

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ**

AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ

AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**TURKEY'S ALIGNMENT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
TRANSPORT POLICY: REVISITING THE INTEGRATION
THEORIES**

DOKTORA TEZİ

AHMET CEMAL ERTÜRK

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ONAY SAYFASI

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ÖZET

Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin Ulaştırma alanında AB'ye entegrasyonunu araştırmaktadır. AB ile Türkiye arasında kurulmuş olan Gümrük Birliği'nin güncellenmesinin tartışıldığı bu günlerde, Ulaştırmanın ikili ekonomik ilişkilere olan katkısı göz ardı edilmemelidir. Bunun yanında, Ulaştırma entegrasyonu halen Türkiye'nin tam üyelik öncesi çözüme kavuşturması gereken konular arasında yer almaktadır. Yakın zamanda yapılmış siyasi söylemler ve önemli yatırımlar, Türkiye'nin Ulaştırma entegrasyonu konusunda hayli ilerlediğini iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışma da bu söylem ve yatırımların etkisini ve geçerliliğini ortaya çıkarmak için düzenlenmiş ve Türkiye'nin AB Ulaştırma politikalarına ne kadar entegre olduğunu bilimsel olarak incelemiştir. Bu bağlamda araştırma üç ayrı vaka analizini karşılaştırmış ve sonuçları gözlemlemiştir. Almanya, Birleşik Krallık ve Türkiye Ulaştırma konularında aynı yönetim modeline sahiptir ve vaka çalışmaları olarak seçilmişlerdir. Üç farklı entegrasyon teorisinin hipotezleri değerlendirilmiş ve Çok düzeyli yönetim modelinin Ulaştırma entegrasyonu için uygunluğu vurgulanmıştır. Yapılan bu testler sonucunda Türkiye'nin entegrasyon bağlamında gerekli olduğu savunulan yönetim modelinin kurulumunda sorunlar yaşadığı tespit edilmiştir. Türk devlet görevlileri ve çıkar grupları ile yapılan toplantılar sonucunda bu tespitinin nedeninin Türkiye ve AB arasında Ulaştırma alanında yaşanan yüksek derece siyasallaşma ve seçiciliğin olduğu belirtilmiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Ulaştırma, Çok düzeyli yönetim, Korporatist yönetim modeli, karar alma mekanizmaları, siyasallaşma.

ABSTRACT

This study investigates Turkey's integration to the EU on transport. While Turkey and the EU still negotiating the terms of the Customs Union modernization, transport still constitutes an important place in the bilateral economic relations. Moreover, alignment on transport is still a condition for Turkey before full membership. Recent political declarations and huge investments on transport claimed a far advanced progress on the integration process. This study is designed to validate these claims and take out how far Turkey achieved on this alignment. With respect to these goals, the research question asserts the extent of the Turkish integration on transport. In the empirical part, this study offers a case study comparison between Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey, countries that have the same governance model with Turkey when it comes to transport. By using three different integration theories, the empirical data shows that Multi-level governance is the key for these countries to thrive over alignment. However, Turkey has somehow failed to form this anticipated web of interactions. The outcome of the interviews with Turkish state officials and interest groups lead to the conclusion that the high politicization and intense selectivity could be the reasons of the missing links between different decision-making levels.

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, Transport, Multi-level governance, corporatist governance, decision-making, politicization.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AA- Anadolu Agency
- ABP- Associated British Ports
- ADR- International Carriage of Dangerous Goods
- AEF- UK Aviation Environment Federation
- AFD- Alternative for Germany
- AICES- UK Association of International Courier and Express Services
- AKP- Justice and Development Party of Turkey
- AOA- UK Airport Operators Association
- ASLEF- UK Transport Trade Union
- AUSDER- Turkish Association of Intelligent Transport Systems
- BATA- British Air Transport Association
- BMVI- German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
- BPA- British Ports Association
- BTS- United Transport Workers Union of Turkey
- CAA- UK Civil Aviation Authority
- CCC- UK Committee on Climate Change
- CER- Community of European Railway and Infrastructure
- CHP- Republican People's Party of Turkey
- CSU- Christian Social Union of Germany
- CTA- UK Community Transport Association
- CDU- Christian Democratic Union of Germany
- CLECAT- European Association for Forwarding, Transport, Logistics and Customs Services
- CO2- Carbon dioxide
- DB- Deutsche Bahn
- DfT- UK Department for Transport
- DG- Directorate General
- DGCA (SHGM)- Directorate General of Civil Aviation in Turkey

DHMI- Directorate General of State Airports in Turkey
DSATIS- German Federal Statistics Bureau
DTD- Railway Transport Association of Turkey
DVF- German Transport Forum
EASA- European Aviation Security Agency
ECSC- European Coal and Steel Community
EEC- European Economic Community
EIA- Environmental Impact Assessment
EIB- European Investment Bank
EPC- European Political Cooperation
ERDF- German Federal Transport Infrastructure Programme
ETS- EU Emissions Trading Scheme
ETSC- European Transport Safety Council
EU- European Union
EVG- German Railway and Transport Union
FIATA- International Federation of Freight Forwarders Association
GAA- UK General Aviation Alliance
HDP- People's Democratic Party of Turkey
IATA- International Air Transport Association
ICAO- International Civil Aviation Organization
ICT- Information and Communication Technology
IHA- Ihlas News Agency
IMEAK- Turkish Chamber of Shipping
IMO- International Maritime Organization
IPA- Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
ITS- Intelligent Transport Systems
KGM- Turkish General Directorate for Highways
LODER- Logistics' Companies Association
MDGs- Millennium Development Goals
MEP- Member of European Parliament
MHP- Nationalist Movement Party of Turkey
MLG- Multi Level Governance

NO2- Nitrogen Dioxide
OYPG- Turkish Automotive Aftermarket Association
PACTS- UK Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety
RAYDER- Rail Transportation Systems and Industrialists' Association of Turkey
REGM- Directorate General of Coastal Safety in Turkey
RFG- UK Rail Freight Group
RMT- UK National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers
SESAR- Single European Sky ATM Research
SNCF- French National Railways Company
SPD- Social Democratic Party of Germany
TCDD- General Directorate of Turkish State Railways
TDSS- Transport Decision Support System
TEN-T- Trans-European Networks- Transport
THK- Turkish Aeronautical Association
THY- Turkish Airlines
TINA- Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment
TND- Turkish Transporters Association
TOSHID- Turkish Private Aviation Enterprises Association
TRACECA- Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
TURKLIM- Port Operators Association of Turkey
TUSHAD- All Civil Aviation Federation of Turkey
UDHB- Turkish Ministry of Transport, Maritime and Communications
UIC- International Union of Railways
UK- United Kingdom
UKAT- International Road Freight Forwarders and Logistics Services Providers
Association of Turkey
UKIP- United Kingdom Independence Party
UKMPG- UK Major Ports Group
UKTiE- The Voice of UK Transport in Europe
UND- International Transporters Association of Turkey
USA- United States of America

UTIKAD- Association of International Forwarding and Logistics Service Providers of Turkey

VBB- Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg

VDB- German Railway Industry Association

VDV- German Association of Transport Services



INTRODUCTION

Humankind often underestimates the value of simple things. Things those are so vital for our daily life and for our survival in the long run. Living in a highly politicized world sometimes pushes us to prioritize the abstract rather than the physical, concrete and of course, technical. Infrastructure is one of these things that are critical for our needs but mostly undervalued when it comes to open a debate about. Foundation of the nation-states, empires, and international organizations blossomed under the roots of strong, solid constructions. Buildings, roads, bridges, airports have been established so that the interaction between people becomes severe and accessible. However, its significance in the world of politics remained limited.

Debates about infrastructure are also political. Like everything else in this capitalistic world, infrastructure creates social, economic interaction and every interaction needs a political approach to handle. This need for a political approach obviously takes attention of the policy makers and creates a ground for them where they can use matters of infrastructure as a political tool or a simple opportunity to help people. In the past decade, we often came across different reactions from different politicians when it comes to building or rebuilding their infrastructure. Some of them used the concept as a tool in their election campaign such as Donald J. Trump's 1 trillion \$ pledge to rebuild the USA's bridges, roads and airports (Belvedere, 2017). On the other hand, organizations like the EU often underline the importance of infrastructure spending even in these turbulent years (European Commission, 2014a). Whatever the motivation is, infrastructure is a political matter and for the growth and development of a particular nation or region, its existence is indispensable.

Along with energy and environment, transport policies take an important part in infrastructural concerns. Transport is the most critical element for a well-functioning economy by creating the necessary routes for trade and commercial activities. A strong rail, road, air and maritime sectors are an absolute need for a country to increase growth and development within and outside of its borders. A well-functioning transport also

provides interaction between people, which constitutes a necessity for policy makers to see the social part of the debate along with economic concerns. Transport even matters to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by creating economic development and urbanization (GTZ, 2005). Transport infrastructure is a must for integrating the markets around the globe such as the EU's completion of the internal market (European Commission, 2014a).

The European Union and its policy makers was never a stranger to the debates about transport and mobility. Although it will be explained in a very detailed way on next chapters, it would be influential to briefly explain the role of Europe in this sphere. The story of the European Union begins with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and soon transformed into a European Economic Community (EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The Treaty of Rome envisaged an economic integration for the first member states of the Community but the founding fathers and scholars such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were fully aware that the basic ingredient for a fully functioning economic integration was something else. That is why we first heard the word of "transport integration" at the beginning pages of this cornerstone document. It was a fact that without a working transport system, model and integrated modes, it was just a dream for Europe to complete their vision of creating a sphere of welfare, a functioning economy and a single market consisting free movement of people and goods. Europe followed the path that they decided in Rome. Despite serious setbacks coming from inside and outside such as various economic crisis, Europe hold on to its path and promised an integrated transport for the continent.

Finding new commercial zones and trade interactions is the essence of the neo-liberal economic principles and once the European integration got speed and economic development reached a certain level, the European economy started to search new markets to enlarge their horizons. The idea of enlargement and successful integration of United Kingdom, Mediterranean and Scandinavian countries finally transcend the Western borders and lead the way for the EU to go Eastward after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Along with the addition of new markets and free movement of goods and people, transport and mobility became a greater challenge for the member states to

coordinate and standardize. The old communist countries and their deteriorated infrastructure caused an important problem for the whole continent in terms of the well functioning of the single market and at this turning point, new aspirations such as transport alignment criteria for candidate members came to agenda. Turkey was one of these candidate members who were ready to be tested under the rules of Common Transport Policy, the EU's final goal to harmonize member state standards for transport, for full membership.

Turkey, as a candidate state since 1999, was always a part of this integration endeavor. The economic relationship between Turkey and the EU officially started in 1963 but the roots of this bilateral relationship are much deeper and historical. As we will see in the upcoming chapters, Turkey-EU relations are a historical engagement with constant fluctuations and not just in economic senses, but the bilateral relations include political issues and social debates that are adding up to these ups and downs throughout the history. With respect to that, this study aims to analyze a technical area, transport, where the political engagement of the parties assumes a necessary integration. In this sense, Turkey-EU relations in the area of transport also have its roots before the Ankara Agreement of 1963, which is an association agreement, envisaged a Customs Union between the parties with a full membership objective. Transport in Turkey is a critical issue for Europe and there are historical reasons behind this assumption and history explains why Europe was always involved in transport projects and transport spending in Turkey. Starting from the Ottoman Empire period, Europe invested many transport projects in Anatolia, especially when it is concerned the development of Ottoman railway infrastructure. The most obvious reason for that was Turkey's unique geography. Turkey was the gateway for Europe, the last bridge for the Europeans on the way towards Middle East, the oil rich part of the world. Although this study aims to cover the historical part of the transport relations later, it is fair to say that the glimpses of integration started centuries ago between two regions. Nevertheless, the foundation of the new Turkish Republic and formation of the European Economic Community gave a different perspective to the transport partnership of the two powers. European interest continued with more interaction and speed and on the other side, Turkey was also keen to work with Europeans to change its transport infrastructure. Starting from

the Ottoman Period to present day, Europe has become a major foreign trading party to Turkey. When Turkey became an official partner of Europe in 1963 and a candidate for the EU in 1999, she took more responsibility to speed up the integration process.

Obviously, transport is vital for states and international organizations to grow and survive in a globalized world and International economic interactions cannot function well without its existence, where its importance also resulted to trigger the European Union to evaluate transport as an indispensable source for integration. Transport policies' place within the Treaty of Rome, Schengen Agreement and the Treaty of Maastricht is an indication for that. Integration in the area of transport might become complicated while the new markets and regions added to the agenda and apply different transport regimes and cultures. For creating common goals, candidates for the European Union have to harmonize their national rules and standards with those of the EU acquis on Transport before being an official member state. Turkey is currently in line for an official membership and as of 2005, the accession negotiations have officially launched and transport issues specifically covers the Chapter 14 of accession negotiations.

The year of 2005 is specifically important for Turkey since the accession negotiations were officially started but the Turkish alignment to the EU on transport is having much deeper historical roots. Starting from the Ottoman Period, Turkey is always got pressured to physically connect with Europe via transport and be a part of the European transport regime, which aimed to reach the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern trade routes. Turkey's biggest transport projects such as Bosphorus Bridge was a part of this European plan and investment, to make sure that the continental Europe and the region of Anatolia is together as a path for economic growth and prepare Turkey to be a partner of the Common Transport Policy. Significant investments of the past two decades jointly financed by the EU and Turkey are the latest episodes of the Turkish alignment to the EU transport policies and harmonization of the EU acquis in the transport field became a prerequisite for Turkey before full membership. Although the Chapter 14 concerning the negotiations over transport is suspended at a very early stage of the process due to a political cause, Turkey signaled strong numbers in transport alignment and this is where the Turkish case became very curious for this study.

Official statements made by the Turkish state also confirmed this strong alignment where the ex-Minister of Transport and current Prime Minister Binali Yildirim identified transport sector as the readiest policy area for the EU membership (Hurriyet, 2005). In order to scientifically test this very strong statement made at a very early stage of the negotiations, this study aspired to analyze the current stage of the relations between the EU and Turkey on transport.

This proposed analysis of the study could be effective due to the fact that Turkish harmonization to the EU on transport is a much larger scale debate than a mere implementation of the EU acquis. Turkey is an economic powerhouse and an indispensable trade partner for the EU where the EU single market is also the single biggest export provider for the Turkish economy. This unbreakable economic partnership will not be productive without a working transport system that cutting the costs and time of mobility. In this sense, Turkish alignment is a must rather than a prerequisite if the EU and Turkey are aiming towards better functioning economic relations. Analyzing the current status of relations could provide a useful guideline for Turkey or a roadmap for her current stage at the negotiations and future projections. With respect to this purpose, the main research question of the study is “To what extent Turkey is aligned to the EU transport policies? Definitely, such a question is only applicable through making an understanding and assessment on the different integration actors, competences, decision makers and their relations with each other on the way through the achievement of a certain alignment level. This is why this study also offers an answer to the sub-question of “How Turkey is aligned to the EU transport policies?” in order to provide a clearer picture of the Turkish integration on transport.

Integration is a dynamic and ever changing process where states willingly shift their expectations and sovereignty into an upper level authority to create common purposes working for every actor inside of the integration process. Not just the domestic implementation of the current rules, but an alignment to the EU also means that resettling the expectations of different actors towards the EU. Integration includes calculating the positive and negative positions of the players and the diplomatic traffic between the supranational and national level of competences, which results in as an

alignment for a member or candidate state and the evolution of the Common Transport Policy. With respect to that, each governance (decision maker) actors' tendency towards the EU is significant in this process because integration itself is a dynamic process and decision making in national systems are changing from policy to policy. This is why this study selected to find out the governance model of Turkey in transport before making such claims about harmonization with the EU and to achieve that; this study uses Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) model, categorizing the capacity of actors when it comes to make a decision on transport. According to this model, Turkey is a corporatist country where both state and society have high action capacity along with countries such as Germany and United Kingdom, which are also the respected case studies along with Turkey in this study.

For testing these corporatist cases and find a meaningful answer to the main research question, this study uses some of the mainstream regional integration theories: neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. Each of these theories is making assumptions about the role and capacity of different decision making mechanisms on the way towards establishing a EU level polity. Therefore, they draw a path for the alignment of specific state through an interaction between different levels of decision-making. Since this study covers a technical area of integration, these theories are both providing a path to understand the ways, different behaviors on pooling sovereignty and a testing ground for the claims that technical areas are simpler compared to "high politics" cases. Integration theories designate the role of each integration actor for the alignment with the EU acquis and each of them prioritize a different decision maker(s) actor ranging from supranational to national, sub-national, regional and local. This research is willing to test each of these roles and their effect on harmonization for creating a hypothesis through the successful case studies and answer the main research question searching for an answer to Turkey's alignment status. The cases used in this study are very suitable to be analyzed under the guidance of mainstream integration theories. Germany and United Kingdom are the countries, which were historically played a major role in the establishment of the Common Transport Policy and their harmonization process is also promoting a promise of examination for the early promises of these theories. On the other hand, Turkey as a candidate state,

poses a wider challenge since it is a vital part of the Common Transport Policy without being a member state. Turkey's unique position will also be analyzed under the concept of "differentiated integration" to show the differences in Turkish integration compared to Germany and United Kingdom. By combining the assumptions of the selected integration theories with corporatist country cases, this study aims to find the best way for policy implementation in EU transport policy and answer the research question.

Three different research methods used in this study for the application of the theories and cases. Case study method is used to observe the main integration actors and their contribution to the EU-level policy making. With respect to that, three cases are selected: Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey and there are three reasons for this selection. First of all, all of these cases are having the same governance systems when it comes to transport and their national decision making model is corporatist where both state and society have high capacity of competence. Secondly, historically and economically, these three countries are bound together. Turkey's biggest export partners are Germany and United Kingdom and this means that regardless of the EU integration, these three countries have to be aligned on transport to continue on the good economic relations. In addition to that, Germany and United Kingdom were always interested about the Turkey's integration to the West on transport due to their will to reach Eastern markets. Thirdly, Germany and United Kingdom are successful cases whose integration process to the Common Transport Policy is efficient. These two cases could provide a model for Turkey in order to compare the level of policy implementation in Turkey and significance of integration actors. Connected to the first method, comparative analysis will be used to make a comparison between the corporatist cases for evaluating the different and similar trends. Observations from each case will be identified and compared respectfully to form a hypothesis concerning the path for the transport integration and apply to Turkey for answering the research questions. Each observation taken from the cases based on the integration process concerning on air, rail, maritime and road transport will be evaluated at the last chapter of this study. While comparing the observations taken from Germany and United Kingdom with Turkish integration on transport, the results coming from six semi-structured interviews will also be used. The reason of the usage of interview results is to concretize the differences in the interaction

of Turkish actors by having first hand information directly declared by state officials, interest group members, academics and ex-state officials. Within this study, six semi-structured interviews completed with the contributions of Head of Department at the DG for EU Affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Transport, officials from interest groups such as International Transporters' Association (UND), Association of International Forwarding and Logistics Service Providers (UTIKAD), Railway Transport Association (DTD), one academic who is counseling to the transport organizations and an ex-Deputy of Minister at the Turkish Ministry of Transport. These interviews mainly cover the state and non-state integration actors, their relations between them on the way towards transport integration and their contribution to the process. Since the academic literature is not far advanced on Turkish transport, semi-structured interviews are also a useful tool to reach real insights of the integration process.

As a result of the above theoretical applications to the cases and comparisons between them, this study suggests a correlation between the interaction of actors and integration results. Out of all three integration theories, multi-level governance is providing the most advanced answer to the transport integration of the corporatist cases. With respect to that, EU-level policy making and implementation rises if positive cooperation and collaboration is settled between supranational, national, sub-national, regional, local or non-state competence levels where all have high capacity on decision-making. Germany and United Kingdom reached substantial levels on interaction and contributed to the Common Transport Policy by establishing this web of interaction while Turkey failed to deliver this positive and progressive shift of expectations to a higher level and application of EU-level policy making stayed mediocre. The main reason for this failure lies at the heart of the concept of "differentiated integration" where high politicization of the process produces a selectivity based on political and economic interest for each integration actor. This selectivity directly prevents actors to focus on delivering high results.

So, how this study is organized to answer all of these questions and fulfills these aim and purposes? In the continuing chapters, different modes of transport filled with their history in Turkey and comparisons between Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey will

be identified. This study contains five chapters in order to answer the research question and the sub question. After this short introduction, this study continues with a methodological and theoretical framework until the beginning of the first case study, Germany. Then the United Kingdom case will be evaluated, aiming to bring out different or similar integration stories. This will finally lead us to Turkey, our main point of analysis.

The first part of the beginning chapter is concerning the methodology of the study. In the methodology section, a very detailed explanation of research methods will be identified. Case study method, comparative analysis and semi-structured interviews are the research methods used in this study. This chapter aims to clarify both preparation and implementation stages of these methods. In addition to that, limitations will be identified in order to prevent any confusion about the clear purposes of this study. Selection of the cases is believed to be one of the most prominent parts of any methodology and selections should be consistent with the flow of the argument. Inside the methodology part, these justifications will also be made.

The first chapter consists the Kerwer and Teustch (2000) study which provides the model of governance in transport policies used in this research to follow the integration patterns in these three countries and help to establish the main hypothesis of the research. In this chapter, we will also revisit the integration theories that we identified at the above. With a more detailed analysis, this study offers the main discussing points of the mainstream integration theories. In this respect, neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi -level governance approaches will be identified in a very informative way. Moreover, this chapter will help us to establish a correlation between the interaction of transport decision makers and implementation of the EU acquis in a particular member or candidate state. The concept of differentiated integration, which helps this study to broaden our approach for Turkish case, will also be the subject of this analysis.

Neo-functionalism will show us that the nation-state is still an actor in this transaction but in a good, beneficial way. Rather than blocking the process, states are leading the way for a further integration. With the founding fathers like Ernst Haas and Leon

Lindberg, this liberal theory proved that integration in one area leads to another like a chain reaction with the help of state and the other actors involving to the process. This theory will contribute to the argument by stating the areas of “spill over” and settling a pathway of the successful liberal integration process.

Liberal intergovernmentalism, founded by Andrew Moravcsik, is a counter approach to the neo-functionalism and reverses the role of the state as the sole decision making mechanism in a successful integration. It clearly positions the state as the cornerstone figure and the whole process of integration depending on the interests of a particular nation state. Integration is possible as long as it complies with the goals of the state. Specifically, for this study, liberal intergovernmentalism used to measure the role of the state and compared with other theories in terms of transport governance, to see the real position of the state within the suggested web of interaction.

Last but not least, multi-level governance is a fairly new approach contrary to the former theories and appreciates the contribution of other non-state actors in the process. According to the theory, integration is not a one-level game between the supranational authority and the state. Integration and implementation of the EU acquis involve different policy levels where interests of other groups such as civil society and political parties effect state policies/interest to share a common ground combined with the European Union goals. Multi-level governance will deepen our evaluation by signifying the importance of non-state actors and their potential effect on the whole process and on each other actor. For having a wider explanation on Turkey’s current situation, differentiated integration will also be explained at the end of the first chapter. As a result, both of these theories will help us to identify Turkey’s current position and the reasons of her success or failures. Only after the application of case studies and necessary evaluations, the reader will have a chance to see which integration pattern is more suitable to understand corporatist countries and their ways for success and Turkey’s position on this subject.

Before the introduction of cases, the evolution and present state of the EU Common Transport Policy will be explained with special reference to the beginnings of the integration in the policy area and current EU acquis about transport. The case studies

then follow, aiming to provide useful comparison groundwork for Turkey by looking through Germany and the United Kingdom. All cases start with a brief history of transportation in these countries and continue with actor analysis; overall integration figures and ends with the evaluation of the integration pattern. The very existence of two Western European countries as a case is vital. The transport integration in the European Union started in the Western Europe and these states could be characterized as the initiators, so it is clear that any alignment after that was built on their existing achievements. Inside the chapter, the reader will be informed about these accomplishments. Germany and United Kingdom serve this study an important model to compare with Turkey while finding out the similarities and differences. The first case Germany claims to be as an important transport actor compared to the other parts of Europe. Although Germany's infrastructure was highly demolished after the catastrophic outcomes of two World Wars, Germany did show a strong will to overcome those difficulties and came back to the transport arena as the leaders on logistics and transportation. Today, especially with Hamburg and Frankfurt, Germany also serves as an important transportation hub for air and sea transport modes.

In this study, each transport mode will be evaluated one by one. For each case, the rail transport will be a major point of discussion as the railways are directly related with both passenger and freight in the transport studies. The EU prioritizes the railway usage since the modes' efficiency on cutting costs and time is evident. Railways are both used as an important transport and logistics mode as well as a connecting unit, which provides a connection between different modes. On the other hand, road transport is still the most frequently used mode in Europe. Despite the fact that road transport's influence on transport policies and logistics is currently decreasing after recent shifts to the rail transport for intermodality efforts described by the EU, road transport is still topping the statistics inside Europe, especially it is a reality for the candidate countries like Turkey. Air transport and EU initiated air corridors provides us an important example for growing transport sectors and also gives us an idea about the future of transportation. Speaking of the growing powers, maritime transport is a stable and progressive mode of transport in Europe for both logistics and passenger transport services. Maritime transport will surely give this study important cases and examples.

Last but not least, some other modes of transport such as inland waterways will be discussed whenever it is applicable and necessary.

After the start of new millennium and developments in the transport technology, the European Union member states have decided to push their limits and to keep up with the changing dynamics in the sector by making new projections for the year 2050 in the White Paper dated back to 2011. In this document, the European Union members predicted a far more increased mobility in the future and called every part of the Union to align with these new developments by putting forward new concepts: Intermodality, sustainability and ITS (European Commission, 2011). Intermodality means using several interconnected transport modes for one particular journey, which is much more cost and time efficient. According to the White Paper (2011) named a “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area”, European Union is aiming to create a one single space for transport with intermodality and sustainability efforts, which is also technologically improved at the same time. This recent attempt to involve Europe into an intermodal position on transport will be included to the cases as well. Intermodal transport efforts are far advanced in Germany and United Kingdom and these cases will be the perfect examples again to see the efforts and compare with them to Turkey later.

The second case study, the United Kingdom will follow Germany. What attract transport researchers in here is that the UK’s unique geography and policy initiatives. Despite being a bit discrete from the continent on geographical terms, the United Kingdom managed to connect itself to the continent with an established strong transport infrastructure. Historically, the United Kingdom has started to build on transport centuries ago and today, they are building upon what their forefathers left. The country’s rail, road and air policies and its integration to the other regions of Europe will be a very crucial story to analyze and discuss on the matter. Before concluding each chapter, cases will present some observations concerning their actor analysis, implementation results and their contribution to the overall European integration on transport and this will automatically lead us to the projected overall results for the countries, different examples and distinct pathways for further analysis and obviously, the concluding evaluations.

After analyzing the Western European examples and establishing the spine of the case studies for generating the hypothesis, the study will turn into a different direction where the oldest integration cases meets with one of the newest. Our third case study in this research will be about a candidate member of the EU, Turkey. With the help of integration theories and lessons learned from Germany and the United Kingdom integration process, we will look at the Turkish alignment to the European Union's transport policy. Each case and example will be linked by theoretical assumptions to find out the current integration stage of Turkey into the European Union's transport area. Like the former examples, our third case study starts with a short historical background information. On these pages, the reader will be informed about the very first European influence on Turkish transport beginning from the late Ottoman Period to today. This background study also consists the period between the Republic and late 90s where the European influence is fairly low but again persistent on transport issues. The argument then will continue with the identification of present transport actors in Turkish politics and society. The reason for identifying them is to inform the reader about these actors beforehand so it will not affect the flow of the argument when discussing these players within the evaluation of the actor interaction on the way through integration on transport. These players consist actors within the state, political parties, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and other social organizations. When we get to the mode-to-mode analysis, the reader will sense a similar approach in comparison with the former cases. Rail transport, road transport, air transport and intermodal/other transport modes will be analyzed one by one and differences/similarities between the modes will be given when necessary with a reference to particular modes in comparison.

Inside the Turkish case, the major mode of transport to be discussed is the road transport. When we take a brief look to the official documents and the EU progress reports of the last decade, we can easily assume that the road transport integration and its alignment with the European policies is the most frequently used and seemingly unproblematic. This part will try to move on this assumption and test it by taking account all policies that the Turkish parties made and find out the remaining setbacks if there is any left. It is a fact that Turkey's road transport is a huge sector with a lot of

logistics and civil transport actors but is it really that unproblematic? We will see that it is not an easy question to answer when we get through this part.

Maritime transport is a fairly old policy area in Turkey but seems underestimated when it comes to passenger and freight transport. In the area of logistics, it is growing but still have problems of its own. In order to stabilize a working integration model, Turkey should align itself with the current maritime policies of the European Union. However, the numbers show us a picture of a mediocrity and Turkey is tackling with some important issues that prevent the country from putting the *acquis communautaire* into a successful implementation process. Maritime integration of Turkey will be an interesting part to research on and the results might open further question and debates.

Probably the most problematic mode of transport in Turkey is the railways. The reforms in the past decade and efforts made by the current government seem not enough for the European officials when it comes to the evaluations made in the past twenty years. This means harder work for Turkey and more policy effort to integrate rail networks with Europe. It is pretty much essential for the European logistics flow and the EU aims to use Turkey as a transit railway path and corridor to reach Middle Eastern markets. Establishment of a good rail network and policy alignment in this area seems indispensable for the both sides. However, when we take a look at the speed of solutions, it is still far from the expected. This study will analyze this problematic area with a detailed analysis in order to identify the current challenges with all of its misfits and future plans.

Over the last ten years, the air transport sector in Turkey is vastly growing. Especially in the commercial area, airways are the country's new point of focus and the state projects are vastly growing in the past years. Both public and private sectors authorized high amount of investments over the last decade for developing new perspectives in the air transport sector. Still, latest developments seem not enough and need more policy-making effort to align with the European Union. This part will take a critical focus over the developments on the air transport last decade and try to clarify the basic policy areas that Turkey still needs to move forward. Intermodal transport system is fairly new to the Turkish agenda but it is not forgotten. Compared to Germany and United Kingdom,

efforts are still young and current efforts seem not enough for European officials. After the explanation and analysis of each transport with the help of European integration theories, it will be the time to show the overall results for Turkey and the concluding remarks. The current stage of Turkey in each transport mode will be summarized. At the end of the chapter, Turkey's over politicized and selective transport strategy will be visible. The Turkish case involves six semi-structured interviews with selected transport officials, civil society organizers and academics. Rather than simply researching over the official documents and reports, these interviews will deepen the argument with the officials' own ideas and studies about the country and direct on-site observations.

The concluding part of the study includes an evaluation and proposes a wider and final comparison between Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey. It will start with the summary of results for each integration case and then present us the differences and similarities (if there is any) between the integration in the German and British corporatist schemes and Turkey's alignment to the European Union transport policy. This is the chapter that provides the results of this study and the current stage of Turkey in this highly respected integration process. Compared to Germany and United Kingdom, the reader will be surprised by the variances in Turkey even if the all cases have the same types of actors working for integration. At the end of the chapter, the "differentiated integration" concept will be used to explain the variances in Turkish integration. Moreover, it will give us a clear picture about Turkey's remaining harmonization patterns for the future in order to complete its compliance with the European Union in terms of transport. The conclusion part will also summarize the chapters from the beginning and share the results of the study one more time. In addition to this detailed summary, a recommendation part take place to answer the question of "What is next for Turkey?" By giving a future projection for the current flow of relations, the end of the research hopes to start a new argument about the issue and to encourage more researchers to share their studies in the near future.

CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Besides the methodological framework and identification of the governance typology, this informative chapter is aiming to draw the main concepts and theories that are included and implemented to the analysis towards to find an answer to the initial research question. Basically, the study uses three integration theories, which explains the evolvement of European integration and roles of the both supranational and national actors in this process. These theories are: neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. In addition to that, the case of Turkey and the situation that Turkey is facing today will be identified by the concept of “differentiated integration”. Justifications for the selection of these theories and their relevance to this study here will also be included to this chapter. Rather than limiting itself into a one theoretical explanation, this study thrives on an eclectic approach aiming to use definitions of three theories, which explains the same phenomenon with different means. This study aims to use each theoretical definition on the respected cases to see the country trends and institutional roles towards integration and this study will try to find out the best theoretical description for the integration of corporatist countries. In order to answer the question of “to what extent” by explaining “how”, this study is prioritizing the actions of the state (their behaviour on transferring the sovereignty), actions within the society through interest groups and stakeholders, contribution of the supranational institutions and the politicization of the process and its effect on the overall integration rates if there are any.

1.1: METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

The first section of the chapter contains the research methods that have been used to measure and analyze the current position of the Turkish integration to the European transport policies. In this study, the main purpose is to answer the question of “to what extent” when it comes to Turkish transport integration. However, in addition to that and for a more complete picture of integration, this research is also aware the fact that the question of “how” should also be emphasized. For this reason, finding the level of

integration by looking through the relationships of different actors and governance levels, the inside dynamics are crucial. Because of this, the study needed a reference point, cases that we can refer in order to process the level of integration in Turkey. Therefore, the discussion will be focused on to the question of “how to measure” different integration patterns and role of different parties in an integration process.

In this respect, three research methods are identified and used in this study. These methods are case study, comparative case analysis and semi-structured interviews with state officials, officials of stakeholder/interest group organizations and academics that are working inside of the and related with the transport field. Within this firmly qualitative research, quantitative analysis will only be used as a supportive element to the main research methods. Secondary data analysis concerning official statistics and country reports will be implemented to the study as quantitative supplementary elements. In this section, each method that this study is going to be used, will be analyzed and justified in regard to their suitability for the research question, argument and the whole study. This part also contains the limitations of the study with justifications of the selected country cases. At the same time, a philosophical and intellectual explanation and confirmation of the research models will also be available.

1.1.1: Methods of the study

The first research method is the case study method. Moses and Knutsen (2007) explain the case study method as the “histories with a point”. They are cases of something and that thing under the study is indeed interesting, relevant or under focus because of the existence of a larger theoretical concern (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). What Moses and Knutsen (2007) said at the above was the main reason for this study for selecting and using Turkey as the case under investigation. Using a candidate country of the EU for analysis could be an important challenge and interesting testing ground for the future of Common Transport Policy of the EU. In addition to that, the premise of the integration theories, which mentions the high importance of technical areas and their usage as a trigger for wider integration would be under a prominent challenge when it comes to a candidate country since it is not tested before in terms of transport policy making.

Moreover, as Bryman (2008) identifies, using a case study method is useful since the analysis includes intensive examination of a particular setting such as a location, community or an organization. The case study method itself favors unstructured interviews, which this study contains for multiple purposes. Like any research, external validity and generalizability are the key elements of a sound case study analysis (Bryman, 2008). This study tries to reach external validity and generalizability by picking a single case and apply the findings to the other two (same/similar governance model) cases as well in order to see if there are any similarities, familiar patterns, negative or positive trends between different integration performances. If the integration trends/elements such as causing a spill-over effect, progressive/supportive state involvement, elite socialization, forming deliberate linkages, involvement of political parties and interest groups in Germany is applicable and similar to the other corporatist cases (United Kingdom and Turkey), then we could argue about and confirm the external validity and generalizability of the research.

In this regard, the cases being used in this study could be characterized as representative or typical cases as mentioned in Bryman (2008) study on competing methodologies. Yin (2003) defines the mentioned methods as having an objective to capture the circumstances and conditions of commonplace situation. By this way, Yin (2003) also identified the characteristics of this type of study as being “repetitive” on other case scenarios as well. For Moses and Knutsen (2007) methodological definition, this research could be counted as theory-conforming and misfitting case methods. Theory confirming research means that there is an aim to investigate the degree to which a given case fits a general proposition (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). In this study, by looking through two corporatist countries Germany and United Kingdom, we are arguing that Turkey should have the similar pattern, level and contributions on transport integration, which is a general finding in the other two biggest corporatist cases. As another corporatist case, Turkey is the key searching point to verify this assumed generalization. Theory confirming cases are also a useful tool for demonstrating the explanatory power of a particular theory, which in here will be used to demonstrate the main explanations of the selected integration theories.

Turkey will also be used as a mis-fitting case. Obviously, this study is going to analyze the power of falsification of a single case. The mis-fitting case identifies how a case study does not easily fit into a general or universal claim (Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 134). These types of cases are deviant cases where they are known to deviate from established generalizations (Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 134) as this study assumes after looking through the other prominent corporatist integration scenarios. Case studies are also influential research methods within the field of European studies. Pahre (2005: 115) defines this long lasting relationship of this field and methodology as “Given the history of European Union studies, case-study methods also provide rhetorical advantages to the scholars who can use them.” In addition to its rhetorical advantages, case studies also embody many alternative explanations that are available for many events that scholars want to model (Pahre, 2005). Of course, case study methods are not excluded from constructive criticisms. Providing findings that cannot be generalized is a very general concern for every writer working on the field (Bryman, 2008). However, at least, the case method has the power to show us differences between the two cases if not generalize it at all. Also, there is a possibility to lead us to identify the variables/notions that provide this differentiation. Again, in this study, both generalization and differentiation tests are applied and any similar or different pattern will be analyzed. The end goal is not the generalizability of the three cases but applying the general and everyday practices to every case for understanding the similarities and differences.

Another important question here could be inclusion of quantitative data in order to support the theoretical arguments supported throughout research. For achieving this, the study at the hand uses secondary data analysis namely the data already collected and analyzed by other researchers in the field and the secondary analysis of the data that have been collected by various state, stakeholder and academic organizations. One prominent example for this type of data in order to answer the question of “to what extent” is the official statistics provided from the European Commission, Turkish/German/British state, Turkish/German/British stakeholders and academics working on the field. Transport scorecards prepared by the European Commission will be frequently used to identify current positions of Germany and United Kingdom in transport integration performance. The main reasons to use such data analysis in this

research are varied. In Bryman's (2008: 297) words, this is the high quality data, where the researcher could get in a very cost efficient and less time consuming manner. It is a fact that it is much harder to get this kind of information from another source on a very short time with no cost. Moreover, it gives the writer an opportunity to make quick cross-cultural analysis with a chance to make re-analysis when there are new interpretations of the same data (Bryman, 2008: 297-300). Naturally, there are limitation threats such as lack of familiarity between the research argument and the indicated data, absence of key variables and no control over the data. At that point, this research turns to firsthand information gathering methods, such as semi-structured interviews with the actors involved into the integration process.

Before going into detail of the semi-structured interviews, it is time to understand how to use the case studies efficiently on the way towards establishing a proper hypothesis and answer the research question. One example is to clash and compare the selected cases and this is what this study intends to do. In this study, the same theoretical premises and assumptions will be applied to the cases to take out similarities and differences between them before making any generalizations and in this regard, comparisons will be helpful to form a hypothesis about the general findings. Then the study turns to the application of that general assumption to the final case for one last final comparison with the past examples. This study is using this strategy because of the firm belief that in this way, the social phenomenon we are discussing will be understood better by comparing two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations. In addition to that, in cross-cultural studies, comparative method provides comparison of the overall observations in specific cases coming out from secondary data evidence. This study compares these observations from each country cases and tries to see if there are any similar or different patterns in corporatist countries. The questions that this study asks that: Is there a difference between their patterns? If there is a contrast, then why the cases are differentiating? There is also a possibility that the differentiation comes from the application of the findings to the unfamiliar, candidate country cases, Turkey since the other two cases are long lasting member states. In that regard, what this study applies is the "Method of Difference". This method compares political/social systems that share a number of common features as a way of neutralizing some

differences while highlighting others (Moses and Knutsen, 2007:97). In this research, cases were selected based on their similar structures on policy-making schemes (corporatist governance countries), however any observed differences were also being taken into the account. For breaking off from any unnecessary and untrue generalizations, the study prefers to look at basic and common characteristics to have effective control but aimed to find the key explanatory factors for differences. The variation between the cases is coming out from the presence or absence of these factors. These factors are identified with the help of European integration goals on transport and the basic facts coming from the integration theories. For understanding the any causal effect, each case (Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey) outcome is designed by nine observation points to compare with each other. Observation points are coming from the evaluation of same integration pattern or concept in each case. Each country will be named after its abbreviation and compared point-by-point basis in order to show similarities and differences for the desired outcome of identifying the level and pattern of Turkish transport integration towards the EU. For Germany, observations will be numbered as (GER1, GER2, GER3,....., GER9). UK observations are GBR1, GBR2, GBR3,, GBR9) and lastly, observations coming out of the Turkish case will be numbered as TUR1, TUR2, TUR3,.....,TUR9. The identification for each observation is as follows:

(OBS1) GER1-GBR1-TUR1: This observation would be about the “spill over” effects that the neo-functionalism signifies as the essence of European integration. For neo-functionalists, spill over is the basic ingredient of a single integration process. Liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level analysis also took attention to the concept in a different manner and the current EU acquis on transport clearly prioritize these spill over actions as the necessary source of European integration on transport such as environment, health and education effects.

(OBS2) GER2-GBR2-TUR2: In here, observation occurs from the secondary data analysis (official statistics) and what the quantitative supportive information tells about the level of accomplishment when it comes to application and implementation of the EU acquis.

(OBS3) GER3-GBR3-TUR3: This point observes the reality of the transport governance in the country cases. In other words, confirming the assumption of these countries are governed by corporatist models when it comes to transport where supranational, national, sub-national, local and non-state actors are all having a significant policy making space. The goal is to strengthen the validity of the used model and over-confirmation of the selection of cases.

(OBS4) GER4-GBR4-TUR4: Observation derived from the state action, capacity and integral role that the state plays to establish the extent and pattern of integration. It is important to remember that state is the indispensable part of the process according to the three integration theories and state actions is an indicator for the level of integration.

(OBS5) GER5-GBR5-TUR5: The essence of this observation is coming from the cooperation culture and share of responsibilities between the integration parties. Neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance assume cooperation, collaboration, bargaining, transfer of ideas between the elites shapes the faith of integration levels. Obviously, their assumptions differ but do not change the fact that integration comes out from interaction.

(OBS6) GER6-GBR6-TUR6: Observation derived from the interest group (stakeholder) action, capacity and integral role that these societal powers play to establish the level, extent and pattern of integration. Again, interest groups have all different roles in each theoretical assumption. When it comes to corporatist cases, sub-national and non-state groups supposed to be active along with other actors. This observation challenges the liberal intergovernmentalist state role in integration.

(OBS7) GER7-GBR7-TUR7: This observation concerns the integration support tendencies of each actor contributing to the process and their interaction patterns, which is so crucial for any integration process to move forward. Tendencies also consist political parties and domestic political dynamics, which are an integral part of the process.

(OBS8) GER8-GBR8-TUR8: Politicization of the process. Aiming to understand the positive and negative ways of politicization on the integration process. With respect to our conceptual and theoretical framework, this study assumes every integration process is political, varies on level but the outcomes would be different. This observation aims to take out the behavior of actors when a political case settles a bottleneck for the integration process.

(OBS9) GER9-GBR9-TUR9: The involvement of the Brussels as an external factor, the role of the supranational side of the debate and the effect of EU-member (candidate) state relations over the state of integration process.

By looking through these observation points, one might ask that “Cannot we possibly sure about the level of integration after applying the second observation point and the statistical data? This is obviously a legitimate question to be asked at this point and the answer is simple. If this research solely looks upon the OBS2, then there is a huge threat for this study to become a country report. There is no way for this study to measure the Turkish integration without knowing the trends in other similar countries; comparisons are crucial for getting reliable, general and valid results. The research question itself calls for a case comparison. The level of integration or the pattern of integration in one country is not just about the application and implementation of the EU acquis and directives but also, and as the selected integration theories indicated, is the understanding or measuring the role that the state plays or initiates, spill over outcomes, dynamism of the process, inclusion of stakeholders and the role of domestic politics, elite socialization, bargaining segments and forming deliberate linkages with learning systems. The two research questions are also interconnected. Without understanding “how”, it is impossible to know “to what extent” and vice versa. Rather than just indicating the numbers and official statistics, this research serves the pattern, which establishes the rate and explanatory factors that may provide differentiations. If we only regard the fallacy of evaluating the level coming out of secondary data analysis only, then it would be impossible to locate the variations between the similar settings. Another significant question is that “What if official statistics or secondary data is not

enough, available or not reliable?” This study does not fully depend on their reliability as well. For supporting every single observation here, semi-structure interviews used and applied to the method and this research intends to include these interview results to the main Turkey case.

Semi-structured interviews have the ability to give the researcher the opportunity to move forward and feed the observations when there is no secondary data available for the researcher to analyze. Most importantly, it gives this study to ask “to what extent” and “how” questions directly to the parties who are the actual living examples for establishing the pattern that led us to ask these questions. With this way, a first-hand knowledge is open for the analysis. During the preparation part of the study, six interviews scheduled for the case of Turkey where official statistics and reports were not providing enough data to understand the correlation of actor involvement/actions and integration success. These six interviews conducted with three stakeholder groups (UND, UTIKAD and DTD), two state officials (UDHB and ex-counselor of UDHB) and with one academic (Dr. Can Baydarol) working and counseling for the field for many years.

Before getting into the deeper analysis of questions and claiming some final words for the advantages of interviewing, Bryman (2008: 438) states some strong points of the semi-structured interviews. In this model of qualitative interviewing, there is a much greater interest of interviewee’s own point of view rather than the structure of the question (Bryman, 2008: 438). Semi-structured interviews are fulfilled by a lot of “ramblings” between the interviewer and the interviewee, and interviewers can depart significantly from the any formed schedule or organized questionnaire (Bryman, 2008: 439-440). Depending of the replies coming from the interviewee, the questions could be modified, continued with follow up questions and can be varied the order and wording of the questions (Bryman, 2008: 438). In this study, based on the classification of the interviewee (either state or stakeholder/academic), the wording of the question is subject to change without ruling out the main essence and purpose of the question. Bryman (2008: 438) continues to the advantages of this method by encouraging the researchers to use the “flexibility” option meaning that responding to the direction

which the interviewee takes during the process and shifting the emphasis constantly based on emergence of different issues. By combining all of these advantages, this study aims to reach a rich, detailed, sometimes conflicted and contradicted answers between the responds of interviewees. The questions that this research used in semi-structured interviews are as follows with detailed explanations about the reasoning of the questions asked:

Question 1: In general terms, do you (your organization) think that Turkey is integrated to the EU on transport matters?

This question could be counted as the starting or warming up question. The question prepared in a way that it aims to get a clear cut answer of the research question from the perspective of state, stakeholder organization or the selected academic. It is also an open ended question aims to achieve flexibility and possibly that could lead more debates such as “why do you think that Turkey is integrated?” or vice versa. All of the questions in this study are more or less direct questions.

Question 2: As being a (state organization/stakeholder/an academic working on the field), do you consider yourself as an actor in this integration process/who would you consider as an actor in this integration?

Whether the answer of the first question is a “Yes” or “No”, this follow up question aims to understand the particular pattern of the integration by asking “how” this time. In other words, the purpose is to understand the actors and information about the actor behaviors leading to the different results. This is a specifying question looking through the actor dynamics.

Question 3: As being a (state organization/stakeholder/an academic working on the field), do you support Turkish integration to the EU on transport/how can you evaluate the support over transport integration? Or would you consider any alternatives?

As each integration theory indicates the importance of actor behavior on integration and vitality of their support for the progress, this question needed to be asked to understand the positive/negative sides of the different parties on the way towards integration. Asking about any alternative integration system is a follow up question.

Question 4: Please define the level of your relationship with the (state organizations/stakeholders) on the way towards integration? /If there is any, please define the state-interest group relationship/cooperation in the integration process.

Following the footsteps of the answers coming from the third question and taking the essence of the interview, now the fourth question tries to get solid information about the any reciprocal relationship between the actors. If this exists, the specifying question follows with the definition of results coming out of this relationship. The interviewer aims to add some “probing” or indirect questions to here as well such as clashing the results by asking: “Is that the way you think about the other actor too?”

Question 5: Do you believe that your opinions are evaluated as important on the state level? / Do you take account the interest group opinion while making a decision? / Do you think that the Turkish state listens interest group opinions about integration and leans toward that way?

If there is a relationship coming out from the fourth question, then it is vital for integration parties to take consideration of each other’s concerns and opinions. This is what, as the integration theories indicate pushes/retracts integration process. There are expected differences between the cases since there are cultural and sociological differences.

Question 6: Are there any dual projects that you and (state/stakeholders) are making together? / Do you know and want to emphasize any dual integration project between the state and a stakeholder organization?

In this question, the interviewer tries to get a concrete evidence and correlation between the cooperation of the two and the actual results. The interviewer is looking for scientific evidences, for example an organized meeting series, projects, program or implementation process is needed for signifying this correlation.

Question 7: Do you consider (state/stakeholder) efforts (projects, implementation) are enough for a fulfilled integration process?

In here, the question aims to understand the level of integration on the eyes of the actors. If the answer to the question is “enough” then this indicates that the interviewee considers integration process is complete or at least nearly complete. The question also aims to ask each party the same question in order to cross-examine the answers, the opinions that the parties are entitled to.

Question 8: As a state organization/stakeholder in the transport field, what was your office’s biggest accomplishment? / Please indicate the biggest integration accomplishment in Turkey that at least one of the mentioned actors is involved?

Is there a signature accomplishment that adds on an important dimension to both integration process and actor structure of the parties? For example, is there an accomplishment in Turkey like the Rail liberalization in the United Kingdom or road haulage deal in Germany?

Question 9: As a stakeholder in the transport field, how can you evaluate your relations with other stakeholders on the way towards EU transport integration? / How can you evaluate stakeholder-to-stakeholder relations on the way towards EU transport integration?

As an ending question, it tries to understand an important integration indicator namely the “elite socialization” or forming of the “deliberate linkages” and the question intends to measure actors economic or national interest while forming relations with each other. In short, how a particular stakeholder thinks about the other organizations in the field and their contributions to the integration process.

Question 10: Please indicate your views about the future of the Turkish integration to the EU’s transport policies?

This is the last question and for this reason, it is open ended and leaves the interviewee to think about what is actually done for the sake of integration and what is there for more to achieve in the upcoming years. The question also leans toward to open a one last argument and generate possible sub-questions for future research material. This is a completion question aiming towards to understand more about the level that Turkey integrated.

All of these interviews with respected interviewees were held with the help of Turkish state and stakeholder organizations and academia. To rule out any methodological fallacies, these six interviews are concluded and transcribed before the application of them to the cases. For detailed transcriptions of the interviews, please see the Appendix at the end of the study.

1.1.2: Limitations and Case Selections of the study

This study is not and in any way aims to impose a final judgment over the overall Turkish transport policies, politics and projects. Therefore, it is not a success/failure report on the Turkish transport. It is rather a political science study, which tries to analyze the pattern or assumed completion of the Turkey's integration to the EU on transport issues. It is willing to do and achieve that through comparative case studies. The sole focus is on the European Union integration and the EU acquis, norms and processes. Other transport policies, integrations, partnership alternatives, domestic or local transport decisions are not a concern of this study. While saying transport, this study indicates air, maritime, rail and road transport policies and inland waterways when it is applicable. In addition to that, intermodal/multimodal/combined transport systems, intelligent transport systems will also be an issue point. Any other mode of transport is not included to the analysis.

In this study, the international/regional integration theories such as neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance will be used to analyze integration process of Turkey. The explanations on what an EU integration process on a respected policy is and what is the process or dynamics for a member/candidate state is entirely depend on what these theories are assuming and promising. However, this is not in any way to reject other possible theoretical works that could be applicable to the question that this study is asking. In addition to that, this study only aims to use main ideas, hypotheses and premises of these integration theories and there is no other intention such as either entirely confirming or refuting them. Explaining the same question with other conceptual and theoretical understanding is accepted and expected

in any other research but specifically for this study, the line is drawn with the mentioned theories for the reasons mentioned in the earlier parts.

Case studies and the selection of the cases will be justified in the latter part of this methodology chapter. Cases are limited to Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey due to their similarities, historical partnerships, and efficient use of every mode, same governance structure, geographical stances and trade/commercial links. No other European country examples or cases will be exemplified in this study. Case selections are covering only the selected corporatist countries and in this respect, only three countries will be investigated. Besides them, no other corporatist example will be included. However, this does not mean that other cases are not available to compare with Turkey for wider generalizations.

This is indeed a study concerning Political Science and International Relations, and politicization of the integration process is indeed a matter of discussion. Although politics is the main part of the study rather than technical part of the transport, this study is not in any way tries to put political judgments over the decisions of the Turkish state or other political parties who are involved to the process. Only the facts and the actors' respective actions toward integration will be used and identified for making educated assumptions.

Integration is a dynamic process with covering many research areas and issues. This study solely focuses on transport and transport policies of the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom and Turkey. Other policy areas that the European Union focuses on will not be covered besides the policies producing spill over functions of the transport. However, for the sake of reliability and repetition, the results coming of this research is hopefully be applicable to the other integration areas, especially to the technical areas.

As mentioned many times before in this study, three corporatist cases derived from the Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) model will be evaluated to form a hypothesis regarding the integration pattern of the corporatist countries: Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey.

Remembering from the literature review part of the study, corporatism in transport is a governance model, which a country selects for day-to-day decision-making and its relations with the European Union. A corporatist national policy -making scheme assumes a high action capacity of the state along with the high action capacity of the society. This given classification is calling for cooperation between the actors while taking and implementing transport decision and of course, the EU integration process and decisions regarding that are not exempt from them. However, the question needs to be asked and justified in here is: why these countries? What is so important about them to study along and compare with Turkey?

First of all, the main case analysis of this study is Turkey. Turkey-EU Relations officially started in 1963 after the sides agreed over an Association Agreement with an end goal of a forming a Customs Union between them and the agreement also envisaged a full membership perspective. Since 1996 and the official establishment of the Customs Union, the integration process on transport was became a greater concern. Obviously the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the given candidacy status and start of the negotiations gave the EU-Turkey relations a new momentum but relations over transport were rather deeply historical and interesting. Analyzing Turkey as a case is a new challenge for both what the EU wants to establish on transport and for the integration theories, which are trying to explain this alignment. On the EU side, the single market and its good functioning is depending on the dynamic integration of transport inside and their relations with the other markets. Turkey is a gateway, a corridor for Europe to transport goods into the Middle East and the Central Asia. Turkey is critical trade partner and market for the Single Market. The declared new potential Customs Union modification deal will most probably include transport policies in a significant manner. Turkey and especially Istanbul is a prominent and indispensable hub for international and regional transport. As a result, Turkey is case that the European Union cannot emancipate or bare the cost of losing the country in economic senses. Turkish integration to the EU on transport is indispensable for Europe and of course indispensable for Turkey since the biggest trading part of Turkey is the European Union countries. Historically, economically and because of the indispensability of the parties, transport in Turkey is an interesting case to investigate. On the theoretical side, all of these three theories

made an assumption on the importance of integration on technical issues where nation states are more eager to transfer their sovereignty. As a candidate state, Turkey's proposed inability to adapt in this study and non-implementation of many significant EU transport norms could be an important critique for these early premises. In a way, adding a candidate state to the analysis is a significant test for these theories and their views about technical areas.

Indeed, Turkey is integrating herself with the European Union. However, out of its member states pool, Germany and United Kingdom is having a different relationship with Turkey and these reasons are explaining why this study is comparing Turkey with these countries when it comes to transport integration to the Europe. The first reason is obviously that all of these countries are having the same governance model in transport, which is corporatism. This gives the research a limit and a classification. Germany and United Kingdom are the initiators of the many integration cases and examples in Europe. Road policies of Germany and Rail policies of the United Kingdom are still a basis for Europe. On the matters of comparison with Turkey, these two initiator countries and their methods of integration could provide a model for Turkey since these three countries are also sharing similar geographic/demographic patterns with Turkey. These countries are also using every mode of transport ranging from road, rail, maritime and air in conformity due to their geographical advantages.

Transport means trade, commerce and the well functioning of the EU single market. Economic growth and employment is closely related with good transport alignment with the closer markets. On the matters of export of the goods, Turkey's biggest export partners are Germany and the United Kingdom. The recent Turkey Statistics Office Report (2017) validates that Germany is in the first and the United Kingdom is the second when it comes to Turkish exports. This export rates clearly makes alignment of these three transport regimes inevitable at some point regarding or regardless of the EU integration process. Common laws and transport regimes would be beneficial for all these three countries in terms of cutting time and cost and Turkey's integration to these two countries with regard to the EU integration process is much more important than a single trade deal with another European country. In addition to all of these justifications

above, each of these countries also have similar transport endeavors like becoming a transport and logistics hub and they already established important air and land hubs (Frankfurt, London and Istanbul).

As a result, at a time where European Union needs to compete with the USA in the West and China (Silk Road on rail) in the East, Turkey is an indispensable associate for making them a part of the integration process. Along with that, Turkey needs the European Union and especially Germany and United Kingdom for economic, geographical and rational economic reasons. This is why understanding the current level of these countries on the same explanatory factor, which is the European Union integration on transport, is vital for these goals to come alive.

1.2: A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE

For the case selections and evaluating integration patterns of these cases, this study uses the model of governance structures proposed by Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) in their study called “Elusive Europeanization: Liberalizing road haulage in the European Union”. Before detailed evaluation and review of the article, a question we might have to ask is “Why do we need a model for this research?”

First of all, governance structures give us an idea of “how are the things done” in a particular country. With a typology at hand, it is much easier to group similar countries or identify similar governance structures. Since this research aims to find out different integration patterns in similar or model cases, working out over a typology is critical. By looking through the similar countries on governance structures, differences would be much more crucial. Secondly, a typology confers certain characteristics of governance groups. Then, understanding each country’s different dynamics would lead us separate countries and make case selection easier. Within these similar countries, a typology could be used to take out common and distinct patterns toward integration. Main actors of integration, either public or private factors, could be identified by a typology in separate structures. This is especially important for theoretical research such as this one. The relationship between the state, political parties, stakeholders, civil society and

political culture is important for a research using neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism or multi-level actor analysis. With respect to these reasons, the typology offered by Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) is the following:

		Action capacity of the state	
		High	Low
Action Capacity Of Society	High	Corporatism	Clientelism
	Low	Etatism	Market

A typology of governance structure (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000)

Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) criticize the Europeanization process in transport policy as being “elusive”. In their study, the academic duo prioritizes the domestic factors as the game changers on the way through European integration rather than regarding European influence as the shipmaster (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). Even for the countries, who have abandoned their policy positions on transport, the domestic governance structures, traditions and factors have much important roles than the desirability of European norms or “top-down” European authoritative decisions (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). Kerwer and Teutsch (2000: 1) announce this new finding as a new challenge for European integration research and an end to the justification period of ‘ever closer union’. The question is investigated in this research is a similar one to the research at the hand: “To what extent national policy traditions and styles are called into question?” (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000:1).

For a particular case selection, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) choose road haulage policy in Europe to investigate different integration patterns and for country selections; they choose Germany, Italy and France. Each of these countries represents a different

governance structure on transport, which suggests changing actors, policy traditions and market structures regardless of the push coming from the European Union for regulation. The road haulage policy in Europe characterized by effortless attempts to overcome market failures, however, since the 1980s and the end of quantitative market regulation, a general trend in the policy area started towards liberalization (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000: 3-4). Kerwer and Teutsch (2000: 4) wished to discuss the factors responsible for overcoming the well-established national policies and traditions in Europe about transport. The above figure is proposed to make an assessment of the relative weighting of national factors in different regions of Europe. (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000: 4). Each section of governance assumes a government preference convergence towards liberalization, however, with different actors and methods. Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) model provides a general trend towards the liberalization process of road haulage policy in Europe. Suitable for our theoretical framework, the role of the state, stakeholders, action capacity of the civil society and political parties are crucial to understand. Especially, the neo-corporatist and policy network literatures. At the end of the study, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) conclude that the dynamics of the national decision-making towards integration can be linked to the interaction between public and private actors. Since this research tries to measure Turkey's integration process by looking through public and private sector relationship, this trend will be a significant indicator.

Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) do not just offer a typology but also a trend in different government structures towards European integration. As you can see from the Figure above, there are four different governance structures in national transport policy making. These are corporatism; assuming a high level of interaction and involvement from state and public level, clientelism; modest state capacity but high public involvement, etatism; regulations ruled by state decisions and low participation of societal actors and market; where both sides' action capacity is fairly low and market regulates itself (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). Each of these typologies offers an integration trend towards road haulage policy and European transport policy in specific country examples.

Starting with etatist governance model, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) use the French interventionism as a case. The French model on road haulage policy offers a firm state action, dominance and adversarial relations with private interest groups that shaped the reform policy (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). In this type of integration, party politics did not influence the reform and neither did interest groups, the particular reform was the administration's brainchild (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). The etatist structures are basically weak if there are slim ties between the state and interest groups and this could result into a greater autonomy to the state where implementation could be jeopardized without the cooperation of sides (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). However, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) also recognizes the rise in the action capacity of society in France in 1992, 1996 and 1997 after series of union organized strikes and pressures on government.

Italian road haulage policies take account a clientelist model of integration. It is important to know here that the Italian state has only a little autonomy compared to French case and private interests here are the main decider about interventionism or protectionism. The Italian story about the road haulage liberalization tells us different views over the regulation between small and big scale transport firms at the expense of state involvement and ends with a hard decision with a tendency to protectionist measures (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). Italian Government's surprise decision to go over liberalization in the road haulage sector was considered as a watershed moment in the history of country's transport sector and regarded as a significant departure from the past policy model (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). This means that current typologies are subject to change throughout the cases, a dynamic approach should be a subject for all countries with an understanding the general structure.

The third type of governance is the corporatist style. Besides Lemkuhl's (1999) comparative analysis on the evaluation of German and Dutch corporatist models on transport, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) is the second in the literature who uses German regulation methods as a case point. In here, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) identify the corporatist method as cooperation between the Ministry of Transport (state level) and transport associations (society level). Unlike etatism, lobby makers, trade unions,

transport associations and private companies are indeed accepted as the primary partner in transport affairs (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000: 7). The shift towards liberalization in this field was not called into question or not welcomed by many strikes as happened in France but rather with a harmony between the parties since the interest groups did not want to jeopardise their good relationships between the states over a lost cause (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000: 8). Rather than that, interest groups were trying to put these new rules into new uses such as containment of the threat of rising costs by environmental considerations of all parties (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). The inevitability of liberalization at the European level is a great factor for both state and public level for convincing the entrepreneurs in government and interest groups, leaving the idea that European Union still is in the game while discussing the behavior of domestic actors. While we are discussing Turkey in the next chapters, this factor will be a much more intensive indicator for a candidate country. In Germany, economic adaptation pressures coming from the European Union found a support from the pro-liberalisation interests at the national level and made economic regulation possible (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). Under corporatist sectoral governance it was crucial for a partial shift in the interest groups' opinions towards sustained liberalization (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). On behalf of road haulage policy, only a slight raise on the market access requirements without creating an entry barrier also played a role in this smooth passage of German transport history (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000) indicating once more that pro-liberal measures must not harm the demands of stakeholders.

Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) conclude by showing us different reactions from different governance structures towards the same European liberalization process. The same directive triggered protectionism in one case (Italy) but liberalization in the other (Germany) with a social regulation need in France. Nevertheless, it results a useful typology, interaction between national parties, changing roles during the process and continuing role of the European Union on adaptational pressure. "Specifying a dominant Europeanization mechanism highlights rather than disguises the fact that the same European cause had different effects at the national level and that Europe was influential in other ways as well" (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000: 17).

As a result, the Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) study implemented an important typology for this research. The usage of German case is also important for the validation of points at the argumentation part. However, in order to understand or generalize the trend of corporatist tendencies in such countries like Germany, one case of road haulage is not enough. To strengthen the analysis and show that there is actually a trend, this research tends to analyze the transport policy as a whole in Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey which are all could be considered as corporatist based on Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) typology. In addition to that, Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) criticize Europeanization literature but at the same time, they are using the same theoretical dimensions to come out with an answer to their research question. In a corporatist scheme, where we measure domestic roles of state and private actors, integration theories such as neo-functionalism; which assumes the importance of consensus between European level and domestic level, liberal intergovernmentalism; prioritizes the role of state against the EU and other domestic parties and multi-level governance where a complex web of cooperation within the state and society, could be more useful to understand the nature of different integration patterns. Finally, it is a fact that integration is a dynamic process and even the firm governance structures could change shape during the process. Especially, the Turkish case will show us an ambiguous float between the models.

1.3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.3.1: Integration as a Concept

This study oversees the concept of integration as the forming of a new bigger and independent political or economic power by combining little pieces together with a mixture of different cultures and governance models. In this case, the new bigger economic power is the Common European Transport Policy and the little pieces are the different countries that are willing to give their authority for a common interest and mixture of collaborative gains. Regarding the transport, both national economies and transport policy has to be regarded as common for a fulfilled integration and national actors has to be willing and working towards a general good rather than selfish interests. To sum up, (Bomberg et al., 2012: 11) defines it as the process whereby sovereign

states partially or fully relinquish their national will into a something bigger on collective power and interests. According to Haluk Ozdemir (2012: 33), there are two types of integration: positive and negative. Negative integration aims to remove the bottlenecks, national restrictions while the positive one is composed of creating new common projects in order to widen the scope of integration. The European transport story consists both ways and for a particular state to be fully integrated with the system, both kinds of integration have to be supported. Integration is a dynamic and never ending chain of processes where nation state and national actors has to give their consent and provide active contribution, otherwise, we cannot talk about the integration (Ozdemir, 2012: 33-34). Ernst Hass, the founder of the neo-functionalist theory also defined integration as an evolutionary and dynamic process with a change in all institutional and international systems (Ozdemir, 2012: 68). Once the integration process produces a rather upper body, the national states have to interact with it even if they do not like the policies this new mechanism produces (Ozdemir, 2012: 36). Every nation state has to approve the European Union as an actor in this field once they get an interaction with it and has to calculate their position and national policies based on the decisions that the EU is going to make in its supranational upper body (Ozdemir, 2012: 37). For this study, the upper body that the integration process is created is the Common Transport Policy and decisions taken with respect to this common policy making sphere. This study assumes that Common Transport Policy is already established and growing gradually since the Treaty of Rome with new concepts and projects, therefore the existence of the policy area is not under question here, it is pre-given. The consent and policies that the member states made during the creation of the Common Transport Policy is not the subject of the research. However, this study is willing to identify another phase that mentioned at the above, meaning that the identification of state and national calculations towards this policy and the dynamic interaction between different governance level while making decisions for the sake of policy area.

The evolution of the integration process is only achievable if the interaction chain between governance levels keeps itself fresh and dynamic. This could only be feasible if the supranational level puts new perspectives and projects and national governance levels are able to adapt them (Ozdemir, 2012: 36). A diplomatic traffic, negotiations and

new prospects coming from the integration elites are substantial in this sense (Ozdemir, 2012: 36). Fortunately, the history of transport policy in Europe is an important example for that, as the reader will see in the upcoming chapters. Within this dynamic process, nation states and national sub-actors have to identify their expectations based on the ideas coming from Brussels rather than national interest schemes (Ozdemir, 2012: 37). The nation state, or in this case the member or candidate state are the most vital actors of the process since they are the creators, initiators, the ones that making the history-making decisions and the ones that are obliged to implement the common policies to their own national agendas (Ozdemir, 2012: 40). For this reason and because of their importance, this study identifies and uses the concept of “actor integration” where actors like state or sub-national groups are involved to the process are changing to be similar to each other and continue over negotiation to keep a level of dependency even if they have to protect their differences (Ozdemir, 2012: 40).

After defining the concept of integration and before giving broad information about the integration theories that will be used in this study, several justifications on the selections of these theories has to be made. This study aims to discover the nature and current extent of Turkish integration to the EU’s Common Transport Policy by explaining the role of the national actors playing in the process. Therefore, the state and sub-national actors are vital in our definition of integration. Their actions will be tested as the source of high or low rates on integration. All of the theories define and appoint substantial roles to the integration institutions, some broader and some subtler. However, this study does not intend to verify or nullify any of these theories ranging from neo-functionalism to multi-level governance. Any of these theories could identify the case we have in the hand but this study only covers three of them. Integration theories, in their own nature, are useful for explaining the nature of the process, proposing the basic elements for success in this process and coming up with new strategies to put a dynamism to the process (Ozdemir, 2012: 51). Comparing them with the institutionalism analysis such as Europeanization, integration theories are not much different since they also put an emphasis on institutional behaviour and evaluate their roles in integration process (Ozdemir, 2012: 93). Therefore, without prioritizing or falsifying any of them, all of

these theories could be useful for explanation but this study only uses three of them in an eclectic approach and there are some reasons for this selection.

First, this study covers a technical area and an economic integration. These three theories are arising from the fact that the beginning of the European integration process will be based on technical areas and within these areas; countries are more willing to pool their sovereignty and the process will be smooth compared to highly political areas. The neo-functionalist idea of “spill over” stems from that the technical areas will spill towards the other policy areas once the former is fully integrated and there is a potential to spread into political areas. However, the question lies here that are these technical areas and their integration is really that smooth and easy? The Turkish case as a candidate country could be an important test ground for that earlier assumption of the integration theories. Moreover, the spill over understanding of the integration theories is vital for transport policy where the EU build up the entire policy based on the transport effects on other related areas such as environment, health and education. The cases that will be covered in this study will identify the success of that concept. This early assumption of these theories and the importance of the concept of “spill over” motivated this study to work over these theories and find out the validity of these technical area and spill over assumptions while testing the extent of corporatist alignment processes.

Secondly, to answer the question of “how the Turkish transport integrated into the EU transport area?” the study needed to claim a deeper focus on the state and the grounds that state decides to pool their sovereignty on Common Transport Policy alongside with interest motivated sub-actors and their role in the integration process. Neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are the two theories that are giving different views about the behaviour of the state and multi-level governance distributes a broader focus on the local actors such as interest groups, stakeholders and political parties. Politicization of the process is considered as an important element of integration for this study. Each of these theories provides an opinion about the future of the process once it gets politicized. For identifying the tendencies of the actors and their actions after the politicization of the process, these theories were applied to the cases for understanding their effect on the integration process.

For the justification of selecting these three theories rather than institutionalism or Europeanization, this study has some explanations. Radaelli (2000: 7) claims that Europeanization is the stage starting right after the European integration process. “Europeanization would not exist without European integration. But the latter concept belongs to the ontological stage of research, that is, the understanding of a process in which countries pool sovereignty, whereas the former is post-ontological, being concerned with what happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their effects.” (Radaelli, 2000: 7). With respect to the cases that are covered in this research, applying integration theories rather than the concept of Europeanization seemed much more applicable due to some reasons. For the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, these were the initiator countries when it comes to transport integration. Rather than being “Europeanized”, these countries were the elements establishing a “common Europe” on transport and the EU institutions were initiated by their national policies in a rather bottom up beginning. There was no conditionality or fully-fledged external incentives by the time these countries became a EU member. For example, the rail liberalization policy in Europe inspired by the national policies taken by the UK government. The institutions and rules of the UK rail were intact with common goals even at the time when the country was not a EU member. However, pooling of sovereignty and their support over the dynamism of the process was always under the question, which resulted in the ups and downs in their integration ratings. Even today, there are hesitations when it comes to transferring the authority. So, the first two of the cases are not really fitting the definition at the above. On the other hand, Turkey causes more ambiguity to the definition. As a candidate country, we are not fully sure that the EU institutions are fully in place and produce their effects since Turkey is not even in the decision making process of the EU. This study believes that Turkey is still in the ontological stage of the research, where the country’s pooling of sovereignty is highly conditional and there is an important correlation between that and its overall integration success. Finding domestic impact is not the end goal of this study but to find out the correlation between the interaction of different governance levels and the level of integration in a selected case. But again, Europeanization and other institutionalism theories could also be used to identify the cases in the hand but this study prefers over

the integration theories for the given reasons to understand the levels where actors shift their expectations and its effect on the transport scoreboard.

Last but not least, this study only uses these theoretical standpoints to establish an answer to the question of “to what extent” by looking through the changing effects that drive integration, behaviour of different governance levels on integration and resource exchange within networks that shape the entire process. There are no grand purposes besides this goal and both of these ideas will be used together in the selected cases for this purpose only. While making a study, at some points, using just one theory could identify the entire problem but sometimes even multiple theoretical explanations might not be enough. In this respect, testing the applicable theories on available cases is the only way to achieve generalizable results and these three theories are just here to identify the trends and correlation between their assumptions and their contribution to the overall integration results. Once again, this study does not aim to validate their assumptions. Besides these theories, the case of Turkey and its integration towards the EU on transport will be explained by the concept of “differentiated integration” to provide a further explanation to the different results this study reached compared to Germany and the United Kingdom cases. The “differentiated integration” is believed to indicate a meaningful answer to the different trends in selected corporatist cases where they have the same actor interaction towards integration.

In Political Sciences, theory gives us guidance and helps us to explain the issue in our hands. Since this study offers a theoretical look over the European integration on transport, it is an obligation to know which theories will be used to explain the respectable cases. The integration theories, which are the substance of analysis here: functionalism (since it is the grand theory that created neo-functionalism and settle the ground for other theoretical assumptions in European integration), neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, multi level governance and the concept of differentiated integration. Before starting to explain the theories in detail, some points have to be cleared. There is no one theory to be able to explain the whole European integration process on any issue. When we talk about integration, we have to mention as many as possible and take the best from all of it. That is why this study aims to take out an

eclectic approach over integration theories. This means that the study in your hand is not following a particular theoretical path but tries to reach out the best knowledge by selecting and using what are considered the best elements of all systematic theories. As Bomberg, Peterson and Corbert (2012: 10) clarifies, it is a way to present them with all their nuances by not giving privilege one over the other.

In this respect, this section starts with the detailed analysis of the functionalism by David Mitrany. Although functionalism will not be applied while testing the cases, it is important to know the nature and ground it settled for the other integration theories, especially to the neo-functionalism. Moreover, the assumptions over the technical cases as a trigger to the integration are highly important for this study. Functionalism is a grand theory, which calls an international cooperation for peace and security. Although it is not specifically made for the European integration, the later neo-functionalism theory harmonized functionalist idea into a regional integration process to study European Union. According to functionalist theory, peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it. As a result, the world needs transnational institutions rather than nation-states to overcome challenges and satisfy the needs of peace and security. So, functional cooperation and coordination over specific areas will result in conflict reduction. Economic unification would also build up the foundation for political agreement, which is the first theoretical foundation of the term “spill over”. However, as we will see in the upcoming parts, the theory originally supports universal cooperation rather than regional approach and a spreading web of international activities and agencies. For functionalism theory, the fundamental change to which any effective international system must aspire and contribute is to make international government coextensive with international activities. The main aim of the theory is to organize governments for common action along the lines of specific needs and ends, and according to the conditions of the time and place. In order to establish that, the world needs international planning for investment and development on specific areas of continental, intercontinental and universal by railways, shipping, aviation and broadcasting. “The distinctive characteristic of functionalism is the fact that economic and social problems produce their own resolutions; the usefulness and efficiency of

concrete, issue-specific (technical) cooperation and its outcomes legitimized international cooperation.” (Kurt, 2009: 45).

According to the father of the theory, David Mitrany, the key exponent for this relationship are the technical experts for every policy area and not government representatives. (Anastasiou, 2007: 35) Mitrany also advocated for the creation of separate international bodies with authority over functionally specific fields would break away from the traditional association of authority. (Anastasiou, 2007: 35) For the spill over effect, which identifies an interaction of two different policy fields where one integration leads to another, Mitrany believes that this logic guarantees the growth of planning in all the economic aspects (Popoviciu, 2010). He also advocated the international bodies, which had separated identity and authority over functionally specific fields, such as security, transport and communication (Kurt, 2009: 45). Desmond Dinan (2000) considers the Treaty of Rome, which formed the European Economic Community as the perfect example of the functionalist school of thought. According to Dinan (2000), no treaty represents better the core idea of both functionalist and neo-functionalist reasoning: close cooperation in specific economic sector is the key to overcome national sovereignty. Moreover, Dinan (2000) explains functionalism as a classical theory of regional integration that holds that a common need for technocratic management of economic and social policy leads to the formation of international agencies. (p. 245) However, although Dinan (2000) considers the theory as a regional integration theory, functionalism principally opposed to continental unification like regionalism, which is derived from a territorial closure and defined territory (Kurt, 2009). Functionalists believe that this could lead to interregional antagonisms and disagrees with the idea that advocated territorial closure in the form of regional integration (Kurt, 2009: 51).

So, why functionalists defend the idea of European integration? First of all, they see the process of European integration as an inevitable solution to an important problem. According to Kurt (2009), the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) was attractive to Mitrany because it generated functional solution to a particular set of sectoral needs emerged in post-war Europe. “According to functionalism, the creation

of integrationist international institutions was seen as an acceptance of the inevitable historical forces that driven the state towards surrenders of sovereignty. In that sense, functionalism sees the European integration as an inescapable process (Kurt, 2009: 45). “The nations can be bound together into a world community only if we link them up by what unites, not by what divides” says the father of the modern functionalism theory, David Mitrany in his work called “The Functional Approach to World Organization” (1948: 359). By saying that, David Mitrany imagined a work community, organization raised by the common needs and problems of the nations, these were issues that unite the nation states in the time of need. For Mitrany, functionalism was an idea for common purpose more than a blunt theory. He explained his reason for coming up with that idea as “pulling together a problem rather than representing a theory” (Mitrany, 1948: 350).

The development of functionalist idea stems from the critique of two schemes for international organization: League of Nations or United Nations and the idea of federalism. Mitrany associates organizations like United Nations with loose associations for occasional specific joint actions (Mitrany, 1948: 351). He firmly believed that these type of unifications are unable to touch on nation state interests and incapable of forming of their own authority (Mitrany, 1948: 351). Likewise, federalism offers a will of unity but with a clear intent to manage most matters severally, especially when it comes to hard line policy areas where nation states firmly puts interest on (Mitrany, 1948: 351). In addition to that, the very nature of federalism or similar groupings can cause a threat to the idea of forming an international unity. According to Mitrany (1948: 351-352), federalist thought is prone to create another political division. He gives the example of Germany and indicates that a federal Germany did bring peace within a group but creation of a two powerful federations facing each other in Europe only serves more restrictions rather than unification (Mitrany, 1948: 352). On the other hand, functional framework is different from the former two; it is an application rather than a new invention (Mitrany, 1948: 354). Functionalism for Mitrany (1948: 356) defines a common outlook to the common problems. These commonality and togetherness over the shared problems leads us to specific joint functional undertaking with pooling sovereignty and common policies (Mitrany, 1948).

Functionally specific needs over a policy area can bring nation states to give up on sovereignty and share a joint authority over those subject areas. Interestingly and very suitable for our case in this study, Mitrany (1948: 355) gives the example of Alcan Highway to define pooling sovereignty between states. As a joint enterprise, the Alcan Highway has created an international administration running from the United States through Canada to Alaska. For an example from Europe, Mitrany (1948: 356) uses the problem of the Ruhr region and dictates that only a non-political international functional management could be a cure for the mixed claims in here. The European Coal and Steel Community was the proof of Mitrany's futuristic vision. "A common index of need" could give humanity a peaceful scheme (Mitrany, 1948: 356). The functionalist approach or scheme is at best when it is complementary to each other and worst when independent (Mitrany, 1948: 357). This is where Mitrany underlines the idea of "spill over" before its development in the neo-functionalist approach. "A scheme started by a few countries for transport, or for oil, and so on, could later be broadened to include belated members, or reduced to let reluctant ones drop out." (Mitrany, 1948: 357-358). With another attribution to the transport, Mitrany here identifies that a functional scheme on a particular policy area can activate another integration process in elsewhere. Following this route, established transport integration between the joint nations could lead integration on the areas of economy, oil and trade. As a result, Mitrany (1948) envisaged a world where all countries are working together for their common good by shifting the emphasis from power to problem solving and pooling sovereignty into an independent international authority rather than the interest-driven hands of the nation states. All of these must be performed jointly and controlled centrally (Mitrany, 1948).

In Mitrany's writings, one fact is fairly important and this is the diminished role of the nation states. In fact, nation states have no power or act in any way at his designed world system. Anthony Teasdale and Timothy Bainbridge (2012) identifies the theory as a form of integration between states where they can share a practical cooperation in well defined areas with only a minimum usage of institutional apparatus. By saying institutional, two scholars imply that; "It involves no institutional blueprint and is driven by economic, social and technical imperatives, rather than by political forces."

(Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012: 489). Teasdale and Bainbridge (2012: 489) continue their argument by considering functionalism and neo-functionalism both have a “positive” and “normative” characteristic with a focus on technocratic organizations rather than state on the functionalism side. David Mitrany projected a future where series of apolitical, technocratic agencies working at international level to solve specific problems over mostly technical policy areas such as air traffic control, postal services or refugees (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012: 489).

Compared to other scholars in the field, it is very interesting that David Mitrany and other functionalism researchers often use examples from the area of mobility such as transport, postal services and air traffic. There are some reasons behind this continued usage. First of all, David Mitrany was a firm believer that the technical areas should be the starting point of the integration process since these areas need technical expertise more than state involvement. Secondly, soft policy areas like transport and broadcasting always less complicate the mind of state apparatus and much more easy to share a common ground with other countries. In the *Working Peace Sysyem* book, Mitrany projected a new world order with overlay political divisions and a spreading web of international activities and agencies on these technical areas where the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012: 489). This integration process could also provide a learning process to citizens to lead a societal force to accumulate partial power transfers from the state to the international organizations (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012: 489). Haluk Ozdemir (2012) is another researcher who identifies functionalism as the standpoint/backbone of neo-functionalism rather than a separate theory.

According to Ozdemir (2012: 63), functionalism is more of a logic that brought neo-functionalism in the end and the theory is a supporter of international integration rather than regional alignment, which we will see in the next chapter while discussing neo-functionalism. A regional integration process is only tolerable when it envisages or opens a way for further possibilities of international integration. Otherwise, we can face with another nationalism threat, namely the European nationalism (Ozdemir, 2012: 65). As an example, Ozdemir (2012) uses enlargement policy of the European Union.

Mitrany states that a union of nations should always be ready for the further integration without being a closed club and this logic automatically highlights the enlargement policy as a protection against a possible EU shutting door policy (Ozdemir, 2012: 63). That is why the European Union member states never say “no” to Turkey for a possible membership. The EU member states clearly know that the country is culturally and politically different from the other members but being a closed club is much more of a bigger threat and the EU states should need Turkey to stay as progressive (Ozdemir, 2012: 63). Functionalist logic has several stages: it starts with a particular function on a common interest area followed by a communal agreement before the integration process and it leads to the formation of joint central institutions (Ozdemir, 2012: 66-67). However, integration needs flexibility. A nation could stand back whenever an integration area puts the states’ interest in jeopardy. That is why functionalism offers technical areas such as transport, communication and broadcasting as the ideal starting points for an integration process which might lead to a political integration only after a learning process in the society (Ozdemir, 2012: 67). In fact, starting with technical areas is an obligation for a purpose of integration since technical areas are the ones that could only be led by technocrats. With this way, it will diminish the influence of politicians and the centre of power relocates itself from politicians to technocrats (Ozdemir, 2012: 67). Functionalism desires a non-political approach even when the subject is political one. So, this is the only way to force out any political elements from the process. According to this “doctrine of ramification”, the whole process gets started with technical issues, continues to be branch out and finally political issues will be the topic of integration interest (Ozdemir, 2012: 67). Institutions too, came out as the servants of this common purpose and transforms while the common need grows into some other area. In this process, the expectancy from the nation state is not giving up on its identity or devolving its sovereignty but to pool enough power and sovereignty in order to serve to the common purpose for greater good (Ozdemir, 2012: 68). As an example, Haluk Ozdemir (2012: 68) uses the European Transport Community proposal as indication of functionalist impact at the time of first European integration movements after World War II.

1.3.2: Neo-functionalism

Thrives on the logic of functionalism, neo-functionalism is another grand theory of European integration with regard to the works of Ernst Haas. Neo-functionalists and mainly Ernst Haas describes the theory as an alternate position to international relations' dominant theoretical streams of the 1950s and mainly opposed to realism (Rosamond, 2005: 239). "Haas was clearly attracted by Mitrany and functionalism's emphasis on the idea that post-national institution building would/should be premised upon a technocratic engagement with human welfare needs." (Rosamond, 2005: 239). What is the point of difference here then? The main point of partition between the two theories is that neo-functionalism's emphasis on inherently regional quality of institution building as opposed to functionalist beliefs (Rosamond, 2005: 240). In short, while functionalists insist on international cooperation and criticize regionalism for interregional antagonisms, neo-functionalists describe a possibility of regional integration over economic policies and supranational institutions based on neighbouring states' pooling of sovereignty. According to neo-functionalism, supranational institutions develop their own interests and aims with a sense of political community, political integration and spill over effects where economic cooperation leads to political integration. Learning processes of political actors, leading to increasing demands for more integration and resulting to spill over. "Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones." (Haas, 1958: 16).

Neo-functionalism also draws attention to the relevance of sub-national actors for this process, be they citizens and interest groups with respect to the anticipated shift of the loyal elites from the national to the supranational setting (Gehring, 1996: 229). Ernst Haas developed his argument with relation to the European Coal and Steel Community. The theory was very dominant in the 1950s and 1960s when the European integration was on its fast track and the most anticipated historical search for European peace was still on the agenda (Anastasiou, 2007: 36). So let's look at some core arguments within

the neo-functionalist logic in a more detailed way with the help of Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter and Joseph Nye. Neo-functionalism is a theory where an economic welfare structure establishes the societal basis of the integration. As Haluk Ozdemir (2012: 68) states: neo-functionalism has its own stages for integration and continues in an evolutionary manner without hitting the wall of sovereignty. The theory criticizes functionalism in two neglected areas: “interest” of the state and “interest” of the groups within the society. In neo-functionalism, we cannot discuss any common will by neglecting the interest of the parties (Ozdemir, 2012: 69). These parties in interaction are diverse. Unlikely to the functionalism, neo-functionalists treat the state as the main actor but not the only decision maker. Each state’s preferences reflect the balance of their domestic economic interests and bargaining between sovereign governments will be an outcome for any European integration process (Bomberg et. al, 2012: 14). Other parties are the interest groups, interest oriented political elite and the elites and interest groups on the other side. (Ozdemir, 2012: 69) In order to establish a societal base for integration, interest groups and their ways as much as important as states’ role in the process.

The integration process is not a technocratic process as we saw in the previous chapter. Different from that, politics and political groups are the main indicators here rather than the presumed technical personnel (Ozdemir, 2012: 69). The process moves forward if the final outcome meets the expectations of the interest groups and if not, it may retrench back to its initial position (Ozdemir, 2012: 69). The route of the integration process starts from a potential economic area and spills over to the political area if the process is a success. Even in the economic area, political interaction, bargaining, interest seeking and intervention continue to establish a common will and it is duty of supranational institutions to control and persuade other actors towards integration (Ozdemir, 2012: 70). The integration process is not only a political decision making mechanism, since it creates its own institutions and bureaucracy, it is a political process from the beginning to the end. Neo-functionalism does not reject welfare driven functionalist idea but it clearly indicates that it is obsolete to talk about welfare without identifying the power and interest struggles to claim that welfare (Ozdemir, 2012: 70). Another criticism against the functionalist idea is about the universality of the approach.

Neo-functionalism believes that an integration process should be regional because regional interests are more similar when you compared it with an international political will (Ozdemir, 2012: 71). Again, technocrats are not the king makers here but they are the ones who have a duty to help the continuity and success of the progress. However, they have to be in an interaction with the state and the political area as well. As Ozdemir (2012: 73) explains; the specialists who are there to push the process forward, should have a bond with the political pressure groups and have enough knowledge about the consequences of decisions and support the common will.

Ernst Haas (1961), the father of the neo-functionalist theory, developed the theory as a contribution to the world peace by creating ever expanding practical cooperation islands which eventually spilling over the fields with controversy laden. For the process integration, Haas (1961: 369) calls it as a condition among nation states where political actors in several national settings are willing to shift their loyalties, will, expectations and political activities to a new, larger centre called supranational institutions to possess competence to the whole. Ernst Haas (1961) founds conflict resolution as an indicator for political cooperation and integration. He identified three core areas that lead a conflict or misfit into a peaceful integration process if all of those areas meet in one setting. The first condition is the basis of minimum common denominator where the least common points should be in order between the parties. Secondly, “splitting the difference” which means that if there are differences between the interests of the parties, institutions or special personnel should involve tackling with those difficulties. Lastly, the parties should upgrade their common interests. The national settings should be willing to re-identify their problems and interest in a supranational upper level which also broadens the competence zone of the newly establishes institutions (Haas, 1961: 368). When both desires meet and parties are prone to upgrade their partnership, this mode of accommodation maximizes the “spill over” effect. Haas (1961: 368) explains this effect as: “policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task.” To establish such an effect, mediation and bargaining take such an important place. Haas (1961: 368) describes the role of experts in this process as vital when saying that the common interests rely on the services of institutionalized

mediator. The process of mediation and bargaining combines intergovernmental negotiation with the participation of independent experts, spokesman for interest groups, parliaments and political parties (Haas, 1961: 368). This pluralistic bargaining eventually leads to a supranational setting. Parliament and role of political parties are highly important because it mobilizes the mediatory forces namely uncommitted parties, groups, persons and reluctant parties (Haas, 1961: 368). As an example, Haas (1961: 368-369) claims that the parliamentary diplomacy was the chief contributor to the European unity where the credit goes to various parliamentary settings.

Bargaining level is coordinated by the supranational entity and consists of a several institutions and interest groups. Within the process, the aim is to upgrade the integration with generating new common interests and make spill over effect visible. In this process, the nature of the integration is not important, the important thing is the running of the process (Ozdemir, 2012: 72). Integration is not an automatic process by nature, in order to predict the outcome of a bargaining process, so many issues should be taken into account (Ozdemir, 2012: 72). It is a creative and experimental progress where any outcome is expected (Schmitter, 1970). Again, the role of the political elites here to bring out creative proposal and conflict resolution techniques to lead the way for the progress, if not, the integration process may not succeed (Schmitter, 2008: 47).

In functionalism, technical and economic areas were the ones that favoured to put into the negotiation table for integration. Likewise, neo-functionalism put forward the economic and technical areas as the starting point of any regional integration process. Ernst Haas (1961: 372) himself admits that non-economic tasks have shown themselves much more inconsistency. So, in which ways an integration process find success? Philippe Schmitter claims that there are several ways. According to Schmitter (1969), its “scope” and “level” are the main indicators for an integration process to succeed. “Scope” means the importance and weight of the political sectors and interest groups involved into the process. “Level” indicates the enthusiasm of these parties to comply with the common decisions. By measuring these two subjects, Schmitter (1970) identified levels of integration namely: spill over, spillback, retrench, muddle about and encapsulate. Spill over happens when progress in one policy area meets with common

interest and transfers its supranational power into another sector, this could only be visible if both scope and level is high (Schmitter, 1970).

Spillback is a condition where the process goes back to the status quo position without any development, this happens where scope and level is low (Schmitter, 1970). This may cause a crisis but if the parties hit back to the crisis with a far more progressive stance and marginal alteration, then it may “encapsulate” the process (Schmitter, 1970). Schmitter (1970) explains the condition of retrench as the increase in the supranational authority in a one particular field but a decrease in the scope of that policy with a short amount of actors. Spill- around and muddle about are the last two conditions. In the spill around, parties start to engage with other sectors without any given competence and likewise, muddle about identifies a blurry ground where supranational institutions start to debate about new policy areas when their competence power simply loses control (Schmitter, 1970). In addition to these potential outcomes, Schmitter (1969) created three neo-functional hypotheses. First hypothesis is the main standpoint of the neo-functionalism theory: spill over. As indicated at the above chapters, spill over is the spread of sectoral integration and supranational competence to the other economic or political areas (Schmitter, 1969). The second hypothesis “externalization” is explaining a story of common standpoint against the outside politics. In “externalization”, parties who are engaged in an integration process, identifies common principles against the outside actors and their policies after some progress (Schmitter, 1969). Last hypothesis concerns politicization and signifies a continued, cumulative stage of spill over (Schmitter, 1969). In here, Schmitter (1969) claims that the engagement of different interest groups, different opinions and values are possible when the process goes deeply into the political area. Within the “politicization” level, actors either solve their problems coming out of their interests or fought over the clashing visions over the meaning of common interest (Schmitter, 1969). Making decision in this level is highly difficult so it needs a high level of participation from all actors and a change in the political actors’ visions is expected. This may cause an obstacle or provide a pushing factor but only depends the time of the “politicization” and political interests of the member states. Joseph Nye (1970) criticized it by claiming that an early “politicization” may cause damage to the whole process.

In his work called *Comparing Common Markets*, Joseph Nye (1970) introduced two additional hypotheses: redistribution and reduction of alternatives. Redistribution means the inevitable redistribution of power and sources after the integration process. According to Joseph Nye (1970: 824), some member states may gain more than others at the end of the process, for example; they may become more attractive than others in terms of foreign capital investments or the events created by the integration process may favour one state to another. It is not supposed to be a bad situation for the whole process but this might happen. In order to prevent the worst-case scenarios, redistribution should change hands from the integration institutions to the free flow of the market economy (Nye, 1970: 825). On the other hand, “reduction of alternatives” explains the reduction of policy alternatives within the integration process with the increasing societal and economic pressures resulted in inevitable policy reduction (Nye, 1970: 826). As Nye (1970: 826) puts it very well: with the institutionalization, politicians felt more restrained on some policy areas because of the resistance coming from the interest groups who is getting a share from the integration process, however; this does not mean that the integration process could only go further. Political crisis is highly predictable in the neo-functionalism and politicians may choose to face with a crisis sometimes. Nevertheless, a crisis should not signify a retrenchment every time it might provide a signal for every part to put the process further (Nye, 1970: 823).

Every integration process could develop into a separate direction and there are several variables that may decide this possibility in a particular period of alignment. Joseph Nye (1970) gathered these variables and sums up in three particular periods called as: parameters before integration, parameters present during the integration process and variables, which are crystallized during the integration process. For the first party of variables, Nye (1970: 821) explains them as the indicators for pre-integration period. Within this period, these conditions shall be critical: power and political weight of the countries engaging into a partnership, the frequency of their mutual relationship and sharing mutual, common values, ideas and traditions. Second class of variables; parameters that should be present during the integration process should be: the balance between economic interests, aims and their value on the political level, the involvement

of the political/regional elites to the process and the involvement towards to supranational entities (Nye, 1970: 821). The last ensemble of variables consist the parameters that become prominent during the process. Alignment with the common rules and learning process should be visible (Nye, 1970). In both two periods, pre-integration or during integration, crisis may arise between the parties. The important issue here to use this crisis as an opportunity to redefine the problem and solve it in a supranational level. This may provide two outcomes: spill over or spill back (Nye, 1970). Learning process is the vital point here. While integration continues, the involved parties learn about the nature of the process. They learn how to limit their selfish interests and the chain of relations between the sides. When the actors know that they can keep their interests much well with newly developed solutions, it signifies that the learning process has started. This automatically leads us to the “spill over” effect (Nye, 1970: 804). For Joseph Nye (1970: 804), “spill over” means of a transfer of the learned policies from one area to another. Unlike to his colleagues in this field, Joseph Nye associated the “spill over” effect with the learning process.

Lastly, Joseph Nye (1970) identified seven process mechanisms that gradually developed and interacted after the start of the integration. With respect to their conditions of emergence, each would lead the process into a wider integration or dissolution (Nye, 1970). The first mechanism is the “functional linkage of tasks”, meaning that the existence of functional linkages between the aims. If there is an imbalance within the process, “functional linkage of tasks” claims a “spill over” affect with wider more widening and deepening but still the way through the “spill over” is not automatic (Nye, 1970: 804). This is the only way to move forward after a potential disequilibrium. For example, Joseph Nye (1970: 804) uses the European Coal and Steel Community. The community formed as a task specific organization and experienced hard time to deal with issues like tax, transportation and trade since that integration have failed to include those policies. However, the displacement of tasks may supply an excuse for wider integration to tackle with logistics problems. Although it is an effective mechanism, it may also lead to a “spillback” as well if different linkages interpreted negatively (Nye, 1970: 804). To prevent any potential “spillback” effect, Joseph Nye (1970: 804) proposes the implementation of “cultivated spill over”. The

idea of “cultivated spill over” explains the involvement of the political elites and supranational institutions to move forward in an integration process. Besides that, two more “spill over” explanations are existent in the European studies. “Functional spill over” is lot like Nye’s “functional linkage of tasks”. It means that economic area integrations like coal and steel would gradually trigger wider integration on other economic fields such as transportation and trade (Kaya et al, 2011). On the other hand, “political spill over” is much more elite driven. Political decision makers involved into the progress here. As Kaya et al (2011) explains; during the integration process, benefit-driven national decision makers could socialize between themselves to see the benefits of forming a supranational institution and they will need to transport relations into an upper level.

Back to Nye’s process mechanisms; the second one is the “rising transactions” which increases the interaction between the involved integration partners (Nye, 1970: 805). Integration leads to a rising transaction and this automatically affect the decision makers in two different ways. First, they might head into restricting policy areas after the relations reach a level that decision makers could not handle or they can try to solve the problems by taking precautions nationwide. Another possibility is to widen the scope and power of the supranational institutions they built for the integration. All in all, “rising interaction” breeds political action in every way. (Nye, 1970: 805) “Deliberate linkage and coalition formation”, as you can see from the name, signifies the linkage formation between sectors and functions in order to move forward the integration process. Policies that could improve the integration should be served as a package with the other easily adoptable concepts. By doing this, integration parties could weaken the defence against anti-integration resistance. This may also lead to a coalition between politicians, technocrats, eurocrats and interest groups (Nye, 1970: 806). Speaking of political elites, fourth mechanism is called “elite socialization” and tries to understand the formation of a different kind of political elite during the integration process. When integration commences, different politicians and bureaucrats start to engage in a regional dialogue and relationship in respectful meetings. As an example, Nye (1970: 806) uses today’s Eurocrats working in the different sectors of Commission and Council. Starting from the scratch, these bureaucrats transformed into a task specific

Eurocrats as a result of the whole dialogue and socialization process (Nye, 1970: 806). In short, every integration process creates its own elite division in order to move forward and back up the alignment issues. Besides states and political groups, interest groups and non-political groups could also be a player in the process mechanisms. When defining “Regional Group Formation”, Joseph Nye (1970: 809) stated that non-state actors could form some official or non-official coalitions and partnerships just like the member states for reaching their aim of maximizing their interests at a regional level. Sixth process mechanism is called the “ideological-identitive appeal” and it tries to define the established culture coming out from the policies followed by integration. The integration process and potential success creates an integration culture with the perception of stability and inevitability, which leads to a desirable common ideology demand. Even the short term failures and losses greeted by greater sympathy with regard to the common culture of success and history of the process. However, this identical transformation may upset nationalist leaders and anti-integrationist sides and integration might experience a resistance from them (Nye, 1970: 810). Lastly, the “involvement of external factors” expresses active and passive external factors affecting the whole alignment. Active external factors are the involvement of actors into the process. On the other hand, passive external factors are the perceptions of regional actors upon external environment. In here, external actors could affect the development in a good and bad way. If the actors think that integration has a reverse effect on their interest than they could easily manipulate the process in a negative manner. Moreover, unnecessary active involvement from external actors may also lead the alignment into depression (Nye, 1970: 811).

There are two conditions for process mechanisms to cope with the created change and pressure. One is perceptive condition and the other one concerns structural conditions (Nye, 1970: 821). Structural conditions meet when the symmetry, equality, elite values are compatible in each other between the parties and also a reaction to the change occurs within the member states and pluralistic unit. Perceptive conditions could be achieved when a perception over the equal share and distribution of integration gains is visible. In addition to that, perception of political leaders over external problems, the cost of integration (visible or low) also play a role (Nye, 1970: 814-21).

To summarize, neo-functionalism has followed the path that David Mitrany left and developed the idea in a more regional and interest-oriented approach. Moreover, the theory foresees an eventual integration with a possible “spill over” effect between the sectors. At the previous two parts of the theoretical framework, we discussed functionalism and neo-functionalism, which are the two overlapping approaches and one completes the other. This continuing part of the chapter contains a far more different framework and also an important critique for the previous two. Liberal intergovernmentalism, pioneered by Andrew Moravcsik, defines somehow a realist approach that puts the state at the centre of the idea.

For liberal intergovernmentalists, integration is possible and beneficial for the member states but if and only if the integration process fulfils and suits the selfish national interests of the state. As it is understood from here, the process proceeds by the will of state and the state is the main actor that defines and decides the faith of the integration. So, in what circumstances that any nation state chooses to get involved in a particular integration model? To answer the above question, Haluk Özdemir (2012: 88) clearly signifies the state position as an interest-seeking player. States only involve to an integration process if they foresee a better way to protect or maximize their self-interest and to claim that purpose; they choose to establish various rules, principles and organizations for reducing the uncertainty in the international arena. (Ozdemir, 2012: 88) Otherwise, if they fail to reduce uncertainties and choose not to integrate, the cost of not being involved may increase and damage the profit-maximizing scheme of the state. (Ozdemir, 2012: 88) So, it is obvious that state must compromise from its sovereignty in order to find the middle ground with the integration partners and reduce the costs of international future uncertainties (Ozdemir, 2012: 88-89). Of course, state is not an impatient and measureless actor. Every state within the process calculates a cost-benefit analysis even before getting involved into the transaction and makes their decision with regard to this analysis. For example, after World War II, it was reasonably expensive for any Western European state to not cooperate and as a result, they have selected to be together in the idea of the EU and reduce the costs of opting out (Ozdemir, 2012: 88).

1.3.3: Liberal Intergovernmentalism

At the beginning of the chapter, we defined liberal intergovernmentalism as a close up to the realist thought of politics. However, liberal intergovernmentalism recalls a realist approach but also finds integration as a possibility. It is also fairly different from realism. As an example, Ozdemir (2012: 89) shows that liberal intergovernmentalism explains a possibility of inter-state cooperation with internal political decisions. Liberal intergovernmentalism identifies the nation states' foreign policy preferences by looking to their evolution within the internal politics unlike realisms' tendency to treat these preferences as a fixed approach. With regard to this, there is no room for objective interest in liberal intergovernmentalism but different social and political groups create these interests by bargaining and competing with each other (Ozdemir, 2012: 89). Andrew Moravcsik is the main pioneer and founder of the idea of liberal intergovernmentalism. As a starting point, Moravcsik (1993) criticized the nearly automatized evolution of integration based on the neo-functional theory. In liberal intergovernmentalism, nothing is natural, automatic or self-inflicted in the integration process. Moravcsik (1993: 480) puts an emphasis on the bargaining between the states where the will for integration occurs when both interest-maximizing parties find a way to increase their shares. It is the most important stage of the integration, which is mostly undermined by neo-functionalists (Moravcsik. 1993: 477).

The European Integration and new regional settlements in Europe could be counted as a unique example of an international regime establishment with respect to the international political economy theories and common principles, rules and institutions. However, treating the European integration as a sui generis development makes it impossible to generalize the processes that produce the integration at first place. We should elaborate the European Union by looking through the window of international political economy theories (Moravcsik, 1993). According to Andrew Moravcsik (1993: 481), the liberal intergovernmentalist framework of analysis is a combination of liberal theories and intergovernmentalist theories. A liberal intergovernmentalist integration process starts with the international demand for outcomes, which triggers the domestic

politics and eventually leads to pressure from domestic societal actors as represented in political institutions. This creates the national preferences formation; in other words, a bargaining process in the former level establishes the national interest for the member states. After configuration of state preferences, the integration process heats up with interstate negotiation. This level is another place that bargaining takes place but this time, on the international level. Interstate negotiation affected from the following: underlying political factors such as intensity of national preferences, alternative preferences and available issue linkages. Whatever comes out from this international level of bargaining gives us an outcome decision of wider integration or not (Moravcsik, 1993).

Concerning the issue areas, Moravcsik (1993) defines three areas that have a possibility for integration. “Commercial liberalization” consist tariffs and quotas and agricultural price policy. “Socio-economics public goods provision” means monetary, environmental, social and regulatory policies and “political, institutional or re-distributional policies” cover EPC, Euro-parliamentary affairs and structural funds (Moravcsik, 1993). For each issue area, Moravcsik (1993) defines an economic interdependence and national preferences model which gives predictions based on the sources of societal interests and determinants of state action. When we explain the issue areas one by one with the help of Moravcsik (1993: 489) model; the “commercial liberalization” area demands overt pressure from producers whose expected gains/losses reflect competitive position in international markets and certainty of policy outcomes. For the determinants of state action, “commercial liberalization” issues need strong, unified and certain producer interests with conformity from the government. Otherwise, it may lead to low investment and growth since governments are more likely to risk liberalization when faced with policy failure (Moravcsik, 1993: 489). On the other hand, “socio-economics public goods provision” demands both pressures from producers and from the public in favour of public goods provision (Moravcsik, 1993: 486). These issues should also have strong and unified societal interests with government conformity. Again, if government does not support, it may lead to coordination of actions to combat with policy failure. Lastly, in order to predict a possible integration on the issue areas of “political, institutional or re-distributional policies”; a pressure

from narrow groups is needed where the implications are calculable. If not, it might lead to a loose public opinion or constrained elite opinion. In addition to societal interests, state action should be visible with calculable implications. Governments and political elites must enjoy a broad autonomy to take out symbolic goals (Moravcsik, 1993: 495).

Governments and states should be working together in a cooperative and harmonic manner for integration and profit maximization. However, this is not an automatic process. Conformity between the interests and a will to cooperate is essential. For Robert Keohane (1984), another pioneer of the liberal intergovernmentalism, conformity is pre-given because it is actually the matching interests between states and we should put an emphasis on cooperation since it needs special care and attention. In order to cooperate, states should establish institutions and institutionalize. Keohane (1984) identifies the integration process as the commonality of the behaviour, principles and decision-making between the involved parties. However, we should not forget that the initial purpose is maximizing the national interest. Within this period of integration, no state has an intention to make a progress without making the necessary cost-benefit analysis. No holy purpose could triumph the profit maximization will of the nation state. Therefore, governments will not cooperate just for making a partnership and serving to the peace, interest should be there (Ozdemir, 2012: 90). What happened in European integration is close to that, for Ozdemir (2012: 91); in liberal intergovernmentalist view, nation states are using the supranational institutions just for a tool to reach their self-interested goals and they know that it is impossible to reach it without using these institutions and play their integration cards (Ozdemir, 2012: 91). For Robert Keohane (1984) cooperation comes from potential disparities rather than mutual interest because cooperation is naturally an effort to harmonize the interests and policies between the states. To summarize, cooperation forms national interests in the internal politics and to generate and develop the self-interested goals, states should have to bargain at the supranational level to maximize their profits with a possible alignment.

Why nation states choose to cooperate when they know there is a possibility of potential losses in their sovereignty? If maximization of their profits comes from cooperation and being powerful in the international arena, then there is no question that states would

lean into that way. To answer the above question; power in the international arena comes from cooperation and states are afraid of being left out from potential coalitions and advantages coming out of those coalitions (Moravcsik, 1993). As an example, Moravcsik (1993: 501) uses Britain's journey towards the European Economic Community. Although Britain snubbed the first integration waves to keep other interests elsewhere, eventually cooperated with member states to prevent solitude in the international arena (Moravcsik, 1993: 503). In time, Britain became a member of the European Union. In the supranational level, coalition is important as the cooperation in the internal level. If the effect of any coalition causes negative consequences on the outside parties, then those parties choose to get involved. However, if the effect is still positive even on the outside players, then those players choose to stay outside for taking advantages without bearing any coalition costs (Moravcsik, 1993). Institutionalized structure and supranational institutions also help states to cut the costs of bargaining. For example, if a state has to follow an economic discipline policy because of the decisions coming from integration institutions then states may use this as an excuse to close up the internal bargaining and internal political costs (Moravcsik, 1993).

What is the position of integration institutions in liberal intergovernmentalism? Institutions matter because they give the actors clues about the other actors' behaviour. (Ozdemir, 2012: 91) The characteristics and defining principles of a one particular institution are shaped by the conflict of interests between the actors. However, once the institutional culture and values have established, then it starts to define and affect the behaviour of the involved players (Ozdemir, 2012: 91). When interests start to be similar, the threat of "sovereignty loss" and weakening becomes obsolete for a nation state, however, it does not mean that institutions are the supreme authority, there is no authority above the state in any given integration process. This similarity and continuity between the interests is the only way for an integration to move forward (Keohane, 1984).

1.3.4: Multi-level governance

The other important theoretical foundation that will help us to understand the Turkey's alignment to the European transport policies is Multi-level governance. At the first part of the chapter, we discussed functionalism and neo-functionalism, which are mainly the supranationalist approaches and the last part concerned liberal intergovernmentalism, which was fairly state-centred. Multi-level governance is a theory in the middle. It consists various actors including state, supranational institutions but also other agencies like civil society, non-governmental organizations and political parties and makes an assumption that effect of each actors' level should not be underestimated. As Hooghe and Marks (2009) points out; the roles of nongovernmental, supranational and non-state actors are indispensable for an integration process but the contributions of state and intergovernmental relationships should not be denied as well. Multi-level governance defines an integration policy where governance levels are diversified with different governance levels (Hooghe and Marks, 2003).

At first, participation to the decision making process is only possible at the state level. However, while the process continues, different actors could interact with each other and may decide to involve as well. Integration is a system where these different actors continuously negotiate among themselves (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). The combination of supranational, state level, regional, local and non-state actors and their active involvement is essential. According to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2003: 236-237), two types of multi-level governance are possible. One basic "first" type is the federalist system where the relationship between the layers of different actors is hierarchical. On the other hand, the "second type" assumes a far more flexible, non-hierarchical integration and decision-making process. The "second type" model contains high amounts of actors compared to federalism and this makes it the fundamental approach in explaining the multi-level governance analysis (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 237). Shortly, involvement of non-state, national and supranational decision makers of the process is fairly essential here.

In multi-level governance model, there is also a specific focus to the elected politicians and their position on European integration. Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996) clearly centred the position of elected politicians as the key actors of the process. For the reason of it, Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996) claimed: “Unlike judges, army officers, civil servants –or Commission officials, they can expect to remain in their positions for a matter of years rather than decades. Many are committed to substantive policy goals that are not derived from the goal of state executive control.” However, they are doing this in order to sustain their period in the government with electoral success (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 348). So, why they are choosing to share sovereignty when they exactly know that this could seriously harm their own political control? The answer is easy, if they get something in return. There are two basic reasons for a country for choosing to integrate than not. The first one is the “intrinsic benefits” coming from the European integration. If the political benefits of giving decision-making to the supranational level exceed the cost of losing political control, a country could easily be captivated by realization of potential efficiency gains like: decisional reallocation cost could be less politically salient than the efficient delivery of collective policies and costs could be lagged with respect to benefits and this may provide less political weight for the leaders (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 349). As a result, elected politicians could sacrifice their sovereignty in order to have a more efficient policy provisions, which may help them to hold their electoral success a little bit longer (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 349). Political parties may also prefer to avoid responsibility for certain policies and relieved themselves from the all the burden coming from the process (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). As an example, Marks et al. (1996) uses Britain and their fight over the Agriculture policy in the European agenda. To summarize, the political leaders may also shift decision-making to change the flow of political pressure, which could be seen from this:

“In response to the (sometimes violent) demonstrations of animal rights’ advocates in British Ports, William Waldergrave, the Minister of Agriculture, explained that the British government could not be blamed because effective decision-making was made in Brussels”. (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 349).

Obviously if elected leaders are having such distinctive position in the multi-level governance theory, the people who have elected them is also important. Public opinion on European integration has a powerful effect over the progress of integration process. Explaining such a scheme, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005) assume that citizens can evaluate the economic/political/identical consequences of European integration for themselves and for the groups that they are in part and these consequences motivate their attitude towards the whole integration process and the parties that favour integration/non-integration. With respect to this analysis, Hooghe and Marks (2005) presumed a theory that finds out the dimensions for the support to European integration from the community level. There are three different dimensions that could initiate a response from the public towards the integration process. These are: economic models, identity and political cues (Hooghe and Marks, 2005).

Starting with the economic models, some economic evaluations should be existent from the public to talk about its effectiveness. An economic dimension is only effective and valid when the economic consequences of a particular integration are perceived with some accuracy, they are large enough to matter and when a person really believes that his/her opinion really makes a difference on this ground (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 421). Secondly, Hooghe and Marks (2005: 423) believes that “identity” plays a critical role on the eyes of citizens upon the faith of integration. Since the European Union bonds national and European governments in a system of multi-level governance, it makes it more difficult for national governments to take out national preferences and clearly it undermines national self-determination (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 423). So, how the community reacts to such a change? Well, there are clear losers. As Carey (2002) identifies, national attachment combined with national pride could have a negative effect on the support for European integration. On the contrary, integration could also provide a strong sense of identity loss among the defenders of the nation and among anti-cosmopolitans (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 423). In order to answer the question of “how national identity could both reinforce and undermine integration?”, Hooghe and Marks (2005: 424) assumes the process as not automatic but indicated that identity and attitude toward integration is politically constructed.

This automatically leads us to the political ties, ideology and cues that form the political identity, which is a pushing force to challenge the integration process. According to Hooghe and Marks (2005), the European Union is a multi-level governance system that encompasses domestic political arenas, so we should expect domestic politics to shape public views on European integration. The writers then assumed that public opinion is constrained by political ideology, political parties and political elites (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 420). In here, party cues and ties are fairly important. Being supporter of a political party could mean as being a supporter of the party's overall stance over the integration. As Hooghe and Marks (2005: 427) puts it; individuals who support a particular party will have a tendency to follow party's position on European integration, which is called "the party cue". In addition to that Hooghe and Marks (2005: 426) also made two more hypotheses over party politics: 1) greater divisions between political parties on European integration make the citizens more likely to oppose the process. 2) If the political elite is more pro-integration and firmly believes to the European project, then it is easy to project a dormant national identity with a positively associated support for integration.

For the model of their theory, Hooghe and Marks (2005: 427) combined three different elements for support: the principle of membership, the desired speed of integration and the desired direction of future integration. For the presumption of the study, Hooghe and Marks (2005: 427) claimed that political parties and countries are important political context that are in an interaction with individual attributes to take out political effects. These effects could either promote support or opposition towards the European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 427). For the results, Hooghe and Marks (2005: 431) found that national identity mainly shapes the public opinion on European integration. It is more deeply rooted in people's minds rather than any attribute towards the European issues. Citizens have a tendency to look at the economic consequences in a great deal both for themselves and for their countries. Then they evaluate the positives of integration process by looking through their communal identities, views towards foreign cultures and later, it is also cued by political ties with ideology, party and elite opinion (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 431). In addition to that, economic consequences and communal identities should not institute a single voice across the EU but they

should interact with national institutions and elites. Moreover, where elites are united on Europe; the national identity and integration tend to coexist but if not, national identity may produce Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 431).

In a particular integration process, national political parties now exist in a multilevel polity where a decision over European integration might affect their further goals. (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 433) With regard to that, party position based on social cleavages also plays a role in the direction of the integration process (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 433). As introduced at the beginning of the chapter, political parties are the organizations with historically rooted orientations to response over the issues like European integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 433). The existing ideologies of the political parties interact with the ideas of political elite, interest groups, and social movements and influence the opinion of the public. In this regard, party stances over integration play an influential role. Marks and Wilson (2000: 436) found two dimensions that shape the party positions: political integration and economic integration, then they implemented their hypothesis on different political ideologies.

Social Democratic Parties: standing on the left of the class cleavage, social democratic parties defend greater equality with social welfare spending and political control of markets. The costs imposed by economic integration causes variation between countries and this makes these parties homogenous. European integration is a double edged process for Social Democratic Parties while they see the deepening of market integration in Europe as a threat to labour, they also seek to engage with it because of the possibilities on establishing social democratic regulations within the EU, achieving their goals on EU-level decision making. If a social democratic party is weak in the national area and have a chance to establish an influence with deepening, then it chooses to integrate. Likewise, integration is a possibility when they realize that they could not exit the single market (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 443).

Liberal Parties: They are the left-of-centre on economy and support a broad interpretation of democratic rights. It has a second variant called liberal conservatism, which puts an emphasis on economic freedom with a conservative –right agenda on

rights. Liberal conservatives are mainly supporters of European integration mainly because of lower trade barriers and institutionalized free markets but cautious to the idea of political integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 448).

Conservative Parties: Conservative parties address a support of economic liberalism and a strong opposition to social democracy. In economic area, they tend to support neoliberal policies where European integration should focus on market integration, constraining monopolies and a single market regime competition as a result. However, they are opposed to any further integration. Many conservative parties are the defenders of national culture, language and national sovereignty against the external pressures from international or regional organizations. Opposed to the neoliberals, they are against any weakening of national sovereignty, even if it is for the sake of economic integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 454).

As one can see from the above, political parties are the distributors of the established ideologies. In addition to that, European integration and the issues related with alignment policies play an important role, which should not be underestimated. Many political parties (either from a candidate or a member) have a European agenda now and its evolving. However, they are also organizations, which are coming from a long-standing vision composed by embedded ideologies (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002) A national location of a political party may affect the direction and flow of the overall process. With respect to that, Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) prepared an analysis that shows the exact positions of the party positions on European integration regard to their embedded ideologies. According to their analysis, conservative parties, which will be our main focus on this study while testing Turkey and the Justice and Development Party; they are moderately in favour to the integration process since their position on economic integration is strongly positive because of the extension of free markets and dissolution of market regulation. Thought they are also strongly opposed to any idea of supranational authority, which undermines the sovereignty of the state (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002). Party stances are not the same when you compare it from region to region. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Moria Nelson and Erica Edwards (2006), in their analysis called *Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West*,

asked the question of “Do the East and the West view on the European integration have the same or different opinions?”

To answer that, they conduct a research on the structure of party competition on East and West over an economic Left/Right dimension and a noneconomic new-politics dimension (Hooghe et. al, 2006). The economic Left/Right dimension concerns with economic welfare, redistribution and regulation of the economy. The Left proposes an economic equality and the right prioritizes individual economic freedom. On the other hand, noneconomic or cultural new-politics dimension concerns societal issues like ecology, lifestyle and community and it is more diverse than the Left/Right dimension (Hooghe et. al, 2006). The writers also claim some political positions or poles called gal (green/alternative/libertarian) and tan (traditionalism/authority/nationalism) and positioned the Western European countries as more prone to be between Left/Gal and Right/Tan. This gives us an idea on how the political actors position themselves on major issues such as the European integration (Hooghe, et. al, 2006).

For the part of the Eastern European countries, which are mainly transition countries from communism to participatory democracy, the picture is more different and versatile. Within those transition countries, there is a clear migration from left/tan to right/gal. Parties that have failed to transform after the communism or “transition losers” placed themselves as the initiators of economic equality with traditional authority (left/tan). However, the rising trend after the fall of communism is the right/ gal where the defenders of nonmarket distribution are gal (Hooghe, et al., 2006). In Hooghe et al. (2006) analysis, the study clearly shows that Conservative parties are Right/Tan, Liberal parties are Right/Gal and the Social Democrats are Left/Gal for both the East and West. The unchanged placement of Eastern left parties on the Left/Tan position is because of their rejection to capitalist system and shows their suspicion to any change (Hooghe et. al, 2006).

1.4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.4.1: Differentiated Integration

Last but not least for this chapter, the concept of “differentiated integration” will be used to identify the differentiation in Turkish case and the main answer to the research question. Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger (2015) claim that for any integration process, differentiation is an essential and the most likely outcome of the formation of any supranational level policy. There are basically two different models of differentiation, which we can apply to the cases this study covers.

The first model of differentiation is the vertical differentiation where policy areas have been integrated at different speeds and reach different levels between the European Union states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 765). The second model assumes a horizontal differentiation in which many integrated policies are neither uniformly nor exclusively valid for the EU member and candidate states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 765). If a member state chooses to exclude itself from a particular policy that the EU distributes then the model turns into an internal horizontal differentiation and if a non-member chooses to participate in the selected EU policies then the name of the game is external horizontal differentiation (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 765).

There are two important explanatory elements in the concept of differentiated integration. For an integration process to become differentiated, interdependence and politicization must be observable. Interdependence is a driver of integration arising from the basic need for an alignment when the both sides are indispensable for each other and politicization is the quite opposite which creates an obstacle for the dynamism of the process (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 765). Variations in interdependence could be a cause for the vertical differentiation where horizontal differentiation is feeding from a high level of politicization (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 765).

For an overall hypothesis, Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger (2015) summarizes that increasing interdependence between the sides creates a demand for more integration as long as integration keeps its borders between non-core state powers and integration

friendly countries and in this way, integration is likely to overcome politicization and choose to continue. However, once politicization enters the stage as interdependence continues to increase and other policy areas and countries became a subject of the integration, this will affect the core state powers, less integration friendly countries and mechanism within the countries (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). The end point for Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger (2015) is that differentiation in any European integration process is here to stay and survive. The non-member states who are interacting with Europe and having a highly Eurosceptic society which prevents them from implementing the EU agenda will start to answer the high interdependence by selective integration on non-politicized areas such as the internal market and this will cause an external differentiation (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). This model will be used to identify the ambiguous position of Turkey towards the transport integration in the later chapters.

The European Union itself characterizes and defines the concept as a differing arrangement concerning the member state participation to the various policy areas (European Parliament, 2016). The concept is also defined as the “variable geometry” and an “a la carte Europe” where different member or non-member countries are having the possibility to re-join their European counterparts on policy areas such as Euro and Schengen area (European Parliament, 2016). The United Kingdom and the recent decision of disintegration from the European Union seems the most genuine example that could be applicable to the concept. While explaining the Brexit decision, Schimmelfennig (2018) used the term “differentiated disintegration”, meaning that there is also a selective reduction on the level and scope of the integration coming out from the national level competences. Similar to the above conceptualization of the “differentiated integration”, this term could also be explained in two different levels. Internal differentiation means that a certain member state keep alignment intact while exists from some specific policy areas (Schimmelfennig, 2018). However, the external differentiation is explaining a different actor strategy that exits from the EU entirely but insist on keep participating some selected supranational policy areas (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Schimmelfennig (2018) explains the Brexit decision with the latter conceptual explanation.

Meanwhile, various other scholars also pointed out the validity of differentiated integration on member/non-member state decisions against EU-level policies. Andersen and Sitter (2006) study criticizes the current European studies literature because of its tendency to pay less attention to the different choices of the member states while continuing to align with the European Union. Since integration can be explained through different policy outcomes between regions, there is no single explanation of the actor's behaviour on sharing sovereignty (Andersen and Sitter, 2006). Therefore, the "differentiated integration" could be explained as a simple choice of a member or non-member state depending on their will on active participation to a specific sector (Andersen and Sitter, 2006). Leruth, Ganzle and Trondal (2015) study also underlined the same fact that the concept is never properly explained throughout history and mentioned this differentiation as natural to the "composite polity" of the European Union and. According to Leruth, Ganzle and Trondal (2015), only few of the EU policy areas are exclusive and most of them are regulated by the willingness of the member states. Therefore, opting-out is a naturally developed mechanism against the theories that appreciate it as a mere solution to the sovereignty challenges. The concept should not be limited into a crisis response mechanism (Leruth et al, 2015). While integration theories are continuing to explain the integration pattern in favour of the EU and "permissive consensus", the current challenges are indicating now that this is contested. The example of Turkey on the specific transport case is also another indicator of this challenge.

Tekin (2017) also indicates that the forms of differentiated integration are not a new phenomenon in the history of European integration. The term is always discussed and contested since the first glimpses of the integration process. Tekin (2017) characterizes "differentiated integration" as a method to explain the EU implementation of the states, which are having a pragmatic approach towards the common principles. However, Tekin (2017) study also underlined that the concept is especially useful for the EU member states to overcome instability in the integration process by using an opt-out option. However, this usage of the concept is also contested in this study since the concept itself is creating a stalemate in the EU-Turkey relations concerning transport.

This study advises that selectivity could be a useful tool but it could also be damaging to the integrity of the process.

About the applicability of the concept on the cases such as Turkey, Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012) study approves that “differentiated integration” is open to both member state decisions and non-member countries. External governance, where a non-member state is selectively approving the EU’s *acquis* on specific sector is an enduring fact in the European integration (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012). As a result of this fact, there is no fixed membership or integration status within the framework of the European Union nor there should be (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012). As long as the EU keeps the current structure, different standards of different groups will endure and their loyalty against the EU will always depend on the willingness of the countries (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012).

By combining a multi-level approach to the differentiated integration, Fumasoli, Gornitzka and Leruth (2015) provide a meaningful conceptual framework for this study. The both varying interdependence and degree of politicization is depending on the calculating of costs over integration but within a multi-level policy scheme, differentiated integration also occurs among the lower level decision making mechanisms, along with the member states (Fumasoli et al, 2015). Therefore, the concept also takes place in the policy-making schemes of the sub-national counterparts such as regions, cities, nongovernmental organizations and private corporations (Fumasol et al, 2015). Differentiated integration emerges from this dynamic interaction between these different levels of competences.

CHAPTER 2: EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY

2.1: MAIN THEMES OF THE COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY

What is the meaning of European integration on transport policy? When talking about the alignment of Turkey to this Common Transport Policy of the EU, exactly which policies or projects that a country has to implement for a full alignment with the EU? In a shorter way, what the EU demands from member or candidate countries in terms of transport integration? This short chapter is designed to satisfy the above questions with official answers. Starting from a basic historical background on the development of the policy area, the chapter will be continued by the basic elements of Common Transport Policy today with regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the White Papers designed for specific transport modes, EU-wide plans, projects and written regulations. The chapter will be concluded after giving some basic information about the pieces in the current literature on European transport.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union signed by the member states in 2007 at Lisbon and shaped the framework for the Common Transport Policy of the EU. Inside the Articles of 90 to 100 of the Treaty, the EU amended the measures to improve transport infrastructure, safety and the EU once again aimed to remove all the bottlenecks on the way towards a fulfilled integration on transport (European Union, 2012). Although the Treaty of Lisbon repeatedly shared a common vision for transport, the transport integration for the EU is not regulated recently. Transport has its roots in the very old passages of the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 first gave transport a role in the European integration aimed to fulfill three of four freedoms of the common market: free movement of individuals, services and goods (European Commission, 2014a). The only way to establish these freedoms was to create a single European transport area with fair competition and to overcome the bottlenecks for road, rail, maritime and air modes of transport (European Commission, 2014a). However, the progress was slow due to the fact that national governments were reluctant to give

control over the aimed network and in addition to these, the regulatory differences were also influential (European Commission, 2014a). Between 60s to the late 80s, the only progress achieved in this area was the 1985 White Paper to promote internal market on transport and the 1986 Single European Act decision which replaced unanimity with qualified majority voting for air and sea policies (European Commission, 2014a).

Although the progress was slow at that time, the European aims were clear: opening up the national markets in transport which are previously governed by strict national restrictions and public monopolies, and also abolishing unnecessary differences in technical and administrative standards between the EU member states. These ambitious aims later affected the influential attempts during the market liberalization of 90s and signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (European Commission, 2014a). The next stage for the Europe was to ensure the high quality transport services and this is where the Treaty of Maastricht came to help with vital new provisions on the vision of common transport. In the Treaty of Maastricht, the Common Transport Policy added a brand new Trans-European Network scheme into the agenda and the new dimension assumed an expansion, connection and modernization over the EU-wide transport infrastructure (European Commission, 2014a). Transport corridors were identified and put into the implementation agenda. For the first time, “forming of functional linkages” between the areas function of the transport policy became evident. Security, safety and environmental dimension of the transport policies are incorporated to the Treaty (European Commission, 2014a). In 1992, another White Paper published concerning the Common Transport Policy and promoted the idea of sustainability on transport and opening of the transport markets to competition, which later settled the ground for the EU to integrate all aspects of transport into the co-decision policy with more environmentalist measures in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 (European Commission, 2014a).

The new millennium signaled another shift to adopt new environmental measures and measures to overcome uneven growth in some transport modes, fight with congestion and road fatalities and plans over freight logistics (European Commission, 2014a). The White Paper of 2001 and Freight Logistic Plan of 2006 were the visible outcomes of

these new policies. A follow up White Paper issued in 2011 named as the “Roadmap to a single European transport area”, focused on the work remaining to be done to complete internal market including: building integrated transport networks between the modes, creating multimodality, removing any remaining technical bottlenecks, improving infrastructure of new members, emphasizing research on de-carbonization targets and environmental protection measures (European Commission, 2014a). By looking through the history of this evolvement, we can assume that it is essential for the European Union to properly integrate 28 member states with building the missing links with each other and remove technical barriers and streamlining the national differences (European Commission, 2014a). The ultimate aim was to achieve a single transport area and the European Union is still searching to achieve that by aiming to succeed on top quality transport infrastructure backed by enough funding, legislation and research and development (European Commission, 2014a).

Today, the European Union explains the issues on Common Transport Policy as an aim to develop and promote transport policies that are efficient, sustainable and competitive for the sector which also need to contribute to the overall growth and employment prospects of the EU (European Union, 2017a). There are still major challenges that the European Union has to overcome such as congestion affecting both road and rail traffic, oil dependency and a need to turn alternative fuels on transport combined with a need for cutting down the greenhouse gas emission to reach the 2050 goal of 60 % cuts and also building more competition by abolishing any remaining closed markets while tackling with unequal distribution on infrastructure between the member states (European Union, 2017a). The European Union (2017a) proudly presents the achieved less pollution targets, technological progress, safer skies targets, decent working hours and more transport choices as the EU achievements on this field but there is still work to do. For these newly emerged challenges, the EU established common goals for each member state on every transport mode. For road transport, the EU is willing to continue over cutting costs and provide efficient journeys with reducing pollution and uniform technical standards (European Union, 2017a). For air, the competition must be protected for easier and cheap travels with the addition of new airlines to the field (European Union, 2017a). The “Open Skies” management paved the way for the EU external

aviation policy and regulated the international air services. The Open Skies initiative aimed to stop any more bilateral agreements between the European countries and put the EU in charge for coordination with the wider world (European Union, 2017a). The Open Skies agreements with third countries (US, Canada, Israel, Balkan countries, Morocco, Jordan, Georgia and Moldova) allowed any EU airline to fly from any EU airport to any city in those countries (European Union, 2017a). Another target called the “Single European Skies” initiative promoted two packages for European aviation to meet future capacity and safety links and established targets in key areas such as effectiveness and environmental impact on aviation (Eurocontrol, 2017). In addition to these initiatives, in 2005, a roadmap document published to form a “Common Aviation Area” with the EU’s neighbor countries (European Commission, 2017a). For efficient travels for passengers and freight, the EU supports the idea of modal shifts from the frequently used road transport to other modes such as rail, air and maritime. These shifts are important for taking the burden from road transport and open space for cheaper, environment friendly and intermodal transport. This target is designed depending on the alignment in rail and maritime sectors.

For rail, the EU achieved and continue to protect the market liberalization where any licensed rail company can now offer its services anywhere in the EU (European Union, 2017a). Besides that, the establishments of high-speed rail networks and implementation of four different railway packages are essential goals of the Union (European Union, 2017a). Maritime is a highly important transport mode for the EU since it covers the biggest percentage of the EU trade and export to third countries. The opening of the maritime market and completion of the sea routes of the Trans-European Networks is substantial for the economy of the EU (European Union, 2017a). In addition to that, safety; decreasing number of deaths in maritime and safety standards with respect to ICAO and IMO provisions are a must for any EU member state to implement and regulate (European Union, 2017a). Definitely and for every mode of transport: sustainability, new green technologies, intermodality, interoperability and closing the infrastructural gaps between the countries are additional goals of the EU (European Union, 2017a).

In this sense, the European Union expects its member states to achieve on two grounds for integration: legislation and infrastructure. Legislation covers the EU regulations and directives on respected transport modes in order to achieve not only dismantling barriers but also integrating the national markets by open access, achieving technical compatibility, increasing passenger and freight (European Commission, 2014a). Legislation also stems from landmark legislative pieces that member states has to achieve such as four railway packages for the liberalization of national rail markets, laws on road and maritime cabotage (the transport of goods and passengers between two points in the same country by a transporter registered in another country) and two single European air transport packages covering common aviation rules (European Commission, 2014a).

To be more specific on the laws that the member or candidate states have to align, this study offers a mode-by-mode regulation analysis starting from the road transport. Road transport is the most common and used transport mode in Europe for both passenger and freight terms. Begin from the mid-1990s, the road transport policy in Europe started to open up its international road freight market and remove barriers to competition such as road haulage licenses for transport companies to gain access in another member state market (European Commission, 2014a). Closely related with this liberalization wave, much more was eager to come. The road charges decided to be not excessive or pose discrimination against foreign drivers between the member states and this led to the Eurovignette decision where an electronic common toll collection system integrated all vehicles to register and pass through road tolls in Europe after paying only a single fee based on vehicle weight and size (European Commission, 2014a). The EU has now common standards for maximum driving times (regulated by tachometers) and clear-cut directives and initiatives to cut down the road fatalities, which is still considered to be unacceptably high (European Commission, 2014a). The European Commission (2014a) initiated the Road Safety Action Program for member states to halve the number of the death in the EU by 2020. With regard to these accomplishments and goals, here the selected legislations for the road transport that member or candidate states have to implement while aligning with the Common Transport Policy:

- Road safety directive
- Policy orientations on road safety 2011-20
- Checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road
- Maximum weight regulations
- Testing to ensure the safety of vehicles
- One-type driving licenses
- Roadworthiness tests for vehicles
- Driving times, break and rest periods on road
- Usage of tachometers
- Road haulage operating rules
- Rules on access to EU road haulage market
- Eurovignette and charging of heavy goods (European Union, 2017b)

Increasing rail transport is the main concern of the EU aims on transport and it is the integral part of the EU goals over intermodality and interoperability targets. Europe had a very fragmented railway system before 90s because of the national considerations. Series of market liberalizations during last two decades turned this into a healthy direction for integration but still the EU's railways are not yet fulfilled their true potential. To achieve this true potential, the European Commission (2017b) proposed and promoted four railway packages between 2001 and 2016 with an aim to gradually open up the rail transport market completely for competition and establish the "Single European Railway Area". The Single European Railway Area included charging and capacity allocation rules, common provisions for licensing, train driver certifications, safety requirements, creation of the European Agency for railways and rail passenger rights (European Commission, 2017b). These packages established the legislative background of the European railway integration. The first package of 2001 led operators to have access to the Trans-European network on a non-discriminatory basis (European Commission, 2017b). Second package in 2004 put new provisions to the agenda such as improved safety directives, interoperability initiatives, complete opening of rail markets, establishment of the European Railway Agency for safety and fastening the liberalization process (European Commission, 2017b). In 2007, the third railway package aimed to revitalize the railways and complete the regulatory framework by

opening access to the passenger services and achieve commonality on driver licenses (European Commission, 2017b). Lastly, the fourth railway package proposed by the European Commission (2017b) in 2016 with two significant pillars: technical pillar regulations operated the safety and interoperability clauses and the market pillar regulated to offer more choice to the customer by completing the open market. With regard to these packages, the EU also wants member states to implement regulations such as:

- Development of the Single Railway Area
- Interoperable EU Rail
- Rail infrastructure and common standards for locomotives
- Competitive market structure and quality of rail freight
- Railway safety (European Commission, 2017b)

In aviation, the EU liberalized the transport mode through three successive packages ranging from airline safety to air carrier licensing, market access and competitive fares (European Commission, 2014a). The third and probably the most significant aviation package offered the principle of full freedom on operating an airline within the EU and provided services in a single aviation market combining airline operating with safety and security (European Commission, 2014a). The regulations and directives in this area are:

- Operation of air services
- Harmonization of civil aviation requirements
- Information for passengers
- Alignment with the European Aviation Safety Agency
- Integrating environment dimension to the aerial transport
- Alignment with the Single European Sky initiative for common air traffic management and air navigation services
- Interoperability of the European air traffic management
- Being a part of the EU-US Aviation agreement (European Union, 2017c)

Maritime and Ports holds the 90 % of the trade of the EU's external freight and 40 % of its integral freight (European Commission, 2014a). Starting from the 1986, when is the first legislative package of regulations included to the EU agenda for opening up the seaborne market, the regulations continued with 1989 cabotage rules combining common cabotage rules with tighten rules for the safety of seafarers (European Commission, 2014a). Today, environmental issues are now an integral part of the legislation to protect the sensitive marine environment. The European Commission (2014a) also follows the global standards put in effect by International Maritime Organization (IMO) to protect passenger rights. The European Commission (2014a) urges member states to integrate with the IMO legal instruments as a part of the European integration in this area. European Commission (2014a) also encourages voluntary actions in this field to improve the operations, especially for the modernization and investment of new European ports. Ports are vital for the maritime and other transport sectors concerning an intermodal infrastructure. Their modernization and investment is a key to develop an integrated and sustainable transport system. In this sense, public private partnerships for port development, investment, sustainability and integration with other modes are substantially important (European Commission, 2014a). In this perspective, such legal provisions are expected to be a EU policy with the help of member and candidate states:

- Single area for EU shipping
- Rules of Maritime Safety Agency
- Integrated Maritime Policy
- Port Infrastructure modernization (Green Paper)
- Maritime Safety
- Working hours for ships
- Multimodality by combining maritime with other sectors
- Security for ships
- Ports: an engine for growth (European Union, 2017d)

Naturally, only legislation is not enough if the EU wants complete transport alignment between the member and candidate states. A well-functioning infrastructure is a

substantial need for any legislative pieces to come alive. This is why the EU bids an important amount of attention to the infrastructural concerns of its members and the Common Transport Policy. Integrating EU legislation in force and establishing complete infrastructure are the only ways to achieve key policy objectives (European Commission, 2017c). Today, a great deal of the EU's transport networks is in a need for expansion and renovation for growth and more efficient trade. To overcome the problem of unequal distribution between the members and candidates, the EU offers the approach of Trans-European Networks on Transport (TEN-T) to establish the biggest infrastructure initiative in the continent (European Commission, 2014a). Needless to say, the TEN-T is also a negotiation chapter for Turkey as well and the EU expects Turkey to align itself with this important initiative. The TEN-T policy of the EU for growth and competitiveness supports 30 projects in total consisting roads, rail and inland waterways (European Commission, 2017c). The ultimate aim in this field for the EU is to establish a core network between the EU and neighbor countries with transport corridors by removing bottlenecks, upgrading infrastructure, streamlining cross border operations, improving connections between different modes and overall contributing to the EU's climate change objectives (European Commission, 2017c). The EU wants to feed this core network at regional and national levels but the member states and candidate states like Turkey who are desired to be future members, have to spend on infrastructure together with the financial assistance coming from the EU itself (European Commission, 2017c).

Member states are important actors in the identification of projects and these projects should be in line with the wider EU objectives on transport (European Commission, 2017c). Selection of modes and interconnectivity is vital here when deciding over projects, especially the maritime ports and airports became the Europe's gateways where they are connecting with rail and road terminals to provide key infrastructure for intermodal transport chains (European Commission, 2017c). In this planned core network and corridor approach, the EU offers sustainable transport solutions and these respected corridors:

- Atlantic

- Baltic Adriatic
- Mediterranean
- North Sea Baltic
- Orient-East Mediterranean
- Rhine-Alpine
- Rhine-Danube
- Scandinavian-Mediterranean (European Commission, 2017c)

Turkey's position within this corridor scheme is much different than the member states. As a candidate country, Turkey has to implement the TEN-T chapter both in legislation and infrastructure before becoming an official member of the European Union. The TEN-T corridor designed for Turkey will be combined to the existing corridors and help the established network to reach Middle East and Asia. In order to achieve this, the TINA (Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment) program offered to Turkey with a financial assistance by IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) coming directly from the EU (Turkey Ministry of European Union Affairs, 2016). This initiative aligned into the Turkish Transport Operational Program and infrastructure projects, which have been planned in advance. Currently, Ankara-Istanbul High Speed Railway construction (Kosekoy-Gebze Line), Irmak-Karabuk-Zonguldak Railway rehabilitation and Samsun-Kalin Railway modernization projects are under construction and these projects are funded and assisted by the EU. Moreover, a highly critical corridor for the European exit of the Anatolia, the Halkali-Kapikule High Speed Railway line is planned and waiting to be constructed as a part of the TEN-T corridors (Turkey Ministry of European Union Affairs, 2016).

Along with legislation and infrastructure on every mode of transport, concerns over environmental effects of transport and intermodality dimension of the policy plays a key role in the European integration on transport. As we have seen at the above, spill over effects such as safety clauses are visible in every part of EU legislation in this field. For infrastructure, it is especially important for the EU that planned routes should be calculated to protect the environment and ensure safety for passengers and drivers. For environment, the EU put important directives for member states to implement:

- Reduction in CO2 emissions of new passenger cars
- Reducing pollution
- Emissions of heavy duty vehicles
- Energy efficient road transport vehicles
- Maritime Pollution (European Union, 2017e)

In addition to these directives, the resource efficient travel project called “smart, green and integrated” has to be implemented to the member state agenda for reducing carbon emissions by innovation and replacing oil-based energy (European Commission, 2014a). Deep cuts in emissions are a supranational purpose and the expectancy is at least a 20 % cut of the current rate and 60 % by the year 2050 (European Commission, 2014a). “Cutting emissions caused by transport is a key part of EU policy, which is backed by numerous projects and initiatives to cut urban congestion, encourage more use of cleaner forms of travel such as rail and waterways” (European Commission, 2014a).

This automatically leads us to another significant EU initiative called the “intermodality” between transport modes to cut transport costs, create efficient travels for both passengers and freight forwarders and provide a positive effect on environment and human health. Shifting modes or using different modes in one journey could possibly give the EU the environmental and sustainable efficiency they seek in the transport policy. This is why the European Union created provisions prioritizing Intermodality for each member or candidate state to align:

- Quality of Rail freight (to shift road freight to rail freight)
- Combined transport of goods
- A sustainable future with intermodality
- Marco Polo program to reduce congestion by modal shifts
- Combination of modes in passenger travel
- Passenger rights for all combined modes
- Intelligent transport and ticketing systems (European Union, 2017f)

To sum up, this section is designed to answer the question of “What the EU expects from member or candidate states in terms of European integration on transport?” As a result, both legislation and infrastructure provisions and projects expected towards this alignment are stated in this short chapter, in order to settle further guidance for the case studies. Today, there are indeed challenges ahead of the European Union and future of the policy area depends on transforming the new dynamics and technologies into the supranational agenda. For overcoming these concerns, in the “Roadmap to a Single European Area”, the EU projected the challenges and named them for further considerations. Inside this roadmap, the EU declared that the supranational body is full aware of the future environment challenges and their relation to climate change goals and the EU showed its committed to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions in transport and clear congestion on road and air (European Commission, 2014a). Moreover, the EU knows the importance of the smart technologies. Efficiency will endure as a target in the upcoming future. That is why the EU continue to commit on intermodality by using new technologies and combine every transport mode rather than using a single form of travel and freight (European Commission, 2014a). Rational usage of the modes must also be combined with a modernized and sustainable infrastructure systems. Shift2Rail and SESAR projects are designed to keep infrastructure intact for the modes and modal shift in order to achieve rationalization and sustainability (European Commission, 2014a). As a result, promoting integration across different transport sectors must be obtained by developing common security concerns for safe travel and freight (European Commission, 2014a).

2. 2: A BRIEF LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN TRANSPORT

In a highly globalized world, transport issues are not exempt from the international concerns. Once a regional topic is now touching every nerve of the modern society. Researching in this field matters because the sector itself is facing important challenges. Neither Turkey nor the European Union is apart from these challenges. The Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) declared by the United Nations identified the vitality of

transport for all regions and countries. Rather than an obstacle, the MDGs considered transport as an indispensable engine for the regional development. The GTZ (2005) report on the question of “Why transport matters?” explains the nature of transport in two ways: first, with a complimentary role to the other sectors such as health, education and environment and second, as a stimulant for economic growth and poverty reduction (GTZ, 2005). Within its nature, transport naturally provides a path for integration. As seen from the GTZ (2005) report, its complimentary role is very similar to the idea of “spill-over” introduced by the theory of “neo-functionalism” of European integration.

Transport is an indispensable part of the economic development. Since European integration aims to achieve a welfare area for trade and growth, a sound transport infrastructure is a crucial determinant for completing this goal (GTZ, 2005). In addition to that, transport design also influences the distribution of growth by lowering the costs, leading to higher enrolment, improving the quality of life and reducing the number of road fatalities (GTZ, 2005). By minimizing costs and increasing the service quality, transport could provide an important step for any integration process by determining the efficiency of moving products (Tseng et. al, 2005). The importance of studying transport on European level also mentioned in John F. L. Ross’ (1998) book called “Linking Europe: Transport Policies and Politics in the EU”. On European level, transport matters since it is a prime example of the issue linkage (Ross, 1998: 10). Again in here, Ross (1998) repeated the very nature of transport studies as having a “spill-over” effect, which is the pinpoint for neo-functionalist theory. These issue linkages identify transport’s increasingly direct effect to other policy areas and vice versa (Ross, 1998: 10). “The numerous horizontal associations attest to the broad sweep of transport concerns, and these interlinkages are reflected in the markedly divergent treatment of the subject in the European integration literature (Ross, 1998: 10).

Although these interlinkages assume a natural “spill-over” reaction with other issue areas, Ross (1998: 10) criticizes the current position of the European integration literature by claiming that there are only a few studies having separate discussions on transport. The extensive treatment of the other policy areas did not provide an effect on the literature since there is a tendency to provide transport with policies such as

industrial and economic (Ross, 1998: 10). Ross' critique is only partly true since Germany and the United Kingdom based scholars gave important amount of examples where giving transport a greater appreciation rather than being a simple factor when it comes to European integration. For Germany; Lemkuhl (2000), Dienel and Schiefelbusch (2000), Seidel (2002), Schöller-Schwedes (2010), Brandt (2006), Beck (2011), Gand (1982) and Zender (1982) articles are particularly based on the topics/sub-topics concerning German transport industry and its place on Europe. Moreover, the United Kingdom also has a moderate amount of study explaining the situation in the country: Preston (1999), Hull (2005), Jones (2010), Banister (1985), Nash (1984) and Rutherford (1987). Only for Turkey, the critique could be counted as true. The last part of this chapter will give a detailed summary about Turkish transport literature on European integration which is lacking in quantity and only informative in quality.

Ross' (1998: 11) book continued with pointing out the uneven treatment to the place of the transport studies and the policy linkages that the transport problem provides. Again, John F. L. Ross (1998: 12-17) gave numerous policy area examples where the European Union transport policy has a synergy between, such as: industrial policy, competition policy, regional policy, energy policy, environment policy and telecommunications. Within the next few chapters, these issue linkages will be validated through Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey cases, comparisons will be made and with respect to the integration theories which based the issue linkages as the cornerstone of a specific country's integration process. Especially, John F. L. Ross' (1998: 17) inclusion of the area of "foreign policy" as in a close relation with transport policy is an important indicator of this study and will be used accordingly when it comes to analyze Turkey's performance for transport integration. Ross (1998) put forward the Western interests in the Middle East and the disputed Mosul territory even before the World War I and indicated the involvement of politics into a technical area. Surely, our Turkish case is at the heart of this disputed relation. Accordingly, with the Ross' (1998) ideas, this research also claims that Turkey-European relations on transport started before the establishment of the European Union and had a political nature rather than technical. The relations continued with a mixture of two even today.

Politicization of the technical policy areas such as transport has an important place in John F. L. Ross' (1998) book. Ross (1998: 17) explains this phenomenon as "Transport links are commonly used by states as instruments of political leverage". This relationship between the politics and transport issues will be analyzed in this research both in the EU-Turkey relations level and inner dynamics of the Turkish, German and UK politics. The politicization of transport questions in the European level assumes also a shift from neo-functionalist demands to liberal intergovernmentalist tendencies. As this research also inquires about these theoretical shifts, Ross (1998: 19) consolidates this shift and the importance of political inclusion by assume a bit further and explains transport issues as being the symbolic elements of a national consciousness, regarding it as having an importance bigger than its economic impacts. As an example, Ross (1998) uses the collapse of a French government back in 1952 over the question of railway reform. Furthermore, Ross (1998) also acknowledges transport policy as an international issue rather than regional any more, contributing this research's tendency to combine Turkish transport concerns with wider supranational issues.

European wide transport policy or common name- Common Transport Policy is the model project that Turkey is supposed to be buying and get integrated into whether for political or economical reasons. The very beginning of the Common Transport Policy goes back to the Treaty of Rome and philosophically, it has deepest roots. Anthony Sampson (1968) is one of the earliest scholars who mentioned the formation or necessity of the common transport idea and its possible extension. In his book called "The New Europeans", Sampson (1968) opens the case of "necessity" for cooperation when it comes to transport. Sampson (1968) regards the railways as the subjects of hope for the European states to integrate. Furthermore, the establishment of railways was making intergovernmental cooperation a necessity, giving meaning to the idea of one Europe. Even in 1968, Sampson (1968) projects a future where the European transport channels updated into an international sphere. Sampson (1968) mentions the importance of the Common Market for providing enough funds to create such a sphere.

Sampson's (1968) ideas are important for this research in three separate ways. First, he mentions the indispensability of the cooperation in this field. Sampson (1968) evaluates

the character of transport policy as the main source for European integration and wider economic development of the welfare area. Secondly, Sampson's (1968) writings are a both inspiration and a warning for this research. Inspiration, since he actually believes the idea that cooperation in transport between the states is inevitable. In 1968, he wrote about the suitability of transport for spill over effects. Sampson (1968) claims that the railways are not only important for the touristic purposes but also for cultural and economic purposes. He thought that the future of Europe is bound to the development of road and cars, which connects cities to villages and issue cohesion between the urban and suburban (Sampson, 1968). For the warning part, Sampson (1968) reminds us that the very nationalistic nature of the transport issues as well. At the time of his book, many European countries were holding the privatization of transport modes because of nationalistic purposes (Sampson, 1968). Given the fact that the chaotic Turkish history of transport privatization, international cooperation is a necessity for escaping nationalistic tendencies and wider economic growth. Thirdly, Sampson's (1968) writings about transport are well wide ahead of its time. He mentioned the first tryouts for "Single European Sky" idea and how the rivalry between France and Germany had to put an end to the idea back then (Sampson, 1968: 318).

By giving these examples, Sampson (1968) also shows that how politicized the nature of the transport policies. The political nature and existence of states as the sole decider was already existent before the World Wars. Sampson (1968) gave the example of the British Channel and the construction of the Tunnel. The construction of the tunnel had to be postponed because of the concerns coming from the British side and threats of a possible invasion (Sampson, 1968). If the tunnel had been established a year before the war, the European history might have been emerged differently says Sampson (1968), who also thinks that the tunnel gave a chance to Britain to industrialize its Southern regions and develop Northern France eventually. Assuming the inevitable issue linkage effect once more. As a summary, Sampson's (1968) writings evaluated the European transport policy as an important ingredient of the European integration where international meets the regional.

There are a few articles within the literature that answers the question of “Why does the European Union have a transport policy?” and usually try to understand it by focusing on a particular area, country or a transport mode. For a general answer, the European Commission has series of reports to persuade scholars. A 2014 report prepared to explain what does the EU doing in different policy areas and especially on transport. According to European Commission (2014a), the very first reason for this is to answer the need of the strong connections and networks for creating employment and prosperity. Transport networks are at the heart of the supply chain and it is the cornerstone of the European integration, which it is linked to the creation and completion of the single market, aiming to achieve a European transport area with fair competition rules (European Commission, 2014a).

Aviation and rail, dominated by national monopolies for decades opened up to the EU internal market and these types of barriers to access, unnecessary differences in technical and administrative standards have been removed or changed (European Commission, 2014a). This information is absolutely critical for Turkey and the EU relations as well. The European Union aims to abolish differences between the countries provide many liberalization attempts in Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey. For Turkey, aviation became the most evolved mode of transport after series of privatization and free market operations. However, barriers to access are still available for Turkey and the EU itself is the provider of these unnecessary problems. This is a point where this research and the above report part opinions.

Moreover, the European Commission (2014a) extends the points of necessities with claiming that the market liberalization is not enough to achieve the objectives of the European Union in this field. The complete integration and modernization comes with a sound infrastructure, completing the cross-border intermodal networks- namely the Trans-European Networks (European Commission, 2014a). As mentioned many times before in this research, both of our cases are important hubs, corridors and transit points of the Trans-European Networks. The European transport networks combine an integration pattern where legislation, infrastructural development and research/innovation should both take a place (European Commission, 2014a). This

research also aims to look at both these three factors while evaluating the integration performance of the three country cases. Finally, like the former articles in this chapter, the European Commission (2014a) report also put an attention to the issue linkages that the transport policy provides for Europe. As the report states: EU transport policy is also about helping and protecting the environment by finding environment-friendly transport solutions, securing the passenger rights within an integrated system, reducing pollution and accidents (European Commission, 2014a). Combining these with its economic role, the European transport policy considered as an integral part of the integration process, which creates a probable spill over effect and validates theories such as functionalism and neo-functionalism, which assumed the same.

Moving along with the literature concerning the implementation of the European legislation, four articles: Knill and Lehmkuhl (2000), Vierth, Schleussner and Mandell (2015), Beckers et. al (2010) and another Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) studies are an integral part for this research. In other words, their methods and models inspired this work to move forward along with transport studies and European integration theories. Starting with Knill and Lehmkuhl (2000) research, the article investigates the EU's railway directive as a legislation piece and measures the impact upon the domestic policy making context. Their article introduces its agenda by a simple critique assuming a well-known fact that member state is 'no star pupils' when it comes to the implementation of European legislation (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000). The transposition and enforcement of the European legislation in general is sufficient at the national level but European requirements tell another story, often neglected as well (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000). However, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2000) study shows that the railways case of the community is always a success story and even many member states went far beyond the minimum requirements of the EU integration demands. The factor behind or the reason behind this success on a technical area is the "bottom up" logic of the policy and the "bottom up" support (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000).

This "bottom up" logic support means a change at the political climate at the national level in order to win support for European reforms (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000). Knill and Lehmkuhl (2000) found this trigger of domestic change meaningful especially for

railways directive. So, how this European legislation impact upon the domestic policy making context or national support building does happen? First of all, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2000) evaluate the nature of the transport policy as “tiger without teeth” meaning that the directive is hardly pose any challenges. Secondly, the railway directive gave legitimization for political leadership (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000). In addition to those, the directive provides concepts for the solution of an important national problem and imposes strategic constraints for domestic actors that oppose domestic reforms (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000). Similarly, with this research, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2000) measured the impact of the European integration in similar national systems but in only one rather specific case. On the other hand, this research aims to show that some aspects of transport legislation are not “tiger without teeth” when it comes to more challenging cases such as candidate countries and their transposition patterns.

Another study that combines a comparative and case study methods is Vieth, Schleussner and Mandell (2015) research about the road freight legislative implementation in Germany and Sweden. Apart from revealing Germany’s implementation patterns, Vieth et al (2015) measures the performance of European road freight transport market on two different cases. Overall, the road freight market within the European Union is completely deregulated around the member states, however, the policy implementation is still up to individual EU countries to decide upon, as long as they do not violate the limits imposed by the European Union (Vieth et al, 2015).

Vieth et al (2015) studies the impact of this particular directive on four different road freight policies. The study shows that there are separate and different transport regimes mainly between countries like Germany and Sweden and systems differ especially regarding infrastructure (Viert et al, 2015). Viert et al (2015) research continues with investigating how these policy changes in national arena influenced the state budget, mileage performance and the environmental implications. At the end of the research, Viert et al (2015) conclude that German policy on road freight affected other policy areas and spill-overs to affect the neighboring countries. Another case study, Sweden resulted in a very similar environmental and budgetary effect (Viert et al, 2015). Similar to Knill and Lemkuhl (2000), Viert et al (2015) also measures the effect of European

integration and country performance on a specific directive along with specific country cases. Germany's spill over effect and clear cut implementation progress is an important indicator for this research. However, Viert et al (2015) assumptions do not provide a general pattern for integration in similar cases, which this research aims to achieve. It is also important to mention here that many of these transport classifications are using comparative and case study methods.

Beckers et al (2010) wrote a classification paper for comparing the market access for long distance passenger rail services in Europe, discussing its advantages and disadvantages for member states and their national regulations. It is another comparative work focusing on a particular directive (long distance rail services at this point) and a case (Germany rail sector). Beckers et al (2010) separate the rail sector governance models into two as "monopolistic network operators" against "open network" agencies. As you can imagine from the names, monopolistic networks assume a one agent dominated system along with discriminatory process. Open network on the other hand, is a non-discriminatory network along with many participants both public and private actors. Beckers et al (2010) use the German example to classify this comparison for market access in Europe. The justification for this case selection is Germany's position as Europe's largest market for rail services. (Beckers et al, 2010).

Germany is also an important example for the "open market" model of integration. According to Beckers et al (2010), Germany introduced a non-discriminatory market access for private companies as a result of the European integration process; however, the interesting research outcome is that there is no substantial amount of private actors on track competition. In other words, on legislative level, the integration is substantial but on matters of implementation, there is a low level of competition intensity. There are various reasons for this uneven integration process. Beckers et al (2010) assumes some factors such as the information advantages of the Deutsche Bahn (DB), a company holds more than 90 % of the passenger rail market, a vertically integrated structure of the German rail market and the network access. At the end, Beckers et al (2010) study gives this research an important validation point when it comes to German rail market, which is also a topic for this discussion. Moreover, there are similarities in

the development of Turkish rail market and its integration patterns. Needless to say, Turkish rail market liberalization has a long history of unfinished legislations and implementation.

Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) proposed another research about the integration patterns of the member states and tested transport policy issues such as road haulage and railways policies on country specific examples. Their research method and investigation path resembles this research except testing a broader range rather than specific transport policy issues. The aim of the Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) study is to search the impact of European integration at the national level, which the duo thinks that poorly understood in the current literature. Unlike their counterparts, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) criticize current Europeanization assumptions as abstract and limited. Rather than that, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) evaluates institutional adjustments across countries and policy sector but doing this by looking each sector individually to find out dominant regulatory styles/structure in a certain policy sector.

Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) study suggests three integration patterns for member states. These are: positive integration, negative integration and 'framing' integration processes (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). Each of these patterns has distinctive approaches with a look to different policy areas for measuring the domestic impact. As an example, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) are using road haulage policy for negative integration and railways policy for framing integration as specific cases. For country selection, Germany and United Kingdom also used as a pioneer nation for two categories. Starting with the road haulage policy, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) detected a negative integration pattern where the European Union acts as a decisive factor and challenges the domestic opportunity structure and challenges existing equilibrium. In Germany, a country where liberalization attempts took a hold until mid-80s, changed its pattern rather smoothly after the engagement with the European Union. The effects on the other member states are similar: "In principle, the Common Transport Policy had the same impact across the member states: a strengthening of the users of transport services, while putting the supply side of the sector under pressure." (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999).

Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) also use the European railway policies as a case point where understanding the 'framing integration' process. Framing integration process is visible where the European Union puts an emphasis on building national support for domestic reform. As happened in the integration of railway policies in the United Kingdom, the basic objective here is to influence the national values and participation patterns in the national level in a direction towards the projects and adjustments at the European level (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). In other words, the EU has to act in a "norm entrepreneur" way to impose its values and inject necessary adjustments. Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) approach is important in two ways for this research. First, the results taken from German and British cases are compatible with the results of this research, which provides wider correlation of results. Secondly, it provides a guideline for the research because of the pattern it follows: measuring integration in different countries, models with different cases. As you can see, lots of different scholars measured and evaluated member states' different or similar reactions to identical European acquis communautaire on transport when the state has similar external, internal conditions and governance models. Two of these scholars are Knill and Heritier (2000) and their account on elusive liberalization of European road and rail haulage policies in five different European countries. Knill and Heritier (2000) found out five different reactions over the same directive set. Where Britain and Germany significantly or radically transformed their transport policy, France, Netherlands and Italy only partly applied the regulations in a rather hesitated way (Knill and Heritier, 2000).

So, how can these different responses to the same challenges identified? By asking this question, Knill and Heritier (2000) propose a comparative explanatory schemes or factors as we can speak in order to show the differentiation. Factors include the current stage of liberalization in that specific country, the dominant belief system or problem solving approach and especially, the reform capacity (Knill and Heritier, 2000). Knill and Heritier (2000) approach and the factors involved to the process will be used in the coming chapters as an indicator for the integration performance of Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey and their comparisons. Especially, on the number of veto positions, both this research and Knill and Heritier (2000) study appreciates the emergence of the veto point factor in a great manner. Specifically, in German case,

Knill and Heritier (2000) had similar results. Besides the existence of number of different actors (veto points), Germany has a highly cooperative sectoral decision-making system. The main actors, which are the transport ministry and the railway management, successfully mobilized the support of scientific expertise on the topic (Knill and Herittier, 2000). Along with the “top-down” power coming from the authoritative EU legislation, the main actors persuaded railway unions, regional governments and opposing political parties (Knill and Heritier, 2000). This also gave us an idea about the involvement of multi-level policy actors into the game, either from public or private level. Concessions had been given to these actors for the sake of wider integration. Knill and Heritier (2000) summarized their findings on German case as follows: “the capacity to coordinate diverse interests and to compensate potential losers of the reform in exchange for their support is carefully “socially engineered”.”

CHAPTER 3 - GERMANY: THE PIONEERS OF TRANSPORT

3.1: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The case studies start with Germany, the biggest country of the European Union based on its population and one of the starting nations of the European integration. This historical overview aims to understand the phases of German transport development and the events that shaped its present structure. When we take a look to the geographical position of Germany, we can see that Germany is a transit country, which is at the crossroads of the European-Atlantic trade routes and still constitutes a hub for technological production. While thinking and writing over Germany, it is essential to address the effects of the two world wars, which deteriorated the infrastructure in the continent along with many lost souls. As an actor in both of the wars, Germany faced the worst of consequences in terms of transport infrastructure.

According to Paul Baron (1995), right after two world wars, the German transport system was in a catastrophic condition. Railway hubs, which were so vital for a transit country, were severely damaged in addition to the road damages such as the destruction of the bridges on Rhine, Elbe and Main rivers and also the canal bridges, which are the gateways of inland waterway transport systems (Baron, 1995). The situation was not so different for the other transport modes as well. Maritime transport affected by the costs of sunken ships and unusable ports whereas many airports of the country resembled a “crater landscape” as a result of the damaged infrastructure (Baron, 1995). The obvious need for restructure and reformation was in the hands of the separated country and their governments. The West German Model was the first attempt for the German integration to the family of nations in Europe and the newly formed supranational authority.

However, we should not take these West German attempts for modernization and development as the first starting point of German endeavors on integration. An integrated transport policy inside Germany and with other European countries was a case before the wars as well. The earlier examples of the integrated transport policy in

Germany found at the 19th century with the foundations of the Reich in 1871 which created the necessary conditions to meet the need for a demand of technical cooperation in order to promote a technical standardization and modernization of the transport systems (Scholler-Schwedes, 2010). The reasons for that vary from political to social dimensions. Basically the first reason came out from the organization of modern society in the 19th century with division of labor and differentiation of increasing social functions (Scholler-Schwedes, 2010). Political reasons were based around the new concept of “intervention state” whereas economic ones arise from the interests of trade representatives, Ministry of Commerce and agriculture stakeholders (Scholler-Schwedes, 2010). In addition to the goals of integration within the country, militaristic purposes also led German officials to went overseas and search for transport partnerships and investments. On the regional basis, these were the first attempts of the German government to integrate its transport infrastructure with other European regions. Inside of Europe seemed not enough since there were clear aspirations of alignment attempts with other regions at the time. For example, German firms like Deutsche Bank made investments to the construction of Turkish Railways in 1888 to reach Middle East for political and economic reasons (Georgeon, 2016: 317). Shortly, even before the world wars, German aspirations about an integrated transport policy were evident.

The afterwards of the two world wars welcomed the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany which envisaged a West German Model of European integration between the years of 1949 and 1990 and this West German Model assumed an economic integration based on industry-finance nexus (Anderson, 1997). As a founding member of the European Union, Germany had a lifelong connection with the integration process by generating a complex distribution of capacities and incentives for public and private actors altogether (Anderson, 1997). Connected to this model, Germany proposed an industry nexus plan concerning long range planning and investment policy combined with interpenetration of finance and capital and inter-firm cooperation (Anderson, 1997).

For transport, the early post-war period filled with policies to restore makeshift services between the years of 1945 and 1948 (Baron, 1995). Besides these restorations, the transport essential laws amended in this period to regulate the access of all carriers (Baron, 1995). As a result of the settled neoliberal economic policies after the wars, the integrated transport approach produced a new era for road transport hegemony with a significant amount of increase in the usage of automobile (Scholler-Schwedes, 2010). These new developments on the road sector eventually caused problems to the railway transport mode due to the fact that rail lost its monopoly in the sector, which was misjudged by German authorities (Baron, 1995).

Political shifts and changes in the government have always challenged the structure of German transport policy. These shifts were much more significant before the 1990s and before the establishment of the Common Transport Policy of the EU. Since the country was divided until 1990, two different approaches on transport followed by German policy makers. The West German model, as we mentioned above, followed a social market economy approach towards transport policies. This approach signified a neoliberal openness and competition including multimodal passenger/freight transport and strategic planning. On the other hand, the East German model was far different than the former. Similar to all other socialist models of the time, transport was an important prerequisite for economic welfare and development but highly different to the system in the West since tariffs and domestic railway freight rates were significantly low in order to encourage public transport and discourage private car ownership (Baron, 1995). These political and ideological divisions between the separate regions continued until the unification of the country.

3.2: A BRIEF LITERATURE ON GERMAN TRANSPORT

After showing some pieces from the literature concerning European integration process on transport as a whole or on a particular directive, let's now see the literature about the performance of specific countries on the towards Common transport policy of Europe. For the sake of contributing to our research, only German, British and Turkish cases will be evaluated to find out similarities and differences. As indicated at the above pages, lots of different articles in the literature are mainly concerned about the domestic

impact and transformations rather than evaluating the total picture and different roles assigned to distinct partners. Lehmkuhl's (2000) article is one of them. In this particular piece, Lehmkuhl (2000) tries to analyze different domestic changes happened in two cases towards Europeanization analogy. Within these two cases, Germany is the one that this research is concerned of. Similar to other articles, which use Europeanization doctrine, Lehmkuhl (2000) study shows the impact of European integration on societal structures and mainly based on a focus over the business associations of the transport sector in Germany and the Netherlands. Unlike to the research in your hands, no priority was given to the integration process. But on the other hand, Lehmkuhl (2000: 1) is also interested about the roles of interest groups and mention this while saying: "Given the importance of organized interests in national political systems, it comes as no surprise that a great deal of attention has been paid to the role that interest groups play in the process of European integration." This importance on focusing the national level and the roles of interest groups is followed by a critique to the neo-functional understanding towards the integration process. Lehmkuhl (2000) refers a defect in the theory by criticizing its promise and failure on generating an organizational adaptation by improving the organizational representation at the European level. The empirical evidence Lehmkuhl (2000) suggests that the organization's focus has not been diverted from the national theatre despite the pressure coming from the European Union.

Lehmkuhl (2000) research analyzes how the transport sector in two countries under study (Germany and the Netherlands) has changed because of the economic impact of European integration and trade associations are the case for evaluation. Like Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) assumption, Lehmkuhl (2000) also characterizes Germany as a corporatist country in nature where strong state cooperates with dominant interest groups, stakeholders in the society. Moving on the history of German integration to the European transport area, Lehmkuhl (2000) explored a significant change in the behavior and position of domestic actors. The role and dominance of the road transport/trade/commercial associations (the main stakeholders in this matter) in the price setting committees represented in the administrative council where they cooperated with the state, diminished and changed in a position where the committee loses

its desirability for these associations (Lehmkuhl, 2000). In both countries, Germany and the Netherlands, the domestic impact of the European integration on the position of these associations are negative and this led to a decrease in the willingness of firms to participate in collective action. However, similar to the results coming from the Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) research at the above, these associations tended to transform themselves to the position where they can meet with the rules of the new game in town, regardless of the negative impacts. As Lehmkuhl (2000) strengthens this idea, he mentions associations' attributes to the European integration and their assigned importance to European institutions. As an example for this, Lehmkuhl (2000) uses the founding offices of these institutions in Brussels as the most visible expression of the importance that they assigned to European institutions where they can directly meet and bargain.

Lehmkuhl (2000) study identified a transformed association system in Germany after European integration. After the establishment of integration patterns, domestic impacts of the transformation were an enormous dynamic increase in the growth of the transport industry, leading to the fragmentation and differentiation of the transport modes and transport markets (Lehmkuhl, 2000). After facing some negative position throughout the process, transformed associations have started to compete for members, which was a necessity for them since they relied heavily on a great deal on the material income coming from the protection measures of 80s (Lehmkuhl, 2000). This obviously led to a dramatic decrease in the influx of resources these associations had before but they choose to adapt new rules immediately instead of opening up a struggle against the state and the European Union. The reason for that is the same in the Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) analysis, the trade associations wanted to regain the organizational stability rather than losing their position and their connections with the German state (Lehmkuhl, 2000). As mentioned before in this chapter, it was unwise for stakeholders to lose their effect over a lost cause.

Brandt (2006) on the other hand, evaluates on another domestic impact took place in Germany after European integration. In his article, Brandt (2006) focuses on local transport in Germany and the dynamics of liberalization. Mainly, the change in behavior

and the diverging roles between state and the private sides are the subject for analysis. In a nutshell, the article starts with direct comparisons and references to the situation before liberalization in the field. In these comparison and historical background, Brandt (2006) identifies the situation in local transport before liberalization as a mainly a municipal and state task. Like all protectionist transport economies, private transportation was only active on a lesser degree (Brandt, 2006). However, once liberalization started, the roles of the different driving forces are gravely important.

According to Brandt (2006), the effects of liberalization were dependent on the both different decision making systems in national and international bodies. It is evident here that we cannot take out European Union and the EU pressures as a factor when it comes to further liberalization. The local transport directive was an important push factor for the German state as Brandt (2006) clearly states that the EU directive were the initial points for the reorganization of the public transport sector in Germany. The directive changed German regulations and opened local transport into competition. However, for the national dynamics, the regulation is handled by the two sectors: private organizations and the states (Brandt, 2006). Besides the push factor from the EU, both the state and society were willing to address those policy changes. On one side, the German states provided enough funds and investment for the regulation to take place and also, ensured a fair competition in the market (Brandt, 2006). On the other side, the private field players such as consumer organizations also powered the implementation of the new legislation by demonstrating influence (Brandt, 2006). In addition to these, the German state also undertakes new roles concerning the making of new legislation. Brandt (2006) explains this new role as a negotiator position and declares that the level if the German Federal Government seems to act rather as a policy moderator and co-financer between the national field and the European Union. To summarize, Brandt (2006) analysis once again showed us the importance of interaction between the actors on the way towards integration. Both willing actors, combined with the push factors coming from the European Union, can achieve a very smooth process. Although it is only telling the story on one transport field, Brandt (2006) is very important to understand the main driving forces in German transport liberalization. On general transport legislation, these actors are also evident.

When we continue over the literature evaluating the liberalization process in Germany, Beck (2011) study on the German railway market shows us the current trends in the German market, liberalization aftermath. Beck (2011) summarizes the evident market barriers even after the market is open for competition. Indeed, Beck (2011) accepts that Germany, along with the United Kingdom, is one of the most intense cases of liberalization. As a result of the railway reform in the country, there is an important increase in the use of competitive practices but the direction of the practice is towards controlled competition rather than addition of countless firms (Beck, 2011). On the other hand, in terms of volume and kilometers, Beck (2011) identifies the German rail transport market as the largest competitive market evolved since the market reforms took place. Although failed to establish desired competition style, the German rail market achieved to be the first in Europe. In relation to that, Beck (2011) study assumes a model to understand the tendering procedures in railways and an empirical study analyzed whether market entry barriers can be identified. Even though the study gives an analytical look over the liberalization actors and changes in the market, it falls short on theoretical look and giving fully- fledged domestic impacts when compared to its counterparts within the literature.

Different from Beck (2011) and the other scholars above, Gand (1982) tries to give us a picture of the organization of transport in Germany and Germany before the 90s and speed up integration period. However, even that period when no integration process yet to be taken, Gand (1982) assumes a high standard for all modes of transport and that German transport was capable of meeting the demands for mobility and for a free choice of the means of transport. Importantly, Gand (1982) is telling about “issue linkages” which is fundamental for many integration theories and argues that these issue linkages are the reasons for the German state to understand transport policy priorities. “Environmental protection, energy policy and traffic safety led to a reconsideration of transport policy priorities” (Gand, 1982). This led to a federal investment decision based on a federal traffic infrastructure plan aiming at intermodal planning on cost-benefit analysis (Gand, 1982). For the other actors besides the plans of the state, Gand (1982) underlines the considerable influence of regional authorities on the federal

policy. In addition to that, the international rules and norms also played an important role of German state's transport plans back then. According to Gand (1982) again, the Federal Republic of Germany has to take into account the international dimension of its transport policy since a change in Germany would effect a change in the whole European traffic arteries. Although it is only a simple look to the German transport systems in 1980s, Gand's (1982) study is important for showing us that there was already a cooperative link between the German state and regional authorities for to forward on interlinked transport systems. Moreover, issue linkages and intermodal transport goals were taken place long before the liberalization process. As a result, we can say that as a corporatist country, the integration pattern was ready even before the European integration process. However, different from the other pieces in the literature, less importance made into the protectionist measures of the 80s.

Finally, for the Germany part in the literature, Jeffrey Anderson (1997) proposes a German Model for European integration. Although it is not particularly related with the transport policy, it is gravely important to understand how Germany embraced the dynamics of integration far more swiftly than the other European countries? Anderson's (1997) evaluation of the German model characterizes the state-public relations as an exaggerated support for multilateralism based on ideational factors the Germany had to erase the antipathetic memories of the World War II. Similar to Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) model of governance, Anderson (1997) defines German model dynamics and political economy as an approximation of neo-corporatism based on the principles of consensualism, liberalization and domestic compensation. The whole integration model of Germany is premised on peak bargaining among the social partners of the society and the state (Anderson, 1997). By stating that, Anderson (1997) accepts the reality of the high level state-public cooperation in corporatist integration models. However, Anderson (1997) also states the fact that sole participation for cooperation is not enough; public level should also be well informed and ready. Fortunately, German associational life is well developed enough and highly articulated (Anderson, 1997). The state level also encourages this intellectual participation where these groups enjoy a ready access to the negotiations and have legitimacy within the policy process (Anderson, 1997).

Since Germany has a federative government system, the German associational public life is much more different and divergent than the other European countries. State governments or *Länders*, also enjoys a real political autonomy in Germany along with interest groups (Anderson, 1997). In this corporatist model Anderson (1997) demands the meeting of organizational strength and political coalition for moving forward towards integration. An “ideational consensus” must meet before the economic and political integration starts (Anderson, 1997). Anderson (1997) repetitively calls for a harmonious fit between the ideational and physical worlds of the counterparts. “The close, harmonious fit between ideas and institutions in the West German political economy rested on a deep consensus in society concerning the market, the state, and their relationship to one another” (Anderson, 1997). For understanding this deep consensus and actor behavior, Anderson (1997) also investigates the ideational nature of these parties.

For the political system of the country, Anderson (1997) identifies a political consensus on integration process, especially between the right and the liberal parties of the time. Today, the coalition is even greater. For these parties, valued integration as the unavoidable yet ultimately acceptable price for regaining elements of state sovereignty (Anderson, 1997). By stating that, Anderson (1997) accepts the factor of “regaining political acceptance” in every sphere of the country as an attempt to erase the hazy memories of the past. This could add an ideational focus of German elites on the integration process where the process could be counted as the only way to achieve that (Anderson, 1997). This resulted in the acceptance of the Treaty of Maastricht and the general consensus that generated within the country besides the count of any undesired effects of the integration (Anderson, 1997). In other words, the idea of being a part of the multilateral world again, established an ideational acceptance focus of German elites towards integration and they see this as an opportunity rather than a threat to sovereignty. In the United Kingdom and Turkey cases, this focus is highly differently. All in all, the German model suggests a broad area of common interest between the European Union, German policymakers and the community officials (Anderson, 1997). The interest associations, both in the level of big businesses and labor organizations,

responded to the intensification of the integration in a great deal with a combination of opportunistic and defensive motivations (Anderson, 1997). After Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) model, Anderson (1997) article validates the governance style in the country and provide a basis for this research.

3.3: COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This country analysis part covers the important aspects of German transport. As mentioned constantly in the previous chapters, Germany plays an important role in the European transport. First of all, Germany is a leading example, which contributed to the formation of the European Union and European integration. Secondly, the country is a significant transport hub. It is at the crossroads between Europe and the United Kingdom, and provides high technology airports and highways to the European economy and the Single Market. Finally, the political structure of Germany and its governance structure in transport is a good comparative example for our further cases of United Kingdom and Turkey.

This section will start by identifying the nature of German transport policies by looking through the transport governance structure in Germany with the help of the typology introduced by Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) analysis over the liberalization of road haulage in the European Union. Then, the next step will be finding the correlation between the governance structure in Germany and its integration patterns on transport. We will use the main assumptions of three integration theories to understand the current level of integration in the country. At the end of the section, summary of findings will be underlined for comparisons of Germany with two other respected cases in order to detect any similarities and differences and generating a hypothesis for the integration of corporatist countries.

With respect to the definition of transport governance typologies coined by the study of Kerwer and Teutsch (2000), we can identify the governance structure of Germany as corporatism when it comes to make decisions on transport. Kerwer and Teutsch (2000)

study explains German liberalization on road haulage policies based over the country's corporatist tendencies on governance. This study identifies that not just the road haulage policies but the sector in total is regulated by a corporatist style of governance. For the sake of remembering the concept, corporatism as a governance model means a structure in a neoliberal economy where the action capacity of the state and the action capacity of the society are resembling a high level of impact on the decisions taken over transport (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2000). As Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) describes it clearly: "In Germany the transport sector was regulated in a corporatist style. Transport associations co-operated with the Ministry of Transport and a special regulatory agency in the administration of the sector and the setting of rules and standards."

The corporatist structure in Germany has a strong state capacity, which also makes a space for the interest groups and stakeholders in the transport sector to involve to the decision-making processes on European integration. To understand the transport governance in Germany, one should not underestimate the roles of the both sides. However, since each side have high action capacity over the policy making, different examples will show that actors might compete with each other over different policies where one actor influence more than the other one to change the direction of the integration process. In the remaining parts of this country analysis, examples and actual evidences will be used to indicate these power relations. Before starting the analysis of integration patterns and the current integration structure in Germany, the integration actors must be identified.

First of all, the state in Germany has a high level of influence concerning the matters of transport. The transport mainly organized by the Federal Government and the main regulatory body is the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI). Because of the federal structure of Germany, each local government also has its own governance structure over transport and its own Ministry of Transport but policies that affect Germany on supranational basis like the European integration are mainly the duty of the Federal Ministry. Though, this does not mean that the local agents and local Ministries are not a part of this process. Although their part in the integration generally considered as minor, their influence on the Federal decisions is substantial. The Federal

Minister of Transport heads the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure and currently responsible for the work of the department, which comprises the Ministry and a total of 63 executive agencies (BMVI, 2017). The Federal Ministry has the official duty to make the strategic alignment and coordination of Germany's EU policy on transport and the strengthening of bilateral relations with other European states combining with the strategy to assist the German companies and stakeholders who desires to establish business at the abroad (BMVI, 2017). These duties officially make BMVI as the highest authority of the German transport policies when it comes to transport integration of the country. Besides the Minister him/herself, the Ministry also have an office of the Policy-Issue Directorate General who are responsible for the development of EU-specific policy issues, strategic policies, infrastructure planning and the Master Plan for transport (BMVI, 2017). The issue area of the Directorate- General ranges through aviation, waterways, and shipping, land transport, road construction (BMVI, 2017).

As mentioned at the above, the BMVI is not the sole decision maker of the integration process. Different stakeholder organizations ranging from the civil society actors, local political parties and the business groups are highly active and enthusiastic to shape policies of the German state. As a matter of fact, there is a need to take account the interests of the government and the interests of the stakeholders in this field together when it comes to understanding the transport integration in Germany. The interest groups in Germany are also very diverse. It ranges from ordinary transport mode groups to business associations and environmental groups. Here is a list of associations who are taking an interest on the German transport:

- Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies
- German Association of Transport Services
- German Logistics Association
- German Transport Forum
- German Railway Industry Association
- Federation of German Inland Ports
- German Association for Freight Forwarding and Logistics

- Association of German Transport Undertakings
- German Association of Cities and Towns
- EVG Railway Trade Union
- German Partnership for Sustainable Mobility

Besides these organizations, many other civil institutions are collaborating with the state depending on their transport expertise. Much of these associations are highly active and negotiating at the state level. As an example, the German Association of Transport Services could be satisfactory. The Association defines itself as an active sector association, which is in collaboration with the channels of politics and economy (VDV, 2017). The association encourages its members to get in touch with the area of politics and economy in order to exchange knowledge and prepare the economic and legal principles for transport decisions (VDV, 2017). Moreover, the Association also represents itself as a protector of the interest of its member companies in regional and European level, also have offices in both Berlin and Brussels where they aim to create a lobbying web between the European and member state Parliaments as a coordination unit (VDV, 2017).

Another coordination organization is the German Transport Forum. The Forum presents itself as the only inter-carrier economic association in Europe and has an aim to improve the maintenance and development of mobility conditions which is highly important for the growth of the economy (DVF, 2017). The forum combines transport with other sectors such as energy and finance with the help of over 170 member companies highly active in Germany and Europe (DVF, 2017). Similar to VDV, the German Transport Forum also has lobbying offices in Berlin and Brussels (DVF, 2017). For the last example, this study introduces a functional trade union, EVG (German Railway Trade Union), as an active party of the German transport integration. The German Railway Trade Union (EVG) is active more than 120 years and aims to protect the interests of the transport workers mainly working in the area of railways (EVG, 2017). The EVG is an interesting organization to study when it comes to its involvement to the German politics. The Union prepares comments over railway packages, ideas/proposals over social regulation policies and evaluates the European


reforms on behalf of its members (EVG, 2017). In addition to that, the Union also fiercely criticizes some European reforms such as the 4th railway package but also appreciates the importance of some European goals such as sustainable mobility (EVG, 2017).

As stated at the above examples, the German stakeholders in the transport sector are highly diverse, influential and wide ranging when it comes to their involvement to the decision making process. Firstly, most of them are active on the supranational level and have direct contact besides their commitments at the regional level. This clearly shows that most of them are already aligned themselves and shifted their positions to the European sphere of influence. Moreover, these sub-national actors also provide a connection perspective for their members at the home if they ever want to be heard at the supranational level. Secondly, some of these groups such as German Transport Forum and German Railway Trade Union are working towards multiple transport modes and policy areas in order to achieve more activism in economic growth decisions and help their members to thrive within the current economic structure. VDV combines transport with energy and telecommunications and EVG combines transport with social regulations and sustainability and these connections offer new areas of possible collaboration for each integration actor. The concept of “spill over” is already internalized in these organizations and clearly adds another dimension to the negotiations they made with the German government, local authorities and Brussels. Last but not least, it must be understood that these organizations are still interest groups and they also have a natural duty to protect the interest of their members and their country. So, when we are dealing with their policies, we have to take account their role as rational interest seeking mechanisms for the welfare of their member groups. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the assumed activities on the supranational level shows the efforts of these organizations to become an active part of the decision making system of the EU.

Stakeholder actions in German transport are not limited with the interest groups and the significance of German regional/local politics and effects on the other political actors should not be forgotten. Germany is a Federation and BMVI is only operating at the

Federal level. Obviously, the main regulatory body about the transport issues is the BMVI at supranational matters and politically, the Ministry is now under the influence of current government: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) partnership. However, as a natural outcome of the Federation systems; local authorities and political parties play their role when an issue relating the integration crosses their regional interests. In fact, the current Transport Minister of Germany is Alexander Dombriant and Dombriant is a member of the CSU, which is the coalition partner of the Christian Democratic Union. As a result of these political relations, when a push comes to shove, domestic political issues could either move forward or stall the degree of integration. As a matter of fact, while talking about the interests and the role of the stakeholders in German transport integration, we have to analyze the business, trade unions, local governments and political parties altogether along with the interests of the federal government. Like in every corporatist model, both German government actors and political organizations pay enough respect to the transport issues. The mainstream political parties are the governing coalition: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, Social Democratic Union as the coalition partner of the CDU/CSU, The Left (Die Linke), Greens and Alternative for Germany. The interesting observation here is that most of these political parties, except the far-right Alternative for Germany, are optimistic and supportive about the European integration in many policy areas including transport. The detailed information about their visions on transport integration declared in their party manifestos will be given later in this chapter but it is fair to declare beforehand that each of these political parties have modest, progressive and positive views about the ongoing integration process. Examples concerning the issue of road haulage and railway package will give the reader more detailed information about the involvement of political parties and contribution of their different agendas to the process of the alignment of European norms into the domestic politics. It is also fair to say that even though the political parties have different views and policy proposals for different political occasions, both past and present governments have followed a similar path towards the integration process on transport and it was mainly positive and supportive. Government changes or the establishment of unlikely coalitions did not change the positive views towards the process.

To summarize the roles of different actors in Germany, we can elaborate the German transport model as a product of a “sectoral corporatism”, which is a term coined by Kerwer and Teutsch study in 2000. Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) study identified that the sectoral corporatism is historically developed in Germany and still applicable given the current political and sectoral climate. The aim of the rest of this chapter is to analyze the current integration results for Germany by looking through the established links between supranational, national and sub-national actors and their effect on the progress of transport integration to the EU. The below figure indicates the integration pattern in Germany and the roles of different actors.



Proposed German Pattern of European Integration on Transport

Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) study explains the above figure as the scheme for “Transport associations co-operated with the Ministry of Transport and a special regulatory agency in the administration of the sector and the setting rules and standards.” Of course, this pattern evolved after many years and the assumed positive tendency towards the European norms developed in coordination with the supranational authority as well. Traditional corporatism may also lead to a place where sectoral interests overcome the supranational pressures. Today, it is still observable in some cases of German corporatism but in general, German corporatism found a way to overcome any roadblock against full integration. According to Kerwer and Teustch (2000), it was the European Union that changed the understanding of sectoral corporatism in Germany even though some traditional meanings of the concept are still active. Yet, traditional corporatism in Germany started to lose its influence when it comes to the alignment with the European reforms (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000). In the past decades, the industry’s call for more flexibility and lower prices went unheard by the government who is willing to integrate, and the supranational side that aims to push

Germany (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000). However, over the years, the interaction between the sides made the policy area as a ground for compromise where each side internalize to calculate their interest for the direction towards integration and common interest.

As a result, within this interaction, both state and stakeholders send their policy choices to the upper level, the European Union and choose to deal with the pressures coming from Brussels. For decades, both sides positively or negatively challenged their proposals and demands. As we will see in the next section, the integration rate and performance of the German State is more than satisfactory as a result of this positive interaction. Obviously, the reasons for that result in a highly corporatist structure will be stated in this section where the state-stakeholders-EU relations had its rise and falls in Germany like any other European state. Regarding the words of Haluk Ozdemir (2012), an integration process continues when the stakeholders are aware that the gains from the process exceeds their losses, and if they think that the process may damage their interests or increase their debts, then they might think to opt out or stall any proposal coming from Brussels. The reason to underline this statement in here is that in Germany, both situations are observable within German transport history. However, the high rate of integration at the end is indicating that the conflict of interests between these groups is manageable if a country has a willing state with a pro-European agenda, political parties that are concerning about “transport policy” rather than “transport politics”, business associations/trade unions which are seeking their interests but at the same time, open for alignment and finally, the European Union aiming to be at the side of compromise when a conflict comes into agenda. Luckily, Germany has all four counterparts in order to successfully convert a corporatist transport regime into a fulfilled part of the European transport.

The current German government supports the EU’s Common Transport Policy and agrees to assist the alignment with enough financial assistance to push for further integration with Europe. According to the BMVI (2017) website, the German government currently prioritizes four different projects with respect to the EU directives, which are vital for both the country and the EU. The Trans-European Networks are significantly important for the State and it basically makes Germany as a

transport hub since 6 out of 9 corridors are cutting through Germany (BMVI, 2017). The Federal Transport Infrastructure Program (ERDF) is also designed to meet the needs of the EU and financed by the European Regional Development Fund (BMVI, 2017). The Infrastructure Program and the funding are critical since it aims to reduce the disparities between local regions and transform the old infrastructure in Germany (BMVI, 2017). The German Government cares about these types of European projects because it builds links between the neighbor countries. As an example, the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link is a projected tunnel between Germany and Denmark where Germany, Denmark and the EU is working together (BMVI, 2017). Lastly, as a direct reference to an old peace and cooperation agreement, the Elysee Treaty of 1963, the Common Transport Policy also helped to continue the peace and goodwill relations between Germany and France. The Franco-German cooperation on transport inspired by the 50th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty which gives the German state an opportunity to continue to cooperate with France on the grounds of joined transport initiatives (BMVI, 2017). These four examples summarize the current German Transport Ministry's view over the European integration. It defines a strong support on common interests.

Inside of a corporatist sector, a willing state definitely needs supporting business associations and trade unions. Unlike the concept of Etatism where the action capacity of the state far exceeds the capacity of society, the agencies and civil society is accepted as the primary partner at transport affairs (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000). When we look through the historical progress of the stakeholders in Germany, we can see two detailed and different/conflicting studies identifying today's German business associations and trade unions in the transport sector. Kerwer and Teustch (2000) study identifies the history of transport regulations in the country and the stakeholders' involvement. According to this study, EU transport liberalization promoted a shift toward an alignment where stakeholders started with negative views but turned eventually into a supporting position (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000). The reason for Kerwer and Teustch (2000) about these associations' changing views was the inevitability of the integration process. Until 1980s, the business associations were much in favor of the traditional regulation and industry's call for more flexibility and lower prices were mostly unheard (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000).

Despite these strong negative views within the industry, when the sectoral corporatism achieved its heyday in 1980s, it contributed to a new understanding of re-regulation in Germany and when this new liberalization stand of the government is accepted, the implementation passed smoothly (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000). As a result, in order to transform and prepare them to the new re-regulation policies, the interest groups decided not to spoil their good relationship with the government over a lost cause but instead to put the European integration into new uses which serves their interests as well as a compromise (Kerwer and Teustch, 2000). As Kerwer and Teustch (2000) declares as an end result of this non-conflictual relationship, the liberalization process coming out from the European integration went on gradually without any harsh criticism or large scale strikes as happened in France and Italy.

On the other hand, Dirk Lehmkuhl (2000) study explains another view about the position of business associations. Lehmkuhl (2000) dictates that business associations are primary partners and their interests and their intermediary position is a game changer. "Business associations of the transport sector in Germany-as intermediate organizations operate at the interface between private and public actors and incorporate the dynamics of their political and economic environments in both structural and strategic terms." (Lehmkuhl, 2000). Lehmkuhl (2000) study identifies and underlines the change brought by the European integration and challenges the neo-functionalism argument that an automatic shift in decision-making competencies and actors' loyalties from national to the European level will be happened eventually. Contrary to the Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) analysis at the above, Lehmkuhl (2000) concerns about these loyalties and is not sure about the disappearance of these interests at the national level. It is obvious that the European integration process started a high degree of transnational interaction between the national and international actors; however, the associational attention is not entirely disappeared or diverted away from the national gains (Lehmkuhl, 2000). In addition to that, this international interaction did not also bring an improvement on the level of these associations, which are the established patterns of public-private interactions (Lehmkuhl, 2000). According to the analysis, the European integration aimed to generate new organizational adaptations where national

associations can improve their organizational representation at the European level but these new organizational adaptations only occur at the expense of national associations (Lehmkuhl, 2000). As a result, Lehmkuhl (2000) concludes by claiming that: “It is argued that the way in which the configuration of associations within a sector changes in the course of European integration relates to efforts at this intermediate level to maintain or increase its relative autonomy from its constituencies and its interlocutors.” German Associations relied heavily on the past regulatory functions which gave them an important control and protection, however, the liberal European regulatory regime on transport, decreased the influx of resources and the name of game for these associations is now simply “adapt or die” (Lehmkuhl, 2000). These two contradicted views about the position of business associations in German transport integration will be evaluated in the later pages of this section.

As an initiator of the European integration, it is not a surprise that the German government is sympathetic about the overall transport alignment. Stakeholders on the other hand, are indicating mixed signals about their position on the integration. The evaluation over the above contradictory assumptions will be analyzed but before going into that, the political stakeholders namely the positions and contributions of the political parties and their interest structure on the process has to be covered. As we have said earlier in this chapter, Germany has a very diverse political structure and now governed by a coalition government. The important question lies here is that are these political parties supportive over the whole re-regulation process or do they have diverse opinions as well? In order to answer that, we should look at the different political actions and Party Programs. The party in government, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), in coalition with the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), defines its transport policy as an open, innovative and in the same direction with the goals of the Common Transport Policy of Europe. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), as the incumbent governing party, prioritizes the role of transport in German economy as a vital source and urges the integration actors for an intelligent shaping of the transport infrastructure in the Party Manifesto of 2007. Uniformly with the European goals on transport, the CDU aims to achieve a well-functioning transport infrastructure, new development opportunities for congested and rural areas, an efficient and innovative

drive on road transport, environmentally acceptable designing of transportation and low pollution promotion of public short distance passenger systems (CDU, 2007). Moreover, the 2007 Party Program also manifests itself as a promoter of economic spill over activities on transport. Complementary to the neo-functionalist arguments, the party is aiming to achieve an integration process where a well-functioning transport infrastructure assumed to promote growth and jobs in the other sectors and the CDU believes that low pollution and new vehicle designs could promote environmentally responsible solutions. The current coalition government CDU/CSU and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) made a coalition agreement on 2005 and within this agreement, they made a direct reference to the European integration process with an aim to be the champion of the non-discriminatory European market for transport vehicles and their components (CDU, CSU and SPD, 2005). The coalition agreement also had innovative goals based on innovation on transport, an integrated and sustainable transport policy to develop Germany as a logistics hub and an environmentally friendly transport system for achieving sustainability on growth.

Besides its role in the consecutive coalition governments at the past decades, The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP) has a long history of supporting the European initiatives, norms and transport policies that suits the ideology of the party. The SDP were always in favor of the idea of the European Union and the integration process of Germany to the EU. The 1946 Party Program assumed an idea of a “United States of Europe” against another possibility of war in the continent (SPD, 1946). In contrast to present party position, the SPD was encouraging a public sectoral planning when it comes to transport at 1946 (SPD, 1946). This could be explained by the firm leftist position of the party back in that time, right after the ruins of World War Two. However, the party’s position on the transport policies changed over the decades. We can easily detect this transformation when we look through the Hamburg Program of the Social Democratic Party. The Hamburg Program is the milestone document of the party, which defines its principal guidelines. The document both supports the idea of European integration and the Common European Transport.

Recalling the policies mentioned in the coalition agreement of SPD and CDU, and similar to the policies supported by CDU/CSU, the SPD encourages a heavy investment to the transport infrastructure (SPD, 2007). Needless to confirm, a full working transport infrastructure is a prerequisite for transport integration for the SPD. Similarly, the SPD (2007) favors efficient ecological modes of transport and combined transport systems. Most importantly, the SPD underlines the importance of a modern and efficient railroad transport in a country where 4th railway package is still highly controversial for the public (SPD, 2007). In addition to their support over the railway mode, the SPD (2007) directly using the European integration as a reference point by claiming that a modern and efficient railroad means a meaningful approach towards the Europe's cohesion. As a result, it is not a surprise for a party that already chosen a way towards an integrated Europe in 1946, and inevitable to position itself with the integration.

Back to the points on the 2007 Hamburg Program, the SPD (2007) also aims to convert networks of busses and trains to be more economical with regard to European aims and finally, aims to encourage the environmentally sustainable transport projects to exploit opportunities of hybrid, hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. Taken from the analysis of the SPD position, two points could be made for this study. One, despite their ideological differences, the SPD and CDU/CSU, has the nearly same goals when it comes to transport. This means that the SPD, the current coalition partner and a possible opposition for future, is not a possessing roadblock against the continuity of policies. Neither there is a threat of future stalemate depending on these policies. Second, both parties have also the similar goals towards the European integration. A support from the two largest parties diminishes the threat of discontinuity after a possible government change and assumes a strong, smooth and unanimous progress for the implementation of European norms on transport.

The ideological differences between political parties reduce when transport policies came into agenda. All political integration actors in Germany are leaning towards this direction. The key is to see transport as a provider of common good and German political parties have a tendency to overcome their differences when the German public

and common European interests are higher. Even, the far left and far right parties are showing a will to transfer authority for the sake of alignment on transport. “Die Linke”, the far left party called “The Left” could be the best example for this assumption. As an important part of the German Bundestag (National Parliament of the Federal Republic), “The Left” is organized under the umbrella of leftist policies such as nationalization against privatization and policies that defend public, regional interests, trade unions rather than the causes of business associations’. However, there are similarities with the centre-right and centre-left parties while discussing Europe and transport. According to the Party Program prepared in Erfurt on 2011, “The Left” aimed to achieve an environmentally sound alternative to rival transport policies (Die Linke, 2011). Though, these environmental friendly transport goals do not contradict with present European sustainability goals.

“The Left” underlines the importance of accessible transport infrastructure, facilitation of mobility between smaller locations and a sustainable infrastructure development on transport (Die Linke, 2011). Although the party criticizes and offers a change to the current structure of the EU, “The Left” also finds the harmonization with the EU as an indispensable process and issues itself as a leading part of the Germany’s integration (Die Linke, 2011). In common with the European goals as a whole, Die Linke (2011) proposes a shift from road to rail to reduce the costs and find an environmentally sound alternative between the transport modes. Along with their ideological credentials, the party manifests a broader control over the public assets like Deutsche Bahn (DB) and firmly rejects the idea of privatization of the public transport companies (Die Linke, 2011). Shortly, the party defends a transport policy which must be affordable and for everyone. Besides the far left ideology of the party, these mentioned goals neither contradict with the European goals nor the transport aims established by the other major political parties, which states a political consensus towards the positive gains of the Common Transport Policy. This notion possibly creates a political environment in Germany where continuity survives after possible future political shifts and political criticisms become more constructive and supportive rather than being destructive and challenging.

3.4: EVALUATION

3.4.1: Road transport

Before analyzing the evaluation of German transport integration based on theoretical assumptions and the involvement of different factors, it is essential to look over the numbers and statistical information which identifies a clear quantitative picture over the performance of Germany in each transport mode. This overall picture could help the analysis to observe a fair outcome and a guideline for actor evaluation. In this part, each transport mode will be judged with respect to the statistical data produced by the European Union or German Government itself. The road sector will be the first mode since Germany is an esteemed road transport hub for both passenger and freight travels.

Depending on the data calculated by the European Commission (2017d) itself, Germany is in the 3rd position out of 28 member states in terms of transport integration performance. The used score chart in here is seized from the European Transport Scorecard, which is a data set organized by the European Commission and obtained by the average scores of the European countries on the statistics based on the internal market, involvement of people, innovation and investments. As a country in the 3rd position of Europe, Germany's performance on road transport is above average. This is mainly because Germany's strong road tradition. The country has the largest road network within the European Union, totaling 12 363 km in which accounted for over the 20 % of the total EU-28 (Eurostat, 2009). This significant length makes Germany as the main provider both in passenger and freight transport on road. Among the major economies of Europe, Germany has the largest quantities of goods transported nationally by Road and as a result, Germany became the leaders in the total distance covered by road vehicles as well (Eurostat, 2009). The Federal Statistics data also indicated the same numbers. According to the German Federal Statistics Bureau (DSTATIS), quantities carried on road in 1000 tones rose from 3, 244, 200 to 3, 539, 200 between 2000 and 2015. Road transport infrastructure statistics, which is underlined in many stakeholder and political party programs, regarded Germany as the leader between the modes in terms of length and quality (DSTATIS, 2017). As a result of this quality, the registration of road motor vehicles, the quantity of passenger cars is rising accordingly (DSTATIS, 2017). The quality of German highways is higher than the EU

average and position itself as the 8th out of 28 member states due to the rating based on a survey conducted by the World Economic Forum (European Commission, 2017d). The European Transport scorecard validates the quality of German roads by claiming, “German roads have gone down slightly but stay well above the EU average” (European Commission, 2017d). The next part of the chapter will test the relation between the policies taken by the incumbent government and other political parties to regenerate the German road infrastructure and these actual numbers.

In terms of integration, the disposition and implementation of European laws on road is essential. For the European Commission’s (2017d) European Transport scorecard, the transposition of the EU transport directives is above the completion level of 97 %, which makes Germany the leading nation in this classification and 5th out of 28 countries. However, the pending infringement procedures coming out from a failure to implement a European policy is also relatively high but also in a positively decreasing trend (European Commission, 2017d). The Trans -European Networks (TEN-T) policies are also regarded as vital for the complete integration. At the beginning of this chapter, this study indicated that it is also an important strategy for the German Federal Ministry of Transport to complete the corridors cutting through Germany as soon as possible. Given that the indicated full alignment date for the overall TEN-T project is 2030, the 59% completion rate is not a mediocre rate but there is still time to accomplish more (European Commission, 2017d). It should also be mentioned that Germany is a transit gateway for the TEN-T projects and a bridge for freight traffic between the Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Accomplishments in this area will probably contribute Germany to close down one more chapter on the way through full alignment with the EU.

Decreasing road congestion and road accident fatalities along with putting environmental friendly standards are also important goals of the Common Transport Policy of the EU and underlined in consecutive White Papers and strategies which declared these spill over functions of transport as the indispensable parts of transport integration. Germany is also leading the scores in these indicators. The road fatalities are below the EU average and Germany performs better than the EU average in terms of

the road safety (European Commission, 2017d). The road fatalities in Germany fell by an average of 3.5% yearly between 1990 and 2006 and this indicated an above-average reduction in the number of road fatalities in Germany (Eurostat, 2009). Although the number of accidents is in an increasing trend due to an increase in the vehicle amount, the fatalities are decreasing (European Commission, 2017d). This shows the important quality of the German road safety and services. The road congestion rate of the country signals a number of 29.57 average which is slightly above the desired level (European Commission, 2017d) but still low given the fact that Germany has the highest amount of passenger cars and freight vehicles in Europe.

3.4.2: Maritime transport

By simply observing the geography of the country, the general assumption of Germany is that the country is not far advanced on maritime transport. It is mostly landlocked with only a short length of coast through Nordic and Baltic Sea. However, this assumption falls through into falsification since some of the most important ports of the EU (for passenger and freight) lies at the German coastline. Germany has two major ports in Hamburg and Bremerhaven, where significant amount of sea trade takes place in Europe. Not only influential on the trade by the sea, the country is also an influential example for all the EU member states in terms of the development and usage of inland waterways as an instrument for freight and for the development of new transport technologies. In terms of inland waterways, Duisburg bears the burden of both freight and passenger networks.

The Federal Government evaluates the waterways as indispensable for the growth and development of transport routes in Germany and the EU. According to information distributed by the Ministry of Transport (BMVI) in 2017, the federal waterway network in Germany covers about the 7,350 kilometers of inland waterways and two important ports. These 7,350 kilometers consists of 75 % rivers and 25 % canals with 450 locks and 290 weirs (BMVI, 2017). Within this fairly large web of waterway systems, 240 million tons of bulk trade/commercial goods are transported per year (BMVI, 2017). It is again Federal Ministry's duty to overcome the bottlenecks on this sector and assign

policies in a very cost effective way and in a consumer/producer satisfied version. The Federal Ministry of Transport (2017) considers waterways as the essential component of the Trans-European Networks (TEN-Ts) as well, to meet the needs of the transport aims; the Ministry has a goal to complete the infrastructure of the waterways. The waterway systems in Germany are keeping more than 400,000 employees at work and also vital for the country's touristic needs (BMVI, 2017). These could be considered as the assumed and expected spill over effects of the transport policy on the way through European integration. The spill over effects of the waterways is already visible on some sectors, such as shipping industry, cargo, environment and tourism. In 2016, German Nordic Sea and Baltic Sea ports handled around 296 million tons of cargo and passengers over 30 million (BMVI, 2017). It is substantial to mention that 13 million out of 30 is for international services and touristic purposes, combined with the aims over investments on shipping industry via smart shipping initiatives (BMVI, 2017). As a result, Germany nearly completed the EU purpose on finding alternative ways to ease the freight and passenger burden on road transport by increasing the usage of inland waterways.

The overall performance of German maritime and inland waterways sectors is more than satisfactory. Compared to the mode of road transport, the pending infringements on maritime and inland waterways is limited to one case recorded by the European Commission (2017d) on the European transport scoreboard. According to the European Commission (2017d) statistics, transposition of the EU directives on waterway transport is 97 % and nearly completed. The term "completed" here means that the existed infrastructure and mentioned regulations are already implemented and there is no further need for infrastructure requirement (European Commission, 2017d). As an example for this, we could look at the quality of port infrastructure where Germany positions itself on the 5th in Europe, higher than the EU average with respect to World Economic Forum research (European Commission, 2017d). At the above parts, this study mentioned the significance of the Trans-European Networks for the EU. Linked to this common will, Germany already accomplished their goals with a perfect score of 100 % completion rate in the TEN-T Inland Waterways Core Networks. However, these accomplished goals are not satisfactory for German decision makers so they decided to

push for more investments. Between 2014 and 2017, the infrastructure investment in maritime affairs increased with a decreasing rate. The 1, 005 million Euros in 2014 increased respectively to 1, 062 million Euros in 2017 (Eurostat, 2009).

Germany continues to investment and planning on the waterway infrastructure. Since the country has the 8 % of the overall European share on the maritime goods transport, consecutive master/action plans on logistics creates new purposes to overcome current roadblocks and to make progress over the new EU regulations. The Federal Action Plan on Transport prepared by BMVI in 2016, aims to make Germany a logistics hub with the evolution of new EU initiatives in the ports sector. A new National Ports Strategy is a brand new necessity for the Ministry to keep up with the new challenges in the sector and for further alignment with the EU as well (BMVI, 2016). To summarize the German maritime achievements, in terms of success rate, integration level and other terms, Germany already completed the common goals on this sector, played their part and proposed new initiatives to catch up with the newest developments on the maritime sector.

3.4.3: Rail transport

Issues concerning the railways in Germany are probably the most political and complicated area of transport integration to the EU. However, railways are also the policy area where Germany is most persistent on reform. These reform plans and new initiatives are still continuing since the beginning of 1990s and the ultimate aim is to diversify the freight and passenger traffic by increasing the share of railways against the road monopoly, which is highly recommended by the EU for intermodal purposes of the Common Transport Policy. In addition to that, efficiency is an important indicator for German policy makers. As mentioned above at the Common Transport Policy goals, efficiency lies in the diversification of modes and equal separation of investments and growth policies on modes.

Certainly, daily politics matter when it comes to railways. There are various reasons for the politicization of railway integration by the integration actors. First of all, the privatization attempts or rail in Europe started very late compared to the other modes.

Before that, there was a tendency of nation states to keep the railway control at the hand of states to keep prices low and putting barriers against foreign involvement. Especially the socialist governments of Europe interpret any privatization policy on railways as an attempt of foreign intervention to the national economy. Although socialist governments are more protectionist and pro-market barrier, both political sides kept railways under control up until 1990s regardless of ideological differences. Still, the European integration process and concerns over modal shifts made liberalization inevitable for German policy makers and stakeholders.

Germany experienced the most intense liberalization period concerning the re-regulation of railway principles. According to Beck's (2011) historical analysis, the reforms started in mid-1990s and present Germany still continues to regulate. Controlled competition is the German solution for the need of market regulation (Beck, 2011). "Since the market reform in the mid-1990s, regional services have been either placed directly in the hands of the incumbent, Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) or other minor operators by means of long-term contracts, or put out to competitive tender." (Beck, 2011). In other words, these attempts were to be made for ensuring competition but market barriers are still available and controlled. At the past, the rule was the co-existence of long distance services on non-profit basis and regional subsidies by the federal states (Beck, 2011). Beckers et al (2010) study also accepts the existence of this fact about the railways in Germany. Beckers et. al (2010) recognizes the size of German railway market as the largest in Europe and a prominent example of the "Open Market" integration for the long distance rail network. However, the development of the integration is much more characterized as "niche competition" rather than fully open market features (Beckers et. al, 2010). Even today, the current existence of the Deutsche Bahn as the market leader is creating criticisms and questions about the cartel inquiries, potential monopoly and existing market barriers.

Although stuck in between the market freedom and control concerns, the rail reform happened in Germany and the reform was considered as important stepping-stone for the European integration. In conformity with the European directives, 130 further laws changed in four consecutive reform packages and already transformed the structure of

federal and local railway services called Bundesbahn and Reichsbahn (Schwilling and Bunge, 2014). In Germany, these consecutive reforms already expanded the high-speed rail networks into double, from 447 km in 1995 to 1,300 km in 2007 (European Commission, 2009). In terms of freight, which is the ultimate aim for Europe and Germany to increase freight traffic on rail, the market share is also increased slightly from 16 % of the total market share to 17 % in 2006. Nevertheless, the overall score coming out from these reforms indicates that there is still a need for new national and sub-national policies on the way to full integration with Europe. The European Commission (2017d) transport scoreboard evaluates the German score as mediocre and expects new national decisions for supranational goals. Given the fact that the complicated political and economic status of the railways and involvement of diverse national and sub-national actors, it is rather not a surprise. Yet, as a positive note, the German market share of the railway undertakings is increasing after the European integration and regulation of new laws. In 2014, market share reached the level of 34.10 %, surpassing the 2012 rates, which were 28.60 % (European Commission, 2017d). The market share of railway passenger is also increasing with 12 % and this rate puts Germany to the 4th position in Europe (European Commission, 2017). Definitely, there is still so much to do for German policy makers. As the European Commission (2017d) indicates, there are six pending infringement cases belongs to Germany and it is the highest amount in Europe. This problem is coupled with the deteriorating railroad infrastructure. The infrastructure is still above the EU average but the significant concern is that the infrastructure continued to deteriorate between the years of 2013 and 2016 (European Commission, 2017d). On the other hand, the TEN-T routes on railway are nearly completed with the completion rate of 94 % and 58% percent of the country railways are already operating on high speed (European Commission, 2017d). The 52 % electrified railway lines could also be counted as a major development and only minor rail fatalities reported with 0.1 % for the German evaluation (European Commission, 2017d). Moreover, the consumer satisfaction with rail is 84.4 %.

3.4.4: Air Transport

Before discussing the German integration patterns which believed to be the main cause of these developments on the way towards European integration, this study will briefly

evaluate the German Air transport and aviation industry. The air transport in Germany is important in two ways. First, it provides a service to both passenger and freight purposes. And secondly, so many economic actions have a necessity on transport for survival such as trade, tourism and logistics. From the European integration perspective, spill over effect could be expected between the sectors, starting from the developments in aviation.

With respect to these, the Federal Ministry on Transport shares the same perspective and generates their projects/policies accordingly. The Ministry focuses on the advantages of the policy area and indicate that aviation have a paramount economic importance for Germany (BMVI, 2017). The spill over purposes of the mode has also mentioned in the vision of the Ministry. Today, the aviation industry and infrastructure either directly or indirectly promotes jobs for more than 800,000 people and in addition to that, the aircrafts annually transport external goods worth more than 200 billion euros (BMVI, 2017). The recent global advances promoted a need for liberalization and deregulation under the light of International Air Transport Market regulations and European Common Transport Policy. The BMVI (2017) responded to these needs with an air transport strategy, which is prepared by CDU, CSU and SPD while forming the coalition agreement.

Connected the policies of the ministry, the air transport infrastructure is vital for both the aviation industry and their alignment with the European goals. In the area of commercial airlines and passenger travel, Lufthansa is the leader on the annual revenue (Domestic and International), biggest on the fleet size and higher than the average on safety/passenger happiness compared to other European airlines (European Commission, 2014b). Frankfurt am Main airport in this sense is indispensable for Germany. On passenger traffic, Frankfurt is the third and it is the 4th main intra-EU airport (European Commission, 2014b). On freight traffic, Germany also leading the polls with Frankfurt as being the most frequently used airport whereas Leipzig as the 5th and Köln-Bonn as the 6th in Europe (European Commission, 2014b).

When we summarize the current situation and rate of European compliance, we can see that the quality of airport infrastructure is higher than the EU average with a score of 5.89 with respect to the data taken by World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (European Commission, 2017d). In addition to that, consumer satisfaction with air transport is also tops the EU average with 85.3 % of passenger satisfaction rate depending on all airline services (European Commission, 2017d). This is a crucial amount given the fact that the domestic and international air passenger demand grew by an average of 4.6 % between the 2001 and 2006, reaching a total volume of 179 million passengers and still continues to grow (European Commission, 2009). Meaning that Germany both achieved its transport integration goals by providing safer service to more people. The economic effect of liberalization seems to show its effect on the air transport where passenger benefits mostly with lower prices, selectivity and efficient service (European Commission, 2009). For a negative note, the number of pending infringements is similar to one we saw in railways. Currently, there are 6 pending infringement cases are waiting in the line for investigation (European Commission, 2017d).

3.5: ACTORS AND PATTERN

Integration theories assume that different actors are shaping the faith and integrity of the integration process in different ways. Nevertheless, cooperation between different competence levels is essential and affects the integration performance. This short part will apply the basic assumptions of the integration theories in order to find out a pattern of relations between the actors and the outcomes of this pattern. As the numbers indicated at the above, the integration level in Germany is substantial and encouraging. Though, the question of how have to be asked and might constitute a proper guideline for the sake of above inquiries. However, the governance structure of the country should not be forgotten while defining the actions of different competences. Germany is a corporatist country in nature, meaning that the state in Germany and German regional government and non-state stakeholders should play a role in these strong numbers. The above statistical evaluation is indicating a strong involvement of supranational, national, sub-national and non-state actors and this part is aiming to validate this by using

integration theories. In a corporatist country, the expectancy is that both actors in the national and sub-national level should work together along with a constructive supranational side. The anticipated pattern will be compared with the other cases in order to detect similar patterns in corporatist cases and form a hypothesis based on the correlation between the web of interaction and accomplished EU goals.

Neo-functionalism assumes that “spill-over” is the main outcome and ingredient of any integration process towards the EU. Spill over in this sense means that the EU integration on transport must be connected to the other related sectors such as environment and health with the help of national, sub-national and local bodies by establishing functional linkage of tasks, deliberate linkages between one policy area to another for achieving satisfying results and progress over EU goals. In the German integration process, these linkages are strongly formed and showed development since both the state and stakeholders are working together to connect different policy areas to achieve higher standards on the EU level. During the past decade, the German state gave substantial importance on connecting transport issues to environmental goals. There is a growing State initiated discourse concerning the climate change policies and the goal is to reduce CO₂ emissions on transport (Fichert, 2017). Germany has set targets for reducing CO₂ emissions, which are currently above the average of other the European Union member states (Fichert, 2017). Political parties are working alongside the state for this achievement. The 1998 coalition between Social Democratic and Green Parties resumed a policy of modal split and environment friendly modes to reduce traffic and achieve sustainability on transport (Fichert, 2017). Fichert (2017) mentioned policy shift after the change of coalition in 2005 (Christian Democratic Party and Social Democrats) where more environmentalist concerns left their place to an agenda that prioritizing infrastructure. However, environmental goals stayed similar with some small differences showing that the political changes do not have a game changing effect on the decision making over transport. Even the conservative CDU Party Manifesto of 2007, which emphasizes the importance of economic gain above every other policy, underlined the significance of mobility in an environmentally acceptable manner. For another political party contribution, CDU/CSU/SPD (2005) coalition manifesto could be concrete evidence where parties introduced the ideas of sustainability, economic

growth and road safety for public health as common goals regardless of ideological differences. Political parties that are not in government also have the ability to affect the process by upgrading their incentives to the state level using bargaining and negotiation. For example, Die Linke (The Left Party) (2011) proposed environmentally sound alternatives to private transport in order to achieve European goals and political groups are working together in the Federal Parliament for this purpose.

The role that the state mechanism is playing on the subjects referring the concept of spill over is empirically substantial. Neo-functionalism regards that state should provide necessary policy subjects to ensure this effect on European level. So far, the state mechanism in Germany is nothing but cooperative on this matter where series of Action and Master plans are underlying the importance of linkages between economic sectors like transport and the goals of Common Transport Policy. The German Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI) published three different plans to ensure these policies. The Freight Transport and Logistics Action Plan designed to be aligned with such Common Transport Policy rules as the EU Directive 2001/14/EC regarding an important revision on mitigating the noise on the railways and currently the Ministry is lobbying at the European Commission (BMVI, 2010). Thanks to the state initiatives, the noise level decreased significantly (BMVI, 2010). The Master Plan for Logistics also designed to promote environmental friendly freight conditions (BMVI, 2008). On the safety and health issues, the German state started new projects to ensure transport interconnectivity by decreasing CO₂ trends and measuring future traffic to overcome road safety problems. According to the Mid-Term review made by the Ministry itself, Germany took account all the Commission proposals concerning transport-health linkages (BMVI, 2015).

Positive initiatives of the German governments also triggered German non-state actors who started to respond positively to linkages between the transport and other sectors. Different interest groups, civil society organizations, private companies and trade unions performed as an alternative decision making bodies to ensure the effect of spill over on transport. One of these players is the Railway Trade Union of Germany (EVG), a politically active union for the development of rail transport and public transport to

ensure environmentally friendly, safe transport systems to achieve high economic standards in Germany (EVG, 2017). Another stakeholder is the Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (a transport association run by transport providers in Germany), which advocates a true internal market for rail services and lobbying for the decreasing of gas emissions by 20% regarding on the Transport White Paper of the European Union (VBB, 2013). Concerning the private companies, Deutsche Bahn is the biggest train operator firm and infrastructure company in Germany and openly supports and negotiates with government for the attempts toward promoting environmental and health goals on transport. According to their competition report published on 2016, Deutsche Bahn (2016) intends to reduce the CO₂ emissions by 30% to reach Germany's and the EU's national climate goals. The report also mentioned the campaigning efforts of the other associations such as the VDB (German Railway Industry Association) at Brussels and Berlin for reorienting transport policy with a greater focus on environmentally friendly transport (Deutsche Bahn, 2016). Combination of the efforts from national and sub-national competences, namely the lobbying/support from the interest groups and investments/policy-making from the state, resulted in a positive trend towards the alignment with supranational goals.

Efficient campaigning and policy-making distributed by the both players showed actual results. For example, CO₂ emission reduced by 40 % (Roland Berger, 2014) while number of deaths in road accidents are decreasing (20 % achieved, 40% is the goal) in all road sectors (BMVI, 2015). The European Commission review on 2009, ranked Germany as high on integration especially on the grounds of environmental sustainability. According to another review prepared by the European Commission (2009), Germany achieved the desired Euro emission standards, transposed air quality directives into national legislation, ensured pricing and taxation mechanisms on vehicle environmental and health damages, promoted the use of cleaner vehicles in urban public transport, reduced the noise and made significant progress towards reducing polluting and GHG emissions. "The legislative and regulatory framework of the EU in the areas analyzed has been transposed into national law and, in some circumstances Germany has also taken measures that go beyond the provisions of the Common Transport Policy" (European Commission, 2009). To summarize, Germany both proposed

solutions for combining the different integration sectors and internalized the spill over process within the decision-making indicators of national and sub-national levels. The positive results taken from the official statistics are could be counted as the outcomes of this strong collaboration between the competences over the spill over effect. This culture of “harmonic sharing of tasks” was even evident at 1953 when the first comprehensive West German transport policy program prepared with the help of the state and stakeholders (Fichert, 2017).

Certainly none of these developments are exempt from the criticisms of other integration actors involved to the process and some of them made arguments based on the assumed fact that Germany is not at the desired level on spill over areas. Dehmer (2016) study suggests that Germany’s image to see the country, as a pioneer on environmental concerns is false and not enough for implementing the European standards completely since the European Union opened 16 infringement cases against Germany based on environment protection at transport. In addition to that, the Green Party (Die Grünen) accused the incumbent Merkel Government of being “serial sinners” when it comes to EU law on environment (Dehmer, 2016). Green MEPs were also critical over the issue at the Parliament level by accusing BMVI for allowing emissions for years at above of the Common Transport Policy goals (Euractiv, 2016). Although the significant facts are claiming the opposite, these criticisms should also be taken account with great deal of attention.

In a corporatist country, the position of the state towards European integration is crucial. The high action capacity of the state in Germany accounts for positive, cooperative and progressive towards the EU integration on transport. In both three integration theories, state has an important role to play in terms of making decisions towards the integration with the EU. Liberal intergovernmentalism assigns the leading role to the state where the mechanism basically controls every stage of the process depending on a cost-benefit analysis and can easily make or break the integration interaction to protect national interests and sovereignty. Neo-functionalism accepts the position of state as the protector of economic interests but also does not underestimates the influence of the integration elite and organized special interests coming from public political pressures.

Multi-level governance also does not deny the role of the state but indicates that there are other actors such as interest groups, civil society and political parties that the state has to share the authority for the transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level. However, the similar approach in these theories is that the all assumes a pivotal role for the state and its behavior has to be positive for a forwarding alignment. Nevertheless, the distribution of powers between the state and other actors has to be emphasized and this study aims to look over this interaction starting from Germany.

The most anticipated cost-benefit analysis of the liberal intergovernmentalism took place in Fichert (2017) study that explains the entire transport infrastructure in Germany is assisted by the state and their cost-benefit analysis summarizes a master plan towards embracing European integration. State in Germany is highly active on the decisions over infrastructure, sustainable development, and funding to different projects relating to the alignment with the EU. This positive tendency towards the EU integration on transport is believed to mainly arising from this rational action of the state based on the gains over economic growth via applying EU norms. Empirically, the EU transport policies are an instrument to provide a boost to the economy through competition coming out of the liberalization principles of the EU. As an example, Deutsche Bahn (2016) explains Germany's positive tendency over integration process by using its positive support to the debatable Fourth Railway Package where competition could get a boost from the complete liberalization from the market.

Again in the BMVI Action Plan of 2010, the state clearly perceived the European integration as having a positive effect on the national interests of Germany where the principles are suitable for strengthening Germany as a logistics center. As a result of this, Germany proposed EU legislation concerning multimodal strategies, efficiency on all modes and combined transport and the BMVI (2010) also decided to consider the transport integration as a key to evolve the European regulatory framework and equip European corridors on Trans-European Networks (BMVI, 2010). The European Commission (2009) appreciated this positive alignment attempts of the state and emphasized the BMVI and Federal State as an official party of the integration and also claimed that the 2003 Federal Transport Network Plan of the state is in line with the

2001 EU Transport White Paper since it aims to remove barriers on transport market liberalization, modernize rail network, relieve congestion, enhance competition and strengthen the transport infrastructure for all modes. Besides positively supporting the entire process, the German state has lively relations with the supranational level during the constant negotiations over the national priorities. From time to time, Federal state challenged the EU norms for pushing the supranational position into a place where it serves the best interest of the national priorities. Debates over the Fourth Railway Package introduced by the EU could constitute an evidence for these claims. The Federal German state lobbied at the European level for forcing the Commission to make changes over the Fourth Railway Package (International Railway Journal, 2013). Unlikely to the rational habits, the state in Germany also put efforts to help the European Commission to investigate exhaust emissions for potentially illegal manipulation devices in member states in order to protect common interest of the EU member state citizens (Euractiv with Reuters, 2016).

The European Commission appreciated the Federal State demands for the re-designation of the Fourth Railway Package and the Germany indeed achieved a change towards their direction where the new package allowed Germany's railway holding company model. This change faced serious criticisms from other member states concerning the potential of German state for changing the direction of Europe and the size of German companies taking over the passenger and freight operation market in Europe (Berkeley, 2013). In time, exploiting the new opportunities presented by the supranational level became an important dimension for Germany to strengthen the German presence and EU-Germany relations on transport. To summarize, the Federal state interests corresponds with the EU norms but also the Common Transport Policy itself creates an opportunity for the federal state to become a more influential decision maker at the supranational level and therefore, the support of the German state level towards integration is inevitable.

Yet, the importance of state on calculating the national position is not enough to understand Germany's alignment to the Common Transport Policy. Studies has shown that the responsibilities are shared between the state and stakeholders when it comes to

making a decision based on the Common Transport Policy alignment. In that manner, the role of local governments in Germany has to be appreciated. As Fichert (2017) study indicates clearly, several decisions are still within the competencies of domestic policy makers such as Lander (regional governments) and public/private stakeholders. Regional governments like Bavaria or Lower Saxony are responsible for regional and local public transport and since they have responsibility, their views on the integration process should not be underestimated. In Germany, the federal government's position is shaped by the opinions submitted through bargaining and negotiation with the sub-national and non-state actors such as local governments and private companies (Deutsche Bahn, 2016). Deutsche Bahn (2016) report also emphasizes the hustle and difficulties to come up with a significant decision on a balance national position but two sides are working effectively for getting positive results. The Federal State stays as an active player to organize the finances and force the supranational side to make necessary regulations whereas stakeholders are exploiting the assigned actor position coming out the EU alignment (Drew and Ludewig, 2011). This shows that the stakeholder actions must be taken into account to understand Germany's integration and the high integration results.

It is obvious that the positive state decisions over integration did contribute to the high alignment of Germany but the efforts of sub-national actors should also be investigated for fully understanding the chain of relations. Integration theories do give important place to the role that stakeholders are playing. Neo-functionalists prioritize the position of the stakeholders as the newly emerged integration specialists who become the primary actors alongside the state throughout the process. Interest groups have the ability to establish a societal base, transform themselves into an "integration elite" for protecting the common interests. Similarly, Multi-Level governance finds the role of stakeholders as influential as the state and supranational level. For a flexible and dynamic integration process, the approval and support of these non-state actors are vital. Alongside with the state, stakeholders have the power to affect the process in positive or negative ways. On the contrary, liberal intergovernmentalism defines these interest groups are rather inferior to the state in integration decision making and only functional through state initiated domestic bargaining procedures, which establishes the national

position for state to possess. However, German stakeholders are rather challenging the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption and their actions could much more applicable to the former explanations above. With the power of Landers (regional governments), private enterprises, trade unions and civil society associations as the sub-national and local players, they do not even need the state apparatus to challenge or welcome EU legislation. These groups have direct connections and access to the supranational level regardless of the state.

German interest groups are directly involved to the policy planning on the way towards the German integration of Common Transport Policy. As a matter of fact, German political groups, private associations, interest groups and trade unions are generally supportive on transferring sovereignty to an upper level competence. The first example of this direct involvement here is the role of regional governments in integration. The regulatory framework in Germany is separated between the Federal State and regional “Lander”. These states are also responsible for regional transport issues (Fichert, 2017). So, Federal state can only take a decision with the approval of the Lander where the decision-making is shared and become much more politically motivated. For Roland Berger report (2014), German Lander play a key role in submitting proposals for infrastructure projects to be funded by the Federal state and needless to say, infrastructure projects are the backbone of European integration. When the process gets political, lots of different political groups play their roles. Political party behavior is a significant indicator for German transport integration. Fichert (2017) explains it with the policy changes between coalitions in Germany and its effect on the policies related with alignment. When the coalition changed in 2005, the newly elected CDU/CSU and SPD government changed their focus to the infrastructure projects, leaving the mostly environmentalist agenda of the outgoing SPD/Green coalition (Fichert, 2017). However, the positive tendencies against the integration process have not changed even though ideological shifts took place. Since both infrastructure and environment are the integration policy, prioritizing one another did not make such difference to the political party positions for integration. Party coalitions are also eager to provide policy-making space to the interest groups while establishing their policies for transport integration. The CDU/CSU and SPD coalition agreement of 2005 openly supported the cooperative

role of the transport industry, scientific community and shippers while preparing the Master Plan for Freight Transport and Logistics. As of today, these sub-national actors are playing significant roles in the planning process of German transport and their coordination with the national administrative bodies became indispensable for European integration (Roland Berger, 2014).

Besides Regional governments and Political Parties, there are also non-state actors in integration including trade unions, customer groups, business associations and transport operators. According to Roland Berger (2014) competition report, the Federal Government's position and decision is shaped by the opinions of local governments, opinions submitted by the interest groups, private companies and it is again a duty for Federal Government to introduce incentives to cope with their different interests. Deutsche Bahn itself is a prominent example as a company involved to alignment. Regardless of the state permission, Deutsche Bahn (Roland Berger, 2014) cooperates with other European operators like SNCF (France) to cope with integration bottlenecks. For other difficulties that the country could face during integration process, the industrial actors of Germany are playing their part. Examples can vary on different levels. First, The Association of German Transport Companies (VDV) and its members initiated a productivity campaign with the state on optimizing workflows for rail transport after integration (Roland Berger, 2014). Second, Pro-Rail Alliance supported the European initiative to shift from road to rail on freight and open criticized government's allegedly road-friendly policies and campaigned in Berlin for better rail coordination (Roland Berger, 2014). Third, The German Railway Industry Association (VDB) is currently campaigning in Berlin and Brussels for reorienting transport policy with a greater focus on environment (Roland Berger, 2014). Finally, The Deutsche Bahn (Roland Berger, 2014) itself is playing a key role for upgrading and operating the Trans-European Networks corridor policy since the organization has the capacity to reduce bottlenecks and increase capacity.

The German transport industry's commitment to the policies of integration does not stop on implementations over national legislation but also focuses on to preserve and improve the competitive strength of the common European transport. For the matters on

railways, Community of European Railway and Infrastructure (CER), International Union of Railways (UIC) and Association of German Transport Companies (VDV) formed a dialogue with other rail companies established at the EU level in order to discuss the initial results of the integration with the European Commission and address EU policy makers the areas on national legislations that need for action (Roland Berger, 2014). This industrial initiative also triggered the Federal adoption of Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan where the Federal state and interest groups submitted the plan towards a joint planning structure through recommendations and bargaining (Roland Berger, 2014). Therefore, consultations with non-state actors cemented itself as the major policy-making mechanism on transport where both sides have a high action capacity. This web of connections eventually produced outcomes such as the adoption of 2016 legislative alignment regarding the new German Railway Regulation Act to implement Directive 2012/34/EU establishing a single European railway area (Roland Berger, 2014).

Local roles in the process continue with the constructive involvement of German trade unions. The Railway Trade Union (EVG) is a sound example that gave counsel to the government officials on creating environmentally friendly and safe transport policy but with references to employer rights while designing in government and European policy (2017). EVG appreciates cooperative efforts at national and supranational level. The main purpose of the EVG is to protect transport worker rights and for claiming this, the group is working together with European leaders, advocacy organizations, national political mandate holders and special target groups (EVG, 2017). EVG also provides recommendations, research projects, dialogue forums, workshops, seminars, conferences and consultancy services for their workers about their rights during the integration process (EVG, 2017). EVG (2017) is highly active on negotiating with the Federal State to improve financial assistance for private infrastructure and also pushed regional governments to make fair distribution of the regionalization funds assisted by the EU (EVG, 2017). EVG works in both national and supranational level to raise awareness for better regulations. As an example, for EVG role at the discussions on Fourth Railway Package is interesting. The Railway Trade Union has welcomed the essential requirements of the initiative but criticized the EU for not including the Digital

Driver map and tachometer usage into the agenda (EVG, 2017). The EVG also urged the EU to make more improvements for the employee rights and pushed Bundestag to improve the national regulation based on the EU regulations (EVG, 2017). Similar to EVG, VBB (2013) also appreciates the EU legal framework and supports the intent of the Commission for creating a single European railway area, improving the market share of the railway and a true internal market for rail services. VBB (2013) welcomes the aims of the Commission to avoid excessive administrative costs. Last but not least, the Association of German Transport Companies, VDV (2014) used its capacity to raise awareness on the delays over full market liberalization and campaigned in Brussels for effect member state representatives to respect the corporate interests of railway undertakings.

For affecting the supranational and national levels, German regional groups are having high action capacity through effective lobbying at the supranational level and being a part of the policy-making at the national level. Stakeholders in this sector have even shaped the first Rail Reform achieved in 1994 to increase rail traffic, finance infrastructure and open up rail market to competition (Roland Berger, 2014). To meet current challenges; local governments, political parties, VDV and Pro-Rail Alliance pressured the supranational and national levels to take political action and this led to cross-party consensus on introducing opening to East and European integration (Roland Berger, 2014). The consensus affected the government for a change in the German constitution to pass seven laws regarding the issue and these changes were also in line with 91/440/EEC directive for opening up rail network to third parties (Roland Berger, 2014). As a result of this, transport volumes on rail rose by 58 % in freight and 36 % in passenger with side effects such as the growth at the Deutsche Bahn on high customer satisfaction and more employment (Roland Berger, 2014). Pro-rail alliances are still continuing to form unions with German local governments to push the government and the EU for longer freight trains and ensure higher competitive rates to lead a shift from road to rail as the EU anticipated (Bringinshaw, 2016).

The final part of the German integration pattern concerns the actor analysis during the politicization of the process. Neo-functionalists describe the whole integration process

as political from the beginning but it is not necessarily bad for national alignment. Rather than that, actors could turn a political stalemate to a useful learning process with the help of integration elites and compromises. Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that the politicization is inevitable during the bargaining stage domestic and international levels but the important aspect is to keep national interest intact. Liberal intergovernmentalism also defines integration as a useful political instrument for the state to use the process as a legitimization device for national interests. Multi-level governance puts the political influence at the heart of the cooperative links of integration actors. Within these links, integration could become a playground for domestic politics where politicians try to influence sub-national and non-state level actors and on the other side, interest groups also try to both engage with domestic and supranational area. Similar to liberal intergovernmentalism, Multi-Level governance also emphasizes the instrumentality of integration when it comes to politics.

A significant example to the involvement of politics to a technical area is the controversial German road toll law and its complicated implementation. The road toll bill in Germany was a signature project for the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of the CDU. The bill was also politically important for Alexander Dobrindt, the current Minister of Transport since he was a CSU politician and the implementation of the bill was a party promise at the 2013 Parliamentary Election (Stupp, 2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel also supported the bill as a concession to the sister party for their support in the upcoming election. Dobrindt and the CSU promised this toll because of domestic public frustrations over the road tolls in neighbor countries (France, Austria, Switzerland) while foreigners use German roads for free (Stupp, 2016). In compliance with the EU law, the CSU also forced to include this bill to the coalition agreement since Bavaria (on geographical terms) is the state which mostly effects from transit road passes. Unfortunately, Dobrindt's aim to put the bill on force was disturbed by the European Commission depending on a potential threat of unfairness where cars registered in Germany would be reimbursed for the charges but foreign vehicles would not be (Stupp, 2016). The Commission also started an infringement procedure while at the same time, Dobrindt criticized the EU for over delaying legislation claimed to be compatible with the EU transport rules (Stupp, 2016).

This three level political hustle between supranational side, state and regional actors finally ended with a compromise from each side suppressing the interests and pave way for the resolving a bottleneck on integration. At the end, Dobrindt agreed to change the law and offered temporary short term vignettes for foreign drivers and long passes for residents (Stupp, 2016). In addition to that, for alignment with the EU goals, the agreement included five road toll categories that vary based on how environmentally friendly the vehicles are (Stupp, 2016). As a gesture, the European Commission stopped the infringement process. Although the agreement did not make Austria and German Green Party happy on the grounds of unfairness to the other member states, the integration actors did choose to find a middle ground rather than posing a serious roadblock against the implementation of the EU acquis. This shows that German policy makers have the ability to overcome concerns over national interests when integration goals are at stake. Luckily, each actor is behaving in the same manner where the most political side; the regional governments were possessed incredible will to work for the sake of integration rather than having political conflict with the EU and Federal government. However, the hustle in the national and supranational arena continued after the passing of the bill. The requests from the Bundesrat (the states' chamber) to make exceptions to the toll for border areas rejected by Dobrindt himself (Euractiv with Reuters, 2017). Moreover, 11 member states threatened the European Commission for a lawsuit since the passing of the bill created an impression that the big states like Germany always get their way (Stupp, 2017).

Obviously, political hustle and braining is an expected outcome of the integration process. Though, the experience in Germany showed that if each actor is supportive and willing over the alignment and dissolution of roadblocks, there is a way to overcome damaging political interests. There are also other examples that could indicate Germany's forwarding integration pattern. The "dieselgate" scandal of the Volkswagen car company is another case. The company is the biggest car manufacturer of the country and a significant contributor to the country's economy. But regardless of how damaging to the interests of Volkswagen and the national economy, the Ministry of Transport has claimed no responsibility over the deprivation of European norms (Euractive, 2016) and on the regional level, the state of Bavaria opened a lawsuit

against Volkswagen over the lost state pension funds for civil servants in the state (Euractiv with Reuters, 2016). Other political parties also made their voice on the matter; the Green Party accused the German state for allowing emission limits to be exceeded and state inability to issue the European norms (Euractiv, 2016). German state also made lobbying practices in the Commission to overcome the pressure in the domestic level. As an example for this, Germany tried to revise Directive 2001/14/EC to mitigate noise on the railways and make it process EU-wide in order to clinch their national goals on environment protection and evolve European regulatory framework to block any other scandals (BMVI, 2010). Meanwhile, German state also encouraged national companies such as Deutsche Bahn to exhaust European wide political decisions such as Brexit to boost or re-clinch integration between United Kingdom and Europe by starting routes from Frankfurt to London (Morgan, 2017). This believed to create more income to German companies whilst continuing integrative patterns with the United Kingdom.

The politicization of the process obviously is a product of the political parties, their ideological stances and election programs. Political coalitions could easily block the integration process when political interests conflict with the integration goals. Though in Germany, different coalitions between 1990 and 2010 showed a common political vision towards integration regardless of small ideological differences (Fichert, 2017). In Germany, parties on the left lean more on environmental concerns while parties on the right is more concerned over infrastructure (Fichert, 2017). Yet, each side appreciates European goals on growth and multimodality. These similarities are visible through the party manifestos. CDU, Chancellor Merkel's party, supports growth on transport since 1947 and promises better utilization, better infrastructure, shaping mobility in environmentally acceptable manner and promises Germany to become a hub for European transport routes (CDU, 2007). In accordance with that, the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition agreement of 2005, offers an integrated and sustainable transport with the implementation of trans-European networks, removal of national barriers and promotion of innovative projects to keep national and European interest together. Even the far left opposition Die Linke program corresponds with the Right and Center party programs when it comes to transport. Die Linke promises efforts on environmentally sound

solutions and shifting goods from road to rail with sustainable infrastructure developments (Die Linke, 2011). This political consensus over integration goals ensures a future stability for the integration process where governments could function better without significant political opposition. In other words, German politics see transport as a technical issue, where integration defines gains for every side.

Local actors such as trade unions are also playing their part inside the political scheme of transport integration. Their influence on political parties and their decisions on transport are substantial. In order to ensure their goal on protection of employment rights and environment protection, trade unions like EVG pressured other European trade unions, the social partners of the transport sector to establish forums for pushing the government and the Commission (EVG, 2017). For the Fourth railway package, EVG also pushed local and federal government for more fair distribution of regionalization funds and change on the EU regulations (EVG, 2017). The EVG also participated to the EU project of “Mobile Workers” with other sub-national actors in Europe such as ETF and CER to make a milestone social dialogue at the supranational level for a better change in the regulations (EVG, 2017). For the changes in the Fourth Railway Package, VDV (2014) also urged the member states to consolidate changes by taking account the corporate interest of railway undertakings. To satisfy the needs of the local groups in the country, Chancellor Merkel and Deutsche Bahn successfully lobbied to allow Germany’s railway holding company model to the package (International Railway Journal, 2013). This clearly showed while forming a political decision, the German decision-makers has to take account every interest based on opinions submitted by the local governments, interest groups along with the government incentives (Deutsche Bahn, 2016). This resulted in a more balanced decision-making process and obviously, it adds to the forwarding agenda when political parties and interest groups are on the same page with the state and supranational side.

3.6: SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Observation 1: Germany is committed to a corporatist model of governance when it comes making transport decisions concerning European integration. The decision-

making structure that this study attributed to German transport is empirically true where the state, sub-national and non-state actors both have significant power to shape the German integration towards Common Transport Policy. Theoretically, the inclusion of both actors and their established web of interaction are much closer to the assumptions of neo-functionalism and multi-level governance.

Observation 2: The result of this established web of interaction between the actors is high-level alignment with the Common Transport Policy. Integration divaricated into different settings and all of these settings established their distinct views about the process but actors always stayed open for coordination. State-level implementations, campaigns of the stakeholders, recommendations of local governments and the settled compromise culture were welcomed as the vital indicators for pushing the integration forward and remove the bottlenecks.

Observation 3: The neo-functionalist logic concerning the convenience of technical policy areas for integration is not entirely applicable to the case of Germany. It is an empirical fact that the policy of transport as a technical area is straightforward when it comes to ramification of the process into different policy areas with the spill over effect. Yet, the integration process is neither automatic nor unproblematic and non-political as anticipated. The case of Germany showed this with many examples where the process stumbled by internal and external problems.

Observation 4: State is an important mechanism in the integration process. The implementation of the laws and financial assistance for the process is the assumed tasks for the Federal state. On the contrary to the assigned role of the state in liberal intergovernmentalism, it is not the ultimate decider on both supranational and national levels.

Observation 5: The case of Germany constitutes a balance of power between the integration actors. Each of them has the ability to change the direction of integration in positive or negative ways. Therefore, in Germany, their positive support has the capacity to increase the level of integration.

Observation 6: Cooperation is the key indicator of transport integration in Germany. Stakeholders are highly active and eager to move on “elite socialization” with other groups where negotiation and alliances between the groups are inevitable for contributing to the policy-making. Power struggles are evident but not aimed to harm the integration process. Interest groups do not need permission from the state for negotiating and policy-making at the supranational level. Regional group formations are also available. As an example, “Logistics Alliance Germany” established with an aim to make Germany as a logistics gateway for Europe. The Alliance consists of members of the Ministry, service operators, R&D developers, logistics corporations, public initiatives and political parties (Logistics Alliance Germany, 2017). The Alliance is currently very active in Brussels to push the German freight rates higher inside the Common Transport Policy and shape the process of modal shifting (Logistics Alliance Germany, 2017). Recent statistics show the outcome in Germany is rather satisfying for the group.

Observation 7: One of the most important factors for the constantly increasing integration rates is the positive and supportive tendency of the national and sub-national actors. Besides the initiatives and plans of the state, interest groups and political parties are also aiming towards a wider integration with the EU. Interest groups identify themselves with the European goals. Their rational focus and private interests are not calling for breaking the ties with the EU. Regardless of ideology, political parties commonly have progressive programs towards integration, which also dissolves the anxiety for political shifts after government changes. The German political class pledges stability and unity over transport issues.

Observation 8: The integration process of the German transport is indeed political and different political interests matter. Ranging from supranational to sub-national, the political interests of the actors should be taken into account for decision-making. However, rather than putting roadblocks when different political interests clashes, German transport actors are eager to move forward and find a ground for compromise

above all rational political/economic interests. Deliberate linkage formations and opinion coalitions led to a learning process and this opens a way for straightforward integration. Road toll and dieselgate examples are the two important examples showing the will of different actors towards integration.

Observation 9: Involvement of the supranational side is not aimed to intervene domestic policy-making process but eager to coordinate with national actors to move integration forward. The constructive role of the European Commission in the road toll case was an important example for that. National actors are also open to send their views about the Common Transport Policy to the supranational side through effective lobbying and policy-making at the EU level. For example, CDU-CSU-SPD Coalition Agreement (2005) promised lobbying for removing international distortions of competition. Moreover, The Federal state also urged the Commission to examine competition and abusive practices in certain states concerning transport market liberalization (White, 2016) and to investigate exhaust emissions for European car companies for illegal manipulation devices (Euractiv with Reuters, 2016) in order to ensure similar social standards.

CHAPTER 4- UNITED KINGDOM: A SUCCESS STORY

4.1: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Similar to the Germany and Turkey cases, the geographical importance of the United Kingdom is an undeniable fact. The location of the British Isles is remote to Middle Eastern and Asian markets but in terms of trade and trade routes, United Kingdom is the gateway to the Atlantic. In these terms, United Kingdom is also considered as a transit route between the Europe and the Americas. Another similarity with the other cases is about the geographical formation of the country. Since United Kingdom is an island, all transport modes including road, rail, maritime, air and inland waterways are available to use and effective since the pre-war periods. It is also absolutely vital to remember that the United Kingdom faced two world wars and dealt with all the heavy consequences that resulted after the wars. Like Germany, infrastructural problems became common and the transport units were in need to be reinvested, redeveloped at the post-war period. Under the shadow of wars, the transport policy of the country began to emerge.

The first glimpses of the policy-making on transport in the United Kingdom emerged during the pre-war period. These first signs continued after the war with major prompting the use of motorways, mainly for predicting traffic levels in the country and congestion (The University of Nottingham, 2007). The first formations of the transport policy were based on the policy called “predict and provide”, which brought significant analysis on road and congestion problems (The University of Nottingham, 2007). The post-war period signaled an important infrastructure development on road building by new road policies. During the decade between 1960 and 1970, the United Kingdom invested more on road infrastructure compared to all other modes. The road investments continued until 1973, when fuel crisis led to a significance cutback to the program, (The University of Nottingham, 2007). This period also experienced the earliest report that suggested integration between the modes. The Buchanan Report was a significant article for new regulations on the UK’s transport policy and suggested a need for integration with abroad by identifying the situations in urban areas where road building

would be needed to minimize the environmental impact (The University of Nottingham, 2007). Environmental concerns were already in the agenda long before the European engagement. To reduce congestion, British policy-makers tried to put a road pricing mechanism but failed due to technological restraints of the time. As a result, the mid 70s passed as the period where local authorities and transport elites started to recognize the environmental and social impacts of the transport policies (The University of Nottingham, 2007).

Government changes and political differences were always a part of the British transport history and 1980s were the decade of policy shifts on transport. A need for deregulation and increased public awareness to environmental issues was the mainstream theme of the newly elected governments (The University of Nottingham, 2007). Government backing to environmental agenda continued in 90s but this time, with a combined focus over integration. Three documents called “Our Common Future”, “Planning Policy Guidance” and “UK Strategy for Sustainable Development” was published in 1994 to measure the ways on integrating the transport with other European countries and effective land planning in an environmentally acceptable manner (The University of Nottingham, 2007). In addition to that, policy shifts from road to rail started to emerge both for passenger and freight transport. The 90s experienced the privatization of the railroads and changes in the structure of railways, which was the main event of the decade ended with a rail policy patronage (Worsley and Mackie, 2015).

Aimed to reduce the road building exercises, late 90s were also signaled the need to travel by public transport rather than cars. At that time, the newly elected Labour Party government was the leader of this policy shift. In 1997, the new government announced new policies and changes in the administration of the transport policies, proposing to tame road priorities and traffic growth with a transfer of freight to rail (Glaister, 2002). Their manifesto was committed to an integrated transport policy between the modes and railways were the focus point (Worsley and Mackie, 2015). The “new realist” approach proposed by the “Third Way” Labour Government emphasized restrictions on car use and optimizations of the existing infrastructure usage (Anable

and Shaw, 2007). In addition to that, the government also combined transport with environmental issues with an aim to reduce carbon emissions and achieve newly generated reduction goals (Anable and Shaw, 2007). These cooperative attempts between the policy areas were also a result of the demands of Common Transport Policy and the EU White Paper published in 2001, which provided a wider legal framework for transport policy in the United Kingdom (The University of Nottingham, 2007). The Labour government published a document called “A New Deal for transport: Better for Everyone” to set out an integrated policy with the EU to tackle congestion and pollution (Anable and Shaw, 2007). Centre for Mobilities Research (Cemore) report also evaluates the Labour government period as vital for environmental issues since they explicitly recognized the damage caused by road transport and identified the need for a change (2016). However, the early 2000s experienced another wave of political shift.

The shifts in the new millennium mainly included a policy-making scheme referring the importance of road transport and signaled a return to the years before 1980. The 10-year plan on transport envisaged this return to road policies but in a more controlled manner (The University of Nottingham, 2007). For rail and air, these political shifts also meant change. In 2002, the government published the Consultation paper on the future of air transport for the sake of establishing Network Rail as a not-for-profit company to redevelop Britain’s railways (The University of Nottingham, 2007). New targets such as the formation of the futuristic developments and facing projected challenges came into the UK agenda and the British policy-makers also prepared a progress report based on their 10-year plan called “The Future of Transport: a network for 2030” to meet the needs of the domestic and international demands (The University of Nottingham, 2007). Obviously, the European integration process and implementation of common goals played a significant role in all of these policy shifts, changes and challenges. Especially, the 2001 European Union Transport White Paper provided a framework for the UK’s transport policy. The EU-United Kingdom relations were always fluctuated during the historical development of the transport policy in the UK. The EU-UK relations on transport started at the 70s when the country became a member to the European Union. At 70s, the UK policies toward European transport were rather protectionist against

European involvement (Gwilliam, 1979). However, the official membership to the EU dissolved this protectionist tendency over the years.

4.2: A BRIEF LITERATURE ON BRITISH TRANSPORT

The United Kingdom is another corporatist country in nature where state and stakeholders are highly active in the decision making process on transport. Despite familiarities with the German model, the ideational focus is much more less in the United Kingdom case. On the contrary, much more interest and rational focus is visible in the United Kingdom. Turkey, however, is much more a mixture, which makes it more complicated to investigate.

One of these pieces in the literature investigating the integration dynamics of the United Kingdom is Preston (1992). More likely a regulation report, Preston (1992) offers important insight about the results of regulation process in the United Kingdom, the importance of the European Union and political structure of the country on the way towards transport policy changes. Preston (1992) made an overview of the public transport in the United Kingdom and projections for the future by evaluating the de-regulation culture of the country. The changes after attempts of privatisations and EU White paper demands are included to the research. Obviously, there are lots of ups and downs of regulation when we take a brief look to the analysis.

In a nutshell, Preston (1992) underlines the importance of the competition, the effects of the regulation on route and network structure, the effects of the privatization on road and rail networks and the interrelationship between the markets. For the political structure of the country, which might indicate a consensus in the corporatist systems, Preston (1992) talks about the continuation of reforms regardless of the different party managements. According to Preston (1992), the reforms of the bus and rail industries were closely linked to the consecutive Conservative governments of nearly twenty years (1979-1997), however, the newly elected Labour government of the time does not pose a threat to transport policy but only a modest change. Indeed, Blair government of late 90s continued to the progress towards European integration and further articulated the reform process.

Angela Hull (2005) is another scholar deals with the integrated transport planning in the United Kingdom with respect to European transport rules and norms. The aim of the Hull's (2005) paper is again develop a model or analytic typology that evaluates connections between policy issues and administrative responsibilities on the way towards full-fledged compliance with Europe. Compare to the other model suggestions in this literature review, Hull (2005) research is not so much different from the former models but indeed gives an informative insight about the integration dynamics at the United Kingdom. Since the UK case is also assuming a corporatist model, the composition and positions of the state and public sphere are also included in this study. First of all, Hull (2005) defines a correlation between the European and the UK legislative position towards integration goals. "Integration, co-ordination and interoperability are core themes in the development of both the UK 10- Year Transport Plan and the EU Common Transport Policy." (Hull, 2005). Of course, implementation deficits are also a problem for the United Kingdom like other European countries despite the same goals.

Sustainability and integration on sustainability is the main case point for Angela Hull (2005) to understand integration pattern in the UK. Stages in the progress towards sustainable and integrated practices and outcomes in the UK context are measured by looking through the axes of administrative integration and cooperation between different actors. As Hull (2005) emphasizes, there are two axes for administrative integration, horizontal and vertical. In the horizontal sectoral integration sphere; public policy demands must meet the ideas coming from the private organization level (Hull, 2005). On the vertical integration side, it describes the integration of policies between the tiers of government, which underlines the importance of looking through the different layers of government while measuring responses to integration, along with interest group decisions (Hull, 2005). On the issue of sustainability, Hull (2005) proposes a dynamic multi-level approach for integration. Inevitably, consensus between these different levels is vital. A sustainable transport policy compatible with the European approach requires integration between different government authorities, measures of modes, infrastructure/planning and policies for environment, health and

education (Hull, 2005). In such a web of relations, a multi-level governance system, gaining consensus on how to reach the sustainable future vision is much more difficult (Hull, 2005). These rather complicated cooperation lines are also implicating a clear picture of the issue linkage connections.

For conceptualizing the debate, Angela Hull (2005) analysis proposes a ladder of integration, in other words, steps through the integration and the inclusion of distinct actors. The concept that Hull (2005) proposes has 8 steps and each of these steps has to be taken place for getting the sufficient positive outcome from the process. First two steps are the physical and operational integration of public transport following a modal integration (Hull, 2005). Needless to say, issued importance on the development of infrastructure and intermodal transport is similar in every piece of literature covering cases and subjects from the Western Europe. The ladder continues with integration with the market needs and social objectives (Hull, 2005). Here, the societal forces and their views came into the agenda. The interaction between the state and public sphere is highly critical. On the state side, Hull (2005) thinks that central government in the UK plays a pivotal role for driving and supporting the public policy makers through handling the financial part of the process and institutional responsibilities. However, this importance is not without an aim on the regional co-operation. In addition to that, Hull (2005) also indicates the started cooperation customs between the different levels of administration based on distinct issue linkages. For the level of “integration with social objectives”, Hull (2005) uses the example of integration of education with the European norms in order to develop policy initiatives such as safe routes to school and school travel plans.

The proposed ladder continues with the stages of “integration of environmental issues in transport policy making” and “institutional and administrative integration” (Hull, 2005). A direct reference has been made upon spill over effect of the transport issues and the significance of the state level integration. The typology concludes with the final stages called as the “integration of policy sectors” and “integration of policy measures” (Hull, 2005). Unfortunately, Hull (2005) is not so optimistic when she looked through the implementation side of her proposed steps of integration. The UK example on

sustainability showed a rather gap between aspiration and implementation than a smooth process (Hull, 2005). The reasons for this gap are mainly coming from the barriers developed by departmental and ministerial fragmentation (Hull, 2005). This shows a threat for integration in such cases where different opinions arise from the fragmented levels of the government poisoning political complexion more than policy clarity.

Resembling the purposes of the Hull (2005) research, Jones (2010) is evaluating the transportation strategy adopted by the United Kingdom and its implementation in the country. At the German case above, we mentioned the significance of the pressures coming from the EU level for integration. A rather “top-down” approach and a push prepared by the European level institutions. Jones (2010) claims a different integrative perspective in the United Kingdom. According to his analysis, the integration process in the UK triggered by the layers of the public sphere when a long term planning has been made after the pressure coming from the public and business communities in 2005 (Jones, 2010). After 2005, the government model (issued role) indicated the use of high profile experts, an “independent review” to break with traditional departmental thinking, providing independence for different layers of society, identifying innovative solutions and creating cross-party support for action coined with cross-departmental work of civil servants (Jones, 2010). The cross-party support is explaining the attempts to get together different political party agendas into the same path specifically for transport integration. In the upcoming chapters, we will see the importance of that on familiar cases.

In order to strengthen the debate and measure the proposed government roles, Jones (2010) uses Eddington Transport Study as an example. The study gives a pathway or a guideline for later transport integration in the UK. In Jones’s (2010) own words, the Eddington Transport Study is a plan to push transportation as a means to improve general economic performance and to do so by promoting environmental and societal goals. The study includes four paths, which tell about a change in the transport thinking. First, there should be an understanding of the links between transportation and the economic growth and transports effect on increasing competition, business efficiency

(Jones, 2010). Secondly, the challenge in the United Kingdom should be clearly defined before passing through the third phase of meeting that challenge (Jones, 2010). At the end, the United Kingdom should enable the system to deliver by defining the outcomes that society seeks, assessing all impacts, making a benefit-cost ratio and quantifying them that are hindering achievement of those economic, environmental and societal goals (Jones, 2010). Once again, the writer concludes with rational assumptions, potential spill-over effects and multi-level governance solutions. This report was generally received a sound, positive support by the stakeholders in the transportation policy process of the United Kingdom (Jones, 2010). For example, the business community gave vocal backing to Eddington report (Jones, 2010). However, the implementation of the report was not that effective. As Jones (2010) states, it was far from strait forward due to the series of administrative and procedural changes, which are also visible on the Hull (2005) study above.

Morton (2011) measures the impact of a direct policy area, the European Union competition policy on the public transport habits of the United Kingdom. This piece is a typical example of the issue linkages we have seen before in this chapter and answers the question of “how different issues affect each other?” Morton (2011) claims that the EU-UK integration process had a considerable impact on public policy concerning transport. The liberalization reforms and tendering processes are the main standing points of the essay like other pieces covering domestic impacts of the European pressures. However, the result of the integration process is a success as Morton (2011) indicates. The extent of liberalization in the UK bus and train sectors is as advanced as in any European Union member state (Morton, 2011). In fact, it is far better than the average of these states. This is mainly due to the fact of successive political government programs in the country. Morton (2011) tells about a unique political structure in the United Kingdom where driving force of this smooth integration came from within the United Kingdom courtesy of successive governments from 1979 to present day. The policy stability in the country is very unlike to other member states, which needs significant pressure from above to comply with the reforms. Especially, Morton’s (2011) claims continue with the rail policy in the United Kingdom. According to this

claim, the EU's liberalization preferences for non-member countries have followed a very British model, signifying a "bottom-up" integration process (Morton, 2011).

Similarly, another paper concerns with the domestic impact is Geurs et. al (2009) article. This time, social impacts of transport are measured with a reference to the dimensions of sustainability. Geurs et. al (2009) paper presents a theoretical framework describing the relationships between determinants of social impacts of transport. It reviews the state of the practice of national project appraisal in the United Kingdom and social impacts of transport investments, which took many forms and have varying importance between the states (Geurs et. al, 2009). Because of these, Geurs et. al (2009) mentions a need for and the importance of a typology between the European Union members defining the differences of social impacts. This is ultimately important for the countries like the UK since the UK transport includes much broader spectrum of social actors and impacts compared to other member states (Geurs et. al, 2009).

Last but not least, a case study including air pollution and road transport covered in Hitchcock et. al (2014) article in order to take out a comparative study between the UK and other countries and show the spill-over effects of the transport policy on different policy areas. To summarize, Hitchcock et. al (2014) used the case of air pollution as a public health issues and found that the contribution of transport for this is massive while comparing air legislation between the EU and the UK. The primary aim of the EU air quality policy is to reduce the burden of ambient air pollution on human health but different UK zones have distinct responses and different compliance rates on this policy (Hitchcock et. al, 2014). As a result, although there are serious attempts to overcome this integration deficiency, UK is falling behind to comply with European levels on cars limits in NO₂ levels (Hitchcock et. al, 2014).

4.3: COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Similar to Germany, the United Kingdom also holds a corporatist position when it comes to transport governance. The corporatist stance of the country could also be considered as well established, cultural and historical. Since the United Kingdom is one of the initiators of the neo-liberal economic system, the effect of the industry owners on policy-making was a historical fact.

The corporatism in the United Kingdom assumes a system where business owners have to negotiate with the government and other stakeholders in order to get the change in any anticipated transport policy (Wolf, 2007). In Britain, the proposed corporatist model resembles the prototype in Germany. As Schifferes (2005) explains, it is model of welfare and also a typical example for European countries where the policy-making is depending on a work-oriented scheme and being based on the contributions from the sub-national actors. However, the similarities do not change the fact that corporatism in Britain has deeper historical roots and different in nuances compared to Germany. Lah and Seibt (2012) consider this difference as significant since the level of corporatism is higher in Britain but each side have more or less similar policy development webs since both examples prioritizes coherence and continuity in the decision making.

Since the period of World Wars (1930-45), corporatism surrounded the country as the main governance model and a plan to share the power among the different layers of society rather than a state monopoly on decision-making (Carpenter, 1976). Through British corporatism, the self-governing industries learnt to unify under the wings of national committees at a very early stage and became aware of the fact that they have the action capacity to represent the interests of the stakeholders at national level (Carpenter, 1976). In addition to the business groups, the trade unions are highly active on forming congress to respond the necessities of corporatist model (Carpenter, 1976). Even in the early 1930s, the trade unions formed joint consultation programs with the state and became a part of the Industrial Advisory Council and Central Committee of Export Groups (Carpenter, 1976).

Corporatist model in Britain also evolved with the effect of political parties. Different researchers are indicating the involvement of politics as a factor in the evolution of this corporatist model. For example, Carpenter (1976) accepts that the corporatism in Britain was always defensive against the Left ideologies that prefer the role of trade associations for shaping the whole transport industry. Namkoong (2008) explains corporatism as a movement started mainly in the 70s where state, business and labor relations are collided and resulted in a very political way. Namkoong (2008) characterizes the British model of corporatism as a sphere of interaction for centralized economic interest groups under the guidance of governments. As a result, interest groups are taking part in the decision-making system involving the major interrelated policy areas such as energy, transport and infrastructure (Namkoong, 2008). However, Namkoong (2008) also points out that the politics always disrupted this interaction by shifts in the policies of the political parties in the Parliament. The political parties in the UK have sharp ideological edges and this also effect the alignment with the Common Transport Policy.

At the 70s, corporatism was used to overcome the market failures and the British state formed a series of reciprocal bonds with some major organized interests (Banister, 2002). Interests of local business actors became important where state involvement to decision making was also at the center (Banister, 2002). Yet, the 90s welcomed a new form of corporatism as a protective version where state worked in conjunction with business and interest groups to run transport services and funding (Banister, 2002). This model also treats business as partners and investors for the transport planning where state started to play a rather cooperative role compared to past decades. Natural to the corporatist governance model, state plays an effective role in the transport integration of the United Kingdom to the Common Transport Policy of the European Union. The British state has different competence levels and offices to shape its policy on transport and interact with other actors. The main body of policy making in the state mechanism is the Department for Transport (DfT). The department identifies itself as the body for planning and investing for the transport infrastructure in order to keep the United Kingdom on the move in both passenger and freight levels (Department for Transport, 2017a). Most importantly, the department admits that they are working with their local

agencies such as public, business partners to support the transport network for helping the United Kingdom's businesses and travelling of goods and people (Department for Transport, 2017a).

The British Department for Transport is a body of the state supported by 19 agencies and public bodies such as the Office of Rail and Road, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Civil Aviation Authority and Highways England (Department for Transport, 2017a). The Department for Transport (2017a) is responsible for providing policy, guidance and improving passenger and freight travel, investing for motorways, setting the strategic direction for the transport industry, providing less congestion and pollution, lowering carbon emissions, encouraging the use of new technologies, ensuring high standards of safety and security and supporting the rail/maritime sectors, planning policy for ports and setting national aviation policy. For developing and ensuring these responsibilities, the Department has variety of policies. The department has standard policies and Action Plans to improve accessibility, ensure security and sustainability on aviation, invest on high speed rail, maintain their position as the world leader on shipping, modernize railways, provide sustainability on roads (Department for Transport, 2017a). These policies are also supplemented by legislation and projects. Some of these government initiated plans and programs are: Transport accessibility action plan, port facility security plan, plans on promoting equality on transport, action plan on rail fares, DfT capability action plan, road investment strategy post, various progress reports and infrastructure implementation plan (Department for Transport, 2017a).

Although the European integration process is interrupted through the Brexit decision, the UK state tendency towards the European transport integration was always positive and integrative until present day. The state itself put forward the National Implementation Plans for alignment with the European Union where the Department Secretary have good relations as a part of the European Union Transport Council along with the representatives of local actors (Department for Transport, 2017a). The Department for Transport (2017a) also has priorities on transport, which coincides with the common European goals such as boosting economy and growth, improving

journeys, connecting Britain with Europe and ensuring sustainable and safe transport. For the accomplishment of these priorities, the state published legislative pieces such as the Road investment strategy, the implementation plans for European railway management system, the Transport Action Plans, the EU implementation requirements for maritime transport, air quality plan, national implementation plans to the European Union, the transport investment strategy and the intelligent transport systems report (Department for Transport, 2017a).

Though, the responsibilities over transport integration are divided between the main department and sub-departments within the state of the United Kingdom. The Office of Rail and Road is one of these sub-departments, which is in the control of rail and road regulations. The Office identifies itself as an independent regulator of the rail and road issues and declares that the office is operating within the framework settled by the United Kingdom national laws and the European Union legislation and the office is accountable to the UK Parliament and European Commission (Office of Rail and Road, 2017a). The Office of Rail and Road are the main implementation and regulatory body for the Common Transport Policies on rail and road. The office has a duty to implement the EU law in the best way for the United Kingdom and also has the power to act as an influence unit for the formation of the European Union law in order to achieve the best possible options for the UK and the EU on rail and road industry (Office of Rail and Road, 2017a).

The Office of Rail and Road (2017b) supports the European initiatives such as opening the rail markets, promoting competition, tackling barriers to market entry, harmonization of technical specifications and harmonization of safety standards. So far, the office supported the four railway packages initiated by the European Union and had success on implementing the EU legislation that is compatible with the UK and the office also indicated that implementation of these packages has not been disruptive for the United Kingdom rail and road industry (Office of Rail and Road, 2017b). Besides being supportive to the integration goals, the Office also designed its strategic objectives based on the common purposes of the European Union Common Transport Policy. The strategies driven by the EU common goals are concerning health and safety,

sustainability, better rail network, high-speed rail projects and investment on infrastructure of highways (Office of Rail and Road, 2017b).

To ensure a high level integration to the Common Transport Policy, the Office provided series of regulatory changes on rail and road since 1974. To be more specific, the examples are: The Health and Safety Act (1974), Railways Act (1993), Competition Act (1998), Transport Act, Railway and Transport Safety Act (2003), Railway Regulations (2005), Interoperability Regulations (2011) and Infrastructure Act (2015) that are all designed and issued for ensuring compatibility with the European regulations on road and rail transport (Office of Rail and Road, 2017b). The cooperation culture dictated by the corporatist model also applicable to the operations of the office and department officials are also supporting an established network between the state, sub-departments, business groups and supranational institutions. The Office of Rail and Road (2017c) are closely working with expert groups, interest group panels and other local bodies that are emerging at the EU and the UK level to make sure that the regulations are building over expertise and common will. The department works with both central and devolved administration units ranging from the Department for Transport to the interest groups such as infrastructure companies, safety bodies and industry partners (Office of Rail and Road, 2017c). Moreover, these actors are also eager to establish coalition groups and panels for in order to exchange ideas and put forward implementation of the EU law at joint initiatives such as Consumer expert panel, economics expert panel, research and development advisory group (Office of Rail and Road, 2017c).

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Highways England are the other state offices responsible for the regulation and implementation of European norms and values. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is working for establishing an efficient aviation industry to meet the highest safety and infrastructure standards (CAA, 2017). The Authority has the responsibility to regulate all the UK airlines to make sure that they comply with relevant international aviation rules including the EU safety regulations proposed by European Aviation Security Agency (EASA) (CAA, 2017). The Civil Aviation Authority signified its positive tendency over the European integration process in its updated Strategic Plan in 2014 by

stating that there is a sound and supported alignment with the European partners especially on the EASA rules which makes sure that there is a commitment to proportionate, risk based regulation in the UK (CAA, 2017). In this sense, the CAA (2017) annually reports for evaluation and putting regulations forward such as the Civil Aviation Working Time Regulation. The CAA (2017) identifies itself as the principle regulator of the UK air transport for safety and growth in the industry. Besides safety standards, the CAA (2017) also aims to provide choices for consumers, deal with the environmental impact of the aviation, reduce CO2 emissions, and work with the industry to take greater action on environmental impacts and removing the regulatory burdens in the aviation market. The CAA (2017) fills a mediator position between the public and private interests at the heart of the industry where the priorities and purposes of the authority correspond with and designed upon the common European goals.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is the responsible state office for the issues regarding maritime and inland waterways. The duty of the agency is to implement and support the European legislation by building capability for the international shipping arena and reforming sea and inland waterway passenger rights (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2017). Along with the assigned roles over policy-making and guidance on maritime matters, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (2017) also works on regulating environmental safety, which assumed to be highly valuable for the UK's success rate on maritime integration. To ensure these goals, the agency implemented directives on the Maritime passenger rights, the National security program on maritime and published strategy papers called "Our future as a maritime nation" explaining the future steps for integration (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2017).

Last but not least, the Highways England (2007) is the state funded company charged with the operation, maintenance and improvement of the England's motorways based on the laws and regulations provided by the UK and the EU's Common Transport Policy. This company aims to establish accessible and integrated motorways with compatible learning and development practices and policies (Highways England, 2007). Along with these sub-departments, the state in the UK is playing a major role in the

integration and also supporting the continuity and development of the Common Transport Policy even in the turbulent times of British exit from the European Union.

Interest groups and business associations are also a substantial part of the British corporatist governance model on transport. Compared to Germany, it could be counted that the British stakeholders are more involved and efficient on decision-making through their high capacity of action guaranteed and encouraged by the other integration actors. In this context, the UK state also tends to value these the role of these associations more than their German counterparts. There are substantial amounts of local associations and trade unions that are dealing with transport matters at the UK and the EU. By being an integral part of the corporatist governance model, associations in the United Kingdom does make their voice in the decision making process. Each of them has a similar but supportive approach towards the European integration. In this case, this study aims to analyze the ones that are working directly with the government and European organizations. The names of some of these organizations that will be covered in this study are:

- UKTIE (The Voice of UK Transport in Europe)
- Airport Operators Association (AOA)
- Association of International Courier and Express Services (AICES)
- ASLEF (Transport Trade Union)
- Aviation Environment Federation (AEF)
- British Ports Association (BPA)
- Community Transport Association (CTA)
- Freight Transport Association
- General Aviation Alliance (GAA)
- Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS)
- Rail Freight Group (RFG)
- Railfuture
- UK Major Ports Group (UKMPG)

Local associations in the United Kingdom vary based on their focus over transport modes. However, some of them are much concerned about the effects of transport policy rather than the policy area itself like the ones specializes on the environmental issues and freight forwarding. Needless to say, these organizations are naturally involved to the decision-making process and their opinion is important at Parliament hearings and political party groups. Evaluating their role in the UK integration pattern could be useful to understand the effect of the non-state groups on the level of UK integration towards the Common Transport Policy.

The first example to these influential regional actors is the UKTIE (The voice of UK Transport in Europe). The organization is one of the effective stakeholders in the business, which have lobbying activities at two levels- UK Parliament and European Commission. The UKTIE (2017) summarizes their position as a public body protecting the transport interests of the UK in Europe via monitoring, briefings, quarterly events, outreach and engagement activities and annual forums. The organization is based at Brussels and has direct lobbying opportunities at the EU institutions such as European Commission and European Parliament. In other words, they are operating in Brussels for the protection of UK transport organizations (UKTIE, 2017). This direct access provides a place for the organization to raise awareness on a specific transport issue without the help or assistance coming from the state mechanism.

Air transport and aviation is a significant mode for the future of the UK transport. Besides London as being the hub for European-Pacific trade and passenger line, many UK airlines are benefiting from the open market access in Europe. This is why the opinions of stakeholders and private companies in air transport are important for the state before taking a position towards the EU. Airport Operators Association (AOA) is one of these prominent non-state actors. AOA (2017) believes that aviation provides support for sustainable growth and environment protection and these factors are vital for the UK's national interest on the long run. Since the Common Transport Policy initiates these factors, securing a legal framework compatible with the EU is preferable for the organization (AOA, 2017). Currently, the AOA (2017) is fighting for a new transport agreement to dissolve the negative effects of the ambiguous future provided by the

Brexit decisions and the organization declared that the continuation of integration is substantially critical for the future of UK aviation. Since the EU agreements account for the 85 % of the UK airspace, the UK's connectivity could be undermined and its ability to trade could be compromised (AOA, 2017). This is why the AOA is working in both levels (UK Government and the EU) to make sure that close cooperation survives in the future (AOA, 2017). The UK-based Association of International Courier and Express Services (AICES) also leans toward the same direction and participates to integration process along with national and supranational bodies to ensure that UK transport industry is represented and benefited from the decision making process in the European Union (2017).

On a policy linkage formation perspective, the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF) concerns with the environmental effects of the Aviation industry in the UK. They are campaigning exclusively over the environmental impacts of the air transport mode and trying to come up with solutions for an alternative future with sustainable aviation (AEF, 2017). AEF (2017) is having a high action capacity with a prominent member size and sphere of influence. AEF (2017) extends their duties to go beyond the national policies and influence European policy makers by consulting and using cooperation bodies. AEF (2017) openly supports compliance with the EU environment legislation concerning transport. Lastly but not least, General Aviation Alliance (GAA) is an active lobbying agency for Government Ministers, as well as for the needs of the Civil Aviation Authority and the Department for Transport. The GAA has five members in the CAA Strategic and Regulator Review Committee and their job is the implementation of the UK and the EU transport policies in a harmonious manner (GAA, 2017). The GAA (2017) admits that the UK Government is in full commitment with the alignment of Common Transport Policy rules and defined their non-state position as a consultation unit when it comes to formulating the effects of European norms.

On maritime, British Ports Association (BPA) represents the interests of important ports of the United Kingdom at the national and supranational settings (2017). The association is dedicated to the promotion of short sea and coastal shipping within the European Union combined with the protection of the European goals on environmental

sustainability and equitable industry (BPA, 2017). The UK Major Ports Group (UKMPG) also involves to the integration process while having mixed positions over the EU since the group considers EU directives such as Ports Directive as unhealthy for the development of UK maritime industry (2017).

The Rail Freight Group (RFG) supports full implementation of the European railway directives in all member states including the EU and the group is eager to welcome new amendments and proposals to form a wider consistency between the UK rail freight and the EU norms (2017). The Group is mostly deals with the efficiency concerns, negative environmental impact and the challenges posed by the road haulage industry and actively campaigning for the reduction of emissions by a commitment to the Euro 6 standards (RFG, 2017). Another rail organization, Railfuture (2017) takes a neutral stance over the EU integration but campaigns for a bigger and better railway in Britain by recognizing the need for an intermodal approach between different modes of transport and in this way, the organization goals correspond with the Common Transport Policy.

The Freight Transport Association is a local group that emphasizes the UK's priorities in compliance with the EU on the matters of freight. The organization is aimed to keep the freight rules in accordance with the EU on Drivers' hours, Working Time and tachometer usage and the organization is willing to keep these rules after the Brexit decision (Freight Transport Association, 2017). Other focus points of the groups consist of the common goals such as modal shifts, ensuring intermodality, facilitating the development of rail freight terminals and developing a functioning road infrastructure (Freight Transport Association, 2017). For politically represented sub-level organizations, the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) is designed as an All-Party Parliamentary Group for transport safety. The Council has an aim to advise the members of the House of Commons and Lords regardless of their political stances (PACTS, 2017a). The Council is actively lobbying with the House members and trying to persuade the members for transport safety issues while recognizing the importance of the implementation of the EU transport norms (PACTS, 2017a). The PACTS (2017a) also have a mediating role between the European

Commission and the UK government and currently advises to the European Transport Safety Council (ETSC). Trade Unions like ASLEF and RMT could be counted as politically motivated non-state actors who have different views over the EU effect on transport. While ASLEF (2017) directly supports European Rail Traffic Management System, RMT (2017) is critical over the EU railway management and this was the basic motivation for the group while supporting the Brexit decision.

Similar to the case of Germany, the UK political party stances and their role in the integration has to be emphasized since supporting political parties could help an integration process to move forward into a stable and progressive future. Compared to Germany where transport policy-making is mostly elaborated on the technicality of the issue, the UK party stances are much more political towards the transport policies. Although each political party has a separate vision over transport, this vision is not far different from the goals of the Common Transport Policy. The first case is the incumbent Conservatives, the party that have a duty to lead the country into a healthy Brexit process. On the recent party manifesto, Conservative Party (2017) proposed the largest-ever investment program compatible with the European goals such as re-organizing the infrastructure on roads and railways, reducing time and cost of transport by modal shifts, increasing the capacity on rail freight and achieving zero-emissions while improving the existing routes for freight. On the contrary, the Labour Party stance towards European norms is much more fluctuated due to the experienced ideological shifts inside the party. Currently, the Labour is proposing the repeal of the Railways Act of 1993, which privatized the rail network by a Conservative approach and is backing a return to the public ownership (Labour, 2017). Although this seems as a contradiction against the liberalization principle of the EU, there are provisions at the party manifesto that could be as compatible with the integration rules like the environmental aspect on the reduction of gas emissions (Labour, 2017). Nevertheless, the party position over the EU was much more favorable two years ago. In 2015 manifesto, the Labour Party (2017) favored only public control on rail management but not a change in the liberal structure of the market along with promises on the expansion on rail freight, a high speed rail network, rail electrification, Euro 6 standards on emission and a will to continue to work with the EU on Highways and the Sea Programme, retaining the

membership of Common Aviation Area and Open Skies arrangements. Last case is the Liberal Democrats (2017) who are currently busy with protecting the Britain's place in Europe with an environment friendly agenda over transport such as: clean air and green transport initiatives, compliance with the EU limits on pollution, reduction of air pollution and a better transport infrastructure. On the other hand, UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) is an openly anti-EU integration political organization in the country when it comes to transport integration. As being a decisive actor of the Brexit process, the UKIP freely opposes to the EU initiatives on transport and prefer national protectionist measures against the effects of Single Market. This clearly shows that the political party stances could change frequently depending on ideological shifts and different time frames. However, the positive support of the parties could be vital for the integration process in order to achieve political stability.

4.4: EVALUATION

4.4.1: Road transport

The road transport is still having the largest scale in the United Kingdom in both passenger and freight quantity. The country has an important highway web for these purposes. According to the overall ratings of the transport scoreboard distributed by the European Commission (2017d), the quality of roads in the country is above the European Union average. The freight trends on highways is desirable for the European Commission since there is a decline in lorry traffic with a reduction rate of 0.8 billion vehicle miles but the road congestion rates are considering (spending time on road) the opposite and currently rising (European Commission, 2017d). Traffic is growing and still 89 % of the passengers and 76 % of the freight movers prefer road transport to rail because of the business concerns and advantages of road transport regarding the easy commuting and delivery (Department for Transport, 2017b). However, the United Kingdom is still the leading country inside the EU when it comes to road fatalities, where it is well below the EU average with only 3 infringement cases waiting on the line (European Commission, 2017d). Although the motor traffic levels rose by 1.4 per cent compared to 2016 rates, only 176,500 casualties reported down 5 % from the

previous year (Department for Transport, 2017b). According to a PACTS (2017b) report, the UK is one of the top performers globally in reducing death and injury in the road transport due to the regulations on professional road transport and efficient implementation of the EU Directive 2015/413 on cross-border enforcement. The completion of the Trans-European Network- Transport on the road sector is completed 100 %, which constitutes the best rate throughout the EU member states (European Commission, 2017d).

For environmental concerns of the EU such as cutting gas emissions and improving the air quality, the UK once again is leading the polls in Europe. CO₂ emissions from road transport fell by 6.3 % between 2000 and 2014 despite the fact that there is a rise in the road traffic volumes and vehicle miles (Department for Transport, 2017b). This leader position is a direct result of the important improvements on the fuel efficiency and the establishment of a fairly stable infrastructure on the road conditions (Department for Transport, 2017b). In order to achieve these influential ratings, the United Kingdom liberalized the road freight and passenger services by implementing the 1992 White Paper initiatives including limited liberalization of cabotage services and these implementations followed by the alignment with the EU drivers' hours rules, Renewable Energy Directive, EU's policy on promoting cohesion, interconnectivity directives, Eurovignette Directive, Interoperability regulations and minimum requirements to deliver the EU aims to improve air quality including emission limits from road vehicles (Department for Transport, 2013).

4.4.2: Rail transport

United Kingdom is one of the European Union member states, which gives an utmost importance to the modal shifts from road to rail in terms of passenger and freight transport. As mentioned at the above, the UK is one of the earliest countries that privatized and liberalized the rail market even before the founding members of the EU like Germany and France. Although the success of liberalization is still debatable for the members of rail industry, the integration scores on rail are in fact well

above the EU average and implementations seem compatible enough with the Common Transport Policy.

According to the transport scoreboard published by the European Commission (2017d), the market shares of all but the principal freight rail undertaking is second in the whole EU with 54.70 % and the UK are first in the principle passenger rating with 89.2 %. Only four infringement cases were reported last year concerning the rail and the quality of railroad infrastructure is well above the EU average (European Commission, 2017d). 33 % of the railway lines are electrified while rail fatalities are close to none with only 0.1 points (2nd in the EU) and 72.5 of the customers are satisfied with rail transport network (European Commission, 2017d). For the completion of TEN-T rail core network, the UK is completed the conventional line 100 % while 90 % of the high-speed rail network is already established (European Commission, 2017d).

After liberalization of the market, the highest record of passenger journeys detected in 2015 where 1.69 billion passengers used the network and number of rail passenger journeys has more than doubled between the years of 95-96 and 2014-15 and satisfied the supranational actors (Office of Rail and Road, 2016). According to the Department for Transport (2015a), 1.7 billion rail journeys were coded and this number has more than doubled since the liberalization. At the same time, the government support continued with investments reaching 4.8 billion pounds (Office of Rail and Road, 2016). Like the road sector, the British rail sector also reported low passenger fatalities with only 4 fatalities in the years of 2014-15 (Office of Rail and Road, 2016). For environmental goals, the CO₂ emissions per passenger kilometers have declined by 23.9 % since 2005-06 (Office fort Rail and Road, 2016). On rail freight, the steady growth since 1982-83, reached its peak with 22.7 tons/km at 2013-14 and compared to the other member states, the UK positioned itself as 7th in the EU in the volume of rail freight (19.3 billion tons) moved on the rail network (1st is Germany with 116.6 billion tons) (Office of Rail and Road, 2017). With respect to 2015 ratings, 10 % of all freight moved on the railway network (Office of Rail and Road, 2017d).

On the overall score for the implementations, the UK so far succeeded in alignment with the EU legislation and transformed it to achieve compatibility with the UK model and implementation stage was not disruptive for the rail industry in the country (Office of Rail and Road, 2017b). From the first railway package to last, the implementation stage was unproblematic. The first railway package was implemented as the new Railways Infrastructure Regulations and The Railways Licensing Regulations of 2005 (Office of Rail and Road, 2017b). The second package was become compatible with the introduction of the Directive for Railways and Guided Transport System in 2006. Another Railways Regulation package introduced and combined with the Railways Infrastructure Regulations of 2009 for the implementation of the third railway package of the EU (Office of Rail and Road, 2017b). As a result of these implementations, the high implementation ratings of the rail industry and the positive effects over the whole rail network became a reality.

4.4.3: Air transport

Air transport sector or aviation industry is one of the success stories of the Britain. Besides London being as an important transport hub for the transit travels between Europe and Americas, the UK based airline companies also enjoyed the outcomes of the market openness in Europe. When it comes to the integration of the sector to the Common Transport Policy, the success rate is not different from the other modes. Based on the ratings calculated by the transport scoreboard of the European Commission (2017d), the quality of air transport infrastructure is above the EU average with 5.76 rating based on a survey conducted by the World Economic Forum. Currently, the UK aviation infrastructure is 7th out of 28 countries and 81.1 % of the customers are satisfied with the air transport in the UK since the country only faced three cases of infringements in the last year (European Commission, 2017d).

Since 2013, 19.8 million passengers on domestic flights used the air transport with a 1% rise and no reported casualties (Department for Transport, 2015a). The air transport in the UK consists of the 80 % of the total overseas travel with 60.1 million visits to abroad by UK residents in 2014 and in addition to that, the ratio of visits to the UK by overseas residents almost doubled to the 34.4 million visits and in terms of freight, air

transport covered 2.3 million tons of freight handled in 2014 with an 2% increase compared to 2013 (Department for Transport, 2015a). In 2011, 72 % of all international flight arrivals to the UK airports are coming from another EU airport and this shows how important that the integration between the UK-EU airspaces is vital for the common market (Department for Transport, 2013).

For maintaining this structure and ensuring the increases in international/domestic flights, transport movements, freight numbers, environmental and security advances; the United Kingdom amended important legislative measures compatible with the EU norms. On licensing procedures, Civil Aviation Act implemented on 2012 (Civil Aviation Authority, 2017). The Competition Act of 1998 gave the UK companies to use the market in a fair way and also helped the country to be more equivalent with the provisions relating to competition in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Civil Aviation Authority, 2017). The Transport Act of 2000 regulated the environment and safety measures for aviation (Department for Transport, 2017a). Last but not least, the Civil Aviation Authority (2017) also implemented measures over access to air travel for disabled persons, insurance, denied boarding and air carrier liability.

4.4.4: Maritime transport

Compared to the other sectors of transport, there are no pending infringements about the UK maritime transport (European Commission, 2017d). On maritime, the active partnership of British state and stakeholders has also achieved substantial levels on integration. The quality of ports is higher than the EU average with 5.60 ratings (European Commission, 2017d) and 27 billion tons' kilometers of freight moved by waterways, which took 15 % of all freight actions in the UK (Department for Transport, 2017c). This is an important indicator for the usage of intermodal freight methods, achieving the modal shifts on freight and interoperability. Since the UK is a major importing country and the usage of ports for import is an important economic instrument, the UK captured an increase by a 22 % on the imports via ports since 2000 (Department for Transport, 2017c). The passenger side is also exhilarating. In 2014, there were 21.3 million international short sea passenger journeys to and from the UK.

Moreover, 5.9 million cars were shipped from the UK ports and travelled to the Western Europe (Department for Transport, 2017c). This is another important indicator for the established intermodal culture in the country where major shipments were imported by using maritime instruments rather than road freight. For the transport of goods, the UK ports are handling over half billion tons of freight which is more than any other EU member states' maritime freight forwarding (Department for Transport, 2013). Similar to London's significance for the air transport, Dover became the largest passenger port in Europe with nearly 13 million passenger passed through in 2011 (Department for Transport, 2013). The National Policy Statement for Ports, Merchant Shipping Regulations, Equality Act, Maritime Passenger Rights (EU regulation 1177/2010), Maritime Security Strategy, Domestic Passenger Ships Amendment (Directive 2010/36/EU), Prevention of air pollution from ships are the basic legal documents that the UK officials implemented for the sake of integration with Europe and for developing the UK domestic interests on maritime affairs (Department for Transport, 2017c).

To summarize this evaluation part, the UK is currently 7th out of 28 EU countries (European Commission, 2017) with important high ratings over intermodal transport, environment protection, investment/infrastructure and safety concerns of the European Union. The rail market in the country is the most liberalized in the EU and has important ratings on passenger (10.8 % of the market) and freight market (45.3 % of the market) shares (European Commission, 2017d). 97 % of the EU transport directives are transposed to the domestic laws and the quality of transport infrastructure in the UK is rated positively across all modes of transport (European Commission, 2017d). The UK is far more advanced compared to other EU member states when it comes to the establishment of TEN-T core networks (European Commission, 2017d). The UK is also the top performer for private investment on transport (European Commission, 2017d). The share of renewable energy in transport is currently increasing and the UK has continued to enjoy excellent road and rail safety records (European Commission, 2017d). Customer satisfaction with all modes is increasing even though the road congestion is continuing to stay as a problem for the country (European Commission, 2017d).

4.5: ACTORS AND PATTERN

As given in the above evaluation, statistical results show high integration tendencies and series of achievements on the way towards being a part of the Common Transport Policy. Similar to Germany, this research will also analyze the role of the state and local actors in the establishment of these successful results and try to seek a proper answer to the question of “how Britain achieved these strong implementation policies?” In this distinct corporatist case, integration theories will help the study to identify this anticipated pattern between the actors and the role of these actors. For shifting the UK’s expectations to the EU level, the roles that the state and stakeholders played, could be considered as a constructive positive engagement with the supranational institutions and as a formed web of interactions proposing ways for continuation even at the turbulent politically motivated times.

First of all, let’s start again with the neo-functionalists’ assumption of the spill over effect where the EU also assigned a critical role to these linkage formations within the Common Transport Policy. In the UK case, the functional linkage of tasks and establishment of these deliberate linkages between the policy areas are internalized and naturalized in all spheres of state, local and political actors. The integration actors calculate the effects of the transport decisions on the environment, health and economy. For the British state, taking consultations for these tasks and planning accordingly became a habit. The Single Department Plan prepared by the Department for Transport is an important example. Inside the plan, the Department for Transport (2017b) admitted that linking transport policies to the other affected areas is a must and in relation to that, aimed to achieve a boost in economic growth and opportunity, sustainability between modes, safety, security and improvement the quality of journeys along with the direct goals in transport. In Road Investment Strategy, the Department for Transport (2015b) also generated functional linkages between transport and other sectors. The strategy is composed of intelligent and sustainable transport techniques combining transport with new technological advances. Inside the strategy, the state formally declares a will to connect related areas together by promising to support local economic growth, improving journey safety, the delivery of environment goals and

setting emission standards to the European level (Department for Transport, 2015b). The investment strategy also emphasized the importance of the EU ambient air quality directives and the Climate Change Act of 2008 which both established an emission target to reduce emissions by at least 80 % in accordance with the EU directives (Department for Transport, 2015b). Another state department, the Office for Rail and Road (2017b) also mentions the harmonization of safety standards and prioritizes its duty for ensuring safety on road and rail, which is largely driven by the EU and the UK legislation. The Office also puts an emphasis to the Health and Safety at work act of 1974, prepared under the authority for European Union law as an example to the implementation of spill over tasks (Office for Rail and Road, 2017b). Last organization on the state level is the Civil Aviation Authority, which provided a linkage between the tasks at the Aviation Safety Review of 2008. The review supports European integration on airline and aviation safety with the transposition of the EU safety directives into the Article 142 of the Air Navigation Order of 2005 concerning Airline safety and Aviation safety (Civil Aviation Authority, 2008). The Civil Aviation Authority (2017) also played a part on ensuring aviation safety by supporting the rules of the European Aviation Safety Agency and implementation of agency requirements into the domestic law.

Stakeholders in the UK are also signaling positive and supportive tendencies over the functional linkage of tasks. In the UK, there are specially organized stakeholder organizations that have the sole purpose of working towards the policy areas affected by the transport implementations. In that regards these organizations formed under the idea of regulating the effects of transport policies on environment and safety. One of the very influential examples for these interest groups is the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF). The AEF is campaigning against the unsustainable expansion of the transport modes and campaigning for putting noise on the public health agenda, reducing aviation's emissions and fighting for fairer skies (AEF, 2017). AEF (2017) is mostly working for raising awareness on the protection of public health and effective climate policy to reduce the negative effects of the EU integration process on transport and they are also lobbying and campaigning on the state and supranational level to justify their case. After the most anticipated results of the Brexit referendum, AEF (2017) was very

vocal about the negative consequences of the decision and warned both the UK state and the EU officials for maintaining the UK access to the single market for the continuation of compliance with EU environmental legislation. Another task specific group is the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS). The significance of the organization is that the PACTS are an all-party group for ensuring the transport safety in the UK. This means that the group put their ideological/political differences aside for a common goal on forming linkages between the policy areas on the way through European integration. PACTS (2017b) has a advisory duty in the Parliament and make counsel sessions with the political party groups on the positive effects of the European integration and claims that the EU plays a pivotal role for the road safety restorations in the UK.

Besides stakeholders, political parties are also eager to propose solutions to the issues relating transport and effects of transport on environment and health. The Conservatives promised greener transport infrastructure and technologies in three consecutive elections at 2010, 2015 and 2017 (The Telegraph (2010), BBC News (2015), BBC News (2017)). On the other side, Labour Party mentioned the importance of environment, education, health and economic side of the transport policies in a party strategy document published in 1998 called Third Way Government's "A New deal for transport: Better for everyone" (Labour, 1998). Aimed to work together with the European Union on the fields of road safety, the reduction of CO₂ emissions is included and supported by the Labour Party (Labour, 1998). Compared to the above parties, Liberal Democrats has much influential agenda on the effects of transport on other policy areas. For three consecutive election programs, the Liberal Democrats promised a greener and modernized transport infrastructure including ultra-low emission zones and zero legally binding greenhouse gas emissions (The Telegraph (2010), BBC News (2015), BBC News (2017)). The party programs issue similarities towards the EU goals over the tasks of spill over.

The positive agenda of the integration actors on the environment and health issues empirically affected the direction of the alignment to the EU on these spill over functions. The PACTS (2017b) acknowledged that the organizations' support/lobby

action for the implementation of the EU legislation regarding the crash protective design of cars, contributed to the lowest fatality rate in the country history. The Aviation Environment Federation (AEF) also claimed that their campaigning over the Climate Change Act, compatible with the EU Emission goals, led government to take include aviation emissions into the act and as a result, this added to the high rates on gas emissions (AEF, 2017). Along with the lowest fatality rates and high rates on cutting the gas emissions, the UK also achieved efficiency on fuels better than most EU member states, very low casualty rates on aviation and maritime and significant emission schemes on the rail transport.

The role of the state in the integration process changes between the theoretical explanations. While liberal intergovernmentalism defines its position as the principle authority defining the faith of the integration process, neo-functionalism and multi-level governance attributes a more balanced position to the state along with other parties. In the United Kingdom, the position of the state is rather pragmatic but mostly positive towards the EU integration and the state assumes good relations if the common goals correspond with the national interest. It has to be admitted that this pragmatism led the UK state to be more rationalist while making a decision concerning transport. Even in some cases, more rationalist than Germany to protect UK domestic interests. The former part explained the neo-functionalist effect of spill over and the actor's behavior on the common linked goals, this part examines that state is a critical part of the process and supportive over integration since the domestic and supranational interests are linked and corresponding. However, state is not the only authority on decision-making.

The Department for Transport (2017d) openly supports the European interests by the Single Departmental Plans concerning common European goals such as boosting economic growth, employment opportunity, sustainability, safety, security and improving the quality of journeys. In addition to that, strategies and planning of the department also prepared under the guidance of such integration aims. For example, the Road Investment Strategy is covering a plan of smarter and sustainable transport technologies with assumed support for local economic growth, sufficient infrastructure investment and the delivery of environmental goals (Department for Transport, 2015b).

For environmental goals, the UK state directly uses the references from the EU ambient air quality directives and the Climate Change Act prepared under the guidance of same common purposes (Department for Transport, 2015b). The Department for Transport (2015b) admits that the emission standard adoption makes Britain as the pioneers of emissions alignment, which led a fall in the average emissions of new cars (29 % since 2001). The Ministry also warned the sub-departments such as Highways England for the improvements on traffic closure causing wasted time, fuel and unnecessary carbon emissions (Slawson, 2017).

The sub-departments of the government also share their positive opinions over the process. The biggest two of them: Civil Aviation Authority and Office for Rail and Road have similar thoughts about British integration to the Common Transport Policy. First of all, the Office for Rail and Road (2017b) admits that the EU and the compatible UK legislation, which successfully implemented the four railway packages, jointly arrange their duties on transport safety arrangements. The aim of the office and strategies corresponds with the EU goals. Therefore, shifting the policy expectancies to a supranational level is not a problem for a department, which supports the alignment on opening rail markets, promoting competition, tackling barriers, harmonization of technical standards, safety standards and certification (Office for Rail and Road, 2017b). Common Transport Policy became an influential guideline for the structure and regulation of the rail markets regulated by the Office for Rail and Road. The financial assistance provided by the state sub-department made sure the doubling of the rail freight by 60 % since mid-90s in order to achieve modal shifts on transport (Office for Rail and Road, 2017b). Motivated by the benefits of the integration to the UK economy, the Office for Rail and Road (2017b) is eager to influence to and influenced by the EU for the best possible result for the UK (Office for Rail and Road, 2017b). This confirms that the neo-functional, liberal intergovernmentalist and multi-level governance logic is evident in the UK where the national interest is important for the state decisions.

Another state sub-department, The Civil Aviation Authority (2017) supports the EU targets such as Single European Sky and with respect to these goals; the department published a performance plan in 2014 associated with stakeholder consultations.

Moreover, the sub-department also applied the European Regulation (1107/2006) to the national laws, which provides rights for passengers. The CAA amended the regulation in 2014 and since then, there is a positive outlook over the passenger rights in the country (Civil Aviation Authority, 2017). To summarize the state position and contribution, the competence report prepared by the HM Government is important. In this report, the UK state reviewed the balance of competences between the UK and the EU with consultations and contributions of stakeholders. In this report, the given competences reflected the fact that the UK has generally been a leading advocate for the development of single market in transport services like air and rail liberalization since 1980s and 1990s (HM Government, 2014). The report also showed that the UK state was also influential during the negotiations at the Commission concerning a liberalization of the market on aviation, shipping services and rail (HM Government, 2014).

In many cases, the UK legislation such as rail liberalization was also used as a model for the EU transport proposals. This is mostly because the UK was far advanced on the present common goals even before the full formation of the Common Transport Policy at the 80s. For example, during the establishment of the maritime single market with the EU, the UK swiftly adopted four EU shipping regulations since the country was far advanced at the maritime affairs compared to other member states (HM Government, 2014). This directly resulted into present statistics showing a correlation between the unproblematic market opening at that time and current increasing freight traffic (HM Government, 2014). Another example of for this was the rail sector liberalization. The rail liberalization and modernization started before other member states and this led to another high degree of alignment at the present day (HM Government, 2014). Yet, the interest driven motivations of the state could also possess small roadblocks to the integration like the state position on the Single European Skies arrangement of the EU where the state hold a firm position on the equality of advantages between the EU and the UK (HM Government, 2014). On the other hand, for the Open Skies agreement between the EU and the US, the UK state played a pivotal role for backing the deal including a full liberalization of air services between the sides and even made demands

on a further deal that lifts restrictions on foreign ownership of US airlines and permits European carriers to operate in the US (Milmo and Gow, 2007).

Today, the biggest question over the position of the state is whether to continue over integration or disintegrate from the EU after the Brexit decision. As being an important economic factor, transport integration is at the heart of this debate. Although this study will analyze this issue in a much-detailed way in the later parts of this chapter, it could be admitted that Britain still wants to be a part of the Common Transport Policy even after the dissolution of the membership bonds with the EU. There are two main indicators for this assumption. First one is the current Brexit officer David Davis' comment about the UK's relationship with European Investment Bank (EIB) after the British exit. David Davis declared that Britain is the fifth largest recipient of the EIB funds and most of these funds were used for modernizing the infrastructure on transport (Stone, 2017). The Brexit Secretary mentioned that the UK was looking to maintain this ongoing relationship with the EU after the decision fully takes place (Stone, 2017). The other indicator is the problematic situation of railways after the exit of Britain. Britain is a one of the leading nations that implemented rail liberalization earlier than other EU member states and is also a vocal advocate of the single market on rail transport. The current opinion of the stakeholders is that the UK state would maintain its place as a part of the EU rail market regardless of the Brexit decision, which assumes a disintegration from every instrument of the single market including the liberal rail policies of the EU (Hall, 2016).

Theoretically, the position of the state towards the Common Transport Policy could be analyzed in two ways. By neo-functionalism and multi-level governance, it should be admitted that the state is playing the pivotal role in the integration process and the state preferences in the UK reflect the balance of their economic interests. According these theories, the UK's state priorities on transport corresponds with the EU goals and this moves the integration forward in turbulent times. The Brexit issue showed that even though there are tendencies for full disintegration with the EU, a will for continuation is visible in the state since transport is a technical policy that still serves for the best possible options for the UK and common European interest. The behavior of the UK

state could also be explained by liberal intergovernmentalism where state decision-making is solely based on the economic benefits of integration. Despite the pragmatic view of the state and natural will to protect the UK interests on transport, the strict cost-benefit analysis is not applicable after the state position over transport at Brexit decision. Contrary to the liberal intergovernmentalist vision of the state, even in a time of full economic uncertainty, the tendency to continue to be a part of the Common Transport Policy showed that the state is still eager to support the transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level when it comes to transport. Compared to the German integration, the British officials are aiming for “continuity” rather than compromise. Yet, on the issue of power shifts between the actors, there are similarities with the case of Germany. This leads to another contradiction with the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption based on the fact that the national and local actors in Britain are sharing the decision-making power on the matters regarding the integration to the Common Transport Policy.

In corporatist Europe, the largest interest groups both in influence and size, are located in the UK and their position against the Common Transport Policy directly affects the integration process. These stakeholders are including business groups, interest groups, civil society actors and trade union. The groups have a high capacity to intervene and change the direction or structure of any policy regarding the alignment. So, the complete shift of expectations to the EU level is not possible without the consent and support of the British non-state transport actors. Therefore, their support and contributions are critical for the integration process to reach high numbers. At the below, this most anticipated effect of the local actors is analyzed through their consultation, lobbying and financial abilities alongside with the state.

In a competence analysis between the UK and the EU, the HM Government (2014) reviewed the opinions and consultations distributed from non-governmental organizations, business groups, trade unions and interest groups. In this report, the main idea based on the role of the stakeholders is that they are generally supporting for an alignment with the Common Transport and they have a desire to be effective on the decision making process (HM Government, 2014). Stakeholders such as British Air

Transport Association (BATA), Easy Jet, British Airways, Association of Train Operating Companies, ASLEF (trade union of train drivers), Transport Planning Society, UK Transport in Europe (UKTiE), Aviation Environment Federation are usually outspoken about the issues concerning integration and recognize the value of common European norms (HM Government, 2014). In fact, the report is an important evidence of the actual decision-making process that takes place in the United Kingdom, where there is a constant bargaining between the layers of supranational, national and local settings. Inside of this web of interaction, the political pressures coming out from the organized special interests of the stakeholders are significant. The UK example shows that the integration specialists/elites are visible and existent in the stakeholder structures and the state willing share the authority through constant negotiations. There are reported cases in the UK where EU action fails to take account in transport causes, and it is the UK stakeholders acting as the watchmen of the common interest, that broadly push the EU and the UK (HM Government, 2014) This led the supranational and national levels to focus on implementation of the existing laws in which failing is much more harmful to the single market (HM Government, 2014). One of the most certain examples for this characteristic of the non-state actors is the liberalization of rail market. The liberalization of the UK rail market is a prominent example in Europe since the EU took the process as a model for the other integration processes. Besides the state as being the frontrunner for the liberalization, the effect of the stakeholders should not be underestimated since it was the interest groups who pushed the government for the application of common operational standards, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of the rail market for economic growth (HM Government, 2014). In aviation market, it is again the British business groups such as British Air Transport Association (BATA), Easy Jet and British Airways that urged the state for the vitality of the EU engagement in the aviation sector (HM Government, 2014). Companies like Easy Jet declared that their existence is solely based on the British national and local determination to align with the Common Transport Policy rules on aviation and European Aviation market (HM Government, 2014). The report resulted that the outcome of this state-interest group engagement on transport is an increased competition, driving down prices, more leisure/tourism and huge growth in the passenger market (HM Government, 2014). The motives of the both competence levels are clearly in the same direction with the EU

norms and this effected the high achievements. Elite socialization and coalition formation at the stakeholder level is also evident. In the maritime sector, business organizations such as UK Chamber of Shipping and UK Major Ports Group (UKMPG) helped maritime industries to mobilize themselves and became an engine for growth to help the state for adopting EU shipping rules (HM Government, 2014). The successful negotiations of these groups at the state level resulted in the adoption of EU shipping rules and led to an increase in the maritime freight traffic (HM Government, 2014).

As a matter of fact, the state also appreciates, activates and encourages the stakeholder involvement to the decision making process and this is a unique character of the UK integration to the Common Transport Policy. The Office for Rail and Road (2017b) openly admits that the greater cross-industry cooperation and negotiation is a must for delivering the EU goals and benefits. The office is currently working together with the Rail Delivery Group (RDG) to enhance a strategic dialogue with the whole industry (Office for Rail and Road, 2017b). Moreover, the Office for Rail and Road (2017) promised to continue to work with the Department for Transport and the industry partners to widen the scope and effect of the EU norms in the light of European Commission's Fourth Rail Package. Since the mid-1990s, this cooperation continued with the help of financial assistance coming from the state and policy recommendations driven by the local transport industry and this interactive web of decision making resulted in the doubling of passenger and freight numbers (Office for Rail and Road, 2017b). Like the Office for Rail and Road, Civil Aviation Authority is also holding consultation analysis with the stakeholders for achieving the EU targets.

One of the most interesting characteristics of the interest groups in the UK is that their tendency to form a coalition and elite socialization between the competence levels is high. An important for this could be the behavior of stakeholders during the Brexit discussion and mostly on the issue of future flights to Europe. For this matter, The UK's biggest stakeholders; Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester airports formed an alliance with the ACI Europe (European Regional Airports Council) to ask for a compromise from the EU and also urged the government for the continuation of the integration with the Common Transport Policy even after the British exit (Morris, 2017). Another

example could be an issue regarding the carbon emissions. Again, the Brexit vote had thrown some EU-linked emission policies into doubt but the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent advice channel to the UK government, published a report declaring the dangers of losing the implementation on the UK climate change policies (Carrington, 2016). The report became very effective due to the fact that the government assured the committee and the public that the UK will continue to cut emissions with respect to the common European goals (Carrington, 2016). In the field of aviation, the experienced integration actors like British Airways, Virgin Atlantic backed the views of the Association of European Airlines declaring that further liberalization is vital for passengers and the companies (Milmo and Gow, 2007). As a result of this socialization at the local level, the groups have decided to push the UK government for a more profitable deal on the Open Skies aviation pact (Milmo and Gow, 2007). This also indicated that the interests over integration formed through bargaining and negotiations in the distinct layers of separate competences.

Interest groups are negotiating with the other levels of governance structure to keep the industrial national and the common European interests. Rail Freight Groups's (RFG) approach towards the European Rail Policy is a good example for this. The RFG is campaigning in Europe with three aims: to ensure that the European goals best fit to UK's best interest, to improve both rail services in the UK and Europe and to ensure that the European rail policy continues to support RFG member companies who are working in the other parts of Europe (Rail Freight Group, 2013). Inside of this constant negotiation structure, the state has not had the final say over the integration issues. For many times, the UK interest groups kept the authority on the decisions concerning the supranational level and used their capacity to lobby and work with the EU, without the actual consent of the state. For example, in the EU Ports Regulation case, where many interest groups like UK Major Ports Group (2017) are interested, the Britain's biggest port operator group; Associated British Ports (ABP) took the initiative and decided to lead the fight in the European Parliament by making a case against the proposal and asking Members of the European Parliament to modify the current proposal (Port Technology, 2016).

Multi-level governance claims that the role played by local and regional groups in the shaping the future of the Common Transport Policy is crucial. The UK case shows that these groups are an indispensable part of the UK transport integration to the EU since the EU-based policy-making is devolved into different competences. Stakeholders such as Airport Operators Association (AOA) are working through all these layers in order to get best implementation results for the UK and their members. The AOA is directly involved to the process in two spheres. First, they are the permanent members of the Select Committee on Transport of the UK Government (Airport Operators Association, 2017) and they have also the capacity to send a memorandum to the European Commission about the current stage of competences between the UK and the EU on aviation (UK Parliament, 2004). Another actor is the Campaign for Better Transport who works and lobbies in the government level to dissolve the negative consequences of Brexit such as the possibility of losing the EU environment directives (Campaign for Better Transport, 2017). The campaign called all stakeholder actors to support the European emission standards at the Parliament level (Campaign for Better Transport, 2017). Related to this effective lobbying, the Campaign for Better Transport (2017) did get positive signals from the government on allocating funds to road infrastructure maintenance, did achieve to insert campaign goals into the Government's new Rail Freight Strategy and reduced the impact of existing roads on the environment.

Trade Unions are also active voices in the transport decision-making and integration process. ASLEF (Train Driver's Union) and their roles in coalition formations are immense. ASLEF's formed partnerships with other rail trade unions and rail freight industry aims to help local authorities to see through the effects of the modal shifts, which is a direct outcome of the integration process (ASLEF, 2014). The Union supports and helps the other stakeholders while facing the economic consequences of the integration but also ASLEF has managed to have its voice heard in the Westminster and in Brussels through effective lobbying with the Members of the Parliament and hosting consultation events at the supranational level (ASLEF, 2014).

Multi-level governance assigns significant roles to the political parties during the integration process since they have the ability to change the public opinion. Either in

government or opposition, political party choices are always evident and an indicator for the behavior of other actors. In the United Kingdom, political party choices are highly effective on shaping the transport governance and the relations with the EU. As a result, the decisions taken by these groups and their manifestos are vital for making future projections about integration. Banister (2002) study validates that different transport policies of separate political parties changed the direction of the integration process in the UK. Planning and project analysis was an important part of the party programs in the 1960s and 1970s but 80s showed more policy-led decisions based on more ideological concerns (Banister, 2002). Basically, two political parties are sharing the political stage in the UK and their policies could be counted as effective: Conservatives and Labour.

In the sense of alignment with Europe, these two political parties (either in government or opposition) affected the process by taking bold steps on transport regarding their ideological concerns. For example, the most anticipated rail privatization was an important Conservative Party initiative at the 90s. Conservatives had a massive privatization agenda and this contributed to the Common Transport Policy demands on the liberalization of the rail market in the UK. The Conservative plans for rail market liberalization was based on avoiding the creation of private monopolies and later, this plan was included to the 1992 Election Manifesto (BBC News, 2000). After the election success, the Conservatives decided to take the initiative and privatize the rail track and railway services and their motive was partly political and economic (BBC News, 2000). However, the important point should be taken for this example is that the Conservatives, who are mostly cautious about anything coming from the supranational level, taken a liberal, EU-friendly approach regarding an important transport decision and led the way for integration. The supranational side also set the UK success on rail liberalization as an example for the other member states. It could be taken from here that the success rate of integration increases if the actor action coincides with supranational goal. When the issue comes to transport, the UK political parties are more flexible on their ideological differences and they are mostly concerned with the continuation of the positive gains for each side.

The position of the anti-privatization Labour Party on the liberalization of the rail services is an important case for this claimed “continuation” habits of the actors when transport matters are concerned. After the end of the Conservative government, the newly elected Labour government in 1996 had a significant decision over the renationalization of the railways or not (BBC News, 2000). Although the ideology of the party is anti-privatization, the high costs of renationalization and a threat of damaging the relations with the EU led the party to make a political decision to continue over rail market liberalization. Moreover, this decision survived as a Labour Party policy until 2017, when the party faced another important ideological shift after the election of Jeremy Corbyn as the new leader. Two decades before that, the Labour “Third Way” government proposed “A New Deal for transport: Better for everyone” in 1998 to settle a defense mechanism against the radical changes in the transport sector. Interestingly enough, the deal promised to continue over the Conservative initiatives of the past government, and these initiatives were including the Common Transport Policy rules (Labour, 1998). Besides the promise to work with every actor in the transport sector, the Labour vision also brought new targets compatible with the common European standards such as: reducing the dependence of car usage, fighting with climate change by reducing emissions, integration with different modes of transport (intermodality), modal shifts, a promise to work with the European Union on the development of Trans-European Networks, alignment with European road safety initiatives and pressing for the implementation of overall EU legislation on transport (Labour, 1998).

Since both political actors have more or less the same forwarding agenda on the integration process, no damaging policy shifts happened after the formation of a coalition government between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in 2010. The new coalition continued to work on improving roads, rail tracks and reducing carbon emissions (UK Government, 2017). The party stances toward the integration also continued to stay sympathetic even after the decision of British exit from the EU. Before the 2010 elections, the three biggest political parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats) made the same commitments regarding the supranational causes such as establishing a high speed rail modification, railway improvements, greener

transport, cutting congestion and modal shifts to rail freight (The Telegraph, 2010). Again before the 2015 election, the political parties agreed over the continuation of the EU goals such as investment in road and rail infrastructure and modernizing/investing more on rail (BBC News, 2015).

The Brexit was probably the biggest test of the decade for the UK political parties. In terms of the position on the referendum, all three political parties stayed impartial where each of them consists members from the both sides. Concerning the effectiveness of the Common Transport Policy rules after the exit, all parties (except UKIP) showed enthusiasm to keep the transport integration intact. Especially the Labour, Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party are eager to keep the Clean Air Act and EU Environmental rules on transport after the Brexit (BBC News, 2017). Conservatives also want to continue over the EU-led initiatives like investments on infrastructure to provide rail and road fairness on modes (BBC News, 2017). The only sharp ideological turns happened in the Labour position over the liberalization of the rail market. Contrary to the Common Transport Policy provisions, the newly elected pro-left Jeremy Corbyn administration is willing to change the liberal status of the rail market after Brexit via renationalization (BBC News, 2017). This could constitute damage to the relations if a potential Labour government comes into office in the near the future. Another potential roadblock in the future is the rising far right in the UK and their vision over strict disintegration with the EU. The most prominent far right representative is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the party chooses end of the transport integration of the UK with all elements including high-speed rail investment and climate change provisions (BBC News, 2017). All in all, the political parties are playing an important role to keep the policy positions intact towards the EU integration and currently, the future seems bright for the UK alignment with only small scale uncertainties.

In fact, the involvement of the different political parties (either in government or opposition) and politically motivated business groups into the process is enough for making the process political where each side of this web of interaction compete to get the best results. Compared to Germany, actors in the United Kingdom are far more

interest driven and the German culture of compromise between the different competences is hard to exist in the UK. The last section of the chapter covers the reaction of the different actors to the politicized issues of the transport integration and its effect on the level of integration. One negative and one positive example will be used to show the effect of the highly politicized issues. The negative case consists the EU Ports regulation example, showing the significance of the business interest even after the transfer of sovereignty into the supranational level. Though, the afterwards of the Brexit is standing as a hopeful case upon the future of integration, where the actors choose to continue on the integration at the time of political crisis.

Brexit was a political shock for the both British and European politics. Although British-EU relations were always complicated, another disengagement between the parties seemed unlikely. However, the higher percentage of the British population voted for a British exit from the EU. On the side of the political parties: Conservatives and Labour positioned themselves into a neutral ground and avoid choosing a side. Other parties such as the Liberal Democrats aimed for remain and the United Kingdom Independence Party openly campaigned for leaving the Single Market and the EU. Transport did take and still taking an important attention during this political crisis. Obviously, there is a threat for stopping the EU alignment on transport after a major vote over disintegration. In order to continue or stop over the integration process, the acts of the supranational, national and non-state players were decisive. Stakeholders and interest groups such as the Rail Delivery Group, the Freight Transport Association, the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport claimed their position as staying as part of the Common Transport Policy (Hall, 2016). On the other side, Bruges Group and ASLEF decided to vote for disintegration the UK transport from the EU (Hall, 2016). These stances of the prominent stakeholders have put the transport debate at the heart of the Brexit discussion and the area of transport became much more politicized. According to a report designed by an independent organization called the UK Transport in Europe (UKTiE); it seems that transport has played an underplayed role in the Brexit decision but in reality, the effects of the vote will certainly impinge on transport since the future of UK-EU economic relations are basically depending on this vote (UKTiE, 2017). After the decision on exiting the European Union, the focus turned to the

possible effects of this political decision on transport integration and the behavior of actors on this political uncertainty.

Immediately after the decision, civil society actors like The Norton Rose Fulbright (2016) independent group issued a report and warned the state officials and stakeholders about the possible impact of Brexit on the transport sector. The report accepted that there are dangers for the British transport actors such as losing the profitable free market access in aviation, the ability to procedure for a rail franchise in the EU, the single European maritime market access and cabotage services, the British role in the EU Emissions and Trading Scheme and the profitable Open Skies Agreement and the EASA membership (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2016). Nevertheless, the Norton Rose Fulbright (2016) organization predicted that UK would be willing to continue as a part of the Common Transport Policy. On the side of stakeholders; all UK-based aviation, maritime, rail and shipping companies admitted that the UK have to stay and operate within this regional integration scheme over transport and stick to the profitable common interests (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2016). The UK airline companies wanted to hold the period of wealth inside the Common Transport Policy and the UK rail industry aimed to continue on improving its emission reducing performance by being a part of the EU environment regulations (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2016). In this regards, interest groups that are eager to proceed over integration started lobbying and awareness building at different competence levels. The United Kingdom Transport in Europe (UKTiE) group is one of the most influential examples on this matter. After the decision, the UKTiE started campaigns aimed to protect the British transport interests inside the EU by keeping the UK as a part of the Common Transport Policy (UKTiE, 2017). The UKTiE (2017) reasons for these campaigns were: lack of clarity in the sector after the British exit, possible disruptions to the single market access, and uncertainty on the transport specific arrangements. However, the UKTiE (2017) also shared their vision on working alongside the government and the European Commission to shape the future of the integration (UKTiE, 2017). The efforts of the UKTiE reminded the neo-functional logic assuming that the political crisis is not necessarily bad if the crisis creates an opportunity for the actors to learn from the past mistakes and continue on negotiations.

The UKTiE campaign has circulated around pushing the government and the European Commission on keeping the priorities of the transport sector at the highest point during the Brexit negotiations and urging these integration actors to keep the transport rights of the EU and UK citizens, to provide minimum disruption on the functioning of the Single European transport market and to support the current international agreements and to eliminate the possible dangers over the anticipated disruptions between the UK and Ireland (UKTiE, 2017). These are the basic reasons, which triggered a local actor like UKTiE (2017) to work along with the UK government and the supranational level in order to ensure the continuation of the integration. The first accomplishment of these lobbying activities came out in September 2017 right after the UK decision to trigger the Article 50. The officials in the UKTiE met with Michel Barnier, UK government officials and the EU Task Force 50, who are the responsible group for negotiating the Article 50 for the EU. The UKTiE warned the Task Force and the government about the dangers of not securing a future agreement and declared “UK transport is deeply integrated into EU transport networks and markets, and is a major contributor to the success and competitiveness of Europe’s economy. The connectivity it provides is vital to the functioning of virtually every other industry and also enhances the lives of millions of people throughout Europe” (UKTiE, 2017).

At the same time, another regional actor also started campaigning for keeping the integration process intact. The Campaign for Better Transport decided to meet with the national actors and push the government for not letting this political decision damage the economic welfare established by the UK and the EU together. In accordance to that, the Campaign for Better Transport (2017) proposed the government to keep European emission standards after the British exit. On the other side, the dangers of possible disruptions on the flights to Europe also alarmed the UK’s largest airports including Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester, where they formed an alliance to warn the UK government about the necessity of keeping the integration principles and the EU rules (Morris, 2017). This is where the ACI Europe (European Regional Airports Council), as the representative of more than 500 airports, also joined to the decision-making process. Together with other European counterparts, the ACI Europe pushed the government to

maintain as a part of the Common Transport Policy and develop a strategy on air connectivity with the other member states (Morris, 2017). Otherwise, the council warned the UK that there is a risk of losing at least 270,000 jobs in the aviation sector.

For the environmental effects of transport, the possible exit of the UK from the EU alarmed some groups that concern transport and environment policies. The Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent advice channel to the government, published a progress report and declared that the integration process is an important factor for the falling numbers of emissions in the UK (Carrington, 2016). With respect to the committee report, the main opposition party Labour decided to push the government to keep the environment provisions of the EU *acquis* after the exit (Carrington, 2016). Against these views, interest groups like Bruges Group and trade unions such as ASLEF declared their vote against the integration on the grounds of keeping national interest and sovereignty sacred. Bruges Group criticized the restrictions on loading gauge, interoperability of technical standards and named these initiatives as unnecessary burdens (HM Government, 2014). The trade union of the train drivers (ASLEF) claims was based on keeping social rights regulations at the hand of national government (HM Government, 2014).

As a result of this dynamic political experience where national, sub-national and non-state actors are constantly in a bargaining position, the integration actors declared their official intention to keep the integration process in power against the decision of disintegration. These declarations came from the state officials such as the ex-transport secretary Patrick McLoughlin, who claimed that the success of important British companies are depending on the continuation of the European integration on transport so the government cannot possibly take the burden of losing the liberal aviation market and the government should make a positive case for a new deal aiming towards the continuation of integration (Helm and Boffey, 2015). Proceeding on the same vision, the current Minister of Transport Chris Grayling relieved the decision-making actors that there is no danger for a disruption at the airline sector and promised that the country will remain as a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency, who settles the EU legislation for member state aviation sectors (Reuters, 2017). In addition to that,

Grayling also emphasized that the UK government and business groups want a “business as usual” approach from the EU towards the integration process (Young, 2017). Although Chris Grayling supported a leave vote in the referendum, the Minister preferred to stay loyal to the integration process when it comes to the future of the sector and this resulted in the success of the campaigning efforts of the respected local groups. Once again, this promise showed the importance of the recommendations coming from the non-state levels for the state officials. Moreover, for concerns based on the environment protection, the government assured that the UK state is evaluated and decided to support the advice made by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) and promised to stick with the emission cutting policy even after the Brexit (Carrington, 2016).

The negative example is the EU Ports Directive, which aimed to change the structure of the European ports into a different operating model with wider market openings and independent sector regulations for the ports in the member states (UK Parliament, 2016). The role of the UK Ports on the rejection of the implementation was a prominent example for the effect of non-state actors on the decision-making process. Therefore, this effect was also able to change the conditions on the integration level. During the discussions surrounded on the future of the EU Ports Directive, both national and local players took different positions. The UK Ports have chosen a way to pressure the government to secure an exemption from the legislation at the time when the UK also need to decide on the faith of British exit from the EU (Barnard, 2017). In relation to that, the UK Ports started strong lobbying activities at both government and the supranational level. The Associated British Ports (ABP) was one of these lobby facilities. The organization was strongly against the allegedly damaging regulation and explained the directive as a decisive factor for the future of the UK-EU relations (Gutteridge, 2016). Since the matter is so crucial, the representatives of the organizations paid a visit to the European Parliament along with supporting trade union such as UNITE to make a case against the alignment with the EU Ports Directive (Container Management, 2014).

Although the overall position of the stakeholders is negative towards the Ports Directive, this did not constitute a generalization over the integrity of the European integration on transport. In fact, at many times, the UK Ports operators officially declared that they are eager to proceed on the integration process even after the Brexit but the operators are also determined to pull back on any interest damaging directives (Wright, 2016). The operators are believing that the nature of the Ports Directive is against the delicate balance shaping the common interests on transport (Wright, 2016). At this point, the opposition parties: Labour and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) started to engage with other competence levels to manipulate the decision-making process. Since the directive had only a few tangible benefits for the ports and environment sector and for the workers, the Labour members in the European Parliament decided to vote against the proposal of the directive (Labour in Europe, 2017). Moreover, the UKIP kept the party promise of rejecting any directive regarding the continuation of the Single Market and declared that the EU Ports Directive is a direct example of why the UK voted against the EU. As an outcome of these negative views from the different governance layers, the UK government drew national “red lines” over the directive and accepted the recommendations of the non-state groups and opposition (UK Parliament, 2016). For the establishment of the state position, the UK government consulted with pro-integration stakeholders called the UK Major Ports Group and British Ports Association and found out that even these interest groups, which are supporting the integration are against to the proposal due to the fact that the UK ports have different operating models compared to the other member states (UK Parliament, 2016). The parties have agreed upon ensuring the autonomy of the private ports and not hindering the state aid for the UK ports (UK Parliament, 2016). Therefore, the final verdict of this formed web of interaction in the UK was that the legislation could be harmful to the UK’s already competitive ports structure (UK Parliament, 2016). However, the UK government also added even that the current structure is not desired for the decision-makers in the UK, this does not mean that a revised version of the same proposal is closed for negotiations but the upgraded version has to protect the already competitive UK ports structure (UK Parliament, 2016). Despite the fact that the EU Ports Directive is a negative example towards integration on transport, it is useful for showing the evidence on the settled web of interactions for decision-making and its

effect on the integration process. Instead of turning to a national protectionist agenda, the demand of the actors for a counter-proposal clarified their persistence over the continuity of the problem solving at supranational level.

4.6: SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Observation 1: Similar to Germany, the United Kingdom is a corporatist country when it comes to transport governance. Towards the European integration on transport, both state and important amount (size and quality) of stakeholders are working together by forming interactive webs for decision-making. Cooperation and negotiation is never out of question, which means that both action capacities are high.

Observation 2: Another similarity with Germany is observable at the integration levels. The process in the United Kingdom is far advanced on each transport mode. This rate is obtained from the official statistics of the UK government, independent group reports and government competency reviews. Especially for the rail and road, the United Kingdom is a leading example for all member states.

Observation 3: Yet again, the neo-functionalist logic concerning the convenience of technical policy areas for integration is not entirely applicable for the UK either. Though, the policy of transport as a technical area is straightforward when it comes to ramification of the process into different policy areas with the spill over effect. The capacity of the UK stakeholders for this ramification is immense. Yet, the integration process is neither automatic nor unproblematic and non-political as anticipated. The case of the EU Ports Directive showed that a technical area could be easily politicized and complicated if it affects the interests of every actor inside the integration process.

Observation 4: The state mechanism in the UK has a high action capacity and playing a significant role both in project making and financial assistance in order to implement the provisions of the Common Transport Policy. The UK government is positive towards the European integration on transport and eager to work with other competence levels to keep common interest at. The state level in the decision-making is also ready

to share this authority with other levels regarding the inclusion of supranational and local actors. The decision-making process was regulated by a settled web of interactions and then positively affected the level of integration.

Observation 5: These shared responsibilities have brought the fact that there is a balance between the actors over regulating, implementing and projecting the European integration on transport. The existence of integration specialists in various interest groups are observable and they are as powerful as their German counterparts. Yet, there is no total shift of decision-making power to these organizations. Rather than that, there is a delicate balance between the national and non-state actors to implement the tasks proposed by the EU acquis. The Brexit process clearly monitored this delicate balance and its effect on the decisions for integration.

Observation 6: Interest groups, business organizations, environmental groups and trade unions are active and have high action capacities with regard to decisions concerning transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level. In some cases, the stakeholders have the power to negotiate directly with European institutions without exhausting the capacity of the state and government. The United Kingdom could be considered as the most influential example of elite socialization, deliberate linkage formations between policies and coalition formations against a specific political decision. Regional group formations are also available such as the coalition of the UK and the EU airports against the damaging consequences of Brexit. These formations resulted in high speed bargaining platforms for the actors in supranational and national levels.

Observation 7: Most of these stakeholders are accepting and supporting the European integration on transport. These local actors are considering the Common Transport Policy as a useful guideline for the UK national and industrial interests. Therefore, they acted like a guardian to protect these common norms even at the time of political crisis like the British exit from the EU. These stakeholders are active on variety of transport issues ranging from environmental effects to the social rights of the transport. This diversity gives an advantage to the UK since there are some groups like UK Transport in Europe (UKTiE), who are solely lobbying towards the continuation of the integration

policies. The structure of political parties is also similar. Besides UKIP, all political parties are supportive towards the process with only small-scale complaints. So, it could be said that the political opposition against the transport integration is very low.

Observation 8: The transport integration of the United Kingdom to the EU is a political process. Political interests on different governance levels matter when it comes to the decisions regarding the supranational policies. Each side has a balanced opinion over the issues and openly negotiate at the established web of interaction between the actors. However, within this political scheme, the overall tendency of the actors is “continuation” on Common Transport Policy rather than disintegration. This directly affects the UK’s persistence on the implementation of the EU acquis on transport. The actor behavior and the elite socialization after the Brexit resulted in a decision of stability at the transport and ruled out the possibility of the full disintegration of the sector, which may pull down the UK integration achievements.

Observation 9: The involvement of the supranational factor here is constructive. Even though, the UK-EU political history is filled with mistrust, the European Commission is eager to find middle ground between the common and national interests when it comes to transport issues. As a result of this positive attitude, the Brexit example once again indicated that the supranational side is willing to hear the demands of each governance levels before making a deal concerning the functioning of the transport market between the UK and the EU.

CHAPTER 5: THE CURIOUS CASE OF TURKEY

The last two chapters were based on the evaluation of two successful corporatist country examples and this study empirically assumes that Germany and United Kingdom have the same governance structure with Turkey: where both the action capacity of the state and non-state actors are high on making decisions over transport. These two examples, their generated integration strategies and expectations from the integration process are assuming that actor behavior and tendencies have an effect on the scores over integration. Although the motivations might differ, Germany and United Kingdom indicated that there is a connection between state-society relations and integration process. Within a corporatist governance model that gives significant roles to each party, the integration needs a high negotiation, connectivity and bargaining to thrive. Germany and the United Kingdom were the respectful member state cases that choose to organize their transport governance in this way.

By looking through the trends that they choose to do in integration, this study could draw a lesson and prepare an educated guess or a hypothesis on the way towards understanding the integration processes of these cases and answering the research question. In corporatist Europe, where countries organize their transport decisions through high level involvement of state and society, the transport integration to the EU is going forward if each governance level is willing to positively cooperate in an established web of interaction even though the state/society motivations towards the EU is different but generally in a positive manner.

Like Germany and the United Kingdom, Turkey is also a corporatist country. Turkish state shows a great deal of importance over the transport issues and there are prominent Turkish civil society actors who are at the heart of transport decision-making. For the EU, Turkey's transport integration is so vital for the good functioning of the single market and because Turkey constitutes a pathway for the Far East and Middle East markets. Without Turkey, there is a threat for the EU to lose this figurative bridge towards new markets. The same concerns are exactly valid for

Turkey as well. Turkey's biggest export partner is the EU and on country basis, Germany and the United Kingdom. This reciprocal interest makes the case much more valuable and needless to say, creates inevitability for integration. If Turkish integration to the EU cannot happen in this area, the single market could lose an important partner and this might damage to the already fragile economy of the EU member states.

As a candidate country, Turkey is an important testing ground for the above hypothesis. This chapter will be a search for the similar pattern that this research found in the former country cases. However, at the end of this chapter, the readers might be surprised that the findings in Turkey are far different from the case observations and even the corporatist structure of Turkey is much more ambiguous to understand. This complicated structure is mainly arising from the mixed signals which the Turkish state and non-state actors sending to the EU, involvement of a heavy and political EU factor which we have not seen in the other cases and some chronic administrative problems that the state and society is facing when it comes to transport decision making. These difficulties are obviously affecting the integration performance of the country and producing an ambiguous case with a mediocre integration performance. But first, similar to the other chapters, this case of Turkey also starts with a short historical background.

5.1: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

To understand the EU-Turkey relations on transport, the readers should first look at the late Ottoman Period before mentioning the effect of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. The interest for reaching Turkish and Middle Eastern markets was an important aspect of the European economy during 1880s. The first glimpses of this European interest were the building of Hejaz railway project of the Ottoman Empire. Hejaz railway project were planned and established by the Sultan Abdulhamid II but the significant fact here is that the railway line was engineered by the German transport specialists and the ownership of the Haifa-Damascus part of the line were given to a British corporation (Auler, 1906). These connections indicated a very early European

interest to the Anatolian transport projects and especially a great deal of importance to the Turkish railway routes. Railways were the definition point of the technological advances that the Western civilization established and for a long time, frequently used as the main transportation unit since it provides connection to the wider parts of the world (Quataert, 2017). The Berlin-Baghdad railway line of the time, have created the opportunity for the European countries to create economic and political bonds between the Ottoman Empire and these international powers also believed that the railway line will create employment to provide growth (Quataert, 2017). As a result of this, two significant railway corporations were formed under the names of Anatolian and Baghdad Railway Company and the operation of the Anatolian Railway Company was given to Germany (Quataert, 2017).

The German motivation for starting a corporation ownership in Anatolian soil was basically to build an influence over the region since railways meant more than just mere transportation functions and the Ottoman Empire was happy about this European attention due to the fact that railways provided huge military and strategic advantages to the Empire and made it much more easy for the Ottoman military to intervene Middle (Quataert, 2017). Despite this transport agreement on the state level, there were inescapable problems between the German Company and the Ottoman public concerning social rights (Quataert, 2017). Since the 90 % of the workers are ethnically Turkish but the administrative positions only filled with German nationals, this ethnic stratification led Ottoman workers to mobilize by forming trade unions and constant strikes (Quataert, 2017).

Compared to the late Ottoman period, the newly established Republic of Turkey and its leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had significantly different relationship with the Europe. Against the superiority of the foreign companies and their sphere of influence at the past, the Republic was much more conservative and protectionist over the operation of transport systems and preferred nationalization of the transport routes. However, railway modernization and infrastructure building became a significant policy of the Republic era. According to Evren (2006), Ataturk himself was the pioneer of this modernization period on railways and made the development of

railways and maritime affairs a priority. With respect to the realization of the industrialization at all costs, the railways are nationalized in 1923 and the 1925 Congress for National Railways established the ground rules for railway operations (Evren, 2006). As a result of these important initiatives, the railway line reached to 3186 km in 1939 (Evren, 2006). At this period, the modernization goals of the Republic made railway policies a national initiative for industrialization and the railways assumed bigger roles than solely being a simple transportation matter since it became a mechanism to transform even the social policies of the Turkish society (UDHB, 2017). According to the Turkish Ministry for Transport, Maritime and Communication (UDHB, 2017), the railways were an “unnamed social responsibility project” where it helped to the establishment of schools, social facilities, sports clubs and a wider social transformation.

Modernization attempts on other modes were also evident. As an example, the first glimpses of airline companies and air transport facilities formed in this period. In 1925, Turkish Aeronautical Association (THK) institutionalized and few years later, Turkish Airlines was founded in 1933 (Bakirci, 2012). A second example could be the projects on road transport and highways. Since the railways are not simply enough for fulfilled realization of modernization and industrialization, the Republic decided to invest on highways as well and founded the General Directorate for Highways (KGM) in 1950 (KGM, 2017a). Although there were investments, not much attention was given to highways because of the first Republican leaders was highly reluctant on a modal shift to slow down high-level modernization on railways (KGM, 2017a).

The outbreak of Second World War heavily affected Turkish economy and transport projects albeit Turkey was not involved to the war directly. This dramatic event led Turkey to change politically as well. The wartime era witnessed the end of single party period in Turkish Republic and assumed a government change. However, the most important change concerning Turkish transport was that the policies started to function under the heavy influence of daily political events, political challenges and issues of Turkish foreign policy. The United States effect on Turkey and Marshall aids distributed to Turkey for post-war rebuilding was the highlight of the era. Marshall

aids not just provided technical and financial sources to Turkey but also helped to shift Turkish priorities on transport (Cetin et al., 2011). The United States put immense pressure on Turkey for a modal shift to the establishment of highways rather than railways. This plan was originally based on the US economic interests to increase the amount of motor vehicle in order to increase oil consumption and create a Western influenced car industry in Turkey (Cetin et al., 2011).

Obviously, these neo-liberal interests coupled with the new government's political agenda, which was assuming a priority on the reformation of the highways and made a political promise to build huge infrastructure projects (Cetin et al., 2011). Coupled with this political motivation, harsh economic consequences of the war period was also a factor for modal shift, since railway establishment and operation was much more costly than highway building (Cetin et al., 2011). As a result of this, Turkey started a significant road-building period and road transport achieved a long lasting reign in the Turkish transport history. By the foundation of the KGM in 1950, new highway lines were analyzed and new transport plans came out concerning highways as a priority (KGM, 2017a). This unplanned structure caused Turkey to deal with an important unbalance between the transport modes. In this golden age of road transport, Turkey was much more focused on integrating the domestic highway routes of the country and other transport modes were more or less ignored. Between 1950s and 80s, only 30 km new railway lines established, which is far too short compared to the first period of the Republic (Cetin et al, 2011). Even though there was some planned organization recorded after the 60s, railway policies were never becoming a priority until 2000s (Cetin et al, 2011).

Only for air transport, there were some significant developments such as the modernization of the fleet, new airplane additions and planned new airport infrastructure projects (Bakirci, 2012). For maritime, the problematic areas were not so different from the railways. Although there were ideas floating around about rationally using shipping and maritime for trade (Cetin et al., 2011) and new reforms on maritime was planned (Akgungor and Demirel, 2004), Turkey failed to modernize its fleet and ports until 2000s and no anticipated shift happened to rail or sea freight

(Akgungor and Demirel, 2004). As a result, this period caused an important imbalance between transport modes due to the explained political and economic factors until. In this nearly fifty-year period between 1950s and the new millennium, only 945 km railroads established in Turkey (UDHB, 2017a).

Even though 50s and 60s were caused Turkey more transport problems for the future, it also witnessed an active EU-Turkey relation, which also gave the first glimpses of the bilateral relations on transport. EU-Turkey relations on transport were a direct consequence of the Association Agreement signed on 12 September 1963 and ratified on 1 December 1964. The Ankara Agreement envisaged the establishment of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey. This new economic cooperation is a direct result of the growing political bonds and interdependence between the Western Europe and Turkey initiated by the US influence and Marshall aids (Ozer and Kisi, 2011). The Ankara Agreement of 1963 was a project aimed to increase the capacity of cooperation and provide direct and balanced reciprocal trade relations. The Ankara Agreement was projected a stage based process towards the ultimate goal of the Customs Union before discussing the full membership of Turkey to the European Union. Obviously, for the efficient establishment of the Customs Union, the transport integration was a prerequisite. With respect to that, the EU-Turkey relations on transport started on road projects. One of the most prominent examples for these joint initiatives was the building of the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul, which is financed by the European institutions. Two different sources are confirming that the European Investment Bank (EIB) was responsible for funding this integration project. First of all, Gungor Evren (2006) defines the EU and EIB had major interest over the project and provided enough funds available to connect European and Turkish highways. The project co-partners were German-British enterprises and the project has influenced by the Severn Bridge in the United Kingdom (Evren, 2006). Cetin et al. (2006) also declared that the European Investment Bank and the EU as the main source of the financial assistance for the bridge construction.

Although the EU-Turkey relations on transport were heated at this period, the unplanned transport administration in the country continued until 2000s. The 70s and

80s were the times when highways kept the privileged position with new funding opportunities and by a rise in the automotive sector (Evren, 2006). At the same time, maritime and rail affairs kept losing their momentum (Evren, 2006). Without a master plan, the Turkish government continued to increase the capacity of the road transport compared to other modes (Cetin et al., 2011). In the late 80s, the gradual start of liberalization in the air transport market could be counted as the only positive for the other transport sectors (Bakirci, 2012). Although the state-owned Turkish Airlines stayed as a monopoly, the aviation market was finally ready to allow nineteen new private airline companies owned to the Law of Civil Aviation (Bakirci, 2012).

The decade of 90s have not witnessed major changes over the unbalanced structure of the Turkish transport. On the one hand, the road transport continued to hold its privileged position and grow aggressively with new educated personnel, technological advances and twinning projects with the EU (Cetin et al., 2011). Despite the government was aware of the existing imbalances between the modes and of the need for the much anticipated shift of freight to maritime and rail but, Turkish officials found it was too hard to break the long lasting supremacy of the highways for both political and economic factors (Cetin et al., 2011). On the other hand, the EU-Turkey relations on transport evolved into another level with the decision on the establishment of a Customs Union. The 1/95 decision on the Customs Union (31 December 1995) aimed to form an economic integration with the full implementation of the EU acquis on customs and trade, which directly affected transport.

Even after the Customs Union decision, the decision-making and project funding on transport was slow and Turkey had to wait until the new millennium to reach a wider level of potential. Meanwhile, the road transport stayed as the major source of transport. Only after the year of 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power with a brand new, pro-EU political agenda to abolish the imbalances between the transport modes. Later years witness the gradual decrease of this uncontrolled planning. The pro-EU agenda of the new AKP government was able to come up with an agenda for achieving European integration on transport and this started by modal shifts such as modernizing the Turkish maritime fleet to reach world

standards at maritime freight (Akgungor and Demirel, 2004). The aviation market liberalization of 2003 coupled with the new government slogan of “Every Turkish citizen should at least once travel with an airplane” and led to a speed up modernization process in the air transport sector and this resulted in an increase in the company number and size, new flight lines and more accessible journeys with safety standards (UDHB, 2017b). After project building in 2003, major railway lines planned and this progress remained until today (UDHB, 2017a). However, the supremacy of the road transport did not change despite major attempts to shift freight and passenger to the other modes. Within this period, standardization and modernization on road transport continued with an increasing rate. Therefore, the created imbalances inside the Turkish transport system continued and survived to cause an increase in the total road congestion and fatal accidents (Cetin et al., 2011).

For the EU-Turkey relations on transport, another major step was the start of the accession negotiations in 3 October 2005. The negotiation chapters specified the legal and technical framework for the European integration on transport. In terms of alignment with the EU, the negotiations were including two chapters concerning transport: Chapter 14- Transport Policy and Chapter 21- Trans-European Networks-Transport. The Chapter 14 included the necessary legal and technical transport adjustments for the free movement of goods, persons and market liberalization within the EU (Turkey Ministry of the EU Affairs, 2017). This chapter demanded from Turkey to fulfill legislation and implementation of road transport (market entering, road hours, tachometer usage, road tolls and dangerous goods), rail transport (market liberalization, rail safety, infrastructure, passenger rights and working conditions), maritime transport (sea environment protection, market regulation, state contribution and sea safety) and air transport (market entering, air traffic management, air safety, passenger rights and market liberalization) clauses (Turkey Ministry of the EU Affairs, 2017).

Unfortunately, it is an obligation for this study to inform the reader that the Chapter 14 is now suspended for any further negotiations due to the fact that Turkey rejected to amend the necessary provision in the Additional Protocol concerning the

recognition of Cyprus and the opening of the ports and the air space for Cypriot ships and freight forwarders. The second negotiation chapter is concerning the Trans-European Networks-Transport (TEN-T), which manages the integration of the transport infrastructure between the EU and the member/candidate countries on the grounds for establishing same technical standards and ensuring the free movement of goods (Turkey Ministry of the EU Affairs, 2017). The TEN-T networks are the physical infrastructure of the Single European Transport Market and an important aspect of the Common Transport Policy (Turkey Ministry of the EU Affairs, 2017). The chapter opened for negotiations in 2007 and Turkey accomplished the technical criteria by establishing the necessary lines on Kapikule-Halkali-Ankara-Sivas-Kars Railway (Turkey Ministry of the EU Affairs, 2017). However, the technical criteria were revised at 2013 regarding the inclusion of Halkali-Kapikule part to the integration agenda (Turkey Ministry of the EU Affairs, 2017). Needless to say, Turkey has to fulfill and close both chapters before full alignment and membership to the EU.

5.2: A BRIEF LITERATURE ON TURKISH TRANSPORT

At this stage of the chapter, now it is time to turn to our main country case, Turkey. From this earlier point and before going to detail, it is fair to admit here that the academic literature about Turkey-EU relations on transport policy is lacking in both quality and quantity. Besides the scholars made only a little amount of academic work, most of these articles and reports are concerning the physical side of the transport policy rather than the political and economic side. The ones, which introduce political elements, fell short to take out a theoretical debate. Methodological deepness is also lacking since most of these papers are using solely secondary data analysis and no other methods. This causes these papers to be more like a policy report or a brief rather than a full-fledged academic work. One of the aims of this paper is to change this and put this theoretical and methodological depth to the literature and show more convenient and actual reasons of Turkish integration to the European Union. Evaluating the home works of Turkey is an important point to write. This research also wants to do that but an evaluation becomes obsolete when you do not know the actual process, actors and

internal/external effects. To know the extent of Turkish integration, one can only do that comparison between different countries and models and make a future projection by knowing the changing dynamics. Even, a domestic impact approach is absent in the current literature.

However, there are some articles that could help this study to thrive on and worth to mention for understanding Turkish transport history and its relation with the European Union. Ulengin et al. (2007) study about a proposal of integrated transportation decision support system for Turkish policy makers is one of them. For Ulengin et al. (2007), the Turkish transport network has not followed a path of planned integration due to the political factors compared to its European counterparts and the current trends in this sector is unsustainable. Within this politicized structure, the current trends in Turkish transport sector is unsustainable to fight with predicted growth in traffic, traffic's impact on the environment and health and growth in the road capacity (Ulengin et al., 2007). Especially, for integrating itself to the European Union's outmost goal, Turkey has not master plan at all for intermodal transportation (Ulengin et al, 2007). For the lack of this unplanned policy decisions in the sector, Ulengin et al. (2007) proposed a decision support system for transportation policy makers both on the state level and private actors.

According to Ulengin et al. (2007), the European goals for integrated multimodal systems, introduction of the term "Trans-European Networks" and the internal integration of political, institutional and financial basis are highly important for a country to thrive on European integration. A country also needs a change in the focus of their management on policy. Many countries changed their views in order to achieve that. As Ulengin et al. (2007) states, Germany and United Kingdom changed their policymaking regimes from "predict and provide" to "pragmatic multimodalism" in transport to face the challenge. For Turkey, Ulengin et al. (2007) proposes a Transportation Decision Support System (TDSS) instead to allow formulation of aggregate and long-term scenarios. By developing a causal map for transport, calculation of the conditional probabilities and scenario analysis, the proposed Transportation Decision Support System (TDSS) aims to make policy makers to

analyze the impacts of socio-economic variables and variables related to transportation on passenger and freight demand for the future projections (Ulengin et al, 2007). It is worth to mention that the writers of the article are accepting the socio-economic perspective of the transportation regulations and significance of the politics and policy makers. This proposed plan of Ulengin et al (2007) signifies an input for the future Transportation Master Plan of Turkey. Of course, it is merely a suggestion. Ulengin et al (2007) also defends the idea that without these inputs, anything included to the Master Plan would be in conflict with the European Union Maastricht goals on transport concerning analysis of economic growth, energy usage and pollution. The writers think that intermodality also brought issue linkages and spill overs within the country and with the European Union.

Along with model proposing articles, there are some pieces including comparisons between Turkey and European Union members. Tanyas et al. (2004) research is triggered by the common literature fact in Turkey, that is the lack of a well-arranged comparison report about transport. However, the comparison only includes secondary data analysis and data gathered by current transport figures. No specific country cases, similar models or other data collection methods are available in the research. The sole aim of the article is to find out the reasons behind the differences and gaps between transport figures of the European Union countries and Turkey, a benchmarking analysis in short (Tanyas et al, 2004). A benchmarking analysis is important for the researchers since it is a useful reference for policymaking process, namely a lesson from the best practice (Tanyas et al, 2004). Different from it, this research uses two country cases, which are similar to Turkey in many ways, as a benchmark for integration. But in both two articles, the importance of transport is emphasized. From the own words of Tanyas et al (2004): “Certain EU states argue that their experience shows that given the right conditions, the combination of deregulation, regulatory reform and liberalization of services are playing a key role in enhancing competition, leading to improved performance at both the sectoral and the economical level.” Understanding that “right conditions” is one of the direct goals of this research.

Tanyas et al (2004) also emphasizes the importance of government on transport policies in maintaining and enhancing economic competitiveness. Governments should also be aware and committed to impose or struggle with the positive/negative impacts of the transport on other policy areas such as environment (Tanyas et al, 2004). The idea of establishing European transport policy and corridors was arising from a European aim to reach other markets such as Asia with an improved logistical infrastructure and this goal is absolutely crucial for Turkish companies who compete with European and Asian stakeholders (Tanyas et al, 2004). However, compared to its foreign counterparts, Turkish infrastructure, state and private actors have deficiencies. Tanyas et al (2004) emphasize the low railway usage in Turkey but in a wider comparison: Turkey has a relatively long but loosely woven transport network in terms of all transport modes. Although the odds are not in Turkey's favor in the transport network level, Turkey is willing to accompany the growing transport needs of the country and the continent with planned extensions of the air and seaport capacities and motorway building (Tanyas et al, 2004). Government is showing an effort to build a better transport policy by making projects but it is not alone in this field, private enterprises such as LODER (Logistics' Companies Association) and UND (International Transporters' Association) is also contributing with policy and project recommendations.

At the time when Tanyas et al (2004) paper is in the making, Turkey was started to get willing over the changes on transport but not functioning very well at the modernization and implementation side. For those reasons, Tanyas et al (2004) claimed that Turkey should have high connectivity, capacity and logistics facilities and support services. The driving forces should support distribution capacities of all types of transport and there should be all round services and facilities for ship management and operations companies (Tanyas et al, 2004). But at the end, policy integration through the Europe only comes with an effective cooperation of the national units. The physical, ICT and infrastructure of the country and its modernization could only be achieved through political, economic and regulatory stability (Tanyas et al, 2004).

Concerning a specific mode of transport, Idil Uz (2001) and her article about the privatization of railway sector in Turkey on the way towards EU integration is an

interesting piece. Uz (2001) uses the example of United Kingdom railway sector privatization as an assumed guideline (in positives and negatives) for a future Turkish liberalization process. Idil Uz (2001) has chosen the case of railways because of the direction in the European Union towards other means of transportation to compete with the dominance of road transport. In order to show this importance, Uz (2001) makes a cost-benefit analysis between rail and road sectors. This cost benefit analysis showed that railways could provide employment and more growth, railways are reducing the costs, reducing social costs, provides; a resistance from costly road constructions, less energy loss and gasoline, less environment concerns, less dependence on foreign countries on cars, less traffic accidents and more touristic value to the country (Uz, 2001) As a result, Uz (2001) found out that Turkey is far less advanced compared to European countries both in kilometers and infrastructure because of the series of wrong political decisions since 1950s and unjust treatment of railways in Development plans until 2000s regardless of the European Union pressures for regulation change.

The cost of these wrong policies toward railways cost Turkey to see TCDD (Turkish National Railways Agency) became a non-profitable entity (Uz, 2001). The less dependence on railways especially in freight operations directly resulted in the less pressures on privatization and change for the modernization of bad infrastructure (Uz, 2001). The case study is the British privatization on rail and gives an important insight for Turkey. However, the end result is not something that Turkey would desire. British privatization is a good example of cooperation between the state and business associations despite criticisms from other political parties and society (Uz, 2001). In the most natural way, privatization could bring planned liberalization, satisfaction of private sector customers, increased competition and a modern infrastructure but in Britain, did not work that way and found as a failure by customers and state officials (Uz, 2001). As a naturally politicized subject since it directly affects the productive layers of the society, many political clusters in the country directly rejected the policy change. For example, Tony Blair, the leader of the time mentioned “private companies” as disasters for railway industry (Uz, 2001). Once again, shows the importance of political conformity within the country for big decisions like liberalization. Regardless of privatization, Britain modernized its railroads because of the issue linkages that the

policy area created such as increase in the tourist level (Uz, 2001) but Turkey never did even though the country has so much touristic value than the United Kingdom. At the end of the article, Uz (2001) advises that the failed privatization should be a lesson for Turkey and for more liberalization; Turkey should provide more finances rather than privatizing the whole industry.

The last two papers defining EU-Turkey relations on transport are Sinan Kuscu (2011) and Joseph Francois (2003). First of all, Kuscu (2011) investigates the European Union transportation policy and its reflection in Turkey. The European Union is in need for new channels and distribution points to meet the requirements of its internal market and to supply goods from the Eastern markets as well (Kuscu, 2011). This is why the European Union proposes policies such as TRACECA, corridors for Asian markets or the Common Transport Policy for its members (or its potential members) to provide balance between all the modes, environment protection, social welfare, economic growth, modern infrastructure, balanced costs, competition and free choice of modes (Kuscu, 2011). For the integration to its Common Transport Policy and its transport corridors, the European Union suggests compliance with the *acquis communautaire*, liberalization, multimodal networks, modern infrastructure, smart strategies, solutions and research and development (Kuscu, 2011). After mentioning all the prerequisites for integration, Kuscu (2011) summarizes Turkey's position towards the process as incomplete. As Kuscu (2011) defines over different modes: Turkey has six times more accident rates in the road, no liberalization taken place in the rail and less control and personnel in the maritime sectors. These are mainly part of Turkey's internal and external problems in transport. Internally, the demand rises as economy grows but supply side is always debatable and externally, Turkey is a transit country and there is always an unbeatable traffic flow coming from the neighbor countries (Kuscu, 2011). Within this cloudy picture, Kuscu (2011) recommends Turkey to continue over the integration process but also focus on alternatives such as bringing the EU corridors and old Silk Way together.

Secondly, Joseph Francois (2003) looks upon the possible accession of Turkey to the EU and its futuristic implications for the European transport sector. This is a paper that

explores the quantitative and qualitative implications of Turkish accession to the European Union for the transport sector (Francois, 2003). It is also an assessment of the regulatory in Turkey for transport, as compared to the rest of the EU (Francois, 2003). Francois (2003) identifies membership in the EU involves not only market access but the community's own rules and regulations. So far, Turkey's regulatory regime is not entirely inconsistent and may be only a little overall alignment may be necessary for the integration (Francois, 2003). Even though Francois (2003) study claims broadly consistent elements between the EU and Turkey over degree of competition, price regulation and government financial intervention, other dynamics could differ on both state and society level. This research aims to take out these other dynamics where the EU and Turkey do not fit entirely.

5.3: COUNTRY ANALYSIS

The country analysis is based on the definition of actors in the policy making structure when it comes to Turkey's alignment with the Common Transport Policy. In other words, it is an analysis showing which actors are deciding the faith of Turkey's shifting of expectations from national setting to the new supranational setting. In terms of implementation regarding legislation, infrastructure and distributing transport projects, both the state in Turkey and Turkish stakeholders are an important part of the process. Similar to Germany and the United Kingdom examples, Turkey uses a corporatist governance model while making transport decisions. Turkish corporatism on transport is much more complex compared to the former examples. While state enjoying a great autonomy on governance, the local contributors such as stakeholder organizations, civil society actors and trade unions are playing a role complementary to the state decisions. This does not mean that these non-state groups are having a low action capacity but rather they are using this capacity differently than the other examples. This case will exemplify these differences. The same complexities are also evident for the political party structures and positions.

Starting with the role of the Turkish state in European integration, the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications (UDHB) are seemingly the highest authority within the state. Subidey Togan (2016) explains the responsibilities of the ministry as the development of infrastructure for road, rail, air and maritime, regulation of transport operations and supervision of state economic enterprises in the transport sector. Along with its sub-departments such as Directorate General of Highways (KGM), Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA/SHGM), Directorate General of State Highways (TCDD), Directorate General of State Airports (DHMI) and Directorate General of Coastal Safety (REGM), UDHB is responsible for ensuring the necessary policies for the alignment of Turkish transport modes to the Common Transport Policy of the European Union (Togan, 2016). In order to achieve this, the UDHB became the highest paid Ministry in Turkey in terms of EU funds and financial assistance (UDHB, 2017c). Inside the Ministry, one significant Directorate General is particularly important for the EU alignment process. The Directorate General (DG) for Foreign Relations and EU Affairs is responsible for the implementation and inclusion of the EU acquis, preparation of Transport Operational Programme (sets out the priority projects for integration) and regulation of the Transport Operational Programme in terms of investments, implementation of legislation, evaluation of the integration projects, coordination with the stakeholders, and giving necessary information back to the stakeholders about the integration projects and current level of Turkey (UDHB, 2017c).

During the personal interview with the head of Department, Umut Demirci declared that the DG is the main actor and mediator at the state level (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Other political figures such as ex-deputies at the Ministry have also confirmed that state plays the integral role in this process (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018). For infrastructure, legislation and regulating the negotiation demands, the DG is the sole coordination authority between the EU, Turkish government, other Ministries and domestic/supranational stakeholders (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). According to the personal communication with U. Demirci (August 22, 2017), the department is also included to the other negotiation chapters when it is affecting transport directly or

indirectly. These chapters are including environment, national development strategies and the Customs Union as a whole (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). For these spill over functions of the transport such as cutting the carbon emissions and increasing travel security in every, the department also have shared responsibilities (UDHB, 2017c).

The Directorate General openly appreciates and supports the EU integration process on transport by claiming that the EU integration is a state project and there is no turning back without any other alternatives (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Together with the EU officials, the department tries to increase the alignment in the transport field without getting affected by political problems such as Cyprus issue, the current cause of the suspension on the negotiation chapter regarding transport (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Moreover, the DG believes that the EU acquis is something that assisting Turkey to increase the level of development in the area of transport (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Regardless of the prospective membership, there is a tendency on the state level to appreciate the EU as the ultimate model of development in this sector (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). As a result, along with their assignment to align Turkey with the EU before the official membership, Turkish state officials evaluates the EU process on transport as something efficient for the people living in Turkey.

In the next parts of this chapter, the actor and pattern analysis will show how Turkey has a strong need to improve the transport infrastructure. In order to face these challenges and achieve alignment with the EU acquis, Turkey set transport strategies and targets for the year of 2023, which constitutes the 100th anniversary of the Republic. State departments also have important duties on setting these strategies and already made plans to achieve these targets. Most of these targets are directly or indirectly related with the EU integration process. Inside the National Strategic Plan of 2014-2018 prepared by the UDHB (2017d), Turkish officials once again indicated that EU alignment is a state goal and alignment with the EU acquis will be a decisive factor for the organization of the projects in each transport mode. Even the ex-

Minister of Transport and the current Prime Minister of Turkey Binali Yildirim evaluates the EU process as a very significant part of the Turkish transport strategies by claiming that “Our country is not a EU member yet but aligned with the Common Transport Policy in a great manner compared to some member states” (UDHB, 2017d). In this strategic plan, the state promised to support EU acquis about transport and achieve integration towards the EU and the TEN-T routes. For these targets, the state started initiatives such as making railroads as a priority to overcome the problem of high modal imbalances, establishing more high speed railway lines, increasing maritime security and safety, introducing slogans like “Air transport will be the people’s transport” to increase accessibility to air travel and making the alignment happen with the Common Transport Policy in efficient and safe transport perspective (UDHB, 2017d). So far, terms like modal shifts, increasing intermodal transport measures and traffic safety became a part of the Turkish transport policy-making when it comes to national strategies for the EU alignment (UDHB, 2017d). In terms of integration, this could be counted as an important achievement for Turkey since the positive stance of the state is an important push factor that moves the process forward.

National projects started to include EU expectations and the national level obliged to change decision-making positions depending on the common European goals in transport. The railways are a sound example to indicate this policy shift. The state policy aimed toward to establish a full liberal market for railways along with the EU goal to achieve balance between the transport modes, starting with a shift from road to rail on freight (UDHB, 2017d). In terms of intermodal transport, the state emphasized the importance of connecting logistics centers and maritime ports with railway lines. During a personal communication with the DG for Foreign Relations and EU Affairs, the head of Department Umut Demirci also confirmed that they are tirelessly proposing projects over the achievement of this target (August 22, 2017). High Speed Railway projects and electrification of the lines started to be established in order to create brand new initiatives to speed up the railway development (UDHB, 2017d). For interoperability with the EU member states, the technical necessities planned to be implemented via bilateral infrastructural cooperation. In this regard, national level policy makers arranged seven framework projects with the EU, consisting intermodal

transport, green transport corridors, environmental effects of transport and travel safety (UDHB, 2017d). The Ministry increased the administrative capacity of the TCDD and in terms of communication with the EU on infrastructure, declared TCDD as the coordination body to attend meetings with the EU for integration on Chapter 14 and 21 (UDHB, 2017d).

On maritime, the state created strategies to increase the freight and passenger transport with a clear-cut cabotage policy (UDHB, 2017d). First of all, the Ministry aimed to change the structure of Turkish ships from black list to white with respect to Paris Memorandum on sea safety and environment (UDHB, 2017d). For intermodal purposes, the state proposed strategies to establish energy efficient ports and a sustainable port infrastructure (UDHB, 2017d). KGM (Directorate General for Highways) became a part of the negotiations on Chapter 14 and a coordination body for the inclusion of the EU acquis to the national system. KGM (2017b) is now have the authority to support EU-Turkey joint projects on framework programs, ensuring travel safety on road, TINA projects for TEN-T road lines, Turkish contribution to the ECOLABEL (environment friendly roads) projects and the establishment of Gebze-Izmir and North Marmara motorways.

Last but not least, when it comes to the EU alignment on air transport, Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA/SHGM) is the government coordination body. Along with the EU-initiated government policies such as increasing airport infrastructure, increasing passenger capacity and full liberalization of air transport market, this sub-department is also responsible for the realization and evaluation of these goals. In that regard, the DGCA joined the TWINNING projects of the European Union for strengthening the administrative capacity of the air transport institutions and provide support for the transposition, disposition and enforcement of the EU legislation in Turkey (DGCA, 2017). Administrative capacity of the state departments is a long lasting problem in Turkish alignment process and Turkish state is currently trying to solve this issue by being a part of bilateral commitments and joint projects. DGCA (2017) has also the responsibility to transform Turkish aviation legislation and make it compatible with the EASA rules on air travel safety. As a sub-

department, DGCA (2017) supports the EU integration on transport as being a coordination body between the EU, Turkish Ministries and local transport stakeholders. To summarize, the position of the main state actors in the Turkish integration is positive and aiming towards integration. One of the biggest outcomes of this positive intention is the Transport Operational Program designed to overcome the bottlenecks on the way towards the EU integration.

The Transport Operational Program was activated by the UDHB (2017e) to coordinate the EU integration projects that are financed by the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) funds. For the application of funds and evaluation of project results, the DG for Foreign Relations and EU Affairs had the utmost responsibility (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). The program is designed to promote Turkish transport with an advanced infrastructure, compatible with the EU intermodal, multimodal and combined transport aims (UDHB, 2017e). In addition to that, projects of the program have the task to integrate Turkish transport by efficient, balanced and rational solutions in order to reduce road traffic, accidents, travel and freight transport times, costs and ensure safety (UDHB, 2017e). During the IPA I period between 2007 and 2013, the UDHB (2017e) implemented three projects with three priorities to achieve these goals. These planned projects were considering new construction and rehabilitations works on existing TEN-T railway lines and new railway harbors with necessary intermodal, multimodal and combined transport hinterland connections (UDHB, 2017e). As a result, for the IPA I period, Turkey concluded rehabilitation of the Kosekoy-Gebze section of Ankara-Istanbul High Speed Railway Line and signalization of the Irmak-Zonguldak line. Modernization of the Samsun-Kalin line is currently under construction (UDHB, 2017e). In IPA II, The Ministry and the EU agreed on capacity development and harmonization with the EU acquis on an extensive agenda (UDHB, 2017e). Similar to other joint initiatives, Turkey stated its general objective to become a party of the Common Transport Policy (UDHB, 2017e). To establish a national transport system that has unproblematic connections to Europe, a strategy generated consisting environmental friendly, intelligent, accessible and sustainable transport systems for less congestion, lower emission levels and lower accident rates (UDHB, 2017e).

Compared to the former model, the IPA II period of the Transport Operational Program (2014-2020) is expecting to achieve a sustainable and safe transport by these projects:

- Modernizing railway infrastructure
- Necessary measures to protect environment and face climate change
- Encouraging intermodal transport
- Accessible and sustainable transport
- Alignment with the acquis and full integration to the EU
- Increasing the capacity and harmonizing legislation for the implementation of EU acquis
- Construction of Cerkezkoy-Kapikule Section of the Halkali-Kapikule railway line (UDHB, 2017e)

Moreover, the newly designed Transport Operational Program also contributes to the technical assistance projects such as increasing the administrative capacity of the DG, preparing a National transport master plan for Turkey and building an info management system for the TEN-T (UDHB, 2017e). In coordination with the common goals, Turkish state also created initiatives to cope with wider EU interests on the field of transport. Documents like National ITS Strategies, National Plan on Climate Change and inclusion of transport to the 10th Development Plan were the indicators of that. For the realization of these strategy studies, the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communication worked in coordination with other Ministries such as Ministry for Environment and Ministry for Development (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017).

For the interest groups and stakeholder perspective, their contribution to the integration process of Turkey is highly interesting to evaluate. Many local groups (business organizations, civil society or trade unions) are evident and recognize themselves as the actors of this process. Their effectiveness will be investigated in the later parts of this chapter. But first, let's understand their actorness and positions

towards the Common Transport Policy then identify their effect on the overall process. Today, a mixture of business organizations, civil society groups and some effective trade unions are working alongside with the state on the way towards the Turkish transport integration. Notable groups which are claimed to be as a part of this integration are:

- UND (International Freight Forwarders Association)
- UTİKAD (International Freight Forwarders and Logistics Services Providers Association)
- DTD (Railway Transport Association)
- UKAT (International Road Freight Forwarders and Logistics Services Providers Association)
- TOSHID (Turkish Private Aviation Enterprises Association)
- Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association
- TUSHAD (All Civil Aviation Federation)
- TURKLİM (Port Operators Association of Turkey)
- TND (Turkish Transporters Association)
- AUSDER (Association of Intelligent Transport Systems)
- İMEAK (Turkish Chamber of Shipping)
- BTS (United Transport Workers Union)

Starting with the most influential of the group, the UND (International Freight Forwarders Association) is a distinct example for Turkish stakeholders. Both on state and the EU level, the business group representatives are clearly showed themselves as an actor and supporters of the integration process. During our personal communication with the organization members, a UND executive admitted that they are very different from other civil society organizations since there is a deep connection and evident socialization between the state and the business group (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017). T. Dengiz, who is the ex-counselor to the Ministry of Transport, confirms that the state-UND network was even highly efficient even before the start of the EU negotiation process (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018). Within this network, UND states that they working

harmony with the Turkish state officials on the matters concerning integration and only after an exchange of ideas between the sides, the state makes the final decision (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017). At ministerial level, the UND representatives are having highest level priority on decision making since they are critical and strategic given the fact that they are the representing the pioneer organizations of the logistics sector (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017).

UND is not just a simple part of the Turkish integration to the Common Transport Policy, but also a locomotive, a trigger for wider integration. UND openly supports the EU expectations and sovereignty shift to the EU level due to rational reasons where they believe both sides are in a win-win situation (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017). Not just on the state level but the organization is also effective at the supranational level where they negotiate in and attend to the meetings on behalf of Turkey at the European Parliament and the European Commission (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017). During the solution stage of the Road Transportation Quota Problem between the EU members and Turkey, UND combined the roles of negotiating and raising awareness about this bottleneck. For this reason, the group organized protests at Brussels without any encouragement directed from the state level. Turkish state only joined the process right after UND made the legal case at the European Court of Justice (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017). It could be assumed that UND is an important proof of the high capacity that Turkish stakeholders hold in the integration process. Without an expectation of consent and contribution from the state level, the positive views of stakeholders about the EU integration process and their ability to negotiate and raise awareness about Turkish integration bottlenecks showed the influence of non-state groups when they are willing to be a part of the process.

Yet, UND is a distinct example. The other stakeholders are also trying to be a part of the policy making process but compared to UND, their effectiveness is not impressive. Before evaluating their effectiveness, their overall position against the EU integration must be understood. UTIKAD (International Freight Forwarders and Logistics Services Providers Association) is another highly regarded stakeholder in

this sector. UTIKAD (2017) is a sector representative organization at the levels of Ministry of Transport (UDHB), Road Transport Regulation Council at the Ministry, TCDD, KGM and TRACECA projects. On the way towards the EU alignment, this business group continues to solve the problems of Turkish logistics and transport sector by using lobbying activities at supranational level (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Although this does not constitute a direct communication, UTIKAD negotiates with the European Parliament via European freight organizations such as FIATA (International Federation of Freight Forwarders Association) and CLECAT (European Association for Forwarding, Transport, Logistics and Customs Services) (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017).

At national level, UTIKAD attends the meetings organized by the UDHB over new road transport directives, the EU White Paper analysis and other various lobby activities (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Even though the UTIKAD official admits that the civil society culture is not yet operating functionally at the state level, the EU progress challenged and changed this perspective in a highly productive manner where the civil actors like UTIKAD is now a part of the decisions concerning sovereignty shift to the EU by contributing to the respective policy making schemes (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). In a nutshell, UTIKAD is a promising stakeholder group and considered as an actor and active contributor to the decision-making process through EU integration (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). UTIKAD have an open support to the EU progress as long as it adds to the economic interests of Turkey and the Turkish logistics sector (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017).

Railroads were always remained as a critical milestone in the Turkish transport history. Besides the initiatives of the state to increase railway travel and freight traffic inside the country, stakeholders could also be considered as active and vocal. Railway Transport Association (DTD) is certainly the most influential organization on railways. The organization is established to assist the ongoing developments on the railway sector and assumed a purpose to ensure a green and sustainable railway framework for the Turkish transport (DTD, 2017). In terms of the EU alignment, DTD

(2017) regulations declare the main goal of the organization as the integration of railways to the international routes/corridors and representation of the sector in national and supranational settings. Given the fact that railway sector and railway companies are recently emerging in Turkey, the DTD officials are currently considering themselves as a brand new actor in the transport decision making of Turkey (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). DTD supports the EU integration process in terms of both its modern approach towards the balanced growth of modes and effective use of railways in freight (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). DTD officials also see the organization as an actor in the EU integration process with their 74 freight forwarder members (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). Most importantly, DTD consider the organization as a partner to the Turkish state in the decision making process (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). In a rather interactive way, Turkish state institutions (UDHB, TCDD, Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Development) constantly calls for the DTD's opinion over the Transport Operational Program, new EU directives and preparation of the Transport Master Plan (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). The DTD motivations toward integration continues with regular stakeholder meetings, counseling/networking to business groups about integration process, planning education programs about the EU directives and forming working groups for assisting state decisions. Besides these functions, sadly no other activity is detected between national and local level where the DTD is a part of.

There are also other interest groups, which could be counted as the non-state actors of the EU integration process. While the above three organizations are currently at the doorstep of the Turkish Ministries and national level actors, these other local groups are currently developing into a fully-fledged stakeholder groups of the future. UKAT (International Road Freight Forwarders and Logistics Services Providers Association) is one of them. Located in Izmir, at the heart of Aegean freight forwarder hubs, UKAT (2017) aimed to develop the road freight transport in Turkey and attend the decision-making at supranational level in this manner. So far, only Jointed Committees of Transport (annual committees gathered for a particular transport project between

the Turkish state and a third country) asked the opinions and recommendations of the organization. Along with DTD, RAYDER (Rail Transportation Systems and Industrialists' Association) have a purpose to develop the rail transport systems in Turkey and tries to establish a common ground and enough standards for Turkey in order to make rail networks compatible and aligned to the European Union (2017). TND (Turkish Transporters Association) is also aiming towards to contribute to the process by helping the policy making in the transport sector and to make the sector as a national and international powerhouse by setting decent coordination with domestic and supranational levels (2017).

When it comes to maritime affairs, different non-state actors are working on the ground to become a part of the decision making process. Turkish Chamber of Shipping is a fierce supporter of the EU integration process on shipping and maritime and the Chamber gave direct attention to the advantages coming with the EU acquis and informs its members about maritime security, ports control, TEN-T sea corridors clauses of the EU directives (Turkish Chamber of Shipping, 2017). Turkish Chamber of Shipping (2017) currently contributes to the decision making process by annual coordination meetings with the Ministry of Transport and other stakeholder bodies. In addition to these, the Turkish Chamber of Shipping (2017) also aims to achieve wider EU goals such as preserving maritime environment and creating initiatives via EU IPA projects. TURKLIM (2017) is also a maritime stakeholder group and continues to hold necessary relations with national level and other civil society actors in order to keep directive changes effective for all parties involved. For the alignment, the maritime group plans to contribute to the process by approaching to the EU funded projects and work on the solutions for the problems such as professional proficiency for the maritime personnel (TURKLIM, 2017). In air transport, TUSHAD and TOSHID are the two pioneers of the sector. TOSHID (2017) is the representative organization of the private airlines operating in the Turkish market and the organizations provides counseling to the Ministry when it is necessary. TUSHAD (2017) on the other hand, cooperates with all other stakeholder organizations in order to make air transport policy as compatible with Turkish national transport goals and national interests.

Last but not least, there are stakeholder organizations evident in Turkey which are trying to raise awareness about the functional linkages of the transport with other policy areas. AUSDER (Association of Intelligent Transport Systems) is currently working operating towards the recognition of Intelligent Transport Systems in Turkey and with this way, they are aiming to reduce the increasing rate of road accidents and fatalities (AUSDER, 2017). AUSDER (2017) recognizes the EU integration as a guideline for the development of ITS and obliges themselves as a coordination mechanism between the Turkish state and other stakeholders operating in the transport sector. AUSDER (2017) attends to the meetings at the Ministerial level and works with every part of the integration process in a coordinative manner for the sake of the development of ITS in Turkey. Finally, Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association (2017) is a civil society organization that is working cordially with state organizations such as KGM in order to make academic and empirical studies about the problem of increasing road traffic, accidents and fatalities. For this goal, Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association (2017) is willing to design joint protects with the state and supranational institutions, and other civil society organizations on transport.

On the side of the Turkish political actors, the political party structure is far diverse than Germany and the United Kingdom examples. In the former cases, this study empirically identified a strong level integration with the EU when political party stances are supportive and does not accommodate an opposition towards the alignment. Obviously, politicization of the decision making was evident but this attempt did not aim to create a bottleneck for alignment. Even though both countries were governed and are still governing by formed coalitions, political parties are far more eager to find a common ground regardless of their ideological perspectives.

In Turkey, even though the country is under the heavy political influence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) majority government for nearly 20 years, mixed signals towards the EU and the transport integration is evident for both the government and opposition parties. The incumbent AKP government has now reached two decades of ruling and the party agenda, goals, manifesto and slogans are

inevitably intertwined with the state policies. Though, this could be either good or bad for integration, depending on the AKP position over the EU and transport integration. However, one certain outcome is the high politicization coming out from the connection between a party agenda and dependent state actions. Compared to AKP, the perspective of the opposition parties is also heavily different in terms of transport alignment.

In this political scheme, the first key decision maker is the incumbent President Erdogan's party, AKP. As a conservative liberal party, AKP's party program is very closely aligned with the overall state goals about the Turkish integration to the Common Transport Policy. The party manifesto, accomplishments, strategies and comments about the EU integration indicate a strong commitment to the transport integration while being hesitant about the integration structure that the EU proposed to Turkey. The AKP Party Manifesto claims an integration between the modes along with efficient, balanced and environmentalist transport regime (AK Parti, 2018). Moreover, strategies such as preparing a Transport Master Plan, developments on railways, security on roads, full liberalization of ports and coordination with civil society for the protection of maritime environment puts more depth to the party position (AK Parti, 2018). After nearly 20 years, there is an inevitable resemblance between the state strategies and AKP manifesto. On the positive side, both of them are supporting the EU integration process and claim themselves as an actor and decision-maker. AKP's political vision generally settles on the idea that continuing over the integration process as long as it fits with the universal transport approach that the Turkish citizens deserves (AK Parti, 2012). Yet on the negative side, the recent years of the AKP government has passed with critical claims over the negotiation process since the EU failed to give a proper membership prospect to Turkey even though the party was generally continued for alignment (AK Parti, 2012). During the last decade, AKP also constantly blamed the supranational level for constructing more bottlenecks against Turkish integration (AK Parti, 2012). The intertwined positions between the party and the state have also been observed during the interview with the UDHB officials when they made the same criticism about the behavior of the supranational side.

Although state-AKP engagement could be seen as a roadblock, the AKP government achievements did suggest an alignment with the EU transport legislation. The AKP government achievements directly propose the EU alignment as a reference point for the usage of tachometer on road trucks, passenger rights in aviation, application of Paris Memorandum rules, rail market liberalization, establishment of Halkali-Cerkezkoy high speed railway line and projects of new port infrastructure (AK Parti, 2017). This major political actor also has EU inspired ongoing projects for transport such as: building intelligent transport systems to the all modes, solving the road quota problems of the freight forwarders, increasing road traffic security, full liberalization of the railway market and solving the remaining bottlenecks, environment friendly transport and most importantly, a will to continue over the EU integration (AK Parti, 2017). However, these achievements and strategies might be in danger due to the policy shift that the party took in recent years and comments made by party officials, which have started to declare mixed signals about Turkey's alignment to the EU. The President of Turkey and incumbent party president Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently promised to send the EU process into a national referendum after years of waiting in the membership line (BBC, 2016). Moreover, President Erdogan also claimed that Turkey does not necessarily need the EU integration any more (BBC, 2017). Current Prime Minister and ex-Minister of Transport Binali Yildirim have also warned the EU to speed up the membership process before it gets too late for Turkey (IHA, 2017).

Opposition parties in Turkish Grand National Assembly could also be counted as the minor partners of the integration process. Over the last decade, Republican People's Party (CHP) became highly critical over the position that the AKP took on transport decisions and the EU integration. CHP is the main opposition party and had always complex ideas about the EU integration process on transport. On one side, CHP supports the EU alignment and Common Transport Policy directives/projects such as preparing a Master Plan for a guideline, a balanced transport mode network, environment protection, coordination with the civil society and stakeholders, proper implementation measures, modal shifts on freight to rail and modernizations in port infrastructure (CHP, 2013). The party promises to continue over these measures if

ever holds the majority in the assembly. On the other side, the party manifesto also indicates a strong opposition towards rail market liberalization and identifies this approach as the privatization process of state enterprises such as TCDD (CHP, 2013). For the latest elections at November 2015, CHP prepared an election manifesto including the EU demands on transport. Inside this document, CHP approved to continue ongoing government projects such as sustainable infrastructure, integration between the modes, building railway connection to the ports, more freight forwarding on railways and coordination at the Brussels with the help of civil society and other stakeholders (CHP, 2015). However, CHP also criticized the incumbent government's initiatives about transport integration. CHP (2015) believes that the AKP government is making road transport investments because of political motives and this is causing an unbalanced mode structure in the country. Projects like North Marmara Motorway, which is highly critical for TEN-T road corridor connections, criticized by the CHP due to environmental concerns. This resulted in a paradoxical position. Even though the current position of CHP over the EU integration on transport is positive, major EU inspired developments like rail market liberalization and North Marmara Motorway is believed to be inefficient due to ideological and environmental grounds.

Last but not least, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and People's Democratic Party (HDP) are the other political figures in Turkey's highly political integration climate. As a hardline nationalist party, MHP is openly critical towards the EU and the EU integration on transport. As far as transport issues concerned, MHP (2009) has a will to protect the national interest and an expectancy shift to the supranational level is only achievable if the proposed alignment is protecting national interest and keep the state as the primary decision making mechanism. In the party program, MHP (2009) defines its transport approach as a balanced transport network, which will protect the Turkish national interest. While there are visible commitments that move the party position towards a bit more to the EU level such as keeping the task for establishing international transport corridors, port modernization and modern railway infrastructure (MHP, 2009), comments made such as the EU being "a Christian club" and Turkey does not need the integration process at all, puts a big question mark to the MHP's future actions concerning alignment with the EU (MHP, 2009). The final

opposition actor is People's Democratic Party (HDP) which has actually no concrete plans or projects indicated before towards the EU integration process except a will to involve local governments more on transport decision making (HDP, 2017).

5.4: EVALUATION OF INTEGRATION

The first two parts of the chapter introduced the major breakthroughs in history and the main actors of Turkish transport. Now, the chapter continues with the summary of the integration level in Turkey. As also applied for the former case studies in this study, the performance of Turkish transport will be evaluated by the progress that Turkey achieved in the Common Transport Policy goals, directives and projects of the EU. In this respect, all transport modes (road, rail, maritime and air), including the intermodal transport between the modes will be included. All patterns of achievements on alignment, directives, implementation of laws and infrastructure building will be accounted. Interview results, official EU statistics and sector reports will be used to establish a guideline for this evaluation.

As indicated in the history part, Turkey's transport modes developed highly uneven during the last fifth years. Compared to the other modes, road transport has been used as the major transportation instrument for both passenger travels and freight forwarding. However, given the fact that the EU prioritizes and demands an equal distribution of passenger and freight to the modes, major progress on road transport might still be counted as an underachievement for Turkey. Another point is that development or modernization does not necessarily mean a complete integration or alignment to the EU. Remembering from the other cases, the EU claims something wider from the member states, an integration process based on; sustainability, respect to environment and intermodal measures. In Turkey, it could be argued that there is only a moderate progress compared to other corporatist cases. Although immense progress level achieved in the last fifteen years, every transport mode in Turkey still have certain problems. This part of the Turkish case aims to clarify the overall progress in order to design a fieldwork for the pattern analysis.

5.4.1: Road transport

While making an evaluation out of Turkish transport modes, road transport should be taken into account. For both passenger and freight, Turkish transport sector is heavily and essentially depending on the road transport (Togan, 2016: 38). Statistics and reports are setting a basis for clarifying this notion. Compared to other transport modes, the road transport currently handles the 89,9 % of the freight haulage in Turkey (TCDD, 2016). The closest mode to this is maritime transport and ports, which fills only 6,3 % of the freight market (TCDD, 2016). On the passenger side, the picture is more or less the same. In 2015 statistics, the road transport covers the 89,2% of the passenger traffic in Turkey (TCDD, 2016). Only positive trend here in terms of European integration is that the percentage of road passenger traffic decreased from 97,8% to 89,2% between years of 2010 and 2015 (TCDD, 2016).

For road transport infrastructure, Turkey holds a strong position. The highway web in the country continued to grow and reached 64,619 km in 2016, compared to 60,000 levels in 1995 (KGM, 2017c). These rates are just considering the state and provincial roads. Infrastructure developments such as highway constructions also achieved substantial progress by reaching 2,542 km in the last sixteen years (KGM, 2017c). At the year of 2000 and two years before the AKP government, this rate was only 1,674 km (KGM, 2017c). This is also directly related with the ever-growing state investments to the road transport. Due to the AKP government's aggressive strategy to build more roads in the country, state investments increased from 1 M Turkish Liras to 21 M Turkish Lira in just sixteen years of time (KGM, 2017c). As a result of that, passenger rates and freight usage increased in the road transport in a way that the EU would not appreciate. Passenger vehicle quantity increased to 119,671 vehicles/km in 2016 from 51,604 vehicles/km at 2002, while freight topped into 253,139 tons/km in 2016 from the 2002 rate of 150,912 tons/km (KGM, 2017c). In comparison with the EU rates, Turkey is far below of the EU goal of the differentiation of modes and modal shifts. The EU average rate for road transport freight handling is only 75,1 % (TUSIAD, 2014). A good sign of integration achieved

in capacity of road truck drivers training and increasing administrative capacity (European Commission, 2015).

TEN-T integration of Turkey is also significant for the alignment with the EU infrastructure. An uninterrupted transport line between Europe and Asia is essential and Turkey is the main corridor (Isik, 2012). TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) and TINA (Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment) projects are the instruments to establish this corridor. TINA project objective was to establish multimodal transport in Turkey while extending the TEN-T network (Isik, 2012). For this reason, 15 road projects launched in order to provide a 15, 200 km road network in TEN-T road section of the EU (Isik, 2012).

Although road infrastructure signals mixed results, there is an efficient transposition of road transport directives. Two different personal interview results are confirming that. The Turkish state officials declared that Turkish road transport laws are mostly integrated with the EU and left very few wider arrangements (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). An important stakeholder organization, International Transporters' Association (UND) also accepted this claim by declaring that 90% of the EU laws are integrated to the Turkish national legislation (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). On road safety, the legislative alignment of Turkey is still continuing but usage of digital tachometer became obligatory at 2011 and registration of vehicles added into the national system (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Besides these, Turkey became a part of the ADR (International Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Convention regulating the road transport laws for the transport of dangerous goods (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Driver licenses are now aligned with the EU standards by the new by-law on road traffic and being a member to the Convention on Road Traffic and the European Agreement (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). The 4925 Road Transport Law of Turkey also consists provisions about driver competence on road and financial capability of corporations (UDHB, 2017f). In addition to that, 23 road inspection stations were built and financed jointly by the Turkish government and the EU (UDHB, 2017f). The latest EU Progress Report in 2016 also evaluated the Turkish legislation on road as

mostly aligned with the EU imperatives (European Commission, 2016). According to the latest report, the technical inspections of road infrastructure and vehicles carrying dangerous goods are entered into force and Turkey is now continue to align with road safety policies with respect to the EU acquis (European Commission, 2016). For latest EU directives, Turkey has some pitfalls such as on implementing the intelligent transport systems legislation into the road transport (European Commission, 2016). Especially, the energy efficient vehicles and alternative fuels must be used in Turkish road transport (European Commission, 2016).

Nevertheless, Turkey's most important roadblock on road transport is the disorientations in implementation and ambiguous progress towards environmental and safety concerns. Although Turkey pays an important attention to the road safety legislation, numbers are saying the opposite. Road fatalities and death rates are increasing. According to the latest numbers reported by the KGM (2016), road traffic accidents increased into 1, 182, 491 in 2016 compared to the 2008 number of 950, 120. At the same year, road fatalities also nearly doubled from 4, 2365 to 7, 300 (KGM, 2016). The renewed driver licenses and road control units failed to answer the problem of road fatalities. Therefore, the reason of this numbers is mainly coming from driver mistakes, which is the reason for 90% of all accidents (KGM, 2016). While the EU is trying to decrease the number of vehicles and aims to orient people to alternative transport mechanisms, Turkey insists on increasing the number of cars, buses and trucks in the traffic. Between 2004 and 2016, amount of all cars, buses and trucks in the road transport increased in substantial amounts (KGM, 2016). Tachometer usage for buses and trucks constitutes another problem for the Turkish road transport sector. The tachometer law in Turkey indicates that all bus and truck drivers have to use tachometer efficiently in their travels. However, there are increasing concerns and criticisms over the policing and supervision of this tachometer usage combined with the lack of administrative capacity to evaluate the vehicles for tachometer supervision (OYPG, 2016). A similar pitfall is evident in the alignment of environmental goals to the EU's Common Transport Policy. In this case, gas emissions and reduce of carbon dioxide on road vehicles is such an important indicator. Turkey's average on this matter is far less than adequate. As Ozpeynirci

(2015) puts it firmly, Turkey is far away to realize the emission goals since it is not even ready to withdraw the old cars (3, 2 million) from the traffic, which is causing the problem at the first place. The EU emission standards became a national law at 2009 but even the regulations for implementation took five years and only realized at 2014 (Ozpeynirci, 2015). Today, the amount of cars which are not regulated with respect to this emission regulation (withdraw of cars older than 20 years) is 3 million and counts for the 22, 3 % of all cars in Turkey (Ozpeynirci, 2015). In addition to that rate, only 10.66 % of the cars are below 100 gr/km CO₂ emissions (Ozpeynirci, 2015). Yet, the EU average claims that all vehicles must be below the rate of 95 gr/km.

5.4.2: Air transport

Developments in the air transport are the prize projects of the current administration in Turkey. With the motto of “Air transport is the people’s transport”, Turkey aimed to achieve efficiency on infrastructure and legislation. Along with the alignment to the EU acquis, it is fair to say that the Turkish integration is defining a rapidly growing process with only evident shortcomings. The expert interviews of this study are the main indicators for this assumption. The General Manager of Association of International Forwarding and Logistics Service Providers (UTIKAD), Cavit Ugur, explained that the air sector in Turkey is ready for further alignment with only small problems enduring on the way (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). This alignment is evident in both implementation and infrastructure level (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Turkish state officials also confirmed that Turkey has the highest level in air sector alignment even though there are problems arising from Turkey’s status as candidate member, which constitutes an important obstacle for Turkey to contribute to the decision-making process of Common Transport Policy (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Full integration to the initiatives such as Single European Sky is not ready enough but Turkey is eager to sign another bilateral air agreement with the EU and is currently preparing to amend this (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). On the implementation side, state officials are claiming that Turkey is fully ready to

implement the EU law and have an efficient legislation since implementation is a necessity in air travel due to security and safety reasons and needless to say, these safety clauses are also binding for international conventions such as IATA rules (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017).

The first attempts of liberalization issued in 1983 when Turkey introduced the 2920 Civil Aviation Law to redistribute the air transport market (Gerede, 2015). Though, the lack of competition experience combined with continued controls over market opening and resulted in a rather inefficient free market access (Gerede, 2015). However, this first move paved the way for the 2003 market liberalization, which is triggered by the EU acquis itself aiming towards liberal policy establishment, the removal of bottlenecks and accessible travels (Gerede, 2015). Since 2003, the steady progress on air transport sector continues with taken precautions and full liberalization of the air travel market as the most visible indicators (DHMI, 2014). After liberalization, the air market in Turkey grew steadily 10% per year and contributed to Turkish aims for full realization of EU acquis with modern and secure air transport (DHMI, 2014). Within this period, the passenger number and freight rates on air also increased. At 2013, the air transport filled the 5, 9 % of the all freight, which is an immense increase compared to the past (DHMI, 2014). In addition to that, the first glimpses of an accessible air transport network achieved in this period due to the fact that 3,2 billion passengers traveled in the year of 2012 (DHMI, 2014). Infrastructure and fleet wise, Turkish aviation field is operating 12 airlines and 50 air taxis and in total, 1, 231 planes are currently working (DHMI, 2014). Between the years of 2003 and 2014, the airport infrastructure and the number of working airports are doubled from 26 to 53 (Servantie, 2015a). This directly affected the increase in the domestic passenger rates, which again rose by 10 million to 76, 1 million between the same years (Servantie, 2015a). Moreover, horizontal civil aviation agreements with other countries increased from 81 to 169 countries (UDHB, 2017b).

Subidey Togan (2016) defines the developments in the Turkish air transport sector as “tremendous”. In the last decade, Turkish capacity building attempts became very important by combining regulatory reforms like the liberalization of market (Togan,

2016). For this swift alignment and capacity building, the Turkish government achieved full harmonization on regulations towards occurrence reporting, rating on air traffic controllers, licensing of the maintenance staff, the safety assessment for the domestic and aerial vehicles and the revision and modernization of the passenger rights (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Turkey also adopted the legislation concerning the safety assessment of national and foreign aircrafts (European Commission, 2016). In addition to these legislative revisions, the EU- Turkey Horizontal Aviation Agreement is signed at 2010, but the implementation arrangements are still pending and the agreement is not effective yet (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Turkey also contributed to the EU-funded projects such as institutional and administrative capacity building, supervision of civil aviation navigation services and forming a working emission trading scheme within the country (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). In terms of the EU integration, Turkey became a member and part of the EUROCONTROL and EASA (UDHB, 2017b). Moreover, a Twinning project between the EU and Turkey is completed with a purpose to develop the Turkish air sector by evaluating the best examples in Europe. Under the umbrella of the Twinning projects, Turkey completed the project goals of building emission evaluation facilities and administrative capacity for the Directorate General for the Civil Aviation (SHGM) (UDHB, 2017b).

Obviously, this important level of alignment in the air transport sector is not immune to workable deficiencies. First of all, administrative capacity seems to be endured as a problem in both the European Commission's 2015 and 2016 progress reports, regardless of the efforts in the Twinning programs. As reported in the European Commission (2016) analysis, the capacity of the Directorate General for Civil Aviation is not keeping with the pace of the growth speed of the sector. At the EASA, Turkey must build on this working arrangement and must extend this to the all areas of aviation security (European Commission, 2016). The lack of communication between Turkish and Cypriot air services poses a huge threat for the EU aviation safety and security and Turkey must work on a possible political solution (European Commission, 2015). The most important problem in this area of integration once again arises in the spill over functions of the transport policy. In terms of the EU

Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on air, Turkish government and Turkish Airlines are currently avoiding to make such commitments for preventing emissions (Kivilcim, 2012). The emission trading schemes in this policy area is only developed by certain projects and The National Plan for Climate Change assumes manageable goals on the matter (referencing the EU acquis) but no concrete legislative process arranged or implemented yet Turkey (Kivilcim, 2012). At a time when the EU shifted its priorities to the effects of air transport rather than the air transport itself, it could be a huge disappointment for Turkey to not keep the pace after series of alignment procedures.

5.4.3: Maritime transport

Maritime is one of the sectors that Turkey has to make a difference and continue over the alignment efforts. After the start of membership negotiations, Turkey did revise its legislative structure. In Turkish officials' words, "remarkable progress" has been achieved on the maritime safety (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). This is a direct result of the placement of Turkish flag from the high-risk black list to the low risk white list under the rules of Paris Memorandum on Port Control (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). To get aligned with the EU acquis on maritime administration, Turkey did reorganize the Ministry departments into three more directorate-generals solely functioning on maritime affairs (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). While the EU alignment is continuing, Turkey also became a part of International Maritime Conventions such as "Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation on Pollution" and "Convention on the Prevention, Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic" (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Development continued on the issue of maritime surveillance where Turkey has integrated the IMO rules and International Mobile Satellite Organization (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017).

The problem of the Turkish Maritime Sector is that the progress in this field is limited to the developments at the above. On the grounds of the quality of ports and maritime travel/freight, the sector is not ready for further alignment. The latest report published by the IMEAK Chamber of Shipping in 2015 acknowledges that the port infrastructure needs an immense re-structure. There are two ways to achieve this

modernization: either by increasing the efficiency of the existing ports or building new ports with State investments (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). Currently, Turkey has four planned projects on building container ports such as Candarli, Filyos, New Mersin Port and Derince port (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). However, neither of these big projects is fully completed and this affects the freight traffic. Needless to say, shortcomings on port quality also directly diminish the rate of freight that the ships are handling. According to Deniz Servantie (2015b) analysis, the share of shipping freight holds is just 2, 4 % of all freight operations. Although 87,6% of the export freight is handled by the Turkish vessels, cabotage transporters are left with only a 3,6% of the share (Servantie, 2015b). The uneven structure also a result of the structure of the current ports. The ports that Turkey is currently using such as Iskenderun, Derince, Bandirma and Tekirdag are having difficulties based on the specialization of freight patterns and intermodal/multimodal connections. The IMEAK Chamber of Shipping (2015) assumes that the ports in operation and new projects must be separated based on freight specialization. Meanwhile, the Turkish ports handle the 86% of the container traffic and could be used as a hub for transit freight lines (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). Though, the lack of railway connections to the ports such as Iskenderun/Aliaga makes Turkey to lose the advantages of combined transport and progress over the EU acquis and intermodal transport goals (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). For this matter, urgent infrastructure planning is needed. In the semi-structured interview series, the Association of International Forwarding and Logistics Service Providers (UTIKAD) also mentioned this port infrastructure problem in Turkey. During the interview, stakeholder officials admitted that the quantity of private ports is enough for the EU integration and the problem is the sustainability of these ports (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). The stakeholder officials warned about the problem of not having a Turkish master plan for all transport modes and effect of this unplanned organization on port building (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Without feasibility, evaluation and planning on the state side, the private investors are trying their best to build shipping ports in a highly irregular geography (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Against these claims, the Turkish state officials declared that they are currently working on solutions over

building railway lines to the ports (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Turkish state officials are also claimed that they are aware of the fact that classification of ports based on freight is much more significant for Turkey's geography and Turkey has to make special and efficient ports rather than building large port facilities such as Rotterdam (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017).

In maritime transport, another problem is currently haunting the dreams of full alignment and this obstacle is the administrative capacity problem. Between the Ministries and sub-departments, poor coordination and authority clashes are frequent. In terms of maritime alignment, a simple legislative change or implementation could become such a problem because of the complex web of authority sharing (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). For a simple decision making on maritime transport: Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior and sub-departments such as TCDD could clash over authority and this causes the EU project and legislation to be delayed or suspended for a very long period of time (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). At the interview with UTIKAD, the organization also advised about the departmental lack of coordination in Turkey but not just for shipping, for the transport as a whole (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). As a result, besides good governance efforts and close relations with the EU on maritime safety and surveillance, port infrastructure and the quality of ports endure as an obstacle on the way towards full integration. The state coordination problems will also be covered in detail in the upcoming parts of this chapter.

5.4.4: Rail transport

The most important transport problems lie at the heart of the rail transport policies. Since the end of the first Republic period, railways sidelined as a state policy and only after the start of the EU membership negotiations, the project making mechanisms revived. Although reforms made and alignment efforts are continued over the last fifteen years, railways are still the biggest roadblocks in the Turkish alignment process. This part will start with an evaluation on what did Turkey achieve in terms of

railway modernization and liberalization before investigating the causes of the problems in this sector.

As a start, rail market liberalization is an important indicator for the EU alignment. In that direction, Turkey finally activated the long lasting proposal of market liberalization on rail transport. The rail liberalization law has been signed on 1 May 2013 but a 5-year transition period has been given to the market and government to issue necessary adjustments for the implementation of the law (Togan, 2016). Since then, the preparations are still ongoing for alignment with the new rules for safety on railways, railway interoperability, passenger rights and the environmental impact of the railway infrastructure (Togan, 2016). Even though the legislation is ready, liberalization in the railway market is not fully realized with all its advantages.

Regardless of these shortcomings, the AKP government started an important development period on the railways. Between the years of 2004 and 2016, 1, 805 km new railway line has been established in Turkey (TCDD, 2016). State investments increased from 485, 540, 000 TL to 4, 457, 536, 000 TL in the same year (TCDD, 2016). However, this did not affect the shift of freight and passenger to the railways. The EU acquis goal of modal shifts and equal distribution to modes have not achieved yet to the desired rates. In 2010, the freight issued by road was 89, 9 % and 5, 3 % by rail but in 2015, this number even decreased into 3,9 % for railways and the road transport stayed at the same rate (TCDD, 2016). On the passenger side, it gets even much harder for Turkish policy makers to shift. Between 2010 and 2015, the number of passengers using railways is decreased from 1, 6 % to 1,1 % despite the introduction of new railway lines (TCDD, 2016). In terms of supranational comparison, Turkey is well below the EU average on both freight and passenger terms (TCDD, 2016). In addition to that, the electrification of the new high- speed lines covers only 1, 213 km of the whole 12, 532 km railway line in the country (TCDD, 2016).

Nevertheless, railways once again became a priority for the state after the foundation years of the Republic. Subidey Togan (2016) evaluates this new initiative as a direct

result of the EU integration process. Marmaray is one of the most visible examples of this supranational effect. Marmaray is a rail project that connects Asia and Europe under the sea and the project financed by the European Investment Bank (Togan, 2016). Since the European Investment Bank only gives financial assistance to the projects for the EU alignment, Marmaray could be easily classified as one of them. As a direct result of the alignment with the TEN-T acquis of the EU, the state and the EU have declared priority projects. Inside these projects, the most important ones were related with railway infrastructure building. Ankara- Istanbul High Speed Railway line is completed without Kosekoy-Gebze section, which is still under testing and this section is financed by the EU (Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, 2018). In addition to that, the EU also financed the recently opened Irmak-Zonguldak line, Samsun-Kalin railway line (under construction) and Halkali-Kapikule line (not started yet) (Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Halkali-Kapikule line is especially important for the EU alignment since the route is the main connection to Europe (Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, 2018). On the issue of high-speed railway lines: between 2012 and 2016, the length of the high-speed railway line increased from 888 km to 1, 213 km (TCDD, 2016). Besides Ankara- Istanbul line, Turkey also established the high-speed rail lines in Ankara-Konya and Konya-Eskisehir-Istanbul sections (UDHB, 2017a).

For legislation, Turkey continues to align with the EU and the railway market is ready for the full realization of market opening. For providing an answer to the problem of administrative capacity, Turkey formed the Directorate General of Railway Regulation in order to regulate the market liberalization process (Turkey Ministry for the EU Affairs, 2017). Moreover, the Turkish state issued by-laws concerning the access to the railway infrastructure, capacity allocation, transport of dangerous goods by rail, investigation of railway accidents and railway safety (Turkey Ministry for the EU Affairs, 2017). Even the supranational level appreciated these legislative achievements in the annual progress reports. In 2006 report, the EU underlined the Turkish rail progress by claiming that the secondary legislation on railway stock and safety means an attempt to foster the market opening in the country (European Commission, 2016). However, the latest reports also show important criticism points towards Turkish alignment to the Common Transport Policy.

These recent by-laws have been criticized by the EU on the grounds that they are not powerful enough for a fully-fledged open market where Turkish officials still keep the process in a pending situation and this causing delays and efficiency problems (European Commission, 2016). The secondary legislation for the market opening is still lacking and there are some parts in the law that fails to comply with the *acquis* for market freedom (European Commission, 2015). In addition to these criticisms, the administrative capacity of the new regulatory body considered as ambiguous due to the complicated hierarchy between Turkish decision making bodies and independence of the regulatory bodies from the Ministry (European Commission, 2016). The EU efficiently demands candidates to give enough autonomy to the regulatory bodies against a political pressure coming from the state. Overall, the EU still convinced that the Turkish railways are not compatible with the Directive 2012/34 establishing the single European railway area (European Commission, 2016) and further alignment and policy making is surely needed (European Commission, 2015).

During the personal interviews, stakeholder officials carefully enlightened these areas in need of a further alignment. Similar to the supranational side, non-state actor DTD (Railway Transport Association) once again evaluated the Turkish position as not integrated yet because of the above reasons (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). According to this personal interview, the DTD officials declared that Turkey is currently struggling with modernization, signalization, and electrification problems on infrastructure (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). For legislation, the law for market liberalization is ready but the stakeholders are also not happy about administrative capacity of the state organizations for a swift alignment process (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). Recently established railway lines such as Marmaray is not ready for freight forwarding but the original plan for Marmaray was including both passenger and freight (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). In addition to that, the overall railway connections to the commercial areas and ports are not enough for shifting freight from road to rail (Y. Rota, personal communication,

October 30, 2017). According to the stakeholders: without the proper application of these projects, it seems highly unlikely for Turkey to achieve full alignment.

5.4.5: Inter/multimodality, combined transport, sustainability and ITS

As mentioned before in the earlier chapters of this study, the European integration is a dynamic process. Integration is not just about legislative changes and implementation of the common projects but also a process, which creates a ground for technological advances, sustainability and combined transport models. In other words, it is open for evolvement with new developments in the transport industry. In the Common Transport Policy, the EU demands from member/candidate states to shift their allegiances and national policies to benefit from these new developments in the sector. Nevertheless, in Turkey, there seems to be a low level of understanding over this dimension of the integration process. The latest EU progress reports proposed the importance of these subjects and the European Commission (2016) underlined failure of Turkish decision makers on the adoption of legislation to create intelligent transport systems and capacity development for the effective implementation. As a result of these shortcomings, no alignment has yet achieved on the development of ITS. Another evaluation report prepared by the stakeholder organization AUSDER (2016) and the interest group report is also claiming that there is no legislative background on ITS, combined with lack of knowledge in the state institutions and non-state groups. Besides ITS, sustainability and environmental effects of the transport are critical EU policies. In terms of adding these to the integration agenda, Turkey needs a revision in the key documents in order to push for more sustainability measures and combating with the bad consequences of climate change (European Commission, 2016). On combined transport, the supranational actors are not convinced by the overall progress except the 2014 Combined Transport Strategy document of Turkey (European Commission, 2016). A domestic TUSIAD (2014) report on Turkish multimodal transport strategies also indicated that overall progress in Turkey has not been developed yet into the expected level. Deveci and Cavusoglu (2013) study also confirmed that the alignment for multimodal transport is at its most critical on port-railway connections but Turkey is still failed to launch enough multimodal railway

links. The study also evaluated the reason for the delays on railway market liberalization and found out the cause as Turkey's poor conditions on intelligent transport technologies (Deveci and Cavusoglu, 2013).

5.5: ACTORS AND PATTERN

Germany and the United Kingdom cases indicated that a multi-level governance model of decision-making has been established between supranational level, national governments and lower national/regional bodies such as local governments and stakeholders. Inside of this dynamic system, all of these actors are playing a positive and supportive role in the decision-making, which eventually leads to the establishment and implementation of supranational goals of the Common Transport Policy. This became the integration pattern for the biggest two corporatist examples where action capacity of state and society is high. In addition to that, when the actors in this pattern assume mutual flexibility over tasks, coordinate with each other and fill their gaps, alignment of the European transport policies thrive and domestic expectations shift to the EU level. For Turkey, the story is a bit different. This part also indicates that state and non-state actors are essential players for the shift of expectancies to the supranational level. These actors are all consider themselves as a part of Common Transport Policy and the EU-Turkey relations on transport. However, the above evaluation of integration signals rather odd outcomes and mediocre rates compared to the former corporatist cases. The rest of this chapter will be an analysis of the Turkey's multi-level governance pattern and detected deficiencies between the actor interests and relations and its effect on the overall integration performance of the country.

In order to analyze this mediocre completion rate in Turkish integration, fields of "spill-over" and transport policies in need of deliberate linkage of tasks, could be an important indicator for the ambiguous responses of supranational, national and local level actors. As indicated many times before in this study, these transport linked "spill over" tasks are an essential part of the Common Transport Policy and if a particular country aims to align with the supranational level, it has to implement these tasks as a

part of the alignment process. That is also what this study observed in the German and Britain cases, where developments on road security measures, reductions on gas emissions and introduction of intelligent transport systems were considered as highly critical. What happened in Turkey is that even though both state and stakeholders are eager to propose variety of solutions to align with these tasks, there is a general failure to deliver these promises.

To exemplify these failures, Common Transport Policy goals such as gas emissions reductions and measures over the road security could be highly useful. For the reduction of gas emissions, the state seemed not entirely convinced about shifting the expectations to the EU level. Compared to other EU initiated policies, Turkish government does not have enough care about these matters. This could be explained by the existence of these goals in the strategy documents but not visible actions when it comes to implementation. Certainly, couple of state strategies and vision plans are indeed mentioning about the essentiality of the gas emission reductions. The Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications strategic plan for 2014 and 2018, gives a direct reference to the EU-based policy making in this sphere and promises to set the EU average as a goal in gas reductions (UDHB, 2014a). Emission strategies were also indicated as a duty for the Directorate General for Foreign and the EU Affairs, calling for the observation of the developments in the supranational area and a report it back to the national actors (UDHB, 2017c). In relation to that, the Directorate General also works as a task force to raise awareness in the environmental effects of the transport (UDHB, 2017c). As an example for these initiatives, the projects such as “Green Airports” could be given where both Ministry of Transport and Directorate General for Civil Aviation are working together for the reduction of gas emissions into the EU levels (DGCA, 2017). Last but not least, emissions goals on transport were also introduced to the “Climate Change Action Plan” carried out by the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning and the plan aimed to reduce the gas emissions and create alternative fuel mechanisms (Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 2011).

The above numbers are indicating a rough turn in Turkish policy shifts into the EU's emission reduction approach. Özpeynirci (2015) explains this ineffectiveness as a matter of two-level failure. At the state side, these environment concerns do not get enough importance taken by the Ministry or government and on the stakeholder part, interest groups are not aware of the significance of these matters at the supranational level. The current statistics are indeed providing a proof for this assumption. Although it has been nearly five years since the Climate Change action plan and 2014 transport action plan passed as alignment legislations, no significant development on reductions is realized. The 1990 norms of the EU only became a law in Turkey at 2009 and the implementation only came in 2014 for the new cars (Ozpeynirci, 2015). According to Ozpeynirci (2015), the state is not even trying to withdraw the old cars from the market that is not compatible with the EU measures.

İlge Kivilcim (2012) also puts an attention to the problem expressing the fact that Turkish state and biggest airline operator THY wanted to postpone the environmental measures and the alignment with EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on air transport, due to economic reasons. Even though there are settled projects for the future commitments, the problem lies in Turkey's inability to assign a proper timeline and guideline for the implementation of these commitments for integration (Kivilcim, 2012). In these strategy documents, Turkey took the EU as a reference point but no other effort has taken neither by the state nor the non-state actors in order to draw joint initiatives with other competences (Kivilcim, 2012). The EU progress reports have also mentioned the Turkish shortcomings in the integration process and warned Turkey for the immediate revision of all transport strategies for taking account the latest EU priorities on sustainable urban mobility and combating climate change (European Commission, 2016). However, these supranational level criticisms and advices for integration did not make such seemingly effects on the national side. Other national actors in this area also criticized the government on the basis of the environmental damages provided by the infrastructure building projects like the third international airport in Istanbul. Although local actors such as environmentalists and environment chambers found out that there is a significant possible damage to the environment, state officials ensured that the airport would be a "Green Airport" (BBC,

2014). The opposition party CHP also brought this new infrastructure project into the court, claiming that the project is ongoing even though the EIA report does not give permission for the state to build the airport (T24, 2013). So, there are concerns over the project's legitimacy. This automatically creates an ambiguity for the alignment process. Common Transport Policy demands both infrastructure building and the protection of environment and these two aspects should not contradict each other. Nevertheless, the Turkish case showed that when this type of a controversy arises, the tendency of the Turkish officials is to "selectively" continue over the infrastructure projects at the expense of disputable problems over the environment.

As a matter of fact, it is the duty of interest groups and stakeholders or the other non-state actors to play their significant roles in decision-making when an implementation problem arises. The former cases indicated that interest groups are highly active in the integration process to come up with plans and projects together with national and supranational authorities in order to move integration further. In relation to these environmental issues, Turkish non-state, private actors are far away from reaching that point. There are only two stakeholders who are basically only aware of the problem and both of them are maritime organizations. One of them is TURKLIM (2017), which started a monitoring program to learn the EU commitments for its members and initiated the "Green Ports" project for environment friendly ports. The second group is the IMEAK Chamber of Shipping (2016a) and the organization promoted its support to the environmental measures over the preservation of maritime environment, but no significant outcome achieved from this support. Even for these organizations, a planned cooperation with national or supranational authorities has not come into agenda yet. In addition to that, there are also no stakeholders are evident in Turkey, who is solely deals with the effects of transport. These issues have been used as sub-topic areas to the mode specific interest organizations.

Another evident fallacy in Turkish integration is the country's inability to integrate EU road transport security measures and this is directly affecting the accident rates. In the Common Transport Policy, there are two vital measures: using tachometers for freight trucks and introduction of Intelligent Transport systems to reduce road

fatalities. Tachometer is a device, which regulates the driver's hours, driver break moments and the speed in order to decrease the truck-based traffic accidents. The incumbent Turkish government introduced the regulation concerning the usage of tachometer at 2004 as a directive regulated by the Ministry of Transport. Tachometer is a Common Transport Policy measure and the EU members or candidates have to take necessary precautions on the usage of the device. The directive also took attention from the political actors. The government party AKP showed the tachometer directive as an achievement towards the EU integration. However, the system and implementation of the directive is still open for manipulation.

An OYPG (2016) report detected serious administrative problems in Turkish alignment to the tachometer system. According to the study, the Turkish directive states that all buses and trucks have to use the device (OYPG, 2016). To be more specific, in the EU member states, if a vehicle is having more than nine seats (including the driver), the vehicle counts as a bus (OYPG, 2016). In Turkey, this definition also became a domestic law, however, one significant provision was added to the directive indicating that if vehicle seats do not exceed seventeen (including driver), this counts as a "small bus" (minibus) and this type of a vehicle does not have to use a tachometer (OYPG, 2016). Given the fact that "small bus" has the highest rate on road accidents and fatalities after regular buses, this provision made Turkey much more vulnerable to the accidents (OYPG, 2016). In this way, Turkey used a "silent opt-out" from the Common Transport Policy procedure. In addition to that, the OYPG (2016) report is also advocating that the road investigations over tachometer use are not enough and effective. This view also accepted by the UND official during a personal communication, which stated the claim that in road transport and especially in freight, there is a law but there are complications on regulation and inspection over the effectiveness of law (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). This perspective points out another Turkish integration problem concerning the enough administrative capacity to handle alignment problems. Since the tachometer regulation and implementation generates separate duties for different Ministries (Science, Transport and Internal Affairs), taking a holistic position is very difficult to achieve (OYPG, 2016). As a result of this, complex issues and authority problems are arising

in the decision making process and it is directly effecting the implementation of the law (OYPG, 2016). When there is no effective regulation, road accidents and fatalities are prone to increase in along with rises in the “small bus” and regular bus numbers, which are the other causes of these accidents.

The other case example here is the introduction of Intelligent Transport Systems. The “2016 Progress Report on Turkey” prepared by the European Commission (2016) and urged the state officials to upgrade current policy strategies into a position where they are fully aligned with the newly developed technologies for transport. In other words, the EU warned Turkey to use intelligent systems to provide road safety. It is fair to say, state did take out new strategies about these systems. “The National ITS Strategy Document” aimed to use informative and new technologies through comparative analysis with the EU member states (UDHB, 2014b). In this way, Turkish state wants to achieve road safety and environmental sustainable policies until the 2023, the centenary year of the Turkish Republic (UDHB, 2014b). The inclusion of the ITS methods are also visible in the second Transport Operational Program funded by the European Union and 65. Government Plan. Even though few steps taken in the state level to recognize this part of the Common Transport Policy, there is no significant progress made in this policy section. AUSDER (2016) interest group report about the Turkish progress on ITS, signals a lack of EU initiated policy making in this sphere, where there is no specific directive, no feasibility plan between state organs and no authority sharing between the stakeholders working for the field. The interest group suggest that there must be standardization within the country if there is ever going to be a will to integrate the ITS mechanisms into Turkish transport (AUSDER, 2016).

Along with the state, there are stakeholder and civil society groups working for the achievement of road safety and security. AUSDER (2017) has a purpose to increase the road safety, capacity and sustainability by the introduction of ITS mechanisms. Although the stakeholder group is attending meetings at the Ministry level and makes coordination efforts with other private parties (AUSDER, 2017), no significant achievement has been made by the group towards raising awareness except a report showing the current Turkish position on the ITS. For road accidents, Highway Traffic

and Road Safety Association (2017) is currently working together with state organizations such as KGM in order to make an academic analysis on the prevention of accidents and fatalities. The Association also has future strategies to mediate with national and supranational level on a regular basis to initiate joint projects (Highway Traffic and Road Safety, 2017). Even though the strategies are promising, currently there are no detected projects or policies coming from these stakeholders to raise awareness in both national and supranational levels. Despite the existence of these two civil society organizations could be considered as an advantage to Turkey on claiming ITS and road safety, their inability to act shows that these organizations have not realized their duties as an interest group and their action capacity. Against this assumption, the Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association (2017) answers it by criticizing the state level for not giving enough financial assistance and support to these organizations. Even this is not a proper answer to their inability to act; it shows the state as the indispensable part of this integration.

State mechanism in Turkey considers itself as the chief negotiator and one of the principal decision-makers on the issues concerning Turkey's alignment towards the Common Transport Policy. At the above, this study has already made the point that the overall approach of the Turkish state is positive on the alignment. However, this chapter will show the reader that what state has actually achieved and failed to achieve based on the integration process to the Common Transport Policy. Although Turkish state accepted supranational goals in transport, another national agenda is also available on the constant implementation problems, administrative capacity issues and various other ambiguities unresolved. Moreover, the state approach is much more selective towards the policies when it comes to the EU integration. Rather than setting a balance policy-making framework with other actors, the state chooses to set priorities over infrastructure and modernization at the expense of safety and environment measures. However, the reasons of this selectivity are causing damage to the overall process.

First of all, the state considers itself as the main integration party along with the supranational level on the matters of infrastructure, legislation and negotiation

chapters of 14 and 21 (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). The first responsibility given to the state and the Ministry of Transport is to make coordination between the all actors of integration and produce strategies such as Transport Master Plan (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). For specific issues like the problem of road transportation quotas, the Ministry of Transport also shares the authority with other state institutions such as the Ministry of Economy (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Obviously, it would be highly unfair for the Turkish state, if this study states that nothing has achieved towards the EU integration and this mediocre rate is the direct outcome of this lack of project building. Indeed, there are indicators and factors for that assumption but fair to say, Turkish state did start a lot of initiatives, became an important transport actor during the last 20 years and internalized the EU integration on many fields. Respected strategies and plans that explained at the beginning of the chapter became a reality thanks to Turkey's acceptance to share its sovereignty with the EU. The full authority transfer to the supranational level is now an achievable target after only if Turkey resolves all bottlenecks. This transfer is visible through successful Turkish implementations of the EU rules and project development over the EU values.

When we look to the state's role in the EU progress, road transport is in important indicator. According to Subidey Togan (2016: 65), the Law on Road Transport (2003) and the by-law on Road transport (2009) promised Turkey a brand new licensing system, aligned with the EU directives and goals. This state initiative resulted in registering 90 % of commercial freight vehicles along with the near completion of driver license harmonization and training requirements for drivers (Togan, 2016). The 2015 EU Progress Report also mentioned the state effort on road traffic legislation and appreciated the effort with an evaluation of full alignment on subjects such as driver licenses (European Commission, 2015). The state efforts continued with government initiatives combined by the EU funds available for candidate states and completed the establishment of 23 roadworthiness-testing stations (UDHB, 2017f). Except some minor implementation issues, these initiatives led the road transport sector of Turkey to a 90 % alignment rate with the Common Transport Policy and led

state investments for road transport to become actually higher than many European Union member states (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Even at the times of political crisis such as the road quotas or suspension of the transport chapters, the Ministry of Transport officials confirmed that the negotiations and authority transfer continues (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). As a result, only minor deficiencies left on road transport agenda for integration thanks to these state measures (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). The Ministry still continues to work over these deficiencies by making joint projects with the supranational level concerning infrastructure building on the Trans-European Motorway and Kuzey Marmara Motorway lines (UDHB, 2017). At the end of the day, the state initiatives made road transport market as the biggest employment provider sector between the modes (Togan, 2016).

On railways, current bottlenecks did not change the fact that it was the Turkish state, which started the liberalization process and initiated biggest rail investments after years of waiting. Through the EU alignment, the Twinning projects and the established positive framework towards the EU resulted in the realization of Rail Liberalization Law at 2013 (Togan, 2013). In the last decade, the incumbent government of Turkey placed significant efforts on the modernization of railways and finally, the decision-makers at the state level realized the importance of the transport mode (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). After the realization of the EU integration process and Turkey officially became a candidate for the Common Transport Policy, the railways became a “state project” again (UDHB, 2017a). Not just the railways but also the whole integration process became a state policy (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Along with this new vision, state placed more investment and modernization to the railway lines, which resulted in a 1, 805 km new railway line between 2004 and 2016 (TCDD, 2016). This new line included important high-speed railway lines like Ankara-Istanbul (Kosekoy-Gebze part is financed by the EU), Irmak-Zonguldak and Samsun-Kalin (TCDD, 2016). These EU financed projects and technical funds also played a part in the liberalization process of the rail market (UDHB, 2017a). The supranational level also appreciated the developments by mentioning that there is a significant domestic improvement

towards the market liberalization, on railway stock and safety (European Commission, 2016). Currently, the state is continuing to increase the freight levels, the modernization of the lines and the alignment with the EU directives (UDHB, 2017).

In the air transport sector, there is a reported steady growth as a result of the market liberalization at 2003 (DHMI, 2014). The liberalization made air travel much more accessible for citizens and more domestic and international passengers started to use Turkish airports for travel, which resulted in a rise from 34 million to 143 million between 2003 and 2014 (Gerede, 2017). In the EU alignment period, state liberalization of the market provided a 10 % growth to the Turkish economy (DHMI, 2014). To reach the infrastructure targets of the EU, state investments focused on increasing the number of airports, which eventually doubled from 26 to 53 airports (Servantie, 2015), including a brand new airport to Istanbul as a new transit hub between Europe and Asia. A good degree of convergence at the EU-EASA rules on airworthiness has been achieved (European Commission, 2016) through the Ministry of Transport efforts on integrating Eurocontrol commission directives (UDHB, 2017b). During the personal interview, the state officials admitted that the alignment is still continuing while the EU acquis became a state guideline rather than being a mere document for the EU membership (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). This officially indicates how much the state officials are willing to make authority transfer happen with the supranational level.

The Ministry of Transport has also proven itself as an important actor on maritime matters by putting efforts to the port infrastructure investment and modernization, combined with strategies to make them as “hub ports” with a railway connection (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). As a result of this, 21 public and 136 private ports have been established in Turkey (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2016a). As the direct consequence of EU alignment, the state created maritime safety initiatives that helped Turkey to transfer the country position from the black list to the white list on Paris Memorandum (UDHB, 2017g). For the balance of the modes and modal shifts, the maritime transport increased its share 8 % on passengers thanks to the state investments for the new ships and port infrastructure (UDHB, 2017g).

However, the mediocre rate that Turkey currently holds in the process is also produced by the initiatives that the state is failed to deliver. The observable fact is that while state is making a speedy progress on some issues, facing important problems on the delivery of others through lack of communication with the other actors. Although the explanations and assumed reasons will be given in the next few pages, there major problem is the political selectivity of the state decisions when it comes to the authority transfer to the supranational level. The first observation for this is the never-ending implementation problems for the EU directives. It is especially visible on the maritime and railway directives. On maritime, the state did activate four projects to increase the capacity of maritime freight (Candarli, New Mersin, Filyos and Derince) but these projects still under construction for over a decade and neither of them are assuming a specialization over freight types nor having a proper railway line in order to make intermodal transfer (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2015). Our personal communication with the Railway Transporters Association also indicating the same problem, where railways and current railway projects are not aiming towards to achieve an intermodal transport between the modes or balancing the burden of the modes (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). The same selective behavior of the state decision makers is also observable in the air transport policy. Turkey made important infrastructure achievements during these 15 years but the state is unwilling to solve the biggest roadblock by transforming the national argument and settle the airspace issue with Cyprus (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Although the European Commission (2016) urged Turkey to increase communication with Cyprus on air control centers, no measures taken or started yet in the state side.

Railways were the prize projects of the AKP government. Yet, the sector is struggling with important problems. Even though high-speed railway infrastructure is developing and liberalization is promising, the sector is not ready for full alignment. Since the integration process started, Turkey failed to comply with electrification rules, reach the EU targets for deploying more freight to railways, construct railway connections to the ports and commercial hub zones and finish the establishment of the Halkali-

Kapikule high-speed rail line, which is the main transport connection between Turkey and the EU (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). One proposed reason for these failures is based on the fact that railway construction is far more expensive than any other mode, so the Turkish officials are avoiding the costs (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018). The supranational level also saw these deficiencies and made a strict statement that further alignment is required for Turkey, mostly on the basis of rail market liberalization (European Commission, 2015). Although the market liberalization became a law by the state at 2013 and the transition period is ended this year, there are provisions in the law that are not compatible with the *acquis* for market freedom and the secondary legislation is still lacking (European Commission, 2015). Officials of the stakeholder group Railway Transporters Association (DTD) has also urged the state level that the problems concerning the sector also makes the market liberalization inefficient and incomplete (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017).

One of these inefficiencies is the state's lack of attention towards intermodal transport. Countless state strategies aimed towards the balance of modes and modal differentiation, yet the state initiatives are still far away from achieving a fulfilled intermodal approach. It is also known that without intermodal transport lines, the railway infrastructural developments could never achieve a full integration to the Europe (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). A TUSIAD (2014) report is claiming that the state has not established a proper administrative structure to make intermodal policies as a priority while at the same time, the current railway infrastructure projects are not aiming to provide an intermodal freight carriage or passenger travel. Deveci and Cavusoglu (2013) study serves the same results and puts blame on the state level for constantly delaying the liberalization process for years and the EU funds were not used effectively towards the realization of this aim. As a result, Erel (2002) concludes the main problem in Turkish transport as the unplanned implementation and irregular policy initiatives of the state.

It was the state that started the liberalization process in railways but again failed to dissolve ambiguities over the future of the process. The long lasting debate between

“privatization vs. liberalization” is still problematic between the Turkish decision makers. There are certain allegations over the law such as jeopardizing the working conditions on railways and railway safety (Milliyet, 2013a) but the state failed to provide a meaningful answer to these questions. Meanwhile, the railway sector continued to report financial losses close to 60 million Euros (Fortune, 2015). While the EU member states and Common Transport Policy is trying to make a balance between the modes and regularly decrease the freight and passenger level that the road transport hold, Turkey is doing the exact opposite. Subidey Togan (2016) explains that the country still relies on the road transport and state aggressively continues on road building and investment on road freight. The road fleet continued to develop at these fifteen years and now became a threat for the EU integration process (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). The Railway Transporters Association identifies this threat as the state’s silent approval of the establishment of “road transport lobby” within the country and their negative effect on the state decision-making (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017).

Last but not least for the state side, the administrative capacity problems of the state must be resolved on the way towards EU alignment and the current solutions seem not enough. Supranational level actors warned the Turkish officials for many times over this problem. In 2016 Progress report, the European Commission (2016) evaluated that the alignment must be focused on the public service obligations and strengthening the administrative capacity. For road and rail sectors, the inclusion of transport elites to the decision-making process should be a reality for Turkey. Railway sector is heavily affected from the fact that there is a lack of educated railway specialists both inside the state mechanism and the local organizations to design efficient projects (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). As a result of this, road transport organizations are signaling the difficulty to make a future projection at the state level since specially trained transport personnel is not efficient in both quality and quantity (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 4, 2017).

In addition to these problems, complications are also evident between the state organizations. Though the Ministry of Transport seems the main decision maker at

national level, this study evaluated before that different Ministerial agencies are also contributing to the policy making process. However, this crowded structure could also constitute a problem in some measures and this might affect the speed of the integration process. For example, the IMEAK Chamber of Shipping (2016b) evaluation document named fourteen (including Ministry of Transport, Health, Finance, Interior, Agriculture and Environment) different state mechanisms that are working on the maritime integration decisions. Although coordination seems an effective instrument, the exceedingly high number of actors for just one simple decision is always causing integration to decelerate and authority problems between departments arise (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2016b). Another example of this type of a problem became evident in the road transport quota issue. The issue was about the removal of a highly problematic bottleneck for alignment. While Turkey was trying to analyze the road transportation quota issue, the evolved complexities between the state institutions concerning on which department has the main responsibility, has caused Turkey significant delays for solving the issue (C. Baydarol, personal communication, April 28, 2017). This problem mainly arises from the Turkish state governance procedures and the governance culture developed over the years, where state organizations hustle over competence even before going to the supranational level for bargaining (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Yet, the state officials claim this as a necessary and obligatory coordination between the different Ministries and against these allegations, they declared that only a few minor delays came out as an outcome of these competence hustles (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017).

From the above statements, a liberal intergovernmental type of a state mechanism might be naturally observed in Turkey, where the state is generally the rent-seeking primary actor and limits the action capacity of other actors. However, this assumption could be counted as premature and false. Unlike the general view, the state does allow and encourage local actors to be a part of the negotiation process and upload their interests to the supranational level. Some non-state groups also have promising actions towards these encouragements. As multi-level governance theory indicates, there is a complex web of interaction between these national competences. According

to the state officials in Turkey, the Ministry of Transport admits this reciprocal web of interaction. Especially for infrastructure and implementation matters, state negotiates with the industry officials and even the supranational level often sends their appreciation about this newly settled negotiation culture (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017).

While settling the national position before the decision-making with supranational level, countless meetings were held at the Ministry with the stakeholders, to come up with a rational and stable plan for integration (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). State is willing to hear their plans, take their opinion seriously, make a stakeholder analysis and even call a representative from these organizations to take place during the negotiations (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). The UND interview also approves the above claims. The biggest transport stakeholder organization accepts that state listens the ideas of non-state actors in transport decision-making and settle them a platform to exercise their actorness mostly during implementation stages, legislative stages, the representation of the sector and while influencing the EU directives (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Other stakeholders also accepted that the state is allowing to share the decision making stage with them. UTIKAD officials admitted that even if prioritizing the interest group views is not something happened regularly in Turkey, stakeholders are working together with the state on making the legislation concerning the integration process (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). In addition to that, DTD also approves that state takes their opinion seriously about the EU initiated practices such as the evolution of Turkish transport master plan (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). Independent transport experts tend to explain this relation by using the role of the UND during the solution of the road transport quota issue as a significant indicator for this web of interaction between the supranational, national and non-state levels (C. Baydarol, personal communication, April 28, 2017).

UND played an important role when fighting for a solution to the road transportation quota issue. The interest group was very influential while removing this bottleneck for the Common Transport Policy. The road transportation quota issue is arising from an

ambiguity in the EU law and its differentiated implementation in different member states. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU member states now have the status to negotiate transport agreements with third parties such as Turkey (Servantie, 2017: 7). So far, Turkey signed 25 bilateral agreements with the EU members to strengthen alignment with the Common Transport Policy. Although there are bilateral agreements and the clear rules of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, some member states grant transit permits but choose to issue a significant quota in an inadequate pace (Servantie, 2017: 7). For the first time in 2017, this issue has been brought to the ECJ by a Turkish firm who had been subjected to these unfair quota practices (Servantie, 2017: 8). This firm was also a member of the UND and motivated by the interest group.

After the membership of the Eastern European countries, the problem has gotten worse but since 2007, the UND is continuing to raise awareness about the issue in both supranational and national levels (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). With the UND's excellent mediation, Turkish road sector's quota issue was openly discussed at the national level before taken to the supranational level for the first time (Servantie, 2017: 8). After the recently taken positive analysis at the ECJ and the given Commission support, the bottleneck is now reaching a point where the full liberalization might be achieved before the modernization of the Customs Union. The UND single handedly made negotiations and bargaining with the European Commission and brought the case to the ECJ without direct involvement of the state and solved an important bottleneck for the functioning of the Common Transport Policy. Before the UND made the case, even the state level was not fully aware about the scope of the problem for the EU and Turkey. For this problem, Turkey and the EU missed out a 3, 5 billion euros of trade increase (Servantie, 2017: 7). However, the UND made a positive case at the supranational level and has started an awareness process at both competence levels. UND have been made the national level aware that policy coordination is needed here with campaigns like "Europe without quotas" protests and civil disobedience acts in Europe (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Even at the times when the state is not aware about the scope of the problem, the UND single handedly performed as a local, non-state actor in order to remove the

bottleneck for both Turkish national interests and the supranational interests. (C. Baydarol, personal communication, April 28, 2017).

However, this settled web of interaction between the actors is not at the desired level. Besides the UND, there are only few other stakeholder groups at the field who are working with the supranational level and this is where the problem starts about the Turkish private sector actors. As a result, only inefficient examples came up like TURKLIM's efforts in the Brussels. Without the help of the state except financial assistance, TURKLIM (2017) coordinated with the European Commission and used the EU project assistance to establish an office in order to promote professional qualification and information for the maritime freight forwarders. Another example could be the IMEAK Chamber of Shipping (2016b) and their negotiations at the EUROCHAMBERS and their provided assistance for their members about the EU integration process. The Chamber played a prominent role while Turkey was transferring the place of domestic ships from black list to white list in the Paris Memorandum, which was also a prerequisite for European integration (IMEAK Chamber of Shipping, 2016b). But none of these accomplishments are comparable enough to the UND's place as a game changer in this settled web of interaction. Clearly, the interest group was doing something different than the other local actors.

After many years of negotiation and bargaining with the EU and the state, the UND became very different from the other civil society groups. Even if the state is not obliged to follow the proposals of the group, the group's effect on the state level is substantial (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). UND-State relations were even evident long before the start of the negotiation process (T. Dengiz, personal communication, March 3, 2018). UND gives a special attention to keep the state relations at the highest level, not only by the regular meetings but the interest group is also trying to make the road sector a priority for the state and upload opinion when relevant or necessary (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Yet and above everything else, the UND is the only Turkish group who chooses to be functional at the EU level when it comes to an integration problem. In that sense, UND contributes to joint Commission-candidate state meetings (A. Ozel, personal

communication, May 2, 2017). Since then, the supranational institutions are portraying the organization as representative of the country and assist them while putting pressure on the state level and as a result of this scheme, the interest group is now considering itself as an official negotiation actor along with the European Parliament and Commission (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). The most important indicator for this interaction is the UND meetings at the supranational institutions and stakeholders. Therefore, “elite socialization” is very high for the UND example. The interest group held a meeting with the Siemens, a major German industrial group to give information about the bottlenecks in Common Transport Policy (UND, 2016). UND also attends coordination meetings with DG Move and DG Near in the European Commission, as well as with the European Parliament Trade Committee (UND, 2015). All of these formed interactions resulted in a dissolution of a major bottleneck against the Turkish alignment to the Common Transport Policy. In terms of integration process, these meetings both added to the bilateral stakeholder cooperation and also created a ground for removing bottlenecks and create awareness at the supranational level.

The striking issue in Turkey is the low integration rates after seeing an example like UND but there are actual reasons for these non-state “actorness” problems. In order to be a local actor, an interest group should find areas of coordination to raise awareness and be a part of the implementation stage. This is the part where Turkish stakeholders became ineffective. The general problem in Turkish stakeholders is that their policy making agenda is so limited because of their industrial interests. If an integration policy does not concern their industry, Turkish groups does not feel the obligation to work on the supranational goals. When asked about the EU’s project for balancing the modes and reduce the threshold that road transport holds, the UND respond to the question with an ambiguous and unsatisfactory claim that the EU has no such policy towards modal shifts and the EU also changed their views on this balance (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Given the fact that there are written White Papers and EU directives about modal shifts, this claim has no meaningful ground. This is where it gets complicated in Turkish case. Even the most influential groups tend to make groundless claims when a common policy contradicts with their

industrial goals. This creates a high selectivity while joining the decision-making and limit the high capacity of the stakeholder groups.

It is even much more complicated for the rest of stakeholder organizations. Some of them have supportive policies but fail to achieve a proper vision on policy making or cooperation with other competence levels. For example, UTIKAD is a local actor and its members are ranging from road to maritime. This is an organization with an aim to achieve intermodal structures in the Turkish transport. During our interview, the organization officials admitted their belief on a balanced transport development and mentioned their demands for the immediate construction of the Halkalı-Cerkezköy rail line and the realization of a Single European railway line for Turkey (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). So, the question arising here is that regardless of these demands, are these organizations actually making something effective for the realization of these goals? Besides indirect lobbying activities of UTIKAD at the supranational sub-bodies such as FIATA and CLECAT (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017), no such project concerning the good functioning of integration is observed yet. This observation is also valid for the DTD. DTD is the single stakeholder unit for rail freight forwarders and the group officials declared that they have an important action capacity at the state level (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). Though, the group members also justified their failure to use this capacity by claiming that every stakeholder must be stick to their own agenda without interfering other modal interests (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). Therefore, ex-deputy Minister T. Dengiz explains these relevant transport stakeholders as small in vision and too much business oriented (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018). As a result of these, even the most significant stakeholders stayed as selective on a single mode of transport. Compared to Germany and the United Kingdom, there are no other stakeholder groups who are solely working towards the functioning of the alignment principles.

The UND example showed that the action capacity of these groups is clearly high when they find a way to enter negotiations with the supranational and national levels. However, Turkish stakeholders choose to be selective on focusing on a single

transport sector and there is a tendency to protect the interests of the corporations that are financing them. Although this is a natural behavior for an interest group, it does harm the integration process since this tendency could cause lack of awareness. Focusing on a narrow agenda prevents these groups to widen their horizons at the supranational level. Because of their limited approach, UND's road transport quota success lies as the prominent accomplishment. UTIKAD only prefers to contribute to the debate via indirect European support groups and on the other hand, DTD is mostly active at the national basis. As being an expert on the field, Can Baydarol also stated that besides UND, there is no other stakeholder name comes to mind when it comes to transport integration to the EU (C. Baydarol, personal communication, April 28, 2017).

Even in the national sphere of coordination, there are problems. DTD insists on that the railway sector must be aligned with the EU goals and objectives but make no moves towards this aim, even in the national level except education schemes, working groups and attendance to Ministry meetings. RAYDER aims to support to widen the usage of railways in the country; however, their relations with the implementation bodies are still at the meeting level. For a highly striking issue such as the prevention of road traffic accidents, the Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association (2017) has stated an aim to cooperate with the EU and other civil society actors to prevent this problem but nothing has achieved so far. As a result, even though the action capacity is high at some cases, these groups choose to be rather selective on their basic agenda and do not prefer to upgrade themselves into the supranational policy making.

One reason for this selectivity will be covered in later pages but another reason is their inability to work in a harmonious manner at the national level. A reciprocal criticism is evident between the state and non-state sphere where the parties makes it difficult to coordinate their policies and upgrade it into the supranational sphere for resolving bottlenecks and make necessary implementations. The state side criticizes the non-state actors for not pushing or challenging them enough for the sake of integration process. When this study asked the question of "Have you ever changed an ongoing policy just because the civil society asked for it?" the state officials responded to it as

they did not remember any policy change mentioned in the question, mainly because non-state actors never made an objection against these initiatives or never asked for it (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Besides what UND accomplished in the quota issue, state view over civil society rests on the idea that these groups are single-minded, issue specific and even on their specific agenda, they are not qualified enough to motivate the state side for integration (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Most of the demands and comments made by the stakeholders are irrelevant and it seems that they do not care at all about the faith of integration process besides their own agenda (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). State officials are thankful to the UND for shaping the country's position on a vital problem but no footsteps followed by the other actors since they are behaving like business group personnel rather than an integration actor (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). Since the European Union wants a proper public consultation before the transformation of power, a lack of holistic approach and protectionism over a particular mode is evident in the rest of Turkish stakeholders (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). "There is no single civil society actor came to us and showed their problem solution scheme and ask support" added the state officials during a stakeholder conference held between national and local level (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017).

On the other side, stakeholders are also critical about the state and its administrative capacity. Interest groups such as UTIKAD claim that their voices and demands from the state side are disappearing within the competence complications between the state ministries (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). On the other side, DTD pointed out the tendency within the state for prioritizing road-oriented groups and their demands at a higher attention level (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). The Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association are unhappy about the lack of support coming from the state to civil society organizations and political measures behind any support (Fortune, 2014). To conclude, this reciprocal criticism creates a high level of distrust between the parties before putting an issue to the supranational agenda. Even within the non-state actors circle, "elite socialization"

and their interaction with each other is not producing efficient policy making schemes. Creation of transport elites is an important function, which leads to a healthy integration process. These experts must be coming from the national and local levels to shape Turkish transport policy making. Can Baydarol found this linkage in Turkey as inadequate since there are only small quantities of experts working in these organizations (C. Baydarol, personal communication, April 28, 2017). For the preparation of joint projects at the EU level, these formed partnerships are significantly amateur. UND explains this as the problem of other stakeholders and underlines that UND is not saying that these partnerships are irrelevant but they are not also indispensable (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). UTIKAD is eager to settle good will relationships with other integration actors via joint frameworks in ministry meetings but they also avoid interference with specific subject areas of other interest groups (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). In addition to that, DTD officials also define the same structure, good will relations and framework commitments but nothing far exceeding (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017).

All problems in Turkey emerging at the field of transport are connected to the issue of politicization of the transport governance. In the other country cases, the process was undergoing a certain level of political pressure as well, but when there is a bottleneck on the way; positive coordination, a joint effort to continue for integration and bilateral compromises seemed to have solved the road stumbles. The key for all transport parties is to see transport as an important technical and low-politics issue and avoid complications of the daily political and subject irrelevant concepts. However, in Turkey, this is not applicable and politicization of the subject area is at its highest possible levels. At every level ranging from supranational to sub-national, each actor chooses to be selective as a result of politicization, rather than focusing on the good functioning of the integration process. For the actors in Turkish integration to the Common Transport Policy, transport is not an entirely technical matter but a rather political instrument, which causes selectivity in their motives and effects directly the integration rates of the country. This assumption analysis will start with

the supranational area of the Common Transport Policy and calls the European Commission itself as the facilitator of the high politicization.

Compared to Germany and the United Kingdom, where the EU's contribution to the process is productive and progressive, the EU shows ambiguous and complicated features in Turkey. Not only fails to push country enough for implementation, the supranational level policy-making is filled with irrelevant bottlenecks and political motivations. As a start, the Chapter 14 concerning the Transport Policy on membership negotiations is currently suspended because of a political issue, which is not directly concerning the Turkish transport. The European Commission suspended the chapter for negotiations due to Turkey's failure to amend Additional Protocol on the Cyprus issue. The EU temporarily locked the door for the full completion and integration to the Common Transport Policy and also indicated this at the 2015 progress report by mentioning that if Cyprus issue is not resolved by Turkey, no full implementation will be realized (European Commission, 2015). Regarding this decision, the competence level that supposed to open the way for further alignment and encourage a candidate member state to transfer their sovereignty is blocking the process itself and telling the candidate that there will be no full implementation even if the candidate completes the alignment procedures. Officially, the EU reports and declarations show a support towards the alignment and demand of integration from the Turkish side. Even highly debated infrastructure projects such as the highly controversial new airport project in Istanbul is congratulated by the Transport Commissioner of the EU because of the project's high capacity to increase cooperation between the two levels (Aksam Gazetesi, 2017). But when it comes to the actual legislation and progress reports, the EU prefers to keep to door locked due to ambiguous reasons. This causes an unclear approach at the supranational level based on whether they support Turkey or not in this matter. As a result, the politicization of the matter in Turkey is started at the supranational level and provided by the EU itself regardless of what is happening at the national and local levels of integration.

The Turkish state itself considering this position of the EU as a stumble block that causes a huge mistrust, deterioration of relations and the disappearance of the push

factor that the domestic side expects from the supranational level. During our interviews, state officials clearly stated that they are willing for full integration but the EU is not allowing Turkish domestic actors to the decision making process even if the alignment is continuing at a positive rate (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). At this point, the integration also reaches into a certain level but does not create a path to move forward or escape from the political problems and as an example for these; the state officials signal the issue of rail liberalization (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). The state officials are claiming that there is no point to make a rail liberalization where the EU and Turkish investors are not allowed to go into each other's markets because of the EU's stubbornness to allow Turkey to the decision making process (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). The Cyprus issue is always keeping a barrier for Turkey on transport integration and many proposed Turkish integration projects are rejected due to this political problem (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). This political problem clearly decreases the motivation in Turkey for full implementation where even the supranational actor, who is responsible for the integration, is preventing Turkey to be involved into the EU's legislation committees (U. Demirci, personal communication, August 22, 2017). To summarize, the supranational level blocks and suspends the high action capacity of the state on integration.

The local actors are also aware and got affected from this politicization at the highest level. UND raises the issue of Road Transportation quotas as a political problem where the supranational actors were aware of the problem but constantly avoided a solution because of the national interest agenda of some member states. UND considers this problem as an entirely legitimate national cause for Turkey, since this asymmetrical aspect in the Customs Union still continues and both Turkey and the EU are reluctant to come up with a proper solution (A. Ozel, personal communication, May 2, 2017). UTIKAD supports Turkish state for continuing progress in the integration even if it is the chapter is suspended and also evaluates the current stage as a "miracle" thanks to the national policy makers (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). The EU's political attitude is even affecting the calculations of the

Turkish interest group actors at the supranational level. CLECAT, a stakeholder group with close links with the European Parliament, is not allowing non-state actors like UTIKAD as a full member because of Turkey's non-member status at the EU (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). In this way, The EU is indirectly preventing Turkish non-state actors to make lobby actions on the way towards full implementation. After this, expectations over these groups to create a supranational agenda became irrelevant. DTD also evaluates the political stance of the EU as unnecessary and unjust while questioning Turkey's future plans for continuation (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017).

From a multi-level governance perspective, all actions at these levels supposed to be interconnected and affect each other in this web of interaction. While supranational level is not providing the effective surveillance and promise for wider integration, it also opens a ground for more politicization and selectivity at the national and non-state levels, where the actors are eager to use the process as a political tool to fulfill domestic political interests. As an example for that, the connections between major political party interests and state plans could be useful. T. Dengiz advocates that Turkish transport politics and the EU integration was always a political process from the start and connected with personal interests and party purposes (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018).

In Turkey, AKP's political aims over transport is now integrated to the state level after nearly twenty years in power. Although this seems plausible, it creates selectivity on the state side where an integration policy checks out only if it is considered politically useful for the government party. This also creates transport plans to fall short to be integrated, with no master plans, lack of holistic approach and unsustainability. This selectivity regularly happens in the infrastructure development. As could be seen from the AKP election slogans such as "Big ports are coming", "Railways will be liberalized", "Marmaray is constructed", "Air transport is the people's transport" (AK Parti, 2017) are all included inside the state documents such as UDHB (2017d) State Action Plan which also considers the 2003 as the turning point in Turkish transport integration. Needless to say, 2003 is the year when the AKP

came into power with a majority government. In this action plan, UDHB (2017d) states the achieved goals of the country as: railroads became a state project, air transport is now the people's transport, and every citizen will use the airways and re-energizing the maritime sector. In an unorthodox fashion, the state document prepared by UDHB (2017d) criticizes the state policies before the year of 2003 like a simple political analysis paper. When the state level strongly connects itself to the political arena, an expected outcome could be the selective pick and choose over the integration policies.

State level in Turkey is permissively putting two silent criteria for an integration policy to make it applicable at the national level. First, an integration policy should be applicable to the domestic politically motivated goals of the incumbent government and secondly, a supranational goal should be aligned with Turkey's foreign affairs measures. A good example for this is the establishment of high-speed railway lines in Turkey. Ankara-Istanbul Railway high-speed railway line supposed to connect the two biggest cities of the country and the Halkali-Kapikule extension of the line aimed to connect it to Europe in both passenger and freight travel. This is also compatible with the supranational goals of balancing the modes and increasing the amount of rail freight. However, while Ankara-Istanbul part of the line opened in very quickly due to political considerations even without fully completing the regulations (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017), the most critical part of the line for the European integration, Halkali-Kapikule extension is not even started yet. Both DTD (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017) and UTIKAD (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017) consider this extension highly critical and underline the fact that there should be a connection to the EU regardless of political motivations. Without the extension of the freight line, the future of the rail market liberalization is also in jeopardy. Another example is the establishment of Baku-Tbilisi railway line on the Eastern part of the country while Halkali-Kapikule is still waiting for stable financial assistance. This could be seen as a selective approach depending on the country's foreign affairs priorities. The alleged foreign policy shifts from West to East seemed to find its voice even at this railway line prioritization. Altun (2017) defines this political shift and the establishment of Baku-Tbilisi line as a

historic turn for Turkey against the dangers coming from the West to postpone it. Altun (2017) continues his argument with the allegedly Western perception to keep Turkey at the side but never fully accept as a part. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi line against the European demands is also a significant move from Turkey to intimidate this perception and clinch the re-connection with the East (Altun, 2017).

Last example concerning the railways is the famous Marmaray line that connects Asian and European sides of Istanbul by underwater links via rail. The European Union financed the project two times over the European Investment Bank in order to achieve a balance of modes in Turkey (EU Delegation in Turkey, 2014). The project-making stage was also evident even before the AKP government (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018). The project aimed to connect the railway line between Europe and Asia and also connect the Halkali-Kapikule section with Ankara-Istanbul railway for both passengers and freight. The project is now partly completed due to some reasons. The full completion is projected to happen before the next local elections (Evrensel, 2017). What Turkey planned here is to open passenger side of the line very quickly before the elections but rather take a slow progress for the freight. DTD explains that in terms of integration and claimed that the freight part must have been a priority but the line is still not ready for freight forwarding (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). UTIKAD officials also criticize that the EU connection of the country must be bigger than a single line and political sustainability must be achieved to make this a reality (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017).

The politicization problem in Turkey is bigger than the anticipated. Unlike other corporatist examples, policies not only change with party politics but also with other measures. To summarize: monthly basis changes over sustainable master plan policies, changes over investment plans based on the geographical and modal voting basis are also evident in Turkey (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). In addition to that, Can Baydarol (personal communication, April 28, 2017) mentioned policy shifts after the Minister changes in the government. To see this kind of politicization clearly, continued investments on the road transport even though the

EU asks for the opposite is helpful. In 2005, the ex-Minister of Transport, Binali Yildirim declared that Turkey has to push down the road transport rates for both passenger and freight. However, Turkey continued to invest over road transport and even the government party programs insisted on keeping projects such as the establishment of divided roads. Why? UTIKAD officials explains this as a problem of political motivation since the “divided roads” discourse survived even though the official state plans said otherwise (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). DTD officials considered that the balance of modes is unachievable and unwanted since there is a “road transport lobby” within the sector and have a huge political support for and from the government party (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017). T. Dengiz interview also concludes the same result (T. Dengiz, personal communication, 3 March 2018).

As a result, it turns out that there is no actual plan for the balance of modes and no master plan at all to achieve that. There are double roads in terms of infrastructure but decreasing the road accidents is not desirable as the former. Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association presumes double standards when it comes to road transport integration where road traffic problems are undermined by the politically motivated policy making (Fortune, 2014). This is why Turkey does not show an aligned, single approach over the transport since railroads and roads are only distributed for political favoritism and populism rather than the actual purposes (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Ankara-Istanbul High-Speed Railway line is opened for passengers and opened without full functions because it is popular among voters but when it comes to freight, the state does not put a priority since there is no connection to the political concerns (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). The so called “road transport lobby” is assumed to be highly decisive at the state level and at some points, they even have the power to put obstacles over railway developments to protect road sector interests (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Erel (2002) study also discovers that unplanned implementations combined with administrative capacity problems, opens a ground for the decisions based on political interests and projects without efficient planning but with political pressures.

Unregulated planning also haunted the Turkish dreams during the establishment of new airport in Istanbul. The project got support from the European Commission on the grounds of increased cooperation (Aksam Gazetesi, 2017) but it was another selective attempt for Turkey to choose on infrastructure development rather than critical alignments over EASA and EUROCONTROL, which are as important as the former. Needless to say, the establishment of new airport is a signature project for the incumbent government. The project continued regardless of the Environmental Impact Assessment report (Milliyet, 2013b). The environmental impact counts as a prominent spill over concern and highly critical for integration. A transport project should not undermine another EU priority at a different sector. This political rush also jeopardized the integrity of the project makers after corruption allegations. The main opposition party, CHP made a legal case over the decision makers based on the allegation that the rules of the project have changed unlawfully during the process (Birgun, 2014). Same concerns were effective in the rail liberalization process, which is again a key project for the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Although the directive is passed, the implementation faced with difficulties. First of all, there is an ambiguity within the sector over the name of liberalization. Some sector partners such as trade unions see this as a fully-fledged “privatization” (Hurriyet, 2011) that undermines the working conditions. In other words, while making an integration project, there is now a threat of “spill back” since the liberalization is not fully operating and also jeopardizing the working rights. These concerns have a standing ground since the worker amount is decreasing constantly in the railway sector (Evrensel, 2016) combined with another corruption allegation towards the EU-financed Kosekoy-Gebze railway section where the EU delegation urged the state for proper regulation (Fortune, 2015). The same selective behavior is also evident at the maritime sector. The port initiatives are not supposing to function without connecting them by railways but the state is again not considering these intermodal connections as a priority (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017).

This politically motivated selectivity makes the overall stance of the Turkish state towards the EU as vastly changing and highly unreliable. Even though the 2014-2018

Strategic Plan of the Ministry referencing the EU process in a great manner, the newest 2017-2021 plan has no references over the Common Transport Policy. In 2005, The Ministry of Transport approved that the EU integration is an outmost priority and transport is the most prepared sector for negotiations (Hurriyet, 2005). However, the overall position over the integration has changed, connected to the current stalemate over the EU-Turkey relations. Just after three years of the 2005 declaration, the state started to criticize the progress by claiming that the EU is not sincere about Turkey's progress and the European emotions towards Turkey is always political at the supranational level. Since then, Ministry of Transport officials clearly urged the EU for an honesty test and regulate the Customs Union rules (T24, 2011). In addition to that, Turkey also states that there is another way and option for Turkey besides the EU integration on transport (Milliyet, 2011). The most recent one is the 2015 interview with the ex-Minister of Transport, Lütfi Elvan, who claimed that the EU is not treating Turkey right and Turkey has alternative options even though the chapter is fulfilled by Turkey (Posta Gazetesi, 2015). As a result, general climate of the EU-Turkey relations also affected the discourse on transport integration and that could also be resulted in the political selectivity especially on the faith of transport projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi line.

Inside of this ambiguous politicized portrait driven by the supranational and national levels, it is not a surprise that the non-state level is operating in the same manner. While the EU and national level is treating the entire process politically, it is not a surprise for non-state actors to be interest specific. UTIKAD explains this with a question asking that why expecting a supranational approach from us while the state does not even have a master plan about this? (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017) UTIKAD also complains about the supranational level since their political agenda prevents stakeholder organizations like CLECAT to allow Turkish groups as full members (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). As a result of this, the group also does not want Turkey to leave the transport sovereignty at the hands of supranational level especially when national interests are at stake (C. Ugur, personal communication, August 4, 2017). The "road transport lobby" obviously is working as a selectively driven organization since the EU policies could

constitute a threat for their development in Turkey. The road groups demand from Turkey to develop a transport regime outside of Europe just because the EU is not giving enough incentives to road transport and evaluate the balance of modes policy as a trap for Turkish truck drivers (Dünya, 2013). Other civil society actor such as Highway Traffic and Road Safety Association blame the upper levels for the lack of financial and administrative support and defines the failure in the road safety because of the subject's political undesirability (Fortune, 2014).

5.6: SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Observation 1: The transport governance in Turkey is corporatist where action capacity of the state and non-state actors is high. In this way, the case resembles Germany and United Kingdom outcomes. However, this high capacity is not resulted in a fulfilled cooperation and negotiation between these two actors but rather than that, there are established boundaries.

Observation 2: By looking through the other two cases, the expectation in Turkey was again a high integration rate since the actors are evident and same governance structure is applicable. It is indeed true that “a small rate of integration is much better than no integration at all” (Y. Rota, personal communication, October 30, 2017) but the overall integration scores is not indicating more than a mediocre alignment. This chapter is aimed to understand the reasons for that.

Observation 3: In this mediocre integration, nothing is automatically given or aligned, especially when it comes to spill-over effects on transport to the issues of health and environment. For these issues, no coordination or issue specific partnership is visible between the national state level and local stakeholder parties and in accordance with that; the results are prone to decrease. The overall integration process itself is always prone to disruption at every level since politicization and selectivity is the decided name of the game. Coordinative and administrative difficulties affect the level of interaction.

Observation 4: State has a high action capacity in both infrastructure and financial terms. Compared to the older years, made successful initiatives and definitely moved the integration further. However, the state is facing problems that prevent itself from a fulfilled realization of authority transfer. Administrative capacity is not admittedly enough for necessary alignments. State mechanism is too politically motivated and made decisions based on these motivations, which eventually led into selectivity over integration goals. State's motivation to include other competences to decision making mechanism is currently under threat by coordination problems between the levels of interaction.

Observation 5: State is not the single authority when it comes to transport. The UND example showed that an interest group could change and shift the national strategy without the state engagement. However, the low implementation rates also showed that the relations between the state and non-state level are not at the desired rate. State's administrative capacity and political selectivity prevents interest groups whereas interest groups counter-balance with a lack of interest to raise awareness and work at the supranational level to solve integration roadblocks. As a result, emergence of integration elites is not at the desired stage.

Observation 6: It is a fact that interest groups, mainly business-oriented stakeholders are very active in the field of integration. UND example validated their position as an integration actor and the outcome when they use their action capacity properly. Stakeholders are important at problem solving decisions and raising awareness. Yet, elite socialization between non-state actors is at a meeting basis and does not upgrade into a joint project levels. Regional group formations are not at the desired point. Stakeholders have the power to negotiate at the EU level, state does encourage that but they are avoiding this and choose to stick with their issue specific policy agenda.

Observation 7: Both state and interest groups are supporting the transfer of authority to the EU level. But when it comes to implementation of Common Transport Policy, the rates are telling the opposite. There are no stakeholders evident who are solely working on the integration issues as this study indicated in German and British cases.

Collaborating with different transport modes and issues are not available and desirable for the local actors. Some modes like road transport is having a better influence due to the established transport lobbies but the others are not heavily effective at different levels. This creates a raised awareness on some issues such as Road Transportation quotas but failed to raise others such as environmental concerns. For both state and society, projects are considered but there is not enough will to implement. Political opposition parties are also not sure about a European future on transport.

Observation 8: The process of EU integration on transport is a political case for Turkey. It starts political from the supranational level and gets more politically motivated at the lower levels as well. There is mistrust between the parties within the web of interaction. Political interests matter for every actor. The state goals are too much politically motivated that causing a selective integration on the transport matters. Without continuation or compromise, political dogmas and irrelevant political concerns surrounded the climate of transport decision makers. In a situation like this, no one chooses to speed up the integration but prefers to hold on to current political agendas.

Observation 9: The involvement of the EU as an actor is much more negative than positive. It is expected from the supranational level to regulate integration process, solve the bottlenecks within this web of interaction through coordination and positive negotiation. However, in Turkish case, the supranational level chooses to be a party where it desires to make Turkey as a part of the Common Transport Policy but at the same time, produces important political bottlenecks such as Cyprus issue to suspend the chapter even if the Turkish state and non-state actors are ready to negotiate. This two-sided approach directly affects the behavior at the lower tiers of integration.

CONCLUSION: EVALUATION AND COMPARISONS

At the last part, this study aimed to look at each corporatist case in a detailed way. For Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey; actor analysis, integration performance and integration pattern (the relationship between governance levels and their effect on performance) was made and evaluated. Before the concluding remarks and suggestions, this part have a purpose to critically assess and compare the cases with each other to understand which theoretical framework best analyzes the integration of corporatist country examples into the Common Transport Policy at the supranational level. In other words, if a particular case has a transport governance model including a state and society with high action capacity, which way is the best for this case to shift their expectations to a higher authority and get the best results? At the beginning of the research, neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance was selected due to various reasons and now it is an essential for this study to get the best explanation and form a hypothesis by looking through the cases. The main research question will be answered again and investigated through the formed hypothesis.

One particular outcome that the country cases produced in this study is that the integration is a dynamic and ever changing process. Since governance methods differ from policy to policy, it should not be a surprise that different policies in different countries have distinct integration patterns. This is why this research did not choose a single theory to explain the Common Transport Policy and member/candidate state's pattern to shift authority. However, it did want to achieve a common explanation for the countries, which have the similar governance model when it comes to transport. With this way, the idea was to find out the best possible scenario for these states. From the case studies, this dissertation analyzed the patterns for achieving the most influential and productive way for shifting the authority into a supranational level and the answer lies in the established web of interaction of the multi-level governance. In the last three chapters, the reader was informed about these countries' choices to transfer the expectations, projects, policies into the supranational authority and what that authority dictates for the Common Transport Policy. Based on the ideas of the three integration

theories covered in this research, it is time to capture the best theoretical explanation where multi-level governance stands as the most convincing understanding.

Starting from the neo-functionalism, even though the theory makes a strong case for the member states' inclusion to the Common Transport Policy, such claims fell short on some characteristics of the corporatist countries. Especially when a candidate state come into agenda. First of all, neo-functionalism makes the case that technical areas such as transport (since it is a low politicized area) are more easy and open for integration rather than deeply political arenas. This might be true if one compares transport with foreign policy but still does not support the argument that integration in transport is a smooth and facile stage. Rather, it includes many deadlocks such as Turkey facing for more than ten years in road transportation quotas. Meanwhile, even Germany and United Kingdom, pioneers of the transport integration, faced many domestic political challenges and even choose to opt out on certain policies of the Common Transport Policy like the EU Ports Directive. The automatic shift from a technical area to the political integration is not visible in candidate country cases such as Turkey since the supranational area itself is locking the process to thrive by holding the negotiation chapter unopened due to transport irrelevant reasons. As a result, even though the process is political and political interaction between the layers is evident, no such speed up shifts from economic to political area is evident that makes the neo-functionalism argument a bit far-fetched.

In neo-functionalism, the interest group role in integration is much more subordinate compared to supranational and national competences. Neo-functionalists tend to include interest groups as sub-actors that are establishing the societal base for the integration. In both three cases, the non-state and sub-national actors could place and change the direction of the integration process, even without the help of the state. In Germany, the road toll case showed the power of local governments. In the United Kingdom, the will of stakeholders decided the country to continue on integration in a time of Brexit disintegration. Turkey's UNCTAD single-handedly provide a legal solution to a significant integration roadblock. These examples are stating obvious facts that the choices of these local actors are vital and changes the dynamics within the integration process. In a

corporatist country where action capacity of the society is high, the expectancy should also be in this direction and these cases proved it in the right direction. However, deliberate linkages and coalition formations between the national groups are rather slow and dysfunctional as we seen in the Turkish case.

Meanwhile, neo-functionalism also assumed the evolution of integration specialists in every stage of the process, who have links with the national bodies to regulate the adaptation and formation of common policies. If a difference arises between the supranational and national levels, specialists have to “split the difference” and find out some kind of a compromise ground in order to continue for integration. Turkish example is also a challenge to this argument. Specialists on every competence level in Turkey, tend to work in the opposite direction. Even the admittance of national and non-state integration specialists to negotiate at the supranational level cut down by the supranational authority itself on political grounds. Therefore, this compromise ground is never achieved or aimed to be achieved. Elite socialization and transformation of national elites into integration advisors is only visible through German case. After reaching a certain level, national competences in Germany acted as the protector of the common goals. In the UK, even though lower levels are working towards the integration, they choose to stay national and interest seeking. In Turkey, elite socialization between the EU, state and interest groups is hardly working. Neo-functionalism gave the bargaining management to the supranational level where specialists coordinate and negotiate with lower levels. However, the theory does not give a satisfactory answer to the point when supranational authority itself posing a stalemate by not allowing Turkey for negotiations even though the progress is available. This times of political crisis is not so much of an opportunity when it comes to countries like Turkey, rather than learning or political compromise, the parties tend to be strict on their agendas. Thus, causing a political crisis to stay. The personal interviews also showed that the actors are indeed disturbed by the level of politicization at every level.

Spill over function and dimension of an integration process is a vital concern for neo-functionalists where an integration at one policy gradually shifts and affect decision making in the other policy area. This research found out that the Common Transport

Policy is actually built on this idea. Regulations on environment protection, health and technology are essential and a particular candidate or member has to shift their policy making strategies by implementing this agenda. In Germany and United Kingdom, the evidence showed that the actors in every level are operating their integration decision making mechanisms on the basis of potential effects of the Common Transport Policy to the other subjects. While taking decisions on transport, Germany and United Kingdom also achieved another supranational goal of reducing road traffic, fatalities, gas emissions and usage of new technologies. Turkey again poses a threat to neo-functional argument since no such obedience to the European goals between the sector is observable. Although national level took necessary steps on project making, the necessary implementations are suffered by selective political deadlocks within national and local levels.

On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism also does not provide a fully-fledged explanation to the evolution of Common Transport Policy for corporatist countries. The main purpose of the theory is to analyze and understand the formation of an integration process only if there is a national, economic interest calculation. Otherwise, there is no reason for a member state to shift the authority into an upper level competence. From the cases that covered in this research, the evidence shows that national interest affects national decision making process and indeed crucial. Assuming that nothing is automatic in an integration process is also in the same direction with the findings of this research. Especially in the UK, the cooperation between the national and non-state actors is increasingly depended on the cost-benefit analysis made to prioritize UK interest first and the supranational vision in second. On the contrary, German road toll case indicated the actor's separate behavior to compromise over national interest in order to find common supranational solution along with the local bodies. In Turkey, even though the chapter is closed by the EU for further alignment, the efforts continue for integration at both levels. This vision of no integration without "a holy purpose" fell short in these two cases. Institutions matter and integration is all about the actor's behavior but imposing a highly dynamic approach into a single direction makes the argument very compelling. The UK's behavior on transport integration after the political holy purpose Brexit, dictates that there is an opportunity outside the selfish

reasons of the state and where other parties are willing, there is not much room for state but to continue for integration at a time of disintegration.

The existing underestimation of non-state stakeholders is creating a huge gap between the theory and what is actually happening in the transport sector of corporatist countries. Transport groups such as UKTiE (UK Transport in Europe) and UND in Turkey are operating on the supranational negotiation levels without having a permission given by the national competence itself. While this is evident, such claims indicating the superiority of state decisions within Common Transport Policy is staying on a thin ice. As a result of this, it is absolutely true that the national interest has a role to play but assuming a static state centric approach on corporatist cases could cause to lose the very essence of the Common Transport Policy for these countries.

This leads us to the final and the most convincing theoretical framework to shape an integration pattern for corporatist countries on the way towards Common Transport Policy. The other theories are useful at some points while explaining some patterns of integration but missing out the whole picture after very specific evidence coming out from the country case studies is included. Hooghe and Marks (2009) explained an integration pattern where supranational, national, sub-national, local and non-state levels, the established web of interaction between these groups and intergovernmental processes are have to be investigated and estimated together. In other words, the diversification of governance and decision-making levels is essential and integration supposed to include an interconnected jurisdiction process (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Obviously, this fits better to the corporatist country cases since the diversification is already happening at the national level. The Multi-Level Governance (MLG) case is the upgraded vision of this diversification with an addition of the supranational authority. An integration decision, visions over the common purpose and achieved goals are all experience in this web of interactions without prioritizing a single level of jurisdiction.

The MLG explains integration as a never ending and a dynamic coordination and bargaining system between distinct competences. Before the integration, decision-making competency of the actors were only possible at the national level but integration

transformed them into partners in cooperation. It is a truth that the coordination with the supranational level triggered UND to make a case in the ECJ for the solution of a problem. Again, without policy making in the different levels, it would not have been possible for a local government in Bavaria to effect the views of the supranational authority. Likewise, the UK interest groups would not have the opportunity to push for an opt out from the Ports Directive. The MLG's assumed flexibility and the option for changing directions during the process, is what these examples are indicating. MLG assumes that the state and national level decision making is absolutely important but has to share decision making with the other levels. All three examples in this research proved that each actor could make a history changing decision within this dynamic, evolutionary program. What is absolutely crucial for each level of competence is that political identity and political options of the layers have a great deal of significance when it comes to establishing common goals. In other words, the process is political from the beginning and each level uses and abuses their political concerns. Integration goals are now active and having influence on domestic politics such as Germany's actions on an EU directive for satisfying local electorate and Turkey's political selectivity over the integration projects. MLG gave political identity of the government and political options a great deal of importance. Politicization is indeed a matter that could push for or prevent further alignment. This could be exemplified by the connectedness of Turkish political party decisions on transport and state's behavior on the common EU goals.

State has to take the interest group decisions. It is not a homogenous body and actually formed by the coalition of these separate, distinct mechanisms. This means that different interests will be taken into account to achieve a common approach. The coalition agreements in the UK and Germany and their partnerships towards integration could be an influential case where separate interests have the ability to come together when a common purpose is at stake. Hooghe and Marks (2001) assumed two types of governance model in case of MLG. The first model is closely related to the federalist establishment. The second type of governance model assume a specialized, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a relatively flexible manner with large number of jurisdictions including supranational, national and local bodies. This research believes

that the Type II governance exists for transport integration and establishment of Common Transport Policy formed by a decision-making spill over between the core institutions. As provided by the case analysis, number of jurisdictions is vast. Jurisdictions operate at diverse territorial scales where German local government issue an interest over Austrian drivers or a local interest group in Turkey could criticize actions of Bulgarian border officers at Brussels. These are also task specific jurisdictions served by not government only but variety of public service industries such as the transportation industry (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). In order to respond to the vast political interests and changing dynamics during interaction, jurisdictional systems have to be coordinating with each other and must be flexible for getting the best results from the diffusion of authority (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). The division between private actors and formal authority is essential. Some jurisdictions like the Rail system of Britain is at the hands of stakeholder organizations and they enjoy considerable amounts of autonomous authority against the state (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). However, the functional specificity makes jurisdictions numerous but intersect and relatively inert with a respect for each other (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).

What is crucial for Type II governance is that the capacity of jurisdictions to take collective decisions and make them stick, shared among a wide variety of actors (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This is the point that this research formed a hypothesis to test the observations coming out of the cases and answer the research question concerning the Turkish integration. The observations, scores and correlation between the scores and integration patterns assumes an educated guess that integration thrives when the capacity of jurisdictions and cooperation abilities of the actors are high in a Type II governance model, which is the best fit for a corporatist governance structure in transport. This is a dynamic approach and aligns over common EU goals when all jurisdiction levels have a positive understanding, a will to compromise over variety of private interests, a view to depend on continuity when the system get crowded by the political interests. Comparisons between case observations could account an evidence over the existence of Type II governance model in Common Transport Policy for these three countries and their performance on alignment.

Observation 1: It is direct evidence that Germany, the United Kingdom and Turkey are corporatist countries with a high state action capacity and influential presence of the actors from society such as interest groups, civil society actors and even trade unions. This basically fits into the idea of overlapping, fluid, variety of competence levels. The cooperation and ability to achieve a common purpose is high in Germany and the United Kingdom despite political difficulties and vast private interests. In Turkish integration, the competences vary from supranational to local but fail to achieve a fulfilled cooperation network and have more boundaries.

Observation 2: In relation with the first observation of the cases, there is a general trend in the corporatist countries that score of integration rises when a positive web of interaction is settled. In Germany and the United Kingdom, various sources indicated that when all competences are willing to make an authority transfer for a common purpose with other territorial levels, the integration signals a growing alignment. Although same web of competences is available in Turkey, and all actors have declared their support over the shift of expectations to the EU level, completion and implementation rate of the EU goals are somehow mediocre. This reverse trend indicates a difference between the corporatist cases. Then the question arises that why a different outcome in the same governance model?

Observation 3: It is the same in every case that the integration is not an automatic process between the sectors or an easy decision-making is possible. Even though transport is a technical issue, political obstacles and constant problem solving is essential for a learning experience. On the contrary to the neo-functionalist agenda, there is no automatic or gradual shift of integration from economic to political levels. Even the economic part is already chaotic and puzzled. When it comes to spill over between different levels of integration, German and British cases possess a very high level of interaction and successfully transferred authority in the related areas as well like health and environment. For those cases, the shifting of expectations on a certain flexibility between different policies is not much of a concern. On the other hand, Turkey case impose another downward trend. Coordination between the actors and specific partnerships between competences is relatively low where they also constantly

disrupted by overt politicization and interest oriented selectivity. The lack of national and local project making is a direct cause of this failure on coordination.

Observation 4: All three cases are assuming that the national competence (state) is the prominent part of the web of interaction towards Common Transport Policy. In Germany and the UK, projects and policies driven by the state is achieved high scores and designed on the basis of common supranational goals. In Turkey, state is a very powerful actor and supports the integration process with a high attention. The distinct part of the Turkish state is that there is an ambiguity towards the common EU purposes. State is not certain and exact over shifting their expectancies over an upper body especially when it comes to matters of maritime and rail. This is mainly because of the settled political selectivity and lack of administrative capacity. State is obviously not a homogenous body in these three cases and formed by different coalitions at the national level. Yet, in Turkey, the state mechanism is too much oriented with major political party interest on the domestic level.

Observation 5: Although state is prominent, there is a balance of power between the layers of competence in Common Transport Policy decision making. In Germany and Britain, integration elites are providing assistance to coordinate the decisions taken by different levels. This could be a supranational body or members of a simple interest group. To summarize, positive and good will interaction between the parties is essential for a common position regardless of interests. On the contrary in Turkey, low implementation of the EU transport directives is the direct cause of the lack of coordination and trust between the competence levels. Combined to this, failures on establishing a necessary administrative capacity and political selectivity at supranational and national levels prevent local parties to upgrade their opinions and interest into the policy area for raising awareness.

Observation 6: Germany and the UK is may be the best corporatist examples of elite socialization, deliberate linkage formations and coalition formations between governance layers and territories inside the Common Transport Policy. In all three cases, there are times that local comptences do not need the state mechanism and

bargain directly with the supranational level with using their own resources. Nationally and in supranational manners, interest groups are seeking towards alliances between territories and policy areas in order to negotiate stronger at the EU level. In Turkey's lack of coordination, it is not a surprise that non-state actors could not find enough room to make allegiances at different territories. Even the relations between national (state) and non-state actors for integration is only at annual meeting basis and did not into joint-decision level. Turkish stakeholders have the power to change the direction of the integration when it is possible and of course, the state level encourages wider integration but the overall selectivity also possess them to stick to their specific issues.


Observation 7: German, British and Turkish non-state actors are eager to accept and transfer their policy decisions directly to the EU level. While German and British groups are supporting the integration even at a time of political crisis, Turkish stakeholders are falling under the problems of capacity and overt politicization. As a result, no stakeholders evident in Turkey working solely towards specific integration subjects (such as the example of UKTiE in the United Kingdom), ranging of transport issues but established lobbies working on private interest. Except the major political party, a lack of knowledge towards integration is surrounded in the area of political parties. Stakeholders are cherishing the state projects but not very much aligned themselves to the awareness raising at the implementation stage.

Observation 8: On the contrary to the general opinion, transport as a technical issue is highly politicized. As the MLG states, domestic political interests must be accounted while discussing the formation of EU policy areas. In Germany and the UK, making an issue political does not mean that it becomes an obstacle. Politicization is evident but so does the compromise ranging from supranational to local and continuation on integration against a possible national interest blockage. At the end of the day, transport seemed as a technical area where domestic interests could be digested. Turkish integration towards the Common Transport Policy poses a different picture. Inside the web of interaction, every actor in Turkish integration act upon their political motivations and these interests are rather static and unchanged. Supranational side is blocking the negotiations for irrelevant political concerns. State is acting on an

established selectivity over the common goals based on political party interest and local parties are staying single-issue and corporate motivated. Of course, this produces a certain level of integration but only when it is fitting the selective agenda of the parties. However, this is also means that the capacity of exercising the common purposes is low.

Observation 9: The involvement of the supranational actor must be positive. Supranational level must regulate and coordinate the decisions taken at the lower levels and also have a holy duty to help implementation procedures. As being old members of the community, in German and British integration, the involvement of the EU to the debate is rather constructive and based on making coordination and compromise. The EU is even eager to change the common agenda for the sake of keeping a member state intact with the integration process. In the case of Turkish integration, the EU itself treating the integration process differently and the exact opposite. It is the supranational level itself keeping the bottlenecks and blocking the national and local competences to thrive. The positive coordination facilitated between the actors is even stumbled at the starting stage of Turkish integration. As the cases indicate, this causes a loss of trust and enthusiasm within the lower levels of alignment pattern.

At the beginning of the study, when asking the research question and after seeing bold declarations from state officials and recent huge transport investments, we assumed to reach a high level of integration in Turkey towards the Common Transport Policy. By looking through the two successful corporatist cases, which could constitute a model for Turkey, this research observed that there is an indeed way through the success within an MLG governance model where different layers of competences are in relation.



The figure above indicates a desired MLG relation between the layers of competences. Since integration is a dynamic process, the evolution of Common Transport Policy could differ from stage to stage and member state to member state. Corporatist states are the ones where their governance model is providing a high action capacity for both the state and society. In terms of transport, the biggest corporatist countries of Europe: Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey are signaling the same competence structure and same actors when it comes to their integration through Common Transport Policy. However, the success and the answer to the question of “To what extent” lie in the positive interaction of these integration partners. Transfer of authority and the shift of expectations are at its best when the decision levels are leaning towards generating an integration diplomacy and complete each other’s pitfalls by ensuring an inter-play between institutions, a fragmented governance approach and a polycentric decision-making universe. Germany and United Kingdom is showing the best rates at authority transfer and EU-level project building when each policy making level achieve a dynamic circle, a positive cooperation, complete each other, vote for continuity when it gets political and crisis-driven, compromise on disagreements and share the decision making power. At that point, the cases are showing an increasing integration level. Therefore, by looking through these successful cases, this study could make an educated guess for the corporatist countries in an MLG circle,

If positive cooperation rises between the polycentric competence levels, then integration thrives as well.

This research also expected the same or at least a close level of integration in Turkey when asking the question of “To what extent”. The expectation of a high rate came out from here combining the bold statements from the state officials in the last decade. The mediocre integration rate in Turkey is arising from the deteriorated and untrusted relationship circle between the competence levels. Although the actors are the same and the balance of power is more or less established (at least all levels have an action capacity), a positive assumed polycentric pattern is not yet constructed. Starting from supranational, the lack of trust and capacity problems are preventing actors in Turkish integration to reach a certain level. Cases such as UND and Road transportation quotas

are direct example of how integration develops when a single attempt for cooperation is available. As a result, Turkey's failure to form a capacity to take collective decisions towards Common Transport Policy is creating an outcome of selectivity at all levels. This is exactly where Turkey differs from the other corporatist cases. In a land of mistrust, every actor is behaving to pick and choose from what is on the table and what suits for their expectations. So, theorizing this selectivity could give an answer to the second research question of "How Turkey become mediocre?" and why the above hypothesis is not working for Turkey's MLG structure. The answer to the Turkey's situation lies at the heart of the differentiation of the EU integration models from case to case. Even in a limited case where only corporatist countries available inside of an MLG approach, integration is dynamic and differs. In here, this research explains the place of Turkey and reason of Turkish mediocracy based on the theory developed by Schimmelfennig et al. (2015). The Schimmelfennig et al. (2015) model evaluates any integration process as prone to differentiate at different levels with lack of uniformity, options to opt out and behavior of non-member states such as Turkey.

For an integration process to become differentiation, some variables have to be existent and activated. The concept gained substantial importance as the EU evolved on tasks, competencies and into different regions of the continent (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Interdependence between the actors and politicization defines the place of the integration process and gives projections towards the future actions. As we explained in the theoretical framework part, two concepts in differentiated integration plays a significant role when dealing with a non-member or candidate state like Turkey. Horizontal differentiation defines that many integrated policies in the EU are neither uniformly executed nor exclusively valid for every integration partner (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Moreover, external horizontal differentiation allows the way for non-member states to join and participate to the EU policies and integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). For an external differentiation to occur, non-member states should be unable to fully align with the EU because that the membership on a particular policy area is highly politicized but choose to opt in selectively towards the EU goals nevertheless in highly interdependent but weakly politicized (low politics) policy areas.

High Interdependence. The two specific variables; interdependence and politicization is existent in Turkish integration on transport. Interdependence is the driver of the integration and must be high for external differentiation. European Union is dependent on Turkey in terms of transport. As mentioned several times in this research, Turkey is an indispensable transport corridor for the EU's single market to reach Middle East and Asian markets. With its huge population, Turkey itself a significant market and the European interest towards Turkish transport started even before the EU and continued today in the negotiation framework. At a time where China inspires to revive a Silk Road on rail and become an important transport actor, the Turkish corridor and Turkey's will to stick with Europe stays critical for the EU's actorness on transport. In relation with that, transport and TEN-T chapters are the EU imposed pre-conditions for Turkish membership to the EU. This means that the faith of membership process is also bound to the completion of transport integration, which increasing the rate of interdependency. On the other hand, the EU transport is also the irrevocable option for Turkey. Turkey's major trade partner is the EU and to be more specific, the biggest corporatist cases of Germany and United Kingdom. Without removing the bottlenecks and reaching the level of these countries, Turkish state and stakeholders will always bound to suffer from social and economic consequences such as road transport quotas. Full and complete integration with Europe, will definitely boost Turkish foreign trade. Recent years showed a lack of inspiration on the Turkish side where priorities shifted from West to East, from Halkali-Kapikule to Baku-Tbilisi-Kars but nevertheless, Turkey still continued to align on a slow basis. As a result, interdependence between the parties are high and shared.

High Politicization. A differentiated integration is likely to result when high levels of interdependence meets with high level of politicization on the policy area. Compared to interdependence, high politicization could be counted as an obstacle towards integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Although transport policy is generally counted as low politics and a technical area, the behavior of actors could easily make it political. In the case of Turkey, politicization occurs at every level of transport competence. As we can observe from the case analysis, supranational level puts barriers on integration

regarding irrelevant political obstacles such as Cyprus problem where national side answer this call by creating a political selectivity towards the EU goals. This results offer a “no escape zone” from the overdose politicization of the process where successful cases escape from this differentiation by interpreting transport policy as a technical issue. For Germany and United Kingdom, even if the process becomes political, making compromise is available based on diminishing economic interest. But in Turkey, the hardline political interests are preventing parties to establish a working, positive and constructive web of interaction. Politicization creates a lack of trust and push the actors to be more selective over the common targets.

Selective Responses. Today, the EU integration became a device that creating an increase on polarization of opinions, interests and values (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Turkey’s inabilities on the way towards Common Transport Policy are an important indicator for this hypothesis. As a result of this combination of high interdependence and politicization, the non-member state opts in on a selective manner and depending on the domestic interests. In the Turkish case, selectivity is bounded on the increase of a domestic political interest. If a particular EU transport project is on the same direction with the ruling party goals (which is now interlocked with state strategies), country choses to opt in. On local industrial level, if the common purpose is concerning the industrial interests, stakeholders are tending to form more institutional and territorial linkages. For example, Turkish officials’ tendency to regard infrastructure building more than implementation of the common norms. Although transport integration consists both sides, infrastructure is always prioritized since it is helping the majority party to achieve domestic goals. This is causing the integration rate to stay at mediocre level, a gradual progress with a lack of will for full alignment.

The Turkish case is also applicable to Zhelyazkova (2014) study on the relationship between differentiated integration and selective implementation. Zhelyazkova (2014) article assumes that selective participation (opting in) is increasing the state conformity with the EU laws comparing to the no integration at all but does not completely diminish the gap between member and non-member countries. In a similar manner, this research showed that the established pattern of differentiated integration creates a

selective participation in Turkey where opting in is based on political decisions. With this way, integration and alignment with the common goals stay at the middle, in a mediocre way and produces a gap with other corporatist countries who have the same actors and same integration pattern. The differentiated integration package of Turkey is the obstacle that prevents actors for building more positive coordination and decreasing the result of integration. This is where Turkey split itself from the other corporatist cases.

To sum up, the expectation of full alignment for Turkey in terms of EU transport policy is actually untrue. As a corporatist country, the extent of Turkish transport integration to the EU is understandable over a Multi-Level governance model but only mediocre compared to other successful cases. Since positive coordination between the competence levels is the ingredient for an achievable integration, Turkey is indeed failed to construct the compulsory web. Then the question paved the way for “How Turkey stayed mediocre?”, to understand the reasons behind the inability of Turkish integration actors. Differentiated integration pattern proposed by Schimmelfennig et al. (2015) stand up as a reason for this problem where high interdependence meets with high politicization. Within this integration package, neither supranational nor the national sides are ready for a full authority transfer since there is a lack of trust and overdose political relationship rather than positive construction. Selective participation is the only answer that a non-member state could give where the realization of full integration is already locked by the upper authority itself. This is why coordination is deteriorated, only depended on selective interest and the completion rate remain at the middle.

Last but not least, after giving the answer of the research question(s), the last paragraphs will cover the ways to escape from this mediocrity. The solutions lie on the successful cases that of Germany and United Kingdom and their ways on integration which could also constitute as a model for Turkey since all three countries have the same governance pattern on transport. For establishing more active and positive coordination between different levels, the differentiated integration pattern has to be changed by demolishing or at least decreasing the selectivity of actors. To change the differentiation in

integration, the first and most critical way is to decrease the overdosed level of politicization in Turkey both in supranational and national manners. First the European Union, as the upper level authority must show release all the bottlenecks drawn by itself. Especially regarding the road transportation quotas and opening the chapter for negotiations is having the outmost importance for triggering the integration will at other layers. In successful models, the involvement of the EU factor does only seem constructive and work for finding a middle ground for every interest. Compromise on common purposes for decreasing the lower level protests were evident in the Germany road toll example. In Turkey, since it is still a non-member, the effect of the supranational behavior is higher than the other cases. When this is also negative, it is possible to crush the enthusiasm of the other actors as well. By looking through the successful scenarios, the EU itself must remove the bottlenecks if there is a demand to increase Turkey's level of integration. Given the fact that Cyprus problem and Additional Protocol are political cases which are only having indirect relations with transport policy, it is not a wise decision to punish transport competences for something they do not poised at the first place. As we can remember from the personal communication with the state officials, the EU's unsettled and reactionary behavior towards the Turkish state is the main cause of the loss of enthusiasm even though the integration continues without a projection of chapter opening. As a result, in order to change Turkey, the EU must do their homework first.

Politicization must be decreased in the national level. If the EU reset the political view towards the transport integration, it is possible for the Turkish state to ease the strict selectivity as well. Concerning the national competence only, it is natural for a major political party to seek votes and domestic interests by using the transport integration. This is a rational behavior and there is no problem. However, what should be dissolved is the selectivity created by party interests as an answer to the EU's political behavior. There is not much to do with the alignment of party interests with the state policies after nearly twenty years. Interests could still play its role but should not interfere or ascend the common projects. The role of the national competence here is to obey the plan that settled in the negotiation framework document and cut down picking and choosing based on domestic power relations. State must ensure an enough administrative capacity

independent from selfish domestic interest and like the successful cases, an integration elite must be transformed through coordination with local actors. State side actors should give same priority to the implementation like they did to infrastructure building for political reasons. Even within infrastructure development, selectivity is there and must be abolished. Looking through the debate a little more technical than political is the key for Turkish negotiations to thrive.

Non-state actors should also escape from the limited agenda they built over these years. With respect to the MLG process which is the way for a success in transport integration, Turkish stakeholders have to come up with a pluralistic agenda that give precedence over balance of modes, spill over functions of transport policy and EU-level policy making. So far, without UND, no single stakeholder group is achieved the above circumstances for a successful integration. In order to increase the score on integration, interest groups are vital to fill up the empty spots and make awareness on implementation deficiencies. Turkish stakeholders are currently having a single industrial agenda and operating their negotiations mostly at meeting levels with other competences. This should be changed. Interest groups should join more to the negotiations with supranational and national levels. On supranational level, the UND and road transport quota case could be an inspiring act for all other groups. On national level, stakeholder organization should bring more projects concerning the common goals. Project building and collaboration are the indispensable ingredients of increasing the integration rates.

While decreasing the politicization and selectivity at the different levels, interdependence between the EU and Turkey should also be strengthened. This research took out the reciprocal commitments of the both actors in terms of economy and growth. More should be come from each side to deploy ever closer relations. At a time when Turkey is very close to shift its focus on transport policy priorities with a wider approach towards the East through Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the EU should keep up by being a point of attraction more than ever. Needless to say politicization and interdependence is highly connected. Even a single easiness towards the opening of chapter might have an immense effect on new projects, spill overs to new policy areas

and increase in implementation. This could directly affect increasing the interdependence between two forces. It is clear that in this economic picture, both sides have no other alternatives as well. No Turkish state or interest group officials declared an alternative to the Common Transport Policy. In economic senses, there is no other trade party for Turkey to cover losing Germany and the United Kingdom. On the other side, the EU could lose the battle against China if continues to undermine Turkish expectations. When there are no alternative moves, the rational choice for both sides is to stick with the current agenda by abolishing the bottlenecks. This is the only visible way for creating a win-win situation. Otherwise, the continuation of selectivity will probably delay further progress and hold the parties in this mediocrity.

At the end of this study, we could draw some concluding remarks and suggestions. Since the beginning of the last decade, transport investments in Turkey increased with substantial rates. Triggered by Justice and Development Party's new vision over infrastructure development, Turkey nearly doubled the spending. In 2005, the Minister of Transport, Binali Yildirim made the assumption that Turkey was already aligned to the Common Transport Policy and implementation was nearly finished. Since integration could be counted as a dynamic, not automatic and a time consuming process, this assumption was in need of an investigation due to the fact that Turkey was just started to the negotiations with the EU at that time. In addition to that, negotiation chapter was suspended without because of a political issue. This curious chain of events led this study to question the nature of Turkish integration on transport and validity of the above assumptions. An empirical approach was needed to take out a clearer picture.

In this regard, the first task was to come up with a question that examines the nature of the Turkish transport integration. Therefore, the main research question was followed through asking the extent of Turkish integration to the Common Transport Policy. This area of integration consists of the ways of transferring authority, shifting expectations to an upper policy-making sphere and the implementation performance coming out of this established pattern of relations between different competence levels.

Secondly, the question of “How Turkey aligned/failed to aligned?” formed a follow-up question to the primary inquiry, to test the established pattern of relations that led to the answer of main research question. In order to answer these questions, the first investigation was to ascertain the ways of integration for a country like Turkey, in other words the governance types on transport when it comes to the European integration. At this point, the Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) study selected from the literature to form a model basis for this study. According to Kerwer and Teutsch (2000) study, governance models and national competence levels are different between the member states and this could change/effect the direction of EU alignment. These governance models led this study to find out the governance type of Turkey in transport and possible similar cases that could provide an integration pattern and comparison. As a result of that, this study believes that Turkey is a corporatist country along with EU member states such as Germany and the United Kingdom where high state action capacity meets with balanced decision-making from society.

Thirdly, Germany and the United Kingdom have been selected as the case studies for making wider comparisons and establishing corporatist integration schemes. The reason for Germany and the United Kingdom to be selected as comparative case studies is that they have similar aspects with Turkey in terms of transport. Besides their governance model, these three states sharing the similar transport geography that makes every mode available for passenger travels and freight forwarding. Moreover, all of these three countries have historical connections started even before the formation of the EU and the modern Republic of Turkey. Interdependence between these countries started at very early at the past centenary and this interdependence survived until today in economic terms where Germany and the United Kingdom became the two biggest export partners for Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey still constitutes a far useful corridor for Germany and the United Kingdom to reach the Middle East and Far East markets. As a result of these similarities, transport integration between these three countries could be counted as a rather necessity than a simple alignment. With respect to that, this study believed that the patterns of authority transfer between Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey could be useful to explain Turkish integration and answer the research question(s).

The fourth step was to ensure a theoretical and conceptual framework to explain the integration patterns that led these corporatist states to shift expectations into the supranational level and to understand the different relations between national policy making levels that could affect the integration process in positive or negative terms. In order to find a meaningful explanation to the nature of the corporatist alignment to the Common Transport Policy of the EU, this study aimed to test three integration theories namely neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance on different cases. The reason for the selection of these theories is that they are considered to be as influential on explaining the national governance dynamics, competition between supranational and national levels and different actor behaviors towards implementation. Since the cases are assumed as corporatist models, this study intended to test each theory to find the best explanation for the integration scenarios where state and society both have significant decision making powers.

After the explanation of integration as a concept and the proposed theories, the fifth stage was the application of Germany and the United Kingdom cases for understanding their ways of authority transfer and its correlation with the high results of implementation. This study suggest that implementation is the necessary segment of the integration where supranational decisions expected to be carefully monitored, advanced and implemented by the lower levels. The results of the Germany and the United Kingdom cases presented that the countries assume high integration ratios where transfer of authority could be counted as completed. Germany and the United Kingdom seemed to ship off their domestic expectations into a supranational level and this directly affected the implementation of the rules of Common Transport Policy.

Between three integration theories, multi-level governance came forward as a useful theoretical explanation, where it explains the German and the United Kingdom integration success through settled web of interactions. Although integration is a dynamic and ever changing process for every single member or candidate state and different theories could explain different parts of the whole, Type II of Multi-level governance theory could provide a significant explanation for the key policy-making

patterns of the corporatist countries which assign high implementation and compliance rates. Multi-level governance suggests an interactive decision-making sharing between different levels of competences for the formation and development of Common Transport Policy at the national and supranational spheres of action. Starting from the supranational level, national and local departments are all active on shaping the faith of supranational level common expectations. Germany and the United Kingdom cases could be an indicator of the existence of these actors on decision-making and on collaborative efforts for the advancement of the integration process.

As a result of these case studies and application of the theories, a hypothesis formed proposing a successful integration pattern. The relative results came out from these successful cases was showing direct formation of a web of interaction where each level of policy making competence positively fills each other's gaps, respect on different views and share the transfer of authority. Indeed, a possible positive correlation between this web of interaction and alignment results is suggested. The integration assumed to thrive when corporatist countries choose to form the above cooperation scheme. Even when the process became too political or critical for domestic/industrial interests, the competence levels were seemed to be eager to find a way of compromise and continue over supranational level policy making rather than suspending the whole process. Germany and the United Kingdom cases established a ground for what this study analyzed as a successful integration and assumed a possible way for defining the actors and their behavior. However, the application of this hypothesis to the Turkish case showed different results compared to the former corporatist cases.

The last case study covered the Turkish transport as the main analysis point of this study. By looking through the former cases, this study expected a similar result. But Turkey, as a candidate state, signaled a lack of interaction between the actors and a mediocre integration rate as a result. Even though Turkey has the same governance model and all competences are supposedly contributing to the alignment, the much-anticipated positive cooperation is seemed to be inefficient for all competence levels. Then, the focus of the study turned to the factors that led Turkey into this situation with the same governance type.

In order to understand the mediocre results in Turkey, the concept of “differentiated integration” is introduced. With the application of differentiated integration, the Turkish case assumed a high level interdependence with the EU coined with high politicization for an issue-specific EU integration at every competence level to result in a rather selective process towards the supranational goals of the Common Transport Policy. Inside of this unusual case, even the supranational authority, which supposed to be the main trigger for supranational level polity and shift of expectations, behave in a politically selective way concerning indirect political interests. The high level politicization and the selectivity negatively affected the positive coordination between the actors and made the entire process as an “a la carte” fashion where the players are picking and choosing the policies based on domestic concerns. For example, infrastructure modernizations continued due to domestic political gains but other Common Transport Policy issues like implementation and administrative capacity problems endured for decades.

The high level politicization in Turkey is standing out as the main reason of this selective behavior in every policy making level. It is also important to admit that Turkey reached a significant level of alignment despite the EU’s politically motivated interruptions over the transport chapter, but also the full alignment seems highly unlikely in this picture. In this study, politicization of the integration seemed as a common phenomenon for the corporatist countries but the former cases learned to deal with domestic politics and found ways to overcome with the help of integration elites in every decision making levels. On the other hand, Turkey was never eager to create these problem-solving techniques for wider integration. Starting from their inability to set a “transport master plan” agenda to the constant administrative problems, competence levels in Turkey are still not convinced about the idea of transferring the sovereignty into a supranational level. In addition to that, the national and non-state actors seemed to have different approaches toward the future of the alignment process.

After explaining the problems in Turkish integration process on transport, this study turns to find some proposals for the solution. In order to reduce the effects of

differentiated integration, this research respectfully proposed some concessions from each integration actor. In this regard, Turkey and the EU have been warned to take account the successful examples of Germany and the United Kingdom and take these models as an inspiration. Supranational policy making assumed a need for harmonious action and it seems the time has come for Turkey and the EU to reduce the bottlenecks with positive coordination. The suggested web of interaction in multi-level governance scheme seems only possible by increasing the already existing interdependence and overcome the excessive amount of politicization. With this way, the dissolution of selectiveness could be a reality and the actors might start to work over a definite and clear agenda for the future of relations and this might also affect the future of the Common Transport Policy in a positive manner. Otherwise, the relations will probably stay at these mediocre rates with neither a significant progress nor retrenchment.

Different sources from the literature, theories and concepts have been used for achieving the research goals. In addition to that, the earlier premises of the selected integration theories also tested through a low politics, technical case. The results signaled a rather different outcome when we apply these theories to corporatist countries. Especially in the case of candidate countries, an automatic and smooth process does not seem applicable. However, it is now believed that this study could contribute to the current literature about the EU-Turkey relations on transport and shed more light on the future projections of the policy makers. The results should indicate an alarm for supranational, national and local integration players to detect their deficiencies and work over/inspired by the successful cases. In this sense, German and British policy levels and their behavior could indicate a standard for a candidate case. A transfer for authority could only be achievable through the establishment of positive linkages and satisfaction of the needs of every single actor. Compromise and continuation through crisis should be the key aspects for Turkish policy makers.

For achieving wider reliability and validity, this study could also be tested with other technical policy areas where Turkey and the EU are currently working together. To increase a further generalization, outcomes of this study could be assigned to economic cases such as energy, telecommunications and Trans-European Networks. Given the

resemblance of the progress at the energy sector, where Turkey stands as the key for the EU's future energy needs, the same approach might be applicable. Not just other technical integration sectors but another country case could also be useful for analysis. Other candidate states with different governance models on transport might assign different results. For example, the Central and Eastern European countries and variations between themselves based on different governance methods could provide an interesting case. It is worthy to understand that integration is a dynamic process and similarities do not constitute the idea that each case is having the same pattern. Therefore, each case has to be considered by its own domestic dynamics and politics. Domestic governance methods and actors for each policy should be clearly absorbed before having an opinion about integration to upper body.

For concluding remarks of this study, some suggestions might be helpful for the future. While conducting the personal communications for the preparation stage of the study, a comment made by one interviewee is may be the simplest way to summarize the situation in Turkey today. The interviewee commented, "an insufficient integration is better than no integration at all". This short comment is what Turkey is facing today, small amounts of everything but only at a mediocre rate. In a rather ironic way, this transport integration could be an indicator for the current EU-Turkey relations. These are two partners who have a lack of trust since the beginning but also have a significant level of interdependence. It could be considered as an economic fact that each side is not ready to face the cost of breaking the bonds. But indeed, Turkey-EU relations are at a critical juncture and change is a need for energizing the relations. After years of stalemate, it is now also a primary concern for member states that Turkey's axis is shifted from the Europe. In foreign policy, this is highly relevant. Yet, even for technical cases like transport, we have sensed the reflection of this shift. The time is yet to come once more to convince Turkey to stay loyal to the cause of European integration. Given the fact that the desirability of the integration is decreasing day by day, it is much harder for the European policy makers to achieve this reasonability in Turkey.

At this point, the renegotiation and modernization of the Customs Union deal would be a new chance for energizing the relations. This new deal will possibly include provisions that concerning removing the bottlenecks on transport such as new rules on road transportation quotas and fair deals for Turkish freight forwarders. A new approach on Customs Union could constitute another chance for Turkish policy makers to regenerate the lacking trust against the European Union and to upload their concerns to the supranational level. Possible developments in this alleged modernization could positively spill over to the ongoing membership negotiations and might possibly establish a good will, which could also be effective on reviving the long lasting suspended transport chapter. This might provide a boost to the implementation of the EU directives as well. In here, there are important duties available for the Turkish national and non-state actors. Compromise is a two-level game. For the sake of further integration, Turkey might also relax the hardline position concerning the ports and airports of Cyprus. Turkish officials have to regard transport as a technical issue and try to escape from over politicization on this matter. On the other hand, the EU also need to change perspectives on Cyprus. Even though transport of Cypriot ships and airlines is included to the transport agenda, the problem is not directly about transport and this political problem is prone to hurt Turkish integration at every stage. Both sides have to overcome this stress by making political compromises.

At this stage of relations, the choice for Turkish and European policy makers seems clear. Either continue over the limited integration outcomes or renegotiating the terms and take out a new framework working for each side. This could be a possible way to reformulate the trust and diminish selectivity. For the obvious reasons stated in this study, the current level is not enough or sustainable. With these rates, Turkey will stay in a position where a certain level of integration exists but might never reach the desirable situations. EU and Turkey both have to learn to function during political crisis, make compromise and continue for common purposes. Otherwise, it would only be a heavy burden for Turkey to become an influential example such as Germany and the United Kingdom. The ongoing negotiations concerning the modernization of the Customs Union might be the right instrument for a fresh framework if it includes the present bottlenecks on transport.



APPENDIX

1) Personal Communication with Alper Ozel (2 May 2017)

Vice Director to the Executive Board of Directors

International Transporters Association of Turkey (Uluslararası Nakliyeciler Derneği/UND)

Interviewer: Ahmet Cemal Ertürk (A. E)

Interviewee: Alper Özel (A. O)

A. E: Mr. Ozel, thank you for accepting me for this meeting. I know you are an important civil society organization. This is why I reached you for my first interview. In these interviews, I am aiming to find out the state-civil society relations for the EU integration. I have ten questions in total and if you are ready, we can start with the first question.

A. O: Of course, we can...

A. E: As being an important logistics organization, do you think that the transport sector is fully integrated to the EU? If not, which stage we are currently in?

A. O: Let me start with the road transport then?

A. E: As you wish...

A. O: I think the sector is now 90% integrated. Numbers will tell you the same thing as well. Indeed, this is about legislation and directives. On the implementation side, we need more time.

A. E: This is an important rate...What do you mean by “we need more time”?

A. O: Well, Turkey’s geography and education rate is different compared to Western countries. The most important defect in Turkey is surveillance mechanisms. This is where we lack most. In Western Europe, the evaluation of directives is the most important thing and implementation rate is high because of this strict surveillance on road transport with constant checks. They even have special local authorities to review and check the road and traffic to overcome accidents and charge penalties. Turkey is a party of many international covenants concerning that but the implementation of road directives is insufficient. We have the rules but nobody seems to mention the importance of

regulations. This creates an unfair treatment to people who are actually obeying the rules like our freight forwarder members.

A. E: Like the tachometer example right?

A. O: Yes. It is just like that and that is why we have to overcome this unfairness and state should do that

A. E: Do you ever warn them about this?

A. O: Of course. We work very close at the minister level, almost as a sub-department of the Ministry.

A. E: Really, that close?

A. O: Definitely. We share a lot of debates. In this sense, we are very different from other civil society and stakeholder groups. Well we do not expect from them to accept every single issue we brought but we work in a well-established harmony. Exchange of ideas is an indispensable thing in our relations and only after that, state gives its decision.

A. E: Could you please specify the level of your relations?

A. O: At the highest level. I would say at a Minister level. This is mainly because international logistics is important. We are critical and very strategic for them.

A. E: I would like to ask you something in here. I hear a lot about you before coming here. And I think it is a good thing. But don't you think this is somehow bad for the whole of the sector, I mean you have a close relation but others don't?

A. O: Well, I don't think so. This is not our fault. This might be a generalization but if you do nothing for integration and you will probably get nothing in terms of directives and implementation as well. UND thrives because we are raising awareness. If you do nothing, nothing will come to you. Look, state considers these matters by asking "How many groups are coming to me?". We are working like a think tank as a matter of fact and they saw this. I'm afraid others have never reached that level. We will continue to protect the interest of the sector.

A. E: OK then. I think you already answered the second question but let me ask you any way. Do you see yourself as the part of the EU integration process?

- A. O: Of course, we are not just a simple part of it but a pioneer, locomotive of the process for this sector.
- A. E: Do you support it based on industrial interest?
- A. O: Transport is a rational debate and so if the process looks right, cheap and efficient than the country and we win. This is simple mathematics.
- A. E: In the context of integration, could you please specify your relations with other actors, especially the state?
- A. O: For example, funding. State compensated the financial side of the quota case at the ECJ. We do not like to share these things but Ministry of Economics did.
- A. E: Did somebody come along with you from the Ministry?
- A. O: Yes. Even before the hearing, we first made the necessary mediation with the Ministry, reach consensus then we made the case to the ECJ.
- A. E: Why Ministry of Economy and not Transport?
- A. O: This is purely about the enormous effect of logistics on economy, that is why they involved heavily. Ministry of Transport also helped as well along with TIM and us. They were at the background but they were there.
- A. E: Do you certainly believe that state officials listen your concerns?
- A. O: Definitely. Mostly during the implementation stage. They respect us as a separate decision making mechanism. Not every time of course but UND is almost there for every single thing concerning the EU process.
- A. E: Do you have joint projects with the state level besides the ECJ case?
- A. O: That project is passed now and we are waiting for a positive outcome. Our other projects are mainly about legislation and its conceptual framework.
- A. E: About integration review and road transport surveillance perhaps?
- A. O: Well no, mostly based on legislation. UND also contributes to joint commission meetings with the EU member states. They always call us to represent the sector at Brussels and influence the Ministry on EU integration. Not just the EU but Russians and Chinese as well. We are pressuring them to make good deals with Turkey. China wants to reach Europe and they want to use Turkish corridor.
- A. E: Which adds another Eastern dimension to EU-Turkey transport relations right?

- A. O: Yes. If you are going to trade with China, Turkey will be your only flexible option. Believe me, Europeans will use that.
- A. E: These are all good but we are entirely speaking about road transport but the EU in fact is wanting to balance modes and give more attention to railways?
- A. O: No, this is not true. It always and will be bound to the economic structure of the country and what is more flexible. The EU gave up on the idea of prioritizing railways. Too costly for everyone. We want strong railways and increasing rail freight forwarders. Port connections are essential here. It will be a huge decrease in costs. When costs decrease, logistics will thrive.
- A. E: So, do you think that state is doing enough to complete EU integration?
- A. O: Let me just finish what I have started about railways. For example, rail liberalization. We want this but it is fair to say that we did not want to involve heavily since it is not our expertise. It is hard thing for state to achieve but we were very supportive. But we also said them that port connections are a must, without them there is no point to use railways on freight. We do not have efficient ports also. Concerning infrastructure, it is not enough and there is lack of coordination at this point between society demands and state. A coordination must be achieved.
- A. E: Germany achieved this, why not Turkey?
- A. O: We know this is harder for Turkey we do not have that kind of an economic power. But at the end of the day, we need functioning ports and rail connections to them. Logistics centers must be connected.
- A. E: Turn to roads, are state investments enough?
- A. O: Better than many average EU members on road but if you ask about rail and sea, not enough. Air is OK too....
- A. E: Do you think a third airport is good for EU integration?
- A. O: In terms of integration, location is good, provides a transit opening which EU demands. It is a good project and we heard that some European states are already unhappy about this. That is because its huge effect on the competition between European hubs. That we should be doing in logistics as well. THY, Turkey should be a logistics hub in every mode. But we need more balanced coordination and completion of integration.

- A. E: All right Mr. Ozel, last questions. In this integration process, what was your biggest achievement as a non-state party? Please indicate your relations with the EU also.
- A. O: The road transportation quotas of course. Please do not think this as bragging but we are now considered as a negotiation party to Parliament and officials in the Commission.
- A. E: Highly beneficial right?
- A. O: Of course, we are an influential deal breaker and solved a huge problem by using this power. Now, we can get an appointment whenever we want.
- A. E: Do you have a Brussels office?
- A. O: We don't but even we don't have one, we can regulate everything from here on daily basis.
- A. E: Is it possible to do this without state, a piece of integration?
- A. O: Yes. We are the living example of this. They call us to meetings, seminars to inform them about Turkey without anybody from the state, we are the negotiators.
- A. E: Thoughts about the quota case?
- A. O: We nearly reached the end.
- A. E: Took many years right?
- A. O: Since 2007. This is when we started.
- A. E: But this problem was evident before that right?
- A. O: Right. Old and long forgotten...
- A. E: Why is that? I mean why state stayed without action for so many years?
- A. O: There is no explanation available in our side. Why is that? May be because Turkey did not do its homework before but this is just hypothetical. But let's say that it is long forgotten and things never affected anybody throughout years until the membership of Eastern European countries. This is when everybody remembered it. Of course, we know very well back then.
- A. E: This obviously prevented our full integration for years...
- A. O: Yes. The new deal on Customs Union will be about this too. Quotas are the biggest bottleneck on integration of roads. When we solve this, 3.5 Billion Euros

will be added to the market. This asymmetry coming from the EU itself also affects the implementation of directives in Common Transport Policy. However, with this ECJ case, now we have a huge advantage before the modernization of Customs Union. We expect no more negotiations for a case which we are 100 % right. Over these years both Ankara and the EU never wanted to scratch this itch but now it is the time.

A. E: So I think your actions was a wake-up call for state?

A. O: True. Asymmetrical. Generally, state comes to you for a solution of a problem but for this issue, we started with raising awareness by doing activities inside European soil.

A. E: You are an influential stakeholder organization and I think you have the right to criticize. How do you think about the actions and contributions of other stakeholder groups?

A. O: They should join but I don't know.

A. E: Are there any groups coming along with you to the negotiation stage with the state and the EU?

A. O: Yes, but as we have seen so far, the results of these meetings are all "What the UND will say?" We hope the others are also being listened and encouraged but we don't think about this so far. Mostly about our ideas and opinions. That is why there is a special place for the UND at the other levels.

A. E: But for the well-being of integration process, don't you think everybody should put their efforts?

A. O: Of course, I am saying we should encourage other parties as well but so far, not very much. This is about a vision. When you have a vision towards integration not limited to your own concerns, it adds to the process, good or bad. We did civil disobedience to make our voice, they should do too.

A. E: Civil disobedience?

A. O: Yes, in Austria with 52 trucks. Austria did not allow our drivers depending on quotas and we blocked their rules and went there anyway.

A. E: What did they do?

- A. O: Nothing, exactly nothing. They behaved like exactly nothing is happening. Because they know that if they stop us, this would have been created a diplomatic crisis.
- A. E: Did state know about this?
- A. O: Of course. We even made a press release about this, it was all open. Because Austria was so afraid of a political crisis, they did nothing. Even we mentioned our intentions to our partners at Commission and asked their support. As a result of these events, the EU made an analysis on quota issue and found us right and member states wrong. At the end, Commission defended us at the ECJ case.
- A. E: Very well. Last question, is future bright for the EU integration?
- A. O: We are working tirelessly with the state and the EU. On roads, simple matters left after road quotas. I think the air transport is highly integrated. Only for rail and sea, the Turkish integration seems inefficient.
- A. E: Could Turkey achieve the rates of Western European countries such as Germany and United Kingdom?
- A. O: We should be but we have to form our own model by looking through their successful parts. Geography and region is look alike but different. There are different dynamics here. There is a power coming from the East. We need this integration but we can only achieve this through coordination between civil society and state. We need to create our transport elites as soon as possible to lead the way for bigger things.
- A. E: Well, I think that is all. Thank very much Mr. Ozel for answering the questions.
- A. O: Thank you for coming here, it was a pleasure.

2) Personal Communication with Cavit Ugur (4 August 2017)

General Manager

**Association of International Forwarding and Logistics Service Providers
(Uluslararası Tasimacilik ve Lojistik Hizmet Uretenleri Dernegi/UTIKAD)**

Interviewer: Ahmet Cemal Erturk (A. E)

Interviewee: Cavit Ugur (C. U)

A. E: Mr. Ugur, thank you for having me today. I have ten questions waiting for you and if you are ready, we can start...

C. U: Sure we can, please continue...

A.E: You are a logistics organization with many members; do you consider that Turkey and Turkish transport systems have finalized their integration to the Common Transport Policy? If we have not finished this authority transfer, then where are we?

C. U: When you talk about the authority shift to an upper level and its rules, there are different parameters. Infrastructure, legislation and implementation all differ and wider concepts.

A. E: As a summary may be?

C. U: Yes, in that sense we can't talk about a 100 % completed integration.

A. E: Shall we start with infrastructure?

C. U: OK. First, we have problems on railways; our line is not so healthy and ready for European freight. It is working somehow but not well functioning. For three years, the European section of the line was closed and the officials came up with the idea of ferry option from Tekirdag. Of course, the Bosphorus freight line is closed too despite Marmaray. Again, it is working but not efficient.

A. E: Road?

C. U: It is again working but border passes and quotas are huge bottlenecks for wider integration. Especially member states like Greece and Bulgaria are constantly making problems. Our physical infrastructure also is not efficient. For airways, I don't think there is a problem on the way towards integration. Both infrastructure

and implementation of rules were applied. Ataturk Airport does not have the enough capacity any more but at least we have a hub.

A. E: What about sea?

C. U: We have efficient private port structures and enough ferries so I don't think there are any obstacles left besides railway connections of course.

A. E: You forgot about intermodal infrastructure, may be the most important one for the EU?

C. U: Indeed, it is, I was going to. When you go over the White Papers of the EU...

A. E: Sustainability as well...

C. U: Definitely. We do not have a very good intermodal line. But let's move over to the legislation parameter first. Although the official negotiations for transport have not started yet, the alignment speed of directives is recognizable. When you compare it with the goals mentioned in the White Papers; railways liberalized and we are waiting for the second legislation, the transport of dangerous goods is also aligned. Yes, the legislative pieces have their own inside problems regarding implementation and the state level should also consider its own sovereignty and change the structure of some pieces regarding to that. But in a nutshell, legislation is in a good shape at a time of this stalemate in relations.

A. E: Yes, when it comes to get a feedback from the EU, it is such a problem when you are having tough time at negotiations...

C. U: Well, feedbacks are something else. The EU expects some changes in here and Turkey, I think is doing fine. When you think that the negotiations closed, what Turkey is doing right now is more meaningful. For example, there is no obligation for Turkey to move on liberalization but Turkey is doing it regardless of stalemate. Now even the state is preparing the secondary legislation. This means that we are doing our homework very good but Turkey also protects itself on some political matters.

A. E: Any examples here?

C. U: Not something big but may be customs directives regarding transport. There are perspective differences between the EU and Turkish levels. For specially transport, we have differences over intermodality. The story of 44 tonnes on road transport for example. Sorry, 40 tonnes. You cannot deliver more than 40 tonnes of

freight regarding EU road directives. Well, you can use the sea route in the EU including the truck, the freight and container. But if you put this to road, you cannot use it. So, how to deal with intermodality then? In the EU, they overcome this problem by using sea routes and railways after. In Turkey, there is no way to forward a freight more than 40 tonnes when you drop it at a port. You have to unleash the freight and forward it by pieces after that. Where are the railways for connected ways? There is none. You see... Turkey still has such problems.

A. E: I think we still have one more parameter.

C. U: Let's get to it then. Implementation. No bottlenecks but some headaches we have here. For example, cabotage. Turkish trucks more than some age is not allowed to use highways but member state trucks in Bulgaria, at the same age, are still active. The other one is the road transport quotas. How can you expect an efficient implementation while the EU has forgot all its promises for Common Transport Policy? If you make an interview with the UND...

A. E: I did.

C. U: Oh very good, they probably said the same thing. There are problems created to us because we are not a member and supranational authority is doing that. There is a freedom of movement for the good but not for the person and vehicle forwarding the good. As an answer to that, Turkish side also making political anti-integration moves. But and this is a big but, and our biggest problem, lies in the effective coordination between the local competences. EU member states are doing these matters very well. In Turkey, there are huge coordination deficiencies between government institutions and we failed to make enough surveillance against foreign vehicles as a result. For example, police supposed to give fines to the foreign vehicles that are breaking the law here but there is not enough capacity to make surveillance for this on borders. For many years, we are warning them about this but nothing happened. We expect a good functioning reciprocity policy against these foreign vehicles that are highly hazardous for the integration.

A. E: Indeed. Competition is very important right? Since Turkish road freight could constitute a problem for the EU since they are very big in size.

C. U: Very much. We have to admit that it is unnecessarily big. State policies are now prioritizing something else. It became too big and the EU now sees our road

fleet as a threat to the goals of Common Transport Policy. They want to balance the modes but we are still using road transport when it comes to logistics.

A. E: Thank you very much for this very detailed answer to the first question. Let's continue with the second one if you please? Do you consider yourself as a part, a decision maker of the integration process?

C. U: We are working and willing to work with every section of the Turkish transport sector for achieving this integration. We are making lobby actions to make our voice heard. Inside the FIATA federation of world freight forwarders, we are communicating with other regional stakeholders. In FIATA, UTIKAD is a part of intermodal working groups and other modes as well. We are a member and also directing some of these working groups. Mostly the groups concerning Europe-Asia lines. Especially for road transport, for White Paper evaluations, we are very actively lobbying inside the federation. So, we are a part of this integration. CLECAT is another federation concerning the EU states' freight forwarders. UTIKAD is also contributing to CLECAT working groups. One important character of CLECAT is their close ties with the European Parliament. It is more like the EU wing of FIATA. But unfortunately we are not an official member to CLECAT because Turkey is not a member state. But we are a part of their working groups, they always ask our opinions. Like the environmental criteria, Learn and Alice projects, sustainability programs, we are actively working with them. So, in this manner, I can say that UTIKAD is an important part of all of these.

A. E: So you consider yourself as a part?

C. U: Yes, we are a part of this integration and doing our job in this regard.

A. E: Very well, the third question is related with that....

C. U: Let me just briefly explain something before a new question. In our country and mostly at the state level, there is no listening culture to the civil society organizations. This changed in a great manner after the EU integration process. With new EU projects such as IPA-II, state started to use new EU funds on infrastructure and legislation. For directives like Road Transport of Dangerous Goods, they gladly accepted stakeholders as a part of the decision making and project building. We also gave our help to the recognition of new combined transport directive. Of course in here, state listened us more because there was a

lack of information about this matter. For other experienced departments, these civil society hearings are much less. But in total, they ask our opinion when it concerns road transport, this is inevitable.

A. E: Related with this, do you support the EU integration on transport?

C. U: Of course...

A. E: No alternatives for Turkey whatsoever?

C. U: No, look...The EU integration must be finalized in the healthiest way. But there should be a balance between the EU demands and Turkey's national concerns. Such as Single European Skies. We should not ease our national arguments without being an official EU member. Do not take this to wrong way, this is not something nationalistic but it negatively affects the sector when you be a part of something does not recognize you as a member. We should be very careful about this. Again, no alternatives but we should be aware of the other initiatives. Everything must be exhausted for the EU integration with recognizing that there are other parts of the world.

A. E: OK. Then the key question. You already answered a part of it. But maybe you can give a little bit more detail. How do you consider your relations with the state in terms of integration? Reciprocal communication may be?

C. U: Definitely much healthier relationship compared to past. You should take account the views of civil society for implementation. This is a rule as well. Exchange of views is a necessity and the parts of directives were changed in the past depending on the opinions of civil society. For example, concerning the Rail freight regulation directive. An important part of the EU integration. State issued a compulsory certificate for all rail freight companies to be aligned with the EU regulations. As a stakeholder, we said that our members have a similar certificate called R2 certificate which is compatible with EU norms and that we do not need another certificate. We asked the state level to not impose another certificate to our companies. They listened and add this provision to the directive. Now it is good for us and aligned with the EU norms. This was a positive example. There are negative ones as well. Such as the times when we gave comments to the Ministry of Interior about a directive. They listen but tackles to some other regulation. For combined transport they are negotiating with us before making a deal. Constant meetings in

Ankara and at overseas. Sometimes, we say that the regulation does not concern us and skip it. Of course, they do not listen what we expect 100 % but when our demands tackle with administrative capacity problems of the state, there is nothing we can do.

A. E: So we can say there is a good relationship between two levels. On a broader perspective, do you think that the state approves your demands?

C. U: Look there is something called state policy. We cannot demand something above state policy or do with the EU regardless of state. There is nothing negative concerning our demands on technical issues. Ministries always call and ask our opinions to include us to the decision making. The problem lies at the Ministry coordination. Such as subsidizes given by the Ministry of Economy. When the Ministry of Transport wants to use these funds for combined transport, they have to wait the decision of Ministry of Economy. Both money and time waste but this has to be matured.

A.E: Did you ever make a specific demand from them like these funds, for railways may be?

C. U: Halkalı-Kapıkule for example. We asked about it countless of times but the state said that there are ongoing problems. Then, the line has opened by using ferries instead. Look, railways are a traditional and nationalistic issue. Protectionism is still valid for our country. But this is not a problem, the problem is the coordination problems between state, state departments and the EU. These institutions are constantly struggle with each other over such directives. Not allow other parties to their own competence areas. Of course, this effects implementation. Loss of time. For example, when you want to establish a logistics center, I can guarantee that your process will be delayed. I do not want to talk bad about our Ministiries but this is the situation. You need to get permission for sub-departments within the Ministry departments. Coordination will be lost after some point. And you forget what is your demand at the first place. So far, unfortunately, our state system and state's coordination in itself and with other decision makers is not good enough. There is a reality called authority conflict at the state level.

A. E: How to prevent this then?

C. U: Our state system has to change. We cannot do anything about this. Not included to our competence nor we have the authority. If the Minister wants something that happens but if not, whole integration deal could be in danger. This has to change.

A. E: But this is not beneficial for you, why you say that there is nothing to do? Has to be something?

C. U: Yes, but everybody is affected by it one way or another. This is absolutely about the organization of state and endured for decades. We are just asking for more smooth coordination within the state, increase in the administrative capacity may be to overcome hurdles.

A. E: Like the quota example, UND single handedly removed a bottleneck. Why can't you be the pioneers for increasing this capacity and coordination?

C. U: The organization of state is a whole different issue. Concerning the quota problem, we gave our advice during the FIATA meetings and choose to not be there at ECJ physically.

A. E: Why?

C. U: Well civil organizations are different from each other. DTD and UND are the groups that are focused on a single transport mode. We are more than that, include every single transport mode and combined transport as well. So, when we make a decision, we concern every member at different modes. For example, we were very influential at TRACECA but it is over now and no funds left. Now, as a single mode organization, UND put every single penny to the quota issue. We have no such luxury and we were not there to support them because it was unnecessary, no extra contribution from us was available bigger than they are already doing. We already gave our comments about the issue to FIATA and CLECAT. Of course, we never did civil disobedience but we cheered their cause from here!

A. E: OK then. Your relations with other stakeholders? Both your relations and their contributions. Are there enough actors to give positive contributions to integration?

C. U: We have very good relations with DTD, UND, UKAT and VIDAT. There is no separate structure on air transport, we are the biggest on that sector. In our job, sectoral international conventions matter and we have to obey these rules like ADR. This is our connection to the world like the EU directives. These organizations are

included to the decision making stage of these conventions when it fits to their agenda. Groups like DTD is very new but they are doing progress as well. We also give our best to help railway organizations. All in all, all groups are working very efficiently to be a part of this integration.

A. E: Between you and these groups?

C. U: We are going to Ministry meetings together. Closely working with each other and arrange meetings beforehand. Indeed, there are some conflictual points between the groups based on industrial interest since the end goals and purposes on integration is different. But we all want to find a common solution. So I believe that we have a very healthy relationship. The TOBB Chamber of Logistics is a good arena for us to make exchange of ideas on the sector. Ministry also sends a representative to these meetings. Every segment of integration meets there. Conflict of interest is inevitable and may be a little bit high in Turkey but we manage to talk at least. We hope the state level could do that eventually.

A. E: The biggest project of yours concerning integration?

C. U: Lobby activities at FIATA and CLECAT. These are directly effective on European Parliament decisions.

A. E: As a stakeholder organization, do you think that the state and stakeholder efforts are enough for integration and what do you think about the future of integration?

C. U: Let's start with the second question. I think the sector is integrated. The future problems are all related with the state level. We did more than what we expected and gave enough contribution. Now, let's turn to the first question about the state. If the state insists on protectionism over integration, problems will survive. Our railway connection with the EU must be finalized, at least two lines should be established and this should be a priority. The road transport priorities are still an issue. The EU wants more of a balance and even though the state says that road transport is no longer the privileged more, we don't think so. Still they use the discourse of "double motorways" to get domestic political gains. Railways will take time...

A. E: But this integration needs some kind of a continuity. How Turkey will achieve this? In the EU, they see this as a technical issue...

C. U: Let's continue with that. The policies of the Ministry are changing not just from government to government but it also changes when there is a Minister change. So, highly inconsistent compared to Europe. In Europe these plans are not yearly but for decades regardless of the political arena. This adds positively to the implementation. But in Turkey, integration investments changes between the regions where the government party gets the most votes and other regions. Investment plans are depended on where they got the most votes, not based on the balance of modes or whatever. This is the picture in Turkey regardless of political parties. Every single political party is doing that. This is a problem came out from the political culture in Turkey. Transport is not a technical issue here. This is also a risk at the EU but very low. In Turkey, politicization is substantially high. When the EU integration becomes political, we get a deadlock as a result...

A. E: Before concluding the interview. I would also want to know a little bit about maritime transport. Reports and statistics are showing that we have a huge port connection problem and freight forwarding from here is very hard. What do you think about this?

C. U: Absolutely not. Our private company members are doing exactly what they have to do about this matter. Turkey is a very hard country, and geographically, to establish a port like Rotterdam is only a dream. For our commercial needs, we have enough ports but in terms of the EU integration and trade, there are continuity problems such as lack of master plans. At least we need a long term plan for maritime but unfortunately we do not have for any mode. State level must do the feasibility plans before planning. Sea freight forwarders are doing their best in this picture. We have apartments at the backyard of our ports, how can you manage to put railways inside to the port? State should find the proper geography to make efficient ports and this only comes with correct planning. In terms of intermodality, there is no railway connection. At this current structure, it is impossible to use rail freight from ports. Aliğa is an important project, we have a port at Derince and we have rail connections there but again, operated very badly. I don't want to over emphasize the role of private sector but they really doing their best in these circumstances. And they are alone...

A. E: Why alone?

C. U: You should ask this to the state why stakeholders are alone besides annual meetings. Not just for ports, Turkey does not have a holistic approach for any transport matters, always a short-term solution. The state has an integration policy for passenger transport on railways because this turns into votes at the elections. Ankara-Eskisehir line become popular when it gets you through in just 1.5 hours but no one asks about the implementation of rail transport directives and freight! No one cares about the freight...

A. E: Mr. Ugur, thanks very much for answering my questions.

C. U: Thank you for coming.



3) Personal Communication with Umut Demirci (22 August 2017)

Head of Department

DG for Foreign Relations and EU Affairs at the Ministry of Transport Maritime Affairs and Communications/UDHB)

Interviewer: Ahmet Erturk (A. E)

Interviewee: Umut Demirci (U. D)

A. E: Thanks for having me Mr. Demirci today. I'll ask you very general questions, which I prepared for my dissertation. In general, I would like to find your relations with other competence levels on the way towards integration. If you may, I would like to start with the opening question. As the main department of the Ministry, how you consider our integration performance? Are we fully integrated to the Common Transport Policy? Are we a part of it?

U. D: Just before the start I would like to say that the answers I am going to give you today is my personal opinions and not any way is the official view of the Ministry. I think we have to start this question by a conceptual analysis. What do we mean by integration? We saw this as full alignment, as being a part of the Common Transport Policy that affects and affected by it. Without being a full member, without being inside of the main decision making of the policy, full alignment is not possible. Full alignment without full membership is opposite to our national concerns as well. Let's talk about example. Since the negotiation chapter is closed, our efforts to align for Single European Railways and Single European Sky is not enough. But we are trying to find another way to make a bilateral deal on air transport for example. Thus, we are aiming to push our limits but it stays at some certain level because of the problems produced by the supranational side. Without being inside of the machine, it is too hard. We are negotiating on road transport regardless of their imposed quotas but it only gets into a certain point. For example, we are trying to liberalize the rail market but at these circumstances, even the EU based companies are not allowed to get into our market. What is the point then? Our investors cannot operate at the EU level as well. This is contradictory to the what the EU formed at the first place.

A. E: Legislation?

U. D: Only small problems. Our target is the full implementation. On national program for transport, we aimed for that. It is not easy to put a scale on the rate of integration. It is a dynamic process and have countless of different paperwork. While you are making that implementation, Common Transport Policy evolves at the same time. So, you have to keep up with the pace. The important thing between the levels here is the intent. Our scale here is the national program. This document gives us our homework. If we fulfill all of them at the exact time, and then we consider ourselves successful. Right now, we achieved our goals with respect to 2008 document. For secondary legislation, I think the completion rate is more or less 70 %. We are also considering document and goals prepared by other Ministries if it concerns EU transport goals.

A. E: What about implementation?

U. D: On air transport, implementation is an absolute necessity. Without that, you cannot use a single plane. So, it is full in that manner. For rail, I cannot say the same thing. This is a whole new sector even for us and implementation is still at progress.

A. E: How much time do you think that Turkey needs for full integration on rail?

U. D: Five more years will be enough. But let me get this straight, the EU members are not all integrated as well. Common Transport Policy is not that common in that sense. Integration is dynamic and changes from state to state. Same policies could get different meanings at member states.

A. E: Can we consider infrastructure as a part of this integration? For example, Turkey's port infrastructure may be?

U. D: Of course, it consists an integral part of the process. On ports, I think we are doing the enough work on modernization and investment. The EU is very strict on the completion of TEN-T lines. We are the only nation who is not a member but included to the TEN-T corridors. On railways, modernization continues. Road and air is far developed than many EU members in this sense. Road investments were always here but we finished the legislation at the last decade. I think your question concerns more on ports being "hub ports" more than regular ports. This is more related with the freight forwarders and locations. Fares and costs are highly important. Geography is indeed a part of the debate. For natural reasons, we do not

have very much option. Because of our geography, forwarding freight from port to port is highly difficult. Still, using road transport from Trabzon to Mersin much less costly compared to sea freight.

A. E: And the competition on road is also a dimension right?

U. D: Sure. Not just our plans for hub ports but freight forwarders should also give up on easy costs on road and choose maritime instead.

A. E: What about connecting ports with railways?

U. D: For that we are working immensely. We are making feasibility reports on which ports need railways and which are not. But the main problem at our local level that each maritime company wants a “big port” project. In this geography, this is not really possible, we should classify our options. For example, we could use Karasu port for car transport and Mersin could be a hub port instead. Specialization is much more important in this geography. Everybody is chasing a Rotterdam dream here. All right, let’s build a Rotterdam here, do they guarantee that rate of freight? Do they guarantee that they use sea line rather than road? We will compensate the costs, are they willing to do the rest? I do not think so but we can say that connecting ports is a priority for us.

A. E: Do you want to add anything more to this question?

U. D: To summarize, I can assure you that state is on the right path concerning integration.

A. E: Second question than. To make sure that there is a role for the state here. Do you consider yourself as the decision-making, evolutionary, policy-building part of integration? What kind of an actor you are?

U. D: Concerning infrastructure, legislation and the EU chapter negotiations on Chapter 14 and 21, we are the integral part and actor. We are making coordination with the EU, other Ministries and society. But outside of these chapters, we have other duties as well. It is a fact that integration is something where you share authority with different departments and society. For example, Ministry of Development makes the Development plans and we coordinate these goals with other levels if this concerns transport. Road transport quotas are also related with Ministry of Economy because of the Customs Union, so we work together with them as well. On environmental matters, we are coordinating with Ministry of

Environment. This has to be done of course. On international coordination, project building, we always ask Ministry of the EU Affairs and Foreign Affairs to make sure that our national cases are protected. For infrastructure, we are the main actor but not without coordination. Indeed, government also has its goals as well.

A. E: Is that making a contradiction? Government goals and different Ministries' opinions in terms of administrative decision making capacity?

U. D: Duties and roles are well defined at the state level. I think this coordination is operating at a very good pace. Definitely there are differences on opinion many times but we are eager to solve this within the state. There is nothing to make a fuss about. Duplications are possible. For example, we were at a meeting at the Ministry of Environment the other day. It was about IPA projects on gas emission. We learned that the Ministry of Environment started the same project with us without our knowledge. Another example is that while Ministry of Environment are starting to initiate a strategy; Ministry of Development could warn them that they are the only state party for making strategies. So, this kind of things could happen but not in a negative manner and could solve very easily.

A. E: Were you involved to the Road transport quota case along with UND?

U. D: Of course, we watched the whole process. But the main responsibility on the state level was at the hands of the Ministry of Economy. We just gave our support to them.

A. E: Anything to add to second question?

U. D: Not really, as I have said, we have the duties of being the main and sub-actor when it concerns transport integration.

A. E: Third question is about your support to the integration. Do you support the integration process to the EU and is it valuable for you?

U. D: We are seeing it like this: although we have ups and downs in our relations, the EU integration is the state policy and we have to work towards that goal. These fluctuations on relations do not affect us technically, we continue no matter what. My observation is that when the process is blocked by political matters, we even work harder at the technical side. This is our reciprocal understanding with the EU. But we have to mention the political matters that are blocking our ways. We continue but this is also a fact. Let's be honest about the Cyprus issue. This issues

both effects air and maritime integration and limits us to get one step further every time in negotiations. There are so many projects that are rejected just because of this political issue. Technical projects blocked because of an irrelevant issue. But we continued, nevertheless...Never locked the door.

A. E: Quotas are the same I think?

U. D: Sure

A. E: So you continue over integration no matter what, right?

U. D: We think that the political issues are irrelevant with the technical common goals. We have to move along these technical purposes. The EU is a guideline for us, this is a state policy. Passenger rights, more efficient transport, these are good without the membership perspective as well. You want them for your citizens, this is good for you. We do not have any other alternative. Sure we are making deals with the Eastern countries like China, such as in TRACECA but this is a necessity. You cannot ignore the other parts of the world.

A. E: In terms of EU integration, please indicate your relationship with the society level, the stakeholders?

U. D: On infrastructure, we are working together with our private sector partners to build our projects. EU appreciates the investment procedures of us with the private sector.

A. E: So you include them to project making and planning stages?

U. D: We talk with them constantly before negotiating with the supranational level. Especially on air transport projects. We are making meetings at the Ministry and call them to come. While taking bargaining position as well. Even we are taking a representative of the civil society with us during negotiations as an observer and counselor. While arranging the IPA II Operational Program funds, we deployed all the ideas coming from a ranging of stakeholders from Bicycle Owners Club to UND. We are also making a stakeholder analysis and conferences. Sometimes we left the negotiation process to them.

A. E: The fifth question is related with that. Are these stakeholder views being important for you? Is that changing anything towards your attitude over a piece of proposal?

U. D: For general matters, yes we are taking them into account. But for single projects, it is highly unlikely to us to listen every sound.

A. E: For example, did you stop or delay a process before just because a stakeholder group rejected it?

U. D: I don't remember really. I don't remember any objections. But I have to say this, we are comparing ourselves with Europe here, we should compare our non-state groups as well in here. I am not talking about big organizations like UND but many of them are not even know what they are talking about and not even have a command over their own modal agenda. While you are talking a specific topic, they come, make an irrelevant comment and left even without listening what we are going to say. This makes us really uncomfortable. For example, UND single handedly shaped the Turkish position on a road transport deadlock. May be this will change the rules in Common Transport Policy in the future. But the others are more like the representatives of the private groups who are funding them rather than a civil society group. This is a huge problem of our civil groups countrywide. We have to change their culture and make them more efficient for raising awareness. Unfortunately, Turkey does not have that civil society prototype. They failed to catch new developments, new regimes and without making a holistic approach and help us, they choose to bound to their small scale industrial goals and protectionist over their specific mode. This is not EU integration. This is about coordination between the levels and coordination starts with these stakeholder groups. Again, this is a Turkish problem. We always call them to coordinate with us, with the EU but so far this is not achieved.

A. E: Thank you for this very detailed answer. Let's connect this with a new question. In this unholy structure, are there any joint projects towards integration? Are they asking you to make joint projects?

U. D: Never happened so far. Private sector always come but for R&D funds. In other words, for their own interests. I have never seen a civil society actor come and say: "Look we have this kind of an EU project, let's do it together" or negotiate something together at the EU level. Only Municipalities come to us when they hear the word "EU", because it means money for them. We started to make the stakeholder conference to establish a network but it seems that civil society does not

recognize us as a partner for integration since they are not attending and pay attention. As I have said, private companies come time to time for their own personal reasons. Even in these conferences, they never asked for a support to a specific initiative and no word on joint projects either. UND is always there to protect their interests of the members but at least they are there and make comments, shaping our policies. This is mainly because civil society is so crowded with their own small agenda and lack of thinking big. They do not know their potential. We are helping them to reach that point like UND did but maybe we are the wrong address.

A. E: So where is the right address?

U. D: I don't know, may be the municipalities or local actors. They do not cooperate either. It is just about money and funds for them. Only groups like UND knows that integration bottlenecks are costing them more on the long run. Others' approach is always short term and lacks vision. Passenger Rights issue as an example. I think they should work and arrange our priorities at that policy but nobody is working on that. The matters relating the EU integration is very transparent, they can come anytime to observe and ask our support. Our DGs always eager to reach them.

A. E: So you don't think that there is no cooperation between the stakeholders as well?

U. D: Well I don't know it clearly. May be there are certain groups coming together to do something but this never reflected into the state level. I can only say what I observed from these stakeholder conferences.

A. E: Well then do you think your initiatives are enough so far for full integration?

U. D: Look this is a dynamic process. If we say that it is all enough, then we have to stop. We always think that what we could do more. But there are unfortunate events and still political bottlenecks. There are committees within the EU which we want to be a part of and negotiate at the supranational level and may be add something to the Common Transport Policy. We tried to be a part of them but the EU, the part that we supposed to be integrated with, said that we cannot attend to these meetings since we are not a member state. We also proposed to them that we can at least be an observation party but even that rejected. So this resistance against us like preventing our technocrats to be a part of meetings based on political matters is

something we never expected of. The chapter is also closed you know. Since 2006. Nevertheless, we are still in the game.

A. E: How much this resistance effected the state?

U. D: Major effect on moral and motivation. That is for sure. At the state level, we always felt betrayed by the actions of supranational level. We want to negotiate, close this and shape the future of Common Transport Policy with our own way.

A. E: Could you please mention your biggest achievement or the joint project for integration?

U. D: Well, there are so many. Since we are the main negotiating party, I cannot say a specific part. Every part of it is a success story given the circumstances. But to be more specific, what we achieved on air transport is so significant. For both infrastructure, legislation and implementation of the rules, it added a different cultural dimension to the Common Transport Policy.

A. E: Mr. Demirci, thanks for this very detailed interview. As a last point, could you please make a comment for the future of the integration process?

U. D: For our side, we are working tirelessly for making more contributions to the common goals. For us, we will not stop until we see us as a full member. This is our plan. But the supranational level must respect to the rules of Common Transport Policy and increase our motivation, not by blocking everything we want to achieve for political reasons. As the both competences, we need to see this as a technical issue and learn to continue in a politicized arena. Otherwise, our efforts will always be limited.

A. E: Thank you Mr. Demirci.

U. D: No problem, thank you...

4) Personal Communication with Dr. Can Baydarol (28 April 2017)

EU Expert on Transport Integration/Academic

Interviewer: Ahmet Erturk (A. E)

Interviewee: Dr. Can Baydarol (C. B)

A. E: Dr. Baydarol thanks for accepting my invitation to make this interview with you.

C. B: Thanks for inviting me Ahmet, let's start shall we?

A. E: First question Professor. Do you think that our transport policy is integrated to the Common Transport Policy of the EU?

C. B: In general no. I don't think we are there yet. We are still dealing with the removal of major bottlenecks like road transportation quotas. Without solving these problems, a fully-fledged partnership is not possible of course. Even the Customs Union is not working under these circumstances. Modernization must be achieved. For maritime and rail, infrastructure is not enough to handle the capacity of common needs. But nevertheless, the major problem we need to overcome is the bottlenecks. We must conclude that chapter before anything else. You know the chapter is blocked as well...

A. E: Of course, for a political reason.

C. B: Political but also significantly affects transport. It concerns Cypriot ships and vessels. It is directly about the freedom of movement and transport within the Common Transport Policy. So, it is not that indirect but again, no need to block whole chapter for a political reason. Again, in here the EU blocks itself the development of Common Transport Policy, like they did in the road transportation issue.

A. E: You were very active on that case right?

C. B: I was the counselor to the civil society group UND which brought the case to the ECJ against Hungary.

A. E: How was the atmosphere at the ECJ?

C. B: Very well. I think after so many years, we reached to some point. The problematic thing was the perspective over the years. We lost so many time criticizing the freedom of movement of persons but it was a case concerning the

movement of goods. When we concentrated on the good inside the vehicle, things started to have changed. Now, we reached to a positive decision but not finalized yet.

A. E: UND's role?

C. B: They started it for sure. We should give that to them. At least there was a civil society group dealing with a major bottleneck.

A. E: Right now, I think the place for the second question. I can ask you the actors in this integration. Do you think the state and civil society are joint partners in this process?

C. B: I think they are actors. Different levels and dimensions but actors. However, I can't say that they are partners and there is coordination. The understanding between the two so thin in Turkey. State is crowded with administrative problems. For road transportation quotas, we lost important amount of time because of the intersecting competences between state organizations. Everybody say different things, no unity and no common approach inside the state. Opinion towards integration changes from policy to policy. Too political indeed.

A. E: How so?

C. B: I am saying that political interests and domestic interests is a motivation for the state to decide over transport integration. This could be either good or bad. But not a technical issue for the state and government party for sure.

A. E: Interest groups?

C. B: You mean UND because I never saw another stakeholder pushing too hard anything for integration. They are never around and small organizations pursuing small-scale interests.

A. E: Do you think that these different competences support the EU integration on transport?

C. B: Well they have to. Otherwise they cannot operate freely and less costly at the EU level. This is a must for them. But again, besides UND, I never saw another group working towards the integration. For state, the EU process is a part of your state policy. You have to get things done. If you want your product move freely through Europe, you have to align with their rules. Not much done so far but the support is inevitable. Sure, the respect between the EU and Turkey must be mutual.

A. E: What about state-society relations? Could you please elaborate more on that?

C. B: We don't have a civil society culture like they have in Europe. If you are a well-funded, functioning stakeholder with many members, you can get state's attention but otherwise is not possible. Civil society also stayed small scale and concern about daily matters rather than long term plans. So, no strong state-society relations on integration.

A. E: This surely affects implementation right?

C. B: Sure. If you have very supportive state and civil society. It is just logical that the integration will be much more easy for you. You have to work on it. So far, we don't have this in Turkey. State have its own agenda and private sector have something different.

A. E: Do you think that the state listens the concern coming from the society?

C. B: If you are UND, they will. This is the rule of being a civil society actor in Turkey. You have to be close to the authority. You can do it by raising awareness as well, this is very influential for integration. Civil society must show the state the bottlenecks before any deal because they are the ones who are most affected. But in Turkish case, it is somehow different....

A. E: This directly manipulates the possible joint projects of the state and society I think. Don't you think so? Do you know a project cooperation?

C. B: You can name the road transportation quota case as a joint product but UND I think did the most part. State was only there to observe and support. Ministry of Economy was there. I think it concerns Ministry of Transport greatly but they never included themselves since it is mostly about Customs Union. See the problem is...It is too complicated even within the state, who gets what? This complication affects the whole situation. You don't know where to go and ask for help? Even settling that question takes time, left the actual hearing of the concern.

A. E: Then how to change it?

C. B: I don't think this will ever change in Turkey. This is the state dynamics; we have to deal with that. This is our state culture.

A. E: OK then. I think this is a duty for stakeholders but anyway...

C. B: This is whole different story. That is our civil society culture as well. Limited....

A. E: Next question. Do you think what our state level provides for integration is enough or we need more?

C. B: We even do not have a master plan for long-term planning. How can I say that these initiatives are enough? It took twenty years to overcome a bottleneck. For rail, maritime and road, we need to work more as a country. This is beneficial for us; this integration and we need to know that for sure. State has to be more efficient, solve this administrative capacity issues. Stakeholders have to act more like UND. Use their resources more efficiently for community issues. They have to try to get out that industrial circle they are currently in and deal with awareness raising. This is what a country needs for positive support.

A. E: What do you mean by that industrial circle?

C. B: Well they have to lose the tone of the owners and private interests and work more on common problems. But again, this is the civil culture in Turkey and very hard to change and very hard to work on common problems while your boss was paying you to be a voice of the private sector. What I am saying is the ideal version but it is not achievable in Turkey.

A. E: The biggest step so far towards integration? Any thoughts?

C. B: I think the possible solution of the road transportation quotas will be the biggest step. Both sides lost money and time over that. It was something both against the Customs Union deal and the integration. Something against what the EU build upon. This was a very significant case for Turkey where a stakeholder organization changed every perspective at the EU level and Turkish state. In other words, the organization shaped the Turkish policy and decision. Mutual respect must have been achieved and now Turkey is very close to that.

A. E: A significant or successful example for anticipated joint projects right? Could be a model for the others?

C. B: Exactly, they have to see that when they work on this way.

A. E: What do you think about the relations within the civil society? Are they helping each other at all for overcoming problems?

C. B: This is a hard question for me to answer since I don't know very detailed about their inside dynamics but I was included into one policy challenge concerning integration and I was a counselor to a civil society group and I saw no other support

or cooperation to the UND about this issue. I guess that their relations were mostly at the meeting level but this is just my educated guess.

A. E: All right Professor, then the last question. The future of our integration process on transport. What do you think?

C. B: Look, the state and other stakeholders should know that this integration is inevitable and indispensable for Turkey as long as we are waiting in the line of full membership. It is also not related with that as well, if you want to sell your product to Europe, your transport rules must be aligned. So far, we achieved only a little. State must tackle with the inside problems and decisions must not be based on political reasons. Stakeholders must be more active and the EU should respect the mutual agreements. This cost them more as well. They listen countries like Hungary, Austria and cost more money by respecting their national causes. Common Transport Policy is about common measures. The EU must respect to the Turkish causes as well as the member states concerned. Both levels should show mutual respect and understanding. Only this way they can achieve a common ground.

A. E: Thanks very much Professor.

C. B: Your welcome Ahmet.

5) Personal Communication with Yasar Rota (30 October 2017)

General Manager

Railway Transport Association (Demiryolu Tasimaciligi Dernegi/DTD)

Interviewer: Ahmet Erturk (A. E)

Interviewee: Yasar Rota (Y. R)

A. E: Thanks for accepting this interview with me Mr. Rota.

Y. R: On behalf of Railway Transport Association, we glad we could help to your thesis, I think we can start.

A. E: In general, do you think that the Turkish transport is integrated to the EU Transport Policies? Which stage is Turkey in currently?

Y. R: Well, I can only answer this question by defining the integration process in our sector. Railways...I honestly do not want to comment about the other modes or success of organizations. What concerns us is our sector.

A. E: All right Railways then...Integrated?

Y. R: Not integrated for sure and we still have lot to do and need time. Railway integration is a new process compared to others, time will tell the scores.

A. E: Why not integrated?

Y. R: Look, to integrate fully with Europe, you need an efficient and long line from Kapikule to Iran. This is what to EU is expecting from you. Using the corridor to reach Asia. But we still have single railway lines, signalization problems. Only 1/3 of the railways are having efficient signalization.

A. E: But Turkey started a liberalization process to overcome all of these problems. It is not effective then?

Y. R: It is effective but do not forget that the secondary legislation is just completed. We still need time to see the effect of this liberalization. You cannot expect to change things just overnight. I have to add that the liberalization lacks a huge human resource problem, we are lacking trained personnel in railways.

A. E: Like a transport elite to help us transform?

Y. R: Exactly, who knows the directives at the abroad and help to implement them in here. Without them, it is just so hard to achieve things.

A. E: Please continue on Turkey's integration score.

Y. R: OK, not integrated and have to change many before full integration. We have 574 locomotives in this country and only 102 them are electrified. Railways are used mostly for freight in the world. The EU also wants member states to use more railways on freight forwarding. This is the way to be a part of the Common Transport Policy. However, railways only cover 3,9 % of the national and close 0 % of the international freight. It consists only 26 million tonnes. Turkey has only 15, 393 freight locomotives, which is well under the average.

A. E: Railway connections?

Y. R: Lacks also. In Turkey, there are 660 rail stops and stations and 191 ports. Only 15 of them have decent railway connections to forward freight. Turkey aspires to be a logistics hub but in order to do that, all logistics centers have to be connected by rail, these includes the airports and ports. This is how you get intermodal transport. But although we have 295 commercial zones in this country, only 45 of them have railway connections, which gets the freight to other places. See? You cannot design an intermodal travel with these deficiencies.

A. E: What do you think about the EU funded railway projects like Samsun and Kalin?

Y. R: Well we would be glad once they are completed but the slow moving of the state and inability to offer a substitute line during modernization, costing us more while making these projects. Halkali- Kapikule is not working at the moment, means that there is no single line to Europe. Samsun-Kalin, as I have said, cost more because now the freight stops because of modernization. Forwarders need to use trucks after some point. Van Lake is another comedy. Do not know how to get the freight on the other side. Now Turkey is using ferries to overcome that problem. But the thing is there are only 4 ferries are currently operating and it takes 8 hours to take freight and come back to get other freights. In our job, time is money, it is everything. Tell me, how we suppose to operate under these circumstances? Before integration, you need a working infrastructure, you have to handle that first.

A. E: I imagine this could be very hard for you. I suppose intermodality is a dream then?

Y. R: No, nothing is impossible if you believe and work right and give more privilege to the transport models concerning railways and intermodality. Railways

are the most efficient transport mode, much less money and time consuming and you can handle all your freight on a single line without interruption. But you have give more to it rather than road transport.

A. E: Why Turkey is not giving priority to railways then?

Y. R: We are, we started to give but just started. We are very happy about the stance of state about railways. However, a little bit late. It should have been long before the road transport investments had to be diminished.

A. E: Why late then?

Y. R: We should not forget that we have an important “Road transport lobby” in this country. Lots of organizations and power and they have a huge influence on the state. Compared to our power, they have an enormous effect on the government. They are big as size as well. Turkey has to solve that problem too, while they are in such power, road transport will always be the number one mode. We are not saying that we should get more. We are saying that there should be a master plan about the integration of Turkey and there should be balance between modes depending on time and cost efficiency. Our organization is working tirelessly on educating both state and society about the importance of intermodality and combined transport. So far, not much helo but we are trying.

A. E: Do you think state initiatives like Marmaray are helpful?

Y. R: Of course, at least they are trying to do something. More than nothing and that was exactly we were getting at the past. But, based on the initial plan, Marmaray supposed to carry freight at nights. In order to align your freight line to Europe, Marmaray was a part of the plan, EIB gave that money for you to do that. However, we are still waiting for the freight line to open so we could start forwarding. You see, when it is passenger, it opens swiftly. But when it comes to freight, we always wait.

A. E: Why?

Y. R: Political and passenger always comes first in Turkey. It is popular to open a railway line before elections but freight is not. Also, the road transport forwarders, it is a huge market and lots of people could be effected by it. Road transport should not have been that big, now the market is so big and creates problems if they lose money. Political concerns are there also; they do not want to lose support. But the

EU is political too. Closing negotiations before any discussion definitely creates an unwillingness in the Turkish side.

A. E: Do you consider yourself as a part of the integration?

Y. R: Certainly. Now with more than 74 member organizations, we are the representatives of the sector. Our forwarders are carrying 26,000 tonnes of carriage with 4000 wagons. This should tell you that we are the pioneers of the sector.

A. E: So I think you support this integration process after these comments to the first question. Do you?

Y. R: Yes, and we have no alternatives on railways. The EU supports the railway integration and use of railways for more on passenger and freight and we are working towards that, our interests are mutual in this sense.

A. E: Ok then what about your relations with the state for this support?

Y. R: Concerning the EU projects and implementation of directives, we are constantly in mediation with Ministry of Transport, Economy, Development and TCDD. We contributed to the preparation of Operational Programme and Logistics Master Plan. We warn many times about the need of a concrete Master Plan. In addition to that, they always ask our opinion on the liberalization process.

A. E: Is this liberalization or a privatization?

Y. R: Of course this is liberalization. Some groups deliberately and politically want to turn this into a privatization but what the EU wants here is clear and what Turkey is doing clear. State is still in the market but as a separate corporation and also finances the infrastructure but the market is not a monopoly any more. Any organization could come and compete with state. So, not privatization, there is no political debate here.

A. E: Do you think that your views are listened in these meetings with Ministries?

Y. R: Look you don't expect the state to listen everything you say. They call us and ask about the directives and we give our comments. This is how the state and their organization works in Turkey and we respect that decision making process. But they always ask our opinion.

A. E: But there are stakeholders that even mediate with the EU to raise their voice without using the state apparatus. Why can't you?

Y. R: Our sector is not that big and our organization is not there yet. The railway market is just established. This is their business actually, we respect our relations with the state and we are happy about it. If a chance comes up in the future, we may take it but so far we are mediating matters at the meetings.

A. E: Besides meetings, do you have any joint projects, cases to move on to integrate Turkey?

Y. R: We are making educative classes and want our sector to learn the progress at the supranational level. Our transport school is teaching the sector organizations about what the delegation wants, EU directives and implementations in Turkey.

A. E: With the state?

Y. R: No. With state, we have no joint projects besides meetings, exchange of ideas on infrastructure projects.

A. E: Do you believe that the state projects and initiatives are towards integration?

Y. R: Compared to the past, they are. Now, we have a state and government listens the needs of railway associations. At the past, this was only a dream. Even a small amount of integration implementations is better than no integration at all. This is how we see the debate today. Of course, there are places and policies that we are very critical of and we still have lot to do and I honestly accept that Turkey is far from rail transport integration but at least, they are trying to do something, new lines and new policies.

A. E: What is your organizations' biggest achievement in this sense? Towards integration?

Y. R: Well nothing big but we educated the whole sector about what is coming after the EU integration, shaped the sectors position and learned how to operate within the Common Transport Policy.

A. E: Not at the EU level then?

Y. R: So far no.

A. E: Any significant reason for that?

Y. R: We select the way with the state. We share our opinions and left the state to do the implementation and this does not mean that we won't do it in the future. Again, the market is newly emerging and let's see in the future.

A. E: Besides states, how are your relations with other stakeholder groups and how you elaborate the non-state actors and cooperation in Turkey?

Y. R: We constantly get together at the Ministry meetings and the logistics meetings at TIM. Certainly, there is coordination and good will relationship.

A. E: Anything else like a common position against a EU directive?

Y. R: Well we share opinion but I can't say the same for the common position. I don't think our interests are common in this transport policy. Every group wants to protect their own industrial interest and this is natural. We are doing this too and it is too hard to make common positions with lobby groups such as road transport forwarders. They certainly do not want to share their monopoly with other groups.

A. E: What about UND?

Y. R: We have very good relations with the UND and lots of them are my close friends but this does not change the fact that they are the integral part of the road forwarders lobby, they have very close relations with the political side of the state and does not concern over the future of railways. I don't blame them; this is the way it goes in Turkey. We have to be more aggressive as well. We are the single organization of rail sector and they have lots of different organizations.

A. E: Mr. Rota, thanks for your answers. Lastly I want to know your opinion about the future of integration?

Y. R: Turkey has to pay more attention to the railways. Railways are the most efficient option. Every single EU White Paper mentions that. If you want to achieve an intermodal, multimodal and combined transport, railways are the answer. In addition to these, directives have to be implemented very quickly. On railways, it is much slower compared to road transport due to the reasons I stated before. And these directives have to be regulated clearly and effectively. Again, the sector is young, still growing and there is still time to manage everything. Most importantly, we have to come up with a solution to the infrastructure and lack of transport specialists.

A. E: Are you working to overcome these problems?

Y. R: Well, if you are concerning educated transport personnel, it is the state's duty to make this happen.

A. E: OK then. I think I got it covered, thanks Mr. Rota.

Y. R: No problem Ahmet, thanks for visiting our organization.



6) Personal Communication with Tahir Dengiz (03 March 2018)

Undersecretary to the Minister of Transport between 1993-2002

Interviewer: Ahmet Erturk (A. E)

Interviewee: Tahir Dengiz (T. D)

A. E: Mr. Undersecretary, thanks for giving me this opportunity. Before start, could you please tell me a little bit about you and your work at the Ministry?

T. D: First of all, welcome. I am Tahir Dengiz and I was the Ministry of Transport Undersecretary for the years between 1993 and 2002. I worked with many governments, with Demirel, Çiller and Ecevit governments. At my time in the Ministry, I was generally concerned about the infrastructure projects and communications side of the Ministry.

A. E: Transport?

T. D: Well indeed. It was the Ministry of Transport and we were responsible about the selection and implementation of Transport project as well.

A. E: What about the EU integration on transport?

T. D: We had a separate DG only about the European integration. I worked with them very closely for many years, concerning the regulation of funds and implementation of directives, observation of differences between the systems.

A. E: Very well, now I think I can start with the first question. Considering the past and the present, do you think that Turkish transport is integrated to the EU?

T. D: Taking account the everything Turkey is doing from the past, we cannot talk about a full integration and it is still in progress. Of course, this not something started at 2002, there is a back story, integration is not a new thing.

A. E: What do you mean by that?

T. D: I am saying that before the AKP governments, integration was there and we were working on it, of course, they came and take something very well-functioning over in terms of integration.

A. E: But many government and state texts show that the official starting period of the integration is 2002 and afterwards.

T. D: This is not true. Before the AKP governments, we were using all our power to integrate Turkey with the EU and the world, ranging from transport corridors and

telecommunications. At the EU Coordination departments, the Ministry was attending meetings at the supranational side to coordinate EU directives. Even the decisions concerning intermodal systems which is a huge part of the EU today. High speed trains, Marmaray...

A. E: Marmaray? At the 90s?

T. D: Of course, many people think that Marmaray is a new project, an AKP-led EU project. However, the first project and the feasibility of the line has been made at our time at the Ministry. This includes the Ankara-İstanbul High speed line as well. As I have said before, integration is not something came afterwards of 2002. The back story includes these projects. The new governments took these already existing projects and established them.

A. E: This is very strange and I have never heard that these are old projects?

T. D: Well this is political you know. If you establish something then you expect to gain from it domestically, this is inevitable in political life.

A. E: Who are the actors in this integration? State?

T. D: State is the main actor and political parties as well. Political shifts are always change things in Turkey including transport. Agendas differ very much between left and right parties. There is no such distinction in Europe, it is technical there and more solid plans. In Turkey, everything changes very fast, even 24 hours is a very long time in politics.

A. E: What about society? Interest groups may be?

T. D: They are. There are some strong ones like UND. They were very influential and effective even back in 90s. But I don't think the recent ones are very effective, more interest and money oriented I think. Political as well...

A. E: Do you think that both state and society supports this integration in Turkey?

T. D: It depends; I mean the EU progress is not much something prioritized in Turkey any more. So, I really do not know what is the current stance of the government. Back then, we did what was absolutely necessary for the EU. For Ciller government, this was the end goal. Society and interest groups were supportive but they only support because it is aligned with their industrial gains.

A. E: So you think that this is only about rational gains?

T. D: Look, every political action is about domestic and industrial gains. Without them, nobody will take action. Transport is a political issue and actors are playing this game with respect to it.

A. E: What about the relations of these rational actors? Are they supporting each other at the supranational bargaining?

T. D: This bargaining is mostly about the actions of the state. When I was at the state, we were negotiating with them before going to Europe. For example, I remember we formed a transport conference to get the opinions of each local actor, worked with UND on the implementation of directives such as Dangerous Goods but again, the contribution of non-state actors is very minimal. The biggest negotiation party is the state.

A. E: But don't you think this effects the implementation part of the integration?

T. D: Of course it effects. Everybody wants well-functioning, issue raising, problem solving non-state actors. This is very important for implementation and wider regulations.

A. E: Do you think that state listens to them?

T. D: At our time, we always asked and listened. I don't know about the current status. My guess is that state only listens if the organization is politically closed to them and raise an issue particularly profitable for the government. This is how it works in Turkey.

A. E: Did you ever make a joint project with a non-state actor back then?

T. D: Of course, with the counselors coming from the EU states, we worked very closely with the UND to align the directives of Dangerous and Flammable Goods. For TRACECA as well, studied and analyzed the corridor system with our industrial partners.

A. E: In a nutshell, what do you think about the state's current initiatives?

T. D: Marmaray and Ankara-İstanbul lines are good projects. Besides the location, I think a new airport is a good initiative as well, the "hub" goals are correct and towards integration. However, these are old projects but they established them. These are good. But the problems are still there. First one is implementation, the rule is there but nobody is looking for an alignment. Second, infrastructure. Both in

transport and telecommunications, this is a must. Third, too much political and it has consequences.

A. E: What kind of consequences?

T. D: For example, politics always led the governments to fund more money and projects to the road transport. This is a significant Turkish transport story. Starting from the 1950s, for selling more Ford cars and pressure coming from the US, Turkey always financed road transport more due to political reasons. Because investing on road meant more use of petroleum products and selling more cars. Compared to railways, it was the cheapest option also. Now, they are trying to change this but it is not so easy. Lots of interests are at stake. Besides, to make a railway project and connect all railways for freight is highly costly.

A. E: What about road transporters' lobby activities? Are they strong enough like people told?

T. D: Very effective on state decisions. All for these privatizations and liberalization processes, they have a say. You should not underestimate the domestic influence of these freight forwarders.

A. E: The biggest accomplishment of your time?

T. D: There are lots. As I have said, projects like Marmaray, high speed rail, transport stakeholder conferences are all products of our time. Besides, on telecommunications, we built today's infrastructure, now the current system arose from what we achieved back then.

A. E: We are now reaching the end. Back to stakeholders, do you think or observed at any level during your time-that there is a cooperation between non-state actors for organizing a common purpose towards integration?

T. D: No, I honestly never observed or think that stakeholders are in cooperation to create something larger than shaping the country policy. Stakeholders at transport sector is currently small, ineffective and do not have the ability to shape things. They are more or less interest driven and care much about their own agenda rather than common purposes such as integration.

A. E: Last question, how do you see the future?

T. D: Not think very bright future is upon us. It gets more and more political every day. What Turkey needs is a significant plan consisting the balance of modes, either

road and rail, respecting the EU corridor scheme and continue over infrastructure investments. However, I am not sure that this is achievable any more...

A. E: Thanks for your time Mr. Dengiz.

T. D. Thank you Ahmet.



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