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MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ

AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

INTERACTIVE PROCESSES OF EUROPEANIZATION:

A CASE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

EYLÜL ÇETİN

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
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ABSTRACT

INTERACTIVE PROCESSES OF EUROPEANIZATION: A CASE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

Since 1980s, civil society in Turkey has shown drastic advancement related to several internal and external developments. However, it is the European Union accession process began with the official recognition of Turkey's candidacy in 1999 has significantly not only improved the Turkish legal and institutional structure for the operation of civil society but also enhanced the practices of civil society organizations in Turkey. In this regard, the involvement of the EU in the civil society development and empowerment in Turkey has been taking place through the interactive mechanisms of Europeanization processes via direct and indirect ways. Conditionality principle; funding policies and mechanisms; cooperation through interactions, networks and partnerships; legitimization of civic activity in Turkey are the categories for figuring out the influence of the interactive Europeanization processes on the development of Turkish civil society in legal and practical terms. By incorporating the top down and the bottom up considerations of Europeanization perspective into the analysis, the thesis attempts to reveal that both the EU and Turkish civil society have shaped Turkey's Europeanization outcomes collectively thanks to the EU accession context.

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ÖZET

AVRUPALILAŞMANIN İNTERAKTİF SÜREÇLERİ: TÜRKİYE'DE SİVİL TOPLUM ÖRNEĞİ

1980'li yıllardan beri, Türkiye'deki sivil toplum, çeşitli iç ve dış gelişmelere bağlı olarak ciddi bir gelişme kaydetmiştir. Ancak, 1999 yılında Türkiye'nin adaylığının resmi olarak tanınmasıyla başlayan Avrupa Birliği katılım süreci, Türkiye'deki yasal ve kurumsal yapıyı sivil toplumun işleyişi açısından iyileştirmekle kalmayıp, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının faaliyetlerini de önemli ölçüde geliştirmiştir. Bu bağlamda, AB'nin Türkiye'de sivil toplumun geliştirilmesi ve güçlendirilmesine dahil olması, Avrupalılaşma süreçlerinin interaktif mekanizmalarının doğrudan ve dolaylı yollarıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Koşulluluk ilkesi, finansman politikaları ve mekanizmaları, etkileşimler, ağlar ve ortaklıklar yoluyla tesis edilen işbirliği ve Türkiye'de sivil faaliyetlerin meşrulaşması, interaktif Avrupalılaşma süreçlerinin Türk sivil toplumunun yasal ve pratiksel açılardan gelişmesindeki etkilerinin anlaşılmasına yönelik kategorilerdir. Bu tez çalışması, Avrupalılaşma perspektifinin yukarıdan aşağıya ve aşağıdan yukarıya doğru çözümlemelerini yaparak Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaşmasının sonuçlarını, AB katılımı sayesinde, hem AB'nin hem de Türk sivil toplumunun birlikte şekillendirdiğini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party
AKUT	Arama Kurtarma Derneği-Search and Rescue Association
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi-Motherland Party
AP	Adalet Partisi-Justice Party
APD	Accession Partnership Document
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People's Party
CSDP	Civil Society Development Program
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
ÇAÇADER Association	Çocuklar Aynı Çatının Altında Derneği-Children under Same Roof
DİSK	Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions
DP	Demokrat Parti-Democrat Party
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti-Democratic Left Party
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEC	European Economic Community
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
EWL	European Women's Lobby
FB	Fazilet Partisi-Virtue Party
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi-Peoples' Democratic Party

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
İKV	İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı-Economic Development Foundation
KA-DER	Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği-Association for Supporting and Training Women Candidates
KAGİDER	Kadın Girişimcileri Derneği-Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey
KİH-YÇ	Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler-Women for Women's Human Rights-New Ways
KSGM	Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü-Directorate General on the Status Women
MFİB	Merkezi Finans ve İhale Birimi-Central Finance and Contracts Unit
MGK	Milli Güvenlik Konseyi-National Security Council
MÜSİAD	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği-The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
NAP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-Nationalist Action Party
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-Kurdistan Worker's Party
SEA	Single European Act
STGM	Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi-Civil Society Development Center
TEMA	Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları Koruma Vakfı-Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, For Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats
TESK	Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu-Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen
TİP	Türkiye İşçi Partisi-Workers Party of Turkey
TİSK	Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Komisyonu-Confederation of the Employers' Unions of Turkey
TOBB	Türkiye Odalar ve Borsa Birliği-The Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges

TÜRK-İŞ	Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu- Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
TÜSEV	Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı-Third Sector Foundation of Turkey
TÜSİAD	Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği-Turkish Industry and Business Association
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank

INTRODUCTION

Coming a long way since the beginning of the 1990s, Europeanization has become a widespread phenomenon in political as well as academic realms. The term has been increasingly used, largely driven by the growing significance of the European Union (EU) on socio-economic relations in Europe. Although scholars offer varying interpretations of the term, it has generally been utilized as an analytical tool to describe the EU's influence on EU member states and candidate countries.

Within this context, one of the most continuing subjects of research for Europeanization academics has been the relationship between the EU and civil society. There have been at least two reasons behind this persistent interest in the study of Europeanization of civil society. Firstly, the EU repeatedly stresses the importance of civil society in the accession context. Especially since the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Europeanization of civil society has turned to be a prerequisite for EU membership. Hence, understanding the connection between the EU and civil society is crucial for comprehending the role of civil society in the accession process.

Secondly, within the framework of liberal tradition, the existence of an active civil society is essential for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Externally, civil society organizations (CSOs) have an influence on democracy through the demands they make on governments by supporting a specific cause. Internally, associational life fosters "habits of cooperation and public spiritedness" that develop civic abilities required for participation in public life and "inculcates democratic habits" (Putnam, 2000, p. 212). As a result, civil society activities can support more participatory and pluralistic democracies.

Accordingly, the relationship between the EU and Turkish civil society has also become an important research agenda with respect to the Turkey's EU membership process and the democratization efforts in the country since the official declaration of Turkey as a candidate state in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. Thus, the Europeanization of Turkish civil society is important both for Turkey's becoming a member of the EU and the democratization process of the country. Therefore, understanding the factors which produce favorable conditions conducive to civil empowerment in Turkey is crucial to further encourage such

elements. Most of the studies have evaluated Europeanization process of Turkish civil society through top down or bottom up research designs. While many studies predominantly consider Europeanization as an EU-induced process by disregarding domestic factors, some studies dominantly favor domestic actors in explaining the domestic change. Nevertheless, this study attempts to demonstrate that there has been a dynamic and reciprocal process between the EU-based factors and domestic forces through interactive mechanisms of Europeanization processes. Therefore, Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has been collectively shaped by the EU and Turkish civil society.

In this regard, this thesis aims to understand in which ways and to what extent the EU has influenced civil society development in Turkey within the accession context. It argues that the EU accession process, through the interactive mechanisms, has significantly enhanced the Turkish legal and institutional structure for the functioning of civil society as well as improved the practices of civil society in Turkey although civil society empowerment in the country still has serious shortcomings compared to those in the EU. Through its membership conditionality mechanism, the EU has contributed to the improvements in the domestic legal and institutional environment regarding the operation of CSOs. In addition to Europeanization of legal infrastructure, the Turkish society has also experienced a phase of socialization. Societal dimension of Europeanization has influenced the practices of Turkish civil society and enabled the EU and Turkish CSOs to enter in a more interactive interference.

In order to reach a comprehensive analysis of the EU's influence on the civil society development in Turkey, direct and indirect instruments of Europeanization processes and their interplay with each other are evaluated. In this respect, the thesis analyses Europeanization process of Turkish civil society under four parts. Conditionality principle; funding policies and mechanisms; cooperation through interactions, networks and partnerships; and legitimization of civic activity in Turkey are studied.

First, the thesis evaluates the direct involvement of the EU with its conditionality mechanism in the development of civil society in Turkey under the category of the Europeanization of Turkish civil society in legal terms. Second, it assesses explicit and implicit contributions of the funding mechanism of the EU in the accession context. Third, cooperation section is highly valuable since the establishment of networks is perhaps the most

important dimension of societal Europeanization. Lastly, the legitimization of civic activity, that is the most indirect and long-lasting impact of Europeanization process, evaluates the Europeanization of civil society in a more extensive socio-political and normative context rather than a formal process of institutional, legislative and policy adjustment induced by the EU.

In doing so, the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey is divided along legal and practical terms. While the conditionality mechanism is evaluated in the Europeanization of civil society in legal terms since the incentive mechanism of the EU has directly imposed the legal changes representing the task of civil society in Turkey, the remaining categories of Europeanization are gathered under the Europeanization of Turkish civil society in practical terms as they have transformed the activities of Turkish civil society through collective socialization within the accession process. Under each category, the thesis repeatedly tries to show that different mechanisms of Europeanization processes have progressed in an interactive manner with each other in the accession context. More importantly, these interconnected instruments of Europeanization processes have altogether played a role in incorporating top down and bottom up elements into the Turkey's Europeanization. That is to say, EU-related factors and Turkish civil society have conjointly shaped Europeanization outcomes thanks to the interactive mechanisms of Europeanization through direct and indirect ways.

For studying Turkish civil society advancement in relation to the EU, the thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter is designed in order to demonstrate the conceptual and theoretical framework of the thesis. In this respect, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first part of the chapter puts forward the evolution of the Europeanization literature by focusing on how academics have made use of the term, Europeanization, as an analytical structure. In this regard, it is attempted to reach a comprehensive analysis of the European integration process in influencing domestic changes both in member states and candidate countries. The following part points out the application of the theoretical premises of the Europeanization literature for the Turkish context for assessing how the influence of Europeanization on various policy areas in Turkey is studied. The final part specifically concentrates on civil society area in Turkey by laying down the academic debates on the

Europeanization of Turkish civil society in order to reveal their contributions and limitations in the growing literature on the development of civil society in Turkey during the accession context.

The second chapter tries to display the origins and development of EU civil society policy. In this regard, the chapter is separated into two parts. The first section of the chapter examines the Western origins of the idea of civil society so as to demonstrate the conceptual history on which EU's civil society perspective relies. The second part chronologically presents the major milestones in the crystallization of EU's civil society policy within and beyond its borders. In this way, the application of EU's policy towards civil society in Turkey can be better understood in the context of enlargement.

The third chapter puts forward the historical background of civil society development in Turkey before the official declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy in order to compare and contrast civil society in Turkey with regard to the EU's influence on it during the accession process. The chapter is divided into four phases in parallel to the important thresholds in Turkish politics. The initial part demonstrates how the long-lasting strong state tradition in the Ottoman state hindered the development of civil society. The second part indicates that the early Republican era was characterized by the continuities with the late Ottoman era rather than changes. The third part points out that although the installation of the multi-party system was a milestone in Turkey's democratization, this period was shaded by a series of political and legal developments which precluded the conditions conducive to the development of civil society. The last part displays that several internal and external developments since 1980s have together paved the way for the development of a genuine civil society in Turkey. More importantly, it is argued that the EU accession context among these factors has brought a remarkable leap to the status and activities of Turkish civil society.

The fourth chapter deals with the Europeanization process of civil society in Turkey. For this aim, the chapter is divided along Europeanization of Turkish civil society in legal and practical terms. The first part figures out the influence of EU's conditionality instrument on the development of legal and institutional structure governing the operation of civil society in Turkey. The second section is separated into three parts in order to demonstrate the change in the practices of Turkish civil society through socialization. In this regard, the contributions of

funding policies and mechanisms of the EU to civil society development in Turkey through various programs are examined. The following part focuses on how the cooperation dimension of Europeanization process has fostered interactions, networks and partnerships among civil society actors in Turkey, between Turkish CSOs and their European counterparts and between civil society and state in Turkey. The last part displays that the EU has operated for legitimizing Turkish CSOs and their policy initiatives.

Due to the long-lasting strong state tradition, Turkish civil society had remained weak, dependent on and controlled by state institutions especially until the mid-1980s. However, Turkey's EU accession process has had a crucial influence in the development of Turkish civil society and changed the relationship between civil society and state. Accordingly, CSOs in Turkey have started to gain significance both in Turkey's democratization process as well as in the relations between the EU and Turkey despite having deficiencies which are deeply rooted in the state-centric tradition.

CHAPTER I. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptual and theoretical framework is separated into three areas. The initial part of the chapter points out the development of the Europeanization literature in order to clarify how the term, Europeanization, is used as an analytical framework among scholars for evaluating the changes related to the process of EU integration not only in member states but also in candidate countries. The following section specifically concentrates on the Europeanization literature for the Turkish case so as to demonstrate how the theoretical premises of the Europeanization literature are applied to the Turkish context and the influence of Europeanization on specific aspects of policies and policy fields in Turkey are evaluated. The last part gives the academic debates on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey in order to benefit from the conclusions of them and contribute to the literature growing on the development of civil society in Turkey during the accession context.

1.1. The State of the Art in the Europeanization Literature

In general, Europeanization has become analytical focal center of interest in understanding the process of European integration (Featherstone, 2003, p. 19), but the very definition of the concept is still debated (Knill, 2008, p. 73). However, it is a "useful concept, since it cuts across traditional analytical dimensions such as European, national, sub-national etc." (Featherstone, 2003, p. 19).

In parallel to the accelerated pace of deepening and widening efforts of the EU, the Europeanization literature began to take its shape in the late 1990s (Güney and Tekin, 2016, p. 1). On the one hand, the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty), on the other hand, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that queued up for joining the EU, has led Europeanization studies to become a field of increased academic interest. The EU's intention to emerge as a global actor as well as its increased influence and transformative impact on polity, politics and policies of member states are the issues which first generation of Europeanization scholars are dealing with (Duina 1997; Börzel and Risse, 2000, 2003; Radaelli, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Falkner *et al.* 2005). The Europeanization studies have primarily attempted to "answer how

European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic political systems" (Vink and Graziano, 2007, p. 12). In this regard, the understanding of Europeanization has largely taken the misfit - the incompatibility between European and domestic policies, institutions, political processes - as the basis (Börzel, 1999; Börzel and Risse, 2000, 2003).

It is exactly at this conjuncture that "new institutionalism" theories and methodologies have influenced the Europeanization literature (Radaelli, 2003). The understanding which is "institutions matter" recognizes particular varieties of institutionalism (Bulmer, 2008). New institutionalism in general, and rational choice as well as sociological institutionalisms in particular, identify two mechanisms of institutional change that can likewise be connected to change of policies and politics. On the one hand, rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors act in a rational and interest-maximizing manner and in accordance with "logic of consequence". Accordingly, European integration and the resultant misfit change the domestic opportunity structure for domestic actors. This change leads to differential empowerment of domestic actors and results in domestic change if the favored actors can exploit the new resources made available to them (Börzel and Risse, 2000, pp. 6-7). On the other hand, Börzel and Risse argue that sociological institutionalism assumes that actors act with a "logic of appropriateness" where rationality is socially constructed and where they seek conformity with social norms. This framework interprets Europeanization as a provision of new forms and meaning structures that define legitimate and rational behavior, with which domestic actors strive to comply (ibid., pp. 7-8). According to sociological institutionalists, norm entrepreneurs, for example, epistemic networks and advocacy or principled issue networks, who work towards convincing political actors to comply with the EU norms are facilitators of Europeanization of the domestic settings (ibid.).

Since the mid-2000s, candidate state or accession Europeanization literature as a second generation of Europeanization studies has emerged related to the EU's eastern enlargement as well as those candidates who are not in the membership region. The Europeanization scholars, who were dealing with the member states up to that point, have now utilized the framework of Europeanization theories for studying CEECs. The same framework has also been valid for analysis of the other candidate countries apart from candidate states which are in the CEE, including Turkey (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,

2005; Vachudova, 2005; Pridham, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Jakoby, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2007, 2009). Numerous investigations have displayed that the EU has momentous influence on the polity, politics, and policies of the candidate states by concentrating on the instruments as well as procedures of Europeanization process (Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007).

Although theoretical perspectives of the candidate state Europeanization are generally deducted from two fundamental variations which are rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, the Europeanization of candidate states and the conditions for it are not the same as those of the member states. The external dimension of the Europeanization literature has provided important mechanisms for emphasizing different domestic mediating factors for the domestic influence of the EU. Along these lines, "conditionality" and "socialization" are viewed as two primary instruments of EU impact (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). While conditionality is an instrument highlighted by rationalist institutionalist accounts, socialization is a mechanism stressed by sociological institutionalist perspectives. In spite of the fact that these methodologies are diagnostically extraordinary, it ought to be underlined that they are correlative to each other and not mutually exclusive.

In accession Europeanization literature, on the one hand, rationalist institutionalism is characterized as the external incentive model. In this approach, conditionality is the key instrument with which the EU sets conditions that candidate countries and different countries must satisfy particular criteria to pick up EU membership status. The literature demonstrates that the influence of the EU is identified with international and domestic facilitating factors. In terms of the international facilitating factors, rationalist account concentrates on "the credibility of conditionality", "the clarity of EU demands", "the size of rewards", "the temporal proximity of rewards", "power asymmetry", "linkages to Western Europe", and "monitoring capacity" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, Sedelmeier, 2011, pp. 12-14). In terms of the domestic mediating factors, rationalist approach stresses "veto players", "adoption costs", "administrative capacities", "societal mobilization" and "formal institutions". Both the international and the domestic facilitating factors mediate the EU's influence (ibid.).

On the other hand, sociological institutionalism is defined as the social learning model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). According to this perspective, the effectiveness of EU influence also depends on mediating factors. In terms of international level, the social learning model concentrates on "the legitimacy of EU demands" and "the legitimacy of the process" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 18-19; Sedelmeier, 2011, pp. 15-16). The model assumes that the probability of rule adoption increments as the authenticity of principles increments. At the domestic level, the literature regards domestic facilitating factors as "positive normative resonance with domestic rules", "identification with the EU", and "transnational networks" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011, pp. 12-14).

The premises of accession Europeanization is crucial for the thesis which is embedded in the ground theories of Europeanization of candidate states, namely external incentive model and social learning model, as Schimmelfennig (2012) argues that "All other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of these two fundamental logics- varieties that work indirectly and/or transnationally than conditionality and socialization" (p. 9). That is to say, the ground theories of accession Europeanization constitute the cornerstones of the thesis since the study attempts to reveal the interactive processes of Europeanization in which both of the mechanisms are at play. Besides, the ground theories of accession Europeanization are also crucial for the study since they not only concentrate on international facilitating factors, but also highlight the significance of domestic contexts and demonstrate how such contexts matter by identifying domestic mediating factors.

However, the Europeanization literature has overwhelmingly credited rationalist account for the EU's impact on the domestic political change of EU member and candidate states. Without doubt, there have been theoretically fluctuating models to explore the EU's influence on domestic political change (Börzel and Risse, 2012). Be that as it may, the vast majority of the works has prevalently supported the rational approach. In other words, in the literature, Europeanization is essentially operationalized as the institution building and policy making procedure of European integration. Although these are crucial aspects of Europeanization processes in member and candidate states, European integration process is more than a formal process of institutional, legislative and policy adjustment induced by the

EU. Consequently, the pervasive Europeanization ponders, by predominantly focusing on the conditionality mechanism of the EU, have largely underemphasized the societal dimension of the EU's influence and the normative context in which the EU's leverage has been applied. Besides, in most of the studies, Europeanization is considered as a top down process by focusing on the domestic influences of European integration in the member and candidate countries. In a way, domestic actors are evaluated as passive recipients of European integration process.

In this respect, Jacquot and Woll (2003) make a crucial contribution to the literature by defining Europeanization in a broader conceptual framework with the concept of creative usage which covers

> practices and political interactions which adjust and redefine themselves by seizing the European Union as a set of opportunities, be they institutional, ideological, political or organizational. These practices and political interactions happen as the actors go back and forth between the European level and the national, local, sectoral or institutional level on which they act (or wish to act), creating a context of reciprocal influence (p. 4).

Accordingly, Radaelli also (2003) evaluates Europeanization in a more interactive sense by asserting that Europeanization can take place in vertical and horizontal ways. The former means that rules and policies are defined at the EU level, then have to be adopted by the domestic level. The latter assumes that there is no pressure on the domestic level by the EU, rather the influence of the EU on domestic level takes place through market mechanisms or socialization. In a similar vein, Radaelli and Exadaktylos (2010) argue that

> Europeanization is an interactive process rather than a simple process of unidirectional reaction 'to Europe'. It covers both the notion of Europeanization as domestic impact of Europe (or pressure) and Europeanization as creative usages of Europe (p. 193).

For them, "the presence of the EU level of a forum of discussion, an arena for negotiation, or a political architecture for interaction and discourse" enables both the EU and domestic actors to enter in a more interactive interference (ibid., p. 194).

Drawing on their arguments, the study follows an interactive and process-oriented consideration of Europeanization for assessing the influence of the EU on civil society in

Turkey. In this respect, the study tries to overcome aforementioned top down research design by incorporating bottom up model with a focus on domestic actors. More importantly, it is aimed to display the reciprocal relation between the two models in creating domestic political changes through the interactive mechanisms of Europeanization processes. In doing so, it is attempted to reach a far reaching comprehension of the EU's part in influencing domestic changes.

1.2. The Europeanization Literature for the Turkish Case

Since Turkey's declaration as an official candidate in 1999, the Turkish case has gained importance for inquiry. Many researchers have utilized the term to investigate the democratization process in the Turkish political framework as a result of political reforms for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria set by the EU (Aydın and Keyman 2004; Baç 2005; Faucompret and Konings 2008). In evaluating Turkey's Europeanization process, most of the analyses has largely focused on the influence of conditional incentives exerted by the EU for the adaptation of the EU rules (Kalaycıoğlu, 2003; Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2003; Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004; Diez *et al.,* 2005; Tocci, 2005; Keyman and Öniş, 2007; Grigoriadis, 2008, 2009).

However, scholarly there has been increasing attention on the influence of Europeanization on specific parts of policies and policy fields in Turkey, such as minority policy (Grigoriadis, 2008; Duyulmuş, 2007; Onar and Özgüneş, 2010; Atikcan, 2010; Yılmaz, 2012), regional policy (Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005), foreign policy (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2009; Terzi, 2012), military (Sarigil, 2007), economic policy (Öniş and Bakır, 2007), asylum policy (İçduygu, 2007; Kirişçi, 2007), civil society (Kübicek, 2005) and citizenship policy (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005). Nevertheless, in a large portion of the works, Europeanization has been studied "as a cause of responses to demands by or developments on the European level" (Alpan and Diez, 2014, p. 3). Güney and Tekin (2016) well represent this top down research design by stating that

> we consider Europeanization of Turkey in the framework of Accession Europeanization, and we define Europeanization mainly as a top-down process due to the fact that Turkey, as an accession country, and due to the asymmetrical character of the negotiation process, is not in a position to affect European integration in terms of a bottom-up Europeanization (p. 3).

Therefore, a vast majority of the analyses endorsing Europeanization research program for studying Turkish case has employed a top down research design, but several scholars have begun to raise their concerns on these top down designs (Bölükbaşı *et al.,* 2010; Kaliber, 2010, 2012, 2013; Alpan and Diez, 2014; Yılmaz, 2014; Boşnak, 2015; Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016).

To put it differently, notwithstanding a developing number of studies for the Turkish case, they have remained limited due to the widespread inclination to adopt top down perspectives relied largely on the conditionality mechanism and on the evaluation of domestic elements as mediators. By predominantly focusing on a formal process of institutional, legislative and policy arrangement induced by the EU and evaluating domestic actors as passive recipients, the top down research models overlook alternative explanatory factors in the domestic realm. Contrary to the top down approach, domestic elements are also at play as Yılmaz argues that

> Europeanization can be driven by domestic factors. From this perspective, Europeanization is a bottom-up process, in which domestic change is a consequence of domestic pressure exercised by grassroots actors (civil society organizations, interest groups, media or political parties). While civil society organizations, business interest groups and media put pressure on policy-makers for domestic change, political parties, including government parties, themselves may be the driving forces behind domestic change due to the political preferences based on their own political interests. In this vein, domestic factors can drive the change rather than hinder it as expected by the dominant top-down perspective in the literature (Yılmaz, 2014, pp. 304-5).

Despite the fact that the influence of EU conditionality on Turkey's Europeanization procedure has diminished particularly since 2006, domestic reforms in many areas have been continued to be undertaken by Turkey. In this regard, it is essential to incorporate domestic dynamics into the consideration when examining Europeanization process of Turkey (Yılmaz and Soyaltın, 2014). Such an approach displaying instances of domestic change in a candidate state with a remarkable decline in membership prospect in the meantime deserves attention in studying accession Europeanization literature.

At this point, Kaliber's (2013) critique on the mainstream Europeanization literature is highly valuable for two reasons. First, he highlights the importance of domestic actors in

Turkey's Europeanization process. Second, he draws on "an analytical distinction between EU-ization as a formal process of convergence with EU's policies, institutions and legal framework and Europeanization as a wider socio-political and normative context" (p. 65).

Kaliber criticizes the literature on Europeanization prevalently managed by rational and sociological varieties of neo-institutionalism. According to him, the main problem in these accounts is that misfit is mainly considered "as the exclusive factor inducing Europeanization of domestic settings"; as a result, no real political role is attributed to domestic actors (ibid., p. 55).

On the one hand, rationalist perspective gives the two major factors mediating change through Europeanization as "the existence of multiple veto players and formal facilitating institutions" (Börzel and Risse, 2000, p. 7). On the other hand, the sociological account considers the capacity of "norm entrepreneurs" to foster change and the presence of "a political culture and other informal institutions" promoting "consensus-building and cost-sharing" as two main mediating factors (ibid., p. 9). After analyzing the premises of these accounts, Kaliber criticizes the top down designs of the studies drawn on rational or sociological approaches by stating that

> In both accounts adaptational pressure comes from the EU, it is mediated by some domestic factors and then 'the domestic' changes through Europeanization. In either case, change refers to a linear, empirically observable and testable process, the success of which mainly depends on the adaptational ability and learning capacity of the European societies. [...] The literature often hinges upon the presumption that European integration takes place up there, while down here actors and institutions try to make sense of it and as best they can. Europeanization is imagined as a uni-dimensional process, whereby the norms, rules, and institutions that are typical of Europe are constructed at the EU level and diffused through various mechanisms into the domestic/national polities, policies and political structures (2013, pp. 56-57).

So as to handle this inquiry, Kaliber makes utilization of a distinction between EU-ization and Europeanization with the point of yielding a more far reaching comprehension of the impact of Europe. While EU-ization is a formal process of alignment with EU's policies, institutions and legal structure, Europeanization is taken place through the involvement of all the related actors. For him, domestic performers are also creators of Europeanization as opposed to mediators. In this way, he dismisses the thought of Europeanization as a top down

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procedure of adjustment experienced by all social orders in similar modalities. Accordingly, drawing on Buller and Gamble (2002), Kaliber argues that

> Europeanization exists as a normative-political context where all European societies have been contributing to negotiating European norms, values, and policies. EU-ization is an integral part, and may currently be the most important instrument, of Europeanization, but not the whole of it. The penetration of Europeanization into domestic political structures of European societies is overwhelmingly contingent upon the willingness of national actors to mobilize this context to promote their political agenda. Therefore, domestic actors as the interpreters and implementers of European norms, rules, and policies in domestic settings are not 'mediators' but creators of Europeanization. European-level developments overwhelmingly influence the ways in which these actors react to and make use of Europe (2013, p. 66).

As a result, his re-conceptualization of Europeanization is highly useful by suggesting that: the sole source of the Europe is not only the EU; Europeanization can be experienced in various social orders in various modalities; and the process of Europeanization should be considered in tandem with domestic and external factors.

In any case, there has been a recent pattern in the literature on Turkey's Europeanization so as to portray the declining impact of the EU's conditionality mechanism on Turkey. Scholars argue that there have been instances of de-Europeanization in the Turkish case. On the one hand, de-Europeanization process is related with the blocked chapters in the accession negotiations and the expanding discussions on the desirability of Turkish membership within the EU. As a result, the credibility of membership prospect has declined in the eye of Turkish public and national authorities, leading to a slowdown in the reform process (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, 2012). On the other hand, de-Europeanization is also associated with the inclinations of the decision party towards a more authoritarian administration (Cebeci, 2016; Yılmaz, 2016; Sipahioğlu, 2017). Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) argue that "concepts such as Europeanisation, EU-isation and EU conditionality may no longer be sufficient in discussing the current role and impact of the EU on Turkey" (p. 4) due to the post-2005 local and worldwide developments. Along these lines, the selective maintenance of harmonization with the EU acquis in a few policy fields has been related to domestic forces, such as the domestic agenda of the ruling party (Öniş, 2010; Yılmaz and Soyaltın, 2014), Turkey's modernization strategy (Kaliber, 2013), or interest groups (Yılmaz,

2014). Besides, the role played by other external actors on ongoing reforms, such as European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the United Nations (UN), is underlined (Kirişçi, 2012; Tolay, 2012). Such studies are valuable in terms of incorporating domestic elements and worldwide dispersion forms into the study.

At this point, however, Bürgin (2016) makes a crucial contribution to Europeanization or de- Europeanization literature on the Turkish case by arguing that while the first wave of Europeanization literature overestimates the domestic influence of the conditionality mechanism of the EU, the new attention on the factors other than the EU undervalues the EU's impact. In spite of the fact that Bürgin does not deny "the existence of indicators of de-Europeanization in political discourse and the significance of non-EU factors for policy reforms in Turkey", his examination, by showing the continuous impact of "conditional external incentives and social learning which are the two EU-driven Europeanization instruments", concludes that the literature on the Turkish Europeanization process tends to underestimate "the continuing transformative power of the EU" (2016, p. 108).

Based on the extensive literature review, this study on the development of civil society in Turkey during the accession context, not only by integrating both the top down and the bottom up approaches into the thesis but also by transcending the distinction between these perspectives, attempts to demonstrate that Europeanization, through its direct and indirect mechanisms as well as their interplay with each other, has been progressing in an interactive and dynamic manner. Therefore, Europeanization is evaluated as a reciprocal process through which the EU factors and domestic elements influence each other. As a result, these forces can shape Europeanization outcomes collectively.

1.3. Academic Debates on the Europeanization of Civil Society in Turkey

Historically, there have been diversified definitions of civil society and the main reason of divergence is that whether it must be characterized in a liberal democratic context. Indeed, many scholars acknowledge the essentially liberal character of the concept. Nevertheless, there are scholars trying to dissolve the term of civil society from a liberal democratic framework. For them, society and state should be seen "as products of a common

political order in which conflicts occur within the state and the civil society rather than between them" (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 42). That is why, civil society could manifest itself and prosper in non-democratic contexts without essentially fostering political liberalization. Hence, one could conceptualize "patriarchal, Islamic, communist and fascist civil societies" (ibid.). However, in this study, "civility" is grasped "as tolerance to opposing views, ideologies, and cultures and viewed as an essential element of civil society" (ibid.).

First of all, it is crucial to accurately comprehend the sort of civil society which is studied in the thesis. Although there have been multiple ways of defining and studying civil society, the current study adopts the definition of the London School of Economics' (LSE) Centre for Civil Society which presents a highly beneficial definition of civil society in analytical and empirical terms as such

> Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from the state, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degrees of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.[1]

For Europeanization researchers, the connection between civil society and the EU is one of the critical zones of research. One of the underlying reasons for the scholarly interest in the relation between the EU and civil society is that the EU often highlights the importance of civil society in the accession process. Especially, the EU's enlargement to CEE has increased debates on the capability of civil society, the role of it in reform process, and the Europeanization of civil society as a prerequisite of the EU accession. Thus, studying this relation is significant for understanding the role of civil society in accession context. Secondly, in a liberal tradition, the promotion and consolidation of democracy necessitates a

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[1]LSE Centre for Civil Society Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29398/1/CCSReport05_06.pdf Accessed on: 10 September 2017.

vibrant civil society. Hence, if the EU strengthens civil society, civil society exercises can enhance more participatory and dynamic democracies.

Accordingly, the literature regarding the Europeanization process of Turkish civil society has expanded (Rumelili, 2005; Kuzmanovic, 2010; Ergun 2010; Ketola, 2011; Öner, 2012; Zihnioğlu 2013; Kaliber, 2014; Yılmaz, 2014; Boşnak, 2015, 2016; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015). The analyses have concentrated on the study of various civil society actors (Rumelili 2005; Boşnak, 2015), the part of Turkish civil society and public opinion in the pre-accession context (İçduygu, 2013), the influence of the EU on the advancement of civil society (Ergun, 2010), the philosophical ground of the EU's civil society perspective (Ketola, 2013), processes and conditions of the EU influence (İçduygu, 2007; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015).

However, the extensive analysis of the literature on the Europeanization of Turkish civil society shows that the influence of the EU has been heavily examined by making use of top down or bottom up perspectives although the studies have used various approaches and made different conclusions. While the top down perspectives on civil society have studied the impact of the EU through the mechanism of conditionality, the bottom up perspectives on civil society have analyzed how domestic civil society actors influence the accession context and Europeanization process. Nevertheless, the exclusive focus on top down and bottom up perspectives undervalue the interplay of both external and domestic factors in the development of civil society in Turkey since CSOs in Turkey have been not only subjects but also objects in the reform process. As Turkish CSOs have been gradually strengthened by the accession context, they have also pushed for further EU integration in turn. Therefore, this study takes both approaches into consideration so as not to evaluate Europeanization process from a single perspective.

In this regard, the thesis does not concentrate on the EU influence as a one way procedure by incorporating top down and bottom up perspectives into the analysis since it attempts to demonstrate that these perspectives are overlapped and mutually reinforce each other. Accordingly, the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has been portrayed as an interactive and dynamic process through which domestic civil society actors close by the EU intelligently shape Europeanization outcomes. That is why, different categories of the

Europeanization processes are studied in order to reveal that various but interconnected mechanisms of Europeanization have enabled both sides to enter in a more reciprocal process and shape Europeanization outcomes collectively.

CHAPTER II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU CIVIL SOCIETY POLICY: TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

The underlying fragment of the zone gives the inceptions and the advancement of the present utilization of the term, civil society, in the West in order to set out a typical framework for the conceptual history supporting EU's civil society approach. In this way, a superior appraisal of the contemporary EU civil society arrangement in the Turkish setting can be brought up in the accompanying parts.

Accordingly, the following section chronologically gives the main defining moments in the improvement of civil society policy of the EU. In this part, the main aim is to reveal how the logic of the EU policy towards civil society has emerged and transposed into the enlargement context. The assessment of the process displays that the EU's policy on civil society is in light of two dimensions which are regarded corresponding to each other. In sum, civil society is considered both as an agent of promoting democracy and a partner in policymaking.

2.1. The Western Origins of the Idea of Civil Society

Civil society basically is a Western idea since its recorded advancement experienced in Western Europe and North America has amazingly affected our comprehension of it (Ketola, 2013, p. 10). The first usage of the term of civil society goes back to Ancient Greece when Aristotle used the concept in the Politika under the title of "Politike Koinonia", political society/community. The Latins later translated as "societas civilis", and subsequently in English wound up "civil society" (DeWiel, 2008, p. 8). He considered politike koinonia as the moral political network of free and equal subjects living under a legally defined arrangement where the term of civil society did not separate society and state, yet constituted a "all-encompassing social system with nothing except from natural relations outside" (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 84). However, the contemporary understanding of civil society relied on the distinction between state and society is a result of the changing flow in economic, political and social conditions particularly in Western Europe (Black, 1984). The evaluation of these developments in Western European life can be useful to grasp how civil society has flourished in this region and what the concept of civil society entails.

In the first place, there was an increment in the quantity of towns in Western Europe in the medieval times. This increase led to radical changes in the daily lives of Europeans because towns made possible the emergence of an area for self-association and the development of new social relations. In Western European towns, both guilds and neighborhoods functioned "as means of popular organization" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 15). Starting from the thirteen century, the craft-guilds started to acquire control on towns, at first in Italy and later in Northern Europe. Accordingly, the expansion in business action and capital resulted in the empowerment of these medieval towns. Having more autonomy brought about a first advance for "the emergence of a civil domain outside the state in Western Europe" (Çaha, 2001, p. 36).

Alongside the increase in autonomy of towns, the emergence of a new class of bourgeoisie due to favorable circumstances, such as development of new production modes; less expensive crude materials with the disclosure of novel courses to Far East; and stream of valuable metals from vanquished lands, was the second important development for the flourishing civil society. The rising bourgeoisie also started to become powerful in social and political terms. As a result, the medieval monarchs began to understand the requirement for more liberal trade policies (Mardin, 1995, pp. 280-81).

The third decisive factor was the tripartite relationship in Western Europe among the monarchy, the medieval honorability and the rising bourgeoisie. In this order, the feudal nobility taking the advantage of increasing commerce started to make contracts with the emerging bourgeoisie. The contracts between them created privileges and rights for both sides. Therefore, a community of interests was created with the more legally protected bourgeoisie. This tripartite rivalry of the monarch, the medieval honorability, and the town facilitated to prosper present day free enterprise (ibid., p. 280). Accordingly, this environment provided a more convenient conditions for the bourgeoisie to maintain their self-association and contain the intensity of first feudal and then central authorities. In this process, each time a tradeoff was gained by "the forces of periphery- the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labour - against the centre" (Mardin, 1975, p. 8). In this way, these forces started to integrate with the central powers and have some sort of recognition of their autonomous status. In that condition, the most vital episode for the bourgeoisie was the

advantage to "private property, from which political rights and commitments were gradually considered to stem", regarded as the fundamental part constituting civil society (Mardin, 1995, p. 281).

Against this background, the sixteenth century witnessed radical changes in the economic, political and social order of Western Europe. The first significant shift in the medieval order was the emergence of central authorities, leading to the modern state era. The second was the increasing power of the bourgeoisie relied on private poverty. The rise in the socio-economic status of the bourgeoisie functioned as the reverse process compared to the earlier alliance with the monarchy because the former now targeted to contain the power of the later (Zihnioğlu, 2013, pp. 16-17). Lastly, the advent of the press in the seventeenth century changed the scope of social relations throughout Europe. The widespread circulation of information and news in the public realm enabled new ideas to spread (Doğan, 2002, p. 21).

In parallel with these developments, the rise of market economy by necessitating a divorce between the state and the self-composed financial exercises of society added a further dimension to the evolution of civil society as a different domain from the state. The breakthrough end product of the ascent of a market economy has been "the defining of freedoms more and more autonomous sphere of action" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 17). Philosophers and political theorists of this new era started to evaluate civil society as a sanctuary to secure the recently realized individual freedoms and rights vis-à-vis the arbitrary interventions by the state. Thereupon, civil society came to be "organized through the medium of voluntary associations" (Edwards, 2004, p. 7).

In sum, although the concept of civil society has prevailed since ancient times, a conceptual divide between society and the state due to the aforementioned developments started to become clearer towards the mid-eighteenth century. In other words, the contemporary understanding of civil society began to take its shape in the eighteenth century. Previously, the term had been considered "as coterminous with the state" (Ketola, 2013, p. 11). The thought of civil society was being modernized "through industrialization and development of modern, complex societies" (ibid.).

Alongside the radical changes in political, economic and social conditions within the Western world, the spread of liberal thoughts in Europe following the Renaissance was a major ideational impetus for the disassociation of conceptual unity between the state and civil society. Liberal democracy has firmly been associated with civil society since it entails "not only political representation and participation, but also privacy and autonomy of associations as well as the free formation of all sorts of movements and parties" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 18).

A significant character that political specialists of the civic-liberal tradition offer is their comprehension of the idea of civil society relied upon the dubious connection between the public and the private. Inside the convention, the theoretical scene of civil society, through the examinations of natural law specialists, political scientists of Enlightenment, and Alexis de Tocqueville, has been created in the light of the sensible division among state and civil society (ibid., p. 19).

Albeit natural law speculations did not make an unquestionable refinement between civil society and the state, one of the essential ideational segments of natural law theories adding to the disassociation between civil society and state is their insistence of "the state as a result of a social contract" (ibid.).

Amidst the second half of the eighteenth century, the movement known as Scottish Enlightenment restored the term civil society as a significant hypothetical idea. The elaboration of an area of society, that is separate from the state and works under its own particular measures, suggested a basic motivation behind the scholastic advance of Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. During this period, the point of those logicians was to build up a thought of civil society so as to propose a combination between the private and the public since people by seeking after their self-interests need to enter in a mutual open. In this way, Scottish masterminds viewed civil society as the domain of social relationship inside which the different private quests and the welfare of the society can be kept up in the meantime. In this manner, civil society deals with the concurrent presence of the person's narrow minded interests without mutilating the order of society. Along these lines, civil society is considered as a solution for the liberal issue of giving harmonization of decent variety and solidarity; in doing as such, a system of free individuals with a balance in their private and public issues can be founded (Seligman, 1992, p. 25). By putting effort to

harmonize the mutual existence of public welfare and private interests, Scottish thinkers went beyond the severe distinction between the communitarian and the liberal-individualistic way of thoughts.

In this regard, Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* in 1767 has crucial importance, especially for yielding a novel interpretation of civil society with respect to modern civic terms and hence showing the first marks of the erosion of the classical comprehension of the theory of civil society. He put forward two significant elements about the characteristics of modern civil society. Firstly, civil society is intricately interwoven with the establishments of present day business economy. Accordingly, Ferguson saw civil society as a by-product of the increasing division of labour among various groups in modern societies and stressed that the advanced division of work can lead to corruption of public spiritedness. He stated that "the separation of professions, while it seems to promise improvement of skill [...] serves, in some measure, to break the bands of society" (1995, p. 12) because every individual has an acceleratingly particular part, in such an environment personal interests can override the communal spirit. This disintegration within society can result in the empowerment of the state over its subjects, in turn this central authority can endanger the very existence of civil society (Keane, 1988, pp. 40-41). Secondly, Ferguson claimed that modern society can be protected from the negative social reactions of the division of labour thanks to presence of civil society because "people are also social animals and prosper by maintaining dynamic social communications that incline us to live with our fellow-creatures, and to do them good" (1995, p. 51). He believed that civil society necessitates a centralized state for its endurance, but this centralized state is at the same time a threat to the civil liberties and potential for independent association (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 21). His problematic between state and civil society signified the appearance of a divide between these two realms that enabled the collapse of the traditional comprehension of civil society.

In the late eighteenth century, a prominent figure of the Enlightenment, Friedrich Hegel also studied on the concept of civil society. His study on civil society is related with Ferguson's account in its attempt to conciliate the tension between private and public interests. Hegel's works strengthened the possibility of civil society as a different element from the state. In a similar vein with the Scottish thinkers, Hegel saw civil society as "a set of

social practices which are constituted by the logic of the market" (Ketola, 2013, p. 13). In this regard, he claimed that self-seeking individuals in search of satisfying their particular interests are the constituting blocks of civil society. However, he also underlined that "Particularity by itself [...] destroys itself" (Hegel, 1952, §185). Accordingly, he stated that "there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all" (ibid., §183). For him, public authorities are in charge of securing that particular needs of individuals do not surpass universal interests. In this way, the innate propensity of civil society to fulfill their selfish needs is controlled through the interaction between the specific/individual and the general/public interests.

Another influential figure of the Enlightenment, Kant (1985) attempted to accommodate the self-governance of people installed in freedom, ethics and legislative issues with the need of social request coordinated by principles and laws (p. 90). He considered the term civil society in two respects, "the freedom of the individual as a human being and the equality of each subject" (Seligman, 1992, p. 42). He also offered treating other individuals as ends as opposed to means, whereas securing that the means individuals use to run after their own private pursuits does not impinge on others' rights to pursue theirs. Hence, Kant's ideas are in line with the moral sentiment on which the Scottish thinkers formed their notion of civil society as well as consolidated their understanding in certain points (ibid.).

In the evolution of the conceptualization of civil society, Alexis de Tocqueville, a prominent nineteenth century American thinker, is also a very important figure with his work entitled *Democracy in America,* published in 1832. His account of the problematic relation between the state and civil society has profound effects on the theory of civil society. By suggesting associational life as a remedy for the excesses of state power, civil society is regarded as a fundamental element of democracy (Ketola, 2013, p. 13). De Tocqueville (1981) stated that "there are no countries in which associations are more needed to prevent the despotism of a faction or the arbitrary power of a prince than those which are democratically constituted" (p. 104). Tocqueville anticipated that the problems stemmed from the consolidation of democracy can only be reduced to the lowest degree by assuring the extensive existence of an organized society.

Tocqueville's approach both clearly separates the state and civil society and affiliates with the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers by reconciling liberal individualistic values with Republican virtues of collective participation. Subsequently, his declaration that people progress toward becoming citizens through investment inside associational life has been considered as the mystical cure of democracy. This understanding has affected the contemporary thinkers on American democracy and has become a cornerstone of the conceptual background of EU civil society approach that presumes a correlational relationship between associational life and democracy (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 24).

Relying on Tocqueville's observations, neo-Tocquevillians celebrate associational life and give primary importance to participation in civil associations on the grounds that they not only have potential to produce the necessary patterns of behavior for example, propensities for collaboration, solidarity and public spiritedness, but also empower social association for the advancement of democratic administration by enunciating and bringing individual interests together (ibid.). Therefore, for neo-Tocquevillians, associational life is vital for the functioning of democracy and its vitality is essential indicator of the prosperity of democracy.

In the light of Robert Putnam's work (1995), associational life is expected as the major agent as well as urgent wellspring of social capital, contributing to advance "sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust" (p. 67). CSOs promote "habits of cooperation and public spiritedness" which develop necessary civic abilities for cooperation in the public life and "inculcates democratic habits" (Putnam, 2000, p. 212). In a similar vein, another neo-Tocquevillan figure, Sullivan (1999) also underlines the necessity of civil associations in order to attain success in democratic governance.

Common affiliations are additionally commended for their commitment in reproducing political cooperation with a civic spirit among people. Also, neo-Tocquevillans state that even apolitical affiliations can deliver political effects in view of their comprehensive impact on different levels of political collaboration and work as the base for the enabling of citizenship (Edwards, 2004, p. 26). In sum, neo-Tocquevillians assume that "the disintegration of civil society from the state play a key role in bringing about and sustaining democratic societies" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 27).

Contemplating everything, the theoretical review of the disintegration procedure of civil society from the state in Western Europe is crucial keeping in mind the end goal to see how the EU conceptualizes and handles it in light of the fact that the EU has embraced the neo-Tocquevillan suggestion that a vibrant civil society is the vital part of a full-fledged democracy. In the following section, it is more visible that one of the main aims of EU civil society approach, both in its internal affairs and external relations concerning candidate countries, especially during the Turkey's accession process, relies on this neo-Tocquevillan premise which the formation of a lively civil society is essential to support the democratic transition or to ensure its consolidation.

2.2. The Landmarks in the Evolution of Civil Society Policy at the EU Level

The existence of interest groups goes back to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. European integration, for the most part, was an economic activity when the Treaties of Rome set the institutional establishment of the EEC. The Treaties built up the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) for the representation of national economic and social interest groups as well as for the involvement of them in formation of the European internal market (Boşnak, 2015, p. 57). However, it generally stayed as "a discussion forum where capital and labour could find each other, launch their prepared papers and mature a certain sense of interdependence" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 28). The acknowledgment of the significance of civil society as another performer at the European stage and of their dynamic contribution to policymaking in EU institutions has begun to wind up in the 1990s. Previously, the EU's engagement with civil society actors had largely relied on ad hoc basis (Armstrong 2002; Smismans, 2003; Finke, 2007; Saurugger, 2008; Zihnioğlu, 2013; Ladrech, 2014).

In conjunction with the preparations for the completion of a common market with the SEA during the 1980s, the need for a social and employment dimension in economic integration process was started to be voiced by different circles because the European integration process was heavily being characterized by a permissive consensus at that time; meaning that "the politics of European integration was a decidedly elitist undertaking" (Ladrech, 2014, p. 25). In this regard, one of the first efforts for the engagement with civil society was the "European Social Dialogue" in 1985 which was initiated by the European

Commission under the presidency of Jacques Delors in order to bring social partners together in the internal market process (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 29).

Meanwhile, the EU began to add a political dimension in its integration when the "Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity" in 1973 underscored democracies and standards of rule of law and human rights for the first time. The standards of the 1973 Declaration would be made piece of the EU legislation with the Maastricht Treaty and of the accession criteria for new candidates with the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 (ibid., p. 28). This emphasis on democracy in the European integration was not occurred in a vacuum because "the third major wave of democratization in the modern world" was taking place "between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world" (Huntington, 1991, p. 12). During the third wave, by granting membership in return for democratization, the EC played a central role in the promotion of democracy in southern Europe. The 1980s also witnessed the liberation of the Eastern Europe due to the Soviet withdrawal in this region (ibid., p. 14). The accession of formerly authoritarian regimes as well as the independence of CEECs and their willingness to join in the EU demonstrated the significance of stable democratic regimes in order to unite the continent, which is a long-dated European ideal (Dinan, 2004). Such events have paved the way to a new discussion in the EU on democratic participation, taking its shape in the framework of the neo-Tocquevillian way of thought which sees civil society as building stones of an entrenched democracy.

These developments provide a basis for comprehending how the civil society has turned to be an important actor in the EU social policy realm as well as the role has being attributed to civil society involvement in establishment of new democracies, especially in the context of the Eastern and Turkish accession processes. In this vein, four EU strategy reports from 1992 to 2001 are chosen to demonstrate how the EU's civil society approach has advanced and what shape it has taken. Unquestionably, the determination of these records is not discretionary. While the year 1992 signified the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty that brought about serious talks on the democratic deficit inside the Union and the discovery of civil society to tackle this problem, the year 2001 marked the shift in debates on the role of civil society from internal affairs to the context of enlargement (Ketola, 2013, p.

38). To put it another way, the first document reflects a breakthrough moment for the evolution of EU civil society policy in its internal affairs, the last document projects how the Union has started to transfer its civil society understanding into its external politics in the realm of enlargement.

The ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 drove a legitimacy emergency inside the Union because of the Danish rejection and the limited French support. These outcomes made "stun waves all through the EU" (Dinan, 2004, p. 259). Things have quickly changed from that point forward. The discourse on the EU's legitimacy issue brought about the revelation of civil society by the EU institutions. Because of the disintegration of "the permissive consensus", researchers, technocrats, and government officials coordinated their core interest towards the input-oriented element of democratic legitimacy that could be obtained from "authentic participation and governance by the people" (Finke, 2007, p. 4).

In such an environment, a document, "An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups", was released in 1992 by the Commission which started to grasp the significance of interest groups including not only profit-making but also non-profit organizations. This policy document came after the Gale Report which had already underscored the garish behavior of some lobbyists within the EU institutions bringing damage to the democratic consolidation in the Union (McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995). This report highlighted the necessity for a better arrangement of interest representation so as to avoid abuses, achieve more transparency and improve access for non-profit organizations to the EU policy-making process. The preparation of Gale Report as well as the 1992 Communication were taking place at the same time while the discussions for the Maastricht Treaty were being carried out because the underlining objective behind the Treaty was to build up a more open network which would draw on a more informed public discussion. Accordingly, the 1992 document projected the motivations that attempted to operationalize this purpose. Hence, the aim of the 1992 Communication was to trigger a long-range consideration on the role of civil society actors in EU operations, demanded contributions of academics and experts dealing with such issues (Ketola, 2013, p. 39). In this respect, it acknowledged "the value of special interest groups as a channel to provide specific technical expertise" (Commission of the European Communities, 1992, p. 1). Recognizing the dialogue with these groups as

"valuable", this policy report was prepared to formalize the relations with such actors and thus make the integration process more transparent. Stating that "transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration" (ibid., p. 2), the document underlined that intensified transparency in the workings of the EU could secure a better informed public debate on its conduct. Indeed, even this early document gives two essential measurements in the approach of the EU on civil society. Firstly, civil society is regarded as an answer for handling democratic deficiency at the EU level by concentrating on the all-inclusive community conviction. Secondly, civil society is seen as a partner at the EU level by underlining the need of technical expertise (Boşnak, 2015, p. 58). Henceforth, the value of civil society is justified by its commitments made to effective policy outcomes and democratization.

In the late 1990s, the discourse in the EU on participatory democracy in the light of neo-Tocquevillian premises has begun to find more audience. In addition to better policy-making, civil society engagement in the policy-making process has come to be seen as a requirement of democracy (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 30). In this atmosphere, another document, "Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organizations and Foundations in Europe", was released in 1997. Like the previous report, the preparation of this policy document occurred at the same time with the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, which itemized the standards of liberal democracy that the EU would depend on (Ketola, 2013, p. 40). Accordingly, 1997 document, for the first time, mentioned the political significance of civil society rather than just regarding them as profit-making organizations (Boşnak, 2015, p. 59). Hence, the Commission has begun to attribute more political values to the idea of civil society by reserving a section in the document under the title of Political importance: citizenship and promoting democracy. First, the role of civil society in fostering active citizenship is highlighted by the document as such

> For many people, membership of, or volunteering for, voluntary organisations and foundations, provides a vital means through which they can express their sense of citizenship, and demonstrate an active concern for their fellows and for society at large (Commission of the European Communities, 1997, p. 5).

Second, the policy document clearly shows that civil society is perceived as a channel for citizens to exercise democracy by mentioning that

Voluntary organisations and foundations foster a sense of solidarity and of citizenship, and provide the essential underpinnings of our democracy. [...] There is no doubt that voluntary organisations and foundations make a profound and indispensable contribution to the democratic life of Europe. Indeed, the existence of a well-developed association and foundation sector is an indication that the democratic process has come of age. For many people participation in a voluntary organisation may be their only experience of democratic processes outside of the normal electoral framework (ibid., pp. 5-6).

In addition to fostering citizenship and promoting democracy, the report underlines the increasingly significant role of these organizations as partners. Dissimilar to the first approach report, civil society is not only comprehended on the EU level, but also "at the level of the Member State or, where fitting, at the level of the area or the region" (ibid., p. 11). Henceforth, the value of civil society is assessed regarding advancing democracy and citizenship as well as creating partnerships both at the member state and EU level. The report underscores the importance of "the relationship ("partnership") between voluntary organizations and the public authorities" by stating that "voluntary organizations are given the opportunity to be involved in planning services and policy making with public authorities at all levels" (ibid.).

Meanwhile, in 1998, the EU was beginning to prepare itself for the upcoming enlargement by gradually starting the accession negotiations with the ten countries of Central-Eastern and Southeastern Europe that would join in May 2004. The expected Eastern enlargement has added a further dimension to EU's civil society policy because these countries as being formerly communist regimes were seriously in need of a tremendous transition both in democratically and economically in order to comply with EU standards (Novotna, 2007, p. 51). Therefore, the following two documents were written while the fifth enlargement was on the EU's agenda. In this respect, the first one shows "a new, more carefully thought-out list of activities for cooperating with NGOs, which reflect the newfound challenges of enlargement and integration" (Ketola, 2013, p. 41), while the second one projects "how the development of civil society is deemed an integral part of the accession process for the Eastern European candidate countries" (ibid.).

In 2000, the third policy report was published. The third document, "The Commission and Non-Governmental Organizations: Building a Stronger Partnership",

recognizes a consistently expanding number of NGOs working inside and outside Europe and underlines the need of making a more organized structure for managing the relations amongst NGOs and the EU institutions. The document also encourages cooperation with NGOs on the grounds of "fostering participatory democracy", "representing the views of specific groups of citizens to the European institutions", "contributing to policy making", "project management", and "contributing to European integration" (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, pp. 4-5). In this regard, the core rationale behind the civil society engagement that the EU conceives will be put forward in the future is laid down under the second section entitled as "Dialogue and Consultation" as such

> Dialogue and consultation between NGOs and the Commission have to be seen in the framework of the democratic decision-making process of the European institutions. Many European institutions, and in particular the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions have a strong tradition of close contacts with NGOs. [...] dialogue between the European Commission and NGOs is an important complement to the institutional process of policy shaping (ibid., p. 7).

The content exhibits how the EU has grasped a two-sided approach towards civil society. The crystallization of the double point of view depended on "policy effectiveness and democracy-enhancing features of NGOs" are reflected in the third document (Ketola, 2013, p. 41). Greenwood (2007) characterizes these two sides of the EU's civil society arrangement as input and output legitimacy. While input authenticity originates from the veritable inclinations of residents, output authenticity is connected to policy results. In this respect, the EU considers NGOs as an effective instrument in providing input and output legitimacy; as a result, they have the potential for helping the Union to solve governance problems that the EU faces (Ketola, 2013, p. 42).

The legitimacy issue inside the EU culminated in the lessening turnout in the European Parliament elections and the Irish rejection to the Constitutional Treaty. Among EU institutions, it was the Commission that specifically highlighted civil society as a remedy for the apparent authenticity emergency. In 2001, this concern brought about "White Paper on European Governance" by the European Commission (Finke, 2007, p. 4). The report is viewed as an achievement in the advancement of EU's civil society viewpoint (Greenwood, 2007). By expressing that "numerous Europeans feel estranged from the Union's work"

(Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 7), this paper raises worries over "the lack of confidence in the EU institutions and the growing gap between the EU institutions and citizens" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 60). In order to deal with this problem, the document promotes the idea of good governance by giving the principles as such

> Five principles underpin good governance and the changes proposed in this White Paper: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle is important for establishing more democratic governance. They underpin democracy and the rule of law in the Member States, but they apply to all levels of government - global, European, national, regional and local (ibid., p. 10).

In order to handle the problem of public confidence, a fundamental role is attributed to civil society with the claim that

> Civil society plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people's needs. Churches and religious communities have a particular contribution to make. The organisations which make up civil society mobilise people and support, for instance, those suffering from exclusion or discrimination. The Union has encouraged the development of civil society in the applicant countries, as part of their preparation for membership (ibid., p. 14).

The preceding quotation deserves further attention on the grounds that it makes reference to EU candidate states. The document highlights "an expectation that civil society in a candidate country operates-or ought to operate-in a similar fashion to how it does within the EU" (Ketola, 2013, p. 43). To put it differently, the idea and the way of engagement with civil society actors in EU internal affairs has begun to spread outside of its borders.

Although there are variations in the interpretation of civil society across European member states; for instance, Sweden has a strong civil society tradition whereas the Southern European countries have low degrees of civil society participation, the EU's general perspective reflects a particular understanding of Europeanized civil society (Boşnak, 2015, p. 62). In this regard, the examination of these approach reports not only uncovers the sources of EU civil society perspective, but also shows how specific subjects have turned out to be predominant inside the EU civil society discourse (Ketola, 2013, p. 39).

In general, the documents clarify that the civil society perspective of EU has two dimensions which are evaluated as corresponding to each other (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 129). While civil society is perceived as an agent of democratization, it is also regarded as a

vital partner of policymaking with the ability to lobby and work with governments as well as implement and monitor the EU policies.

CHAPTER III. CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although the modernity project brought its own notion of associational life into the late Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the development of civil society was very slow, even after the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. Not only Turkish society, which was mainly agrarian, but also Turkish politics, which persistently projected the nature of a strong and centralized state tradition, hindered the emergence of a sufficient ground for the development of civil society especially until 1980s (Yerasimos, 2000).

However, there has been a point of divergence concerning the presence of a genuine civil society in Turkey (Kuzmanovic, 2012). "The new history of civil society" is portrayed by the advancement of a lively civic activity amid the period after 1980 (Gümüş, 2005; Grigoriadis, 2009; Kuran, 2012; Öner, 2012) while "the long history of civil society as associational life" is associated with the presence of diverse Ottoman foundations and a long custom of generosity (Çaha and Karaman, 2004). If civil society is depicted as an associational life outside of the state, it is fair to argue that there has been a long history of civil society in Turkey (TÜSEV, 2006, p. 37). For example, establishments created in the Ottoman Empire as philanthropic organizations produced social solidarity outside practical and political issues (ibid.). However, civil society is "something more than an associational life outside of the state and instead as a sphere that contributes to public participation and democratization on a voluntary basis" (İçduygu, 2013, p.174). Hence, the history of a genuine civil society in Turkey is not very long because such a civic engagement in Turkish political and social life only came into prominence especially after the 1980s.

In the early Republican era, the conventional wisdom was relied on an organic account of society existed on the principal of serving the state and its interests rather than on the basis of social relations stemmed from individual interest or economic class (Sarıbay, 2000). Although there was a smooth advancement in the status and practices of CSOs in parallel to the transition to democracy in 1946 and the adoption of the relatively liberal 1961 Constitution, the state control over civil society prevailed harshly during the multi-party period. When the discourses and practices of civil society are assessed, the post-1980 developments have initiated a new epoch in modern Turkey's political and social affairs

although the modernization process in Turkey underwent before 1980s also had an influence on the wider social transformation and democratization course (İçduygu, 2013, p. 175). Not only domestic developments, for example, the legitimacy crisis of the strong state tradition, but also external ones, for instance, the increased international integration, particularly the ascent of European integration, have all assumed a part in the beginning of another period concerning the civil society development in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003).

In this respect, this chapter figures out the historical evolution of civil society in Turkey until the Helsinki Summit to lay down the background conditions so as to critically compare and contrast the legal status and practices of civil society with the period after Turkey's EU candidacy. Concentrating on the important turning points in the Turkish political life, the chapter is separated into three parts; associational life in the Ottoman Empire, early Republican era, multi-party period and the post-1980 developments.

3.1. Associational Life in the Ottoman Empire

As mentioned above, many academic analyses have produced a significant distinction drawn between a long history of associational life and the new history of civil society. On the one hand, scholars have claimed that the absence of a genuine civil society is largely inherited from the Ottoman traditions which relied on Islamic history and culture, and relatedly on strong state tradition and lack of organizational structures for the development of civil society. On the other hand, some academicians have supported that civil society was not totally missing in the Ottoman State. However, there is a convergence of these two points of views on the existence of a strong and centralized state tradition in the Ottoman Empire and its long-lasting implications on civil society in the modern Turkish Republic.

In this respect, two countervailing trends influenced the Ottoman State tradition. On the one side of the coin, the Ottoman Empire was characterized by the Middle Eastern patrimonial dynastic tradition, in which the religious and political spheres were interwoven with each other and political legitimacy relied on the personal rule of the sultan (Grigoriadis, 2009, pp. 67-8). This implies that the sultan would decide a man's status in the society (Boşnak, 2015, p. 83). Besides, the patrimonial bureaucracy highly tended to curb any cluster of power which emerged outside of the legitimate power structure. This situation generated a

culture in which opposing ideas or tendencies out of the norms of state were considered as "threatening" to the well-being of the society (ibid.). The sultan had ultimate control over economic affairs, meaning that in the Islamic world "the sultan had the patriarch's duty of hisba; that is, he was considered personally responsible for the welfare of its subjects" (Heper, 2000, p. 65). Hence, society and the state were regarded as indivisible implying that "the welfare of society was dependent upon the well-being of the state" (ibid., p. 66).

Be that as it may, there was a countervailing pattern beginning around the second half of the fourteenth century. Since "the state treasury was isolated from that of the sultan", the state and sultan began to isolate from each other (ibid.). This was followed by the development of the adab tradition with which the sultan was pushed to follow reason and assign a priority to state interest rather than Islamic law. Hence, the sultan was not regarded as the identical to the state from then on; meaning that the adab tradition added a secular element to the Ottoman statecraft. As a result, this tradition reinforced the emergence of "a strong centralist bureaucratic state tradition" (Heper, 1985, p. 35). In the following centuries, this bureaucratic elite would come into control in the Ottoman Empire and later in the early years of the Republic.

During the Period of Decline, Sultan Mahmud II felt the necessity to modernize the Ottoman State with respect to Western standards in order to prevent its dissolution (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 68). In addition to the Sultan, the secular elements among the bureaucratic circles started to be crystallized through nineteenth century as Heper (2000) clearly summarizes that

> With the advent of Westernization, those members of the elite who came to have knowledge about the West considered themselves better able to rule the country than others. They equated their newly acquired knowledge with political legitimacy. Thus, in the early part of the 19th century, the civilian bureaucratic elite-the Old Ottomans-and the modernizing Sultan Mahmud II could push the members of the Religious Institution and the traditional Janissary Corps to the sidelines. In the second part of the century, the Young Ottomans (mostly journalists and mid-level bureaucrats) neutralized the Old Ottomans, as well as the non-modernizing Sultan Abdulaziz (p. 67).

Correspondingly, the society was affected in a specific way under the strong, centralized state tradition alongside the ruling elite. Contrasted with the West, the conditions

conducive to the development of civil society were not notable in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the tripartite rivalry in Western Europe among the monarch, the medieval nobility and the rising bourgeoisie was absent in the Ottoman Empire. Mardin argued that these features of multiple confrontation and integration seem to be absent in the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century. Rather, the main confrontation was "unidimensional", always a clash between "the center and the periphery" (1973, p. 170). This cleavage among the society became more severe with the modernization efforts as Heper (2000) explains that

> From the 19th century onward, the cultural distance between the elite and the ordinary people increased as the elite became increasingly familiar with Western culture. Earlier, despite the fact that the elite and commoners subscribed to different versions of their religion, Islam had served as a vital link between them. In the 19th century, many in the elite secularized and increasingly adopted high European, frequently French, culture while the people maintained their Islamic customs and norms. In the process, the elites came to see the general population as unsophisticated. Because of this, beginning in the 19th century, members of the central elite perceived themselves as far superior to the people (p. 66).

Meanwhile, the European aspirations culminated in the declaration of the Tanzimat reforms in 1839. The state "underwent a period of westernization in political, social, legal, and economic fields" (Çetinsaya, 2007, p. 7). In return, the invitation from the Concert of Europe was symbolically very important on the ground that Turkey, for the first time, was recognized as European power. Turkey's aspirations to join Europe have deep historical roots because "a campaign aiming at the recognition of a European identity" has been prevalent since the initiation of the Tanzimat (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 2).

However, motivated by "the centralized European model, Tanzimat pioneers strengthened a strong concentration of power" as a method for changing the state and ensuring the territorial integrity of the Empire (Boşnak, 2015, p. 84). Nevertheless, this modernization or Westernization attempts empowered the state at the expense of society. The Tanzimat period ended when the state renounced autocracy and accepted parliamentary regime in 1876 with the pressures coming from the Young Ottomans. The declaration of first Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) transformed the regime to a constitutional monarchy (I. Meşrutiyet). Although the new parliamentary regime brought representative institutions toward a political liberalization, the succeeding period was overshadowed by the conflict

between the despotic rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks (Kızıltan, 2006, pp. 267-71). The Young Turks included individuals mainly from "the bureaucratic and military elites, maintained the political elitism of the Old and Young Ottomans" and started to prevail over Ottoman politics (Heper, 2000, p. 67). By reinstating the Second Constitutional Period (II. Meşrutiyet), the 1908 Young Turk revolution terminated the authoritarian rule of the Sultan and increased "hopes for economic, political and social transformation to bring the Ottoman Empire closer to Europe" (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 2).

Inspired by the Western European polity notions, the Young Turks played a key role in the foundation of the Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) which set the 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations (Cemiyetler Kanunu). By regulating relations between state and society, the elite aimed to soften the political atmosphere and increase the associational activity (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 15). However, the 1909 Law of Associations had a legal infrastructure on associations in a very restrictive nature that was later inherited by the modern Turkish Republic. To illustrate this restrictive manner, Article 120 follows as such

> Ottomans enjoy the right of assembly, on the condition that they obey the law on the subject. The societies are forbidden which aim at injuring the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, changing the form of the Constitution or of the government, acting contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, or bringing about a separation between the various Ottoman elements, or which are contrary to public morals. The formation of secret societies in general is also forbidden.[2]

By stressing unity over diversity, community over the individual, solidarity and integrity over autonomy, the Association Law hindered "the balance" between the state and society (Alkan, 1998, p. 55). In like manner, the expectations for political and social change soon vanished since the Young Turk administration was substantially "more serious than that of the Tanzimat leaders" (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 2). More importantly, the prohibitive convention of legitimate structure on civil society development would proceed with the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

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[2] The Ottoman Constitution. Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm   Accessed on: 5 October 2017

3.2. Early Republican Era: 1923-1946

The historical background of the Turkish Republic was intentionally mentioned in detail in order to demonstrate that the early Republican period, in terms of the development of civil society, was marked by continuities with the late Ottoman era rather than changes as Heper (2000) argues that

> The absence of civil society in Turkey was an inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, where political, economic and social power coalesced in the center. Within the upper strata, status and wealth were attached to offices, and not to lineages or families. Bureaucratic position, thus, had the greatest weight in determining policy. The elite justified its appropriation of policymaking based on its presumed cultural preeminence and superior knowledge (p. 78).

Following the War of Independence, in 1923, the modern Turkish Republic was established with the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who ruled the country under the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). The governing military bureaucratic elite initiated the modernization project with an incredible reform agenda. The elite had "the gargantuan task of turning the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, Westernized nation state" (Ketola, 2013, p. 59). In reality, these modernizing endeavors had already been predominant in the post-Tanzimat period from the above, leaving an extremely limited space for the prospering of civil society (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 44).

The ruling elite inspired by an influential political philosopher from the late Ottoman era, Ziya Gökalp, whose theory titled "Turkist-Islamist-Westernist Modernism", attributed each of these notions to a role in society as such: "We are of the Turkish nation (millet), of the Islamic religious community (ümmet), of Western civilization (medeniyet)" (Ketola, 2013, p. 60). In order to reconcile the Western and Islamic traditions, Gökalp made "a distinction between culture and civilization", by suggesting that it would be conceivable to receive Western institutions, qualities and standards as long as they were vital for accomplishing a modern, civilized society, whereas simultaneously maintaining traditional, and national values (ibid.) Following the ideas of Gökalp, the new governing elite found a formulation by combining Western civilization with Turkish culture in order to realize a modernized nation state.

Upon this background, the new ruling elite tried to find a bargain between the Ottoman customs which depend on Islamic history as well as culture and the secular reforms such as the abolition of the Caliphate and the replacement of Sharia law by a legal code modeled on European examples (Dodd, 1992; Poulton, 1997). While modernization agenda in realms such as law, governance and politics was put forward, Islamic traditions were tolerated in the spiritual, cultural and ethical domains so long as they did not impinge on the modernization process. In terms of the civil society development, one of the serious consequences of this understanding applied by the new governing elite was a public-private divide with which "religion was pushed out of the public and into the private sphere" (Ketola, 2013, p. 60). For many scholars, this situation rendered political force distant to the masses (Parla, 1985; Kübicek, 1999; Yılmaz, 2007). In the following years of the Republic, this understanding also resulted in political tensions, at some intervals, between "the modernizing reformists (secular) and traditionalists who resist change (Islamist)" (Ketola, 2013, p. 61). For some, this situation led to a "bifurcated, two-tier civil society" (ibid., p. 60).

Another characteristic of the early Republican era was that although the reforms initiated by the secular elite in the light of the Westernization project underlined sovereignty of the people and signified a significant break from the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish state was the hegemonic and decisive power in economic, political and associational life (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 223). Accordingly, the connection between the state and society was eclipsed by the presence of a strong and centralized state since the new elite grasped the idea that the individual interest should subordinate collective interest and the power ought to be assembled at the centre. "By coming out against any independent groups with a powerful ground performing outside of the state authority", the strong and centralized state tradition prevented the development of an atmosphere within which the favorable conditions for the development of civil society could emerge (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 99). Like the Ottoman era, the first concern in the relations between society and state was "the assurance of the state interest and solidarity" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 88). Besides, Turkish bureaucratic elites undertook the role of social engineering in order to cope with social, economic and political problems. By forcing directions set by the governing elite, the goal of the Turkish social engineering was to coordinate from the top. Moreover, the social groups were tolerated only when they complied

with the centre (Mardin, 2000, p. 98). Therefore, the political environment impeded domestic dynamics which could nourish the structural transformation of society.

In this respect, the state centric ideology deepened by Kemalism hindered the emergence of a dynamic civil society and yielded a powerless model of civil society depended on state foundations. Kemalist tradition was considerably significant in order to understand how it played a fundamental role in molding the relations between the state and society. While many of the Western values and norms were adopted by a civilizational reform agenda, Kemalist ideology at the same time was "establishing the groundwork for a homogenous, Turkish national identity" (Ketola, 2013, p. 61). The six principles of Kemalism (republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism, and reformism) were presented in the Constitution and taught to everyone in the education places in the 1930s, hence leaving little space for different views to develop in the public realm (Boşnak, 2015, p. 88).

The earlier bifurcation in society between the core and periphery inherited from the late Ottoman era was furthered in the early Republican era. In this period, civil society was basically fragmented along two directions. Kemalist civil society actors carried the official state ideology and were assisted by the state and in return they backed the state's policies and strengthened its dominant status whereas nonKemalist organizations having different perspectives of civil society were not tolerated. Many organizations unfollowing the official state ideology, such as opposition political parties and tarikats, were eliminated (Mardin, 1973, pp. 304-5). During the early 1930s, many para-governmental organizations were formed, leading the masses to a statist scheme. "The total control of political authority over the components of civil society" had been deeply established by 1935, hence "leaving no channels of opposition remaining" (Keyder, 1988, p. 203). Thus, the political reflex of the state was characterized by continuities not only in the state structure but also in the development of civil society.

As in the case of the post-Tanzimat era, Europe also continued to remain as the reference point. The Western European notions were considered as source in the evolution of civil society. For instance, the Turkish Women's Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği-TKB) took the model of modern woman in the West for the association as one delegate with whom an interview was made in 2011 expressed that the association since its formation has followed

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"European/Western women as a model" (Interview 2011 in Boşnak, 2015, p. 90). Ironically, although the Western model was regarded as a reference in the civil society development, the presence of external ties with different civil society actors was not notable. By the way, it should be kept in mind that the behavior of establishing international connections was not widespread in other countries as well. However, the lack of such connections continued to prevail in the later years of the Turkish Republic. This situation was related to two factors. On the one side, the restrictive legal and institutional structure prevented cooperation with international civic actors. On the other side, as a side-effect of the defeat Sévres Syndrome, the view of the state was incredulous against any activities that tested its dominant position since the activities were considered "as a threat for the survival of the state and intervention in domestic affairs" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 86).

Moreover, one of the other features of the early Republican era was the existence of a loose alliance among the local notables, the bureaucracy and the emerging bourgeoisie. In order to gain peasantry support and participation as a military force in the battles during the Independence War, the Kemalists had given assistance to the local notables and enabled them to cooperate in exchange for the recognition of the authority of the local notables in the provinces when the Turkish Republic was established. In the early years of the Republic, this alliance took the shape of "an implicit recognition of the local notables' authority in the provinces in return for the acceptance of the military bureaucratic elite's central position in the center" (Sunar, 2004, pp. 48-49). Therefore, the ruling elite was "never able to attempt an overall structural change in the social order of the recently established Republic" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 100).

On the other hand, towards the end of the War of Independence, the core of the Turkish bourgeoisie began to take its shape with the rise of a national economy commanded by Turks alongside an entrepreneurial group (Ahmad, 2000, p. 45). Nevertheless, this gathering was powerless to thrive by its own particular and henceforth required the state help to prosper and acquire a self-supporting level of capital (Kongar, 1998, p. 19). In contrast with the West, the bourgeoisie could not emerge as an independent force. Rather, the Turkish bourgeoisie was formed and became stronger under the influence of the state apparatus (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 100).

When it comes to the legal structure for the functioning of civil society in the early Republican period, following short-term interruption during the WWI and the Independence War, the ruling elite put efforts to provide the legal infrastructure for the freedoms of association and assembly. Under the war conditions, the Constitution of 1921 had no mention individual rights and freedoms. This situation changed with the Constitution of 1924 that formally recognized the right of association and assembly. In practice, however, the government had power on the community domain and confined any movement that would negate with its interests (Alkan, 1998).

A series of limitations in the legal area governing freedom of association and assembly were also introduced. For example, the Law for Maintenance of Public Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) declared on 4 March 1925 expedited severe restrictions and suppression on the foundation of associations. Although the Civil Code of 1926 included more democratic and liberal provisions on associations, the restrictions passed by the Law for Maintenance of Public Order and the High Treason Laws of the early 1920s made the foundation of associations difficult (Alkan, 1998, pp. 56-57). Besides, the 1909 Law of Associations was superseded by a further prohibitive Law of Associations in 1938 which prevented associations from developing "an independent financial-administrative infrastructure by introducing heavy restrictions and arbitrary financial control by the government" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 89). Moreover, the new Law restricted formation of associations having international ties. For instance, Article 10 forbade remote relationship outside the nation to open branches in Turkey. Although the second paragraph of the article softened the restrictive nature by mentioning that "international associations could be established if there was national interest in cooperation", it seriously hindered the development of international connections by giving "the Council of Ministers the sole authority to decide on the establishment or closure of the associations" (ibid., p. 90). Thus, external connections were severely limited and shaped under the state control.

Another drawback concerning legal and institutional environment for the development of civil society in Turkey was related to mass organization. In 1934, the Labour Law was introduced. The measures it determined on unions and strikes projected the tendency of the ruling elite in a similar vein with the Associations Law. To illustrate, the Labour Law

of 1934, that was made more severe in 1936, did not permit workers to establish unions or to strike (Ahmad, 2000, p. 99). Thus, worker's opposition was seriously suppressed.

Especially during 1930s, one party rule became more intolerant against autonomous organizations independent from its authority. All autonomous societal elements, including CSOs, were discharged. The Free Republican Party was abolished and relatedly the Turkish Hearts, in 1927, dissolved itself to join the RPP (Keyder, 1988, p. 203). From that point forward, all affiliations were shut down or compelled to break down themselves (Ahmad, 2000, p. 90).

All in all, the restrictive legal and institutional framework as well as practices induced by the founding reformers stemmed from their resistance in admitting the components of civil society as an autonomous entity outside of the state apparatus and the political participation of the masses. Therefore, the early Republican era created insufficient conditions conducive to development of civil society. Although there were initial hopes for a more liberal climate with the multi-party period, these hopes were also soon refuted and a series of military interventions took place.

3.3. Multi-Party Period: 1946-1980

The acknowledgment of the multi-party system was a breakthrough development in Turkey's democratic transition. However, this period was again overshadowed by a series of political and legal developments that endangered "all civic assets and thwarted the bottom up dynamic" which may have been conducive to the development of a genuine civil society in Turkey (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 103).

The political alliance established during the foundation of the Republic among the bureaucracy, the newly emerging bourgeoisie and landlords began to dissolve since the private sector had become more powerful by the mid-1940s and started to see bureaucracy as a barrier to free investment while at the same time landlords supported the urban dissidence against the land reform introduced by the RPP (Sunar, 1974, pp. 82-89). The bourgeoisie as well as the landlords by breaking away from the earlier alliance began to criticize the implementation of the Defense Law of 1940 and the Capital Tax Law of 1942. The newly emerging cooperation between the landlords and the bourgeoisie wanted to change the status

quo. The interesting point is that the emerging bourgeoisie in Turkey, unlike their counterparts in the West, did not enter in a conflict with local notables (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 103).

In January 1946, the recently rising collusion resulted in the foundation of a new party, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP), headed by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. With the general elections in July 1946, the DP got the 62 seats in the national assembly. In spite of the fact that the DP spoke to the interests of private sector, the mass premise of the DP was rural conservatives, who were avoided from politics by the centre for a long time (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989, p. 620). As a response, the RPP started to incorporate "the discourse of democratic rights, religious freedom and liberalization into its slogans" as its primary rival, the DP, did (Sunar, 1974, p. 83). A relative liberation of freedom of social and political participation rights were undertaken. To illustrate, the Law of Associations was reformed with an Act declared on June 1946. In addition, regulations on the formation and on the prohibitions of associations, inherited from the single party period, were alleviated. Moreover, in 1947, a new law which allowed workers to form trade unions was passed although strikes were still regarded as illegal (ibid.).

However, the period in the vicinity of 1946 and 1950 saw the endeavors of the developing bourgeoisie to increase economic and political self-rule. At last, the DP, developed as a fabulous coalition of powers including "landlords, businessmen and even some of the state elite from the RPP", enjoyed a landslide victory in the 1950 general elections (Ahmad, 1996, p. 106). Immediately, the DP put a considerable effort to curb the hegemonic position of the bureaucracy with a loose form of secularism. Indeed, for the first time, political power set up a noteworthy connection with the periphery, thus in turn the main percentage of the votes for the DP came from the rural peasantry (Mardin, 1973). Besides, by initiating several democratic reforms, the DP appeared to adhere itself to democratization (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 104).

In terms of the development of civil society, the DP also actualized improvements in the spheres of freedom of association and assembly (ibid.). Accordingly, there was a radical increase in the amount of associations and worker's organizations. For example, the first labor federation, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları

Konfederasyonu- TÜRK-İŞ), was formed in 1952. During the early years of the DP rule, the number of associations reached over 17, 000, meaning that the quantity of such organizations multiplied about eight times (Özbudun, 2000, p. 129).

However, the elected elite, like its predecessor, had difficulty in seeing civil society as autonomous mechanism and suppressed CSOs which questioned its policies. To give an example, the DP precluded TÜRK-İŞ from joining to its international counterpart and hence maintaining the status quo in terms of the weak international connections. In a similar vein, during this period, broader political participation did not become possible due to "top down and a suspicious approach by governmental authorities" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 91). To illustrate, in 1952, the Associations Law was changed "to allow courts to ban the activities and safeguard the properties of associations even before they were ordered to be closed" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 104). Undoubtedly, political life kept on outstanding a statist-elitist circle where "the elected political elite still had full control" (ibid.). Hence, these newly emerging components of civil society were disallowed to become actors in political life (Mardin, 1969, p. 280). As in the early Republican period, the organizations which showed their support for government policies were enabled to flourish whereas the oppositional ones were not tolerated and surpassed (Boşnak, 2015, p. 91).

Although the DP continued to win the elections held in 1954 and 1957, the decline of the support began with the unpopularity of Menderes. Like the RPP, it started to become a majoritarian party and associated the state with the government (Ketola, 2013, p. 64). In addition to the political dissatisfaction especially voiced by the RPP opposition, the worsening of DP's economic performance resulted in the military intervention on 27 May 1960. This military intervention can be evaluated in terms of two important respects. One is that the military force stepped in to rearrange the system in favor of the traditional elite, including itself. Besides, the established elite were not willing to share its central authority with the new ones whose legitimacy based on their electoral success (Akarlı, 1975, p. 150). Moreover, the army intervention reflected the division between the centre struggling for maintenance of the status quo and the periphery seeking for change (Mardin, 1975, p. 30). Second is that the coup d'etat alongside with the 1961 Constitution demonstrated the desire as well as the attempt of the bureaucratic elite to transform society with respect to a new social

system within which both democratic rights and freedoms could be enhanced and the state could be rendered with the instruments to control economic and social life (Kongar, 1998, p. 320).

That is to say, although the 1960 military takeover resulted in the jail of political activists and the execution of DP politicians, the 1961 Constitution granted more importance to fundamental rights and freedoms when it is compared with the previous one. The new Constitution established a legal structure enabling the flourishing of civil society. Besides, it gave more attention to civil rights, which were later enhanced with the reformation of the Association Law in 1964 that limited police entry into associations. Moreover, the new Constitution granted much more autonomy to universities. For instance, the freedom to organize associations at the universities was given students (Özbudun, 2000). Consequently, many Ideas Clubs (Fikir Klüpleri) in universities were formed during the 60s. In such clubs, students discussed the problems facing their society; as a result, they can be evaluated as one of the first notable attempts to generate a space for civil society in Turkey. Last but not least, social rights, for the first time, were systematically arranged. In this respect, Article 46 secured "the rights of employees and employers to establish trade unions obtain prior permission, to enroll in them as members, and to resign from such membership treaty" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 105). Therefore, individual human rights were more protected.

During the 1960s, the private industrial sector became much more important in the economy, hence influencing the social structure in the country at the end of the decade. In this respect, two new groups became politically more powerful, the working class and the increasingly self-conscious bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the former was those who moved to shanty towns in the big cities because of urbanization triggered by increasing industrialization. The more convenient environment thanks to the new Constitution enabled the working class to become politicized. At first, they had united under TÜRK-İŞ which was supporting government policies. Later, a group of unions departured from TÜRK-İŞ formed the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-DİSK) that embraced the European model, stressing the importance of political action to realize economic demands, rather than the American model only concentrating on economic demands and discoursing political affiliations (Ahmad, 2000, pp.

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132-143). On the other hand, due to being united under a single organization namely the Union of Chambers, business groups became more powerful during the 1960s. Since the bourgeoisie increased its capacity, they began to disassociate itself from the government and formed the Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği- TÜSİAD) in 1971. By the way, during the 1960s, organizations were still formed with a functional basis especially those took part in economic life rather than a structure comprised of completely voluntary organizations (Mardin, 1975, p. 30).

As aforementioned, the 1961 Constitution generated a convenient environment in which new parties could be established. One of them deserving attention in Turkish political life was the Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP) representing the interests of groups which were severely in contradiction with those of government. Its influence through Ideas Clubs at universities was considerable. Leaning towards left politics students in universities and workers in factories were well organized. The left politics also "spread into the streets and demonstrations became a factor of daily politics" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 107).

When it comes to the Parliament, towards the mid-1960s, there was a serious political instability with successive coalition governments between the RPP and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) that was regarded as the successor of the DP. In 1965 general elections, the JP gained a landslide victory, yet immediately troubled with the new Left-Right politics in the country (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986). Indeed, this period can be characterized by the extreme polarization and a left-right ideological division within society. This ongoing struggle between right and left groups led to a second military intervention on 12 March 1971. The rationale behind this intervention was projected in the words of then Prime Minister, Nihat Erim, who stated that "the 1961 Constitution was a luxury for Turkey, a developing society could not afford if it desired rapid progress along the road to capitalism" (Ahmad, 1996, p. 285).

The 1971 Memorandum brought "the changes covered basically every political and social institution in Turkey, including the trade unions, the press, universities, the Council of State and the Parliament" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 92). It aimed to terminate of all political activity outside the national assembly. Especially the leftist groups, which were seriously blamed for the break of law and order, were suppressed. For example, the TİP, that had remarkably

influenced trade unions and youth organizations during the second half of the 60s, was shut down and groups such as the Ideas Clubs in universities were prohibited (Ahmad, 2000, p. 148). The military and secularist elite behind the 1971 Memorandum saw "civil society as a threat to the political stability" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 92) Introducing serious restrictions on the freedom of association, the space for the operation of civil society was constrained and "any activities which were outside the state policy" were not endured (ibid.).

However, the 1971 Memorandum could not bring a solution to the chaotic environment. By the end of the 1970s, the political instability alongside the fight between rightist and leftist groups went worse. As the following part demonstrates, the political chaos of the 1970s resulted in a third military intervention on 12 September 1980. This military regime established a new Constitution in 1982 which brought harsh restrictions on human rights and liberties.

3.4. Post-1980 Developments

With respect to the National Security Council carrying out the military intervention of September 1980, the 1961 Constitution by unfolding rights and freedoms was responsible for the crises during the 1970s. Kenan Evren, who led the coup d'etat, characterized the preceding decade in his memories that "primary thing was the individual freedom; the peace in the society and the existence of the state were secondary" (1991, p. 276). Hence, the underlying logic of the 1982 Constitution was to strengthen the state authority vis-à-vis the individual (Yazıcı, 2009, p. 123). The most important feature of the new Constitution was that although all the fundamental rights and freedoms were included, they were at the same time exposed to the serious limitations for empowering the state against the individual in order to restore the peace and order. Besides, Article 13 determined general conditions for restricting each right and freedom, demonstrating the very restrictive nature of the 1982 Constitution. Thus, "The constitution has established an order in which the limitations underlie the essence; the acknowledgement and protection of the freedoms, the exception" (ibid., p. 127).

Since the military takeover did not envision a participatory and pluralistic democracy, it did not establish favorable conditions for civic activity (Öner, 2012, p. 101). Both the 1982 Constitution and the relevant legislation provided a very restrictive legal

ground for the functioning of civil society. In terms of freedom of association, the legislative framework did not give effective protection to this right that is a prior condition of the development of a free civil society (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 56). In this respect, Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution disallowed associations to

> pursue political aims, engage in political activities, receive support from or give support to political parties, or take joint action with labor unions, with public professional organizations or with foundations.[3]

In addition to leaving civil society outside political life, Article 33 stated that

> Associations may be dissolved by decision of judge in cases prescribed by law. They may be suspended from activity by the competent authority designated by law pending a court decision in cases where delay endangers the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national security or sovereignty, public order, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or the prevention of crime.[4]

As for the freedom of assembly, Article 34 of the Constitution, "the Right to Hold Meetings and Demonstration Marches", after stating that "Everyone has the right to hold unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission" returns to its restrictive nature as such

> The competent administrative authority may determine the site and the route for a demonstration march in order to prevent disruption of order in urban life. The competent authority designated by law may prohibit a particular meeting and demonstration march, or postpone it for not more than two months in cases where there is a strong possibility that disturbances may arise which would seriously upset public order, where the requirement of national security may be violated, or where acts aimed at destroying the fundamental characteristics of the Republic may be committed. In cases where the law forbids all meetings and demonstration marches in districts of a province for the same reason, the postponement shall not exceed three months. Associations, foundations, labor unions, and public professional organizations may not hold meetings or demonstration marches outside their own scope of activity and aims.[5]

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[3] Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5be0.html Accessed on: 30 October 2017
[4] ibid.
[5] ibid.

Besides, the 1982 Associations Law was written in line with the restrictive nature of the Constitution (Göymen, 2004, p. 5). Establishing an association with the intention to take part in "any activity on the basis of or on behalf of any region, race, social class, religion, or sect" was forbidden (ibid.). Associations in Turkey were also prohibited from engaging in relations with their international counterparts. Moreover, they could only use Turkish language in their official interactions. Furthermore, the reasons for outlawing an association were defined in a loose manner, therefore state intervention in operation of civil society was maximized (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 57). In brief, the arbitrary application of legal and constitutional clauses by state authorities as well as pressure on leaders and members of the associations were epidemic to the 1980s.

However, civil society began to flourish after the 1980 military takeover since focusing on issue-based activities as the sole available way to show discontentment over social, economic circumstances and government policies "although successive governments did not considered civil society actors as important stakeholders in Turkey's social and political transformation" (ibid.). In this regard, academics have claimed that the post-1980 period has witnessed a breakthrough in the history of Turkish civil society (Toprak, 1996; Şimşek, 2004; TÜSEV, 2006; Kaliber and Tocci, 2010; İçduygu, 2013). Despite the existence of the restrictive legal framework, the quantity of CSOs increased immediately after the military intervention. Besides, their activities increased and diversified and therefore the range of civil society was extended and the space of civil society became "more diffused" (Seckinelgin, 2004, p. 174). As Zihnioğlu (2013) briefly comments on the changing nature of civil society during the 1980s as such that

> Together with and as a result of the 1982 Constitution, the term civil society came to stand for a zone of rights and liberties against the state and assumed a meaning that is the antonym of a military society. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, civil society was regarded as a tool to express the needs and the desires of individuals and society against the state and a *military power* holding control over every aspect of life. In that sense, civil society was closely related to forming state-society relations in which the position of the society would be enhanced and liberties reinforced (p. 112).

Indeed, the relative nourishment of civil society was also taking place in parallel to several economic, political and social changes that transformed the political landscape in Turkey (Boşnak, 2015, p. 94). In this respect, scholars have identified a number of

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interrelated domestic and international developments as particularly influential in relation to these changes since the mid-1980s (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 222). All these internal and external processes have together paved the way for the development of a genuine civil society in Turkey.

The first process "is characterized by the emergence of a range of alternative modernities in the form of new actors, new mentalities of development, and new identity claims" (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 12). As mentioned above, various groups have grasped the benefits of embracing "the language of civil society" (Seufert, 2000, p. 34) as one of few available means of challenging an authoritarian and a reactionary state tradition because the 1980 military takeover created an environment in which regular party politics was not possible. The noteworthy characteristics of "this process are a critique of the status of secular-rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey, and increased strength of Islamic discourse as source of political action and identity construction" (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 13).

In particular, this empowerment of Islamic discourse and political Islam "as a key force in Turkish politics has been perhaps the most significant long-term outcome of the 1980 coup" (Ketola, 2013, p. 67) because the military junta saw moderate Sunni Islam as a useful fabric in order to reconcile the Leftist and Rightist tendencies among the society. With this policy which was crystallized as the "Turkish- Islamic Synthesis" (Kadıoğlu, 1996), the importance of Islamic values was highlighted within the official discourse of the government. A policy of active support to Islamic ideology was actualized by fostering the formation of Imam Hatip Schools. Thereupon, these schools with a religious education triggered the formation of many civil society associations that operated for the management of such vocational schools (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 50). Indeed, the well-educated religious intellectuals embraced "a rhetorical path between traditional values and modernism" (Ketola, 2013, p. 67) as a counter-movement to the long-lasting secular-rational ideology as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey (Kübicek, 1999; Yavuz, 2003). Tünay claims that the developments taking place after the 1980 military takeover have generated an environment and a new balance "for the Turkish new rights attempt to hegemony" (1993, p. 11). Besides, "the language of civil society and citizenship rights" was not limited to the new right, similar

claims were raised by diverse groups such as "women's groups, leftists, intellectuals, and various ethnic and religious minority groups for a society with more room for multiculturalism and multireligiousness" (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 13). Hence, such developments have created "a new space for the civic activity and brought new dynamism for the civil society" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 95).

In the emergence of alternative modernities, economic liberalization under the influence of external forces has also played a serious role by contributing to a more open political system (Ketola, 2013, p. 67). "Worldwide market powers and the rationale of liberal market financial aspects" started to enter Turkey in the 1980s, "punching gaps in the insular and protective economic approaches that had commanded until at that point" (Ketola, 2013, p. 67). The progression of the Turkish economy and the move from import substitution to an export-oriented model has definitely affected the improvement of civil society (Öner, 2012, p. 101). After the 1980 overthrow, the junta not just prohibited the old gatherings and kept their pioneers from taking an interest in governmental issues yet made new ones, one of which was the liberal Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) that won the 1983 elections. Under the initiative of Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister and later the President of the period, the free market economy "turned into the most predominant financial worldview" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 113). Affected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), a number of long term structural neoliberal reforms depended on three fundamental drivers which are "trade liberalization, privatization and an increase in exports" were realized (Öniş and Şenses, 2007, p. 15). This has led to the emergence of new economic elites, including conservatives and liberals, who raised their voice for political reforms in order to restrain state intervention (Toprak, 1996, p. 102). This was followed by the removal of impediments to political liberty. Liberalism has both generated a more conducive atmosphere for civil society to operate and paved the way for the emergence of a new entrepreneurial group, that has performed many initiatives. Hence, new private sector businesses and new economically-oriented CSOs have started to flourish (Weber, 2006, p. 86).

Second process for the rise of civil society has to do with "the legitimacy crises of the strong state tradition" (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 223). The legitimacy problem alongside with the economic liberalization marked that "the state has gradually begun to lose

its dominant position as the primary context for politics in Turkey and that the state is no longer perceived as the prime agent of social change" (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 13). To put it differently, a public perception of the bureaucratic state as hindering the dynamism of economic and social actors has increasingly gained ground with the legitimacy problem and the aggravated economic liberalization (Toprak, 1996, p. 117). This perception reached its peak when the authorities could not efficaciously cope with the Marmara Earthquake in 1999. The inability of the state to handle the disaster made it apparent to the many Turkish citizens that social agency can no more be totally entrusted to the state apparatus (Özerdem and Jacoby, 2005, p. 51). In a way, the crisis has contributed to the activation of CSOs by showing their necessity for the immediate and effective solution of many problems surrounding Turkish society. For instance, the rapid response of the Search and Rescue Association (Arama Kurtarma Dernegi-AKUT) to the crisis has increased not only public respect to CSOs but also their self-confidence (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 54). Accordingly, they have started to "play an increasing role in representing various social problems and transmitting society's demands for democratization and the necessity for effective governance to the country's political actors" (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 221).

Third decisive factor for the flourishment of civil society after 1980 is a process of increased international integration. As aforementioned, a number of long term structural neoliberal reforms were undertaken under the influence of the WB and the IMF since the beginning of 1980s to deal with recurring economic crises. The increased economic liberalization by contributing to a more open political environment has a considerable influence on the development of civil society. In addition to a series of economic recommendations, the WB and the IMF have increasingly stressed the importance of "ethics and good governance" and the WB currently supports "civil society capacity building" in Turkey (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 14). Hence, economic reforms are no more considered as adequate, but should be followed "by political liberalization, democratization, and good governance" (ibid.).

Particularly with reference to civil society, the UN has had a serious influence. The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), hosted in 1996 in Istanbul, was a significant breakthrough incidence for the position of civil society in Turkey because a

great number of CSOs from all around the country came together, many international counterparts came to Turkey and provided various opportunities for cooperation between domestic and international CSOs, both to share experiences and enable local CSOs to find new sources of financial assistance (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 47). The Habitat Conference has played an important role in the participation of Turkish CSOs in the global movement of civil society. Besides, the Conference has increased awareness of Turkish CSOs in terms of their role in providing social justice and sustainable development (Bikmen and Meydanoğlu, 2006, p. 6).

However, in addition to aforementioned external developments, the European integration process deserves a special attention among them, which is the aim of the study, while analyzing the contribution of post-1980 developments to the flourishment of civil society in Turkey because its role on the development of civil society has been tremendous. At least, it is really fair to argue that the EU has been the most important external donor and policy actor that has had an influence on the strengthening of civil society in Turkey in the past decades (Öner, 2012, p. 102). As Zihnioğlu (2013) well summarizes that

> It is true that the liberal policies of the post-1980 period, the relative change in the strong state tradition, the Habitat Conference held in Turkey in 1996 and finally the Marmara Earthquake in 1999 all helped to activate civil society, resulting in an improved environment for active citizenship and also encouraging the development of civil society organizations. However, it is the course of Turkey's accession to the EU that has had a far-reaching influence on state and society relations, bringing about a new structure in which state and society can relate to one another. In particular the reform process triggered following the official announcement of Turkey's candidacy to the EU in 1999 has resulted in the revision of the related legal and institutional framework, thus paving the way for lifting some of the ongoing limitations in place since the early 1980s over freedom of association and freedom of assembly. Following the approval of Turkey's candidacy to the EU in 1999, one of the most comprehensive Constitutional amendments was carried out in 2001 (p. 114)

European integration process between Turkey and the EU accelerated by the accession context has generated new institutional and legal framework encouraging the changes described and the new civic actors that have emerged (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 14). Turkey has been required to comply with a range of democratic, liberal political criteria embodied by the so-called Copenhagen Criteria so as to be regarded eligible for accession negotiations with the EU. In addition to legal and institutional requirements, the EU has

explicitly regarded Turkish civil society as a partner/local agent with reference to engendering political and social change and supporting the development of a democratic policy (ibid.). In sum, "civil society activity really took off after Turkey officially became an EU candidate country in 1999" (Center for American Progress, 2017, p. 11).

The last factor has to do with "the general processes of globalization", particularly globalization of business sectors and the expansion in worldwide communication (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 225). Globalization has shown the breaking points of national legislative issues and the urgency of international cooperation to deal with global issues such as poverty, multiculturalism and ecological debasement (Boşnak, 2015, p. 96). Due to the emergence of a stronger sense of global awareness, a gradual recognition that such matters necessitate collaborative relations has developed. In brief, globalization "challenges the state as the sole locus of political agency, and in some instances even calls for civic actors to work around the state" (Kuzmanovic, 2012, p. 15). Within this context, CSOs have started to become significant players in political, economic and social affairs.

CHAPTER IV. EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH CIVIL SOCIETY

EU's attention in fortifying civil society empowerment in Turkey is legitimized by its pledge to democracy and its part in working up the dialogue between Turkey and the EU in order to set up the country for EU membership. In other words, not only civil society is considered as a key actor in supporting and sustaining reform process in Turkey, but also it is ascribed an essential part in combining political and social exchange amongst Turkey and the EU member states by uniting individuals (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, p. 8).

In this respect, the EU has influenced civil society development in Turkey through several processes (İçduygu, 2007; Grigoriadis, 2009; Ergun, 2010; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öner, 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015; Boşnak, 2015). As Zihnioğlu (2013) notes that

> The increasing flow of resources for financial and technical assistance, as well as enhanced political support, given to civil society organizations are not the only means employed by EU civil society policy, in particular for accession countries. The EU deems it equally necessary to transform the environment in which these organizations participate, so as to establish a more autonomous area outside of the state, in line with its neo-Tocquevillian understanding. The EU has been active in promoting the strengthening of freedom of association and freedom of assembly, and it has been closely monitoring the legal and institutional reforms in Turkey, as well as the changes in the relevant socio-political environment (p. 71).

As aforementioned, the civil activity in Turkey has started to pick up its energy since 1980s because of the interchange of a few internal and external elements. However, it is the EU accession context has incredibly added to the flourishment of civil society in Turkey. The Europeanization process through its interactive mechanisms has significantly enhanced the Turkish legal and institutional structure for the operation of civil society as well as advanced the practices of civil society in Turkey although civil society empowerment in the country still has drawbacks compared to those in the EU. Firstly, the conditionality mechanism is evaluated under the title of Europeanization in legal terms so as to figure out the improvements in domestic legal and institutional framework for the functioning of civil society. Secondly, under the heading of Europeanization in practical terms, funding policies

and mechanisms; cooperation; legitimization of civic activity are the instruments in order to demonstrate how societal dimension of Europeanization has influenced the activities of Turkish civil society and enabled them to become important actors in the accession context. These four mechanisms have been interactively progressing via direct as well as indirect ways in the Europeanization process of Turkish civil society. More importantly, these interactive instruments of Europeanization have enabled both the EU and civil society in Turkey to shape the process collectively. In order to display the reciprocal relation between external and domestic factors through the interactive mechanisms of Europeanization, the study tries to overcome the top down research design by incorporating the bottom up model with a focus on domestic actors. In doing so, it is aimed to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the EU's role, influence and limitations in encouraging domestic changes.

4.1. Europeanization of Civil Society in Legal Terms

In evaluating the EU impact on civil society, academics have generally agreed that the EU has induced a considerable change in the Turkish legal structure through its conditionality mechanism, hence improving the domestic conditions for the operation of civil society (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004; Ergun, 2010; Ketola, 2011; Öner, 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015).

Since the official declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, there has been a series of legislative and institutional improvements in the domestic framework. The primary motive behind the constitutional changes and legal reforms was to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004, p. 5). In the accession period, Turkey has amended many articles of the 1982 Constitution in order to harmonize its legislation with the EU acquis communautaire. In addition to Constitutional amendments, a series of reform packages, known as Harmonization Packages or Harmonization Laws, were passed. A large range of legal changes included reforms related to the development of civil society. Especially those reforms regarding freedoms of association and peaceful assembly have generated a conducive environment for civil society to flourish and instigated changes in the activities of civil society (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 71) Notwithstanding the focal part of the EU in evolving the relationship between Turkish state and society, it is noteworthy to recognize that such a change has not been driven

by the EU alone. CSOs in Turkey have additionally assumed an important part in shaping help for EU membership and pushing for the expected legal, political and social changes (Weber, 2006, p. 85).

In this respect, the consecutive sections, path to the EU, golden age, deceleration period, and years of turbulence try to give a full picture of the constitutional amendments and other substantive changes in ordinary laws, especially giving specific attention to freedom of association and assembly, realized since the official announcement of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999.

4.1.1. Path to the EU: 1980s-1999

The military intervention in 1980 caused an important reaction by the European powers although the earlier ones had not provoked little or no criticism. Since "the European public was now more conscious of a need to protect democratic norms in allied states", the military regime was pushed to return civilian rule (Hale, 2000, p. 177). In this respect, the first reaction came from the Council of Europe that withdrew the Turkish delegation from the Council's Parliamentary Assembly immediately after the coup. This incident had a symbolic importance for the Turkish elite since membership of the Council recognizes Turkey as a European power. The Council did not change its position until some months after civilian rule had been reinstalled. Besides, under the pressure of European Parliament, the release of the aid by the Turkey-EC Association Council in the framework of the Customs Union Agreement was made conditional on effective moves to restore democracy. Following the military regime's ban on all existing political parties, the European Commission also hardened its position by deciding that it would not resume any discussions on the release of the funds. All these reactions "played an unacknowledged role in encouraging the regime to return to democracy under acceptable conditions" (ibid., p. 178).

After governed by the interim regime for three years, Turkey returned to civilian politics in 1983. However, the military junta brought severe constitutional and legal restrictions on the rights and freedoms. When it comes to the legal framework governing specifically the operation of civil society in Turkey, both the 1982 Constitution and the relevant legislation provided a very restrictive legal ground for the functioning of civil

society. In this regard, the legal structure governing civil society in Turkey has started to be improved related to the 1980 developments in general and the accelerated European integration process since the mid-1990s with the completion of customs union between Turkey and the EU as well as the eventual official candidacy of Turkey in 1999 in particular. The EU has begun to influence the legal framework concerning freedom of association and assembly as Rumelili and Boşnak (2015) comments that

> Historically, civil society development in Turkey has been hampered by shortcomings in the general state of democracy and civil and political rights, as well as by specific legal restrictions placed on the freedom of association and assembly. Relations with the EU began to have a positive impact on this legal environment starting in 1995. From 1999 onward, Turkish civil society has been positively influenced by constitutional and legal reforms in the area of civil and political rights that have been enacted by Turkish governments in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. In the context of Turkey's candidacy and accession process, the EU has also repeatedly stressed that the restrictions on freedom of association and assembly constitute key obstacles to Turkey's compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria (p. 132).

Having purpose for dealing with "objections by the European Parliament to the customs union agreement" negotiated in 1995, a limited reform agenda was introduced by Turkey (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 57). The first step in terms of freedom of association was taken by "amending the Article 33 of the Constitution extensively" (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004, p. 20). Indeed, this agreement that became effective at the end of the 1995 was "a major step in Turkey's encounter with formal EU conditionality" (Bayer and Öniş, 2010, p. 186).

To elaborate, the 1995 amendments lifted "the ban on the political activities of associations and gave associations permission to engage in collaborative action with political parties and other CSOs" by erasing the fourth paragraph of the Article 33 (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 57). Besides, in incidents "where an association was suspended from activity by the decision of the competent administrative authority, this decision had to be submitted to the approval of the competent judge within twenty-four hours. The judge was required to announce his decision within forty-eight hours, otherwise the administrative decision automatically ceased to be effective" (ibid.). Although those reforms were not major improvements, the protection provided for the freedom of association can be evaluated as "anything but satisfactory" (ibid.).

Meanwhile, in addition to legislative changes, the EU has supported the development of civil society in Turkey through funding NGOs. For candidate countries, EU financial aid has been given to advance the capacities of NGOs. Turkey was included in "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" since its introduction in 1995. Thus, Turkey started to receive EU assistance through the MEDA I program which lasted in 1999 (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 132). Although MEDA was not produced exclusively for civil society, Turkish NGOs benefited from this program. Indeed, some of those organizations which were working for "promoting democracy, human rights, and civil society" began receiving financial assistance under diverse "EU budget lines even before 1995" (ibid.). However, the declaration of Turkish candidacy in 1999 was the most crucial step for the institutionalization of extensive EU funding programs due to fact that the EU increased its financial aid to Turkey and established specific lines of pre-accession funding for civil society actors, as the funding policies and mechanisms section extensively analyses.

When Turkey obtained candidate status at the Helsinki Summit, the European Commission initially emphasized in Regular Reports that "there are severe limitations on freedom of association and assembly" in Turkey (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 71). Regular Reports, later called as Progress Reports, have been one of the key instruments of the Commission to lay down a general assessment of the candidate state's accession process with respect to political and economic circumstances. The Commission with its reports has continuously celebrated Turkey's progress in order to encourage the country for further reforms whereas simultaneously criticized the political, economic and social troubles facing Turkey so as to prepare the country for the EU accession. When it comes to the issue of civil society, the initial Regular Reports persistently highlighted the inadequacy of the freedom of association and assembly as one of the fundamental deficiencies for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Even before the declaration of the official candidacy of Turkey, in 1998, the Commission applauded the 1995 amendments by stating that

> In 1995, certain amendments were made to the Constitution by TGNA; these were a positive step contributing to the strengthening of democracy in Turkey. For example, these amendments make it possible for any association, such as a trade union, to take part in political activities (Commission of the European Communities, 1998, p. 11).

Simultaneously, the Commission criticized the legal drawbacks by mentioning that freedom of association and assembly are "subject to limitations" (ibid., p. 16). It specifically raised it concerns about the limitations on international ties by noting that "Associations may not, for example, invite foreign associations to Turkey, issue public statements or organise any activities outside their premises without obtaining the prior permission of the authorities" (ibid.).

Eventually, Turkey was granted as an EU candidate status in December 1999. This declaration was "a breakthrough development in the history of EU-Turkey relations" as the membership of Turkey became a reality in the end (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 224). Accordingly, "a process of pre-accession including a transitional period of policy and legislation adoption and harmonization" (ibid.) has begun. In this process, the adoption and the implementation of the political and economic, social policies of the EU are the general requirements for the candidates to obtain membership. Among these prerequisites, the adoption of the EU acquis communautaire is the most significant part since its implementation ultimately propagate the transformation of prevalent domestic policies and practices in diverse Justice and Home Affairs. In this regard, the European Commission and its individuals have given incredible significance to the issues of citizenship and civil society. The importance of these subjects has been anticipated in the "Accession Partnership Document" (APD) published in 2000. This report characterized its short-and medium-term targets, transitional points and conditions. The document underlined that these are not open to negotiation since they constitute the fundamental ground for the induction and of the dismissal of an applicant nation as a full member, like Turkey (ibid.). Accordingly, from 2000 onwards, "much more place to the freedom of association and assembly" in Turkey has begun to be given in the Commission Progress Reports (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 58).

4.1.2. Golden Age: 1999-2006

With the official recognition of Turkey's EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, Turkey initially began to give a remarkable political attention to the required reforms so as to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. At the beginning, in line with the EU legislation, the coalition government passed the 2001 constitutional amendments. Besides, the

reforms were maintained with a new Civil Code and three harmonization packages in 2002 (Yılmaz, 2014, p. 305). In general, the government realized

> some revolutionary political, administrative, and judicial reforms in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law: these changes were directly related both to the further democratization of the state in Turkey and to the reconstruction of the republican model of citizenship in a way to make it more democratic and liberal (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 224).

Against this background, the government introduced the National Programme in 2001 that was prepared to

> elevate the structure and quality of Turkish democracy to the level of European democracy by creating a legal foundation for the full protection of the individual rights and freedoms, the freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and the enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey. These reforms involved the abolishment of the death penalty, the elimination of the legal restrictions to the rights of different ethnic communities both to education and to broadcasting in their own mother tongues, and the granting and the non-Muslim religious foundations the right to acquire property. These reforms, which were made in accordance with the Copenhagen political criteria, are of utmost importance in the creation of a strong language of rights in Turkey, which has a positive impact on the democratization of the state and the enlargement of the space of civil society. At the same time, it should be admitted that these reforms also indicate that the sources of democratization in Turkey are no longer only national, but also global, and therefore that the EU plays an important role in the changing nature of the state-society relations in Turkey and functions as a powerful actor generating system-transforming impacts on Turkish politics (ibid., pp. 224-25).

When it comes particularly to the issue of civil society, thanks to EU pressure through conditionality, a series of constitutional amendments and changes in relevant laws concerning civil society activities were started to be made in the beginning of 2001 (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 135-36). In line with the Helsinki Decision and the Regular Reports, Turkey was pushed by the European Council to "Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees of the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil society" (Council of the European Communities, 2001). Respectively, in the short run, Turkey promised to advance constitutional protections governing CSOs and promote the economic and social institutions for democracy with its "National Programme of the Adoption of the Acquis" in 2001. In the medium run, Turkey assured to realize legal

reforms regarding freedom of association and assembly. Correspondingly, the Parliament made "a series of amendments to the 1982 Constitution" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 72). These changes were related to many policy fields, including the civil society sphere.

As for freedom of association, Article 33 was amended in line with the promise given by Turkey in its national programme to modify the legislation and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) entitled "Freedom of assembly and association" (ibid.). The second paragraph of Article 33 on getting permission to form associations was erased. Hence, the way for the formation of associations was facilitated. However, specific reasons for limiting the right to establish associations, such as "national security, public order, for the prevention of crime, public morals, public health, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" (ibid.), were put in the article. Thus, the amendment to freedom of association was made "without significantly changing its substance" (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004, p. 20). When it comes to the issue of freedom of assembly, the Commission has repeatedly criticized the deficiencies related to this right since the beginning of Turkish candidacy. There were serious drawbacks "becoming all too evident in the mass celebrations including Worker's Day, Newroz and Women's Day" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 81), largely arising from the restrictive nature of the Article 34. In addition to legislative limitations, the lack of coherent interpretation of the legislation was another problem hindering the various activities of CSOs (ibid., p. 82). Hence, like the freedom of association, Article 34 was also amended by erasing from the text both the second and the last paragraphs which subsequently stated that "The competent administrative authority may determine a site and route for the demonstration march in order to prevent disruption of order in urban life" and "Associations, foundations, labor unions and public professional organizations shall not hold meetings or demonstration marches exceeding their own scope and aims"[6]. Although the paragraph on the specific reasons for limiting freedom of assembly was rearranged by adding the provision "national security, public order, for the prevention of crime, public morals, public health, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and by law" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 82), the repeal of the detailed description concerning the

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[6] Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5be0.html Accessed on: 30 December 2017

postponement and prohibition of demonstrations expanded "the scope of freedom of assembly considerably" (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004, p. 21).

Meanwhile, "Harmonization Packages" or "Harmonization Laws" that have become one of the key instruments of the reform process in Turkey for the fulfillment the EU's Copenhagen political criteria. Initially, eight packages, between February 2002 and July 2004, were passed by the Turkish Assembly. These Laws considerably reformed Associations Law, Foundations Law and Civil Code, in addition to improving other related legal documents. The reforms enhanced the rights concerning "founding an association/foundation, membership, cooperative activities, international activities, funds received from abroad, announcement and publications, state interference, administrative affairs and financial undertakings" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 73).

With the second harmonization package on 26 March 2002, "more comprehensive amendments" were made to the 1982 Associations Law in order to reduce state control (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 58). The most important of the reforms was the repeal of articles which had prohibited international connections with international associations (ibid., p. 59). However, the reforms made on the Civil Code in January 2002 "maintained the possibility of state control" on the interactions between CSOs in Turkey and their international counterparts (Öner, 2012, p. 104). This package likewise included changes to the articles governing freedom of assembly. To start with, the age limit from 21 to 18 and the prerequisites for membership in the organizing committee of meetings and demonstrations were decreased. Second, the grounds for local authorities were limited to prohibit or defer meetings and demonstration marches. Third change was made by giving under specific circumstances meetings might be put off rather than precluded and decreasing the reason for deferment (Zihnioğlu, 2013, pp. 152-53).

The third harmonization package of 3 August 2002 brought further reform to both freedom of association and freedom of assembly. Regarding freedom of association, a significant change was brought by this package with the amendments to 1982 Law on Associations. A new body "in charge of associations within the Ministry of the Interior, which was given the authority that had previously been entrusted to the Directorate General for Security" was formed (ibid., p. 73). Another improvement was the removal of restrictions

"on civil servants' right to establish associations" (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 59). Moreover, the prohibition "on association activities for civil defense purposes" was repealed (ibid.). The third bundle additionally made changes in freedom of assembly. The participation by foreigners in meetings was facilitated and "the time limit for advance notification for the organization of a meeting by Turkish citizens from 72 hours to 48 hours" was decreased (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 153).

Incidentally, the 3 November 2002 elections brought about the triumph of the JDP. Being a single party government, the JDP had and took the benefit of having the capacity to make significant changes in issues on which it had been extremely hard to achieve an accord before. Particularly in the early years of the JDP, the administration demonstrated a solid political will on satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria (Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 62). With the fourth harmonization package of 2 January 2003, the JDP government brought further reforms regarding freedom of association. For instance, the Civil Code was reformed by removing "the necessity of prior permission from the Council of Ministers for the international activities of associations" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 144). The package also included revisions on the 1982 Associations Law. The limitations on the purposes for which associations may be formed were eased. Associations were also allowed "to use foreign language in their international contacts and unofficial correspondence" (ibid.). Moreover, the membership of legal persons in associations and the right to vote for those legal entities were provided. Furthermore, "the restrictions on making announcements or distributing publications and the obligation to forward copies of these documents to the relevant authorities prior to distribution" were removed (ibid., p. 145).

These were important developments. As a response, in the Regular Report of 2002, the European Commission applauded the improvements regarding freedom of association by underlining that the restrictions on this right were eased (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, p. 32). Following the Report, Turkey quickened its endeavors with the seventh package of 30 July 2003, which "enhanced the conditions administering both freedom of association and assembly" (Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 64). The amendments to the 1982 Associations Law improved the legal framework governing freedom of association. The right to establish associations was advanced by allowing them to be formed "by legal persons,

people convicted of certain crimes under Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, former members of an association or political party abolished by a court decision and higher education students related not only to educational and recreational matters but also to art, culture, and science" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, pp. 145-46). When it comes to the improvement of freedom of assembly, there were also amendments to the Constitution. "The maximum period of time required to postpone some meetings from 30 to 10" was reduced (ibid., p. 153). Besides, the prohibition of meetings was made more difficult. For instance, "the competence of the governor to disallow meetings by restricting the reasons for banning them in provinces and townships" was limited (ibid., p. 154).

Finally, in line with the legislative reforms, Turkish Assembly adopted an entirely new Law on Associations in July 2004, further enhancing the legal ground for freedom of association. The new Law handled the drawbacks of the previous legislation which had been stressed repeatedly by the Commission. Although its implementation was partially blocked due to an appeal to the Constitutional Court by the RPP, it was issued without a change in November 2004. This Law was rightly defined by a prominent Turkish NGO, namely the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı- TÜSEV), as "the most progressive Law on Associations in over 20 years" (TÜSEV, 2006). For instance, the new Law lifted "restrictions on the formation of associations on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sect, region, or any other minority group" (ibid.). Other important revisions included that

> (1)associations are no longer required to obtain prior authorization for foreign funding, partnerships or activities; (2) associations are no longer required to inform local government officials pf the day/ time/ location of general assembly meetings and no longer required to invite a government official to general assembly meetings; (3) audit officials must give 24 hour prior notice and just cause for random audits; (4) NGOs are permitted to open representative offices for federations and confederations internationally; (5) security forces are no longer allowed on premises of associations without a court order; (6) specific provisions and restrictions for student associations have been entirely removed; (7) children from the age of 15 can form associations; (8) internal audit standards have been increased to ensure accountability of members and management; (9) NGOs will be able to form temporary platforms/ initiatives to pursue common objectives; (10) government funding for up to 50% of NGO projects will be possible; (11) NGOs will be allowed to buy and sell necessary immovable assets (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004, p. 21).

The 2004 Law on Associations represents a harmonization with the EU legislation. It has also significantly restricted the legal space for state intervention in civil society. Hence, the new Law has changed the organization of state-society relations (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 136).

In terms of freedom of assembly, in accordance with the aforementioned reforms, a series of changes has enhanced this right step by step. Despite the significant authoritative and managerial changes Turkey embraced by 2003, there were as yet implementation constraints in the usage of the new enactment. There were a few situations where "local authorities resorted to excessive use of force against demonstrators" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 82). In the aftermath, in June 2004, a circular was promulgated by the Ministry of the Interior stressed the ways with which "local authorities should handle demonstrations, marches and press conferences in order not to violate the freedom of peaceful assembly" (ibid.). Also, it underscored that the exercises of CSOs ought not be subject to video accounts, if the authorities do not require. Additionally, the Ministry of the Interior, in August 2004, issued another circular targeted precluding security forces from the use of disproportionate force and assuring appropriate sanctions, if there is a necessity (ibid.). This circular was exceptionally critical advance not only in asking the Governors to think about this issue as a need but also in guaranteeing that the vital disciplinary move will be made.

These legal, administrative and institutional developments resulted in the famous declaration of the Commission in October 2004 stating that Turkey sufficiently met the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership and recommending that the EU should open accession negotiations with Turkey. Subsequently, at Brussels Summit held in December 2004, European Council confirmed that Turkey sufficiently met the political criteria and thus took the decision to launch accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 (Usul, 2008, p. 112).

4.1.3. Deceleration: 2006-2013

The previous part figures out that considerable progress was undertaken in enhancing the legal and institutional environment with respect to freedom of association and freedom of assembly since the Helsinki Summit of 1999. In any case, after the last harmonization bundle

and around one year after the beginning of the accession negotiations, the reform process quickened by the EU has started to demonstrate a slowdown since 2006 (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 84). Calling attention to the elements prompting this deceleration is vital as far as uncovering the significance of the EU's incentives on reforms during the accession process.

Amid the second half the decade, the positive air following the official declaration of Turkey's candidate status by the EU in 1999 and later with the European Commission's Recommendation on Turkey's progress towards accession in 2004 and subsequently, in December 2004, the European Council agreement on opening accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 can be evaluated as an important structural advancement in the relations. However, five points in the agreement triggered severe reactions in Turkey that are

> the issues of permanent derogations; the extension of the 1963 Ankara Agreement to the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus; the absorption capacity of the EU; a statement in the agreement that the negotiation process would be open-ended; and the issue of maintenance of the good relations with Turkey's neighbors with particular focus on the Aegean issue (Usul, 2008, p. 183).

To begin with, the incorporation of the issues which are not straightforwardly identified with the Copenhagen criteria and have high symbolic value for Turkish national identity, for instance peaceful settlement of disputes with the neighbors such as Cyprus and Armenia, were severely reacted by Turkish public and authorities (Özer, 2015, p. 152). The EU also continued to raise its concerns on the issues not related to the Copenhagen criteria, such as Turkey's size and demographic growth and the absorption capacity of the EU (Kirişçi, 2008). Besides, the Commission in its Recommendation overemphasized the open-ended nature of accession negotiations. Although the procedure was applied to CEECs, such a road was not emphasized as much during the Eastern enlargement as during Turkey's accession period (Tocci, 2005, p. 77). The statements of the Accession Negotiation Framework "on the long-transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in areas such as agriculture, structural policies and free movement of persons for Turkey" were not witnessed in the previous enlargements (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p. 146). Moreover, the launch of the accession negotiations was highly conditional since "it was worded in such a way as to leave open the possibility of a non-membership or of a special partnership instead of full membership" (Yankaya, 2009, p. 12). Lastly, a possible referendum for future enlargements, for instance Turkey's accession, in Austria and France, and the implication of a

"privileged partnership" discussion by some EU member states since 2005, have "added further ambiguity and uncertainty to the accession process" (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 90). Thus, the credibility of the membership carrot has declined considerably in Turkey's accession process (Scmimmelfennig, 2009, p. 418).

The very process of accession negotiations likewise prompted an adversarial impact on the credibility and consistency of the EU's conditionality due to the fact that only 16 chapters have been opened to negotiations and one chapter, titled as Science and Research, has been conditionally closed. A standout amongst the most imperative issues which drove the accession negotiations to a deadlock is ongoing disputes over Cyprus (Öniş, 2010). In July 2005, Turkey broadened the 1995 Customs Union Agreement with an Additional Protocol to those nations that joined the EU in 2004. Nonetheless, Turkey pronounced that "the signature of the Additional Protocol did not mean the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 85.). Respectively, on December 2006, "the EU Council decided not to open negotiations on the eight chapters on all aspects of the freedom of movement of goods" (Müftüler-Baç, 2016, p. 66). Maybe more essentially, the Council likewise chose that no other section can be temporarily closed except if Turkey changes its position. Consequently, "the Turkish implementation of the 2005 Additional Protocol" swung to be a closing benchmark for all the remaining chapters (ibid.). Shortly after, in 2007, France blocked the Turkish accession negotiations since it vetoed the opening of negotiations on five chapters. The reason for France is that these chapters are directly related to membership. Indeed, the position of France is "surprising as the accession negotiations, which were launched with the unanimous votes of all member states of the EU, are officially aimed at Turkey's eventual membership" (ibid., p. 68). Lastly, in December 2009, Cyprus declared that it would veto the opening of six further chapters and the European Council officially adopted these vetoes in the same year. Therefore, the accession negotiations have suffered dramatically. Turkish officials and the public have started to question the EU's willingness in this process and thus the credibility of the membership prospect. As a result, democratization process in Turkey that had mostly been related to the accession context has lost its momentum (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit, 2012; Özer, 2015; Saatçioğlu, 2009; Yılmaz, 2014; Zihnioğlu, 2013). If the credibility and the consistency of the membership prospect were highly maintained as in the case of Eastern

enlargement, the EU would be more able to induce further democratization steps in Turkey (Usul, 2011, p. 164).

However, the democratization process including civil society development did not come to an end although there was a slowdown since various mechanisms and actors of Europeanization process have been at play (Bürgin, 2016). For example, the Commission, through several community programs and projects, has eagerly continued to work for further democratic reforms in general and for civil society enhancement in particular. Besides, as being empowered by the EU accession context, civil actors in Turkey have also become more important players in domestic reform process as their contribution to democratization process of Turkey is shown in the following sections.

In this regard, a major step was undertaken to enhance the legal structure concerning civil society with the adoption of the new Law on Foundations on 20 February 2008, putting the previous legislation into a single set of rules. All prevalent foundations are now "included in the scope of the new Law" (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 77). In this respect, "the foundations established during the Ottoman Empire; minority foundations established by non-Muslim communities during the Ottoman Empire; and the more recent foundations (private cash foundations) established according to Civil Code provisions during the Turkish Republic" (ibid.) are regulated under the new Law.

This new Law on Foundations was an important development in terms of freedom of association by settling the ground for the formation of a new body, the Foundations Council, as the highest decision-making body for foundations. It regulated that the Council has 15 seats and five of which are assigned to representatives of foundations. It has begun to function since the first elections to the Foundations Council. The introduction of this institute is a major progress due to the fact that foundations, for the first time, "have a say in the making and implementation of policies concerning themselves" (ibid.). The principle of reciprocity also replaced the preceding prohibition that put a ban on the formation of foundations by foreigners in Turkey. Last but not least, the new Law repealed the necessity of "prior authorization for opening branches or representative offices abroad or performing international activities" (ibid.). Besides, this Law allows foundations in Turkey to receive grants from abroad with a prior notification.

Despite these efforts, some argue that this development has not essentially improved the situation seeing that there has not been substantial increase in the quantity of foundations like in the case of associations, even though both the new Foundations Law and the considerable enhancement in the legislative structure are realized as well as many new instruments of financial support to the foundations were assigned. However, the main reason behind this situation has largely stemmed from the fact that the reforms related to associations are far more comprehensive in nature when compared to those legal and institutional improvements regarding foundations, thus leading people to prefer establishing associations (ibid., p. 78). As a result, the slow increase in the numbers of foundations does not mean that the improvements concerning them are inconsiderable.

A major improvement to propel the respective rights of non-Muslim people communities was occurred with a change to Article 1 of the new Foundations Law. This change allowed non-Muslim Community establishments "acquire and dispose of property, regardless of whether or not they possessed the deed of trust of a pious foundation" (ibid.) although the related Regulation limited the number of non-Muslim foundations to only 160, which still needed to be increased. Besides, such foundations have the right to register the property if they can prove ownership. The situation was further enhanced since "the requirement for the permission of the Council of Ministers for the acquisition and disposal of immovable properties" was replaced with "the requirement to get permission from the Directorate General for Foundation" (ibid.).

Up to this point, particularly with the adoption of the new Law of Associations and the new Law of Foundations, the EU seems to be satisfied with the extent of general improvement with respect to freedom of association. Especially the new Associations Law both signifies a compliance with EU law and significantly restricts "the legal space for state intervention in civil society and thus has changed the organization of state-society relations" (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 136). As the Regular Report of 2005 states that

> The Law is important in reducing the possibility for state interference in the activities of associations and has already begun to bring a number of practical benefits for associations, thus facilitating the further development of civil society in Turkey (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a, p. 27).

Accordingly, the positive influence of the legislative reforms regarding freedom of association is highlighted by the annual Progress Reports after 2005 (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 79). For example, in 2006, the Commission clearly states that

> As concerns civil society organisations, the recent reform environment has led to positive developments. Civil society organisations have become relatively more vocal and better organised, especially since the adoption of the new Law on Associations. There is an increasing variety of organisations in Turkey including approximately 80 000 registered associations, and several hundred unions and chambers (including vocational and professional associations) (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 16).

Meanwhile, the Commission initiated the "Communication on the Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and the Candidate Countries" in June 2005. The Communication underscored the advancement of exchange among civil society, in the EU and the applicant nation, with a particular ultimate objective to manage issues related to the accession. Accordingly, the revised Accession Partnership documents of 2005 (Council of the European Communities, 2006) and 2007 (Council of the European Communities, 2008) include both open communication and cooperation between all segments of civil society in Turkey and their European accomplices as well as support of local civil society enhancement and incorporation of Turkish civil society in the shaping of public policies.

The National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis of 2008, which was overhauled in accordance with the previously mentioned Accession Partnership documents of 2005 and 2007, underlines that "the dialogue, communication and cooperation" between civil society in Turkey and its European partners will be more supported and that the civil society development and involvement of civil society in the shaping of public policies will be further fostered (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 80).

In this regard, a standout amongst the most important prevailing drawbacks is that no legal and institutional steps have been taken concerning the inclusion of CSOs in the shaping of public policies. In spite of the need of such changes, some huge advances were made so as to include civil society actors in policy making cycles. For instance, amid the screening procedure, the agents of certain CSOs were welcomed by the Chief Negotiator, together with the related civil servants and ministers, following the completion of the screening of every

chapter. This was a critical improvement on the grounds that CSOs basically started to be included in public policies, yet these sessions could have been consultative in nature instead of being informative. Upon the request of the Chief Negotiator, another remarkable step was taken with the start of the actual negotiations. In this regard, certain CSOs present "a sample Negotiation Position Paper on the basis of the screening reports and, following those, position papers submitted by the new member states of the EU, which would be accompanied by a meeting at the General Secretariat for EU affairs once the final position paper was completed" (ibid.). In spite of the fact that CSOs are not partaken in the decision making, this instrument provides a certain degree of consultation.

The then Chief Negotiator, Egemen Bağış, subsequent to taking office organized a meeting on 6 March 2009 in Ankara, with the agents of CSOs. Similar meetings were rehashed on 18 June 2009, 13 February 2010 and 11 December 2010 in Istanbul (ibid.). These were all open doors for CSOs from different fields to voice their causes and also to have a productive dialogue with the governmental authorities.

4.1.4. Years of Turbulance: 2013-

The declaration in the relations between Turkey and the EU coincided with an internally turbulent period in Turkey when the democratization process in the country started to slowdown and the fragmentation between the secular and conservative circles of Turkish society was further increased (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012).

When the JDP first came to power in 2002, the party enthusiastically bolstered EU accession and the democratization process. Nonetheless, both the declining credibility of the EU's membership impetus and the JDP's second appointive triumph in 2007 influenced the governing party's stand. Without doubt, the JDP turned out to be much great both in the public eye and against the secularist foundation in the military and the judiciary, consequently became less reliant on the EU and its democratization program (Öniş, 2010). Moreover, the expanding authoritarian inclination of the JDP corresponded with the declining credibility of the EU, and relatedly that supporters for democratization in the nation have turned out to be more helpless against the suppression by the governing party. The authoritarian drift of the JDP has become more visible after 2011 elections with which the JDP came to control for the

third successive. For some, "the legal and de facto restrictions on the freedom of press, expression and assembly, the extensive prosecution and imprisonment of journalists and political activists, the use of disproportionate force by the police against protestors and political activism" symbolize the arrival of an authoritarian administration under progressive JDP governments (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016, p. 2). Such developments in Turkish governmental issues since 2011 demonstrate a continuous slide into authoritarianism (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012; Kaliber, 2014; Özbudun, 2014). The reactions against the ruling party's policies and the authoritarian perspective on policy-making adopted by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reached its peak with mass demonstrations in July 2013 spread over the streets of Turkey, known as the "Gezi protests" (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016, p. 2)

The EU and some member states have raised their concerns about the worsening conditions for democratic rights and freedoms and criticized the severe repression against its adversaries. The concerns about the democratic path of the country became more visible "throughout 2015 in the face of deadly large-scale attacks targeting civilian activists, the resumption of armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, the accompanying intermittent and open-ended curses in conflict areas and two consecutive general elections in June and November" (ibid.). Indeed, the results of June 2015 general elections did not give majority of seats to the JDP, signifying another signal from the Turkish society against the authoritarian drift of the government (Müftüler-Baç, 2016, p. 87).

In addition to domestic volatile period, EU level factors and other regional/international developments have also affected the relations between the EU and Turkey. The euro crisis in 2008 coupled with the rise of right-wing parties in various member states of the EU triggered an unfavorable atmosphere regarding EU's enlargement. Under these circumstances, the prospect of Turkey's membership, that was already long debated both on economic and political as well as societal and cultural grounds, has increasingly been questioned within the EU. Besides, the chaotic environment in the EU's wider and Turkey's immediate southern neighborhood has severed such concerns on Turkey's membership due to the fears about "potential of terror, instability and a mass refugee problem infiltrating the EU from the wider South through Turkey" (Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016, p. 2). Moreover,

Turkey's sympathy towards Islamist parties in the region during the Arab upheavals and underestimation of the security threat set by the radical Islamist opposition spreading in the Syrian conflict have further intensified the concerns about Turkey's membership within the EU (ibid., p. 3).

Given the contemporary stalemate in the relations between the EU and Turkey, there have been increasing concerns about the influence of the former on the latter. The credibility and effectiveness of the EU for influencing Turkish politics and society have increasingly been questioned. One exception to this crackdown in the relations between EU and Turkey was the Readmission Agreement on Syrian refugees reached in December 2013. According to the agreement, Turkey would take back illegal immigrants entering the EU via Turkey in return for financial support. Besides, economic and monetary policy chapter that had been vetoed by France would be opened. Moreover, the EU presented the incentive of visa liberalization (ibid.). Although recent reforms in migration policy are not directly related to the civil society empowerment in Turkey, it is important to understand the continuing EU influence on policy processes in the country. Thus, it is beneficial to show that the incentives set by the EU have still considerable impact on Turkish politics.

At this point, Bürgin's study on this agreement (2016) deserves a serious attention in terms of figuring out the ongoing influence of the EU on Turkey. Based on the interviews carried "with Turkish officials from the Ministry for EU Affairs (MEU) and the Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU in Brussels; and with officials from the European Commission from the Directorate General (DG) Enlargement and DG Migration and Home Affairs in Brussels and the EU Delegation in Ankara in May 2013, April 2014 and May 2015" (Bürgin, 2016, p. 106), he tries to demonstrate that the EU has still a considerable influence on Turkish political and societal spheres.

For sure, the partial maintenance of harmonization with the EU acquis in a few policy fields has been related with domestic components, especially the ruling party's inclinations (Avcı 2011; Öniş 2010; Yılmaz and Soyaltın, 2014), or Turkey's modernization endeavor (Kaliber 2013). Besides, the role played by other international actors, for example, the ECHR and the UN, is examined for the analysis of the most recent changes in different policy areas (Kirişçi, 2012; Tolay, 2012). Explanations concerning domestic and other

external factors are all valuable. However, while the first wave of literature on Europeanization had a tendency to overemphasize the domestic impact of the conditionality system of the EU, the new consideration on non-EU-related elements tend to underestimate the effect of EU's incentives (Bürgin, 2016, p. 105).

With respect to findings of Bürgin (2016), despite in a weakened form, the influence of the EU prevails due to the two reasons. Firstly, the EU's incentives still have an influence on the policy making processes in Turkey. Accordingly, the Turkish bureaucrats still consider that fulfilling EU requirements will increase the pressure on the EU for opening of new chapters in the accession negotiations, showing that EU's conditionality mechanism is still relevant in the bilateral relations. At least, the Turkish bureaucratic elite still favors the integration process with the EU. Current opposition within the EU against Turkey's membership has obviously shadowed the credibility of the EU. Nevertheless, focusing on the elected political elite, the literature on Turkey's Europeanization "underestimates the administrative actors and their roles and perceptions" (ibid., p. 109). Based on the interviews with Commission and Turkish officials, Bürgin demonstrates that the significance of the membership carrot has not been completely lost at least at the administrative level. Although the officials of the MEU underline that the salience of the refugee problem and Turkey's general modernization track are relevant domestic factors for latest reforms in migration management, these officials also mention the ongoing readiness in the ministries to fulfill EU requirements if the EU rewards progress in Turkey by opening further negotiation chapters as a Commission official states that "officials on the Turkish side, in particular at the lower levels of hierarchy, are pro-European and strongly interested in a positive judgement in the progress report" (Interview 2015 in Bürgin, 2016, p. 109). Besides, there are other studies which are in line with the findings of Bürgin. To illustrate, Pierino and Ülgen (2014) conclude that a continuing interest in EU alignment process exists among Turkish technical administrations (p. 13). Moreover, the incentive mechanism set by the EU is not only related to membership prospect in the areas of migration and border management policy. Thanks to the efforts of the Commission, the EU has initiated a visa liberalization dialogue with Turkey in December 2013, thus providing new incentives to fulfill EU requirements, with around "72 benchmarks ranging from technical adjustments in border cooperation to human rights" (Bürgin, 2016, p. 110). Secondly, the impact of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

(IPA) on Turkish politics and society deserves more attention in evaluating the ongoing influence of the EU as Bürgin puts that

> IPA goes beyond that of a mere facilitator of domestically defined interests and goals. While applications for IPA projects may initially be driven by financial, organisational or personal career-related incentives unrelated to the accession process, the projects' long-term effects may result in new institutional constraints, or stipulate social learning processes leading to deeper change than initially envisaged by the Turkish side. This suggests that domestically defined strategic interests are a precondition rather than an obstacle for the subsequent socialisation processes. Such inclusion of the time factor in the analysis of Europeanization processes contributes to resolving the issues of whether domestic or external factors are the key drivers of Europeanization. The implication is that while domestic factors may prevail in the short term, the EU's influence evolves over time (2016, p. 106).

In other words, domestically defined strategic interests can subsequently bring institution-building, that establishes new requirements for actors or can even change their pursuits and perceptions in the long run, hence replacing a logic of consequences with a logic of appropriateness. Indeed, the following section, the funding policies and mechanisms, elaborates how the financial assistance of the EU has contributed to the socialization process of the actors by bringing them together.

Moreover, the legal section of the thesis is prepared by taking the analytical distinction of Kaliber (2013) "between EU-isation as a formal process of alignment with the EU's institutions, policies and legal structure and Europeanization as wider socio-political and normative context" (p. 65). In this respect, in the legal part, it is tried to demonstrate the direct importance and relevance of the conditionality mechanism of the EU on Turkey's democratization process in general and civil society development in particular. Accordingly, the last section, the legitimization of civic activity in Turkey, studies how the Europeanization process as a socio-political and normative context has indirectly operated for the legitimacy of the practices of Turkish civil society.

Turning back to political and legal situation of civil society in Turkey, the political environment in the country in which civil society operates has been facing a severe turmoil especially since the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, and the following emergency rule and suppression on political dissidents which project the climax of extraordinary period of disturbance. Besides, the authoritarian drift of the ruling party especially since 2013 with the

restrictions on political opposition and public activity has been reflected in the recent constitutional amendments approved by voters in a referendum on the April 16, 2017 with a slight majority. Although this is a civilian constitution, the archaic clauses of the 1982 military constitution were not touched by the JDP such as laws prohibiting "groups or activities deemed contrary to national security, public order, or morality and Turkish family structure" (Center for American Progress, 2017, p. 13). Moreover, the new Constitution expanded executive powers by providing "numerous legal means to suppress wider political dissent in ways that also shape the civil society environment" (ibid.). For instance, an amendment which gave "State Supervisory Board prosecutorial powers over civil society organizations, further expanding the president's authority to police their activities" (ibid., p. 14).

However, it should be underlined that despite the strain of relations between the EU and Turkey and the environment of uncertainty and fear which exists among Turkish civil society actors due to the authoritarian drift of the governing party, civil society in Turkey still remains active and relevant. CSOs have the capability to help handle Turkey's most important problems.

> With respect to nearly all of the major challenges facing Turkey—integrating and educating Syrian refugees, reducing ethnic tensions, improving educational outcomes, combatting radicalization, and bringing more women into the economy—CSOs are leading efforts to find solutions. Turkey can be strengthened by a renewal and reopening of civil society activity (ibid., p. 6).

The effective response of Turkish civil society to the Syrian refugee crisis is one of the clearest examples about the capability of Turkish CSOs. In addition to their capacity, civil society in Turkey has the power to shape public opinion (ibid.). Another point should also be underlined that the repressive environment does not cause civic organizing to disappear since it has been evolving for a long time. Interactive Europeanization processes on civil society development in Turkey, including legal improvements, have already strengthened the civic activity. Thus, the contemporary suppressive political environment rather has resulted in "pushing more activity underground and contributing to informal networks and quiet efforts to maintain civic space under the radar of extremely sensitive and hostile governing authorities" (ibid., p. 18).

Therefore, the endurance of civil sphere under such extraordinary conditions is seriously important in order to understand that "Europeanization is still a relevant phenomenon in civil society" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 221). In this respect, it is important to underline the recent dynamics in Turkish civil society. Unorganized forms of civic participation vis-à-vis the authoritative policies of the JDP as well as "Erdoğan's way of ruling" (ibid.) has had crucial importance in order to grasp new modes of organization. For instance, the Gezi Events has signified the strength of "a less institutionalized form of mobilization, the existence of an unorganized civil society and raised discussions in the public sphere" (ibid., p. 222). In this regard, the last part on the legitimization of civic activity in Turkey attempts to deal with how the Europeanization as a legitimization device has contributed to the autonomous societal action.

Indeed, in addition to aforementioned legal and institutional changes governing the operation of civic society, the past two decades have witnessed a tremendous societal change, and civil society in Turkey has projected these wider changes in the country. Although the scope of public expression and civic activity was expanded in the 1990s, it is the official recognition of the Turkey's candidacy to the EU in 1999 bringing a remarkable leap to civil society activity. Since 2000, the number of CSOs' membership and activity has approximately doubled. Currently, there are "almost 130,000 CSOs, and nearly 13 percent of the Turkish population is a member of a legally defined association" (Center for American Progress, 2017, p. 10). In spite of the shut down of 1,500 CSOs during the post-coup period, there has been still great "diversity, complexity, and capacity among Turkish civil society" (ibid.).

Taking everything into consideration, Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has been taking place through different and complementary processes. Although the conditionality mechanism has weakened, it has not only created favorable legal and institutional conditions for the civil society to flourish, but also taken part in the interactive processes of Europeanization especially by eliminating the limitations on both the foreign funding and international connections, thus bringing a considerable change on the practices of the civil society. However, as the following sections discuss in detail, even the most top down dimension of Europeanization processes, the conditionality strategy of the EU, can also be

influenced by the bottom up pressures for further Europeanization and democratization, thus both the top down and bottom up forces mutually shape Europeanization outcomes.

4.2. Europeanization of Civil Society in Practical Terms

As aforementioned, the EU has influenced civil society development in Turkey through several processes (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015). First, through its membership conditionality regime, the EU has contributed to the improvements in the domestic legal and institutional environment regarding the operation of CSOs. In addition to Europeanization of legal infrastructure, the Turkish society has also entered in a phase of socialization process. Societal dimension of Europeanization has influenced the changes in the practices of Turkish civil society as Grigoriadis (2009) clearly summarizes that the Europeanization process

> also initiated a process whereby views on the meaning, role, priorities, and objectives of Turkish civil society have been rethought and modified. Social learning has taken place at different levels within the ranks of several social actors. Turkey's business community was the social actor most affected by this socialization process. It was more widely agreed that civil society should be prepared to intervene in all aspects of policymaking and support Turkey's course toward democratization. Similar trends were also observed within the ranks of Turkish bureaucracy, although the existence of strong opposing views showed that the socialization process was incremental and incomplete. Within civil society, self-confidence and trust in the ability of NGOs to bring about political and social change in the direction of Turkey's democratic consolidation were reinforced. A positive change was also noted in public opinion polls. Civil society was approached with less suspicion and more appreciation and interest in its activities (p. 63).

Indeed, different interactive dimensions of Europeanization have contributed to the socialization process of the Turkish civil society. It means that the CSOs have been learning European ways of conducting civil society activities (Öner, 2012, p. 106) through the channels of Europeanization processes in practical terms. Besides, through the increased interactions among the European societies, the outcomes of Europeanization can be collectively produced. Moreover, although the study divides the societal Europeanization processes into three categories, all these processes are interactively reinforced by each other as it is shown in the following sections.

Firstly, through its financial policies and mechanisms as well as technical assistance, the EU has advanced the autonomy and viability of CSOs, enhanced their organizational

capacities and management, diffused a project culture, framed their agendas with respect to EU's needs, brought professionalism and standardization in their activities. Secondly, the EU has empowered cooperation among the Turkish CSOs, between CSOs in Turkey and their partners in other European nations, between civil society and decision making cycles in Turkey. The EU's support to cooperation among the Turkish civil society is essential for lessening the internal polarization within the Turkish civil society. The networks set up amongst Turkish and European associations have created an extra open door for the spread of European standards, qualities and practices to Turkish CSOs. To a lesser degree, these networks have empowered the projection of issues which are of worry to CSOs in Turkey onto the European plan. The networks framed amongst CSOs and policymakers in Turkey have expanded the significance of the former in policymaking and empowered collaboration and association between the state and civil society. In general, cooperation among different actors from below and above is crucial for shaping Europeanization outcomes collectively. Lastly, the EU has worked as a reference point for legitimizing the activities of CSOs and for the promotion of their policy initiatives.

4.2.1. Funding Policies and Mechanisms

In addition to legislative improvements, the EU has reinforced the development of civil society in Turkey through funding channeled to NGOs. In other words, "as well as supporting civil society friendly legislative reform through conditionality, and encouraging the development of CSOs, the EU has also provided with them with crucial financial support" (Öner, 2012, p. 105). As for candidate countries, this funding is aimed to advance the capacities of NGOs (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 132). The EU's pre-accession funding has improved the activities of NGOs through the implementation of several programs (İçduygu, 2007, p. 191). There has been a widespread agreement in the literature on that financial support through EU's grant programs has provided capacity-building, professionalization, a certain degree of independence of CSOs from the state, expanded their activities, elevated amount of cooperation between CSOs in Turkey and their partners in the EU, diffused project culture (Grigoriadis, 2009; Kuzmanovic, 2010; Öner, 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015; Boşnak, 2015). To put it differently, EU funding has worked as a "social learning" mechanism and taught Turkish CSOs European ways of conducting civil society activities. A

representative of environmental organization with whom an interview was made in 2008 stated that

> One of the major contributions of the EU is funding. They contribute to the development of civil society, increase their institutional capacity and make them more active. This is obvious. And all the activities are conducted in accordance with European bureaucracy, European thinking, and the European format. It brings with itself work which can be conducted with expert knowledge and also people's participation-which represents local knowledge (Interview 2008 in Ergun, 2010, p. 514).

The European integration process has been decisive for the development of civil society in Turkey since the financial assistance given "by the EU and its related institutions, along with other international CSOs, constitutes the main financial resource with which most domestic CSOs realize their activities" (Ergun, 2010, p. 513). The main reason why EU funding has been extremely important for Turkish CSOs is that they are largely relied on external funding, stemming from that the tradition of state-society relations in Turkey has caused Turkish NGOs, unlike their European counterparts, to prefer not to use government funds so that they may secure their independence from the state (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 133). As a result, EU funding is crucial in such a country where the state-centric ideology considerably prevented an environment through which conditions for the flourishment of civil society could emerge. Besides, EU funding has also encouraged CSOs in Turkey to search for other opportunities for external funding (Rumelili 2005; Ergun 2010; Boşnak, 2015) since the EU provides a certain amount of the budget in many projects while the rest is required to be obtained by the NGOs from different sources. Hence, NGOs have been given an important incentive to develop their fundraising capability (Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 67-68).

As in the case of CEECs, financial assistance has turned into an essential apparatus of the EU to advance the practices of Turkish civil society. With a few financial means, for example, the funds for pre-accession and the Community programs, civil society advancement in Turkey has been helped. In this regard, different projects have concentrated on "the development of civil society and capacity building and enhancement of freedom of association and freedom of assembly candidate countries" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 67). The first step taken for civil society development was the introduction of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. As a member of this initiative, Turkey began to receive financial assistance from the EU with the MEDA Framework Agreement Since its inception in 1995.

Although MEDA was not prepared exclusively for civil society, Turkish NGOs were "among the main beneficiaries of this program" (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 55). Under the program, ad-hoc applications from individual civil society actors were granted financial support. This aid largely concentrated on individual NGO projects such as cultural integration, consumer protection, women and youth empowerment. Like the experience CEECs, these civil society actors included various segments of society and the EU involved in issues on which it has tremendous knowledge and expertise (Boşnak, 2015, p. 68).

The following plan for improving civil society was undertaken in 2002 and lasted until 2005. With the declaration of Turkey as candidate state in 1999, Turkey began to benefit from the increased financial opportunities and the pre-accession funding. Accordingly, Turkey was replaced from the MEDA program and included in the IPA budget line. The EU aims to the incorporate Turkish CSOs into the alignment process with the acquis in order to make the harmonization process more dynamic. At first, for example, eighty-four projects with CSOs in Turkey were realized to support "the harmonization process within the scope of 2002, 2003 and 2004 programs" (ibid., p. 69). As underlined in different EU documents, the objective of these projects is to render civil society more powerful in the policy making cycles within the accession context (ibid.). To put it differently, conditionality mechanism has been supported with the funding program in order to make Europeanization process more interactive by integrating Turkish CSOs into the accession process for taking necessary legal reforms.

Accordingly, civil society development programs mainly focus on fostering capacity building of Turkish civil society. Alongside development programs, the Civil Society Development Center (Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi-STGM) founded in 2002 as a permanent institution which not only reinforces the organizational capacity of civil society in Turkey, but also makes secure development of civil society around Turkey. By undertaking various "programs to develop Turkish civil society through advocacy, campaign, research, training and lobbying activities", the STGM has become an eminent actor in the country and a bridge between the EU and Turkish CSOs (ibid.). In addition to the capacity enhancement of civil society thanks to civil society development programs, they also promote democratic development. As in the case of the EU's dual civil society policy within its internal borders,

these projects targeted to cultivate the EU standards, qualities and standards in Turkey by emphasizing both the importance of civil society development in democratization process and the necessity of formation of dialogue and partnerships for better governance between Turkish civil society and the state (ibid.). The programs such as "Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process", "Improving Cooperation between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs Democratic Participation Level", "Strengthening Freedom of Association for Further Development of Civil Society", and "Strengthening the NGOs' Democratic Participation Level" reflect how the EU tries to transmit its twin-track policy towards civil society in Turkey. For instance, "Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process" was introduced in 2006 in order both to strengthen the consolidation and expansion of democratic reforms in Turkey and to promote the civil society participation in these processes. The budget of the project was 3.4 million Euros. With this project, the EU gave incredible support to many civic initiatives by financing approximately 150 projects on different areas, including protection of consumers, environment and culture, social inclusion of disadvantaged people and protection and advancement of children's and women's rights (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 45). Similarly, the project, "Strengthening Freedom of Association for Further Development of Civil Society Program" targeted to improve participatory democracy with empowered NGO sector. As the European Commission states that

> The purpose of the project is to enhance development of NGOs and their capacity for networking, voluntary work, national and international dialogue in Turkey during the EU accession process through institutional capacity building and grant schemes (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b, p. 1).

In this regard, this program included three main dimensions. By providing an extensive training including the various aspects of organizational management as well as facilitation services and assistance, the first component was related to "Capacity-building for NGOs", (ibid., p. 5). By founding a communication centre, carrying information sessions and relevant publications for the transfer of know-how from European CSOs to those organizations in Turkey and promoting the NGO sector through seminars, conferences, assistance to events and publications, the second dimension was concerned with "Awareness raising for NGOs and the public on civil society" (ibid.). The last one offered "Micro-grants

schemes, grant support for exchanges and administrative costs of NGOs" for interconnection and collaboration between the Turkish NGOs and their European counterparts (ibid.).

Moreover, thanks to these projects, the EU has fostered cooperation between civil society and the public authorities in Turkey. To illustrate, the program, "Improving Cooperation Between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs' Democratic Participation Level", was introduced in 2005. The project targeted to enhance collaboration between civil society and various public bodies. Besides, it aimed to improve democratic participation of CSOs by involving them in the EU harmonization process (ibid.). Therefore, the pre-accession funding mechanism of the EU has also worked for strengthening the cooperation dimension of Europeanization processes as it is discussed in the cooperation section. Moreover, such collaborations have indirectly increased the visibility and legitimacy of CSOs in Turkey thanks to the direct financial contribution of EU's funding as the legitimization part figures out.

To sum up, different civil society development programs have concentrated on the strengthening civil society with capacity building activities. These programs have also promoted cooperation among domestic NGOs, between Turkish civil society and the national decision making bodies, and between Turkish CSOs and their counterparts in the EU. Moreover, they have raised awareness for the importance of civil society among the NGOs themselves, the policy making bodies, the public, national as well as local media. In other words, these programs targeted to enhance the capacity of civil society have established more balanced relations between the state and citizens in Turkey, empowered civil society as part of democratization program, and promoted dialogue among domestic and European civil society actors (Birden and Rumelili, 2009). Therefore, as in the cases of the EU's own internal approach and eastern enlargement, the EU considers civil society as a tool of democratization and as a partner in policymaking.

As a continuation of the civil society development programs, "Civil Society Dialogue" was launched in 2005 with a Communication by the Commission. This program is "a landmark" regarding financial support given to Turkish CSOs (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 46). The experience of the CEE enlargement displayed that there was a gap between the EU and the general population because both the EU and candidate countries had not been adequately

informed about the benefits and difficulties of EU membership. For tackling this problem, "Communication of the Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries" was introduced for bringing citizens from the applicant nations and the EU closer. The Communication stresses that

> Any future enlargement of the EU needs to be supported by a strong, deep and sustained dialogue between the societies of the candidate countries and in the EU member States, as well as with the EU institutions. This would help to bridge the information gap, achieve better mutual knowledge and bring citizens and different cultures, political and economic systems closer together, thus ensuring a stronger awareness of the opportunities as well as the challenges of future accessions (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b, p. 2).

Within this context, especially with regard to Turkey, civil society dialogue

> will encourage a discussion on perceptions regarding everyday culture and values expressed by the society and the State on both sides. To achieve these objectives, the dialogue will increase bilateral exchanges, thereby contributing to the increased participation of civil society in the political, cultural and economic development of the candidate countries concerned. It will thus support the further development of a lively and vibrant civil society in the candidate countries, which is key to the consolidation of human rights and democracy, in line with the political criteria for accession (ibid., p. 3).

Therefore, this Communication places lively civil society at the core of the enlargement as the Commission's recommendation on Turkey's progress towards accession proposes that "Civil society should play the most important role in this dialogue, which should be facilitated by the EU" (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, p. 8). Respectively, the European Council supports the idea of a civil society dialogue. It states that

> Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with every candidate state in an intensive political and cultural dialogue. With the aim of enhancing mutual understanding by bringing people together, this inclusive dialogue also will involve civil society (Council of the European Communities, 2005, p. 8).

In parallel to the desires of the EU, civil society discourse has essentially added to Europeanization procedure of civil society in Turkey through social learning instrument as the General Secretariat of the Economic Development Foundation (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı-İKV), Çiğdem Nas specifies that civil society exchange between the EU and Turkey has

played an important role in "spreading EU values, especially in the fields of human rights, women's rights and environmental issues" (Interview 2011 in Öner, 2012, p. 106). Besides, through exchanges of knowledge between the two sides, Turkish CSOs have gained the opportunity to shape the Europeanization outcomes together with the EU. Within this mutually reinforcing context, three civil society dialogue programs were completed and the fourth phase has being carried since 2015. All the programs have put many projects related to different thematic fields into practice.

To begin with, "Civil Society Dialogue I" not only put a great emphasis on democracy but also on dialogue. The program aimed to establish dialogue and cooperation among the citizens of Turkey and the EU by incorporating Turkish CSOs into the reform process. In this regard, the program included different projects which brought various CSOs from Turkey and the EU around common activities, enabling these organizations to exchange knowledge and experience as well as to establish a sustained communication between them (Ministry for EU Affairs). Three primary fields were included in the program. These areas were advancement of civil society, social exchange, and employment and social affair. Under the Dialogue, in 2006, the EU assigned around 4.33 million Euros to four different programs in order to support the following grant schemes: "Civil Society Dialogue: Europa-Bridges of Knowledge", "Small Projects Program: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue", "Civil Society Dialogue: Culture in Action Program", and "Strengthening and Civil Society Dialogue: Participation in NGO Events in the EU". In a similar vein, in 2007 and 2008, the financial assistance for civil society dialogue programs was expanded to 21.5 million Euros to promote the following grant schemes: "Towns and Municipalities Grant Scheme", "Universities Grant Scheme", "Cultural Bridges Program", and "Youth Initiatives for Dialogue and Professional Organizations Grant Scheme" (ibid.). These programs through various projects have considerably supported, legitimized, and professionalized NGOs in Turkey (Boşnak, 2015, p. 72). Thus, EU's direct funding to CSOs has enhanced the status and activities of civil society in Turkey. Besides, the promotion of cooperation and dialogue between Turkey and the EU has contributed to the capacity of Turkish CSOs for actively involving in and shaping the processes of Europeanization.

Among the programs of the first phase, "Civil Society Dialogue- EU- Turkish Chambers Forum (2006-2009)" project deserves a crucial attention since it has had a great influence on Turkish business circles. The program was launched for that

> The overall objective will be to strengthen the dialogue and co-operation between the Turkish Chambers and their counterparts in the EU as members of civil society; thus promoting the integration of EU and Turkish business communities (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b, p. 1).

Therefore, the project aimed to make the collaboration between Turkish chambers and their European partners more grounded by helping the two sides to learn about their experiences. The EU considers the Turkish chambers as crucial civil society actors and views dialogue with them as essential on the grounds that

> The Turkish Chambers are one of the target groups of the Project given their responsibility within the civil society to represent the business community towards local and national authorities and to facilitate linkages with their EU counterparts. Chambers are the important players of the Civil Society in Turkey as they represent whole of Turkish enterprises operating in Turkey and representing them both locally and internationally. They act as catalysers among the businesses and law makers in order to increase competitiveness, internationalization and entrepreneurial capacities of businesses (ibid., p. 5).

The project had two segments. The main part was the establishment of "EU-Turkey Chambers Development Forum" for building partnerships between the Turkish business associations and their European counterparts while another one was related to formation of "EU-Turkey Chambers Partnership Scheme" between the two sides. The project included various activities extending from raising awareness to forming communication networks. These activities comprised of "partnership-building events, EU training seminars, publications, and general public relations work for more visibility" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 73). Thanks to this prominent project, sustainable dialogue and advanced cooperation have been fostered through the settlement of long-term partnerships. Besides, by involving Turkish chambers in the EU accession negotiations, the project has enabled Turkish chambers to become more inclusive partners in the harmonization process.

Indeed, Turkish business associations have been one of the most Europeanized civil actors in Turkey. Although they had had different attitudes towards Turkey's European

integration before the Helsinki Summit in 1999, they have gradually become one of the most active pressure groups for Turkey's Europeanization thanks to the opportunities provided by the accession context. While TÜSİAD and İKV have been the pioneering business associations actively supported Turkey's membership since the 1990s, The Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsa Birliği-TOBB) and Confederation of the Employers' Unions of Turkey (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Komisyonu-TİSK), having passively followed the process until the Helsinki Summit decision, joined the pro-EU business alliance after 1999 (Yankaya, 2009, p. 3). In sum, business associations in Turkey have been influenced the most by the Europeanization process, and have been the most dynamic and powerful pressure groups supporting Turkey's EU membership process, with TÜSİAD and İKV being the pioneers (Öner, 2012, p. 106). Especially, TÜSİAD has played very influential role in pushing for democratization and reform process in Turkey. Its activeness has been considerably important, not only in the process before the official declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy, but also during the reform process in the post-Helsinki period. Europeanization is crucial for TÜSİAD since this process enables economic and political modernization, and means a further step in order to accomplish stability and progress in line with Western standards (Bayer and Öniş, 2010, p. 182-87). During the accession process, they have been joined by TOBB whose membership is compulsory for all registered business entities in Turkey. At the end of the day, business organizations have pushed the national authorities for further political and policy Europeanization and lobbied in Europe for Turkey's membership. Besides, they have become important agents of societal Europeanization thanks to not only their participation in European business systems, for example, BUSINESSEUROPE, but also their illustrative and campaigning exercises inside EU foundations by building up their workplaces in Brussels (Yankaya, 2009, p. 4).

Indeed, many associations from Turkey alongside the business associations have established representative offices in Brussels, such as TÜSİAD, İKV, the Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu-TESK), DİSK, the ARI Movement, the Humans Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği-İHD), History Foundation (Tarih Vakfı), Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (Kadın Girişimcileri Derneği-KAGİDER), and Association for Supporting and Training Women Candidates (Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği-KA-DER). As a result, the accession

context by fostering the links between the EU authorities as well as European organizations and Turkish CSOs has promoted dialogue and cooperation among them since such networks have enabled the Turkish civil actors actively to take part in and make their contributions to the Europeanization processes of Turkey.

After the achievement of the first phase of the Dialogue, the second aspect of the program, the "Civil Society Dialog II", was presented in October 2010. Through the second phase of the program, 41 dialogue projects were completed with more than 160 NGOs from sectors related to areas of Culture and Arts and of Agriculture and Fisheries. These projects were assisted with a budget of over 5 million Euros (Ministry for EU Affairs). Similar to the first phase, the main objective was to promote cooperation among the societies of Europe by bringing CSOs from Turkey and the EU. For example, "Promoting Civil Society Dialogue Project II" targeted to improve dialogue among the aforementioned sectors. In addition to the main components of the program, small scale project ideas and local NGOs were also supported with grants of a maximum five thousands (ibid.). For instance, 41 neighborhood NGOs from various urban communities were bolstered for the association of courses, gatherings, workshops and different exercises. For example, in June 2010, the Association for Supporting Entrepreneur Business Women of Ankara arranged an international workshop with a project called "A Half Does Not Make a Whole". In a similar vein, under different project, titled "One Hand Has Nothing Civil Society Has Everything", a conference on the influence of alignment process of EU's policies and cultural harmonization was held in Samsun with the participation of CSOs from different European countries (Boşnak, 2015, p. 73). Therefore, the EU worked for the incorporation of them into the accession context by funding grassroots organizations.

In the third phase, other sectors were also included in order to expand the scope of interactions among the societies of Turkey and the EU. "Civil Society Dialogue III" was introduced in 2013. The aim was to induce "strong connections and high levels of cooperation between civil society in Turkey and their counterparts in the EU on the themes of political criteria, media and EU policy" (ibid.). On the one hand, 16 projects were completed in order to help media institutions for informing the public both in Turkey and the EU member countries about the matters related to the accession process. As for media, the EU granted 2.1

million Euros to the projects. On the other hand, 4.9 million Euros were granted to 39 projects undertaken by various CSOs working in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and anti-discrimination. The aim was to foster inclusion of Turkish civil society in shaping the political reform process and in conveying the outcomes of the alignment process to the ordinary citizens. In addition to these projects, a number of dialogue seminars in 6 provinces of Turkey were arranged in order to establish communication among CSOs, media members and national officials as key domestic actors in the accession context (Ministry for EU Affairs).

The ongoing period of the program, "Civil Society Dialogue IV" was launched in 2015 with nine different calls for proposals for new grant projects. An overall budget of 11 million Euros were granted to the projects related to nine acquis and policy fields of the EU, including "Justice, Freedom and Security; Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services; Environment; Energy; Consumer and Health Protection; Enterprise and Industrial Policy; Agriculture and Fisheries; and Education; Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments" (ibid.). In order to facilitate the program, Ministry of EU Affairs has provided an online "Partner Search and Matchmaking Tool" so as to ease the process of finding partners for CSOs (TASCO, May 13, 2015) since partnership Turkish CSOs and their European counterparts is a requirement for applying to the projects under the civil society dialogue programs. Thus, the new system has provided an important channel for the promotion of cooperation between Turkish and EU CSOs (ibid.). Moreover, civil society dialogue not only funds the projects in different areas, but also assists them through the participation of Turkish CSOs in various Community and thematic programs, that are mentioned below (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 46). Thus, the financial support of the EU to CSOs in Turkey is not limited to certain sectors.

For the period beginning from 2007, the EU has begun to give its financial assistance to Turkey under the framework of IPA in order to promote harmonization process. IPA program, which is the annual budget allocation of the EU in order to encourage changes in the applicant states through financial and specialized support as well as prepare them for EU membership, has become the primary financial tool for CSOs in Turkey to access EU funding (ibid.). The obligation regarding appropriating EU's budgetary help under the IPA is given to

the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (Merkezi Finans ve İhale Birimi-MFİB) in Turkey. The MFİB works as a free body. However, it is authoritatively appended to the under-secretariat of Treasury of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (ibid.). The lack of total independence of the MFİB has been one of the remaining challenges for empowerment of Turkish civil society.

At first, IPA I was intended for the period 2007-2013, giving budgetary help to Turkish civil society with a specific end goal to promote "transition and institution building; rural development; cross-border cooperation; human resources development and regional development" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 74). For the period 2014-2020, a new framework for pre-accession assistance to CSOs in Turkey has been implemented with IPA II. When this program is compared to the previous program, the new one has more strategic concerns and "the principle of ownership" is fostered via country strategy papers (ibid.). Like the former, the latter also assigns civil society as one of the main sectors for financial support.

Furthermore, apart from financial instruments particularly related to the pre-accession, the EU has also opened some "Community Programs" from which Turkish CSOs can benefit. Although these programs are set out by the EU so as to promote cooperation and exchange experiences among the member states, third countries can participate in some of these programs. The candidate states are included in such programs if they sign a memorandum with the Commission and contribute to these programs (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 47). Turkey has increasingly been taking part in these programs such as "Culture 2007"; "Youth Actions"; "Framework Program"; "Lifelong Learning Program"; and "Social Policy Program". These programs have provided CSOs in Turkey with diverse financial sources through which they are able to benefit from EU funding. For Turkey, the EU gives some part of IPA with which Turkey can participate in community programs (ibid.).

Another mechanism for assisting CSOs in Turkey is the "European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights" (EIDHR). Turkey has benefitted from this program since 2002. Although the enhancement of human rights is a primary concern with respect to all EU funding, EIDHR has become the main instrument of encouraging activities of civil society and advancing democracy and human rights in third countries. In general, the main priority areas under EIDHR program are

Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries where they are most at risk; 2) Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and, in consolidating political participation and representation; 3) Supporting actions on human rights and democracy issues in areas covered by EU Guidelines, including on human rights dialogues, on human rights defenders, on the death penalty, on torture, on children and armed conflict, on the rights of the child, on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, on International Humanitarian Law and on possible future guidelines; 4) Supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection and promotion of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy; 5) Building confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral processes, in particular through election observation (Commission of the European Communities, 2010, p. 4).

The calls for proposals since 2002 has demonstrated that EIDHR has primarily funded associations working on human rights in Turkey since the program heavily stresses the importance of such actors in policy making processes (Boşnak, 2015, p. 75). With this program, Turkish CSOs have become more active players in decision making cycles. Besides, such thematic field programs have contributed to the development of civil society in Turkey by enabling internalization of a select number of NGOs without the broad-based involvement of civil society at large (İçduygu, 2013, p. 179).

The EIDHR is a significant thematic budgetary mechanism which covers and supplements other civil society support mechanisms in Turkey. However, the most important strength of the EIDHR program is the independence of its budget from governmental bodies. As opposed to IPA, EIDHR funding is independent in its budget coming from EuropeAid. In this respect, the EIDHR programs applied to Turkey can be funded with two main ways. The first way is based on global grant schemes that are available to all nations while the second instrument is relied on country support schemes managed by country delegations. Hence, in contrast to IPA, financial assistance is not distributed under consent of governments and CSOs in Turkey are directly funded by the EU bodies (Boşnak, 2015, p. 76). This funding has crucial importance especially in the case of Turkey where the long-standing strong and centralized state tradition at some intervals highly tends to suppress opposing voices.

All in all, the EU-originated assistance has contributed to the democratization process in general and the enhancement of civil society in particular. Nevertheless, there have

been several criticisms on the funding instrument of the EU. On the one hand, the survey results reveal that EU funding is extremely important for stakeholders. On the other hand, they also criticize "the cumbersome, bureaucratic and unclear nature of aid competition" (Altan-Olcay and İçduygu, 2012, p. 169). Although most EU funding schemes in Turkey are applied with the explicit aim of addressing elitism, NGOs outside of the major cities in Turkey are not easily able to apply to EU projects due to capacity limitations (Birden and Rumelili, 2009) since application procedures to such projects include "too many bureaucratic requirements and serious professionalism" (Rumelili 2005, p. 51). These criticisms are important points needed to be taken into consideration and local organizations should be more involved in projects.

Taking everything into consideration, although there has been still necessity for further steps in the realm of EU funding in order to make this assistance more efficient for the benefit of Turkish civil society, the EU funding has improved the activities of NGOs through the implementation of aforementioned programs (İçduygu, 2007, pp. 191-94). As Ergun well summarizes that

> funding provided by the EU helps domestic CSOs to enhance capacity-building and to diversify their activities. Interaction with the international community of donors and civil society organizations has a transformative impact on civil society in Turkey. Through the financial and advisory support of European partners, Turkish civil society associations have become more active and more visible in the public eye. They have not only increased their activities but also acquired more skills to engage in issue-based work. Interaction makes local CSOs internationalized. This implies that they have been learning an 'international/European way' of doing civil society work; observe and interact with their international counterparts, which facilitates experience sharing and exchange of know-how (2010, pp. 515-16).

Therefore, the funding policies and mechanisms of the EU as being one of the direct contributions of Europeanization processes to Turkish CSOs have brought several indirect benefits to them, for example by increasing their visibility and legitimacy both at the international and domestic arena. More importantly, through funding instrument, Turkish CSOs have the opportunity to become more active players in policy-making processes both at the EU and domestic level by taking part in various projects. As a result, while the direct influence of conditionality mechanism has worked for the elimination of foreign funding for

CSOs in Turkey, the funding policies and mechanisms of the EU have in turn contributed not only to the legal Europeanization of Turkey's public policies in general and civil society field in particular but also to the incorporation of domestic actors into the harmonization process.

4.2.2. Cooperation through Interactions, Networks and Partnerships

International networks have a decisive role in triggering and contributing to universal participation since membership in international networks provides important opportunities for local actors, by generating an environment in which a great deal of local, regional and international CSOs can interact with each other, thus increasing their organizational capacity all together. Hence, "familiarity with a number of networks" promotes international cooperation. Significant sorts of exercises with which global collaboration can prosper include "personal ties, friendship, occasions such as meetings, joint seminars, conferences, workshops and training, project-based activities, mutual aid and solidarity support for campaigns, consultancy and joint publications" (Ergun, 2010, p. 512).

In general, networks provide remarkable opportunities for the consolidation of civil society all over the world. International cooperation and relationships with international organizations enhance capacities of various domestic CSOs. Without doubt, the significance of the chance to exchange information and experience for CSOs is over and over underscored. CSOs generally team up with associations from nations with more learning and experience while some others want to impart information and experience to their worldwide partners working in similar fields. The more interaction expands the visibility of domestic associations and anchors the coherence of worldwide participation. International networking activities usually bring together CSOs functioning in same fields. Domestic organizations which are active in their respective areas become addresses and references for international organizations.

In the accession process, the EU has encouraged the involvement of Turkish civil society actors in external and internal networks especially through the partnership requirement in return for financial assistance. First, the EU works for the establishment and promotion of external networks between Turkish CSOs and their European counterparts. Second, the EU encourages internal networks among Turkish CSOs as well as between

Turkish civil actors and policy makers in Turkey. Hence, the direct contribution of the EU's funding has reinforced the cooperation dimension of Europeanization processes at the same time. Such cooperation through interactions, partnerships and networks at different levels has indirectly worked for the socialization process of the respective actors within the accession context.

In terms of external networks, the European Commission actively encourages the involvement of candidate country NGOs "in transnational networks and European umbrella organizations" (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 133). This dimension of Europeanization process is the most important mechanism for collective socialization as Weber puts it

> The EU has also supported Turkish civil society in other ways, for example, by working to create and reinforce links between civil society in the European Union and civil society in Turkey. In these and other ways, the EU has acted as an agent of socialization, where socialization is understood as the induction of new members into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a society. It should be emphasized again, however, that the process of socialization is both top-down and bottom-up. [...] in some areas the European Union has led the way while in others the pre-accession process has supported work already being done by civil society organizations (2006, p. 92).

In general, the EU accession process creates an important opportunity for Turkish CSOs to interact with their counterparts in other member states. More importantly, several EU programs have required the establishment of partnerships in various fields of cooperation with other European NGOs as a condition for funding, further encouraging the development of external networks. As a result, the participation of Turkish CSOs in these external networks triggers learning and mutual understanding between actors. Learning through interaction to shape and implement EU policies empowers CSOs in the accession process, thus supporting the bottom up Europeanization process of Turkey by empowering domestic CSOs and involving them in policy-making processes. Indeed, issue-based external networks are a noteworthy normal for the European administration. Along these lines, CSOs can figure out how to advance discourse, organize, trade encounters with their partners and exchange EU practices to the national level and can encourage shared comprehension (Boşnak 2015, p. 133). Thus, the EU by explicitly requiring partnerships for funding has directly contributed to the establishment of networks which in turn produce long-lasting implicit outcomes on the Europeanization of Turkey by increasing interactions among the societies in Europe. That is

to say, different mechanisms of Europeanization processes have been interactively reinforcing each other.

In this respect, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement promoted by the EU deserves crucial attention since these two memorable opponents went to the edge of war on various events before. Besides, Turkey's EU candidacy became possible owing to the withdrawal of Greek veto. Moreover, the relations between these two countries are also important in terms of finding a peaceful solution to inter-state disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. With respect to Turkish and Greek policymakers and civil society actors, the EU not only as a funder but also as a legitimizer has contributed to Greek-Turkish cooperation and dialogue (Rumelili, 2005, pp. 45-49). The EU's role as a legitimizer is analyzed in the next section. Now, the influence of EU by requiring partnerships as a condition for funding on this cooperation is figured out.

After fighting with each other for independence and territory, the Greek and Turkish publics have been forcefully separated with a compulsory population exchange in the 1920s, and since then socialized into antagonistic national identities by their respective nation states. Due to this separation and socialization, Greek and Turkish publics embraced opposing positions in the inter-state disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean and rallied around the flag during times of crisis. However, the twin earthquakes of İzmir and Athens consecutively in August and September 1999 triggered a boost in Greek-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, for the first few years following the 1999 earthquakes, the collaboration among Greek and Turkish civil societies depended on ad hoc basis and on personal efforts rather than common interest (Pridham, 1991, pp. 73-88). In any case, as for discoveries of Rumelili (2005), and Birden and Rumelili (2009), Turkey's EU candidacy process in general, and the EU funding allocated for Greek-Turkish joint civil society projects in Turkey in particular, have fostered as well as legitimized cooperation between organized Greek-Turkish civil society actors, expanding on the air of shared sensitivity following the 1999 seismic tremors. Indeed, Greek-Turkish civil society cooperation had remained isolated elite initiatives and detached from the general public before the Turkish accession process.

At this point, it should be reminded that the literature on civil society and conflict resolution figures out that there have been four potential drawbacks of civil society activities.

Elitism, the detachment from local conditions and priorities, problem of sustainability, and failure to lead attitudinal change can be potential shortcomings of peace-building through civil society cooperation (Diez *et al.*, 2006). In this regard, the EU's role in conflict resolution through its promotion of civil society cooperation has also been evaluated in many conflict settings in the European periphery. For example, Demetriou (2008) analyzes the influence of bicommunal projects through mutual civil society activities in Cyprus funded by EU and concludes that this cooperation has to some extent tackled the legal obstacle to civil society cooperation in Cyprus, arising from the non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Accordingly, in the context of Turkey's EU candidacy, the EU became a primary donor of civil society initiatives between Greece and Turkey. The main aim of the EU's funding was to consolidate and diversify the fields of the previously sporadic cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs, through partnerships at the grassroots as well as the regional level (Birden and Rumelili, 2009, p. 322).

In this respect, the European Commission developed an extensive program designed to empower Turkish civil society in 2002. Under "Civil Society Development Program", two components, namely "Local Civic Initiatives" and "Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue", have been put into practice with the assistance of NGO Support Team formed in Ankara. The CSDP was designed to address some of the aforestated potential problems about civil society involvement in peace-building. For instance, in order to overcome elitism, small-scale and emerging NGOs from different parts of Turkey as well as partnerships between Turkish and European NGOs were primarily supported. In this respect, in order to support small scale NGOs for the complex procedures of EU funding, NGO Support Team provided technical assistance for civic initiatives in these two countries by, for example, preparing a website in English, Greek and Turkish and a database of Turkish and Greek NGOs. Besides, it distributed regular newsletters to more than 1000 Greek, Cypriot, Turkish and other international recipients. Moreover, the NGO Support Team arranged various workshops to bring together Greek and Turkish CSOs and concentrate on issues of mutual mistrust, enmity, fears, prejudices and stereotypes (ibid., p. 325). More importantly, under the CSDP, "Greek Turkish Civic Dialogue Component" explicitly required partnerships between Greek and Turkish NGOs as a condition for funding. The aim was to strengthen the capacity of civil society, foster cooperation for dialogue, networking and partnerships and diversify areas of

cooperation between Greece and Turkey. Under the Component, two open calls for proposals were launched subsequently in 2003 and 2004. In total, fifteen joint projects were selected with target areas ranging from cultural heritage, rural development, tourism, gender, conflict resolution, minority rights, environment and to culture and the arts (ibid, pp. 322-24).

Birden and Rumelili (2009) evaluate these projects in their study, with respect to reports and interviews given by the project coordinators, succeeded in involving Greek and Turkish audiences beyond the immediate beneficiaries of each project and beyond organized civil society groups. Unlike the previous ad hoc initiatives mostly undertaken by cultural and political elites already committed to the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, issue-based joint projects of the Dialogue have succeeded in including larger groups with shared interests. Besides, through their structure and design, the potential problems of elitism, existing mutual distrust, technical difficulties, and detachment of civil society activities from general public were explicitly addressed (ibid., p. 325). Moreover, these projects have contributed to the capacity building of CSOs in both countries and increased their ability for networking with their counterparts in the Union, fundraising and designing projects. The authors conclude that the EU membership prospect and process has not only an important influence on the empowerment of civil society in Turkey, but also on the common perception that the networks of civil society cooperation which have been established between two countries will prevent a reversal to a state of open conflict prevails although there have been still tensions over the bilateral disputes during the Turkey's EU accession (p. 328). Therefore, the direct requirement of partnerships for funding have produced positive outcomes through mutual socialization of the civic actors via dialogue and networking.

Following the expiration of the CSDP in 2005, the EU has maintained supporting Turkish CSOs by increasing available EU funds, especially as part of the third pillar strategy of promoting civil society dialogue between the EU and candidate nations. The Delegation of European Commission to Turkey began to administer "Small Projects Program in Turkey: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue" and granted one million Euros. Under this Program, the EU requested from Turkish NGOs to apply with a European, but not necessarily Greek partner. While this new partnership requirement has dramatically contributed to the formation of various networks in new areas of cooperation, some of the previous partnerships raised

from Greek-Turkish Dialogue continued to prefer each other (ibid., p. 329), showing the success of the preceding program by employing the partnership principle in creating stable civil society cooperation between the two countries. Accordingly, Turkish CSOs have considerably improved relations among themselves, with their European counterparts and Turkish governmental institutions so as to fulfill EU funding requirements and/or benefit from opportunities provided by the accession process.

As in the case of CEECs, the external networks between Turkish CSOs and their European counterparts have also contributed to internalization, redefinition, reevaluation of European norms, values, principles. Moreover, CSOs in Turkey have utilized these external systems to gain international recognition, raise their national image and shape EU policies towards Turkey (Kutter and Trappmann, 2010).

To begin with, Europeanization process has resulted in internalization of European values as Öner argues that the human rights, women's and environmental movements have been positively influenced by internalization of EU values, and the transnational activities of civil society have increased. Besides, business associations are among the most affected actors in this process. In order to illustrate, the Europeanization process of MÜSİAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen-Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) is selected intentionally. Being an Islamically-oriented business association, it stresses "Islamic ethics in economy and the importance of religiosity in society and the individual's life" (Yankaya, 2009, p. 4). On the one hand, an analysis of Europeanization of MÜSİAD is related to the study on business associations constituting an important dynamic of Turkish civil society. On the other hand, the evolution of MÜSİAD is also studied in parallel to the Islamic movements in Turkey (ibid.). Therefore, the evaluation on its Europeanization process is valuable in order to show how far the transformative influence of the EU on CSOs can reach, including religious groups.

Especially in the second half of the 1990s due to the relative economic liberalization, MÜSİAD voiced the need for Turkey's economic alignment with the EU's economic system earlier compared to other Islamic organizations. However, MÜSİAD's stance against EU was characterized by hard Euroscepticism during 1994-1999. It was against European integration process, by arguing that existence of civilizational divergences between Turkey and Europe

would make such an integration impossible. The Helsinki Decision in 1999, particularly with its promotion of civilian control over the military, has triggered an important change in the positions of MÜSİAD and other Islamic groups since the EU has provided an opportunity to advance their economic and political power against the secularist military establishment (Uğur and Yankaya, 2008, pp. 8-9).

In general, the process of EU integration has led social actors to reassess and redefine their own identities, political stances and preferences. This context necessitates a deeper understanding of Europeanization than the evaluations of the process at the political level since Europeanization process has also to do with the creative usage of the interactive process of the EU integration by the domestic social actors. As Jacquot and Woll (2003) argue that the concept of usage

> covers both the strategic interaction of rational actors with the European institutions and the more sociological effect of usage - as daily practice - on the interest and identities of the actors. The concept thus ties political changes and transformations to the utilisation an actor is able to make of the European integration process and the less conscious, habitual practice that might evolve out of this utilisation. [...] These practices and political interactions happen as the actors go back and forth between the European level and the national, local, sectoral or institutional level on which they act (or wish to act), creating a context of reciprocal influence (pp. 3-4).

In parallel to theoretical considerations of Jacquot and Woll on the interactive Europeanization process, for the case of MÜSİAD, Yankaya argues that

> At the end of the day, Islamic groups found themselves drawn into this interactive Europeanization process through learning to take the EU/Europe not only as a mere political opportunity provider but also as a normative reference point for the re-evaluation and re-definition of individual and collective identities. MUSİAD, as a professional association of businessmen, provides a suggestive case to demonstrate that Europeanization engenders a process of questioning previously accepted patterns as well as an effort to coordinate with the newly experienced European business norms and practices (2009, p. 6).

As a result, the Europeanization context has brought about the reformulation of political and social arguments based on religious dimensions into democratization-related debates on human rights, rule of law and multiculturalism, thanks to the promise of EU on

religious freedoms and the increased "interaction of Islamic and European ideas and practices" (Yavuz, 2006, p. 256).

The analysis of changes in the position of MUSİAD vis-à-vis the EU is important in order not only to show the influence of the EU over Turkish CSOs but also to demonstrate the interactive processes of Europeanization by underlining the long-term effects of interactions. First of all, due to the completion of customs union, increased bilateral trade ties have provided for Turkish businessmen intense contact with their European counterparts. Through close economic relations, they have also integrated with European business spaces as well as practices and culture. In this respect, MÜSİAD's economic ties with their European partners have resulted in several activities, such as international expos like the International Furnishing Show, providing important channels of interaction between businessmen from Turkey and the EU. Besides, by enlarging its trade area, members of the organization have entered in a phase of economic socialization in the European markets through organizing several visits to many EU countries and through establishing their representational offices in EU countries. Due to Turkey's compliance with European standards in economic affairs, European business norms and quality standards have influenced the way Turkish businessmen interpret the operation of the Turkish internal market. For example, MÜSİAD has begun to criticize the products with no the CE mark (ibid., p. 6).

Secondly, MÜSİAD businessmen have trade ties not only with the countries from the EU but also with the Balkans, Central Asian and the Middle East countries. As a result, they have experienced and compared the economic practices and business culture of different countries. They have credited European economic norms and practices over non-European ones; as a result, largely preferred European partners. MÜSİAD businessmen have been impressed by the qualities of European standards such as precise work definitions and working hours, the clear division of labor and clear checking mechanisms. More importantly, they have gradually associated the transparency of commercial and financial transactions with European business norms (ibid., p. 8). Thus, rational calculations of MÜSİAD have been contributing to the changes in the perceptions of its members vis-à-vis the EU.

Last but not least, MÜSİAD now has information services for its members on the EU accession process, new EU regulations and EU funding projects. The organization also

"encourages them to be open to the European market and to integrate into the EU business world" (ibid.).

However, although MÜSİAD embraced a very pro-EU standing in the golden age of the relations, the association has endorsed a soft Eurosceptic position due to the decline of EU's credibility, for example by putting permanent safeguards on the free movement of labor. Indeed, the important point is that this soft skepticism, as opposed to hard scepticism before the EU integration process, prevails without giving up Turkey's EU membership. Rather, it criticizes EU's policies within the context of integration, differing from the civilizational divergence argument.

In addition to internalization of European norms, values and principles, as aforementioned, CSOs in Turkey have used external networks with the EU to gain international recognition, raise their national and international image and shape EU policies towards Turkey. One of the clearest examples of how Turkish NGOs has taken the advantage external ties is the participation of Turkish women's NGOs in the European Women's Lobby (EWL). This organization is the most prominent and largest NGO network of women's organizations within Europe. The involvement of the Turkish women's NGOs in EWL has remarkably contributed to reliability, validity and leverage, and their supplies. Although the feminist movement had "launched campaigns to push the state to recognize and take necessary measures against domestic violence and eliminate discriminatory laws", feminist demands "received little more than lip-service from various governments until the late 1990s" (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009, p. 360).

Firstly, in terms of international recognition, the EU accession process, by lifting the ban on international connections through conditionality, enabled Turkish women's NGOs to become members of the EWL. Accordingly, in 2004, a number of women's NGOs by coming together formed the Turkish Coordination of the EWL. KA-DER has become the Secretariat of the EWL. The cooperation between the EWL and women civil society in Turkey is a noteworthy incident since this collaboration has increased visibility of Turkish women's NGOs at the international stage. Besides, the Turkish Coordination has eagerly taken part in many activities within the structure of EWL. Through these activities, Turkish women have found an important opportunity to show their knowledge and capability. Thus, they have

improved the profile of the movement of Turkish women in Europe. The Turkish Delegate of the EWL with whom an interview was made in 2013 stated that

> memberships to the EWL represent an historical step in the collaboration and solidarity between women of Turkey and women in Europe. We, the women of Turkey, are members of the EU now. [...] participation in European Women's Lobby allowed Turkish women's organizations to demonstrate different strategies of mobilization and knowledge of feminism and peculiarities of the women's movement in Turkey (Interview Turkish Delegate to the EWL 2013 in Boşnak, 2015, p. 133).

Thus, the legal changes in Turkey directly required by the compliance process with the acquis have brought indirect benefits on the practices of Turkish women's civil society. Thanks to the process of Turkey's Europeanization in legal terms by allowing the cooperation between Turkish CSOs with their European counterparts, societal Europeanization through interactions has influenced the practices of civil society in Turkey.

As aforementioned, the participation in such transnational networks has enabled Turkish NGOs both to raise their leverage vis-à-vis the state and to shape EU policies. For instance, Europe has been a significant symbol for the women of Turkey. However, Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999 has added a further dimension to this symbolic importance by enabling women's NGOs in Turkey to push the state to make gender-sensitive legal changes in different fields (Boşnak, 2015, p. 120). In this respect, the most important consequence of the societal Europeanization of women's NGOs through cooperation has been comprehensive reforms in the Law on Associations, the Turkish Civil Code, the Turkish Penal Code, Municipality Law and the Turkish Labour Law which have been undertaken since 2001 (ibid., p. 115). These numerous changes in the legal framework have influenced the political and social context where civil society operates (ibid.). As a result, the cooperation dimension of the Europeanization processes by empowering women's civil society in Turkey has in turn enabled Turkish women's NGOs to affect the Turkey's Europeanization process in legal terms. In this way, the legal and practical outcomes of Europeanization processes are mutually contribute to each other. More importantly, top down requirements urged by the EU such as fostering cooperation through partnership principle have contributed to the bottom up dynamic of Turkey's democratization and Europeanization process by increasing the recognition of Turkish women's NGOs. To illustrate, two fundamental authoritative reforms made in Civil and Penal Codes are analyzed in order to display how the societal

Europeanization of women's NGOs, in terms of cooperation among themselves and with their European counterparts, has contributed both to their empowerment vis-à-vis the government and to direct European concerns on their cause.

The pre-accession context has fostered the collaboration and formation of networks among Turkish women's NGOs. In order to be more powerful in European circles, these organizations have organized several campaigns by coming together through platforms. In this regard, stages built up among women's NGOs, such as "Civil Code Women's Platform" in 2001; "Women's Penal Code Platform" in 2002; and "Women's Platform for the Constitution" in 2011, have encouraged collaboration on various areas and intensified shared values among these domestic actors. These interactions are important both for promoting positive dialogue and solidarity among various actors and for making CSOs more significant players in policy making cycles.

To begin with the reform process on the Civil Code deserves attention to show the importance of domestic and international cooperation within the processes of Europeanization. Although the Turkish women's movement had long questioned the inferior position of women and the discriminatory measures reflected in patriarchal structure of the Civil Code, it began to be seriously criticized by the feminist movement in Turkey in terms of gender-sensitive approach mainly since 1980s. However, their leverage against government remained limited to invoke important reforms (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009). In this respect, Europeanization processes have empowered the bottom up dynamics in Turkey, leading Turkish women's NGOs to influence both the Turkish state and policies of the EU towards Turkey.

The Women for Women's Human Rights New Ways (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler-KİH- YÇ) embraced the cause and worked for raising awareness in the international fora to mobilize international support. Another women's association, KA-DER also adopted the cause of amending the Code. At the international level, the UN and especially the EU due to Turkey's EU accession context together have played role in supporting Turkish women's movement in this process. A staff from KİH-YÇ with whom an interview was made in 2011 stated that

It is true that we use the EU tool to overcome the state's resistance and refer to the Copenhagen criteria to increase the pressure on the state and amend the legislation. Moreover, we have used the EU framework to mobilize international support (Interview KİH-YÇ 2011 Boşnak, 2015, p. 121).

In 2000, the government, by taking women's proposals into consideration, prepared the draft law of the Civil Code. However, the question of property was not solved in the draft law due to the rejections by the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) and Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) although feminist demanded to replace the separation of property with the shared property regime, which would give women the ideal to share the property picked up amid the marriage, thus recognizing women's labour work in home-place (Arat, 2008, p. 403). In this respect, the Civil Code Women Platform, under which 126 NGOs came together, launched a major campaign for gender-sensitive reforms in the beginning of 2001. Although there was a harsh resistance from the government against shared property, the women's movement succeeded in the adoption of this regime in November 2001. Women's NGOs from various segments of the society were united for this common cause. Thanks to the domestic and international campaign of the movement, the demands of the movement were accepted by the government. The new Civil Code "eliminated the supremacy of men in marriage and established gender equality in the family" (İlkkaracan, 2007, p. 159).

Another illustration is the reform of the Turkish Penal Code in the EU accession context. Following the accomplishment of the past battle, in 2002, the women's movement coordinated by the KİH-YÇ established the Women's Penal Code Platform under which thirty CSOs organized campaigns to demand the changes in the Penal Code because the Code sexual crimes committed against women were defined as crimes against public morality and social order. The women's movement demanded these crimes to be regarded as violations against individual women's rights. This platform was very important incident by transcending the political divisions in the society since it brought together "feminist, Kemalist, and a few Islamist women's organizations" (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009, p. 365), thus showing the potential benefits of civil society through cooperation. In the same year, the KİH- YÇ formed the Women's Working Group on the Penal Code including "the representatives of women's NGOs, bar associations and academicians all around Turkey" to represent different approaches and to increase participation (ibid.). This group prepared its own draft report and lobbied extensively. With the election of the JDP, however, the new government established

its own committee and did not properly address the discriminatory provisions (Özdemir, 2014, p. 128). In response, the movement of women initiated a big campaign and enlarged the working gathering to the national stage which organized various awareness raising exercises and campaigned intensively (ibid.). Nevertheless, in 2004, then Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan assailed the women's platform at a media conference and stated that

> There were even those who marched to Ankara, carrying placards that do not suit the Turkish women. I cannot applaud behavior that does not suit our morality and traditions. [...] A marginal group does not have any right to represent the Turkish women (Quoted in İlkkaracan, 2007, p. 163).

When Erdoğan attempted to criminalize adultery in 2005, a wide range of women's groups formed a European network for immediate action. The women's group explained the incompatibility of this step with the EU's standards and norms to European counterparts. In 2004, the successful campaign of Turkish women's NGOs stemmed from both "domestic organization and strong support from the EWL in Brussels" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 122). Respectively, the government's proposal to criminalize adultery caused an emergency between the EU and Turkey. The former pushed the latter to draw back the proposed law. As a consequence, the government withdrew the proposal and made transformative changes in the Penal Code in 2005, by regulating several forms of gender-based violations in a liberal sense (Arat, 2008, p. 407; Özdemir, 2014, p. 127) as a dissident and prime supporter of KİH-YÇ, Pınar İlkkaracan, states that "The campaign succeeded in achieving a holistic reform to transform the philosophy and principles of the Penal Code in order to safeguard women's rights, and bodily and sexual autonomy" (İlkkaracan, 2007, p. 7). Therefore, women's NGOs not only directed EU towards their causes, but also pushed the state to endorse their proposals. To put it differently, this case illustrates how Turkish women's NGOs by uploading their concerns to European agenda benefited from the EU accession context in general and from the cooperation with their European counterparts in particular to justify their cause and gain leverage vis-à-vis the state.

Moreover, an Advisory Board on the Status of Women comprised of CSOs was formed in 2010. The State Minister for Family Affairs chairs the 36- member the Advisory Board on the Status of Women. Since 2011, related to the preparation of new civilian Constitution, women's associations established a Women Platform lobbying for improving

the gender policy in Turkey. In this respect, they were organized under the Constitution Platform and Constitution Reconciliation Platform. Through these platforms, the women's groups actively presented their demands by sending its proposals to all the main policy makers (Müftüler-Baç, 2016, p. 119).

Last but not least, the activities and efforts of the KAGİDER, a prominent women's NGO in Turkey, further demonstrate how external networks formed between Turkish civil society actors and EU institutions as well as officials have enabled the former to shape EU policies towards Turkey. KAGİDER is a very active organization working on different issues to upload their concerns on European agenda. In this respect, it has formed contacts between European and Turkish parliamentarians in breakfast meetings in order to make pressure on the Turkish government to establish a specialized commission on gender equality (Rumelili and Keyman, 2013, p. 74). Besides, as the former vice President of KAGİDER, Ayla Sevand, mentions that KAGİDER's office in Brussels has organized meetings with officials of the Commission and Members of the EP and that they have a joint project on women ambassadors with the point of expanding correspondence between Turkish women and women in the member states (Interview 2010 in Öner, 2012, p. 108). Thus, KAGİDER shows great effort for shaping EU's understanding towards Turkey. In this regard, the project concentrates especially on Austria, France and Germany since the public opinion in these countries is more skeptical about Turkey's membership to the EU. Accordingly, KAGİDER has made several visits to these countries by taking successful Turkish women to organize seminars in order to inform European people on controversial issues such as the position of women in religion (ibid.).

Another example of how participation in European networks has enabled Turkish CSOs to raise their leverage vis-à-vis the state and shape EU policies towards Turkey is that the incorporation of the right of conscientious objection into the accession talks through the political activism of Turkish conscientious objectors at the European level. Although they may have pursued their demand only at the national level since laws which restrict national service to military service are open to question on constitutional grounds, conscientious objectors in Turkey has chosen to use European level instruments in order to pursue their demands (Rumelili *et al*., 2012, p. 51). They have showed their European-level political

activism not only through petitioning the ECtHR but also through close contacts formed with EU's institutions, especially with the European Parliament and Commission, and with objectionist movements and organizations in Europe.

In the early 1990s, conscientious objection became a public issue in Turkey when two citizens, Vedat Zencir and Tayfun Gönül, publicly announced "their objection to perform military service on conscientious grounds" (Çınar and Üsterci, 2008, p. 9). Following the first objections, several conscientious objection associations were established in the 1990s. The first one, İzmir Anti-War Association, was founded in 1992. The target of the Association was to resist all forms of militarism in the country (Üsterci and Yorulmaz, 2008, p. 218). In Istanbul, another anti-war association was formed in 1994. The Anti-Militarist Initiative, to which many objector groups joined, was founded. Meanwhile, the objectors were begun to be tried in military courts since they were charged with violating Anti-Terrorism Law (ibid., p. 220). For the first time, in 1997, one of the imprisoned objectors, Osman Murat Ülke, brought his case before the ECtHR. In 2006, the Court found that Turkey had violated the ECHR. The Turkish state was sentenced to a payment fine. Besides, the Court urged Turkey to take necessary steps. This was a significant breakthrough in the efforts of Turkish conscientious objectors. In addition to the litigation at the ECtHR, the political activism of the movement through networking with the EU's decision makers and civil society is equally noteworthy as Rumelili *et al.* clearly (2012) notes that

> Turkey's conscientious objectors are active in the European policy arenas, through their intense contacts with their European counterparts. From the very inception, organizations advocating the right of conscientious objection in Turkey have organized common anti-war rallies and festivals, and shared stories of various objectors in their countries with their European counterparts. For example, immediately after its establishment, the Anti-Militarist Initiative immediately became part of the European Network of Objectors. These partnerships and contacts have been crucial in informing European institutions of the various pending cases of objection in Turkey and in pressuring the EU to include the issue of the right of conscientious objection in Turkey's membership negotiations (pp. 55-56).

Indeed, the Progress Reports on Turkey until 2005 did not include the question of conscientious objection. Finally, thanks to European level activism of the conscientious movement in Turkey, the Commission 2005 Report stated that

Turkey does not recognize the right of conscientious objection to compulsory military service and has no alternative civilian service, as prescribed by the Council of Europe Recommendation which lays down the principles regarding conscientious objection (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a, p. 109).

After 2005, the issue of conscientious objection has begun to occupy the EU agenda. As a result, the issue has started to be raised more prominently on the agenda of European institutions. For example, the 2006 Progress Report repeated its concerns and demanded necessary reforms (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 61). In addition to the Commission, the European Parliament also partaken in the issue by adopting a resolution on conscientious objection in Turkey. With this Resolution, for the first time, the Parliament directly urged Turkey to revise the laws governing the right of conscientious objection if Turkey wants to join the EU. In the resolution, the European Parliament

Recalls that the ECHR advised Turkey to prepare a new legal framework for conscientious objectors and reminds Turkey that the right to conscientious objection is recognised in the EU Charter of Fundamental Right (EP Resolution on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, 2006).

Nevertheless, Turkey has not recognized the right of conscientious objection yet. The important point is that the European-level political activism of the conscientious objectors in Turkey has increased the discussions on conscientious objection. That is to say, the conscientious objection is no longer a taboo subject in the country. Such organizations have started to be taken consideration by Turkish national authorities. To illustrate, in 2012, the Conscientious Objectors Platform participated in and made a presentation at Parliament's constitution-making commission, the Constitution Conciliation Commission, in order to explain and demand their cause (Hürriyet Daily News, April 10, 2012). Besides, they have succeeded in the incorporation of the issue into the accession framework.

To put it differently, if the Turkey's conscientious objectors had pursued their demands solely at the national level, it is not sure that the question would have taken place in the agenda of EU-Turkey relations at all. Therefore, the transnational advocacy of conscientious objection movement of Turkey through European-level channels, in particular lobbying activities in European networks, is able to shape the EU policy towards Turkey. However, it should be noted that their European-level activism has not just remained as a

strategy of using the EU and the Council of Europe as leverage against to pressure the Turkish state. Turkey's conscientious objectors have stayed as European actors by maintaining their "European-level activism to question, challenge, and transform the dominant European interpretations of conscientious objection" (Rumelili *et al.,* 2012, p. 52). Thus, they are enhancing "a vision of not only an alternative Turkey, but also of a different European polity, and are responsibilizing European institutions for the realization of this alternative vision" (ibid.). In general, this situation shows that Europeanization outcomes have been collectively shaped through the EU-based factors alongside domestic elements, thus making European integration an interactive and dynamic process. In particular, the case is also important to figure out how the cooperation dimension of Europeanization processes has contributed to the incorporation of the issue into the accession framework, thus integrating the topic into the conditionality mechanism of the EU.

For various groups in Turkey, the matters that the EU stresses and the level of pressure it exerts on the Turkish state are significant concerns. Last but not least, Kurdish citizens of Turkey are among the groups who benefit from European level activism. They have sought to make the Kurdish question as a critical political issue in Turkey's EU accession process and influenced EU policy in that direction. In this respect, Kurdish civil society actors, through their external networks, have assumed a great part in forming the EU's motivation on the Kurdish issue (Rumelili *et al*., 2011). Some Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin regard themselves to be situated in these external networks through which they enjoy privileged access to EU institutions and officials in a way that bypasses domestic authorities. Other Kurdish citizens of Turkey perceive realistic opportunities for participating in such networks, and mobilize campaigns which target EU institutions. Still others take part in ethnic Kurdish networks in Europe so as to raise their voices in European public spheres (ibid., p. 1301). "By pursuing their demands at, in or through European institutions", Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin "constitute Europe as a polity, with the capacity and legitimate responsibility" to have an impact on the Kurdish question. Besides, "through their input they are shaping EU policies" on the Kurdish question and so that influencing "the policies of a polity to which they do not formally belong". "Through their criticism" they can hold the European institutions "accountable to the normative order of the European community that they claim to share" (ibid., p. 1297).

Kurdish residents of Turkey partake politically in expanded European orders by taking an interest in the information networks of EU institutions. For example, Commission authorities and European Parliament delegations visit consistently civil society actors and local politicians in Diyarbakır to get ready EU reports and trade data on human rights practices in Turkey. The data accessed from these intermittent visits constitutes the principle premise of the areas on the Kurdish issue in the reports of Commission and Parliament, as one of the previous leaders of the Diyarbakir Bar Association, Sezgin Tanrikulu, with whom an interview was made in 2008 stated that "They generally visit us before setting up their reports. We at that point frequently observe our own particular sentences in the reports" (Interview, 2008 in Rumelili *et. al.,* 2011, p. 1307). Another prominent figure, Osman Baydemir, the mayor of Diyarbakır between 2004 and 2014, is one of the leading participants in these networks, for example, he was the first mayor who was invited to participate in the EU Visitors Programme. Baydemir was regularly invited to take part in other EU and EP forums both for giving speeches and making contacts and for presenting informing and submitting reports to the EP on the situation of local governance and the Kurdish issue in Turkey (ibid.).

In addition to participating in these information networks, campaigns are mobilized by Kurdish citizens in Turkey. These campaigns target EU institutions in particular and the European public spheres in general. For example, a petition was organized in 2005 in order to demand "an expansion of the freedoms of thought, expression and association, a new constitution and democratic structures which would secure a fearless existence for Kurdish citizens in Turkey, and recognition of Kurdish as an official language" (Bianet, 8 April, 2005). With this campaign, 83 Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin sent a letter to the Turkish Parliament and the EP in order to convey their demands and perspectives. Besides, an online version of the letter was presented in a website to address the European public. In order to appeal to the EU, the group concludes the letter by mentioning that "the EU has a legal and ethical responsibility to ensure the smooth functioning of this process" (ibid.). Therefore, by calling European authorities to take part in the issue, Kurdish citizens have worked for shaping EU policies towards themselves and Turkey.

Accordingly, there has been a gradual improvement in the Kurdish issue during the post-Helsinki period when it is considered that it was a crime to speak Kurdish. As Özdemir and Sarigil (2015) state that "the series of minor, on-path institutional changes added up to an off-path outcome over time, resulting in a new institutional equilibrium in Turkey's Kurdish issue" (p. 184). Especially when the EU's membership credibility was high, it has paved the way for the major changes, such as the gradual elimination of legal obstacles to use of the Kurdish language in the public sphere, through conditionality mechanism. During this period, the European level activism of Kurdish residents of Turkey in extended European orders by participating in information networks and organizing campaigns has significantly influenced the EU's policies towards Turkey and relatedly the accession negotiations.

When it comes to internal networks among Turkish CSOs, the EU has fostered the cooperation among civil society in Turkey through various projects. As mentioned in the historical evolution of civil society in Turkey before the Helsinki Summit, the fragmentation within Turkish civil society has deep roots. Kuzmanovic well summaries that civil society in Turkey is

> traditionally heavily stratified both with regard to the character of activities (political, charity, social clubs, mosque-building, etc.), as well as along ideological (leftist, right-wing nationalist, Kemalist, liberal, pro-Islamic etc.), culturalist (Alevi, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkish, women etc.), and social (class, location) lines. Barriers between activist and organizations are often insurmountable and information-sharing limited. The members of different organizations usually do not meet, and often do not even know each other, although they may refer to each other using various stereotypes. Formalized horizontal networks are thus weak (2010, p. 434).

However, the world of projects has embraced a wide range of activities. These civic activities have enabled various CSOs that had had little to do with each other to interact. This is perhaps the most important contribution of EU's projects for Turkey since the fragmentation on differences among the Turkish society and relatedly among the CSOs has deep historical roots. These projects include "citizenship training, 'get to know the EU' seminars, or project-cycle management and fund-raising courses in small conference rooms of local NGOs" (ibid.). Besides, large seminars on different topics related to democratization and accession processes have been organized in university conference halls or in big hotels. The participation in such activities has been very high since a large number of seminars and

conferences is populated by more than hundred people (ibid.). These activities, alongside with the partnership requirement in project applications, bring various civic activists from different circles together. This does not mean that the traditional fragmentation among Turkish civil society, which is one of long-lasting drawbacks still needed to be addressed, has lost its importance. Rather, it can be fairly claimed that "new spaces for civic activism has opened where the prominence of such cleavages can under particular circumstances recede into the background" (ibid.).

In addition to EU's support for internal cooperation among Turkish CSOs through projects, the EU accession context has also indirectly promoted such collaboration since "the common desire to join the EU has often brought disparate groups (e.g. secular, liberal, Kurdish, and Islamic) in Turkish civil society together" (Kübicek, 2011, p. 917). In order to push the Turkish state for democratic reforms required by the EU and lobby for Turkish membership both in the EU and Turkey, many civic initiatives have been taken by Turkish civic organizations. For instance, İKV and TÜSİAD headed a consortium called "Movement for Europe 2002" before the December Copenhagen Summit which was critical in terms of whether a date should be set for Turkey to start accession negotiations for ultimate membership (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 90). The movement "unprecedentedly mobilized as many as 175 civil society organizations" to form collective support for Turkey's EU membership and reforms (Saatçioğlu, 2013, p. 11). A digital clock counting the days, hours and minutes until the Summit was located opposite the entrance to parliament. This was "a simple yet effective tool" for putting pressure on public authorities (Aydınlı and Usul, 2002, p. 11). Besides, through broadspread media campaigns, these CSOs contributed to the mobilization of public support for democratizing reforms (Eylemer and Taş, 2007, p. 564). In 2004, İKV and TOBB led another pro-EU coalition called "Turkey Platform" for lobbying Turkish membership in both the EU and Turkey before the December Brussels Summit from which the decision on actual date for the opening of accession talks was expected. The Platform was comprised of 269 NGOs representing the different segments of the Turkish society (Kübicek, 2007, p. 368). These two examples demonstrate that "Turkish civic organizations, with an eye towards the EU, have taken the initiative to organize themselves" in order to increase their effectiveness (Kübicek, 2011, p. 916). Therefore, the common will to join the EU has both fostered the

cooperation among different groups in Turkey and strengthened the bottom up dynamic for further Europeanization.

In terms of the EU's promotion of the establishment of internal networks between CSOs and national authorities in Turkey, the EU has played a considerable role in changing the antagonistic relationship between the state and civil society actors in Turkey in two main ways. First, the EU accession context has facilitated regular consultation and cooperation between civil society and state institutions. In this respect, the Ministry for EU Affairs organizes regular meetings with CSOs in Turkey concerning the relevant developments in the accession process. Second, in addition to the requirement of partnerships between Turkish NGOs and their European counterparts, the EU has also necessitated the formation of such networks as an effective mechanism to develop partnerships between the Turkish state and civil society actors in Turkey. In various EU-funded projects, cooperation between CSOs in Turkey and different state institutions, such as ministries and municipalities, is a condition in order to promote positive mutual interaction between actors (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 134). In sum, it is fair to argue that cooperation between state and civil society actors in Turkey has developed compared to pre-Helsinki period although the extent of change differs with respect to state institutions and issue areas.

As in the case of EU's own internal affairs and the previous enlargement, the main aim of the EU for promoting the formation of internal networks between civic actors and state in Turkey is to enable Turkish CSOs to participate in policy-making both in Turkey and within EU, since its twin- track policy towards civil society assigns partnership in governance as a responsibility to the very existence of civil society relying on neo-Tocquevilian understanding.

In this respect, as elaborated above, the gender-sensitive amendments to the Criminal and Civil Codes can be given a very clear-cut example of participation and contribution of women's NGOs to policy-making in Turkey. (İçduygu, 2013, p. 180). In the reform process of gender-related legislative, women's NGOs have worked closely with the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women (KSGM) and benefited from the EU framework to pressure the government to incorporate their proposals (Coşar and Onbaşı, 2008; Kardam, 2006; Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009; İçduygu, 2013, Boşnak, 2015). In addition to

Turkish women CSOs' contribution to policy-making in Turkey, they also contribute to policy making at the EU level (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 138). For instance, as a member of the Turkey-EU Joint Consultative Committee, KAGİDER submits reports on the position of the women in Turkey, thus the EU enables Turkish NGOs to participate in EU's policy-making related not only to its internal policies but also to external policies concerning Turkey.

However, although the EU has considerably changed the existence of Turkish civil society in terms of rendering them as important actors by contributing to the formation of internal networks between Turkish civil actors and state institutions, it should be noted that CSOs still play a limited role in policy-making and their participation in policy networks usually takes place as an exception rather than rule (ibid.). EU-induced consultation processes between state and CSOs have generally occurs on an ad hoc basis (Commission of the European Communities, 2013, p. 11). Besides, there are complaints by Turkish NGOs for the unclarity of the selection criteria for these meetings and of the insufficient encouragement of the national authorities in Turkey for broader participation. As a result, there have been further steps need to be taken in order to foster the participation of Turkish civil society in policy making cycles.

Taking everything into consideration, the cooperation dimension of Europeanization processes among various actors through external and internal networks has made Turkish civil society actors more important players in political and social affairs, thus contributing to collective socialization among the societies of Europe.

4.2.3. Legitimization of Civic Activity

Alongside the direct influences of the EU, even the very existence of Turkey's EU accession context has operated as a "legitimization device" or a "legitimizing usage" (Jacquot and Woll, 2003, 2010; Tsarouhas, 2012) for civil society actors in Turkey (İçduygu, 2013). Particularly incepted in the golden age of the relations between the EU and Turkey, the civic activity in Turkey has been considerably legitimized as Rumelili and Boşnak (2015) well summarizes

Especially between 1999 and 2005, the EU functioned as an effective legitimization device for a wide range of Turkish civil society actors. On many issue areas, Turkish NGOs referenced EU standards and the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria to exert influence on the government [...] Such referencing of the EU accession process has enhanced the overall legitimacy of NGOs as actors and of the issues they advocate (pp.134-39).

The accession context has functioned in two interrelated main ways for legitimizing the activities of Turkish civil society. First, not only the influence of the EU has increased as a norm-setter and relatedly Euro-skeptical view has decreased among many circles in Turkey, especially with the initial credible membership prospect, but also the EU has enabled Turkish CSOs to gain legitimacy, visibility and credibility both within the EU and in Turkey.

Firstly, an optimistic prospect of EU membership following the declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999 and later the confirmation of the start of accession negotiations with the Presidency Conclusions in 2004 created a positive attitude towards the EU among Turkish society. The rapprochement between the EU and Turkey in a mutually reinforcing mood was a very important step for challenging particularly the long-standing "Sevres syndrome" in many circles within the Turkish society. The positive atmosphere between the two parties weakened the skeptical belief among Turkish authorities and public towards the EU as Göksel and Güneş states that

For years, the lack of understanding of the basic parameters of human rights has led to reactive responses from the Turkish public whenever EU representatives brought up the human rights violations in Turkey. The skeptical view that the EU was attempting to weaken Turkey's social fabric by bringing such violations to the forefront lost credibility as a result of the Helsinki Summit which acknowledged Turkey as a candidate country (Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 61).

A large part of the society began to understand that the EU aims to improve human rights in Turkey, not the contrary. The skeptical attitude highly lost its credibility during the golden age with the revitalization of the EU membership prospect compared to the previous years before the Helsinki Summit (Kübicek, 2007, p. 372). As a result, the democratization process of Turkey triggered as well as required by the EU has prepared the ground for many circles, such as policy-makers, the media, and the CSOs, to bring many sensitive and controversial issues, which were previously not discussed and considered out of bounds, into the Turkey's political agenda (ibid., p. 370).

The second interrelated impact of the EU on the legitimization of Turkish civil society both in Turkey and within the EU has been the EU's clear and repetitive insistence on the significance of civil society for Turkey's membership. In this respect, the EU's consistent mark on civil society legitimized not only its existence in Turkey, but also its controversial arguments on different issue areas. With the official declaration of Turkey's candidacy, the EU began to emphasize its motivation to integrate civil society actors with projects related to the compliance of the EU legislation. For instance, eighty-four projects with Turkish CSOs were initially introduced to support the alignment process inside the extent of 2002, 2003 and 2004 projects (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 44). The EU's motivation has enabled civil society actors to "link their political agendas to the EU and justify and legitimize their actions and decisions with reference to the EU" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 69). Especially during the golden age of the bilateral relations, CSOs in Turkey has taken the advantage of being listened as an important actor. To put it differently, Turkish CSOs have comfortably worked on many issues, even on the most polemical ones like the conscientious objection, by assigning responsibility to the EU. Therefore, through the legitimization usage, the EU's conditionality, principles and norms have been used as reference points in domestic political discussions to justify decisions, actions and policies.

Accordingly, having secured the support of the EU, "Turkey's long-established will towards EU membership served as a framework for older demands for the deepening of democracy in Turkey" (İçduygu, 2013, p. 180). A great number of the prominent CSOs has become significant actors and players not only in spreading a pro-EU perspective and the democratization process at the national level, but also in lobbying for Turkey's EU membership in Brussels. In this regard, a variety of prominent CSOs, such as TÜSİAD, İKV, Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, KA-DER, KAGİDER, History Foundation and ARI Movement (ibid., p. 177), has benefited from the legitimization dimension of Europeanization processes, both leading to direct and indirect outcomes. That is to say, the EU's persistent enthusiasm on civil society in the accession context has indirectly contributed to the empowerment of the NGO sector in Turkey by increasing their legitimacy in the eye of public as well as national authorities. In turn, such organizations have had more capacity to become more important players in legal terms by directly involving in the decision-making cycles both at the EU and domestic level.

Accordingly, NGOs from Turkey have also began to be taken seriously by the officials of EU member states as well as European Commission who benefit from the opportunity to engage in genuine exchanges of norms, ideas and knowledge after having only heard the official discourse from Turkish state officials for many years. For example, when the ARI Movement first established its branch office in Brussels, the vacuum was apparent. Apart from TÜSIAD, "Turkish civil society had been only marginally vocal in Europe" before the start of pre-accession context, but "a more balanced and diversified group of NGOs" has begun to take part in dialogue with experts and decision-makers in Europe (Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 67). Thus, in turn, being listened to as a credible voice has reinforced the standing of a great number of NGOs in the domestic arena as well. The abovementioned story on the legitimization impact of the EU can be clearly shown by a couple of examples.

In the first place, the ARI movement was built up in 1994 with the aim of improving the learning on participatory democracy and expanding this practice in Turkey. In any case, before 2002, human rights projects had not been conveyed by the organization due to the previously mentioned reasons. Having taking advantage a positive environment in the nation as far as democratization endeavors identified with the EU accession context, it promptly directed human rights venture, "Human Rights for All", which was bolstered by the European Commission. To be sure, "the need for such a project, as well as the grounds for its positive reception, were strongly influenced by prospects of EU membership" (ibid., p. 61). Under this task, focus group meetings were composed. Additionally, a national survey among youngsters was done. Depending on the discoveries, the movement came to the conclusion that the comprehension of the idea of human rights was extremely restricted among the Turkish youth. As needs be, the undertaking focused on commonplace discussions keeping in mind the end goal to bring issues to light in the issues of human rights and rule of law among the Turkish youth. The development particularly centered around less developed regions in Turkey where serious human rights infringement had been seen. A site was formed and numerous handouts on the history and importance of human rights, the rule of law in Turkish and EU enactment, pluralism, and human improvement were given out. Moreover, national human rights meetings were additionally hung on these issues. The objective of the program was to promote a knowledge-based discussion rather than a debate relied on dogmatic beliefs,

as well as to support the idea that human responsibilities and human rights complement each other (ibid., p. 60). As a result, the step in terms of democratization efforts undertaken by ARI movement is one of the examples of the Europeanization processes in which the EU membership perspective has provided and contributed to stronger grounds through which Turkish CSOs can legitimize and conduct projects on issues previously articulated as too sensitive or polemical.

Within the accession context, the scope of conditionality through the Copenhagen criteria associated with many areas has strengthened the efforts of various NGOs on a large number of issues with reference to the EU accession. The reason for this is that the topics that they have been working on are all issues where Turkey is required to comply with EU standards in order to join the Union. The perspective of EU membership has increased visibility of civic activities that are taken part in the framework of EU integration process. In practical terms, NGOs which work on topics related to democratization has taken the advantage of the political Copenhagen criteria, for instance, by including EU references in their studies and presentations. A very good example of such CSOs like the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly which is one of the prominent organization in promoting minority rights, multiculturalism, freedom of expression and conflict resolution has incorporated a strong EU dimension in their activities and perspective. For instance, by bridging their traditional concerns with Turkey's EU accession process, the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly carried out events, such as "meetings in Anatolian provinces on modernization and pluralism in a wider Europe; summer schools on the future of universities on the path to EU membership; panels on language-related rights associated with EU integration; a series of meetings analyzing the reforms carried out and progress yet to be made in the area of freedom of association in light of the effort to harmonize with the EU" (ibid., p. 61).

For the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, the EU membership carrot made bureaucrats more eager to restructure and reform their ways. Accordingly, they needed the support of NGOs which have the necessary expertise, leading administrative authorities to become more willing to cooperate with NGOs. In turn, such collaborations between the state officials and CSOs have contributed to the legitimacy and visibility of the latter. Incorporating the EU dimension has also enabled CSOs to raise their concerns more loudly especially for the

specific issues at hand and to inform wider circles of the society. "As many segments of the society believe EU membership is in their interests, albeit for different reasons, adding the jargon of EU integration into conceptualizations of social problems raises the level of interest, awareness and credibility" (ibid., p. 61).

As aforementioned in the previous section, another example of the EU's role in the enhancement of legitimacy concerning civic activity in Turkey by uniting different strands of the Turkish state and civil society actors through EU accession process is Rumelili's research (2005) on the promotion of Greek-Turkish cooperation as follows

> Therefore, in terms of the alternative understanding of Europeanization, the change in Greek- Turkish relations cannot be reduced to policy Europeanization; that is, Turkey's making peace with Greece in order to fulfill the EU's membership conditions. My interview findings clearly indicate that the change within Turkey towards relations with Greece reflects elements of both political and societal Europeanization. Turkey's EU membership candidacy has empowered the domestic actors in favour of Greek-Turkish cooperation and allowed them to use the EU to legitimize cooperative policies and activities (p. 46).

Greek-Turkish rapprochement is very important to show the different layers of the term, the EU as a legitimization tool. In this respect, the operation of the EU as a legitimize device in the relations between Greece and Turkey displayed itself at many levels. At one level, for many in Turkish elite there is a perception that disputes with Greece can reach to a solution since the EU has the capacity to defuse interstate conflicts as a successful security community. This belief has worked for legitimizing Turkey's membership in the EU and for resolving the disputes with Greece. At another level, Greek-Turkish participation is legitimized since sustaining good relations with Greece is crucial for Turkey's EU membership quest. Especially during the inception of the project, the allure of the EU membership carrot was high. The high credibility of the EU has enabled Turkish decision makers to persuade themselves as well as others of the necessity of cooperation between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, by initiating Greek-Turkish cooperation, the EU has also contributed to overall legitimacy of civic activity in Turkey since Turkish activists in this cooperation took active role with their additional motivation to legitimize their existence and raise their visibility both in international area and Turkey (ibid., pp. 52-53). Greek-Turkish cooperation at the civil society level has enabled Turkish NGOs "to both present themselves

and also be perceived as working not only for Greek-Turkish cooperation but also for Turkey's accession to the EU" (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 134). Thus, this incident has also contributed to cooperation between Turkish officials and CSOs at the domestic level.

Through its accession context, EU has worked as a legitimization device at multiple levels leading to implicit outcomes on the Europeanization processes of Turkish civil society. In this regard, the very existence of Turkish civil society, its publicity, and its various concerns over controversial issues have considerably gained legitimacy when civil society actors has wisely taken the advantage of Europeanization discourse which can be illustrated by many examples as İçduygu (2013) mentioned that "change has been observed in advocacy activities following integration of a frame of reference on Europeanization" (İçduygu, 2013, p. 179). Besides, "the level of trust in the ability of CSOs to contribute to political and social change and democratic consolidation" (Öner, 2012, p. 107) both at the EU and domestic level, and the membership in such organizations in Turkey (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 63) have begun to increase during the pre-accession period. Moreover, the legitimization dimension of Europeanization processes reveals that Turkish NGOs are not basically passive recipients and only shaped by EU's demands. They also operate as active agents in democratization and Europeanization process as Ergun (2010) underlines that "civil actors have become more active and visible in shaping public opinion and government policies" in Turkey (p. 509).

For instance, not only the networks between women's NGOs and their European and transnational counterparts have contributed to the reform processes for the Civil and Penal Codes as aforementioned in the previous section, but also Turkish women's NGOs have made references to the EU's legislation to incorporate gender mainstreaming as a key element into gender-related laws in Turkey. When both of the reform processes are taken into consideration from a different focus, it can be shown that "how women's NGOs have used the EU strategically, linked their agendas to the EU, and legitimized their concerns with reference to the EU" (Boşnak, 2015, p. 120).

In this context, it is possible to comprehend the interplay of direct and indirect ways of Europeanization processes. Not only has the EU directly improved, through legal reforms and funding, the environment and conditions in which women's civil society operates, but also the EU has indirectly contributed to the enactment of gender sensitive laws in Turkey

through the establishment of networks between Turkish women NGOs and their counterparts in Europe as well as through its operation of a legitimization device for women's NGOs activism. As a result, the direct influences of the EU have contributed to indirect Europeanization outcomes in practice. While the indirect processes, in turn again, result in legislative reforms leading to direct outcome by inducing legal changes. Thus, this is an example of that it is difficult to measure the interactive mechanisms of Europeanization as bottom up or top down processes. Rather, the interplay of the different dimensions of Europeanization, thanks to the pre-accession context, have generated an ongoing process including both external and internal factors, as well as, the mutually reinforcing interactions of these components in the accession period.

In addition to becoming active players in various policy initiatives in Turkey and gaining legitimacy vis-à-vis the Turkish state, in many issue areas, CSOs have also taken part in shaping the EU's agenda on Turkey by contacting EU officials and institutions providing input to Commission reports (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 135). The previous section has illustrated that both the issue of conscientious objection and the Kurdish question in Turkey have been brought to the attention of the European institutions thanks to the advocacy of Turkish activists and NGOs. As Rumelili and Boşnak (2015) well summarizes that "Once an issue begins to feature prominently on the EU's agenda on Turkey, the EU begins to function as a legitimization device for NGOs advocating change in that particular issue area" (p. 135). In this respect, the preceding two examples have proved that civil society actors or societal action can project their concerns onto the European agenda in order to legitimize their causes, when the EU takes part in the related issue area, it can operate as a legitimization mechanism for these bottom up pressures, thus in turn, can create top down influence on the issues of concern.

Nevertheless, many scholars studying on the Europeanization of Turkish civil society associates the legitimization dimension of the EU with two more prerequisites: the political will of the government to comply with EU conditionality and the salience of topics on the EU-Turkey agenda (Birden and Rumelili, 2009; Ergun, 2010; İçduygu, 2013; Boşnak, 2015; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015). Indeed, these two critical arguments on the legitimacy impact of

the EU, though having reality, somewhat takes the legitimacy dimension of Europeanization process in a vacuum.

Firstly, as mentioned in the legal Europeanization part in detail, since 2006, the validity of EU membership has diminished in Turkey due to several factors such as the lack of clear and consistent EU strategy and commitment to Turkey's membership. Relatedly, the political will of the government to meet EU requirements has diminished. Besides, there has been a growing suspicion in the Turkish society for the reality of Turkey's EU membership. (Kaliber, 2013, p. 18). Therefore, compared to the earlier period of accession process, "the use of the EU as a tool or a framework for every occasion is no longer highly preferred by CSOs in Turkey" (İçduygu, 2013, p. 180).

However, it should be seriously underlined that this does not mean that the legitimacy of European norms and standards especially concerning its civil society perspective in the larger framework of democratization has not significantly lost its stand in the minds of CSOs. The usage of the EU as a legitimization device and the attribution to the EU accession context for promoting reforms in Turkey have still reserved their places in the statements and declarations of the prominent Turkish NGOs due to fact that different dimensions of Europeanization are at play in the process of socialization in practical terms. For example, cooperation between the Turkish NGOs and their counterparts for a long time amid the accession period and contributions of EU funding enable CSOs to raise their voice since they have important channels and sources. Therefore, the interplay of several direct or/and indirect Europeanization processes have compensated for the political ruptures in the relations between Turkey and the EU. To illustrate the maintenance of the EU accession context discourse as a legitimization device in order to justify and defend further democratic reforms, the President of Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği-İHD), Öztürk Erdoğan, states that "we need to focus on the process of membership of the EU which is the important dynamic in the democratization process of Turkey" (Opening Speech of the 15th General Assembly of İHD, 2010). In a similar vein, the President of the Children Under Same Roof Association (Çocuklar Aynı Çatının Altında Derneği-ÇAÇADER), another respectable NGO, say that

When we look at the legislation on children rights in Turkey we can easily pinpoint that we are too away from meeting international standards. The main reason is the perception in the country on children's rights. We emphasize that our expectation from the EU process is to comply with the legislation on children's rights. We can use the EU acquis to change our legislation in positive way and reflect it to children's rights. The EU accession process is a key dynamic for rights and democratization in Turkey (Interview, 2012 in Boşnak, 2015, p. 190).

These statements display that civil society actors and organizations have still loudly put forward the EU structure to legitimize their choices, activities, and strategies. In addition to the individual statements, representatives of more than one hundred NGOs and universities formed "Civil Society Platform for Turkey's EU Membership Process" and organized a meeting in 2011 in order to show their commitment to the Turkey's EU accession. With a joint declaration, the platforms states that

Turkey's EU negotiation process had recently come to a deadlock. We are concerned about the probable consequences of such course. We have gathered today to share our concerns with our government, political parties, public, EU institutions, governments of members countries and the public opinion in Europe. The EU membership as an indispensable goal of Turkey still prevails. For us, membership to the union meant sustainable development, high democratic standards, security of law, individual freedoms, gender equality and a prosperous society for the country. Periodical political and economic developments both in Turkey and the EU cannot change this main direction (The Civil Society Initiative for Turkey's EU Membership Process: Joint Declaration, 22 April, 2011).

In brief, although the relations between Turkey and the EU have occasionally been prone to tensions and ruptures, it can fairly be argued that "civil society in Turkey retains its EU perspective to a large extent" despite the declining political will of the government to comply with EU conditionality (İçduygu, 2013, p. 180). When it comes to Turkish society's increasing doubt about the EU prospect due to the weakened credibility of membership prospect, this does not imply that the society is separating itself from European qualities, standards and institutions as Kaliber (2013) argues that

Europe is increasingly becoming a vantage point for Turkish society to compare and contrast the characteristics of the political regime and the course of daily life in Turkey with those of European states. Thereby, one might expect that even if Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU currently stalled, Europeanization as a normative-political context will continue to influence politics and society in the near future (p. 66).

Indeed, many studies have largely associated the EU's influence on democratization with the credible external incentives, whereas they have underemphasized the significance of the softer mechanisms of the European integration process. By embracing a societal perspective, it can be grasped that the EU's impact is more than alignment with certain democratic criterion in the enlargement context as Noutcheva (2015) argues that

> It can empower societal groups to act as agents of change through direct support and indirect legitimization of the democracy cause. It can further serve as a reference point in domestic deliberations about the appropriate democratic action and, as such, actively shape societal understandings of the rightful democratic behavior of elites in office. By helping societies take up their role as democracy watchdogs in their polity, the EU can have a more profound and more durable effect on democratization beyond its borders (Notutcheva, 2015, p. 14).

The legitimization measurement of the EU's societal impact has been occurring through "the interaction between societal actors in target countries and the EU's rules and understandings of democracy" since societal performers have agency and can draw in with EU structures (ibid., p. 7). As said previously, Jacquot and Woll have built up the idea of "uses of Europe", that stresses "how actors engage with, interpret, appropriate or ignore the dynamics of European integration" (2010, p. 116). The legitimization impact of the EU is also related to the existence of a strong democratic acquis which can empower societal actors to legitimize and bolster democratization efforts. The legitimization tool gives priority

> to the structural power of EU democratic norms and conceives of societal action at the domestic level as a function of that power. The EU can in this way have an indirect impact on democratization through the entrepreneurship and initiative of societal actors who can evoke ideas, images, discourses and practices embedded in the EU system of democratic governance in order to frame and justify political action in support of democracy at the domestic level. References to EU policies, declarations, statements and legislative acts can arm societal actors with arguments ignorer to demeaned policy and institutional changes and persuade a critical mass of followers in order to enact political change (Noutcheva, 2015, p. 7).

Moreover, although the EU directly encourages democratization efforts and civil society development through its conditionality mechanism, the external legitimization sought through references to the EU's standards and understanding of democratic governance is also independent from direct EU action. That is to say, the EU's commitment to democratization comes from what it stands for. This does not mean that the EU and the member states do not

have problems in their democracy. Despite the internal problems and its democratic deficit, the EU still stands as a champion on human rights and democratic principles (Müftüler-Baç, 2016, p. 89). Therefore, the very existence of the EU as a democratic structure has ideally contributed to the domestic democratization efforts.

Furthermore, societal actors have begun to benefit from new ways of communication such as social media, satellite television, and mobile technology rather than national channels of communication in order to express their ideas to trigger debates and mobilize public support in favor of reform. To illustrate, pro-democracy protests occur at the local level, yet they occur with the knowledge that similar actions are happening elsewhere and collectively contribute to the generation of a global practice and narrative (Kaldor *et al.,* 2012) The spread of ideas in societies exposed the authoritarian tendencies, for instance, is a noteworthy aspect of how the "Arab Spring" revolts spilled over from one country to another (Bellin, 2012). A similar "contagion impact" (Noutcheva, 2015, p. 8) is broke down in Eastern Europe with the spread of "color revolutions" over the region in the 2000s (Stewart, 2009). The recent global anti-austerity protests in Greece, Spain and Portugal and the pro-democracy protests in Turkey, Brazil and Ukraine "require scholars to update their analytical tools, revise their research questions, and look for alternative answers related to the transnational dimension of protests" (Porta and Mattoni, 2014, pp. 2-3).

The role of new channels of technology for communication is crucial for seeing how contemporary societies are influenced by thoughts, casings, pictures and illustrations originating from outside. Mattoni and Della Porta, by studying the most recent wave of global demonstrations, figure out that the new innovation, particularly the broad utilization of web based life stages in blend with cell phones, has turned into the fundamental transnational channel of dissent dispersion across borders. Up close and personal correspondence has started to give its place to web based information exchange platforms, bolstered by computer-savvy activists who are able to create powerful images about demonstrations and to spread them through social media platforms (Mattoni and Della Porta, 2014, p. 286).

Another part of the worldwide dissent drift is the "civility" of challenge activities and the peaceful way of defending democracy. Other interesting common features of such protests are the leaderlessness of the mobilization and the spontaneous eruption of the

demonstrations outside the political procedure and without the authoritative help of political groups or NGOs (ibid.). When it comes to the side of the EU for these demonstrations, the normative and socio-political context that the EU symbolizes is crucial for understanding wave of global protests as Noutcheva (2015) argues

> The EU's influence on these processes is immaterial, but the permissive liberal environment associated with the west indirectly facilitates the international context in which such cross-national exchanges occur. Globalization and international rule of law have been identified as key factors setting the context for the emergence of a global civil society. The EU has no doubt contributed to both with its policies, its body of law and their external impact (p. 8).

Last but not least, the domestic authenticity of official practices and policies is not only a fundamental element of democratic quality, but also a ground-breaking legitimization instrument for ruling elites who need popular support for their actions. The EU can impact this domestic flow by spreading thoughts, frames and policy structures across different domestic supporters and, among others, advancing the domestic legitimacy of many democratic practices and policies. Official EU communication is extremely important for articulating what is suitable in particular circumstances and settings. "Explicit declaratory support by Brussels for specific policies, even if symbolic in nature, confers external legitimization on particular interpretations of events, legislative acts, policy initiatives, etc. Conversely, the EU's direct criticism of democratic malpractice exposes governments democracy records and can amplify bottom up pressure for change" (Noutcheva, 2015, p. 6)

Accordingly, as for Turkish side, a critical political change took place on June 7, 2015 with the fourth general elections that the JDP had joined since its formation in 2002. On the one hand, although there had been a general increasing trend in the votes of the party from 2002 to 2014, the 2015 general elections displayed a possible downturn for the party with a decline in its share of national votes. Besides, this was also the first time that the AKP could not gain the majority seats for becoming a single party government. "For pundits, this was not surprising as the AKP was seen to have become increasingly authoritarian since 2011 and less prone to be wary of European criticism" (Müftüler-Baç, 2016, p. 87). There are many reasons leading to be pronounced as authoritarian such as the reversal of the reforms after 2011, the increased control on CSOs, the harsh repression of Gezi Protests in June 2013, the demolition of Kurdish opening, and 2014 internet censure etc. as Müftüler-Baç (2016) well summarizes

"the AKP is openly nationalist, significantly authoritarian, and highly critical on the EU especially since 2013" (p. 99). At this point, it should be reminded that the party's main hold over Turkish society since 2002 was its promise of democratization. The victory of AKP in 2002 was a critical message supported by diverse actors in Turkish politics, including the Islamists, liberals who were tired of secular authoritarianism, and those who wanted to live without a military takeover or a party closure. "It is precisely these expectations of increased democratization in Turkey that led to the AKP's political victory" (ibid., p. 96). On the other hand, the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi-HDP) surpassed the 10% threshold in 2015 elections. This is particularly important since the HDP is the pro-Kurdish political group and seemingly pro-European and most egalitarian, both rejecting all forms of political discrimination on ethnic identity without nationalist and authoritarian style message of the CHP and supporting elimination of all forms of discrimination on gender and sexual orientation (ibid., p. 95). Therefore, the legitimacy of democratic principles highlighted by the EU has continued to prevail among the society, thus the EU pressures and criticisms can act as a catalyst to facilitate political change.

Second criticism for the EU's legitimization mechanism is that the significance of issues for the motivation of EU-Turkey relations affects the EU's legitimization influence. When an issue is prominently highlighted in EU Commission reports and in the statements of various EU officials, the CSOs in Turkey are more able to take advantage of the EU's legitimization impact; they can refer to those EU reports and statements to push the decision-makers in Turkey (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 139). Nevertheless, if the salience of an issue diminishes, or the worse, the EU's position turns on negative as one human rights activist with whom an interview was made in 2008 stated that "if the EU says torture has stopped in Turkey, then the raison d'être of the CSOs which work on torture and victims of torture will vanish" (Interview 2008 Ergun, 2010, p.515).

However, as aforementioned repeatedly with several examples, CSOs in Turkey have capacity and opportunities provided by interactive processes of Europeanization to shape EU policies towards their cause. As a result, when the salience of issues which are concern of CSOs decreases on the EU-Turkey agenda, then the Turkish CSOs with their acquired expertise, visibility, legitimacy can influence the process for the activation of their concerns.

Besides, thanks to the accession period through various mechanisms, especially in the golden age of the relations, the EU has enabled CSOs to delegate responsibility to an external anchor when they work on controversial issues like the rights of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin or LGBT rights, so that formerly taboo subjects are opened to public discussion at the end of the day. As a result, civil society actors in Turkey do not have to, all the time, rely on the Turkey's membership quest in order to raise their concerns as a feminist activist mentions that "We may not always think of the EU in a positive way but we do think positively about the process" (Interview 2007 in Ergun, 2010, p. 518) or an environmental activist states that "If the EU was not here we could have been very much behind where we are now" (Interview 2007 in Ergun, 2010, p. 518).

Taking everything into consideration, the EU has added to the legitimization of the activities of CSOs as well as the promotion of their policy initiatives in particular and the spread of democratic principles among the society in general.

CONCLUSION

Civil society is generally characterized as the ground where the components of society and the state interact. In Turkey, the conventional ill-disposed correspondence between the performing actors of civil society and state has started to change especially since 1980s. This changing relation between civil society and the state in Turkey has been related with the transaction of several internal and external developments. The self-strengthening of civil society in Turkey has gone with slow yet expanding inclusion and support of external actors, the EU in particular. Turkey's EU accession process has created rather positive national and transnational conditions for the Europeanization of the policies and practices in the civil society field. Albeit numerous researchers keep on claiming that Turkish civil society's capacity to impact the state is limited, it is fair to argue that civil society actors have turned out to be more associated with political and social change in the process of democratic consolidation. For sure, the political elite in Turkey can no more disregard civil society. On a worldwide scale, civil society associations have started filling the hole between the top down arrangements of the EU settings and the bottom up requests of local grassroots activity. The three-level connection between the EU, civil society and the state is winding up progressively complex. The thesis offers a perspective of this complex web of interaction from the point of civil society.

During the accession context, the interactive instruments of Europeanization, directly or indirectly, have altogether assumed a part in the development of Turkish civil society. These interactive mechanisms of Europeanization processes are gathered under four categories in order to demonstrate their contributions to the development of civil society in Turkey. Conditionality principle; funding policies and mechanisms; cooperation through interactions, networks and partnerships among CSOs in Turkey, between Turkish CSOs and their European counterparts, between the Turkish state and domestic CSOs; and legitimization of civic activity in Turkey are analyzed. The thesis concludes that these interconnected mechanisms of Europeanization processes have conjointly played a role in incorporating top down and bottom up elements into the Turkey's Europeanization. To put it another way, the interaction of different dimensions of Europeanization enables domestic actors and the EU to shape Europeanization outcomes collectively.

Firstly, through its membership conditionality mechanism, the EU has straightforwardly forced an adjustment of the domestic legal and institutional conditions regarding the task of CSOs. After the official declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, an expansive scope of reforms, included legal changes identified with the advancement of civil society, particularly those changes in regards to freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, has produced an empowering domain and instigated changes in the operation of civil society. Despite the central role of the EU in transforming state-society relations in Turkey, it is basic to perceive that such a change is not being driven by external forces alone. As strengthened by the accession context, CSOs in Turkey have also played an important role in forming support for EU membership and pushing for the required legal and political changes.

Although the EU's weakened conditionality mechanism due to decline in its credibility since 2006 coupled with the authoritarian drift of the ruling party has endangered the overall democratization process, the influence of the EU on Turkish politics in general and Europeanization of Turkish civil society in particular still prevail in a weakened form since not only the EU's incentives still have an impact on the policy making processes in Turkey but also interconnected dimensions of Europeanization processes are at play in a complementary manner. However, it should be underlined that the maintenance of the EU's clear and strong commitment to Turkey's membership is essential for the endurance of Turkey's Europeanization in legal terms. During the accession process, the EU's non-Copenhagen-related considerations of Turkey's accession and the debates on the desirability on Turkey's membership seriously overshadowed the credibility of the EU's conditionality in the eyes of both national authorities and the public in Turkey. The erosion of a consistent, clear and credible membership prospect makes more difficult for domestic actors to maintain their pro-EU positions and take the reforms required by the EU.

In addition to the formal alignment process of legal structure in Turkey with the EU's legislation, the Turkish society has also experienced a phase of socialization during the accession process. Societal dimension of Europeanization has enhanced the Turkish civil society in practical terms and made the process more dynamic. In this regard, the three remaining mechanisms of Europeanization are evaluated with regard to the societal

Europeanization process of Turkish civil society in order to demonstrate how the accession context has changed the practices of civil society in Turkey. This means that the CSOs have been learning European ways of performing civil society activities. Besides, through the increased interactions and collaborations among the societies of Turkey and the EU, both sides have entered in a more interactive interference.

Secondly, through its funding policies and mechanisms, the EU has considerably supported civil society development in Turkey. The EU's pre-accession funding has transformed the activities of CSOs through the application of several programs. In other words, EU's financial support has functioned as a social learning mechanism since Turkish CSOs have learnt European ways of conducting civil society exercises. In this regard, the EU funding has improved institutional capacity of Turkish CSOs, fundraising capability of them, their capacity for networking. Additionally, the CSOs in Turkey have gained a certain degree of independence from the state and organized more effectively. Moreover, the EU funding has extended and diversified civic activities, increased participation in civil associations, diffused a project culture and professionalization. Last but not least, the EU's consistent assistance has increased legitimacy and visibility of civil organizations. However, the funding mechanism of the EU is criticized for bureaucratic nature of the application process although stakeholders agree on the importance of EU's financial support for the civil society empowerment in Turkey. CSOs outside big cities have difficulties in applying to EU projects because of too many bureaucratic requirements and necessity of considerable professionalism. These criticisms are crucial points needed to be taken into consideration and local organizations should be more included in projects.

Thirdly, the EU has fostered cooperation through interactions, networks and partnerships among CSOs in Turkey, between Turkish CSOs and their European counterparts, and between the Turkish state and domestic CSOs. The cooperation dimension of Europeanization processes is the most important mechanism for socialization process. To begin with, the EU has promoted cooperation among Turkish CSOs through diverse programs and projects which include a large range of activities. These civic activities have enabled various CSOs that had had little to do with each other to interact and cooperate. Besides, the EU accession process has created an important opportunity for Turkish CSOs to interact with

their counterparts in other member states. The networks built up amongst Turkish and European associations have provided an extra open door for the spread of European standards, qualities and practices to Turkish civil society associations since these external networks have contributed to internalization, redefinition, reevaluation of European norms, values, and principles. In addition to internalization of European standards, CSOs in Turkey have used the external networks with the EU to gain international recognition, raise their national and international profile and shape EU policies towards Turkey. Finally, the networks shaped amongst CSOs and policymakers in Turkey have expanded the significance of the Turkish civil actors in decision making cycles and empowered collaboration between civil society and the state. However, although the EU has remarkably contributed to the formation of internal networks between Turkish civil actors and state institutions, it should be noted that CSOs still play a limited role in policy making and their participation in policy networks usually occur on ad hoc basis. Therefore, further steps should be taken so as to promote the participation of Turkish civil society in policy making process in Turkey.

Lastly, alongside the direct influences of the EU, the legitimization of civic activity is the most indirect and long-lasting aspect of Europeanization processes. The EU has functioned as a reference point for the legitimization of the activities of CSOs and for the promotion of their policy initiatives. Such referencing of the EU accession process has advanced the overall legitimacy, visibility, credibility of Turkish CSOs as important actors in political and social spheres. Besides, the democratization process of Turkey triggered by the EU has enabled many circles, including CSOs, to bring various sensitive and controversial arguments on various issue areas, which were formerly not discussed, into the Turkey's political scene. Moreover, the EU's clear and continuing emphasis on the importance of civil society for Turkey's membership has enhanced the image of Turkish civil society both in Turkey and within the EU. Nevertheless, many scholars argue that use of the EU as a legitimization device for promoting democratic reforms in Turkey has begun to lose its significance since the credibility of Turkey's EU membership prospect has declined since 2007. However, the legitimization dimension considers the Europeanization process in a more extensive socio-political and normative context. That is to say, the very existence of the EU as a democratic framework has ideally contributed to the domestic democratization efforts.

In brief, compared to the pre-Helsinki era, civil society in Turkey has acquired more significance and capacity in influencing Turkey's political, economic, and societal affairs in spite of their limitations embedded in the long-lasting strong state tradition. The development of civil society in Turkey is analyzed in the light of the country's aspirations for EU membership and the role played by civil society associations in upgrading Turkey's Europeanization. The accession process has both enhanced the Turkish legal and institutional structure for the operation of civil society and improved the practices of civil society in Turkey. In this regard, the study uncovers that the involvement of the EU in the civil society development has been taking place through the different but interconnected mechanisms of Europeanization processes via direct and indirect ways. By generating a reciprocal and dynamic process, the interactive instruments of Europeanization processes have enabled both the EU and Turkish civil society to influence the outcomes collectively.

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