

THE CYPRIOT MULE CORPS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

by

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: Identity troubles, Cyprus, Cypriot Mule Corps, Muleteers

Cypriot muleteers served in the British army in the Macedonian front during the First World War. Both Cypriot men and island mules were used in the war. Mules were used in the war due to their carrying ability under harsh geographical conditions. The British government utilized the existing economic problems in Cyprus to attract Cypriot support. For some Cypriots joining the war serving in the army was the only way to provide for the livelihood of their family. In fact, Turkish Cypriots participated in the Great War against the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, there were differences in terms of religious creed between Greek Cypriots and the British: the Greek Cypriots were Orthodox while the British people were Protestant. Hence, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had some troubles about joining the Great War. Despite these differences, Greek and Turkish Cypriots set aside their national and religious feelings and were united in the same army to serve Great Britain. Another important aspect of the Cypriot Mule Corps lies in the fact that the Turkish Cypriots joined the British army not only against their former Sultan but also against their compatriots who migrated to Anatolia and were subsequently recruited to the Ottoman army. Overall, this thesis aims to illustrate this complex situation of the Cypriot Mule Corps from the standpoint of Cypriots and to show that people can ignore their national and religious identities when they have to.

ÖZET

BİRİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞINDA KIBRISLI KATIRCILAR BİRLİĞİ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik sorunları, Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı Katircılar Birliđi, Katircılar

Kıbrıslı Katircılar Birliđi I. Dünya Savaşında İngiliz ordusuna Makedonya cephesinde hizmet etmiş bir birliktir. Hem Kıbrıslılar hem de Makedonya cephesinin sert cođrafi koşulları nedeniyle Kıbrıs'taki katırlar I. Dünya Savaşında kullanıldılar. İngiliz idaresi Kıbrıs'taki kötü ekonomik koşulları kullanarak Kıbrıslıları cepheye çekmeye çalıştı ve bazı Kıbrıslılar için cepheye katılmak ailelerini geçindirmek için son çareydi. Kıbrıslı Türkler Osmanlı İmparatorluđuna karşı bu savaşa katıldılar. Bununla birlikte Kıbrıslı Rumlar da Ortodoks Hristiyan olmalarına rağmen kendilerinden farklı bir mezhebe bađlı olan Protestan İngiltere yanında savaşa katıldılar. Savaşa katılmayı seçmek hem Kıbrıslı Rumlar hem de Türkler için kolay deđildi. Yine de Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Türkler milli ve dini kimliklerini bir tarafa bırakıp bu birlikte aynı amaç için çalıştılar ve aynı orduda İngiltere'ye hizmet ettiler. Kıbrıslı Katircılar Birliđinin bir diđer önemi ise, Kıbrıslı Türklerin sadece Osmanlı İmparatorluđuna karşı deđil aynı zamanda Osmanlı topraklarına göç edip askere alınmış diđer Kıbrıslı Türklere karşı da bu birlikte hizmet etmeleridir. Genel olarak bu tezin amacı Kıbrıslı Katircılar Birliđinin bu komplike yapısını Kıbrıslılar açısından incelemek ve zorunda kalındığı zaman insanların milli ve dini kimliklerini bir tarafa bırakabildiklerini göstermektir.

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INTRODUCTION

World history did not experience global war until the First World War (Great War). Different from the previous wars, World War I affected many parts of the world. Various factors had an impact on the outbreak of World War I: imperialist and trade rivalries, arms race, and economic and social tensions were some of these reasons.¹ In addition to these reasons, nationalism had a significant effect on the Great War. In the end of the 19th century, religious communities within the empires started to attain national identities and their desire for setting their own nation states became more explicit. Minority subjects in the empires did not want to be part of multinational empires, and they demanded to have their own nation states.² These minority subjects and their nation state demands had an important influence on World War I.

Furthermore, repercussions of this war reached numerous people who did not have any association with the decision-takers of the war. The main factor leading to a global impact of the war was colonization whereby European countries supplied their own needs through their colonies. These needs mainly included man-power, animal power, and export goods. Thus, many non-European countries were forced to join the war to support their mainland. For example, the Indian Army served in France from 1914 to 1915, and it comprised almost one-third of the British Expeditionary Force in France.³

In addition, during the First World War, technology, especially military technology, had been developed. For example, important innovations in weaponry, including the tank, submarine and poison gas were made.⁴ However, these innovations were not sufficient for enabling convenient access to the military fronts. Due to harsh geographical conditions in the fronts, European states needed pack animals to transport military equipment. War horses and mules helped transport ammunition in the Great War.⁵ For instance, Zion Mule Corps was one of the corps in the Great War for transforming

¹ Spencer C. Tucker, *The Great War 1914-18* (London: UCL press,1998) p.1.

² Ibid.p.1

³ Alexander Davis, 'The Empire at War: British and Indian Perceptions of Empire in the First World War'(Thesis for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History, University of Tasmania,2008),p.2.

⁴ Spencer C. Tucker, *The Great War 1914-18* (London: UCL press,1998) p.11.

⁵ Captain Sidney Galtey, *The Horse and The War* (London: Country Life,1918)p.13.

ammunition with the pack animals. This corps was composed of Jewish people who served for the British army in Gallipoli.⁶

Overall, various people from different colonies joined the Great War. They contributed to the war on behalf of the European colonialist states. The perspective of the history started to change in the 20th century. First, Antonio Gramsci who was a Marxist intellectual used the term ‘*subaltern*’ to identify Italian peasants and workers. Then some Indian historians were inspired by Gramsci and used this term to explain different classes in India.⁷ However, it was Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who brought the essential meaning to the term ‘*subaltern*’ with her study ‘*Can the Subaltern Speak?*’⁸ Thus, historians no longer research only the people from the upper class but also analyze the people from the lower class such as the people from different colonies in the Great War. History has included the history of ordinary, invisible and silent people thanks to the subaltern studies. In a broader context, postcolonial and subaltern studies affect the perspective of history. The standpoint of the history has shifted from Europe to the other parts of the world.⁹ These changes to the historical perspective also influence this study. This thesis will analyze the condition of the ordinary Cypriots in the Great War.

The perspective of this study is to investigate the history of Greek and Turkish Cypriots from a common viewpoint. The Cypriot Mule Corps was chosen for this study because it is a common subject for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It can be said that investigating these ordinary Cypriot people in the First World War is important to fill some gaps in the Greek and Turkish Cypriots history. I aim to investigate the role of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the First World War to shed light on the history of unknown and invisible participants of the Great War. The main goal of this thesis is to show that people can ignore their national and religious differences when they have to. In other words, when necessary, people can participate in actions that conflict with their identities. The history of Muslim Turkish Cypriot muleteers stands as a prime example for this phenomenon.

Cyprus hosts two main ethnic groups: Greek Cypriots who are Orthodox Christians and Turkish Cypriots who are Muslims. These two different ethnic groups used to live

⁶ Reberto Mazza, ‘We Are Coming, Unafraid: The Jewish Legions and the Promised Land in the First World War’ *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, no.12 (2013),p.576.

⁷ Serhat Celal Birdal, ‘Madunu Dinlemek.’ *Kaos GL*, no.129 (2011),p.30.

⁸ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson, Lawrence Grossberg (USA: Macmillan Education,1988),pp.271-313.

⁹ Robert J.C. Young, *Post-Colonialism A Very Short Introduction* (UK:Oxford University press, 2003),pp.1-44.

together since the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571. Nevertheless, since the end of the 19th century, Greek Cypriots began to fall under the influence of nationalism. Compared with the Greek Cypriots, nationalism among Turkish Cypriots progressed slowly, but eventually both groups came under the influence of nationalism.¹⁰ Nationalism can be identified as a process of identity formation. National identities had not been developed naturally but they had been created with the help of modernity and shaped within the process of the construction of the nation states.¹¹ As Ernest Renan says; *The nations are not something eternal. They had their beginnings and they will end.*¹²

In the beginning of the 20th century, formation of the national identities among Cypriots had not been completed yet. Turkish Cypriots were a pre-Ottoman Muslim community¹³ and Greek Cypriots, especially those from lower class, belonged to the Orthodox Christian community.¹⁴ Greek Cypriots were affected by nationalism more strongly than the Turkish Cypriots even though their national identity formation had not been finalized in that time. It can be said that at the beginning of the 20th century, religion was an apparent feature of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots' identity.

The Cypriot Mule Corps which served in the Great War at the Macedonian Front is important not only for understanding the exploitation of colonies but also realizing that approximately 15,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots joined this corps together. Indeed, Greek and Turkish Cypriots participated on the same side in the same war. Although written documents on the daily life of Cypriot soldiers in the British army are limited, it is indisputable that Turkish and Greek Cypriots joined the British army together. This study aims to show that Greek and Turkish Cypriots were able to fight at the same war in which they helped each other to fight a common enemy. Turkish Cypriots were a minority in the beginning of the 20th century as it is at present time. Consequently, the number of Turkish Cypriots joining World War I was less than the Greek Cypriots. Approximately 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined the Cypriot Mule Corps. However, what really counts is that a certain number of Turkish Cypriots joined this war together with Greek Cypriots who followed a different religion, Christianity.

¹⁰ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul:İletişim,2005) pp.212-244.

¹¹ Ibid.p.17.

¹² Ernest Renan, 'What is a nation' in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London and New York: Routledge, 1995),p.20.

¹³ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul:İletişim,2005) p.217.

¹⁴ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.85.

Cyprus was under the control of Great Britain since 1878, although legally it was still a part of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ According to the Berlin Conference in 1878, Great Britain rented Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire for 87,676 British sterling. Great Britain accepted to protect the Ottoman Empire from the Russian threat according to this treaty.¹⁶ When World War I broke out, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire entered the war as opponents, and Cyprus was annexed as a British colony.¹⁷ Great Britain benefited from many resources of Cyprus. Cyprus was not one of the fronts of World War I but it was close to the main centers of the First World War including Egypt, the Dardanelles and Macedonia. Thanks to the strategic geopolitical location of Cyprus, Britain could use the island to provide food and some military necessities to the British army.¹⁸ In addition, Cypriot muleteers joined the Macedonian front and they officially came to be known as the Macedonian Mule Corps.¹⁹ They served for the British army in the Macedonian front to free Serbia from the Central Powers.

Both Cypriot men and island mules were used in the war. Mules were used in the war due to their carrying ability under harsh geographical conditions. Besides providing food and some military necessities from Cyprus, benefiting from local Cypriot people was a significant issue. These people were the people who did not contribute to the reasons of the war but contributed to the fighting in the war. When one examines the wars, it can be understood that ordinary people suffer more from wars than the main actors who are effective in the outbreak of the wars themselves. Furthermore, the main actors of the war made an effort to attract these ordinary people. For instance, the British government gave medals to participants of the Cypriot Mule Corps after the war. British policy was also a factor that convinced the local people to join the war. British government utilized the economic problems in Cyprus for attracting Cypriot support. They supplied salaries for volunteer Cypriots. Also, they made arrangements about Cypriot passports to prevent Cypriots leaving Cyprus to work. For some Cypriots joining the war was the only solution for supporting their family.

¹⁵ Antigone Heraclidou, 'Cyprus's Non-military contribution to the Allied War effort during World War I' *The Round Table* no.2 (Spring,2014),p.193.

¹⁶ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul:İletişim,2005)p.214.

¹⁷ Antigone Heraclidou, 'Cyprus's Non-military contribution to the Allied War effort during World War I' *The Round Table* no.2 (Spring,2014),p.193.

¹⁸ Ibid.p.194

¹⁹ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.100.

Moreover, Cypriot Mule Corps are significant for thoroughly understanding the concept identity in the context of Cyprus. As mentioned above, identities, especially national identities, have been created with the help of modernity. In the beginning of the 20th century, Turkish Cypriots were troubled because they were no longer a part of the Ottoman Empire, and neither they were Greeks nor Turks.²⁰ Turkish Cypriots were only a Muslim community at that time and their national identity was not yet formed. This means joining the Great War with the Christian Cypriots on the British side was a religious problem for them. On the other hand, process of national identity formation had started among Greek Cypriots although it had not been completed yet. Thus, both Muslim Turks and Christian Greeks joined the same corps despite their religious differences. More interestingly, Turkish Cypriots participated in the Great War against the Ottoman Empire. Attending the war against their previous Muslim Sultan was a dilemma for Turkish Cypriots. Although, national feelings progressed very late among Turkish Cypriots, religious fellowship was important for them.²¹ Despite these troubles, some Turkish Cypriots enlisted in the British army.

On the other hand, some Turkish Cypriots who migrated to the Ottoman Empire joined the war in the Ottoman front. The number of Turkish Cypriots who joined the Macedonian Mule Corps is fewer than the Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots who joined the British army not only fought together with Greek Cypriots but also fought against the Turkish Cypriots who were in the Ottoman front.

It is important to note that joining the Great War was not troublesome for Greek Cypriots, at least not in the same way it was for the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots also had some problems about joining war which will be explained in this study. However, their participation in the war was relatively easier than the participation of Turkish Cypriots. Cypriot Mule Corps was sent to Macedonia which is very close to Greece, and Greece and Great Britain was in the same front. Joining the war was more acceptable for Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless, serving with Turkish Cypriots in the same front was probably not totally acceptable for them. Thus, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had religious hesitations about joining the Great War.

The Cypriot Mule Corps was not the only corps which joined the war from European colonies. The Great Britain used its other colonies in the First World War. The

²⁰ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul:İletişim,2005),p.217.

²¹ Ibid.pp.209-244.

most famous corps was Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) who fought at Gallipoli. In addition, as previously discussed, the Indian Army contributed to British brigade in the war.²² Similarly, African people joined the war and fought for colonial states.²³ Great Britain even used Chinese people.²⁴ In addition, Jewish people served in the Great War in the Zion Mule Corps. Particularly, scholars have many works about the ANZAC in the First World War. On the other hand, academic studies on the Cypriot Mule Corps are extremely limited. Finding sufficient information about Cypriots in the war is challenging. The most important academic article about this subject belongs to Andrekos Varnava who is a Greek Cypriot historian in Flinders University.²⁵ He also published a book about this subject at the end of February 2017.²⁶ In his article, he examined the Cypriot Mule Corps in the context of British genius on using people from Cyprus in the war. Although his work is far from being thorough and conclusive, Varnava provides invaluable information on the Cypriot Mule Corps. In addition, Varnava's newly published book contributes to the history of Cypriot Mule Corps. His book provides general and detailed information on the Cypriot Mule Corps. It includes nine chapters and the author also details the situation before and after the formation of this corps. Varnava aims to explain silenced memory. His book contributes the perspective of history from below and subaltern history. For example, in chapter four, Varnava refers to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who is the author of '*Can the Subaltern Speak?*'. Moreover, he examined Cypriot muleteers who went to Istanbul with the British Army after the Macedonian Front. Compared to Varnava's book the current thesis is more specific with a narrower scope. This study aims to illustrate some part of the history of Cypriot Mule Corps in the Macedonian Front. In addition, this thesis aims to shed light on identity troubles among Cypriots especially Turkish Cypriots. Compared to Varnava's precious book, this thesis includes more details about Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, this thesis includes the study of the Royal Irish Rangers, Major J.P.B. Condon who compiled some

²² Hacker, Barton C. "White Man's War, Coloured Man's Labour. Working for the British Army on the Western Front." *Itinerario* 38, no. 3 (2014): 27–44.

²³ Jacqueline Jenkinson "All in the Same Uniform? The Participation of Black Colonial Residents in the British Armed Forces in the First World War" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* vol.40 No.2 (June 2012),pp.207-230.

²⁴ Griffin, Nicholas J. "Britain's Chinese Labor Corps in World War I." *Military Affairs* Vol.40 No.3 (1976), pp.102-108.

²⁵ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38.

²⁶ Andrekos Varnava, *Serving the Empire in the Great War The Cypriot Mule Corps, Imperial Loyalty and Silenced Memory* (UK: Manchester Uni Press,2017)

records about the Cypriot Mule Corps in 1979. He interviewed some survivor muleteers in 1979 and this thesis differs from the book of Varnava also by using Condon's study.

In addition, some books mention Cypriot muleteers to explain related subjects on the Macedonian Front. For example, Colonel R. H. Beadon mentions Cyprus in his book titled '*The Royal Army Service Corps*'.²⁷ He provides general information about the British transportation in wars. When he explains the Macedonian Front, he points out to Cypriots in Salonika who contributed British Army. He does not give further details on the Cypriot muleteers. In addition, Alan Palmer wrote about the Salonika Front in his book '*The Gardeners of Salonika*'.²⁸ Similarly, details on Cypriot muleteers is limited and does not go beyond some explanations for the necessity of mule packs in Salonika in the British Army. Considering existing literature, history of the Cypriot muleteers needs to be further studied.

The major primary sources from the British National Archive is used in this thesis. Resources in the Shropshire Archive are also used. In addition, documents which belong to the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive in Istanbul and The State Archive in Nicosia are used in this study.

The Shropshire Archive only includes some copies from the British National Archive. In the British National Archive, some telegrams were found between governor of Cyprus, Sir John E. Clauson, and the Secretary of the State for the Colonies. In these telegrams, they had discussed establishing the Cypriot Mule Corps. After the establishment of this corps, they talked about some issues about the corps such as salaries and number of volunteers. Further, the National Archive includes the agreement contract through which it is possible to examine that what the Cypriot volunteers approved when they joined the corps as well as what the rules of the British army were.

Furthermore, the British National Archive contains an army book which includes all people who joined the war. It includes volunteers' name, address, their period of services and one of their relatives. The National Archive has the registry of muleteers who were granted the British Medal after the Great War. The Royal Irish Rangers, Major J.P.B. Condon compiled some records about the Cypriot Mule Corps in 1979. This document can be accessed by people in the National Archive.

²⁷ Colonel R.H. Beadon, *The Royal Army Service Corps A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army vol:2* (UK: Cambridge Printed at the University Press,1931)

²⁸ Alan Palmer, *The Gardeners of Salonika: The Macedonian Campaign 1915-1918* (UK: Faber and Faber, 2009)

The Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive is used in this thesis to give some details about Turkish administrators in Cyprus. The State Archives in Nicosia includes of the registry of the British administration in the colonial era. It has various supplemental documents to the documents in the British National Archive.

In summary, this thesis examines the Cypriot Mule Corps using resources from The National Archives in London, Shropshire Archive, State Archives in Nicosia and the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive in Istanbul. This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter looks at the telegrams between Cyprus High Commissioner and Colonial Secretary about Cypriot muleteers. In the second chapter, the agreement contract which was signed by Cypriot muleteers when they joined the corps is analyzed. Further, the conditions of the British army are explained. The third chapter examines the methods devised by the British for attracting people to the Macedonian Front. Why Cypriots chose to join the British army is analyzed in the third chapter. Next, the fourth chapter analyzes Major J.P.B Condon's work about the Corps. Condon's study is not an academic work but it is pivotal for accessing the interviews of survivor muleteers. His study is central as it is the first written study on Cypriot muleteers. Finally, the conclusion part finalizes and presents the findings of this thesis.

CHAPTER 1

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF CYPRUS AND THE COLONIAL SECRETARY

This chapter aims to analyze the background for establishing Cypriot Mule Corps by referring to the correspondence between mainly Cyprus High Commissioner John Eugene Clauson and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Fourteen telegrams will be analyzed and the meanings of these telegrams will be discussed. Specifically, the telegrams which were sent in 1916 will be examined. This year is chosen because the Cypriot Mule Corps was established in 1916.

John Eugene Clauson became the Cyprus High Commissioner in 1915 as the successor of Goold Adams. Clauson was a military high flyer and he served as the assistant secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense for six years. These years taught him the intricacies of internal politics of the British Colonial and War Offices.²⁹ The telegrams herein belong to John Clauson. His replies to the Macedonian Front and his reports to the Secretary of State for the Colonies are examined in this chapter. Requirements and requests of Great Britain and other Entente States from Cypriot Mule Corps will be analyzed through these telegrams.

1.1 Introduction

The main objective of the British Government for colonizing Cyprus was to attain a strategic location in Mediterranean. Nevertheless, after occupying Egypt in 1882 the importance of Cyprus took a back seat.³⁰ Indeed, a book has been published on the inconsequential possession of Cyprus.³¹ It can be deduced that the strategic importance of Cyprus was diminished after the occupation of Egypt, a situation which was changed by the First World War. When the Great War broke out, the military importance of Cyprus

²⁹ Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p.77.

³⁰ Ibid.p.69.

³¹ Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus 1878-1915 The Inconsequential Possession*,(UK: Manchester University Press,2009).

increased dramatically.³² On 5 November 1914, Cyprus was annexed formally and the British secretariat published the proclamation in English, Turkish and Greek. Interestingly, after the British annexation of the island, the Kadi of Cyprus, Ali Rifat, and administrators of the endowments, Musa and İrfan Efendi, congratulated the British government and they traveled throughout the island to spread propaganda on behalf of the British government.³³ Nevertheless, when it is investigated further, it is understood that the Ottoman government sent an inspector to examine the people who spread propaganda against the Ottoman state. The inspector reported that the administrators of the endowments, Musa and İrfan Efendi were not real administrators.³⁴ Most likely, the Kadi of Cyprus Ali Rifat Efendi negotiated with the British government and kept Musa and İrfan Efendi for disseminating British propaganda. It is understood that the British administration behaved very carefully and they avoided attracting objections to the new administration. They negotiated with the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots to prevent potential protests and to attain Turkish people's sympathy. Propagandas of the Kadi Ali Rifat and Musa and İrfan Efendi indicate that the British government wanted to gain public's sympathy secretly. Conceivably, Musa and İrfan Efendi were not actual officers but the Kadi was the real Kadi of the Cyprus. He collaborated with the British government as an Ottoman officer. Also, the engagement ceremony of the eldest son of the Mufti, Ziyaeddin Efendi, took place in Mufti's house to which the British secretary Harry Luke was invited.³⁵ It is understood that Turkish Cypriot notables wanted to side with the British administration. The position of Turkish Cypriots will be elaborated extensively below. In addition to these collaborations, when Great Britain annexed Cyprus, all public ceremonies about British annexation of Cyprus were prohibited. They did not want to provoke Ottoman subjects in Cyprus.³⁶ Thus, after 5 November 1914 Cyprus became a part of Great Britain completely, and Great Britain could now use the island to serve its interests.

³² Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p.69.

³³ Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive, Istanbul, Turkey, BOA, A.MTZ.KB. 1E,1,33,1-6, November 1916 / BOA, HR.SYS.2428,13,1-6, November 1916.

³⁴ Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive, Istanbul, Turkey, BOA,A.MTZ.KB. 1E,1,33,4, November 1916.

³⁵ Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p.72.

³⁶ Ibid.p.76.

In the Great War, Serbia did not have an advantageous position, a position where it was surrounded by Central Powers on all sides. In addition to this, Serbia had a weak communication with its allies.³⁷ In 1915, the Central Powers, Austria, Germany and Bulgaria, attacked the Serbian territory and Serbian civilian population were compelled to withdraw to Greece. Serbian forces were not strong and for this reason the Allied Powers came to Salonika to assist the Serbian defense.³⁸ Hence, the Macedonian Front was comprised of the Allied forces Britain, France, Serbia and Russia against the Central Powers Austria-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria. Additionally, two Ottoman divisions joined the fight on the eastern end of the Macedonian Front from autumn 1916 to spring 1917.³⁹

The geographical situation of the Macedonian Front needed help from the pack animals. Specifically, northern Greece has mountainous topography coupled with poor infrastructure and rail network. For these reasons, soldiers in the Macedonian Front required pack animals for transportation.⁴⁰ These primitive factors in the Macedonian Front made the Mule Corps essential. Cyprus had an advantageous geographical location for Great Britain because it was far away from the main war fronts and yet its distance was not prohibitive for reaching the fronts. Moreover, Cyprus had potential to provide both men and animals, specifically mules, for the corps.

The Cypriot Mule Corps were sent to the Macedonian Front to serve in British army. In 1916, Allied Powers required backup force in the front. Although the exact age of the muleteers is not certain, during his visit to the depot and muleteer training school range on 6 September 1917 Major General Rycroft raised concerns about the age range of the muleteers. He remarked that Major Sisman should have warned him about the age of muleteers. The age range should be between 19 between 35 years.⁴¹ It is understood that before this date the age of the muleteers was not regulated strictly.

³⁷ Gordon Brooks Shepherd, *November 1918: The Last Act of the Great War*, (Boston: Little Brown,1981),pp.116-117.

³⁸ Loukianos Hassiotis, "Macedonia in the Great War." *Macedonia Studies Journal*, vol.2 (2015), p.10.

³⁹ Richard C Hall, 'Bulgaria, in: 1914-1918'-online *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 02 February 2016.

⁴⁰ Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p.79.

⁴¹ State Archive, Nicosia, Cyprus, SA1/722/1916/305 6 September 1917.

1.2 Telegrams between Cyprus and the Macedonian Front

The earliest telegram for this research is from 24 May 1916.⁴² Britannic Majesty's Minister of Athens sent a telegram to the High Commissioner of Cyprus and asked about muleteers. He wanted to recruit 7,000 experienced muleteers which included both Christians and Muslims for British Army in Salonika. He stated how much muleteer recruits could be paid as well as their period of engagement which depended on the duration of the war. Three days after this telegram, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Salonika sent a telegram to the High Commissioner of Cyprus.⁴³ He was anxious about raising muleteer corps but he thought that reliable Cypriots might be obtainable for serving in the Macedonian Front. First, he asked for 3,000 muleteers, a number which would increase later on. He informed the Commissioner about the daily wage and the provision of clothes and rations for the recruits. He wanted information on the reasonable numbers of potential Cypriot muleteers as well as the period they would need to enroll them. On 29 May 1916, the High Commissioner of Cyprus, Clauson, wrote to Athens and Salonika about his estimation and he said 3,000 muleteers could be enrolled in three weeks.⁴⁴ On 14 June 1916, Athens required 6,000 packed animals for army services.⁴⁵ He enquired about available animals for purchase in Cyprus and their respective cost. Clauson replied that the average cost was 18 British pounds and probably 2,000 animals could be gathered for sale.

Some telegrams record that Commanding Chief of Salonika was under the control of the Serbian army. Possibly, the Minister of Athens belonged to the Greek army. Thus, it is understood that both Greeks and Serbians required rear guard support in the Macedonian Front. On the other hand, the British political thought can be realized thanks to these telegrams. For instance, on 22 June 1916, the Serbian army in Salonika requested 2,000 mules and 500 men and enquired information on the purchase and payment.⁴⁶ Moreover, they asked about the port that would be the most advantageous for protection against enemy attacks for shipping animals. One day later, the High Commissioner of Cyprus sent a telegram with the title of 'secret and urgent' inquired whether the mules

⁴² The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/178,no:1, 24 May 1916.

⁴³ Ibid.no:2, 27 May1916.

⁴⁴ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/178/179,no:3, 29 May 1916.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 179, no:5, 14 June 1916.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 180,no:9, 22 June1916.

and officers were requested by the Serbian or the British army.⁴⁷ He added that this detail was very important for political reasons. He underlined that both muleteers and mules should be for the British Army. Serbia and Great Britain fought on the same side but we can infer that Britain did not trust her allies and it did not bestow its resources to under the command of friendly but foreign forces. On 29 June 1916, Clauson informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies where he wrote that any purchases made in Cyprus would be used to serve solely for the purposes of the British military.⁴⁸ Before Clauson's memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 24 June 1916, General Mine who belonged to the Serbian army sent a telegram to Clauson and said mules were for the Serbian Army and added that he had consulted with the War office about this.⁴⁹ On the other hand, muleteers were for the British army but their enrollment was not required at the present moment.

1.3 Telegrams between Cyprus and Secretary for the Colonies

On 26 June Clauson sent a telegram to the Secretary for the Colonies to provide information on the muleteers and mules which were requested from Cyprus to meet army demands at Salonica.⁵⁰ He indicated that it was still in progress but 3,000 muleteers should be gathered for the British Army and 2,000 mules were for Serbian Army. He thought that raising of a Cypriot transport corps for British army could bring excellent results. Further, he referred to the military report on Cyprus which was prepared by the General Staff in 1913. According to this report, Cypriot transport corps could be profitable from military standpoint. Before the start of the Great War, British Government had prepared military reports on Cyprus.

As it was mentioned in the introduction part, Great Britain rented Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. In 1913, Cyprus legally still belonged to the Ottoman Empire. It is understood that in all probability, Great Britain designed its plans around including Cyprus in the Great War.

Moreover, Clauson continued his telegram with discussing Cypriots. He believed that both Christians and Muslims 'with insignificant exceptions' keenly desired the

⁴⁷ Ibid.181,no:10, 23 June 1916.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 268, 29 June 1916.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 182, no:11, 24 June 1916.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 176, 26 June 1916.

success of the British arms. Of course, this opinion was not objective, but it is important to note that during these years any important uprising or disturbance did not happen in Cyprus. Had any significant uprising had occurred in Cyprus, the governor could not have mentioned gathering Cypriot transport corps easily. Nevertheless, in this case the Cyprus governor Clauson did not fear any opposition among Christian and Muslim Cypriots.

On the other hand, on 29 September 1916 Clauson sent a telegram to the Colonial Secretary about an article in a French journal, *Journal Lloyd de Constantinople*, which was published on 12 July 1916.⁵¹ He mentioned that disturbances in Cyprus mentioned in this article were not true, and the disturbance refers to the four boatmen who sent a message to the enemy coast in two stolen boats. He added that the Muslims of Syrian origin implicated in the affair were under arrest. Moreover, on 20 October, the editor of the *Near East* sent a private telegram to an unknown sir (his name was not written). In addition, it is not known that the *Near East* was a journal or a newspaper because the editor did not give further information. He also mentioned the French Journal *Lloyd de Constantinople* which was under German control. He said that this journal printed an absurd article on 12 July 1916 about riots in Cyprus chiefly dealing with the supposed discontent of the Muslim inhabitants with English rule.⁵² Further, this article alluded to supposed riots against the British troops and claimed a wholesale arrest of Greeks. The editor of the *Near East* identified this article as false reports in enemy journals. He added that there has not been the slightest disturbance of any kind in Cyprus since its annexation to the British Empire in November 1914. He highlighted that people of the island are peaceful and prosperous, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots ‘yield a ready and cheerful obedience’ to the British government.⁵³ These words sound exaggerated. Perhaps, the riots which French journal mentioned did not happen in Cyprus but why should both Greek and Turkish Cypriots yield a ready and cheerful obedience to the British government? Probably, the person who wrote the telegram tried to portray more peaceful situation in Cyprus than there currently was, which may be because of his fear to his superiors. Probably, he did not want to specify small-scale problems in Cyprus.

Mete Hatay who is a Turkish Cypriot intellectual asserts that the information of Muslim Cypriots who joined the First World War is very limited due to the British

⁵¹ Ibid. 506, 29 September 1916.

⁵² Ibid. 508, 20 October 1916.

⁵³ Ibid. 20 October 1916.

annexation and the silenced Turkish press.⁵⁴ When one investigates the Turkish press in Cyprus in the war period it is understood that Seyf newspaper was shut down in 1914 and Kıbrıs newspaper was terminated in 1916. Social and economic life became difficult in this period because of the Great War and hence the Turkish Cypriots did not have any publications until 1919.⁵⁵ In the beginning of the war, Turkish Cypriots might have been unaware of the countries participating in the war. Probably, they did not know that Great Britain fought against the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, Famagusta which is one of the cities in Cyprus has a Monument of Fallen Soldiers for Gallipoli. Great Britain started to transfer the Ottoman war captives from Gallipoli, Suez Canal and Hedjaz to Famagusta on September 1916 and this monument belongs to these soldiers.⁵⁶

Moreover, in one telegram dated to 2 August 1916, Clauson mentioned 3,500 Muslim prisoners.⁵⁷ He informed the Colonial Secretary about 1,500 proper huts for the prisoners. Thus, despite the silenced press and weak communication, Turkish Cypriots might have been aware that Great Britain fought against the Ottoman Empire. They must have realized the truth. The Battle of Gallipoli took place between 1915 and 1916, and hence it was before the formation of the Cypriot Mule Corps. In the light of these facts we understand that Turkish Cypriots knew that they would fight against the Ottoman Empire when they joined the mule corps. Despite this, Cyprus High Commissioner Clauson was not worried about any uprising and furthermore he insisted that both Christians and Muslims keenly desired the British army to attain victory. Moreover, the editor of the *Near East* highlighted the fact of a ready and cheerful Cypriot population who were obedient to the British government. It can be inferred that British government in Cyprus did not face any serious social problems during the war period.

On the other hand, Mahmut Celalettin Efendi who was a Turkish Cypriot council member of the Parliament of Laws (Kavanin Meclisi) requested precaution about the bad condition of the Ottoman prisoner camp in Famagusta. The British administration took some precaution thanks to the request of Mahmut Celalettin Efendi. However, the British administration accused him of helping prisoners of the war and Mahmut Celalettin Efendi

⁵⁴ *Gazete* 360, 28 March 2014.

⁵⁵ Pınar Gürçınar, "Kıbrıs Türk Tarihi İçerisinde Kıbrıs Türk Matbaacılığının Doğuşu, Geçirdiği Modernleşme Aşamaları Ve Bu Aşamaların Kıbrıs Türk Toplumuna Etkileri Üzerine Bir Deneme" *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol.7 Issue.31, (2014),p.344.

⁵⁶ Mahmut Akkor, "I. Dünya Savaşında Çeşitli Ülkelerdeki Türk Esir Kampları" (MA Thesis, Sakarya University,2006), pp.106-107.

⁵⁷ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/304, 2 August 1916.

was exiled to the Kyrenia Castle until the end of the World War I.⁵⁸ In addition, at the beginning of the 20th century Famagusta involved the lowest Muslim population, 20.7%.⁵⁹ It means the British administration did not choose Famagusta randomly for the Ottoman prisoners. The administration placed the Ottoman prisoners in Famagusta where the population of Muslim Cypriots was few to create trouble for the administration.

It seems like that ‘insignificant exceptions’ were not as few as Clauson thought. Some Turkish Cypriots tried to help Ottoman prisoners and this shows that they did not keenly desire the success of the British arms. Considering the general national and religious feelings in this period, these reactions are not unexpected.

Before the annexation of Cyprus, unsurprisingly, Cyprus was influenced by the Ottoman Empire which was its legal owner. For example, some Young Turks escaped from the Hamidian regime to Cyprus which seemed more liberal because of the colonial government. In the beginning of the 20th century Turkish Cypriot intellectuals started to be affected by Young Turks' opinions. On the other hand, ordinary Turkish Cypriots were still faithful to the Sultan. When Young Turks rose to power in Istanbul, their influence over Turkish Cypriots became explicit.⁶⁰ Hence, in the 20th century, Turkish Cypriots were not unaware about national feelings. Also, they did not sever their bonds with the Ottoman State. Turkish Cypriots continued to connect with the Ottomans through religion, language, commerce, and culture. For instance, zaptiehs (policemen) had worn the Fez which was hallmark of the Turkish man until 1930s in Cyprus.⁶¹ On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community was divided because conservative groups still supported the old monarchist order while many Turkish Cypriots supported the government of Committee of Union and Progress in Istanbul.⁶²

On the other side, Clauson's word ‘insignificant exceptions’ was not totally exaggerated since after the annexation of Cyprus, some leaders of Turkish Cypriots came into British high commissioner's presence to highlight their loyalty. They wanted to protect Cyprus from Greece annexation. They consented to become a part of Great Britain

⁵⁸ Mahmut Akkor, ‘I. Dünya Savaşında Çeşitli Ülkelerdeki Türk Esir Kampları’ (MA Thesis, Sakarya University,2006), p.109.

⁵⁹ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.87.

⁶⁰ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkırcısında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul:İletişim,2005),pp.215-216.

⁶¹ Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p75

⁶² Ibid. p.76.

forever.⁶³ It is understood that considerable number of Turkish Cypriots and some of the administrative actors such as Kadi Ali Rifat whom was mentioned above were satisfied with British administration. On the other hand, the intellectual influence of the Young Turks on the Turkish Cypriots cannot be denied. Some, especially elites, supported the British administration but ordinary people had considerable national and religious links with the Ottomans.

Moreover, Turkish Cypriots were confused about the new status of the island because ordinary life style of the Turkish Cypriots was not changed. Their customs still continued. The birthday of the Sultan was celebrated every year. Also at night, they illuminated minarets of Ayia Sophia mosque in Nicosia.⁶⁴ Ordinary Turkish people still felt they were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This is also the reason of Turkish Cypriots' acceptance of the British administration as under this administration their social lives did not change dramatically. Most of the Ottoman rituals were maintained and they still felt the Ottoman hegemony in Cyprus. The British governor was already appointed in 1878 by the Ottoman Sultan and Turkish Cypriots were accustomed to foreign administrators. Hence, British High Commissioner Clauson either ignored the ordinary people among Turkish Cypriots or he did not want to inform his superiors regarding them. Possibly, he did not think Turkish Cypriots' loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was substantial and he may have believed he could resolve this potential problem on his own.

On the other hand, it is important to note that the decision of Greek Cypriots to join the British army meant that they could fight on the same side with Greece. In the beginning, Greece did not want to join the Great War against Germany because Greek King Constantine shared a line of descent with Germany. On the other hand, Greek government was governed by Eleutherios Venizelos and he wanted to be in side of Great Britain. In the end, Greece joined the war on the side of Allied Powers.⁶⁵ Considering Greek Cypriots' national feelings and their connection with Greece, joining to the Great War was not a controversial issue for them. However, in the beginning of the 19th century, in contrast with the elites Greek Cypriots, most of the Greek Cypriots who belonged to peasantry and working classes had not been Hellenized yet.⁶⁶ In addition, an important

⁶³ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul:İletişim,2005),p.215.

⁶⁴ Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p74.

⁶⁵ Alan Palmer, *The Gardeners Of Salonika: The Macedonian Campaign 1915-1918*, (UK: Faber and Faber,2011),pp.33-55.

⁶⁶ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?"

fact which has not been discussed is the differences in religious sect between Greek Cypriots and the British: the Greek Cypriots were Orthodox but British people were Protestant.⁶⁷ Greek Cypriots, especially the Orthodox Church in Cyprus, were not satisfied with the British administration. During the Ottoman reign, Cyprus was governed according to the *Millet* system whereby each religious community composed one *Millet* and people were classified according to their religion. Religious leaders had the power of political representation of their people under the Ottoman administration. However, British rule of Cyprus changed and undermined the political power of the Orthodox Church.⁶⁸ Probably, if the British administration had given similar rights to the Orthodox Church, the Church would have been satisfied with the Great Britain. On the other hand, arguably ordinary Greek Cypriots did not want to be governed by different and heretic (at least according to the orthodox people) sects. Both the Ottoman and the British people were heretics according to the Orthodox belief. Because of this sect issue, Greek Cypriots perhaps were not totally enthusiastic about joining the Great War. Nonetheless, joining the side which included Greece, did not seem controversial to them. They probably got used to fight with Protestants because their cognates also fought and allied with them.

In addition, on 19 April 1916, Commissioner and Provost Marshal C. Wodehouse informed the Chief Secretary about the Greek Independent celebration in Cyprus.⁶⁹ He wrote that the Greek Community of Larnaca used the anniversary of Greek Independence as an occasion and they held a national political celebration. Customary Religious Service took place at the Church of St. Lazarus. The ceremony of the administering oath followed this in the Euriviades School for Girls. Wodehouse said that clearly the oath administered was one of allegiance to a foreign monarch, King Constantine of Greece. Greek Cypriots concluded the ceremony by the singing of the Greek National Anthem. Also, he continued that the procession was formed under the Greek flag. In the end of his telegram, Wodehouse attached the translation of this oath '*Neon Ethnos*' which means new race;

I promise to keep faith to the Mother Country and the King, to assist every man and on every occasion and to obey blindly to the Law of the Scouts. So, let God help me in life.⁷⁰

Itinerario No.38, (2015),p.95.

⁶⁷ Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, (New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004),p.22.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*p.16.

⁶⁹ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/47-48, 19 April 1916.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 49, 19 April 1916.

After this oath leader of the Scouts Body, Metropolitan Bishop, the consul and the mayor talked to the scouts eloquently. Lastly, they closed the ceremony with the National Hymn. It is understood that some groups of the Greek Cypriot community felt faithful to the King of Greece and they tried to create loyalty among other Greek Cypriots. Thus, the participation to the Great War on the British side was a confusing issue for Greek Cypriots. As it was mentioned, the King of Greece had relations with Germany and he hesitated to join the war on the side of British Army. Some Greek Cypriots might have felt the same hesitation about joining the British army.

In the light of these discussions, it can be deduced that joining the Great War was not easy both for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. They did not keenly desire success of the British arms profoundly but especially Greek Cypriots did not cause any troubles during recruitment at least according to our current knowledge.

Furthermore, the population of Cyprus in this time should be considered. Most probably, Clauson considered this data as well. In 1881, the Muslim, Christian Orthodox, and others in Cyprus were 45,458, 137,631 and 2,541, respectively.⁷¹ In total, the population of Cyprus was 185,630 and a great majority of this population was Greek Cypriots. Disturbance among Turkish Cypriots were not a great problem for British administration because they were a minority. Further to their small population, Turkish Cypriots were divided among themselves. Although the term ‘insignificant exceptions’ appears confusing at first glance, when explored further we can see that Clauson was not entirely wrong. In the end, the number of people who could be potential exceptions was insignificant. Some Turkish Cypriots might not have been happy with either the annexation of Cyprus or becoming subjects of the enemies of the Ottoman State. Nonetheless, they did not amount to a large enough proportion to cause anxiety for the British government.

On 28 June 1916, High Commissioner of Cyprus, Clauson, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.⁷² He again informed the colonial secretary about gathering corps with Cypriots muleteers for British army and mules for Serbian army. He repeated his words about the desire for British success among Christian and Muslim Cypriots. However, he was worried about sending Serbians to Cyprus or bringing Serbian army into the question. He believed that this could stir mixed feelings among Cypriots.

⁷¹ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul:İletişim,2005),p.213.

⁷² The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/269, 28 June 1916.

He was still against allowing Serbians to use Cypriot mules. He thought that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots might be against Serbians.

Although Clauson raised the issue of mixed feelings in the island, he did not separate Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Instead he referred to their common feelings. Moreover, he did not want to dissatisfy the Cypriots as he needed them in the mule corps. We can deduce the strategies of British political intelligence in this situation where Clauson did not want to leave anything to chance. He was very careful about satisfying both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

On 5 August 1916, Clauson sent a telegram to the Colonial Secretary in which he referred to the cypher telegram of the Colonial Secretary.⁷³ This cypher telegram could not be consulted for this thesis as it was not included in the archive documents. Nonetheless, it is understood that they did not communicate only via normal routes but also, they communicated secretly. It is clear that the cypher telegram was about the agreement of muleteers because Clauson mentioned the agreement in the telegram. He said that 1,091 muleteers set out to Salonika and the copy of printed agreements were sent by the post and these agreements were similar to the ones used for Greek muleteers at Salonika. Its contents included: service for one year or the duration of the war, obedience to command except to bear arms, being subject to military law as administered in the British army, payment of 90 drachmas a month: a provision of food, some clothing including brassard, as well as the return passage. The agreement will be further discussed in chapter 2. It can be deduced from this telegram that the Secretary of the State for the Colonies regarded the agreement to be important to the extent that he sent cypher telegram about this subject. This telegram also highlighted that 1,091 muleteers had left Cyprus for Salonika before 5 August. Moreover, British government had established a Military Mule Purchasing Commission. The assignment of this commission was, to buy mules and engage muleteers in Cyprus.⁷⁴ The British government considered potential issues regarding the mules which might be the underlying reason for their political success in persuading both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to join the war. On 7 August Clauson sent another telegram to the colonial secretary in which he enclosed copies of printed agreement form for muleteers.⁷⁵ In addition, he confirmed that 1,091 muleteers, 919

⁷³ Ibid. 328, 05 August 1916.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 333, 07 August 1916.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 334, 07 August 1916.

mules and 49 ponies were shipped to Salonika. It seems they did not use only mules but also ponies.

1.4 Difficult Communication with Turkish Cypriots

A telegram dating 6 September 1916, highlighted the difficult communication with Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁶ It was sent by Clauson to the colonial secretary and he again mentioned a secret telegram. We can get information about this secret telegram thanks to Clauson. He wrote that it was advised to minimize contact with Turkish Cypriots. He identified Turkish Cypriots as uneasy. When referred to Turkish Cypriots as uneasy, he referred to his older telegram from 9 September 1915, approximately a year earlier. We can infer that the British administration have previously informed the colonial secretary about Turkish Cypriots. To do so, they must have conducted some investigations on Turkish Cypriots and therefore we could infer that most probably the British administration had observed the Turkish Cypriot community.

If one compares Clauson's previous use of 'insignificant exceptions' about desiring the success of British arms with the term 'uneasy', a contradiction can be seen. Probably, Military Mule Purchasing Commission encountered some problems among Turkish Cypriots. Such problems in 1915 is unknown yet presumably Turkish Cypriots may have regarded themselves to be the real masters of the island as they were descendent of the Ottomans. They did not realize their minority position at that time.⁷⁷ In 1881, Turkish population formed approximately 24% of the total island population. In the line with this, according to the 1911 religious/ethnic distribution of Cypriot population, Muslim population was 20.6%.⁷⁸ Presumably, some Turkish Cypriots were not satisfied with the British administration which may have caused some uneasiness. Nevertheless, we do not have any information on uprisings in these times.

This uneasiness was not apparent among the Turkish Cypriot community although it was realized by the British administration. Indeed, Niyazi Kızılyürek, a Turkish Cypriot political scientist, highlights the collaboration between Turkish Cypriots and British

⁷⁶ Ibid. 418,419, 06 September 1916.

⁷⁷ Even today, in schools of Northern Cyprus we learn that our population is smaller than Greek Cypriots but we are not taught to contextualize the extent of the population size. Greek Cypriot population is substantially larger than the Turkish Cypriots.

⁷⁸ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.84.

administration from 1882 to 1930.⁷⁹ Also, this collaboration can be inferred from the reactions of Kadi Ali Rifat and administrators of endowment Musa and İrfan Efendi to British annexation. This shows that Turkish Cypriot notables were not uneasy as they collaborated closely with the British administration. Indeed, the difficult and uneasy Turkish Cypriot individuals seem to belong to the ordinary people. Probably, they still felt a sense of belonging to the Ottoman Sultan. This belonging might have stirred some uneasiness among ordinary Turkish Cypriots. Further, muleteers were mostly from rural areas and they were mostly peasants and laborers.⁸⁰ Most probably, considerable amount of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot muleteers belonged to the lower class. It is plausible that when British administration observed Turkish Cypriot community they focused on ordinary people, but not on notables.

Furthermore, after the British annexation of Cyprus collaboration with Turkish Cypriot notables became more important because the Ottoman Empire declared holy Islamic war against the Allied Powers of Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro. The important point was that the Ottoman caliph adjudged about Muslims against whom Muslims should fight and condemned Muslims to fires of hell if they fought on an opposing side, i.e. the Allied forces. British administration demanded that Kadi İrfan Bey controlled Turkish Cypriot populations and kept them silent and harmless for the British administration. They saw İrfan Bey as ‘soul expounder of the Turkish view’.⁸¹ The relation between Kadi İrfan Bey and British administration is not the subject of this study but this relation is important to thoroughly grasp the fear of the British administration for a potential opposition among Turkish Cypriot population. On the other hand, the caliph’s condemning of the Muslims to the fire of hell was noteworthy for Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, this may have played a central role in Turkish Cypriots donations to the Cyprus branch of Red Crescent Society. These donations amounted to nearly 1,500 British pounds by December 1915.⁸² Turkish Cypriots tried to show their side with the Ottoman Empire. Their minds still belonged to the Muslim Ottoman Empire. These factors could be the primary causes of the uneasiness of the Turkish Cypriots.

⁷⁹ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul:İletişim,2005),p.219.

⁸⁰ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.87

⁸¹ Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*,(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),p76.

⁸² *Ibid.*p.76.

1.5 The Issue of the Armenian Corps

In the same telegram, the Colonial Secretary advised to Cyprus High Commissioner that the Armenian corps might be an alternative corps to minimize their contact with the Turkish Cypriots.⁸³ However, it is understood that they did not pursue this further as new corps because Clauson mentioned the withdrawing of the Armenian corps. He argued that withdrawing of Armenian corps is about political influences. Further, Clauson recommended that the secluded part of the island which were in north or east should be sought. If they had withdrawn from establishing Armenian corps, what they needed to seek was the north or east of the island. It seems that they did not seek Armenians because they did not want to organize Armenian corps. That is to say, it might be possible that Clauson advised to seek Turkish Cypriots in north or east part of the island. Further information about this subject is not available. Nonetheless, if British government had sought the north or east part of Cyprus to find Turkish Cypriots, this could have been for several reasons. First, Turkish Cypriots might have uprisen against British government and the search could have been to find these rebels. Second, some Turkish Cypriots might have left the mule corps after registration. They might have escaped to these secluded parts of the island. Another assumption is that the British government might have forced them to join the mule corps. Although, the mule corps were composed of volunteer Cypriots. As it was mentioned before, Cypriots signed an agreement and accepted the conditions of the war. Unfortunately, these speculations are not enough for understanding what the British sought in the secluded parts of the island. On the other hand, it is possible that the British government might have sought these parts to find Armenians.

Further, Clauson added in the same telegram that the local British military camps encountered some difficulties in sea and land transport. Furthermore, importing many requirements caused incurred expenses and delays. Difficult sea and land transport is reasonable under the war conditions. This information gives clues about financial life in Cyprus. Even the British army could not attain their necessities on time and they tried to cope with high expenses. How the ordinary people could supply their needs in this situation? The economic condition in Cyprus was very hard for the ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the war time. Even from this unrelated sentence about the economic condition in Cyprus, the troubled economy of the war time period can be deduced.

⁸³ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/418,419, 06 September 1916.

1.6 Conclusion

The need for the Cypriot Mule Corps in the Macedonian Front can be understood with these telegrams. Pack animals were needed on the hinterland to transport armory. The colonies were the best option for colonial empires to supply the necessities of the Great War. In addition, some numbers regarding mules and muleteers which was sent to the Macedonian Front in 1916 was shown through these telegrams. Hence, the establishment of the Cypriot Mule Corps was not unusual. As it was discussed earlier, Great Britain also used its other colonies in the Great War. These telegrams shed light on some parts of the history of the Cypriot Mule Corps.

Further, the social condition of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were analyzed briefly in this chapter. It seems like that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had reasons to be against British administration. Nevertheless, Cypriots joined the Macedonian Mule Corps in spite of their identities and they did not create remarkable problems for the British administration. The British administration did not consider Cypriots as a threat, instead the administration described Cypriots who keenly desired British success. The reasons why Cypriots decide to join the Macedonian Mule Corps will be explained in detail in the second and third chapters.

CHAPTER 2

IMPORTANCE OF THE LETTER OF AGREEMENT

British administration did not leave anything to chance in the process of recruitment. They considered some possibilities and they prepared agreement document for the volunteer muleteers.⁸⁴ The British administration did not prepare only one edition of the agreement document. Various editions were published in accordance with the necessities of the British army. This chapter analyzes the letter of agreement and demonstrates its importance.

2.1 The Language of the Letter of Agreement

The first issue is the National Archive in London included only two forms of the agreement. One of them is in English and the other is in Greek. This seems interesting because according to the British World War I Medal Card index at least 785 Turkish Cypriots joined the war for which they had received Imperial Medals.⁸⁵ Considering that some volunteers may have died in the war, it can be said that 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined to the Great War. It is acceptable that Turkish Cypriots were a minority group in the Cypriot Mule Corps. Indeed, in total, 11,193 Cypriots received Imperial Medal.⁸⁶ This means that approximately 15,000 Cypriots joined the war, and therefore 1,000 Turkish Cypriots would indeed form a minority group among total 15,000 volunteers. Nevertheless, approximately 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined to the war for which they had to sign agreement document.

Fortunately, the Turkish agreement was found in the State Archives in Nicosia. The British government could not have underestimated the importance of getting a signed agreement from the Turkish Cypriots. In 4 July 1916, the Office of the Chief Secretary to the British Government sent a telegram to the Superintendent Government Printing Office.⁸⁷ The Office of Chief Secretary ordered printing office to make the following

⁸⁴The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/335, 25 August 1916.

⁸⁵ Ibid. WO 372.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ State Archives Nicosia, SA1/758/1916, 4 July 1916.

copies: 100 one sided copies in English, and 3,000 copies printed in Greek on one side and Turkish (Ottoman language) on the other side. Also, the Office ordered Callones and Toundjian to arrange for completion of the Greek and Turkish to be made. It is not obvious who are Callones and Toundjian but probably they were officers in printing office. It seems like that final form of the agreement documents was not ready at this time. The Chief Secretary demanded to see the final of the documents and ordered that the forms are urgently required. In this demand, the Secretary noted that 10 needed to be sent to the Chief Secretary, 40 to be sent to major L. Beirne, the Commissioner of Limassol, and the remaining 50 copies to be retained pending further instruction. In addition to these, the Chief Secretary required 500 copies in Greek and Turkish to be sent to Major Beirne and 2,500 copies to be retained pending instruction from Major Beirne.⁸⁸ Hence, the British government did not leave out the Muslim Turkish community and they prepared an agreement document in Turkish.

2.2 The Clauses of the Letter of Agreement

The date of the agreement which is in the National Archive in London is 25 August 1916. Probably, this was the date that the Secretary of State for the Colonies received the copy of the form of printed agreement. Clauson wrote in his telegram that he sent the copy of the printed letter of agreement to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Interestingly, there are two dates in the telegram: 7 August 1916 and 25 August 1916.⁸⁹ Possibly, Clauson sent the agreement on 7 August but the Secretary received the printed agreement on 25 August. This agreement probably the first one because the other agreements which were found in the State Archives belong to later times. In this part, clauses belong to this agreement will be analyzed.

The agreement started with the period of the agreement. The volunteer Cypriot muleteers wrote their name at the top and agreed to serve the Britannic Majesty's Government (British army) for a period of one year or until the end of the war.⁹⁰ They agreed to obey any command given by either British soldiers or native foremen. Nevertheless, they were not permitted to bear arms. They might have carried armory

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/334, 07 August 1916.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 335, 25 August 1916.

without weapons. Why did the British government not permit them to bear arms? Probably they did not trust the Cypriot muleteers. British administration recruited them to be employed in the hinterland not in the frontlines. This is about the lack of trust for the Cypriot muleteers. They have been a subject of the Ottoman Empire until the annexation of the Island in 1914. They were recruited to the British army in 1916. These dates were too close for this reason the British administration were apprehensive about the potential disloyalty of the Cypriots. They did not want to enable close encounters between the Ottoman soldiers and the Cypriot muleteers who were the former subjects of the Ottomans. In addition, Turkish Cypriots were Muslims and Greek Cypriots were Orthodox Christians. Both communities had different religious beliefs from the main religion in the Great Britain. The differences in their beliefs had important influences on the mistrust between Protestant British with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot muleteers.

Moreover, the volunteer muleteers accepted that if work ceases before the termination of one year, they accept they notice this before seven days. This was completely like a business contract. Even today, people should hand in at least one or two-week prior notice before quitting their jobs. Further, the volunteer agreed to be inoculated against cholera.⁹¹ British army took precaution against illnesses in the front. They did not want to lose their soldiers to cholera.

The second part of the agreement was about discipline in the front. Muleteers accepted to be subject to military law as administrated in the British army. They accepted to be liable to field punishment in the same manner as British soldiers.⁹² They were punished as British soldiers if necessary because they became a British soldier before their nationalities and religions. Being a British soldier is like a supra identity for all members of the British army. Eliminating the different identities is key to victory. It cannot be said that the British army was successful and had won in the all fronts but even so their war policy was reasonable. They tried to minimize any possibility of disorder in the front. They tried to unite all subjects of the British army under the name of 'British soldier' and in the command of British commanders. They were careful in creating a unity among soldiers under the name of British soldiers. On the other hand, they kept Cypriot muleteers in the hinterland and not in the first line of the front because they did not trust them thoroughly.

⁹¹ Ibid. 28 August 1916.

⁹² Ibid.

Furthermore, it is known that spying is not acceptable in every war. British government maintained a sentence in the agreement to prevent spying. Muleteers accepted that in the case of spying or any information whatever given about their work or concerning the British army to anybody connected with his Britannic Majesty's enemies, the perpetrator would be sentenced to death.⁹³ They were not exiled or imprisoned but directly killed. It is normal in the situation of war because the course of war can be changed via spying. Spying among the muleteers could be detrimental because they transported the armory and they knew the situation of the armory including its weaknesses. Information leaks about the deficiency of the armory could have been fatal for the British Army.

The third title in the agreement was on the scale of pay and fines. The daily rate of pay was 4 drachmas rising to 5 for foremen and up to 90 drachmas per month for muleteers.⁹⁴ Probably some Cypriots became headworkers of muleteers and they were distinguished from ordinary muleteers as foremen. The third title showed their differences. The payment of the muleteers was 90 drachmas per month and their food was composed of aliments per the scale fixed by superior British officers.⁹⁵ 90 drachmas corresponded 3.15 British pounds.⁹⁶ This would be 37.8 British pounds per a year, a sum which was deemed to be very high by the Cypriot muleteers as they could not make much many in Cyprus. For example, in Cyprus they made between 3 and 18 kuras (piaster) per month from agricultural work, and this some corresponded to 2 to 20 Cypriot pounds for a year.⁹⁷ According to Rebecca Bryant, the average annual income in a population of about 140,000 was approximately 30 pounds.⁹⁸ This harsh economic condition represents the most important and attractive reason for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in joining the Great War. Especially, it was the main point for Turkish Cypriots because as it was pointed out before, Turkish Cypriots joined the Christian British front against the Muslim Ottomans. The poor economic condition in Cyprus was the most determinant factor for joining the war. For instance, according to the annual report for the year 1915 and 1916

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.94.

⁹⁷ Ibid.p.94.

⁹⁸ Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, (New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004),p.25.

on police force, the crime rates increased substantially.⁹⁹ The officer admitted that there had been an increase of 1678 cases over the previous year.¹⁰⁰ He showed the offenses for the last four years from 1912 to 1916 on the chart. Animal stealing consisted of 579 crimes in 1912/1913, a crime which rose to 769 instances in 1915/1916. Petty larceny consisted of 1070 crimes in 1912/1913 but it rose to 1900 crimes in 1915/1916. Prandial larceny and robbery and theft also increased in 1915/1916. These crime rates tell us about the living conditions of the Cypriots. These rates were not stratified further for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. These were mutual ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It seems like that the economic life was not good. From 1912 to 1916 their living conditions became even worse which was not extraordinary during war time. Probably, it was similar in many countries which suffered from the war. Cyprus was far from the battle field, but this did not protect its people from economic crises. The people did not have sufficient economic resources to take care of their family. The officer who prepared this report accepted that the crime rates increased because of poverty. The officer said that poverty exists in the villages especially during the winter months. In addition, he added that because of the war, many villagers were in abject poverty and they were unable to provide their families with basic necessities of life.¹⁰¹ It is understood that some people committed crimes to support their families. Moreover, the reason of the poverty of Cypriots was not only about the Great War. The Great Britain made an agreement with the Ottoman Empire when they rented the Island which stipulated that they should pay Istanbul approximately 90,000 British pounds for a year.¹⁰² They levied more tax on Cypriots to pay the Ottoman Empire but this money never reached Istanbul.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, the taxes influenced the economic conditions of the Cypriots. The poverty of the Cypriots increased because of the ruthless taxes. British administration and its tax collection caused one of the greatest periods of extreme poverty in Cyprus.¹⁰⁴

The other important economic pressure for Cypriots in war time was exportation. The British government exported goods and animals not only to Salonica but also to

⁹⁹ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/137, 14 June 1916.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 137-138, 14 June 1916.

¹⁰² Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, (New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004),p.25.

¹⁰³ Ibid.p.25.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.p.26.

Egypt.¹⁰⁵ For example, the telegram dating 28 May 1917 informed that 258 donkeys had been shipped to Salonica, and 45 mules and 1 donkey for Egypt. Additionally, 1824 tons 271 okes potatoes, 8377 tons 284 okes carobs, 492,670 eggs, 299 tons 721 okes raisins, 6 tons 455 okes 455 okes cheese, 706 Goats, 28,559 kilos oats and 21 tons 6 okes onions were set for exportation. In addition, a considerable quantity of barley, chopped straw and bran had been shipped for voyage rations of animals although there is no record of the exact amount.¹⁰⁶ These foods and animals were exported from Cyprus to Salonica and Egypt. This exportation might create economic difficulties for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were forced to sell their goods to the government but they could not always supply the demands of the government. For instance, the Treasurer reported to the Chief Secretary that on 10 January 1917, out of 6,000 kilos of barley, only 500 kilos had been taken and they wished to know exactly what amount was available.¹⁰⁷ Export of supplies for army in Salonica continued even after the end of the Great War. Some documents inform us about food export in 1921 from Cyprus to Salonica.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, according to the report from 20 August 1920, cereals of the harvest were not available for exportation. Famine in these times is understandable because of difficult war-time economic conditions. The exportation did not end even after the end of the Great War (1918). As it will be explained below, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had no choice but to sell their goods. This mandatory exportation most probably negatively affected the life style of Cypriots for an extended period of time.

Moreover, acquisition of mules was compulsory in some places such as Limassol.¹⁰⁹ The order belonged to Chief Secretary dated 28 September 1916, commanded compulsory acquisition of mules on 1 and 2 October 1916 to Limassol Commissioner. Chief Secretary said that a large number of mule owners in the villages of Lophos, Vouni, Kilani and Ayios failed to comply with the notice requiring them to bring their mules on the 25 and 26 August 1916. He attached a notice calling upon all such defaulters in those villages to bring their mules to Limassol on 2 October 1916.¹¹⁰ It is understood that villagers were forced to sell their mules to the British army. They did

¹⁰⁵ State Archive, Nicosia, Cyprus, SA1/758/1916/299, 06 June 1917.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 30, 28 May 1917.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 299, 06 June 1917.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. SA1/582/1917.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. SA1/758/1916/212, 28 September 1916.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

not want to sell their mules because probably they did not have any other property or animals that could make money without their mules. In the copy of the notice, every person was called to the military purchasing office on 2 October 1916 at 8 o'clock in the morning. The order added that any person who did not complying with this notice would be punished under the martial law and would be subjected to a fine or imprisonment, or both. Both Turkish and Greek version of this notice were prepared.¹¹¹ Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were obliged to sell their animals and if they did not sell, they were punished by the British administration according to the martial law. This condition is another proof of the financial difficulties of the Cypriot society. They did not have the right of choice regarding their properties. They were required to sell what the British government wanted from them.

Moreover, it is understood that the war period was difficult not only for men but also for women. For instance, although being a prostitute is forbidden to Muslim women, but a 1916 British administration survey exploring the diseases soldiers contracted from prostitutes at Famagusta Harbor documented seven women, five of which had Muslim names.¹¹² Most likely, these women were Turkish Cypriots. The economic poverty of Cyprus society can be imagined in the light of this information. Joining the Great War and receiving salary from the British army might have been the last chance of survival for some Cypriots.

Both the First World War period and the British administration caused poverty and misery in the island. Cypriots did not have many resources to provide their family necessities. In this context, we can see that people can ignore both religious and national identities to survive and take care of their families. This displays how constructed issue the nationalism is. People can join a war to be in the same front with others to whom they may have hostile attitudes if participation in the front could allow them to support their families. This is the most significant facet of the Macedonian Mule Corps. When people struggle to make a living, they can do unusual things. Religious ideologies and nationalities become insignificant in this situation.

Turkish Cypriots are the best example for this because they did not join the war only against their former Sultan but also they joined the war against other Turkish Cypriots. Some Turkish Cypriots escaped to the Ottoman Turkey after the British

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid. SA1/979/1916, 1916-1917.

annexation of Cyprus. These people were recruited to the Ottoman army.¹¹³ It might be unknown among Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus but if they had known this information, they would not have changed their decisions about joining the war. It was about surviving and it did not matter who they were fighting against.

The third part of the agreement asserted that some clothing and a brassard which muleteers must wear on all occasions would be issued to persons who signed the agreement.¹¹⁴ Probably this brassard was a sign of belonging to the British army. The British army demanded that the muleteers always showed their dependence to the British army. The Cypriot muleteers became a British soldier when they joined the mule corps, and allegiance they needed to show at all times. Their brassards were their symbol which show their belonging to the British army.

The third part also included information on the pay book that would state the exact balance of the volunteer's daily credit and each payment they would receive. The British army recorded details about the payments. They recorded the credit allowance and paid sums so, the muleteers could not object the British army regarding the payments. Obviously, the British administration tried to preclude all kind of uneasiness in the front and they took precaution.

The third part included four rules which the signers had to sign that they understand, agree and undertake to abide them.¹¹⁵ First one was about their payment. It would be one week in arrear, but any sum might be retained as a guarantee of their good faith. From this, we can deduce that the payments sometimes were not paid on time. The British army made certain his position against any riots regarding payments. Greek and Turkish Cypriot muleteers accepted payment delays in the beginning. Also, muleteers accepted that the British could retain their payment 'as guarantee of their good faith'. What does 'the guarantee of good faith' mean? It seems like the British army tried to test the good will and faith of the Cypriot muleteers for the British army. This is about the economic problems of the British army. Probably, they knew that they could not pay muleteers on time and hence added this clause to the agreement. In addition, it is about the economic problems of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. They should accept delays in their payments because they did not have several options. They did not have a good condition in Cyprus.

¹¹³ Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive, Istanbul, Turkey, BOA, MV. 203,77,1, October 1916.

¹¹⁴ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/335, 28 August 1916.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Even this delayed payment was more profitable for them than staying Cyprus. This clause also shows us the desperate position of the Cypriot muleteers. They could not object the British army and they accepted this compliance in the beginning of their participation in the war.

Furthermore, the second rule was about the fines, which maintained that any sum could be deducted as a fine from the payments.¹¹⁶ The British army determined even the fines in advance and the muleteers could not do anything because they accepted it in the agreement paper. The British administration did not have to pay the full payment to the muleteers because when the British army wanted or needed they could fine them and pay less to them in accordance with the second rule of the agreement. The muleteers sometimes could make mistakes and in such cases the army wanted to punish them. Nonetheless, this clause also provided an alternative route for the British army. Indeed, when they lacked sufficient money to pay the muleteers they could fabricate some mistakes and cut their payment. Also, this rule did not specify the amount of fine that could be deducted. Hence, the British army could set the amount depending on their agenda. Moreover, in the third rule, the muleteers accepted that they shall not be entitled to any pay in case of illness.¹¹⁷ This sentence was very bad for the muleteers. They went to the fighting area with which they were unfamiliar. They could get ill even because of the weather. They were inoculated against cholera but the cholera was not the only illness at the front. If this rule is considered from the British perspective, this sentence was acceptable because it is understandable that they did not want to pay useless muleteers. On the other hand, it was thoughtless and merciless rule for the muleteers. Probably, the muleteers tried to work all the way even they were ill because they joined the army to gain money. The payment was the most important issue for them and it is understandable that they did not want to lose it. When they became too weak to work in the army probably the British commanders sent them back to Cyprus.

In the fourth rule, the muleteers accepted that irregularity in their work will be punishable by either immediate dismissal from their work, forfeiture of pay, or fine varying from two to ten drachmas.¹¹⁸ In the second rule, the muleteers had already accepted to paying fines and the fourth rule is again about the fines. This time the British

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

administration specified the reason of the punishment. Further, the punishment was not only paying fine but also being dismissed or forfeited from the army. The amount of the fine was also indicated in this rule. In the second rule, the amount is not definite and, the British army could specify it according to their will but in this rule, they set lower and upper limits for the fine. In addition to these, they could cut all their payment thanks to the expression of forfeiture. This rule is the most understandable one because irregularity in the war could cause very significant and irremediable consequences. All soldiers and muleteers must do their work regularly. Except the fourth rule, the other rules are not in muleteers' power. They could not object to illness. In addition, the delays in their payments was not in their control. Nevertheless, if they were not sick, the irregularity on their work was up to them. They could conduct work regularly or irregularly, and it was about their will. Punishing the muleteers because of their faults is acceptable.

The fourth part in the agreement was about the leaving the army temporarily. The muleteers accepted that in case they should require to leave, it would only be granted to them where possible and if they had not received previous orders for work. In addition, the muleteers accepted that they were not entitled to any pay during their absence and if they exceeded their leave, they would be considered as deserters.¹¹⁹ It is understood that they could leave the army in some cases to return. Nevertheless, it seems that the British army did not always permit muleteers to take a leave. They put these stipulations to them and they were reasonable in war conditions. Even so, the British army did not forbid leaving from the front totally. This part seems humanistic. Perhaps, the British administration wanted to show the muleteers that the muleteers could leave from the front when they wanted and they should not be afraid of the front. Also, the British administration did not indicate what would happen when the muleteers became deserters. Probably, the punishment for the deserter was death but why they did not write this punishment in the agreement. The British administration did not want to scare Cypriot muleteers. The Macedonian Front was unfamiliar to Cypriots and with this criterion they knew that they could leave when they want even in specific situations.

The fifth part was about the repatriation. The return passage was not written in this agreement. Instead of this, the agreement specifies that the return passage to Cyprus will be provided on termination of this agreement provided that the muleteer was not

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

discharged for misconduct.¹²⁰ It is interesting that the conditions of the return passage were not definite in the beginning. The British administration would provide it in the end of the war. The only information about this return passage is that it would specify that the muleteer did not participate in any misconduct in his work. It would show that the muleteers worked regularly and efficiently. Perhaps, they received their medals according to this return passage. If they were guilty of misconduct, the Great Britain would not have given a medal to them. In this situation, instead of giving them a medal, the British administration probably punished the muleteers. Therefore, it can be said that perhaps more Cypriot muleteers survived after the war but they did not get imperial medal because of some reasons. The exact number cannot be accounted for these reasons exactly. Also, it is possible that some Cypriot muleteers were killed by Great Britain not by the enemy.

The letter of agreement finished with the fifth part, and at the bottom of the page the word 'Cyprus' was written. Under this word, the date when the muleteer signed this document was recorded. It is understood that the muleteers signed this document in Cyprus which means this happened before they arrived in the Macedonian front. The British administration tried to minimize the loss of Cypriot muleteers because the muleteers could not change their minds if they wanted to after they signed the letter of agreement. All their information was taken by British army in the army book¹²¹ and if the British government could not find the escape muleteer, they could find his family. This was a big risk for the muleteers.

2.3 Different Editions of the Letter of Agreement

Approximately one year later, on 23 October 1917, the British army needed Cypriot laborers for road work at Salonika.¹²² They wanted approximately 35 years old Cypriot muleteers for road work. On 8 November 1917, they decided to recruit 1,000 laborers from Cyprus for work on roads in hill country in Macedonia. They needed an agreement document for this work, and hence on 12 November 1917 the Chief Secretary sent a telegram about the salary of these muleteer workers to Mule depot.¹²³ He indicated that the salary of workers will be 1 shilling per diem until they started the work. When they

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid. WO 95/4806.

¹²² State Archive, Nicosia, Cyprus, SA1/1085/1917, 23 October 1917.

¹²³ Ibid.

started to the work, their salary would rise to 2 shillings and 6 pence per diem. Before this telegram, on 12 October 1917 British Salonika Force Headquarters sent a telegram to the mule depot and said that some pay for the period which muleteers spend waiting to embark from Cyprus could be provided. The Headquarters and the mule depot were discussing about whether the salary they would be paid full or part via telegrams. As we understand from the telegram belonging to 12 November 1917, they did not pay whole amount of salary before the muleteers started to the work in Macedonia.

The Chief Secretary added the start time in the agreement. The first agreement, which I explained above, was written only for a period of one year or duration of war but now the secretary ordered to alter this inscription with one year from the date of the embarkation of muleteers from Cyprus. It is understood that the first agreement created trouble about the duration of the work and they took precaution for this problem in the new agreement documents.

On the other hand, British administration faced challenges about the duration of being muleteers. On 18 October 1917, the General Headquarters of Salonika reported that some muleteers who wanted to disembark were informed through a native interpreter that their term of service would not end with the expiration of one year, and it would last for a longer period. Accordingly, the headquarter decided to hold muleteers to serve at a rate of pay increased by 10%, but the muleteers stated that they did not understand that their term of service would extend beyond the expiration of one year from the date of their engagement in Cyprus. In addition, allegedly they had seen in Cyprus a document which they describe as ‘a Proclamation’ stating their period of service would be for one year only and they would be exposed to no dangers.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the agreements which was found in the National Archive in London and State Archive in Nicosia were written as ‘for a period of one year or duration of war’.¹²⁵ It is not known whether or not another ante-dated agreement exist. It might be that some Cypriot muleteers signed another agreement and the duration of being muleteers would be different in this agreement. Even so, this is just an assumption. The reality cannot be known, and in compliance with the documents we have, the British administration took precaution and indicated that service period of the muleteers might expand in accordance with war conditions. It is possible that the muleteers did not pay attention to the articles of the agreement. During that time,

¹²⁴ Ibid. SA1/722/1916/324, 18 October 1917.

¹²⁵ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/335 (1916). / State Archive, Nicosia, Cyprus, SA1/1085/1917 (1917) / State Archive, Nicosia, Cyprus, SA1/722/1916/321 (1917).

people had not understood the importance of documents and articles yet. Presumably, this agreement was the first agreement that these muleteers signed in their life. Also, the literacy rate was not high in the beginning of the 20th century. For example, according to the Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1911, approximately 60% of male population in Cyprus was illiterate.¹²⁶ It is possible that literate people translated the agreement documents to illiterate volunteers. In this process, the translators did not pay attention to all clauses, and they might have explained clauses of the documents superficially to illiterate volunteers. Thus, the muleteers might not have been aware of the period of duration for their work in the Macedonian Front.

Moreover, the General Headquarters continued to his telegram with three offers about the problem of disembarkation of the muleteers. First, he offered the adoption of some form of compulsory service, second, he offered the adoption of a system of voluntary enlistment for the period of the war under which muleteers would be attested and take the oath of allegiance as soldiers. Lastly, he offered the continuance of the present system of engagement under the agreement. According to him, the first offer was the most preferable.¹²⁷

On 7 November 1917, Commanding Chief of Salonica sent a telegram to High Commissioner and Commander of Cyprus.¹²⁸ Telegram was written about the newest form of contract. It stated that this contract did not provide a clause granting leaves. It continued the contracts should be granted leave for Cyprus with pay provided that muleteers agree to re-engage for an additional year. Similar with former telegram of General Headquarter of Salonica, this telegram also tried to find a solution for extending the service period of muleteers.

In addition to this, on 12 November 1917, Cyprus High Commissioner Clauson sent a telegram to Chief of British Salonika Force.¹²⁹ Similar to the General Headquarter of Salonika, he was worried about the disembarkation of muleteers. He mentioned about the muleteers' desire to return to Cyprus. He said that while the pay was attractive, muleteers had the prospect of being able to return to Cyprus at the end of a stated period. He asserted that the withdrawal of this concession would have a prejudicial effect upon recruiting. He

¹²⁶ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.93.

¹²⁷ State Archive, Nicosia, Cyprus, SA1/722/1916/324, 18 October 1917.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 284, 07 November 1917.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* 326, 12 November 1917.

did not want other Cypriot men to be influenced by these ex muleteers. He added in his telegram that during the period of 15 months from July 1916 to September 1917 a total number of 6,599 muleteers agreed to serve in corps but the mule corps had a considerable number of ex members. The British administration clearly wanted to increase the number of volunteers and they attempted to address this.

Approximately two months later, on 11 December 1917, General Headquarters in Salonika sent a telegram about the disembarkation of Cypriot muleteers to the High Commissioner of Cyprus again.¹³⁰ He changed his mind about holding muleteers in service. The headquarters said the muleteers who signed contract about disembarkation could be permitted to terminate their service at the end of one year from the signing of the original contract. He added that muleteers who do not wish to re-engage would be returned to Cyprus as soon as possible and they furlough in Cyprus in full pay. Of course, they can only be sent on leave if the conditions of their service permitted. He hoped that when this becomes generally known, there will be an increase in the number of recruits. It is understood that the numbers of Cypriot volunteers were not enough for the mule corps. The headquarters tried to increase the number of the muleteers.

On the other hand, the other objection of the muleteers was being exposed to danger.¹³¹ The agreement documents do not include anything about danger but Cypriot muleteers knew that they were joining to the war. They should be conscious of the dangers of the war. On the other hand, probably they thought and the British officers said that they would be in the hinterland and only transported the armory so, they would not face the dangers of the war. Nevertheless, it did not happen like this. Most probably they stayed on the hinterland but the front could not be safe in a war time. The First World War as its name implies, the First Great war influenced and destroyed several parts of the world. Cypriots like other muleteers and soldiers in that time did not join this kind of war before, Cypriot muleteers were inexperienced in this regard. Probably, they could not imagine the catastrophic results and effects of the war. As it was discussed earlier, Cypriots did not have an ideal about the Great War. They did not try to save their nation, religion or their country. The only important thing for Cypriot muleteers was the salary. They joined the British army as workers and of course they did not want to face danger while they

¹³⁰ Ibid. 347, 11 December 1917.

¹³¹ Ibid. 324, 18 October 1917.

tried to gain money to survive. However, conditions of the Great War were not easy and falling into danger was inevitable for them.

Considering the subject of the road workers, on 13 November 1917 the mule depot in Famagusta sent a telegram to chief secretary and asked 250 agreement documents to be printed in Turkish and in Greek. He also added that he altered the conditions for pay for the muleteers.¹³² This time, Cypriot muleteers were not recruited for transportation but for road work. Probably, their condition in the agreement changed because of this. Further, the British government probably updated and regulated the agreement according to their interests. He attached the announcement in handwriting which said; 'wanted for road marking at Salonika, able bodied men aged from 35 to 45 for one year duration'.¹³³ Presumably, this announcement was used to recruit men to the British army. The requirements and salary of the work were included in this announcement, and hence this was like an advertisement to recruit workers.

The agreement for road workers was different from the first agreement which was explained but generally they have same clauses. Different from the previous agreement the British administration separated foremen into two grades A and grade B. Grade A was paid 5 drachmas, grade B was paid 4 drachmas and muleteers were paid 3 drachmas per diem.¹³⁴ The agreement again included arrear payment but this time the relevant clause was expanded. It recorded that the pay would be one week in arrear but any sum might be retained as a guarantee of muleteers' good conduct or to cover the cost of their repatriation in the event of such sum being payable by muleteers under the 5th clause. This time the clause did not mention good faith but it is about a guarantee of good conduct and repatriation. The agreement document was improved from 1916 to 1917. The agreement which belongs to 1916 also mentioned fine penalty but this time it was expanded. Probably, the British administration faced problems about muleteers' conduct and added these details. The 5th clause said that on the termination of the agreement, either by effluxion of time or otherwise, the British government would repatriate the muleteer to Cyprus and the cost of passage would be borne by muleteer if such termination were due to muleteer's misconduct. Further, the clause added that during any period which might elapse between the termination of the agreement and muleteer's repatriation, muleteers

¹³² Ibid. SA1/1085/1917 13 November 1917.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

accepted to continue to serve the British government and the terms of the agreement so far would be applicable.¹³⁵ It is understood that even the cost of passage to return to Cyprus could be taken from the muleteers. The clause did not explain what misconduct is and which behaviors constitute misconduct. The British commanders could claim any behavior as misconduct as the exact description of bad conduct did not exist in the agreement document. Moreover, automatically the muleteers accepted to expand their service time because of the 5th clause. British army could find excuses to enable the expansion of the service time. In this situation the muleteers, had to serve the British army, and they could not oppose the army and demand compensation. They had to continue to serve under the same rules.

Moreover, the clause about reducing the grades did not exist in the first agreement. In the second one, the British administration added that any foreman at any time and for any reason could be reduced to a lower grade or to the position of muleteer by his commanding officer. It is understood that punishments were increased in these agreements. It seems like that some problems occurred in the muleteer corps and the British army took precaution about these problems with these appended clauses. Moreover, the agreement stated that no compensation would be payable by the British government even in the case of death. In the other agreement, the muleteers accepted that they would not demand any pay in case of illness but in this time clause became stricter. The muleteers could not obtain compensation in the case of disability and their family could not receive compensation when their relatives died in the Macedonian Front. Probably, some muleteers or family of muleteers wanted compensation and Great Britain added this clause enable the rejection of such demands.

Another important difference between agreements in 1916 and 1917 was in the end of the agreement: the place recorded in the second agreement was not Cyprus but Salonika. This means that in 1917, muleteers signed the agreement in Salonika not in Cyprus. In other respects, the agreement indicated that the 5th clause would be deleted in every case in which the muleteer was not originally enlisted in Cyprus. So, the muleteers were only enlisted in Cyprus but they did not sign anything. They accepted the rules of British army after they reached Salonika. This means they did not have another chance, but to sign the agreement after they arrived at Salonika. They did not have right of choice about the agreement. In 1916, the muleteers signed the agreement in Cyprus where they

¹³⁵ Ibid.

could change their minds about joining the war if they did not consent to the articles of the agreement. However, in 1917, they joined the British army without knowing their rights and British commanders' rights over them. This might be reason for the stricter rules.

On 10 December 1917, the muleteer recruitment and supply purchase staff informed the Chief Secretary to government about 1,000 agreement forms.¹³⁶ This copy of agreement is the same with the agreement of the road workers. Road workers did not have a different status from the muleteers, and they signed same the agreement.

2.4 Conclusion

Overall, the British administration determined several conditions about Cypriot muleteers and prepared this letter of agreement. In many aspects, the document was like a business agreement because actually Cypriots were employed in the Macedonian Front as muleteers. Their payment, duration of service and fines were determined in the agreement.

On the other hand, the agreement documents did not detail the exact duties of the muleteers in the front. It is understood that the muleteers did not only work only in transportation but also, they worked in road work. Nonetheless, full details about their work in the Macedonian Front were unknown. The letter of agreement is significant for understanding British distrust for the Cypriot muleteers. They did not permit to Cypriot muleteers bear arms. Additionally, the situation of the muleteers from other colonial countries was unknown. Notably, Clauson wrote in one of his telegrams that their agreement conditions were similar with Greek muleteers in Salonika. He mentioned briefly the clauses of this agreement. These Greek muleteers were probably Greek from Greece not Cyprus. Their conditions were similar to those of the Cypriot muleteers. It is understood that bearing arms was not forbidden only to Cypriot muleteers. Probably, the British administration did not trust Greeks from Greece as their king was close to Germany and he did not want to join the war with Great Britain at the beginning of the war. Also, similar to Greek Cypriots, Greeks from Greece belonged to the Orthodox Church. For these reasons, their conditions were similar with the Cypriot muleteers. British army did not trust them and the rules about bearing arms reflected this mistrust.

¹³⁶ Ibid. SA1/722/1916/346, 10 December 1917.

The agreement papers are significant for understanding the British distrust to the muleteers but also for demonstrating the conditions of the muleteers. These documents detail the conditions to which the muleteers agreed when joining the Great War. Lastly, muleteers' desperate position can be understood from these letters of agreement.



CHAPTER 3

BRITISH WAY OF ATTRACTING CYPRIOTS TO THE FRONT

The First World War was not the war of Cypriots. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not have any impact on initiating the Great War. Nevertheless, approximately 15,000 Cypriots including Greek, Turkish and other minorities joined the First World War on the side of the British Army. Why did they join a war which was totally irrelevant to them? What was the policy of British administration for persuading Cypriots to join the Great War? Which conditions attracted them to the Macedonian Front? This chapter analyzes and find outs answers to these questions.

3.1 Introduction

As it was mentioned in previous chapters approximately 20 to 25% of Cypriot males aged 18-39 years joined the Great War.¹³⁷ This percentage was not insignificant. The decision to join the British Army in the Great War was mainly driven by financial difficulties. Cypriots could not make enough money to take care of their family. In addition, the war era's conditions negatively impacted the economic situation in the island. Mandatory exportation and difficult conditions of war time period forced Cypriots to join war to make money. They did not mind the discrepancy among their religions. Turkish Cypriots joined the War with Greek Cypriots who were Orthodox Christians and on the side of Great Britain who was Protestant Christian. However, arguably the worst thing aspect of joining the war for Muslim Cypriots, was joining the war against their former Muslim Sultan. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots joined the war on the side of Protestant Great Britain. It is known that European countries have had extensive wars with each other due to Protestantism. According to Orthodox Christians, Protestants do not differ from infidels. What was reached after these facts is that joining the Great War did not possess any religious or national reasons for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In addition, joining the British army was against their religious identities. Hence, the British administration needed convincing reasons to attract the Cypriots to the Macedonian Front.

¹³⁷ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.82.

In addition, to ensure Cypriots participation in the war, the British administration did not leave any other way for the Cypriots.

3.2 Percentage and Numbers in Cyprus

Andrekos Varnava, a historian in Flinders University, created some tables about the percentages and numbers of individuals in the Cypriot Mule Corps using the Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1911. His tables will be used in this study to present the enlistment of Cypriots.

Table 1: Enlistment in Cypriot Mule Corps, males aged 15-39¹³⁸

District	Males 15-39	Cypriot Mule Corps	Percentage of Males of 15-39
Nicosia	15,366	2,909	18.0%
Famagusta	10,658	1,570	14.7
Limassol	9,343	1,451	15.5
Paphos	6,842	1,274	18.6
Larnaca	5,669	737	13.0
Kyrenia	3,382	1,178	34.8
Total	51,260		17.8

Table 2: Enlistment as Percentage of Male Population across Urban Centers, Regional Centers and Villages¹³⁹

Place	Size	Percentage of Male Population
Nicosia District Average		7.0%
Nicosia	Urban	5.5
Kaimakli	Semi-urban	6.2
Strovolos	Semi-urban	6.2
Morphou	Regional center	11.2
Athienou	Regional center	9.9
Kythrea	Regional center	3.1
Dali	Large village	15.0
Paleokythro	Large village	7.6
Lefka	Large village	4.2
Louroujina	Large village	2.1
Loutro	Village	23.3
Prastion	Village	22.0
Engomi	Village	18.7
Psimolophou	Village	18.5
Famagusta District Average		5.6%
Varosha	Urban	3.7
Famagusta	Urban	5.6
Yialousa	Regional center	9.8
Rizokarpasso	Regional center	5.8
Lefkonico	Regional center	4.5
Marathavounos	Large village	14.3
Vatili	Large village	13.6
Trikoma	Large village	8.2

¹³⁸ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.85.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*,p.85.

Akanthou	Large village	6.7
Lysi	Large village	4.6
Komi Kebir	Large village	4.0
Paralimni	Large village	3.9
Asha	Large village	3.7
Tripimeni	Village	13.2
Agios Nicolaous	Village	12.3
Kondea	Village	11.8
Limassol District Average		6.5%
Limassol	Urban	8.1
Episcopi	Large village	7.2
Kilani	Large village	6.7
Vouni	Large village	6.5
Arsos	Large villa	3.6
Lophos	Large village	1.0
Louvara	Village	16.7
Asgata	Village	14.9
Vasa	Village	14.3
Agia Phila	Village	14.3
Paphos District Average		7.2%
Ktima	Urban	5.8
Paphos	Urban	7.5
Beyia	Large village	10.9
Philousa	Village	24.4
Agios Photi	Village	19.1
Tsada	Village	17.6
Lasa	Village	17.0
Akourdalia	Village	16.3
Mylikouri	Village	14.6
Kyli	Village	14.6
Anavargos	Village	14.4
Larnaca District Average		5.1%
Larnaca	Urban	3.9
Lefkara	Regional center	1.7
Aradippou	Regional center	9.6
Melini	Village	17.1
Kato Dhris	Village	14.5
Mazotos	Village	13.1
Vavatsina	Village	12.8
Kyrenia District Average		12.7%
Kyrenia	Urban	7.5
Lapithos	Regional center	14.3
Karavas	Large village	21.0
Dicomu	Large village	20.1
Larnaca tis Lapithou	Village	25.5
Fteriha	Village	23.6
Karakomi	Village	23.5
Kalorka	Village	20.8
Karmi	Village	18.1

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Cypriot Population in Urban Centers, by Religion¹⁴⁰

Municipality	Orthodox Christians	Muslims	Other
Nicosia	58.0%	37.6%	4.4%
Famagusta	77.6	20.7	4.4
Limassol	75.0	23.0	2.1
Paphos	51.4	47.9	0.7
Larnaca	68.3	25.4	6.3
Kyrenia	65.0	33.0	2.0

If these tables are examined in detail it can be seen that the regions which sent the highest number of volunteers to the Cypriot Mule Corps were Kyrenia, Paphos, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca, respectively. It is understood from the table 3 that Orthodox Christian population constituted majority volunteers from every region. Nonetheless, the Muslim population in the top three regions were not the smallest compared with the enlistment percentage of Mule Corps. For example, in Paphos approximately half of the population was Muslim but this area was the region that the second region sent the most volunteers to the corps. The largest Muslim population lived in Paphos, Nicosia and Kyrenia, respectively. As demonstrated above these three regions were the top three cities which sent muleteers to the corps. It is likely that the regions which had relatively higher proportion of mixed population sent more muleteers to the Macedonian Front. It means that the decisions of the Muslim population might be influenced by their Christian neighbors' decisions. Probably, they were closer to the Greek Cypriots than Muslim counterparts living in more homogenous districts, and also these Turkish Cypriots did not blame themselves about joining the war. They had lived with Greek Cypriot neighbors for several hundred years and they might have been accustomed to share activities with non-Muslims. Furthermore, in some mixed population villages several Muslim Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek rather than Turkish as their first language.¹⁴¹ It means these Muslim Cypriots were very close to their Christian neighbors or they might be converted Greek Cypriots from the Christianity to the Islam. In any case, a complex situation can be seen on the aspect of identity.

In addition, the Muslim population in other regions also had lived with Greek Cypriots although their exposure to Greek Cypriots may have been limited. For instance, in Famagusta the ratio of Muslim to Christian population was almost one to four (20.7% Muslims vs 77.6% Christian). Due to the relatively smaller numbers of Turkish

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p.87.

¹⁴¹ Rebecca Bryant, *Imaginig the Modern The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, (New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004),p.34.

individuals in areas with fewer Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots in such areas may have connected more tightly with each other compared with the Turkish Cypriots living more heterogenous regions such as Paphos or Nicosia. This tighter connection may have stemmed from their need for security, protection and identity formation.

Moreover, the other and the most important issue that table 2 demonstrates is that individuals from rural areas were more likely to join the Great War than those residing in urban areas. As it was explained in detail this discrepancy stems from financial problems. People in rural areas suffered more severely from economic problems than people in the urban areas. In addition to the difficult war-time economy, Cypriots in rural areas were forced to export their harvest and their animals to the British Army. They did not enjoy welfare living conditions. On the other hand, people in the urban areas mostly belonged to the upper class and probably their economic conditions were not severely affected by the Great War like the villagers. The urban people might have been impacted but not the same extent as the rural residents. These tables also show that Muslim population mostly lived in urban areas, as volunteers mostly belonged to the rural areas and Muslim volunteers were very few in numbers compared to Christian volunteers.

3.3 Strategies of the British Administration

The British administration implemented various policies to attract Cypriots to the Front. First the administration forbade Cypriot people leaving Cyprus without special permissions.¹⁴² On 24 October, a proclamation detailing the permissions on leaving Cyprus was published. The High Commissioner John Clauson ordered this regulation. It was stipulated that from 19 October 1916 until further notice, no person deemed fit for the military service would be allowed to leave Cyprus without special permission.¹⁴³ Further, Clauson demanded the resubmission of all passport which have already been issued. He sought to preclude any fit men leaving Cyprus as these men were needed in the British army. His intention was to limit Cypriots options to ensure that they join the Mule Corps. Forbidding the emigration of young men was a first way to attract them to the British Army. Before this proclamation, Cypriot men emigrated to the United States or Egypt as seasonal workers.¹⁴⁴ Clauson informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies

¹⁴² *The Cyprus Gazette*, Tuesday, 24th October 1916, British Colonial Government Nicosia Cyprus.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?"

on 6 November 1916 about this subject and he stated that emigration to the United States provided remunerative employment for Cypriots and increased in the cost of living in Cyprus created a tendency among Cypriots to emigrate to the United States.¹⁴⁵ He also detailed that 940 passports were issued to the United States from 1 January 1916 to 21 October 1916. In this document, Clauson also argued that Cypriots choose to migrate the US where they earned two or three dollars a day, while they could live on half a dollar a day. Therefore, he forbade the emigration from Cyprus and these men who wanted to work outside of Cyprus became potential volunteers for Cypriot Mule Corps.

Moreover, in the light of information from the correspondence between Cyprus High Commissioner and Secretariat State for the Colonies, it is understood that all Ottoman subjects resident in Cyprus on the 5 November 1914 have become British subjects.¹⁴⁶ The British administration did not separate Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots or other minorities from each other. All Cypriots who were former Ottoman subject became British subjects regardless of their ethnic and racial background. However, within one month after the British Proclamation on this subject, people who wanted to remain as Ottoman subjects could migrate to the Ottoman Empire while Cypriots who choose to stay in Cyprus became British subjects. With this policy, British administration implemented integrative rules for all Cypriots. Similarly, the British administration did not separate Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots when they called Cypriots to the Great War. They adopted an integrative policy whereby they did not emphasize the religious and national identity of Cypriots. They called all Cypriots without exception. Preparation of contractual documents in three different languages: namely, Greek, Turkish and English, is an example for this attitude. The British Army recruited not only muleteers and foremen but also interpreters.¹⁴⁷ These interpreters helped muleteers when they signed the agreement documents. In addition, with the help of these interpreters British commanders could easily communicate with Cypriots speaking different languages. If the British administration had followed a discriminatory policy when they made propaganda on behalf joining the Great War, they would have not been successful in recruitment. For instance, they did not make propaganda on behalf of the

Itinerario No.38, (2015),p.92.

¹⁴⁵ State Archive Nicosia Cyprus, SA1/1083/1916/1, 06 November 1916.

¹⁴⁶ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, CO67/181/536, 06 July 1916.

¹⁴⁷ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.89.

victory of Christians against the Ottoman Empire. Of course, they battled not only against the Muslim Ottoman State but also against other Christian Europeans. It is important that they could have identified other Europeans as infidels and identify themselves as the protectors of Christianity. Indeed, they could use religion as a tool to attract people but if they had followed this policy, they would have lost both Orthodox and Muslim community. For these reasons, they did not make propaganda in the name of Christianity, and instead they attracted volunteers by using different incentives.

In the persuasion process of Christian and Muslim Cypriots, the British administration used secular arguments. This can be seen clearly in the posters prepared call Cypriots to the Great War both in Greek¹⁴⁸ and in Turkish (Ottoman language)¹⁴⁹ (The Turkish poster also has English translation in manuscript).¹⁵⁰ Posters in Greek and in Turkish had no dates but they were most likely prepared in 1916. (The Greek poster which is in the State Archives includes English translation above each words). It called the Cypriots to the British army advancing in Macedonia and Bulgaria to see the world. It portrayed volunteering for the army as a wonderful opportunity for young Cypriot men where they could gain a high salary, and receive free food and clothes. The poster did not mention any national or religious feelings.

In the same vein, the Turkish poster called volunteer Cypriot males aged between 18 and 35 to join British army in the name of King George. It provided details about the benefits of the army, free food and clothing, and, 31 liras 12-shilling salary. It highlighted that if one desired to see world, they should not waste time and should go to Famagusta, Limassol and Paphos Mule Camps to sign up to be recruited in the British army. The poster also emphasized that volunteers would be exposed to no danger in the front because their service would not be a battle service, and rather they would serve in the hinterland. In addition, the poster noted that returning to Cyprus would be free and volunteers would return to Cyprus with ample money. The poster also indicated that the relatives of volunteers would be paid 50 drachmas or more according to wish of volunteers.

The British army registered essential information about the muleteers in the army books. The National Archive possess eight army books about Cypriot muleteers.¹⁵¹ These books enlist the muleteers' name, where they come from and one of their relatives. It is

¹⁴⁸ State Archive Nicosia Cyprus, SA1/722/1916,63.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 329.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 122.

¹⁵¹ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO95/4806.

likely that the muleteers could register someone they chose from their relatives and the British administration paid some amount of money to these relatives. Giving money to muleteers' relatives was another strategy to lure Cypriot men to the Great War. When Cypriot men worked in the front, their families would not live difficult lives because they would receive salaries.

The Greek and Turkish posters were similar in fundamental issues but the Greek one did not mention the payment of relatives and it did not emphasize that the volunteers would be exposed to no danger in the front. On the other hand, the Turkish poster did not mention anything about serving in Macedonia and Bulgaria, it highlighted the possibility of exploring the world. These posters might have been issued in different times. Probably the Greek poster was prepared before the Turkish one and the missing information may be due to this. The other possibility is, the Turkish poster might be a second or third edition which was further tuned to attract more volunteers. Unfortunately, the posters are undated and therefore it is not possible to establish which was created first. Nevertheless, on 16 November 1916, Major Sisman sent a telegram to the Chief Secretary regarding the Turkish Poster as reply to the telegram was sent on 14 November 1916.¹⁵² He stated that there are no objections for using a recruitment poster in Turkish. He wanted copies of the poster as to be printed in Turkish and Greek. From this, it can be deduced that the Turkish poster was published after 16 November 1916.

Indeed, Cypriots did not think about the dangerous aspects of the war as the British propaganda was based on the fact that joining the Mule Corps would not be dangerous. It is understood that Cypriot volunteers trusted the British administration and they did not contemplate potential war conditions. As discussed in chapter two, the muleteers did not think that they were exposed to any danger and they complained about this. The emphasis of the British administration about the war was adventure and travelling the world. They worked like an advertisement company and they did not bring up the potentially dangerous and suboptimal conditions of the war. The advertisement campaign left out the conditions of the Great War. It seems like Cypriot men perceived being muleteer to be exactly what the British administration showed them it was. Nevertheless, the agreement document described muleteers as subject of the British army and they were subject to the military law. They were not different from soldiers in being exposed to danger. They worked in the hinterland but they were in the front. They did not fight in the frontline but

¹⁵² State Archive Nicosia Cyprus, SA1/722/1916,126, 16 November 1916.

they worked in the front. They did not have weapons and they did not participate in a hot battle but this did not change the fact that they were in the Great War. Even so, their believing in the posters indicates the success of the advertising policy.

In addition to adventure and the travelling the world, the British administration highlighted the salary of the volunteers. The poster listed the salaries as 4.15 pound to 6.0 pound for foremen; 4.15 pound for saddlers, farriers, and coach-makers; and 3.12 pound for muleteers.¹⁵³ It is understood that they salaried men according to their work. All Cypriot volunteers were not muleteers and they undertook different jobs. It means they were separated according to their qualifications.

The poster accurately reflects the British strategy for recruiting Cypriots in the Great War. As it was mentioned in second chapter approximately, 60% of male population in Cyprus in the beginning of the 20th century was illiterate. Also, we should consider that the main target of the British administration was poor villagers. The British government were aware of the economic difficulties in Cyprus and they knew that their offer could attract poor men from rural areas more than townsmen. The most important factor which led the British administration to successful recruitment was economic difficulties faced by Cypriots. The salary of the Cypriot Mule Corps was the most significant reason for Cypriot men deciding to join the war. In addition, most probably, 40% of the male population which were literate lived in the cities. Therefore, the target audience was mostly illiterate. It means, the poster would attract people with its outer view. It must pique people's curiosity. The illiterate Cypriot men needed literate men to translate the poster and therefore the poster needed to attract attention of men to require translation.¹⁵⁴ In the end, it is understood that the posters were completely an advertisement policy. The British army called Cypriots to work in the Great War but they did this captivating Cypriots' interest and curiosity. Especially they used young men's feelings about adventure and experiencing different parts of the world. Most young men (also young women but they are not a subject of this thesis) could be lured with the dreams of adventure. The British administration used these emotions of men and they attracted Cypriot men's curiosity with these posters. They did not emphasize religious or national feelings but they used youthful excitement. They tried to reach entire Cypriots both

¹⁵³ Ibid. 63.

¹⁵⁴ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),pp.93-94.

Greek, Turkish and other minorities with this advertisement policy. This was very perceptive and it worked well in the recruitment process of Cypriots to the British Army.

On the other hand, the British administration did not use the newspapers to attract Cypriot men to the Great War.¹⁵⁵ They did not need newspapers because their target audience did not read newspapers. They tried to attract poor villagers and villagers mostly did not know how to read and write. However, people from lower class who were illiterate usually were not interested in newspapers. Mostly townsmen read newspapers but they were not target of the British army. They did not need money like the villagers. The high salary was the most attractive feature of being muleteer. Without high salary, perhaps some young men wanted to join the war to discover different parts of the world, although these people were likely to be the minority of the volunteers. For these reasons, British administration did not use newspaper, the posters were sufficient for them.

Furthermore, on 24 January 1918, Major Sisman who was the head of Mule Purchasing Commission at Famagusta offered that in addition to the new posters, uniforms can be used during training at Famagusta.¹⁵⁶ He wanted to create a sense of pride in both muleteers and people who saw them. He tried to encourage other Cypriot men to join the war by making muleteers visible with uniform in the public. High Commissioner Clauson agreed with Sisman, but Sisman worried about the clothes at Famagusta. He thought that enough clothes did not exist for 300 or so men at Famagusta. In the end, they accepted that allowance was necessary in exchange for the ex-muleteers returning their caps and jackets, and the allowance was determined as 10 shillings. So, Salonika sent 500 sets of uniforms monthly.¹⁵⁷

3.4 Conclusion

The British administration used various method to attract Cypriot young men to the Great War. As it was mentioned in the second chapter, the British army tried to decrease disembarkation numbers of muleteers. They needed muleteers in the Macedonian Front and they did not want to lose muleteers who served in the Cypriot Mule Corps. In addition to these muleteers, they wanted to increase the number of recruitment. They pursued very

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. p.96.

¹⁵⁶ State Archive Nicosia Cyprus, SA1/722/1916/1, 24 January 1918.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

clever strategies to attract Cypriot men for the British army. Existing economic difficulties and, financial challenges paved the way for joining the British Army. If Cyprus had not suffered from economic problems to that extent, the demand for being muleteer would not have been that high. In addition, the British administration did not let anything ride, they minimized other ways Cypriots could make money. Forbidding of passports is an example to this. Some Cypriot men did not have any other choice but to join the Great War. They could not go anywhere to work and Cyprus did not provide them sufficient income for survival. The British administration was aware of this situation and they used this condition in the best way they could. The posters are evidence of their smart strategy to recruit men. They did not emphasize being soldier in the Great War but they stressed experiencing adventure and travelling the world. They tried to attract the attention and curiosity of the Cypriot men with these posters. They showed how much money volunteers could make and how exciting their lives could be if they joined the British army.

The other important strategy is that they did not stress the dangers of the war. In contrast, they portrayed a picture of safety and adventure for the muleteers. Both the muleteers and their relatives could gain money without facing any danger. Also, the muleteers could return Cyprus without any extra fees. The most significant attitude of British administration is, they did not segregate Cypriots according to their nations and religions. They implemented a secular integrated strategy to attract Cypriots to the fronts. All Cypriots were considered as British subjects and they became subjects of British army without any differences. Cypriots were not separated in accordance with their nation or religion in the army. Moreover, the British administration did not emphasize their enemy in the front because one of them was the Ottoman Empire which was the former ruler of Cypriots. The British administration did not want to lose anyone who could join the army. For this reason, they did not emphasize the Ottoman Empire to avoid provoking the anger of Muslim Turkish Cypriots. Also, they did not emphasize Greece because they tried to implement peasant and worker classes for the Greek Cypriots and these classes had not been Hellenized yet.¹⁵⁸

Furthermore, it is important to note that Paphos, Nicosia and Kyrenia included largest Muslim population and these regions were the top three cities from the aspect of

¹⁵⁸ Andrekos Varnava, "Recruitment and Volunteerism for the Cypriot Mule Corps, 1916-1919. Pushed or Pulled?" *Itinerario* No.38, (2015),p.95.

sending muleteers to the corps. It means Muslim Turkish population might be affected by their Christian neighbors. Presumably, these Muslim Cypriots were accustomed to working with the Christian people and they did not blame themselves about joining the war in the British side with Christian Cypriots. On the other hand, in other places where the Muslim population was few, Muslim Turkish Cypriots might be in need of tighter connection to protect their security and identity.

The British administration tried its best to recruit Cypriots to the front. It can be said that they were successful because approximately 20 to 25% of Cypriot males aged 18-39 joined the Great War. Moreover, the British administration honored Cypriot muleteers by granting them Imperial War Medals after the Great War.¹⁵⁹ It means they did not underestimate the Cypriots even after the war. This was another strategy because if the British administration had treated Cypriot muleteers badly, they would not use Cypriots for further work of Great Britain. Instead of this, they honored them with medals and they used Cypriots also in the Second World War.

¹⁵⁹ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO/329/2357.

CHAPTER 4

IMPRESSIONS OF THE ROYAL IRISH RANGERS

4.1 Introduction

Major J.P.B Condon who belonged to the Royal Irish Rangers compiled several records about the contribution of Cypriots to the First World War in the Macedonian Mule Corps.¹⁶⁰ His work is significant for this study because he investigated Macedonian Mule Corps on 1970s and he interviewed several muleteers who were still alive in that time. Condon could not reach detailed information on the muleteers' situation in the Macedonian Front yet he interviewed the volunteers of the Macedonian Mule Corps and attained important information about their experiences in the Macedonian Front. In this chapter, his work titled; *The Macedonian Mule Corps 1916-1919*, will be analyzed and evaluated.

4.2 Additional Page of Condon's Study

Condon's document was found in the National Archive in Kew Garden, London. The Shropshire Archive also includes this study but one more page in the beginning of this work can be reached in the Shropshire Archive. Major & Quartermaster R.C.H Berry from the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry in Dhekelia Cyprus sent this research to the curator of King's Shropshire Light Infantry Museum (KSLI), Sir John Moore Barracks. Berry explained himself in six matters in this additional page under the title of Macedonian Mule Corps dated 21st November 1979.¹⁶¹ Firstly, Berry recapped his previous enquiries about the Macedonian Mule Corps that were made in the previous year. It means that when Condon requested help from Major & Quartermaster Berry, he contacted the curator of KSLI Museum to find out more information on the Macedonian Mule Corps. This is understandable because Shropshire includes ample information about different fought throughout the British history. In the second matter, Berry wrote that Barrack's letter set him off on a whole chain of research which became a distinct file. Third, he indicated that he met Major Condon who had undertaken substantial research on Macedonian Mule

¹⁶⁰ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO/405/1, October 1979.

¹⁶¹ Shropshire Archive, Shropshire, Shrewsbury, 6005/SHYKS/101399, 21 November 1979.

Corps. That is to say, Major Berry was curious about the Macedonian Mule Corps and investigated this subject before he met with Major Condon. It is not known whether or not he compiled reports on this research. Archives do not include Major Berry's work.

In the fourth matter, Major Berry recorded that he made his files available to Condon. He was more than delighted that when he returned to Cyprus three weeks ago Condon gave him two copies of the book he had produced. It is understood that Major Berry produced some files about the Macedonian Mule Corps and gave them to Major Condon. It can be said that Condon accessed some resources with the help of Major Berry. Interestingly, Major Berry mentioned Condon's book, although Condon's work was not a book and could be thought of more as a filed record. Possibly, he compiled his research in a book that he did not publish.


Major Berry continued to provide information about Major Condon in his letter. Major Berry stated that Major Condon was excited about the letter which Curator John Barracks sent to Major Berry regarding his father's service on the Macedonian Front. Major Berry added that Condon used information of Barracks' father in his work. Finally, Major Berry finished his letter and by disclosing that on behalf of Major Condon he presented Sir John Barracks a copy of Condon's well documented records.¹⁶²

The other pages of Condon's work were exactly the same as the documents in the National Archive in Kew Garden, London¹⁶³. Perhaps, the two copies of Condon's book to which Major Berry alluded in his letter are these copies: one curated in the National Archive and the other in the Shropshire Archive. It is not known whether another copy of Condon's work exists.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO/405/1, October 1979.

4.3 Main Parts of the Condon's Study



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This picture above is the cover of Condon's work. Condon produced the other pages with a typewriter. Major Condon started with the preface to his research. He wrote this preface in October 1979, one month before Major Berry's letter. He noted 'HQ UNFICYP Nicosia' at the top of his preface. UNFICYP stands for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. HQ might mean Head Quarter. It is understood that Major Condon worked in the UN Force in Cyprus since he mentioned this in the introduction.¹⁶⁵

Major Condon composed his work in three chapters in addition to introduction and conclusion sections. As it was stated earlier, he interviewed some muleteers who were alive at that time. He also collected some photographs belonging to the muleteers. Some of these photographs will be used where appropriate. Major Condon utilized previous works on the British army and the Macedonian Front: Alan Palmer's *The Gardeners of Salonika*, *The History of Transport of the British Army Vol.2* by Col R.H Beadon, General Routine Orders British Salonika Force, *Cyprus Gazette* and *The Salonika Front* by W.T Wood and A.J Mann. He did not provide information about the publication date and place of these books. He recorded only authors and the name of the books.¹⁶⁶

Further, Condon retrieved information from the Journal of the Orders and Medals Research Society, Army Records Center, Army Medal Office, The Public Record Office, Army Historical Branch Ministry of Defense, Royal Corps of Transport Museum, Maj Eliophotou Vice President of Cyprus, President Royal British Legion, and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Athens Greece.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Shropshire Archive, Shropshire, Shrewsbury, 6005/SHYKS/101399, p.1, 21 November 1979.

¹⁶⁶ The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO/405/1.p.44, October 1979.

It is no surprise that Condon's position allowed him to easily access his resources. He conducted detailed research about the Macedonian Mule Corps. His resources which he used mainly allowed him to attain general view of the British transportation in the Fronts, especially in the Macedonian Front. It is not known if he had a specific motivation for his research. Nevertheless, he contributed to the history of Cypriot muleteers. More specifically, his interviews with the ex-muleteers are pivotal for understanding the history of Cypriot muleteers.

He introduced his notes on the Macedonian Mule Corps. He was afraid that his time was up (probably in Cyprus) and his final effort was far from completing this work to a standard he normally would like. He realized some minor errors but he hoped that these were not numerous. He indicated that the objective of the exercise was to record the relatively few notes he had acquired to date. He aspired to continue his research since he received further information since the research documents were compiled. Nonetheless, the archives do not include further work of Major Condon about Macedonian Mule Corps. What information he received after this work is unknown. He expressed his gratitude to the people who helped him in his research. Lastly, he noted that he hoped his research would be useful for someone. He finished his preface with his signature and date 'October 1979'.

After the preface, he began the introduction part of his research.¹⁶⁷ He started his introduction with mentioning his first clue on the Macedonian Mule Corps. Condon said that after a while of his tour of duty in HQ UNFICYP in Nicosia, he obtained a bronze British War Medal which had been awarded to muleteers in the Macedonian Mule Corps. The British War Medal piqued his interest in the Macedonian Mule Corps. He tried to collect the British War Medals which were awarded to the muleteers. He said he was very happy with this example of the standard medal awarded to 'natives'. He quoted the word 'natives' and he described this term as a condescending colonial word of the 1970s. Probably, these 'natives' who were undoubtedly Cypriots aroused his curiosity. These people are from the East which is very far from the Great Britain but they contributed to the Great War on behalf of the British army in the Macedonian Front. The perspective of the Europeans towards the East is a controversial issue.¹⁶⁸ Some intellectuals defend that Europe underestimates the East. The perspective of Major Condon might reflect this

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. pp.1-4, October 1979.

¹⁶⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Enland:Penguin,2003)

perception. He did not say anything to underestimate Cypriots but his words suggest that he was astonished about the British War Medals given to the muleteers. For this astonishment, he started his investigation of the Macedonian Mule Corps. On the other hand, he thought the term natives was an arrogant colonial word. It seems like, he did not agree with the use of this arrogant term. Hence, his perspective about Cypriots is not clear. Nevertheless, his work is the first known study regarding the Cypriot Mule Corps.

Condon, continued that after a few days he procured three more Medals. Also, he indicated in a parenthesis he had 11 medals when he was writing the introduction of his study. Major Condon described himself as he innocently assumed that finding Cypriots and their history would be easy after he identified all Cypriots involved in the Macedonian Front. Condon's reason of expressing these sentiments to mock his earlier innocent view on Cypriots. It is understood that he did not reach the history of Cypriots easily.

Major Condon started his investigation with advertising in the Journal of the Orders and Medals Research Society for information in Autumn 1978. Nevertheless, he was surprised to get only one answer from a member in South Africa. This member was unable to tell anything about the Macedonians but he referred to the Zion Mule Corps. In addition to this answer, he received another reply from the Imperial War Museum. He was again surprised because the museum indicated that they have been able to trace no mention of the Macedonian Mule Corps. Instead of Macedonian Mule Corps they suggested that this Corps might have some connection with the Zion Mule Corps. Major Condon did not give up and wrote to the Army Records Center. Their reply was similar with others and they said they have searched the First World War records but they did not find any reference to the Macedonian Mule Corps. It is really interesting to see that many associated the Macedonian Mule Corps and the Zion Mule Corps. In accordance with the information in the Jewish Virtual Library,

Vladimir Jabotinsky proposed that a Jewish legion be formed to join the British in liberating Palestine from the Turks during World War I, but the British resisted the idea of Jewish volunteers fighting on the Palestinian front. Instead, they suggested the Jews serve as a detachment for mule transport at another location along the Turkish front. Joseph Trumpeldor subsequently formed the 650-strong Zion Mule Corps, of whom 562 were sent to the Gallipoli front.¹⁶⁹

As it was mentioned in the introduction, Zion Mule Corps is another corps which worked in the Gallipoli front in World War I. Both the Imperial War Museum and the Army

¹⁶⁹ <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-zion-mule-corps> April 2017.

Record Center did not know anything about the Macedonian Mule Corps but they knew about the Zion Mule Corps. The Zion Mule Corps did not serve in Macedonia but served in Gallipoli which became widely known and influenced the outcome of the Great War. The importance of the serving area of the Zion Mule Corps might be the reason why the Zion Mule Corps was known widely than the Macedonian Mule Corps.

Ultimately, Major Condon could not find any information about the Macedonian Mule Corps in the Imperial War Museum and the Army Record Center. However, he accessed several clues from the Public Record Office. The Public Record Office replied that there are some references to the Macedonians in the War Diary of Salonica Muleteers Base Depot. Condon added that he found scattered references to Macedonians and frequent references to Mules in other papers, but not in combination.

The other important issue is that Major Condon did not reference the State Archive in Nicosia which was established in 1978 with the name of Public Record Office.¹⁷⁰ The establishing time of the State Archive coincided with the period of Condon's research on the Macedonian Mule Corps. Nevertheless, he did not try to search the resources in Cyprus. Instead, he explored British resources such as Army Record Center. The State Archive involved relatively extensive information about the Macedonian Mule Corps, most of which was used in this study. Perhaps, Major Condon did not know about this newly established Public Record Office. It may also be possible that he ignored this office. The other possibility is that the Public Record Office opened in the same year with Condon's investigation and perhaps the office had not put the documents in order yet. On the other hand, Major Condon was unlucky in some aspects because the National Archive in London was not established during the duration of his research. Indeed, the National Archive was established in 2003 along with the Public Record Office and Historical Manuscript Commission.¹⁷¹ Major Condon contacted with the Public Record Office but probably at that time correspondences of colonial office were not transformed to the Public Record Office or they did not check these records. The colonial correspondences are important because most of the sources of this thesis belong to these documents and these correspondences clearly refer to the Cypriot muleteers in the Macedonian Front.

Despite encountering challenges in reaching information, Major Condon did not give up researching the Macedonian Mule Corps. The Army Medal Office answered that

¹⁷⁰ http://www.mjpo.gov.cy/mjpo/statearchive.nsf/page30_en/page30_en?OpenDocument April 2017.

¹⁷¹ <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/our-role/what-we-do/our-history/> April 2017.

this unit was formed using Egyptian Natives (Arabs) associated with the British Forces. This response clearly evidences that they had no idea about the Macedonian Mule Corps. It can be said that in the end of the 20th century, Great Britain had not classified its historical sources. The British War Medals were given to the Cypriot Muleteers but the Army Medal Office did not realize these Medals. In addition to their unawareness they confused Cypriot muleteers with Egyptian Natives.

Major Condon understood that this information from the Army Medal Office was wrong and he asked them to reconsider their answer. Fortunately, they reconsidered their answer and found out their mistake. Their next reply recorded that Macedonian Mule Corps was indeed composed of Cypriots and not Egyptians and they were awarded the British War Medal in bronze but they were not awarded the Allied Victory Medal. After reaching this information, Condon added a note in parenthesis that the Medal Office did not mention Greeks in the Macedonian Mule Corps. Major Condon tried to distinguish Greeks of Greece from Greek Cypriots. He gives some information about these Greek muleteers in other pages of his study.

Moreover, the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) Museum said that they cannot find any references regarding the organization of Macedonian Mule Corps. Major Condon was not satisfied with this answer and he started to explore secondary sources. He found some references to muleteers who were recruited for the Salonika Campaign in Beadon's *History of Transport and Supply in the British Army*. He quoted and sent these references to the RASC Museum.

The other proof about the existence of the Macedonian Mule Corps came from the MOD Whitehall Library. The reply, probably composed by the library manager, stated that the Order of Battle of the British Forces in Salonika was searched and no specific mention of the Macedonian Mule Corps was identified. The reply included some photocopies on Salonika Force General Routine Orders. These photocopies directly referred to the Macedonian Mule Corps.

More good news came from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission in Athens. This was another proof because it referred to at least 38 muleteers who lied in the cemeteries in and around Salonika and others in Bulgaria, and each grave was clearly marked Macedonian Mule Corps. In addition to these proofs about the Macedonian Mule Corps, Condon had reached some information from the War Diary of the Director of Supply and Transport of the British Salonika Force. He described the War Diaries as

official resources about the Macedonian Mule Corps. However, it was the interviews with surviving muleteers who provided the most extensive information to Condon.

In the light of all this information, Condon was certain about the existence of Macedonian Mule Corps and the contribution of Cypriot men to the British Salonika Force. Condon describes his feelings and argues that the story of Cypriots in the Macedonian Front was neglected and had not been recorded before. Nevertheless, he was delighted that he could at least partially provide information on the Macedonian Mule Corps. He added that the unknown area was immense which justified the extensive labor.

Major Condon discovered more information about Cypriots during his research. He found out that 91 Cypriots served in the operations up the River Nile and near the Suakin in 1884-1885. This subject is outside the scope of this thesis. For this reason, further information except Condon's work was not searched about these operations. Condon continued to provide information about these 91 Cypriots in these operations. He said Cypriots were referred to as 'Cyprus Mule Drivers' and they were awarded the Egypt Medal, 'Tofrek' and 'Suakin 1885'. Condon referred to PRO WO 100/68 and probably PRO was the first letters of the Public Record Office. He had one of these Medals which belongs to the No.62 Driver Panto Haralambro. Cyprus Mule Drivers astonished Major Condon because he indicated that Cyprus became a British Colony in 1878 and it was surprising that after only six years Cypriots supported the British Army. According to Condon this support of Cypriots to British Army was probably the first one. He was curious how many other campaigns Cypriot muleteers served in addition to First World War in Salonika and Second World War in Africa, Italy and Palestine.

Major Condon thought his research was not complete and it had unanswered questions. He described his work as unscholarly presentation. He was intending to continue on his return to UK but he felt it was important to commit his notes to paper before he left Cyprus. Probably he did not continue his research because any other work about the Macedonian Mule Corps which belongs to Major Condon was not found in the archives which were searched for this study. The other possibility is he did not commit his notes to paper after his further investigation in UK or he did not find new information about the Macedonian Mule Corps. Major Condon continued to his introduction part and indicated his compilation was distributed on an extremely limited circulation. He wanted respect from his recipients to his copyright because he had not cleared copyright with the authors he quoted especially in the first chapter. Condon stated his work as an unprofessional academic study. Nevertheless, his contribution to history of Cypriots in

the Macedonian Front cannot be denied. It is understood that before Condon's investigation about the Macedonian Mule Corps, many people did not know even the name of Macedonian Mule Corps and they did not aware of the supporting of Cypriots to the British Army. Major Condon revealed this unknown part of the history of Cypriots.

In the end of the introduction part, Major Condon mentions his conclusion about this work. Condon was not sure that the term conclusion is the right word to his study since he described it basically incomplete study. He defined that his information was clearly debatable because they were based on little information which was found official way or otherwise. However, he believed that he had closed to the truth as he could attain in that time. He was aware that he had been assisted by whole host of very patient people but to complete his task, he needed to do some personal digging in archives. At the end, he said, he should be delighted to be corrected on the work by anyone who can set the record straight.¹⁷²

After the preface and the introduction Major Condon started his first chapter.¹⁷³ In the first chapter Condon gave information about the historical background of the Macedonian Front. He started with notes which said the chapter is for background information and has not been cleared copyright. He clearly indicated that this information must not be quoted outside the context of this study. His sensibility about the plagiarism was impressive. He was not a scholar, he was a Royal Irish Rangers but he was aware of the importance of the plagiarism. He did not use footnotes in his study but he indicated when he quoted from another work. However, most of time he did not specify the pages and he did not write publication place and year of books which he used in his bibliography. Nonetheless, he was not a scholar, his professional job was being a soldier. His mistakes can be excused.

After his notes, Major Condon titled the first chapter as 'Historical Context'. Condon illustrated the background of the Macedonian Front.¹⁷⁴ He mentioned the complicated position of the Greece in the Great War. The wife of the King Constantine of Greece was the Kaiser's sister and Greece was in neutral path because of this. On the other hand, the Prime Minister of Greece Eleutherios Venizelos had offered to put Military and Naval resources of Greece at the disposal at Britain in 1914. However, his

¹⁷² The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO/405/1.pp.1-4, October 1979.

¹⁷³ Ibid.pp.6-15.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

offer was not accepted and created embarrassment. In February 1915, British, French and Russian divisions were planned to send Salonika. Their aim was creating an encouragement to Greece to go to the assistance of Serbia. Nevertheless, in March 1915 office of Venizelos was replaced by a pro-German government. In June, Venizelos was again selected but he was not called on to form a government until August. So, the position of the Greece was not determined, it divided between the Entente party which was supported by Venizelos and the Neutralist party which was supported by the King. Following these fluctuations in Greece, in September 1915, Serbia appealed to Britain and France to send troops to Salonika to oppose Bulgarian army.¹⁷⁵

Later on, Condon passed on to the condition of Cyprus and he mentioned British annexation on 1914. The annexation disposed the argument that Cyprus did not belong to Great Britain to give. He added Greek Cypriots expressed a formal protest but Turkish Cypriots made a request to the High Commissioner that Cyprus would always remain part of the British Empire.¹⁷⁶ It is not known that how Condon reach this idea but probably he mentioned about the position of the upper class among Turkish Cypriots. As explained in the first chapter, especially the Kadi and the Mufti of Cyprus took side with the British administration. Condon continued his chapter to mentioning British offer to Greece.¹⁷⁷ In October 1915 Britain offered to cede Cyprus to Greece. Nevertheless, because of the pro-German sentiments of the King Constantine, Greece would not accept the offer of Great Britain. Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece because it needed Greece in the Great War as ally. It was not about the wishes of the Greek Cypriots.¹⁷⁸ However, on October 1915 the Allied Powers arrived Salonika despite the King Constantine.

Condon passed on the Alan Palmer's book '*The Gardeners of Salonika*' after his own explanations about the Salonika campaign. Condon started to quote Palmer's writings about the troops of Allied powers and mules in Salonika. As it was mentioned he did not give the page numbers of these quotations and it was not exactly indicated when these quotations were ended. In this part, Condon did not mention about the Cypriot muleteers because his source did not about the muleteers. Instead of muleteers Condon gave information about the Salonika Front and the necessity of mules and horses in the Macedonian Front. Because of the bad weather conditions and bad roads, Allied Powers

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. p.6.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. p.7.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

required animal power. In addition to these information Condon explains some fighting in Salonika Front such as Dorian fight in April 1917.¹⁷⁹

Furthermore, Major Condon wrote that one of the enemy of the British army in Macedonia was undoubtedly the malaria bearing mosquito. He added that during the three years of the Macedonian campaign, many soldiers -almost the amount of two infantry divisions- entered hospital with malaria and they were subsequently invalided as chronic malarial cases. For example, at the end of the July 1916 the sick rate of malaria only in the 10th division was 150 a day. Condon asserted that this condition was not change in the following years of the campaign.¹⁸⁰ This malaria case reminds the complaint of the Cypriot muleteers about the facing danger at the Macedonian Front. As it was explained in detail, Cypriot muleteers did not consider that they would face danger in the front. Nonetheless, muleteers did not expose only to danger of the war but also, they exposed to danger of the diseases. Further, it is understood that the number of British army members who contracted malaria was not small. It seems like that Cypriot muleteers experienced difficult war time conditions in the Macedonian Front. The experience of Salonika campaign was different from the British narrative about the campaign during the propaganda process in Cyprus.

Major Condon continued his chapter with the end of the war. He said the war came to an end on 29 September 1918 with the capture of Skopje by Moroccan Spahis of the French army. After this event, British became responsible for an advance on Constantinople, with France, Italy, Serbia and Greece. Only one British battalion stayed with the French army and crossed into Romania.¹⁸¹ The other British troops which took the road for Constantinople could not see Constantinople because when they reached to Dedeğaç on 30th October, the Ottoman state signed an armistice in Mondros. Only the one brigade went to Constantinople but the others took the road back to Macedonia. In addition, Condon came to an end for the first chapter with mentioning the medals. He alleged that British War Medals both in bronze and in silver was awarded to all British subjects who enrolled in Native Labor Corps units and served in theatres of war.¹⁸²

Major Condon outlined the Macedonian Front and he gave a general information about the Front and the conditions of the soldiers, and environment of the Front. He

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.pp.7-13.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.p.13.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.p.14.

¹⁸² Ibid.p.15.

summarized the Salonika campaign from its beginning to the end of the war. Also, he gave general information about Greece and Cyprus in the time of Great War.

In the second chapter, Major Condon started to mention about Macedonian Mule Corps.¹⁸³ He found a war diary entry which belongs to 7 June 1916 of the Director of Supply and Transport of the British Salonika Army. It was the formal directive on the formation and terms of service of the Macedonian Mule Corps. Condon started with the information of enlistment muleteers in accordance with the war diary. Nevertheless, it is understood that these muleteers were not Cypriots but Greeks from Greece. He asserted that these muleteers 'maybe' engaged from Cyprus. Condon was not sure about these muleteers. These muleteers mostly engaged for ride and drive work in the campaign. Condon wrote that these muleteers with part worn clothing and they were engaged under a form of agreement which holds them to serve for the duration of the war. Also, they were subject of the Military Law. These principles are almost same with telegrams which were explained in the first chapter and the agreement document of Cypriot muleteers. Condon also continued to the salary of the muleteers and foremen. 4 rising to 5 drachmas per day for foremen and 90 drachmas per month for muleteers. These amounts are same with the agreement document.

In addition, Condon gathered some other relevant information in the war diary. Firstly, he gave information belong to 7 March 1916.¹⁸⁴ This entry mention about recruiting muleteers and obtained 25 muleteers to handing them over to Base Supply Depot for training. References for native muleteers exist in the entry dated 1 May 1916. Probably these native muleteers were Greek. On 9 May 1916, the war diary state that Greek government stopped to giving permission to Allied Powers use of Macedonian Muleteers. On 25 May 1916, the war diary again mentioned about the native muleteers. It was written that Serbians were not required for service with the Serbian Army and it might be possible to employ some native muleteers. At the end, one of the entry was about Cypriot muleteers. The entry mentioned that on 22 July 1916, Major Bearne sent a telegram and he informed some numbers about the Cypriot muleteers and mules. Bearne wrote 150 muleteers left Cyprus at once with 400 pack mules and further 1000 were enlisted waiting for transport.¹⁸⁵ It seems like Macedonian Mule Corps was not composed

¹⁸³ Ibid,pp.16-27.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid,p.18.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

of only Cypriot muleteers. Native muleteers (Greeks) were also joined to the Macedonian Mule Corps. Most probably, these native people were not sufficient for the mule corps and British army needed more muleteers. Moreover, the British army was not the only army in the Macedonian Front. It is known from the telegrams, Serbian army and British administration argued about the Cypriot muleteers. Both armies wanted Cypriot muleteers for their army. Serbian army might use native muleteers when British army did not agree about using Cypriot muleteers in the Serbian Army or the Serbian army might use Greek muleteers before Cypriot muleteers were discussed. Probably Serbian and British armies were not satisfied from native muleteers. The position of the Greece in the Great War was not clear in the beginning. For this reason, Serbian and British armies might not trust to the native muleteers. If the position of Greece had changed in the war, these muleteers would have betrayed the Allied Powers.

Major Condon continued with quotation from R.H. Beadon, *History of Transport and Supply in the British Army*. In this time, he specified the page numbers of this quotation.¹⁸⁶ Condon quoted from R.H. Beadon to demonstrate Macedonian Mule Corps in the First World War. Condon quoted Beadon's words about number of enlisted muleteers and the danger of malaria. After the first one, Condon gave another quotation from another page of the same book. In this quoted passage Beadon mentioned about muleteers from Cyprus; how many muleteers were asked by Macedonian and how many muleteers were enlisted for the Macedonian Front. These data are not insignificant but we have already known how many muleteers were enlisted and sent to the Macedonian Front thanks to the correspondence between Cyprus High Commissioner and Colonial Secretary.

Condon continued to make quotation from the book of Sir Charles Lucas, *The Empire at War*.¹⁸⁷ Lucas mentioned about the hard situation of Macedonian road and necessity of muleteers in the Front. He wrote about enlistment of muleteers from Cyprus. Lucas expressed economic difficulties as reason of the joining of the Great War. Sir Charles Lucas mentioned about prohibition of emigration and age range of the Cypriot muleteers. These data are also important but they are known in detail from archival documents. Condon benefitted from these secondary sources and tried to reach

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.p.19.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.p.20.

information about the Macedonian Mule Corps. He could not reach archival sources but these secondary sources gave him an abstract of the Macedonian Mule Corps.

Major Condon did not only quoted information from these books but also, he made some evaluations. He realized that the numbers of the muleteers were given different in these two books. Condon said according to the Army Medal Office 15,400 medals were awarded in total. Nevertheless, Condon had a medal in his collection which was awarded to muleteer in number 13,126. He thought that if the British War Medals were only awarded to British subject, it could be assumed that no Greek received it. He believed that the medals might be buried with soldiers in accordance with the old Cypriot practice of burying. Another reason according to Condon was, perhaps Cypriots were not interested to keep their medals. He said some Greek Cypriots threw their medals away during the EOKA campaign in mid 1950s.¹⁸⁸ It is understood that taking sides with the British administration was not a good behavior for the EOKA campaign and some Greek Cypriots could destroy their medals because of this. Also, Condon indicated that some medals could be lost in the various turbulences in Cyprus especially during Turkish invasion in 1974.¹⁸⁹


Moreover, Condon mentioned that he searched the *Cyprus Gazettes* for the years 1914-1920. He could not find anything about the Macedonian Mule Corps in the *Cyprus Gazettes*. As it was shown previous chapter, the *Cyprus Gazettes* only include notice about prohibition of emigration from Cyprus. They did not contain direct information about the Macedonian Mule Corps. Condon continued to write about his investigation. He said, he met Attorney General Mr. Tornaritis who had practiced in Cyprus since 1928 to that time and he also met Deputy Minister of the Interior but both said that no official document was available in Cyprus which refer to the muleteers.¹⁹⁰ However, this thesis includes many documents about the Macedonian Mule Corps which were found in Cyprus. Probably, they did not aware of these documents or, because the Public Record Office in Cyprus had opened recently, they did not classify the documents they had yet.

Major Condon found clue about the mule corps from General Routine Orders of the British Salonika Force.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.p.21.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. p.22.



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In the first General Routine Orders, it referred to the Cypriot and Macedonian Mule Corps but in the second one it referred only Macedonian Mule Corps. According to Major Condon no reason existed for this distinction unless all the personals which were mentioned in the second one were indeed Greek. The General Routine Orders did not give a lot of information about the Macedonian Mule Corps but it became trace for Condon.

Moreover, Condon tried to interpret the meaning of the Indian troops which was written in the first General Routine Orders. He said according to Beadon there was a quantity of Indian Army Transport carts as 3rd and 31st Mule Cart Corps. Nevertheless, Condon said that he had not seen any medal similar with Beadon's explanation and he had not realized the relationships between these Indians with the Macedonian Mule Corps. Indian troops are not the subject of this study.

In addition, Condon used some numbers belong to the Macedonian Mule Corps from Beadon and Sir Lucas. For example, he gave the numbers of animals which were shipped from 1915 to 1918 for the Macedonia Front.¹⁹² Condon gave the numbers of mules, donkeys and horses. Also, Condon mentioned the family of Dr. Fazıl Küçük who was the leader of Turkish Cypriots before Rauf Raif Denktaş. He said this family made their fortune selling mules to the British Army in the Great War.¹⁹³

In the light of these enquiries which Condon did, Condon was convinced that the Macedonian Mule Corps was composed of two elements; Greeks who were not officered

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid. p.24.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

by British personnel and Cypriots who were fully integrated to the British Army. Condon thought that number of Greek muleteers must be relatively small because they served in their own, Venizelist army. Condon found this information from A.J. Mann' book *The Salonika Front*. Also, Condon obtained information about Greeks from Curator of the KSLI Museum, M.E. Jones. Jones familiar with Greek muleteers because his father served with the KSLI on the Vardar Front. His father mentioned him Greek muleteers wore no uniform and they were unarmed. In addition, Greek muleteers were not entrusted on the transport of ammunition and they were not trusted by the soldiers. Soldiers described them as dirty, sullen, and cruel to the mules.¹⁹⁴

Condon combined information of Jones' father and data of General Routine Orders. According to General Routine Orders, Greek muleteers were issued with uniforms. Condon thought that perhaps Greek muleteers wore uniforms but he believed Greek muleteers were unarmed and the British personnel did not accompany to them. On the other hand, Condon thought that these definitions of Greek muleteers were not proper for the Cypriot muleteers. His photographs of muleteers also proved these differences.

Further, Condon was astonished about Turkish Cypriots. He did not think that Turkish Cypriots also joined the Great War as Greek Cypriots. He thought that this detail was interesting to note. Nevertheless, he indicated that the numbers of Turkish Cypriot muleteers were very few, only about 400. He said he heard from one veteran that Turkish Cypriots did not join to the Great War because of the Turkish propaganda which defended to not fight against their Turkish brothers.¹⁹⁵ It is certainly known that at least approximately 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined the Macedonian Mule Corps. However, it is uncertain that if Turkish Cypriots had made any propaganda against the British Army. In the light of archival documents which are used in this study, especially the upper class of the Turkish Cypriots took side with the British administration. On the other side, several Turkish Cypriots tried to help the Ottoman prisoners of the Great War. It is possible that some faithful Turkish Cypriots would make propaganda on behalf of the Ottoman Empire.

Major Condon continued to give information about Turkish Cypriot muleteers. He said he has only one medal which belongs to the Turkish Cypriot muleteer in his collection. Condon gave details about the recipients of 11 medals he had. The details

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. pp.25-26.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

included dates of service. The service record of this Turkish Cypriot muleteer showed he had served until November 1919. For this reason, Condon suggested that he might have served in Constantinople.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, Condon made differentiation between Greek and Cypriot muleteers. Condon did not emphasize the race of Cypriots. He separated the Cypriot muleteers from the Greeks muleteers. Most of time he did not write Greek Cypriots but wrote only Cypriots.



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4.4 Interviews with Survivor Cypriot Muleteers

The last chapter of the Condon's study is the most important part because Condon recorded the stories of some Cypriot muleteers who were alive in that time.¹⁹⁸ When Condon decided to investigate ex-muleteers, he contacted Ex-Service Men Association of Cyprus. He met Mr. Eliophotou who served in the Second World War and Palestine. Mr. Eliophotou had little information about the Macedonian Mule Corps. He helped to Major Condon and arranged meeting with some survivor ex-muleteers.

The first ex-muleteer Condon interviewed was Mr. Charalambos Christodoulou.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. pp.26-27.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p.25. Macedonian Muleteers.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. pp.28-36.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. pp.28-30



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He was born in Paphos in 1898. He applied to Ktima Recruiting Office in 1916 to join the Mule Corps. Nevertheless, he was turned down because of his age. Probably he had not reached the age of 18 yet. He did not give up and walked to Famagusta. Condon said Christodoulou was very keen to enlist because he had paid 10 shillings to the recruiter to become muleteer. In the end, he was accepted to the corps on 6 January 1917. However, it is not clear that why the Recruiter Office did not accept him without bribe because he must be 18 in 1917 in any case. Perhaps, Christodoulou remembered wrong the year he was born. The most important detail in his story is, Christodoulou gave bribe to the officer to join the war. This situation illustrates the very bad condition of Cypriots in the war time. Perhaps, he was unemployed from very long time and he thought this was a last chance for him to made money and survive.

Hence, he was accepted to the Mule Corps and he did 15 days basic training in Famagusta and he embarked on Egyptian Cargo boat which called '*Pouriana*' for Salonika. Christodoulou described this ship as horrid old ship. The bow of the ship was shored with heavy Cyprus timber because of the submarine threats. The rest of the ship was loaded with men, material and mules. Christodoulou said the journey took 17 days. Apparently, this journey came to him very long and boring because he described the speed of the ship as about 4 knots. He continued to narrate and said their training in Salonika included weapon handling and mule handling. Their weapon was the Lee Enfield 303. In the agreement document, one of the clause indicated that muleteers must obey any commands except bearing arms. However, according to Christodoulou muleteers had a weapon. Probably, British army gave them weapon to prepare them for a possible attack. British army did not trust Cypriot muleteers who were ex-subject of the Ottoman Empire

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p.28. Charalambos Christodoulou.

but they took precaution for dangers of the war. The muleteers did not bear arms but they had their own weapon to protect themselves against any attack.

Christodoulou continued and mentioned that after service with No.186 Hospital, he was posted to No.111 Coy. This Coy included 200 personnel and 100 of them were Cypriots who were both Greek and Turkish. The 100 of them were British. The uniform of muleteers was similar with the British soldiers without cap-badge or collar-dogs. Moreover, Christodoulou could not recollect what buttons they wore but he believed the buttons were general service patterns. He added their training ended at the beginning of April 1917. Later they travelled to the Dorian Front where was in the Macedonian Front and close to Salonika²⁰¹ by train. Their job in Dorian Front was to carry supplies forward to the trenches. Christodoulou described their job very dangerous because they were moving over in open country as subject to fierce shelling. He clearly remembered death of his two friends who died in early morning shelling. Also, shelling was not their only problem, dysentery and malaria were their terrible worries. According to the agreement document, muleteers accepted to be inoculated against cholera but the document did not include any expression about dysentery or malaria. Probably, British Army did not have any protective medicine against dysentery and malaria. So, muleteers could be protected from cholera but they were helpless in the face of other illnesses.

Furthermore, Christodoulou said that in September 1918 his coy moved to Constantinople. Later, in February or March 1919 they moved to Odessa in Russia and they remained for eight days. After this short remaining in Russia the coy returned to Constantinople and Christodoulou was discharged at the end of 1919. It means some of Greek and Turkish Cypriots moved to Constantinople as British soldier. Most probably it was very complicated in the aspect of Turkish Cypriots. They joined the Macedonian Front and they served in the British army but they were in out of the Ottoman Empire and they did not fight completely against to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was only one component of the Central Powers. Nevertheless, moving to Constantinople was another issue. Constantinople was a heart of their former Sultan and the Ottoman Empire. Condon interviewed with one Turkish Cypriot muleteer but very briefly. Their feelings about being side against the Ottoman Empire is unknown.

Christodoulou joined the Greek army in İzmir after he was discharged. He served Greece until August 1922. It is understood that Christodoulou had national sensibility and

²⁰¹ Spencer C. Tucker, *The Great War, 1914-1918* (London: UCL press,1998).p.xv.

he wanted to serve the ideology of Greek nationalism. Some years later he returned to Cyprus and he was summoned to his local police station at Paphos to taking his bronze British War Medal. Condon described the medal of Christodoulou as unique because the other medals which he had seen did not bear recipient's name, they showed only the numbers. The medal of Christodoulou showed both his name and number.

The second alive muleteer was Xenophon Kyvenedes.²⁰²



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He enlisted Macedonian Mule Corps in May 1917 at the age of 18. He embarked on the 'Arcadia' after twenty days of his enlistment. He embarked with 800 other Macedonians for Salonika. It is not clear that who were these Macedonians and why they embarked in Cyprus for Salonika. Further, he mentioned that on the same day, two other ships, one was French, loaded with Armenian soldiers and other loaded with goats sailed from Famagusta. He described that these Armenians were not Cypriot Armenians. He said that these two ships were torpedoed and the Arcadia could not take any more passengers but it assisted in summoning other ships to help. In addition, after their arriving to Salonika the Macedonians moved to a Base Depot three miles outside the town. Kyvenedes and other 17 muleteers was attached to 81 Hospital of 22nd British division. They were employed on fatigues and general labor. Later, 22nd division moved to Palestine and Kyvenedes joined to No.800 Coy. His coy supported troops on the front between Serres and the mouth of the River Stremon. One year later, on 29 September 1919, war was over in that area and British Army moved to Constantinople with Macedonians (it is understood that Kyvenedes meant all veterans in the Macedonian Mule Corps not only Macedonian people). They had to sign a declaration that they continued with their own free will. After Base Depot in Constantinople they went to support units in Bulgaria. Different with other Macedonians Kyevenedes did not go to Russia and returned to

²⁰² The National Archive, Kew Garden, London, WO/405/1.pp.30-31.

²⁰³ Ibid. p.30. Xenophon Kyvenedes.

Cyprus on 21 May 1919. His story almost same with Christodoulou but he did not choose to join Greek army in İzmir, instead he returned to Cyprus. Moreover, the rank of Kyvenedes was foreman. His rank was denoted by an arm brassard with the letters 'MMC' (Macedonian Mule Corps). Condon said that apart from recruit badge, this brassard and the interpreter's arm band were the only rank markings worn by Cypriots. Similar with Christodoulou, Kyvenedes was awarded bronze British War Medal but with no name.

After Kyvenedes, Condon gave brief information about a Turkish Cypriot muleteer.²⁰⁴ It does not clear that he spoke to him or not. He did not write his name. Condon only said one Turkish Cypriot now living in Trikomo in North Cyprus enlisted to the Macedonian Mule Corps in 1916. Condon said he did not remember exactly when he enlisted to the corps. Why Condon did not write even the name of Turkish Cypriot muleteer? Perhaps Turkish Cypriot muleteer was not comfortable about speaking his joining the Great War against the Ottoman Empire or Condon did not have broad time to talk to him. Other possibility is, perhaps this muleteer was ill in that time and he could not speak very well. Unfortunately, Condon did not explain why he did not give more information about this Turkish Cypriot muleteer. Hence, we only know that the Turkish Cypriot muleteer joined the Great War in 1916 and he was discharged in 1918. He served in Salonika with No.362 Coy.

The fourth veteran was Menelaos Constantinides.²⁰⁵ He was born in Nicosia on 26 October 1900. He enlisted as an interpreter because he studied in English school in Nicosia and he knew English. He enlisted to Macedonian Mule Corps in 1918. Nevertheless, following these information Condon said Constantinides left Famagusta in May 1917 on board the 'Magda' with 1,000 other muleteers who were Greek, Turkish, Armenian and Maronite Cypriots and 500 mules. Hence, either the enlistment date of Constantinides or his leaving time from Famagusta is wrong. How he could leave from Cyprus for Salonika without enlist to the corps. It is known that after 1916, muleteers signed the agreement document in Salonika but enlistment to the corps was different issue. After Constantinides arrived at Salonika, he went forward to support British units fighting in the area of Lake Dorian. Constantinides mentioned that they used Hungarian mules who had much larger hooves than Cypriot mules. These mules were better able to

²⁰⁴ Ibid. p.31.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. p.32.

deal with the mud. It is understood that British army did not use only Cypriot mules in the Great War. After Salonika, Constantinides served in Tutrakan and later moved on to Varna in 1919. Lastly, he moved to Constantinople for two months and then returned to Cyprus. He was awarded bronze British War Medal and Victory Medal but he lost his medals along with everything else during the fighting in Famagusta in 1974.

Condon met also a Maronite muleteer Johannes Mannarides from Kormakiti village. He enlisted in Macedonian Mule Corps in 1918. When he was 18 he went from his village to Morphou to enlist. He arrived at Salonika at the end of the war. He joined 121 Coy at Bulgarian borders. He also served in Constantinople for 6 months. Similar with other muleteers who Condon met he was awarded bronze British War Medal.

The next ex-muleteer who Condon met was Georgios Michael Parkaris. Parkaris could not remember much of his service but he was the first to tell Condon a company which Condon identified as an Army Service Corps Pack Company. Nevertheless, Condon did not give further information about this company.

In the Village of Karpasia, the wife of Muhtar gave to Condon photograph of her father Antonis Bifani who was a muleteer.



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Antonis Bifani is in the center of the photograph but the daughter of muleteer did not know who were other two soldiers.

Condon met another Maronite Cypriot M. Hagi Vrahimis. He was born in 1903 and he said he joined the war in 1916. Nevertheless, as Condon said he was clearly mistaken about the dates because Vrahimis would be 13 in 1916.

²⁰⁶Ibid. p.33. Antonis Bifani and his friends.

Victor Kassilian was another ex-muleteer. He was born in 1898 and studied in English school. He enlisted to the Macedonian Mule Corps in 1916 as an interpreter. On 5 September 1916, he sailed on 'Ele' together with other muleteers and mules. He spent the entire campaign at the hospital. He was interpreter for muleteers who were treated there. In 1917, he was promoted to interpreter grade A. After this promotion, he started to wear the cap badge and his pay increased. Further, he was entitled to carry a pistol. After the Macedonian campaign, Kassilian went to Constantinople with British army and served until September 1920. Nevertheless, he did not return to Cyprus after Constantinople and he went to Egypt. After Egypt, he served in Palestine until 1948. After all these serving he returned to Cyprus in 1948. He was awarded British War Medal in bronze. Condon described this medal as the only medal he had seen inscribed with the rank interpreter. Kassilian also said that he was awarded Victory Medal.



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It seems like that Cypriot muleteers did not serve in only Macedonia. Some of them moved to Constantinople and some of them continued to serve British army after the Great War like Kassilian who served in Egypt and Palestine.

4.5 Condon's Last Words about his Study

The last part of the Condon's work is conclusion.²⁰⁸ Actually Condon hesitated to write conclusion part because he thought that he could not find so much information about the Macedonian Mule Corps except few facts. Nevertheless, he believed that combination of these few facts and his impressions about the subject could be provide broadly correct conclusion. His first inference was the Macedonian Mule Corps included two indigenous

²⁰⁷ Ibid. p.36. British War Medal.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. pp.37-39.

elements. One element was Greek, until November 1916 and the other element was Cypriot, from July 1916.

Condon's second impression was about the number of Greeks. According to him the Greek muleteers were relatively few. For instance, only 2,000 Greek supported the army by August 1916. When the Greek National Army was formed in Salonika in November 1916 Greek muleteers transferred to their own army. Moreover, the Greek Muleteers were not led by Royal Army Service Corps. This was the reason of their improper wearing. Also, Greek muleteers were unarmed and they did not carry ammunition. Condon believed that they were not awarded British War Medals and they were not integrated with Cypriot Companies. In contrast with Greek muleteers, Cypriot muleteers wore uniform, they were armed and led by Royal Army Service Corps personnel. According to him the number of Cypriot Mule Corps were between 13,000 and 15,000. They were awarded British War Medal in bronze. Condon observed and did not understand that why the British War Medal was inscribed Macedonian and not Cypriot. As it was mentioned, the official name of the Corps is Macedonian Mule Corps not Cypriot Mule Corps. Probably, the element of Greeks in the Corps influenced the name of the Corps. Most probably, in the end of the War Cypriot muleteers were awarded according to the name of the Corps.

Condon was confused about the exact numbers of the Cypriot muleteers. The enlistment number of Cypriot muleteers and muleteers who Condon made interview was not compatible to each other. He said these men could make mistake in their dates over a half a century later. He checked dates which were provided by Medal office from 1916 to 1918 and he reached 13,126. This number seemed to Condon more accurate than Cypriot muleteers' memory.

In the end, Condon listed 30 muleteers who are lying in different cemeteries outside Cyprus such as in Greece and Salonika.

4.6 Conclusion

The study of Major Condon is not professional academic work but it is very important for the history of Cypriot muleteers. Condon was probably the first who started to investigate Macedonian Mule Corps. His contribution to the history of Macedonian Mule Corps cannot be denied. Even the Army Medal Office was not aware of the Cypriot muleteers in 1970s but Condon dug and found considerable information about Cypriots

in the Salonika Front. Especially his interviews with the survivor muleteers are valuable sources for historians. Also, his finding about the first contribution of Cypriots to the British Army in operations up the River Nile and near the Suakin in 1884-1885 was another significant subject. Condon's work illustrates exploitation of Cypriots by Great Britain from the beginning of British administration. Moreover, the photographs which belong to the Cypriot muleteers are other very significant sources for this study. Condon contributed also the visual history of the Cypriot muleteers. The only deficient side of his study is the information about Turkish Cypriot muleteers in the Macedonian Front. Condon met only one Turkish Cypriot but he could not obtain sufficient information from this muleteer. Nevertheless, Condon might have valid reason about this. Consequently, Condon met eight ex-muleteers and the daughter of another muleteer, Antonis Bifani. Condon also accessed the photographs of some of these ex-muleteers. Although Condon was not a historian he contributed to the history of Cypriot muleteers in World War I.

CONCLUSION

This thesis tried illustrated certain parts of the history of Cypriots in the Macedonian Front. Mostly, scholars approach Cyprus History in the aspect of policy and from the perspective of the administrative class.²⁰⁹ Cyprus history is in need of different perspectives. History of ordinary people in Cyprus need to be investigated further by scholars. This study focused on the colonial era in Cyprus during a part of the Great War (1916-1917). This era represents a relatively short period in which Cypriot people were exploited people by Great Britain. They were not used only in the Great War. As Major Condon highlighted, 91 Cypriots served during the Operations up the River Nile and near the Suakin in 1884-1885. Further, Great Britain used Cypriot muleteers also in the Second World War.²¹⁰

The harsh geographical situation of the Macedonian Front necessitated help from pack animals. Specifically, northern Greece has mountainous topography coupled with poor infrastructure and rail network. For these reasons, soldiers in the Macedonian Front required pack animals for transportation. Cyprus had an advantageous geographical location for Great Britain because it was far away from the main war fronts and yet its distance was not prohibitive for reaching the fronts. Moreover, Cyprus had the potential to provide both men and animals, specifically mules, for the corps. In 1916, Allied Powers required backup forces in the front. The Cypriot Mule Corps was established in the summer of 1916 and the corps completed its mission in April 1920.²¹¹ The corps served in the Macedonian Front until the battle at the front was over. After the Macedonian Front, some Cypriot muleteers went to Istanbul with the British army.

Approximately 15,000 Cypriot muleteers joined the Cypriot Mule Corps of which 1,000 were Muslim Turkish Cypriots. For Turkish Cypriots, joining the Great War with

²⁰⁹ Morgan, Tabitha *Sweet and Bitter Island A History of the British in Cyprus*, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011.

-Reddaway, John *Burdened with Cyprus The British Connection*, London-Nicosia-Istanbul:K. Rustem&Bro. And Weidenfeld& Nicolson LTD,1986.

-Varnava, Andrekos *British Imperialism in Cyprus 1878-1915 The inconsequential possession*, Manchester: Manchester Uni Press, 2009.

- Hill, George *A History of Cyprus; Volume 4 The Ottoman Province, The British Colony 1571-1948*, Edited by Sir Harry Luke, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni Press, 1952.

²¹⁰ State Archive Nicosia Cyprus, SA1/1558/1939/w, 1939.

²¹¹ Andrekos Varnava, *Serving the Empire in the Great War The Cypriot Mule Corps, Imperial Loyalty and Silenced Memory* (UK: Manchester Uni Press,2017),p.3.

the Christian Cypriots on the British side and against the Muslim Ottoman Sultan created an identity dilemma. However, both Muslim Turks and Christian Greeks joined the same corps despite their religious dilemmas. The main reason to join the British army was the poor economic condition in Cyprus during the war time. Cypriots did not have ideals about the Great War. They did not try to save their nation, religion or country. The only important thing for Cypriot muleteers was the salary. Especially mandatory exportation adversely affected the economic life of Cypriots. The British administration exported goods and animals to Salonika and other places such as Egypt. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were forced to sell their goods. In addition, Cypriots had to pay heavy taxes to the British administration, which was driven by the rental costs of the island (the Great Britain rented the island from the Ottomans for approximately 90,000 British pounds a year). They levied more taxes on Cypriots to pay the Ottoman Empire but this money never reached Istanbul. Furthermore, crime rates for the year 1915 and 1916 increased substantially because of the deteriorating economic condition. It is understood that Cypriots suffered from economic difficulties. In these difficult situations joining the mule corps was very profitable for Cypriots. The salary of the muleteers was 90 drachmas per month and it corresponded 3.15 British pounds. This amount was very high for ordinary Cypriots. Moreover, the relatives of the muleteers would be paid 50 drachmas or more according to wish of the muleteers. In the end of the Great War, Cypriots were honored by a bronze British War Medal.

Moreover, the British administration did not separate Greek and Turkish Cypriots or other minorities from each other. When Great Britain annexed the island in 1914 all Cypriots who were former Ottoman subjects became British subjects regardless their ethnic and racial background. British administration implemented integrative rules for all Cypriots. Similarly, they did not separate Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots when they called Cypriots to the Great War. British administration did not emphasize religious or national identities of Cypriots. They called all Cypriots without exception in the name of King George not the God. All these reasons involved a considerable influence on the Cypriots to ignore their religious identities and join the Great War.

The first chapter of the thesis discussed telegrams between the High Commissioner of Cyprus and the Colonial Secretary, and the Macedonian Front. Fourteen telegrams were analyzed and the earliest telegram for this research is from 24 May 1916. The necessity of pack animals and muleteers in the Macedonian Front was illustrated through these telegrams. In addition, the perspectives of the British administration on both Greek

and Turkish Cypriots in which they considered Cypriots to be an easily governable community was detailed. In addition, the idea of the Cyprus High Commissioner about Cypriots was discussed. High Commissioner Clauson wrote in one of his telegrams that all Cypriots 'with insignificant exception' keenly desired the success of the British arms. This sentence of Clauson was discussed to illuminate the real feelings of Cypriots towards the British administration. It was understood that an important uprising did not happen during World War I. However, it cannot be said that all Greek and Turkish Cypriots keenly desired the British success. Some Turkish Cypriots were still faithful to the Ottoman Sultan and Greek Cypriots believed in different religious sect from the British people. Furthermore, the Greek Church lost some of its rights which they held in the Ottoman *Millet* system. Hence, various Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not satisfied with the British administration. Nevertheless, they did not create considerable trouble for the British administration.

The second chapter investigated the conditions of the Cypriot muleteers who joined the Great War. The Letter of Agreement was examined and the poor and desperate position of Cypriots was discussed in light of the agreement document. In many aspects, the document was like a business agreement. In fact, the Cypriots were employed in the Macedonian Front as muleteers. Their payment, duration of service, and fines were determined in the agreement. The agreement documents were prepared in English, Greek and Turkish. The first agreement document used in this study belongs to 25 August 1916. The British administration revised the agreement documents in 1917. The condition of the document became stricter in 1917. For example, in 1916 muleteers signed the agreements in Cyprus but in 1917 they signed in Salonika. It means they could not give up if they did not agree with the clauses of the agreement. The letter of agreement is significant for understanding the British distrust for the Cypriot muleteers. They did not permit the Cypriot muleteers, who were former subjects of the Ottoman Empire, bear arms. In addition, it is understood that British army did not recruit only muleteers but also road workers in the Macedonian Front.

Next, the British policy for attracting Cypriots to the Great War was explained in the third chapter. The reasons why Cypriots decided to join the British army despite their religious identities were discussed. This chapter showed that Great Britain did not use national or religious propaganda to attract Cypriots. Instead, they carried out an advertisement policy through which the possibility of adventure and traveling the world were highlighted. In other words, the advertisements did not emphasize being a soldier in

the Great War but stressed experiencing adventure and travelling the world. They tried to attract the attention and curiosity of the Cypriot men with the posters. They showed how much money volunteers could make and how exciting their lives could be if they joined the British army. Moreover, they did not stress the dangers of the war. In contrast, they portrayed a picture of safety and adventure for the muleteers. Both the muleteers and their relatives could gain money without facing any danger. Further, existing economic difficulties paved the way for Cypriots in joining the British Army. If Cyprus had not suffered from economic problems to that extent, the demand for being muleteer would not have been that high. The British administration limited the options of Cypriots by forbidding the emigration of the young Cypriot men. Moreover, it is understood that the regions which had relatively higher proportion of mixed population sent more muleteers to the Macedonian Front. Muslim Turkish Cypriots might have been influenced by their Christian neighbors. They had lived with Christians for several hundred years and most likely they were accustomed to share activities with Christians. Furthermore, in some mixed population villages, several Muslim Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek rather than Turkish as their first language. They might be converted Greek Cypriots from the Christianity to Islam. Nevertheless, in any case identity troubles are noticeable.

Lastly, the study of Royal Irish Rangers Major Condon was explained in chapter four. Condon's study is not an academic work but it is pivotal for accessing the interviews of survivor muleteers. His study is central as it is the first written study on Cypriot muleteers. His contribution to the history of Macedonian Mule Corps cannot be denied. Even the Army Medal Office was not aware of the Cypriot muleteers in 1970s but Condon investigated and found considerable information about Cypriots in the Salonika Front. Condon obtained a British War Medal in bronze which had been awarded to muleteers in the Macedonian Mule Corps. The British War Medal piqued his interest in the Macedonian Mule Corps and he started to investigate the Macedonian Mule Corps. It is understood that the enemies of the Cypriot muleteers in the front were not only the Central Powers but also diseases. Condon mentioned that during the three years of the Macedonian campaign, many soldiers—almost the amount of two infantry divisions—entered hospital with malaria and were subsequently invalided as chronic malarial cases. In addition, his interviews with the survivor ex-muleteers are valuable sources for historians. Pivotal information about the Macedonian Mule Corps can be learnt from these survivor muleteers. Condon met eight ex-muleteers and the daughter of another muleteer, Antonis Bifani. Condon also accessed the photographs of some of these ex-

muleteers. These visual resources are also important to the history of Cypriot muleteers. In summary, Major Condon was not a historian but he contributed to the history of Cypriot Mule Corps.

To sum up, one of the aims of this thesis was to highlight the constructed aspect of identities. As it was detailed, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were united in the same army to serve Great Britain. This showed that Greek and Turkish Cypriots can participate the same battle and the same front without fighting each other. It is understood that people can ignore national and religious differences when necessary. Indeed, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can set aside their national and religious feelings and work towards the same goal. Another important aspect of Macedonian Mule Corps lies in the fact that the Turkish Cypriots joined the British army not only against their former Sultan but also against other Turkish Cypriots who migrated to Anatolia and were subsequently recruited to the Ottoman army. Overall, this thesis aimed to illustrate that when it is necessary, people can take actions that may be incompatible with their identities. The Cypriot muleteers during the First World War serve as an outstanding example for this phenomenon. Indeed, approximately 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined the Christian British army with Christian Greek Cypriots against the Muslim Ottoman army. In doing so, they chose not to act on their religious differences. Interestingly, they also chose to fight against the Muslim Ottoman army. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots joined the Protestant British army with Muslim Turkish Cypriots. This was not totally acceptable for Orthodox Christian Greek Cypriots; however, this did not stop them from participating in the muleteer corps.

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