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EUROSCEPTICISM AND EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS

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
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ABSTRACT

After 2014 European elections, the latest survey data indicate that MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) have been becoming more polarized within the European Parliament than its predecessors. More MEPs have been placing themselves at the ends of either a more anti- or pro-integration spectrum than previous years. The flow of Eurosceptic MEPs appear to cause rather intensification and division of policy fondness for mainstream ones. Pro-integrationist MEPs seemed whether to respond in a harsh way or in reverse to address this Eurosceptic stream. In addition to this, external political and economic crisis have played the integral part of this phenomenon. Thus, European integration was put into a question even further. While the crisis has comprised further Eurosceptic sentiments, it has been proved that future integration in foreign policy is tried to be secured via institutional constrains on MEPs and other Eurosceptic actors. It is hard for opposition groups or individuals to create coherent foreign policy formation in order to defend their ideas. Therefore, while Eurosceptic political groups as well as non-attached MEPs in the European Parliament have strongly emphasised as an 'untidy' opposition, pro-European actors from mainstream political groups seemed having more compromises among themselves. While this thesis probed the relationship between growing numbers of Eurosceptic MEPs and their foreign policy choices, it has inquired whether those actors are exposed to formal or informal democratic constraints within the European Parliament. The thesis also paves the way to understand upcoming European elections via today's hardships in the European Parliament. The thesis concluded that Eurosceptic MEPs play 'soft' or inefficient role concerning foreign policy issues because they face some formal and informal institutional constraints in the EP. This situation has been examined with reference to the democratic deficit in European institutions, different voting behaviours, socialization process and social constructivism.

Key Words: European Parliament, Euroscepticism, European elections, Social Constructivism, Identity, Foreign Policy

ÖZET

2014 Avrupa seçimlerinden sonra, son anket verilerinin ışığında, Avrupa Parlamentosu üyelerinin seleflerinden daha fazla kutuplaştığı görülmektedir. Daha fazla Parlamento üyesi entegrasyon spektrumunda kendilerini önceki yıllardan daha karşıt ya da taraftar uçlarına yerleştirmiştir. Avrupa kuşkucu Parlamento üyeleri'nin varlığı, ana akım gruplar için azımsanamayacak siyasi yoğunlaşmalara ve ayrışmalara neden olmuştur. Entegrasyon yanlısı milletvekilleri, bu Avrupa kuşkucu akışa hitap etmek için sert bir şekilde yanıt vermek ya da tersine hareket ediyor gibi görünmektedirler. Buna ek olarak, dış politika ve ekonomik krizler bu fenomenin zeminini hazırlamışlardır. Böylece, Avrupa bütünleşmesi bir kez daha sorgulanır hale gelmiştir. Krizler daha fazla ayrışık duygulara yol açarken, gelecekteki dış politika entegrasyonunun Parlamenterler üzerindeki kurumsal kısıtlamalarla güvence altına alınmaya çalışıldığı görünmüştür. Hem Muhalif grupların hem de bireylerin fikirlerinin uzlaştığı tutarlı bir dış politika oluşumu zor görünmektedir. Bu nedenle, Avrupa Parlamentosu üyesi siyasi grupların yanı sıra bağımsız aktörler "düzensiz" bir muhalefet olarak güçlü bir şekilde lanse edilmektedir. Ancak, ana akım siyasi grup üyelerinin kendi aralarında daha fazla uzlaşma sağladığı görülmüştür. Bu tez, Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun önde gelen Parlamento üyeleri ve grupları ile Avrupa Birliği'nin dış politikası arasındaki ilişkiyi incelerken, aktörlerin Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki resmi veya gayri resmi demokratik kısıtlamalara maruz kaldıklarını sorgulamaktadır. Bu tez aynı zamanda Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun bugünkü zorluklarını yorumlayarak yaklaşan Avrupa seçimlerini anlama yolunu da açıyor. Tez, Avrupakuşkucu parlamento üyelerinin resmi ve gayri resmi bir takım kurumsal kısıtlamalarla karşı karşıya oldukları ve dış politika alanında 'yumuşak' veya etkisiz bir rol oynadıkları sonucuna varmaktadır. Bu durum Avrupa kurumlarındaki demokrasi açığına, farklı oy verme davranışlarına, sosyalizasyona ve toplumsal inşaacılığa atıfta bulunularak irdelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Parlamentosu, Avrupa şüpheciliği, Avrupa seçimleri,

Toplumsal inşacılık, Kimlik, Dış Politika

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFCO	**:**	Committee of Constitutional Affairs
AFET	**:**	Committee on Foreign Affairs
ALDE	**:**	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CFSP	**:**	Common Foreign and Security policy
CSDP	**:**	Common Security and Defence Policy
DF	**:**	Danish People's Party
EAF	**:**	European Alliance for Freedom
EB	**:**	Eurobarometer
EC	**:**	European Communities
ECR	**:**	European Conservatives and Reformists
Eds	**:**	Editors
EEAC	**:**	European External Action Service
EEC	**:**	European Economic Community
EFDD	**:**	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
EP	**:**	European Parliament
EPC	**:**	European Political Cooperation
EPP	**:**	European People's Party
EPRS	**:**	European Parliamentary Research Service
EU	**:**	European Union
EUSRs	**:**	European Union Special Representatives
F5M	**:**	Five Star Movements
EUGS	**:**	European Union Global Strategy
GUE-NGL	**:**	European United Left–Nordic Green Left
HR/VP	**:**	High Representative/Vice President
Ibid.	**:**	Ibidem
MEP	**:**	Member of the European Parliament
NF	**:**	National Front
NI	**:**	Non-Inscrits
NL	**:**	Northern League
NPD	**:**	National Democratic Party

Op. Cit.	**:**	Opus. Citatum
PESCO	**:**	Permanent Structured Cooperation
S&D	**:**	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SNS	**:**	Slovenian National Party
TEU	**:**	Treaty on European Union
TFUE	**:**	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TTIP	**:**	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UKIP	**:**	United Kingdom Independence Party
VB	**:**	Vlaams Belang
XA	**:**	Golden Down

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INTRODUCTION

Euroscepticism, unlike its previous understanding, has started to be perceived on various dimensions since the Maastricht Treaty came into existence. It is a result of how different actors perceive European integration while interpreting the public feelings. Seeking a common ground for both anti- and pro-Eurosceptic discourses is perceived as a threat towards the pace of European integration. Constructing this common ground further leads to suppressing those diverse voices without democratic tools.

Before the 1990s, the existence of opposition to the EC (European Community) and European integration was not a major study area due to the so-called 'permissive consensus.' The European public has been considered as disinterested in the topic of European integration because of this so-called 'permissive consensus.' However, with the advance of opposition paths, criticism and populism towards the EU (European Union) have showed the necessity of the studies related to this topic since the 1990s. Since then, conceptualizing and explaining public and party-based Euroscepticism became a more topical issue. Scholars (Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart, Catharina Sørensen, Cas Mudde, Nathalie Brack, Catherine E. De Vries and various NGOs.etc.) in the recent years indicate that, there is a burgeoning academic and social focus towards understanding of the scope and depth of rising Euroscepticism. Its dynamics in relationship with European Union Member States, their public perception and actors have had significant importance. However, there are not enough sources regarding to this phenomenon to be researched in supranational level.

The concepts of political, cultural, national and supranational concerns constitute the focal points for this thesis. Next, the rising Euroscepticism after the Maastricht Treaty will be the starting point of this work. Moreover, I put forward the social constructivist account in the centre of this work in order to focus on actors and their behaviours, identities and discourses. I then probe the attitudes of the MEPs in relation with foreign policy sphere. There are many reason to apply constructivist approach to explain foreign policy area such as interest and preferences of the actors who are involved in the decision making process; the transformative role of formal and informal factors in different social and institutional contexts (Torun, 2016, p. 162). Therefore, I focus on

one of the key supranational organ to probe those variables: The European Parliament (EP).

a. The Aim of the Study and Research Questions

This thesis argues that there are impacts on European Union's common foreign policy making and rising Euroscepticism through the EP's position. This study aims to show that to what extent they interact and influence each other. This beleaguered process may poses existential threat to the future integrations of the union and one of its supranational structure: The EP. Because of this reason the aim of the thesis, in other words, to explain how these phenomenon coalesce and be explained all together to cope with future disorders of the Union. In an effort to explain these relationships, I develop some hypotheses to explain what kind of threat and hardship might be waiting for the EU's future integration and elections in the new world order. The first hypothesis is as follows; there is a significant relation between Euroscepticism and EU's common foreign policy (independent variables) making *vis-à-vis.* The second hypothesis is that there is a negative effect of the institutional construction on anti-EU MEPs' behaviours aimed at constraining them. The final hypothesis is that even though there is no relationship between Euroscepticism and foreign policy sphere, nevertheless dissident MEPs may hinder those two subjects within the current crisis the EU faces, while assessing the MEPs' behaviours. Moreover, I address some set of sub-questions:

- Whether there is a relationship between MEPs, Euroscepticism and Foreign Policy or not;
- Whether MEPs are exposed formal/informal constrains in the EP or not;
- Whether MEPs play key role when the EU is taking foreign policy decisions or not;
- Whether MEPs constitute soft or hard power in the EP or not;
- What future democratic implications will be seen while assessing the EP's current position.

b. Methodology

Comparative and objective examination will be conducted while collecting mostly secondary sources (official documents, reports published by relevant organizations, think thank and projects outputs and previous interviews' informations). When the research questions are asked, the basic principle of cause and effect is determined whether the results and trends are seen in the research problem of this thesis. Furthermore, through literature review qualitative research method will be used in order to inquiry the relationships among the variables. Thus, a descriptive and unbiased observations will be undertaken.

c. Outline of the Study

In its theoretical background, this thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter of the thesis examines and presents the theoretical background of Euroscepticism in relation with constructivist perspective. Over the last 30 years, various European politics has been facing Euroscepticism as an integral part of the integration process. The Maastricht Treaty has paved the way for the severity of this problematic issue. It appears that anti-EU/Eurosceptic rhetoric needs major reforms while legitimacy of the Union is becoming implausible. This situation provides a good theoretical ground for the Eurosceptic behaviours in the EP together with an unprecedented anti-EU success and growing discontent among citizens. Due to the ever-growing Eurosceptic parties in national and international layers, these trends are not marginal or temporal any longer. Since the early 1970s the EP has become a place where the Eurosceptic MEPs increase their number in supranational level. This raises the questions about the EP's future image and impact whether MEPs pose threat or asset in terms of democratisation.

Therefore, the first chapter also examines the theoretical basis of Constructivism, through socialization process. It helps us inquire the democratic deficit in the EP concerning MEPs' interaction and foreign policy choices in the EP. Even though the Eurosceptics are usually considered to be outnumbered by the mainstream actors and parties, their attitudes and discourse are rather significant for the future of the Union. The findings will be evaluated all together within a constructivist perspective. The reason why

social constructivist theory will be used is because of the fact that constructivism concerns human developments. These human developments are socially situated and they define national and supranational elites' and public's perceptions and their foreign policy choices. In any national context or structure, ideas, identities and perceptions towards the EU are expected to have impact on the ultimate policy choices about Europe. Thus, the multidimensional continuum of research problem and the empirical results will confirm the fruitfulness of the theoretical approaches in this study. The degree of the framework of this work will be the socialisation process in the EP and constraints upon the Eurosceptic MEPs on foreign policy choices after the Maastricht structure. Those are the essential variables in order to understand this study due to the fact that the EU is inclined to block the oppositional Eurosceptic channel in the EP (Mair, 2007, p. 7). In other words, the Eurosceptic MEPs lack the institutionalised oppositional channel to sufficiently organise themselves.

Thus, the constructivist approach helps us see the institutional construction as a key tool to pinpoint behavioural activities, priorities, heterogeneities, core values and motivations of MEPs. Constructivist perspective can also contribute to determine MEPs' foreign policy choices and manoeuvres. There is an apparent interaction between the institutional framework, scope of individual activities and opportunities to express MEPs. Through examining these various data, an inference can be made about the Eurosceptic MEPs and their relevant foreign policy choices in the EP.

Due to the recent crisis in the EU the problem has become more severe. Populist and the Eurosceptic discourses came to existence more distinctly. Member States, now, are less willing to transfer their sovereignty to the common foreign policy area. The reason why the issue has become significant is that because the EU has evolved into a more complex and problematic political structure since the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Thereby the EU's foreign policy became a hub of conflicting actions and policies.

Especially after the post-Arab spring and migration crisis, Europe has started to confront significant external and internal challenges in the midst of the complicated political baseline in different regions. Jihadist threat has started to manifest its imminent challenges. Moreover, the striking example of 2014 European Parliament election

constitutes the triumph of the rising anti-EU parties and movements. Thus, the waxing populist tendencies and anti-trust towards European projects were strengthened. This negative trend became a thorn inside the union regarding effective foreign policy practices (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 2). Therefore, foreign policy of the Union needed to be tackled more effectively. The effects of further integration (deepening) fatigue not only hindered economic and financial fields but also made harder to forge common foreign policy decisions (Archick, 2017, p. 5). These unprecedented hardships obliged to do something altogether and be united across Europe.

Therefore, in the second chapter, the evolution of the concept of foreign policy making in the EU is briefly examined conceptually. The Maastricht Treaty will be the threshold point of the discussion. The main and current external challenges (Russia, the US, Southern neighbours, migration flows) of the Union will be assessed. Then, the findings which are obtained from examining foreign policy choices will be discussed within its decision making structure and Member States' diverse positions. The aim of this chapter is to show whether there is a relationship between the EU's common foreign policy making and rising Euroscepticism while examining the EP's and National Parliaments' positions. This chapter also aims to show to what extent those variables interact and are influenced by each other. The beleaguered interaction among these variables (Euroscepticism, MEPs, foreign policy and the EP) can pose existential threat to the future integrations of the Union and one of its supranational structure: The EP. Because of this reason, the aim of the thesis, in other words, is to explain how these phenomena coalesce and are evaluated all together in order to cope with the future disorders of the Union.

There is a tendency that the right-wing parties of Member States are becoming more dominant and they are likely to be Eurosceptic. Thus, the idea of the majority of the EP is becoming, mostly, right-weighted, populist and Eurosceptic. Therefore, in the final chapter, through the MEPs' voting behaviours, the creation of this study will expand its theoretical perspective to all phenomena with regard to future of the EU. The 2014 European elections, rising Eurosceptic MEPs in the EP, institutional constraints on MEPs and MEPs' voting behaviours within their room of manoeuvre will be examined. That is

why this thesis is planned to contribute to understand the current hardships as well as the discussions about upcoming European Elections.

I hope that this thesis is not only a contribution to better comprehend understanding relationship between the Eurosceptic MEPs and their effects on foreign policy sphere, but also, learning more about the public concerns, democratic deficit in the EU, the characteristics of the Eurosceptic MEPs and their perception of the European integration. In this study, I analyse collected survey data, interviews from various studies together with official documents by cross-validating them. It appears that if the enhanced role of the EP continues to evolve, new actors and policy issues are likely to make themselves felt in different policy areas where those actors intersect with Euroscepticism. The real action, theoretically and empirically, is where norms, discourses, language and material capabilities - with broader institutional contexts- interact with motivation, social learning and preferences. To put it another way, agent interests and their identites are shaped by the institutional interactions through social learning. However, the EU's impact of communication exchanges, socialization process and social learning on the EP are where I focus on in order to see how the Eurosceptic MEPs' identites, believes and interest are constructed.

1.EUROSCEPTICISM FROM SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

"Once we cannot organize opposition 'in' the EU, we are then almost forced to organize opposition 'to' the EU"

Peter Mair, 2007

In this chapter the historical background of Euroscepticism will be evaluated in line with the social constructivist perspective. By doing that, constructivist theory will position how ideas, beliefs and values shape the relationship between rising the Eurosceptic tendencies in the EP and European foreign policy decision making. The theory will present a holistic explanation for European integration studies and European governance. According to Risse (Risse, 2004, p. 147), social constructivists conceptualize institutions as social structures affecting actors and their behaviour directly or indirectly. In this regard, "Social learning involves a process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures), acquire new interests and preferences" (Christiansen, Jørgensen, & Wiener, 2001, p. 53). Therefore, the integration process cannot be minimised as unified political or institutional process. Thus, different sorts of European realities can be observed in different social structures (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 24).

The conceptual explanations of Euroscepticism will be analysed in line with the abovementioned definition hereinafter. A brief background and definition of the early Eurosceptic formations enable us to understand how this opposition has evolved, particularly from the early 1990s through 2014 European elections among MEPs in the EP prior to 2019 European elections. Foreign policy constitutes one of the concerning area about Euroscepticism. Therefore, in light of these inputs, the impact of the Eurosceptic politicians on foreign policy issues, both at national level and EU level, will indicate us an utmost importance. As the main focus of this chapter is the frame of Euroscepticism and constructivism, the most relevant foreign policy topics will be examined within the framework of those two phenomena. Since there is a considerable

relationship between public opinion, agents (the Eurosceptic actors, states or politicians) and structures (EU institutions, projects, societies, organizations or nation states - in the case of this study: the EP), the aim of this chapter is to examine the origins and theoretical base of Euroscepticism in order to give insightful knowledge to test of the hypothesis. Whether structures constrain or signify the birth of the Eurosceptic actors (the Eurosceptic MEPs) will be observed in this chapter.

1.1. Multiple Definitions of Euroscepticism

It is convenient to start with the definition and origin of Euroscepticism in order to grasp its holistic understanding and its evolution in relation with common foreign policy. Therefore, this section seeks not only to conceptualize, but also to explain this phenomenon. There have been several scholars who attempted to define it. Many definitions to some extent are comparable with similar sketches in the literature. However, "different dynamics, experiences or facts are important in the formation of different types of Euroscepticism" (Jorgensen & Ünal, 2017, p. 63). In this manner, they are all intersecting phenomena because of the fact that those dynamics apply to both agency and structure sides. Therefore, the scope of Euroscepticism needs far-reaching analysis for the integration process. In other words, it is needless to speak of a single European scepticism because it interacts with the dynamics of each national context and manifests itself in different ways in Member States. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the question of "What kind of Europe?" has begun to make the Member States more engaged in their public opinion (Connelly, 2015, p. 60). This question points to the fact that Euroscepticism is not a new guise compared to previous populist discussions. However, due to the complex structure of the EU, Euroscepticism cannot be indicated with certain cultural variables, nation-states or specific geography. Therefore, its impact varies to each Member State quite differently (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 155).

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism is in tendency to be used as a simple generic, which refers to opposition, reluctance, distrust or doubt as adversely towards the path chosen for European integration (Aphecetche, 2016). Most scholars agree that the

worsening of economic conditions and globalization[1] are the main reasons for the rise of the Eurosceptic parties across Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no single or concrete definition commonly accepted for Euroscepticism, according to Taggart and Szczerbiak, two types of Euroscepticism can be categorised: Hard and soft (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). Table 1 and Table 2 indicate the diversification of the numbers of the hard and the soft Eurosceptic parties in the EP. 'Hard' and 'soft' Eurosceptic parties have been existing in almost all Member States. 'Hard' or 'radical' Euroscepticism means a principled rejection against almost every policy domain about the EU such as co-operation, economic and political integration with the emphasis of distress of transferring local authorities into the EU. On the contrary, the 'soft' one can be considered as more moderate.

Table 1. Soft Eurosceptic Parties in the EP

Soft Eurosceptics	7 – The Left (DE) 6 – United Left (ES) 6 – Syriza (GR) 5 – Podemos (ES) 4 – Left Front (FR) 3 – Communist Party (CZ) 3 – Sinn Fèin (IE) 3 – The Other Europe (IT) 3 – Democratic Unitarian Coalition (PT) 2 – Progressive Party of Working People (CY) 2 – Socialist Party (NL) 1 – Left Alliance (FI) 1 – Socialist Party of Latvia (LV) 1 – Left Bloc (PT) 1 – Left Party (SE) 1 – Sinn Fèin (UK) **Sum: 49 seats**	17 – Five Star Movement (IT) **Sum: 17 seats**	20 – Conservative Party (UK) 18 – Law and Justice (PL) 7 – Alternative for Germany (DE) 2 – Civic Democratic Party (CZ) 1 – Party of Rights A. Starčević (HR) 1 – Democratic Unionist Party (UK) 1 – Electoral Action of Poles (LT) 1 – National Alliance (LV) 1 – Christian Union (NL) 1 – Nova (SK) 1 – Ordinary People (SK) **Sum: 54 seats**

Notes: Seat share of hard Eurosceptic parties: 92 of 751 seats: 12.3 per cent.
Seat share of soft Eurosceptic parties: 120 of 751 seats: 16.0 per cent.
Seat share of all Eurosceptic parties: 212 of 751 seats: 28.3 per cent.
Parties were classified on the basis of internet-based research on their main programmatic stances.
Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Parliament_election,_2014 (accessed: 10 June 2018).
http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/seats-member-state-absolut.html (accessed: 10 June 2018).

On the other hand, Kopecký and Muddle suggest four dimensional categorisations which Taggart and Szczerbiak criticise. They offer four ideal types for the

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[1] Globalization can be divided into two: The 'winners' and the 'losers' of globalisation. Mainstream parties can be considered as winners and the peripheries are mostly the losers.

phenomenon related to the Member State's differentiated support towards integration and ideological understanding: *Euroenthusiasts, Eurorejects, Eurosceptics,* and *Europragmatics* (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, pp. 300-301). This typology is more complicated and precise (needs several detailed inputs), whereas harder to be operationalised than what Taggart and Szczerbiak have suggested. Yet, this typology constitutes one of the main conceptualisations. Another typology comes from Nicolò Conti. He extends those typologies with two more definitions: functional and identity Europeanism (Conti, 2003, pp. 1-41). In that sense, if it is delved into the meaning more, it can be seen that the objections towards the values of the EU vary deeply (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, p. 255). Therefore, I apply hard and soft Eurosceptic division for this study in favour of limiting the issue.

Table 2. Hard Eurosceptic Parties in the EP

	Radical Left	Centrist	Moderate Right	Radical Right
Hard Eurosceptics	2 – Communist Party (GR) **Sum: 2 seats**	1 – People's Movement against the EU (DK) **Sum: 1 seat**	24 – Ukip (UK) 4 – Danish People's Party (DK) 2 – Finns Party (FI) 2 Order and Justice (LT) 1 – Party of Free Citizens (CZ) 1 – Independent Greeks (GR) 1 – Reformed Political Party (NL) **Sum: 34 seats**	24 – National Front (FR) 5 – Lega Nord (IT) 4 – Freedom Party (AT) 4 – Party for Freedom (NL) 4 – Congress of the New Right (PL) 3 – Golden Dawn (GR) 3 – Jobbik (HU) 2 – Bulgaria without Censorship (BG) 2 – Sweden Democrats (SE) 1 – Vlaams Belang (BE) 1 – National Democratic Party (DE) 1 – Right Wing of the Republic (PL) **Sum: 55 seats**

Notes: Seat share of hard Eurosceptic parties: 92 of 751 seats: 12.3 per cent.
Seat share of soft Eurosceptic parties: 120 of 751 seats: 16.0 per cent.
Seat share of all Eurosceptic parties: 212 of 751 seats: 28.3 per cent.
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http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/seats-member-state-absolut.html (accessed: 10 June 2018)

The main concern of hard Euroscepticism is not economic interests. Examining Spain and the UK, it can be seen that Spain is one of the countries that which has been affected by the Euro crisis. However, Spain did not hold a referendum on leaving the

Union unlike the UK which was not affected by the Euro crisis but decided to leave the EU. The reasons indicate different levels of EU policy and regime evaluations for those countries (De Vries, 2018, pp. 23-25). In other words, the sovereignty of the Member States matter considerably. Some Member States are inclined to perceive the EU institutions and overall policy outputs as if they are "anti-democratic and impossible to reform" (Brack, 2013a, p. 91). Especially the non-EU western countries –such as Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland– show more Eurosceptic attitudes due to these reasons. Another reason why those countries are labelled as hard Eurosceptic is because of the fact that nearly all the Icelandic, Norwegian and Swiss Eurosceptic parties' opposition comes from their existential stance against the EU membership (Skinner, 2013, p. 126). Those countries see themselves better off outside the EU.

Whereas in the cases of already-EU-members –such as United Kingdom (The UK), Denmark and Sweden– the Eurosceptic attitudes come from rejecting the common currency and some policy involvements (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 53), which refers to both 'soft' and 'hard'. Hence, by contrast with hard Euroscepticsim, 'soft' Euroscepticism, in principle, does not express a mere opposition. However, it confirms some current, contingent, qualified or future discontent and deficiencies of particular integration and policies. The soft Eurosceptic oppositions can basically be explained by further competencies that the Union is gradually having. It occurs mostly in a policy-oriented manner. Thus, the conceptual weakness of these divisions lead us to make blurred and unclear assumption in practice. Catherine E. De Vries divides the classification into four as follows: soft right, soft left, hard right and hard left Eurosceptic. According to De Vries, hard scepticism mostly comes from right-wing political groups or actors unlike the left side (De Vries, 2018, p. 142). However, there are a number of different sub-classifications which complement the understanding in different kinds of Euroscepticism: Identity based (national identity versus European identity), cleavage based (labour versus capital etc.), policy based (against to particular policies), institutionally based (high legitimacy versus low legitimacy problem), national interest based (European goals versus national goals), experience based (asymmetric negotiation process), party based (features of charismatic party leaders), Atlantic based (pro-European versus pro-American) and practice based (different practices of acquis

communautaire) Euroscepticism (Riishøj, 2010, pp. 14-15). In addition to these classifications, Catharina Sørensen (Sørensen, 2008) from the Danish Institute for International Studies explain the phenomenon from different classifications;

1. "Euroscepticism can assume an economic character,
2. Euroscepticism can be sovereignty-based,
3. Democratic Euroscepticism and
4. Political (Social) Euroscepticism" (Sørensen, 2008, p. 101).

As it was boiled down above, Euroscepticism has key relation to political, economic, social and democratic variables according to Sørensen. From this point of view, Sørensen further focuses on the call for a more social Europe, whereas Marianne Sundlisæter Skinner follows the concept of post materialist values of social Europe such as equality, environment and solidarity (Skinner, 2013, p. 128). See Table 3. for different typologies of Euroscepticism.

In addition to them, two different schools (Sussex and North Carolina) also put different explanations according to their distinct epistemological and ontological understandings about the social and political reality. While Sussex school emphasizes more on nation-specific characteristics and parties' position that explain the party strategies, election culture, party system and competitors, in short partisan competitions; North Caroline school focuses on, instead, socio-economic divisions on the EU integration (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 156). However, recent studies demonstrate that the influence is reciprocal while investigating the connection between party positioning and the Eurosceptic public opinion: both parties/political elites and public have capacity to shape each other in response to their social and political environment (Brack, 2018, p. 56).

Table 3. Three Different Typologies of Euroscepticism

	Economic	Political	Left-wing values	Cultural	Right-wing values	Rural values
Sørensen (2008)	Utilitarian	Sovereignty-based Democratic	Social			
Leconte (2010)	Utilitarian	Political		Cultural	Value-based	
Skinner (2012)	Utilitarian	Political culture	Postmaterialist values	National identity		Rural society

Source: Marianne Sundlisæter Skinner, "Different Varieties of Euroscepticism? Conceptualizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-Member States", *JCMS*, 2013, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 128.

Unfortunately it is not possible to apply the independent variable one hundred per cent into a single categorization. As far as I compiled from various sources, these are the ones that have been researched hitherto which show the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon to describe it.

To put it simply, in a holistic way, constructivism is to show the relationship between ideas, structures (for instance, the European Council meeting, the EP or the EU in general), identities, values and beliefs which are highly related to those economic, political and democratic variables to describe Euroscepticism. Cultural and identity-based Euroscepticism is what comprises political Euroscepticism in this study. Moreover, "the historical development of a country's political institutions plays a very important part in the national identity of its citizens and political actors" (Skinner, 2013, p. 135). Therefore, the identities and values have been constituted a basis for the Eurosceptic interests.

1.1.1. Scepticism or Dissatisfaction

Scepticism or dissatisfaction towards the EU's aims and actions are coupled with the protection of national sovereignty, national heartland, local values and opposition to elite consensus. Insomuch as the European integration process is pushed as an elite project, the clarification of scepticism or dissatisfaction is needed. Especially, after the

Member States' reaction towards 2008 sovereign debt crisis, these phenomena have become more prone.

Being a sceptic is often mistaken with opposition, whereas from its historical roots (from ancient Greek), scepticism means that 'observer' or 'examiner' who has reasonable doubts (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 52). Those definitions cause other challenges to diversify the root causes. In the case of Europe, the word became a measurement for the biggest challenges. Naturally, pro or con theses on the EU integration are the core factors defining the debates over Euroscepticism in both Member States level and the Union level. "The word Eurosceptic is a neologism quickly and definitively adopted, which, according to Larousse dictionary as a noun or adjective, denotes or characterizes a person who doubts the viability or usefulness of the European Union" (Le Petit Larousse, 2011, p.101) (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 53).

1.1.2.Different Bases of Euroscepticism

Because of aforementioned reasons, the phenomenon is not straightforward to grasp. "Thus, no coherent theory exists that details what Euroscepticism is, or why, when and how it occurs and develops" (Sørensen, 2008, p. 6).

To go back to Sørensen's four different definitions that were listed above, the first type of Euroscepticism is related to money-based calculations, perceiving and seeking the benefits of the co-operations. Second one is sovereignty-based which refer to the multitude and complex supranational co-operations (this may appear even though there are no economic problems). In this type of Euroscepticism, cooperation should not jeopardise and challenge the national sovereignties. The third type of Euroscepticism accounts for the shortcomings of the democratic representation (democratic deficit in the EU structure) and political set-up (decision mechanism). Finally the last one is the political scepticism which has been expounded in different national political cleavages. (Sørensen, 2008, p. 8).

Nevertheless, for the sake of the inductive conceptual framework of this thesis, it can be called just 'Eurosceptic' in general in order to limit the research area. Euroscepticism differs intensively when it is focused on the different political targets. The definition may lead to more than one phenomenon such as being 'cynical, distrustful or politically alienated' towards the EU or political elites. Therefore, it can be said that there are differentiated considerations that take shelter behind "the Eurosceptic" guise which determines different effects (Wessels, 2007, p. 287). There is a dual dimensional conceptualisation in this regard. First, the target groups and the Eurosceptics are the main discontent towards accelerated integration process of the EU. Secondly, the division of this axis is rather clear in relation to the authorities, politicians, governments, regime and their reflexivity. Thus, populist actors play a key role in this relation towards the EU performance and politics.

1.2. The Role of Populist Leaders Affecting Public Perceptions

The Eurosceptic leaders may resemble each other in some discourses. For instance, they blame the migration flow to Europe by claiming that new comers are taking jobs from locals and reducing the wages; they mention sovereignty and independence issues in terms of foreign policy; they worry about their political institutions in terms of direct democracy or erosion of national values; they point out anti-globalization camp or unemployment; finally they may defend anti-elite sentiments or ruling classes (De Vries, 2018, p. 176; Skinner, 2013, p. 130). According to Mudde, those discourses can be both real and imagined enemies (Mudde, 2015). Yet, researches show that while the political actors' concerns are mostly protection of national interests and safety, the public demands can be considered as more democracy base because of the elite-citizen gap (De Wilde, Michailidou, & Jörg, 2014, pp. 766-783). Whereas, the populist or the Eurosceptic parties are not monolithic. "The degree of being sceptic vary widely among them and they hold a range of different views on the future of the EU" regarding to what extent they are willing to relinquish their sovereignty under the supranational body (Archick, 2017, p. 6). Therefore, Eurosceptic or populists -distinct or latent- have great impact on chancing the attitudes of public and generate the feelings staidly. Furthermore, the public does not have

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a fixed opinion. Generally, the public has ambivalent ideas towards the Union. Hence, the populist/non-populist politicians top into the public perception regularly. They concentrate on emotions (which is a growing interest) and negative election commercials. (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, pp. 252-254) (Holtz-Bacha, Novelli, & Rafter, 2017, p. 93).

> As citizens are generally uninformed about the EU, their political opinions are strongly influenced by the domestic political context. In this manner, attitudes toward supranational actors and institutions can simply be transferred from the national establishment to the European political class and from national institutions to the EU-level (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, p. 264).

The reason why public Euroscepticism occurs as a cumulative force is due to the fact that specific attitudes towards both domestic regime and the EU institutions are imposed by those Eurosceptic actor behaviours and discourses (Buturoiu, 2014, p. 43). The political elite draws a divided picture on European integration. In that manner, populists play their key roles by taking side with the ideas of the citizens and convert them in line with homogeneous communities' against the EU or its policies. Regarding to this, identities play a crucial role to shape institutions and public reciprocally. Populists and Eurosceptics, to a certain degree, "attack politics as usual, since they see differences between government and opposition" (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, p. 264). In the case of CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) they see a direct threat towards democratic policy making in this specific institutional element. They voice the presence of the incumbent minority elite malformation that downgrade democracy in Nation States. As relevant to this, having phobia of deprivation of sovereignty is directly seen as the rights of citizens and democracy (Smits, 2010, p. 69). Therefore, populist parties' rhetoric is opposite to the Union's motto which is *'United in diversity.'* They do this by boosting merely created discontent and altering the observations for the citizens.

Nonetheless, ranging from distinctive explanation, some of the Eurosceptic actors may have a particular opponent ideas that can be changed in course of time. For instance, some people may become 'Eurodistrust' who has/had big frustration of a policy failure or over a project such as European currency. Therefore, "Euroscepticism has become the price the EU pays when governments fail to fulfil their side of the bargain" (Hooghe & Marks, 2007, p. 124). Unlike Cynicism and alienation, being sceptic and

distrustful or opponent are reconcilable terms that can be influenced by the political actors or policy changes. Being sceptic and distrustful can be understood as a "continuum that ranges from very positive to very negative dispositions towards European integration, its policies, its institutions, or its principles" (Hooghe & Marks, 2007, p. 120). Moreover, it is good to indicate that the term itself can be shaped differently with differentiation of the actors as well – for example vote-seeking or policy-seeking actors.

Having determined Euroscepticism ranges from one Member State to another considerably. Each Member State, their political actors and public have variety of expectations from the integration process. However, the particular focus of this thesis is whether or not the Eurosceptic tendencies occur in relation with European foreign policy in the EP. In other words, whether the influence of the MEPs from different backgrounds in their opposing behaviours towards the EU foreign policy matters considerably or not. Naturally, not all the EU policies are likely to be supported by everyone due to the divergent multitude of opinions. However, how the opposition comes to existence might constitute key point with regard to the EU's future integration.

The invention of bureaucracy within the Europe, bypassing the nation states' impact at supranational level basically decrease the tolerance of nation states towards creating common foreign policy initiatives. Populist leaders or politicians often point out this bureaucratic super-state model which diminishes national autonomy in an undemocratic manner. Therefore, "narrow national agendas are taking priority over European-wide solutions" (Archick, 2017, p. 7). Consequently, the very straightforward common composition may become the stand against Communitarian Method (or *status quo)* of the Union (Aphecetche, 2016). From that point, an inference can be made that Euroscepticism should not be understood only as a 'touchstone of dissent' (Taggart, 1998) towards European polity but as a systemic oppositional attitude against the integration project, process and their legitimacies together with political demands.

Legitimacy is rather important to distinguish rightful or permissible political acts. From constructivist perspective, actors try to gain legitimacy in their own social community by shared norms and values. Additionally, they commit themselves to promote these norms and values together with the Community's legitimacy and their self-

interest. Having that legitimacy gives them a political and bargaining power to affect outcomes (Sienkiewicz, 2003, p. 117). They, then, can start to manipulate the public by using the Eurosceptic rhetoric "to manipulate and downplay community norms and values" (Sienkiewicz, 2003, p. 118). 'Discourses' are important in their quest for legitimacy. "Their speech acts underline the structures of argumentation, or discursive power structures" (Checkel, 2006, p. 3). Populist leaders assign a good deal of significance to its power. Unlike limited scope of rationalist approach, these communication acts constitute constructivist norms which have insightful sources towards actors' behaviours while they create Euroscepticism (Richmond, 2014).

1.3. The Historical Roots of Euroscepticism

In the evaluations made about the EU, it is frequently encountered as "an economic giant and a political dwarf" (Ermağan, 2012, p. 146). As it also constitutes the starting point of this thesis, since the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, the Union has started to face great political difficulties. It gained significant importance not only because of the economic issues, but also in the political discourses. The Treaty shed light on the new term which reveals the end of permissive elite consensus regarding European integration. That is why signing of the Maastricht Treaty take us one step forward to evaluate Euroscepticism. In other words, it is necessary to claim that the emergence of the political construction of Europe and the concept of scepticism show parallelism to each other. A number of specific policy areas comprise Member States' shared sovereignties in which the EU possesses executive power and authority. Over the years that the Union evolved to more political entity, nation states have sought to take a stance for more common political issues (Archick, 2017, p. 1). For this reason, the sentence quoted above, which refers to the economic base of the phenomenon of scepticism, is incomplete in order to observe the whole picture.

Nowadays, social and economic phenomena has become rather a political reality. Today, the socio-economic welfare is not a solid determinant unlike in the pre-Maastricht era. Since the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in

1957 with the 'Big Six' (or inner six: founding members of the EU), being sceptical has been felt in speeches exponentially. Hence, in the early Maastricht Treaty years, scepticism has increased its pace in the integration process. Therefore, since the very beginning of the European integration history, Euroscepticism has maintained its usual place within the discussions. However, following the Maastricht era, Euroscepticism has increased its importance with the rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 by France and the Netherlands – which paved the way for further opt-outs such as the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 (Vasilopoulou, 2013, pp. 160-161). However, this opposition can be embedded and seen as persistent, at both European and national levels. This nested affiliation has considerable consequences for the future of the Union. Monica Condruz-Bacescu expresses this as follows;

> The Union started to be regarded as lacking legitimacy, which made its action to be labelled as having a serious democratic deficit. Polls have shown a decline in public support for European integration. Regarding the direction this project is heading, it seems to be a gap between population and political elite. This situation has given rise to the concept of Euroscepticism (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 54).

According to her, the situation became rather severe after the rejection of the constitution by France and the Netherlands. Criticisms on integration were generally shaped by economic gains like aforementioned reasons. For example, between 1973 and 1988, the growth of intra-European exports played a crucial role in identifying support for the European integration (Ermağan, 2012, p. 149). However, supranational integration, intergovernmental bargaining and inclusion of three new countries (United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland) in 1973 revealed division between parties. Unsurprisingly, increasing relationship between Euroscepticism and deepening foreign policy went parallel to a dramatic decrease in the public support during 1980s and early 1990s- which led to the period of "Post-Maastricht Blues" in the literature. Thereafter, the monetary union, social security and, specifically, foreign policy have become dominant topics of the phenomenon (Ermağan, 2012, p. 149).

Jacques Delors' ambitions to build economically and politically ever-closer union was criticized by Margaret Thatcher's long-familiar Bruges speech on defending Europe as a family for nations rather than a super state governed by Brussels. This has

been considered as a key founding opposition towards European integration, European political union and a common foreign and security policy. Afterwards, this sudden opposition has started to crystallize itself in many mainstream policies (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 3) (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 158). Being sceptic was perceived as a British syndrome initially, however, this syndrome has exceeded to the whole continent nowadays. Quoting from Bernhard Wessels, Ermağan says that;

> Both 1992 and the post-2004 period can be summarized as, which is perceived as "risk" and "threat" in the peoples dimension as the institutional jurisdictions of the EU expand and the decisions taken by the EU bodies deepen their commitment to the daily lives of the citizens of the Member States (Ermağan, 2012, p. 150).

This passage indicates that especially after the treaty of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Laeken summit objectives (confirmation of deepening projection of the integration)[2] (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 164) and finally the Lisbon structure, the severity of the situation has increased steadily and beset by obstacles. More specifically, it is worth pointing out that;

> Maastricht acted as a pivotal point as the raised profile and salience of the EU allowed opportunistic politicians and leaders willing to mobilize public opposition to obtain national draw from the European issue. Pan-European co-operation begins between nationally organized sceptical interest groups, springing from shared adversity and common threats, drawing in groups where opposition might have previously been only latent and/or inopportune. In short, Maastricht acted as a catalyst as Euroscepticism spread across the EU, both in terms of political parties and in terms of public opinion (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 4).

In short, the Union faced up a significant opposition which became increasingly embodied both at European level and national level. The EU was "perceived to have become a too complex political project" (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 54). 'People of the Union' and even the political elites felt as if the EU was getting away from the

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[2] **Laeken Summit** took place 15 December 2001 to redraft the important decisions regarding to creation of more integrated EU policies mainly in the following areas: legislation, decision making procedures, Internal security and justice and the first essential steps towards a common European security and defence policy that was mentioned in Nice and before. It was considered as a milestone on the future of the EU beneath the rather unstable global order. It was aimed to give tangible solutions to what was put forward in Nice Treaty. Source: https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/the-laeken-summit-a-milestone-for-europe/ (accessed 15.03.2018)

institutional decisions. It should be noted that, within this framework, voiceless public opinion during the 1990s has begun to differentiate the course of Euroscepticism along with developments having close impact on their daily life.

Even though it is hard to agree that there is no *a priori* reason for the existing Euroscepticism, the Maastricht Treaty has led Euroscepticism more questionable and attached to the integration (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 2). After that, this shift has been triggered by sovereign debt crisis, future enlargements, Eurozone crisis and migration crisis as key part of foreign and security policies.

1.4. Social Constructivist Perspective of Euroscepticism

During the 1990s social constructivism has involved in the studies of the EU integration. Until that time, realism / neorealism and institutional neoliberal / neoliberal views have dominated the international relations theories, which can generally be called as rationalist theories. However, the constructivist approach rebuffed those approaches which are in favour of material values. What constructivism entails is a basis for social ontological features for the European integration studies. Under this title, this theory will be correlated with Euroscepticism. By doing that, whether socialization and identity-shaping effects on agents are valid or not since the beginning of the Euroscepticism will be examined.

Social constructivism claims that social truism has not fallen from heaven. However, social actors, politicians – the so called 'agents'- have created and reproduced it through their daily practices. Societies are built by those actors' behaviours simultaneously. Identity, interests and beliefs of actors are socially constructed via the interpretation of reality. In this interaction, the social rules link all agents to each other along with institutional structures. Communication and language play key roles. Learning and argumentation process can be the example for institutional socialisation within the EU (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001, p. 221). All these processes give meanings to social contexts/structures. Yet, because of the vague definition of social constructivist

theoretical framework, further description is needed to grasp it correctly. That is why it is better to emphasize social ontology together with the phenomenon.

Social constructivism claims that identities of actors are socially constructed and 'change' is possible within the social norms. This is the fundamental insight of the problem to explain the relationship between agents and structure in terms of existing Euroscepticism. The chief point lies behind this agency (represent the free will of making social changes) and structure axis when they interact and mutually constitute each other. Agencies can be implied as the ability of people to act, while structure refers to the system, institutions or international sphere which consists of material and ideational elements (McGlinchey, Walters, & Scheinpflug, 2017, p. 37).

In social constructivist theory 'mutual constitutiveness of the social structure' has key importance (Risse, 2004, p. 145). According to Checkel; "the real action, theoretically and empirically, is where norms, discourses, language and material capabilities interact with motivation, social learning and preferences" (Checkel, 2001, p. 62). In the context of this thesis, it is European foreign policy formation and the Eurosceptic actors (MEPs) that interact within the EP structure.

**Figure 1. Interaction in the EU from Constructivist Perspective**

Source: Author's own calculations.

Alexander Wendt is the founding father of social constructivist theory. According to Wendt, states are the centre-point of this theory. He notes that it is necessary

to use positivist epistemology as well as ontology at the same time. That is why social constructivism partly acknowledges the existence of objective world in confirming the patterns of realistic perspective. However, Wendt also limits the idea by stressing the independent objective world as not being on its own (Guzzini & Leander, 2005). In this context, social constructivism intersects with other positivist theories in terms of state and state-centric actors.

Figure 2. Interaction in Constructivism

Source: Author's own calculations

Therefore, even though some constructivists share some key common features, they may also be separated from each other. For instance, while conventional constructivists usually ask 'what'-type questions such as 'what causes an actor to act like this'. On the other hand, the critical constructivists ask 'why'-type questions related to identities (McGlinchey, Walters, & Scheinpflug, 2017, pp. 38-39). Most constructivists position themselves in to the middle of those two question types.

The reason why social constructivism was adopted into Euroscepticism is because of the fact that social constructivism was included in the EU integration studies in the late 1990s likewise the Maastricht Treaty. Relatedly, the new foreign policy structure of the Maastricht was thought as one of the 'structures' that interact with 'agents' behaviour which are nation states or in very individual cases: public or MEPs.

This 'agency' and 'structure' relation codetermines each other because there are not autonomous and fixed -*a priori* –interests in this relation. From this point of view, the

focus will predominantly be on political parties and actors in the EP. Their attitudes, discourses and acts play a key role in relation with their interaction in the EP. In other words, the theory is based on the understanding that knowledge is created at the institutional level as a result of the interactions of individuals. Thus, it can be described as 'interactions in structures' which means a designation of societal relationships and conflicts (Richmond, 2014). Within this societal interaction, political elites often try to manipulate the public with their own preferred values and norms.

According to Risse, "research inspired by social constructivism substantially contributes to European integration studies theoretically" (Risse, 2004, p. 144). Regarding European integration, the Eurosceptic tendencies have evolved from this relation. The more desire creating ever-closer and integrated Union, the more opposition and dissents have come to existence.

Even though there is a big debate about what distinguishes constructivism from the other theories, according to Checkel "social construction, a growing literature in contemporary international relations (IR), can help students of integration to theorize and explore empirically neglected questions of interest and identity" (Checkel, 2001, p. 50). Checkel's approach can be considered as a 'middle ground' study which means that constructivism positions itself in between rational choice and postmodernism. However, this is partly criticized by Steve Smith. According to Smith, Checkel's approach constitutes rather a 'rationalist' perspective than 'reflectivist' in his article (Smith S. , p. 191).

Based on the assumptions of the constructivist theory, the perception of reality (accepted as constructed by human activity), production of knowledge (socially and culturally constructed human product) and learning process (socially engagement) distinguish the theory from the others and fits into this thesis (Beaumie, 2001). Because of the fact that Euroscepticism occurs when actors socially interact within certain structures, in contemporary European studies constructivism has a better explanation to understand the institutional structure. It should be noted that individuals do not exist discretely from their environments. Moreover, there cannot be any exogenously given *a priori* structure. As Andrew Hurrell argues: "Instead of focusing solely on material

incentives, constructivists emphasize the importance of shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces, normative and institutional structures" (Hurrell, 1995, p. 64).

Social structures from a constructivist perspective therefore create a collective identity and thus influence the coexistent beliefs, interests, identities and values of individuals. These values can be specifiable by asking following questions: "how identities interact with material incentives" or "how actors interpret their social context because their perceptions influence their behaviour" (Risse, 2004, p. 146) (Sienkiewicz, 2003, p. 115). Because actor preferences are not given in this social structure, it is not possible to apply liberal intergovernmentalism for this theory. Neo-functionalists theory either fails to improve the significant agent-centred view of social interaction although the strong reference to identity formation and change (Checkel, 2001, p. 62). When examining neo-liberalism, it can be observed that the importance of material interests is over emphasised where the importance of values, norms or identities in the interaction between actors is lacking (Sienkiewicz, 2003, p. 115). Rationalist approach also falls short of fixing the problem of rigid and fixed structural understanding. In addition to this, rationalism fails to enhance the institutional conception (Richmond, 2014). Besides, it focuses on the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy area, which in reverse I focus on its supranational nature in the EP.

The logic of consequences posits fixed preferences and identities but unlike this, the logic of appropriateness (behaving or acting in compliance with what is told as a right thing in a given structure) entails the theoretical framework of this thesis. It shows that actors try to figure out the appropriate rules in a given social situation (Sending, 2002). Accordingly, social institutions and structures, in the example of the EU and its bodies, become 'internal' to actors (Risse, 2004, p. 148). According to Risse: "Constructivists concentrate on the social identities of actors in order to account for their interests. Constructivism maintains that collective norms and understandings define the basic 'rules of the game' in which they find themselves in their interactions" (Risse, 2004, p. 148).

To understand the relationship between this approach and the formation of Euroscepticism, it is better to look at different attitudes towards European integration, which is highly related to the Eurosceptic standpoint. For Checkel;

Much social interaction involves dynamics of learning and socialization, where the behaviour of individuals and states comes to be governed by certain logics of appropriateness (informal communication in working groups of the Council of Ministers or European-level policy networks centred on the Commission) (Checkel, 2001, p. 52).

Groups from both sides – European and national – interact with each other and shape those biases, policies and ideas mutually. The outcome of this interaction stems from how actors learn the preceding interaction. This interaction further proceeds by preferences and actors' identities and interests. That is why Checkel says that "institutions constitute actors and their interests reciprocally" (Checkel, 2001, p. 51). As Checkel refers to linguistic methods to distinguish interpretive constructivism (Checkel, 2001, p. 2), Thomas Diez also refers to the relationship between language and norms. He basically probes the role of the language.

According to Diez, languages and discourses are more than a sum of individualistic acts, but they have structural quality:

My attempt (…) is to make a case for the importance of the language in the process of European integration. By way of three moves (Austinian, Faucauldian and Derridarian), I argued that language does more than describe; that all our accounts for the world (and thus of European governance) are embedded in certain discourses; that the meaning of words is depending on their discursive context; that this context is not rigid but in contrast, if only slow, flux; and that the recent transformations of the discursive context enable the construction of Europe as a network (Diez, 1999, p. 10).

Steve Smith agrees with what Diez points out in his articles as follows;

The role of language in constructing the EU. (….) Discussions on the EU are not simply descriptions of an existing reality but are instead part of the process of constructing that reality; as such these cannot be non-political discussions. (….) interests are inseparable from the discursive context in which they emerge (Smith S. , p. 193).

Thus in the context of foreign policy area when the EU takes decisions, these decisions should reflect both the community's common norms and also the very individual states' discursive norms simultaneously. However, "a norm only becomes an expected behaviour when a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt and internalise it

in their own practices" (McGlinchey, Walters, & Scheinpflug, 2017, p. 38). Therefore, the adoption of norms greatly varies for different actors and the states that have divergent historical backgrounds. At this point the following questions might be asked again: how these norms are constructed at the European level and how these norms interact with different levels. To answer these questions, it is crucial to know the understanding of social learning, discourses and broader normative beliefs.

Checkel refers to 'Interpretive constructivism' to indicate 'how possible' questions. For this approach, "deeply inductive research strategy targets the reconstruction of state/agent identity, with the methods encompassing a variety of discourse-theoretic techniques" (Checkel, 2004, p. 231). In order to evaluate this process and outcomes Checkel pointed out, the main method is using process-tracing.[3] Process-tracing breaks down fixed preferences and engages in cognitive information search (Checkel, 2001, p. 57). The quest of process-tracing method in understanding domestic identities and norms also can go along with foreign policy making (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007, p. 172).

It should be noted that these diverse informations and discourses feed the the Eurosceptic movements eventually when there is a conflict of interests which occur in the common ideas and identities. Hereby, not only social learning, but also societal pressure leads to norm empowerment, according to Checkel (Checkel, 2001, p. 58). Different arguments constitute different ideas and if they are put all together, it is highly likely that the more valid argument overrides. Therefore, when the argumentation is better, it gains more power to have impact on the policies. Then this can shape the direction of Euroscepticism across Europe by combining the actors and the structures.

In his work, Checkel comes up with the arguments explaining when exactly the social learning process occurs;

> Social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds – for example, where all/most group members are lawyers or, say, European central bankers [or MEPs]. Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and

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[3] A strategy of qualitative analysis in social sciences.

incontrovertible evidence of policy failure. Social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants. Social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure (Checkel, 2001, p. 54).

From above point of view, the variables that are used efficiently, signalize the social learning process. The EU institutions and their identities are relatively young compared to individual nation state identities and values. Therefore, the problem is not only how institutions affect the actors from those social interaction, but also whether entrenched national identities prevail some set of amplified values or norms that could trigger Euroscepticism or not. Again, these incidences may occur, for instance, when there are crises or policy failures in foreign policy area (Willis, 2017). According to Usherwood *et al.* (2013) the more inclusive initiatives are implemented, the more disturbance towards those initiatives generally spring up. This is regarding to the "communication defects [malfunctions] in EU's values, but also grounded in a bloc of active opposition within both public and political layers" (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 2). This opposition bloc is always watchful to show its concerns and fears. However, there is one certain thing according to constructivism. The EU has deep impact on discursive and behavioural practices in every Member State and actors with rule of appropriateness (Risse, 2004, pp. 148-149). Due to these reasons, the social learning process can pave the way for an understanding of Euroscepticism.

1.5. Identity, Euroscepticism and Foreign Policy

According to Risse, identities and discourses in social constructivist perspective help us to grasp the EU integration studies. Understanding the integration paves the way to grasp the Eurosceptic tendencies in turn;

First, accepting the mutual constitutiveness of agency and structure allows for a deeper understanding of Europeanization including its impact on statehood in Europe. Second and related, emphasizing the constitutive effects of European law, rules, and policies enables us to study how European integration shapes social identities and interests of actors. Third, focusing on communicative practices permits us to examine more closely how Europe and the EU are constructed discursively, how actors try to come to grips with the

meaning of European integration and how they develop a European public sphere (Risse, 2004, p. 151).

States and actors have multiple identities. Those socially constituted identities represent who those actors are and what their interests are. Notwithstanding the abovementioned paragraph, the triplet of European integration (in foreign policy sphere), identity and mutual constitutiveness are highly related to and complement each other. There are still a number of strong Euro-pessimists or Eurosceptics who challenge the possibility for future European integration and divert the topic into a negative way. They strongly argue that the formation of common European policies are impossible. Thus, the socialization process of certain MEPs in the EP generates institutionally the idea of defending national foreign policy identity. This lead to further anti-establishment discourses, as Schedler indicates (Harmsen, 2010, p. 335). Those discourse exceeds the national issues and becomes a supranational ideological problem.

Additionally, the anti-EU actors voice that there is no common identity, history or mythos on which mutual European structure could be erected (Risse, 2004, p. 151). Many researchers suggest that there are stronger national identities and weaker European identities which lead people to be less supportive of the EU (De Vries, 2018, p. 43). However, one can argue that the identities of the Member States cannot merely be reduced to an integration pace and a common European identity because both European identities and nation state's identities are "imagined" or structured phenomena.

The argument of lack of European demos has been proposed by the Eurosceptic, nationalist and far-right parties. However, according to the Eurobarometer survey (Standard Eurobarometer 83, European Citizenship - spring 2015), the feeling of European citizenship reached an all-time high since spring 2010. In addition to this fact, as seen in Line Graph 1, "more than two-thirds of Europeans feel that they are citizens of the EU."[4]

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[4] **Standard Eurobarometer 83 (EB83),** European Citizenship - spring 2015, pp. 15-16.

Line Graph 1. Feeling of EU Citizenship According to Eurobarometer Survey 83

QD1.1. For each of the following statements, please tell me
to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion.
You feel you are a citizen of the EU - % EU

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 83, 2015

According to European Election Study (EES) 2014, socio-economic advantages make people to vote for more sceptic parties both at national and European levels. Therefore, in light of this information, Euroscepticism is on the rise when social wellbeing and socio-professional categories are lower. In general, European citizens think that established and mainstream parties lead the citizens down.

It cannot be claimed that European identities extinguish the national identities because those different identities depend on different empirical variables. Once again, the connection between cultural variables and identities (social structures and agencies) is subject to constructions and reconstructions regarding Euroscepticism.

The question of how people identify themselves as Europeans illustrates a contested meaning of Europe and integration process. According to Risse;

> European institutions and European elites deliberately try to construct a post-national civic identity (…), and this modern and post-national European identity seems to resonate with mass public opinion. The 'inclusive

nationalists' who show some degree of identification with Europe also share the modern values (Risse, 2004, p. 154).

The social construction of this post-national identity in the context of foreign policy also determine how xenophobic and the Eurosceptic tendencies occur in the concerned area. In order to see how this situation occupies the social sphere, it is better to look closely at how identities are used interchangeably as many European policies. In this regard overlapping and unclear identity crisis cannot help Member States' perception to shape their foreign policy in line with European common foreign policy.

In his book, Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy, Ted Hopf points out the constructing and reconstructing the domestic identity domain in Moscow. He divides the topic into two separate years: 1955 and 1999. In these cases, from constructivist perspective, he propounds his hypotheses that the Soviet/Russian leaders perceive other states in terms of their identity. In his second part of the argument, Hopf tries to test his hypotheses to see whether they are justifiable while advancing on 'foreign policy choice'. In this manner, Hopf's study constitutes one of the prominent examples due to the affiliation between identity and foreign policy making from a constructivist perspective.

Therefore, unlike the rationalist focus of fixed interest, the constructivist approach demonstrate ever-changing foreign policy tool: identity and interest. For instance, the actors, within certain structure, can demand sovereign identity to maximize their interests. However, identity cannot be one sided. It is rather a multi-dimensional subject that contains both internal and external identification for the actors. Identity, at the same time, varies in different institutions (Bancoff, 1998, p. 14). It is seen that national and supranational actors identify themselves differently when examining their press conference or public speeches in different institutional settings.

An analysis of Anastasia Chebakova (Chebakova, 2008) suits perfectly to this work. Chebakova asks that, "how it [CFSP] was historically formed; how, despite resistance, it has become a 'second pillar' issue; and how it projects a global identity" (Richmond, 2014). According to Chebakova, CFSP shows more concrete and convergence course to understand (common) identity issue and constructivism. This also indicates that the transformation of intergovernmental foreign policy norms into a

supranational (global) identity may force a new set of rules in another institution such as the EP.

Since the beginning of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), there is a strong link in social construction of European foreign policy identity. The meaning of this construction has started to vary across national political contexts over time. Furthermore, constructivist insights have strived to show us one of the starting points of the relationship between socially creation of European identity and the signs of Euroscepticism in this integration process (Risse, 2004, pp. 158-159). In addition to that, identities can also interact with material consideration and institutional constraints (Bancoff, 1998, p. 26).

The EPC has been seen as 'gentlemen's club' where European diplomats were more socialized (decisions were taking dominantly by consensus) foreign policy actors, whereas, the EP has been seen rather incapable as an institution in return (Smith M. , 2004, p. 104). New colloquies were also created between the EP and foreign affair council with the EPC. This cooperation, which was included in the EU structure, paved the way for a new identity for the Union (Elles, 1990, p. 70). After the first direct elections in 1979, the Solemn Declaration in 1983 and the Spinelli Report in 1984, the EP has increased its involvement in foreign policy issues. Those EPC activities can be seen in the articles 237 and 238 of Treaty of Rome regarding the foreign policy roles. Even though the EP's assent is needed in certain politics, it could not have made binding decision but political ones. Moreover, the discourse of 'Europe's one voice in foreign policy' has fallen short and could not show consistency from the EP side. Consequently, the opposing/Eurosceptic MEPs have raised their number due to this channel of political manoeuvre and new identity creation (Elles, 1990, pp. 74-75).

In a nutshell, under this title, the relationship and the social interaction between Euroscepticism, foreign policy and identity were tried to be explained. The attention was drawn to the behaviour of the 'actors' and 'structures' with identity principles. Unlike the realist understanding of chaos in the international sphere, constructivists emphasize the atmosphere of anarchy and chaos created by human agents that can be reshaped. Regarding this chaos, Euroscepticism was presented as a constructed phenomenon based on the core principle of identity and culture within this relation. Moreover,

Euroscepticism affects the preferences of actors as constructed by themselves rather than a given object. Therefore, both the left-wing and the right-wing Eurosceptic groups agree on national sovereignty and identity issue to some extent. All in all, constructivist perspective constitute the endpoint of the actor-structure debate. The theory of construction, which focuses on the concepts of "discourse" and 'Europeanness', has an important place in the context of a new construction to examine the post-Maastricht period and foreign policy area.

1.6. What Changed After the Maastricht Structure?

Macroeconomic factors have specified the core determinants regarding the support for the European integration up until the early 1990s. However, those economic factors became weaker gradually, while public support eroded in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty. According to Susan Milner, Maastricht heralded shocking shift in terms of integration and various political issues from elite concern to public concern. This new period was the turning point with regard to the perception of European integration. Dutch and French rejection of the Constitution in 2005 affected this period staidly. "The nature and scope of Euroscepticism changed dramatically from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty onwards. This period marked the rise of plebiscitary politics in Europe and revealed the pervasive and embedded nature of Euroscepticism within the integration process" (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 159).

The ambition for creating political integration and foreign policy cooperation since the 1970s has, hereby, been institutionally strengthened in 1992 under the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, this new watershed term has served the Eurosceptic political agents to officially display their wish to transfer competences from the national level to the European level for the first time (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 159). This has had enormous impact on public opinions towards the EU and its policies. "Specific policy areas, such as foreign policy, social security and monetary policy, suggests that the precipitous decline in support that began in 1991" (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 128). The most prominent reason of this was the hardship in ratification process of the

Maastricht Treaty which reflected the growing gap between the EU institutions and European citizens: 'European democratic deficit'. As abovequoted, the phenomena of Euroscepticism has steadily grown into one of the biggest problematic areas namely are the EU common foreign policy and its decision making structure. The word of crisis has exceeded its meaning. It evolved in to a political hardship which became consequently a major concern to majority of the politicians, Eurocrats as well as citizens. The Eurosceptic stand has showed that the disagreement with EU policies have led severe foreign policy concern and opposition in connection with economic hardship.

There is no doubt that the Maastricht Treaty intended to establish modern-day EU as Usherhood and Startin emphasise below. However, greater coordination in many policy areas has never been fully achieved.

> First, Maastricht signalled a new politicization of European integration, with the name change from 'Community' to 'Union' and the creation of a new political order. Second, it marks the moment when divisions between European and domestic policy begin to become increasingly blurred in areas of environmental, political, economic, social, legal and foreign affairs (Usherwood & Startin, 2013).

Before the reforms were laid out with the Maastricht Treaty, more consistent community mind-set has triggered further integration. One could argue that the Treaty has done the system transformation entirely. In addition to this, the Treaty altered the calculation logic of the integration process. Accordingly, despite the positive economic influence the public support began to go downward. The evolution of this process immediately became discernible and rebounded to European public opinion. This process has led more hostility towards the EU. The support for the Eurosceptic parties and leaders, who are against further European integration, has risen concurrently. Both citizens' and political actors' evaluations regarding *status quo* (the EU) has started to become less attractive. These evaluations further indicate alternative options such as leaving or opting out particular integration domains (De Vries, 2018, p. 38). This situation, therefore, has affected the pro-EU bloc. This EU-supporter bloc are exposed to a challenge by the Eurosceptic actors' discourses both internally and transnationally within the key EU institutions (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 240).

1.6.1. Post-Maastricht Blues

Because the Union has started not to be seen as the only 'economic enterprise' any longer, the direct and unprecedented crush towards the Union was named as *'Post-Maastricht blues'* (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, pp. 131-132). Richard C. Eichenberg *et al.* put it in this way;

> Until Maastricht, the European Union was largely an economic entity. Thereafter, the Union moved in the direction of political integration by expanding the number of policy areas for which it has some responsibility; by expanding the coverage of majority voting in the Council; and by strengthening the powers of the European Parliament (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 132).

To put it simply, the Union's policy domains has turned into a political concern than economic concern. This new conception of integration can be portrayed as *'multispeed community'* (Vasilopoulou, 2013, pp. 163-164). Furthermore, the supports for the policies has begun to erode (this fact can be seen early Eurobarometer surveys during 1980s and 1990s respectively). This erosion, once again, shows how economic effects occurred as less beneficial to explain and determine the integration and the Eurosceptic tendencies. Economic variables almost evaporated in the post-Maastricht era. That is why the statistical analysis became vaguer. At this point the main reason of this erosion is "unleashing a period of political backlash against the European Union" (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 139).

1.6.2. Transformation in European Integration

Since the concerted initiative has created the Union's political space at Maastricht, some nations have not desired to transit their sovereignty to the EU's body entirely. They have had feelings that they were forced to accept things that they did not want. Political failures and large-scale bureaucracy have triggered this opposition and diminished the pace of future integration regarding foreign policy. Financial crises revealed widespread opposition as a more structural factor (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 162). The invention of extensive bureaucratic governance has led an undemocratic super state

and eroded the position of nation states in terms of foreign policy making. That is why the interval which started during 1990s, with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, can be put forward as a good turning point.

> Maastricht acts as a watershed, a key turning point in the debate surrounding the development of the EU as it marks the moment when referendums become a regular occurrence in certain countries to ratify changes to EU treaties, serving to galvanize Eurosceptics in their bid to derail the process of European integration (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 4).

From this passage's point of view, it is not hard to recall how this '*unleashing period*' has started by the impulse of French and Danes votes in their countries. The Treaty in their referenda[5] led to unexpected legal hurdles. The political arm of the issue has involved prominently. Then, the EU has started to involve not only in economic issues but also in political discrepancies. Thus, after the Maastricht Treaty, more alarming concerns have started to be seen in political and integration projects that the European elites can no longer one hundred per cent trust their populations. Euroscepticism became more transnational.

> Maastricht drastically transformed the Union's institutional basis by introducing European citizenship, increased majority voting in the Council, and expanded powers for the European Parliament. In addition, the Union extended its policy competence to include powers in the areas of environment, home affairs, social (and worker) policy, and foreign and security policy (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 139).

As it was noted above, Richard C. Eichenberg *et al*. (2007) explain this situation as changing of the scope and depth of the integration process. The legislature procedure was changed gradually in favour of the EP that has a significant effect on the Union in addition to co-decision procedure. This situation was reflected on the EP elections - especially in 1994 election. Prior to that there was not strong opposition in the EP –at least not officially strong. Since the post-Maastricht EP elections had taken place, the Eurosceptic MEPs and political groups have increased their number by all means at each European election (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 7). From that time onwards the pro-

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[5] The French referendum slightly remained in favour but the Danes first said no then yes in the second voting (Worre, 1995, pp. 235-236)

European MEPs have started to take advantage of the co-decision procedure to influence the agenda of the EP. However, whether they succeeded or not is questionable. Moreover, this has caused a domination of mainstream parties in the EP. This biggest pro-EU parties have started to construct a sense of excluding the Eurosceptic MEPs institutionally.

1.7. Euroscepticism in Eurobarometer Findings

According to 2012 Eurobarometer survey, 53% of the total EU citizens believe that things are currently in the wrong way. This increasing negativity has started to be seen particularly in the Post-Maastricht period. This negative trend heralded more disunity with regard to common foreign policy in the EU layer. Examining the latest Eurobarometer data, it can be observed that there was general lack of popularity for the EU and the EP (See Line Graph 2). This situation is embedded across all the EU countries including the founder states such as France or the so-called pro-European Germany (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 6).

In the years that have elapsed, the growing negative manners and decline in confidence constitute degradation both in the eyes of the citizens and political parties. "In short, public attitudes have never recovered to the highs of 1991" (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, pp. 6-7). By 2011, only 31% of the population across Europe has remained in favour of positive attitude according to the 2011 Eurobarometer survey (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, pp. 6-7).

Line Graph 2. Attitudes towards the EP

Source: Elaboration of data from Standard Eurobarometer 70: Autumn 2008 - Standard Eurobarometer 80: Autumn 2013. Giovanni Barbieri, "He's Worse Than Me: The Eurosceptic parties at the turning point", The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies, Issue. 8(1), 20015, pp. 99.

While talking about common values in terms of foreign policy, the interests are more dissimilar, especially in times of European crisis. For instance, the early post-Maastricht failures can be seen in the common position of Gulf War (1991) and the protracted debates over the Bosnian conflict. These examples are the justifications of longstanding diverse national interests and frustrations. According to 2013 Eurobarometer survey, "66% of citizens feel their voice does not count in the European Union and almost half are not satisfied with the way democracy works, at either national or European levels."[6] Even though this rate has decreased to 50% of distrust in the EU according to the 2017 Eurobarometer survey; if there is a collapse of confidence then "enthusiasm for the European project will not return unless the EU will significantly change how it relates to the Member States and their citizens" (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 56). This quotation could be interpreted as an economic problem which was seen as the main one to be coped with for the first time. However, it is not the single denominator of the integration process anymore. There is a linkage between the previous Eurozone debt crisis and foreign policy crisis. However, the economic reasons exceed their scope to political disunities such as the presence of 'coalesced disunity' in organizing the EU

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[6] Standard Eurobarometer 80, Public opinion in the EU – Autumn 2013, pp. 107-108.

common foreign policy. Although people of the EU seem "clear in the judgment that foreign policy should be conducted by the Union as a whole" (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 141); there are concerns that evoke. Current disunities and disputes in the foreign policy areas such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)[7] or the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) maintain certain places in which diverse foreign policy interests collide with. However, this is not a dramatic upsurge.

The recent Eurobarometer findings show that the trust and total optimism about the future of Europe have gathered pace compared to 2011 surveys (Eurobarometer 85, 2015). The citizens made the 'precise' distinction about the areas which should be governed by the EU as whole and retained by the national governments. However, this does not show complete support towards common foreign and security policy. Overbearing and cumbersome bureaucracy are always significant hardships as long as there are the populist/ Eurosceptic political parties and actors. This insecure prediction is felt within the EU and in its foreign policy sphere significantly (See Line Graph 3 and Bar Chart 1 below). Ever since the 1990s and the 2000s, the EU has attempted several times to bring through its institutions. Nevertheless, the EU's "decision making process remains extremely complex, lacks transparency and still too slow and unwieldy" (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014, p. 5). It is bureaucratic and centralised which may leads future conflicts among the Member States inevitably.

One of the latest Eurobarometer surveys (Standard Eurobarometer 88 Autumn 2017) shows that;

> Since spring 2017, trust in the EU has gained ground in ten countries, most strikingly in Belgium (53%, +7 percentage points), Slovakia (48%, +5) and the Czech Republic (35%, +5). Conversely, it has lost ground in 17 Member States, led by France (33%, -8), Croatia (39%, -8), and remains unchanged in Germany (47%) (Standard Eurobarometer 88 Autumn 2017).

In addition to this, "trust in the European Union (41%, -1 percentage point since spring 2017) continues to exceed together with the trust in the national government (36%,

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[7] **Permanent Structured Cooperation** (**PESCO)** is a Treaty based defence cooperation among member states was officially founded in 2018.

-1) and parliament (35%, -1)"[8]. This clearly shows that the general trust is not satisfactory in the opinion polls. According to the 2014 European social survey, policy and exit scepticism across Europe constitute about 16% and 18% respectively. Major examples were the Netherlands, Great Britain, Austria, Finland, Denmark and Sweden (De Vries, 2018, pp. 82-83).[9]

Even though there is an ultimate upward trend in trust in the EP, according to the spring 2018 Eurobarometer survey, only 55% of the citizen think that MEPs are directly elected by the citizens of the each Member State. However, this trend is decreasing since 2014 (from 71% to 55%). Therefore, it can be asked that whether the rising trust in the EP is the reason of the rising populist and the Eurosceptic MEPs' population in the EP or not (See line graphs 4 and 5 below). The Populist and the Eurosceptic MEPs are able to fill the voids and recasting politics as disputes among elites and citizens. Since the absolute majority is needed on budgetary issues (the most important tool of the EP), they could complicate the mainstream parties' position and reverse the idea of Brussels-based favoured EP by emphasizing 'less Europe' oppression (Leonard & Torreblanca, 2014, p. 9).

Another survey, 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), indicates that there are "77 Eurosceptic parties that competed in elections in 27 Member States. Of these 77 Eurosceptic parties, 28 classify as hard right, 21 as soft right, 9 as hard left, and 19 as soft left" (De Vries, 2018, pp. 134-136). In 2014 election Slovakia and Czech Republic constitute the countries having the lowest turn-out rates ever in European elections (Mudde, 2016a, pp. 89-91).

In sum, the people of the EU became more sensitive and aware of the implications in the areas that used to be nationally cultivated before the post-Maastricht period. One of the significant signs of this situation is the ebbs and flows of distrust. Thus, the meaning of integration became much more than economic in today's Europe.

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[8] Standard Eurobarometer 88, Public opinion in the EU – Autumn 2017, pp. 12-13.
[9] European Social Survey 2014

Line Graph 3. The Future Trend of the EU

Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU? (% - EU)

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 88 - 2017

Bar Chart 1. Opinions about Common Foreign and Security Policy across EU Member States

QA18.2. What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

A common foreign policy of the 28 Member States of the EU

Source: Eurobarometre 88 - 2017

Line Graph 4. Trust in the EP

And please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these European institutions

'Tend to trust'

— The European Parliament   — The European Commission   — The European Central Bank

Source: European Parliament

Line Graph 5. People who think MEPs are directly elected

For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false.

The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member State (% - EU)

Source: Standart Eurobarometer 89 Spring 2018

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2. THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY

"No foreign policy - no matter how ingenious - has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none."

Henry Kissinger, 1973

Understanding of foreign policy in Europe requires simple policy answers, while mainstream parties refuse to reconcile themselves by diverse Eurosceptic challenges. Europe, now, is considered to be on the blink of a collapse in terms of democracy and good governance. It is unable to manage all those foreign policy choices coequally. This has generated strong cooperation in need of institutionalisation. While the EU sticks up for the democracy value, "it is increasingly difficult to sustain the traditional notion that foreign policy is incompatible with democratic decision-making and scrutiny" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 7). Thereby, state sovereignties remain controversial. Moreover, foreign and security policy have direct effect on citizens' life in today's interconnected system. Foreign policy has a transformative effect because of the diverse pattern of public behaviours. Therefore, at supranational level those citizens' representatives in the EP require to achieve public acceptance and trust for these foreign policies choices (Bajtay, 2015, p. 7). However, there is a huge decline in democratization and public sympathy towards such institutions and the political elites. In fact, the widening scope of foreign policy may conceive uneasy politicisation of this policy area with various opinions.

As an overview, especially after the post-Arab spring and migration crisis, Europe has started to confront significant external and internal challenges in the midst of the complicated political baseline in different regions. Jihadist threat has started to manifest its imminent challenges. Moreover, the striking example of 2014 European Parliament election constitutes the triumph of the rising anti-EU parties and movements. Thus, the waxing populist tendencies and anti-trust towards European projects were strengthened. This negative trend became a thorn inside the union regarding effective foreign policy practices (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 2). Therefore, foreign policy of the Union needed to be tackled more effectively. The effects of further integration (deepening)

fatigue not only hindered economic and financial fields but also made harder to forge common foreign policy decisions (Archick, 2017, p. 5). These unprecedented hardships obliged to do something altogether and be united across Europe. Beyond this problem, in 2015, the United States (US) withdrew from its watchdog duty of the EU. This withdrawal has forced the Union to adopt a new world order by itself at the global stage. Ultimately, a new foreign policy strategy was seen as a big necessity in order to overcome global hardships.

In sum, after giving brief summary of European current foreign-policy-related-crisis, under this chapter the following topics will be analysed;

- The EU's Foreign Policy formation and Europeanization of national foreign policies in the global context,
- The Foreign policy arguments after the Maastricht treaty concerning high representatives of the union for foreign affairs and security policy (VP/HR),
- The sweeping of geopolitical foreign policy across the world,
- Understanding of Member States' foreign policy making, the Unions' External Relations actions and its diplomatic cooperation with the EU and non-EU countries,
- The evolution of CFSP and its decision making structure from a constructivist perspective.

The main aim of this chapter is to associate ill-equipped foreign policy structure with Euroscepticism. The root causes of the problems and the Union's disputed fabric of cohesion will be examined in order to see how the EU tackles with surrounding problems.

2.1. Recent External Foreign Policy Challenges and Euroscepticism

Especially, after the cold war, the EU was put into a new position which remained vulnerable towards new challenges regarding foreign policy area. Those significant challenges and instabilities can be sorted as the relationship with Balkans, Eastern Europe and Middle East. All these geostrategic areas have obliged the EU to take

more efficient foreign policy stance and framework. In other words, the world became more 'connected, contested and complex.' The EU's latest foreign policy initiative – The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) - promises faster foreign policy responses. The EP also plays a role in its consultation process by organizing Foreign affairs committee (AFET) meetings. However, it could not seem likely to have wider process of public consultation and EP consensus.

Especially after Brexit[10], the EUGS has required to render Europe's foreign policy to a more constructive policy area at first glimpse. Therefore, after all, the EUGS tried to provide rather an overall approach, 'principled pragmatism'[11], towards foreign policy. It sets forth the vital interests and key foreign policy priorities. However, the Union can reach these political goals by only assuming more citizen involvement, representation, resilience and fully accountable institutions, such as the EP. Therefore, both the EUGS and its processor, European Security Strategy (ESS), adhere to claim that they highly needed well-governed democratic states. However, the problem is a lack of democratic governments in present.[12] The idea of having democratic governments is rather hard to achieve due to the political stability of some Member States. Those Member States are not always inclined to transfer their power to the Union's policy tools (Biscop, 2016).

As Federica Mogherini (HR/VP) indicates in the EUGS; "Our foreign and security policy has to handle global pressures and local dynamics, it has to cope with super-powers as well as with increasingly fractured identities" (Vincenti, 2016). Therefore, shared goals and common interest in foreign policy are likely to collide with the presence of divergent identities and interests. Unlike what the EUGS claims, there are still clashes between national and European interests among the Member States. Moreover, even though the EUGS claims a multi-lateral approach engaging with all players, the EP's position remains rather limited. At this point, remaining united in

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[10] The UK leaving the European Union, 29 March 2017 - 29 March 2019.

[11] Principled pragmaticsm is mostly for the Eastern policies. It is conceived as a policy of political, economic and military expansion towards the Eastern neighbours. However, principled pragmatism falls short to strengthen the CFSP, but does reduce the intra-institutional imbalance within the EU. Therefore, it provokes a collision of national pragmatisms.

[12] A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy - Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, June 2016. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en (Accessed: 11.07.2018).

diversity is what needs to be remembered, whereas democracy is being questioned. As Mogherini says: "EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand united and work in a coordinated way."[13] Yet, national Member States' assumptions about the EU's foreign policy role remain diverse, insufficient and without strategy and objectives (Wallace, 2017, p. 78). Consequently, they incline to retain veto power in various actions by pursuing their own foreign policy choices.

In a nutshell, both European Security Strategy and Global Strategy constitute a rather powerful example regarding constructivist perspective. Furthermore, structurally constructed external strategies conceive new Eurosceptic challenges. Therefore, more reconciliation is needed among actors (such as MEPs) on their foreign policy choices. In the following sub-chapters, the relationship between some certain external challenges (Russia, the USA, and Southern Neighbours) will be examined along with their potential effects on the Union's foreign policy and Euroscepticism.

2.1.1. Russia

Dealing with a resurgent Russia in Europe, Asia and Middle East constitutes a challenge for EU's common foreign policy making in general. Russia compels Europe by the activities in different geographical scale. Thus, Member States confront more external instability and conflicts among themselves. It is crystal clear that such tensions between Russia and the Member States with different national preferences breed negative impact on crafting common EU foreign policies. This even forces the EU to rethink its common sanction policy toward Russia (Archick, 2017, p. 13). Russia has 'exaggeratedly belligerent reaction' towards Europe, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 2). This Russian nationalist and revisionist posture has started to revive by posing peril for the liberal worldview fundamentally. Europe's Eastern

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[13] A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, p. 47.

neighbourhood is the main subject area in which historical Russian impact has always been felt.

Because of the fact that some former communist eastern European countries had Soviet domination, it is probable for some pro-Russian eastern European leaders to adopt the Eurosceptic manners in the foreign policy sphere. This can also be explained from the identity concept of constructivist perspective. On the one hand, some Member States still need Russian involvement for their commercial tie such as trade and energy. On the other hand, others are strongly against the Russian involvement. In addition to that, Putin's Russia tries to shake the international sanctions by altering oil prices, threatening the economic stability and peaceful foreign policy stance. From this point of view, it would not be hard to envisage the relationship between Euroscepticism, foreign policy and Russian aggression.

The point here is to indicate how those European leaders – especially the Eurosceptic and far-right parties – are exposed to the Russian political and economic influence. For this reason, Member State leaders consider themselves in a serious dichotomy. It leads significant internal split while uniting foreign policy towards Russia. Thus, whether Russia is a friend or foe is questionable;

> The first is a good cop/bad cop dilemma between a less strangulatory approach of negotiated reengagement or tightening the ratchet to increase economic pressure. Those in favour of this bad cop approach - notably Poland and the Baltics - will point to the relative 'success' of EU sanctions to date and claim that a heavy hand is the only way to push back a Russia which is fast encroaching upon their borders. The 'good' cops, led by Germany, are worried that any victory achieved by the sanctions is pyrrhic; not only does it strengthen Putin's domestic narrative, but the knock-on effects of Russian economic collapse on a stagnant Europe could be highly counterproductive (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 3).

From a constructivist perspective the real challenge towards foreign policy making comes from those political agents at the heart of the relations with Russia. Hungary's Victor Orbán speaks of his praise about Russia's sovereignty understanding. In the meantime, Marine Le Pen speaks well of the Russian heritage in Europe. Moreover, Alexis Tsipras condemns the EU sanctions against Russia. Therefore, it is not hard to

understand why Putin allegedly supports the Eurosceptic far-right parties in the EU. Parties like FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), AfD (Alternative for Germany) and FN (National Front) were claimed to receive financial help from Russia. Naturally, media usage and discourse play key role in those countries' propaganda (Balfour, et al., 2016, pp. 32-33) (Mudde, 2014). Thus, this affiliation stimulates the political margins to act with sceptical attitudes and schism inevitably. Member States should perceive Russia strategically important but not as a role model to be followed within the global and regional structure. One of the striking examples is as follows;

> In June 2015, the EP voted resoundingly in favour of a non-binding report on the state of EU-Russia relations calling on the European Commission to propose legislation to forbid non-EU funding of political parties. The report was approved by over 70% of MEPs, but the minority which voted against included not only a mix of FN, UKIP, LN, FPÖ, Jobbik, and M5S, but also members of GUE/NGL, such as SYRIZA, Podemos and the Dutch Socialist Party (Balfour, et al., 2016, p. 33).[14]

In other words, the quotation above shows how the Eurosceptic MEPs in the EP may have an effect on creating hardship through their voting behaviours towards Russia. This situation further weakens the EU's common stance concerning the confrontations against common enemies with Russia. Therefore, Russia constitutes a divisive factor. Yet, the EU-Russia relations mainly goes parallel with mainstream party politics rather than the Eurosceptic agenda. The EU and Russia have mutual interests on many issues.

2.1.2. Southern Neighbourhood

The other problematic issue is the southern neighbourhood of the Union. The area has become more volatile because of the ongoing deprivation especially after the Arab spring and North Africa migration flows. These imminent threats affect the shores of the Union significantly. Heather Grabbe, the director of Open Society Foundation, says that in 2015 there were 114 xenophobic (15.2% of MEPs) MEPs (from VB, UKIP, FPÖ,

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[14] VoteWatch Europe, "State of EU-Russia relations", available at: www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-state-of-eu-russia-relations-motion-for-resolution-vote-resolution.html#/##vote-tabs-list-1 (Accessed: 29.05.2018).

FN, PVV, LN and Fidesz[15]) who were satirically against to the migration policies. Moreover, those MEPs follow the anti-immigrant Eurosceptic policies (Balfour, et al., 2016, p. 42). This can be also seen in the latest EB survey (Eurobarometer 90, autumn 2018) that immigration was mentioned by 40% respondents as their main concern at European level while terrorism declines to 20%. These results inevitably affect mainstream party politics adversely by defending the anti-migration discourse.

The decade-old domestic migration policies have evolved to a complex and controversial political atmosphere due asylum policies and quota systems (Dublin system). The controversial migration policies also question the absorption capacities of the EU. Therefore, Turkey's membership, for instance, is rather debatable because of the over-population of Syrian refugees. In fact, the migration debates further lead deep and profound division between central and frontier countries (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 4) (Archick, 2017, p. 9). At this point, another factor that exacerbates this cleavage is the problematic voting system in the migration policies. In the case of territorial integrity, the Member States are always in favour of consensus rather than the qualified majority voting system (Archick, 2017, p. 10). This example is rather similar to the eastern enlargement. Regarding southern neighbourhood, Member States show that their divergent interests are to some extent integrated. However, those interests prove some inconsistency related to Tbilisi, Yerevan, Tunis and Tripoli. One of the reasons behind this conflict of interests is inadequately constructed institutional setup which sometimes overlooks the consent of the EP. Furthermore, this institutional setup leads to unavoidable painful operational objectives (Wallace, 2017, pp. 82-83). Besides all, the nuclear deal with Iran can be considered as one of the most effective European foreign policy successes thanks to the US help.

Furthermore, military interventions and defence spending show the divided nature for nationalist or the anti-imperialist Eurosceptic parties inside and outside the EU institutions. There appears that the Eurosceptic parties are supporting the budget cuts (it is the most influential tool for MEPs) for the external issues. They instead advocate that

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[15] See percentage of those parties againts migration: Ifop, October 2015, www.ifop.com/media/poll/3181-1-study_file.pdf (Accessed: 30.05.2018)

those budget, such as development aid etc., should be spent for the Union's national interests inside. Financial expenses concerning foreign affairs contain the least of their proposals. Those MEPs seem reluctant to spend money for the migration influx. For instance, conservative Austrian People's Party and Swedish central-left parties' external aid cut soar up to 60% (Balfour, et al., 2016, p. 38).

All in all, these policies have paved the way for the Eurosceptic parties to benefit from such policy shifts. These policy shifts have reduced the Union's effectiveness towards its migration policy. For example, Le Pen's FN is in favour of interventions in Middle-East. Besides, she sees it as an opportunity in a globalized world, whereas the other Eurosceptic parties remain within the anti-terrorism camps, such as Northern League (NL) in Italy. Naturally, socially constructed identity politics play an important role to set the foreign policy priorities of these parties and actors. As can be seen in the case of NL, identity preferences tend to change depending on the terms or new political outcomes. NL shows divergent behaviours while remaining in favour of being interventionist in Afghanistan, but at the same time showing an anti-Interventionist position in Iraq (Balfour, et al., 2016, pp. 35-36). Still, those Eurosceptic actors' foreign policy choices have potential to exploit the weakness of Europe. However, with regard to external relations, their choices reflect marginal tendencies.

2.1.3. The United States

Withdrawal of the US foreign policy shield from the EU constitutes a detriment for the future of the continental Europe. It appears that after the US presidential elections, the future and current US – EU relations has shaken profoundly. However, when Donald Trump was elected, many right-wing politicians congratulated him on his success. Together with Brexit and the problematic Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, the traditional Atlantic alignment has been hindered by those foreign policy issues (Archick, 2017, p. 16) (Bakerjan, 2017). Especially during the TTIP negotiations, some of the Eurosceptic MEPs from UKIP and NF joined the anti-American camp and became trouble makers in the EP.

One of the main reason which lies behind the changing shift of the US's foreign policy interests is the financial reason. The US no longer wants to spend money for the Union's security. Another reason is the changing priorities of the US. Today, the European region does not constitute a primary priority for the US because Russia and China are the main concerns for the US foreign policy. This situation started during the last presidential year of Barak Obama became more pronounced after the election of Donald Trump. Therefore, the EU is, now, on the verge of losing a like-minded partner standing on its side. Thus, the US' security umbrella on the EU is becoming a 'civilian power' rather than being a military power.

There is also a paradox between the Eurosceptic groups regarding their stance against the US. The "United States of Europe" model is heavily criticized by the Eurosceptics. They express their opposition concerning deeper political co-operation in the areas such as culture, defence and foreign policy. However, the Eurosceptic actors are not in favour of developing common policies by spending national savings in specific areas such as foreign, security and defence policy. Moreover, they voice their dissatisfaction towards the EU in terms of international politics (Ermağan, 2012, pp. 162-163).

While the US' attention shifts towards China, the EU should take its own foreign security and defence responsibilities. In order to fend off disagreements and conflicts which go parallel with populist and Eurosceptic tendencies, the EU needs to evaluate its Member States' roles within the framework of NATO. However, the more steps the EU has taken, the more diverse foreign policy responses the Union faces. To put it another way, Member States comprise cross-purposes. Some right-wing parties such as FN, SD, FPÖ and M5S remain quite sceptical towards to the US by provoking the EU in terms of foreign policy conflicts. Some of the striking examples follow as Snowden case, Iraqi and Libyan intervention and strong anti-NATO stance in France (Balfour, et al., 2016, p. 32).

These are the external affairs having impacts on the rising Eurosceptic opinions. These opposing views threaten the EU's core solidarity principles by empowering the hands of populist parties. "Such issues have challenged the EU's ability to forge common foreign and security policies (often complicated by the need to reach consensus among

all Member States) and to further integration in the area of Justice and Home Affairs"
(Archick, 2017, p. 12).

From here onwards under the next title, the brief analyses will explain how those
nation states' foreign policies are established; what their national preferences conceive
together with the European norms; and how common policies decisions are taken.
Ultimately the attempt will be assembling various pieces of these foreign policy variables
into a holistic image by giving some clarity to the future direction of European foreign
policy making.

2.2. Europeanization of National Foreign Policy Making

Europeanization needs steps to achieve its goals: firstly, a construction, then,
diffusion and finally, institutionalisation of all the formal and informal rules which lead
to common norms and beliefs. In this relation norms at the national levels and the EU
level incorporate and feed each other.

Foreign policy is a 'high policy' area that directly affects and hinders the
cooperation on the convergence of national interests. It is rather an intergovernmental
setting. However, it had a weak institutionalisation in the past. Thus, it should be noted
that the demands of the anti-EU groups tend to be deep divided on foreign policy making.
They are unwilling to make compromises in foreign policy area by delegitimizing the
status quo. It is also clear that Member States in general are in tendency to show diverse
interests in foreign policy making (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013). This is called logic of
diversity;

> During the intergovernmental conferences leading to the Treaties of
> Maastricht and Amsterdam, Britain and France were the strongest opponents
> of a supranational CFSP because they possessed other (unilateral) foreign and
> security policy alternatives, while Germany lacked such alternatives and thus
> favoured a more supranational CFSP (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, p. 8).

Mutual and unilateral interests play a key role in the Member States' policy
choice. Even though the Member States have similar preference and interest at the EU

level, they can support their national opposition within their national unilateral foreign policy structure. However, when they participate in common foreign policy issues, this pushes each Member State to go in line with the same 'problem solving' cultures. This shows that socialization process goes together with reconstruction of public and elite perception. Soft determinants such as social and identity factors play a key role with regard to this process (Torun, 2016, pp. 165-166). In fact, those factors are rather conducive. However, it mainly depends on the Member States' cultural features since Europeanization remains as a moving target and reciprocal because of the constant reproductions process in this ever-growing and dynamic entity.

The multi-subjectivity of the Member States' identities, norms and beliefs can be examined by using the process tracing method to see familiarity and repetitions. Further, actors' discourses need to be taken for granted to develop common foreign policy outcomes. Rather than straightforward calculations, the Europeanization of Member States depends on how they want to see themselves in Europe and in the world. According to Ben Tonra, participation in common foreign policy process change their perception of world view through social learning and socialization. Since the Maastricht Treaty came into existence, Europeanization of foreign policy has gradually possessed its own unique discourse in order to get substantive common outcomes from the Union's institutions.

2.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy from Constructivist Perspective

Ever since CFSP was launched, the EP has started to demand more power from it. In comparison with the general EU *modus operandi,* the decision making of CFSP is quite conservative (Hill, 2002). Annual reports approve this conservative trend clearly. However, the role of the EP in foreign policy is still a controversy. The main problem is democratic accountability of the CFSP because there is a lack of European Demos across the continent. In several cases, the interests of MEPs are colliding with the Council and the Commission regarding foreign policy.

Historically, "European Foreign Policy is characterized by a great variety of theoretical approaches and conceptual lenses" (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, p. 2). The

establishment of the EPC in 1970 stimulated a number of descriptive understandings of European Foreign Policy. In those years, the intergovernmental nature of the Union has affected the parliamentary democracy in the EP regarding foreign policy. However, when the international conjuncture was reshaped, "the establishment of the EU's CFSP triggered a wave of studies that provided some conceptual accounts of European Foreign Policy" (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, p. 14). After that the EP gained formal democratic legitimacy beside its consultative role. The extended rights of the EP can be seen under the article 21. However, the EP's legitimacy remained insufficient and non-mandatory in comparison with the Council's and the Commission's positions and interests. This insufficient EP was left as proactive soft power. The EP remained just requesting information or giving recommendations to take its initiatives (Diedrichs, 2004, pp. 31-46).

The EU is more intertwined with other policy areas such as EU's external relations due to the traditional integration process (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, p. 6). Since the EU holds unique decision making competences which do not only belong to governments, but are also divided by supranational institutions, the common foreign policy decision outcomes have been exposed to the Eurosceptic discourse from the actors who seek to minimise the Union's supranational position.

The current studies[16] show that the CFSP constitutes a good prospect for the future of the Union's global stance and leadership. Acting collectively against global threats has key importance to become a global actor. However, this is not quite straightforward. The EU's external image and self-identification were jeopardised by the Eurosceptic actors and their discourses. The CFSP has been forced to become more supranational, efficient and Brusselized under the Council's, the Commission's and the HR/VP's authority. This supranational desire has jeopardised the EP's position. In this regards the EU's unclear CFSP has remained inefficient due to those EU-averse actors. That is why it is indispensable to study CFSP in connection with Euroscepticism within constructivism (Chebakova, 2008, pp. 2-3).

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[16] European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS); EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations.

It should be noted that the creation of 'second pillar', CFSP, has brought challenges to the EU's institutional structure and decision making mechanism. At the same time CFSP raised the capabilities both inside and outside the EU. Whereas, the self-interested Eurosceptic actors envisage that CFSP is nothing but a temporal coalition of interests. "However, the establishment of CFSP can hardly be explained by using intergovernmental logic, which implies that domestic interests of the member-states are all, what matters" (Chebakova, 2008, p. 9). Although no structured consensus has been achieved among the Member States, there is a convergence between some of the Member States and political actors' position towards the CFSP due to their mutual disagreements. As Chebakova stresses;

> Constructivism reduces this problem since it looks at the process of formation and the role values, norms, mode of thinking and language constructions play in this process. Therefore, it is not the outcome and 'efficiency' that only matter. Moreover, disagreements have sometimes more power to bring change and induce development, and the CFSP's future cannot be defined by only using such categories as success or failure (Chebakova, 2008, p. 9).

While having agreed with Chebakova's argument, it is useful to look at how this adverseness has been built by the Eurosceptic actors in relation to the CFSP. According to her, those disagreements bring more change to induce common development. However, it accommodates the unfavourable Euroscepticism which may obstruct common decision making across Europe. Opposing views are on the rise especially in one of the key institutions which represent all citizens in Europe: the EP. Still, constructivism offers better theoretical models for the EU foreign policy. It points to the fact that norms, identities, language and discourse of the actors are indispensable in creation of foreign policy. Those are the ideational factors that are interpreted as certain values in foreign policy area (Chebakova, 2008, p. 10).

2.3.1. Socialisation in Foreign Policy and Euroscepticism

One important question to be asked is "why socialization process and norms matter in CFSP? However, more important thing to be answered is whether this process

has impact on the EU structure and actors' behaviour" (Chebakova, 2008, p. 10). These are the double sided questions which point to how the Eurosceptic actors influence this process reciprocally. In other words, to what extent the Eurosceptic actors (MEPs) in the parliament affect CFSP by their norms and discourses is the question that needs to be answered. The answer might be clear: "understanding the action - creation and development of CFSP - by looking at the structure and the agents, that is the international system and the EU" (Chebakova, 2008, p. 10). Within this relation, norms and institutions are constructed and reconstructed by actors continually. How this construction eventually reshapes the perception of CFSP is a certain level of social interaction. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink put: "Norms do not appear out of thin air: they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 896).

As it is applied to CFSP, the socialization process of the norms is perceived as a special kind of logic of appropriateness by the Eurosceptic actors in different institutional structures. Therefore, it is important to take a look at these institutions in relation with these norms and their interaction. By doing that how the Eurosceptic rhetoric and patterns are structured and reproduced can be understood. This socialisation process and institutional interaction determine the functioning of the institutions.

Since the key institutions such as the Commission and the EP are embedded into the CFSP's norms and practices, the prominent obstacles take place as lack of coherence and consensus between those institutions. This further creates an impact on slow decision making and inefficient foreign policy results (Chebakova, 2008, p. 11). These factors unleash the CFSP to be more inefficient in particular international crisis. Specific the Eurosceptic actors' behaviours consistently interact with each other within this political structure. Therefore, actors who have divergent interests do not only transform the internal environment of the Union but also alter the global presence of the CFSP. In other words, collectively integrated or disintegrated values and norms both strengthen and weaken the position of the EU in common foreign policy area.

In a nutshell, CFSP, in its history, cannot be simply deduced from pure national interests. Contrarily, CFSP emerges as social constructive process which is "as a results

of national diplomacies intentionally and unintentionally communicating to themselves and to each other's intents and perceptions of political co-operation" (Glarbo, 2001, p. 141). The foreign ministers meeting in the Council, the Commission, different political committees and working groups contribute to the CFSP within this social interacting as well as the EP's stance. In addition to this, the actors who involve in making CFSP are conscious of the social demands to control or manipulate both national and European foreign policies (Glarbo, 2001, pp. 155-156). In the meantime, beside those aforementioned reasons, CFSP does have an effect on actors' behaviours since it is more a supranational body than bargaining platform which contributes to the EU's presence outside its borders (Chebakova, 2008, pp. 12-14). Therefore, creating foreign policy communication is a mutual social construction that affects the perception of each actor and institution which are involved. This situation may be considered as a balance of the interaction.

2.3.2. Decision-making of foreign policy and Euroscepticism

Unlike the EP, the Commission and the Council are rather a technocratic setup whose members are not elected. In the three-pillar structure, decision-making process of foreign policy was largely intergovernmental which means that the EP cannot play a big role unlike the Council (Efe, 2008, p. 72). However, the EU does not have a complete integrated and cohesive national policy with regard to controversial areas such as Common Foreign Policy (Sienkiewicz, 2003, p. 115). That is why, internalization and harmonization of the norms are rather important to create normative power for the Union.

> The European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's 'foreign ministry', has been one of the main institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Not a new EU institution but rather a new 'service' in the EU's institutional architecture, which is expected to be instrumental in making EU external action more coherent by combining relevant forces of the Commission, Council Secretariat and Member States, and headed by the 'triple-hatted' High Representative/Vice-President. The EEAS and the HR/VP are politically accountable to the Council and democratically controlled by the European Parliament. The creation and regular scrutiny of the EEAS has been a reflection on how effectively parliamentary hard and soft powers, formal

competences and indirect influence can be combined to ensure parliamentary involvement and maximise the EP's impact on EU foreign policy beyond its Treaty-based formal role (Bátora, 2010, p. 9) (Wisniewski, 2013, p. 14).

As abovequoted, the EP plays a significant procedural role as a main control mechanism. The increased parliamentary influence on foreign policy issues reflects the politically-binding decisions. Political accountability "was issued shortly afterwards by the HR/VP on the cooperation between the HR/VP-EEAS and the Parliament" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 32). The heads of the EU delegations have been playing a significant role of creating, shaping and controlling the EU foreign policy decisions. Therefore, the EEAS has never been meant to be fully independent and bureaucratic in order to exert coherent influences into foreign policy issues (Furness, 2013).

> After their appointment by the HR/VP but prior to taking up their post in the third country, EU ambassadors, selected upon Parliament's priorities and in agreement with the HR/VP, appear before a closed meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). They inform Members on the country concerned and the EU priorities/objectives to be pursued in relations with the partner country (Bajtay, 2015, p. 32).

In the case of the EP's position within the foreign policy decisions, although the EP is formally not entitled to block an appointment or having ambassadorial duties, the result of its position is invaluable because the EP's impact remains limited in creating a formal dialogue. The EU ambassadors and the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) ensure a formal control mechanism. Thereby they shape the room for the EU foreign policy (Furness, 2013, p. 32). Moreover, AFET was addressed many times by a variety of the actors and organizations (Albertini, p. 8). This inevitably has affected the autonomy of EEAS.

Ever since the election system has changed, one of the core democratic institutions, the EP, has become increasingly vigorous to contribute to complex foreign policy issues. However, it has started to have impact gradually and directly on citizens' lives by legitimising complex foreign policies initiatives (Bajtay, 2015, p. 3). On the other hand, institutional constraints came to existence when the Eurosceptic actors increased their number. The Eurosceptic actors have been exposed to constraints that limit their

ability both *ex ante* and *ex post* under its legislative and budgetary power (Furness, 2013, p. 106).

The Commission appears to have more willingness to assume legal responsibilities. This situation empowers the Commission regarding the military missions under the same European flag with a more community method. This growing power proves the limitations on the EP and Member State's decision making. In other words, the EEAS pushes greater autonomy in more foreign policy areas. According to Elmar Brok,[17] the EU was creating a new bureaucracy which "locates in between the Council and the Commission in the long term would… lead a life of its own to become an independent kingdom outside our control" (Furness, 2013, p. 110). This shows how there are conflicting interests between the EP and the Commission or the Council. Besides, the first Council decisions about the EEAS left some key points regarding the interaction between Member States, the EP and the Commission. The conflicting interests should be solved through 'learning by doing' procedures. However, some key policy areas remained under the Commission's control, and the College of Commissioners' responsibility for reaching consistency in certain foreign policy choices with certain external posture (Furness, 2013, p. 112).

All delegated powers, Member States' intergovernmental desires and especially the EP's directly elected representatives play a key role in limiting the EEAS' autonomy. However, the EP basically remained having more like oversight role over the EEAS. Therefore, both the Eurosceptic and the non-Eurosceptic MEPs can be considered the least influential regarding their endeavour on foreign policy reports which enable meaningful Parliamentary oversight (Furness, 2013, p. 113). As Article 14(1) TEU shows, the HR/VP only consults the EP on general issues and CFSP choices but not on specific policy areas. This left no manoeuvre for the EP to alter any decisions. Today, current and previous HR/VP have been the main agenda setters in this regard. The EP's ability to control HR/VP therefore remains rather limited and lack of having genuine control mechanism.

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[17] One of the EP's rapporteurs during the 2010 EEAS negotiations.

To sum up, both the Commission and the EP have bigger says in certain policies after the Lisbon Treaty. Their roles have increased gradually. However, the role of the Commission, now, has a bigger say in foreign policy activities. Moreover, the Commission became more reluctant to abandon its power over foreign policy decisions. The desire of more effective and coherent military missions remained contested among different actors (Furness, 2013, pp. 118-123) (Wouters & Raube, 2012, p. 151). The EP's accountability continues to be overshadowed. Therefore, democratic issue is the biggest and first substance which affects the procedures of CFSP decision making.

3. MORE STRUCTURED INNER EUROSCEPTICISM: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

> *"Without public support, Europe cannot go forward. This is something
> I know all leaders, in Brussels and in our Member States, realise acutely."*
>
> *Herman Van Rompuy, 17 June 2015, Brussels*

Parliamentary diplomacy refers to a wide range of political activities that represent the will of the public via direct democracy. "In a broad sense, parliamentary diplomacy is about the construction of state actors, about the pooling of power and about common ideals" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 10). However, it mainly vary in scope of its activities related to the roles in decision making. The last aggregate election results and opinion-poll data indicate that the electoral triumph of the Eurosceptic parties has evoked significant worries about their effects on the Union's policies. Thus, the current dissatisfaction towards the mainstream parties, decision making procedures and institutional set-up constitute simply these worrisome situation against the EU (Treib, 2014, p. 1541). The EP elections are the second order election model which was developed by Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt in 1980 in order to give an empirical analyses for the European elections. However, it shows that these elections have very low turnout. Moreover, they are mainly concerned with the national issues and the voting against the EU (Treib, 2014, p. 1547).

3.1. Evolution of the EP and its Elections

Before assessing the Eurosceptic actors and their behaviours in the EP, it is worth seeing how the EP historically evolved and started to have an impact on the citizens' daily life. After publishing the first report[18] on Enlargement of the Powers of the European Parliament, the EU has acknowledged the priorities for the EP's legitimacy and single electoral law for its direct elections. Despite its approval, the EP's position was not

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[18] Vedel Report: By a famous French MEP and constitutionalist George Vedel on 25 March 1972 – Vedel working group.

influential at the beginning. The reform process also faced some opposition from the individual Member States such as France[19]. After all these political situations, in 1975, the EC adopted a new report[20] explaining the direct election for EP (Costa, 2016, pp. 17-18).

> Before the introduction of direct elections, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were appointed by each of the Member States' national parliaments. All Members thus had a dual mandate. The Summit Conference held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974 determined that direct elections 'should take place in or after 1978' and asked Parliament to submit new proposals to replace its original draft convention of 1960. (…) The Decision and Act on European elections by direct universal suffrage were signed in Brussels on 20 September 1976. Following ratification by all Member States, the Act entered into force on July 1978, and the first elections took place on 7 and 10 June 1979. (The European Parliament: Historical Background, Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2018, p. 1.)

Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, these acts and reports constituted the main 'political' decision in the EC history representing the EU citizens at the supranational level (Costa, 2016, pp. 10-12). As quoted above, while the MEPs were appointed by their national parliaments, there was an over-representation of the EU favourable parties in the EP. However, the 1979 EP's direct elections strengthened the Parliament's power by creating a channel for the Eurosceptic formations exponentially. According to Costa, these direct elections remained rather technical. Moreover, the EP's power was not changed drastically (Costa, 2016, p. 25). Nevertheless, small and objector parties gained parliamentary representation to voice their anti-thesis to the public. These objector parties have found channel to influence and criticise the deepening of the Union (Brack, 2013a, p. 87). The EP has increased its institutional independence: "The newly acquired 'democratic legitimacy' of the EP allowed to directly express its views to the Council and to develop a more balanced connection to the Commission" (Costa, 2016, p. 32). Furthermore, the Court of Justice put forward that the treaties should be reinterpreted with references to the democratic representation (direct referring to the EP) which also strengthened the role of the EP (Costa, 2016, p. 33).

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[19] French President Georges Pompidou was against to it before Valéry Giscard d'Estaing took his place.
[20] Patijn report on 14 January 1975.

When the Single European Act was signed, the Treaty advanced Parliament's role in some legislative areas such as, the cooperation procedure. From that time onwards, making accession and association treaties were tied to the EP's consent. Following that the subsequent Maastricht Treaty exceeded the cooperation procedure to different areas by adopting the co-decision procedure. Therefore, the EP became co-legislative in the relevant areas such as the final approval through the membership of the Commission which proves its robust political control over the EU executive (Bux, 2018). Following that "the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty led to the emergence of new political forces and revealed the strength of Euroscepticism across the continent" (Brack, 2013a, p. 87). The constitutionalization process and the EP direct elections fostered the Eurosceptic movements while the EP became more powerful in terms of decision-making.

After the Maastricht Treaty, the co-decision procedure was extended to several executive and legislative areas. The EP was set as a co-legislator institution together with the Council. Even though the EP was under the domination of mainstream parties, "the appointment of the President of the Commission was made subject to Parliament's approval. This is the power of control over the executive" (Bux, The European Parliament Historical Background, 2018). Besides, these changes have heralded the *Spitzenkandidat* system. This new system was envisioned to appoint the Commission president. One of the main goals of this system was the embodiment of the democratic participation of the EP in order to lower anti-Brusselisation opinions (Hobolt, 2015, p. 5). Therefore, along with its increasing power and scope, the EP has gone further by polarizing the attitudes of citizens in the same time. The *Spitzenkandidaten* ('top candidates' in German) procedure created further sceptic ideas because of the polarization among the MEPs. Nomination of the Commission president for the first time was miscarried in terms of democratic representation because of the domination of pan-European candidates. It was disputed by coalitions such as from Britain and Hungary (Gómez & Wessels, 2016, p. 3). Since 33% of the MEPs did not nominate the leading candidates, 23% of the MEPs was opposed to *Spitzenkandidat* system. Therefore, it can be said that elected Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker was not recognised by all MEPs (the candidate has to receive the consent of 376 MEPs (Art. 17(7) TEU)). The high threshold was considered

as a main obstacle regarding this co-decision procedure (Gómez & Wessels, 2016, p. 13). Despite all the competences that were granted to the EP, the Council remained playing the key role interfering with the decision-making and overlooking the consent of the EP;

> The Treaty of Lisbon constitutes another important extension of both the application of qualified majority voting in the Council (using a new method as of 1 November 2014 — Article 16TEU) and the application of the co-decision procedure (now extended to some 45 new legislative domains). Co-decision, now known as the ordinary legislative procedure, has become the most widely used decision-making procedure, covering particularly important areas such as the common agricultural policy and justice and security policy. Parliament's role in the preparation of future treaty amendments has become more significant (Article 48 TEU) (Bux, The European Parliament Historical Background, 2018).

The Parliament's responsibilities have increased especially in the legislative and budgetary functions. According to the Article 14 TEU, the EP has more consultation and political control over the Treaties. Therefore, the EP's consultation power has risen to important oversee issues (Costa, 2016, pp. 37-38). As abovementioned, the legislative power of the EP may have direct impact on making foreign policy. However, there is a conception of a worrisome situation in terms of the mind-set of the EP. Because of the fact that the EP has a growing political role in effective foreign policy, some MEPs have begun to be able to exert their influence on the Union.

The most important effect of the Parliament regarding the foreign policy is the concept of democratic legitimacy in decision making. Democratic legitimacy has revised the Union's citizenship by enhancing the EP's political control (Dempsey, 2014). Because of the fact that there are direct elections, rising populism and democratic legitimacy; MEPs have started to use their extended power to create an environment to exchange their foreign policy desire with the national parliaments. Among these MEPs, some of them attempt to combine the citizen's voice with a Eurosceptic manner. This is because those MEPs are inclined to express their national level hardships by stigmatizing the EU in general. However, according to Duff the paradox is that;

> Europe's democratic problem lies, rather, at the national level and, above all, with national political parties. This dilemma is readily identifiable by a discerning public which when faced in an EP election with lacklustre

campaigns by national political parties intimidated by 'Europe', chooses not
to vote (Duff, 2013, p. 149).

Due to this reason, "strengthening the powers of the Parliament was inversely
proportional to the interest that citizens take in it" (Aphecetche, 2016). For this reason,
the number of voters has dropped steadily since the first call for a direct election in 1979.
The empirical analyses have also shown that how this issues remains limited (Piedrafita
& Renman, 2014, p. 24) (Maier, et al., 2015, pp. 369-385). Thus, since the 2000s, scholars
have pointed out the unintended consequences of the electoral campaigns which increase
the Eurosceptic tendencies and the support for anti-EU parties (Costa, 2016, p. 45).

The reasons for the low turnout in 2014 elections were the citizens' ever-growing
set of poor information about the EP, therefore, the low level of positive interest towards
the EU in general. Moreover, there was no solid incentive from certain nation states to
make this elections more attractive and less blurred for their citizens (Costa, 2016, p. 24).
Since the less voters are on the rise, the Eurosceptic MEPs have gained more substantial
power.

All in all, the EP has become one of the centrepiece to compel and provide added
value for the Member States to take serious decisions on foreign policy topics,
enlargement and external relations. It is the EP's duty to scrutinise and consider the issues
regarding common foreign and security policy and the budget. As an important actor,
VP/HR needs more consensus with consultation of the EP. The EP demands proper
consistency and coherence. For instance, with regard to the nuclear deal with Iran unclear
deal and conflicts between Russia and the Ukraine, the EP played a forefront role to speak
for the EU's actorness (Costa, 2016). The VP/HR of the Union was put into a position
which takes the Parliament consultation more seriously into consideration in order to
facilitate the formulation of a more coherent and common position in European common
foreign policy.

3.2. Towards the Latest EP Elections (2014) and Euroscepticism

Notwithstanding having failed to win their national elections, some of the radical right and the left Eurosceptic parties entered into the mainstream EP works. In fact, there was huge increase in anti-EU rhetoric and controversial achievements in the 2014 EP election. According to Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak's simplified typology, the EP parties can be classified as follows: "The soft Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the hard Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL), which includes parties adopting both hard and soft Eurosceptic stances" (Barbieri, 2015, p. 104) (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016, pp. 504-514).

Those parties have had numerous changes since the first direct elections in 1979 till 2014 elections. Even though European People's Party (EPP) remains as the biggest party group, EPP's population has shrunk to 29.4% from 37.2% in the period between 1999 and 2014. In other words, EPP lost 53 seats throughout those years. The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has taken the second position in terms of the seats it lost (-16 seats). However, Eurosceptic EFDD party's MEPs rose to 6.4% from 2.6 in the same period. EFDD gained 17 seats in 2014 elections. Therefore, the percentage of Eurosceptic groups increased between 2009 and 2014: "the ECR by 2.0, EFDD by 2.1%, and EUL/NGL by 2.1%; even the NA members grew by 3.2%" (Barbieri, 2015, p. 106)[21] (See Figure 3 below).

Eurosceptic party support for exit supporters rose to 42%. Main pro-EU parties lost 65 seats. 23 Member States' Eurosceptic parties gained seats in their national level (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 242; Treib, 2014, p. 1542). Non-attached MEPs from Front National gained 24.9% seat compared to 2009 elections which was only 6.3%. Another striking example is that SYRIZA from GUE-NGL gained 26.6% of seat (+17 seats) in its political group. Their population was only 4.7% in 2009. UKIP's electoral achievement

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[21] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf and http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html. (Accessed: 19.06.2018)

have risen from 16.1% to 26% of the seats in EFDD group (Barbieri, 2015, p. 108). These are extraordinary results in the EP's election history so far.

**Figure 3. Number of Seats in the EP (2009 – 2014)**

Source: European Parliament

2014 European elections prove that there is a big and ascendant increment of the Eurosceptic tendencies across the EU. About one-third of the 751 MEPs became Eurosceptic[22] (Treib, 2014, p. 1543). "Besides the increase in the number of Eurosceptic MEPs, these elections have demonstrated both a mainstreaming of Euroscepticism and an upsurge in support for radical parties" (Brack, 2015a, p. 346). However, the upcoming 2019 European elections will redistribute the number of the seats in the EP. UKIP's 73 seats will be redistributed to other countries while 46 seats will be kept for the Union's prospective future enlargements. This will make the population of the EP 705 in 2019 European elections (EU elections: how many MEPs will each country get in 2019?, 2018). (See Figure 4 below).

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[22] 212 out of 751 MEPs belong to Eurosceptic parties, which means more than 28%.

Figure 4. How Many Seats Will Each EP Party Groups Have in 2019?

Despite their success and critical position, the Eurosceptic block seems "unlikely to be cohesive or sizeable enough to effect any material change to policymaking in the European Parliament on their own."[23] The Eurosceptic MEPs can be considered successful to bring their national discontents and interests to the EP. This is because of the fact that the EP is one of the perfect platform defending national interests. However, those MEPs exacerbate their discourse against various EU policies and crisis. They regularly voice national discontents in order to defend their national sovereignty. In addition to this, the economic reasons are sufficient for dissimilar groups to oppose to foreign policy. Since the current Eurozone crisis is related to foreign policy, "populist

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[23] Eurosceptic effect at the European Parliament: Key issues for the 2015 Parliament, retrieved from https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/foreign-affairs/european-parliament/ (Accessed: 29.03.2018)

campaigns are better-placed than ever to exploit fears about sovereignty, immigration and safety in order to distort facts and heighten tensions."[24] Therefore, some nationalist Member States' parliaments perceive federal projects as adversary created. This rising nationalism may pose existential challenge to the form of integration process. Theoretically, nationalism is not forbidden. However, it may evoke some catastrophic results. It should be noted that World War I and II are the sharpest examples for rising Nationalism (Duff, 2013, pp. 140-142).

In terms of governance, the EU is still deficient with regard to democracy and efficiency. The current crisis lead Member States to take more individual decisions to undertake their parliaments' works. However, "whatever their source, ideas for the resurrection of national parliaments to deal with the EU polity are objectionable and unworkable" (Duff, 2013, p. 148). Member States should comprehend the deep interdependence to each other. Some national parliaments can be regarded relatively under the influence of their own national governments or the Eurosceptic parties. They have limited knowledge about the scale and depth of supranational policies. They show that they are against superior authorities by transferring sovereignty to the EU bodies. Furthermore, some national parliaments opt for a few projects. However, their endeavours are not enough to be united in further integration, common interest and mutual foreign policy identity.

Some of the pro-nationalist, the populist or the Eurosceptic leaders may defend counter attitudinal behaviours by referring to ex-Soviet control. Mostly eastern and central EU Member States voice this Eurosceptic tendency;

> The emergence of Eurosceptic leaders at a national level has been more marked in central Europe than in the more laconic west. Lech Kaczynski, president of Poland 2005–10, and Václav Klaus, president of the Czech Republic from 2003, borrowed from their revulsion at past control by Soviet Moscow a comparable reaction to future control by EU Brussels (Duff, 2013, p. 144).

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[24] A guide to Europe's key eurosceptic parties, and how successful they are. Retrieved from https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how-successful-they-are (Accessed: 29.03.2018)

Therefore, the most prominent opposition arises from those Member States' national parties. Those central and eastern European countries stand against the EU's migration policy and common foreign policy. They do not want to see the EU as a mere and ultimate integration structure. Consequently, the Union is exposed to be scapegoat due to its overall disorder and drastic downgrade protecting national values. The general uneasiness of the Union –together with high unemployment rate, distrust in the EU projects, increasing inequality among the citizens etc. – has marked those EU-averse actors as high point. Those Eurosceptic actors have contributed the popularity of the anti-Brussels sentiments both at national and European levels. As Václav Klaus mentioned in one of the speeches during his presidency of the Council in 2009(supported by Nigel Farage (The UK));

> The present decision-making system of the European Union is different from a classic parliamentary democracy, tested and proven by history. In a normal parliamentary system, part of the MPs support the government and part support the opposition. In the European Parliament, this arrangement has been missing. Here, only one single alternative is being promoted, and those who dare think about a different option are labelled as enemies of European integration (Duff, 2013, p. 145).

Another example is one the speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban in 2012. Orban was simply accusing the EU for being a post-communist entity that puts nation states in a second position. He claims that he will not live under the influence of any foreign commands. Orban voices the fears towards Brussels centralization, supranational domination and joint decisions (Duff, 2013, p. 146). During the recent Syrian migration flow, Orban has built a long fence at the borders of Hungary by protesting the EU's migration policy. Ironically, he continued receiving money from the EU for the migrants while blocking them in the border. Nevertheless, countries like Estonia demands 'detachedness' between the East and the West regarding the foreign policy (Ermağan, 2012, p. 159). From this point of view, the 'melting pot' of the EU is questioned. In other words, today, supranational projects are not merely applauded across the EU. It is certain that Euroscepticism becomes as popular in national parliaments as it is provocative in EP.

Prior to the 2014 election, on 13 November 2013 in The Hague, Marine Le Pen (French Front National) and Geert Wilders (The Dutch PVV) expressed their mutual "intention to collaborate in the run-up to the May elections and to recruit further Eurosceptic colleagues across Europe" (Piedrafita & Renman, 2014, p. 25). They submitted the idea of the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF).[25] However, the EAF was not strong enough to be formed because of the threshold.[26] In the first place, there were MEPs from five different Member States. Therefore, the EAF remained incapable of the parliament's requirement to be represented. Following that, on 15 June 2015, Le Pen's initiatives thrived with the foundation of Europe of Nations and Freedom party (ENF) with 38 MEPs as the smallest group in the EP (Maurice, 2015). Even though this new small party has envisaged to wreck the EU, it could not be united under the common ground for the anti-EU rhetoric. However, it would be a prejudgment to say that these small parties lost their power drastically (Le Pen and Wilders fail to form anti-EU bloc, 2014) (Willsher & Traynor, 2014) (Bacchi, 2014).

> Even though their actual power will be limited by their small size and low internal cohesion, their presence in the EP will not go unnoticed. Their increased visibility and popularity in their respective countries could also have the potential side effect of moderating the pro-European stance of mainstream political parties (Piedrafita & Renman, 2014, p. 29).

In a nutshell, the winners of 2014 European elections can be listed as follows: FPÖ (Austria), PiS (Poland), UKIP (United Kingdom), Danish People's Party (Denmark), SYRIZA (Greece), FN (France), Jobbik (Hungary), M5S (Italy). The losers are such as Vlaams Belang (Belgium), ATAKA (Bulgarian) and Left Block (Belgium). The presence of those opposition groups secure their position in order to exercise their influence. Yet, their "conflicting logic of nationalistic behaviours make these actors hardly to organize their Eurosceptics views at the supranational level" (Brack, 2013a, p. 91). In other words, different nations perceive their Eurosceptic parties in divergent ways. Moreover, the interaction of the Eurosceptics generally shows an inability to create one single structure

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[25] **The European Alliance for Freedom:** EAF was founded in 2010, dissolved in 2016. It is a Eurosceptic, right-wing pan-European party. The party was calling for national freedom and democracy in opposition to centralised, supranational control. And funded by the European Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.eurallfree.org/?q=node/65 (Accessed: 04.03.2018).

[26] Establishing a political group in the EP requires at least 25 MEPs from at least 7 different member states. These political groups ensure MEPs to receive funds, chamber speekings and seats in the EP.

for themselves. It appears that they are the least co-ordinated but the enthusiastic groups in the EP.

3.3. Euroscepticism from Margins to Mainstream

Since May 2014, the 8th EP election is one of the striking and worrisome example regarding Euroscepticsim, as it causes a stir among political scientists with regard to the Union's future integration. Moreover, it constitutes the surge of Eurosceptic and anti-establishment blocks in European Parliament (Bertsou, 2014, p. 1).

One of the main national discontents comes from the accumulated economic hardship which has put the countries into two positions: debtor Member States (such as Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Ireland) and rich creditors (such as the Netherlands and Austria) who finance the debtor Member States. However economic problems cannot be the single denominator to explain the Eurosceptic tendency.

The Eurosceptic radical left parties such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain gained notable seats in 2014 European elections. Their main concerns are towards the economic and monetary policies. In addition to the left-wing parties' results, the biggest winners in the anti-EU camp became political right (Treib, 2014, p. 1543). There are some populist parties that can pose serious hardship on the mainstream parties. The winners of those far-right parties as follows: French Front National, the UK's UKIP, Danish People's Party, Hungarian Jobbik, Austrian FPÖ, True Finns and Greece's Golden Dawn (Vasilopoulou & Sofia, 2014, p. 285). Apart from all these parties Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain can be considered as countries which to some extent uptick populist parties – especially after Brexit. The main power of common foreign policy makers, France and the UK, are lack of robust strategic visions for the future of the EU. They have remained impotent and their MEPs are/will likely to fail to address the issues in a united way (Archick, 2017, pp. 6-7). (See Table 4.)

Because of the fact that there is an accelerating presence of these populist opponent parties, the EU has constant "failure to offer convincing evidence in favour of

the creation of a truly European demos" (Bertsou, 2014, p. 1) in many fields, especially in the common foreign and security area. As aforementioned, there are many structural complexities and failures in the EU institutions. Yet, when these failures combine with general dissatisfaction towards the Union, the anti-EU discourse becomes more in the limelight. The anti-EU sentiments push the EU towards more mainstream and chronic hardships.

The Eurosceptic winners of the 2014 European elections have started to impose a greater impact on voting behaviours of the citizen and the way in which Union level policies are conducted at national level (Meijers, 2017). Their ideological disposition make significant gains to alter mainstream discourses abundantly. Moreover, their attitudes and motivations seem to indirectly overshadow the pro-EU rhetoric (Treib, 2014, p. 1550).

Table 4. Number of the Left and the Right Eurosceptic Members in the EU states

Source: Catherine E. De Vries, "Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration", Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 133: Author's own calculations based on official results from the European Parliament (2014).

3.4. The Eurosceptic MEPs' Behaviours

According to Natalie Brack, there were 165 Eurosceptic MEPs during the sixth legislature term (2004-2009), which means 19.14% of the EP was Eurosceptic. The 2009 and 2014 elections increased these Eurosceptic numbers considerably - more than 20% in the 7th and more than 30% in the 8th legislature term (Brack, 2018, pp. 65-66, 68-69).[27] At the same time new parties like Dutch Freedom Party, AfD, True Finns, Five Stars Movement made their sight in the EP. In the context of the EP groups "European United Left–Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) as well as non-attached MEP from radical right parties and anti-EU groups can be identified as Eurosceptics" (Brack, 2018, p. 66).

Nevertheless these parties and political groups are more heterogeneous. Some of them are unequivocally against the EP's work. They claim that the EU's effort of creating an ever-closer Union is worthless. However, these efforts vary in many contexts. While, some opposition are merely against the community method and co-decision, the others can be in favour of legitimacy of national parliaments. In addition to these, some other actors show more reformist tendencies by defending the veto power of the Member States (Brack, 2018, pp. 71-72). This picture proves a multifaceted position regarding the legislation of the EP by the Eurosceptics.

On the one hand, political parties in the EP are highly important gate keepers in terms of integration process. Most of the time those party members are associated with their national parliaments.[28] MEPs, as their stance in a supranational institution, help bring their national experiences and political dialogue in multilateral conflict prevention. However, together with the rising Euroscepticism and the institutional constrains of the EP, the Eurosceptic MEPs (especially the radical right ones) are pushing the liberal and mainstream path out of the Union's agenda. In addition to this, they become more reactive

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[27] European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html (Accessed: 02.06.2018)

[28] Many MEP surveys and questionnaires conducted by the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG) can be found online concerning the variety of research questions regarding to MEPs preferences and their positions. www.mepsurvey.eu

by reviving the problematic developments of the European integration at their national level.

According to Mudde (2015), anti-democratic answers are merged with illiberal democracies. The current operation of the EU proves this changing pattern. Besides, "amid the growing numbers of Eurosceptic MEPs, it is more important to understand what MEPs think about the EU policies and the integration process" (Whitaker, Hix, & Zapryanova, 2017, p. 492). This has also an effect which reshapes the pattern of coalition formation in the EP (Whitaker, Hix, & Zapryanova, 2017, p. 492). Prior to upcoming European elections (2019), the grand coalition in the EP and the pro-European governments strive to bypass the anti-EU camp and populist propensities by pushing more intergovernmental deals.

The Eurosceptic MEPs' behaviours and roles over public show us a triple categorization from a social constructivist approach. With regard to their priorities and motivations, Brack's classification constitutes a very accurate one hitherto. She puts forward the following characteristic roles and behaviours in terms of involving parliamentary work: 'Absentee', 'Public Orator' and 'Pragmatist' as Weberian understanding[29] (Brack, 2013a, p. 92).

The first behavioural role is being 'absent' ("Absentee") in the EP. Usually UKIP, the Greek Golden Dawn and the Hungarian Jobbik appear to be the parties playing this role. This behavioural pattern has more impact on their national parliaments by undertaking more active involvement in their home countries in order to influence their citizens. Their motivation comes from a total refusal of the EU mandate. Institutional engagement of Absentee MEPs can be interpreted as opportunistic and utilitarian. They do not seek to track a report or hold responsibilities in the EP. One of the Absentee MEPs' interview indicates the opinions about their position in the EP as follows: "I do not think it matters by the way because even if I sit there to blow bubbles it does not matter, they are to push the laws through anyway. So the whole thing is pointless" (Brack, 2018, pp. 85-86). Another Absentee MEP states that: "Everybody sleeps (in the EP), it is an empty

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[29] Weberian Understanding is based on the observation of a culture as a sociologist relates to actors or cultural groups in their special period, condition and from the certain actor's point of views.

chamber, and it is not taken seriously" (Brack, 2018, pp. 85-86). These examples show the democratically poor picture for the EP in the eyes of the people. Those MEPs indicate that their influence for action in the assembly is cut. Thus, their focal points become the constituency in their own nation states. In other words, Absentee MEPs' main duty is promoting their ideas at home and influencing the opinions of their own nations (Brack, 2013a, pp. 92-97). One Absentee MEP from the UK says that: "My main responsibility is to find out the truth of what the EU is doing to democracy and expose it to the people in the UK." In short, almost none of these MEPs exercises any responsibility in any EP organs. They are not homogenous related to their speeches as well as their specific interests (Brack, 2018, pp. 86-89).

The second type of Eurosceptic MEPs see themselves as 'only opposition public speakers' ("Public Orator") for the purpose of informing the citizens of the Europe. There is to inform the citizens of the Europe about unfavourable consequences of decisions and integration process. They create controversies within the assembly. They are willing to publicize and advocate their position by all means necessary. Some of these Public Orator Eurosceptic MEPs' statements are about how they are ashamed of the EU which cannot protect its citizens' rights and benefits.[30] They point out how the EU is an artificial institutional formation.[31] They point to the fact that there is no confrontation of ideas in the institutions[32] and so forth.

In their behavioural patterns, media (TV, blogs, and social networks) is a vital tool to alter and manipulate public opinions. They further disseminate informations by putting the stress on downward democratic legitimacy. One example for this type of MEPs indicates as follows: "(…) I am not here to help this thing exist, I am to criticize, criticize, criticize. In committee, they call me mister no, I say no to everything" (Brack, 2018, p. 90). Direct and exclusive communication styles can be seen from that example. They give their priorities to the speeches that regularly verbalise the legislatives displeasure (Brack, 2018, p. 94). Their ideal representation is usually peer-to-peer politics by emphasizing the 'will of the public'. Moreover, their political practices go in line with

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[30] Lucas Hartong, PVV, 12 June 2012
[31] Krisztina Morvai, Jobbik, 13 March 2012
[32] Bruno Gollnisch, Front National, 10 July 2011

the logic of escalation and confrontation (Jacques Delors Institut, n.d.). While they tend to see themselves as permanent opposition, it appears that their main task is to de-legitimize the assembly through their public speeches. However, they often use these speech acts in order to gain publicity to participate in the EP activities (Morris, 2013, pp. 6-7). Likewise Absentee MEPs, they also disseminate informations both at national and community levels (Brack, 2013a, p. 99). In short, their behavioural activities serve best the socialisation and learning process from a constructivist perspective. One analysis (Brack, 2018, p. 93) shows that they are relatively cohesive on their acts.

The final type is the "pragmatist" Eurosceptic MEPs who show efforts to change and solve the problems in the EU level. However, they tend not to compromise their Eurosceptic beliefs. Yet, they do not see their acts as mare opposition. Conversely, they tend to bring national level issues to the assembly to discuss by using their leverage. Their behaviours can be classified as constructive of opposition or 'creative destruction'. Therefore, they keep the opposition in balance and respect the rules of the EP (Brack, 2013b; Brack, 2015a, pp. 339-343). Compared with other types of MEPs, pragmatists seem less confrontational and more conciliatory.

3.4.1. How the Eurosceptic MEPs are perceived?

The committee works are rather an essential tool for the MEPs to obtain their objectives with significant legislative output and power of control. Therefore, they can be influential in terms of the commitments that belong to them. One MEP interviewee proves this claim as follows: "I would say the most important is the work in the committees, putting the amendments, controlling powers, controlling the budget, the legislation process" (Brack, 2018, p. 98). This view is akin to the propensity of pragmatic Eurosceptic MEPs: "Our aim is to change the EU and the Eurozone from inside the institutions. As a political party we are in opposition, in a group labelled as Eurosceptic (…)" (Brack, 2018, p. 99). Therefore, this triple classification sheds light on the understanding of how the Eurosceptic MEPs' behaviour are perceived in national level and the EU level.

The attitudes and behaviours of the Eurosceptic actors do not only affect the domestic and international politics, but also hinder citizens' democratic participations in politics. In other words, this situation causes a chronicle problem of less voter turnout in the European elections. Moreover, they may undermine the efforts of Member States to create a common foreign policy. According to Domhnall O'Sullivan, "Foreign policy begins at home - in terms of formulation, perception and failure to get one's own house in order can only lead to an inability to influence the construction of the international edifice" (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 2).

Hopf's argument is akin to O'Sullivan's quotation. Hopf came up with the idea that '*constructivism* [starts] *at home*'. Therefore, management weakness of ongoing crisis in national layers may lead to internal foreign policy failures towards the European projects. Hence, increasing presence of national anti-immigrant hostility is likely to undermine the EU's external relations.

From a constructivist perspective, VP/HR Federica Mogherini is one of the key actors to create a culture of cooperation in the common foreign policy structure. Therefore, her communication acts between the European citizens and the national foreign policy identifiers are rather important regarding coherent European foreign policy identity. It is rather important to be united around the vital issue together with all the actors. In order to be united, there needs to be a communal agreement (public, national or supranational consensus) to call it a certain kind of values. Since there are diverging perceptions towards the European construction, political "elites make strategic use of the Eurosceptic rhetoric in order to appear strong defenders of the national interest at home" (Vasilopoulou S. , 2013, p. 162).

Constructing the united Europe, therefore, needs a more positive and compromising discourse to keep the Eurosceptic rhetoric innocuous. Because of this reason the old federalist EP should be portrayed as more inclusive by the pro-European actors. The Eurosceptic parties and actors (MEPs) in a way have potential to trigger European integration. They can increase the legitimacy of the process. If the perception becomes positive and inclusive, the dissenting voices from their own nations and public will diminish. (Brack, 2013b). Even though they are not homogenous enough, they help

arise the representability of the citizens by minimising Euroscepticism and apathy of citizens (Brack, 2013b) (Aphecetche, 2016). What is more, the positive perception towards the Eurosceptics may help the EU issues become understandable and straightforward.

According to Yves Bertoncini, president of the European Movement (*Président du Mouvement Européen*); "there will be a populist upswing in the next European election, but the thing is that populists are not a family. So of course they will be weaker because they are not united" (Francis, 2014). Another similar opinion comes from Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, one of the authors in European Council on Foreign Relations. He claims that the Eurosceptic actors' solutions are different and cannot undergo concrete decision making because of their divergent positions except being anti-EU. However, Torreblanca adds that those actors' agenda setting powers do not require majority. They have a remarkable high level of influence. The perception of mainstream and pro-European parties approves these arguments (Francis, 2014).

As aforementioned, strategies developed by those Eurosceptic MEPs inside the institutions have been initially driven by their national parliaments. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty provided a significant motivation for those Eurosceptic groups (Brack, 2013a, p. 87). In addition to that, "the roles adopted by actors were embedded in particular institutions; therefore, the institutional framework started to influence the scope of opportunities available for actors" (Brack, 2013a, p. 89). Hence, those Eurosceptic MEPs have begun to act like 'agree to disagree' towards the Union's policies. At least, this is the perception of pro-EU actors or groups.

However, the institutional framework has not determined enough room for debates inside the EP (Brack, 2013a, p. 89). This makes harder to create constructive opposition concerning common policies. The Eurosceptic actors have been left insufficient to promote their values and power within the EP. Yet, their position reduced to heterogeneity and personal types of action (social media posts, speeches or parliamentary questions). Their powers are limited in the mainstream policy decisions. If the perception does not change in the future, there is likely to be more anti-establishment Euroscepticism backlash in 2019 European elections.

3.4.2. Voting Cohesion of the Eurosceptic MEPs

MEP speeches and voting behaviours can be analysed in accordance with the direction of European integration and national interests rather than left/right magnitude. There are, however, two primary ways for MEPs to show their positions in the EP: The first one is parliamentary speeches and the second one is involving in the legislative voting (Proksch & Slapin, 2010, p. 588). However, the way how they act remain quite under the shadow;

> The system tends to provide members with greater disincentives to be in permanent opposition: given the working mechanisms of the EP, any permanent opposition will tend to have fewer resources, more limited visibility and face greater marginalization (Brack, 2013a, p. 90).

Since the number of Eurosceptic MEPs are on the rise, their opposition channel is likely to be compensated with pro-European views.

> After frantic negotiations within the broader right-wing Eurosceptic camp, involving the 'soft Eurosceptic' European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) as well as the 'hard Eurosceptic' EAF and EFD, the far right has become even more dispersed. First of all, the EFD lost its old far right members – the DF [Danish People's Party] joined the ECR, the LN the EAF, and the SNS [Slovenian National Party] lost its representation – but gained a new one, the SD. Second, the FN, FPÖ, PVV, and VB have so far been unable to constitute the EAF, and remain temporarily in the NI. Finally, the more extreme parties (Jobbik, NPD [National Democratic Party], and XA [Golden Down]) are considered beyond the pale for all three groups and will probably stay in the NI for the duration of this legislative term. (Mudde, 2016a, p. 36)

Therefore, it is accurate to call them 'untidy' camp because of their diverse positions. They remain rather marginalized in the EP, especially regarding their group representation.

National governments can have an influence on the voting behaviours of those MEPs (Proksch & Slapin, 2010, pp. 587-611). Some of those actors are still in favour of intergovernmental co-operation or transferring sovereignty to the Union. Yet, because of their conflicting logic, they are unable to achieve to be united at supranational level. It can be said that the Eurosceptic (radical) right parties show the least cohesion rate because of the ideological heterogeneity. Radical right actors possess unwillingness to create a

united or co-ordinated opposition body (Brack, 2013a, p. 91). They do not often write reports and push amendments. Therefore, they have a rather limited effect on scrutinising foreign policy issues in the EP.

There are some voting issues that can be classified as both radical left and radical right, on which Eurosceptic actors may not agree such as the enlargement of the EU, the condition of European treaties and transferring national sovereignty to the supranational bodies (Wolfert, 2016). Extension of the competences of the EU in those area comprise the common stance of those radical actors. Whereas, it is hard to observe similar voting cohesion of those Eurosceptic groups ranging from left-wing to right-wing parties in general. More specifically, hard or soft groups may not show tidy voting behaviours among themselves. However, from the constructivist perspective, their voting patterns help us generalise the findings at the EU level (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, p. 75).

As a matter of preserving the national sovereignty, usually the hard Eurosceptic parties may show a common stance against foreign policy choices. This means that hard Eurosceptic groups are to a certain extent united by their opposition to European integration (Wolfert, 2016, pp. 10-13). Another point is about the population of hard and soft Eurosceptic parties in the parliament. It shows that there are 25 soft Eurosceptic parties compared to 15 hard Eurosceptic ones (Treib, 2014, p. 1543). This situation is justified by the fact that there are less hard Eurosceptic parties present in the EP which mean that they do not profoundly affect the foreign policy issues (Wolfert, 2016, p. 7). Therefore, their most coherent area remains the scrutinising of the EU's annual budget.

Consequently, the Eurosceptic party's and actors' voting cohesions are rather important to turn the EP into an open institution which represents every group by enhancing the legitimacy of the EP. Yet, the roles adopted by political actors are embedded in the institutions. Because of this reason, the institutional structure has also an impact on the range of opportunities and voting behaviours conducted by actors mutually. Despite the fact that the EP has limited formal role in foreign policy decisions, the institutional structure is inclined to be in favour of the voting pattern of pro-EU MEPs.

From the above findings of three main divergent behavioural attitudes of the Eurosceptic MEPs, it can be claimed that those Eurosceptic MEPs have a small chance to profoundly impact the EP's legislative works by their voting behaviours. Their impact lies behind delegitimizing the EU in the eyes of the citizens by indirectly hindering the integration pace (Brack, 2013a, p. 102). There are some constraints coming from the institutional setting which limit those MEPs' behaviours simultaneously.

3.5. Do Populist Parties and Actors Run Europe and Its Foreign Policy?

According to one of the influential non-profit organizations, Carnegie Europe, the implications of populist actors to foreign policy should neither be underestimated nor exaggerated, especially on the eve of upcoming European elections (Cadier, 2019). This mindset overflows to foreign policy. The question of 'whether Populist Parties Run Europe or not?' might have similar answers: They are already running it. This feeling is valid since the early 1990s –from the Maastricht Treaty. As aforementioned, one of the more recent concerns is that the populist and the Eurosceptic parties are influencing the Union's foreign policy and integration process. Regarding foreign policy, the EP must approve the annual budgets of CFSP. The EP also scrutinises the operations of the EEAS. However, another comprehensive report published by the European Policy Centre (EPC) came up with a different result regarding the populist actors and how they challenge foreign policy issues. According to that report, "contemporary European populists on both the left and right have so far shown limited transformative power in terms of their ability to determine actual policy choices" (Mudde, 2016b). A further study with regard to bids of PVV and NF leaders shows that the populist or the Eurosceptics are usually inclined to appoint inexperienced foreign policy decision makers to those positions thereby cause lack of crisis management and unclear foreign policy directions (Kane & McCulloch, 2017, p. 46).

Therefore, even though populists are on the rise, it seems unlikely for them to gain big leverage to run Europe. Moreover, the main populist and Eurosceptic actors and parties are a real 'troublemakers' for the future of Europe. The reports above make some

recommendations. The first and foremost solution is that "the deficiencies in the way our democracy work need to be acknowledged and addressed" (Mudde, 2016b). After that, a positive and credible alternative should be created by mainstream parties rather than engaging in confrontational dialogues with their opponents. According to Muddle;

> If the mainstream simply tries to steal their [the Eurosceptics] clothes, disaffection with traditional politics will push populist leaders onto more radical ground. Moreover, by doing this, mainstream politicians risk confirming in the public's mind the very shallowness and attachment to power that the populists accuse them of (Mudde, 2016b).

While foreign policy makers debate on international issues, they bring the loop of domestic and international issues on the table that tangibly affect public's everyday life. Therefore, the populist or the Eurosceptic actors predicate themselves as an alternative between citizens and elite politics. This division of the Union should force the pro-European actors to do the same: Listening to the citizens' concerns to address them better. This can also de-escalate democratic deficit in a non-technocratic way. Thus, communication is significantly the most important tool in this regard (Mudde, 2016b).

There is an understanding that the Eurosceptic parties and actors are pushing centrist parties into the populist camp regarding foreign policy. They force pro-Europeans to adopt more anti-European discourses and rhetoric. In addition to this, Fredrik Erixon[33] says that "mainstream parties are forced to tap into populist constituencies to win elections or avoid death by opinion polls" (Dempsey, 2014). The best example is David Cameron's call for a referendum to make UKIP's voice down. However, it backfired and was concluded with a triumph of the hard Eurosceptic camp. In the case of Sweden's 'volte-face' Democrats party, they chose to follow the path of far-right party on migration issues. The situations are more unfavourable in the Netherlands and Denmark because in those countries left-wing and socialist parties apply populist acts. Hungary and Poland constitute an acute position. According to these findings, it is apparent that those populist and Eurosceptic parties may not seem running their countries, but they find fertile ground

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[33] Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy.

to strengthen their position by disregarding democracy thanks to the mainstream party policies (Dempsey, 2014).

The Eurosceptic parties and the Eurosceptic MEPs may find an easy path to widen the range of their choices in the EP. They comprise huge potential to make the EU complicated to govern. They can play an indirect role to limit the EU's ability to embark on key decisions such as foreign policy (Leonard & Torreblanca, 2014, p. 2). Thus, they are able to weaken the legitimacy of the EU by exposing disaffection. In other words, the Eurosceptics lead a big division and mistrust that jeopardise the future integration of the Union. By converting the EP into a conflicting institution which does not reflect the will of people but do cause democratic deficit.

Two main groups, the Group of European People's Party and the European Democrats (EPP - S&D/ALDE), are still the dominant ones in the EP. In fact "the dominance of these groups in the parliament shows the general tendency of the European citizens" (Cepel, 2011, p. 535). Bar Chart 2. shows the percental share of deputies for each political groups in the EP that testify the small but ever increasing number of the Eurosceptic groups. Pro-European groups may have prevalent influence on the legislative process without negotiating the Eurosceptic rapporteurs. Since the public opinions affect these legislative process, according to Dimiter Toshkov, the Eurosceptic MEPs are needed to be consulted properly in order to affect foreign policy choices.

Bar Chart 2. The Percental Share of Deputies for Each Political Groups in the EP (1979 -2014 Left to Right)

Source: European Parliament

In a nutshell, the Eurosceptic actors and parties endeavour to transform the EP into an influential domain to present their opposition in both national and European level. After 2014 elections the Eurosceptic actors became vocal about the CFSP. MEPs have attended several conferences and nominated their rapporteurs to overhaul legislative activities. However, the presence of those Eurosceptics and populists varies[34] (Balfour, et al., 2016, p. 23). Moreover, they appear to be unable to effect the actual policy outcomes. For instance in the case of recent Greek crisis, the decision has not reflected the both left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic preferences but mainstream parties. The Eurosceptics appear less likely to work together because of their mutual mistrust to each other and institutional constraints (Balfour, et al., 2016, pp. 21-24). Although there is a proximity between Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (45 MEPs) and European United Left–Nordic Green Left (51 MEPs) groups, they lack having blackmail power in order to influence the foreign policy decision consequently.

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[34] For example 65% in Hungary -Fidesz and Jobbik but 5.6% in Belgium -Vlaams Belang or Sweden Democrats 12.9%.

3.6. The Influence of the EP and National Parliaments on Foreign Policy

Before focusing on the EP, it is worth evaluating the position of some national parliaments in foreign policy making. French and British parliamentary control over the EU's military action remain inadequate with regard to democratisation and accountability of the states. In both cases, those Member States block their parliaments to exercise supervision over the EU military actions. It is crystal clear when taking the operation Artemis and Concordia as examples. In these examples, the French and British parliaments were left unable to consult the decision making process such as launching military troops. This lack of formal approval creates further problems for the Eurosceptic MEPs in the EP to follow their national agendas.[35] Having government majority in their countries reduce the efficient parliamentary scrutiny in foreign affairs. Thus, this forces some MEPs to follow the EP party agendas rather than national agenda.

It appears that "the more authority, ability, attitude and ambition a parliament has to act apart from government, there is more intervening in shaping of the foreign policy of the state/entity" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 11). The 2014 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) survey also proves this statement (Bajtay, 2015, pp. 10-11). According to this survey, all the members of parliaments are to some extent exposed to divergent and limited ways of involvement in international affairs.

MEPs' accountability refers to the executive which is held responsible for legislation in the EP. MEPs evaluate the policies which tangibly affect the citizens. Therefore, they raise questions and "strengthen the visibility of the EU's foreign policies, and serve as a bridge between the EU institutions and citizens" (Turunen & Legrand, 2018). MEPs also have power to elect the president of the Commission and approve the College (Costa, 2016, p. 3). This is a rather political control. Their main tools are making recommendations, preparing reports, organizing committee hearings (which are frequently used for civilian issues) as well as financial/budgetary control over the legislation (Bajtay, 2015, pp. 12-13). However, because of the democratic deficit in the

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[35] "The role of Parliaments in European foreign policy Debating on accountability and legitimacy", EU publications, 15.05.2006. Retrieved from https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6e345679-0438-40f9-b6ca-7c52288ccd60/language-en (Accessed: 23.06.2018).

EP, the oversight instruments are not applied in every policy area such as foreign affairs. This leads the parliament to continue having rather limited influence on those highly politicized issues.

> National parliaments (and the European Parliament) fulfil very similar functions and roles in 'soft' foreign policy: they adopt related budgets and control their implementation, consent to or ratify international agreements, the external equivalent of domestic law; they monitor their application in different ways as well as providing a platform for public debate. However, the 'harder' the elements of the foreign and security policy of a state/entity, the fewer legislative and budgetary actions are required to pursue them; the more dominant the executive is and the less parliaments appear to be involved in the controlling and shaping of this particular policy, the more diverse parliamentary powers and practices become (Bajtay, 2015, p. 14).

This problem also occurs in the evaluation of the EU national parliaments' participation in CFSP/CSDP decision making processes. Some Member States' parliamentarians have only a consultancy role. However, some others' parliamentarians are needed necessarily to approve sending troops. For instance, in Germany the ambitious of the parliament is rather limited regarding the foreign policy issues. But, even so, the Federal Parliaments and the executive are expected to share the power over the countries' foreign, security and defence policy. In addition to this, no parliamentary approval is necessary for unarmed civilian missions. That is why there is no check and balance system exerted on Germany with regard to contribution to CSDP civilian missions (Bajtay, 2015, p. 17). In the case of Britain, neither the House of Lords nor the House of Commons have limitless powers to obtain a leading position in formalizing foreign policy. In Britain, the parliamentary control is only exercised to the extent deemed necessary by the executive. Moreover, it is likely to take place after the decisions are already made (Bajtay, 2015, p. 18). The situation is quite the same in the case of "the French National Assembly which also has a limited role in shaping and controlling the country's foreign, security and defence policy" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 19). Therefore;

> Consequently, given the wide variation of legislative powers and substantial differences of practices in controlling CSDP as well as the limited formal controlling functions of the EP, a lack of collective oversight can be observed and neither EU national parliaments nor the EP itself are able to effectively control the EU's foreign and security policy (Bajtay, 2015, p. 14).

Governments and the EU prefer to have some flexibility to act in various foreign policy topic dexterously. At first glance the EP seems rather strengthened after the Lisbon Treaty in terms of its budgetary power on CFSP and EEAS, however the bureaus of the AFET and Budget Committees remain under the influence of mainstream party population. Unlike national parliaments, "the parliamentary majority in the EP is not 'the extended arm' of the other 'state-like' branch. MEPs are not 'mouthpieces' of the executive, their policy approach or value choices are not necessarily determined by political affiliation to the Commission" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 21).

Within this structure, the parliamentary groups in the EP generally tends to pursue different foreign policy positions autonomously. Additionally, some MEPs (mostly the Eurosceptic ones) in the EP take advantage of the absence of national institutional set-up in the EP. This situation ensures them with opportunity to take foreign policy positions more independently but being politically obliged to the Council, the HR/VP or the Commission. These three constitute the main executive organs related to the EU foreign policy (Bajtay, 2015, p. 21).

At first glance, this may appear as if those MEPs enjoy considerable political autonomy and independence with their political identity and issue-specific expertise.[36] Since the major revisions of the last five treaties have occurred, the EP's legislative and budgetary power has increased. Thus, stronger parliamentary legitimacy led to more EU competence battle on the issues of foreign policy. The growing power of the EP created inter-institutional tensions. Especially after the latest Treaty provision (the Lisbon), the EP took the position in foreign policy domain by expanding its legitimacy and oversight. The overall role of the EP in foreign policy has become "translating the values, interests, policy choices of EU citizens from non-binding instructions to the executive conducting European external action" (Bajtay, 2015, pp. 24-25).

Even though the EP can be considered as enjoying the well-established institutional arrangement in bilateral, multilateral, international and global capability; practically this does not create a profound influence on the policy issues. The EP remained

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[36]For instance, while the Spanish MEPs focus on Mediterranean and Latin America, the Polish MEPs focus on Russia and Ukraine as their foreign policy agenda.

empowered regarding internal policies, but its effect could not be felt so much in the foreign policy sphere. Increments in the legal procedures of consent and co-decision procedure could not improve the EP sufficiently. Additionally, the Council often neglects the EP's legislative demands –except the EP's power of delay (Kardasheva, 2009, p. 386). Despite all, the EP's peculiar reputation shed light on its legislative actions which make an impact on the EU's 'soft decisions' both internally and externally. Nevertheless, the hard powers have not been extended to all fields of European foreign policy issues. The EP has been left with a limited formal parliamentary manoeuvre. Therefore, "the EP continues to have only limited control functions over the Council's competences in the field of CFSP" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 25). Even though it was put into the Treaty ("... [The EP] shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure" (Article 218(10) TFEU)), the attitudes of the Commission and the Council are seen reluctant to give feedback to the certain groups in the EP.

This reluctance creates cumbersomeness for MEPs to inform their citizens and hinder bilateral affiliation between the EP and the Commission (Bajtay, 2015, p. 26). In other words, the EP's substantive concerns are disregarded by affecting the Union's credibility adversely and feeding the Eurosceptic tendencies consequently.

Therefore, MEPs' real impact on foreign policy issues – especially hard policy ones- is hard to measure because of the abundance of constraining factors. Their acts in pursuing foreign policy interests at the EU level are blocked by the pro-EU legislative actions in the EP (Bajtay, 2015, pp. 22-23). However, with the huge budgetary role on the European external cooperation assistance, the EP's role is launched as if the EP has big control power on foreign policy. This formal legislative power provides the EP not only legislative competence but also financial decision making power on the external action and foreign policy issues. However, this remains as limited substantial control over CFSP. MEPs are not formally consulted before the actions such as military operations which directly financed by the Member States governments (Bajtay, 2015, p. 28).

Unlike the national parliaments, "the EP and its influential Members always had the ambition and attitude to maximise parliamentary authority and make full use of the acquired formal powers for the sake of taking European integration forward" (Bajtay,

2015, p. 28). However, as it was referred above, this policy area is mostly under the discretion of the VP/HR, the Council and the Member States.

> The VP/HR is invited to consult Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices' of the CFSP and CSDP regularly by presenting an annual report to the EP and participating in twice-yearly parliamentary debates to cover all foreign policy issues (Bajtay, 2015, p. 29).

It can be seen that double legitimacy puts the VP/HR in a position that needs more close relation with the EP in Lisbon Treaty. "The EP plays a formal role in endorsing the nomination of the VP/HR, since this person is subject to a collective vote of consent by the EP" (Albertini, p. 8).

Yet, it is not clear how the EP's consent are dully taken into consideration by the VP/HR. According to Gabriele Albertini,[37] there are also a number of informal influences on the CFSP. The prerogatives of the executive branch allows simply a limited parliamentary involvement, control and democratic participation in scrutiny mechanism (Albertini, p. 9). This makes parliamentary scrutiny highly contested. Albertini puts forward that decisions which directly affect the citizens, should be taken collectively. In addition to this, the EP should play a more effective role to control those decisions. Thus, there should be more parliamentary involvement. The Council mostly fails to engage with the EP in terms of inter-institutional dialogue. This further triggers decreasing of the EP's accountability on foreign policy actions. It appears that unlike the EP's reports and recommendations related to CFSP issues; the VP/HR, the Council and the Commission still hold the main opinion exchange (Albertini, p. 8).

Furthermore, there is a significant paradox in the institutional system. Thus, policy decisions lead the EP as if it is unqualified to ensure democratic accountability for the citizens of the EU. "The EP has no formal say in authorising the launch of an EU crisis-management mission, neither a civilian one nor a military one. It can neither co-decide on legal obligations nor on individual mission budgets" (Wouters & Raube, 2012, p. 152). The EP basically remains depending on the the Council's goodwill to receive

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[37] Gabriele Albertini is a MEP, former Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs European Parliament, Brussels.

information about the CFSP which, again, creates a huge democratic deficit. Besides all, the EP "is widely and increasingly used by external and internal actors as an open forum for pursuing foreign policy interests and trying to make an impact on international developments" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 33). In this regard, the EP is prone to be a proactive institution thanks to its inter-parliamentary delegations and bodies.

Consequently, the EP (together with MEPs, the political parties, committees, sub-committees, inter-parliamentary delegations) is perceived relatively discernable but often formally and informally ignored in terms of the influence on certain (foreign) policies. MEPs often have hard time to impose their views on the Commission. Compared to the pro-EU MEPs, the Eurosceptic MEPs face discriminatory policies by the Council (Costa, 2016, p. 45). Yet, the EP is directly able to affect the European integration in the following circumstances: "Parliament can raise questions; Hold interpellations; Organise public debates (both on plenary and committee level) including hearings and workshops; Adopt resolutions and own-initiative reports; Set up special committees of inquiry; Confirm appointments and launch no-confidence and impeachment procedures" (Bajtay, 2015, p. 34).

All in all, the European party groups are the key agenda setting tools. They control the allocation of the committees. They ask questions, organise public debates, make resolutions/reports/recommendations and have budgetary control over the EEAS. The EP, still, enjoys its political autonomy to develop their own foreign policy ideas. MEPs have endeavours to drive the CFSP/External relations despite their asymmetrical opinions. However, MEPs' traditional argument is 'necessity of flexibility' which means 'expert sovereignty' rather than 'parliamentary sovereignty' (Bajtay, 2015, p. 39). Yet, these institutional challenges (lack of informations, restrictions, anti-democratic decision making structure etc.) inevitably stimulate the Eurosceptic impulses in the EP. The EU political system remains essentially limits the impact of the directly elected MEPs (Costa, 2016, p. 46).

3.7. Formal and Informal Constrains on MEPs

Individual roles and acts result from the formal (Chamber's Rules of Procedures) and informal (lobbying in the EP committees) constraints and the incentives socially construct MEPs' abilities. (See Figure 5.) This institutional structure serves full autonomy or a restriction to certain kind of MEPs' rooms of manoeuvre (Brack, 2018, p. 116). "This (limitations) has allowed the EP to become more efficient, maximize its impact on the legislative process…" (Hix, 2002, pp. 259-280). Individual MEPs rely on the formal rules of the EP. However, those rules are not given the Eurosceptic MEPs a room to act freely. Especially after 2014 they gain limited information about the actions of the Commission and the Council.

Figure 5. Constraints on the Eurosceptic MEPs

Source: Author's own calculations.

The reason why there is a limited parliamentary question is the fact that there are thresholds for committees, parliament's component Members as well as the political groups. "Until the 8th legislature, any MEP could table a written declaration but this, now, requires 10 MEPs from at least 3 political groups (Rules of Procedure of the EP article art. 136), and the possibility disappeared in January 2017" (Brack, 2018, p. 119). MEPs could also table amendments in plenary sessions before. However, now, it requires a precise committee with at least 40 MEPs according to the Rules of Procedure of the EP Article 169. These rules directly affect the non-attached Eurosceptic MEPs negatively.

They reduce the visibility of opposition MEPs in the EP. Multiplication of speeches and delaying the adoption of reports are hardly possible in this system. In short, the impacts of the Eurosceptic MEPs' on filibustering opportunities have been reduced notably to avoid future conflicts. After the sixth legislature term the president of the Parliament also gained more power to reduce misuse of those parliamentary rules (Brack, 2018, p. 119).

While individual MEPs' roles had been diminished, the political groups' positions have been empowered. Political groups have progressively gained explicit prerogative rules such as nomination of the President of the EP. Nevertheless, those rules have empowered the main political groups in the EP, which are S&D and EPP. These groups (almost two thirds of the EP) have been left more powerful to set the agenda. This creates hardship for smaller groups/ Eurosceptics under domination of the biggest ones. Domination of the biggest groups damages political multivocality. Moreover, it evokes permanent struggle for creating legislative activities beyond main groups. According to one Eurosceptic MEP, this situation started since ideological cooperation was limited with the post-Maastricht reforms (Brack, 2018, p. 121). Because of the fact that there are restrictions, the Eurosceptic MEPs are reluctant to cooperate, appear and join a political group. In other words, they show individualistic attitudes.

Referring to Non-attached MEPs, the first problem for them is the lack of resources. Furthermore, they are excluded from crucial coordinator's meetings. Moreover, they face time limitations during the plenary sessions. Non-attached MEPs are given no chance to become rapporteur which are main instruments of the EP creating legislatures and reports (Corbett, Jacobs, & Shackleton, 2007, p. 57). Those privileges are dominated by the biggest groups. More attention is given to legislative activities than plenary sessions by these biggest groups. The Eurosceptics are blatantly underrepresented in the reports. In other words, those Eurosceptic groups, especially non-attached MEPs, are left marginalised. Therefore, they are excluded from their activities in the EP (Startin, 2010, pp. 429-449).

According to EPP and S&D party politics, these restrictions and reforms are necessary to produce more efficient legislatures, while the smallest anti-European/marginal groups claims that this is a total bureaucratization of the EP (as

Greens, EUL/NGL and EFT claim). It is apparent that while the biggest groups work on sensitive legislatives, they avoid making compromises with the Eurosceptics at the same time. Manfred Weber from EPP says that; "It is crucial this stability is safeguarded. We want to make sure that the role of radical and extremist MEPs are limited and that they cannot influence major EU decisions" (Brack, 2018, p. 131; Eriksson, 2016). Pro-EU groups do not want any constructed opposition destabilising the EP. Thus, pro-Europeans neither want the Eurosceptic MEPs to promote their ideas nor affect crucial decisions.

Institutional settings, identities, cultural factors and MEPs' divergent preferences are important to understand and determine their behaviours. These factors should be dealt with in an intertwined way. Therefore, finding a same line regarding foreign policy is rather troublesome because of these reasons. Since there is a democratic deficit in the EP, the opposition pole will always aggravate the EP's agenda.

Consequently, the attitudes of the Eurosceptic MEPs are highly influenced by the roles that imposed on them by formal and informal institutional constrains (Brack, 2018, p. 154). All the restrictions lead the Eurosceptic MEPs to adopt self-exclusion attitudes. Whereas, the Eurosceptics MEPs may either choose to involve in a parliamentary work to threaten the EU with limited manoeuvre or remain structurally marginalized without any involvement (Brack, 2018, p. 181). In short, there is no one-size-fits-all description for the Eurosceptic MEPs behaviours.

> As noted by Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton, 'the rules thus give considerable scope for dissident members within a political group or coalitions of individual members across groups, to trigger different procedures'. On the other hand, however, the institutional framework also acts as a constraint on their actions. Small groups receive very few reports in part because some of them do not want the reports but also because, as extremists, they might obtain the least salient reports… Eurosceptics are restricted to individual types of action (Brack, 2012, pp. 159-161).

In a nutshell, if the EU wants a hub for democratic control, the institutional structure of the EP should not be favouring the pro-EU groups by limiting the Eurosceptic/opposing views. The institutional framework should be more inclusive. Therefore, the EU needs to reform its institutional setting as a crucial step, since every MEP directly represents the public opinions. In order to eliminate these constrains, all

different views and heterogeneities should be reconciled within the Union by increasing the democratic participation in the EP.

All in all, it seems that the Eurosceptic MEPs mostly remain irrelevant and without significant influence regarding their policy preferences. While the centrist counterparts easily have a chance to be selected as rapporteur in committees; the Eurosceptic, the non-attached or the non-centrist MEPs have the least chance to tap into that privilege in order to obtain preparation of crucial reports and pushing amendments (Morris, 2013, pp. 46-50). In plenary stage, the biggest groups have the highest rate of approval for amendments thanks to their group side: between 2009 and 2012 only 2 of EFD's amendments were approved compared to EPP's 59.[38] In the 8th parliamentary term, there are 158 legislative/non-legislative activities, parliamentary resolutions and initiatives in the subject of external relations of the Union in Foreign Affairs Committee. EPP and S&D political share 84 of them, while the rest are shared by other political groups with significantly lesser amounts.[39]

### 3.8. Institutional Interaction and Socialization

Institutional interaction between actors and structure in the EP allows the Eurosceptic MEPs to adopt divergent roles, voting behaviours and parliamentary perceptions of their position. According to Searing, roles are the result of this interaction between the institution and actors. Ruth Wodak's study on discursive politics in the EP points that the creation of the roles partly depend on the social interaction (socialisation process) of the institutions. These roles determine the actors' motivations intertwined with their attitudes. In this regard, "actors define their goals and motivations in an ongoing dialogue with the institutional rules that structure their environment" (Searing, 1991, pp. 1239-1260). It can be said that MEPs rather act as they interpret the institutional reality of the EP. They do not make utilitarian calculations. These interpretations and behaviours explain how they perceive their mandates.

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[38] VoteWatch Europe. https://www.votewatch.eu/
[39] European Parliament Legislative Observatory; Author's own calculations.

Therefore, the roles and foreign policy choices of the Eurosceptic MEPs indicate the results from the interactions between institutional factors (such as formal and informal rules and constrains) and individual preferences. In other words, from a constructivist perspective, it can be accentuated that there is a correlation between those institutional factors and MEPs behaviours (Brack, 2018, pp. 30-37) (See Figure 6).

Figure 6. How the EP's Rules Affect MEPs Roles towards European Integration

Source: Nathalie Brack, "Opposing Europe in the European Parliament: Rebels and Radicals in the Chamber", Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 36.

Bureaucratization, less sovereign nation-state ideas, vague nature of European projects, democratic deficit and rising elite-citizen gap have consolidated the behaviours of the Eurosceptic MEPs within the EP. 2014 unprecedented electoral success of the Eurosceptic MEPs augments these situations. "The structures and procedures of the EP does not allow the institution to play its role as a 'site of opposition' in the classic sense of the term" (Brack, 2018, p. 63). These institutional constraints and the lack of democratic check and balance system create further tensions by forming a new identity for the EU. There appears to be a new socialization process among MEPs within the EP's institutional setting. Regarding this interaction, MEPs' voting behaviours, party affiliation and discourses, once again, show the key for their foreign policy choices.

CONCLUSION

European politics has been facing Euroscepticism for 30 years. Even though dissident voices have started in the early stages of European integration process, the severity of this problematic issue mainly dates back to the Maastricht Treaty. One of the controversial political tools was created with the Maastricht Treaty: the CFSP. The EU has gained its political identity. Integration process has increased its pace regarding foreign policy area. However, the transformation of national identities into a single supranational actor was criticised increasingly. These criticisms have galvanised the Eurosceptic voices in many policy areas.

Steadily, it appears that the anti-EU/Eurosceptic rhetoric needs major reforms while legitimacy of the Union becomes implausible gradually. The EP serves a fertile ground for those Eurosceptic behaviours especially after the 2014 European elections. These elections constitute an unprecedented success and a growing discontent among citizens and anti-EU camp. Depending on the recent incidents, the growing negative trends are neither marginal nor temporal. There are constant ever-growing Eurosceptic ideas in national and international layers. Since the late 1970s, the EP has become a place where the Eurosceptic MEPs increase their numbers at supranational level. This raises the questions in minds about the EP's future image and impact whether there is an existential threat regarding institutional democracy or not.

Evidently, from a constructivist perspective, it can be seen that the democratic deficit in the EP signals a permanent incidents. Even though the Eurosceptics are usually considered to be outnumbered by mainstream counterparts, their attitudes and discourse rather significant for the future of the Union. There is a close relationship between institutional structure (degree of independence or formal and informal constrains upon MEPs) and certain political preferences on foreign policy choices in the EP. Those are essential variables in order to understand this study. The EU is inclined to block the oppositional Eurosceptic channel in the EP (Mair, 2007, p. 7). In other words, the Union lacks institutionalised oppositional channel. Accordingly, the Eurosceptics feel that they are lacking the right to organise opposition as well as the area to do it.

Thus, constructivist approach helps us see the institutional construction to analyse MEPs' behavioural activities, priorities, heterogeneities, core values and motivations. Constructivism provides a larger arsenal to analyse the relationship between the Union's common foreign policy making, Euroscepticism and MEPs' foreign policy choices and their manoeuvre. There is an apparent interaction between institutional and individual activities. Comparison of rigorous source of data, previous interviews with MEPs, parliamentary questions, speeches of certain actors, official documents; the EP serves us a fertile empirical ground to probe the Eurosceptic MEPs and their foreign policy choices. Through these various data, the inference can be made in relation with the Eurosceptic MEPs and their foreign policy choices in the EP.

Thus, this study has attempted to sketch out the key aspects of the issues in order to provide important insights for the hypotheses that I tested: there are institutional constraints on the Eurosceptic MEPs and this process determines their limited foreign policy preferences.

The EP has been empowered and it became a more serious institutional setting after the Maastricht Treaty. The co-decision procedure (which was introduced by the Maastricht treaty) was extended. However, the EP election results and its consent have remained limited. Relatedly, there is a growing tendency for the Eurosceptic MEPs to become progressively more agenda-setters. Therefore, it should be noted that their position is essential now in terms of fundamental issues (Brack, 2018, p. 4). However, transparency of the EP underwent a serious criticism as well as undemocratic and inefficient decision making process (Brack, 2018, p. 19). Therefore, the Eurosceptic MEPs are not inclined to be homogenous.

It should be noted that, the socialization process in the EP has relinquished to push more pro-integrationist mind-set unlike previous years. The idea of 'all MEPs go native eventually' is not widely held any longer. Rather, some MEPs are incline to represent their electorates at national level.

The process of intricate socialization process along with the impact of cultural structures on identities create more diverse MEPs behaviours. Therefore, the normative

effect of the EP has a different impact on the MEPs' knowledge, values, consensus and beliefs. This sometimes causes stigmatization for the Eurosceptic actors to effect foreign policy decisions. Thus, those Eurosceptic MEPs are inclined to sustain various behaviours.

Accordingly, the Eurosceptic MEPs show divergent voting patterns. On the one hand, they tend to follow the voting instructions of their national party politics. On the other hand, their political groups remain more cohesive in terms of political competition in the EP. This is discernable in left/right cleavage or the pro-/anti-integration axis. It affects the common European demos in the EP adversely because of the least inter-group cohesion regarding the policy outcomes.

Democratic accountability and institutional limitation over the EP create a significant challenge for the Eurosceptic MEPs. Even though the EP's budgetary power creates some weight, it does not enable a substantial right to anti-EU MEPs. Furthermore, since the Commission turned into a hub for an institutional arranger regarding the foreign policy issues, there is a lack of Commission trust towards the EP. This lack of trust as well as less cohesiveness and institutional constraints, push the Eurosceptic MEPs and party groups to become like niche parties, which can only affect soft politics.

It is important to have an institutional social inclusion and interaction in order to consult everybody in the EP. Reducing unfair political control constitute the key importance for overarching legislative structure. With this regard, being democratic means accepting that the ideas may contradict with yours; and things you do not necessarily approve. However, it should be noted that democratic deficit is the consistent phenomenon in today's world. Therefore, this proves that while MEPs have significant place regarding play forefront role in foreign policy, the severity of the institutional conflicts and constraints limit the democratic environment in the EP for certain MEPs.

The EP is the main democratic oversight power which rises the visibility of the Union. However, as this study indicates, the EP's role in democratic legitimacy lacks in terms of the Eurosceptic MEPs' positions in foreign policy. Yet, social constructivist

perspective of foreign policy constitutes rather a positive integration because it does not generate any end-point but abstract goals.

In short, the grand coalition in the EP predates any needs to avoid compromises with the Eurosceptics. This creates the main hardship for the Eurosceptics in the EP. Moreover, this coalition divides the parliamentarians into pro- and anti-integration dimension. In order to cope with this heterogenity, parties need to make more compromises.

All in all, the EP is an important cornerstone regarding the EU's foreign policy with three key features: budgetary, supervisory and legislative power. However, even though there are some principled rejections of the Eurosceptic MEPs on foreign policy choices, this policy field is not jeopardized by the Eurosceptic MEPs fundamentally. Yet, those MEPs are also *sine qua non* for democratic participation in foreign policy.

Therefore, I come up with the following conclusions which I can test the hypothesis of this work. First, due to the gradual rise of the EP's role, formal and informal institutional constraints prevent the Eurosceptic MEPs from involving in Foreign policy domain effectively because of the pro-EU picture. Moreover, the current supranational structure hardly allows every MEPs to contribute to tailor-made political outcomes. Secondly, the Eurosceptics are not cohesive and in multitude number to create big impact on concerning policy sphere with diverse interests when they prefer to involve in. Therefore, they have limited transformative effects, while they mostly undermine the consensus. Additionally, there are more under-performing and the less engaged Eurosceptic parties than the over-performing ones. Therefore, the achievement by creating deeper European integration has caused the EU to gradually fall victim to its own success. Subsequently, the provisions which enable the EP to voice its foreign policy choices, do not reflect any bouncing powers. Those provisions are rather "soft" powers such as consultation, recommendation and questioning (less actual political influence) which neither bind the Council nor the Commission regarding foreign policy domain. Finally, there is a socialisation process in the EP which favours the pro-EU camps by creating formal and informal constraints over the anti-EU MEPs.

This thesis tried to explain that the Eurosceptics still have the capability to involve in the talks related to some foreign policy issues such as terrorism, migration and other internal crisis by pointing sovereignty, national boundaries, democratic deficit, political and institutional incorrectness and decision making procedures. Hence, their foreign policy activities are filtered through by pro-European mainstream actors and the other supranational bodies (the Commission and the Council). Yet, Euroscepticism remains unpredictable and uncertain on foreign policy issues. The pattern still varies across national preferences, identities and institutional interactions.

Apart from the discovery of the relationship between foreign policy and Euroscepticism, the continuation of the research for this thesis can be developed in more empirical approach to collate a larger volume of statistical evidence prior to the upcoming 2019 European elections and further democracy studies. I hope this study to some extend contributes to the democracy studies which concern the future of the EU. To create post-national, truly democratic, egalitarian, anti-Eurosceptic and fair institutions; it is essential to have an environment in which every citizens enjoy the political equality −maybe an utopian dream of 'European Republic'.

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