanao peace process. The NGOs facilitate the discussion between the parties, open new ways of communication, provide reports for the officials as well as national and international society, and monitor the acts of the parties during the period of manifest conflict as well as peace (Hofmann, 2011, p. 3).

Claudia Hofmann (2011) of the United States Institute of Peace explains this active civic involvement in the peace process by the developed civil society culture of the Philippines. Hofmann argues that the Philippines has a long history of providing a friendly and welcoming environment for the NGOs that wanted to operate in the field of conflict management and peacebuilding. The country has cultivated a “culture of consultation” towards NGOs over the years (Hofmann, 2011, p. 2).

## **6. The Involvement of Turkey and IHH in the Philippines**

### **6.1. The Official Involvement of Turkey in the Mindanao Peace Process**

The Republic of Turkey has been actively contributing to the Mindanao peace process since 1970s according to Turkish Foreign Ministry ("Türkiye-Filipinler İlişkileri," 2016). The initial involvement of Turkey in the process was through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Muslimin Sema, a member of the executive committee of the MNLF and former mayor of Cotabato City, claims that Turkey was among the countries that led the involvement of the OIC along with Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia during the conference of the OIC in 1974 to which Sema personally attended (Sema, 2015).

Since 1970s, Turkey has been participating in the peace process as a member of the OIC Peace Committee for the Southern Philippines. The committee has played a significant role in the signature of the 1996 agreement between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF (Calica, 2014).

Yet, the official involvement of Turkey as an independent actor has begun when Turkey has become a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) in November 2009, upon invitation of the parties ("Davutoğlu MILF heyetini kabul etti," 2009). As a

member of the ICG, Turkey has attended as an observer to the negotiations between the MILF and the government of the Philippines in Kuala Lumpur.

Apart from its duty in the ICG, Turkey is also invited to chair the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), a duty that Turkey has been undertaking since the creation of the IDB in 2014. Turkish officials celebrated the position of Turkey in the IDB. In his visit to the Philippines, Turkish Prime Minister of the time Ahmet Davutoğlu said: “We are very happy to see this process is getting very successful and we are very proud that the chairman of the Independent Decommissioning Board [sic] is a Turkish diplomat” (Calica, 2014).

In the same diplomatic visit of Davutoğlu in 2014, the President of the Philippines Benigno Aquino III, expressed his gratitude for the involvement of Turkey in the peace process with the words:

Finally, we wish to take this opportunity to personally thank the Prime Minister for the support and guidance Turkey has provided in our government’s pursuit for peace with our brothers in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Just as Turkey showed support for the 1996 GPH-MNLF Peace Agreement, in its capacity as a member of the OIC Peace Committee for Southern Philippines, Turkey continues to be our partner towards establishing a just and lasting peace in Mindanao. Turkey presently participates as a member of the International Contact Group and the Independent Decommissioning Body in our talks with the MILF... (Aquino, 2014)

The diplomatic involvement of Turkey in the Philippines apart from the peace process has also developed in the past two decades. The embassy of Turkey to the Philippines has opened in Manila in 1990. The opening of the Philippine Embassy in Ankara in the following year ensued. The first Prime Minister-level visit from Turkey took place in 2014, in which the leaders of the two countries explored further ways to advance bilateral relations (Calica, 2014). In 2015 Turkish Airlines has started direct flights from Istanbul to Manila. In the same year Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has opened its Manila branch aiming to operate throughout the whole Philippines (“Türkiye-Filipinler İlişkileri,” 2016).

## **6.2. IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation IHH in the Philippines**

IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) is an independent Turkish NGO that is based in Istanbul. Officially established in 1995, today IHH operates in 140 countries ("Tarihçe," 2016). The activities of IHH vary from emergency reliefs to building infrastructure. Within its organizational framework, IHH has a division for Humanitarian Diplomacy.

The first visit of IHH to the Mindanao Island of the Philippines took place in 1996. In its early years, IHH had carried out its humanitarian relief activities in the Philippines through local NGOs (Oruç, 2016). Along with delivering humanitarian aid, IHH started its regular food relief distributions in the Philippines in 2007 during two Muslim holidays: Ramadan and Eid-ul Adha, which have been continuing ever since (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014).

Establishing a greater operational capacity in Mindanao over the years, IHH has expanded its humanitarian aid to include development and education projects. In 2009 the organization established an orphan sponsorship program to support the children who lost fathers during the conflict (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014). In 2010, it opened up an orphanage in the Mindanao Island with the capacity of 50 children ("İHH Filipinlerde yetimhane açtı," 2010). Subsequently, IHH constructed a school in 2011 (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014) and another orphanage for 40 children in 2015 ("İHH'nin 26.yetimhanesi Bangsamoro'da," 2015). Munawwar Hossain, IHH's coordinator of South Asian countries, stated that by the first half of 2016 IHH has a school and three orphanages in Mindanao. Additionally, two orphanages are under construction, which is estimated to be completed by the end of the year (Hossain, 2016).

Meanwhile, since 2009 IHH has been delivering emergency aid to the Philippines during various emergency situations such as hurricanes, floods, fires and armed conflicts (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014). While the developmental aid is focused mainly on the Muslim Mindanao, the emergency aid is delivered to a wider and more diverse population, who live in the disaster-affected areas in all the Philippines.

Apart from its humanitarian aid mission, IHH has also been undertaking an official peace-monitoring role in the Mindanao peace process. IHH is a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) since its establishment in 2013.

### **6.3. IHH's Emergence in International Peacebuilding and Nomination to the TPMT**

#### **6.3.1. IHH's emergence in international peacebuilding**

IHH senior officers attribute the NGOs position in international peacebuilding to its independent humanitarian work and impartial attitude on the field (Hossain, 2016; Oruç, 2016; Şahin, 2016). In his article on IHH's mediation roles, Hüsrev Tabak claims the same causality: "The international recognition the IHH has received due to its success in delivering aid has provided the IHH with a solid basis for adding humanitarian diplomacy and mediation to its humanitarian agenda" (Tabak, 2015, p. 212).

IHH has started its journey as an NGO that delivers humanitarian aid to the people who live in crisis zones. The initial actions of the NGO did not involve mediation, negotiation or other diplomatic roles. Yet, increasing visibility and trust IHH gained in conflict zones paved the way for its emergence in international peacebuilding. Today IHH has a Humanitarian Diplomacy department within its organizational scheme and it undertakes diplomatic roles, such as hostage negotiations and peace monitoring in a variety of countries including, but not limited to, Syria, Libya and the Philippines.

Izzet Şahin, the head of IHH's Humanitarian Diplomacy Department, reflected that the humanitarian activities of IHH in conflict zones enabled IHH to become an effective third party. He argues that, being on the field in times of conflict necessitates one to risk his life and freedom. This sacrificial behavior in turn brings IHH out as a trustworthy actor. Şahin states, "the population sees that the employees and volunteers of IHH risk their lives as much as the people who are experiencing the conflict in order to deliver humanitarian aid to people, regardless of their side in the conflict" (Şahin, 2016).

However, presence and trust are not the only ingredients for IHH's humanitarian diplomacy. Şahin underlines IHH's operational capacity as an important reason as to why conflicting parties resort to the mediation of IHH (Şahin, 2016). For instance, IHH has a sizeable operational capacity and large logistic network within Syria. Moreover, Şahin claims that all the conflicting parties in Syria acknowledges IHH as an impartial humanitarian actor, which gives the NGO access to the areas that are blocked for other outsiders. For these reasons, so far the United Nations and countries like Russia, Iran, and Syria have asked for IHH's mediation on multiple occasions within the Syrian conflict (Şahin, 2016). The international media coverage of IHH's mediations such as

the exchange of 48 Iranian with 2130 Syrian, which has been the largest swap in Syrian conflict (Dehghanpisheh, 2013), provided the NGO with global acknowledgment for its high operational capacity.

One of the notable events that provided IHH with worldwide recognition is the Mavi Marmara incident. In 2010, IHH co-organized a humanitarian aid campaign together with Free Gaza Movement, to break the Israel's blockade of Gaza. *The Freedom Flotilla* left for Gaza aiming to deliver its cargo, which contains humanitarian aid and construction materials, without the intervention of Israel. IHH's *Mavi Marmara* was a passenger vessel leading the flotilla ("What Happened on the Mavi Marmara?," 2010), which consisted of six other ships ("Summary of equipment and aid aboard the Gaza flotilla," 2010). The attempt of breaking the blockade resulted in a raid of Israeli commandos into Mavi Marmara ship, which left 10 civilians dead and many others wounded. The entire voyage of the flotilla, until the very moment of the raid, was broadcasted online and viewed by thousands of people. The event made IHH a widely recognized NGO in other Muslim countries as well as in Israel. IHH's vice-president Hüseyin Oruç reflects on Mavi Marmara's role on IHH's humanitarian diplomacy with the words:

Mavi Marmara incident have increased the recognition of IHH and brought it forward as an actor that deals with international humanitarian mediation. That is because; Mavi Marmara was not only about humanitarian relief. It was also about human rights and humanitarian diplomacy. Mavi Marmara made the humanitarian diplomacy role of IHH more visible, since, previously people have only known humanitarian relief role of IHH. After Mavi Marmara, IHH undertook more roles on mediation and humanitarian diplomacy (Oruç, 2016).

### **6.3.2 IHH's nomination to the TPMT**

Although the process that led to IHH's membership in the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) had started before the Mavi Marmara incident, the incident had a positive effect on the process, as it eliminated the doubts on IHH's capacity for humanitarian diplomacy. The incident had demonstrated to the MILF that IHH is not only an actor that is active in the region, but also an international NGO that undertakes prominent projects in other parts of the world. Moreover IHH's adoption of the Palestinian case, which has been closely followed by Moro Muslims, was significant for

the MILF (Oruç, 2016). Hüseyin Oruç, IHH's representative to the TPMT, indicates two main reasons for IHH's nomination for the TPMT, the first is the NGO's continuous humanitarian presence in Mindanao since 1996, and the second is the global recognition it received after the Mavi Marmara incident (Oruç, 2016).

The continuous presence of IHH had increased its recognition among the local population as well as the leaderships of the MILF and the MNLF, and consequently paved the way for IHH's nomination as a member of the TPMT. While previously Arab NGOs had strong presence in Mindanao, the September 11 attacks changed the picture. After 9/11, IHH had remained as the only Muslim iNGO regularly operating in Mindanao, visiting the field multiple times a year (Oruç, 2016).

During the period between 2010 and 2012, IHH was initially offered a role in the International Contact Group (ICG) and later for the International Monitoring Team (IMT), both of which involves non-governmental organizations along with states (Oruç, 2016). However, IHH could not accept these offers due to the fact that it had allocated all its resources to ongoing projects and was undergoing the preparations of one of its biggest projects yet: the organization of *the Freedom Flotilla*. Since both positions in ICG and IMT required a constant attention and a permanent representative on the field, IHH turned down these positions (Oruç, 2016).

Nonetheless, in 2012 IHH received another offer from the parties, this time to be a member of the TPMT. By this time IHH has included humanitarian diplomacy on its agenda. Moreover, the position although required a lot of attention, was less time consuming than the previous two positions that were proposed. The TPMT met in every two months as opposed to the ICG and IMT, which required 24/7 attention. Hence IHH accepted the position (Oruç, 2016).

### **6.3.3 The effect of the TPMT on IHH's humanitarian diplomacy**

Similar to Mavi Marmara's effect, IHH's role in the TPMT also made the NGO more prominent as a humanitarian diplomacy actor. Oruç stated that, after the role in the TPMT, IHH is offered more roles in various conflict resolution processes. In the following years we might see IHH with similar roles in the armed conflict of Patani, Southern Thailand; and in Libya. Hüseyin Oruç stated, "In Patani, we are currently meeting with the parties, both the insurgent side and the government side, on peace negotiations. If the negotiations are held on Patani, IHH will take a part in the peace

process as it did in Mindanao. Likewise, currently a preparation continues for Libya” (Oruç, 2016).

The TPMT’s effect was not accidental. It was actually one of the main reasons why IHH was offered a membership in the TPMT in the first place. Oruç states that when he asked the MILF leader El-Hajj Murad Ebrahim why they had chosen IHH for the mission, Ebrahim answered:

You are with us since the beginning of the process. More importantly IHH needed such an official position. You are operating all around the world but you never had such a high level responsibility. For IHH to get involved in similar processes in other geographies, you needed this. That is the reason why we specifically asked for IHH’s involvement in the process. Besides, there were no other alternatives (Oruç, 2014).

IHH had always faced problems concerning being associated with the armed groups in geographies where it operates. Oruç claims that such associations are a byproduct of humanitarian aid; as one needs to get in touch with the local power holders if one wants to operate in a region, and in conflict regions, insurgents are the local power holders. Moreover, he believes that stereotypes around being a ‘Muslim NGO’ contributes to such associations. However, now “with the official role in the TPMT”, Oruç argues, “IHH showed the world that its previous actions were no different than this official mission. Contacting armed groups for the purpose of peace is nothing bad” (Oruç, 2016).

## **7. Conclusion**

This chapter has provided information on the background of the Mindanao peace process and examined the third party involvement in peacemaking, with an emphasis on the roles of NGOs in the process. Furthermore, the activities of IHH and the Republic of Turkey in the Philippines are briefly summarized in order to set the stage for an analysis of state-NGO relationship in peace processes, which will be studied in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE ANALYSIS

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#### 1. The Data Collection

##### 1.1. The Case

This study aims to explore the spectrum of NGO-state relations in peace processes using the three-fold framework introduced by Cooper & Hocking (2000). This thesis focuses on IHH Humanitarian Relief's activity in the Philippines and the relationship between Turkey and the NGO as the case study, and covers a time frame between 1996-2016.

IHH represents a unique case in that; it is involved in mediation and peace monitoring in a variety of countries, notwithstanding the fact that it is coming from a country in which the civil society culture, especially in the realm of diplomacy, is currently being established. This recently developing civil society culture, and consequent lack of operational codes in terms of NGO-state relationship might enable us to discover new forms of relationship that have not been categorized previously.

To clarify, for the purposes of this research, the activities within the context of peace processes include humanitarian activities in peace process as well as diplomatic roles. This is because, as discussed in the previous chapter the humanitarian and developmental activities in conflict zones have direct and significant effect on NGO roles in peacebuilding.

Moreover, the scope of this study was intended to be limited to the Philippine case. However, after the interviews, this research ended up covering a wider variety of cases, which help clarifying the state-NGO relationship in the context of the Philippines.



## **1.2. The Method**

This research is an exploratory study that aims to survey different varieties of state-NGO relationship in peace processes. To this end, the qualitative research method is employed. The main data was obtained from semi-structured in-depth interviews with senior NGO executives and field workers.

This study relies on qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews that aim to explore the relationship between the Turkish state and IHH Humanitarian Relief in the case of Mindanao peace process.

The reason for selection of semi-structured questions is to lead the interviewees to talk in the direction of state-NGO relations, while not limiting their answers in any way, as this research aims to discover a spectrum of relationships as broad as possible. The guiding interview questions are included in the appendix of this study.

The interviews took around forty-five minutes on average. All interviews are tape-recorded with the consent of the interviewee. Prior to the interviews, the interviewees were verbally informed about the general purpose of the interview, about their right to answer as long as they feel comfortable answering, and that the interviews are tape-recorded. Subsequently, the interviewees signed a consent form that includes this information.

The interviews were conducted in Turkish, and transcribed and translated by the author of this dissertation thesis.

In addition to the interviews, news items, official websites of government agencies and IHH, and the content of related academic articles, namely, Aras & Akpınar (2015), Tabak (2015) and Özkan (2014), were also included in the analysis.

## **1.3. The Interviewees**

This study aims to gather in-depth knowledge on a particular topic rather than to study the perceptions of a representative sample (Neumann 2006). For this reason, the sample is selected from the people who have vast experience and insight on IHH's humanitarian and diplomatic activity in the Philippines. All the interviewees are selected from different departments of the NGO in order to maximize the variety of insights.

For this study, four employees of IHH Humanitarian foundation who take an executive role in the Organization's involvement in the Philippines are selected. The

interviewees are the vice-president of IHH and the IHH's representative in the Third Party Monitoring Team Hüseyin Oruç; Humanitarian Diplomacy Coordinator İzzet Şahin; IHH's Board of Directors member and Philippines representative Ömer Kesmen; and IHH's Coordinator of South Asian Countries Munawwar Hossain. The interviewees represent all the departments that are involved in the execution of IHH's activities in the Philippines, from top to bottom. Thus they represent the saturation point for my study and any additional person from IHH would mean only a small increase in the new information (Kvale, 2008). This is why the scope of this study is limited with four executives.

I approached the interviewees separately, with an interview request. All interviews were conducted on different dates, and face to face with the exception of Ömer Kesmen. Since Kesmen lives in the Philippines, the interview was conducted over the Internet.

In addition to the interviews I have conducted, I also included in the analysis a previously published interview of Hüseyin Oruç (Oruç, 2014) and quotations from İzzet Şahin in Aras & Akpınar (2015), and El-Hajj Murad Ebrahim<sup>4</sup> in Tabak (2015).

## **2. The Data Analysis**

The interviews are analyzed on the basis of recurring themes. For the ease of analysis the three-fold categorization, which Cooper & Hocking suggested, is used for categorizing the recurring themes when applicable, with the addition of new themes when the three-fold categorization is not sufficient.

### **2.1. The Recurring Themes**

During the semi-structured interviews five main themes stood out. Three of these themes are sorted under the categories suggested by Cooper & Hockings, namely, *the agent*, *the kick-starter*, and *the joint manager*. For the remaining two main themes, new categories are identified in this study. These are *the stakeholder* and *the representative patterns of interface*.

Although this research aims to analyze the topic in the case of the Mindanao peace process, the interviewees also talked about several different cases in which IHH developed specific relationships with the state. Most cases interviewees mention, with

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<sup>4</sup> El-Hajj Murad Ebrahim is the chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

the exception of repetitive themes, are also included in the analysis although the main stress is given to the Mindanao case.

### **2.1.1. The Agent**

Cooper & Hocking (2000) identified three forms of state-NGO interface in their study, namely, *agent*, *joint manager*, and *kick-starter*. Based on this theoretical framework, I aimed to explore in my interviews the forms of interface IHH developed vis-à-vis the Turkish state.

The first pattern I intended to discover in my research is the *agent* pattern of relationship between the IHH and the Turkish state. The *agent* pattern is identified by Cooper & Hocking as “a pattern by which NGOs take on a sub-contracting/facilitative role that supports the work of government” (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 372). In this pattern, the NGO carries out the operations commissioned by the state. It is a strong form of cooperation in which the NGO lends its resources to the use of state.

To explore the agent form of interaction I talked with IHH employees about the operations of IHH that are undertaken with the guidance of the Turkish state. To this end, I asked the interviewees whether they recall any projects that have been brought to the attention of IHH by the Turkish state agencies, particularly in the case of Philippines. Moreover I asked them whether IHH initiates any form of communication with Turkish officials before or during its operations in the field whether in humanitarian or diplomatic capacity.

All the interviewees emphasized IHH’s independent decision-making and implementation mechanism in their answers. The interviewees did not recall any project that is commissioned or offered by the state or undertaken after a consultation with any state agency.

Munawwar Hossain remarked that in the Philippines there are no joint projects with state agencies (Hossain, 2016). Similarly, Hüseyin Oruç stated that there is no cooperation between the state and IHH in the case of Mindanao<sup>5</sup> (Oruç, 2016). He stated:

Somalia and Myanmar can be examples in which a somewhat cooperative manner is developed; however the Philippines is not like that. The state carries

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<sup>5</sup> To be sure, the reported absence of cooperation in the Philippines case must be understood as a rejection of joint undertakings. The lesser forms of cooperation will be discussed below.

out its projects through governmental agencies such as Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB).

Nevertheless, they expressed that they maintain an informative form of communication with Turkish state representatives in countries they operate. For instance, Munawwar Hossain, IHH's coordinator of South Asian countries, stated that they attach importance to informing the embassy of Turkey in each country they are operating and try to visit the ambassador while on the field, when possible (Hossain, 2016). Similarly, Ömer Kesmen, IHH's Board of Directors member and Philippines representative, stated that on occasion they write reports for government officials on the activities of IHH in the Philippines (Kesmen, 2016). This informative communication will be elaborated further below.

Although the informative communication is important to note, as it demonstrates that IHH feels responsibility towards the Turkish state, the interviewees stressed that it does not affect the decision-making mechanism of the NGO in any way. İzzet Şahin, the head of IHH's Humanitarian Diplomacy Department, emphasizes, "IHH acts independently in decision-making, contact-making, and implementation of its projects" (Şahin, 2016). Moreover, not only the decision-making process is independent, as Munawwar Hossain claims, but also IHH has never been commissioned or offered a project by a Turkish state agency (Hossain, 2016).

Hüseyin Oruç, IHH's vice-president and representative to the Third Party Monitoring Team, and İzzet Şahin both talked in their interviews about a systematic absence of state cooperation with NGOs in operations abroad. Şahin reflected that, in fact, he would be happy to see the state approaching IHH in order to put its operational capacity into use (Şahin, 2016). Şahin and Oruç attribute the absence of Turkish state's interest in utilizing IHH, or other NGOs for that matter, to the newly developing civil society culture of the state. Oruç pointed out that NGOs operating in different countries is a relatively new phenomenon for the Turkish state. Even more, NGOs operating in the diplomacy field is still a newer phenomenon. He argued that Turkish state has not yet developed a foreign diplomacy culture that considers taking advantage of the capacities of Turkish NGOs. Instead, the Turkish state has been employing its own agencies such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), The Disaster and

Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), and Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (a quasi-NGO) in Humanitarian and Developmental projects abroad (Oruç, 2016).

Nonetheless, Munawwar Hossain argues, in some infrequent occasions, these agencies contribute to the projects of IHH, such as furnishing the schools that are constructed by IHH or donating computers to orphanages of IHH. However, Hossain notes, in such cases the end project is not considered a cooperative project. Rather it is considered as a combination of two separate projects of two different organizations (Hossain, 2016). This form of interaction will be elaborated more in the section '2.1.4' as it relates more to the *stakeholder* form of interaction than the *agent*.

In the case of Mindanao, as in other cases we discussed above, the *agent* pattern of interaction is seemingly absent. IHH have been undertaking an important diplomatic role in Mindanao peace process as a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT). IHH's representative to the TPMT, Hüseyin Oruç stated that the role in the TPMT was accepted by the IHH without any consultation or communication with the government. The role was accepted considering the regional role of IHH and its humanitarian agenda. Oruç emphasized that IHH did not consider this role as a diplomatic representation of Turkey in any stage of this diplomatic involvement (Oruç, 2016). The role was taken as a result of IHH's own activities and initiative, thus the Turkish state was not a part of the picture since the early stages.

However, the informative communication mentioned above exists in Mindanao case as well. Ömer Kesmen, IHH's Board of Directors member and Philippines representative, stated that they occasionally visit government officials such as the President of Religious Affairs, in order to inform them about IHH's activities in the Philippines (Kesmen, 2016). Moreover, Hüseyin Oruç reported that he had discussed the importance of the Philippine peace process, the current situation on the field, and the possible diplomatic roles for the Turkish government in this process, in person with the foreign minister of the time Ahmet Davutoğlu on multiple occasions before IHH's role in the TPMT. During these exchanges, and others with policy makers, Oruç advocated the importance of diplomatic roles that Turkey can assume, such as the membership of the International Contact Group (ICG) and the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB). Oruç stated that during these exchanges they did not discuss IHH's role in the TPMT. However, he believes that this prior communication might have paved the way for the government's positive acknowledgement of the diplomatic role of the NGO in the Mindanao peace process (Oruç, 2016).

After IHH became a member of the TPMT, Oruç paid a visit to the Turkish embassy during his first trip to the Philippines as a TPMT member. Furthermore, the Asia Pacific General Manager of the Turkish Foreign Ministry invited IHH in order to share insights after the first meeting of the monitoring team. Oruç emphasizes that their exchanges with the government was overall positive. The government approved and encouraged IHH's position in the TPMT. Yet, Oruç stresses the informative nature of these exchanges and points out that they should not be understood as attempts of cooperation, for Turkey has not yet developed a diplomacy culture that benefits from the agency of its non-state actors. He adds that IHH's role in the TPMT is the first time for Turkey to have an NGO undertake a diplomatic role. Consequently, there was no pre-established response from the government. Although the state welcomed this role, it had not established a cooperative mechanism to extend its influence in the peace process through this role (Oruç, 2016).

To sum up, although the decision-making and implementation phases work independently of the state, IHH maintains an informative form of communication with the government representatives. Yet, this informative communication does not lead to a "sub-contracting/facilitative role that supports the work of government" as the *agent* form of interface requires. The interviewees hinted at two different possible reasons for the lack of sub-contracting/facilitative roles of NGOs vis-à-vis the Turkish state: first, since internationally operating NGOs are a new phenomenon for Turkey, the state has not yet developed an inclusive diplomatic culture and cooperation with NGOs; and secondly and consequently, the Turkish state operates through its own agencies instead of privately funded NGOs.

And yet, demonstrating the absence of the agent form of communication is nothing more than ruling out the one end of the scale of state-NGO relationships, which lies in between subjugation of NGOs to the state, and total independence of NGOs from the state. To be sure, this point does not mark the end of cooperative relationships between a state and an NGO. Cooper & Hocking states:

The commonplace way to depict this set of relationships has been to concentrate on the conflictual/adversarial aspects. At one end of the continuum, considerable emphasis has been placed on forms of diplomatic activity generated by state officials in that NGOs are either subordinated and/or managed. At the other end, conversely, increased attention has been devoted to

activity in which NGOs either disengage from or challenge the authority of the state (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 370).

Hence, emphasizing the independent nature of the NGO is no more contribution than consolidating the commonplace attitude towards state-NGO relationship. Focusing on the extreme points is the mainstream approach to the state-NGO relationships and is not the aim of this research. This research aims to explore the cooperative relationships that lie in middle points of the scale, which tend to get overlooked in NGO studies.

### **2.1.2. The Kick-starter**

As discussed above, even though the interviewees emphasized the independent decision-making and implementation mechanisms of IHH, they nevertheless expressed that they attribute importance to maintaining a certain level of communication with the government officials in order keep them informed about IHH's actions. However, occasionally, IHH also uses its communication channels to advocate diplomatic positions for the Turkish state, especially when they see opportunities on the field for the state. IHH workers consider this flow of information as their responsibility being a Turkish NGO, notwithstanding the fact that government uses its own agencies for collecting such information.

For instance, İzzet Şahin states that when IHH is operating on the field, if they see opportunities or positions that Turkish state can use more effectively, they bring it to the attention of government officials in their meetings, pointing out certain roles or directions of development (Şahin, 2016). Similarly, Munawwar Hossain states that, as Asia desk, they share insights with related agencies, especially TIKA, when they see a potential humanitarian investment that would benefit Turkey in the long run (Hossain, 2016).

This model of communication corresponds to the *kick-starter* category of interface that Cooper & Hocking identified. Cooper & Hocking (2000, p. 370) defined this category as “a pattern by which the activity of NGOs stimulates corresponding or complementary activities by governments.”

The Libya case, in which IHH mediated in numerous local disputes between the conflicting parties, is one of the examples where the NGO employed the *kick-starter* pattern of relationship by lobbying for the participation of the Turkish state in the peace process. Şahin believes that IHH has a great role in the involvement of Turkey in the

final Libya agreement as a third party. He remarked that IHH wanted Turkey in the process because the NGO lacked the enforcing power to guarantee compliance to the negotiated agreement although it was very successful in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiation table and subsequently mediating an agreement. So IHH lobbied for the participation of the Turkish state in the final Libya agreement in order to successfully finalize a process in which it played a central role (Şahin, 2016).

In Mindanao case, a similar pattern existed. Ömer Kesmen, IHH's Philippines representative, commented on the cooperation between IHH and the TIKA in the Philippines, "We were not able to undertake a joint project with TIKA so far. However, in our meetings and consultations with them, we point out to the fields in which there is a need and deficiency, and they develop projects in those fields." He furthermore adds that IHH's communication is not limited to TIKA, likewise on occasion they present reports to the government officials on the areas that need developmental aid (Kesmen, 2016).

IHH aims to draw various Turkish institutions into contributing to the Philippine peace process. In a separate interview Hüseyin Oruç remarked, "We want to direct both the governmental and non-governmental organizations of Turkey to specific projects regarding the future of Bangsamoro" (Oruç, 2014).

IHH's kick-starting role in the Philippines is not confined to humanitarian and developmental projects. The NGO also engages in stimulating diplomatic activities of Turkish government within the Philippine peace process. Hüseyin Oruç stated that just after the failed MOA-AD agreement in 2008, when the parties wanted to restart the negotiations to end the recurring turmoil, IHH met with the MILF leadership. Oruç claims that in this meeting IHH advised the MILF to go and meet with Turkish government officials in order to involve Turkey in the peace process. Following the advice, the MILF representatives visited Ankara. During their trip to Turkey, they also visited the IHH headquarters in Istanbul. The meetings between MILF and Turkish officers paved the way for Turkey's membership to the International Contact Group, and later, to the Independent Decommissioning Body (Oruç, 2016).

Oruç Believes that IHH had an effect in the official involvement of Turkey in the peace process. He states in a separate interview, "It was MILF who wanted the involvement of Turkey in the process. And IHH had a great effect in that" (Oruç, 2014).

Likewise, IHH lobbied for the participation of Turkey in the IDB. Oruç stated, "We advocated for Turkey's presence in IDB discussing the matter both with the Asia



Pacific General Manager [of Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and later with the higher officials we have met.” Oruç remarks that they have emphasized the importance of being a member of IDB when Turkey is already a member of International Contact Group, and IHH is a member of the TPMT. He adds that Turkey had already resolved that it wanted to be a part of the peace process in Mindanao, so the advocacy of the IHH was not on an unfamiliar topic to the government (Oruç, 2016). By the same token, Ömer Kesmen stated that they have communicated with the government officers in order to convince them about the importance of the meetings, when they observed that Turkey could not attend the meetings of the Philippine peace process regularly (Kesmen, 2016).

Nonetheless, it is important to note that the information exchange and advocacy is a result of IHH’s initiative as opposed to a demand from the government side. In fact, arguably, there is a vexation in IHH officers due to the lack of demand from the government side. The interviewees mentioned quite a few examples in which they believe that the government should have asked them to share their insight, but it was not the case. For instance, Izzet Şahin stated that IHH had not been invited to a meeting organized by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Humanitarian Diplomacy, although one of the two journalists, who had been rescued from Syrian rebels with the mediation of IHH, had been invited as a speaker (Şahin, 2016). Likewise, Munawwar Hossain mentioned that IHH’s Asia Desk has never been invited to a meeting organized by state agencies to share its insights on Asian Countries (Hossain, 2016).

Thus, the information exchange occurs with the initiative of IHH without an explicit demand from the government side. However, the lack of explicit demand does not mean that the government does not expect IHH to contact its representatives when the NGO is operating in the field. The statist political culture of Turkey might indeed necessitate such exchanges without any spoken rule.

Nonetheless, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that the state has not yet considered the independently working NGOs as information providers from the field. Rather it uses its own institutions such as TIKA, YTB and diplomatic missions.

The provided examples of IHH’s attempts to stimulate activities of the Turkish government do not propose a conclusive evidence on whether the state behavior had, in fact, been altered in any way. And yet, the investigation of whether the *kick-starter* role of IHH had an effect on the state behavior is beyond the scope of this study and is not necessary for demonstrating the existence of the *kick-starter* pattern of interaction. To

this end, it is sufficient to demonstrate that IHH employs a form of communication with the government that aims to “stimulate corresponding or complementary activities” (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 370).

### **2.1.3. The Joint Manager**

Another category of interaction Cooper & Hocking described is the *joint manager*. They describe this form of interaction as “a pattern by which the activity of NGOs lend themselves to some type of institution-building with governments” (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 373). This form of communication emphasizes cooperation and resource sharing between an NGO and a state.

Interviewees mentioned some cases in which the Turkish government and IHH shared their resources and undertook cooperative projects. For instance, İzzet Şahin stated that IHH is building a “village for orphans” in Reyhanlı, a small district in South Eastern Turkey bordering Syria, in cooperation with the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policies and RAF (Qatar) Foundation. Şahin described the cooperation between the two NGOs and the Turkish state with the words: “IHH undertakes the implementation of the project, while RAF provides funding and the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policies provides administrative and bureaucratic support” (Şahin, 2016). The Deputy Minister of Family and Social Policies emphasized the cooperation between IHH and the government on this project during her speech in the groundbreaking ceremony. She stated that IHH and the government had signed a cooperation protocol for establishing a center for Syrian orphans on June 11, 2015 according to which the Ministry would provide all occupational and administrative support to IHH in the establishment of the center (“Suriyeli yetimler için Reyhanlı’da dev yaşam merkezi,” 2015).

Another notable case in which we observe the *joint manager* pattern of interaction is an exchange of wounded soldiers in Syria. In 2015, IHH mediated a wounded soldier exchange between soldiers fighting for Assad and soldiers fighting for opposition forces. During the exchange UN, ICRC, Syrian and Lebanese Red Crosses, Turkish Airlines, Turkish and Lebanese States, and IHH worked in cooperation (“IHH'nin “insani diplomasisi” savaşa can kurtarıyor,” 2015). Şahin described the cooperation and IHH’s role as:

IHH was in the center. It established the coordination between OCHA [UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs], ICRC, Syrian Red Cross, Hatay governorship, and the Turkish Airlines. For instant and simultaneous cooperation, we created a Whatsapp group, which included all the partners. The operation was accomplished by moving towards the border from the Syrian and Turkish side simultaneously, going to airports from the borders, taking off from the airports at the same moment, and landing at the same moment, and then conducting the exchange. ... Of course, during this exchange the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the governorship, borderline security etc. was among the supporting parties. However, IHH was the key coordinator of all the partners due to its presence in Syria and ease of communication with the Turkish government, since the main exchange took place within Turkey (Şahin, 2016).

The Syrian case necessitated the IHH and the Turkish government to share their resources and capacities with one another as well as with the other stakeholders. In addition to this large-scale project, Şahin added that IHH had worked in cooperation with TIKA, AFAD and Turkish Red Crescent on multiple occasions (Şahin, 2016).

One of the areas in which the *joint manager* pattern of interaction was employed effectively is emergency relief. The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) has been cooperating with the search & rescue and emergency teams of Turkish NGOs. Moreover, AFAD provides training courses on search & rescue for capacity development of NGOs. Munawwar Hossain noted that IHH emergency team participates in these trainings. In addition, IHH joins AFAD and other NGOs in quickly responding to large-scale disasters. To exemplify, the Turkish team, including AFAD and IHH, was the first international team to arrive at the venue during the earthquake in Nepal as well as the Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Hossain, 2016).

The *joint manager* pattern of communication also exists in the Mindanao case. In 2014, a group of jurisprudents from Mindanao came to Turkey to attend a seminar on the Turkish judicial system organized by Turkish Justice Academy, a governmental institution ("Moro'lu Hukukçu Heyetine Yönelik Türk Yargı Sisteminin Tanıtımı," 2014). Ömer Kesmen remarked that IHH had cooperated with the Justice Academy in this process, acting as a bridge between the institution and the participants. Similarly, IHH had cooperated with the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in order to provide scholarships for students from Mindanao to study in Turkey. Kesmen states that IHH both endorsed, within Moro communities, the idea that students

from Mindanao, who study abroad due to the lack of educational facilities in the conflict zone, should study in Turkey; and also communicated with the YTB officials for allocating scholarships to students from Mindanao. As a result, IHH and YTB cooperated in providing scholarships for 70 students from the region to study in Turkey in 2015. This number is expected to grow annually with the addition of new students (Kesmen, 2016).

The *joint manager* pattern of interface is seemingly always initiated by IHH without any first attempt from state side (Hossain, 2016; Kesmen, 2016; Oruç, 2016).

#### **2.1.4. The Stakeholder**

Both Munawwar Hossain and Hüseyin Oruç pointed out the absence of cooperative projects between the Turkish state and IHH in the Philippines (Hossain, 2016; Oruç, 2016). However, in fact, there are few projects in which we can see a contribution from both the Turkish state side and IHH. For instance, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has donated a computer laboratory to IHH's Uğur Süleyman Söylemez orphanage in Cotabato, Philippines ("Filipinler'e Eğitim Alanında Destek Devam Ediyor," 2014). In addition, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) cooperated with IHH in selecting students from Moro community to receive a scholarship for studying in Turkey (Kesmen, 2016; "Morolu Uluslararası Öğrenci Tanışma ve Bilgilendirme Programı," N/A).

Then why do IHH employees responsible from IHH's projects in the Philippines claim that there are no projects in the Philippines that IHH conducted in cooperation with the Turkish state? The reason might be the way those projects are perceived by both IHH and the state. To illustrate, Munawwar Hossain remarked that although there have been several undertakings in which government agencies contributed to IHH's projects -such as TIKA furnishing a school or an orphanage constructed by IHH-, the contribution of the government agency is a separate project than IHH's. These, Hossain argues, are independent projects on the same topic, rather than one cooperative project (Hossain, 2016). Ömer Kesmen describes TIKA's contribution with the words: "When TIKA was entering the region, they wanted their first activities to be in the sphere of education. We [IHH] already had a running orphanage, and we needed computers. They have donated 15 computers each to our orphanage and a school called Dar-ul Ulum Vel Hikme, and also to a school in Manila" (Kesmen, 2016).

It can be argued that the same perception exists in the state agencies as well. For example, TIKA mentions their contribution of a computer laboratory to the IHH's orphanage in a news article on their official website, after mentioning their contribution of a computer laboratory to a Philippine elementary school in Manila and another one in Cotabato. The article implies that TIKA has donated computers to education facilities in the Philippines regardless of the institution to which they belong. The news article does not give the impression that there has been any form of communication between the TIKA and the Turkish NGO ("Filipinler'e Eğitim Alanında Destek Devam Ediyor," 2014).

The same pattern can be seen in another -yet this time actually more cooperative- project. In 2012, IHH and TIKA opened up a Faculty of Agriculture in Somalia as a joint project ("Somali'de Tarım Alanında Kalitenin Artırılmasına Yönelik Çalışmalar Devam Ediyor," 2013). Although the initial news in TIKA's website state that the project is a joint undertaking with IHH ("Somali'de Tarım Alanında Kalitenin Artırılmasına Yönelik Çalışmalar Devam Ediyor," 2013), a later news article on the topic does not mention IHH's name at all. The news article reads: "The project, which started as a small-scale agriculture school with 20 students in 2013, became Anatolia Faculty of Agriculture within the Zemzem University, with the contribution of TIKA" ("Somali Anadolu Ziraat Fakültesine Kapasite Desteği," 2016). Similarly, although an early news article in IHH website mentions that the agricultural school is established in cooperation with TIKA ("Somali'deki Tarım Okulu'muzdan güzel haberler var," 2013), a later news article on the same topic does not mention TIKA. The news article reads: "A first of its kind agriculture school has been established in Somalia by IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. ... The project is an offshoot of Agriculture School project initiated two years ago by IHH and developed into a faculty affiliated to Zemzem University" ("First faculty of agriculture in Somalia," 2014).

To be sure, neither of these institutions tries to hide away the cooperation, as their initial news articles clearly describe the project as a joint undertaking. Besides, during our interview Munawwar Hossain mentioned this project as an example of IHH's cooperation with a government agency (Hossain, 2016). However, the fact that the more recent news articles mention the project as if it was a venture of a single institution reflects Hossain's claim that the governmental and non-governmental institutions tend to see cooperative projects as separate activities, even in a clear case of cooperation such as the case of Somalia.

Although we find a degree of cooperation between the Turkish state and IHH in the case of Mindanao, and in similar other cases, we do not see a joint decision-making mechanism, which the category of *joint manager* implies. Rather, the communication here is a result of independent project cycles. Besides, the failure or success of one project is not attributed to another one. This form of relationship between the state and the NGO, while located near the *joint manager* in the scale of NGO-state relationships, refers to a distinct pattern of interface, which can be called as the *stakeholder*. We can define the *stakeholder* form of interaction as a pattern by which the activity of NGOs is joined by the governments although the end result is considered as a combination of separate undertakings. In this, the government and the NGO cooperate through their independent decision making processes and do not perceive the end result as a joint project.

The importance of having the *stakeholder* category in addition to the *joint manager* is to create a place on the scale of state-NGO relationships, for cooperative projects that are perceived as separate activities by the state and/or the NGO.

#### **2.1.5. The Representative**

One of the recurring forms of interaction in the interviews is what we can name as a *representative* pattern. It is a pattern by which the activity of NGOs has a representative value for their home countries, and indirectly influence the foreign policy outcome of their governments.

The *representative* pattern is arguably the most frequent interface the IHH employs. The interviewees unanimously expressed that they feel they are representing Turkey when operating on the field. IHH's Coordinator of South Asian Countries, Munawwar Hossain said, "When you are on the field, what people see is the Turkish flag in your uniform. People do not know IHH, they know Turkey" (Hossain, 2016). Similarly İzzet Şahin expressed;

We are Turkish. When we go to a country we go there with Turkish passport. And although we have a completely humanitarian and universal agenda, of course, when we sit on a table with some people, they say that they are communicating with an NGO that is coming from Turkey. Surely, our actions in conflict zones have positive effects for Turkey as a country.

Şahin furthermore adds, “Operating in 140 countries, IHH represents the ‘giving hand’ aspect of Turkey. ... Turkey gains international credit from humanitarian actions of its NGOs” (Şahin, 2016).

IHH carries the Turkish flag in all their banners, vests, and uniforms. And they express something akin to national pride in doing so. When talking about cataract surgeries conducted by IHH, İzzet Şahin states, “it is amazing that when they [cataract patients] open their eyes the first things they see are your smile and your flag” (Aras & Akpınar, 2015, p. 11).

Interviewees acknowledge that at times their actions represent the Turkish nation, since on occasion they are the only ones operating in a country under the Turkish flag. IHH’s actions in Somalia are a good illustration of this phenomenon. A country report on Somalia by SETA –a Turkish think tank- reads, “... with the start of the humanitarian aid in 2011, Somalis [sic] sympathy towards Turks has increasingly gained momentum and the locals have reflected this sincere affection by waving Turkish flags upon the arrival of the first Turkish aid workers” (Özkan, 2014, pp. 47-48).

Representative pattern of interface is a common aspect of Turkish non-governmental institutions. Aras & Akpınar (2015, p. 11) claim that, emphasizing ‘representation’ and ‘promotion’ of Turkey as a country is a generic feature of Turkish Humanitarian NGOs. They note that Turkish NGOs are acting consciously of the fact that “their actions often have consequences for Turkey’s image abroad, whether positive or negative” (Aras & Akpınar, 2015, p. 11).

The representative pattern is clearly observable in Mindanao case. Ömer Kesmen, who lives in Cotabato, the capital of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) since 2012, believes that his settling down in Mindanao created a positive image of Turkey among the Moro Muslims. He states:

When we first arrived to the region, they couldn’t believe that a person from Turkey would come here to live, and work for them. They initially had thought that we were Arabs, because previously they have seen Arabs coming to the region for humanitarian work. But in time, they’ve learned that we came from Turkey. Every day they have seen our vehicle driving up and down with a Turkish flag imprinted on it (Kesmen, 2016).

Kesmen adds that every year during Muslim holidays –Ramadan and Qurban-Turkey becomes the main topic of conversation in the region due to the activities of IHH and other Turkish NGOs that operate in the area (Kesmen, 2016).

Although the NGO workers are conscious of their representation of Turkey, and adjust their behavior accordingly, it does not necessitate them to align with Turkish political stance when operating abroad. Hüseyin Oruç emphasized this point when he talked on IHH's role in the TPMT,

“If tomorrow Turkey needs to take a political position that might not be agreeable to Moro Muslims, we [IHH] need to stand by the Moro Muslims, because this is our mission. Representing Turkey is not our mission. We are for sure representing Turkey wherever we are, but our responsibility detaches us from being a representative of Turkey.”

The difference in political stance that Oruç mentioned is not a hypothetical one. Indeed, IHH maintained its high profile involvement in the TPMT, although, according to Oruç, Turkey had altered its involvement in the Mindanao peace process, by changing to a low profile within both the Independent Decommissioning Body and the International Contact Group. The change in Turkey's stance was due to the critiques regarding its domestic policies against the Kurdish peace process, which had been pointing out the different attitudes Turkey had developed towards the Moro Muslims and the Kurdish (Oruç, 2016).

Admittedly, representing Turkey as a country, and representing the Turkish state is not the same thing, despite the fact that the two types of representation undeniably influence one another. Having said that, representing the country is not clearly distinguishable from representing the state, especially in the context of humanitarian diplomacy. The difference is clear in terms of legal basis. IHH's acts do not legally bind the Turkish state, and IHH is not accountable for its independent acts neither in the name of Turkish state nor the nation. Oruç underlines this legal point when talking about national representation,

We are representing Turkey and it does not bother me. However, it's not my duty. It is the duty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because they are the ones who are accountable for their deeds. I cannot be held accountable for my deeds as a TPMT member, as far as the Turkish foreign policy is concerned. If we make a mistake there, it is the mistake of IHH, not the Turkish state (Oruç, 2016).



Nevertheless, IHH's independent activities, which are carried out under the Turkish flag, have a considerable effect on Turkish foreign policy. For instance, the signature event of IHH -the one that made IHH as well known in the Muslim world as it is today-, the Mavi Marmara incident (Oruç, 2016), paved the way for a significant change in Turkish foreign policy regarding Israel. Hüsrev Tabak remarked on the effect of Mavi Marmara, "This incident also influenced Turkey's foreign policy, as it set the relationship between Turkey and Israel at odds, eventually making Turkey a confident third party in the Middle East, one that declared ownership over the Palestinian issue" (Tabak, 2015, p. 202). The diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey went downhill after Mavi Marmara, until June 2016, when the two countries signed an agreement to restore the bilateral relationships.

The effect of *representative* pattern on the Turkish foreign policy is not limited to unplanned tragic events. Hüsrev Tabak claims, "In Turkey, civil society has played a pioneering role in working towards restoring the bonds with other predominately Muslim countries/communities that had been practically broken by the Kemalist regime" (Tabak, 2015, p. 195). On a similar basis, Munawwar Hossain, for example, believes that the aid that IHH has been continuously delivering to the Rakhine state in Myanmar over the years has created a positive image of Turkey among the residents of the country (Hossain, 2016).

Although the interviewees claim that the representative pattern occurs because the local population is unable to differentiate between an independent NGO and its workers' national identity (Hossain, 2016; Oruç, 2016; Şahin, 2016), one can argue that the representation is not a mere perception of people who are not familiar with IHH as an independent NGO. Both the IHH executives and their non-Turkish official counterparts seem to share this perception on some occasions. For instance, when talking about IHH's diplomatic and humanitarian role in Libya, İzzet Şahin stated: "IHH's presence in Libya compensates for the slow functioning bureaucratic mechanism of Ankara, in the name of Turkish Nation" (Şahin, 2016). Clearly, this argument presents IHH as an organization fulfilling a duty for the Turkish nation that could otherwise have been fulfilled by the state.

On a similar note, Hüseyin Oruç mentioned that IHH lobbied for the participation of Turkish state in the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB). He used these words to pitch the idea to Turkish officials: "Turkey must be a part of IDB. It is already a member of International Contact Group. And now there is a responsibility in the

TPMT. IDB is a crucial position” (Oruç, 2016). Although Oruç later emphasized that TPMT is an independent position and Turkey, as the state has no saying or effect in it, nevertheless he considers ICG, IDB and TPMT as positions strengthening the involvement of Turkey in the Philippine peace process.

Apart from the IHH executives, the people and institutions that closely work with IHH also share this perception of representation. For example, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), an official agency established by the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, has mentioned IHH as a part of Turkey’s help to Bangsamoro:

TIKA is a primary instrument of the Turkey’s government proactive foreign policy. The country has been extending various assistances to Bangsamoro through other organizations like the İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH) that is supporting BDA for the management of orphanage for Moro orphans, Ramadhan program and Qurban program with Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV), among others ("Sustainable projects for Bangsamoro underway thru TIKA support," 2016).

Likewise, the MILF’s understanding of IHH-Turkey relationship is no different than the BDA’s. The Chairman of MILF El-Hajj Murad Ebrahim considers the IHH’s role as complementary to the Turkish state. In a speech he stated, “Turkey [the Turkish government] runs the political side of the [peace] process while the IHH runs the humanitarian” (Tabak, 2015, p. 210).

Hence, there are cases in which the employees of the NGO, their official counterparts, and the people on the field perceive IHH as a representative of the Turkish nation. Moreover, although IHH follows its own humanitarian and diplomatic agenda on the field, its activities might influence the foreign policy of Turkey. As demonstrated above, the Mindanao case is one of the examples in which the *representative* pattern of interface is employed. IHH’s work as a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team, and as a humanitarian NGO is perceived as an extension of the Turkish involvement in the peace process.

It is important, however, to note that in *representative* pattern, representation is not a result of an understanding between the state and the NGO. It is rather the representation of the country, which has indirect consequences for the state. However, the *representative* pattern affects the behavior of the NGO workers on the field, and more importantly it creates new opportunities or threats for the foreign policy of the state. The identification of the *representative* category is important, as it enables one to

distinguish between NGO activities that have no representative value, or consequences for a state -such as activities of the Greenpeace or Doctors Without Borders-, and the ones that have.

### 3. The Limitations

The general limitations and the scope of the study have been discussed in the first chapter. In this chapter, the limitations that are elaborated in the first chapter will be revisited and the particular limitations that arise from the method and sample of this research will be discussed.

*Firstly*, this study of NGO-state relationships is, although generalizable to similar cases, time and context-specific. The political culture of Turkey and historical development of civil societies in this country have a significant impact on the types of relationships that Turkish NGOs develop vis-à-vis the state. Hence, the relationships explored here do not exhaust the spectrum, notwithstanding the fact that they have an important place there.

*Secondly*, this study does not talk about the prevalence of the types of relationships. Therefore, although all the categories of interface that exist in the IHH-Turkey case, namely *the kick-starter*, *the joint manager*, *the stakeholder*, and *the representative*, are given equal emphasis in this study, one must note that some of these patterns might be employed very frequently while the others are rarer. Nevertheless, all the types of relationships discussed here are supported with multiple examples to make sure that they refer to a pattern of interface rather than a one-time conduct.

Although these conditions limit the scope of this study, they are by no means a shortcoming of this research, since this research aims to explore all possible patterns of interface, and therefore even the infrequent and/or context-specific cases are relevant.

*Thirdly*, this study explores the state-NGO interaction only from the side of the NGO. The examples and narratives provided are coming from one side, although reiterated by multiple interviewees who work in different departments. To avoid any biases, the information given is supported by outside sources, such as official websites and newspaper articles, when possible. Moreover, the two patterns of interface, namely *the kick-starter* and *the representative* are defined only by the perceptions and aims of the NGO, and do not require any input from the state side. Nonetheless, talking to the Turkish state might have enabled us to reach more definitive conclusions on the agent,

joint-manager and stakeholder patterns. As mentioned earlier, this drawback is compensated to a degree by involving official websites of government agencies and online news items. Yet again, involving the state and other actors such as the MILF and the Philippine state might have led us to the exploration of new patterns. This remains as a road to take for future research.

*Fourthly*, it is important to note that questioning the cooperation between IHH and Turkish state might be alluding to a sensitive debate for IHH employees and consequently the responses might be given in a way to eliminate the idea of any form of cooperation. To elaborate, during the interview when asked about whether IHH undertook any projects commissioned by the Turkish state, Izzet Şahin, the head of IHH's Humanitarian Diplomacy Department, commented that very often they receive similar questions inquiring whether IHH works for the government. He stated, "IHH's Humanitarian Diplomacy Department receives around 1000 annual visits from abroad by journalists, diplomats, academics, researchers and so on. The most asked questions by the visitors are 'what is the relationship between IHH and the Turkish government' and 'does IHH work for the Turkish government'" (Şahin, 2016). He adds that he sometimes jokingly responds asking whether they receive all the questions from one source, as even the order of the questions is the same. Şahin argues that it is normal that people have such a perception. For, people are not used to seeing an NGO working independently of the state. He remarks, "in the East there is not a single NGO that can operate outside of the will of their governments, and in the West, although the NGOs are theoretically independent, since they receive their funding from the state, it is not easy for western NGOs to cross the lines drawn by their states" (Şahin, 2016).

In order to demonstrate the independent nature of IHH, Şahin states that IHH had publicly criticized various government policies concerning Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine. According to Şahin, public criticism is an important indicator of independence as it is a very rare phenomenon among NGOs both in the West and East to publicly criticize their home states due to their dependence on state funding and/or lack of democratic culture (Şahin, 2016).

From Şahin's comments it is understood that IHH has been dealing with establishing its public image as an independent NGO, as they consider that the automatic perception of outsiders is to think of it subordinate to the state. So it would not be unrealistic to expect that the interviewees would emphasize non-cooperation with the state more than cooperation in their answers. However, despite this, the fact that we

have found all patterns of cooperative relationships between the Turkish state and IHH, except for the *agent* pattern, demonstrates that the cooperative relationships can only be more various between these actors, but not less. And, as explained above, the absence of the *agent* pattern is attributed more to a lack of demand from the state side than a resolution on the topic from IHH.

*And lastly*, this research can only explore the observable cooperation of state and NGO. Considering that we are exploring diplomacy, chances are that some patterns of interaction take place behind closed doors, and they are not observable to outside researchers.

#### 4. Conclusion

The *kick-starter* and *joint manager* patterns of interaction that Cooper and Hocking (2000) defined exist between IHH and the Turkish state in the Philippines case, while the *Agent* pattern is absent. In addition to these categories, two distinct patterns of interactions are observed and defined in the Philippines case, namely the *stakeholder* and the *representative*.

It is important to note that the forms of relationships argued in this chapter do not necessarily refer to well-defined and clearly distinct categories. Each case brings its own ad hoc element to the relationship between state and NGO. However, this categorization is significant in understanding often-ignored forms of government-NGO interface. Cooper & Hocking states,

Thus, the relationship does not manifest itself in consistent patterns. Rather, there is a considerable ad hoc element built into the dynamic, with a great deal of short-term assessment as to the benefits of developing relationships on an issue-by-issue basis. In overall terms this pattern remains fuzzy, fragmentary and awkward, but nevertheless vital and important. Contacts and coalitions are built in an improvised manner and a premium is placed on bargaining and flexible arrangements (Cooper & Hocking, 2000, p. 370).

## CHAPTER 4

### THE CONCLUSION

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#### 1. The Discussion on Findings

This research intended to find the existing patterns of relationship between the Turkish government and IHH in the Mindanao peace process. It furthermore aimed to introduce ‘perceptions’ into the study of NGO-state relationship as a criterion of categorization. To this end, this study was constructed around three hypotheses. Those are:

4. We can observe all three types of NGO-state relationships, *namely kick-starter, agent, and joint manager*, in the Mindanao peace process between IHH and the Turkish state.
5. We can identify new categories of relationship between IHH and the Turkish state that lies outside of the three-fold categorization of Cooper & Hocking (2000).
6. Outsiders’ perceptions on IHH’s activities transform the patterns of relationship that the NGO develops vis-à-vis the state.

The analysis of the data proved the first hypothesis wrong. Although the *kick-starter* and the *joint manager* forms of relationship exist in the Mindanao case, we couldn’t find any evidence on the existence of the *agent* pattern.

The second hypothesis, on the other hand, is proven to be correct in this case study. The particularities of the IHH-Turkey relationship in the Philippines case have created new forms of interface that lie outside of Cooper & Hocking’s (2000) categorization. First, we have found a cooperative relationship that looks similar to the *joint manager* pattern as far as the outcomes of the cooperation are concerned. However, the difference is that, in this new pattern both actors, i.e. the state and the NGO, tend to see the

relationship outside of the cooperative frame. They rather perceive the outcome as a combination of two separate projects. Consequently, the end result is advertised as an undertaking of a single institution rather than a cooperative endeavor. We have identified this distinct pattern of interface as the *stakeholder*. Secondly, this research has demonstrated that the independent activities of NGOs can be attributed to the country they belong to. This attribution occurs not only in the minds of people who are unfamiliar with the identity of the NGO, but also in the minds of partner institutions, and even of the NGO workers. People are inclined to perceive activities of some NGOs as a representation of the attitudes of the NGO's home country. This representation is not a result of an agreement between the state and the NGO. However, it does influence the way the NGO workers act on the field, and the image of the state abroad. We identified this distinct pattern of interface as the *representative*.

With the identification of the *representative* pattern, the third hypothesis was also proven right. The *representative* pattern was born merely out of the outsiders' perception of the NGO activities as representative of the nation. The existence of this perception transforms the meaning of the activities on the field, and their effect on the country's foreign policy. As much as the *representative* pattern is a result of outsiders' perception, the *stakeholder* pattern is of insiders' perception. Thus, the identification of these two categories introduces 'perception' as a criterion for categorization of NGO-state relationships.

## **2. The Implications of the Research**

This research's main contributions are to diversify Cooper & Hocking's (2000) threefold categorization, to identify new points on the continuum of state-NGO relationships, and to introduce 'perception' as a measure of categorization.

The identification of the *stakeholder* and the *representative* patterns of interface brings about certain implications. First, the *stakeholder* pattern illustrates that the state and the NGO can contribute to the same projects without forming a cooperative communication in a conventional sense. Hence, establishing a *stakeholder* pattern of communication may enable NGOs to get contribution from the state in the contexts in which the state do not want to be seen in cooperation with the NGO. The existence of this category necessitates the researchers to study not only projects as cooperative outcomes but also the communication processes between NGOs and states to determine

whether it is a *joint manager* pattern or the *stakeholder* pattern. With the identification of this category, the projects that are formerly evaluated outside of a cooperative relationship pattern can now be placed on the spectrum of state NGO relationships.

The *representative* pattern, on the other hand, comes with greater implications. We have found that the independent activities of NGOs might construct a positive or negative image for their home countries. This image can present the state as a friend, benefactor, caring state etc. in a foreign country, and might create possibilities for diplomatic involvements such as an official position within a peace process. Hence, the *representative* pattern of interface might affect the foreign policy of the home state. Therefore, being aware of the *representative* interface, and adjusting attitudes accordingly might enable states to take maximum advantage from it in the foreign policy.

### 3. Further Research

A significant result of this research is the identification of the *representative* and the *stakeholder* patterns in the case of Mindanao peace process. Now, additional research is needed in order to find the existence of these categories in various other cases, and consequently elaborate them further.

For the *representative* pattern, the types of NGOs, and NGO activities that pave the way for the representation of the country should be analyzed.

In this case study the *representative* pattern existed in a context in which the agenda of the NGO is more or less in line with the foreign policy objectives of the home state. The opposite cases of the *representative* pattern, i.e. the cases in which the agenda of the NGO is in contrast with the foreign policy of the home state, must be studied in order to understand the scope of the effects of the *representative* pattern.

Moreover, in this research, the state representatives are not interviewed. A further research studying the perceptions of the state representatives might also discover new patterns of interface between NGO and the state.

Furthermore, this research did not study the prevalence of the types of interface between IHH and Turkey. A further study of prevalence would help us explore the nature of the relationship between IHH and Turkey in humanitarian diplomacy.

Finally, the findings of this research hints at the importance of the political culture on the formation of NGO-state relationships. A cross-country analysis of NGO-state



relationships might demonstrate the influence of political culture, history of civil society development, and other variables on the patterns of relationship that NGOs develop vis-à-vis the state.



## APPENDIX

### The Guiding Questions for the Semi-Structured Interviews

Below are the pool of questions that are asked during the interviews as guiding questions. Each participant are asked a different combination of these questions based on their field of work and past experience. Being semi-structured, the interviews were not limited to the questions indicated here.

1. Can you describe the activities of IHH as a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team?
2. How did IHH got nominated for the TPMT? Was there a role of its previous activities in the Philippines in this nomination?
3. Did IHH get more opportunities in humanitarian diplomacy after its role in Mindanao?
4. Do you believe that you represent Turkey when you operate abroad on humanitarian or diplomatic capacity?
  - a. If yes, does such an awareness lead you to behave accordingly?
5. Do you believe that the actions of IHH in the Philippines effected the Turkish foreign policy in any way?
6. The Turkish government is also taking part in the Mindanao Peace Process. Do you communicate with Turkish officials regarding the peace process?
  - a. If yes, can you describe this communication.
  - b. If yes, how often do you communicate?
7. Are there any opportunities or threats for the Turkish state that you have detected while working on the field in the Philippines, and reported to the Turkish officials?

8. Did IHH play any role in the nomination of Turkey as a chair of the Independent Decommissioning Body?
9. Did IHH undertake any projects in the Philippines that are commissioned by the Turkish state?
10. Do you recall any projects that have been brought to the attention of IHH by the Turkish state agencies, particularly in the case of Philippines?
11. Are there any joint-projects in the Philippines that are conducted in cooperation with the Turkish state or state agencies?
12. How is the relationship between IHH and the Manila Branch of TIKA. Have you ever conducted a joint project?
13. TIKA has donated computers to an orphanage of IHH. How did this donation occur. Was it a cooperative project?
14. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) have been providing scholarships to the students from Mindanao. Does IHH have any role in this process?

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