

**THE IMPACT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ON AGRICULTURE IN POST-
CONFLICT COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL
THE CASE OF KOSOVO**

by
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
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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ON AGRICULTURE IN POST- CONFLICT COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL THE CASE OF KOSOVO

GÜZİN AYCAN ÖZTÜRK

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The thesis departs from the idea that there is not enough academic research on the relationship among sectors constituting the whole peacebuilding/ statebuilding activities while most of academicians and practitioners value the comprehensive peacebuilding and post-conflict statebuilding to respond the challenges in post conflict context. As a starting attempt, the thesis focuses on the possible impacts of Security Sector Reform (SSR) on agriculture in post- conflict environment. The thesis takes Kosovo as a case and examines possible positive and negative impacts of SSR on agriculture based on the hypotheses considering the engagement of security forces in rural areas, labor shifts and resource distribution. The results based on the qualitative data indicate that positive impacts are more visible while negative ones are not totally proved due to lack of data as another impediment in post- conflict context.

**Keywords: Peacebuilding, Security Sector Reform, Agriculture, the Case of
Kosovo, Empirical Appraisal**

ÖZET

UYUŞMAZLIK SONRASI ÜLKELERDE GÜVENLİK SEKTÖRÜ REFORMUNUN TARIMA ETKİSİ: AMPİRİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRME KOSOVA ÖRNEĞİ

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TEZ DANIŞMANI: DOÇ. DR. MEHMET EMRE HATİPOĞLU

Bu tez, mesleki meşguliyetlerinin ne olduğundan bağımsız, akademisyen ve pratisyenlerin çatışma sonrası bağlamındaki zorluklara cevap verecek kapsayıcı bir barış ve çatışma sonrası devlet inşasını önemserken, barış ve çatışma sonrası devlet inşası aktivitelerini oluşturan sektörler arası ilişki üzerinde yeterince akademik araştırma olmadığı fikrinden yola çıkmaktadır. Bir başlangıç girişimi olarak, bu tez, çatışma sonrası durumunda Güvenlik Sektörü Reformunun tarım üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu tez, güvenlik güçlerinin kırsal alanlardaki angajmanı, iş göçü ve kaynak dağıtımını içeren hipotezlere dayalı olarak, Güvenlik Sektörü Reformunun tarım üzerindeki muhtemel pozitif ve negatif etkilerini incelemek üzere Kosova'yı bir vaka olarak ele almaktadır. Nitel verilere dayanan sonuçlar, olumlu etkilerin daha fazla görünür olmasına karşın, negatif olanların, çatışma sonrası bağlamın başka bir engeli olarak veri eksikliği nedeniyle tamamen kanıtlanmadığını göstermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış İnşası, Güvenlik Sektörü Reformu, Tarım,
Kosova Örneği, Ampirik Değerlendirme**

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List of Symbols and Abbreviations

BONUCA: United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic

CEMAC: The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa

CSDP: the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy

DFID: Department for International Development

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EU: the European Union

EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

EURSR: European Union Special Representative

FAO: the Food and Agriculture Organization

FOMUC: Multinational Force in Central Africa

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GIZ: German International Cooperation Agency

GNI: Gross National Income

IFOR: Implementation Force

IMF: the International Monetary Fund.

IO: International Organization

KAS: Kosovo Agency of Statistics.

KFOR: the Kosovo Force

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC: the Kosovo Protection Corps

KPC: the Kosovo Police Service

IPTF: International Police Task Force

MISAB: Inter- African Mission for Accord Surveillance

MINURCA: United Nations Mission in Central African Republic

MINURCAT: Mission of the UN in Central African Republic and Chad

MISAB: Inter- African Mission for Accord Surveillance

NATO: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

OAU: Organization of African Union

ODA: Official Development Aid

OSCE: Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe

OECD DAC: Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe Development Assistance Committee

PKSOI: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

SFOR: Stabilization Force

SSDAT: Security Sector Development Advisory Team

SSR: Security Sector Reform

TİKA: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

UK: the United Kingdom

UN: the United Nations

UNDP: the United Nations Development Program

UNDPO: The United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations.

UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIK: the United Nations Mission in Interim Government in Kosovo

UNMOT: the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

UNPROFOR: the United Nations Protection Force

UNSG: The United Nations Secretary General

UNTOP: The United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding

USAID: the United States Agency for International Development

USIP: United States Institute of Peace

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Post- conflict has been widely used as a concept following the end of the Cold-War in order to refer to the period following the “cessation of conflict” (Gagnon and Brown, 2014). The concept was first mentioned in the report of “*Agenda of Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*” authored by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros- Boutros Ghali in 1992, following the January 1992 UN Security Council Summit Meeting. According to Hozic, (2014) the Agenda asserted three features for “post- conflict.” First, it preferred the word of “conflict” rather than “war” in a manner that would cover material and immaterial issues and clashes; second, it focused on creation and empowering liberal institutions; and lastly it provisioned the obstacles that “post- conflict” poses to *the grand aspirations of the Agenda* (Gagnon and Brown, 2014, p.24). Since then, post-conflict societies continue to attract attention, scholarly and policy-wise (Paris 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Le Billon, 2008; Bell and Evans, 2010; Chandler, 2010; MacGinty, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; IPI 2012; Gagnon and Brown, 2014; Heleta 2016;). For instance, resolving issues in post-conflict Bosnia in administrative and legal issues or post-conflict Burundi proved to be quite challenging for locals and internationals.

A number of challenges exist in post-conflict reconstruction: societal, political, historical, legal among others. Economics also form an important challenge to recover the whole economy after a total destruction with another basic need of human beings such as safety and security (Maslow, 1954). And as a result, post-conflict plans in general and Security Sector reform in particular have started looking at the satisfaction of basic needs of humanity.

Economics by itself is also a huge concept that includes foreign aid, income, growth, production, trade, agriculture and so on (Hoeffler, Ijaz and con Billerbeck, 2010). The usage of foreign aid delivered by the international organizations and by other states and how to recover the totally destroyed economy are amongst the most debated issues in post- conflict economies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2002; Minoiu and Reddy, 2009). Many of the acute interventions, however, proved to be insufficient to sustain peace as the relapsing cases of post-conflict violence in Afghanistan, Timor Leste (Call 2008), Central African Republic and Tajikistan have shown. These pitfalls in interventions have also been reported by the representatives of


intervening institutions. Former United Nations Under-Secretary General Jacques-Paul Klein (2004) claimed that post-conflict peacebuilding activities are negatively sloped in terms of their results considering the success of peacebuilding interventions by the international organizations. These series of failures deriving from uncertain atmosphere in post- conflict setting composed of asymmetric power relations; unprecedented consequences stemming from imposition of a new political, economic, social system by international organizations and varying levels of resistance by the locals to peacebuilding agendas in intervened cases, in turn, raised the prospects of *peacebuilding* necessitated a deeper and nuanced engagement by the international organizations.

However, few have looked at specific outputs in the policy sector and the interaction among different policy sectors. This is important not only because that a functioning economy, rebuilding mutual trust in the society, strengthening the institution and even creating new ones are vital, but also important for a cohesive polity in a country that all the aspects are being rebuilt after a destruction. For instance, water management has been a persistent issue in Kosovo's Drini basin, a region composed of mostly Albanians and of a smaller group of Serbians. The management company of this water basin, Gelsenwasser, had facilitative relations with Albanians while suffering from relatively vulnerable relations with the Serbian community. Intermingling with enclaves for water supply and usage, this issue turned to rejection of paying the bills by the Serbs, as the water is supplied from Radiniqi Lake situated in an Albanian-dominated region. The company, as a response, sent the bills in different languages to persuade the Serbians that the issue is not something political. However, enclaves insisted to refuse the payment. As a result, the company had to explain to the Albanians that they had to pay the bills while Serbs do not. Furthermore, the company faced financial restrictions, as well. Finally, the pipe lines were destroyed several times by Serbian enclaves and the water management system failed (Krampe, 2016). Thus, this technical approach in water management without considering conflictual past among the communities and lack of political strategy showed that local realities be acknowledged in a reform and management attempt in post- conflict context.

Security sector reform (SSR) is one of the attempts to address such multi-faceted challenges in post-conflict societies. SSR, as a second generation of peacebuilding activity among other pillars of reconstruction such as justice and economic system, seeks to build and/or strengthen institutions responsible for security such as defense and


police forces, intelligence with respect for human rights and rule of law (UNSG Report, 2008). SSR is also related with judiciary and parliamentary reforms due to the emphasis on the importance of rule of law and civilian oversight in order to achieve democratic, transparent and a just system (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012). Just as water management and security sector reform, agriculture constitutes another important area for sustainable peace and development. Because agriculture is considered as the most suitable source for survival in a short-term. In relation to responsiveness to short term needs, agriculture is a main driver for economic development especially in post- conflict countries (USAID, 2009); most internal conflicts take place in less-developed countries (Collier et al, 2003), and agriculture tends to make-up larger shares of employment in such less developed countries (Birner, Cohen and Ilukor, 2011). Accordingly, the share of agriculture stimulates the importance of the sector as a main contributor in GDP in these countries (FAO, 2012). Additionally, the most of post- conflict countries are rural ones and the sector can endure disarmed combatants (USIP and PKSOI 2009).

After a separate revision of two salient sectors in post- conflict recovery, when the general trend in security sector reform and agricultural reconstruction by international organizations is skimmed, one can see the similarities in the aims and the way they how international organizations approach to post- conflict reconstruction agendas in agricultural and security sector. Meaning, for both sectors, the IOs, mainly the UN and its related branches, aim to build capacity and to make the actions community driven; perceive the processes as a technical issue; put sustainability of the reforms as a priority (UNDPO SSR Unit, 2012). Despite the salience and similarities in the approaches of security and agricultural sectors in post-conflict societies for a sustainable peace, few have looked at the relation between the two. This study aims to fill this gap. More specifically, this study identifies an interesting trend among many countries that have undergone SSR: regardless of the country's acute conflict history before SSR, (i) the agricultural output remains stagnant, and (ii) the gap between agricultural imports and exports in US dollar current prices significantly increases (Please see Graphs 1 to 7). This situation, thus, needs to be investigated.




Graph 1: Albania, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product. US Dollar, Current Prices.

Source: World Trade Organization Data




Graph 2: Benin, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product. US Dollar, Current Prices.


Source: World Trade Organization Data



Graph 3: Bosnia Herzegovina, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, Current Prices.
 Source: World Trade Organization Data




Graph 4: Central African Republic, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, Current Prices.
 Source: World Trade Organization Data




Graph 5: Cote d'Ivoire, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, Current Prices.

Source: World Trade Organization Data



Graph 6: Guinea, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, Current Prices.

Source: World Trade Organization Data



Graph 7: Kosovo, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, Current Prices.

Source: World Trade Organization Data

To problematize this empirical evidence considering the increasing gap between export and import following SSR year, this study borrows from various strands of literature, namely public finance, foreign aid, migration, and labor economics, and develop a number of possible causal mechanisms. Further analysis of available data on Kosovo show that while some of these factors are at play in a majority of cases, others may be idiosyncratic explanations for individual cases.

This thesis focuses on one such sub-topic: agriculture. A number of reasons warrant such focus: 1) civil conflict usually takes place in developing countries where agriculture plays an important role, 2) changes in agricultural patterns –as will be discussed in detail later on- may lead to migratory patterns and so on. The research question is ‘Whether and how Security Sector Reform impacts the agriculture sector in post-conflict countries?’ While asking this question, the writer also acknowledges the difficulty to measure marginal impact of SSR and the reasons that can affect the agricultural production, export and import such as changes in trade openness, technological developments or physical conditions such as productivity of the soil, changes in climate et cetera. However, as the situation that randomly chosen countries underwent SSR represented above show, one can see a kind of pattern following SSR.

As such this thesis will specifically look at the impact of resource distribution (government budget and foreign aid) between security sector and agriculture; the impact of engagement of security forces in rural areas on agriculture and how security sector reform can have an impact on rural- urban shifts in post conflict context. In addition to the difficulty to the measure the impact of SSR on agriculture, this study does not aim to build a causal relationship but rather seeks to grasp the mechanism in the empirical data revealed in graphs above.

This study conducts research on the relationship between Security Sector Reform and agriculture in the context of Kosovo. The results indicate that in Kosovo, SSR can have an indirect positive impact on agriculture especially when demining and the engagement of security forces in rural area is the case. However, indirect negative impacts, examining labor shift towards urban areas and competition between these sectors for resource distribution could not be proven due to lack of data about labor distribution in security and agriculture. However, all the qualitative data collected prevails the reality that existing dialogue between security and agriculture sector is not enough to enhance comprehensive peacebuilding aimed across a variety of sectors and although the participants agree their individual importance for a peaceful society especially in post- conflict context.

CHAPTER 2. PEACEBUILDING IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

2.1. Challenges in Post- Conflict Polities

Post- conflict reconstruction has occupied a major place and taken scholarly attention in conflict resolution and peace and conflict research. This is not only due to the aim to realize a stable peace in a society recovering from conflict, but also due to the challenges stemming from the remnants of conflicts. These obstacles to reconstruction can be grouped as the ones that are psychological, economic, political and security in post- conflict environment.

Steenkamp (2011) argues that peace does not bring physical security. Rather, even at the presence of a negotiated settlement, insecurities and barriers to effective resolution remain, if not get worse in a post-conflict environment. The transition from acute to post-conflict management poses a number of challenges due to new contestations in various realms of life. In the socio-political realm, Lederach (1998) points out geographical proximity of the conflicting parties and sticking on and transfer of violent trauma associated with perceived enemies to next generations, he also highlights the importance of *real life experiences* in post-conflict context. The past continues to haunt and it presents a problem of commitment and increases suspicion over the motivations of the other sides and of external actors, as well. Similarly, Berdal (2009: 44-45) asserts that the past can reflect on post-conflict societies by the exacerbating rhetoric and policies of subjugation, conflict and glory. Such rhetoric, as others have found, are very difficult to eradicate since they serve as opportunities for mobilization by exploiting politicians. Similar to Lederach (1998) and Berdal (2009) in valuing the shadow of conflictual past in post- conflict, Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoglu (2015) also underline importance of the emotional remnants of conflictual relations. On the psycho-social dimension, Volkan (2004) coins the concept of 'chosen trauma' for building the identity on a past victory or a loose and consolidating, transferring trauma based identity from generation to generation as a defense and linkage mechanism in a group. Chosen trauma, furthermore, can be activated by propaganda and turn to a violent act as a defense mechanism to protect the 'self.' Relating to historical experiences in sociological realm, this sense of vulnerability and conflictual past augments expectations in an unrealistic manner that makes harder to satisfy the needs of parties (Berdal, 2009: 45-46).

These barriers mentioned above poses some problems for future relations of previously conflicting parties. From a conflict resolution perspective, for instance, getting at the table and opening the new issues between the parties become harder (Ghosn, 2010). Since post-conflict horizon is significantly longer than that in acute conflict, Zenelaj et al (2015) also argue that giving concessions to the other party becomes costlier over time: a legal favor today, some parties perceive, may lead to their assimilation decades later on. The problems are no longer 'ripe' (Zartman, 2003) for resolution in a post-conflict setting, which in turn, make "*parties to dig in their heels, with the understanding that small political gains during the formation of these institutions can translate into substantial positional advantages in the future.*" (Zenelaj et al, 2015: 431)

The pressure to stop immediate conflict can saw the seeds of other intractable conflicts in the longer term. Peace agreements mostly aim to stop blood (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005), and therefore may not be comprehensive, and leave certain points for later deliberation. Such points that have not been finalized can later transform into political impasses, which, in turn, can increase the likelihood of ethnic security dilemmas to be used by the parties (Manning, 2004). Conflict recurrence, therefore, poses another risk in post conflict environment if long- term dynamics are not considered in post- conflict reconstruction agendas. According to Walter (2015: 1242), 90 per cent of civil wars happened by 2000 have repeated themselves. The prevalence of such recurrence may be due to several reasons. By introducing the concept of *conflict trap*, Collier and Sambanis (2012) argue that once a country falls into a civil war, that country is trapped in a cycle that produces social, political and economic context that can reproduce a civil war. By examining military expenditures, Collier and Hoeffler (2006), find that military expenditures increase during civil war and military equipment is mostly imported. Moreover, these expenditures continue substantially even if the civil war ends as civil war risks continue. In post-conflict countries the risk persists due to the higher level of expenditures and continuous unfairness in society although they are more advance than their rates in times of conflict regarding the level of growth, income and they receive more aid in post- conflict phase (Hoeffler et al, 2010). Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007), focus on the decisions of ex-combatants to reinitiate war into consideration based on structural conditions regarding the end result of conflict that indicates whether it was a victory for any party of a negotiated settlement. Quinn,

Mason and Gurses (2007) value post-war economic development after any kind of conflict to prevent recurrence.

Violence in conflict can also resurface as ‘crime’ in a post- conflict polity. DeRouen, Lea and Wallenstein (2009) find that the cost of power sharing itself can affect the duration of peace agreements and reoccurrence. For them, low cost power sharing for the governments agreements affirming previous agreements last longer than costlier power sharing agreements because the government can control the situation and thus, less likely to initiate renegotiation. From an institutional perspective, Walter (2015) underlines the importance of accountability of political elites and participation of public into political affairs with a provision of checks and balances over power and providing a non-violent platform for political change.

In addition to various obstacles mentioned above, post- conflict societies that have suffered from large-scale violence generally lack necessary capital for reconstruction and strong institutions in a post-conflict setting (Themnér and Utas, 2016). Therefore, peace is fragile in post-conflict setting and requires to be sustained A number of institutional interventions, yet, have been designed to overcome and to transform security and consensus seeking challenges into a ‘peaceful’ manner. The innovations have been applied across a wide geography; for different types of civil war; by various actors taking initiative, such as nation-states, regional or international organizations. For instance, United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was established in 1992 to coordinate humanitarian assistance. Thanks to a shuttle diplomacy and cooperation with Russia, the UN paved the way for a political settlement between Tajik leader Rakhmonov and opposition leader Nuri in 1994. United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) was founded to support the agreement, to empower post- conflict peace process with a broad agenda composed of economic recovery, mitigation of poverty, good governance, rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 37-38).

Recurrence of conflict and interventions by various missions in Central African Republic (CAR) exemplifies one of the innovations to overcome the obstacles in post-conflict. Following its independence in 1960, CAR established one-party system dominated by the strongman David Dacko. His tenure was also marked with numerous attempts of coup d’etat. The 1996 coup attempt led to a full scale civil war which result in deployment of peacekeeping operation *Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accord de Bangui/ Bangui* Inter-African Mission for Accord Surveillance (MISAB) led

by Organization of African Union (OAU) with French financial support. Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine/ United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (MINURCA), a UN peace operation replaced MISAB between 1998-2000. *Bureau politique d'observation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique* / United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) took the place after 2000 and it was followed by The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) sponsored by *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique*/ Multinational Force in Central Africa (FOMUC). In 2008, *Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et Tchad*/ Mission of the UN in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) came to the scene with the mandate to stabilize the region, focusing on the borders and involved development based approaches by the World Bank (N'Diaye, 2012).

With the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on 11 October 1995, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was on the ground until 20 December 1995 in order to monitor the ceasefire and to support peace negotiations in Dayton. By the Resolution 1031/(1995), the Security Council endorsed the presence of a High Representative to “mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies” in civilian components of Peace Agreement. In addition to this broad agenda, the Resolution welcomed the NATO initiative, Implementation Force (IFOR), which would be succeeded by multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) by the urge of the UN in 1996. By Resolution 1035 (1995), the Security Council decided to launch the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The civilian dimension of UNMIBH involved establishment of rule of law, reform and restructuring of the local police, strengthening of the judicial system and monitoring of all these activities. As these selected three interventions in different conflicts show, post-conflict international statebuilding and peacebuilding have become especially salient with their loaded agenda over a decade.

2.2 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding has gained increasing scholarly attention over the last two decades. Although the UN operations has held peace operations in some countries both during and at the early times of the end of the Cold War such as in Egypt, 1956, Belgian Congo and New Guinea in the beginning of 1960s (Paris, 2004), peacebuilding was first

formally defined by the former UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. In his *Agenda of Peace* he defined the objective of peacebuilding as to “[i]dentify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Agenda for Peace 1992). Additionally, the need to increase

“the sense of confidence, disarmament, repatriation of refugees, training and support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation”

are mentioned as the issues for a consolidated peace in post-conflict peacebuilding. According to Sabaratnam (2011) this attempt to define peacebuilding was to revitalize and to re-assert the role of the UN in global politics as an “*autonomous agent of peace.*”

Following this first attempt to frame the concept and the actions by the UN, several international organizations and scholars have come up with various definitions. For Call (2008, p. 5), “*peacebuilding is actions taken by international or national actors to consolidate or institutionalize peace.*” Paris (2004) also agrees with this definition but he also underlines preventive actions in his peacebuilding conceptualization. Moreover, according to him, “*democratization and marketization*” has been a common theme among organizations engaged in peacebuilding (p. 19). Later, Paris (2008) draws attention the ‘institutionalization’ of peace in political, social and economic realms. He emphasizes the creation of institutions that would penetrate the society to transform the repertoire of action in a ‘peaceful’ manner. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000), additionally, peacebuilding aims to strengthen the institutions that facilitate non-violent solutions for the conflicts that every plural society has.

However, for Barnett et al (2007), local and international actors can vary in their aims and prioritizations. For instance, while finance-driven organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) assign a high rank for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction; international organizations such as the European Commission, the UN Development Program prioritize conflict prevention.

Barnett et al (2007) further clarify what differentiates conflict prevention from peacebuilding. Although both conflict prevention and peacebuilding aim to eliminate

the root causes of conflict by the similar techniques, for them, the ‘post- conflict’ aspect of peacebuilding is the defining factor as conflict prevention aims to eliminate the risks before conflict occurs (Barnett et al. 2007: 41-42). Accordingly, since conflicts are unique in terms of their root causes, every different peacebuilding action taken to overcome these root causes vary in peacebuilding targets.

Barnett et al. (2007: 49) grouped these peacebuilding targets as “*stability creation, restoration of state institutions and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict.*” The difference in targets and definition is also emphasized by Paris (2008). But this time, the difference between scholars and practitioners are highlighted. According to him, scholars mainly focused on ‘negative peace’, i.e. termination of armed conflict, while practitioners have a broader understanding in ‘positive’ kind of peace composed of various actions undertaken to provide a full-range of developments in human life.

Similar to Barnett et al (2007) in the variance of priorities of local and international actors, Barnett and Zürcher (2009) attempt to classify the peacebuilding game among peacebuilders, national and sub-national elites in post-conflict environment departing from the assumption that peacebuilding aims to solve root causes of conflict in a sustainable way which provide some qualities for life in post-conflict environment such as rule of law, a market economy free from corruption and culture of tolerance and respect. They establish a framework to explain why problems arise during implementation of peacebuilding programs, programs designed after a negotiated and accepted peace settlement and why only symbolic parts of the programs are more visible rather than internalization of the values proposed by peacebuilders. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) take these three group of actors as monolithic units for the sake of simplicity of the model. Therefore, they have stable definitions of interests for each actor, meaning, peacebuilders work for stability and liberalization; state elites seek to consolidate their power and subnational elites search for autonomy from the center in a world that has limited resources. They derive from the assumption that ability of an actor to reach its aims is based on the strategies of the other actors, they assert that environment cooperation is required by peacebuilders in order to achieve the program while state elites pose a skeptical approach towards their counterparts and the program in a peacebuilding. Based on these founding assumptions, they present four types of outcomes according to the interactions among these actors.

Cooperative peacebuilding results in accepting and implementing the peace program in cooperation among all the actors. Secondly, *compromised peacebuilding* provides the platform for reflection and negotiation for demands of all sides. In *captured peacebuilding*, the program is implemented and resources are distributed by local and state elites as long as they are in accordance with their interests. *Conflictive peacebuilding*, lastly, poses possible use of force by any actor in order to realize their aims. Can you give any real life examples?

Deriving from the conflict of priorities, the categorization examines the interactions between locals and internationals in the field and explains why a program is implemented or not. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) especially draw attention to the peacebuilding efforts in African countries by underlining the colonial history while they make the categorization operationalized in Afghanistan and Tajikistan in a broader context while the existence of Soviet Union is underlined. They mainly focus on willingness to share power between locals and internationals in political realm. However, we observe that statebuilding and peacebuilding programs are composed of varying sectors in the field that would provide instruments of governance such as security sector, rule of law and civil society and there is a need to go beyond transitional authorities and their relations with sub-national elites and international peacebuilders. Furthermore, they touch upon the differences in order for preferences of the actors among these types of outcomes for instance between stability or continuation of peace programs, however, we do not see any systematic explanation for these preferences and order. Although they underline the choices of international actors towards stability over the local issues in cases of Tajikistan, they do not fully explain what makes a peacebuilding action to fall under these categories.

2.3. Legitimacy in Peacebuilding

Legitimacy is another concept which occasionally becomes part of the discussion in peacebuilding (Bell and Evans, 2010). These peacebuilding interventions have been targeted by several critiques. The general tendency in these critiques can be summarized by the assumption of Lederach (1997: 94) that the best source of long term peace is embedded in local people and culture.

Departing from the assumption that peacebuilding literature often focused on statebuilding and how to provide legitimacy for newly created or strengthened

institutions, Talentino (2007) delves into the question of how perceptions shape these activities approaching from first Western domination and imposition and secondly from broken promises perspectives. As well as previous scholars, for Roberts (2011) lack of legitimacy is the reason for why peace does not prevail as intended by international peacebuilding efforts. According to him, goals of peacebuilding do not match with the immediate needs of the people. Another problem he raises is that people are included only by the elections not by continuous and inclusive activities such as events that target the different segments of society. Thus, this periodic approach in peacebuilding based on elections decreases the level of dialogue. He also criticizes elite- oriented policies as they are not able to end corruption in post- conflict societies. According to him, liberal peacebuilding institutions can succeed only if they serve to the *popular will* before the needs of the elites.

As a first kind of measuring the success of peacebuilding by quantitative analysis, by controlling local capacity in terms of peacebuilding success, Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 793) also find that economic development facilitates reconciliation even if level of hostility is high in an intervened country. They also find that identity wars as war types; deaths and displacement; number of factions in a war; natural resource dependence are negatively correlated with peacebuilding success while the power of the UN mandate and the UN involvement in the treaties for peacebuilding success. One surprising finding is that ethnic heterogeneity is not significant in peacebuilding success while some other scholars (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2000) find ethnic heterogeneity is important in continuation of conflicts. Thus, economic development can contribute to the success of peacebuilding even if the post- conflict country has different ethnic groups.

Williams and Mengistu (2015) scrutinize which bureaucratic changes are necessary in order to achieve 'hybrid' peacebuilding aims. They propose (i) a horizontal organizational structure to pave the way for a platform for exchange of ideas and collaborative relations instead of a '*centralized command system*'; (ii) creation of new databases about the resources devoted and used for operations by all stakeholders to reach a cross- check for the data prevailed by different actors that can contribute the resource allocation for each operation ; (iii) evaluation of actions that reveal the perceptions of targeted stakeholders an accountability and legitimacy bases.

Bleiker (2012: 296), asserted that "*Wherever peacebuilding takes place, there is resistance to it.*" He underlined that the colonial legacy of peacebuilders made the

acceptance of peace programs by the host communities and their implementation difficult. He also criticized these programs due to their aspect that liberal peacebuilding activities are state-centric and top down which do not consider local cultural values and everyday relations among the people that can penetrate into the society the peacebuilding operations are held.

Whalan (2014: 8) furthers the legitimacy debate by addressing the concept of power in order to *identify and understand processes through which a [peace] operation affects local actor behavior*. Here, it should be stated that legitimacy is mostly searched for the legality of the operations in international arena, for instance the approval of the United Nations Security Council. However, in her framework, legitimacy is scrutinized inside the country vis-a-vis the local actors, as Whalan focuses alike. Her framework can also be combined with Barnett and Zürcher (2009). *currencies of power* (coercion, inducement and legitimacy) can pave the way for consolidation of relations among international, national and sub-national groups proposed by Barnett and Zürcher (2009). Whalan (2015: 63) furthers the importance of legitimacy from just being a currency of power by asserting that *legitimacy makes the exercise of power easier, less costly, more effective and more resilient*. Because she takes power as relational departing from the work of Dahl (1957), in international relations literature, she presents a foundation to explain the relations between local and international actors in different sectors both underlying the hierarchical structure but also looking for sources (rules and norms, institutional credibility) and types of legitimacy (substantive and procedural) in local actors.

The exclusive focus on local elites in Barnett and Zürcher (2009), is weakened by the approaches of Björkdahl, Höglund, Millar, Lijn and Verkoren (2016). They assume that sometimes it is the international side which comply, adopt, adapt, co-opt, resist or reject the applications (Björkdahl et al, 2016: 6). For instance, international actors can lack legitimacy in the eyes of locals if they propose an agenda based on only ‘dividing the cake’ but not on local needs. On the other hand, local actors who are active in statebuilding can also lack legitimacy in the eyes of internationals if they are corrupt (de Guevara 2008). However, corruption itself is also a debatable issue in times of peacebuilding. For instance, Le Billon (2008) asserts that although the legacy of such an approach is risky, sometimes corruption can foster security and stability in peacebuilding by its network of presenting resources to certain groups, especially if the risk of conflict of recurrence is high.

2.4. Hybrid Peace

The critiques of top- down approaches to peacebuilding paved the way for arise of the concept of ‘hybrid’ peace was proposed by others to harmonize peacebuilding actions between local and international actors. By pointing to the failure of liberal peacekeeping operations to provide peace as they have pursued a ‘one-type-fits-all’ model so far, Mac Ginty (2008), values indigenous ways as they can correct the failures of liberal peace. Relatedly, Richmond (2010: 26) defines hybrid peacebuilding as “*an emancipatory form of peace that reflects the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, state and non-state, and aims at the creation of a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice which recognizes difference.*”

Hybridity, according to Mac Ginty (2011: 209- 225), is a result of four elements: first, the coercive power of liberal peace; second, the incentivizing power of the liberal peace; third, the ability of local communities to resist, negotiate with and subvert the liberal peace and fourth, the ability of local communities to create and maintain alternatives to the liberal peace. Thus, this combination of *hybridizing* the local and international approaches is useful to delve into the interaction between internal and external actors in internationally sponsored statebuilding (i) to move beyond liberal understanding, (ii) to overcome traditional binaries doomed as local and international, (iii) to look inside these categories, (iv) to capture the complexity and fluidity. The combination of local and international, in turn, led to the question of which actors are uniquely local and to what extent these actors possess agency and autonomy. (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012). For Richmond (2010: 669), ‘local’ is characterized by “*context, custom, tradition and difference in everyday setting.*”

Sabaratnam (2013), different from others, suggests that critiques to liberal peacebuilding should look in deeper and systematically at the nature of liberal peace which relies on *Eurocentric* point of view which stands for *a belief in Western distinctiveness* (2013: 267). According to her, intellectual dichotomy links liberal peace with ‘the West’ and the local with ‘non- Western’ by underlining cultural differences.

The formal and informal network amongst local and international actors also affect the implementation and success of peacebuilding missions. These networks have generally been examined from the perspective of political economy in peacebuilding by scrutinizing local economic relations in everyday life as a way of continuation of power

relations of ex-combatants over the ordinary people (Themner and Utas, 2016). Kostic (2012, 2014, 2017) instead looks at the role of international networks in of NGOs in “*knowledge production*” in a post- conflict setting. Kostic (2014: 634), asserts that especially in times of peacebuilding, which he defines as “*battlefields of ideas where key international policy makers engage in internal battles for control over intervention policy*”, international think- tank organizations, act like agencies of international interveners to legitimize the positions of international actors.

2.5. Peacebuilding and Post- Conflict Statebuilding

Parallel to the emergence of peacebuilding, with the end of the Cold War, ‘*statebuilding*’, with the aim to create and enhance good governance, became a salient topic in the post-conflict agenda (Chandler, 2010,). Chandler (2010: 65- 66) characterizes international statebuilding paradigm with the notion of ‘post- liberal governance.’ This notion has two parts. The first is the shift from the autonomy and sovereignty that describes liberal state. The prefix of ‘post’, second, reveals the shift from the concept of *government* to *governance* that is no longer about which actors have the role in the system but rather how the “*order is regulated and managed.*”

The lack of control over territories seen as main causes of internal conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and of the main threats for international peace and security (Chandler 2010), as weak states are not able to “*penetrate society, regulate social relationship, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways*” (Migdal, 1988: 4). As an international phenomenon, decolonialization, starting from 1960s, led to the creation of states which are built on colonial legacy and supported by external states. These newly independent states could not develop infrastructures and institutions as a result of lack of their own capability. These kind of states are named as ‘quasi- states’ by Jackson (1990). As a related concept to capacity control over territory and provide infrastructure, state failure appears in the statebuilding debate. A failed state is composed of warring parties, completely lacks authority and legitimate power within its territories. strengthening state has been proposed as the solution to recover and also to prevent conflicts.

The role of state in development was revealed in the Washington Consensus (Newman and DeRouen, Jr, 2014). This role is also related with the preventive nature of

statebuilding and the intersection with peacebuilding that aims to eliminate the root causes of conflict with a sustainable, multi- dimensional peacebuilding agenda that generally combines governance, economic development and security.

According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 780), state authority is crucial for sustainable peace, thus, statebuilding is a critical component of peacebuilding. This idea echoes in the assumption of Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 23), who state “[n]o international police or army can substitute for a combination of well- ordered markets and states.” They also underline the importance of statebuilding as solution for all security and development problems globally.

De Guevara (2008: 348- 349) posits that statebuilding is dependent on the *statebuilder’s “own social logics”* and “*incapacity of statebuilding practices*” rather than their interactions with local actors. According to her, international statebuilding results in creation of dependent institutions in host countries to international actors while these kind of interventions aim to create ‘governance states’. As governance states are created by external actors rather than internal/ local contestation, she asserts that this ‘synthetic structure’ leads to external and internal lack of legitimacy for sustainable functions of the newly created states. Egnell and Halden (2013: 5-6), in relation to the creation of ‘new’ state apparatus, argues that statebuilders mainly approach statebuilding from Weberian understanding underlying *monopoly over the use of violence*. They build their argument on the *new agendas in statebuilding* which is composed of *hybrid statebuilding*, as in the critiques of liberal peacebuilding and endogeneity. Following their theoretical standing, they assert that this approach is not able to capture the reality as international statebuilding because (i) Weberian state theory in essence aimed to explain Western state formation in previous century, (ii) monopoly over use of violence is not appropriate enough to explain current post-conflict states, (iii) the approach cannot explain the complexity of the social context on which today’s state is built, (iv) Weberian approach tells us about a completed process while today’s statebuilding transforms by ongoing process.

For the presence of international organizations and the strategies have been used by them, Bieber (2011), instead, takes EU conditionality vis-à-vis Balkan countries and he assumes that conditionality policy has been ineffective due to the lack of commitment of political elites to the EU integration in the cases of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND AGRICULTURE IN POST- CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

3.1. Security Sector Reform in Post- Conflict

The very first aim of cessation of violent conflict and to provide basic secure environment by the international interventions show that “[a]mong the primary conditions for starting a process of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of political institutions, security, and economic structures is a secure environment” (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 3). Therefore, interveners work for the institutionalization of security in order to contribute post- conflict peacebuilding activities in post- conflict setting (Ingerstad, 2012). This attempt is named as Security Sector Reform and is categorized in second generation of peacekeeping operations which aims to prevent the future conflicts by delivering betterment of life in intervened conflicts rather than to ‘freeze’ the conflict (Kenkel, 2013).

SSR covers ‘all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight’ (Chalmers, 2000: 6). The concept of SSR, additionally, is not only about police and military branches but also about judiciary, governance and transparency as SSR is intertwined with rule of law, human security and development. Moreover, as an intervention-led concept in post-conflict countries; supported/ sponsored by foreign nation-states and supra-national organizations such as the United Nation (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); SSR brings various actors at different levels. As a starting point, the initiatives of Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom starting from 1999 in Sierra Leone¹ stands for the developing of SSR in post- conflict. Specifically, it becomes a priority for development- security nexus in the March 1999 speech of Clare Short, who was UK secretary of state for International Development back then (Albrecht, Stepputat and Andersen in Sedra, 2010). In this speech Short (1999) defined security sector as ‘*the military, paramilitary*

¹ Graphs regarding Sierra Leone are not present in the Introduction part due to the lack of data in World Trade Organization Statistics.

and intelligence services, as well as those civilian structures responsible for oversight and control of the security forces.’’ After that the UK played a proactive role in creation and initiation of an agenda through OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Ball in Sedra, 2010).

OECD uses a broader definition on Security System and Governance Reform based on a larger set of actors, their roles and responsibilities. The broad actions, therefore, reveal the necessity to ‘‘[work] *together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework*’’. the OECD DAC Reference Document (2004: 16) identifies these actors and stakeholders as:

- Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias).
- Security management and oversight bodies: the executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.
- Non-statutory security forces with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; and political party militias.

As the DAC documents show, SSR is mostly concerned about strengthening newly created (or recently overhauled) institutions, and capacity of human resources. Additionally, since SSR is a reform process that is about re-shaping the institutions by foreign and domestic actors, it is a completely political process. Since the reform process is about security institutions that are crucial for state authority, any change can

have a political impact (Barnabeu, 2007). According to Sahin (2016: 2), emphasis on civilian oversight may either strengthen power and position of the civilian authorities and aligned interest groups; or may face with a resistance by the former armed groups if they see any threat to their power. For instance, in Liberia, although disarmed, the ex-commanders of the civil war have turned into ‘Big Men’ of Liberian informal economy, mostly thanks to the networks and political economic legacy established during the times of armed conflict (Themner and Utas, 2016).

In relation to different conceptualizations of SSR, the reform process also differ in the ways SSR is held. In some cases, former warring parties are integrated into one security institution as in the case of Sierra Leone, which has been under SSR since 1999 Lome Peace Accord. On the other hand, in some other countries, like Liberia, present security forces are dissolved and recreated again. According to Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs (2013: 3) these two different choices in SSR contain advantages and drawbacks. Integration of ex-combatants, for example can be relatively more “*speedy and cost-effective*” in short term, but may create the impression that the international and local actors participating in SSR ignore human rights violations in long term. In addition, this integration can pose a threat for ex-commanders as they become a member of a branch under government control, thus peace itself becomes riskier (DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen, 2009). As opposed to integration of ex-combatants into the existing security structure, recreating the institutions can necessitate more time and resources in a society that is under high security risk. Thus, international peacekeeping forces are mandatory to endure the reform process.

Although the way SSR is conducted differs, Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs (2013) find that international funding provides the required financial sustainability and both ways- creating new security institutions or integrating ex-combatants into existing institutions- have significant pitfalls in civilian oversight. Similar to previous scholars, Stanley and Call (in Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008: 300- 301) compares other strategies in creation and sustaining security institutions. One of them is ‘military merger’, as in the case of Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique. The second type for SSR is ‘demilitarization and police reform’ which depicts demilitarization of armed groups to diminish the power of ex- combatants and gives the responsibility to civilian police to secure the society and institutional reforms as in the case of El Salvador, Guatemala and Namibia. Relatedly, Wilén (2016) finds that integration of former foes may be

functional but does not mean that there is a positive correlation if there is an undemocratic framework for the government and the army interactions.

In addition to civilian oversight for the sake of good governance and democratization (Chappuis and *Hänggi in* Chandler, 2013), local ownership has been highly prioritized for the sake of implementation (Donais 2009; OECD 2007; Oosterveld and Galand 2012; Mobekk 2010). Because lack of support and acceptance may endanger the legitimacy of reforms and therefore, the actions initiated by the international actors may not be sustained as they supposed to be (Gordon, 2014). Additionally, if SSR related institutions do not respond the needs of local people, trust in these institutions and in the state will be restricted (Jaye 2006; UN 2013; Gordon, Sharma Forbes and Cave 2011). Sometimes the willingness of local governments to reform their security sector is low. Examining Central African Republic and Liberia, Mehler (2012: 51) asserts that financial capacity, structure of security forces, mainly the size of presidential guards, continuation of civil wars, lack of responsibility of elites toward the ordinary people can impede providing security services for ordinary people and this lack of service leads to diminishing level of legitimacy for the central government. Therefore, increase in antagonism between state-society relations can cause new conflicts and central government may become reluctant to commence and maintain a reform based on rule of law and under civilian oversight. Thus, turning into a 'top-down' process due to lack of legitimacy imperils success of reform process.

3.2. Security Sector Reform and Agriculture in Post- Conflict


Security sector reform is entangled with development vision by the international organizations. This developmental vision of international organizations is based on two arguments. First, institutionalized and secure environment will boost foreign investment and production in a post-conflict country that would satisfy the needs of the population and this will contribute to the successful and sustainable peacebuilding (Barnett et al, 2007). The relation with economic development constitutes an important part of modern SSR.

The main components of economic development, relatedly, include increase in production and manufacturing, export and import rate, employment percentage, income level among others (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). Agriculture also constitutes an

important part of economic development, especially in post-conflict societies. Several reasons underline this importance of agriculture in relation to peacebuilding/ statebuilding and to SSR as a component of peacebuilding / statebuilding in post-conflict context:


1. Agriculture constitutes an important part of economy, especially for underdeveloped countries (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). These countries are *“with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita incomes that have remained dependent on primary commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict.”* (Collier et al., 2003: 53)

World Bank Data shows that the share of agriculture in GDP holds an important percentage in those countries affected by *‘prolonged conflict’* such as Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea Bissau. The percentages in those countries are at least 20 percent, if not above 50 percent.




Graph 8: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Benin.

Source: World Bank Data.




Graph 8: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Burundi.

Source: World Bank Data.




Graph 9: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Central African Republic

Source: World Bank Data.



Graph 10: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Democratic Republic of Congo

Source: World Bank Data.



Graph 11: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Guineau Bissau.

Source: World Bank Data.

2. The countries further become more likely to trap into civil conflict due to poverty and unequal distribution (Collier et al., 2003). A healthy agriculture economy will dissuade parts of the populace from restarting conflict because especially in countries

experienced a civil war, society is relatively more prone to recreation of perceived grievances when people become greedy in an underdeveloped economy especially when unemployment rate is high, armed groups can recruit more people (Collier and Hoeffler, 2014). In relation to employment and recruitment by the insurgencies as an impediment in post- conflict, according to the *Synthesis Report of International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (2010), agriculture is an important sector for job creation and a direct way to reach poor and the people in need in rural areas that would ensure a sustainable economy and peacebuilding. Furthermore, it will provide resources upon which the state itself can also draw from – providing finance to the government. For instance, according to the Report (2010: 36- 17), focusing on economic development encouraged by job creation prevailed in agriculture, strengthen stability in peacebuilding activities in countries such as Burundi, Southern Sudan, Timor Leste and Sierra Leone.

3. A healthy agricultural center that would produce surplus will also kick-start the rest of the economy. Although Tsakok and Gardner (2007) find no statistically significant clue for the role of agriculture in total economic growth, Tiffin and Irz (2006) finds that agriculture stands for a causal indicator for economic development. Winters et al (2007) posits that agricultural surplus can augment productivity, innovation and investment. It can foster public spending in industrial activities. Or absent such planning, the focus of agriculture can also may slide to illicit drugs as happened in Afghanistan with opium production. This is visible in the last reports of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that opium cultivation increased at 10 % in 2015. The founding reasons according to the Afghan officers are that increasing insecurity along with lack of capability and equipment to control poopy farms. (Agence France- Press, 23 October 2016). Raspberries in Kosovo exemplifies how can a specific type of fruit can earn higher price in comparison with other fruits in a country suffering from high trade (import-export) deficit. Plus, raspberry production creates increasing total export value as of €680 in 2013 (Open Data Kosovo) that makes the Ministry of Agriculture to ameliorate the competitiveness of the product by cost sharing.
4. Civil conflict and its aftermath are usually marred with massive movement of people both domestically and externally. Such movement puts considerable pressure on the state apparatus as well as the neighboring countries (Ayoob, 1995). If the movement is


international, it can regionalize the conflict and can have a spill-over effect (Milner in Betts and Loescher, 2011). This spill-over can be in a way of internationalization of civil conflicts by the states in order to win over their insurgents beyond borders which can intensify the tensions with their neighbors. (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008). Or, direct and indirect violence during conflicts cause migration from conflict zones (Wood 1994). If return of displaced people to the rural is the case in post-conflict, this rural return poses obvious obstacles in both institution building and services such as education, healthcare, employment. Moreover, the rural return can augment “*competition for arable land.*” (Zaum in Betts and Loescher, 2011: 288). On the other hand, if migration from rural to urban is the case, then urban unemployment increases and rural output decreases (Stiglitz, 1974) if there is no dramatic change in technological equipment. A healthy agricultural sector, on the other hand, may ameliorate such migration problems, by providing employment opportunities and distribution of population across land.

In these two salient sectors in post-conflict that is related with the basic needs in Maslowian terms, some linkages can be constituted for the impact of SSR on agriculture in post-conflict societies. These linkages also constitute the arguments of this study and will be tested in the case of Kosovo.


1. SSR can increase state capacity (Gbla, 2006). This increase in the ability of the state to “*design, implement, monitor and evaluate policy*” (de Waal 2011: 130) can augment the control over territory which can make state to pursue agricultural development plans in an effective way (Delpeuch and Poulton, 2011).
2. The more SSR provides secure environment in rural areas, the more people can engage in agricultural product This relation was exemplified in FARM project supported by the USA in South Sudan. In that case, the process continued by two ways: (i) As the mined areas were cleaned up, the lands became adequate for agricultural activities; (ii) people returned to their arable lands when SSR provided a secure environment for agricultural activity. Thus, agricultural sector developed by planted area and by the amount of product (FARM Project Report, 2012).

Indeed, figures below illustrate that the size and share of rural and urban population tend to increase in countries that underwent SSR in the aftermath of the Cold War. The figures list seven cases where SSR followed civil conflict, both of are illustrated with separate marks. An examination of these illustrate that the share of population living in rural areas increase, if not stay stable. This result also suggests that some of this population may have moved to urban centers in anticipation of pending conflict at the time, as civil wars paves the way for emigration at home or abroad that also turn to a *chain migration* (Collier et al, 2003). As such, effective management of this “rural shift” becomes of utmost importance in creating sustainable peace in post-conflict environments.

Graphs from 12 to 18 below illustrate rural and urban population and the year of SSR.




Graph 12: Rural and Urban Population in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Source: FAO




Graph 13: Rural and Urban Population in Benin.

Source: FAO




Graph 14: Rural and Urban Population in Burundi.

Source: FAO




Graph 15: Rural and Urban Population in Central African Republic

Source: FAO




Graph 16: Rural and Urban Population in Cote d'Ivoire

Source: FAO



Graph 17: Rural and Urban Population in Democratic Republic of Congo

Source: FAO



Graph 18: Rural and Urban Population in Guinea

Source: FAO


The link between SSR and improvement in agricultural sector is, however, neither direct nor evident. The impact of SSR can be *'janus-faced'*; SSR can lead to either to the improvement or deterioration of the agricultural sector in a post-conflict society. A number of factors turn out to be critical in defining the nature of the relationship between SSR and the health of agricultural sector. It is also important to note that the direction of causation between these two salient sectors may run either way, or in a cyclical fashion.

1. The political preferences of the government: A post-conflict government, which receives untied foreign aid, i.e. aid that the government can spend in any way it sees fit (Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2002), may decide to allocate resources to SSR at the expense of agricultural development. As a result, the agricultural sector can notably suffer, especially if the agricultural sector lacks capital-intensive equipment after a destructive conflict (Wanasundera, 2006). For instance, the Technical Report (2010: 67-68) of the Asian Development Bank indicated that the Bank aimed to revitalize agricultural sector by first strengthening infrastructure that the farmers need. In longer term, they guaranteed micro grants that will enhance engagement of people and prevail more job opportunities and economic development.
2. Labor movement: A hypothetical resource distribution favoring SSR over the agricultural sector can also significantly affect labor movements in the society. For instance, improving the life and work conditions via SSR in the urban area, such as education programs and salary, may attract people from the rural side to the urban (Gbla, 2006). Such sustained migration can further destabilize the agrarian sector, hence jeopardizing post-conflict peace.
3. Employment (or lack thereof) often becomes an important concern in a post-conflict economy (Collier and Hoeffler, 2003). SSR, in the short to medium term, creates notable employment in a post-conflict polity in urban centers through contracting. Furthermore, the business milieu / funding environment in urban setting created by SSR-related activities can lead to further employment opportunities (UNSG Reports on SSR, 2008; 2013). The projects held in Burundi, Guinea and Sierra Leone exemplified the job creation and especially youth and women employment that generally constitute

the higher greater rate in population. The SSR project in Guinea employed at least 2000 young people and other provided necessary infrastructure and capacity building. (Fitz-Gerald, 2012) Such a demand on the SSR side for employment can lead to further migration from rural to urban, putting more pressure on post-conflict cities.


4. If locals and internationals have conflicts about SSR and if the economy of intervened country is heavily dependent on foreign aid; internationals can cut the foreign aid as a 'stick' in order to have an impact on policies of locals as aid can redefine the *repertoire of action* of the locals (Wood and Sullivan, 2011). Thus, this decrease in the amount of aid can deteriorate other sectors of the recovery agenda in which agriculture is part of. From another perspective, SSR is internationally supported and/ or sponsored.

The role foreign plays in the economies of post conflict societies with SSR is illustrated in Graphs 19 to 26. Foreign aid, in turn, can have a number of deleterious effects on the share of agriculture vis-à-vis industry in a country's GDP (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2014). An inflow of "cheap SSR money" can lead to a speedy growth in the service sector, hence crowding out human resources and investment in agriculture (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). This rural 'Dutch Disease', therefore, can deteriorate agriculture sector. Thus, when agricultural product decrease or the demand increases, the gap between export and import becomes sustained in the flow of 'cheap money.'




Graph 19: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Afghanistan

Source: World Bank Data




Graph 20: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Benin

Source: World Bank Data




Graph 21: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Bosnia Herzegovina

Source: World Bank Data




Graph 22: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Burundi

Source: World Bank Data




Graph 23: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Central African Republic

Source: World Bank Data




Graph 24: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Cote d'Ivoire

Source: World Bank Data



Graph 25: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Mali

Source: World Bank Data



Graph 26: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia

Source: World Bank Data

Therefore, the reflections of SSR on agriculture in providing more secure environment in rural areas, job opportunities and the place of SSR in resource distribution is worth to be scrutinized.

CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHOD

4.1. Research Question

The main research question of this thesis is ‘Whether and how Security Sector Reform impacts the agriculture sector in post-conflict countries?’ In order to investigate this impact, I formed 40 sub-questions scrutinizing 6 hypotheses above regarding state capacity, migration from rural to urban or vice-versa, governmental budget and foreign aid distribution for these two sectors.

4.2. Descriptive and Qualitative Method

Descriptive research method provides “a picture of the specific details of a situation, social setting or relationship” (Neumann, 2014, p.39), and is applied in this study to investigate the impact of Security Sector Reform on agricultural sector in post-conflict countries. and resource distribution, urban- rural relations in terms of job creation and preferences underpin the theoretical framework. Since qualitative research focuses on interactive processes (Neumann, 2013, p. 17), and “seeks to unpack how people construct the world around them, what they are doing or what is happening to them in terms that are meaningful and that offer rich insight” (Kvale, 2008, p. 4); qualitative method stands an efficient way to study such an interrelated and multi-disciplinary mechanism. For this research, deriving from empirical quantitative data revealed by international organizations, qualitative research makes possible to investigate the possible mechanisms in a specific case which is Kosovo. In addition, according to Yin (2002), case study is one of the best ways to understand a complex reality and to Walton (1992), “it demonstrate a mechanism about how social forces shape and produce results in particular setting.” .

4.3. The Case of Kosovo

Declaring its independence in 2007 and being partly recognized by the international community, Kosovo is in a statebuilding/ peacebuilding phase. While the country has been heavily under international guidance for its main functions, many of the administrative duties, as in the words of the one of the interview participants, ‘*from collecting the garbage to designing laws*’ has been transferred to the national authorities over the last 9 years since independence. Kosovo is an important case to study in a post-conflict context for several reasons. First, Kosovo has an armed conflictual past with Serbia starting before its independence declaration following the disintegration of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990s. Second, the country has a multi-ethnic and multi- religious population composed of Albanians, Bosniaks, Serbs, Turks, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Romani ethnic groups constituting Muslims, Catholic and Orthodox Christians and others. Early military intervention by NATO in 1999 and deployment of peacekeeping mission by the UN (UNMIK) in 1999 which was transformed EULEX in 2009 also mark the country’s brief history of independence. The Kosovo case is further important to be scrutinized because one of the regional international organizations, the EU also underlined as an important country for security vision under CSDP (Battiss, Luengo- Cabrera and Morillas, 2016). Plus, examining Kosovo as a case will contribute to the literature as the relation between SSR and agriculture has not attracted attention especially in Balkan countries although international organizations and scholars have been focused on these individual sectors in the Balkan Region.

4.3.1. Background of the Kosovo Conflict

The history of violent conflict in Kosovo has been dated back to ancient times similar to the other conflicts intermingled with historical, demographic and nationalistic arguments by the primary parties of the conflict. Main historical ‘milestones’ that produced historical ‘myths’ for the conflict are first, the ‘Battle of Kosovo’ that the Ottoman Empire won over the Serbian Kingdom in 1389; second is Serbian exodus from Kosovo from 1690s; third is Serbian ‘*reconquista*’ or ‘*invasion*’ of Kosovo in the eyes of Albanians in 1912 (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003: 31). For the contemporary conflict that started in 1998- 1999 and led to the independence, the Independent

International Committee on Kosovo (2000: 32-35) finds the origins in nationalistic aspirations and the rise of Milosevic, who was the leader of Yugoslavia following Tito, the founder of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although the Committee mentions the domination of Albanian population in Kosovo, they underline the importance of Kosovo 'as the heart of Medieval Serbia'. Such a primordial importance attested to Kosovo for the Serbs has increased the tension between Kosovars and Serbians. Milosevic, a populist-Serbian leader, was key to further instigating this conflict to mobilize his nationalist supporters in the –then- Yugoslavia during 1990s.

Kosovo was an *autonomous 'constituent of Serbia'* in foundation of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 despite the Albanian majority Kosovo territories. National armed forces during the Second World War (Weller, 2009: 28) that led to the creation of Yugoslavia left '*ambiguous promise of self- determination*' for *Kosovo province* . According to Malcolm (2002: 314), Albanians in Kosovo were subjected to harshness in the first two decades of the Republic under socialist party of Tito due to the domination of Serbs and Montenegrins in the party. Although there were ongoing legal debates about and demonstrations for the status of Kosovo from the beginning (Malcolm 2002), several constitutional changes have been passed in 1960s that enhanced the legal status of Kosovo as a political entity(Weller, 2002: 28-29). In 1966 constitutional change, in Amendment XVIII, Kosovo gained a legal entity with the potential that can pave the way for upgrading to a 'Republic' status in Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 2002: 324). Following the demonstrations adhered to the Prishtina University, Kosovo was defined as 'autonomous province' of Serbia instead of an 'autonomous region' in 1974 Constitutional Amendment (Ker- Lindsay, 2009). By this change, Kosovo gained the equal status with Vojvodina, which was another province of Serbia and granted for this status in 1946 that was continuously debated considering the legal entities in the Republic.. Kosovo, now, could have its own constitution, assemble and seat on the federal council that were reserved rights for republics except the right of self- determination (Ker- Lindsay, 2009: 10). In this constitution, both autonomous regions were under the administration of Serbia and based on the principle of 1943 constitution that only 'nations' can declare independence while 'nationalities' did not have such a right. Kosovo was considered as a 'nationality' in Serbia due to the 'Albanian' Republic in the Federation (Malcolm, 1998).

However, the stance in Kosovo was upon the independence in addition to 'pro-Tirana' slogans to be part of Albania while the Enver Hoxha regime in Albania was

suppressing all kind of religion. This suppression was also questioned by some other Kosovars that practice their religion in addition to cultural and linguistic differences between Kosovars and Albanians in that time. Plus, internal migration in Yugoslavia from underdeveloped to developed regions, increased the Albanian population in Kosovo as between 80,000 and 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo between 1961- 1981 (Malcom, 1998: 328- 329).

After the death of Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia, unhappiness with political and economic issues in Kosovo' s status led to the riots starting at the University of Prishtina, later on, the protests was symbolized with the University, (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). Many of these protests were non-violent led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova who was the president of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologist and by Veton Surroi, the representative of Prishtina branch of the Union for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative. These protests harshly responded by the Milosevic administration and increased the clashes between Kosovo Liberation Army (Malcolm, 1998) an armed group appeared in the beginning of 1990s (the Intependent International Committee on Kosovo, 2000). These clashes ended up with creation of new 'hero and martyrs' in in one of the clashes, Serbian forces killed Adem Jashari with his family and turned him into a 'hero' in the eyes of Albanians. The sanctions imposed on Milosevic by the Contact Group composed of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States, on 9 March 1999 that blocked investments and restricted visa paved the way for more violent responses (Malcolm, 1998). From a conflict analysis perspective, these acts led to radicalization and dehumanization of the 'other side' that escalated the conflict in a higher speed (Pruitt, Rubin and Kim, 1994). Following these clashes and escalation, village militias by calling themselves as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), initiated the armed 'defense' mechanisms "*This was the beginning of the war.*". (the Independent International Committee on Kosovo, 2000: 55)

4.3.2. International Presence in Kosovo

International presence in Kosovo is comprised of the branches of the EU, NATO, OSCE and formerly, by the UN. The missions of these international organizations vary across from military intervention to capacity building. Some of the mandates for these missions start from the times of acute conflict to end the violence

while others have been solely active during post-conflict to endure the creation and establishment of institutions.

The EU is currently present in Kosovo with the European Union Office in Kosovo/European Union Special Representative (EURSR), the EU Member State Representations (Embassies and Liaison Offices) and EULEX Mission, which became fully operational in 2009. The EU Joint Action of February 2008 and the Council Decision of June 2010 and June 2012 provide the legal basis for the Mission. EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The Mission supports Kosovo on its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area. The skills and expertise of EULEX are used to support the key EU aims in the visa liberalization process, the Feasibility Study and the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue. EULEX also supports the Structured Dialogue on the rule of law, led by Brussels. The Mission continues to concentrate on the fight against corruption and the mission works to enhance the ties with local counterparts to achieve sustainability in Kosovo (About EULEX, <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44>). Recently, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo entered into force on 01.04.2016 which composes the framework of relations between the EU and Western Balkan Countries and also is a step for membership such as screening and monitoring reports.

The NATO's military presence in Kosovo started with the air bombings in Kosovo on 13 October 1998 with authorization of the NATO Council after armed conflict between Serbia and Kosovo in 1998. However, before that, North Atlantic Council marked NATO's objectives in Kosovo as facilitation for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and promotion of stability and security in neighbors especially in ex-Yugoslavian countries on 28 May 1998. Until this decision, as Kosovo-Serbia conflict was long lasting since 1990s the NATO encouraged the Contact Group efforts and Rambouillet Meetings to reach a peaceful resolution. Following the seventy-seven days of air campaign, the strikes were temporarily suspended based on consultation of the North Atlantic Council and by General Clark who was in charge of Kosovo. After the United Nations Security Council Resolution, which paved the way for withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces of Federal Republic's (Serbia), to demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army, and to deployment of international security presence, NATO started to deploy its KFOR in June with the aim of peace and

stability, border security, assistance for relocation and return for displaced person and refugees in addition to assist Kosovo Security Force and Kosovo Protection Corps.

OSCE (Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe), as third big international organization in Kosovo, conducts a wide range of activities including support to democratic institutions, civic participation, human rights and freedoms, “countering terrorism and cyber threats; advanced police training and support to key policing strategies; and support to the implementation of agreements stemming from the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade.”

4.3.3. SSR in Kosovo

The first SSR attempt began with the deployment of UNMIK under Resolution 1244 which aimed to dissolve all institutions created during the uprisings against Serbia and to create new institutions under the supervision of UNMIK (Holley, 1999). ‘Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation’ agreement was signed between KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and NATO was signed on 20 June 1999 after the elections internationally supported and mandated and ended up with the elections of Kosovar Leaders. In the agreement of Demilitarization and Transformation, the status of Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Police were accurate and were launched in the aftermath of the agreement in January 2000 (Sahin, 2016: 13). In contrast, the creation of Kosovo Army was ‘due consideration’ “[on] the lines of the US National Guard in due course as part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accord” (Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation Agreement, 1999, Article 25, b).

Following the agreement, Police Service in Kosovo was held under the area of rule of law along with the establishment of *the Kosovo Judicial Institute, the Kosovo Law Center* and *the Criminal Defence Resource Center* with the facilitation of OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Bernabeu, 2007: 75). Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was designed as a ‘*civilian emergency service*’ to undertake humanitarian aid in times of disaster and to ‘*contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities*’ without any role in law enforcement (UNMIK Regulation, 1999, No:8, Articles 1-2). In addition to the law enforcement states, The KPC was not to be engaged with any political affairs

alike (Regulation No:8, Articles 2.3- 2.4). KPC was to constitute 3000 active personnel at most and 2000 at most to be called upon (Regulation No:8, Article 2.1). In January 2000, the KPC constituted 5052 personnel with 500 reservations for minorities. According to International Organization for Migration Records (2000), 20,000 former KLA members applied to be enrolled in the KPC and 46 key leaders became part of the Corps (UNMIK, 2002).

The Kosovo Police Service, as another security institution in addition to Kosovo Security Forces, was created under the mandate of UNMIK in the absence of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The KSP was composed of 5000-7000 police officers that would be educated by the OSCE. Approximately 4000 police graduated from capacity building education in 2001. The reserved quotas for inclusion of ethnic minorities and women (15 percent for each) were fulfilled in contrast to KPC which was dominated by former KLA members (O'Neil, 2011: 112). Creation of Police Service in Kosovo was held under the area of rule of law along with the establishment of *the Kosovo Judicial Institute, the Kosovo Law Center* and *the Criminal Defence Resource Center* with the facilitation of OSCE Mission in Kosovo. (Bernabeu, 2007: 75). The Police Force in Kosovo is based on ethnic representation that would reflect the population according to 2010 Law on Police. According to the latest data provided by Kosovo Police Press Office, 84.04 % of the Police Force is Albanian and 19.96 % are part of other ethnic groups constituted by Serbs, Turk, Boshnak, Rom, Malazians, Croatians, Macedonians. 85.93 % of the total number of 8855 people is male and 15.07 % is female.

According to Sahin (2016: 14), Kosovo experienced a new phase with the “*adoption of ‘standards before status’*” between December 2003 and declaration of independence in February 2008. The standards were composed of democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee return, economic development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade and the structure of KPC (Standards for Kosovo, 2003). These eight standards were perceived by Albanians as a delaying mechanism to be recognized by the international community and led to another uprising in 2004 (Sahin, 2016). This uprising caused the death of 11 Albanians and eight Serbs; 900 people wounded; displacement of 4500 people, and destruction of 700 properties and UNMIK equipment (International Crisis Group, 2004).

Martti Ahtisaari, former Prime Minister of Finland and the EU representative during the 1998-99 War and after the UN Special Envoy to Kosovo after the war presented a peace plan (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). The Ahtisaari Plan pointed to democratic institutions for the oversight of security sector and the place of rule of law, cooperation between Kosovo authorities and the branches of the UN, OSCE and the EU. Ahtisaari Plan also re-assumed the structure of Police Forces and proposed the creation of Security Council that would report to the Prime Minister (Ahtisaari, 2004, Annex VIII). However, the plan did not refer to the establishment of an Army. According to Sahin (2016: 15-16), the actions provisioned in the plan were to be taken based on the review conducted by the British Government's Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT). This review suggested a '*comprehensive and inclusive*' approach that would include local people and leaders and appraise international actors via the data gathered from the public (Cleland Welch in Ebnoether, Felberbauer and Stanicic, 2007). The review, according to Welch (2007: 48- 49) was based on two stages. First the report defined and analyzed threats; second The Advisory Team proposed creation of institutions based on Copenhagen Criteria which was demanded by the Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy back then. This emphasis on creation of institutions according to Copenhagen Criteria was due to the prediction that Kosovo would be member of the EU in the future, so the institutions would be underpinning of the EU criteria. The review also proposed composition of a Steering Committee including representatives of UNMIK, the PISG, the OSCE, religious and community leaders, political parties, which was criticized by some Serbs and Kosovars (Welch, 2014). For Serbs, the Steering Committee was dominated by the Albanians, and for some Albanians, the composition of the Steering Committee was favoring Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Party.

Ahtisaari Plan was brought in the form of the constitution in June 2008 following the independence declaration in February 2008. In this amendment, Kosovo Protection Corps transformed into Kosovo Security Forces which was lightly armed in order to fulfill civil protection and disaster response. It can be deployed for humanitarian operations, overseas peace operations and training and exercise programs (Law No. 04/L-177 on Overseas Deployment). Kosovo Government initiated to compose a Strategic Security Sector Review of Kosovo which was published in 2014, predicted to transform Kosovo Security Forces to Kosovo Army


4.3.4. Economic Outlook and Agriculture in Kosovo

Kosovo is market economy which operates on principles of free trade principle (Dr. Musliu, Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary). As Graph 27 below shows, it is a slowly increasing economy with a decline in 2015 after the destruction in the infrastructural capacity and human capacity fled in times of war in 1998-1999 (IMF Report, 2001). According to Green Report of Ministry of Agriculture (2016), the share of commercial activity defines the economy of Kosovo although agriculture has a relatively higher share in the economy. Graph 28 below shows the net ODA received in Kosovo and it' s percentage of GNI which indicated the tendency in decrease in the economy of Kosovo. According to the IMF 2001 Report, international donors mobilized this foreign aid to recover the agricultural sector, housing, utilities. According to the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Kosovo receives foreign aid from European Commission, USAID, Swiss Cooperation Agency, GIZ, TİKA. The most competitive agricultural production in Kosovo, is according to the all participants of the interviews is raspberry.



Graph 27: GDP per capita in Kosovo


Source: World Bank Indicator



Graph 28: Net ODA Received in Kosovo

Source: World Bank Data

In addition to fluctuations in GDP, Kosovo has a continuous trade deficit (please see Graph 29) although the value of exported goods and services has an increasing trend, which was indicated as 6.4 %. According to the Representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Kosovo is undergoing an economic reform program that would determine the most competitive sector to create more jobs and income to close the gap between export and import. According to the representative, agriculture is one of the most competitive sectors along with mining, energy, communication and services.



Graph 29: Balance of Payments in Kosovo.

Source: Central Bank of Kosovo.

Table 1: Consumption Trends- Survey Results of Household Budget 2015.

Year	Total in mil (€)	Consumption per household	Consumption per capita
2009	1.911	6.847	1.161
2010	1.937	7.110	1.226
2011	1.928	7.010	1.210
2012	2.292	7.657	1.380
2013	2.382	7.625	1.402
2014	2.471	7.611	1.386
2015	2.461	3.503	1.432

Source: KAS

Table 2: Farm Structure by Size and Number of Agricultural Households in 2014

Farm Size	Area (ha)	Participation in (%)	No. of Agricultural Economies	Participation in (%)
0 and less than 0.5	9,142	5.1	39,939	35.2
0.5 to less than 1	16,703	9.3	24,562	21.6
1 to less than 2	31,905	17.7	23,827	21.0
2 to less than 5	55,257	30.6	18,726	16.5
5 to less than 10	29,518	16.4	4,493	3.9
10 to less than 20	15,755	8.7	1,203	1.0
20 to less than 30	2,303	2.9	228	0.2
30 and more	16,798	9.3	253	0.2
Total	180,381	100	113,231	100

Source: KAS

Agro- industry in Kosovo, is another growing sector in terms of turnover and employed people in industries according to the representative from Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. He supported this argument by addressing the *Food Industry and Agro-Business for 2011- 2015* (See the Table 3 below). This sector covers plant and animal production; hunting and related services; forestry and woodcutting; fishing and aquaculture; food processing, production of wood and wood and of cork products (except furniture), production of items from straw and plaiting materials; production of paper and paper products; production of non-metallic mineral products.

Table 3: Food Industry and Agro-Business for 2011- 2015

Year	Turnover (in Euros)	Number of Employees	Number of active businesses
2011	275,851,580	6,046	1,742
2012	285,389,767	6,778	1,819
2013	290,518,661	7,130	1,896
2014	312,188,431	8,004	2,055
2015	323,370	8,790	2,130
Total	1,487,318.55	36,748	9,642

Source: KAS, Department of Economic Statistics.

The trade deficit in general economic indicators is also reflected in agricultural products as the Graph 30 shows off.



Graph 30: Export- Import in Agricultural Products, in 1000 Euros in Kosovo.

Source: KAS

As it is seen in the Graph 30, export- import deficit in agriculture increased from 400.000 Euros to 600.000 in 2011 in the years that SSR became an important topic in peacebuilding/ statebuilding in Kosovo.

4.3.5. Data Collection

The main focus of this study is how Security Sector Reform affects agriculture in post-conflict countries with a specific focus on Kosovo. As stated before, some scholars assert that many international interventions are not suitable for local economic, political, social context (Visoka and Richmond, 2016). They also address asymmetric relations in the region between locals and internationals. The processes, through which such obstacles arise, however, has not been thoroughly explicated. Interviews with actors involved in the interaction between peacebuilding/state building and various sectors in the economy can shed a first light over such processes.

Accordingly, 16 face-to-face, in-depth and semi- structured interviews were conducted, including interviews with representatives from USAID, Kosovo Police, Kosovo Security Forces, Kosovo Center for Security Studies, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Kosovo Statistics Agency, an academician and eight students from Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary at University of Prishtina, and finally, a judge from the Kosovo Constitutional Court. I tried to contact with some representatives from Ministry of Defense of Kosovo, EULEX, KFOR and OSCE but my requests for interviews were declined. EULEX directed to the public resources. Members of the Kosovo Parliament pointed out to their work-load, mostly due to an upcoming early- election on 11 June 201. This political agenda also reflected on the other interview arrangements with Ministry of Interior and OSCE. While OSCE approved to send written answers but after seeing the questions, they asserted that the scope of the study is not in their area of action. As Neumann (2014) suggests that the number of interviewee sample does not rely on representativeness but rather relevance, having at least one interviewee from each major institution involved in the process and some group of people who had been engaged with agriculture and security sector related jobs, is appropriate

All interviews were conducted in the beginning of June 2017, at the time and place that the participant preferred. In order to provide maximum comfortable setting for the interview, the questions were sent before the meetings since many of the

questions require technical knowledge. Snow-ball sampling was preferred to reach the students rather than random sampling which is preferred when getting in contact with and reaching to interviewee are hard (Neumann, 2006). The interviews with state institutions; the Constitutional Court, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and Kosovo Statistics Agency were arranged via the Embassy of Turkish Republic in Kosovo. In contrast other meetings were arranged by the individual attempts of the writer.

In a qualitative study, interviews are mostly used methods in data collection as they pave the way to construct a dialogue in critical points that can arise through the process (Smith & Osborn, 2007). Semi-structured interviews, in parallel, makes the investigator to scrutinize the participants' perspectives and views deeply as semi-structured interviews are flexible in terms of time and the type of questions (Kvale, 2008). Thus, when composing the questions, it was aimed to guide the participant to construct an open dialogue on the subject. Departing from Neuman' s suggestions (2014), the questions were composed as descriptive, critical, by using reframing and re-asking based on different data, and sensitive to the issues. Additionally, they are recorded in order to re-listen and for transcription after the interview and all gestures, pauses and non-verbal cues are noted for analysis. The questions are constructed after reading secondary resources such as articles, reports, news in the media (Turkish, English and rarely French). This brings another complementary aspect of data collection as well. Plus, by reading the secondary resources before the interviews, the risk to extend the interview to the unrelated topics was also eliminated thanks to empirical knowledge that brought the interviewee back to the topic. During the interviews, all the participants were informed about the aim of the study, the investigator and the Ethical Form obtained from the Ethical Committee of Sabancı University presented into the consideration of the participant. All participants signed the consent form before the interviews begun with regard to ethical considerations. All interviews were recorded except the ones at the Kosovo Police and at the Statistics Agency upon the participants' request. All the participants informed that they would skip the questions or withdraw from the interview but none withdrew from the interview.

Just as many other field studies, this study has some limitations, as well. First, snowball sampling can generally have some drawbacks such as limiting the people interviewed in a specific group, however, as the subject of the study is limited in security sector and agriculture and as participants are composed of different segments,

this kind of sampling does not pose an unanswerable question regarding the sampling and capturing different perspectives in all participants' answers for major questions also increases the reliability of the sample and the design of the study. This kind of sampling is also appropriate when dealing with a small size of sample as random sampling would lead to biased observations (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).

Language limitation should also be mentioned in this part as only English can be used in the interviews rather than native language of the participant. This is why no interview was conducted with farmers but with students of course of Agricultural Economy at the University of Prishtina. The students come from different parts of Kosovo, 3 from rural and 5 from urban cities and 5 were men while 3 were women. Thus, gender bias was weakened by this way. In the interviews at the University, a student translated 5 questions in Albanian language to other students as some of them raise the problem that they did not understand the English version of the questions. In addition, as all the reports are available in English and most of the participants can speak English this does not reveal a crucial drawback to the study.

4.3.6. Qualitative Data and Hypotheses Analysis

Hypothesis 1

SSR → Increase in State Capacity → Increasing Control over and Continuation of Agricultural Plan → More Agricultural Production

All the participants supported the idea that Kosovo state capacity is gradually increasing especially after the independence declaration and formal end of International Steering Group in 2012. The general tendency for this approach can be summarized by the words of the judge at Constitutional Court. For the UN presence, the judge said that

“There is still UN presence but many of their competences transformed to the Kosovo institutions ... their role in Kosovo is now different than before... they are now not visible, they only visible, we see them only when they make reports in every three months to the Security Council. They are more active in North Kosovo but they do not exercise executive power in Kosovo.”

He asserted that ‘*every institution was created from zero... while there were total destruction, mass graves and more than 1 million people returned after Serbian displacement.*’ The judge and the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development confirmed the presence of other international representatives at the state institutions of Kosovo to endure some cases or projects just as other Kosovar officers while asserting the increase in Kosovo state capacity.

The participants also agreed on the role of Security Forces in increasing state capacity. However, for them, as the state has not total control over agriculture as Kosovo exemplifies a free market economy, increasing state capacity has no direct effect on agriculture. For instance, according to the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the government has agricultural development programs that can refine agricultural sector, the professor from the Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary this does not prevail the ‘*state capacity over the sector.*’

Hypothesis 2

SSR: Demining and More Secure Environment in Rural Areas → Return to Rural Areas → More Agricultural Engagement

Although participants were not crystal clear regarding the relation between SSR and agriculture when the research title was revealed, they were able to resonate this hypothesis. The most direct relation with SSR and agriculture for them was that the more Security Sector prevail secure environment, the more people can engage in agricultural activities. In addition to this sense of security Representative from the Kosovo Security Forces and from the Ministry of Agriculture put the role of security forces contributing to infrastructural development. Although students from Agricultural Economy and representative from USAID underlined the lack of infrastructure such as electricity, roads, and so on, they could not consider the security forces as contributor to the infrastructural development such as building bridges and roads. Demining issue, like in FARM Project, was also important in post- conflict Kosovo but the participants did not have a concrete data showing how much demined lands transformed to arable lands although they said in some villages it might be the case.

According to a soldier, Kosovo Security Force is present in rural and is able to reach all over the country in case of emergency. According to the Kosovo Police Press Office,

“Kosovo Police functions in two levels; central and local level. In central level based on a KP Structure there are General Director with his deputies, five Departments with their respective Directorates and Divisions. In local level there are eight regional directorates with police station and substations in all territory of Republic of Kosovo.”

Although the participants agree that rural areas are more secure than before and they mention individual cases for rural return thanks to more secure environment, the link between more secure environment and more agricultural product is not crystal clear.

Hypothesis 3

Resource Allocation and Political Preferences of Government in Favor of SSR → Lack of Resources for Agriculture → Suffer in Agriculture

All the participants confirmed that security sector and agriculture have slightly equal budget so it can be said that there is no resource competition between security sector and agriculture. However, representatives from two separate sectors pointed to a need to increase their sectoral budget as they lack equipment in order to fulfill their capacity. One different discourse was used by the representatives from civil society and aid organization that the budget can meet the needs of the sector if used and overseen effectively.

Although the lack of interaction between security sector and agriculture was visible in the Strategic Security Sector Review (2014) in Kosovo that no article was about agriculture nor the Ministry of Agriculture was part of the consulting group, the question of ‘which one would you choose between SSR and agriculture?’ revealed the lack of dialogue between two sectors. Meaning, the students of agriculture said ‘agriculture’ and the ones in security sector said ‘SSR’. Only the representative from


Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the academician underlined the need for interaction for these two salient sectors that has not been undertaken so far. The both participant wished to be heard after this study by the others even though the both were not certain about the possible interaction between security and agriculture sectors except the hypothesis based on secure environment in rural areas.

Hypothesis 4-5

Employment opportunities prevailed by SSR and Job Attraction → Migration from Rural to Urban → Decrease in Agricultural Engagement

All the participants underlined the unemployment rate which is formally indicated around 30% of the population as an impediment in economy of Kosovo (please see Graph 31 for changing employment and unemployment rate). They further argued that people are not engaged in agriculture as the lands are small due to dividing lands after inheritance among the siblings. This division of land among siblings can prevail the importance of social organizational structure that family relations have an impact on agricultural activity. Additionally, all the participants presumed that people are coming to the urban arena from the rural in search for jobs in public sector, but not necessarily in security sector. A soldier and a student said that

“almost everyone in Kosovo seeks a table and a chair, wants to be a manager or director... We, Kosovars, want to order someone to do something but not to do something... And if you are a farmer, you should be always caring about your land, you have to be both producer and a businessman, but having a job from 8.00 am to 4-5 pm and getting your salary in the end of the month are much more preferable especially when you are not sure if you can sell your product such as maize and cereals if not raspberries in agriculture.” This can be seen in the Graph 32 that shows the percentage of people employed in agriculture.



Graph 31: Unemployment Rate in Kosovo.

Source: KAS



Graph 32: People Employed in Agriculture.

Source: KAS

In addition to public sector, the representative from Ministry of Agriculture pointed out the job research of people coming from rural to urban, in service sector, as well. He said that, “*when you are a farmer gained less education, you are most likely to search for jobs to work at cafés, restaurants et cetera.*”

In order to cross- check the representative from Kosovo Police was asked whether farmers apply more than people from any other sectors. He said that “*For now,*

we do not have the full data showing the applicants' background for vacancies but for the first vacancies, we can say that yes, mostly farmers applied to the jobs at Police Forces as Kosovo was mostly agrarian society back then.'' He added that 20 thousand people applied for the last vacancy in 2014 in total but provided no data for rural- urban division. Thus, this hypothesis lacks data in order to be totally approved.

Hypothesis 6

- A. Conflictual issues between Locals and Internationals over SSR → Cut in Foreign Aid → Deterioration of Agriculture
- B. Foreign Aid → Growth in Services Sector → Crowding out Agricultural Production

All the participants indicated that the amount of foreign aid to Kosovo has decreased over the years while acknowledging the importance of foreign aid in their economy. Plus, they valued the role of foreign aid delivered for equipment and capacity building training. Participants generally underlined the decline in need of Kosovo to explain the decrease in the amount of delivered foreign aid. The representative from the Kosovo Center for Security Studies came up with the European Economic Crisis since 2011 as another explanation for decrease while the Judge brought international agenda by elaborating the changes of concentration of international actors across various crises.

The status of Kosovo Army is still the main issue of the conflict between international and local actors. This is one of the obstacles that it was mentioned in the post- conflict context. In that case, it is visible that undetermined and delayed issues create future conflicts. Transformation of Kosovo Security Forces to a National Army exemplifies this situation as it is one of the main topics in current Kosovo politics. Although the participants mentioned the conflictual preferences over transforming Kosovo Security Forces into an Army, they did not mention it as a reason for decrease in foreign aid used as a 'stick' by the international actors over Kosovar government to change the *'repertoire of action.'*

As second step to investigate the impact of foreign aid distribution between security sector and agriculture, participants were asked to compare and contrast the reserved resources for these two sectors. All said that the government does not receive

untied foreign aid but rather international actors have their pre-planned agenda with their executive personnel. According to the data Kosovo Government provides for all the foreign aid, 34 projects (with 2,077,120 total actual disbursement) were listed in contrast to 29 projects (with 329,0916,111 Euros total actual disbursement) in security sector. This non-presence of untied foreign aid eliminates the mandate of government to distribute foreign aid according to its political preferences. Plus, they assert that foreign aid has not crowd out agricultural production but privatization led to the industrialization of agricultural activity that boosted the product while people migrate from rural to urban areas.

Following these separate finding in accordance with the hypotheses, the interviews revealed that lack of data presents another impediment in post- conflict for a researcher. Finding data is hard due to lack of continuation of data in time series since independence, or lack of technological capacity to collect in agriculture as the representative from USAID argued. Thus, this qualitative research makes the need for further research clear.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This thesis emerged as an attempt to take attention to inter- sectoral studies in peacebuilding/ statebuilding activities in order to contribute to the mostly debated issues such as the discrepancies between international plans and local needs, legitimacy and ownership. This thesis prevails that although individual sectors attract attention, there is also need for communication among the sectors that would respond to the obstacles on the field. Moreover, this communication can compensate the discrepancies in the plan and implementation that would enhance local ownership and sustainability for the peacebuilding programs that pave the way for more legitimacy. Therefore, this approach can also contribute to the dialogue between academics and practitioners engaged in peacebuilding/ statebuilding area.

The fieldwork in this research shows that, SSR can have positive impacts on agriculture by demining and providing security in rural areas. However, only this clue is not enough because in order to motivate agricultural engagement, change in mentality is required as many participants emphasized the overlooking the farmers and search for regular jobs in the cities. Plus, as some parts of negative impacts are accepted by the qualitative data, the need for separate studies is present to scrutinize resource allocation and the impact of foreign aid among the sectors. Moreover, this study can be extended by cross-country comparisons in order to test the hypotheses and to look for new explanations deriving from new empirical data.

Based on the qualitative research, this study suggest inter-sectoral engagement is necessary to enhance the comprehensive approach in post- conflict. Plus, considering the local perceptions, as in the example of overlooking being farmer, would contribute to institutional reforms and capacity building activities in peacebuilding. Furthermore, this study also points to the requirement of policies that target migration to urban cities.

In addition to the hypotheses examined in this thesis, field work and this attempt open new horizon for future research in post- conflict context. For instance, what is the role of rural- urban relationship in post- conflict recovery that shapes labor movement, production, industry and in more general, economic development. Second, as in the Kosovo case, how can we specify the role of Diaspora in this whole environment as the

qualitative data shows the resources transferred from Diaspora has an impact on economy via creation of new job venues in some sectors such as agriculture and service. Third, as the field research were conducted just before the election, the calm and non-violent atmosphere in the capital city inspires the question what determines election violence in post- conflict countries as in some cases such as Central African Republic we observe election violence.



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**The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post- Conflict Countries:
The Case of Kosovo**

Interview Questions

1. Could you tell me about state capacity of Kosovo?
2. How do you think state capacity has been since independence? Do you think it is increasing or decreasing? A lot? Gradually? Very Slow?
3. Is it about implementation or the program itself?
4. Do you think that SSR increased the ability of the state *to design, implement, monitor and evaluate policy*? By which means?
5. Does the state coordinate/ organize/ control agriculture? What do you think are the challenges for good agriculture policy? Do you think that SSR and increased state capacity contributed to coordination, organization continuation of agriculture?
6. Do you think that the state has full control over agricultural plans? Why? Why not?
7. Do you have any statistical data showing the correlation between state capacity and agriculture?
8. Do you think there are drawbacks for agricultural sector? Can SSR pose any obstacles for agriculture?
9. Which one of them would you choose between SSR and Agriculture, if you had to choose?
10. Are Kosovar Security Forces engaged in rural areas? To What Extent?
11. Have previous conflict zones, the territories, where conflicts have been occurred, transformed to arable lands? And if so, is there demand for these arable lands? Or demands to make these conflict zones arable?
12. Has rural population increased over years, or drastically following SSR? Are there any villages that increased in population more than others? Why do you think this was the case?
13. Do you know people who are returning from cities to rural/ villages? Why do you think they do/ don't?
14. How about the other way around? Are those who want to go to rural but not? Why not?

15. Why do you think there is an increase in or 'return' to rural is the trend? Is it because of the possibility that people feel more secure after security forces are taking place in rural?
16. Has agricultural product increased following SSR? Which crops? Why do you think?
17. Could you tell me about foreign aid flow in Kosovo?
18. Does government receive untied foreign aid?
19. Does the budget reserved for agriculture meet the need for *agricultural capital-intensive equipment like tractors, processing etc?*
20. Does the government reserve more resources in SSR than agriculture? Why do you think this is a good policy?
21. Do international organizations deliver more aid to SSR than agriculture? What are the shares of these sectors in foreign aid distribution?
22. Do people leave their lands non-harvested because they are not interested in agricultural activities? Are there cases where they want to harvest but cannot? If so, why?
23. Are SSR related jobs more comfortable than being farmer? How exactly?
24. Does working and life conditions of SSR related jobs attract people more than agriculture related jobs? If so, do you think this had led to a labor movement to the city?
25. Do farmers apply for SSR related jobs than other people?
26. Is being security-servant more prestigious than being a farmer in the eyes of people?
27. What would you say about employment and unemployment rates in Kosovo in post-conflict era? How do you think it will extend into the future?
28. Do people find more jobs in urban than rural areas?
29. For what kind of jobs do people immigrate to cities? / What kind of jobs attract people in urban setting?
30. Does SSR provide job opportunities for people than other sectors for instance, agriculture?
31. What kind of jobs does SSR provide? Does SSR prevent important employment opportunities?
32. What is the employment rate SSR provides in comparison to other sectors? For instance, agriculture? Again to repeat, what are SSR's advantages?

33. What is the job opportunities / resource opportunities for SSR- related activities: civil society Project funding?
34. Do you think that foreign aid has an impact on your economy. How?
35. Have you ever faced with externalities / unintended effects caused by foreign aid?
36. Do you know of people who could not get credit/ funding because businesses created by foreign aid IOs prevented them? 3. Has foreign aid caused to growth in any sector, specifically (for instance service sector)? Has agriculture been affected by any changes / growth of any other sector? How?
37. Have there been any changes in foreign aid you receive following SSR: has the amount of foreign aid increased or decreased: changes in tied and untied foreign aid, as well. What would happen if foreign aid substantially decreased for next year?
38. Have you ever experienced any different approaches to SSR, especially with IOs that are active in Kosovo?
39. Has the amount of foreign aid decreased following any conflictual issue about SSR?
40. If yes, how did this decrease affected any sector specifically? (Security, agriculture?) That happened to the ones who worked there?

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Sabancı University Research Ethics Council (SUREC)

Date: 03/05/2017

To: Dr. Emre Hatipoğlu (PI)
Güzin Öztürk (Co-Investigator)
From: Dr. Cengiz Kaya, Chairman of the Ethics Committee

Protocol Number: FASS-2017-10

Protocol Name: 'The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post- Conflict Countries'

Subject: SUREC Approval

Official Approval Date: 03/05/2017

Sabancı University Research Ethics Council has approved the above named and numbered protocol through expedited review. You are responsible for promptly reporting to the SUREC:

- any severe adverse effects
- any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others;
- any proposed changes in the research activity

Enclosed you can find the below noted approved documents.

Protocol Application

Informed Consent Form

If you have any questions please feel free to contact me via phone at 216-483 9666 or via e-mail at cengizkaya@sabanciuniv.edu.

Best Regards,

Dr. Cengiz Kaya
Chairman of the Ethics Committee

**SABANCI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COUNCIL
APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH STUDY**

For SUREC Use Only

Protocol No: FASS-2017-10
Modification Requested Date:

Approval Date: 03/05/2017
Modification Approval Date:

1. Title: 'The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post- Conflict Countries'

2. Principal Investigator(s) (The Principal Investigator must be a faculty member or equivalent) **Co-Investigator (s)** (The Co-Investigator must be Master's or Phd Student)

Principal Investigator	E-mail	Phone
Dr. Emre Hatipoğlu FASS / Advisor	ehatipoglu@sabanciuniv.edu	02164839260
Co-Investigator Güzin Aycan Öztürk FASS / MA Student	guzinaycan@sabanciuniv.edu	05426014214

Note: This application must be submitted by the Principal Investigator, who assumes full responsibility for compliance with this research study.

3. Programme:

Please answer all questions below: Master Thesis

4. Will this be funded by an external sponsor? Yes No

If yes, list sponsor/funding agency:
Proposal Number:

5. Proposed Start Date (actual date may not precede SUREC approval date)

May, 2017

6. Describe the purpose of the research

The interventions by the international organizations such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into the conflicts in other countries in order to end the conflicts, has been defined as peacemaking. In post-conflict stage, these organizations also involved in further activities named as peacebuilding (Boutros- Ghali, 1992) in order to prevent recurrence of the conflict. These activities also aimed to provide sustainable peace in these countries. As peacebuilding activities aim to recover all aspects of life after the conflict, it has a broad agenda that composed of institution building, capacity building for state and society in various sectors such as security, judiciary, civil society and economy.

In relation to that, in most of post-conflict countries that have experiences of international intervention and have Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda such as Central African Republic, Liberia, Libya, Guinea, Bosnia and Herzegovina and so on, it is witnessed that the gap between export and import rates in agriculture becomes greater while export rate stays stagnant following the year of beginning of SSR. In addition, although interactive relations between locals (the actors in the intervened country) and internationals have taken attention in these international interventions by the scholars, there is not any inter-sectoral approach that explores the changes following the beginning of SSR in post-conflict

countries. The thesis tentatively entitled as 'The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post-Conflict Countries', will aim to fulfill this gap in the literature and asks whether one can find any impact and how the impacts can be explained. Main axes of the impact analysis will be foreign aid distribution across the agricultural and security sectors, government expenditures and labor attraction of these sectors.

In relation to these axes, the concept of SSR will be taken as Second Generation Peacebuilding/Statebuilding Activity. In addition, the "security sector" will include "all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight" (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005). The study will use quantitative data from international organizations such as FAO, UNDP, UN, the World Bank. However, Kosovo is a partially recognized state, FAO and the UNDP has no country indicator section for it. Therefore, this study requires to collect the unique data from Kosovo. Thus, this case study of Kosovo will provide a data-set for further research as well. The research will address the possible impacts of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture and the statistical questions will be about foreign aid distribution, government expenditures and labour force shifts in the country, their possible causes and results on agriculture.

The participants will be selected from the institutions that are part of security sector and agriculture at national and international level. Plus, as the study also focuses on labour attraction, the participant pool will include women and men farmers who immigrated to urban places in order to be enrolled in security sector- related activities for instance to attend police schools, to take part in civil society organizations.

7. Describe procedures to be used and any associated risks or discomforts.

The main questions will be sent before the meeting by the agreement but door for follow-up questions will be left open.

The place of the meeting will be decided by the participants.

Consent form will be presented and the participant will be asked to sign it. However, the name of the participant will not be shared in the released study. The names of the participants will be kept anonymous, only the background of the participant will be shared in the study (please see section 8, paragraph 3).

The Q & A will be audiotaped, by informing the participant before the meeting, will be kept on the personal computer of Co- investigator and will not be shared any other person. The results of the meetings will be shared only with the Advisor in order to review the study.

In addition, the participant will be informed that he/she will be able to skip questions if he/she finds the questions sensitive or personal. The participant will be also informed that he/she will be able to end the meeting whenever he/she would like to.

The duration of the meeting is predicted as approximately 30-45 minutes but the participant will be free to prolong the duration.

The completed study will be shared with the participants as electronic versions.

8. Describe in detail any safeguards to minimize risks or discomforts, including any measures to render the data anonymous (you will not know the identity of the research subject) or confidential (subjects' identity or personal identifying information will not be disclosed).

With the aim to provide participants comfortable and convenient environment, the meetings will be held in the place the participants prefer, they will be given a consent form and will be informed that they would withdraw from the meeting when they would like to. In addition, they will be informed that they can refuse or skip particular questions if they find these questions sensitive and personal. As their identity will not be shared even if it is asked, they will feel free to share the ideas and the data during the meetings.

The scope of data collection and questions will be sent to the participants before the meetings and the Q-A part will be conducted in an active listening way with an order of questions by the co-investigator. This will present a non-threatening mode of research conduct for the participant. In addition, although there is predicted duration for the meetings, they will be informed that they can prolong or shorten the time period, as well.

The participants will be informed that recording will be kept only in the computer, for 5 years at most, of the co- investigator without accession of any other person and their identity will be kept anonymous. For each recording, numbers will be assigned and a separate list showing the number and the background of participant will be prepared. Only the Advisor will be able to access the results of the meetings to review the study.

As the last version of the study will be sent to the participants, they will be able to see how the data collected are used in the study.

9. Describe any financial compensation or other potential benefits to the subjects associated with this research activity.

There are no direct benefits or financial compensation to participate in this research.

10. Does the proposed human subject research pose a financial conflict of interest to the PI. Yes No

11. Is the consent form attached? Yes No

12. Benefits and Risks: Do the potential benefits to the subjects and/or the anticipated gain in research knowledge outweigh the risks to the subjects? Explain. (Be specific and succinct - do not "justify" the research.)

The participants will be informed that there is no direct benefit and risk to participate in this research.

13. If another institution(s) is involved in the proposed research, please list each institution , the protocol number, and SUREC approval date. Yes No

14. After reviewing the University Research Ethics Council Instruction

<http://mysu.sabanciuniv.edu/surecharitasi/tr/yonerger/irg-a410-02>

I believe this protocol to be:

Exempt from further SUREC review Expedited Full Council review required.

Applicants Signature

For SUREC Use Only

Protocol No: FASS-2017-10
Modification Requested Date:

Approval Date: 03/05/2017
Modification Approval Date:

Title: 'The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post- Conflict Countries'

Principal Investigator(s): Dr. Emre Hatipođlu

Co-Investigator: Güzin Aycan Öztürk / FASS- MA Student

THIS SPACE FOR SUREC USE ONLY

- The protocol has been determined to be exempt from SUREC review in accordance with Sabancı University Research Ethics Council procedure.
- The protocol has been approved through expedited review in accordance with Sabancı University Research Ethics Council procedure.
- The Institutional Review Board has been approved the protocol through full review review in accordance with Sabancı University Research Ethics Council procedure.

APPROVED BY THE SABANCI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COUNCIL



Prof. Dr. Cengiz Kaya
SUREC Chair



Assist. Prof. Ahmet Faik Kurtulmuş
SUREC Member



Assist. Prof. Çağla Aydın
SUREC Member



Assoc. Prof. Müjdat Çetin
SUREC Member



Assist. Prof. Şerif Aziz Şimşir
SUREC Member



Prof. Dr. Zehra Sayers
SUREC Member

Sabancı University
Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Study Title: 'The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post- Conflict Countries'

Principal Investigator: Dr. Emre Hatipođlu
Co- Investigator: Güzin Aycan Öztürk / FASS- MA Student

Interviewer: Güzin Aycan Öztürk / FASS- MA Student

The purpose of this study:

To examine whether Security Sector Reform has an impact on agriculture sector in post-conflict countries and if it has, what kind of explanations can be provided for the impact.

During the meeting you will be asked to answer the questions about Security Sector Reform, agricultural output, foreign aid distribution and labour force shifts in the country.

There are no predicted risks or discomfort to participate in this research, but if you feel uncomfortable for some questions, you may choose to withdraw from the meeting, skip or refuse to answer particular questions.

Your record and transcripts of the recording will be kept in the computer of the co-investigator and your identity will be kept anonymous.

The duration of the meeting is predicted as 30-45 minutes but the participant is free to prolonge or shorthen the duration. The time and place can be adjusted according to your preference.

Your participation is voluntary, there are no direct benefits or risks to participate in the research. However, you wil be informed when the study is published and a digital copy of the reseach can be shared with you upon your request.

If you believe that your rights have been violated in any way, please contact Cengiz Kaya, Director of Research and Graduate Policy at Sabancı University at (216) 483-9666 or by email at cengizkaya@sabanciuniv.edu.

By signing this consent form, you are indicating your consent to participate and be audio taped in this study.

Signature _____

Date _____