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AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
ANABİLİM DALI

THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER?
The EU's Gender Equality Norm Diffusion in Turkey

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Sinem BAL

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ÖZET

Ian Manners'a göre AB dış ilişkilerindeki norm düzenleyici rolünden dolayı normatif bir güçtür. Özellikle, Manners'in belirttiği üzere, genişleme politikalarında evrensel normları koşul olarak öne sürmesi ve aday ülkenin bunu iç hukukuna aktarması, AB'nin normatif gücünü göstergesi olduğunu belirtmektedir. Son 20 yılda AB'nin uluslararası ilişkilerdeki rolünün kavranması alanındaki akademik çalışmalar ağırlıklı olarak bu normların aday ülkelerin iç hukukunda, politika yapma sürecinde ve hatta düşüncelerde nasıl yayıldığını, hayata geçirildiğini ve içselleştirildiğini analiz etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Düşünsel değişim normun yayılmasından sonra oluştuğunda, AB'nin belirli bir ölçüde normatif özelliğe sahip gücü olduğu anlamı çıkarılabilir. Bununla birlikte, genişleme sürecinde her ne kadar prosedürel dökümanların koşulluluğu normatif bir etkiye sahip olsa da, AB menşeili toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği normları evrensel toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği anlayışının sadece belirli bir parçasıdır. AB'nin aday ülke üzerindeki normatif etkisi ve düşünsel değişimi yaklaşımı sadece yasal değişimler ve reform paketleri dikkate alınarak değerlendirildiğinde, sınırlı olacaktır. Çünkü AB normlarının meşruluğu, merkezi otoritenin, yerel kurumların ve sivil toplumun güçlü savunuculuğu sonucunda oluşan yerelin rızasına da bağlıdır. Yeni aktarılmış normun yereldeki halktan rıza alması için, yereldeki kamu kurumlarının bu normu benimseyip yerelde yayması, merkezi otoritenin yasal yollar ve politikalar ile tereddütsüz bir şekilde bu normu uygulaması ve sivil toplum örgütlerinin de hak temelli bir özellikte olup devlet organlarıyla birlikte normu sosyalleştirmesi gerekmektedir. Bu üçlü sac ayağı düzgün bir şekilde çalıştığı takdirde, yeni aktarılan norm kesinliği garanti olmasada, içselleşebilir. Fakat bu çalışmanında öne sürdüğü üzere, AB toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği normunun içselleşmesi temel üç nedenden dolayı tamamlanamamıştır. Birinci neden AB'nin kendisi, kendi sınırları içerisinde tam anlamıyla evrensellik temelli toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği normunu içselleştirememiş. İçselleştirilmiş norm ise eksik bir çerçevede ele alınmıştır, çünkü AB'nin norm uygulaması ataerkillik ve yapısal cinsiyet rollerini sorgulamaktan uzaktır. İkinci olarak AB tarafından öne sürülen toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği normu, Türk hükümetinin kendi ideolojik duruşu ile çelişmiştir ve norm olması gerektiği gibi uygulanmamaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, hükümetin ve yerel kamu

kurumlarının AB toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği normuna karşı gösterdikleri daimi dirençten dolayı, yerel halk sivil toplum örgütleri tarafından sosyalleştirilmeye çalışılan yeni norma rıza vermemektedir. Böylelikle normatif bir değişim tartışılır olmak ile beraber, bu durum AB'nin norm yayma mekanizmasını yeniden düzenlemesini gerektiğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Normatif Güç Avrupa, Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitliği, Normun Hayat Döngüsü, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, Kadın Hareketi ve Hak Temelli Sivil Toplum Örgütleri.

ABSTRACT

According to Ian Manners, the EU is a normative power due to its norm promoter role in its external relations. Especially, as Manners indicates, EU's conditionality on universal norms and their transposition to Turkish domestic law reveals the EU's normative power. In the last two decades academic studies on the EU's role conception in its international relations mainly aim to analyze how these norms are diffused, actualized, and internalized in candidate states' domestic laws, policy making processes, and even in ideas. Since ideational change occurs after norm diffusion is complited, it can be inferred that the EU has a certain degree of power that includes a normative feature. However, within the enlargement process, although the conditionality of procedural documents seems to have a normative influence, EU-driven gender equality norms form a specific part of universal gender equality understanding. The EU's normative power influence and ideational change over a candidate country approach would be bounded, if it is evaluated just by considering legal changes and reform packages. Because, the legitimacy of EU norms also depends on local consent, which may develop through the efforts of the central authority and its local institutions, and the strong advocacy of civil society. To gain the consent of local people for a newly-transmitted norm, public institutions at the local level should adopt the norm and diffuse it at this level, central authority should unreservedly implement the norm through legislation and policies, and civil society organizations should have a rights-based feature while socializing the norm alongside state organs. If this three-legged system works properly, then the transmitted norm may be internalized, yet without certain guarantee. However, as this study argues, internalization of the EU's gender equality norm in Turkey has remained incomplete for three main reasons. First, the EU itself cannot exactly internalize a universal-based gender equality norm inside its borders, while EU norm implementation remains far from questioning the patriarchy and structured gender roles. Secondly, as the EU's gender equality norm contradicts the Turkish government's ideological stance, it has not been implemented as it should have been. Thirdly, due to continued resistance to diffusion of the gender equality norm by

government and local public institutions, local people in Turkey have not consented to the new norm socialized by NGOs. Hence, it is questionable whether there has been normative change, which implies that the EU should revise its norm diffusion mechanisms.

Keywords: Normative Power Europe, Gender Equality, Norm's Life Cycle, Turkey-EU relations, Women Movement and Right-based NGOs.

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AÇEV	:	Anne Çoçuk Eğitim Vakfı/Mother Child Education Foundation
AKP	:	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/ Justice and Development Party
ANAP	:	Anavatan Partisi/ Motherland Party
APD	:	Accession Partnership Document
BPfA	:	The Beijing Platform for Action
CEDAW	:	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEEC	:	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHP	:	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/ Republican People's Party
CoE	:	Council of Europe
CPE	:	Civilian Power Europe
DAPHNE	:	Data as a Service Platform for Healthy Lifestyle and Preventive Medicine
DEP	:	Demokrasi Partisi/Democracy Party
DEVAW	:	Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
DG	:	Directorate General
DP	:	Demokrat Parti/ Democrat Party
DSP	:	Demokratik Sol Parti/ Democratic Left Party
EC	:	European Community
EC6	:	Original six founder countries of European Community
ECJ	:	European Court of Justice
ECSC	:	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	:	European Economic Community
EIDHR	:	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIGE	:	European Institute for Gender Equality
ENP	:	European Neighbourhood Policy

EP	:	European Union Parliament
EU	:	European Union
EURATOM	:	The European Atomic Energy Community
EWL	:	European Women Lobby
GAD	:	Gender and Development
GBV	:	Gender-based Violence
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
HDP	:	Halkların Demokrasi partisi/ Peoples' Democratic Party
HEP	:	Halkın Emek Partisi/ People's Labor Party
ILO	:	International Labour Organization
IO	:	International Organization
IPA	:	Instruments for Pre-Accession
IR	:	International Relations
ISKUR	:	Türkiye İş Kurumu/ Turkish Employent Agency
KADER	:	Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği/ Association for Support and Training of Woman Candidates
KAGIDER	:	Kadın Girişimciler Derneği/ Women's Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey
KAMER	:	Kadın Araştırmaları Merkezi/ Women's Research Center
KASAID	:	Kadının Sosyal Hayatını Araştırma ve İnceleme Derneği/ Association for Research on Women's Social Life
KHF	:	Kadın Halk Fırkası/ Women's People Party
KSGM	:	Kadın Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü/ General Directorate of Women's Status
MDG	:	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	:	Mercado Común del Sur/ Southern Common Market
MP	:	Member of Parliament
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organization
NOW	:	New Opportunities for Women
NPE	:	Normative Power Europe
OECD	:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OMC	:	Open Method of Coordination
PHARE	:	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
SEA	:	Single European Act
SHP	:	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti/ Social Democratic People's Party
ŞÖNİM	:	Şiddet Önleme ve İzleme Merkezi/ Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers
TEPAV	:	Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı/ The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
TGNA	:	Turkish General National Assembly
TKB	:	Türk Kadınlar Birliği/ Women's People Union
TUIK	:	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu/ Turkey Statistics Corporation
UK	:	United Kingdom
UN	:	United Nations
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	:	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR	:	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAD	:	United Nations Trade and Development
US	:	United States
USA	:	United States of America
USSR	:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAKAD	:	Van Kadın Derneği/ Van Women Association
VAW	:	Violence against Women
WID	:	Women in Development
YÖK	:	Yükseköğretim Kurumu/ Council of Higher Education

Always looked good on paper,
Sounded good in theory
One, Alanis Morrisette

"All the women of the world, unite!"

INTRODUCTION

> The EU promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable (Manners, 2008a p. 66) … the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state centricity (p. 65).

The European Union is a unique kind of actor in world politics: neither a state nor an international organization but comprised of both because of its supranational and intergovernmental nature. What makes it different from other actors is its use of a catalogue of values and principles that are shaped, shared, and diffused by Europe around the world. By expanding these values beyond Europe, the EU constitutes its self-identification and reflects a particular kind of actorness in international affairs. These performances occur within specific role conceptualization interpretations, such as a 'civilian power' (Duchêne 1972; Telò 2004), 'structural power' (Keukeleire, 2003), 'normative area' (Therborn, 2001), and 'normative power' (Manners, 2002). All these classifications aim to clarify what the EU is, what kind of political actor the EU is, and how we can know this. Among these academic works, Ian Manners (2006c) contends that these approaches and related theoretical studies all include a degree of normativity through the term 'normative', which overlaps with the EU in many ways.

One of the reasons for Manners' argument originated from the EU's political achievements, mostly shaped over the last two decades. Previously, following the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the priority of European states was to rebuild a well-functioning economic structure, which had been destroyed during World War II. After laying the economic foundations for integration on substantial grounds, the EEC gradually changed its outlook towards a deeper union, through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the Copenhagen Summit and its membership criteria in 1993, Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, along with various other documents, directives, and declarations. These treaties, summits, and declarations are noteworthy due to their intensified political dimensions and contribution to the EU's self-representation. More specifically, this new political

identity of European integration accelerated in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, this new European home was designed by male architects while women could only occupy specific rooms.

During the 1990s, in line with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Copenhagen summit of 1993, the EU redefined its political development. The Copenhagen summit and its criteria were designed for the candidate countries wishing to become EU members. The political criteria aligned with the universal values of the Copenhagen summit were primarily intended to harmonize institutional, judicial, and political structures of the candidate states. These values helped these states to re-constitute their domestic laws, prepare for a market economy, and reform their political structures. Diffusing these norms led the EU to develop a value-driven foreign policy and constitute its own identity before 'other' international actors.

Since then, researchers have concentrated on the EU's norm diffusion-oriented foreign policy and identity construction from a different perspective, rather than just limiting itself in debating the EU's economic or military capacity. It is clear that these norms matter for the EU's external relations, especially for enlargement. Hence, researchers have tended to analyse how these norms penetrate and are activated in third countries, and adjusted to candidate states' domestic laws. Another research focus is whether these norms create constant change and sustainability in the candidate country's institutional and legal structure, and whether they are internalized locally and create ideational change in the society. If concrete sustainability and ideational change occurs after norm diffusion, then EU conditions have credibility and the EU has a degree of 'power' that includes a 'normative' character.

Manners (2015) grounds his 'Normative Power Europe' (NPE) argument on normative justification, which is embodied by principles that appear through actions, which have impacts that influence the principles and produce an on-going mutual constitutiveness. Considering this normative justification, he defines 'power' in terms of EU actions and their effects. The first type of power is *puissance*, which is the normative ideal type of power, referring to the EU's potential performance. The second type is *pouvoir*, which

is the normative form of power based on EU's performance in practice. By considering ideational change as the expected effect, Manners locates the NPE argument among other power definitions: "idée force, power over opinion, or ideological power" (Manners, 2002, p.239). These approaches, which are far from state-centric interests, are not only derived from the EU's historical background but also products of the United Nations and the European Charter of Human Rights (Diez, 2005). The EU then integrated them into the Union's identity construction while simultaneously contributing and consolidating to the United Nations Charter's principles.

The EU's gender equality, on the other hand, is also part of these aforementioned universal human rights and equality values. Yet, since the foundation of the European integration project, the gender lens of integration has been neglected in many ways. But in its external relations, the EU exports 'gender equality' as a norm under both the 'equality' principle that envisaged to eliminate all discrimination, and the 'human rights' value that includes women's rights and equal rights for men and women. Indeed, the EU seems to offer a well-designed and significant gender equality regime, as can be clearly seen in the Treaty of Lisbon and its definition of fundamental European values:

> The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Article 2, Treaty of Lisbon[1]).

Although the EU guarantees equality for men and women, creating an equal environment is a complicated and onerous task as it is located within the triangle formed by the welfare state, the neoliberal labour market, and the patriarchal social structure.

The issue of gender (in)equality has existed since the beginning of humanity, when the women's world was organized differently than men's, when women were guided and governed by men. Consequently, an asymmetrical role division developed between woman and man in the public sphere, political life, and in labour market participation,

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[1] More information can be found in
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN

not only in Europe but worldwide. There is no single reason why, when, and in which geography gender inequality, women's subordination, and gender roles first occurred. However, numerous studies have identified when women's movements against these unjust and unequal roles began. They have had significant influence in shaping gender equality universally. They challenge the cultural factors that shape women's status in religious, in political, and economic life; they also confront states' gender regimes, which re-define and re-shape this (in)equality through their laws and policies. Feminist movements have contributed to defining gender equality as a norm in international law. The EU, in particular, has taken this law as a reference in developing and consolidating gender equality institutionally – declaring it to be one of the constitutive values[2] of European integration.

Regarding EU-Turkey relations, gender equality, along with other human rights and equality norms, is undoubtedly contentious. Within the context of NPE argument, an ideational change in gender equality would occur, when Turkey transfers this norm into its domestic law, constitutionalizes it and state socializes it through proper policies. Turkey is expected to comply with these universally-driven human rights norms along with EU's specific principles. Indeed, in the accession process, Turkey implicitly accepted many universal values through reform packages and constitutional amendments, for a specific or more limited period. These norms are considered as touchstones of the EU's 'identity' or 'self'; hence, if any 'other' wants to be a part of this 'self' then it should adopt and practice this identity and socialize these norms.

Within the accession process, gender equality is tackled in the Employment and Social Policy Chapter within the context of equal opportunities for men and women, whereas women's rights are considered within the political criteria. Turkey's situation is complicated because gender equality is pulled between the definition of Turkish women as secular and modern, derived from the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and a conservative and subordinated definition of women, based on Islam and its culture. In

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[2] Ian Manners and many international relations and European Studies scholars view gender equality as a 'value' whereas the feminist literature and norm diffusion analysis have defined gender equality as a 'norm'. Hence, in this study, 'norm' and 'value' are used interchangeably. According to Manners, however, norm is derived from the 'normal' and this study emphasizes 'norm' from this perspective.

addition, regional differences make the case even more complex. As a result, the definitions of 'gender' and 'equality' remain contested in Turkey and among its regions. Nevertheless, international conventions and the EU's value-driven enlargement criteria have led Turkey into a new normative vacuum which forces it to reshape the 'normal' regarding gender equality.

By taking all these processes into account, this study aims to investigate the EU's self-representation as a gender equality norm-promoter and the limits of its norm diffusion. European scholars have many different understandings of 'normative power', so it is worthwhile to re-evaluate whether NPE argument is feasible for every aspect of human rights and in relations with every third party. The EU tries to transform its normative milieu towards greater compliance of universally accepted values. Given this norm diffusion, researchers have interpreted these normative acts in terms of how the EU succeeds or not while diffusing the norms, rather than in terms of what the EU neglects to do. Thus, it is important in revealing what the EU neglects to do in its relations with Turkey and to what extent EU actions demonstrate normative 'power'. This study aims exclusively concentrate on the power of the EU in the enlargement process, not the role of the other actors. It tries to answer crucial questions regarding how Turkey is affected by and reacts to the EU, and where the EU falls short, if at all, in the accession process.

In the enlargement, if there is a concrete normative change or Europeanization in domestic structure in the time process, it is assumed that the EU has an influence in candidate country. Particularly European scholars tackle norm diffusion and socialization within the context of Europeanization, which defines the domestic impact *of* the EU or the domestic impact *on* the EU, both of which based on the top-down and bottom-up processes. Europeanization contains a significant portion of sociological and historical institutionalist theorizing from a euro-centric interpretation and superior construction of history. However, this study abstains from a meso-level Europeanization analysis, because NPE study puts emphasis on the universal-driven norm promoter role and the shortcomings of the EU in external relations, while Europeanization focuses on domestic changes in policy structures and institutions. Both concern domestic adaption, but NPE does not specifically focus on to what extent an institutional adoption is

completed or fits and misfits of the transmitted norm. Hence NPE research needs more macro level analysis by addressing the question how the EU shapes the normality in world politics, and what kind of power the EU has when it diffuses the norms in the external relations. On the other hand, it can also be argued that if there is a Europeanization in the institutional setting and domestic structure of the candidate country, then there is a normative power of the EU in the enlargement.

Methodologically, even though identifying the EU's normative influence is difficult, Manners (2015) suggests specific methods for NPE researchers, such as "causal and constitutive research design; trinity of power including the concept of 'normative justification'; tripartite analysis; comparative case studies; longitudinal interpretation" (p.224). As well as in his NPE argument, he presented norm's diffusion channels for the enlargement process, which are procedural diffusion, transference diffusion and cultural filter. Therefore, to clarify the EU's *pouvoir normatif* in shaping gender equality in Turkey, this study considers suggested methods in norm's procedural and transference diffusions, and in addition tackles cultural filter as a consequence of norm's socialization.

Hence this study addresses the following research question: *Whether the EU a normative power in gender equality in its relations with Turkey? If so, to what extent?*

As Turkey is a candidate country and a subject of EU enlargement, the EU made gender equality a condition for its accession. In this regard, with its very complex nature comprising a secular Republic characterized by Muslim beliefs, Turkey is an interesting case to determine the degree of the EU's normative power regarding a human rights issue. To answer the main research question, this study focuses on several sub-questions:

1) By using which paradigm is the EU's gender equality norm constructed?
2) How does the EU act in gender equality norm diffusion in the enlargement process?
3) How and to what extent is the EU based gender equality norm socialized and internalized in Turkey?
4) Has there been any ideational change in terms of gender equality in Turkey?

In response to these questions, this study mainly argues that normative power prefix for the EU is questionable in terms of gender equality, because an ideational change in equality between men and women needs a process and many boosting and supporting factors. Furthermore, it is not easy to determine the EU's normative power over a candidate country because normative influence and ideational change cannot and should not be evaluated just in terms of the legal changes and reform packages. Rather, a change towards universal 'normal' requires local consent, which occurs through the interplay among the state's central administration, its local institutions, and the strong advocacy of civil society. A normative change may occur when local public institutions adopt the norm and diffuse it at this level, the central administration unreservedly implement the norm through legal changes and policies, and civil society organizations obtain a rights-based character and socialize the norm alongside with state organs.

From a theoretical perspective, this study makes an important contribution to the gender equality issue in Turkey's accession process by using constructivist theory. The existing literature predominantly focuses on the EU's top-down influence in terms of sociological institutionalism or by exclusively considering whether norm diffusion is functioning well in the Turkish legal system. In addition, some scholars use feminist approaches to criticize the EU's neoliberal gender equality norm diffusion whereas others criticize the Turkish state's ideology regarding gender equality. These debates try to explore neglected parts of Turkish state policies. Hence, in Turkey, there is a gap in the literature to identify whether this transmitted gender equality norm is exactly internalized in the EU or not, and whether the candidate country's local context genuinely consents to the transmitted norm. Meanwhile, European academic studies, which question the EU's gender equality norm and criticize it through post-structuralist theories, do not tackle the issue in the context of the EU's role conceptions. They do not broadly account for gender equality from an NPE perspective, with its specific diffusion channels and methodology.

To address this gap, this study draws on constructivism to first focus on the neglected parts of the norm's diffusion, its sustainability, and local people's consent to EU-driven norms in Turkey. Likewise Manners' normative theory, norm's life cycle modelled

constructivist theory both suggest employing the power of ideas and norms at the centre of the EU's external relations debate. Although the EU's international identity and its norm promotion role link with several theoretical debates in international relations (IR), the importance of ideas, norms, and identity concepts in foreign policy analysis deserve more investigation from a constructivist approach. NPE has already been analysed by post-positivists in many ways. However, since the focus here is norm diffusion, this study proposes constructivist theory as the point of departure. While theorizing NPE, most studies have not overtly identified the stages of the process, although phasing is crucial for ascertaining the EU's shortcomings and neglected acts. That is, these absences can reveal where the EU *should* readjust its enlargement policy.

This study adopts a constructivist approach for two reasons. Firstly, Manners suggests a three-stage analysis for normative justification comprising an action-impact-change cycle, which overlaps with and suggests similar processes to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) constructivist norm's three-stage life cycle (norm emergence, norm acceptance/cascade, and norm internalization). Finnemore and Sikkink's categorization of norm diffusion can help this study to detect what the EU does not do and should do. Secondly, Manners' insistence on reflexive monitoring for a more normative Union is defined by a 'should' modality that is similar to Finnemore and Sikkink's counterpart modality 'oughtness' as an advice the for shaping 'normal'. Although Finnemore and Sikkink do not directly suggest shaping the 'normal' in their arguments, both approaches reach the same conclusions.

To explain the argument of this study, the first chapter primarily specify the methodological structure of the study by using Manners' specific research design that he suggested for the NPE researches. Gender equality, as a case study is evaluated within longitudinal analysis and in context of procedural and transference diffusions. Procedural diffusion underlines the content and the conditions of the EU in gender equality, whereas transference diffusion analyses EU's financial assistances in gender equality and their impacts. In the following, the study investigates norm diffusion by drawing on constructivist theory. While there are several interpretations of constructivism, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) constructivist norm's life cycle model

is used here to assess the EU's normative influence. Theory part describes what norm and normativity means in the international system and considers gender equality norm diffusion from a constructivist perspective. By applying the norm's life cycle to NPE research, a three-legged model is suggested to identify the diffusion stages, comprising the norm's acceptance, socialization, and internalization. The life cycle model includes a tipping point between emerging and accepting/socializing the norm. This phasing reveals what the EU achieved, and the attitude of the state in norm socialization. This threshold corresponds to the EU's gender equality norm representation, Turkey's norm acceptance, and the efforts of EU-based advocacy groups and Turkish NGOs, which aim to socialize and internalize the norm in Turkey.

The second chapter conceptualizes Manners' work on normative power, and his critical social theory and normative theory approach to normative justification. It highlights the definition of EU's power and international identity by focusing on its value-based agenda and enlargement process. Lastly, the chapter addresses the NPE argument from several perspectives and in terms of the criticisms of European scholars.

The third chapter answers the first research sub-question, focusing on which paradigms the EU has used to constitute its gender equality norm since its foundation. The chapter first tackles the gender equality norm emergence in the 1990s and the feminist movements' impetus behind it. Then it investigates how the EU's gender equality norm is constructed through relevant EU treaties, documents, and project priorities. It considers whether such EU documents aim to eliminate all inequality between men and women and propose any structural changes. In short, this chapter aims to reveal which paradigms the EU pursues (or not) in its agenda setting.

The fourth chapter analyses gender equality norm construction in Turkey before and during the accession process. This pre and post-accession processes are important to differentiate Turkey's existing gender equality norms from the new transmitted gender equality norm, which is intended to end the status quo. This chapter examines the historical process of case study, and examines resistance against patriarchy within the context of violence against women, female labour market integration, and women's political participation. Firstly, the chapter describes gender equality efforts and the

political, institutional, and legal structure before 1999. It focuses on earlier norm socialization and internalization, and the role of Turkish feminist pressure groups in gender equality norm construction. It adopts historical, social, political, and traditional perspectives to identify gender equality norm construction of Turkey before the EU accession process. Finally, it puts emphasis on EU's conditionality in terms of gender equality before concluding how the EU acts in norm diffusion.

The final chapter provides the case study that includes both procedural and transference diffusion, and assesses the degree of internalization. It discusses the processes in EU-Turkey relations after Turkey's candidate status was declared. This reveals the EU's normative role, if any, regarding gender equality in Turkey after this moment. It concentrates on the EU's gender equality norm's life cycle between 1998 and 2013. It examines the norm's engagement through conditionality through progress reports and specific financial assistance programs. This chapter firstly describes how procedural diffusion was practiced through progress reports and accession partnership documents, and Turkey's commitments and achievements. Secondly, it considers transference diffusion though IPA I and EIDHR financial assistance and reports on the 25 interviewees' views, given that they benefitted from this funding, regarding the gender equality norm's life cycle of. Lastly, the chapter assesses how much the norm was socialized, the degree of local consent, and whether there was ideational change, and the cultural filter's effects on internalization.

CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGICAL & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In his all works, Manners apparently argues that the Normative Power Europe (NPE) concept addresses the ontological foundations of the EU (Manners, 2002) and questions what the EU is. Since the previous ontological stalemates between military power (Bull, 1982) and civilian power (Duchêne, 1972) occupied a considerable place in European studies, Manners suggested placing the identity, legitimacy, and nature of the EU at the centre of the debate, but within a different framework. He therefore abandons state-centric approaches by emphasizing the significance and power of ideas and norms, which the EU implements through its foreign policy to shape the normal. NPE certainly opened a new chapter in European studies at the beginning of the millennium and his approach has been addressed in several theories. Yet, Manners prefers to use critical social theory and normative theory in defining the degree of normativity of the EU.

By referring to critical social theory, he touches upon the change towards the normal. Critical social theory refers to the "interpenetrating body of work which demands and produces critics based on critical engagement with the social world; critical account of the theorists' social and personal conditions; critical re-examination of the theorists' conceptual frameworks; critical confrontation with other works of social explanation" (Manners, 2013, p. 35; Manners, 2015, p. 224). Critical theory analyses the EU by using normative justification in global politics through "mixed or multi-method analysis and longitudinal interpretation" (Whitman, 2011, p. 22). Drawing on critical social theory, Manners describes the EU as a norm promoter of Europeans' multifaceted identities, where the EU "maintains a concern for understanding the social production of knowledge-historicizing and contextualizing subjectivity" (Manners, 2011, p.227), and takes "physical, performative and discursive symbolisms seriously" (2011, p.226). The EU undoubtedly has a *sui generis* identity that needs a different kind of theoretical lens to describe what the EU is because its international identity includes how it is constituted, constructed, and represented in global politics.

Secondly, Manners focuses particularly on *normative theory*, which is derived from the distinction between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. According to communitarianism, communities themselves define the limits between proper conduct and universal moral codes because their own morality arises from the culture that is the basis of that community. It is the community's responsibility to determine which morals are privileged: the community's moral code or the universal moral code. Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, stems from a universal moral standard to which all actors should adhere. If an actor violates the rights of the individual or humanity, then cosmopolitan intervention is needed to restore justice. Hence, there should be a universal moral standard by which every community must abide. In his normative theory analysis, Brown (2011) argues that "the biggest problem is the inability of normative theory to answer … what acting ethically involves" (p. 166). On this point, Manners contends that NPE emphasizes the moral code of cosmopolitan law and acts ethically by including "universal norms at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world" (Manners 2002, p. 241), "although the EU's foreign policy is mostly set by member states (communitarian), the supranational EU (semi-communitarian; semi-cosmopolitan), and cosmopolitical world society" (Whitman, 2011, p. 5), and diffusing these cosmopolitan values makes the EU a unique actor in the world politics. While there is an allowance for state autonomy, states should not be completely self-determining and free from moral obligations to the rest of the international community.

Hence, given the definition of normative theory, all international relations are normative and designed by cosmopolitan law, and there are normative judgements that show us what ought to be done. This encompasses actors with their moral cases, directing them towards the normal, which is an extension of the norm. Unlike the previous literature on the EU's presence in world politics since the 1970s, Manners discusses the EU through normative theory as he contends that normative theorizing fully explains the EU's nature and its role in world politics. Because normative theory refers to how to justify the truth, hence normative power as a form of power called *pouvoir*, emphasizes the EU's ideational practices and their impact on others (non-EU actors), which characterizes an ideal type of actor, called *puissance* (Manners, 2013b).

In his investigation of the normative power of Europe over others, Manners suggests five interwoven methods. *First*, there is a need to identify cause-effect in accordance with mutual-constitutiveness. This means that prior principles are embedded into the EU and actualized in impactful EU actions in its external relations. *Secondly*, he underlines the need for a tripartite power analysis of the EU. Previously, the EU had physical force that influenced conflict areas, then, it developed material incentives through its financial assistance programmes, and lastly, it has a normative justification derived from its diffusion types. *Third*, this normative justification can be evaluated in this tripartite analysis by asking how these principles can lead to actions and create an impact. The answer is that these "principles constitute the EU as an actor, and the way of their promotion is based on the extension of the EU polity" (Manners, 2015, p. 227): the actions that the EU takes in promoting its principles affect its relations with the third party. *Fourth*, normative power analysis needs a case study of external relations actions, whereby the tripartite analysis would make the investigation more fruitful. The *fifth* method is a longitudinal interpretation that tackles a specific case where the EU and the non-EU have negotiated over a specific period.

Drawing on Manners' methodology and the existing literature, rather than cosmopolitanism or normative theory and critical social theory more generally, this study applies constructivist theory, which integrates all of these five interwoven stages. Because constructivism accommodates positivist and post-positivist theories, Manners' cause-effect approach along with mutual constitutiveness can also be analysed with constructivism by asking whether the EU has normative power over gender equality in its enlargement relations. It might be said that as long as the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU continue, constructivist theory seems to best fit norm diffusion analysis because the EU constantly forces Turkey to respond to progress reports that identify what appropriate acts *ought to be* in human rights cases.

1.1. Methodology of the Study

Identifying the normative influence of the Union is thorny, albeit various and multilevel practices are actualized in the norm diffusion. As it appears in the Manners' works, there is a lack in the academic literature to develop a normative theorizing of Europe

beyond the traditional approaches. Hence with the NPE approach, Manners come up with a more comprehensive question and unleashed the presence of the EU from material views and articulate a new dimension to the debate. Although Manners concentrate on the ontology of the Union, he also considers on how and within what content the EU norms are diffused in its external relations.

EU's normative power is characterised by the EU's use of common principles, in which the EU intentionally or unintentionally aim to legitimize 'normal' and create an ideational change in third parties' *status quo*. For instance, Manners indicated that EU's normative power on Turkey can be seen through abolition of death penalty, as Turkey internalized this human rights norm by re-arranging its judicial system. Here, an ideational change occurs when judicial system started to be implemented and state practices related policies, hence the transmitted human rights norm sustains lifelong and taken for granted by the society. Ideational change and sustainability are directly interwoven with internalization. However not every norm is internalized as such a specific and limited time and through bureaucratic legitimacy, but also some other norms need process as well as local's consent, which is also designated as cultural legitimacy, cultural filter and vernacularization in different disciplines, and in this circumstance NPE argument may become questionable and contentious.

In the NPE analysis, Manners (2015) suggests a specific methodology for the international relations researchers, in line with norm diffusion channels to clarify the EU's role in shaping the 'normal' in its external relations. In his methodological approach, he embraces interpretative epistemological assumptions about what constitutes knowledge in the EU's role conceptions. Here, he centres the identity debates, ideations and power of norms in which nature of the Union is based upon, and stresses the importance of the values and norms that are embodied by the foundational treaties, all of which both construct an identity for EU and give normative power role in the foreign relations.

This methodology first put emphasis on 'tripartite analysis' that scrutinizes norm diffusion in conjunction with principles, actions and their impact of the actions. He deepens this approach with 'causal and constitutive research design', and questions

how principles can lead to actions; how these actions may have an impact; and how such impact, if any, re-changes the principles and create a mutual constitutiveness. Apart from this method, he also points out the 'trinity of power' that is based on EU's physical force, material incentives and normative justification in the its foreign policy. In terms of physical force, he infers the use of coercive force by actors, especially the EU, in global politics. By referring material incentives he focusses on the material benefits that are allocated by the EU the third parties. However differ than these two, in the normative justification approach, he involves the EU's capacity of persuasion, moral justification and conferral of prestige in global politics. Normative justification particularly based on the creation of fora for dialogue and EU-driven norm's socialisation by other countries. As a complementary to these methods, he suggests a selection of a specific case or comparative cases driven from the EU's external relations tools: sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. After selecting a case or cases, he also proposes a 'Longitudinal analysis' , which aims to study a case over time in order to understand the effects of change and context. This interpretation of EU actions aims "to produce and reproduce case study, comparative, experimental or cross-sectional studies over longer periods of time in order to better understand the EU in global politics" (Manners, 2015, p. 231)

In the enlargement policy of the EU, norms are presented within the context of conditionality, in which some of the EU-driven norms can easily be transposed to Turkish domestic law by the state authority, where some others need actors constellations and process. By pursuing Manners' method suggestion, this study selects gender equality as a case study, which is a very contested issue across the world, as it broadly aims to eliminate any gender role devoted to men and women. By concerning tripartite analysis and causal and constitutive research design, this study aims to reveal how the EU gender equality norm is constructed and conditioned, and how this conditioned norm is diffused, and how this diffused norm has an impact -if any- in Turkey's existing gender equality and whether this impact mutually constitute EU's and Turkey's gender equality norm.

Gender equality was selected as a case for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of the most challenging aspects of human rights value and equality principle, because gender roles are deeply constructed in and by societies. There is a possibility that a conditioned normative change is would encounter with entrenched governmental and cultural opposition. Secondly, the EU is known as an actor that focuses on gender equality and women's empowerment, not only inside the Union borders and its institutions, but also in its relations with third parties, including candidate countries. Therefore, the gender equality norm is a good testing ground for the degree of the EU's normativity, as the case is contentious issue in every society.

This study first tackles how the EU gender norm is constructed and reconstructed in historical, economic, legal and socio-political contexts in the EU treaties, action plans, strategy papers, Commission reports and project priorities. Study does not include all of the EU official texts (such as development policy reports or documents, or other foreign policy documents), rather concentrates specifically on documents that answers the research question and sub-questions. In the following, it tries to describe how gender equality norm is conceptualized in the enlargement, and by using which paradigm gender equality is framed in progress reports, accession partnership documents, instruments for Pre-Accession (IPA) financial assistance .

Since gender equality is selected as a case study, a longitudinal interpretation of the case study is made by considering EU enlargement documents and financial assistances programme priorities and outcomes. Longitudinal study involves constant and repeated observation of gender equality norm to understand changes in social context and policies over time. Here the observation of gender equality norm diffusion is made by referring procedural (normative justification method) and transference diffusions (material incentives) channels, which are also part of trinity of power method suggestion.

In the 'procedural diffusion', the EU diffuses its internal norm as external to create legal and constitutional changes through conditionality. Through this conditionality, the EU presents its normative justification for the legitimization of transmitted norm. This process occurs through the target state responding to progress reports and accession

partnership documents. In this study, these documents that force the state to fulfil gender equality norm diffusion are analysed since 1998 until the end of 2013. In terms of Political Criteria, gender equality and women empowerment concepts are indicated in two subtitles of the 'Human Rights and Protection of Minority' and Democracy and Rule of Law parts: Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In Economic Criteria, gender equality norm is conditioned within The Capacity to cope with Competitive Pressure and Market Forces within Union and The Existence of a Functioning Market Economy titles. In the Acquis, gender equality is tackled within Chapter 19 Employment and Social Policy and Chapter 23 Judiciary and Fundamental Rights parts. In a similar vein, in the 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008 Accession Partnership Documents, gender equality is conditioned to be implemented in short and medium terms.

The 'transference diffusion', on the other, is based on the immaterial and material assets that the EU spreads through its relations with third parties. In the enlargement, the EU's engagement with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local public institutions is through financial assistances, specifically 'Instruments for Pre-accession' (IPA I and IPA II) and 'European instrument for Democracy and Human Rights' (EIDHR) as transference diffusion is concerned. Here, the longitudinal analysis of gender equality is made by interviewing the beneficiaries of IPA I and EIDHR grants that were allocated between the years 2007 and 2013. Through these financial assistances, the EU directly endorsed local agencies, which are 250 beneficiaries from both public institutions and civil society completing 300 projects. Of these, a representative sample of 10 percent (25 beneficiaries) of EU project coordinators who completed more than one gender equality project were selected as the interviewees. They were selected for interview, considering their EU project experiences, the size of their grant, and regional distribution of the fund.

In the thematic issues the projects that received financial assistance more than others are preferred, but due to some of the beneficiaries' hesitation over giving an interview, other beneficiaries are also considered. In the interviews, semi-structured interview technic was preferred and the questions were formulated to determine the EU's

normative influence, public institutions' attitudes, civil societies' struggles, and the degree of ideational change in terms of gender equality. Open-ended questions were used, requiring lengthier responses than one-word answers. The open-ended method enabled the researcher to learn more about beneficiaries' intention on the EU project applications, the struggles of the beneficiaries, and sustainability of the outcomes. The interviews were conducted between 2015 January to July 2017. Interviews with local agents in Ankara, Mardin, Diyarbakır and Kayseri were done via Skype, four interviews were done in Istanbul via face to face conversations and interviews with the local agents in Hakkari, Erzincan, Hatay, Tokat, Van, Adana, Denizli, Rize, Bayburt, Çorum, Konya, Bingöl, Elazığ and Düzce were done by phone calls.

1.2. Theorizing Norm in International Relations

There is a plethora of studies with regards to norms, which have entered international relations, particularly since 1990s and with the rise of social constructivist approaches to theoretical analysis (Manners, 2002). This new turn has produced new interpretations of the international system through different paradigms. These new paradigms, apart from positivist interpretations, highlight norms and their powerful nature and emphasize the significance of the socialization of the actors. Norms are related with appropriateness and cultural legitimacy of the social community, whose purpose is to "bring about normative change in accordance with the community's normative standards and recruit new members to the community" (Björkdahl, 2012, p. 83). Meanwhile, this social community may also diffuse its norms just to strengthen its presence and to consolidate the coherence of the community (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

A norm can be defined as a "collective understanding of proper and the different norms commanding varying levels of agreement" (Legro, 1997, p. 33; Elgström, 2005, p.29), which is associated with continuity-stability and a variety of strengths. It is a "standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 981) "in a given context" (Finnermore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). According to Eerdewijk and Roggeband (2014), "norms both concern the ideational dimension of

social and political realities and as well as they carry out a quality of appropriateness" (p. 43) that is expounded in the judgments of the society that we live in. That is, actions need to be justified. Björkdahl (2002) claims that norms guide behaviour by providing motivations for action while Finnemore (1996) stresses that norms can be systemic-level variables rather than subjective because of their intersubjective nature. Norms are a subset of collective ideas (Sinkkonen, 2015) as they are based on cognitive commitments and make behavioural claims on individuals. Thus, they have an explicit intersubjective quality because of collective expectations (Katzenstein 1996; Risse *et al*, 1999). Intersubjectivity is used mostly within constructivist vocabulary to refer to shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions for shared social purposes.

Therefore, while explaining the norm concept, we refer to a specific proper standard among a group of people who share an "oughtness" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Björkdahl, 2002), a "goodness", and a "legitimate social purpose" (Payne, 2001, p.38). These features of norms lead us to understand that "both the intersubjective and the evaluative dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 891) – for instance, regarding the constructivist approach, "how political actors produce the intersubjective understandings that undergird norms in major interesting areas" (Payne, 2001, p. 38). Like other collective ideas, norms are created by a society's shared beliefs, define social identity, and reduce uncertainty in social settings, facilitating common solutions and cooperation (Crawford, 2002). In defining norms, there is a "normative perspective that norms are moral prescriptions stressing justice and rights through moral or ethical norms of behaviour" (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 14). Moral norms are both prescriptive and proscriptive, and situated in a judgmental context, which is irreducible to rationality because they represent the "prescriptive quality of oughtness" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Their prescriptive character distinguishes moral from immoral actions, which is also defined in the normative power analysis through normative theory that refers to moral norms' judgmental context for others.

Normativity, in contrast, relates to what ought to be, giving us judgments of what is right and wrong. According to Haukkala (2007), "[n]ormativity is something we can

hardly escape or do without: as social beings' normative assumptions are the equivalent of our biological DNA – it is the very fabric of our existence" (p. 2). It is important not to rule out normative practices as right or wrong, or good or bad because they are operational and not limited to morality. However, if a benign characterized norm aimed to change agency for the sake of oughtness then there is normative influence from one to another. Here, the ethical dimension of normativity means that "moral norms provide the 'code' for what we ought to do and how we ought to behave" (Doyon and Breyer, 2015, p.1). Thus, norms play a role in our life where inappropriateness is acknowledged as unacceptable and generates disapproval.

In international relations, norms are defined as the articulation of an actor's specific identity, and it is expected that the actor *should act* in compliance with this given identity. Therefore, norms deal with actors' behaviours, which are action-oriented and directive while actors are defining their aims. According to Björkdahl (2002), norms give opportunities to actors to legitimize their interests and provide instruments to reach their aims. Actors can demarcate their political actions and draw normative borders for these actions. Thomson (1993) also argues that "the most useful definition of an international norm is *'as normal state practices'* and it is a norm only that as a rule states engage in such practices" (p. 81). That is, norms are specific guidelines for how states *should* and *should not* behave in international society as they are part of the means, and "[c]ertain norms are formalized in written conventions while others are derived from informal agreements" (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 19). For instance, a country's laws are an example of a formal norm whereas traditional mores are informal norms. While mores include a moral component and do not often attract punishment if broken, the violation of a formal norm results in judicial punishment.

By conceptualizing the EU in terms of normative power and referring to the power of ideas and norms, Manners identified a missing dimension in international relations. As he argued, most IR-based definitions bypassed the role of norm, which is the abbreviation for the normal (2002), meaning what should be done. Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink appear to recognize that the prescriptive [moral] quality of norms is good norms; thus, oughtness is identified along with norms relates to the 'normal', likewise

normative power frames the differentiation of 'good' from 'bad'. Framing is crucial here because "construction of cognitive frames is essential component of norm entrepreneurs' political strategies" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 897).

Elgström (2005) defines two types of norms in international relations: rigid and predominant status of norms, in which first the norm importer is expected to both transfer norms into domestic law and implement them. Inevitably, however, there may be compliance problems before, during, and after this process. Sometimes it is hard to criticize these norms because they stand as untouchable. As Elgström notes, if the negotiating partners hold opposing norms, it is difficult to attain a consensus, where "actors cannot be expected to concede on their principles, even when faced with the most convincing and eloquent persuasive argument" (p.30).

International norms are transcended in various ways, but particularly through three main channels: first, international treaties or conventions; second, social justice claims of social movements that advocate and lobby, and that may change ideas; and third the hegemonic ideas or frames in the global community (Finnemore, 1998). Norm exporters diffuse similar behavioural claims to different actors (Finnemore, 1996), and this causes a moral dimension in the society and concentrates on spreading shared perceptions with a demand to reach a common ideal good, which ends with normative change. Norms are supposed to include persuasive messages within their frames because framing the mission with specific messages means the norm entrepreneurs can accomplish the first stage and publicize the norm.

1.3. Norms Diffusion through a Social Constructivist Approach

In the constructivist reading, international organizations are independent actors in global politics that promote international norms which "carry social content and often independent of power distribution" (Checkel, 1999a, p. 84). Constructivists focus on the importance of coherence and mutual agreements around a normative idea because "persuasive messages can be viewed as a social interaction" (Payne, 2001, p. 42). Within this social interaction, ideational issues matter more than material objects. Undoubtedly, local conditions (Chaban *et al*., 2015) or, more specifically, what Acharya

(2004) calls the "domestic context of the importer", and how the community in this local implements the norm become more than an issue. This is a problem because idea and "norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformations" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 894) in that they are expected to create macro-level changes through micro-level practices. It is therefore also important to underline what kind of norms the local is likely to internalize. Hence, this process requires examining the cycle of the transmitted norm to explain how an idea becomes a norm.

Constructivism, in this context, explains international life through social phenomena based on common rules, norms, language, institutions, and principles, whereas "international relations are constructed when people talk, follow the rules and norms, guided by world views or institutions, perform rituals and engage in various social practices" (Locher and Prügl, 2001, p. 114). Norm diffusion means that norms start to be mobilized internationally through the help of norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms, before spreading to particular locations worldwide. Constructivism defines an identity by linking the social and ideational supra-structure of international politics, with actors modifying their behaviour in conjunction with this superstructure. It attaches importance to identity because, through this collective identity formation, actors can easily define who the 'self' and 'other' are.

In constructivism, "human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings" (Risse, 2009, p. 145); instead, they are situated inside a normative environment along with the "mutual constitutiveness of (social) structures and agents" (Adler, 1997, p. 324-325). Constructivism mediates agency and structures and believes they are co-constituted. According to Ruggie (1998), different from the atomistic framing of liberalism and realism's neo-utilitarianism, social constructivism considers a relational social ontology, including ideational factors such as worldviews and ideas. This feature challenges the theoretical grounds and positivist epistemology of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists because, rather than material ontology and state-centric analysis, constructivists propose a social ontology, by referring to the interaction of several actors to define the international system. On the other hand, as Adler (1997) argues, although

constructivism shares a "similar ontological stance and ideational phenomena, such as norms, it challenges the ontological and epistemological foundations of reflectivist perspectives" (p. 323). This middle ground of constructivism makes it an eclectic approach between rationalists and reflectivists.

In the conventional approach of realists, norms, common ideas, principles, and discourses are tools that serve the interests of powerful states to utilize or limit the behaviour of weak states. Similarly, neo-liberalists also argue that states need norms to create cooperation to protect or develop their interests. In contrast, in the constructivist interpretation of the international system: unlike positivists' logic based on being and interest, there is a social being with a collective sense, actualized by individuals and states, and the normative rules that surround them. For instance, constructivism argues that identity is a crucial in a state's decision to become a member of the European Union. The constructivist approach does not deny the importance of interest and power, but "it asks what the interests are and it investigates the ends to which and the means by which power will be used" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 155). There is a social nature, and accordingly a normative understanding, such as common values, expectations, and behaviours among various and dissimilar international actors, because the international system is determined by the international distributed ideas in the international system (Wendt, 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). In this international ideational structure, "[s]hared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what give the world structure, order, and stability" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 894). There is normative evolution and, like other theoretical frameworks in international relations (IR), "much of the macro-theoretical equipment of constructivism is better at explaining stability than change" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 888).

According to Guzzini (2005), the constructivist approach is based on three characteristics: first, it makes an epistemological claim that knowledge is socially and intersubjectively constructed; second, it makes an ontological claim that the world is socially constructed; third, it distinguishes and problematizes the relationship between levels of observation and fact, or, more specifically, it defines the reflexive relation "between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality" (p.

499). At some point, therefore, power is used, which relates to a performative analysis to determine what power does. Reality is socially constructed through an ongoing collective process and, in the case of gender equality norm construction in Turkey, we do not speak about a single actor. However, norms are constructed through the help of state and non-state actors at many levels. It gives the state secondary importance because normative entrepreneurs espouse ethical leadership more than the state's interests and power. In addition, norms expand the "repertoire of theoretical approaches by arguing that states behave with the logic of appropriateness" (Krook and True, 2010, p. 106). The question here is why states prefer to converge in new norm even though their domestic norms are embedded in diverse level dynamics. One answer was given by Krook and True (2010), who argued that such convergence makes states comply because they want to enhance their reputation and present their identity as a modern and open-minded state. The essential motive of constructivism is Kantian philosophy (Wendt, 1999; Rumelili, 2014), which is based on friendship and the internalization and prioritization of humanity and human rights.

On the other hand, as Rumelili (2014) claims, constructivist knowledge does not passively and solely transmit itself to subjects, but it also creates cognitive structures. Hence, truth is a social construct nourished by interactions that are influential in the actor's presence. As Rumelili points out, what others attribute to states by using concepts like power and authority are included within states' behaviour and practices. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim that these external forces shape normal, proper standards as non-state actors and normative entrepreneurs, such as the EU or other international organizations, have a particular influence in making states accountable and obedient to the rules of the moral system.

Identity may change in time of course because civil society maintains the norms and is the norm entrepreneur that always affect transnational and national opinions. Civic organizing in the national level establishes transnational networks and mobilize and socialize national leaders and other country's leaders. On the other hand, norm entrepreneurs can also be leaders who try to increase a norm's validity internationally. In this process, they present the norm both to convince state leaders and to persuade

domestic civil society that this norm would be useful for their country and for the world in general.

1.4. Norm's Life Cycle: Shaping the Oughtness

This section of the chapter discusses the life cycle of a norm in the international context and tries to deepen its meaning. When we are dealing with international politics in a constructivist sense, we should definitely refer to norms as political instruments. This raises a number of questions: What are norms? "Where do norms come from? How do they change the domestic structure" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.888) – or, more basically, d*o norms travel?* In the academy, "norms have been central to the study of politics" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.889) since the 1990s with many researchers attempting to determine the role of norms from a constructivist perspective. International relations studies locate norms within soft power politics to broaden our semantic span in conceptualizing them. By using soft power politics, norm construction may encounter multi-level phenomena, such as norm-breaking behaviours. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask, "how many actors must share an assessment before we can call it a norm" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 892).

This latter question is significant because the idea finds grounds through norm entrepreneurs who look for suitable opportunities to spread this agreed norm. These "norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states, without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). Sometimes this conviction needs time because it is not easy or fast to institutionalize a norm and habituate it in the given society and in its ideational structure. Thus, permeation of any norm occurs through socialization. Sometimes, however, "international norms have to come from somewhere and may not identify feedback effects from local agents and as a result lose sight of large overall shifts in the global normative fabric" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, p. 397-398), although these norms' contents are linked with oughtness.

In this part of the chapter, rather than placing debates on Europeanization, sociological institutionalization, or institutional change at the center, this study concentrates

exclusively on a constructivist life cycle analysis to crystallize the normative and ideational performance of the EU as a norm-exporter and promoter. Accordingly, it illustrates how norms are interpreted theoretically and who these critical masses are that endorse a norm's passing a threshold. These questions need answers to develop the basis of compliance on normativity, norm interpretation, non-conformity and the stance of norm-entrepreneurs, who always advocate for norm change and use international norms as their reference point to strengthen their position.

To scrutinize how international norms are accommodated in place of the domestic structure, Finnemore and Sikkink divide norms into three steps located in a loop that they call the life cycle. These three stages are based on emergence, acceptance, and internalization, all of which are designed to theorize the effect of norms on other actors' behaviours. Using the norm's life cycle formula, this chapter tries to answer several questions: Who defines these standards? How many actors have to agree on something before it becomes a norm? Who is the leader for norm acceptance? Who is the norm entrepreneur for its emergence? Within multi-level moral dimensions, norms are produced, spread, and internalized, with each step "characterized by different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). During norm construction, Payne (2001) stresses the significance of framing the norm through using the right instruments to persuade normative change to a given standard.

In the life cycle model, norms should first emerge in a proper kind of standard. Afterwards, between the first and second phases, there is a threshold that defines success of the norm acceptance and the succeeding moves. Threshold specifies whether to proceed towards change or not. During this first phase cycling of the norm, different social actors may be involved to pressure the state for accepting the new norm. In the following, the new norm becomes a subject of state socialization, which decides whether the society can digest the norm or not, as there is no guarantee that every nation or locality would accept and internalize the norm.

Norm emergence	Norm cascade (Socialization)	Norm's internalization
stage 1	stage 2	stage 3

Tipping point
(Threshold for Norm's Acceptance)

Figure 1: A Norm's Life Cycle

Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998.

As Finnemore and Sikkink showed, once the life cycle of any norm has been completed, it can be asserted that the norm is internalized, bureaucratized, and institutionalized. This means that both the society and its political leaders have accepted and habituated the norm. If the transmitted norm has not explicitly completed its life cycle, then this ill-completed norm will certainly face with non-conformity in its arrival. Therefore, socialization and internalization stages should be justified first in the norm emergence stage, which is depend on the efforts of the norm entrepreneurs who first formed the norm's content.

In Manners' normative power Europe proposition views the EU as a norm entrepreneur that tries to diffuse its human rights norm to third parties (including candidate states). However, this norm should first complete its life cycle within the EU, where it was first accepted, socialized and internalized by member states within its borders. Some other norms have not, officially, emerged at the EU level; yet, as they are universal norms, EU member states individually contribute to and internalize these human rights norms, regardless of EU incentives. Hence, norm emergence was completed at the universal level before being issued by the EU during the acceptance process – which makes the EU a norm entrepreneur. Since then, the internalized human rights norm has become part of EU identity. This is because, at both EU and member state levels, 'benign' universal norms are acknowledged as an essential part of the Union. In Manners' argument, NPE approach "desire to move beyond the debate over state-like actorness through an understanding of the EU's international identity" (Manners, 2002, p. 239),

characterized by universal values. Norm communities like the EU, "consists of actors that share expectations about appropriate behaviour as well as norms that define this understanding of 'appropriateness'" (Björkdahl, 2012, p. 83). Thus, these common principles are expected to be practiced by both EU institutions and member states, given that the norm originated from the EU. In subsequent external relations, these principles are represented within two forms of norm negotiations: text negotiations and implementation negotiations.

1.4.1. Norm Emergence

During norm emergence, moral agents problematize and frame a social, political, or economic unrest that is mostly based on inequality (Elgström, 2005) while asking for public or international authorities to act to change the institutional, legal, and political realm. Thus, norm emergence depends on the effectiveness of norm entrepreneurs, who try to persuade states to accept the norm. This mechanism works within the framework of historical and cultural evolution, social and communicational construction, and political and institutional dynamics. The historical past and social structure of the norm-importer country is critical for norm diffusion. For instance, it is much easier to diffuse some human rights norms in democratic than non-democratic countries.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), one of the major points in the emergence of a norm is to count how many actors share the same understanding and enthusiasm to persuade the critical mass of states to become a norm leader. A group of people, whose motive might be altruism, empathy to the other's deprivation, ideational commitment, or feeling aggrieved, come together to redress some specific grievances. The unifying point of the moral agents is that they share a common humanity and fight for equal welfare for all. Here, it is necessary to have a common voice, although a norm can be based on different levels of agreements. There is also a need to create a platform comprised of civil society and transnational advocacy networks to promote the norm to states, international organizations, local civil society, and other networks. At the end of this step, persuasion passes a tipping point, whereby "an agreement becomes widespread in many empirical cases, and we provide some suggestions about common features of critical mass" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; p. 892-893). After the norm

has emerged within the platform, it transits from covert to overt, esoteric to exoteric, and endemic to epidemic, widening the logic of the norm's oughtness.

Agents struggling to win over states face with challenges in convincing them that the presented norm will pave the way for the normal. The essential point is to ask how the proposed norm is expected to be located in perceptions because "new norms …….emerge in a highly contested normative space that the norms compete with other norms and perception of interest" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; p. 897). It is therefore clear that a new norm takes the place of the prior norm as well as its logic of appropriateness. The consequences of such strife can be punitive, such as ostracism and legal punishment, but at least the message finds grounds to be heard. For instance, in the case of human rights, an agent wanting to diffuse this norm to the third party faces a different human rights regime that was constructed on and embedded in different dynamics in the international system. Therefore the moral agent should pursue the right campaign and endeavour to embed the norm into international law and engage in international politics. Norm emerge is related to socialization, which requires a methodology that can best be driven by norm entrepreneurs and conducted by the state.

Norm entrepreneurs are the key critical actors, they are both norm makers and norm socializers. Through their help, norms are actively constructed in international and domestic scale, hence "domestic norm entrepreneurs use international norms to strengthen their argument" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 893) to incorporate the norm domestically. In norm making, both domestic and international norm entrepreneurs should possess the normative power to persuade others. Entrepreneurs can be individuals, such as scientists who have devoted their lives to social change and are recognized as reliable. In addition, civil society, transnational advocacy networks, international organizations (IOs), individual states or collectives of states, such as the EU, can become norm makers in constructing and promoting norms to perceive these norms ought to be universal. While presenting the norm, they try to persuade, negotiate, and debate to show that implementing this new norm would be more appropriate. As Björkdahl (2012) suggests, norm makers can use "transformative power in the negotiation process that norms are introduced, negotiated and sometimes accepted"

(p.84) because this presentation of the normative ideal may trigger the others. Norms "do not appear out of thin air" (Krook and True, 2010, p. 107) so norm entrepreneurs play a crucial role by "having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in the community" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 896). They are supposed to represent, spread, and socialize the norm, even if the norm is fragile in their social environment.

Although socialization certainly does not occur only through the performance of norm entrepreneurs, they call for attention through the agreement among state leaders, the government, or international institutions to legitimize the norm, because legitimacy involves the social ferment and coalescence of the norm from the international through national to local level. According to Björkdahl (2007b), norm entrepreneurs operate in three steps.

> First, the norm entrepreneur selects a morally convincing idea as a foundation for its foreign policy and norm-building exercise. Second, the norm entrepreneur then uses norm advocacy, which is a combination of diplomacy, communication and coalition-building to persuade other states to embrace the norms. Once strong support is achieved, the process gains momentum and operates to alter the convictions of reluctant states. Third, the norm entrepreneur strives to find an organizational home for the newly established norm in order for it to become self-sustaining (p. 540)

These norm entrepreneurs are in the driver's seat, struggling to shape perceptions and proposing "a multi-level of understanding of those factors and how they may affect the reception of normative messages sent by the norm promoter" (Chaban *et al*., 2015, p. 57). They have strong "notions of a desirable behaviour and actively promote this moral prescriptive" (Elgström, 2005, p. 31), and play a major role in presenting and framing the norm through specific language and effective interpretation of the norm for public understanding. They create some specific activism because the aim is to attract the society's attention regarding this newly emerged norm. For instance, Greenpeace activists have chained themselves in the street or in stadiums before a soccer match to create awareness on environmental issues.

Ethan Nadelman (1990) defined norm entrepreneurs as "transnational moral entrepreneurs" who engage in 'moral proselytism'; in the legal theoretical terrain, Lessig (1995) described them as 'meaning managers' or 'meaning architects', in which

they are full of social and moral meanings in their contents. They are responsible for constructing the cognitive framing (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), which is one of the central devices of successful persuasion. Framing a problem means there is a need to align the core instruments for prompting others towards a common interest and to propose solutions. According to Payne (2001), after framing the problem with a clear solution, persuasion is critical while building and then spreading the norm because "[g]reat attention has been directed at communication, especially at persuasive messages, which attempt to change actor preferences and to challenge current or create new collective meaning" (p. 38).

Norm entrepreneurs bring the norm onto the agenda and form it on an organizational platform, which is a highly contested normative space during e norm discussions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Eventually, new norms are promoted through these discussions. The organizational platform is also beneficial for information access and the media because these platforms are composed of several local, national, and international NGOs, and transnational advocacy groups with specific agendas. After reaching agreement, they promulgate their stance regarding the norm. NGO experts are professionals who have experience of many studies and are responsible for presenting the norm to bureaucrats to promote a change. However, it is not certain whether bureaucrats or the state leader really want to accept the normative change. For instance, the norm entrepreneurs and the organizational platform could be well-equipped and endorse normativity, yet the states leaders may not be willing to deal with this kind of change or tend to filter the norm to quantify its costs and benefits. Hence, it is important for both sides to be like-minded to ease dialogue and increase authenticity.

At the end of the tipping point, a critical mass of states has ratified and implemented treaties on the norm and have agreed to become norm leaders – yet there is still a limbo. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that "states are not equal when it comes to normative weight" (p. 901) so that crossing the tipping point does not imply passing the next stage. Tipping a norm matters because it is important whether the state is critical and eager for change. On the other hand, a state is critical because of its international moral status, which influences its presence; however, it is also possible that states may

role play to convince the other side. The concept of role playing means that an "enlarged understanding of the actors' behaviour is both influenced by self-conscious game playing as well as ritualistic following of social norms" (Saurugger, 2010, p.489). Reluctance, on the other hand, may occur but not always and against all norms, just depending on the subject. Many scholars rule out the significance of the "contested space within and among the norms and how it might result in the fluidity or evolution of norms" (Krook and True, 2010, p. 107).

1.4.2. Norm Cascade

So far, norms have been imported by state leaders who have signed the agreements, but there is a need for an agency to foster the norms' adoption in society because "little normative change occurs without significant domestic movements supporting such change" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). In the stage between the norm's emergence and norm's cascade, norm entrepreneurs or organizational platforms try to influence states to accept the norms. This stage is very comprehensive and can be actualized in various ways. The question here is why the state leader agrees to adapt and socialize this norm as part of its identity. One answer examined by Sjursen (2002) and Björkdahl (2012) is that members of a norm community or prospective members wish to create a kind of kinship or belonging to a specific community. By adapting these norms, members of the norm community demonstrate their belonging to a common identity and a readiness for convergence. Therefore, norm socialization is a mechanism whereby new states are induced to change their behaviour to become part of an international society of states. For instance, in Turkey-EU relations, Turkey passed harmonization packages and made constitutional amendments to become a member of the EU. However, states are not the only agents because there are also or sometimes only social movements, civil society actors, and their networks with transnational advocacy, and international organizations "socialize the norms by pressuring states to adopt policies and laws, and to ratify treaties" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 902).

Norm entrepreneurs first try to persuade the state leader to accept a specific issue, for instance by signing and ratifying an international agreement. This mostly happens after

the norm emergence process. Secondly, it is expected that state leaders and other domestic agencies try to socialize the norm within their country. Socialization reveals itself at judicial, institutional, and cultural levels. For instance, institutional change may include constitutional amendments, re-arrangements in regulations, or educational curricula, changes in or the establishment of government agencies, embedding the norm in the religious or other cultural institutions. To socialize this norm, these institutional re-arrangements should work and be seen as effective, which means that media organs are another significant socialization instrument.

This phase has a tipping point and with different dynamics, such as states, international organizations, and advocacy groups, whose main motivations are legitimacy and reputation. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that "a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades" (p. 895). The norm cascade only happens after a country's citizens understand the norms because states cannot adhere to norms without taking the support of their society. However, that does not mean that local impulsively has internalized the norm.

At the tipping point, international norms become global standards of appropriate behaviour, which is why a growing number of states subscribe to them. For instance, states sign and ratify treaties, which is evidence of a tipping point; and "once the tipping point reached, international norms tend to exert constitutive efforts on the states in a sense it becomes the 'normal' to sign and ratify the treaties" (Risse, 2007, p. 136). Cass Sunstein (1996) called this stage the 'norm cascade' to express how completing the norm's first cycle represents a significant test. Here, Sunstein (1996) underlined the role of norm entrepreneurs, giving credit for their efforts in the tipping point stage, as the group of people who are interested in changing social norms. Once they complete the acceptance stage, the norm acts in concert that aims to declare and clarify what the norm is. However, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, not all norms reach the second stage because it is challenging to achieve a critical mass of state acceptance. Clearly, any absence of norm's life cycle would cause confusion. Therefore, it is important to frame the norm accurately since emergence plays a significant role in easing socialization.

After the norm emerges and passes the threshold by achieving a critical mass, it is legitimized by international law. Here, the crucial part is to broaden the norm and underline its importance.

The cascade requires socialization in which the norm leaders (states) try to persuade other states to adhere to the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) argue that, after accepting the norm and passing the tipping point, states are expected to socialize the norm and follow international and domestic norm entrepreneurs, because they are motivated to be a member of a collective identity, acquire a reputation, while also facing legitimization and social or /peer pressure. State leaders' enthusiasm, through their utterances and operationalization, is essential as much as the efforts of norm entrepreneurs. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, "enough states and enough critical mass states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behaviour for the identity called 'state' or some relevant subset of states – such as a 'liberal' state or a European state" (p. 902). They take for granted that, once a certain norm has won in a contested environment and passes the tipping point then there is a chance for it to be internalized. However, this new norm needs concrete state socialization along with mutual domestic actors because signing a human rights convention – passing the tipping point – does not mean that socialization will definitely be done by the state. States may not implement what was signed in the document but may sign it merely not to be named and shamed by other states. Hence, this study underlines that socialization needs another tipping mechanism that includes monitoring of the state's norm implementation and performance.

Another form of diffusion can be made by scientists, who can increase the norm's credibility by proving the need for this normative change (Elgström, 2005). Nevertheless, legitimacy plays a central role in the norm's legal survival and is supported by certain policies. When states slow down the norm cascade, international socialization groups pressure the actors to adopt or legitimize it. States, along with international organizations and local institutions, and civil society socialize the norm to pace off internalization stage. That is why states are expected to ratify treaties monitored by international networks to check whether they comply with international

standards. Their dominant mechanism is socialization, institutionalization, and demonstration. They are also motivated by legitimacy, reputation, and esteem because their political identity in the international system is important and directly related to their recognition.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), and Katzenstein (1996), similar state identities are constructed on similar norms, which shapes similar behaviour. Peer pressure operates here to avoid exclusion, so "states comply with norms to demonstrate that they have adapted to the social environment they belong to" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). In one respect, the state is defined by its cultural-institutional context, particularly social categories like religion, language, customs, and others. This cultural 'shareholderness' among states may create a common understanding of norms, while the tipping part means to convince a certain number of states or agents to implement the norms that define a collective identity and belonging. The tipping point includes material and normative factors while socialization pressure from peers induces states to incline towards cultural shifts in their society, particularly in the local. In EU-Turkey relations, for example, the tipping point is meeting the Copenhagen criteria and responding to the comments in EU Progress Reports and Accession Partnership Documents. According to Harrison (2004), this normative shift includes self-reflexivity, which "is associated with a permissive space within which actors may voluntarily engage in cultural change and ….suggests a view of the critical turning point of a moment of deliberation" (p. 528). This enable states to criticize their ex-identity. This persuasion for new norm also creates ideational change.

Through cascading a norm, states fulfil "a psychological need to be a part of a group and they gain esteem because they want others to think well of them and themselves" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). However, it is also important to remember that the existing political institutions that the citizens are accustomed to can be preferred to new alternatives. For instance, Sikkink (1998) stressed that, although the norms have emerged and passed the tipping point, there is still a need for clear explanations as to why particular norms become influential and accepted whereas others do not. It might be argued that both the citizens' attitudes regarding the new norm and their consent, and

the government's domestic legitimization are crucial. Conformity and being a part of a group-or self may not always motivate states when their domestic politics satisfy them more than diffusing a transmitted norm and losing reputation. There might also be a relative perception regarding the norm that the states are supposed to cascade. For instance, a state may not consider what other states think about its national esteem because its cultural and institutional structure incompatible with the new norm although it shows conformity with other norms. Therefore, it can be argued that between cascade and internalization there is another threshold that many states should pass when there is a contradiction between discourse and action.

Krook and True (2010) showed that this distinction between discourse and action is over-classified when the contents of the norms are stable and written in the documents. They do not have a commitment to cling to written documents; rather, they have a vague dimension. However, norms continue to evolve after emerging and, during norm actualization, like adaption and implementation, they face various dynamics that may fit into very different contexts. Krook and True clarify this with a discursive method, as they argue that norms are anchored in language, used in the repeated speeches, and become an attitude. According to them, norms evolve over time, which is related with language shaped by competing meanings and external normative environments.

For the cascade process, both the difference between written document norm and norm actualization and the content of the transmitted norm are noteworthy. If the transmitted norm is emphasized with a particular content with specific dimension, then it would be a mistake to expect norm diffusion with multi-dimensional content. During norm socialization, norm advocates, who press for normative change, may face a highly contested platform because the "decision makers are exposed to several and often contradictory policy concepts" (Risse-Kappen, 1994, p. 187; Payne, 2001, p. 38). The situation may be slightly more advantageous if the norm importer leans towards a normative framework because of ideational affinity (Payne, 2001), which means a demand for normative change. For instance, regarding Scandinavian countries' EU membership, internalizing an EU-based gender equality norm was not a big challenge as they were already implementing more exhaustive gender equality policies than the EU.

Generally, norm cascade has two main stages: the first is to transform the approved norm into legal texts and gain acceptance from the state; the second is to implement it properly through concrete policies and to convince the society from the national to the local. In convincing society, the state is the norm leader, although there is also a need for an actor constellation. Text presentation involves negotiations on norms that have to be defined and interpreted by exact wording. Otherwise, according to Elgström (2005), norm opponents can influence the impact of the norm by promoting "vague definitions and fuzzy language, limited application areas, numerous exceptions and long transitions periods" (p. 34). Legro (1997) also stressed that the specific trait of the norm should be presented clearly to ensure its robustness. According to him, well-understood guidelines and legal documents prevent poor operationalization of the norm because significant details reveal whether the contracting parties have differing perceptions or interpretations of the norm. Another possible consequence would be that the norm advocates might separate and interpret the norm differently from each other. Thus, the content and the language of the norms should be very clear and specific.

1.4.3. Norm Internalization

The stages so far are the most challenging because norms are promoted by experts who aim to spread a specific normative idea, which are socialized through the help of state leaders. In the final stage, norms become taken for granted by the citizens, where internalization seems more comfortable and based on conformity. Public debates no longer take place concerning such norms. For instance, suffragette is not a problem anymore. According to Checkel (2005), this stage is the ultimate aim of socialization. The expected result is that different actors perform the same behaviours in some cases. Some states find it hard to move onto the internalization stage; hence, they might need another tipping point between cascade and internalization, where they work in accordance with local actors, such as civil society organizations. Socialization and the resulting ideational change may emerge more easily if there is coherence among public institutions, civil society organizations, and informal initiatives in the local, and if the state adopts complementary policies and legal changes with these groups. In the

internalization stage, there is loyalty for the norm, which makes it unquestionable and no longer interrogated.

The reactions and attitudes of the local towards this new norm is more critical than it seems because the local may totally reject the norm or interpret it differently. In sociological-institutionalist or Europeanization studies, this stage is sometimes described as norm localization, whereby international and local norms are expected to be in harmony. Here, the local actors' perceptions and performance determine localization. However, in the constructivism, internalization is the final stage. Before this stage, state leaders play significant roles to persuade citizens and socialize the new norm, "if the new norms are compatible with existing ideational elements in a local society" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 908; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 204–5). Norm importers often requires "adjustment of the norms to fit with the local normative context" (Björkdahl, 2012, p. 83) because the local has its own culture and normative structure.

Actors and their efforts are very complementary because the state in the cascade stage is supposed to complete the necessary reforms related to the norm and help internalize it. If socialization has been completed successfully in the norm cascade stage, then internalization is very easy. However, according to Merry (2009), from a human right anthropological view, there is another threshold before internalization called cultural legitimacy, in which the local or domestic norm becomes deeply entrenched with its own vernacular. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) called this "domestic legitimation which is important because it promotes compliance with government rules and laws; ruling by force alone is almost impossible" (p.903). Therefore, international legitimation of any norm needs moral justification for a government's domestic basis of legitimation and the local's consent. Amitav Acharya (2004) also points out that the existing literature on norm diffusion and "moral cosmopolitanism view norm diffusion as teaching by transnational agents, thereby downplaying the agency role of local actors" (p. 242). However, local actors' consent and voluntarily acts to spread the norm to the local people is very important in completing the cycle of norm diffusion. Here, as Katsumata

(2011) mentioned, "local actors may voluntarily adopt external norms for the sake of legitimacy, even if the new norms compete with existing ones" (p. 576).

During internalization, including small geographies, the key factors are bureaucracy, law, and the professions; the motive is conformity, and moral justification to become a habit. Certainly, states and non-state actors acted together in the previous stage and tried to get their preferred meaning collectively accepted from the national to local level. This means that norms are contextual and embedded in ideas, interests, and culture. Hence, internationally emerging norms become part of the social fabric and facts of this (norm-importer) society. During internalization, there is no need to question whether this transmitted norm is benign or malign.

In order to evaluate how the norm is internalized by the norm importer, there is a need to consider its effect on state behaviour and how the state operationalizes it (Legro, 1997). Thus, the performance of the state in the norm cascade is very significant; in other words, how successfully the political elites perform their norm leader role is critical. In some cases, governments, which Risse *et al* (1999) designate as norm-violating governments, are either unable or prefer not to transform the norm as verbalized in the norm diffuser's language, whether in the legalization or implementation stage, in. In this context, norm advocates or proponents should intervene. There are two kinds of operative groups in the norm importer country: norm opponents and norm advocates.

When a norm is approved by the state, it means it is politically accepted while internalization means to implement the norm appropriately to the country's conditions. Norm advocates play, or are supposed to play, a crucial role in this process. Besides, when a norm neither matches some specific cases nor uses straightforward language, the norm opponents appear "to justify violations in the fuzzy language of norm prescriptions" (Elgström, 2005, p. 34). During norm diffusion, especially if the norm concerns a weighty issue (Risse *et al*, 1999), such as human rights, there should be a strong advocacy network. The never-ending duty of this network also supports the internalization stage. These networks are expected to serve three purposes that constitute the necessary conditions for change;

firstly, norm promoters put norm-violating states onto the international agenda to raise their awareness about moral consciousness. Secondly, they empower, mobilize, and legitimize the claims of those domestic groups that oppose norm-violating governments. Thirdly, they challenge norm-violating governments by creating transnational pressure because the more pressures that can be sustained, the fewer options are available to political rulers to continue repression (Risse, 2016, p. 120).

Elgström (2005) suggested two types of resistance during implementation. First, the cultural context of the norm importer country and its political correctness may clash with the norm exporter's new norm. The second is bureaucratic and cultural engagement, in which the norm clashes with the dominant norm structure of the country's bureaucracy. Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) also touched on the role of the bureaucracy, in that "bureaucrats in these organizations helps or blocks the promotion of new norms within standing organizations" (p. 899). During norm negotiation, according to Elgström (2005), "both because of moral reasons and the domestic consequences of giving highly cherished values, norm negotiations with the norm-receiver country acquire all-or-nothing character" (p. 30). On the other hand, depending on the content of the issue, the norm diffuser actor might also not concede on its principles. Both legalization, which involves a text negotiation, and implementation are interwoven in norm diffusion.

The new norm must find a basis to become habituated. Through laws and policies, the trainees of the professionals gradually create trust and familiarity with the norm. Trust from within changes both identity and empathy, which are both the engines of integration (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Domestic receptiveness for the new norm is necessary for its international legitimization. Legitimization is related to motivation for normative change and state endorsement. However, the state may also manipulate the norm to bolster its own reputation. For instance, when a candidate state internalizes any EU norms, it is more likely to be considered European and Western in the international system. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) particularly emphasize the importance of adjacency, whereby linkage between the settled and transmitted norms "must be actively constructed by proponents of the new norm" (p. 908).

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE: SHAPING THE NORMAL

Since the inception of European integration, numerous academic and political debates have been conducted to answer the vital question of what kind of power or global actor the EU is. This question is derived from an ontological analysis of the EU in the international system because as Manners argued it is

> [f]irst, the EU is a hybrid polity reflecting the contrasting demands of national, supranational and transnational actors and processes. Second, the EU is not just one actor and must be disaggregated into competing institutions, councils, directorates, states and parties. Third, the EU is not the only actor in the European and global political environments − it competes with a multitude of other global, regional, state and transnational actors. Finally, the EU is itself constituted through its actions and the structures it contributes to − it is neither pre-political nor apolitical (Manners, 2015, p. 221).

The crowded literature on European studies addresses several role conceptions that the EU has taken on such as whether it is a civilian, transformative or normative power, or something else. By focusing on the normative power articulation of the EU, Ian Manners − more than a decade ago − displaced the state and material factors (including economic incentives) from these conceptualization debates and accommodated the non-material benefits of international relations. He engaged norms, the ability to shape the normal, normative theory and critical social theory to offer a new viewpoint for EU ontological research. In the following years, wider debates on "international and comparative engagement with the notion of normative power" (Manners, 2013a, p. 305) developed across and beyond Europe. Both proponents and opponents engaged with and criticized the concept through their case studies, with both sides contributing to the debate from their distinctive perspectives.

In addition, beyond these theoretical debates, EU officials have verbalized particularly normative power and civilian power conceptions. First, at the fiftieth anniversary of European integration in 2000, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi mentioned Duchêne's (1972) civilian power adjective to underline how the last 50 years had passed in peace, solidarity and prosperity. In this speech, he stressed the importance of achieving strategic security through building sustainable global development on a civilian basis. Similarly, five years later, in his EU-UN Partnership in Action speech in 2005 High Representative Javier Solana also dwelt on the importance of shaping effective foreign policy, which is based on a responsibility to work for global common goods. These goods involve having a benign identity through the promotion of universal values and principles, which are the frames of the EU. Lastly, "[i]n an interview in 2007, the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso" (Bickerton, 2011, p. 28), he also expressed the EU's normative power as it sets the standards not only for Europe but also beyond Europe.

The task of conceptualizing the EU's role in foreign policy first started in the 1970s, when the EC established an intergovernmental European Political Cooperation to coordinate member states' external relations. Although it was not warmly welcomed by member states, the resulting weakly unified foreign policy had certain effects on economic aid and sanctions for third countries. François Duchêne (1972) designated these actions as 'civilian power Europe' , later became deeply entrenched as the EU's motto in its external relations. Duchêne's designation of a 'civilian power Europe' (CPE) has a significant place in describing the EC's role in world affairs during the 1970s and 1980s. According to him, the EC's use of civil instruments like treaties and conventions, and economic agreements in its external relations led to a civilian power role being attributed to the EC. This power was likely to influence opinions of the others as the EU conducted external relations with third parties.

However, at the end of the Cold War, the EC suddenly faced a new level of challenge on the European continent that needed to be addressed due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Immediately after this, the world witnessed revolutions in Eastern and Central

European countries struggling to regain their national sovereignty. Subsequently, civil war broke out unexpectedly in Yugoslavia. Although the signing of the Treaty on the European Union in 1992 was a precursor of the most coherent image of the EC in line with changes in its foreign policy, the EC's civilian role and its power instruments were unable to reduce the violence at the centre of Europe. Starting with the EC Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), EC member states intended to gather under the umbrella of common policies over issues including trade, humanitarian aid, sanctions and peacekeeping. As member states hesitated to give up their security and defence policies to the EU, "human rights driven issues have become the core reference for security policy, supplementing the principle of territorial sovereignty" (Sjursen, 2006a, p. 176).

Before the Soviet Union's collapse, EC's external relations were governed by agreements led by the Commission under three categories: "agreements that maintain special links between certain member states and non-member states" (Whitman, 1998, p. 167) concerning their historical ties (relations with ex-colonial countries); agreements for membership, such as countries in the enlargement process (e.g. Turkey-EU relations); and agreements concerning specific economic cooperation with other regional integrations, such Mercosur-EU relations. In addition, the EU has developed specific relations with North America and Far East countries. The EU has tried to have a normative influence on these countries by making its relations conditional on rule of law, human rights and democratic values, both directly through procedural relations and indirectly by financial assistance.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union paved the way for new borders, new neighbours and potential member states for a unified Western Europe. Considering these potential enlargements and the political image of integration, the EC agreed a set of rules, called the Copenhagen Criteria, at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit. These defined whether a country was eligible to join the EC. In addition, they officially demonstrated for the first time that the EC's self-representation was not just limited to the economic realm, but that is also had a political and value-based character. The criteria had three dimensions: the economic criteria (states must have a functioning

market economy and be competitive with third countries), the political criteria (candidate states must have institutions preserving democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law), and the adoption of the *Acquis* (states must accept the EU law, its obligations and legal procedures such as treaty resolutions). Thus, the negotiations and EC accession process entail the socialization of candidate countries into the values and norms of the EC. Before the process begins, the EC and candidates sign Association Agreements that "involve reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures" (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art. 238). In line with such agreements, candidate states are financially funded to improve their economic structure. For instance, through the Instruments for Pre-Assistance (IPA) program, Commission-funded projects are implemented by candidate states to reconstruct their infrastructure and fulfil their normative commitments.

Meanwhile, the EU implemented its foreign policy on respecting universal principles and diffusing European values, not just regarding enlargement, but also including development policy, external trade relations, neighbourhood policy and relations with the countries outside the EU's neighbourhood. In these external relationships, the EC refers to cosmopolitan law based on norms. Regarding the 2000s and beyond, Ian Manners consistently focuses on the role of these norms and the EU's normative power over third parties and its ability to shape the normal. While he refers to the critical social theory and reflexivity of his 'normative power' argument, he particularly stresses the importance of the normative theory and cosmopolitanism embedded into the EU's external relations. Normative theory remained in the shadow of the positivist paradigm until the 1990s because the realist approach was, and still is, one of the dominant reference points of scholars when discussing international phenomena. Besides, its contest with cultural relativism also left normative theory somewhat behind mainstream approaches. Although societies need common ground to solve universal problems (Geertz, 1993), their approaches to various problems and their constructed norms can hardly be taken together.

The aim of the EU is indeed to morally influence third states to encourage major changes in their norms and behaviour (Finnemore, 1996). Moral persuasion becomes

apparent while spreading norms, hence the EU causes changes in preferences and interests in this way. As a moral entrepreneur in its foreign policy relations, the EU tries to convince decision-makers of third countries that moral superiority is for their own interest. State leaders (decision-makers) may then calculate their benefits considering ends and means. During this norm cascade (the exact tipping point moment), actors may either experience ideational change and try to socialize their country into the new norm or reject the moral superiority. Before assessing where this normative power role conception comes from, the following section considers some of the EU's actions and related conceptualizations in advance. Therefore, it is important to investigate the origin of the definition of global common good, which assumes that the EU is an ideal model in world politics.

2.1. The EU's International Identity in World Politics

Since the 16th century, the capitalist economy has had a cyclical rhythm in the world system. After Europe was devastated after the second world war, it regenerated itself by maximizing the Western European states' interest under the European Integration framework. The EU later started to compete with hegemonic powers such as Japan and the US through single market initiatives and by developing high technology. The essential stance concerning the EU's international identity mostly touches on economic re-structuring (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) and the global power of its economic capacity. The European Union (EU) has become a distinctive and *sui generis* polity that tries to develop a whole range of progress to influence others, both inside and outside its geographical sphere.

The EU "constructs an identity of the 'new', i.e. 'post-World Europe', as one in which peace and respect for human rights prevail over the use of force and pure power politics" (Diez, 2005, p. 634). It also means that this new Europe is a peaceful community "whose primary 'other' is its own, war-torn past…. where the self becomes is the unquestioned model for geographical others" (Diez, 2005, p. 634). On the other hand, the self-representation of the new Europe with its union model involves the "externalization of a preceding internal agreement on the EC/EU values and aims, and a

performative act which eventually contributes to shaping the collective understandings of the EU's identity and role, both processes in the making" (Lucarelli, 2006, p. 51).

According to Petó and Manners (2006), "[t]he EU's identity is based on universal human values in order to overcome the difficulties of diversity found in differing national traditions and lack of a common 'European' cultural tradition" (p.97). Diffusing these values makes the EU a unique actor, although these values are shared by many other international actors. The EU is different in its interpretation of such values. As Lucarelli (2006) underlines, these values make the EU distinct because the translation of a value is used as a guiding principle while the hierarchical order among values in different political communities and the interpretations of these values makes the EU diverge from other actors.

From a Realist perspective (Gordon, 1998; Kagan, 2002), the EU seems to be a weaker entity whereas the USA has the ability to solve international disputes by using military force, and it appears unable to produce common action and applies a variety of methods in specific ways to solve problems. Its pacifism is not a choice but stems from a lack of military resources to become a military power. Kagan (2002) severely criticizes the EU's ineffective security and defence policy because he believes that USA tends to be an active power in a Hobbesian anarchic order in which international law and procedures are invalid. According to him, true security and defence based on the use of military capacity so the EU is seen as unable to implement a coherent and powerful foreign policy, although it tries to foster trade and aid policies in foreign policy through aid and trade contracts, which are conditional upon consolidating democratic and human rights standards. He argues that the EU, as a 'non-power', seems to promote its external relations through "inner characteristics . . . primarily: civilian ends and means" (Diez, 2005, p. 619), social values of equality, collective action, tolerance and justice. He suggests that this Kantian Europe is embedded in peace by necessity rather than choice because, if there were an opportunity to establish well-functioning regional level military integration, "one would expect the EU to pursue a different approach" (Sjursen, 2006c, p. 237).

Complementary to Kagan, Gordon (1998) also argues that the EU is weak and fragmented in foreign policy and will continue to be a subordinate partner of US foreign policy, which makes it a minor actor. However, Sjursen (2006c) asserts that, "even with the military capabilities at its disposal, the EU tends to favour civilian instruments" (p. 238). On this point, Howorth (2010) claims that "military power alone has very little utility when it comes to solving complex socio-political problems" (p. 459), as seen from the Iraq War. Here, Manners (2002) insists that military capabilities and normative influence should be kept separate because "the EU's ability to shape conceptions of *normal* in international affairs needs to be given much greater attention" (p.239).

2.1.1. The Civilian Power Myth

The Civilian Power approach, as suggested by François Duchêne in 1972, is based on and refers to to the EC's economic resources, world production and world trade, which means an actor employs non-military means for its interest. The civilian power conceptualization makes the EC superior over some other actors in world politics because its "strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stability through economic and political means" (Whitman, 2011, p. 4) rather than coercive physical force. By arguing that the EC is a civilian power, Duchêne bases his argument on two reasons. One was the position of the newly emerging Europe among the great powers in the Cold War and the second was the attitude of urban people and concomitant civilian ends and means. Regarding the former assertion, he argued more extensively that, in the Cold War bipolar era, the Soviet Union and the USA were competing powers showing off their military might. Western Europe, as the European Community, explicitly lacked a united military capacity so its "ability to pursue politico-military policies is severely circumscribed by its lack of nuclear or indeed of major conventional military power" (Duchêne, 1973, p. 9). In addition to its lack of nuclear weapons and superpower enthusiasm, the EC "has given much more scope to the civilian forms and influence and action" (Duchêne, 1973, p. 19), especially by means of economic scale. His second assertion regarding the EU's civilian basis concerned the preference of urban citizens, who possess rights and try to "secure for democratic and civil standards of the suburbs over those of the armed camp and the balance of power" (p. 19, 20).

> A primarily civilian power on the scale of a Western Europe, accounting for a fifth of world production and nearly a third of world trade, could play a very important and constructive role […] endowed with resources and free of a load of military power which could give it great influence in a world where […] interdependence seem[s] to be growing at a rapid rate (Duchêne, 1972, p. 43).

Therefore, according to him, considering the "international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards" (Duchêne, 1973, p. 20) on the one hand, and the economic presence of the European Community in the 1970s, on the other, the civilian power of Europe's role conception was a much more significant adjective for the EC's stance in global politics than attributing military responsibility. Here, Hedley Bull (1982) argued that "the power of influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control" (p.151). The EC's strengths in world politics stemmed from strong economy, international trade potential and its relations with ex-colonial countries and developing countries. The civilian power myth, which occurred in relation to the 1970s, refers to the economic interdependence and European imperatives, in which both offer "a well-established image of Europe as a civilian power, exercising influence by commerce and diplomacy, not traditional military strength" (Manners, 2010, p. 74).

Ian Manners argues that in civilian power Europe, articulation seems to have a neo-colonial nature within it in that it implies that the EC should civilize the rest of the world. This power characterization can be described along three main dimensions: "diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems' with multilateralism; 'centrality of economic power with non-military character; and legally-binding supranational institutions' with international law" (Manners, 2002, pp. 236–7). The civilian power role conception refers to the 'long on economic power' or non-military but primarily "economic resources, objectives and strategies" (Manners, 2006b, p. 176) of integration. It seems at first that there is no concrete difference between the civilian and normative when considering how the EU tries to civilize others. However, Manners rejects this similarity completely and asserts that the "normative power term is an

attempt to escape civilizing missions by countering the neo-colonial discourses of claims implicit (or explicit) in civilian power" (2006b, p. 175). According to him, civilian power mostly emphasizes material assets and physical power, including economic capacity, whereas normative power is based on non-material instruments such as contagion, imitation, transference and attraction.

As Manners (2006b) re-defined it, civilian power is derived from the Westphalian acculturation and its emphasis on international society, hence, the EC use power "primarily for the benefit of those exercising it" (p. 176). Duchêne emphasizes the national interest and goals of the exercising power. However, normative power is derived from a "commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with third parties, including member states" (Manner, 2006b, p. 176). In addition, rather than pursuing the status quo, according to the NPE approach, the EC shapes the 'normal' of world politics. It is interested in "setting standards for the others through the means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either military or economic sources" (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.175).

Among these civilian, military and other prefixes the Normative Power Europe characterization of power contends that the "EU's power cannot be enucleated to either military or purely economic means; it works through ideas, opinions, and conscience" (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.175). These ideas have helped the EU to be concerned about more than economic policies. Through the diffusion of ideas, "normative justification can be increasingly found in much of the EU's relations with the rest of the world, including the external dimensions of internal policies, and external relations more generally" (Manners, 2009b, p. 2), such as enlargement, trade and development policies. What specifically distinguishes civilian power from normative power is that in civilian power Duchêne identified a "strong orientation towards a Westphalian concept of statehood, an objectivist understanding of power and a focus on rational interest as the moving force of external policies" (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007, p. 437) whereas normative power emphasizes an ideal Europe.

2.1.2. Development of the EU's Value-based Agenda

In his all works, Ian Manner indicates nine substantive normative values that are both constituted and "promoted by the EU are sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance" (2008b, p. 46). As Lucarelli and Manners (2006) indicated,

> the EU interpretations of these values have been translated into guiding principles of EU policy. These principles include conflict prevention principles in peace; conditionality principles (essential and fundamental elements clauses) for human rights, democracy, rule of law, and good governance; mainstreaming principles for equality; the precautionary and preventative principles for ecological modernisation; as well as associated principles such as UN authorisation, multilateralism, and 'free and regulated trade' (p. 202)

All the principles, but particularly the core ones, reference the "Council of Europe's (CoE) 1950 ECHR, together with the CoE's 1997 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights" (Manners, 2006b, p. 171). Thus, it is implied that "normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted" (Manners, 2011, p. 233). The principles that shape EU norms come from international conventions, treaties or agreements; more specifically, they are derived from the UN system or CoE and bodies like Amnesty International, hence ideas "may or may not have behavioural implications but norms by definition concern behaviour" (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 21). These principles "were adopted by the EU in its treaty base, and then eventually promoted and practiced, first inside the EU, then in its external relations" (Manners, 2009b, p.3).

According to Björkdahl (2002) although the ideas are subjective, in the case of the EU "there exist collective ideas, which refers to the concepts or beliefs held by groups and that cannot be reduced to any individual state's belief system" (p.21). These collective ideas are social and holistic, and have an intersubjective existence, being the property of the union and embodied in its symbols and discourses. For instance, rule of law and democracy are the collective identity of the union, and EU states reflect this identity through practicing norms, for instance in multi-level governance.

However, it is not that easy to convince a state actor to internalize these principles under specific norms because states accept or reject these principles depending on their culture, interest, ideology or stance in global politics. Thus, the international actors that develop these universal principles may struggle to negotiate with and convince states. The main catalyser of the tipping point here is the efforts of transnational and national advocacy groups. At this point, the EU may also be a norm promoter by making these principles conditions for its external relations. It first socializes the norm inside EU borders before diffusing it to other actors through treaties or financial support to local and national public bodies and NGOs. The EU's role in norm diffusion has two parts. The first is to adopt and socialize universal principles inside its borders, whereby the EU is a norm importer; the second is to diffuse these principles as EU norms in its external relations, thereby acting as a norm entrepreneur or norm leader.

It can thus be acknowledged that the EU is first a norm importer, which means it accepts, socializes and internalizes norms inside its borders. Not only the EU itself but also its member states are obliged to internalize these norms. Hence, universality based on the UN or Council of Europe is institutionalized by the EU (acting as a norm importer). Regarding diffusion, the EU undertakes a norm entrepreneur role and practices these universal principles, which are also the founding values of its political image. Here, Sedelmeier (2006) argues that the EU's approach is consistent with role conception that is defined regarding collective identity and the diffusion of norms. Katzenstein (1996) also argues that norms have a 'constitutive effect' in that norms constitute the identity of actors. However, it is questionable whether the EU's standards of appropriate behaviour are actually complete even inside its borders.

In the NPE, the main argument of Manners is that the EU can shape what is 'normal' for third parties, using liberal political and economic norms. The norm is interwoven with power derived from the normative influence on 'other' actors. Therefore, enlargement seems to be a good testing ground to understand the diffusion of political and economic norms through which the EU can present and legitimize itself as being more than a regional integration. According to Sedelmeier (2006), "eastern enlargement, indeed,

with its policies and the related discourses, contributed to the formation of this specific political role of the EU" (p. 118) and have led to the creation of these constitutive norms.

Recent enlargements have made "adherence to human rights and democratic principles the central condition" (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 121) of its offers of aid, trade and eventual membership. Above all, because of the EU's eastern enlargement and the political conditionality arranged for further enlargements, the EU has amended its founding treaties. Hence, these conditions are arranged to be met by the applicants, but they also represent the collective self-image of EU member states. On the other hand, this shaping of the 'normal' in enlargement negotiations and specifically the progress reports increase the EU's credibility, power and status, which are areas where the EU represents itself as a normative power. The NPE is built on series of appropriate actions in line with 'oughtness', 'goodness' or, what Pace (2007) calls, the 'force for good'. The core point is where all these norms come from. As Manners (2002) expressed, it is very apparent is that these values were the

> defining features of Western European politics in the immediate post-Second World War period and now the norms of democracy, the rule of law and human rights grew later when it was important to distinguish democratic Western Europe from communist Eastern Europe (p.243).

The EU's polity is embodied by constitutive liberal norms of the Western community, which were all crystallized in the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 that expressed three-legged entry criteria: economic, political and the adoption of the *Acquis*.

Before these criteria were declared, the EU/EC already had a set of constitutive values in its founding treaties. For instance, when the European Economic Community was established in 1957, apart from the economic integration telos, 'peace' was another important factor that led the six continental European countries to come together to prevent another war on the continent. In addition, not only for eastern enlargement but also for the southern European enlargement, the EC presented a 'Declaration on Democracy' at the Copenhagen European Council in 1978 to "strengthen the

Community's leverage against any future member which might slip towards authoritarian rule" (Wallace, 1996, p. 16). However, according to Young (2004), the "[t]raditional pictures of rationalist bargaining between discordant national interests fail to capture the accumulation of a more normative, value-driven foreign policy profile" (p. 416) because "[h]uman rights represents not so much a monolithic policy as a broad framework within which a variety of operational and policy-making dynamics might prevail" (p. 415).

Clearly, "normative principles are not exclusively European, but rather reflect universal and especially post-Cold War practices of the international community." (Whitman, 2011, p. 6), as they are part of cosmopolitan law and internalized by converting them into EU legitimacy. They are included in its treaties and applied in its external relations. Its modus operandi is nourished by special positive incentives and international law that all create the EU's normative legitimacy. The EU has two types of normative role. The first concerns what Manners calls internal principles within the EU and the norms derived from these principles, such as equal pay for equal work for men and women. The second concerns the external principles that the EU imported from universal discourse and embedded them into its external relations, such as gender mainstreaming.

In several works, Manners argues that the "EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics…….it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity" (2008a, p.65). It is very apparent since the beginning of 1990s that human rights are the EU's identity card. With regards to its foreign policy through human rights conditionality, Smith (2001) argues that "respect for human rights is already felt to form part of the EU's international identity" (p. 203), which considers the "causal impact of identity on foreign policy" (Manners and Whitman, 2003, p.382).

Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms: These rights are covered in universal human rights conventions. Manners (2006d) designates them as associative human rights,

> because emphasize the interdependence between individual rights, such as
> freedom of expression, and group rights, such as religion or belief. The

associative nature of EU human rights has developed since the 1973 Declaration on European identity through the 1986 Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on Human Rights and the 1991 Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development. These documents emphasize the "universality and indivisibility of these associative human rights with consensual democracy, the supranational rule of law and social solidarity (p.34).

Democracy: Democracy is the sine qua non of modern societies alongside other universal principles, and "[c]onsensual democracy is the operating principle within the EU member states-but not all of them- and includes proportional representation in electoral systems, coalition governments and power-sharing among parties" (Manners, 2006d p. 34). In the enlargement process the EU conditioned this value to the for those country with democratic deficit.

Liberty and Freedom: These values are also viewed as universal, "understood as an absence of restraints and the possession of rights respectively" (Manners, 2006d, p. 33). In the political sphere, the EU gives particular attention to minority rights while in the economic realm, it focuses on trade free from regulatory intervention.

Rule of Law: This is as important as democracy and human rights, and another inseparable part of the EU and modern societies generally. According to Manners (2006d), it is rule of law can be tackled in "three senses: communitarian, international and cosmopolitan" (Manners, 2006d, p. 35):

> First, the EU principle of communitarian law promotes the pooling of sovereignty through the *Acquis Communautaire*—the supranational rule of law within the EU. Second, the EU principle of international law encourages participation by the EU and its member states in supranational law above and beyond the EU. Third, the EU principle of cosmopolitan law advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals (Manners, 2006d, p. 35).

Solidarity: Solidarity is another cosmopolitan universal value under fundamental freedoms. Social solidarity concerns "balanced economic growth, a social market economy, full employment and combating social exclusion, promoting social justice and protection, intergenerational solidarity and social solidarity within (and between)

member states" (Manners, 2006d, p. 36). The EU value of solidarity in its foreign policy is based on the "development cooperation policy of solidarity as important for projecting EU values of democracy, social justice and sustainable development" (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p. 205).

On Peace: This draws on the "United Nations Charter, together with references to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the 1990 Paris Charter" (Manners, 2006b, p. 171) to sustain peace and a peaceful environment in Europe and beyond. Sustainable peace corresponds to Kant's perpetual peace in addressing the causes of any conflict. The EU policies in external relations "place development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as elements within a more holistic approach to conflict prevention" (Manners, 2006d, p. 33).

On Equality: Manners (2006d) refer to the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, which includes "references to the prohibition of any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation" (p. 35). However, "[e]quality should be a universal value but is rarely practiced……EU interpretation of equality is one that seek to advocate the value of equality in the absence of widespread international support" (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p. 204).

In Sustainable development: Likewise the other values, the sustainable development also referred "Principle 1 of the 1992 UNTAD Rio Declaration, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC" (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p. 172). Hence, "[s]ustainable development is intended to provide a balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis" (Manners, 2006d, p. 37) the EU tries to "promote balanced and sustainable development" (Manners, 2006d, p. 36), and "involves the integration, or mainstreaming, of sustainable development into the policies and activities of the Union" (Manners, 2006d, p. 37).

Good governance: This is referenced in certain external principles, which are "the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance" (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p. 172). Good governance refers to civil society participation "in order to encourage openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate democratic participation" (Manners, 2006d, p. 37).

2.1.3. Exporting EU Values beyond Europe

EU's foreign policy is shaped by nine constitutive principles, mentioned above, which are being institutionalized as targets of the EU's external actions. The use of these foreign policy actions "entails endorsing and operating through international institution, upholding international law, engaging dialogue, offering positive incentives to those who conducts contrasts with the EU's prescriptions" (Wood, 2009, p. 113). It uses foreign policy in economic and political actions, with the latter including a commitment on democratization and improvement of human rights.

There was significant growth in external affairs following the Single European Act (SEA) because it revised the Treaty of Rome, the EC revealed that it was concerned with several important universal principles in its agenda and formally declared them:

> to display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached, so that together they may make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within the framework of the United Nations Charter. (SEA, 1986, 2)

In the following decade, the EU started to stand as a political actor after the Copenhagen Summit, especially in development and enlargement negotiations. According to Schimmelfennig (1999), from a normative prospective, especially in the enlargement process, "socialization is the primary mechanism through which inter-subjective structures are transformed into individual preferences and action" (p. 21). That is, through socialization, EU norms and values are/should be internalized by EU members and would-be members. Through the enthusiasm of state leaders, a candidate country's public is socialized into EU-guided roles. Similarly, the EU also tends to promote these

values in its relations beyond its own territory. Its foreign policy instruments, which are designed at agreements, dialogues, summits etc., are its crucial conditionality tools in providing financial assistance (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005).

The EU foreign policy for the promotion of these values can be seen in various tangible or intangible support, rewards and punishments, based on three strands. First, association agreements that the EU offers a political reward; second, "financial assistance, market access, technical expertise, technical aid (material reward); and public praise by EU actors for change in partners' identity scripts (social reward)" (Pace, 2007, p. 1046). Regarding political rewards, the EU uses asymmetrical interdependence to attach conditions to its membership or trade agreements with third countries, with democracy and human rights being central elements of EU political conditionality. Regarding material rewards, EU-financed programs, such as the PHARE, IPA or EIDHR democracy program, aim to enhance human rights, rule of law and democracy. Regarding social rewards or punishments, which are used in less developed countries, the EU focuses on the 'ethical dimension' of its foreign policy by implementing sanctions if third countries abuse human rights or democracy. The sanctions or social punishment may vary. For instance, "its weakest form is to condemn violations of these principles in common declarations and demarches or stronger forms range from diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes to approving military interventions to end human rights abuses" (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 119).

2.1.4. European Enlargement and the EU's Conditionality Power

Being an EU member state is tempting in many ways: not only receiving the benefits of the economic integration but also being defined as 'European' if your country is counted as part of Europe. For a candidate state, EU enlargement proceeds in three stages: subscribing in full to the normative agenda of EU norms; making necessary domestic reforms to please the EU; implementing EU-funded projects funded by technical and economic pre-accession financial support. There is thus an asymmetrical bilateral relationship between the EU and candidate states in which the "projection of norms and values is entirely one-sided. Candidates are supposed to internalize both the

approximately 80,000 pages of the *Acquis Communautaire"* (Haukkala, 2011, p. 49) and the other value-driven prerequisites. Hence, the criteria demonstrate the strength of the EU's success in its relations and attribute a power role to the EU because the ability to shape the political and judicial system in a candidate country's written documents indicates the sustainability of the EU's policy impact.

After the end of Cold War, the EC prompted the CEEC to transform their economies and polities (Glenn, 2003) through various reform packages. The aim was to eliminate all Communist regime institutions and replace them with democratic and market-based structures. To make a quick transformation, the Copenhagen criteria stand as a sort of guideline and recipe, give that shifting institutional and infrastructural support is not be easy. The EU's eastern enlargement occurred for three reasons: economic, security and political. Economically, the EU's ever-growing economy needs new markets, so a customs union was important for the integration process. Various economic criteria encouraged candidate states to develop a neoliberal economy, along with social rights, loyalty to universal values, as reiterated in the Copenhagen declaration and other documents. Politically, without respect for human rights, the superiority of law and democratic governments, the EU could not even create or maintain any relationship with these countries; hence, it was politically essential to guarantee relations. Integrating these countries under one economic and political umbrella would eventually create a secure environment.

According to Young (2004), Eastern enlargement was "presented as necessary for the credibility of the EU's own core values" (p. 416), as enlargement is the best way to represent the EU's value-driven structure. Indeed, the eastern enlargement was completed in a hurry so that EU officials and many scholars could demonstrate that integration would be completed when these countries joined the union as 'Europeans'. Each enlargement, indeed, has its own reflexivity "because enlargement reflects a community perspective" (Young, 2004, p. 417), namely democracy and a post-nationalist, liberal collective identity. As one of the prominent "European values conditioning the accession process" (Young, 2004, p. 417), democracy means that the EU should strengthen its own democratic legitimacy to consolidate others' fragile

democracies. Thus, enlargement is the "outcome of 'rhetorical entrapment' as actors with self-interest in enlargement have strategically used normative arguments to shame the rest of the EU into accepting it" (Sjursen, 2002, p. 500).

The success of such shaming depends on the actors' conviction but as what Elgström (2000) calls there are also some 'non-neglectable norms'. However, for other norms, a candidate country's actions might not match because of the intentions of the state's leader, which is very determinative in norm diffusion. Intentions can be observed in policy implementations, rhetoric, discourses and other practices. Persuasion is applied through this process. Socialization of the norm eases the impact of the diffusion. As its basic purpose, the content of these constitutive norms is based on the promotion and protection of liberal democracy, democratic peace, human rights and freedoms, and multilateralist collaboration. During enlargement, the EU extends norm diffusion for a time, giving it "enormous leverage over European states that have applied for membership" (Pace, 2007, p. 1046). Meeting EU preconditions and the *Acquis Communautaire* are examples of this in that the EU often puts pressure on candidate states. On the other hand, in case the third party cannot become a member state, the EU regulates behaviour within conflict societies as to construct stable relations with this third state through EU financial aid and trade programs (Pace, 2007).

The concept of a normative or civilian power Europe is proposed "with regard to the EU's enlargement policies, although the literature differs with regard to what type of norms can explain the EU's policies" (Sjursen, 2006c, p. 239). Among the EU's foreign policy actions, enlargement occupies a different place because 'the other' wants to be a part of the 'self'. Here, a state applies for EU membership and the relations and interaction between the EU and this third country (the other) are based on an asymmetrical relation. For instance, in the development relationship with ex-colonies, the EU's attitude is different because its norm diffusion may face obstacles while the norm negotiations, which are based on the logic of instrumental rationality, may end with the third country calculating its benefits and increase maximization. Such a state's primary aim is to benefit from trade agreements and financial support whereas enlargement means a state wants to become part of the EU's identity. These criteria are

based on the superiority of the law above everything as well as a functioning liberal democracy "where citizens are expected to be able to distinguish between different forms of justification for constitutional principles as well as policy choices, and to assess which of them are acceptable and which are not" (Sjursen, 2002, p. 493).

This idea consolidates the emergence of belonging to a particular community, which has both a logic of appropriateness (being part of Europe) and a logic of consequentialism (being part of the good life). The good life myth in the EU is enshrined with its value commitments that refer to a specific conception of the good life, such as belonging in a specific community. These values are actualized in the policies legitimized by "interests, perceptions of the good life or cultural identity" (Sjursen, 2002, p. 495). Because applicant states are expected to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, and the EU sometimes prioritizes some states over others. However, according to Sjursen (2002), "[n]ot only does enlargement threaten to disturb the internal order of the EU, the new external borders that will follow from the expansion could also create new divisions on the European continent and thus foster instability in Europe at large" (p. 491).

According to Haukkala (2001) "European integration has been a geographically open-ended 'European project'" (p. 52) and enlarging the Union represents the EU's main self-image. It is sometimes seen that "the EU can be envisaged as a regional normative hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of its norms and values" (Haukkala, 2007, p. 3). In development relations, we can argue that material incentives motivate compliance with such norms, although in the case of enlargement there is the direct enthusiasm of the candidate state to become part of 'Europeanness'. Hence enlargement can be seen as one of the EU's most effective foreign policy tools. Conversely, according to Haukkala (2007), the EU has not been very successful "in projecting its normative power in cases where full membership has not been on the cards" (p. 5).

Regarding the southern and eastern enlargements specifically, the EU has found opportunities to diffuse its democratic, human rights and rule of law norms in a way that

is both effective and legitimate since it "can exert the strongest normative influence on its partners" (Haukkala, 2011, p. 47). It has already created effective economic partnerships with third parties; yet in this interacting with other international actors it needs to create partnership based on the same norms, standards and procedures; otherwise, the EU itself will face political and judicial problems.

2.2. On the Normative Form of Power

Since the Cold War ended, a new system of regulations emerged, hence new international actors, such as the EU, several non-state organizations, international institutions and civil society organizations, try to respond to new challenging issues. Meanwhile, world politics has had to deal with the EU actor and its actions, which raises the question of how the EU has gradually constructed its political identity and located itself in the international arena. Certainly, academic scholarship has needed to define what kind of actor the EU is in utilizing its capacity and power. Alongside this political development, rather than military superiority, the EU has shaped its direction on geographical expansion to some degree and intensification of institutional and political capacity inside its borders (Diez, 2005) by referring to universal principles.

A large body of literature has concluded that the EU is a novel type of power in international politics with a unique identity shaping and institutional set-up that has crystallized since the Copenhagen Summit. It is neither exclusively an economic community, a state, an intergovernmental institution nor a military actor. It is *sui generis* or, as Diez (2013) puts it, a different kind of actor. According to Manners and Whitman (2003) , it is "a hybrid international entity which can be found represented in three different roles – civilian, military, and normative" (p. 388). Clearly then, the EU is "a political system with multiple perspectives to its polity" (p. 387), which makes it a novel power, a different kind of actor. Of course, the importance of power and ideational change is not new. Carr (1962) earlier differentiated the notion of power as military power, economic power and "power over opinion" while Galtung (1973) distinguished three types of power: ideological, remunerative and punitive. He defined ideological power as the power of ideas whereby "the power-sender's ideas penetrate

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and shape the will of the power-recipient" (p. 33), making ideological power a predecessor of the normative power attributed to the EU; besides, "the EU not only promotes norms, but does so in a normative way" (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1185).

According to Manners (2010), the necessity for defining the ontology of the EU emerged due to the post-Cold War era. He aligned three elements that enabled the rise of the EU in world politics: presence and capability, international identity and normative power. Normative justification implies that "relations and policies with the rest of the world should be 'normatively sustainable' – i.e. 'normatively' explicable and justifiable to others; 'sustainable' into the next generation" (2009b, p. 2). However, a degree of "militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU's normative power" (Manners, 2004, p. 1), rather it "reinforce[s] normative power, but his central argument is that the EU as a normative power does not rely on military power to set the agenda and the standards of international politics" (Diez and Pace, 2007, p.1). In addition, according to Forsberg (2011), "the construction of the military dimension within the EU does not change the NPE factors-hybrid polity and treaty-based legal order" (p. 1192) because the concept of normative power includes normative interest based on milieu goals instead of selfish aims. However, this norm diffusion and normative influence does not give a guarantee when there is a competition among international actors.

Manners (2002) defined the EU as a "normative power as it has an ontological quality to it" (p. 252) because the EU promotes norms in the international system. It is also because of the "way in which its policies shape our understandings of the EU and the way in which the EU is a political and social agent embedded in and employing political and social institutions" (Lucarelli, 2006, p. 1-2). There is also "a positivist quantity to it-that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and lastly it has a normative quality to it, where the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system" (Manners, 2002, p. 252). By indicating 'should', the latter refers to the self-reflexivity of the normative power conceptualization, and "if the EU displays reflexivity in its external policies it can be considered as 'both normative and powerful" (Manners, 2005, p. 10). This distinct political entity of the EU does not "closely

resemble those of a state (whether unitary or federal) or those of an international organization (whether regional or global)" (Manners and Whitman, 2003, p.384). EU member states have developed "agreement on these principles to the point that they are legally binding commitments" (Dunne, 2008, p. 22). Manners is convinced that the "EU will remain and continue to be a normative power for the foreseeable future" (Manners, 2008a, p. 69).

According to Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002) and Diez (2005), the EU's reflexivity in external relations can also be analysed in terms of the consistency between internal and external EU policies. As Allison (2015) contends, the focus of EU foreign policy should not only be on the 'reflexivity' of EU identity or should not only refer to the EU analysing itself; rather there should be "an ongoing reflection about the action, its context, its effects on such a context and the feedback of those expected effects on the action" (p. 37). In short, the analysis should refer to "how others are affected by and react to the EU, and how effective and successful the EU is at achieving its foreign policy aims" (Allison, 2015, p. 37). Here, Forsberg (2011) categorized NPE under five criteria.

> First, there is the view that such a power has a normative identity, or as Manners puts it, that the EU is 'normatively constituted'. Second, a normative power can be said to have normative interests, whether or not it has a normative identity. Third, there is the idea that normative power behaves in a normative way, in accordance with existing rules and norms. Fourth, 'normative power' can be seen as referring to the means of influence. Finally, we can also expect that a normative power is able to achieve normative ends, especially if we think of it as a 'power' (p. 1191).

The normative form of power, unlike conventional powers, has a mission to establish normatively sustainable relations with others. Another mission of the NPE is the gradual transference from a normative heading to the ideal type of actor in world politics. Undoubtedly, the ideal type of (meta)narrative is linked with a power that spreads (as a promoter) and is internalized (institutionalized inside its borders) by cosmopolitan law. The ultimate aim is to normalize the cosmopolitan world, in which the "militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU's normative power" (Manners, 2006d, p. 182); rather, a "more just, cosmopolitan world

would be one in which communitarian, social rights of self-accommodate cosmopolitan, individual rights of others; where local politics and global politics commune" (2008a, p. 67; 2011, p. 232).

This normative power conceptualization has been tested in several cases and policy areas while "many foreign policy goals are couched in normative terms" (Bickerton, 2011, p. 30). Academic researchers, who still ask whether the EU is a normative power, all approach the issue from a different theoretical terrain and case studies and try to answer how the NPE is constructed. The NPE's construction in theory enables EU actors to "eliminate socio-economic inequalities and to build up political and social institutions and capacities that will enable those involved in conflict areas to cope with (ethnic) plurality" (Pace, 2007, p.1051).

Diez and Pace (2007) here argue that the EU acts through its specific abilities and is a normative power. Complementing these definitions, Manners references Raymond Aron's conceptualization of two forms of power. The first is *puissance*, which refers to 'the potential to do something'; the second is *pouvoir*, meaning the 'act of doing something'. Manner's (2013b) *puissance* is similar to the normative ideal type of actor whereas *pouvoir* corresponds to the normative form of power. In considering internalization as one impact of EU actions, it is necessary to clarify the *pouvoir* normative power to understand how normative justification appears in action. These two French words help define the power of the EU "to examine in more detail the different mechanisms of normative power as a vehicle for wielding influence" (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1191).

According to Manners, the EU's ontology should be considered beyond state-like features, such as a series of beliefs and principles. As he argues, there is an 'ideational' perspective, which was previously included in power by Carr (1962) as power over opinion, by Duchêne (1973) as the *ideé force* and by Galtung (1973) as ideological power. This ideology-power-ideational-normative concepts indicates that international norms aim to penetrate the ideas and shape the domestic settings of the states to construct the 'normal' through making successful law. Here, successful law is derived

from international law, which "enables EU actors to reiterate international legal commitments" (Pace, 2007, p. 1047) and create the basis for the NPE construction.

In Whitman's definition (2011), "Manners distinguishes two aspects of power: being normative because the nature of the EU or as a result of its hybrid polity embracing intergovernmental and transnational governance and acting in a normative way behaving in an ethically good manner" (p. 6). 'Being normative' means that procedural normative ethics in external relations are derived from the EU's virtuous character, whereby it applies the same principles within its borders. 'Acting in a normative way' refers to the consistency between inside the EU and abroad, which demonstrates "that the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms" (Whitman, 2011, p. 8) and loyal in its attitude and presence. According to Manners, EU global actorness studies are "structured by a series of false dichotomies; such as supranational/intergovernmental governance, civilian/military power and soft/hard power" (Manners and Whitman, 2003, p. 392–393; Manners, 2011, p. 240–241; Manners, 2015, p. 225). Instead of these confusing dichotomies and discussions that focus on the question of the EU's capabilities, he highlights the normative role of the EU that requires a discussion of acculturation based on EU's civilizing role that provides continuity of norms and conciliation that refers "to the extent that the EU's military role ensures continuity in terms of conflict over conciliation in the causes of conflict" (2006a, p. 68).


Figure 2: Role conceptions of the EU)

Source: Manners and Whitman, 2003, p.391

Besides in the power conceptualization, he references Weber's analysis of a trinity of powers in global politics. The first is physical force, which involves the "use of coercive force by global political actors……….the EU includes the deployment of the EU rule of law, border, police or military operations" (Manners, 2015, p. 225). The second power involves material incentives by offering or denying material benefits, such as development assistance. The best example of this, which Manners discusses several times, is transference diffusion. In this kind of diffusion, 'actions' mean that the EU sponsors new norms, which mostly occurs locally. The EU enables "aid or technical assistance to third parties" (Manners, 2015, p. 226) financially by funding the projects. These material incentives are "seen in the impact of pre-accession assistance (IPA) to countries joining the EU" (p. 226). In normative power construction particularly, "financial assistance is primarily related to the importance of EU actors give to economic and social development in conflict areas" (Pace, 2007, p. 1046). Hence, the EU engages in the construction of 'force for good', not only by diffusing moral norms but also by applying material resources such as irreversible financial assistance. This means "ideational and material forms of power come together in explaining the peculiarities of the EU's normative power in Europe" (Haukkala, 2007, p. 3).

The third type of power is the normative justification based on conviction through attraction, which involves argumentation, persuasion and shaming by actors. Normative justification is based on a tripartite analysis (of principles, practices and impact), with a close resemblance to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) life cycle model of norm, emergence-norm and cascade-norm internalization stages. The reason for incorporating such a framework in analysing EU foreign policy is that it gives more practical instruments for policy evaluation. The normative justifications' tripartite analysis is focused on "how principles can lead to actions, how these actions may have an impact and how this impact may change the principles" (Manners, 2015, p. 225). Herein Manners focuses on 'the ability to shape this normal' in which an actor can create this consequence and, as he adds, "[n]ormative power should ultimately be envisaged as socializing the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles" (Manners, 2011, p. 237). The impact stage of normative justification corresponds to Finnemore and

Sikkink's life cycle's third stage: norm internalization, which means 'ownership' through cultural legitimacy or local consent.

2.2.1. *'Pouvoir Normatif'* in Action

The normative power argument is nourished by or derived from the norm diffusion potential or EU acts towards the 'normal' or its ability to shape 'the normal' in others. As mentioned above, ideational normative justification involves three stages: principles, actions and impact. In the principles stage, normative power is legitimate because the principles it promotes have a universal nature. Principles are promoted coherently and consistently, where the latter is because of different principles and standard practices. Both the coherence and consistency of these principles are envisaged to be guaranteed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, enhanced in the Lisbon Treaty. In the Action stage, normative power is seen in persuasion, which "involves constructive engagement and the institutionalization of relations" (Manners, 2011, p. 235). The EU encourages 'others' to internalize the same principles and persuades them through argument, conferral, shaming or dialogue. The EU's prestige is conferred or attributed during the action stage through membership. To describe the EU as a normative power it is not solely enough to scrutinize how it internalizes universal principles and becomes a role model, but also how it diffuses norms as the other component of its role conception. Ian Manners describes six diffusion types, all of which concern where normative power comes from.

Contagion Diffusion: Contagion means the spread or transmission of something. Regarding EU politics, it is defined as diffusion of EU ideas to other political actors that can be a state or another regional union. According to Manners (2006d), contagion diffusion "takes place almost entirely through the role of symbolic manifestations in diffusing ideas from the EU to other political actors" (p. 76), for instance through the diffusion of ideas and means to other regional integrations. Thus, the EU's *pouvoir normative* influence on others occurs through its ideas and means, without any action or incentive, although there is "imitation, emulation and mimicry/*mimétisme* through the persuasive attraction of ideas" (Manners, 2013a, p. 315). In Manners' argument, other

regional integrations imitate the EU's integration process and are influenced by the EU's core constructive ideas, such as the four freedoms in economic relations. In this diffusion type, the EU is presented as a model whose institutional and administrative structures serve as an example for other integrations. It is not easy to expose diffusion because "the EU is actively engaging in interregional diplomacies and it implicitly or explicitly promotes *mimétisme* (regional replication) in particular areas" (2013b, p. 41).

Informal Diffusion: This diffusion type occurs in two ways: first through strategic communication, "such as new policy initiatives, and the declaratory communications" (Manners, 2013a, p. 315) from the President of the Commission or head of another EU institution. In the declaratory communication, Manners again references symbolic interactionism. This diffusion "occurs through references to totems, rituals and taboos in the messages and readings regarding the EU's normative role" (Manners, 2006a, p. 74). For instance, specific declarations and communications made by EU officials in their public statements may include "persuasive attraction and the argumentative promotion of ideas" (Manners, 2013a, p. 316) inside and outside the EU, such as limiting carbon emissions. In this diffusion type, the EU encourages countries to implement these rules, direct them to commit to working with international institutions and engage them in multilateral fora for cooperation. Hence, this multilateral environment entails a commitment to find common grounds for implementing the norms.

Procedural Diffusion: "Procedural diffusion of norms means the institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and other third parties" (Manners, 2015, p. 226). This diffusion can be actualized through various "mechanisms of partnership, cooperation, association and membership" (Manners, 2013a, p. 317) to the EU (enlargement process), or the EU's membership in international organization. This diffusion, like the others, involves the persuasive attraction of ideas. Here, the important point, as Manners underlines regarding all diffusion types, is the "prestige and status of associating with the EU" (Manners, 2013a, p. 315). Regarding this type, Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) signed an Agreement Creating an Association (Ankara Agreement) to establish their first relations in 1963 that has lasted until today; however, their current institutionalized relationship is at a completely different level, including

Turkey's candidate state status. The case of human rights is given as an example (Manners, 2013b) particularly in this diffusion model. The EU not only implements economic and trade agreements with these non-EU countries but also asks them to develop human rights, the rule of law and democracy in their home country. The EU demands that third parties should establish and obey international standards and universal principles. The motivational factor is bringing them closer to achieving EU membership.

Transference Diffusion: Transference diffusion is based on the immaterial and material assets that the EU spreads during its relations with third parties. *Pouvair normatif* in action happens in two ways: by conditionality clauses or by grassroots engagement where the EU financially support the NGOs in particular cases. Regarding the latter, one example is how the EU financially supports women's NGOs to empower their capacity for gender-awareness activities. These organizations are also engaged in EU agencies. Therefore, this diffusion type relies mostly on financial aid, technical assistance and dialogue for diffusing an idea. It is seen more in peace building activities, such as EU humanitarian aid for Palestinians or development aid for ex-colonial countries. Both transference and procedural diffusion are indicative of economic and political conditionality

Overt Diffusion: Overt diffusion of norms occurs when there is a direct physical influence or pressure by the EU on other actors regarding specific cases. For instance, "[s]ince the end of the Cold War, EU members have become increasingly cohesive in their support of common EU positions within the General Assembly and other UN organs" (Manners, 2006a, p. 79). This enforcement of ideas can be seen "in the EU support for the creation of the UN Human Rights Council in 2006 … or how the EU intends to promote good global governance through reforms of the UN system" (2013b, p. 46). The prior aim of the union in this context is to enhance efficiency, transparency and accountability.

Cultural Filter: This is the "interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion" (Kinnvall,

1995, p. 61). In the diffusion process, the EU may face domestic salience, which may make it hard to persuade others to begin engagement, dialogue and argument. Global norm's diffusion always come across with the local's demands and are influenced by "cultural filters" (Kinnvall, 1995, pp. 61–71; Manners, 2002, pp. 245 and 247–48; Manners, 2013, pp. 318–19). There may be a strong cultural filter shaped by local knowledge, or there may be a contradiction between norms embedded in a particular cultural context and higher-order principles. For instance, particularly since the end of the 1990s, the EU has played a significant "role in pursuit of the international abolition of the death penalty" (Manners, 2006a, p. 79). However, for some third countries, such as the USA, "the cultural filter has remained robust against EU based norm diffusion" (Manners, 2006d, p. 79). The cultural filter is the mechanism that marks out the social and cultural border, shaped by the degree of the local area's norm adoption or consent for the arrived norm. The meaning of norm is redefined by the local area's cultural practices and this type of diffusion is related to the logic of contentedness.

In the EU Normative power debate, Manner gives special priority to how the EU produces and promotes human rights and fundamental freedom values in its foreign policy. These core values are the content and reference points of the EU's foreign policy actions. Hence, the EU's actorness in line with its NPE articulation mostly demonstrates itself in legitimacy through justification. That's why Birkerton (2011) describes the normative power idea as a prism of legitimacy and refers to the EU as a source of legitimacy.

2.2.2. The Critical Distance to Normative Power

Over the last decade, debates on defining and judging the normative power conceptualization have grown and criticisms have proliferated. Several criticisms or deconstruction analyses have been made regarding the NPE role conception. Many of the central problems that the criticisms highlight concerns the juxtaposition of normative and power concepts. For instance, Sjursen (2006a) argues that if power means the ability to make others do what they would not otherwise do then there is a contradiction between the definition of normative and power. According to her,

"[p]ower alludes to 'coercion'; 'normative' alludes to 'legitimacy'. How do we know that the EU's use of – normative – power is legitimate, as is implied in this concept? And how can we account for a normative dimension to the EU's international role?" (p. 172). Hence, she suggests that there is need to conceptualize norms on a rational basis.

Thomas Diez (2005) asks another important question of whether EU behaviour consists or whether there are double standards for the candidate countries. Here, he underlines that by using the normative power conception, Manners presents to other actors "a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU; it also constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the 'outside world" (p. 614). That is, the normative power proposition somehow makes a distinction between European and non-European. Diez stresses "a greater degree of reflexivity both in the academic discussion about normative power, and in the political representations of the EU as a normative power" (p. 615). On the other hand, Pace and Diez (2007) and Cebeci (2012; 2015) claim that normative power is firstly a discursive construct of the EU and that, in this discourse, the EU is represented as a model that forces good on the rest of the world. Secondly, Diez (2005) claims that if the normative power articulation is based on spreading an ideology, an idea to 'others' then the United States also seems to fit this position. The empirical evidence of the normative power conception relies largely on the policies the EU pursues, and similar examples can be found in US policies. In his article 'Response to Thomas Diez', Manners (2006b) evaluated this criticism and argued that EU member states lead in ratifying international treaties compared to the USA; hence, ratification of international treaties is significant in terms of symbolic and public demonstrations of international commitment, even if member states themselves may be weak in implementing them.

Diez (2005) also explains that "the EU has military means in its foreign policy machinery" (p. 623). Young (2004) contends that, economically, the EU's actions may be more complex in that "the EU may exercise normative power, but often for instrumental – not value-driven – purposes" (p. 421), whereby norms can be seen as a cloak that hides effective legitimacy of external policies and stabilize the economy. According to Young, Diez's point is noteworthy because strategic interests and norms

are intertwined and always go together in external relations; hence, "a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical" (Diez, 2005, p. 625) since rationalist interest and constructivist norm diffusion are combined in this process. The spread of values and norm diffusion mostly happens through NGOs, through which the EU seeks to impose European values to confirm that the EU is a normative power.

From a realist point of view, Hyde-Price (2006) argues that several liberal and idealist notions have emerged since the end of the Cold War, "such as civilian or normative power, committed to civilizing. international relations as part of a wider transformation of international society" (p. 217). However, these "liberal-idealist views regard the EU as a novel and uniquely benign entity that serves as the herald of a Kantian *foedus pacificum (League of Peace)"* (p. 217). This benign norm exporter discourse and representation of the EU reminds one of the Kagan's suggestion (2003) that Europeans come from Venus whereas the others – but particularly the USA – come from Mars.

From another critical perspective, Nicoloaïdis and Howse (2002) emphasize the NPE narrative that constructs the EU's identity along with the identity of the EU's others, and through which the EU acts as a power while disregarding its "own shortcomings unless a degree of self-reflexivity is inserted" (Diez, 2005, p. 627). Their point is that, since the Copenhagen Criteria, EU member states, both before and after Eastern enlargement, see themselves as "having fulfilled the principles written into the Declaration, the principles' explicit incorporation makes sense primarily as a means to exert influence on a set of others that do not stick to them" (Diez, 2005, p. 631). Besides, there are specific problems unresolved problems related with the Copenhagen Criteria.

According to Pace (2007), to analyse the process of how NPE has been constructed, the case "should cover a degree of temporality, that is, it should be characterized by a considerable degree of continuity" (p.1043). Hence, as Pace indicates, construction of NPE or the NPE assertion itself, requires "serious reflection and soul-searching" (p. 1044). In addition, EU member states' success in conflict cases is not efficient because economic interests thwart the human rights priorities embedded into the NPE. A large part of the literature that concerns itself with the particularities of the EU's foreign

policy also makes claims about the EU being a normative, ethical, civil power, etc. However, according to Sjursen, "these claims often seem insufficiently grounded theoretically and also appear to convey a rather indiscriminate view of norms" (2006a; 2006b, p. 86). Apart from conceptualizing these power types in the EU, Sjursen stresses that there is a need to theorize actors' ability with the potential contribution of discourse theory and the concept of communicative rationality, which may contribute by providing the micro-foundations necessary for us to theoretically account for the importance of norms, as well as for an actor's ability to rationally assess their validity.

Haukkala (2007) also stressed that Manners' normative power argument is very narrow in that, in his descriptions of the EU's roles he is too caught up in normative theory, the ethical importance of the EU and how it should act in a reflexive way. However, Manners himself "betrays too static and passive understanding of the EU's role as an actual norm entrepreneur in international relations" (Haukkala, p. 5). In the enlargement process, the EU is a norm entrepreneur, an actor that wants to highlight the importance of specific issues and norms and diffuse them. Thus, the EU is a normative hegemon. It is "normative as its foreign policy agenda is full of norms and values and it is a hegemon as it seeks and seems to enjoy a monopoly on defining what those norms are and entail, thereby creating the boundaries of normality" (p. 50).

Cebeci (2012) and Diez (2005) meet on the common ground that NPE or an 'ideal type' designation of EU actions is also endorsed by scholars. Intentionally or not, they comment on this positive attribution that establishes the EU as a self and defines the others. The problem here is this 'self' and 'otherness' that presents the EU as a good force with its benign norms whereas others are not. According to Cebeci (2012), it is based on meta-narratives that show the EU as post-sovereign and postmodern, representing the EU as a model and NPE. She adds that NPE itself is a different discourse constructed to distinguish the EU from both underdeveloped countries and the USA, which are the others. Normative power adherents are criticized for focusing on analysing the EU's unique identity, emphasizing Europe as a force for good and somehow avoiding analyses of the global problems that the EU is a part of. As Merlingen (2007) notes, "even though it is aimed at the protection and strengthening of

the basic exercise of human agency, it is never clearly distinguishable from the subjection and subordination of this very agency" (p. 442). Another criticism concerns "the inconsistency between the EU's rhetoric and behaviour and the lack of reflexivity [that] undermines its credibility" (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007, p. 435).

The EU indeed seems superior in the eye of the 'other', which is evoked as 'absent'. According to Manners, it is a self-empowering exercise, because the "EU's normative power in particular is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practice and experience it" (Manners, 2008a, p. 66). From another perspective, Hettne and Soderbaum (2005) assert that "[w]ith weaker partners, the EU dictates much more of the conditions for interregional cooperation which tends to lead to more imperial relations" (p. 17), and normative power debates disguise the EU's soft imperialism.

CHAPTER 3

ON EU GENDER EQUALITY NORM CONSTRUCTION

As human beings, men and women are not equal on a biological basis, but they are both individuals and citizens in any given society. Hence, their only differences concern sexual productivity, in that women can give birth. In the 'normal' way of thinking, they obtain same rights due to their citizenship and are equal social agents in society. In short, equality between men and women is acknowledged in terms of "the social, political and economic forces that shape gender structures" (Guerrina, 2005, p.19). According to liberal feminists (or so-called equality feminists), in *formal terms*, equality corresponds to women's legal rights (Hoskyn, 1985), but this approach fails to consider that the importance of women's private roles hampers their participation in the official labour market (Guerrina, 2005). On the other hand, in *substantive* terms, equality refers to the capacity of equal rights policies to promote social change and consider women's voices in social and political affairs (Guerrina, 2005). This definition touches on the interaction between gender hierarchies and socio-economic structures as well as how much the state socializes gender equality as a norm to constitute ideational change.

Therefore, a substantive understanding of equality recognizes that the personal and political spheres are linked and mutually reinforcing because gender (in)equality is socially constructed (Kardam, 2004), and reproduced by state and society. It denotes the roles allocated to men and women, and the behaviours and activities formed by the society and state. Gender inequality has been an entrenched structural problem since humanity emerged. However, it has been questioned by women, particularly since the eighteenth century, through emphasizing voting rights, women's rights, women empowerment, and the economic inclusion of women into the labour market. This debate has been expanded within the 'gender equality' paradigm while, since the 1990s,

its gender mainstreaming strategy and structured gender inequality issue has been elaborated beyond national and labour market-oriented debates.

Gender equality has dual importance: First, it is a fundamental aspect of human rights; second, it has economic significance in terms of growth and combating poverty. It follows a linkage that starts from education to having a profession, from participation in the labour market to live in better conditions, from job promotion or business entrepreneurship to increasing family household income, from having healthier conditions to look after a child to reducing child morality, from socializing and experiencing equal treatment in society to involvement in the political sphere. There is a clear circulation that portrays the priority of equality between men and women in every part of life.

Investigating the EU's international identity through a gender lens means defining how the gender equality norm is constructed inside the EU and presented in outside. This in turn requires investigating the EU's constitutive history, which shapes norms, and studying how these norms are used in EU external relations as a foreign policy tool. In the case of gender equality norm construction, the EU has two approaches: the first, is binding internal norms since the foundation of integration; the second is a concern for gender equality as a part of human rights but articulated into non-binding procedures. Internal norms are indeed the normative principle of the EU as they are constituted in hard law and form the gender *acquis*. These constitutive norms are intensified in equal opportunities, equal treatment, and fighting against all forms of discrimination, all of which are fostered by treaties, directives, and relevant legal prohibitions. The universal principles, on the other side, stem from human rights and have been embedded into the EU agenda, particularly since the 1990s. The universal gender equality approach is the product of worldwide feminist movements and embodied in international conventions.

All these gender equality approaches are included in EU policies, external relations documents, as well as conditioned in the enlargement process and represented as part of the EU's human rights self-image. By taking these dual binding and non-binding features of the gender equality approach into account, it is important to ask whether the

EU itself can shape 'normal' gender equality inside its borders. The EU's 'normal' is designed according to the content of its gender equality directives, treaty articles, external relations conditionality instruments, and policy practices. Hence, these legal procedures construct a gender-equality based on the "self of the EU, while it attempts to change 'others' through the spread of particular norms" (Diez, 2005, p. 241).

To understand the EU's normative gender equality power and its impact on others, there is a need to identify the normative justification that turns the equality principle into actions. These actions have impacted that lead to the re-constitution of the principles. The central point in identifying the EU's gender equality approach is to ask how and to what extent the EU relies on normative principles while diffusing gender equality norms. This question is significant while crystallizing the content of transmitted gender equality norms and the normative influence of the EU on both member states and candidate countries. The EU's normative power in diffusing the gender equality norm is not easy to reveal, but ideational change and the impact of these principles may be found in legal, economic, and political changes. From a feminist stand point, an ideational change in the gender equality can only be achieved through challenging dominant patriarchal values, which requires cultural legitimacy or what this study prefers to call 'local consent'. In addition, legal practices, the numbers of the women parliamentarians, female labour market participation, significant reductions in sexual and gender-based violence (or any type of gender discrimination) are indicators to assess the degree of reflexivity.

In a gender-sensitive constructed identity, discourse and practices are situated as the representation and constitution of the 'real', and provide a "managed space in which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others" (Campbell, 1992, p. 6). International norms regarding gender equality have always been challenged and directly compete with domestic norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), in that most states specifically are not interested in promoting egalitarian environment for men and women in their society. Although states sign related international conventions on women's rights and gender equality, in their actions or discourses, they hesitate to eliminate any devoted gender roles in their society. This can happen because of

culturally specific (maybe regional) rigid existing values or just because the states do not necessarily want to regulate this issue.

According to Lombardo *et al.* (2009), while pursuing the acceptance of gender equality as a universal norm, during implementation it is possible to witness that "amidst different policy actors, at both institutional and non-institutional levels and across a variety of national and international organizations, the concept of gender equality is labelled differently" (p.1). It is because of the discursive construction of concept of the gender equality, which is openly contested and has multidimensional realities of equality. Furthermore, the borders of gender (in)equality may stretch to accommodate other inequalities, such that "other inequalities are not separate but independent and intersecting phenomena and it is impossible to reach gender equality as long as other inequalities still exist" (Lombardo and Verloo, 2009, p. 68). Thus, the shaping and the meaning of gender equality is not a fixed term; rather it is composed of inequalities that women are exposed to, whether directly or indirectly.

Moreover, the norm receivers' degree of compliance with gender norms may clash with the transmitted norms' fixed definition. The norm receivers' articulated inequalities may not overlap with the norm sender's inequalities content. While negotiating norms in this context, it is important to identify points of correspondence. Hence, in gender equality norm diffusion, especially in the EU's case, it is vital to understand "how norms are translated, stretched and bent in the dynamics between transnational, national, regional and international actors" (Van der Vleuten *et al.*, 2014, p. 2). Regarding the definition and diffusion of the EU's gender equality norm, this chapter explains the EU's gender equality related acts since its foundation and discusses how these acts address entrenched structural problems. Gender equality at both the EU and member state level is a contested issue as there is an intersection of inequalities in different social policy typologies. According to feminist critiques, the EU itself has not typically placed gender equality at the centre of its policies (Lister, 2006) and does not consider other inequalities within each member state. Instead, it just tries to diffuse a fixed norm, which leaves it confronted by a harmonization or adaptation stalemate as states try to achieve this Brussels-centred gender equality (Gerber, 2010). Differences in gender

regimes or, in other words, a diversity of constructed norms among member states block further progress or slow adoption of EU-level provisions. Hence, this study will broadly examine this adaptation process and the implementation struggles of member states in the following sections.

3.1. Shaping the 'Normal': Gender Equality Norm Emergence at the Universal Level

It would be deficient to tackle the EU's gender equality approach without referring to background factors. The gender equality issue has become a hot topic on the EU's agenda for two main reasons. First, at the beginning of integration, the gender issue emerged due to equal-based competitiveness in member states' labour markets. However, it has become more comprehensive and a field of interest as women's lobbies have increased their role and voices inside the union (Kantola, 2010). They had an integral and significant effect on gender equality discussions from local to regional levels. Secondly, since the end of the 1970s, there has been an overt and more detailed concern globally regarding gender equality. The UN and international feminist movements are the key players in this process with both conceptualizing the inequality problem, if not all its areas, and drawing up a roadmap for countries to solve gender-based inequalities. Within the EU, each member state was or is party to the UN and its major frameworks, such as Women and Gender Equality, and the Council of Europe's Conventions (such as CEDAW, Beijing Platform for Action, UNSCR 1325 and 1820, Millennium Development Goals, and the Istanbul Convention). Each member state has its own active women's civil society organizations, feminist movements, advocacy groups, and women's lobbies, all of which directly or indirectly have contributed to the design of these conventions.

The Role of Feminist Movements

The feminist movement has generally always been well-functioning in Europe at nation state, European, and international levels, although ideological divisions remain. Women's struggles started at the end of the nineteenth century before becoming visible with the onset of an international campaign on women rights and women's suffrage in

1904, at the initiative of various organizations. Before 1930, "no country had adopted women's suffrage without strong pressure from domestic suffrage organizations, and first wave feminism movements in Western countries had become to focus on and grant for the women movements" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 896), although they lagged many years behind some other countries. Therefore, norm entrepreneurs aimed to make women's voices heard and create significant awareness. After 1848, woman rights were gradually realized, strengthened, and elaborated nationally and internationally. With the contribution of this first wave feminism (1930s to 1960s), women were able to acquire their basic citizenship rights. This movement happened in an environment of urban industrialism along with liberal and socialist ideologies and their political trajectories. Indeed, the roots of this movement began at the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848, which created pressure before the norm emergence stage was eventually completed. As a result, by the end of the 1930s, many western countries had accepted women suffrage.

In second wave feminism (1960s to 1990s), the main debate within women's movements concerned women's subordination. It emerged in a period when anti-war and civil rights movements were emerging, and there was a growing consciousness of human rights and equality worldwide. Whereas first wave feminism was generally propelled by the middle class and organized by white women, second wave feminism encompassed sexuality and reproductive rights, leading to the Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution to guarantee social equality regardless of sex. According to Gillis *et al.* (2004), a clear, "self-defined and self-identified feminist movement had emerged … and they concerned themselves with broader social relations and concentrated on issues which specifically impacted upon women's lives" (p. xxi). Meanwhile, the citizenship of women of colour, sisterhood, and solidarity were centralized by sharing that motto that 'women's struggle is class struggle'.

In order to overcome the limitations in defining the structural problems of women's subordination, a new paradigm was discussed and developed by third wave feminists, especially during the 1990s. Their focus was on the unequal social construction of gender roles and a recognition of social structures like race, class, and ethnicity. In this

period, along with the 'Gender and Development' (GAD) approach, there was a vocabulary shift towards a new paradigm that highlighted 'gender equality' as a new debate. Gender began to be perceived "as the product of the same structures that validate and perpetrate the division between public and private sphere" (Guerrina, 2005, p. 33). According to Mann and Huffman (2005), this new paradigm is viewed as a more profound perspective, because it touches on the "rise of a new discourse for framing and understanding gender relations that grew out of a critique of inadequacies of second wave" (p. 57). Third wave feminists distinguish themselves from previous feminist movements. In particular, "as a wave, that attempt to offer at least a provisional delineation of the parameters of the third wave – even while acknowledging the difficulties attending such a mapping of the subject -has been an underlying concern of many of those works making claims for its existence" (Gillis *et al*, 2004, p. xxii).

Third wave feminism has been the back-stage actor in the 'gender equality' paradigm shift since the start of 1990s. Its approach is much more comprehensive in that it emphasizes gender equality more strongly, as well as considering women in line with post-colonial, post-modern thinking, and intersectionality. This movement questions many norm constructions, including notions of universal motherhood, body-politics, gender, sexuality and heteronormativity, and neoliberal individualist ideology, which are produced and reproduced by the state and society.

The Role of the UN

Since the end of World War II, the UN has played a special leading role in promoting gender equality consciousness and sentiment worldwide. It has guided and funded many grassroots gender organizations considering their social policy differences and how member states tackle the issue using specific methods. In 1946, established the Commission on the Status of Women, which is a functional Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO), and was a significant step in raising women's voices, particularly during the post-war period of economic recovery. The Commission dedicates itself exclusively to the advancement of women and gender equality, organizes specific conferences and networks, and establishes important bodies

to eliminate or at least decrease women's exclusion. Concrete steps had been taken, especially during the 1970s, with the aim of debating about the 'Women in Development' (WID) process. Despite its deficiencies, the Commission's efforts on engaging women in development has been very promising and led to new solution-oriented approaches.

The UN's first conference on women in 1975 in Mexico City was a substantial moment in that it unveiled the problem on the world stage, especially by establishing the United Nations Decade for Women (1976-1985) to increase global awareness of all types of gender inequality. Through these steps, the women's rights dimension was implemented in policies and bureaucratic procedures as part of international organizations and governments (Meyer and Prügl, 1999). Subsequent conferences organized under the UN Decade for Women were held in Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995, all of which reviewed and appraised the programme's results and purposes. Another significant achievement of the UN Decade for Women was the adoption of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. CEDAW was influential as it "made women's rights a matter of international development" (Carbone and Lister, 2006, p.4) and entailed the inclusion of women's needs and interests in the development process. It is also described as the 'international bill of rights for women' and provides a basis for realizing equality between women and men. The key aims of the Convention were to establish a bill of rights for women and guarantee and monitor it along with the antecedent rights that women possess (CEDAW Report, 1979). Considering issues of civil, political, economic, and social rights, and women trafficking issues, CEDAW was a crucial moment in women's movement's history. However, there some parts of the Convention remained neglected, such as violations against women (Tickner, 2001), which is another bleeding wound in all societies. It was partly addressed in the UN Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW), which was adopted in 1993 by the UN General Assembly. This generated a normative but non-binding framework for states to take measures with the aim of eliminating all violence (Van der Vleuten *et al.*, 2014). This recommendation-based convention was composed of specific legislative, educational, and administrative measures to be taken by states and legitimized by

national feminist movements. However, states' reservations to the Convention trivialized the problem and created another obstacle to finding a solution.

Along with the UN's concrete efforts, the 1970s witnessed a paradigm shift towards WID, based on including women in the development domain through a network of donor agencies, governments, and NGOs (Razavi and Miller, 1995; Carbone and Lister, 2006). WID envisaged women's participation in every sector, which was a multi-level problem with social, political, and economic foundations. Despite WID's intention to invest in women, it was criticized for ignoring women's status and rights (Carbone and Lister, 2006). The core point of the critique concerned WID's exclusive focus on development and economic growth rather than women's economic freedom. As Meyer and Prügl (1999) examined WID's paradigm was based on 'women' and 'development' concepts, which were discussed mostly by the agencies concerned with economic development, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). That is, what the WID proposed only addressed the role of women in development despite the need for structural and institutional change. The objectives on women in development and reducing inequality, however, were included in external relations and stimulated world summit debates, structural programmes, agencies and various projects.

Starting from the WID, the women's rights and women's empowerment dimension already faced problems with unclear vocabulary on how to tackle this issue, whether within or outside the development term. The key problem about terminology became trapped in a very basic but intensive debate and conflicting positions. Ambiguity emerged as to whether states and organizations have to consider women's issues as an isolated matter or take gender equality as the centre of the debates. The importance of the latter is that it examines both men's and women's roles, their relations, equalization of their status, and their position in the society. According to Arnfred (2002), the change of language from 'women' to 'gender' has a crucial meaning in that the concept of women was firstly used in the Women in Development (WID) and only refers to integrating women into the development process without criticizing the unequal power relationship between men and women.

Through third way feminism, the GAD theoretical approach also entered the debates. GAD stresses that "gender came to refer to the socially constructed relations between women and men" (Cornwall, 1997, p.9), yet "instead of improving women's rights and status, the development process appeared to be contributing to a deterioration of their status" (Razavi and Miller, 1995, p.2). Despite the feminists' mainstream activism in the fight against women's disadvantages, discrimination, and WID's identification of women's lack of access to resources, GAD theory stressed the "importance of power, conflict and gender relations in understanding women's subordination" (Razavi and Miller, 1995, p. 12). This new approach politicized the WID debate, which gradually gained recognition and was advocated by feminists (Arnfed, 2002). According to GAD, the social roles of men and women are the determiners of the structural condition of the problem so to find a solution, there is a need for a new perspective that considers gender relations rather than only women. This approach was embedded in another term, Gender Mainstreaming, which became used especially in the 1990s, to acknowledge that gender should be evaluated as a norm.

During these periods, the UN and the Council of Europe considered women's voices more intensively, included the issue in countries' development policies. The gender equality problem was formulated not only by considering third world countries' political and economic neglect of the women dimension but also by indicating the gender gap stalemate in developed countries. By taking account of the exclusion of women from various realms, significant attempts were made some areas to fight against this problem, which brought the issue to the fore and made it more visible on international stage. However, mapping the gender inequality situation across countries reveals circumstances vary considerably. For instance, to constitute a gender mainstreaming strategy in developed countries, increasing women's participation in the labour market helps to improve women's social role in the society. However, the same term has different meanings in developing and underdeveloped countries in that the problem is more fragile and multi-layered, runs from education to health, and that livelihoods are more important for both men and women (Carbone and Lister, 2006) rather than women's economic emancipation.

The suggested solution for all initiatives were based on fixing the countries' economies through structural changes to public policies. The gender equality goal requires different approaches due to each country's different types of economic, political, and social policy traditions. For instance, social democratic governments consider gender equality as an essential part of their institutional settings whereas liberal economies tend to promote and re-arrange their market economies to include women in the economic process.

Gender mainstreaming is an important organizational strategy and channel to include gender in institutions' policies and activities to build gender equality (Reeves and Baden, 2000). In 1994, not only the UN but also CoE adopted a gender mainstreaming approach by setting up a Steering Committee for Equality between Men and Women, which was responsible for conducting its activities in line with promoting gender equality. After a year, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA) was adopted at the 1995 World UN Conference on Women. This international agreement aims to remove all obstacles facing women in all spheres of public and private life, based on a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural, and political spheres. It focuses on gender the dimension deeply by scrutinizing prospective methodologies and re-considering definitions of rights (Tickner, 2001). The Beijing Conference stressed that women's participation in every field of life should entail the empowerment of women in decision-making processes. This also means poverty alleviation can only be achieved by empowering women. The Declaration of the Conference adopted a Platform for Action, for which the EU made a significant contribution during the drafting process (Lister, 2006). The results of the Conference were included in both the Declaration and Platform for Action (Population Council, 1995).

The Declaration overtly examined women's status, empowerment, role in development, and participation in and access to power, assuming them to be fundamental elements for achieving equality (Beijing Declaration, 1995). Compared with previous conference declarations, Beijing was much more committed to the fight against gender inequality. However, countries had various reservations and there was a critical challenge regarding

the vocabulary of the gender dimension. The declaration uses the gender paradigm rather than women, which shifted the discussion from women to men and women (Carbone and Lister, 2006). Another criticism came from non-Western women who questioned the contents of the rights. They claimed that all the rights mentioned in the Beijing Declaration considered Western standards rather than cultural practices of the participating countries (Tickner, 2001). However, as Moser and Moser (2005) report, although most of the gender mainstreaming policies were adopted and implemented by international institutions, their implementation remains unsatisfactory due to these perspectives.

In the 1990s, many gender mainstreaming implementations were criticized for being ineffective and sometimes gender blind. It was again the UN that started a new agenda by presenting specific goals at the beginning of the millennium. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, the United Nations Millennium Declaration was adopted with eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved within a specified period. Since 2000, MDGs have become the primary global framework for international development aiming to reduce poverty by 2015. A specific goal of women's empowerment (goal three) and the recognition of gender as key to achieving the other seven goals demonstrate the global recognition of the centrality of gender equality to development.

The third goal specifically aims to "promote gender equality and empower women", which was assigned to governments to act jointly with non-governmental organizations, regional, national, and global bodies, and gender advocates and activists. Gender equality in the MDGs mostly concerns the elimination of disparities at all levels of education, increasing women's share of wage employment in the non-agricultural sector, and increasing the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. The education, employment, and political participation goals are expected to be implemented within a given time, although this is too limited considering the goals themselves, and the potential and will of the countries concerned (Kabeer, 2008; Lister, 2006).

In 2011, a decade after the MDGs were launched, the CoE introduced the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. This highlights a number of deeply traumatizing acts of violence that require attention: stalking, sexual harassment, sexual violence (including rape), domestic violence, physical and psychological abuse at the hands of intimate partners, forced marriage, and forced sterilization. The Convention made violence against women into a public health problem rather than a private issue. Thus, it declares that "it is the obligation of the state to address it fully in all its forms and to take measures to prevent violence against women, protect its victims and prosecute the perpetrators".[3]

3.2. Internal Norms: Gender Equality Norm Emergence in European Integration

This section provides a historical perspective on the EU's gender equality approach, which is a contested subject in European integration, as gender equality itself is a changing term, depending on time and context (Liebert, 2003). It is also important to bear in the mind that the term has been interpreted differently by member and candidate states. Meanwhile, at the EU level, the notion of gender equality has been re-framed and extended from equal opportunities to positive action and, since the 1990s, by using gender mainstreaming. All these approaches have gradually formed the EU's gender regime, composed of norms, principles, and policies.

Initially, the original six countries' (the EC6) aim by European integration was to create a market economy after the devastating effects of the Second World War. They believed that a common market would help their economies to recover by creating free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour across borders. For such a market economy to function effectively, two social provisions were crucial. One was free labour mobility. Thus, Article 117 of Treaty of Rome was important for harmonizing the labour market among the six by improving workers' living and working conditions. The second was expressed in Article 119, which stipulates equal opportunities between men and women. The latter's importance rests on the belief that unequal employment

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[3] More information can be found in
http://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/about-the-convention

damages another member state's economy. These two articles demonstrate how economic integration and social provisions were prioritized and embedded as complementary parts of the common market system.

Since then, gendering practices have become important, although in limited areas. From another perspective, gender distribution in the European Community's institutions especially in the European Parliament was unequal, with is the parliament being the least powerful EC organ (Abels and Mushaben, 2012). Initially, the percentage of women parliamentarians was 5.5 % at the beginning of the integration, 16.8 % in 1979, 19.3 % in 1989, and 35 % in 2009. The number of the women parliamentarians especially increased after the 1995 enlargement (Sweden, Denmark and Austria), which have higher gender equality rates.

Feminist scholars argue that the EU is a market that creates enterprise while neoliberal economic policies eliminate women from the labour market (Abels and Mushaben, 2012). Women have equal access to the job market, employability, and social security systems. However, women's economic inclusion does not solve the structural problems as highlighted by third wave feminism and in the GAD approach. Rather, the stalemates have sociological and political foundations concerning women's positions in society or their social role in family and society. According to Kronsell (2012), these neglected areas not only have a societal basis but are also found in the academic literature, in that academic studies of European integration need to make use of a gender lens.

The general approach regarding the gender gap in the EU can be considered under two major problems and many sub-problems. First, women are under-represented in EU institutions and decision-making process. Second, European policies are insufficiently sensitive to gender equality (Van der Vleuten, 2012), while there are still specific issues that need to be solved, such as sexual and gender-based violence. On the other hand, although the EU's social agenda ostensibly aims to reconcile work and family, progress is still very slow (Sümer, 2009). Feminist authors indicate that, if the gender gap problem remains unsolved then the EU's democratic deficit will double (Kronsell, 2012).

During the widening and deepening process of European integration, gender equality among member states were issued in a narrow sense by just concentrating on ensuring equal pay for women workers in specific sectors. This clause was a part of the ILO Convention, which obliged signatory states to do so. This concern regarding equal pay for equal work was first declared in the Treaty of Rome, Article. 119 and all six-member states had to implement this article in their domestic law. Considering 1950s' conditions, this law was an important step towards subsequent treaties. However, until the end of the 1980s, no women-oriented work had been done or considered, except for some action programs that promoted positive discrimination in favour of women. In the same period, the concept of gender mainstreaming was first proposed at the 1985 Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in Kenya, discussed in GAD debates, adopted at the 1995 UN Women's conference in Beijing, and put into the EU's agenda as a strategy. This became enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which made gender mainstreaming a primary policy for achieving gender equality. The Treaty of Lisbon then explicitly indicated that gender equality was one of the EU's human rights values.

3.2.1. The Beginning: Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women

The first stage of gender policy development is the period from the Treaty of Rome until the end of the 1970s. During this slow integration process, it is hard to argue that the EU tried to foster the gender dimension in its agenda. Unsurprisingly, its newly emerging economic integration did not concentrate on such an issue, especially in those years. Both the practice and theoretical analysis of early theories were gender blind (Lister, 2006) and totally ignored the gender dimension of integration. However, to make economic integration successful and expedite the internal market, some specific gender directives were articulated onto integration. This started with Article 119 in the Treaty of Rome, which provided "equal pay for women and men in equal work" in the EEC, which tried to harmonize or equalize labour costs in economic competitiveness (Lister and Carbone, 2006; Yvonne and Clavero, 2012).

Article 119 was actually first introduced after the First World War, with the strong advocacy of women's organizations in Europe. These insisted on equal pay by referring to the Versailles Peace Treaty's labour section, which was important for employers as they preferred to use cheap women's labour while the men were either at war or had died in it (Kantola, 2010). On the other hand, even before European integration, France had already adopted this article (Lister, 2006) when equal pay for work of equal value became part of the ILO Constitution in 1919 (Kantola, 2010). France, while disregarding it for the sake of women's rights, had clearly taken the leading role in this process by arguing that "it was necessary to include the principle of equal pay for women and men in order to avoid distortions in competitiveness between Member States" (Arribas and Carrasco, 2003, p. 22). It also forced member countries to implement the article to further the Common Market (Yvonne and Clavero, 2012). Hence, France's insistence on equal payment was not because of feminist ideological sensitivity about the structural conditions of inequality but rather due to considering its competitive disadvantage with other member states.

The EU's gender equality related policies began with Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which declared that "men and women should receive equal pay for equal work". This article became noteworthy due to activism in Belgium in the Gabrielle Defrenne case, which established the direct effect of the equal pay principle in 1976 (Hoskyns, 1996, p:15–17). That is, legal efforts related to gender equality first appeared in reference to the founding treaty's equal pay principle in Article 119 (now Article 141 EC). Since then, the content of the principle has given way to a broader agenda that includes not only the promotion of equal opportunities for men and women but also the elimination of inequality based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, age, and sexual orientation.

However, pay gaps between these countries still existed during the 1960s. According to Hoskyns (1996), Van der Vleuten (2007), and Kantola (2010), the central incentives during this period were the internal market aim of the original six states and the ILO's Convention's recommendation on equal pay for men and women. Meanwhile, increasing claims of the women's lobby for equal pay was supported by international

trade unions, which played an effective role in developing Article 119 and the following directives. Although the essential aim of this article was based on economic interests, it was important to frame such a clause in 1957 because many European states in the first decades of the post-war years were struggling to reconstruct their economies and political structures so gender equality or women rights were often ignored, postponed, and never proposed as items for the countries' concern. It is far to argue that the integration had taken account gender equality as a part of human rights, as human rights, itself, was not a concern during these years. Although the 1970s were regarded as the "golden age for harmonization of the living and working conditions in the member states" (Horibayashi, 2006, p.5), this golden age did little for women's struggles. Rather, the significant steps made towards women in terms of hard laws were also introduced by binding directives. These directives in the mid-1970s intensified the equal opportunities approach in women's favour. According to Kantola (2010), there are several reasons for these directives. The first was the burgeoning social dimension of European integration with the leading role of left-wing parties. The second was enlargement and new member states with their own gender equality laws and policies. The third was the attitude and role of women politicians, bureaucrats, and more unified women movements in European.

Considering these directives, all member states were asked to align their laws with these supranational provisions within a specified time frame. These directives were also supported by EC Structural Funds to close the gap among member states. Nevertheless, states faced obstacles while internalizing these directives –especially in the 1970s – as still they were struggling to reconstruct their economies and political structures. According to Marshall (2013), the Equal Treatment/Opportunities directives in 1970s are noteworthy because "they were prepared by the significant input from the feminist officials and experts" (p. 22) in Europe and EU institutions. Nevertheless, despite the specific emphasis on the elimination of sex discrimination, there was no reference to marital and family status, access to employment, training, working conditions, promotion or dismissal. The same trend continued in the following directives. Considering norm emergence in the EU regarding the gender equality norm, although equal pay was first stated in the Treaty of Versailles and at the ILO Convention in 1919

and emerged universally, the gender acquis was founded on the basis of Article 141 on equal pay for men and women, which was prior to Article 119, Article 13 on anti-discrimination, introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and later directives on equal treatment, equal opportunities, and social security. These articles and directives constituted the binding hard laws of European integration, with the gender equality norm first emerging in terms of inclusion in the market economy.

3.2.2. Expanding the Scope of Gender Equality: Violence against Women

In contrast to the early steps towards integration, the 1980s was less focused on gender equality. Instead, the age of neoliberalism and a conservative environment prioritized a market economy driven priority that watered down many previously drafted directives and steps for many equality directives. Apart from the Directive on equal treatment of men and women in occupational social security schemes (86/378, as amended by Directive 96/97) and the directive on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity (Directive 86/613, repealed by Directive 2010/41), gender equality attention was directed towards the use of soft laws with two action plans on equal opportunities (Kantola, 2010). Moving beyond the market-driven gender equality hard laws in social policy, the EU has designed more soft law instruments since the end of 1980s that are not legally binding and are instead represented through guidelines, action plans, and recommendations. The scope of these soft laws expanded in the "field of combatting with violence and intersecting equalities as well as endorsing the use of positive action and gender mainstreaming as tools to provide gender equality" (Marshall, 2013, p. 25).

No binding directives or treaties were implemented regarding Violence against Woman, except for Article 13 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which stressed anti-discrimination. However, the central problems of inequality are certainly based on a "gender-segregated labour market, gender gaps in the labour market and in parliament, the exclusion of minority women from official discourses, and high levels of violence against women" (Kantola, 2010, p. 10). Regarding domestic violence, the EU avoided focusing on it since violence was still seen as a private family issue in the 1980s. Concrete concern

was only given to sexual harassment (Marshall, 2013). Although several women's organizations and feminist movements inside Europe declared that violence is a constant problem that challenges women in every sphere of life, their claim did not receive much attention from either the EU or its member states.

The most recent common conceptualization of violence is gender-based violence (GBV), which includes, but is not limited to, four types: economic, sexual, psychological, and physical. Considering the directives and two treaty articles, it can be said that, among these violence categories, the EU/EC mostly focused on economic violence in a few specific cases. However, the 1984 Committee of Women's Rights in the European Parliament (EP) prepared a report based on recognizing domestic violence as a public health problem and issued a resolution on domestic violence in 1986 based on systematic data gathering. The need for such a report was first expressed at the UN World Conference in Nairobi (Lombardo and Meier, 2007) as there was previously no clear data on domestic violence cases in EU member states.

Similarly, following the 1995 Beijing Conference, which tackled violence against women as one of the twelve issues that states should take measures against, the EP issued a resolution in 1997 for "zero tolerance of violence against women", which paved the way for recognition of violence as a public matter (Marshall, 2013). Indeed, the 1990s was a turning point in many ways because violence was explicitly explained in Article 129 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, albeit as part of soft law whereby the EU introduced its Daphne programmes for women against violence (Kantola, 2010): Daphne I 1997-1999, Daphne II 2004-2008, and Daphne III 2007-2013. The aim of these programmes has been to raise awareness and strengthen anti-violence networks inside the EU.

3.2.3. Positive Action Programs in favour of Women

Following the narrow competence of equal opportunities, feminists inside and outside EU institutions complained that these directives were ineffective for eliminating gender-biased structural problems (Lombardo and Meier, 2007). While equal pay for equal work is the first stage of the European integration's three-legged gender equality

development process, the positive actions period is the second stage. Positive action is a concept that entered the EU's agenda in the 1980s and refers to the context of anti-discrimination law, which "not only measures involving sex-based preferences but also any other neutral measures whose effects are such as to remove existing barriers to equality" (Selanec and Senden, 2011, p. 4). It involves the use of special measures to assist disadvantaged groups in overcoming the obstacles and discrimination, they encounter in their society. Its aim is to shift the policy focus from specific equal outcomes to the equalization of starting points (Kantola, 2010). According to Lister (2006), "[n]ew approaches to development, from the first 'women in development' strategies of the l970s to the empowerment approaches of the 1990s, have consistently pushed the boundaries of recognizing gender-based disadvantage and promoting equality" (p. 17). This encouraged the European Economic Community towards dealing with the issue in its integration process. However, the implementation of the Article 119 (now Article 141) and the following WID approaches during the 1970s faced challenges among the six founding states so that further gender dimensions, except equal pay for equal work, were not welcomed enthusiastically.

In the 1970s and 1980s, positive actions complemented Article 119 (now 141) and related directives in many ways. In the mid- 1970s, gender equality-based directives included the Directive on equal pay for men and women (75/117), the Directive on equal treatment of men and women in employment; as regards access to employment, self-employment and occupation, including working conditions and vocational training (76/207 as amended by directive 2002/73); the Directive on equal treatment of men and women in statutory schemes of social security (79/7). By the 1980s, both the economic paradigm and the social policy priorities had been changed in line with neoliberalism. Positive action programmes were introduced as a sort of remedy for the overt distortions of market economies. However, some feminists and gender experts argued that "positive action was seen as contradicting equal treatment legislation" (Stratigati, 2005, p. 170), in that some legislative statements of gender equality were not institutionalized until the 1990s due to the UK's opposition on the equality agenda's legislative base provided by the Sex Discrimination Act, 1976. This strong opposition to positive action

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measures in terms of gender equality was maintained by the Conservative Thatcher government during the 1980s.

Indeed, in these years, the EU labour market positive action approach was promoted by medium-term programs for equal opportunities for women. This was implemented in the first action program (1982–85) that focused on awareness, information, and best practice activities; it was consolidated in the second action program (1986–90) that considered networking and the share of occupational and domestic responsibilities; the third and fourth equal opportunities programs, covering 1991-1995 and 1996-2000 respectively, aimed to foster women's participation in decision-making mechanisms; finally, the fifth programme (2001-2006) concerned the dissemination and improvement of gender equality issues that involves the factors leading to multidirectional gender discrimination.

These action programs mostly emphasized the share of best practices and transnational networking to improve capacity building of the grassroots within the EU. These activities included campaigns and publishing programs to increase awareness in the society. Other programs envisaged policy analysis that included statistical data, impact assessment, aggregation of tools and mechanisms, and effective dissemination of results and indicators. These activities aimed to monitor the effectiveness of EU law and practices. In addition, since the 2000s, the EU has introduced various programs to demonstrate its commitment to eliminating any type of inequality: the five-year framework strategy on gender equality in 2001; the roadmap for equality between women and men for 2006-2010; and the recent roadmap for 2010-2015 concerning the need for eliminating any type of violence.

The positive action approach views women as a disadvantaged and vulnerable group, who deserve treatment for structural oppression. This perspective is reflected in the EU's action programs and other programs that it funds. The institutional developments of the EC are the Committee on Women's Rights in the European Parliament and the European Commission Equal Opportunities Unit in the Directorate for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs. All these institutions work to ensure that

information about women's needs are considered in the policymaking process. These structures support positive action projects, for which the main vehicle has been the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Community Action Programmes for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, and programs such as NOW (New Opportunities for Women) in the EU's structural funds, which gives occupational training for women.

Equal treatment law and policies during the 1980s concerned pay, employment, social security, self-employment, pregnancy, and parenthood (Hoskyns, 1992). The first two Action Programs on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities (1982–85 and 1986–90) involved the creation of equality networks by the Commission, which moved the agenda from equal treatment to positive action, with an emphasis on addressing the question of women's disadvantage. However, the inadequacy of existing policies was first formally acknowledged by the Third Community Action Programme for Equal Opportunities (1991–5). One of the reasons for this is the society-wide benefits that equality measures are based on the liberal idea that both men and women had something to gain.

Since the 1990s, the Gender and Development approach, along with the Beijing conference, highlighted an important paradigm shift in the issue of women's empowerment. The shift in focus from women to gender caused alienation in using positive action approaches in that these programs "targeted funding and reserved opportunities for women, often placed women in opposition to men and sometimes in opposition to other women" (Booth and Bennett, 2002, p. 438). Despite the programs' fluctuating effectiveness, the Commission report on positive actions measures (Selanec and Senden, 2011) reported that, concerning the normative goals of the EC and the national reports of member states, positive measures had been used to improve the ability of disadvantaged groups to compete for available opportunities, especially in the labour market. States often used positive action to limit the negative effects on women's position in the labour market of the unequal distribution of responsibilities in the family, with member states using positive action to ensure a balanced representation of men and women in bodies with significant decision-making powers. Consequently, the positive action programs somehow helped member states to ameliorate problems with female labour market participation, despite its narrow room for manoeuvre.

The Women's Charter

The European Commission adopted the Women's Charter in 2010 to improve the promotion of gender equality in Europe and worldwide. In line with the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter became the binding legal authority and was introduced to extend awareness of gender inequalities not only economically but also regarding the wider reality of inequality, all of which are politically articulated and referenced to legal protection. The Charter proposed five specific fields of action: economic independence; equal pay for women and men; the representation of women in decision-making; respect for women's dignity and integrity; and external EU actions regarding equality between women and men.

In the first economic independence action, the Charter emphasizes combating discrimination, educational stereotypes, labour market segregation, precarious employment conditions, involuntary part-time work, and unbalanced sharing of care responsibilities with men. Its actions were expected to facilitate better gender distribution in the labour market. In the second action, the Commission commits to fighting pay gaps by mobilizing all available instruments, including legislative ones. In the third action, the Commission aims to eliminate the under-representation of women in both the public and private sectors, and commits to acting for a fairer representation of women, particularly by adopting incentives at the EU level. In the fourth action, the Commission aims to end gender-based violence, including harmful customary or traditional practices, eliminating inequality in access to healthcare, and eradicating all forms of gender-based violence. Finally, in the fifth action, the EU aims to support the development of sustainable and democratic societies, and defend equality between women and men in its relations with third countries through the mutual support of state and non-state actors.

The first action program document of the Charter was the action plan of 2010-2015 strategy for men and women. The scope and the content of gender equality related policies were extended and equality between men and women became a "well established legal principle at the European level" (David and Guerrina, 2013, p.53). Ultimately these efforts have emerged incrementally along with treaty provisions and

social action programs that ultimately gained a new meaning after being enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.

3.2.4. Gender Mainstreaming as a New Strategy

After almost 40 years of equal treatment and positive action policies in the labour market, the gender mainstreaming approach was introduced in 1996 to promote gender equality in all EU policies. This strategy aims to construct a "procedure for promoting gender equality instead of on a case-by-case basis" (Peto and Manners, 2006, p. 99) and transform malestream policies by introducing a gender equality perspective. It offers a new understanding on how to tackle gender discrimination that entails a paradigm shift from the EU's previous equality measures (Beveridge and Velluti, 2008) by addressing greater structural change – including ideational change – such as political participation, governance, and participatory modes of democracy.

Prior to these gender mainstreaming strategies, one of the important steps was the establishment of European Women's Lobby (EWL) in 1990. Lobby became the norm entrepreneur in the Community, promoting the idea of integrating a gender perspective in all decision-making processes, and has influenced the Women's Committee of the European Parliament in promoting positive action and placing the gender equality debate on the EU's agenda. This shift occurred because it became clear that positive action related policies were failing to bring stable change to women's lives, as women faced more structural problems, which positive action programs were inadequate to ameliorate. However, the essence of this challenge comes not through imitating what men do but by "reconstructing the political agenda by seeking recognition of non-hegemonic gendered identities that have been treated as different to male normative identities and cultures" (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007, p.23). Instead of the "*tinkering* with equal treatment legislation, or *tailoring* positive action measures, gender mainstreaming is advocated by feminist scholars as a means of 'transforming' the pre-existing 'malestream' organizations, structures, and norms in order to feminize the mainstream" (Manners, 2007, p. 89). The official adoption of gender mainstreaming represents the beginning stage of the EU's gender perspective.

To explain what gender mainstreaming means in detail, international institutions and the EU produced a common definition that gender mainstreaming is the "(re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making" (UNHCR, 1998, p.15). From this definition, it is understood that the expected result is institutional and ideational change (Roth, 2004). According to Bretherton (2002), it is a "demanding strategy" as it offers a chance to challenge deeply embedded cultural values and reviews the formation of existing policy issues. Now, the EU's self-image or self-expression in terms of gender equality has become a marble cake that first started with the gender *acquis*, then positive action in the 1980s and its related programmes, and lastly the universal principles on gender equality and its gender mainstreaming strategy. The difference between the latter and the former two approaches is also determined by many factors, such as the number of women EU parliamentarians, and how these women interpret gender equality and collaborate with women's movements.

As Beveridge and Velluti (2008) note, gender mainstreaming entails a paradigm shift from the logic of equality measures and positive action to the core problems, such as gender inequality at a more structural level. When compared with previous measures, this strategy represents a democracy and complaints led model that focuses on women and the gender biases derived from the constructed roles attributed to women. For problem solving, it inserts a mainstreaming mentality into both the EU's and national states' policies to make them question patriarchal and malestream constructions in decision making. It also envisages social and cultural ideational change that leads to "a transformation of society by naming and challenging the existing gender and power relations through policy interventions wherein formerly disempowered women or their organizations participate in questioning, analysing, and acting upon the gendered world" (Debusser, 2011, p. p. 40).

This mainstreaming strategy implies a broader definition as its aim is to "transform gender relations in the direction of gender equality" (Council of Europe, 1998, p. 13-

14). This transformative potential of gender mainstreaming constitutes the long-term agenda for the purpose of scrutinizing deeply rooted societal norms and practices within which inequalities are embedded. According to Squires (2007), this strategy should facilitate the "transformative frame of analysis that enables gender relations to be understood as changeable by policy interventions" (p. 68). Hence, there is a need to identify "hidden, unrecognized and unremarked ways in which systems and structures are biased in favour of men, and to redress the balance" (Rees 1998, p.189). The rise of the gender mainstreaming paradigm was also endorsed by the Fourth and Fifth Action Programmes on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities (1996–2000 and 2001–2005), in which feminist scholars emphasize the integration of gender into "intellectual and 'real world' mainstreaming" (Mazey 2000; Manners, 2007, p. 89), and developing more tools to diffuse this strategy.

Indeed, a gender mainstreaming strategy designed a universal level corresponds to the EU's maturation process, when the EU re-shaped its agenda to incorporate gender norms as an instrument in its enlargement process and development policies. The EU's commitment to its mainstreaming strategy was first overtly seen when EU Development Commissioners proposed placing the UN's MDGs at the heart of the EU development process. Thus, the EU devoted itself to achieving the MDGs, including gender equality (European Commission, 2003a) and playing a catalytic role by imposing them on other states. Since then, the EC has followed "a twin-track approach for development policy towards integrating a gender dimension: i) measures specifically designed to tackle gender inequalities and ii) incorporation of gender issues into all aspects of development policy" (European Parliament, 2009, p.8).

The presentation of this strategy aiming for gender equality was introduced in 1997 in the Treaty of Amsterdam. With this treaty, the EU first explicitly stressed the importance of employing a gender dimension in every policy realm for achieving equality between men and women, not only inside the EU but also in its external relations. Through the norm entrepreneurship role of the European Women Lobby, the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty can be considered to have been the first step towards reaching the tipping point that provokes socialization dynamics (Neumann, 2009). In

the same treaty, Article 141 on equal pay (previously Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome) was revised and Article 13 was added to give the EU new powers for tackling discrimination, which significantly expanded legislation with a few years. Article 13 differs from Article 141 in terms of voting as the former requires a unanimous vote in the Council whereas the latter requires qualified majority voting (Kantola, 2010). This non-discrimination driven article 13 was acknowledged as a fundamental right by the Treaty of Nice in 2000, and it was implemented through the Employment Equality Directives, which prohibit employment related discrimination. The directive has had a significant impact on the level of protection provided, particularly to victims of disability. Through article 13 and its related directives, the EU has revealed a specific power to combat discrimination on a wide range of grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. This has led both to the introduction of a series of new Equality Directives as well as to the revision of the existing Gender Equality Directives.

In addition to Article 13 on anti-discrimination, the European Employment Strategy was also introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam, again referring to gender mainstreaming. Its strategies give a specific economic role to gender equality in that "development of equal opportunities policies and gender mainstreaming has been an explicit objective" (Fagan et al., 2005, p. 568). With the European Employment Strategy, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) emerged as a soft law tool for gender policies, actors, and institutions. Due to differing gender regimes and social policies among member states, the OMC is used in fields where EU policy binding is difficult. It calls for the harmonization of national policies with EU policies, but without the use of legally binding instruments, relying instead on dialogue, peer evaluation, best practices sharing, and naming-shaming methods. Peer evaluation of national reports and action plans are used as pressuring tools for national states and EU policies. All member states, candidate states, or other countries that the EU negotiates with have distinct social policy structures and ways of tackling the gender problem. Although the OMC can be assumed to be a good model, member states' social policies could only be converged rather than harmonized.

However, despite these promising steps, Hoskyns has criticized gender mainstreaming for often remaining focused on implementation issues rather than power challenging shifts. The EU has acknowledged gender mainstreaming as a duty and stressed on the elimination of any gender-based inequality. As a part of soft law, this strategy has included domestic violence and healthcare, which were both previously under the domain of member states. However, gender equality needs local as well as state level consent as it is directly related with the gender roles constructed in the society and consolidated by cultural norms. Although the EU produces normative commitments to promote gender equality in social policy and market integration, Krizsan and Lombardo (2013) argue that policy actors engage in conceptual disputes on gender equality while the process has shown that "the criteria by which the success of policies in promoting women's rights or the quality of equality policies could be assessed are open to contestation" (Lombardo *et al.*, 2009, p. 10; Krizsan and Lombardo, 2013, p. 78).

3.3. External Norms: Engaging in Universal Gender Equality

Regarding the EU's gender equality norm diffusion, gender equality has been one of the major elements of integration since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and gained further importance in EU agreements and official documents. It is recognized as vital to economic growth, prosperity, and competitiveness, as exemplified by the Council's commitment to fulfil EU ambitions on gender equality through the adoption of the European Pact for Gender Equality (2011–2020) (7349/11) and the European Commission's Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010–2015) (COM (2010) 491 final). One of the EU's committed efforts on gender equality is the Charter of Fundamental Rights represented in the Treaty of Amsterdam and enshrined in the Nice Treaty. The Charter focuses on adopting measures for combating discrimination on grounds of racial origins, sex, age, disability, religion, or sexual orientation.

Along with the Treaty of Lisbon, gender equality has been prioritized by implementing mainstreaming in all policy areas, and by including trafficking of women and sexual exploitation as issues that challenge the EU's fundamental values, as prominently outlined in Articles 1a and 2 of the Treaty. Eliminating gender roles in the societies

requires a process and well-designed strategy in which the EU's ultimate aim is to involve inequality solving policies in every sphere of life.

As Kantola (2010) notes, even though the Treaty of Lisbon attaches importance to gender equality, referring to it as the common value of member states (Article 1a, Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, p. 11) by indicating that member states should promote it (Article 2, Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, p.11), mainstreaming is not fully included in all parts: health, culture, education, foreign and security policy, and finance (p.216) areas remain poorly equalized. Similarly, David and Guerrina (2013) also argue that, although gender equality is assumed as a normative value in both rhetorical and policy terms, its definition and implementation remains uneven.

In 2007, the EU seems much more enthusiastic to demonstrate its willingness to engage in gender equality building by more comprehensively highlighting it in its report, Communication on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Cooperation. In this paper, the obstacles facing women in developing countries were collected under specific headings, with particular concern given to women's positions in economic activities, employment, and their informal working positions, although trade liberalization benefitted these economies. Other issues included poor participation of women in education, decision-making processes, and their role in peace building. Although there were explicit references to the UN goals and the EU's statement, Gender Equality is a Fundamental Human Right, the EU mostly emphasized gender equality regarding economic activity (European Commission, 2007). Because this is a sector-based strategy (European Commission, 2003b), the EU's concrete consideration was intensified on poverty reduction and sustainable development.

It is important to see that, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has presented a more gender sensitive self-image and become a role model (Woodward and Van der Vleuten, 2014) regarding member state policies, and for gender norms and cultures to filter down from the international and EU level to national, regional, and local levels (EIGE, 2013). To brighten its self-image, in its 2010 report, the European Commission adopted the Women Charter because "reducing the gender inequalities, tackling gender-based

violence, and promoting women rights are essential for developing sustainable democratic societies" (European Commission, 2010, p. 4-5). It was also evident that the EU had dedicated itself to gender equality and being a role model for third countries, using its gender equality norm as a complementary tool in its external relations. According to Woodward and Vleuten (2014), the EU's aims in its relations with third countries are interwoven with human rights, peace, and rule of law, but again along with the market economy. Hence, this enthusiasm to spread these values paves the way for the "dominance of neoliberal ideas and the export of its norms by economic means" (p. 68-69). That is, gender equality is a kind of entry ticket (Galligan and Clavero, 2012) and "product for export" (Woodward and Van der Vleuten, 2014, p. 69).

So far, gender equality as a norm seems to be one of the key criteria to identify whether the EU has *de facto* normative power over third parties. Although gender equality is not a formal EU membership criterion or development policy condition, third parties are expected to improve their women's empowerment standards in the market economy and develop women's rights in compliance with human rights values. These norms are imported by the third country through international interactions, agents, stakeholders like NGOs and social movement actors. Each gender equality norm has faced a degree of struggle in the norm-receiving country due to several intersecting inequalities, the country's gender regime, or government ideology.

One of the EU's priorities was to fulfil the UN's Gender Declaration's objectives, achieving the rights listed in CEDAW, the MDGs, and the Istanbul Convention. The EU has announced its objectives in Commission reports, with the aims designed to consider gender equality in every sector and women's empowerment in line with adopting international commitments. However, the European Commission reports indicate that adopting the MDGs as a guide and taking concrete steps in line with the targets would not be easy and would require sufficient time, both in the EU's external relations and for gender equality construction within the EU (EU Report, 2005; European Parliament, 2009).

3.4. Gendered Welfare Modelling and the Contested Nature of the EU's Gender Regime

Gender is not a static concept (Locher and Prügl, 2009) because its meaning and interactions with various actors makes it multi-layered. According to Fagan *et al.* (2005), gender mainstreaming is also not a static framework as its content, objectives, and monitoring tools can move up or down depending on the cyclical situation and political power shifts. The EU's gender equality identity is conceived of three circles, layered one above the next. The first circle is the national gender equality identity of member states that have different welfare state typologies. The second circle is the EU's gender acquis-based or EU-based internal norms that member states are expected to internalize, such as Article 141 of the Treaty of Rome, concerning equal pay for equal work. The third circle encompasses the previous two plus the universal gender equality conceptualization as the EU acknowledges it as its value. Although the literature is scarce on the gendered welfare state typologies of member states, it is well-known that each member state possesses a different type of gender equality regime based on its welfare system or the relationship between state and market. Hence, the welfare structures of EU member states determine the degree of gender equality norm internalization.

Walby (2004) highlighted the varieties of gender regimes in member states and developed a conceptual framework that shows the continuum from domestic to public – mostly in industrialized societies – that are classified as market-led, welfare state-led, and regulatory policy-led trajectories. In the welfare state-led model followed by Nordic countries, enhanced care services, such as child care, increase female labour market participation. In the market-led model, service provision only supports employed women in the market mechanism. The regulatory system developed by the EU facilitates women's employment through directives such as anti-discrimination, working time, equal pay, and other social inclusion soft and hard laws.

Esping-Andersen (1990) first categorized three welfare regimes of EU member states: Liberal Democratic, Conservative/Corporatist/Bismarckian, and Social Democratic

Welfare. This model has an important place in the literature. Leibfried and Ferrara's addition of a fourth category, the Rudimentary Welfare Regime, is also important to better grasp classical European welfare typologies. However, the categorization is strongly criticized by feminists for not including a gender lens in its welfare state analysis. (Sainsbury, 1994; Duncan, 1995). Esping-Andersen therefore included a gender sensitive welfare typology, by writing the book 'Incomplete Revolution' (2009). In the new analysis, the role of the family as a welfare supporter is examined. When it examined the categorizations from a gender perspective, it becomes apparent that, economically, Europe's gender map varies, with diverse constructions of men's and women's labour market participation. For instance, child care is an important factor while tackling women's employability. Care work is taken as a clue to analyzing how women are commoditized or isolated from the labour market.

In their social democratic welfare model or Nordic egalitarian model, Scandinavian countries adopted gender mainstreaming as the main gender equality method even before the EU promoted the concept (Neumann, 2009). Accordingly, there was already a certain level of gender awareness before their membership in 1995 and even before the Beijing UN conference on Women in the same year. In Scandinavian countries, "the public and private distinction is not upheld" (Kantola, 2010, p. 10) in that public provision of child care is well-developed and there is gender-neutral social citizenship. Consequently, women's labour market participation is higher than in other European countries. The Nordic system is based on dual worker/dual carer system that gives a broad place for men's caregiving roles and women's employability. Indeed, the dual-winner system is new a norm (Esping-Andersen, 2009) in modern industrialized societies. Care services are institutionalized and, rather than family-centred care, public services are preferred and demanded, because family-centred care consolidates a traditional gender equality ideology and has adverse effects on women (Dedeoğlu, 2012). In the Scandinavian/Social Democratic model, "de-commodification of labour is extended (Duncan, 1995, p. 266) and women have been liberated from dependence on men because they can earn an independent income (Esping-Andersen, 2009). For example, in Finland, "a pervasive child care system was developed as to support the pre-existing norm of women as full-time workers" (Duncan, 1995, p. 272).

In liberal regimes, Anglo-Saxon countries use neoliberal policies, public services are at a minimum, and social policy is just used to uphold the market. For instance, Britain's liberal regime is composed of "conservative values with a restricted role of the state and heightened emphasis on individual" (Kantola, 2010, p. 9). This model therefore considers motherhood and childcare as private, leaving the market responsible for providing needs. In gender relations, women are free to choose between paid and unpaid work, which influences changes in housewifery. Hence, this residual welfare system progressively reduces social citizenship (Duncan, 1995) and women's inclusion in the labour market.

In corporatist/conservative systems, such as Germany's, the presentation of status differences is central to social policy. Germany has a conservative viewpoint on gender roles and "advocates a more traditional gender equality approach, which focuses more on the integration of women into the 'male-stream' than on to restructure social roles" (Neumann, 2009, p. 28). The conservative model is based on the principle of primarily male employment rather than women's economic inclusion. This gender regime is constructed on the male breadwinner/female carer family, which is least favourable for women's labour market integration. The state intervenes in a highly regulatory manner, and in terms of women's employment, it is "using childcare to support for full-time housewives" (Duncan, 1995, p. 266). However, this intervention does not explicitly "aim to enhance or diminish social inequality but rather is aimed at maintaining the status quo" (Pfau-Effinger, 1998, p. 148).

Lastly in the Rudimentary system or Mediterranean regime in southern European countries, the central role is given to families, which provides social protections as if it's an institution, while the "Catholic Church has upheld the centrality of nuclear family" (Kantola, 2010, p. 9) with a minimal role for state interventions. Social citizenship remains weak and there is little childcare support for women. In addition, the division of labour is strongly gendered because these countries, namely Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece, do not have a history of full employment, particularly from a gender perspective and especially during their authoritarian eras. Consequently, women's

unemployment is very high. However, while Spain's Socialist Party government was in power from 2004-2008, "crucial new laws on gender violence, same sex marriage and effective equality between men and women were passed; and internal measures on gender promotion in public administration were taken" (Bustelo, 2009, p.531).

While this classification of gender in the welfare systems provides an analytical description of Europe's gender map, it neither tackles the issue in a single country context nor includes other patriarchal and class-centred variations. While the classification gives us a picture of women's employability in European countries, it does not explicitly include unpaid domestic work. According to Neumann's comparative study on gender equality norm in Sweden and Germany (2009), the diffusion of gender mainstreaming launched by the European Council has shown that norm internalization, especially at a local level, has not happened in some EU member states because "traditional social structures are deeply entrenched" (Neumann, 2009, p. 54). There have been problems with implementation because civil servants and local politicians do not know how to implement the tools or a critical mass of the people are yet to be convinced about the importance of the norm.

3.5. The Gender Equality Norm as a Foreign Policy Instrument

After Europe's integration process started to deepen its political and economic structure, gender issue became part of the acquis, along with specific problems. Although the spill-over gradually became functional in many areas, gender equality has remained a secondary interest (Hoskyns, 1996; David and Guerrina, 2012) of integration. Accordingly, these implementation problems are also reflected in the EU's enlargement process when new members or candidate countries have faced specific difficulties in transposing the gender *acquis* into their national law. The gender *acquis* has been intensified along with international movements and European level policy preferences that have taken form through the EU's changing economic and political structure. The evolution of the gender *acquis* has improved from the first women in development strategies of the 1970s via the positive discrimination for women approaches of the 1990s to the current gender mainstreaming strategy. As well as the early effects of WID

and later approaches such as GAD, strengthened women's activism, whether conducted individually or supported by various institutions like trade unions (Galligan and Clavero, 2006), have played a visible complementary role in the progress of the EU's gender policies.

The end of the Cold War coincided with the rise of the EU's economic actorness in these years. When CEEC enlargements became an issue, this meant that new feminist scholars and new perspectives would be included into the EU gender equality debates. Meanwhile, new women politicians have also made significant contributions in the EP. Particularly following the Eastern enlargement, new member states tried to adapt to the EU's liberalizing approach, although their socialist equality and reproductive rights for women background was challenged by this liberal economic model. However, EU enlargement policies have failed to provide a basis for gender equality while "these countries feminists were often side-lined in the process" (Manners, 2007, p.88). EU policies have begun to address gender in the EU's external actions, with an emphasis on development policy, ACP relations and enlargement. According to Debusser (2016), the inclusion of gender advocates at every stage of the EU's external policy is necessary "to avoid stereotypical, paternalist and Eurocentric ideas about the meaning of gender equality abroad and allow for a contextually grounded reflexivity on the quality of gender policy" (p. 1), and thereby to increase the quality of the norm.

Likewise, before the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted, the DG for External Policies of the EU conducted a survey in April 2009 to assess whether mainstreaming was functional in all external relations policy areas. Giji Gya (2009), who was the author of this survey and an Executive Director of ISIS Europe, reported an overall picture of the EU's gender mainstreaming in the EU's external relations and within its external relations institutions. The report demonstrated that the EU is still lacking, both in using gender as a tool and within the Brussels bureaucracy. Considering the latter issue, for instance, one of the most important focuses was on the non-proportional gender distribution among working staff and resources, and insufficient fund-raising opportunities for women's empowerment, which still creates a problem. On the other hand, in some specific foreign policy areas like conflict analysis, gender blindness remains and,

according to Gya (2009), this needs more politicized efforts. The report also highlighted a common stalemate regarding language in both addressee countries, including ENP states, and prospective EU members. Regarding financial support priorities or similar documents, there are expressions like 'what the important targets are' rather than 'where the important targets lie'. Hence, as Gya underlines in her report, there is a clear need to identify the problem and provide a method for tackling the underlying 'how' to overcome the gender inequality stalemate. The report noted that this obtrusive detail also creates communication difficulties in foreign relations.

3.5.1. Gender Equality Norm Construction in the Enlargements

Enlargement has played its part creating both new leaders and laggards on gender equality in the EU (Beveridge and Velluti, 2008). Enlargements since the EU's foundation to the end of the 1990s comprised Western European enlargements, with the scope of gender equality mostly restricted to the economic realm. In the first years of integration, the main focus among the EC6 revolved around equal pay for men and women while subsequent directives were engaged with equality in the work place. When compared with the EU's most recent gender policy, the previous content was much narrower. Yet, despite being limited, early member states faced specific difficulties conforming during the transition period, with implementation discrepancies among them (Galligan and Clavero, 2012), where equal pay commitment (Article 119, now Article 141) was essential part of integration to proceed to the next phases. Here, it can be underlined that strikes by working women in the 1960s had a significant effect in breaking the unwillingness of member states to reform and spurring the process (Hoskyns, 1996; Kantola, 2010; Galligan and Clavero, 2012).

In the first enlargement, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark became EU members in 1973. From a social and gender policy perspective, the UK was governed by the Labour Party, and somewhat better off than the other two. However, Denmark and Ireland quickly overcame their shortcomings because of several advantageous factors in their transposition process. In Ireland, intense pressure from women was crucial in adapting to Article 119 while in Denmark, the already functioning equal pay in the public sector

since 1925 and an agreement with the Danish private sector following membership was important (Galligan and Clavero, 2012). In addition, women's campaigns in the trade unions in both countries accelerated adaptation and implementation in these new member states (Siim,1993). Due to transposition slowness, "the implementation of the European Community rules on gender equality in the employment led the establishment of state equality bodies" (Galligan and Clavero, 2012, p. 107) and was supplemented with ECJ verdicts. Indeed, the ECJ was the key actor and primary institution to construct an environment for gender equality and "binding decisions promoting the value of gender equality in guarding the implementation principles of equal pay in the labour market, equal treatment and equal opportunity" (Peto and Manners, 2006, p. 105). After the first enlargement in 1973, the domain of gender policy was extended by other directives, such as equal pay for equal value, equal treatment in the work place, and equal treatment in social security directives, although all were still limited to economic integration and it was hard to talk about women's rights.

In the second enlargement, which is also called the Mediterranean Enlargement, Greece, Spain, and Portugal became EC members in the 1980s. The common problem of these three countries was to consolidate their new democratic order since they had all had experienced authoritarian dictatorship regimes instigated by military *coup d'états*. According to Elvert (2004), these three countries had been "politically marginalized due to the authoritarian nature of their political systems, and EC membership now appeared to have great potential for the succeeding political elites in the newly democratic structures" (p. 212). EC membership was a chance for these states to re-constitute their democratic system in a civilian and pluralist vein. When compared with the previous enlargement and the founding members' gender *acquis* transposition, Mediterranean countries faced greater challenges as they shared a different social policy to other countries. That is, they were "culturally more conservative and less secularized compared with the liberal ones" (Galligan and Clavero, 2012, p.109). However, during the transition process, was Spain challenged less because of its gender-friendly left-wing government under the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, which paved the way for enforcing women's policy agency activities more effectively in those years (Valiente, 2005). Concomitantly, the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s were also a period of

positive EC actions as the social dimension of the integration unfolded in line with the Single European Act and new social action programs were adopted to reduce inequality and promote integration regarding social rights. Subsequently, the mainstreaming approach aimed to create gender awareness (Galligan and Clavero, 2012) through women's networks across Europe. The term was first coined at the Women Conference in Nairobi in 1985 and gained a more precise focus and impetus in the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, in which the EC acted jointly in preparing the proposal.

In the third enlargement, Sweden, Finland, and Austria became EC members in 1995. According to Elvert (2004), the end of the Cold War was an important triggering factor in these countries' accession in that "the collapse of the Soviet bloc led to the accession of neutral and non-aligned countries by completely transforming the European security system" (p.215). Previously, they were nervous about being a part of the blocs' tensions and any systematic conflict. According to Galligan and Clavero (2012), when these prosperous and developed liberal economic countries became members, they could easily adapt and transpose the EC's institutional policy structure, which also would "outweigh the costs of the Community" (p.110). During the pre-accession period, some opposition came from left-wing parties in Sweden's parliament, arguing that their entry into the EC would create incompatibilities between it and Sweden. They were concerned that being an EU member could mean the end of the gender equality already pursued in their countries (Roth, 2004a).

Before the Scandinavian enlargement, female (un)employment became more visible through the emergence of the service economy, the importance and value of care work, and women's housewifery role. Child care services and state support for care services, whether by providing baby sitters or from financial support, were measures of how social these states are and how women friendly their policies are. In many parts of Europe, women postpone having children until they can find affordable day care (Esping-Andersen, 2009), which is why institutional support is important and a key determinant of the number of the children. Fertility rates are directly related to female employment rates and institutional support, whether in the public or private sector, which in turn creates a direct or inverse proportionality between these two dynamics.

Considering gender equality standards regarding social rights in Sweden, much opposition came from Swedish feminists. In 1999, 31% of European parliamentarians were women, who formed a progressive force that catalysed support for the development of action on many women related issues, such as policies against sexual harassment.

However, the entrance of these prosperous countries was welcomed by European feminists, who were aware that Scandinavian accession would increase the number of women's seats in the European Parliament (Roth, 2004; Van der Vleuten, 2008). In addition, the participation of these countries made new political opportunities available, especially regarding equal opportunities commitments (Pollack and Burton, 2001; Roth, 2004). Undoubtedly, Scandinavian countries did not experience any conformity problems regarding gender mainstreaming or gender *acquis* transposition. However, Pettersson (2007) found that a gender inequality problem still exists in Scandinavian countries, particularly in the science and innovation sectors, where masculinity is mainstreamed with the analysed innovation policies. Nevertheless, the accession of Finland, Sweden, and Austria increased women's presence in decision-making processes.

Until 2004, enlargements were all Western-oriented, yet even these countries faced conformity difficulties during the transition period, while the Eastern Enlargement encountered more struggles. Gender equality has been firmly and officially promoted as an EU norm (Locher and Prügl, 2009) since the Treaty of Amsterdam, with gender mainstreaming being the subject of debate with its legal principles (David and Guerrina, 2013), and intensifying the content and extending the reach of gender policies. This requires both member and candidate states to implement gender policies within the context of employment policies in line with the Single Market, like the early enlargements, and also to internalize the newly embodied scope of the *acquis*, which directly addresses gender equality and non-discrimination in all policy fields. However, all the new gender policies embedded into the gender *acquis* coincided with the latest Eastern Enlargements.

3.5.2. Eastern Enlargement and its Welfare Regime

The collapse of the Soviet Union had both benign and malign effects on Central and Eastern European countries, not only in terms of their transition to a radically different political structure after dismantling the old regime, but also by introducing a neoliberal mode of economic organization in their social setting. Bretherton (2001) and Galligan and Clavero (2012) argue that when the EU included gender equality as a norm in the enlargement process, it hindered implementation, especially in CEECs. The EU adopted its gender mainstreaming strategy in 1996, only a year before starting accession negotiation with CEECs. According to Marshall (2013), "[t]he EU considered its duty to bring CEEC's back to where they 'originally belonged' meaning to the Western European alliance and was committed financially and politically to make the unification happen" (p. 86). Due to their different infrastructures, the process faced some specific challenges. For instance, after their economies collapsed during the fall of the Socialist system, public services (such as child care) were abolished while many women were excluded from the labour market and started to look after their children (Galligan and Clavero, 2012). In the CEEC enlargement process, "the Commission … emphasized the 'strong need' for systematic integration of gender equality issues during the pre-accession period" (Bretherton, 2001, p. 60). However, this sudden, intensified, and unrehearsed initiative posed an obstacle in promoting gender awareness in the future.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth enlargements included CEECs, Cyprus and Malta, whose accession negotiations were started in 1994 and 1995 and formally finalized in 2004, 2007, and 2014 (lastly Croatia). Widening Europe was an important step to gather old European countries under one umbrella. A plethora of debates developed around this enlargement process. Some argued that enlargement towards the East was an asset for EU integration by reuniting its historical elements while revitalizing the frozen Europeanness of the ex-communist countries. On the other hand, Laidi (2008b) draws attention to the point that pooling a degree of sovereignty in the EU was not considered enthusiastically by CEECs as they had only just escaped from a similar system, albeit ideologically different, so their priority was to regain their dignity, prosperity, and sovereignty as countries. Not only in the sovereignty debate but also in social

deregulation, economic policies, and many other social policy issues, the EU had rapidly prepared these countries for accession. Peto and Manners (2006) also argued that, during the enlargement talks, the accession countries' governments "interpreted gender equality within the framework of anti-discrimination legislation and the sole policy site of work and employment … the implementation of gender equality policy is problematic due to the interpretation not only linguistically but also institutionally" (p. 102). For instance, a paradigm difference was revealed in the interpretation of gender in terms of women.

Regarding employment, candidate states had to reorient their employment policies and make "legislative changes associated with the implementation of the *acquis*" (Fagan *et al.*, 2005, p.578). The harmonization of the EU gender *acquis* to these ex-state socialist countries' national laws was a much more difficult, multi-levelled problem than for previous enlargements. One of the reasons behind this struggle was the extreme complexity of the process for both the EU and these ex-socialist countries. After the demise of communism, the EU offered and promised new opportunities along with an economic and political shift as a relief for these countries "under a Western model substituting neoliberal equality in an integrated Europe" (Locher and Prügl, 2004, p.181). In line with the Copenhagen Criteria, these countries had to foster democratic government, human rights, and market economy synchronously. Given their political histories, however, it was not easy to implement the conditions through the reform packages compatibly with their legal, political, and economic context. During the candidacy period, gender equality featured in the negotiations, although priority was given to neoliberal principles, and social and political reforms (Choluj and Neususs, 2004).

Compared with previous enlargements it seems that this Eastern enlargement faced more comprehensive demands from the EU in two ways. First, these countries had to shift their economic and political structures, and legal systems to internalize EU demands without leaving any residue from the socialist tradition, which required a long period. The second challenge was about the gender *acquis* because its content had been expanded and deepened with previous enlargements. Eastern countries were therefore

challenged to implement an EU gender equality because of the lack of any "institution/organisation in charge of monitoring discrimination against women, the inspection of the enforcement of relevant legal provisions and the promotion of real equal opportunities though positive actions" (Peto and Manners, 2006, p. 105). Indeed, the equal pay for men and women for equal work "was one of the founding principles of the 'statist feminist' communist states in Eastern Europe guaranteed by the Stalinist constitutions" (p. 97). Even so, these countries were not ready for rapid change, although some women's organizations in both Western and Eastern Europe argued that "this enlargement was a great opportunity for more gender equality" (Locher and Prügl, 2009, p. 192). Creating a liberal democratic system with a well-functioning market economy and implementing democracy and rule of law properly (Velluti, 2005) was too much for these newly liberal democratic countries, where progress on issues like gender equality inevitably lagged.

In contrast to other member states, these new, ex-socialist members had not included either general or specific references to gender equality in their welfare state typologies. However, it is known that the gendered welfare structure of these states developed under state feminism, whereby "women of working age had full-time jobs and supported by maternal leave, paid leave for sick children and heavily subsidised childcare" (Kantola, 2010, p. 10). In fact, during the era of state socialism, their welfare regimes were more generous than those in Western European countries. In his notes about the CEEC's welfare system under state socialism, Deacon (2000) highlighted some important features. In the socialist era, the monopoly state took control "in the allocation of the national product, it could freely shift resources between the accumulation fund (for use by enterprises including the payment of wages) and the consumption fund which included the state social insurance budget" (p. 147). This could be observed in their welfare system, which was nested with political and economic structures. The monopoly state guaranteed employment, housing, transportation, free education, health care, egalitarian pensions, and food, which were the core indispensable elements of the social policy. Under these conditions, other social policy issues also functioned well. For instance, there were policies in favour of women, such

as state provision of three years of child care leave with partial wages and other supplementary public services for mothers.

According to Horibayashi (2006), although the socialist regime offered this wide range of social benefits for women it did not explicitly guarantee gender equality. In other social policy aspects, the regime's social policy structure was similar to that of Social Democratic Regimes, with "a high degree of decommodification and female participation into workforce" (p.11). Likewise, "[u]nder socialism in countries such as East Germany, the Baltic states, and Russia, the employment rates of the women were almost as high as the rate of men's labour force participation, much like Sweden at time" (Roth, 2004b, p. 120).

According to Galligan and Clavero (2012), on the other, transposing a Western welfare system within a very short period made the negotiations more complex and created other problems, especially regarding employment. This approach is also supported by Einhorn (1993), who argues that women during the socialist regime were an important part of the full employment labour market, with opportunities to be represented in parliament, access to abortion, and supportive public services, such as day care, child care, laundries, and canteens for working women. However, along with privatizations during the transition to a deregulated liberal economy, child care services and the loss of secure employment, coupled with the increased costs of goods and services, forced women to withdraw from the labour market to look after their children (Einhorn, 2006).

Many scholars have argued that women had greater economic, social, and political rights under state socialism. In support of Einhorn's approach, Roth (2004a) found that women under the state socialist system experienced more extensive gender equality than in western democracies, although there was no overt interest in gender. Roth claims that "in the former Socialist countries, women's political participation was much higher than in Western Democracies" (p.118), especially in national parliaments. Here, Pascall and Lewis (2004) point out that under the authoritarian regime, women's labour market participation was crucial for economic development while education and public benefits were more comprehensive and helpful to increase women's inclusion.

The same can be said for the political inclusion of women. Whereas women's share of parliamentary seats was high under the socialist regime, it fell during the democratization process (Roth, 2004b). Likewise, Locher and Prügl (2009) also report that, after the socialist system collapsed, the EU offered a better, egalitarian future for these countries because, in the transformation period from socialism to liberalism, women lost their jobs and positions in government. However, these EU commitments were blocked because women were under-represented in the EU Parliament, other EU Institutions, and in their national government bureaucracies. Besides, during the transition period, other issues arose, such as "violence against women, women's sexual and reproductive rights as well as trafficking women" (Locher and Prügl, 2009, p.192), especially after the mid-1990s.

The pre-accession period was thus a turbulent period for Eastern countries. Both the EU and the member states were struggling in policy representation, implementation, and monitoring. Locher and Prügl stress that "there were no clear and comprehensive indicators providing objective criteria for assessing the progress" (p. 192) because the main concern in the pre-accession process was technical compliance (Galligan and Clavero, 2012), which created a non-systematic analysis of legal and political progress. Enlargement was the period when the external became internal (Bretherton, 2001) and where the new internal was shaped only by the EU's political culture and priorities. Regarding the gender issue, the EU was also consolidating its own gender policy during the same period, which was not well grasped by member states either. Thus, "by neglecting to integrate gender during the pre-accession period, the EU has failed to realize its influence in promoting gender awareness in CEEC" (Bretherton, 2001, p. 75), although gender equality needs strong institutionalization. Besides, in the pre-accession stage, due to economic stalemate and transposition difficulties, many women represented a traditional image in the labour market (Bretherton, 2001; Velluti, 2005), where "women were strongly represented in shrinking sectors" (Roth, 2004b), particularly in the public and informal sectors. To reduce or eliminate any prospective exclusion, the EU supported the NGOs and their complementary roles in promoting

gender equality (Choluj and Neusuess, 2004; Velluti, 2005) by strengthening consultative NGO networks and working collaboratively with government policies.

When these CEE countries became member states, their situation altered somewhat. Their situation has become like Western countries, which means their conditions have worsened, although Sedelmeier (2009) claims that there are no specific differences in the gender policies of Eastern states (especially Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovenia) when comparing pre- and post-accession processes. He found that "despite the decline in the sanctioning power of the EU institutions, there is no significant deterioration in the post-accession period and pre-accession period" (p. 13). In its relations with new member states in both the pre- and post-accession periods, the EU exerted no major efforts in the gender dimension; instead it fostered and particularly encouraged "coordinated actions involving social partners and NGOs to raise awareness and disseminate information to break gender stereotyping" (Velluti, 2005, p. 224).

Adoption of the gender *acquis* has undoubtedly created difficulties in these countries' national legal and political systems because the EU constitutes new hegemonies through its distinct normative ideas. For instance, the Women's Rights Committee in the European Parliament and women's organizations in Eastern and Western Europe insisted on placing the gender equality issue into a broader context during the accession negotiations, which was considered to represent a great opportunity to eliminate any gender backlash (Locher and Prügl, 2006). The expected changes included access to abortion, rights to sexual determination, the fight against women trafficking, and economic and political rights. Due to the lack of femocrats, who the strongest supporters of gender equality in the European Parliament and Commission, there is a lack of a comprehensive gender policy transition and the design and process of the gender *acquis* was narrower than expected.

Similarly, Bretherton (2001; 2002) argues that the Commission was extremely enthusiastic in the pre-accession period to systematically integrate gender equality as a norm in Eastern countries during the pre-accession period, when the mainstreaming strategy within the context of CEE enlargement was frequently noted. This process was

supported with structural funds so that the external become internal while mainstreaming tended to be embedded in the process. However, this aim confronted significant specific constraints from the low quality of CEEC institutions and their inability to shape and adopt mainstreaming. Another structural problem was that the Eastern countries' approach to gender equality required extra effort since the status of women has deteriorated in CEECs and become contested. Under these circumstances, priority was inevitably given to market construction rather than mainstreaming for gender equality. Thus, the gender issue that was included in EU-CEEC relations remained at a superficial level.

Therefore, despite the power of the EU in stipulating gender equality in its enlargement process (as well as in the post-accession process), changing the institutional and legal structure in a candidate state is not solely under the control or sanctioning capacity of the EU. While gender equality is an EU norm, imposing this or any international institution's norm on these states is insufficient to create political compliance in those countries' domestic laws (Aydeyeva, 2009). In addition, there should be the political will to comply with the candidate states' multi-level actors' role in this process being significant because they have more power to promote adaptation and change institutional and legal structures. For instance, various political and social actors, social movement actors (such as feminists and Women NGO's voices and their capacity to act), women parliamentarians, and parties in the national parliament are more active in shaping government compliance regarding the gender equality transposition. It is important to bear in mind that the women movements' demands for institutional reforms is also moderated by the ideology of political parties. That is, the demand for gender equality may be consistent with the government's ideology so that "under international pressure governments transpose policies into domestic legislation but it might delay their implementation" (Aydeyeva, 2010, p. 214).

3.6. A Feminist Critique on EU's Gender Equality Norm Construction

The normative resonance of the EU gender regime question has been widely criticized, especially by European feminist researchers. Firstly, these researchers agree on one

point: that the European integration project and its treaties were the products of men so integration is a masculine project. In the first three decades of integration, women were restricted to a few specific positions (Abels and Mushaben, 2012) rather than visible contributors. Secondly, according to European feminists, presenting this dimension inside and outside its borders, the EU designated a gender definition and referred to a frame that denotes what gender is. At the same time, the conceptualization of gender equality has gained greater importance in a universal context. The EU has adopted a definition that refers to differences between women and men that have been learned and differ among cultures. A more extensive version of this definition was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 as one of the yardstick values (Kantola, 2010) of the EU, and this definition is also used in EU external relations, particularly Commission based financial instrument priorities. As David and Guerrina (2013) argues, when looking at this stance of the EU, by imposing these norms and values on third countries it plays a role of norm entrepreneurship in its external relations, especially in issues where it has an ability to show its own identity.

For European feminists, EU bodies retain their hegemonic masculinity and heterosexuality in many ways. With respect to the existing literature and the EU's policy implementations and conditions regarding gender equality, they assume that gender equality is generally elaborated within the scope of the labour market. This argument is partly based on the EU's economic path dependency since the beginning of integration. This can also be seen in EU Commission funded project priorities, in which crucial importance was given to the empowerment of women in employment or women's entrepreneurship. On the other hand, intersecting inequalities are supposed to be tackled with multiple discriminations; yet the EU considers only an expanded version of anti-discrimination laws, rather than a comprehensive gender inequality and intersectionality analysis and positive measures.

According to Lombardo (2013), the equal treatment vision insists on symmetry between men and women and neutralizes their differences. However, as it is argued, this approach neglects structurally disadvantaged women and relies on short-term remedies. It is also significant to note that the transposition process is pertinent to member states'

economic policies, political foundations, and cultural perceptions, in which all can be observed in the potential for women activism in the country, domestic political tendencies that are shaped by economic policies, and ideologies such as centre right or left, and state structures, whether it's a federal or unitary state. Galligan and Clavero (2012) report that the national implementation of the EU's social security directives diverges depending on each state's economic policies and social policy traditions. For instance, social the security transposition was much easier in former East Germany due its Bismarckian social security past than in other European countries.

Theorizing gender equality in the EU is complicated as there are different possible goals (Walby, 2004) and means, at both the EU and member state level. Academic debates about convergence and increasing homogeneity in gender equality have increased. Especially in the last decade, feminists have analysed the degree of gender equality that the EU implements in member states or the conditions it imposes on candidate states. For instance, in the case of Turkey's gender equality during its EU accession process, due to historical, cultural, economic and geographical reasons, gender inequality articulated with many other inequalities and confronts a less-developed gender contract, where the issue is based on profound causes of inequalities. The EU represents a gender equality model in its external relations and to its member states to enhance the gender equality standards of the country.

Some scholars (Rubbery *et al*, 1999; Shaw, 2002) stress that, the EU has limited potential for fighting gender equality, although it can influence binding legal directives on equal treatment of employment. According to Rossilli (1999), the EU's primary concern is to standardize forms of women's employment regarding temporary or part-time work or, more generally, atypical work. Although Walby (2004) disagrees with Rossini's approach and pointed out the importance of recent directives that encompass atypically working women, unpaid work in gender relations is still neglected. However, Peto and Manners (2006) insist that "part-time work is an option for both men and women to harmonise their duties as parents and as workers, then it is certainly a progressive means towards achieving equality" (p. 112) and it should be promoted by

positive means for both sexes. However, they missed the point that the central cause of gender inequality is patriarchy.

The dominant argument of feminists is that, despite major upheavals in women's employability or their noteworthy participation in the political sphere, conventional gender norms in the domestic sphere are the reason for perpetual change. Taking the gender equality issue from a patriarchal conceptual analysis, early approaches were based on specific models of causal relations, and promoted male dominance or motherhood as the only determinants (Walby, 1989; Duncan, 1995). By doing this, however, they partly or totally ignore the importance of the historical and cultural factors that led to the emergence of the patriarchy. In this context, Walby, in her study 'theorizing patriarchy' (1989), underlined the importance of six levels of patriarchal structures that pave the way for social differentiation between men and women. In her classification, patriarchy is composed of six structures: "the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions, such as religion, the media and education" (p. 214). She is against explaining patriarchy by reducing it to capitalism since she believes that patriarchal relations between men and women have existed since or before feudal societies.

However, Duncan (1995) thinks that all six factors interact and can be changed by other social structures, such as capitalism; because there is a direct or indirect relationship between patriarchy and capitalism. For instance, women are counted as the vulnerable group as they have a disadvantaged position with less paid work than men or due to their housework responsibilities. Within the context of occupational segregation in paid work, which is consolidated by capitalism, women's subordinate role is reinforced, because capitalism changes the nature of employment. While patriarchy predates capitalism, the rise of capitalism enabled gender inequality to gain a new dimension, which is occupational segregation by sex.

Thus, although the idea of patriarchy with these six phenomena is valid, it is deficient. These conventional norms may be reproduced by governments or state institutions

through practices and discourses. Patriarchy is a social structure and concepts of femininity and masculinity are geographically, historically, and culturally constructed, and embody the forms and degree of patriarchy. It is framed by ethnicity, religious affiliation, and regional differences in nation states. Hence, women under different social circumstances diverge in their social life, experiences, and relations with men (Duncan, 1995). One of the reflections of this patriarchy can be observed in the labour market, where strong gendered divisions, especially in certain sectors, disadvantage women, increase male dominance and relegate women to domestic work.

In its level gender equality perspective, the EU limits the inequalities that surround gender relations and jettisons any conceptualization of an explanatory structure of gender inequality. The missing point in the EU's gender equality norm is that fails to question where these inequalities come from, how they are produced, and changed. The gender norm is itself gender blind. To analyse gender inequality, it would be simple and sufficient just to reference state policies toward women in families or paid work because gender inequality is nourished by a range of unequal mechanisms and social structures. Hoskyns suggests that European integration is an impulsive force that accelerates the transformation of domestic social patterns, including gender relations (1996, p. 19), on the other side the main hindrance to eliminate inequalities is "national governments that insist on pre-existing gender patterns rather than complying with the EU norms" (in Liebert, 2003, p. 33). Domestic gender equality policies have converged on a "moderate diversity" (Liebert, 2003, p. 280) but neither the compliance of EU regulations nor structural and institutional changes can explain the impact of Europeanization on national policies, exclusively.

3.7. Chapter Conclusion

The EU's gender equality policy went through three approaches or historical periods with specific paradigms. The first period was the equal treatment perspective that focused on equal rights for men and women for economic inclusion. The purpose of this stage was to achieve equality between the sexes in employment so this starting point for policy spilled over from economic into political action. It is worth noting that, in this

period and the following decades, second wave feminism played a complementary role in the institutionalization of equality between the sexes. Nevertheless, equal rights legislation, which represents a more formal and liberal feminist approach, was presented as a concession for women while the gender equality perspective during this period was employed to achieve the aims of economic growth and social cohesion. The second stage was more concerned with the women's perspective (from the 1960s to 1990s) and promoted positive action on equality of outcome and separate institutional provision. The difference of this approach from the former is its non-binding nature. Positive action was only designed to ameliorate the status of women in particular cases, which again does not explicitly touch on the roots of patriarchal problems. The third one is gender mainstreaming based on equal valuing of difference and deconstruction of the gender-based roles. This approach has appeared more promising for tackling gender inequality problems. However, it still includes non-binding methods, and neither the EU nor member states are enthusiastic on implementing this strategy.

It is certain that there is uneven integration in terms of gender equality for two reasons. First, gender equality directives and articles (Articles 141 and 13) focus more on limited areas and do not offer promising solutions or benchmarks to eliminate gender inequalities and solve structural problems. The second reason is the struggles in adopting gender equality policies at the national level as member states' gender regimes are based on diverse welfare state practices. The EU's efforts have been seen as "undesirable by different domestic actors and interest groups, in the field of gender equality the EU was criticised for not exercising normative pressure in the interest of one 'imagined community" (Peto' and Manners, 2006, p. 106).

The EU emerges as a gender equality norm promoter for member states that occupies a privileged position for solutions, especially with its expanded competencies, governance patterns, institutional policy-making mechanisms, and social partners. However, the meaning of gender equality is defined in specific contexts, such as its meaning in hard law and soft law. The EU's gender regime is represented by these laws, policies on gender, its institutions, and policy-making processes. Hard law's binding power is shaped by primary law through the treaties, secondary law through the directives; and

by the rulings of the European Court of Justice. Hard law has a direct influence in the legal structure of member states as it requires amendments in their national laws. Its content is narrowly defined and tries to eliminate gender inequalities and gender-based discrimination in relation to the labour market and related situations, such as sexual harassment.

Soft law's persuasion domain, on the other hand, comprises policy documents, recommendations, and declarations. Hence, throughout integration, the EU's primary focus on gender equality is based on the market, whereby hard law directives are concerned with equality opportunities and for employment. In addition, in the case of sexual and gender-based violence and gender mainstreaming, the EU uses soft laws that are recommendations rather than judicially binding. This is why unbinding measures have always been criticized by feminists as the policies possess counterproductive ambiguities and do not have direct solution-oriented methods.

CHAPTER 4

GENDER EQUALITY IN TURKEY: RESISTANCE AGAINST PATRIARCHY

This chapter explains how women's status was conceptualized, institutionalized and internalized before and during the EU accession process. To understand what was achieved regarding gender equality before Turkey's EU candidacy, the first part discusses what women did collectively to challenge the existing patriarchal structure and how state policies conceptualized women in the public and private sphere. Thus, the chapter first considers the content and scope of women's historical movements until they achieved political rights of representation in the 1930s. This was a time when the newly established Turkish Republic and its political elites were embarking on a long-lasting project of transforming society. The idealized gender regime could only be continued through socio-political and economic transformation, and through the internalization of new dynamics in which the political elites showed greater attention towards the human factor.

Although this collective women's movement and political concern had been silent for half a century, an unprecedented wave of feminist protests took place during the 1980s and 1990s, due to attacks on reproductive rights, which increased women's visibility in the public and the political sphere. Women movements were also significant in these years as the neoliberal restructuring of women's low labour market participation and labour casualization were factors that galvanized increased organizing by women. These collective acts led to legal reforms and policy changes on women's status. The first part of this chapter also discusses female labour market participation, women's parliamentary representation, and gender-based violence in Turkey, particularly from the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. It is necessary to discuss these indicators to clearly

distinguish normative state feminism and the power of the women movements before relations with the EU intensified.

In the second part, this chapter reveals how EU gender equality norms, including the gender *acquis*, positive action, and gender mainstreaming, were introduced in Turkey through which paradigm. The diffusion process involved both procedural and transference diffusion, in which EU's internal or universal norms are expected to be accepted and socialized by Turkey. Although state actor and public institutions were the central addressee, in transference diffusion, in addition to the state, civil society, which provides the crucial norm entrepreneurs for socializing gender-based equalities, were involved as another social agent for diffusing the norm. The state socializes the norm through reforms, policies, and constitutional amendments, in line with the conditions presented in official documents. In contrast, women's civil society established transnational networks to socialize the norms at the local level and create advocacy as a complementary mechanism in the norm diffusion process.

4.1. Turkey's Gender Equality Regime Before the EU Accession Process

Turkey is a very particular and interesting example in gender equality studies as women's rights are engaged within a secular-religious dichotomy. This dilemma stems from women's mixed western-secular and conservative-religious status, whereby latter is defined by Islamic society's own gender norms. Furthermore, Turkey's geographical diversity and the cultures embedded into this can both support and block the women's movement or other positive efforts towards women's rights. For instance, women from west of Turkey are more conscious about their rights and challenge the patriarchy whereas eastern and south-eastern women are still under strong pressure. More specifically, women in east parts of Turkey are subject to a family structure, which is entrenched with restrictions that control their lives, such as honour killings, forced child marriages, or religiously endorsed polygyny.

In other respects, gender inequality in Turkey can be explained by the various causes of low, or even declining female labour market participation, the under-representation of women in parliament, sexual and gender-based violence, and honour killings, all of

which are unresolved problems awaiting concrete counter measures. These structural problems involve issues of fundamental rights, including the right to life, safety, freedom, dignity, and physical and emotional integrity. Hence, the patriarchal gender regime's influence on society and its perception of women, and the lack of investment in the labour force bifurcate gender equality policies, as in many European countries.

However, since the 1980s, owing to stronger feminist movements and the effective role of international organizations, gender equality issues have been placed on the political agenda in Turkey. Due both to governments' aims to achieve universal human rights standards and the strong advocacy and demands of the women's movement, significant legal steps have been taken to improve women's status. Women's grassroots organizations, either as NGOs or initiatives, have declared their demands by saying that women's rights are human rights. These politicized or rights-based civil society actors are the catalysing agents that enable women's voices to be heard and develop a strong pressure against state's ill-defined and narrow content on gender equality. The following section describes state feminism in Turkey since the foundation of the Republic and women's persistent resistance against rising inequalities derived from the state's gender regime.

4.1.1. State's Feminism in the Early Decades of the Republic

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, several legal reforms were introduced to improve the rights and status of women in line with its modernization project. This new regime not only restructured the nation and the citizens' collective identity but also affected the public sphere in pursuance of reproducing new customs in the citizens' daily practices. This modernization also involved new gender policies in education and development in women's status (Dedeoğlu, 2013), in which women were re-designed as secular, well-dressed, educated, and good mothers (Marshall, 2013). However, this state feminism (Tekeli, 1992) openly and continuously existed with shortcomings (Abadan-Unat, 1998; Marshall 2013) because the beneficiaries of these reforms were mostly urban women whereas the modernization project failed to reach lower societal segments (Dedeoğlu, 2013) or

address the inequalities due to Turkey's internalized patriarchal system (Kandiyoti, 1987). Indeed, before the 1930s, no country was particularly concerned with women rights, and none of them adopted women's suffrage without strong pressure from domestic women's movements. From 1890 to 1930, these movements were most likely to gain female suffrage in western countries (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) where women exerted strong and sustained pressure for their citizenship rights.

Some similar significant, but unseen women's organizing also burgeoned in the late Ottoman years. During the nineteenth century, Turkish women started to question their status and educational rights by borrowing the term feminism from their western counterparts. The Tanzimat (1839-1876) and its modernization wave brought about new reform policies that also addressed women's status in public life. During this period, modernization influenced women's lives, as many educated women living in Istanbul and Izmir established associations, published journals – such as Kadınlar Dünyası (Women's World), and expressed themselves regarding suffrage and education rights. Despite these significant and conscious efforts, they were unable to achieve their demands and expand their opinions in the public sphere.

The concern over the emancipation of women after the foundation of the Turkish Republic was actualized by legal changes called the women's revolution, specifically the Unification of Education Law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), enacted in 1924, the Clothing Reform Law (Kıyafet Kanunu), adopted in 1925, and the Turkish Civil Code of 1926, which banned polygamy and "instituted civil marriage, allowed the initiation of divorce proceedings by either partner, and guaranteed equality of women before the law" (Gündüz, 2004, p. 116). The latter code was adopted from the Swiss Civil Code, which was a radical move (Arat, 2000) as women achieved equal rights with men. The 1926 civil code thus eliminated Islamic law and "underlined the segregation of genders and their differential legal treatment clearing the way for comprehensive changes in women's lives in terms of education and admission to public professions" (Berktay, 2004, p. 25).

Despite the efforts of the women's movement in the nineteenth century, it has always been acknowledged that women's rights were first enshrined by the new Republic, in

that this new system granted women a citizenship and created awareness on women's legal and social status. This reformation process created new possibilities for women to argue, protest, and insist on their rights as citizens. According to Berktay (2004), one of the most distinctive differences between Ottoman society and the new Republic was that the latter enabled women to be more visible in the public sphere. The modern, educated Turkish woman became one of the symbols of the westernization of the new Republic despite the tensions between westernization and Islamic culture. Yet, as Gündüz (2004) also notes, under these circumstances "women and men were failed the question the patriarchal gender roles within Turkish society" (p. 117), where modern women's status had clashed with traditional and religious social customs that ascribed specific roles to women.

On the other hand, significant efforts were made by the strengthened women's movement, in which women were determined to increase their voices in both the public and political spheres. First, in 1923, a group of women under the leadership of Nezihe Muhittin, established the Women's People Party (Kadın Hakları Fırkası-KHF) to gain suffrage. It was a remarkable step towards the rise of a feminist women's movement, but the newly established Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) decided to dissolve and replace it with the Turkish Women's Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği-TKB) in 1924. This new organization was active in drawing attention to women's rights through press releases. Although it was a "self-proclaimed apolitical organization" (Arat, 2011, p. 188), it was insistent in making its claims. Women sent telegrams to the government "to show their support for the new political regime and express their demands for the vote and be elected" (Marshall, 2013, p. 48). Following the strong lobbying by this union, women were granted the vote in municipal and general elections in 1930 and 1934 respectively while women could also run in parliamentary elections. Turkish women were elected, albeit in only small numbers, to local government in 1930 and the national parliament in 1935. While female candidates were listed for parliamentary elections and the parliament included female members and cabinet members following women's enfranchisement in the 1930s, "it was not until the 1999 elections that religious and nationalist-right parties had female deputies (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008, p.464).

However, this loyalty to state policies due to the "absence of autonomous feminist movement" (Marshall, 2013, p. 49) caused stagnation from the 1940s to the 1960s. Gender discriminatory clauses in laws remained embedded with moral principles, such as Article 154, which stipulated that the husband represents the family union or Article 159, which required women to get their husband's consent to work outside the home (Çubukçu, 2004; Marshall, 2013). The latter article was not amended by the Constitutional Court until 1990 and officially abolished in 1992, again due to strong pressure exercised by women's movements. However, Turkey's civil code continues to include negative statements on women's labour market participation, such as the declaration that "the harmony and welfare of the marriage union should be borne in mind when choosing and performing a job or profession", which can be seen as hindering women's right to work outside the home (Dedeoğlu, 2013). Therefore, whilst these articles were noteworthy, they still had negative repercussion by contradicting the emancipation of women from their family and the patriarchal community.

More specifically, even though the legal changes seemed revolutionary in this political and reformist atmosphere, modernization of Turkey's cultural code was clearly difficult, and "the patriarchal structure continued to shape women's everyday lives as it was deeply entrenched in cultural mores on sexism and patriarchy that prove strongly resistant to change" (Berktay, 2004, p. 25). For instance, these new codes had patriarchal biases legally designating the husband as the head of the family and relegating the wife to be his helpmate (Berktay, 2004). In another example, women were encouraged to be modest and protect their virginity before marriage and sexual faithfulness during the marriage (Marshall, 2013) as virginity was interwoven with women's virtue and family honour.

While these laws had no direct influence on gender equality, they just weakened the position and status of women and slowed the reform of substantive inequalities, such as female labour market participation and political representation. Although women became more visible, structural problems, such as motherhood, care work, protection of her sexuality and being productive in the family, were unquestionable responsibilities. In addition, these codes enshrined men as the breadwinner and traditionally privileged

them over unpaid domestic female workers (Gül, 2013). This unequal division of unpaid work degraded domestic women workers, while the status of being dependent happened both financially and emotionally. Not just in Turkey but also in many western societies, the patriarchy during this era was still an obstacle as women were responsible for fulfilling their devoted domestic roles, such as child care, while family members were historically coded under the responsibility of women in the private family sphere. It was also because of the women's movement approach that first wave feminism's paradigm concentrated exclusively on women's status in the public and political sphere rather than shifting gender roles.

After the transition to a multiparty system in 1946, Republican reforms slowed down, especially with the election of the centre-right Democratic Party (DP) in 1950. Although its ideology was based on liberalism and democracy, women were not incorporated in this consolidated democracy, political liberalism discourse, or its policies. During the DP government period (between 1950 and 1960), women were ascribed as good citizens, wives, and domestic workers. State school textbooks emphasized specific roles for women, picturing a confined woman as the ideal, who works in the kitchen, cooking and cleaning (Marshall, 2013). These ideational constructions of women portrayed traditional and subordinated women whereas men were shown as wise breadwinners. Hence, during the DP years, Turkish women's modernization slowed in social life, the labour market and political participation as they were publicized as sacrificed good mothers, cooks, and good care-workers. In the following decade, the 1960 military coup and amendments to the 1961 Constitution increased unionization, which was a way of demanding rights and legal regulations. This enhanced relations between the people and government, and nourished organizing capacities in significant ways. However, it did not directly influence or contribute to women's status.

4.1.2. Women Politicization in the times of Pressure

While the 1960s' political atmosphere, social changes, and peaceful discourse were momentous, particularly in leftist movements, the 1970s saw a more politicized and conscious grassroots women's movement. One of the reasons of this awareness was

intensified with rural to urban migration, in which women rights became inextricable. Until 1950s and 60s, Turkey was an agricultural society, where 75%[4] of the total population had been living in the rural areas, and family form was based on farming and unpaid work. In this agriculture-based growth, women were acknowledged as family workers, who were deprived from any social or political conscious and subject to precarious, informal and unsecured working conditions.

Despite the agricultural modernization practices by the credits of the Marshall Plan, since 1960s, Turkey had gradually transformed to pre-capitalist society and entered into the industry-driven growth, which led the rural people to move to urban and were articulated in industrial activities. The reasons of internal migration flows at first are based on financial difficulties in the rural or health problems. This pre-capitalist process that evolved to capitalist society since 1980s faced with progressive urbanization. Within this context, women both continued to be a commodity and unpaid worker of the rural and new informal workers of the urban, such as unsecured janitorial workforce or domestic workers. Hence, since the 1980s Feminist movement had included another layer in their agenda and issued the class struggle and women subordination of women from various dimensions.

Furthermore, especially at the end of the decade, Turkey experienced economic and social difficulties during the fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983). During this period, the country faced negative economic growth and was in a state of chaos that prevented the implementation of government policies. Due to this stagnation, women began working in cities and became subject to casualization through informal work, irregular working hours, insecure working environments, part-time jobs, and low salaries. All these factors hindered women's capacity to work and constituted a disorganized working class. Differ than the economic reasons, in 1990s Turkey again witnessed a forced migration phenomenon due to political situation in the east and southeast regions. In all these processes, woman migration is designated as 'associational migration', in which women move from rural to urban along with their husbands (İlkkaracan and İlkkaracan, 1998).

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[4] More information can be found in TUIK guideline on Statistical Indicators 1923-2011

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Turkey's women's rights advocates took on a pivotal role, particularly in the case of women's economic, social, and political status, with a specific emphasis on subordinated women. This situation paved the way for a re-gathering of the women's movement in major cities, although women's subordination along with the patriarchal structure was still rigidly enforced in other regions. It was striking that while the women's movement concentrated on issues that "involved blatant human rights violations, discourses that argued for women's sexual liberation in a positive manner were missing" (İlkkaracan, 2007, p. 11).

This rising movement of politicized women in the 1970s was linked with leftist ideology and its party-based projection. Women organized in universities, trade unions, and other leftist organizations to heavily criticize state policies and their gender-biased approach. Despite women's visible activism in the public sphere, their political participation was still very low. Furthermore, during the 1970s, the Turkish left focused on women's rights as part of a systemic social transformation, with promising but limited attempts taken in terms of political representation. In 1972, the National Women's Party of Turkey was founded by Mübeccel Göktuna in reaction to women's exclusion from Turkish politics and decision-making processes. Although the party was closed following the military coup in 1980, it was a significant and encouraging step for women. Behice Boran, who was the chairman of the Workers Party of Turkey between 1970 and 1980, was another important figure in the leftist movement, although her concern was more with social transformation of the state system rather than an awareness on gender equality.

Until the 1980 military coup, there had been no significant developments in terms of woman rights, with women confined and moving in concert with state feminism. The 1980s were historic because second wave feminism again tackled state traditions, the constructed patriarchy, and Turkey's commitments on gender equality-based conventions. The first half of the decade was challenging due to the military intervention, which aimed to de-politicize society, including politicized people. However, although the coup suppressed left-wing movements, it paradoxically led to the rise of (left) feminist women. Women who had previously been active on the left

began to transfer their experience and ideas to women's activism to eliminate discrimination against women in Turkish society (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008). Nevertheless, the coup had catastrophic consequences for women's movements due to the absence of a democratic environment, yet it could not prevent their efforts, hence "informal groups became the natural form of organizing among the women activists" (Marshall, 2013, p. 63).

At first, these activists only gathered in small numbers in private houses (Arat 2011), later, however, they created women's circles in associations to provide consulting services for women's legal problems. Their demands were "substantive equality beyond formal equality and control of their own sexuality" (Arat, 2000, p. 113), "but by ignoring the nationally protected patriarchal system" (Gündüz, 2004, p. 118). This new second wave feminism drew on academics, professionals, journalists, and students, who gathered to create ideational change regarding women's sexuality. Indeed, their priority was the sexuality clauses in the penal code because, due to population concerns, "the state changes the law in 1983, allowing for abortion up the ten weeks into pregnancy" (Marshall, 2013, p. 51) with the husband's permission. The law punished women who were not at risk and had an abortion after ten weeks. Coinciding with these movements, rising political Islam discouraged these activists and engaged them in "traditionally taboo areas related to sexuality, such as sexual autonomy, sexuality outside marriage, forced heterosexuality or the rights of lesbians" (İlkkaracan, 2007, p. 11).

Meanwhile, violence against women was also placed on the feminists' agenda from the legacy of women's movements since the 1960s (Gül, 2013). The main concern was to publicize violence, which was regarded as a private matter. Their efforts were influential in developing civil protection orders, and legal and ideational changes. Through their pressure on the state, the issue of violence was gradually transformed from a private to a public problem over the following years. Women's centres and shelters were opened, which were necessary to demonstrate the problem and emphasize that women need protection.

Following Turkey's ratification of CEDAW in 1985 (yet with reservations to various paragraphs of Articles 15 and 16), institutional and political arrangements on gender

equality became concrete, which allowed women's movements to increase gender awareness in public policies. CEDAW and the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights represented women's rights, and feminists particularly used CEDAW as a guideline while shaping their advocacy. Some newly developing women's organizations incorporated into their agenda specific norms mentioned in detail in these universal conventions and incorporated the gender, gender mainstreaming, women's empowerment, and women's rights as part of their human rights paradigms. In addition, states that have ratified CEDAW are obliged to abide by their stipulations and create national mechanisms for the advancement of women (Kardam, 2017). For instance, by referring to CEDAW, the acceptance of women's issues as an independent political and planning problem was first seen in Turkish politics when women were included as a section in the fifth Five-Year Development Program (1985-1990). Then, an Advisory Board for Policies with regards to Women was established in 1987, which was the first such separate unit in the public sector. However, as these efforts were not enough, feminist groups prepared campaigns, signed petitions, and created pressure to counter the state's reluctance to implement CEDAW, which aimed to eliminate gender discriminatory laws, customs, and practices.

As Arat (2011) indicates, state bureaucrats were not interested in getting engaged in a dialogue with women's organizations so women exclusively concentrated on awareness activities, which were necessary because "the citizens are not fully aware of their rights as citizens and there is a wide apathy among people towards civil society and organization" (Tomen, 2015, p. 473). However, despite these awareness-raising endeavours and developments, the policies produced to eliminate gender segregation, especially in the labour market were ineffective (Marshall, 2013). Of the few female workers, they were expected to devote themselves to supposedly women-related jobs, such as teaching. This was common as Turkish women were encouraged to be patriotic teachers who would not hesitate to go to various parts of Turkey but should appear in the public sphere without the veil.

Indeed, in the 1980s, gender inequality started to be discussed within different paradigms because feminists themselves had previously focused on how both the

Republic and society remained essentially patriarchal. Another contribution of the 1980s movement was active citizenship, in which consciousness-raising activities were noteworthy, because women arranged campaigns and lobbies for the amendment of the Civil Code (Berktay, 2004). Through these women's movements, women became politicized, understood their subordination in society, and questioned their modern, but state-driven identities. Thus, it can be said that second wave feminism emerged relatively late in Turkey "because of the less-developed economic and political structure of the country" (Marshall, 2013, p. 62), yet it still had an influence in the politicization of women about their citizenship and rights.

Indeed, not only in Turkey but also internationally, women started to react to the increasing brutal effects of neoliberal and conservative politics and impediments against women. Some of the actions of this second wave feminist movement were publications and organized campaigns against domestic violence, and gender discrimination in the Civil Code and the Penal Code. The aim of this activism was to create a feminist consciousness, elucidate the importance of women's rights, and disseminate their claims by criticizing neoliberal commodification and conservative coding of women. They organized independently and gathered as part of a rebellion of civil society to institutionalize their stance.

One of the first important actions of the women's movement was the protest against domestic violence, when 3,000 women gathered in Istanbul on 17 May 1987. In their campaigns and protests, they distinguished themselves from leftist groups by prioritizing consciousness-raising activities in their autonomous movement. This campaign against the battering of women was significant, with "women activists using creative methods to draw public attention" (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008, p. 463). The reason for this demonstration was the court case of a pregnant woman who had petitioned for divorce because of her husband's violence and the judge's discriminatory reaction and decision. Second, was the signature action on 8 March 1988 (World Women's Day), in which a group of women gave the Turkish Parliament a women's petition with 7,000 signatures to remind it of its CEDAW obligations and the implementation of holistic reforms (Özdemir, 2014).

Along with their Western counterparts, feminists in Turkey highlighted the motto of second wave feminism: the personal is political. Many feminists used this phrase in their writings, speeches, and consciousness-raising activities. The main aim of this motto was to act politically and collectively rather than individualizing problems as personal; hence, they integrated the previous public-private dichotomy. In particular, cases of violence, constructed motherhood, sexuality and marriage were all examined through this lens. Women started to problematize and debate their privacy, including gender inequality, and started to share with others. In place of Republican equality, which considers all individuals as equals with respect to their duties while acknowledging gender inequality as a private matter, feminists demanded equality on the basis of individual freedom and liberties (Arat, 1998; Dedeoğlu, 2013).

Visibility of Headscarf Question

The wave movements not only encouraged modern and educated women supporters of Kemalist and socialist ideologies but also influenced Islamist women, who started to insist on specific demands regarding the public space. In particular, Islamic women demanded that the restrictions on using the veil be lifted, as a fundamental aspect of their religion. According to them, this ban was an attack on Islamist women's freedom and their access to public spaces, such as universities and political institutions. Islamic women's activism to end the headscarf ban grew in the 1980s and intensified in 1990s. As Çubukçu (2012) notes, most feminist groups were also against the ban as it prevents women from being represented in politics, eliminates them from the labour market and limits their rights. In addition, the headscarf ban should be tackled as part of a global understanding of human rights and a social reality concerning the preferences of religious women.

During period, the veil, or *türban*, became a phenomenon and debated in the political sphere as it was the reason for excluding girl and /women who wanted to enter universities (Marshall, 2013) from these public institutions. Head covering at universities was banned by the Commission of Higher Education (YÖK) from 1982 to the 2000s. During this period, disagreements between Islamic woman and secular

Kemalist women became heated as Kemalists considered the headscarves to be a threat to secularism. One of the consequences of this debate led to the foundation of the Association to Promote Contemporary Life in 1989, under the initiative of the Association of Contemporary Legal Professionals, who were organized in defence of secularism (Berktay, 2004). The central contribution of these diverse women's movements was politicization because they expanded the realm of civil rights and women's rights. This plurality, whether Islamists or secular feminists, offered an alternative understanding of democracy in which civil rights and liberties are just as important as formal requirements of democracy (Arat, 1999, Berktay, 2004). Although their stand points differed sharply, they both arranged campaigns to protest against so-called honour killings, struggle against violence, and demanded amendments to Turkey's civil and penal codes.

4.1.3. Institutionalization of Gender Equality

Along with global third wave feminism, Turkish feminists gained momentum in the 1990s, particularly in the institutionalization of the feminist movement regarding gender equality as a norm. In accordance with CEDAW's priorities and intensive feminist movements, the first state institution, the General Directorate of Women's Status (KSGM), was established in 1990 as a national mechanism for promoting gender equality, as one of the main units of the Under Secretariat of the Prime Ministry for Women and Social Services, and then under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. This unit coordinates women's status in different provinces and concentrates on anti-discrimination for women. It has developed programs, policies, presented periodic reports to CEDAW and prepared the national action plans to demonstrate willingness to improve gender equality in Turkey.

Although KSGM was a significant step in institutionalizing gender equality and dealing with problems related to inequalities, "the main approach in gender policy remained unchanged, following the Republican legacy of considering, all forms of inequality as a private matter or a problem of modernization" (Dedeoğlu, 2013, p. 10) In addition, KSGM was unable to eliminate the inegalitarianism that women faced in eastern regions

due to traditional rules. These women were unaware about state laws or, if they were, they were either hesitant or unwilling to apply for their civil rights (İlkkaracan, 1998a). Nevertheless, it aimed to provide an opportunity for the interaction of the state and the women's movement, which yielded the adoption of the Law on the Protection of the Family in 1998 (Law No. 4320). However, particularly the shift of political power to religious right parties after the 1994 local elections and the 1995 general election had "a restraining impact on the range of discourses and demands of the new feminist movement of the 1980s, especially those related to sexuality" (İlkkaracan, 2007, p. 11).

In civil society, by using this new gender equality paradigm, feminists expanded their human rights activism and institutionalized this paradigm along with international law to constitute stable, rights-based, and independent women's organizations. As subjects of the third wave, these women were aware of their local and national realities while referring to international or global norms. The feminist movement of this third wave "kept the idea of the 'private is political' connoting that violation of human rights in the private can be denounced publicly" (Gündüz,2004, p.121). These movements campaigned against patterns of oppression that were increasing more in the 1990s. Feminist groups participated in international meetings and launched national campaigns to draw attention to discriminatory laws, such as Article 438 of the Penal Code, which called for two-thirds of the punishment for rape if a man who rapes a prostitute and Article 159 of the Civil Code, whereby a woman requires her husband's permission to start any work outside the home (Marshall, 2013; Dedeoğlu, 2013). According to Marshall (2013), even though both campaigns were effective and successful, "the limitation of the judicial leverage in Turkey prevented feminists from being able to effectively bring change to legal discourse on gender policies" (p.73). On the other hand, without international endorsement, it was more challenging to eliminate the unequal treatment of women dependents, which "reflects the existing traditional gender roles and supports women's dependency on men" (Dedeoğlu, 2013, p. 10). This unequal system could also be seen in working women, who were entitled to receive payment within one year of marriage if they quit their work (Labour Code, Article 14).

Considering all these problems, an enhanced and consolidated solidarity of the 1980s enabled the institutionalization of the grassroots women's movement in the 1990s. The most remarkable institutionalization process was the establishment of *Mor Catı Kadın Sığınma Vakfı* (Purple Roof Women's Shelter) in 1990, *Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı* (Women's Solidarity Foundation) in 1992, *Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği* (Women for Women's Human Rights/New Waves) in 1993, *Uçan Süpürge* (Flying Broom) in 1996, Women's Research Centre (KAMER) in 1997, and the Association for Support and Training of Woman Candidates (KADER) in 1997, research centres and graduate programs on gender and women's studies in universities, the Library of Women's Work, and the Information Centre Foundation. Additionally, since 1998, "the Women's Shelter Assembly has been held regularly to build solidarity and a web of communication between women's NGOs" (Özdemir, 2014, p. 124). In short, gender inequality started to be addressed not only through governmental initiatives and social movements but also through non-governmental institutions.

These organizations' agendas included domestic violence, honour killings, promoting women's parliamentary representation, women's empowerment, and any gender discriminatory structures. For instance, particularly through the constant pressure of KADER's activism, the number of women election candidates has increased three times since 1935 while the number of elected women reached 24 in 2002. According to Dedeoğlu (2013), these organizations' efforts and their international monitoring activities have indeed "led to the initiation of policy and action by governmental bodies" (p. 10). These NGOs recognized the importance of the representation of women in parliamentary politics and women's participation in the labour market. Nevertheless, the problem of gender inequality multiplied when it became apparent that Turkish civil society was strongly divided by Liberal, Kemalist, left and right-wing narratives (Mühlenhoff, 2014). This increasing plurality within the women's movement was also widened by the strong advocacy of the Kurdish movement and political Islam and its feminist projection. With the inclusion of Kurdish and Islamic women's demands, the scope was extended by other realities.

This was also the period when the EU started its Progress Reports with the first progress report in 1998 that focused on four areas. The parts on the political criteria regarding democracy and the rule of law, the judicial system and human rights, and protection of minorities' civil and political rights highlighted the importance of two amendments to the civil code on protecting the family, which was approved by the government in 1998 and passed to the Turkish General National Assembly (TGNA). The bill concerning the civil code was mainly designed to eliminate discrimination, yet it retained many discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations exist while domestic violence remains widespread. The TGNA passed legislation in January 1998 making spousal abuse illegal. In addition, this new Civil Code "abolished the supremacy of the husband in the marriage union and in cases of divorce allowed women to share the property acquired during marriage" (Berktay, 2004, p. 26).

4.1.4. Gender Inequality in National Realities

Despite the strong advocacy of second and third wave women movements and ratification of CEDAW, political representation of women, female labour market participation, and violence against women remained challenging topics due to ineffective state policies, lack of legal reforms, poor implementation of international conventions, and neoliberal market liberalization that easily victimizes women. Across many dimensions, women's advocacy continued its catalytic role and kept problems active on their agenda, although the problems could not be comprehensively solved; instead, they re-produced new realities with new subjects. The following section discusses women's employability, women in politics, and violence against women before Turkey's EU candidacy to clarify the EU's influence on Turkey's gender equality norm before and during the accession process.

4.1.4.1. Female Participation in Labour Market

Thus far, women's low labour market participation was identified with traditional roles and the patriarchal system, which can also be evaluated within the Turkish economy and its trajectories. Rural-urban migration and market liberalization at the beginning of the 1980s increased the population of urban women, which led to labour absorption with a

gradual feminization of the labour market. However, this only took place in labour-intensive export manufacturing jobs, as these sectors demanded women with lower education and offered low pay. According to İlkkaracan (2012), export-led growth and market liberalization after the end of the 1970s galvanized a slow but steady increase in women's share of non-agricultural employment, yet overall labour demand growth was not sufficient to compensate for the rural labour surplus of women released from agriculture (Kabeer, 2008; İlkkaracan, 2012). The rise of import substitution industrialization-led (ISI-led) economic modernization after World War II had caused labour absorption problems, "especially in the gendered nature of labour absorption under ISI leads to a male-breadwinner bias" (İlkkaracan, 2012, p. 6). In addition, migration patterns provided the urban labour market with a large labour surplus. These factors led to de-feminization of the labour market and housewification.

The table below presents employment rates for 1988-1999 with a focus on marital status and education level. Official statistics show a fall in female labour force participation rates in this decade. The feminization of the labour force reflects that those with at least high school education and single status had relatively more labour market participation.

Table 1: Women's Employment Rates (+15) between 1988-1999 in terms of Marital status and Education level

YEARS	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
a. Marital Status												
Not Married	38,5	40,3	39	40,6	37,9	30,9	35,9	35,3	35,8	32,6	33,9	34,1
Married	29,9	32,2	30,9	30,8	29,4	23,4	28	27,9	27,9	25,8	26,3	26,8
Divorced	35,7	40	33,6	37,1	37	37,6	32,1	35,5	34,9	38,9	36,8	37,4
Widow	15	15,4	13,8	13,7	13,5	10,3	13,4	14	13,7	13,3	14,2	14,7
b. Education												
Illiterate	31,2	32,7	30,7	31,8	30,1	24	28,1	28	27,2	24	24,7	26,6
Literate but not graduated	29,7	33,3	33,2	33,1	29,1	16,7	24	24,5	26,1	20,8	21,7	24,3
Primary School	31	33,5	31,7	32,2	30,5	25,3	30,4	30,1	30,5	27,8	28,4	28,4
Secondary/equivalent School	12,9	16,4	14,9	15,1	14	11	13,7	12,9	12,1	12,6	13,5	14
High School	29,6	28,7	29,8	27,5	29,6	26,5	25,7	26,5	25,5	24,8	25,3	24,9
Vocational High School	41,1	36,2	40,5	37,7	40,8	38,7	31,7	35,5	35,5	35	37,1	33,2
University or College	68	73,2	71,9	71,9	71,9	68,8	70,8	67,8	66,3	65,7	67,1	63,8

Source: TUIK database in Women Labour Force Statistics

According to İlkkaracan (2012), this may be because of job segregation in that women with less education got jobs with low pay. From another perspective, it may be widespread disguised employment without social protection because, during this decade, the feminization of labour occurred at the same time as paid work was becoming informal.

In line with globalization, export-led industrialization increased informal employment so that women became of the preferred source of cheap and flexible labour. As Dedeoğlu (2000) notes, while decent pay with social security rights is called the primary sector, the secondary sector was defined by informal work. In the first years of market liberalization, men were captured by the primary sector while the secondary sector was composed of women. Hence, it might also be possible that working women with high education could be informal employees as the social security system in Turkey is biased toward men, "as state-provided benefits are conditional upon an individual's registered labour market participant status" (İlkkaracan, 2012, p. 15). This excludes the majority of women from direct access to the social security system. Besides, women who married to a formally employed men had a chance to access social security. This also happened through their formally employed fathers as long as the women remained unmarried.

Tunalı (2004) also reports that, at the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, the labour market participation of both women wage workers and women entrepreneurs with their own business increased and became more visible owing to the rise of the neoliberal economy, privatization, and market driven policies and opportunities. However, the disadvantage of women entrepreneurship was that it weakened women's class consciousness and politicization.

4.1.4.2. Political Participation

Intensified communication and transparency among international women movements worldwide made women's issues more prominent and led them to be discussed within the context of fundamental human rights. In addition, awareness of the inequalities that women had faced since the foundation of the Republic increased Turkish feminists' local activism. Inevitably, therefore, women expressed their demands in the political

sphere as female politicians were supposed to be aware of women's interests and act in favor of them. They acted as role models to improve women's self-esteem and show how political representation is important as a basis for gender equality because male politicians can rarely maintain women's interests or consider gender inequality as much as for their other policies.

However, the main obstacle facing these women was the low level of women's quotas, which was hindering the overall approach to women's situation in politics because equal representation of women and men in parliaments is a symbol of justice and democracy. That is, women's quotas are positive measures to provide a more gender-balanced participation and representation, and to bring equal opportunity to the under-represented. This should be mandated by the constitution or in gender equality laws, whereby law-makers should set up a gender quota system that political parties must abide by or else political parties should voluntarily impose quotas on their election candidates. This attract more female attention to politics but also increase the likelihood of articulating and integrating women's issues and perspectives into parliamentary debates.

The Republican People's Party (CHP) first opened a women's branch after 1960, and this followed by the other parties. However, these branches did not provide many political opportunities for their members but tried to promote party politics through the organization of social activities (Günes and Ayata, 1998). Although many legal barriers to women's political participation were removed as early as 1934, women were less involved in politics until the 1980s (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). The 1980 military coup created further obstacles for women because women's branches were closed, and their political activities were banned. Nevertheless, they continued to exist as charity organisations with loose party ties. Despite the bans, women became more organized and conscious of their political rights. Perceiving their importance in Turkish politics drove women towards parliamentary participation activism in election campaigning.

Using gender quotas to increase women's political participation was not on political parties' agendas until 1989. For the first time, SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-Social Democratic People's Party) began to use a quota to increase the number of

women throughout the party (Güneş and Ayata, 1998). In the 1990s, "the proliferation of party quotas may have been due to party competition for increasingly important women's votes" (Marshall, 2010, p.575). Feminists in many countries strongly advocate quotas as do international bodies, such as Socialist International, and international agreements and conventions, such as CEDAW.

Women became more visible, especially in the national election campaign of 1991, when the presence of women voters in women's rights supporting parties were apparent (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). Thus, "the apparent limited effectiveness of women representatives was accounted by their low levels of representation" (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008, p.461). However, since the 1990s, women representatives have constituted a critical mass articulating women's perspective. For instance, Tansu Çiller's leadership of Doğru Yol Partisi (True Way Party) and her position between 1993 and 1996 as Turkey's first and only female Prime Minister was another important step in Turkey's male-dominated politics, although she was ideologically distant from feminists, particularly left feminists. Çiller's advantage was being an academician and a modern woman that led her to gain support from western-educated women and many other liberals. However, it was still prevalent that, since gender roles within the family are shared, women were less involved in politics than with their role in the family because gender stereotyping influences women and their position in Turkish politics.

As in many other countries, Turkish women were excluded from political life while their historical under-representation was not seen as a problem for democracy. Women have been able to vote since 1930 and elected into public office since 1934, which represented a comparatively progressive reform for the time globally because, during 1930, women had the right to vote for their political leaders in only 28 countries. Another sign of progress was that there were 18 women MPs out of 395 MPs in 1935. Although 4.6 % was very low, it was the highest ratio until the 2007 elections. As the table below shows, in the following years, the percentage of female MPs was inversely proportional to the increase in the number of MPs.

Table 2: Number of Women Parliament and Rates between 1935 and 1999

The year of Election	Number of MP	Number of Women MP	Women MP Rate (%)
1935	395	18	4.6
1943	435	16	3.7
1950	487	3	0.6
1957	610	8	1.3
1965	450	8	1.8
1973	450	6	1.3
1991	450	8	1.8
1995	550	13	2.4
1999	550	22	4.2

Source: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.dagilim

In terms of political representation, the highest representation of women was recorded in 1999 with 22 women MPs. Almost all the political parties' programs addressed the women's question. However, among these, the Kurdish movement and its political party projection had the largest women's quotas due to the strong feminist stance of Kurdish women and their advocacy. From 1992 onwards, HEP and later DEP Kurdish parties developed concrete policies regarding women's rights and gender equality. Since 1994, DSP and the Kemalist CHP have also addressed women's issues by employing the language of rights by lobbying for social equality between men and women. In contrast, the Islamist Refah and later Fazilet Party were less confident in mentioning women but willing to raise the headscarf ban onto the political agenda.

4.1.4.3. Violence Against Women (VAW)

Rights-based politicization made women aware of constructed gender discriminatory laws, discriminatory policies driven by the state, and traditional and patriarchal norms carved out by society. Although in the 1990s, there was a range of ideology-based women's groups, their efforts yielded the Law for the Protection of Family as a measure against domestic violence, passed in 1998 and amended in 2001. Violence against women (VAW) in Turkey became publicly visible in the 1980s through the efforts of the feminist movement. The dimensions of VAW were elaborated from different viewpoints in civil society. For instance, the Kurdish women's movement and local

women's NGOs, such as *Kadın Merkezi* (Women Centre Foundation/KAMER) and *Van Kadın Derneği* (Van Women's Association) (VAKAD), focused on the patriarchal culture and its effects on Kurdish women, honour killings, structural inequalities, the state authorities' lack of attention to the problems of Kurdish women. On the other hand, "the 'headscarf issue' and equality of women in the public sphere became symbols of the Islamist women's movement" (Özdemir, 2014, p. 124), which were gathered under scattered groups.

What distinguished the perspective of the 1990s' feminist approach from earlier Kemalist state-led feminism was that the new agenda criticized the Republican conception of equality of women and men in the public sphere. Their agenda also deeply tackled the patriarchy, the elimination of VAW, the oppression of women in the family, the use of sexuality as a means of male dominance, rape, battering of women, virginity tests, and sexual harassment. More generally, the third wave's focus point was gender roles that treat men and women unequally, based on discrimination against women in health, education, employment, participation in politics and decision-making, and property ownership.

These new liberal feminists "began to organize campaigns, protests and meetings to expose the widespread violence and for the improvement of legal and policy mechanisms to prevent VAW" (Özdemir, 2014, p. 124) and forced a significant transformation in the violence paradigm. One concern was the lack of specific data to reveal the number of the violence victims, oppressive actions against women's personality and who the perpetrators were. The lack of data arose because violence is assumed to be a private family matter rather than a public issue. The UN's recognition of domestic violence as a human rights violation and sexual productivity as women's rights enabled these cases to be publicized. After the initial international campaigns against sexual violence at the beginning of the 1990s, sexuality was taken up by the feminist movement in Turkey, and virginity tests and honour crimes were re-evaluated as human violations. There is no question that honour crimes and virginity tests were issues of utmost importance for women, especially in rural areas.

One of the most important and frequent types of violence against women is domestic violence, which often includes physical violence against females from the male figures in their family. In combating violence against women, the most important legislation was Law No. 4320 on the Protection of the Family, issued in 1998, to protect women from violence. This law aimed to eliminate inappropriate treatment of women due to religious or traditional practices. At the institutional level, to combat violence against women, KSGM prepared and conducted training programs to raise awareness about violence against women and gender equality in collaboration with various ministries to eliminate negative attitudes and behaviours that cause and reinforce violence. Furthermore, the Directorate General, prepared National Action Plans that highlight cooperation between institutions and organizations to combat violence against women. State-based institutional bodies, international pressure, and monitoring emanating from the UN encouraged the Turkish state to take the initiative in ratifying CEDAW.

4.1.5. The Role of International Actors

The rise of the feminist women's movement in Turkey since the 1980s was also enhanced by global developments on women's human rights and gender equality. The UN has become an important global actor as well as a platform for international rule and norm development since the 1980s. CEDAW in 1979, the UN World Conferences of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies in 1985, and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995 provided important guidelines for women's movements to develop a global gender equality regime. The global history of women's human rights was entrenched with the activism that took place inside countries along with the support of international actors. Sikkink (1998) argues that the human rights regime follows a logic of diffusion of universal morality and these norms are based on the claim that the global can limit the excessive use of local power. To reach central government, "women's groups used human rights discourses to resonate the values of the secular state" (Tomen, 2015, p. 473), which allowed them to make legitimate demands of the political elites.

Global actors, such as international organizations or, as what Nadelmann (1990) calls them, 'transnational moral entrepreneurs' are the new activists of the international community that aim to change social realities. They are mainly constituted by civil society and intended to make human rights advocacy relevant in global politics. According to Çubukçu (2004), these actors are "an important deterrent force of regulations to prevent discrimination that women face in every area" (p. 63). International regulations derived from them can help prevent further violations of rights based on legitimate national but mostly global claims. For instance, CEDAW strengthens the status of women as it is envisioned to spread of awareness nationally and internationally. Women can form social pressure groups with political power by using the same language and referring to CEDAW.

The gender equality norm, which has been placed on the agenda by transnational advocacies and national feminists since the nineteenth century, has been accentuated mostly internationally and embedded into many national and regional judicial systems, such as the EU. Internationally, Turkey is one of the signatories of major Conventions such as the Beijing Platform for Action and CEDAW, which commit it to subscribe in principles of universal rights and equality on the basis of gender and women's human rights.

In the 1990s, "the legacy of state feminism in the Turkish context intertwined with the role of the state in the global context" (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008, p. 463) because the international women's movement, like other international actors, directed attention to the role of the state in reinforcing institutional barriers to women's progress for achieving gender equality through legal reforms and the courts. Women's status in Turkey was consolidated by signing and ratifying CEDAW in 1985 and the Additional Protocol of CEDAW in 2002. However, Turkey initially stated some reservations against CEDAW, although it lifted these in 1999. These areas were Article 15, which specifies that "States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law" and Article 16, which states that 'States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations'. Strong feminist advocacy lies behind this achievement, although the success

was granted to EU power (Berik, 1990). Indeed in 1985, by signing CEDAW, the state involuntarily paved the way for Turkey's feminist movement to organize campaigns, street protests, and petitions. This activism was launched by feminist consciousness-raising groups to enhance the meaning of women's citizenship and implementation of CEDAW. Although the state authorities ignored these petitions and women's voices, the 1995 UN World Conference in Beijing acted created a deadline for the removal of Turkey's reservations (Marshall, 2013). Until the end of 1999, the feminist movement kept up their activism and pressure for the removal of the reservations.

The signing of the Convention demonstrates the normative influence of the UN and local women's activism in Turkish legislative reforms for gender equality. These international standards comply with the EU's agenda, in that the EU regulates gender equality by taking international norms into consideration and acknowledging CEDAW and other UN resolutions as guidelines. Academic studies regarding gender equality in Turkey during the EU accession process have noted the positive and incontrovertible role of the EU, especially regarding constitutional change and financial support for women's NGO's and governmental bodies.

4.2. The EU's Gender Equality Conditionality in Turkey's Accession Process

EU-Turkey relations date back to the Ankara Agreement of 1963, which recognized Turkey's eligibility for European Economic Community (EEC) membership if it could fulfil the obligations arising from the agreement. The demands of the Community focused on Turkey's economic and political weaknesses. In the process, although democracy and human rights were not the priority and conditions of the EEC in this period, the military memorandum in 1971 and the coup in 1980 were concrete obstacles to democracy and rule of law, as well as to becoming a member of the EEC. The transition to a democratic civilian system was consolidated in 1983 with the foundation of the neoliberal and right-wing Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) in 1983 (Marshall, 2013). Its priority was to implement neoliberal economic policies to open up Turkey's markets, carry out privatization policies, and re-constitute a democratic political system. ANAP was keen to demonstrate its commitment to European economic

and political standards, and in 1987, it applied for full membership of the European Community based on Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, Article 98 of the European Coal and Steel Community, and Article 205 of EURATOM. However, in 1989, the European Commission's Opinion regarding Turkey's application for full membership indicated that the EC could not accept a new member before completing its own internal market as well as the required economic, social, and political reforms for candidacy.

Nevertheless, Turkey continued its efforts to receive a date for opening membership negotiations and made some positive attempts to consolidate democracy and human rights. Following this process, the EU presents specific entry criteria at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit as conditionality tools for prospective EU members. Among the political criteria, the EU stressed that Turkey's human rights and democratization record had considerably improved since its application for membership in 1987 (Marshall, 2013). Economically, the Customs Union decision in 1995 represented that start of relations whereby the EC allowed Turkey to become a part of its economic structure. Over the following years, Turkey made specific amendments in terms of its anti-terror laws, penal code, and abolition of the law that banned publishing in any language other than Turkish. According to Müftüler Baç (1997) and Marshall (2013), Turkey's geographical location became very strategic and important during the Gulf war crisis and after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. This led the EC to reconsider its security, cost-benefit, and strategic meaning of Turkey's membership, rather than establishing common culture and identity.

The 1999 Helsinki Summit established the formal beginning of the EU-Turkey relations, in which the European Commission as the executive body of the EU officially recognized Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership. Although Turkey expected to join CEECs on the 1997 Luxembourg Summit list, it was only included two years later in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. Since then, EU-Turkey relations have been much more complicated than those for other enlargements, or as Diez (2005) noted, "the EU wields its influence over Turkey and tries to construct its difference" (p. 633) in the accession negotiations.

Gender equality is represented in the enlargement as a fundamental right and an EU policy priority, in which Turkey committed itself to promote gender equality by eliminating all forms of discrimination against women and enabling an inclusive society for all. It acknowledges and promotes gender equality first as part of human rights and democratization, which reflects a gender sensitive image in its political stance. In addition, it is regarded as a necessity for a functioning market economy and growth. Although Turkey was already familiar with these norms as it is a signatory of international conventions, the situation has become more contentious now that gender equality is a condition for EU membership.

Turkey's social policy, specifically gender equality, is a challenging part of the process, among other political and legal issues. Women rights, women's empowerment, and gender equality topics are stipulated by the EU under Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria (Human Rights and Protection Minorities; Democracy and the rule of law; Economic, social and cultural rights); Economic Criteria (Structure of the Turkish economy; Macro-Economic Developments); and Administrative capacity to apply the Acquis (Chapter 13-later Chapter 19); Social policy and employment; Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights), all of which clearly indicate the necessary requirements to achieve gender equality.

Turkey is a very good example of normative justifications and *pouvoir normatif* in action, as well as demonstrating the impacts of the EU in its external relations. Turkey seems to be an ideal 'other' to construct and present the EU as a normative power because of its hybrid position regarding Europe. The EU's first so-called normative power influence started in 1998, when Turkey received its first progress report from the EU, although it was not yet a candidate country. Regarding gender equality, in the part covering the judiciary, the report stressed the importance of amending the law concerning the civil code, which is mainly designed to eliminate discrimination between men and women. Regarding human rights, the report focused on women's status and remaining discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations, despite Turkey's ratification of CEDAW in 1985. It also emphasized Turkey's lack of provisions the criminal code to counter violence against women in marriage.

In December 2004, at the summit meeting of EU Heads of State, it was stated that Turkey has sufficiently implemented the political criteria so it could open negotiations for EU accession in 2005. Since Turkey started the accession negotiations, the procedural diffusion of the EU has officially started. Before that, Turkey was asked to reform its political structure, judiciary system, constitution, and economic substructure, all of which constitute the basis for other procedures. This period was also a procedural diffusion period because Turkey was required to fulfil political and economic criteria, although it only officially started in 2005. The EU has presented its conditions through the Accession Partnership documents since 2001 under short, medium, and long-term periodical categories. All these processes were monitored and evaluated by the EU through yearly regular progress reports. As the norm importer, Turkey was asked to remove all impediments and complete the diffusion of the core norms within given periods. Taking these priorities into account, Turkey prepared its own national programmes to ensure its strategy and planned implementations were aligned with EU conditions. The national programs also showed that Turkey had accepted the EU's internal and external norms. Hence, it is the stage where norm acceptance occurred. Since 2007, the EU has provided financial assistance under the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). These are transference diffusion tools categorized under Manners' diffusion group that are envisaged to build up the capacities of candidate countries to prepare them for the rights and obligations that come with EU membership.

The asymmetrical relationship between the EU and third parties allows the EU to threaten any norm-breaking country that they will be kept out of future stages of the enlargement, because it has more leverage over candidate countries as it holds the carrot in accession relations (Müftüler-Baç, 2000). The candidate state voluntarily accepts the "particular political order as legitimate and entails the recognition of a set of rules and obligations as binding" (Risse, 2009, p. 148). Through EU conditionality, moral, political, and social processes are actions achieved through virtue, persuasion and conferral. More specifically, persuasion involves constitutive engagement, encouragement of principles, and institutionalization of regular patterns, such as

accession procedures. During enlargement, the constitutive norms affect or may affect the actual behaviour of actors as they prefer to be a part of a collective identity.

4.2.1. The EU's Gender Equality Conditionality: Procedural Diffusion

The EU's gender equality norm emerged in two ways. Firstly, internal norms are part of hard law, comprising several directives to eliminate gender discrimination in the labour market. These norms have been developed by the EU since its foundation so here the EU acts as the norm entrepreneur that framed these norms in the context of its own labour market. Secondly, external norms are part of soft laws that aim to mainstream gender equality in every sphere of life, where gender equality is considered as part of human rights. The latter has emerged through the historical women's movements and with the endorsement of international institutions, which is why it is called a universal norm. Here, the EU acts as a norm promoter as it adopted these universal norms inside its borders before trying to socialize them third countries during the EU accession process.

Progress reports between 1999 and 2013 were prepared by the EU Commission while the Association Partnership Documents (APDs) of 2001, 2003, 2006, and 2008 were prepared by the European Council, composed of ministers from member states. In the APDs, the Council urged the Turkish government to comply with the technical conditions without any relevant suggestions or a comprehensive outline as far as adaptation was concerned. In addition, compliance with EU conditionality is documented through regular screenings, which can be seen as the EU's monitoring capacity and the power of the Commission through regular reports. According to Cebeci (2012), in this technocratic approach, EU standards, which are shown as the EU's best practice implementations, are represented as benchmarks of membership. Indeed, progress reports seem one of the most overt normative power instruments whereby the EU presents itself as a norm promoter.

The APDs' gender equality conditionality is as follows:

In the APD of 2001, the women's rights issue was mentioned under the medium-term priorities' Employment and Social Affairs heading. This part sets the conditions for the transition of anti-discrimination, amendments in the labour law, equal treatment of men and women, occupational health and safety, and public health directives, and reinforcement of administrative structures for social security. These have been directives and internal norms in the EU since the 1970s.

The APD of 2003 tackled the same priorities as the 2001 APD in the Social Policy and Employment Chapter as short and medium-term priorities. Conditions for short-term priorities included adoption of the *acquis* in the areas of labour law, equal treatment of women and men, health and safety at work, the fight against discrimination, and public health. Medium-term priorities highlighted conditions for the transposition of EU legislation in the same fields but also included strengthening related administrative and enforcement structures, including labour inspectorates.

The APD of 2006 set conditions for the gender equality norm under Economic and Social Rights Title in Terms of Women Rights in its short-term priorities. Turkey was asked to implement legislation relating to women's rights, particularly the civil code, the new penal code, and the law on the protection of the family. In addition, it was expected that judges and prosecutors should receive specialized training while municipalities and other responsible institutions should strengthen their capacity to establish shelters for women at risk of violence. To eliminate violence against women, the report saw a need for further awareness-raising of the public, and of men in particular. It is crucial to promote the role of women in society, through ensuring equal access to education and participation in the labour market, and in political and social life, as well as supporting the development of women's organizations to fulfil these goals.

The APD of 2008 listed the same conditions as the 2006 APD while gender equality conditions were discussed in the Human rights and the Protection of Minorities' Economic and Social Rights part as a short-term goal. Turkey was asked to implement

legislation relating to women's rights and against all forms of violence against women, including crimes committed in the name of honour. The EU also highlighted the importance of NGO and state cooperation in the solution-seeking process.

Although the first two APDs conditioned the transition of labour market-oriented directives, after the accession negotiations started in 2005, more comprehensive topics, such as violence against women and the role of women in society, were added in the latter two documents.

4.2.2. The EU's Financial Assistance on Gender Equality: Transference Diffusion

The regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey entered into force in December 2001. The purpose of this framework was to simplify procedures for programming and implementing the conditioned priorities for local authorities and NGOs. This financial support helped to disseminate gender awareness, female labour market participation, representation of women in politics, and the fight against gender-based violence. A range of civil society organizations were the main addressees that would provide gender awareness activities and increase pluralism by respecting cultural diversity. This financial assistance included transfers of material and immaterial assets, such technical assistance, "but it is equally likely to be the result of more 'grassroot' engagement of EU agencies and support for NGOs on the ground" (Manners and Whitman, 2013, p. 191). There is more that can be done through public policy and transference to facilitate greater numbers of value interpreters.

In addition to the comments of the EU Commission and conditionality in gender equality, IPA and EIDHR funding for civil society actors provided other alternative sources to socialize norms and ameliorate inequalities. Apart from the state's effort in norm socialization, at both national and local levels, socialization occurs through domestic actors, such as NGOs and trade unions, in cooperation with transnational organisations and networks that aim to exploit international norms and generate pressures for compliance on state decision makers (Checkel, 2001).

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European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a thematic financial instrument, from which the EU transfers funds in external actions aiming to support projects in human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy in non-EU countries. The European Commission has prepared a programming guide for states to ease their implementation of the political criteria. The Commission has also integrated and mainstreamed this financial assistance into all areas of policy making with candidate countries. The Commission directs attention to the strengths and weaknesses of civil society regarding democracy and human rights. The main objective of the EIDHR is to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms worldwide. The target groups of the project's priorities include the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in society.

The allocated budget for 2007-2013 was 1.104 million Euros (157 million per year approximately). It has a strong focus to make civil society organizations more effective forces for political reform and human rights norm diffusion. The EIDHR allows Turkey to benefit from projects to promote gender equality, freedom of expression and independent media, good governance, improved access to justice, the prevention of torture and support for the rehabilitation of torture victims, as well as the fight against racism and discrimination. For the most part, such projects are implemented by civil society organizations.

According to Mühlenhoff (2014), the EIDHR supports NGOs through a liberal narrative that aims to empower them by giving financial and ideological support for realizing liberal values through projects involving citizens or target groups. This also technologizes and de-politicizes the funded NGOs. The EIDHR is one of the most promising civil society instruments regarding human rights "since it avoids the interaction with respective governments and instead focuses on civil society" (Kurki, 2011; Mühlenhoff, 2014). Kurki (2011) also argues that the EU transfers its neo-liberal governmentality by first giving responsibility to foster further democratization to the

country's domestic civil society by empowering NGOs. Thus, Turkish civil society should help itself and provide what is missing in Turkish democracy.

However, in Turkey, NGOs are the legitimized version of loose right-based movements in which the necessity to gather under a non-governmental status is required to become a legal entity as this helps to build legitimacy, recognition, attribute positions and responsibilities, and create strategic coalitions and alliances, or become a legal agent in the system. Yet that does not mean that every women's NGO is a politicized rights-based supporter as there are service-based NGOs that only run projects that complement state policies. They pursue their advocacy with the support of international or national actors' financial assistance.

Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA I; 2007-2013)

Beginning in 2007, Turkey received EU financial aid under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which provides financial assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries. The aim of IPA assistance is to support the achievement of EU pre-accession strategy goals, as described in the Accession Partnership Document (APD). Based on the priorities of the APD, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs on the Turkish side, and the European Commission Delegation and European Commission Enlargement on the EU side, formulate strategies as to which projects will be supported with EU funds.

IPA funding 2007-2013 (IPA I) is based on five different components:

- Transition Assistance and institution building
- Cross-border cooperation (with EU member states and other countries eligible for IPA)
- Regional development (transport, environment, regional, and economic development)
- Human resources (strengthening human capital and combating exclusion)
- Rural development

In addition, EU-funded projects support a functioning market economy and increased competitiveness; the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of EU legislation; civil

society dialogue between the EU and Turkey; and preparation for managing structural Funds. The sectors that the EU gives funding for are agriculture, food, fisheries, and rural development; business environment; social policy (education, health, culture, employment); environment, transport, and energy; public administration, reform, and governance; justice, home affairs, and fundamental rights (including civil society); diversification and development of rural economic activities; investments in processing and marketing of agricultural and fishery products; restructuring agricultural holdings.

It can be argued that IPA funding is directly related with the issues mentioned in the APDs and regular reports. Through the use of IPA funding, the public institutions and women's NGOs can increase gender mainstreaming, which has evolved from the GAD strategy and analyses how gender relations are shaped and constructed by the social roles of women and men (Lister, 2006). It also emphasizes the roles of both women and men in planning and incorporating the development agenda into the IPA for candidate countries like Turkey. However, gender mainstreaming has not been implemented in every sector but is limited to the economy, education, violence and employment. The EU has provided more than €36 million to support gender mainstreaming programmes aimed at promoting gender equality, strengthening women's NGO networks, combating violence against women, supporting women's entrepreneurship, and this funding towards on-going or planned projects with the following objectives:

- Empowerment of women and women's NGOs in least developed regions by incorporating a gender sensitive approach into the service provision policies of government organizations, local administrations, and NGOs, and improving their organizational and technical capacities

- Promoting gender equality in working life to address gaps in labour and social security legislation as well as improving staff competence in institutions.

- Promoting women's employment by increasing the capacity to design and implement effective labour market measures

- Strengthening pre-school education and increasing enrolment rates to help promote women's participation in the workforce through improved childcare services

- Increasing enrolment rates for girls in secondary education and vocational training, reducing drop-out rates, and raising parents' awareness of the importance of education, especially for girls.

Direct Funding titles in the Central Finance and Contracts Unit's project database:

- Empowerment of women and women NGOs in the least developed regions
- Increasing School Enrolment rates especially for girls
- Promoting Women's employment
- Strengthening Capacity of National and Local NGOs on Combating Against Violence Grant Scheme

Indirectly:
- Civil Society Dialogue Program
- Civil Society Dialogue III - Political Criteria Grant Scheme
- Developing Civil Dialogue among CSOs grant scheme
- Developing Civil Dialogue among NGOs

The legal entities that can benefit from this financial support are mostly universities, public institutions (municipalities, special provincial administration, unions for providing services for villages, vocational high schools, and public training centres) and non-governmental organizations (chambers of commerce and industry, trade associations, cooperatives, associations, foundations, federations, and clubs).

Table 3: IPA Financial Assistance Categories between the years 2007-2013

COMPONENTS	MEASURE/SECTOR	TITLE OF THE PROJECT	AIM OF THE PROJECT
PRE-IPA(BEFORE 2007)	Justice and Home Affairs Fundamental Rights (Including Civil Society)	Providing Shelters for Women subjected to Violence	to ensure through the establishment of shelters, that women subjected to violence were provided with sufficient protection
Transition Assistance and Institution Building (IPA I)	Social Policy (Education, Health, Culture, Employement)	Promoting Gender Equality in Education	To promote gender quality for girls and boys in schools and encourage an equality - and gender - sensitive approach throughout the educational system
	Social Policy (Education, Health, Culture, Employement)	Promoting Gender Equality in Work Life	This project's objective was to align Turkish legislation with EU gender equality requirements and to improve the capacity of institutions responsiblefor the implementationof these. Within the scope of the project, experts from two EU member states assisted their Turkish colleagues in analysing EU directives on gender equalty and equal opportunites as well as related case law from the European Court of Justice. This approach enabled.
	Justice and Home Affairs Fundamental Rights (Including Civil Society)	Empowering women and women NGOs in the least developed regions of Turkey	Set out to involve non-governmental organisations working with women in the wider efforts of the government to increase and facilitate women's access to municipal, social and judicial services. Gender mainstreaming training programmes and workshops were provided for NGO's, local government and municipal officals, which were encouraged to work in partnership through the signing of cooperation agreements. The project also sought to increase the participation of women's organisations in local decision-making
	Justice and Home Affairs Fundamental Rights (Including Civil Society)	Providing Shelters for Women subjected to Domestic Violence	Overall government objective to protect women's right in Turkey. This project aims to offer women subjected to domestic violence with sufficient protection through the provision of shelters and other support services in 26 provinces.
	Justice and Home Affairs Fundamental Rights (Including Civil Society)	Preventing domestic violence against women	Project seeks to improve the role of Turkish Gendarmerie in protecting human rights, particularly in the field of combating violence against women.
	Justice and Home Affairs Fundamental Rights (Including Civil Society)	Enhancing projecting for women subjected to violence	The objective of this project part of the government's overall effort to safeguard women's human rights, is to assess the feasibility of the use electronic devices in order to enforce court protective and preventive orders and to improve the operations of shelters for women victims of violence.
	Justice and Home Affairs Fundamental Rights (Including Civil Society)	Supporting the work of local human rights boards and raising awareness of women's right	Directed by the National Human Rights Institution, the overall aim of this project is increase the public's understanding of human rights in general. A particular focus of the project is the need to highlight the right of womento participate in social, economic, and cultural life and to utilise all measures to prevent domestic violence and "honour" killings.
Human Resources Development (IPA I)	Social Policy (Education, Health, Culture, Employement)	Increasing girls' enrolment at secondary school level	The objective of this project was increase enrolment rates, particularly for girls in secondary education and the VET sector, to decrease drop-out rates, to increase the vocational skills and competences of labour force, and to increase awareness among parents on the importance of girls' education
	Social Policy (Education, Health, Culture, Employement)	Promoting women's employment	The objective of this project was assist The Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) in delivering more effective public employement services, particularly to women at local level, as well as to provide direct support to women to become employable through local project implemented by NGO's local authorities, education institution, etc.
			The 131 local projects that were implemented have helped improve women's employability in different sectors, support women's entrepreneurship and diminish cultural and other obstacle that hinder women's participation in the labour market. Thousands of women have benefited from the projects and are now better placed to find jobs in the formal market.

Source: http://www.cfcu.gov.tr

In these projects, women's empowerment plays a complementary role in closing the gap between women and men, even if legal arrangements have not yet been implemented properly. In addition, empowerment is always used to discuss women's employment or women's entrepreneurship, "most of which focus on increasing the percentage of women in the workforce and encouraging women to take a more active entrepreneurship role" (Landig, 2011, p. 206). In fact, empowerment was first mentioned in UN documents about gender equality. It is specifically stated that

> Empowerment encompasses women's sense of self-worth; their right to have access to opportunities and resources; their right to have the power to control their own lives, both within and outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social change to create a more just social and economic order, nationally and internationally (United Nations Population Information Network –POPIN, 1995).

Following the UN's clarifications on women's empowerment, the EU also referred to this explanation and included it in its agenda, acknowledging the women's status should match their empowerment in the society. However, the important point is that empowerment is always related to women's economic empowerment. As Dedeoğlu (2012) notes, in the EU's gender equality policy, nursing services and the harmonization of women's work and daily life are prioritized. However, empowerment of women in the labour market partially helps to eliminate women's subordination and reduce gender inequalities.

4.3. Chapter Conclusion

This part of the chapter first tried to illustrate the general structure of gender inequality in Turkey and the influential agents behind of gender equality norm diffusion before the EU accession process began. It was very notable that, since the nineteenth century, not only in Turkey but worldwide, women's grassroots activities have catalysed women's rights norm diffusion. Their constant activism and pressure have been responsible for many of the achievements in the legal system. On the other hand, through the modernization wave, granting votes to women in the new Turkish Republic demonstrated its sensitivity to accelerate the process of democratization because state-

supported feminism symbolized Turkey's more Western and democratic image. Since 1930s, this women-sensitive image was also consolidated with the labour law that gave women working status. State feminism was clearly pursued in line with nation-building; in their working and daily lives, women were encouraged to develop the nation economically as producers and conscious consumers that prefer national products. However, women remained confined by the state's discourse and its definition of the status of women.

Despite the obstacles posed by the state, women's advocacy groups continued awareness-raising activities to challenge the patriarchal structure and its related projections. These movements emerged in the public sphere in the 1980s before becoming institutionalized in the 1990s, independently from the political sphere, which was often in conflict with the international human rights regime. Turkey's women movement was composed of those who had been attributed rights within the political sphere in the early 1990s, who pressured the state for equal rights through a series of legal challenges. However, gender discriminatory traditions and practices have persisted, such as honour killings, condemnation of premarital male-female interactions, and the concept of preserving family honour as a justification for limiting women's freedom of movement.

Some argue that these unsolved structural problems are caused by entrenched cultural norms whereas some other feminists tackled the issue in terms of economic liberalization and market struggles. For the former, family structure and the role of the women in the family play key roles in shaping women's employment and labour market patterns whereas for latter, export-led development strategies in developing countries increase female labour market participation. At the same time, however, this growth commodified and manipulated women's labour within the informal sector. Accordingly, the male-breadwinner and female-homemaker family was reflected in Turkey's legal and social security framework.

Therefore, awareness had to grow to institutionalize women's rights effectively and create ideational change in the consciousness of the stereotyped gender-bias place given to women. The Turkish women's movement, especially since the 1980s, has worked

hard to publicize women's status and problems nationally and institutionalize it. They started to question the patriarchal system, its norms and state policies, in which by bringing supposedly private issues onto the political agenda and fighting for their legal rights, new social norms, and discursive change. Women's activism has worked on consciousness and established platforms to challenge the discourse and defamiliarize rooted local realities. Meanwhile, global developments had an important impact on the place of the human rights regime in Turkey and on the evolution of women's movements.

One of the turning points regarding gender equality was when Turkey became an EU candidate state in 1999 and accession negotiations were started in 2005. In the accession process, the Copenhagen political and economic criteria, and the *Acquis Communautaire* were introduced through short and medium-term priorities. This conditionality has been expressed in the EU's Progress Reports since 1998, and in Accession Partnership Documents (APD) since 2001. Among these conditionality priorities, gender equality was defined as a pre-condition for accession negotiations, albeit limited when compared with other topics. The progress reports have had significance benefits for women's rights advocates as the conditions that Turkey must implement have underpinned their demands and given them the opportunity to increase their pressure. In particular, financial assistance allows them to organize, lobby, and conduct gender awareness activities, and specify the inadequacies in the progress reports. They then ask the EU to provide more detailed and comprehensive conditionality policies for Turkey. Hence, they have been able to frame the content of both the progress reports and the APDs during the accession process. Here, the EU has acted as a channel to regularize the ideas and behaviour of Turkey regarding gender equality issues, thereby constraining Turkey's actions against gender discrimination.

CHAPTER 5

THE EU'S GENDER EQUALITY NORM'S LIFE
CYCLE IN TURKEY

This chapter investigates how EU internal and external gender equality norms cycle at national and subnational (local) level. The diffusion of EU norms on the gender equality is partially translated and stretched in the dynamics between the EU and Turkey. Unequivocally, gender equality norm diffusion needs an actor constellation. It is not easy to measure the normative resonance of the EU, where it is mostly defined in conventional terms, such as military capacity or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, it is possible to see the EU's performance through its exercise of power in promoting norms and regulatory competency in the enlargement process. Other indicators include the financial resources distributed under transference diffusion and persuasion techniques or sermons in EU progress reports.

EU official discourses and progress reports specifically and constantly reiterate that Turkey must reach EU standards in terms of human rights, rule of law, and democracy. Among these standards, gender equality norm is covered in Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 19 (Social Policy and Employment) - previously Chapter 13 - of the *Acquis.* In the political criteria, gender equality is issued in 'Human Rights and Protection of Minorities', 'Economic-Social and Cultural Rights', 'Democracy and Rule of Law,' and 'Civil and Political Rights' titles; and in terms of economic criteria, it is included in 'the Existence of functioning market economy' and the 'Capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union' titles. The EU highlights both the achievements and deficiencies in the process and lays out the rights and obligations of the candidate countries through progress reports.

Turkey first accepted EU gender equality norms in 1999-2005, and by preparing its national programmes it expressed its commitments and legal fulfilments. This norm-

acceptance process was the start of the procedural diffusion's first step. In the second step, norm socialization was directed by the EU's regular reports and again conditioned in the 2006-2008 Accession Partnership documents. In addition, EU financial assistance exerted its influence, particularly at a local level, by funding women's NGOs, where gender equality norm socialization was echoed in women's grassroot organizations and public institutions such as municipalities. EU stipulations gained support from these agents as they gained an opportunity to fund their projects to raise gender equality awareness at local and national levels. The EU conducted this transference diffusion to ease the norm socialization process and further the norm's internalization.

This chapter first explains Turkey's norm acceptance process and its responses to the Accession Partnership Documents (APDs) by preparing national programmes to improve gender equality. Such actions mean that the EU-driven norms passed a tipping point, thereby completing the first stage of the norm's life cycle. After passing this threshold by establishing institutions, developing policies and judicial amendments, Turkey became committed to socialize the norm nationally and locally within both the short and medium term. During norm socialization, women NGOs were the internal catalysing agents that pressured the state. The state was expected to implement gender equality laws properly, and produce and implement gender equal policies in the political and economic realms.

The second part of this chapter evaluates the EU's additional financial assistance for gender equality projects to expedite the socialization process. This part explains procedural diffusion and how local agents responded to this norm socialization. Interviews with 25 local agents that refer their completed projects, the projects' sustainability and the limits of socialization give an opportunity to understand local consent to the EU gender equality norms. Following norm socialization or norm cascade, the third part of the chapter focuses on the degree of norm internalization, which is the last part of the norm's life cycle, to determine the extent of the EU's normative power over gender equality in Turkey and to uncover the obstacles facing in socialization and internalization of gender equality norm.

5.1. STAGE I: Norm Acceptance and Turkey's Commitments (1999-2005)

Gender equality did not initially occupy a significant place in EU conditionality for Turkey. Instead, the EU imposed some certain priorities through APDs and Progress Reports regarding women's status in Turkey's penal and civil codes. These judicial amendments, which are also the part of CEDAW, aimed to eliminate gender discrimination and transpose the EU's market economy directives into equal treatment under Turkish Law. As a norm receiver country, Turkey accepted these norms through judicial amendments and harmonization packages, and reported its plans in national programmes, which were prepared as commitments to the EU's short and medium-term APD priorities. Following these documents' assurances, many reforms and constitutional amendments were adopted between 1999 and 2005 to achieve EU standards. These efforts enabled the start of accession negotiations in 2005 between Turkey and the EU under the 35 chapters of the *Acquis*. In its regular reports and APDs, the EU focused on violence against women, enhancing women's status in the penal code, civil code, and constitution, female labour market participation, and female political participation. In the pre-negotiation period, the EU specified these titles and indicated a more sweeping wave of conditions for gender equality. Among these titles, women's political participation was the least prioritized condition, in that Turkey's low female parliamentary participation levels were only mentioned briefly in the 2002 progress report and some of the project priorities. This issue was also not on Turkey's agenda until accession negotiations started. In contrast, the EU urged Turkey to reform its judicial system and produce policies to combat violence against women and women's unemployment, and improve women's status.

Regarding 'violence against women', the EU strongly emphasized in its 2001 and 2004 reports the need to abolish Article 462 of the penal code, which allows for reduced sentences for honour killings, and Article 51, concerning crimes committed under "extreme provocation", which was applied to offences traditionally viewed as being against women's 'virtue'. In the same reports, the EU constantly referred to the limited scope of Turkey's 1998 Law on the Protection of the Family. The 2005 report, for example, focused on the security forces' failures to investigate women's complaints of

violence. The EU considered this a major problem that required urgent retraining of the security forces. In the 2005, the EU also emphasized the lack of statistical data on gender-based violence, effective victim-monitoring mechanisms, and an urgent need to further increase the provision of women's shelters.

Regarding 'women's status', the EU focused on some specific issues. The first was the absence of comprehensive civil and administrative laws to prohibit discrimination, which was supposed to be transposed and implemented in line with Article 13 of the EC Treaty. The second was the portrayal of women in school text books, which reinforces gender discrimination, while the third concern was the lack of amendments on legal and practical initiatives to tackle the problem of discrimination. This anti-discrimination conditionality was also reflected in female participation in the labour market. During the norm's acceptance and in the first steps of procedural diffusion, gender discrimination was elaborated in each progress report and APD by indicating the legislative barriers preventing women from entering certain types of employment. The EU therefore obliged Turkey to promote gender equality in employment and pay, as well as to prioritize the elimination of gender gaps in employment by 2010. To do so, Turkey was required to accept Article 8 of the European Social Charter on the right of employed women to protection of maternity, to adopt legislation aimed at guaranteeing the effective prohibition of discrimination in employment or under-employment, and to transfer EU directives for parental leave, equal pay, access to employment, burden of proof, and occupational social security.

To understand the first stage of the gender equality norm's life cycle, it is important to examine the content and the scope of the gender norm that Turkey committed by drawing a roadmap before the accession negotiations started. In the 2001 and 2003 national programmes, Turkey explicitly presented its plans to transform the gender *acquis.* Following the programs, Turkey's successful and deficient achievements were reflected in subsequent annual progress reports while Turkey's achievements and commitments demonstrated that the gender equality norm had been accepted.

Turkey's Commitments in 2001 National Programmes

In the first years of its candidacy and in line with the progress reports' remarks, Turkish government made constitutional amendments and implemented various harmonization packages. The 57th coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) between 28 May 1999 and 18 November 2002 lifted Turkey's reservations on CEDAW in 1999. The government also prepared the 2001 National Programme, committed to amending the constitution to grant men and women equal rights, and enacted a draft civil code to foster gender equality. For medium-term priorities, Turkey declared its undertakings by drafting a law on social security that gave equal treatment for men and women, protected self-employed women during pregnancy and the post-natal period, and harmonized the labour law on gender discrimination with the EU *Acquis*. The norms were planned to be diffused by the corresponding Turkish legislation through the Turkish Constitution and by adopting several ILO Conventions, CEDAW, UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and UN Convention on Personal and Political Rights. Furthermore, the government committed the EU to institutionalize parental and paid maternity leave according to employment status; abolish the concept of the male head of the family in the civil code, and eliminate unregistered female employment.

Turkey's 2001-2002 Achievements

One of the most significant achievements of the 57th government in gender equality happened in 2001. Regarding the political criteria, with a new civil code was adopted through a constitutional amendment; specifically, Article 10, 'Equality before the Law''', was amended by adding the sentence 'Men and women have equal rights and the State is responsible to implement these rights'. The amendment also changed the term 'head of the family' in the civil code, which was previously attributed to men as the 'male-breadwinner of the family' so that men and women became equal under the law. Hence, in terms of women's status the "wife's position in the family became closer in line with European norms" (Landig, 2011, p. 208). This amendment also stipulated that after divorce the possessions are divided equally. Finally, Article 66 of the Constitution

was changed so that Turkish citizenship no longer discriminates on the basis of gender in the case of a foreign parent.

According to Berktay (2004), especially the removal of patriarchal clauses in the civil code was due to the significant contribution, long struggle, and pressure by Turkey's women's movement. During the revisions to the civil code, "the women's movement worked together with women in political parties in the Turkish Parliament and strategic male parliamentarians in the Ministry of Justice" (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008, p.467), namely, members of the DSP. Despite these efforts, however, the 2001 progress report highlighted the issue of violence against women within the family, including honour killings. In particular, the EU expressed concern about reduced sentence for the perpetrators.

In 2002, Turkey made further achievements regarding the political criteria, especially for women's status. Firstly, the parliament abolished the 1982 regulation banning female civil servants from wearing trousers in the work place. Secondly, the Directorate for Religious Affairs announced a series of clarifications on the Muslim faith, giving women equal rights with men to attend public religious services. Thirdly, the regulation allowing students to be subjected to virginity tests was abolished. Regarding the Social Policy and Employment Chapter of the *Acquis*, the civil code increased the legal age for marriage to 18 for both men and women and introduced a legal separation period of six months before couples can file for divorce. The same code also allows women to file for divorce if their husbands commit adultery and improved women's financial position in case of divorce by guaranteeing that all assets accumulated during the union are equally shared. On the other hand, it also allowed men to request alimony if their former wives are financially better off. Although there was a controversy over this draft law on equal share by the conservative parliamentarians from Nationalist Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP) and Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) at first, a conciliation was achieved after the visit of women organizations visit to these Parliamentarians (Marshall, 2013). Regarding the political criteria, the EU stressed the absence of comprehensive civil and administrative law provisions against all discrimination, which were supposed to be transposed and implemented in line with Article 13 of the EC Treaty.

From the end of 2002 until the end of 2013, the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), which has a neoliberal and conservative ideology, passed many reform packages. In its first five-year term, the party's discourse and practices aimed to strengthen relations with the EU and produce a roadmap for Turkey's EU membership. During AKP's first four years in power, many of the reforms, amendments, and harmonization packages were passed that acknowledged women as a vulnerable group needing special protection and compassion.

Turkey's 2003 Commitments in 2003 National Program

In its 2003 National Program for Adoption of the *Acquis*, Turkey's new government committed to ensuring gender equality more comprehensively. In terms of the economic criteria, it planned to take measures to increase employment opportunities for women. Furthermore, the program mentioned the transition of the EU Council Directives, which are based on equal treatment in payment, in employment, in social security and occupational security, women's engagement in agriculture, vocational training, and working conditions. The directives also encapsulate pregnancy, parental leave, and burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.

In institutional change, the 2003 National Programme promised that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security would strengthen the institutional structure to ensure Turkey's participation in the Community Programme on effective gender equality implementation, establish a commission for the harmonization of equal treatment legislation, and train members of the commission and social partners regarding this new legislation. The Directorate General for the Status and Problems of Women was envisaged to strengthen the institutional and legal basis of equality and establish a Law Department. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security was committed to recruit 10 new personnel to establish the preliminary structure of the Equality Body within the Directorate General of Labour, participate in the Community Programme on Combating Discrimination, and train the members of the commission for the harmonization of equal treatment legislation.

Regarding political criteria achievements, the AKP government established Turkey's first ministerial position covering women's issues. As part of the sixth reform package in relation to violence against women, Article 453 of the penal code was amended to address EU concerns regarding so-called honour killings of children born to unmarried mothers. Secondly, Article 462 of the penal code, which allowed reduced sentences for so-called honour killings was also repealed. Instead, the new penal code of 2004 envisaged life imprisonment for crimes against life motivated by 'tradition and customs' in cases of so-called honour killings. Thirdly, honour killings and sexual assault within the marriage became subject to legal investigation and prosecution if the victim lodges a complaint. To socialize these judicial reforms, the Diyanet instructed imams and preachers to speak out against honour killings during their Friday prayers sermons. Finally, the Law on Municipalities, adopted by parliament in July 2004, required municipalities with a population greater than 50,000 (now 100,000) to provide shelters for women and children. The new Minister of State for Women's Affairs also issued a circular to maintain security for the residents of women's shelters by guaranteeing confidentiality.

In harmonization with the Social Policy and Employment Chapter of the *Acquis*, a new Labour Law regarding equal treatment of women and men was introduced with provisions that partly comply with EU directives on equal pay, equal treatment in employment, and burden of proof. The new law accepts the principle of equal treatment irrespective of sex, racial, and ethnic origin, religion, and ideology, also includes provisions for maternity leave and prohibits discrimination based on gender, especially dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or sexual harassment. Regarding maternity, the working conditions of women in night shifts was harmonized in line with the EU directive on the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding. For maternity leave, the new law provided civil servants with paid maternity leave for sixteen weeks, although these lags behind many EU states' maternity leave laws and implementations.

Institutionally, the Law on the Organization and Duties of the Directorate General on the Status of Women was adopted by parliament on 27 October 2004. This directorate was founded in response to international demands, although it did not achieve permanent status for a long time due to understaffing and underfunding (Marshall, 2013). This was followed by further socialization in that the Diyanet refused to conduct any more unofficial religious marriages without a prior civil marriage. In addition, the Diyanet would actively promote the role of women within Islam and appoint women as muftis. The interior designs of mosques were also altered to facilitate women's participation in religious ceremonies. A regulation was issued on the establishment of an Advisory Board on the Status of Women to include representatives from all government ministries, and individuals from relevant academic institutions and NGOs. This board aims to provide advice on the planning and implementation of state policies related to the status of women and the functioning of the Directorate General for the Status and Problems of Women. Complementary to this, two committees were established: The Parliamentary Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality and the Committee on Violence against Women and Children.

Regarding women's position in the labour market, Law no 4857 in the Labour Law was passed in 2003, which mandated that gender equality should be supported in the labour market. New policies were introduced for health and social security, and it was acknowledged that a new paradigm was emerging and being consolidated to treat women as independent citizens (Kılıç, 2008b; Dedeoğlu 2012). These were the most significant developments regarding discrimination against women and guaranteed under the penal and civil code. In terms of economic reforms, Turkey's adoption of the EU *Acquis* was expected to bring radical changes in the functioning of its labour market. For policy changes over equal pay and social protection, the European Economic Strategy was assumed as a guide in gender equality and social inclusion. The EC Commission identified several specific priorities, such as promoting gender equality in employment and pay and eliminating gender gaps in employment by 2010. However, in both the Social Policy and Employment Chapter of the *Acquis* and the Political Criteria part of the 2004 Progress report, the EU constantly criticized Turkey's limited progress in passing legislation.

Although the constitutional changes in 2001 and 2004 were more woman-friendly, in their implementation they "meet the demands of the EU recommendations or neoliberal reforms of the AKP government" (Dedeoğlu and Elveren, 2012, p. 6). During the revision of the penal code, AKP was in power and it was not easy to disseminate the gender equality idea, although the penal code was as important as the civil code. This was firstly because of the difficulty in finding strategic male partners to support women's interests during parliamentary debates and secondly because of moderate Islamist party's distance to women's movements, which argue that "without an effective intra-parliamentary effort, revision of code could not remove all statements that discriminated against women" (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008, p.467). However, the new government's attitude had not changed in terms of increasing the number of the women parliamentarians, when "an amendment to the Turkish Constitution advocating gender quotas was rejected by parliament" (Marshall, 2010, p. 573), but the issue only became an issue during changes to Article 10 of the Constitution in 2004.

Nevertheless, in the penal code, punishments for violence against women and honour killings were increased. At the same code, crimes of sexual assault considered as "Crimes Against Traditions and Public Customs and Crimes Against the Family Order" under article of "Crimes against Society" was replaced with the article "Crimes against Sexual Crimes" under "Crimes Against Individual". Thus, the whole ideational approach of the penal code was changed in favour of women. However, in 2004, the ruling party AKP proposed to revive laws making adultery a crime in the penal code. The government's argument was that this proposal reflected Anatolian values and the demands of Anatolian women so that the government was trying to preserve human honour (İlkkaracan, 2016). The proposal faced protests from both women's groups and Gunter Verheugen, the EU's Commissioner for Enlargement, who declared that he would present his recommendations regarding criminalizing adultery[5], because this proposed law on adultery threatened reforms on gender equality and the penal code. Due to the sustained strong protest of women's organizations supported by the EU, whereby the EU clearly stated that outlawing adultery could breach Article 8 of the

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5   More information can be found
     https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/06/turkey.helenasmith

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European Convention on Human Rights, and damage membership negotiations,[6] the AKP government abandoned its proposal.

Turkey's Commitments in the 2008 National Programs

In response to the 2006 and 2008 APDs' conditions and in line with the comments of the 2006 and 2007 progress reports, Turkey prepared its last national program in 2008 as to show off its willingness to adopt the gender *Acquis*. It paid particular attention to reducing violence against women and increasing women's employment. However, regarding increasing the number of women in politics, the program only aimed to strengthen the status of women in society including their participation in the labour force, and political and social life.

On violence against women, Turkey firstly committed to further awareness-raising training for judges and prosecutors, law enforcement bodies, municipalities, and other relevant institutions concerned with women rights. Secondly, it guaranteed to increase its efforts to establish municipality shelters for women. Thirdly, it promised to conduct activities to determine the reasons and effects of violence against women and to take measures to prevent violence against women and monitor the process and initiate broader campaigns to raise public awareness. Lastly, Turkey highlighted that it would implement the recommendations of the report of the Parliament's Investigative Commission established to investigate the reasons for honour killings and violence against women within the framework of Prime Ministry Circular No. 2006/17.

In terms of labour market participation, the government committed to several reforms. Firstly, it targeted to introduce and spread micro credit opportunities to support women's entrepreneurship in various provinces. Secondly, it proposed to work towards harmonization with the *Acquis Communautaire* along with Law No. 5763, known as the employment package, which aimed to increase women's employment and improve active labour market policies, facilitate the foundation of private employment agencies, and regulate sub-employer's status. Thirdly, the young unemployed and women were

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[6] More information can be found in
https://www.upi.com/EU-frowns-on-Turkeys-adultery-ban/65051094566911/

guaranteed vocational training on establishing businesses, training on business development, and information, counselling, and guidance services on these issues. Lastly, it guaranteed to set up a labour market information system to monitor developments in the labour market, and determine policies and strategies to increase employment. This new system was aimed to focus on improving the employability, qualifications, and skill levels of unqualified workers. In adopting the *Acquis Communautaire,* Turkey committed to EU to harmonize parental leave so that mothers and fathers had equal unpaid leave for the care of children in line with Directives No. 96/34/EC and 92/85/EC, and introduce legislation on EU labour law, gender equality, and antidiscrimination in 2009-2010.

By taking these legal steps and commitments, Turkey accepted EU-conditioned gender equality norms, which enabled the norm to pass the tipping point and enter the cascade/norm socialization stage. This norm was accepted to expedite EU membership, conform to international and national regulations, and avoid any belief that Turkey is incompatible with the EU. According to Göçmener (2008), during the accession process, the EU has made concrete contributions to Turkey's gender mainstreaming adaptation, particularly on the legal basis for anti-discrimination. Gender mainstreaming was spurred by a binary structure in Turkey, in which the legislation stage determines the institutional stage (Eray, 2008). These concrete steps to legislation can be seen in the amendment of Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution to emphasize positive discrimination and highlight equality between men and women. After Turkey passed these reforms and seem to adapt the EU gender equality norm, the socialization process on how Turkey evaluated the norm was explained in the progress reports, which point out the deficiencies and successes in transmitting the norm.

5.2. STAGE II: Norm Socialization through Procedural Diffusion

Once Turkey started accession negotiation in 2005, procedural diffusion officially started and the tipping point was passed, which introduced the second stage of the norm's life cycle, namely norm cascade or norm socialization. Here, an increasing number of actors began to socialize the EU's gender equality norm. At this stage,

Turkey redefined appropriate behaviour to prove their belongingness to the EU. The EU employed two diffusing channels. The first was procedural diffusion, whereby the negotiation was institutionalized and monitored through regular progress reports and accession partnership documents. In the procedural diffusion the main addressee is the central government, however in some of the progress reports, the EU also asked women NGO to be included in socialization process along with the central authority. The second was transference diffusion, whereby the EU transferred financial assistance to local public institutions and civil society because these agents are to introduce the norm in the local.

Following the gender equality norm's acceptance, the EU continued its conditionality on the same specific cases, yet more intensively, because it started to specify each gender equality case and included new actors to accelerate socialization. This procedural diffusion can also be considered in two particular periods. The first period concerns the EU's criticism of socialization process until Turkey presented its 2008 national program while the second period concerns how the process proceeded after this national program presented Turkey's undertakings.

Regarding 'violence against women', before Turkey proposed its new national program in 2008, the EU reiterated the specific points needing urgent attention. Violence against women is an entrenched and structural problem that needs awareness raising in Turkey. In contrast to previous approaches, in the 2006 and 2007 progress reports, violence was associated with women's economic insecurity that further reinforces violence. According to the reports, because victims of domestic violence have severe difficulties in accessing employment, an equality body should be created. Although the EU found the legal framework to be satisfactory, its implementation remained a challenge. Despite the acceptance of the gender equality norm, domestic violence against women in Turkey continues to be widespread. More specifically, in the 2006 report the EU indicated that crimes in the name of honour or suicides, and early and forced marriages continue to occur, and that suicides have not always been properly investigated. The 2007 report put particular emphasis on the Court of Cassation's decisions on sentencing for honour

killings, which are given only if there is evidence showing that the murder was committed following a decision of the family assembly.

During the 2005-2008 period, the Directorate General for the Status of Women was given the task to coordinate activities to eliminate crimes in the name of honour, and violence against women and children. The Law on Protection of the Family was extended to cover all individuals in the family, including family members living separately. The law also introduced medical consultation or treatment in a health institution as and abolished the financial burden of legal proceedings for victims. Nevertheless, in its 2006 progress report, the EU remarked that the Law on Protection of the Family, also called Law No. 4320, had only partially been implemented. Drawing on reports by women's organizations, the EU stressed the importance of family courts' attitude on restraining orders to protect women facing the threat of violence as well as preventing further victimization of women.

The progress reports noted the insufficient implementation of Law No. 4320, as there was still a need to further increase the provision of shelters for women subjected to domestic violence. Although the number of shelters increased in 2007, municipalities and women's NGOs were asked to work on capacity building and improve services. Regarding the number and capacity of properly functioning shelters, women's NGOs in Turkey conducted surveys, which showed that it was impossible to obtain information about the scope of the needs, both in terms of number of shelters and overall bed capacity[7].

Despite these shortcomings, the Turkish authorities had issued circulars to governorates, judges, and prosecutors, to improve services to victims of violence. This circular on combating honour killings and domestic violence against women helped to enhance cooperation between public institutions. In addition, to mainstream this new gender equality norm, the state started campaigns supported by the media, NGOs, and the private sector. The role of women's NGOs was crucial in this process to disseminate

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[7] More information can be found in Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı Report http://kadindayanismavakfi.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Kad%C4%B1na-Y%C3%B6nelik-%C5%9Eiddet-Veri-Taban%C4%B1-Raporu-2007.pdf

gender awareness and advise the state on details of the problem. Likewise in 2008 APD, in subsequent 2008 reports, the EU underlined the importance of civil society's role in gender mainstreaming and combatting violence against women. Thus, cooperation between public institutions and civil society was reinforced and regular meetings were held between these agents to monitor the implementation of the circular.

Regarding 'women's status', from the start of accession negotiations until the last 2008 national program, legislation and action plans continued to be implemented in the field of women's rights and gender equality. However, substantial efforts were needed to guarantee women's rights and protect vulnerable groups. Regarding institutional capacity, although additional staff were recruited by the Directorate-General for the Status of Women, this was not effective. There was also no Gender Equality Body and Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality in Turkey, as required by the *acquis*. On the other hand, the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) issued a circular to ban gender-based discrimination in job matching services: for instance, men were allowed to become nurses. This was a positive step towards reducing job segregation. Gender awareness efforts continued to further the social perception of the role of women in society, as well as the legal framework to satisfactorily endorse and socialize the norm. Nevertheless, according to the 2006 progress report, women's rights were not always protected in practice, particularly in the poorest areas of the country. Besides, according to the women's NGO reports, documents posted on the Diyanet's site contained discriminatory language against women. Hence, women's civil society organizations asked for the establishment of a committee that could play an essential role in mainstreaming women's issues in all policy areas, not only in metropolitan cities but also in specific regions.

The EU also strongly emphasized employment. The reports noted that little systematic effort had been taken to reduce substantial employment in the informal economy and improve the legal framework to narrow the gap between men and women's economic participation and opportunity. Consequently, the prevailing discrimination continued in

the labour market. According to official statistics, women's participation in the labour force remained low,[8] although women occupied some high-profile positions.

Concerning these low employment rates, parliament adopted the Employment Package to amend the Labour Law to promote women's employment. This package provided incentives to employ women and aimed to reduce their non-financial burdens and social security contributions. These low employment rates also reflected the potential of the shadow economy and its informal workers. Therefore, the new package these addressed unemployment challenges and aimed to stipulate that the employers' share of social security premiums for newly hired women employees should be covered by the Unemployment Insurance Fund for five years, starting with 100% in the first year and ending with 20% in the fifth.

Another aspect of the gender equality norm mentioned in the reports concerned women's political participation. The levels of women's participation in parliament and local representative bodies were both very low. Despite the efforts of civil society organizations, political participation was also another challenging segment of norm socialization. Civil society organizations submitted proposals to address this issue for the forthcoming municipal elections scheduled for 2009. They prepared campaigns to raise awareness about women's participation in politics and to promote female candidates in the July 2007 elections, although the party quotas were limited. Despite some success in the 2007 elections, in which the number of women elected to parliament almost doubled over previous elections, 51 women parliamentarians among 550 MPs was still very low.

As can be seen in the post-negotiation process, in the first years the EU also took account of the importance of bans on head-scarfed women and their working opportunities in public institutions, the attempted criminalization of adultery, women's representation in local and national politics, and enhancing girls' participation in the education system. Among these, the AKP government clearly progressed in terms of granting equal rights for women and men, "supported the rights and public visibility of

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[8] More information can be found in the TUIK data at http://rapory.tuik.gov.tr/06-06-2018-00:41:15-18077974024423150244336807.pdf

women with headscarves and championed for women's roles as mothers and wives" (Dedeoğlu, 2013, p. 7). Enmeshed with the party's ideology, their gender equality approach was to keep women's traditional roles and use the regulations to reinforce familial dependency and the gendered division of labour.

The Successes and Deficiencies since 2008 National Program

The 2008 National Program was the last document in which Turkey declared its commitment to EU conditionality. Since then, the EU continued to identify the specific deficient, successful, and contested parts of Turkey's gender equality norm socialization. In combating violence against women, Turkey tried to reduce it and fulfil the commitments expressed in the 2008 National programme. Starting from April 2009, state authorities and dependent institutions signed protocols to raise gender awareness and train civil servants. The first protocol was signed in 2010 between the Directorate-General for Women's Status and the Ministry of Justice with a view to training prosecutors and judges on combatting violence against women.[9] Another protocol was signed in the same year among the Social Services and Child Protection Agency, the Directorate-General for Women's Status, and the Turkish national police to improve services for women and children as victims of domestic violence.[10] As part of this protocol, the police started to be trained and were obliged to use standard reception forms for such victims for risk assessment and subsequent referrals. In 2012, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies also signed a protocol with the Gendarmerie to provide training for Gendarmerie staff in the prevention of violence against women and gender equality issues to support victims of violence.

In 2010, the Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men conducted investigations, prepared reports, and consulted relevant bodies, including NGOs, on violence against women, early marriages, and sexual harassment of minors at school. Following these investigations, Law No. 6284 on the Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence against Women was adopted in March 2012. The law primarily

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[9] More information can be found in
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c058/b043/tbmm230580430402.pdf
[10] More information can be found in
http://www.keig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/KSGM_TRkadinindurumu2011.pdf

aimed to protect family members and those in relationships outside marriage from violence. The procedures for urgent cases are generally positive and inclusive, and undertaken by the authorities in accordance with civil society. In addition, the same year, a National Action Plan was adopted by the Ministry for Family and Social Policies. This action plan focuses on five areas: legislation, awareness raising and changing attitudes, empowerment of women and preventive services, health care, and cooperation among stakeholders. An extended legal infrastructure for combating violence, new laws, national action plans, and protocols were designed to fulfil the obligations introduced by the Istanbul Convention that Turkey signed in 2012.[11]

However, as indicated in the 2012 progress reports, these amendments were insufficient to reduce violence against women, including honour killings, and early and forced marriages, which remained widespread in all regions of Turkey. Although the national action plan was a positive step towards meeting the Istanbul Convention's requirements, the 2012 report stressed implementation problems due to the lack of sufficient human and financial resources, and measurable targets. The latter is important as there was still a lack of reliable data on such events. For instance, it is not known how many women have faced violence. Thus, the action plan should also include detailed statistics on incidents of violence against women, including murder-perpetrators.

Referring the women's NGO reports,[12] progress reports after 2009 emphasized that because they lacked effective protection and awareness of their rights, women were still victimized, and defendants continued to believe that requesting a lawyer implies guilt. As indicated in the 2012 report, family courts imposed severe sanctions, but they had insufficient capacity and lacked assistance for each victim's specific case. The reports therefore stressed the need for concrete legal and practical steps to address violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Because many cases ended with murder although the victim of violence had sought help from the authorities,

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[11]   More information can be found in
       https://kadininstatusu.aile.gov.tr/data/58528516369dc524d057a5fe/Combating%20Violence%20Agai
       nst%20Women.pdf
[12]   The reports were mostly prepared by Mor Çatı. More information can be found in
       https://www.morcati.org.tr/tr/yayinlarimiz/izleme-raporlari

women remained reluctant to go to the police or the courts due to their lack of confidence in the protection offered by officials.

Another criticism in the 2012 progress report concerned the Law on Municipalities, which obliged establish women's shelters. According to the report, victims remained at risk because this provision had not been fully implemented and the number of shelters and other protective and preventive mechanisms fell short regarding needs and social services while greater local coordination among the actors was necessary. In addition, there was also a lack of awareness among law enforcement forces and public administrators about the Ministry of Interior's circular on violence against women and children. The report noted that many women victims of violence still reported that police officers were trying to convince them to return their home.

Regarding school textbooks' stereotypes about women's role and status, and women's negative portrayal in the media in male-dominated discourse, efforts to eliminate gender bias from school textbooks at all levels and from the media were accelerated to improve women's status. According to the 2011 and 2012 progress reports, the sustainability of these actions and policies were supported through national and international resources. However, the reports also recommended that the government should promote changes in stereotypes and perceptions of gender roles. Because the actor constellation is crucial while tackling these stereotypes, dialogue between the appointment of the new minister of family and social policies and women NGOs was improved in 2011.

Furthermore, in March 2009, the Turkish parliament established a Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women, which aimed to monitor developments on gender equality and the implementation of laws and circulars, offer advice on draft laws, examine complaints about gender discrimination, and propose steps to align Turkish legislation with international agreements. As expressed in the EU Commission 2012 progress report, this committee has issued several reports on women's issues and improved its institutional capacity, including with the aid of training as well as issuing 20 opinions on draft legislation since being set up. Yet, there is still room for the committee to become more involved in mainstreaming gender equality via legislation.

In 2009, this institutionalization was the successor of awareness-raising activities and gender sensitivity training programs for public service and health personnel, including local civil servants. However, most Turkish women were still not comprehensively aware of their rights. This low level of awareness of legal rights among women, combined with a low level of gender equality awareness among law enforcement officials, meant that women still faced obstacles in accessing justice. Thus, there is need for additional national resources to increase gender awareness raising on women's rights and gender equality both for men and women.

In 2010, a constitutional amendment to provide positive discrimination measures in favour of women was adopted. This aimed to achieve substantive equality between men and women while not contradicting the principle of equality. However, gender mainstreaming efforts were inefficient in law-making and public administration. Specifically, judges, lawyers, and prosecutors should be trained in anti-discriminatory law and decisions because, as the 2011 progress report indicates, several statements by public figures and judicial decisions have portrayed woman as partly responsible for harassment, rape, or violence due to their behaviour or dress. One of the reasons of these decisions is the low number of women prosecutors and judges in the judicial system. In addition to these shortcomings, debates on abortion and the law governing caesarean sections were adopted with insufficient consultation with women's civil society organizations. The government's statements disregarded women's opinions and did not respect women's rights in practical terms. This conservative government discourse reflects its attitude on women rights and gender equality in that it only acknowledges women through identities of wife and mother rather than as individuals and citizens (Yıldırım, 2013).

While the AKP government's actions had partly consolidated gender mainstreaming, after the 2011 election, the 61th government, decided to remove the word 'Women' from the name of the relevant ministry, changing it to the Ministry for Family and Social Policies with Decree no. 663. The new Ministry included the General Directorates (DGs) of Family and Community Services, Women's Status, Child Services, Disabled Persons and Old Persons, and Social Benefits. According to then

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP is a conservative democrat party that considers the family to be important. Thus, rather than approaching women's problems and inequalities independently, Turkey focuses on family construction and familial relationships. The new government's actions were criticized by both women's NGOs and academics because, according to them, abolishing the women's ministry would politically devalued women's problems and gender inequality (Bianet, 2011). Moreover, in a 2014 speech, Erdogan also claimed that "equality between men and women is against nature", in response to rights-based women's NGOs, "which demands subsidized childcare, where he shared his ambivalence on the issue by expressing his belief that children are better raised by their mothers" (İlkkaracan, 2012, p. 17). The women's NGOs asserted that this move contradicted international agreements and the EU *acquis*, while weakening gender equality policy reforms and amendments.

During the accession negotiations, female labour market participation and high women's unemployment rates were a major concern of the EU because, according to the reports, ending gender inequality – including violence – rests on economic independence. That is, the EU acknowledges that female labour market participation would both positively affect Turkey's market economy and empower women. To increase the number of women in the labour market, the state should provide facilities for women, particularly for maternal leave. Taken this conditionality into account, a 2009 legislative amendment granted civil servants employed under labour contracts the right to have paid maternity leave of 16 weeks, the possibility to return to the same post if they applied for it at the end of their maternity leave,[13] and 6 months extra unpaid leave.

In 2010, a Prime Ministerial circular was issued to promote women's employment and equal opportunities, particularly in the labour market. This circular proposed a national board for monitoring and coordinating women's employment and employment reasons along with social partners and NGOs. This coordination among the actors would contribute to the work of the board and for pursuing gender equality and gender mainstreaming in drafting and implementing legislation and policies. In 2012, in

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[13] More information can be found in http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/11/20161108-11.htm

response to the EU Commission's comments in the 2009 and 2010 progress reports on the lack of social inclusion mechanisms for women to counter-balance the impact of socio-economic problems, and the fact that Turkey has the lowest women's employment rate among EU member states and OECD countries, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies signed a protocol with the Ministry of Labour and Social Security with to raise women's employment and labour participation rates, including those of women subjected to violence.

The 2009 and 2010 progress reports focused on women's unpaid work in subsistence agriculture and the informal sector, which meant they earned less than men for work of equal value. Turkey should therefore broaden the content of the national action plan for gender equality for 2008-2013 by including information on human or financial resources because the funds for encouraging women to become self-employed were inadequate. Flexible working arrangements should also be considered regarding the potential for women's precarious and informal working conditions. Dedeoğlu (2009; 2013) also noted the link between women's informal work and inactivity, with most women registered as housewives in official statistics despite being engaged in informal market activities. Either way, such home-based, domestic service, or unpaid family work and traditional handicraft activities are prevalent forms of women's informal employment. According to her, "statistical evidence regarding informal employment in the early 2000s comes from estimates of the number of wageworkers who are beyond the reach of legislative and institutional protective measures, including social security" (Dedeoğlu, 2013, p. 11). Although the state contribution to social security premiums was a positive move for female employment, the 2013 progress report noted that this contribution has not solved the problem of women's undeclared work.

Meanwhile, the absence of sufficient child-care facilities discouraged women from having a working life or stopped them finding a job because of being pregnant or having children. The 2011 report therefore recommended further efforts to increase female activity rates, which were suppressed due to stereotypes that restrain women's employment and their access to affordable childcare facilities. In addition, the package

law adopted in 2011 included new amendments on parental rights, particularly for civil servants – although this also widened the gap between workers and civil servants.

In terms of equal opportunities for women and men, the public and private sector together launched new initiatives to boost women's employment, although it was not sufficient to increase the proportion of women in decision-making positions or the labour market. Indeed, measures on improving the labour market mainly focused on ameliorating women's position instead of adopting a gender mainstreaming approach. According to the 2012 and 2013 progress reports, existing labour market measures should be designed to avoid gender-based employment segregation. To combat this, Turkey committed to establish an equality body as outlined in the directive on equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation. However, Turkey has not created the equality body as required by the *acquis*. Apart from gender segregation, unequal pay was also tackled in the 2013 progress report in that the Turkish labour law did not decrease the risk of discrimination during recruitment and in labour contracts.

During the constitutional reforms and harmonization packages, Turkey did not necessarily consider concrete reforms on gender quotas, neither did the EU directly pressure Turkey. However, the EU progress reports reflected its discontent on the underrepresentation of women in decision-making bodies and in the municipal elections, with criticisms linked to the EU's general stance on women's political representation, especially since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (Marshall, 2010). Rather than the Turkish state, it was women's NGOs that first launched campaigns to increase female participation in local elections in 2009, such as '50/50 equality'. The campaign aimed to increase the quotas for women as well as candidates for the 2009 local elections. However, despite these efforts very few women were elected as mayors and neither the Law on Political Parties nor the party statutes increased their gender quotas. The 2011 elections increased women's participation in parliament from approximately from 9% to 14%. The 2011 progress report noted that research on women's underrepresentation in politics was not just due to voter choice or women's traditional family roles but also to the insufficient support given to women in politics. Similarly, in

the 2012 report, the EU clearly stated that the government had not responded to the women's movement's demands to revise the Law on Political Parties and the Law on Elections. These clauses were rejected by the governing AKP (Marshall, 2010).

5.3. STAGE II: Norm Socialization through Transference Diffusion

In order to strengthen local services for women and mainly to mainstream the gender equality idea, the EU transfers financial assistance to local agents to legitimize its gender equality norms. In norm socialization, one of the potential challenges facing local agents, especially rights-based women's NGOs, is that "the woman is viewed as the mechanism for protecting the cultural boundaries that set the community apart from other societies" (Baç-Müftüler, 1999, p. 305). While diffusing the norm locally, cooperation among local actors, such as women's NGOs, municipalities, and universities in cities, are crucial because these agents boost ideational change in terms of equality between men and women. According to Mühlenhoff (2014), especially rights-based and service-based NGOs acknowledge the EU as a material endowment that fosters their training activities and acts as a service association. Rights-based NGOs are agents that raise awareness and advocate a specific human rights norm in the society whereas service-based NGOs provide social services in those areas where social policies are not properly implemented by the state. Rights-based NGOs use this financial assistance for moral justification, where justifiability is essential for legitimation because people legitimize a new norm when it is justified in terms of their beliefs, values, standards, and normative expectations (Aydın-Düzgit, 2018).

In doing so, rights-based NGOs, which view rights as an ongoing product of political struggle, have become the essential addressee when the state is reluctant or local people resist ideational change. Hence, it is important to establish a right-claiming civil society that can ultimately lead to right-getting mechanisms. In line with EU standards, a Law on Associations entered into force in Turkey in November 2004, since when increasing numbers of NGOs have been established. According to Usul (2011), the reason for the rise of women associations in the public space is the government's desire to show the EU that it is taking steps towards consolidating democracy. Accordingly, at the local

level, municipalities are the agents that people can easily reach or benefit from their services. Municipalities can mainstream gender equality through training activities, workshops, outreach programs, specific meetings, and establishing equality bodies and shelters.

The EU's transference diffusion in terms of gender equality comprises two financial assistances: the European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). Beneficiaries from these grants conducted projects between 2007 and 2013, and included 250 institutions running 300 projects. Among these beneficiaries, a representative sample of 25 (10%) were selected for interview, considering their EU project experiences, the size of their grant, and regional distribution of the fund. According to Central Finance and Contract Unit's (CFCU) data;

- 714.932 Euro was transferred to Public Training Centres
- 920.474 Euro was transferred to Cooperatives
- 1.047.290 Euro transferred to Special provincial Administration
- 1.199.607 Euro transferred to Vocational High Schools
- 1.671.600 Euro was transferred to Universities
- 2.365.288 Euro was transferred to Public and Private Unions
- 2.868.432 Euro was transferred to Chambers
- 3.479.055 Euro was transferred to Municipalities
- 16.213.391 Euro was transferred to Rights-based and Service-based NGOs

Financial assistance in terms of gender equality was given in three areas:

- promotion of women's rights and violence against women,
- female labour market participation
- political participation.

Table 4: EU Financed Projects on Gender Equality completed between 2007-2013

250 beneficiary-300 projects 13 projects were funded by EIDHR (11 beneficiary)	Interviewee Sample	Number of the Beneficiaries (Number of Projects completed)
Civil Society Organization	**17**	**170(217)**
Associations	11	110(142)
Foundations	3	28(40)
Professional Associations	2	23(26)
Cooperatives	1	9(9)
Public Body	**8**	**80(83)**
University	1	12(13)
Municipality	2	24(25)
Public Training Centre	1	7(7)
Vocational High School for Girls	1	9(9)
Special Provincial Administration	1	9(9)
Unions (Private-Public)	2	19(20)

Table 5: List of the Interviewed Beneficiaries

Beneficiary/City	Subject
Civil Society Organization	
Ka.der (Association for Support of Women Candidates)/ İstanbul	Political Participation
Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom)/Ankara	Political Participation
KASAID (Association for Research on Women's Social Life)/ Ankara	Political Participation
Mor Çatı (Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation)/ İstanbul	Violence Against Women
TÖRKAD (Association for the Prevention of Honour Killings and. Using Women's Potential)/ Mardin	Violence Against Women
Denizatı Kadın Dayanışma Derneği (Seahorse Women Solidarity Association)/ Düzce	Violence Against Women
EURODER (Avrupa Birliği'ne uyum, Gelişim, Kültür ve Çağdaş Yaşam Derneği)/ Adana	Violence Against Women
Soroptimist Women Association/ Denizli	Violence Against Women
AÇEV/Mother Child Education Foundation)/ İstanbul	Violence Against Women
Çağdaş Aile Derneği (Modern Family Association)/ Konya	Violence Against Women
KAGIDER (Women Entrepreneurs Association)/ İstanbul	Employment
Anatolian Development and Education Association/ Elazığ	Employment
Olive Branch Women Cooperative/ Ankara	Employment
TEPAV (The Economic and Policy Research Foundation/Ankara	Employment
Hitit Academy Association/ Çorum	Employment
Semi NGO-Semi Public Institutions	
Chamber of Industry/ Bayburt	Employment
Chamber Chamber of Industry and Commerce/ Bingöl	Employment
Central Anatolia Development Association / Kayseri	Employment
Public Institutions	
Yüksekova Municipality/ Hakkari	Employment
Bağlar Municipality/ Diyarbakır	Employment
Special Provincial Administration/ Erzincan	Employment
Samandağ Union for Providing Services for Villages/ Hatay	Employment
Niksar Public training Center/ Tokat	Employment
Çay Vocational High School (Vocational School of Health)/ Rize	Employment
Yüzüncü Yıl University /Van	Employment

The interviews shed a light on the achievements and difficulties in carrying out projects, the degree of local consent, the legitimacy of the newly-transmitted EU gender equality norm and the potential sustainability of the outcomes. Before the interviews, the contents and the categories of the selected projects were analysed to better grasp the context of the EU's funding of these institutions. It was predicted before the interviews that the larger the grant received, then the more that norm would be socialized at the local level. During the interviewee selections, if the targeted interviewee could not be reached, other beneficiaries were selected, although the amount of the financial assistance was lower than the previous one.

5.3.1. Transference Diffusion for Political Participation of Women

Financial assistance, allocated through the EIDHR and IPA I programs in terms of political participation, was given to women's NGOs across Turkey. Political participation was the least concerning aspect of EU conditionality, as can also be seen in the progress reports, in Turkey's commitments, as well as in the financial assistance program's contents. While running the projects, one of the important tenets in the representation is that the Member of the Parliament (MP) or Mayorship candidates should act "in the interest of women in a manner responsive to them" (Agustin, 2008, p. 506). Regarding political representation, three rights-based beneficiaries were selected for interview. All three beneficiaries agreed on one point that these funds were useful for their capacity building and increased their space for training women regarding their rights. Although it was very limited when compared with other financial assistance titles, EU funding helped these associations to plan their short-term and medium-term goals.

KADER is the most prominent of these NGOs regarding political participation, which only focuses on women in politics and plays an active role in public opinion and promoting gender awareness with respect to representative politics, regardless of ideological and political differences. KADER's above-party attitude has unequivocally created new possibilities for Turkish politics because it implicitly represents women as a social group from any socio-economic level or ideology. Their project on active

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citizenship was conducted for two years in seven cities, where KADER has its own branches. In the project, women in these locations were trained regarding their rights, the channels to become an active citizen in politics, and how to become a trainer while increasing awareness on active citizenship. The project's main object was to consolidate solidarity among women instead of making them competitors in different parties. During the activities, project coordinator Ayşe Şentürk indicated that women acknowledge that being politicized means being a part of a political party. According to the women who attended the project (target groups), being a member of any political party or being in the parliament means staying in the political background because political decision-making is man-oriented. The EU-funded projects tried to convince these target groups that women can also be an active part of politics and challenge the system for their demands. KADER's projects had two main purposes. The first was to create greater awareness of gender equality while the second was to increase the number of women in decision-making mechanisms. KADER argues that gender equality can only be achieved when there are more women parliamentarians or women mayors in the political arena, because they are more likely to develop a more gender-friendly budget.

According to Ayşe Şentürk, the EU's financial assistance was only enough to enable these organizations to survive and increase gender awareness through their specific activities:

> *The EU's financial assistance is a catalyser for change. However, the NGOs have a transformative power, not the EU. The rights-based NGOs know how to transform the society or push the state regarding any women's rights violation. However, we need money to do these activities or pursue our advocacy. State-based funding is not enough to further our activities because the government does not support rights-based NGOs as their approach contradicts the government's ideology. That's why shadow NGOs, which share the government's conservative discourse, benefit from the state's budget more than others (Ayşe Şentürk).*

Thus, the sustainability of KADER's EU projects is noteworthy but because of the limited funding, not as objected. According to Şentürk, rather than focusing on women's political participation or rights-based women NGOs' advocacy, the EU privileges service-based NGOs or public institutions to increase women's employment.

The EU prioritizes women's economic independence by contending that gender inequality can be solved when women participate in the labour market. However, while economic independence is a significant part of gender equality, it is not the whole part because economically independent women still have to cope with violence or exclusion from decision-making mechanisms.

Another interviewed NGO was the Uçan Süpürge Association, which does not exclusively work on women's political participation but includes this issue as an integral part of the women's empowerment. It temporarily focuses on political participation projects yet runs these projects for organizing women locally. According to Uçan Süpürge, women's local political participation, such as mayorships or municipal assembly membership, is easier than winning parliamentary elections. In addition, electing women locally is more effective and clearer for women voters to make their demands. Hence, Uçan Süpürge, as a well-known association in Turkey, conducted a project called 'Shadow Assemblies' using EU financial assistance. The main aim was to let these women ask, 'What am I doing with politics?'. These shadow assemblies allowed local women to debate their demands from the municipalities and question whether they equally benefit from the city they live in. In doing so, they were also trained in communication skills to better express themselves, and in political awareness to grasp the political mechanisms around them.

The project did not necessarily force women to take part in elections but gathered them to grasp the importance of their contribution to local government. According to the project coordinator, Özlem Başdoğan, the sustainability of these projects and their ability to create ideational change depends on who the project beneficiary is because the beneficiary agent should have a persuasive influence:

> *One of the important things in the EU projects is risk management and sustainability. Many of the funded projects do not have realistic targets. It is important to have aims and networks to convince the third parties. These aimless projects could not contribute to legal arrangements. In terms of our project's sustainability, yes there is ideational change now because the women trusted us and our activities, and became more aware of their potential (Özlem Başdoğan).*

In addition, the coordinator also emphasized the difficult procedures of EU funding in which linguistic knowledge and experience in project management made it easier to run projects properly because EU projects require specialization. Such projects are both crucial for capacity building and as a means of survival for Turkish civil society.

KASAID, is a women rights association that was founded in 1953, and specializes in women rights and encourages women's candidacy for parliamentary and municipality elections. It supports NGO advocacy for enhancing political consciousness and considers women's organizations as essential pressure groups, without which civil society would be limited to a shadow existence. The inclusion of civil society in decision-making and consciousness-raising activities consolidate democracy. According to Ayça Akpak, coordinator of EU funded projects, being organized increases solidarity for a common purpose. However, an important problem in Turkey is that being organized as an NGO is defined as part of terrorism in the Turkish penal code under the rule of certain governments. That is, rights-based NGOs may be accused of potential terrorist organizing, which reduces the number of rights-based NGOs and silences their voice.

> *One of the significant approaches to understanding whether the EU has normative power in a country is to see the realities of the given country. For instance, it is crucial to grasp whether this country has rule of law and a consolidated democracy, and whether its political culture is ready for normative change. On the other hand, women are perceived different in each region of Turkey, which aggravates the problem (Ayça Akpak).*

EU financial assistance creates a space for civil society activities, such as social consciousness and raising the gender inequality problem. KASAID has benefitted from EU financial assistance to announce their activity-training, conduct field research for potential candidates that need encouragement, and train these women as prospective MPs or mayors. This training informs these women about their rights, how the political system and decision-making mechanisms work, and how to set a gender-friendly budget. According to Akpak, women who want to be politicians should understand their contribution to gender equality and grasp the need to transform society for gender equality because advocating women's rights is not a philanthropic duty. However, what

KASAID witnessed in its field work is that women just want to be politicians rather than femocrats. In the EU project, women were brought to mayoral offices to make them realize the power they have to transform the society. Although of the 90 women who attended the projects only three were elected to municipal assemblies, KASAID saw this as a success for grassroots movements.

The common discourse of these three NGOs is that there are few rights-based NGOs that support gender equality. Instead, many women's NGOs use EU projects to develop their position, further their careers, meet financial needs, or make a milieu among project conductors. Such women's NGOs do not necessarily aim to challenge constructed gender roles or gender bias structure in the society. Meanwhile, according to all interviewees, EU projects have become a sector in cities as agencies that have appeared to draft EU projects for women's NGOs or public institutions in return for a percentage from the project's budget. Consequently, these projects deviate from their aims and become more of a commercial tool. Rights-based NGOs are aware of the society's problems and know the solution or the policies that should be developed. In this sense, the EU just helps them to finance their needs. However, the outcome would be the same if another donor had financed them.

5.3.2. Transference Diffusion for Violence against Women and Women's Rights

Violence against women is one of the prominent issues that both the EU and Turkey aimed to solve and raise awareness locally and nationally. To eliminate violence against women, the EU conditioned the Turkish state to collaborate with civil society organizations because solution seeking can only be carried out in an actor constellation. Violence against women projects were mostly conducted by civil society organizations and financed by EIDHR and IPA I financial assistance programs. Seven NGOs that had conducted both women's rights and violence against women projects were selected as interviewees.

Among these NGOs, AÇEV and Mor Çatı are well-known foundations in Istanbul that tackle gender equality more seriously. AÇEV has a corporate identity, with activities that involve violence against women, in addition to its mission that mainly focuses on

women's empowerment, mother education, and reproductive health. In the projects funded by EU financial assistance, AÇEV conducted gender awareness training for men, particularly fathers. It aimed to educate men on gender equality, which was also indicated in the progress reports, and to teach them how and why men should be a part of the solution-seeking process. According to the project coordinator, it is crucial to educate men on women's rights, to make them realize that violence against women is a violation of human rights. Other than this project, they also used EU financial assistance to reach women living in different regions of Turkey. Before conducting a project, AÇEV takes the mayor's attitude on gender equality into account to understand whether this municipality is ready to cooperate. According to the project coordinator, this is important because mayors may privilege some NGOs over others based on their political ideology or approach to women's empowerment.

> *We haven't directly confronted problems with the mayors. We know who to work with and manoeuvre according to the institutions. There is a need to think strategically because these projects are significant and should be conducted seriously. Maybe due to our education mission and substantial work, our activities do not face local struggles. We do not work on unrealistic activities. For instance, other NGOs or public institutions conduct women's entrepreneurship projects locally, but after the project is completed these target group women return to their homes. Why? Because entrepreneurship is not relevant or available in their culture. That's why projects are not sustained (AÇEV projects' coordinator).*

When asked whether EU financial assistance makes a concrete contribution to gender equality norm socialization and ideational change, the project coordinator emphasized the importance of a sustained rights-based women's movement, CEDAW, and the Istanbul Convention, more than the EU. According to the coordinator, the EU influences women's rights in terms of social security, municipality nurseries, laws on employment, and women's status in general. The EU makes the gender inequality problem visible and supports change, so beneficiaries do not waste time finding resources for their activities. However, if there is improvement in gender equality, it is by means of the women's movement that leans on international conventions. Hence, there are two international catalysers, the EU and international conventions, and one local catalyser, the women's movement (either organized or not). In the accession

process, Turkey amended many laws on gender equality, but without socializing them as it should have done. NGOs, in this sense, are decisive in pressuring the state and reminding it of its commitments to the EU and international conventions.

Mor Çatı, which is a pioneering NGO on violence against women, was another interviewee that managed several projects funded by the EU or other international donors. Zelal Yalçın, the project coordinator and feminist activist, argued that ideational change, if any, occurs in a country if there is a strong feminist grassroots. Loose or organized rights-based women's groups advocate gender equality, and apply for EU financial assistance when their purpose and political stance overlap with the project's priorities. According to Yalçın, norm transmission from the EU to Turkey does not emanate through financial transference but through procedural diffusion, such as amendments in labour laws, and the civil and penal codes. The EU accession process increases the visibility of gender (in)equality because ministers and high officials have to tackle the issue broadly and accept civil society organizations as addressees. However, there are still complaints from civil society organizations because only a few civil society organizations, most of which share a common discourse with the government, are invited during solution-seeking debates, and consultations or negotiations with state organs.

> *We benefit from EU delegation funds but not the CFCUs[14] because the CFCU projects on violence against women are audited by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. We rejected both the EU grant and working under the control of this ministry. We are a pressure group and we shouldn't be under any institution that we criticize or pressure for implementation (Zelal Yalçın).*

Mor Çatı's project on violence against women focused on consultation services, improving local shelter conditions, and making municipalities implement Law No. 539, which requires municipalities with populations greater than 50,000 (now 100,000) to provide shelters for women and children. In the project, Mor Çatı aimed to strengthen consultation and solidarity centres and the shelters, and develop policies in line with information received from these local sources. Yalçın mentioned that many

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[14]   Central Finance and Contracts Unit

municipalities do not consider establishing shelters in their locality. Moreover, if there are shelters, their capacity and conditions are underdeveloped. Hence, in the project, Mor Çatı arranged workshops for psychologists, social workers, lawyers, and women's branches of political parties to create a network and strengthen local women's organizing. Mor Çatı also informed participants about unjust provocation decisions and remissions for perpetrators of violence, and how the laws are not implemented as they should be.

According to the coordinator, EU grants are necessary and important for NGOs because financial assistance allows them to implement their policies and enhance their efficiency, conduct activism, and help them to survive and increase their work's sustainability. Besides, conducting an EU project confers prestige and legitimacy because state organs previously ignored women's NGOs whereas now they endorse projects if the activities are financed by the EU. However, there are still many deficiencies in law-making so women's NGOs should do more. For instance, as CEDAW has not been transmitted properly into the constitution, Mor Çatı conducts projects to train members of the judiciary on Law 6284 and related cases. In addition, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies should have a budget for working on gender equality and violence against women's issues, and a separate ministry for women is needed. Finally, municipalities should run projects on gender mainstreaming and establish sustainable equality units.

Two other important NGOs regarding violence against women are Törkad in Mardin and Çağdaş Aile Association in Konya. Both these EU project beneficiaries rest their normative justification on Kuran's definitions regarding women, and on penal codes regarding perpetrators. They prefer to use religious discourse in their project activities as their target localities are mostly conservative small towns and villages. In the interviews, it was apparent that Törkad acknowledges the reasons of violence in terms of unemployment, hence its projects and activities are based both on sermons and women's economic empowerment. On the other hand, Çağdaş Aile Association mostly emphasizes family coherence and conciliation methods in domestic violence cases. It assumes that violence is a private rather than a public health problem.

Törkad's President, Zeynep Alkış, is a lawyer and a theologist. In order to fight against honour killing, she conducted awareness projects and visited the places where honour killing cases mostly occur. Along with imams or muftis, Törkad members give talks with male family members to remind them that killing an individual is a sin in Islam. These narratives provide a method for persuasion and ideational change. Meanwhile, they also train women and girls regarding their rights if they are exposed to violence. According to Zeynep Alkış, women should be economically active as well as participate in political decision making because themselves can solve gender inequality if they join the political and economic sphere like men. Törkad has therefore conducted projects on girls' education, the female labour market, and political participation.

> *The problems of the East and West of Turkey are different. Being an Easterner means being oppressed and constantly resisting since we are born. However, being a Westerner means living in a modern society. Nevertheless, Western women are also subject of violence. Women who participate politics follow their brothers and do not necessarily aim to be a role model for women or fight for women's rights. They pursue similar practices and discourses as male politicians do (Zeynep Alkış).*

Like Törkad, Çağdaş Aile Association follows a religious training method in its project activities by selecting family members for training on violence against women. It conducts projects in many cities apart from Konya, which are mostly funded by the EU. Their stakeholders are muftis, teachers/trainers, law enforcement officers, lawyers, health workers, NGOs, and municipalities. Their activities are based on family communication programs, workshops, and seminars to resolve discord among family members. During family visits, the projects aim to raise awareness on how domestic violence contradicts religious culture. In the seminars, both local women and stakeholders are trained about domestic violence and how to tackle this problem. Women who experience violence can consult the Çağdaş Aile Association. The association first informs woman about her rights and provides advice. Then, if woman accepts, the association invites the male perpetrator and tries to reconcile family members by providing support for both sides.

Through EU financial assistance, this association has been able to enhance and extend its trainings. It has created a network among stakeholders and monitor them when confronted with domestic violence cases. Konya now has ŞÖNİMs, which are the protection centers of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, and associations that work on domestic violence have links with ŞÖNİM members.

> *Personally, I do not support the Istanbul Convention and the existence of ŞÖNİMs. Instead of protecting women, this convention and related institutions increase the rate of divorce. In addition, the adoption of Law No. 6284 increased violence against women. If my wife complains about me to a police officer and I am banished, I would not return to this house and accept this woman as a wife. I am not invited to many meetings just because of these ideas (Hüseyin Bulut).*

According to Hüseyin Bulut, who is the association's president, the solution to eliminate violence against women is to refer to the moral discourses of the Prophet Muhammad regarding women and their sacredness. These discourses should be extended and used in training activities. The main contribution of EU grants in these projects is that the association has an opportunity to reach many people locally and provide equipment needed while conducting the project.

Violence against women, specifically domestic violence, is as widespread in Western regions as it is in Central and Eastern parts of Turkey. Denizatı Association in Düzce and Denizli Soroptimist Women's Association both highlighted the challenges that women face in their daily lives and the disagreements between NGOs and municipalities during norm socialization. Both these women's NGOs conducted EU-funded projects to give vocational training to women living in ŞÖNİM shelters. They aimed to create a collaboration with their local municipalities to facilitate their activities and convince the mayors to establish municipality shelters. However, they claim that, due to the local culture, particularly in AKP municipalities, there was a refusal to establish women's shelters. Local people view domestic violence as a private matter while municipalities argue that ŞÖNİMs are sufficient so another municipality shelter is unnecessary. Vahide Aksan, President of Denizatı Association, and Şebnem Dal Korkmaz, President of Denizli Soroptimist Women's Association, argue that women's solidarity ties need to be built locally to pressure public institutions to implement laws

as they should be. Hence, apart from vocational training, they also train women workers in their localities regarding their rights and the significance of rights-based advocacy and solidarity.

During the training for women workers in textile factories, Vahide Aksan realized that women are not aware that the oppression they experience in the family constitutes violence. Therefore, women academicians and lawyers give the women information regarding categories of violence and referrals in case of violence. According to Aksan, there is a legal gap regarding the laws on violence against women as they are not dissuasive because if men are banished from their house for a period, they later return to commit even greater violence than before.

> *Women's economic independence is crucial but not a solution. In a patriarchal society, women always cope with subordination, whether they are employed or not. In the projects, we try to stress that violence is an inhuman practice and women have rights to deal with violence (Vahide Aksan).*

Vahide Aksan strongly emphasized that municipalities are the main actors for the shelters' capacity building. While she was a member of the municipal assembly, she founded a shelter for women in Düzce, although it was closed after she left her post. The mayor criticized the shelter as an overcrowded place in the municipality building. Aksan indicated that ideational change in terms of local gender equality may occur in three ways. First, there should be strong local organizing of women. Second, there has to be financial assistance for activities and to make the problem visible. Third, there must be a local actor constellation. In localities where rights-based NGOs are weak and municipalities are reluctant to participate in awareness activities, EU financial assistance are only partially sufficient so project outcomes are not sustainable.

Şebnem Dal Korkmaz also stressed that local women are not aware of their rights and do not see domestic violence as a public health problem. Before she started the projects, she first tried to persuade association members that violence is not a private matter. For her, EU projects are useful for awareness-raising activities, although the project priorities do not always match local needs because projects are geared towards EU priorities to benefit from financial assistance. She found that one of the most

challenging institutions during the projects are municipalities. Before the projects started, women's NGOs wanted to work together with municipalities to exert more influence locally. However, municipalities negotiated to take an additional amount from the project's budget.

In contrast to the NGOs working on violence, Euroder association in Adana works in collaboration with Yüreğir Municipality in Adana, as Feride Demir, the Euroder President, is a municipal employee. Demir noted that Adana is a conservative, patriarchal city with internal migration that increases violence cases. Women's socialization in Adana is less than in neighbouring regions, which made it harder to conduct projects on violence against women, although they were funded by the EU and run in conjunction with the municipality. Nevertheless, Feride Demir and her husband, as the founders of Euroder, held family visits and focus group activities to raise awareness on women's rights. In the training sessions, Euroder stresses the penal codes that protect women from harassment and violence. Demir claimed that such projects can make women more conscious about eliminating violence and raising their voices against husbands.

Demir specifically stressed that being an association, a legal entity, increased Euroder's status for state institutions. However, not all EU project priorities serve the purposes of rights-based NGOs in Turkey. It is therefore important to analyse local problems and needs because EU financial assistances are not enough to solve the problem or create ideational change. According to the project coordinators, local public institutions should contribute to these projects and diffuse the outcomes.

These coordinators for projects on violence against women noted a lack of dialogue between civil society organizations and government or public institutions concerning gender-related issues. Women's organisations reported a deterioration in their cooperation with central authorities and local public institutions. A sweeping approach regarding women's rights has yet to be adopted by NGOs, but public institutions are reluctant to use a common discourse or share a common purpose along with these organizations. This has created obstacles to the norm's socialization. On the other hand, contrary to the gender mainstreaming strategy and international conventions' claims,

some local NGOs have conducted their own strategy that contradicts the gender equality discourse. Expressing a conservative discourse, the gender equality norm socialization of these NGOs curbs the equality logic of ideational change and consolidates the local culture instead. The normative justification for the norm's legitimacy is a formidable process as the local context meets new paradigms, such as eradicating gender roles. Although rights-based NGOs are determined to press for ideational change, limited resources and their separate efforts block their progress.

5.3.3. Transference Diffusion to Increase Women's Employment

The greatest EU financial assistance was given to women's employment projects as the prevalent assumption of both the EU and service-based NGOs is that women's economic independence can reduce gender inequality. The beneficiaries of employment projects are mostly public institutions, although the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and several NGOs have used EU financial assistance to increase women's employment. Among these institutions, 15 interviewees were selected.

The agents build their projects through vocational training activities. Professional training, which can be seen in the norm socialization process, not only transfers technical knowledge but also actively socializes people in the given norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). From state bureaucracy to local councils, these beneficiaries and their training programs aim to generate more professional staff and aware individuals. States may be unwilling to fulfil the expected norm through legal implementations and policy developments so EU-funded projects are available tools to close this administrative gap. These local actors are also local epistemic actors at various levels, and new subjects of the socialization process who actively try to promote EU norms and practices for several reasons. They offer technical solutions and employment opportunities for local women who have never experienced being an employee or are excluded from the labour market. According to TUIK data on women's employment, before the allocation of financial assistance started, women's overall employment rate in terms of marital status was 27.8% and in terms of education the average was 31.2%. In Turkey, approximately 31% of working-age women are economically active whereas

the rest are inactive, unregistered workers, or housewives. Of the working women, most are educated and single because "women's status in Turkey is the most distinctive area to examine employment, in which women are almost mostly invisible" (Dedeoğlu, 2013, p. 5).

Table 6: Women employment rates 1998-2006 by marital status and education level

YEARS	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
a. Marital Status									
Not Married	33.9	34.1	35	35.1	36.8	35	33.2	33.6	34.3
Married	26.3	26.8	25.2	25.9	26.4	25.3	21.6	21.3	21.5
Divorced	36.8	37.4	41	43.5	42.1	41.2	40.9	42.7	41.4
Widow	14.2	14.7	11.5	12.8	12.4	11.5	9.1	9.2	8.7
AVERAGE (27.8)	27.9	28.2	28.1	29.3	29.4	28.2	26.2	26.7	26.4
b. Education									
Illiterate	24.7	26.6	25.2	24.8	24.4	23.6	16.6	15.6	14.7
Literate but not graduated	21.7	24.3	22.2	24.2	22.4	21.1	17.9	18.2	18
Primary School	28.4	28.4	24.5	26	26.7	24.8	21.4	20.9	21.1
Secondary/equivalent School	13.5	14	15.3	15.7	18.4	19.9	20.6	22.7	22.9
High School	25.3	24.9	28.1	27.2	28.5	25.2	26.1	26.9	27.9
Vocational High School	37.1	33.2	42.4	40.3	39	36.4	39.4	36.8	36.2
University or College	67.1	63.8	70.1	70.8	71.5	69.5	70.3	69.1	68.8
AVERAGE (31.2)	31.1	30.7	32.5	32.7	32.9	31.5	30.3	30	29.9

Source: TUIK database on Women Labour Force

Five of the 15 beneficiaries of EU women's employment financial assistance are NGOs that mostly conduct projects on societal issues, including women in poverty. According to them, the common problems of these local women are the struggle against poverty, social oppression in terms of honour, and emotional labour, all of which exclude women from the labour market. The project coordinators argue that EU project priorities do not meet the requirements of local women, although NGOs and other public institutions write and conduct these projects to improve women's professional skills at least. Another common problem these NGOs face, except TESAV, is the municipalities' attitudes on gender equality or women's empowerment projects. Municipalities act pragmatically and envisage the local approach to newly-transmitted norm before carrying out EU-funded projects. For instance, most do not want to participate in violence against women projects in order to avoid complaints from male voters. However, women's empowerment projects for employment and entrepreneurship need a

public institution partner to introduce the project, reach more of the target group, and sustain the outcomes.

Menşure Işık, the project coordinator of Olive Branch Women Cooperative, said that many local agents cannot maintain EU projects because their priorities do not match their NGO framework or because of bureaucratic and technical liabilities. According to Işık, the EU should tackle the gender equality issue more in the context of women's empowerment because this would ameliorate many of the struggles that women in poor regions face, including violence. In their projects, women in Ankara's tenement districts received a professional skill in at least one specialization, even though many women provide their own source of income. Having a job empowers them ideationally. Like the Olive Branch Cooperative, TEPAV also conducts women's empowerment projects in the poor districts of Amasya in conjunction with Amasya Municipality. Ülker Şener, the project coordinator, noted that women in tenement districts share similar problems that are intensified by poverty and class identity. Even poverty itself has a gender. TEPAV conducted projects for home-based working women. Although home-based work prevents the socialization potential of these women, they work part-time due to their child-care work and preference to be independent workers. However, if the household's income is enough, they prefer not to work. On the other hand, many of these women receive a vocational training certificate but have no awareness about the importance of this document or prefer to work in gender-segregated jobs, such as bakeries.

> *Amasya is a conservative place. The municipality was involved in many women's empowerment activities and endorsed these women while getting a job. However these jobs were gender-segregated jobs because their local culture allows women to work in specific areas, not more. The main obstacle in the norm's diffusion is the lack of any women's NGO or small/loose groups of women organizing. For instance, there is no shelter in Amasya because the culture considers violence as a private matter. Although violence is a common problem worldwide, employment varies (Ülker Şener).*

Regarding women's entrepreneurship, the Hitit Academy Association, the Anatolian Development and Education Association, and KAGİDER emphasized the need to inform and encourage women on how to further their entrepreneurial capacities. In contrast to the first two associations, KAGİDER, being İstanbul based, took a liberal

feminist approach by establishing special links with the private sector and the EU women's lobby. Due to their far-reaching relations with several national and international agents, KAGIDER carries out neoliberal economic projects in which they encourage women to participate in the labour market as entrepreneurs rather than dependent workers. They train wealthier local women in budget management and service economy principles. They create networks with these women and many of their projects are completed successfully. Regarding sustainability, they continue links with these women as long as they are involved in working life, while they also monitor the gender mainstreaming strategies of large companies.

In contrast, the Hitit Academy Association and the Anatolian Development and Education Association are small, local NGOs that were established for different purposes. Although gender equality is not their priority, they conduct entrepreneur projects to create awareness in the society. Both NGOs have encountered problems in their conservative regions in that women's empowerment efforts did not resonate at the local level. Consequently, the sustainability of the project outcomes was weak. The Hitit Academy's project aimed to ameliorate peasant women's conditions and serving styles in market places. Peasant women were trained in how to sell their products according to more appropriate modern standards. However, during the project, the association had struggles with Çorum Municipality, which hindered the process due to electoral concerns that local people might consider it as being the EU's public speaker. Municipality hesitated to join the project and signed a protocol with the association in which the association guaranteed it would not demand any funds from the municipality during or after the project. However, such regional, small-scale civil societies need municipality support for sustainable outcomes and norm internalization.

> There is a difference between metropolitan and Anatolian municipalities. Anatolian municipalities still have the rural culture. Women's employment is linked with the concept of honour whereas Istanbul municipality consider women's empowerment projects as a contributing to women in Istanbul and prestige for the municipality. Besides, Anatolian municipalities categorize NGOs and acknowledge them as suspicious agents in their purposes. Hence, the EU's universal aims in norm diffusion do not resonate at the local level because these projects do not explicitly fit local people's approach (Dr. Ahmet Mutlu, project coordinator).

Similarly, the Anatolian Development and Education Association aimed to train women to produce grapes for sale in the central markets of Elazığ. However according to the project coordinator, Osman Akarçay, the conservative attitudes of Elazığ people prevented women from joining the project. For instance, their husbands would not allow them to participate. This conservatism could also be seen in the municipality's discouraging approach, which made the projects unsustainable. In addition, the lack of commerce and investment in the city impeded further projects. Ultimately, the women who participated in the project were trained but then returned home.

Bayburt Chamber of Industry and Bingöl Chamber of Industry and Commerce, which are both semi-public and semi-civil society organizations, conducted EU-funded projects to empower women in the public sphere. In these conservative cities, the project coordinators aimed to improve social and economic inclusion for subordinated women, whose husbands or other male family member seclude them from the society. According to Önder Karaoğlu, Head of the Bayburt Chamber of Industry, women should join the common-mind of the locality. However, the cultural codes of the society and political discourse that endorses women's oppression reinforce women's lack of self-confidence. On the other hand, as he stressed, violence against women in Bayburt is not high, albeit because of a belief in the sacredness of motherhood rather than individual rights. The target group of Bayburt Chamber of Industry's project was mothers, who are considered the essential addressee to counter gender discrimination. Using a diverse actor constellation, including NGOs, academicians, and private institutions, Bayburt Chamber trained more than 2,000 women in the textile sector and informed both men and women participants about gender equality, women's rights, and the importance of women's employment. Nevertheless, few of the women participants were subsequently able to find jobs.

Like Bayburt's project, Bingöl Chamber of Industry and Commerce also trained women in the local textile sector. Bingöl is also a city where women's unemployment is high because of the conservative society and male family members' seclusion of women and their lack of occupational experience. Regarding the sustainability of these projects, only 2 or 3 % of participants gained employment. According to the project coordinator,

Netice İnak, women in these small places need a promoter to increase their visibility in the society. According to Inak, although EU financial assistance provides an opportunity for improving women's social inclusion, these projects or financial assistance do not guarantee the sustainability of registered employment. Given that many of these women work in the informal sector, the EU should institute a monitoring and auditing mechanism.

The circumstances were different regarding EU financial assistance for Yüksekova Municipality in Hakkari and Bağlar Municipality in Diyarbakır. Both localities are governed by the People's Democratic Party (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi-HDP)/Democratic Regions Party (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi),[15] which is a leftist party with policies supporting gender equality.[16] Thus, despite these localities' conservative characteristics and high levels of honour killings and forced marriage cases, the two municipalities consolidated a gender equality approach that aimed to reach EU standards. They benefitted from many EU grants to provide empowerment opportunities for women. Yükseova Municipality's project coordinator, Sıddık Karagöz, noted that women in the locality do not work or even do not socialize, being dependent on male family members. Therefore, to socialize these women, the municipality implemented a women's employment project for women already doing handiwork. The project envisaged making the products more market-orientated and encouraging these women to become artisans. Although the project was conducted in cooperation with public and semi-public organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce and public training centres, only 10% of the women became artisans. The other participants either continued to stay at home or worked informally. However, according to Karagöz, women's subordination has gradually decreased in the region due to an increase in girl's schooling and the HDP's stance on gender equality. While the EU has had a partial influence, it has been the region's political consciousness that has promoted ideational change. That is, HDP's leftist ideology has shaped the normative justification to legitimize the gender equality norm locally.

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[15] The Project Coordinator used the People's Democratic Party and Democratic Regions Party interchangeably.

[16] More information can be found here: http://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/parti/parti-tuzugu/10

Similarly, Diyarbakır Bağlar Municipality conducted a very specific project to tackle women's empowerment and eliminate gender segregation. Among the EU-funded projects, this was particularly designed to create ideational change in gender-segregated jobs. Even though driving jobs are usually associated with men in Turkey, the Bağlar municipality project trained 30 women for the class E heavy vehicle driving license, of whom 15 started work for several Diyarbakır county municipalities as bus drivers, and 90 women for the class B driving license, of whom some became taxi drivers in the city. According to Funda İpek, the project coordinator, although the idea of gender equality was strengthened in the region, challenges still exist because there are many disadvantaged women in South-eastern Turkey who are excluded from social life and labour market, or work unregistered.

> *We want to break down the prejudices and perceptions in the working areas attributed to men. If it is said that a woman could not be a heavy vehicle driver then she would never tend to see her potential. We wanted to show these women that they can enter a certain type of employment that men and women can equally enjoy in practice (Funda İpek).*

The remaining six public institution interviewees were a high school, public training centre, university, development union, special provincial administration, and a services union. All carried out vocational training projects focusing jobs that were gender segregated due to the local patriarchal structure of constructed gendered roles. For instance, husbands do not let their wives work, especially alongside other men. As the project conductors were public institutions, unlike the case of NGOs, they partially benefitted from other public institutions' support. Some of them, such as the special provincial administration, even received a micro-credit assistance from the governorship to promote the outcome's sustainability. The common narrative of these institutions is that although the disadvantaged women participants were enthusiastic about vocational training, almost none could find jobs. Nevertheless, these projects enabled the women to become socialized in the public sphere and gain self-confidence. Yet some of the interviewees such as academician Kenan Gülle (Van Yüzüncü Yıl University) reported that the projects should have re-arranged by considering the local's cultural context, otherwise women would not participate into the activities. According to him, the projects would be sustained when the gender equality issue is on the government's

agenda. He also noted that women employment should not deteriorate women's motherhood role, which is sacred and should be sustained. Because women empowerment subverts the family cohesion.

On the other hand, technical problems continued to appear in the process. For instance, Murat Çelik, coordinator of the Special Provincial Administration project, and Hakan Yiğit, coordinator of Central Anatolia Development Union, both reported that municipalities did not participate the projects as EU procedures conflicted with Ministry of Finance regulations. The EU's imposition of its own regulations can paralyze a project. Hence, the inter-institutional network was weak during the implementation, so the project's outcomes were not long-lasting. Local agents did not aim to diffuse the new norm and were unaware about the transmitted norm. Hence, the projects barely influenced a limited group because local people and public institutions were reluctant to accept ideational change.

5.4. STAGE III: Norm Internalization or Incomplete Practice

EU-driven norms do not enter an empty vacuum; rather, the contested nature of normative change confronts existing local structural conditions, such as deeply ingrained beliefs and traditions. Universal norms should therefore be reconstituted to match local needs. According to Merry (2009), ideas from transnational sources travel to small local communities where they are expected to be vernacularized, which means a process of localization or socialization whereby the universal norms are reshaped by the local context and actors. Norms have multiple origins as they came from multiple sources, so diffusion is multidirectional in which the norm receivers interpret, translate, and contextualize ideas to create new norms (Eerdewijk and Roggeband, 2014). Because of this fragmented nature, a clash among international, national, and local norms is inevitable.

For instance in the accession negotiations, EU norms and practices are sometimes acknowledged as counterfactual in Turkey, such as women's entrepreneurship in small conservative localities because a universal gender equality understanding is not only Western but includes various gender equality understandings from all around the world.

While socializing the gender equality norm, there is a specific need for social and political forces, such as the central authorities, municipalities, and local women's NGOs to form actor constellations that take the local context into account. According to Vargas and Wieringa (1998), these forces should be composed of "triangles of empowerment, which referred to the interplay between three sets of actors – the women's movement, feminist politicians and feminist civil servants (femocrats) at the national level" (p.3). Given the case concerns gender equality, female forces would better introduce and internalize the norm into the agenda of society and politics. However, Turkey's gender inequality problem is not only derived from specific cases; rather, more comprehensive attention is required from many perspectives.

The newly-transmitted norm aims to change the status quo, even though norms are embedded in larger social systems linked with ideas and behaviour. Normative change in gender equality means replacing the status quo with the new gender regime, which entails altering rules, decision-making procedures, and practices. This may be resisted by the norm receiver state, whether from the political authorities or even society, because their principles and norms are being challenged. For instance, ending violence against women is a typical example where there is resistance to normative and ideational change, as violence directly engages ideas about what is public and private, and what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

Regarding Turkey-EU relations, the progress reports' content and conditionality initially invite us to consider that the EU has potential normative power (*puissance*) while diffusing universal human rights values beyond Europe. However, the legitimacy of its gender equality norm encounters several problems. Women in Turkey face considerable structural obstacles, while the EU and the women's movement agree that Turkey's overall legal framework is somehow adequate, although implementation remains another challenge (Landig, 2011). Considering the Turkish government's attitude on procedural diffusion and the interviewees' answers, three main factors explain this incomplete practice. First, the transmitted gender equality norm contradicts the government's official ideology. Second, the norm conflicts with exisiting cultural norms of the society. Third, the EU's gender equality approach mostly prioritizes women's

economic empowerment because the EU argues that women's economic independence can reduce gender inequalities in every sphere of life. However, the procedural and transference diffusion process reveals the limits of the EU's capacity to overcome the ideological shadows over constructed gender roles.

In the procedural diffusion, the state's reluctance about ideational change can be seen by analysing 16 years of EU progress reports. These annual reports consider gender equality under several main titles: women's parliamentary under-representation; incomplete practices regarding women's status; low female labour market participation; violence against women and femicide. It is understood that there is an insufficient dialogue among the central authorities, local public bodies, and women's NGOs, which damages the diffusion process. Although Dedeoğlu (2013) contends that reforms on women's status have "moved a step further from seeing women's issues to be a developmental problem" (p.7), Koray (2011) claims that the conservative AKP government and its approach to gender equality are provisional acts for being an EU member. That is, although gender equality is acknowledged as adapting to modernization in line with universal norms, the change in Turkey's government at the beginning of the 2000s, despite some positive policies regarding women, has taken modernization off the agenda and made gender equality policies unsustainable.

In addition, gender equality-based policies have only lately been implemented, and within the context of "conservative language, and within the frame of political unwillingness, and weakness or silenced women movements" (Koray, 2011, p. 36). This conservative language, in which the sacredness of motherhood and the existing unequal context have become normalized, is consolidated by the absence of a social state and inadequate social policies. For instance, the AKP government's step to establish a State Ministry regarding women in 2007 was significant and eased the direct access of national and international women's NGOs into decision-making processes. In addition, the relationship among public, private, and voluntary organisations presented an opportunity to actively practice gender mainstreaming. However, after the 2011 elections, the ministry was abolished by the Prime Minister, who indicated that the government was conservative and that the family was its priority, making it appropriate

to replace the State Ministry responsible from women with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies.

As the interviews show, the government's ideological stance has resonance in the local public institutions. For instance, regarding the norm's socialization, municipalities are the important public bodies that are supposed to diffuse the norm locally. It is their common task to grasp and translate the concept of gender equality and build local institutions (such as equality centres, violence against women centres, and solidarity units) to facilitate people's access to municipal services and develop policies to solve local problems. Another responsibility of municipalities is to create networks with other local actors in norm socialization. This interactive mechanism can create a common understanding of the key ideas to spark ideational change. However, while municipalities are policy makers in their sovereignty zone, they mostly develop their policies in relation to local demands and in line with their party's ideology, which was observed in the interviews in that municipalities hesitated to join the projects as a stakeholder while wanting to reap the benefits of EU financial assistance.

Thus, the NGO interviews revealed that, although municipalities are obliged to establish women's shelters; their lack of interest and central government's disregard hinder the process, despite the efforts of women's NGOs. In addition, they continued to view violence against women as a private rather than public health problem. In contrast, municipalities governed by left parties showed at least limited resonance of EU standards. For instance, Diyarbakır Municipality's gender equality project went against local cultural codes; with the support of local women's NGOs, relying on the party's egalitarian ideology, and with a willingness to reach EU standards, the municipality pressed for ideational change in its locality and employed women in supposedly male-based jobs.

Even though Diyarbakır Municipality's example offers only a small remedy for the overall struggle, the EU's economic criteria and the Acquis regarding gender equality cannot be internalized because of the low level of female employment. According to the

UNDP's human development index,[17] the gender development index for 2015 shows that estimated female gross national income per capita in Turkey is 10,648 US dollars whereas that of males is 27,035 US dollars. There are structural reasons for women's low employment and income inequality. First, there is insufficient investment in the private sector to absorb Turkey's surplus labour, whether foreign direct investment or public/private investment (Toksöz, 2012). This lack of investment considering women's low employment levels was seen in the interviews with the Chamber of Commercial and Industry. Therefore, "the economy may not create enough jobs to respond to an increasing adult population, which in turn caused male dominance even in low-paid jobs" (Dedeoğlu, 2013, p. 11). Besides, due to the "lack of a strong enough macroeconomic growth and demand-side challenge to the male breadwinner family, the gender division of labour and gender roles have been institutionalized as binding constraints on women's labour supply" (İlkkaracan, 2012, p. 3).

Second, the interviews revealed that the local is still closed to women's employment as women are defined as mothers and wives, which reduces their self-confidence while increasing their dependency on male family members. Third, women are heavily involved in unpaid household services and care-works due to inadequate state child-care or elder-care services. As can be seen in the interviews, socially inactive women preferred to be employed in handiwork. This situation increases the housewifisation of women, and "unless there are sufficient public services and policies that aim to mitigate the care burden of women and promote an equitable share of care work, the exclusion of women from labour markets will continue" (Dedeoğlu and Elveren, 2012, p. 9). Fourth, women are recruited into gender-segregated jobs, such as cooking, cleaning, or service work, most of which are unregistered or part-time jobs, due to their home-based care responsibilities. Finally, women's entrepreneurship projects only become partly successful when they serve women who were previously active in working life or have no financial difficulties. However, some projects are designed to include unsocial and unconfident women to entrepreneurship activities for being a business woman, which

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[17] More information can be found at http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GDI

should be problematized. Because these women, after completing the projects, neither produce any goods nor became artisans.

The EU has provided financial assistance for women's employment since 2007. Comparing the UNDP index to the 1998-2006 data of TUIK for female labour market participation, women's average employment slightly increased between the years 2007 and 2013; but yet employment of Turkish women is lagged far behind many OECD countries, specifically the EU's minimum targets.

Table 7: Women's Employment in Turkey 2007-2013

YEARS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
a. Marital Status							
Not Married	27.6	28.2	27.6	28.3	29.1	28.9	30.2
Married	20.3	20.9	22.1	24.2	26.1	27.3	28
Divorced	32.9	34.2	34.2	37.5	39.8	41.2	41.3
Widow	7.7	8.2	8.4	8.6	9.5	9	8.5
AVERAGE (24.6)	22.1	22.8	23	24.6	26.1	26.6	27
b. Education							
Illiterate	14.2	14.2	14.5	15.9	16.8	16.5	17
Literate but not graduated	16.6	17.4	17.5	19	20	19.7	19.4
Primary School	19.1	19.5	21.1	23.5	25.6	26.5	27.3
Secondary/ equivalent School	19.4	17.8	18.2	20	21.4	23.6	23.4
High School	22.1	23.1	22.4	22.8	23.8	24.8	25.6
Vocational High School	28.8	30.4	29	30.8	31.3	30.7	31.3
University or College	59.8	60	59.3	59.7	60.1	60.4	61.3
AVERAGE (27.3)	25.7	26	26	27.3	28.4	28.8	29.3

Source: TUIK database on Women Labour Force

Regarding EU political criteria and the Acquis's political conditions, women's political participation remains low and violence against women is still widespread. That is, internalization was not achieved, and the gender equality norm is not cycled or even not socialized. As part of political participation, which is the most important yet least considered part of the accession negotiations, low percentage gender quotas are still the fact that women are underrepresented in politics. Gender quotas indeed reflect the degree of equal citizenship rights and the consolidation of democracy although, for

some, "gender quotas are against the principles of liberalism because they ignore merit and its necessary companion, competition (Marshall, 2010, p. 574).

Table 8: Women's Political Participation 2002-2015

Election Year	Number of MPs	Number of Women MPs	Women MP Percentage
2002	550	24	4.4
2007	550	50	9.1
2011	550	79	14.3
2015 (June)	550	98	17.8
2015 (November)	550	81	14.7

Source: http://ka-der.org.tr/kadin-istatistikleri/

Among the political parties, the percentage of women MPs is 8.33 percent in MHP, 10.76 percent in AKP, 14.5 percent in the Republican's People Party (CHP), and 34.62 percent in HDP, which means Turkey lags behind many developing countries in providing parliamentary seats to women. The percentage of women MPs rose from 4.4 percent to 9.1 percent in 2007, 14.3 percent in 2011, and 17.8 percent in 2015 – the highest percentage in Turkey's democratic history. Likewise the parliamentary elections, municipal elections and mayorship is also male-dominated where number of women mayors is far less than men mayors. According to KADER's data[18], between 1930-2004, 6 women out of 1159 men were elected. This number has changed in 2009 and 2014 elections; in 2009 elections 26 women mayors were elected among 2950 total mayors and in 2014 elections 40 women were elected out of 20.832 men (Üste, 2017). But yet the latters have a low percentage when compared with formers.

Women's political participation is crucial as a high number of female MPs is critical for evaluating gender inequality issues. Along with women's NGOs, they may pressure the government for an egalitarian budget, establishing equality institutions and bodies, and producing more gender-egalitarian policies. Just as women are not independent from their family and society, the same is seen in their political stances. According to Ayata and Tütüncü (2008), women MPs are constrained by party discipline as well as party

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[18]   http://ka-der.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ka-der-2013-kadin-istatistikleri.pdf

leaders, regardless of their party affiliation. In that sense, to achieve gender equality in every sphere of life, NGOs and activists should use as much social media as possible to increase public awareness of the need for women's political participation. To convince them, femocrats and women MPs of existing parties, feminist NGOs, and female activists should become interlocutors. It must be clearly elucidated that women's advancement of equal representation in politics is vital for party success. However, this vehicle of the gender equality norm's life cycle is trapped below a threshold and has not been able to progress further than small financial assistance or weak legal amendments.

Since the 1990s, combatting violence against women has become an international norm, as developed by transnational feminists, human rights organizations, and NGOs. This defines violence as part of human rights and obliges governments to take measures to mitigate this social problem (Van der Vleuten *et al.*, 2014). The attitude of transnational feminists has been crucial in naming and framing the problem of sexual violence, which has led the UN to provide a specific strategic framework to re-evaluate the reality of violence as part of human rights and women's human rights specifically. Normative change regarding violence against women has faced resistance because the private becomes public, whereby this normative justification directly engages with ideas and procedures that need to be altered to protect women from gender-based violence.

Violence against women activism first emerged in the grassroots "and took long and highly contested routes towards politicization and institutionalization" (Van der Vleuten *et al.,* 2014, p. 4). According to Marshall (2013), the women's movements of the 1990s in Turkey were significant in fighting against domestic violence and campaigning for the Family Protection Law. Although the law was previously named the Violence against Women Law, which highlighted a comprehensive and major concern, due to the government's priority of family unity, it was only considered in terms of domestic violence. Despite the naming problem, violence has many sub-categories, as Müftüler-Baç (1999) indicates:

> Turkish women face various forms of oppression and subordination in their daily lives; these can be categorized under tangible and intangible forms of oppression. The intangible ones include legal discrimination, economic inequality, and social inequality. The tangible ones comprise

sexual harassment, assault, insult, battering, rape, virginity tests, torture, and murder at the most extreme (p. 305).

The main reason for this violence stems from Turkey's patriarchal and conservative structure, whereby many women who also face poverty depend on men due to their domestic responsibilities, low income, and lack of education (Gül, 2013). As the only official data on domestic violence, TUIK 2008 figures show that 39% of women in Turkey have faced domestic violence from their spouse at some time. Among these women, 40.7 percent were employed whereas 38.7 percent were unemployed,[19] which throws the argument of an inverse relationship between women's economic independence and violence into question.

Along with the Istanbul Convention, Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centres (ŞÖNİM) have been established since 2012 to combat the reasons, incidence, and outcomes of violence under Law No.6284 on the Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence against Women. These centres provide protection for women subjected to violence and transfer them to the ŞÖNİM of another province if necessary. ŞÖNİM are expected to enable coordination between the judiciary, nongovernmental organizations, the gendarmerie, police departments, healthcare institutions, bar associations, the Turkish Employment Organization (İŞKUR), universities, and municipalities.

By referring to progress reports and the interviews, it can be inferred that municipalities are unwilling to participate in women's empowerment projects. However, depending on the population of their locality, most are obliged to establish shelters financed by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. Due to local people's view about the privacy of violence, some municipalities have not opened any shelters even if there is a ŞÖNİM in their locality. On the other hand, the claims and advice of the rights-based civil society interviewees are recognized by the state institutions ostensibly. However, it is also possible that the state may constrain the activities of civil society actors, as mentioned by the coordinators of violence against women projects. These rights-based NGOs challenge dominant institutional discourses more than other actors who deliberately choose not to interact with such institutions. Nevertheless, because of these NGOs'

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[19]   More information can be found in
       http://rapory.tuik.gov.tr/20-06-2018-22:45:16-7176243451362412547208641576.html?

pressure on the state and EU conditions, several legal changes regarding domestic violence against women have been made, such as establishing Family Courts in 2003 and ŞÖNİM in 2012, albeit deficient in their implementation. The government and public institutions share the same conservative approach that prioritizes local people's specific concerns instead of diffusing universal values or moral justifications regarding human rights.

Overall, it can be concluded that an ideational change regarding gender equality has emerged where the women's movement is powerful and intense, and public organizations are keen for change. In contrast, usually in conservative localities, but likewise with the conservative government, ideational change has been resisted, especially in the absence of rights-based NGOs. Rights-based NGOs or the local feminist movement is crucial because "mobilizing support from the bottom up involves increasing the skills and capacities of individuals and altering the horizons of identification in patterns of global life" (Rosenau, 1995, p. 14). However, Turkey has very few of these rights-based NGOs, which are more aware of gender inequality problems and experienced in carrying out EU projects. Because of the lack of state backing, "outside donors prompted the women movement to be more open to international gender norms that help to promote equality" (Marshall, 2013, p. 71). Rights-based NGOs, along with their transnational advocacy networks and national (women) supporters, know which methods to use and how to socialize and internalize the transmitted norm for ideational change. Conversely, the interviews show that service-based and inexperienced NGOs fall short in introducing the norm and creating cooperation with other local actors.

At the same time, the factors behind the gender equality norm's internalization problem can also be ascribed to the EU's diffusion approach because its financial assistance for women's empowerment mostly focuses on "increasing the percentage of women in the workforce and encouraging women to take a more active entrepreneurship role" (Landig, 2011, p. 206), even though the violence problem is considered as part of women's economic dependence. However, the EU does not consider local resistance to a new norm. That is, "[i]nternational norms are in differing degrees reshaped by local

contexts and actors, but their universal meaning and assumed status as external or international norms is not questioned" (Krook and True 2012, p. 108). This limits the EU's approach to gender equality, so "the EU must go further, promoting social justice and altering structural conditions that produce and sustain gender discrimination" (Peterson and Runyan, 2010, p. 83). It is not enough to focus on women's independence as a solution for inequality, yet the EU still views it as one of the most effective tools to improve the status of women in candidate countries, such as Turkey.

Cultural Filter or so-called Local Consent

The cultural filter refers to learning and changing social and political identity. Despite the catalytic role of rights-based NGOs, international conventions, and the EU, there is a contradictory relationship between legal and cultural norms in that the latter is sometimes preferred to the former in specific cases (Sever, 2013). Manners and Whitman (2013c) argued that, through the EU's public diplomacy (PD) by financing rights-based civil society or other intellectual institutions,

> it might be suggested that as an adjunct to the EU's Instrument for Stability that promotes the strengthening of law and order in third countries the EU needs to be able to deploy a longer-term presence that promotes civil society "best practice" through education and the promotion of the free exchange of ideas (p. 193) …. By supporting the establishment of progressive foundations and shared university colleges, EU PD could provide a means of sharing minds with others by actively engaging with the cultural filters of identity, domestic salience and the construction of knowledge in a local context (p. 195).

According to them, this would take place by gathering intellectuals and other social actors within a progressive foundation to exchange experiences and ideas about local normative justifications. However, the construction of gender equality knowledge encounters local dis-consent or even discontent, as can be seen in projects implemented by academics and civil society. Entrenched local cultural codes may be mitigated by the state's enthusiasm and local actor constellation because internalization of any norm (i.e. localization or vernacularization) presents change as the result of translation rather than contestation (Eerdewijk and Roggeband, 2014). While the government's ideology is critical for transforming gender equality, in Turkey, as Kandiyoti (2010) noted, the AKP

government's masculinist restoration reintroduces the rights of men under the fabric of political Islam and its conservative approach to women's role in the society. The addressee of many reforms in terms of gender equality are middle- and upper-class women, who are employed or educated, whereas lower-class women are trapped within conservative discourse and roles defined by the patriarchal system.

The cultural filters stay between the diffusion of the international norm and political learning of the local. This emphasizes which and how ideas embedded into the norm may pass through the filter. This process forces us to analyse the degree of norm internalization. In the case of enlargement, the cultural filter is one of the most important parts of the NPE to see whether the gender equality norm has been taken for granted by the norm receiver and whether the expected impact has happened from the EU to the local level. In the EU accession process, gender equality is accepted by the population yet not recognized because "the perception of the global in Turkey is supposed to be internalized by citizens, and that involving local politicians creates obstacles for human rights norms to be established quickly and efficiently" (Bahçecik, 2015, p. 1230). According to Neumann (2009), "the idea of gender mainstream is far away from being a settled norm and unsettled norm since local politicians and civil servants often directly reject or ridicule it" (p. 53), as the similar one was clearly seen in the interviews. Besides, the local public institutions' attitude, in the "local context which comprises socio-cultural factors as well as the government/opposition dynamic – is a key determinant of whether the EU is perceived as a normative power" (Aydın-Düzgit, 2018, p. 613). Hence, Bahçecik (2015) argues, "human rights regime that is globally written and imagined by the international community, but locally applied by the government and respected by the population" (p. 1225). Similarly, Turkey's paradoxical gender identity stands between global and local realities, and is diffused by the influence of the government's stance and ideology, and local consent.

From a Turkish and European feminists' perspective (Guerrina, 2001; Walby, 2004; Sayın, 2007; Koray, 2011, Dedeoğlu, 2012; Ecevit, 2012; Van der Vleuten *et al.*, 2014; Woodward and Van der Vleuten, 2014), it is apparent that the EU faces limitations while diffusing the gender norm. The key reason for this non-compliance is the factors

behind the fragmented inequalities that the EU underestimated. As Manners argued, world politics does not converge around a single set of ideas that shape how to structure the state. The same is plausible for each EU member and candidate state because their societies do not exist within a single system and culture. Hence, the NPE approach ignores the state's and society's discursively constructed variables, and the inequalities associated with them.

In the case of Turkey, this study concurs with this feminist approach and further argues that three factors are important for revealing whether the EU exerts normative power over gender equality in Turkey. First, there are Turkey's cultural norms, in which patriarchy has a significant place ingrained with conservatism. Second, there is the multivocality of women's movements and their scope. Third, there is state compliance, government ideology, and its supportive policies. These are the main indicators for measuring whether the norm is internalized or not, and whether ideational change has occurred and there is a normative power of the EU.

On the other hand, empowerment paradigm is unable to explain intricate gender equality problems, as was also argued by third-way feminism. The EU's approach to gender equality and local resistance to the new norm hinder both socialization of the gender equality norm and further steps towards internalization. This highlights a *second tipping point* between the norm's socialization and internalization, which also corresponds to the cultural filter. In order to make gender equality norm pass this second tipping point, the EU should first undertake monitoring and auditing responsibilities, second oblige states to implement and stress the significance of gender equality, and third transfer financial assistance to those rights-based NGOs and local institutions that specifically include the mainstreaming gender in their practices. Women's movements or their organized legal versions as rights-based NGOs were the essential national norm entrepreneurs and catalysers before the EU accession process started. By relying on the EU's conditionality and international conventions' articles, they have empowered their struggle. Hence, instead of pressing the state on gender equality norm socialization, the EU should directly finance rights-based NGOs as they were/are the constant central actors in norm diffusion.

5.5. Chapter Conclusion

This case study chapter investigated the EU"s normative justification by using norm life cycle theory. Through procedural and transference diffusion channels, the EU aimed to promote its gender equality norm, which includes the EU's own internal gender norms and universal principles. During procedural diffusion, the EU addressed the state, and constantly focused on four aspects of the gender equality norm: violence against women, women's legal status, increasing female labour market participation, and political participation. The Turkish government transposed all the EU-driven directives on gender equality, signed all the necessary international agreements and conventions, and remove all its reservations from these conventions. It changed its laws, amended the constitution, passed reform packages, established institutions to monitor the process, introduced policies to consolidate equality, and committed itself to promote gender equality norm socialization. The AKP government, with its neoliberal identity, specifically aimed to legitimize the norm as characteristic of a liberal state and the globalized world.

Considering the constitutional amendments and reform packages, the first part of the chapter showed that, since receiving candidacy status in 1999, Turkey aimed to ameliorate its gender equality image among other human rights issues. In terms of the EU's role in gender mainstreaming, the EU was not the exclusive actor in the process but acted in accordance with Turkey's women's movement and other international organizations. However, it was the EU that overtly conditioned the state over specific issues. Especially in the negotiation process, implementation of the EU's conditionality through reform packages was a priority for successive Turkish governments, while the EU exerted specific normative influence in some areas, such as the withdrawal of the adultery law. These reforms and amendments to the civil and penal codes and the constitution addressed the place of women in both the private and public spheres, based on the principle of women's rights as individuals rather than as community and family members. However, during this procedural diffusion process, it can be argued that, since 2007, Turkey has deficiencies in the implementation, and lack of institutionalization and socialization of the gender equality norm. Furthermore, discourses of the Turkish

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government's leader and other officials contradict the aim of mainstreaming gender equality due to the clash of ideological approaches between Turkey and the EU.

On the other hand, regarding the transference diffusion, the interviews revealed that civil society was addressed as a complementary agent in norm socialization. Rights-based NGOs were the agents and norm entrepreneurs that are closer to the local level than state institutions. This led them to socialize the transmitted norm by considering both local problems and global demands. Their channel role required diffusing the gender equality norm regarding violence against women, women's rights, and empowerment of women. Enduring implementation of gender equality norms requires political coherence supported by political transformation through reforms that create an environment to construct the new transmitted norm. It can also be said that EU funding of Turkish civil society has enabled the public to become more aware of violations of human rights and pressure governments to affirm their commitment to these norms to maintain legitimacy. However, the norm's socialization process hardly impelled local internalization due to various problems hindering the norm's life cycle. Rights-based NGOs directly encountered municipality obstructionism as well as local people's unwillingness to consent to the EU-driven norm. Moreover, NGOs constantly found that EU priorities did not meet the exact requirements of their localities because EU norms were sometimes considered counterfactual by local people. This suggests that it is unrealistic to create ideational change in the target country without comprehensively supporting a rights-based civil society.

To summarize, neither the local nor government level in Turkey consented to the new EU norm. Thus, this case study clearly shows that the EU has had limited normative influence on gender equality in Turkey, and that norm diffusion may face resistance. In addition, the EU does not promote a consistent set of norms but mostly exports neoliberal or market-based norms that do not explicitly reflect the arguments of gender equality. The EU proclaims women's empowerment and equates the term with women's rights as human rights rhetoric. A norm's life cycle concerns not only how norms travel between levels of actors but also how they are transformed by these interactions. It can therefore be concluded that there are the following important obstacles to norm

socialization and internalization: the reluctance of state and local public institutions, insufficient NGO capacity, lack of investment in Turkey, local discontent regarding the EU's norm, and the content of the transmitted EU-driven norm. There is a need for another normative tipping point between the socialization and internalization stages, which would expand the scope of rights-based women's NGOs.

CONCLUSION

Norms are of abstract quality and it is hard to observe the actual normative change in one state's status quo. One method that might help to detect the new norm transition is to observe practices of the norm-receiver state. If the state accepts and socializes the transmitted norm through developing policies and amending its domestic law, then it can be argued that the norm sender has a normative power, as it changed the ideas at the national level. Nevertheless, this does not mean the local unmitigatedly internalize this new norm, which means a normative role of the norm-sender agent is uncertain, unless local consents for its justification.

However, Ian Manner argues that the EU has a normative power in its external relations because it promotes universal norms based on moral and normative justifications to shape the normal in the global politics. This NPE role conception of Manners is a highly contested issue, as the concept itself is too categorical and depends on specific cases in EU actions. According to Manners, one of the EU's most prominent norm promoter role can be seen in Turkey's accession process because, in order to fulfil the EU's conditionality on human rights, Turkey has abolished the death penalty and amended its constitution and legal system regarding other critical human rights issues. Manners argues that such role of the EU means, it creates an ideational change in Turkey in terms of human dignity because Turkey legitimized the 'normal'. Indeed, NPE approach overburdens the EU and conditions it to act consistently, which leaves no margin for error. On the other hand, this approach and its exemplifications based on specific cases whereas there are other human rights issues that are interwoven with complex realities in which the EU falls short to have an influence, such as gender equality.

Gender equality, as a new paradigm, has been embedded into the women's rights agenda since 1990s, and widened the perspective of women's subordination. The gender equality, as a norm, emerged in the universal level by the efforts of transnational women

movement, and was enshrined with the GAD approach, Beijing Platform for Action and several international conventions. Previously, women's empowerment paradigm was the prominent discourse of the women's rights struggle, and engaged in equal treatment for men and women in every sphere of life, but particularly in development issues. In contrast, gender equality directly refers to the constructed asymmetrical relationship between women and men and problematize the socially constructed roles devoted to sexes and questions how patriarchy poses an obstacle for equality.

In terms of gender equality norm construction, the EU tackles the issue from two perspectives. First, there are internal gender norms, which are binding, and composed of labour market directives and treaty articles based on anti-discrimination. Second, there are also external norms based upon universal principles and acknowledge equality between men and women in terms of human rights context, but are non-binding. Although the EU indicates the importance of gender equality by emphasizing it as a fundamental EU value in its official documents, it uses the 'women empowerment' paradigm and binds equality to the labour market, rather than emphasizing gender role inequalities. As chapter three showed, there also resistances exist in EU member states in complying with the EU's gender equality goals and its consensual policy objectives. This prevents the EU from translating the external gender norm into its own member states' divergently structured gender regimes and create a collective understanding. This situation constantly criticized by the European feminists as the EU has not been exerting more efforts in terms of human rights-based gender equality norm diffusing. In addition, the EU degrades inequality problems into employability or market economy functioning level, albeit gender equality is linked with enhanced social rights, which contradicts the EU's neoliberal market economy goals.

By concerning gender equality approach of the EU, this study questions whether the EU is a normative power regarding gender equality in Turkey. In the enlargement process, however, Turkey was conditioned to adopt both internal norms composed of equal treatment in labour market directives and Article 141, and external norms. During the accession process, a candidate country is subjected to normative change and conditioned to implement positive measures along with procedural and transference diffusions.

Procedural diffusion is a form of technical assistance that consists of knowledge transfer and best practices, whereas transference diffusion is the financial assistances via the IPA and EIDHR programs.

Through the procedural diffusion, Turkey accepted gender equality norm and committed to socialize it within specific time periods in its national programs. With the onset of the negotiation process since 2005, Turkish woman policy makers, academicians, and the women's movement have further impetus to overcome the stalemates in gender equality. In procedural diffusion, conditionality is presented as a normative justification, although it does not provide clear benchmarks for gender equality norm socialization. Besides, there has been a growing realization that such measures have limited effect because of a backlash by the AKP government against human rights promotion efforts. Regarding the Turkish legal system, the EU has an influence in promoting and developing women's rights, which are covered by EU directives, in terms of the right to work, right to divorce, right to organize, etc. However, the state's norm socialization remained limited because policy implementation was obstructed by the government's ideological stance on women in the society. It therefore seems insufficient to evaluate the EU's normative influence just by focusing on legal amendments since they reflect a different picture to that which exists in practice. Besides, the government acts consonantly with the cultural context, where femininity is constructed through specific roles, such as housewifery and motherhood.

On the other hand, through transference diffusion, the EU has provided financial assistance to local agents in Turkey, especially those NGOs that are also national norm entrepreneurs, to socialize the norm locally and act in line with the state. Indeed, during norm diffusion, woman NGOs in Turkey are the right addressee because, before the EU accession process, the women's movement campaigns had already been against the hegemonic gender regime entrenched in the culture and which consolidated and was reproduced by state policies. By referring to CEDAW and other conventions, they regularly pressured the state over the years, creating networks with transnational groups, connecting with international bodies such as the UN, and advocating worldwide. Hence rights-based NGOs in Turkey are critical in the socialization process, because they are

thematic and advocate particular issues that each touch on one part of gender equality norm construction. However, the interests of non-institutionalized, service-based NGOs are determined by the objectives set by EU project priorities, and the projects designed by these priorities are unsustainable. In addition, rights-based NGOs' activism and activities have been curbed by the AKP government and public institutions locally.

Nevertheless, one of the most prominent achievements of the EU is to make the women's movement and their struggle visible in Turkey. Through its procedural and transference diffusions, the EU has enabled them to increase and maintain their pressure mechanisms against the state, despite the AKP government's unwillingness to mainstream gender norms. Furthermore, the acquired women rights are the products of ongoing pressure of the women's movement, rather than the condescension of the state. In the absence of state norm implementation or amendments, the EU exerts direct pressure on Turkey to enact legislative reforms as an external catalyser and indirect promoter, which facilitate the activities of the women's movement. It is thus local and national agents that take advantage of the EU's norm promoter role. EU grants allow them to keep rights issues on the public agenda and disseminate their voices and actions. These actions both try to change the laws and legal-political discourse as well as make the society more aware of women's subordination and gender inequality. Thus, the women's movement and NGOs -as women movement's legitimized legal entities-in Turkey have always been the main internal catalyser both before and after EU accession, they should have benefited from the EU more than recent financial assistance.

Therefore this incomplete internalization and even socialization and the problems in the cultural filter can be summarized by several factors, which also highlight what the EU does not do. Firstly, in the EU's official documents, gender equality is mostly examined within women's empowerment paradigm, and the project's priorities are based on female labour market participation and violence against women, in which for the latter the EU suggests increasing the employability of women as a remedy for combatting against violence. The EU itself does not correctly conceptualize gender equality in its policies, documents, directives, etc., although framing this concept is essential,

especially when it is linked with conditionality. Regarding accession, considering the interviewees' answers, the contents of the EU projects are far from a universal gender equality norm, and do not question the patriarchy, structured gender roles, and gender discrimination in social, political, and economic life. Furthermore, in its employment projects the EU has broadly funded vocational training projects, which are mostly focused on gender-segregated jobs, partially touch on Turkey's structural gender inequality problems.

Secondly, the AKP government's ideological distance from gender equality reinforces inequality and reverses for any norm socialization. Although the AKP government is considered as a liberal, moderate Islamist party, this synthesis has tended towards a more conservative party ideology, in which the discourses of state leaders, party policies, and the government's distant relations with rights-based NGOs specify the place of women in the society. That is, women continued to be coded along with family and motherhood. Here, the EU as a condition-maker could have acted more prescriptive and force the government to implement the gender equality norms more properly, as it did in the adultery case.

Thirdly, when the state hesitates to socialize the norm from national to local, local people remain unaware of this newly-transmitted norm, and do not consent to any direct EU gender equality norm, because the norm clashes with their structured cultural codes. Such individuals do not see themselves as part of these European values and its collective identity. After the completion of the projects, they still are insufficiently aware that any violation of women means a violation of human rights. In conservative localities, women are not seen as independent individuals; rather, women's subordination is believed to be normal. The EU could have evaluated the process, especially when the state organs conduct the awareness projects.

Fourthly, local internalization of the socialization of gender equality is ineffective due to the lack of support from local public agents – especially municipalities. One reason is the dominance of leading positions by men, who do not necessarily consider norm change in terms of gender roles. Especially in conservative localities, mayors do not

want to lose local support and seek to work compatibly with the cultural context. On the other hand, AKP municipalities especially follow the same ideology as the central government and they prefer not to contradict the common party ideology. Hence, it is important to encourage women's political participation in municipal and parliamentary elections, and increase the number of the femocrats and women MPs. However, the EU did not explicitly focus on this during the procedural and transference diffusion.

One of the important points in this process is the strength or weakness within the local-national-universal nexus or, more simply, to what degree the domestic and universal norms are compatible in terms of shared expectations and a common voice, whereas the norms act as a reflector of the norm diffuser and it might also be challenging for the norm importer to synchronize them effectively. Diffusing a norm to the third country and getting it approved by the state and locality means the norm promoter has normative power over the norm importer agent. The study argues that there is not a certain normative power and ideational change in Turkey in terms of gender equality. Manners disregards the local realities, in which the new transmitted gender equality norm is diffused with a normative will but encounters with different political outcomes. Hence this study proposes that if the three-legged system based on actor constellation-signifying government, civil society and public institution- works properly, then the transmitted norm may be internalized, yet not guaranteed.

Hence, social construction of gender equality knowledge clashes with the social reality of the local based on patriarchy. However, this reality also socially constructed through a collective process, and mutual construction of gender equality in the local needs extra mechanisms. It is overt that there is a capability and expectation gap of the EU that degrades the EU's credibility. As to be called a normative power in gender equality, the EU *should* re-develop its gender equality conditionality and diffusion methods for candidate countries because, in its procedural diffusion, the EU is lack in pressuring states to shape the normal in gender equality and does not exert sufficient effort to develop extra mechanisms between the state's norm socialization and local internalization.

Normative Justification based on normative sustainability, which means any EU-driven norm should be normatively explicable to others and sustainable to next generations. Degree of reflexivity can be found in the consistency between internal and external EU policies as well as in the feedbacks of those expected effects on the EU actions. To understand the great degree of reflexivity by considering the feedback of the actions, there is need to embed a 'second tipping point' in the life cycle model between socialization and internalization, which would express what the EU *should do* to internalize the norm. Gender equality norm's diffusion needs process, differ than other human rights norms. That is, the EU should support rights-based NGOs in their gender awareness activities more than now, monitor the process, provide benchmarks for solutions to eliminate any ambiguity in the content of the transmitted-norm, and align its project priorities with local's needs, because ideational change in cultural norms would occur when transmitted norm is stretched by considering local realities.

ANNEX

Interview Questions

1. Could you please define your institution/NGO?

2. In what areas does your institution perform? Does your institution include gender equality or women empowerment in its activities?

3. Which of the EU Financial Assistances did your institution apply for, EIDHR or IPA I?

4. Why did your institution prefer to carry out a project regarding gender equality/ women empowerment?

5. How would you define the gender (in)equality or women rights issue in Turkey?

6. What was/were the aim of the project(s)? Who were the target groups?

7. Did your institution face with problems while carrying out the project?

8. What was the local people's reaction to the project activities? Did they attend the project activities, if not, why?

9. Do you think these projects have an influence in transforming the existing norms of the society? If not, what are the challenges in front of this new norm?

10. Why do you think the EU allocates these funding?

11. Can it be argued that there is an ideational change occurred in the society after the completion of these projects?

12. Do the project outcomes sustain? If not, why?

13. According to you, what supposed to be done to sustain these projects, and to create an ideational change? Do you think the government has a responsibility in this process?

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