A COMPARATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEE EDUCATION: TURKEY AND LEBANON

IS IT LIKELY TO DESIGN
"A STANDARDISED EDUCATION FOR ALL?"

by
ASLIHAN ALKURT

Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Sabanci University
August 2016

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APPROVED BY:

Assoc. Prof. İzak Atiyas
(Thesis Supervisor)

Assoc. Prof. Ozan Bakis

Assist. Prof. Gökçe Uysal

DATE OF APPROVAL: 05.08.2016

ABSTRACT

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ASLIHAN ALKURT

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Supervisor: Assoc. Prof İzak Atiyas

Keywords: Refugee Education, Syrian Refugee Children, Policy Analysis, Policies on
Refugee Education

The ongoing Syrian Civil War is so destructive and threatening that an overwhelming
majority of Syrian dwellers have fled to Turkey and Lebanon. Today, these countries
comprise the highest Syrian populations, respectively. The majority of Syrian population,
children, requires special attention to their access to education since most are out of
schooling in the host countries. Syrian children are in need of certain skills, abilities, and
knowledge, so as to reconstruct the largely damaged institutions and public provision in
their home countries during the post-war period. In respect of these preconditions of the
reconstruction, this study examines the Turkish and Lebanese policies on refugee
education to identify the current educational profiles of Syrian students based upon
instruction they participate in. As a qualitative study, this research deploys comparative
case studies and examines Turkish and Lebanese policies for Syrian refugees. This study
shows that the Lebanese government plays an active role in providing education through
its tailor-made education policies. Although Turkey and Lebanon have very similar
structures in refugee governance, their educational supplies differ from one another to a
larger extent. Three educational categories are formed on the basis of the analysis. The
term "educationless" (1) refers to Syrian children with no access and certificate to formal
education in the host countries, whereas the term "informeducational" covers children
with only certificates of informal education. Thirdly, a "super-educated" group consists
of children with a diploma or transcript from their last attended institutions.

ÖZET

KARŞILAŞTIRMALI SURİYE MÜLTECİ EĞİTİM POLİTİKALARI ANALİZİ: TÜRKİYE VE LÜBNAN VAKALARI KAPSAMLI BİR STANDARTLAŞTIRILMIŞ EĞİTİM MODELİNİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ MÜMKÜN MÜ?

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ASLIHAN ALKURT

Kamu Politikaları, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ağustos 2016

Tez Danışmanı: İzak Atiyas

Anahtar sözcükler: Mülteci Eğitimi, Suriye Mülteci Çocuklar, Politika Analizi, Mülteci Eğitim Politikaları

Devam etmekte olan Suriye Savaşı öylesine yıkıcı ve tehditkardır ki Suriye halkının büyük bir çoğunluğu, Türkiye ve Lübnan'a sığınmıştır. Bugün, Türkiye ve Lübnan en büyük Suriyeli mülteci popülasyonlarına ev sahipliği yapan iki ülkedir. Savaşın başından beri eğitime tam anlamıyla entegre olamadıklarından, büyük çoğunluğunu çocukların oluşturduğu Suriyeli mültecilerin eğitime erişim olanakları bu çalışma kapsamında detaylandırılmıştır. Çocukların, savaş sonrası dönemde kendi ülkelerinde büyük ölçüde zarar görmüş kurumların yeniden yapılandırılması için de belirli bir düzeyde beceri, yetenek ve bilgiyi kazanmaları gerekmektedir. Bu çalışma, mülteci çocukların ev sahibi ülkelerde katıldıkları eğitimleri baz alarak şu anki eğitim profillerinin çıkarılmasını hedeflemektedir. Bunu yaparken Türkiye ve Lübnan mülteci eğitimleri ve politikaları da incelenmektedir. Bu çalışma kapsamında, Lübnan'ın mülteci eğitimi politikalarında aktif bir rol oynadığını ortaya çıkarmıştır. Türkiye ve Lübnan mülteci yönetişim çok benzer yapılara sahip olmalarına rağmen, eğitim hizmetleri büyük ölçüde birbirinden farklılaşır. Çalışmadaki analizler doğrultusunda üç eğitim kategorisi oluşturulmuştur. "Educationless" çocuklar ya hiç eğitim almamış veya resmi olmayan bir eğitime katılmışlardır. "Informeducational" ise resmi setifikalı bir yaygın eğitimi tanımlamaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, "super-educated" grup son katıldığı kurumdan diploma veya transkript hakkı kazanmış çocuklardan oluşur.

To my beloved mother - Ilknur, my lovely sister - Ecehan,
and my spiritual sister - Mamuna

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Prepare the list of abbreviations in a dictionary order as follows:

AFAD: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

ALP: Accelerated Learning Programme

ECE: Early Childhood Education

GER: Gross Enrolment Ratio

GIGM: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Migration Management

INEE: International Network for Education in Emergencies

MoNE: Ministry of National Education, Republic of Turkey

MEHE: Ministry of Education and Higher Education

MoN: Memorandum of Understanding

NET: Net Enrolment Ratio

NFE: Non-Formal Education

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

TDV: Türk Diyanet Vakfı

TL: Turkish Liras (currency)

UN: The United Nations

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

The Syrian Civil War, which began as an uprising in March 2011, turned into a social conflict between the Assad government and pro-democracy supporters. The government could not put the brakes on the nationwide protests insisting on President Assad's resignation. Thousands of people revolted against his totalitarian regime across the country. The group of pro-democracy supporters took up arms against the soldiers of the Assad government. In the beginning, the group were involved in clashes with the soldiers to defend themselves and their families, and shortly afterwards this defence activated the formation of local security forces. The country was plunged into the civil war. Both sides attempted to take hold of the locations, including cities and towns. The conflict resulted in more than one-armed conflagration across Syria. The civilians who did not join these local battles in their regions began migrating their hometowns to other cities or fleeing the country entirely. As a result, internally and externally displaced populations have appeared both in and outside the country.

Within the framework of humanitarian assistance, neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt let Syrians in as the live-saving aid. Their populations have reached extreme limits in the refugee-hosting countries, particularly Turkey and Lebanon, since the start of the civil war. Both are overburdened with the refugee populations and provision of basic services for them. The overall population of externally displaced Syrians have already exceeded 4.5 million[1], the majority of whom consists of children and women. UNHCR estimates that only children and women are comprised of nearly 70% of this population. With regard to the size of Syrian population by country, Turkey encompasses approximately 2.8 million[2] asylum seekers, whereas Lebanon has received

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[1] Source: The World Bank
2 Source: AFAD (2016), AFAD stands for Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency.

around 1.5 million[3], including both "registered" and "unregistered" Syrians. Considering that the general population of Lebanon, including its refugee audiences, is nearly 6 million today, a quarter of the population is composed of only externally displaced Syrians. In May 2015, Lebanon pronounced that it discontinued mandating the registration of Syrians fleeing their country. As of the second half of 2015, UNHCR registered none of Syrian refugees on behalf of the Lebanese government.

With respect to age distribution, El-Ghali, Ghalayini & Ismail (2016) report that a majority of Syrians is children aged 0 to 18. Apart from this population of refugee children, AFAD[4] also states that there are approximately 150,000 new-born Syrian infants in Turkey. These babies populate in both refugee camps and urban settings today. The government has serious difficulties in looking after those in the urban settings because they neither settle in particular places in the provinces nor manage a life under the supervision of the central government. Even local authorities are incapable of precisely determining where they accommodate in cities. In the beginning, the Turkish authorities intended to keep the Syrian refugee population under control by placing them in refugee camps. For this reason, 25 refugee camps have been constructed and bolstered with service provision, including literacy courses, health centres, and cafeterias (Emin, 2016). Violence, nonetheless, escalated in the Syrian war and a higher number of Syrians were accepted to cross into Turkey. Regarding the growing population of refugees, Turkey also expanded Syrians' access to urbanisation by re-regulating the existing refugee laws in 2013. Today, only 10% of the Syrian asylum seekers are benefitting from the facilities and services in refugee camps, whereas the rest depend on their personal possessions in the urban life, which has resulted in the implementation of the newly recognised concept into Turkey's context: urban refugee.

Any types of displacement may lead mass populations to move to other lands internally and externally; nevertheless, their destination does not necessarily have to involve them in a refugee-camping, protected, and service-supplied area. Large numbers of asylum seekers are obliged to adapt themselves to urban contexts through the challenging and insufficient situations, particularly in the countries where do not provide

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3 Source: Brekke (2015)

4 AFAD is the governmental agency which is responsible for the registration of Syrian refugees on behalf of the Turkish government.

them with the camping facilities (UNHCR, 2009). Consequently, they are very often exposed to a range of protection risks. For instance, urban refugees live under the threat of arrest and detention, refoulement, harassment, exploitation, discrimination, inadequate and overcrowded shelter, as well as vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), HIV-AIDS, human smuggling and trafficking (UNHCR, 2009). On the other hand, basic services such as shelters, education, and health are systematically delivered to in-camp residents by the governmental agencies in charge of service provision for refugees. Although these vulnerable people are provided with fewer opportunities to sustain their vital activities based upon a limited set of resources in a camp area, standard and long-term welfare is customarily presented to them. This is because the whole service provision is constantly carried out under the supervision of the state rather than based upon individual subscription.

Both externally and internally displaced Syrian children have been struggling to access education since the conflict erupted. In the "Crisis Report" that UNICEF published in March 2013, both groups of children were introduced to global communities as the risk of a "Lost Generation" (UNICEF, 2013). This UN agency has pronounced that Syrian children have access to quality education in neither Syria nor refugee-hosting countries. Seeing that the host countries prioritised life-saving interventions and humanitarian assistance such as shelters, nutrition and health services, they could produce late responds to the educational needs of children. Moreover, the number of children with no access to education has been gradually going up with the new-borns. For instance, Syrian children who were born in the first year of the conflict are 5 years old today. In Turkey, five-year children participate in compulsory education, which starts with primary education.[5] So, five-year Syrian children already became latecomers for Early Childhood Education. Their current situations require an urgent government intervention so as to involve these children in primary education as immediate as possible. Those in the other host countries are also in the same danger. Unless Syrian children are instantly exposed to education somehow, there will be no next generations for future Syria who are capable of reconstructing the systematically destroyed infrastructure, public services, and institutions during the post-war period.

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[5] MEB prompts five-year children to receive primary education within the regulation of the 4+4+4 education system.

The provision of educational services is of great significance to Syrian refugee learners, regardless of their status- urban or in-camp. Nevertheless, the content of training to which they may potentially be exposed also needs particular attention to determine both individual and societal needs, and fulfil these needs and requirements accordingly. Inspired by the logic and mentality of CEN & CENELEC[6], this paper also questions the possibility of standardised education for Syrian refugees. In matters of this type of training, the level of education is required to be carefully tailored to these target audiences due to the strategic importance of standardisation.[7] Within the context of education for Syrian refugees, this strategic importance can be interpreted as the accomplishment of certain skills, abilities, and knowledge. It does not mean that all Syrian learners should be trained with the same instructional concerns, objectives, and tools but that the authorities can ensure the core curriculum, including the basic abilities and competence, is transferred to these refugee children. Thus, no matter how long the civil war lasts in Syria will refugee children have achieved the pre-determined and targeted basic skills. In other words, their achievements are required not only to sustain welfare among individuals in host communities but also to support the post-war Syria with an educated generation. From this viewpoint, this study does not express any remarks on Syrians' return from their host countries. There is no focus on whether Syrian refugees should go back to their home country at the end of the Syrian conflict. Instead, this research aims to evaluate all the scenarios and contexts concerning Syrian refugee education in host countries. Within the framework of the existing refugee educations, it also seeks to make several inferences regarding the post-war Syrian generations in educational terms.

As one of the internationally recognised basic rights, education should also be supplied to refugees in emergencies. Access and quality of this supply may vary across host countries and sizes of the target group. Nevertheless, the displaced must be provided with the educational services under any circumstances. At the very beginning, most stakeholders envisaged that the Syrian conflict was terminated in a short period of time and refugees were not permitted to adapt themselves into the systems of the host countries to a larger degree. By the second year of the conflict, neither basic infrastructure nor

[6] This refers to the collaboration of the European Committees for Standardisation.
[7] CEN & CENELEC (http://www.cencenelec.eu/standards/Education/Pages/default.aspx 01.06.2016 - 10.10)

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public service had been available for Syrian citizens, a vast majority of whom were already internally displaced in the country. The realisation soon afterwards dawned that Syrians were going to be devoid of the educational services for a longer period of time that it was expected. As a response to this long-term education deprivation, both host countries and supranational organisations mostly remained indifferent and could not take an immediate action to Syrians' urgent needs of education. Upon the provision of educational services for Syrians, policy implementers have pretended to take into consideration both access and quality in theory since the beginning, not in practice. Their late responses are mostly designed based upon access to education rather than quality education. For instance, most studies on refugee education of the host countries have devoted their full attention to the analysis of the current numbers of Syrian participants in schools. According to the findings of these studies, if the student enrolment rate is high enough in a host country, its educational service delivery is considered as sufficient, regardless of the content of education.

Analysing the recent regulations and amendments about refugee governance in Turkey, it seems clearly that this country has mostly followed the "non-intervention" policy on Syrian refugees since the beginning. As a reason for this policy, all the uncertainties about the Syrian conflict might lead Turkey not to produce durable and long-term answers to refugee education, but interim solutions such as vocational and life-skills education in refugee camps. Similar to Turkey, the Lebanese authorities have also intervened in refugee education as one of the latecomers; however, they prefer a different way to integrate these Syrian children into the instructional activities and allow these children to somehow participate in Lebanese public schools. Although the refugee participation in the Lebanese school used to be unavailable to refugees across the country due to the limited capacities, Syrians have been able to attend formal education through the amendments that the Lebanese government has reregulated in matters of refugee education. Apart from the participation in schooling, Syrians have been exposed to a huge variety of education provided by Syrian private schools in Turkey. These schools are not recognised as the official institutions by the Turkish authorities. but in the category of informal education providers. The certification offered by these private institutions, therefore, gain neither a universally recognised status nor nationwide validity due to the lack of the customised, refugee-specific, and formal curricula. Furthermore, the content of these Syrian schools have not been scrutinised under the supervision of the Ministry

of National Education (MoNE). They educate Syrian students based upon the different components of the Syrian National Curriculum. Different from this variety, a group of Syrians in the Turkish public schools are required to learn the pre-determined and standardised subjects in the Turkish National Curriculum even though they are unable perform in the host language (Turkish), mostly used as medium of instruction in Turkish public schools. All in all, these examples indicate that Turkey and Lebanon provide the different types of education for their Syrian refugee children to a larger extent. In other words, Syrian child refugees can currently access education through the different resources and educational models in Lebanon and Turkey.

1.1.1. Refugee Policy Context

The main reason for the different types of refugee education is directly related to the refugee governance systems of the host countries. "Refugee governance" shapes the government approaches and policies to asylum seekers in general. With respect to budgeting, planning, and resource allocation, governments intend to produce a number of policies which are designed to fulfil the refugee needs and expectations. Similar to refugee governance, the refugee history of the host country is also of immense significance to the formation of the necessary strategies for service provision. This history incorporates certain international agreements, treaties, or limitations into the refugee admission procedure that host countries are required to implement into their existing political systems. In this regard, the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees are the globally recognised, legal document that provides the definition "refugee" and structures the refugee rights within the legal frameworks. The Convention regards "non-refoulement" as the core principle and determines the legal obligations accordingly. As the implementer, UNHCR executes the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol in the ordinary course of refugee status. Within the context of these legal documents, collaboration must be established among all stakeholders so as to guarantee that refugee rights are recognised and guarded.[8] These treaties preserve the rights of the bindingness and enforceability of a unilateral promise. The Member Nations of this promise are required to adopt the requisites accordingly.

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[8] Access on http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html (21.07.2016 15.15)

As the Syrian refugee-hosting countries, Lebanon and Turkey have also determined their policies on externally displaced Syrians based upon their own refugee governance systems. The following section explains how Lebanon and Turkey have shaped their Syrian refugee policies and under what circumstances they have determined service provision for these displaced people. Within the framework of refugee governance, Lebanon and Turkey have already constructed the means of delivering certain services. Therefore, this part elaborates on the general framework of refugee governance in Lebanon and Turkey separately.

1.1.1.1. Lebanese Context of Syrian Refugees

Lebanese refugee policies have been shaped grounded in the principle of "no refugee law" to a larger extent (Hamdan&Khater, 2015). The population of Lebanon mostly currently consists of Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian refugees as well as Lebanese nationals. As can be understood from its rich demographic structure, this refugee-hosting country has experienced many refugee-specific issues in recent history. With reference to the Constitution, Lebanon repudiates to acknowledge the refugee status for the newcomers, regardless of protection and emergencies. In other words, the externally displaced are not permitted either to accommodate in Lebanon or benefit from the basic services provided for citizens by law.

Lebanon recognises neither the 1951 Convention nor its 1967 Protocol related to the refugee status and rights. Although it opted not to become part of the Convention and its Protocol, Lebanon signed several internationally recognised legal documents concerning migration such as the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (1972), the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment (2000) and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1995) (Hamdan&Khater, 2015). These agreements prompt Lebanon to adopt the principles of humanitarian assistance and temporary protection. In this context, temporary protection refers to "non-refoulement", which prevents vulnerable asylum seekers from deporting

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back to their native country. Within its context, UNHCR aims to provides refugees with secure return to their countries in the post-war period.

As mentioned above, the Lebanese Constitution and regulations decline to nominate the externally displaced to the "refugee" status, including displaced Syrians. Nevertheless, in order to eliminate the challenges of the "Syrian refugee" problem, Lebanon has already implemented a number of ad hoc policies on the refugee status since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. For example, it made a few constitutional amendments to the "refugee" article, called the "1962 Law Regulating the Entry, Stay, and Exit", so that Syrians can legally cross into Lebanon with the "displaced" status (Hamdan&Khater, 2015). This law places special emphasis on the obligation of non-refoulement and guarantees that Lebanon must provide protection and security for those fleeing the Syrian conflict (Hamdan&Khater, 2015). Nevertheless, this new regulation has expectedly put many more burdens on the authorities to fulfil Syrians' needs for access to basic services. From a case-specific perspective, Lebanon refers to the re-definition or activation of the previous treaties that it signed with UNHCR and puts into action the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) accordingly. The Memorandum has been implemented to offer protection and service provision to displaced Syrians in Lebanon. With the significantly inclusive initiative, the government facilitates the admission of Syrians at the level of the temporary status and expands the range of service provision to a larger extent. Therefore, MoN still identifies Lebanon as a temporary settlement rather than an asylum country and does not entitles displaced people to "a permanent stay" at all.[9]

Requirements of the temporary status are acknowledged and implemented under the supervision of UNHRC, which works in cooperation with the relevant Lebanese Governmental Agency (General Security Office).[10] Thanks to their collaboration, displaced Syrians are able to benefit from the provision of educational services based upon the international standards. Here, UNHCR functions as both a service provider and

9 Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of General Security (Republic of Lebanon) and the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, concerning the processing of cases of asylum-seekers applying for refugee status with the UNHCR Office, Sept. 9, 2003.
10 According to the MOU with UNHCR "UNHCR provides the necessary assistance to refugees holding temporary circulation permits ... in order to avoid that those refugees be forced to violate the national laws or constitute a burden on the Lebanese Government."' Akram, Suzan. Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing. Boston: Boston University, n.d.

policy-implementer. In other words, this UN agency for refugees is, on the one hand, required to pursue the government regulations and policies, and implement them into the existing system within the limits of the host country laws accordingly. On the other hand, the agency also supplies additional services to the demand of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, wherever necessary. Moreover, UNHCR is also supposed to update the contemporary changes in refugee population by systematically collecting quantitative data concerning the official and unofficial refugee registration. Hamdan & Khater (2015) report that the UN refugee agency also bears responsibilities for interpreting the data and reporting to public opinion across the world, and promoting the level of effectiveness of basic service provision in Lebanon, including education, protection, and health.

1.1.1.2. Turkish Context of Syrian Refugees

The Turkish government emphasises that both Islamic brotherhood [11] and humanitarian assistance require the provision of protection for externally displaced Syrians. Therefore, Turkey has followed the "open-door" policy which metaphorically defines Turkey's strategy for vulnerable Syrians. Based upon this policy, all displaced Syrian in need of protection have been admitted to Turkey since the beginning. In 2012, there were only 100,000 externally displaced people in the region, whereas, this number became 800,000 by April 2013 (Ahmadoun, 2014). At the end of the same year, this number doubled to 1.6 million. Today, more than 2.8 million Syrians are accommodating in Turkey in accordance with the AFAD records; however, the recent population has been estimated to be higher with unregistered refugees (AFAD, 2016). On the other hand, Turkey has neither withdrawn its open door policy on Syrian admission nor re-regulated this policy with the particular restrictions since the beginning.

As one of the signatories to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, Turkey is legally responsible for providing protection and basic rights for refugees; however, these treaties limit the definition of its responsibilities due to the special signatory status. Within the legal framework of the Convention and its Protocol, Turkey does not nominate the

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[11] Islamic brotherhood is perceived as a tradition which supports religious connections among believers

refugee status to asylum seekers fleeing to Turkey, except for those from Europe, owing to its time and geographical limitations. Nevertheless, as with Lebanon, Turkey is not allowed to abandon the principle of "non-refoulement", but just permanent accommodation. Some scholars interpret Turkey's open-door policy on the admission of Syrian asylums as the consequence of the "temporary protection" right exceptionally defined to Turkey by UNHCR. This is because it guarantees that Turkey will not be responsible for providing basic services and protection any longer than the end of the Syrian conflict. In this regard, the Turkish authorities have regarded vulnerable Syrians as their guests rather than the legal refugees (Ahmadoun, 2014). During the peri-war (current) period, Turkey, therefore, lets these Syrians in without setting any measures, criteria, or limitations on their admissions. On the other hand, it can also seem advantageous for Syrian refugees because Turkey has attempted to receive as high a number of asylum seekers in needs of protection as it can. In other words, many more people have been saved from violence and harshness of the civil war in Syria. From the Turkey perspective, temporariness leads to minimise calculations on long-term service provision and process of integrating Syrians into the existing conditions to some degree. This can be interpreted as "the less calculation, the poorer service provision" because the budget devoted to Syrians has been distributed among more crowded populations and the quality of basic services have reduced accordingly. Nevertheless, in order to make more accurate conclusions about the quality, the distribution of budgetary items should be scrutinised in more detail.

In matters of spending, Turkey has invested million dollars in basic service provision for Syrians, including the construction of refugee camps, delivery of health and education services. For some reason, both supranational and international stakeholders have not financially contributed to this supply chain as much as Turkey anticipates. In spite of its demand for additional financial supports, Turkey could not necessarily receive the intended amounts of funds and donation from the Western countries. To sum up, Turkey aims at providing protection for many more Syrians through the open-door policy. Nevertheless, the number of refugees crossing to Turkey from Syria has reached extreme limits, nearly 3 million at present. Regarding the limited resources and service provision in Turkey, Syrians currently suffer from poor quality services and insufficient access to basic rights in Turkey.

1.1.2. Educational Context in Lebanon and Turkey

In order to better analyse the process of implementing education policies on Syrian refugees in the host countries, it is necessary that Turkish and Lebanese education systems be explained in detail. Seeing that Syrian children are exposed to refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon, they are supposed to participate in instruction in support of Turkish and Lebanese national curricula, teachers and their other educational components. Moreover, refugee education is developed in parallel to regular education in countries to a larger extent. In this context, the Turkish and Lebanese educational models for refugees intend to integrate Syrian children into the national education circle as their ultimate goals. Upon the process of integration into the systems, Syrian children are, however, exposed to slightly or completely different education in the host countries based on the existing conditions, regulations, and opportunities in these countries.

1.1.2.1. Lebanese Education System

Compulsory education in Lebanon is basically comprised of nine primary school years, aged to 15 and is free of charge (Hamdan, 2013). Although the Lebanese Education System is comprised of four consecutive cycles (UNICEF, 2011), basic education (nine years) covers the first three cycles, including elementary and intermediate educations (Table 1). Pre-primary education, or kindergarten, depends on the preference of Lebanese families. The first and second cycles compose primary education in Lebanon (Shuayb, Makkouk and Tuttunji, 2014). Primary schooling is basically divided into three categories, namely public, free-private and private schools. Lebanese authorities provide formal education for learners in different types of schools through a shared Lebanese National Curriculum (Lansing, 2014). However, as a social trend or perception of the society, Lebanese children are mostly encouraged to participate in free-private or private institutions rather than the public (Hamdan, 2013). Therefore, the ratio of teachers to pupils in a public school is equal to one to seven on average, whereas it is one to twelve in private institutions (Hamdan, 2013). Although students are involved in more crowded classes in private schools, these schools provide them with access to quality education. Therefore, Lebanese parents opt to send their children to private education as long as they

can financially support them. As a result, the authorities have reported that there are many seats available for refugee children of Syria in public schools. In the following step, they have turned these seats into the Lebanese education policy for Syrian children, which will be examined in the analysis part in detail.

Stages	Cycles	Years of Study		Official Exams
Kindergarten		2		
Elementary I	Cycle I	3	Basic Education	
Elementary II	Cycle II	3		
Intermediate	Cycle III	3		Baccalaureate I (Brevet)
Secondary	Cycle IV	3		Baccalaureate II (Terminale)

Table 1. The Education Stages of the Lebanese Education System[12]

After the third cycle (intermediate), students are supposed to take the Brevet exam to keep on training in the next cycle (secondary) (Brekke, 2015). Students complete the four-cycle education at the age of 18 on average (Lansing, 2014). Completing primary education in Lebanon in Arabic, students continue their secondary in English or French as medium of instruction. According to the statistics, more than half of Lebanese schools use French as medium of instruction, whereas 25% of schools teach the curriculum in English. The rest educate pupils in both English and French as a common teaching language (Yaacoub & Badre, 2012). These languages are also applied to the secondary level as medium of instruction. However, during the transition from primary to secondary education, the change in the teaching language leads to a higher number of drop-outs among Lebanese young population. In other words, language barriers cause students to fail to obtain the expected achievements and success in their secondary education studies as they do in primary schooling.

With reference to refugee education, it is also necessary to elaborate on the educational decision-making mechanisms in Lebanon. Today, this host country does not cope with the provision of educational services by itself, but carry out the educational

supply in cooperation with international stakeholders. Educational facilities and strategies have been implemented into the education system with the support of these stakeholders such as UNHCR in the Syrian refugee case. An attempt to "Improve school achievements for children at risk of dropping out or failing" exemplifies this collaboration well. Within the context of this project, international NGOs, UN agencies, and MEHE have jointly embarked upon a new discussion about how to decrease the drop-out rates among the young Lebanese.

UNRWA schools have a remarkable importance to the transfer of educational services to Palestine children, a minority group in Lebanon. This UN agency serves the Palestines who have lived in Lebanon with a lack of refugee status since 1946. Seeing that Lebanon does not define these asylum seekers as the 'refugee' status, they are officially permitted to participate in only Palestine schools (Hamdan, 2013). However, with reference to the content of instruction, the Lebanese National Curriculum is taught to the Palestine minority in these schools. This is because the education authorities do not allow any schools in Lebanon to follow any other curricula and instructional materials, but teaching components with the approval of the State. Nonetheless, while implementing the government policies on refugee education, UNRWA, one of the UN agencies, have been working to fulfil the Palestine children's needs for education in cooperation with the Lebanese government. This agency gives a wide variety of educational supports for Lebanon, from registration to recruitment of teachers. The participation rate of Palestine children is around 55% today. Regarding the case of the Palestine asylum seekers in Lebanon, it can be deduced that Lebanon has already experienced the provision of refugee education for minorities. This experience may create positive impacts on Lebanese service provision for Syrians. Based upon its experience with Palestine children, Lebanon can approach the issue more systematically and promote its performance on educational service delivery to Syrian newcomers.

1.1.2.2. Turkish Education System

Compulsory education in Turkey covers consecutive 12 years and is totally free of charge, including basic instructional materials like textbooks. With the recent change in education, students began participating in the "4+4+4 mandatory education, in which each four refers to primary, secondary, and high school respectively. Different from Lebanon, a vast majority of students are taught in public schools. The Turkish National Curriculum is used as a guide to teaching activities in both public and private schools at all the levels of education. As medium of instruction, Turkish is used at the primary level; nevertheless, a few private schools, mostly at the secondary level and above, carry out their instructional activities in a foreign language, including English, French, and Germen.

Turkish education system has been placed 41th in the ranking of mathematics and science in accordance with the results of 15-year-old students.[13] On the other hand, as stated earlier, the duration of compulsory education went up to 12 years in Turkey to catch up with the European standards, nevertheless, pre-schooling has not yet been included in this 12-year compulsory education. The ratio of students to teacher is 23:1 at the pre-schooling level (OECD, 2013). For primary and secondary education, there are 21 and 18 pupils per teacher respectively, which remain off the scale. OECD and EU21 countries nominate 13-14 students to each teacher on average (OECD, 2013). In comparison with Lebanon, Turkey's average numbers refer to overcrowded classes. This makes any additional service provision almost impossible because of the limited educational resources. Therefore, Syrian integration into the Turkish education system needs to be carefully investigated, analysed, and invested to a larger extent. As mentioned before, Lebanese teachers educate 14 students in private schools and fewer than this number in public schools.[14] From this viewpoint, Lebanese schools may provide Syrian children with better opportunities to receive education in less intensively-populated classrooms.

Compared to Lebanon, Turkish population who participate in the instructional services consists of more complex and exhaustive structures. As the educational decision-

13 Source: OECD (2015)
14 Source: CERD. 2009-2010. Yearly Statistical Bulletin.

14

making mechanism, MoNE develops education policies for each level of education based upon the government approaches, except for tertiary education. In recent history, the number of private schools has gone up in Turkey. This is because the Ministry has reregulated the "private lessons" policy and transformed all convenient private teaching institutions into private schools. With the recognition of "school" status to informal institutions, the Ministry has gained the right to control, supervise, and make a shift on their educational activities. The main policy objective is reportedly to promote equality among students in Turkey. All in all, the education authorities identify education as a right for all learners with the principle of "equality" in Turkey. This example has been given to illustrate how the Ministry has recently begun to put into practice this principle.

1.2. Objectives of the Study

As mentioned earlier, most studies place great emphasis on "today's numbers" in refugee education, including number of schools and teachers, and student enrolment rates. They also interpret these numbers from the perspectives of the host countries. However, these studies do not seem highly satisfactory because they do not refer to the content of refugee education necessarily. These are just numerical analyses that focus on only the numbers of Syrian children in the host schools. Few of studies investigate what types of education Syrian children currently receive in schools, what contents are taught to them, or how these children benefit from this education in the long term. Nevertheless, regarding the post-war period in Syria, all researches and refugee education should be designed based upon the content of education because this content determines the future of refugees, Syria, and host countries. From this viewpoint, in order to make all stakeholders better-off, the content of refugee education should provide the necessary skills, abilities, and knowledge for Syrian generations. The more inclusive content the host countries supply to them through their refugee education, the more successful achievements they attain from this instruction. As a result, they can reconstruct a brighter future for themselves and their fully destroyed country, and contribute the societies that they will opt to settle in under the post-war circumstances.

In this regard, the host countries should raise educational awareness of providing refugee children with the extensive content and develop an applicable and solution-

oriented strategy for their education accordingly. This is of greater significance to Turkey and Lebanon because they currently include the first two highest Syrian populations, respectively. In other words, more than 4 million externally displaced Syrians accommodate in these countries. During the post-war period, the highest populations of Syrian refugees will most likely return to their homes from these two countries because neither recognises a "refugee" status to externally displaced Syrians in their countries by operation of law, but guests. In the light of this recognition, Syrians are required to go back to their home country throughout the post-war period. Unless Turkey and Lebanon alter the current conditions for and recognition of refugees, Syrians will have no right to demand permanent accommodation from these countries. From a boarder sense, all these regulations and policies are initially merged into refugee governances of Turkey and Lebanon. Their refugee educations have shaped in accordance with the objectives, resources, and capacities that are attached to their refugee governances, accordingly. All in all, it can be inferred that these countries are educating the Syrian next generations at present. As a result, the quality of the instructional content gains overwhelming significance to both with the highest Syrian populations.

With reference to education for Syrian refugee children, the similarity between the Turkish and Lebanese cases, identified above as "temporary" status for refugees, puts forward a proposal to implement the same core educational content/model into both countries so as to ensure that Syrian children will have attained a set of skills, abilities, and knowledge at the primary level at least. This study, therefore, approaches this proposal by questioning the possibility of "Standardised Education for All". The idea behind this concept is that refugees must have certain characteristics in common such as their basic needs like feeding, health, shelters. The host countries aim at fulfilling these needs through the shortest and most effective ways. Education can be regarded as both a goal and tool in this context. As a goal, it should provide refugees with the necessary competences, knowledge, and experiences, whereas it can also function as a tool to supply other services to asylum seekers. For example, language is mostly seen as a barrier in the "migration" contexts. A host country can communicate with refugees only if it can transfer the native language to them through education. In order to promote communications and welfare in society, the government must adapt the newcomers into the society to some degree but it does not have to be "assimilation" necessarily, but adaptation. To sum up, no matter for what purposes education is used in the refugee

context such as communication, adaptation, and achievement of goals can a core curriculum help asylum seekers to exceed a certain level of education and accomplish basic skills and competences. Thus, although host countries have different refugee governance, resources, and regulations, they can deploy this "standardised" model or core curriculum as the foundation of their refugee educations.

Regarding the existing conditions, policy-makers can question whether Turkey and Lebanon can agree upon a "Standardised Education" for Syrian refugees as a starting point. This question has already inspired the study to expand on both Turkish and Lebanese refugee educations. Although these two countries have the same target group with the same background, they may differentiate with each other because of their different resources, service provision, and decision-making mechanisms. In the end, these factors play a central role in determining how they shape their policies for asylum education. In this regard, as the main objective, the study intends to comparatively examine Turkish and Lebanese policies on Syrian refugee education to draw the general framework for the educational profiles of Syrian children with both peri-war (today) and post-war (tomorrow) concerns. Secondly, this research also aims at figuring out how the Turkish and Lebanese systems of refugee governance, comprised of their general approaches to and policies on refugees, have shaped their education policies on Syrians asylum seekers in both countries.

1.3. Research Questions

The post-war period of Syria requires special attention to determine the future needs of both Syria and its citizens, and produce the immediate and optimum responses to these needs. Future leaders who will reconstruct all the institutions and system in the post-war Syria are today's Syrian youth and children. Unfortunately, this young population suffer from poor quality or lack of education in Turkey and Lebanon. By analysing and comparing the existing education policies on Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon, this study aims at attaining a comprehensive understanding of how and why Turkey and Lebanon have determined their strategies for and policies on Syrian refugee education. Thus, it also seeks to figure out what types of education these vulnerable

students currently receive in these host countries.

Regarding the provision of different educational services, Syrian refugee children are exposed to various instructional activities in Turkey and Lebanon because these countries have produced and implemented the different education policies on refugee education. Therefore, the Turkish and Lebanese policies which determine these existing educational activities for refugee children hamper the young Syrian population to be merged into one large, whole education group in post-war Syria. This hypothesis will be investigated by means of answering the following questions below:

- How have the host countries, Turkey and Lebanon, shaped their education policies on Syrian asylum seekers as the first two countries with the highest Syrian Refugee population?

- What are the joint bottlenecks of both Turkey's and Lebanon's education policies on Syrian asylum-seekers?

- How does refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon differ from each other though both regard Syrians as their guests in need of temporary protection?

- What are the successes and failures in the Lebanese and Turkish refugee education?

1.4. The Significance of the Comparative Policy Analysis

According to Keman (2011), the contemporary trends should be monitored through comparisons of multi-national institutions. The findings obtained from these comparisons set out more valid and transferable results. In order to attain a better understanding of how particular structures work in different environments, their patterns, similarities, and differences should be exposed to a deeply investigated analysis among the systems. Therefore, the comparative analysis of two countries aims at enlightening the main concern through more realistic and comprehensive approaches.

Syrian refugee education has become a subject of researches as a recent phenomenon. These researches generally intend to conduct needs analysis on Syrian refugees by host country. The country-specific aspects hamper the decision-making mechanisms to consider refugee education as an investment in the future. With references to the current literature conducted on educational service delivery to Syrians, evaluations

have produced the host country-specific numbers and failed to interpret them in accordance with the post-war needs of Syrian population. In other words, several analyses generate the findings closely related to the current educational needs and possessions of Syrian populations in the host countries. Nonetheless, these findings are not deployed and adapted into the foundations of the Syrian future.

As stated above, the investments in Syrian future are constructed based upon the current educational opportunities provided by the host countries. Therefore, the studies should also be conducted in parallel to this viewpoint. Different from the current literature on Syrian refugee education, the "post-war" educational situation in Syria has been determined as the main concern of this study. In this regard, the objectives of Syrian refugee education must ensure that Syrian children will have obtained the essential achievements and competences to re-establish the public service mechanisms by the time they return to their home country. At that point, this research can pioneer the field with an emphasis of the "post-war period". As mentioned earlier in the section of "Objectives of the Study", Turkey and Lebanon contain the highest Syrian populations among the Syrian refugee-hosting countries, respectively. Neither, nevertheless, acknowledges Syrians to the refugee status and rights, but a temporary stay by both domestic and international law. In the light of these preconditions, this study aims at contributing to the literature by providing a comparative policy analysis as a bridge between the current refugee education and future Syria. With the intention of draw the general structure of future educational profiles in Syria, this analysis works on the refugee education policies of the host countries. On the other hand, it also aims to produce useful and applicable findings to measure and eliminate the risks of "Lost Generation" in the host countries by revealing the alternative policies in each other.

Finally, this study places particular significance to refugee governance which can be defined as the body of the refugee policies, regulations, and approaches of country. The refugee governance policies are the key elements in exploring the ways of shaping the education policies on Syrian children. The analysis of refugee governance in both countries, therefore, is essentially required to understand their implications on the formation of Syrian refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon. In this regard, the next chapter explains the tools and methods through which this study analyses the policies of

the host countries. In order to obtain the better results from the policy analysis, the evaluation framework has been implemented to discover the functions of the policy components. The third chapter is devoted to the section of "Refugee Education Principles". Within the scope of refugee education, this study aims at identifying the basic elements of an ideal model for refugee education. Thus, it can evaluate the existing examples (Turkey and Lebanon) comparatively. Without composing this ideal design model on refugee education, both cases (Turkish and Lebanese refugee instructions) cannot be exposed to a more unbiased assessment. Based upon the criteria of the ideal instructional design model, the successes and failures of both models in the host countries can be detected instead of plainly comparing them to each other. This approach produces more realistic and effective results in the end.

The fourth chapter elaborates on the policy review and analysis, consisting of two sub-sections. The first sub-section mainly discusses how Turkish and Lebanese refugee governances affect their education policies on and service provision for Syrian refugees. Secondly, Turkish and Lebanese education policies on refugee children are describes and monitored through the data which has been collected from authentic sampling. This type of sampling refers to all the participants of Syrian refugee education in these countries, including teacher, students, principles, and even field researchers. Finally, the last chapter initially interprets the findings of the policy review based upon the evaluation framework introduced earlier in Refugee Education Principles. The discussion about the findings results in categorising the educational profiles of Syrian populations in Turkey and Lebanon. These chapter and study are finalised with a number of recommendations relating to further studies in the field.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Method

This study deploys the comparative case studies method to analyse Turkish and Lebanese policies on Syrian refugee education. Cyr & DeLeon (1975)[15] purport that *Public Policy* should establish high-quality comparative analyses from cross-national perspectives as this field includes similarities and differences in nature. In the light of this special nature, policy analysis on different cases rejects artificial and misleading fashion. If not at all, it becomes more challenging to conceptualise, define, organise, and implement in practice. Cyr & DeLeon (1975) also express that social, cultural and political variables need to be used for the expansion of the comparative case analysis.

On the assumption that refugees from Turkey and Lebanon are expected to become the representatives of two different education profiles in post-war Syria, this study intends to comparatively interpret the findings of the country analyses. Thus, the comparative policy analysis can more inclusively identify from which perspectives and in which topics the educational achievements of Syrian refugee children in Lebanon differ from those in Turkey. Seeing that there is no data concerning Syrian students' academic achievements and outcomes yet, this study mostly refers to the education policies on refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon. Therefore, both have been approached as the case studies. In this regard, the comparative analysis of their policies and implementation process is of special importance to understand the objectives and intentions of these host countries in the matter of Syrian refugee education.

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[15] Access on https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5458.pdf (15.15.2016 – 12.00)

As another method to elaborate on the policies, a document analysis also helps to discern relevant information about the phenomenon that is targeted to be investigated (Bailey 1994). According to Grix (2001), a document is the source that is composed with a particular purpose and on some assumptions. It additionally includes a certain style and targeted audience with interests in the phenomenon. Based upon this approach, policy documents are structured to detail the well-designed, pre-determined, and authentic government initiatives and practices. Within the scope of this study, document analysis aims at investigating, evaluating, and interpreting the Turkish and Lebanese governments' strategies on the provision of educational services through the written resources. For the analysis, both primary and secondary data can be applicable and be obtained from private and public resources. This study, therefore, deploys not only official reports and documents but also blogs, news, interviews (videos and secondary data), and reviews of the findings in the previous researches.

2.2. The Evaluation Framework

In order to figure out how effectively refugee education policies have been made and implemented in Turkey and Lebanon since the beginning of the conflict, this study deploys a number of measures which are also used to assess "effectiveness" of the European policies.[16] In this regard, certain types of questions are required for evaluations, namely descriptive, causal, and normative. Descriptive evaluation aims to observe and measure changes in the issues which have been subject to make a policy, whereas causal evaluation intends to explain the cause-effect relationship under the particular circumstances. Different from these two evaluations, normative approach elucidates to what degree the results have gone hand in hand with the prior explicit objectives. In this regard, this study conducts the analysis of refugee education policies based upon the normative approach. Therefore, within the scope of this analysis, it is crucial to question whether the policies have achieved the expected results and satisfied the stakeholders so far. Through normative questions, the policies should be categorised as follows:

16 Towards a new EU framework for reporting on environmental policies and measures (Reporting on environmental measures - 'REM'), www.eea.europa.eu/publications/rem/defining.pdf

• Effectiveness: is defined as "Likelihood of achieving policy goals and objectives or demonstrated achievement of them".[17]

- To what degree has the policy achieved its pre-determinant objectives, in relation either to outcomes (any changes in the behaviour of socio-economic actors), and/or impacts (on the state of the bio-physical environment)?[18]

• Relevance: states that policies should go hand in hand with their objectives as close as possible.

- To what extent have these objectives been determined in accordance with the policy problem?[19]

• Efficiency: explains "Program goals or benefits in relationship to the costs. Least cost for a given benefit or the largest benefit for a given cost."[20]

- Have the policy achieved maximum benefits/objectives with the lowest cost?[21]

• Utility: depicts "Fairness or justice in the distribution of the policy's costs, benefits, and risks across population subgroups".[22]

- Have the overall impacts of the policy – both expected and unexpected – contributed to a considerable increase in social welfare?[23] These types of normative questions have been illustrated in Table 2. From this point of view, normative questions mostly aim to develop a better understanding of the design, management, and review of the policies, whereas causal and descriptive questions work on the current and future trends to which policies refer in problem solving.

17 http://people.uncw.edu/imperialm/UNCW/PLS_505/PLS_505_Figures_Eval_Criteria.pdf
18 Towards a new EU framework for reporting on environmental policies and measures (Reporting on environmental measures - 'REM'), www.eea.europa.eu/publications/rem/defining.pdf
19 Towards a new EU framework for reporting on environmental policies and measures (Reporting on environmental measures - 'REM'), www.eea.europa.eu/publications/rem/defining.pdf
20 http://people.uncw.edu/imperialm/UNCW/PLS_505/PLS_505_Figures_Eval_Criteria.pdf
21 Towards a new EU framework for reporting on environmental policies and measures (Reporting on environmental measures - 'REM'), www.eea.europa.eu/publications/rem/defining.pdf
22 http://people.uncw.edu/imperialm/UNCW/PLS_505/PLS_505_Figures_Eval_Criteria.pdf
23 Towards a new EU framework for reporting on environmental policies and measures (Reporting on environmental measures - 'REM'), www.eea.europa.eu/publications/rem/defining.pdf

Figure 1 : Policy Evaluation

Needs, Problems, Issues (Societal, Economic and Environmental)

[RELEVANCE, UTILITY]

Policy / Programme / Project

[EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY]

Needs

Impacts

Effects

Outcomes

Objectives → Inputs → Outputs →

Relevance

Efficiency

Effectiveness

Utility

| Evaluation Questions	Relevance: To what extent are the objectives justified in relation to needs?	Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected objectives been achieved?	Efficiency: Have the objectives been achieved at lowest cost?	Utility: Are the expected or unexpected effects contributing to a net increase in social welfare?

Table 2. Policy Evaluation of the EU Framework

In lieu of any changes and cause-effect relationships in the process of policy making, this research has employed the normative questions to analyse the government policies of Turkey and Lebanon comparatively. Regarding the sub-categories of normative evaluation, educational strategies which have been developed for refugee education in the host countries are detailed in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and utility. With reference to the ideal education model for asylum seekers, normative analysis aims to figure out for which audience education policies have been produced and which policy instruments have been adopted into policy implementation. In addition, upon turning out a number of stratagem for training the vulnerable Syrians, Turkey and Lebanon have determined the objectives and, accordingly, put into action the new acts and policies. In this regard, normative questions enable the comparative analysis to gauge whether the objectives are fulfilled with education services that the host countries have provided up to the present. In doing so, the policies that have been developed for refugee education in the host countries are initially ascertained through document analysis. Next, they are checked to evaluate to what degree they have functioned well with the expected results and how differently Lebanese and Turkish education serves for the externally displaced Syrians.

3. REFUGEE EDUCATION PRINCIPLES

3.1. Definitions, Concepts and Policies on Refugee Education

With reference to refugee children, mothers, and fathers, global communities highlight that "education is the key to the future, that it will help bring peace to their countries, that despite not knowing what will happen tomorrow, education brings stability and hope" (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). As a constructive body, education tailor-made for emergencies regularises societal construction and stabilisation. Therefore, UNHCR (2011) reports that 'access to education' is directly connected to reducing poverty among individuals, supporting economic growth, and presenting better conditions for children, families, and communities. Apart from nationwide benefits, it also provides them with an opportunity to overcome traumatic processes, and to transfer various skills and values for a better future and governance at both local and national levels (Crisp, Talbot & Cipollone, 2001). As a milestone, education is stated to become part of the "fourth pillar", which is the "central pillar" of humanitarian response, along with nourishment, shelter and health services (Norwegian Refugee Council et. al., 1999: 26; Midttun, 2000: 3–4; ICWAC, 2000: 9). The United Nations (2010) pronounces that "The right to education for refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers is articulated in the Article 22 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, resolution 64/290 (July 2010) of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly on the right to education in emergencies." In the light of this statement, the education sector has been described as one of the basic rights of displaced people by UNHCR.

In terms of education in emergencies, the profile of asylum seekers is defined on the basis of the numbers and statistics collected across the world. These numbers of the externally displaced have been going up in the recent years faster than it is expected. This

makes education in emergencies more vital, necessary, and indispensable in the UNHCR services. According to UNHCR (1999), nearly one of three displaced persons needs to participate in schooling and other child and adolescent education when the overall populations of asylum seekers are statistically assessed to figure out the number of children in need. Although most children in UNHCR-assisted populations should enrol in schools, there are many drop outs of education quickly owing to poverty and other factors (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Low enrolment rates are very often seen among refugees from poor rural areas UNHCR, 2000). One reason for the low school enrolment is that refugee parents in the family have not obtained a primary school diploma and hence do not encourage their children to do so. Another reason for this low enrolment rate is the need for financial support and regular income. Accordingly, displaced children work outside as breadwinners of their families rather than attend instructional activities in schools. On the other hand, previous statistics report "One-third of refugee children (excluding infants) and adolescents in populations categorized as "UNHCR-assisted" are in UNHCR-supported schooling" (UNHCR, 2000). In another word, the UN refugee agency plays a crucial role in providing education for vulnerable refugee children in schools sponsored by UNHCR.

The field actors, including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), scholars, and other UN agencies, function well in education as does UNHCR (P. W. Jones, 1999; P. W. Jones & Coleman, 2005; Klees, 2002; Mundy, 1999, 2002; UNESCO, 2011, pp. 4-23). When compared to asylum seekers, these institutions pursue a different way of approaching education. Burde (2005) explains this under three headings, namely humanitarian, human rights, and developmental approaches. As the first step, the humanitarian approach requires an immediate response and protection for refugees against violations. UNHCR intervenes in the situation to rescue the vulnerable people from any dangers. Secondly, the human rights approach contributes to educational support for asylum seekers through "skills that people need to reach their full potential and to exercise their other rights, such as the right to life and health" (INEE, 2010). In this regard, education is utilised to enable individuals to accept the existing conditions and adapt themselves into them faster and more easily. The developmental approach considers education as a long-term investment for both refugees and the host society. Quality education is of great significance to refugee children and parents. Any advancements relating to their future are based upon this approach.

There are two crucial service providers that work on refugee education other than UNHCR. In order to normalise the crisis in asylum seekers' lives and ensure children's futures, UNESCO and UNICEF also participate in education planning and provision for those in need. UNESCO describes an educational emergency as a crisis which has occurred as a result of conflicts or disasters. This occurrence causes the education system to destabilise, disorganise or disfunction, and requires an intervention in the crisis and post-crisis process (UNESCO, 1999). Similarly, UNICEF brings another viewpoint to education in emergencies. This organisation identifies "emergencies" as two different categories. One of them includes natural disasters and human-made crises, whereas the other is called "silent emergencies", illustrated by HIV/AIDS, extreme poverty and children living in the streets (Pigozzi, 1999). Therefore, education in emergencies is designed to fulfil the needs of asylum seekers by referring to both peri- and post-crisis. This is because UNICEF emphasizes that "in emergency situations, educational activities must be established and restored as soon as possible" (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Moreover, emergencies also cover more comprehensive situations other than wars and natural disasters in accordance with the definitions of UNESCO and UNICEF. These UN agencies have designed educational kits and tools for refugee education such as UNESCO's "Teacher Emergency Package" and UNICEF's "School-in-a-Box", since 1999 (Sinclair, 1998).

As stated above, inter-agency collaboration aims to improve the conditions for refugee education to the highest degree. In this context, UNHCR has so far agreed upon cooperation with other agencies such as NGOs and associations. For example, in 1994, UNHCR agreed on educational service provision and signed a treaty with Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). The Norwegian NGO assigned a number of short-term education officers to UNHCR. As another example, there used to be a huge difference between "education in emergencies" and "refugee education" prior to the agreement on collaboration. UNICEF, which pursues the objectives of the former programme, excluded refugee children from the scope of its instructional services in the beginning, whereas UNHCR has developed new strategies and policies to constantly augment the number of refugee children, hence collaborated with UNICEF so as to receive technical and financial assistance on refugee education.

The relationship between refugee governance and education plays a central and determining role in providing any types of training for asylum seekers and displays differences among the nations and states. According to Article 22 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signatory states "shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education.... [and] treatment as favourable as possible... with respect to education other than elementary education" (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). The Convention on the Rights of the Child legally puts pressure on national governments so that child refugees are able to access education within the borders of the host countries. Most governments actively take part in or provide support for refugee education programmes (Crisp, Talbot & Cipollone, 2001). Nonetheless, the implementation of refugee education policies changes from country to country due to the existing regulations and limitations. To be more precise, access to education is shaped on the basis of refugee governance structure and policies in the host countries. This can also vary from time to time. For instance, UNHCR reports that the displaced children of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire used to participate in the national education system of Tanzania (Dodds & Inquai, 1983, p. 11). In the following years, refugee camps were made available to children's education (Obura, 2003). Although primary education was stated as a basic and mandatory right in the 1951 Convention, there are two countries, namely Malta and Turkey, which have been excluded from service provision to a certain degree owing to the time and geographical limitations. According to both the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, neither of the countries calls people fleeing their homes "refugees", but asylum seekers or externally displaced. They, therefore, are not regarded as legally responsible to provide these people with a "refugee" status, which leads asylum seekers in Malta and Turkey not to benefit from refugee rights in the host countries, but from limited service provision.

The Education for Asylum Seekers (EFA) movement gives great significance to both right-based service provision and development of human capital (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). The UNHCR education strategies and education policy commitments were first published in 2003 as a guide to right-based and universal primary education. As of the commitments in 2003, UNHCR has developed education policies for refugees on the basis of the key principles of "access, quality, and protection". In matters of the education policy commitments, UNHCR underlines how important it is to deliver quality education to asylum seekers and enable them to access primary education as a basic right. In

addition, protection is directly connected to educational programmes of UNHCR such as "education as a tool of protection" (UNHCR, 2009).

Apart from the key principles, UNHCR also highlights four main concepts, namely refugee participation, local capacity building, gender equality and addressing the specific needs of groups at risk (UNHCR, 2009). In this context, UNHCR aims to successfully implement six goals into refugee education. These goals can be identified as: free access to primary education, equitable access to appropriate learning for youth and adults, adult literacy, gender equity and quality education (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). In light of these principles and concepts, UNHCR initially gives support to ensure refugee protection through education and to produce durable solutions. Next, quality education must be distributed to the vulnerable, displaced people by enhancing teacher training and developing quality teaching and learning materials (UNHCR, 2009). Moreover, innovation is also required to develop high-quality programmes for life skills and values education. Upon implementing these commitments, UNHCR is pro early intervention and refugee participation in education at the earliest stages of an emergency (UNHCR, 2009). As well as coordination with UNESCO and UNICEF, UNHCR bolsters collaborative service provision at local, national, regional, and international levels of educational partnerships. In this regard, other UN agencies, NGOs, and local governments play an active role in serving both refugee and returnee education through teacher training, development of educational materials, and certification (UNHCR, 2009).

3.2. Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER)

Table 3. Refugee participation in primary and secondary school (2009) as compared to global participation (2008) expressed in Gross Enrolment Ratios (GER). Sources: (UNESCO, 2011; UNHCR, 2010).

Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) refers to the overall enrolment of students who attend any levels of education, regardless of their age. Early or late entries into schools, changes in education policies, and repetition may lead GER to exceed 100%. Nevertheless, GER differs from the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) in terms of the enrolment age. To be more precise, NER refers to a particular group of students at a given level of education, whereas GER is the overall enrolment number in schools. As can be seen in Table 3, the participation in primary education is noticeably higher than that in secondary schools for both refugee and global population. However, this participation in refugee education suffers from more severe decreases. Upon switching from primary into secondary, refugee learners have tendency not to continue their education for some reason such the level of difficulty, change in medium of instruction, and financial barriers. According to the numbers (Table 3), only one third of refugees continue secondary education, whereas the rest quit education entirely. Regarding refugees' drop-outs, Dryden-Peterson (2011, pp 26) has determined a number of factors which shape access to primary and secondary education:

• *Supply*, such as the nature and diversity of accessible schools, the location of formal schools, and the availability of sufficient classrooms and teachers;

• *Demand*, such as social perceptions of schools, decision-making and strategies for school enrolment and attendance based on the direct and indirect cost of schools, and the role of children in households and family livelihoods;

• *Exclusion along individual characteristics,* such as gender, age, social and economic position of the family, urban/rural residence, displacement, ethnicity/race, language, disability, and documentation/legal status;

• *Discrimination in policies and practices*, such as certification and recognition of studies;

• *Refugee governance*, such as asylum and settlement policies, and how the right to education is protected by law and in policy and practice;

• *Security situation*, such as the physical destruction of educational infrastructure and the pervasive nature of violence and insecurity for children both inside and outside of schools (Dryden-Peterson, 2011, pp 26).

On the grounds of the factors mentioned above, access to education varies in different contexts. For instance, child refugees attend educational activities in urban settings less frequently than in refugee camps. This also differs from region to region, between operations in the same context, and by gender (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Compared to GER in the urban context, access to education is far lower than in refugee camps. According to the UNHCR statistics, GER in camp settings is equal to 78%, whereas it goes down to around 70% in urban areas across the world (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Nevertheless, the global average shows a difference between country operations on education for refugees. When a country devotes its resources, equipment, and experts to both urban and camp-based operations, primary and secondary GERs exceed the global average to a greater extent (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Therefore, whether a country carries out both urban and camp-based operations is an important signifier of GER.

3.3. Curriculum Design

It seems clear that education refers to the previous experiences of refugee learners, their current needs, and expectations concerning their futures (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014). Any attempts to fulfil refugee necessities, therefore, require a complex, comprehensive, and particular education kit. In this context, one of the most significant concepts in refugee education is to customise the curriculum in accordance with the needs of the vulnerable (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014).

First, a customised curriculum is required for vulnerable newcomers as they differ from regular students in mainstream schools in terms of psychological needs, culture, and poverty (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014). From different perspectives, their education, therefore, requires a particular attention so that they can easily adapt themselves to their new environments. Secondly, the instructional setting is also differently described in regular schools and refugee camps. In a refugee classroom, individuals have poor access to basic infrastructure and quality education (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014), whereas regular schools provide the necessary conditions for learners. Thirdly, the customised curriculum also needs bolstering with a number of additional courses to overcome the psychological, mental, and linguistic needs of the vulnerable children. To be more precise, refugee learners should be exposed to tailor-made and situation-specific lessons to reduce the negative impacts of the refugee experience. All in all, Wa-Mbaleka (2014) states that what works effectively in ordinary classrooms is not likely to work in refugee classrooms. Therefore, he propounds that there must be an instructional model that is designed to fulfil the needs of this special population.

As with Wa-Mbaleka's proposal, scholars have developed several instructional design frameworks for refugee education. As the milestone, the ADDIE is an instructional model that defines the curricular guide to refugee education as a collection of the stages, namely analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation (Molenda, 2003). These stages must be followed to develop an ideal curriculum for asylum seekers. The first step must be to discover what they primarily need because design and development include necessary educational approaches and items relating to their needs as the second and third steps of curriculum development. For the implementation of the tailor-made curriculum, cooperation is required among NGOs, UN agencies, and host governments

based upon refugee governance of the country where refugees accommodate permanently or temporarily (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). With a small change in the ADDIE instructional framework, the USER model proposes that educators should initially assess the learning needs, plan the key points of the ideal instruction for the target group, and engage learners in tailor-made instruction before assessing how effectively the instructional delivery is completed (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014). In addition to ADDIE's stages, teachers should carry out needs analysis at the first stage due to their one-on-one interaction with the target group.

As the next step, educators build up and transfer the instructional objectives to the target audience of asylum seekers and finalise their educational activities by evaluating the success of the instructional design model (Bell & Shank, 2007). According to Wa-Mbaleka (2014), the Dick & Carey Model, similar to the previous one, enables educators to determine the educational goals, conduct an analysis of the refugee needs, and produce the instructional objectives. Nevertheless, this model also purports that teachers should be responsible for selecting instructional strategies and media, and conducting formative and summative evaluations in the end. The collective model that has been obtained from the findings of other models up to this point emphasises the role of educators for the stages of curriculum design. From a different viewpoint, The ASSURE instructional framework inserts student involvement into refugee education. According to ASSURE, curriculum design should benefit from active participation and personal learning of refugees. As the next step, the overall output of instruction is evaluated and revised by educators. The Morrison, Ross and Kemp Model (Morrison, Ross, Kalman & Kemp, 2011) determines nine interconnected steps for this collective model. Within the scope of this model, an ideal instructional framework can be built up by determining the educational needs and analysing the major characteristics of the target group. Next, it also proposes the content of the learning objectives and goals, and puts the instructional steps in order. In the process of planning, evaluation tools and strategies are selected as the components of the model as well as appropriate resources.

Wa-Mbaleka (2014) broadens the model with systematic needs analysis, formative and summative evaluation, and instructional design maintenance. The needs of teachers and learners must be taken into account more broadly and inclusively so as to to explore how they experience the instructional design model in emergencies, how the

setting can be described, and what type of challenges they face. (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). In order to expand on curriculum design, Wa-Mbaleka has both observed nine teachers who have taught refugee students and analysed several lesson plans and instructional materials. The findings show that the models suffer from a lack of needs analysis (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014). To illustrate, teachers are unable to understand the needs of the target group precisely and react to these needs accordingly. As with needs analysis, necessary equipment and tools are not available for evaluation and feedback sessions (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). Therefore, these two requirements should also be attached to the collective model to improve the quality of the stages of curriculum development for refugees.

Wa-Mbaleka (2013) also finds out that teacher training programs are not designed based upon needs analyses. In this regard, upon preparing the teacher candidates for schools, these programs do not provide them with the necessary theories and practice on how to approach refugee education and what refugees need under the current circumstances. Due to lack of experience in analysing the needs of the target population, teachers are not qualified to develop or design the instructional models and to apply them to the existing situation (Kay, 2011; Parsons, 2008). The main reason for this weakness is that teachers are not exposed to training on an effective and efficient instructional design. As a result, they begin teaching refugees with poor knowledge of systematic needs analysis and instructional design (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013).

Secondly, the process of instructional model design is of great significance to teachers so as to develop a lesson plan and instructional objectives (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). This process plays a vital role in determining the sequence of the steps in refugee education since educators are supposed to produce tailor-made instructional models for the target group on the basis of a systematic needs analysis. It is obvious that refugee learners differ from their peers in mainstream schools to a large degree and hence require special attention. Therefore, Parsons (2008) states that teachers must be encouraged to learn how to conduct a complete analysis. Otherwise, they will be unable to produce the efficient and needs-based design, but keep teaching the pre-determined and ineffective educational models through standardised approaches. In order to overcome this drawback in teacher training, Wa-Mbaleka (2014) suggests that teachers should be trained on the basis of the components of instructional design models, namely needs analysis, design, development, implementation or delivery, evaluation and maintenance (Morrison, Ross,

& Kemp, 2007; Smith, 2009; Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). As another alternative, an instructional designer may be assigned to schools where refugees participate in education. Thus, s/he can provide the necessary guidance to other teachers in designing their instructional plans.

Thirdly, apart from the instructional design, a number of educational materials which facilitate instructional delivery are required (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). Similarly, instructional design experts must be employed to adapt teachers to different settings and target group instruction. The Wa-Mbaleka findings indicate that the integration of new elements such as experts and materials results in financial challenges. Fourth, Wa-Mbaleka draws great attention to refugee psychology. Severe traumatic experiences are commonly seen in situations in which people are forcefully displaced from their countries. In this context, refugee education must be designed with reference to special training sessions on trauma so that refugee learners can more easily overcome psychological problems through education (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). As the best approach to psychological intervention through education, teachers are the most valuable implementers since they are capable of managing behavioural changes in their learners in emergencies and helping them to gain critical skills and abilities to cope with their new settings (Richardson, 1998).

The results of this study also show that national programmes are applied to refugee education without any changes and adaptation (Wa-Mbaleka, 2013). Therefore, they do not fulfil the instructional needs of the learners. Instead, the study proposes that the government is required to participate in the operations of refugee education and to customise the national programmes in accordance with the needs and expectations of the displaced people upon their service provision. Finally, it also supports the idea that there must be continuous research on instructional design models and their implementation in refugee camps.

Table 4. The Refugee Instructional Design Model by Wa-Mbaleka (2014)

Regarding the collection of the authentic findings, Wa-Mbaleka (2014) contributes to the instructional model and proposes a framework for curriculum design in refugee education (Table 4). Wa-Mbaleka (2014) elaborates on the proposed design model with seven steps: Teacher Training, Analysis, Adaptation, Development, Requirement for Learner Participation, Evaluation, and Revision and Maintenance. Different from the previous studies, this model brings innovative perspectives to the sequence of steps and opts to begin with teacher training by referring to the findings of Wa-Mbaleka's research. Furthermore, instructional model designers are allowed to adapt their models in accordance with the existing conditions (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014). That is to say, they are not expected to plan and pursue the operations in a particular order. Instead, the steps can overlap or replace one another.

3.4. Teacher Training

With respect to the steps identified in the previous instructional models, Wa-Mbaleka (2014) emphasizes how significant it is to merge teacher training with the other components of the refugee education model to obtain an ideal instructional design model. Similar to Wa-Mbaleka's approach but from a different perspective, UNHCR has also reported that teacher training programs enable refugee education to provide better conditions for the displaced learners. However, Crisp, Talbot & Cipollone (2001) asserts that in-service teachers should be involved in the need-based sessions which are deployed to overcome handicaps of both newly arrived refugees and internally displaced children. Not only learners, but also their parents are included within the scope of teacher training in the UNHCR reports. For instance, Crisp, Talbot & Cipollone (2001) suggests that in-service teachers should inform newly arrived refugee families about educational opportunities available to them in the host country. Apart from parents' awareness, teachers can also collect the authentic numbers of refugee population at any levels of education through monitoring and reporting (UNHCR, 1995).

In comparison with UNHCR, Wa-Mbaleka's model does not assign in-service teachers to data collection mechanisms or information providers for refugee learners, but prompts teachers to design the instructional framework and implement the existing educational tools into refugee education by means of customisation. According to Wa-Mbaleka (2014), teachers involved in refugee education are not capable of designing an instructional framework, but are capable of delivering what has already been planned by the Education Authorities. Therefore, an additional preparation is required for teachers prior to their teaching activities in the refugee camps/ schools. He also suggests that these teachers should receive an internationally recognised certificate for the completion of their training on refugee education. Thus, more quality, inclusive, and long-term investment in refugee instruction can be provided. Wa-Mbaleka (2014) states that these certificates should be awarded to the participants by UNHCR.

As described in the proposed instruction model by Wa-Mbaleka (2014), refugee children are in need of psychological support because they experience severe traumatic situations due to their mandatory migration. Therefore, teachers of refugee children are expected to know how to approach these children thanks to the useful teacher training

programs. In this context, Wa-Mbaleka (2014) draws attention to two main areas in his study, namely parenting skills and counselling skills. The study, based on the authentic experiences of the teachers and learners in refugee education, indicates that some teachers may react to the orphaned refugee students by assuming a parenting role. Similarly, refugee children can also approach their teachers with an instinct to replace the empty parent figures with their teachers. From this viewpoint, it is crucial to involve parenting skills in the instructional design model (Wa-Mbaleka, 2014). Similarly, traumatic experiences also require different approaches to educating refugees. Whatever causes these experiences, teachers should receive education on counselling which show educators various perspectives from the student side.

UNHCR has recently merged these two standpoints and re-defined teacher training policies on refugee education. According to Dryden-Peterson (2011), "teacher training" policies have been involved in the UNHCR agenda as follows:

> Investment in teacher training that cultivates high quality skills related to both pedagogy and content and that is sequential, leading towards a basic qualification that is recognised in home and/or host countries (Dryden-Peterson, 2011).

The interpretation of this statement is that teachers should gain knowledge of both refugee psychology and instructional content in accordance with the needs of the target population (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Nevertheless, seeing that teacher training is very often provided in a refugee case by NGOs, there are short-term courses which are less academic and professional. Therefore, refugee learners' achievements also inevitably remain local and insufficient (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). In other words, different types of teacher training may lead to different levels of education and educational achievements among asylum seekers. In order to overcome such an educational gap between learners, UNRWA[24] intends to construct a number of long-term strategies for teacher training to standardise and equally develop learning outcomes among refugee students (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). In this regard, it has opted to build up new partnerships with universities in Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, which have been home to thousands of Palestine refugees for more than 70 years and are seeking to produce durable solutions to their education (Dryden-Peterson, 2011).

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24 UNRWA stands for United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This UN agency provide assistance and protection for some 5 million registered Palestine regufees to help them achieve their full potential in human development.

4. POLICY REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

This section consists of the theoretical reviews and analysis of the policies on Syrian Refugee Education in Turkey and Lebanon. Within the scope of this analysis, document analysis and secondary data have been deployed from the valid and reliable resources. The secondary data is comprised of the news, blogs, video interviews, and interviews with the UN representatives, NGOs, principles, and teachers. It is primarily necessary to achieve a better understanding of the background policies on Syrian refugees in the host countries, Turkey and Lebanon, so as to figure out how they have constructed their education policies on the provision of refugee education. This analysis of their education policies on Syrian refugee is carried out separately to clarify the details precisely.

4.1. The Impacts of the Background Policies on Syrian Refugee Education in Lebanon and Turkey

Background policies are the strategies that the host countries, Turkey and Lebanon, have utilised to shape their policies on Syrian Refugee Education. These policies have a determining effect on the management of educational service delivery to Syrian children. In other words, this section analyses how Turkey and Lebanon construct Syrian refugee education on the basis of their current refugee governances, consisting of background policies.

4.1.1. Lebanon's Policies

Refugee Governance in Lebanon: Lack of "Refugee Status" Policy

With reference to the components of refugee education in the host countries, refugee governance shapes what type of rights are acknowledged to asylum seekers and to what degree they benefit from service provision of the refugee-hosting country. In this context, refugee governance of Lebanon has a great impact on determining the policies on Syrian refugee education. Before the Syrian mass influx, Lebanon did not recognise the refugee status to any migration movements but only to the Palestine asylum seekers, living in Lebanon for more than 70 years (Brekke, 2015).[25] This is because Lebanon does not identify itself as a country for resettlement (Brekke, 2015). For the same reason, this host country did not sign either the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol, both of which ensure that the refugee rights and status are preserved and recognised by the signatories. As a result, Syrian newcomers who have temporarily settled in Lebanon are supposed to go back to their country at the end of the war. In other words, Syrians are not regarded as 'refugees' but 'guests' in Lebanon. Therefore, the Lebanese government is not regarded as service providers for refugees in terms of the provision of health, shelter, and education, particularly in the beginning (Tabar, 2010).

With a view to enhancing access to basic rights of the refugees, UNHCR and Lebanon agrees on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).[26] Thanks to the MoU, Lebanon recognises the principle of 'non-refoulement', which guarantees that the displaced Syrians are not forcefully repatriated to their country throughout the peri-war period.[27] Within the scope of this agreement, UNHCR has responsibilities for the registration and resettlement of vulnerable Syrians crossing intoto Lebanon. On the other hand, the authorities still keep the right to deport unregistered Syrians from Lebanon (Tabar, 2010). The "special case" status for extraordinary displacement has been assigned to the Syrian asylum seekers who look for protection in Lebanon (Shuayb, Makkouk, and Tuttunji, 2014). Therefore, Lebanon does not refer to them as "refugees", but "displaced",

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25 This statement has been taken from the interview with the UN representative in Brekke (2015)'s research.
26 This statement has been taken from the interview with the UN representative in Brekke (2015)'s research.
27 Government of Lebanon and United Nations 2014

"foreigners" or "migrant workers" (Shuayb, Makkouk and Tuttunji, 2014). On the other hand, in spite of the low tolerance to the "externally displaced" status, Lebanon displays an extreme generous service provision for the Syrian asylum seekers in need.[28] This is because of historical and religious connections and closeness between the Lebanese and Syrian communities.[29]

Seeing that Lebanon did not sign the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol (Brekke, 2015), which intend to recognise the formal status to refugees and assure that externally displaced people survive on the basic rights such as health, feeding, and education, asylum seekers do not have the globally recognised rights in Lebanon. In other words, Lebanon does guarantee to provide basic services for these vulnerable people on the grounds of an internationally recognised agreement. Nonetheless, this host country has entered into an exception for the Syrian migration on the basis of the MoU and agreed upon policy development for the Syrian asylum seekers, including registration, education, health. All in all, a lack of "Refugee Status" policy is very likely to lead Syrians to be excluded from mandatory and quality education in Lebanon. This is because education is not provided for them as the basic right, but as a personal preference. To be more precise, they can opt to participate in formal training in a state school or go for informal education in another setting. Different from these options, Syrian learners may also prefer to drop out of schooling entirely because of child labour, language barrier, and financial constraints.

"No Refugee Camp" Policy

The "No Refugee Camp" policy is the political strategy that the government has developed to cope with Syrian migration to Lebanon. Having taken a lesson from their previous experience with Palestine refugees, the Lebanese authorities decided not to construct refugee camps but service provision. The main reason is that Palestine asylum seekers have been used to living in a camp area in Lebanon for more than 75 years and their migration to Lebanon began in a similar way to that of Syrians. Seeing that the

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28 This finding has been obtained from the interview with the UN representative by Brekke (2015).
29 This statement has been taken from the interview with the NGO and UN representatives in Brekke (2015)'s research.

government intends to hamper any permanent accommodation for refugees this time, it has made this policy as a precaution. Thus, there is no special place for Syrians to settle in and extend the duration of their living there in Lebanon. As urban refugees, they shoulder their own expenses of living in cities and rely on their financial resources. In the light of this policy, the government aims to block long-term accommodation among Syrian asylum seekers. As refugee governance of Lebonan, the "no refugee camp" policy plays a crucial role in shaping education policies of Lebanon for Syrian learners because it encourages refugee students to attend the urban life and public schools, and make your own payment for education. In this context, Syrian parents are responsible for spending related to their children's education.

The consequences of this policy may differ in various contexts. From one viewpoint, urbanisation helps refugees to make higher amounts of money and achieve better life standards.[30] On the other hand, the UN Refugee Agency also proposes that large and anonymous cities include serious barriers to reach the vital support that the displaced need.[31] For instance, it is not possible to officially register all refugee children and follow their attendance to schooling in urban settings. The authorities cannot encourage them to keep on training and language learning. As a result, they can feel psychologically and physically isolated in host society. Most of the time, the authorities are not able to confirm the real numbers of asylum seekers outside refugee camps. However, these vulnerable people should be detected and bolstered with different resources, wherever they survive.[32] All in all, it can be deduced that urbanisation definitely makes service provision twice as challenging as service supply in refugee camps.

Today, Lebanon includes 12 Palestine refugee camps which have become permanent construction and caused a tendency to militarization within the country (Hamdan, 2013). With reference to "Palestinian experience", these refugees have been marginalized from mainstream society over time, which launched the idea of "a community in a community" (Stovel, 2005). With the similar concerns about newcomers,

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30 The term 'Urban Refugee' has been introduced in the UNHCR website and retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/urban-refugees.html.
31 The term 'Urban Refugee' has been introduced in the UNHCR website and retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/urban-refugees.html.
32 The term 'Urban Refugee' has been introduced in the UNHCR website and retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/urban-refugees.html.

Lebanon perceives the Syrian influx as a demographic threat, which the newly arriving refugees create in society as the Palestines do (ICG, 2013). As a result, it avoids constructing new living quarters or camps for its Syrian guests. Instead, the Lebanese authorities opt to recognise them as urban asylum seekers and to involve them in the urban life on the assumption that the Syrians intend to go back to their homeland in the post-war period.

Different from the UNHCR regime in the refugee camps, out-of-camp refugees depend on local legislation and service provision.[33] In this context, urbanisation of the asylum seekers leads the Lebanese government to shoulder much heavier burdens. For example, service provision like education is supplied to the demand of urban refugees based upon the national structures and standards unlike service delivery in the camps.[34] However, on the condition that the host countries do not have a capacity to do it, the UN agencies like UNHCR and UNICEF intervene in and support service provision.[35] For the Lebanon case, Brekke (2015) also reports that the interviewees find it more challenging to respond to the needs in urban settings. The observation he made during his visit to Lebanon in Fall 2014 is that the displaced Syrians are everywhere across the entire country. Therefore, upon transferring service provision to vulnerable Syrians, the agencies with the intention of the humanitarian assistance must take into consideration local governance and supremacy.[36] The government should enter into cooperation and autonomy delegation with locals and NGOs.

One of the implications of this policy on Lebanese refugee education is that Syrians are initially permitted to accommodate in urban settings of Lebanon freely but temporarily, and to receive education from both Lebanese public and private schools as Lebanese citizens do.[37] It means that there is no tailor-made instructional model which responds to the needs of these refugee learners. Upon supplying educational services to the Syrian demand, the Lebanese authorities do not take into consideration any educational drawbacks of the target population in terms of medium of instruction,

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33 This statement has been taken from the interview with the the UN representative in Brekke (2015)'s research.
34 This statement has been taken from the interview with the the UN and NGO representatives in Brekke (2015)'s research.
35 This statement has been taken from the interview with the the UN representative in Brekke (2015)'s research.
36 This statement has been taken from the interview with the the UN and NGO representatives in Brekke (2015)'s research.
37 This statement has been taken from the interview with the the UN representative in Brekke (2015)'s research.

overcrowded classes, certificates, or curricula. Apart from the expectations of the target group, Lebanese students also suffer from the Syrian participation in their educational activities without any adaptation, which results in overcrowded classrooms, groupings among peers, different educational levels in the same setting.[38] For Lebanese teachers, it is very struggling to create safe and productive conditions for learning by means of combining both Lebanese and Syrian children's needs as an instructional design package.[39] In the interview that Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Elizabeth Adelman have carried out with a Syrian kindergarten teacher in Lebanon, the teacher describes how difficult it is to overcome the current conditions but still emphasises how important it is to educate the Syrian youth as follows: "I show [my students] inside the class that I am laughing and teaching, but my condition   is just like theirs. I don't have a house, I don't have a country to live in... but in order to return to our country and do something, or even to do something in the country we are in, and change our condition—maybe if we studied and worked, we might get a house and teach, or be a lawyer or a doctor, anything. Be productive. Life is when you learn something."[40]

Secondly, "No Refugee Camp" policy leads Syrian refugees to rely on their income and savings because they live in an urban setting where they are supposed to pay for their living expenses by themselves unlike in refugee camps. Nevertheless, due to their budgetary constraints, they opt to stay in an informal tented areas or cheap, overcrowded, and unfinished buildings.[41] Hala Naufal, a professor at Lebanese University, says "Refugees have set up in old houses and abandoned buildings".[42] Similarly, one Unicef official in Beirut explained, "When they arrived, they took rented rooms. Then as the money began to get lower, they packed into one room, then they shared the one room with other families – and then went to live in tents..."[43]

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38 This has been mentioned as high tensions against the Syrians among the Lebanese citizens in Brekke (2015), Harb& Saab (2014).

39 This finding has been reached from a blog written by Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Elizabeth Adelman. These bloggers explore the experiences of Syrian refugee children and their teachers, drawing on long-term observations and interviews in Lebanon in formal and non-formal schools that serve Syrian refugees (February, 2016).

40 This has been taken from the interview that Sarah Dryden-Peterson, a professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Doctoral candidate at Harvard Graduate School of Education, have conducted with Hadia, who fled Syria to Lebanon four years ago and worked as a ten-year kindergarten teacher in Lebanon those days (February, 2016). (retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/education-plus-development/posts/2016/02/09-syrian-refugee-schools-dryden-peterson-adelman 18.06.2016- 16.38)

41 This statement has been taken from the interview with the the NGO representatives in Brekke (2015)'s research.

42 This was reported in December 2012 by *Hala Naufal, Professor at Lebanese University.* (retrieved from http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=72 16.06.2016 23.20)

43 This has been taken from the interview that Robert Fisk, a reporter of The Independent, had with a UNICEF official in Beirut in 2014. (retrieved from http://nena-news.it/the-200000-syrian-child-refugees-forced-into-slave-labour-in-lebanon/ 18.06.2016- 14.48)

From an educational perspective, Syrian learners are exposed to neither fully free compulsory education like in refugee camps nor viable conditions for their studies, but are expected to pay for their education in Lebonon such as books, transportation, and school fees for private schools (Brekke, 2015). Therefore, Syrian families do not push their children towards schools since they cannot afford to spend a penny on their educational expenses. With reference to the interviews of Dryden-Peterson & Adelman, they also find out that Syrian refugee families are incapable of paying out on their children's schooling. To illustrate, the Syrian interviewee reports[44] that she enrolled her children in a private school in Lebanon in the beginning. However, when her family was not able to send her the school fees of her children, she could not continue sending them to this school any more.

Most refugee families encourage their children to become part of the labour market in Lebanon so that they can make money to support the household as a breadwinner rather than keep on training, which results in an increase in child labour and a fall in school enrolments of Syrian learners. Robert Fisk, from *The Independence*, exemplifies child labour in Lebanon with eleven-year-old Abdullah. Fisk reports that Abdullah who has worked on a construction site is only one among 200,000 Syrian refugee children who earn their money from Lebanon's potato and bean fields, or figs in the Bekaa Valley.[45] With a view to attracting attention to today's Syrian youth, he also emphasises that Abdullah and others will become tomorrow's new men and women who have to return to Syria and rebuild it up.[46] However, he questions under which conditions these children are growing up and being educated for their future today. All in all, "no refugee camp" policy activates isolation and self-sufficiency mechanisms and leads Syrians to shoulder their educational burden. As a result, children are excluded from urban education and participation in schooling. In these contexts, receiving education in controlled and government-sponsored areas such as refugee camps are more useful for Syrian beneficiaries than dealing with more demanding variable in an urban setting.

44 This has been taken from the interview that Sarah Dryden-Peterson, a professor at Harvard Universite, and Elizabeth Adelman, Doctoral candidate. (retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/education-plus-development/posts/2016/02/24-syrian-teachers-futures-dryden-peterson-adelman 18.06.2016- 17.15)
45 Robert Fisk describes under which circumstances Syrian refugee children work in Lebanon on the basis of his obsesrvation. (retrieved from http://nena-news.it/the-200000-syrian-child-refugees-forced-into-slave-labour-in-lebanon/ 18.06.2016- 15.25)
46 Robest Fisk makes an inference concerning the danger in Syrian refugee children's future. (retrieved from http://nena-news.it/the-200000-syrian-child-refugees-forced-into-slave-labour-in-lebanon/ 18.06.2016- 15.25)

4.1.2. Turkey's Policies

"Open Door" Policy

In 2009, Turkey and Syria altered the visa policies through liberalisation and repealled the visa requirement in transition of passengers (Linden, Evin, Kirisci, Straubhaar, Tocci, Tolay & Walker, 2012). The termination of the visa obligation is of great significance to the crisis in Syria since the Syrians fleeing the civil war have been able to cross Turkey's borders without any problems since the beginning. Kirisci (2014) reports that the government has also adopted the same strategy to accept externally displaced Syrians who reach Turkey without their passports. Thus, Turkey opens its doors to any Syrians running away from the crisis. This is called "Open Door" policy.

Seeing that a "refugee" status is not available for Syrians in Turkey under the tutelage of the Convention and its Protocol, these people are unable to benefit from either basic rights of asylum seekers or service provision for Turkish citizens. In other words, they have suffered from lack of basic services, particularly outside the refugee camps, since the beginnig. In order to overcome these drawbacks to some degree, the government passed the new law of "temporary protection" or "conditional refugee" status in October 2011 (UNICEF, 2015a).[47] UNICEF describes this Temporary Protection Regulation[48] as a guarantee of "no forced return" (non- refoulement). The responses to the needs of Syrian refugees have been produced through AFAD and financed with its budgeting in Turkey since the beginnig. As of the second year of the crisis, even though the Turkish Government would like to cooperate with the United Nations agencies in service delivery, the exclusive mandate has been conducted by AFAD, whose budget is provided by the Turkish authorities (UNICEF, 2015a). In this context, the authorities keep collecting the up-to-date information concerning the needs and services through surveys. In terms of refugee education, MoNE has also delegated a group of experts to cope with the education of Syrian refugee children since the first quarter of 2014 (UNICEF, 2014).

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47 Temporary protection for Syrains have been established to recognise all Syrian citizens as conditional refugees so that they can be involved in service provision operations. In 2013, the Turkish parliament passed another law extending the rights for the externally displaced who look for international protection in Turkey.
48The regulation was passed and published in the Official Journal on 22 October 2014 by the Turkish parliament.

In the light of the "Open Door" policy, the number of Syrian refugees has gradually gone up over time. In 2014, the more the violence escalated in the Syrian war, the higher number of asylum seekers fled their country to Turkey. The total number of the Syrians exceeded 1.8 million in Turkey (Table 6). From the beginning, AFAD has functioned as a service provider in allocating the resources to the demand of Syrian refugees under the supervision of the government (Kirisci, 2015). As stated above, the Turkish government has not been able to achieve the expected collaboration on funding and service provision with its international partners. In this context, it has appropriated the funds for the annual expenditures on service provision for Syrian refugees through AFAD. Educational expenditures are also defrayed from the budget that AFAD devotes to the refugees each year.

A sudden increase in the number of refugees decreased per capita quota as of 2014. For instance, AFAD spared about 1285.75 TL per refugee in 2012 and 1295.06 TL in 2013, whereas these numbers became approximately 558.5 TL in 2014 and 564.79 in 2015 (Table 5&6). This considerable loss in per capita quota created exactly the same impact on the allocation of refugee education resources. The government began investing less in education both in the camp and urban settings. From this viewpoint, the "Open Door" policy a negative effect on refugee education in Turkey since this asylum-hosting country has not been able to support the educational service delivery to refugees with sufficient amount of financial resources. The number of Syrian refugees in doubled in 2014 (Table 6). On the other hand, the total expenditure on service provision has not been divided evenly among Syrian asylum seekers because of urbanisation and "unregistered" status. Therefore, in-camp population benefit from the government expenditure most efficiently, whereas urban refugees rely on their own income and savings in the cities.

Spendings on Syrian Refugee (through AFAD's budgeting)			
	Amount of spendings		Total spendings
	Provinces/ institutions Turkish Liras (million)	Centres Turkish Liras (million)	
2011	33.2	-	33.2
2012	493.9	20,4	514.3
2013	918.5	52.8	971.3
2014	882	123.3	1,005.3
2015	1,273.9	81.6	1,355.5
Total	3,601,6	278,2	3,879,9
source: Ministry of Finance (Republic of Turkey)			

Table 5. AFAD's Annual Expenditure on Syrian Refugees in Turkey[49]

Syrian refugees in Turkey, 2012 to present

Table 6. Syrian Refugee in Turkey, 2012-2015[50]

It seems clearly that Turkey's "Open Door" policy has contributed to the refugees fleeing the crisis to Turkey through the provision of temporary protection. However, the vulnerable displaced still live below the certain standards such as poor conditions for education and shelters, except for health services. The number of Syrian asylum seekers exceeds the capacity of the refugee camps in Turkey. This imbalance between demand

49 The Republic of Turkey, The Ministry of Finance
50 Source: UNHCR (July, 2016)

and supply of accommodation has increased the number of urban refugees. Due to the difficulties in delivering services to urban asylum seekers, they remain devoid of these services in an urban setting. Regarding the low capacity of refugee camps, Numan Kurtulmuş, the Deputy Prime Minister, stated: "...There are 27 refugee camps available to Syrians. Compared to those across the world, the Turkish Government provides their Syrian guests with accommodation in high-quality camps. However, these camping settings are hosting only nearly 300,000 refugees[51], which refers to 10% of the overall Syrian population in Turkey."[52]

Seeing that the government has been convinced of the fact that the Syrian crisis is not going to be terminated in a short period of time, it began systematising the regulations and memorandum for the Syrians' access to services in Turkey (Emin, 2016). In the beginning, the policies that were pursued towards education for Syrian refugee children were made on the assumption that they would go back to their country soon. Therefore, the objectives of these policies have been determined based upon only the needs of in-camp learners (Emin, 2016). For example, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) opted to provide training on Syrian National Curriculum in Arabic rather than to teach Turkish to Syrian children in the camps so that their education was not interrupted with different curricula and educational approaches in the long run (Emin, 2016).

In designing out-of-camp education, the government should take into consideration Syrians' tendency to gain the Turkish citizenship as their long-term plan (Akgül, Kaptı & Demir, 2016). It is also necessary to note that Syrian refugees have spread across the country and settled in the urban settings without any supervision. The number of Syrian children who have reached their schooling age across the country is around 700,000, whereas only 300,000 refugees have access to education somehow (Akgül, Kaptı & Demir, 2016). In other words, this refugee group with access to education is not exposed to a planned, well-designed, and effective model, but is involved in different instructional contexts. Therefore, the government agenda includes to discuss where, how, which curriculum and in what language Syrian learners should receive education in and outside the camps. In this context, the main concerns in which the

51 The most contemporary number of in-camp refugees is 256.079 in accorance with the AFAD data (June, 2016) (retrieved from https://www.afad.gov.tr/tr/IcerikDetay1.aspx?ID=16&IcerikID=848   23.06.2016- 12.36)
52 It has been taken from the interview that Numan Kurtulmuş gave to a news source in May 2015. (retrieved from http://www.memurlar.net/haber/515446/   23.06.2016- 12.12)

Turkish authorities initially seek to intervene are teachers, coursebooks, and curricula (Akgül, Kaptı & Demir, 2016). For instance, it has been reported that in-camp education is provided by Syrian volunteers, which means that they are not paid for their contribution to the refugee education by MoNE.[53] The voluntary participation does not fulfil the requirements of quality and equal education (Akgül, Kaptı & Demir, 2016). To be more precise, voluntary teachers educate Syrian learners based upon different instructional models through different methods. For some reason, quality education is not achieved in the refugee camps at all.

In the urban context, Syrian families are not sufficiently informed about how to benefit from public services.[54] For instance, parents who want their children to keep on education in public schools have poor knowledge of which procedures should be pursued, how to register their children for the state school, and which documents must be supplied. As a negative consequence of the "Open Door" policy, urbanisation causes Syrian families to cope with many more responsibilities for their children's education. There occur a number of barriers to education for Syrian refugees when they decide to participate in educational settings.[55]

First, the process of school enrolment starts with the "registered" status of refugees. Syrian families must officially register with the district police departments or AFAD so as to obtain "temporary protection" or foreigner ID numbers used for their children's enrolment in schools. Secondly, the administrative units of public schools also require several official documents for the registration other than their foreigner ID numbers. Nonetheless, for most situations, these documents may not be easily supplied to schools by Syrian asylum seekers because their original copies may be lost or left behind in Syria during their migration. Some school administrations may create some problems about Syrian children's enrolment in the school due to overcrowded classes, insufficient instructional tools and materials, and lack of enrolment documents. For instance, refugee students must submit "Certificate of equivalence" to schools as evidence of their last attended grades during on the duration of the registration so that they can also

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53 It has been reported in Akgül, Kaptı & Demir (2016) and Emin (2016).
54 It has been reported by Ezgi Koman in December 2015, Heinrich Böll Stiftung- Turkey (retrieved from https://tr.boell.org/tr/2015/12/29/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-ve-engellenen-egitim-hakki 25.06.2016 – 11.10)
55 Ezgi Koman from Heinrich Böll Stiftung- Turkey describes the barriers to education for Syrians. The findings that she obtains from her observation on urban refugees are explained in the following lines in detail. (retrieved from https://tr.boell.org/tr/2015/12/29/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-ve-engellenen-egitim-hakki 25.06.2016 – 11.10)

be placed to the grade in Turkey that they are supposed to be in Syria. Otherwise, Syrian children may be unwilling to continue their education in public schools and quit formal schooling completely when they do not attend the classes with their own age group.

The "unregistered" guests of Turkey are unable to benefit from any services, including education (Ahmadoun, 2014). Therefore, unless they change their "unregistered" status to "registered", they are not allowed to access educational services in any settings. Their unregistered status shows that they are urban refugees who live outside the camps. They, therefore, rely on their limited financial resources and savings. As a result of financial disabilities, most parents from the unregistered group encourage their children to work unofficially[56] rather than to participate in public schools or receive any types of education such as formal, informal, or vocational training. Today, the population of the unregistered Syrians is estimated as around 500,000 in Turkey (Ahmadoun, 2014).[57] These people are not open to any government intervention owing to the lack of the "registered" status.[58] Therefore, upon arriving at the post-war Syria, this group of people will represent the uneducated layer of Syrian society. Furthermore, their expected contribution to re-construction of the post-war Syria cannot be high under their current circumstances in Turkey.

"Guest/ Conditional Refugee" Status

Syrian refugees are politically recognised with their "guest" status in Turkey, which refers to "temporary protection". In other words, they do not have a legally identified "refugee" status (Emin, 2016). Regarding the geographical limitations of Turkey in the Geneva Convention and its Protocol, the Turkish authorities allow only temporary stays for the refugees, except for those with the Western citizenship. As a result of this application, asylum seekers face limited service provision and poor living conditions in Turkey. After the first years of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has extended the

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56 It has been reported by Ezgi Koman in December 2015, Heinrich Böll Stiftung- Turkey (retrieved from https://tr.boell.org/tr/2015/12/29/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-ve-engellenen-egitim-hakki 25.06.2016 – 11.10)
57 This number has been announced as 620,000 by an international NGO, called "Goal Global". (https://www.goalglobal.org/stories/post/the-unregistered-syrian-refugees 25.06.2016- 17.00)
58 It has been reported by Ezgi Koman in December 2015 , Heinrich Böll Stiftung- Turkey (retrieved from https://tr.boell.org/tr/2015/12/29/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-ve-engellenen-egitim-hakki 25.06.2016 – 11.10)

scope of the "guest" status for Syrian nationals as temporary protection; nevertheless, this extension in their status is not globally recognised under the Geneva Convention.[59] In order to gain UNHCR status in Turkey for better access to service provision, it is necessary to make an appointment with the UNHCR agency in Turkey. However, this "make-an-appointment" process takes up 7-10 years, by reason of their high workload density.[60]

"Temporary Protection" status shapes the means of providing Syrian refugees with education across Turkey to larger degree. In this regard, there are three education models which offer education to Syrian learners in Turkey through different combinations of curriculum and medium of instruction, namely Syrian private schools, temporary education centres, and public schools (Emin, 2016). For example, Syrian learners who participate in public schools are exposed to the Turkish national curriculum in Turkish, whereas those in Syrian private schools are educated with the revised Syrian Coalition Curriculum in Arabic (Emin, 2016). On the other hand, temporary education centres are the new schools that have been established for Syrian children's education. These centres are located in both refugee camps and particular urban settings. As the content of the education provided by these schools, the modified Syrian National Curriculum[61] has been taught to children in Arabic (Emin, 2016).

As another impact of the "guest" status, refugee families suffer from the uncertainty of their children's future. The main reason for this concern is that Turkey provides them with neither a refugee status nor permanent stay (Emin, 2016). Therefore, they are unable not only to benefit from service provision effectively but also to make long-term plans and accumulation in Turkey (HRW, 2015).[62] On the other hand, it is unlikely to guess when the Syrian crisis ends and the externally displaced go back to their homeland. Therefore, Syrian parents with the concerns about their children seek to

59 A blogger, Can Mutlu, discusses the topic by referring to the 1951 Convention and the definition of refugee in this UN document. As experiential data, this statement was taken from the institutional blog which was created to compare insights and analyses.
(retrieved from https://thedisorderofthings.com/2015/09/03/the-status-of-syrian-nationals-residing-in-turkey/ 30.06.2016 – 10.00)
60 A blogger, Can Mutlu, discusses the topic by referring to the 1951 Convention and the definition of refugee in this UN document. As experiential data, this statement was taken from the institutional blog which was created to compare insights and analyses. (retrieved from https://thedisorderofthings.com/2015/09/03/the-status-of-syrian-nationals-residing-in-turkey/ 30.06.2016 – 10.00)
61 MONE Circular 2014/21, Article 3.
62 This has been taken from the report of Human Rights Watch based upon the interviews with Syrian refugees in İstanbul, İzmir, Turgutlu, Gaziantep, Mersin ve Ankara .

intervene in their education so that these kids can obtain the necessary skills and knowledge of constructing both their future and post-war country to a great extent. As a solution to Syrian children's education, most Syrian parents opt to move to the "Western" world by crossing the sea from Turkey to the Mediterranean countries (Kutlu-Tonak, 2016), which are seen as the entrance to Europe.[63] For this reason, they both jeopardise their lives and spend all their wealth on arranging the illegal way of reaching the European countries.[64] Many Syrian families passed away on the way to provide their children with better educational conditions.[65]

"Change in Legal Status" Policy

With a view to expanding the formal status of Syrian refugees and providing them with access to urban settings, the Turkish government developed a more comprehensive refugee policy at the end of 2013 (HRW, 2015). This change in policy intended to reregulate the scope of the temporary protection for the displaced Syrians and to reduce high pressure on overcrowded camping settings and refugee-hosting provinces, particularly those located in southeastern Turkey. In April 2014, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP)[66] was also revised to broaden the definition of government objectives on refugees (HRW, 2015). As a new service provider, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was established to better manage service delivery to the displaced under the tutelage of the Ministry of Interior. This department is basically assigned to service provision for Syrian refugees in cooperation with AFAD (HRW, 2015). On the other hand, although this regulation

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63 It has been reported based upon the experiences of the Syrian refugees by Ezgi Koman in December 2015, Heinrich Böll Stiftung- Turkey. (retrieved from https://tr.boell.org/tr/2015/12/29/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-ve-engellenen-egitim-hakki 25.06.2016 – 11.10)
64 There are several sources of the news which report the Syrian attempts to enter Europe illegaly:
"Meriç Nehri'nde can pazarı!", 06/05/2016, http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-meric-nehrinde-can-pazari-557075/;
"1 filikaya 49 kişi bindi", 02/05/2016, http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-1-filikaya-49-kisi-bindi-540447/;
"36 göçmen ve 6 organizatör yakalandı", 06/05/2016, http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-36-gocmen-ve-6-organizator-yakalandi-542526/ (retrieved from İhlas Haber Ajansı website, 30.06.2016 – 12.10)
65 It has been reported by Ezgi Koman in December 2015, Heinrich Böll Stiftung- Turkey
(retrieved from https://tr.boell.org/tr/2015/12/29/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-ve-engellenen-egitim-hakki 25.06.2016 – 11.10)
BBC Turkey has also reported the similar news about illegal ways of reaching the European continent (December, 2015)
http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/12/151210_suriyeli_multeci 30.06.2016 – 14.00)
66 Law on Foreigners and International Protection, No. 6458, adopted April 4, 2013,

extended the definition of the temporary protection status for refugees in Turkey, they have not yet been recognised a right to work and benefit from social assistance. Some policies are still in need for revision and expansion in the refugee context. This shows that certain beneficiaries are able to access a few facilities under the particular circumstances, which can differentiate in time and places (HRW, 2015).

Regarding the educational needs of the beneficiaries, MoNE restructured the regulations on refugee education in line with the extension of the migration law in April 2014 (HRW, 2015). This MoNE movement launched in October 2014 took into consideration the objectives similar to those of the migration law. Seeing that Syrians were permitted to settle outside the camps and access public services in urban settings as of the April migration law, the limitations to their education were aimed to be eliminated with MoNE's Circular 2014/21. For example, the number of necessary documents which were required for Syrians' enrolment in public schools were reduced to a certain degree (HRW, 2015). In this regard, "foreigner identification document" was accepted as sufficient for the school registration.[67] Within the scope of the extended migration law, Syrian refugees were recognised with rights to access any services in each and every province where they would like to live. This means that service providers must be assigned to each city so as to keep service delivery in control and at a sufficient level. In connection with this need, the MoNE Circular created provincial commissions which were authorised to manage the education-related measures (HRW, 2015).

The "Change in Legal Status" policy indicates that the Turkish government has altered its approaches to Syrian refugees due to their uncertain period of stay to a great extent. As the reflection of this changing government policy, Yusuf Buyuk, deputy undersecretary for education, says as follows: "If we cannot educate these students, they will fall into the wrong hands, they are going to be exploited by gangs, criminals..."[68] The education authorities are also aware of how education is of great significance to the development of refugee standards in Turkey. Different from the educational researches conducted based upon the refugee needs, expectations, and future, Yusuf Buyuk

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67 Turkish Ministry of National Education Circular (MONE) 2014/21, art.4.
68 This has been taken from the interview with Yusuf Buyuk which was used for the newspaper " Reuters. With the heading of "No School for 400,000 Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey- Official," it was written on 02/10/2015. (retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/10/02/uk-mideast-crisis-turkey-education-idUKKCN0RW1WK20151002 30/06/2016 – 11.12)

highlights the "protection" role of education. Similar to the refugee education model introduced in Refugee Education Principles in detail, education must be deployed as a "protection" tool. In the second year of hosting, Turkey also began implementing the components and strategies of refugee education into its service delivery as education policies. HRW (2015) also suggests that the Ministry should develop education policies on "the elimination of language, cultural, and legislative barriers as well as the fortification of technical infrastructure".

Upon producing the Circular 2014/21 with the extended educational rights, MoNE has built up a partnership with the experienced UN agencies and NGOs so as to achieve the highest level of the provision of educational services through effective cooperation.[69] The Ministry also intended to obtain financial and technical support for refugee education (HRW, 2015). In parallel with the Refugee Education Principles, MoNE also agrees upon collaborating with the UN agencies on service provision in order to involve their technical assistance in refugee education in Turkey. In this context, UNICEF can be perceived as an education expert with technical knowledge. It has contributed to Turkey's Syrian Refugee Education with YOBIS database, which MoNE has employed to register and monitor Syrian learners (HRW, 2015). In the long term, this database enables MoNE to control GER (Gross Enrolment Ratio) of Syrian children more effectively. It also gives an opportunity to make faster intervention in refugee education, whenever a sudden or sharp change in the number of participants comes out.

All in all, with reference to refugee education described in Refugee Education Principles, Kirişçi (2014) emphasises that there is a growing need for education policies which should aim to attain three dimensions: namely humanitarian assistance, temporary protection, and long-term and refugee-specific cooperation with the UN agencies, NGOs, and donors. The Circular that Turkey developed in 2014 is a good example for the combination of these three dimensions in refugee education.

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69 As stated in Refugee Education Principles, refugee-hosting countries need to collaborate with other stakeholders for better service provision. This takes place in the UN Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, Turkey: 3RP Monthly in August 2014.
(retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/August2014dashboard-Education.pdf 30.06.2016 – 19.00)

4.2. Analysis of Education Policies on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Turkey

Regarding the background policies and their effects on refugee education, which are described in the previous section, the study intends to clarify under which circumstances Turkey's and Lebanon's education policies on refugees have been produced. These circumstances include the host countries' approaches to asylum, living conditions, refugee needs and expectations, and service provision capacities of the host countries. Refugee education policies which have been designed on the basis of these criteria shape the provision of educational services for Syrian learners in Turkey and Lebanon. As the second half of the analysis part, refugee education policies are assessed to figure out to what degree Syrian students are exposed to training in their host countries.

4.2.1. Refugee Education Policies in Lebanon

Lebanon provides primary public education only for Lebanese children by law.[70] With a great emphasis on the "public education" law, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) strengthened the principle that all learners who enrol in public schools must possess a Lebanese citizenship (Hamdan & Khater, 2015). The auhorities approach asylum seekers from Syria deliberately so that Lebanon does not face the second Palestine refugee issue in the near future. Camp contruction and permanent protection is, therefore, not allowed for the displaced, but urbanisation and post-war Syria are seen as the milestones of the Lebanese policies. In terms of service provision, refugees are encouraged to settle in urban settings through policies. As part of this service delivery, public schools have been made available to non-Lebanese students after the Government terminated the legal limitations on foreigners' access to public education (Hamdan & Khater, 2015).

MEHE re-regulates the requirements of "non-Lebanese participation in public education" and reduces the number of the necessary documents[71] for the school registration. With this attempt, it aims to increase the enrolment rate of Syrian refugee

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70 Law no. 686 of 1998 stipulates that "public education is free and compulsory in the primary phase and is a right for every Lebanese of primary age".
71 Identity card, proof of previous schooling, transcript.

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children. The Ministry also had students take official exams in English, French, and Arabic in 2012 as long as Syrian students provided their official transcripts that they obtained from their last-attended grades (Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji, 2014). Arabic exams are of great significance to Syrian population since they have been educated in Arabic in their home country (Brekke, 2015). Nevertheless, because of the limits on budgeting, MEHE took one step backward and withdrew the regulations on the registration of Syrian children in the 2013-2014 school year. In other words, Syrian children gave a one-year mandatory pause to their education. Upon implementing the refugee policy, called "Reaching All Children with Education", the Ministry also prioritised Lebanese children to Syrians. It enrolled the Lebanese to the morning shift of the schools, whereas Syrians were allowed to attend only the afternoon sessions (Hamdan & Khater, 2015). This is because the target audience of the policy was defined as Syrian refugees, Lebanese students with low income, and Palestines. In this regard, school capacities were not fully devoted to Syrians but Lebanese children. Apart from school enrolment, MEHE also signed a circular concerning refugee rights to take national exams in May 2014.[72] As of that time, Syrian children were allowed to take national exams without their education transcripts. The results of these placement tests were used to determine whether they were eligible to schooling and in which grades they could be involved.

State schools, including public and private educational settings, educate individuals based upon the Lebanese National Curriculum. For private schools with the intention of deploying another curriculum, there must be a special approval of MEHE. The curriculum which will be adopted is required to be accredited by the Ministry, accordingly. However, these private schools are not allowed to avoid pursuing the Lebanese National Curriculum completely, but are required to teach two curricula to students simultaneously.[73]

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72 252 UNHCR, Education Dashboard, May 2014.
73 According to the Lebanese law, Syrian children have to provide records with their grades from the last three years in Syria stamped by the Syrian Ministry of Education and certified by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These records have to be stamped by the Lebanese embassy in Syria too. Following entry into Lebanon, these records have to be taken to the Lebanese Ministry of Education for an "equivalency." There, refugees are asked for their residence permit (which costs approximately US$200) and a Syrian identity card (huwiyya) that has been stamped by the Syrian embassy in Lebanon. Refugees younger than 15 do not have an identity card and are thus asked for their family's ikhraj qayd (civil registry) instead which shows data about all the family (which may be sensitive information for a refugee) (Parkinson, 2014).

"Reaching All Children with Education (RACE)" Policy

Regarding the poor provision of educational services in Lebanon, the United Nations attempts to intervene in the development of the new strategies, policies, and partnerships as an inclusive response to the educational needs of the vulnerable Syrians. Within the framework of this cooperation, UN agencies and development partners, the Global Partnership for Education, and the Lebanese Government, especially MEHE, intend to contribute to training of both Syrian refugee and Lebanese vulnerable learners.[74] The policy aims to reach children aged 3 to 18.[75] All stakeholders agree upon producing the immediate response to emergencies and strengthening the Lebanese public service providers, especially schools in the education sector. They also emphasise the improvement of the sustainable provision of educational services for vulnerable children.

The multi-provider three-year programme was launched in January 2014. By highlighting the principle of "equity" and "equality" in accessing quality education, this programme initially gives support to i) school rehabilitation and equipment, ii) enrolment in formal basic education, iii) enrolment in basic education (ALP), iiii) enrolment in non-formal education (NFE). With a view to promoting the quality of teaching and learning, MEHE secondly determines its objectives as follows: the development of the instructional materials, higher teaching workforce capacity, school readiness and learning for adolescents.[76] As stated in the instructional design model in Refugee Education Principles, the Lebanese educational response also includes certain steps to pursue in Lebanon's refugee education. Learning outcomes assessment and monitoring exemplify two of these steps. Moreover, this model bolsters the institutional development through school-based management and grants.

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74 This overall objective has been taken from the original copy of the policy paper that MEHE prepared to introduce the three-year programme as the immediate response to the Syrian crisis. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

75 The target age group has been stated in the original copy of the policy paper that MEHE prepared to introduce the three-year programme as the immediate response to the Syrian crisis. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

76 The objectives have been stated in the original copy of the policy paper that MEHE prepared to introduce the three-year programme as the immediate response to the Syrian crisis. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

With the intention of involving an average 413,000 [77] Syrian refugee and vulnerable Lebanese school-aged children in quality education per year, MEHE and its international partners have initially determined these children as the programme beneficiaries. As the overall objective of RACE, school-aged Syrian children (3-18 years) should be provided with both formal and informal instructional opportunities to eliminate the scars of the Syrian crisis and build up a bright future for the next generations in a safe and protective environment.[78] The overall budget which has been allocated to the three year programme costs 634 million US$.[79] In terms of population, demographic analysis shows that the rate of school-aged refugee children is equal to 42 % of Syrian population. More than 280,000 of these children have still been out of school since end of 2013.[80] The number of out-of-school children is expected to go up to 470,000 by 2016.

RACE aims at promoting not only student participation in basic education but also achieving some other areas such as trained teachers, rehabilitated schools and classrooms. The Lebanese authorities are aware of the importance of the educational components to quality education; therefore, they determined to attain an increase in in the number of the equipped classrooms, established school libraries, trained teachers, and rehabilitated schools, which are capable of making considerable contribution to refugee education. The numbers that have been aimed to be achieved in the scope of RACE are 20,000 for trained teachers, 250 for rehabilitated schools, 2500 for equipped classrooms, and 250 for established school libraries.[81] Early Childhood Education was also assessed as one of the fields that needs improving through the government investment. RACE regulated a set of objectives to make community-based early childhood education (ECE) available to 40,000 children.[82]

77 This number has been reflected differently by UNHCR. The UNHCR number is close to 417,000 Syrian refugee children in Lebanon, aged 3 to 14

78 The objective has been stated in the original copy of the policy paper that MEHE prepared to introduce the three-year programme as the immediate response to the Syrian crisis. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

79 This budget has not been fully provided for the Lebanese authorities. It was determined as the targeted allocation, including 211.3 million US$ for the first year, 191.3 million US$ for the seccond year, and 231.4 million US$ for the third year. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

80 ESWG calculation. This number is a conservative estimate and could be much higher.

81 The numbers are taken from the policy paper of RACE. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

82 The numbers are taken from the policy paper of RACE. (retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 02.07.2016 - 13.13)

ALP	• Children from age 10 to 18 who have lost school time but who have already acquired some basic literacy and numeracy skills
NFE	• Children from age 10 to 18 who are out of school or have never been in school and need to master basic literacy and numeracy skills
Community-based ECE	• Children from age to 3 to 6 not in school
Life skills	• Adolescents from age 15 to 18 in under-served communities (especially ITS)

Table 7. Profiles of beneficiaries by education approach[83]

Accelerated learning programme (ALP), Non-Formal Education (NFE), Community-based ECE, and Life Skills symbolise the student profiles which were determined as beneficiaries of the policies (Table 7). Seeing that the policy was inclusively designed to improve the principles of "equality of opportunity" and "access to education" for not only Syrian refugee but also vulnerable Lebanese children, different categories like NFE and Life Skills were produced, specifically for refugees, other than formal basic education. The main reason for this multi-provider education delivery is to encourage refugee children to participate in education somehow even though they suffer from financial, psychological, and social difficulties in Lebanon. As seen in Table 8, the target population of children is comprised of 65 per cent Syrian refugee children, 20 per cent Lebanese children from the host communities, 10 per cent Palestinian refugee children from Syria and 5 per cent Lebanese returnee children from Syria (5%).[84]

83 The numbers are taken from the policy paper of RACE.
(retrieved from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf   02.07.2016 - 13.13)
84   The   numbers   are   taken   from   the   policy   paper   of   RACE.   (retrieved   from http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf   02.07.2016 - 13.13)

Type of education	Age group	Provider	Where	How many	Groups in %	Cost per child
Formal Basic (1st shift)	6-14	MEHE	Public schools	30,000	65% Syrian refugees 20% host communities 10% PRS 5% Lebanese returnees	363
Formal Basic (2nd shift)	6-14	MEHE	Public schools	170,000		600
ALP	10-18	NGOs/MEHE (quality assurance)	Public schools/community centres	90,000		350
NFE (basic literacy and numeracy/e-learning)	10-18	NGOs	Community centres/ITS	45,000		250
Community-based ECE	3-6	NGOs	Community centres/ITS	40,000		363
Life skills	15-18	NGOs	Community centres/ITS	35,000		75

Table 8. Programme beneficiaries[85]

With reference to service provision, MEHE transfers formal basic education to 200,000 children in public schools, whereas NGOs take many responsibilities for educational operations and aim to reach 210,000 students through different community-based centres (Table 8). Moreover, the target age group of NGOs vary from 3 to 18, which requires a more professional and comprehensive preparation process of education delivery. This range has been limited between 6 and 14 in MEHE, which refers to "compulsory education" in Lebanon. Interestingly, the table below shows that early childhood education is supplied to nearly 10% of the target group by the unofficial providers such as NGOs. In other words, the education authorities are not responsible for education delivery to very young learners in Lebanon. As explained in the section of "double shift" policy (see below), while the morning shift of formal basic education is devoted to Lebanese students, Syrian learners are prompted to be involved in the afternoon shift. Many more capacities are available to the afternoon section, accordingly. Nonetheless, compared to the first shift education, the second shift costs higher fees per student.

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[85] Jalbout (2015) underlines that RACE promotes the refugee enrolment in basic education (aged 6 to 14), whereas it makes no contribution to the enrolment in secondary education.

According to Jalbout (2015), RACE aim at devoting $177.2 million to the first year of the programme (2014) and $191.3 million to the second year targets (2015). However, the overall funds met only 57% of spending in 2014/15 school year. Provided that these funds were doubled, the number of second-shift participation would go up twice as high as the current enrolment, which provides access to education for another 60,000 children. It can be inferred from these analyses that more donors are required to make financial contribution to refugee education in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of basic education enrolment has been 6% from 2013/14 to 2014/15 school year, whereas there is no increase in the enrolment of secondary education (Table 9). This is because RACE primarily determined its target group as basic education students. It means that RACE did not develop any particular strategies or objectives for an increase in the number of secondary school enrolments. In terms of budgeting, the government did not invest in secondary education, accordingly. As a result, secondary school students of Syria did not enrol in public schools in 2014/15.

Age group	2013/14 School Year			2014/15 School Year		
	Total number	Number enrolled	Percentage enrolled	Total number	Number enrolled	Percentage enrolled
3-5 years	133,000	N/A	N/A	134,000	10,000	0%
6-14 years	280,000	87,000	31%	291,000	107,000	37%
15-18 years	81,000	3,000	4%	87,000	2,000	2%
6-18 years	361,000	90,000	25%	378,000	109,000	21%
3-18 years	494,000	92,000	19%	512,000	109,000	29%

Note: Information for 2013/14 from Government of Lebanon (2015) and CERD 2014/15 from UN statistics

Table 9. Syrian refugee children enrolled in Lebanese public schools, 2013/14 to 2014/15[86]

Buckner & Spencer[87] bring another perspective to the enrolment issue and analysed the enrolment rates between 2014 and 2015. Their findings show that the out-of-school rate has fallen down to 49 percent in 2015 from 78% in 2014. From this viewpoint, RACE has achieved most of its objectives in integrating refugee learners into the Lebanese education system. Apart from budgeting, the roles of NGOs should also be questioned in quality assurance and access to service provision. Within the scope of RACE, MEHE has designed the NFE content as preparation units for formal education

86 Jalbout (2015) underlines that RACE promotes the refugee enrolment in basic education (aged 6 to 14), whereas it makes no contribution to the enrolment in secondary education.
87 These bloggers analysed the Lebanese Refugee Education in Carnegie Endowment For International Peace- Sada Middle East Analysis, including different and inclusive sub-topics on May 04,2016 (retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/63513. 28.06.2016 – 10.00)

such as remedial and catch-up classes, language support, and homework help, and explicitly expressed that they take on the responsibilities for the development of non-formal education. This policy never sees the Lebanese authorities as the only provider of NFE, but civil society (NGOs) for effective service provision. By the end of 2015, approximately 160,000 refugee learners enrolled in public schools even though the RACE objective was 200,000 at least. Moreover, this number is supposed to go down in 2016 by reason of transportation costs of the second shift schools, where Syrian children are encouraged to participate.

MEHE does not provide necessary assistance to give support to secondary education from its international partners, but only from civil society and NGOs. Seeing that RACE could not fulfil the expectations and criteria of MEHE in the provision of basic education, the Lebanese authorities may not attempt to develop another policy on secondary education similar to RACE. For the same reason, donors are not willing to fund the similar programmes like secondary and higher education with the same amount of financial support. Regarding the public schools' limited capacity for refugees, NGOs can be seen as the short-term service provider of life skill and vocational education. They can very likely reward students with grants or financial supports so that Syrian learners can keep on their secondary education in private schools. In this regard, MEHE benefits from its partnership with NGOs more than that with international stakeholders or donors.

Fleeing Syria to other host countries, refugee families experienced the challenges of registering their children for schools due to a lack of documentation. These families did not have a particular diploma or official document concerning their children's last attended grade. As a result, their children began education late, participated in the lower grades, or dropped out of schools entirely. Therefore, today, refugee families seek to obtain an official document which elaborate on their children's academic success or abilities. They do know that these certified educational activities in Lebanon can create an opportunity to make instruction available to them at the level that they deserve. Nevertheless, the certificates can be provided only for the students that are educated in Lebanese public schools. On the other hand, although refugee students who manage to start education in state schools, there are still many barriers to understand the subjects in the Lebanese curriculum because of its languages. For secondary education, public schools teach the Lebanese curriculum in English or French, which is found difficult even

by Lebanese students. To illustrate, the pass rates of students who studied the Lebanese curriculum were 30 % for boys and 58 % for girls in secondary schools whose medium of instruction was English or French.[88] The success rate in the modified Arabised Lebanese curriculum was 95 % in the secondary stage. Comparing the former rates to the latter, it can be said that learning the Lebanese curriulum in Arabic encouraged students to do better in the exams.

"Double Shift" Policy

Double shift education, also called "hot seating"[89], refers to instructional activities that take place in both morning and evening shifts. Provided that the target group is overcrowded or suffers from lack of teachers, education is divided into the first and second shifts. This education is also integrated into the contexts where infrastructure or school capacities do not fulfil high demand of the target group. Some criticise the system due to its poor quality in the evening sections if the same teachers educate both shifts. For the "double shift" training in Lebanon, teachers are supposed to design in-class educational activities in accordance with the needs of two different populations, the Lebanese learners in the morning shift and Syrians in the afternoon.[90] The Lebanese authorities insistently place great emphasis on the fact that Syrian generations should be exposed to quality education since they will construct the post-war Syria based upon the newly built-up knowledge, skills, and experiences in Lebanon.[91] This can be interpreted as temporary accommodation/ protection for Syrians in Lebanon. Moreover, with the intention of educating the future of the post-war Syria, the government takes up an assertive position of prompting Syrians to turn back to their country. Public school teachers are directly assigned to critical responsibilities for refugee education on the duration of temporary protection, accordingly.[92]

88 These rates have been taken Shuayb, M., Makkouk, N., & Tuttunji, S. (2014).
89 This term has been used for double shift by Bray (2008). Bray, M. (2008). *Double-shift schooling: Design and operation for cost-effectiveness* (Vol. 90). Commonwealth Secretariat.
90 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
91 MEHE involves this statement in Reaching All Children with Education (R.A.C.E) as the main objective of the Lebanese refugee education.
92 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside

In the 2013-2014 academic year, MEHE activated the regulation on promoting the school capacities through the double-shift method (Hamdan & Khater, 2015). Upon the development of the double shift policy, the Lebanese government applied for educational funds to the UN in tandem, so as to increase the capacities of public schooling for Syrian newcomers. However, the authorities prioritised the educational needs of the Lebanese students to those of the asylum seekers. MEHE intentionally pushed non-Lebanese refugees into participating in afternoon sessions of the public schools, whereas morning shifts were mostly devoted to the Lebanese (Hamdan & Khater, 2015). As a result, Syrian children were involved in poor quality afternoon education with tired teachers. (Hamdan & Khater, 2015).

At beginning of the 2014-2015 academic year, MEHE discontinued implementing the "double shift" policy into the Lebanese context of Syrian refugee education until further notice[93] because Lebanon's funds were not provided by its international partners for the first term. As a solution, MEHE excluded Syrian population from public schools for one term. In the second half of the year, the expected funding was supplied to the MEHE demand for refugee education. Thus, Syrian nationals could keep their education in public schools even thought these funds provided by the UN agencies did not cover the whole educational spending in Lebanese public schools (Hamdan & Khater, 2015). Moreover, these UN funds also helped to register a larger number of Syrian students for the second shift (afternoon) and to allocate some additional students to the first shift (morning) (Hamdan & Khater, 2015). These findings show that there is a direct relation between Lebanese refugee education and financial support of the UN. So, if the UN reduces its financial contribution to educational service delivery, the government will have serious difficulties in implementing its refugee education. Based upon the increasing funds, the number of public schools which deploy the double shift system is estimated to become 160 out of 1350 in Lebanon this year (2016).[94]

Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
93 Annahar, September 8, 2014. (retrieved from http://newspaper.annahar.com/article/168707-النهار-275-تلميذة-ألف-_الجي-في-من-ادار-املدارس-الرسمية-ابو-صص400ال-طيع-نستعاب-اب-؟id=168707 30.06.2016)
94 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.

In order to measure its technical and administrative qualifications, the Lebanese double shift policy is also analysed based upon the authentic experiences of Syrian refugee children and their teachers.[95] According to MEHE, the number of school-aged Syrian children fleeing their country to Lebanon is over 360,000 today.[96] As a shared goal of integrating these children into public schooling, UNHCR and MEHE cooperated to improve the double shift system. Although this cooperation creates an increase in the school enrolments of Syrian children, public school teachers suffer from overburdened teaching and longer working hours. Moreover, these teachers also reported that they seek to educate a group of refugees who requires different types of training and attention. Unfortunately, they were not exposed to such training prior to this experience. Therefore, they are feeling unprepared both technically and in practice. As mentioned in the Refugee Education Principles, this can create unwillingness to teach in the long run. As a result, teachers can demotive themselves and the quality of their teaching skills goes down accordingly.

Regarding the success and operations of the double shift education in Lebanon, Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Elizabeth Adelman conducted some interviews with Lebanese teachers to reveal their experiences about the "double shift" issue.[97] Adnan educates both Lebanese and Syrian pupils in a government school as a teacher with a Masters degree in Science. He participates in both the morning and afternoon shifts of his school from 8.00 am to 06.45 pm. With reference to teachers' salaries, Adnan reported that his salary depends on a contract and he is paid for each shift that he participates in. As an incentive to work in the afternoon shift, higher salaries were initially offered to teachers by MEHE. Nevertheless, Adnan had not yet received any second shift payments since the academic year began.[98] There is no clear explanation about the reason why this delay has been made by MEHE. According to the interviewers' observation, most teachers, however, keep educating the second shift students as policy implementers.

95 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
96 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
97 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
98 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.

Similar to Adnan, Rida also educates the double shifts students as the elementary education teacher in another government school. She talked about her concerns about the refugee children in her afternoon classrooms. Rida explained that the major difficulty in teaching Syrian children starts with teachers' poor knowledge of refugee education.[99] There is always a risk for crises in the classroom and teachers should be ready to intervene in them all the time. It is also unlikely for teachers to exclude children's lives or family issues from the classes. Rida also reported that refugee students may suddenly quit doing their studies due to the deaths of their relatives or become extremely agressive each time they get something wrong.[100] These crises require immediate responses not only from teachers but also the Ministry. As an immediate response, psychosocial courses can be referred to these children, for instance.

With reference to training specific to refugee education, Adnan participated in the four-day course provided by the British Council, whereas Rida was not exposed to any training about how to work with refugee learners. Therefore, she did not know how to approach the challenges and demands of Syrian students as she was not provided with not only training on ad experiences about refugee education within the scope of teacher training. Although he found this course useful and applicable to refugee classrooms, he mostly complained about its too broadly designed content. The challenges that teachers could experience with refugee learners in a classroom were not detailed sufficiently in the teacher training programmes, but exemplified with only a few examples. For the teacher training course, there were no enough materials to elaborate on the design of refugee education.[101] Regarding the methods that he deployed for double shift education, he developed several new strategies through interaction with these students by himself. For instance, he explained. "I also learned how to mix Arabic and English in the classroom, an approach I now uses in both shifts."[102] All in all, the experiences that were obtained from these two teachers did not fulfil the requirements of the refugee education

99 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
100 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
101 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2,2016.
102 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2,2016.

model which has been determined and detailed in Refugee Education Principles. As a result, they reported that the insufficient resources reduced efficiency of their teaching activities.

Name of Institution	Curriculum	Staff	Teacher training
Private Lebanese schools secular	Lebanese	All Lebanese	None
Private Lebanese faith schools	Lebanese	Lebanese and Syrians	None
Syrian schools including coalition	Syrian	All Syrian	None
Lebanese NGO	ALP, and homework	All Lebanese or Palestinian, except for a single NGO with one Syrian teacher	Meetings
Syrian NGO	Lebanese, Syrian, ALP	All Syrian	Just started
UNRWA	Lebanese	Palestinians in Lebanon and PRS	None

Table 10. The survey results of the Staff in the Lebanese schools[103]

The interviews show that surveyed teachers were not offered any teacher training programme on either the Lebanese education system or refugee education, except for Adnan's four day-training. For those with no training, the most important support is provided through classroom observation by their Lebanese colleagues. Lebanese teachers did not receive any training specific to how to approach their refugee learners and modify the instructional plans. As stated in Table 10, Lebanese schools, including public, private,

103 Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji (September 2014) published their studies, including this data. This table intends to figure out whether teachers are involved in training on refugee education. If so, what types of schools include teachers with this training.

and NGO institutions, organise the educational activities with a combination of Syrian and Lebanese teachers. The interviewees report that they hardly come together to discuss the instructional actions in their classrooms. Different from regular schools, NGOs with language program for refugees hold periodic meetings with their instructors. Moreover, the findings of Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji (2014) indicate that one of these NGOs provided an extensive language training on the use of the socio-linguistic method and psychosocial activities in the classroom. The other two also support their refugee students with counsellors, whereas one of them organises "house visits" to communicate with refugee parents to better analyse the environment where children temporarily built up their lives.

As shown in Table 10, the nationalities of the teacher responsible for refugee education are of great importance to shaping the instructional acitivities in Lebanese schools. Most school administrators that were interviewed[104] expressed that there was an absolute need for the mixed-nationality group of the teaching staff in schools. This is because Syrian children did not feel isolated in their learning contexts when Syrian teachers helped them to adapt themselves into their new environments by sharing the familiar values and backgrounds. On the other hand, teaching in informal education (in NGOs and community-support schools) provides Syrian educators with financial support and compensation. As can be seen in Table 10, Syrian schools and NGOs opt to employ Syrian teachers for their private institutions even though these NGOs can also go for Lebanese specialists for certain responsibilities in their schools. However, this preference is different for Lebanese public schools. They mostly transfer refugee education through a mixed nationality group of teaching staffs (Table 10). The main reason for this preference is that Lebanese schools intend to achieve the highest efficiency from their teaching activities; therefore, Lebanese and Syrian staffs differentiate with each other in tasking in the schools in accordance with their branches, abilities and knowledge. For example, Lebanese teachers are assigned to teach Brevet and Baccalaureate preparation as they are able to provide students the relevant information about the Lebanese official exams.

104 Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji (September 2014) published their studies, including this data. This table intends to figure out whether teachers are involved in training on refugee education. If so, what types of schools include teachers with this training.

Quality education is as important to raise awareness of the past, present, and future as access to education. Otherwise, it does not help individuals to access education whose content remains below certain standards. Therefore, interviewees were also asked to assess their own performance in the second shift where syrian refugees are involved. Adnan, one of the teachers, notes, the morning shift produces better learning and student achievements since both teachers and students available to the instructional activities.[105] Compared to students, teachers complain about exhaustion after the morning shift. Another interviewee reports that she lost her enthusiasm for the second shift as the repetition of the morning seesion. In parallel with this teacher, Adnan also says, "I teach very slowly! ...if a chapter for the first shift takes one hour, in the second shift it takes two."[106] Aatifa, another teacher in Adnan's school, claims that her lessons in the second shift must be much easier due to the education level of the target population in the afternoon session. She describes, " ...classes must be very simple in the afternoons... I don't teach them much."[107]

Type of organisation	Psycho-social support provided
Private Lebanese schools (morning shift)	Art, Music, Life Skills, and other activities
Lebanese NGOs	Recreational, Psychosocial activities, Theatre, Art, Physical Education
Private Lebanese Arabised curriculum	A few classes occasionally offer Physical Education and Art in primary and intermediate levels. Drama was offered, but NGO delivering service left
Syrian schools	None
UNRWA	Physical Education and Art
Coalition	None
Syrian NGO running a tented part-time school	None

Table 11. The types of psychosocial support in the schools and NGOs[108]

105 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2,2016.
106 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
107 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.
108 Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji (September 2014) published their studies, including this data. This table intends to figure out which schools provide refugee students with psychosocial courses and recreational acitivities.

As stated in Refugee Education Principles, the content of the curriculum should be customised in accordance with the needs, backgrounds, and expectations of the refugee population. In this regard, Lebanese schools are also assessed to figure out whether they provide their refugee students with the psychosocial support and recreational activities to enhance their psychological welfares. As shown in Table 11, the majority of educational institutions supply some psychosocial courses. However, these courses have mostly been designed by community and NGO-supported schools. They are intentionally excluded from the curriculum of public schools so that the cost can be reduced per student (UNICEF, 2015a). MEHE exposes Syrian children to the condensed Lebanese Curriculum in Arabic in the afternoon shift. Similar to public schools, Syrian private schools do not cover the psychosocial activities in their education modules because Syrian communities are not capable of making financial investment and human resources in these courses (Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji, 2014). According to the interviews conducted with refugee children, Syrian schools place too much emphasis on academic activities, whereas these children complain about this overload academic studies. One Syrian learner has reported, "we need activities and maybe some rewards and trips."[109] The interviews have also revealed that educators have certain concerns about the sustainability of such motivating courses in the long run. In other words, the psychological support provided by NGOs fully depends on their financial contribution. Therefore, as long as NGOs provide schools with sufficient funds, these schools will be able to involve refugee children in the educational activities any more. One principal summarises the "sustainability" problem as follows: "We do have some associations that want to help out like Save the Children, but due to the situation, they had to postpone for a while, but now another group are doing that. They meet with children during PE or Art classes."

The overall evaluation of the " double shift" education shows that the Lebanese instructional model for refugee education has promoted access to education; nevertheless, it is crucial to note that this education needs improving in sustainable psychosocial courses, customised curriculum, teacher training and overwork.[110] Although the British

109 This has been taken from the data of Shuayb, Makkouk & Tuttunji (September 2014).
110 These areas which need improving are obtained from the data analyses of various studies on the Lebanese refugee education.

Council and NGOs provide teachers with the short-period training on how to work with refugee learners, teachers emphasises their needs for better guidance:

i) to customise the curriculum and its objectives on the basis of students' needs,

ii) to develop lesson plans for refugee leaners in need of traumatic supports,

iii) to enable students to interact with each other in schools,

iv) support teachers with motivating compensation.[111]

Grade Allocation Policy

The Lebanese authorities facilitate Syrians' access to education in public schools by terminating the declaration of certificate or official document which proves the last attended grade. Nevertheless, in order that Syrian children can begin education at the most appropriate level, schools have developed new strategies that identify the education level of the Syrian learners based upon different criteria like language, age, or grade.

The term of "grade allocation" is used to indicate the overall integration of Syrian refugees into Lebanese schools. As shown in Table 12, many schools opt to utilise the placement test as the most common instructional tool to determine the grades of the Syrian children. However, the content and language of the placement exam are major barriers to the error-free placement. This is beause the test content is prepared based on the Lebanese curriculum with which Syrians are not familiar. In terms of language, refugee students also face several linguistic challenges in the exams whose language is not Arabic. As a result, students are allocated to the classes disproportionately or are forced to repeat the grades that they have already completed in Syria. On the other hand, some schools also take into account the age criterion as well as placement test and certification such as Lebanese public schools. In terms of curriculum, Table 12 shows that schools mostly deploy the Lebanese types of curricula or its modified version in terms of language, except for Syrian private schools.

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111 These were obtained from the interviews and added to the blog whose report was written by Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. (retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/education-plus-development/posts/2016/02/17-inside-syrian-refugee-schools-dryden-peterson-adelman   30.06.2016 – 15.50)

In order to better analyse the government policy on replacement, the approaches to grade allocation should be individually detailed. "Age" helps to determine which grade a Syrian student should start as a global requirement. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table 12, most schools do not accept "age" as a sufficient indicator which determines Syrian learners' grade. For this reason, they request students to take a placement test in the absence of the last attended grade certificate. On the other hand, "age" can be a useful tool to equally allocate students to the grades when accumulations of students concentrate on particular grades. For instance, according to the results of the placement test, most of Syrian fifth-graders are supposed to become fourth-graders in the Lebanese Education system. Yet, the limited physical infrastructure and conditions lead a school not to be able to provide education for this overcrowded group of Syrian and Lebanese fourth-graders simultaneously. In this context, the school can reallocate these Syrian fifth-graders to the Lebanese fifth grade. Thus, the school administration can ease off too much pressure on fourth grade teachers' shifts and tempo to a certain extent. Instead, these Syrian fifth graders learn a simplified fifth grade curriculum within the same age group. For this case, fifth grade teachers who teach the double shift students should make the curriculum more simple and understandable.[112]

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[112] According to the findings of Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, there is evidence of proving that the afternoon shift does not require over-work from a teacher perspective because of the lower education level of the second-shift participants (interviewees reported their own experiences).

Type of Programme and Curriculum	Acceptance Policy
Private Lebanese curriculum	Age and placement tests or certificate of last attended grade
Syrian official curriculum	Age and placement test
Private Lebanese Arabised curriculum	Placement test
Syrian and Libyan curriculum	According to age, certificates and placement tests
UNRWA	Last grade attended
ALP	Placement Test
Syrian NGO offering literacy and numeracy	Placement tests then leveling
Lebanese NGO pyshcosocial and life skills	Placement test
Coalition	Certificate of last grade attended and placement test for those without report cards
Private Lebanese	Certificate of last grade attended
NGO offering a tented school	Oral placement test

Table 12. Grade Allocation Policy in the Lebanese education programmes[113]

As two basic components of the language, fluency and accuracy are of great importance to grade allocation. Lebanese schools where the survey was conducted reported that they also assessed Syrian students' proficiency in English to allocate Syrian

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[113] Sarah Dryden-Peterson, professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Elizabeth Adelman, Phd student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has reported these experiences as the second in series "Inside Syrian Refugee Schools" on Feb 2, 2016.

children to the ideal grades. Their assessment tools vary from pronouncing a word to having an interview with a committee of English teachers. Provided that this committee does not find learners' language skills proficient enough, they are place to lower grades. A Syrian student in public school explained, "They asked me if I spoke English and I said that I did not so they placed me in a lower grade". In parallel, a teacher talks about their placement test on the foreign language as: "We made a small placement test. We wrote a word on the board. If the students could read it, then they were placed in one group and those who could not were placed in another." all in all, language plays a determining role in allocating Syrian students to the grades.

In terms of the exam content, Lebanese schools follow different ways of assessing Syrian learners. The first finding about Syrian and Lebanese curricula is that they differ from each other to a larger degree. Therefore, Syrian students cannot be expected to earn high scores in the placement test designed based upon the Lebanese curriculum. One principal working with Syrian learners in a private school expresses his approach as: "I cannot give the student an entrance exam from a curriculum that is totally different than theirs. The students need a specially designed entrance exam. The examiner should know the Syrian curriculum so that the evaluation is valid. If we evaluate according to the Lebanese curriculum, it is unfair, especially if they have not studied it." This school following the Lebanese curriculum evaluates the placement test as irrelevant and unequal for Syrian newcomers and hence redesigns the content of their placement exam in line with the Syrian curriculum. Thus, the placement tests promote the quality of education in which Syrian children participate because these assessment tools help to assigned students to their ideal grades in terms of knowledge and skills.

4.2.2. Refugee Education Policies in Turkey

Turkey has not yet undertaken a particular education programme or policy like Lebanon's RACE to provide Syrian learners with the most comprehensive and effective service delivery in training. This is because Turkey regarded the Syrian civil war as a short-term conflict and hence did not invest in refugee education. Instead, Turkey's policies prioritised some refugee rights to access health, feeding, clothing facilities to the right of education to a larger extent. Although the government approached Syrian students

with temporary solutions such as vocational training in camps or enrolment in public schools, it opted to enter into new regulations and policies on Syrian refugee education after 2012/13 school year. As of 2013, politicians quit producing solutions to refugee education in circumlocution and were actively involved in eliminating possible negative impacts of lost generation on both the Syrian future and current political atmosphere. Different from Lebanon, Syrian learners do not easily integrate themselves into the educational services that are provided for them in Turkey because of different medium of instruction and curriculum.

"No Integration" Policy

Since Turkey's borders were opened to Syrian refugees, academicians, experts, and educators have debated the most effective implementation of the ideal curriculum and language policies for Syrian learners. In 2011-12 school year, Syrians were initially exposed to unmodified Turkish curriculum in learning settings (UNICEF, 2015a). These instructional activities were bolstered only with the Arabic interpretation in Syrian accommodation centres (Emin, 2016). In 2012-13 academic year, the government policy indifferent to refugee education began altering because the authorities realised uncertainty about the continuum of the Syrian crisis. They could not motivate local, national, and transnational stakeholders to pursue the "indifferentness" strategy for Syrians' education in Turkey. Therefore, MoNE was charged with investigating the Syrian National Curriculum in detail and excluding certain points concerning the current political regime from the Syrian curriculum. This modified instructional content started to be taught to Syrian students in school settings like refugee camps and temporary education centres in Turkey in 2014. As the justification of "Syrian curriculum for Syrian children in Turkey", the authorities expressed that they implemented the modified Syrian curriculum into refugee education to invest in the post-war Syria. They did not want students to get confused about what they have studied in Turkey and they will learn in Syria (UNICEF, 2015a). This shows that Syrian refugees will not be allowed to accommodate in Turkey after the emergency time.

Turkey's general government policy on the minorities aims at integrating the minor groups or communities to society through the national school system. In this regards, teaching Turkish to these sub-units becomes the first strategy to follow. Nevertheless, from the beginning, the authorities have not attempted to encourage Syrian refugees to develop their language skills in Turkish, but to participate in the Arabic instruction in refugee camps and schools (UNICEF, 2015a). Nevertheless, Turkey also altered this "temporariness" perception over Syrian refugees in the fifth year of the Syrian crisis. The impact of this change on Syrian refugee education initially occurred in 2015-2019 Strategic Plan that was published in September 2015 by the Ministry of National Education. In the strategic report, MoNE elaborates on the integration of the Syrian refugee children through education. In this regard, it also discusses what types of studies should be conducted to promote and accelerate the integration process (Emin, 2016). MoNE mentions the refugee education issue as follows: "On the purpose of providing education for refugees, foreigners with the right of temporary protection, and stateless asylum seekers on the duration of their stay in Turkey, MoNE will carry out a number of studies on the achievement of their integration into the Turkish Education System (MoNE, 2015, s. 37). This statement indicates how MoNE has changed its intention of refugee education over time.

As of January 2016, the population of Syrian refugee children, aged 5 to 17, is more than 800,000.[114] According to the MoNE data, only 34,000 children, including in-camp and urban numbers, could have access to education when they first migrated to Turkey in 2011, whereas this number has gone up to 290,000 in 2016 (UNHCR, 2015). In 2014/15 school year, 90 % of in-camp children were involved in instructional activities in 25 camps constructed and managed by AFAD. This number refers to only 13% of the overall population of school aged Syrian children in Turkey. In the same academic year, nearly 26% of Syrian children are estimated to enrol in temporary education centres or public schools in Turkey (Table 13). In 2015/16 school year, GIGM has reported that urban refugee children's education level is much lower at the primary level than that of in-camp children. The number of urban Syrian children is estimated to be around 625,000. The distribution of their education levels are 10% for kindergarten, 35% for primary education, 27% for secondary schooling, and 28% for high school education.

114 Source: UNHCR, 2016

The Number of Children Enrolment Rate In and Outside Camps

Table 13. The Enrolment Rates of Syrian Children In and Outside Refugee Camps[115]

The findings show that Turkey has permitted Syrian refugees to attend public schools since the beginning of the crisis on condition that they can provide appropriate documentation, especially (residence permit)[116], for the enrolment department of the schools. Although the requirements for enrollment in public schools have been revised and some items have been excluded from the list, there are still some important points that the majority of Syrian students suffer from such as language barriers (Turkish as the language of instruction), lack of information on refugee rights and financial constraints (UNICEF, 2015a). For these reasons, only 7,446 Syrian children have reportedly attended Turkish schools across the country since May 2014,[117] whereas the capacity of the public school system is available to at least 20,000 Syrian children.[118] Delisting the requirement for a residence permit, MoNE has also decided to establish new units at the provincial level, called "Provincial Education Commissions".[119] Seeing that the government has released urbanisation or out-of-camp accommodation for Syrian children through law

115 Source: UNICEF (2015b)
116 Prior to the issuance of circular 2014/21 in September 2014, the main document requested for enrolling in Turkish school was the residence permit. The residence permit gives every citizen or foreigners a unique identifier number, which is used to include students in the EMIS. Once included, students are officially recorded and can receive their education certificates. It was reported that Syrian children without a residence permit were allowed to enrol in Turkish school as 'guests' and but did not receive any formal recognition of their learning (interview with UNHCR in Ankara on 3 April 2014 and interview with UNICEF in Ankara on 2 April 2014).
117 Data refers to May 2014.
118 Interview with MONE official, Ankara 3 April 2014
119 It was issued through circular 2014/21.

amendment, all the provinces are responsible for service delivery for urban refugees. These newly established commissions, therefore, function as the provider of educational services and implementing "Immediate Action Plans"[120] that AFAD has developed for refugee settings in provinces in cooperation with UNICEF. UNICEF (2015a) defines that these commissions are responsible for analysing the educational needs of Syrian students, cooperating with the authorities on the establishment of temporary education centres, and giving support to refugee enrolment in public schools.

The government makes different types of schools available to refugee learners, only a few of which provide formal education. The schools with formal education and Turkish curriculum are state schools in general. In reference to the new regulations, these schools are available to Turkish students in the morning and Syrian children in the afternoon. On the other hand, temporary education centres were also established under the tutelage of the Turkish authorities; however, education provision in these centres is based upon the revised Syrian Curriculum. Moreover, there is no standardisation in education, which results in obtaining different outcomes from the students attending the different centres. The education centres were specifically established to educate the next generations of Syria in cooperation with civic society and NGOs. These centres can be categorised in accordance with the places they provide education for Syrian children. These are the areas where refugees mostly settled down in Turkey; namely refugee camps and provinces. Educational activities are carried out in collaboration with MONE, AFAD, and international partners like the UN agencies. It is crucial to note that these institutions have not been fully accredited,[121] which means that they supply informal education based on the modified Syrian curriculum to refugee children.

Apart from public schools and temporary education centres, Syrian families opt to send their children to the Syrian private schools which are completely designed on the basis of the Syrian education system with the Syrian curriculum. The medium of instruction is Arabic; however, children are also exposed to Turkish language courses

120 Source: UNICEF Turkey (Retrieved from http://unicef.org.tr/basinmerkezidetay.aspx?id=12482, 13.07.2016 – 17.00)
121 There is a variety of schools established for Syrian children in Turkey, and they are formally under the mandate of the MONE. For example, the temporary education centres that UNICEF supported will be issued with certificates from MONE. Some education programmes that have been supported by NGOs can be accredited based on the protocol signed between the MONE and individual organizations. However, some other programmes have uncertain status and are not fully accredited.

under the tutelage of MoNE. For example, within the context of primary education, more than 1,200 Syrian children participate in these schools in Gaziantep, located in southeastern Turkey. Although mapping these schools has not yet been completed yet, the estimated number of Syrian private schools was determined as 35 in March 2014.[122] UNICEF (2015a) categorises private schools that Syrian learners attend in Turkey as follows:

• religious organizations affiliated with the Diyanet (the Directorate for Religious Affairs);
• community-based initiatives associated with the Syrian opposition in Turkey, with Syrian businessmen or with Syrian displaced communities (the so-called Syria diaspora);
• local NGOs recognized by the Government (UNICEF, 2015a).

Community-based education provision is supplied to Syrian refugees in schools, private homes, and buildings. These types of service delivery do not guarantee high quality instruction and certificates which are approved by the Turkish authorities due to their unregistered status. Nonetheless, Circular 2014/21 can be described as the first attempt to arrange their legislations. In this context, certain provision has been identified to those unregistered[123] schools such as the right to use public schools for their educational services as the second shift. The best example is public school buildings which are used in the afternoons by Diyanet (the Directorate for Religious Affairs). This governmental unit organises its educational support for Syrian children by educating them in Turkish schools in the afternoon as the second shift. Regarding the unregistered status, lack of certification, and unaccredited programmes, UNICEF's analysis elaborates on its concerns about quality and content of education that is provided by private, community-based schools and refugee camps.

As can be seen above, educational institutions from which refugee children benefit may differ from each other in terms of student achievements. The main reason for this difference is the implementation of different curricula into refugee education. There are several adaptations of the Syrian National Curriculum, which are deployed for Syrian students in various institutions in Turkey (UNICEF, 2015a). For instance, The Islamic Sham Organization, a Syrian NGO, excluded some topics and pictures from the content

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122 Interview with UNICEF in Ankara on 6 April 2014. Other sources put this number at 100 (see Kirishi, 2014). These 35 schools are in the south-eastern region and are recognized by the Government. Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara provinces are not included, despite the large numbers of Syrians residing in those areas.
123 Information about these schools is scattered because many of them are not registered

of the Syrian curriculum, and rearranged the geographical maps of Syria. Next, this organisation provides Syrian students with this modified curriculum with the textbooks which were also revised accordingly (UNICEF, 2015a). One of the topics which were removed from the curriculum was the units of Bashar al-Assad and speeches of Hafez al-Assad. From this perspective, modifications mostly were made with biased politics-based approaches rather than with an audience-targeted and objective understanding. UNESCO's findings also expressed that textbooks could be downloaded from the website of MEHE and were modified by the anti-government educators. There was no extra revision of the curriculum. Textbooks were immediately spread out to refugee camps and Syrian schools. During the interview, it was also revealed that some Syrian private schools reportedly implemented the Syrian curriculum into their refugee education during the 2011/12 school year even though they were decided to follow the Turkish National Curriculum at that year by the Turkish authorities.[124]

Another example can be the revision of the Syrian Curriculum by the Syrian Education Commission. This Commission attempted to make two modifications on the curriculum (UNESCO, 2015). The Commission prepared 1.4 million textbooks to distribute refugee camps in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq in the second half of 2013.[125] The final version of the revised Syrian curriculum was taught to Syrian children in Turkey with additional Turkish language courses. With reference to the modification of the revised curricula, UNICEF carried out a detailed content analysis of the textbooks that were revised by the Education Commission (UNICEF, 2014). The analysis has indicated that the revised curriculum catered for Syrian learners in terms of pedagogical fundaments. However, the changes were mostly based upon political and religious approaches. The number of pedagogical changes was about 400 in textbooks. Most of them were mostly made in Arabic, Science and Mathematics textbooks. Moreover, the numbers of political and religious modifications were 119 and 22 respectively. This revised curriculum neither produced any effective solutions to the needs of the externally displaced children nor helped them adapt themselves into their new environments such as life skills and psychosocial programmes (UNICEF, 2015a).

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124 The findings of UNESCO (2015)
125 The use of these textbooks took place during academic year 2013/2014 but has since been stopped.

The content of non-formal education (NFE) consists of vocational training, life skills education, pre-school education, and adult literacy. These types of education are not provided for Syrian refugees as a long-run and regular training. Instead, with the intention of improving refugees' abilities, skills, and knowledge of certain subjects, the government helps them promote their life standards and invests in their future through vocational and language courses. NFE mainly depends on community, civic society, and NGO's supports. Nevertheless, AFAD also prioritises vocational training in refugee camps as a governmental agency. In guidance of AFAD, UNHCR bolsters the courses with some financial resources. Although AFAD and UNHCR give importance to the educational activities which are organised within the scope of non-formal education, MoNE does not provide participants with national or globally recognised certificates. The main reason for invalid certificates is that participants are unable to register with the MoNE information management system because foreigner identification numbers are not available to these refugees.[126] Non-formal edcucation includes Islamic courses and Qur'anic programmes which were establised in temporary education centres. According to the AFAD survey, Syrian asylum seekers opt to attend the Qur'anic classes most frequently. In the available programmes, 40% of male and 27% of female participants attend the religious classes (AFAD, 2013).

In terms of learning environments, the surveys have also shown that the temporary centres educate Syrian learners in overcrowded classrooms. During the interviews that were conducted in Kilis, a school principal reported, "Turkish schools have around 25 students per class; but in our school, in one class or in one session, there are 199 students. We have four students per desk. Students are not able to study. They have to take exams to be quiet. With one teacher in each class, she or he has to control the class to be able to give the lesson."[127] Similar to the principal, one of the interviewees also added, "There are about 90–100 students in each classroom and not one minute passes without one of them going out and another coming in. Teachers did not take a holiday in the summer. They have been teaching the whole summer."[128] These numbers are nearly the same as what we have calculated in the previous lines. According to the recent data, the number

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126 This situation will likely change with the introduction of the new EMIS for Syrian children (YÖBIS) and the issuing of foreigners' identification documents and numbers under the Government's Temporary Protection Regulation law.
127 Focus Group Discussion, UNICEF (2015a)
128 Focus Group Discussion, UNICEF (2015a)

of in-camp students is around 270,000. 90% of these children are actively involved in the temporary centres in the camps. It means that more than 240,000 refugee children are currently exposed to education; nevertheless, the overall number of teaching staff available to refugee education is only 3,650 in camps.

With reference to teaching personnel in the camps and host communities, there are four categories, namely Syrian teachers, Syrian teaching personnel, Turkish (Arabic and non-Arabic speaking) teachers (assigned by MONE), and Turkish (Arabic and non-Arabic speaking) teachers (not assigned by MONE).[129] As stated above, the estimated number of these personnel is at least 3,650 in camps; however, compared to the overall population of school-aged children in camps (around 270,000), the number of in-camp teachers remained relatively insufficient. Moreover, UNICEF has also informed that the authorities have poor information about the profile of the teaching staffs and human resources in refugee camps. According to the interviews of UNICEF, teachers and teaching staffs were reported to be not as qualified as it is required. Moreover, most teachers could not have an opportunity to gain sufficient experience in teaching before their participation in camps. This is because university students and new graduates consist of the teaching personnel in general.[130] According to the data of the UNICEF teacher-training programme, 45 % of in-camp teachers have less than two-year experience.

As part of "no integration" policy, Turkey has not yet taken an active role in providing in-camp teachers and teaching personnel with training on how to work with refugee learners in a camp setting. Instead, UNICEF has involved them in special training on lesson planning, psychosocial support and classroom management as well as the one-day orientation and training workshops[131] UNICEF has also shouldered the burden on training Syrian teachers for the better provision of educational services.[132] This support from UNICEF intends to create a positive impact on both their teaching skills and integration into new teaching settings. One of the experts who was involved in UNICEF's

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129 Source: UNICEF, 2014
130 A school principal, for example, mentioned that, "All the teachers teaching in the camps have a teaching diploma, but we do not know if this applies to teachers who are teaching outside the camps". Another principal added that, "There is a shortage of teachers, so some university students, who are about to graduate, are hired to teach in schools, but they do not have teaching certificates."
131 In June and July 2013, UNICEF provided a training programme in Turkish for teachers in camps in three provinces. The programme focused on a training of trainers for quality education (Help the Helpers for Quality Education) and on the INEE Minimum Standards for Quality Education
132 Training for host community teachers started off with the subjects of reactive teaching, effective teaching methods and psychosocial support in the classroom for children who are affected by war.

research interviews has also confirmed the need for special training as: "Teachers are given psychosocial support for two hours, and Turkish courses, but not related to teaching...(for daily life)...they are given promises on teaching languages, training for teachers, psychosocial support, methods of teaching...promises and promises. They came, they told us and they were gone."[133] Parallel with this explanation, there is no sufficient training on the introduction of the Turkish Education System. Although most Syrian teachers do not participate in formal education, they need to be informed about the basic components of the education system in Turkey so as to accelerate the process of their students' integration into the community.

As a significant conflict, although Turkey does not provide a "work permit" for Syrian asylum seekers under any conditions, it agrees upon recruiting Syrian teachers for temporary education centres in refugee camps in cooperation with the UN agencies. This is because the Temporary Protection Regulation, which shapes the government policies on refugees to a larger degree, does not currently allow any teaching personnel from Syria to educate target refugee population. On the other hand, MoNE has re-regulated the refugee law on access to education for Syrian children and expanded their rights to benefit from more inclusive educational services. Within this modified regulation, the Ministry has also involved Syrian teachers in service delivery for their future generations. The conflict begins with these teachers' payments since MoNE is incapable of transferring their salaries to them in the scope of Turkey's "work permit" policy on foreigners. In other words, a lack of "work permit" leads Syrian educators not to be part of MoNE's payroll even though they are employed to work in the schools that are supervised by AFAD and MoNE.

In order to overcome the conflict between "work permit" and "payments for teaching", and compensate Syrian teachers' work, MoNE and UNICEF collaborated to develop a new system, called YÖBİS (foreign student grade operating system). UNICEF (2015a) explains this three-module system as follows:

133 Focus Group Discussion in Kilis

• Syrian teachers and students in camps;

• Syrian teachers and students in the temporary education centres in the host communities;

• Syrian students in Turkish schools.

The system functions in three languages, namely Turkish, English, and Arabics. However, it has been designed not only for Syrian refugees' education, but for all foreign students in the future as well. As of the Syrian issue, this system is officially recognised for refugee children in Turkey. UNICEF's financial support has been transferred to Syrian teachers through YÖBİS with the partnership of MoNE and PTT[134], accordingly. In cooperation with UNICEF, teachers that are determined to transfer formal education to refugees by MoNE are paid approximately 150 (in-camp)/ 220 American dollars (out-of-camp).[135]

For non-formal education, teacher payments are not made through the YÖBİS system but by the organisation itself. For instance, refugee education at the provincial level is provided for Syrian children by the local authorities or governorate. This unit, therefore, are obliged to make payments for teachers' work from their own funds. According to the interviews with Syrian teachers, their incentives are not regularly paid and and guaranteed with a contract. In the same interview, some teachers report that 450 Turkish Liras are provided for them as an incentive per month in some NGO-sponsored schools, whereas another group of teachers mention that they receive 850 liras at present. Compared to minimum wage which is rearranged as 1300 liras[136] in Turkey in 2016, the range of Syrian teachers' salaries remains below this wage. Low incentives that are supplied to Syrian teachers both demotivate them and affect their teaching work negatively. In the category of "non-formal education", TDV (Turkish Religious Foundation) has functioned as an income-provider for not only 457 Syrian teachers but also other teaching staffs, including 18 Syrian principles, 37 cleaners, and 15 security personnel (Emin, 2016). Furthermore, TDV also financially contributes to stationary expenses of 13.987 students (Emin, 2016).

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134 PTT stands for the Directorate of Post, Television, and Telephone.
135 The data has been taken from MoNE.
136 Retrieved from https://www.csgb.gov.tr/media/1692/2016_onikiay.pdf

Similar to YÖBİS, public and private schools dependent on MoNE require their refugee students to have foreigner ID numbers on the duration of their education in Turkey. These students are also supposed to register an online tracking system, called "EMIS".[137] Upon managing Turkish students' education status, MoNE has already implemented such an online system into the Turkish Education System, known as "e-okul". With the similar logic, the Ministry intends to enrol Syrian students in schools, monitor the student achievements, and grant these students with certificates in the end.[138] In this regard, YÖBİS and EMIS help to register both personal and academic data of Syrian refugees with the MoNE system. UNICEF propounds that these applications guarantee that Syrian children are supported with the same educational services as those of Turkish children. Moreover, they also provide children with certification for their learning activities as evidence that can be used in their further education. Within the context of the "online system" regulation, there are 55,360 Syrian and 11,515 Iraqi students who are currently educated in public schools (Emin, 2016).[139] Although only 31,254 students could attend these schools last year, this number has gone up to 66,875 this year (Emin, 2016). Nevertheless, compared to 450,000 children with no access to education, the government must shoulder much heavier burden and carry out more inclusive studies on the improvement of refugee education and student enrolment in schools (Emin, 2016).

In order to assess the student achievement in refugee education under the current circumstances, MoNE takes no responsibilities for exam preparation, but only the venues for the exams. The examination content is determined and developed by the Higher Commission for Education, the representative of the Syrian MEHE in Turkey. Based upon education in Turkey, the exams have been prepared by Syrian experts and educators under the supervision of the Higher Commission. Nonetheless, it has been found out that Syrian students display the weak academic performance to some extent. During the interviews, most teachers report that learning achievements are not at the expected level, but rather poor. There are only four interviewees who describe the learning objectives

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137 'E-okul' means 'e-school' and refers to the EMIS designed for teachers and administrators as well as students and their parents.
138 'E-okul' means 'e-school' and refers to the EMIS designed for teachers and administrators as well as students and their parents.
139 Emin (2016) has analysed the comtemporay data concerning Syrian students and their enrolment rates in schools. This research was carried out by SETA, an association that researches, analyses, and evaluates the government policies. In order to avoid any biasedness in terms of the secondary data, the numbers have been double-checked. There is no subjective comment or approach that can be found in this study other than numbers.

and student achievement as good results. One interviewee has explained, "They are good students because they have many, many problems in Syria ... they come here and started a new life, and I think if others were in their place, they would not be able to do the same".[140] Throughout the focus group session, one of the teacher participants has drawn attention to the conditions that Syrian students are currently coping with by saying: "With war in Syria and students far away from motherland, they are performing quite well. At least, they are coming to school. They are still willing to learn."[141]

Some schools have provided psychosocial assistance for Syrian children since they arrived at Turkey. Unfortunately, this assistance is not organised in schools systematically and regularly, and differs from school to school. For example, some public schools in Kilis have involved a number of remedial classes in their course planning so that their refugee participants can receive psychological support concerning the topics they suffer from. With reference to the field research conducted by UNICEF, it can be inferred that there are several variations in school arrangements, including the enrolment of children, placement tests and the participation of families in the school process and environment (UNICEF, 2015a). Observations have been done on a refugee school in Kilis by an NGO and the other one in Gaziantep by the Metropolitan Municipality. The main difference between these two centres starts with parental involvement. Syrian parents whose children attend the refugee school in Kilis are relatively indifferent to their education, whereas the school principals in Gaziantep report that parental involvement is at the satisfactory level. The school in Kilis also has difficulties in the provision of educational services and psychosocial support because of limited budgeting, lack of educational materials, and equipment and overcrowded classrooms. In temporary education centres, social workers and councellors expose refugee children to a number of psychosocial sessions; however, these support has not become part of the curriculum or education programme through which these children are educated. The Syrian National Curriculum whose political content has been revised to some degree does not provide either psychosocial services or life skills courses for the Syrian population in community-based schools.

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140 This has been taken from the interviews that UNICEF (2015a) carried out with Syrian teachers.
141 This has been taken from the interviews that UNICEF (2015a) carried out with Syrian teachers.

Regarding the policy on Syrian refugee education that the Turkish government pursues, neither AFAD nor government has made no detailed explanation concerning the policy budget. It can be inferred from both documentation[142] and news analyses that the governmental institutions responsible for refugee education do not make educational budgetary details public. Moreover, the pre-determined financial resources that are devoted to Syrian refugees have also been revised. Yalçın Akdoğan, vice prime minister, has announced, "The government primarily determined the AFAD budget as 993 million liras for the year of 2015. Nevertheless, during the year, additional spending on service provision for refugees reached an increase of 300% in the budget. At the end of 2015, the spending hit an all-time high of 3,3 billion liras in total."[143] He has also declared that 1,052 billion liras will be budgeted for the AFAD spending on Syrian refugees in 2016.[144]

For the analysis part, it is also crucial to note that Numan Kurtulmuş, vice prime minister, declared that, in line with the Cabinet Decree taken in Jan 1, 2016, Syrian asylum seekers with "temporary protection" status will be granted with "work permit". The Regulation numbered 2016/8375 Regarding Work Permits for Foreigners Granted with Temporary Protection Status was already published in the Official Gazette in Jan 15, 2016. Thus, salaries of the foreigners who are recruited under the tutelage of this regulation have become subject to law and hence have to be arranged as minimum wage at least.[145] The government has also recently placed great emphasis on "high school education" policies for Syrian refugees and announced that there will be seven religious vocational high schools[146] where high-school aged Syrians can receive education in Arabic.

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142 It refers to the official documents of the governmental institutions responsible for Syrian refugee such as AFAD.
143 It has been quoted from Hurriyet Ekonomi. (retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/2-5-milyona-yakin-suriyeliye-8-milyar-dolar-harcandi-40046299 10.07.2016 – 16.16)
144 It has been quoted from Hurriyet Ekonomi. (retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/2-5-milyona-yakin-suriyeliye-8-milyar-dolar-harcandi-40046299 10.07.2016 – 16.16)
145 Official Gazette, January 15, 2016. (Resmi Gazete, 15 Ocak 2016)
146 This refers to "İmam Hatip Liseleri" in Turkish.

5. EVALUATION

5.1. Discussion

Policy evaluation framework helps to measure the policy success and performance on the problem area. The evaluation follows the processes of policy formation and implementation, and takes part as the third step of policy-making. Without evaluation, the process of policy-making cannot be completed. The main reason for "incompleteness" is that policy assessment enables the government to detect to what degree their pre-determined objectives have been achieved through this policy and improve it, where necessary. Thus, according to the feedback obtained from the analysis, the policy should be modified to promote its efficiency and effectiveness.

For the policies on refugee education, this study has deployed a policy evaluation framework with four components: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and utility. Turkey and Lebanon's policies have not been finalized yet, but still in progress. Therefore, the evaluation steps of "effectiveness" and "efficiency" in this study are incapable of outright determining to what degree the government policies have attained their objectives. Nevertheless, the evaluation aims to give an inclusive response to the question of how well they have worked with Syrian refugees so far. For the rest of the components, the refugee education policies will be assessed based upon needs, problems, and issues (Table 2). In other words, relevance and utility will be employed as the evaluation tools to investigate the impact of the policies on the target group. For instance, relevance intends to figure out to what extent Turkey's refugee policies on Syrians' education refer to the real problem or whether the authorities in Lebanon have designed their refugee education policies by determining the target audience precisely. On the other hand, utility will compare each refugee education policy with the degree of social welfare that it has achieved in society. Equity and equality are the terms that are used to evaluate Turkish and Lebanese policies in terms of utility.

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For Syrian refugee education, Turkey and Lebanon have describe the problem area as "lack of access to education among Syrian children". Scholars claim that seeing that Syrian refugee children have not been exposed to appropriate quality education from the beginning, a lost generation is growing up in these countries today. Regarding access to education and its quality, Turkey and Lebanon were supposed to take serious steps to provide educational services for Syrians kids. They began working on the policies as of 2013 when they realised that the Syrian crisis was going to continue in uncertainty for a period of time. As a demographic factor, the number of refugee population fleeing Syria was gradually increasing, which made Turkey and Lebanon keep the situation in control. The population of Lebanon, including Lebanese citizens and Palestine refugees, was around 4 million.[147] With Syrians' arrival, the population become more than 5 million today. As a result, Syrian refugee population remains relatively challenging to deliver basic services for refugees in both countries. Similar to the rapid demographic change in the overall population, the ideological factor also prolonged the process of decision-making on Syrian refugees' education. This is because Turkey and Lebanon are not the refugee-hosting countries at all. The written documents that they signed in terms of the refugee issue indicate that these countries have not assigned the globally recognised refugee status to Syrians. Therefore, these vulnerable people can accommodate in Turkey and Lebanon only for a temporary period of time. Nevertheless, they pursue the principle "non-refoulement" and hence cannot force Syrians to go back to their country during the time of war.

In terms of relevance, Lebanon with experience of hosting Palestine refugees launched the process of policy-making on Syrian refugee education by underlining that Lebanese refugee policies aim at educating future generations who will reconstruct post-war Syria. In this regard, "Reaching All Children with Education" (RACE) and other policies are effective initiatives to involve refugee children in formal or informal education. Before Syrians entered the country, Lebanon was suffering from low student enrolment in schools, drop-outs, and poor quality education in public schools. Therefore, the target group was identified as Syrian refugee, vulnerable Lebanese and even Palestine children in need. From this point of view, although the target group and problem of the policy were determined accurately, MEHE designed the policy components based upon

147 Source: UNHCR (Jun, 2016)

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only the basic education level, also known as compulsory education in Lebanon. Therefore, RACE excluded Early Childhood (ECE) and High School students from the target population. Here, it is also crucial to note that these two are not provided for Lebanese students as compulsory education in the Lebanese Education System. Nevertheless, within the context of RACE, upon the supply of informal education to children aged 6-14, NGOs also provided some educational services in ECE for very young Syrian learners. This resulted in an increase in the ECE participation, unexpectedly. Therefore, this increase can be included in policy outcomes as an unintended achievement. In terms of "utility" evaluation, the policy contributed to social welfare of both refugees and society from the ECE perspective, whereas it could not produce any solutions to the needs of high school learners. As an expected outcome, RACE also promoted welfare of the communities through educational investments in three different groups of nationals in Lebanon.

As the main objective of RACE, the Lebanese policy-makers aimed to achieve the highest participation in education, particularly among children in need. As stated previously, Lebanon has intended to grow up the next generations of Syria through education. Thus, these children will be able to dedicate their educational achievements in Lebanon to the future of their own country whose system and institutions have already been destroyed due to the political and military conflicts. In order to assess whether the policy has achieved its objectives, it is necessary to obtain more information about the student achievements. However, as shown in the "analysis" section, the only policy instrument for evaluation is the pass rates of refugee students in formal and informal educational settings in Lebanon. Regarding Syrian refugee children's success in education, their pass rates are relatively high at the primary education level. Although pass rates change based upon the types of schools, the minimum rate does not go down below 80%. Interestingly, refugee students attained the highest performance in Lebanese private schools with 100% pass rate. On the other hand, high school students who studied the Lebanese curriculum in French or English have a 30-60% pass rate.

Owing to language barrier and lack of policy on high school aged refugees, the success of this age group is realtively low. Regarding the effectiveness evaluation of RACE, the pre-determined policy objectives have been substantially accomplished at the primary level, whereas it could not produce the expected outcomes from Syrian learners

aged 15 to18. On the other hand, RACE can also be accepted as an effective policy because there is a remarkable success in reducing the number of drop-outs. The drop-out rate of Syrian children dropped to 49 % from 78% in the first year of the policy implementation. All in all, this policy has effectively improved education that the authorities aimed at providing for Syrian refugee children.

Upon producing a number of solutions to the needs of the target population, the Lebanese authorities intended to attain the optimal achievements with a limited group of resources in terms of budgeting, teaching staff, and school capacity. Therefore, they initially assessed the school capacities in public setting which could be available to the target population. For public service provision, Lebanon made all the calculations by assuming that there was no change in the numbers of teachers and schools. Thus, the 200,000-student capacity was determined as the upper limit for the target group. RACE, which was planned to last three years, has not yet been completed; nevertheless, more than 165,000 students have already been included in formal education. In spite of delays in the funding transfer from the international partners, Lebanon managed to improve the conditions and involve a high number of children in need in public schools. This makes the policy substantially successful in terms of the "efficiency" evaluation. This is because the existing resources were allocated most systematically to achieve the highest numbers in school enrolment. From the efficiency perspective, the Lebanese policy-makers also determined the target audience of RACE by bringing three different groups of students (Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestine children) who suffered from the same educational problem (lack of access to education). Thus, they could intervene in three problem areas through one policy and various funds provided by the international partners. In this regard, it can be inferred that RACE has been efficiently implemented to a large extent.

As mentioned above, upon determining the upper limit which aimed to involve the maximum number of refugee children in public schools, the Lebanese government has implemented the double shift policy. The main objective of this government strategy was to promote access to education for children in need. Based upon the existing capacities and resources, the government intended to provide the most efficient service delivery for the highest number of students. In terms of relevance, the double shift policy can be one of the most effective ways of increasing the number of beneficiaries who are supposed to participate in educational settings under the current conditions. Seeing that

this policy has so far achieved its objective to a larger degree, it can also be deduced that it has been effectively implemented. However, the authorities created a conflict among productivity, efficiency and quality of refugee education in Lebanon by doubling teachers' working hours. Teaching in the morning and afternoon caused teachers to lose their efforts and ambition to educate the afternoon audience. This is because tiredness and repetition of the morning sessions demotivated them and reduced the quality of instruction in the afternoon shift. The educators mentally and physically exhausted from teaching in the morning could not reportedly motivate themselves for the afternoon group. On the other hand, it is also important to note that the government determined the target group of the second shift as Syrian refugee children, whereas Lebanese pupils were encouraged to participate in the first shift. In this context, the group of students suffering from poor quality most became Syrian learners, who need special attention from their teacher. That is to say, although the double shift policy has achieved its objective of "access to education" by promoting the school capacities through the shifts, quality education could not be provided for Syrian learners.

In order to promote efficiency and effectiveness of the policy, both Syrian and Lebanese teachers could be supported with training on education in emergencies, but they did not receive any training on refugee education at all. Such training is of great importance to educators because it provides them with knowledge of the Lebanese curriculum and particular techniques which enable both teachers and target group to adapt themselves to the changing conditions more easily. Different from regular education, education in emergency is based upon certain strategies that teachers are supposed to deploy and implement in their classes. For example, curriculum modification could improve the student participation and achievements if Lebanese or Syrian teachers had revised the teaching materials in accordance with the needs and backgrounds of their refugee students. As a result, efficiency of the double shift policy could increase to some degree. Similar to curriculum modification, teachers should also develop a set of skills of counselling. These skills can enhance interaction between teacher and students, and helps to motivate both for the educational activities. Nevertheless, in the Lebanon case, teachers did not know their students by name due to lack of communication. They reported that they made the teaching activities much easier by removing certain topics from lesson plans so that they could teach the topic to Syrian children more easily. From this perspectives, teachers with no training hamper refugee learners to benefit from quality

education. Moreover, excluding the topics from curriculum fails to attain the educational objectives. This results in the less effective and efficient policy implementation.

Regarding efficiency of the double shift implementation, some community-support schools recruited Syrian teachers as well as Lebanese specialists. Based upon their observation on Syrian children's academic performance and process of adaptation, they realised that Syrian teachers helped to promote efficiency of the targeted education by supporting their educational activities only with a number of native teachers. Moreover, community-supported or private schools which employed both Syrian and Lebanese teachers for refugee education allocated their teachers to the relevant branches where they could work most efficiently. For example, Lebanese teachers were assigned to teach students who were going to take placement tests for further education because they had knowledge of Lebanese examination and could prepare candidate students for the exam best. This allocation was made to promote efficiency of refugee education. On the other hand, the employment of Syrian teachers was perceived as a motivating factor because they returned to their vocations after a long break and began earning a regular income, which contributed to their life standards substantially in Lebanon. Compared to Syrian colleagues, Lebanese teachers in public schools very likely exhibited the low performance on working with refugee children for some reason. For instance, one of the Lebanese teachers reported that the government did not make their extra payment for the afternoon teaching. It means that there is no financial incentive for these people to keep teaching in overcrowded classrooms. Moreover, the classes are full of students in need of special attention and care. Without receiving any training on refugee education, Lebanese teacher could not produce immediate responses to the needs of Syrian pupils. All in all, seeing that these experiences demotived Lebanese teachers to a larger extent, efficiency and quality of education remained below the intended level.

Upon implementing the double shift policy, it has been realised that the more the funds are supplied to refugee education, the better outcomes the policy has produced. There has been a remarkable increase in student enrolment in public schools in the recent years, accordingly. In 2015-16 school year, the Lebanese government, nevertheless, granted a motion for stay of the policy implementation owing to lack of funding, which refers to "sustainability" problem. Seeing that the government could not sustain funds and donations which local and international NGOs transfer to Lebanon, only Lebanese

students were allowed to carry out their studies in public schools last year. For the next academic year, although the authorities decided to continue the double shift education in financial support of their international partners, one-year interruption or pause caused the policy to fail to achieve its pre-determined objectives and the targeted numbers of enrolment in refugee education. Based upon the principle of utility, the double shift policy could hardly increase individual welfare of Syrian refugee children because the content of teaching in formal education was not expanded with psychosocial courses that are designed to facilitate the process of socialisation and adaptation into the new environments. Instead, Syrian students were expected to integrate themselves into the new curriculum and instruction.

Informal education provided in community-supported schools followed a slightly different way of educating Syrian individuals and involved a number of psychosocial courses in their education models unlike public schools. These courses were designed to help refugee learners to normalise the existing conditions and develop useful life skills. Interestingly, the findings indicate that Lebanese policy-makers consider community-supported schools as preparations for formal education. The main reason for this approach is that schools in Lebanon are not allowed to follow their own curricula without the approval of MEHE. Even if the Ministry approves and accredits their curricula, they are required to pursue the Lebanese National Curriculum as well as the accredited curriculum. Similar to a standardised curriculum for all schools, both state and community-supported schools evaluate Syrian children through similar tools such as placement and language tests so that they can allocate them to the equivalent grades in Lebanon. This systematic and consistent work on refugee education creates positive impacts for Lebanon to achieve the educational objectives.

Placement tests are used as a policy instruments for "grade allocation". This policy has intended to place Syrian students to the grades in which they can attain the optimal outcomes. Thus, they could benefit from educational opportunities most efficiently and effectively; nevertheless, a majority of institutions took no notice of the psychological effects on refugee learners. Not only studying the same grade with younger learners but also repeating their last attended grades can demotivate vulnerable learners. Moreover, language-based placement tests were carried out as oral examination by school teachers and they did not fill in an assessment rubric on the duration of placement test. This may

lead to the biased or subjective evaluation because the placement results vary among evaluators as well as schools. In order to eliminate the drawbacks concerning placement tests, some Lebanese schools altered the exam language as Arabic and adapted the content of the exams into the Syrian National Curriculum to some extent. Thus, the success of Syrian children was determined more realistically. To sum up, this policy has achieved effective and systematic service provision in refugee education; nevertheless, ignored psychological dimensions of learning and teaching to a larger externt.

Turkey has opted to produce the amendments on refugees rather than to develop a particular policy on refugee education. With the intention of educating Syrian next generation that will return to post-war Syria, the Turkish authorities have determined the same main objective as that of Lebanon. Turkey approached the Syrian civil war as a short-term conflict within the borders of Syria. Therefore, it opted to deploy the "inaction" strategy in terms of the policy development and built up refugee camps. Until 2013, these camps were the only place that Syrian asylum seekers could benefit from service provision. However, the number of Syrian refugees exceeded the camp capacities. Realising that the facilities in refugee camps failed to satisfy the needs of the Syrian refugees sufficiently, the government identified the term "urbanisation" for Syrian refugees, which refers to access to many more facilities across the country. As a result, vulnerable Syrian began reaping benefits from the enlargement of refugee rights. The most significant impact of this law amendment on refugee education is that Syrian students could enrol in public schools with fewer legal formalities.

From the beginning, Turkey has explicitly encouraged Syrian learners to follow their National Curriculum or informal education, including vocational education, language courses, and life skills instruction. It has developed the refugee policies in this direction. Although refugee education based upon the Syrian curriculum were provided only in refugee camps at the beginning, it has become available to Syrian children at the temporary education centres in all the provinces recently. The government opted to provide instruction through the revised Syrian curriculum in Arabic so that refugee children's learning was not exposed to any interruption and could be supported with necessary skills and knowledge of the targeted subjects. Nevertheless, these subjects were not examined, modified, and assessed by the Turkish education authorities, but by the Syrian Education Commission. Today, there are several revised Syrian curricula which

have been adopted by different types of schools. In other words, there is no standard education for Syrian refugees in Turkey and the educational activities differ in the schools that refugees attend. On the contrary, Lebanon provides all students with a standardised education based upon the Lebanese National Curriculum. Although some Lebanese private schools opt to integrate an additional curriculum or educational module into their refugee education, they are required to primarily have the approval of MEHE for this curriculum and then allowed to implement it with the Lebanese curriculum in tandem.

In Turkey, regarding informal education, there is an "accreditation" problem for the schools where Syrian children are involved in education. MoNE takes no responsibility for education outside public schools, even for the temporary education centres which are legally recognised by the government. Therefore, neither education nor curriculum of refugee-based educational institutions is not accredited, hence no certificates for Syrian learners at the end of the programmes. There is a contradiction between the strategy that the government follows and the actions that it takes in terms of refugee education. This is because both temporary education centres and educational facilities in refugee camps were built up by the Turkish authorities. They have made the necessary decisions and investments in these schools; however, education provided in these schools is not accredited at all. Moreover, there is no government strategy which aims at making a connection between informal education in the centres and formal education in public schools. For instance, although the government has already arranged a number of language courses to teach Turkish to Syrian children, it does not use these courses to facilitate to transfer Syrian students to formal education. In other words, the government can organise particular Turkish language courses in the temporary education centres so that Syrian children can learn language and consecutively participate in public schools.

The principle of relevance cannot be implemented into the Turkish policies on refugee education because there is no clear identification of the target group by age, grade, or educational level. Upon the law amendments, the government did not take into account a particular group of Syrian students, but referred to the whole population. It is, therefore, very difficult to deduce that the education policies have reached their target audience. However, it can be deduced from the findings that there is a remarkable increase in Syrian children's enrolment rate in public schools. However, the number of Syrian students in

public schools is around 67,000, which points to only 10 % of the overall Syrian refugee children in urban settings. Once those in refugee camps and temporary education centres are involved in this calculation, the enrolment rate in formal education will become lower.

Turkey could not well perform in the process of recruiting the teaching staff for education in refugee camps. In the camps, not only the modified Syrian National Curriculum but also language and history courses are taught to Syrian children. While Syrian teachers educate the children about the core curriculum, Turkish teachers support them with language teaching and history lessons. Nevertheless, there are no certain requirements for the recruitment of teaching staff such as degree in education or teaching experience. The authorities open the doors of refugee camps to anybody who would like to work with Syrian refugees. They do not pay attention to the branches to which teachers can be assigned. In other words, due to lack of work permit for Syrian, AFAD is not able to employ Syrian teachers for the educational activities in refugee camps, but can allocate only volunteers to the classes in need. In spite of their experience and degree in Syrian education, these teachers remain out of the classes. Instead, university students and less experienced people work with refugee children in camps. This should be regarded as an "efficiency" problem because the resources have not been allocated for refugee education properly and efficiently. On the other hand, Syrian teachers who have already worked in refugee camps are employed by UNICEF, which collaborates on the provision of educational services for Syrian refugees with Turkey. Their salaries, which can also be regarded as financial incentives, are provided through MoNE by this UN agency. Syrian teachers receive monthly payments that vary from 450 liras to 850 liras. These numbers have remained well below the minimum wage in Turkey. In order to improve the conditions for those who are unpaid for their teaching work in the camps, the government currently work on a new regulation concerning work permit. Provided that this regulation is implemented into refugee rights, Syrian teachers' salaries will have to be equal to at least minimum wage or higher. Nevertheless, although this law amendment was taken to the agenda, the government has not come to an arrangement on it yet.

The main reason for ineffective policies is language barrier. As medium of instruction, public schools in Turkey carry out the curricular activities in Turkish. Nevertheless, Syrian children use Arabic for both their daily life activities and educational purposes. This difference caused these children to have adaptation problems with their

new environments. The Turkish authorities could not integrate them into education as easily as Lebanon did. Compared to Lebanon, Turkey should spend more efforts and resources on Syrian refugee education to keep up with Lebanon's supply. Therefore, Turkey is required to develop more effective policies on Turkish language teaching. The analysis indicates that language is also a significant reason for low enrolment rate in public schools. It has a negative and direct impact on student academic success and achievements. From this perspective, the government policy on refugee education failed to attain the principles of effectiveness because it could not transfer educational service delivery to the target population successfully.

Syrian students were required to provide a number of official documents such as foreigner ID cards, residence permit, and transcript to enrol in public schools. In order to facilitate the enrolment in schools and access to education, the government revoked the requirement of residence permit and allowed Syrian students to register for schools only with their foreigner ID numbers. Regarding this change in the regulation, MoNE has developed an online system, called YÖBİS and EMIS. This system enables the Ministry to track Syrian students' educational records. With this cost-effective online system, it succeeded in incorporating Syrian students into the existing application to which both Turkish teachers and students have access for the educational purposes. The system was reportedly developed for both Syrian learners but also for other foreign participants as a long-term investment. Three different language options are available to users, namely English, French, and Arabic. A similar system, YÖBİS, was also established to provide Syrian teaching staff with their salaries. These systems help to officially identify both teachers and learners into the Education System and facilitate their access to certain services which Turkish citizens are able to use actively. Thus, based upon equality and equity, the government initiative has enhanced individual welfare among those who participate in formal education. Although this implementation could not include all school-aged Syrian learners but referred to a small group, they were behaved equally and given the same educational opportunities as Turkish students' in terms of access to education through the online system.

As opposed to Lebanon, Turkey did not produce a particular stratagem for Syrian refugee education, hence lack of information about the policy budget. As mentioned earlier, MEHE introduced the resolution of RACE to promote access to and quality of

education across the country by prioritising Syrian refugee children.[148] The Ministry worked on budgeting and allocation of the financial resources for education, whereas neither MoNE (Turkey) nor AFAD provided a policy budget whose items bear the expenses of education. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that AFAD budget increased at the rate of 300% in 2015, from approximately 993 million to 3,3 billion. The expansion of spending on refugees caused the supplementary appropriation to be transferred to the AFAD budget. One possible reason for such a high appropriation can be mass influx of Syrian refugees. However, although there was already an increase in the number of externally displaced Syrians in Turkey last year, the group of newcomers was not three times as high as the previous year. Secondly, the government may invest in constructing new refugee camps or facilities. Nevertheless, such initiatives have not been reported by the authorities. This increase that occurred in the fourth year of service delivery to refugees draws attention to a "transparency problem. The allocations of financial resources in the AFAD budget are required to be described item by item.

Multi-provider refugee education can be regarded as the general summary of Turkey's policy on Syrian children. As the target group, these children are able to participate in learning activities in public schools, temporary education centres, Syrian private schools, and refugee camps. As mentioned before, the only accredited educational programme is provided through public schools; however, Syrian students face serious language barriers in these schools. The rest of schools supply only informal education to the demand of Syrian children, which may possibly hinder them to continue their education in the future. Furthermore, informal education cannot help them to attain necessary knowledge and accomplishments that rebuild up post-war Syria. In Turkey, providers of informal education, including foundations, local and international NGOs, are responsible for all the expenses of education such as teacher recruitment in their schools. To be more precise, these institutions do not receive any state subsidies or grants from the Turkish government, but depend on their own resources, funds and donations. In case of the disruption of donations, they shut down education for Syrian learners. Similar to Lebanon, this picture points out a "sustainability" problem about the provision of informal education in Turkey.

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148 Access on http://www.mehe.gov.lb/uploads/file/2015/Feb2015/Projects/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf 15.07.2016 – 10.00

In comparison with Lebanon, upon working with Syrian children, community-supported schools in Turkey are not supposed to follow a particular educational framework or curriculum. The analysis has asserted that refugee children are exposed to not only the Turkish National Curriculum but also many revised Syrian Curricula as well as language and life skills courses. Based upon different curricula, education also requires different assessment tools to evaluate the student achievements precisely. In this context, one-tool examinations such as national exams do not fulfil the needs of all testees in tandem. In order that Syrian students attain the maximum benefit and better accomplishments from refugee education, they are prompted to take the placement test for grade allocation in Lebanon, whereas refugees are more subjectively assigned to their grades in Turkish public schools by the school principles unless they provide an official document which shows their last-attended grade in Syria. Contrary to the systematic implementation of placement tests, Turkey's approach to placement remains relatively insufficient and biased. As the main decision-maker in education, MoNE accepts no responsibility for preparing the assessment tools for Syrian students. As with the curriculum implementation, community-based schools make their own decision on placement tests in Turkey; nevertheless, any examples of the placement test implementation have not been found during the data analysis.

Based upon the existing implementations of refugee education policy in Turkey and Lebanon, it can be inferred that the post-war generations who return to Syria from Turkey and Lebanon can be categorised into three groups based upon their levels of education: namely "educationless", "informeducational", and "super-educated". The term "educationless" initially refers to Syrian children who are unable access any types of education and somehow receive informal education with no certificate in both Lebanon and Turkey. The informal educational programmes support Syrian children only with certain skills and handicraft. During the post-war period, they will become the most vulnerable group who need an immediate educational response. The second term "informeducational" is used for Syrian learners who have access to informal education and are rewarded with certificate that shows what types of education they receive in their host countries. Thirdly, the term "super-educated" symbolises a group of Syrian students who have participated in formal education in Turkey and Lebanon. These students are expected to obtain a diploma or transcript from their last-attended institutions. All in all, this study has come up with three profiles of Syrian learners in the host countries through

the comparative analysis of refugee education policies. As the main objective of Turkey and Lebanon, these groups will take all the responsibilities for reconstructing the new Syria and developing the social, cultural, and economic systems throughout the post-war period. Therefore, the realisation of the current refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon can help to support Syrian children with advanced knowledge, and accomplishments.

5.2. Conclusion

Regarding the analyses of refugee education policies that have been implemented in Turkey and Lebanon, this paper reveals that Syrian children have serious difficulties in accessing education in host countries. Those with access to educational services also fail to achieve productive outcomes due to poor quality education. This study has intended to figure out what types of policies Turkey and Lebanon have so far made to overcome these drawbacks. By both analysing and comparing their policies to one another on the basis of the framework of policy evaluation, the study has also aimed to bring a new perspective to Syrian refugee education. This is because Turkey and Lebanon follow the similar regulations on the "refugee" status. With reference to this similarity, the comparative analysis shows that these are two countries, neither of which recognise externally displaced Syrians and provide them with a refugee status. In other words, Syrian asylum seekers were allowed to accommodate in both Turkey and Lebanon for the temporary time. During the post-war period, these people will be required to leave the host countries.

Uncertainty about how much longer the Syrian conflict will continue leads the provision of educational services to slow down or disrupt to a large extent. In order to cope with uncertainty, Turkey has opted to prioritise informal education in community-supported schools, refugee camps, and temporary centres to formal training in public schools. The first reason for this stratagem is the limited absorption capacities of state schools. Teachers are not trained to work with Syrian refugees in overcrowded classrooms. Secondly, the integration of Syrian students into Turkish curriculum and medium of instruction is not a cost-effective method, but requires a well-planned, systematic and effective educational model. In this regard, Turkey needs to develop a number of long-run policies on teaching Turkish to Syrian children. As the consecutive

step, these children can be involved in formal education. Nevertheless, Turkey has remained considerably inactive and provide only in-camp education for Syrian children, particularly in the first years of mass influx.

Different from Turkey, the Lebanese authorities are more experienced in the refugee issues because of the history of Palestine refugees. Therefore, it has pursued a more conscious way of producing proactive and applicable policies to Syrian refugee education. The most remarkable characteristic of the Lebanese approach is that children have been exposed to a standardised education based upon one particular curriculum in terms of the provision of formal education. Thus, the government contrives long-term education whose inputs and outcomes are manageable for the future. Lebanon has turned the common medium of instruction- Arabic- into an advantage at compulsory education level and produced the RACE policy to increase refugee enrolment rate in public schools. However, seeing that it has determined only the children aged 6 to 14, ECE and High School learners are completely isolated. Another drawback in the Lebanon case is that its refugee education is always at risk to be subject of uneasy financial resources. This is because the policy budget depends on donations and funds provided by its international partners such as UNICEF.

To sum up, this comparative analysis has discovered that there are three different groups of Syrian learners based on their levels of education; namely "educationless", "informeducational", and "super-educated". Educationless group include refugee children who have no access to education in their host countries and participate in informal education with no certificate, whereas informeducational individuals are involved in informal education and rewarded with an accredited certificate at the end of the programme. The term "super-educated" refers to Syrian students who are given an opportunity to receive formal education and obtain a diploma or transcript as evidence of the last-attended grade/level. This categorisation is of immense significance to improve the current refugee education in Turkey and Syria with skills, abilities and knowledge that they need most in post-war Syria.

5.3. Recommendations

This study examines the education policies on Syrian refugee education through the comparative analysis method. In terms of the countries to compare, Turkey and Lebanon have been selected because of their similar approaches to the "refugee" status. Based upon the same refugee governance policy, these two have also produced the same main objectives; however, their backgrounds, service provision, resources, and numbers of Syrian guests differ from each other. These differences, therefore, shape the means of making and implementing their policies on refugee education. Further studies should begin with their background information so as to better analyse semantic relationships between the parts and the whole. Establishing further studies on the basis of background information, researchers should take into consideration as follows:

1. This research has worked on the secondary data and documents obtained from valid and reliable resources; nevertheless, fieldwork could provide many more opportunities to discover the unknown
and different aspects of refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon. Further studies on this topic should benefit from more authentic data such as face-to-face interviews, dairies, personal experiences, and memory collection.

2. Seeing that the number of Syrian refugees constantly increase in the host countries, the studies should determine a particular period of time such as the years of 2012-2015. Thus, researchers do not allow the contemporary developments in the field like any changes in government policies to affect the results of the analysis positively or negatively so as to keep it as unbiased as possible.

3. Another recommendation for data collection is that a refugee-interested researcher should have a direct communication with at least one of the policy-makers who took an active role in producing the relevant education policies on Syrian refugees. This may help to attain a better understanding of which policies are made for which purposes, what the government intends to do, or how they determine the target population of the policies.

4. In order to reach more inclusive results in the current provision of educational services, the number of the countries can be increased. For instance, as the third country with the

highest Syrian refugee population, Jordan should participate in the research. Thus, by adding another refugee-hosting country to the analysis, researchers can reach more realistic numbers concerning the overall post-war population by age, grade, and level of education in Syria.

5. In the policies on Syrian refugee education, a teacher functions as a policy implementer; therefore, it is very significant to detect the impact of teacher training on refugee education and consecutively investigate how "lack of this training" has affected teachers' contribution to refugee education in Turkey and Lebanon.

6. Grounded in the results of the comparative analysis, this study has come up with three categories: educationless, informeducational, super-educated. Each term refers to Syrian students in different educational needs. In order for the betterment of service provision to attain, there must be particular studies which carry out a needs analysis for each category separately to define the problem areas at the different level of post-war education. In other words, super-educated Syrian students cannot be expected to have the same needs as those of educationless students. Different service delivery to the groups is required accordingly.. Further studies can elaborate on and improve these categories through in-group analyses.

7. Syrian refugee education is comprised of some other sub-fields such as educational sciences, curriculum, counselling, and refugee psychology. Therefore, prior to the targeted study which will be conducted in this field, researchers should do readings or have mini talks with field experts to gain sufficient knowledge of these sub-fields. Thus, they can make connections among the events more productively and coherently.

8. Based upon the findings of this study, there must be a particular research on curriculum analysis. Researching for the content of both Lebanese and Turkish curricula can figure out what is included in formal educations of these host countries. This is because the content or grade division of the Turkish National Curriculum may not be equivalent to those of the Lebanese National Curriculum. In such a situation, the categories of Syrian children may need to be divided into some other sub-categories under these categories.

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