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ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

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ÖZ

Bir iç savaş, müzakere veya bir tarafın zaferi sonrasında bittiğinde resmi yardım kuruluşu, devletler arası örgüt ve sivil toplum kuruluşları gibi birçok yabancı aktör o ülkeyi yeniden inşa için sahaya gitmektedir. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana yeniden inşa çabalarında neoliberal barış inşası yaklaşımı baskın olmuştur. Neoliberal barış inşası yaklaşımı devletin çöküşünü iç savaşın asıl sebebi olduğuna inanmaktadır. Çözüm olarak neoliberal barış inşası yaklaşımı çok partili liberla demokrasi ve serbest piyasa ilkelerine dayalı ekonomi inşasını önermektedir. Bu çalışma, neoliberal barış inşası zihniyetinden dolayı yabancı aktörlerin iç savaşın asıl sebebini tanımlamakta başarısız olduğunu ve asıl sebepleri ortadan kaldıracak projeler yerine devlet kurumlarını inşa etmeye odaklandığını savunmaktadır. Daha önemlisi, yabancı aktörlerin neoliberal barış inşası zihniyetiyle savaş sonrası yeniden inşa sürecinde yer almaları o ülkelerde iç savaşı ilk sefer çıkartan neo-patrimonyal devletin güçlenmesine sebebiyet vermektedir. Çalışma, yabancı aktörlerin neo-patrimonyal rejimleri yeniden ürettiği ve güçlendirdiği üç yol ortaya koymaktadır. İlk olarak, Batı tarzı devlet modelini dayatarak yabancı aktörler merkezi hükümetin, kırsal kesimdekiler başta olmak üzere, yerel insanlar gözünde meşruiyet kazanmasına engel olmaktadır. İkinci olarak, çok partili demokrasinin desteklenmesi yerel aktörlerin failliğini elinden almakta ve merkezi hükümetin meşruiyet sorunu yaşamasına sebep olmaktadır çünkü insanlar kendi geliştirdikleri sistemle değil kendilerine dayatılan sistemle yönetilmektedir. Üçüncü olarak, devlet kuruluşlarına dış yardım sağlanması yolsuzluk ve kayırmacılık için maddi teşvik üretmektedir. Çalışmanın argümanı Ocak-Haziran 2014'te Sudan'da Darfur iç savaşı hakkında yürütülen altı aylık saha araştırmasının bulgularıyla desteklenmiştir. Araştırmanın sonuçları, neredeyse Sudan'daki bütün yabancı aktörlerin kalkınma odaklı projeler geliştirip finanse ederken iç savaşın kökenindeki soruna dönük projeleri gündeme almadığını göstermektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Darfur, İç Savaş, Çatışma sonrası yeniden inşa, Barış inşası*

ABSTRACT

Once a civil war ends, a number of external actors such as governmental aid agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, move into the war-torn country in order to reconstruct the collapsed state. Since the end of the Cold War, post-conflict reconstruction efforts are dominated by neoliberal peacebuilding approach. Neoliberal peacebuilding approach believes that state failure is the root cause of the civil war. As the remedy, it proposes establishment of liberal multiparty democracy and free-market-oriented economic system. This study argues that due to the dominance of neoliberal peacebuilding mindset, the external actors often fail to correctly identify the root cause of a conflict and focus more on building state instiutions than projects designed to address the root cause. More importantly, engagement of external actors in post-conflict reconstruction with a neoliberal peacebuilding mindset causes reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regimes, which caused the civil war in the first place. The study demonstrates that engagement of external actors reproduces and reinforces neo-patrimonial regimes in three ways. First, by imposing Western-like state modality, external actors fail to help the central government earn loyalty of local people, in particular in rural areas. Second, promotion of multiparty democracy takes agency away from local people and causes lack of legitimacy of the central authority in the eyes of people because they will be ruled not by a system they devised but by a system imposed upon them. Third, provision of foreign aid to state institutions generates more material incentive for corruption and clientelism. I support the argument with empirical evidence from a six-month field study conducted between January through June 2014 in Sudan about the civil war in Darfur. The findings show that almost all external actors in Sudan devise and fund projects tackling mostly development-related issues, while leaving the root cause of the conflict out of their project portfolio.

Keywords: *Darfur, Civil War, post-Conflict Reconstruction, Peacebuilding*

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

Decreasing frequency of inter-state wars and perceived increase in the number of civil wars since the end of the Cold War directed scholarly attention to the study of civil wars. I deliberately called the increase in the frequency of civil wars as a perception because prevalence of civil wars in the 1990s is attributed to the accumulation of conflicts since 1950s rather than the end of the Cold War (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2004b). Two genocides perpetrated in a couple of years right after the collapse of the Soviet Union alarmed the international community and worried major powers about future civil wars that could threaten their national interest at global scale. Humanitarian catastrophe and political instability created by those civil wars reiterated the need to study civil wars more broadly. Civil wars are important and need to be studied more thoroughly from different perspectives not because it is a topic that is intellectually attractive but because the international community will witness more civil wars in the future. We are in a post-imperial world where borders are drawn arbitrarily by imperial powers. Although the reign of imperial powers is over, their legacy is still alive. As Holsti rightly points out, 'in many region of the world the issue of statehood and the relation of the state to its constituent nations, communities, and people has not been settled with de-colonization' (Holsti 1996, 40). In particular, countries that are ruled by administrations that are viewed illegitimate in the eyes of citizens or suffer from efficient and effective governance are more likely to be hotspots in the future.

Onset of civil wars draws and should continue to draw the attention of the international community for several reasons. First, civil wars are more deadly than interstate wars. Comparing interstate wars with civil wars, Fearon and Laitin (2003) dramatically present the inhuman and tragic side of civil wars. Between 1945 and 1999, 25 interstate wars occurred. They take 1000 battle deaths and at least 100 dead on each side as criteria for a conflict to be qualified as interstate war. These 25 interstate wars involved only 25 countries and caused 3.33 million battle deaths. Interstate wars in this

period had a median duration of not more than 3 months. In the same period, 127 civil wars occurred in 73 different countries. These civil wars caused 16.2 million deaths, five times more than interstate wars in the same period. These figures clearly show marked transformation of violence in international political arena. Wars during the 18th, 19th and the early 20th century had different characteristics. Kalevi Holsti calls them 'institutionalized wars' and argues that this kind of war is not only 'fast fading' but also analytically inappropriate. He believes that with the end of the Cold War, the world faces what he calls 'third kind of war' (Holsti 1996, 36). These wars of third kind often take place not between states but within internationally recognized and sovereign states. They are different from institutionalized wars in that they have no fronts and are fought over a vast geography, territorial sanctity of states are easily trespassed because fighting spills over borders. Furthermore, civilian/soldier distinction disappears in civil wars. It is this last factor that increases the death toll in civil wars the most.

Another factor that makes civil wars more deadly than interstate wars is that fighters wage a war in an environment that they are familiar with. Unlike interstate wars that are at times fought in a foreign and unknown territory, civil wars are fought in a person's home country where he/she is familiar with the terrain, geography, climate and people. This fact makes civil wars more deadly and causing displacement of civilians in large numbers (Kalyvas 2001). In a typical interstate war, the party in offensive takes the risk of moving into an unknown territory. Even if the fighters received intelligence about the master city plan, fighting a war in rural areas is more risky because mountainous and forest areas are perfect places for ambushes. However, in civil wars, fighters are aware of the terrain they are deployed. They know where streets will take them. Even if they are in the rural areas, they know better than a foreigner the locations of hide-outs or possible ambush points.

Furthermore, civil wars produce refugee and internally displaced people (IDP) problems. Once a civil war breaks out, tens of thousands of people are displaced and these people often seek refuge to the safer areas within their own country or peaceful neighboring countries. Given the fact that particularly in the Third World countries states do not have necessary and effective mechanisms in place for border security,

people threatened by violence can easily pass already vague border and enter neighboring country. According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees, at the end of 2015, there were more than 21 million refugees worldwide. Refugee flow from a civil-war-waging country to a neighboring country can lead to internationalization or regionalization of a civil war (Gleditsch 2007). A refugee can be simply defined as anyone who flees his/her country of origin for fear of armed conflict or politically motivated persecution. A major problem Refugees create is financial in that construction of camps for these refugees, provision of food and basic needs are vital. Sustenance of services in refugee camps creates an enormous financial burden for both the international community and the host nation. More importantly, these refugee camps are at times used by rebels as a base to recruit more people or get food supply or medical treatment. The weakened rebel forces are likely to seek safe havens to reorganize, remobilize and for sanctuary across the border. Refugee camps function perfectly for this purpose. Because civilian/soldier distinction disappears in civil wars, it is almost impossible for the bureaucrats of the host state and international aid organizations to differentiate who is a rebel and who is refugee.

One of the adverse impacts of colonialism in many parts of Africa is drawing arbitrary borders that divide ethnic groups into different states. As Ali Mazrui put it succinctly, 'If colonialism forced into the same political entity people who would otherwise have lived apart, it also separated people who would otherwise have lived together' (Mazrui 2008, 37). Naturally, spread of a society across borders means cultural affinity between groups on either side of the border. Upon starting the rebellion, rebels can count on people across the border that are culturally proximate for support. While this is the situation on the ground, politically relevant groups in neighboring countries are beyond jurisdiction of governments. Therefore governments waging a civil war are nearly helpless with regard to ethnic kin across the border. This reality is likely turn refugee issues into a security issue and raise tension between neighboring countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). To take an example, following the Iraq war in 1991, refugee camps established in Northern Iraq were used by Kurdish separatist rebels in Turkey. In the following years, Turkish army conducted many military operations

targeting rebel bases in Northern Iraq. As a result, a civil war fought in a country becomes a regional security predicament.

In many cases, civil war breaks out because the central government is no longer capable of administering the country, providing basic services or even maintaining peace and security. It is for this reason that civil wars are seen like a reflection of the international system from a realist perspective. In other words, civil war is a condition in large part similar to a Hobbesian world where self-help system prevails and each actor (i.e.socities) has to take care of itself for survival (Herbst 2000; Kalyvas 2003). Failure of weak or failed states in their statehood creates an anarchic environment in which each societal group has to ensure its own survival and cannot count on other groups for its survival. Absence of a supreme authority in a country, that is state, not physically but in terms of performance, eventually leads to civil war. Therefore after a civil war breaks out, squashing the rebellion and maintaining security become the top priority for the central government and ruling elites. While efforts to defeat rebels are in progress, development of the country and growth related projects lose their significance because societal group in charge of government and running the country faces an existential threat. Therefore states view civil wars as life and death struggle and use all necessary means to win. That is why civil wars last longer than interstate wars. Of the all civil wars began after 1945, 75% lasted more than two years (Fearon 2004b). A typical civil war lasts around seven years (Collier et al. 2003). Continuation of violence in such an environment for years ultimately damages not only the physical infrastructure but also social cohesiveness and honesty among society. That is why rebuilding peace after civil wars are more difficult because people no longer trust to other groups within their society.

Beside human cost and deadly face, civil wars are destructive to the economy an development of countries. Economy of a country fighting a civil war reverses, if not stagnates. That is why a World Bank study concludes that civil war not only interrupts but also reverses economic development, and view civil wars equal to 'development in reverse' (Collier et al. 2003). During civil wars, roads, bridges, power grids, railways and many other strategic components of a country's infrastructure are destroyed. When

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rebels take control of a town from government forces, one of the most strategic places to secure is airport of that place so that rebels can benefit from transportation of supplies, ammunition and rebels by air. For exactly the same reasons, governments fight hard to get back the airport from the rebels. That is why airports are damaged first and severely during the civil wars. Roads and bridges connecting strategic locations are also identified as target by belligerents and at times destroyed in the early stages of war in order to deprive the other side of access. In a civil war, government spends more on military which leads to decrease in investment in other services such as education and health. During civil war, violence scares business circles, causing them withdraw their capital and invest somewhere else. Security and stability are essential for an investor or a businessperson because they need to be ensured that their investments will yield the expected profit in the near future as planned. Under civil war conditions, however, rule of law is suspended, justice is delayed and bureaucracy slows down because the state faces an existential threat. Plus, due to the war conditions, economy shrinks and people tend to consume less. This reality will discourage business people to produce or invest more. Lower investment and production will consequently result in higher unemployment figures. Additionally, civil war damages social capital of a society. Young, energetic, educated and productive segments of a society are forced to join the fight or leave the country. Causing depopulation among educated young cohort, society lacks labor power required for development.

Once a civil war breaks out, either belligerent group is aware of the fact that giving up is tantamount to imprisonment, deprivation of state resources, exile, or even execution for the top leaders. That is why civil wars are fought longer than inter-state wars. The same World Bank study also shows that a country fighting a civil war loses, on average, nearly 2.2 percentage points off its normal annual growth rate. The study also shows that by the end of a typical civil war, per capita income of that country will be 15 percent lower than it would otherwise have been (Collier et al. 2003, 84). In this sense, civil war takes the existing wealth and development away from the country experiencing civil war.

The most outstanding distinguishing aspect of civil war is probably the fact that belligerents have to live together after the cessation of violence. When interstate wars end, armies are withdrawn back to their national borders and, in some cases, international forces are placed between the armies in order to prevent future clashes. In civil wars, however, fighters have to live within the same community, perhaps as neighbors in the same street. Because there are no borders or international peacekeeping forces to separate former belligerents of civil wars, it is difficult to maintain order and go back to pre-conflict settings of the social relations.

Termination of war does not necessarily mean an ultimate end to violence and reconciliation. On the contrary, due to hostilities and animosities created by vandalism and barbarism during the war, new grievances are induced and individuals are filled with new hatred. As a result of such a post-conflict psychology and sociological structure, some countries relapse into civil war, although fighting parties signed a settlement agreement. Even if a party defeated the opponent and won a victory, the loser party is likely to resort to violence for revenge. According to a data set created for a study, of the 58 cases of civil wars that ended between 1946 and 1996, 14 cases repeated the war (Walter 2004). These civil wars started after parties stopped fighting and signed detailed peace agreements. Empirical evidence shows that a civil war ended between 1946 and 1996 is 36% likely to be renewed and that a civil war ended with a negotiated settlement is 43% likely to relapse into violence within five years (Call and Cousens 2008).

Following the end of a civil war, a number of international institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, rush into the war-torn country for reconstruction. With these institutions, the international community channels a great deal financial resources for various projects. Aid organizations of developed countries, several United Nations agencies, religious aid organizations and secular non-governmental organizations develop, fund and execute many projects. In many cases, the United Nations deploy a peacekeeping force to observe the ceasefire agreement or peace deal signed by the belligerents. Annual budget of a typical peacekeeping force is likely to exceed $USD 100 million. The international community desires to prevent future

conflicts, maintain peace and security after the cessation of fighting, and rebuild the infrastructure and institutions so that war-shattered country can gather pace in its development. Then the question becomes, in spite of engagement of dozens of foreign institutions and spending a fortune, why on earth does peacebuilding fail and some civil wars recur? Why does the international community fail in some post-conflict reconstruction cases?

Before moving on to the study, it will be wise to clarify two basic concepts which will be used in this study a lot: post-conflict reconstruction and neo-liberal peacebuilding. In this study, by post-conflict I refer to the situation in which large scale civil war fighting ended, a sort of peace agreements has been signed and the transition of the country from state of war to the state of peace began. In this sense, post-conflict does not refer to the absolute absence of violence and skirmishes. On the contrary, individual violence can occur, especially in the rural areas where new ruling organs cannot project authority. But the most important feature that changes the situation into a post-conflict one is the termination of organized large-scale fighting between the armies and the intent to rebuild the torn country. By neo-liberal peacebuilding, I mean post-conflict reconstruction attempts to bring war-torn countries into conformity with the international system, by rebuilding state institutions and basic infrastructure such as buildings, schools, bridges etc. The most distinguishing feature of neo-liberal peacebuilding is the imposition of democratic governance model where multi-party elections are held and free-market oriented economy. In short, neo-liberal peacebuilding approach is a set of attempts, both governmental and non-governmental, to transform a war-torn country into a Western-like, free market oriented multi-party democracy.

2. THE ARGUMENT

This study problematizes the role of external actors and their involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. That one out of every civil war ended recurs within five years deserves scholarly attention. Following termination of violence and end of a civil war, a number of external actors take part in reconstruction efforts in various sectors. More importantly, these actors earmark enormous amount of money for their projects in the war-torn country and send personnel to oversee those projects. Then, in spite of

involvement of many external actors and earmarking hundreds of millions of dollars, why do civil wars recur?

In this study, I argue that modern post-conflict reconstruction philosophy is dominated by the neo-liberal peacebuilding approach. I do not contend that neo-liberal peacebuilding is flawed and needs to be abandoned totally by the international community. On the contrary, neo-liberal recipe may be appropriate for some cases but viewing neo-liberal peacebuilding as a one-fits-all approach is counter-productive. I argue that neo-liberal peacebuilding does not take the realities of post-colonial African states into consideration. Disregard of realities of post-colonial African state is important because neo-liberal peacebuilding assumes that conflict-torn countries have exactly the same state they have in Europe or North America. Reconstruction or rebuilding words in the concepts are themselves misleading because they directly delivers a message noting that something already existed prior to the conflict and the external actors are there on the ground to revive it. But in many Third World countries, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, an effective state that projects authority across the entire territory has never been the reality (Rotberg 2004). The post-independence state in Sub-Saharan Africa has existed most of the time in the capitals only, and perhaps in some other major cities to a certain degree. The side effect of this disregard is that by imposing a one-fits-all type solution to Sub-Saharan African states without devising mechanisms to cope with informal institutions of the post-colonial African states, peacebuilding efforts help nothing but rebuild the predatory, or what is often called in the literature as (neo)patrimonial, state that created the conflict in the first place.

Past research, especially economists interested in the relationship between foreign aid and development, examined the role of foreign aid and its impact on development of poor state. Research argues that foreign aid aggravates informal institutions in neo-patrimonial regimes and therefore inadvertently causes its reinforcement.

> Projects provide for the allocation of all sorts of discretionary
> goods to be politicized and patrimonialized, including expensive
> four-wheel-drive cars, scholarships, decisions over where to

place schools and roads, and so on. The common practice of paying cash ''sitting fees'' for civil servants attending donor-funded workshops, where the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries, turns even training into a rent to be distributed. ......Aid dependence thus leads to a situation in which bureaucrats are often not rewarded for focusing on their core developmental functions but rather on getting money from donors (Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle 2008, 263).

The contribution of this study to the literature is the argument that external actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction of a war-shattered country inadvertently cause reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regime. In other words, what causes reinforcement of informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes is not foreign aid supply per se, but it is the external actors with their neoliberal peacebuilding mindset that result in creation and reproduction of informal institutions such as clientelism, patronage networks etc. Foreign aid is only one dimension. I demonstrate that neoliberal mindset as the ultimate remedy is the main problem and has more problematic dimensions beside foreign aid. Therefore once civil war ends in a country, using neoliberal peacebuilding as a panacea or one-size-fits-all recipe reinforces the informal institutions by two ways. First, it delegitimizes the central authority and thereby encourages people to be involved and be part of the informal institutions. Second, provision of material resources to the central authority generates incentives for high-level bureaucrats to distribute them to their clients in return of political loyal or material benefit. As a result, it increases possibility of corruption, bribery and nepotism. Therefore, application of neoliberal peacebuilding approach to post-conflict reconstruction cases at times cannot prevent and even pave the way for civil war recurrence because it creates and reproduces the neo-patrimonial state that caused the civil war in the first place. As a diplomat commented after the civil war in Sierra Leone, 'all our resources have gone toward recreating the conditions that caused the conflict'.

We can talk about three parameters by which external actors profoundly contribute to the reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regimes. First, while building

collapsed states in post-conflict reconstruction, external actors tend to impose a Western-like state modality whereby administrative structure in large part reflects Western states, legal/rational institutions of Western states are transferred and indigenous or pre-colonial institutions are despised, looked down and excluded from state structure. Second, external actors assume that multi-party liberal democracy as practiced in the West is the ultimate remedy for war-shattered societies. It may work in some situations perfectly but it takes agency away from local people. Moreover, it helps creation of a governance system that is viewed illegitimate by large part of society because it did not emanate from deliberation of society or past experiences. Imposing democracy model of the West also disallow local people to devise their own version of democracy, as people in Somalia and Somaliland did. Third, external actors provide large sums of foreign aid in post-conflict settings to the state that they want to rebuild.

Among the main actors of neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm are international governmental and governmental aid institutions which are ruled by bureaucrats whose promotion heavily depend on the concrete success stories from the field. Due to this fact, neo-liberal peacebuilding attempts to rebuild the collapsed state and transform the war-torn state into a well-functioning Western-like welfare state with few years. As noted by two scholars, the major and probably the most fallacious assumption of neo-liberal peacebuilding is that the belief that 'historical processes of state formation can be compressed into an accelerated transition process through external support' (Goodhand and Sedra 2007, 43). Birth and development of welfare states of Europe or wealthy free-market states of North America took over a century. They have not become what they are in a decade. I also suggest that enforcing a single paradigm prevents African societies from developing genuine and alternative modalities. Such an imposition takes agency of Africans away from them in rebuilding their states and leads some scholars to accuse neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm of being neo-colonial tool.

Drawing attention to the bureaucratic nature of the UN agencies and peacekeeping staff as well as non-governmental aid organizations, I contend that the international community often fails to understand the true root causes of a civil war. This results in allocation of pockets of aid money into false sectors. Because the neo-

liberal peacebuilding focuses too much on rebuilding state institutions and making sure of good governance, aid money often does not elevate the living standards of ordinary citizens and therefore the grievances which triggered the war in the first place are left unaddressed. Instead, I argue that the international community should shift its focus from building democratic governance institutions and establishing free-market economy to redressing the grievances that led to the conflict onset. I do not mean, nor would it be wise, to stop efforts and allocation of resources for rebuilding state institutions. What I propose is that the international community should put more emphasis on addressing the root causes than state building.

In short, I argue that the international community also fails to apprehend the state of post-colonial African state. Informal institutions are sustained by bureaucrats and their relatives in the community even after the termination of violence. Patronage networks and clientelism cause corruption, embezzlement and ineffective use of resources which all eventually lead to maintenance underdevelopment. Without dealing with the challenges of post-colonial African state, pumping pockets of money into state institutions will help nothing but reinforce such informal institutions. In other words, by focusing too much on state-building, the external actors feed the failed state that caused the civil war in the first place.

The prospect of building Western-like welfare states prevents international community from fully comprehend the situation in the field with its all dimensions. Staff at external actors' institutions is often appointed for two years periods. They desire to show a high performance and clean record without causing or being part of any trouble. They often live in the capital cities, within the well-equipped and well-protected special complexes designed for them. Such an environment disables them from contacting local people from different folks of life and background. As a result of this fact, headquarters of such institutions have limited knowledge about the situation. Since the international media, policy makers and NGOs heavily rely on information released by such institutions, situation in the field is likely to be misrepresented at the world stage, which will eventually lead to misallocation of resources.

3. METHODOLOGY

A. Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable in this study is identified as civil war recurrence. There are different definitions of civil war in the literature (Kalyvas 2001). In this study, I adopt the civil war definition developed by the Correlates of War Project: 'A civil war was defined as any armed conflict that involved; (1) military action internal to the metropole of the state system member; (2) the active participation of the national government; (3) effective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war'. By recurrence I refer to a situation in which large scale violence resumes in a country following a civil war ended with a negotiated settlement or a kind of peace agreement or victory of one side.

As the independent of the study, I take involvement of external actors in post-conflict reconstruction. By external actors, I refer to any governmental development agency, international governmental organization, international aid agency, and non-governmental organization from any country other than the country experienced the civil war. From this perspective, I am interested in any external actor who is involved in post-conflict reconstruction. This will allow me to compare actors with different worldviews, ideologies and values.

B. Case Selection

To test the argument I had to pick a country that not only experienced a civil war but rolled back to violence in spite of a negotiated settlement or peace agreement with the rebels is signed. In this study, I picked Sudan's civil war in Darfur. Two factors played key role in my decision to pick Darfur conflict as a case study. First, unlike other countries, I was familiar with the official language of Sudan. My Arabic language skill helped me contact local people and interact citizens who are the real victims of the civil war without a translator. Second, unlike other cases, civil war in Darfur recurred twice. The civil war in Darfur started in 2003 and fighting continued fiercely for three years. In 2006, Sudanese government and rebels signed a peace agreement in Abuja, Nigeria. After a short period of peace, some rebel groups rejected the agreement and returned to

civil war. The Sudanese government and rebel factions continued to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict and maintained back-door negotiations. After long discussions between representatives, Sudanese government and rebels met second time for a comprehensive peace agreement in Doha, Qatar in 2011. Although Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, as the official name of the peace agreement of 2011, was quite comprehensive, some rebel factions reneged after accusing the government of watering down the provisions of the peace agreement.

C. Data Collection and Limitations

Studying conflicts is a daunting task for a researcher. As the common saying goes, when the war begins, the truth is the first casualty. It is politically sensitive and humanely difficult to read and try to understand the grievances, victimhood and sad stories. For this study, I drew information from two main resources. First, I extensively benefited from the written literature such as books, journal articles and news stories. Second, I conducted a six-month field study in Sudan between January and June 2014.

During my field study, I attempted to interview as many people as possible. List of people interviewed is presented in Appendix I at the end of this study. My intention was to interview three groups of people. First, I wanted to get a grasp of the story from the government side. So I wanted to interview with members from Sudanese government and public officers. I established contacted with people including Member of Parliament from the ruling party, people in charge of institutions which are close ally of the government, university professor. Second, I had to hear the other side of the story. To do this I interviewed with figures from opposition groups including local people in Darfur who suffered from the conflict, journalists, researchers at think tanks and university professors. Third, in order to understand other aspect of the case, by the external actors, I wanted to interview with the UN agencies, governmental aid organizations (UK's DFID and USA's USAID in particular), as well as foreign non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, I was unable to interview some officers from the external actors. In spite of my persistent e-mails and phone calls, neither DFID (Department for International Development) nor USAID (United States Agency for International Development) nor other external aid organizations accepted my interview

offer. I believe that the reason behind the tenacious rejection of the external aid organizations is the leaked documents of a former UN officer in Sudan and their publication in Foreign Policy magazine in April 2014. Aicha Elbasri, former spokesperson of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), leaked documents to Foreign Policy magazine. Leaked documents showed that UN officials concede that their operation in Darfur is highly flawed. I assume that because of pressure on them, these foreign aid organizations were reluctant to speak to researchers and journalists.

In conducting my interviews, I followed intensive interview and elite interview technique. Because elite interviewing is a more useful technique in analyzing multi-dimensional issues such as conflicts, I deliberately selected interviewees from above-mentioned three categories. When meeting with people who had flexible schedule and could spare more time to me, I used intensive interview technique in order to extract more detailed information and in-depth analysis of the situation.

This study was supposed to have another chapter in which I would quantitatively measure the effectiveness of the involvement of external actors. To do this, I designed a questionnaire in consultations with Professor Fayz Jamie, who is director of Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Bahri. I then get the questionnaire translated into Arabic because ordinary Sudanese people, especially in rural areas where victims mostly live, do not speak any foreign languages but their mother tongue, which is Arabic. During my visit to Darfur area in the second half of May 2014, the Sudanese government did not grant permission to conduct the questionnaire. Although I shared the questionnaire with them and made sure that it does not contain any question that breaches privacy of victims or requires political answers, the authorities did not allow me into the internally displaced people's camps and conduct my questionnaire. I had to leave Darfur region and go back to Khartoum after ten days, although I intended to stay longer. The Sudanese government is extremely suspicious of foreigners in Darfur due to intelligence gathering cases occurred in the past. I was forced to shorten my stay in Darfur and go back to Khartoum by frequent phone calls from the local security and intelligence units inquiring my return date.

Violence escalated and skirmishes took place even in the city during my last 3 days. Upon physical surveillance of Sudanese intelligence units and escalating violence, I had to leave Darfur without conducting the questionnaire and interviewing the intended people.

4. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The following chapter surveys the literature on civil wars. Starting with a thorough examination of the literature is important because what causes civil wars in the first place, in other words the root cause, is related with developing remedies to prevent recurrence. The chapter starts by presenting what international relations theories view civil wars. Then the chapter focuses on determinants of civil war and what variables are correlated with civil war onset and to what degree. After that the chapter examines how civil wars end and elucidates three major scenarios by which civil conflicts tend to terminate. Understanding how civil wars end is important because civil war recurrence is profoundly related with the outcome of the first civil war.

The third chapter is about what this study challenges, namely the view that neoliberal peacebuilding is panacea for every civil war-torn country. The chapter starts with a thorough assessment of post-colonialism and post-colonial reading of politics. In this chapter, taking a post-colonial stand, I critically evaluate the neoliberal peacebuilding its perils, risks and disadvantages. The aforementioned statistics about 36% likelihood of civil war recurrence makes it imperative to interrogate the neoliberal peacebuilding as the dominant approach. It is obvious that application of neoliberal recipe does not work in some cases. The chapter mainly argues that neoliberal peacebuilding is Eurocentric, in that it assumes that civil war-torn countries should imitate the Western countries and follow their footsteps to revive their collapsed state and be part of the developed world. In this sense, neoliberal peacebuilding is nothing but modernization theory disguised behind the veil of rebuilding.

Chapter four makes the discussion more detailed and focuses on the main argument of the study. The chapter argues that external actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction often disregard or overlook a fundamental reality which is the fact that

the post-colonial African state is different from Western-like states and are often characterized as neo-patrimonial. I suggest that external actors, perhaps inadvertently, cause creation and reproduction of the neo-patrimonial state that generated the civil war in the first place. The chapter discusses three ways by which the external actors cause creation or reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regimes. First, external actors fail to produce consent and legitimacy for the central government by imposing Western-like state and administrative structure on the war-shattered countries. A number of pre-colonial or indigenous administrative institutions and mechanisms are not incorporated into the new state because they do not fit into the Western state model. Second, suggesting multiparty liberal democracy as practiced in the Western countries as the only governance option prevents local people from developing their own modalities. Third, when external actors provide large sums of foreign aid to state institutions, they inadvertently provide material incentives for clientelism patronage networks. In a sense, flow of aid money to state institutions where corruption and nepotism are widespread, that financial resource will reinforce those informal institutions.

As empirical part of the study, chapter five focuses on the civil war in Darfur region of Sudan. The chapter first presents a historical background of the conflict so as to provide a foundation to the discussion. The subsequent section of the chapter elucidates what I call the root cause of the conflict in Darfur. Contrary to many accounts that view bad governance as the root cause, I demonstrate that the depleting natural resources aggravated the relationship between animal herding groups and those groups earning their livelihood through traditional farming. The second half of the chapter demonstrates how the parameters by which external actors reinforce neo-patrimonial regime apply to Sudan and Darfur case.

After developing a theoretical argument and presenting a case study in the study, chapter six presents the overall findings of this study. What all the discussion and examination of the conflict in Darfur show us is that external actors need to evaluate each post-conflict case individually and avoid using neoliberal peacebuilding as one-size-fits-all approach. The study also shows us that external actors should prefer to allocate their resources to projects at local level designed to address the root cause of

the conflict, rather than providing funding to the state institutions and expect them to fix the problem. The study ends with a concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

1. INTRODUCTION

Civil war has been an under-studied topic until the late 20th century. During the Cold War, intellectual attention was directed towards rivalry of two superpowers and conflicts between and among states. Eruption of violent events in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe drew scholarly attention towards civil conflicts. Disintegration of Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda sparked intellectual curiosity in intellectual circles. Civil wars, political violence and identity politics became popular among academics. Number of journal articles and books on these issues increased. Yet, there does not exist a generalizable and one-fits-all type theory that can help us understand civil wars. Depending on the theoretical approach used and methodology applied, findings of research on civil wars point to different variables in understanding the phenomenon. So, the debate about understanding civil wars is an ongoing intellectual quest with no agreed-upon conclusions, at least as of today.

Beyond understanding outbreak of civil wars, another challenge is the recurrence of civil wars. We know that some countries relapse into civil war although fighting parties signed a settlement agreement. Even if a party defeated the opponent and won a victory, the loser party is likely to resort to violence for revenge. According to a data set created for a study, of the 58 cases of civil wars that ended between 1946 and 1996, 14 cases repeated the war (Walter 2004). These civil wars started after parties stopped fighting and signed detailed peace agreements. Empirical evidence shows that a civil war ended between 1946 and 1996 is 36% likely to be renewed and that a civil war ended with a negotiated settlement is 43% likely to relapse into violence within five years (Call and Cousens 2008). As will be discussed in detail in the following pages, the international community, both governmental and non-governmental organizations, spends billions of dollars once violence ends to establish lasting peace but some countries relapse into armed conflict after ending war nevertheless.

This chapter reviews the existing literature on civil war and post-conflict reconstruction. In order to understand why post-conflict efforts fail and countries relapse into war, it is important to understand why the civil war breaks out in the first place, how it ends and what happens after war termination. The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I survey different theories devised to understand why civil wars break out in the first place. The second section discusses the main variables that are related to civil war onset. Understanding civil war onset is crucial because prevention of recurrence is about elimination of the initial causes. The third section discusses how civil war ends. It discusses different alternative outcomes of civil wars and compare research findings about each alternative to find out the most preferable outcome for lasting peace. The fourth section focuses on the post-conflict period and reviews literature on the role of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and foreign aid in post-conflict period. I conclude the section with a series of questions about the role of aid organizations and foreign aid in preventing civil war recurrence.

2. THEORIES OF CIVIL WAR ONSET

In spite of more than half-century of academic research, there does not exist a one-fit-all theory that can explain why a civil war breaks out in a country. Existing explanations of civil war onset can be subsumed under four main categories. These are essentialist, realist, grievance, and greed approaches.

According to essentialism, ethnicity is an inherent value and human beings have a sense of belonging to a group that is coherent by ancestry and/or ideas. Essentialism, or sometimes called primordialism, contend that we, human beings, cannot choose our ethnic, religious or racial identity or our mother tongue at birth. Human beings inherent these qualities when we are born in a certain community. Such identities originate from similarities of customs, language, faith and are based on congruity of blood. We are bound to our kinsman not because of personal affection or an inherent need but because of, in great part, this hard-to-explain affinity based on blood, and originates from similar qualities (Green and Seher 2003). It is the congruities of blood, language, religion have coercive power in and of themselves. It is this

coerciveness that create groupness, make us favor our kinsman and bind people in a group together (Geertz 1994).

Because ethnic identities are primordial, clashes and memories of tensions in the past are likely to trigger violence in modern times. Members of an ethnic group differentiate themselves from others with some certain characteristics that contribute to the sense of uniqueness of the group. Such group differences are believed to activate prejudices against other groups and spark violence(Varshney 2001). Essentialists argue that such ancient hatreds lie at the core of the ethnic conflicts of our time. The role of false histories built upon such ancient hatreds play a key role in raising tension. People develop oral history and stories of heroism are passsed from one generation to another. These stories are not objective and based on scholarly works. Such stories attain reality over years and become part of the group identity (Brown 1993). Essentialist arguments were helpful in accounting for especially the civil wars in Africa after the years of decolonization. The new states were in conflict, the argument goes, but the animosities among the groups were ancient. However, Connor (1972:341) warns that tangible characteristics of a group can make us come up with superficial explanations, and that we may assume that the ethnic strife is reflected over language, religion, customs, or other tangible elements. He notes that 'divergence of basic identity' and 'the "us-them" syndrome' are more fundamental to the understanding of conflict.

Essentialism has been criticized by scholars for its weaknesses. First, constructivist school criticized the primordialism of the sense of ethnic belonging and arguments about ancient hatreds. In his seminal work, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson (1983) argued that nations were not a primordial phenomenon but construction of the modern times. Kaufman (2001:23) also argues that most national identities of today are new and as an example mentions French peasants who, until the end of the nineteenth century, had stronger sense of belonging to local identity rather than national identity. Second, although some conflicts are caused by ancient hatreds, many conflicts have nothing to do with old animosities. Some civil wars are fought or have been fought not between groups with long history but between inhabitant/settler group and a migrant group. For example, Chinese-Malay violence in Malaysia,

Chinese-Indonesian violence in Indonesia or Igbo-Hause tension in northern Nigeria cannot be explained by ancient hatreds because these groups do not have centuries of coexistence (Varshney 2007:280). These are cases where tension is between a native group and immigrant group. Third, if the essentialist argument were sound and sufficient to explain the majority of civil war cases, conflict between native groups would have been the rule rather than exception. Essentialist view, for example, fails to account for nearly five centuries of peaceful period of Ottoman administration in the Middle East. For all these weaknesses, essentialist view is no longer regarded as a helpful paradigm to understand the root causes of a civil war.

Application of neo-realism to civil wars became popular right after the end of the cold war, with the eruption of civil wars in the former members of the Soviet Union. Strong emphasis on anarchy and weak state by neo-realists is not without a reason. It is not a coincidence that number of civil wars increased during the 1960s. Decolonization and tense cold war rivalry resulted in new states with ambiguous political arena whereby actors struggle over imposition of order.

Neo-realism argues that the international system is anarchical. According to neo-realism, survival is the essential concern of the states. Absence of a higher authority that can regulate the international system creates a self-help system whereby states are in a position to take care of themselves. Due to uncertain and ambiguous environment of the international system, states cannot trust each other because there is no mechanism to punish renegade actor. This neo-realist view of the international system is used to analyze state-level violence and to understand civil wars. When states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups and to manage relations among them in an even-handed manner, collective fears of future arise. Civil wars are mostly caused by such collective fears (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Absence of strong state authority creates an anarchical environment just like the international system. In such a situation, groups take defensive measures to ensure the group survival. Increasing security of a group means decreasing insecurity of the other. This misperception triggers a security dilemma between the groups and leads to eruption of a civil war. Under anarchy, neo-realists argue, societal security is as significant as material security(Buzan 2007).

For neo-realists, people look at the past and find out how that group behaved last time when it was not constrained. At this point history-making/history-writing should be noted because how old rivalries of groups are conveyed to the present generation influences one group's perception of the others(Posen 1993).Just like states compete with one another to survive or maximize their interests in the international arena, in case of state collapse, self-help system arises and ethnic groups feel insecure as states do. In the absence of an all-powerful regulating authority, ethnic groups feel threatened by other ethnic groups in the country(Brown 2001). In an environment characterized by uncertainty, ethnic groups use the advantage of offense to defense. This is simply because of the fact that in case of state collapse an ethnic group cannot be sure that other ethnic groups will attempt to dominate or wipe them out. As empirical evidence shows, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians lived in relative harmony with high rates of intermarriages for centuries(Ignatief 1995). But the power vacuum emerged with the collapse of the Yugoslavian regime turned these friendly societies into hostile rivals. It is due to this transformative power of anarchy that neo-realists emphasize the importance of state weakness as a crucial factor in civil war onset.

Neo-realism's explanatory power was significant, particularly with regard to the civil wars in the Balkans and the absence thereof in the Eastern Europe. That being said, it should be noted that neo-realist view failed to explain lack of civil war in other Baltic states. If peace endured in Ukraine because it possesses nuclear weapons, what can account for non-occurrence of civil war in non-nuclear states? Although Posen's (1993) account for prevalence of peace between Ukraine and Russia is built on material capability, it overlooked non-material factors such as collective fear of future. Placing much emphasis on material capabilities is a serious weakness of neo-realism in explaining civil wars. Another major weakness of neo-realist view of civil wars is that many civil wars do not take place in a political environment characterized by anarchy (David 1997:561). Neo-realists inaccurately assume that anarchy at the international level and at the state level is the same. Neo-realists accentuate anarchical structure as the ultimate factor but several civil wars occurred in some countries where anarchy was out of question. Chechen uprising against Russia took place when the Russian state was still operating. When *Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)* rebelled against the Algerian

government, state was not collapsed and the country was not under anarchy. The civil war in Sudan, what is called the longest in the continent, did not start under anarchical conditions but while a functioning state was in the capital, Khartoum, collecting tax, appointing officers and controlling an organized army. In other words, neo-realists overlook and confuse anarchy with a weak state.

There is a long history of research on civil wars with focus on inequality and deprivation. According to this approach, people rebel against their governments because of deprivation and inequality incurred on people. Some governments fail to provide some needs of certain groups in the society, allocate resources unequally, and deny granting certain freedoms to some groups in the society. This inequality causes discontent among people and some people become relatively deprived of some needs and/or freedoms compare to the rest of the society. Some people find themselves in so desperate situation that they are left with no other alternative but armed rebellion against the government to redress their grievances. Severity of the deprivation increases the likelihood of the civil conflict. It is also argued that generalized discontent, rather than discontent at individual or small group level, is more likely to lead civil war onset (Collier et al. 2003). For Ted Gurr (1968), who is one of the foremost scholars of grievance approach, relative deprivation is the necessary precondition of civil conflict. Gurr describes relative deprivation as follows:

> …actor's perception of discrepancy between their *value expectation* and their environment's apparent *value capabilities*. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found largely in the socai and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain. (p. 252-253, emphasis in original)

We should also note that some values can be more salient than others in different societies. A value in a society can be so important that people can die for; while the same value may not bear any significance in another society therefore does

not cause any conflict. It is for this reason that everything can be the root cause of a civil war (David 1997). The value assigned to something also determines the acceptable level of intereference and thwarting. Any amount of interference and thwarting by leaders will meet discontent of people. According to Gurr (1968), frustration arises when they are "thwarted by some social or physical barrier in attempts to attain or continue enjoyment of a value" (p.253). Actors are frustrated when they are aware of such interference or thwarting. Gurr argues that leaders can use their followers' anger and mobilize masses.

Inequality is considered as a main motive behind rebellions in the literature. It is important to draw attention to the difference between inequality and deprivation. Although inequality can be a form of deprivation and a cause of the grievance, it is different from deprivation. As Regan and Norton (2005) argue, deprivation is a judgment which is made "relative to one's own expectations", while inequality is made relative to others within society. While acknowledging the role of inequality in civil war onset, we need to differentiate it from deprivation scientifically. Empirical findings show that income inequality is associated with a higher rate of household theft occurrence but does not have any effect on rebellion (Collier 2000).

Explanatory power of grievance school has been significant but it is not flawless. The major problem with grievance school is the lack of theoretical foundation for overcoming free-rider problem. Grievances exist in many societies in many countries but we do not observe civil wars in all these countries. Grievance school does not provide a satisfactory answer for why people with grievances in one country do not rebel against their government but in another country resort to arms. Why do people in one country join the rebellion but some do not join in another country? How people in one country overcome free-rider problem and start a rebellion while others continue to live with their grievances. Some argue that speaking about grievances is tantamount to viewing conflict from the rebels' perspective only. Grievances reflect rebels' argument for starting an armed rebellion while disregarding the government's story. These weaknesses of the grievance approach lead scholars to search for another and more explanatory theory of civil war.

Until the end of the 1990s, literature on civil wars has focused on grievances and deprivation as the main motive behind rebellions and civil war onset. The unexpected increase in the number of civil wars following the end of the cold war provided scholars with more cases. A group of scholars have argued that material motives play more significant role in civil war onset, rather than psychological and sentimental motives. The ultimate objective of a rebel group in a civil war is to capture the state. Following the victory, the new owners of the state will reward its supporters during the war. Other than this post-conflict reward projection, it is argued that lootable resources, opportunities for theft and other material gains during war create an opportunity for people suffering from deprivation to take up arms against the government. Therefore, it is the greed of the human being rather than grievance that motivates people to join the rebellions. Acquisition of revenue through predation during conflict is a motivation for rebels. Hence, it is not the discontent but the opportunity that makes people rebel. Behaviors of rebels cannot be controlled because a supreme authority does not exist among rebels. It is for this reason that some rebels are likely to be engaged in criminal activities. Civil wars therefore are a different kind of criminal activity because "the labor force engaged in the activity is both large and organized into a single enterprise"(Collier 2000:842). Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that both greed and grievance are significant variables in predicting civil war occurrence. In their study, they measure greed as the share of the primary commodity exports in total exports. They find that greed (i.e. ratio of primary commodity exports to total exports) is five times stronger than grievance in predicting civil war onset. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) develop an econometric model of civil war onset. They test several variables in 78 civil wars between 1960 and 1999 to see the difference between motives and opportunity . They find that grievance has little explanatory power while their model focusing on opportunities perform much better.

Those who argue that greed plays a more significant role does not deny the role of grievances and deprivation (Regan and Norton 2005). They admit that grievances and deprivation are important factors in initiating violence and mobilizing masses. Kaufman (2001) argues that, if played carefully, ethnic and nationalist leaders can argue that the

war is about both material goods (i.e.greed) and group survival and respect (i.e. grievance).

One may argue that the civil war in Sierra Leone played a key role in development of greed approach, or what is known as Collier-Hoeffler model. Foday Sankoh, leader of rebel group, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in Sierra Leone gained control of northeast parts of the country where rich diamond reserves are located. Extracted diamonds are smuggled and sold to Liberia in return of arms, ammunition and other equipments. It is also fair to argue that all natural resources are not as easy to extract as diamond. Oil, natural gas, or radioactive materials are valuable resources but their extraction by rebels is not easy. Therefore, assuming all natural resources equally accessible is a major weakness of the greed aproach. But this does not change the fact that after waging a war against a government for some time and recruiting many people, rebel movements begin to operate like business orgnaizations (Collier et al. 2003). Kurdish terrorist organization PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) generates significant amount of revenue through cigaratte smuggling, drug and human trafficking (Özdemir and Pekgözlü 2012; Shelley and Melzer 2008). Colombian rebel organization FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has grown so much that by the end of the 1990s, it was an organization that employes 12,000 people and generates USD $700 million a year (Collier 2000). Prospect of income when joined rebel movement constitutes a great deal of opportunity for those who are discontent with the goverment policies.

Econometric model developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that has become associated with greed approach has some empirical weaknesses. Empirical studies show that the model fails to predict some civil war incidences in Burundi (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005) and Nigeria (Zinn 2005). It should also be noted that ratio of primary exports to total exports may be questioned as a proxy of greed. De Soysa (2002) argues that poor countries lack industry and developed infrastucruce and therefore are dependent on the revenue generated by the primary product exports. There are several empirical studies that prove positive correlation between civil war onset and low per capita wealth (Brown 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier et al. 2003; De Soysa

2002). Future studies on the greed approach should focus on developing models that can separate impact of availability of natural resource from low income.

In the final analysis, both greed and grievance approaches have explanatory power to a certain extent. Some argue that grievances and deprivations are the necessary condition of civil war and the main motivating factors that convince people to take up arms. Those who approached civil wars more like economists rather than political scientists believe that rebels need to develop a discourse of grievance so that they can justify their fight. For defenders of econometric view of civil wars "grievance isto a rebel organization what image is to a business" (Collier 2000:3). Some studies in the existing literature find the common ground for these two approaches on civil war onset. Grievances play a key role in civil war onset, mobilization of masses and recruitment. However, greed plays an important role in sustaining the civil war and in recruiting new rebels. Regan and Norton (2005) suggest that income inequality, resource distributional issues, repressive policies are associated with civil war onset. They maintain that "greed" becomes salient after the initiation of war when rebel leaders face difficulties in motivating rebels. According to their argument, preferences of the leaders and soldiers in a rebel group differ. Soldiers in a rebel groups are more interested in improvement in life and material gains, while leaders seek power and control. Although grievances are the backbone of rebel movements, leaders should make some side payments to soldiers in order to motivate them and to balance government efforts to uncouple them from the rebel movement. Similarly, Korf (2005) argues that we cannot separate greed and grievance once the conflict breaks out. He contends that "either-or" thinking of greed and grievance can be misleading because they interact during the conflict and grievances encourage greed-based behavior while they cause more grievances. As Grossman (1999:273) succinctly put it, "Lenin overcame free-rider problem not by charisma, but by providing excludable benefits to his active followers". In short, grievances are the root cause of a civil war but rebellion in an organized manner cannot be possible without material benefits.

3. DETERMINANTS OF CIVIL WAR ONSET

In the previous section I briefly discussed major theories that attempt to account for why civil wars break out in the first place. Additionally existing literature provide ample empiric evidence on some variables that make some countries more prone to civil wars. It is not to say that countries with these qualities will experience a civil war soon but that such countries are more likely to experience civil war than those countries without these qualities. Some determinants of civil war are still debated by scholars, while there exists a consensus on the role of some determinants. Brown (2001) identifies some causes or conditions that make countries more prone to civil wars and places those causes under four categories: Structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors and cultural/perceptual factors. A brief examination of these determinants can give us an idea about conditions of a country that is a potential civil war victim.

Under structural factors Brown mentions weak states and ethnic geography as main causes of civil wars. By weak states he refers to those states that are born out of colonial empires with artificial boundaries. Empirical studies show that artificial boundary argument is not valid and supported by evidence. Öztürk (2013) finds that former colonies in the Middle East and Africa are not more likely than other states to experience civil war. Findings of Sorli, Gleditsch, and Strand (2005) do not lend support to the contention that Middle East is exceptional and general civil war theories can explain cases in the Middle East as well. They also find that variables associated with the Middle East such as Islam and oil are not significant. Intra-state security concerns are related to the condition whereby groups within a country are compelled to take care for their survival on their own. This is security dilemma at intra-state level. As discussed above in detail this has some strengths and weaknesses.

Another structural factor discussed by Brown is probably the most controversial one. By ethnic geography he refers to ethnic composition of states. There are very few ethnically homogenous states in the world and the majority of the states have heterogeneous societies. For decades, it was argued by many, including Brown, that states with more ethnic groups are more likely to experience civil war because

presence of several groups within a single political entity can complicate political bargaining and allocation of resources fairly. However, we have evidence such as protracted civil war in Somalia that even ethnically homogenous societies are likely to have civil wars. Ellingsen (2000) finds that countries with more than three ethnic groups have a higher risk of experiencing civil war than countries with two ethnic groups. Ellingsen finds that relation between ethnic composition of a country and civil war probability has an inverted-U shape. That is to say that countries in which the dominant ethnic, religious or language group constitutes the majority or countries in which the minority group is so small have a lower risk of civil war. What is so small or so large? For methodological reasons, Ellingsen assumes that an ethnic, religious or language group constitutes the majority if the group is more than 80% of the population. Regan and Norton (2005) and Sambanis (2001) find that ethnic heterogeneity is statistically significant in ethnic conflict onsets.

On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and de Soysa (2002) find that diversity does not increase or decrease the risk of civil war in a society. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find a non-monotonic relationship between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and civil war onset. They find that highly fractionalized societies are as likely to experience civil war as homogenous societies. In another study, Collier and Hoeffler (2004:581) argue that socially fragmented societies are safer. Their results show that "a maximally fractionalized has a conflict risk only one quarter that of a homogenous society".

In an attempt to settle this theoretical and methodological argument, Blimes (2006) argues that research on the relationship between civil war and ethnic heterogeneity tend to focus on a quest of a direct relationship. He believes that scholars should search for an indirect relationship. He uses a heteroskedastic probit model and shows that ethnic heterogeneity has an indirect effect on many variables that are associated with civil war onset. In another eye-opening study, Reynal-Querol and Montalvo (2005) argue that instead of ethnic fractionalization we should focus on ethnic polarization. They show that ethnic fractionalization is indeed an insignificant variable

of civil wars but societies with a high rate of ethnic polarization are more likely to experience civil wars.

With regard to political factors, there is a consensus in the literature that regime type matters. Literature on inter-state wars shows that democratic regimes do not fight each other. In the same manner, empirical studies conducted at intra-state level show that both highly democratic countries are less likely to experience civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ellingsen 2000; Reynal-Querol 2002; Sambanis 2001). According to the literature, the relationship between regime type and probability of civil war onset has an inverted-U shape (Regan and Norton 2005). That is to say that autocratic and highly democratic countries are less likely to experience civil war than midlevel democratic countries. It is argued that in highly democratic countries, groups can solve problems through peaceful mechanisms without resorting to arms. Research also shows that civil wars are less likely to occur in autocratic regimes because the leaders are not accountable to citizens and therefore can suppress dissident groups brutally. But in midlevel democracies leaders are to a certain extent restrained by relatively open society, developing institutions and constraints on use of brutal techniques on dissidents (Hegre et al. 2001). Ellingsen (2000) shows that midlevel democracies are three times more likely to experience civil war than a democracy.

Level of development in a country is highly and positively correlated with peace. Civil wars are less likely to occur in wealthier countries than poor countries. When a country's per capita income doubles, probability of a civil war occurrence is reduced by 50% (Collier et al. 2003,58). Collier and Hoeffler (1998) shows that higher per capita income not only reduces the probability of civil war onset but also duration of a potential civil war in the future. Sambanis (2001) argues that determinants of ethnic and nonethnic wars are different. According to his findings, economic variables play more important role in nonethnic wars than ethnic wars. This perspective is also related to relative deprivation argument in that lower per capita income is a sign of unequal distribution of national wealth. Therefore, one is likely to establish a connection between declining level of wealth and likelihood of civil conflict. But we have several cases that can weaken this argument. Kaufman (2001) presents examples from post-

Soviet republics and shows that both Armenia and Georgia did experience ethnic conflict, although economies in these countries grew prior to conflict. He concludes that we can establish a sound relation between ethnic violence and economic decline.

Finally, availability of an abundant resource in a country is often seen as a resource curse. It is argued that natural resources can cause industrial sectors remain underdeveloped. Presence of a natural resource, particularly if it is a lootable kind, it can encourage opposition groups to rebel against government because controlling the resource rich regions can generate revenue to finance the rebellion. Two contradictory views are debated in the literature with regard to the effect of lootable resources. Regan and Norton (2005) argue that extractable/lootable resources are actually associated with a decrease in civil war onset. Saudi Arabia and other oil rich countries of the Gulf are good examples. On the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that increased natural resources increase the probability of civil war onset. Subsequent studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), find that ratio or primary commodity export to the total exports matter. The results are consistent with Regan and Norton (2005) in that if a country's economy highly or minimally depends on the natural resources, then probability of civil war is very low. Threshold level found by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggests that risk of a civil war is at maximum level in a country where primary commodity exports comprise 32% of the total exports.

It is important to reemphasize at the end that these are variables that make a country more prone to civil war. Observation of these conditions in a country does not necessarily mean that a civil war is definitely going to break out in the near future. Understanding these factors that determine probability of a civil war in a country is crucial because preventing future conflicts can only be possible by reducing the effect of these variables.

4. ENDING CIVIL WARS

Wars between states draw more scholarly attention than wars within states. There are more studies on termination of interstate wars than termination of civil wars. Interestingly, scholars of civil wars have paid more attention to the causes of civil war and civil war onset than how civil wars end, civil war outcome and their impact on the post-conflict environment. Ending civil wars have become more important and crucial for external actors than it has ever been. In our increasingly interdependent world, civil wars cannot be considered as a "private quarrel" in a far country and ignored. Civil wars of our age are likely to result in international military intervention and escalate into regional or international conflict (Licklider 1995a, 4). It should be noted that by ending a civil war, we do not refer to a condition where absolute peace prevails and members of a heterogeneous society live in harmony. Distinction between war and conflict is important while discussing civil war termination. The distinguishing quality of war is violence. Wars are violent. But a conflict is a strong disagreement or incompatibility of interests. In other words, conflicts do not necessarily have to be violent. Therefore, termination of a civil war does not mean that the underlying conflict has been resolved. For the purpose of this study, I find Licklider's (1995b) definition of civil war termination quite helpful. Licklider identifies three conditions that need to be met in order for a civil war to be considered as ended. According to him, if the concern about living together, multiple sovereignty, and violence ends in a civil war, then the case is considered ended. Disagreements may not be resolved, groups may still be hostile to each other, and armed groups may remain mobilized. End of a civil war, therefore, is the beginning of a process in which enduring peace is expected to emerge.

In an interstate war, states can withdraw behind their internationally recognized borders once the violence ends, while belligerents of a civil war have to live within the same political entity. It is mainly due to this fact that resolution of civil wars are more difficult than interstate wars because the loser is likely to face annihilation. Once a civil war breaks out, it does not end very soon. According to data from *Correlates of War* project, 108 civil wars coded in the dataset lasted an average of 1.665 days, while 23 interstate wars coded in the dataset lasted only 480 days on average (Brandt et al.

2008). If war makes preexisting conflict more intense and increase grievances, as Wagner (1995) draws attention, then motivation of groups to live together in harmony will dramatically diminish. Eventually, after years of fighting, belligerents face three possible scenarios for civil war termination. First, fighting parties will reach a negotiated settlement. Second, either government or rebels will achieve a military victory. Third, partition will take place by physically separating fighting parties into new sovereign states.

A. Negotiated Settlement

Perhaps the most peaceful and the most desired solution to a civil war is a negotiated settlement where fighting parties come together to sort out their problems by devising alternative mechanisms that will eliminate root causes of the conflict. Although it is the best policy option to end a civil war, negotiated settlements do not occur frequently. Nature of civil wars also make negotiated settlements more unlikely than interstate wars. More than half of interstate wars end in negotiated settlements, while about 25-30% of civil wars have ended so (Zartman 1995a).

Using a rational choice approach, Mason and Fett (2008) develop an expected utility model to understand under what conditions actors of a civil war prefer a settlement to continuing fighting in the hope of a decisive victory. According to their model, in a civil war fought between a government and a rebel group, negotiated settlement is more likely when the expected utility of a negotiated settlement is higher than the expected utility of continuing the conflict, for both the government and the rebels. They argue that decision by the government or the rebels to agree to a settlement rather than continue to fight depends on "each party's estimate of its probability of victory, its expected payoffs from victory versus those from a settlement, the rate at which it absorbs costs of conflict, and its estimate of how long it will take to achieve victory" (Mason and Fett 2008, 549). According to their model,

> Any factors that (1) reduce both party's estimate of their
> chances of victory, (2) increase the rate at which both are
> absorbing costs, (3) extend both parties' estimate of the amount

of time required to achieve victory, or (4) increase the utility

from a settlement relative to the utility from victory will make

them both more willing to agree to a negotiated settlement rather

than continue to fight in the hope of achieving victory.

In addition to the conditions identified by Mason and Fett (2008), William Zartman (1995b) argues that must be power parity between the fighting parties in order for them to prefer negotiated settlement to continuing war. If the international community hopes for a negotiated settlement in a civil war, we need to wait or work for the ripe moment whereby, what Zartman calls, a civil war takes the form of a "mutually hurting stalemate". Zartman defines a mutually hurting stalemate as a condition "where the countervailing power of each side, though insufficient to make to other side lose, prevents it from winning" (1995,24). Zartman also argues that if a civil war is a result of ethnic violence, it should be dealt with early, before the situation gets out of hand. Then, according to Zartman, the probability of a negotiated settlement decreases and the duration of a civil war increases.

As shown in the previous pages, grievances and commitment are two important components of a civil war. Zartman believes that (1995a, 9) the balance between these two components are crucial for a negotiated settlement to be possible. He suggests that

As long as redress of grievances and commitment to the cause,

or the first exceeds the second as a motivator, negotiations are

possible. But when commitment to continuing the rebellion

exceeds grievances as a motivation, it becomes an end in itself.

Even when the government accedes to the demand to negotiate,

a rebellion can be so high on commitment that it throws its

chance to negotiate and compromise, as happened in the conflict

in Sri Lanka, the Baque homeland, Eritrea and the Western

Sahara…

Even if this condition is met, there are other factors that make negotiated settlements less likely. Governments view negotiating with rebels as a concession.

Because leaders are accountable to the public in democratic regimes, agreeing to negotiations is a critical decision for political careers of politicians. When dissident groups rebel against their governments and resort to violence, they lack legitimacy and recognition. Starting negotiations, regardless of any gain at the end, can get rebels recognition and legitimacy they lack. Rebels are also likely to use negotiations as an opportunity for more recruitment and gain strength so that they can go back to battlefield stronger.

Involvement of third party actors and putting pressure on the belligerents do not totally eliminate these risks and can make negotiated settlements more fragile (Werner and Yuen 2005). Guarantees provided by third party actorsalso matter, especially if the negotiations are in a positive trend and likely to succeed because the ultimate success of a peace treaty rests on a third-party's desire to become involved and remain involved after a treaty was signed. (Walter 1997). Partiality of a third party actor is also another problem during negotiations and can impact the course of negotiations dramatically. Svensson (2007) empirically shows that government-biased mediators have a significant effect on the probability that the belligerents will sit at the negotiation table and give up their weapons. On the other hand, rebel-biased mediators do not have any significant effect. If there is a biased mediator that is biased towards both the government and the rebels, then probability of a negotiated settlement significantly increases. He concludes that if the objective is to start negotiation between the parties, then one-sidedness of a mediator is not a problem. But if the objective is to reach a settlement, then government-biased mediators do better job.

B. Victory

Although negotiated settlements look as the best and the most peaceful solution to civil wars in principle, empirical studies do not support this view. On the contrary, research shows that negotiated settlements are not as preferable as the theories suggest. A widely-accepted argument about negotiated settlements is that they minimize the casualty because without a negotiated settlements belligerents would kill more people. Licklider (1995b)argues that this theoretical argument is false because we cannot know what would have happened if the war have continued. Moreover, his data show that

casualty patterns are similar for wars that end in negotiated settlements and military victories. Hence, his data prove that the argument that negotiated settlements reduce casualty is a myth. Negotiated settlements are assumed to lead to enduring peace and prevent future conflict deaths. Toft (2010) shows that civil wars ended through negotiated settlement resulted in significantly more deaths (as measured by total deaths per capita). Her data also suggest that civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are more likely to recur and to last longer. Negotiated settlements may result in peaceful environment in the short term but they do not create a lasting peace. Toft (2010) proves that civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are twice as likely to recur as civil wars ending in victory.

After a civil war ends, people who attempted to kill each other have to live together within the same political entity. Negotiated settlements envisage a sort of power sharing agreement that will force former belligerents to cooperate and rule the state in harmony. However, Licklider (1995b)argues that this theoretical argument is not true because negotiated settlements with power sharing agreements will create "internal balance-of-power situations that make it difficult for the new government function effectively. Military victory, on the other hand, will destroy the organizational structure of one side, making a resumption of the civil war much more difficult." That is why, he argues, civil wars ending with negotiated settlement including a power sharing agreement is likely to resume in the future. He further argues that post-civil war environments require significant structural changes so that grievances that caused the war in the first place can be redressed. Power sharing agreements, however, will create veto group that can block such reforms. Moreover, victory by one side does not necessarily mean that the winner will definitely pursue structural reforms but that if intended, it will be easier to implement reforms. Based on his findings, Licklider draws two important conclusions. First, the most favorable option for an enduring peace in a civil war fought over identities is military victory, not a negotiated settlement. Second, military victories may be followed by mass atrocities, massacres or genocides because the winner may wish to annihilate the opposition so that they can never rebel in the future.

In spite of the risk of post-war atrocities, military victory may look as the best solution but who the winner is also important. Toft (2010) finds that rebel victory is a more preferable to a government victory in a civil war because the former results in more lasting peace. She shows that 17 percent (8 of 48) of civil wars ending in government victory recur, whereas only 6 percent (2 of 33) of civil wars ending in rebel victory recur.

C. Partition

Policy circles and international relations scholars tend to believe that once a civil war breaks out, it is difficult to make parties live together in harmony within the same borders. Western powers tend to argue that separatist movements start because of poorly drawn borders. If two peoples cannot live together, separating them is the most viable option. Therefore, it is believed that the best option is to let nations to have their own state if they cannot get along well with the ethnic groups they live with. This especially true for nationalist and ethnic civil wars. It is for this difficult nature of the civil wars that partition of belligerents into sovereign states looked as the most favorable solution, although there are differing views in the literature.

After a ceasefire or a peace agreement ending a civil war, international community tends to exert effort to restore multi-ethnic states and pave the way for politics in ethnically diverse societies. Kaufmann (1996) suggests that in case of an ethnic civil war international community must exert effort to 'facilitate and protect population movements to create true national homelands'. He believes that rival ethnic groups should not live within the same political entity because grievances during the conflict can cause resumption of violence. Therefore, separation of fighting groups demographically into defensible enclaves is the only stable resolution. Separation, he argues, eliminates both incentives and opportunity for further combat and reduces the risk of ethnic cleansing.

He also argues that partition after ethnic civil wars and creating ethnically homogenous new territories will eliminate the security dilemma which is considered an important cause of ethnic conflict. Armed forces of an ethnic group, which will be

transformed into a professional army, can defend people. Since they will be in a defensive position, offensive dimension of the forces will disappear. Hence, security dilemma will fade away. According to him, separation of groups should not necessarily mean creation of ethnically homogenous states. He notes that remaining minorities must be small in number so that they do not constitute a threat for the host group. But he does not present a satisfactory explanation on how to deal with possible discriminatory or assimilating policies towards those minorities. He also defends that inter-group boundaries should be drawn along the best defensive terrain, such as rivers and mountain ranges. Lines should also be as short as possible to allow the heaviest manning of defensive fronts.

Kaufman admits that ethnic separation does not guarantee peace. With separation, possibility of ethnic cleansing and rescue imperative disappear. As he elaborates elsewhere, partition is not a preventive measure but a remedy which can be used by the international community for at least some communal wars; otherwise, the processes of war will separate the populations anyway, at much higher human cost" (Kaufmann 1998, 123).

Partition as a viable solution is not proposed to all civil wars. It is seen as a better alternative in identity civil wars that are fought as a nation-state project between different ethnic or religious groups. Civil wars of this kind are caused by incompatibility of identities.Chapman and Roeder(2007)argue that partition is more likely than autonomy or de facto separation to reduce the incompatibility of national identities. They believe that after partition, incompatibility will fade away over time. But in case of de facto separation or autonomy, incompatible identities will remain and even be reinforced. They also suggest that partition should be implemented fully "through creation of separate sovereign states". Incomplete measures, improper population exchanges and other measures that will keep fighting people together will worsen the situation.

On the other hand, there are strong arguments against the partition as a favorable solution. Fearon (2004)is skeptical of partition as a general solution to nationalist wars.According to him, granting a state for all proper nations is not practical

because identifying a proper nation is a political question and parties cannot reach consensus easily, if possible. He argues that there are three problems with ad hoc partitions. First problem is about efficacy and justice. As a result of partition, some members of an ethnic group remain in the partitioned state and some are left in the main state. Such a process is very likely to leave some unhappy and fearful communities that are minority in the newly formed state. Second problem is about incentive for insurgency and counterinsurgency. Application of partition to one troubled state may produce more violent separatist nationalist movements elsewhere, and make existing nationalist wars more difficult to resolve. Anticipation of spillover effect is theoretically strong but is not supported by empirical evidence. A quantitative analysis shows that granting territorial concessions to a separatist group does not create domino effect in other countries, while other ethnic groups within the same country are likely to be inspired (Forsberg 2013). Fearon's third problem is about incentive for interstate competition. Incentive effects of imposing partition apply both to relations between insurgents and governments and relations among states. A tacit bargain exists among states since the 1950s: if you do not seek to change interstate borders by force, then neither will we. If a state is militarily strong and considered as major power, then its territory is secure. Forming coalitions and carving up weaker states will create a system in which even major powers are not secure. According to Fearon, it is not responsible to undermine this bargain without finding another applicable formula to replace it.

Sambanis (2000) empirically proves that that partitioning is not a better solution for civil war torn state than other alternative solutions. According to him, partition is not as clean and easy solution to civil wars as it is thought to be. He tests three hypotheses: partitions facilitate postwar democracy, partitions prevent civil war recurrence, and partitions reduce low-level violence after the war. With regard to the relationship between partition and postwar democracy, he finds support for his hypothesis. However, he warns us that this effect may not be the result of democratization but due to declining democracy during the prewar period. Moreover, Sambanis notes that it is very difficult to collect data about democracy level of new states that are not internationally recognized. Therefore, we must be cautious about the findings about democracy. His findings imply that nonethnic partitions are more stable

and peaceful than ethnic partitions. This finding is consistent with Kaufmann (1996; 1998) and Chapman and Roeder (2007). Sambanis does not find strong evidence to support the argument that partition prevents low-level violence after civil war. He also shows that partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence. Therefore, separating ethnic or religious groups into sovereign states does not eliminate the hostility among groups.

Another reason scholars favor partition is the belief that by separating fighting groups future death toll can be minimized and more lives can be saved. Kaufmann(1996) makes a hard-to-prove contention that civilian deaths would certainly have been higher without partition as in the Israel-Palestine case. On the other hand, Fearon (2004) does not think that population exchanges is a right option because it will cause many displaced people and refugees. Fearon argues against this contention and suggests that we should consider tradeoffs rather than making the number not killed the only value.Some argue that without partition more people will die in the war. Historical evidence shows that partition does not take place as peaceful as scholars predict. Partition of India and Cyprus was violent. Although Indian National Congress and Muslim League exerted much effort to prevent spread of violence, during the riots in 1947-1948 more than a million people lost their lives in six months and nearly 15 million people were displaced (Kumar 1997). In short, although partition sounds a feasible and easy solution to civil wars, it cannot be one-fits-all solution to all civil wars. International community must be picky when it comes to partitioning a state. It seems that this can be a viable option for ethnic/religious civil wars where fighting groups are geographically concentrated and the partition is fully implemented with sufficient financial support from the international community.

5. AFTER THE END OF CIVIL WAR

With an end to fighting and large-scale violence following a peace agreement settling the dispute in a civil war, scholars label such cases ended conflict. However, much effort has to be exerted in order to prevent recurrence of civil war and build peace in the country. Building peace and reconstruction of a war-torn country is essential in that failure to establish a peaceful environment and redressing grievances can cause the

country relapse into civil war again. It is for this reason that peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are critical phases in a civil war. Peacebuilding is defined as "actions undertaken by international and national actors to instituitonalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics" (Call and Cousens 2008, 4). World Bank defines post-conflict reconstrction as a task to "support the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society" (Holtzman, Elwan, and Scott 1998,14). Because the cessation of hostilities are not equal to the end of transition and the beginning of a peaceful period, according to the World Bank, post-conflic reconstruction "does not refer only to the reconstruction of physical infrastructure ... [or] rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework that existed in a country prior to the onset of conflict". For the World Bank, what is needed in the post-conflict period is the "reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioningpeacetime society in the economy and society and in the framework of governance and rule of law".

As shown in the previous pages, a civil war either ends with a victory by a party or with a negotiated settlement. However, termination of fighting and silencing guns do not mean the end of conflict. End of a civil war is the beginning of a new challenge to both the international community and the war-torn country. In case of victory, defeated party may use non-violent post-conflict environment to reorganize to initiate a new war for revenge. In negotiated settlements, as discussed above, parties may use the peaceful environment to gain legitimacy and acquire more resources. In either case, keeping the peace and preventing recurrence of war are the most difficult challenge for the international community and civil war fighting country. Civil war torn countries are not expected to do much in post-conflict period because of depleted resources, low trust among groups and absence of necessary institutions. That is why the international community is perceived as the impartial and objective actor to take on the role of preserving the peaceful environment, reconstruct the collapsed institution and revitalize the economy. So far, the most innovative solution to maintain peace and security after civil wars has been peacekeeping missions in civil war torn countries.

When all civil wars examined, one is likely to notice that peacekeeping forces are not sent to all countries following the termination of violence. Peacekeeping assistance is provided to only 38% of civil wars (Stojek and Tir 2014). The United Nations Charter does not have specific articles about where and when to send peacekeeping missions. Peacekeepers are expected to intervene in some cases where low level of violence continues and there is no peace to keep, while in some other cases fighting parties silence their guns and end violence totally. It is obvious that success of a peacekeeping operation is more likely in the latter cases. Then should we believe that peacekeeping forces are sent to countries where keeping peace is easy? Fortna (2004) argues that this is not the case. Her data show that this is not true. She shows that if there is a negotiated agreement reached by the parties, then Chapter VI peacekeeping is less likely. However, when she separates UN from non-UN peacekeeping, the relationship between agreement and peacekeeping is not robust. Therefore, she is confident to reject the hypothesis that peacekeepers are more likely to intervene when a formal treaty has been signed. She also does not find any statistically significant relationship between peacekeeping and the type of civil war (identity or not). She also finds that UN peacekeepers are often not deployed when war ends in a victory by one party.

Another fact about UN peacekeeping missions is the decision making process. The United Nations Security Council approval is required for deployment of peacekeepers. Politics among the members of the council play a key role in determining where peacekeepers are deployed. Findings of Stojek and Tir (2014) show that national interests of the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council influence the decision making about which cases will receive peacekeeping assistance. They find that since the 5 permanent members of the United Nations Securit Council (P5) has the political power to decide where peacekeeping operation (PKO) is deployed, these countries are likely to approve deployment of PKOs to countries that engage in significant economic exchange with the P5. It is important, however, to note that the authors do not ignore the effect of humanitarianism. They agree that countries do not solely approve PKOs for material (i.e. trade) purposes. Trade ties constitute only one, and important, factor in decision making process. Probably the most comprehensive

study about where peacekeepers are deployed, Gilligan and Stedman (2003) show that PKO is more likely to be deployed in more severe conflicts. They also find that a UN intervention is more likely as a war drags on. According to their findings, "the UN has roughly twenty-five times higher rate of intervening in a war after ten years than after one year, other things being equal" (Gilligan and Stedman 2003,49).

Due to hostility level among belligerents, fighting parties are unlikely to solve the problem own their own without external intervention. We tend to expect that a PKO will eliminate the trust problem and create a conducive environment whereby the conflict can be mediated or negotiation can be initiated. PKOs facilitate implementation of peace agreements and help parties overcome commitment problem so that enduring peace can be established.

There are two competing views about the impact of peacekeeping operations on realizing and maintaining peace: optimist and pessimist views(Greig and Diehl 2005).The optimist view mainly argues that violence is bad therefore any factor that reduces violence is good. First, a cooling off period will reduce the level of hostility between parties and build some trust among the belligerents. Second, high intensity of conflict causes pressure on political decision makers, and make negotiations look like a concession. Third, as long as the violence prevails, leaders will focus on winning battles and achieving victory, not making peace.

The pessimist view, on the other hand, basically argues that peacekeeping operations interfere in a conflict and do not allow the conflict to run its natural course. Therefore, peacekeeping will make conflict resolution efforts less likely to succeed. Fighting between parties releases information about capability and resolve of the other side. Thus, parties can make more accurate calculations about whether to sustain fighting or search for an agreement to end the war. But peacekeeping interrupts this information flow and leaves fighting parties with less and inaccurate information. Peacekeeping reduces the likelihood that disputants make more healthy decision and keeps uncertainty high. As a result, lack of adequate and healty information can reduce the willingness of parties to initiate negotiations because such an act would mean a sign of weakness to the rival party. Pessimists also believe that peacekeeping missions

prevent emergence of hurting stalemate between parties. That peacekeeping operation will stop or limit fighting reduces the cost of fighting to the parties and therefore delays any possible hurting stalemate. Because peacekeeping missions usually do not have a deadline, parties do not feel the need to settle the dispute and use the cease-fire to build up stronger army.

In spite of good intentions, performance of PKOs has been a subject of scholarly debate. Results of Greig and Diehl support the pessimist view of peacekeeping that peacekeeping operations do not help peacemaking. Their findings show that `factors such as high levels of previous dispute severity, frequently stalemated disputes, or a long rivalry duration that engenders intense hostility between disputants, all dampen the occurrence of both mediation and negotiation`. Thus, the authors find that the most conflictual events drive the disputants toward mediation and negotiation. This particular finding contradicts with Fortna (2004) because she argues that peacekeeping forces are deployed mostly after negotiated settlements while Greig and Diehl argue that peacekeeping reduces the possibility of mediation and negotiation by reducing the cost.

Fortna tackles the question of whether peacekeeping forces keep peace by examining both the UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations. Her analsysis of raw data and results of statistical analyses totally differ. She looks at raw data about ending civil wars, whether peacekeepers were deployed, and whether violence resumed. At first glance, it seems that peacekeeping does not make significant difference.

> Of the civil wars since 1944, there is another round of fighting between the same parties in about 42% when no peacekeepers were deployed, and in approximately 39% of those with peacekeeping. The numbers are even worse for UN peacekeeping, with peace slightly more likely to fail when UN peacekeepers are present than when they are absent (Fortna 2004,271).

Contrary to the raw data, her statistical analysis yeilds contradicting results. She runs hazard analysis and finds that risk of resumption of violence decreases by more than 30% if UN peacekeepers are deployed. But presence of non-UN peacekeeping does not have significant effect. Things begin to chance with the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War, her data shows that peacekeeping becomes more significant in keeping peace after civil wars. Other things being equal, deployment of peacekeepers reduce the risk of war recurrence by almost 70%. When she separates UN from non-UN peacekeeping operations, she finds that non-UN missions have larger effect but she is suspicious of this finding due to low sample size. When compared with the findings of Greig and Diehl, Fortna's findings about failure of peacekeeping operations are likely due to methodology and statistical modelling. Overall, the relationship between involvement of peacekeeping forces and building sustainable peace look more like correlatation rather than causation (Call and Cousens 2008).

If we know that the UN Security Council members play key role in creation and design of PKOs and that this is a decision influenced by politics, then poor performance of PKOs in building sustainable peace should be debated because such decisions are likely to be purely political rather than being also humantarian. States function and make decisions under both material and resource constraints as well as normative pressure. In such a dilemma P5 states are likely to act what is called in "organized hypocrisy" (Lipson 2007). If so, it is quite possible for hesitant leaders stuck between normative pressure and material constraints to follow a middle course. Betts urge leaders to avoid following a middle course and "act decisively by either lending their military weight to one side or forcing both to compromise" (1994,31). Leaders are expected to take all necessary parameters into account, make a decision and committ to that decision with full moral and material support. Because international interventions like PKOs are supposed to be impartial, any hesitation, lack of funding or will to lend support to an idea will turn the impartial-to-be intervention into, what Betts call, a delusion. In some cases, under normative pressure, leaders are likely to reject a bitter remedy, even if it may be the right choice for a sustainable peace. For example, Mearshimer and van Evera (Mearshimer and Van Evera 1995) argue that the US administration was wrong in supporting the Dayton Agreement to end the war in former

Yugoslavia because this peace may mean war. According to them, although sounds bitter, partition was a better solution for a sustainable peace betwen the Bosnians and the Serbs.

Failure of peacekeeping operations in establishing peace does not result from a single factor. Scholars and policy makers have not been successful in agreeing upon a method to measure success of a peacekeeping mission. Probably the primary reason for lack of a consensus on how to measure success is the absence of a "generally accepted criterion for success" (Call and Cousens 2008). That is why some peacekeeping missions are considered as a success by some accounts, while as a failure by some others. In an overall assesment, Dennis Jett (1999) finds UN peacekeeping missions unsuccessful and argues that there are several reasons behind the failure. According to Jett, factors affecting success of UN peacekeeping operations are about all phases of the missions – predeployment, deployment, and postdeployment.

One of the criteria used to measure success of peacekeeping missions is the completion of mission mandate. Probably the primary problem with this criterion is the difficulty of preaparing a clear mandate for the mission. Mandates can be too ambitious, expecting the mission to achieve more than the mission's capability. Sometimes mandates are too ambiguos and leave the peacekeepers in a difficult position during the mission. It is also possible that missions are not supported by sufficient funds and/or military and civilian personell. Underpaid and/or understaffed missions are likely to fail. Parameters of a mission are determined by the Security Council. Undoubtedly, designing the details of the mandate reflects political plays among the Council members. Some ambigious points in mandates are deliberate because such ambigiuty helps political interests of the council members. Jett believes that the Security Council members are responsible for mandate-related failures "because they were acting either in accordance with their own interests or on the basis of faulty assessments of the situation" (1999,39).

In addition to ambiguous, ambitious or vague mandates, organizational factors have a significant role in perceived unsuccessful record of the peacekeeping missions. Because the UN has to represent diversity and give chance to bureaucrats from different

countries, features other than merits come into play while appointing an official to a key position. Conservative and protective structure of the institution causes poor performance, mismanagement or misbehavior to be kept secret, rather than have impact on the career of the bureaucrat. For example, in 2000, a memo written by the commander of the United Nations force in Sierra Leone General Vijay Jetley leaked to the press. According to the memo, the Indian General Vijay Jetley accused Nigerian officials of being involved in stolen diamond business with the rebels. Following the reports in the newspapers, the UN removed General Jetley from its position rather than investigate the allegations which were to sabotage the peace process. Upon removal of General Jetley, Indian government pulled its soldiers out of the operation (Jett 1999; McGreal 2000).

Another good example of both understaffed mission and the UN organizational problems is the UNAMID, United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur. Wishing to draw attention of the international community, the mission's former spokeswoman, Aicha Elbasri, leaked some documents to Foreign Policy magazine. The leaked documents demonstrated that from 2012 through end of 2013 the UNAMID peacekeepers were unable to protect Darfur civilians, nor were they able to deter either rebels or government forces. The UN concedes that the operation is "deeply flawed" and Hervé Ladsous, top official in charge of UN's peacekeeping missions, admit that the relationship with the Sudanese government had been challenging (Lynch 2014). Most of the irregularities and incidences were reported to the headquarters, while some failures of UNAMID were not even reported to New York. Although the officials at UN headquarters in New York were aware of the poor performance of the mission, they have not taken any concrete steps, nor did they share information with the international community.

Above and beyond a discussion about success or failure of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, one should discuss the underlying philosophical orientation of the practitioners. Once a civil war is over, what the best way is to reconstruct the war-torn country, state institutions, economic institutions and the society has been a contentious issue among scholars and practitioners. Since the end of the Cold War, what is called a

neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm prevails over others in postconflict reconstruction cases. Neoliberal peacebuilding has been the guiding perspective in postconflict reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq after the invasion of these countries by US-led coalition forces. Neoliberal peacekeeping aims reconstructing the war-torn country based on political and economic liberalization. Liberalization in political realm promotes competetive, periodic, free and fair elections where multiple parties compete. In economic realm, it aims to create a free-market oriented economy.

Shattered states of Afghanistan and Iraq, characterized by ongoing violence, instability and disorder, caused neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm to lose its legitimacy. Paris (2004) argues that "generally unstated but widely accepted theory of conflictmanagement", referring to neoliberal peacebuilding, failed to build lasting peace and to prevent civil war recurrence. He shows that international community's fast political liberalization policy and demand for multiparty elections as early as possible resulted in rebels' rejection of the election outcome and resorting to violence. Rushing in economic liberalization in Latin American countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala) helped reproduce the conditions that caused the outbreak of civil war in the first place. Because economy shrink with the civil war, ruling elites wish to use remaining state resources after the conflict to expand their patronage networks and seek more rents. Therefore, autonomous, accountable and effective institutions envisaged by neoliberal peacebuilding pose a threat to this ruling elites (Kandeh 2012). Opposing foreign interventions in general, Cooper, Turner and Pugh (2011) argue that regardless of under which conditions they are conceived, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are use of hegemonic power, either directly or indirectly through private security companies or regional organizations. Paris does not reject the view that UN missiosn reflect the interest of powerful countries and admits that modern peacebuilding is not "wholly altruistic" (2010,349-350). Peacebuilding experience in Democratic Republic of Congo also showed that liberal peacekeeping's one-fits-all solution did not work because, in addition to insufficient funds, donors did not take local factors into account (Eriksen 2009). Ignorance Disregard of local factors and dynamics is due to the underlying philosophy of liberal peacekeeping, which has also been criticized for being guided by Western political thinking (Roberts 2011). We should also note that,

following the 2007 financial crisis, interestingly Western governments prefered to stick to the very non-liberal economic principles they recommend to postconflict countries.

Although himself is critical of liberal peacekeeping, Paris (2010) defends the paradigm and argues that alternative strategies are likely to create more problems than they would solve. However, alternative strategies have been proposed in recent years. Drawing on the experiences of the Asian 'tigers', Barbara (2008) suggests adopting developmental state model in post-conflict reconstruction. In most postconflict environments, international donors exert much effort to create a private-sector driven development model. However, civil war fighting countries run out of resources, capital and infrastructure. Therefore, Barbara suggests, instead of promoting privatization, international community should help state to take on the basic economic functions. As an another alternative model, Roberts (2011) proposes a different conceptualization of peacebuilding outcome: popular peace. He defines popular peace as the "democratic expression and prioritization of everyday needs" (2011, 2543). Roberts also emphasize that those needs must be defined by local people who are the supposed beneficiaries of the peacebuilding, not by external actors. In opposition to political liberalization, Roberts suggests that the international community should prioritize what he calls 'just enough' governance because people who just came out of a devastating war will need water, food and shelter more than political freedoms. In the final analysis, as Roberts point out, it is very unlikely to move beyond liberal peacebuilding paradigm in the short run as long as hegemony of neoliberal values prevails.

No matter what paradigm is employed during the postconflict environment, components of reconstruction projects cannot materialize without foreign aid and aid organizations to implement projects to create lasting peace and sustainable development. With the new millenium, we have also seen that international financial institutions and states include development as a component in their peacebuilding and postconflict understanding. The World Bank, for example, created Post-Conflict Unit in 1997 to pursue postconflict economic development programs because the bank realized the relationship between the low level of development and civil war onset. The United States created a new command center for Africa, AFRICOM, in 2007 and included

development-related tasks such as fighting AIDS among its obejectives. Such examples prove that states and intenrational institutions will pay more attention to postconflict reconstruction in the future. Given the fact that states, government institutions and international institutions cannot function as efficient and effective on low budget as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), we can expect to see more active role played by NGOs in the coming years.

We have empirical evidence that provision of aid to a country while a civil war is going on decreases the duration of the war (de Ree and Nillesen 2009). Especially bilateral development aid is offered with some conditionalities on the recipient state. Drawing on their study on Afghanistan, Goodhand and Sedra (2007) show that provision of large amount of unconditional aid is likely to create the structural conditions that caused the civil war onset in the first place. In postconflict environments, offering large amount of unconditional aid directly to the state institution can function like a bribe, especially if control mechanisms are absent. In fact, such actions are likely to hinder progress of the postconflict reconstruction programs and to encourage other officials to use their positions to play it against off the donor. Although with good intentions, states, international organizations or NGOs are likely to pour foreign aid to wrong sectors or programs in countries undergoing a postconflict reconstruction phase. It is for this reason that Uvin (2001) urges donors to assess the situation they are in carefully and make their priorities clear. There are a lot of tasks to do in a postconflict environment in various sectors. Lack of planning in advance and prioritization may result in mismanagement of limited funds, and worse, damage to peacebuilding process. For example, eighteen months after the genocide in Rwanda, the amount of money spent for refugees was $1.2 billion, while less than $10 million spent on justice (Uvin 2001, 185). In a similar case in Sierra Leone lack of planning in postconflict justice and reconciliation programs led donor funds to improve the living standards of judicial personnel rather than to establish justice (Kandeh 2012). Elsewhere, Uvin (Uvin 1998) demonstrated how unplanned and uncontrolled donor funds can pave the way for a genocide, or what he calls a "policy of voluntary blindness".

Even if the civilian or military officials on the ground act with good intentions, structural causes of the peacekeeping operations and aid institutions are likely to lead to some unintended consequences. Some mission mandates speficify a category of people for assistance or protection. This specifications can exclude other needy people or make them join the rebels. For example, during some operations designed to help victims of famine, aid is delivered to abandoned children only. This causes some parents abandon their children (Aoi, de Coning, and Thakur 2007,12). UN operation in Somalia had similar unintended consequences as well. Like in many countries, UN operations created jobs in cities they are based and offered business contracts. Competition of hostile clan groups for these economic opportunities obstructed the UN operation (Betts 1994).

An inevitable and unpleasant consequences of a civil war is the flux of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and refugees. In most cases, camps are created for these people and a wave of aid organization flows into these so-called temporary settlements to provide humanitarian aid to needy people. Soon after a refugee camp is established, the UN is likely to send food aid through World Food Program to starving people, Red Cross or Medicines sans Frontiers (Doctors without borders) and similar medical aid organizations provide medical assistance to suffeering people and other NGOs dig water wells. As humanitarian as it sounds, providing humantarian aid to refugees can have side effects such as inadvertently helping rebels to sustain their war. In other words, humanitarian aid can help feed war instead of refugees (Barber 1997). Hutu militias used refugee camps, supported by the international community and aid organizations, in Democratic Republic of Congo for years. Kurdish separatist rebel group in Turkey (PKK) used UNHCR camps in Northern Iraq as their base and recruitment center. Although the UN agencies provide significant amount of humanitarian aid and coordinate the aid flow in a country, it is not the only actor. A number of aid organizations also operate in postconflict environments and refugee/IDP camps. Some of these organizations are state-directed, established by some governments or funded by goverments. It is naive to assume that the functions of such aid organizations will be apolitical and purely altruistic. It is for this reason that some governments have low trust in aid organizations and are suspicious of their activities

because they are not sure whether they are "angels of mercy or development diplomats" sent by some governments (Tvedt 1998). Presence of state-affiliated or state-directed NGOs with their ill-conceieved projects can hidner peacebuilding and damage postconflict reconstruction. Foreign aid organizations, because they usually come from wealthy Western countries, often times come with Western political and economic values and do not take local dynamics into account. But their wrong projects will have lasting impacts both on people and the country. In case of failure, foreign aid workers are the first group of people to take the plane out of country. It is a daunting task for both the international community and the civil war fought countries to distinguish angels of mercy and diplomat-like humanitarians. But the ill-conceived projects are likely to relapse the country into civil war.

6. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I demonstrated that civil wars are more complex emergencies than one may think. We do not have an explanatory theory of civil war onset yet. As demonstrated in the earlier pages, there are a number of variables that can increase the probabilty of a civil war onset in a country. Existing literature shows that, regardless of any other factor, presence of aggrieved and disenfranchised group of people increases the probability of civil war onset. Once a civil war starts, literature shows that the most preferable option for a lasting peace, though not the most humane, is a victory by one side. Toft (2010) shows that rebel victory rather than a government victory is more likely to lead to a lasting peace. Ending a civil war is difficult, though not impossible. In the above pages, I discussed that contrary to the conventional wisdom, previous studies show that negotiated settlements are not the best way to end a civil war because they are more likely to collapse and result in recurred violence in the long run. I also surveyed the literature on the postconflict reconstruction and showed that ending violence does not necessarily mean the beginning of a peace. Politics among major powers play a significant role in whether a country will receive peacekeeping assistance or not. Even if received, the postconflict reconstruction process is likely to relapse countries into civil war after a couple of years. This is mainly because of ill-conceived, underfunded

and understaffed postconflict projects and peacebuilding agenda that is driven by political motives rather than humanitarian values.

The literature on civil war suggests that civil wars are devastating and cost much not only to the conflict country but also to the region at large. Empirical evidence supports the scholars who oppose intervention to civil wars by the international community and believe that we should "give war a chance" (Luttwak 1999). In general, intervention to civil wars do not solve the underlying causes of the contention between groups. That is why instead of intervening and exerting effort to reconcile parties, the international community should let the conflict follow its natural course; we should let states fail as a result of civil war or let some territory to secede from the country (Herbst 2003, 2012). We cannot ensure that other states that have stake in a civil war will distance themselves and remain impartial to the conflict. However, as shown in the previous pages, once international community intervenes to rebuild peace after conflict terminationa, involvement and practices of international actors, even NGOs founded by the principle of nuetrality and impartiality, cannot remain apolitical. In short, existing research suggest that civil wars should be prevented and not start in the first place. Once started, rebuilding lasting peace is a daunting and costly task.

Yet, the costlyy task of postconflict reconstruction and building lasting peace does not succeed in some cases. As I mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, on avearge one out of three civil wars is likely to recur within five years of postconflict reconstruction. The international community spend billions of dollars and form military force to keep the belligerents apart from each other, maintain peace and security, and help war-torn country to provide security reconstruction. UN agencies and aid organizations collect donations from people and invest large amount of material resource to provide basic needs of civil war victims. Meanwhile, states offer development assistance to rebuilding state to establish necessary institutions and deliver basic services to its citizens. In spite of all these, why do some civilwars recur? What can explain the failure of billions of dollars spent for postconflict reconstruction to establish a lasting peace? Is it, then, true that foreign aid in postconflict reconstruction help nothing but prolong the war? What role does humanitarian aid organizations and

development institutions of governments play in sustaining peace? What accounts for failure of billions of dollars worth of aid to keep groups away from violence? These are the question the next chapter attempts to find an explanation.

CHAPTER 3: POST-COLONIALISM AND NEO-LIBERAL OF PEACEBUILDING

1. INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the most unexpected repercussions of the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was eruption of civil was in several parts of the world. Brutal war among Serbs, Bosnians and Croats not only resulted in thousands of deaths and displaced people but also in a genocide perpetrated by the Serbian soldiers. Civil wars in the West Africa unveiled the destructive forces of ethnic and ideological polarization in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Surge of civil wars following the end of the Cold War compelled the United Nations and the international community to undertake an unprecedented task of maintaining security and building peace.

It is not easy to assess the overall performance of the international community in building sustainable peace and maintaining security. While one may praise the extent to which Rwandese society embraced peace, it is difficult to argue in favor of a sustainable peace in the Balkans, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The international community was able to end violence permanently in some cases, while failing to convince belligerents to give up arms. However, even in those cases where violence ended and security is achieved, it is difficult to talk about achievement of sustainable peace. Although violence is out of question in the Balkans, any contention about perpetual peace among former belligerent societies is dubious. Two decades of relative peace and involvement of a number of external actors and allocation of a great deal of resources have failed to bring about a decisive and long-lasting solution to Serbs, Bosnians and Croats. An outstanding characteristic of the post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts is that it is dominated by a single approach that prioritizes and promotes liberal democracy and free market economy. Although the international community was successful in establishing multiparty democracies where regular elections are held and installation of free market economies, neo-liberal peacebuilding's success in achieving sustainable peace is debatable.

In this chapter, I argue that the neoliberal peacebuilding approach is not panacea for every post-conflict setting and should be replaced with an alternative approach that prioritize addressing the root causes of the conflict at local level. Neoliberal peacebuilding has two main objectives in post-conflict countries: maintaining security and state building. Following a ceasefire or a peace agreement, scores of external actors such as NGOs, international organizations and individual countries rush into the war-torn country to reconstruct it. These actors, preferred to be called as peacebuilders, often regard state building as the primary objective because the good governance is often identified as the root cause of complex problems that triggered the armed violence. Meanwhile, international peacekeeping force helps new-born army, enforced with the reintegration of former rebels, provide security and maintain order within the territory. From a post-colonial perspective, I argue that due to the ideological mentality of neo-liberalism, peacebuilders fail to correctly identify the root cause of the conflicts, devise alternative solutions and create sustainable peace. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section briefly discusses post-colonialism and how it can help us understand international relations from a different perspective.   provides In the second section a historical background of peacebuilding. The third section focuses on neo-liberal peacebuilding and critically assesses various dimensions of this prevailing paradigm. I deal with the failure of the neo-liberal peacebuilding in identifying root causes of conflicts and thereby how it is forced to adopt a single approach.

2. POST-COLONIALISM

Post-colonialism, as the name connotes, is concerned about a period coming after the end of colonialism and its impact in the analyses. Obviously, post-colonialism means much more than this commonsense understanding of the term. From a social science perspective, post-colonialism is a paradigm focuses on understanding the historical relationship between former colonial powers of Europe and colonized societies across the world. As can be inferred from the nature of colonialism, the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized had been unequal. Therefore, post-colonialism problematizes impact of colonialism on the identity and culture of the colonized, and

how colonialism shaped the current state of the colonized societies *vis a vis* the former colonizers.

Like other post-modern approaches, post-colonialism notes a considerable and worthwhile relationship between new values and culture of the post-World War II era. Formation of a new world economic order, birth of new types of relationships between the developed countries and the rest of the world entail a new theoretical approach to interpret and make sense of this new phenomenon. Just like post-structuralism, post-colonialism objects meta-narratives which claim to explain the rest of the world, although they were developed in the West by western scholars. It is for this reason that post-colonialism is rightfully called as 'a child of post-modernism' (Dirlik 1994, 348). New order in world economy, or what is called new global capitalism by some, has created new relationships between erstwhile colonial power and ex-colonies upon which the former wishes to maintain its power grip, both economically and politically over the latter.

Colonialism's origin can be traced back as early as 5th and 6th centuries when the Roman Empire attempted to colonize what is today Eastern Europe. Since then colonialism has been practiced at varying degrees for centuries. But the colonialism depending on settlements and exploitation starts towards the late 15th century with the geographical discoveries. Increasing population density in Europe coupled with depleting resources and tense power relations between the notables, defending economic interests required new geographies for the ruling elites of the European kingdoms.

Practice of colonialism has inevitably changed as a result of changes in technology, transportation and economic means. It is not dubious that relationship between the former colonizers and the colonized has dramatically changed since the World War II and decolonization. However, nature of this change and the new form the economic relationship has taken became a controversial issue. From a Marxist point of view, there is a significant difference between colonialism of the past and the modern colonialism that was practiced since the late 19th century. Whereas the colonialism of earlier centuries was pre-capitalist, modern capitalism of 19th and the early 20th

centuries was established alongside capitalism in Western Europe. Not only the nature of economic relationship was different but also the modern colonialism had deeper and long lasting impacts on the colonized societies. As one observer notes, 'Modern colonialism did more than extract tribute, goods and wealth from the countries that it conquered – it restructured the economies of the latter, drawing them into a complex relationship with their own, so that there was a flow of human and natural resources between colonized and colonial countries' (Loomba 2005, 9). Walter Rodney, in his seminal work *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,* shows that colonialism not only took away human and natural resources of the colonies but distorted the local economy and economic relations with regional countries. In the long run, negative effects of colonialism entrenched the underdeveloped status of the colonies (Rodney 1982, chap. 4). Loss of effective labor force resulted in a society that is unable to tame the wild forests for agriculture and more production for the community.

Marxist distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist types of colonialism was coupled with other considerations. Because colonial powers enlarged territorially by invading African, Asian or South American communities, the latter process was also named imperialism. It is a well-known phenomenon that direct political rule is not in question in colonies since the decolonization in the second half of 20th century but former colonies remain tied to their former colonial power both politically and economically through established relationships. That is why, former colonies, in spite of gaining independence, are called to be subject of neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism, which are two interchangeably used terms (Loomba 2005, 9–12). For example MacQueen (2007) refers to the colonialism of 19th and 20th century as the 'new imperialism' arguing that imperialism is much older phenomenon. The economic and social relations of dependency and control ensure both captive labor as well as markets for European industry as well as goods.

When the European powers set out for expeditions in hope of discovering new fertile lands rich in natural resources, they were motivated more by material incentives than by moral imperatives. Conquest of the global south and invasion of territories rich in natural resources were justified through various concepts. For example, during

glorious days of the British imperialism, ruling elites used the medieval concept of *translatio imperii* (Latin for transfer of rule), which suggested that legitimate political power to rule was first translated from Greece to Rome and then to western Europe, used as a justification for imperial ambitions of the colonial powers (Loomba 2015, 8). The colonial powers, in particular the French, justified their expeditions on the North Africa by calling their campaigns *mission civilisatrice*. According to the French colonialists, by colonizing the Northern Africa, France will perpetrate a noble duty, which is civilizing the savage and barbaric communities of Northern Africa. Unsurprisingly, Lord Cramer who was the head of British Empire in Egypt strongly opposed use of veil by Egyptian women. He took this stance as a justification reason for the British rule in Egypt because Cramer believed that presence of the British had a noble mission in Egypt and that was civilizing the society (Chowdhry and Nair 2002, 20).

Apart from naming an era as post-colonialism or neo-colonialism, another major controversy in post-colonialism is what the term post-colonial signifies. In other words, which period of time or what portion of history is meant by post-colonialism? What point in history should be marked as the beginning of post-colonialism? If the post suffix refers to the aftermath of colonialism, should we start with decolonization of 1960s, the demise of colonialism?

Those who believe that the term post-colonialism should not be downgraded to mean the demise of colonialism because the complex political, economic and cultural relations and conjectures of the contemporary era are much newer than the past. According to some scholars, the term post-colonial does not only signify the end of colonialism by official means but also its continuity and persistence of colonial practices disguised as bilateral relations between two sovereign nations (Chowdhry and Nair 2002, 11). Such relationship, which is apparently between equal sovereign states but in fact an unequal, is designed in such a way that they serve the interests of the former colonial powers and maintain the dependent status of the ex-colonies. As Childs and Williams (1997, 5) argue,

In the period after decolonization, it rapidly became apparent that although colonial armies and bureaucracies might have withdrawn, Western powers were still intent on maintaining maximum indirect control over erstwhile colonies, via political, cultural and above all economic channels, a phenomenon which became known as neo-colonialism.

In response to the use post-colonialism, some critics of post-colonialism argue that the term should refer to the end of colonialism and not to the ongoing effects or presence in different forms. For example, those who oppose to expanding the term's coverage several decades argue that

The term "post-colonial" carries with it the implication that colonialism is now a matter of the past, undermining colonialism's economic, political, and cultural deformative-traces in the present. The "post-colonial" inadvertently glosses over the fact that global hegemony, even in the post-cold war era, persists in forms other than overt colonial rule' (Shohat 1992, 105).

Use of post-colonialism in broadest sense tends to make the term embrace almost all socioeconomic phenomena related to the colonialism. In a sense, it depicts a conjuncture that is a whole new episode in history. Periodization of history in such a triad way compels us to think that three periods of history, pre-colonial era, colonial era and post-colonial era, are all different from each other by certain features. But judging by the well-known features of colonialism such as exploitation or slavery, is it true that all these periods of history are totally different? It is difficult to say yes. In the colonial era, colonial powers had the physical control over the labor force of the colonized communities through coercive methods. Early phases of colonialism transferred labor force to where production was. In other words, through slavery, the imperial powers transferred the labor force to the farms in different parts of the world where agricultural production used to take place. 19th century colonialism, however, which is characterized by capitalism, was well known by transferring production to where forced labor was

abundant. In the last century, instead growing cash crops and agricultural commodities in their homeland, colonial powers moved their farms to Africa or Asia where forced labor was in their service for almost free of charge. Since the decolonization, relationship between production and labor has not changed dramatically. With high pressure from international financial institutions towards expansion free trade, gigantic companies of the West move their production facilities to low-income countries, where they have not forced labor but people who are content with minimum or less wages.

Seen from such a long term historical perspective, relationship between production and labor has not changed over centuries. Exploitation of underdeveloped communities by the capitalist class continues in different forms as it was in the pre-colonial era. It is for this reason that in *Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism"* Anne McClintock (1992, 87) defines post-colonialism as 'prematurely celebratory'. Similarly, Childs and Williams believe that in spite of some differences in the relationships between the colonizer and the colonized and effect of the colonialism on present day relationship, post-colonialism cannot be regarded as a fully achieved state. They argue that

> There is a form of perverseness in taking the label 'post-' for a state which is not yet fully present, and linking it to something which has not fully disappeared, but in many ways that paradoxical in-betweenness precisely characterizes the post-colonial world (Childs and Williams 1997, 7).

McClintock criticizes post-colonialism on two more grounds (McClintock 1992, 85–86). First, she argues that post-colonialism draws a linear line of history. By employing a triad periodization, dividing history into pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras, post-colonialism views history as a series of stages followed by one another and divided by colonial experience. It is believed that Third World literature progresses from being a protest literature to a higher status of resistance literature and then to national literature. This is what McClintock objects by arguing that post-colonialism, in fact, establishes a sequential linear progression while it attempts to demolish the sequential progression narrative of the enlightenment. Second, post-

colonialism, like post-structural theories, opposes the binary oppositions (self/other, metropole/colony, developed/undeveloped etc.) produced and constantly reconfirmed by the traditional theories. Yet, post-colonialism offers us a paradigm that is built upon a single binary opposition: colonial/post-colonial. In traditional theories, the binary oppositions are produced along the axis of power. That is to say that in traditional theories a character/attribute in a binary opposition is positioned against another according to its power relation between them. Colonizer/colonized or man/woman binary opposition are based on the power relations between them. But post-colonial theory reduces the whole narrative to a single binary opposition which is based on time. In other words, post-colonialism shifts the axis of binary oppositions from power to time. However, unlike power, time is not able to produce political nuances or cause significant realities between phenomena.

Another problem with the term post-colonialism to which we should pay attention is a sort of contradictory feature of post-colonialism. Leading scholars of post-colonialism pays enormous attention to culture and view it as fundamental piece of the paradigm. However, the role of culture is downplayed by post-colonialism. Just like capitalism, colonialism was not experienced at the same degree throughout the colonized parts of the world. Even in a single political entity, extent of the penetration of colonial administration's authority varied dramatically. Spanish colonialism was not as same as the British colonialism in Hong Kong or Portuguese colonialism in Southeast Asia. We do not have to diverse our perspective that wide. British colonialism in Africa was significantly different than French or German colonialism in many aspects such as use of violence, direct or indirect rule etc. Similarly the resistance to or independence struggles against colonial powers differed from one culture to another. Taking time as the main determinant of historical stages and categorization of all these countries with diverse cultures under a single rubric is tantamount to downplaying the role of culture.

In addition to discussion on post-colonialism's start point (i.e. when to start post-colonialism) and whether we should name our time as post-colonial era, another dimension on which post-colonialism debate focuses is "where", meaning which former colonies, should be included in the domain of post-colonialism. Should we include all

varieties of domination in post-colonialism? Or should we confine the domain of intellectual inquiry to the European colonization in the 19th century? A number of kingdoms in sub-Saharan Africa never gained their territory after decolonization; some became part of a new political entity (e.g. Igbos in Nigeria), while some were divided into more than one political entities (e.g. Somalia). Some African countries gained their independence from colonial powers after a bloody and long wars of independence such as Kenya or Algeria, whereas some other were granted their independence without a major war or a swift one, such as Ghana and Senegal. Following decolonization starting from the 1960s, many African rulers adopted the borders drawn by colonial powers rather than redrawing lines to create the pre-colonial political entities. This was mainly due to the inability of newly independent states to go through another episode of warfare to determine the borders (Herbst 2000). Eritrea maintained its struggle for decades and gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1991. Former British Somalia, which is today the autonomous region of Somalia called Somaliland, still struggles to receive international recognition and reject being under political rule of the Somalia elites in Mogadishu.

The point I am trying to make is that for the people of Somaliland, it is very difficult to call their current state as decolonized. If colonial era ended officially in the 1960s with the wave of independence ceremonies in sub-Saharan Africa, should we include Eritrea as decolonized until 1991? A more striking example is Kurdish people scattered in four Middle Eastern countries. In Kurdish media outlets ethno-nationalist Kurds refer to Turkish as well as Syrian or Iranian governments as colonial power. According to the discourse of the ethno-nationalist Kurdish groups in Turkey, southeast region of the country is the homeland of Kurdish people called Kurdistan, and therefore their homeland is being colonized by Turkish government. When viewed from this angle, colonial era has never been over for Kurdish people. In other words, post-colonialism is not a valid conception for several peoples across the word. McClintock makes a similar point and mentions the tension between England and Ireland and Palestine and Israel. According to her,

Ireland may, at a pinch, be "post-colonial," but for the
inhabitants of British-occupied Northern Ireland, not to mention
the Palestinian inhabitants of the Israeli Occupied Territories
and the West Bank, there may be nothing "post" about
colonialism at all. Is South Africa "post-colonial"? East Timor?
Australia? By what fiat of historical amnesia can the United
States of America, in particular, qualify as "post-colonial" - a
term which can only be a monumental affront to the Native
American peoples currently opposing the confetti triumphalism
of 1992 (McClintock 1992, 87).

Building upon these grounds, McClintock opposes the use of the term post-colonial
because she believes that it is too soon to call present as the post-colonial era.

Post-colonialism discussion presented so far reveals another quandary. Should
we include all former colonies no matter who the colonizer was? Should we confine our
discussion to the European colonialism alone? The United States of America consists of
former colonies of the British Empire and France. These two former colonial powers
ruled almost entire North America for over a century. Should post-colonialism be
interested in the USA? What about Canada? Should we regard Canada tantamount to
sub-Saharan African countries because they are all former colonies? Childs and
Williams raises a quite interesting point by drawing our attention to metropoles of
former colonial powers such as France and Britain (Childs and Williams 1997, 11).
Due to large-scale immigration from former colonies to the industrial cities of the
former colonial powers created a new situation that Childs and Williams prefer to call
'internal colonization'. These immigrant people often live a much worse lives relative to
the rest of the population and are marginalized in the society. Then these people still
live a sort of colonial life and wait for decolonization. These difficult to answer
situations are not considered as concern of post-colonial studies. Post-colonialism
currently focuses on former colonies of 19th and 20th century colonialism of European
powers in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

Another dimension of discussions on post-colonialism is related to history writing, in particular history of the colonized. The West has denied existence of any decent history in areas it colonized. Subject communities of colonies did have neither the chance nor the opportunity to write their experiences to write their own version of the history. Given the fact that colonial administrations downplayed spread of primary education in the colonies, colonial subjects were deprived of the opportunity and capability to write their own history. Colonized communities were deprived of schooling, education and necessary basic education such as learning how to read and write. In many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, when the colonial powers left, number of schools were less than a dozen. This resulted in enhanced influence of oral traditions in Africa's history writing, which makes the narratives of the past, often conveyed by the elders, questionable in the eyes of historians. Those who attempted to find out history of Africa through scientific methodology often referred to the written books. Interestingly, a great deal of books on the history of pre-colonial and colonial Africa is written not by Africans but Europeans. As a consequence, not only the colonized perspective in history writing is excluded but also their agency is taken away. As Ahmad (1995, 6) notes

> It is worth remarking, though, that in periodizing our history in the triadic terms of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial the conceptual apparatus of 'postcolonial criticism' privileges as primary the role of colonialism as the principle of structuration in that history, so that all that came before colonialism becomes its own prehistory and whatever comes after can only be lived as infinite aftermath. That may well be how it appears to those who look at that history from the outside ... but not to those who live inside that history.

Taking his home country, India, as an example, Aijaz Ahmad highlights the difficulty of treatment of the social and cultural implications and results of colonialism as separate. He maintains that such a treatment will not possible for India because of entangled

nature of gender, caste and class throughout pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras.

Writing the history of the colonized by Western priorities and by placing the colonizer at the center does not provide us an objective and impartial account of the past, and therefore a fair understanding of the present relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Such a paradigm inevitably excludes non-European and non-Western elements in history writing and overlooks their agency because the colonizer speaks and writes for the colonized. As a result, the colonized is rendered insignificant and even invisible in the history written by the colonizer. Just like Africa, many ex-colonies were deprived of their pre-colonial histories. In other words, these colonies entered into the world history with modern capitalist colonialism, and thus their "history" began. But this time, the so-called modern history of the colony focuses on the colonizer and overlooks and marginalizes the colonized.

Post-colonialism opposes such history writing and rejects placing European experiences as benchmarks in periodization or bringing the Western characters to the fore. For example, Gyan Prakash (1992, 17) focuses on the historiography of India from a post-colonial perspective and critique the existing approaches. He says that history in India is "flawed at birth" and "has lived an embattled life". According to Prakash, nationalism and Marxism in India grew as a response to colonial narrative of history. Nationalist attempts of historiography reversed the Orientalist discourse by attributing agency to the colonized Indian subjects. Marxist historiography of India, on the other hand, was flawed because it assumed mode of production narrative of Europe as a universal experience. Marxist narrative overlooks the fact that capitalism developed in India more differently than Europe. Yet, Prakash argues, both employed master-narratives that attribute a key role to Europe and place the European outlook at the center. Taking a post-colonial stand in historiography of India, Prakash adamantly rejects taking Western experiences as benchmarks in writing history of colonized people. He argues that

> We cannot thematize Indian history in terms of the development
> of capitalism and simultaneously contest capitalism's

homogenization of the contemporary world. Critical history
cannot simply document the process by which capitalism
becomes domi-nant, for that amounts to repeating the history we
seek to displace; instead, criticism must reveal the difference
that capitalism either repre-sents as the particular form of its
universal existence or sketches it only in relation to itself
(Prakash 1992, 13).

Providing a post-colonial critique of Indian historiography, elsewhere Prakash highlights outstanding themes of nationalist or Marxist oriented Indian historiography. According to Prakash, instead of dealing with national origin or the colonized identity of the colonized Indian society, Indian historiography focuses on the subject position of the colonized. He argues that 'because the experience and expression of subordination are discursively formulated, we are led back to the processes and forces that organize the subordinate's subject position'(Prakash 2000, 181-182). Furthermore, Prakash elucidates that while Indian historiography takes a third world stance against Orientalist and colonial narratives of history, this third world stance results in engagement of Indian history into the dominant historiography in the world rather than differentiate the colonized society and produce a unique and differentiated historiography peculiar to the colonized.

Although not considered as one of the pundits of post-colonial studies, probably the foundational work emphasizing this point is Eric Wolf's *Europe and the People Without History*. Obviously, the title of the book is an irony. Wolf, challenges the long-held conception that prior to capitalism and globalization the world was divided into small civilized groups of people concentrated in the Western Europe on the one hand, and uncivilized and underdeveloped communities on the other (Wolf 2010). Wolf argues that because the West believed that the latter did not have a worthwhile history prior to colonialism academic circles have long assumed that it is right to start history of the latter group with arrival of colonialism. Wolf explicitly shows that the world prior to colonialism was inter-connected by means of commercial relations. Again contrary to the conventional wisdom, Wolf argues that societies often ignored by Western

historiography actually resisted to the Western attempts to permeate their territory. With a Marxist narrative starting from 15th century and ending in 20th century, Wolf shows as a result of expansion of commerce and interaction with non-European societies, new religions, identities and cultures were born which were later colonized.

3. POST-COLONIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Post-structural studies, notably the works by Foucault, Gramsci and Derrida, inspired a number of scholars. Long, tedious and deep intellectual efforts resulted in emergence of a new school of thought called post-colonialism. Since its birth in academic circles, post-colonialism triggered a great deal of admiration, controversy and skepticism among pundits of social sciences and humanities. This was mainly due to its critical stand of the prevailing Western thoughts and, probably more importantly, the fact that early prominent post-colonial scholars were of non-Western origin. In other words, non-Western/non-European scholars devised and foregrounded an alternative theory that challenges the long-held Western clichés on ontological and epistemological grounds. It is not surprising that post-colonial theory was first systematically developed and improved by those scholars who were either born or grew in a country that was once colonized or still is a colony. As Ahluliwa [CITATION NEEDED] rightfully notes, Edward Said, Jacques Derrida or Foucault was able to think out of the box and harshly criticize the status quo in academia because of their experiences of colonialism.

Edward Said is often considered the founder of post-colonial theory. Said, who had a long career as an English professor at Columbia University, was born in Palestine before the State of Israel came into being in 1947. Therefore, he grew up with first hand experiences as well as narratives of the British colonial administration in Palestine. Said's seminal work, *Orientalism*, was first published in 1978. Said basically argues that the Western powers, particularly Britain and France, engaged in colonialism created a version of the Orient for Western consumption that had little to do with the actual orient. By Orient, Said's main concern is the Arab world. But it is obivous that the book also discusses orientalism in respect to India, Africa and other parts of the non-Western world.

According to Said, imperial powers used East-West dichotomy as the ontological and epistemological basis of their knowlege production. It is this false base of the knowledge that produced racially biased knowledge upon which the Western powers legitimized their imperial projects. Said defines orientalism as 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" (and most of the time) and "the Occident". Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers. political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social, descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, "mind," destiny, and so on' (Said 1978, 2–3).

Adopting a Foucaultian approach, Said views orientalism as a discourse. Two key concepts in Said's *Orientalism* are image and other. Image is not tangible, and entails representation of *the other* in one form or another. Starting with the first adventurers and travellers of the Western Empires, for centuries, writers, poets, painters and scientists depicted the East as what the binary opposite of themselves. Such acts inevitably entail representation. It is the representation, Said argues, that reproduces the orientalism. For Said, orientalism is not only a collection of works that misrepresent the orient. What is more important is that these misrepresentations appear in almost every discipline of art and humanities in an organized form and created a kind of repertory. The problem is, in Said's words, that Western image of the Orient produced by orientalism 'had little to do with the "real" orient'.

It would be wrong to assume orientalist works only as a collection of productions of a biased artistic perspective. Said believes that orientalism had a political vision that through production of works on the differences between the West and the East and promoting these differences helps entrenchment of the Western domination over the East. Over centuries, orientalism produced a body of theory and practice which are used by scholars of the following decades. In a sense, orientalism was an investment in order to impose and maintain the Western domination over the East by means of academic scholarship.

On the grounds of challenging the Western imperialism and dominance as well as acknowledging the subjugation of the colonized societies, one may draw parallel between dependency theory and post-colonialism. Ilan Kapoor (2002) attempts to read dependency theory and postcolonial theory from the eyes of each other and critique each theory from the other's perspective. Kapoor does not intent to reconcile them nor does he synthesise. However, he demonstrates that these two theories can function in a complementary way because each theory focuses on what the other ignores to examine in depth.

According to conventional wisdom of the mid-20th century, societies are considered modern or traditional to the extent of their exposure to outside capitalist world. Societies that are exposed tend to become modern, while those societies that lack such an exposure remain traditional. Andre Gunder Frank challenges this view and argues that 'underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage ... [but] is generated by the very same historical process which also [generates] economic development: development of capitalism itself' (quoted in Kapoor 2002, 648). Kapoor notes that, judging by modernism, many countries in Latin America were undeveloped in pre-colonial times, but these countries became underdeveloped with the arrival of capitalism to the continent. It is this very condition, as Rodney (1982) concluded in the case of Africa's colonization, that made Europe's modernization possible.

Andre Gunder Frank believes that economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin. He does not believe that the national bourgeoisie is likely to play a significant role towards economic development even after the nation's political independence because its role is tantamount to collaboration of imperialism. It is very unlikely to find considerable bourgeoisie class in former colonies that gained independence in the second half of the 20th century. Even if there is, Frank argues, the interests of this class is so inextracably linked to the interests of imperialists that bourgeoisie can help nothing but deepen underdevelopment. The only escape from this doomed destiny is adopt a socialist system. To achieve this

objective, Frank believes that the working class should start a revolutionary struggle to topple the capitalist system, even adopt guerilla warfare.

Similar to Frank, in studying capitalism, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto adopt a structural approach and regard capitalism as a 'world system'. Their approach differ from Frank's considerably in that they refuse to see development and underdevelopment as the opposite sides of the same coin. According to Cardoso and Faletto, underdevelopment is not mere result of capital accumulation, which is at the center of Marxist paradigm. According to them, underdevelopment is the result of 'relations and struggles between social classes and groups at the international as well as at the local level' (Kapoor 2002, 649). Cardoso and Faletto also differ from Frank in the degree of attention they attribute to the study of social groups and practices and their central role in reproduction of and/or resistance to imperialism. For Cardoso and Faletto, the form of alliance established between local and foreign classes, groups or ideologies (e.g. peasantry, national or collaborating bourgeoisie, state populism, multinational corporations, international financial systems, foreign states etc.) may function in such a way that it creates local dependency. While Frank vehemently opposes to any possibility of pro-development alliance between foreign and local actors, Cardoso and Faletto suggest that it is possible that ruling bourgeoisie is likely to form alliances with local classes so that it can isolate itself from foreign actors' influence and its interests are protected. Thus Cardoso and Faletto develop a new dependency paradigm in which dependent relations with the imperialists are likely to lead to some development and growth and does not have to cause underdevelopment. In other words, unlike Frank who views the relations of the third world countries with the imperialists as zero-sum game, Cardoso and Faletto believe that there might be alternative outcomes in such relationships. Development can occur while dependency continues. Despite of these differences, they believe that dependency ties must be broken and a path towards socialism must be followed. However, for Cardoso and Faletto, it does not necessarily mean that the path must be revolutionary.

According to Kapoor, dependency theory and post-colonial theory converge on two common points. First, both theories are ardently committed to critique of

modernity. The West has long tended to neglect examining its past. But these theories emphasize the importance of the study of the Western imperialism's past its consequences on the current situation in the Third World. Dependency theory deals with the underdeveloped status of the Third World, while post-colonialism focuses on its marginalization.   Second, both theories are critical of neo-liberalism and neo-liberal policies of the West. Dependency theory argues that neo-liberal policies of the imperial powers of the West caused fierce underdevelopment across the global South. Post-colonialism suggests that neo-liberal policies, particularly in the post-Cold War period with the decolonization, stripped the former colonies off their agency.

In spite of their counter-liberal and counter-modernity stand, the two theories differ dramatically. From the postcolonial standpoint, dependency does not pay sufficient attention to culture and power of representation. For Cardoso and Faletto, culture is a factor but only in relation to political economy, meaning that culture matters only it helps or hinders economic development. Postcolonial theory also criticizes dependency theor for its use of binary oppositions. By constructions of binary oppositions in their discourse (e.g. developed-underdeveloped, center-periphery, metropole-satelite etc.) they leave the former unexamined while taking the latter as granted, withtout further examination. Such a stand reinforces the central position of the West because it is these binary oppositions through which the West facilitates and legitimizes its imperial ambitions. Thus, by ignoring the power relations between these binary oppositions are leaving them unanalyzed dependency theory unwittingly helps the maintenance of the imperial relations and neo-colonialism.

Dependency theory can also be accused of being orientalist by postcolonial theory. Dependency theorists use Europe as a universal model of development which has to be emulated, as if no other alternative model of development can be possible. In this way of thinking, countries in the Third World are regarded as failures. Therefore, postcolonial theory objects master historical narratives of dependency theory. For example, Prakash (1992; 2000) argues for a post-colonial approach in historiography of India and suggests that the dominant views in fact underpin the existing structure of caste and class in India.

Another point of disparity between dependency and postcolonial theories concerns the configuration of power. Dependency theory focuses more on imperialism and capitalism as the source of power. Imperial ambitions, material capabilities, possesing means of production are all vital for power generation in dependency theory. However, postcolonialism focuses on discourse, representation, orientalism because it highlights the relationship between knowledge and power. Post-colonialism believes that imperialism owes its might in part to the biased and otherizing knowledge it produced about the 'East'.

Dependency theory does not foresee a development possibility or resistance to the imperial power under colonialism. The only possible solution to recuperate is a total regime change to socialism, either through violent revolution (for Andre Gunder Frank) or through transforming the relationship between the local bourgeoisie and foreign actors. Post-colonialism, however, views this position problematic. Post-colonialism opposes the replacement of totalizing power of colonial regime with totalizing power of socialism. For post-colonialists, in both cases, third world subjects are passive and bystander, and more importantly, underdevelopment and western domination are likely to persevere under a totalizing regime.

In the past, there existed some intellectual attempts to link post-colonialism and international relations discipline and the former's incorporation among the theories of international relations (Chowdhry and Nair 2002; Darby and Paolini 1994). Apparently, those attempts seem to be successful. Textbooks on global politics and international relations published in recent years include post-colonialism among theories. The volume edited by Chowdhry and Nair (2002) argues that the need of the social sciences today is not to bridge post-colonial theory and fundamental notions of international relations but rather to unravel the impacts of imperial era on the present international relations and challenge the hierarchical structure of the discipline. On the other hand, Darby and Paolini (1994) emphasize the need for a new discourse in international relations discipline, and encourage intellectual struggles to bridge the two. According to them, traditional international relations theories and post-colonial theory have both their own strengths and weaknesses. Therefore a dialogue between the two can help scholars

overcome the theoretical predicament the discipline is currently in. Darby and Paolini compare international relations and post-colonialism like two ships pass in the night. Though they are similar, they are not aware of each other.

Darby and Paolini point to three areas of difference that a possible engagement of post-colonialism and international relations is likely to have significance for the discipline (Darby and Paolini 1994, 384). First area of possible engagement is power and representation. Although a central concept in international relations, power is rarely debated in the discipline. Power is often understood in economic or military terms and its key referents such as deterrence, force, threat, are understood one-dimensionally. Power of representation, on the other hand, draws almost no attention in the academic circles. Post-colonialism, however, recalling Foucault who emphasized the relationship between power and knowledge, sees power as the essential element in the discourse and language construction. Post-colonialism believes that Western scholarly and artistic works represent the non-Western, or the other, in different forms in such a way that the knowledge produced will eventually help the imperial project of western domination over the rest of the world. In other words, post-colonialism sees a strong relationship between knowledge produced by representation and political power. With regard to exerting power through knowledge and establishing domination, one is likely to inquire whether there exists any resistance. Darby and Paolini argue that an overall assessment of the historical trajectory of imperial relationship with the colonized implies that post-colonial account of both Western dominance and resistance of the Third World is exaggeration. They suggest that dominance through power of knowledge, just like power in international relations, is often taken for granted to have a coherent influence to establish domination. Investigation of knowledge, if there exists any at considerable level, by the Third World is weak and mostly insufficient. Resistance is considered an exaggeration of post-colonialism because, given long duration of imperial dominance in the Third World, even if there existed resistance, it is contentious to believe that such resistance was successful.

Relationship of international relations and post-colonialism to modernity constitutes the second are where these two discourses can converse. International

relations as a discipline in itself is considered as the 'dutiful child of modernity'. Contrary to this view, post-colonialism is in part an intellectual rebellion and contest against modernity. It is widely accepted that international relations discipline is heavily dominated by realism or liberalism or their variant paradigms. These paradigms are enormously shaped by the thoughts of the European Enlightenment. The core teachings of that era are in large part accepted as universal and incorporated into theories of social sciences and humanities emerged in the West, more interestingly viewed applicable to the rest of the world without any further inquiry. The notion of nation-state, for example, is strictly defined in terms of territoriality as a construction of European thought during the Renaissance years. For over centuries, traditional international relations theories in large part accept this notion as the foundation for producing theories. Post-colonialism, on the other hand, critically examines the notions dictated by the European Enlightenment. Viewing neo-colonialism and globalization as the consequence of imperialism project of the West, post-colonialism underpins its intellectual stance by retrieving culture and local norms and values in order to unsettle modernity and its teachings about the politics in general.

As the third area, Darby and Paolini are concerned with emotional commitment and political leaning differences between the two discourses. According to them, international relations represent what they call 'rearguard of the old formations of knowledge', while post-colonialism represents the new. So, these two discourses are located at the opposite poles. They argue that international relations discipline has been the discourse of those who hold power. As a result, the discipline possessed the discourse of the powerful. It emerged as a discipline in Europe in inter-war period, and moved to the United States following the World War II. In the second half of the 20th century, the discipline spread across the world but with limited modifications. Thus, the paradigm of the center became the major paradigm of the periphery with the center's own notions and values. Moreover, international relations distanced from values and morality to such an extent that Waltz argued that states that act in line with morality will have to bear dire consequences. Post-colonialism, on the other hand, emerged as the paradigm of the periphery challenging the center. In other words, international relations represents dominance and the worldview of the powerful at the center, while post-

colonialism represents the resistance and the worldview of the marginalized and disenfranchized.

Even with its current intellectual and theoretical strength, post-colonialism can help us better account for some phenomena in international relations than the traditional positivist theories. First of all, post-colonialism can enable us to challenge the ontological, epistemological and ideological authority of the dominant West and the Western elite knowledge which facilitated and legitimized the imperial project. In *Orientalism*, Edward Said explicitly elucidates how discursively gendered and racially biased knowledge plays a key role in the spread and maintenance of imperialism. Knowledge produced by the Western elites and its relationship to power has dramatically shaped the way the international community viewed security predicaments in the Third World countries and remedies to address failed state debacles of the many sub-Saharan African nations. Post-colonial theory rejects the dominance of the Western knowledge as the given and centrality of the Western experience in history righting as well as analyses of current developments.

Second, foreign policies of many countries that used to be colony is significantly influenced by the old colonial relationships with their former colonial power. Even though colonialism is over and the nature of the relationships has changed from being a colonial one to a diplomatic one, former colonial powers still exert influence both politically and economically over their ex-colonies to shape their foreign policies. This is what is called neo-colonialism by some.

It is not dubious that nature and dynamics of the modern international relations were markedly shaped and determined by colonialism and its aftermath. As mentioned earlier, international relations discipline is heavily dominated by the realist school, which represents the discourse of the major powerful Western states. Foundational texts of the international relations have laid out their arguments from the perspective of the Western imperial powers. International relations discipline, for the founding fathers of the international relations discipline, was a discipline to understand the nature of relationships between the imperial powers and the reasons behind the wars among those imperial powers. As ravishingly presented by Wolf (2010), when the relations between

the imperial powers were examined, the rest of the world in general and the colonized societies in particular were denied existence in historiography. Therefore, we have to concede that, as Darby and Paolini (1994, 380) notes, 'imperial relations were not international relations' as the latter was imposed upon the academia worldwide. Beier emphasize the same point by saying that 'that international relations is simultaneously subject and object of advanced colonialism' (Beier 2002, 88). Therefore, any topic examined in international relations with regard to former colonies cannot be well understood without a post-colonial perspective.

Prior to the arrival of colonial powers, there used to exist a great deal of political entities in various froms in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the traditional international relations paradigms, neither these kingdoms, clans or other political entities nor the colonies are considered as part of the international system. Those political entities had their own "international relations" with the major powers of their time. Many political entities with predominantly Muslim population in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa maintained diplomatic relations with the Ottoman State, especially after the 16th century with the tranmission of the Khalifate from Egypt to Istanbul. Other East African societies had large scale commercial and diplomatic relations with China and India who were the major powers in the East. Analyzed from this perspective, we have the right to challenge the traditional narrative of the international relations discipline and ask, like Andre Gunder Frank (1996), if the world system is really five hunderd years old, or five thousand. Many decades later other disciplines such as anthropology took on the role to acknowledge the existence of and studying the peoples, societies, cultures and states that constitute the majority of the current international system. However, due to the organized nature of Orientalism, racially biased knowledge produced by such social scientists helped nothing but reproduction of the Other the West wish to maintain. As Beier (2002, 85) argues,

> Interestingly, many of the same assumptions that underpin the orthodoxy of international relations and its more fundamental political commitments may be found at the root of a number of orthodox anthropological and historiographical accounts ... This

shared commitment suggests the arbitrariness of the disciplinary division of knowledge which, coincidental with the racial ideologies of late nineteenth-century imperialism, marked out anthropology as a discrete sphere within which to construct discourses about those others.

In short, post-colonial perspective will help us critically assess the neo-libereal peacebuilding and its impact on the war-torn societies. Traditional theories present us the Western societies and advise us to take their current systems as example. Dubious success of neoliberal peacebuilding in creating sustainable peace and preventing civil war recurrence compels us to consider alternative perspectives. Post-colonial perspective will allow us to think out of the box and evaluate development not by criteria set by the Westerners but by more objective indigenous criteria. As imposed upon us by modernism theory, we are inclined to uphold liberal and Western values and to accept them as the only available path to development and growth. Post-colonial theory facilitates contemplation about alternative possibilities on government types, administrative models and economic systems.

4. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, not only the structure of the international system but also the way international affairs are run has changed. With the withdrawal of a super power from the international political scene, frequency, magnitude and vision of the United Nations intervention to civil wars changed. Following the invasion of Egypt in 1956 by Britain, France and Israel, the UN deployed the first peacekeeping mission. With the consent of the all parties, United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) supervised the departure of foreign troops out of Egypt and monitored Egypt-Israel border. In the following years and decades, tasks of the UN forces were mostly limited to overseeing peace agreements, patrolling borders, and securing humanitarian aid delivery. The main objective was to prevent overt violence in order to curb regionalization of the conflict and to create an environment in which belligerents can make peace.

With their limited mandates and authorization to use force, peacekeepers face a challenging task of keeping peace and maintaining order so that belligerents can sort out their problems and reach a lasting peace. Deployment of peacekeeping mission does not necessarily mean that the consent of the people is acquired. At times, peacekeeping missions are deployed in a war shattered country because they are invited by the ruling elites to oversee a negotiation process. Given the undemocratic and authoritarian governance modalities of parties in a civil war, invitation of peacekeepers is a reflection of the top leaders' consent, rather than of the whole rebel group. Factions within a rebel group are highly likely to oppose deployment of peacekeeping force and signing a peace agreement, although the top echelons of the rebel group agree so. Disagreement among rebel groups over whether to sign a peace/ceasefire agreement results in observation of small scale skirmishes in rural areas, although violence ends in the capital city. It is for this reason that deployment of peacekeepers is not equivalent to termination of violence throughout the country. Rather, the international community care more about what Roberts (2011) calls a popular peace: "democratic expression and prioritization of everyday needs, defined by local people". General tendency among external actors is often cessation of hostilities, termination of overt violence in the capital. Prevention of overt violence in the streets of the capital city and running the basic services in public offices creates a political environment that gives hope elites that peace is possible.

Throughout the Cold War, neither the US nor the Soviet Union allowed the UN peace operations to intervene in the domestic affairs of the war-torn countries. This was mainly due to their concern of protecting their spheres of influence, rather than respect to the sovereignty of their allies. For more than four decades, the UN peacekeeping operations observed the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of the host nation and use of armed force for self-defense purpose only. In only two cases the UN deviated from this pattern. In what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN took on the role of providing military assistance to the government. In New Guinea, the UN governed the entire country for seven months, from October 1962 to April 1963. Other than these cases, the Cold War politics, veto-wielding powers interests and ambitions to maintain influence in their allies prevented any possible UN involvement in the domestic affairs of a war-shattered country.

Number of peace operations more than doubled between 1989 and 1999. While the UN deployed only 15 peace operations from its creation to 1989, number of peace operations deployed from 1989 to 1999 was 33 (Paris 2004). These peace operations of the 'new world order' were different from the previous ones. The first signal of change came from Boutros Ghali, then the Secretary General of the United Nations. In a policy statement published in 1992, Boutros Ghali introduced a new categorization of peace operations by drawing distinctions between them. First category was peacekeeping, referring to deployment of UN military personnel with traditional mandates of observing peace agreements and border patrol. Second category was peace enforcement, referring to 'deployment of missions that were heavily armed and authorized to use armed force for purposes other than self-defense. Operations in Bosnia and Somalia are examples of peace enforcement operations. Finally, Boutros Ghali offered a third type of peace operation: post-conflict peacebuilding. By that, he defines the concept as the task 'to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace' (Boutros-Ghali 1992: para.21). Roland Paris defines peacebuilding as an attempt 'to bring war-shattered states into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance' (2002:638). Obviously, peacebuilding is a daunting task and impossible to be handled by the war-torn country alone. That is why, post-conflict peacebuilding requires engagement of a variety of international actors in a wide range of operations such as monitoring and holding elections, providing humanitarian and technical assistance, rebuilding physical infrastructure, advising as well as training security personnel and judicial officials (Paris 1997,55). Judging by these criteria, most of the peace operations in the post-Cold War era are obviously fall under the post-conflict peacebuilding category.

Towards the end of the 20th century, a holistic approach dominated responses to security predicaments of post-conflict environments. What was common in the countries shattered by civil war was a weak or failed state that is unable to adequately deal with problems arising in the society. As discussed in detail in previous chapter, civil wars break out in countries where people have grievances, are poor and excluded from the state institutions. Therefore, the remedy to establish permanent and sustainable peace (i.e. positive peace) was to rebuild the failed state. State building refers to

'constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security' (Chandler 2006:1). Post-war statebuilding has been defined as a process of the 'strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts' (Paris and Sisk 2009:14). In a publication of Economic Commission for Africa, state building is defined as 'efforts by national actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions, where these have been seriously eroded or are missing' (Maponga and Abdullah 2012). State building was so prioritized by Western scholars that failed states were identified as the source of the world's most severe problems such as poverty, terrorism, and even AIDS. According to this approach, once Western-like institutions are created, relations between former belligerent groups can be managed without resorting to violence through peaceful mechanisms of democratic state.

It seems that a single approach dominates and guides state building projects in war shattered countries as well as fragile countries that are not trapped in but likely to experience civil war. Especially the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union consolidated this particular peacebuilding approach which is known as neoliberal peacebuilding. This approach envisages transferring political and economic structures of the West to conflict torn countries. Neoliberal peacebuilding promotes establishment of liberal democracy where multiple political parties compete for power in regularly held free and fair election, while free market oriented economic model is propagated to structure the economy. Roland Paris, defines liberal market democracy as a 'system of governance that emphasizes periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, respect for basic civil liberties (including freedom of speech, assembly and conscience), and the principles and practices of market-oriented economics' (2002, 638 fn.4). The aim of liberal peace in the post-Cold War era, according to Duffield (2001, 11), is "to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies …. into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities".

One of the main reasons for this apparent prevalence of neo-liberal peacebuilding is the ideological and institutional bias of international liberalism and the dominant actors of the major international institutions (Ogbaharya 2008). Major

international financial institutions involved in peacebuilding, namely the World Bank and the IMF, are liberal democracy and free market oriented organs dominated by Western countries. Bias of these international organs became more prominent at the end of the Cold War, with the sudden disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The UN, IMF and the World Bank were less vigorous supporters of liberal internationalism and neo-liberal peacebuilding. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly emphasized the UN's support for representative democracy by passing a resolution in 1991 declaring that 'periodic and genuine elections' are a 'crucial factor in the effective enjoyment … of a wide range of other human rights" (Paris 2002, 641). This bias inevitably leads Western paradigms to dominate the activities of these institutions. Even Boutros-Ghali (1992: prg.59), in *An Agenda for Peace*, equates democracy with peace and underscores promotion of good governance. As Richmond (2010, 667) puts it, key organs 'have been captured, ideologically and materially, by those who have more direct access to the liberal international edifice'. Because the richer and more developed nations have more influence in international organizations, the activities of such institutions are highly influenced and shaped by the values of these rich and developed nations.

Decades of peacekeeping and peacebuilding experiences have proved that presence of UN troops and non-military officers may help prevent recurrence of full scale civil war but not creating a permanent peace. Presence of peacekeeping missions for a long time creates a superficial, or what Oliver Richmond (2004) prefers to call "virtual peace". This is also named as "negative peace" which refers to the absence of explicit violence, while "positive peace" refers to the condition whereby no large scale violence is observed and the underlying conflict is resolved. That is to say that the challenge the international community faces is more than just keeping peace and preventing eruption of large scale violence. That solving the underlying causes of the conflict so that civil war recurrence can be avoided becomes a more prioritized agenda for the international community. Then, the question becomes how to keep peace and solve the problem that created the civil war in the first place.

With the end of the Cold War, the belief that political and economic liberalism can offer a panacea for a wide range of complex problems in fragile states was widely shared in developed nations. The United States and other Western nations had not any obstacle to implement their preferred type of governance modality (i.e. neoliberal democracy), which was declared the ultimate form of human government and endpoint humanity's socio-cultural evolution (Fukuyama 1992). Both Afghanistan and Iraq cases demonstrated that in spite of involvement of a number of external actors, both state and non-state actors, and billions of dollars poured into war shattered countries do not guarantee a sustainable and permanent peace. What went wrong? Why did peacebuilding attempts collapse in spite of the engagement of major powers and investment of staggering amount of resources?

5. NEOLIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND ITS CRITIQUE

Liberal internationalism has been the ideological premises on which the post-Cold War peacebuilding missions were built. It was hoped as a lasting solution to one of the greatest challenges of the international community in the post-Cold War era: recurring civil wars. It was assumed that the most feasible way to consolidate peace is to establish liberal democracies and market-oriented economies in post-conflict settings. This understanding of peacebuilding was applied in almost every peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War era, regardless of geographical location of the host nation.

State and institution building processes in the post-conflict settings entails a great deal of international intervention in the domestic affairs of failed states to create a governance model that is viable to provide basic needs of their citizens and to remain stable so that they do not pose a security threat to other states. Intervention in failed states creates an unfair and unbalanced political partnership between the international and the local actors. Because the host states are weak, both politically and economically, they are in great need of external political and economic support to maintain peace, even for a limited period for strategic purposes. It is for this reason that international actors are regarded as prophets and they hold enormous amount of sway in the preparation of peace agreements, establishment of the institutions, and creation of constitutions. As one scholar notes, this environment provides international actors

conducive environment to test their development theories (Barbara 2008, 308). Failure of applied development model in a failed state does not induce a cost or burden for the international actor because they are accountable neither to the host state nor to another international governance body.

International actors, dominated by Western countries, use this advantage to transfer norms and institutions of liberal democracy and free market economy to the host state. There are four main mechanisms by which international actors transfer their values to the war-torn country (Paris 2002). First, because international actors have political influence, power and expertise, they shape the content of the peace agreements during the negotiations and make sure that new government is founded on liberal democratic values. Second, during the implementation phase of the peace accords, with their expertise, international actors convince local actors to follow footprints of the Western liberal democracies. Third, many financial aid providing agencies impose conditionalities in return of loan or grant releases. Imbursement, renewal or release of funds are tied to the implementation of some conditionalities which usually include reforms towards political and economic liberalization. Fourth, in some cases, the international actors take on governance roles on behalf of local authorities where they are unable or unwilling to undertake the administrative tasks. Through all these mechanisms, liberal values are imposed and neo-liberal institutions are established in the failed states.

The US invasion of Afghanistan following the 2001 terrorist attacks included several countries in the war coalition. The US-led war is considered ended with the end of NATO-led security mission (ISAF) at the end of 2014. In more than a decade, a number of countries suffered casualties and spent more than a trillion dollar. The invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition in 2003 made the American administrations in Washington learn a bitter lesson and pay a high price until the end of the war in 2011. True cost of the invasion of Iraq to the United States is never known. It is estimated somewhere above a trillion dollar. In both countries, the United States and coalition partners imposed democracy, helped these countries write constitution, hold elections, establish free market-oriented economy and state institutions such as banks, army,

police, judiciary. Left unrestrained with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had both the economic and political capability to establish its 'ideal' system in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US preferred to transform new Afghanistan and Iraq into a modern developed Western country with flourishing democracy and economy. But this project failed. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq is a beacon of hope in their regions. As of 2015, both Afghan and Iraqi governments have no control and sway beyond their capital cities.

One may think that these are cases of unilateral action, non-UN peacebuilding operations. Studies show that UN peacebuilding operations guided with neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm were not successful in the post-Cold War era (Paris 1997; 2004). Although their 'freeness' and 'fairness' are dubious, elections are regularly held in Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) approved by the UN is active in Somalia fighting Al-Qaida affiliated Al-Shabaab terror group. A number of NGOs and international governmental organizations operate in the country and pour significant amount of resources into the reconstruction of the country. Yet, the Somali government is barely able to rule the surrounding areas of the capital. Although regular elections are held and overt violence ceased in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both countries suffer electoral violence, human rights violations and rampant corruption.

Scholars have been critical about the effectiveness and legitimacy of post-Cold War peacebuilding missions guided with neoliberal paradigm. It seems that much of the criticisms are fair and legitimate. Nearly half of the peace support operations (both peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations) fail after around five years (Krause and Jütersonke 2005; Paris 2004). What makes the evaluation of peace operations more difficult is that the international community cannot reach a consensus on what a 'success' or a 'failure' means and determining a reasonable timeframe to measure. Several cases of post-conflict reconstruction failures make it imperative to question the viability and feasibility of neo-liberal peacebuilding in every post-conflict setting. Roland Paris believes that there is no "realistic alternative" to liberal peacebuilding strategy (2010: 340). However, cases studies in his book (2004) prove that current neo-liberal peacebuilding approach has some problems. Acknowledging the shortcomings of

the prevailing peacebuilding approach, he admits that post-conflict peacebuilding 'has arrived at a crossroad' and concludes that the challenge is not about "replacing or moving 'beyond' liberal peacebuilding but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal framework" (2010:337,362).

The major criticism for neo-liberal peacebuilding approach is raised by Roland Paris himself. In *At War's End*, Paris examines eleven peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War era across different parts of the world. As a result of examination of these cases, Paris demonstrates that the international community rushes to hold multiparty election in the war-affected country. Holding elections before the hostilities cool down, Paris argues, causes former rebel groups resort to violence should they lose the election. The defeated group is worried about discrimination and persecution due to lack of trust in the state institutions. Paris recommends the international community to adopt a more controlled and gradual approach to liberalization and focus more on institutions. But Paris fails to adequately elucidate how his "Institutionalization Before Liberalization" model is going to be implemented and how long the elections should be delayed so that the international community will be sure that tension among former belligerents has cooled. As a reaction to similar criticisms in the post-Cold War era peacebuilding missions, the international community undertook the administration of the entire country (e.g. in East Timor) and the country is run by diplomats of the international organizations until they are convinced that former belligerents can now rule the country on their own.

I must draw readers' attention to an irony of the post-Cold War peacebuilding as well as international transitional administrations in the post-conflict settings. As elucidated so far, international actors interfere in the domestic affairs of the failed states, while drafting peace agreements, deciding what kind of governance and economy model is more viable for the country, building state institutions or administering the entire country on behalf of the local people. Although such interventions take place in failed states, these are political entities which are legally sovereign. In the post-Cold War era, international actors impose a governance and economy model while the people have the right to determine how they are governed. The fact that a state is unable to

function, to deliver basic services to its citizens or to provide security does not strip a state off its sovereignty and rights given by the international law. Therefore, the current peacebuilding paradigm contradicts with the self-determination principle, a fundamental right of people granted in the international law.

Apart from contradicting self-determination principle, imposing liberal democracy as a part of the neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm is also problematic. It is believed that peace is possible as a result of a transformative process that replicates liberal democratic states of the West. However, cases of post-conflict reconstruction demonstrate that lasting peace is rarely possible with neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Bureaucrats of the international agencies tend to stay in a mission not more than two years. Therefore, they are more concerned with fictitious peace, rather than lasting positive peace. As a result, after a couple of years of peacebuilding efforts, war-torn country is left with a "virtual" peace, while the promise of the international actors is the establishment of Western-like democratic peace. As noted by an observer, "peace on the ground is simulated to be as it is in the liberal states, though in practice it may be more like the situation that existed in former colonial dependencies" (Richmond 2004, 85).

In addition to separation of belligerents and ending violence, peacebuilding operations of the post-Cold War era seek to establish peace through promotion of certain political reforms and establishment of multiparty democracy. In most cases, democracy is promoted as the most fundamental piece of a sustainable peace. Such a presumption is simple equation of peace not only democracy but with the Western style multiparty liberal democracy (Höglund and Kovacs 2010, 371). Building peacebuilding paradigm on a narrowed and single kind of democracy serves to stigmatize and demonize alternative democratic systems and governance models. Barkawi and Laffey (1999, 409) argue that the existing peacebuilding paradigm constitutes a hegemony on liberalism and suggest that it "defines out other historically valid democratic claims and may license violence against them". Especially in Africa, due to subconscious racial superiority beliefs, local input is totally ignored when it comes to building peace

because Western type of democracy, that is liberal peace, is the real peace (Taylor 2007, 556).

That liberal democracy works with limited problems in the Western countries does not necessarily mean that the same model will work perfectly for all war-torn countries. Presenting liberal democracy as the only viable option for lasting peace can endenger long term stability in fragile societies. Local actors should be able add their input during peace negotiations so that the governance model they will follow will be owned by the very people ruled by that system. More importantly, if liberal democracy is imposed as a conditionality during the peace negotiations or following the peace accords as a requirement for funding, then it is impossible to call it a "negotiated peace". It should be more appropriate to call it an "imposed peace" (Cooper, Turner, and Pugh 2011, 2001). In order for the international actors to bring about a sustainable peace, it is imperetive to create a governance model that reflects the values, mores, and culture of local actors. Otherwise will be stripping local actors off their agency, which is a legacy of colonial era.

One of the main factors that make peacebuilders embrace liberal democracy is the bureaucratic nature of the international agencies involved in peacebuilding. Unlike in the past, states privatize or subcontract many peacebuilding tasks to NGOs and international agencies in the post-Cold War era. These organizations employ officers who pursue a career in this field and seek promotion to a more prestigious and higher paying position. Therefore, for peacebuilding officers, handing over a calm and stable country to the successor officer is a primary goal. Because these organizations are bureaucratic structures, their officers develop defensive mechanisms to guarantee their career by avoiding taking initiatives and risks. It is for this reason that for peacebuilders implementation of peace agreements become a mechanic task where they fill out forms, prepare reports, draft constitutions that resemble their home countries, while leave more essential and fundamental issues unaddressed (Mac Ginty 2006, 3–4). Under the heavy load of bureaucratic tasks, peacebuilding officers are very unlikely to notice that positive peace does not flourish. Severine Autesserre argues that international peaceubilders "inhabit a separate world with its own time, space, and economics – and,

more importantly, its own system of meaning" (2014, 5). According to Autesserre, everyday elements (standard practices, shared habits and narratives) that characterize life and work in peaceland can be counterproductive and prevent peacebuilders from comprehending the dynamics of the conflict and addressing the root causes. As a result of the everyday elements in the peaceland, Autesserre argues, international peacebuilders "value thematic expertise over local knowledge. They favor technical, short-term, and top-down solutions to complex social, political, and economic problems" (Autesserre, 2014). Swamped with bureaucratic works, ignorance of local knowledge and lack of area expertise, peacebuilders inevitably fail to accurately analyze the conflict dynamics, realize whether negative or positive peace prevails and develop projects to establish lasting peace.

I have demonstrated that modern peacebuilding operations of the post-Cold War era are guided with neoliberal principles of liberal democracy and free market economy and characterized by ignorance of conflict dynamics and root causes, imposition of a single type of governance and economy model by excluding local input and creation of virtual peace. Paris (2002) draws our attention to the similarity between modern peacebuilding and *mission civilisatrice*. During the colonial era, the European imperial powers believed that they had a moral duty to 'civilize' their subjects in overseas. Of course there are a number of differences between old version of *mission civilisatrice* and the modern peacebuilding operations, as acknowledged by Paris himself. Nevertheless, what is common in both situations is the belief in the superiority of a set of norms and values and the undeniable fact that these norms and values are imposed to a society. John Ikenberry (2001:105,192) makes a similar remark and argues that major powers feel responsibility to maintain order as the greater good. In other words, for Ikenberry, internalization of democracy and free-market economy in war shattered countries are promoted by the major powers because inclusion of new members in the international system with such political and economic model will help the former further their national interests. Imposition of so-called superior and contemporary norms is often promoted at the expense of disregarding local values and ignoring alternative solutions at local level. I should also emphasize that Western-like state institutions are often imposed not for the sake of humanity but for political purposes. As propagated by

Western scholars, like Fukuyama (2004), the West should care about weak and failed states and not consider them as problems confined to a certain region because they have direct impact on the developed nations. In other words, humanitarian interventions and formation of international peacebuilding missions which are supposed to be apolitical and neutral are often designed for maintaining stability, not for achieving lasting peace but in order to secure the interests of Western countries.

So far, it should be clear to the reader that state and its restoration has been the premise upon which neoliberal peacebuilding approach is built. In the post-Cold War era, peacebuilding forces were coupled with civilian teams entrusted with building the shattered state. In order to achieve this grand objective, enormous amount of aid in the form of donations, loans and financial assistance has been disbursed to the countries under reconstruction. Although some of the aid is channeled to the projects addressing the root causes of the conflicts, the bulk of aid is channeled to state building projects. State and institution building, however, is a task that can be achieved in the long term. Concentration of more aid to such an ambitious task requires at least adequate knowledge of the local society and clear understanding of the conflict. With regard to Africa, I argue that post-Cold War peacebuilding missions failed to understand the nature of post-colonial African state. Considering the relationship between the state and citizens in a war-torn society of post-colonial Africa same as that of Europe misguides peacebuilding missions in Africa. Such a misguided approach will inevitably engender waste of financial resources while failing addressing the root causes of the conflict.

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed basic tenets of post-colonial theory and how it helps us understand the international relations as a discipline better. Post-colonialism's critical stand of the international system, its attempt to intellectually interrogate the hegemony and the political solutions dictated upon us by the dominant powers. Skeptic attitude of post-colonialism towards the nature of international relations allows us to consider alternative possibilities in post-conflict societies. This chapter also assessed neoliberal peacebuilding from a post-colonial perspective. I have shown that neoliberal peacebuilding has been criticized by many scholars on several grounds. First of all, neo-

liberal peacebuilding assumes the Western state system as the sole idea that will lead any underdeveloped society to prosperity and peace. Neo-liberal peacebuilding has a eurocentristic view in that it overlooks historical experiences of the non-European societies and their value judgments in devising solutions to the conflict. I have also criticized neoliberal peacebuilding for being mostly driven by Western bureaucrats and experts who are unfamiliar with non-Western societies and values. This attitude inadvertently results in disregard of local dynamics.

Building upon post-colonial theories of African state, I assert that external actors coupled with neo-liberal peacebuilding mindset play a detrimental role in post-conflict reconstruction process. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where ruled by the post-colonial state that is inadequately comprehended by the international community, investing the bulk of the resources into state building can be counterproductive. Post-colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa has limited control over the entire territory, its area of full governance is often limited and institutions are reflection of patronage networks. Therefore, rebuilding post-colonial state and transforming its institutions into the Western-like efficient, transparent and accountable institutions will require tremendous amount of resources and time. Exerting too much effort and resource to state and institution building will result in allocation of less resource to projects designed to redress the root causes of the conflict at local level. As long as the root causes of the initial violence are not addressed, civil war is very likely to recur in the subsequent years to peace agreements.

In case of reconstruction of a war shattered country in sub-Saharan Africa, the international community should examine the situation in detail, identify the root causes, and finally channel the majority of aid to solve the problems at the local level and to address the root causes of the conflict. Delay or negligence of dealing with problems at local level is likely to worsen grievances and entrench the enmity of people towards the state. Frozen problems in rural areas and neglected parts of the country where the conflict erupted in the first place are potential recruitment areas for a possible revival of insurgency. As discussed in the previous chapter, as long as grievances are left unaddressed, people are very likely to participate in a revived rebellion.

Finally, external actors who are mostly equipped with neoliberal peacebuilding mindset tend to ignore the nature of post-colonial state in Africa. When external actors are involved in a reconstruction case of a post-conflict society, they cannot simply assume that the society they wish to reconstruct is in large part different from their home countries. Colonialism was not experienced in Western societies, nor did colonial powers alter the sociological and political structures. Legal rational institutions are not consolidated in many sub-Saharan Africa. That is why central governments are notorious with rampant corruption, nepotism and clientelism. Inadequate comprehension of post-colonial African state by neoliberal peacebuilding practitioners will result in reproduction of the failed state system that caused the civil war in the first place. In the next chapter, I will discuss these different characteristics of the post-colonial state in Africa, and how external actors, even inadvertently, contribute enforcement of detrimental features of the post-colonial state.

CHAPTER 4: NEO-PATRIMONIALISM AND ITS REINFORCEMENT BY EXTERNAL ACTORS

1. INTRODUCTION

In this part of the study, from a post-colonial perspective, I examine the state in African societies. As I presented a detailed discussion in the first chapter, state plays a key role in civil wars occurrence. A powerful and effective state is significantly related to whether a country is more or less likely to experience civil war because a political authority that lost its statehood can hardly address the problems of the social groups. Understanding the state in Africa after decolonization, from a post-colonial perspective, and how colonialism shaped the current relationships between the people and the state. Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in a war-torn country have to deal with a post-colonial state in the cases of sub-Sahara Africa. Therefore, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of the post-colonial state so as to devise a coherent post-conflict reconstruction paradigm.

The approach I take in this study is post-colonial to the extent that I intend to disempower the hegemonic meta-narratives of state as well as the relationship between the political authority and the subject. My approach is post-colonial because I also seek to enable the marginalized groups of the colonized societies to raise their voices by attempting to resist the knowledge produced by the Western orientalism and understand the knowledge of the local. The Western accounts of the societies of the sub-Saharan Africa, their histories and experiences, mainly shaped by the orientalist knowledge-power relationship, have maintained the orthodox international relations theories. In this sense, post-colonialism allows us to think outside the box and reject the hegemonic narratives of political authority and dominant international relations notions.

As highlighted before, modern international system is a product of colonialism. One may agree with the world system theory which is built on the belief that the current relations are defined as neocolonialism, and world is divided into core and periphery countries. However, it is an undeniable fact that colonialism has significantly shaped the

current political entities of the sub-Saharan Africa, and that its effects persist even today. Consequently, theories of international relations discipline are shaped by colonialism. Furthermore, colonialism and its ongoing effects after decolonization continue to constrain or subjugate the international relations theories we employ to account for phenomena of the world politics. Thus, colonialism and the ideas shaped by its effects inhibit our intellectual struggles to make sense of the current international relations. In other words, 'international theory too has been deeply inscribed and conceptually bounded by the colonial experience in ways that have diminished its potential by artificially delimiting its ruminations of the possible' (Beier 2002, 88). Then, post-colonial approach to understand state in Africa and therefore making sense of post-conflict reconstruction allows us to get rid of intellectual bonds imposed upon us by the dominant Western racially biased knowledge.

My post-colonial stance in this study also helps us object the meta-narratives such as Marxism that inscribed into the dominant theoretical perspectives the European experience as the sole path towards development that the rest of the world has to pursue. Existing theories of international relations discipline are profoundly constrained by the European experiences and historical trajectories. Through international organizations which are mostly governed by a neo-liberal vision, European experiences and solutions are dictated to the rest of the world as the only possibility. With the help of a post-colonial perspective, we can refuse the imposition of a single modality and consider non-European/non-Westphalian possibilities of political and social rule. Therefore, through the lenses of post-colonialism, we can have the chance to acknowledge the local knowledge (e.g. unbiased non-racialized), and have a better grasp of state in sub-Saharan Africa.

2. NEO-PATRIMONIALISM

In traditional sub-Saharan African societies, social and political life was ruled by an authority that was far different from the modern understanding of the state. In many parts of the sub-Saharan Africa, mainly due to abundance of habitable land, people were scattered around the continent, living in remote areas in small numbers. This is contrary to Europe where people were more concentrated in limited habitable lands. Unlike

European state in modern sense, traditional African societies had different political authorities until the arrival of the colonial powers.

Following the arrival of colonialism to Africa, state and governance modalities of Europe were imported to the colonies without any adequate assessment of the local socio-political conditions. Colonial administrations, in large part, replaced the traditional administrative institutions with European ones, while in some colonies some traditional institutions were preserved. Therefore, by transferring European style state to Africa, colonialism helped the European colonial powers butress the international system which as built on the foundation of independent states (MacQueen 2007). When African colonies began to gain independence one by one at decolonization period, what colonial powers left as a legacy was upended socio-political structures replaced by European style states. It is also argued that African leaders who took over the administration of the colonies from colonial powers kept the existing state structures and institutions intact because the founding elites of the new born African nations had neither military nor financial capability to reconstruct new governance system or reinstate the traditional institutions which were delegitimized and humiliated for decades by the colonial administration (Herbst 2000). Then colonialism indirectly caused spread of the Westphalian notion of the state as the only plausible alternative to rule a community. It is for this reason that Walter Rodney (1982) sees colonialism as an incursion of European colonial powers that took the opportunity of developing indigenous institutions away from Africans. If we had not experience colonialism, we might have had different governance modalities in sub-Saharan Africa in various forms.

Throughout the history of human being, when a number of people live together, they established some rules, regulations and set some norms so as to prevent chaos and maintain order in everday life of the group. In order to ensure the peaceful coexistence among group members, people have developed governance modalities in various forms. These modalities have varied from one culture, religion or geography to another. The main livelihood of the group was influential in formation of the governance modalities.

Max Weber identified three sources of legitimate authority: Tradition, charisma and legal-rational institutions. Traditional legitimacy is derived from a society's culture and history. Long-existed norms and values can legitimize a person or a group to rule. People bow to this governing mechanism (kingdom, chiefdom etc.) because they believe that the ruler possesses the inherited right to administer the society. Nobody questions the right of kings and emperors to rule during the reign of kingdoms and empires in Europe. In different cases, individuals follow a person and obey a ruler because of the leader's charisma or his/her unique qualities such as personality, heroism, ideals. Such rulers generate legitimacy among people due to the influence they have on people through their personality, outlook and eloquence. Finally, according to Weber, legitimacy can be generated through an established set of rules and regulations which are agreed upon by the society governed. Governors are regarded legitimated because they are constrained by legal institutions created as a result of rational rules. In other words, citizens obey the rulers because it is believed that the latter administer the state institutions to serve the interests of the former. Over the years, plethora of research on African state and society caused transformation of Weber's categorization of sources of authority to a one of regime type.

It is a long-held belief that traditional African societies are ruled by patrimonial authority where a tribal chief or a clan leader held enormous power over the subject population. On the contrary, in traditional African societies it was rare to see an administration by a single person. Most pre-colonial African societies, and some even in rural areas of current states, were ruled by collectives in which decisions were made by people gathered along lineages. At first glance, these polities look despotic where the ruler is almost almighty. However, the ruler in traditional African societies cannot exercise unlimited authority because he (rarely she) functions under some arrangements such as elders' committee that are tantamount to a sort of checks and balances. In some other cases, like in East Africa, communities were ruled by a collective where decisions were made by a group of eminent and respected people of the community on unanimity.

According to Weber, patrimonial authority is best exemplified in a family which is a patriarchic structure. In a traditional family, father has the absolute authority

over family matters and is in a position to endow benefits to the family members. In patrimonial regimes, however, relationships between state and the citizens are maintained through personal relations. States, which are usually embodied in a single personality, and the authority vested in it are often seen as the personal property and right of the ruler. These are understandable in a nucleus family consisting of a father, a mother and children. In fact, patriarchy cements social bonds between people in small-scale structures, such as family because it builds trust between members. However, when applied to larger structures where many people are expected to trust the ruler who is expected to deliver material benefits to the subjects in return of loyalty, patrimonialism is likely to fail.

Comparing post-colonial African state after independence to patrimonial regimes has to do with the similarities between the Weberian patrimonial authority and the practices of the African leaders following the independence. Especially the first presidents of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa followed a patrimonial way of governance. For example Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania or Daniel Arab Moi of Kenya were seen by citizens as the "father of the nation". In addition to attributing fatherhood, Nyerere was addressed as *Mwalimu* (Swahili word for teacher) by Tanzanians in the sense that he taught the nation how to become independent and form a nation. By expanding the role of a father to a country, Weber argues that in patrimonial monarchies and similar forms of governments the governors act like a father towards the governed. In other words, in patrimonial societies, governors favor their kin and/or circles close to them. Patrimonial regimes are defined as 'systems in which political relationships are mediated through, and maintained by, personal connections between leaders and subjects, or patrons and clients' (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009, 129). In modern political systems of the West, authority is exercised through impersonal institutions designed to function impartially. Social linkages in such systems are not profoundly important, and the citizens have the opportunity to confer or withdraw the mandate of the political authority from leaders. In short, patrimonial regimes are often associated with personal rule, where the ruler claims dominance over the country and right to use state resources at his discretion.

Post-colonial African states are no longer kingdoms or feudal chiefdoms. Colonialism brought several legal-rational institutions to Africa. Thus, at independence, source of the legitimacy of ruling elites in post-colonial African states were these legal-rational institutions, which is what Weber thought as the most efficient form of government. Although independence movements were motivated by rejection of colonialism, founding fathers of the sub-Saharan African states adopted administrative institutions created by the colonial regimes. Because a system of government cannot run smoothly by just one person, it is imperative to create institutions to carry out basic duties of the state and administer relations between citizens as well as between citizens and the state. In order to run newly independent states efficiently, founding leaders of the sub-Saharan African states preserved and maintained governance institutions of the colonial regimes such as judiciary, parliament and taxation.

It is wrong to assume that ruling elites are not bound by formal rules and administrative decisions are often arbitrary because institutions to constrain and control the ruler do not exist. As I emphasized earlier, founding elites of the African countries inherited the legal-rational administrative and institutional apparatuses from the colonial powers upon their departure. One may hardly ignore the existence of patrimonial governance modalities in the current sub-Saharan African countries despite the prevalence of legal-rational institutions, legal rules and regulations. Put differently, in modern day post-colonial African states, patronage networks, personal rule and clientelism prevail, while rules and constraints imposed by weakened legal-rational institutions are bypassed.

This situation in which post-colonial African state presents both traditional modern elements takes us to a predicament. State in post-colonial Africa functions both in traditional and modern patter simultaneously. Therefore, we have to distinguish the ways by which political authority is exercised in African context. I follow the distinctions made by Victor Le Vine in his article published in 1980 (Le Vine 1980). According to Le Vine, we have to distinguish two types of governance modalities in post-colonial Africa. First type is traditional patrimonial system that is still practiced ubiquitously as 'sub-system' identity in many rural parts of Africa. Second, those

systems which have to a certain extent evolved into a Western like states and become part of the modern international order. Therefore, patrimonialism does no longer sufficiently characterize post-colonial sub-Saharan African regimes described in the second category.

Distinct nature of the modern state in post-colonial Africa has been noted by a number of scholars, and they attempted to come up with an operational definition for the African state. For example, Thomson suggests that modern independent states of sub-Saharan Africa 'should be seen as a fusion between patrimonialism and legal-rational institution' (Thomson 2000, 108). However, the elements of this fusion are not clearly laid out. In recent years, scholars describe modern day independent sub-Saharan African states as neo-patrimonial regimes to better reflect the true nature of governance. The term neo-patrimonialism was first used by Shmuel Noah Eisanstadt in *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism* published in 1973 (Erdmann and Engel 2007). Neo-patrimonialism and modern patrimonialism are used interchangeably in the literature. According to Kelsall, neo-patrimonialism refers to a political economy in which patrimonial authority system exists 'behind formal, impersonal elements of governance, like a legal system that demarcates the public and private domain, or an administrative code with formal criteria for staff hiring and promotion' (Kelsall 2011, 77). Bratton and Van de Walle describe neo-patrimonial regimes as 'hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions' (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 62). Similarly, Christopher Clapham (2004, 48) argues that state in the Third World profoundly differs from developed world. He also prefers to define the post-colonial African state as neo-patrimonial. He defines neo-patrimonialism as:

> Form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly
> patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system
> which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials
> hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which
> are formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they
> can, as a form not of public service but of private property.

In short, post-colonial sub-Saharan African states have a form of governance in which patrimonial features prevail under disguise with limited constraints from legal-rational institutions.

When gained independence with the decolonization process, African states inherited a Western style administrative structure with which they were hardly familiar. While some new born African independent states embraced the state structure as inherited from the colonial powers with minimum or even no modification at all, some states altered the inherited structures so as to fit into the founding fathers' vision. Victor Le Vine suggests that four elements were translated into the modern political arena with local adaptations at varying degrees (Le Vine 1980). It is these elements that make distinguish patrimonial and neo-patrimonial regimes because their presence makes two distinct regimes function similarly, albeit a great deal of differences. We have to keep in mind that these elements of the modern African state are reminiscent of traditional African states because they have their roots in the pre-colonial times. First element Le Vine discusses is charisma. Free-floating charisma was a rare phenomenon in traditional African societies. In the pre-colonial and colonial eras, the leader of a community was often associated with some metaphysical forces and had the ultimate wisdom to interpret the developments around the community. Such leaders were regarded as the embodiment of the community and also as the point of contact with the ancestors as well as the deceased eminent members of the group. Frequent and routinised detailed rituals underpinned the charisma of the traditional leader. Likewise, leaders of the independent African states assumed similar type of charisma for themselves. Those leaders who arose to the leadership of the country with traditional base, and were from the dominant group even during the colonial era maintained those rituals to sustain their charisma. It is not surprising therefore that many leaders of the post-colonial African states pay special attention to some occasions, festivals and ceremonies because these events function as a tool to underpin the charisma of the leader.

Second element of the African political culture shared by both patrimonial and neo-patrimonial regimes is constitutionalism. Le Vine argues that African social and political order was and is constitutional. By attributing a constitutional character to the

social and political order, he means that society and political space is so carefully structured that ideally every individual fits in or has the opportunity to fit in. Not only states controlling large territory but in traditional African societies, even small groups of people acted constitutionally. Even villages consisting of couple of dozens of people had a governance model constrained by some sort of constitutionalism. Rather than the contemporary connotations of the term, by constitution Le Vine refers to the rules, norms, and even balancing institutions such as elders committee, which are all in one way or another circumscribe the powers of the patrimonial leader. Such constitutional social and political order is still prevalent in many rural parts of Africa, and they are more legitimate and respected in the eyes of local people. It is for this reason that ruling leaders lost their legitimacy when they attempted to challenge the local authorities by dissolving constitutional order through administrative reforms or appropriating traditional symbols. For example, Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, wore *kente*, the piece of cloth that symbolizes the royalty, and used a stool similar to the royal one used by the pre-colonial tribal chiefs. By doing so, Nkrumah wished to reflect himself as the sole authority across the country and draw loyalty from all clans and tribes. Unfortunately, Nkrumah was not only unable to attain the loyalty of those groups in rural areas but also avoid being made fun of Ghanaians for being a phony chief. One of the first moves of the soldiers who toppled Kwame Nkrumah by a military coup was to start reconciliation meetings with traditional rulers of rural Ghana. Contrary to this, some African leaders maintained traditional legitimacy with the independence. These leaders never lacked legitimacy during their rule in the early years of independence. Probably the most salient example of the present is Swaziland. This small state surrounded by the Republic of South Africa is ruled by a king who maintains traditional legacy that is rooted in the pre-colonial era. First rulers of the independent Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi were also politicians who preserved their traditional legitimacy. Therefore, not only they did not lack legitimacy in modern sense but also they were constrained by other traditional mechanisms and structures.

Third element is the zero-sum nature of the political competition. Political competition in the patrimonial regimes of pre-colonial African kingdoms and societies as well as in the post-colonial is a struggle to attain the power at the expense of the

opponent's total loss. In the past, political competition used to take place in the form of bloody wars where the properties of the defeated are confiscated, villages are destroyed and people are enslaved. In modern era, political competition often takes place in the form of fraudulent elections which are neither free nor fair. Losers of the election are usually deprived from state resources and political offices.

The fourth and the final element is the big-man, small-boy syndrome. This is a syndrome whereby people try to position themselves in power structures or informal networks to gain wealth. In the pre-colonial era, those people who were close to the king were used to control vast resources and the rest were dependent on their favors. In modern times, those who achieve to attain a high position in government structures gain the power to control enormous resources and become a big-man in the eyes of his/her kin. Consequently, other members of the group who demand favors from the big-man are called the small-boy. This aspect of the relationship was common in pre-colonial and in post-colonial era, it took a more bureaucratic form and functions through informal institutions.

Then, the discussion presented above so far takes us to another question. What prevented African societies from moving from traditional patrimonial regimes to modern legal-rational regimes and caused them remain in a neo-patrimonial state? One argument is that colonialism not only scrambled the mechanisms by which authority is exercised in traditional African polities but also restructured and reconfigured the social relationships in such a way that traditional elements of authority were not able to persist. In some other cases, colonial administrations replaced the traditional relationships and structures with the Western-like ones (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009). The focus of this argument is on the social relationships and its logic is situated in the exclusionary practices of the colonial administrations. This argument also overlooks the fact that neo-patrimonial regimes of the modern African states adopted many of the administrative structures bequeathed by the colonial powers.

Another argument presented by Robin Theobald relates prevalence of neo-patrimonial regimes to development and argues that neo-patrimonial regimes of post-colonial African societies are consequences of underdeveloped state of those societies.

Locating patrimonialism mostly in bureaucracy, Theobald believes that it is an aspect of bureaucratic structure. In principle, as Weber's legal-rational bureaucracy actually proposes, states hire, ensure job security and provide fix salary to people in order to handle the tasks to manage the relationship between the citizens and state institutions. Since underdeveloped countries do not have sufficient money to provide a decent salary to bureaucrats, employees of the state institutions resort to alternative mechanisms to gain wealth. According to him, in underdeveloped societies people typically tend to rely on bureaucracy or public offices to gain wealth. Because individuals do not have sufficient opportunities and conducive environment, they fail to gain material wealth through existing mechanism and therefore to secure their financial security they either establish linkages with friends or kin in public offices for favors or personally engaged in networks to attain wealth (Theobald 1982). Theobald argues that because underdeveloped states are unable to enforce rule of law, create efficient, effective and accountable bureaucracy, public officers are easily tempted to engagement into informal and illegal activities. According to Theobald,

> A patrimonial bureaucracy thus is the administrative instrument
> of an underdeveloped economy: that is to say, a primarily
> agrarian economy with limited trade and a large subsistence
> sector. The limited penetration of commercial transactions in
> such an economy constitutes a serious impediment to the
> appropriation of resources by the center, and hence to the
> development of an efficient "modern" administration (Theobald
> 1982, 557).

Pierre Englebert opposes Theobald's view and suggests that in fact neo-patrimonial regimes are not the consequence but the cause of the underdevelopment. Englebert draws our attention to possible clash between post-colonial state institutions and pre-colonial ones. According to him, Variation of African states in terms of adapting pre-existing governance institutions to the post-independence period are profoundly linked to the countries' state capacity. Countries with low state capacity therefore lack legitimacy. His empirical study finds support to his hypothesis that 'the

more illegitimate the state, the more likely political elites are to resort to the types of neo-patrimonial policies which lead to poor governance and economic stagnation' (Englebert 2000, 29). Because of neo-patrimonial policies, ruling elites use state resources at their disposal to chase their political ambitions and increase private wealth. As a result, state capacity is weakened because growth-enhancing policies are avoided at the expense of policies tailored to benefit the ruling class. The most striking implication of Englebert's study is that reforms designed to address the economic field alone are doomed to fail to produce a sustainable peace because the root cause of the economic stagnations in many African states is about the structure of the relationships, both economic and political, between citizens and the state.

Another eye-catching issue in the literature on neo-patrimonialism debate is the tendency to associate the term with regime types and to subsume countries with neo-patrimonial characteristics against democratic regimes. Some scholars note that neo-patrimonial regimes or personal rule is believed to be practiced in almost all regions of the world (Hyden 1997). However, as Erdmann and Engel emphasize, it will be overgeneralization to argue that neo-patrimonialism functions across the world in all types of political regimes (Erdmann and Engel 2007, 98). Under what circumstances neo-patriomnial regimes prevail then? State legitimacy, as Englebert rightfully drew our attention, matters. States lacking legitimacy and consent of the subject resort to neo-patrimonial techniques. Another factor is the degree to which citizen-state relations are centered on the community or the individual. If the community-centered networks have more sway in a society, then informal institutions and rules prevail over formal institutions and rules (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009, 131).

Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) identify three types of informal institutions used by neo-patrimonial regimes for political legitimation: presidentialism, clientelism, and state resources. Presidentialism refers to concentration of political power in the hands of a ruler, who does not delegate almost every strategic and important decision-making tasks. Although number of ministers in neo-patrimonial regimes are high and institutions are designed for many tasks, the final decision is often made in the president's office, rendering ministers virtually powerless.

Clientelism refers to distribution of material benefits by ruling elites (patron) to citizens (client) to in order to buy their loyalty. Neo-patrimonial leaders provide jobs to relatives, ethnic kindred and close friends by appointing them to public offices. For a citizen, securing a job in a public office means regular salary and access to state resources. Neo-patrimonial leaders also provide security (freedom from arbitrary violence and use of force) to buy clients(Thomson 2000, 111). As a token of appreciation for leaders' generosity and such blessings, clients support and remain loyal to the leaders. Personal loyalty and support are required in order for clients to maintain the office. The material benefit exchanged or favor provided to the client can be insignificant or symbolic. Either way, they link the patron with the client and consolidate existing patronage networks. Exchange of gifts, resource grants by the state officials, offering favors are commonplace in sub-Saharan African societies at every level. For explaining widespread clientelism practices, "the absence or narrownessof a public realm in the Western sense, the strength of clan, ethnicityand other sub-national identities, the predilection for dyadic exchange inprimarily rural societies, and the need for mechanisms of "social insurance" in the risky and uncertain environment of low-income societies" have been cited as the main reasons (Van de Walle 2003, 311).

The third informal institution used by neo-patrimonial regimes for political legitimacy, state resources, is closely related to clientelism. Leaders in neo-patrimonial regimes tend not make any distinction between state and personal coffers and spend state resources for personal interests. Neo-patrimonial leaders do not hesitate to use state resources to pursue political as well as private objectives, to maximize their power, buy off potential contenders in political arena and buy loyalty of citizens (Englebert 2000). Such leaders use the authority to issue licenses, contracts and projects at their discretion to allocate state resources to a group of people. In addition to gaining political loyalty and gaining legitimacy, Kelsall (2011:78) argues that there are economic reasons for maintaining neo-patrimonial regimes: "…because markets in most African countries are poorly-developed, political power is often the easiest route to wealth. Neo-patrimonialism allows African politicians to supplement their incomes through corruption, or to use the power of the state to gain a foothold in business."

Judging by universal governance norms or ethics, clientelism, use of state resources for private purposes, and maintaining patronage networks for political gains are not acceptable. However, such institutions prevail in post-colonial African societies without mass rejection and protest. The main reason behind the sustainability of such unethical and non-democratic institutions are win-win situation they create. As Van de Walle (2003:311) notes, both clientelism and use of state resources by neo-patrimonial leaders are accepted and espoused by society because of the common view that they serve for community purpose and help kindred.

Such informal institutions in neo-patrimonial regimes have negative impacts on post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa and as well as their societies. As Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) explain in detail, state resources are allocated and distributed unequally due to the existence of informal institutions under neo-patrimonial regimes. Benefitting from state resources and acquiring contracts and licenses to key projects are contingent upon loyalty to the ruling elites. Pervasive clientelism encourages citizens to seek and join patronage networks and engage in clientelist behavior. That people holding public offices have the authority to allocate state resources and make (even insignificant) decisions creates an environment in which renders bribe an institutionalized manner of doing business. As a result of such a political system, identities of social class and ideology become less salient in the society because more salient ethnic identity and kin relations have higher material return in life (Van de Walle 2003). Increasingly disenfranchised and disempowered citizens who are stripped off their political identities tend to take part in clientelist and patronage networks. As Muiu and Martin (2009, 18–19) highlight, such practices result in "inappropriate institutional arrangements and market incentive structuresthat encouraged and handsomely rewarded corruption, rent seeking, rent extractionand other forms of opportunism". A small group of ruling elites exploit such a corrupt state structure for private purposes to maximize their personal gains, which is tantamount to undermining economic policies of the state. Just to give one striking example, it is worth to tell briefly the story of Daniel Arab Moi's fighter jet purchase. Daniel Arab Moi, Kenya's former president, sent an envoy to Britain to enquire about buying 12 fighting jets that the Kenyan army requested. British Aerospace company agrees to sell the fighter jets but refuses to offer personal

bribe to Moi. Instead the British company offers a 100,000 sterling pound donation to a foundation that pursues anti-poaching campaigns. Angered Moi sends his envoy to France. They find out that French fighter jets cost twice as much as the British ones. French company also offered a free presidential jet if Kenyan government buys French fighter jets. In the end, Moi flew to Paris to sign a contract with the French company to purchase 12 Mirage fighter jets (Ayittey 1993, 245). This is a typical example of how state resources are used in a post-colonial African state ruled by a neo-patrimonial regime.

Since market economy is poorly developed in many post-colonial African states and resources are mostly controlled and managed by ruling elites, it is a challenging task to gain wealth without state approval and support. So, dissent from and opposition to ruling elites in neo-patrimonial regimes are tantamount to be devoid of state resources. This nature of neo-patrimonial regimes engenders a political environment that inhibits dissent groups and opposition political parties from growth. Citizens who are unable to challenge the ruling elites through peaceful and democratic ways tend to take part in clientelism and patronage networks to secure a better living. Therefore, as more people participate in informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes and benefit from them, these institutions are reproduced and become entrenched.

Another negative repercussion of neo-patrimonial regime is that informal institutions engender a parallel political system and economy which cannot be accounted for. As an inevitable consequence of informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes, uncontrolled administrative practices that take place behind closed doors result in degeneration of formal state institutions and erosion of state authority. With the establishment of a one-party state or domination of political sphere by a single political party, power within the state is manipulated and core institutions such as parliament, judiciary, and local governments are bypassed (Thomson 2000, 102). As a result, state capacity is weakened, institutions and bureaucrats become less powerful and degenerate, and the development-oriented policies are avoided (Englebert 2000). Lacking legitimacy and authority, governing and administrative organs of the state at local level fail to maintain order. These factors facilitated informal structures to take on

administrative and governance tasks over people in some parts of countries due to the absence of law enforcement capacity of the state. For several reasons such as corrupt, ill-equipped and underpaid law enforcement officers, states have difficulty in broadcasting authority especially in rural areas. Thus, people resort to such informal institutions (e.g. ethnic or religious leader, tribal chiefs) for provision of security and human security. Emergence of informal governing actors undermines legitimacy of ruling elites and cause entrench informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes in various regions of a state. Broadcasting state authority across the whole territory has been a challenging task for post-colonial African governments since the early years of independence.

Beside informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes, nature of the state formation in Africa has been a key factor for lack of state authority in most parts of the country. As Jeffrey Herbst (2000) elucidates in depth, concept of power in pre-colonial Africa significantly differs from Europe. Land scarcity and population density in Europe made control of land as the basis of the state authority. It is not a surprise that wars in Europe were fought over territory. However, in pre-colonial Africa land was not in short supply and population density was low. Therefore, full control over a certain territory with clearly defined borders was not a condition for recognition as a legitimate authority. This also explains why we do not have precise maps of pre-colonial African kingdoms and chiefdoms showing their borders.

It is for this reason that Ake (1985) emphasizes that state in post-colonial Africa has "extremely limited authority", and goes even further to question whether we can properly talk of existence of a state. Many post-colonial African states barely have authority across the territory they own. That is why Ake is not alone in questioning existence of state in post-colonial Africa because governments have limited authority within their borders. Englebert (1997) argues that post-colonial African state is "neither African nor state". According to him, it is not African because these are political units arbitrarily created by colonial powers. He also maintains that they are not state because most African states fail to meet the basic criteria of a state defined by Weber (Englebert 1997, 767). As of the early 21st century, several governments in sub-Saharan African

states such as Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic have no authority outside their capital cities. This fact was the reason for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to establish a rule at its foundation that prevents irredentist claims by requiring minimum sovereignty and refusing any irredentist claims toward changing borders. OAU also made it clear since the early 1960s that the organization will recognize a government as the legitimate ruler of the people as long as it has full control of the capital city. That is why in civil wars of sub-Saharan African countries belligerents use their all force on seizing and controlling the capital city. According to Jeffrey Herbst (2000, 19), this state of power competition leaves political actors of sub-Saharan Africa countries with a dilemma. On the one hand, ruling elites wish to extend state authority over the entire population, most of whom live in rural areas. On the other hand, citizens in the rural areas prefer to remain loyal to their existing political patronage networks rather than submitting to the central government because new allegiance is likely to deprive them of basic services and some material benefits.

Thomson (2000) identifies two main factors behind post-colonial African states' lack of legitimacy: crisis of accumulation and crisis of governance. These two factors are closely related to neo-patrimonial structure of the current regimes and they constantly reproduce each other in various ways. In spite of rich resources African states possess, governments fail to accumulate capital to facilitate economic growth. Because of the ill-nature of patronage networks and clientelist linkages, limited accumulated capital in state coffers are spent for poorly planned projects which do not generate revenue and are doomed to die off soon. Patronage networks and nepotism in post-colonial African state lead to filling public offices with close friends, relatives and kin groups who are very likely to be incompetent, undereducated and unenthusiastic for providing better service to the public. This results in poor governance in rural areas which eventually lead to loss of state legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens. Absence of state authority and fundamental services to citizens bring about grievances in the long run. Indirectly, these two crises of post-colonial African states are major factors behind armed conflicts.

As it should be clear from the discussion presented so far, post-colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa markedly differ from European states. Post-colonial theory allows us to analyze the African state and assess it without referring to Western norms and consider other possibilities as alternatives. Colonialism altered not only the borders in Africa but also administrative and economic structures of the colonized societies. When former colonies gained independence in the early 1960s, they adopted the borders and the state structures bequeathed by colonial powers. The fact that the founding fathers of the independent African states had neither material nor political capacity to exercise authority across the territory they inherited. Moreover, internal ideological clashes within new states caused fragmentation in the states. As a result, new independent states fail to produce a national supra-identity that will bring the entire population together. This reality allowed sub-state groups to maintain their pre-colonial ties, create or enforce informal institutions that will help them survive and run their daily lives. Existence of such institutions under an ineffective state mechanism is often lead external actors miscalculate the outcome of their endeavors.

3. REINFORCEMENT OF NEOPATRIMONIALISM

After the civil wars end either with a negotiated settlement or a victory by one of the parties, another challenge begins for the international organizations as well as states that have stakes at the reconstruction of the war-torn country. Neo-liberal peacebuilding envisages for the war-shattered countries a reconstruction path that follows the success stories of the central European and North American states. Following the footsteps of the Western world and pursuing a path of development and undergoing the same stages like the Western states did in the past it is believed that the war-torn countries will be as stable and developed as the countries that pour enormous resources into the peacebuilding projects. This paradigm which is consistent with the modernization theory develops a one-fits-all remedy for failed states and civil war experienced countries. Furthermore, it does not take the local dynamics and realities into consideration.

In this section, from a post-colonialism perspective, I argue that neo-liberal peacebuilding project fails to reconstruct stable states and achieve sustainable peace.

External actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts underpin the informal institutions and thereby maintain the neo-patrimonial regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, external actors, be it institution of an independent state or an international governmental or non-governmental organization, unwittingly help reproduce the illegitimate state mechanisms that caused the civil war in the first place.

A. Imposing A Western-Like State Modality

In the previous sections, I highlighted that one of the fundamental tenets of the neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm is that civil wars occur mainly due to state failure. Because state institutions are corrupt and ineffective, citizens cannot redress their grievances by peaceful means through politics, and therefore resort to violence to settle the dispute. Then, the ultimate solution to remedy a country torn by a civil war is to reconstruct the failed state and institutions. While doing so, however, external actors, mostly international NGOs, UN agencies, and Western governmental organizations, take Western-like state system as the ideal type of state. From a post-colonial perspective, such an approach by neo-liberal peacebuilders takes agency away from people of the former colonies or war-torn society. Furthermore, such a remedy overlooks indigenous political institutions and conflict-resolution mechanisms of the society intended to reconstruct, even though those institutions and mechanisms are obsolete, ineffective or malfunctioning. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) argue that although scholars and policy makers predict that Africa's weak states are to collapse in the short term, it is mainly due to these overlooked dynamics that weak states of Africa persist, although they do not meet many requirements of modern statehood.

Prior to arrival of colonial powers to Africa, there was a variety of political systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Some societies were ruled by political organizations which were similar to European states; in some other societies daily affairs were administered by a council consisting of respected elders of the society, while in some societies different issues were assigned to different committees constituted by age-cohorts. On the most extreme, some societies of pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa were stateless.

With the creation of colonies, the colonial powers imported the state systems of their own to the newly created colonies, replacing the existing indigenous political systems or mechanisms without any examination or study of its potential impacts on the society. European powers established an executive office, a legislative branch and judiciary in the capital cities of the colonies. It is important to remember that African elites did not have any say in the creation of political mechanisms of their society, nor had any consultation with the colonial powers. These colonies became independent with decolonization in the second half of the 20th century. In political science and international relations, we tend to accept the post-colonial state as given, without problematizing its nature. External actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building tend to regard their task as one of reestablishment of a Weberian state. According to Weber's definition, a political organization can be named as state only if it has the monopoly over the legitimate use of force over a territory. As Jackson and Rosberg highlight, Weberian conceptualization of state focuses on means rather than ends (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Consequently, for such an empirical conceptualization confines state's role to security and maintaining order, while downplays state's role as welfare provider and justice dispenser, the international community exert much effort to create a Western-like state, ignoring local dynamics, pre-existing institutions and local demands.

We tend to assume that post-colonial African states, with the creation of rational-legal institutions by the colonial powers, are no longer different from European states. Four criteria defined in Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 provides necessary legal grounds for the former colonies to be treated as equal states in the international law. These four criteria are (a) a permanent population; (b) an effective government; (c) a defined territory; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Without any doubt, the last two criteria are clearly met by post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the first two criteria have to be reassessed. Because of inability of the post-colonial African states to meet these criteria, they profoundly vary in their performances from one country to another.

First criterion of the legal state is a permanent population or stable community, meaning large group of people settled in a territory and rendered that territory as their home. Because of the influence of nation-state notion in Europe, this definition presupposes that a state is the political organization of people who share common cultural traits such as language, religion or common ancestry. Very few African states meet this requirement because the great majority of states in Africa ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. Almost every African state has population that is divided among many distinct ethnic, religious or language groups. Due to colonial demarcation of Africa as a result of political negotiation between colonial powers, ethnic groups and religious groups are divided in more than one state.

Furthermore, livelihoods of many African groups make application of 'permanent population' condition difficult. Many sub-Saharan states along Sahel region, stretching from Somalia in the East to Senegal in the West, have nomadic groups, which are on constant move throughout the year. These groups take north-south or east-west migratory routes during the rainy season and get back during the dry season. Given the geographical features and vague border lines between states, nomadic group can easily find themselves in neighboring state while migrating to a more habitable land. Cattle herding groups from Chad often trespass Niger, or nomadic groups of Niger can trespass neighboring Mali without even noticing that they enter into a neighboring state. Therefore, many African states along Sahel do not have permanent population, at least in the Sahara Dessert.

Given the facts presented in the previous paragraph, many states in sub-Saharan Africa do not have stable population. Ethnic and religious fractionalization in Africa has been a major factor contributing to tension and even civil war in many countries. Establishment of a national identity following independence was not possible for almost every sub-Saharan African state. Because allowing sub-national identities such as ethnicity, religion or language to be strengthened would pose a threat to the central governments, many African rulers thought that promoting a national identity will contribute more to the domestic peace. Consequently, such policies resulted in

oppression of ethnic and religious groups, depriving groups of their cultural rights and eventually civil wars.

Another reason for questioning statehood of post-colonial African states is the extent to which they have effective governments. An effective government basically refers to two main components. First, it must possess a legitimate authority, and second it must have power to enforce the authority and make the subject population abide by the rules and regulations. A government may possess high degree of legitimacy but with ineffective apparatus it cannot govern a territory effectively. On the other hand, a government may have established strong apparatus of power to enforce law but if the office of the authority lacks legitimacy, apparatus of power will help nothing but cause resentment and grievance, thereby leading to arbitrary use of force and domestic disturbance. Even if not resulted in violent clashes between government forces and citizens, strong apparatus of power under a government with low degree of legitimacy leads to autocracies. This was the case during the rules of Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast, Gnassingbe Eyadema in Togo and Omar Bongo in Gabon.

One way to close the legitimacy gap of the national authority is establishment and operation of effective law enforcement agencies. These are mainly the police and the army. In practice, armies of many sub-Saharan African nation functions more like protector of the regime rather than regular military organization designed to protect the entire nation from foreign aggression. Furthermore, factionalism and politicization of officers turn the armies into a political instrument. Head of states tend to appoint loyal officers, in many cases close relatives, to top ranks of military in order to ensure the passivity and loyalty of the army. Moreover, secondary high ranks of the military positions are reserved for other major groups in the country as pay off. In case of profound political disagreement, maladministration or ideological divergence, ineffective governments were often interrupted by military coups in unstable African regimes. According to research by the African Development Bank, since the independence era of the early 1960s, there have been more than 200 military coups in Africa. Almost half (45%) of these coups were successful and resulted in toppling of the head of state/government officials or dissolution of the constitutional structures

(Ntomba 2015). Given the empirical evidence that abortive, rather than successful coups, have the greatest adverse impact on economic growth (Fosu 2002), and low level of institutionalization in African armies, sub-Saharan African countries run the risk of frequent setbacks by their own soldiers.

Police in many African countries are far from being an accountable, transparent and effective law enforcement agency. Although established as an apparatus of power, in many sub-Saharan African states, law enforcement agencies are under-equipped, underpaid, inadequately trained, and unfortunately, corrupt. According to a survey conducted between March 2014 and September 2015 by Transparency International, 72% of Nigerians perceive the police as corrupt (Transparency 2015). Nigerian public officers, especially the police, are notorious for demanding bribe even for the regular office work. According to a survey result cited in a Security Brief published by Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 33 percent of the 11,500 people interviewed had paid or had been asked to pay a bribe to the police (Okenyodo 2016). Like armies in many African states, the police in Nigeria are politicized and appointments are rarely based on merits. Okenyodo (2016) notes how patronage networks render Nigerian police force weak by saying,

> Leaders are often appointed based on their political allegiances rather than on their experience or capabilities in law enforcement. As a result, the quality of leadership at the helm of the NPF suffers. Appointees under such circumstances feel loyalty to their political patron rather than to their institutions or citizens. How and to whom the law is applied is not consistent. Norms of professionalism and ethics are weakened.

Inevitably, allegiance of the police to the patrons prevents deterrence of penal code of the state; pave the way for arbitrary arrest and extrajudicial killings by the police. Hence, citizen security is threatened and legitimacy of the national authority is undermined.

Classical philosophy of state in the post-World War II era assumes a community for each state. States of the post-Cold War era are not as isolated as they were once when philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke wrote about philosophy of state. Then we cannot treat the post-colonial state of sub-Saharan Africa in the same manner as that of Europe or North America. As Holsti (1996) draws our attention, prevalence of various communities scattered across the vast territory of the post-colonial state results in existence of multiple authorities. This fact renders post-colonial state strong in coercive capacity, surveillance and internal security but weak in compelling the subjects to comply with government decrees. Consequently, this political reality creates an environment in which multiple authorities co-exist: national/central authority and local authority. The latter enjoys loyalties of significant segments of the population over which the state assumes authority. In Weberian sense, existence of multiple authorities may lead us to doubt the statehood of that political entity. Contrary to this common view, in post-colonial state of sub-Saharan Africa, political authority is also exercised at local level by non-state and non-governmental organizations. In Holsti's terms, 'this does not mean the absence of rule; it is, rather, that rule is localized' (Holsti 1996, 104). These localized authorities are often not codified in the constitutions of the states, nor are they legal and officially acknowledged institutions.

In spite of lacking constitutional backing and legal base, informal institutions play a key role in everyday lives of people in societies, in particular rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. In a survey conducted in 2001 in Nigeria, Afrobarometer investigated the influence of informal modes of conflict resolution in Nigeria (Afrobarometer 2002). In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked "who would you turn to for help to resolve a violent conflict between groups in this country?" and asked to provide three answers in their own words. Given the sample size (n=6305), results are quite reflective of the reality. Afrobarometer finds that "Taken together, these indicate that Nigerians are twice as likely to prefer an informal community-based process rather than an official intervention by a state government or the federal agency" (Afrobarometer 2002, 3). According to the results, in case of a conflict 54 percent of all responses prefer an informal institution to settle the dispute, while only 26 percent of all responses prefer

local or federal institution. Informal modes of conflict resolution mechanisms include, but not limited to, tribal chiefs, headmen of the clan, elders of the community, priest of a church or imam of a mosque. Results also show that Nigerians mostly (17% of all responses) prefer community level informal institutions (i.e. tribal chiefs, clan headmen, community elders), while secondly (14% of all responses) prefer religious institutions for settling their disputes.

Rwanda is another case where informal institutions were employed immensely in post-genocide era for transitional justice purposes. Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers were also among the victims of en masse killings during the genocide. Following the cessation of violence, Rwanda was left with a few people who are trained in judiciary and can work in courts. That is why Rwandese government started a traditional conflict resolution mechanism, called *gacaca*, public trials of the perpetrators by the community. In spite of enormous criticisms by the outsiders and genocide survivors among Hutu and accusations of delivering victors' justice (Brouneus 2008; Brounéus 2010; Corey and Joireman 2004), *gacaca* system tried many times more people than government courts in short period. Some government development agencies even provided support for *gacaca* system.

Localized rule is more a consequence of colonial legacy rather the administrative preference of the post-colonial administrations of the independent states. Colonial administrations established legal-rational institutions and semi-parliamentary governments in the sub-Saharan Africa colonies. However, these political entities were created to exploit rich resources of the colonies, not to respond to the needs of the colonial subjects. That is why national authorities are often regarded as illegitimate in the eyes of subjects in the rural areas because these structures were legacy of the colonial administrations and were designed to subjugate the Africans rather than to provide welfare. State institutions were structured in such a way that authority was monopolized in the hands of central governments, bypassing local political structures. These local administrative/political structures were not only declared illegitimate, but also banned by law so that loyalty of citizens can be directed to the central governments only. With independence, citizens in rural parts of sub-Saharan African countries were

asked to refer to the traditional institutions to settle their disputes but seek justice in the courts administered by judges appointed by the central government. An inevitable consequence of this process was politicization of the appointments in peripheral areas of Third World countries. To ensure loyalty to the central governments, national authorities preferred to appoint judges and administrators to peripheral towns from other parts of the country.

As common practice this may be in many developed countries, in sub-Saharan African countries this practice sparked immense discontent and resentment among peripheral parts of countries mainly due to inability of central governments to check appointed public officers and ensure their compliance with the constitution and laws. Given the widespread corruption and informal institutions discussed earlier, public officers coming to a town or village from a culturally, ethnically or religiously different part of country fail to deliver justice and provide welfare. Additionally, the inherited structures were not effective in rural areas without the enforcement agents of the colonial armed forces. States with meager resources coupled with underpaid and understaffed law enforcement agencies were unable to maintain order and distribute justice to the entire territory. As a result, central governments in many sub-Saharan African countries lost legitimacy in the eyes of their own subjects over years. Instead, people of the peripheral regions directed their loyalties

Moreover, an enduring competition exists between the national authority and the local power centers. As I discussed above, inefficient apparatus of power and failure in statehood as well as delivering basic services in rural areas necessitated survival, or in some cases even reestablishment, of pre-colonial administrative and/or juridical mechanisms. Such mechanisms and institutions are often administered by tribal leaders, religious sheiks, community elders or people gained authority by hereditary means. Although cost-effective and efficient in service delivery compared to the government agencies, central governments in Africa view these institutions as a threat to their grasp of power. Because these institutions are beyond the control and manipulation of politicians, they are even regarded as an existential threat to the regime since these local leaders have more legitimacy in the eyes of local people than the central government.

In their relations with war-torn post-colonial African states, external actors reiterate this Weberian understanding of government in every reconstruction effort or in almost every agreement, protocol or memorandum signed. External actors often assume that administrative officers appointed by the central authority to the peripheral provinces or towns are accountable, respect rule of law and legitimate representatives of the national authority. Unfortunately this is not the case. As I discussed earlier, in many parts of post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa, personal rulers, informal institutions operate by decrees, commands and edicts, bypassing the legal and governmental institutions. If we interpret exercise of control by the state as 'the ability to pronounce, implement, and enforce commands, laws, policies, and regulations' (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 6), then it entails a transparent, accountable and efficient law enforcement agency. As the glimpses from Nigeria show us, many African states fail to effectively exercise control over the territory.

International organizations, individual donor countries or even non-governmental organizations underline the significance of the central government and exert tremendous effort to increase capacity of state institutions in the capital cities of war-torn countries. Meanwhile, these actors often overlook informal institutions and downplay the legacy and impact of pre-colonial institutions that still exist. It should be highlighted that this approach is a Eurocentric one. Indirectly, external actors spend the bulk of their financial and human resources to transform the state institutions which are illegitimate in the eyes of the aggrieved citizens into a legitimate one and to delegitimize the informal institutions which are more legitimate than state institutions.

When foreign aid is delivered to a disaster-hit region or a devastated village/town by civil war by the international community, external actors prefer to hand it to the local mayors or to the governors. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations tend to trust administrators in delivering the aid to the needy people, although they are well aware of the rampant corruption and nepotism present in those societies. That aid provided by foreigners are unequally distributed, relatives and kin of state officers are favored are known by foreign aid providers. In spite of this fact, local leaders are bypassed so that legitimacy of the state organs will be underpinned and

people's faith in state organs will arise. Yet, because local people are aware of the unethical behaviors, favoritism and corruption among state officers, external actors unwittingly support the organs which are legitimate on paper but illegitimate in practice.

Those external actors in post-conflict zones providing financial or material aid to the needy are in fact in a dilemma. Even though they are aware of the unintended consequence of their actions, external actors, especially governmental ones, are not in a position to collaborate with informal institutions and/or support pre-colonial mechanisms. As much benevolent as they are, external actors raise money from their base in their home countries and are accountable to their executive boards as well as concerned state institutions. Charity organizations, be it governmental or non-governmental, are subject to audit and meticulous control of their expenditures. Disbursement of funds to institutions that are not empowered by the constitution of the host state will appear as illegal financial transaction. This is likely to cause serious auditory problems for the external actors.

In conclusion, external actors tend to pay more attention to empirical statehood (de facto) than juridical statehood (de jure attributes of a state). This is to say that with regard to state and institution building external actors adopt a Weberian approach in post-conflict reconstruction and make sure that legitimate use of force is exercised by only a single entity. Another authority (internal or external) that can challenge the central authority to even a small degree cannot coexist. This view overlooks other responsibilities of a state and de jure attributes of statehood. Such thoughts, according to Jackson and Rosberg (1982), are at odds with contemporary African experience. A number of informal institutions prevail and coexist alongside with legal institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, they operate more effectively than government organs and institutions. Otherwise, we cannot explain persistence of weak African states. Even in the rural areas of the so-called failed states, we observe order and everyday life is maintained by people without chaos. It is in large part due to the informal institutions and their effectiveness that we have order in peripheral parts of Africa's weak or so-called failed states. Neo-liberal peacebuilding approach ignores to acknowledge these informal institutions and does not see any role for them in the future of the country.

External actors in a war-torn country therefore should evaluate the existing informal institutions and their viability to devise alternative models that can integrate these informal institutions into the constitution and provide them a legal framework. Incorporation of all informal institutions into the existing administrative structure may not be possible, nor will be wise and feasible. However, external actors have the capacity and resources to help the host country to evaluate possibility of incorporation of some effective informal institutions. Even for a transition period, defined and monitored by the external actors. As long as informal institutions remain unincorporated into the administrative structures, one way or another, or legitimacy of the legal administrative institutions or organs is cemented, the latter is doomed to be associated with inefficiency, corruption, clientelism.

B. Promoting Democracy As The Sole Regime Type

One of the basic tenets of neo-liberal peacebuilding is establishment of a democratic regime in the war-torn country following the termination of civil war. As discussed in detail in the previous chapters, neo-liberal peacebuilding believes that the principal cause of civil wars is a state that is unable to govern, and envisages liberal democracy as the remedy. It is believed that installation of liberal democratic governance where multiple political parties compete for power in regularly held free and fair elections will which are supposed to be free and fair will prevent people from resorting to violence to redress their grievances because the political scene is available.

As of the 21st century, democracy is practiced in various ways in many countries. There is not a single definition of democracy upon which scholars have agreed so far. Schmitter and Karl defines democracy as a 'system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives' (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76). In a more unsophisticated mode, Shively views democracy as a state 'in which all fully qualified citizens vote at regular intervals to choose, among alternative candidates, the people who will be in charge of setting the state's policies' (Shively 1997, 351). According to Samuel Huntington, a political system in twentieth century as democracy as long as 'its most powerful collective

decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote' (Huntington 1993, 7).

There are several factors that determine the emergence or consolidation of democracy in a country. Probably the most important determinant is the economic development. According to a prominent view, first proposed by Seymour Lipset, democracy will not emerge in less developed countries and economic development of a certain level is the necessary condition. A study by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues show that this long-held view of Lipset is not true. In their study, Przeworski and his colleageus studied the impact of economic development on creation of a conducive environment for democracy. By examining 135 countries for 1950-1990 period, they concluded that economic development does not necessarily lead to democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). In fact, oil-rich wealthy countries of the Middle East are living examples of this finding. Oil producing and exporting countries of the Midlle East are among the countries with the highest GDP per capita. Yet, these countries are not ruled by democratic regimes.

Sharing a similar view, Wejner rejects association of higher GDP per capita with transition to democracy because it is rather an indicator of the wealth of a nation. According to Wejner, overall economic development can be misleading because in the degree of regional industrialization is limited and level of non-agricultural labor force is at considerable than such an economy inhibits democratic growth. For example,

> In 1993, Mexico, located in less-developed Central America,
> had a GNP/c of $4230, wehereas in 1976, Portugal, located in
> well-developed, industrialized Europe, had a GNP/c of $2020.
> Using the GNP/c alone (as many studies thus far have done) we
> would predict that Mexico had a greater chance of becoming a
> high-level democracy tan Portugal. In reality, Portugal was
> highly democratized in 1976, whereas Mexico had a low-rated
> level of democracy in 1993 (Wejnert 2005, 67).

According to the World Bank data, GDP per capita in 2015 in Saudi Arabia was $20,400, for Qatar $74,000; for Oman was $15,600. The fact that all of these countries have a higher GDP per capita than another regional country, Turkey ($9,100) but lower level of democracy, also shows that high GDP per capita is not a good predictor of transition to democracy.

In another study examining the relationship between GDP per capita and democratization, Przeworski and Limongi find impirical evidence to support the this view (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Accordingto them, dictatorships maintain their existence in countries with a GDP per capita lower than $1000. Their findings also suggest that dictatorships create instability in countries whose GDP per capita is somewhere between $1000 and $4000. They conclude that if the GDP per capita exceeds $4000 under a dictatorship, transition to democracy will be less likely. Indeed, this finding well explains the political quagmire with which Middle Eastern deal with for decades.

In addition to economic development, culture is another much debated factor that is thought to be an important determinant of democratization. When it comes to the Middle East, North Africa or Horn of Africa where countries are dominated by Muslim majority, democratization is often associated with Islam and this religion's incompatibility with democratic principles. Some scholars reject the idea that Islam inhibits democratization and argue that it is rather about regional dynamics, not religious (Tessler 2002; Zakaria 2004). Comparing with democratic regimes of the world, Stepan and Robertson find that lack of democracy in the Middle East has more to do with being an 'Arab' than being a 'Muslim' (Stepan and Robertson 2003). When they compare 16 countries whose populatin is dominantly Arab and Muslim with 29 other countries whose population is dominantly Muslim, they find that the latter group of countries have higher rating of democracy than the former group. In a similar study, using Freedom House scores of democracy, Larry Diamond compares democracy levels of countries whose population is dominated by Muslims (Diamond 2010). He finds that of the 8 countries rated as democracy none is Arab, while no Arab country is categorized as democracy.

The discussion above show us that democracies emerge under various conditions. I have shown that cultural arguments are not supported by empirical evidence. Democracy can emerge in a country independent of its religion or culture. But neo-liberal peacebuilding prescribes multiparty democracy as the remedy for all the countries torn by civil wars.

Using the lenses of post-colonial theory, I argue that insistence of neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm to establish multiparty democracy in post-conflict settings as the ultimate remedy for disorder and mayhem is problematic for two reasons. First, multiparty democracy was the solution for the internal power struggles of European powers. African nations did not undergo the same social and economic hardships European nations underwent. They did not fight the same problems or challenged the same authoritarian kings or religious institutions like the Church as European nations did. I have to make it clear that I do not argue that democracy is not a viable regime type for African nations. Democracy may work in any nation in any part of the world. What I object is the presupposition of the external actors in post-conflict settings that promotes multiparty democracy as *the* solution rather than *an* option as to what type of government should be in the best interest of the country. Establishment of a Western-like multiparty democracy to war-torn countries without due assessment of the society and political conditions is likely to please the external actors more than the local people.

Second, and related to the previous reason, is that by imposing multiparty democracy as the sole and single viable regime type, neo-liberal peacebuilding takes agency away from African people. Unwittingly though, neo-liberal peacebuilding assumes *mission civilisatrice* role for the post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Paris 2002). When Britain colonized Egypt, Lord Cromer described the role of its administration as to teach Egyptians how to run a country and state institutions because local Egyptians were backward and unable to effectively handle administration of the country. It will be wrong to draw parallel between colonialism and modern neo-liberal peacebuilding and accusing the latter of dehumanization of the African people. However, it is imperative to pay attention to the imperious and commanding attitude of neo-liberal peacebuilding with regard to democracy promotion. Once African people are

given the chance, they can possibly come up with their indigenous and more legitimate regime types.

Somaliland is a vivid example for what Africans can achieve once they are given chance and external actors do not interfere. Somaliland is the self-declared independent state located in the northwestern part of Somalia. In spite of declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland is not an internationally recognized state and regarded officially as an autonomous region of the Republic of Somalia. Following the independence, country was ruled by Mohamed Egal until his death in 2002. Thanks to the institutionalization efforts by Egal during his term, succession to presidency after his death took place peacefully without causing any inter-clan violence.

With the new president, Somaliland took further steps towards more institutionalized governance and adopted a multiparty democracy of a special kind. Like many African countries, Somaliland society was highly heterogeneous. While many African societies were divided along ethnic or religious lines, Somaliland population was dominated by Muslim Somalis. But the problem for Somaliland and for the Republic of Somalia as well, is that the society is fragmented along clans. In order to avoid voting according to clan affiliations and further polarization of politics, Somaliland elites decided to limit number of political parties to three. According to the constitution of Somaliland, people are not allowed to form political parties along clan or regional lines (Harper 2012). By doing so, Somaliland elites guaranteed that politicians have to cooperate with other clans. In order to have the support of more clans, they have to come up with policies that are more inclusive and less discriminatory. As Hansen and Bradbury argue, unlike Western Europe or North America where political parties are seen as mechanisms of political representation and power competition, Somaliland elites created political parties not only for political competition but also as platforms for deliberation and discussion (Hansen and Bradbury 2007). Thus Somaliland politicians have achieved to avoid a common trap in which many African nations fell that political parties formed along ethnic or religious lines compel people to vote for the party that represents their ethnic or religious group. People of Somaliland created this three-party system on their own. Neither the UN nor the developed countries advised or imposed

this system. Somaliland example shows that once African are not forced to imitate Western nations and not interfered, they can come up with genuine solutions for their governance.

Neo-liberal peacebuilding, however, envisages a single regime type, that is multiparty democracy, as the solution to governance problem. Even when multiparty democracy is established and nationwide elections are held on regular basis, these regimes are likely to lack legitimacy because it is not genuinely devised by local people but imposed upon them by outsiders. With regard to legitimacy, Holsti argues that legitimacy has two dimensions and states can be successful if they are based on both dimensions. First dimension of legitimacy is about the 'definition of the community over which rule is to be exercised'. Second dimension is about 'the principle(s) upon which the "right to rule" is based (Holsti 1996, 80). According to Holsti, these dimensions are 'inextricably connected', and states will have difficulty cohering even if one dimension is absent or insufficiently developed. Holsti calls the first dimension vertical legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy 'deals with authority, consent, and loyalty to the idea(s) of the state and its institutions'. Second dimension is called horizontal legitimacy and deals with 'the definition and political role of community' (Holsti 1996, 84). Just like Holsti says, imposed multiparty democracies in war-shattered countries in Africa lack vertical legitimacy. Coupled with the lack of independent institutions required for checks and balances, new regimes established by the persistence, if not imposition, of the external actors suffer legitimacy deficit. Inevitably, rather than being loyal to such a regime people tend to submit their loyalty to the informal institutions which are more legitimate in their eyes.

As long as the external actors insist on imposing multiparty democracy as the single viable governance option for war-torn countries, local people will be stripped off their agency. Insistence of establishing a Western-like multiparty democracy in civil war experienced countries will consequently ignore other possibilities. State formation in Europe was based on contract theory where a higher authority (i.e. the state) was needed to regulate the relationships between people. It is the historical and political experiences the Western countries had that forced them to adopt the political system

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they use today. Again from a post-colonial perspective, non-European societies had different experiences and it is unwise to assume that they also need political order that is based on the same type of state and/or democracy. External actors from Europe and North America often promote not only democracy but also a particular system of democracy – single-member districts or proportional representation. They often push for the system they are familiar with or the system they believe works better. This choice of system propaganda is usually based on what the external actor in question is most familiar with: system in his/her own country (Carot 1999, 125). In other words, as Marshall Beier argues, existing paradigms prevent emergence of different possibilities in non-Western societies because Westerners promote and impose their own system with the belief that it is the only viable option (Beier 2002, 84). It will be naïve to expect a society which is a victim of years of violence, looting and horror to submit their loyalty to an insitution that is too young to earn their trust. Therefore, establishing multiparty democracies in a war-torn country is tantamount to preventing the society's loyalty from the state. Instead, the informal institutions will gain more legitimacy and be more efficient. Given the informal institutions are out of the reach of state apparatus and operate under personaal rule, imposing multiparty democratic regime will inadvertently foster the informal institutions, which is tantamount to higher corruption, more clientelism and expanding patronage networks.

Another possibility of civil war termination is interference of an external actor with vast military capability. It is likely that, like in Sierra Leone, former colonial power or another powerful state with military might can interfere in the civil war to end violence. In such cases, if the intervening power is a democracy, then the regime type following the peace agreement is very likely to be multiparty democracy because it seems to be the panacea for war-torn countries, regardless of the social, cultural and economic dynamics of the war-torn state. Military interventions disguised under democracy promotion helps politicians in the West to gather public support for their interventionist policies, while legitimizes the move in the international arena. However, empirical studies show that democracy imposition through military interventions does not always lead to democracies. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs find empirical support that military interventions usually result in erosion of democratic

foundations of regimes (Bruce B. de Mesquita and Downs 2006). James Meernik also finds that US military interventions do not increase the level of democracy (Meernik 1996). In fact, he finds that most cases show that the target countries retain their level of democracy after the intervention.

Given the fact that informal institutions in a society and formal institutions of a democratic regiem are difficult to distinguish because these structures interpenetrate one another. Taking regularly held elections as the criterion for measuring democracy may be misleading because political patrons use state resource at the discretion as material rewards to integrate their clients and other groups into the political community (Lemarchand 1972). Empirical findings also show that in countries where informal institutions coexist along democratic regimes democracy is often associated with the efficiency of informal institutions. Findings of Michael Bratton also support this view.

> People are most likely to judge the extent of democracy in terms of their trust in the incumbent president. The evidence therefore suggests that African politics has not yet moved fully from the realm of personalities and factions to the realm of policies and formal institutions.... Citizens defer to authority when they benefit materially, but question and condemn their leaders when benefits accrue to others, especially political elites (Bratton 2007, 107–108).

Therefore, nascent democracies in war-torn countries operate under the disguise of informal institutions. As a result, corruption, nepotism, ineffective use of state resources become more rampant in society. These are often times the attributes of a state that societies rebel against.

Another flaw of external actors is that they use Western values, norms and benchmark to categorize, evaluate or qualify adminsitrative systems in non-European world. Today most scholars and analysts in the Western countries who work in or advice for institutions involved in peacebuilding believe that explicit consent expressed through regularly held free and fair elections is the only legitimate rule. There are a

variety of states across the world whose regimes base their legitimacy on different principles such as religion. During pre-colonial era, societies in sub-Saharan Africa had various forms of polities. Some societies were even stateless. It is not that there was no administrative or govervance structure but that limited knowledge of the colonial adminstrations about the local people led them to label some societies stateless. Somalis of Somalia used to be a stateless society. Igbo and Fuani people of today's Nigeria are believed to be stateless societies as well. However, some scholars believe that Igbo people was organized along autonomous villages without a powerful higher authority such as king (Eze, Omeje, and Chinweuba 2014). These autonomous structures were as sufficiently able to meet aspirations of the subject population as the colonial and post-colonial states. According to the conventional wisdom among scholars, each society must have its own state that is hierarchically structured and omnipotent. Unfornatutely we are prevented by the dominant neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm from devising alternative governance modalities. Even Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, once said that 'I am convinced that those societies [as Indians] which live without government enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under European governments' (quoted in Ayittey 2012). Then, why do external actors insist on building Western-like states and establishing multiparty democracies that are reminiscent of their home country?

My answer to this question in this study is the dominance of the neo-liberal peacebuilding approach. It prevents actors from devising alternative governance modalities, evaluating other possibilities and ignoring local dynamics. As I discussed earlier, due to the institutional and functional problems of the international NGOs, UN organs and foreign aid organizations, those foreigners who are in war-torn country for reconstruction often contact with rural people. They are mostly exposed to the same segment of the society. As a result, they fail to evaluate the situation with all its dimensions and therefore misread the root cause of the conflict. As the democratization discussion presented in the beginning of this section sheds light, creating a certain level of development is the most strongest determinant of democratization. Spending billions of dollars by external actors for institution building or democratization from top-down

will not help create a democracy. Nor will it help create a stable and peaceful soceity in the short-term.

C. Foreign Aid

For decades, provision of aid to underdeveloped states has been a hotly-debated issue in societies of developed nations. Aside from humanitarian aid, which is provided to disaster-hit countries in case of emergency situations in the form of search and rescue teams, staple food, and medical care, foreign aid provided for development purposes, often called official development assistance (ODA), is the most controversial form of foreign aid. The latter kind of foreign aid is what this study will be focusing on since the humanitarian aid is less controversial because public usually do not question the necessity and efficiency of aid once emergency is presented with pictures and videos. It is difficult to find an agreed-upon definition of foreign aid because different institutions adopt different definitions. They prefer to tailor the definitions in such a way to fit into their institutional interests and activities. Just to work with, I will provide an operational definition and define foreign aid as the transfer of capital, goods or services from a country to another country or international (governmental or non-governmental) organization for the benefit and/or development of the recipient country and population.

Such a broad definition will inevitably include financial assistance for budget support as well as military assistance by providing training, technical equipments or even lethal weapons. From this perspective, supply of computers to finance ministry of a post-conflict society may sound quite logical because those computers will increase the capacity of the ministry and efficiency of services. Another relatively wealthy state can transfer millions of US dollars to the coffers of the post-conflict state so that the post-war government can pay salaries of public officers. This is also unarguably legitimate state behavior. More strangely, however, supply of automatic rifles, ammunition or even howitzers can be categorized as foreign aid. Donor countries rationalize and defend their donations by arguing that such military equipments will help the country have a strong army and deter potential rebels and therefore ensure domestic stability. Thus, foreign aid can take many forms and can be delivered by many actors. This reality makes comprehension of foreign aid and its impact more difficult

because we tend to divert our attention to actors and their actions rather than the material source that makes those actions possible.

Post-conflict reconstruction is widely known and seen by projects executed by governmental aid agencies, international organizations or non-governmental organizations. There is a plethora of research on foreign aid and its impact on several issues. Foreign aid and its role in conflicts have been studied by many scholars and empirical findings present contending views on foreign aid's impact on various issues. What is often overlooked, as I will attempt to demonstrate in this section, is that foreign aid in post-conflict settings of post-colonial African states, willingly or unwillingly, helps foster and maintain the neo-patrimonial state. One reason for civil war occurrence is the collapse and failure of administrative institutions to function effectively and fairly. It will be naïve to expect these newly established state institutions and administrative organs to make use of disbursed foreign aid in the best way possible. Especially inflow of large sum of cash into dysfunctional and corrupt state institutions is likely to create many problems. External actors, be it governmental or non-governmental, tend to focus on accomplishment of their missions, which are often defined as short-term objectives, and inevitably miss the long-term negative consequences. When thought in a longer term, external actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction, perhaps inadvertently, help reproduce and maintain the informal institutions of the neo-patrimonial state. Given the fact that it is this neo-patrimonial state that caused the civil war in the first place, role of external actors and foreign aid they provide play a key role civil war recurrences.

Any discussion regarding foreign aid is perhaps doomed to start with its politicization, especially by the major powers. When developed countries provide development aid to developing countries, political considerations often influence to which country foreign aid will be channeled and to which sector. Politicization of foreign aid is not a recent phenomenon. It has been politicized for more than half century. Hans Morgenthau was one of the scholars who noted this reality. He recognizes that states use foreign aid as a political tool and that they pursue various policies by the name of foreign aid. Morgenthau identifies six types of foreign aid: humanitarian

foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development (Morgenthau 1962, 301). According to Morgenthau, only humanitarian aid is non-political, meaning that almost all what we call today development aid is political. Interestingly, Morgenthau identifies bribery as part of 'the armory of diplomacy'. Proving him right, foreign aid practice of the last decades uncover that bribery in diplomacy functions under the disguise of foreign aid. Rather than multilateral aid, which is disbursed by international organizations where a single country cannot have influence decisions on its own, bilateral aid is more politicized. As a result, also supported by empirical findings (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998), in their bilateral relations, states tend to provide foreign aid not to the neediest countries but to countries which the donor states have more interests.

Role of foreign aid in US foreign policy during the Cold war is a vivid example. The US administrations during the Cold War used foreign aid as an effective political tool to attract countries as to contain Soviet expansion. Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine are probably the most well-known examples. US foreign aid policy towards Pakistan is also a striking case. Following Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, the US suspended all its foreign aid. In subsequent years, however, the US renewed foreign aid to Pakistan as to guarantee support of this nation in its fight against international terrorism after September 11 attacks. This example clearly shows that political considerations play a key role in determining who will receive the US foreign aid. The list of US aid recipients in 2016 also supports this argument. According to data provided by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Israel is set to receive the most foreign aid from the United States in 2016; receiving $3.1 billion. Meanwhile, the United States will be spending $1.5 billion in foreign aid in Afghanistan in 2016, making this country the second top recipient of US foreign aid. Egypt, a close ally of the United States, is expected to receive $1.4 billion in 2016 and become the third top recipient of US foreign aid. Given the development level and living standards of Israel, Egypt and Afghanistan, it is expected that the US government will earmark the largest portion of foreign aid to Afghanistan. On the contrary, the list of the top ten US foreign aid recipients demonstrates that the Obama administration will prioritize

political preferences to humanitarian emergency. The aforementioned list also shows that no country from sub-Saharan Africa is in the top five of the US foreign aid recipient list. This fact is consistent with the declining significance of sub-Saharan Africa in the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period.

That foreign aid bureaucrats of the wealthy countries make strategic and political choices in their decision making to determine recipient countries is alone a major problem for political opposition groups and non-governmental actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction in the recipient country. Post-war governments may not be able to make political decisions independent of external actors because they are constrained by financial difficulties, budget deficits and precarious economy. Wealthy and former colonial countries who have stakes in the reconstruction of the war-torn country and wish to establish a state that serve their interests tend to offer more help. Since war-shattered countries are in need of financial support and foreign aid to keep the newly established state running, the political leaders desperately come to the terms with the donor countries and make political concessions. It is therefore unsurprising that the United States was one of the most active actor in post-civil war Liberia, providing more foreign aid to its close ally in Africa. This situation creates a political environment in which the governments find themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, if they pass the necessary legislations as they are expected, the country will not receive as much foreign aid as possible. On the other hand, if they compromise with a donor country and make political concessions, then the country's reconstruction will be hampered due to absence of necessary legal/administrative framework. Following foreign-aid-for-policy model of de Mesquita and Smith (B. B. de Mesquita and Smith 2007), we have theoretical reasons to assume that in post-war society, where income opportunities are limited and ministries stand out as the most lucrative public offices, political decision makers will prefer to stay in the office as many years as possible because leaving the office will deprive the leaders huge financial and material resources and benefits. Therefore, they tend to prefer the latter by accepting policy concessions in return of receiving large sums of foreign aid in various forms.

Foreign aid, as defined in a nutshell above, basically refers to transfer of material resources to needy countries. Given that many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular post-war countries, lack effective and accountable government institutions, aid provision to fragile states inadvertently fosters the informal institutions of the neo-patrimonial state. Public officers in post-conflict settings abuse their discretionary power granted by the nascent state institutions and control mechanism in order to gain material benefits. Due to years of civil war, destroyed infrastructure, collapsed market and institutions, post-conflict states usually have meager resources following the termination of violence. These states often have sufficient reserves pay for public officers only. Even if ministries have budget earmarked for investments for infrastructure or basic services, rampant corruption and embezzlement of these funds dry up state coffers. Under such circumstances, pouring large sum of financial aid into a neo-patrimonial state is tantamount to fuelling the informal institutions. A public officer cannot pursue clientelist behavior or entrench his/her patronage network without financial resources at his/her disposal. It is the material resources that enable the public officers to seek strengthening patronage networks, clientelist behavior or embezzlement. In other words, foreign aid provision to a neo-patrimonial state generates profit opportunities for crooked and corrupt bureaucrats and thus fosters the informal institutions. Consequently, more foreign aid will result in more corruption.

The point I am trying to make here is not that halting or suspension of foreign aid will eliminate informal institutions or prevention of corruption. Even a public officer with limited power or meager resource can be involved in small-scale or what is called petty corruption. What I am trying to focus in this study is corruption at senior bureaucrat level; offices that initiate state tenders, award contracts to private companies etc. Politicians who are often in control of ministries or high-level institutions that require contracting, tend to receive a certain percentage of the sum of the tender bid from the contractor in return of the contract award. Some politicians even frankly ask for bribe for granting concessions to a private company or for awarding contracts. These behaviors, of course, are illegal and unlawful. Absence of rule of law, weak judicial institutions and ineffective law enforcement agencies create conducive environment for greedy politicians to engage in more corruption. Foreign aid provided by external actors

directly to state aggrandizes the resource pool that politicians are prone to exploit. Without effective control mechanisms, the more foreign aid provided by external actors the higher probability that corruption-prone politicians will be engaged in more corruption. As I discussed above, powerful developed powers who usually turn out to be the major donors, provide foreign aid mostly on political and strategic considerations.

Informal institutions cannot be sustained by selfish, crooked and corrupt bureaucrats or politicians alone. Relationships such as clientelism are reciprocal in nature. In other words, it takes two sides to sustain a clientelist behavior or patronage network: provider and beneficiary. Apparently, the latter benefits more in these relationships. However, the former, usually a public officer or a politician is the main beneficiary. He/she provides a modest benefit to the client while he/she gains much more in the long run, or behind closed doors. Citizens at local level or junior politicians/public officers who witness such practices and notice that they go unpunished are likely to imitate their seniors in the future. Even local people who are involved in clientelist behaviors or patronage networks will prefer such engagement because of material benefits. Since human beings are rational, they make a cost-benefit analysis and as a result conclude that being part of patronage network or engagement in clientelist behavior pays off much more than remaining aloof. Therefore, more foreign aid to corrupt state institutions means not only more corruption but also reproduction and entrenchment of clientelism and patronage networks. In other words, external actors with foreign aid they provide make informal institutions more lucrative for public officers and bureaucrats, while making them more attractive to regular citizens.

At times these politicians use their discretionary power or resources at their disposal to satisfy their constituencies, even though such expenditures are dead investments and will not have valuable contribution to national development. Basic rule of politics is that politicians need reelection and loyalty of their constituents is precious for them. Therefore, they sustain their patronage networks or engage in clientelist behaviors to strengthen their base or to earn loyalty of wider population. Financing such an ambitious political objective entails generation of extra wealth for politicians. The required funding for politics then is obtained through corruption, bribery and clientelist

behaviors. Thus, when external actors provide foreign aid to post-war states where control mechanisms are almost absent, they inadvertently pave the way for more corruption. More corruption means more rent opportunities for politicians and senior public officers who are prone to be engaged in clientelist behaviors. Then, it is logical to conclude that outcome of foreign aid provision to post-war societies where neo-patrimonial regimes prevail is threefold. First, it produces, reproduces and fosters informal institutions by rendering clientelist relationship or engagement in patronage networks more lucrative. Second, it increases corruption by aggrandizing the resource pool available at the discretion of corrupt public officers. Third, it makes informal institutions more attractive to regular citizens because those who engage in these institutions are rewarded and go unpunished.

Empirical studies lend support to the theoretical arguments presented so far. Foreign aid by democratic developed states is often provided to underdeveloped or transition countries to reward good governance. During the administration of former president George W. Bush, the United States announced that it will tie foreign aid to good governance, meaning that countries with a more remarkable governance record will receive more aid. Compiling data from six different sources to measure corruption from different angle, Alesina and Weder find that less corrupt governments do not receive more foreign aid. Conversely, their findings show that more corrupt governments receive more foreign aid (Alesina and Weder 1999). In a more detailed study, Kono and Montinola seeks an answer to the question of whether foreign aid bolsters democratic or autocratic regimes (Kono and Montinola 2009). They argue that duration of aid provision and regime type of the recipient country are correlated with the success of foreign aid. They show that one-time provision of foreign aid supports democratic regimes, while continuous provision of foreign aid supports autocratic regimes. Taking a different stand, Goldsmith believes that foreign aid contributes to governance ability of African states, although he admits that this is a minor contribution. However, he also admits that this minor positive contribution is 'easily drowned up by other factors' (Goldsmith 2001). As I discussed in detail above, existence of informal institutions and absence of control mechanisms in post-war

societies prevent foreign aid from being used effectively by state institutions for reconstruction of the collapsed state.

This situation leads us to consider the role of foreign aid in post-conflict societies more like as a variable that produces incentives for politicians and high-level bureaucrats to seek more rents. With the termination of violence and signing a peace agreement, post-war governments, if they do not have abundant exportable natural resources, take over a state with empty coffers. Starting from this fact, financing politics, generation of material benefits for clients or patronage networks become an essential problem for politicians. Under these conditions, when they search for more opportunities to seek rents so that they can maintain clientelist relations and strengthen patronage networks, pumping large sum of foreign aid into state institutions creates conducive environment for politicians and bureaucrats to loot those resources. If foreign aid is supplied continuously in large quantity, corrupt officials will be bolstered and have opportunity to rip off state institutions. Furthermore, the informal institutions are reproduced and strengthened as long as inflow of mass foreign aid is present because it will fuel the corrupt mechanisms. This cycle of informal relationship may result in stability and security in the post-conflict societies in short term. But in the long run, such an economic system reliant on external aid supply is likely to produce dire problems. First, over years, because people will prefer to be engaged in clientelist behavior or join patronage networks for material benefits, consolidation of formal institutions and therefore central authority will be hampered. Second, foreign aid's role in reproduction of informal institutions will undermine legitimacy of the central authority by rendering patronage networks more legitimate in the eyes of regular citizens.

Although foreign aid supply continuously for years may create stable and secure societies at the expense of undermining and delegitimation of central authority, it will not help post-conflict states create peaceful societies. Moreover, interruptions in aid supply after years of non-stop inflow of aid monies are likely to create instability. As I discussed above, neo-patrimonial regimes heavily rely on outside revenue sources, mainly foreign aid, and therefore elites attempt to capture or recapture state institutions

so as to control those funds. Aid shocks therefore are likely to trigger fresh violence in post-war societies where security is still precarious. Aid shock refers to both sudden increase and decrease in foreign aid supply to a country. Sudden interruptions in foreign aid supply compel the ruling elites to seek for alternative revenue sources and rent-seeking behavior. In countries where resources are limited, fresh violence is inevitable in order to control those resources. Sudden increase in aid supply is also another factor that can raise the possibility of conflict recurrence. Sudden and significant amount of increase in the aid flow to the state coffers will encourage politicians to loot earmarked donor money. Since neo-patrimonial regimes do not have consolidated, accountable and transparent institutions to equally distribute additional aid to citizens, elites are likely to resort violence to sort out the problem of distribution of the additional resources in question. Tuareg rebellion of the early 1990s in Mali is believed to be triggered by the sudden decrease in the aid flow to this country (Nielsen et al. 2011). Tuareg people have been marginalized by the central governments in Mali for decades. Nomadic and livestock-reliant nature of Tuareg people made it difficult for governments to provide basic services. Even if governments desired to provide assistance to Tuareg people, state had meager financial resources. When the government struck a peace deal with Tuareg people, country began to receive large sum of foreign aid from the international community. Marked decrease in the amount of foreign aid supply in the late 1989 caused collapse of the peace deal and recurrence of the rebellion. Foreign aid supply therefore plays preventive and peaceful role before an armed conflict breaks out. Even following the conflict onset, provision of foreign aid is likely to shorten conflict duration and help belligerent groups consider striking a peace deal earlier. As empirical findings show, a 10% increase in aid flow to a country of an ongoing conflict is likely to decrease continuation probability of the conflict by 8% points (de Ree and Nillesen 2009).

Another dimension of the causal relationship between foreign aid and reproduction of the neo-patrimonial regimes is concerned about food aid. Once a civil war erupts, civilians leave their homes and move to a safer place. While some people who have relatives in neighboring countries cross the border and seek refuge in other countries, those who do not have the means or capacity are forced to move safer areas

within country, searching for new areas of settlement to stay away from war. In foreign aid lexicon, these people are called internally displaced people, or often known with the acronym as IDP. These IDPs are often hosted in camps established and maintained by the United Nations and/or other donor countries. IDP camps have always been a hotly debated issue in conflicts due to two main problems. First, in a civil war, where distinction between a civilian and a rebel is almost impossible, rebels are likely to seek refuge in the IDP camps and use these facilities to reorganize and receive basic services. Second, because the international community is mainly concerned about the survival of IDP residents the foreign aid packages received in IDP camps are markedly food aid. Then the question as to whether rebels infiltrated into the camps receive food aid becomes a contentious issue.

As Nunn and Qian (2014) show, food aid provided to conflicts actually increases the conflict duration. Humanitarian organizations do not hesitate to provide food aid to IDP camps because they operate according to humanitarian principles such as non-partiality and objectiveness. Therefore, when they see a civil war victim in need of food, humanitarian aid workers cannot and are unable to discriminate a rebel and an IDP.   In this sense, Nunn and Qian fills a caveat of de Ree and Nillesen research in that they study foreign aid as a single variable, rather than breaking into pieces of various types of aid, while Nunn and Qian focus on food aid alone. Food aid as well as other basic service provision such as healthcare or emergency medical care in IDP camps causes tension between international aid practitioners and governments officers because of the existence of informal institutions in IDP camps. Victims of civil wars, even after the cessation of violence, remain in IDP camps for years because their homes and villages are most likely destroyed during the fight. People move to IDP camps en masse with their kin, relatives or people with ethnic/religious ties. That is why in IDP camps where people feel vulnerable, they stick to their identity groups more. Food distribution, benefiting from healthcare services or even security provision in large camps is ensured by groups. Food aid or other forms of material aid provided to IDP camps strengthen the informal institutions in the camps. While tribal or clan chiefs in IDP camps use their authority to make material benefits through distribution of services. Thus, foreign aid to

IDP camps also indirectly generates revenue and therefore reproduces the neo-patrimonial regimes, although in a smaller-scale.

As a matter of fact, these findings prove that neo-patrimonial regimes of conflict-prone countries become, what Dambisa Moyo (2009) prefers to call, aid addictive. The entire state mechanism is established on the assumption of continuous foreign aid flow. Once external actors, for one reason or another, suspends or halts foreign aid, survival of the neo-patrimonial regimes become the primary concern for the elites. This shock heightens tension between ruling elites and contenders of power and even causes new armed conflicts or recurrence of frozen ones. Theoretically thinking, argument presented so far leads us to conclude that once external actors begin foreign aid supply to neo-patrimonial regimes, they should not halt the supply suddenly. The fact that administrative mechanisms are reliant on the foreign aid supply makes the post-war governments precarious and fragile. As research points out, without any exception, all bilateral donors condition the foreign aid allocation to conflict (Balla and Reinhardt 2008). As a matter of fact, as the de Ree and Nillesen's findings demonstrate, countries with an ongoing conflict need more foreign aid so that the fighting can cease sooner. But the Balla and Reinhardt's findings indicate that donor countries pursue a different policy in aid allocation and halt aid supply with a conflict onset.

Another aspect of foreign aid to post-war societies is concerned about loans provided by the international financial institutions (IFIs). In addition to providing loans and aid, IFIs are key players of neo-liberal peacebuilding project. Once a peace agreement is signed and violence ends, IFIs join the reconstruction efforts to revive the collapsed states so that negative impacts of civil war can be redressed. Although there are a number of IFIs, as far as post-conflict reconstruction is concerned, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), together known as Bretton Woods institutions, are the primary actors. The IMF provides loans to countries and focuses on balance-of-payment disequilibria, while the World Bank is more interested in funding infrastructure projects. The Bretton Woods institutions pour in millions or in some cases billions of US dollars to countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction. IFIs have relations with many developing countries but countries of sub-Saharan Africa receive

more loans compared to other parts of the world. In 1980s, for example, Africans constituted nearly 12% of the population of the developing world but received about 22% of the total IFI aid. Africans benefited more also in terms of per capita aid received. In the 1980s, IFI aid share per person in Asia was about $5 and in Latin America around $7, whereas in Africa the figure was about $20 (Ayittey 601, 2). But these apparently benevolent interventions have several repercussions on the post-conflict society.

First, these institutions negotiate, consult, and sign agreements with the central authority recognized by the international community after the peace agreement or termination of the civil war. In fact, the relationship between the IFIs and the central authority has detrimental effects on the legitimacy the latter. In the eyes of many, the Bretton Woods institutions are nothing more than proxy for Western major powers, serving their economic and political interests, notably the United States. That is why they have low credibility and poor image in developing countries. Half a century performance record of the IMF, for example, also entrenched the idea that these institutions serve the interest of the Western hegemony, while lagging economic development of the host country. Due to this common concern about the poor performance of these institutions, their involvement in post-conflict reconstruction efforts raises eyebrows, in particular among local people. Thus, when a central authority gets along well with these institutions and cooperates satisfactorily with them, legitimacy of the central authority become dubious in the eyes of local people. Inevitably, loyalty of local people will be diverted to informal institutions.

As a matter of fact, citizens of underdeveloped countries and post-conflict societies are cannot be accused of being pessimistic about their negative view on the Bretton Wood institutions. Infamous World Bank funded forestry project in Mubende district of Uganda is a case in point (Easterly 2013, 4). In February 2010, villagers in Mubende district were shocked when they realized that their farms and crops are torched by soldiers. Later, they found out that a British company undertook a forestry project in the district and the company wanted around 20,000 villagers to leave the land that belongs to them for generations. In spite of resistance to soldiers, villagers were

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overwhelmed by the armed security forces. What was more interesting was that the project was funded by the World Bank because the project would raise employment in the district and generate income for some villagers. Following the riots in Mubende, some international media outlets covered the event and the World Bank was compelled to announce that they will start an investigation. The Bank never concluded the investigation. The Project is in progress and the villagers are left with no other option but to reach an agreement with the British company.

When a country signs an agreement with IFIs, in return of loans, debtor countries agree to undertake some reforms, which are commonly known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Outside commentators tend to criticize SAPs for being too detailed and more importantly copied from other countries that IFIs deal with. SAPs often entail same political and financial remedies for every case: devaluation of currency, elimination of subsidies, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and removing state control over prices. This one-size-fits-all approach inevitably caused many failures and earned IFIs a poor image. The fundamental principle of SAPs is reducing state intervention in economy, while what was necessary in post-colonial African societies was a 'boost in low domestic savings so that countries could fund the investments necessary for structural change and growth' (Woods 2006, 154). In post-war societies, the elites in power prefer to cooperate with IFIs not only for the financial benefits of receiving loans with interest below market rate, but also in order to gain international approval for entrenching their position in power. Survival of a government just established following years of civil war entails support of the major powers and approval of international actors in order to increase its legitimacy in international politics.

Relations between IFIs and post-war countries have two major repercussions. First, similar to foreign aid by bilateral donor and non-governmental aid organizations, financial loans provided by IFIs to post-war governments create incentives for corruption and clientelist behavior. The more resources available at the discretion of bureaucrats and high-level politicians the higher probability that they will misappropriate IFI loan to strengthen patronage networks and buy off more client in

political marketplace. By so doing, IFIs help informal institutions and therefore neo-patrimonial regime reproduce itself. Second, SAPs tend to be detrimental to economic development. Failure to demonstrate a robust economic growth in the early years of post-conflict period in spite of the support of IFIs, central authorities are blamed for siding with the international institutions at the expense of domestic interests. Years of relationship with IFIs often create a chronic debt problem in underdeveloped countries. IFIs do not provide financial aid pro bono but supply loans for balance of payment deficits or infrastructure projects with an interest rate below market rates. Debtor countries must pay the loans back to IFIs in a pre-determined payment plan. Due to poor economic policy, rampant corruption and weak state institutions, countries fail to pay back to IFIs their due on time. As a result, debtor countries seek for additional loans from bilateral loans from individual donor countries in order to pay the IFIs (Woods 2006, 146). Getting into debt from an external actor to pay the debt to another external actor inevitably causes a debt spiral. Between 1970 and 1997, Africa's foreign debt rose 24-fold to $350 billion. Under such a huge debt burden, countries use their limited savings to pay for debt instead of for infrastructure and growth-related projects.

Vulnerable position of countries against IFIs reduces their bargaining power. IFIs loans often (if not always) come with mostly political strings attached. Debtor countries are supposed to fulfill the conditionalities required in the agreement in exchange of loans. IFIs also set the conditions that debtors need to meet in order to borrow not only from IFIs but also from individual donors. The latter will consider fulfillment of IFI conditions in granting loans to the debtor country. In exchange of loans, IFIs make sure that the debtor implements the policy recommendations defined in conditionalities in the agreed period so that another stand by agreement can be signed and the next line of credit can be released. In reality, however, IFIs act with political considerations in renewing stand by agreements. When debtors have something strategic offerings to the major powers, notably the USA makes sure that the debtor assumes access to IMF funds. Randall Stone empirically shows that IMF usually fail to enforce conditionalities prescribed in the agreements if the debtor has influence over the creditors (Stone 2004). Republic of Turkey, for example, signed 19 stand by agreement with IMF. Although Turkey did not fulfill the conditionalities in the past, IMF did not

hesitate to propose a new agreement. In spite of serious failure in meeting the requirements in the late 1990s, Turkey's support to the US military operations in the Gulf guaranteed IMF agreements. To take another example, following nuclear tests in the late 1990s, IMF funds to Pakistan was suspended. But IMF funds were restored after Pakistan assured its support to the Western world after September 11, 2001 to US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. Policy concessions made to major powers, in some cases to former colonial powers, are sometimes in a grave contradiction with interests of the local people and growth-oriented policies. Pro-IFI policies of the ruling elites are not gone unnoticed by the elites in opposition. As a result, they are encouraged to entrench their patronage networks and seek for more clientelism to strengthen their political bases and gain material benefits. Consequently, this attitude is likely to divert loyalty of people from the central authority to informal institution, reproduce them and therefore undermining the legitimacy of the central government.

4. CONCLUSION

As I discussed in depth in the second chapter, grievances play significant role in triggering civil wars. Oppressed, discriminated and victimized citizens living in areas out of the state authority search for alternative allegiances to secure their life and earn a living. Ethnic or religious groups or kindred are the primary areas where fearful citizens seek refuge to. Over time, citizens develop new links with these groups and create group cohesiveness. Coupled with ineffective state that is unable to exert authority across the entire territory, post-colonial African state takes a neo-patrimonial character, where patrimonial relations are maintained under the legal/relational institutions of the state. Even though well-known by the external actors, neo-patrimonial character of the post-colonial African state is often overlooked by the officials of the aid organizations.

Moreover, in this chapter I have demonstrated that engagement of external actors in post-conflict reconstruction efforts can be counterproductive. Benign and sincere peacebuilding efforts are likely to enforce inadvertently the neo-patrimonial regimes of the post-conflict society. This happens in two ways. First, external actors undermine the legitimacy of the central authority in the eyes of the society. IFI loans contingent upon implementation of neo-liberal political reforms, imposition of

multiparty democracy as the only possible regime type, exclusion of indigenous institutions, ruling out administrative mechanisms of the pre-colonial era that have existed until the present may all have negative repercussion on the society. Thus, citizens are likely to think that a government that is unable to protect its citizens against international institutions cannot protect their interests. Therefore, citizens are encouraged and find motives to be engaged in neo-patrimonial regime.

That external actors bring with them a great deal of financial resources is another factor that enforces neo-patrimonial regime in sub-Saharan Africa. External actors do provide financial assistance to the state through various ways such as budget support, loans, funding infrastructure projects. In order to underpin legitimacy of the central authority, external actors tend to provide foreign aid monies to state treasury or to the concerned ministry. Because the post-colonial African state is characterized by neo-patrimonial regimes and informal institutions, resources entrusted with the state for institution building will probably lead to foster corruption. Due to patronage networks and clientelism pursued by politicians, resources allocated for development-oriented projects will end up with doomed-to-die projects for maximizing private purposes to gain wealth or to buy loyalty of the constituents. Financial aid to governments of neo-patrimonial regimes is often regarded as conduit of gaining additional wealth by ruling elites.

CHAPTER 5: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN DARFUR CRISIS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, from a post-colonial perspective, I examined the prevailing approach in peacebuilding practices, neoliberal peacebuilding, and discussed it with a critical perspective. I have criticized the neoliberal peacebuilding on two major grounds. First, from a post-colonial perspective, it praises neoliberal values with a Eurocentric outlook by placing achievements of the Western world as the ultimate solution for the rest of the world. In a sense, neoliberal peacebuilding devises a one-fits-all approach to war-torn societies. the international community with a strong faith in neoliberal peacebuilding believes that weak state is the main reason behind the civil war therefore rebuilding a democratic state will prevent civil war recurrence. Second, neoliberal peacebuilding ignores alternative possibilities in reconstruction of war-torn societies by focusing totally on the European experience. Being oblivious to the pre-colonial heritage and indigenous institutions of the war-torn societies prevents neoliberal peacebuilding from developing a comprehensive approach that is compatible with the sociological and political dynamics on the ground. I have also elucidated that post-colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized with neo-patrimonialism. Influence of informal and patrimonial relationships in spite of existence of legal and rational administrative institutions has been an undeniable fact in many countries of the sub-Saharan Africa. I have argued that with their engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, external actors inadvertently reinforce the neo-patrimonial regimes in war-torn societies.

In this chapter, I intend to provide empirical evidence to support the argument developed in the previous chapter and summarized above. I focus on Darfur crisis in Sudan and examine the efforts of the international community to end violence and recurrence of the civil war in Darfur region of Sudan. First, I start with a brief section to introduce the Darfur conflict, its background, how the civil war started and evolved. Second, I discuss what the root cause of the conflict in Darfur is, and elucidate the

underlying reason of the conflict. I intend to draw attention to the fact that, contrary to the neoliberal peacebuilding assumption that lack of good governance as the root cause of conflicts, the civil war in Darfur started as a local conflict. In the third section of the chapter, I examine how involvement of external actors in post-conflict reconstruction of Darfur reinforces the neo-patrimonial regime. I argue that perhaps inadvertently, the external actors contribute reinforcement of neo-patrimpnial regime in three different ways. First, by imposing a Western-like state structure that ignores pre-colonial or indigenous institutions. Second, promoting of democracy as practiced in the Western world also undermines the credibility of the external actors because the ideal democrary is presented as a secular regime. Third, foreign aid provided by the external actors help corrupt high level public officers incentive to be involved in clientelist relationship. Patrons need to provide material benefits to satisfy the client so that he/she can extract political loyalty or other favors in return. In this regard, foreign aid functions like the fuel of neo-patrimonial regimes because patronage networks and clientelism cannot survive widespread without abundant resources. Chapter ends with a conclusion that sumps the argument and the findings of the post-conflict reconstruction in Darfur .

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

With its approximately 500 thousand square kilometer area, equal to the size of France, Darfur is the name of a region consisting of five provinces (North, South, West, East and Central Darfur) and with a population of around 7 million. Darfur, which is the westernmost region of Sudan neighboring Chad, literally means the land/realm of the Fur people. In this sense, it is more appropriate to write *Dâr Fûr* when referring to the particular land where the Sultanate of Darfur existed, and more appropriate to write it as a single word as Darfur when referring to the whole region under modern Sudanese rule.

Knowledge about the history of Darfur is limited mostly due to the prevalence of oral traditions in the region instead of written records and tradition. Darfur Sultanate is believed to be a Fur kingdom established around mid-seventeenth century around Marra Mountain, or what is called by locals as *Jebel Marra*. Although it is called as if a single mountain, it is a range of volcanic peaks rising up to three thousand meters. For the Fur

people, the land around the Marra Mountains is of paramount importance because it is considered as ancestral land and even kind of sacred by some clans. It is no coincidence that Fur people adopted this region and remained here for ages. In the middle of desert, with temperate climate, higher rainfall than neighboring regions, water abundance and arable land for agriculture, *Jebel Marra* area is a rare place to find for settlement in Darfur (de Waal 1989). As much as an advantage for the Fur people, geographic features of the area made it a hot spot for tribal conflicts and clashes over the control of depleting resources.

Historically, Darfur was home to several kingdoms and empires about which knowledge is limited. What is known through archeological studies and oral tradition is that Daju kingdom and later Tunjur kingdoms (both are non-Arab) existed in the region between twelfth and seventeenth centuries (O'Fahey 2004). In spite of collapse of their empires, both Daju and Tunjur people are able to preserve their ethnic identities in modern Darfur. Although it is not clear when and by whom the Darfur Sultanate was established, it is estimated to be established around 1650 (O'Fahey 2004). According to R. S. O'Fahey (1980), Keira dynasty of Fûr people was a tributary state of Tunjur Empire. Unsure about exact foundation of the Darfur Sultanate, however, M.W. Daly, argues that Dâr Fûr Sultanate and Tunjur Empire coexisted for an unknown duration until the latter vanished from the political scene (2010, 17). When the Tunjur Empire was weakened and finally collapse, Keira dynasty inherited the governance of the region. It is also speculated that Keira (sometimes spelled as *Kayra*) dynasty to be of Abbasid descent implying that the dynasty leaders moved from north somewhere Egypt to Darfur (Hassan 2010, 154). For O'Fahey, several factors helped Keira dynasty and Fûr people to take over the region: Fûr's numerical superiority, the lucrative trade routes around *Jebel Marra*, and expanding control of the most fertile regions (1980, 10). In addition to these, another factor that made Darfur Sultanate powerful was slavery and slave trade. The Sultanate was an enslaving political entity. Because it was located on three major trade routes, slave trade was quite lucrative for slave raiders. Moreover, the Fûr sultans used slavery as a major source of army, mostly infantry.

The Darfur Sultanate ebbed and flowed for centuries; sometimes powerful enough to control the entire region, while sometimes weakened and ruled by shadow sultans. A merchant prince named al-Zubayr Rahma Mansour, a Sudanese Arab from Ja'ali tribe, attacked and defeated the Darfur Sultanate in 1874. After the collapse of the sultanate, Darfur became part of the Anglo-Egyptian government during the *Turkiyya* period. Towards the end of the 19th century, one of the grandsons of the last Darfur sultans, Ali Dinar, revived the Darfur Sultanate. Darfur Sultanate under Ali Dinar's rule was a land of peace and harmony. As O'Fahey (2004, 25) notes:

> My impression, from the many documents I have collected and
> read from the period, is that the mesakin or ordinary people
> could expect not too much zulm or 'oppression'. In short, it was
> a well-run state.

Ali Dinar's success in maintaining order and preserve the sultanate was not only result of his wise policies. Isolated location of the sultanate was a major factor. Weary of military campaigns to expand the colonial borders, both British and French forces were hesitant to move further into the continent. British administrators in Khartoum did not attack Darfur Sultanate to invade for a long time. As Daly (2010, 108) points out, "leaving Darfur unoccupied was Britain's and Egypt's policy", not appointed administrators in Khartoum who are eager to launch a military campaign and show off their capability. With the eruption of the World War I, the British had become worried about a likelihood of a rebellion or a declaration of jihad by people in Darfur who are ruled by Ali Dinar who declared allegiance to the Ottoman state. Following Ali Dinar's rejection of the British demand of allegiance, colonial army in Khartoum launched a military campaign against Darfur Sultanate. Darfur Sultanate ended in 1916 when the last Sultan Ali Dinar was shot and killed by the British forces(Aqeed 2007). After the collapse of the Darfur Sultanate, the region was incorporated to the Sudan.

As stated before, Keira dynasty transformed itself into a sultanate in the midst of a number of chieftaincies. For the sultanate to gain upper hand against neighboring chieftaincies, the sultan had to stay above those tribal chieftaincies, to control and impose authority over them. To do this, the sultanate had to "build its owninstitutions,

involving at least an army and an officialdom, anchored in a property system that would provide countervailing forms of landed property alongside existing communal ones" (Mamdani 2009, 114). Because the land is the most essential asset for the livelihoods of the communities in Darfur, conflicts and at times small scale clashes among tribes were frequent. Therefore, devising a mechanism with which land disputes could be managed, coupled with other advantages mentioned above, would elevate Keira dynasty to a higher political standing among neighboring chieftaincies.

A central institution initiated by the Darfur Sultanate was an estate system, called *hakura*. The *hakura* system was initiated not long after the emergence of the sultanate. According to O'Fahey (1980, 50), the system was established during Sultan Musa's era, and records show that land grants were given to the neighboring tribes around 1700. There were two types of *hakura* grants and they were distinguished by scale and purpose. First is the administrative *hakura*, kind of a grant of "administrative rights whereby the sultans rewarded their notables and through them maintained control over outlying areas". Second is the *hakura* of privilege, grant of right to an estate as a means of accommodating new comers, mostly Islamic scholars, called *fuqara*, coming from West Africa and the Nile river area, merchants, members of the royal clan, army leaders and state officials (O'Fahey 1980, 51). Unlike administrative *hakura*, holders of privileged *hakura*, were granted also exemptions from taxation over a defined area of land or a named community. Plus, it gave the holder all rights to collect taxes and religious dues (Mamdani 2009, 116). In other words, Darfur Sultanate used *hakura* system to ensure the loyalty of the group's leader in return for officially confirming and acknowledging his position and tribal land. Therefore, Darfur Sultanate developed a grid of estates among chieftaincies in Darfur region, and most tribes had their own homeland, called *dar*, such as *Dar Masalit*, homeland of Masalit people or *Dar Zaghawa*, homeland of Zaghawa people.

Darfur Sultanate's *hakura* system of land allocation is marked by detribalization of the region because land was open to outsiders and the ruler was not challenged as long as taxes are paid to the sultan. Because Darfur was at the intersection of three major trade routes (West Africa – Arab Peninsula; South/Central Africa – Libya;

South/Central Africa - Egypt), over years, many people who had to pass through Dâr Fûr preferred to stay and settle in this sultanate. Over decades, this influx of newcomers led to the demographic changes in the region, loss of Fûr people's majority is being one. Towards the end of the 19th century, it is estimated that the Fûr constituted only 1/3 of the population, whereas they were the majority in the early 18th century. The colonial government did not maintain the communal ownership of land. Instead it arranged the new colonial administration in such a way that the community leaders of majority groups assumed administrative leadership for the minority communities who lived with them. Some minority groups who lived peacefully under *hakura* system but did not possess their own *dar* began to state their desire to have administrative authority(Mohamed and Badri 2010). This led to violent conflicts among tribes within Darfur.

As will be discussed in detail below, there are three main mode of livelihood in Darfur. First, nomad camel herders, mostly nomad Arabs in the northern parts of the region. Second, semi-nomad cattle herders, both Arabs and non-Arabs, in the southern part of the region. And third, groups who are engaged in rain-fed traditional agriculture settled mostly in between. What the colonial administration did was to abolish the traditional estate system and redistribute *dars* according to the mode of living. Thus, settled groups engaged in traditional farmers were granted the largest dars. Cattle herders who have villages but stay out of their homeland half of the year during the rainy season were granted smaller *dar*. Finally, nomad camel herders were not granted any *dar* because they are currently on move with their animal. Being left out of dar distribution by the colonial administration was not a big deal for nomad Arab camel herders in the early decades of the 20th century thanks to the abundance of resources. However, not having a *dar* of their own has become a problem within the last couple of decades due to environmental and demographic factors which will be discussed in the next section.

In spite of alterations by the colonial administration, *dar* system was respected and preserved by Sudanese governments after independence until the early 1970s.The major factor that kept the region peaceful and the relations between tribes stable was the

institution of native administrations, called *idârat el-ehliyye*. These native administrations acted as arbitrator to settle disputes among communities such as murder of a tribe member, killing an animal from another tribe. Both the colonial administration and the Sudanese governments maintained the native administrations. The change began with the President Numeiri's attempt to dismount the traditional tribal structures in the name of modernization and reform. In factthe President Numeiri had an insincere aim, which as to destroy the traces of tribalism in the name of creating a "Sudanese" nation (Daly 2010, 207). Numeiri's attempt to dismantle native administrations was also a move to weaken the political opposition movements in general and Umma Party in particular because such traditional structures were seen by Numeiri regime as a source of political support to the political opposition (Cockett 2010, 173). In 1971, Numeiri regime passed the People's Local Government Act to reform and reorganize the native administrations which, for the regime, are undemocratic, corrupt and resistant to the development. As much as it sounds innocent, the new boundaries of the native administrations were "drawn deliberately to cut across rather than incorporate tribal *dars*" (Cockett 2010, 173). Numeiri's attempt failed because state had not enough financial power to finance the project. As a result tribal structures collapsed and number of inter-communal conflicts increased.

Native administrations were reinstated by Omar el-Bashir after taking over the government in 1989. I have interviewed with the minister, Yusuf Takana, who was in charge of reviving native administrations and settling existing tribal disputes in Darfur. Being a notable of Habbaniya tribe, Takana himself is from the region and knows the local dynamics of the region. According to Takana, native administrations are led by respected local elders and therefore the verdicts are legitimate and respected by both sides. He also underlined that native administrations reduced the judicial work load of state courts in the region whose verdicts were regarded as political, illegitimate and dubious.

So far, I have discussed two major developments that altered the socio-political structure of Darfur region. These are abolishing traditional *hakura* system and redistribution of *dars* along ethnic lines by the colonial administration, and

dismantlement of native administration by the Numeiri regime in 1970s. In addition to these, one more factor, decades-long civil war in Chad, should be discussed as an essential element that added fuel to the already fragile political environment.

Chad is Sudan's neighboring country in the west. This former French colony has been bogged down into a civil warbetween the Arab-Muslims of the north and the mostly Christian Africans of the south. As a frequent practice in sub-Saharan Africa, border line between Sudan and Chad was drawn by colonial powers ignoring the demographic and ethnic dynamics at the local level. As a result, a number of ethnic groups are divided between these two countries, although there was never an effective border control, which was also almost impossible for governments to secure the border line from nomadic groups. Impact of the civil war in Chad on Darfur conflict was also reiteratedby professor Fayz Jamie, who is director of Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Bahri. When I interviewed him for this research at his office in Khartoum, he highlighted that there are around 14 tribes scattered between the eastern Chad and the Darfur region. For example, the current president of Chad, Idriss Deby, is also from Zaghawa tribe whose members are also dominant in Darfur.

The civil war in Chad had negative impact on Darfur in three different ways. First, Darfur was seen as a safe haven by the rebels in Chad because of inability of Chad forces to chase the rebels to the very east and the presence of kindred in Darfur. Rebels in Chad retreated to Darfur whenever they felt weak and disorganized so that they can feel safe for a while until they rest, get medical assistance and reorganize to maintain the rebellion. Second, intermingling of these two regions to such an extent made fired arms easily available in Darfur. Over years, Darfur has become a region that is awash with fire arms and AK47s. An indirect consequence of this phenomenon is that people began to resort to fire arms to settle their disputes in case of a disagreements, while conflicts of the region were used to be settled peacefully. Third, many nomadic Arab Muslim or farmer African groups who are affected by the civil war in Chad left their homeland to move to eastward to live with their relatives in Darfur. Given the disadvantaged status of some groups in Darfur in terms of *dar* possession and debilitating natural resources, new coming groups had difficulty in settling in Darfur

and finding a suitable place to build their home and start farming or animal breeding. Consequently, these new comers from Chad constitute a significant portion of the warring parties. Because they are desperately in need of land to sustain their livelihood, they are more likely to attack communities with allocated land, especially if there exist historical animosities between the groups.

Drought and famine cannot be left out when discussing causes of the civil wars not only in Darfur but throughout the Sahel region. As de Waal (1989) explains in detail, Darfur region, particularly the northern part was hit by drought and drought-induced famines many times. Although low rainfall and low level of agricultural output are not conditions that Darfurians are unaccustomed to, in some years the drought and famine were so severe that caused many deaths. Coupled with negative impacts of the civil war in Chad and political instability in Khartoum, famines often triggered large scale communal violence in Darfur between tribes. It is for this reason that Natsios (2012) talks about three rebellions in Darfur in the post-independence period.

The last wave of civil war in Darfur started in 2003 when rebels attacked Sudanese army garrison in el-Fasher in north Darfur. Fighting between rebels and the Sudanese government forces continued for years causing hundreds of thousands deaths and internally displaced people. Government of Sudan and Minni Minnawi faction of Sudanese Liberation Army signed a Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. Because other rebel groups rejected this agreement, fighting continued at lower level. Another round of peace talks started in 2010 in Doha, Qatar. As of the end of 2015, Government of Sudan has not been able to reach an agreement with the all rebel groups. Although hostility level decreased and severity of fighting has been reduced, scattered skirmishes are observed in remote areas of Darfur.

In short, due to the reasons discussed above, violence among tribes and inter-communal armed conflict was common in Darfur. Worsening environmental conditions, influx of people and guns from Chad, widening economic development gap with the capital Khartoum, and political disagreements made armed conflict easier to start and more destructive. Disenfranchised political figures, former speaker of the Sudanese parliament Hasan Turabi in particular, capitalized on these grievances and socio-

economic problems to put pressure on the central government for political concessions. As of 2016, the conflict in Darfur has been transformed into and seen by Sudanese as a fight over political power. In fact, the underlying factor was depleting natural resources and mismanagement of resources, while population in the region was in disproportionate increase.

3. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT

As always, an analysis of the cause of the civil war in Darfur will conclude by saying that "it is complicated", meaning there are different factors at play. Darfur conflict is not an exception. As discussed in detail above, there are different elements aggravated the situation and increased tension. Yes, underdevelopment of the region and negligence of the central government is *a* cause of the conflict. Yes, civil war in Chad resulting in influx of refugees and arms is *a* cause of the conflict. Yes, former Libyan presiden Gaddafi's pan-Arab policy of arming Arab tribes against African tribes of Darfur is *a* cause of the conflict. But, of these factors, in this section I argue that depleting natural resources (pastures and arable land) coupled with population increase is the cause of *the* conflict in Darfur. Let me explain in detail why I argue so.

Darfur region is made up of three main geographical zones. In the north, land is covered with sand of the Sahara desert with almost no rainfall. It accounts for nearly one-third of Darfur's territory. Second geographic zone is southern savanna region, with low hills covered with sandy soil, called *quz* by local people, extending across central and southern Darfur and neighboring Kordofan. This part of the region is suitable for vegetation and people are engaged in both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture to grow a variety of products such as citrus tree, tomato, and melon. Third zone is in between the northern desert and the southern savanna. This transition zone is marked by prolonged rainless periods, at times for eleven months.

These geographical zones are key to understanding the livelihood and communal life styles in Darfur. People of Darfur can be divided roughly into two groups in terms of their livelihoods: settler farmers (*muzari'in*) and nomad animal herders (*ru'aya*). Settler farmers are located in the southern part of the region expanding from east to

west, inhabiting the most fertile lands for agriculture, and traditional farming constitutes the main source of income for most residents of Darfur (Nur 2014). Animal herders can also be divided into two sub-categories. First group of people is called *baggara*, which refers to cattle herders. Cattle herding is a major way of line in this central belt of Africa for many communities from the White Nile in the east to the Lake Chad in the west. The second group of animal herders in Darfur is called *abbala*, which refers to camel herders. In contrast to *baggara* people, *abbala* communities live in the northern parts of Darfur. The *abbala* tribes are nomadic tribes migrating from north to south during the dry season to avoid extreme heat, and from south to north during the rainy season to avoid water puddles and swamps. This way of life is not peculiar to the *abbala* tribes of Darfur. The same pattern can be seen in the entire sahel region from the eastern Sudan to Mali in the West Africa. Although it is not possible to draw crystal clear line of distinction between Arabs and Africans, people dealing with traditional farming are mostly Africans, while nomadism and animal herding is the most common mode of living for Arabs (Mohamed and Badri 2010, 119).

Depending on the mode of living, animal herder groups pursue an unsettled life in Darfur region. Throughout my field study in Sudan, interviewees from all sides agree that nomadic way of life in Darfur is an inextricable element of the conflict in Darfur. As demonstrated in figure-1, camel breeding tribes are concentrated in the north, while cattle breeding tribes are concentrated in the south and tribes whose livelihood depends on traditional farming are located in between. Given the lack of infrastructure, paved roads, sewage and drain system, during rainy reasons, living conditions in the central part of Darfur region becomes unbearable for animal breeding tribes. These animal breeding tribes migrate north during the rainy season because grazing areas turn into mud fields which are difficult especially for cattle to move around(Muhammed 2013). Moreover, as a result of lack of sewage and drain infrastructure rain water causes water puddles and puddles of mud, which are conducive environment for multiplication mosquitos. Since animals, especially goat and sheep, are vulnerable to diseases transmitted through mosquito bites, rainy season carries a huge risk for animal breeding tribes. Threatening environmental conditions during the rainy season force animal breeding groups migrate toward *quz* area or semi-desert areas in the northern parts of

the region. During the dry season, however, these groups move southward where water and grazing land is more easily available, and also to avoid extreme heat in the north that can cause animal deaths.

Figure-1: Migration Routes and Modes of Livelihood in Darfur

As the figure-1 demonstrates clearly, tribes whose livelihood depends on traditional farming are located between camel breeding and cattle breeding nomadic tribes. In other words, farmer tribes (*muzari'in*) are based at the intersection of the migration routes of the nomadic tribes, and the cultivated farming lands are located on where nomad tribes use as a passage with their animals. Inevitably, during nomadic tribes' migration, hundreds of people and animals, cultivated and/or arable land is damaged or the crops are destroyed by animals (Sa'deh 2011). The migration used to pose a great deal of risk for nomadic tribes as well. It was also possible that people of farming tribes could steal, kill or hurt animals. It should be born in mind that this way of life is not a modern practice but has been practiced for centuries.

This vibrant way of life in itself has not been a great deal of problem when the population was low in Darfur. However, with the influx of people from Chad, massive increase in population has put more strain on diminishing natural resources. As mentioned earlier, border drawn by the colonial powers not only separated states but also a number of tribes. It is for this reason, whenever people in Eastern Chad faced difficulty faced difficulty in sustaining their livelihoods, they moved eastward towards Darfur to their relatives. This was not a phenomenon peculiar to modern Sudan. Influx of people from Chad to Darfur was an issue for the British colonial administration as well. For example, this fact was noted by the Darfur officers of the British colonial administration in the Annual Report of 1938, available at the Sudanese National Archives (CIVSEC 57/25/102):

> The number of permits to enter the Sudan issued at Geneina was
> 4,447 as compared with 3,823 in 1937. The normal movement of
> local population to work in the eastern cotton fields took place
> and was accentuated at the end of the year in certain areas where
> the crops had been destroyed by locusts.

When the first census was conducted in 1955, population of Darfur region was 1.12 million. The population more than tripled in 1973 when the figure rose to 3.6 million. Just before the conflict broke out in 2003, there were 6.5 million people in Darfur.

There were 7.5 million people in Darfur, after the intensive and deadly phase of the conflict was over in 2008.

Table-1: Population and Population Density Changes in Darfur (1956- 2002)

Year	Population	Density (person/km^2)
1956	1,080,000	3
1973	1,340,000	4
1983	3,500,000	10
1993	5,600,000	15
2003	6,480,000	18
2008	7,515,000	-

Source: (Cockett 2010; Fadul 2004; Takana 2014)

The population increase would not have been a problem if the number of animals had not increased simultaneously. It should be born in mind that animal breeding is the second most important mode of livelihood in Darfur. Because Sudanese governments supported livestock sector, especially after 1970s, number of animals increased dramatically. During those years, many people who used to be farmers, began animal breeding for two main reasons First, Sudanese government improved preventive health care for animals in order to reduce animal deaths and market fluctuation. Second, meat demand especially from the Gulf states increased in tremendous amount(Fadul 2004, 37–38).

Table-2: Change in the Number of Camels, Cows, Sheep and Goats in Darfur.

	Camel	Cow	Sheep	Goat
1987	443,350	4,752,420	2,900,000	2,507,870
2007	639,211	8,569,320	10,705,150	8,098,872

Source: (Takana 2014)

In parallel with the population increase, need for food among farmer tribes increased as well. This reality eventually led farmers to cultivate more and more land for crops to sustain their livelihood. Data showing expansion of cultivated land is not available specifically for Darfur. But according to the available data for Sudan, area used for traditional crop cultivation increased from 6 million feddan (0.42 hectre) in 1970 to approximately 22 million feddan in 2004 (Egemi 2014).While the Sudanese

governments supported livestock sector, similar support was denied to farmers. As a result the agricultural production was not as productive as livestock. Therefore, farmers cultivated more land to gain more food. Because the agricultural production was mostly for human consumption animal breeders began to face shortage of food for the animals. The unintended consequence of this situation was that animal breeding tribes began to use arable lands of other tribes (Fadul 2004, 38). This predicament resulted in increased competition over natural resources in the region.

Increasing need for more arable land for farmers and grazing land for *baggara* people led them to cut more and more trees to clear the land for their need. Desertification and deforestation at worrying level as a result of cutting trees aggravated the competition among tribes over natural resources. According to United Nations Environmental Program's report, "an estimated 50 to 200 km southward shift of the boundary between semi-desert and desert has occurred since rainfall and vegetation records were first held in the 1930s" (UNEP 2007, 7). It should also be born in mind that annual rainfall in Darfur has been in continuous decline since the early 1970s. Annual rainfall average between 1940-1971 in el-Fasher (North Darfur) declined from 280 mm to 180 mm between 1972-2002; for the same period average annual rainfall in Nyala (South Darfur) declined from 460 mm to 370 mm (Akasha 2014, 36). As can be seen in the figure-2, average annual rainfall is in decline in the whole region since the 1970s. Therefore, deforestation and desertification, coupled with declining rainfall, caused significant amount of diminishment of available land. Increasing human population and growth of livestock sector raised the demand for fertile land which was not abundant and in decline.

Speaking categorically for the sake of argument, I keep on saying livestock but I have to draw attention to a tiny but significant detail. Dietary patterns of camel and cattle are quite different. As Mamdani (2009, 11) explains succinctly:

> Camels and cattle occupy different ecological zones. …One
> single fact illustrates the difference between cattle and camel
> nomadism: Cattle graze, but camels browse. Unlike cattle,
> which usually feed on grasses and harvest remnants, camels

largely look to trees for nourishment. Unlike cattle nomads, camel nomads are constantly on the move and establish their camps far from villages, preferring to exploit the extended tree bands in lowland areas. From the viewpoint of farmers, camel breeders tend to practice overcutting while grazing. All in all, cattle nomads typically have a symbiotic relationship with sedentary farmers, whereas relations between camel nomads and sedentary groups are likely to be more strained.

There was a sort of gentlemen's agreement between tribes regulating passage of nomadic tribes through cultivated areas and protecting both animals and crops. Tribes in Darfur had identified certain routes for nomadic tribes to pass during their migration. Because of diminishing pastures and grazing lands, to feed their animals nomadic tribes used certain lands that are claimed by farming tribes.

Figure-2: Rainfall at three stations in Darfur (mm.) 1940- 2001.
(Dashed lines are means for 1940-71 and 1972-2002)

Source: (Akasha 2014, 36)

Throughout the history, migration of nomadic tribes and damage they or their animals caused to the farming tribes during the migration has always been an issue of contention and conflict in Darfur. However, disagreements and contentions did not turn into a large-scale war or violent mass-fight between tribes in the past. Transformation of disagreements into an inter-tribal conflict is a modern phenomenon emerged in the second half of the 20th century, for three main reasons.

First, in the past, native administrations, *idârat el-ehliyye*, were quite active in settling disputes. If a farmer's crops were destroyed or the cultivated land is damaged during the passage of a nomadic tribe due to human or animal activity, tribal leaders or elders of all concerned parties used to come together and local mediators (*ajaweed*) who are respected people in the region arbitrate the case to find a resolution(Mohamed and Badri 2010). According to Mohammed Mahjoub Haroun, director of the Peace Research Institute at University of Khartoum, among the most common resolutions were giving one or two animals to the farmer depending on the damage. If the nomadic tribe is the victim and their animals are stolen or killed, then the farming tribe was supposed to pay to the nomadic tribe a sort of compensation, usually in the form of crops. After the native administrations were abolished during the Numeiri regime in the early 1970s, the Sudanese government failed to replace them with a legitimate arbitration institutions. Darfurians had not had alternative mechanism to settle their disputes. They did not trust the established local courts because they lacked legitimacy in the eyes of tribal elders, since the court delegations were appointed by the central government and appointments were politicized.

Second, the decades-long civil war had also negative impact on the transformation of less significant disputes into inter-communal war. As I mentioned earlier, due to the fact that more than a dozen tribes are scattered across the border with Chad and so many tribes in Darfur had relatives in eastern Chad, weakened rebels were used to move east and seek refuge in Darfur. Those rebels come with their arms. Over years of civil war in Chad, weapons have become easily accessible and Darfur has become awash with all sorts of fire arms. In the past, in case of failure of native administrations, when the two contending tribes fight, the human cost was not very high because the used weapons were mostly swords and spears. With the proliferation of fire arms, however, increased the capacity of tribes to hurt other tribes in case of conflict. As the judicial vacuum created with the demise of native administrations and failure of state courts to gain legitimacy, people who are in dispute with another tribe resorted to fire arms easier than they used to in the past. As a result, even a stolen cow or a damage to a portion of a cultivated farm led tribes to large scale fighting ending up with a couple of death people.

In short, the root cause of the conflict in Darfur is the competition among tribes over declining natural resources. Tension was already there in the region due to low-level hostility among tribes. Due to several factors such as abolishing native administrations, civil war in Chad and South Sudan, and proliferation of fire arms minor disagreements began to turn into violent conflicts more easily. Then, the international community should focus on natural resource management and solutions to desertification, deforestation and creating more pastures for nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, *ru'aya*. Neo-liberal peacebuilding approach would argue that building democratic, transparent and accountable institutions through state-building modalities can facilitate governments to use state resources more efficiently. What is overlooked is that Sudan is both a destitute state and a neo-patrimonial regime.

4. NEO-PATRIMONIAL REGIME AND ITS REINFORCEMENT IN SUDAN

Sudan is a striking example of a post-colonial African state and neo-patrimonial regime. At first glance, one notices the existence of and constitutional foundation for all so-called independent and democratic institutions such as parliament, judiciary, national election commission etc. However, these institutions mostly function in a perfunctory fashion in line with the interests of the ruling elite rather than the laws. All informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes discussed earlier are present in Sudan. Clientelism, patronage networks and use of state resources for personal purposes are rampant. Hence, corruption is widespread in the country and often institutionalized whereby citizens feel obliged to bribe in order to get their demands.

According to data withdrawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicator (WDI), bribery is not negligible in Sudan. One indicator measures bribery incidence and is interested in the percentage of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request. According to the 2014 data for this variable, 17.6% of the firms in Sudan have been asked at least one bribe payment. Another variable in WDI is CPIA, which assesses transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector. The variable gets a numeric value between 1 and 6, 1 being the lowest level of transparency and accountability and 6 being the highest level. Data on this variable for Sudan is available from 2005 to 2014. According to WDI, Sudan gets 2 for 2005-2008 period,

while gets 1.5 for 2009-2014. Apparently, the onetime bribe demand measured in the previous variable seems be more than once and more systematic feature. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the Transparency International also substantiates these findings. CPI ranks Sudan in 2015 165th out of 168 countries. It is not surprising that 2015 ease of doing business index of WDI ranks Sudan 159th. What is obvious from these data is that Sudan's legal institutions function not in line with the constitution but with material benefits and interests.

The fact of tribalism is another factor fostering neo-patrimonialism in Sudan. When the borders of the country were drawn by the colonial powers, the newly emerged country contained several ethnic and linguistic groups from several geographic zones. In this sense, when Sudan state was established more than a half a century ago, there was not a Sudanese nation. As Zain explains in detail, the societies living within the border of today's Republic Sudan used to be divided along sectarian lines. Sufi orders were so organized and powerful during the Funj Sultanate that 'it was rare to find any who were not influenced by Sufism in their life' (El-Zain 1996, 524). When the colonial powers arrived and took over the control of today's Sudanese territory, they promoted tribal motives, supported and favored tribal leaders as a rival force to constrain sectarian groups motivated by Sufism and nationalist groups demanding independence. Lack and failure of the administrations in the early years of Sudan to establish a Sudanese national identity allowed tribal identities to take precedence of national identity. As a result, following the independence from the British, central government in Khartoum that took over the administration of Sudan was unable to exert authority fully across the country. Nor did the central government have military or financial capability to maintain order or deliver basic services. Inevitably, at the time of independence, Sudanese society was divided along tribal cleavages. Absence and impotence of the central government in demonstrating its statehood prevented any possible diversion of loyalty from tribal and religious groups to the new born state. Indeed, state of the central authority in the modern Sudan has not been far different than the early independence year.

That failure of Sudanese administrations to demonstrate a sound performance in statehood and deliver basic services eventually led tribal and ethnic, in a broader sense, bonds to maintain societal cohesiveness among Sudanese along non-national identities. Therefore, gaining high-level government offices or being influential in a ministry has become significant not only for an individual but for the entire tribe. Due to patronage networks, a person who attains a high-level position in a state institution hires people from his tribe or ethnic group. This is done not only as a token of appreciation but also seen as a duty of loyalty to the group. Since the public officer recruitment process is not transparent and fair, officers tend to hire people from their own group because they know that they cannot be hired under the management of another person from a different tribe. For example, when Adem Abdullah, former general in the Sudanese army from *Habbaniya* tribe in Darfur, became the governor of South Darfur state in 2014, he hired new public officers, of course from *Habbaniya* tribe. With the new recruitments, the new governor replaced all non-Habbaniya administrative managers, including at district level, in the South Darfur state with new recruited officers from *Habbaniya* tribe. This case exemplifies how people benefit by displaying more loyalty to their tribal allegiances than that of national.

Other than securing jobs in state institutions and government offices, empowered sub-national identities along tribe, clan or religious order, also help them benefit from state resources. By means of engagement in clientelist relationships people and public office holders benefit mutually. In the previous chapter, I defined clientelism by distribution of material benefits by a patron to a client in return of loyalty. In this sense, Sudanese state institutions and high-level bureaucrats are often involved in clientelist relationships. Former governor of South Darfur state, Adem Abdullah, granted a lucrative contract for construction of 80 km road to a businessman from another sub-clan of *Habbaniya*. By granting the contract, the governor distributed the public resource without due process to a person on whose political support the governor can maintain his grip on power. To take another example, appointment of Tijani Sese as the chairman of Darfur Regional Authority is another case of clientelism in Sudan demonstrating neo-patrimonial characteristic of the regime. Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 stipulated creation of an administrative unit to oversee development of the entire

Darfur region. Although it was established as a transitional institution, following the Doha Peace Agreement in 2011, Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) became permanent. Instead of appointing an experienced administrative from Khartoum or from Darfur region, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir chose Tijane Sese as the first chairman of the permanent DRA. The problem was that Tijane Sese was a former rebel leader. He led Liberation and Justice Movement, which was an alliance of several small rebel groups until Doha Peace Agreement in 2011. Many Sudanese analysts like Tariq Nour, a history professor at the University of Khartoum, believe that as a result of a deal made behind closed doors al-Bashir offered Sese the chairman position at DRA in return of his loyalty and dismantling the rebel group. Similarly, following the Doha Peace Agreement of 2011, al-Bashir appointed Idris Abu Garda as the minister for the Federal Health Ministry. Like Sese, Abu Garda was also a former rebel. He was vice president of Justice and Equality Movement, the major rebel group in Darfur, and formed his own rebel group in 2009, United Resistance Front. It is also believed that Sudanese president bought the loyalties of Darfurian rebel notables in return of giving them high level offices in government.

These few examples can be generalized across all tribes in Sudan. Attaining a position in a government institution does not mean job security for life only. It is likely to open doors to state resources and additional job opportunities for tribal kin. As discussed in the previous chapter, failure of the central government to create a national identity superior to tribal, ethnic or religious identities, compelled people to give their allegiances to sub-national identities. Consequently, citizens prefer engagement in clientelism or being part of patronage networks to be a loyal citizen of the central government. Over the long term, these informal institutions of the neo-patrimonial regime reproduce and sustain the corrupt and inefficient regime that failed to address the grievances of the citizens since independence and forced people to resort to violence in the first place. When considered over a half a century period, neo-patrimonialism and its practices result in intra-government and intra-bureaucracy factionalism within Sudanese state. In a sense, on the one hand, competition over the public offices can be a means to survive for the tribes and clans. On the other hand, allocation of resources and recruitment for public offices are also seen as a way of constraining and weakening

rival tribes and clans. In other words, accessing to state resources through gaining control of the offices become a survival game under neo-patrimonial regime of Sudan because it is a zero-sum game and the group that is left out of state is often doomed to be deprived of resources in the broadest sense.

In fact, this point was raised in *the Black Book (al-Kitab al-Aswad)* with much emphasis that the tension in Darfur was directed towards ethnic discrimination. Generally known with this short name, the book's original title is *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan* and published in two parts; first in 2000 and the second in 2002. The book was published anonymously, though it credits "Seekers of Truth and Justice", but it is believed that it was written by people who have close ties with the main rebel group in Darfur, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The book is available online with its English translation at JEM's website. The book, the first volume in particular, provides a plethora of statistical data about how the state and government offices and revenues in Khartoum, and therefore in Sudan, are dominated by three tribes of Northern Sudan, namely *Shaiqiyya, Ja'alin, and Danagla*. Although the book presented striking disparity in Sudan, it revealed very little that was unknown to Sudanese. These three tribes constitute 5% of the Sudanese population but hold nearly 70% or more of the senior positions in governments (Natsios 2012, 132). The Black Book shows that between 1989 and 1999, 59.4% of ministerial positions were given to Northerners. This figure is even higher at 68.7% for 1969-1985 periods. The Black Book also draws our attention to the committee in charge of division of national wealth. The committee is heavily dominated by Northerners with 19 out of 25 seats, equivalent of 76%. As a result of such an overwhelming majority of Northerners in the committee, Darfurian and Eastern groups benefit disproportionately from the national wealth. As a result of nepotism and sustaining patronage networks, national wealth is distributed unequally.

Since its eruption in 2003, the civil war in Darfur caused death of tens of thousands and displacement of hundreds of thousands. The most brutal phase of the war was fought between 2003 and 2005. The civil war halted twice as a result of peace agreements signed between the government and the rebel groups, once in 2006 in

Abuja, Nigeria and second time in 2011 in Doha, Qatar. However, after both peace agreements, violence did not terminate and the civil war persisted. Involvement of external actors in the post-peace agreement period did not change much. Involvement of external, Western aid organizations in particular, was often associated by the Sudanese government with conspiracies, espionage and incitement of local people against the government. Controversial role of foreign aid organizations resulted in their expulsion from Sudan in 2009. For Sudanese officials, these claims are substantiated. During my interview, Ali Adam, director of Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC), accused some foreign aid organizations of writing reports about rebel groups and government army.

> We had cases where confidential reports have been discovered
> with foreign aid workers. And we still talked to the person and
> reminded them that they should focus on implementation of
> their project not writing a security report. I mean people are
> writing reports which is not related to their mandate . If you are
> talking about the rebel group movement and all the others, that
> is not part of their job,`you are here to help projects, you are not
> supposed to write a report about rebel movement, the
> government or army movement and fighting etc. It is not your
> job

In spite of my insistence on providing a concrete example, he rejected to share any evidence with me because those were intelligence reports which are classified and not shared with public. Since then, in addition to the United Nations agencies, only few foreign aid organizations are allowed in Sudan. Therefore, role of external actors is very limited in Sudan, especially in post-Abuja peace agreement period.

Presence of a foreign aid organization in Sudan does not guarantee implementation of projects in Darfur. Sudanese government strictly controls actions of foreign organizations. Probably the most handy and widely used tool by the Sudanese government is travel visa to Darfur region. According to the laws in Sudan, all foreigners who wish to travel Darfur region, all five states, must obtain a travel permit

from Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC). Although on paper there is no restriction for foreigners to travel to Darfur region, in practice employees of Westerner organizations are not granted travel permit. Aid workers of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and the Qatar state are the only people who can easily obtain travel permit. An officer from HAC told me that as of May 2014, no employee of Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) was granted travel permit for the last one year. Due to several reasons such as difficulties in obtaining travel permit, close inspection and suspicion at local level Western aid organizations tend to focus their projects in Sudan on Khartoum or Eastern part of the country. However, their even limited involvement help Sudan maintain its neo-patrimonial regime. In the previous chapter, I discussed some parameters of neo-liberal peacebuilding by which the dominant paradigm inadvertently cause enforcement of neo-patrimonial regime in sub-Saharan Africa. Now let us turn how and to what extent those parameters work in the case of Sudan.

A. Imposing A Western-Like State Modality

Like in many war-torn countries, external actors who came to Sudan following the Abuja Peace Agreement in 2006 as well as Doha Peace Agreement promoted a Sudan that is intended to be a replica of Western states. The envisaged state of external actors is administratively reminiscent of Western state structure: centralized, divided into administrative units such as provinces/cities, ruled by legal/rational institutions. In fact, as Jeffrey Herbst (2000) explains, post-independence leaders of African nations adopted the state structures inherited by colonial powers because the former had neither political nor material capacity to recreate a state system from scratch. With the independence in 1956, Sudanese people took over the rule of their country with an administrative system established by the British.

In the early years, Western-style state structure coexisted with the indigenous administrative systems. The most notable indigenous administrative mechanism in Darfur has been native administration (*idârat el-ehliyye*). Native administrations, with their hierarchical system, have been fundamental part of social life in Darfur for centuries. They have three main purposes: 'to manage that most precious commodity

(land), to render justice, and to represent both the state, in the various and diverse parts of the territory inhabited by diverse communities, and the interests of those constituencies to the authorities' (Tubiana, Tanner, and Abdul-Jalil 2012, 5). Put differently, for many years, native administrations have functioned like part of state apparatus with the entitlement of administering the area under their responsibility. The way they were created and function was not similar to the state organs of the Western countries. Following the independence, in an attempt to consolidate their power, governments in Khartoum empowered local governments which are appointed and controlled by the central authority against native administrations which are more independent and less reliant on the government. Inevitably, in the second decade of independence, tension raised between local governments and native administrations. People in charge of local governments who were appointed by the central government were often out of region and oblivious to the local concerns, values and norms. Therefore, head of local governments were regarded illegitimate in the eyes of local people because their political loyal belonged to the central government rather than the local people.

Increase in the tension and competition between the two administrative organs (local vs. native) caused political concern in the central government in Khartoum. In 1974, Jafar Numeiry abolished native administrations and replaced their leaders with local government officials. Although Numeiry's policy was maintained for many years, native administrations continued to exist and local governments were never able to fully replace them. In spite of their official abolishment, native administrations were still in charge of managing local affairs. Local governments lacked sufficient funds to function effectively and the central authority was unable to financially back local governments (El-Zain 1996, 527). As a result, native administrations maintained their existence and function through authoritarian regimes. Impotence of the central governments prevented their replacement with local governments.

When Omar el-Bashir came into power through a military coup in 1989, he reinstated the native administrations, which were in fact already present. However, el-Beshir's policy of reinstatement of did not yield the expected result of native

administrations that are politically in line with the central authority in Khartoum. According to Yusuf Takana who is a member of opposition Ummah Party and former minister, failure of reinstatement of native administrations is mainly due to the policies of el-Bashir regime. During an interview in Khartoum at his residence, Takana argued that starting from mid-1990s, el-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) began to intervene in the election of the native administration leaders. According to Takana, tribes in Darfur had their own election mechanism for leader based upon their own traditional and local values, norms and rules. Because native administration leaders were elected in consensus by tribal elders, the elected leaders were legitimate. But el-Bashir regime began to impose people who are loyal to the NCP to the leadership of native administrations. Disregarding the values and norms of the tribal groups, Khartoum regime imposed politically loyal people into the leadership position. As a result, as Takana said during our interview, the tribal groups did not accept the authority of the appointed native administration leaders. They did not obey to, what they regard illegitimate, new leader because people did not choose him. Takana also strgonly argues that the NCP regime in Khartoum was not sensitive enough in appointments to native administrations:

> The people the regime appointed have been ignorant people,
> mostly marginalized people within their community. They had
> no legitamacy to stand for leadership. But because they had the
> support of the government in Khartoum, they have been
> employed as the leader of native administrations.

Yusuf Takana was the commissioner of North Darfur state between 1986-88. As a comissioner, he was in charge of reestablishment of native adminsitrations in North Darfur state. As a politician who believed in the necessity and functionality of native administrations he cooperated with the tribal leaders. Takana says that during his term, he visited tribal leaders and said:

> Look I came here to reestablish the leadership of native
> administration. I have no business other than just to wait for you
> to go to your own people and choose your own leader. I will just

put it in the government documents and then you will be
responsible for so and so... If there are small problems, you
solve it among yourself before taking the issue to my office.

Constructive approach taken by Takana yielded positive results. He says that during his term in North Darfur, native administrations functioned effectively. Letting local people electing whom they view legitimate and eligible help reduce tension between people. As a result, during this term in the office number of cases brought to the local government decreased incrementally. Local people did not prefer taking their cases to the local government, which meant facing a long haul, time consumption and dealing with a person who is unfamiliar with the local dynamics. Instead, people preferred to take their cases to the native administration because the leader was viewed more legitimate than the leader of local government. Plus, native administration was more easily accessible.

In the mid-1990s, when NCP regime began to interfere in election of native administration leaders and favoring politically loyal people, these administrations lost their legitimacy in the eyes of people. Local people were left with two administrative organs, local and native, which were both illegitimate in their eyes. Thus, less people began to take their cases to these institutions and preferred to settle their disputes by themselves. As might be expected, people were not very successful in settling their disputes by themselves and, as might be expected, people resorted to violence when failed to settle their disputes peacefully. Small problems which were solved by native administration began to pile up over years and create more grievances. Eventually these problems erupted in 2003 and triggered the civil war.

The post-colonial approach taken in this study allows us to envisage a reconstruction of war-torn Darfur region where native administrations are recognized by the constitution and incorporated into the legal administrative system of Sudan. Post-colonialism does not prevent us from considering alternative possibilities with regard to management of political conflicts. But apparently the post-conflict reconstruction process in Darfur has also been affected by neo-liberal paradigm. For example, Article 13 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) stipulates coexistence of local

government and native administration, while vesting the sovereignty in the local governments. However, their respective roles, mandates and distribution of tasks are not clearly defined in the peace document. Local governments will continue to rule with a leader who will be appointed by the central government and be likely to oblivious to the local dynamics. In article 76 paragraph 473 of the DDPD, parties believe that in order to realize dialog within Darfur, it is necessary to 'enhance the status of native administration including its authority and building its capacity'. One may easily predict that in a governance model in which local governments are prioritized and accepted as essential, enhancing authority of native administrations will cause more tension between local government and native administration. It is important that with regard to truth and reconciliation, the parties in the DDPD agree that weakness of native administrations is one of the causes of the conflict in Darfur and on the need to strengthen these native administrations system (Article 58 paragraph 306-7). However, adopting Western-style governance model, while maintaining indigenous institutions and without replacing them with legitimate institutions, is unlikely to end civil war in Darfur.

DDPD does not clearly stipulate how leaders of local governments are going to be elected. Given the legitimacy of native administration, failure to replace native administrations with at least equally legitimate governance institutions is likely to undermine legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of Darfurian people, and consequently deepen the cleavage between societies. Imposition of local governments and their leaders that are viewed illegitimate leads local people to seek opportunities in neo-patrimonial institutions. As I mentioned earlier in the case of governor of South Darfur state, in order to gain legitimacy leaders tend to engage in clientelist relationship by distributing meager material resources at their disposal to those who can in return provide them political support. The more illegitimate the local leaders, the more likely they are to be involved in clientelism.

B. Promotıng Democracy As The Sole Regıme Type

In an independence ceremony in Khartoum on 1 January 1956, Egyptian and British flags were lowered and Sudanese flag was raised. Sudan is one of those rare countries that gained independence without an armed struggle. However, period of even weak

democracy did not long last. Two years after independence, General Ibrahim Abboud took control of the government with a military coup in November 1958. Since then, in large part Sudan has been ruled by autocratic military regimes. Brief episodes of democracy during Al-Khalifa and Al-Mahdi failed to render Sudan's political scene peaceful.

Polity project rates countries on the grounds of their autocratic as well as democratic tendencies. By subtracting autocracy rate from democracy rate, the project assigns a polity score for each country. The project has a 21-point scale ranging from -10, being the most autocratic, to +10, being the most democratic. Polity project almost never assigns a positive polity score for Sudan beginning from independence. Sudan received a negative score for almost entire post-independence period, except those rare episodes of civilian governments. Unlike Somalia and Somaliland, Sudan was not able to come up with their own governance model. Military regimes were dominated by the Northern tribes specified by the Black Book in the previous pages. Lack of natural resources or an industrialized economy encouraged tribes to capture state apparatuses in order to gain wealth because accessing government offices is tantamount to accessing state coffers. Even when oil is discovered, revenue generated by oil export was used to fund the civil war with the South.

Each administration that came into power in Sudan embraced the administrative structure inherited from the colonial power (i.e. Britain) and attempted to distribute state resources as fair enough as possible. No Sudanese administration attempted to devise an alternative governance model. Although political parties are not banned in Sudan, they are not effective and strong both due to absence of free press and democratic culture within political parties and among opposition leaders. When external actors promoted multiparty democracy in Sudan for decades, Sudanese leaders were unhappy not with the idea of multiparty democracy itself but the secular characteristic of the regime. Sudanese society, which is almost totally Muslim, except a Coptic minority, is sensitive about their Islamic identity. Therefore any external actor who intends an alteration to this Islamic identity meets with hostility.

Military regimes used Islamic identity as the unifying factor to legitimize their rule as the defender of the nation against the non-Islamic states who have evil intentions. Interestingly, the Islamic identity is seen as an inextricable characteristic of the Sudanese society even by the opposition leaders. During my field study in Sudan, I also had the chance to interview Ghazi Salahaddin, who was an ally of the president but now is the leader of opposition Reform Movement. According to Salahaddin, foreigners, especially the Western countries, are not happy and ready to recognize the Islamic identity of Sudan. According to him, Western countries wish to change Arab and Islamic identity of Sudan into a more Africanized and secularized one. For example, Salahaddin says that in few cases in the past use of Arabic language as the lingua franca was brought up by external actors as an issue. Salahaddin says that, as a long term objective, Western countries are more interested in the cultural aspect of the regime than the democratic character of the regime.

> They [Western countries] do not want special aspects of Sudanese culture. For example, Arabic langue which is not the case now. No one says Arabic language has precedence over other languages but still they know its effect. Practically speaking, it is lingua franca of Sudan. They do not want to see Arabic as the lingua franca of Sudan. They do not want to see the mainstream culture presented by riverine Sudanese.

From a post-colonial perspective, external actors equipped with neo-liberal peacebuilding mindset do not only promote multiparty democracy but also a particular form of governance. One of the key characteristic of the democracy promoted by neo-liberal peacebuilding is secularism. As Biswas argues, 'the globalization of international norms produced not just the legitimacy of the idea of the nation-state, but also the expectation that such nation-states should embody unique and distinct identities' (Biswas 2002, 184). No doubt that one of the distinct identities Biswas talks about is secularism. Put differently, when the Western countries believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of mankind's ideological evolution, they also meant that the triumph of secular state. According to neo-liberal peacebuilding paradigm, a state

run by clergy based on religious principles is doomed to fail. However, reconstruction of a war-torn country should focus more on the root causes than on the governance.

C. Foreign Aid

Republic of Sudan has received foreign aid for decades. In particular, the country began to attract foreign aid with the tragic drought-induced famine in mid-1980s. The grievous famine affected many countries across the Sahel belt, including Sudan. Another unfortunate event that attracted attention of donors to Sudan was the civil war in Darfur. As the figures in Table-3 demonstrate, Sudan received the bulk of bilateral aid flow from Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD countries after the civil war onset in Darfur. According to the data presented in Table-3, amount of foreign aid flow to Sudan began to decline after 2009. Foreign aid data presented in this section is from OECD member countries and do not include Chinese government or Arab countries of the Gulf. The reason is that OECD regularly gathers data about foreign aid distribution of its members. However, neither China, nor Gulf countries nor other developing countries has systematic data collection system. That is why we do not have data for all external actors in involved in post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan.

Table 3: Net bilateral aid flows from selected DAC donors to Sudan (current US$)

Country	1960-2005	2006-2010	2011-2014	TOTAL
Norway	1,201,380,000	555,280,000	141,610,000	1,898,270,000
Japan	1,164,210,000	434,050,000	320,680,000	1,918,940,000
Germany	1,201,380,000	221,350,000	92,490,000	1,515,220,000
Netherlands	1,164.210,000	640,210,000	77,020,000	1,881,440,000
United Kingdom	1,160,060,000	1,032,380,000	429,740,000	2,622,180,000
European Union	1,652,140,000	1,341,910,000	575,690,000	3,569,740,000
United States	3,351,170,000	3,947,890,000	2,081,740,000	9,380,800,000

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington-DC(Countries donated less than one billion in total is not included in the table)

Many external actors in Sudan provide food to IDP camps in various parts of Darfur. Villagers, who escaped rebel attacks and left villages in fear of government bombing, come to the camps designated by the UN for IDPs. At these camps, people are provided food on every day, they have access to drinking water, and medical teams take

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care of sick people. These services are almost impossible to have in remote villages of Darfur. Government of Sudan does not allow aid organizations to build permanent buildings in the camps because these people are expected to leave the camps 'soon'. IDPs will not be encouraged to go back to their villages and will stay in camps around urban centers, if permanent buildings are constructed. In order to have an in depth understanding of the issue, I interviewed with Ali Adam, who is the director of Humanitarian Assistance Commission, Sudan government's organ in charge of coordinating incoming humanitarian aid and activities of aid organizations in Sudan on 15 April 2014. Adam notes that constant provision of food aid to the IDPs in the camps, while not investing more in improving conditions at the abandoned villages of the IDPs so that they can go back. According to Adam, by doing so, external actors prolong the conflict because the more IDP camps remain functioning, the more rebel control over the abandoned villages.

Once activities of the foreign aid organizations are examined, Adam's claims are mostly verified. Currently there are a handful of foreign aid organizations in Sudan. With a presidential decree in 2009, Sudan banned many NGOs. Remaining aid organizations, Western organizations in particular, face difficulties in functioning such as extreme delays in government permits. I wanted to interview officials of the remaining aid organizations, but I was rejected by all organizations. Most probably due to the reason I have mentioned above. I have gathered data from websites and reports of these organizations.

For example, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) identifies six sectors under which its activities are categorized: agriculture and food security; democracy, human rights and governance; economic growth and trade; gender equality and women empowerment; water; working in crises and conflict. According to the data provided from USAID's website, in 2014, USAID provided more than $183.7 million to World Food Program and UNICEF "to support food-insecure and vulnerable populations in Sudan through the distribution of emergency food aid, including ready-to-use supplementary foods, which help improve nutrition among children". Moreover, since the fiscal year of 2014, "USAID provided more than $95.9 million in non-food

humanitarian assistance to Sudan for activities across multiple sectors, including agriculture and food security, health, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, as well as humanitarian coordination and information management, logistics support and the provision of relief commodities". Although USAID has other projects under other categories, such as famine early warning system, the website does not provide information about the amount of money spent for other sectors. More importantly, USAID has no project about the forestation, pasture creating, animal breeding or expansion of arable land. As I demonstrated earlier, these are the root causes of the conflict in Darfur.

Another active organization in Sudan is Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This organization does not limit its scope to Darfur, but runs various projects across Sudan in different sectors. JICA focuses more on technical cooperation and ways by which to increase the capacity of Sudanese state and government institution with such projects as "The project for Strengthening Vocational Training in Sudan" and "Project for Strengthening Solid Waste Management in Khartoum State". JICA has an ongoing project called "Project for Strengthening Peace through the Improvement of Public Service in Three Darfur States".Just like USAID, JICA does not have any project addressing underlying problems of farmers and animal breeders in Darfur.

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) is one of the most active organizations in Sudan. Due to its centuries-old historical and religious ties with Sudan, Turkish institutions are the most freely functioning organizations in both Sudan and Darfur. With regard to Darfur, TİKA provided seeds to around 300 local farmers so that they can increase their agricultural production. However, the project was not well-planned so that follow-up procedure was neglected and the project died off. TİKA also facilitated digging water wells in various parts of Darfur. To a certain extent, these water wells helped Darfurians have access to drinking water. Yet, TİKA has not address the root cause of the problem either.

During my research in Sudan and in Darfur region, I have come across only one organization that really addresses the root cause of the conflict. It was done neither by a Western rich country nor by a former superpower. It was a project run by local aid

organization called Qatar Charity, established to implement the projects financed by State of Qatar. The project selected five towns in Darfur, one from each province of the region. Each town was allocated USD$ 3 million for a project which will be implemented through a two-year time span. I interviewed with the director of the project, Tarık Ali, in Nyala, Sout Darfur on 23 May 2014. According to the information provided by Ali, the project has four components: buildings and construction, infrastructure, income generation, and peace building.

Project team starts with constructing buildings for essential institutions for the town so that order can be maintained and people's faith in the local administrations can be restored. Initially, a police station, small clinic, primary and secondary school and housing complex for teachers and doctors were built. Meanwhile, the project takes care of fundamental infrastructure of the town such as roads, sewage system to prevent diseases, and digs water wells to provide clean water for both drinking and farming. As the first step, project team distribute seeds and tools to the farmers and train them to do modern agriculture. They also provide sheep and goat to those who are animal herders. Over time, local people began to generate income by selling crops, vegetables or milk. As the final stage of the project, aid organization organizes peace and reconciliation meetings in which local people are brought together and told the importance of living together in peace, and demonstrated its benefits. Rather than choosing tiny towns, the aid organization picked larger towns where people from different tribes live together. By promoting peaceful coexistence, the aid organization expects these groups to overcome tribal enmity and work together to improve the quality of life in their town. The local people were given a great incentive for this objective. What I have summarized so far, is the first phase of the project. Upon the successful completion of the project, in the summer of 2016, more projects with larger budgets will be approved for the successful towns. I asked Tarik Ali to take me to the town of Bulbul to witness the project myself. Although he kindly accepted my request, I was not granted permission to go out of Nyala, due to worsening security situation during my stay in the region. Foreigners are required to hold written permission to travel to Darfur, and also to travel from the city you came for to another city within Darfur.

With regard to foreign aid provided in reconstruction of Darfur and reinforcement of neo-patrimonial institutions, findings of my field study are telling. Even though limited foreign aid is provided directly to Darfur region, foreign aid in question is misappropriated by local public officers or misused by tribal chiefs in the IDP camps. While in Darfur, unlike Khartoum, I was able to get access to the UN branches and interview Darfurian employees of the UN organs. One of the Darfurian UN employee I interviewed, who wishes to remain anonymous, asserts that tribal, religious and other social structures are maintained in the IDP camps. When a village in rural Darfur is attacked or under the serious threat of attack by rebels or government forces, the entire population of the village moves to the nearest IDP camp. Once the group moves to an IDP camp, the tribal or religious leaders maintain their social roles of managing the group affairs. Foreign aid organizations who provide food aid to the IDP camps usually deal with representatives of groups in the camp, rather than dealing with each person individually, which is of course practically impossible and unreasonable. By doing so, foreign aid organizations function more effectively, while they plant seeds of democracy and self-governance into the IDP population. However, representatives of those IDP groups are often not elected by the group by self-proclaimed leaders, who used to be the clan, tribe or religious leaders in the village. It is usually those leaders who receive the aid in the IDP camps on behalf of the group. Using their social status and leadership position, role of those leaders, and therefore the social cleavages, are reinforced in IDP camps.

This may not be problem for those groups that are small in number compared to the rest of the camp. However, some groups in IDP camps are so large that they have more than a thousand members. I was told by local people and UN workers in Darfur that sometimes tension over distribution of aid arises between large groups. In some cases, political competition as to who will be the leader of the camp and contact person with the foreigners causes violence within IDP camps. In order to gain support of those smaller groups in the IDP camps, some tribal leaders use foreign aid provided at their disposal to buy off loyalty of those smaller groups. In particular, foreign aid in form of transferrable goods such as food and clothes provide group leaders material incentive

for their political competition, and therefore reinforces the neo-patrimonial regimes within the camps.

Foreign aid in Darfur is provided by two groups of actors: state and non-state. State actors such as JICA, TIKA or Qatar Charity face less difficulty in terms of red tape or bureaucratic hassle. Because these institutions are in Darfur and function as part of their respective governments, harming relationship with these organizations can be costly for the public officers and elites in Darfur. While delicate in its relation with governmental aid organizations, at times local bureaucrats in Darfur become greedy and corrupt in their dealings with non-state aid organizations. According to the Sudan's laws, aid organizations are supposed to cooperate with a local aid organization. The rationale behind this, according to Sudanese officials, is to better coordinate the activities, create employment for local people, and more importantly, making sure that foreigners come with aid organizations are not involved in political affairs. Sudanese government is very strict when it comes to execution of this law. Sudan suspended the activities of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in Sudan in April 2014. According to the reports appeared in the local media, the reason was that ICRC did not abide by the regulations. During my interview with Ali Adam from HAC, I brought up this issue and asked his take on this. Adam says that activity of ICRC was suspended because the institution refused to work with Sudanese charitable organizations. Therefore, the ICRC violated the laws of the Republic of Sudan.

At first glance, one may totally agree with the Sudanese government and blame ICRC or other foreign NGOs for not cooperating with local charitable aid organizations. Looking at the other side of the coin will help better understanding of the facts on the ground. Charitable organizations, foundations and NGOs present in Darfur are in large part created or owned by people who hold senior positions in government offices. These institutions with whom foreign NGOs have to cooperate are often managed by people who are either relatives or close friends of those public officers at the higher echelons of local governments. In a sense, in Darfur foreign NGOs deal with two different actors, governmental and non-governmental, while in fact they are the same actor. Those corrupt bureaucrats who have the authority to approve permits and licenses for the

foreign NGO so that their aid projects can continue are also interested whether these foreign NGOs cooperate with the 'local' partners. Some local officers even work like public relations officers of some local NGOs and inform foreign NGOs about what is in their best interest to work with which local partner. When foreign NGOs decide to work alone or ignore the 'recommendations' of local officers, local bureaucracy raises difficulties for foreign NGOs or hampers their activities. Even if foreign NGOs cooperate with local partners, they complain about corruption at the side of local partners. When division of labor is decided at the early phases of the project, local NGOs tend to misappropriate the resources at their discretion. The major concern for foreign NGOs is that they are unable to hold these local NGOs accountable because of their connections with the local government officers. Perhaps, this is the main reason for foreign NGOs to leave Darfur and not come with new projects. Approached from this perspective, foreign aid provided by foreign NGOs inadvertently fosters the informal institutions in Darfur, and therefore reinforce the neo-patrimonial regime.

Figure 3: Relationship between bilateral aid flow and corruption performance in Sudan

Source: Transparency International, World Bank

In conclusion, foreign aid provided to Darfur for reconstruction seems to be reinforcing the neo-patrimonial regime. Due to clientelism and patronage networks, strong tribal bonds prevail over the weak government institutions. Resources channeled to Darfur for reconstruction of the region and addressing the grievances are often misused by public officers. More importantly, inflow of aid increases the amount of resources at the discretion of local officers because by doing so senior bureaucrats have the material resources to distribute in return of political loyalty or to embezzle the funds provided by the external actors. In the literature on foreign aid, a number of studies show that it is positively correlated with corruption. However, as the Figure-3 demonstrates, regardless of the trajectory of foreign aid inflow to Sudan, government's corruption performance deteriorates and perception about corruption increases. Interestingly, according to the data in Figure-3, perception of corruption in Sudan stabilizes and even slightly improves in 2009 and 2013. We have to note that these incidences coincide with sharp decline in foreign aid inflow to Sudan. It shows the presence of informal institutions in that provision of less resource limits resources available at neo-patrimonial regime.

5. CONCLUSION

The conflict in Darfur is the first tragedy of the new millennium. It was unfortunate that the conflict and international involvement was so politicized that the international community's pressure backfired because the Sudanese elites believed that Darfur conflict is used by the Western power to topple the Islamic regime in Khartoum. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the conflict in Darfur has several causes both internal and external. Ruling elites' Arabization policies since independence, discriminatory attitudes towards Darfur, Libya's encroaching Arabization policy in Sudan, and endless civil war in neighboring Chad have all contributed to the aggravation of the tension in Darfur. It is not dubious that political opposition has capitalized on the grievances and exploited the conflict to undermine the regime (Hoile 2008). Above all, however, in this chapter I argue that environment (environmental degradation, deforestation, and depleting natural resources) is the root cause of the conflict in Darfur. That is why the

Darfur conflict is labeled by an observer as "the first true climate-change war" (Borger 2007). Without disregarding other factors, the main argument of this chapter is an objection to the neoliberal peacebuilding in that establishing multiparty democracy and free market economy is not the ultimate solution for prevention of civil war recurrence.

In a decade since the inception of the conflict at large scale in the early 2000s, very few things have been done by the external actors in Darfur towards addressing the root cause of the conflict. Political and economic isolation of Sudan for its alleged links with terrorist groups made the Sudanese governments more suspicious about foreign aid organizations. As a result, very few foreign organizations have the will and the governmental consent to work in Sudan. Most of external actors in Sudan operate in Khartoum because of the higher quality of transportation and telecommunication infrastructure. Very few foreign aid organizations operate in Darfur and have projects implemented. Those few foreign aid organizations in Darfur have been mostly helping IDPs by providing staple food and emergency health care for infants. This is done through World Food Program of the United Nations (WFP) with contribution from other external actors. Foreign governments donate in form of food or money to the UN and the WFP purchases the necessary items and transports the aid to the IDP camps in various locations of Darfur. Constant provision of food by external actors convinces IDP population that as long as they stay in the camps they will receive food. In this sense, the food aid helps nothing but prolong the conflict in Darfur because people in the IDP camps realize that during their stay, they are safe, provided food, shelter and healthcare. Services are usually unavailable at their home towns. More importantly, they receive these services for free without being had to work.

In this chapter, I also argue that due to the bureaucratic nature of the UN organs and foreign aid organizations, external actors often fail to correctly and thoroughly identify the root cause of a conflict. This results in misrepresentation of civil wars in the rest of the world. I demonstrate that inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations in Sudan are not much involved in Darfur. One reason for this disinterest is the visa problems incurred by the Sudanese governments. The ones that are involved in Darfur channel their resources to projects targeting to subordinate issues such as

women empowerment, education etc. I have demonstrated that Qatar Charity is the only organization in Darfur that addresses the root cause of the conflict in the region.

Above all, in this chapter, I demonstrate that involvement of external actors in post-conflict fosters informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regime in Darfur and Sudan in general. Their involvement has two main repercussions with regard to building a strong, legitimate and effective state and therefore sustainable peace. First, their projects and the neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm they adopt undermine legitimacy of the central government. By excluding indigenous administrative institutions which are unfamiliar to neoliberal democracies, external actors neglect the possible ways of earning loyalty of local citizens in the conflict zones. Thus loyalty of citizens is channeled towards neo-patrimonial institutions. Second, that external actors pour enormous amount of financial and material resources into the war-torn societies inadvertently provides resources for neo-patrimonial regimes to distribute at their discretion in return of personal profits, political loyalty or clientelist behavior. In other words, high level bureaucrats cannot be involved in clientelist behavior unless they have material benefits to distribute to their clients. By providing foreign aid directly to the state institutions where corruption is rampant, external actors reinforce the informal institutions of the neo-patrimonial regime.

Persistence of neo-patrimonial regimes and their reinforcement by external actors not only result in ineffective governments, but also in widespread corruption. Another repercussion of their involvement undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the central and local governments in the eyes of citizens. As a result, citizens put their trust in the indigenous or neo-patrimonial institutions which are unconstitutional but more legitimate in the eyes of citizens. In the short run, this type of relationship between war-torn countries and external actors may produce stability and suppress hostilities among former belligerents. However, in the long run, such a relationship is likely to cause civil war recurrence because external actors reinforce a type of state that caused the civil war in the first place. Empirical evidence from post-conflict reconstruction in Darfur also supports my argument. The majority of external actors prefer to provide assistance to the Sudanese government in Khartoum as the central authority so that this

government will address the root cause of the conflict in Darfur. Unfortunately, due to the neo-patrimonial regime in Sudan, assistance by external actors in large part is misappropriated by corrupt public officers in the bureaucracy, while meager share is used for victims of the conflict. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to predict that the civil war in Darfur is very unlikely to terminate for good. Instead, we are likely to see continuation of the conflict even at low level in the coming years.

CHAPTER 6: RECONSIDERING POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the most outstanding adverse effects of the end of the Cold War is perhaps the alleged surge in civil war occurrence in various parts of the world. Inevitably, individual countries, human rights organizations, advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations of various kinds brought up ending these civil wars and rebuilding the shattered states and societies at every possible platform. Reconstructing these civil war-hit countries sparked a fresh debate. Collapse of the Soviet Union was interpreted as the triumph of neoliberal democracy and free market economies over alternative governance modalities and ideologies. This illusionary victory of neoliberal ideology and the Western countries began to unequivocally dominate post-conflict reconstruction field. Since we have an ideology that won a decisive victory over socialism and that is successfully implemented in the Western Europe and North America, why not apply the same ideology to underdeveloped or war-torn countries so that they follow the footsteps of the developed world.

Recurrences of those previously ended civil wars such as in Angola and Liberia have proved that establishing a liberal democracy where multiple parties compete for power through free and fair election does not guarantee peace. In spite of involvement of dozens of actors and inflow of billions of dollars, the international community failed to establish a sustainable peace following termination of violence in many civil wars. These failures of post-conflict reconstruction inevitable entail interrogation of the current practice, the dominant peacebuilding approach and the role of these actors. Post-conflict reconstruction experience in Darfur also shows us that there is something wrong with the current approach adopted by the international community. Unlike the civil war in Liberia or Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflict in Darfur is not regionalized and is still contained within Sudan's borders. In spite of its international dimensions, as demonstrated in detail in the previous chapter, the conflict is mostly

about competition of tribes over depleting natural resources and fight against the adverse effects of environmental degradation. Although the international community has spent more than a billion dollar each year since the first peace agreement in Abuja in 2006, the civil war in Darfur has not ended, nor is sustainable peace achieved.

What does this tell us? Where do all these theoretical argument and discussion of the civil war in Darfur take us? We are compelled to problematize two related and complementary dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction. First, we have to question not only the performance of neoliberal peacebuilding at practice but also its intellectual and moral grounds. It is obvious that neoliberal peacebuilding is not working. At least, it is not a wise idea to regard it as panacea or one-size-fits-all solution for every post-conflict reconstruction case. Second, critical assessment of foreign aid is required in order to make use of the vast resources channeled to the post-conflict countries. Allocation of aid monies as to how victims of civil wars benefit as much as possible becomes the central question. Previous chapters have demonstrated that many post-colonial societies where civil wars usually occur are neo-patrimonial regimes. Disbursement of foreign aid and its allocation under such regimes are two main issues that require particular attention.

2. END OF ONE-FITS-ALL APPROACH AND NEOLIBERAL PEACEBUILDING

African continent, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, is often associated with civil wars, although almost half of the countries have no experience of civil war. However, the duration and brutality of those civil wars cause Africa to be marked by violence. Once the conflict ends, the war-torn country needs assistance of external actors for reconstruction because meager resources of the country have been spent for financing the civil war. Arrival of external actors comes with a moral responsibility which is reconstruction of a country in such a way that belligerents do not resort to violence again. How the collapsed state and war-torn society will be reconstructed is markedly determined by the most influential actors among peacebuilders. Since reconstruction entails undertaking a great deal of financial burden, wealthy Western countries usually have more sway in the formulation of post-conflict reconstruction strategies. Recurrence

of one third of ended civil wars and the fragility of stabilized civil wars such as the one in Bosnia leads us question the performance and credibility of the dominant paradigm which is neoliberal peacebuilding.

The fundamental fallacy of the dominant liberal peacebuilding is that it embraces a top-down approach towards settlements of conflicts. Such an approach is based upon an essential assumption that civil wars occur because state as the highest political authority to manage affairs between individuals fail to function. What is meant by state failure is that vital institutions in a country fail to function in a fair and effective manner, even though their actions do not violate any constitutional provision or regulation. The most cited reason for such a failure is that societies in a country fail to cooperate with one another about how to choose qualified people to run these institutions and manage resources. Appointment of unqualified relatives, close friends or kin to critical institutions results in misappropriation of the resources at the disposal of those institutions and maltreatment of those societies that are excluded from institutions. Then, the logic follows, if the international community can help these divided societies formulate a system that will allow them to elect legitimate people to run state mechanisms, there will not be any problem. Since the developed countries had the same problem in the past and they solved it through liberal democracy where multiparty elections are held regularly, why not transfer the perfectly working system to failed states. Establishing multiparty democracy and free market economy in a war-torn country is presented as panacea for every case where civil wars are experienced.

Record of liberal peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era shows that the international community has not been very successful in rebuilding failed states. This study argues for and shows that, beside other factors, the peacebuilders have focused too much on state and institution building, while failing to redress the root causes of the civil war. Neoliberal peacebuilding has focused paid attention to building functioning and representative states so much that the bulk of resources disbursed for reconstruction are allocated for state-building, while projects designed to directly address the root causes are underfunded. Decision makers in post-conflict reconstruction efforts tend to believe that once the failed states is reestablished, the grievances at the grassroots level

will be addressed by the government and civil war recurrence will be avoided. This study has shown us that this argument can hardly be held true. First, research and empirical findings presented in the first chapter clearly show that grievances are *sine qua non* for civil war occurrence because without existing grievances it is almost impossible for the elites to mobilize the mass to take up arms and rebel against a government. Even if there exists some abundant resource which is lootable by rebel leaders to fund rebellion, without grievances such material incentives will not be sufficient for mass mobilization. Second, I have demonstrated that post-colonial state in most sub-Saharan Africa is mostly identified as neo-patrimonial regime which is associated with personal rule, clientelism, patronage networks etc. In other words, as explained in detail in the third chapter, several informal institutions play significant role in managing affairs between citizens and state institutions. It is because of these informal institutions that constitutional organs of a state in a post-colonial society functions perfunctorily. Corruption, nepotism and bribery are widespread in such states and therefore those administrative organs which are supposed to redress the grievances in fact cause new grievances.

Neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm is intellectually and practically flawed. However, it will not be fair to put all the blame on the neoliberal mindset of peacebuilders because it will strip off their agency and prevent us from analyzing other related factors. It is true that because of dominance of neoliberal ideology, unfortunately, so far peacebuilders have not been successful in identifying the true causes of the civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa. It is not that diplomats and officers of the aid organizations are incapable of comprehending the developments around them. Most of them are well-read, highly educated from respected universities of their countries and fluent in more than one foreign language. Yet, due to two main reasons, peacebuilders fail to accurately identify the true root causes of the civil wars. First, political aspect and bureaucratic nature of politics at the United Nations make it difficult to reach a consensus by major powers on what should be identified as the root cause and addressed with priority (Jett 1999). One UN Security Council member may prioritize starving displaced people and feeding them, while another member may define eliminating rebels as the top priority. It should be born in mind that people assigned to

post-conflict zones working for the UN or other international organizations or NGOs have a career. They are promoted or demoted based on their performance at the field. Dealing with conflict resolution at local level is a challenging task that entails tremendous amount of time and courage to take risk. Those who hesitate to take such a risk prefer to restrict their work load to the bureaucratic procedures at the headquarters because they do not wish to be labeled as trouble-maker by their superiors at the headquarters in New York or elsewhere. Inevitably, such an environment encourage peacebuilders to prevent problems to surface during their assignments and sweep problems under the carpet until they are assigned to a different post. Among some known examples of some similar consequences is corruption in oil for food program in Iraq and sexual abuse cases of foreign peacekeeping forces in Africa, just few to cite.

Second reason is at the country level. Everyday practices of the peacebuilders prevent them from analyzing the problem they are dealing with and therefore understanding the true root causes of the conflict (Autesserre 2014). Because peacebuilders usually live in highly secured UN complexes, they rarely go out of the complex and have the chance to know the society. They do not meet many local people as expected. Peacebuilding missions usually do not hire anthropologists or sociologists. Nor do they work with area experts. Therefore, they can have very limited knowledge about the conflict. We should keep in mind that these peacebuilders are also knowledge producers in the sense that high ranking officers at the UN headquarters in New York will make decisions about the future and content of the peacebuilding missions based on the reports written by such peacebuilders.

These factors also result in a short-sighted peacebuilding missions and make donor countries overlook more important developments in the countries they are assigned. While the peacebuilders and diplomats are busy with paperwork, writing reports or following up ways to further national interests of their home countries, unfolding events can go unnoticed. In Rwanda, for example, Hutu extremists began arms buildup as early as in 1990. They prepared for genocide for years by radio broadcasts to incite and mobilize people, indoctrination through informal meetings, importing weapons such as machetes and firearms. Between 1990 and 1993, Rwanda

spent around $122 million for weapons import and became the third largest weapons importer in Africa, although at that time the country was among the poorest of the continent (Gallimore 2014). All these activities were not clandestine and happened in an environment where a number of international actors such as embassies, UN organs and NGOs were present. In spite of all those overt preparatory efforts of Hutu extremists prior to the genocide, Western or other foreign embassies did not intervene, nor did any UN organ raised a red flag. Peter Uvin (1998), for instance, shows with plenty of concrete examples from Rwanda that it was known except by peacebuilders that aid from donor countries to the administration in Kigali was used for buying weapons. As Uvin (1998, 94) notes,

> The development aid system knew of the disintegration of
> Rwandese society; saw the many Tutsi working for aid agencies
> or partner NGOs being harassed, threatened, or killed; discussed
> these matters and surely regretted them; but seemingly felt that
> it was outside its mandate or capacity to intervene, that all it
> could do was to continue business as usual. Thus aid continued
> to muddle through, trying to make its usual projects work with a
> faltering government, until the day genocide began.

I suggest that the external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction should divert their focus from the state to the local. I argue that the main focus of the peacebuilders must be to correctly identify the root causes of the conflict and canalize the bulk of the resources to projects designed to ameliorate the living conditions at the local level. I do not argue that the international community should totally give up state and institution building. On the contrary, they should definitely continue constructive efforts for rebuilding collapsed state institutions, but more emphasis should be placed on ameliorating the conditions that triggered the violence in the first place. Prevention of civil war occurrence does not entail a perfectly functioning state and absolutely representative institutions. Many states in sub-Saharan Africa have ill-functioning governments, and yet they are not experiencing a civil war. Absence of civil wars in those countries with ineffective governments also underpins the argument that

grievances at the grassroots level are more important and need to be addressed urgently in order to avoid civil war recurrence.

In conclusion, we are at the end of neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm. This does not necessarily mean that neoliberal principles should be refuted and never be used for post-conflict reconstruction. On the contrary, I believe that neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm can be helpful in some war-torn countries. What the past post-conflict reconstruction experiences and this study show is that it is neither wise nor practical to view neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm as panacea for every case. In other words, the international community should abandon neoliberal peacebuilding as one-size-fits-all model. Instead, each case has to be treated differently taking local dynamics and facts into account.

3. REEXAMINING FOREIGN AID

Many people believe that handing out charity to needy people to provide them food or create new opportunities is the only way to help the poor. However, development aid is different than charity. In post-conflict settings, development aid is more necessary than charity. Ordinary citizens may donate humble amount of money to a charitable organization to be spent for the poor somewhere else in the world. Such charities of many people generate huge funds for non-governmental aid organizations. Plus, governmental organizations such as embassies and development agencies of governments provide considerable amount of aid to societies undergoing post-conflict reconstruction problems. External actors execute their projects with financial means provided by either their governments or donors. In this sense, foreign aid is an important component of post-conflict reconstruction. Put differently, if we assume that post-conflict reconstruction is built upon two pillars, neoliberal peacebuilding paradigm is one pillar and foreign aid is the other. This is simply because of the fact that without foreign aid, it is impossible for external actors to execute their projects.

A major problem, probably with the most adverse effects, with foreign aid is that it is highly politicized. This is not a recent phenomenon. Donor countries have chosen aid recipient countries according to two main motives: need and interests. It is

absolutely legitimate for a country to have certain interests in a country going through post-conflict reconstruction. It is also understandable that a donor country determines the sector for allocation of aid by considering its interests. Civil war-hit-countries have many needs in various sectors such as infrastructure, sanitation, education, policing, institution building, or even constitution writing. There is no problem if interests of a donor country and the root cause of an ended civil war in war-torn country overlap. But if there is not overlap, then there is a problem and that is the subject of this study. As the evidence from Darfur also shows, individual governments tend to provide aid to central governments based on political decisions.

Choosing aid recipient country on political grounds is common among donor countries. Empirical studies also support the contention that donor countries do not provide foreign aid on altruistic bases alone. In a detailed quantitative analysis Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook and Bruce Taylor examine aid determinants of four major donors, namely the United States, France, Japan and Sweden (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). Their findings confound the conventional wisdom for Japan and Sweden in that these countries are often cited as examples of donors giving aid on altruistic basis. They find that foreign aid of the United States is heavily driven by strategic and ideological interests. For France, cultural considerations play significant role in determining who will receive aid from Paris administration. In other words, France cares more about its former colonies and African countries that are members of *la francophonie*, rather than ideological proximity. Interestingly, their findings show that economic interests did not play a major role in foreign aid policy of France towards Africa. Different from the US and France, economic interests are the main determinant of Japan's foreign aid policy towards Africa. During the 1980s, top aid recipients of Japanese aid include countries with important sources of raw material and major economic markets. Finally, Sweden's foreign aid policy towards Africa is also in large part determined by economic interests. By mostly offering tied aid, Swedish governments make sure that foreign aid disbursements are tied to purchase of Swedish goods and services. This finding strikingly contradicts with the conventional wisdom that rationale behind Sweden's foreign aid policy towards Africa is humanitarian need of recipient country.

In a different study, Kuziemko and Werker focus on whether holding a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) influences foreign aid flow to that country. They gather data for all developing countries that are likely to have held non-permanent seat at the UNSC from 1946 to 2001. They construct two different panel data sets to test their hypotheses. In the first data set, drawing data from United States Agency for International Development (USAID), they include two variables. Firs variable is total economic assistance loans and grants. Second variable is military assistance loans and grants. In other words, the authors cover both military and development aid flow from the United States of America to the recipient country. In the second data set, the authors include Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the United Nations. Their results lend support to the expected hypothesis that being a non-permanent UNSC member causes donor countries supply more aid. According to their results, being a council member is associated with 59 percent increase in U.S aid. The effect of serving in the UNSC is also significant for UN aid. Being a UNSC non-permanent member alone does not help receive more UN aid. However, being a member during an important year predicts a considerable, 53 percent, increase in the UN aid inflow. As control variable, the authors also measure how much the UNSC is covered in the news for each year. During those years in which the UNSC is least covered in the news, non-permanent members from developing countries received almost no additional US aid. When the UNSC received moderate press coverage, increase in the US aid flow is positive but statistically insignificant. Non-permanent UNSC members from developing countries are lucky if they serve during the crises period when the Security Council is covered extensively in the press because in those years US aid flow increases nearly 170 percent.

That foreign aid is supplied based on strategic and economic interest is not the whole story. Aid provision has more detrimental effect to the economies of the recipient countries. As the vast literature on resource curse demonstrates, unearned income in developing countries undermines incentives for ruling elites to develop sound economic policies and build strong institutions (Brass 2008; Ross 1999; Shaxson 2005). Below quote dramatically expose the magnitude of resource curse effect on economic development:

Thanks to improvements in exploration technology, 34 less-developed countries now boast significant oil and natural gas resources that constitute at least 30 percent of their total export revenue. Despite their riches, however, 12 of these countries' annual per capita income remains below $1,500, and up to half of their population lives on less than $1 a day (Birdsall and Subramanian 2004).

Just like oil, minerals or other natural resources, foreign aid is an unearned income for poor or underdeveloped nations. Therefore, as some scholars argue, it is highly possible to expect foreign aid recipient countries suffer from the similar detrimental effects on the economy. In the light of such an argument some scholars call this phenomenon an 'aid curse' (Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle 2008). Many underdeveloped as well as war-shattered countries rely on foreign aid so much that governments remain reluctant to undertake structural reform. To take an example, foreign aid constituted 42%, 33.7%, 33%, and 28.2% of Tanzania's national budget in 2007/8, 2008/9, 2009/10 and 2010/11 respectively. In June 2015, Tanzania's Finance Minister Saada Mkuya proudly announced that the share of foreign aid in national budget of 2015/2016 will be lowered to 10% only. Furthermore, given the fact that countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction are heavily dependent on foreign aid, politicians have the incentive to manipulate macroeconomic indicators, and change national statistics so that national economy looks sound and foreign aid flow will not be halted. In such cases, budgetary sessions in the parliaments become nothing more than a ceremony or a procedure that has to be followed for going on with the expenditures.

Another unintended but detrimental effect of foreign aid to post-conflict or underdeveloped countries is increase in national expenditures. As long as governments are aware that donor countries will continue to supply foreign aid, unearned income coming from abroad will be used for additional government expenditures rather than for funding infrastructure projects that are planned or already in progress. Brautigam and Knack (2004) show that access to foreign aid encourages decision-makers to be more flexible with regard to budget and downplay fiscal discipline. Empirical studies also

prove that foreign aid is associated with government expenditures and lower level of revenue generation domestically (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000; Remmer 2004).

Additionally, sustained and large sums of foreign aid have also detrimental effects on the improvement of state capacity. This regressive effect is most observable in revenue generation and in particular tax collection. A country that does not receive any foreign aid will exert utmost effort to collect as much tax as possible from citizens. In addition to its contribution to the national budget, tax collection is also reflection of a state's capability to connect and control its citizens. Stronger, more institutionalized and legitimate states collect more tax from citizens. However, studies show that foreign aid is negatively correlated with tax collection (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Remmer 2004). Governments receiving large amount of foreign aid have less incentive to tax citizens as well as improve tax administration.

As I demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, post-colonial African states are governed by informal institutions such as patronage networks and clientelism. Funneling large sums of money into state institutions which are often characterized with rampant corruption and widespread bribery will help reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regimes. The members of the international community and foreign peacebuilding officers cannot rule the entire state mechanism until the international community and the society are convinced that state institutions are in sound and robust form. Since the majority of the public offices will be filled with local people, then injection of large sums of aid money into state coffers are most likely to maintain the neo-patrimonial regimes. Being a corrupt state does not prevent lenders to lend money to these states. With examples from Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, Dambisa Moyo (2009, 53) explains in detail who international financial institutions and major powers continued to lend money to countries ruled by infamous corrupt leaders. It is indisputable that foreign aid is inextricably linked to foreign policy, which makes it highly political. Therefore, as long as leaders of a neo-patrimonial regime maintain friendly relations with rich nations, flow of aid money is guaranteed regardless of human rights violations or undermining rule of law. High likelihood of aid flow to political allies also increases the possibility of leaders to make expenditures over the

budget. Leaders who are certain of flow of aid money in the coming months feel free to go off the national budget.

Once a crisis is "discovered", humanitarian actors flow into the conflict zone to provide humanitarian aid. In the post-conflict phase after the termination of violence, majority of such organizations remain in war-torn countries. Their presence cause several unintended consequences (Aoi, de Coning, and Thakur 2007). For instance, they drive the housing prices up, play a detrimental role and hinder development and growth of local organizations by taking on more responsibility, undermine consolidation of state institutions' capacity to deliver services. There is also vast empirical evidence that pouring large sums of money into state coffers engender corruption among public officers. When the role of external actors and aid monies they provide during post-conflict reconstruction processes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina are examined, it seems that such funds end up in the pockets of the elites and fail to assist creation of liberal democracies (Kurtoglu-Eskisar 2015).

4. INVESTING IN PEACE IN A NEO-PATRIMONIAL REGIME

Once closely studied, as demonstrated above, it is obvious that external actors pursue their own agenda. Country strategy papers of such organizations are immensely influenced by the foreign policy objectives of the donor country in the host state. Be it a governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, they are run by career-oriented people who are assigned to the position for mostly around two-year period. These development and aid bureaucrats ardently stick to their code of conduct and guidelines to prevent any unpleasant event during their terms so that they can retain a clean career record.

Examination of activities of foreign aid and development organizations in Sudan demonstrate that external aid actors almost rarely address the root cause of the conflict in Darfur, which is depleting natural resources such as shrinking arable land, pastures, water resources and desertification. Different narratives of the conflict and its politicization by opposition groups in Sudan lead the international community to overlook the underlying reason behind the conflict. Identification of the root cause of

the conflict as an essential element of effective post-conflict reconstruction approach was not just occurred to me in the previous chapter, while developing my argument. It is for this reason that many organizations view that the conflict in Darfur is a consequence of poor governance both at national and regional level and therefore capacity building in the capital can help ameliorate the situation in conflict zones. With a neoliberal mindset, viewing the civil war in Darfur as a poor governance problem results in application of neoliberal peacebuilding remedy to Sudan.

According to my argument, state building efforts must be coupled with projects designed to address the root causes. More emphasis must be paid to the projects at the local level to redress the grievances. State-building efforts should not be abandoned but regarded as secondary. Majority of the territory ruled by neo-patrimonial regimes of sub-Saharan African states are ruled by local chiefs or clan heads. Lack of a *leviathan* makes it easier for smaller socio-political entities resort to violence to settle their disagreements. Unlike the past centuries, availability of fire arms increases the likelihood of armed conflicts at micro-level. As Autesserre (2008) explains in detail with examples from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), such small conflicts at local level can easily be exploited and manipulated by politicians at national level to gain more political leverage. The case in Darfur is not much different from DRC. This is to say that, as long as small-scale conflicts remain unsolved at local level, probability of civil war recurrence stays high.

This is due to the neo-patrimonial character of post-conflict states, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Aid provision directly to the state institutions controlled by those neo-patrimonial regimes will create material benefits that can be distributed, and therefore generate more incentive for high-level bureaucrats to be involved in clientelism and patronage network. Foreign aid provided by the external actors will inadvertently cause more corruption. As a result the relationship between public officers and citizens will be significantly altered. More importantly, external actors will harm the social contract in the society by undermining the legitimacy of the central authority because public officers will be more loyal to external actors than local citizens in order to sustain inflow of aid. State institutions will not care about accountability and

credibility in the eyes of citizens because financial problems can be mitigated by guaranteeing foreign aid. Consequently, citizens will be encouraged to be part of informal institutions because formal ones are viewed illegitimate and more importantly inefficient, if not useless.

As the case of post-conflict reconstruction in Darfur conflict demonstrates, civil wars ended with a negotiated settlement are prone to recur as long as the root causes are addressed and initial grievances are remedied. Previous chapters clearly present that foreign aid provided by the external actors to the state institutions is counter-productive. Instead of focusing too much on state-building, external actors will have a more constructive role if they pay more attention to projects that will ameliorate living conditions at the local level where conflict was fought. In other words, what I argue is that external actors should prioritize development projects that will eliminate the problem over which people fight. External actors may not welcome such an approach with open arms due to lack of funding for both state-building and development projects at the local. But lack of funding cannot be an excuse for external actors to stay out of development projects at the local level.

African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), for example, functions for almost a decade. Just like its authorization, UNAMID's budget is approved annually. Approved budget of the force for the period of July 2014 – June 2015 was USD$ 1,15 billion. Given that annual budget of the Sudanese state in 2014 was USD$ 6,54 billion, the international community spends an amount of money that is roughly equal to 17% of Sudan's annual budget to sustain a peacekeeping mission which is understaffed and whose success is dubious. Recall that the most marvelous job towards addressing the root cause of the conflict in Darfur was done by Qatar Charity by only USD$ 3 million for a town. Let us imagine, what would have happened, if more money is spent to fund projects like that of Qatar Charity. Even if a modest fund of a USD$10 million, around 1% of UNAMID's annual budget, is reserved for the right projects, dozens of towns in Darfur can be revived. This is not an unsubstantiated abstract calculation. A Sudanese agricultural expert working for Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN also proposed a similar plan. Creation of new pastures

for cattle herders will prevent them attacking villages dealing with traditional farming in order to gain the necessary land. Drilling water wells will enable traditional farmers to make use of larger areas so that they will not compete for pasture areas for agriculture. Likewise, forestation projects in the Northern Darfur will help camel herding groups feed their camels so that they will not trespass crop yielding farms of agricultural villagers.

Sudanese officials complain that IDPs who left their villages and sought refuge to the camps reject to go back to their villages; even if the government is able to provide security. IDPs do not want to go because sustaining their livelihood is too difficult and the Sudanese state lacks both financial and technical capability to undertake the task of developing and reviving those abandoned villages. External actors should come into the play right at this moment, just like Qatar Charity did. Foreign donors, including government agencies and INGOs, spend millions of dollars across Sudan for different projects in a variety of sectors. Given the limited resources the external actors can devote to Sudan, dispersing human as well as financial resources is not a wise policy. Then it will not be unfair to conclude that external actors do not prioritize reconstruction and reviving Darfur as an institutional strategy.

Insecurity, bandits, rebels and kidnappings are also cited as other excuses by external actors for not being active in Darfur. During my interview with a foreign officer of OCHA (UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance) officer, who prefers to remain anonymous, I was told that foreign organizations are willing to go to Darfur and undertake huge tasks but tribal conflicts and insecurity hinder potential projects. Again, Qatar Charity's project falsifies such claims because this organization has been successfully running their projects in five towns in five provinces of Darfur. I do not mean that fears and concerns of foreign actors are groundless. On the contrary, they are valid concerns and insecurity prevails in Darfur. However, characterization of the entire region with chaos is nothing but distortion of the truth. Qatar Charity, for example, picked a town called Marla, 50 km south of Nyala in South Darfur province as a pilot town in the initial stage of the implementation phase of the project. After a couple of months, the project team suspended the project and left the town due to inter-

communal violence in the town. But in Bulbul, again in South Darfur, the project runs smoothly without any security concern.

What lesson can we draw from all this discussion? I believe that discussion presented above and Darfur case study teaches us two important lessons. First, if an external actor intends to be involved in post-conflict reconstruction of a society following a civil war, it should at least minimize, if total avoidance impossible, provision of foreign aid directly to the state institutions. As demonstrated in this study, foreign aid provided to the state institutions is counter-productive. Some scholars even argue that provision of foreign aid to state is a vain effort.

> By creating incentives for the expansion of the state, aid can be seen as fostering rent- seeking behavior at the expense of productive economic activities. From a market-oriented perspective on development, foreign assistance thus represents a largely futile and self-defeating enterprise (Remmer 2004, 88).

Similarly some African economists such as Dambisa Moyo (2009) also argue that donor countries should stop loans and grants to the African governments. Since foreign aid causes unplanned governmental expenditures, increases corruption, reduces incentives to collect tax, external actors should help African governments devise income generating projects. Second lesson this study teaches us is that focusing more on the development projects at the local level that are designed to address the root cause of the conflict is more fruitful. It is not only more constructive, but will also cost less to the external actors.

In short, the post-Cold War post-conflict reconstruction sector has failed to prevent civil war recurrence and devise an efficient modality of peacebuilding. This is due to the bureaucratic nature of the organizations involved in peacebuilding missions, both governmental and non-governmental organizations, as much as to the politicization of foreign aid. As argued by several authors, foreign aid whether it comes with attached conditionalities or not, has political impacts. Nevertheless, foreign aid in the post-conflict settings are more political and militarized as the donors condone to military

expenditures while aid monies are spent for prestige projects which have no positive impact to the welfare of citizens (Easterly 2008; Goodhand and Sedra 2007). Peacebuilders and aid officers who are confined to the capital city of their assignment often fail to comprehend the local dynamics and miss out significant developments occurring in their neighborhood. It is for this reason that the international community is often caught by surprise when a peace process collapses and civil war breaks out, in spite of flowing positive and promising situation reports from post-conflict zones to the headquarters.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Civil wars have been a heavily debated issue for the international community since the end of the Cold War not only because they result in more casualty but also because of their spillover effect and possibility of transforming into a regional security predicament. Collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia created an anarchical environment in many states in which societies stood for their own survival. In this sense, civil wars are seen like a Hobbesian world compressed within national borders. Absence of a functioning state makes societal groups worry about their existence and compels them to take care of their survival.

Once a civil war breaks out, social groups that used to live in the same city or town begin to fight each other. Such a hostile environment causes emergence of fresh hatred among communities that will last for decades, or even centuries. It is for this reason that rebuilding peace after a civil war is more difficult than a typical inter-state war. After an inter-state war ends, parties withdraw their forces to their homeland and they respect the borderline between them. However, there is no border that separates belligerents in a civil war because they used to live in the same street, town or city and they have to continue to live together after the war.

Politics of the post-Cold War era have been reinfocing the understanding of security and development as two inextricable elements crucial for sustainable peace. This understanding strengthens networks that link military deployment and development bureaucracy. Then, we are left with a new dilemma in the new millennium: do development projects lag behind because of insecurity, or insecurity prevails due to lack of development? Answer of the international community to this dilemma in the post-Cold War was a holistic view that regards development and security as two tasks to be taken up simultaneously (Duffield 2001). According to the international community of the post-Cold War, therefore, deployment of peacekeeping missions to war-torn countries is essential because development and state-building projects are doomed to fail unless security and order are maintained.

It was this mindset that created the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769. Since then, authorization of the peacekeeping force has been extended on yearly basis. Last time, the UNAMID's authorization was extended by Security Council resolution 2228 of 29 June 2015 until 30 June 2016. Although initially authorized for 19,555 military personnel and 6,432 police, the military and police components of the force were decided to be decreased in August 2014.

Has the UNAMID been successful in fulfilling its mandate since its establishment? It is difficult to give a clear answer to this question. UNAMID, pertaining to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, is authorized by the Security Council resolution 1769, to take necessary action in the areas of deployment in order to:

> (i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,

> (ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;

Judging by these tasks, UNAMID has not been successful in protecting aid workers because a number of aid workers have been kidnapped by rebels in Darfur, though they are often not reported in the international media. Yet, Patrick Noonan, a British aid worker working for World Food Program's logistic team in Darfur was kidnapped by Darfurian rebels in March 2012 and had been held hostage for nearly three months. Noonan is just an example of a group of cases went unreported. Several volunteers of Doctors Without Borders were kidnapped for some time by the Darfurian rebels. In

some rare cases, however, some aid workers have been killed because they were caught in the crossfire between rebels and the security forces.

It is also difficult to call UNAMID successful with regard to protection of civilians from rebel attacks, which is *raison d'etre* of this peacekeeping mission. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Darfur is a region as vast as France. Therefore, it is utopian to expect UNAMID with its some 17 thousand personnel to maintaining order and security in such a vast region where rebels are immensely scattered throughout the region. To continue comparison, France maintains orders and security within its border with the *Police Nationale*, whose number is estimated to be around 150,000, and *Gendarmerie Nationale*, whose number is around 100,000. Then the question becomes, how fair is it to expect UNAMID to accomplish with some 17,000 units what France has been accomplishing with over 250,000 units? It is not surprising that the senior officials in UN peacekeeping operations are often heard complaining about the need for additional personnel. France has been providing security to its citizens in a stable country where institutions are intact and functioning. Whereas in Darfur, as in other civil-war-hit countries, institutions are missing and instability and anarchy are prevalent.

Another point that requires attention is the mandate of the peacekeeping forces. Narrow and ambiguous definition of what the soldiers were supposed to do is likely to put peacekeeping forces in dilemma. As Jett (1999) succinctly calls, peacekeeping forces are often consisted of "too many soldiers with too little to do", a condition leads armed personnel to inaction rather than action when threats arise. UNAMID in Darfur is not an exception to this ill fortune of UN peacekeeping history. On 24 March 2013, a group of displaced residents of Darfur was on their way to a peace conference, escorted by a convoy of UN and AU peacekeepers. The convoy was stopped by rebel groups. Drivers of the buses and displaced people were taken to a rebel stronghold where their personal properties were stolen and they were kept as captive for six days. According to an unreleased assessment by an UN personnel, "[The peacekeepers] made no visible effort to prevent the abduction of IDP conference participants from the convoy. They just stood watching as the gunmen drove away the buses carrying the IDPs" (Lynch

2014). I also witnessed a couple of cases during my stay in Sudan whereby violence broke out in a meeting in which two rival tribes are being reconciled with UNAMID's mediation. In spite of presence of UNAMID's armed personnel, fighting broke out and several people were killed including peacekeeping forces. It seems that all the problems and criticism about UN peacekeeping operations discussed in the previous chapter are relevant to UNAMID case in Darfur. UNAMID is not able to maintain peace and security in Darfur, nor is it able to protect civilians or aid workers.

Many mission failures such as March 24 kidnapping would have been gone unreported, unless Aicha Elbasri, former spokeperson of the UNAMID mission, leaked documents to Foreign Policy magazine. Leaked documents showed that UN officials concede that their operation in Darfur is highly flawed. The documents also reveal that the UNAMID mission has so many other problems which are obviously to negatively affect its success: "conflicting visions of its role between U.N. headquarters and African leaders; a lack of cooperation by the Sudanese government; poor leadership; and badly-equipped troops that lacked the helicopters, trucks, and other military hardware" (Lynch 2014).

Deployment of peacekeeping forces is not sufficient for rebuilding collapsed states. Multi-dimensional approach is required to reestablish a functioning state. Therefore post-conflict reconstruction is almost the same as building state from scratch. But the question is what kind of state and institutions will be built? Since the end of the Cold War, with the triumph of liberal democracy and free-market economy, post-conflict reconstruction efforts are dominated with a prevailing paradigm: neoliberal peacebuilding. The international community desires to create Western-like states out of civil war-torn countries within a decade by focusing on two main pillars: liberal democracy where multiple political parties compete for power in regularly held free and fair elections and free-market oriented economy where state control over prices is removed and state enterprises are privatized. Because political system collapsed due to the civil war, external actors often encourage former rebel groups to form political parties and go to polls, while establishing relevant state institutions to govern the post-conflict elections. As reasonable as it sounds, the fact that one out of every ended civil

war recurs within five years clearly shows that post-conflict reconstruction mind set has some problems.

In this study, I argued that external actors fail to prevent civil war recurrence because by focusing too much on rebuilding the collapsed state so that it can address the root cause of the conflict, the external actors allocate bulk of resources at their disposal to projects designed to rebuild the state organs and institutions. The problem is not rebuilding the collapsed state but using neoliberal peacebuilding approach as one-size-fits-all recipe for all cases. In other words, external actors attempt to transfer state structures of Western countries to the war-torn countries and expect them to function perfectly. On the one hand, external actors expect the new state to regulate a free market, while the state lacks necessary institutions, equipments or capacity. A free market economy without supervision of regulatory organs is doomed to produce inequality, if not collapsed. On the other hand, in an environment where societal groups fought war with each other for years are expected to live side by side and peacefully compete for political power through political parties. As Roland Paris (2004) shows with several cases, the international community rushes to hold multi-party elections to have western-like democracies and end up with a situation where hostilities resurface and civil war recur.

The earlier chapters showed and Darfur case study lends support that neoliberal peacebuilding approach has serious problems. First, state-building process in many post-conflict reconstruction cases is seen as replication of the European experience in that external actors expect war-shattered countries adopt and run smoothly a system that took two centuries to flourish in Europe. Second, when external actors support neoliberal peacebuilding in every war-torn country, they indirectly help the Westphalian state system to be strengthened because reconstructed states are designed exactly as the Western countries. Third, neoliberal values function in Western countries perfectly because it is a remedy that emanated from their own experiences, past crises, and values. Therefore, transfer of those institutions and mechanisms without taking experiences, values and past crises of the local people will not produce a healthy system that will last long. Fourth, imposing neoliberal peacebuilding as the only remedy takes

agency away from local people. Who knows what kind of alternative governance model local people can devise. Imposing neoliberal peacebuilding as the only recipe then eliminates any alternative solution to the reconstruction predicament.

I have also drawn attention to the bureaucratic nature of the institutions through which external actors pursue their objectives, and argue that it is the career-oriented bureaucratic nature of these organizations that prevent officers from fully comprehend the situation and identify the root causes. Persons who are appointed by governmental or non-governmental institutions to work in post-conflict reconstruction projects in those countries often live in the capital cities, within the well-equipped and well-protected special complexes designed for them. Such an environment disables them from contacting local people from different folks of life and background. This isolationist attitude results in reflection of one side of the story to the institutions and this one-sided reflections are often reported to the headquarters whose views international media and decision-makers heavily rely on.

This study has also argued that while external actors attempt to reconstruct the war-torn country, they failed to recognize the realities of post-colonial state in Africa. I have demonstrated that post-colonial African state is usually identified as neo-patrimonial. By this concept, I refer to those states that have legal/rational institutions but function like a patrimonial state. In other words, in a neo-patrimonial state we can find all requirements of a modern state such as parliament, judicial and executive branch etc. However, state affairs are run by patrimonial relations behind these modern institutions. Building upon the work of Bratton and van de Walle (1997), I identify three types of informal institutions used by neo-patrimonial regimes for political legitimation: Presidentialism, clientelism, and state resources. Presidentialism is an informal institution whereby political power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler, who delegates almost no strategic decision making. Clientelism is a relationship in which somebody who is in an important position in government (patron) distributes material benefits to somebody (client) whose political loyal is needed. Clientelist relationship is closely associated with patronage networks, a situation in which a relative or kin is distributed material benefit because the constituents elected that person for gaining

benefits. Third informal institution is use of state resources. In neo-patrimonial regimes, high-level bureaucrats who have state resources at their disposal rarely make distinction between public and personal good. Because there is not any control mechanisms, neo-patrimonial leaders do not hesitate to spend state resources to pursue personal objectives or maximize their power by buying some oppositional leaders off.

The main argument of the study is that external actors, perhaps inadvertently cause reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regimes in civil war-hit countries. Through the projects they finance or policies they follow, external actors help local politicians maintain neo-patrimonial regimes. In this study, I show that external actors cause reinforcement of neo-patrimonial regimes in three ways. First, external actors acting with neoliberal peacebuilding principles wish to create a state structured exactly like their own back home. In other words, external actors believe that transferring Western state model to the war-shattered society will overcome bad governance problem, grievances will be redressed and therefore civil war recurrence will be avoided. Such an approach, however, will not take local dynamics, indigenous governance mechanisms and pre-colonial institutions into account. A governance modal that is stranger to the local people, coupled with clientelism, corruption and nepotism, will lack legitimacy. By following this strategy, external actors disregard, overlook and exclude many local administrative structures, indigenous governance mechanisms or conflict resolution mechanisms because these are believed to be unmodern, backward and obsolete. As a result, post-conflict reconstruction efforts of external actors will exclude institutions in which local people have faith, while support central government which is seen corrupt, ineffective and therefore illegitimate by people. Over years, this attitude of external actors will cause undermining of legitimacy of the central government and encouraging people to seek alternative ways to get things done. These alternative ways are informal institutions of like clientelism, nepotism, etc.

Second, as one of the fundamental pillars of neoliberal peacebuilding, external actors push hard for establishing liberal democracies in which multiple political parties compete for power in free and fair elections. This strategy prevents emergence of any alternative governance system because external actors dictate a particular democracy as

the sole option. Because leaders of civil war-hit countries need financial support of the external actors, they often prefer compromise to challenge. As an example, I mentioned Somaliland case. In self-declared independent state of Somaliland had no external actor imposing upon them a certain type of governance structure. Yet, they came up with a genuine democratic system that functions smoothly and creates stability. If the governance structure is not owned by local people, the central government will lack legitimacy. Eventually, this will encourage citizens to bypass formal institutions and be part of the informal institutions.

Third, external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction provide large sums of money to fund projects, increase capacity of state institutions, or simply to support the government budget. In all these forms, foreign aid provided through state institutions is tantamount to inflow of financial resources to state. Due to lack of control mechanisms, post-conflict state institutions are prone to corruption, embezzlement of funds and misappropriation of resources, informal institutions of neo-patrimonial regime are strong in post-conflict states. In spite of this fact, external actors persist to provide foreign aid to state institutions. This behavior inadvertently reinforces neo-patrimonial character of the regime in that foreign aid functions as more material benefit that can be distributed by high-level bureaucrats in return of political or personal benefits. The more resources leaders have at their discretion without sufficient control mechanisms, the more likely they will be engaged in clientelism, nepotism or corruption. It is unwise, if not naïve, that external actors hand in large sums of money to political leaders and expect them to address the root cause of the conflict and redress the grievances. Post-conflict states do not have capacity to undertake such an enormous task, nor do they have the ability to project authority at grassroots level. Therefore, this study shows that foreign aid provided by external actors to the state institutions help nothing but increase corruption, misappropriation of funds, and as a result reinforce the neo-patrimonial character of the regime.

The entire discussion in this study takes us to highlight two main points. First, external actors should stop considering post-colonial African state as if it is a well-functioning entity similar to those in the West. As one observer noted:

> Although political independence brought some change to the composition of the state managers, the character of the state remained much as it was in the colonial era. It continued to be totalistic in scope, constituting a statist economy. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority (Ake 1996, 3).

By Drawing attention to the informal institutions of the post-colonial African states, which are characterized as neo-patrimonial regimes, allocation of resources to state institutions and expecting them to redress the grievances that caused the conflict in the first place further strengthen those informal institutions by entrenching clientelism, corruption, and patronage networks. I emphasize that it is these informal institutions that caused state failure and triggered the civil war in the first place. If it is not wise to channel foreign aid directly to the state, then with whom should the external actors work with? This takes us to the second point.

For many years, foreign aid organizations were accused of undermining state legitimacy for bypassing state institutions and working with NGOs at local level. However, research shows that foreign aid provision to the state increases government expenditures and prevents development of state capacity to collect tax. Furthermore, foreign aid supply to post-conflict state institutions reinforces neo-patrimonialism. In short, foreign aid in post-conflict states plays a detrimental role. It undertakes an ambitious task like rebuilding a state that is expected to govern the entire country. More importantly, this ambitious task requires a great deal of financial resources. Instead, in this study I argued that external actors should focus on the projects designed to address the grievances and root causes that sparked the violence in the first place. Such a strategy will not only cost less to the international community but also help the central governments to avoid unplanned expenditures and focus on capacity building to be more effective such as collecting more tax.

There is one more final issue that deserves attention. All civil wars are not the same; there are many reasons for civil wars to erupt. For example, Sambanis (2001)

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argues that ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars have different causes. Simple distinction of civil wars among scholars is based on whether the civil war is revolutionary in that inspired by an ideology and aiming at toppling the government or inspired by identity related grievances. Moving one step further, we can distinguish civil wars according to the matter over which the fighting started in the first place. If the civil war is about resources, then it is easier to find a long-lasting settlement to the conflict. If the war is about who will run the government, it will be more difficult to find a common ground among belligerents. External actors can play more constructive role in the former, while they can play minimal role in the latter.

It should also be born in mind that civil wars are not like diseases. They do not surface over a night and become contagious to the entire society within weeks. Yes, it is true that grievances are often kept unspoken by leaders as domestic affair in media outlets or international organizations or various platforms. However, civil wars are not impossible to predict because 'prior indication normally extends back over many years' (Carment 2004, 137). There are several tools available for external actors to help evaluate fragile societies or identify root causes more accurately. Conflict monitoring NGOs, such as International Crisis Group, monitor political crises across the world and regularly publish reports about the unfolding events in those fragile countries. With the help of non-governmental institutions engaged in risk-assessment or early-warning mechanisms for conflicts, external actors can more efficiently use resources at their disposal. Therefore, after a civil war ends, external actors can use these institutions to monitor the situation on the ground and channel their resources accordingly where the central government fails to respond. Doing so will eliminate grievances at grassroots level through which rebel leaders will not be able to mobilize masses and rebel recruitment will be hampered.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWED PEOPLE IN SUDAN

Abdullah Mohamed – Member of Parliament, National Congress Party

Abdullah Zakariya – President of International Center for African Studies

Ahmed Mohamed – Professor of Political Science at the University of Khartoum

Ali Adam – Director of Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC)

Badawi Altahir Ahmed – Professor of History, University of Port Sudan

Barood Sandal – General Secretary of Parliamentary Group, Popular Congress Party

Fayz Jamie – Director of Center for Peace and Development Studies

Ghazi Salahaddin – Chairman of Reform Movement

Hassan Makki – Professor of Political Science, African International University

Mohamed Haroun– Director of Peace Studies Institute at the University of Khartoum

Omar Egemi – Professor of Geography at the University of Khartoum

Seed Ahmed Aqeel – Professor of History, Neelain University

Tariq Nour – Vice Rector of the University of Khartoum

Yusuf Takana – Former Interior Minister and Member of Ummah Party

APPENDIX 2: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEIW WITH ALI ADAM

What is sudan policy towards foreign aid organizations?

Sudan is a member of international community and also member of certain organizations like IOM. We are a member. Sudan always sees itself as one of the partners and he sees international organizations, whether UN or NGOs, as partners so we think we are in a partnership. we are always going to have needs, which just has to be complemented by international in addition to the governmental institutions. so the strategy is always we will be working with national and international partners. so this is policy, and we have mechanism, we have directives clearly saying how it shoud be in 2013. and we have voluntary act which is clearly seeking how the realtionship... because i am focusing on the humanitarian sector, not other sectors. so regarding this, i think that our policy is always welcoming and even for international organizations, yes we talk about sudanization, we want to enhance national capacities with allligned ministeries or national NGOs or national actors. also we want to ensure that there is a mechanism whereby out international partners they are most welcome, but we also want to look at cost and benefit analyis, we do not want a project of 4 million US dollars or 1.5 million spent on staff... because we need maximized benefit rather spent on staff. Sudan has very clear plan and all directives are there - always we would like to have international partners to work with us because we know our limitations. and of course we know our potential. but we need to regulate and ensure that we are working together. i think relaly we don t have problem but we want to have the right to regularize the sectors we want to ensure there is cost and benefit analysis... also there is value for the money. not like the past... ensure maximization of the benefit to the beneficiary rather than spend more on operations and administration.... this is our strategy, in other words to know who is doing what.

These aid organizations want to adress the root causes of the problem so that they dont recur again. Do you think they adress those root causes?

I mean the answer is yes, within the of course [inaudible] also some of the root cause of the problem is not really [inaudible] again it depends on who the partner is. If you are talking about the NGO sector, yes they are doing, trying to do in terms of peacebuilding process in the community, but the root causes of the most of the conflict is really, a part of it is internal but part of it is external. For example, we have the Darfur Doha Agreement, think it is clearly [inaudible] there is nothing not mentioned in this agreement. But some of the rebel groups decided not to join. Of course, they are getting political back up from some countries and institutions. This is an example of where the root cause of problem is not being adressed. But at least everybody is making effort; within the mandate, capacity and limitations.

So, although these NGOs adress the root causes but because of the external back up rebels are encouraged to fight.

No**,** I will just say we need also [inaudible] because roots causes are problem they are different, some of it is a local community kind of problem. So you can adress it. But some of it political. So the political problem, of course, they cannot do much. They can just influence. am the civil sector. UN is expected to do a much higher work compared to an NGO sector. UN, African Union , Arab League have different capacities.

But for those political demands, if they interfere it will be interference in domestic politics?

No, not interference. It is within their local mechanism, providing support, of course it could be, it is an agreement of the government, like the negotiations with the AU auspices.

They can help the Sudanese government, but it is the Sudanese government who is going to make the political decisions at the end. Corect?

Of course, they can just do negotions between Sudanese government and SPLM-N. This is being under the aus pies of the African Union.

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Personally, can you say that those foreign aid organizations adress the roots causes of conflict? For instance, those people in darfur area who are in conflict with nomads and farmers, are they really helping them? Are you happy with their activities?

Well yeah, any assistance provided. This conflict is mainly resource-based. Any contribution, provision of basic services, in education, health, water system, definitely at the end to reduce the conflict on the resources. There is only two water points, and there is a project which is to increase the water points and this will reduce the conflict on resources.

Are there any mistakes that foreign aid organizations make in Sudan? Because in international media, sometimes they characterize Sudanese government as if they are against these aid organizations because of expelling them?

I think in any country there are rules and regulations, whether in US or UK. If you do not follow these rules, just like in your own family. We have directives. The whole idea is to regulate the sector. To ensure that we are working in partnership. We have also trust and confidence to build a process. We have coordination mechanism, but if an organization or an individual .. actually because you cannot blame an organization, normally the individual within the organization, they are the one. And there is a code of conduct. If that individual does not follow the code of conduct, the organization will just terminate the contract. There is no policy against NGOs or UN agencies or international organizations, even our recent issues with International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) is about regulations, we are saying the ICRC has to work within the framework of the rules and regulations of Sudan government and it has to work in partnership with Sudanese red crescent. It has to ensure that also within the humanitarian sector it has to work with Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC). It is all about rules and regulations. [Inaudible] we just want them to implement within a framework which means there will be a proper reporting to ensure that. Also we are all of the picture... but the way most of these agencies, they are just doing what they like.

So the case of ICRC is that they wanted to act too much independently?

Yeah, but you cannot work independently because you are part of a sector, you are in a country. I cannot go now to Belgium and say do what I like as a Sudanese citizen in Belgium. Even in Sudan I cannot do just what I like. There is rules regulations whether it s community or family or government. At the end it is the Sudanese government which is responsible for the people. They have to work within a framewrok, if they want to solve a problem they have work within this framework and we have coordination mechanism. As I said, they are individual who are misbehaving, and there is of course we have to deal with them, what do you expect? In any country if you misbehave, what do you expect? They will ask you to leave. [Inaudible] we ask them to leave in a very dignified manner, people are asked to leave quietly, and not to go to media. They can leave the country without anybody knowing what is happening. And people are not taken handcuffed and put in a plane. We are not handcuffing them. I think that is an issue. And of course sometimes again if we notice an irregularity, we call the country representative and say please make sure that what you are doing is within your mandate, [inaudible] we had cases where confidential report has been received and being discovered and still we talked to the person and reminded to do this - to implement project not writing a security report. I mean people are writing reports which is not related to the mandate. If you are talking about the rebel group movement and all the others, that is not part of their job, you are here to help projects, you are not supposed to write a report about rebel movement, the government or army movement and fighting, it is not your job. They are not a journalist. If you are a journalist and you cannot tell you are a project manager and this guy is a journalist as a project manager.

Are these allegations all documented?

Of course! I mean there is nothing something based on rumors. I am telling you. Other thing we also want to ensure the protection of the international people also. This is an issue when the access issue comes. Somebody says I want to this place but unless we are sure it is safe we will tell this person not to go .UN system has a security system UNDSS... sometimes you say go and they say no. Our international [inaudible] cannot go to this place. So again even Sudan government is not allowing people to go to conflict areas. Of course, if there is conflict even sometimes we as a government we

cannot go. Even the army cannot go. That is what it is. We are asking our partners to be rational rather than just think when I say no, ooo that is because he does not like.

Major criticism about aid organizations is that their aid projects help refugees stay in the camp longer. In a sense these aid organizations prevent normalization. Do you agree in the case of Darfur?

Again to be fair, there is always what is called intended effect or impact and unintended. Because the primary role the primary reason for an aid agency or government or nongovernment organization is to come is to support people to assist them. Start from life saving to as a beautiful solution or they want to return or they want to integrate or they [inaudible]. This is a beautiful solution. Sometimes as a result of interventions without realizing like now the people in the camp for 10 years in Darfur. With no clear solution about those people where they want to return. Some of them are returning but they don't officially declare it. They go and come back, because they are getting free food free service. So when you provide it this free food and free service you want to save lives you want to ensure those people but without realizing you perpetuate this situation. Then become you create a dependency syndrome. Whereby people just think they like ... if you say " I am not going this is insecure" but in the real sense some of them they go far and come back .so that is where the unintended. Now we have 1.5 million people being fed by the national and international partners. This is now we end up in a dilemma. What to do with them. They don't want to be integrated. Even they have all capabilities of being integrated they just say "no, I prefer IDP camp".

So even though the villages are secure now?

Even to settle where they have settled. Take a shortcut, how things are you can even note that down. Abu Shouk IDP camp, in Al-Fasher, is a camp where if you enter you will never feel you are in an IDP camp. People are already integrated in the city but they are still considering themselves as IDP camp. Because they receive free food and anybody can do that if anybody feeds my family for the next 10 years. I will be quite happy I will be relaxed.

While we are helping those IDPs, are there other aid organizations providing water or sanitation to the villages so that they can go back now?

This is happening absolutely now. Also there is a difficulty of it. It is just a comparison with you. Do you taking care of your own business by somebody taking care of your life. Because if he goes you are responsible of yourself but if you are here in the camp the system. So that is that challenge.

Is this possible? May be people do not go back to those villages because of lack of safety or water or sanitation?

No, I think if you go rural Sudan anywhere, there are problems like that. It is not special to Darfur. But Darfur is a special case. The special case about is security. If you go to eastern Sudan you can find villages with no water but still they are just doing.

But if they go there, they have to work in a farm

Of course but they will take care of their business. There are people now living in rural areas with no services but there is money. They know how to manage. That is something else. So what I am saying here the problem is just the kind - by creating dependence syndrome which is like in eastern Sudan. We have still Eritrea refugees [inaudible] after forty years after 20 years of independence of their countries. They say 'we are refugees, no we cannot go back we don't want to be integrated, we want to be refugees'.

And more refugees coming from Central African Republic now

Of course! Because there is a come but if it is being sorted out I think there is no incentive of becoming immigrant. Some of them are immigrants. Just like people going to Europe or Turkey ...I mean If I had a chance to go to Turkey I will say "ok" , the best thing to claim is refugee status.

Can Turkey ask for advice from you because of the Syria crisis?

I am telling you, there are people who will never return to Syria whether Asad is there or someone else. Because they expose themselves to a new life and they see another

opportunity. Of course you have to be prepared. May be at least 40 percent of the people will not go and some of them will even be to settle there. That is why it is common all over the world it is becoming a phenomenon. Even without the old people are finding a way to leave their country to go start a new life. This is part of the globalization.

What is the amount of Ethiopian refugees?

Anything between 200 or 250 thousand but I am sure this is unofficial figure. Like the..... Even they claim refugee but they are economic migrants. at the end of the day, they need assistance there is a reasonability of the country of host and also the international supporters.

Regarding Turkish NGOs, does Sudan favor Turkey or is it because they follow the rules?

Turkish NGOs are doing their job in a manner that we have not had any problem with them so far. There might be individual problem from time to time. It is okay it happens. But in general all NGOs, even the western countries, at the end of the day we are looking at the individual behavior rather the organization. As far as you don't have problems with the individual staff, but sometimes they send people who are not qualified, we ask them, for example, one organization says I want this person to be country director we say sorry, for the position of country director we need a person with experience who can do the job we want somebody who can do our job. You cannot just bring a young graduate of the four year experience become a country director. There is no favoring in real sense. But also because of Turkish organizations for example there is the hospital in Nyala, they are bringing specialists coming for voluntary operations so that is why they have specialty. But we are doing it to the Italian organization which is an emergency hospital in Khartoum. They are bringing their volunteers surgeon and other specialists and we support them. As long as these organizations cooperate with us in following rules and regulations we are very happy to have them.

APPENDIX 3: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEIW WITH YUSUF TAKANA

In your opinion, what kind of role do you think external actors such as United Nations and development partners play?

Well I would like to be frank I have been very close to the united nation organizations in Sudan and especially UNICEF and UNDP and FAO. I think they have been doing very successful jobs in Sudan. UNDP in the 99s and 80s have got a very viable program in rural development this is in six seven places in Sudan- two in Darfur one in [inaudible] in south Darfur and the other in north Darfur and I think it was very very productive rural development programs. again they have been now funding something called Darfur peace and security fund. It is about 50 million pounds donated by western countries especially UK and they have been facilitating the finance of so many projects in different parts in Darfur. I think this is facing real needs of Darfur.

So do they address the root causes of the conflict?

No, not them. They are developmental and peacemaking at the grassroots. I think they have been doing very professional well done jobs. I have no doubt about their genuine approach about doing things for the sake of the people. if you see the FAO helping very much giving feasts to different farmers in different Darfur areas. WHO and UNICEF doing very good job helping kids to learn. this is a kind of service we need. This will put these organizations in a very good place in Sudan. but if you go to other cities in Sudan, governmental organizations. I think there are two points which are very very annoying to me. One is government development institutions are very weak. The capacity of the staff is far below the standard and understanding the job as partners is very poor.

What do you mean by this?

Their performance is very poor and they are very weak in the face of [inaudible] again during this regime they are very suspicious about the NGOs or the UN. This Islamist regime is very suspicious about foreigners in general and these organizations in

particular. So I think these are two weaknesses facing the international organizations who are doing the development. If you can remember in 2009 the president or the system expatriated and abolished 12 NGOs or international organizations from Darfur. They have been just driven out of the country, leaving the people at real need of service. so this is a kind of playing politics. i think the major point is the regime is not trusting the IOs and their staff and they do not need to be disclosed. they don't like to the government activities to be disclosed. For example in Darfur there are some atrocities from different actors especially the janjaveeds and security forces. The government does not like to see the witness in the ground to tell that these are atrocities. So this is why the system is not happy about the IOs.

I was a minister between 2002 and 2005. We have been split into two. We have joined the regime at that time to change the attitude of the regime and to make a real change. But we failed so we quitted. I left the government because we could not change. This is under the leadership of Mubarek al-fadrel Mahdi. This is a fraction of the Ummah Party. So when we failed to change things within the system, so we came back to the Ummah Party ministry.

Are they really addressing the root causes?

Yes, for example the UNICEF is helping primary school children. They are giving some tools they have been funding and building schools or sitting tools for kids. This is directly development related. If you are going to finance self-help schemes in some parts of Darfur, this is directly development and poverty reduction. They have been doing good job. This is specialized International Organizations (IOs) of the United Nations. But in politics the issue is completely different. People do not trust these IOs and the cooperation between the government and the institutions and these organizations is not at ease. The ministry of humanitarian affairs as well as the ministry of foreign affairs is quizzing these people NGOs. Even the law of NGOs is not up to the standard of international laws of NGOs. So there have been very strict control of security forces. In 2002 when I was minister of International corporations this humanitarian affairs was under the mandate of my ministry. I just called for a meeting for the humanitarian affairs system at that time. There is a committee for humanitarian

affairs. They were composed of five senior members and they came to my office. Four of them have been either from the police or security forces and the other from military and the third was a hidden agent of the security forces. He was a senior officer in my office. So I went to the wise president Ali Osman. I told him 'look this is a security cell it is not a humanitarian committee'. I like to do things professionally either you take them to another area or I am going to change this. So they created the ministry of humanitarian affairs. They separated the ministry form.

Are they not right?

Because when I talk to people in Sudan everybody says that "*NGOs! they are hafiyya (secret agent)*'.? I don't know. this is skepticism. People are afraid of. I am not sure if this is the right thing to do. People are coming are coming to help you.

But they come with a hidden agenda?

No, no... I don't think there is hidden agenda. I think if you have some sort of test and control and very clear mandate and you can see whereby the mandate. I don't think so. If you have been skeptic about anybody coming from outside of Sudan, because you are Muslim and they are not, how can things work? You will not have any cooperation with international organizations.

You can just let them work and you can check. You should have a very mandate an NGO and see and revise through this ..... you can see if they deviate from their mandate you can check them and punish them. But if you have a general idea general skepticism about anybody coming outside anybody or any organization, how can you [inaudible] the international community became global and everybody in Turkey every organization, people are interacting, it is impossible to stop. And if you isolate yourself in shell to be away from other influences, I think this is madness definitely. I think you have some reservations you are right. i should have some reservations. But I should have the mechanism to check out. if it is wrong you can punish them but if it is not. You know Sudan is a developing country they could not help the demands of the different sectors of the Sudanese people. You need some other international actors to help you. If you keep them away you are punishing your own people.

It means cutting your resources and you have resources that are very limited already. When I have been minister of international cooperation, and then Darfur problem started to begin with this massive IDP camps in different parts of Darfur. I raised from the international cooperation 6 million dollars to help the refugees and the displaced all coming from western countries. If I could not do that people could have died from hunger. You cannot isolate yourself. Every country now in the earth [inaudible] from other countries through threat, different mechanisms, you cannot [inaudible]

Is the aid sector globalized too?

For example, OXFAM organization. It is British and American. They separate themselves. They say British Oxfam, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the globalization became very strong institution that no country could separate itself from other countries. The international organizations like the IMF, the World Bank, G-20 aid, WHO, WTO, a lot of regional organizations and NGOs. You cannot separate yourself. The world now is becoming very close to each other. I don't think such policies will work. If you are going to be a fundamentalist, you look just for the dogma of your principles. And don't like others, I think you are going to commit suicide. I think you should be flexible. You should respect the accumulation of knowledge of the international community. I think some policies are very split..

The ones which stay now in sudan really serve sudan?

I don't believe that it could be only through security forces. You can train civilians with very high qualifications and they can be the people of the HAC. No security not soldiers not security as such. This is confusing things. Because the international organizations or UN they are working for your people. Why are you hurting them with soldiers? Why don't you train people, civilians to be highly qualified, just to see if they are following the mandate, whether they are helping the people in the right channels or not... whether they are playing politics or not. If they are playing politics, you can drag them out.

The ones staying in Sudan now , are they abiding by the rules?

Yes, but some are imposing them, because you cannot expel UN workers, because then you will damage your international relations reputation. But I think the international cooperation issue in Sudan has got a real problem. In may last year, I was in Darfur. I am from south Darfur. I assessed the situation in IDP camps after the government expelled these international organizations like Red Cross. It was a very awful situation in the camps. People are really needy. People are in their need of help. But nobody is asking about them. So I think it is a tragedy for Darfurians to be deprived of that. There is no good reason. The allegation is that these people are spying on Omer al Bashir and this is why they have been accused by the HAC. this is rubbish.

But the HAC office explained that they cancelled the Red Cross service because they did not follow the agreement and did not work with the Sudanese red cross. They ignored this?

I am not following closely what is happening with the Red Cross. But I am telling about NGOs which were expelled from Darfur in 2009. And there is a huge gap of need created by expelling these people. Nobody could compensate Darfurians for that.

What could be the solution for you?

If today i have to decide, they should have come back but

In the case of a medical examiner who found with reports on movements of armed groups, the whole NGO was expelled. Would you do the same thing or punish just the person?

In this condition, I would just see how effective they have been on the ground in helping people. I will tell them immediately to stop anything outside their mandate. Otherwise they will be punished. And I should have punishment procedure. Why not? you can make it public and tell their headquarters in Geneva or in America and the international media and I will tell very clearly if they repeat, and I can tell them to punish the director general but to tell them to go out, I will leave the people without service. And I cannot do that service. So this is a punishment for the people.

You know, in this report I found just in al-Fasher, it is a very conservative town, there was about 300 prostitutes, because they are needy. I found about 1000 pregnancy outside marriage because people are needy, without food. Services, money how can they live?

And there have been some people died. These organizations have been giving them food shelter medicine all of a sudden, they were without these services. And the government cannot compensate. And what do you expect out of them? They have got prostitution. It is a documented thing. I met a lot of women who have been leaders of these IDP camps. They told me frankly how can we live without selling ourselves. They don't have anything else. They are not trading anything else. They have been put in camps. So what else they could do? I think you have to manage these organizations who have been helping people that you are not capable to help them. But put your measurements to put them in the right place. But to expel them and leave people with empty hands, is it a solution? It is not. You are caring a damn about the people you have been governing.

Your solution is that the Sudanese government should increase the control mechanisms?

Yes, sure. To make more regards about the life of the people. You have been a ruler on what? On chimps? On human beings? You should take care of these human beings. Their welfare. There is a real mess especially in Darfur. Because I have been touring Darfur for 3 months to gather this information. For a report and myself because I am an activist. A report other than my dissertation.

Can you give me your dissertation?

No it will cause me a trouble. Because I have been working for them. The security people in Darfur states that they are unhappy about my being there. Because I am collecting serious data. But they could not resist that because I am from the area and one of the leading Umma Party and I am an expert in government in governance and I have a very big tribe: Habbaniya.

So they could not touch me but they are really unhappy. And I used to live to be hosted by the state governor or one of the ministers. So they could not come to the minister and say "will you please expel Mr. Takana outside?". They could not do that. So I have been collecting this data and the situation is very awful. You just put these people in these camps like ships without rendering them the minimum needs of life and you expel all the people helping them.

Who controls the camps now?

The government controls through HAC. It is almost in full control of HAC because I met HAC man in Nyala and Al-Fasher and I met HAC man in [inaudible] they are all in the security list. The HAC does just very little. They just tell the incoming people to go this or that camp. They just assign people to camps. They just register people. Two of these HAC people one in North Darfur. They even don t like to give me statistics about these camps. They are suspecting me. This is madness. Even the current NGO presence is not enough. People are in demand their help. Because one or two third of Darfurians who have been farmers now have been driven out of their homes because of the conflict. These are the African tribes of Darfur who have been farmers in different parts of Darfur region. They have been driven out of their villages and pushed into camps. IDP camps. With bare hands. There is food shortage in Darfur. Because all farmers have been in the camps. it is very simple. Who is going to bring food? NGOs! but NGOs are limited... and the world food program have been doing their best to bring some dura some cereals. But this is very short. This is why people women have been getting out of the camps and going to the towns and selling themselves. it is very simple.

Is it easy to go out of the camps?

Yes there is a gate but still they can manage to go out and work as servants in manual labor in houses in market to make tea and... in the evening they come back to camps. It is inhuman situation. It is not humanitarian at all.

If the camps are not very strict, it means that even rebels can come in and go out.

I don't think they come in and go out. Because they don't need. They have their agents and they have been communicating probably daily or every minute.

What is the benefit of having a spy in the camp?

Because it is a political issue. these people... from Darfurian, non-Arab groups, this is what we call the African groups, zurqa, so they have been pushed into these camps and the young people are taken out against the governmentt so they are playing politics with the leaders of the camps and they have very close contact with them.

Are there any Arab groups in the camps?

No not at all, not a single Arab group.

What about those rebels. How do they sustain their life?

By robbery, or they have been putting some taxes on local people. They act like a govt. sometimes and they go to markets and loot oil. The Sudanese government is not effective in providing security. Outside of main towns, there is no government, at all, because there are so many remote villages. And now the government came to destroy these villages completely and bring the people to IDP camps as a solution. I expect they will not go back at all because they don't have a village anymore. And they now have been enrolled in education, electricity and water and modern services so they have been picking up. i think they are going to benefit from education very much. i was talking to the ministry of education last year in may about one of the big camps in Al-Fasher where there is more than 90 thousand refugees. Before these camps, these people resided on something called "jabaltsi" with a single elementary school. Now they have been driven into Al-Fasher camp and they have about 18 elementary schools. So they have been benefitting from this. But I am afraid the students whether girls or boys will be very radical people. Because they have bee in the camps. So this is a future problem. They will definitely join the rebels. They are against the north Sudan. Because they expect that this Omer Al Bashir system is from the north and mistreating them very badly. So they will be radicals.

What about the people in the south? Do they have the same feeling?

Of course! I was in a conference in Nairobi just 7 days ago. We were discussing the issue of Darfur with international scholars. All of them telling that we have to ask for self determination because this Sudanese government for the last ten years have been disregarding [inaudible] and the atrocities in Darfur are very very crucial. Especially the younger generation. They have been......... way of thinking about Sudan. I think this is very serious.

Is self-determination a solution??

For me it is not. I have been defending the point that by education this system definitely is going to change and you will be the future leaders of the Sudan with other groups from different parts the east, west. But they are [inaudible] because the atrocities marginalized them [inaudible] it was very grave mistake. How could you kill people loot them and even rape their women and just you have been the ruler of the country and how could they understand that. Even during slavery slave trade you cannot do that. Now you are doing it in the daylight.
so I can understand why they talk this tough language about the unity of Sudan.

One of the things I have heard about IDP camps, for example, people from government side, they criticize that these NGOs create a dependency syndrome. Instead of investing all the resources to IDP camps, they should also invest in some of the villages so that the villages will develop?

No security.. No security in the village...outside the main urban centers, just Nyala, just 5 km outside Nyala, you are not secure.

If Sudanese government constructs a huge nice modern village, if people go there they will be robbed by the rebels?

Of course, they will be killed. The only solution is the government to make a very strong control institutions, army and judiciary. This is a normal law and order institutions in every country in earth. Unless you back up these institutions to make people feel secure, janjaveed and that kind. It is difficult to control them. It is difficult and it is tribalistic. You give armies to one tribe and tell them to kill other tribes, like

Arabs because only Arab people become janjaveeds. To be frank, the other rebel people, the other rebel people- the majority and the leadership are from zurga. the leadership of rebels.

Without security people will never leave the IDP camps. This is nonsense. Because I told the government , my friends in the government, because I have had some linkages with the ruling class. This is what rational governments do: bring the law abiding institutions, police and army and judiciary. If they are strong enough as in any country on earth, they could keep law and order intact and the people can go and live in villages in their lands. If you don't have this, nobody will go outside the town. And the returnees are only political. This is nonsense. There is no returnee at all.

Why does not the government send police or army to Darfur? Is it now enough?

I don't know. It is not the number. The present regime disintegrated the traditional government institutions and they created their own. Their own is not working properly.

Numeyri regime abolished the local governments. Right?

Yes, but the local government is only minor and you compare it to the police with the law courts and the army. They have been the institutions of law and order.

I mean the traditonal government (native administrations) was abolished in 1974. So, were they not reinstated again?

Yeah. But when this regime came, they do it in a wrong way. They do it for their own people, not through the consensus of the local people. So they are not functioning, they have not been legitimate enough to make law and order proper. I think the policies of the regime are really the reason behind what is going on in Darfur.

So you are saying "no janjaveeds" at all, increase the number of soldiers and police so that they can control.

Yes, yes. I have been the commissioner of north Darfur between 1996-98, when the military coup happened. I was just maintaining law and order with just the police. And there was no problem at all.

Was there any problem between the muzareyn and ruaya?

It is very simple and it could be dealt with the native administration. In that area I reestablished the native administration.

Were they constitutional then?

No, Sadiq el-Mahdi, the Mugdari regime ordered the reestablishment of the native administration. In the old traditional system. So I did it in north Darfur. And it was a very smooth time at that time. There was very limited conflict and they have been settled on the grounds with the people of native administration.

Are they still there?

Yeah. They are still there. But they are very weak. Because this people created new institutions and new native administration in addition to the native one.

How did this happen?

The traditional administration is that the tribe or the community [inaudible] definitely will choose their own leaders according to their own certain values they know. This government instead of that appointed what they have been in the party of what they call it "national congress part". The authority did not obey this new system because it was not legitimate. People did not choose them. It is nonsense. The people know this is a rubbish man. He is not deep with consensus of the people. So he could not be effective. Very simple. The reestablishment of native administration system collapsed in 1986. These people [inaudible].

I reestablished the native administration after Numeri in 1986. In my time, leaders were elected with the consensus of the people. I just come the people in the village or urban center. I said them; look I came here to reestablish the leadership of

native administration. I have no business other than just to wait for you to go to your own people and choose your own leader and I will just put it in the government documents and then you will be responsible for so and so...

So if there are small problems they solve it on the ground

They changed the native administration system radically all of a sudden, completely and they began to appoint these people, they have been ignorant people , marginalized people within their community, they have no legitimate stand for leadership, but they support the government of Khartoum. So they have been now just employees.

Those small problems which were solved by native administration began to pile up and erupted in 2003. It became very violent. This is one of the reasons why the armed forces the rebels began to gather themselves and get armed. One of the reasons, because the native administration was useless and the government cannot provide security. So they took arms to protect their people. This is what they say.

APPENDX 4: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEIW WITH GHAZI SALAHADDIN

Do you think that involvement of development organizations or aid organizations, do they have any impact on the rebel movements?

Yes, they gave them, the rebels, recognition. by allowing the rebels to go to Paris and London and Washington and address their congress give them legitimacy. This is a mesasge saying that these are legitimate rebels. this gave them strength but also embolden them towards the negotiations. It made it very difficult for the government to reach an agreement. even when the government reaches an agreement in Abuja in 2006, it was rejected by the rebels. Because they saw that they can gain more support. the same thing happened in 2011 when Doha Agreement was signed. Due to encouragement and emboldenment took place within the leadership of rebels. ıt was not possible to reach an agreement, they refused the agreement [inaudible] so we are stuck. We have that have been reached, we have institutions that have been created by the Darfur Regional Authority, But it is not working. Despite the fact that borders with Chad has been secured, we have joint troops patrolling the borders but we still have negative impact from South. People in the South provide support and weapons and ammunition. Rebels themselves have been caught up in the fighting in Darfur in South Sudan [inaudible] JEM is extending assistance to Salva Kiir.

With regard to this aid organizations or development partners like the UN, JICA or TIKA of Turkey, DFID all these NGOs, what is their role? Do they really help projects of Darfur Regional Authority? Do they really help Sudanese government or are they just extending war?

It depends on the individual organizations you are talking about. If you talking about Christian agencies they have revenue. Unfortunately, their agenda is [inaudible]. The agenda is to make the population dependent on them to gain influence with that dependency. They repackage themselves to the population without colonialist without saviors. Turkey will not have this kind of imperial motives. But the USA will have imperial motives. They wish to use this aid for their objectives, one of them being

maintaining cultural and political and intellectual influence on the rebels and on the population. It is the rebel leaders who ultimately depend on the support from the population and grassroots. So by influencing the population in the grassroots you make them see that West as saviors. you can change the cultural make up. Egypt, Turkey or even Japan will not have the same agenda. But in the end, whether it is this country or that country, you have created a certain dependency. Now if you talk to Darfur people even here in Khartoum, they are very passive. they demand their rights, wait for somebody to bring their rights for them. they are not politically active in the national sense. they are becoming regional by the day, operating in Darfur, even in our political movement which is open to all Sudanese, people from Darfur are very passive.

Is it because they don't want to be involved in politics?

They want to be involved in passive sense. They want to receive, they don't want to give. Even political support to the political agreements, they are passive. Because of dependence this passiveness moves up to the leaders. Generally speaking, I find their attitude extremely lazy. there is this tendency to wait for the outside to bring solutions which is very difficult to effect in the future.

In your opinion, is it easy to divide these NGOs into two groups: westerns and non-Westerns. Meaning the ones with agenda and the ones without an agenda.

That was what I was alluding to. I do not have registry of organizations. But I can tell you blindly that countries with colonial past in Africa, Anglo Saxon countries France, another problem facing NGOs there is no unified plan, there is no grand strategy NGOs come and allocate themselves where they can work. But this is not done as a part of national plan. When I was dealing with Darfur dossier, for the first time, for a developing country, I put a strategy, Darfur Strategy. I produced it in English and Arabic. And I put it on the internet. It was respected to the extent that for the first time the US envoy went out publicly said that "I support the government strategy, it is very well written"

Was there any mechanism to enforce NGOs to follow this strategy?

Of course, there was not. It was just the strategy. It did not contain either mechanisms or specific jobs to be done. It was a strategy that the governors, UNAMID and USA and the international community and everyone should abide by the dictates of the strategy. It was not solid by specific plans and programs. But it was a strategy that outlined role of every institution every country every interested party in Darfur, how we should join forces, how we should merge resources together and put them in one direction. I am sure the situation is even more [inaudible] than it used to be regarding NGOs because as I have been told, the government position has been stiffing lately towards NGOs. Because they tend to influence the population for long period of time they tend to change the culture of the population. It is an understandable reaction but not the best reaction you should have [inaudible] You gain control of these NGOs in a positive sense by asking them where to fit in in the overall strategy governing the development

You said that Darfurians are not politically active to get their rights, don't you think that regarding the rebel groups, they are not representatives of Darfurians.

I don't mean that they are politically inactive. What I am saying is that their attitude is negative. They are too much broken in making demands. They make demands, they make agitation they make noises in the international community but they don't act proactively work together and join hands with all opponents of the political class. Most of the Darfurian groups have actually tribal bases. You can tell me any rebel group and I can tell you the tribe behind it. So, it is very tribalistic. This has been intentional in the attitudes of society.

You mentioned that one of the impacts of foreign organizations is that they create dependency syndrome. Is there any other major impact of foreign organizations you can mention about?

The way they operate in Darfur, the way they advocate as well, enhances ethnic cleavages, differentiation. The feeling by Arab tribes that they are not being treated fairly, no body is addressing their needs, no one is concerned about their sufferings. for instance, sometimes there are massacres by other tribes and nobody talks about it. Arab

tribes believe that the African tribes are discriminated by foreign organizations. This is the belief among Arab tribes which is substantiated by certain facts. If you talk to Arab tribes generally, they are not very kind about perception of what NGOs. So it has also enhances the ethnic divide. If you talk to security people, they give you other reasons, they will say that they are fraud organizations, working for foreign secret services, which will be exaggeration but it is a worry. Then you have this cultural influence. UNAMID was accused of distributing Bible among Muslim population. I will not be surprise if they did that because I have not doubt that some of the activists in Washington especially Evangelicals, they have such kind of objective in operating in Darfur. Exploiting the suffering of the people in order to evangalize people of Darfur

If you were in a situation to address all these NGOs, what would be your speech about? What would be the main theme?

There must be very clear strategy. It is true that we must give precedence to needy people, in terms of food and medicine, but this should occupy only part of the program. The main program should be about developing the country. There was a donor conference for Darfur which pledged $4 billion. Nothing of it came out. Donors pledge money but they do not imburse their pledges. When I spoke to one of the donors, they said they diverted the money to UNAMID. I said, you spend 1.7 or 1.8 billion yearly on UNAMID. Believe me, if you spend that money one year for Darfur, that will solve the problem. So, you need to have an agreement between the actors including the government of course, devising a new strategy for development so that you can fill the gaps by allocating some of the aid emergencies like food. But you should not divert the all sources either to UNAMID or NGOs for minor operations. this will create dependency and prevent addressing the root causes of the problem. As I said at the beginning, what led to the population movement was the crowd, ecological change, growing demand for more pastures, Real development projects will help population to settle down and coexist.

One of the problems I noticed with regard to the development partners and the government of Sudan, in fact in any country, an NGO may raised money to build a few km of road in a certain town but that may not be the need of the government. So, there can be clash of interest and priority.

That is why coordination is important. NGOs cannot just ignore the government, they should respect the government but the government can do that as we did in the Darfur Strategy. We consulted with the Americans, UNAMID, UN, AU, and all the actors. That strategy was produced as a result of consultation with all concerned actors. As far as development and aid is concerned, you need to have one strategy, and one plan.

Do you think foreign organizations cooperate enough with Sudanese government? Or do they act unilaterally?

They are always reluctant to coordinate with the government. They push international actors in order to put pressure on the government to allow them to operate freely, which tends to worsen the situation. This means that you are excluding programs on the ground which are prioritized by the government. When I was in charge of Darfur Dossier, I heard many criticisms that there are many projects implemented in Darfur that did not reflect the priority of Darfur, the population in Darfur.

You cannot separate Western countries' Sudan policy from Darfur policy. So, what do you think about their Sudan policy? What do they want for the future of Sudan?

There are different theories. There are those who claim that Americans, certain agencies within American society, not necessarily the government itself, agencies and forces that demand long-term changes. These demand a fragmented Sudan. this may have been true until very recently, when they saw effect of separating south Sudan and its impact on the region. Generally Americans know that government in Sudan and successive governments since independence have been pro-Arab pro-Islam. They would like to see that end. That is why they target the local population, the grassroots. Infusing new culture and new values new ideas bringing them closer to western institutions and western culture. You have Radio Dabanga for instance, you have media projects in

west, This insistence on not reaching an agreement which is programmed by western countries, It was clear to me that Americans were not keen on pushing rebels to reach an agreement. So, they have long term objectives. they would like to change the identity of Sudan, which bring them in confrontation with riverine Sudanese who represent well-intentioned old culture mainstream culture of Sudan. they know that if this dark border of Sudan is broken, the center of influence will be very weak. It will allow the periphery to move in and fill the gap and create its own mainstream. ı have no doubt about that. I don't complain about it because it is their legitimate choice. If I get my hands on the US, I would do the same thing. But it is important to [inaudible] by having your own national strategy in order to be proactive rather than being reactive, and responsive. Right now we are complaining. If you read newspapers and books, we are just complaining about imaginations of the West's conspiracies. By the way this is natural. These people are looking for their interest. They see us as an obstacle to their interest. So, they want to move us as Sudanese central culture or main stream culture. This does not necessarily mean separation of Darfur or dismantling Sudan. They saw the effects of separation of south sudan. even within a united Sudan, if you have cultural influence, like policy they have employed in Iraq or in Turkey in Syria or in Algeria. They target certain minorities to have influence then tryting to have joint interests in order to change the attitudes of the society and to create a certain loyalty within leaders.

You said the main target is to change and transform the identity of Sudan. Could you elaborate on that?

The West would like to see more Africanized Sudan. They don't want to specialties [inaudible] about Arabic languages for instance, which is not the case now. No one says Arabic language has precedence over other languages but still they know its effect, practically speaking it is lingua franca, they don't want to see Arabic as lingua franca, they don't want to see the mainstream culture represented by riverine Sudan.

APPENDX 5: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEIW WITH BAROOD SANDAL

What is the role of external actos like UN and charity organizations and how they influence conflict in Darfur? So far in my research what I saw in Nyala is that they don't play almost any role. When I ask, people say when they say it is because of security. But I saw that Qatar state is funding a big project, 6 million dollar project. But they have this project in each state in Darfur region. That means 6 millions times 5. So all these projects are going smoothly. But it is a small scale it is only one village. 20 thousand people live there. What is your view? How do you see their role

From the beginning, once the conflict in Darfur, 2003 is the beginning of the conflict in Darfur, all of the problems, this conflict in Darfur, we are talking about, marginalized , the thing all the people, we are, in Darfur, in south Sudan before separation, also in Nuba mountains, also in Kordofan we think that there is a problem in Sudan from the independence of this country. we are talking about decentralization, the system of war in Sudan is from the independence from 1956, there is centralization in Khartoum, all the services in Khartoum like education, health, and so forth. There is many movement like there is SUUNA FRONT . it is the first time, there is people to first , in the beginning of 1960. Suuna is the area in Jabal Marra. From that time we think that we are not equal to northern Sudan. i mean the northern Sudan from Khalfa to Khartoum. This is north Sudan. These people dominated the government in Khartoum. at 2003, this is after the conflict between the Islamic movement in Khartoum. Between Omer al Bashir and Hasan al Turabi. some people they are affiliated with Hasan al Turabi like if you heard Dr. Khalil brother of Dr. Jibril, some leaders decided to go to Darfur and they stabilized the movement th JEM and that is what happened to Darfur.

The role of international organizations, their movement is good for Darfur. they provided food for people. Also, they provided shelter for refugees and IDPs in Darfur. But many even talk about UNAMID, the mission of UNAMID to protect the civilians from the movement and government in camps and villages. The government cannot

protect people in camps and villages. so this is the main mission of the UNAMID is to protect people .I think that they failed to do that .the UAMID failed to do that.

Also, you hear that. janjaweed it is the militia of the government. They are all from Arab tribes. They are provided by guns and cars from the government, exactly from security forces.

There are also some Africans in janjaweed but they are very little. Right?

No, no Africans. But they are out of border. They came from Cameron, Central African Republic and Chad. Most of them came from that area.

So they came from those countries and they joined Janjaweed

But if you ask about the international organizations and NGOs, you know our government denied it these organizations to do freely in Darfur. But as I know from one of the human right activist, they do a good role in Africa. Most of them they can scattering or moving freely. But I think that they do good things. Also they help the ICC to collect evidence from Darfur and also they work in the camps outside and inside of Darfur.

As for the UNAMID soldiers, do they have the authority to open fire against the rebels?

Yes, they have the authority to fight and protect themselves first and to protect the people in camps.

So if it is necessary they can shoot, right?

Yeah!

Because in some countries, UN soldiers are not allowed to shoot.

As the beginning of the UNAMID, they are not allowed to shoot to kill even the movement or government soldiers or others. But the last mission, they have the right to shoot to kill to protect themselves and to protect people in camps.

But these NGOs, apart from UNAMID, they are mostly helping the people in the camps.

Yes, they mainly help the people in the camps in Darfur.

But, for example, I saw the project like Qatar state, they really help to develop towns, south of Nyala, for example, they said that different tribes live in Bulbul, it is 50 km southwest of Nyala. They said there are different Arab and African tribes living together in this town and they are to help them develop town so that will live in coexistence and they said this project will take 3 years and at the end of this time if the project is successful, they will invest much more, may be 20 million dollars.

Yes, I can say, according to information from Darfur, Qatar has many projects in Darfur, even in south Darfur, in Nyala, in the area of Jabal Marra, Darfur. But the people say, this village is... there is developing of this village....but, the most of people in this village who can settled [inaudible], from the Arab tribes. As you know in Darfur, the main tribe is Fur tribes. In the area of Jabal Marra, this area belongs to the Fur. Now all these people go out of this area. This area is now the main Arab tribes in this area. and all the villages in this area according to Qatar project belong to Arabs. Not African tribes like Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, other tribes. but in north Darfur, in al-Fasher, in the area of Kabkabiyya, and the east of al-Fasher, there is building of village and drilling water and other activities there are from the qatar.

So the Qatar state, they are favoring Arabs over Africans?

No, no, not Qatar, but the government of Khartoum. Qataris do not separate between Arabs and ethic Africans. But the Khartoum government separates here.

So they are favoring Arabs over Africans. How do they do it? For example, there is one village here, belonging to Africans they empty the village and they take people from here to there, so this village is taken by Arabs.

Yes, this people, for example, the village, Shattaya, a big village west of Nyala, belonging to al-Fur, but after the problems these people go they migrated out of this

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area, now this area is empty , there is project from Qatar and other countries to build this. But these people around these projects are all Arabs.

Nomads?

Yes

So those nomad people will settle in these villages?

Yes, we are talking, if you are following Abdulvahid Muhammed Nour they said most of these people, outside, indigenous people came back to negotiate with this government. That means the indigenous people came from out of... and others came from Sudan, Cameron, Central African Republic, from Chad, they will be settled here in this area.

So, these people from Shattaya, they are currently in the camps, right?

Yeah

So, if they go back, there is no village.

Exactly.

So Abdulvahid Muhammed Nour says that these people should leave the village?

First they must leave the village and after that you can go to negotiations with the government.

But, if they go to village, is there security?

No, right now no security

So why should they go back to village?

Secure firstly from the UNAMID soldiers, after that, the people come back and this goes out.

Also, they are going to attack any more, the rebels, so it is a condition.

No , yes it is a condition.

Am I correct if I say that these foreign aid NGOs or international organizations do not really spend money for development? They spent almost all of the money for humanitarian aid.

Yeah exactly this is right

For example, the main problem in Darfur is lack of agriculture, lack of pasture for animal herders. And with some little money, these problems can be solved.

Yes

Not the whole problem, but some parts of the problems will be solved. But they don't do it. That is what I am trying to understand.

Yeah, you are right. I think that in Darfur, we need .... the condition on the ground, we are talking about how to serve the people, how they eat, and the necessary aid is [inaudible] but as a long time, we do not want to give ourselves something like this, we need NGOs or organizations, we need water, we need electricity for the future. But now just how to live the people and how to serve the people and something like this. Just survive.

Are you affiliated with a political party?

Yeah, I am affiliated with the Popular Party, the leader is Hasan al Turabi

What is your position in the party?

I am the general secretary of the parliament of the party: heyetil shuura-

How do you see the future of this conflict?

It is a political issue. What can I say, my vision to solve the problem in Darfur and in blue Nile, Nuba Mountains is I think is to change this government.

Do you mean the system or the person?

Not exactly one person but this system, now they can get the system of the USA to one area. We are talking about north of Sudan. now the military force, the security force and the secret service, and so forth, all these institutions belonging to party. If you are in opposition, you do not get anything. if you are from Darfur, may be from Blue Nile or Nuba Mountains, this is a problem, if this government can get all the system, may be all the Sudanese sit down equal, talk about the system, federation or centralization or so on. But if this government they change their mind....now we are talking about .... we do all parties... government, oppositions and movement. If they really want to change to the system by dialogue, it is better. But if they are not willing to change by dialogue, may be the movement. may be they can go to Khartoum office by force

Do you mean rebels will come to Khartoum.

Yeah yeah will come to Khartoum or the people of Khartoum or other states in Sudan move relation to change the government.

But, is the Sudanese army strong enough to suppress that revolution

As the last Sudanese forces they may be...what you call it....if there is a revolution they will change the side.

Like some soldiers did in Syria

Yeah yeah like soldiers in Syria, Tunisia and in Libya

You also think that this centralized should be changed and more power should be given to provinces (vilayats)

Most to be changed, yeah federation is best to do for Sudan.

But now there is federation and there are vilayats but they do not have power

Federation as a frame, they have no power. Not power, not wealth, just frame federation. We need real federation for Sudan

for example let's say agricultural ministry, they do not have authority much?

Yes, if they need anything they have to come to Khartoum, they cannot do any project without approval from Khartoum. It is not federalism really. we need federalism exactly like in U.S.A.

What can Turkey do at this stage?

I think the regime in Turkey or Erdogan, they try to support Sudan, they think that the regime in Sudan is Islamic regime. I think they did many things.

For the future, what can Turkey do?

They can do more pressure on the government to change its mind, which is difficult. And also, I think in south Darfur, there is hospital, her in Khartoum there is a Turkish hospital, Kalakal, closed now, and there is a big organization from Turkey here. My wife studied in this institute. now, she speaks turkish. TIKA... she is a nurse. Nurse and a police officers go to Turkey and stayed there 3 months., now she resigned. Turkey can do more developmental projects even in Darfur.

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