

CAUGHT IN SOVEREIGNTY: A TURKISH REMEDY TO THE INEFFECTIVENESS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM

by

MERVE KÜÇÜK

Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Sabancı University
July 2017

CAUGHT IN SOVEREIGNTY: A TURKISH REMEDY TO THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM

APPROVED BY:

Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç
(Thesis Supervisor)

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kerim Can Kavaklı

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selin Türkeş Kılıç

DATE OF APPROVAL: 10.07.2017



© Merve Küçük 2017

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

CAUGHT IN SOVEREIGNTY: A TURKISH REMEDY TO THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM

MERVE KÜÇÜK

M.A. Thesis, July 2017

Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç

Keywords: European Union, Counter-Terrorism, Islamic State, Jihadist Terrorism

Following the two world wars, the formation of security policy in Europe was shaped by the security threats that it confronted throughout the history. During the Cold War era, the threat was the evil of communism created by the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world became much closer and globalized. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the nature of security threat has changed, and terrorism has emerged as the most important security threat for the world and Europe.

Religiously inspired terrorism hit Europe first in 2004 with the Madrid bombings and then in 2005 with the London bombings. Following these attacks, the European Union security policy was framed to combat terrorism. Although the European Union created the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005 to fight against terrorism, the EU policies remain ineffective due to the reluctance of member states to make concession on security issues.

This master thesis focuses on the Turkish role and power as a remedy to the ineffective counter-terrorism policies of the European Union. The frame of this thesis is formed on the historical and theoretical explanations which will reveal Turkey as a sustainable ally to Europe in combatting religiously inspired terrorism, i.e. Islamic State. Due to the convergence of material interests between Europe and Turkey, which has strategic importance for and experience in combating terrorism for many years, the relationship between the two parties will become much more interdependent in terms of achieving the common objective: fight against terrorism.

ÖZET

EGEMENLİK SARMALI: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN TERÖRLE MÜCADELE POLİTİKALARINDAKİ BAŞARISIZLIĞINA ÇÖZÜM OLARAK TÜRKİYE

MERVE KÜÇÜK

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2017

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Avrupa Birliği, Terörle Mücadele, Irak-Şam İslam Devleti, Cihatçı Terör*

İki dünya savaşının ardından, Avrupa'daki güvenlik politikasının oluşumu, kıtanın tarih boyunca karşılaştığı tehditler tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Soğuk Savaş döneminde, tehdit Sovyetler Birliği tarafından yaratılan komünizm tehlikesiydi. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra dünya daha yakınlaştı ve küreselleşti. 2001'deki 11 Eylül saldırısından sonra, güvenlik tehdidinin doğası değişti ve terörizm dünya ve Avrupa için en önemli güvenlik sorunu olarak öne çıktı.

Din temelli terörizm Avrupa'yı ilk olarak 2004'te Madrid Saldırısı ile daha sonra da 2005'te Londra Saldırısı ile vurdu. Bu saldırıların akabinde, Avrupa Birliği'nin güvenlik politikası terörle mücadele çerçevesine alındı. Avrupa Birliği'nin 2005 yılında Avrupa Birliği Terörle Mücadele Stratejisi'ni ortaya çıkarmasına rağmen, AB politikaları üye devletlerin güvenlik konularında kendilerinden taviz vermeye çekinmelerinden ötürü başarısız kalmaktadır.

Bu yüksek lisans tezi Avrupa Birliği'nin başarısız terörle mücadele politikalarına çözüm olarak Türkiye'nin rolü ve gücüne odaklanmaktadır. Bu tezin çerçevesi, Türkiye'yi, Avrupa'nın IŞİD gibi din temelli terörizmle mücadelesinde sürdürülebilir bir müttefiki olarak ortaya çıkaran tarihsel ve teorik açıklamalar üzerine şekillendirilmiştir. Avrupa ve terörle mücadelede stratejik öneme ve uzun yıllara dayanan tecrübeye sahip olan Türkiye arasındaki somut çıkarların kesişmesinden ötürü, ortak amaç olan terörle mücadeleyi gerçekleştirme açısından, iki taraf arasındaki ilişki birbirine daha bağımlı hale gelecektir.



<Yağız Efe'ye>

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When working on this thesis, I had many difficult times when I felt I would not complete and defend the thesis. However, in the process of writing my thesis, I had enough support from some people to whom I am grateful and I dedicate this acknowledgment.

First of all, I would like to thank my dear supervisor Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, whose expertise in the field, and whose kindness and patience provided me with enough encouragement to keep writing and finally defending my thesis. I am sure the thesis would still be in its infancy without her constant help. I also would like to thank the remaining two members of my thesis committee: Assoc. Dr. Kerim Can Kavaklı and Assoc. Dr. Selin Türkeş Kılıç, whose constructive comments on the final work meant a lot not only for my intellectual development but also for the improvement of my thesis.

Apart from the academic circle, I was also lucky enough to have my friends and family supporting me ever since I embarked on my Master's journey. My friends tried to push me to my limits so that I could complete the thesis and conclude my journey. Likewise, my family was always there to support me both psychologically and financially, without whose support I would not be able to write my thesis, let alone the acknowledgment part.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY/THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM THE POST-WORLD WAR I TO THE 21ST CENTURY	8
2.1. The European Defense Community and Its Failure	12
2.2. Maastricht Treaty: Creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy	15
2.3. Saint-Malo Declaration for More Assertive European Foreign Policy	19
CHAPTER 3: TERRORISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION	24
3.1. Types of Terrorism and the European Union	24
3.1.1. Evolving Trend of Terrorism	25
3.2. Major Terrorist Attacks in the European Economic Community/the European Union before the 9/11 attacks	27
3.3. The European Union Responses to Terrorism before the 9/11 attacks	28
3.4. Historic Moments in Europe	29
3.4.1. Madrid attacks	30
3.4.2. London attacks	32
3.5. The European Union Responses to Terrorism after the 9/11 attacks	33
3.5.1. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy	35
CHAPTER 4: INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY FORMATIONS IN REGARD TO TERRORISM	40
4.1. Critical Analysis of the European Union Policy To Combat Terrorism	41
4.2. Recent Terrorist Attacks: Paris and Brussels Attacks	44
4.2.1. Paris Attacks	45
4.2.2. Brussels Attacks	47
4.3. The European Union Responses to the Recent Terrorist Attacks	51

4.4. The European Union Responses to the Terrorist Attacks: Theoretical Explanations	55
CHAPTER 5: TURKEY’S PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY CONSIDERATION.....	62
5.1. The European Union and Turkey Relations: A Brief Historical Analysis	62
5.1.1. NATO-EU Cooperation and Turkey	65
5.2. Turkey as a Sustainable Ally in Providing Security to Europe	67
5.2.1. Convergence of Material Interests: Turkey and the European Union... ..	68
5.3. Current challenges for Europe and Turkey’s renewed power	71
5.4. Rationalist-Utilitarian Model and the Turkish Case	74
CONCLUSIONS	77
REFERENCES	80

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQAP	Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CTMs	Counter-Terrorism Measures
EAW	European Arrest Warrant
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECTC	European Counter-Terrorism Centre
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EJN	European Judicial Network
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU IRU	European Union Internet Referral Unit
INTCEN	European Intelligence and Situation Centre
IS	Islamic State
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs

PNR	European Passenger Name Record
RAN	Radicalization Awareness Network
TE-SAT	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFTP	Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
WEU	Western European Union



INTRODUCTION

“Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror... Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature... America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism”

said President George W. Bush on the evening of September 11, 2001 (Bush, 2001).

The world was shaken by the news of terrorist attacks targeting World Trade Center in the US by the morning of September 11, 2001. This is a milestone in the history of terrorism altering the mindset of people regarding what constitutes a terrorist activity and terrorist group. In the 21st century, terrorism has become the most terrifying security threat to the globalized world.

With the turn of the new century, globalization has become influential in every aspect of the human life. It has eased the information dissemination and made people aware and informed about the world thanks to developments in technology. An increase in the level of trade has been observed which makes the world much closer in economic terms. In the globalized world, international security in the conventional sense is ensured given the fact that the possibility of war between nation states has been eliminated with the exception of intrastate wars. However, it is a commonly held the idea that for each and every single concept which is regarded as positive, there is a negative side to it as well. Beside of the virtues that globalization has brought to the human life, it has also changed the meaning of security and sources of security threats. The crimes such as terrorism, organized crime, smuggling of human beings, trafficking in arms, illicit drug trafficking, and cyber-crimes have become the new threats for the world. Therefore, the attention has been given to minimize these threats in order to maintain international security and peace in the world. To this end, both international organizations and sovereign states have started to cooperate with each other to fight with these threats.

Among these threats, terrorism has gained the utmost priority after the 9/11 attacks in the US. This unfortunate incident became the turning point for the world’s terrorism history

since its scope and results were shocking. As CNN declares ‘At the World Trade Center (WTC) site in Lower Manhattan, 2,753 people were killed when hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were intentionally crashed into the north and south towers or as a result of the crashes’ (CNN, 2016). Besides psychological effects that the attacks created on the US citizens, according to Carter and Cox’s research it cost \$3.3 trillion to US government to recover the damages (Carter and Cox, 2011, NYTimes). The attacks were immediately associated with the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda although Al-Qaeda did not claim responsibility for the attacks at the first stage. In 2004, the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the attacks through a videotape by saying that ‘We should destroy towers in America because we are a free people... and we want to regain the freedom of our nation’ (CBC news, 2004). In response to the attacks, the United States of America notably started the fight against terrorism together with the Western part of the world. This can be shown in the words of President Bush on the evening of the attacks. He stated ‘America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism’ (Bush, 2001). As a result of the attacks, War on Terror started in the Middle East in the leadership of the US in order to defeat terrorists and prevent future terrorist activities. In fighting against terrorism, the US government has been supported by its Western allies including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Being a supporter of the US, the European Union immediately condemned the attacks. Guy Verhofstadt, former prime minister of Belgium, expressed “deep shock and dismay” on hearing of the attacks. He said ‘On behalf of the European Union, [we] condemn in the strongest possible terms this type of cowardly attack on innocent civilians’ (as cited in CNN, 2011).

The 9/11 attacks have long term consequences on the perception of terrorism and on the military actions and policies adopted by nation states and international organizations in order to combat terrorism. First of all, the 9/11 attacks changed the perception of the terrorism and terrorist groups. The mindset of the Americans about the terrorism and Islam has changed and this incident has an impact on the policies of states and international organization to combat terrorism. Islam started to be associated with terrorism which led to the emergence of Islamophobia in the West, particularly in the US. Since the 9/11 attacks, Muslims have been referred to as prone to violence, easy to radicalize and to be irrational.

Furthermore, with the 9/11 attacks in the US, the difference between old and new terrorism became much more explicit. In order to better understand the debate about old vs. new terrorism, it is needed to define terrorism in the first place. Terrorism entered into the European language during the French Revolution of 1789. Terrorism referred to state terrorism which means acts of a government to create a fear among its population. Although every nation has defined what constitutes a terrorist act in a different way, this is not an easy task in the international area because of the disagreements about the definition of terrorism and anti-terrorism policies. In the broadest term, terrorism can be defined as the use of violence by a group to create a fear for the realization of a purpose. In international law, agreed legal meaning of terrorism is:

“any action... that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (UN, 2004, pp.51).

The reason for distinguishing new terrorism from the old one is that the features of terrorism have evolved throughout the time. The characteristic of old terrorism manifested itself in the years between the 1960s and 1980s. In those years, terrorism included either right or left wing terrorists or ethnonational separatists. Terrorists had primarily secular motivations and a rational political cause for their acts of terrorism. On the other hand, the new terrorism differs from the old terrorism in terms of actors, motivations, tactics, target groups, the scope of activity and reactions given to any attack. Primarily, the most salient characteristic of the new terrorism is the motivation for terrorists to use violence. Contrary to the old terrorism, the new terrorism does not have secular motivation. Indeed, the underlying cause for terrorists is religion, notably radical Islam. Being reluctant to any sort of negotiation, the terrorists radically believe their reason to demand any change. Therefore, the target group differs from the old terrorism including civilian population. This unselective violence of new terrorism creates greater fear in the society. As the technology develops in the 90s with the globalization, the weapons used for terror attacks can reach broader scope and cause greater damage both physically and psychologically. It can be argued that this kind of terrorism has started in the mid-90s with the bombing of World Trade Center in 1993 and it manifests itself evidently in the 9/11 attacks in 2001 in the US. Being an exact example of new terrorism, the 9/11 attacks were coordinated by a

radical Islamist terrorist group, Al-Qaeda. As it can be observed from the information provided above, the attacks and the outcomes terrified the world and thus the reaction was large-scale including many world powers led by the US and the UK to fight against terrorism. Therefore, another difference between old and new terrorism can be described as the perception of terrorist groups and the reaction given to any attack. In the 60s and 80s, the separatists were considered as terrorist groups such as IRA, ETA etc. However, there were also some recognizing these people as freedom fighters who use selective violence for a political change. Therefore, once there is an attack, this is considered more of a national problem of that country since the attack is coming inside of the country. Moreover, separatism, as a political problem, is not in consideration of other countries since such kind of an attack does not pose any threat to another country and to the world. However, the situation is not the same with the new terrorism. The threat becomes much more enormous and sudden since the motivation is different in the new type of terrorism. Therefore, sovereign states cannot ignore this problem by considering this as a matter of one nation state. Furthermore, the danger is so immense that one sovereign state cannot possibly find a way out to fight against terrorism. Because of these reasons, fight against the new terrorism would necessitate the cooperation and collaboration at the international level. To this end, the United Nations took the first step as the largest international organization. As it is declared in the official website of the UN, ‘the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1373, which for the first time established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)’ (un.org). The main principle of the committee and the other consecutive bodies of the UN is to ‘to enhance the capacity of Member States to prevent and respond to terrorist acts’ (un.org). Besides the US’s War on Terror and, the international community has been an active actor to combat terrorism since 9/11 attacks.

It is historically well-known fact that not only the United States of America was the victim of terrorist attacks but the European countries have also suffered from terrorism threat for many years. Both the old and the new terrorist attacks happened in Europe. However, they differ in terms of time, effect and scope of the attack. Once the old terrorism hit the European states, it did not create reactions at the supranational i.e. the Community level due to several reasons. First of all, it can be argued that Europe was not entirely

unified politically and economically when terrorism was threat for the European countries. Indeed, it was in the process of deepening and widening in the 60s and 80s so it could not act jointly. Secondly, the root causes of the attacks which were ethnonationalism and separatism prevented Europe since perception of terrorism threat was not large enough to prompt Europe to find a common solution. Thirdly, even if Europe wished to act together, the European Economic Community (EEC) lacked any sort of mechanism to do so since it was established in order to prevent any war among European states through enhancement of economic relations. Because of these reasons, old terrorism did not get attention at the Community level and the European states had to deal with the problem themselves. However, the perception of the terrorism has changed throughout the time so did the European capabilities and its institutional form. Once the Al-Qaeda organized horrible attacks in the US in 2001, Europe has already created a union which has supranational institutions and decision-making power. The 9/11 attacks were so unexpected and the results of it were so terrifying that it created the sensation that it may also happen anytime and anywhere in Europe. Therefore, one of the purposes of any terrorist attack which is to create fear was realized in Europe after the 9/11 attacks. In fact, Europe's fears came true in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. The attacks have continued in Europe although actors have changed with the time. Radical Islam increasingly continues recruitment and organizing its attacks in Europe. In response to that, Europe has sought to stand together and prevent the terrorist attacks. To this end, the European Union formalized a strategy to combat terrorism in 2005 after the Madrid and London bombings. Since 2005 the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, the European Union has endeavored to strengthen the Member States' capabilities, to prevent any terrorist attack, to further cooperation both at the supranational and intergovernmental levels in order to combat terrorism. Despite all of the endeavors, the European Union could not prevent further terrorist activities from occurring on its continent. 2015 November Paris bombings and 2016 March Brussels bombings are the illustrations of the incapability of the European Union in the fight against terrorism. The recent Jihadist attacks in Europe demonstrate the role and power of the Republic of Turkey in fighting terrorism.

In this context, the objective of this thesis is to draw attention to the new threat for Europe which is posed by Jihadist terrorism and to revitalize deteriorating relationship

between the European Union and Turkey as to cooperate in combating terrorism. In order to achieve these objectives, the thesis will be built upon three research questions. First of all, the question of ‘To what extent are the European Union policies effective?’ will be answered. Secondly, ‘To what extent can the European Union responses to terrorism be explained by the theoretical perspectives: inter-governmentalism vs. neo-functionalism?’ will be addressed. Lastly, the question of ‘To what extent the European Union and Turkey cooperate in order to combat terrorism?’ will be examined. The thesis will describe and explain the European Union policies to combat terrorism within the limited scope which includes the European Union security policies since its establishment until today. The individual member states’ policy formation to combat terrorism will be beyond the scope of this thesis.

To realize the objectives within this scope, the thesis is composed of six chapters including Introduction and Conclusions. The Introduction draws attention to the emergence of the new terrorism threat which differs in many aspects from the old terrorism. The second chapter titled as Security Considerations in European Economic Community/European Union from the post-World War II to post-Cold War Era will focus on the security considerations in Europe with the clear historical background. Firstly, this chapter will provide information on how World War I and World War II shaped the international security structure. Furthermore, the conjuncture in which Europe tried to unite and integrate itself after two world wars will be pointed out. This chapter will also present and examine in detail the security considerations of the EEC/EU from the establishment of the European Defense Community to formation of the Common Security and Defense Policy together with historical developments that triggered the policy formation in the European Union.

Chapter 3 titled as Change in Security Threats for the European Economic Community/European Union will analyze the changes in security threats for the EEC/EU before and after the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, it will examine the policies and strategies adopted by the European Union before and after the 9/11 attacks in order to combat terrorism so that the significance of the 9/11 will be illustrated in altering the mindset of Europe in regard to terrorism and terror policies. This chapter will select two important

terrorist attacks in Europe which are the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively as a case study in order to explain the danger in Europe and concerns of the European Union. In the light of this information, this chapter will elaborate on the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2005 as a response to the Madrid and London bombings.

Chapter 4, Ineffectiveness of European Union Policy Formation in regard to Terrorism, will provide briefly critical analysis on the European Union policies regarding terrorism by presenting the current literature about the subject matter. As an illustration of this inefficacy, another case study will be carried out which will analyze two further incidents in details: the Paris and Brussels bombings realized in 2015 and 2016 respectively. In addition to these bombings, the recent terrorist attacks organized in different parts of Europe will be examined. The European Union responses to these attacks will be analyzed together with the world reactions. After this analysis, the European Union's security policy formation will be studied in the theoretical framework of neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism.

Chapter 5 entitled as Turkey's Place in the European Union Security Consideration will give place to Turkey's role in the EEC/EU's security considerations by presenting a brief historical analysis of the relationship between the European Union and Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish power in NATO-EU cooperation will be touched upon. After explaining the importance of Brussels bombings in 2016 which illustrates the fundamental role of Turkey in Europe's security, Turkey will be asserted as a sustainable ally for the European Union particularly in combating terrorism. This chapter will be finalized by examining the relationship between Turkey and the European Union within the perspective of rationalist and utilitarian model.

Finally, Conclusions will summarize the main findings of this research and submit the concluding remarks. The thesis will be finalized by further recommendation on related research areas for the literature.

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY/THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM THE POST-WORLD WAR I TO THE 21st CENTURY

“World War I was the most colossal, murderous, mismanaged butchery that has ever taken place on earth. Any writer who said otherwise lied, so the writers either wrote propaganda, shut up, or fought”

said Ernest Hemingway demonstrating the horrors of the World War I (Hemingway, 1929).

The war was called Great War since it was the first war that included most of the powers in the world which were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Empire as Central Powers; France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan as Allies (Smith, 2015). The world witnessed such a war that caused millions of casualties which were estimated as ‘17 million people killed including soldiers and civilians’ (BBC, 2014). The war devastated the world economically as well. It is claimed that ‘By 1914, Europe had won the respect of the world as a reliable money-lender, yet just four years later was greatly in debt to her allies for their generous financial contributions toward the war effort, owing them as much as \$10 billion’ (Karpilovsky et. al). In such a catastrophic atmosphere, the one and only objective of the world states was to ensure the peace in the world and to recover the countries both economically and psychologically. To this end, ‘By December 1920, 48 states had signed the League Covenant, pledging to work together to eliminate aggression between countries’ and established the League of Nations (Townshend, 2011). The leadership of the United States of America and the fourteen points of Woodrow Wilson was essentials of this foundation even though the US did not prefer become a member of the League. The core purposes of the League were to ensure the collective security and disarmament in the world. Hence, since the end of the World War I, ensuring the international security has been one of the key objectives upon which the world states have placed importance. However, newly emerged conjuncture did not allow the world to live in a peace. The League of Nations could not maintain disarmament and prevent power struggle in Europe. On the one hand, Germany had become one of the most powerful countries in Europe and

asked for revenge of World War I. In order to compensate the losses of the Great War, Germany started to rebuild its army and prepared the country for a new war. On the other hand, France was willing to curb the power of Germany any way that it saw possible. As a result of unceasing desires of the countries, unsuccessful leadership, power struggle and ineffectiveness of the League, the world witnessed the Second World War. The results were terrifying for the world. Similar to World War I, it ended up with the loss of lives; and devastated the economies of many states. The Second World War caused even more casualties than the World War I. According to Fraser Cameron 'It was the greatest and deadliest war in human history, with over 57 million lives lost' (Cameron, 2014).

After living through two unspeakable world wars, immediate aim was to guarantee the peace in the world. The states were sick and tired of fighting one another and thus they were willing to eliminate the wars and to ensure international security. In order to achieve this aim, the United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 when the Charter was ratified by the five permanent members namely, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union at the time (History of the United Nations, un.org). Contrary to its predecessor, the United Nations has been able to preserve its existence while expanding and developing. In the beginning, the United Nations had 51 members; today in 2017, it has 193 member states. The purposes of the United Nations are described in its Charter. Chapter I, Article I of the UN Charter defines the UN's purposes as

“to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character; to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends” (UN Charter, art. 1).

After the Second World War, international security was maintained thanks to the international organizations and to the states which were reluctant to witness any world war. The immediate need for the states was economic recovery after the war. Being destroyed too much by the war, European countries needed an outside help in order to compensate their losses. The United States of America became part of an effort for the amelioration of the European economy through its Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. The speech given by President Marshall in June 1947 clearly guaranteed the US assistance to Europe and

suggested also that Europe must itself seek for recovery. President Marshall declares in his speech:

“It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations” (Marshall, 1947).

Besides being supported by the US financially, European politicians and bureaucrats looked for the European ways to create an integration in which they could live in peace and hold together. There were different ideas and political design for Europe in different parts of the continent. First of all, after the war and establishment of the United Nations, the idea of federalism became very popular both in Europe and America. The movement for a federal unification of Europe was designated by Altiero Spinelli who was an Italian politician. Together with Ernesto Rossi, he wrote Ventotone Manifesto in which he defined an action plan for United States of Europe (Levi, 2009). Having considered federalism as a way for the European integration, he proposed the creation of supranational European federation of states which would prevent any war in Europe. The essential of Spinelli's thoughts is that concept of nation state is the core cause of fascism and authoritarianism. While expressing Spinelli's opinion on the nation state, Levi states that ‘Ultimately, the cause of imperialism and war lies in state sovereignty and international anarchy. The more specific cause of imperialism in the era of the world wars is to be found in the crisis of the European system of states’ (Levi, 2009). Thus, the political design of Spinelli for Europe was the European Federation which would eliminate international anarchy and guarantee the peace. However, the conjuncture after the war was not appropriate for the creation of the European Federation. First of all, the antagonism between the nation states particularly between France and Germany were not totally eliminated so that national boundaries would be abandoned and thus a federation would be established. Furthermore, the high bureaucrats of the time were not favoring such establishment.

Second proposed idea to form European integration was based on the economic relationships between the Europeans so that there would be overlapping interests, which may prevent possible conflicts in the continent. Therefore, the aim was to establish an organization which was capable of controlling war materials such as coal and steel. To realize this objective, with the leadership of Jean Monnet, French bureaucrat, and Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951 as the first European institution based on the principle of supranationalism which envisaged a creation of High Authority controlling the production of coal and steel. The European bureaucrats and politicians preferred the establishment of such organization as a way for the integration since it was the most conceivable path for the integration. First of all, contrary to the European Federation of Spinelli, the cooperation through the ECSC preserved the existence of nation states and of national sovereignty which the Europeans attached importance to it after the war. Secondly, for the European politicians of the time, the economy seemed most reasonable way to choose for integration since it was considered as low politics which made cooperation more doable and sustainable. The European states were more prone to make concessions on economic policies rather than on security and/or defense policies after the war because there was not enough feeling of trust between states to collaborate on security and defense policies. Furthermore, the common and concrete question to be dealt with urgently after the war was ameliorating the economy and ensuring the war. Therefore, establishing an organization controlling the economic production in certain sectors through the supranational institution, High Authority in the ECSC, was the most reasonable way to prefer for the European integration.

Besides economic path for integration, another design for the European integration was the creation of the European Defense Community in 1950. The Community was introduced in 1950 and failed four years later because of the reasons that will be touched upon in details in the next section of this chapter.

While having entered into a process of integration both economically and politically by the creation of the ECSC in 1951, Europe found itself in the Cold War as the rest of the world. When the Second World War was over in 1945, the balance of power changed and a

power vacuum emerged. In this conjuncture, the world was divided into two poles, West and East, because of ideological differences and power politics. On the west side, the United States of America was the superpower by influencing the Western part of the world. On the east side, the Soviet Union was the superpower as the opponent of the US. From time to time, the tension between the two blocks was accelerated and there was a possibility of the start of a nuclear war. Fortunately, no such war happened in the world during the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War ended leaving the United States of America the only superpower of the world at the time. The elimination of two poles brought about more integration to the world in the 90s while Europe was also endeavoring to improve its integration and cooperation in the areas other than the economy. In order to analyze better the security considerations in the European Economic Community/European Union, the European Defense Community as a proposed integration path needs to be examined while taking into consideration that the defense, security and foreign policy formation emerged different times and in different patterns in the European Union history.

2.1. The European Defense Community and Its Failure

The consequences of two world wars demonstrated to the Europeans that they could not manage their problems through the race of armament. For this reason, both world wars have a fundamental role in Europe's future integration as Cameron states 'without both World Wars there would be no European Union (EU) today' (Cameron, 2014). Since this thesis will focus on the European Union's policies to combat terrorism, it is needed to analyze first the security considerations for the EEC/EU since its establishment. The EEC/EU's policies on security have been shaped by primarily the security threats that the countries confront and the countries' willingness or reluctance to form security policies at the Community/Union level. In order to understand better the creation of security policies in accordance with the security threats, the European integration process after the war must be analyzed. After the war, immediate aim for the Europeans was to create a relationship that is capable of preventing any war between them. Since the aim was to prevent any war from occurring again, it was thought that the most reasonable way to realize this aim, as

explained above, was to create a community which would be based on economic relationships. Being one of the most crucial high politics issues, the security issues were preferred to be considered at the national level rather than the Community level because it was harder to reach common security interests for the countries, given the fact that they had recently fought a destructive war among each other on their continent. Being aware of this fact, the European politicians and bureaucrats decided to establish an economic community based on supranational principle. Six countries namely France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy established the ECSC in 1951 by Paris Treaty. This community was 'based on the common market, common objectives and common institutions' as reflected in the Article 1 of the Treaty (Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951, Art 1). The Treaty included control of the production of only two war materials, coal and steel; equal access to the sources of production within the common market; promote the improvement of the living and working conditions of the labor force, under the High Authority (Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951, Art 3). The Paris Treaty outlined the objectives of the Community in the Article 2 as 'to contribute to economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries through the institution' (Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951, Art2). Thanks to this treaty, integration for six European countries was ensured for a narrow part of the economic production in Europe. As it is summarized in the European Union's website,

“The overall achievements of the ECSC were positive. The Community was able to deal with crises, ensuring balanced development of the production and distribution of resources and facilitating the necessary industrial restructuring and redevelopment... The ECSC's systems of social management (early retirement, transitional allowances, mobility grants, training, etc.) were of great importance in dealing with crises” (Summaries of EU Legislation, eur-lex.europa).

This is the preferred and the most reasonable way for the European countries to realize their dream of integration, as clarified in the preceding section.

However, for the sake of this thesis, another proposed idea for the European integration which was the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) needs to be examined. This idea was initiated by René Pleven, French Premier at the time, in 1950 and

thus this plan is also known as the Pleven Plan which was defensive in nature proposing the creation of the European Defense Forces. The international conjuncture was an essential factor to be specified for this proposal since the United States of America encouraged the Europeans for involving in a military organization which would be under the command of NATO and would be capable of resisting the Soviet Union. In 1950, the Korean War broke out and the threat of Communism was explicit for the European countries. Indeed, during the Cold War, the most essential security threat for the European countries was the spread of Communism. Influenced by this structure and the war, the European countries had the need of rearmament to be ready to fight against Communism if it is necessary. Furthermore, the United States of America asked its European allies for rearmament of West Germany, given the fact that West Germany was prohibited from building an army after the war. Having bad experiences on this issue and having aimed to prevent the military possibility of West Germany's making war again; France desired to establish a European army under the European Defense Community which was capable of controlling the armament of the European countries especially of West Germany. France recognized the need to establish a community which was based on collective security as Kunz argues 'Just as the Schuman Plan should guard against the economic possibility of Germany's making war again, thus the Pleven plan is designed to prevent Germany's military capability to making war again' (Kunz, 1953). The another intention of this plan was to create pan-European defense force as opposed to West Germany's proposed accession to NATO. French politicians were never in favor of Germany's rearmament under the NATO and thus as opposed to Germany's improving its power within the NATO, French recognized the European Defense Community as its own solution which could control Germany under a European institution. Therefore, a treaty was signed in 1952 but never ratified since the ratification was ironically rejected by the French Parliament itself in 1954. First of all, there were Gaullists in France who opposed the idea because they had fears about diminishing of France's national sovereignty because of the supranational character of the EDC. Secondly, there were Communists who did not want the creation of such organization since they were not willing to be allied with the USA under such kind of a plan. The main idea was that as Ari states 'The U.S. involvement in and supervision of the E.D.C. process was primarily due to economic and trade interests. Their primary aim was

to create a stable Europe so that the U.S. private sector could operate and make business on the Continent' (Ari, 2004). Moreover, there were others suspecting of West Germany's remilitarization and fearing of rearmed and reunited Germany in the continent. The research demonstrating French Public opinion states that 57% of the French people believed that existence of military troops in Germany would create a danger to France (as cited in Ari, 2004). Furthermore, the plan lost its significance since with the death of Joseph Stalin in 1954 at the end of the Korean War; the threat of Communism was not as apparent as of 1950 which means that the threat was faded away. In a nutshell, both the internal dynamics of the French politics and the US pressure on the UK and France to accept German rearmament for the security reasons, the European Defense Community Treaty was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954. Hence, the European integration in the defense policy area withered in the wine in the first years of the EEC. However, this issue became at the top of the agenda in a different way in the European Union history after the end of the Cold War. As it is also understood from the failure of the European Defense Community, the European Union could not designate acceptable defense policy. However, changing international conjuncture and the deficiencies in the European Union institutions revealed the need to form common foreign and security policy, if not common defensive policy.

2.2. Maastricht Treaty: Creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy

As time progresses, the Europeans needed to widen their integration into other areas. One of the most significant areas of integration besides economy was foreign and security policy formation. The European politicians and bureaucrats needed to act jointly in their foreign matters. Before the Maastricht Treaty, which formalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the Union level, came into force in 1993, there was another attempt for foreign policy coordination in Europe. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced in 1970 after the failure of Fouchet Plan of Charles de Gaulle. In order to understand better the EPC, the first need is to examine briefly the Fouchet Plan. Having emphasized the French national sovereignty too much, the French President at the time, de Gaulle, had a grand design for Europe which favored the French power and

autonomy in the continent. In 1961, the plan was written by Christian Fouchet who was France's ambassador to Denmark. It aimed to create common foreign policy and common defense policy while taking into consideration of member states' preferences and interests and minimizing the role of the Commission. It was an alternative to the European Community which was based on supranational principles. Contrary to this, the Fouchet Plan adopted intergovernmental principles because of the concerns about loss of French national sovereignty in the European Community. However, the Benelux countries, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, objected to the plan on the ground that this plan was against the idea of supranationalism and that the power of the Commission would have been weakened. Furthermore, there were fears among Benelux countries that de Gaulle would abuse the power, dominate the EEC and seek for national interests. Moreover, it was thought that the plan was opposed to NATO's missions and directives, given the fact that France was not an Atlanticist state and intended to create European only defense policy. Hence, because of these reasons, the Fouchet Plan was never implemented in Europe and as a result of it de Gaulle's grand design for Europe collapsed.

Although the Fouchet Plan was unsuccessful, the European countries were still aware of the absence of a coherent foreign policy for the EC. That's why the European Political Cooperation was introduced in 1970. A report was prepared by foreign ministers of member states on the problems of political unification, known as Davignon Report of 1970. Member states agreed to seek for political unification by cooperation and consultation at foreign policies through ministerial meetings. The report outlined two main objectives:

- “(a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly;
- (b) To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable” (1970, pp.10).

Having these aims, the EPC sought for coherent foreign policy formation and being a single voice for Europe in foreign policies. The EPC was later empowered by Copenhagen Report of 1973. The members of the Community expressed their satisfaction caused by the cooperation and consultation in political area in the Copenhagen Report of 1973 (Part I, 1973). In order for further cooperation, the member states decided to make improvements

within the frame of European Political Cooperation. The improvements included the ministerial meetings four times in a year, setting meeting in the Political Committee of the Member States of the European Community, creation of Group of Correspondents and Working Parties to ensure more consultation and to deal with problems, enlargement of the role of the embassies in the member states and third countries, set up of priorities to discuss and consult foreign policy questions to further political cooperation (Part II, 1973). In London Report of 1981, foreign ministers of member states emphasized increased political cooperation and the possibility of a single voice in foreign affairs (Part I, 1981). Furthermore, foreign ministers agreed to strengthen the organization, assure the continuity of political cooperation and increase the relations and consultation with the institutions of European Community such as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Part II, 1981).

In the European Community, the desire to have a common position in foreign affairs, to strengthen and to broaden the political cooperation areas became possible to be fulfilled when the Common Foreign and Security Policy was introduced in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty which viewed the 'European Political Cooperation as a guide' (Treaty on the European Union, Final Act, 1992). The Maastricht Treaty, formally the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), was signed by 12 member states in 1992 and established the European Union. The Treaty changed the structure of the European Community by forming the Union in Europe. It introduced the three pillars structure, namely European Community pillar (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs pillar (JHA). While the first pillar was reserved for economic policies to be agreed at the community level and the third pillar was under the control of member states, the second level policy formation which was based on intergovernmental principles was possible through cooperation between member states and the EU institutions mainly the Commission.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is the organized foreign policy formation for the Union's external affairs, including only security and defense policies. The external economic relations are organized by the European Community Pillar. The objectives of the CFSP are outlined in Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty as:

“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, Art J.1, 1992).

As clearly seen from this article of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has sought to create the Union’s coherent and single voice foreign policy although the decision making in this critical issue area depends on unanimous voting in the Council of the European Union.

In order to better manage and lead the policies, the European Union created a new post called High Representative under the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is responsible for the European Union Special Representatives and also is the president of the Foreign Affairs Council besides other tasks such as coordinating and carrying out the EU’s foreign policy. The first High Representative was Javier Solana who was former Secretary General of NATO. Currently, the post is held by Federica Mogherini, former Italian foreign minister. In spite of the fact that the role and power of the High Representative were limited initially, this was extended with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The treaty changed the post’s name as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, it merged the External Relations Commissioner with the High Representative, enabling that only one person becomes responsible for the EU’s foreign policy. Therefore, the EU has seemed to answer the famous question of Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State of the USA: ‘Who do I call if I want to call Europe?’ (Brunnstorm, 2009) Thus, the answer given to the Kissinger’s question has become explicit since the Lisbon Treaty, which demonstrates significant turning point for the EU. The reason for this is that there had been complexities and debates before the Lisbon Treaty in the international area concerning who is responsible for conducting the EU’s foreign policy because there were many institutions and people who had a saying in foreign and security affairs. Furthermore, nation states and international organizations had problems with whom to apply when there is an issue on foreign affairs as the Kissinger’s question summarized this problem. With the reforms

made first by the Amsterdam Treaty and then by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has acquired a single post called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In this way, the EU has a 'single voice' in its foreign and security affairs in institutional level, which empowers the European Union in international area in a certain extent. However, the crises occurring in the continent demonstrates that the EU did not succeed in creating a single voice in its foreign and security affairs as it will be explained in the next section.

2.3. Saint-Malo Declaration for More Assertive European Foreign Policy

In reality, did the European Union answer the Kissinger question by designating so-called the EU foreign minister position? Institutionally, the answer may be given as 'yes' although there are other foreign representatives of the EU besides the High Representative. Even though the answer may be yes, another question arises: 'To what extent does the establishment of the High Representative post improve the European Union's foreign policy formation and its effectiveness in the international area?' In order to answer this question, it is needed to examine the international conjuncture emerged in the post-Cold War era.

Since the failure of the EDC in 1954, the European states have been genuinely in an effort to create a common foreign and security policy in order to ameliorate the power of the European Union in the international area. Even though having formalized and institutionalized this policy by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and developed it by the consecutive ones in ensuing years, the European Union has not been successful enough to response the international crises even in its own continent. The best example to demonstrate this reality is the Yugoslav Wars beginning in 1991 and lasting till 2001. The European Union clearly failed to resolve the conflicts and to prevent the genocide in Bosnia. It was not the EU and its CFSP, but NATO which brought peace on the European continent. It was argued that 'Neither can one ignore the irony that as the European Community races toward unification; its increasingly wretched neighbors in the east and south face violent disintegration' (Cohen, 1993). One of the most important reasons for

this failure is that the three big European states, Germany, the UK, and France, were unable to agree among themselves about Yugoslavian disintegration. On the one hand, Germany supported Yugoslavian disintegration and favored the creation of independent of states Croatia and Slovenia in the region. Marolov claims ‘The German foreign policy was quite active in the field of providing support for Croatia and Slovenia from one hand and accusation for the outbreak of conflict to Serbia, on the other hand’ (Marolov, 2012). On the other hand, Britain preferred to stay inactive since it viewed the war as Balkans’ problem, not one of Europe. Pond (2006) asserts ‘the UK had developed tactic by which an action by the West is not necessary because what was going on in Yugoslavia it would inevitably result in war between the Balkan “tribes” and finally with the creation of one hegemony (Serbian) which Britain would later easily handle’ (as cited in Marolov, 2012). Considering Serbia as an ally of itself, France opposed any argument that views Serbia as guilty of the war. Marolov argues ‘Similar like the UK, France too, chose to have a passive view by which the West should not interfere too much in Yugoslavia’ (Marolov, 2012). To sum up, the European views and interests on the Balkan wars were different, which could not result in a common foreign policy of the EU towards the Yugoslavian issue. The only common position taken by the EC/EU was ignorance of the issue, which made the European Union inactive to prevent the war from accelerating. This resulted in huge failure and tragedy in the European Union history. This can be demonstrated in the words of the then European Commission president of the time, Jacques Delors ‘I see in the Yugoslav tragedy the proof that Europe does not exist as a foreign policy actor’ (as cited in Marolov, 2012).

In addition to the disagreements among the European states, the lack of instruments is the other reason why the Europeans were unable to halt the conflicts. Even though the European Community at the time presented many negotiations offers to the conflicting parties, it was not capable of convincing each party. The soft power the EC had at the time was not enough to stop accelerating of the conflicts and when there was bloodshed in the European continent, the EC had not the military capability to end it. This failure demonstrates that the European Community was lack of common foreign and security policy in response to the international crises even in its own continent and the establishment of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty and even the creation of the position of

High Representative with the Amsterdam Treaty could not improve the EU's position in international crises.

Bosnian and Kosovo crisis demonstrated the fact that the European Union could not act as a union once the member states did not speak in a single voice in its foreign affairs. Because of the divergent interests of the essential member states about the issue and the deficiencies in the European institutions which means the absence of supranational authority to deal with foreign issues and absence of capable police forces under the High Representative, the European Union could not interfere in the crisis and could not prevent the conflict from accelerating and turning into a genocide. The ignorance of the issue and viewing it as a 'Balkan Problem' by the Europeans resulted in an inaction which made the situation worse from day to day. The crises of Bosnia and later of Kosovo clearly showed the role of member states of the EC/EU in dealing with international crisis. In other words, since the formation of security policy is based on the bargaining between member states i.e. unanimous voting is enforced in the Foreign Affairs Council in order to form a policy; the EU could not act jointly in the Yugoslavian crisis and activeness of the EU in world affairs has been questioned due to this failure.

Being shocked by this failure and having realized the deficiency in its own institutions, the European Union attempted to ameliorate this situation with a declaration. In 1998, Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the time, and Jacques Chirac, the French President at the time, issued a joint declaration. The Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998 realized the European Union's inefficiency to respond international crises and stimulated the EU to act immediately. It was agreed by the two states' leaders that 'To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises' (1998). The need for military means and armed forces at the Union level to respond international crises had been apparent to French and British. This commenced the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. What was lacked in Europe was emphasized in this declaration as 'Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology' (1998). The priorities of the

European Union in the ESDP was indeed agreed upon firstly at the June 1992, Western European Union (WEU). The Petersberg tasks defined the type of the European Union's military action which was expanded and incorporated into Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Originally, the tasks contained three main purposes namely 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' (2016). The Treaty of Lisbon expanded these to include 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilization tasks' (2016). Through this policy configuration, the European Union became capable of undertaking military actions and thus became much more powerful foreign policy actor in world affairs. The successes, failures, and challenges of the EU operations are too beyond of the scope of this thesis.

As it can be seen from these policy formations, the European Community/European Union needed a different kind of policies throughout the time. In this point, for a better understanding, there is a necessity to distinguish these policies. First of all, defense policy was designated for the European Economic Community afterward of the Second World War by the European Defense Community. As it was explained this policy was based on collective defense principle as a response to the existent threat of communism. After the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 because of the French rejection of the Treaty, the European Union formalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992 with Maastricht Treaty and developed it by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 as a reaction to changing international conjuncture and for sustaining further integration in the Union. According to Mix's statements 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy is based on unanimous consensus among the member states. CFSP is a mechanism for adopting common principles and guidelines on political and security issues, committing to common diplomatic approaches, and undertaking joint actions' (Mix, 2013). Further integration may be feasible under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) presented in the Treaty on the European Union. As Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) states that

"The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an

operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States” (TEU, Art 42, 1992).

Overall, all these policy formations from the European Defense Community to the Common Defense and Security Policy demonstrates that the European Union has manifested its incremental willingness to involve in world affairs through institutional reforms and revision of the mindset bearing in mind that member states of the Union are the most significant players for Union’ acting effectively in world politics. The reforms that the European Union has realized since its establishment illustrated that the EU has amended and adapted its institutions in accordance with the security threats that it confronts. The change in security threats brought about change in security considerations and security policies at the Union level. To sum up, the main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that even though the European Union has formulated and evolved its policies in order to deal with foreign and security matters, the process of very integration, i.e. the fact that the European Union was established on the basis of economic relationships in the first stage, is not convenient and sufficient to establish common foreign and security policy.

The European Union has continued to accommodate itself and its policies to the newly emerged security threat, Jihadist terrorism, in the turn of the new century as well. This creates a need for deep analysis of precautions and policies adopted by the Union. In this context, the main subject matter of the next chapter will be the threat of terrorism, particularly Jihadist terrorism, from the European Union. Together with the evolving trend of terrorist attacks that the EU confronts, the major terrorist attacks and the European Community/European Union responses to deal with this threat before the 9/11 attacks will be analyzed. Furthermore, the two historic moments in terms of terrorism in the EU’s history, – Madrid and London bombings – will be studied as a case study in order to understand the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was introduced in 2005 in order to combat terrorism.

CHAPTER 3

TERRORISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The perception of security has changed and broadened with the turn of the 21st century. Conventional security threats yield to new threats which become more influential because of the globalization. Therefore, security policies have to be reformed in accordance with the threats in the globalized world. One of the most significant threats is terrorism which did not emerge by the globalization but it has evolved with globalization and caused much more insecurity in the world. The most fundamental incident that has made terrorism a threat to the world was the September 11 attacks happened in 2001 in the US. By these attacks, the mindset of sovereign states and international organization about terrorism has been altered so did have the policies to combat terrorism. For the purposes of this thesis, terrorist attacks that the European Union has witnessed, and policies regarding terrorism adopted by the European Union will be elaborated in this chapter. In order to realize this objective, it is needed to bear in mind the fact that terrorism is not a newly emerged threat affecting the Europeans but its root causes, scope, impact, and results have changed by the 9/11 attacks. For a better understanding of the subject matter, a brief analysis of terrorism and the European Union's responses before the 9/11 attacks would be presented in the next section.

3.1. Types of terrorism and the European Union

Terrorism has threatened Europeans for many years but it had been considered as a national security problem since its causes and impacts necessitated viewing it in that way. Throughout history, terrorism has evolved and it has eventually become capable of drawing international attention in order to combat it. Before analyzing the terrorism confronted in the globalized world, it is necessary to explain the types of terrorism that the Europeans have witnessed throughout the history. The information provided in this part of the thesis relies on the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report(s) (TE-SAT) which

have been published annually since 2007. TE-SAT is an EU report which 'aims at providing an overview of the situation in the EU rather than describing the situation in individual member states. It seeks to establish basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks, arrests, and activities in the EU' (TE-SAT, 2008, pp.6). Through collecting information from member states, Europol publishes the report once a year covering the information of the previous year. These reports provide the information on the trends of terrorist activities, the number of terrorist attacks both failed and completed, and the number of arrests together with the number of persons killed and injured. Types of terrorist activities are ranged under five headings: Islamist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, and single issue terrorism. Before explaining each type of terrorism, it is necessary to note that Islamist terrorism has been replaced with religiously inspired terrorism with TE-SAT 2012. First, religiously inspired terrorism is motivated by religion for justification of the acts. Second, the motivation of separatist terrorism is to be recognized, i.e. self-determination, nationalism, and ethnicity such as the IRA and the PKK. Third, in left-wing terrorism, the aim is to change political, economic and social structure through the usage of the Leninist-Marxist ideology. Fourth, right-wing terrorism shares the same goal with left-wing terrorism; however, their ideology depends on an extremist-rightist model. Finally, single issue terrorism seeks to change a particular issue which is often related to animal rights and environmental protection. Even though the European countries have witnessed different types of terrorism in the European soil the fact that terrorism has evolved through time in a clear manner from left-wing separatist terrorism to religiously inspired terrorism is beyond doubt.

3.1.1. Evolving Trend of Terrorism

To demonstrate how the threat of terror has evolved in Europe throughout the history, the situation in 2007 and 2014 will be compared in this section by the information provided by TE-SAT reports. According to the chart provided in TE-SAT 2008, 532 of 583 failed, foiled and executed terrorist activities were carried out by separatist terrorist groups mainly in France and Spain in 2007. Only 4 of the all terrorist activities were related with Islamist

Groups (TE-SAT, 2008, pp. 10). The attacks of separatist terrorist groups were claimed by the Basque and Corsican separatist terrorism. The main aim was to bring indiscriminate mass casualties. On the other hand, the situation of 2014 is different compared to that of 2007. The main threat has been coming from not separatist groups which are decreasing in number and scale, but from the jihadists who can easily cross borders and increase their capabilities to attack. According to the chart provided in TE-SAT 2015, the number of attacks of separatist terrorists decreased from 160 in 2010 to 67 in 2014. (TE-SAT, 2015, pp. 26). The report provides also a chart showing a significant increase in the number of arrests for religiously inspired terrorism, from 179 in 2010 to 395 in 2014. (TE-SAT, 2015, pp. 19). 188 of the arrests took place in France. Al-Qaeda has been replaced by Islamic State (IS) as the main threat whose network and capabilities are growing. Thus, in recent years, IS is posing a greater threat for the EU member states by recruiting people from various countries and attracting home-grown people to participate in terrorist activities. Contrary to this, left-wing terrorism has been in decline from 21 attacks in 2007 (TE-SAT, 2008, pp.37) to 13 attacks in 2014 (TE-SAT, 2015, pp.30). Furthermore, the course of terrorist activities has been also evolving. For instance, the type of attacks has been expanding from arson, small fire arms to suicide bombings, explosives and even to the threat of the involvement of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) substances. Increasing usage of Internet and social media facilitate for terrorist groups targeting certain audiences and then to recruit them. Involvement of home-grown people in the EU, younger population and women in terrorist activities is another dimension of the evolving terrorism in the new century. In this evolution of terrorism in Europe, the 9/11 as a turning point in history has to be emphasized. Indeed, one of the objectives of this thesis is to illustrate the importance of the 9/11 in the history of terrorism. In order to better understand the issue, certain incidents will be chosen to be examined before and after the 9/11 in the next section.

3.2. Major Terrorist Attacks in the European Economic Community/the European Union before the 9/11 attacks

The incidents provided in this section have an intention to give example to existing types of terrorist attacks before the 9/11 in Europe. For this reason, unique cases will be chosen which are intriguing and have a significant effect in the venue of the incident. Early years of the EEC/EU experienced major terrorist attacks in Italy. On 12 December 1969, the Ordine Nuovo (New Order) which was a far right political organization placed a bomb in 'Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura in Rome killing 16 and injuring 90 people' (Willan, 2001). 'Their aim was to prevent the country falling into the hands of the left -wing by duping the public into believing the bombings were part of a communist insurgency' (BBC). On 5-6 September 1972, Germany witnessed significant terrorist attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich. The attack was claimed by the Black September Organization which was a Palestinian terrorist organization. The terrorists had taken hostage Israeli athletes and coaches and killed 11 Israeli people. Italy had continued to witness a right-wing extremist terrorist attack by the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Armed Revolutionary Nuclei) in 1980 in Bologna resulting in the killing of 85 and of injuring more than 200 people. On the other hand, Spain has mostly experienced separatist terrorist attacks. For instance, the Basque separatist organization ETA was responsible for the car bombing in 1980 in Barcelona killing 15 people and wounding 39 (1987, NY Times). In 2002, Finland also experienced a terrorist attack. The attack that was believed to be committed by a 19-year-old chemistry student, Petri Gerdt, was realized in a shopping mall killing 7 people and injuring many (Lyall, 2002, NY Times). A connection to any international terrorist organization could not be found.

These terrorist incidents have various roots and they are different than the terrorist activities which the world is familiar with today in terms of the actors, motivations, target groups and weapons being used. Hence, they did not arouse the necessary attention at the community/union level in order to fight against terrorism. Furthermore, in the first years of its establishment, the Community gave slight importance to security issues and terrorism was left to national sphere given the fact that the Community was mostly focused on

economic integration in the early years. For this reason, the measures adopted by the European Economic Community/European Union remained superficial.

3.3. The European Union Responses to Terrorism before the 9/11 attacks

Before the 9/11, terrorism in the EEC/EU was not so apparent that the reactions given to the attacks did not draw attention at the Community level. Indeed, the first attempt to combat terrorism was implemented under the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. The TREVI group was created in 1975 in order to combat terrorism and it met for the first time in 1976 at ministerial level. The objective was to cooperate in the exchange of information regarding terrorist threat (Council of the European Union, 2005). In this framework which was coordinated under the JHA pillar, the Home Affairs and/or Justice Minister of the Member State came together to create counter terrorism and policing in the EC. Later on, the ministers accompanied by the senior police and security service officials at these meetings. In this framework, the TREVI I was responsible for counter-terrorism measures; TREVI II was responsible for police cooperation; TREVI III was responsible for the fight against international crime and TREVI 1992 was responsible for the abolition of borders (Council of the European Union, 2005). This was the ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation which conducted its works beyond the scope of the Treaties. The TREVI Group lasted until 1992 at it was formalized as part of the JHA pillar by the Maastricht Treaty. Overall, the first attempt to organize counter-terrorism policy was realized on the basis of intergovernmental principles among the ministers of Member States which demonstrate that the European Commission had no role in creating and coordinating terror policies in the EC.

Further measures to combat terrorism were taken by the Council of Europe in 1977. The Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 1977 for the purposes of extradition between states and to abandon the principle that extradition can be refused if the offense is political or is politically motivated. However, the Convention has loop holes. For example, the Convention enables states the right to refuse extradition if it views offense as a political offense under Article 13 (Art.13, 1977). This

deficiency was remedied by the European Union in 1996 by the EU Convention on Extradition. Article 5 provides 'no offense may be regarded by the requested Member State as a political offense, as an offense connected with a political offense or an offense inspired by political motives' (Art.5, 1996). Another measure was taken in 1998 when the European Union established the European Judicial Network. As it is described in the official website of the EU, its main role is 'to facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the EU Member States, particularly in actions to combat forms of serious crime' (About EJM). It made easier to process judicial requests by one member state to another. Furthermore, hearing by videoconference (Art.10) or telephone conference (Art.11) and request of interception of telecommunications (Art.18) were made possible through the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000). By additional protocol to this Convention, member states are obliged to provide information on banking transactions and bank accounts and to monitor banking transactions in 2001.

3.4. Historic Moments in Europe

Having experienced different types of terrorism, the Europeans have been in an effort to minimize the terrorist activities in the continent. Until the 9/11 attacks, the measures adopted by the EU, as observed above, remained mainly superficial and intergovernmental. No concrete and binding policy were adopted by the European Union until terrorism has become a threat to the world by the September 9/11 attacks. Since then, the European Union entered a different phase of collaboration with the other world powers to combat terrorism. In order to fight against terrorism, the EU decided to adopt new security strategies and enhance the cooperation among the member states. Before analyzing the policies and decisions adopted by the EU after the 9/11 attacks, there are two historic moments in the European history that need to be explained in detail in order for a better understanding of the Europeans endeavors to combat terrorism in its territory. These historic incidents which would be analyzed in the following parts of this thesis are the Madrid and London bombings taking place in 2004 and in 2005 respectively.

3.4.1. Madrid attacks

The threat of terrorism evolved by the September 11 attacks in the new century. As the TE-SAT reports demonstrate the activities of old terrorism diminished in number while the new terrorism based on religious reasons is becoming much more influential and threatening in Europe. One of the most fundamental incidents illustrating this threat is the Madrid bombings in 2004. Terrorism hit Europe in the middle of 2004 which led to the emergence of awareness about the threat of terrorism among Europeans. The attacks took place on the morning of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, known as 11-M in Spain, just three days before the general elections, when terrorists exploded 10 bombs which were placed on four trains. All four trains were traveling on the same line and the explosions occurred in the rush hours of the morning because so many people were using the trains for going to work. The civilian population was targeted by the terrorists. The number of casualties is breathtaking since the blasts killed 191 and wounded 1,841 (BBC). These attacks shocked both the Spanish and other Europeans since 'It was the worst Islamist terrorist attack in European history' (Camilos, 2007). Once the general elections ended up with the defeat of the popular party by the socialist party, the leader of the conservative popular party, José María Aznar, argued that the attacks were organized by the Basque separatist group ETA. However, the police investigation found no evidence linked to the ETA. Indeed, it is also stated by Camilos that 'The bombings were carried out by a group of young men, mostly from north Africa, who was, according to prosecutors, inspired by a tract on an al-Qaida-affiliated website that called for attacks on Spain' (2007). The motives for the attacks were ambiguous at the time. One possible reason for the attacks would be the deployment of some Spanish troops in Iraq. However, this reason could be removed since further bombs were found later on between Madrid and Seville even after the victorious Socialist Part withdrew the troops from Iraq. Another possible motivation would be the thoughts and will of fundamental Islamists as Camilos said 'For many Islamist fundamentalists, there is a need to recover the former Muslim lands of "al-Andalus" from Spain, which was taken by Christian armies in 1492' (2007). Some of the suspected terrorists including the mastermind of the attacks, Serhane Ben Abdelmajid and Jamal Ahmidan, blew themselves up while destroying the evidence with them when they were surrounded by the police.

Despite the most Spanish beliefs and media manipulation, the investigation found no clear evidence and link that the attacks included the Al-Qaida leadership.

Even though there was no evidence linking these attacks with the Al-Qaida, the motivation for the attacks were clearly religious given the fact that radicalized young men who were North-African origin carried out the attacks. For these reasons, the attacks provoked reactions among the Spanish and other Europeans. Spaniards organized demonstrations on the streets against terrorism and also the government because of the lack of information. The attacks got attention at international level too. Many state leaders presented their condolences to Spain and condemned the attacks. Despite being disappointed later by the decision of the new Spanish government on withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Iraq, the US President George W. Bush declared his condolences by saying that

“We stand strongly with the people of Spain. I appreciate so very much the Spanish government's fight against terror, their resolute stand against terrorist organizations like Eta. And the United States stands with them. And today we ask God's blessings on those who suffer in the great country of Spain” (BBC, 2004).

The European Union also expressed the grief that they shared with the Spanish. The president of the European Commission at the time Romano Prodi stated that

“I'm here to express our deep grief at this bloody, ferocious and senseless attack. There is no justification whatsoever behind which the authors of this bestial crime can hide. This is violence without an object, without sense against which the entire international community has to mobilize itself. All the peoples of Europe are now close to Spain” (BBC, 2004).

Furthermore, the president of the European Parliament Pat Cox referred to the attacks as ‘outrageous, unjustified, unjustifiable and declaration of a war on democracy’ (BBC, 2004). Similar to other state leaders’ explanations, the European Union also condemned the attacks and called for further cooperation both in Europe and in the world in order to combat terrorism. The European Union not only expressed its deep grief verbally but also decided to take a policy action to fight against terrorism. In order to better understand the policies adopted for combatting terrorism, another historic moment in the European history needs to be analyzed in detail which is the London bombings in 2005.

3.4.2. London attacks

Not having recovered from the shock of the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, Europe was hit by another terrorist attacks in July of 2005. The attacks which are also referred to as the 7/7 were a series of organized terrorist suicide bomb attacks in London. Similar to Madrid attacks, the target group was civilian population since terrorists chose again public transportation, London Underground, and the rush hours of the morning of 7th of July. Terrorists brought terror to London by ‘killing 52 people and injuring hundreds more’ (BBC, 2015). The attacks were referred to as that ‘It was the worst single terrorist atrocity on British soil’ (BBC, 2015). Three of the four terrorists detonated their bombs on underground trains and one of them selected a bus to explode his bomb. Three of the perpetrators were British-born sons of Pakistani immigrants, namely Hasib Hussain aged 18, Mohammad Sidique Khan aged 30, Shehzad Tanweer aged 22. The other perpetrator, Germaine Lindsay, aged 19, was a Jamaican born Muslim. An intriguing note needs to be mentioned here that the youngest bomber, Hussain, ‘raised concern among his teachers when shortly after the 9/11 attacks he passed two fellow pupils a note which said "You're next" in a reference to the terrorist atrocities in the US’ (BBC, 2015). The most threatening feature of the attacks is that all four perpetrators grew up in Britain. These people were radicalized in Britain, which led to the emergence of the feeling among the British that the danger was coming from inside of Britain. Apparently, the underlying reason for the attacks was the radicalized Islam as the motivation for the attacks was described in a videotape made by one of the terrorists calling himself ‘soldier’ and released in September 2005. He stated that

“...I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad. This is how our ethical stances are dictated... Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation” (BBC, 2005).

As it can be observed from the videotape of Mohammed Sidique Khan, the motivation for the attacks was the perception of ‘us vs them’ among radicalized Islamist

people. They demanded the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and Iraq and cessation of military finance and assistance to America and Israel from the British government. Another videotape that was released one year after the attacks included statements of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida's second in command (guardian, 2006). Therefore, the link to the Al-Qaida terrorist organization, at least to its ideology, became much more apparent with these videotape releases. Similar to the Madrid bombings, the London bombings drew attention and caused a reaction at the international level. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasized the cooperation in combating terrorism by saying that

“We have always stressed that the fight against terror is something we all have to join into together. I believe especially that our mutual intelligence organizations need to pool their information and knowledge to be better able to support one another against attacks of this kind” (Hurriyet daily news, 2005).

Furthermore, the European Union High Representative Javier Solana stated that ‘A terrible event can happen at any time. We cannot let down our guard. We are working every day, and in a coordinated way in all the EU countries. Unfortunately, there are times when one cannot prevent one [an attack] happening’ (BBC, 2005).

Besides national measures adopted by Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the time, the European Union decided to adopt new strategies to prevent terrorist activities in Europe. The reason for emphasizing only world reactions to the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London is that the policies and strategies adopted by the European Union after the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid and London bombings would be analyzed in detail in the following section of this thesis.

3.5. The European Union Responses to Terrorism after the 9/11 attacks

Before analyzing the strategy of the European Union, there is a need for explaining the endeavors of the Union to ameliorate its institutions to combat terrorism after the September 11 attacks in the US. With the attacks of 9/11 in the US, the threat of terrorism widened from national, regional to international level. The world was shocked by the attacks and the European Union convened extraordinarily after the attacks because of the urgency of the issue. The result was the initiation of the EU Commission.

COM(2001)521final Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism was issued with the intention ‘to establish minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties for natural and legal persons who have committed or are liable for terrorist offences which reflect the seriousness of such offenses’ (Art. 1)

Furthermore, Influenced by the scale and scope of the attack in the USA, the European Union decided to establish Eurojust by the decision of 2002/187/JHA under the JHA pillar. In the official website of the Eurojust, it is said that

“Eurojust stimulates and improves the coordination of investigations and prosecutions between the competent authorities of the Member States and improves the cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of extradition requests” (Eurojust,eurojust.europa.eu)

To further complement this cooperation, the European Union created the European Arrest Warrant Arrest (EAW) in 2002 (584/JHA, 2002). The definition is provided in the Article 1, 1 as:

“The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order” (Art.1,1, 584/JHA, 2002).

The EAW aims to unify already existing extradition procedures into one clear document. The EAW was supposed to come into force by 2004 but some member states remained reluctant to ratify it since it was formalized under the third pillar in which member states can opt out and decision making is realized by unanimous voting.

The threat of terrorism in the EU has become apparent after the 2004 Madrid bombings. Following the Madrid bombings, the European Council adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism in March 2005. In the Declaration, the EU outlined the general situation and called all the instruments at the Union's disposal to fight against terrorism. Moreover, this declaration established the position of a Counter Terrorism Coordinator. Mr. Gijs de Vries was appointed to the position by the Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana at the time (Art.14, 2004). The person is responsible for 'coordinating the

work of the council in combating terrorism, closely monitoring the implementation of the EU-counter terrorism strategy, ensuring the EU plays an active role in fighting terrorism, improving communication between the EU and third countries in this area' (Counter-terrorism Coordinator, consilium). The EU Plan of Action to combat terrorism was added as an annex to the Declaration. It put forward seven objectives to combat terrorism:

“Objective 1: To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism,

Objective 2: To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources,

Objective 3: To maximize capacity within EU bodies and Member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks,

Objective 4: To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control,

Objective 5: To enhance the capability of the European Union and of Member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack,

Objective 6: To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism,

Objective 7: To target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced” (Annex I).

The July 2005 London bombings have illustrated the deficiency in the EU's anti-terrorism strategy since the EU could act only after the tragedy had taken place. This resulted in an urgent need to create more comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy for the EU. Finally, the European Union decided to adopt the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in November 2005. In order to better understand the deficiencies of the strategy, it needs to be explained briefly.

3.5.1. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy

When the threat of terrorism has become much more explicit after bombings in Madrid and in London, the European Union realized that it had to add value to member states' responsibility for combating terrorism. In order to achieve this goal, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 30 November 2005. The strategy has a 'strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom,

security, and justice' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.2). With this strategy the European Union aims to 'strengthen national capabilities, to facilitate European cooperation, to develop collective capability and promote international partnership' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.4). This strategy has four main pillars which are: prevent, protect, pursue and respond which will be briefly explained at this point.

- **Prevent**

Globalization has made it easier to travel to conflict zones, the transfer of money and communication through the usage of the Internet and therefore to radicalize and participate terrorist activities. The aim in the first step of combating terrorism is to prevent people from turning to terrorism. The European Union intends to prevent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. It is needed to 'identify and counter methods, propaganda, and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.7). The first pillar, prevent, requires a work at local, national and regional levels to succeed. First of all, it is needed to limit people who have a role in the radicalization of people, to prevent people from accessing training, to control the usage of the Internet for recruitment and to establish a legal framework to prevent incitement and recruitment. Second, because of the existing hostility between the West and Islam, the EU must revise and change its policies by engaging civil society and faith groups in order to prevent radicalization and to diminish the division in the society. Third, the conditions which ease the radicalization of people such as economic inequality, insufficient education, and poor governance must be reformed. To tackle this issue, the Union must promote democracy, good governance, and economic prosperity in member states and in the third countries as well. In this issue, cooperation with the third countries and other international organizations gains significance.

- **Protect**

The second pillar of the strategy requires collective action of member states and the EU institutions. To protect means 'strengthening the defenses of key targets by reducing their vulnerability to attack and also by reducing the resulting impact of an attack' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.10). In order to achieve this goal, the EU must enhance control over

its external borders; improve its transport security against people coming from the third countries. The strategy provides 'Improvements in technology for the capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents, will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide greater assurance to our citizens' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.10). The Union must establish the Visa Information System and the second generation Schengen Information System to guarantee the sharing of information among member states. The Infrastructure of the EU Member States, such as airports, seaports, must also be protected. Moreover, cooperation with other international organizations and the third countries must be established 'on transport security, and non-proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials and small arms/light weapons.

- **Pursue**

The key policy here is to share information and intelligence between the member states. The objectives of this pillar is presented in the strategy by this statement: 'Our objectives are to impede terrorists' planning, disrupt their networks and the activities of recruiters of terrorism, cut off terrorists' funding and access to attack materials, and bring them to justice, while continuing to respect human rights and international law' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.12). National capabilities must be strengthened through other member states' evaluation of anti-terrorism arrangements. Both Europol and Eurojust is the key to facilitate police and judicial cooperation. Furthermore, Joint Investigation Teams are necessary to pursue cross-borders investigations. The terrorists' access to weaponry and funding must be prevented. In this perspective, legislation concerning money laundering and cash transfers must be implemented effectively. Therefore, financial investigations are key parts of terrorism investigations. Since terrorism has a global scale, cooperation with international organizations such as the UN and with the third countries on sharing information and intelligence is an integral part of the pursue level.

- **Respond**

Beyond national response, the EU as a union should be able to respond effectively and collectively to any terrorist attack. Civil Protection Mechanism has already been

established to deal with crises occurring within and outside the EU. To achieve this goal 'The development of EU-crisis co-ordination arrangements, supported by the necessary operational procedures, will help ensure the coherence of the EU response to terrorist attacks' (14469/4/05 REV4, pp.15). The strategy suggests the development of a risk based approach to capability assessment in order for member states to respond in the event of an emergency. The EU database with its list of assets and resources may be complementary to member states' responses. Since compensation of the victims of terrorism is an important part of the response, member states should ensure this compensation given to the victims. Lastly, similar to all the other pillars, improvement of the cooperation with the international organizations and third countries on how to respond to any attack or any crisis has real importance. Moreover, there is another need to assist EU citizens in the third countries.

In 2007, Mr. Gijs de Vries resigned from the position of Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator and Mr. Gilles de Kerchove was appointed to the position. Later on, the EU adopted the Internal Security Strategy in 2010. The second objective of the strategy is to prevent terrorism and address radicalization and recruitment. The objective has three action plans: 'Empower communities to prevent radicalization and recruitment, cut off terrorists' access to funding and materials and follow their transactions, protect transport' (COM/2010/0673). These are some steps to be taken in order to create more secure Europe. To achieve these goals, the EU and USA has reached an agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in 2010. 'The Agreement significantly strengthens data protection guarantees relating to transparency, rights of access, rectification and erasure of inaccurate data' (Main Features, europa). Furthermore, the Commission proposed a directive for a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) system in 2011.

“The Directive aims to regulate the transfer from the airlines to the member states of PNR data of passengers of international flights, as well as the processing of this data by the competent authorities. The directive establishes that PNR data collected may only be processed for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offenses and serious crime” (Consilium).

In 2011, the Commission launched the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) system. 'The Radicalization Awareness Network is an umbrella network connecting people

involved in preventing radicalization and violent extremism throughout Europe' (RAN Working Groups).

In spite of all these institutional reforms and policies in order to fight against terrorism which has been undertaken by the European Union after the 9/11, the following incidents demonstrated that Europe is still vulnerable to terrorist activities and the policies adopted by the EU is ineffective in preventing terrorism. The following chapter of this thesis will briefly present the literature review which criticizes the EU policies on terrorism and illustrates the recent terrorist attacks which occurred in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016 as a proof of vulnerability and European states.

CHAPTER 4

INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY FORMATIONS IN REGARD TO TERRORISM

The former chapters of this thesis have the intention to understand the European Union's evolving policy formations in order for the preservation of the European security which has been currently imperiled by the threat of terrorism. It becomes apparent that the EEC was established solely because of economic motivations; however, when the European Union was formally established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty, it was not only a community with six members but a union with 12 members integrating into further areas besides economics. The Community not only has widened in terms of the number of member states which has 28 members currently but also has broadened the policies that the Union integrates and implements within the scope of its institutions. Besides the economy, the European Union has policies on the environment, energy, education, health etc. As it can be demonstrated by the analysis done in the preceding chapters, the European Community/European Union has made an endeavor to formulate common foreign and security policy which would ensure the preservation of the European security. This policy formation has evolved in accordance with the threats that the EU confronts. However, as it is stated in the preceding chapter, it is not an easy task to react to the security threats and the security crises for the Union that was established on the basis of the creation of economic policies in the first stage. Hence, the creation of concrete common foreign and security policy for the Union could not be realized overnight. Integration into these sensitive areas necessitates many years. Indeed comprehensive and complete integration did not become reality and effectiveness of the Union CFSP open to question and criticism.

One of the most significant threats that needs an immediate solution is Jihadist terrorism which has influenced Europe since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The European Union has designated the policies and reformed its institutions in order to combat terrorism as it is explained. This chapter will first present briefly the current literature review on the EU policies on terrorism and then illustrates the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels.

4.1. Critical Analysis of the European Union Policy to Combat Terrorism

When the literature is reviewed, it can be seen that most of the scholars seem to be skeptical about the effectiveness of the EU policies on combatting terrorism given the fact that the European Union has still witnessed the terrorist activities on its own soil. Because of the world's current conjuncture, the existence of the radical terrorist organizations and the deficiencies in the EU's policies and institutions, the European countries are still open to the danger of threat.

The first study which will be examined is done by the SECILE Project. SECILE is an EU-funded research project examining the impact, legitimacy, and effectiveness of European Union counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) led by the University of Durham. After they issued four reports on the impact, legitimacy, and effectiveness of European Union CTMs, Statewatch presented a summary of the work describing major concerns on counter-terrorism policies of the European Union. The first is about the sheer scope of the program which argues that '239 measures is far from comprehensive because of the exclusion of "operational" and "non-legislative" measures and generalized counter-terrorism cooperation with third states' (p.11, SECILE). The second major concern states that there may be Counter-Terrorism fatigue in the EU because of the breadth of the agenda. The third concern emerges from the first two. It is claimed that EU policies are so complicated for its citizens and even for experts to understand what these policies do, whether these are properly implemented or not and whether these are effective or not. The final concern is expressed as such:

"The increasing involvement of the security and defense industry in many of the security and counter-terrorism policies overseen by the European Commission gives rise to concerns about democracy, accountability and undue corporate influence over critical issues affecting the fundamental rights of everyone in the European Union" (p.13, SECILE).

The second work that is looked at is the study of the Quaker Council for European Affairs. The Quaker Council for European Affairs has been issuing briefing papers which outline and evaluate the European Union responses to terrorism since 2005. In their Briefing Paper 14a called 'Law and Policy Framework Developments Since 2005, Relating to EU Counter-Terrorism' (2011), there are certain recommendations for the European

Union so that it would ameliorate the policies in regard to terrorism. First of all, it is said that '[o]fficial documents should make explicit reference to the legal basis for particular human rights' (p.11, 2011). Secondly, they argue that the Prevent pillar of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is not prioritized in reality. The argument is that '[t]he broader aspects of prevention, i.e. social, economic and cultural equality and inclusion, are still largely neglected or relegated as a problem only in third countries' (p.11, 2011). Thirdly, criticism is made for the rhetoric that the European Union utilized for human rights. It is said that '[r]hetoric that attempts to elevate the human rights of victims above those of perpetrators are however unhelpful and incorrect because human rights, by their very definition, are fundamentally equal – there can be no hierarchy' (pp.12, 2011).

Moreover, the Quaker Council for European Affairs presented the criticism Amnesty International in their Briefing Paper 13 called 'Evaluating an Evaluation – "The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and Future Challenges"' which is analyzing mainly the COM (2010)386 which is the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. It is said that

"Whilst Amnesty welcomed the specific references to, and somewhat more systematic attempt to include, human rights in COM(2010)386, they suggest that human rights analysis is still ad hoc and weak, with gaps regarding the impacts of EU and Member States actions in counter-terrorism. Amnesty has condemned the weak and non-binding language relating to, for example, non-stigmatisation and discrimination; there should be explicit reference to the legal right to non-discrimination, an area in which the EU has a strong legal basis" (p.14, 2011).

In his book 'EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?' Oldrich Bures examined in detail the fundamental European Union agencies involved in counter-terrorism and the essential legal instruments utilized in counter terrorism. His main conclusion is that

"The analyses of both relevant scholarly counter-terrorism literature and the official EU documents presented in this volume suggest that the EU counter-terrorism policy has at times been more of a paper tiger than an effective counter-terrorism device and its value added in all of the four pillars of the EU's own Counter-Terrorism Strategy is currently somewhere between weak to moderate" (p.245, 2011).

He also made a reference to the lack of sufficient human rights guarantees (p.206, 2011) and lack of official publicly available data concerning the actual amounts and types of terrorist assets frozen by relevant authorities (p.181, 2011).

Raphael Bossong in his book 'The Evolution of Counter Terrorism: European Security Policy after the 9/11' also agreed with Bures by viewing the EU as a paper tiger (p.138, 2013). He examined the EU's cooperation on terrorism before and after the 9/11. He focused on the fragmented feature of the EU's security cooperation and claimed that member states would view the EU only as an indirect supportive actor. He concludes by saying 'European cooperation is no panacea to international terrorism' (p.143, 2013).

Javier Argomaniz in his book 'The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and policies after 9/11' looked at the EU's policies from a different angle: institutionalization and consistency. He concluded his work by reaching to the conclusion that there is a consistency weakness in the EU's institutional framework in the fight against terrorism. He argues that although the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the 3 pillars structure, the changes it brought 'do nothing to bridge the separation between the external and internal dimensions of EU counter-terrorism, since the Union's CFSP and CSDP remain intergovernmental and preserve its separate voting and decision-making methods' (p.148, 2011), He also criticized the European Commission's reluctance to initiate infringement proceedings against member states (p.148-149, 2011).

Christian Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski in their book called 'The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA' analyzed the EU as an emerging security actor in many areas such as refugee, non-proliferation, climate security and counter-terrorism. Contrary to most of the literature, they concluded that the 'EU has achieved very significant scope of integration and significant capabilities as well as the recognition of the most important actor in global politics-US' (p.114, 2013). They focused on the effective policies that the EU has taken such as the European Arrest Warrant, the international agreement the EU has made on the exchange of passengers' data and appreciated the Commission's role and success in taking these policies.

In his book 'EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law', Cian C Murphy discussed European Counter-Terrorism policies in terms of the rule of law. He argues that pre-emptive counter-terrorism action has a detrimental effect on the EU's rule of law. It creates diverging implementation routes for different Member States so that the power for ECJ to monitor transposition remains limited. He says '[t]hough EU pre-emption has empowered a wide range of public and private actors, EU action also evidences the endurance of state power' (p.242, 2012). Moreover, he argues similarly to the general view in the literature as he points out that '[i]n relation to the rule of law's safeguarding role, the pre-emptive approach to counter-terrorism both evaded and eroded the rights of those targeted' (p.242, 2012).

The literature review demonstrates that the European Union's policies to combat terrorism is an intriguing topic among scholars and once the current threat of terrorism in Europe is considered, it is relevant and worth to further exploration. The terrorist attacks happening in the midst of Europe since 2015 reveals the concerns about the European Union policies to combat terrorism. Since the European security is in peril because of the threat of terrorism, recent terrorist attacks need to be examined.

4.2. Recent Terrorist Attacks: Paris and Brussels Attacks

Recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels demonstrates that how unpredictable and inescapable religious terrorism is and how outrageous the results of the attacks are. To sustain and preserve Europe's security has been on the agenda of the European Union since both the European citizens and the politicians has incremental anxieties for Europe's security and their own lives. The director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, states in TE-SAT report of 2016 that

“It has become clear that Europe currently faces a shifting and increasing range of threats emanating from jihadist groups and individuals. The so-called Islamic State has demonstrated its ability to strike at will, at multiple times and at a diverse range of targets” (Wainwright, TE-SAT, 2016).




Figure 5: Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism 2011 to 2015

The figure above illustrates that religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism remains on an upward trajectory in Europe which signals that terrorism would remain as one of the greatest security threats for Europe (TE-SAT, 2016, p.23). The increase in the religiously inspired terrorism in Europe demonstrated also the failure and ineffectiveness of the European policies to combat terrorism. One illustration of the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on combating terrorism is Paris attacks realized in 2015.

4.2.1. Paris attacks

Witte and Morris deliberately chose the title *'Failure to stop Paris attacks reveals fatal flaws at the heart of European Security'* for their article on the Washington Post which was published after November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris (Witte et.al, 2015). The horror of terror shocked the world because the terrorist attacks in November 2015 in France resulted in outrageous casualties. The Jihadists preferred France in 2015 attacking both in January and November of that year. This is also demonstrated by TE-SAT report in 2016 which states that *'By far the most affected Member State was France, which had to cope with losing 148 citizens and seeing more than 350 injured in attacks perpetrated in January and November'* (TE-SAT, 2016, p.5). The first terrorist attack in 2015 was realized in January. France experienced three days of horror. The incident was identified with the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo. On January 7, in Ile-de-France region, two brothers attacked the editorial staff of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo which is known

for satiric caricatures about the prophet Mohammad, Islam and Muslims. The terrorists killed twelve and wounded eight editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo magazine. The perpetrators were born in France to Algerian parents and they were radicalized in a small mosque in Paris as TE-SAT report states (TE-SAT, 2016, p. 22). On January 8, another terrorist shot an unarmed policewoman and killed her. On January 9, the same attacker took four hostages in a supermarket in order for the two brothers to be released and this also resulted in the killing of four innocent people. The al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility for the attack on Charlie Hebdo by a video release in which an AQAP commander says 'It is France that has shared all of America's crimes. It is France that has committed crimes in Mali and the Islamic Maghreb. It is France that supports the annihilation of Muslims in Central Africa in the name of race cleansing' as CNN authors Shoichet and Levs states (Shoichet et. al., 2015, CNN). The evolving threat for the European countries in regard to the jihadist terrorism is that the terrorists are not coming from outside the Europe. In other words, the threat is grown up inside the continent. Chrisafis says 'All three gunmen were French, from the Paris area, raised and radicalized there' (Chrisafis, 2015, Guardian). The important point is that the European governments are facing a great challenge that home-grown, radicalized terrorists create fear and chaos in the European societies, which makes the prevention of the terrorist activities difficult for the European authorities.

Jihadist terrorism hit Paris again on November 13, 2015, resulting in terrifying casualties. The result is clarified that 'Friday night's deadly attacks in Paris by gunmen and suicide bombers hit a concert hall, a major stadium, restaurants, and bars, almost simultaneously - leaving at least 129 people dead and hundreds wounded' (2015, BBC). The attacks were synchronized which demonstrates clearly that IS targeted public places and aimed mass casualties. As TE-SAT report in 2016 states that 'IS claimed responsibility, stating that the attacks were committed in retaliation for French airstrikes on IS targets in Syria and Iraq' (TE-SAT, 2016, p.22). Six different public places were chosen by the terrorists. Firstly, terrorists chose Stade de France where there was a football match between France and Germany to explode their bombs. The other places targeted by the terrorists were restaurants, bars and a concert hall in which European people went for amusement in that day. Two perpetrators were arrested and the other nine was killed during

the attacks. The attacks were claimed Islamic State and similar to the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, perpetrators were also European citizens meaning that they were radicalized in Europe and became a threat to Europe. Indeed, this is the way preferred by the jihadists to apply in the attacks that they organize. As TE-SAT report express 'Both the al-Qaeda network and IS have called upon Muslims in western countries to perpetrate lone actor attacks in their countries of residence' (TE-SAT, 2016). Both IS and al-Qaeda preferred attackers staying in their countries of residence so that they would reduce the risk of detection by the authorities. In this way, the terrorist activities become less evitable. Because of the terrorist attacks realized in France in 2015, fear and chaos have been created in the European societies and hence the European security has been undermined by the terrorism. This situation can be illustrated by the TE-SAT report stating that 'The Paris attacks of 13 November 2015 appear to indicate a shift towards a broader strategy of IS to intimidate Western audiences, signaling the possibility of more attacks against Member States of the EU in the near future' (TE-SAT, 2016, p.6). In reality, the possibility of another attack comes true with the terrorist attack in Brussels.

4.2.2. Brussels attacks


By its definition, the intention of organizing a terrorist attack is to create fear in the society. This is the outcome achieved by the Islamist terrorist organization in Europe by the organized attacks in France. TE-SAT report in 2016 summarizes this by stating that 'The attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 represented a clear shift in the intent and capability of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations designed to induce a high state of well-publicized terror' (TE-SAT, 2016, p.6). The attacks realized in the center of the Belgian capital, Brussels, on March 22, 2016 illustrated the failure of the European Union to prevent terrorist activities happening on its own soil. In the morning of March 22, Europeans heard about the terrorist attack in Brussels international airport, Zaventem which resulted in the killing of eleven and wounding of 81 (BBC, 2016). Two bombs were detonated by the attackers and the third bomb was prevented from exploding by the security forces. Unfortunately, the third explosion was realized in Maelbeek metro station during the rush hours in the morning. It was reported that 20 people died and more

than 100 had been injured in the blasts (BBC, 2016). Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks according to the message released on a website. Witte et.al express in their article that ‘The message said Belgium was targeted because of its participation in an international coalition battling the group in Syria and Iraq’ (Witte et.al., 2016). Another significant point needs to be clarified in Brussels bombings. The attacks occurred only a few days after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam in Brussels, who was the wanted man of the Paris carnage. Hence, it is apparent that there has been a desire of revenge in IS attacks in the European Union. Furthermore, the attackers were again suicide bombers which are the method applied recently by IS in order to create mass casualties. Islamic State urges its supporters to engage in lone actor attacks. TE-SAT report in 2016 expresses that ‘In early 2015, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani urged the group’s supporters to target the “Crusaders” in their countries, “wherever they are found”’ (TE-SAT, 2016). Moreover, in accordance with the current trend in jihadist terrorism, the attackers of Brussels massacre were also raised in European cities and they were European nationals. This is the real danger for European authorities since they have to provide not only prevention of the terrorist activities but also radicalism and recruitment of its citizens by terrorist organizations. Another crucial factor in the Brussels carnage is the symbolic value of the target places. First of all, the first place targeted by jihadists was the airport which hosts many tourists and Belgian people trying to travel. The timing of the attack was chosen very carefully since it was during the rush hours in the morning. The intention of the terrorist organization was explicit to spread fear in public, to cause mass casualties, and to kill ordinary European citizens. Furthermore, Maelbeek metro station was close to the European institutions. The European Commission headquarters and the Council of the European Union are located near to the station. This can be interpreted as that IS hit the heart of European unity, in other words, the capital of the European Union and demonstrated the capability of bringing terror, fear, and chaos to the midst of Europe. Witte et.al summarize this in their article by stating that ‘The latest bloodshed made clear that European capitals remain perilously vulnerable despite attempts to dismantle the militant network that perpetrated the worst terrorist attack in Paris in generations last November’ (Witte et.al. ,2016). Brussels attacks in 2016 have further significance as to demonstrate the Union’s failure in preventing the attacks. One of the perpetrators in Brussels attacks,

Brahim el-Bakraoui was detained at Turkey-Syria border in July 2015 and deported to Netherlands by the Turkish authorities. Although the Turkish government warned the Belgian authorities in the sense that Brahim el-Bakroui had ties with the extremist terrorism and he was a foreign terrorist fighter, Belgian authorities had not been able to establish any ties with terrorism and the authorities in Netherlands released the suspect. Hence, the suspect could again pass to Brussels and realize the attacks. In this course of events, it can be seen that the information provided Turkey is not processed. Belgian authorities first failed to act in accordance with this information. In addition to this, the information is not transferred to the European level and so the European Union could not succeed to arrest the suspects and prevent the attacks. Therefore, the Brussels attacks illustrated two layers of failure in Europe: national and European level. First, national authorities could not act in accordance with the intelligence provided by a third party in national boundaries. Second, it failed to share with the member states and the authorities of the Union. Furthermore, it is observed that the Union had not been able to control its own border and as a result of these failures, Europe witnessed the Brussels carnage.

In Europe, not only France and Belgium were the victims of jihadist terrorism but also many other cities in Europe were recently threatened by terrorism. For the purposes of this thesis, the other attacks would also be briefly presented. After Paris and Brussels bombings spread the fear and chaos to Europe, France remains to be a target for the terrorist organization. On July 14, 2016, Nice was targeted by Islamic State which killed 84 people and wounded of hundreds of others. BBC summarizes the terror incident by stating that ‘Dozens of people were killed, including children, when a lorry ploughed into a large crowd watching a fireworks display in Nice to mark the Bastille Day holiday’ (BBC, 2016). This grieving attack to French people including children was claimed by Islamic State. On July 22, 2016, another terrorist attack occurred in the German city of Munich, which caused the death toll of nine, injuring 16 others (Shocihet et.al. 2016, CNN). The attack was realized by an 18-year-old German-Iranian gunman opening a fire at a shopping mall. For this attack, no terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack and the motivation was unknown for the authorities. On July 26, 2016 IS organized another terrorist attack to a church in Normandy in France. It was reported that ‘A priest had his throat slit and several others were taken hostage after armed men stormed a church in Normandy during morning

mass on Tuesday' (Batchelor, 2016). On December 19, 2016, another capital city of Europe, Berlin, was targeted by the terrorist organization. The attack was realized by a 'soldier' of Islamic State and it was reported on BBC that 'A lorry smashed into a crowded Christmas market in central Berlin on 19 December, killing 12 people and injuring 49, leaving 18 in a critical condition' (BBC, 2016). In 2017, Europe has continued to experience terrorist activities on its soil. On March 22, 2017 this time religiously inspired terrorism targeted Westminster Bridge, near the Houses of Parliament in London. The attack was realized by a 52-year-old British man, Khalid Masood, drove a rental car onto the pedestrians on the Westminster Bridge which resulted in the killing of four people and injuring more others (Spark et.al., 2017, CNN). As it can be understood from the recent terror attacks, ramming a car or a lorry into pedestrians was preferred by the attackers to bring terror and chaos. Similar to these attacks, the capital of Sweden, Stockholm, experienced such attack when Rakhmat Akilov, a failed asylum seeker from Uzbekistan, drove a truck down a busy shopping street which caused the death of four people and injuring of at least fifteen more according to Foster's article published on the magazine Home of the Daily and Sunday Express (Foster, 2017). The attack was claimed by Islamic State which continues to threaten European cities by bringing terror. On May 22, 2017 terrorists attacked the Manchester Arena when there was a concert. The casualties were harrowing as Marshall expressed in her article 'A bomb attack in Manchester Arena that killed 22 people, including children, and injured 59 has been described as the worst terrorist incident to hit Britain since the July 7 atrocities' (Marshall, 2017). The attack was carried on by a suicide bomber who was a supporter of Islamic State. Lastly, Britain again witnessed the terror in the center of London, at London Bridge on June 3, 2017. BBC reported that 'There has been a terror attack at London Bridge in the center of London in which eight people have died and at least 48 people injured' (BBC, 2017). Similar to the attack in Westminster, three attackers drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge and attacked ordinary British citizens with a knife in a market place. The terrorist organization IS confirmed that it was behind the attack at London Bridge.



The map taken by the TE-SAT report in 2017 illustrated the number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism in the EU Member States in 2016. (TE-SAT, 2017, p.24). As it can be seen from the attacks explained in the European cities, Europe seriously suffers from the danger of terror. In accordance with the analysis provided thus far, it is apparent that the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America were the turning point for the understanding of terrorism. Since then, religiously inspired terrorism has manifested itself in different regions of the world. Jihadist terrorism has been influential in European countries, especially in Western Europe, resulting in the killing of many and injuring several others. The European Union has launched the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2005 to combat terrorism after the Madrid and London bombings. Since then, it has been in the struggle for the amelioration of the policies in order to prevent terrorism and to protect its own citizens' lives. Therefore, the European Union responses to this incremental jihadist terrorism need to be briefly conveyed for the purposes of this thesis.

4.3. The European Union Responses to the Recent Terrorist Attacks

Since 2015, the European countries have seen a lot of bloodshed because of the terrifying terrorist organization, so called Islamic State. The European Union has failed to

prevent the terrorists from organizing attacks and creating terror and chaos in the European cities. The danger was indisputably realized by the European authorities and citizens have been aware of the horror of terror. Commenced together with the Paris attacks, the Europeans have realized the changing security threats for itself given the fact the fragile neighborhood opens Europe to the threat of terrorism. TE-SAT report in 2016 summarizes the challenges as stating that

“Recent developments that include the terrorist attacks in Paris, the clear shift in IS’ strategy of carrying out special forces style attacks in the international environment, and the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters, pose new challenges to the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS)” (TE-SAT, 2016, p.49).

In order to ensure an effective response to these challenges, the EU has taken the necessary actions. To this end, firstly, the EU established the EU internet referral unit (EU IRU) in July 2015 under the authority of Europol (consilium.europa). The strategic goals of the EU IRU are set out in the EU Internet Referral Unit Year One Report. According to this report, one of the core tasks of the EU IRU is ‘effectively countering online radicalization and recruitment efforts by terrorists, by strengthening an adaptive referral capability and mapping and influencing online terrorist propaganda networks’ (Europol, 2016). The EU IRU is only a part of the Europol’s newly established European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). In order to better manage the counter terrorism policies, the Europol created the ECTC in January 2016 which is defined at Europol’s official website as ‘an operations center and hub of expertise that reflects the growing need for the EU to strengthen its response to terror’. The focus areas of the ECTC are also clarified at the website as ‘tackling foreign fighters; sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit); online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU Internet Referral Unit); illegal arms trafficking; international cooperation among counter terrorism authorities’ (europol.europa). The ECTC’s main task is to provide investigative support to the Member States and this operational information is contributed to the center by the member states and third parties. It aims to further on the European Union’s network to combat terrorism.

However, the attacks prove to be unavoidable for Europe as terrorists continue to hit Europe in 2016 as well. To strengthen the ways to fight against the Jihadist terror, the European Union adopted the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA in March 2017. After defining what terrorist offences are, the Directive sets out the necessary measures that the Member States shall ensure in order to combat terrorism as Article 1 of the Directive states

“This Directive establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, as well as measures of protection of, and support and assistance to, victims of terrorism” (Art.1, 2017).

The Directive designates the measurements for the Member States successively in the articles. The Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure prevention of recruitment for terrorism (Art.6), prevention of providing training of terrorism (Art.7) and receiving training of terrorism (Art.8), prevention of traveling for the purpose of terrorism (Art.9), prevention of organizing otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism (Art.10), prevention of terrorist financing (Art.11). However, by definition, an EU directive only sets the aims for all EU countries and it is up to the member states to apply the laws into their national legal system. Moreover, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark are not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and are not bound by it.

Besides the establishment of the EU Internet Referral Unit and of the European Counter Terrorism Center in 2016 and the adoption of the Directive on combatting terrorism, what the European Union have done to combat terrorism consists of the Council conclusions and joint statements of the EU ministers as a response to the terror attacks. To exemplify, following the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, justice and home affairs ministers in the member states issued a joint statement emphasizing the need for an effective response to terrorist attacks. In Riga joint statement, it is stated that

“It is important to provide a determined response at EU level. The latest events have clearly proved the existence of this multidimensional threat involving different areas of crime. The necessity and importance of effectively coordinated and coherent approach is of the utmost importance. In this regard, a

European agenda on Security is needed to address the threats to internal security of the EU for the next years” (2015).

Furthermore, the Council of the EU adopted the Conclusions on preventing violent radicalization on November 21, 2016. As the official website of the Council of the EU states,

“The conclusions underline the need to undermine and challenge extremist ideologies, counterbalance them by appealing non-violent alternatives, support parents, siblings and others in a contact with those young people who were at risk of violent radicalization, involve and cooperate with service providers in the fight against illegal hate speech online” (consilium.europa).

Similar to these actions, the Council have taken many actions, however, to illustrate all of them is beyond the purposes of this thesis.

Moreover, as a response to the terrorist attacks, the European Union issued statements to condemn the attacks in addition to the condemnations of the individual state leaders. For instance, in the Joint Statement of the Heads of State or Government and leaders of the European Union and its institutions on the terrorist attacks in Paris, it is stated that ‘The European Union is deeply shocked and in mourning after the terrorist attacks in Paris. It is an attack against us all. We will face this threat together with all necessary means and ruthless determination’ (Statement/6090, 2015).

Another illustration for condemnation of the EU as an institution, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker issued a statement in which he states

‘It was with great sadness and profound shock that I learnt of the brutal attack that struck Manchester...Today we mourn with you. Tomorrow we will work side by side with you to fight back against those who seek to destroy our way of life. They underestimate ours and your resilience –these cowardly attacks will only strengthen our commitment to work together to defeat the perpetrators of such vile acts’ (Statement/1434, 2017).

Not only the EU and the European states but the world powers also condemned the terrorist activities in Europe. Following the Nice attacks in 2016, the US President Barack Obama was one of the first to call it a "terrorist attack". He said America's "thoughts and prayers are with the families and other loved-ones of those killed” (As cited in BBC, 2016). Furthermore, China’s Premier also expressed that "We strongly condemn terrorism

of all forms. We express our condolences to the victims and we will fight all kinds of terrorism" (as cited in BBC, 2016). In a nutshell, the European states and the rest of the world powers have been aware of the danger brought by the Jihadist terrorism. To fight against, to eliminate terror at least to minimize the threat requires cooperation both national and international level as it is claimed in the EU Directive on combating terrorism

“Furthermore, the cross-border nature of terrorism requires a strong coordinated response and cooperation within and between the Member States, as well as with and among the competent Union agencies and bodies to counter terrorism, including Eurojust and Europol... The global character of terrorism necessitates an international answer, requiring the Union and its Member States to strengthen cooperation with relevant third countries” (Directive (EU) 2017/541).

However, the cooperation at the international level could not yet preclude attackers from organizing activities to create terror and fear in European societies. For the purposes of this thesis, the European Union responses to terrorist activities would also be analyzed briefly together with the theoretical explanations.

4.4. The European Union Responses to the Terrorist Attacks: Theoretical Explanations

In this part of the thesis, the policies adopted by the European Union to form a coherent security policy and to combat terrorism will be examined in theoretical perspective. The theories refer to the theories of the European integration, neo-functionalism, and inter-governmentalism. Neo-functionalism, which has roots from David Mitrany’s functionalist theory, is outlined by Ernst Haas and was influential from the mid-50s to mid-60s. The theory argues that integration requires political leadership of technocrats not of politicians. It claims that integration could take place in limited territories contrary to the functionalist theory which was intended to implement globally. There are some conditions for countries to involve in this process of integration. First, countries should have similar and relatively stable democratic regimes. Secondly, they should share common political norms, values, and civic culture. Finally, they should embrace the political will to involve the integration process. The conditions are applicable for the European countries. In this theoretical perspective, there are two phases of

integration: sharing and delegating. Firstly, sharing refers to the fact that states voluntarily agree on joint decision and policy making in key areas. Secondly, delegating implies that they agree that certain functions are delegated to some other places. Thus, supranational institutions have so significant role in this point that integration is driven by them. For the European case, the institutions with supranational powers are the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Overall, for the neo-functionalist theory, the most crucial actors in the European integration are supranational institutions, not states, and technocrats, not politicians.

On the other hand, inter-governmentalist theory, which was developed by Andrew Moravcsik and Stanley Hoffman, was influential from the mid-60s to 80s since the integration slowed down because of the crisis between the member states. The main argument of inter-governmentalism is that it is the member states, not supranational institutions that are able to make a decision in community or union level. The decisions are the results of bargaining between member states. Moravcsik argues 'International cooperation in the EC is voluntary, in the sense that neither military coercion nor economic sanctions are threatened or deployed to force agreement' (Moravcsik, 1993, pp.498). Another argument made by inter-governmentalists is that the power of member states at the negotiating table is determined by domestic preferences. Domestically shaped political actors, head of states and governments, remain important in decision making. Therefore, it is not the spill-over effect that creates integration but the bargaining process which may result in cooperation when materially calculated benefits overlap. To sum up, inter-governmentalism argues that it is the member states, their domestic preferences and therefore office-seeker politicians are the key to bargaining process for integration contrary to neo-functionalism argues. Given the fact that, the two European integration theories have different explanations and arguments for the EU integration and the failure of the EU to form effective policies to combat terrorism, the question arises 'To what extent can the EU responses to terrorism be explained by the theoretical perspectives: inter-governmentalism vs. neo-functionalism?'

As it is explained in the preceding chapters, the European Union has been in struggle for the formation of common foreign and security policy. When the Maastricht Treaty

created the European Union in 1992, the creation of three pillars structure designed separate policy areas. The first pillar, Community pillar, included all economic issues in the European Union. It includes all community law representing the supranational side of the European Union and the EU institution responsible from this supranational pillar is the European Commission. The second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, were to be conducted by inter-governmental cooperation method meaning that the joint decisions were to be taken by bargaining of member states. Although the Lisbon Treaty abolished the three pillars structure, the distinction between the three separate policy areas still remains valid today. Since the threat of terrorism is apparent recently in Europe, it is reasonable to ask the question that whether there is a coherent common security policy to combat terrorism or not. It is argued by Vicere:

“EU counterterrorism policies suffer the same pitfalls as the broader EU foreign and security policy. The most crucial of these stems from the dichotomy around which the EU is structured: a supranational side and an intergovernmental one characterized by two decision-making processes” (Vicere, 2015).

Terrorism is apparently a security issue for Europe and thus it is under the second pillar. First of all, in order for an EU policy become binding member states, there has to be Council regulation. However, there is no EU regulation which binding all member states on the issue of combating terrorism. Indeed, Denmark has an opt-out for the common and foreign security pillar. In addition to this, the Council Directive (EU) 2017/54 was not adopted by Denmark, United Kingdom, and Ireland. Therefore, the national politicians or ministries in these countries are not bound by the second pillar policies.

In order to understand whether the EU policies on terrorism are intergovernmental or supranational, the policy initiatives must be considered. The question ‘Is it the Union, i.e. Commission, or any member state that initiates the policy for combatting terrorism?’ should be answered by analyzing the policy initiatives

First attempt to combat terrorism and establish cooperation between member states was the COM (2001) 521 final on September 19, 2001 immediately after the 9/11. It was the Commission which first reacted and took the initiative to combat terrorism and call cooperation at the Union level after the 9/11 attacks.

Secondly, another initiative to fight against terrorism was to create Eurojust in 2002. Its predecessor was pro-Eurojust which was established in 2000 by the initiative of Portugal, France, Sweden, and Belgium (eurojust.europa). It has involved judges from the national member states for investigating and prosecuting the crimes affecting more than two member states. Following the 9/11 attacks in the USA, the focus for the fight against terrorism shifted from national/regional to the international context. Therefore, Eurojust was established by the Council Decision 2002/187/JHA and the power of Eurojust was strengthened by the Council Decision 2009/426/JHA in 2008 (eurojust.europa.eu). The initiative for the strengthening of Eurojust was also coming from the member states. It can be seen that this policy initiative to combat organized crime and terrorism was taken by the Council which includes member states' ministries. In other words, it is not the European Commission but the Council of the European Union, i.e. member states that took the initiative and started to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in the USA.

Thirdly, another attempt to combat terrorism after September 11, 2001 was to create the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) which was designed to make it faster to extradite suspects from one member states to another. It was again the Council decision which was initiated by the member states. However, Tran argues in the article published in Guardian in 2014 that 'The UK has a right to opt out of such measures under Protocol 36 of the 2007 Lisbon treaty' (Tran, 2014, Guardian). There has been an ongoing debate in the UK to opt-in the EAW. Tran says:

“The EAW is one of 35 measures the government is seeking to opt back into after having opted out of a raft of more than 100 EU policies relating to justice and home affairs last year, when Cameron wrote to the EU council presidency to give formal notification of the government's intention to exercise the block opt-out” (Tran, 2014, Guardian).

As it is seen from the British example, it can be said that to implement and cooperate with other member states in the EAW is definitely decided by member states' own will. There is nothing for the Commission to deal with this issue since the institution does not have the power to force nation states to implement the rules set out by itself. Therefore, decision making for cooperation to combat terrorism by implementing the EAW is also up to member states meaning that it can only be achieved through an inter-governmental

method of bargaining.

Fourthly, the bombs in Madrid affected heavily on the EU responses to terrorist attacks so that the European Council passed the Declaration on Combating Terrorism on 25 March 2004 and the institution also introduced a plan of action as an annex defining the objectives to fight against terrorism. It created a new post called Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in order to create better cooperation between member states and the EU institutions. This is just a declaration passed by the head of states and governments of the European Council. The declarations passed by the European Council have no binding effect on member states. The declaration was designed for to create and promote cooperation between the member states. It is the Commission that is capable of making binding rules. Therefore, it is arguable that to cooperate in order for fighting against the Jihadist terrorism also remains inter-governmental, not supranational.

Furthermore, following the terrorist attacks in July 2005, in London, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005. Having four main pillars – prevent, protect, pursue, respond—the strategy aims to create further cooperation among member states, enhance national capabilities to fight against terrorism. The member states’ role is significant in the adoption of this strategy, particularly the United Kingdom. The rotating presidency was held by the UK at the time when the EU adopted the strategy in 2005. The UK’s role is very significant in the formation of the policies. Rekawek argues:

“The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, formulated in November 2005, while the UK held the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, is based on the UK’s 2003 CONTEST strategy, and enhances European counterterrorism measures through prevention, by aiming to counter terrorism at the stage of radicalisation of potential future terrorists. The UK is the leading member of the Council of the EU’s working groups on terrorism” (Rekawek, 2015, pp.2).

As it can be observed from Rekawek’s statement, the United Kingdom’s role in the adoption of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy is undeniable. The strategy was first suggested by the government of the UK and it became a concrete policy as a result of bargaining and negotiation among heads and states and governments. Without the member states’ bargaining process, implementing policies cannot be effective and efficient.

In 2010, more comprehensive Internal Security Strategy was adopted for the period from 2010 to 2014. It was the result of bargaining between member states and adoption was realized by the Council. Since the member states have their own policy of internal security, to join the cooperation for internal security at the Union level remain voluntary and thus arbitrary for the member states.

The last terrorist attacks in Paris have complicated the issue of common policy to combat terrorism as it can be observed. The member states likely continue to be reluctant to cooperate at the Union level since their ultimate goal is to protect their national interests and in this case national borders. Because this becomes the sole objective for member states, they prefer to act unilaterally or bilaterally in the international area. For instance, it is said that 'European foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini announced on Tuesday morning that ministers had agreed to support France, which has intensified bombing raids against the terror group's stronghold in Syria and Iraq' (2015). However, this is not the situation where all the EU members agreed to support France militarily. For example, German, British, Swedish and Italian governments presented their limited power to support France militarily (2015).

Furthermore, the terrorist attacks occurred in different cities of the European states since 2015 has prompted the European Union and this resulted in the creation of new policies as it was explained in the preceding section of this chapter. Overall, since the issue is one the most important security issues for the states, member states are inclined to favor their own national interests and hence it is not an easy task for them to bargain and reach consensus on the subject matter. Since this is the situation for Europe, the policies in order to fight against terrorism can be framed and be explained only from the theoretical perspective of inter-governmentalism although the EU Commission has attempted to formulate policies. Despite all of the endeavors the Union has made, the European Union open to the horror of terror given the fact that the European Union could not formulate effective, coherent and binding policies to combat terrorism.

To sum up, because of inter-institutional rivalry between the EU institutions i.e. the Commission and the Council, to form the EU policies on terrorism, existence of too many players in the foreign policy making structure at the Union level, very nature of the

intergovernmental policy making in the related area, the European Union could not form coherent and effective policies to combat terrorism. Therefore, it can be concluded that the cross-nature of terrorism necessitates further cooperation not only between the member states of the EU but also between the European Union and the third parties.



CHAPTER 5

TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY CONSIDERATION

Because of the explanations which are provided in the preceding chapter, the Union would not have the capabilities to formulate more effective policies to fight against terrorism. In order to realize intention to form effective CFSP and CSDP, there has to be cross-border cooperation and collaboration between both the member states and the international organizations. In the international area, the common intention must be the elimination of terrorism when considered the results created by it. However, it would become almost impossible to eliminate completely the threat of terror given the fact that there are varying interests of countries in the world. Fortunately, the threat would be minimized by the creation of effective and efficient security policies. Once the threat of terror for Europe is examined, it is observable that Turkey is the most essential country that binds the European states with the Middle East in which there can be found extremist Islamist ideologies. Given the fact that the Republic of Turkey has been in a fight against the terror of PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) for years i.e. the Republic have experience on the issue area; there is an urgent need for establishing much stronger ties and promoting further cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey. For the objectives of this thesis, firstly a brief historical analysis between the two parties will be presented.

5.1. The European Union and Turkey Relations: A Brief Historical Analysis

Since the establishment of the European Economic Community with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which brought six European countries together namely France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg and the West Germany, the European Economic Community has been in a process of both widening and deepening through successive treaties so that the community evolved eventually into a union with its 28 members today. The policy areas that require both supranational authority of the European Commission and intergovernmental cooperation at the Council has expanded throughout time by consecutive

enlargements. The scope of the relations that EEC/EU has established with other countries has varied in its history. On the one hand, Morocco's application for membership to the European Community was rejected in 1987 (as cited in Briefing No 23, 1998). On the other hand, the European Union has found itself while integrating in a pacey manner with the Central Eastern European countries after the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1989. In this spectrum of varying relations with the other countries, Turkey has an unprecedented relationship with the EU.

The fluctuant and unrivaled relationship between Turkey and the EEC/EU commenced once the Republic of Turkey applied for associate membership of the EEC in 1959. Since then, an ambiguous and differentiated relationship has emerged and still continues in different phases between Turkey and the EU. Intermittent nature of this relation has been affected by both exogenous and endogenous reasons. The explanatory power of this relationship existing between Turkey and the EU requires an extensive analysis of security considerations particularly of the EU and an angle which is able to look through from a realist perspective.

An analysis of the relationship between Europe and Turkey in terms of security considerations needs to take into account of historical legacy coming from the Ottoman Empire. Having a constant relationship with the European countries, the Ottoman Empire had found itself engaging in the balance of power politics in the late 18th century. In terms of its geography, the Ottoman Empire was included in the most of the major powers' security arrangements including Britain. In this respect, the Empire considered itself as an important part of the Western world and continued to reform itself in order to stay in that part of the world. This legacy was transformed to the newly established Republic in 1923. One of the most essentialist goals for the founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was to reach the level of contemporary civilization. By contemporary civilization, he meant definitely Western world. In order to achieve this goal, the Turkish Republic determined its foreign policy so that it became the 13th member state in the Council of Europe in 1949 (mfa.gov.tr) and of NATO in 1952. Having become a member both of the Council of Europe and NATO, the Republic demonstrated itself as a committed partner of the West by both accepting norms and values of the Western world and being part of

Western security arrangement. To complete this goal of remaining as a partner of the Western world, the Republic of Turkey applied for the associate membership of the EEC in 1959 and this was concluded by Ankara Treaty of 1963 which set the basis of relations between Turkey and the EEC.

During the Cold War, all security arrangements for Europe and Turkey were provided by NATO. The only security concern that Europeans had to deal with during the Cold War was the threat coming from the Soviet Union, the threat of communism. Since the United States of America was one of the superpowers during these years and was acting as a big brother for Europe both by providing military and economic aid to these countries, Europe and Turkey was heavily dependent on NATO and the US. In terms of military security of Europe, Turkey became an important partner of the US since it was one of the major contributors of military troops to NATO. Furthermore, Turkey was playing a crucial role in Europe for preventing the Soviet threat from spreading to Europe by being a buffer zone between Europe and the Soviet Union.

Although the role of Turkey in the Western security considerations began to be questioned with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and so with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the crises erupted in the midst of Europe has illustrated that it is not the case. When Yugoslavia began to be torn apart by consecutive secessions, the wars between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina frightfully illustrated the absolute weakness of the European Union in providing military security in its own continent and realized the fact that it needed the help of Turkey while managing these crises. These crises also clarified that the European Union has indeed lacked its own military competence and organization and that it was dependent on the US and Turkey. Since the realization of this fact, there was a clear attempt on the European side to create a separate military organization that would be capable of providing security in Europe and is independent of NATO and the US. In order to achieve this purpose, the president of France, Jacques Chirac and the prime minister of United Kingdom, Tony Blair convened at Saint-Malo Conference in 1998 to make a declaration as it is explained in the preceding chapters. Thus, in the leadership of France and Britain, the European Union decided to create the European Defense and Security Policy. According to Houghton, Saint-Malo Summit was a response to armed conflict in

Kosovo which showed the failure of Europeans to intervene in it (Hogton, 2009). Therefore, the Yugoslavian crisis demonstrated not only the EU's incapability for interfering to resolve the crisis in its own soil but also the soft and hard power of the Republic of Turkey in assisting Europe in the management of a crisis. The European history reflected another crucial moment showing the Turkey's place and power in the security arrangements which requires further analysis.

5.1.1. NATO-EU Cooperation and Turkey

“Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European capacity” said US ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland in Paris in 2008 (as cited in Buharalı, 2010).

Following the Yugoslavian crisis, there emerged urgent need to further NATO-EU cooperation for a better response to the world conflicts. To this end, the EU developed a framework of cooperation with NATO in order to increase its capabilities and visibility in the international arena. Buharalı summarizes the elements of NATO-EU cooperation as:

“Berlin+ arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU; arrangements for a NATO-EU Strategic Partnership (EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP and exchange of letters between Secretary Generals); arrangements regarding the involvement of non-EU European allies in the ESDP (Nice Implementation Document)” (Buharalı, 2010).

The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1999 set three standards of NATO-EU cooperation which is known as 3Ds: ‘The key to a successful initiative is to focus on practical military capabilities. Any initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by *de-linking* ESDI from NATO, avoid *duplicating* existing efforts, and avoid *discriminating* against non-EU members’ (as cited in Hunter, 2002).

In this framework, Berlin Plus agreement in 2003 which provided strategic cooperation between NATO and the EU demonstrated the Turkish role in the western policy formation. Berlin Plus agreement refers to the package of agreements between NATO and the EU establishing a strategic partnership in crisis management. Berlin Plus agreement consists of three main elements as stated in the EU document: ‘EU access to

NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities' (consilium.europa.eu). Another official website of the EU states that the agreement allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations; improves the working partnership between the EU and NATO, ensuring effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in crisis management and peace-building operations (eeas.europa.eu). The agreement has the intention to reinforce effective consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the two institutions in crisis management. It was designed to complement NATO's security formation in Europe. In EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 it was stated that 'The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP' (2002). This signaled that the European Union has to have the approval of non-EU members in the NATO to use NATO assets in the EU-led military operations. In this point, non-EU allies' approval, especially Turkey's approval for allowing the use of NATO assets by the European Union is critical in enhancing NATO-EU strategic cooperation. Through this arrangement, Turkey has acquired right to involve in ESDP activities. This involvement was critical for Turkey as it is said on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that

“A meaningful level of involvement in ESDP activities, is essential for a non-EU European Ally like Turkey, particularly given her substantial contributions to ESDP activities, as well as the fact that many ESDP activities have been undertaken in geographic proximity to Turkey and/or could have potential security implications for Turkey” (mfa.gov.tr)

Unfortunately, the objectives could not be realized given the fact that 'There has only been one EU-led operation which drew on NATO planning expertise and Alliance assets and capabilities since 2004, namely Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was launched in December 2004 after the conclusion of NATO's Stabilization force in Bosnia (SFOR)' (Buharalı, 2010). In addition to the concerns on the US side about increasing European autonomy in engaging EU-only military operations, the tension between Turkey and Cyprus hampered NATO-EU cooperation since Turkey blocked Cyprus participation in the cooperation claiming that only those members of EU which are also members of NATO and partners in Partnership for Peace. Therefore, Cyprus and Malta are outside of NATO-EU cooperation framework. In spite of the EU and Greek insistence

on the issue in favor of Cypriot side, Turkey kept vetoing the participation of Cyprus in the cooperation. In response to this attitude of Turkey, Cyprus vetoed Turkish membership to the European Defense Agency. Lastly, differences in the bureaucratic cultures of NATO and the EU impeded NATO-EU cooperation framework. Even though the cooperation did not succeed to continue and generate a joint reaction to the world crises, the power and capabilities of the Republic of Turkey have been well understood to the European Union.

5.2. Turkey as a Sustainable Ally in Providing Security to Europe

The fact that the nature of the threat has evolved for Europe's security following the 9/11 attacks which revealed the significance of Turkey's role and power in enhancing Europe's security. Since then, terrorism became the most salient security threat to the Western world. As a matter of fact, the terrorist attacks hitting the middle of Europe such as Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Paris in 2015, Brussels and Nice in 2016, Manchester and London in 2017 demonstrated that the real danger of terrorism threat is based on the extremist, Jihadist ideology. These incidents constituted justifiable reasons for the European Union to act in a unified way to protect the Union. As the preceding chapters explained the European Union has designated policies to take joint action in order to prevent any kind of terrorism in its soil. However, the fact that the decision making in CFSP and JHA pillar is based on the bargaining between member states and that unanimous voting is required for any policy to be implemented in the policy areas makes difficult to create effective policies in regard to terrorism. In addition to this fact, member states attach importance to their sovereignty as to such significant high politics.

The terrorist attacks organized in the capital cities of Europe have upset the European domestic politics. In the most parts of Europe such as Sweden, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom, the disseminative populist sentiments have led to an increase in the power of right wing populist parties in domestic politics which have features incompatible with the core European values such as equity and freedom. The policy discourse in these political parties leads to the emergence of Islamophobia, discrimination against Muslims, and social division in Europe. The increase in the power of right wing populist parties, in

return, results in the creation of further opposition to the European Union policies since one of the common features of these political parties is that they criticize the European Union policies and indeed they are against the EU and do not want to be in the. Hence, it is observed that the security of the Europe has been militarily challenged by Islamic State on the one hand and as a result of this threat, the European Union has been politically challenged by the right wing populist parties on the other hand. Therefore, it is concluded that the jihadist terrorism not only poses a security threat to Europe but also it causes further political threat for Europe.

5.2.1. Convergence of Material Interests: Turkey and the European Union

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, one of the centralist goals for the Turkish government has been to ally with the Western civilizations. The only European institution of which Turkey is not a member of it is the European Union even though Turkey demonstrated its willingness to be part of it throughout time. The Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister in 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu illustrates the new vision for the country as stating ‘Turkey’s foreign-policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023’ (Davutoglu, 2010). However, it is observable that Turkey’s relations with the Union have reversed since 2011 due to various reasons. One of the important reasons is that Turkey is becoming more authoritarian under the incumbent government, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). The other reason can be identified as Turkey’s changing foreign policy objectives. Contrary to the early governments and their secular characteristics, the incumbent government is willing to highlight its Islamic characteristic and to become a leading power in the Middle East. For instance, one of the JDP representatives, Ismail Kahraman, in the Turkish Parliament said ‘We are a Muslim country and so we should have a religious constitution’ and called for removal of principle of secularism from the Turkish Constitution, even though it led to disagreement even in his party (2016, hurriyetdailynews). Furthermore, the EU’s credibility and commitment have diminished in the eyes of Turkish government due to the EU’s discriminative attitudes towards Turkey. As a result of these deteriorating

relations, the rhetoric of the Turkish government has changed contrary to what Davutoglu argued in 2010. The President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently says to EU ‘We'll go our way; you go yours’ (as cited in aljazeera.com, 2016) after the EU demands on anti-terror measures in exchange for visa-liberalization for Turkey. In spite of all of these reversing relations, changing rhetoric, vetoed chapters, reluctant member states, there is a high prospect for Turkey and the EU becoming further closer due to the common security threat: Jihadist terrorism. As a matter of fact, the European Union needs Turkey in the sense that preventing terrorism from hitting Europe. In terms of geography, Turkey has significant importance for Europe. It has the capability to provide military security and energy security to Europe which can be illustrated by the words of the EU Commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete:

“Given its strategic location as a transit country in the region, Turkey is a key partner for Europe's energy security and diversification. With the launch of the High-Level Energy Dialogue, Turkey and the EU are injecting renewed political momentum to our energy cooperation. This will lead to concrete actions and projects to our mutual benefit” (as cited in the EU Press Release, MEX/16/191).

Terrorism has been the most important security threat to Turkey for many years. Given this fact the Turkish state and authorities have been occupied with preventing terrorism in its own soil. Because of the various national interests in the geography and fragile neighbor of the country, Turkey opens to the horrors of terror unless it would make concessions on the issue with other parties which Turkey has been unwilling to do so. For this reason, Turkey has developed powerful intelligence agency that is capable of preventing possible terrorist attacks although it cannot eliminate the terror in Turkish soil. Unfortunately, similar to Europe, Turkey is also targeted by the Jihadist terrorist organization, IS which caused deadliest and bloodiest attack in Turkey. The capital city of Turkey, Ankara was hit by terrorists on October 10, 2015, which causes killing at least 95 people and wounding 246 others as Melvin also states in the article published on CNN website (Melvin, 2015). Even though IS did not claim responsibility for the attacks, the Turkish government singled out IS as responsible from the organizing the attack. Besides Ankara, Istanbul was also hit by the terrorist attacks organized in Sultanahmet Square in January 2016 as the article in BBC expressed ‘A suspected member of Islamic State (IS)

group has killed 10 people, at least eight of them German tourists, in a suicide bomb attack in the Turkish city of Istanbul' (BBC, 2016). Following the attack, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a statement: 'International terror chooses different locations for its attacks but the target is always the same: our free life in free societies... It is precisely this freedom and our determination together with our international partners to act against these terrorists, that will go on' (as cited in BBC, 2016). Following any terrorist attack, state leaders expressed the need for cooperation in the international area and united action to combat terrorism together with the partners. Unfortunately, the measures taken at the supranational level are not sufficient and effective enough that terrorist organization has not been prevented yet.

Although currently, the accession is not a priority for both parties due to varying reasons, particularly due to Turkish domestic politics, the convergence of material interests of the EU and Turkey have the power to transform this unique relationship. These convergent material interests include high-security policies in favor of both parties. These policies are to prevent terrorism, particularly fight against Jihadist terrorism targeting both Europe and Turkey, to provide border security, to end the Syrian civil war, and to manage refugee crisis. Furthermore, to act jointly in these sensitive issue areas that both parties have given importance has the ability to surpass all the issues of political conditionality, of meeting the *acquis*, and even of the individual vetoes of member states in relations between Turkey and the EU. As a result, once the Republic of Turkey become an ally of the European Union for the realization of these objectives, the deteriorating relations between the two parties would have a chance to ameliorate and the actual strategic partnership between Europe and Turkey would be created. Among the common interests, to fight against the Jihadist terrorism has utmost priority for the parties because the features of this threat necessitate immediate solution. The terror brought by the extremist Islamists causes killing and wounding of innocent people at an unexpected time and brings extreme fear and chaos to the public. If the terror and the Jihadist terrorist is not precluded and eliminated, the weapon technology would be so developed that IS would cause further loss. Therefore, both the European Union and Turkey should take a step to cooperate further to combat terrorism. In this point, the question 'To what extent the European Union and Turkey cooperate in order to combat terrorism?' has to be answered. To be able to answer this

question, the current challenges that the European Union confronts and the Turkish remedy in this perspective would be analyzed in the next section.

5.3. Current challenges for Europe and Turkey's renewed power

The preceding chapters of this thesis explained the security threats that the European Union has confronted since its establishment. Together with the 9/1 attacks in the US the understanding of security and security threat has changed. Since then, terrorism has become one of the influencing factors for Europe's security. This is the central theme that this thesis presents thus far and it suggests that the European Union must establish further cooperation by international partners, especially with Turkey, in order to overcome the challenges which affect both the EU and Turkey.

The most significant area that necessitates further cooperation between the European Union and Turkey is to fight against terrorism, Jihadist terrorism, Islamic State. As analyzed in detail above, terrorism is one of the greatest challenges posed to Europe currently and its counter-terrorism strategy is not sufficient since it cannot any more prevent suicide bombers attacking Europe's capitals and bargaining between member states makes difficult to reach a common decision at the Union level. It is apparent that combating terrorism requires not only cooperation among the European countries but also cooperation with third states at the international level. Cooperation with Turkey in preventing terrorist attacks from happening in Europe is fundamental to the EU's security strategies. This can be illustrated by the statements that the leaders of both parties made in the summit of November 2015: 'Regular discussions and cooperation on foreign and security policy should be enhanced including on counter-terrorism against the background of serious security challenges notably the rising threat of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations' (consilium.europa.eu). Preventive measures can be taken by establishing cooperation between intelligence services, namely Turkish Intelligence Agency and European Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN). The best way to prevent suicide bombers is to empower the intelligence service of the European Union through enhancing tracking and further border control. One of the key aspects of improving the EU's

intelligence agency is to interconnect the member states intelligence service and to work in cooperation both in national and supranational level. The Brussels attacks in 2016 demonstrated the weakness of the EU at this point since there were two layers of failure, national and the European. The authorities in Brussels did not succeed to transfer the information to the European level. Therefore, it can be concluded that effective channel of communication in regard to intelligence must be established between the member states and the EU authorities. Furthermore, cooperation at an international layer is so important that the European Union needs further information on the terrorist organization by third parties. Turkish Intelligence Agency is of critical importance here since Turkey's importance in supplementing Europe's security is demonstrated in the Brussels attacks. As it is explained in Chapter 4, the Turkish authorities had the information on one of the perpetrators of the Brussels attack and passed this info to the relevant authorities in Belgium as Turkish President Erdogan also explained this by stating that 'One of the Brussels attackers was caught in Turkey in June last year and deported to the Netherlands' (Osborne, 2016). As it can be demonstrated from the statement of Turkish President Erdogan, the cooperation between intelligence services of Turkey and the European Union has irrevocable importance. Even though the terrorism, especially the terrorism caused by Islamic State is hard to be prevented, the cooperation with third countries, especially with Turkey, would help EU a lot so that it can more easily check and control the flow of people internally and externally. Furthermore, the European Union countries must consider Turkey as an important partner to themselves and pay attention to the statements made by the Turkish authorities.

Furthermore, Turkey has significant to Europe in the sense that it is the frontline country in the fight against terrorism. Given the fact that EU could not control its borders, Turkey is complementary power to control the flow of people from the Middle East to Europe. It has the capacity to identify the people crossing borders. In other words, Turkey plays a critical role in figuring out whether people have ties with a terrorist organization or not. Because of this, Turkey and the EU must engage in further cooperation in controlling borders. Once the borders are not controlled and the people are not checked and identified, passing to Europe becomes easier for the terrorist which means the threat of terrorism would not be minimized. Under these circumstances, the Turkish foreign policy as to

Syrian civil war has gained significance. Turkey started open door policy toward Syrian refugees in 2011, which allows Syrian refugees enter Turkey freely with their passports. Since then Turkey has become the country which welcomed the refugees the most. The Prime Minister of 2016, Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that

“We supported our Syrian brothers who were exposed to cruelty from the first day and we continue to support them today. Turkey has kept its doors open to all mistreated Syrians since March 2011 without making a distinction between their religion, language or ethnic background. As of today, the number of Syrian brothers we host in our country has risen to 2.7 million” (as cited in trtworld.com, 2016).

In addition to Davutoğlu’s statement, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan confirmed the policy as saying ‘There are 3 million [refugees] here now. We have to accept the people escaping bombs with an open-door policy from now on. The sons of this civilization have to do so’ (2016, dailysabah.com). The Turkish authorities continued its open door policy and the open door policy has been accompanied by a humanitarian discourse regarding the admission and accommodation of the refugees. Turkey evoked the international community, the United Nations, and the European Union and asked for help to resolve the issue and to ameliorate the living standards of refugees. It is observed that the country was the leading country in admitting the refugees by ‘contributing nearly \$9 billion to humanitarian aid during the ongoing Syrian crisis’ (2016, dailysabah.com). The Turkish foreign policy in regard to Syrian refugees is important to Europe. Due to the Turkey’s open door policy toward Syria, controlling the flow of people became harder for authorities. When the journey to Europe is analyzed, most of the refugees preferred the route from the Eastern Mediterranean and so Turkey. Through Turkey and then Greece, refugees are able to reach the Europe although many of them have struggled to stay alive in this journey. It is argued that ‘Every day between 1,000 to 2,000 people are landing on Greece’s shores, while more than 35,000 people are trapped in the country, unable to travel north as a result of border closures’ (Rankin and Oltermann, 2016). As a result of this open policy border, Turkey did not have the control its Syrian border as such it did not have the information on flowing people. By this means, many foreign fighters passed to Turkey and then Europe. Furthermore, it became easier for European nationals, especially young girls, to join Islamic State through crossing Turkish border. For instance, it is argued that the two

Viennese girls, Samra Kesinovic 17, and 15-year-old Sabina Selimovic, whose parents are Bosnian refugees, disappeared in April 2014 after saying that they wanted to fight in Syria (Burrows, 2015). As a result of this danger and the terrorist attacks happened in 2015 and 2016 in Turkey organized by the attackers that crossing freely the border, the Turkish authorities decided to abandon the open door policy in 2016 after the readmission deal with the EU and build the wall on the Syrian border. Weise also claims that ‘Turkey began stepping up its border protection measures in the wake of multiple terror attacks’ (Weise, 2016).

Overall, Turkish foreign policy preferences in Syrian civil war affects the European Union security arrangements. Thus far, it is argued that Turkey has a critical role in complementing Europe’s security from the south-eastern border given the fact that it is a front line country that fights in the zones where the so-called Islamic State operates besides it is the country identifying the people crossing the borders with its intelligence agency. Therefore, the EU and Turkey meet on common ground: fighting against the Jihadist terrorism. In order to realize this common interest, it is argued that the European Union needs to act jointly with Turkey to be and to feel more secure and both parties must engage further cooperation in intelligence and border policy despite the deteriorating relationship between the two. This argument will also be supported by the theoretical perspective which explains the EU enlargement policy regarding the Republic of Turkey in the next section.

5.4. Rationalist-Utilitarian Model and the Turkish Case

Once the EEC was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, the founding elites of the Community were aware of the fact that the Community would enlarge and include further European powers and become a more integrated community. Indeed, the Community turned into a union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 with its 12 members. Through widening and deepening processes, the European Union has evolved into an economic and political union with its 28 members, today. The unique relationship between the EU and Turkey has begun when the Republic of Turkey applied to the EC in 1959, which led to the signature of Ankara Treaty in 1963, granting Turkey an associate membership. In 1987, the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal applied for full membership to

the EC, however, the application was rejected in 1990 due to the EX internal dynamics. Although the Turkish government was frustrated with the EU decision in 1997 Luxembourg Summit in which Turkey was not declared as candidate country contrary to the Central Eastern European countries, this decision was reversed in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 due to changing preferences of big powers in the EU and Helsinki Summit granted Turkey a candidacy status. In order for negotiations to commence, the Turkish government had to meet the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria. To this end, the Turkish government entered into a reform process and thus the European Commission noted in its Progress Report in 2004 that 'Turkey was sufficiently fulfilling the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria' (COM(2004)656). As a result of this decision, the accession negotiations with Turkey were opened on October 3, 2005. Since then, the accession negotiations with Turkey have continued and the nature of the relations has remained unique compared to the other candidate countries since the relationship between Turkey and the European Union depends on many factors and it has changed a lot throughout the history. In order to clarify the argument that the rationalist-utilitarian model also claims that the EU must engage in further cooperation with Turkey in security policies as to fight the Jihadist terrorism, the Turkish case with the EU in terms of enlargement has to be briefly analyzed.

Rationalist and utilitarian model led by Andrew Moravcsik is examined briefly in order to give the assessment of Turkish accession to the EU and to support the argument of further Turkey-EU cooperation. According to this theoretical framework, enlargement is a foreign policy tool for the EU to promote European stability and security. In other words, the main emphasis would be on material and functional interests of the Union and its member states. As a result, the first proposition set out in this model is that the material benefits and costs of Turkey's membership will determine the Turkish accession. In order to analyze the Turkish accession to the EU with the utility-based model, one needs to consider the benefits and costs of Turkey's membership of the European Union. As Muftuler-Bac argued in her article, the areas of impact can be grouped into three: 'its impact on European security, its impact on the EU institutions, and its impact on the EU budget and economy' (Muftuler-Bac, 2008). In terms of security consideration, Turkey has both hard and soft power thanks to its military capabilities and secular democracy, being a

role model for its region. Turkey has remained as a sustainable ally for the European Union during the post-Cold War era in preserving the European security. Moreover, it is key to NATO-EU cooperation and important to the EU in providing energy security as it is analyzed in the preceding chapters. Turkey's role in Europe's security can be illustrated by the words of former German President, Joschka Fisher 'In order for the EU to be more powerful and for our children and grandchildren to live in peace, Turkey needs to be a member of EU' (as cited in Muftuler-Bac, 2008). In terms of economic interests, Turkey has a well-functioning market economy, being the 8th largest economy in Europe in 2016 according to the World Economic Outlook Database (2016). Thanks to its large labor force and consumer market, Turkey has the potential to revitalize the market of Europe which is aging in terms of population. With regard to economic and security interests of the EU, these are the material and functional benefits that the Turkish membership offers. Therefore, according to the model, Turkey can be a member of the EU since it benefits materially to the Union. However, the situation for Turkey is not so easy that it can be a member of the Union overnight. The argument here in this thesis is that Turkey will be beneficial to the Union in the sense that it is the key country for Europe in the fight against the Jihadist terrorism. Contrary to the accession argument of the model, Turkish membership to the Union does not seem to happen in near future due to various reasons particularly domestic politics in Turkey under the incumbent government, the relations between Turkey and the EU must be much closer and interdependent and further cooperation must be established in the areas of security, particularly terrorism.

CONCLUSIONS

The objectives of this work include attracting the new security threat posed to Europe by the Jihadist terrorism; demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on combating terrorism; revealing the Turkish role and power in the EU security policy formation regarding terrorism. These objectives are realized by finding out the answers to three research questions that are mentioned in the Introduction.

Three research questions are addressed and answered in consecutive chapters of this thesis. The first research question, 'To what extent are the European Union policies effective?', is answered by presenting an analysis of the European Union policies to combat terrorism and illustrating the recent attacks in Europe in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The second research question, 'To what extent can the European Union responses to terrorism be explained by the theoretical perspectives: inter-governmentalism vs. neo-functionalism?', is answered with the analysis presented in Chapter 4. The third and last research question, 'To what extent the European Union and Turkey cooperate in order to combat terrorism?', is addressed in Chapter 5 by giving a historical and theoretical analysis of relations between the EU and Turkey. Let me now put forth the conclusions that are reached in each body chapter of my thesis.

In Chapter 2, I examined the historical development of the EU with regards to the security considerations of the Union. The reason why I chose to start with such an examination was to reveal the root cause(s) of the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on security, specifically terrorism. It was believed that the reason why the EU policies on security proved to be ineffective was that the Union was established as a primarily economy-oriented institution, which hindered the development of any promising security policy. Although my examination proved this point, it also revealed a second major cause of the EU ineffectiveness on security policies. The EU policies on security evolved in response to security threat(s) that the Union confronted. As a result of this, the Union was not able to develop a comprehensive security policy despite the attempted initiatives constituting the second root cause behind the ineffectiveness of the EU policies on security.

The 21st century brought a new dimension to the fight against terrorism. The biggest threat under terrorism was now the religiously inspired terrorism, affecting the entire globe. The 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001 was the turning point in the world which altered the understanding of terrorism. Europe was not an exception in this regard. In Chapter 3, I discuss this through presenting my analysis made by using the reports prepared and issued by TE-SAT. This analysis demonstrates that after the 9/11 the EU realized the threat of terrorism necessitated the development of a Union-wide security policy on terrorism given the fact that religiously inspired terrorism became a great danger to Europe after the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, respectively. As a result, the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2005 is examined in detail as being the first comprehensive strategy on terrorism.

In Chapter 4, I put forward the current literature review which studying the failure of the EU in formulating common foreign and security policy. In the light of the information provided in the literature, it was claimed that the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016 respectively illustrate the ineffective nature of the EU policies on terrorism. While claiming this, my argument was that since the policies regarding terrorism are adopted by the bargaining between the Member States on the basis of inter-governmental principles such as unanimous voting for the CFSP pillar, the EU does not have the capability to form effective common foreign and security policy, particularly towards the religiously inspired terrorism. Additionally, the existence of many institutional actors within the EU makes it difficult to adopt and implement the policies on terrorism. In short, it was asserted that inter-governmentalism and the number of institutional actors hinder the prospect of developing a comprehensive and effective security policy at the Union level.

In Chapter 5, it was proposed Turkey as a remedy to the aforementioned ineffectiveness of the EU on preventing terror attacks on its own soil. I argued that the Brussels attacks in 2016 proved to be an important indicator of this failure and the need for Turkey when it comes to complementing the EU's security and combating terrorism. The two points that were raised in Chapter 5 were that (1) Turkey stands as a front-line country for a range of terrorist organizations, most importantly the so called Islamic State which carried out the attacks in Paris and Brussels, enabling the country to assist the EU in terms

of border controls, and (2) Turkey, based on its experience in fighting terrorism, can identify people having ties to the terrorist organization, which we saw in the Brussels attacks. As I pointed out earlier, since religiously inspired terrorism affects every corner of the world, cooperation will be beneficial to both Turkey and the EU. To do so, the proposition was that increasing the already existing intelligence sharing, forming effective channels of communication, and issuing notes between Turkey and the EU are crucial. The benefits of Turkey in closing off the expectations and capabilities gap already existing in the EU in regard to the fight against terrorism were also supported by the rationalist and utilitarian model of enlargement as revealed in Chapter 5.

As a final word, further research on the current obstacles and other policy areas of cooperation between Turkey and the EU; on the establishment of the Islamic State based on the regional analysis; on the role of supranational institutions of the EU in security policy formation is kindly recommended for the academy.

REFERENCES

1969 Deadly bomb blasts in Italy. (n.d) BBC. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/12/newsid_3953000/3953999.stm

1992 O.J. C 191/1Brunnstorm, D. (2009). EU says it has solved the Kissinger question. Retrieved November 3, 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-president-kissinger-idUSTRE5AJ00B20091120>

About EJM. Par. 4. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJM_StaticPage.aspx?Bread=2

About Eurojust. Mission and tasks. Eurojust. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/mission-tasks.aspx>

Annex, Protocol to Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union. (2001). OJ 326 P.0002-0008.

Argomaniz, J. (2011). *The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and policies after 9/11*. Oxon: Routledge

Ari, T. (2004). The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context. p. 83-98. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/6.-TurkerAri.pdf>

Background: History of Eurojust. Retrieved December 21, 2015 from <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/History.aspx>,

Barcelona Bomb Kills 15 Civilians. (1987). NY Times. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/20/world/barcelona-bomb-kills-15-civilians.html>

Batchelor, T. (July 27, 2016). *Normandy church TERROR: ISIS knifemen made priest, 84, KNEEL as they slit his throat*. Retrieved May 21, 2017 from <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693326/Normandy-attack-hostages-taken-armed-men-Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray>

BBC News. (2004). In quotes: Global outcry at Madrid blasts. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3501178.stm>

BBC News. (2005). In quotes: World reaction. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4660415.stm>

BBC News. (2005). London bomber: Text in full. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm

BBC News. (2014). Viewpoint: 10 big myths about World War One debunked. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25776836>

BBC News. (2015). 7 July London bombings: What happened that day? Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598>

BBC News. (2015). 7/7 bombings: Profiles of the four bombers who killed 52 people in the London attacks. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/77-bombings-london-anniversary-live-profiles-of-the-four-bombers-who-killed-52-people-in-london-10369984.html>

BBC News. Madrid train attacks. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/>

BBC. (2016). Nice attack: World leaders' reaction. Retrieved June 19, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801571>

BBC. (2016). Turkey: 'IS suicide bomber' kills 10 in Istanbul Sultanahmet district. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35290760>

BBC. (August 19, 2016). *Nice attack: What we know about the Bastille Day killings*. Retrieved May 20, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801671>

BBC. (December 24, 2016). *Berlin lorry attack: What we know*. Retrieved May 21, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38377428>

BBC. (June 7, 2017). *London Bridge attack: What happened?* Retrieved June 15, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/40149168>

BBC. (March 22, 2016). *Brussels attacks: Zaventem and Maelbeek bombs kill many*. Retrieved May 19, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869254>

Bosson, R. (2013). *The Evolution of Counter Terrorism: European Security Policy after 9/11*. Oxon: Routledge

Briefing No 23. (1998). Legal Questions of Enlargement. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm#top

Buharalı, C. "Better NATO-EU Relations Require more Sincerity," EDAM Discussion Paper Series, (January 2010).

Bulletin of the European Communities. 1981, n° Supplement 3. Luxembourg. "Report on European Political Cooperation (London, 13 October 1981)", p. 14-17.

Bulletin of the European Communities. November 1970, n° 11. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. "Davignon Report (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970)", p. 9-14

Bulletin of the European Communities. September 1973, No 9. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. "Second report on European political cooperation on Foreign Policy", p.14-21

Bures, O. (2011). *EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Burrows, T. (30 December 2015). *Teenage Islamist 'poster girl' who fled Austria to join ISIS was used as a sex slave for new fighters before she was beaten to death as she tried to escape, former prisoners reveals*. Retrieved July 2, 2017 from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/syria/index.html>

Bush, G. (2001). Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057>

Cameron, F. (2014). The Impact of the First World War and Its Implications for Europe Today. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <https://www.boell.de/en/2014/07/08/impact-first-world-war-and-its-implications-europe-today>

Camilos, P. (2007). The worst Islamist attack in European history. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/31/spain>

Carter, S., Cox, A. (2011). One 9/11 Tally: \$3.3 Trillion. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0

CBCNews. (2004). Bin Laden claims responsibility for 9/11. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/bin-laden-claims-responsibility-for-9-11-1.513654>

Chrisafis, A. (January 12, 2015). *Charlie Hebdo attackers: born, raised and radicalized in Paris*. Retrieved May 17, 2017 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-charlie-hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris>

CNN Library. (2016). September 11, 2001: Background and timeline of the attacks. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/>

CNN. (2011). World shock over U.S. attacks. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/11/trade.centre.reaction/>

Cohen, B. (1993). Why Europe Failed to Halt The Genocide in Bosnia. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://www.wrmea.org/1993-april-may/why-europe-failed-to-halt-the-genocide-in-bosnia.html>

Communication of 6 October 2004 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. (October 6, 2004). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ae50015>

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (2002). European Union. OJ C197 P.0001-0023.

Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (2002). European Union. OJ L190 P.0001-0020.

Council of Europe. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/council-of-europe.en.mfa>

Council of the EU (5855/15). Riga Joint Statement following the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 and 30 January.

Council of the European Union (January 1, 2005). Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Retrieved June 28, 2017 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/PU2088_BROCH_JAI_EN.qxd.pdf

Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/>

Davutoglu, A. (2010). *Turkey's Zero Problems Foreign Policy*. Retrieved May 22, 2016 from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/>

Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004). European Union. Annex I

Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004). European Union. Article 14

Directive(EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. (OJ L88, 31.03.2017, p.6-21)

Erdogan says Turkey will not change terror laws for EU. (May 6, 2016). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/turkey-erdogan-eu-160506132224863.html>

EU Convention on Extradition (1996). European Union. Article 5. OJ C 313 of 23.6.1996

EU tells France: we'll help in war against Isis. (2015, November 17). Retrieved December 21, 2015 from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20151117/france-asks-eu-help-us-in-war-against-isis>

EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP. (December 16, 2002). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm

EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus. (2003). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>

European Commission - Daily News. (January 29, 2016). Energy Union diplomacy: EU and Turkey strengthen energy ties. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-16-191_en.htm

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977). The Council of Europe. Article 13.

Europol. (2016) European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)

Europol. (2016). EU Internet Referral Unit-Year One Report. Retrieved June 15, 2017 from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-report-highlights>

Europol. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2008). pp.6, pp.10, pp. 37

Europol. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2015). pp. 26, pp.19, pp.30

Europol. European Counter Terrorism Centre – ECTC. Retrieved June 15, 2017 from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc>

Foster, A. (June 5, 2017). *Terror attacks timeline: From Paris and Brussels terror to most recent attacks in Europe*. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693421/Terror-attacks-timeline-France-Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism>

Hemingway, E. (1929). *Farewell to Arms*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons

Hoghton, D. (2009). The Saint-Malo Declaration and its impact on ESDP after 10 years. Retrieved June 22, 2017 from <http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/the-saint-malo-declaration-and-its-impact-on-esdp-after-10-years>

Hunter, R. (2002). The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor? Santa Monica: RAND. p. 33.

Hurriyet Daily News. (2005). Erdogan: We need to pool our resources to fight against terror. Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/erdogan-we->

[need-to-pool-our-resources-to-fight-against-terror.aspx?pageID=438&n=erdogan-we-need-to-pool-our-resources-to-fight-against-terror-2005-07-08](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf)

Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France. (1998). Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

Karpilovsky, S., Fogel, M., Kobelt, O. The Great War-Effects. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from http://ibatpv.org/projects/great_war/effects.htm

Kaunert, C., Zwolski, K. (2013). *The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Kunz, L. (1953). *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 47, No.2, (Apr., 1953), 275-281

Levi, L. (2009). Altiero Spinelli, Founder of the Movement for European Unity. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200903/20090316ATT51977/20090316ATT51977EN.pdf>

Lyall, S. (2002). 'Quiet' Finland, a Bomb, and a Freaky Subculture. NY Times. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/quiet-finland-a-bomb-and-a-freaky-subculture.html>

Marolov, D. (2012). The Policy of the USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia. *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*. 1(2), 1-16.

Marshall, G., C. 5 June 1947. Marshall Plan Speech. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/>

Marshall, N. (May 23, 2017). *Watch: A timeline of terror attacks in Europe since 2015*. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from <http://www.independent.ie/world-news/and-finally/watch-a-timeline-of-terror-attacks-in-europe-since-2015-35746776.html>

Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement, 29/11/2015. Press Releases and Statements. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/>

Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement, 29/11/2015. Press Releases and Statements. Retrieved April 8, 2016 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/>

Melvin, D. (2015). At least 95 killed in twin bombings near train station in Turkey's capital. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/10/middleeast/turkey-ankara-bomb-blast/index.html>

Mix, D. (2013). The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy. *Congressional Research Service*. Retrieved May 20, 2017 from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41959.pdf>

Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(4), pp. 498.

Müftüler-Bac, M. (2008). "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The EU's Internal Dynamics", *International Studies Perspectives*, vol.9, issue 2, May 2008, 201-219.

Murphy, C. (2012). *EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law*. Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd.

Osborne, S. (2016). Brussels attack: President Erdogan says bomber was caught in Turkey last year and deported to the Netherlands. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brussels-attacks-president-erdogan-bomber-turkey-belgium-deported-isis-terrorist-terror-a6948341.html>

Parliament speaker's call to remove secularism from Turkey's constitution sparks outrage. (April 26, 2016). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/parliament-speakers-call-to-remove-secularism-from-turkeys-constitution-sparks-outrage.aspx?PageID=238&NID=98341&NewsCatID=338>

President Erdoğan: Turkey will continue open-door policy for Syrian refugees (2016). Retrieved April 8, 2016 from <http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/03/13/president-erdogan-turkey-will-continue-open-door-policy-for-syrian-refugees>

Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, Com(2001) 521 final, 19 September 2001.

Quaker Council for European Affairs. (2011). *'Law and Policy Framework Developments Since 2005, Relating to EU Counter-Terrorism'*. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from <http://www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/bp-terrorism14a-oct-2011.pdf>

Quaker Council for European Affairs. (2011). *Evaluating an Evaluation – "The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and Future Challenges"*. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from <http://www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/bp-terrorisim13-oct-2011.pdf>

RAN Working Groups. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/index_en.htm

Rankin, J., Oltermann, P. (2016). EU-Turkey summit to focus on stemming flow of migrants to Europe. Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/07/eu-turkey-summit-focus-stopping-flow-migrants-europe>

Regulating the use of passenger name record (PNR) data. In Detail. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/>

Rękawek, K. (2015, February 2). The UK's Counterterrorism Policy in Its Relations with the EU. *Bulletin*, 13(745). pp.2.

Response to foreign terrorist fighters and recent terrorist attacks in Europe. Retrieved June 2017, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/>

Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy (2016). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-en#The+Berlin+Plus+agreement>

Shaping of a Common Security and Defense Policy. (2016). Petersberg Tasks. Retrieved November 27, 2016 from <https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-en#The+Petersberg+Tasks>

Shoichet, C., Ellisi R., Hanna, J. (July 23, 2017). *Munich shooting: 9 victims, gunman dead, police say*. Retrieved May 20, 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/22/europe/germany-munich-shooting/index.html>

Shoichet, C., Levs, J. (January 21, 2015). *Al Qaeda branch claims Charlie Hebdo attack was years in the making*. Retrieved May 17, 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/europe/charlie-hebdo-france-attacks/index.html>

Smith, J. (2015). World War I. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <https://global.britannica.com/event/World-War-I>

Spark, L., Jordan, C. (March 24, 2017). *London attack: Khalid Masood named as perpetrator*. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/23/europe/london-attack/index.html>

Statement/15/6090 (November 14, 2015). Joint statement of the Heads of State or Government and leaders of the European Union and its institutions on the terrorist attacks in Paris. Retrieved June 19, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-6090_en.htm

Statement/17/1434. (May 23, 2017). Statement by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker following the attack in Manchester. Retrieved June 19, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-1434_en.htm

Statewatch. *Taking stock of EU Counter-terrorism policy and review mechanisms: Summary of Statewatch's findings for SECILE project*. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/SECILE-sw-summary.pdf>

Summaries of EU Legislation. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Axy0022>

Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme. Main Feature. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/tftp/index_en.htm

The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe. (COM/2010/0673). European Union.

The European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation. Retrieved June 22, 2017 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iii_-turkey_s-views-on-current-nato-issues.en.mfa

The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (14469/4/05 REV4). European Union.

Timeline: foreign terrorist fighters and recent terrorist attacks in Europe. Retrieved June 15, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/timeline-foreign-fighters/history-foreign-fighters/>

Townshend, C. (2011). The League of Nations and United Nations. Retrieved November 3, 2016 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/league_nations_01.shtml

Tran, M. (2014, October 14). The European arrest warrant: What is it and will the UK opt back in? Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/29/european-arrest-warrant-q-and-a>

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.

Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992. Title V: Provisions on a common foreign and security policy - Article 11 - Article J.1

Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253.

Turkish PM says open door policy for refugees will continue. (March 1, 2016). Retrieved July 7, 2017 from <http://www.trtworld.com/mea/turkish-pm-says-open-door-policy-for-refugees-will-continue-58570>

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Retrieved from November 3, 2016 from <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>

United Nations. (2004). Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Part VI, pp. 51.

United Nations. United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism. Retrieved October 17, 2016 from <http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/index.shtml>

Video of London bomber released. (2006). Retrieved November 30, 2016 from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/jul/06/july7.uksecurity1>

Wainwright, R. (2016). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT)

Weise, Z. (10 October 2016). *Turkey's new border wall to stop Syrian refugees.* Retrieved July 3, 2017 from <http://www.politico.eu/article/turkeys-new-border-wall-will-stop-syrian-refugees-immigration-istanbul/>

Willan, P. (2001). Three jailed for 1969 Milan bomb. Guardian. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jul/02/philipwillan>

Witte, G., Mekhennet, S., Birnbaum, M. (March 22, 2016). Islamic State claims responsibility for the Brussels attacks. Retrieved May 19, 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/brussels-on-high-alert-after-explosions-at-airport-and-metro-station/2016/03/22/b5e9f232-f018-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html?utm_term=.aad2f9d55ffe

Witte, G., Morris, L. (November 28, 2015). *Failure to stop Paris attacks reveals fatal flaws at the heart of European Security.* Retrieved May 17, 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/paris-attacks-reveal-fatal-flaws-at-the-heart-of-european-security/2015/11/28/48b181da-9393-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html?utm_term=.774b57ec07ab

World Economic Outlook Database (October 2016). Retrieved June 25, 2017 from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx>