

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM
DALI**

**EUROPEANIZATION OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EU'S SOFT
POWER IN THE CASE OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne

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ABSTRACT

The Europeanization of German foreign policy is evaluated through an analysis of the case of Germany's role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis in this thesis. The main argument of the thesis is that Germany successfully uploaded its national preferences to the European Union level during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the European Union used combination of civilian and soft power tools in tackling the crisis instead of hard power. In this regard, firstly, the theoretical framework of Europeanization and soft power concepts are presented in detail. Then, in the second chapter of the thesis, the Europeanization of German foreign policy is elaborated with the dimensions of uploading and downloading. Finally, Germany's role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the European Union's employment of soft power for addressing the crisis is analysed. The thesis concludes that Germany has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the European Union level, and the EU employed combination of civilian and soft power in dealing with the crisis.

ÖZET

Bu tez çalışmasında, Avrupalılaşıma ve yumuşak güç kavramları kullanılarak Alman Dış Politikasının Avrupalılaşıması, Avrupa Birliği'nin Rusya-Ukrayna çatışmasında yumuşak güç kullanması üzerinden incelenmektedir. Tezin temel argümanı, Almanya'nın Rusya-Ukrayna krizinde ulusal tercihlerini başarılı bir şekilde Avrupa Birliği seviyesine yüklerken, Avrupa Birliği de çatışma karşısında sert güç unsurları yerine sivil güç ve yumuşak güç birleşim unsurlarını kullanmasında etkili olduğudur. Bu bağlamda, ilk olarak, Avrupalılaşıma ve yumuşak güç kavramları detaylı bir şekilde sunulmuştur. Daha sonra, tezin ikinci bölümünde aşağıdan yukarıya Avrupalılaşıma ve yukardan aşağıya Avrupalılaşıma boyutları üzerinden Alman dış politikasının Avrupalılaşıması detaylandırılmıştır. Tezin üçüncü bölümünde, Almanya'nın Rusya-Ukrayna krizindeki rolü ve Avrupa Birliği'nin krize karşı yumuşak güç kullanmasındaki etkisi incelenmektedir. Tezde Almanya'nın Rusya-Ukrayna krizinde ulusal politikasını başarılı bir şekilde Avrupa Birliği seviyesine taşımış olduğu ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Rusya'ya karşı kriz boyunca sadece sivil ve yumuşak güç unsurlarını kullandığı sonucuna varılmıştır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Association Agreement
Bundesrat	German Federal Upper House of Parliament
Bundestag	Lower House of the Federal Republic
Bundeswehr	Federal Armed Forces
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CSU	Christian Social Union
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EC	European Community
ECB	European Central Bank
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union

G-8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICCPR	The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
JCEU	The Court of Justice of the European Union
Länder	German Federal Executive
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA	Partnership And Co-Operation Agreement
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
PJCCM	Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Germany
TEC	Treaty Establishing the European Community
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC P5+1	UN Security Council's five permanent members
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WWII	World War II

INTRODUCTION

This thesis employs the Europeanization and soft power concepts to explain the relationship between Germany and European foreign policy and to analyze the case of the EU's reaction to Russia-Ukraine crisis. The European Union (EU) is at the heart of Germany's political system. The EU has affected Germany significantly and Germany's political system has integrated with the EU (Sturm, 2017: 4). Europeanization has mainly influenced all sectors of German political system including polity, politics and public policies (Zerkavis, 2004: 109). Germany's strong pro-European behavior allowed it to play a significant position in uploading its preferences to the EU level (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010: 1058). Meanwhile downloading from EU level to the national level also continues and constitutes a counter press (Paterson, 2010: 51).

Germany is a leading country and a driving force for the European integration process (Seydak, 2001: 6). Germany, as a highly Europeanized country, has the largest economy and the biggest population in the EU. After severe years of wars, Germany has become one of the civilian and soft powers in world politics. After World Wide II (WWII), Germany has adopted the notion of 'nie wieder krieg' which meant "war, never again". Germany has found itself in a leading position during the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Germany has affected the objectives and policies of its EU allies in the development and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in such a way to prioritize the use of soft power (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2006: 31).

Conceptual framework:

In the thesis, Europeanization is referred to as a process through which domestic and foreign policy fields of the member and candidate states -whether supranational or intergovernmental- are gradually adapted to the EU. The thesis is specially focused on the Europeanization of the member states, because of the fact that the Europeanization of German foreign policy is analyzed. There are three types of policy transfer between the EU and its member states in the Europeanization framework and these are top-down Europeanization, the bottom-up Europeanization and sideways Europeanization. The top-down approach of Europeanization indicates the transfer of EU preferences and policies to the national

level (Major, 2005: 176). The bottom-up approach points out that uploading of the EU member states' preferences to the EU level (Hill and Wong, 2011: 2). And lastly, Europeanization as a sideways process through which member states interchange ideas (Major, 2005: 181).

Constructivist institutionalism evaluates the Europeanization of foreign policy in the member states. It tries to explain that how institutions -values, cognitive frames, and meaning systems- shed light on an actor's identity, their objectives and actions with the logic of appropriateness (Neuman-Stanivukovic, 2014: 18), and the process of persuasion (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). Constructivist institutionalism sees the EU as a new institution composing of new ideas, meanings, rules, values, norms which the EU member states should adopt. As a result, the EU's member states' governments adopt the EU's rules in spite of their material interests (Sedelmeier, 2001: 15). Member states try to do the right things rather than maximizing power and purely pursuing their interests. According to sociological explanation, domestic level of Europeanization is sometimes regarded as a process of change which means adopting EU values and norms (Huggins, 2018: 1266). Contrary to constructivist institutionalism, the rational institutionalism indicates that the actors follow the logic of consequences. Actors behave purposefully, rationally and strategically (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 57).

Power has been widely discussed in the international relations discipline and also it is one of the central terms for the discipline. There is no common or shared definition of power. According to Nye, power is the capability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not do (Nye, 1990: 154). As it is examined in the thesis, power is mainly divided into three categories and these are hard power, soft power, and smart power. Firstly, hard power means military power, but soft power inclines to be regarded with the co-operative power end of the spectrum of behavior which involves the use of civilian means (Nye, 2004: 7). Secondly, soft power is the ability to get what you want with persuasion and attraction instead of payouts. This arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it means that our soft power grows (Nye, 2004: X). Lastly, smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy (Nye, 2008: 43).

According to Nye, there are three resources of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policy. Culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and foreign policy (when they are perceived as legitimate and having moral authority) used to charm persuade and befriend, through foreign aid and humanitarian relief or teaching languages and showcasing culture (Nye, 2004: 11). Europe has been considered as a model of soft power. EU is an institution which is based on law, negotiation and multilateral organization (Bayır, 2016: 10). The EU is considered as an international actor possessing important soft power that is having significant “ability to get what you want by attraction” (Patalakh, 2017: 149).

An overview of the Russia-Ukraine crisis:

Ukraine was one of the most important countries of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine has turned its face to the EU after the end of the Cold War when it gained its independence, some analysts claim that the idea of the EU and its norms and values are intimately associated with Ukraine’s self-image and self-definition (Chaban and O’Loughlin, 2018: 62). The EU initiated trade and association talks with Ukraine after its independence. The country has also been included in the ENP which was established in 2004 and also the EU launched the Eastern Partnership Program in 2008-2009 for eastern partners of the ENP including Ukraine (Sauer, 2017: 89). Russia did not welcome these progressive relations between Ukraine and the EU, especially claiming that it was not fully informed and consulted about such an advanced relationship and as a result, Ukraine crisis erupted.

Ukraine crisis can be studied in three phases. The first phase was the street protests, Euromaidan, which are against pro-Russian government covertly supported by Western allies particularly by the EU and the United States. The second phase was the annexation of Crimea by Russia through the use of military means and with the support of domestic pro-Russian Crimeans. The last phase was the ongoing conflicts between Ukrainian government forces supported by Western states and the Russian backed separatists (Karabulut and Oğuz, 2018: 82-83) in the Donbas region. Through the Ukraine crisis, Ukraine has witnessed the overthrow of Yanukovich administration, Russian annexation of Crimea and armed separatism in eastern regions between November 2013 and May 2014 (Grytsaienko, 2014: 5).

President Yanukovich did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, thus many people came to the Maidan Square and to protest him (Wilson, 2014: 66), and as a result, he lost his presidency and escaped to Russia. Ukrainian Parliament's impeachment and removal of Yanukovich was not welcomed by Russia (Wilson, 2015: 221). The international community was taken by surprise when Putin decided to annex Crimea on the 16th of March (Rutland, 2016: 130). Pro-Russian separatists declared the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk right after the annexation of Crimea, and then the situation turned into an armed conflict between Ukraine and separatist groups (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 194).

The EU has assisted Ukraine to adopt and develop a transparent democratic process. To the contrary, Russia has tried to implement its own sovereign model on Ukraine. The EU and Russia have attempted to open Ukrainian markets to make more favorable and beneficial conditions for developing trade with Ukraine through the Customs Union or the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The EU member states have different preferences and purposes on their Eastern neighborhood and their attitudes towards Russia-Ukraine conflict were various. Greece, Italy and Hungary were more appealing and they were opposed to the use of sanctions on Russia (Kuzio, 2017: 111). Spain and Portugal did not care about the crisis so much, however, the Central and Eastern European countries were in the position of being threatened by Russia, therefore they supported a more effective reaction which would also involve the use of military means if necessary from the EU against Russia (Nitoiu, 2016: 378). Ukraine was making the headlines that mass demonstrations turned into violent clashes and finally Crimea annexed by Russia, but the EU's reaction to the crisis was not weak, otherwise Russia would go further. However, Pawel Kowal, the head of Parliament's delegation to Ukraine, said that "The EU should have reacted much earlier" (European Parliament, 2014)

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany has tried to use its civilian and soft power, namely diplomatic negotiations to solve problems. Germany, as a leading country of the Ukraine crisis in the EU, uploaded its national preferences to the EU level. Germany continued to talk with Russia during the crisis and preferred the employment soft power tools for its solution. However, by infringing Ukrainian sovereignty, Russia broke the international law. Therefore, the EU, with the leading of

Germany, has imposed various sanctions on Russia (House of Lords, 2015: 32). German foreign policy was effective to bring the EU member states together by utilizing instrument of coalition-building, and it helped Germany to lead European foreign policy throughout the Ukraine crisis (Fix, 2018: 12).

Germany's diplomatic efforts during the crisis intended to prevent Russia from expanding its military intervention beyond Crimea and to settle mutual relations and end the conflict (Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Popławski, 2014: 1). German diplomacy towards the Ukraine crisis composed of trying to freeze the conflict via various means including September truce and subsequent protocol into a permanent, and to provide a comprehensive ceasefire (Pond, 2015: 30). Germany has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the EU level during the crisis and Germany has played a significant role in the EU's soft power towards the crisis. The EU had to impose various sanctions on Russia and in this regard the EU tried to bring Russia in a diplomatic negotiation process, not to punish Russia.

The Argument and the Research Questions of the thesis:

The main aim of the thesis is to evaluate the Europeanization of German foreign policy and Germany's impact on the EU's employment of soft power for tackling the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The thesis is important as it attempts to fill the vacuum in the academic literature; adopting the soft power and Europeanization concepts to evaluate the position of Germany in the Russia-Ukraine crisis and to look into how Germany has successfully uploaded its policy to the EU-level.

In this regard, the main research questions of the thesis are;

- How does Germany influence the EU's role and its soft power in the international arena?
- How has Germany's leading position influenced the EU's soft power during the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
- Has Germany successfully uploaded its preferences for the employment of soft power in case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the EU level?

The main argument of the thesis is that Germany with its civilian power has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the EU level during the Russia-Ukraine

crisis and in this way the EU reacted to the Russia-Ukraine crisis with the combination of soft and civilian instruments instead of military means. Although some claim that the EU has imposed various sanctions on Russia and economic sanctions are not soft power tools, the thesis does not accept this approach. The thesis maintains that instruments other than military ones can be regarded within the concept of soft power and sees soft power as a more inclusive term than civilian power (and as one which surely includes civilian power) because it also refers to the power of culture and ideas. Germany's strong civilian/soft power contributed to the EU's reactions to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Germany has employed its attraction power and preferred to use economic sanctions rather than military means during the crisis. In this regard, the EU has reacted to the Russia-Ukraine crisis with civilian power (coercion, economic sanctions), and at the same time the EU has protected and sustained its soft power (diplomatic negotiation and attraction with its prosperous economy and trade) towards the crisis.

The Sequence of Chapters:

The first chapter is divided into two sections and it offers an overview of Europeanization and soft power concepts. In the first part of the chapter various definitions of Europeanization are discussed. Europeanization in the supranational realm is evaluated with reference to the top-down dimension. Furthermore, Europeanization of national foreign policy is analyzed with reference to sociological institutionalism (the logic of appropriateness) and rational institutionalism (the logic of consequences). Following that, the Europeanization patterns of foreign policy are presented. In the second part of the chapter, on soft power, firstly, the term of power is defined and the approaches of international relations theories towards power are examined. Then hard power and soft power concepts and their differences and similarities are discussed. Furthermore, sources of soft power are discussed mainly with reference to culture, political values and foreign policy. Finally, Europe's role in the international arena and the EU's soft power are explained.

The second chapter of the thesis, firstly, studies Europeanization of some domestic institutions (The Federal Government and the Bundestag, Political Parties, and the Bundeswehr) in German political system. Domestic institutions have a considerable role in the process of making German foreign policy, thus they are taken into consideration to explain comprehensively Europeanization of German foreign policy.

Then, Europeanization of German Foreign policy is discussed with the dimensions of downloading Europeanization (downloading and European Security of Defense Policy, downloading and Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership, downloading and EU Policy towards the Middle East) and uploading Europeanization (uploading German preferences regarding accession of Central and Eastern European countries, uploading German preferences regarding Kosovo war, uploading German preferences regarding European Neighborhood Policy and uploading German preferences regarding Russia).

The third chapter, firstly, offers details of Russia-Ukraine conflict including its causes and its phases. Then, Europeanization of Germany's policy on the Ukraine conflict: a clear case of uploading is explained. Lastly, an overview of the EU's policy on the Russia-Ukraine crisis and Germany's successful uploading is elaborated and it shows how Germany has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the EU level, and, thereby, the EU just used the combination of civilian and soft power tools against Russia rather than hard/military forces.

The thesis concludes that Germany has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the EU level and the EU has just used the combination of civilian and soft power resources during the crisis. The EU with the leadership of Germany tried to solve the Ukrainian crisis with the diplomatic negotiation and used just combination of civilian and soft power instruments. The EU preferred to impose sanctions such as diplomatic and economic ones, but the EU has never used military means to solve the crisis.

1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION AND SOFT POWER

The first chapter of the thesis offers an overview of the concepts of Europeanization and soft power for the thesis aims. First part of the chapter includes different definitions of Europeanization, Europeanization in the supranational realm: the top-down dimension, Europeanization of national foreign policy from the perspective of theoretical debates and the Europeanization patterns. The second part of the chapter explains hard and soft power, their differences and similarities, sources of soft power and the EU's soft power.

1.1. Defining Europeanization

European studies have been mainly concentrated on European integration and Europeanization for decades (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 1). Europeanization would not exist without European integration (Radaelli, 2000: 6). Europeanization on its own is not a theory; therefore it needs a theoretical underpinning (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 340). Europeanization is the phenomenon which a variety of theoretical approaches have wanted and tried to explain (Bulmer, 2007: 47). Neo-functionalism, (liberal) inter-governmentalism and the multi-level governance have been centered around the question of how member states explain the nature of the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 1). On the one hand, the neo-functionalist reading of Europe, provided initially by Haas (1958) focuses on the social driving forces of European political integration and describes political integration as a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, political activities toward new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 16). Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) depict the EU as a novel process of supranationalism (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 68). On the other hand, the main claim of inter-governmentalism is that after years of European integration the state is still alive and kicking and capable of shaping further the process of supranational integration (Grazino and Vink, 2013: 32). Both theories have tried to clarify the formation and stability of a case of interstate cooperation and public policies that were consequently formulated at the supranational level (Jacquot and Woll, 2003: 1).

Europeanization research has gained impetus with deepening and widening¹ process for the last decade or so (Bulmer, 2007: 46), and Europeanization has become an increasingly fashionable term. Linguistically the combination of “Europe” with the suffix “anization” stands for a process of something “becoming European”. This “something”, the subject of Europeanization, is by definition not included in that meaning, which leaves a wide range of objects that may become Europeanized such as peoples, practices, individuals and processes (Beichelt, 2008: 1). Actually, there is no common or shared definition for Europeanization and definitions are always delimited to a specific book, chapter or article (Olsen, 2002: 921). Europeanization analyzes to explain mainly how Europe matters in the particular policy field and the term of Europeanization is used in multidisciplinary fields such as in social sciences, in international relations, and, especially in European studies (Major, 2005: 175). Europeanization also refers to the formation of European identity and polity beyond the nation state (Beichelt, 2008: 1).

European transformations are not restricted to the member states of the EU or Western Europe (Olsen, 2002: 926). The effective attraction of EU policy does not end at the explicit political boundaries of the officially member states (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 45). According to Sittermann (2006: 3-4), Europeanization mostly refers to historical Europe, cultural Europe and political Europe. For historical Europe, Europeanization refers to the export of European political practice, political institutions and way of life beyond Europe mostly through the ways of coercion and colonialism. Europeanization for cultural Europe refers to the re-shaping of identities in contemporary Europe in a manner which relativizes national identities. Europeanization for political Europe refers to political institutions such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe. Europeanization is supposed to explain process of new identity-formation, cultural change, policy change, modernisation and administrative innovation (Radaelli, 2000: 4). Europeanization, as an analytical tool helps understand how member states’ policies get affected by EU level policies, in its narrowest sense, and how member states policies affect EU policies as well as how they both feed into the formulation of policy at the EU level in its broadest sense (Zatezallo, 2007: 3).

¹ Widening and deepening are the two ways as to how the EU should develop itself: would it enlarge by having new members or would it continue its integration making it deeper.

Olsen (2002: 923-924), one of the eminent Europeanization researchers, identified five different Europeanization uses. These are: “changes in external boundaries”, “developing institutions at the European level”, “central penetration of national system of governance”, and, “exporting forms of political organization and political unification projects”. “Changes in external boundaries” encompass the territorial reach of a structure of governance, enlargement and the extent to which Europe as a continent becomes a single political actor. “Developing institutions at the European level” indicates centre-building with a common action capacity, determining some degree of coordination and consistency. “Central penetration of national systems of governance” includes the division of obligations and authority between different levels of governance. “Exporting forms of political organization” refers to relations with non-European actors, institutions and how Europe finds a place in a larger world order. Finally, “political unification projects” are related to territorial space, centre-building, domestic adaptation and how European developments affect and are affected by systems of governance and events out the European continent.

Harmsen and Wilson (2000: 14) determined eight distinct uses/meaning of the term “Europeanization”. The first use of Europeanization is “Europeanization as the emergence of new forms of European governance” and Europeanization here focuses on the EU. Also in this sense, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001: 3) suggest Europeanization as the emergence and the development, at the European level, of specific systems of governance; including legal, political, social institutions affiliated with political problem resolving that methodizes intercommunication between the actors, and, of policy networks concentrating in the formation of authoritative European rules. Based on this, Europeanization is perceived as a process of institution-building at the European level in an attempt to analyze how this Europeanization has an affect upon member states. There are three dimensions - policies, politics, and polity - upon which the domestic effect of Europeanization can be studied (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 3).

The second use of Europeanization is “Europeanization as a national adaptation”. Europeanization here focuses on the adaptation of national institutional structures and policy making processes in response to development of the EU integration (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 14). Also, Ladrech (1994: 69) as one of the pioneer academic of Europeanization, refers to suggest Europeanization in the broadest

meaning as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making. In other words, Europeanization refers to transformation either of domestic dynamics by reason of European integration or of the EU's institutions themselves (Ladrech, 2001: 1-2).

The third use of Europeanization is "Europeanization as policy isomorphism" (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 15). Radaelli and Bulmer claim that Europeanization comprises of a process construction, diffusion and institutionalization of, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, methods of completing things and beliefs that are shared, and, norms which are determined firstly and reinforced in the making of EU decisions and incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 3). According to Ladi (2006: 7), Europeanization definition provided by Radaelli is appropriate for the three reasons: Firstly, Europeanization is perceived as a process of institutional and policy change both at the national and the EU level. Secondly, the significance of policy transfer and diffusion is stressed. Lastly, it provides the broad definition of policy change.

The fourth use is "Europeanization as problem and opportunity for domestic political management". Here Europeanization can be understood in terms of problems which it poses and the opportunities which it creates for domestic political management, insofar as it confronts governments with policy choices that fall outside of established domestic parameters (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 15). At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by crating coalitions among those groups. At the international level, governments want to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures and they seek to minimise the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Putnam, 1988: 434).

The fifth use is "Europeanization as modernisation". Europeanization here is applied in the context of the more geographically peripheral and less economically developed of the EU's member states (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 16). The usage is taken to sign a series of structural transformations attempted to bring these less developed countries back into the European mainstream, described with reference to the

political and economic models which prevail in the more effective and affluent “core” countries (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 16).

“Europeanization as joining Europe” is the sixth use of Europeanization. This definition refers to the enlargement of the EU (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 16), relations between the EU and other international actors, and the EU’s attempts to identify its international role (Moumoutzis, 2011: 611). Here it is seen that the EU has been effective in Europeanizing countries, particularly, the candidate countries. Actually the Europeanization of candidate countries has emerged only recently as a separate research area (Sedelmeier, 2011: 5). Europeanization in this sense means their transformation to the fulfil the requirements of the *acquis communautaire*² (Schimmelfenning, 2012: 5) and the way that candidate states are Europeanized are different, because the relationship between them and the EU is asymmetrical and the accession process is rather vague. This is an asymmetrical relationship because candidate countries have no roles shaping in the EU’s integration and they cannot transfer their policy interests to the EU level. They are only consumers, not producers, of the outcomes of the EU’s policy-making processes. Also, it is uncertain because there is no guarantee regarding the endpoint of accession negotiations (Grabbe, 2002: 9).

The seventh use is “Europeanization as the reconstruction of identities” (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 17). The people in Europe have created an European currency (the Euro), flag, and newspaper (the European); European television stations (the French-German Arte, the English SKY) and universities; an European Champions League for soccer, court, film festival, parliament and law; and Eurovision song festival. (Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 487-488). Besides these, European values and norms as promoted by the EU helped them clarify their own identity. Borneman and Fowler (1997: 489), describe Europeanization as a strategy of self-representation and a device of power. If people become Europeans, their identities turn around categories of exchange, difference and value instead of categories of religion, folk or national defence (Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 492).

²The term *acquis* refers to all EU treaties, declarations, directives, regulations, decisions, international agreements, resolutions and the decisions of the Justice Court (Miller, 2011: 1). The candidate states are expected to harmonize their administrative and institutional structures with and to reform their national legislation according to the EU (European Commission, 25.11.2018).

Eight and lastly, “Europeanization as transnationalism and cultural integration” is another use. Europeanization in this definition refers to spheres of interaction in everyday life where people in Europe engage in face to face encounters with each other (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 18). Furthermore, Borneman and Fowler (1997: 488), define Europeanization “as an accelerated process and a set of effect that are redefining forms of identification with territory and people.”

Many other scholars also define Europeanization. For instance, Lawton (1999: 91) defines Europeanization as a de jure move of sovereignty to the EU level. And according to Bomber and Peterson (2000: 77), Europeanization is a simplified description for a complicated process, in which national and sub-national institutions, citizens, and political actors adapt to the patterns of European integration generally and EU policies particularly.

Europeanization is a two-way process and these are “bottom-up” and “top-down” dimensions. Bottom-up dimension refers to the evolution of European institutions as a set of new rules, norms and practices according to national preferences, while top-down dimension emphasizes the affect of these new institutions on political structures and processes on the member states (Major, 2005: 176). According to Börzel, European studies have been mainly centred upon the bottom-up dimension, exploring the underlying dynamics and potential consequences of European institution building for a long time but in recent years, the concept’s field has been widened and many studies have analysed the impact of the evolving European system of governance on the domestic institutions of the member states (Börzel, 2002: 193-194). Dyson and Goetz (2003: 14) also claim that Europeanization denotes a complicated responsive “top-down” and “bottom-up” process where polities, politics and public policies are framed by EU integration and where domestic actors use EU integration to form the domestic arena.

In the broader context, there are three types of policy transfer between the EU and member states in the Europeanization framework. The top-down approach of Europeanization indicates the transfer of EU preferences and policies to the national level. The bottom-up approach is about the uploading of the EU member states’ preferences to the EU level. Europeanization as a sideways process through which member states interchange ideas (Hang, 2011: 144). This is also referred to as cross-

loading where both levels affect each other in the creation and implementation of policies. But a vast majority of users of Europeanization define Europeanization narrowly; as institutional effects of the rules, norms, practices, and *acquis* of the EU on the processes, politics and member states policies. This Europeanization concept has been employed to describe the changes seen in both domestic policy and policy process of the EU member states (Hill and Wong, 2001: 1). Figure I shows types of policy transfer between the EU and member states in the framework of Europeanization.




Figure I: Europeanization(Gross, 2009: 16).

On the other hand, Europeanization is not basically about formal policy rules and but it is also about less tangible aspects, such as beliefs and values (Bulmer and Radalli, 2004: 3). Europeanization is something different from globalisation because of the geographic delimitation and the distinct nature of the pre-existing national framework which mediates this process of adjustment in formal and informal way (Ladrech, 1994: 71). Europeanization absolutely interacts with globalisation, but goes beyond a purely economically-guided process as it is consciously politically driven (Major, 2005: 179). Europeanization also should not be confused with convergence, neither with harmonization nor with political integration. Convergence can be consequence of European integration thus it cannot be used synonymously with Europeanization because Europeanization is a process of internalization and social learning and most importantly of transformation not only of policies but also of identities. Harmonization of national policies is generally considered as an important goal European integration (Grazino and Vink, 2013: 38). Finally, political integration is

concerned with integration theories and seeks to explain why the member states pool their sovereignty at the EU level. In short political integration makes emphasis on what happens to the state and its sovereignty (Major, 2005: 178).

These parts have provided a general perspective of Europeanization concept. However, for the purposes of the study, this thesis consciously restricts itself with the Europeanization of member states with the bottom-up dimension of Europeanization, on the ways which member states upload their preferences to the EU level, in order to show how Germany uploaded its interests and policies from national level to the EU level in the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, before explaining this specific process, it would be useful to see how Europeanization happens in the supranational realm where the top-down character of Europeanization is more significant.

1.1.1. Europeanization in the Supranational Realm: the Top-down Process

Europeanization process can be explained by adopting the EU's perspectives at the national level and the adaptation can be explained by analyzing the reactions and behaviour of the affected actors at the national level (Sittermann, 2006: 11). As mentioned above, Europeanization has impacts on the EU member states, candidate states and even on some other states and international and national organizations. Börzel, and Risse (2000: 5), have emphasised the so called "goodness of fit" between domestic institutions and European policy. By emphasising it, they draw our attention to explanatory factors related to any mechanism of change. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002: 255) have identified three mechanisms: on the presence of European models, on the domestic opportunity structure and on the role of minimalist directives in framing integration. Radaelli (2000: 16), in one of his studies determines mechanisms of coercion, mimetism and normative pressures in EU policy diffusion. He also examines the process of EU-induced cognitive convergence in the absence of direct compulsion from Brussels. Kohler-Koch also describes (1996: 360), mechanisms that go beyond the issue of affect of EU policy on the balance of power and Europeanization can produce effects that go beyond the balance of power. She stated that the most fascinating result of empirical studies on the impacts of Europeanization of regions is the developing significance of network building (Kohler-Koch, 1996: 375).

The analytical tool to measure Europeanization by institutional compliance is called “goodness of fit” and it appoints to the degree of congruence or incongruence between domestic EU policy and institutional arrangements (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 5). According to Börzel and Risse (2009: 1), “Europeanization must be ‘inconvenient’ and there must be some degree of ‘misfit’ or incompatibility between European level processes, policies and institutions, one the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions, on the other.” This leads to institutional requirements for domestic arrangements. “The lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher is the adaptational pressure Europe exerts on the member states.” (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 6). There are two types of misfit: policy misfit and institutional misfit. Policy misfit occurs between European laws and regulations and domestic policies. Institutional misfit confronts domestic rules and procedures at the shared understanding devoted to them (Börzel, 2003: 5-6).

Knill and Lehmkuhl analytically distinguish three distinctive mechanisms (1999: 4), and these are “institutional compliance”, “changing domestic opportunity structures” and “policy framing”. First is that European policy-making may lead to domestic change by determining institutional obligations which member states should adopt. Based on this, EU policy positively determines an institutional model for domestic arrangements, and, according to it, member states have limited discretion when deciding concrete decisions, so as to comply with European requirement and also it includes positive integration policies (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 258). Secondly, European legislation may impact domestic arrangements (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 4). European affect is constrained to changing domestic opportunity systems and the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 260-261). Thirdly, the minimalist perspective of European policy-making does not determine institutional requirements and recast the institutional context for strategic interaction but has effects on domestic arrangements by changing the beliefs and behaviour (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 4).

Radaelli (2000: 16), emphasizes institutionalism in organizational analysis and deduces the mechanism of coercion, mimetism and normative pressures in EU policy diffusion. He also examines the process of EU-induced mental convergence in the lack of direct coercion from Brussels. Theoretically, there are two ways of conceptualizing

the operational process with respect to Europeanization. On the one hand, some see action as driven by the logic of prior preferences and anticipated consequences, on the other hand, some see action as driven by the logic of appropriateness and identity sense (March and Olsen, 1998: 949). In other words, rationalist institutionalists focus on the “logic of consequentialism”, and, in their view, the mismatch between European level and domestic level processes provides societal and/or political actors with new conveniences and restraint in the pursuance of their preferences (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 1). Avoiding the constraints depends on the actor’s capacity and two mediating factors influence. These capacities are multiple veto points and formal institutions. Multiple veto points in a state’s institutional structure can efficiently authorize actors and formal institutions might occur by providing actors with material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 1).

In contrast, sociological institutionalists emphasize the “logic of appropriateness” and the process of persuasion. European policies, norms, and the other collective understanding devoted to them make use of adaptational pressures on domestic level processes (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). I intentionally want to make emphasis on that; regulations, directives and decisions of Court of Justice have direct affect and their fit and misfit can be easily measured in the supranational realm, because they are legally binding. However, to measure their fit and misfit in the foreign policy is really difficult, because they are not politically binding. Two mediating factors influence the degree of misfit results in the internalization of the norms and developments of new ideas. The former factor that changes agents or norm entrepreneurs which mobilize in the domestic context and convince as other to redefine their preferences and identities and the latter one is a political culture and other informal institutions exist with the consequence of consensus building and cost sharing (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). “Logic of appropriateness” can be used more properly in the foreign policy realm. Member states can use the “logic of appropriateness” for their own interests. For instance, Germany has supported the east enlargement and east countries neighbourhoods in order to legitimate its Ostpolitik. Therefore, Europeanization here is used as a reflection of national interests.

1.1.2. Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

European co-operation in foreign and security policy has completed its many years. European Political Co-operation can be described as “the procedures used from 1970 to discuss and coordinate their position on foreign relations and in which appropriate, act in concert” (White, 2001: 71). EPC transformed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991 (E. Smith, 2000: 614). Most studies on Europeanization of national foreign policy put emphasis on the impacts of European regional integration and particularly the impacts of the CFSP on national policies (Hill and Wong, 2011:1). Foreign and security policy absolutely diverges from other policy areas, and this policy directly and insolubly related to the maintenance of national sovereignty (Major, 2005: 183). In regard to foreign policy, establishment of the CFSP, as the second pillar of Maastricht³ was the most obvious institutional mechanism (Dumitru, 2014: 85). Employing tools like goodness of fit to assess is not possible in CFSP because of its intergovernmental nature and the member states’ concerns about their sovereignty (Börzel, 2000: 5). Because of its intergovernmental structure, its decisions are only politically binding. Intergovernmental co-operation have a weak affect on national foreign policies (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614).

Intergovernmental decision-making requires the agreement of all member states and EU foreign policy values, practices and procedures have been formed inter-governmentally and even if they are incorporated into national policy, the EU could not likely have been casually important (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614). Unanimity provides all member states the equal chance and, within it, the minimal demands of each country are satisfied (Moravcsik, 1993: 502). Therefore, there may be some mismatch between European and national interests (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614). Furthermore, if national preferences change over time, a mismatch may occur over time as well (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614).

According to Hill and Wong, factors such as institutions and treaties, socialisation, leadership, external federators, politics of scale, legitimisation of global

³ Treaty on EU, or called Maastricht Treaty has three pillars, these are: European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). The qualifications of the Union in the fields of common foreign and security policy should cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions concerning the safety of the Union, including the progressive framework of a common defence policy that could lead to a common defence (Article 24, Paragraph 1, Treaty on EU).

role and geo-cultural identity promote the Europeanization of national foreign policies (Hill and Wong, 2011: 13). According to Moumoutzis (2011: 618), Europeanization of national foreign policy occurs in the three conditions. First is that substantive EU foreign policy norms (democracy, the rule of law, peace, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms etc.) once cooperated into national foreign policy, they shape national foreign goals. Therefore, national foreign policy makers begin to consider EU values such as peace, democracy, international co-operation, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights, and good governance. Also if the third countries fail to take the course of action that EU foreign policy values and norms prescribe (when above-mentioned norms and values are threatened, violated or falter) national foreign policy makers identify foreign policy problems that need to be addressed and discussed (Moumoutzis, 2011: 619). Second is that if EU foreign policy practices are incorporated into national foreign policy, they shape the policy instruments, their configuration and the way which they are used. For instance, the offer of EU membership constitutes a significant instrument at the EU's disposal. The use of this tool is ruled by a particular kind of conditionality, which has been referred to as "reinforcement by reward" (Moumoutzis, 2011: 619). Third is that if procedural EU foreign policy norms integrated into national foreign policy, they influence the national foreign policy-making process and the actors involved. "EU level co-operation has moved the conduct of national foreign policy [. . .] towards a collective endeavour" (Moumoutzis, 2011: 619).

Furthermore, Europeanization of national foreign policy has various implications on national foreign policies. Firstly, it requires the political and bureaucratic adaptation of foreign policy natures and processes to those of the EU. Secondly, it changes national actors' norms, values, identities and role-conceptions. Thirdly, it changes in the actual content of national foreign policies. Finally, it overcomes of both domestic and external resistance to change (Tonra, 1999: 153).

1.1.2.1. Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Theoretical Debates

Most arguments of the studies on theoretical stances of Europeanization come from sociological (or constructivist) and rational institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism follows the logic of appropriateness; in contrast, rational institutionalism adopts the logic of consequences. Constructivist institutionalism

examines Europeanization within a wider framework when compared to rational institutionalism. Constructivist institutionalism is reasonable for analyzing Europeanization of member states. In contrast, rationalist institutionalism as it focuses on the EU's conditionality and domestic veto players, is appropriate for the Europeanization of candidate countries (Sedelmeier, 2011: 7).

Sociological institutionalism tries to find answer the question how institutions (norms, cognitive frames, and meaning systems) explain an actor's identity, their interests and actions with the following logic of appropriateness (Neuman-Stanivukovic, 2014: 18) and the process of persuasion (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). According to the logic of appropriateness, actors' intent to fulfil social anticipations because actors' behaviours are guided by a common understanding of what socially acceptable behaviour is. Putting differently, appropriateness encompasses cognitive and ethical dimensions, goals and ambitions and within the logic of appropriateness, actions are thought as rule-based (March and Olsen, 1998: 951).

From a sociological institutionalism view, the EU is about new institutions; new ideas, meanings, rules, norms which the member states have to adopt (Sittermann, 2006: 16). As a result of that, governments adopt the EU's rules despite their material interests (Sedelmeier, 2001: 15). Actors seek to do the right things instead of maximizing their interests and domestic level of Europeanization is sometimes considered as a process of change caused by adopting EU rules and norms, fitting the sociological explanation (Huggins, 2018: 1266).

Jacquot and Woll (2003: 3), emphasize the role of actors in social interactions and recognition that their mediation is a crucial component of the integration process. Modernist social constructivists suggest that the studies of politics-or integration- is not about agents with fixed preferences, it seeks to clarify the content of actor's identities/objectives and the modes of social interaction (Checkel, 1999: 548). On the one hand, agents may behave properly by learning the role, acting in the same manner, regardless of they agree on the role or not. On the other hand, agents accept community or organizational role as the right thing to do (Checkel, 2005: 804).

Sociological institutionalism claims that Europeanization causes domestic change by means of collective learning process and socialization (Börzel and Risse,

2009: 2). It is logical to assume that a high degree of interaction among policymakers within an international institution, like the EU's CFSP, may encourage a social learning process (Aggestam, 2004: 86). Checkel says that "social learning involves a process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures), acquire new interests and preferences in the absence of obvious material incentives" (Checkel, 1999: 548). In other words, the agent's interests and identities are changed through social learning (Checkel, 1999: 548). Checkel (2005: 808), distinguishes three mechanisms associating institutions to socialize outcomes and these are: "strategic calculation", "role-playing" and "normative suasion". The first one, "strategic calculation", has roots in rationalist social theory. When incentives and rewards may be social or material, one might expect both to play some role in socialisation process and here agents carefully calculate and seek to maximise given interests, adopting their behaviour to the norms and rules favoured by the international community (Checkel, 2005: 809). The second one, "role playing", has deep roots in organization theory and cognitive/social psychology and agents are considered as rational. When this mechanism takes place, the shift has begun from logic of consequences to logic of appropriateness, because it involves non-calculative behavioural adaptation (Checkel, 2005: 810). The third one, "normative suasion", is drawing on Habermasian social theory and social theory and when this mechanism occurs, agents actively internalize new understanding of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005: 812).

Contrary to constructivist institutionalism, rational institutionalism suggests that actors follow the logic of consequences. Putting differently, policy actors behave purposefully, rationally and strategically (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 57). Rational institutionalism, while focusing on the logic of consequences, ignores the endogenous dynamics (Aggestam, 2004: 86). According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 12-13), the approach has four characteristics of rational institutionalism. Firstly, rational institutionalists make use of a characteristic set of behavioural expectations. Secondly, rational institutionalists purvey a different image of politics. Thirdly, it emphasizes the role of strategic interaction in the perseverance of political consequences. Lastly, it has also improved a distinctive approach to the problem of illustrating how institutions originate.

Rational institutionalism not only suggests a cross-paradigmatic reading of the content of institutions, but also the mechanisms -conditionality, externalization, transnational incentives, transnational externalization- which they produce change (Neuman-Stanivukovic, 2014: 16, Schimmelfenning, 2012: 8). Rational institutionalism is connected with more traditional European integration studies strongly (Grazino and Vink, 2013: 40). The EU's adaptational pressures change the opportunity structure for maximizing domestic interests (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11). Börzel says that:

Rational institutionalism views social institutions, including the EU, as external constraints on the behaviour of actors with given identities and preferences. From this perspective, Europe is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure which offers some actors additional legal and political resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals (Börzel, 2003: 8).

From a rationalist perspective, Europeanization is seen as a response to possible changes or constraints and the consequence of a cost-benefit analysis such as additional resources, competitive advantage or reducing the costs affiliated with Europeanization (Huggins, 2018: 1261). Rationalist institutionalism put forwards that Europeanization causes domestic change by way of a differential authorization of actors resulting from redistribution of resources at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 2).

1.1.2.2. The Europeanization Patterns of Foreign Policy

The Europeanization patterns of foreign policy emphasize the ways in which foreign policy of member states and candidate states are Europeanized. Therefore they are supportive to grasp the extent and the degree of Europeanization (Alkan, 2013: 34). Europeanization of foreign policy has created common rules and norms that are progressively accumulated (Olsen, 2002: 937) and also many scholars conceive of Europeanization of foreign policy as a process of progressive convergence and harmonization of foreign policy processes, identity, and standpoints of EU level institutions and the member states (Batora, 2012: 220).

An Europeanized foreign policy in one which I) takes common EU positions, whether it is formal or not, and it is main reference point, II) does not in general defect from common position, III) attempts to convince its national interests within the scope of common position, and, IV) subscribes positively to the EU values and principles it is

an international activity (Hill and Wong, 2011: 4-5). Based on the above-mentioned criteria Hill and Wong classify seven degrees of Europeanization of foreign policy for member states and candidate states:

1. Significantly Europeanized
2. Eager to Europeanize, however a partial or heavy process
3. Irregular in the level of Europeanization, both over time and between issue areas); cumulative effect invisible.
4. Systematically instrumental in the procedure of Europeanization
5. impervious to Europeanization - through might still present some degree of change
6. De-Europeanizing - i.e. affirmatively trying to rid itself of any thought restraints sanctioned by European foreign policy.
7. Never significantly Europeanized (Hill and Wong, 2011: 5).

According to Hill and Wong (2011: 2), there is a common agreement on three different patterns of Europeanization process which are noticeable in the relations between a member state's foreign policy and EU. Firstly, the dimension of Europeanization is used is a top-down approach which suggests an adaptation of national structures and processes is a response to Europeanization. Secondly, the dimension of Europeanization indicates the bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from national to the EU level. In this perspective, the state tries to increase its national influence in the world and tries to influence the foreign policy of other member states and also the state uses EU level as an influence multiplier. Bottom-up perspective is the most relevant dimension for the thesis purposes, therefore the thesis is studied in this context it. And thirdly, Europeanization is in the broadest sense, which means a process of identity and interest convergence (Hill and Wong, 2011: 2).

Alternatively, E. S. Smith (2000: 617), conceptualizes the four primary ways with national adaptation to political cooperation which is expressed and they are: "élite socialization", "bureaucratic re-organization", "constitutional change" and "the increase in public support for European political co-operation". According to the way of "élite socialization", problem-solving essentially relies on to an extent which is appropriate policy decision makers are socialized into the system (E. S. Smith, 2000: 617). Elite

socialization is closely related to identity reconstruction. “Bureaucratic adaptation” suggests that political co-operation preferences become national (E. S. Smith, 2000: 619). Moreover, “political co-operation” prompts significant constitutional debates in EU states, for instance after a protracted domestic debate, Germany’s government could reinterpret fundamental provisions of its constitution in order to justify its military operations in Balkans (E. S. Smith, 2000: 624). Aforementioned processes –élite socialization, bureaucratic re-organization, constitutional change– are the most important indicators of the way which participation in political co-operation encouraged more fundamental changes in the domestic politics of EU member states (E. S. Smith, 2000: 625).

1.2. Soft Power

The term ‘Power’ has been debated considerably and it is a complex and contested term in the international relations history and simultaneously it is one of the central terms for the discipline. Joseph Nye says that:

Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast the weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe and predict changes in power relationships. Power is also like a mover, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that (Nye, 2004: 1).

There is no shared definition of power in international politics, and its types and contexts have been re-shaped up to now. Nye defines power as a capability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not do (Nye, 1990: 154). With three ways you can affect the others to get what you want: “with threats of coercion; sticks”, “with payments; carrots”, or “with attraction and persuasion” (Nye, 2011: 1). Having power in international affairs is having the capability to affect another to take actions in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise (Wilson, 2008: 114). Power has been the subtitle of international relations studies since the earliest political writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli (Rothman, 2011: 49). It seems impossible to examine soft power on its own, thus before explaining soft power, necessary information about the concept of power is given in order to grasp the EU’s use of combination of civilian and soft power in the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Theories of international relations attempt to explain power in all its forms. A concern with power in international relations is generally explained as a disciplinary attachment to realism (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40). Realism centred on power politics besides anarchy, egoism, and groupism. According to realism, states are the main actor of international relations and they should focus on the hard power instruments such as the army and weapons instead of soft ones. Accordingly, in realism power politics is described as an activity based on (and is a search for) power and security.

Proponents of realism stressed the various explanations about power. For example, Thucydides, who is seen as the father of Realism, claimed the supremacy of might over right. Machiavelli, regardless of religious or ethical considerations was favouring the quest for power. He looked for the answer of the question whether it is preferable for the prince to be loved more than feared or to be feared more than loved, and, consequently, his reply was that for the prince it is more secure to be feared than loved, for love is held by a chain of necessity which is broken whenever it services their purpose but fear is continued by a dread of punishment which never fails (Machiavelli, 2017: 119). Hobbes focused on the man's inherent selfishness and violence. According to him, there are three principal causes of quarrel and these are: "competition", "diffidence" and "glory". The first one, "competition", makes men overspread for gain and use violence to make themselves the masters' of other men. The second one, "diffidence", makes men invade for gain. And the last one, "glory", is for reputation (Hobbes, 2017: 126). His famous word is that "man is a wolf to man", and it can be understood from his words that people are inherently evil and they seek to maximize their power. Morgenthau (1948: 17-18), points out that individuals are engaged in a clash for power at any time they come to contact with each other, because their disposition to control exists in all stages of human life: the family, the polity and the international system. He also says that interest is determined with regard to power and power is an end in itself (Morgenthau, 1948: 13).

Neo-realism perceives power as a possible practical means, with states running risks if they have both too little and too much of it (Waltz, 2017: 153). Neo-realism claims that states are naturally seeking their national preferences regarding power, and they have only themselves to depend on to keep their preferences, sovereignty, and achieve their survival because of the anarchical nature of international system. Thus

power becomes the central element of international relations because it guarantees the state's survival (Collard-Wexler, 2006: 399-400). In other words, the eventual concern for countries is not power, but security (Waltz, 2017: 154). Walt observes that in an anarchic system, security is the highest end and only survival-guaranteed states can try to find other goals such as power, tranquillity and profit (Waltz, 2017: 156). Neo-realism sees relative gains as an essential concern of states, as their relative power enhances, a rising states attempt to shift the rules governing the international system, the division of the spheres of influence and the international distribution of territory (Taliaferro, 2007: 174).

For liberal thinkers, economic incentives are as important as the concern for security (Kohane and Nye, 1987: 729). Liberals have attempted to demonstrate how 'power' variables are not casually consequential in their explanation of empirical outcomes (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40). They emphasize that many important international outcomes cannot be explained with reference to power, instead of it, they can be better understood by the salutary presence of democracy, specific configurations of domestic interests, liberal values, international institutions, or economic interdependence (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40-41). In a nutshell, neo-realists put emphasis on hard power, but liberals focus more on soft power. And they point out soft power as a fundamental source of statecraft (Wilson, 2008: 114).

No sole concept can explain the forms of power in international politics. For instance, Fels (2012: 5), explains that it is possible to distinguish three distinct main understanding of power in international relations: "power as resources", "power as relational power" and "power as structural power". According to the "power as resources", specific material and immaterial components within/of a state can be utilized to assess national power (Fels, 2012: 5). This understanding of power is reflected by Waltz's emphasis on "capabilities" and "attributes of the unit" and Morgenthau's manner towards "elements of national powers" (Fels, 2012: 5). The understanding of "power as relational power" sees it as the casual relationship between actors in international relations in which one state affects the behaviour of another state by using its own material and immaterial components (Fels, 2012: 6). The last understanding, "structural power", draws power in structural terms and the supporter of

this manner perceives power mostly linked with the establishment of control over structures in international relations (Fels, 2012: 6).

Additionally, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 43), emphasize four types of power. First, “compulsory power”, as a relation of the interaction of direct control by one actor over another (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43). Second, “institutional power” which refers to the control actors practice indirectly over others through diffuse relations of interaction (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43). Third, “structural power” is the constitution of subject’s capacities in direct structural relation to one another (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43). And forth, “productive power” is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43).

As we understand from above, power depends on tangible sources such as total GDP, territory, geography, natural resources, population, as well as on intangible elements such as patriotism, education, political culture, and strength of the scientific and technological base (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014: 47). Scholars have made a distinction between hard power and soft power in recent decades. Hard power can be based on threats (sticks). However, sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible payoffs or threats (Nye, 2004: 5). Everyone is familiar with hard power, coercion, and its tangible instruments - weapons, money and military resources - yet after the downgrade of bi-polar world system⁴; many states incline to use soft power to accomplish their foreign policy goals (Amirbek and Ydyrys, 2014: 514). Joseph Nye introduced a new form of power and it is called soft power and he focused on the intangible instruments – culture, ideology and institutions - and then he developed this term (Nye, 2004: 2).

In the aftermath of Cold War in 1989, the world has faced with the period of change accelerated by the globalization and information revolution. The information revolution is built on swift technologies advances in computers and communication that have brought about to sharp declines in the cost of creating, processing and transmitting and searching for information in turn (Nye, 2014: 19). The information revolution is generating important communities and networks that pass through national borders (Nye, 2004: 31). Globalisation as the worldwide expansion of some economic systems,

⁴ Bi-polar world order means a systematic structure in which two actors (thesis indicates to West and East here) and their respective alliances act in a position of substantial contrast around them (Volgy and E. Imwalle, 1995: 820).

cultural and social norms, presents new actors in the international arena such as global capital markets, international organizations and a global civilian community (Yılmaz, 2010: 193). Soft power became a more important concept because of such changes in world politics and it is one of the central terms in international relation discipline (Wilson, 2008: 114). Today there is a new security environment and the table below clearly shows the differences of security environment between Cold War period and today.

Table I: Transformation of Security Environment

Cold War	Today
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State centred international system - Bi-polarity - National security concentrated - National defence - Deterrence and defence - Particular courses of conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Globalisation / Transnational actors - Uni-polarity, asymmetric power distribution - National preference concentrated - Wide spectrum of security - Stretching scope of conflicts - Indefinite sources of conflicts generally

(Yılmaz, 2010: 196).

These changes lead to the creation of the concept of soft power. The ‘soft power’ concept has been introduced, by political theorist Joseph Nye in the book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”, in 1990, which was just after the collapse of Soviet Union, and the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the end of Cold War (Vasilevskytè, 2013: 145). However, the concept’s validity has not been completely investigated in the academy yet (Rothman, 2011: 49). Some people consider power narrowly, in terms of use of military means and coercion, but sometimes we can

get what we want without coercion (Nye, 2004: 2). Soft power builds on attraction and encompasses almost everything other than economic and military power (Wilson, 2008: 114). Attraction is clearly the archetypical soft power behaviour and it is better understood as a form of symbolic, influence-oriented communication that operates in the active and passive sense of soft power (Solomon, 2014: 726-727).

Scholars define soft power using a variety of resources. Some argue the use of information (Armistead 2004), philanthropy (Jenkins 2007), or diplomacy (Kurlantzick 2007) as a form of soft power (Rothman, 2011: 50). Soft power in the broadest terms means that the ability of affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction (Patalakh, 2016: 88). Also Soft power in its original concept was defined as co-optive behavioural power which also aims at getting the other to want what you want (Lee, 2009: 206). Joseph Nye defines soft power broadly as the ability to get what you want with the attraction instead of the payouts. This arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies seem legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is growing (Nye, 2004: X). In this way, you will not need to spend money for the 'sticks and carrots' to force the others into your way when they want what you want (Yilmaz, 2010: 200). Actually, before Joseph Nye, some researchers such as Gramsci (1988) and his cultural hegemony, Bourdieu (1989) and his symbolic power, Foucault (2000) and disciplinary power emphasized non-material power resources (Vasilevskytè, 2013: 145-146).

According to McClory (2017: 29-30), Nye's model for the conversion of soft power into a desired outcome comprises five steps: "resources" (culture, political values and foreign policy), "objectives" (government, culture, global engagement, education, digital and enterprise), "conversion", "target response" and "outcome". Five factors affect the distribution of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology and changing political issues and the role of information-timed actions (Buranelli, 2008: 3). States should improve these resources to have soft power in informational age (Yilmaz, 2010: 196).

Nye claims that soft power does not just belong to the governments, and many non-state actors such as NGOs have primarily soft power as well (Valdes-Ugalde and Nye, 2008: 198). Due to the three reasons, integrating soft power into a government

strategy is difficult: its result is too contingent on the goal, to accomplish visible results can take a long time and the instruments are not completely controlled by governments (Patalakh, 2016: 88). Soft power is especially relevant to the realization of 'milieu goals'. It has a significant role to play in promoting human rights, democracy, and open markets (Nye, 2004: 17).

Nye's soft power concept is criticised in three points: firstly, soft power has a measurability problem, because of the fact that it is difficult to measure soft power or to show that one state's behaviour is a result of other states soft power. Secondly, according to many scholars, the concept of soft power is not original (It is seen as similar to Carr's power categories, Luke's three dimensional power, and Gramsci's hegemony concept). Finally, there is ambiguity about the agent/structure of the concept (Yukaruç, 2017: 493), and Nye focuses on either agency of actors, for instance the US, or structure which determines what it means to be attractive. He does not conflate agent and structure; he seeks to improve a power concept for the USA (Yukaruç, 2017: 409).

Furthermore, Lee suggests soft power analogously with its resources, which means that a power is declared as soft power when soft, non-material resources are used (Lee, 2009: 209). He has expanded Nye's soft power concept in terms of definition and categorization by attracting the nature of power to its sources as a solution to the problem of distinguishing hard power and soft power (Lee, 2009: 207). While Nye's soft power term has been criticised for being centred on the case of the US, which is leading country, Lee offers to look at the case of non-leading country (South Korea) and their reasons to use of soft power (Vasilevskytè, 2013: 150). He suggests that soft power as the power to create the self and others' preferences and images through ideas or symbolic sources that cause behavioural changes of others (Lee, 2009: 210). Lee's soft power definition is based on three steps: categorization of different types of soft power in international relations discipline, distinction between Nye's soft power concept and by distinguishing between soft resources and hard resources and theories of soft power diversion from soft resources (Lee, 2009: 209). The practical soft power strategies are manipulation or creation of self-images to improve security environments, manipulation of others' image to mobilise supports for collective actions, network effect strategy, accelerating situational change, and heroes and celebrities (Lee, 2009: 212-213). Soft power advocates the need to be more convincing that their special strengths

can favour the national well-being and be much more Machiavellian about how to do so (Wilson, 2008: 122).

Lee roughly distinguished soft power into five categories with respect to the policy goals to be accomplished. They are: 1) soft power to develop the outer security territory by predicting peaceful and attractive images of country, 2) soft power to activate other states' to help for one's foreign and security policies, 3) soft power to shape other countries' way of thinking and interests, 4) soft power to protect the unity of a community or community of members, and, 5) soft power to boost the approval ratings of leader, or public support for a government (Lee, 2009: 207-208). According to Lee, resources of soft power are ideas, education, images, discourses, culture, traditions, theories, know-how, national or global symbols etc. (Lee, 2009: 209).

According to Vasilevskytė (2013: 155), Lee's definition is useful for political scientists in four points. Firstly, he offers a well-structured definition by defining the concept with its sources. Secondly, he presents the framework of how soft power resources are diverted into soft power or putting differently, how soft power is produced. Thirdly, he categorised soft power in accordance with policy goals to achieve, and it makes easier to see what goals and by what means countries are exerting their soft power. Finally, he provides a model of how to different soft power strategies can produce different results on domestic and international level.

Furthermore, Vuving (2009: 8), has provided important contributions to the soft power concept. He distinguished three soft power currencies and these are: "benignity", "brilliance" and "beauty". "Benignity" relates to the agent's relations with other actors and in particular with the subject: the agent's kind, generous, supportive action toward the subject arises the former's attractiveness via the production of sympathy and gratitude (Vuving, 2009: 8). "Brilliance" refers to the agent's relations with its work, which in international affairs may manifest itself in high living standards, a successful and effective solution of internal problems, stable economy etc (Vuving, 2009: 8). And "beauty" donated agent's relations with values and ideas (Vuving, 2009: 9). Values of countries in their behaviour at home (democracy), in international institutions (cooperation with other), and in foreign policy (promoting human rights and peace) adequately affect the preferences of others (Nye, 2004: 14).

Aggregative model of soft power includes three types of actors: the “applicant” (the country that conducts a soft power strategy), the “recipient” (the country a soft power strategy aims at) and “competitors” (countries whose soft power strategies towards the same recipient aim at goals that are contrary to the applicant’s ones) (Patalakh, 2016: 87), in other words, the model of soft power resources are divided into three steps: “application of soft power resources”, “cognitive process of the recipients” and “soft power production” (Vasilevskytė, 2013: 148). Soft power has been exercised from the earliest human social interaction. The concept attraction today is adequately high because it appears to offer an approach to the achievement of influence in world politics that is complementary (Gray, 2011: 29). Nye assigns two ontological statuses to attraction: one as a necessary condition and the other as a result of social interaction, but still, in his analyses, Nye depends on the first one and fails to push the second one to its full conclusion (Bilgin and Eliş, 2008: 11). Bilgin and Eliş says that:

Even as he identifies the sources of soft power as ‘the attractiveness of country’s culture, political ideas and policies’, he does not reflect upon how was it that U.S. culture, political ideas, and policies came to be considered attractive by the rest of the world (Bilgin and Eliş, 2008: 11).

Additionally, according to some scholars, soft power does not depend on hard power (Nye, 2004), others think that soft power would be more effective if more money was spent on it (Schneider, 2005) and also some feel that soft power is emerging and getting more influential in today’s global information space and it has less hard power support (Trunkos, 2013: 2). Keohane and Nye called our living world “complex interdependence” which refers to a situation among various countries in where multiple channels of contacts connect societies (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 731). This means a world in which security and force matter less and states are connected by multiple political and social relationships (Singh and Son, 2014: 7). Hard and soft power sometimes reinforces and sometimes interferes with each other (Nye, 2008: 41). Soft power and hard power are two sides of the same coin (Angey-Sentuc and Molho, 2015: 5). Hard and soft power are similar to each other, both of them are aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by impacting the behaviour of others. The distinctions between them are assets which are used and nature of behaviour. Command power is the ability to affect and shape what others do and it can build on coercion and inducement. In contrast, co-operative power is the ability to change what others want and it can build

on the attractiveness of one's culture and values (Nye, 2004: 7). Cultures and ideas are similar with global norms (such as pluralism, liberalism, autonomy) (Yılmaz, 2010: 196). Hard power resources are linked with the command power, but soft power inclines to be regarded with the co-operative power end of the spectrum of behaviour (Nye, 2004: 7). Furthermore, there is one more type of power, smart power, and that is the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy (Nye, 2008: 43). The table below shows clearly a spectrum of behaviours and most likely resources of soft power.

Table II: Spectrum of Behaviours and Most Likely Resources of Hard and Soft Power

	Hard	Soft
Spectrum of Behaviours	<p>coercion</p> <p>inducement</p> <p>Command</p>	<p>agenda setting attraction</p> <p>Co-opt</p>
Most Likely Resources	<p>force Payments</p> <p>sanctions bribes</p>	<p>Institutions values</p> <p>culture</p> <p>policies</p>

Source: (Nye, 2004: 8).

Sometimes same power resources can influence the full spectrum of behaviour from coercion to attraction. A country which faces with economic and military deterioration is like to lose its capability to change the international agenda and some of its attractiveness (Nye, 2004: 9).

1.2.1. Resources of Soft Power

Nye formulated three distinct resources of soft power: 1) “culture” (in places where it is attractive to others), 2) “political values” (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and 3) “foreign policy” (when they are perceived as legitimate and having moral authority) and all of them used to charm persuade and befriend, through foreign aid and humanitarian relief or teaching languages and showcasing culture (Nye, 2004: 11). Soft power resources may have large impact on outcomes by making one alternative more attractive than another (Rothman, 2011: 60).

Culture is a sort of values and practices that create meaning for society (Nye, 2004: 11), and it is the behaviour pattern of spreading knowledge and values. Countries can influence other countries through culture. Nye distinguishes cultures into three levels and these are: “universal cultures”, “ethical cultures” and “other cultures” owned only by people in particular social strata or some small organizations (Lin and Hongtao, 2017:70). If a country’s culture encompasses universal values and its policies encourage values and interests that other state share, the probability of obtaining its preferred consequences rises, thanks to the relationship of attraction and duty that it creates (Nye, 2004: 11). Cultural diplomacy is a subtitle of public diplomacy and it as a country’s effort to promote and facilitate the international diffusion of its culture (Angey-Sentuc and Molho, 2015: 4). Soft power and cultural diplomacy is frequently relied on achieving intangible effects, such as influence and trust which can involve seemingly indeterminate processes, techniques and mechanisms such as convivial and personal encounters (Doeser and Nisbett, 2017: 9). Soft power and cultural diplomacy are not only end objectives and goals, but also processes (Doeser and Nisbett, 2017: 16).

Popular culture is seen as one of the strongest resources of soft power in the globalized world. Popular culture concentrates on mass entertainment such as movie and music (Lin and Hongtao, 2017:70). Some scholars treat soft power as popular cultural power. Yet, it cannot be acceptable for all circumstances. For example, American films that make the United States charming in China or Latin America, but it may have a negative effect and indeed decrease American soft power in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Nye, 2004: 12). Culture transmission occurs through commerce, personal contacts, visits and exchanges (Nye, 2004: 13). State can use their soft power through four main channels: public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchanges and assistance

(Patalakh, 2016: 97). Exchange may be the most useful channel. The EU has many exchange programs and thanks to the many European and non-European students, scholars visit, live and learn while being in different countries. These programs also prove that many diverted nations live in unity.

Political theories generally evaluate military power to be a component of only hard power but “a country in economic decline and with diminishing military status, may lose some of its attractiveness and ability to shape international environment...” (Kudryavisev, 2014: 6). Furthermore, in specific cultures, military power itself is a value, and a state with a strong military capacity is considered respectable in these societies (which is also a part of soft power). Accordingly, the traditional hard power military instrument can achieve soft power effects as well (Kudryavisev, 2014: 6).

Government policies are another potential of soft power at home and abroad. For instance, today the practice of capital punishment and weak gun control laws cut American soft power in Europe. (Nye, 2004: 13). Nye (2004: 11) claims that the political value followed internationally and domestically makes one of the resources of soft power. If a country represents values that others want to follow, the legality of the policies will be strengthened. In contrast, if the value differs from what others want to follow, soft power will be harmed (Nye, 2004: 6).

Political values are measured through levels of democracy and levels of restrictions on political rights (Singh and MacDonald, 2004: 35). The government values champions in its behaviour at home (for example democracy), in international institutions (working with others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) and that firmly affect the interests of others. The EU has tried to expand and promote these values to the other geographies. Copenhagen criteria⁵ include all these government values. Soft power values do not belong to the government in the same degree as hard power does (Nye, 2004: 14).

⁵Copenhagen Criteria, or accession criteria are the fundamental obligations for all candidate countries must please to become a member state. These include the political criteria (the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), economic criteria (a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competition and market forces) and administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the *acquis* and ability to take on the obligations of membership. The EU's capacity to absorb new members are also important consideration (European Commission, 25.11.2018).

According to Gallarotti, there are two general sources of soft power: “international resources” (foreign policies and actions) and “domestic sources” (domestic policies and actions). All of them promote a positive image of the country and this positive image attracts other countries (Gallarotti, 2011: 28). International sources are: respect for international law, institutions and values, fundamental reliance on multilateralism and disposition against excessive unilateralism, respect international agreements and alliance commitments, willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good and liberal foreign economic policies. And domestic sources are culture and political institutions. Culture included sub-titles such as pronounced social cohesion, elevated quality of life, freedom, sufficient opportunities, tolerance and alluring lifestyle. Political institutions included democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism/pluralism and a well functioning of government bureaucracy (Gallarotti, 2011: 30). Foreign policy encompasses the advocated world ideals and certain diplomatic approaches of a country (Lin and Hongtao, 2017:70). Foreign policies adequately affect soft power. Government policies can reinforce or squander a country’s soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the others opinion, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can jeopardize soft power (Nye, 2004: 13-14).

The state and governments remain most powerful actors of world politics, however, they are no longer alone on the stage, and they are sharing the stage with many new actors makes for a different type of politics (Nye, 2011: 46). A successful soft power strategy must attend to all three resources - culture, political values and foreign policies - that are perceived as legitimate in the eyes of others (Nye, 2014: 22). The credibility of soft power based on the resonance and legitimacy of the society it represents (Singh and Son, 2014: 8). Without legitimacy in the eyes of others, our actions consumed rather than produced soft power (Nye, 2008: 199).

1.2.2. Soft Power of the EU

Soft power is useful in the international relations discipline and particularly for guiding diplomatic efforts and human right initiatives (for EU external relations) (Kudryavtsev, 2014: 1). The EU has been created after the severe wars. It is a *sui generis* actor in world politics because of its supranational features and its institutional structure. The EU has pooled sovereignty; it has a territory and system of governance.

Thus it can act in international affairs. The EU's role has been highly debated, but the most debated issue is the EU's role in an increasingly global world (Özer, 2012: 64).

The EU is considered as an international actor possessing important soft power and in the case of the EU; soft power takes the form of normative and civilian power (Patalakh, 2017: 149). Nye states that although the economic and military benefits to Europe were powerful in promoting democratisation, so were popular culture and ideas (Nye, 2004: 48). The EU relies on rule of law, negotiation, and multilateral organization (Casey, 2016: 3), and its soft power has been understood as the Union's ability to protect norms, values and ideas (Mazepus, and et al, 2018: 3). Furthermore, discourse on soft power facilitates building a stronger European identity (Patalak, 2017: 149), this is mainly because there is a direct link between identity, values and foreign policy⁶

The EU is regarded as an example of the post-modern society due to its supranational characteristics. In defining Europe's role in the international arena, some analysts label the EU as, for instance, 'normative' (Manner), 'structural' (Whitman), 'narrative' (Nicolaïdis and Howse) or 'civilian' power (Özer, 2012: 68), but there are some analysts who also criticize labelling the EU as any kind of power, for example, Cebeci (2012) claims that those role concepts are employed to construct an ideal power Europe meta-narrative which should be deconstructed. The term 'ideal' suggests a collection of the concepts: 'normative/civilian/transformational' and it is used to explain how the EU is represented as a 'positive force' in the international arena (Cebeci, 2012: 577).

The EU is a world player and its population adequately large and it is the biggest trader in the world and produces one-quarter of global wealth (European Commission, 2004: 3). The EU donates more aid to underdeveloped countries than any other donor and it has tried to clean off trade barriers, helped underdeveloped regions, and encouraged peaceful cooperation within its frontiers (European Commission, 2004: 3). The EU has also worked with other countries and international organizations for developing open market economies, sustaining economic growth and achieving stability in an increasingly independent world. At the same time, the EU protects its legitimate economic and commercial interests in international affairs (European Commission, 2004: 3). In a nutshell, the EU, in terms of its external economic and trade relations,

⁶For more on this see Cebeci (2012).

works to help the other regions to reach an advanced level of development (Moreno, Puigrefagut and Yarnoz, 2018: 6). The EU has also enlarged significantly, encompassing countries in Central and Eastern Europe and this has empowered the appeal of soft power concept. By accepting new members, the EU has expanded democracy much more successfully and cost-effectively (Rehn, 2007: 2).

The end of the Cold War generated new forces for foreign policy co-operation among the EU member states for defensive reasons and especially in the realm of security which also helped the advancement of the European model in diplomacy and conflict management (Smith, 2009: 597). The European model of democracy promotion, and support for market liberalisation, incorporating capitalist dynamism with social responsibility is more attractive to developing powers (Casey, 2016: 3). However, the complex nature of today's post-industrial societies, which constitutes the key to success and well being, make reliance on military power and force more and more unproductive while soft power and knowledge, rather than hard and muscle power become effective in international relations (Tuomioja, 2009: 2).

Despite the popularity of soft power, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, in particular, those over Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were and have been challenging for the EU. Furthermore September 11, 2001 events and the US's subsequent 'war on terror' have multiplied the challenges (Smith, 2009: 3). After faced with its military weakness, the EU has developed its Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Stavridis, 2001: 43). As aforementioned, CFSP occupied an intergovernmental pillar in the EU where ECJ has no jurisdiction over it and the European Community has no exclusive right to submit proposals to the work of CFSP.

The EU is usually described as an economic giant but a military dwarf (Goldthau and Sitter, 2015: 942). Military capacities of the EU member states are increasingly oriented towards crisis management operations (Tuomioja, 2009: 3). In spite of its military absence, Europeans have been able to act collectively as a civilian power and export their liberal version peace through democracy, and democratization through trade (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002: 768). The EU aims to solve international and regional problems with dialogue and regard the military means as last resort. The EU as a model of successful peaceful regional integration inevitably has soft power (Nye, 2004: 77).

The EU gains credibility thanks to its attractive culture, economic power and its foreign policies, which often serve for the global public good, such as positions of human rights, international law, climate change treaties (Kurtuluş, 2016: 4).

For Kirste and Maull (As cited in Tulmets, 2008: 64), a civilian power's "conception of foreign policy role and behaviour is bound to certain aims, values, principles, forms of influence and instruments of power on the name of the civilization of international relations". They refer to five policy dimensions for the post World War II Germany which are suits for the EU's soft power as well: 1) Constrain and monopolize the use of force and promote the peaceful settlements of conflict, 2) promote the rule of law and institutions, 3) promote the culture of non-violence, 4) promote social fairness and distributive justice, and, 5) promote participatory decisions (Tulmets, 2008: 64).

The 'civilian power Europe' role concept has multiple meanings because there is no consensus on an appropriate definition among studies. Civilian power emphasizes on non-military means of power and low politics. In the case of the EU the typical examples include the wide-ranging enlargement process, neighbourhood policy, preferential trade agreements with third countries, Generalised System of Preferences regime, developmental aid to third countries and regional groupings, etc (Özer, 2012: 68-69). The EU's ability to exert power is a result of its attractiveness, as the world's largest single market and its characteristic of having a policy entrepreneur with a well-stocked regulatory toolbox: the European Commission (Goldthau and Sitter, 2015: 942). The European Commission seeks to explore and improve the various types of soft power instruments, including conditions and third parties to abide by the EU rules and regulations (Goldthau and Sitter, 2015: 950).

The relationship between civilian power and soft power concepts is that soft power is an ability to get the outcomes one wants, makes use of civilian power, namely, the inclination to use non-military tools of power and the promotion of values. The way that these features of civilian power is exercised can make a state a soft power state, if it choose to utilise them in a co-optive manner and the EU growingly utilises civilian tools to implement its soft power (Tulmets, 2008: 64). François Duchêne's Notion (1973) of a 'civilian power Europe' has resonated through the debate on the international role of the EC/EU. The concept as first advanced by Duchêne, at the beginning of the seventies

(1972-1973), was an exercise in futurology (Whitman, 2002: 3). Robert Cooper, the Council's former Director-General for external relations and political-military affairs, saw the EU as a civilian power, but with its exercise of soft power dependent on a track record of protecting its members and successfully achieving its goals (Cooper, 2004: 179-180). Duchêne suggested that civilian forms of influence and action for the European Community and valued its direct physical power in the form of actual empirical capability which is long on economic power and relatively short on armed force (Duchêne, 1973: 19). Thus, he came up with the notion of civilian power with reference to the EC, to characterize an actor that can still exert influence on the other actors in the international arena by wielding non-military tools like trade and diplomacy although it does not have military endowments (Özer, 2012: 66). François Duchêne argued that Europe as a whole is not a victim of colonialism, but, as an example of a new universe in 'political civilization', it can be the first example in the history of a great centre of power balance in the age of decline (Duchêne, 1973: 19). Especially the European Community would have the opportunity to ensure that it is a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards (Duchêne, 1973: 20).

Headley Bull criticized harshly Duchêne's words. He points out that Europe is not an actor in international affairs and does not seem likely to become one (Bull, 1982: 151). He claimed that Western Europeans should have created and developed their military sources for various reasons. First, there was a serious divergence of interest between the Western European Countries and their American protector (Bull, 1982: 152). Second, there was a continuing threat from the Soviet Union (Bull, 1982: 154). And third, this would have removed obstacles to its own regeneration (Bull, 1982: 156).

The EU is a model for soft power. However, much of the EU's soft power derives from its economic power (Casey, 2006: 6). The paradox of European power is that the EU is not able to accomplish many of its soft power aims without higher hard power tools. In contrast, the paradox of American power is that, for all of its military strength, it is not able to achieve many of its soft power goals without the cooperation of others (Casey, 2006: 6-7). European statesmen are more concerned with whether actions are legitimized by international organizations, but Americans focus on the legitimacy of the ends of policy (Casey, 2006: 7). Robert Kagan claims that the EU's power is based on the diffusion of norms and values and characterized by poor military capacities, and

thus it comes from Venus, but in contrast, the more military and martial American approach clearly comes from Mars (Kagan, 2002: 1).

In recent years, the EU has experienced several challenges such as the Eurozone crisis, the Greek government-debt and refugee crisis, Ukraine crisis and the Brexit. Some scholars argue that these crises have led to decline the EU's soft power. Furthermore scholars express certain fears that the EU's weakening soft power may turn out to be unable to compete against Russia's hard power influence (Patalakh, 2017: 149-150). This thesis builds its argument on two types of power: soft power and hard power. Soft power concept has been used for the research's purposes. However, soft power is considered to include both power of attraction as the latent influence and persuasion, different from Nye's soft power concept (Özer, 2012: 72). Wolf claims that (2013: 477), "German foreign policy aims at actively civilizing international relations by trying to replace the military enforcement roles (politics based on power) with the internalization of socially accepted norms (politics based on legitimacy)". After WWII Germany has adopted the notion of 'nie wieder krieg' never again war. Germany has found itself as a leading position in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Germany has tried to use its civilian/soft power, namely diplomatic negotiations to solve problems. This can also be seen in Germany's approach to European foreign policy and the EU's conception of its role in world politics.

2. EUROPEANIZATION OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter offers Europeanization of German identity, Europeanization of some domestic institutions (The Federal Government and the Bundestag, German Political Parties and the Bundeswehr) in German political system and Europeanization of German foreign policy with the dimensions of uploading and downloading Europeanization by examining some special case studies. Germany had been ruled by constitutional monarchy between 1871 and 1912, an unstable democracy during the Weimar Republic between 1919 and 1933, National Socialist totalitarianism between 1933 and 1945. In 1949, Germany was divided into two and, a liberal democratic regime was established in West Germany -the Federal Republic of Germany- and a communist regime took hold of East Germany -German Democratic Republic- until German unification in 1990. Since 1990 Federal Republic of Germany exists as a unified democratic country.

Domestic affairs, leadership, international institutions and political culture all have impact on the German foreign policy (Crawford, 2007: 1). However, the EU has become embedded in Germany's political system and the country has integrated remarkably with European politics (Sturm, 2017: 4). Today, Germany is one of the leading countries and a driving force of the European integration process (Seydak, 2001: 6). Due to the high degree of coherence between Germany and the EU institutions, Germany has been portrayed as one of the best Europeanized countries (Daehnhardt, 2011: 35). According to Anderson (2004: 4), "the reason: Germany is literally 'in' Europe; that is, it belongs to an ongoing and in many ways unique supranational venture". Germany has been considered Europeanized state par excellence (Wagner, 2005: 460). Europeanization took place in three distinct fields which make Germany a Europeanized state. Firstly, Europeanization took place in German identity. Secondly, Europeanization occurred in terms of institutional congruence. And thirdly, German foreign policy was Europeanized. The following sections aim to shed light on these three dimensions (Daehnhardt, 2011: 37-38).

2.1. Europeanization of German Identity

German Unification has shaped the European landscape (Hellmann, 2009: 258). Therefore, Germany has had to think again its national identity and its European

preferences (Hyde-Price, 2001: 695). Germany's leadership role or its hegemon position in the EU has led to many debates among scholars and as a result they characterised Germany with different words such as 'benign hegemon' (Morisse-Schilbach, 2011), 'tamed power' (Katzenstein, 1997), 'reluctant hegemon' (Meiers, 1995), 'embedded hegemon'" (Crawford, 2007), 'civilian power' (Maull, 1990) and "model European" (Baun, 2005).

West Germany has enjoyed its economic development in the 1950s and this helped Germany to be a European champion exporter. West Germany described as economic giant and political dwarf between 1970s and 1980s (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1388). Germany has the power to utilise its economic contribution to the EU, the capacity to shape the EU institutions in the line with its national interests and its attractiveness serves that it can utilize as a knot for its political benefit (Smith, 2005: 275). Germany's continuously growing economy and principle creditor role in the Euro crisis implanted it in the leading position in solving one of the biggest crises of the EU (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1391). Melanie Morisse-Schilbach (2011) studies the initial level of Euro-zone crisis and stated that Germany's leading position as 'benign hegemon' was brought into inquiry by a more one-sided approach to the EU policy (As cited in Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1391). A good fit between EU and German identities, preferences and institutions result in the use of significant German power in the forming of EU rules, norms and in the scope of integration (Smith, 2005: 275).

Politically Germany characterised as a 'semi-sovereign' state (Katzenstein, 1997), or a kind of 'semi-Gulliver': a shackled giant (Bulmer and Paterson, 1989), because of that when Germany playing a leading role in EU integration, successive German governments always acted in cooperation with France (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1388). And Katzenstein suggests "tamed power" concept to characterize the German power in the EU. He claims that Germany uses soft power, and pursues its foreign policy through multilateral institutions (Katzenstein, 1997: 117). Katzenstein goes to further even argue that "the institutionalization of power is the most distinctive aspect of the relationship between Europe and Germany" (Katzenstein, 1997: 117). Germany has eliminated the power concept in their political vocabulary instead of it they speak the language of political responsibility (Katzenstein, 1997: 116). For example, in a speech Angela Merkel said that Germany would take more responsibility

in the international arena and keep pushing for global solutions of climate change, migration and terrorism (Merkel, 31 December 2018). This shows Germany's will to conduct its foreign policy on multilateral lines and engaging global challenges in cooperation with other countries rather than pursuing a unilateral track.

Meiers maintains that the ends of the Cold War and reunification have forced Germany to rethink its foreign policy role and he explains (1995: 83), there reasons for it. Firstly, Germany is no longer a front-line consumer of security, because of its economic development Germany now is one of the major producers of security in Europe. Secondly, traditional security policy approach of Federal republic no longer complements the Germany's responsibilities to multilateral security structures. Thirdly, Germany's own dependence on others has been rather reduced, and Germany will accept international commitments more commensurate with its political and economic weight (Franz-Josef, 1995: 83). According to Meiers, Germany is 'reluctant hegemon' and he (1995: 82) argues that:

Germany is still far from being a 'normal' international actor. The German public, political parties, and government are still uncomfortable with a leading international security role, and Germany's major European partners are reluctant to accord it this new international leadership status.

Beverly Crawford (2007: 15) suggested that Germany role as 'embedded hegemon'. Crawford's analysis relies on three distinct case studies (As cited in Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1391): 1) Germany's participation in the Balkans. Germany unilaterally recognised Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and it was radical departure from attempts to create a common foreign policy in the EU. Germany has done these leading co-operative efforts to bring stability to Bosnia and Kosovo (Crawford, 2007: 17). 2) Germany's breaching of the Euro-zone Stability and Growth Pact in 2003-2004. Therefore, Germany protected it own power position and its domestic monetary culture (Crawford, 2007: 123). 3) Germany's status in establishing an European regime for managing the export of military responsive technologies. Many technologies developed for civilian use are also crucial to military responsive because it is the key to ending terrorism (Crawford, 2007: 6). Germany has led the EU by forming new institutions and also Germany has been Europe's guardian in that Germany has captured on an

excessive share of the regional responsibility of institutionalised cooperation. Therefore its guidance is embedded in these institutions, Crawford explains (2007: 15), that:

Germany has led by shaping new institutions in Europe, and, more importantly, it has been Europe's 'patron,' in that it has taken on a disproportionate share of the regional burden of institutionalised cooperation. Its leadership is thus 'embedded' in those institutions.

Mauil described Germany as 'civilian power' and it refers to 1) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in order to achieve international objectives, 2) avoid of using military power and instead of it preferences to use primarily economic tools to secure national and international goals, and, 3) willingness to develop supranational structures to address solutions for international crisis (Mauil, 1989: 92-93). For example, German policies towards the Yugoslav conflict have been related to principles and objectives of German post-war civilian foreign policy (Mauil, 1995: 114). During the crisis, Germany emphasised on acting multilaterally through international institutions and defended strong normative components in defined interests and objectives. Germany inclined to the validity and viability of international law and also thought use of military as a last resort to end conflict (Mauil, 1995: 114). Domestic restraint which is clarified with Basic law is the most important element of Germany's soft power. Germany operations in out of area if fully depended on Bundestag's decisions (for example in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the waters of the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa) as it is written in the Bundeswehr section. However, historical and other reasons show that Parliament and public opinion are sceptical of the use of military use (Brose, 2013: 5). As it aforementioned before, Germany always prefer to use multilateral diplomacy, economic sanctions for ending all disputes and conflicts.

Lastly, according to Baunn, the new German hegemony based on political, economic and cultural dimensions (Baun, 2005: 371). Germany's power and influence attracted Central European neighbour counties and it was mostly believed that these countries would accept this hegemony because of the need for German economic aid, the attractiveness of Germany's developed economy and democratic achievements and the absence of any realistic alternatives (Baun, 2005: 371). It is shown that the model character of Germany was a important source of indirect soft power for Germany in Central Europe, allowing Germany to utilise influence and shape developments in

Central Europe (Baun, 2005: 374). It is worth saying that a study of soft power conducted by United Kingdom's Institute for governments ranked Germany third, just followed the UK and the USA (Crossley-Frolick, 2017: 448).

2.2. Europeanization of German Domestic Policy

The EU has influenced German political, structural, administrative system considerably. Many institutions of the German government adopted new regulations for alignment with EU *acquis*. In short, Europeanization has occurred in almost all sectors of German political system including polity, politics and public policies, albeit to varying degrees (Zerkavis, 2004: 109). Domestic institutions have considerable role in the process of making German foreign policy, thus they are taken into consideration to explain comprehensively Europeanization of German foreign policy. The thesis in particular, focuses on Europeanization of the Federal Government, Europeanization of Political Parties and Europeanization of the Bundeswehr because of their significant affect in German foreign policy.

Other domestic institutions such as the Bundesrat, the the Länder, the Federal Constitutional Court and the Bundesbank do not have direct role or they have limited role in German foreign policy. These institutions are significantly effective in the EU's supranational structure, therefore detail information about these institutions is not provided. It is worth saying that these institutions have considerably impact on German soft power thanks to their work field such as regional policy, agricultural policy and trade policy.

When we examine aforementioned institutions' role in the German political system and in the EU more comprehensively, we can see these facts: 1) Bundesrat, Federal Council or German Federal Upper House of Parliament, has a veto right over any further transfer of powers to the EU (Jeffery, 2003: 43), also the ratification of all EU treaties or feature transfers of sovereignty to the EU require two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat (and the Bundestag) for ratification (Suszycka-Jasch and Jasch, 2009: 1240). Like the Bundestag, the Bundesrat used to have little influence on European decision-making process (Börzel, 2002: 154). 2) Participation of the Länder in the EU policy-making can be thought as an example of how federal states and their bodies can participate of supranational co-operation (Suszycka-Jasch and Jasch, 2009: 1217). 3)

The Federal Constitutional Court is a guarantor of Basic Law (Harmsen, 2000: 68), and it is one of the most important institutions that significantly restrict the power of German governments (Helms, 2000: 5). 4) The Bundesbank is one of the most independent banks since its creation in 1957 (Mikhel, 2012: 102). Almost all political actors –the political parties, the Finance and Economics Ministries, Bundesbank, Chancellery, the trade unions, the employer associations- in German political system favoured the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Heise, 2005: 287). The transfer of the Bundesbank's monetary model or the Bundesbank's institutional exemplar to the EU level is regarded by some analysts as a demonstration of soft power (Bulmer, 2013: 12), and, it also ensures that German ideas and practices about money and finance are uploaded to the EU level (Dyson, 2003: 175). Consequently, the EMU is regarded a case of 'goodness of fit', with the minimum revision problems for Germany (Dyson, 2002: 88).

Additionally, the Euro-zone crisis increased Germany's relative power and pushed it to fill the EU's leadership gap in foreign policy (Chryssogelos, 2016: 14). Actually, Germany considers itself as Europe's conventional monetary presenter, therefore it felt accountable for obliging Greece and some other South European states to get back on the way of fiscal accuracy (Barysch, 2010: 2). Euro does not just create foreign policy affect, but also it changes European identity. Therefore, Germany's leadership role in Euro crisis is very significant and this shows how Germany has effective power in the EU's foreign policy and in the EU's identity.

2.2.1. Europeanization of the Federal Government and the Bundestag

As stated in Article 65 of German Basic Law, the Federal Government consists of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministries and they together form highest political level of the federal executive (Goetz, 2003: 17). The Federal Government centrally signifies parliamentary, coalition, party, federalised and Europeanized government (Goetz, 2003: 18). According to Calliess and Beichelt (2013: 5):

The Federal Government is still seen as the most important-and also most accessible-representative of German European policy and as a consequence it is seen as primary European legislator through its activities in the Council of the EU. This way of understanding European politics is, as it were, the traditional pattern.

In many instances Europeanization has benefited the Federal Government. The Federal Government has been able to optimize its national resources and copes and deals with more or less efficiently at the EU level (Zerkavis, 2004: 110). The Federal Government enjoys specialized access to the important EU institutions and it has incentive to defend collective decisions adopted at the supranational level for which it may be blamed by the domestic opposition (Wendler, 2011: 490). According to Article 208 of the EC, (formerly Article 152 of the EC Treaty) the Federal Government represents Germany in various policy-making bodies of the Council and the Commission. Thus, the Federal Government has been the entrepreneur of various the Commission initiatives (Börzel, 2002: 154).

The Bundestag is the Lower House of the Federal Republic. In comparison with the other national parliaments, it is regarded as having a considerably strong legislature (Auel, 2006: 250). The Bundestag engages in regular matters regarding the EU, also the Bundestag provides an ambitious setting about the institutional points of reference of its debates (Wendler, 2011: 488). Article 23 indicates that the Bundestag collaborates with the government in the implementation of EU policies. Article 23 also stipulates that the Bundestag works together with the government in EU politics. The Federal Government constitutionality has the responsibility to notify the Bundestag and the Bundesrat “comprehensively” and “as early as possible” regarding every issue of the EU that could be of interest to the Federal Republic. Additionally the constitution provides the Bundestag right to a settlement on European lawmaking proposals (Auel and Benz, 2005: 385). Article 45⁷ of the Basic Law can be considered as a whole in relation to the government and state opinions directly (Hansen and Scholl, 2002: 13).

The Bundestag has an important position in Germany’s foreign policy as much as it has on the German domestic policy. For instance, “German domestic constraints highlighted in the debates in the Bundestag shaped government policy on the terms of the Bundeswehr deployment and the duration of the mission which were then transferred to the EU level” (Miskimmon, 2007: 163), also in the matter of Germany’s involvement in African case has turned into accepted within the Federal Government and the Bundestag, even though enduring hesitation within the Bundeswehr

⁷The Bundestag can name a Committee on the Affairs of the EU. It allows the committee to exercise the rights of the Bundestag under Article 23 regarding the Federal Government (Article 45, Paragraph 1, German Basic Law)

(Miskimmon, 2007: 175), and when NATO made decision to bomb Yugoslavia for ending Serb atrocities in Kosovo, the Bundestag voted in favour of the Bundeswehr attendance in combat actions (Crawford, 2007: 57).

2.2.2. Europeanization of the German Political Parties

German parties, like the other European countries' parties, have developed with the main conflict lines which emerged during the process of nation-state building and industrial revolution in the 19th century (Niedermayer, 2000: 169). The organizational structures of German parties have not changed much with the Europeanization process (Sturm, 2017: 14). The ideas and objectives of German political parties with the excluding of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/Left Party towards European integration are mainly pro-European position (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011: 308).

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) officially have a supportive manner for further EU integration (Behr and Helwig, 2012: 4). CDU has been one of the strong and intuitive supporters of European integration since its inception, and regularly endorsing European integration with meagre to no internal argument. CSU has always supported European integration as well (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011: 295). Schmidt claims that "Politically, the CDU and CSU are centre-right people's parties of religious, inter-confessional and interclass complexion and with a pragmatic, conservative and reformist bent" (Schmidt, 2015: 63).

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP) is the oldest political party in the modern Germany and the party with the longest democratic tradition (Schmidt, 2015: 70). SDP has been one of the party which backs pro-European stance and it supported the general German consensus on European issues (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011: 295). Also SDP supports further federal solutions and concentration of power in the Commission (Behr and Helwig, 2012: 4).

EU politics had limited importance in the political preferences of the Greens and later of Alliance '90/The Greens, and for a long while there was no persistent party idea on significant European projects (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011: 295). Green Party's adopt the materialistic, environmentalist and pacifist policy positions (Schmidt, 2015: 72).

The Left Party -and its predecessor Party of Democratic Socialism- is located at the extreme left pole of German political system (Schmidt, 2015: 70). Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/The Left Party has been the only political party against a pro-European stance (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011: 296). The Left criticizes the EU for being an agent of neo-liberalism and militarism (Behr and Helwig, 2012: 4).

German political parties are very important in the German foreign policy, because they form the foreign policy. German political parties have opportunity to be a major party in German political system and they can create a government in Germany. When they become a governmental party, their policies towards foreign policy can be different. For example, Turkey road to the EU membership is good example for this situation. CDU's attitudes towards Turkey's road to EU accession are negative and mostly they are against Turkey's EU membership (Ermağan, 2012: 82). They claim inherent characteristics on the Turkey's road to Europe, for instance, Turkey is Muslim country. There is inherent tension between modernisation and Islam, therefore, Turkey is considered as the "quintessential" test case (Aydın, 2012: 47). In contrary, SPD have more positive approaches towards Turkey's EU membership. They claim acquired characteristic such as Turkish democracy and its economy can be developed. They claim that if Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria, then Turkey can become a member state (Ermağan, 2012: 83). However, there are no clear-cut divisions in the EU discourse on Turkey between "acquired" characteristics such as democracy and identity-related "inherent" characteristics such as an essentialist understanding of culture (Aydın, 2012: 136). Human rights and democracy can be constructed as inherent characteristics used to exclude Turkey, if Turkey does not share specific European cultural model (Aydın, 2012: 136-137).

2.2.3. Europeanization of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces)

The German Reich and Nazi Germany became postwar Germany's other (Risse, 2015: 66). The experiences of the Third Reich, WWII, and the Holocaust have led to the development of three important normative ideas that shaped German military forces. Firstly, the lessons taken from the Third Reich, WWII, and the Holocaust caused a profound commitment to pacifism and the use of force as a last resort in German policy (Kalata, 2009: 6). This is the major point which shaped Germany's foreign policy identity as a civilian (soft) power. Secondly, West Germany sought to integrate itself

into a Western European and transatlantic security structure. And lastly, Germany's negative role in the aftermath of the First World War and during the Second World War in the period made it feel responsible for preventing upcoming human rights abuses (Kalata, 2009: 6).

The Bundeswehr was just active under the NATO collective defence structures between West Germany's NATO entry and the end of Cold War (Kalata, 2009: 4). NATO's international position in the EU-NATO relations progressively has increased and it brought about by the asymmetric membership of both organizations will persist to cause the German defence planning ambiguous hence the Europeanization of the Bundeswehr is likely limited (Miskimmon, 2007: 180). The outlook of Bundeswehr assignments was broadened to encompass powerful peacekeeping and peace-enforcement assignments under the NATO and the UN after the end of the Cold War (Pradetto, 2006: 19).

Germany experienced two important security challenges in the end of Cold War. The first one is that the Gulf War planted important difficulty on Kohl and Genscher about employment of the Bundeswehr forces in the external area of the NATO (Miskimmon, 2007: 36). Genscher and Kohl felt adequately vulnerable to foreign policy pressures spreading from the Gulf War and the continuing 2+4 negotiations on the German reunification (Miskimmon, 2007: 36). The German role on the Gulf War indicated a hesitation to think the deployment of the Bundeswehr forces in the Unification period process and Germany did not play its traditional role as committed partner within the NATO alliance by rejecting sanction the use of Bundeswehr outside of the NATO area, as a result, Germany was left exposed by the Gulf War (Miskimmon, 2007: 36). Germany's adequate attendance and acceptance of a role for the Bundeswehr in out of area operations is a core characteristic of German foreign policy (Crawford, 2007: 7). The second one is that the collapse of Yugoslavia planted great anxiety on the scope of European Political Co-operation and forced unilateral foreign policy action by German a position which Germany had desired to stay away from since the end of WWII (Miskimmon, 2007: 36). In the case of Yugoslavia it has shown that the strengthening of the EU can assist to mitigate the German power (Miskimmon, 2007: 37).

The conceptual basis of German military and security policy transformed significantly and almost suddenly as German troops entered Bosnia in the mid 1990s (Crawford, 2007: 57). Bundeswehr deployments in Bosnia as a part of Implementation Force and later Stabilisation Force in Bosnia as a part of the post-Dayton stabilisation process were main components in strengthening of elite and public acceptance of a larger role for the Bundeswehr (Miskimmon, 2007: 82). Additionally, when NATO decided to the end of Serb atrocities in Bosnia and to bomb Yugoslavia, German soldiers were among the first to enter Kosovo (Crawford, 2007: 57). Kosovo crisis is was a “wake up” call for Germany’s foreign and security policy (Miskimmon, 2007: 121). Germany tried to work within some institutions (Contact Group, EU, NATO, UN) to find a solution for the Kosovo crisis (Miskimmon, 2007: 102). Stability Pact has been created and it was a strategy to bring an end the Kosovo war and to provide a longer-term solution to the problems of South-Eastern Europe (Miskimmon, 2007: 127). Fischer described Stability Pact as “prime example of conflict prevention”, the ultimate goal of German foreign and security policy (Miskimmon, 2007: 136). The Bundeswehr also acted as a leader nation in peacekeeping operation in Macedonia and participated the US war on terror (Hyde-Price, 2003: 184). Furthermore, the Bundeswehr participated many humanitarian aid missions such as in Cambodia in the years 1991-1993 and in Somalia in 1993 (Pradetto, 2006: 19).

2.3. Europeanization of German Foreign Policy

Germany is more aware of its history than most of the other countries (Mardell, 2008: 2), and Germany’s political responsibility is unique today because of the human wrongs perpetrated by the Nazis during the Second World War, especially because of the Holocaust (Crossley-Frolick, 2017: 443). After the Second World War, a system of European norms and values was enshrined in West German Basic Law. These norms encompassed the restoration of “economic prosperity and peace, safeguarding of civil and political rights and the rule of law” (Quintana, 2009: 5). Also the preamble of Basic Law states that Germany should work towards European integration as a means to bring about regional stability (Miskimmon, 2002: 1).

Germany is regarded as the most powerful state in the EU and it has significant assets in three separate dimensions of power: the military, the economic and the social (Ash, 1994: 68). Germany’s importance is not just due to its big size, large economy,

functional institutions, but its location at the centre of new networks of transnational governance also plays a considerable role (Hyde-Price, 2001: 690). Germany is surrounded by friends or by states which are parts of the EU (Bertram, 2006: 27).

Since its acceptance to NATO, Germany has depended on its Western Allies, especially the USA, in terms of its security and defence. European integration offered Germany a chance to improve its position as an actor whilst recovering its sovereignty (Paterson, 2011: 58). After West Germany joined the NATO in 1955, the integration of Germany into the Western Alliance and institutions under the USA leadership became the key element of European Security and German foreign and security policies (Overhaus, 2004: 551). Germany has been one of the key player countries in the process of widening and deepening the EU and NATO (Harnisch, 2001: 35). Thus, it can be said that German foreign policy tightly integrated into the EU and NATO (Webber, 2001: 1-2). Germany regularly supports the policies regarding European integration, even though sometimes this might restrict the Germany's national power capability (Wagner, 2005: 460). Germany's and Europe's interests are inter with each other as it can be understood from Hans-Dietrich Genscher's word that "the more European it is, the more German it is" (Ash, 2017: 13).

In contrast to France, the UK and Russia, Germany is not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (Stöber, 2017: 1). Germany would like to have a seat in the UNSC and campaigned for it in many events such as its reluctance to shoulder military burden in Afghanistan; its special relations with Russia; and most importantly, Germany's refusal at the UN Security Council to endorse international interventions in Iraq and Libya (Behr and Helwig, 2012: 9). Today, Germany like other European countries, in the field of foreign and security policy has been faced with the new difficulties such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism (Klaeden, 2009: 39). The EU can cope with all these problems only if they have good cooperation within itself and with the other actors.

Germany's the best opportunity to punch above its weight lies with the EU and also German foreign policy needs to bolster the EU as foreign policy actor. Germany's dominant position in the EU can be successfully maintained by persuasion and consent among the EU members (Maull, 2011: 156). Germany's most important framework for making foreign policy is the EU (de Weck, 2006: 65). The European foreign policy

scope let Germany to pursue national preferences and foreign policy objectives more efficiently and functioned as a tool in order to counteract deficiencies in Germany's national foreign policy (Müller, 2011: 386). Germany has always had a key role in the EU and has been supportive of EU enlargement (especially, the Eastern enlargement) and integration (Paterson, 2011: 57). In other words, Germany does not just play a fundamental role in economic stability of the EU, but it also has a significant role in political stability of the EU (Otero-Iglesias, 2015: 2).

Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has pursued its interests even if these interests were/are against with US ones (Ulatowski, 2015: 136). In other words, since the German reunification, German foreign policy has been mainly portrayed by its persistent progression. Fundamental changes occurred at the level of plans and implementation (Klaeden, 2009: 39). Germany is described as one of the first countries that have used geo-economic strategy, even before reunification. This strategy has helped Germany to act as a leader country in the EU (Ulatowski, 2015: 139).

Germany has conducted soft power to affect the ideas and objectives of its EU allies in the EU foreign and security policy as well (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2006: 31). Germany usually places itself as Europe's humanitarian superpower; however Germany needs to take more responsibility on specific missions, particularly in terms of European periphery (Weinstein, 2017: 56). For example, Germany needs to continue to take a clear position towards Russia's aggression (Weinstein, 2017: 56).

German foreign policy attitude and its political culture have composed of a set of policies and values/norms, the roots of which were obviously a consequence of a special aspect of the National Socialist background and the WWII. Germany has been strongly committed to France and the USA, therefore Germany's commitment to the Europeanization and transatlantic alliance has grown as well (Wittlinger-Larose, 2007: 483-484). Multilateralism has characterised German foreign and security policy since the onset of the Adenauer era (Miskimmon, 2007: 187). Actually, many scholars characterised Germany's foreign policy as Europeanized or as demonstrating the characteristics of overstated self-limitation or multilateralism (Sperling, 2010: 171). Today, German foreign policy is adequately becoming a network policy which encompasses private sector agents, non-governmental organizations, development co-operation organizations and cultural bodies (Kappel, 2014: 349).

Germany has remained the heart of Europe's security and its insecurities (Hamilton, 2001: 127). Also European foreign policy cooperation has been a key and core pillar of German foreign policy since the onset of EPC in 1970 (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2006: 30). Germany was a leading country in the Europeanization of security and defence in the beginning of the 1990s. Yet, with the ESDP developing beyond symbols and institutions, Germany has paused behind in conducting its commitments on reforming its military forces and it has jeopardised the performance of whole plan (Wagner, 2005: 455). These changes in German EU policy brought some complications about a stable Europeanized identity or political culture (Wagner, 2005: 455). However, it should be kept in mind that Germany supports these initiatives not for using military power suddenly and harshly, instead of it, Germany prefers to use military power as a last resort to end the conflicts. Therefore, I can claim that Germany is reluctant to use of its military power.

Treaty of Maastricht facilitated the way for the EU to become a foreign policy actor by means of a CFSP (Daehnhardt, 2011: 38). The EU for the first time used crisis management tools within CFSP towards FYROM case test and also for the first time NATO and the EU worked together on a practical level (Gross, 2007: 507). 'Operation Concordia' launched in 2003 and it put into practice 'Berlin Plus' agreements that provided the EU access to NATO assets (Gross, 2007: 507). Thanks to it, there was "at least a rhetorical commitment to a growing role for the EU and Europe in contributions to NATO and later also ESDP operations" (Gross, 2007: 507).

Germany held firm to its pro-integrationist CFSP policy despite dramatic changes in material and institutional environment because of its Europeanized identity (Harnisch, 2018: 4). Two important policy lanes have been seen through the CFSP. In the first policy lane, Germany has sustained its multilateral diplomacy of institutional persistence in the NATO and in the EU promoting the institutional enlargement of both organizations (Daehnhardt, 2011: 38), "in the Maastricht Treaty, Germany projected elements of its domestic model onto Europe" (Anderson, 2007: 207). In the second policy lane, policy makers admitted that the enhancement of Germany's new role as a likely European power implemented further responsibilities and expectations upon its individual actor (Daehnhardt, 2011: 38).

Bonn's foreign policy was determined by its Western inducement and the main principle of Konrad Adenauer's Western policy was Germany's participation to the European community and NATO. Adenauer's Western policy was later completed by Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in the beginning of 1970 (Webber, 2001: 3). Brandt's main goal was the creation of a European Peace Order and reforming the principles of East-West relationship (Paterson, 2010: 43). Helmut Schmidt advanced the link between Europapolitik and Ostpolitik (Zabarowski, 2002: 10). Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) tried to reinforce a policy of persistence and the predictability of actual institutional frameworks, making European integration deeper while enlarging the Union. Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) attempted to strengthen the coordinates of German foreign policy, with a new type of Europeanization. Schröder claimed that Germans "my generation and those following are Europeans because we want to be not because we have to be. That makes us freer in dealing with others" (As cited in Paterson, 2011: 62). The Grand Coalition government led by Angela Merkel (2005-2009) relocated Germany on the centre stage of European and transatlantic politics. This policy has been pursued by the subsequent coalition government as well (Daehnhardt, 2011: 38-39). During the German presidency of the Council of the EU, Merkel stated that Germany needed a strong and united Europe in order to achieve different goals (Merkel, 2007: 3), and also in another statement she said "we need more Europe, not only a monetary union but also we need mostly a political union" (Otero-Iglesias, 2015: 14). These statements show Germany's Europeanist stance.

Germany's strong pro-European (for instance, in foreign, security and defence areas) behaviour allowed it to play an important position in uploading its objectives to the EU level (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010: 1058). Meanwhile, downloading from EU level to the national level also continues and constitutes a counter press (Paterson, 2010: 51).

2.3.1. Germany and Foreign Policy Downloading

Germany's downloading of European foreign policy refers to the adoption of EU policies and the domestic institutional changes caused by alignment with European foreign policy. Such changes occur in a wide range of areas. Nevertheless, there are some examples which show the EU's impact on German foreign policy and institutional structures in a better way. It would be useful to analyze here, these policy fields where

the essence of German national foreign policy has changed as a result of downloading (Daehnhardt, 2011: 40). It is significant to say that Europeanization of foreign policy downloading is limited for Germany; because of Germany is a driving force and a leading country in the EU. Therefore, Germany mostly uploaded its national foreign policies to the EU level. However, three examples will be analyzed in order to show how the EU has affected on Germany's national foreign policy.

The first example is European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). ESDP was first envisaged by the Franco-British 'Saint Malo Summit' in 1998 and established by the Cologne European Council of the 1999. The ESDP's guidelines were set by the Helsinki European Council of 1999. In the first stage of the ESDP, Germany played the role of a spectator rather than a heroine (Overhaus, 2004: 555). Furthermore, it had a balancing role between Europeanist and Transatlanticist countries of the EU as it pursued the view that ESDP would strengthen NATO, and would not work at its expense. Germany also pursued the view that ESDP with its civilian and military capacities would be efficient, and, gives the EU a convenient benefit over other security institutions (Wagner, 2005: 157). The ESDP's main tasks were crisis management tasks which were named as Petersberg Tasks and they were brought about by the Petersberg Declaration of WEU. These tasks were adopted by the EU as the major tasks of ESDP with the Amsterdam Treaty. Petersberg Tasks⁸ have covered all ranges of crisis management missions and the majority of tasks have occurred in the Middle East, in the Africa and in the Far East (Kirchner, 2010: 144). Germany has participated in EU crisis management operations since their start in 2003 and also Germany led some out of area operations. However, Germany prefers to use its civilian (soft) power instruments rather than its military forces. Germany's participations of these operations show how the EU downloaded its policy on German foreign policy. Germany's interest and its participation in ESDP could be examined as a learning process not just in terms of European Security and Defence Policy but also in terms of broadening the status of the Bundeswehr in crisis management and conflict prevention (Miskimmon, 2007: 158). Germany has dedicated to functioning towards the ESDP headline goal 2010, was entirely in agreement with 2003 European Security Strategy (Miskimmon, 2007: 174).

⁸Petersberg Tasks are composed by humanitarian and rescue tasks among with conflict prevention and maintaining the peace, combat forces in crisis management tasks, military assistance and consultations, post-conflict stabilization tasks and joint disarmament works (Eur-Lex, 1992)

Germany downloaded ESDP inputs when its own security policy was in the process of normalization and reform (Daehnhardt, 2011: 41).

The second example is Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership. Union for the Mediterranean (formerly: Mediterranean Union) was proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy who later became the French President and it promptly instigated discord with Germany, Britain and other countries (Chandler, 2010: 164), because, it only covered the Mediterranean littoral countries of the EU together with the Southern neighbours. This meant that other EU countries would be left out of this framework, including Germany. Initially, Merkel countered the idea, claiming that it would break up the Union and she insisted that this project should remain within the entire EU (Chandler, 2010: 164). Germany's opposition to the original idea played a particularly significant role in France's re-writing of Sarkozy's proposal (Charillon and Wong, 2011: 23). Then a settlement was achieved at the bilateral Hanover Summit in 2008, and the initiative was named as the Union for Mediterranean and it was redesigned to include all EU countries and their Southern neighbours (Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Montenegro, Morocco, Syria (suspended), Mauritania, Monaco, Palestine) (External Action, 2016). Even if Germany initially did not support the Union for the Mediterranean project, then the project adopted by Germany. It is also show the EU's downloading policy on German foreign policy.

Eastern Partnership joint policy initiative was introduced by Poland and Sweden and it aimed to strengthen EU relations with six Eastern neighbour countries - Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Belarus- (Pomorska, 2011: 176). Germany successfully coped bilateral relations with Poland and Sweden and helped decisively set the agenda in order to move ahead with the Eastern Partnership (Daehnhardt, 2011: 41). Germany must harmonize its own bilateral ties to Eastern neighbourhood states under the initiatives of the EU. Through the EU framework, Germany needs to pay attention on strengthening good governance and strong institutions in the region, particularly to counter Russia's aggression towards some countries of Eastern neighbourhood (Hopko, 2017: 47).

The third example is the EU's policy towards the Middle East. Germany's foreign policy towards the Middle East has transformed under the Europe's common foreign policy. Early issues of the Israeli-Arab conflict and European relations with the

Middle East were tackled by European Political Co-operation (Maull, 2010: 204), and the Venice declaration which recognised Palestinian people's suffering and right to self determination was crucial in this respect. This is because, despite its ties with Israel Germany adopted the EC stance and agreed to this declaration. This can be regarded as a crucial example of downloading (Daehnhardt, 2011: 42).

Consequently, it is seen that the downloading Europeanization process is rather limited for Germany. Germany accepted and adopted some initiatives and policies which come from the EU, because Germany wants to accept and they are useful for its own interests and the EU's interests as well. However, it can be said that Germany mainly uploaded its national preferences to the EU level

2.3.2. Uploading Germany's Foreign Policy Preferences

Germany, like other European countries, has been trying to upload its preferences to the EU level. It has made two separate kinds of uploading: normative uploading and a policy uploading. For normative uploading, Germany has tried to influence European diplomacy by using conflict prevention approaches, multilateral co-operation mechanisms, and the use of civilian crisis management instruments, namely, using its soft (civilian) power tools. For example, Germany emphasised conflict resolution in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in Kosovo and as a result of it Germany uploaded its preferences to the EU level. For policy uploading, Germany uploaded its foreign policy interests successfully in the waves of the EU's Eastern enlargement (Daehnhardt, 2011: 46).

Central and Eastern European countries accession to the EU is one of the most important examples of how Germany uploaded its national preferences to the EU level. Enlargement probably is the most effective tools of the EU's and thus also of German-foreign policy (Maull, 2011: 159). Germany has been a significant supporter EU enlargement, especially towards Central and Eastern European countries (Baun, 2005: 377). Politically, Germany's effectiveness would be enhanced by the accession of its Central and Eastern European countries. In economical terms, Germany stood to gain the most from inclusion of the CEECs in the EU single market (Baun, 2005: 377). Eastern Enlargement of 2004 (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus) is one of the most important Germany's

policies which Germany has uploaded to the EU level successfully In spite of scepticisms of some EU countries, especially France (Maull, 2006: 102). Germany pursued for Eastern enlargement, because EU membership for CEECs countries would undergird their way to market and democracy, thereby political stability and economic prosperity would be provided to the region (Anderson, 2004: 53). Eastern enlargement contested the validity and legitimacy of civilian power principles and norms (Harnisch, 2001: 44-45). Therefore, it is “arguably has been the most successful exercise in preventive diplomacy since the end of Cold War” (Maull, 2010: 206).

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was introduced with the wider Europe Document of 2003, which came upon the realization that the EU could not enlarge further. In 2004 the ENP was officially established with the aim of creating a ring of well-governed countries around Europe. In other words, the ENP aims to promote stability, good governance and economic developments (Daehnhardt, 2011: 41). It has a Southern dimension (built on Euro-Mediterranean partnership of 1995) composing of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palastine and an Eastern dimension composing of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (European Commission, 2016). The ENP is mainly a bilateral framework but it has a regional dimension as well which is pursued in the Southern neighbourhood through the Union for the Mediterranean and in the Eastern Neighbourhood through the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy Programme. Germany was an active player of EU’s enlargement to the Eastern and Southern of Europe. The ENP was established in 2004, to make clear that the EU would not expand further and to offer a special partnership to the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbours. The ENP is regarded as a geopolitical necessity for the EU’s external action to “solidify a ring of friends around its rims” (Daehnhardt, 2011: 41). Miskimmon (2007: 166), claims that:

German foreign policy remains primarily interested in the wider European region. A sign of this was Chancellor Merkel’s intention to make Eastern Europe a priority during the 2007 German EU Presidency as part of efforts to strengthen the European Neighbour Policy (ENP).

Kosovo case is other policy which has been uploaded by German foreign policy to the EU level. When NATO decided to bomb Yugoslavia for ending Serb atrocities in Kosovo (Crawford, 2007: 57), on 24 March 1999, four German-ECR-Tornados took

part in NATO's bombing of the Yugoslav Federation. German armed forces participated in the combat mission against a sovereign state for the first time since 1945 (Hyde-Price, 2001: 19). There were three incentives behind the Germany's participation of bombing: The first factor was a powerful emotion of responsibility towards its NATO allies. The second factor was a powerful emotion of political and moral responsibility towards the humanitarian suffering in Kosovo and the third was a concern about a new wave of refugees and asylum-seekers (Hyde-Price, 2001: 21-22). Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo triggered to wide measure, migration to the West (Hyde-Price, 2003: 193). Events in Kosovo led Germany to choose between two foreign policy options pursuing the never again war principles or opening German foreign policy to crisis management operations which involve the use of combat forces (Webber, 2011: 10-11). Schröder advocated Germany's participation in the Kosovo War and ignored the pacifist policy, never again war that had guided West Germany's policy since WWII (Nünlist, 2014: 2).

During the Kosovo Crisis, the Red-Green government pursued full support for the NATO bombing on the one hand, and comprehensive diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the crisis in the other hand (Hyde-Price, 2003: 193). The only political party was PDS which was against the participation of German troops in Operation Allied Forces of NATO. They claimed that the operation led by NATO is against a sovereign state (Hyde-Price, 2003: 194). Germany's presidency of the EU coincided with both its WEU presidency and its chairmanship in G-7, giving a great opportunity to steer the diplomatic and military process to terminate the NATO Kosovo campaign in June 1999 (Harnisch, 2018: 9). Germany's interlocutor role in the dispute, among aforementioned institutions -EU, NATO, WEU, G-8- committed it to play an essential role in advancements in Kosovo (Miskimmon, 2007: 101). Kosovo War was a 'wake-up call' for Germany's foreign and security policy. Germany could not any longer rely just on its classical 'cheque-book diplomacy' (Miskimmon, 2007: 121). The Stability Pact⁹ and Fischer Plan was an essential component of a strategy to terminate the Kosovo War and to support sustainable solutions for the region (Miskimmon, 2002: 2). Germany aimed to contain Russia in the settlements regarding the Kosovo War (Miskimmon, 2007: 121). The uploading of German objectives to bring an end to the Kosovo War with the

⁹The Stability Pact was made on the idea of establishing and promoting peace and security in South-Eastern Europe in 1999 and it has been replaced by Regional Co-operation Council in 2008 (European Commission, 1999, 06.16.2016).

proposition of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as a civilian means for post-conflict reconstruction contributed significantly to the EU's security policy shaping to a considerable extent (Daehnhardt, 2011: 47). Furthermore, the Stability Pact and the Fisher plan could be considered crucial German initiatives that shaped the EU's Balkan policy (Miskimmon, 2007: 128).

Germany's policy towards Russia also can be considered as uploaded German foreign policy. Russia was one pole of the bi-polar system and now it is a large and increasingly influential country and plays a crucial role in international arena. For Germany, Russia is a key foreign policy target in order to enhance peace and prosperity in Europe (Paterson, 2003: 222). Furthermore, approximately 40 per cent of Germany's gas and oil imports are provided by Russia, and it makes Germany the world's biggest importer of Russian oil and gas (Nünlist, 2014: 3). Polish people and people from Baltic states are clearly scared of Russia's military might and its potential and this Baltic-Russian and Polish-Russian tensions influence the relations between Germany and Russia and between Russia and the EU as well (Schöler, 2017: 75). Germany's attitudes and its policy towards the Russia are very important. Germany traditionally has tried to have good relations with Russia. Kohl believed that Russia will make a very good tactical partner for the EU and the West and he played a determined and vital position in encouraging and enabling the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) with Russia in which the EU signed in 1994 with Russia for a period of ten years (Daehnhardt, 2011: 50). And also Schröder repeatedly emphasised the special responsibility towards Russia (Stöber, 2017: 2). He considered Russia as a significant component in the stability and peace of Europe (Miskimmon, 2007: 129). In comparison with her predecessor, Merkel has taken a harder position towards Russian disregard of democratic values and human rights (Daehnhardt, 2011: 51). However, Germany has tried to have multilateral and good relations with Russia, instead of the attitudes of Poland and Baltic states towards Russia.

Some events have made the adoption of a common European policy towards Russia more strained, especially the Kosovo War or Russian-Georgian War. Volker Rühle, Germany's Defence Secretary, emphasized that his government would not withstand and accept another Bosnia and that aggression against civilians in Kosovo should be stopped. When Serbia declined to stop aggression, NATO started air strikes

even though there was no UNSC resolution owing to Russia's veto (Wittlinger and Larose, 2007: 486) but the German government become aware of that the UNSC involvement in Kosovo would only be feasible if they could get Russia on board (Hyde-Price, 2001: 28). Germany tried to involve Russia in the tactful resolution for ending the Kosovo War by bilateral negotiations with Russia (Miskimmon, 2007: 130).

As it is elaborated in the last chapter of the thesis, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict has extremely negative political and military impact for the eastern neighbourhood countries and European security system as well (Hopko, 2017: 47). Germany has played a leadership role in the EU's engagement the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and has condemned Russia's actions from the start of the crisis. Merkel insisted that the EU should place economic sanctions on Russia and these were implemented in 2014, the same time Merkel was having negotiations with Putin to persuade Russia to leave Ukraine. When the crisis between Ukraine and Russia in 2014 exacerbated by Germany triggered the Geneva deal and played a significant role on the Minsk agreement of the 2014 and 2015 (Hoffmann, 2016: 3). Germany successfully uploaded its Russian-Ukrainian policy, diplomatic solutions, to the EU level, a subject which is examined in detail in the next chapter.

3. RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT AND GERMANY'S ROLE

This chapter, firstly, offers details of Russia-Ukraine conflict including its causes and its phases. Then, Europeanization of German policy on the Ukraine conflict is examined. Lastly, some EU member states' positions and Germany's role during the crisis is elaborated and it shows how Germany has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the EU level, and, thereby the EU just used the combination of civilian and soft power tools against Russia rather than hard/military forces.

3.1. Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Ukraine's geostrategic position, as a bridge country between Russia and Europe, makes Ukraine very important in the international arena. Ukraine is a crucial case where the tensions between Russia and the West can be openly seen (Wilson, 2015: 223). Russia sees Ukraine as a strategic barrier or buffer state which divides it from the European countries (Sönmez, Bıçakçı and Yıldırım, 2015: 657). Russia perceives that Ukraine has, for two decades, been a fragile, weak and mainly deceptive state which continuously creates problems for Russian energy transportation (Trenin, 2014: 6). Many analysts claim that Russia actively seeks to exploit Ukraine's economic, political and cultural situation in the pursuit of its own preferences (Boulègue, Lutsevych and Marin, 2018: 7).

Russia has never completely accepted Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state, therefore Ukrainians complain about this Russia's attitude (Sauer, 2017: 89). However, Russia and Ukraine have considerable relations in some fields with each other (Sauer, 2017: 89). Economically, Ukraine's biggest trading partner is Russia and most of Ukraine's exportation industry (mainly chemical and steel) relies on the supply of low-cost energy (gas) which comes from Russia (Rutland, 2016: 123). In turn, Russia uses Ukraine for transit of its natural gas exports to Europe, and, Russia's defence industry productions (for example the engines for ballistic missiles) are dependent on some important materials from Ukrainian industries (Rutland, 2016: 123). Militarily, Ukraine is significant to Russia as buffer country and it is central to Russia's Black Sea fleet (McMahon, 2014). Socially, today many Russian people live in Ukraine

(approximately, 17.3 per cent of the population in Ukraine), especially in the eastern part of the country and traditionally they have closer ties with Russia rather than Europe (Smith, 2014: 14). Furthermore, Russian societies and Ukrainian societies have a long common history, family and close cultural, religious, economic and interpersonal ties which have preserved their existence so far (Kiryukhin, 2016: 439).

Russia, however, could not forget its old glorious days, particularly the Soviet Union times. Russia's leaders believe that their country has been continuously humiliated since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and, this externally enforced humiliation must today be eliminated by recreating its great power status (Ishchenko, 2015: 152). For example, after Putin came to power, Russia has tried to regain its political power and be an effective international actor in world politics, particularly regaining its influence on the Soviet countries. One of the greatest ambitions of Putin, his *idée fixe*, is the recreation of Russian Empire within the USSR borders (Sazonov, 2016: 17). Putin "began to politically regain [Russia's] previously lost positions in the region, even at the cost of the military intervention in South Ossetia, Transnistria and Chechnya" (Vrsanska and Kavicky, 2016: 96). Some analysts argue that Russia's policies towards its neighbourhood, for instance towards the Baltic States, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia and the South Caucasus countries, carry the characteristics of neo-imperialism (Trenin, 2014: 5). On the other hand, Putin seeks cooperation with the West, nevertheless, in such a way to establish the glory of the Russian world and expects to be respected as a Eurasian regional actor (Mölder, 36). The Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out under these circumstances.

3.1.1. Causes of Conflict

Actually, there are numerous root causes of the Ukraine crisis which obviously has economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions (Valdai, 2014: 7). Ukraine did not have a state in the past and its recent history has had destructive and conflict-prone potential (Valdai, 2014: 16). Ukraine experienced the Orange revolution in 2004 and the Ukraine crisis happened in 2013. Ukraine has been more or less continuously adequately badly ruled since its independence (Wilson, 2014: 39). Ukraine's politics has been marked by conflict between regional identities. The country's ethnicity was another cause of Ukraine crisis. While ethnic Russian and Russian speaking Ukrainians who mostly live in the eastern part of the country support Russia and its acts, ethnic

Ukrainians tend to live in the Western and central oblasts (Strasheim, 2016: 29). Supporters of Russia in Ukraine favour the policies which turn Ukraine's face to Eurasia; in contrast, Ukrainian Westerners support the Ukrainian state and nation building based on political and economic reforms as expected by the West (Mölder, 2016: 37).

According to Trenin, the causes of the Ukraine crisis lay in the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, which ended prospects of further NATO expansion for Georgia and Ukraine and the year of beginning of global financial crisis (Trenin, 2014: 4). Some analysts argue that the EU responded to the Russian-Georgian War by initiating Eastern Partnership for the six states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Georgia included (Other countries are Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan) (Wilson, 2014: 2). They regard the ENP and especially its Eastern Partnership (EaP) as a reason for the Ukraine crisis because the EaP aimed at projecting Western values to the EU's Eastern neighbours, an aim which was regarded by Russia as an hostile act due to historical distrust of the West (Varsa, 2017: 42). The Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, stated that "the EU Eastern Partnership project from the very beginning was based on the 'either-or' concept: either you are with us or you are against us" (Lavrov, 2014: 11). He argued that this project was an EU instrument to take control over this geopolitically significant territory (Lavrov, 2014: 11). The Russia-Georgia War in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea demonstrate strategic patterns of Putin's intervention. In other words, Ukraine crisis reflects the patterns of the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 (Metre, Gienger and Kuehnast, 2015: 3).

According Karaganov (2019: 2-3), the reasons for the crisis are: 1) the West's systematic expansion its zone of influence, and military and economic (the expansion of NATO and the EU) control to the East, 2) the intention of some Europeans to disturb Russia, and, 3) the West's desire to spoil Russia's Euro-Asia Project. Karaganov's list clearly reflects the Russian view which sees the West, the EU and NATO, as the main reason for the crisis.

According to Mearsheimer (2014: 4), the US and its European allies share most of the responsibility in the Ukrainian crisis. In his view, the West's policies -EU expansion, NATO enlargement and democracy promotion- have been critical elements of the Ukraine crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). At the Bucharest summit of 2008, NATO leaders stated that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of Alliance and also,

they decided to start a period of comprehensive engagement with both states at a high political level (Karabulut and Oğuz, 2018: 81-82). Russia has seen the enlargements of the EU and NATO as a threat to Russia and felt isolated even though the EU has perceived that it was developing close relations with its neighbours without alienating Russia and cooperating with it in different fields (Vrsanska and Kavicky, 2016: 96). For Russia, the expansion of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia meant crossing Russia's 'red-line' and thus raised national concerns (Wilson, 2014: 7). Putin thus stated: "NATO remains a military alliance and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory" (Crowley and Shuster, 2014: 33).

In short, Ukraine turned its face to the EU after its break-up (Chaban and O'Loughlin, 2018: 62), and according to many analysts, as understood from above, the main reason for the crisis was the Russian suspicions over the West's behaviour in its immediate neighbourhood. In short, the EU started trade and association talks with Ukraine without consulting Russia. Russia did not accept these Ukrainian and European steps towards each other, thus the Ukraine crisis erupted.

3.1.2. Phases of Conflict

Before looking into the details of the phases of conflict it is crucial to give an overview of the course of relations between the EU and Ukraine which triggered Russian aggression in Crimea and interference in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is a key partner for the EU and many Central and Eastern European members of the EU (led by Poland) insist that the Union should prioritize its relations with Ukraine and offer it the prospect of full membership. The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which raised concerns in Russia, and which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), was negotiated between 2007 and 2011. The Association Agreement was signed in 2014 and entered into force on 1 September 2017; although parts of it "have been provisionally applied since 1 November 2014" (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 2016). The Agreement replaced the earlier frameworks for cooperation between Ukraine and the EU and has become "the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together" as "it promotes deeper political ties, stronger economic links and the respect for common values" (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 2016). Thus, the agreement has

“enhanced EU-Ukraine cooperation on human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law; political dialogue and reforms; movement of persons; and strengthened cooperation in a number of sectors, including, energy; the environment and climate action; transport; financial services; public finances, including anti-fraud; agriculture and rural development; fisheries and maritime policies; consumer protection and civil society” (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 2016).

The tensions over the signing of the association agreement had been the major source of social unrest in Ukraine which led to a chain of events that triggered the Ukrainian revolution and finally led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Ukraine crisis can thus be examined in three phases. The first phase was the street protests, covertly supported by Western states in particular the EU and the US against pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovich. Second phase was Russia’s annexation of Crimea upon a controversial referendum held in Crimea on March 16, 2014. The last phase was the ongoing conflicts between the Ukrainian government forces supported by Western states and the Russian backed separatists (Karabulut and Oğuz, 2018: 82-83), in the Donbas region.

The first phase of Ukraine crisis is Maidan demonstrations. Ukraine has experienced massive economic problems in 2013. President Yanukovich’s government refused International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) terms for a 15 billion dollars aid package, and, instead, borrowed from private markets by issuing a ten-year Eurobond but then failed. As a consequence of financial crisis, Yanukovich turned to Russia and asked for help. In return, Russia demanded and put pressure on Ukraine to reject the Association Agreement with the EU and Ukraine did as Russia dictated (Wade, 2015: 365), only a week before Vilnius Summit of 2013 (Wilson, 2014: 65). This meant that Yanukovich had made a U turn and he thought financial crisis would only be solved through further negotiations with Russia (Diuk, 2014). The Russian alternative offered to Ukraine was a seat in the Eurasian Economic Union, loosely modelled on the EU, and Russia actually urged Ukraine to join it (Freedman, 2015: 12). Russia’s major concern was to maintain its sphere of influence in its immediate neighbourhood and it has promoted the ‘near abroad’ concept, which was based on the idea of ‘legitimate sphere of influence’ (Mölder, 2016: 35). Thus, for Russia, the Ukraine crisis was the climax of a broader clash with the West over influence in Russia’s near abroad.

In February 2014, as a result of President Yanukovich's not signing the Association Agreement with the EU, many people came to the Maidan Square and protested the president (Wilson, 2014: 66). The political and social unrest began in November 2013, a low intensity violence begun on the 25 November (Faundes, 2016: 145), and by January 2014 the situation had mostly deteriorated in Kiev (Harvard IOP, 2014: 4). This crisis was the most deadly and prolonged crisis for post-Soviet Ukraine (McMahon, 2014). Confrontations between the opponents of the government and police officers reached the climax of the bloodiest day on February 18 (McDougal, 2015: 1847). On February 21, both sides in the government and opposition agreed that Yanukovich will remain in his position until new election will be held. Right after, the agreement was not respected and Yanukovich went by Russia's side without a blink (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). Yanukovich's short-sighted acts led to protests and as a result, he lost his position (Valdai, 2014: 23). Russia depicted the EU's support for the overthrow Yanukovich's governments as being contrary to its democratic values (Headley, 2015: 301). Russian government tried to depict the events in Kiev as a fascist coup, led by the West with the objective of causing the decline of Russia's power in the region (Smoor, 2017: 64). In turn, the Maidan leaders portrayed Russia as an imperial aggressor led by dictator with the objective of neo-Soviet policy (Smoor, 2017: 64). Nationalist groups, coming mostly from Western Ukraine, which always demanded a Ukrainian national identity, even inimical to Russia, joined these civil protests (Trenin, 2014: 5). According to nationalist groups, Yanukovich was forcing Ukraine to merge with Russia and Western Ukrainians mainly perceived this with outright hostility and deep suspicion. (Trenin, 2014: 5). Finally, the Maidan protests were backed by Ukraine's oligarchic clans who were not satisfied with the Yanukovich government (Trenin, 2014: 5).

Protestors demanded the resignation of President Yanukovich and millions of Ukrainians were mobilised from November 2013 onwards, and peaceful demonstrations turned into violence in February 2014 (Strasheim, 2016: 25). Russia portrayed Euromaidan as a violent affair in which protestors committed most of the atrocities (Marples, 2016: 426). When Yanukovich fled Kiev, the Parliament removed him from government the next day and it appointed Oleksandr Turchynov as an interim president. Then, Turchynov formed an interim government. Putin condemned the overthrow of Yanukovich and described new government as an anti-Semites and fascists as Western

subterfuge to undermine his plans for Eurasian integration (Kuzio, 2018: 10). While new government was refused by Russia, which criticized it as unauthorised, it was recognised by the EU and the US (Turkina, 2015: 185).

The Ukrainian elections were held in May 25, and Petro Poroshenko won and became the fifth president of Ukraine. President Petro Poroshenko signed the Association Agreement with the EU in Brussels on June 27, 2014 which became a turning point in Ukraine's history. The Association Agreement includes comprehensive and deep free trade arrangement which opens the European market to Ukrainian exports. Implications of trade cooperation were expected not to just develop Ukrainian trade and customs rules, but it was also thought that it would help Ukraine to adopt the EU's democratic norms and 'Europeanize' other Ukrainian regulatory regimes (Pifer, 2014). The Association Agreement has thus become the key instrument for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together, through stronger economic networks, deeper political relations and respect for common values (European Council, 2019). Putting differently, for the EU and in particular for Germany, the Association agreements have been prepared to export European values and norms (Koeth, 2016: 108). It shows that Germany and the EU want to project their norms and values via their soft power.

The second phase of the crisis is the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Historically, the Crimean peninsula has been ruled by different empires and states; by the Greeks, Bulgars, Scythians, Romans, Gots, Huns, Khazars, KyivanRus, the Byzantine Empire, Venice, Genoa, Kipchaks, the Mongol Golden Horde, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Russia. Crimean Tatars and Ottomans have always been contentious owing to its autonomous status in the Ottoman Empire (Kuzio, 2018: 3). Crimea was an integral part of Russian Empire and Russian Federation approximately for 168 years (Bebler, 2015: 6). The Soviet leader Krushchev transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 (McMahon, 2014), and the Crimean Peninsula became a Ukrainian Soviet Republic at that time and just internal borders of the Soviet Union changed. The shock for Ukraine and Russia came in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, and approximately 1.5 million Russians in Crimea got separated from 'mother Russia' by an international border (Wydra, 2014: 314). In accordance with the Ukrainian constitution, Crimea was declared 'the Autonomous Republic of Crimea' and Sevastopol retained special status

within Ukraine (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 194). Crimea was ruled by Ukraine from 1954 to 2014 (Wilson, 2014: 100), and in 2014 Crimea was illegally annexed by Russia.

Crimea is a significant geopolitical space for Russia. Thus, Russia signed a bilateral agreement with Ukraine in 1997 and via this agreement, Russia farmed out the Sevastopol port. The control of this port means the control of whole Black Sea for Russia (Vrsanska and Kavicky, 2016: 97). Also, owing to the Crimean War and WWII (with defeats in 1853 and 1941), Crimea is important in the Russian national psyche. It also has spiritual significance because Vladimir the Holy, the Kiev prince, (988-1015) was baptised in Crimea, thereby introducing Christianity in Kievan Rus (Smoor, 2017: 87). Today ethnic Russian people comprise an obvious majority of Crimea (%58), Ukrainians and Tatars comparatively are less in population (%24 and %12 respectively) and it is hard to claim that any single homogenous group overpoweringly represents the Crimean identity (Wilson, 2015: 219).

After the Ukrainian Parliament's impeachment and removal of Yanukovich, Putin decided to annex Crimea on March 16 (Rutland, 2016: 130). Russia's military aggression began on February 20, 2014 when Russian armed forces began to reposition its units at the Strait in Kerch and Crimea (Maiorova, 2017: 31). On February, 27 2014, pro-Russian separatists took over and controlled public buildings in Crimea with Russian help (Wade, 2015: 366). In other words Russia invaded Crimea. Russia also destabilised Eastern Ukraine by means of information activities as well as by providing physical/material help to the pro-Russian separatists (Sazonov, Mölder and Müür, 2016: 41). Only sixty men were used for annexation which demonstrated how Russia's propaganda was effective at that time (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 198). According to Wydra, numerous factors caused the instability of the Crimean self-government arrangement from beginning: 1) autonomy was not strong enough, 2) no power sharing mechanisms existed, 3) Ukraine was a weak state, 4) Ukrainian identity discourses diverged increasingly and, 5) Russia contributed to destabilisation in Crimea by providing kin-state assistance to the Russian society there. (Wydra, 2014: 313-314).

Russia refused the allegations that Russian forces got involved in Crimea until Putin said that of course Russian serviceman backed the Crimean self-defence in April 2014 (Gorbunova, 2014: 328). By annexing Crimea, Russia intentionally wanted to spread its effectiveness over southern Ukraine, the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Straits, even

the Northern part of the Black Sea, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (Gardner, 2016: 2). On March 4, 2014, Putin recognised Aksyonov as the legitimate leader of Crimea although he did not openly meet with him (Shuster, 2014). On the March 6, the Crimean Parliament decided the annexation of Crimean to Russia and called for a referendum (Faundes, 2016: 147). Before the referendum, Russia considerably boosted its armed forces in Crimea by raising the number of its troops in Crimea to approximately twenty-two thousand (McDougal, 2015: 1848). Russian authorities claimed that the referendum held on March 16 resulted in a 96.7% vote in favour of unification with Russia (Somin, 2014). According to official data, more than 81% of the Crimean citizens participated in the referendum (Faundes, 2016: 147). However, these figures could not be checked and certified by impartial and international observers (Bebler, 2015: 14), thus this annexation was based on a controversial referendum (Karabulut and Oğuz, 2018: 83). Russia used this referendum to legitimize its continuous rule in Crimea (Harvard IOP, 2014: 6). On March 25, Turchynov ordered the withdrawal of all Ukrainian armed forces from Crimea (Harvard IOP, 2014: 6).

After the annexation of Crimea, the US and the EU decided to impose sanctions on Russia (BBC, 2014). Despite of these sanctions, on March 21, 2014, the Russian Parliament recognised and approved the annexation of Crimea (McDougal, 2015: 1847), and Vladimir Putin signed a law on the admission of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Russian claims on the legitimacy of its annexation of Crimea were based on the ‘right of self-determination of peoples’ in international law (Wydra, 2014: 312-313). Putin stated that “Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian” (Wilson, 2014: 33).

While the West accused Russia of offensiveness against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, Russia responded that the crisis was triggered by the West, and Russia just protected its national interests, and its sphere of influence against Western expansion (Vrsanska and Kavicky, 2016: 96) and safeguarded the rights of Russian speakers beyond the Russia’s borders (Ortung and Walker, 2015). Furthermore, Russia defended its intervention by claiming it to be humanitarian intervention even it was not (Bebler, 2015: 25). Invasion and annexation of Crimea has provoked the reaction of the international community in the form of diplomatic protests, declarations, resolutions as

well as sanctions. For example, on March, 2014, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on Ukraine's territorial integrity. They condemned the annexation of Crimea and declared the referendum in non-valid (Bebler, 2015: 25). However, Crimea had been recognised as an integral part of Russia by Cuba, Afghanistan, Syria, Nicaragua and Venezuela by April 2014 (Wilson, 2015: 217).

The final phase of the Ukraine crisis is the conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine, especially in Donbas. Donbas comprises of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, has a total of seven million population (Wagner, 2017: 38), and has a large industry capacity (Heuvel and Cohen, 2014: 5). As can be understood from its name, Donbas word comes from the combination of two words *Donetsky Bassein* (Donetsk coal basin) (Maiorova, 2017: 7). Donbas has the second largest number of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 198). Putin frequently refers to the Eastern Ukrainian regions as Novorossia (New Russia); a term which dates back to Czars time (Harvard IOP, 2014: 15). Novorossia includes Ukraine's whole south-east (Trenin, 2014: 7). Putin once stated that Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa are parts of Novorossia and these regions were given to Ukraine by the Soviet authorities in 1920s (Johannesson, 2017: 63). Alexander Dugin perceived Novorossia as a welcome gathering of regions that would enlarge Russian territories and create a new Large Russia as the anchor of a Eurasian great power pole in opposition to the West (as cited in Toal, 2017: 246). Putin's Novorossia project offered a historical basis for the separatist or federative project for the mentioned regions (Maiorova, 2017: 29).

Pro-Russian separatists declared the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk right after the annexation of Crimea, and then the situation turned into an armed conflict between Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 194). In other words, the protests in Donbas escalated into armed, separatist insurgency, and, in turn the Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive (Turkina, 2015: 185). The Ukrainian president labelled these separatists as terrorists (Vrsanska and Kavicky, 2016: 99). Russia had effective operatives in Donbas who could help arranging militias needed for actions of opposition forces to challenge the Ukrainian government's control (Wasterlund and Norberg, 2016: 593). Approximately 30% of the pro-Russian fighters in Donbas were Russian citizens in July 2014 (Norberg, 2016:

594). Russia was not formally involved in these separatist movements, but when protests began, local media reported that many participants were Russian citizens (Twickel, Sasse and Baumann, 2018: 1). Although pro-Russian separatists took over the Donetsk State Administration buildings between 1 and 6 March, 2014, these were later removed by Ukrainian government's security service (Heinsch, 2015: 328). Separatist groups, for the second time, took over the control of public buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv on April 6, and the next day they called for a referendum to be held on the May 11 (Faundes, 2016: 150-151).

Referendum was held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; the question was whether they wanted to see their territories as sovereign/autonomous or not (Valdai, 2014: 49-50). Turnout was almost 75% in Donetsk and 81% in Luhansk (Valdai, 2014: 49-50). In both regions more than 96% of the population was in favour of sovereignty (Valdai, 2014: 49-50). This figure caused them to proclaim themselves as independent republics and subsequently declare their intention to unite, Ukraine responded by increasing up military operations (Valdai, 2014: 49-50), but Russia did not hide their sympathy to these separatists and refrained from both to recognise them and sending Russian armed forces to protect them (Trenin, 2014: 7). Russia declared that Russia relates with respect to the expression of will of the people of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. According to some analysts, this referendum does not have credibility in the eyes of the world; because it did not meet democratic election principles such as fairness, objectivity and transparency (Blair, 2014). Therefore, Donetsk referendum was stamped as illegal by the UN, the EU and the USA (Gregory, 2014).

Pro-Russian separatists shot down an MH17 plane of Malaysian Airlines and as a result 298 people were killed on July, 17 2014. There were 283 passengers and 15 crew members on the plane. While Ukraine and the West blamed pro-Russian rebels of shooting down the plane, Russia and the Ukrainian separatists denied any responsibility and claimed that the Ukrainian army should be blamed (BBC, 2015). Over 13,000 people have died in the conflict between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces in the Donbas since Ukraine crisis began in 2014 (United Nations, 2019). According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2019, 8), the Russia-Ukraine crisis has caused 3,331 civilian deaths, including 298 deaths on board of Malaysian Airlines MH17 flight.

In short, Ukraine witnessed the overthrow of Yanukovich administration, Russian annexation of Crimea and armed separatism in eastern regions between November 2013 and May 2014 (Grytsaienko, 2014: 5). On September 5, 2014, a ceasefire was reached at Minsk, and, the agreement was signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. The agreement mainly relied on a plan originally proposed by Ukrainian president Poroshenko in June (Freedman, 2015: 17), but it failed and was followed by a summit in Minsk II in 2015 with a new package of measures (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 194). On February 11-12, 2015, with the Minsk II Agreement, a package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements including instituting constitutional reforms and re-establishing control of sovereign borders (Wagner, 2017: 38-37), was signed. It called for immediate ceasefire and set the plan for a political settlement of the conflict but, it could not stop the Russian offensive (Maiorova, 2017: 43). The Minsk II Agreement did not give Russia what it wanted (Charap and Shapiro, 2015: 39). It is argued that the Minsk II Agreement can only be implemented if Putin agrees to change his confrontational approach towards Ukraine and the West (Wade, 2015: 362).

The Donbas region is now regarded as under a special status (Ratiu and Munteanu, 2018: 194). The necessary requirements for peace between the parties can be listed as: 1) guarantees by the international community that Ukraine and Georgia will not be members of NATO, 2) substantial fiscal and political autonomy (but not independence or political integration with Russia) for eastern regions of Ukraine, and, 3) removal of heavy weaponry from these eastern provinces (Wade, 2015: 369).

3.2. Europeanization of German Policy on the Ukraine Conflict: A Clear Case of Uploading

This part of the chapter explains the EU's general position on the Russia Ukraine conflict. Then, the approaches of Baltic States and Poland towards the crisis are examined. Lastly, Europeanization of Germany's policy on the Ukraine conflict and Germany's successful uploading case during the Russia-Ukraine conflict are analyzed.

3.2.1. An Overview of the EU's Policy on the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia led to a conflict between the EU-Russia relations to start a period of deep freezing. In the last 25 years for the first time the EU said and recognized Russia as a direct enemy in the post-Soviet Union (Nitoiu, 2016: 1-2). "Russia's violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its core" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

In March 2014, the European Council agreed the first diplomatic measures in response to Russian actions in Ukraine (European Union, 2019). The EU's diplomatic sanctions included the cancelling of the EU-Russia Summit, in 2014, and instead of the G8 summit in Russia, holding a G7 meeting in Brussels (Cross and Karolewski, 2017: 5). The EU also decided not to hold regular bilateral summits with Russia (European Council, 2019). EU leaders also set out a second stage of further measures in the absence of de-escalatory steps and additional far-reaching consequences for EU-Russia relations in case of further destabilisation of the situation in Ukraine (European Union, 2019). The EU has strongly condemned Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and does not recognise it. In the absence of de-escalatory steps by the Russian Federation, on 17 March 2014 the EU imposed the first travel bans and asset freezes against persons involved in actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity (European Union, 2019). 155 people and 44 entities are subject to an asset freeze and travel ban, due to their actions (European Council, 2019). In view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in eastern Ukraine, the EU imposed economic sanctions in July 2014 and reinforced them in September 2014. In March 2015, the European Council linked the duration of those economic restrictions to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements (European Union, 2019). The EU remains ready to reverse its decisions and reengage with Russia when it starts contributing actively and without ambiguities (European Union, 2019). The EU also restricted Russia's access to capital markets in the EU and prohibited buying and selling of bonds and equity and services. Furthermore, imports and exports of arms and the export of dual use good prohibited as well (Haukkala, 2018: 85). Lastly, on the 21st of December 2018, the European Council extended economic

sanctions aiming precise sectors of the Russian economy until 31st of July 2019 (European Union, 2019). And on the 15th of March 2019, the EU responded to the escalation at the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov and renewed sanctions over actions against territorial integrity of Ukraine (European Council, 2014).

It can be argued that the EU responded to the crisis in a constrained way for several reasons. Institutional constraints were one of these reasons because of the unpractical structure and cumbersome procedures in which policies and decisions are formulated. Even turf battles could be observed among the Commission, the European External Action Service, the High Representative and the European Council. Furthermore, because foreign policy is still mainly intergovernmental, the member states' governments, foreign ministries, parliaments and diplomats were also involved in these processes making them more complex (Kuzio, 2016: 104). Nevertheless, the EU could still be successful in establishing a consensus (although based on the lowest common denominator) and in using an entire spectrum of policy instruments for dealing with the crisis. The EU has especially been successful in condemning Russia's violation of territorial integrity of Ukraine, its promotion of violence in Eastern Ukraine and attaining the reaction of the international community in this regard (Karolewski and Cross, 2017: 143).

The divergences of the national interests of EU member states over the conflict in Ukraine have been another constraint on European foreign policy. The EU individual member states have different purposes on the eastern neighbourhood and their actions towards Russia-Ukraine conflict were not same. Countries such as Greece, Italy and Hungary were more appeasing towards Russia and have opposed the imposition of sanctions (Kuzio, 2017: 111), Spain and Portugal were not interested, whereas, the Central and Eastern European countries were in the difficult position of balancing between their economic interests which were dependent on Russia and the need to have a common EU response to the crisis (Nitoiu, 2016: 378). Ukraine was making the headlines that if the EU's reaction was weak, Putin would go further (European Parliament, 2014).

The Baltic States and Poland felt threatened mostly by actions of Russia in Ukraine. Russia was the first trading partner for all Baltic countries due to close economic ties inherited from the Soviet Union (Veebel and Markus, 2018: 10). When

the Ukraine crisis erupted, the Baltic States thought that it is an obligation and opportunity to act in support of Ukraine (Vilson, 2015: 50). The Baltic States and Poland saw the Ukrainian crisis primarily in terms of security (Sjursen and Rosén, 2016: 26). According to some analysts, as a result intervention, the Baltic States perceived that most probably they would be the next potential victims of Russian aggression (Vilson, 2017: 9). The Ukraine crisis was a “wake-up” call for Europe, while the Baltic countries had “said so” all from the onset (Vilson, 2017: 14). Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the President of Estonia at that moment considered the crisis of Ukraine as a conflict of values and a battle between Europe and Russia (Vilson, 2017: 14). Dalia Grybauskaitė, the President of Lithuania, made strong diplomatic and political reactions by name Russia a terrorist state (Vilson, 2017: 14-15). Edgars Rinkevics, Foreign Minister of Latvia, called Russia as a revisionist super-power prepare to use force at any time to satisfy its ambitions and purposes (Vilson, 2017: 14-15). Thus, the Baltic States and Poland immediately took a hard-line position towards Russian policies (Siddi, 2016: 668). The Baltic States and Poland looked at NATO to counterbalance Russia’s interventionist policy in Ukraine (Meister, 2014: 9). Putting differently, the Baltic States, Poland and the CEE countries have been making use of Euro-Atlantic institutions in an attempt to shake Russia’s position in Europe (Zwolski, 2016: 654). Policies of the UK and some Scandinavian countries were rather US-like confrontational approach as well (Koeth, 2016: 112). Against the Baltic and Polish requests, Germany persisted on the validity of NATO-Russia Founding Act and was against any military response to Russia (Fix, 2018: 8).

The Baltic States have clearly supported Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and they have harshly condemned the Russian actions via all diplomatic means. The Baltic countries assisted Ukraine by provision of financial aid, project support, non-lethal and humanitarian aid, expertise on conducting reforms, and intense engagement in support of civil society (Vilson, 2015: 59). Furthermore, all of these countries saw NATO as the primary security provider against Russia (Vilson, 2017: 32). Among these three countries, Lithuania was the only country which had not agreed to send military aid to Ukraine (Vilson, 2015: 59). However, Lithuania’s President clearly asked and pressed NATO to deploy troops in the Baltic region, to prevent a ‘Crimea-style scenario’ in Lithuania (Vilson, 2017: 18).

When the crisis erupted, Poland was among the first countries which took a strong position against Russia and used all its available resources within the EU and NATO in order to restore a suitable level of security (Horga and Costea, 2014: 192). Poland has frequently proposed initiatives within the EU, which could jeopardize Russia's interests (Lisiakiewicz, 2018: 117). Poland has been pulling Ukraine towards the West and the West towards Ukraine as well. The EU ultimately developed a competitive programme for Ukraine through the Eastern Partnership initiative thanks to the Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland's pro-Atlanticist Foreign Minister, who insisted and was successful in presenting the opinion to the EU in the first place (Zwolski, 2016: 655). He publicly stated: "I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity" (Koeth, 2016: 105).

The EU's sanctions towards Russia and particularly Russia's counter sanctions have seriously damaged the economic interests of the Baltic States especially in agriculture and food sectors, and exporters in these Baltic States were effected (Veebel and Markus, 2018: 15). However, the Baltic States severely favoured the EU's sanctions against Russia and their extensions until the Minsk agreements would be completely implemented (Vilson, 2017: 26). In the end, all of the Baltic states were referring to the EU positions and adapting to the EU procedures in their own foreign policy making (downloading), and they strongly pushed for their own preferences to form the EU policy agenda and outcomes and also they referred to common European values and norms, for instance, respect for international law (Vilson, 2015: 67).

3.2.2. Germany's Successful Uploading

Ukraine crisis mostly affected Germany and its foreign policy (Uğur, 2018: 83). It took the leadership in the EU and successfully uploaded its national policies to the EU level. Surely, Germany's foreign policy makers saw that Germanies individual attempts would not beadequate to deal with the crisis, thus they thought that its policy towards Russia-Ukraine conflict could only be effective if supported by the EU (House of Lords, 2015: 32). Berlin for the first time took the leadership in a big international crisis instead of Washington, Brussels, Paris or London.

German public opinion was also very much interested in the Ukraine crisis. The German media, both at the right and left wing, has run pages about the Ukraine crisis.

There are different political and public opinions in Germany towards crisis from strong condemnation to understanding, or support for Russian actions against Ukraine (Gromadzki, 2015: 3). Germany's public opinion wanted to see their country as a mediator not as a participant of the crisis, that's why they offered military assistance to Ukraine (Forsberg, 2016: 36), but still Russia remains a controversy and divisive subject in German society and politics (Siddi, 2018: 41). *Russland-Kritiker* take a more critical approach towards Russia's authoritarian developments and aggressive foreign policy. They include, in particular, members of the Christian Democratic and the Green parties who advocate Germany's liberal ideas and transatlantic orientation (Siddi, 2018: 41). *Russland-Versteher* are mainly more diverse groups (Siddi, 2018: 42). They include the Social Democratic heirs of Brandt, intellectuals, those who are critical of the US and Western policies and those who sympathise with the Russia (Siddi, 2018: 42).

German foreign policy was effective to bring the EU member states together by utilising instrument of coalition-building, and it helped Germany to lead European foreign policy during the Ukraine crisis (Fix, 2018: 12). According to Steinmeier, German Foreign Minister, Europe must stand as one and react in a common response. Russia knows, if compromise was not held within Europe in such important event, this would end Europe's common foreign policy (Sjursen and Rosen, 2016: 27). Germany acted as the bridge between Russia and the EU in the Ukrainian crisis (Yoder, 2015: 55). In March, 2014 Merkel emphasized the significance of acting together within the EU and with the United States in conflict management (Fix, 2018: 9). Germany has been a tight promoter of a rules-based multilateral foreign policy (Koeth, 2016: 102). Its role to promote freedom and democracy assisted Germany to more reinforce its identity relied on multilateralism and soft power (Koeth, 2016: 104). Siddi claims that:

German foreign policy has been based on relatively stable set of tenets since the end of the Second World War, including the reluctance to use force to solve international disputes, support for European integration, the transatlantic alliance with the United States, and a policy of cooperation with Russia (Siddi, 2018: 36).

Since the late 1960s, discourses which support the cooperative West German foreign policy stance towards the Soviet Union/Russia have been frequently described as resembling the *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Willy Brandt. The term means Eastern Policy or describes West Germany's cooperative approach to the Soviet Union (Russia as a

partner (Siddi, 2018: 37)), and Warsaw Pact countries (Forsberg, 2016: 21), but between 1960s and 1970s, it gained a more precise meaning with regard to Cold War detente (Siddi, 2018: 40). After the Cold War, Germany was in leadership position to advocate of a detailed approach towards Russia in the European security order (Fix and Keil, 2017: 5).

During the Ukraine crisis, German policies have suggested a new type of *Ostpolitik*, including diplomacy, economic engagement, and based on respect of values and norms (Siddi, 2016: 675). Furthermore, the German elite have always believed that stability and peace of Europe can be achieved only with Russia, not against them. Germany's third biggest partner is Russia and also Germany's most important energy suppliers' companies are Russian (Meister, 2014: 2). German foreign policy towards Russia is based on normalisation of relations, modernisation and democratisation by the path of Europeanization, de facto Westernisation, and engagement in bilateral and multilateral contexts (Daehnhardt and Handl, 2018: 449). As Timmins summarized, Germany prefers to have stable and constructive relations with Russia due to its national interests, Germany's energy dependency, German business interests and wider concerns for European political and security order (Forsberg, 2016: 22). Thus, German-Russian Partnership for Modernization was launched in 2008, Germany wanted to promote its economic interests and helpstrengthen the rule of law in Russia and Russia hoped for economic consolidation and technology transfers from the Europe. Germany uploaded the initiative to the EU level in 2010 with aim of promoting democratic reforms in Russia and develop economic relations, in particular via Russia's accession to the WTO (Siddi, 2016: 667). These developments prove that Germany has encouraged the EU to develop its multilateral diplomacy and also it shows that Germany has successfully grown its soft and civilian power.

Through the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Germany, the UK and France wanted to have bilateral talks with Russia instead of empowering the High Representative. In order to solve the crisis, Merkel and Cameron usually talked with Putin, but most of the time no real progress was made (Nitoiu, 2016: 379). Germany's diplomatic efforts through the crisis intended to prevent Russia from expanding its invasion and military acts beyond Crimea and to conductmutual relations for ending the conflict (Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Popławski, 2014: 1). In February 2014, Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and

Poland went to the Kiev in order to develop an agreement that would end the uncontrollable violence (Horga and Costea, 2014: 187). This *ad hoc* deal allowed Yanukovich to stay in office at least for ten more months, that is, until the presidential elections (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2015: 97). Germany criticized Yanukovich more than Russia and supported diplomatic negotiations in order to find an agreement for solving the crisis, but when Russia annexed Crimea, Merkel stated that the EU and Germany had to remind Russia that the Cold War is over (Spiegel, 2014), and also that Russia clearly violated the principles of international law¹⁰ (Uğur, 2018: 83).

“At the first stage of Ukraine crisis Merkel repeatedly offered to help Putin save face if he would cease his depredations, to the point of suggesting European Union-Eurasian Union talks about creating a common economic space” (Pond, 2015: 29). Merkel prepared the domestic foundation to support her diplomacy and she rallied German business (Pond, 2015: 29). In fact, Merkel was at the centre of efforts to have a diplomatic resolution to the conflict (Fisher, 2015). German businessman and Merkel’s party were more reluctant to impose deeper sanctions on Russia because it could respectively affect German economy negatively and German companies would get negatively affected as well (Horga and Costea, 2014: 193). Merkel warned that the crisis has challenged Europe’s post-war order which is based on the territorial integrity of all nations (DW-World 2014). She reacted strongly to Russia’s annexation of

¹⁰By annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in Donbas region, Russia has violated international law. International law (the UN Charter and General Assembly Resolutions, Treaties between Russia and Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum) offer Russia with accountabilities to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. One of the goals of the United Nations is that the development of affable relationships among nations relied on respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples and equal rights (McDougal, 2016: 1872). Although, self-determination right in international law has been rather narrowed as a result of destabilising effects it can have when generalised (Burke-White, 2014: 71), two human rights covenants of the UN offers a probable solutions to the tension between territories (Article 2(4) UN Charter) and self-determination (Article 1, ICCPR, Article 1 SCESR, Article 1(2) and 55 UN Charter) (Wydra, 2014: 315). General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) sustained that the status of conquest as an illegal method of acquiring land especially by sustaining that no territorial acquisition resulting from threat or using any type of force should be accepted as legal. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, many treaties were signed between Russia and Ukraine but two of them elaborate Russia’s accountabilities towards Ukraine with respect to its sovereignty and territorial integrity: the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet (extended by Kharkiv Pact) and the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine (McDougal, 2016: 1873-1874). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were still considerable numbers of nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory, thus Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances was signed. Budapest Memorandum was done with respect of Ukraine accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Värk, 2016: 45). Because of Ukraine’s commitments to extinguish every nuclear weapon from its territory, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirmed their commitments to Ukraine... to respect the sovereignty and independence and the presence borders of Ukraine (McDougal, 2016: 1876-1877).

Crimea, occupation and Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine (Forsberg, 2016: 29). German foreign policy towards the Russian action in the eastern part of Ukraine represented a deviation from cooperative and inclusive relations with Russia (Daehnhardt and Handl, 2018: 445).

Ultimately, with the leading of Germany, the EU has imposed various types of restrictive measures such as individual restrictive measures (travel restrictions and asset freeze), diplomatic measures, restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, economic sanctions and restrictions on economic cooperation (EU, 2019). This is a clear example of German uploading of its policy to the EU level.

On the other hand, Sigmar Gabriel, Germany's Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economy, stated that the sanctions should aim at solving the crisis in Ukraine, and they should not have the intention to bring about political and economic chaos in Russia (Kostanyan and Meister, 2016: 9). And sanctions cast into question the necessary conditions for peaceful resolution in Europe (Siddi, 2018: 44). The EU sanctions are still continuing (Avarre, 2016: 713), however, communication with Russian politicians, dialogue with Russian society, and, pragmatic cooperation (transactional relations in certain fields) continue including the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline as well (Daehnhardt and Handl, 2018: 451). In 2015, German politicians advocated the resumption of joint energy projects including Russian and German businesses, most importantly the construction of the Nord Stream-II pipeline (Siddi, 2018: 45), which would convey additional Russian gas directly to Germany (Fix, 2017: 8). The German government claims that the Nord Stream-II will contribute to European energy security (Siddi, 2016: 671), and also, the Nord Stream II is a private business project, which has nothing to do with politics (Fix and Keil, 2017: 8). Thus, it can be argued that, in the Ukraine crisis, Germany wants and in many cases leads the EU to pursue a soft power stance, opposing coercive economic measures. Surely this is not about holding a fully normative stance. It is mainly about pursuing Germany's national interests. Nevertheless Germany has been successful so far to upload this policy stance to the EU level.

Germany has initiated many formats within the EU from the Weimar triangle (with France and Poland) to the Normandy group (Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine) and importantly Merkel led diplomatic negotiation to the Minsk II agreement

in 2015 (Siddi, 2016: 665)¹¹. Germany, mainly together with France, took the leadership role and represented the EU in coping with the crisis especially through their actions in the work of the Normandy Format (Haukkala, 2018: 89), in which Minsk agreements were negotiated (Nitoiu, 2015: 379). Merkel was saying that the Minsk II deal agreed between Russia and Ukraine on 12 February 2015 brought a small hope (Lundin, 2014: 278). Merkel in the annual conference in February 2015 criticised Russia directly and strongly for violating international law and she affirmed that the crisis in Ukraine could not end by using force but instead it requires patience and long time (Forsberg, 2016: 30). Both Minsk Agreements were just able partly limit the conflicts between parties (Heinsch, 2015: 324).

Speck (2015) claimed that Russia-Ukraine crisis revealed the weakness and strengths of German foreign policy. Germany successfully used diplomatic skills and economic powers during the crisis, whereas it still lacks the military muscle (Speck, 2015). According to Speck, three reasons caused Germany to become a leader in Ukraine crisis and successfully upload its national policy to the EU level:

¹¹The Weimar triangle (Germany, France and Poland) called for more efforts to end the Ukraine crisis (Reuters, 2016). “The Normandy negotiations over how to resolve the situation in Ukraine only started in the summer of 2014; it therefore had nothing to do with the EU’s agreement on sanctions” (Sjursen and Rosen, 2016: 28). The Geneva format, which consists of Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the US, was the first diplomatic attempt to halt the war and achieve a permanent solution to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (House of Lords, 2015: 61). Geneva talks produce agreement on defusing conflict and it has some important points such as all sides refrain from violence, all illegal groups must be disarmed and there would be an amnesty for all protestors under the agreement (The Guardian, 2014). The second attempt was the format of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which is composed of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and under which the protocol of Minsk I was signed by Russia and Ukraine and the representatives of People’s Republic of Donetsk and the People’s Republic of Luhansk on 5 September 2014. The protocol included 12 steps and the most important of them are the ceasefire monitored by the OSCE, mutual withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons, border monitoring by OSCE, decentralization of power in Ukraine and provisions for local governance in Donetsk and Luhansk, hostage release and prisoner exchange, inclusive national dialogue and humanitarian and economic measures to be adopted in Donbas (House of Lords, 2015: 61). The ceasefire agreed in the context of Minsk I did not work and it collapsed completely in January 2015 (Kostanyan and Meister, 2016: 1-2).

First, German power has grown since the country's reunification in 1990. Germany has not only the biggest economy and the largest population in the EU but also lies geographically at the center of the union and is deeply embedded in EU structures. Second, the crisis is of vital importance for Germany because the entire geopolitical order to the country's East is at stake. Third, there was no one else to take the lead. Paris has weakened in recent years. London is increasingly disconnected from the EU. Washington has taken a step back from European affairs. And Brussels lacks the capability to lead the EU on foreign policy (2015).

Germany had a crucial stake in the crisis not only because of its well-known *Ostpolitik* but also and mainly due to its energy and economic dependence on Russia. Furthermore, Merkel speaks Russian fluently and Germany has been the driving force for a united EU position on a strong sanctions policy without the use of military means (House of Lords, 2015: 30). Merkel's geopolitical leadership throughout the crisis may not be military, but still it has been strong (Pond, 2014). Putting differently, Germany's approach towards Russia has always emphasized diplomacy and negotiation instead of military force and this has not changed significantly after the Ukraine crisis erupted (Forsberg, 2016: 23-24). This is clearly a soft power approach.

Germany's leadership has been a tool in promoting within the EU a diplomatic course of strategic patience (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2015: 97). According to Fix, Germany's leadership position in the Ukraine crisis looks like the concept of civilian power, a state with adequately robust potential for power and effect, targeting the civilisation of international politics via a rules-based order, and reluctant to use military tools (Fix, 2018: 13). But Makarychev explains Germany's approach arguing that Germany mainly uses soft power tools, because Germany is sensitive to civil society engagement and human right issues and is open to supranational integration (Yoder, 2015: 61). The possibility to promote democracy and freedom as a representative of the Western world, provided Germany to reinforce its multilateralism and soft power, which drive German policy today (Koeth, 2016: 104).

The EU is committed to promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights (European Commission, 2015: 5). Thus, the EU is considered as an important actor that can assist and promote Ukraine in developing its judicial system. The EU's developed economy and its market makes the EU attractive in the Ukrainian perspectives. The EU with the leadership of Germany tried to solve Ukrainian crisis

with diplomatic negotiation and used a combination of civilian and soft power instruments. Much of the European soft power derives from its economic power. The EU has imposed sanctions on Russia, not because the EU wants to make Russia weaker, actually the EU has wanted to solve the crisis in a peaceful manner and these tools have been used to invite Russia in a settlement based on negotiation. The EU preferred to impose sanctions such as diplomatic and economic ones, but the EU has never used military means to solve the crisis. Germany has successfully uploaded its national preferences to the EU level, thereby; the EU has just used the combination of civilian and soft power resources during the crisis.



CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the Europeanization of German foreign policy is evaluated through an analysis of the case of Germany's role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. The main argument of the thesis has been that Germany has successfully transferred its national policy to the EU level and in this way the EU has preferred to use the combination of civilian and soft power tools rather than hard power ones in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Germany led the crisis and it was the first experience of Germany's leadership in an international crisis which also involves a great power, Russia. The USA, Britain and France were entangled by their own domestic issues; therefore leadership responsibility was taken up by Germany.

To substantiate the argument of the thesis, an overall assessment of the Europeanization and soft power has been made with reference to the Europeanization of German foreign policy and Germany's civilian and soft power role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Germany has experienced many difficulties in its past from authoritarian regime to wars. Germany's political responsibility is unique today, because of Germany's actions in WWII (Crossley-Frolick, 2017: 443). After these severe years, Germany has adopted the notion of 'nie wieder krieg' which meant 'war, never again'. European values and norms have been adopted by German Basic Law and Germany has usually acted as a bandwagon in the EU especially with regard to security and defence issues.

Germany's national policy has affected the EU and vice versa. Germany has developed its civilian and soft power and it has highly affected the EU's role in the international arena. German and EU interests are intertwined with each other. The EU has been the most important framework for making Germany's foreign policy. In this respect, the EU has affected almost all sectors of the German political system including politics, polity and public policies (Zerkavis, 2004: 109). In other words, the EU has influenced German political, administrative, structural and foreign policy by the top-down Europeanization process. However, Germany's could also successfully upload its own foreign policy preferences to the EU level as well. Germany has utilised the combination of civilian and soft power to influence the ideas and objectives of the EU and its allies and it has also successfully utilized European foreign policy as well (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2006: 31).

With regard to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, this thesis has first given an overview of the situation and developments in Ukraine. After gaining its independence, Ukraine has turned its face towards the EU instead of Russia. The EU also has developed its relations with Ukraine and the EU has assisted Ukraine's democracy, economy, and human rights and so on. However, Russia did not welcome the line of progress in EU-Ukraine relations because it saw Ukraine as its own sphere of influence and geopolitically vital for Russian national security. Russia has continuously sought to exploit Ukraine's economic, political and cultural situation (Boulègue et al., 2018: 7). Ukrainians complained about Russia's attitude as it has never completely accepted Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state (Sauer, 2017: 89). Furthermore, Russia felt encircled by NATO and the EU (i.e., the West) in its immediate neighbourhood and did not welcome NATO and the EU's close relations with Georgia and Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted under these circumstances. The Russia-Ukraine crisis had economic, political, social and cultural dimensions (Valdai, 2014: 7). Ukraine has experienced huge economic problems in 2013 and Ukrainian President Yanukovich asked Russia to help them. In return, Russia demanded Ukraine to reject the Association Agreement with the EU, which Ukraine eventually rejected (Wade, 2015: 365). As an alternative path, Russia showed the Eurasian Economic Union and pressured Ukraine to be a member of it.

Because the Yanukovich government's rejection of the Association Agreement with the EU, many people came to the Maidan Square and protested president Yanukovich, a development which led to the ousting of Yanukovich from power and a series of events which brought about Russia's annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian separatist uprising in Eastern Ukraine. In other words, Ukraine saw the overthrow of Yanukovich administration, Russian annexation of Crimea and armed separatism in eastern regions between November 2013 and May 2014 (Grytsaienko, 2014: 5). By infringing Ukrainian sovereignty, annexing Crimea, and supporting separatists in the Donbas region, Russia has violated international law (McDougal, 2016: 1872).

The EU's reaction to the crisis was the imposition of a series of sanctions on Russia. Although they could agree on certain sanctions, EU member states actually have had diverging interests, policies and attitudes towards the crisis. Some of them have asked for the EU's imposition of severer sanctions and even military action against

Russia whereas some others (led by Germany) preferred a more moderate approach based on the use of soft power tools.

During the crisis, Germany's foreign policy intended to prevent Russia from expanding its military intervention beyond the Crimea and Germany tried to solve the crisis with the diplomatic negotiations (Kwiatkowska-Drozdz and Poplawski, 2014: 1). Germany reacted strongly to Russia's Crimean annexation, and Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine (Forsberg, 2016: 29), but it did not want the EU use military tools against Russia. Led by Germany, the EU, has thus employed various soft measures against Russia such as individual restrictive measures, diplomatic measures and economic sanctions (EU, 2019).

Germany has also initiated multilateral many formats within the EU such as the Weimar triangle (with France and Poland), and Normandy group (with France, Russia and Ukraine) and led the talks for Minsk agreements (Siddi, 2016: 665). This thesis has reached the conclusion that Germany's leadership affected the EU's policies towards the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the EU employed a combination of civilian and soft power to tackle the crisis, prioritizing diplomacy and cooperation at political, economic and security levels. The EU has thus assisted Ukraine to develop its economy, human rights and democracy on the one hand; while imposing economic sanctions on Russia on the other. Germany, as a highly Europeanized state, successfully uploaded its national policies to the EU level and even though some EU member states such as Poland and the Baltic states have defended severer measures against Russia which would also involve the use of military means if necessary, Germany has tried to solve the crisis with soft power tools, especially with the diplomatic negotiations.

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