

THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF POPULISM IN EUROPE

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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M.A. Thesis, July 2017

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Ersin Kalaycıođlu

Keywords: populist breakthrough, populist entrenchment, issue salience, issue ownership

Populist upsurge is running through the Western world and many scholars try to make sense of it. Populism has long been considered to be a thin-centered ideology and efforts to understand it have been concentrated accordingly. Considering populism primarily as a strategy employed by an outsider, this paper investigates the reasons for populist upsurge. By employing the European Social Survey Round 7 data, it demonstrates that perceived unwillingness of the politicians to care for people and distrust in political parties are strong predictors of populist vote. It further demonstrates that increased saliency of the issues owned by populist parties is largely responsible for their electoral success. Populism tends to take a right-wing form when national identity issues become salient and a left-wing form when income inequality becomes salient. To investigate populist entrenchment, the paper analyzes the cases of the Front National, the Freedom Party of Austria and the Danish People's Party. Contrary to dominant view in the literature, it shows that mainstream co-optation of populist party positions helps populist parties.

ÖZET

POPÜLİZMİN AVRUPA'DAKİ İLGİNÇ BEKÂSI

CANER ŞİMŞEK

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Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu

Anahtar Kelimeler: popülist atılım, populist yerleşme, mesele önemi, mesele sahipliği

Popülist ayaklanma Batı dünyasında dolaşıyor ve pek çok bilim adamı bunu anlamaya çalışıyor. Popülizm uzun zamandır ince merkezli bir ideoloji olarak düşünülmüş ve onu anlama çabaları bu minvalde yoğunlaştırılmıştır. Popülizmi öncelikli olarak aykırı siyasetçilerin kullandığı bir strateji olarak gören bu çalışma, popülist ayaklanmanın nedenlerini araştırıyor. Avrupa Sosyal Araştırmalarının 7. Tur verilerini kullanan bu çalışma, siyasetçilerin halkı umursadığı algısının ve siyasi partilere duyulan güvensizliğin popülist oyların güçlü göstergeleri olduğunu gösteriyor. İlaveten, popülist partilerin sahibi olduğu meselelerin öneminin artmasının seçim başarılarının ana sebeplerinden olduğunu gösteriyor. Ulusal kimlik meseleleri önem kazandığında sağ popülizm, gelir eşitsizliği önem kazandığında ise sol popülizm ortaya çıkar. Popülist yerleşmeyi anlamak için, bu çalışma Ulusal Cephe, Avusturya Özgürlük Partisi ve Danimarka Halk Partisi örneklerini analiz ediyor. Literatürdeki baskın görüşün aksine, bu çalışma popülist parti pozisyonlarının ana akım partiler tarafından ortaklaşa kabul görmesinin popülist partilere yardımcı olduğunu gösteriyor.

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I also would like to thank my friends Selin, Çiğdem, Ayhan, Bekir, Faruk and the other members of the Political Science cohort. Their friendship made graduate life endurable.

This thesis is about how well-meaning people become so frustrated with their representatives that they become more inclined towards extremist ideas. Being an MA student at Sabancı University, I can really empathize with what they have gone through. I felt the same indignity, the same resentment and frustration at Sabancı with the people whose titles I will not mention but whose names I will not forget.

What enabled me to complete my studies and this thesis was the love and support of my friends and family. I was also helped a great deal by some of the people who work at Sabancı. I thank the workers of the cleaning service, namely Fatma Abla, for keeping my dormitory room clean. I also thank cafeteria workers Hüsniye Abla and Hızır Abi for giving me larger than usual portions of food.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In June 2016, majority of British voters chose to leave the European Union. The long-term effects of Brexit remain to be seen but the overwhelming majority of the economists have agreed that it would damage Britain's growth prospects. A poll carried out for the Observer demonstrated that 88 percent of the members of the Royal Economic Society and the Society of Business Economists warned that country's GDP would be negatively affected over the next five years (Skinner, Gottfried, and Weekes 2016). A study by OECD economists suggests that the foregone GDP will be 5 percent lower than it would be otherwise by 2030. This means British voters who voted to leave thought that Brexit was more important than GBP 3200 per household in April 2016 terms (Kierzenkowski et al. 2016).

August 2009 was a time when rightwing activists across the U.S. were protesting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare) by spoiling the town hall meetings. In one such meeting Kenneth Gladney, a black conservative activist, and his friends from St. Louis Tea Party involved in a fight with the members of the Service Employees International Union. Gladney was hospitalized. He later turned out to be an unemployed person without any health insurance. He would have coverage under Obamacare, instead he needed to ask for donations to pay the medical bill (ThinkProgress 2009). Mr. Gladney is not the only one in rejecting Obamacare when it benefits them. Clay County is an impoverished community in Kentucky and it was

named the hardest place to live in the United States¹ by The New York Times in 2014 (Lowrey 2014). Estimates show that the rate of uninsured in Clay County fell by 17 percent between 2013 and 2016 owing to Obamacare. During the 2016 Presidential Election campaign, Donald Trump promised to repeal Obamacare and Hillary Clinton promised to extend it. 87 percent of the Clay County's vote went to Donald Trump.

Above examples present us with a paradox. Why do so many people from various countries want to embrace the populist agenda even though it is seemingly against their interests? What pushes them to support populist candidates and parties, again seemingly making them their own grave-diggers? Do populist voters share something in common? What explains populist parties' remarkable electoral success in the recent decades? I believe all research that goes into finding answers to these questions is quite timely and warranted.

The world is taken by surprise by the populist revolt. Who would have imagined, for instance, the United States would choose Donald Trump as president after its first black president? Trump did what everyone thought was impossible. Initially he was given no chance to secure the GOP's nomination largely because he was an outsider who not supported by the GOP establishment (Diaz 2015). "Outsiders don't win presidential nominations anymore" wrote The Economist ("Rubios Are Red" 2015). The dominant view shared by pundits and political strategists held that it is the establishment that decides on the candidate and they would force Trump to drop out (Jaffe 2015). Even after several primary victories for Trump, senior GOP officials did not hesitate to go on record and claim that they "choose the nominee, not the voters" (Belvedere 2016). Unfortunately, political scientists agreed. Many of the arguments made by Trump skeptics were grounded on a thesis called "the party decides". The thesis, which has been explained in detail by a book with the same title, suggests that party elders are the gatekeepers in determining the candidates that a party is going to field. They have many tools at their disposal for getting their preferred candidates to win the primaries ranging from endorsements to financial contributions (Cohen et al. 2008). To win the primaries, one must first win the invisible primary in which he or she tries to get the party elders on board. Yet the 2016 primaries proved otherwise. It showed how strong can the relationship be between a populist leader and the voters. Despite the efforts of party

¹ The study uses six metrics to measure the quality of life: educational attainment, household income, jobless rate, disability rate, life expectancy and obesity rate.

elders who did not hesitate to insult him and of former presidents who publicly rejected him, Trump won the nomination without even a contested convention.

The election of 2016 along with other recent populist electoral successes have proved how little understanding we actually have of political life. Kenneth Galbraith once said, "The only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable." A growing number of people argue the same is true for political forecasting as well. Nothing we know about politics is enough to explain what has happened. The rise of populist parties shook the Political Science discipline from the ground and reignited some of the old debates: Is political science really a science? Can humans be susceptible to scientific causal predictions like the ones in positive sciences? Is prediction of political events attainable at all? Many went on to argue that devising predictive models is a futile effort and "self-defeating" (Blakely 2016). Of course, Political Science can never be as accurate as Psychohistory² and expecting such degree of accuracy is unfair to the discipline. However, deriving patterns or trends from earlier events is the central ambition of the discipline and its success can be judged by its ability to do so. From this perspective, Political Science has performed poorly so far. It is also true that Political Scientists have studied the issue and failed to come up with a theoretical model that could parsimoniously point out reasons for the populist revolt and populist electoral success. However, this does not mean we should abandon the discipline. After all, meteorology gets it wrong more often than not and nobody questions its existence. Political scientists just need to acknowledge the limitations of their models and try to improve them. The driving forces of the populist revolt should be studied rigorously and this thesis is my attempt to unearth these forces.

I argue that the discipline paid the price of reducing political problems to economic causes. Political scientists have insisted on models based on rational choice for too long. What is happening in the United States and Europe now is not about disagreements about trade policy. I contend that what makes people support populist movements is actually quite similar to what makes others join a terrorist movement. Root causes of terrorism are feelings of indignity, the resentment and frustration (Krueger and Maleckova 2002) and root causes of populism are not any different. We should not

² A fictional science in Isaac Asimov's Foundation series that perfectly predicts the mass behavior.

underestimate the role of identities in driving political behavior. Identity is the social frame through which we make our social decisions. Most of the time political behavior is a mere expression of our social identity. Individuals have number of identities and some of them become more salient at critical junctures (Sen 2007). These critical junctures can be nation-specific events as well as global trends. Some processes and events (be it hyper-globalization or silent revolution) in the recent decades have increased the salience of identity issues causing the kind of resentment I mentioned earlier. The specific features of such events are responsible for various kinds of populisms that we witness today. Such events have created many opportunities which populist parties have capitalized on.

Populism is essentially a strategy employed by an outsider to mobilize masses and take on the established groups in order to gain more influence. By extension, populist actors are actually political entrepreneurs. Just like the business entrepreneurs, they observe a demand and take action to fulfill it. It is not a coincidence that Trump was (or still is) a business entrepreneur. He was meaning to bid for president as early as 1987 and actually did run for president in 1999 (PBS NewsHour 2016). What enabled him to mount a serious campaign this time can be none other than the opportunities he perceived. Just like Trump, populist actors have employed narratives that appeal to identities which have been negatively affected from the event that caused resentment, which in turn has resulted in a boost to their vote share. However, the effect of such events is not enough to account for their electoral consolidation.

My central thesis is that electoral breakthrough of populist parties is largely determined by environmental factors that makes certain issues more salient, whereas their electoral consolidation can be explained by party competition. Once some issues become more salient, populist parties offer themselves as the only credible problem-solvers, benefiting from the ownership of the salient issue. The populist threat to mainstream parties forces them to reconsider their positions. Party competition can go a long way to explain electoral consolidation of populist parties. In the face of populist challengers, mainstream parties might opt for three different strategies: to accommodate, to reject and to ignore (Meguid 2005). Meguid argues that accommodative strategies transfer the issue ownership back to mainstream parties. Analyzing the historical development of three populist parties, I argue that precisely the opposite is true. Accommodative

strategies strengthen the populist ownership of the issue and help them become more institutionalized.

The thesis is structured as follows: first, I briefly review the existing approaches to study of populism and the commonly employed explanations for the rise of populist parties. Then, I lay out my theoretical arguments and demonstrate under what conditions populism emerge and consolidate. In the following chapter, I empirically test my claims about breakthrough of populist parties with the ESS data and my claims about their electoral consolidation by analyzing the cases of the Front National, the Freedom Party of Austria and the Danish People's Party. After I discuss my findings and the implications, I conclude by a few remarks about the future of populism and offer new avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS POPULISM?

The word populism pervades TV shows, newspaper articles and political debates. Despite the consensus on its importance and relevance, no consensus exists on its definition. Populism is everywhere and nowhere since people use it as a pejorative term to blame their opponents and their opponents never accept the label. Although historical examples are abundant, political actors today do not call themselves populist anymore since the word is used almost as an insult. Any study on populism has an obligation to enter the labyrinthine debate on what the word actually means. Due to very loose usage of the term, studies usually allocate a few paragraphs to recognize the lack of consensus on the definition. Many recent studies have taken a step forward in this trend and have started to recognize the recognition of the lack of consensus on the matter.

Historically, various movements and leaders from various countries and from both left and right were called populist. Some examples would be Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Juan Perón in Argentina, Indira Gandhi in India, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Occupy movement, Lega Nord and Tea Party (D'eraimo 2013). Although populism is referred as a self-evident concept by the authors, it is surely a difficult job to find a common denominator for all of these leaders and movements. This lack of clarity was noted as early as 1967 by Richard Hofstadter who tellingly delivered a keynote lecture at the London School of Economics titled "Everyone Is Talking About Populism, but No One Can Define It" (Derbyshire 2016).

Three different approaches to study populism is prevalent in the literature: populism as a thin-centered ideology, populism as discourse and populism as a strategy. The most common definition of populism has been offered by one of the most prominent populism scholars Cas Mudde. He defines populism as:

“a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* of the people” (Mudde 2007).

Ideology is usually defined as set of closely related ideas and thin-centered ideologies are those which do not have fully developed ideas on all social problems. Since they do not have a comprehensive agenda of their own, they can be easily combined with other more established ideologies. Arguably, this can explain why so many different movements and parties from both side of the ideological spectrum have been called populist. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) argue “which ideological features attach to populism depend upon the socio-political context within which the populist actors mobilize.” A different approach to study populism is to see it as rhetoric. It is a way of expression that can be used by again both right and left-wing ideologies. Apparent similarities exist between discursive and ideational approaches but the former puts the emphasis on how “us against them” dichotomy is employed to persuade the public. According to Laclau (2005), whose writings inspired many studies taking the discursive approach, the composition of “us against them” depends on social context as well but populist discourse is always a fight over hegemony between “the people” and “the dominant bloc”. The last approach to study of populism defines it as a political strategy. Some accounts of populism see it as advocating of policies that will receive support from certain groups but will consequently result in negative surplus for whole society (Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin 2011). In a similar vein, Jansen (2011) defines populism as a political initiative “that can be undertaken by challengers and incumbents of various stripes in pursuit of a wide range of social, political and economic agendas”.

Finally, populism’s relation with democracy has attracted considerable attention in the literature. Relatively early accounts of populism tend to see it as a danger to democracy, particularly to representative democracy since populists usually express dissatisfaction with the checks and balances and the deliberative decision-making process. For

instance, Urbinati (1998) contends that populism is “parasitical on representative democracy, if it succeeds in dominating the democratic state, it can modify its figure radically and even open the door to regime change.” In contrast, recently scholars have started to entertain the possibility that populism can be corrective to democracy as well (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). Populism not only draws attention to issues ignored by mainstream parties, but it also represents and mobilizes marginalized groups.

Considering these caveats, I consider populism as a strategy through which outsiders aim to carve out a place for themselves by redefining politics as a struggle between the homogeneous and unified people and the immoral and illegitimate elite.



CHAPTER 3

WHY THE POPULISTS REVOLT?

The support for populist parties has dramatically increased in recent decades in many parts of the world. Populist challenge to globalization has always been present in Latin America (Conniff et al. 2012); now it is on the rise in many Western societies. Not only their vote shares have increased, but also they wield enormous influence on agenda setting even in countries where populist parties have very few or no seats in the parliament. I believe studying populist parties is timely considering the importance and relevance of the matter. Naturally, their growth has attracted considerable attention from scholars who aim to explain their rise from various perspectives. Inglehart and Norris (2016) divide the literature on the causes of populist success into three categories: the demand-side explanations that stress public opinion, the supply-side explanations that stress party strategies and explanations that stress constitutional arrangements. Their grouping is also suitable for the purposes of this study. I define demand-side explanations as explanations that emphasize the stimuli to vote populist, and supply-side explanations as explanations that emphasize the role that political parties play in mobilizing the masses. Explanations that emphasize the institutional rules of the game are not reviewed here. This is not to say they do not matter; several institutional arrangements can be of importance to populist electoral success. One usual suspect is the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. It has long been established that political entrepreneurs have more incentive to act in more proportional systems (Duverger 1951). Accordingly, in less proportionate systems voters have more incentive to vote for established parties, refraining from wasting their votes. However, for reasons

of parsimony, I restrict myself to examine demand and supply-side variables and their interaction.

Demand-side explanations put the emphasis on the changes in people's values and opinions, usually through changes in their material conditions and in their environmental conditions. As the argument goes, such changes cause grievances among certain segments of the society which are negatively affected by them. The most common explanation for mass support for populism under this category is the increasing economic insecurity which causes resentment among the less fortunate segments of the society. The insecurity that has caused the recent populist revolt has stemmed from integration of world markets benefiting the capital owners and undermining the status of the working class. Top one percent obtained the lion's share of the gains while poorer segments find it increasingly difficult to make ends meet. Indeed, the rising economic inequality has been a problem that haunts many societies at different levels of development. Combined with the automation, manufacturing jobs sent to overseas and real wages stagnating or even falling, globalization makes a large share of the population worse off. Globalization has contributed to anti-establishment and nativist feelings of poorer populations, which have been exploited by populist movements (Betz 1994; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). Facing the globalization threat to their status, the poorer populations have closed ranks behind a charismatic leader and sought protection. Such arguments are usually employed when explaining the success of right-wing populist parties in Europe. These parties have attacked the governments for diminishing living standards, inadequate social safety nets and "decaying" societies. They have also blamed immigrants for taking their jobs and contributing to the erosion of national identity. Voter bases of parties both from the center left and center right have migrated to populist parties which promised them prosperity, again. In short, the increasing insecurity argument suggests that increasing gap between the rich and the poor due to globalization coupled with dissatisfaction with center parties and their inability to do something about it seemed to have resulted in boosting the chances of the populist candidates and parties at the polls.

Another related and fairly common explanation on the demand side is the cultural backlash thesis. According to this account, rise of populism is in response to substantial cultural transformation that has taken place in developed societies. The so-called silent revolution, the shift towards post-material values such as cosmopolitanism, caused a

counter-revolution among old generations, white men and less educated populations who embraced the populist agenda in reaction to such progressive values (Golder 2016). Data from various surveys consistently demonstrated that advanced industrial societies have continuously become more tolerant about controversial issues such as LGBT rights and abortion. What is causing this shift? Psychology literature almost universally agrees on the role of social environment in determining the boundaries of tolerance and open-mindedness that one will show to others. Those who are born in affluent societies with a secure environment are more likely to accept cultural diversity than their parents who in general had an upbringing that involved more hardships (Inglehart 1997). This trend has resulted in displacement of traditional values by progressive values. For instance, the idea of marital role of women as homemakers gave way to the idea of mutual substitution of men and women. Moreover, young people value multiculturalism more and express more support for supranational unions (Inglehart 1990). Silent revolution of post-industrialization and the post material values it created alienated the people who embrace the material or traditional values the most: men, older generations and the less educated. These people feeling angry and lost, in turn have embraced the populist ideas (Ignazi 1992).

Contrary to demand-side explanations for populist success, supply-side explanations treat voter's preferences as fixed and look at how parties compete for votes. Many diverse accounts of populist electoral success can go under supply-side explanations. For instance, Art (2011) explains populist parties' success by the type of activist they recruit, and argues if populist parties can recruit not only extremist activists but also the opportunists and moderates, they will save themselves from becoming a flash movement. A lengthy discussion of all supply-side explanations is unnecessary for the purposes of this study. Thus, I restrict myself to review party system based explanations only. Many studies noted the impact of the position of mainstream parties on the success of extremist parties but the jury is still out on the true nature of this impact. To clarify, extremist parties are not the same as populist parties, since we observe populist parties in the center as well. However, what the authors refer to as extremist parties are actually what I call right-wing populist parties. Kitschelt (1997) argues that convergence of mainstream parties especially on economic issues benefits far right parties. Similarly, Ignazi (2003) notes that the move towards the center by right-wing mainstream parties create a space that extreme right parties can fill with their radical

ideas. Many studies also concluded that when mainstream parties have similar policy positions, it is easier for extremist parties to take advantage of the dissatisfaction with the system and to channel it to themselves as support (Kriesi 2014). On the other hand, Zaller (1992) argues that it is actually ideological divergence among mainstream parties that benefits far right parties since it undermines the elite consensus to keep such parties out of parliament and government. Finally, in her influential work, Meguid (2005) suggests that the strategies employed by mainstream parties play a role in electoral success of niche parties (right-wing populists and greens). In her framework, strategies available to mainstream parties are: a dismissive strategy through which they try to convince the public that issues are not salient, an adversarial strategy through which they take the opposite position of populist parties and finally an accommodative strategy through which they modify their position to be closer to populist parties. She suggests that employing the adversarial and accommodative strategies increases the issue salience and accommodative strategies also transfer the issue ownership to mainstream parties. I will argue that accommodative strategies are attractive baits that mainstream parties should not take. Employing them only works to allow them into mainstream debate, making them another legitimate claimant.

As argued before, no parsimonious enough theoretical model to explain has been offered to date. The literature is characterized by singular case studies. Such studies usually employ historical narratives and highlight the role played by specific events, electoral rules, party competition, charismatic leaders and the media for each case. One can surely assert that events and processes that take place within a country can explain populist success for that particular country, but then the question why populism is on the rise globally begs explanation. Another aspect that is overlooked in the literature is the interaction between demand-side and supply-side factors. The early studies on the topic were generally focusing on demand-side factors and the recent decade has witnessed the rise of studies that focus on supply-side factors (Golder 2016). Few studies take both demand-side and supply-side factors into account. Moreover, studies that consider both factors do so in an additive manner and do not capture their interaction. Grievances may create demand for populist parties but demand does not always automatically translate into populist success. Although demand is a necessary condition for populist success, it is not sufficient. Many scholars have already noted that variations in demand fail to account for cross-national differences (Norris 2005; Mudde

2007). Populist parties may be successful in countries where presence of demand factors is negligible or even non-existent. Indeed, populist parties are successful even in prosperous regions whose populations are not so economically insecure. While populist parties succeed in some of the most egalitarian countries characterized by strong safety nets such as Denmark, they are non-existent in some countries that seems to be very fertile ground for them such as Portugal. It can be argued these cases are not comparable but the argument stands. Since vote share of populist parties also vary among countries with relatively similar socioeconomic conditions and culture, supply-side explanations should be included in thorough analyses as well. Political context matters for sure but its main effect is to make populist rhetoric more appealing. In order to fully understand how populist parties succeed in catering votes, one must not only understand how values change but also how political entrepreneurs take advantage of that change. Entrepreneurs first, bring together the unorganized individuals and coordinate the movement. Second, they give unorganized masses more visibility. Finally, and most importantly, they reinforce individuals' beliefs and attitudes, thus preventing the movement from being just a flash in the pan. Political actors and institutions are not mere reflectors of social sentiments, they also shape those sentiments.

Another contribution this paper intends to make is to divide the populist success into stages. It is not the first one to do so, several scholars note the distinction between electoral breakthrough and electoral consolidation of populist parties. However, their studies usually focus on only one stage and do not explain what causes the alternation between different stages. For instance, Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield (2003) explain populist parties' electoral breakthrough with the excessive media attention they draw whereas Carter (2005) emphasizes the organizational strength and its effect on electoral consolidation. This study has the ambitious goal of accounting for both stages.

CHAPTER 4

MAKING SENSE OF POPULISM

Having summarized the issues and debates on populism, I turn to explain my position on the matter. I tend to side with scholars who consider populism as a political strategy, yet I argue that three competing definitions are not mutually exclusive. Defining populism as a strategy does not rule out the possibility that it has a specific discursive style and some ideational features attached to it. The sole definition that successfully captures this aspect, which has been surprisingly missed by the literature, was offered by Robert Barr. He defines populism as “a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages” (Barr 2009).

Barr’s definition summarizes the whole literature in a single sentence. It shows the nature of the relationship between related concepts such as demagoguery and populism. More importantly, it ignores the secondary characteristics, such as references to certain constituencies, on which the literature wasted too much effort. Populists do not target certain constituencies everywhere, it is the context that determines the construction of “us”.

The definition I adopt has three pillars. First, populism is a strategy through which an outsider aims to gain more influence. Populist entrepreneurs use it to mobilize masses when the opportunity arises. It is the times of high public discontent that usually provide such opportunities. The source of public discontent along with the socioeconomic context is a very important determinant of the ideological blend. Second, populist

entrepreneurs use anti-establishment appeal. They claim that the elite cannot respond to the people's demands because they are incapable of doing so or just unwilling. By extension, populist entrepreneurs should be outsiders since the anti-establishment appeal cannot work for an insider. What I mean by outsider is not strictly someone who is new to politics or someone who has no ties with the established parties, a political gadfly within the existing parties can also be an outsider. The important thing is that the outsider should distance itself from the converged position of mainstream parties. Finally, populists deny complexity. The more complex and incomprehensible the world becomes; the more populists hang on to their prejudices. Complexity is the first victim of populism. For them, there is no need for complex mechanisms to ensure the protection of fundamental rights or to facilitate deliberation. There is only one right view and it is the people's view. The main purpose of all political institutions should be to ensure that people's will is correctly translated into political decisions. Populists are not angry because their voices are unheard by the establishment, they are angry simply because there are too many voices around. From this perspective, populists cannot be corrective to democracy. They undermine democracy just as they undermine good governance. In the modern world, it is not always possible to bring the majority will and technocratic solutions together. There may be situations where these two are completely at odds with each other. The growing tension between responsibility and responsiveness puts enormous pressure on parties who join in governments (Mair 2009). While they need to strike a balance between two functions, their populist rivals do not face such a trade-off especially at the early stages. Even when in power, populists tend to disregard commitments made by the previous governments, a phenomenon best exemplified by Donald Trump's denial of climate change and withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Populism is about rejecting experts and expertise and putting the demands of the constituency first even when doing so yields catastrophic consequences.

Populism has become one of the most pervasive terms in political debates and analyses and its use is inevitable when trying to understand why the world turned upside down. However, it is usually mistaken for demagoguery, anti-establishment, fanaticism or extremism. It is important to distinguish between those concepts and populism, since loose usage of the term populism undermines the efforts to understand it. Populism requires more than being anti-establishment; not everyone who is critical of the elite is populist. Similarly, populism is not a form of extremism. It is a strategy available to

extremist actors as well as centrist ones, which partially involves taking advantage of the people's grievances by offering simple and usually extreme solutions to the problem at hand. The true danger of populism is that it normalizes the extreme to such a degree that ordinary, hard-working and well-meaning individuals accept it.



CHAPTER 5

UNUSUAL TIMES, UNUSUAL ACTORS

Defining populism as a strategy employed by an outsider inevitably links it with a perceived opportunity to take on the insiders. In the absence of such opportunity, populist entrepreneur simply would not waste efforts to displace the insiders since the chances would be slim. It is the prospect of more political power that motivates the populist entrepreneur, and low probability of success that discourages them from undertaking such a political venture. The opportunity for populists usually presents itself in the form of a crisis. Just like business entrepreneurs who have made massive fortunes during the times of crisis, populists can make massive electoral gains during or after a crisis. Like the well-known quote attributed to Chairman Mao, “the situation is excellent” for all newcomers when “everything under heaven is in utter chaos.” A crisis, be it political or economic, is a time when governments come under stress, frozen cleavages in the society defrost and stable party systems become more volatile. Following the advice attributed to Churchill, another influential statesman from the 20th century, populists “never waste a good crisis.”

Crises help populists in several ways. First, considering economic crises, it is well established by the economic voting literature that incumbent parties that are held responsible for the crisis are punished by the voters in the subsequent elections (Duch and Stevenson 2008). The same argument is valid for political ones as well. Incumbent parties are punished after periods of political instability, political scandals or even after poor management of natural disasters (Heersink, Peterson, and Jenkins 2017). Also,

crises are contagious, meaning both that they can easily spread to other countries and that they can trigger different crises. For instance, Great Recession has sparked political crises in many European countries. It is no surprise that populists mobilize after a crisis in general (Kriesi 2015), punishment of the incumbent parties create room for the newcomers.

Second, crises strengthen the credibility of populists' anti-establishment appeal. Populists argue that mostly due to unwillingness but also due to incapability, the elites do not respond to ordinary people's needs and wishes. Times of crisis certainly make such appeals more credible in the eyes of disappointed voters since their trust in political institutions weaken. More important than trust is the feelings of being abandoned by politicians and the resentment it causes. Political distrust can only be a small part of this resentment. Crises especially combined with the perceived inability or lack of will of the political establishment to remedy the situation fuel feelings of frustration, resentment, and indignity. Such sentiments are found to be the root cause of terrorism (Krueger and Maleckova 2002), contrary to commonly held views regarding the economic status of terrorists, which is essentially why I draw a parallel between supporting a populist movement and supporting a terrorist organization. Both phenomena have been reduced to economic causes in their respective literatures although economic causes are not the main driving factors. Especially the emergence of left-wing populism has been linked to economics causes but I argue left-wing populist voters are motivated not by economic hardships but again the feelings of resentment and indignity. It is not surprising to see that participants of 2011 Spanish protests called themselves "indignados" or that 2011 Greek protests were organized by Indignant Citizens Movement.

I believe economic causes play a lesser role in accounting for right-wing populist vote. As the examples at the beginning of the thesis demonstrate, at least some right-wing populist voters ignore their economic interests. Fueled by resentment and frustration, voters can engage in self-defeating behavior since emotional distress, especially anger is known to cloud judgment and result in irrational decisions (Leith and Baumeister 1996). Behavioral economics offer ample evidence on how gut feelings affect our choices without paying much attention to consequences (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). However, the magnitude of right-wing populist vote is so high that reasons for it cannot be reduced to cognitive biases. I contend that it is more common for right-wing populist

voters to prioritize their ideas over their economic interests. The only way to account for individuals who are seemingly doing things against their interests is identity politics. Fearon (1999) clarifies the concept of identity and suggests it can refer either to a social category or to “distinguishing features of a person that form the basis of his or her dignity or self-respect.” I define identity as the frame through which social actors make social decisions. This definition allows identity to explain the action. This aspect is very important since identity has the potential to explain actions that cannot be explained by rational choice paradigm. Of course, one can still explain extreme behaviors within rational choice by relaxing some of the assumptions held by the theory. One can construct a plausible explanation within the rational choice paradigm even for the suicide bombers (Pape 2005) but the fact that terrorists do not suffer from a psychological disorder is simply not enough to make them rational individuals who make calculated decisions. I argue that this is nothing but an overshoot. Even if we relax rational choice assumptions to incorporate constructivist elements, which is to suggest that interests of political actors are socially constructed (Wendt 1999), we again tap into the role of identity. Voters can be motivated by their interests but their idea of where their interests lie is linked to their identity; in other words, their interests are actually a “limited and preconceived idea” (Rodrik 2013). Similar feelings of frustration, resentment and indignity motivates also the left-wing populist voters although this time I cannot argue it is against their interests to support such parties. Their economic interest is the preservation or the extension of the welfare state and left-wing populist parties promises precisely that.

Finally, and most importantly, times of crisis change the voters’ perception of how salient certain issues are. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (2007) noted, people have multiple identities and any number of them might become more salient at a critical juncture. Crises are the critical junctures that change the salience of certain issues, thus the relevancy of certain actors. Populist entrepreneurs take advantage of crises by employing memes to reach out to voters. Rodrik and Mukand (2016) define memes as cues, narratives and symbols that shift the views of people about how the world works. The precise mechanism through which memes work is not the subject matter of this thesis but I argue that political entrepreneurs have more incentive to find and exploit new memes during times of crisis. Furthermore, I argue that times of crisis are

conducive to make vulnerable believe in new narratives in accordance with the issue or the identity that becomes more salient.

I have already suggested that the nature of the crisis can explain the divergent paths of populists. For instance, the crisis in Latin American countries has stemmed from the Washington Consensus policies. Globalization in the form of trade liberalization and financial opening has caused grievances among working class which left-wing populists have been able to capitalize on. It is almost paradoxical that it was the right-wing populists who thrived after the eurozone crisis. After all, globalization was also in practice in Europe and it did deepen the class division between the winners and the losers it created. More importantly, austerity measures that have been introduced after the Great Recession hit the poorest the hardest (Oxfam International 2015). Some argued that the economic crash should have started a new era for social democracy (Wigmore 2015). Indeed, one would expect to see social democrats attain considerable gains in elections following the crisis since it is them who advocate for tighter capital market regulations and expansion of social safety nets. Their agenda and claims certainly did become more credible after the crisis. The Great Recession might have brought a new era of social democracy if some other issues had not become more salient. I argue that perceived threat due to mass immigration from poorer countries with different cultures has intensified identity cleavages. Thus, a seemingly more important crisis overshadowed the other and it was the right-wing populists that exploited the opportunity. The validity of the argument can be checked by looking at the two countries in Europe where populism took a left-wing form: Greece and Spain. In Greece, the most salient issue was the austerity policies laid by international institutions, thus Syriza was able to achieve an electoral breakthrough. In Spain, immigration was not a salient issue since the country received most of its immigrants from Latin American countries belonging to the Spanish Empire (Hierro 2016). As social attitude towards immigration was favorable, the salient issue was again the austerity policies. Here, too, a newly organized left-wing party, Podemos, achieved a breakthrough.

CHAPTER 6

ROLE OF ISSUE OWNERSHIP

The question why changes in issue salience result in a boost in the vote share of certain parties begs further explanation. According to my model, individuals base their decisions to vote accordingly on the issues that are most salient to them. They later vote for the party which they regard as the most credible problem-solver on the issue. Even such a simple and non-nuanced model yields a valuable insight: election campaigns, which are often thought to be about two rival answers to the same question, are rather fights over which question matters the most. Hence, parties that offer themselves as the most credible problem-solvers on the salient issue are expected to do well in the elections. I expect far right populist parties in Europe to do better when national identity issues become more salient because they own the issue. In a similar vein, left wing populist parties are expected to do better when economic inequality and austerity issues become more salient.

The concept of issue ownership suffers from a similar lack of conceptual clarity as populism. Most definitions draw upon Budge and Farlie's (1983a, 1983b) seminal works on saliency theory. Although they do not offer any clear definition, they argue that political parties emphasize the salience of certain issues and avoid issues favored by their opponents in order to receive more votes. The most commonly referred to definition was put forward by Petrocik (1996), who sees issue ownership as voters' association of certain issues with certain political parties and their perception that those parties are more able to solve problems related to those issues. More recent scholarship has identified a problem with this definition. Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch (2012) argue that Petrocik's definition contains two different definitions, as the party that is

most associated with a given issue may not be considered to be the best handler of that issue. Thus, they make a distinction between associative ownership and competence ownership. This distinction will be important when I investigate the role of party competition in electoral consolidation of populist parties. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that parties hold advantages on certain issues and they do better in the elections when those issues become more salient.

National identity is the combination of elements that creates the perception of “who we are”, ranging from territory to common myths and memories. (Smith 1991) Recent decades have witnessed two challenges to national identities in Europe: European integration and immigration. It is well-documented in the literature that the ambitious push for further European integration led to protest vote for Eurosceptic populist parties (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013; Treib 2014). Yet, I argue that the second challenge to the national identity, namely immigration, is a more important predictor of populist vote. After all, we can talk about a common European identity characterized by Greek mythology and ideas, Roman legacy and most importantly Christianity. Common European identity is not so alien to the national identities whereas immigration from poorer countries brings different races and religions and raises complex issues. Immigration has increasingly turned Europe into immigrant into a union of societies and caused concerns across the continent. Using metaphors of Europe becoming a Muslim continent, of Europe being invaded and of Europe dying slowly, populist parties have fueled the citizen’s feelings of ontological insecurity. This, in turn, has made the immigration one of the most salient issues across Europe. Patriotism and maintaining the social order are not considered to be issues of valence but partisan issues. Especially far right parties outperform the mainstream competitors because they are not bounded by any pre-commitments and do not have to act responsibly. When such issues become more salient, other parties fight an uphill battle and lose.

The Great Recession, which is the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, started in the United States and quickly spread to Europe. The crisis had three dimensions (Shambaugh 2012): a competitiveness crisis which undermines growth, a banking crisis which stems from lack of liquidity and sovereign debt crisis that leads to unsustainable government debt due to rising bond yields. Not all countries in Europe experienced all dimensions; the situation in Southern Europe was grimmer. Unemployment rate in Spain and Greece hit the record above 25 percent. Furthermore,

Portugal and Greece, along with Ireland, were unable to refinance their debts and needed to be bailed-out. In a bid to address the dire situation governments introduced austerity policies that reduce government spending and raise taxes. This in turn led to growing inequalities and provided the fertile ground for populist entrepreneurs. In countries stricken by the crisis the hardest, namely Spain and Greece, economic crisis turned into a severe political crisis which resulted in social unrest, mass mobilization and the demise of party systems. Due to rage against austerity, protesters took to the streets and set up tents in public squares. In Spain, also the discontent over corruption scandals exacerbated the resentment against “la casta”, the establishment. “¡Democracia Real YA!”, the platform that sparked the indignados movement, explained who they and their motives are as follows:

“We are the unemployed, the poorly remunerated, the subcontracted, the precarious, the young ... we want change and a dignified future. We are fed up with antisocial reforms, those that leave us unemployed, those with which the bankers that have provoked the crisis raise our mortgages or take our homes, those laws that they impose upon us that limit our liberty for the benefit of the powerful. We blame the political economic and economic powers for our precarious situation and we demand a change of direction” (quoted in Charnock, Purcell, and Ribera-Fumaz 2012).

Inspired by and born out of anti-austerity street protests was Podemos, an anti-establishment left-wing party that was created out of thin air but still managed to occupy the third place in general elections in less than two years after it was founded. A similar process was taking place in Greece as well. An agreement was reached between the Greek government and “troika”, the foreign lenders (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). The agreement required the Greek Government to introduce new austerity packages whenever the objectives were not met in order to receive the next installment (Simiti 2014). “Aganaktismenoi” (indignants) took to the streets to protest spending cuts, tax raises and introduction of new taxes. Their anger was not only directed towards the austerity policies and increasing inequalities but also toward the political parties. One of the popular slogans that indignants chanted was “Burn, burn this brothel, the Parliament.” Unlike Podemos, Syriza was already an established party when the crisis hit the country but it enjoyed a very modest electoral success before the crisis. In the 2009 national elections, the party won 4.59 percent of the vote and became the fifth largest party represented in the Hellenic Parliament. After the first election following the protests in May 2012, as well as in the following election in June, Syriza became the main opposition party receiving

26.9 percent of the votes in June. Finally, in the January 2015 election, Syriza won an election for the first time in its history by claiming 36.3 percent of the votes. The party held on to power in the September elections that year as well.

What enabled Podemos and Syriza to achieve the electoral success of this magnitude was left-wing ownership of the issues that became salient after the crisis. Expansion of welfare state, redistributive policies, protection of labor market and reducing social inequalities are the issues owned by left-wing politics. When voters attach high importance to such issues, they tend to vote for left-wing parties.

On the basis of above arguments, I hypothesize the followings:

H₁: The higher the perceived unwillingness of politicians to care about people, higher it is the probability of voting populist.

H₂: The more unfavorably predisposed toward the immigrants, the more likely the voters will vote for right-wing populist parties.

H₃: The more individuals favor redistributive policies, the more likely they will vote for left-wing populist parties.

CHAPTER 7

DATA AND ANALYSIS

I test my hypotheses by relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) data, particularly the ESS Round 7 which was conducted in 2014.³ ESS is one of the most commonly used cross-national surveys in the world and a total of 36 countries across Europe have taken part in at least one round of it. Individuals are selected with random probability and samples drawn are representative of all individuals who are older than 15 in each country. The main drawback of using ESS data in explaining voting behavior is that it does not reflect the voter behavior at election time (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Since the national elections are held in different times, the ESS round may be conducted at different points of the election cycles of different parties. However, the ESS is unique in the quality and variety of the information it offers. It is perhaps the only database that includes the suitable variables.

To identify the populist parties, I rely on the previous classification of Inglehart and Norris (2016). They used the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to pinpoint parties' ideological locations and double-checked the reliability of the CHES measures with previous classification of populist parties. Although their classification is a crude one that divides the populist parties into either right-wing or left-wing categories, thus ruling out the existence of center populist parties, it is more up to date compared to other classifications. From their list, I dropped the parties from countries which were

³ The countries included were: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

excluded in the ESS Round 7. I also dropped Estonia, Ireland, Israel and Portugal since no parties from these countries are included in the classification of Inglehart and Norris. Furthermore, Spain was dropped because its only populist party had not seen any elections when the ESS Round 7 was conducted. Finally, two parties (United Poland and National Front of United Kingdom) were de facto excluded since no respondent declared voting for them. The complete list of the countries and parties which are included in the study can be consulted in the Appendix A.

In order to operationalize the perceived lack of will of the elite to remedy the grievances, one can look at variables that measure trust in political actors. If the perceived lack of will to remedy the grievances is high, this should manifest itself as low levels of trust in political actors. However, I opted to use the variable "ptcpplt". This variable alone is essentially why I did not pool the data from previous ESS rounds because it was only included in the seventh round. It asks the respondents whether politicians care what people like them think (Specific wording can be found in the Appendix B along with wording and values pertaining to all questions used). This question implicitly asks the respondents whether they identify themselves with a social category, with a group of other people which they can call "us". Recall that Fearon (1999) defines identity as a social category or as "distinguishing features of a person that form the basis of his or her dignity or self-respect." Individuals who share the opinion that politicians do not care what people like them think, will automatically have a notion of "us against them". Furthermore, they will be indignant since they will think it is unjust for politicians to do so.

I suspect that the politicians' care is a better predictor of populist vote than political distrust vested in them. Yet, I still find it useful to look at trust variables because I want to check if political distrust is also a predictor of populist vote. Levi and Stoker (2000) suggest that trust involves making oneself vulnerable to others who can do harm. Then, by extension, political trust is individuals' belief that political actors or institutions will not harm them. Political trust can be vested in politicians, in political parties as well as in other political institutions. It would be more appropriate to use trust in political parties instead of politicians because it is parties that offer fully developed programs and different policy formulations. Also, party as a whole determines the social groups to ally with or to alienate. This especially becomes important when the party is in government since alienation breeds resentment.

High degree of correlation is expected between politicians' care and trust in political parties. To check for possible collinearity between the two variables, I calculated Pearson Product-Moment Correlation as 0.6163 which demonstrates a high correlation as expected.

To capture the attitudes toward redistributive policies, I take advantage of the answers to a question regarding government's involvement in reducing income inequality. Several options are available for capturing anti-immigrant attitudes but I opted for a question asking whether immigrants make the country worse or a better place to live.

The variables I have described so far are the main explanatory variables. Alongside my explanatory variables, I control for the most commonly employed predictors of populist vote: age, gender and education level. It is often asserted that populist parties' voter base consists of old males without college degrees (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Inglehart and Norris 2016).

The dependent variable is declared vote for populist parties. It is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent states voting for populist parties and 0 otherwise. In order to test my second and third hypotheses I also created dummies for votes for right-wing and left-wing populist parties. It can be argued that the reasons I specified for populist vote can also lead to abstention from voting. Indeed, the perceived unresponsiveness of the government, the level of distrust in political parties, the frustration and resentment can reach such a degree that citizens would find it futile to engage in conventional political participation. Terrorists, too, often claim they resort to it because conventional ways do not work. I admit that capturing the abstainers would definitely enrich our understanding of populism. However, what I am interested in this study is the vote choice of citizens who had already decided to vote. Therefore, I focus on declared vote for populist parties.

Finally, it is worth noting that I deleted all data from respondents with missing values. I conducted complete case analysis (listwise deletion) in which I analyzed only the observations with available data on each variable. Since the sample is large enough, the data should not lose much statistical power.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Populist vote	17436	.1286992	.3348764	0	1
Right-wing populist vote	17436	.052707	.2234544	0	1
Left-wing populist vote	17436	.0763937	.2656346	0	1
Politicians' care	17436	3.837405	2.40065	0	10
Trust in political parties	17436	4.123824	2.274126	0	10
Reducing income inequality	17436	2.233827	1.086447	1	5
Anti-immigrant attitudes	17436	5.207559	2.214506	0	10
Gender	17436	1.507571	.499957	1	2
Age	17436	52.67424	16.97019	15	100
Level of Education	17436	4.217424	1.80155	1	7

I conducted a logistic regression analysis using the above variables. Table 2a displays the results when politicians' care valuable is used and Table 2b does the same for trust in political parties. I find strong support for the first hypothesis. Perceived unwillingness of the elite to remedy grievances, which is operationalized through the variables of perceived politicians' care about people and trust in political parties, is a significant predictor of populist vote. Both disbelief in politicians' care for people and having low levels of political trust in actors of representation are common characteristics of all populist voters. These characteristics unite the bases of right-wing and left-wing populist parties.

Furthermore, I found a significant relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and right-wing populist vote, as suggested by the second hypothesis. Individuals with strong

anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties. Interestingly if not paradoxically, the same is true for left-wing populist parties. Those who vote for left-wing populist parties are not less anti-immigrant than those who vote for right-wing populist parties. This is mainly because many populist parties, which are known for their strong anti-immigrant stance such as the FN, actually have substantial degree of left-wing elements in their agenda. Thus they are considered to be left-wing populist party by according to classification of Inglehart and Norris. These parties are welfare chauvinistic in the sense that they want to preserve and extend the welfare state exclusively for “the people”, not for the immigrants.

A significant relationship has also been documented between support for welfare state and left-wing populist vote. As I theorized in the third hypothesis, individuals who favor redistributive policies are more likely to vote for left-wing populist parties. A reverse relationship seems to be the case for right-wing populist voters; individuals who oppose redistributive policies are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.

In line with the previous findings in the literature, I found gender a significant predictor. Gender gap is once again confirmed; women are less likely to vote for populist parties. The effect of age proves to be the opposite of what the literature widely claims. The evidence strongly suggests that young people are more inclined to vote for populist parties. Finally, the effect of education is negatively significant in general. Populist parties enjoy a broader electoral support among the less-educated segments of the society.

Table2a: Regression estimates using "Politicians' care" variable

	1 populist	2 rightpop	3 leftpop
Politicians' care	-0.0974*** (.0099872)	-0.0722*** (.0151123)	-0.100*** (.0124267)
Reducing income inequality	-0.0980*** (.0206056)	0.0779* (.0341382)	-0.219*** (.023808)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.252*** (.0089783)	-0.252*** (.0130479)	-0.208*** (.0113727)
Gender	-0.263*** (.0364568)	-0.332*** (.0502571)	-0.165** (.0496151)
Age	-0.0139*** (.0014097)	-0.0122*** (.0020512)	-0.0130*** (.0017429)
Level of Education	-0.179*** (.0125955)	-0.234*** (.0180785)	-0.116*** (.0165198)
Constant	1.631*** (.7321991)	0.341 (.2864303)	0.661*** (.3360661)
N	17436	17436	17436
Pseudo R2	0.0933	0.0816	0.0684

standard error in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table2b: Regression estimates using trust in political parties variable

	1 populist	2 rightpop	3 leftpop
Trust in political parties	-0.0743*** (.0101145)	-0.0765*** (.0149077)	-0.0602*** (.0126772)
Reducing income inequality	-0.108*** (.0203962)	0.0774* (.0341067)	-0.234*** (.023479)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.261*** (.0088398)	-0.253*** (.0129136)	-0.222*** (.0111464)
Gender	-0.252*** (.0367937)	-0.327*** (.0504903)	-0.153** (.0501172)
Age	-0.0135*** (.0014097)	-0.0120*** (.0020571)	-0.0126*** (.0017423)
Level of Education	-0.190*** (.0123551)	-0.241*** (.0178339)	-0.129*** (.0161566)
Constant	1.653*** (.7519397)	0.397 (.3049646)	0.664*** (.3389897)
N	17436	17436	17436
Pseudo R2	0.0909	0.0820	0.0647

standard error in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

An issue that can be raised with this analysis is that it takes advantage of only individual level data. There might be country level variables which are linked to populist vote. In order to overcome this possibility of omitted variable bias, I conducted separate regression analyses for all of the 16 countries included in the study. The results can be consulted in the Appendix C. Findings from aggregate data largely hold for "Politician's care" variable, which turned out to be a significant predictor in 11 of these countries (namely Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland) and an insignificant predictor in 5 of them (Belgium, Denmark, France, Lithuania and Slovenia). Interestingly, in Hungary, the relationship is positive which means that as voters think politicians care what they think, they are more likely to vote for populist parties. This makes sense when we consider the fact that country's ruling party, Fidesz is a populist one. However, the same phenomenon is not observed in Poland where the ruling Law and Justice is also populist. As predicted distrust in political parties was a less strong predictor than politicians' care. It proved to be significant in half of the countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) and insignificant in the other half (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Lithuania Poland, Slovenia and Switzerland).

The reasons for the heterogeneity is not obvious and straightforward. Differences might lie in macroeconomic indicators, in social safety nets or in the level of immigration to the country. Election system might also play a role. Explaining this heterogeneity is outside the scope of this thesis.

Another issue that can be raised is that anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-austerity might increase the vote share of all right-wing and all left-wing parties respectively. Being an outsider may not give right-wing and left-wing populist parties the advantage I mentioned earlier. In order to solve this, one could simply run the analysis again with the left-right scores of every party. However, the classification of populist parties that was put forward by Inglehart and Norris does not allow me to do that since their calculated left-right scores for populist parties contradict with the those of readily available datasets. I will tackle this issue in the next chapter where I analyze the party competition in France, Austria and Denmark.

CHAPTER 8

THE COPY WILL NEVER BE ORIGINAL

After approximately 30 years with populist parties as we know them today, it is safe to assume that they are not flash movements. They seem to be successful at carving out a place for themselves within European party systems. They are here to stay for the foreseeable future. How did the European societies end up with them? I argued that rising issue salience and the ownership of the issue that has become salient helped them to achieve electoral breakthroughs. Yet, I suspect that the effect of demand-side variables is not enough to account for their electoral consolidation since many populist parties achieved breakthroughs but not all of them could sustain their success. What facilitated the populist entrenchment in the party systems was the removal of cordon sanitaire which was imposed on them earlier. There was a tacit agreement among established parties to ostracize populist parties (J. V. Spanje and Brug 2007). Established parties were to not cooperate with them or to include them in political debates. However, increasing issue salience has forced mainstream parties to modify their positions in order to maintain or to recapture their voter base.

The party competition literature offers ample evidence on how mainstream party positioning and strategies affect the performance of their challengers. Most research in the literature is influenced by Meguid (2005) who demonstrates how electoral success of niche (far right and greens) parties can be affected by center-right and center-left parties. In her framework, strategies available to mainstream parties are: a dismissive strategy through which they try to convince the public that issues are not salient, an adversarial strategy through which they take the opposite position of populist parties

and finally an accommodative strategy through which they modify their position to be closer to populist parties.

Drawing on the entrepreneurship literature, I propose a new strategy that includes the following strategies: an innovative entrepreneurship strategy through which they counter the disruptive innovation of the challenger by attacking along a different dimension, a copycat or imitating entrepreneurship strategy through which they take the same policy position as the challenger or adjust their position closer to the challenger, a divergent entrepreneurship strategy through which move away from the challenger's policy positions and finally a drone entrepreneurship strategy through which they do not do anything to cope with the challenger or to address the issues which has become more salient.

Meguid (2005) suggests that copycat strategies, which correspond to accommodative strategies in her framework, employed by mainstream parties result in increased issue salience and vote loss for the challenger since the ownership of the issue transfers to the mainstream parties. On the contrary, although Meguid correctly suggests that accommodative strategies increase the issue salience, they serve to strengthen challenger's appeals. Recall that Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch (2012) draw a distinction between associative ownership and competence ownership. While competence ownership can arguably be gained by strategic positioning in theory, associative ownership can only be gained long and consistent efforts by a party. Issues can be owned only by parties that exhibit a special dedication to them. Issue ownership is a reputation that can be developed by time. Furthermore, individuals turn to populist parties because they are frustrated with the way mainstream political parties handle the salient issue. Simple repositioning cannot make them forget about their grievances.

Yet, mainstream parties usually engage in a Faustian bargain with the intention of retaking the grounds they lost to populist parties. Increased saliency and intention of mainstream parties to gain from it help populist parties first as further increased saliency and second, a legitimation of their positions. The move by mainstream parties towards populist party positions pushes the boundaries of what is politically acceptable and provides populist parties the legitimacy which they neither claim nor deserve. As parties adopt similar positions, populist parties become respectable competitors, not a group of

extremists who should be ignored. This is precisely why some scholars refer populist parties as “contagious” (J. van Spanje 2010; Meijers 2015).

In order to investigate my thesis, I take a closer look at the historical development of Front National, Freedom Party of Austria and Danish People’s Party. They are populist parties which are known for their strong anti-immigrant stance. I justify my selection on the basis of electoral success. They have been relevant actors in their country’s politics and have enjoyed a pretty consistent electoral support. They constitute critical cases because if copycat strategies employed by mainstream parties result in vote loss populist parties, then we would expect to see these parties do worse. Demise of them would be most likely since parties from center-right and center-left have consistently tried to co-opt their positions and rhetoric. However, mainstream co-optation of these parties’ positions only contributed to their entrenchment in their countries’ politics.

Perhaps the employing comparative case studies as method needs to be justified since they are often accused to be of little scientific value (Flyvbjerg 2012). It is true that case studies do not represent the natural science ideal that social sciences desperately try to reach but this does not diminish their value. After all, other “more appropriate” methods utterly failed to reach a predictive theory. Sound social science is not about adhering to one method; it is about choosing the best method to solve the puzzle at hand. I believe case studies approach is appropriate in tackling a puzzle as complex as populist entrenchment. Moreover, one can generalize from any number of cases as long as the cases are carefully chosen. One critical case is enough to confirm or to refute a proposition. Comparative case studies help us to see if the theory holds for different contexts. Similar patterns observed in different environments can increase the confidence in the theory.

The Front National is a populist party who is known for its strong anti-immigrant stance. Before the FN rose to the ownership of immigration issue, it was French communists who were worried about it. Motivated by their voters who lost their jobs to immigrants, communists exerted pressure on them at the municipal level. Reports of mayors who deny immigrants the public utilities started to appear as early as 1980 (Ellinas 2010). Observing this, the FN concentrated its efforts on local communities before entering the national stage. The strategy paid off and the FN started to increase

its support starting from the municipal elections in 1983. The party did remarkably well in the 1984 European elections and gained 10.95 percent of the vote.

That is when the moderate right started to move closer to the FN on immigration issue with the hopes to stop their own voters' migration to the FN. In 1986, the UDF and RPR proposed to change nationality laws and to grant the citizenship based on jus sanguinis rather than jus soli. Stricter restrictions and tougher immigrations laws were materialized in 1993 when the right-wing coalition came to the power. The so-called Pasqua law, named after the interior minister Charles Pasqua, introduced measures ranging from forbidding foreign graduates to take jobs in France to extending the time for family reunification (Guiraudon 2001). The change in immigration laws was so radical that the UN investigator on contemporary forms of racism did not hide his disappointment: "France is being shaken by a wave of xenophobia and racism that is highly prejudicial to its image as the homeland of human rights." More important was his comments that xenophobia in France was "fueled by positions taken and declarations made for electoral purposes by politicians from the right and left" (James and Tribune 1996).

Centre-right's flirt with FN agenda did not end there. Nicolas Sarkozy championed anti-immigrant policies as radical as those of the FN several times. The most notable one is the establishment of Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment which created a huge controversy. The decision was made before the regional elections in an attempt to remedy the low popularity ratings. Sarkozy initially had some success courting the FN voters, this is precisely why I call it a Faustian bargain. In the short run, it might work but the politicians who resort to it are sure to have regrets eventually. Sarkozy himself admitted that he was wrong to create the ministry (Chrisafis 2010). However, it did not stop him doing the same mistake again. During the 2012 presidential elections, Sarkozy threatened to withdraw France from Schengen Area and called for border controls within the area again. Such attempts to woo the FN voters proved unproductive as he lost to Hollande. He made a bid to be the nominee of his party for presidential elections in 2017. He said if he won the election, he would not settle for integration of immigrants and require assimilation (Osborne 2016). He was dealt a humiliating defeat by François Fillon in the primaries. The FN candidate Marine Le Pen advanced to the second stage of the election.

It is not just right-wing politicians who try to gain more support by modifying their position on immigration. Before the 2007 presidential elections, the socialist candidate Ségolène Royal joined in Sarkozy's debate on what it means to be a French. Following Sarkozy's lead, she encouraged her supporters to sing La Marseillaise at the rallies (Sciolino 2007). She also said, if elected, she would ensure that every French knows the anthem and has a flag to display on important days. During a visit to Southern France, where Far right enjoys a broad support, she again asked the supporters to take back the symbols of the nation. French election campaigns have the tendency to turn at some point into a debate on how to be a better French, a topic where the far right enjoys a monopoly position.

A similar process has also taken place in Austria where the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) co-opted policy positions of Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Before the FPÖ entered the mainstream, these two parties ruled the country since the end of the World War II, either by taking turns or entering into what is called "the Grand Coalition". The FPÖ, which was labelled as party of former Nazis, was excluded from government formation. Even when the SPÖ did not want to renew the Grand Coalition in 1970, it did not make the FPÖ an official coalition partner. Instead the SPÖ formed a minority government backed by the FPÖ.

Support for the FPÖ averaged around 6 percent for the three decades while it was excluded by both parties. In 1983, the SPÖ's pragmatic considerations triumphed over the principles and the FPÖ was made a junior partner. This served as a critical juncture that marked FPÖ's participation in mainstream politics. A sharp increase in the FPÖ's vote share was observed as the party won 9.7 percent of the vote in 1986 and 16.6 percent in 1990. The party's success was not the result of its inclusion solely but also the increasing salience and co-optation of the issues owned by party. Especially after the leadership change in 1986, the FPÖ has become even more anti-immigrant. Owing largely to its geographical position, Austria was a very popular destination for Eastern European immigrants. In 1989, the SPÖ government partially fulfilled FPÖ's immigration policy and introduced visa requirements for people from Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. During the 1990 electoral campaign, both the SPÖ and ÖVP attempted to woo the FPÖ voters by advocating similar positions to those of the FPÖ. Before the elections, the SPÖ government introduced travel restrictions for people from Poland because of their allegedly high crime rates (Ellinas 2010). The ÖVP also jumped

on the bandwagon by employing “Vienna for the Viennese”, a slogan similar to the FPÖ’s “Vienna must not become Chicago”. Within the two years after the elections, the Grand Coalition passed three important pieces of legislation which brought stricter regulations on immigration: The Asylum Act in 1991, The Alien Act and The Resident Act in 1992. Such developments pushed the FPÖ to launch the “Austria First” campaign which required even more drastic measures and stricter regulations.

Despite attempts by its competitors, the FPÖ continued owning the immigration issue in the eyes of the public (Müller 2002). The co-optation of the FPÖ policy positions had the adverse effect of increasing its vote share and consolidating its gains. Its vote share peaked at around 27 percent in 1999, becoming the second largest party. Despite the leadership crises and breakaway factions, the party never polled less than 10 percent and currently polls around 20 percent. They remain well within the striking distance to the SPÖ and ÖVP, a situation best exemplified by party’s candidate Norbert Hofer winning the first round of presidential elections in 2016 and losing the second and re-run second rounds only by a small margin.

Yet another party that benefited from the efforts by its competitors to co-opt its agenda is the Danish People’s Party (DPP). Founded in 1995, the party entered the parliament in 1998 elections, winning 7.4 percent of the vote. Although it affected the mainstream right’s asylum policies to a certain extent (Ivarsflaten 2004), it first became a significant player after the 2001 elections. Venstre and Conservative People’s Party relied on DPP support to have the parliamentary majority and formed a coalition government. In exchange for its support, government promised to implement some of the DPP’s demands most importantly on the issue of immigration. Promises were materialized in 2002 when government passed what it called the Europe’s strictest immigration laws (*BBC News* 2005).

The new laws reduced the grounds for granting asylum to the bare minimum agreed under the Geneva Convention for Refugees. It also cut the benefits for refugees significantly and introduced the notorious “24-year rule”. In order to bring a spouse from abroad, the rule required that both partners must have reached the age of 24 years, that their links to Denmark should be stronger than any other country, that the Danish spouse should be able to financially support the couple and should not have received welfare benefits for 12 months and that the couple owns or rents a residence of at most

two people per room and at least 20 m² per person. Consequently, country's share of asylum applications in three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Norway) declined to 9 percent in 2003 from 31 percent in 2000, whereas Sweden's share increased 41 percent to 60 percent. Danish people with foreign spouses living in Copenhagen started to move to geographically close Swedish city of Malmö while continuing to work in Copenhagen. This of course led to outrage by Swedish government which accused Denmark of undermining Scandinavian solidarity.

Denmark's center-right coalition continued to co-opt policy positions of the DPP. Before the 2011 elections, in line with the DPP's suggestions, government re-introduced border controls and reinforced its borders with more officers (McIntosh 2011). In the face of criticism from the European Commission, Danish officials asserted that this was not a breach of Schengen agreement but an effort to stop smuggling of illegal goods and human trafficking.

The DPP has done consistently well since its inclusion in mainstream debate and co-optation of its policy positions. In the 2015 elections, the party received 21.1 percent of the vote. Since they are not bound by the commitments that being in government requires, they can easily take more extreme positions on immigration, thus retaining the ownership of the issue. This year, party's spokesperson on immigration went as far as to argue that immigrants should celebrate Christmas if they want to be Danish (Dearden 2017).

Above cases most clearly demonstrate that contesting the issue ownership through repositioning and co-opting the populist policy positions will not work for mainstream parties and will have adverse effects. They further demonstrate that populist policy positions and rhetoric are contagious. However, populists continue holding the upper hand over the issues as the copy will never be original.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

I aimed to understand the reasons for populist electoral success and what makes individuals vote for populist parties. I took the stages approach which distinguishes between electoral breakthrough and electoral consolidation. In the first part of my thesis, I showed that the resentment against the elite and distrust in political parties are common characteristics that unite the voter bases of all populist parties from the right and the left. Populist votes are driven by dissatisfaction with political representatives.

In order to make sense of recent electoral successes of populist parties and understand why populism takes right-wing and left-wing forms in different countries, I looked at the role played by issue salience and issue ownership. I argued that anti-immigrant attitudes are strong predictors of right-wing populist vote and that populist right should have an edge in countries where national identity issues have become salient. It turned out to be a strong predictor of left-wing populist vote as well. Favoring redistributive policies is a strong predictor of left-wing populist vote. Again, by the virtue of issue ownership, populist left should enjoy a boost to their vote share in countries where income inequality and austerity issues have become important.

In the second part, I emphasized the role of party competition in accounting for institutionalization of populist parties. Contrary to prevalent views in the literature, I suggested that copycat strategies through which mainstream parties adopt similar policy positions to those of populist parties do not transfer the issue ownership to mainstream parties. Mainstream co-optation of policies owned by populist parties help the populist

parties by including them in the mainstream debate and providing them the legitimacy that they are desperately in need of. I investigated the validity of this argument by looking at the party competition in France, Austria and Denmark. I argued that attempts by mainstream parties to woo populist voters by advocating similar policies only helped populist parties to entrench themselves further in their countries' politics.

I acknowledge the several limitations of my analysis. Limited number of respondents of ESS Round 7 declared voting for a party that is considered to be populist by this study. Considering the fact that ruling parties from Eastern Europe are also deemed populist, number of populist voters should have been higher. I suspect there might be a social desirability bias since in countries where populist parties do not enjoy a significant support, individuals may not want to reveal their true choices. Even in the United States, some argued that shy voters is the reason why polls could not predict Trump's victory (McGill 2015). The study could have been enriched by other cases analyzing how the issues of social inequalities and redistribution affect party competition. An innovative study would be to check how multiple issues can become salient simultaneously and if both processes go together. This would require the left populist parties to become anti-immigrant and right populist parties to want the welfare only for the native population. Regression analyses lent some support to this possibility and convergence of populist parties seems both highly possible and also taking place right now. I am not aware of any study on this topic which offer hard evidence.

What is likely to happen next? I argued populism requires putting the majority will first even when it contradicts the technocratic solutions that reason necessitates. While out of office, populists are not bound by any commitments, which enables them to better respond to people's grievances. This lack of reason and rationality is bound to result in a crisis if populists are governing. The situation would worsen into a legitimacy crisis as populist actors would find it increasingly difficult to maintain their legitimacy by fueling their supporters' sense of resentment. Survival of populists depend on their own ability to reproduce the conditions that helped them in the first place. In the absence of those, new issues might become salient; new entrepreneurs emerge and the cycle starts again.

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF THE POPULIST PARTIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

Right-wing populist parties

Country	Name	Abbreviation
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ
Belgium	Flemish Block	VB
France	Popular Republican Movement	MPF
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AfD
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	PVV
Netherlands	Political Reformed Party	SGP
Norway	Progress Party	FrP
Poland	Congress of the New Right	KNP
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS
Slovenia	New Slovenia	NSI
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland	EDU/UDF
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	SVP/UDC
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	UKIP

Left-wing populist parties

Country	Name	Abbreviation
Czech Republic	Freedom Union	USVIT
Denmark	Danish People's Party	DF
Finland	Finnish Party-True Finns	Sp-P
France	Front National	FN
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD
Hungary	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	JOBBIK
Hungary	Fidesz Hungarian Civic Movement	Fidesz
Lithuania	The Way of Courage	DK
Poland	Law and Justice	PiS
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD

APPENDIX B: WORDING OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONS

Vote: Which party did you vote for in that election?

Politicians' care: How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?

0: Not at all, 10: Completely

Political trust in parties: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...
... political parties?

Anti-immigrant attitudes: Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

0: Worse place to live, 10: Better place to live

Reducing income inequality: "Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels."

(1) Agree strongly, (5) Disagree strongly.

Gender: Male (1) Female (2)

Age: Age of the respondent calculated from the question "And in what year were you born?"

Education: ES-ISCED, generated variable from the question "What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?"

0 Not possible to harmonise into ES-ISCED

1 ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary

2 ES-ISCED II, lower secondary

3 ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary

4 ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary

5 ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree

6 ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, BA level

7 ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, \geq MA level



APPENDIX C: REGRESSION ESTIMATES AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

Politicians' care - Regression estimates for countries

	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czech Rep.
Politicians' care	-0.116* (.0463304)	-0.158 (.0832318)	-0.117* (.0464889)	-0.183* (.0763367)
Reducing income inequality	-0.248* (.0934885)	0.0519 (.1793633)	0.218* (.1190377)	0.163 (.1725706)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.398*** (.0354577)	-0.233* (.0765598)	-0.358*** (.043705)	0.122 (.0822274)
Gender	-0.580** (.1117012)	0.328 (.541828)	-0.322 (.1600266)	-0.165** (.3892989)
Age	-0.0226*** (.0056426)	-0.0123 (.0109043)	-0.00360 (.0061846)	-0.0103 (.0113114)
Level of Education	-0.319*** (.0629615)	-0.210 (.0978705)	-0.456*** (.0532251)	-0.0390 (.1282123)
Constant	3.543*** (-20.69744)	-1.609 (.2115312)	2.785*** (12.11923)	-2.469* (.0940707)
N	1024	1299	632	1019
	Germany	Denmark	Finland	Denmark
Politicians' care	-0.233*** (.044954)	-0.0453 (.0423277)	-0.163*** (.0349459)	-0.0880 (.0509343)
Reducing income inequality	0.102 (.1074855)	0.0166 (.0874775)	-0.259** (.0707713)	0.0545 (.0911201)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.303*** (.0356993)	-0.450*** (.032678)	-0.308*** (.0320775)	-0.481*** (.0349204)
Gender	-0.533** (.1202012)	-0.132 (.1787836)	-0.841*** (.0768346)	-0.369 (.1457541)

Age	-0.0252*** (.0057139)	0.000415 (.0058587)	-0.0109 (.0056711)	-0.0414*** (.0068229)
Level of Education	-0.0153 (.0654126)	-0.128* (.0567156)	-0.0508 (.0526156)	-0.301*** (.0500426)
Constant	1.177* (1.871913)	1.031 (1.714571)	2.963*** (11.21509)	4.100*** (42.4377)

N	2003	1135	1320	1008
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	Great Britain	Hungary	Lithuania	Netherlands
Politicians' care	-0.205*** (.0460621)	0.191*** (.0463034)	0.118 (.1471052)	-0.203*** (.0420742)
Reducing income inequality	-0.110 (.0990274)	-0.00458 (.1058013)	-1.360 (.1923734)	-0.166 (.0798174)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.342*** (.0370523)	-0.154*** (.0359672)	-0.330* (.1183697)	-0.342*** (.0406122)
Gender	-0.180 (.1908165)	-0.141 (.1397956)	1.124 (2.467246)	-0.0477 (.1901561)
Age	-0.00829 (.0073864)	0.0302*** (.0048897)	0.00286 (.0226056)	-0.0288*** (.0062191)
Level of Education	-0.0982 (.0584904)	-0.140* (.0488081)	0.110 (.2192267)	-0.399*** (.046858)
Constant	0.668 (1.949884)	3.175*** (11.6619)	-4.114 (.0396947)	3.722*** (27.9071)

N	1321	788	890	1312
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	Norway	Poland	Sweden	Slovenia
Politicians' care	-0.152** (.0436292)	-0.0920* (.0390162)	-0.156* (.0593259)	0.0164 (.0482038)

Reducing income inequality	0.231* (.1286844)	-0.191* (.07552)	0.0718 (.1585211)	0.0892 (.1332434)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.461*** (.0368723)	-0.146*** (.0358001)	-0.594*** (.0368723)	-0.00896 (.0526629)
Gender	-0.707** (.1064385)	-0.0532 (.15792)	-0.0211* (.1935616)	-0.00304 (.1821162)
Age	0.00690 (.0058844)	-0.0106 (.0054897)	-0.0211* (.0083575)	-0.00304 (.0068252)
Level of Education	-0.229*** (.053292)	-0.200*** (.0407624)	-0.0891 (.0850378)	-0.266** (.0658224)
Constant	2.006** (4.865811)	2.178*** (4.640778)	2.727** (13.92839)	-0.0200 (.6809133)
N	1063	700	1377	541

Trust in Political parties - Regression estimates for countries

	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czech Rep.
Trust in political parties	- 0.149** (0.04136)	- 0.147 (0.07794)	- 0.00235 (0.05668)	- 0.108 (0.7284)
Reducing income inequality	- 0.262* (0.09234)	0.0496 (0.17911)	0.217* (0.118756)	0.172 (0.175418)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	- 0.388*** (0.03539)	- 0.247** (0.07384)	- 0.392*** (0.04192)	- 0.0845 (0.08207)
Gender	- 0.596** (0.11046)	0.355 (0.55542)	- 0.322 (0.15895)	0.142 (0.39655)
Age	- 0.0218***	- 0.0138	- 0.00368	- 0.00963

	(0.00565)	(0.01088)	(0.006123)	(0.01125)
Level of Education	- 0.346*** (0.06122)	- 0.219 (0.09558)	- 0.457*** (0.05264)	- 0.0404 (0.127214)
Constant	3.785*** (26.744)	-1,446 (0.252841)	2.437** (8.8287)	- 2.646* (0.7861)
N	1024	1299	632	1019

	Germany	Denmark	Finland	France
Trust in political parties	- 0.322** (0.0392607)	- 0.0454 (0.0471635)	- 0.194*** (0.0356845)	0.0228 (0.0543047)
Reducing income inequality	0.0846 (0.1059366)	0.0163 (0.0875253)	- 0.259** (0.0707557)	0.0423 (0.0902595)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	- 0.281*** (0.0357396)	- 0.453*** (0.0324622)	- 0.295*** (0.0326774)	- 0.518*** (0.0338684)
Gender	- 0.526* (0.1221484)	- 0.117 (0.1807355)	- 0.853*** (0.0763327)	- 0.365 (0.146072)
Age	- 0.0270*** (0.0058908)	0.00116 (0.0058608)	- 0.00887 (0.0057295)	- 0.0422*** (0.0068005)
Level of Education	- 0.0676 (0.0631875)	- 0.137* (0.0549312)	- 0.0606 (0.0519352)	- 0.307*** (0.0494594)
Constant	1.837** (3.826471)	1.033 (1.727033)	3.035*** (12.10049)	4.052** (40.60117)
N	2003	1135	1320	1008

	Great Britain	Hungary	Lithuania	Netherlands
Trust in political parties	- 0.172** (0.0477799)	0.170*** (0.0414701)	0.00147 (0.1413104)	- 0.227*** (0.0417146)

Reducing income inequality	- 0.117 (0.0986824)	0.0640 (0.1100691)	- 1.313 (0.2002015)	- 0.171 (0.0796114)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	- 0.347*** (0.0370765)	- 0.136*** (0.0324622)	- 0.314 (0.1192663)	- 0.328*** (0.0417742)
Gender	- 0.193 (0.1881795)	- 0.180 (0.0358806)	1.028 (2.234698)	- 0.0567 (0.1887778)
Age	- 0.00694 (0.0074908)	0.0300*** (0.004868)	0.00246 (0.0224045)	- 0.0270*** (0.0062524)
Level of Education	- 0.121 (0.0566571)	- 0.126* (0.0491195)	0.135 (0.2198768)	- 0.411*** (0.0456815)
Constant	0.640 (1.363386)	2.895*** (8.740109)	-3,816 (0.0534583)	3.805*** (30.59379)
N	1321	788	890	1312

	Norway	Poland	Sweden	Slovenia <3
Trust in political parties	- 0.159** (0.0483267)	0.0352 (0.0457013)	- 0.245** (0.0585059)	0.102 (0.0610717)
Reducing income inequality	0.219* (0.1273014)	- 0.223* (0.072781)	0.0970 (0.1658544)	0.0613 (0.1316809)
Anti-immigrant attitudes	- 0.469*** (0.0363262)	- 0.165*** (0.0351679)	- 0.583*** (0.041379)	- 0.0283 (0.0530046)
Gender	- 0.651** (0.1126233)	- 0.0355 (0.1602863)	- 0.477 (0.1793233)	- 0.172 (0.1810955)
Age	0.00906 (0.0059373)	0.0111* (0.0054866)	- 0.0186* (0.0084063)	- 0.00434 (0.0068417)
Level of Education	- 0.249*** (0.0511999)	- 0.205*** (0.0403566)	- 0.0889 (0.085301)	- 0.256** (0.0663416)

Constant	2.037** (5.056865)	2.085*** (4.207147)	3.042** (19.40678)	-0.0325 (0.671974)
N	1063	700	1377	541

