

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
ANABİLİM DALI**

**DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF AN 'ANTI-IMMIGRATION EUROPE'
BY THE RIGHT-WING POLITICAL GROUPS
IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Kamber GÜLER

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Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Nedime Aslı Şirin ÖNER

İstanbul – 2019

TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne

Enstitünüz, Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Türkçe / İngilizce Doktora Programı öğrencisi Kamber Güler tarafından hazırlanan, “**Discursive Construction of an ‘Anti-Immigration Europe’ by the Right – Wing Political Groups in the European Parliament**” başlıklı bu çalışma, .04./03./2019 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda **OY BİRLİĞİ / OY ÇOKLUĞUYA BAŞARILI** bulunarak aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından Doktora Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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
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12.03.2019...tarih ve 2019/05...sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

ABSTRACT

This study is aimed at understanding and exposing how the European elites, i.e. the members of the right-wing political groups in the European Parliament (EP), use discourses as a means of controlling public discourse, and hence, the public mind. Discourses are used to legitimate the ideology, values and norms of the relevant political groups in the society, which may result in social power abuse, dominance or inequality. The study mainly argues that these political groups discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe during the EP debates within three main discourse topics: immigration as a security threat, as an economic threat and as a cultural threat. Along with some references to Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak as well as the Copenhagen School in terms of the securitisation of migration, this study mostly draws on the premises and strategies of Teun A. van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach of critical discourse analysis to base its arguments. It is seen that the members of the right-wing political groups tend to glorify the Self, i.e. Europe and sometimes their own country, with various positive attributions to them whereas they mostly refer to the Other, i.e. asylum seekers, refugees or migrants, through negative implications, presuppositions, denomination or predication, which is a common attitude of anti-immigration politicians and paves the way for the construction of an anti-immigration Europe. Last but not least, if there is a 'refugee crisis', then, dialectically, the opposite is also possible: 'refugee awareness'. This study also aspires to contribute to the formation of 'refugee awareness'.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Avrupalı seçkinlerin, yani Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki (AP) sağ siyasi grup üyelerinin kamusal söylemi, dolayısıyla kamusal akli kontrol altına almanın bir aracı olarak söylemleri nasıl kullandığını anlamayı ve ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Söylemler, söz konusu siyasi grupların ideoloji, değer ve normlarının toplumda meşrulaştırılması amacıyla kullanılmaktadır. Bu durum, toplumsal gücün kötüye kullanılması, egemenlik veya eşitsizlik ile sonuçlanabilmektedir. Çalışma, esas olarak, bu siyasi grupların AP görüşmeleri sırasında üç ana söylem konusu çerçevesinde söylemsel olarak göç karşıtı Avrupa inşa ettiğini savunmaktadır: güvenlik tehdidi, ekonomik tehdit ve kültürel tehdit olarak göç. Bu çalışma, savlarını temellendirmek amacıyla, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi bağlamında Kopenhag Okulu'nun yanı sıra Norman Fairclough ve Ruth Wodak'a yapılan bazı atıflar ile birlikte, çoğunlukla Teun A. van Dijk'in eleştirel söylem çözümlemesi toplum-bilişsel yaklaşımı sayıltılarına ve stratejilerine dayanmaktadır. Sağ siyasi grup üyelerinin Öteki'ne, yani sığınmacı, mülteci ya da göçmenlere olumsuz imalar, önvarsayımlar, adlandırma veya yüklemleme ile atıfta bulunurken Öz'ü, yani Avrupa'yı ve bazen kendi ülkelerini çeşitli olumlu atıflarla yücelttiği görülmektedir. Bu durum, göç karşıtı siyasetçilerin yaygın bir tutumudur ve göç karşıtı Avrupa inşasına zemin hazırlamaktadır. Son ama oldukça önemli olarak, 'mülteci krizi' varsa, o halde, diyalektik olarak zıttı da mümkündür: 'mülteci farkındalığı'. Bu çalışma, aynı zamanda, 'mülteci farkındalığı' oluşumuna katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been born in my mind and heart if it had not been for the forcibly displaced people including many children who lost their lives on the migration routes. And, I am very indebted to my thesis supervisor, Asst. Prof. Dr. Nedime Aslı Şirin Öner, who made this thesis possible with her precious guidance and comments from the moment I started the research. I am also grateful to Prof. Peo Hansen, who was my mentor during my thesis research at Linköping University and provided new insights to the research through his appropriate interventions especially in critical moments. I am particularly thankful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Catherine MacMillan for the invaluable feedback they provided as the members of the thesis monitoring committee. I would also like to thank all members of the Institute of European Studies of Marmara University and the Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society (REMESO) of Linköping University for their valuable contributions to my thesis. And, this thesis would not be complete without the funding for my research visit to REMESO in Sweden by the Swedish Institute from 1 September 2017 to 31 May 2018, and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey from 1 June 2018 to 31 August 2018, respectively.

Last but not least, my profound thanks go to my dear mother, Türkan Güler, and my dear father, Sabri Güler, for believing in me and giving me unconditional love and support in every sphere of life from the very beginning, and hence, making almost everything including this research process much easier for me. And, of course, my dear sister, Lütfiye Güler, and my dear twin brother, Duran Güler, deserve special thanks for making me feel stronger and fearless against all kinds of challenges in life. Thus, I dedicate this thesis to my beloved family.

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


ABBREVIATIONS

ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Communities
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFD	Europe of Freedom and Democracy
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
ENF	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People's Party
EPP-ED	European People's Party and European Democrats
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EURODAC	European Dactylographic Comparison System
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Greens/EFA	Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE/NGL	European United Left/Nordic Green Left
IND/DEM	Independence/Democracy
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITS	Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEPs	Members of the European Parliament
NI	Non-Attached (<i>Non-Inscrits</i>)

S&D	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TREVI Group	<i>Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale</i>
UEN	Union for a Europe of Nations
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States





*I feel for those who were with me.
They got asylum in the sea.**

* Quote by Ahmed Salih, a shipwreck-surviving refugee (Rice-Oxley and Mahmood, 2014).

INTRODUCTION

Who would like to be a migrant or refugee in a world of xenophobia, racism or anti-immigration? What if it is also added by populism of some political parties or groups, which is also embedded in public discourse and public mind in general? Indeed, no one would probably take the risk of drowning in the cold waters of the Mediterranean to reach such a dystopia if there was another choice. The survival of a single person is not less vital than the survival of the whole of humankind; at least in a utopian world, it should not be less important. In such a utopian world, there would be neither migrants nor refugees: ‘No nation would ever violate any person’s human rights, there would be no armed conflict from which people would need to flee, there would be no environmental catastrophe, and everywhere there would be economic prosperity’ (Legomsky, 2000: 620). However, this is a non-utopian world, and there are millions of displaced people, migrants and refugees who struggle to survive in the face of increasing xenophobic, racist and anti-immigration sentiments among not only the right-wing but also, at least in general, left-wing political circles and their supporters.

This thesis, above all, aspires to deconstruct the phenomenon of ‘refugee crisis’, and thus, to humbly contribute to the formation of ‘refugee awareness’. Among the discussions on the neutrality of a scientific researcher, the researcher overtly takes sides with the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants regardless of their nationality, language, religion, sex or ‘colour’ without distorting the facts and by remaining within the framework of scientific criteria. So as to understand and expose the construction of an ‘anti-immigration Europe’¹ by the right-wing political groups in the European Parliament (EP), the thesis uses the premises and strategies of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as theoretical and methodological framework by also resorting to the relevant literature on securitisation. Because of the need to limit the scope of the thesis and also the shortage of the data regarding the anti-immigration discourses of the left-wing political groups in the EP, the thesis takes the discourses of the right-wing political groups as its focus and mainly argues that these right-wing political groups discursively

¹ The term ‘anti-immigration Europe’ does not have a widespread usage in the literature. For an example of the usage of this term, see (Kuhelj, 2014: 75). In the thesis, ‘anti-immigration Europe’ refers to the opposition of the European citizens to immigration with the perception of immigration as a threat in the context of security, economy or culture.

construct an anti-immigration Europe during the EP debates. In the EP, the left-wing political groups are the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) whereas the right-wing political groups are as follows: the European People's Party (EPP), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) (Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) in the 7th parliamentary term) and Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF). It should be noted that neither all members of the right-wing political groups endeavour to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe nor none of the members of the left-wing political groups pursues such a goal. However, though it is not within the scope of this thesis and thus may not be delivered as an argument, the research conducted for the thesis study has revealed that the right-wing political groups have a more intense and overt tendency to construct such a Europe through their discourses during the EP debates compared to the left-wing political groups. On the other hand, it has also shown that some members of these right-wing political groups deliver more blatant and fierce discourses on immigration whereas some are more moderate or covert in their discourses. Lastly, this thesis also aims at creating an awareness of the increase in such anti-immigration discourses that may only serve for the 'clashes' or 'great divisions among humankind' (Huntington, 1993: 22).

As mentioned above, the positions of the left-wing political groups or parties on immigration should not be taken for granted as favouring immigration in any case. Not only the right-wing political groups or parties but also the left-wing ones have increasingly had a more anti-immigration position as they bear witness to the 'success' of the far right anti-immigration rhetoric during the elections (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012). According to Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012), although the presence of a radical right party results in an increase in the anti-immigration discourses as well as anti-immigration policy preferences of other parties, all parties have got a more negative stance on immigration since 1990 regardless of the presence of a radical right party.

Besides, when the emergence of a new political issue or a new political party puts an old party in a disadvantaged position, there are, in essence, three options for the party to compete in elections (Bale *et al.*, 2010: 412). Firstly, the party does not

renounce its principles and can try to win the argument by sticking to its guns (Schumpeter, 2006 [1942]). Secondly, it can talk about other issues by striving to lessen the impact of the new issue, and if possible, try to get other parties and voters to talk about these issues (Riker, 1996). The last option for the party is to change its position on the issue in question (Downs, 1957). Through a comparative analysis of the social democratic parties of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Austria, Bale *et al.* (2010: 412–413) conceptualise these three options of the party as follows, respectively: to ‘hold’ its position, to ‘defuse’ a new political issue, and to ‘adopt’ the position of the competitor. However, these ideal options may bleed into each other in the real world through some trade-offs between parties (Bale *et al.*, 2010: 412). In other words, most parties, or most left-wing political groups in the EP in terms of their discourses on immigration in our case, ‘end up mixing and matching, boxing and coxing, in the hope that they can stay competitive without surrendering too many of their values and too much of their credibility’ (Bale *et al.*, 2010: 423). It also means that an analysis of the discourses of the left-wing political groups in the EP might reveal anti-immigration tendencies in the positions of these political groups, but probably not to the extent of those of the right-wing political groups so as not to face the risk of ‘betraying their values and alienating voters who support immigration’ (Eger and Bohman, 2016: 886).

It is well known that crises in the economy and, as a consequence, in employment in Europe inevitably result in a noticeable increase in populism, xenophobia, racism, Islamophobia or anti-immigration as a scapegoat for the governments, and thus, the citizens of the European Union (EU) Member States. The terrorist attacks perpetrated by some groups are associated with foreigners and mostly migrants, refugees or asylum seekers with Islamic origin. A person applying for asylum in the EU may find himself to be identified with various denominations in the public discourse: ‘migrant’, ‘economic migrant’, ‘cultural threat’, or more importantly, ‘potential terrorist’, but the worst of all, ‘terrorist’. Such a generalization may include people from all ages ranging from babies to the elderly. For the right-wing political group members in the EP in general, this may be accepted as firm but fair, as is largely exemplified in this thesis.

As the research for the thesis study has revealed, security is the utmost issue for the right-wing political groups in the EP as it is directly related to survival, and thus,

they mostly do not avoid delivering blatant speeches on this issue during the EP debates. However, as shown in Table 2, the discourses that portray immigration as a security threat take second place among the three kinds of threat examined in the thesis, i.e. security, economic and cultural, in terms of their frequency of occurrence during the relevant debates. The discourses related to the portrayal of immigration as an economic threat are the most frequently delivered by the members of the political groups while the discourses presenting immigration as a cultural threat are the least referred to (see Table 2). As given in the relevant chapters, the EPP members are milder in their anti-immigration discourses compared to the other right-wing political groups in the EP whereas the ENF members are the most overt and blunt members of the EP (MEPs) in such discourses. Moreover, it is easier to find anti-immigration discourses in the 8th parliamentary term (2014–2019), particularly in 2015 and afterwards; on the other hand, these discourses are not so common during the 7th parliamentary term (2009–2014).² For this reason, in each chapter, the analysis of the political groups' discourses starts with the 8th parliamentary term and is followed by the 7th parliamentary term. In this regard, the ENF members are an exception with their discourses belonging only to the 8th parliamentary term because this is a new group established in 2015. It should also be noted that the members of these right-wing political groups mostly used English as the language of their speeches during the debates in the 7th parliamentary term; however, they have begun to use their own language more and more in the debates in the 8th parliamentary term, which may be indicative of the increase in nationalist tendency, and thus, anti-immigration attitude in the EP. The tendency to use their own language more and more in the relevant debates may also be because of the efforts to influence their own electoral or voter bases in their countries, or it may partly be the result of the Brexit referendum held on 23 June 2016 by the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU. Besides, each chapter follows a sequence of political groups according to the number of their members in the EP. Thus, the chapters start with the discourses of the EPP, and these are followed by the discourses of the ECR, EFDD and ENF, respectively. In this

² The research for determining the scope of the thesis has shown that the debates during the 5th and 6th parliamentary terms (1999–2004 and 2004–2009, respectively) are not rich in data regarding anti-immigration discourses. Still, it is possible to find anti-immigration discourses in the form of xenophobia, racism or discrimination in the national parliaments of the EU in the relevant periods and before. See (van Dijk, 1992: 2010).

regard, as shown in Table 1 and 2, the number of reviewed debates during the 7th and 8th parliamentary terms is 57 whereas the number of reviewed speeches in various official EU languages is 709, 534 of which were found relevant for the thesis, and the most relevant ones were translated from the original language to English literally as much as possible if required, and analysed critically.

Table 1: Number of debates and speeches reviewed

	Debate	EPP	ECR	EFD / EFDD	ENF	Total
7th Parliamentary Term (2009–2014)	18	61	8	35	—	104
8th Parliamentary Term (2014–2019)	39	211	175	93	126	605
Total	57	272	183	128	126	709

Table 2: Number of speeches including anti-immigration discourses

		EPP	ECR	EFD / EFDD	ENF	Total
7th Parliamentary Term (2009–2014)	Security Threat	15	2	11	—	28
	Economic Threat	36	3	19	—	58
	Cultural Threat	4	3	5	—	12
8th Parliamentary Term (2014–2019)	Security Threat	51	38	32	57	178
	Economic Threat	49	83	34	39	205
	Cultural Threat	8	16	9	20	53
Total	Total	163	145	110	116	534

Searching for the relevant discourses was probably the most challenging and also rewarding part of the thesis. The official website of the EP³ was used for the data, and some keywords such as ‘immigration’, ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’ were helpful to find the relevant debates and speeches in the 7th and 8th parliamentary terms in this respect. On the other hand, it was easier than expected to get accurate

³ See (EP, 2018a).

translation of the excerpts through translation websites, and when necessary, the simultaneous interpretations of the speeches as video records on the official website of the EP were resorted. The dates and titles of the debates, from which the excerpts are taken, are given as an appendix (Appendix 1) at the end of the thesis.

The excerpts included in the thesis are categorised within the discourse topics of immigration as a security threat, an economic threat or a cultural threat depending on their main emphasis. For instance, if an excerpt mainly includes discourses that portray immigration as a security threat rather than an economic threat or a cultural threat, it is examined in the chapter dealing with immigration as a security threat. In other words, since it is quite difficult to draw a clear line between these discourse topics, it is also possible to see some discourses regarding the economic threat or cultural threat in these excerpts categorised within the portrayal of immigration as a security threat. This should also be taken into consideration while reviewing the operationalisation of anti-immigration discourses as red and grey categories given as an appendix (Appendix 2) in the thesis. In this regard, security threat mainly refers to the assumption of some of the members of the right-wing political groups in the EP that immigration brings terrorism to Europe in real terms such as the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Paris on 13 November 2015 by suicide bombers or the one perpetrated in Stockholm on 7 April 2017 by a lorry driven into crowds, which may end up with the ‘downfall of Europe’ in the long term. Secondly, economic threat mainly refers to the so-called threat against the economic welfare of the EU as a whole and its Member States in particular, which is assumed to deteriorate and pave the way for the increase in unemployment and poverty with the arrival of a ‘flood of unmanageable proportions’. Thirdly and lastly, cultural threat mainly refers to the so-called threat against European civilization based on Christian culture as well as the identity of the European peoples, which is assumed to eventually result in the ‘cultural change of Europe’.

In each discourse topic, a discourse is categorised as red if it includes a noun such as ‘terrorist’, ‘crisis’, ‘threat’, ‘invasion’, etc. or includes some adjectives such as ‘uncontrolled’, ‘countless’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘catastrophic’, etc. As well as such nouns and adjectives used to denominate immigration, we also put a sentence or a verb into the red category if it predicates immigration in one of the following ways. These include sentences such as ‘we are at war’, ‘we must stop the flow’, ‘we cannot afford this kind

of immigration in these kinds of numbers’, ‘stop legal immigration’ or verbs such as “undermine” the pillars of the EU’, “destroy” our civilization’, “infiltrate” ISIS in Europe’, “sow discord” amongst your constituent nations’, etc. It should be noted that these anti-immigration discourses are not confined to these nouns, adjectives, sentences or verbs but they may be in any lexical units or forms. The main point in categorising these denominations or predications as red is that they have clear anti-immigrant or anti-immigration characteristics, which may be defined as being ‘opposed to immigrants or immigration: characterized by or expressing opposition to or hostility toward immigrants’ (*Merriam-Webster*, 2018). If these discourses cannot go beyond some implications, presuppositions or similar specific strategies without such clear anti-immigration characteristics in terms of the relevant types of threat, they are categorised as grey in the operationalisation of anti-immigration discourses. For instance, ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘illegal immigrants’⁴ are categorised as grey whereas ‘link between terrorism and illegal immigration’ and ‘invasion of illegal immigrants’ are included in the red category. Lastly, it should also be noted that the anti-immigration discourses in the discourse topic of immigration as a security threat are much shorter in terms of number of words compared to the discourse topics of immigration as an economic threat and a cultural threat.

The thesis is composed of five chapters as well as the Introduction and the Conclusion. Chapter I gives the details of CDA, the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis, which is used to understand and expose anti-immigration discourses delivered by the right-wing political groups during the EP debates. Following the definition and principles of CDA with references to Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak as leading figures in the relevant literature, the chapter elaborates Teun A. van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach of CDA, on the premises of which the thesis is mostly based. The overall and specific strategies used for CDA make up the critical part of the thesis as a means to base the arguments, and these strategies are detailed in this chapter. In the second part of the chapter, the right-wing political groups

⁴ It should be noted that people cannot be illegal even if their method of entry into a country is illegal. In this regard, the use of ‘illegal immigrant(s)’ is one of the common misuses.

in the EP are examined as the unit of analysis of the thesis.⁵ The chapter highlights the role of these political groups in decision-making regarding the migration and asylum policy of the EU, the number of their members as a result of the 2009 and 2014 European elections, their general characteristics and their stances on immigration.

Chapter II underpins the following chapters, which make up the analysis part of the thesis. The chapter starts with the conceptual overview of immigration and defines the main concepts of the thesis, namely migrant, asylum seeker, refugee, etc. It shows that there is still confusion on the use of these concepts in public discussions and media, and gives clear definitions of them. Following some notes on international refugee protection with references to the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the chapter elaborates the historical background of immigration in the EU with emphasis on the EU treaties and the EP, which has gained more and more power over time. The last part of the chapter examines the securitisation of migration by drawing on historical and contemporary resources in the literature so as to highlight three main discourse topics of the thesis: immigration as a security threat, as an economic threat and as a cultural threat.

Chapter III is the first of the analysis parts, and examines the securitisation of migration in the discourse topic of immigration as a security threat. The chapter reveals how the right-wing political groups in the EP construct an anti-immigration Europe in the context of security through their discourses during the EP debates. By using some overall and specific strategies, the members of these political groups try to discredit or marginalise immigration and control the public discourse and mind in line with their own ideology. As this discourse topic is directly related to survival which is the top priority of the public opinion, it is easier for the members to persuade the EU citizens in this respect by repeating the 'refugee = terrorist' equation again and again or intentionally using the denominations such as 'invader', 'wave of violence' or 'potential terrorist' that naturally evoke fear in the public mind.

Chapter IV examines the securitisation of migration in another discourse topic of the thesis: immigration as an economic threat. In the light of the outstanding

⁵ The unit of analysis in this thesis should be understood as the right-wing political groups in the EP and their discourses regarding immigration in a broad sense.

denominations such as ‘economic migrants’ and ‘fake refugees’, the chapter demonstrates the ways in which the right-wing political group members discursively securitise migration in this context. As seen in the previous discourse topic, the members of the right-wing political groups strive to marginalise and problematise the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in the eyes of the public opinion by presenting them as an economic threat. The chapter displays the reproduction of such anti-immigration discourses and legitimisation of these discourses through various strategies used by the members. Undoubtedly, the issue of economy is an inevitable part of daily life of the European people; therefore, it may be easily manipulated to control the public discourse, and thus, public mind regarding immigration.

Chapter V makes up the last analysis part of the thesis, and deals with the discourse topic of immigration as a cultural threat. The chapter exemplifies various anti-immigration discourses of the right-wing political groups in the EP that portray immigration as a cultural threat. In their speeches, the members of these political groups do not include this discourse topic as many as they do in the previous two discourse topics; however, the anti-immigration discourses on culture used by the members are not less in their severity. As shown in the chapter, the members often use the phrase ‘our’ in this discourse topic as follows: ‘our identity’, ‘our faith’ or ‘our values’. It may be argued that they mind their culture at least as much as their security and economy. They mind it so much that some members denominate immigration as a ‘cultural suicide’ or a danger for the European civilization.

The Conclusion includes the findings regarding the securitisation of migration by the right-wing political groups, gives the differences between two parliamentary terms and between these political groups in terms of the use of anti-immigration discourses, and details the use of overall and specific strategies in each discourse topic. Following the evaluation of these discourse topics in the light of common anti-immigration discourses used by the political group members, it ends with some concerns about a possible CEAS (Common European Asylum System) to be formed among such negative sentiments against immigration and calls critical discourse analysts to resist any social inequality, which could result from production and reproduction of anti-immigration language in public opinion, by means of their contribution to the formation of ‘refugee awareness’.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

For some, the ‘refugee crisis’ may seem to be just an ordinary narrative or discourse; however, it is more than that, and may result in an issue of ‘to be or not to be’ for the migrants, asylum seekers and refugees if not tackled in a proper way. The political actors have the power to construct a narrative of crisis or awareness regarding these people, and the political groups in the EP are not an exception in this regard. As the thesis argues, such a narrative is constructed through discourses of these political groups in the public discourse, and thus, in the public mind. The question the thesis aspires to answer is that how it is discursively constructed, or in other words, what sorts of strategies the political actors use to achieve it. To this end, the thesis uses CDA as not only a theory but also a method of qualitative research, which is defined as ‘a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values, etc.) within their social worlds’ (Snape and Spencer: 2003: 3). According to Bryman (1988: 8), one of the central motifs of qualitative research is ‘the way in which people being studied understand and interpret their social reality’. In this context, CDA as a theory and method is examined in the first part of this chapter as a research kit of the thesis to understand and expose the phenomenon of immigration as a social reality in the EU in the relevant framework. The second part of the chapter deals with the unit of analysis of the thesis, and in this respect, the right-wing political groups in the EP are briefly examined as the political actors that have the power in establishing the migration and asylum policy of the EU and mostly tend to use this power to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe, which is detailed in the following chapters.

1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis as a Theory and Method

Is this the ‘end of history’ as claimed by Francis Fukuyama (1989: 1), who pointed out that ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’, or do we face the

beginning of a new era of the ‘clash of civilizations’ as suggested by Samuel P. Huntington (1993: 22), who asserted that ‘the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural’? Or, are all these discourses just a part of an ‘elite racism’ that tries to control public discourse and public mind through some power resources (van Dijk, 1993a; 1995; 1997a: 22; 1997b: 44; 2001: 354–358)? In the light of the last question, this thesis tries to find out how the elites in the EP discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe through the example of the right-wing political groups.

As mentioned earlier, the thesis uses CDA as its theoretical and methodological framework. Within the broad field of CDA, it mostly makes use of van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach as well as some references to two other prominent CDA approaches, i.e. Fairclough’s critical approach and Wodak’s discourse-historical approach, to analyse the discourses of the MEPs of the aforementioned political groups during the parliamentary debates. In the thesis, the political speeches during the parliamentary debates constitute genre, which is defined as ‘a way of acting’ or a particular usage of language as participant or constitutive of a particular social practice (Fairclough, 2010: 75; 1995b: 56).

Before giving the details of CDA in general and the socio-cognitive approach in particular, the questions of ‘what is discourse?’, ‘what is discourse analysis?’, and ‘why is CDA critical?’ are briefly answered below. As one of the main concepts of the thesis, ‘discourse’ is defined in various ways in the literature. Phillips and Jørgensen (2002: 1) argue that

in many cases, underlying the word ‘discourse’ is the general idea that language is structured according to different patterns that people’s utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social life, familiar examples being ‘medical discourse’ and ‘political discourse’. ‘Discourse analysis’ is the analysis of these patterns.

According to Fairclough (2015: 51), discourse is language use as social practice, which implies ‘a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). In such a dialectical relationship, the discursive event is not only shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. With a

more linguistic perspective, Fairclough (1992: 64) claims that ‘discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning’. In other words,

discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially influential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects: that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258).

For this reason, power and ideology as well as hegemony are outstanding issues in CDA studies (Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu, 1991; Foucault, 1980; Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1988; Hall *et al.*, 1978; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; van Dijk, 1998), and Fairclough (1995: 82) notes that, referring to Althusser and Gramsci, ideology works by disguising its ideological nature and becomes naturalized, automatized, in other words, common sense. In ideological context, common sense is defined as a term ‘in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power’ (Fairclough, 2015: 107). van Dijk (1998: 104) suggests that common sense usually involves discourse such as arguments, accounts, explanations, defences and legitimation,⁶ unlike sociologists who consider it as the shared knowledge underlying all usual interaction. By defining common sense as a knowledge which is ‘direct, immediate, unreflected, untheoretical and unscientific, but based on or derived from everyday observation or experiences’, in a more critical way, van Dijk (1998: 104) states that ‘common sense is essentially unreliable, possibly biased by social prejudices and illusions, if not the result of manipulation’.

At this point, Foucault’s description of the relationship between truth and power is crucial to understand how the right-wing political groups in the EP discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe. Foucault (1980: 131) claims that, in each society, there is a regime of truth or general politics of truth that implies

⁶ See also (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Reyes, 2011).

the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

Furthermore, there is a circular relation between truth and systems of power, which both produces and sustains truth, and the matter is to detach the power of truth from social, economic and cultural hegemony within which it operates (Foucault, 1980: 133). And, regarding the power struggle over the determination of discursive practices, Foucault (1981: 52–53) emphasizes that ‘discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized’. By taking all these into consideration, it may be noted that CDA aims at making more visible ‘the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power’ which are often unclear to people (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258).

For Wodak (2001: 66), discourse is ‘a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as “texts”’. Similarly, discourse has three main dimensions: language use, the communication of beliefs (cognition), and interaction in social situations, and there is a relationship between these three dimensions (van Dijk, 1997c: 2). van Dijk’s (2001: 352) definition of CDA, which also answers the question of ‘why is CDA critical?’, is as follows:

CDA is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality.

In addition, CDA is critical because what arise possibilities of empowerment and change are awareness and critique (Fairclough, 1995: 83). In parallel with this notion, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271–80) give the main principles of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive

3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action

CDA makes connections between social and cultural structures and processes as well as properties of text (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 277). These complex connections are not direct but mostly indirect or mediated. In Fairclough's terms, this mediated relationship between text and society is realized by orders of discourse, which refers to 'structured sets of discursive practices associated with particular social domains' (Fairclough *et al.*, 2011: 363), and these orders of discourse embody particular ideologies (Fairclough, 2015: 60). On the other hand, van Dijk argues that the link between the text and society is a socio-cognitive mediation, and specifies the cognitive resources upon which social actors draw in their practice, and the relationship between individual meanings or interpretations and group representations (van Dijk, 1985; 1989; 1993b; 1997: 31). Despite such differences among CDA approaches, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 278) stress the usefulness of using a combination of various CDA approaches in the studies in the light of the term 'mediation' as follows:

different views of mediation indicate contrasting priorities of different theories, but on the other hand they might be regarded as complementary, as pointing to the need in the long run for a complex and multi-sided theory of text-society mediation which gives due weight to orders of discourse, practices of social actors, and sociocognitive processes.

With some differences compared to the main principles of CDA given by Fairclough and Wodak above, van Dijk (1997c: 29–31) lists the principles of [critical] discourse analysis as follows: naturally occurring text and talk, contexts, discourse as talk, discourse as social practice of members, members' categories, sequentiality, constructivity, levels and dimensions, meaning and function, rules, strategies and social cognition. The principle of contexts, for instance, implies the fact that discourse should be analysed as a constitutive part of its social and cultural contexts, which may be possible consequences of discourse. In this regard, not only settings, participants and their communicative and social roles, goals but also norms, values and institutional or organizational structures should be analysed in detail. As for the principle of discourse

as social practice of members, individuals use discourse as a form of social practice in sociocultural contexts not only for themselves but also as members of various groups, institutions or cultures, which may result in enacting, confirming or challenging comprehensive social and political structures and institutions. The principle of constructivity refers to the fact that ‘discourses are constructive in the sense that their constitutive units may be functionally used, understood or analysed as elements of larger ones, thus also creating hierarchical structures’, which applies not only to forms but also meaning and interaction (van Dijk, 1997c: 30). Undoubtedly, the principle of social cognition is one of the most significant terms of van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach, and requires a particular attention. van Dijk (1997c: 31) emphasizes the fundamental role of cognition, i.e. mental processes and representations, in producing and understanding text and talk. In order to properly understand and explain the aspects of discourse, one needs to have recourse to the minds of language users. By referring to cognition as the interface between discourse and society once more, van Dijk (1997c: 31) argues that

besides personal memories and experiences of events (models), the shared sociocultural representations (knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms, values) of language users as group members also play a fundamental role in discourse, as well as its description and explanation.

Additionally, Fairclough (1992: 64) suggests that discourse contributes to the construction of social identities (‘selves’), social relations between people and systems of knowledge and belief. Also, by drawing on Halliday’s (1978) multifunctional approach to language, Fairclough (1992: 64) argues that language has three functions that coexist and interact in discourse: identity, relational and ideational. To define these terms, identity function refers to how social identities are set up in discourse; relational function refers to how relationships between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated; and, the ideational function refers to how texts signify the world, its processes, entities and relations. In addition, Fairclough (1992: 137) adds that identity and relational functions ‘have to do with the ways in which social relations are exercised and social identities are manifested in discourse, but also, of course, with how social relations and identities are constructed (reproduced, contested, restructured) in discourse’.

In his book, *Language and Power*, Fairclough (2015: 38–39) also defines some other basic terms for CDA. There is, for instance, a distinction between intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality refers to the occurrence and combination of parts of concrete texts in the texts whereas interdiscursivity refers to the occurrence and combination of types. Intertextuality enables the analyst to keep close to these concrete texts, and interdiscursivity makes the connection between them and social structures, including orders of discourse, which are also defined as particular articulations of discourses, genres and styles. Recontextualisation is a result of intertextuality and interdiscursivity in progress, and is defined as ‘the movement of parts or elements of interactions and text out of their original context [decontextualisation] and into a different context [recontextualisation]’ (Fairclough, 2015: 38). In other words, recontextualisation goes beyond the question of how elements are combined or articulated in texts, and tries to answer the questions of where these elements come from, where they go to, and how they get there. Moreover, Fairclough (2015: 39) defines operationalisation of discourses as

a movement between discourse and other elements of social realities: discourses may, subject to certain conditions and contingencies, be operationalized, put into operation, put into practice, in wider social realities, ‘enacted’ as ways of (inter)acting, ‘inculcated’ as ways of being (identities), and ‘materialized’ in physical material elements of realities.

Fairclough (2015: 39) adds that, in this way, discourses may have constructive effects on wider social realities, however, it requires a moderate understanding of social constructivism which considers partly non-discursive conditions, such as properties of structures and structural tendencies, which facilitate or impede constructive effects.

After all, Fairclough (2015: 40) suggests that CDA requires a strong commitment to interdisciplinarity, and uses the term ‘trans-disciplinarity’ to underline how the collaboration makes contribution to the theoretical and methodological development of each of the theories or frameworks used. Therefore, the analytical framework may be integrated into a social scientific approach for the critical analysis of hegemonic relations, struggle and change. Considering this interdisciplinary aspect of social studies and the usefulness of using a combination of CDA approaches (Jahedi *et al.*, 2014: 28), the thesis draws on van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach as detailed in the

following paragraphs by also referring to Fairclough and Wodak.

Just like Fairclough and Wodak, van Dijk (1997d: 20) also accepts discourse as a form of social action and interaction. In terms of the socio-cognitive approach, discourse ‘controls the minds of political actors, and hence their actions’ (van Dijk, 1997d: 44). Similarly, control of public discourse through social groups, institutions and their leaders (i.e. the elites such as political leaders) as well as mind control through education, media and even job instructions are two instruments of power to produce, reproduce or sustain its hegemony in social structure (van Dijk, 2001: 354–358). In this context, van Dijk (1997a: 17) calls the power in the discourses of governments, parliaments, dominant parties, politicians and political institutions as political power. Moreover, in line with the argument of the thesis, the relation between power and discourse may be summarized as follows:

Power is control of action, which requires control of personal and social cognitions, which presupposes control of public discourse, which is possible only through special forms of access, which may in turn be based on political, economic, social or academic power resources (position, ownership, income, knowledge, expertise, etc.) (van Dijk, 1997a: 22).

There is a close relation between discourses and actions. In other words, political actions or practices are at the same time discursive actions or practices, which means that forms of political texts and talks have political functions and implications (van Dijk, 1997d: 14). Context of the political texts and talks is decisive for the categorisation of discourse as political or not, and politicians are assumed to talk politically if they and their talk are contextualized in such communicative events such as cabinet meetings, parliamentary sessions, interviews with the media, bureaucratic practices, etc. Considering the time, place and circumstances of the political texts and talks as well as their functions and goals, van Dijk (1997d: 14) adds that ‘text and context mutually define each other, in the sense that a session of parliament is precisely such only when elected politicians are debating (talking, arguing, etc.) in parliament buildings in an official capacity (as MPs), and during the official (officially opened) session of parliament’. In this regard, this thesis takes into consideration these requirements for a discourse to become a political discourse while analysing it in the proper context. The genre of the thesis, that is, the political speeches of the members of

the relevant political groups in the EP during the parliamentary debates, meets all these criteria given by van Dijk.

It needs to be noted that the political texts and talks of the politicians are not merely a discursive way of doing politics but also a way of contributing to the public agenda, and hence to public opinion, as envisaged through the political functions and goals of the political discourses, while providing the necessary legitimation to political decision that may not completely be legal or moral in terms of international law and human rights principles (van Dijk, 1997d: 39–40). In other words, as partly mentioned before, ‘who controls public discourse, at least partly controls the public mind, so that discourse analysis of such control is at the same time inherently a form of political analysis’ (van Dijk: 1997b: 44). Furthermore, a detailed and sophisticated political discourse analysis⁷ provides direct insight into discursive political actions such as cabinet meetings, parliamentary debates, bureaucratic documents, bills and laws, and these political actions need description analysis so that one can comprehend the possible influences or effects they may have on the political cognitions of the public at large (van Dijk, 1997d: 41). This is what the thesis attempts to achieve by critically analysing the discourses of the right-wing political groups in the EP on immigration.

On the other hand, van Dijk makes a distinction between micro and macro levels of CDA. Language use, discourse, verbal interaction and communication take place at micro level of CDA whereas power, dominance and inequality belong to its macro level (van Dijk, 2001: 354). At this point, it needs to be noted that Fairclough (1992: 137) lists more linguistic terms for the micro aspects of discourse practice: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, text structure, force and coherence. In this thesis, the discourses of the right-wing political groups in the EP are analysed at the micro level so as to find out how these political groups discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe at the macro level. To illustrate, an anti-immigration speech by a member of the political group in the EP is a discourse at the micro level, but the construction of an anti-immigration Europe through some legislations as a result of these speeches (or discourses) is at the macro level. van Dijk (2001: 354) argues that CDA has to bridge

⁷ van Dijk (1997d: 11) considers political discourse analysis within CDA, and states that it is not only about political discourse but also a critical enterprise, which deals particularly with the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination via political discourse, including some forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance.

the gap between the micro and macro levels to form one unified whole, and he suggests several ways to bridge these levels as follows: members–groups, actions–process, context–social structure, personal and social cognition. In the thesis, the MEPs represent their political groups with their discourses, and discourse is considered as an action whereas the construction of an anti-immigration Europe through some legislations as a result of these discourses is a process.

As for the overall strategies employed by the socio-cognitive approach, the ideological square is one of them coined by van Dijk, and refers to the group relations included as one of the schematic categories of the structure of ideologies in Table 3.

Table 3: **Schematic categories of the structure of ideologies**

-
- **Identity** (Who are we? Who belong to us? Where do we come from?)
 - **Goals** (What do we want to obtain?)
 - **Activities** (What do we usually do? What is our task?)
 - **Norms and values** (What is good/bad, permitted/prohibited for us?)
 - **Group relations** (Who are our allies and opponents?)
 - **Resources** (What is the basis of our power, or our lack of power?)
-

Source: (van Dijk, 2011: 386).

The ideological square relates to positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation and deals with ‘the way in-groups and out-groups are represented in text and talk, prototypically represented by the ideological pronouns *Us* and *Them*’ (van Dijk, 2011: 396–397; original emphasis). The main idea in van Dijk’s ideological square is that the tendency of the group members’ texts and talks is positive about their own group including references to the hospitality, tolerance, equality, democracy and other values of the Self while it is negative about the Other, or out-group, which is defined as opponent, competitor, enemy, illegal, economic and hence ‘fake’ refugee, foreigner (van Dijk, 2011: 397; 1997b: 36–37). In addition to these two main overall strategies, as a result of analyses of some parliamentary debates, van Dijk (1997b: 37–38) also detected the following characteristic overall strategies: apparent denial (or denial of racism), apparent sympathy, fairness, top-down transfer and justification. Apparent denial implies the popular disclaimer of that ‘We have nothing against

immigrants [or minorities], but...’, or mitigation of racism or discrimination in the country. Apparent sympathy relates to the discourse of ‘for their own good’. Fairness implies that the group members favour humanism, tolerance and equality, but political reality sometimes forces them to make unpleasant decisions; in other words, they are ‘firm but fair’. Top-down transfer relates to the fact that the group members tend to blame the extreme right or some poor or ‘ordinary’ citizens for prejudice, discrimination or racism against minorities, immigrants or asylum seekers. Lastly, justification implies the ‘force of facts’ such as international situation, agreements, financial difficulties and number of refugees.

Table 4: Overall and specific strategies for CDA

Overall Strategies	Positive Self-presentation, Negative Other-presentation, Apparent Denial, Apparent Sympathy, Fairness, Top-down Transfer, Justification
Specific Strategies	Implications, Presuppositions, Denomination, Predication, Storytelling, Reversal, Numbers Game

Source: Adapted from (van Dijk, 2011: 396–398; 1997b: 36–55).

There are also some specific strategies employed for CDA in the thesis, and van Dijk (2011: 398; 1997b: 36–55; original emphasis) explains them as follows:

- **Implications** (propositions implied by propositions explicitly expressed in discourse) – propositions may be used that have (many) negative implications about *Them*.
- **Presuppositions** (propositions that must be true/known for any proposition to be meaningful) – presupposing propositions (negative about *Them*) that are not known to be true.
- **Denomination** (of propositions: participant description) – They tend to be named or identified as different from *Us* (precisely as *Them*) – strangers, immigrants, Others, opponents, enemies, etc.
- **Predication** (of propositions: meanings of sentences) – any predicate of a proposition attributing negative characteristics to *Them*.
- **Storytelling** about ethnic events including personal experiences with Others: These express mental models of such events and the opinions storytellers have about them.
- **Reversal**: We are not discriminating, they are.

- **Numbers game**, the rhetorical manipulation of numbers of arrivals.

Instead of using the terms ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, this thesis uses the terms the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in order to ensure coherence throughout the thesis. The thesis focuses on these overall and specific strategies for CDA to reveal how the right-wing political groups in the EP discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe during the parliamentary debates.

1.2. Unit of Analysis: Right-wing Political Groups in the European Parliament

The political groups in the EP are crucial actors for the EU to overcome the ongoing debate on its democratic deficit.⁸ As the EP has gained or been given more power since the first elections held for the EP in 1979 and turned from a consultative institution into a co-legislator with the Council over time, the role of the EP in general and the political groups in particular has substantially increased in the EU policy areas including the migration and asylum policy. Article 10 (4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that ‘[p]olitical parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union’ (EU, 2012b: 20). As seen in the article, this is not a one-way process but an interaction between the political parties or groups and the EU citizens. However, ‘the will of citizens of the Union’ may be a production or reproduction, or construction, of some norms and values in the public discourse and mind through the discourses delivered by the members of these political groups. This fact could be appreciated only if these norms and values comply with the universal values and norms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Otherwise, as examined in this thesis, an anti-immigration attitude filled with prejudices and ignoring human rights may inevitably become a part of the European norms and values. In other words, the political groups are expected to be cautious while ‘contribut[ing] to forming European political awareness’ of immigration for the sake of the relevant universal values and norms.

⁸ The term ‘democratic deficit’ refers to the lack of democracy in the EU institutions and their decision-making procedures as well as their complexity for the ordinary citizens. As the EP has evolved from a consultative assembly to a co-legislator with the Council of the EU through the recent treaties, the discussions on democratic deficit have been appeased to some extent. For more information on democratic deficit, see (EU, 2017).

Considering the available data for the research and to ensure the validity and reliability of the thesis as well as to be able to compare two different parliamentary terms in the context of the change in quantity and quality of the anti-immigration discourses over time, the thesis takes the discourses of the right-wing political groups in the 7th parliamentary term of 2009–2014 and the 8th parliamentary term of 2014–2019 as its research scope. As mentioned earlier, not including the left-wing political groups in the thesis does not mean that these groups do not deliver any anti-immigration discourses; however, the research for the thesis study has shown that such discourses of the left-wing political groups are considerably less than the right-wing ones. Furthermore, it should be noted that not all members of the right-wing political groups deliver anti-immigration discourses though there is such a tendency within these groups in general. In addition, such anti-immigration discourses are seen to increase in the 8th parliamentary term, particularly with the increase in the number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015.

While there were seven political groups as well as non-attached members in the EP in the 7th parliamentary term, the ENF joined the EP in 2015, and thus, increased the number of political groups in the EP in the 8th parliamentary term to the eight (EP, 2015a). Due to the reasons given above, the thesis examines the discourses of the right-wing political groups in the EP, i.e. the EPP, ECR, EFDD and ENF. It should be noted that the EPP is a pro-European political group whereas the ECR, EFDD and ENF have Eurosceptic positions in the EP. Therefore, these three Eurosceptic political groups are mostly against any common policy area including the migration and asylum policy. They mostly favour the sovereignty of the Member States and intergovernmental solutions on these issues.

As of 7 August 2018, there are 21 non-attached members in the EP (EP, 2018e). However, these MEPs are only included as statistical data and their discourses are not examined in the thesis as they do not belong to any political groups in the EP. Moreover, the MEPs are assumed to represent their political groups with their political texts and talks; therefore, the date of the discourses is also crucial in case that the MEP in question may change his or her political group, which will also influence the general tendency or intensity on anti-immigration discourses of the relevant political group. In addition, the number of members of the political groups may change due to the MEPs

Table 5: Results of the 2009 European elections

Country	EPP	S&D	ALDE	Greens/ EFA	ECR	GUE/ NGL	EFD	NI*	Total
Belgium	5	5	5	4	1		1	1	22
Bulgaria	7	4	5				1	1	18
Czech Republic	2	7			9	4			22
Denmark	1	5	3	1	1	1	1		13
Germany	42	23	12	14		8			99
Estonia	1	1	3	1					6
Ireland	4	2	4			1		1	12
Greece	7	8	1	1		3	2		22
Spain	25	23	2	2		1		1	54
France	30	14	6	15		5	1	3	74
Croatia	5	5			1	1			12
Italy	34	23	4		2		8	2	73
Cyprus	2	2				2			6
Latvia	4	1	1	1	1	1			9
Lithuania	4	3	2		1		2		12
Luxembourg	3	1	1	1					6
Hungary	14	4			1			3	22
Malta	2	4							6
Netherlands	5	3	6	3	1	2	1	5	26
Austria	6	5		2				6	19
Poland	28	7			12		4		51
Portugal	10	7		1		4			22
Romania	14	11	5					3	33
Slovenia	4	2	2						8
Slovakia	6	5	1				1		13
Finland	4	2	4	2			1		13
Sweden	5	6	4	4		1			20
United Kingdom		13	12	5	27	1	8	7	73
EU	274	196	83	57	57	35	31	33	766

Note: *NI: Non-Attached (*Non-Inscrits*) Members – Members not belonging to any political group.

Source: (EP, 2018e).

Table 6: Results of the 2014 European elections

Country	EPP	S&D	ECR	ALDE	GUE/ NGL	Greens/ EFA	EFDD	NI	Total
Belgium	4	4	4	6		2		1	21
Bulgaria	7	4	2	4					17
Czech Republic	7	4	2	4	3		1		21
Denmark	1	3	4	3	1	1			13
Germany	34	27	8	4	8	13		2	96
Estonia	1	1		3		1			6
Ireland	4	1	1	1	4				11
Greece	5	4	1		6			5	21
Spain	17	14		8	11	4			54
France	20	13		7	4	6	1	23	74
Croatia	5	2	1	2		1			11
Italy	17	31			3		17	5	73
Cyprus	2	2			2				6
Latvia	4	1	1			1	1		8
Lithuania	2	2	1	3		1	2		11
Luxembourg	3	1		1		1			6
Hungary	12	4				2		3	21
Malta	3	3							6
Netherlands	5	3	2	7	3	2		4	26
Austria	5	5		1		3		4	18
Poland	23	5	19					4	51
Portugal	7	8		2	4				21
Romania	15	16		1					32
Slovenia	5	1		1		1			8
Slovakia	6	4	2	1					13
Finland	3	2	2	4	1	1			13
Sweden	4	6		3	1	4	2		20
United Kingdom		20	20	1	1	6	24	1	73
EU	221	191	70	67	52	50	48	52	751

Note: The ENF is not included in the table since it was formed in 2015 following the elections.

Source: (EP, 2018e).

who may change their political groups in any parliamentary terms; however, death or resignation of a MEP is replaced by another MEP from a replacement list prepared by each registered political party before the relevant EP election. It should also be noted that analysis of the discourses of the right-wing political groups in the context of the construction of an anti-immigration Europe has almost nothing to do with the quantity of that political group's MEPs but with the quality of their discourses. However, the quantity of the relevant political group's MEPs may be significant during the voting procedures of the decision-making process in the EP, which is naturally influential in the course of the relevant policy area. In the following, the right-wing political groups in the EP are briefly examined as the actors of discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe.

1.2.1. European People's Party

As the leading political group of the EP with its 274 MEPs in the 2009 elections and 221 MEPs in the 2014 elections as shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively, the EPP has popular pioneers in terms of European integration such as Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, Konrad Adenauer, the German Chancellor, and Alcide de Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister, who devoted themselves to a united Europe and the integration in Europe with the ending of the World War II (EPP, 2017). The EPP was initially founded with the name of Christian-Democratic Group on 23 June 1953 in the Common Assembly of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community). Then, the political group changed its name to the EPP during the first direct elections to the EP in 1979. The EPP, which is a pro-European and centre-right political group, has had the biggest number of the members in the EP since the elections held in 1999. Though it changed its name to the Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) and maintained this name in the 5th and 6th parliamentary terms (1999-2004 and 2004-2009, respectively), the political group became the EPP again in 2009.

As the EU has evolved into a more political union rather than remaining as an economic community, and as observed in all political groups of the EP, the position of the EPP has also changed in various policy areas over time. In general, the EPP defines itself as Christian Democrats, and its discourses on immigration are mostly shaped and

delivered around this characteristic of the political group. On its official website, the EPP is presented as follows:

The EPP family has shaped the story of European integration. Today, when Europe is again faced with challenges, we continue to honour that legacy by remaining true to our convictions: a united Europe based on the values of human dignity, freedom, human rights, rule of law, solidarity and subsidiarity (EPP, 2017).

1.2.2. European Conservatives and Reformists

The ECR, which had 57 MEPs during the 2009 elections (see Table 5), got 70 seats in the 2014 elections (see Table 6) and is currently the third largest political group in the EP. Before the ECR was approved as an official political group in the EP on 14 July 2009, the members who were mostly the members of Conservative Party of Britain served as the MEPs of the EPP (then EPP-ED). Since the Conservative Party was against a stronger European integration, the party leader, David Cameron, did not wish to maintain the party's affiliation with the federalist EPP any longer (*BBC*, 11 March 2009). Thus, the Eurosceptic and centre-right ECR was established with the participation of 54 MEPs from 8 Member States in the 7th parliamentary term (ECR, 2018).

The group favours reforming the EU on the basis of eurorealism, respects the sovereignty of the EU nations, and focuses on economic recovery, growth and competitiveness (ECR, 2018). Moreover, fifteen ideas for reform are listed on the official website of the ECR, and there is hardly any reference to immigration or the CEAS within these reform ideas except for the intention of the group to examine the 'issues regarding integration and communities' included under the title of 'Freedom of Movement' (ECR, 2017a). On the official website of the political group, the ECR prefers to use the term 'sensible' rather than 'sensitive' in the subtitle 'Sensible Approach to Immigration', and it continues as follows:

We believe that a '*Firm but Fair*' approach to immigration is the best one. Member States should seek to cooperate with Europe to protect Europe's borders, to offer asylum to those who are *genuinely* in need of our help and protection, and to take a firm stance with those individuals who seek to *exploit* the system. The EU can help support individual

countries by helping them fulfil their international obligations, and provide support through returns programmes, resettlement programmes and the European Asylum Support Office (ECR, 2017b; emphasis added).

1.2.3. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

In the 2009 European elections, the EFD (EFDD in the 8th parliamentary term) gained 31 seats in the EP (see Table 5). Besides, the EFDD considerably increased the number of its seats in the following elections of 2014 and had 48 MEPs, and 24 of those came from the UK while 17 MEPs in the political group were Italian (see Table 6). To briefly note on its historical background, the EFDD is the continuation of the EFD, which was formed in 2009 and mostly composed of the members of the political groups of Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) and Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN) in the EP in the 6th parliamentary term (*BBC*, 1 July 2009). The point these political groups have in common is the fact that they are all right-wing Eurosceptic political groups, and particularly the EFD and EFDD are known with their anti-immigration stances.

It should also be noted that, as the UK is on the verge of leaving the EU as a result of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, the EFDD has a risk of dissolution if it cannot get the sufficient number of 25 MEPs coming from at least one-quarter of the Member States to form a political group during the next European elections in 2019. As included in its name, the EFDD favours direct democracy, and not only harshly criticises centralisation of power in the hands of the unelected, i.e. the European Commission, but also opposes further European integration which is assumed to aggravate the present democratic deficit and the centralist political structure (EFDD, 2017a; 2017b: 3). The political group also considers the EP mostly as ‘just a talking shop which cannot initiate or repeal any EU law’ (EFDD, 2017a). On the other hand, the EFDD presents itself as a political group that attaches particular importance to diversity, which may be exemplified in its following discourse on its official website: ‘The glory and genius of Europe is the diversity of its peoples, its cultures and its languages. Let’s not pretend or force people to be the same. We stand for diversity and for direct democracy for the people. Let the peoples have their say!’ (EFDD, 2017a). The ‘diversity’ here only deals with ‘its’ or ‘our’ peoples, cultures and languages, not the ‘Other’s’ or ‘their’ ones. Besides, in the Statutes of the EFDD and under the subtitle

of ‘Respect for Europe history, traditions and cultural values’, the EFDD refers to diversity along with discrimination: ‘Peoples and Nations of Europe have the right to protect their social stability and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and cultural values. The Group rejects xenophobia, anti-Semitism and any other form of discrimination’ (EFDD, 2017b: 3).

1.2.4. Europe of Nations and Freedom

As the newly established political group of the EP in 2015, the ENF is represented by 35 MEPs from 8 different EU Member States as of 7 August 2018 (EP, 2018e). Before the establishment of the far-right Eurosceptic ENF with an anti-immigration ideology, there was an earlier initiative for a similar anti-immigration political group with the name of Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS), which was established in early 2007 and ended at the end of the same year (Mahony, 2007a; 2007b).

To note on the ideology of the ENF, Marcel de Graaff, Co-chair of the ENF, is strongly against the EU integration and favours a Europe of nations and sovereignty of them. Besides, Marine Le Pen, the former Co-chair of the group, claims that the EU has an explicit deadly plan ‘to deconstruct the nation states in order to create a new globalised order, one that *threatens the security, prosperity, identity* and very survival of the peoples of Europe’, and regards the ENF as the guardian of the national spirit as well as the defender of the interests of the peoples of Europe against the advocates of federalism (ENF, 2017; emphasis added). Interestingly, this quote including the securitisation of the EU for the European nation states is quite similar to the securitisation of migration for the EU as a whole, which is given in details in the following chapters. Though Marine Le Pen is against the integration, she advocates forming a group of countries that cooperates freely with each other by respecting for the political, territorial, economic and monetary sovereignty of the nation states. This view is also supported by Marcel de Graaff, who states that ‘[w]e stand for a Europe of economic cooperation between nation states’ (ENF, 2017). Lastly, as exemplified in the following quotation, Marcel de Graaff considers immigration as a threat, particularly a cultural threat:

We want a Europe that respects national individuality and national identity. *Our European cultures, our values and our freedom are under attack.* They are threatened by the crushing and dictatorial powers of the European Union. *They are threatened by mass immigration,* by open borders and by a single European currency: one size does not fit all. . . . Beneath the surface of all the differences, there is the huge undercurrent of our common cultural heritage. Anyone who acknowledges the importance of our common legacy also acknowledges our differences and appreciates the significance of sovereign states (ENF, 2017; emphasis added).



CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF IMMIGRATION

Who is a migrant? Who is a refugee? Are they ‘fake’ or real? Whatever answer we get to these questions, there is a simple and pure fact: all these migrants and refugees are human beings. Another fact is that discrimination or exclusion is not a new phenomenon and has prevailed over the world for ages, even in the epoch of Aristotle. Though there are some national and international rules and regulations that ensure these people’s rights and obligations, the improper implementation is still controversial. The EU treaties, which are assumed to be based on the international law, are accepted as the starting point of the EU migration and asylum policy. And, in accordance with these treaties and as detailed in this chapter, the EP has gained more and more power since its establishment. It also means that the political groups in the EP have had more say in decision-making on the migration and asylum policy. What if these political groups securitise migration in terms of the European security, economy and culture? Such a securitisation has already become a trend not only in Europe but also in most parts of the world. Unfortunately, this trend seems to be increasing day by day with the increase in the number of people fleeing war, conflict and persecution in their countries, and it is mostly due to the political groups manipulating these facts and numbers for their own interests.

To base the arguments of the thesis and the analysis carried out in the following chapters, this chapter serves as a guiding framework. The chapter starts with the conceptual framework of immigration along with some information on international refugee protection. The second part of the chapter details the historical background of immigration in the EU by referring to the EU treaties in the framework of the migration and asylum policy and also the EP as one of the decision-making actors of the EU in this policy area. Last but not least, the chapter examines the securitisation of migration with a wide spectrum of references ranging from Aristotle to Chomsky, from Copenhagen School to Orientalism.

2.1. Immigration: Conceptual Overview

The first people to ‘migrate’ were the *Homo sapiens* who went out of East Africa across the world, probably sixty thousand years ago (Harzig, 2009: 8; Manning, 2013: 1–2). Were they migrants? Indeed, they were not. They were just people who inherently tried to survive, and this may be accepted as the only way for survival until the period of the first agricultural activities. As Gabaccia (2015: 40) notes, in ancient Rome, the Latin terms for mobility, i.e. *immigrare* and *emigrare*, were hardly been used though they existed. Today, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2004: 31) defines ‘immigration’ as ‘a process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement’ while ‘migration’ is defined as ‘a process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State’ (IOM, 2004: 41). Throughout this thesis, these two terms are used interchangeably if there is not a common use of one of them in a specific context. The term ‘migration’ includes migration of refugees and economic migrants as well as displaced persons. In addition, ‘forced migration’ is used to describe ‘a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes’ (IOM, 2004: 25). The motives behind such a movement may be natural or environmental diseases, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or even development projects.

On the other hand, the terms ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’ are often confused and substituted in public discussions and media including even some leading news sources such as *BBC* and *al-Jazeera* though they are different from each other in conceptual terms as given by various resources and international documents (Ruz, 2015). The term ‘migrant’ applies to persons who move to another country or region to improve their material or social conditions for a better prospect for themselves and their families (IOM, 2004: 40). In another definition, it is defined as ‘a person who goes from one place to another, especially in order to find work’ (Phillips, 2012: 485). Additionally, in a news story published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015b), it is suggested that ‘migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons’. There is also a common migrant prototype with negative connotations mostly created by

the politicians along with the media in the public discourse and mind. Şirin (2008: 12; emphasis added) underlines that such connotations result in bias that negatively influences the attitude towards migrants and answers the question of ‘Who is a migrant?’ in parallel with the context of this thesis, i.e. discursive construction of immigration as a security threat, an economic threat and a cultural threat through various strategies of negative Other-presentation:

Migrant is a young male, who is less educated and unqualified. He is searching for a better life; *he wants to have a job and income security*; he is undocumented thus regarded illegal in the country where he wants to stay. Since he is considered cheap labour, migrant is the main source of developed countries’ economies. His contribution to economy is invisible because he is not registered. He belongs to a different race, ethnic or religious group hence usually faces racism and xenophobia because *he is perceived as a threat to the security and cultural identity of the country where he is staying*.

As for the term ‘asylum seeker’, it refers to the person who waits for the decision on his or her claim for refugee status as these people lack the protection of their own country (UNHCR, 2016b). The term ‘refugee’ is a status under international protection and is referred as follows in the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees:

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Though the 1951 Convention restricted the refugee status to the victims of the events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951, the 1967 Protocol has removed the geographical and time limitations. Moreover, the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees requires some criteria to grant refugee status to the persons, and thus, excludes any person from such protection if

(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious

non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

In accordance with the ‘Directive 2011/95/EU’ (EU, 2011: 13), if a person does not qualify as a refugee but there are substantial grounds that he or she risks of suffering serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin, that person is assumed to be eligible for ‘subsidiary protection’. In the framework of the thesis, ‘temporary protection’ for those in need is also vital because it is related to providing immediate and temporary protection to the ‘mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin . . . in particular if there is a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation’ (EU, 2001: 14). In this context, the term ‘displaced persons’ refers to the third-country nationals or stateless persons who leave their country of origin because of the armed conflict, endemic violence or violations of their human rights prevailing in that country (EU, 2001: 14).

The legal bases of the EU’s migration and asylum policy are Articles 67 (2), 78 and 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.⁹ As envisaged in Article 67 (2) of the TFEU,

[the Union] shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals (EU, 2012c: 73).

Article 78 of the TFEU also envisages developing a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection for the third-country nationals who require international protection, and it emphasizes the compliance with the principle of *non-refoulement* (EU, 2012c: 76). The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status

⁹ The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (or formally the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), includes rights and freedoms under six titles: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, and Justice (EU, 2012a). The Charter was proclaimed in 2000, and has become legally binding on the Member States since the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force in 2009.

of Refugees is taken as the main starting point for an asylum policy that aims at adopting a uniform status of asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection for the third-country nationals throughout the EU, and the EP and the Council are responsible for adopting measures for a common asylum system and a common immigration policy by acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (EU, 2012c: 76–77). In addition, as enshrined in Article 78 of the TFEU,

[t]he Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings (EU, 2012c: 77).

Lastly, Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union envisages that ‘[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees’ in accordance with the TFEU (EU, 2012a: 399).

2.2. Migration and Asylum Issues in the European Union Treaties

The EU is based on the rule of law, which means that its actions are founded on treaties. As seen in all policy areas, the European Commission proposes a law in the field of migration and asylum under the treaties, and then, the Council and the EP adopt legislation through the procedures laid down in the treaties (EU, 2018a). As the thesis examines the discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe by the right-wing political groups in the EP, this section mostly deals with the migration and asylum issues in the EU treaties, which have increasingly given more ‘power’ to the EP as one of the decision-making actors of the EU along with the Council. In other words, a detailed account of historical evolution of migration in the EU is intentionally avoided here in order to remain within the scope of the thesis, and the focus is on the references to the migration and asylum policy and the ever-increasing power of the EP in this field in the EU treaties as well as some critical landmarks in this respect. It should be noted that even during the transformation of Europe as a whole in the context of immigration, one may get the impression of the positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation in the EU’s approach to the issue.

The efforts to establish the EU migration and asylum policy has, in due course, substantially evolved from an intergovernmental issue to a more supranational one. Though the EU treaties may seem to have been the driving force behind such a change, indeed, these treaties have mostly been the consequence of the circumstances of the relevant period as well as the path dependence, which is defined as ‘a social process grounded in a dynamic of “increasing returns”’ (Pierson, 2000: 251). Considering the structural or institutional formation of the EU, it may also be argued that the policy in this area has been determined through negotiations between the Member States as an example of a two-level game, at the international level of which ‘national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments’ (Putnam, 1988: 434). Thus, despite some oppositions by the right-wing political groups in the EP, particularly the Eurosceptic ones, the Member States have increasingly been more willing and prone to deal with immigration at the EU level rather than the national level as its ‘adverse consequences’ have begun to increase or the ‘increasing returns’ of cooperation in this policy area have become more salient. In this sense, though immigration emerged as a low politics issue at first, it has gained momentum and become a ‘high politics’ issue over time (Kostakopoulou, 2006: 232). That is to say, immigration has been regarded as a matter of survival for the EU, and more intensively in recent years, particularly the aforementioned right-wing political groups have tried to construct an anti-immigration Europe through their discourses during the EP debates by portraying this high politics issue, i.e. immigration, as a security threat, an economic threat and a cultural threat as examined in this thesis. In this regard, the EP’s gaining increasingly more power in the EU is not only vital for a more democratic Union but also equally critical for the direction of the migration and asylum policy today and in the future.

As given in Table 7, the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community aimed to relieve the catastrophic consequences of the World War II and to resolve the continual conflict between France and Germany through interdependence in coal and steel industry. It was also the first step for the European integration, and the EP was called the Parliamentary Assembly in this first treaty. In this period, actually starting with the end of the World War II in 1945 and until the first oil crisis in 1973, the migrants were mostly composed of the political asylum seekers mostly from the

Table 7: EU treaties with regard to the changes of the EP's role

EU Treaties	Signed / Entered into Force	Purpose	Main Changes
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community	18 April 1951 / 23 July 1952 Expired: 23 July 2002	To create interdependence in coal and steel so that one country could no longer mobilise its armed forces without others knowing. This eased distrust and tensions after WWII.	—
Treaties of Rome: EEC and EURATOM Treaties	25 March 1957 / 1 January 1958	To set up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).	Extension of European integration to include general economic cooperation.
Merger Treaty (Brussels Treaty)	8 April 1965 / 8 April 1965	To streamline the European institutions.	Creation of a single Commission and a single Council to serve the then three European Communities (EEC, EURATOM, ECSC). Repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Single European Act	17 February 1986 (Luxembourg) – 28 February 1986 (The Hague) / 1 July 1987	To reform the institutions in preparation for Portugal and Spain's membership and speed up decision-making in preparation for the single market.	Extension of qualified majority voting in the Council (making it harder for a single country to veto proposed legislation), creation of the cooperation and assent procedures, <i>giving Parliament more influence</i> .
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)	7 February 1992 / 1 November 1993	To prepare for European Monetary Union and introduce elements of a political union (citizenship, common foreign and internal affairs policy).	Establishment of the European Union and introduction of the co-decision procedure, <i>giving Parliament more say in decision-making</i> . New forms of cooperation between EU governments – for example on defence and justice and home affairs.
Treaty of Amsterdam	2 October 1997 / 1 May 1999	To reform the EU institutions in preparation for the arrival of future member countries.	Amendment, renumbering and consolidation of EU and EEC treaties. More transparent decision-making (<i>increased use of the ordinary legislative procedure</i>).
Treaty of Nice	26 February 2001 / 1 February 2003	To reform the institutions so that the EU could function efficiently after reaching 25 member countries.	Methods for changing the composition of the Commission and redefining the voting system in the Council.
Treaty of Lisbon	13 December 2007 / 1 December 2009	To make the EU more democratic, more efficient and better able to address global problems, such as climate change, with one voice.	<i>More power for the European Parliament</i> , change of voting procedures in the Council, citizens' initiative, a permanent president of the European Council, a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, a new EU diplomatic service.

Source: Adapted from (EU, 2018a; emphasis added).

communist bloc and then from Latin America because of the authoritarian regimes in power as well as the unskilled workers and colonial and post-colonial migrants (Martiniello, 2006: 301–302). In a similar context, the state of play then in some founding countries and the UK, which joined the EU (then EC) in 1973, shows that there were some encouragements as well as hesitations regarding immigration:

In contrast, unlike France, Great Britain, and Holland, Belgium never encouraged immigrants from her colonies to come and work there. Two reasons are often quoted to explain the absence of colonial worker immigration in Belgium. Firstly, industrial exploitation of the Congo necessitated an abundant manpower supply which sometimes fell short locally. Secondly, on account of Belgian colonial *racist attitudes*, the government did not want to risk black workers settling in Belgium (Martiniello, 2006: 302; emphasis added).

The Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) mainly aimed economic cooperation but also included the first references to the migration policy. As the treaties mostly envisaged an economic Union, it gave references to the ‘migrant workers’ (and their dependants) in Articles 51 and 121 in the framework of free movement of persons and social policy, respectively (European Commission, 1957). Since these migrant workers provided ‘industrial reserve army’ of labour, as suggested by Karl Marx (1887 [1867]: 442), in the early years of the EU, it was not a common political habit yet to present them as a threat. However, Castles and Kosack (2010: 28) claim that the immigrant labour in the EU still functions as an industrial reserve army that ‘are given inferior jobs, have no political rights and may be used as a constant threat to the wages and conditions of the local labour force’. On the other hand, the European migration policy was largely reactive until the first oil crisis of 1973 (Martiniello, 2006: 312). The entry into force of the Merger Treaty in 1965 was the first step for the transformation of the Community into a Union, which was realized through the Maastricht Treaty coming into force in 1993. The former created a single Commission and Council for the EEC, EURATOM and ECSC. Though this development may seem trivial for the European migration and asylum policy, it was considerably significant in the context of its possible ‘spillover’ effects, not only in technical terms as suggested by Mitrany (1943) but also in functional and political terms as pointed out by Haas (2008: 13). One of the

indications of such a spillover may be argued to be the first elections held for the EP in 1979.

The oil crisis of 1973 is often accepted as the second critical phase of immigration in Europe. Immigration, which was assumed to be the essential economic resource for Europe and thus temporary, did not end despite the recession and rising unemployment incited by the oil crisis (Martiniello, 2006: 303). On the contrary, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 would increase the number of newcomers. The 1990s were also the beginning of the years when the European governments and their people started to see the immigrants or refugees as ‘false refugees’ or ‘disguised economic immigrants’ (Martiniello, 2006: 304). Before that, in 1985, there were two significant developments in the EU: the signing of the Schengen Agreement and the announcement of the ‘Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration’ by the Commission. The Schengen Agreement, signed by the Benelux countries, France and Germany and in due course extended to 26 European countries, not only has abolished border controls between the Schengen States but also requires these States to take responsibility for controlling the external borders and to issue uniform Schengen visas (European Commission, 2018b). The Schengen Agreement (mostly referred as Schengen Area during the debates), which is believed to be ‘one of the greatest achievements of the EU’ (European Commission, 2018b), is also one of the most referred concepts by the right-wing political group members in presenting immigration as a security threat in particular. Martiniello (2006: 316) argues that the agreement’s emphasis on police and judicial cooperation was nothing short of associating immigration with criminality and terrorism. On the other hand, the guidelines set by the Commission both underlined the importance of free movement of EU citizens and aimed ‘equality of treatment in living and working conditions for all migrants, whatever their origin, and workers who are nationals’ (European Commission, 1985: 5). In addition, a Decision regarding the measures for the entry, residence and employment of the third-country nationals was released by the Commission in the same year, in 1985; however, some Member States unwelcomed this small and non-binding step, and took their objections to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by arguing that ‘the Commission had over-stepped its *authority* by seeking to play a role in immigration policy’ (Luedtke, 2006: 422; emphasis added).

The decision of the ECJ was to void parts of the Decision and to let the remainder stand (Papademetriou, 1996, quoted by Luedtke, 2006: 422).

The Single European Act signed in 1986 gave the EP more power and speeded up decision-making in the EU. Still, it was the Maastricht Treaty that consolidated the EP's power in the EU, created the single European currency and introduced the newborn EU with the structure of the following three pillars: the European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), respectively. The main motive for the third pillar was to cooperate and fight against racism, which had already been started by the TREVI Group (*Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale*) that was founded as an intergovernmental group in 1975, and then, was integrated into the aforementioned third pillar (Uçarer, 2013: 283). Though the migration and asylum policy was included in the third pillar as an intergovernmental matter in the Maastricht Treaty, it was transferred into the supranational first pillar with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. This resulted in renaming the third pillar as the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters through reducing its scope of interest. More importantly, dealing with migration and asylum in a supranational framework would give more say to the EP in this area as a supranational decision-making body, and the increased use of the ordinary legislative procedure through the Treaty of Amsterdam was also of vital importance in this sense.

The Dublin Convention was, undoubtedly, one of the cornerstones in the European migration and asylum policy. The convention was signed by twelve Member States in 1990, and came into force in 1997. Though it was reformed and renamed twice as Dublin II Regulation in 2003 and Dublin III Regulation in 2013, the most controversial article of the Dublin Convention, Article 8, was kept in these following two regulations as well: 'Where no Member State responsible for examining the application for asylum can be designated on the basis of the other criteria listed in this convention, the first Member State with which the application for asylum is lodged shall be responsible for examining it' (EU, 1997: 5). Thus, it was aimed to prevent the asylum seekers from applying for asylum in more than one Member State or choosing one Member State in preference to others due to perceived higher standards of reception conditions or social security assistance in those countries, which is called 'asylum

shopping’ in the EU glossary (European Commission, 2018d). One should pay attention to the implicit negative Other-presentation in this definition and the connotational concept of ‘asylum shopping’ itself. Besides, in order to overcome the weaknesses of the Dublin System such as inefficiency on ‘burden’ sharing between the Member States due to the aforementioned article and as a result of the relative increase in the number of the ‘economic migrants’ or ‘fake refugees’ in 2015, the Commission works on a new version of the Dublin Convention for the reform of the CEAS: the Dublin IV Regulation.

Before giving the details on the CEAS, another milestone that led to the discussion of a common asylum policy of the EU should be mentioned at this point: the Tampere Summit of 15 and 16 October 1999. The Tampere Summit was held to create an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU on the basis of the possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by meeting the deadlines set by both this treaty and the Vienna Action Plan of 1998 drawn up for this objective (European Council, 1999). One of the main titles in the Summit conclusions was ‘A Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy’, which was followed by four related subtitles: I. Partnership with countries of origin; II. A Common European Asylum System; III. Fair treatment of third country nationals; and, IV. Management of migration flows. In the Summit conclusions, it is stated that ‘[t]he European Council reaffirms the importance the Union and Member States attach to absolute respect of the right to seek asylum’, and the Council agrees to work for the establishment of a CEAS on the basis of the Geneva Convention by ensuring the principle of *non-refoulement* (European Council, 1999). In its resolution on the issue, the EP welcomes and endorses the reaffirmation of the Council and appreciates its determination on the objective of developing the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice (EU, 2000: 64). On the other hand, the following statement should be noted within the arguments of the thesis:

[The European Parliament] welcomes the European Council’s call for the fight against racism and xenophobia to be stepped up but reminds the Heads of State and Government that it expects them to act consistently on this by making greater efforts to *avoid creating in the public mind an association between crime, illegal immigrants and asylum seekers* (EU, 2000: 64; emphasis added).

As mentioned earlier, the thesis examines the discourses of the right-wing political group members in the EP that quantitatively make up almost half of the parliament in the relevant parliamentary terms, i.e. the 7th and 8th parliamentary terms, and thus, these members equally contributed to the formation of this resolution with the other political group members in the EP. At this point, particularly the emphasized part of the statement quoted above evokes two hypotheses in our minds. First, the members of the right-wing political groups in the EP are not sincere enough in their statements in the resolution as they actually do not ‘avoid creating in the public mind an association between crime, illegal immigrants and asylum seekers’ in their own discourses regarding these people during the parliamentary debates in the relevant parliamentary terms as analysed in the following chapters in detail. Second, their discourses have changed from a more humane stance to an anti-immigration position over time. The scope of the thesis is beyond proving the first hypothesis; however, as for the second one, it is easier to find the examples of anti-immigration discourses of these political group members in the 8th parliamentary term compared to the previous term, which reveals that the second hypothesis is not far from being proved as examined in the thesis.

So, what is the CEAS that started to be formed in 1999 following the Tampere Summit? Cecilia Malmström, who served as the European Commissioner for Home Affairs from 2010 to 2014, explains the objectives of the CEAS that also include the definition of it as a whole for the Other as follows:

The CEAS will provide better access to the asylum procedure for those who seek protection; will lead to fairer, quicker and better quality asylum decisions; will ensure that people in fear of persecution will not be returned to danger; and will provide dignified and decent conditions both for those who apply for asylum and those who are granted international protection within the EU (EP, 2014: 3).

As for the Self, i.e. the EU, the development of the CEAS is based on ‘bringing more harmonisation to standards of protection by further aligning the EU States’ asylum legislation; effective and well-supported practical cooperation; increased solidarity and sense of responsibility among EU States, and between the EU and non-EU countries’ (European Commission, 2018a). Furthermore, the CEAS involves the following directives and regulations to serve the purposes of it concerning not only the Self but

also the Other: the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation, and EURODAC (European Dactylographic Comparison System) Regulation.

It should also be noted that the CEAS has evolved from having minimum standards to adopting a common policy in this area by taking its place in the EU treaties from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Nice, which was signed in 2001 and came into force in 2003, was aimed at reforming the institutional structure of the EU with the purpose of preparing itself for the envisaged membership of the Central and Eastern European countries, so it did not involve any explicit reference to the asylum policy of the EU. However, the Treaty of Nice is of particular importance since it reformed and strengthened the role of the EP in the decision-making process once more. For the historical sequence of the developments on the issue, it should also be noted that the EU's external migration policy is conducted within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which was developed in 2005 (European Commission, 2018c). Through the GAMM, the EU aims to reinforce its cooperation on migration issues with its non-EU partners, including some countries of origin and transit. On the other hand, unlike the minimum standards introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009 by abolishing the pillar system and creating an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU, has been a vital progress for the CEAS in that, in accordance with Article 63 (1), the EU aims to develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection in order to offer appropriate status to any third-country national who requires international protection and to ensure compliance with the principle of *non-refoulement* (EU, 2007: 60). This article should also be considered within the context of not only the current situation but also the potential developments for the Self and the Other. Finally, in order to achieve the purposes stated above, the Hague Programme (2004) proposed the establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). In 2010, the EP and the Council agreed on the creation of the EASO following the proposal by the European Commission in 2009, and it was officially inaugurated in Malta in 2011 (EASO, 2018). All these developments are, undoubtedly, crucial steps for the institutionalisation of the European migration and asylum policy, and in parallel with one of the aforementioned aims of the thesis that is to contribute to

the formation of ‘refugee awareness’, are expected to serve literally not only ‘for our own good’ but also ‘for their own good’.

2.3. Securitisation of Migration

The term ‘*xenophobus*’ that means the fear of the foreigner or stranger in the ancient Greek likely referred to the turbulent relations of the earliest agricultural societies and the nomadic pastoralists regarding the common parts of Afro-Eurasia and the Americas; however, it was not until the early twentieth century that English speakers began to ‘label their own fear of foreigners by modernizing the Greek-origin term as *xenophobia*’ (Gabaccia, 2015: 40). Since the late 1980s, the increase in the number of refugees over the world has reinforced hostility, and thus, even the ‘deserving refugees’ have been labelled ‘illegal aliens’, and then, a ‘menace to society’ (Marfleet, 2006). Then, in 2015 when the worldwide number of refugees, asylum seekers and the Mediterranean sea arrivals on Greece, Italy and Spain increased to 16,111,285, 3,224,966 and 1,015,078, respectively (UNHCR, 2018b; 2018c), the perception of immigration as a ‘threat’ has more than ever been created by the political circles and disseminated by the mainstream media, which has consolidated the rise of the far right starting in 1970s not only in the European countries but also in many parts of the world. Furthermore, in 2018, one of the leading political figures in the EU, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, called the migration challenge as a ‘make-or-break’ for the EU (*Reuters*, 28 June 2018). Unfortunately, it seems to have been forgotten that the cross-cultural or cross-linguistic migration unique to human beings is a significant driving force for the social change and the evolution of the societies over time (Manning, 2013). In the following pages, the securitisation of migration is examined with references to some outstanding resources in the literature in this context.

Within the context of CDA, the theory and method of the thesis, the Copenhagen School should also be referred so as to complete the CDA premises in terms of the securitisation of migration. As one of the outstanding members of the school, Wæver (1995) discusses security as a ‘speech act’ in his article on securitisation and desecuritisation, and in another study, Wæver (1996: 108) argues that the securitisation perspective ‘can make politicians, activists and academics aware that they make a

choice, when they treat something as a security issue'. According to Buzan *et al.* (1998: 21), 'security is about survival', and briefly, it is about presenting an issue as an existential threat to the 'referent object', i.e. the state, society, etc., so as to justify the use of extraordinary measures including the use of force when necessary to handle it. However, it should be noted that the security is a 'self-referential practice' in which the issue in question becomes a security issue because it is presented as a threat, which means that it may not be a real existential threat (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 24). Then, how to study securitisation? The answer is to study discourse as well as political constellations (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 25). However, a discourse itself is not more than a securitising move, so it entails the discourse to be accepted as a securitisation by the audience so that the issue may be securitised. At this point, the security speech act performed by a securitising actor plays a crucial role in the securitisation of the issue in question (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 40). On the other hand, it is better to aim for desecuritisation than securitisation, and desecuritisation is defined as 'the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere' (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 4) or 'not to have issues phrased as "threats against which we have countermeasures" but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere' (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 29).

In this thesis, the securitising actor or actors are the right-wing political groups in the EP, and existential threat to the referent object, i.e. the EU, is immigration in the 'sectors' of security, economy and culture.¹⁰ The speech act as a means of the securitisation of migration is the discourses delivered by the right-wing political group members during the EP debates. These members are aware of the fact that they must persuade the audience or public opinion to control the public discourse and mind as put forward in CDA in order that these discourses as securitising moves may turn into securitisation, which literally means the construction of an anti-immigration Europe. The term 'refugee crisis' is an oft-used speech act to securitise migration in the EU, and is often followed by negative terms such as 'illegal immigration', 'economic migrant', 'fake refugee', 'invasion', 'flood', etc. The desecuritisation of migration, however, is

¹⁰ The Copenhagen School categorises security in terms of existence into five sectors but does not limit to these: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 21–23). Though there are some similarities between the sectors involved in the thesis and those of the Copenhagen School, it should be noted that they do not exactly overlap, and the thesis does not pursue such a goal.

still possible by taking it out of ‘emergency mode’, i.e. ‘refugee crisis’, and moving into the ‘ordinary public sphere’ or ‘refugee awareness’, the formation of which this thesis also aspires to contribute to.

Undoubtedly, rhetoric as a means of persuasion is as old as immigration. Discrimination and exclusion are also known not to be new phenomena. To give an example of such rhetorics in the context of discrimination or exclusion without considering whether it has anything to do with securitisation or not, Aristotle (1999 [350 BC?]: 8) claims that ‘for that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule’. As a leading figure of the society in which he lived, Aristotle may also be regarded as one of the first elites on the earth using the overall strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation as exemplified in the following quotation:

Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world (Aristotle, 1999 [350 BC?]: 161–162).

It has been more than two thousand and three hundred years since the death of Aristotle; however, not much seems to have changed in terms of othering or discrimination through speech act, be it within the framework of securitisation or not. It could be argued that the circle suggested by Aristotle has slightly enlarged by involving the whole West, i.e. Europe and North America. If Edward Said had not written *Orientalism* in 1979, or even if he had written but had not been an influential scholar in the Western world, maybe now not many would question such rhetorics repeated since the epoch of Aristotle. For Said (1979: 23), ‘Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors’; therefore, he examined both scholarly works and the works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel books, religious and philological studies. Consequently, Said (1979: 108) reveals how the West or Occident presents the

Orient, particularly the Islamic world, in a negative way in its discourses whereas it glorifies itself:

The legendary Arabists in the State Department warn of Arab plans to take over the world. The perfidious Chinese, half-naked Indians, and passive Muslims are described as vultures for 'our' largesse and are damned when 'we lose them' to communism, or to their unregenerate Oriental instincts: the difference is scarcely significant.

These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being.

According to Said (1979: 283), in the Orientalist's work, the Orient or Islam cannot represent itself but it is the Western expert that speculates about the Orient, and its existence is regarded as fixed in time and place for the West (Said, 1979: 108). In this sense, 'the West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior' (Said, 1979: 109). In the Western newspapers, there are always images of the Arab in large numbers, without any individuality or personal characteristics, mostly in mass rage and misery, with irrational gestures; so, 'lurking behind all of these images is the menace of *jihad*. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world' (Said, 1979: 287). While these claims clarify the negative presentation of immigration as well as the positive presentation of the EU in general (and the Member States in particular in some cases) examined in the thesis, the last argument definitely complies with the 'terrorist' discourse of some right-wing political group members in the EP regarding the asylum seekers, refugees or migrants. By making use of the acts of terrorism not only in the EU territories but also in other places of the world such as the September 11 attacks in the United States (US) in 2001, a threat perception is constructed in the public opinion by these right-wing political groups as follows: 'certain beliefs associated with Islam are not compatible with "Western values"' (Spencer, 2006: 2). Likewise, in line with the claims of Said, the Western scholars have redefined migration not only as a security issue but also an economic and a cultural threat through their works that securitise migration (Hollifield and Wong, 2015: 249). While Borjas (1990, quoted by Hollifield

and Wong, 2015: 249) depicts the mass migration from the ‘poor Third World countries’ as an economic threat, Brimelow (1995, quoted by Hollifield and Wong, 2015: 249) argues that ‘the influx of non-White immigrants into Western societies is a cultural threat’. Last but not least, mostly known with his ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ (1993) securitising the Other, Huntington glorifies the Self via the Other through his works as clearly seen in their titles as follows: ‘The West: Unique, Not Universal’ (1996) and *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s Identity* (2004).

Both securitisation and Orientalism are related to power, dominance and hegemony. After all, politics basically involves ‘control, influence, power, or authority’ (Hollifield, 2015: 235). It may inherently be at different levels: national, regional or global. Hence, there is no doubt that politics plays a crucial role not only in the EP but also in the national parliaments of the EU. Regarding the perception of immigration as a burden for ‘our society’ in the Member States, Martiniello and Rath (2012: 19) note that it is ‘undoubtedly associated with the proliferation of volatile electoral and media campaigns in which savvy political and media entrepreneurs can relatively easily and successfully mobilise anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments’. This is also why anti-immigration political movements gain electoral support in various European countries. On the other hand, as quoted in the following lines, Chomsky (2003: 58; emphasis added) implies that politics or the elites having the power may use any sort of securitisation to retain power:

The more you can *increase fear of* . . . *immigrants* and aliens and poverty and all sorts of things, the more you *control people*. Make them hate each other. Be frightened of each other and think that the other is stealing from them. If you do that you can *control people*.

However, retaining power may not provide benefit for anyone, neither for the Self nor the Other, in the long run: ‘the more we claim to discriminate between cultures and customs as good and bad, the more completely do we identify ourselves with those we would condemn’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1961: 225). Furthermore, its being ‘symbolic power’, or ‘false consciousness’ for Friedrich Engels, does not change this truth at all. Bourdieu (1990: 138) defines ‘symbolic power’ as ‘a power of creating things with words’ and ‘a power to conceal or reveal things which are already there’, in which cognition and

recognition take the role of interface, similar to the relevant premise of van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach of CDA.¹¹

Then, the question is how to desecuritize migration or to take it out of emergency mode in the EU without the 'Orientalist' perspective that securitises it through constructing a threat perception in the public discourse and mind. First of all, it should be noted that this thesis does not pursue such an aim, i.e. the desecuritisation of migration in the EU, because it could only be achieved by the [de]securitising actor or actors, which are the right-wing political groups in the EP in this thesis and have the power to persuade the public opinion in this regard. However, the thesis takes a significant role by studying 'the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context', and thus, as mentioned earlier, aspires to 'understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality' (van Dijk, 2001: 352). Thus, the thesis may be a reference for the relevant actors to achieve the desecuritisation of migration in the EU by taking into consideration the benefits of immigration for a Union that is allegedly 'United in Diversity'. Above all, it is surely beyond doubt that immigration has been the source of crucial benefits throughout the history, and for generations, migrants from all over the world have contributed to the economy and culture of European societies as well as to those of migrants themselves. (Sarah, 2006: 2). From as early as 1950s to the 1970s, particularly to the oil crisis of 1973, the immigrants (particularly the 'guestworkers') were seen as an essential part for the survival of the new-born EEC since they provided a significant resource of labour (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Furthermore, on the western side of the Atlantic, the statistics show that they were immigrants or their children who have founded more than 40 per cent of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies, which employ more than 10 million people worldwide and have generated a revenue of \$4.2 trillion that is greater than every country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world outside the US, except for China and Japan (PNAE, 2011: 2). Therefore, as argued by Hollifield (2004), immigration must be managed for strategic gains by the states; otherwise, they may lack labour and human capital, and thus, fall behind in the global competition. Most importantly, it should be kept in mind that immigration is

¹¹ See (van Dijk, 1997c: 31).

more than an issue of economy and also not just a large group of people. As Swiss novelist Max Frisch is quoted regarding the guestworker program of Switzerland: ‘We asked for workers but instead human beings came’ (quoted by Hollifield and Wong, 2015: 243).



CHAPTER III

IMMIGRATION AS A SECURITY THREAT

The thesis examines the most common anti-immigration discourses by the right-wing political groups in the EP. As seen during the research for the thesis study, one of these discourses is: ‘immigration is a security threat’. Undoubtedly, as the security issue is directly related to the survival of the individuals and Europe, or as an example of ‘existential threat’ (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 21), the MEPs are often quite harsh in their discourses on the issue and resort to both overall and specific strategies to justify these discourses not only to get the support of the public opinion but also to control the public discourse and mind in this respect. In other words, there is a continuous interaction between the relevant political groups and the European citizens in the context of discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe. The terrorist attacks are seen to be the most frequently used references by the MEPs for the security of the individuals or societies whereas the Schengen Area, Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency)¹² or external borders often take place in the discourses with the claim of securing the sovereignty of the EU nations or ensuring the ‘political’ security (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 22), if not the EU as a whole. As a consequence, a migrant or refugee is easily denominated as a potential terrorist, if not a terrorist. This chapter examines the portrayal of immigration as a security threat during the EP debates through such denominations and other strategies of negative Other-presentation as well as positive Self-presentation strategies, and exemplifies it through reasonable number of excerpts from each right-wing political group for the validity and reliability of the thesis.

3.1. Portrayal of Immigration as a Security Threat in the European Parliament

How do the right-wing political groups in the EP discredit or marginalise immigration

¹² The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) was established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of 14 September 2016 by replacing the ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union’. However, it maintains the same legal personality and the same short name: Frontex. See (EU, 2016).

and attempt to control the public discourse and mind in this sense in line with their own ideology, and finally, construct an anti-immigration Europe? To answer this critical question, the following sections examine the securitisation of migration in the discourse topic of immigration as a security threat by these political groups through starting with the most populous party, the EPP, and ending with the newly formed and the least populous one, the ENF.

3.1.1. European People's Party

The EPP is the most moderate political group of the four right-wing political groups in the EP in terms of their discourses regarding the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in general. In comparison to particularly the MEPs of the ENF and EFDD, the EPP members mostly endeavour to avoid the discourses that may be called discriminative, racist or anti-immigration by the counter-discourse groups. However, an in-depth probe to these discourses reveals some implications and presuppositions used for the prevalent negative Other-presentation by the right-wing politicians.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate Mr Dati, who has worked hard at a complex text which seeks to embrace the complex aspects of this absurd phenomenon: **violent extremism and intolerance are often children of marginalization and poverty. But** these reasons can never justify this violence.

The approximately 5,000 European citizens who have become foreign fighters have shown the failure of integration policies. **I do not want to fall into the trivial temptation of the 'refugee = terrorist' mathematical equation, but** it is of fundamental importance that in order to enter Europe the controls must be rigorously reinforced and that **all the people who migrate on our continent are registered**. There can be **no exceptions to security**.

To this I would add more stringent measures for the processing of data online, the closure of the trialogue on the PNR with the inclusion of intra-European flights, **a more intense cooperation with the companies that manage social media** and, not least, the swift conclusion of the reform of Europol.

I conclude by quoting Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person'. **Without security there is no liberty. But the opposite is not true** (Barbara Matera, EPP, 24 November 2015).

In the excerpt above, Barbara Matera admits the impact of marginalization and poverty

on the violent extremism and intolerance, and accompanied with an apparent denial, the context of this excerpt makes the MEPs the primary target and the public opinion the secondary target of these discourses through mass media (including social media as its prominent part in the 21st century) have the cognition that the refugees are not only marginal or poor but also intolerant and ‘terrorists’, which are explicit examples of denomination for the refugees. The discourse about the failure of integration of those people combined with the strategy of numbers game implies that all foreign fighters from Europe have a refugee origin though she does not provide the target groups with any evidence on this claim. As one of the ‘stringent’ measures against this security threat by the refugees, Matera proposes to intensively cooperate with the companies that manage social media to maintain the power and dominance of the European political elites, who have anti-immigration attitudes, on reproduction of an anti-immigration Europe cognition in public mind. Even ignoring the common discourse of today, security-freedom balance, Matera sacrifices freedom (or liberty) for the sake of security though there is a clear ‘force of fact’, i.e. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights she quotes, so she prefers to use the strategy of fairness on the issue of so-called security threat by the refugees; that is, ‘firm but fair’.

Mr President, **while not wishing to take the comparison between terrorism and immigration too far, I have observed that unfortunately**, EU action is driven by emergency situations, **such as a serious attack or a mass landing of immigrants**, as is currently happening in Lampedusa, where the exodus of Tunisians to the Italian coast could culminate in a *Chronicle of a Death Foretold*.¹³

The voyage of hope could end up becoming a cursed voyage, and it will be on the consciences of all of us who witness **these continuous uncontrolled influxes** and do not say ‘**enough is enough**’ with sufficient authority. When it happens, we will throw up our hands in horror, but the following day we will forget about it.

Europeans have a duty and a right to know the **truth**: that the **Mediterranean strategy is not working**, that the **common immigration policy will continue to be a dream** until European countries commit to equipping the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) with sufficient resources to be effective.

Talking does not cost anything, but we need to act. Do you really

¹³ *Chronicle of a Death Foretold* is a novella, which was written by Gabriel García Márquez and published in 1981.

believe that Frontex is currently able to **guarantee the security of the European borders?** I do not believe it is. **Let us hope that the people of Egypt, Tunisia and other countries of the Maghreb do not decide *en masse* to seek a better future in Europe,** but rather that they do so in their own countries, because that is what they have fought for, and **we must help them.**

Solidarity and responsibility are therefore required, along with, above all, truth when talking about a common European immigration policy, **which is now more necessary than ever** (Teresa Jiménez-Becerril Barrio, EPP, 15 February 2011).

In her criticism of the Mediterranean strategy of the EU and her reflection of the despair about the common European immigration policy, Teresa Jiménez-Becerril Barrio compares terrorism with immigration ‘while not wishing to’ make such a comparison, and bases her claim on her own observation, which may be accepted as a strategy of storytelling as a part of an overall negative Other-presentation. Through a persistent combination of ‘a serious attack’ and ‘a mass landing of immigrants’, she tries to justify her previous claim by implying that such an attack is an inevitable outcome of this ‘mass’, another example of an insidious numbers game. In the following paragraph of the excerpt, Jiménez-Becerril Barrio shows an apparent sympathy towards the refugees, and argues that the EU should say ‘enough is enough’ not for ‘our’ own good but for ‘their’ own good and stop ‘these continuous uncontrolled influxes’ so as to end this ‘cursed’ voyage. Lastly, she calls the EU Members for the solidarity and responsibility for a common European immigration policy to guarantee the security of the European borders against the presupposed new ‘influxes’ of refugees ‘*en masse*’ who are portrayed as a source of potential security threat in the first paragraph.

Concerned about the scale of discrepancies in the data provided by various media, including politicians, I turn to the suggestion of a reliable, quick verification of information on migration processes, especially those concerning refugees.

Information that **among those fleeing warfare is more than 70% of young men,** data indicating a small percentage of full families, suggests that **every tenth man is a terrorist or potential terrorist that must arouse anxiety.** It is also important to define such terms as, for example, the **said ‘potential terrorist’.** After all, at the current state of interpretation, it can be anyone or rarely anyone. The importance of the precise message is, in my opinion, crucial for the **right reactions of individual communities** (Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, EPP, 16 September 2015).

As power and dominance are organised and institutionalised in general, the social dominance of groups is not only individually enacted by its group members but also may 'be supported or condoned by other group members, sanctioned by the courts, legitimated by laws, enforced by the police, and ideologically sustained and reproduced by the media or textbooks' (van Dijk, 1993b: 255). In the excerpt above, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski seems to be aware of this power and dominance of the elites, not only the politicians but also the media as their main means to control the public discourse, and states that he is concerned about the 'scale of discrepancies in the data' regarding refugees. In the next lines, he shares some information and data, whose sources are not mentioned, which are full of implications and presuppositions to discredit the refugees. Zdrojewski implies that if a refugee is young and does not have a 'full family', he should be 'defined' as a 'potential terrorist', if not a 'terrorist' yet. When viewed from this aspect, there is a strict correlation between anti-immigration discourses, i.e. immigration as a security threat, as an economic threat or as a cultural threat. It all starts with a single word, 'migrant', and then evolves into 'economic migrant', 'cultural threat', 'potential terrorist', and finally, 'terrorist'. Thus, they get the 'refugee = terrorist' mathematical equation, as given before by Matera (EPP, 24 November 2015). Actually, according to these anti-immigration discourses, a 'refugee' is a 'terrorist' not only in terms of security but also economic and cultural contexts. According to Zdrojewski, this is the 'precise message', which should be delivered to the public by the media, and it entails the 'right reactions of individual communities' in line with again this 'precise message'.

Madam President, two years after the **escalation of the migration crisis**, the European Union has taken a number of measures. There are measures that limit the **uncontrolled access of refugees**, such as the agreement with Turkey, negotiations with Libya and other African countries, coastal and border guards. **Mandatory relocation quotas do not work and there is not a sufficient return policy**, as has already been said.

As the **migrations crash**, it seems to me that, personally, it seems to me that **safety** is no longer a priority, and I find this a mistake. I do not want to wait for the need for **further terrorist attacks** and **waves of violence** to make us realize that **migration must be a security issue**. Solidarity without **security** is not sustainable, or yes, let us be solid, **but we have the security of the European Union first** (Michaela Šojdrová, EPP, 12 September 2017).

According to the UNHCR (2018c), the worldwide number of refugees of 10,396,538 in 2009 increased to 16,111,285 in 2015 whereas these numbers of asylum seekers were 989,169 and 3,224,966 in 2009 and 2015, respectively. It also began to be called as the ‘migration crisis’ or ‘refugee crisis’ by the EU in 2015 when the demography of Mediterranean sea arrivals on Greece, Italy, Spain and Cyprus increased to 1,015,078, which is almost five times more than the number of 216,054 in 2014 (UNHCR, 2018b). In the excerpt above, for this reason, Michaela Šojdrová describes 2015 as the year of ‘escalation of migration crisis’, which has also become the turning point for the escalation of anti-immigration discourses by the right-wing political groups in the EP. This is also why the 8th parliamentary term of 2014–2019 includes more blatant and overt anti-immigration discourses when compared to the more moderate and subtle ones of the previous term, the 7th parliamentary term of 2009–2014. Moreover, not only the measures taken to limit the ‘uncontrolled access of refugees’ but also ‘mandatory relocation quotas’ should be questioned in terms of their anti-immigration characteristics. And, if a return policy may be characterized as ‘sufficient’ or not, it means that, for Šojdrová, such a policy is something relative though there is a ‘precise’ provision defining the principle of *non-refoulement* in Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention, which is also binding on States that are party to the 1967 Protocol.¹⁴ To remind within the context of the return policy of the EU, as quoted from the official website of the UNHCR and in contrary to the discourses of many right-wing political group members in the EU,

[t]he landmark figure, which was reached late on December 29 [2015], also indicated that 84 per cent of those arriving in Europe came from the world’s top 10 refugee producing countries, strengthening UNHCR’s belief that most of the people arriving in Europe were fleeing war and persecution (UNHCR, 2015a).

The second paragraph of the excerpt makes its first part clearer. As seen before, the term ‘migration’ is used in parallel with ‘further terrorist attacks’ and ‘waves of violence’ to discredit the migrants or refugees in the eyes of public through such

¹⁴ Article 33 (1) of the *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* is as follows: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ (UNHCR, 2016a: 30).

denominations and predications. That is to say, immigration is presented as a threat to the ‘security of the European Union’, and hence, in Šojdrová’s opinion, ‘migration must be a security issue’. Last but not least, with the discourse of ‘but we have the security of the European Union first’ based merely on some presumptions, Šojdrová implies that the security of the EU takes precedence of the dead and missing people, who increased to tragic numbers of 3,538 in 2014, 3,771 in 2015, and 5,096 in 2016 (UNHCR, 2018b), during their perilous journey to Europe via the Mediterranean due to the ‘war and persecution’ in their countries.

Together with the euro, **free movement of persons in the EU is one of the fundamental pillars of the European project.** There is no reason whatsoever why we should now question this. **The reaction to the thousands of refugees who are literally being washed ashore in the south of Europe cannot possibly be considered a valid reason for us to start closing our internal borders, even temporarily.** The only sensible way to react to this is to do something, in the short term, about a common European asylum and migration policy. **We cannot and should not sit back and allow the arrival of 30,000 refugees on the shores of Italy or Greece to undermine the pillars of the EU.** Obviously, Italy is right to have requested European solidarity in tackling this problem. Solidarity is the solution. **Shutting our borders, even temporarily, is a panic reaction,** unbecoming of EU leaders (Ivo Belet, EPP, 10 May 2011).

This excerpt above and the following one are taken from the parliamentary debates in the 7th parliamentary term (2009–2014). In this parliamentary term, not only the members of the EPP but also other right-wing political group members in the EP rarely attribute to immigration within the context of a threat unlike the more overt and fierce anti-immigration discourses of the 8th parliamentary term (2014–2019). Nevertheless, it is possible to find the first sparks of these anti-immigration discourses of the relevant political groups in this period. For instance, Ivo Belet does not use any term regarding threat in his discourses in the excerpt above. Instead, by using the specific strategies of predication and numbers game, he presupposes that the ‘arrival of 30,000 refugees’ will ‘undermine the pillars of the EU’, one of which is presented as ‘free movement of persons in the EU’, i.e. the Schengen Area. In the discourses of the 8th parliamentary term, the Schengen Area is often referred in the context of immigration as a security threat, and closing ‘our’ internal borders or not is discussed in this framework. Belet

also claims that an action such as closing or ‘shutting “our” borders’ would be a ‘panic reaction’, which evokes some negative connotations in the public mind as if immigration was an emergency situation just like a fire, earthquake or ‘flood’, as often used by the members of the right-wing political groups to present immigration in a negative way. However, Belet also maintains that ““we” cannot and should not sit back and allow’ these ‘thousands of refugees who are “literally being washed ashore” in the south of Europe’ by expecting the reaction of the EU in general and the public opinion in particular. In other words, these discourses are delivered to control the public discourse and public mind through the overall strategy of negative Other-presentation, and hence, to get the necessary support for ‘our’ own good.

I agree with Mr Buzek’s statement that **immigration has always benefited Europe**, insofar as this relates to **immigration that is regulated, integrated and respects the institutions and laws of the country of destination**. When **social renewal and labour turnover** are needed, when **cultural exchange** enriches peoples, **then immigration is a precious resource**. **Our Judeo-Christian roots provide us with the notion of charity and hospitality towards those who are suffering**.

However, when **illegal immigration** results in **emergency situations, hardship, crime and insecurity**, a tangible **strategy for integration** at levels that countries can sustain in demographic terms becomes necessary. We are fooling ourselves if we believe that the problem is limited to the countries bordering the Mediterranean: the free movement of citizens in the EU can only encourage **the free movement of many illegal immigrants who have turned to crime**. Every European state has a moral and direct interest since **this is related to the issue of crime and the security of the half a billion citizens** who have **given us a mandate to protect them** with urgent, tangible actions, both with regard to existing problems and those which are likely to develop rapidly. **The rights of citizens cannot be traded** for the general indifference of the Member States or for Solonic warnings by the European Commission (Tiziano Motti, EPP, 15 September 2009).

As seen at the beginning of the excerpt above, the discourses on immigration by the EPP members were more moderate and softer before the increase in the ‘numbers’ of the asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015. At least, there were more references to the positive sides of immigration by these members. Then, particularly after 2015, these numbers have mostly been referred as a part of the strategy of numbers game to justify their anti-immigration discourses. In the first part of the excerpt, Tiziano Motti refers to the positive sides of immigration: ‘immigration has always benefited Europe’ or

‘immigration is a precious resource’. However, both statements start with two conjunctions that are vital in the framework of CDA: ‘insofar as’ and ‘then’. In other words, according to Motti, there are some conditions so that immigration may be accepted as ‘beneficial’ or ‘precious’ for the EU. Therefore, it does not matter how much suffering those people have, but it matters how much beneficial they are for the EU, probably in terms of ‘labour turnover’ rather than ‘social renewal’ or ‘cultural exchange’ though he also attributes to these last two in his statement. Otherwise, he would go on underlining these positive social and cultural sides of immigration instead of denominating immigration as ‘illegal’ and repeatedly presenting it as a security threat through some implications, presuppositions and predications. Furthermore, the conjunction ‘however’ used at the beginning of the second part of the excerpt following the statement ‘those who are suffering’ shows that the positive discourses regarding immigration in the first part are not more than using the strategy of apparent sympathy. In the second part, Motti equates immigration with ‘crime and insecurity’ and explicitly refers to ‘many illegal immigrants who have turned to crime’. He also tries to justify these anti-immigration discourses by influencing the public mind through the strategy of top-down transfer along with a sort of numbers game: ‘this is related to the issue of “crime” and the “security” of the “half a billion citizens”’. Last but not least, Motti glorifies the Self’s own religion and culture against the Other’s by suggesting that “our” Judeo-Christian roots provide “us” with the notion of charity and hospitality towards those who are suffering’, which is the use of the strategy of positive Self-presentation accompanied with the aforementioned strategy of apparent sympathy.

3.1.2. European Conservatives and Reformists

Before starting to analyse the discourses of the ECR members, it should be noted that there are also some MEPs of not only the left-wing but also the right-wing political groups in the EP who really share the grief of the migrants or refugees, really empathise with them and somehow present the Other in a positive way though they are quite rare. This thesis particularly focuses on the discourses of the right-wing political groups in the EP since their anti-immigration discourses are so common and mostly explicit. However, these discourses may also be implicit so as not to draw the reaction of the

counter-discourse groups, or because of the strategy of impression management so as to ‘avoid tacit or explicit accusations of xenophobia or racism by the opposition, by relevant organizations, or by more liberal segments of the public at large’ (van Dijk, 1997b: 44).

Mr President, honourable Members, **illegal migration is a threat**. It is a **threat to the rule of law** for the **security** of the Member States of the European Union. Those who support **illegal immigration** are committing crimes. The **illegal, illegal crossing of borders** of any country anywhere in the world is a **crime** and this should be well known by **cultural Marxists and Bolsheviks** on the other side of the hall. Moreover, they know it, but they do not understand.

When a non-governmental organization assists **illegal immigration**, assists in the **illegal crossing of borders**, it also commits a **crime**. And here comes the other question: Where is the responsibility of the **so-called leaders** of the European countries? Ms Merkel's responsibility, which as a real populist first **invited everyone**, then denied her words. Where is the responsibility of those who say someone forcibly has to accept someone in their home? Are these our colleagues, today in the hall, have accepted at least one **illegal immigrant** in their home? No, they are not. Therefore, speaking in this way is **a lie and hypocrisy**, and that is what must be done (Angel Dzhambazki, ECR, 25 October 2017).

In the excerpt above, Angel Dzhambazki has an explicit anti-immigration discourse claiming that ‘migration is a threat’, and he uses the denomination of ‘illegal’ to justify his discourse in itself. And, according to Dzhambazki, this is a ‘security’ threat, which makes it easier to gain the support of both the Member States and the public. Similarly, in a ‘call for a sense of reality’, Helga Stevens (ECR, 24 November 2015) argues that ‘[r]efugees are obviously not by definition terrorists, but various terrorists appear to have entered Europe as asylum seekers. That proves the attacks in Paris. Unfortunately, there is a security risk ...’. Additionally, in a blue card question related to the increasing immigration from the southern Mediterranean to Europe, Karol Karski (ECR, 8 July 2015) asks the following question: ‘Do not you think that this immigration should be restricted so that the terrorist threat that is present among these people is not transferred to Europe?’ These discourses clearly portray asylum seekers, refugees and migrants as ‘terrorists’ and immigration as a ‘terrorist or security threat’ even if not ‘by definition’, and contribute to the discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe.

In the excerpt, Dzhambazki also tries to discredit the opponents of these anti-immigration discourses in the EP, though they are rare as mentioned before, by associating them with ‘cultural Marxists and Bolsheviks’ within the context of ‘a largely anti-communist consensus’ in Europe (van Dijk, 1993b: 271). He aims to discredit or marginalise not only the dissident MEPs in the EP but also non-governmental organizations and ‘so-called’ leaders of some countries such as Merkel. In this regard, Dzhambazki blames Merkel of ‘inviting everyone’ to Europe, which is a kind of the strategy of numbers game, by ignoring the fact that these people mostly flee the terror of war in which the role of the European countries cannot be disclaimed. Otherwise, to explain it by Dzhambazki’s own words, such a disclaimer would be a salient ‘lie’ and ‘hypocrisy’.

Mr President, **I have compassion for those who have suffered great danger fleeing conflict and great sympathy for those people in those coastal areas of Italy and Greece** who have borne the brunt of the **current migration flow. We have a crisis**, but I am afraid EU policy has made it worse.

The Schengen open borders system has encouraged entry. The Commission plan to distribute **large numbers of migrants** across Europe is further incentive. Today it is 40,000, plus 120,000. **How many more tomorrow? Over nine million people** have left their homes in Syria. The people-traffickers are being enriched at the cost of human life. **All this is happening at a time of raised threats of terrorism.**

The first priority of EU policy should be the security and cohesion of our countries and the rights of our own citizens. Certainly, we need to relieve the pressure on Italy and Greece. Instead of making the problem worse **we should focus on improving border security** and a functioning system for the processing of migrants, **including the return of those that are not genuine refugees.**

We must help people fleeing persecution, but above all we must protect **our** democracies (Geoffrey Van Orden, ECR, 8 September 2015).

According to the UNHCR (2018a), 44,400 people a day are forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution, and Turkey, Uganda, Pakistan and Lebanon take the first four places among the top hosting countries with the numbers of 3,5 million, 1,4 million, 1,4 million and 1 million, respectively. On the other hand, 57% of the refugees worldwide come from the following three countries: Syria, 6,3 million; Afghanistan, 2,6 million; and South Sudan, 2,4 million whereas 85% of the world’s displaced people are hosted in developing countries. In the light of these numbers, while Lebanon with its

population of about 6 million and Turkey with its population of about 80 million host so many people, the fact that the EU with its population of over 500 million discusses how to distribute or relocate ‘large numbers of migrants’, namely, ‘40,000, plus 120,000’ does not compromise with the glorified Copenhagen political criteria of ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities’ for accession to the EU (EU, 2018b). Along with a similar strategy of numbers game, Geoffrey Van Orden also asks the question of ‘[h]ow many more tomorrow?’ by implying and presupposing that ‘over nine million people’ of Syria will take refuge in Europe ‘in a time of raised threats of terrorism’, which is a clear example of negative Other-presentation within the framework of presenting the ‘Other’ as a security threat. Therefore, according to Van Orden, the security of ‘our’ countries and the rights of ‘our’ own citizens should precede those ‘who have suffered great danger fleeing conflict’ though he claims that he has compassion for them, which is a strategy of apparent sympathy. As a matter of fact, Van Orden seems to have the ‘real’ and ‘great sympathy for those people in those coastal areas of Italy and Greece who have borne the brunt of the current migration flow’, particularly in summer ‘when there must be calm, to develop the tourist season’ (Notis Marias, ECR, 16 May 2017). Van Orden, lastly, implies that ‘we’ must help not ‘fake’, ‘economic’ or ‘terrorist’ but ‘genuine’ refugees fleeing persecution, and right after this strategy of apparent sympathy combined with some implied denominations, he states that ‘but above all we must protect our democracies’, which may be accepted as the strategies of justification and top-down transfer.

Mr President! Ladies and gentlemen! We are to talk about the solution to the **immigration crisis** – this is the title of this report.¹⁵ Meanwhile, for example, points 16 and 39 again contain indirect but explicit calls for the **legalization of illegal immigration**, and as such are, of course, **an attack on state sovereignty and the rule of law**. And it is necessary, the High Chamber, to remember that it was such appeals, such statements about the **legalization of illegal immigration**, that really built up the prosperity for the **illegal immigration industry**. And **this industry of illegal immigration is increasingly – according to the information we have – infiltrated by the Caliphate of the Islamic State**. What's more - and I think that this is the most important thing - it is really suggesting that **illegal immigration will sooner or later be legalized**, is the source

¹⁵ See (EP, 2017).

of the **tragedy of thousands of people** who have been exploited by **smugglers** (Marek Jurek, ECR, 4 April 2017).

In most of the excerpts given in this thesis, the members of the right-wing political groups in the EP exert great effort to call the refugees as ‘economic’ migrants or ‘fake’ refugees as a part of their discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe. However, in this excerpt above, Marek Jurek claims that the report or reports presented in the EP aim to legalize ‘illegal’ immigration, which would be ‘an attack on state sovereignty and the rule of law’. Indeed, this is not more than a simple rhetoric to present the Other in a negative way and pave the way for his anti-discrimination discourses on the next lines. According to Jurek, who completely ignores the humanitarian side of the issue apart from using the strategy of apparent sympathy at the end of the excerpt, ‘this industry of illegal immigration is increasingly – according to the information we have – infiltrated by the Caliphate of the Islamic State’, which implies that there are some or many ‘terrorists’ among the migrants or refugees. This statement, without any explicit information source except for ‘according to the information we have’, involves the use of the strategies of implication, denomination and predication regarding these migrants and refugees to portray immigration as a security threat. To consolidate his political group’s anti-immigration position in the public discourse and public mind, Jurek also uses the strategy of presupposition when he claims ‘illegal immigration will sooner or later be legalized’. To present the Self in a positive way and to mislead the public opinion on immigration, finally, he uses the aforementioned strategy of apparent sympathy by referring to the ‘tragedy of thousands of people’ exploited by ‘smugglers’, who are one of the common references for the justification of the right-wing political group members’ anti-immigration discourses. On the other hand, there are also so blatant anti-immigration discourses that may not be justified at all like the following one delivered in the context of the cases of the immigrants’ attack to trucks in Calais: ‘The honourable Member was kind to mention that we have to develop an integration program for immigrants. It is true – we must, but such immigrants who behave in this way should be integrated in prisons.’ (Kosma Złotowski, ECR, 4 October 2016). This discourse includes the strategy of fairness, which means that suggestion of integrating these people in prisons is firm but fair.

I have spoken out many times for **strengthening the external borders of the European Union**. I called for this in the European Parliament when words came from Brussels and from some capitals about the need to open the borders to the **wave of refugees**, in which, as we all know today, there were **not only economic migrants, but also terrorists**. I have no doubt that the Frontex agency should be strengthened. Not only financially. All Member States should also support the front countries of the Schengen Area most burdened by the need to block the **uncontrolled wave of refugees**.

I voted in favour of increasing the resources for Frontex. The Polish Border Guard helps its colleagues in Hungary. Of course, you have to do more. Some reasonable proposals have been presented today by the Commissioners. However, I do not agree that, as a result of the **crisis** in the Schengen Area, the solution was to establish a federated service. **Safe and tight borders are essential for Europe**. However, we cannot repeat with each **crisis** that the only solution is **‘more Europe’** and transferring responsibilities to the European level. A proposal to register the possibility of deploying services on the territory of a Member State against his will only on the basis of decisions taken at the office level in my opinion is unacceptable (Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, ECR, 15 December 2015).

In this excerpt again, the ‘wave’ of refugees is denominated as not only ‘economic’ migrants but also ‘terrorists’, and Anna Elzbieta Fotyga calls on the EU to strengthen the Frontex against this so-called security threat of immigration. The ambiguous and threatening term ‘wave’ is used to increase the impact of the negative image of immigration on the public mind as a sort of strategy of numbers game. Moreover, according to Fotyga, this is more than a ‘wave’; it is also ‘uncontrolled’, which makes this so-called threat more dangerous for the security of the EU. After setting a solid ground for the justification of her anti-immigration discourses through such denominations, she offers ‘safe and tight borders’ for Europe, which may only be achieved by having ‘more Europe’. In other words, the EU is called on to reinforce the well-known Fortress Europe against immigration. In brief, from beginning to end, Fotyga uses the overall strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation along with some implications and presuppositions.

We want to fight immigration. It is a great problem. In the meantime, our notice board and computer are going wrong. Let us tackle the things which we can really tackle effectively.

Migration is, of course, one of the greatest problems facing Europe today. What is more, it is a problem not just for us politicians,

but it is also a problem for the people of the European Union's Member States. It is, perhaps, **one of the main challenges currently facing the political class in Europe,** and **one of the main problems of our electors.** Immigration has more than one name, because my esteemed fellow Members have spoken today about immigration from Africa, which mainly affects the countries of the Mediterranean Basin, and what they said is, in a certain sense, justified. I represent a country – Poland – where **this illegal immigration** is, of course, smaller, but people come to us from the countries of the former Soviet Union, and some from Asia.

We are faced with a question about the philosophy of the **EU's fight against illegal immigration,** and – let us put it simply – **also against restrictions on legal immigration. Does Frontex have to bear the brunt of this fight?** Is this really advisable? **Would it not be more effective for the extra money which we want to give Frontex to be allocated to the countries which have the greatest problem with illegal immigration,** and also to EU Member States whose borders are part of the EU's external borders? Mr President, it seems to me, as I finish, that this would be more advisable (Ryszard Czarnecki, ECR, 15 September 2009).

Migration is discussed through various phrases by the right-wing political groups during the parliamentary debates in the EP: 'migration crisis', 'migration issue' or 'migration problem' as in this case in the excerpt above from a debate in the 7th parliamentary term. However, whichever term or phrase they use for migration, the general tendency of these political group members is to present it as a threat to Europe. According to Ryszard Czarnecki, this is such a 'great problem' or threat that 'we', both the 'politicians' and the 'people' of the EU, must 'fight' against 'this illegal immigration'. Indeed, fighting or struggling against 'illegal immigration' is a well-known discourse in the construction of an anti-immigration Europe in the public mind by the right-wing political groups. However, Czarnecki's statement goes beyond this familiar discourse and he refers to the EU's fight 'also against restrictions on legal immigration'. Though it is not overt enough in this statement, some MEPs regard immigration as a threat against the European security, economy or culture, be it legal or illegal, regular or irregular, and strive to present it negatively to control the public discourse in this respect. Besides, as a security body of the EU guarding its borders and coasts, Frontex is claimed to 'bear the brunt of this fight', and Czarnecki argues that the 'extra money' should, first of all, 'be allocated to the countries which have the greatest problem with illegal immigration' instead of Frontex. As also seen in this statement, there is an

ongoing debate on who should guard the borders and coasts of the EU against ‘illegal immigration’: the EU as a whole by means of Frontex or the Member States on their own? Whatever the answer they give to this question, immigration cannot get rid of its fate of being a threat in the eyes of the right-wing political groups even before the ‘catastrophic’ increase in the ‘numbers’ of the asylum seekers or migrants arriving in Europe in 2015.

Mr President, my Group and I welcome this opportunity to debate the **issues and problems** which Europe faces in the area of **migration and the Schengen system**. The debate is long overdue. Now is the time to focus not only on providing free movement, but also on **better guarding the borders of Member States** and the EU itself. **Rather than pushing for more legislation in the area of immigration and migration, we should be making the legislation that we already have work better and harder for all the citizens of the Union**. However, current concerns from Member States are not reactionary, but instead the inevitable consequence of over 20 years of ever-changing circumstances in Europe and around the world.

There is no doubt that **Schengen** has been a success in many ways, but **Europe is facing challenges which simply did not exist to the current extent** when the system was first created. **Large-scale unemployment, migration from North Africa, terrorism, organised crime and people-trafficking have provided us with problems far more complex than those envisaged in the policies for free movement of European citizens**. It is not an unfair assessment to say that **the current system is now shown to be flawed and ill-equipped for the new circumstances we find ourselves in**. We need to create an effective tool representative of the modern needs of Europe’s Member States and able to improve the situation for all.

This needs to be complemented by renewed strength in making sure the other agencies of the EU, like **Frontex**, are there to support states in **securing their own EU external borders**, and that the problems are not exacerbated by further countries which may join the EU and therefore the Schengen Area that are both ill-prepared to face the **challenges** and also to assume the **burdens that accompany the obvious benefits**.

This is a **problem** best solved through communication and cooperation, but **Europe’s immigration and Schengen policies urgently require review**, reflection and then sensible reform (Timothy Kirkhope, ECR, 10 May 2011).

Though this excerpt also belongs to the 7th parliamentary term, Timothy Kirkhope’s discourses regarding immigration are slightly milder than the ones delivered in the previous excerpt by Czarnecki. Kirkhope discusses immigration in the framework of

security, and refers to the ‘Schengen system’ and ‘Frontex’ by claiming that the ‘current system is now shown to be flawed and ill-equipped for the new circumstances “we” find “ourselves” in’. According to Kirkhope, except for his reference to ‘large-scale unemployment’ as a strategy of justification, these ‘new circumstances’ that consist of ‘terrorism, organised crime and people-trafficking’ are parts of a security threat against the EU, and they are implied to stem from immigration, particularly ‘migration from North Africa’. In addition, Kirkhope argues that these ‘challenges’ that Europe faces today have never existed ‘to the current extent’, and thus, strives to influence the minds of the ‘European citizens’ against immigration and get their support for consolidating the power of his political group in the EP as European elites in constructing an anti-immigration Europe. This is also a sort of top-down transfer used by Kirkhope to legitimate his anti-immigration discourses. Lastly, by using some denominations, Kirkhope suggests that ‘Europe’s immigration and Schengen policies urgently require review’ against the ‘challenge’, ‘burden’ or ‘problem’ of immigration, which is delivered to pave the way for the aforementioned construction of an anti-immigration Europe in the public discourse and public mind.

3.1.3. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

The members of the EFDD are usually explicit in their anti-immigration discourses, and some of them such as Kristina Winberg come to the forefront in terms of such discourses. It should be noted again that the EFDD is the successor of the Eurosceptic EFD, which was one of the anti-immigration political groups of the EP in the 7th parliamentary term. As the thesis includes the discourse examples of the 7th and 8th parliamentary terms, the last two excerpts under this subtitle in each analysis chapter belongs to the EFD members.

Madam President! I must say that here the EU takes water over its head and sails in the wrong direction. This will lead to even **more supranationality**, where they now want to deprive the Member States of being able to decide on their **sovereignty** and decide on their border protection on a voluntary basis and contribute to the external border protection. This is explained by the recent occurrence of an exceptional situation with **illegal migrants, weapons and terrorists** crossing the Mediterranean. This should have been understood a long time ago. We, Sweden Democrats, want to see **intergovernmental cooperation** with

regard to our external border protection, where Frontex's main task is to monitor our external borders and the Member States should participate on a voluntary basis, and nothing else. If the Commission, supported by France and Germany, tries to do this, I think that Brexit will soon be followed by **Svexit** (Kristina Winberg, EFDD, 15 December 2015).

Kristina Winberg, by representing the SD in Sweden and the EFDD in the EP, favours an intergovernmental EU and does not support a supranational border protection or a common asylum system, which has long been discussed in the EP since late 1990s. Otherwise, she claims that Sweden will also leave the EU just like the UK, which is about to leave the EU as a result of the referendum held in the UK on 23 June 2016. By using the term 'illegal migrants' along with 'weapons and terrorists', Winberg gives an example of negative Other-presentation and presupposes that all migrants arrive in Europe through illegal ways, they are prone to carry weapons and are responsible for the terrorist activities within the borders of the EU. In this manner, Winberg tries to justify or legitimate the anti-immigration position of her political party in Sweden and political group in the EP.

Mr President! In Sweden, we call them **paperless**. The persons, whose asylum applications have been rejected and would have left our country, preferably the day before yesterday. The word **paperless** can easily confuse, they have received paper after paper rejecting their asylum application. These people who should have left **our** countries get, lo and behold, access to **our welfare**, such as healthcare, dental care and, in some cases, supply support, many times more beneficial than **our poor retirees** who are having a hard time. A reform that we, Sweden Democrats, are alone in wanting to abolish. We know that these people are **underground** and many times are impossible to expel. They live in a **shadow community** where we know that many of them **work black, commit crimes and perform terror. Just look at who carried out a terrorist attack in Stockholm this spring where five people lost their lives. The person lived illegally in Sweden and became radicalized.** The authorities had no control at all of the person in question. Each Member State has to speed up expulsions, otherwise increases the risks that I mentioned earlier. We must also be better off to keep those who have been refused their asylum application **in custody**. Sweden can, and should not be a **cash machine** for **all the world's opportunists**. The Swedish government should act much harder immediately; otherwise, we will replace them the next year and they do the work themselves! (Kristina Winberg, EFDD, 25 October 2017)

The excerpt above is full of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation. The terms ‘paperless, underground, shadow community’ are an example of denomination, and these people’s not leaving ‘our’ countries and still having access to ‘our’ welfare though they have been rejected for many times means that they are ‘illegal’ in ‘our’ countries and are here to exploit ‘our’ welfare, which is an example of predication. In this way, Winberg also claims that they ‘work black, commit crimes and perform terror’, which is another negative Other-presentation by using the specific strategy of predication again. By referring to ‘our poor retirees’, Winberg endeavours to polarise the people into two camps, that is, the Swedish and the migrants or refugees. This is a kind of apparent denial and top-down transfer that implies that ‘not me or my political group or party but “our poor retirees” are against the migrants’. It may also be accepted as a way of justification. Another strategy used by the politicians for their arguments to persuade the public is storytelling. The story about the terrorist attack in Stockholm and the presuppositions related to this case do not have any evidence in her speech. Winberg’s suggestion to keep the people, whose asylum application have been refused, in custody is an example of the strategy of fairness; that is, ‘firm but fair’. Calling Sweden as a ‘cash machine’ is another positive Self-presentation and Winberg uses another strategy of numbers game by saying ‘all the world’s opportunists’, which may also be accepted as a hyperbole as well as a denomination.

Madam President, this report¹⁶ completely fails to acknowledge the cause of the current **terrorist threat**, which is ideological. **That ideology is fundamentalist Islam. From its creation, Islam has been propagated by force and violence.**

President Hollande has said that **we are at war**. The first casualties in this war must be appeasement and political correctness. We face one of two choices: we can accept eventual submission to the **ideology of an ever-increasing Islamic population**, or we can take the first step in resistance and **end any more mass immigration from Islamic countries**. Only then can we start to address the difficult issue of integrating the **existing Muslim population**.

The EU strategy is to deny the existence of the real problem, **while at the same time importing millions more people from Islamic countries**. Your **ideological opponents** regard you as fools; history will judge you as traitors (Gerard Batten, EFDD, 24 November 2015).

¹⁶ See (EP, 2015b).

Another strategy used by the right-wing political groups in the EP to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe is to generalize all asylum seekers, migrants and refugees into a single ideology: the ‘fundamentalist Islam’. This thesis does not question the fundamentalist Islam or its proponents, it only deals with its negative connotations in the public discourse and public mind. One of such negative connotations is that Islam is put on par with ‘force and violence’, as seen in the excerpt above. That is, immigration is denominated and predicated as the source of ‘terrorism’ since almost all immigrants arriving in Europe are Muslims, and hence, is presented as a ‘terrorist’ or security threat to the EU. However, Gerard Batten himself does not avoid threatening or frightening the European citizens with the so-called immigration threat by presenting them only two options as if there was no other way: submission to the ‘terrorism’ stemming from immigration or end ‘mass’ immigration from Islamic countries, which is an obvious overall strategy of negative Other-presentation along with the strategy of justification. Furthermore, to legitimate his anti-immigration discourses, Batten refers to Hollande, President of France, and quotes from him: ‘we are at war’. In this way, Batten goes on his efforts to polarize two parties in the public mind in line with the interests of his political group, the EFDD, in the EP: the Christians as the ‘Self’ and the Muslims as the ‘Other’. Then, what about the ‘existing Muslim population’ in Europe? According to Batten, this is not easy to deal with, but he seems to be willing to address the ‘issue’ of integrating these people after, probably, ending the aforementioned ‘mass’ immigration. The integration of migrants and refugees is not in the core scope of this thesis, however, all proposals for the integration of these people by Batten and the MEPs with a similar mindset should be questioned since they may have the characteristics of assimilation rather than integration. And, lastly, Batten also uses the strategy of numbers game to dominate the public discourse and to influence the public mind: ‘any more mass migration from Islamic countries’ and ‘importing millions more people from Islamic countries’.

Mr President, four years ago I stood here and said that **bombing Libya would be a huge mistake**, but of course the UK Parliament and this Parliament were desperate. There was a clamour to go to war. So now we have a failed state of Libya, which is now **a conduit being used for criminal trafficking gangs trying to bring people to Europe**.

We are guilty for this crisis, we are directly guilty for the drownings that are going on, and we are hypocrites in this place when we talk about poverty in Africa, when we pursue a common agricultural policy that puts barriers up to them selling us their agricultural produce, where we have a fisheries policy that rapes and pillages their seas and has caused environmental destruction, and we just assuage our consciences by giving away a bit of foreign aid. **I am not blind to the human suffering that we have caused in many of these countries.** I would call on this Parliament, this Commission to end the barriers to trade, to stop the fisheries policy, to ask the United Nations to get involved and to try and help.

But the real question we face is: what are we to do? Are we to go down the Australian system in dealing with this crisis (and indeed the Australian Premier, Tony Abbott, has offered us his advice and help). Australia faced this and **Australia not only have stopped the boats from coming, they have stopped people from drowning.** But no, we are not interested in what the Australians have done; we have decided that we can deal with this on our own. **So we decided that people can come and that people will not be sent back.**

Now I suspect that **it would be a hell of a shock to many European citizens, including the British,** to understand that we have already agreed a common European asylum system, and what today is about and today's resolution is the direct implementation of it. The problem, ladies and gentlemen, is this: **the definitions for who qualifies for asylum are so wide,** they include not just people coming from war, not just people coming from failed states; Mr Juncker, this morning, seemed to suggest that **perhaps he would even include people who were fleeing poverty.** I am sorry, **we simply cannot accept countless millions.** Already in countries like mine, **77% of the population say we cannot take immigration at current levels.**

But there is **a real and genuine threat. When ISIS say they want to flood our continent with half a million Islamic extremists,** they mean it, and there is nothing in this document that will stop those people from coming. Indeed, **I fear we face a direct threat to our civilisation if we allow large numbers of people from that war-torn region into Europe.** It is ironic that nine days before a British general election, Mr Cameron and Mr Miliband are not engaged in this debate, and in fact the UK can do nothing. We are impotent; we have surrendered our ability to get involved. I promise my party will stand up to this **impending disaster** for all concerned (Nigel Farage, EFDD, 29 April 2015).

As the Chair of the EFDD and one of the most influential and effective speakers in the EP, Nigel Farage seems to have many things to say regarding immigration to Europe. The first few parts of the excerpt above is full of confessions on the EU's 'huge mistake' of bombing Libya and guiltiness for the 'refugee crisis' and drownings in the

Mediterranean, the EU's hypocrisy about 'poverty in Africa' and its responsibility for the 'human suffering' in many African countries. The second part of the excerpt mostly strives to justify the known Australian model in dealing with the 'refugee crisis', which is not only for 'our' own good as this system has 'stopped the boats from coming' but also for 'their' own good as it has 'stopped people from drowning'. The last part of the excerpt deals with the so-called security threat as well as cultural threat of immigration by using various strategies. Through the strategy of top-down transfer, Farage tries to include the European citizens including the British in the debate, who are claimed to be in a 'hell of a shock' about the current CEAS that does not distinguish between 'who qualifies for asylum' or not, and to strengthen his discourse through implications and presuppositions, he refers to Juncker, the President of the European Commission, who is claimed to suggest that 'perhaps' the 'people who were fleeing poverty' would 'even' be included in the definition of asylum seeker. Again in this excerpt, Farage mentions about 'countless millions' in accordance with the strategy of numbers game, and combined with another strategy of top-down transfer, he maintains that, in the EU countries like his, the UK, '77% of the population say we cannot take immigration at current levels'. After all, the main discourse presenting immigration as a security threat, i.e. a 'real and genuine threat', comes with these following words: 'When ISIS say they want to flood our continent with a half of a million Islamic extremists, they mean it'. This is so similar to the generalisation of the asylum seekers, migrants and refugees into single ideology, i.e. the 'fundamentalist Islam', in the previous excerpt. Farage implies and presupposes that 'large numbers of people' allowed from 'that war-torn region' into the EU will be a direct [security and cultural] threat to 'our' civilization, and hence, there is 'impending disaster' for 'our' Europe, to which 'we' must stand up with 'our' anti-immigration attitude and acts. Furthermore, in his answer to a blue-card question during the same debate, Farage (EFDD, 29 April 2015) argues that 'we are headed for disaster' since 'this policy has no means and no way of filtering out extremists in favour of people fleeing in genuine fear of their lives', which is a sort of apparent sympathy to moderate his anti-immigration discourses in the eyes of the opposition and public.

The Commission's response to any perceived challenge to the EU is to reach for more centralised powers. In the same way the financial crisis played perfectly into their hands and they leapt at the chance to

justify economic governance rather than admit the euro's failure, **concerns about the sudden influx of migrants** and the stresses it puts on countries is being used to call for the **reinforcement of Schengen with increased centralised governance**. MEPs are elected by the people, as the **voice of the people**. They represent the countries they are from. **Yet when they reflect national interests here, it's labelled 'populist'**. Mr Barroso said **it's becoming fashionable to be populist and wave the flag of xenophobia**. Does he believe the very essence of being a country – having a domestic government, an independent economy and national borders – is inherently wrong? Why not have the guts to just scrap Parliament and take over Europe by force? **Name-calling, scaremongering** and creeping bureaucracy is calculated and megalomaniac. But **don't think we are unaware**. If we were, the so called 'fashion' for populism would not be developing. **People are waking up to your intentions** and the time will come that you are exposed (John Bufton, EFD, 10 May 2011).

As given for the EPP and ECR, the remarks of the members of the EFDD in the 7th parliamentary term are also not always directly related to immigration, or if they are, they rarely deliver overt anti-immigration discourses. In this excerpt, the 'concerns about the sudden influx of migrants' is discussed in the framework of the 'reinforcement of Schengen with increased centralized governance'; in other words, more supranational Europe in terms of guarding the borders and coasts of the EU against any security threat such as the so-called threat of immigration. As often done by the right-wing political group members in the EP, John Bufton tries to achieve to create an atmosphere of panic regarding the migrants, or 'refugees' although he intentionally avoids using it, among the European citizens by referring to the 'concerns about the sudden influx of migrants', which is another way to present the Other negatively. However, as the 'voice of the people', Bufton disclaims his 'intention' of negative Other-presentation and uses the strategy of apparent denial by claiming that he is not a 'populist' but just reflects 'national interests'. However unreasonable it is to use the 'common sense' to justify some anti-immigration discourses, it is also unreasonable to such extent to use the 'national interests' to justify such discourses by ignoring the international law on the rights of the refugees such as the aforementioned principle of *non-refoulement* in Article 33 (1) of the *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Furthermore, though Bufton denies his being populist at first, he glorifies the populism through the strategy of the top-down transfer by defining it as people's

getting awareness or waking up to the ‘intentions’ of the Commission, the supranational body of the EU. In general, as a part of the strategy of apparent denial, those political group members mostly argue that the terms ‘populism, xenophobia, racism or anti-immigration’ are not more than a ‘name-calling’ or ‘scaremongering’ as in this excerpt.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I must admit that when we talk about the **fight against terrorism** only in terms of intelligence and technology, I always feel as though we are still not getting to the bottom of things, as though we wanted to cure a disease by only concentrating on its symptoms and not on its causes.

Has the time not come to tackle the **problem of terrorism** by looking at the **heart of the matter** instead of limiting ourselves to its external effects? Tackling the **heart of the problem** means, for example, becoming aware that **terrorism is also a direct manifestation of the inability or lack of will of ethnic groups to integrate within the fabric of society in Europe.**

I wonder, and I ask Parliament: do we want a debate on terrorism? **Does Parliament have the courage to face up to a political debate on the level of integration of Muslims in Europe and their willingness to share Western values, rights and freedoms?** To this end I have tabled a question to the Commission on the **burkha** to prompt this House to face up to the topic openly. It seems that no one is willing to deal with the subject.

I wonder, and I ask you, ladies and gentlemen from all the political groups: if the political forum representing the people of Europe cannot **express an opinion about these subjects**, what can they express an opinion on? (Mara Bizzotto, EFD, 10 February 2010)

As mentioned earlier, the thesis does not include the discourses of the non-attached MEPs or the ones who change their political groups in the EP during the 7th or 8th parliamentary term as it does not take the individuals but the political groups and their discourses as its unit of analysis. However, the excerpt above is an exception in this respect to reveal the similarities between the political group members’ discourses even if they change their political groups in the EP. Mara Bizzotto became a MEP as a member of the EFD for the first time during the 7th parliamentary term elections in July 2009, and maintained her status as a non-attached member from July 2014 to June 2015, then, she joined the ENF with the establishment of this political group in the EP on 15 June 2015 (EP, 2018e). Another speech delivered by Bizzotto as a member of the ENF is given in the following chapter to make the reader be able to compare them in terms of similarities and differences.

Throughout the excerpt above, Bizzotto uses the overall strategy of negative Other-presentation along with some denominations and predications about the Muslims, who mostly have a migrant origin. Therefore, these discourses also contribute to the discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe. The words repeatedly used within the excerpt should be noted: ‘terrorism’, ‘fight against terrorism’, ‘problem of terrorism’, ‘heart of the matter’, ‘heart of the problem’ along with the ‘ethnic groups’, ‘Muslims’ and also ‘burkha’. This is another strategy to equate terrorism with the Muslims, or indirectly, immigration. Taking this simple equation into consideration, it may simply be argued that the ‘Western values, rights and freedoms’ attributed in the excerpt are overwhelmed by the Western prejudices against those people coming from the Islamic world. According to Bizzotto, the ‘heart of the problem’ or ‘problem of terrorism’ stems from the Muslims’ ‘inability’ to integrate into the ‘fabric of society in Europe’ or their ‘lack of will’ to share those ‘Western values, rights and freedoms’. Furthermore, considering the previous excerpt, this is not populism, xenophobia, racism or anti-immigration but just ‘express[ing] an opinion’ on behalf of ‘the people of Europe’, which is the use of the strategy of apparent denial as well as the top-down transfer. Last but not least, discussing the ‘burkha’ in the context of the ‘fight against terrorism’ as the ‘heart of the matter’ reveals the level the anti-immigration discourses by the right-wing political group members have reached, as a clear example of negative Other-presentation in the framework of the so-called security threat of immigration.

3.1.4. Europe of Nations and Freedom

Compared to other right-wing political group members in the EP, the MEPs of the ENF are often more overt in their anti-immigration discourses as largely exemplified below.

While Europe is undergoing an **unprecedented crisis**: 20 million unemployed, growing precariousness, austerity, **mass immigration and especially Islamic terrorism**, the EU finds nothing better to do than to fight against the **so-called hate speech or populists**. Populism comes from the Latin ‘**populus**’ which means the **people**, what disturbs this EU? **Is it against the defense of peoples’ interests?** Everywhere the ‘**fake news**’ of the media and policies in place **to scare the people** no longer work. We saw it in the United Kingdom, in the United States or in Italy or Hungary. It is clear that **citizens do not want to be deceived any more** and that your answers are nothing democratic! **Orwell’s Big**

Brother¹⁷ would not have dreamed better! Social networks are a great tool (even if you have to be careful) to reintroduce and fight against your unique thinking. **Being against terrorism does not mean being Islamophobic**, being against marriage for all does not mean being homophobic and **fighting mass immigration does not mean being racist!** I say stop to good-thinking and **yes to the truth!** (Dominique Bilde, ENF, 5 April 2017)

The excerpt above combines the image of refugees or migrants as a security threat with their image as an economic threat so as to leave a stronger impression on the EP members at first, and then, on the public. Through an overall strategy of negative Other-presentation, Dominique Bilde tries to demonstrate these people as the source of the ‘unprecedented crisis’ which includes a great ‘number’ of unemployment and ‘precariousness’ as well as austerity, and just like the increases in xenophobia or Islamophobia in Europe particularly during economic crisis periods, nothing seems to be more guilty in this crisis than this ‘mass’ immigration that is used along with the term ‘Islamic terrorism’. Besides, according to Bilde, there is neither hate speech nor populists, but merely the ‘defense of people’s interests’, which is an example of denial of racism. To justify her anti-immigration discourses and by using a sort of the strategy of top-down transfer, Bilde attributes to the ‘populus’, in other words, ‘people’ or ‘citizens’ who ‘do not want to be deceived any more’, and she claims that the ‘populists’ strive for the ‘interests’ of the ‘populus’. Through the power and dominance in the media, the elites have an unrivalled superiority against the minorities, or the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in this thesis, to produce or reproduce unequal power relations by means of discursive practices. However, by resorting to the strategy of reversal and ignoring the fact that she uses the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ to scare the European people with the so-called security threat of immigration, Bilde argues that it is not ‘us’ but ‘them’ who scare the people through ‘fake news’, probably by means of marginal or alternative media tools since the mainstream media are mostly dominated by the elites like her political group members. Considering the excerpt as a whole, the ‘truth’ according to Bilde is that the migrants or refugees believe in the religion of Islam, and there is ‘Islamic terrorism’, therefore, immigration is a security threat to the

¹⁷ Big Brother is a fictional character in George Orwell's novel entitled *1984*. He is depicted as the leader of a totalitarian state called Oceania, where the ruling party abuses power for its own interests over the inhabitants.

EU. However, she also claims that this means being neither Islamophobic nor racist, which is another resort to the strategy of apparent denial.

The EU summit on 21 October did not yield anything as expected. **This EU is a complete fiasco** and I repeat, Frontex is a towing service for **illegal invaders from Islamic countries. That must stop.** The open borders **are a feast for terrorists**, for people and arms smugglers and **that has to stop. The economic dictation of Brussels plunges citizens into deep poverty. That must stop!**

I call on this Commission to **restore citizens' security, throw out all the invaders from the EU, stop foreign funding for mosques, close national borders.** I call on this Commission: **restore the prosperity of the citizens**, stop the euro, stop CETA and TTIP, stop visa liberalization for Turkey and Ukraine. I say to Mr Juncker: not the Netherlands has to ratify the Ukraine treaty, but **Mr Juncker must listen to the will of the people** and step up (Marcel de Graaff, ENF, 26 October 2016).

Similar to the ECR and EFDD, and as it is also obvious in the excerpt above, the ENF is a Eurosceptic political group in the EP. In other words, these political groups do not favour European integration or the EU as a whole. For this reason, Marcel de Graaff calls the EU as a 'complete fiasco'. However, what differs the ENF from these two political groups is that it is also known with its apparent anti-immigration ideology. In this excerpt, the denomination of immigrants and refugees with the terms 'illegal, invader, terrorist' is the result of such anti-immigration ideology. Unlike many discourse examples in the thesis, this excerpt presents immigration as not only a security threat, but also an economic and a cultural threat: according to de Graaff, they are 'terrorists', they are the main reason of the 'deep poverty' of the EU citizens, and the foreign funding for 'mosques' is the indication of this cultural threat. The emphasis on 'Islamic' countries also reveals why these victims of war, persecution or natural disasters in their own countries are not considered as ordinary 'asylum seekers' but 'illegal invaders', therefore, 'that must stop'. de Graaff attempts to justify his remarks regarding 'closing national borders' against the asylum seekers or migrants by also referring to (arms) 'smugglers', which is, as mentioned before, a widely used reference for justification of the anti-immigration attitude among the right-wing political group members. Finally, the common strategy of top-down transfer is also resorted by de Graaff. To get the support of the public opinion in terms of not only strengthening the Eurosceptic position of its political group but also controlling the public discourse and

public mind regarding the anti-immigration Europe, de Graaff calls on the Commission, the supranational body of the EU, to ‘restore the prosperity of the citizens’ and Juncker, President of the European Commission, to ‘listen to the will of the people’.

Europe is being flooded with asylum seekers who endanger our society, our security, our culture and our freedom. The European elite want to stick to the dream of a European Union without borders at any cost, where there is room **for everyone. An outright nightmare**, because in 2016 free movement of people and goods has become **free movement of terrorists, asylum seekers and kalashnikovs. A nightmare, because millions of fortune-hunters are cruising towards a free house, free care and free money.**

You are concerned here about the collapse of Schengen and other treaties from political prehistoric times, while **you should worry about the downfall of Europe. I would say, wake up!** Schengen is bankrupt! The European Union is a fiasco! **Listen to our people** who have enough of your open border policy. My appeal to the Dutch presidency, to Mr Koenders sitting here today: **close the Dutch borders! Protect the Dutch! Protect our freedom, our safety and our future!** (Vicky Maeijer, ENF, 2 February 2016)

The excerpt above starts with the common metaphor of ‘flood’ used to denominate immigration, and this metaphor is followed by the strategy of predication about the asylum seekers who are claimed to ‘endanger “our” society, “our” security, “our” culture and “our” freedom’. In this sense, immigration is portrayed as not only a security threat but also a cultural threat with the aim of negatively presenting the Other, i.e. the asylum seekers. Vicky Maeijer also calls this ‘flood’, which brings ‘everyone’ to Europe, an ‘outright nightmare’ to get the support of the public opinion in her political group’s anti-immigration attitude. To this end, the denominations of ‘terrorists’ and ‘kalashnikovs’ are used along with the term ‘asylum seekers’ so as to imply that these asylum seekers are terrorists with kalashnikovs, which consolidates the image of immigration as a security threat in the public discourse and public mind. Moreover, according to Maeijer, these asylum seekers, or the ‘terrorists with kalashnikovs’ is also a threat to the economy of the EU as they have replaced ‘free movement of people and goods’, and those ‘millions of fortune-hunters’ are in ‘our’ Europe just for a ‘free house, free care and free money’, which is full of denominations and predications regarding the asylum seekers together with the strategy of numbers game again. Maeijer suggests that these security, economic and cultural threats of immigration are so extreme that the EU

as a whole must ‘wake up’ in order to stand up against the ‘downfall of Europe’, which is a sort of attempt to gather the European elites around his political group’s anti-immigration position. Through the strategy of top-down transfer, Maeijer also tries to persuade these elites by referring to a presumptive support of the European citizens: ‘Listen to our people’. To justify all these anti-immigration discourses, she calls on the Dutch presidency in particular and the European institutions in general to ‘protect “our” freedom, “our” safety and “our” future’ against these ‘terrorists’ and ‘fortune-hunters’. Lastly, it should be noted that these anti-immigration discourses of Maeijer or other right-wing political group members such as Winberg (EFDD) and Halla-aho (ECR) are not an exception or rare during the EP debates. For instance, in order to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe in the context of security threat, Maeijer repeatedly uses similar denominations and predications regarding immigration along with the strategy of numbers game during various debates as given in the following three brief excerpts:

The European Union, with Germany first, has called an **asylum tsunami** over us. And now there is panic because a complete migration has started and **hundreds of thousands** will follow, on the way to a free house and free care. But despite these **asylum tsunami**, despite the **thousands of terrorists** being admitted, the European Union maintains its open border fiction (Vicky Maeijer, ENF, 16 September 2015).

Through the **unlimited admission and inviting of asylum seekers**, the European Union has called a **new crisis** about itself. . . . This proposal provides **more fortune seekers, more terrorists and more Islamization** of the once beautiful continent of Europe. Because the **borders do not close at all** and the European control is, in practice, aimed at **allowing rather than stopping** (Vicky Maeijer, ENF, 15 December 2015).

Hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers have found their way to the European Union last year, and the **asylum tsunami** is also inundating my country. In the Netherlands, **more happiness seekers** have come in than in 2013 and 2014 together, with all the consequences. This has to stop. The Netherlands is a functioning constitutional state where **suspects, criminals, terrorists and also asylum seekers** are treated neatly (Vicky Maeijer, ENF, 16 December 2015).

In another excerpt below, Michał Marusik denominates the asylum seekers as ‘strangers’, and claims that immigration is a security threat, against which the EU should defend itself.

Madam President! The idea of protecting **the external borders** was born in 2001. After fourteen years, **whoever wants enters to Europe**, and imports what he wants – it ridicules us enough and something must be done about it. And now we are proposing a three-tier solution, in which the third stage is the creation of a completely new agency. If we act like this, then **in the next fifteen years, two billion people will come to this Europe and then we will close the borders so that they cannot leave. And this is to save Europe from the influx of strangers?** After all, we in this way, as the European Union, become **a nail to the coffin of Europe** and this must be seen – either we **defend ourselves**, or let us resolve each other and let each country defend itself, because there are limits **to protect them**, not that to be ridiculed and compromised here. We really have to do something very quickly, not wait until it's too late, because **time flows dramatically quickly and plays against us** (Michał Marusik, ENF, 15 December 2015).

The strategy of numbers game is also seen in this excerpt along with some presuppositions as well as hyperboles: ‘whoever wants enters to Europe’, ‘in the next fifteen years, two billion people will come to this Europe’ or ‘influx of strangers’. Marusik implies that this ‘influx’ will be the end of the EU with the metaphor of ‘a nail to the coffin of Europe’. Additionally, Marusik explicitly provokes the EU institutions and the public by using some time expressions that evoke catastrophe in the minds: ‘very quickly’, ‘too late’ or ‘time flows dramatically quickly and plays against us’. On the other hand, Marusik is not a single example in such provocative discourses in the EP. Gianluca Buonanno, who was another member of the ENF but lost his life in a traffic accident on 5 June 2016, is mostly known with his provocations in both his own Italian parliament and the EP halls as well as on TV. For instance, on 1 April 2014, he waved a sea bass in the Italian parliamentary hall to protest against the government’s management of migration (*Corriere Della Serra*, 5 June 2016). The following two excerpts also give a clear idea about his provocations regarding migration in a struggle for negative Other-presentation during the EP debates:

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I apologize but on my mobile phone I read that there was an attack on Roubaix, **probably of Islamic origin**, and there are hostages, including children. I just wanted to inform the House.

[After a short while.]

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to update my colleagues: **it seems that what is happening in Roubaix is a robbery**. But I wanted to emphasize something about this debate, Mr President. In

Europe, how can we make the more than 500 million inhabitants of our continent believe that **we are so attentive to Islamic terrorism?** But look at this Chamber, you look at that stuff! Is this the way of Europe to discuss **Islamic terrorism?** What is happening on this continent where **European policies are destroying our civilization?** (Gianluca Buonanno, ENF, 24 November 2015)

In the excerpt below, Gerolf Annemans resorts to the strategy of storytelling to persuade the ‘European citizens’, as the referents of the top-down transfer, on his anti-immigration discourses: ‘This morning so-called refugees were fled from their refugee camp in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony’.

Yes, Commissioner, please allow me. I do not agree with you. If you say that we need immigration, then I do not agree with you. **Please stop with the new speak and with the use of the word ‘refugees’.** **This morning so-called refugees were fled from their refugee camp in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony because they turned out to be IS terrorists.** *Die Welt am Sonntag* also revealed at the weekend in a reportage that **Iraqis and Syrians travel back to their country with their suitcase, although they are registered here as refugees. I am not the one who says that all immigrants are terrorists, but please stop saying that they are all refugees.** Of course, you need that **moral sauce: refugees, saving lives at sea and the like.** But it would be less hypocritical and fairer if you simply said the **truth**, namely: ‘We of the European Commission have decided to organize a people's replacement over the heads of you, **European citizens.** We have decided that you will have to deal with **immigration unsolicited, the biggest and wildest immigration and mass immigration with the greatest impact in the history of this continent.**’ You should say that. You should have the **honesty** for that and I call on you for that (Gerolf Annemans, ENF, 13 September 2016).

Annemans denominates the ‘refugees’ with the word ‘terrorists’ and uses the strategy of predication by claiming that ‘they turned out to be IS terrorists.’ He also refers to *Die Welt am Sonntag* to legitimate her anti-immigration claims. By ignoring the vulnerable groups of refugees consisting of the children including unaccompanied minors, women and girls, the old and disabled, Annemans maintains his strategy of negative Other-presentation along with apparent denial as follows: ‘I am not the one who says that all immigrants are terrorists, “but” please stop saying that they are all refugees.’ More importantly, he does not avoid making fun of the suffering of these people in the Mediterranean through implying that ‘saving lives [of the refugees] at sea’ is not more

than ‘moral sauce’. Finally, Annemans comes up with his own presumed ‘truth’ accompanied with some other denominations and predications as well as the strategy of numbers game such as ‘the biggest . . . and mass immigration’ so as to present immigration in a negative manner: ‘immigration unsolicited, the biggest and wildest immigration and mass immigration with the greatest impact in the history of this continent’. According to Annemans, asserting the contrary would not be ‘honesty’, which strives to control the discourse of the Commission on immigration, and hence, to ensure the power or dominance of his political group in terms of constructing an anti-immigration Europe.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, but you are serious about defeating **Islamic terrorism** with this confusing and inconsistent mix of half measures, most of which are late. **Beginning with the Council that does not mention the link between terrorism and illegal immigration.** Yet the president of Eurojust now recognizes that this trafficking of **illegal immigrants** serves to finance and **infiltrate ISIS in Europe**. The **religious element** is fundamental: **at the base of these crimes there is the legitimization of extremist Islam** carried by the sermons of the imams in the flies and through the social media.

So, no half measures! Close all the fundamentalist flies also from us, as Tunisia wants to do. Enough with masochism and **bla-bla on Islamophobia**. **I was in front of Charlie Hebdo's headquarters and I was talking to people a few hours after that very serious attack: nobody told me about Islamophobia.** It only talks about it here. **This false masochistic anti-racism is actually the Trojan horse** that serves the most **fundamentalist Islam** to block **our** immune defenses from a virus that also expands through the intimidating force of the **attacks**. They want to create fear in **our** continent.

With Islam we are facing not only a powerful jihadist organization but also a political actor who, with the attacks, dictates his agenda to our countries. With the blackmail of horror and fear they want to impose the Sharia law throughout Europe. Alarm clock, Europe! (Mario Borghezio, ENF, 8 July 2015)

In the excerpt above, according to Mario Borghezio, ‘terrorism’ is ‘Islamic’, and this ‘Islamic terrorism’ infiltrates into ‘our’ continent in disguise of immigration. In other words, he explicitly claims that there is a ‘link between terrorism and “illegal” immigration’. These denominations and predications are parts of the negative Other-presentation that are used in order to discredit and marginalise immigration in the public discourse and public mind. However, these anti-immigration discourses are not limited

to these. Borghezio also uses the strategy of storytelling to disclaim the Islamophobia and go on portraying immigration as a security threat: 'I was in front of Charlie Hebdo's headquarters and I was talking to people a few hours after that very serious attack: nobody told me about Islamophobia.' Furthermore, he uses the metaphor 'Trojan horse' regarding the 'bla-bla' on anti-racism or Islamophobia to deny his racist or anti-immigration discourses. When Borghezio resorts to such an apparent denial, he uses the denominations 'Islamic terrorism', 'illegal immigration', 'illegal immigrants', 'extremist Islam', 'fundamentalist Islam' throughout the excerpt to equate immigration with terrorism that is claimed to 'block "our" immune defenses' and 'create fear in "our" continent', which are used to justify his anti-immigration discourses. Borghezio does not only imply that immigration or Islam is 'at the base of these crimes' but also presupposes that the immigrants of Islamic origin 'want to impose the Sharia law throughout Europe' by ignoring the fact that most of these people try to save their lives by fleeing war, conflict or persecution in their countries. Last but not least, unlike the claims by Borghezio, it should be noted that 'alarm clock, Europe!' to save the dignity of the humanity for the sake of the universal values, if the European values or norms are not enough to save it.

CHAPTER IV

IMMIGRATION AS AN ECONOMIC THREAT

Unlike the welcoming discourse of ‘guestworker’ before the oil crisis of 1973, the economic narrative regarding immigration has also dramatically shifted towards an anti-immigration trend in Europe in the first quarter of the 21st century. Undoubtedly, the war-torn countries end up with not only millions of displaced people, refugees or asylum seekers but also migrants, who are in limbo and often do not have another option except for fleeing their country to survive. However, so as to avoid the international legal, humanitarian and conscientious responsibility for these people in need, using denominations such as ‘economic migrant’ or ‘fake refugee’ for most or all of these people are firm but not fair. In the portrayal of immigration as an economic threat, the referent object is the society, i.e. ‘our young people’, ‘our unemployed’ and ‘homeless or poor pensioners’, overtaken by the ‘Other’ whereas immigration is presented as the existential threat again. This chapter gives the details of this portrayal of immigration as an economic threat.

4.1. Portrayal of Immigration as an Economic Threat in the European Parliament

In the following sections, the thesis attempts to answer the question of how the right-wing political groups in the EP construct an anti-immigration Europe in terms of economic threat by resorting to van Dijk’s ideological square, namely, the overall strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation as well as specific strategies in this sense. As done in the previous chapter, it starts with the EPP and ends with the ENF.

4.1.1. European People’s Party

In the process of production and reproduction of an anti-immigration Europe, the right-wing political groups in the EP make vigorous efforts to distinguish between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘those seeking protection, running away from conflicts’ in order to avoid any ‘obligations to the former’. It is not limited to the excerpt below; on the contrary,

there are many examples of such anti-immigration discourses during the parliamentary debates by the members of the EPP. One of the distinct examples of them is as follows: ‘Italy has always been a land of welcome and continues to be, but we must welcome those who escape from wars, discrimination and we cannot accommodate everyone, and therefore economic migrants,’ (Salvatore Domenico Pogliese, EPP, 12 September 2017). Salvatore Domenico Pogliese implies that there are ‘fake’ refugees who have nothing to do with wars or discrimination but are in Europe just for economic prosperity of the EU. While predicating, and hence, negatively presenting these people, he also glorifies his own country, Italy, by presenting it as a ‘land of welcome’. Undoubtedly, a more striking example of such anti-immigration discourses in terms of distinguishing between a migrant and a refugee comes from György Schöpflin (EPP, 5 October 2016): ‘Having once been a refugee myself, I actually do know what I am talking about. I think there is a very clear distinction to be made . . . between asylum seekers, genuine refugees, and economic migrants. They are a very different kettle of fish.’ In his article ‘Knowledge in Parliamentary Debates’, van Dijk (2003) underlines the relation between politics and knowledge and gives details about the strategies for the use of various kinds of knowledge in parliamentary debates: We know...; I know...; They should know...; ...the fact...; I am sure...; ...no doubt...; ...agree with...; ...accept that...; ...clear that...; or the civilized [Europe]. In this context, the MEPs ‘not only have knowledge but also other beliefs, such as personal opinions, group attitudes and ideologies, . . . [so] what they express or presuppose as knowledge, may well be considered an ideological opinion by their political opponents’ (van Dijk, 2003: 100). As given above, Schöpflin’s remark ‘I actually do know’ is such a strategy based on his own beliefs, personal opinions, group attitudes and ideologies. Additionally, Schöpflin’s statement ‘Having once been a refugee myself, I actually do know what I am talking about.’ is the use of strategy of storytelling that includes the mental models and opinions of the storyteller regarding the Other.

For European asylum policy to be successful, it is crucial to distinguish between **economic migrants** who come to Europe only in search of better economic prospects and **those seeking protection, running away from conflicts**. If we can provide asylum to the latter, **we have no obligations to the former**.

However, the European Union cannot cope alone with the **migration crisis** because it is a global problem whose resolution requires close cooperation with other countries. It is therefore necessary for the European Union to negotiate and sign more readmission agreements **to quickly return irregular migrants**.

Cooperation with countries of origin and transit also needs to be strengthened so as to dismantle the human trafficking networks with which **thousands of people** reach Europe. However, the most successful way of cooperating with countries of origin is to strengthen economic ties and **provide more help so as to create a long-term prospect of economic growth and jobs in poorer countries**. This is precisely the role of European foreign policy and financial instruments, with the help of which **we can turn the migration crisis into an opportunity for the rapid development of the countries of Africa and the Middle East** (Emil Radev, EPP, 4 April 2017).

In the excerpt above, as well as presenting the migrants and refugees in a negative way on the pretext of distinguishing between a migrant and a refugee, Emil Radev uses the strategy of numbers game by referring to the ‘thousands of people’ who arrive in Europe by means of ‘human trafficking networks’, or ‘smugglers’ whose relation to the anti-immigration discourses by the right-wing political group members is discussed in the previous chapter. Radev also resorts to the strategy of apparent sympathy by ignoring his own remarks ‘quickly return irregular migrants’ just in the previous lines of the same excerpt, and suggests that the EU should not only ‘provide more help so as to create a long-term prospect of economic growth and jobs in poorer countries’ but also ‘turn the migration crisis into an opportunity for the rapid development of the countries of Africa and the Middle East’ for ‘their’ own good, of course, not for ‘our’ own good.

At present, each Member State either directly experiences the effects of this process or is really under threat. It is to be welcomed that the European Council began to look at this problem holistically. Political decisions taken not only concern the mechanism of relocation of refugees, but also increase the tightness of external borders or increase assistance in regions where migrants come from.

International organizations indicate that **assistance in places of conflict or in neighbouring countries is often cheaper and more effective than financing support for refugees arriving in Europe**. I am afraid, however, that **a billion euros** may not be enough.

However, the Council conclusions lack specific decisions in relation to the return policy. **Europe cannot afford** to accept all those willing to live on our continent – **it is necessary to separate refugees from economic migrants and send the latter back**. It is estimated that of the

approximately one million people who will come to Europe this year, **more than half are economic migrants**. This shows the scale of the next challenge faced by the Member States.

A few weeks ago, Jeffrey Sachs asked when the European Union would solve the four most important problems: **the crisis in Greece, the influx of immigrants, the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, help with Africa?** At what stage are the works solving these four problems? (Danuta Jazłowiecka, EPP, 6 October 2015)

In most discourses, the term ‘threat’ is given through some strategies of implications, presuppositions, numbers game or storytelling. However, in some discourses like the one in the excerpt above, immigration is directly described as a threat to the EU in the context of security, economy or culture. As given in this excerpt, the Member States of the EU are claimed to be ‘really under threat’ due to the issue of ‘relocation of refugees’. In the next lines, as a strategy of justification, Danuta Jazłowiecka refers to ‘international organizations’ to prove the feasibility of assisting these people in ‘places of conflict or in neighbouring countries’, which ‘is often cheaper and more effective than financing support for refugees arriving in Europe’. She also emphasizes the amount that would be required for such a feasible way, which is an example of strategy of numbers game. However, the strategy of numbers game is not limited to this. Through some presuppositions along with some implications, Jazłowiecka continues to justify her discourses by using the estimations. ‘It is estimated that . . .’ may be accepted as another strategy of knowledge used by the parliamentary members for the interests of their own political group attitudes and ideologies (van Dijk, 2003: 112–113). Jazłowiecka does not only know that ‘approximately one million people’ will arrive in Europe that year, but also is sure that ‘more than half are economic migrants’. So, according to Jazłowiecka, ‘EU cannot afford’ to meet the needs of such a big number while there is already a ‘crisis in Greece’, which implies that the EU should deal with its own economic turmoil instead of accepting those ‘fake’ refugees. Thus, in the excerpt, immigration is described as an economic threat in general. Lastly, two of the ‘four most important problems’ in the EU are claimed to be the ‘influx of immigrants’ and ‘help with Africa’ directly related to the issue of immigration whereas the ‘Ukrainian-Russian crisis’, if not the ‘crisis in Greece’, may also be thought as an issue indirectly related to immigration. As also seen in this excerpt, the issue of immigration is on the agenda of

the political members of the EP and seems to remain for a long time; however, the solutions offered on the issue mostly incline to present immigration as a threat.

In recent years, the EU has faced the biggest crisis in this decade of migration. It is noted that **an increasing number of arrivals are non-war refugees, and those who come from safe-held countries, in other words, economic migrants**. Also, some of the arrivals in the EU come from refugee camps in Turkey, arguing that they are living in extremely poor conditions. We are still not finding, or perhaps we do not have sufficient political will to find a solution to the **flow of migrants**. However, **the time is still diminishing**, as the free movement of people within the EU – one of the key values and achievements of European integration – is already a fool. What to do? Individual EU members must be able to seize the right to reduce their attractiveness to **economic migrants**: Europe needs to get rid of the **image of a mild economic guarantor of the migrants** who are determined to cross the EU border **illegally**. At the same time, the Community must take real action with a common effort to strengthen the external borders. But **most importantly, the various calculations show that providing refugees with the necessary assistance in countries bordering the EU is more than five times cheaper than inside the EU**. This should be an incentive for Member States to maintain such refugee centers in the EU's neighbourhood, in particular in Turkey. **In exchange for EU support, it must be demanded that Turkey pays more attention to ensuring the protection of the border with the EU**, as well as the transparent use of these funds and closer coordination of migration policies between the EU and Turkey (Algirdas Saudargas, EPP, 2 February 2016).

Just like in the previous one, in this excerpt above, not estimations but ‘various calculations’ are given as a reference and used as the strategy of knowledge. And also similar to the claims by Jazłowiecka, through this reference and strategy, Algirdas Saudargas suggests ‘providing refugees with the necessary assistance in countries bordering the EU is more than five times cheaper than inside the EU’. This suggestion reveals once more that immigration issue is not a humanitarian issue – as sometimes claimed by some members of the right-wing political groups in the EP – but an issue of feasibility or an economic issue for these political groups. Furthermore, there are some ‘dirty calculations’ regarding immigration for the sake of the interests of the EU. By ignoring the fact that over 3 million refugees live in Turkey, Saudargas states that some refugees coming from the refugee camps in Turkey argue ‘they are living in extremely poor conditions’. On the other hand, the EU still discusses some quotas and cannot decide on a few hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers to relocate in the EU

countries. Moreover, he suggests ‘In exchange for EU support, it must be demanded that Turkey pays more attention to ensuring the protection of the border with the EU’. To present immigration as an economic threat, Saudargas also uses the strategies of denominations, predications and numbers game as follows, respectively: ‘non-war refugees’, ‘economic migrants’ used twice and ‘flow of migrants’; ‘the migrants who are determined to cross the EU border illegally’; and ‘an increasing number of arrivals’. Through the strategy of positive Self-presentation, Saudargas underlines the ‘free movement of people within the EU’ as a sort of economic success of the EU or ‘one of the key values and achievements of European integration’, i.e. the Schengen Area, which is claimed to be in danger because of the economic threat of migration. Another example of positive Self-presentation in the excerpt is the fact that the EU is portrayed as a ‘mild economic guarantor of the immigrants’ although Saudargas does not favour this ‘image’. Last but not least, the MEPs in the EU as well as the public are warned and provoked against this so-called economic threat of immigration by using another catastrophe evoking time expression: ‘the time is still diminishing’.

President! In order to eliminate **smuggling, illegal migration** must be stopped **outside the borders of the Union**. Only an asylum system can be effective that can separate **illegal economic immigrants** from those who are **truly refugees**, even **outside the Union**.

It must be crystal clear that only **real refugees** can enter or receive asylum status in the Union. All other solutions are interpreted as invitations to the EU by **thousands of illegal migrants**. To achieve this, refugee centers should be set up **outside the borders of the Union**, where processing of asylum applications should be possible. In the meantime, **we must, above all, protect the external borders of the Union**. We need to help the Member States defending the external borders financially, **otherwise human lives will be the victims of the sea or the desert**, because nowadays it is well-known that **smuggling** has become more business than drugs in recent years. **Only in this way** can we break the business model and increasing influence of people smuggling increasingly profitable from the **migration crisis** (Kinga Gál, EPP, 25 October 2017).

Similar to Jazłowiecka and Saudargas, Kinga Gál also suggests that the ‘migration crisis’ must be dealt with and solved ‘outside the borders of the Union’, and ‘we must, above all, protect the external borders of the Union’. To justify these anti-immigration suggestions, she uses the strategy of apparent sympathy with those ‘human lives’ by

referring to them as the ‘victims of the sea or the desert’ as a result of ‘smuggling’, which is a familiar reference for the justification of anti-immigration discourses. At this point, if we put aside the anti-immigration characteristics of her discourses in the excerpt and give the first part of the excerpt as well to get the context of it so as to understand the cognition behind it, Monika Hohlmeier (EPP, 29 April 2015) adds a new dimension to the matter of ‘outside the borders of the Union’ by underlining the ‘desert’ as also given in the excerpt above:

First, the problem of the **50 million refugees** on the move cannot be solved with a coup. Nor should we give the impression that we could find all solutions to **50 million refugees** here in the short term with a few measures. We have to make a contribution.

What does ‘contribute’ mean? Firstly, it means: Of course, we have to start search and rescue operations to save the people in the Mediterranean. **But nobody talks about the Sahara zone, where at least as many people are dying.** And just because **we do not see them**, the dead exist there anyway.

The reason why the EU does not ‘see’ or deal with the people dying in the Sahara desert is probably the fact that the deaths in this desert are not assessed, at least for now, as a threat to the European security, economy or culture by the EU elites. On the other hand, also resorting to the strategy of numbers game, Gál implies that most of the refugees are ‘fake’ or ‘economic’ by using the terms ‘truly refugees’ and ‘real refugees’ to distinguish them from the ‘thousands of illegal economic migrants’ due to some concerns about the economic interests of the EU.

For weeks now, thousands of migrants have been landing on the shores of the Mediterranean and, in particular, in Malta and Lampedusa, **fleeing the situation in their country, where unprecedented political instability reigns.** Frontex has rightly launched Operation Hermes to help the Italian authorities **cope with this mass influx of migrants** to their shores. The management of **this humanitarian crisis** must not be left to the Italian authorities alone. The control of the EU’s external borders must be a joint effort, because it is a **joint challenge.** **This mass influx of third-country nationals will result in waves of illegal migrants entering many Member States.** We need only see how the French authorities are intercepting **every day hundreds of illegal migrants arriving straight from Italy.** We know full well that **those asylum seekers include many economic migrants who ‘slip’ into these mixed migratory flows.** Moreover, the European effort must be stepped up. The Member States must provide Frontex with the resources it needs

to carry out its missions. We also need to cooperate more with the Tunisian authorities. **Tunisia must fulfil its readmission obligations** (Véronique Mathieu, EPP, 4 April 2011).

In most cases, the right-wing political group members in the EP use the ‘Schengen Area’ and ‘Frontex’ so as to portray immigration as a security threat against the EU’s internal and external borders, and thus, against the EU citizens. However, in the excerpt above, Frontex is used as a means to ‘cope with this mass influx of “migrants”’, in other words, with the economic threat of immigration. At first sight, the first lines of the excerpt evoke positive thoughts and feelings regarding the migrants. It mentions about ‘thousands of migrants’ who are ‘fleeing the situation in their country, where unprecedented political instability reigns’, and hence, according to Véronique Mathieu, this is an ‘humanitarian crisis’, or an implicit ‘joint challenge’, which should be managed not only by the Member States’ own efforts but also by Frontex as a security body guarding the borders and coasts of the EU. However, in the next lines of the excerpt, it comes out that this is not more than an apparent sympathy that is resorted by the relevant political groups to justify their anti-immigration position in the eyes of the public opinion. More importantly, Mathieu is in a kind of contradiction with herself as she defines those ‘fleeing the situation in their country, where unprecedented political instability reigns’ as ‘migrants’, and then, claims that ‘those asylum seekers include many economic migrants’. This may be because of the fact that there has yet to develop such an effort to distinguish between the asylum seekers, refugees or migrants in the 7th parliamentary term for the justification of anti-immigration discourses. On the other hand, as well as the strategy of apparent sympathy, Mathieu also uses other specific strategies to present the asylum seekers or ‘migrants’ as an economic threat. The most obvious strategy used in the excerpt is the numbers game: ‘for weeks now’, ‘thousands of migrants’, ‘this mass influx of migrants’, ‘this mass influx of third-country nationals’, ‘waves of illegal migrants’, ‘every day’, ‘hundreds of illegal migrants’, ‘many economic migrants’ and ‘these mixed migratory flows’. It should be noted that most of these phrases include a sort of ambiguity in them and do not reflect precise numbers, which is thought to be intentionally done to confuse the public mind, and thus, to increase the level of fear on immigration. Another strategy used by Mathieu in this excerpt is the presupposition: ‘This mass influx of third-country nationals “will result

in” waves of illegal migrants entering many Member States.’ Mathieu also resorts to the common strategy of knowledge, which often does not have any clear resource or tangible data, accompanied with the strategies of denomination and predication: “‘We know full well” that those asylum seekers include many economic migrants who “slip” into these mixed migratory flows’. Furthermore, the excerpt is full of denominations: ‘illegal migrants’ used twice, ‘economic migrants’ as well as implicit ‘influx of migrants’, ‘influx of third-country nationals’ and ‘mixed migratory flows’. Finally, the fairness of the readmission agreements signed with third-countries such as Tunisia or Turkey should be questioned and discussed in the framework of the requirements of the international law on refugees to expose the unfairness of the use of such agreements as a ‘force of facts’ by the right-wing political groups to justify their anti-immigration discourses.

Madam President, I believe we are discussing a **pan-European issue** here. We have to understand **that Europe must act in a spirit of solidarity and unity**. Today, we have an issue with Italy and with **refugees** from Tunisia, **but tomorrow it may be from Algeria, Egypt or possibly Libya, from whence thousands have already come to us in the past**. The fact that we do not have the Council here is a problem, of course. The Council is not interested in this issue. **I am disappointed that the Council is not sitting here today, listening to Parliament’s debate with us**. In my opinion, we must work with the Commission to find a solution that will be, on the one hand, **legally proper**, while, on the other, as my colleague, Mr Kelly, said, **we cannot simply accept all refugees coming to Europe from North Africa**. This is surely not our objective, and those who do not deserve **political asylum** must be returned to their country of origin (Miroslav Mikolášik, EPP, 15 February 2011).

As this excerpt above is also taken from the 7th parliamentary term, the difference between the terms asylum seekers, refugees or migrants is not so emphasized. Instead, so as to prevent the acceptance of ‘all refugees coming to Europe from North Africa’ by the EU, Miroslav Mikolášik tries to distinguish between the ‘ordinary’ asylum and ‘political’ asylum. It should be noted that the severity of the discourses against immigration increases day by day, term by term, and therefore, there is no doubt that it will get worse and worse over time. The researches like this thesis probably may not hinder or eliminate all anti-immigration discourses over the world, however, they may contribute to the literature in theory and in practice by exposing and resisting production

and reproduction of such anti-immigration, discrimination and social inequality ‘by text and talk in the social and political context’ (van Dijk, 2001: 352). According to Mikolášik, immigration is a ‘pan-European issue’, and it should be dealt with the partnership of the EU’s basic institutions, i.e. the Council, Commission and Parliament of the EU. In other words, he wishes these two institutions to find a ‘legally proper’ solution and share the responsibility of any possible asylum or migration policy within the EU with the EP, even if it is an anti-immigration policy. To discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe, Mikolášik uses the strategy of presupposition and states that ‘but “tomorrow” it “may be” from Algeria, Egypt or “possibly” Libya, from whence thousands have already come to us in the past’. This statement includes the numbers game of ‘thousands’ as well. Such presuppositions in the 7th parliamentary term mostly turn into ‘precise knowledge’ in the 8th parliamentary term as the parts of anti-immigration discourses to present immigration as a threat in terms of security, economy or culture. Though this excerpt is not clear enough to categorise it as an example of so-called threat of security, economy or culture, the strategy of numbers game is mostly used by the political group members to portray immigration as an economic threat and to justify their anti-immigration discourses, and for this reason, it is included in this chapter. The ambiguity in the category of this excerpt also reveals that more covert or implicit discourses are delivered against immigration in the 7th parliamentary term compared to the next one.

4.1.2. European Conservatives and Reformists

The dominant discourse among the MEPs of the ECR is that there should be a clear distinction between ‘genuine’ refugees who flee war or torture and migrants, i.e. ‘fake’ refugees, who look for better economic opportunities in ‘our’ Europe. Such denominations and predications are repetitively used by these MEPs so as to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe in the minds of the public at large. By using such denominations and predications once and again, they aim to give the message that ‘this kind of immigration is an economic and social burden, not a resource’ (Jussi Halla-aho, ECR, 4 April 2017).

Mr President, there will be **smuggling** in the Mediterranean for as long as

illegal crossing is rewarded. The demographic and socioeconomic trends in Africa and the Middle East guarantee that people will keep coming **indefinitely and in large numbers**. We have the tools to manage the **influx**: the problem is that we do not have a political decision on what we want to achieve.

Europe cannot afford this kind of immigration, socially or economically. We have **failed in integrating the immigrants** that we already have, and that failure will become **catastrophic as the numbers grow**. So, **we must stop the flow**. Migrants who are rescued at sea must be returned to the port of departure, and not brought to European ports. **This will also stop smuggling**, because **nobody wants to pay for nothing**, and **it will stop the tragedies at sea** (Jussi Halla-aho, ECR, 25 October 2017).

As seen in the excerpt above, they are not only ‘economic’ but also ‘illegal’ migrants. Along with the hyperbole of ‘indefinitely’ and the numbers game of ‘in large numbers’, Jussi Halla-aho strives to justify his next discourse “‘we’ must stop the ‘flow’”. So, this will stop not only ‘smuggling’ but also the ‘tragedies’ at sea, a kind of strategy of apparent sympathy, ‘for their own good’ again. According to Halla-aho, immigration is an obvious economic threat to ‘us’ because ‘Europe cannot afford this kind of immigration, socially or economically’, which will be ‘catastrophic’ as ‘their’ number grows due to ‘the demographic and socioeconomic trends in Africa and the Middle East’, which is another negative Other-presentation. The cognition behind all these discriminative and anti-immigration discourses is self-evidently summed up in Halla-aho’s own words: ‘nobody wants to pay for nothing’. So, Europe does not want to pay for the refugees, in other words, the ‘nothing’.

Mr President, historical experience has shown that economic difficulties, the long-term economic downturn, but especially **the economic crisis and the increase in youth unemployment**, which are deprived of any prospect of true social inclusion, are **decisive in the emergence of racism, xenophobia and intolerance**. These phenomena appear to be intensifying in the countries of Europe where **migratory flows, especially the waves of illegal immigrants**, are increasing. **These long-lasting phenomena lead societies to dead ends, conflicts, fragmentation, disintegration and marginalization**. Combating them therefore means combating those political decisions and actions that **deepen poverty, causing warfare and massive population movements**. If we are not talking about austerity, the Dublin III Regulation, the need for a Middle East peace process, and the need to build societies based on solidarity and mutual aid, and not on inhumane competition, **we cannot fight xenophobia and racism** (Notis Marias, ECR, 1 December 2016).

There are many examples of apparent denial among the MEPs of the right-wing political groups in the EP. The discourses claiming that ‘we are not racists’ is usually followed by some other discourses to justify or legitimate their racism, discrimination, exclusion, marginalization or othering. In the excerpt above, Notis Marias contributes to the reproduction of ‘racism, xenophobia and intolerance’ in the public discourse, and hence, public mind by justifying them through the ‘economic crisis and the increase in youth unemployment’. Though an economic crisis or a high unemployment may seem the reason of such racism, xenophobia or intolerance at first glance, indeed, the social cognitions such as attitudes, ideologies, norms and values in the interest of the dominant group interface between these discourses and the dominance of the political elites (van Dijk, 1993b: 280). In Marias’ anti-immigration discourse, the stereotypical metaphors of ‘flows, waves’ are used to strengthen the negative Other-presentation, and thus, to persuade the public opinion in the EU (van Dijk, 1997b: 47). Marias also implies that if the EU cannot stop these ‘migratory “flows”, especially the “waves” of “illegal” immigrants’ in some countries such as ‘our’ own country, i.e. Greece, these ‘long-lasting’ phenomena will end up with ‘dead ends, conflicts, fragmentation, disintegration and marginalization’, which include the strategies of denomination, presuppositions and justification in itself. Marias, finally, stipulates some conditions for fighting xenophobia and racism, which are not clear enough to tell whether they are for ‘our’ own good or for ‘their’ own good.

Mr President, I think that the states themselves should decide how many asylum seekers they can receive, for example, Croatia does not have adequate accommodation capacities for **asylum seekers whose number has increased dramatically** in the last few years. It now requires additional care of 1.73% of asylum seekers who arrive on the coasts of Italy, Malta or Greece. Today, this is a figure, relatively small, **tomorrow** we will have to take care of so much, the next months maybe a little more, and so **in the endless**. Such a migration policy leads exclusively to a **social disaster**, since the state, which entered the seventh year of the crisis, whose **own population** is becoming increasingly massive and **where more and more people are poor due to lack of work**, cannot expect to provide quality care to **African immigrants**. Unfortunately, Croatia has nothing to offer to these people – it just wanes while waiting for their process to be completed.

Therefore, I think that **the problem must be resolved more resolutely at its source**, in Africa, because **this migration flow** will lead

to **collapse of the social and security system** in several member states (Ruža Tomasic, ECR, 20 May 2015).

The excerpt above mostly underlines Croatia's 'own' population, as a strategy of top-down transfer and justification of the anti-immigration position of the ECR. In other words, according to Ruža Tomasic, it is not possible and fair to take care of 'African immigrants' while 'more and more people are poor due to lack of work' in 'our' Croatia. Attempts to legitimate discriminative, racist or anti-immigration discourses by attributing to the unemployment or economic crisis in their 'own' countries or the EU as a whole is another common act of the members of the political groups in the EP. For some, immigration is more than a 'crisis' and almost a sign of doomsday. Likewise, Tomasic does not hesitate to call the immigration issue as a sign of a 'social disaster' or 'collapse of the social and security system' due to the so-called economic threat of immigration. By resorting to the strategies of presuppositions and numbers game, she claims that the number of asylum seekers 'has increased dramatically' in recent years, and 'tomorrow' it will be much more, and then, 'maybe' it will be 'endless'. Also, there are similar discourses that cannot be evaluated more than a hyperbole as follows: 'Possibly, this billion people in the queue will bring a huge threat to Europe' (Sławomir Kłosowski, ECR, 4 April 2017). Finally, to get rid of the threat of 'this migration flow', Tomasic argues that the 'problem' must be resolved in the Other's Africa, not in 'our' Europe, which is a sort of implicit negative Other-presentation and positive Self-presentation.

Madam President, **the image of the drowned Syrian child haunts us all and it is easy to get emotional. However,** that image is not very representative. The vast majority of the asylum seekers coming to my country and many others are **not Syrian children, but young men from countries like Iraq, Somalia, Western Africa and even Albania.** They flee from **poverty and unemployment,** which is understandable, **but we cannot afford this kind of immigration in these kinds of numbers.**

A relocation system is bad for Europe itself, but **it is also bad for the refugees of the world.** Should we use **our resources** on the lucky ones who make it to Europe, or should we use them to improve the living conditions of the **millions** who will, in any case, remain in the camps? We must address the pull factors. **The new government in Denmark has drastically cut the benefits paid to immigrants and tightened the rules of family reunification.** These are the kinds of measures that

Europe as a whole should implement **without delay** (Jussi Halla-aho, ECR, 8 September 2015).

In Halla-aho's excerpt given above, the strategy of apparent sympathy is used in one of the most hypocritical ways and reveals the intensity and fierceness of the anti-immigration discourses of some right-wing political group members in the EP. By referring to the photograph of the dead body of Aylan Kurdi, a two-year old Syrian boy who drowned in the Mediterranean on 2 September 2015 while trying to reach Europe with his family (*CNN*, 4 September 2015), Halla-aho says that 'the image of the drowned Syrian child haunts us all and it is easy to get emotional. However ...'. By ignoring the fact that there were 95,205 unaccompanied minors who applied for asylum to the EU in 2015 (EUROSTAT, 2018) and 3,771 dead or missing people in the Mediterranean in the same year (UNHCR, 2018b), Halla-aho tries to manipulate the numbers for the justification of his anti-immigration discourses, and he states that many of the asylum seekers arriving in his country, Finland, 'are not Syrian children but young men from countries like Iraq, Somalia, Western Africa and even Albania'. According to the UNHCR (2016c), the number of sea arrivals of the migrants and refugees in Europe by nationality between 2015 and June 2016 is as follows: 76,561 from Syria; 40,157 from Afghanistan; 24,478 from Iraq; 12,180 from Nigeria; 8,827 from Eritrea; 7,066 from Pakistan; 4,106 from Somalia; 4,683 from Iran; and 53,017 from other countries. These numbers make the possibility of Halla-aho's claim regarding the numbers by nationality quite weak. Furthermore, he maintains that 'these kinds of numbers' are too big to be afforded by Finland or Europe, which makes immigration an economic threat to his 'own' country and the EU. To discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe in terms of economic threat, Halla-aho repeats similar discourses in various debates: 'Europe cannot afford – economically, socially or politically – this kind of immigration in these kinds of numbers.' (29 April 2015); 'The population of Africa is expected to reach four billion by the end of this century, so the pressure will not go away. The question is: can Europe indefinitely afford, economically or socially, a massive influx of people for whom the European labour market has very little to offer?' (20 May 2015); 'The opening of legitimate routes is also not a solution as Europe cannot afford socially or economically the millions of people who come here.' (16 September 2015); 'Well, given the miserable integration rate that we have

seen, even with much smaller numbers of humanitarian immigrants in Europe, I would say that we cannot afford even these kinds of numbers' (11 May 2016); 'This kind of immigration is extremely costly to their [the Member States] societies both economically and socially.' (16 May 2017). Though he refers to the policy of Denmark at the end of the excerpt, Halla-aho is mostly known with his attributes to the model of Australia on immigration for the justification of his anti-immigration discourses as follows: 'I think we should pay close attention to how Australia is dealing with this situation and look for a model there.' (20 May 2015); and, 'As for the external borders, I think we should look closely at what Australia has been doing successfully for the past few years.' (11 May 2016). On the other hand, Halla-aho is not alone in such attributions to the model of Australia in his political group, and there are some other discourse examples in this sense: 'It is high time to wake up and stop this invasion. Australia did it.' (Richard Sulík, ECR, 6 October 2015); and, 'Let's implement an Australian pushback model when we must acknowledge that there is neither the will nor the realism of receiving millions of migrants and refugees on the continent.' (Anders Primdahl Vistisen, ECR, 16 May 2017). Finally, as given in the excerpt above, a relocation system is claimed to be not only 'bad for Europe' but 'also bad for the refugees of the world', which is an example of apparent sympathy.

Mr President, the Commission's joint EU resettlement programme certainly has noble ambitions, which aim to encourage greater cooperation between national governments regarding the **resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers**. However, as a British Conservative, I do remain worried about its implementation. We do not want to see the continuation of problems like those we have had at Sangatte in France.

I think that cooperation and solidarity across the European Union is, of course, important **when discussing the burdens that nations face but we must better distinguish economic migrants from asylum seekers**. They obviously have every right to seek sanctuary, but we must also have legislation that does not tie individual nations' hands regarding who is accepted and who gets asylum. A collective approach such as the one the Commission is proposing might **undermine** each EU nation's ability to decide this.

Meanwhile, though, I think a major priority should be **securing the southern borders**. **Frontex** must play a more prominent part in this regard in order to act as a strong deterrent to **economic migrants** wishing to make the hazardous trip across the Mediterranean. We must act more strongly against the various third countries that irresponsibly encourage those activities. The Commission says it will be national governments

that ultimately decide the number of people they accept, and that Britain and other countries will not be forced to accept **large numbers of economic migrants that it cannot cope with or cannot support in these economically challenging times**. That is necessary and right. Countries like Britain need guarantees that our asylum and immigration policy remains for us to decide and guarantees also that the EU's approach will remain one of open cooperation and not one of compulsion (Timothy Kirkhope, ECR, 15 September 2009).

In the 7th parliamentary term, as it is the case both in the previous chapter on immigration as a security threat and the next chapter on immigration as a cultural threat, the members of the ECR do not deliver so many speeches regarding immigration in terms of portraying it as an economic threat. The excerpt above is one of the rare speeches in this respect. Before starting to analyse this excerpt, the following discourse should be noted to see the difference between the 7th and 8th parliamentary terms in the context of the ECR members' dealing with immigration and to understand that an opposite attitude towards the migrants, asylum seekers or refugees, i.e. not negative but positive Other-presentation, is also possible though this discourse also emphasizes the 'diversity' between migrants and refugees:

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, faced with the **new tragedy** announced in Lampedusa, **Europe must finally understand the diversity between desperate migrants and refugees, fleeing war-torn countries, bloody tyrants and murderous fundamentalisms**.

The refugees who come from Somalia, Eritrea, Syria, do not run away to improve their living conditions, but to be able to continue living. The political inefficiency that the Union has shown in dealing with the **Eritrean and Somali situation, which has been dragging on for years with the escalation of oppression in Eritrea and of terrorism in Somalia, which is spreading to other African countries**, is the inability to demonstrate the handling of immigration and helping the riparian countries that must all be called to the **duty of welcoming refugees**, who will then **have to be hosted in all the countries of the Union**. . . . **Mourning for the dead must be followed by measures for the living, so that they remain alive** (Cristiana Muscardini, ECR, 9 October 2013).

Similar to Cristiana Muscardini's discourse above, Timothy Kirkhope also mentions about the difference between 'economic' migrants and asylum seekers. However, Kirkhope's statements are a bit far from sympathy with these people, and he uses the denomination of 'economic migrants' three times in the same excerpt to present

immigration as an economic threat in the public discourse and public mind. Moreover, his reference to the ‘burdens that nations face’ is a sort of implicit predication used for immigration. Kirkhope also resorts to the strategy of numbers game to justify his anti-immigration discourses: ‘large numbers of economic migrants’. Lastly, the justification is not limited to this numbers game, and so as to control the public mind in this respect, it also appears within these following words: ‘it cannot cope with or cannot support in these economically challenging times’.

Mr President, I would also like to thank the rapporteur. She did a very good job and correctly named a number of important topics.

We agree that we welcome migrants who come to actively participate in value creation to work. The opportunity to apply must be what the migrants to the EU countries attract, **not generous social benefits. We support all measures** that will encourage the **involvement of migrants in the active life of society** in the country they choose for their next life.

However, I cannot agree to the unification of migration rules. **Integration as well as visa policy** must be derived from the **specific needs of very different labour markets** in individual Member States and must also be managed and regulated at this level. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with the proposals contained in the report,¹⁸ such as the **general granting of asylum seekers access to the labour market**, the **challenge** of legalizing **illegal immigration** or the **extension of the right to vote to immigrants** without specifying the length of their stay in that country. Nor is the idea of a single European consular department anything to agree with. We support **language integration** and the **costs** must be borne by both the country to which the migrant is coming and the immigrant himself. The European Union should also not have exclusive competence in the field of **external coordination of social systems** in relation to third countries.

Lastly, let me say that we should also think about **why the EU Member States are no longer as attractive to migrants as they once were** (Milan Cabrnock, ECR, 12 March 2013).

Unlike the denominations of ‘flood’, ‘invasion’ or ‘inflow’ of the ‘migrants’ delivered in other excerpts in this thesis, Milan Cabrnock asks the question of ‘why the EU Member States are no longer as attractive to migrants as they once were’. This question should be discussed in the context of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ starting at the end of 2010 that seems to have turned into a sort of ‘European Fall’ for the Europeans since 2015. In other words, in 2013 when this speech was delivered by Cabrnock, the

¹⁸ See (EP, 2013).

‘generous social benefits’ has yet to attract most people living in their own countries, but then, particularly in 2015, it became inevitable for most of these people to leave their countries just to survive, contrary to the so-called economic motives of immigration that are often claimed by the right-wing political group members. At the beginning of the excerpt, Cabrnock deals with the migrants in the framework of the ‘needs of very different labour markets’ and welcomes them on condition that the ‘migrants who come to actively participate in value creation to work’. Indeed, according to Cabrnock, ‘integration’ or ‘involvement of migrants in the active life of society’ must be, first of all, for ‘our’ own good. Even the ‘language integration’ of the migrants is discussed within the ‘costs’ and benefits framework, and Cabrnock does not favour the ‘general granting of asylum seekers access to the labour market’ again in this respect. Thus, he tries to attract the attention of the European elites as well as the public opinion to the potential so-called economic threat of immigration as a ‘challenge’ that requires proper ‘measures’. Finally, by resorting to the denomination of ‘illegal immigration’ as well, Cabrnock stipulates the ‘extension of the right to vote to immigrants’, which may be accepted as a more moderate anti-immigration discourse compared to the ones particularly delivered during the debates in the 8th parliamentary term by the members of his political group.

4.1.3. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

In the portrayal of immigration as an economic threat, the discourses of the EFDD members are as fierce as the ones delivered by them for the portrayal of immigration as a security threat. On the other hand, comparatively more moderate discourses regarding immigration in the 7th parliamentary term are replaced with blatant anti-immigration discourses in the 8th parliamentary term, which is exemplified in the following excerpts.

Mr President! Temperature is currently in Damascus 25 degrees, in Lagos 30 degrees and in Bangladesh 30 degrees. **No person should sleep in tents like the migrants in Sweden**, as in the winter of 2015. However, there is a simple solution: **We say no** from the beginning. **Europe, and especially Sweden**, have taken responsibility – a responsibility **we** never had, because Sweden did not start a war for over 200 years and had no colonies in 300 years. When does responsibility cease? I ask. There is a simple solution to this: Add resources to travel

homes for the **economic migrants** that it is about. **Say no** before they cross, we do not need to be extorted by Turkey. I'm now putting the solutions up and we'll see what you're doing with them. Perhaps you need to consider a bit more and write reports. However, we all know that it will end with **Australia's migration system**. That's why I'll go there soon and learn more about this. Then you can ask me instead of those Liberals currently in the EU. Free right of asylum and open borders for **the whole world** do not work. It's time to realize it now (Kristina Winberg, EFDD, 15 November 2017).

One of the common strategies used by anti-immigrant, racist or discriminative political party or group members is apparent sympathy. In this excerpt above, Winberg tries to claim that it is not for Sweden's or Europe's good, but it is 'for their own good' not to come to Sweden or Europe as it does not have a proper climate for the immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees. Though Winberg refers to the climate conditions in Sweden in this excerpt, she actually implies that neither economic nor cultural climate of Sweden or Europe is convenient for these people by also referring to them as 'economic migrants', which means that they are not real but 'fake' migrants. Winberg also glorifies Sweden and Europe by claiming that 'we' have taken the best responsibility ever, which is a clear example of positive Self-presentation and a well-known euphemism. By referring to Australia's migration system which has mostly violated the principles of the international law on refugees in recent years, Winberg again tries to justify the idea of sending these people back to the conflict, persecution and political oppression in their homelands by just saying 'no'. She particularly refers to Australia because Australia is mostly known for its values of respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy as well as its prosperity. Winberg's claim of opening borders for the 'whole world' is a numbers game, which is also often employed by such anti-immigration politicians so as to control the public discourse, and hence, the public mind.

Mr President! It is usually said that one should solve the causes of a problem, not just treating the symptoms. I would like to say that there are simpler solutions to **the migration crisis**, which is the crisis we should talk about throughout this House. The crisis created by an **overly generous immigration policy** in especially countries like Sweden, with **a well-thought-out thought**, but which in practice is catastrophically counterproductive for the well-being of a **democratic state**. In addition, the crisis is caused by the **huge population increase** outside Europe, as well as **the dysfunctional nature of these areas and countries**, resulting in **high unemployment** and **very gloomy prospects**. In Italy,

particularly **economic migrants** are **flowing** right now. Some days there are **thousands**. The solution is not to make a compulsory redistribution from Italy to the rest of Europe. It's like pouring water out of the boat but not clogging the hole in the boat, if I can use such a similarity in these contexts. The Commission and some Interior Ministers presented a solution to this day, which among other things will **help Libya's Coast Guard** to better patrol its coastline. We also want to **help Libya** secure their enormously long southern border. Who will do this is not said. It sounds like building a new state apparatus in Libya, which will be a big challenge. I have a simpler solution. Return the asylum legislation to each country. Give Italy the right to set the number of asylum seekers. Deciding on a break in asylum applications, or why not the right to say no to the boats from different organizations that currently, in principle, migrants transport almost all the way from Libya's coast to Italy. **I am aware of objections to asylum and other international law, but this must be done** (Kristina Winberg, EFDD, 4 July 2017).

Given that the number of tourists coming to Sweden or Europe suddenly increases threefold or fourfold in a year, would any conservative, right-wing or far right political party or group member call it 'tourism crisis'? Instead, they would probably choose some positive terms for it so as to increase the tourism revenue of their country or Europe. The term 'migration crisis' is one of the basic terms of negative Other-presentation, which involves political, economic, social and cultural implications and presuppositions. I would suggest using the term 'migration awareness' as a counter-discourse in this case. Winberg again glorifies Sweden as well as Europe by making reference to 'overly generous immigration policy' with a 'well-thought-out thought' in a 'democratic state' like Sweden, which relates to positive Self-presentation. Winberg's speech including references to the 'huge population increase, dysfunctional nature of these areas and countries, high employment and very gloomy prospects', which are followed by the terms 'economic migrants' and 'flowing' implying the natural disaster of flood, is another example of apparent sympathy combined with negative Other-presentation. Winberg claims that these 'economic migrants' 'flow' in 'thousands' some days, but she does not mention about the number of migrants who are rejected or sent back to their countries every day. This is one of the outstanding characteristics of the strategy of numbers game. Winberg's making reference to Libya may be accepted as a top-down transfer, which implies that it is not only for our good but also for another

country's good. The last sentence of the excerpt ending with 'but this must be done' is another example of the strategy of fairness, i.e. 'firm but fair'.

Mr President, the issue of **people smuggling** and **illegal immigration** in the Mediterranean is, in essence, a simple one. The first step that we must undertake is to ask why this happens. Firstly, we must acknowledge the phenomenon of **economic migration**. **European nations are wealthier and generally more stable and enjoy greater social benefits.**

By contrast, **many African nations are poor, some politically unstable, many with lower health-care standards, and little chance of social benefits.** Secondly, there are vast amounts of money to be made by **people smuggling**. Indeed, the last Europol report estimated that turnover in this area was between EUR three and six billion per annum. This has led to an increase in **modern slavery**.

Something has to be done. With no effective control over our borders **we remain vulnerable to terrorism**. Also, we must address the **increasing detrimental health issues**, such as the fact that in 2014, 80% of tuberculosis sufferers in London were born abroad and a third of London boroughs were in that year's World Health Organisation high incidence threshold. This necessarily contributes to the **greater pressure on our own health services**.

Secondly, we must ensure that **people smuggling** is halted, the perpetrators' vehicles confiscated and destroyed, and any NGOs found to have assisted in this despicable trade must lose all public funding and, like the people caught **people smuggling**, also face prosecution.

Illegal immigrants are something very different to refugees. They should be **turned away at the borders** as a measure to send a message back to their homeland that such a journey will not be rewarded. Only by taking such a stance will we then be able to address the issue of support for **genuine refugees** (James Carver, EFDD, 25 October 2017).

As often seen in the previous excerpts, James Carver also uses the denominations of 'illegal immigration', 'illegal immigrants' as well as implicit 'economic migration' and 'genuine refugees'. However, he goes beyond these familiar denominations and uses one of the most explicit strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation in the thesis. He glorifies the European nations as 'wealthier and generally more stable' with 'greater social benefits' whereas he depicts the African nations as the ones which are 'poor, some politically unstable, many with lower health-care standards, and little chance of social benefits'. To prevent the asylum seekers from arriving in Europe, Carver emphasizes 'people smuggling' and uses the strategy of apparent sympathy by referring to 'modern slavery'. However, in the next lines, it comes

out that such sympathy is not for ‘their’ own good but particularly for ‘our’ own good. Carver suggests that ‘something has to be done’ since “‘we’ remain vulnerable to terrorism’. So, according to Carver, it is not only an economic threat but also a security and social threat, which is not in the scope of this thesis but is included just to point it out: the ‘increasing detrimental health issues’ that “‘necessarily” contributes to the greater pressure on “our” own health services’. Lastly, with the purpose of justifying his anti-immigration discourses and contributing to the discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe, Carver claims that ‘illegal immigrants are something very different to refugees’ and suggests to turn away them at the borders as a ‘message’ or an ‘intimidation’ to ‘their’ ‘poor’ and ‘politically unstable’ homeland.

Madam President, this question is an **existential one for the EU**. Your answer to this will define the future of your project. It will say whether the **EU is to be a collective of freely cooperating peoples, based on friendship and enlightened self-interest**, or a centralised coercive structure feared and hated in equal parts by its constituents, and bound one day to **explode in a welter of vituperation and vindictiveness**.

I urge you to look to **the self-interest of your project, your peoples and your nations**. However, my experience of the direction of your mentality leads me to the sad conclusion that you will continue along the **path of self-destruction**, both in terms of encouraging **destructive economic migration from those poor benighted countries** and in terms of **sowing discord amongst your constituent nations** (Raymond Finch, EFDD, 16 May 2017).

To start with the end of the excerpt above, Raymond Finch presents the homelands of the asylum seekers as ‘poor benighted countries’, which are the source of ‘destructive economic migration’, through the overall strategy of negative Other-presentation and the specific strategy of predication. Moreover, Finch explicitly suggests the EU countries to care about the ‘self-interest’ of their own project, peoples and nations with the emphasis of the pronoun ‘your’, or in other words, ‘our’. Otherwise, according to Finch, the EU is on the ‘path of self-destruction’, which is a strategy of presuppositions used to contribute to the construction of an anti-immigration Europe. His reference to the ‘your peoples and your nations’ may also be accepted as a strategy of top-down transfer. Another example of such top-down transfer accompanied with some justifications in a different perspective is as follows:

The people demand an end to open borders. They demand an end to **the use of migration to keep big business happy and workers insecure**, and they demand an end to **the EU wasting their taxes on foreign aid**, which only perpetuates inequalities in world trade and props up dictatorships and unstable regimes (David Coburn, EFDD, 4 April 2017).

For Finch, immigration is also a matter of life or death for the EU, that is, it is an ‘existential’ issue for the future of the European project. He argues that if the EU fails on being a collective Union in line with its own ‘self-interest’ instead of ‘a centralised coercive structure’ for its constituents, it will eventually ‘explode in a welter of vituperation and vindictiveness’. This is, indeed, the justification of his anti-immigration discourses in the second part of the excerpt, and hence, an effort to get the support of not only the EU Member States but also their citizens.

Mr President, I speak from a UK perspective. **We have a long and proud history of accepting people from elsewhere, especially those fleeing political and religious persecution.**

In a time when there were no schools or hospitals, and electricity and public transport were non-existent, newcomers made their own way; but now they need these facilities, and **we, the most densely-crowded country in the EU, are struggling to cope. That is no good for anyone, and we certainly cannot provide the social security they need.**

In these difficult times, we cannot provide properly for those who have been paying their taxes in the UK throughout their working lives; we cannot go on taking in people. So the suggestions in this report¹⁹ are impossible. Even my own government, which is in favour of the EU, is concerned that the number of proposals in this report are overly bureaucratic.

We cannot regularise illegal immigrants. That would open the door to a flood of unmanageable proportions. Will the UK suddenly be expected to accept **great numbers of Bulgarians and Romanians** after 1 January next year? Especially after the Commission document presented to the Committee on Employment last April, which demands that Bulgarians or Romanians seeking work must be given prior claim over a third-country national. That excludes **people from the British Commonwealth**, who the rapporteur now thinks should go to the US instead.

It is also **discrimination** which is outlawed by the Lisbon Treaty. I do not think it is right to take in people for menial work; that is **exploitation. Skilled workers from Eastern Europe may be welcome,**

¹⁹ See (EP, 2013).

but they are exactly what their own country needs to build their economy and prosperity. That is not fair. I do not want to see poor countries in Europe.

In truth, is not this report part of a programme to force people to move around the EU with financial assistance from the Commission, **mixing up the peoples of Europe so that its countries disappear**, to be replaced by a single state called Europe? (Derek Roland Clark, EFD, 12 March 2013)

The excerpt above belongs to the 7th parliamentary term. Although the discourses of the members of the EPP and ECR are more moderate against immigration in this term compared to the 8th parliamentary term, the anti-immigration discourses of the EFDD members keep their severity in both terms. Derek Roland Clark starts with that well-known positive Self-presentation strategy and argues that ““we” have a long and proud history of accepting people from elsewhere, especially those fleeing political and religious persecution.’ Afterwards, he delivers his anti-immigration discourses through the strategy of justification along with the top-down transfer by claiming that ‘we’ are struggling with our own problems in the UK as ‘the most densely-crowded country in the EU’, so ““we” certainly cannot provide the social security “they” need’ while ‘we’ cannot provide it even for ‘our’ own citizens ‘paying their taxes in the UK throughout their working lives’. It seems that Clark is only concerned about those ‘our’ people, ‘our’ citizens, ‘our’ UK or ‘our’ Europe whereas he completely ignores the fact that ‘our’ country, i.e. the UK, is responsible for the ‘exploitation’ of the ‘Others’ and ‘their’ countries for the sake of colonialism for ages, which still continues on various forms in the ‘third world countries’. Nevertheless, Clark does not avoid using the terms ‘exploitation’ and ‘discrimination’ even for the Europe’s own people, the Bulgarians and Romanians, as a part of his apparent sympathy strategy, and he tries to justify this discrimination against these ‘skilled workers from Eastern Europe’ by claiming that ‘But they are exactly what their own country needs to build their economy and prosperity. That is not fair. I do not want to see poor countries in Europe.’ In other words, Clark discriminates against not only the immigrants or asylum seekers but also some specific European countries’ citizens. As for immigration, he uses the familiar metaphor of ‘flood’ to present immigration as a threat, or as an economic threat in this excerpt. Parallel with Clark’s anti-immigration discourses, Claudio Morganti (EFD, 12 March 2013) also delivers a similar speech during the same debate accompanied with

the strategy of apparent denial:

I think the rest of the proposal is out of any logic: I wonder, for example, **how we can guarantee easier access to the labour market for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, when there is no work even for our citizens.** In a perfect moment, in a perfect society, everyone should have the widest rights and the best guarantees, including the work of course. The reality is very different and **I cannot accept that our young people and our unemployed are overtaken by others.**

It is said that **the immigrants do the jobs that we do not want to do anymore:** this was perhaps true until five years ago. But now the situation is dramatically different and **I do not want to be told that I am selfish or racist if I prefer that our young people, our women and our men be guaranteed first.**

Additionally, Clark also denominates the immigrants by calling them as ‘illegal’. Along with a sort of the strategy of numbers game, he presupposes that regularising ‘illegal immigrants’ ‘would open the door to the “flood” of unmanageable proportions’. Lastly, Clark implies that ‘mixing up the peoples of Europe’, or regularising ‘illegal immigrants’, would replace the European countries with a ‘single state called Europe’, which portrays immigration also as a cultural threat, or an existential threat, in the public mind as examined in the next chapter.

Madam President, one of the totems of a sovereign state is that **it controls who can and who cannot come into its own country.** Unfortunately, several governments in the UK have given away this power to unelected, faceless bureaucrats in Brussels. What a **disaster** it has proven to be. **We have a situation now where we have uncontrolled EU immigration into our country, which has resulted in wages being driven down and people – indigenous people – being put out of work.** I do not believe that this EU immigration liaison officers’ network has any **power to stop this happening** at all.

We also have a two-tier immigration system in **our** country whereby if you are from Australia or New Zealand or anywhere else, you have a **cap.** However, if you are from Latvia or Poland or any of the EU countries, you can come to **our** country **willy-nilly.** This is fundamentally wrong. It is argued that this network will help control **illegal immigration,** but what happens if a country like Romania, for example, basically gives citizenship to **hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants?** What it does is it makes a mockery of the whole system.

I support elected politicians in the UK **having control over our own borders.** What I do not support are unaccountable, unelected appointees. I believe that the strengthening of this network would not be necessary if each individual Member State had the **power to control who does and**

who does not come onto its lands. I therefore implore everybody to reject this report (Paul Nuttall, EFD, 13 December 2010).²⁰

In the excerpt above, at first, Paul Nuttall does not categorise the people arriving in his country, the UK, or the EU as legal or illegal, regular or irregular. He just refers to those ‘who can and who cannot come into its own country’ which indicates the fact of discrimination against some specific people coming to the UK. To expose this fact of discrimination, in the same debate, Nuttall (EFD, 13 December 2010) is quoted regarding the people from the Eastern Europe as follows: ‘if doctors and dentists and people like that want to come to the UK to work – and we need their skills – then by all means they should come’, and it goes on with the strategy of storytelling: ‘The taxi driver who drove me to the airport this morning was a bricklayer who has been laid off as a result of Polish people coming onto the site, undercutting British workers, and now he is driving a taxi. That cannot be right.’ According to Nuttall, not only the arrival of those people in the UK but also the ‘uncontrolled EU immigration’ cannot be right because they result in ‘wages being driven down and people – “indigenous people” – being put out of work’. This is the use of the strategies of the justification and top-down transfer to present immigration as an economic threat as well as a social threat to the UK in particular and the EU in general. Or, in other words, Nuttall claims that immigration is simply a ‘disaster’, which is a sort of denomination. Other denominations regarding immigration and immigrants are as follows: ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘illegal immigrants’. Nuttall also resorts to the strategy of numbers game to influence the public mind against immigration: ‘hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants’. Moreover, he implicitly presupposes by asking the question of ‘what happens if a country like Romania, for example, basically gives citizenship to hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants?’ Finally, Nuttall favours an intergovernmental EU instead of a supranational one on immigration so as to have ‘control over “our” own borders’ and ‘power to control who does and who does not come to its lands’. That is to say, ‘we’ should be free on complying with or violate the international law on refugees.

²⁰ See (EP, 2010).

4.1.4. Europe of Nations and Freedom

The members of the ENF are overt in their anti-immigration discourses regarding economy as much as in the ones regarding security.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, over the past five years, **700,000 presumed refugees** have landed in Italy. **More than half a million, or 80%**, are **illegal immigrants** who do not run away from any war. These **false refugees** take advantage of the European asylum system and the inept Italian government, with the complicity of Brussels, offers these immigrants **food, shelter and free services** for years.

All this cost the Italians **€ 14 billion**: a meaningless madness, a scandalous injustice. **The Italians are rightly pissed off with Europe** and with the Letta, Renzi and Gentiloni governments, which have opened the doors of **our** country to the **invasion of illegal immigrants**. The situation is unsustainable and the reform of the Dublin regulation goes in the wrong direction. We need clear and resolute rules, **as in the United States and Australia: stop legal immigration**, forced repatriation of all **illegal immigrants**, immediate closure of borders, life imprisonment for traffickers of human beings. **Only the few who really escape the war are to be welcomed. All the others are illegal immigrants** and must be expelled immediately, without ifs and buts (Mara Bizzotto, ENF, 15 November 2017).

In the excerpt above, this time, the refugees or migrants are denominated as ‘presumed refugees’, ‘false refugees’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. Indeed, they are against not only ‘illegal’ immigration but also the legal one. Mara Bizzotto, a former member of the EFD, argues that the EU should ‘stop legal immigration’ as in the example of the US and Australia, which is chosen as a way to justify her anti-immigration discourses via these prosperous countries commonly known for their respect for human rights though it is not always so as in the case of immigration. According to Bizzotto, these people do not ‘run away from any war’ but ‘take advantage of the European asylum system’ as well as Italia which is claimed to offer ‘food, shelter and free services’. These discourses are supported by using some numbers in accordance with the strategy of numbers game: ‘700,000 presumed refugees’, ‘more than half of a million, or 80%, are illegal immigrants’, or ‘all this cost the Italians € 14 billion’. Thus, the Italians are involved in the anti-immigration discourses of Bizzotto, and a solid ground is sought for public legitimation of such anti-immigration discourses portraying immigration as an economic threat. This rhetorical discourse does not avoid expressing some blatant terms

to increase its persuasive impact on the public discourse and mind by referring to the cost of € 14 billion as ‘a meaningless madness, a scandalous injustice’. After all, ‘the Italians are rightly pissed off with Europe’ and with the relevant Italian governments which open the doors of ‘our’ country to the ‘invasion of illegal immigrants’, which is not only the use of the strategies of denomination and predication as the parts of an overall strategy of negative Other-presentation but also a strategy of top-down transfer for the justification of this anti-immigration attitude of her political group. Bizzotto seems to apparently sympathise with ‘only the few who really escape the war’ whereas she claims that ‘all the others are illegal immigrants and must be expelled immediately, without ifs and buts’, which is an example of the strategy of fairness.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, but look, I am a little perplexed because, for heaven's sake, the issue is relocation and it seems to me clear that until now it has not worked much, but in reality we are talking about **a small piece of a much larger problem, that if it were only that of the relocations would be a very positive thing, almost.**

It should be borne in mind that **180,000 people** have landed in Italy last year. Of these, probably, there will be a **5% that effectively escapes from the war** and that will be able to have **the status of political refugee** so, eventually, it will be **this 5%** that will be relocated.

The real problem is **all the others**. Is there a European plan to bring them back to their home? What do we plan to do? To leave them all in Italy? Is this the big problem that nobody talks about and these people in the end what are they going to do? They go to fatten up those who are **illegal workers**, they go to fatten the **meshes of crime**. **Just this week in my city people were arrested who had submitted the request for political refugee but who were going to steal, which passed off drugs.** So, let's face it, **it is a slave trade** that we are seeing right now and unfortunately there is someone complicit, there are many people doing business and there is someone complicit, even those who do nothing to resolve this situation (Lorenzo Fontana, ENF, 16 May 2017).

As seen also in the excerpt above just like the previous one, the members of the ENF try to distinguish between the people who are ‘real’ and ‘fake’ refugees, or ‘all the others’, who are seen as the ‘real problem’. Furthermore, the strategy of numbers game is used once more to justify their anti-immigration discourses without giving any valid or reliable statistical reference: the previous excerpt maintains that 80% of these people in Italy in those five years are ‘illegal’ migrants not running away from any war whereas this one above argues that only a ‘5% that effectively escapes from the war’ in 2016.

There is no doubt that these numbers are arbitrarily used as a part of their anti-immigration discourses for the sake of the political or ideological interests of their political groups. On the other hand, Lorenzo Fontana's emphasis on 'political refugee' implies that there should be distinction between not only the migrants and refugees but also the refugees themselves: the political and non-political refugees. It means that there is always a way or method offered by these political groups in the EP to decrease the number of people to be accepted by the EU with the status of 'real' or, in this case, 'political' refugee. In other words, according to Fontana, they or 'all the Others' are not political but 'economic' refugees or migrants who arrive in Italy and Europe just to exploit the economic welfare of 'our' Italy and 'our' Europe, and hence, should be seen as an economic threat. Moreover, Fontana suggests that these 'illegal workers' are not only an economic threat but also a security threat as they are considered responsible for the 'meshes of crime' in his city, which is supported by the strategy of storytelling that starts with 'just this week in my city' and goes on accusing someone, who applied for the status of political refugee, of stealing attempt. Finally, just like Bizzotto in the previous excerpt, Fontana also shows apparent sympathy with the 'others', who are presented as victims of a kind of 'slave trade', to make a more powerful impact on the public discourse in reproduction of anti-immigration Europe, and hence, implies that the EU must stop such a trade 'for their own good'.

Madam President, the foreign preference that the European Union is committed to implementing on a daily basis is **particularly scandalous**, particularly because of the **120 million Europeans who experience daily misery. Homeless or poor pensioners, their common point is not to be clandestine migrants and, thus, not to focus all the attention of European social policies.**

I will just remind you of the title of this debate: help for **migrants** facing severe weather. As if **our homeless people** did not suffer, too, **these same climatic hazards**. If our morality should not lead to establishing a hierarchy between the misery of one and the other, so far we must use **common sense**. However, in my country, some elected officials such as the mayor of Paris rushed to build **reception centers for migrants** while, under their eyes, **thousands of homeless people** sleep on the pavement every night and this is in the utter indifference.

Common sense would like us to think first of **ours** before thinking of **others** (Steeve Briois, ENF, 18 January 2017).

It would not be fair to judge or blame Steeve Briois for empathising with the ‘homeless or poor pensioners’. Just like asylum seekers, these people must also enjoy the same economic and social services or benefits with the ordinary European citizens and be included or integrated into the society at the same level with them in accordance with the relevant national and international law. However, making use of the ‘daily misery’ of the ‘homeless or poor pensioners’ in Europe to justify some discriminative discourses against the asylum seekers cannot be excused. At the same time, this is a way of using the strategies of top-down transfer and reversal: ‘Homeless or poor pensioners, their common point is not to be “clandestine” migrants and, thus, not to focus all the attention of European social policies.’ Then, ironically, Briois refers to ‘common sense’ in terms of ‘our homeless people’, and claims that it requires to ‘think first of “ours” before thinking of “others”’. As cited before, ideology works by disguising its ideological nature and becomes naturalized, automatized, in other words, common sense (Fairclough, 1995: 82), which is defined as a term ‘in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power’ (Fairclough, 2015: 107) or ‘essentially unreliable, possibly biased by social prejudices and illusions, if not the result of manipulation’ (van Dijk, 1998: 104). In this context, Briois attempts to distort the reality about the poor conditions of asylum seekers and to make these people scapegoat for the inefficiency or incapability of the EU on the issue by comparing them with the ‘120 million Europeans’ in misery or ‘thousands of homeless people’ suffering from climatic hazards or sleeping on the pavement, which may be regarded as another form of using the strategy of numbers game along with justification.

Mr President, in a dictatorial way, Brussels has decided to transform the European Union into one large asylum seekers' center, and with the redistribution of **thousands of fortune-seekers**, the Pandora's box has been opened. Merkel's open invitation has not been withdrawn. On the contrary, the party has yet to start, because more than **600,000 asylum seekers** have already entered Europe **illegally** this year and **the only contribution that all these so-called Syrian scientists have so far provided is an increase in rapes and fights.**

Fortunately, the democratic resistance in the European Union against the bribery of freedom, security and the future is getting bigger every day, because **66% of the Dutch** think that the Netherlands should no longer include refugees. Meanwhile, **a majority of Germans** are worried about the enormous influx. **Austrians** choose *en masse* for the FPÖ and therefore against **mass immigration**. Mr President, **enough is enough.**

Reception only in the region. **No more asylum seekers. Our borders must be closed.** That is the only way to stop **this asylum tsunami** (Vicky Maeijer, ENF, 6 October 2015).

In the excerpt above, Vicky Maeijer goes on her anti-immigration discourses as given in the previous chapter, but this time, she portrays immigration as an economic threat rather than a security one though there is a slight reference to it as well with the phrase ‘an increase in rapes and fights’. According to Maeijer, these people are not asylum seekers but ‘thousands of fortune-seekers’. In other words, ‘they are looking for a free house, free money and free care and I find it shocking that you knowingly, saddled our own inhabitants with this enormous catastrophe’ (Vicky Maeijer, ENF, 6 October 2015). Maeijer also implies that the redistribution of ‘this asylum tsunami’ equals to the ‘Pandora’s box’, and the ‘tsunami’ could only be stopped by closing ‘our’ borders against these ‘Others’, which is a clear negative-Other presentation. There are also some denominations such as ‘fortune-seekers’, ‘so-called Syrian scientists’ and ‘asylum tsunami’ whereas Maeijer’s accusing all these people of the ‘increase in rapes and fights’ is the use of the strategy of predication. Furthermore, she resorts to the strategy of top-down transfer by referring to the Dutch, German and Austrian to justify the anti-immigration position of her political group in the EP. While doing this, Maeijer also uses the strategy of numbers game throughout the excerpt to increase the impact of her anti-immigration discourses on the public mind: ‘thousands of fortune-seekers’, ‘600,000 asylum seekers’, ‘66% of the Dutch’, ‘a majority of Germans’, ‘Austrians ... *en masse*’, ‘mass immigration’ and the metaphor of ‘this asylum tsunami’. Last but not least, she expresses clearly her anti-immigration attitude at the end of her speech: ‘Enough is enough. ... No more asylum seekers.’

Madam President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, we have to tell the **truth** to the United Nations about **illegal economic immigration**.

We must abandon this irenistic view of immigration at the expense of the law, the rights of our peoples, but also the peoples of the sending countries, which are losing their economic strength.

We must abandon this connivance between **illegal immigration** and the **economy of maximum profit** that exploits the illegal.

We must give up indirect support to the **gangs of mafias and criminal groups** and submission, among others, to satrap Erdoğan.

Will **these facts** be heard? I do not know because we have a vision of a world of mobility, of a globalized world where **countries are no**

more than hotels of an open world, but this hotel becomes a world of pass for **the traffickers and the criminals** (Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, ENF, 13 September 2016).

As mentioned in the first chapter, Foucault (1980: 131) argues that there is a circular relation between truth and systems of power. And, there is a regime of truth in each society that implies ‘the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true’ (Foucault, 1980: 133). So, the ‘truth’ or ‘these facts’ that Jean-Luc Schaffhauser would tell the United Nations (UN) regarding ‘illegal economic immigration’ is a sort of discourse that he makes function as true for him and his political group in the EP so as to retain the power in the public discourse and public mind in terms of reproducing an anti-immigration Europe. In the excerpt, Schaffhauser strives to present immigration as an economic threat, and to this end, denominates it as ‘illegal economic immigration’ and ‘illegal immigration’. He also resorts to the strategy of apparent sympathy by claiming that “‘we” must abandon this irenistic view of immigration’ not only for ‘our’ own peoples’ good but also for the ‘peoples of the sending countries’. His reference to the ‘connivance’ that ‘exploits the illegal’ is also another use of the strategy of apparent sympathy. In addition, as a part of this apparent sympathy strategy, Schaffhauser tries to justify his anti-immigration discourses by suggesting that those sending countries ‘are losing “their” economic strength’ because of immigration. He also refers to the ‘gangs of mafias and criminal groups’ as well as the ‘traffickers and the criminals’ to legitimate the anti-immigration position of his political group in the eyes of the public.

France today has more than 5 million unemployed and nearly 9 million people living below the poverty line. The unemployment rate **explodes** quarter after quarter. **More than 200,000 immigrants** enter the country **every year** for the sole purpose of legal immigration and taking into account only adults. **The growth of my country is at a standstill**, the ultraliberal dogma advocated by Brussels has led to **deindustrialization and social breakdown at home**. The European directive on the posting of workers has created **unfair competition** in **our** national job market... And now the Commission President is asking us to host **tens of thousands of migrants** and, let's not doubt, **hundreds of thousands** and **ultimately how many millions?** France cannot welcome **these illegals**. The European Union does not seem to worry about the **substantive issues** raised by **this sudden influx of migrants**. What states or organizations are behind these displacements? Who finances this and **for what purposes?** It is these legitimate questions that the Union must now answer (Sophie Montel, ENF, 16 September 2015).

Sophie Montel, who left the ENF and became a member of the EFDD in 4 October 2017 and thus makes an exception for the framework of the thesis, also uses various strategies in the excerpt above to present immigration negatively, in other words, as an economic threat. At first sight, it is easy to determine many examples of the strategy of numbers game used to justify her anti-immigration discourses. Here, it should be divided into two categories for the use of the numbers game strategy: the first category regarding the Self and the second one regarding the Other. Firstly, Montel argues that 'France today has more than 5 million unemployed and nearly 9 million people living below the poverty line'. Secondly, she uses the numbers regarding immigration such as 'more than 200,000 immigrants' together with the time expression 'every year', 'tens of thousands of migrants', 'hundreds of thousands', 'millions' as well as 'influx of migrants'. Montel also presupposes that 'millions' of 'illegals' will 'ultimately' come to France so as to create fear in the public mind for the reproduction of an anti-immigration Europe. Montel also resorts to various denominations in the context of immigration: 'these illegals', and again, 'influx of migrants'. The metaphor of 'explode' should also be noted as it revokes the terms 'bomb' and 'bombing', which are used to present immigration as an economic threat that is supposed to be as dangerous as immigration as a security threat. Additionally, Montel uses the strategies of justification and top-down transfer together by referring to 'more than 5 million unemployed and nearly 9 million people living below the poverty line' in France, a 'standstill' growth of the country, 'deindustrialization and social breakdown at home', 'unfair competition in "our" national job market' and 'substantive issues' because of 'this sudden influx of migrants'. In brief, all these discourses are delivered as a part of an overall strategy of negative Other-presentation.

CHAPTER V

IMMIGRATION AS A CULTURAL THREAT

In the portrayal of immigration as a cultural threat, or in the ‘societal sector’ as suggested by Buzan *et al.* (1998: 22–23), the referent object is ‘large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions’. The securitisation of the migrants, or migration, is based on ‘whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained’ (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 23). In this context, the maintenance or reproduction of anti-immigration language is enabled by means of a discourse of the existential threat against the identity. In other words, as detailed in this chapter, the right-wing political group members in the EP present immigration as a matter of survival for the European culture with a special emphasis on national identities and Christianity as well as European civilization and *acquis*. Though the quantity of the discourses related to the cultural threat is relatively less compared to the ones regarding the security and economic threats, these discourses do not fall short in terms of their quality. The chapter aims at giving the outstanding discourse examples of the members of the relevant political groups so as to reveal how they discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe in the context of cultural threat.

5.1. Portrayal of Immigration as a Cultural Threat in the European Parliament

The following sections of the last analysis chapter examine the securitisation of migration in the discourse topic of immigration as a cultural threat. In this context, various anti-immigration discourses of the right-wing political group members in the EP are exemplified with an attempt to expose how these members try to discredit or problematise immigration in order to construct an anti-immigration Europe in the public discourse and mind.

5.1.1. European People’s Party

The overall strategy of negative Other-presentation is also dominant in anti-immigration discourses of the right-wing political groups in the EP in terms of presenting

immigration as a cultural threat. The following excerpts exemplify this overall strategy as well as specific strategies that are resorted within this context by the EPP members.

President! The European Union has unwittingly longed for years to tackle the almost **unexpected migratory crisis**. Although it was apparent from the outset that a common European security and defense policy would be needed **against millions of people in migration**, its development has been delayed ever since. With this in mind, we can only welcome further efforts by the External Action Service, the Commission and the EP to respond to the **asylum question** and to put it to a normal course. The Rome Declaration handles the **extraordinary challenge of migration** and the recent Maltese resolution on **illegal migration** by the European People's Party is also on the right track. For these reasons, the Valenciano-de Mera report unfortunately represents a major step backwards.

In agreement with Hungary and the Visegrád countries, our primary task should be **to protect Europe at all costs from the invasion of illegal immigrants**. It is true that **real refugees** should be provided all the help and we must respect for human rights of migrants. **But our main concern is to protect Europe's citizens and their nations, our security, our democratic system, our identity and our common values. The Holiness of the Pope must also protect our European Christianity, our faith and our values** (László Tőkés, EPP, 4 April 2017).

In this excerpt, there are many denominations regarding migration such as ‘unexpected migratory crisis’, ‘extraordinary challenge of migration’, ‘illegal migration’ or ‘invasion of illegal immigrants’. László Tőkés strives to repeat these denominations as much as possible to achieve his goal of presenting immigration as a threat, or in this case, mostly a cultural threat except for the emphasis on ‘our’ security in the last part of the excerpt, in the minds. The frequency of using the term ‘protect’ by Tőkés should also be underlined to this end: to ‘protect Europe at all costs’, ‘protect Europe’s citizens and their nations’ or ‘protect our European Christianity’. In this respect, the migrants and refugees are portrayed as an enemy of the European identity and Christianity. Furthermore, there is another noteworthy point: ‘European Christianity’. It means that there are various forms of Christianity, and it is the ‘European Christianity’ to be protected against this so-called invasion, which is an example of positive Self-presentation while presenting the Other in a negative way. However, the dilemma within this discourse comes just at the end of the same excerpt: ‘The Holiness of the Pope must also protect our European Christianity, our faith and our values.’ If it is ‘our’

European Christianity, ‘our’ faith and ‘our’ values, then, it is also ‘our’ Holiness of the Pope, which implies that ‘we’ exclude and discriminate against not only the migrants and refugees who believe in Islam but also the ‘Others’ from other parts of the world who do not belong to ‘our’ democratic system, ‘our’ identity or ‘our’ common values, i.e. the European Christianity in general, even if they are Christian. In addition, the phrase ‘millions of people in migration’ is a strategy of numbers game to create ambiguity in the public mind, which is often accompanied by fear as well as prejudice against migration. Lastly, Tókéš uses the strategy of apparent sympathy with the ‘real refugees’ who should be given all the help and refers to the ‘respect for human rights of migrants’, which is followed by the well-known phrase ‘but’ to justify or disclaim his anti-immigration discourses.

Mr President, congratulations to reporters on valuable work. I welcome the initiative of helping the Union's Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which will lead to job creation, economic endurance and poverty reduction, and in particular the need to decentralize the approach to the conduct of the European migrant refugee policy.

However, the key issues remain unanswered. **Who caused the migrant crisis? What is the responsibility of the European Union in this?** And how should the EU act preventively? The European Union must **strictly control migrants' inflows** and **implement systematic oversight of external borders**. Of course, the European Union should be in solidarity and help vulnerable categories, primarily for women and children, **but** it must not neglect **the security issue** and the fact that **a large number of refugees are made up of military-capable men**.

Solidarity and humanity must not be masked for the cultural change of Europe, and the **European Union must not be converted into a refugee camp** nor remain its ultimate destination (Ivica Tolić, EPP, 4 April 2017).

‘Who caused the migrant crisis?’ This is one of the most critical questions that should be tackled and answered by the EU as a whole to determine the root causes of immigration of the ‘millions’ referred in the previous excerpt and to find solutions instead of discursively constructing an anti-immigration Europe. And, as Ivica Tolić asks above, ‘What is the responsibility of the European Union in this?’ Though the EPP is a pro-European political group and Tolić is a member of it, these two questions lead the public opinion to question the innocence and sincerity of the EU in the migration and refugee issue or policy. This excerpt is also rare in that it criticizes the EU on

migration and implicitly presents the Self as a negative actor. However, it is not so implicit in presenting the Other in a negative manner. First of all, accompanied with the strategy of number games, immigration is presented as a security threat with the phrase ‘a large number of refugees are made up of military-capable men’, which implies and presupposes that these refugees are ‘potential terrorists’ (Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, EPP, 16 September 2015) and require a special attention of the EU in terms of the security of ‘our’ own citizens. This is, according to Tolić, why the EU does not have any other option apart from ‘strictly’ controlling ‘migrants’ inflows’. Secondly, and maybe more importantly for a conservative political group member, Tolić argues that there is a risk of converting the EU into a ‘refugee camp’ and a threat of the cultural change of Europe, which may be the result of the solidarity and humanity concerns of the EU. This argument may also be accepted as a sort of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation. Similar to the previous excerpt, Tolić tries to show his sympathy with the refugees, at least the vulnerable ones such as women and children, however, this statement is also followed by a ‘but’ as a disclaimer of his anti-immigration attitude.

We are facing three types of problems: problems with countries of origin, countries of transit and target countries.

The report²¹ shows more attention to the causes of the **refugee problem**, and I am pleased that this approach is much more ambitious to problems in **countries of origin that will still be the source of migration, even if we can contribute to the end of unhappy conflicts in them.**

I come from Slovenia, which has experienced **several hundred thousand refugees** from the south-eastern direction, on the way from Greece to Germany, if I simplify it, and for this reason I am particularly supportive of the intention of the European Union to pay more attention to transit countries that have acted in accordance with the **interests of the European Union.**

Regarding the target countries, I would like to draw attention to the aspect that, in my opinion, is **underestimated**, and that is the **cultural aspect of migration and refugee problems.** The **issue of integration** is not a matter of statistics or technology, but is **a very cultural issue.**

I would like **more attention on this topic** (Alojz Peterle, EPP, 4 April 2017).

Alojz Peterle, in the excerpt above, focuses on three dimensions of the ‘refugee

²¹ See (EP, 2017).

problem'. First of all, according to Peterle, the issue will always remain as a 'problem' 'even if "we" can contribute to the end of unhappy conflicts in "them"', which is not only a positive Self-presentation as "'we" contribute' but also a negative Other-presentation along with the use of the phrase 'unhappy conflicts in "them"'. Secondly, Peterle implicitly refers to the 'interests' of his 'own' country, Slovenia, as a 'country of transit', which acts 'in accordance with the "interests" of the European Union'. In this respect, the approach of the members of the right-wing political groups in the EP regarding immigration is mostly based on 'our' interests as a Member State and 'our' interests as the EU. These members argue that 'our' interests are in danger in terms of security, economy and culture, and hence, they strive to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe through some justifications or various strategies examined throughout the thesis. For this reason, Peterle considers 'several hundred thousand refugees' in Slovenia as a threat to both his 'own' country and the EU, which is also the use of the strategy of numbers game. Lastly, for the target countries such as Germany, Peterle claims that the issue or threat, i.e. the issue of integration, is mostly cultural rather than statistics or technology, which must not be 'underestimated'. In other words, accompanied with some implications, presuppositions and negative connotations on the multicultural society in terms of considering immigration as a cultural threat, 'At European Union level, "we" need to learn from the risks of a multicultural society' (Michaela Šojdrová, EPP, 24 November 2015).

One of the most important duties of the European Union is humanitarian activities and assistance to those in need. However, the common task is also to care for European values, our cultural identity and citizens' security. Unfortunately, in the current situation, it is more difficult to fulfill such roles than 10 or 15 years ago, because **Europe is unable to accept all those who require help, and concerns about their admission are more and more visible among Europeans.** In order to **comply with international commitments,** we must look for **many parallel ways** of proceeding. One of them is undoubtedly the **assistance for refugees currently residing in Turkey.** However, the Turkish state cannot remain alone in this action. Help is needed, including financial support. However, it is not buying up the possibility of **passivity in the refugee crisis.** The most important goal facing the European Union is to conduct a policy to end all military operations in the region. **Without this, the suffering and misery of these people will not be quickly overcome.** The creation of the best possible conditions for **human dignity,** including in the camps, is what the Union can do now with a

noticeable effect. In summary, apart from many actions that we must take in the context of the **migration crisis**, prudent financial assistance to the Turkish side is one of the possible solutions (Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, EPP, 2 February 2016).

The whole excerpt, starting with the first sentence, is full of apparent sympathy with the asylum seekers or refugees. Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska accepts the responsibility of the EU on the issue in terms of ‘humanitarian activities and assistance to those in need’, but as usual, it goes on with the familiar conjunction ‘however’. According to Łukacijewska, ‘European values, “our” cultural identity and citizens’ security’ comes first, and she implies that these are more valuable than ‘human dignity’ of the asylum seekers or refugees. Thus, she tries to justify her anti-immigration discourses through implicit positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation. That is, ‘our’ values and ‘our’ cultural identity are unique compared to ‘theirs’, and ‘we’ cannot risk ‘our’ citizens’ security by ‘accepting all those’ who are ‘potential terrorists’ (Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, EPP, 16 September 2015), about whom ‘our’ Europeans have ‘more and more’ concerns than ‘10 or 15 years ago’, which is used to legitimate the current negative positions of the right-wing political groups in the EP against immigration. Therefore, Łukacijewska suggests to use ‘parallel ways’ to ‘comply with international commitments’ such as assisting the refugees in Turkey, which means, at least partly, avoiding or transferring the responsibility of the EU in the immigration issue, or ‘passivity in the refugee crisis’ though she disclaims it. In brief, Łukacijewska favours using the economic power of the EU instead of its so-called European values, which are expected to involve also humanitarian aspects, to overcome the ‘suffering and misery of these people’. Additionally, Šojdrová (EPP, 24 November 2015) seems to share and support a similar opinion with her on that immigration is a cultural threat: ‘But Europe stands on Christian foundations and we should not give up our values.’

The **integration of migrants into the European labour markets** represents a **solution for the future of economic and social developments of the EU**. The **gains that the EU can achieve through a better integration of migrants** and on our labour markets can fully overpass the negative effects of labour demand and supply mismatches. **Our employers need well-qualified human capital**, and the increased number of individuals in search of a job can satisfy that job offer. **Immigrants need to be granted fair possibilities to job competition** in order to avoid a **social burden** on national governments. **Additionally,**

migrants need to prove willingness for embracing the laws and culture of the host countries before they are granted the same rights as the citizens. A fair balance is needed between the **efforts of the host country for better integrating the migrants,** and the **efforts of migrants for becoming integrated into that country.** The integration process is a two way street. Both the national authorities and the migrants need to work together to obtain that aim. Ultimately, if correct measures are taken, the **integration process can become beneficial: migrants can find a better life standard and employers can find a suitable workforce** (Traian Ungureanu, EPP, 12 March 2013).

As emphasized before, the EPP members are more moderate and covert towards immigration than other political group members in the EP. However, it should be noted that this excerpt above is taken from the 7th parliamentary term, which ends in 2014, so is a bit far from the so-called ‘refugee flood’ in 2015. Even so, the excerpt should be credited because of its positive and optimistic presentation of the ‘migrants’ as a ‘well-qualified human capital’ as long as ‘they’ make efforts for ‘becoming integrated into that country’. In other words, the EU should deal with immigration in the framework of a win-win strategy that would benefit both the EU countries and the migrants. It should also be noted that Traian Ungureanu does not refer to the asylum seekers or refugees but only the migrants, and thus, he does not distinguish between these groups, which is often resorted to justify anti-immigration discourses in the 8th parliamentary term. Furthermore, Ungureanu mostly discusses immigration by beginning from the perspective of ‘for our own good’ instead of ‘for their own good’. That is to say, the interests of the Self always precedes the interests of the Other as a requirement of that familiar ‘common sense’. To illustrate, Ungureanu gives the examples of the benefits that the migrants may provide for the EU as follows: ‘solution for the future of economic and social developments of the “EU”’, ‘the gains that the “EU” can achieve’, ““our” employers need well-qualified human capital’ and ‘employers can find a suitable workforce’. On the other hand, the benefits of the migrants depend on some specific conditions: ‘migrants need to prove willingness for embracing the laws and culture of the “host countries”’, ‘the efforts of migrants for becoming integrated into “that country”’. Even granting ‘fair possibilities to job competition’ to the migrants is for the sake of the EU interests such as avoiding a ‘social burden’ on the EU countries’ governments. Lastly, as gaining the ‘same rights as the citizens’ depend on the

immigrants' 'embracing the laws and "culture" of the host countries', it may be claimed that immigration is implicitly presented as a cultural threat against the EU, which may be avoided through 'the integration of migrants into the European labour markets' and the European culture, according to Ungureanu.

Madam President, Mr Barroso, Commissioner, Minister of State Györi, the **Schengen system** is one of the most tangible *acquis* of the European Union. **If European citizens were asked**, they would mention free movement without border controls as something important for them in the European Union. That is why it is important to preserve this system and to **do everything to preserve the free movement of our citizens and a Europe without borders**. This must remain our primary goal.

The values, our *acquis* have to be protected especially when they are challenged. This challenge today is the surge of migration and refugees. However, in order to address **these challenges** we need concrete proposals and solutions.

This begins with separation and clarification of the issue, which means that **we separate the refugee issue from illegal immigration**, we use **our** existing principles that we can build on, such as **solidarity and cooperation**, and we use **our** existing institutions such as **Frontex**, or **our** existing rules.

I welcome the Hungarian position and the position of Minister of State Györi, and also the words of Mr Barroso, who said that the aim is to reinforce the **Schengen *acquis*** and operate it well, not to depart from it (Kinga Gál, EPP, 10 May 2011).

Unlike Ungureanu's speech above, Gál makes a distinction between the 'refugee issue' and 'illegal immigration' though this excerpt also belongs to the 7th parliamentary term. Gál gives many references to the 'Schengen system' and 'Frontex' in the context of immigration, and claims that 'we' must 'do everything to preserve' this system through "'our" existing institutions such as Frontex'. While doing this, she also tries to justify her discourses by using the strategy of top-down transfer by attributing to the 'European citizens' and the 'free movement of "our" citizens'. So many references to the Schengen system and Frontex may evoke the so-called security threat of immigration in the public mind; however, these discourses are not limited to this. The main 'challenge' is portrayed as the 'surge of migration and refugees' as a part of the overall strategy of negative Other-presentation. And, according to Gál, the 'values and "our" *acquis* have to be protected' against this challenge, or in other words, against the cultural threat of immigration. Also, against 'this challenge', Gál offers to use "'our" existing principles',

“our” existing institutions’ or “our” existing rules’, which may be given as an example of positive Self-presentation. Last but not least, it should be noted that ‘solidarity and cooperation’ to be built between the EU Member States may be used to construct a positive refugee awareness throughout Europe instead of constructing an anti-immigration Europe.

5.1.2. European Conservatives and Reformists

As exemplified below within the discourses of the ECR members, the use of the strategy of reversal is one of the mostly resorted strategies by the right-wing political groups or parties, particularly the extreme ones, in the national parliaments as well as the EP. In this sense, the disclaimer of “we” are not discriminating, “they” are’ is used to reverse the racist or discriminative discourses against the minorities, asylum seekers, refugees or migrants in the eyes of public or opposition groups.

Mister President! The initiative against **racism, xenophobia and hate speech** is problematic because they stop their own concerns. On the one hand, it should fight racism, but at the same time, **culturally or religiously motivated acts** are excluded from criticism. One does not want to see social patterns and not address them. **Violence against Jews and homosexuals in Europe**, for example, is increasing rapidly today. **There are usually perpetrators from the Islamic culture who are responsible for these acts.** Should we really close our eyes and pretend that's not the case?

Similarly, it is not understandable why other **hate messages such as those of Islamists towards Christians** or those of left-wing extremists towards the police – as is often the case in Germany – are not equally persecuted. **The citizens of Europe** take note of **these double standards** and the election results of the coming months will also reflect the **frustration**. The agreed process leads to censorship and thus to the **restriction of freedom of expression**, despite all the opposing assurances (Ulrike Trebesius, ECR, 1 December 2016).

By means of positive Self-presentation along with negative Other-presentation, Ulrike Trebesius claims that there is not ‘racism, xenophobia and hate speech’ or ‘violence’ against the Muslims or Islamic culture but against Jews and Christians, which is a clear example of the strategy of reversal. Furthermore, through the strategies of denomination and predication, she calls the people belonging to the Islam religion as ‘perpetrators’ who are claimed to be responsible of the violence acts against the Jews and hate

messages towards Christians. By resorting to these strategies, Trebesius implies that the migrants or refugees, who are mostly Muslims, are a cultural threat to the European citizens so as to contribute to the discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe. She also attributes to the citizens of Europe in accordance with the strategy of top-down transfer, and maintains that these ‘frustrated’ citizens will punish those who are responsible for ‘these double standards’ during the coming election. The last sentence of the excerpt also reveals that Trebesius does not seem to be paying due consideration to the rights of the Other, i.e. refugees, ensured by the international law as much as she does to the freedom of expression of the Self, i.e. the European.

Madam President! **Populism and lies** have a very wide range. We need to talk about what is extraordinary, about **propaganda** from outside Europe, wanting to influence the decisions of **our nations, our voters**, the propaganda organized by President Putin, by Russia Putin. I want to join these appeals of Mr Štětina, Mrs Macovei, for the mobilization of the European Commission and the High Commissioner in this matter.

And finally, the **language of hatred** – it must be said clearly: **in reality it mainly affects Christians and Jews. It is these two communities who are victims of discrimination, including discrimination on the web.** You have to talk about it openly. **Other groups** are harmed to a much lesser extent. **Anti-Christianism and anti-Semitism are the most fundamental phenomena.** The answer should be **good education** referring to what is basic in **our civilization** (Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, ECR, 5 April 2017).

Almost in the same manner with the previous excerpt, the excerpt above also includes obvious examples of the strategy of reversal as well as apparent denial. Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski suggests that not Muslims, i.e. the refugees and migrants belonging to the Islam religion, but Christians and Jews are the ‘victims’ of the language of hatred and discrimination. Besides, contrary to general belief, he implies that the Muslims are ‘perpetrators’ of these acts of language of hatred and discrimination against these two religion communities. In other words, according to Ujazdowski, these ‘anti-Christianism’ and ‘anti-Semitism’ by Muslims are fundamental threats to ‘our’ civilization. In general, Ujazdowski tries to portray the European citizens as a ‘victim’ whereas the refugees and migrants are presented as the ‘perpetrator’ in the framework of the overall strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation,

and thus, makes contribution to the public discourse of ‘immigration is a cultural threat’.

Madam President! From what Mrs Mogherini said, it appears that the EU has finally understood that it is necessary to help first and foremost on the spot and that **external borders must be effectively protected**. We are all ready for such help. However, the idea that Europe can welcome **millions of immigrants** without causing a **political and social catastrophe in Europe** is a **dangerous dream**, and the **issue of refugees** is still another matter, and here, as Mr Fleckenstein rightly said, they are mixed up. And states have the right to decide on the **inflow of immigrants** into their territory, and **free European societies**, and no one else, can decide on **their ethnic and religious composition** (Zdzisław Krasnodębski, ECR, 12 September 2017).

The use of the strategy of numbers game is also common in presenting immigration as a cultural threat among the members of the ECR to justify their anti-immigration discourses and to influence the public mind in this sense. The phrases ‘millions of immigrants’ and the ‘inflow of immigrants’ are two examples of such strategy in the excerpt above. Zdzisław Krasnodębski maintains that ‘these numbers’ cause a ‘political and social catastrophe in Europe’, and thus, it is a ‘dangerous dream’ to ‘welcome’ them, which is a fierce discourse in the context of constructing an anti-immigration Europe. He also claims that the ‘issue of refugees’ is not distinguished from the ‘issue of immigrants’ by implying that these are not ‘real refugees’ but ‘economic migrants’, and therefore, ‘external borders must be effectively protected’ against this ‘invasion’, which is one of the common denominations used for the arrival of the asylum seekers and refugees in Europe by many right-wing political group members in the EP. Through the positive Self-presentation as well as implied negative Other-presentation, Krasnodębski attributes to the ‘free European societies’, who are claimed to be able to decide on ‘our’ ethnic and religious composition. This is also the use of the strategy of top-down transfer to involve the public in this anti-immigration attitude of her political group, and hence, to normalise and legitimate it in the public discourse and mind. Lastly, a similar use of the strategies of the positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation portraying Christian culture as non-violent but referring to Islam as ‘radical’, which is a sort of denomination, as a source of terrorism, so as a cultural threat against the EU, is as follows:

Our civilization based on Christian culture is attacked and is not attacked by abstract force, but by radical Islam. You have to tell it clearly and not because it discriminates against anyone. **Civilizations fall when they stop believing in their own values.** Please note that **in Central Europe, where the model of social life is based on Christian culture, there is no basis for the existence of terrorism** (Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, ECR, 24 November 2015).

In the following, the excerpt by Branislav Škripek presents the ‘mass migration wave’ as both an ‘opportunity’ for and a ‘threat’ against Europe which ‘is built on Christian foundations’.

The current **wave of migration** is a milestone for **the continent that is built on Christian foundations. Mass migration wave can change the shape of Europe. It is an opportunity and a threat at the same time.** However, we cannot ignore the **large number of people fleeing the horrors of the war** – this war is led by Islamic fundamentalists and led by them for religious reasons, they expel many of their souls. **However,** it is clear that **many people migrate here for other reasons.** And it is also true that **we cannot and we cannot accept all unreservedly. I consider it important to help all who are at risk of life.** I appeal to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have their Christian roots to prove that the values of the Gospel are not just empty words. **But** it is not our best – in the strength of every country – **to offer asylum to all people. That is why I consider it necessary for Member States to have the right to choose which refugees to accept.** Finally, **it is citizens of European countries** who will share their neighbourhoods, their streets and their cities with them (Branislav Škripek, ECR, 8 September 2015).

Though Škripek does not give any details about the opportunity side of immigration, it does not seem that it is something cultural that may contribute to the EU’s motto ‘United in Diversity’. Probably, he means the economic opportunity of immigration as a fresh labour force for the various sectors of the EU whose population is known to be aging day by day, and some Member States like Germany often declare their willingness to make use of this kind of opportunity. Though Škripek’s statements regarding the ‘large number of people fleeing the horrors of the war’ or to ‘help all who are at risk of life’ may seem sincere at first sight, his following statements starting with the conjunction ‘however’ turn them a kind of the strategy of apparent sympathy. As seen in the previous excerpt, Škripek also does not hesitate to imply that ‘many people’ are not refugees but migrants who are ‘here for other reasons’. He may be right in his

claim that every country in the EU cannot 'offer asylum to all people'. However, this fact cannot legitimate his suggestion for the 'Member States to have the right to choose which refugees to accept', at least for the Member States which are a part of the Union which declares itself as aforementioned 'United in Diversity' based on some humanitarian values. Such approach reminds the fact that some Muslim asylum seekers convert to Christianity so that their applications for asylum are not declined by the host countries such as Finland. However, though it does not avoid including the last reason regarding asylum applications, the reasons of the conversion are distorted in the mainstream media as follows: 'Complex factors behind the trend include heartfelt faith in a new religion, gratitude to Christian groups offering support during perilous and frightening journeys, and an expectation that conversion may aid asylum applications.' (*Guardian*, 5 June 2016). Škripek's statement 'we cannot and we cannot accept all "unreservedly"' may also be discussed in this context: is one of the conditions for accepting these people as asylum seekers or refugees their conversion to Christianity? Lastly, Škripek uses the strategy of top-down transfer by referring to the 'citizens of European countries' as the ones who to decide on the refugees to be accepted, which is a way of sharing the responsibility of this anti-immigration attitude.

Mr President, in spite of the fact that I live a relatively long way away, in Poland, I feel that I understand entirely the concerns provoked by **uncontrolled immigration** into France or Italy. **Immigration from North Africa quite naturally exacerbates cultural and social tensions, and intensifies pressure on the social budgets of the Member States.** We therefore have a lot to discuss, and we should not try to ignore the **matter. French, Italian and Maltese citizens** are today faced with the highest bills on account of the fact that controls along the **European Union's external borders** are simply not working. **The European nations are also footing the bill for our failed efforts to halt immigration into Europe.**

I have only one request. I would like the changes to the **Schengen Code** not to be used as a pretext for **limiting the freedom of movement of citizens of the European Union's Member States.** Such proposals have been made for many years in respect of the Polish-German border, to the disadvantage of Polish citizens. It will be easier to reach an agreement if we have a full guarantee that changes to the **Schengen Code** will not affect the **citizens of the Member States** (Konrad Szymański, ECR, 10 May 2011).

In the 7th parliamentary term, there are so few remarks of the ECR members regarding

immigration, and the excerpt above is one of those rare discourses that may be categorised within the cultural dimension of immigration. As seen through the soft discourses of Konrad Szymański, the ‘uncontrolled immigration’ is not described as a threat, at least yet, but a ‘matter’ since it provokes the ‘concerns’ for the EU in general and ‘France or Italy’ in particular. The denomination of ‘uncontrolled immigration’ is followed by the strategy of justification: ‘Immigration from North Africa quite naturally exacerbates “cultural and social tensions”, and intensifies pressure on the social budgets of the Member States.’ As a matter of fact, the discourses of this sort pave the way for fierce portrayal of immigration as not only a cultural threat but also an economic threat against the EU in the 8th parliamentary term, so they should be accepted as a turning point in this respect. Szymański also does not avoid using the strategy of top-down transfer to justify his anti-immigration discourses and increase the impact of his discourses in the public discourse and public mind by attributing to the ‘French, Italian and Maltase citizens’ and by claiming that ‘The European nations are also footing the bill for our failed efforts to halt immigration into Europe.’ Szymański’s emphasis on the ‘European Union’s external borders’ and ‘Schengen Code’ also reveals his efforts to link immigration with the EU’s security, which is again often referred in the next parliamentary term in the context of threat.

Mr President, Baroness Ashton, there is a **major threat** in the Middle East. **There is discrimination, including structural discrimination, against Christians in various Islamic countries.** The Christian community in Iraq has already been **more than halved**. We are now seeing the same thing happening in Egypt. **There are attacks on the ancient Coptic community, there are innumerable cases of daily harassment, forced marriages, and it is pretty much impossible to build a church.** Last February, I received **60 Copts** here and they called out for help.

I therefore have two requests of you, Baroness Ashton. Make the Copts a top priority in your policy. **A stop must be put to the systematic discrimination against them.** Secondly, on 20 January, we asked, in this House, for an EU strategy for **freedom of religion** and the permanent monitoring of such a policy. Will you make that a reality, please. I would appreciate your **reaction**. Thank you for your patience (Peter van Dalen, ECR, 11 May 2011).

This excerpt is particularly chosen to discuss immigration from a different standpoint. Let’s reverse the discourse of Peter van Dalen and rewrite it as follows: ‘There is a

major threat in [Europe]. There is discrimination, including structural discrimination, against [Muslims] in various [Christian] countries.’ Such a discourse would be the use of the strategy of negative Self-presentation, which is not something usual for the right-wing political group members. On the other hand, being against ‘discrimination’ as well as ‘structural discrimination’ should not be limited to a specific group or community. In other words, being against discrimination or structural discrimination requires adopting the same stance for all groups or communities regardless of race, religion, language, gender and even social status. In this context, the members of the right-wing political groups should be concerned about not only the discrimination against Christians in Islamic countries but also the one against Muslims in Christian countries without giving any excuse. If van Dalen or other MEPs can use their status power in the EP to defend the rights of the Christians in Islamic countries who are claimed to have difficulty in building a church there, they should also be able to use that power to defend the rights of the Muslims in Christian countries, or the EU, for ‘freedom of religion’ about which van Dalen mentions. Furthermore, they should feel anxious about 160,000 asylum seekers to be relocated within the EU as much as ‘60 Copts’ calling out for help. In short, the ‘reaction’ should be given and ‘a stop must be put to the systematic discrimination against’ not only ‘us’ but also ‘them’. However, the discourses as follows would just and eventually pave the way for the ‘clash of civilizations’ referring to the argument that ‘the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural’ (Huntington, 1993: 22):

During the January debate on the situation in Tunisia and Egypt and the freedom of religious expression, I mentioned the **tragic situation of Christians in Arab countries**, particularly the Egyptian Coptic Christians, who are being persecuted. I pointed out the **radicalisation of Islam, which is directing its aggression against the followers of Christ** (Zbigniew Ziobro, ECR, 11 May 2011).

5.1.3. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

As detailed below, the EFDD members also resort to the overall strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation as well as some specific strategies in the discourse topic of immigration as a cultural threat to discredit immigration in the public discourse, and thus, public mind.

Mr President! There are many foul languages that are used around in this chamber too often. **'Racist'**, **'xenophobe'** and now **'populist'** are terms that could have had a clear and distinct meaning in another social climate. But given the fact that you have called **ordinary people** – who simply have different views about immigration – the terms have lost their significance. When did it become racist to want a **controlled immigration**? When did it become racist to care about the **safety of women and children**? When did it become racist to **love its country and culture**? **Our citizens** have seen enough to be very concerned about the situation. This cannot be dismissed as **populism** or **divergent** views. You in the EU pretend to fight intolerance while inviting **millions of migrants** who come from **intolerant cultures**. How can you expect **our citizens** to be **tolerant of intolerance**? I would like to have **applause**, too (Kristina Winberg, EFDD, 1 December 2016).

The excerpt above gives a clear example of apparent denial. Winberg uses the strategy of top-down transfer by referring to 'ordinary people', 'safety of women and children' and 'our citizens', which is also a way of justification. Winberg also tries to justify a 'controlled immigration' by claiming that because 'we' love 'our' country and culture. The polarisation between the Self and the Other is obviously emphasized in this excerpt. The Self is presented as 'tolerant' as much as possible whereas the Other is depicted as intolerant 'millions of migrants' coming from 'intolerant cultures'. This includes positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation as well as the strategy of numbers game. By expecting applause from the 'public', Winberg tries to test the success of her attempt to control the public discourse and public mind.

Thanks for asking! I can only see in my country Sweden how in some cases we distance ourselves from **our own culture** to **correct the immigrants** coming. For example, we stop celebrating school closures in the Church because we may encounter some groups, and so on. I see more and more how **we deprive our own culture to adapt to the others** (Kristina Winberg, EFDD, 1 December 2016).

In the excerpt above, one may see another example of overall strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation. And, the specific strategy of reversal is clearly exemplified here. It implies that since the immigrants are not correct enough, 'we' waive 'our own culture' not only so as to 'correct the immigrants' but also in order to 'adapt to the others'. Therefore, it is 'us' who suffers from such a 'flood' of immigration, not 'them'. However, Winberg does not have any evidence on such a

common phenomenon of depriving ‘our’ own culture to adapt to the ‘Others’ in Sweden.

Mr President, we learned something from the European Parliament’s reaction to Article 50. This debate is on an EU response to all the things you try and associate with the **Brexit** vote. If you genuinely want to build a better Europe, how about this: stop what you are doing and think about why people voted the way they did. **Those you call ‘populists’ are patriots. We love our countries, we love our communities, we love living in nations where the people are the masters and, through democratic decisions, the people have the final say.** What they hate is you lot imposing **unfettered immigration that has transformed communities** without the people’s say. **They do not like seeing their streets changed without their approval. They do not like living in places that no longer resemble those they grew up in,** and they know the EU is to blame. You can call us **all the names** you like, but it will not change the result. **The majority of the British people voted to get our borders back, to get our democracy back, to get our country back** and the sooner we are out of this place, the better (Tim Aker, EFDD, 5 April 2017).

The excerpt above is an example of the conflict or dilemma between ‘our’ country and ‘our’ Europe for the right-wing political groups except for the EPP. These Eurosceptic political groups favour to get ‘out of this place’, and as seen in the example of Brexit, there appear new names for such exits such as Svexit as called by Winberg (EFDD, 15 December 2015) or Frexit, a promise given by Le Pen, former Co-Chair of the ENF, to the French citizens (*FT*, 14 March 2017). As given above, the alleged aim of these political groups at exiting the EU is mostly ‘to get “our” borders back, to get “our” democracy back, to get “our” country back’. On the other hand, Tim Aker uses the strategy of apparent denial by claiming that ‘we’ are not ‘populists’ or any of ‘all the names’ you call us but ‘patriots’ who love ‘our’ countries and ‘our’ communities. He also presents the Self in a positive way by referring to the people who are the ‘masters’ and ‘have the final say’ through ‘democratic decisions’ whereas the Other is presented in a negative way through denomination and predication: ‘unfettered immigration that has transformed communities’. By using the strategy of top-down transfer along with some implications and presuppositions, Aker argues that ‘not us but the people’ are against immigration: ‘They do not like seeing their streets changed without their approval. They do not like living in places that no longer resemble those they grew up

in.’ In other words, according to Aker, the people consider immigration as a cultural threat, which is discursively constructed through such negative Other-presentations by the members of the right-wing political groups.

Madam President, I think we can all agree that **the migration crisis last year was probably the single biggest catastrophe to hit the European Union in its history**. In fact, I would go as far as to say that **it has put the very existence of this project in jeopardy**.

What is amazing is that the EU’s own actions helped cause the problem in the first place. When Chancellor Merkel and the Swedish Government committed the equivalent of **cultural suicide** and **invited everyone who had a Syrian passport to come to the continent**, it was obvious to all of us what was going to happen. People would attempt to come **in their droves, people would die in the seas**, there would be **migrant camps overflowing**, Member State would be pitted against Member State, the Schengen Agreement would collapse, and **it would be a golden opportunity for the Islamic fundamentalists to bring carnage to our continent**. It was also obvious that there would need to be U-turns, as we have seen performed in the past couple of months by both the German and the Swedish Governments. **Now we are facing an even bigger crisis. The numbers coming this year to Europe will no doubt dwarf those of last year**. We are facing a summer where the movement of people from the Middle East and North Africa will no doubt reach **biblical proportions**.

What is the European Union offering to solve this problem? The answer is more of the same: **more concessions, more EU, more money, more misery, not only for the migrants but for many of its own citizens**. We have to put a stop to **this madness**, and the answer is not making the same mistakes over and over again: it is restoring proper border controls, just as the **Australians** have done for the past five years. However, for the UK to achieve this goal, we must vote to **leave this organisation** in the up-and-coming referendum (Paul Nuttall, EFDD, 2 February 2016).

To start with the end of the excerpt, just like the previous one, Nuttall also emphasizes the Brexit with the words ‘leave this organisation’, and states that the EU must ‘put a stop this madness’ by referring to the ‘Australians’ to justify his anti-immigration discourses. First of all, according to Nuttall, the ‘migration crisis last year’ is ‘probably’ the ‘biggest catastrophe’ ever for the EU, and therefore, an existential threat to the European project. Nuttall goes further in these anti-immigration discourses and calls inviting ‘everyone who had a Syrian passport to come to the continent’ as a ‘cultural suicide’ for the EU. These implications and presuppositions are followed by the use of

strategy of numbers game: ‘in their droves’, ‘migrant camps overflowing’, ‘biblical proportions’ and ‘Now we are facing an “even bigger crisis”’. The “numbers” coming this year to Europe will “no doubt dwarf those of last year”’. Furthermore, to go on justifying his discourses through the strategy of negative Other-presentation, Nuttall claims that the Islamic fundamentalists would bring ‘carnage’ to ‘our’ continent by means of the people who are not only coming ‘in their droves’ but also claimed to be responsible for the divergence between the Member States and the collapse of the Schengen Agreement. The use of the strategy of apparent sympathy starting with the phrase ‘people would die in the seas’ turns into a sort of top-down transfer at the last part of the excerpt with the phrase ‘more misery, not only for the migrants but for many of its own citizens’. Though Nuttall criticizes the EU because of ‘more concessions, more EU, more money’, this may be accepted as a kind of positive Self-presentation. Finally, to contribute to such discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe in terms of cultural threat by his political group, Batten (EFDD, 11 March 2015) argues that ‘Christendom needs to recognise the threat to its culture and way of life and tackle it head on in our own lands.’ and goes much further with his proposal for tackling the ‘problem’ as follows:

The countries best placed to tackle the **problem** and with the money to do so are, of course, the **vastly wealthy, oil-rich Islamic states** such as Saudi Arabia, etc. These are the countries that should take **these people** because they can afford it. **They share similar cultures and the same religion** (Gerard Batten, EFDD, 25 November 2014).

Though the anti-immigration discourses of the EPP and ECR members are more moderate or covert in the 7th parliamentary term compared to the 8th parliamentary term in general, the ones delivered by the members of the EFDD do not change much despite the name change of the political group from the EFD to EFDD. The excerpt below also belongs to Batten just like the previous one taken from the 8th parliamentary term, and there is not any slight difference between them in terms of the tune of the discourses with respect to their anti-immigration characteristics though the former was delivered about five years later.

Mr President, the measures under discussion are part of the **existing so-called area of justice, freedom and security, of which immigration is a part**. This is about a **common immigration and asylum policy** and,

however much the British Government may lie to the British people, we know that they intend that Britain should eventually be bound by it.

But a **'one-size-fits-all' immigration policy** will not work for Britain. Britain is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, more densely populated, surprisingly, than India, China or Japan. Net immigration to Britain is now running at **about 230,000 people per annum**, adding **over a million new people to the population every five years**. **The population will rise from its current 61.4 million, an all-time high, to about 70 million plus in 2031**, and then spiral ever upwards. **All this growth is due to immigration and births to immigrants.**

The UK Independence Party is not opposed to some immigration, but this should be strictly controlled and for the benefit of Britain and not the European Union or anybody else. Britain does not need a common European immigration policy. **What we need to do is end mass immigration now and introduce a strictly limited and controlled immigration policy.** We should apply the terms of the **1951 Convention on Refugees**, which requires them to seek sanctuary **in the first designated safe country they come to – which is not a little island off the coast of Europe called Britain.**

We should end the promotion of multiculturalism, which is divisive and a recipe for conflict, and assimilate and integrate existing migrants into a common culture with respect for a common set of political and legal institutions. There should be no place in Britain – and, I suggest, anywhere in Europe – **for Sharia law** (Gerard Batten, EFD, 15 September 2009).

In this excerpt, Batten mostly defends the interests of his own country, the UK or Britain, rather than the EU, or immigrants at all, by saying 'for the benefit of Britain and not the European Union or anybody else'. He resorts to the strategy of apparent denial through using the well-known conjunction 'but' that follows the discourse of 'The UK Independence Party is not opposed to some immigration'. To justify his anti-immigration discourses in the public discourse and public mind, he makes use of the numbers game strategy and refers to 'about 230,000 people per annum', 'over a million new people to the population every five years' and 'mass immigration'. Furthermore, along with another numbers game strategy, Batten presupposes that 'the population will rise from its current 61.4 million, an all-time high, to about 70 million plus in 2031' because of the 'immigration and births to immigrants' in order to present immigration as a threat. So, what kind of a threat is it? Considering the discourses of Batten in the last paragraph, it may be argued to be a cultural threat as he regards 'multiculturalism' resulting from the 'mass immigration' as 'divisive and a recipe for conflict'. His

solution for this ‘multiculturalism’ is simply ominous: to ‘assimilate and integrate existing migrants into a common culture’. And, Batten tries to justify these anti-immigration discourses on the pretext of the ‘Sharia law’ that is presumed to gain a place in Britain or Europe, and hence, to present immigration in a negative manner. Finally, he refers to the ‘1951 Convention on Refugees’ not for ‘their’ own good or for the ‘first designated safe country “they” come to’ but ‘for the benefit of Britain’, and endeavours to legitimate his anti-immigration discourse by describing his country as a ‘little island off the coast of Europe’.

Madam President, **the Mediterranean is going up in flames. Obviously, immigration will increase. As civilised people, we need to treat all these people like human beings. However,** we must not overlook the fact that **most immigrants come from Muslim countries.**

According to **the official report, Muslim populations are set to rise by 35%, from 1.6 billion to 2.2 billion, over the next twenty years. Europe today has just 2.7% of the Muslim population. With these influxes and this birth rate, this is expected to rise to 6% in twenty years.** So, as you can see, an **economic and social reversal** in the functioning of Europe, **in European culture, is on its way.**

We therefore need to look at the **issue** as Europe and not leave the Member States to address it on their own (Nikolaos Salavrakos, EFD, 15 February 2011).

In the excerpt above, Nikolaos Salavrakos uses the metaphor of ‘flames’ to imply the so-called threat of immigration, and presupposes that “‘obviously”, immigration will increase.’ Through the strategy of positive Self-presentation, he refers to ‘we’ ‘as civilised people’, and resorts to the strategy of apparent sympathy for the ‘immigrants’, most of whom ‘come from Muslim countries’, as follows: ‘we need to treat all these people like human beings. “However” ...’. Salavrakos also tries to legitimate his anti-immigration discourses by attributing to the ‘official report’, which is followed by that well-known strategy of numbers game along with some presumptions regarding the ‘Muslim populations’: ‘35%, from 1.6 billion to 2.2 billion, over the next twenty years’ and ‘2.7%’ now but ‘this is expected to rise to 6% in twenty years’ due to ‘these influxes’, which is a sort of denomination. Therefore, according to Salavrakos, this ‘issue’ is not only an economic threat but also a cultural threat to Europe, which should be dealt by the EU as a whole instead of the Member States individually. In brief, the excerpt includes many anti-immigration discourses for the negative Other-presentation

as well as the use of the strategy of positive Self-presentation with the aim of controlling the public discourse, and hence, the public mind in terms of constructing an anti-immigration Europe.

5.1.4. Europe of Nations and Freedom

The elites within the dominant group play a prominent role in the processes of reproduction of racism, xenophobia or intolerance, and their power is defined both by their preferential access to social resources such as housing, welfare, education, knowledge and status, and by preferential access to, as well as control over, various forms of public discourse, which results in production of public opinion and the dominant consensus on ethnic affairs (van Dijk, 1997b: 32–33). As these elite groups have the power and dominance, which is defined as ‘power abuse’ to distinguish such power from legitimate and acceptable forms of power (van Dijk, 1993b: 255), they can define what racism, xenophobia, homophobia or intolerance are or not, as seen in the excerpt below.

Like everyone else I can only be indignant towards provocations, words or acts **racist, xenophobic, homophobic or intolerant**. Unfortunately, in this respect, the Commission and the Council, like most of the governors of the Member States, are blinded by a well-meaning ideology.

For example, the **accusation of racism** is very popular on the left as in an uncertain right with regard to anyone who fights against **communitarianism, uncontrolled immigration, multiculturalism, the dilution of identity, the defense of French cultural heritage or European or the looting of social security**. Professional anti-racists have used it, in an often inappropriate use, only intended to discredit the other or knowingly forgetting to describe as racism what should be (**racism of anti-white, anti-Christian or anti-French, anti-Semitism assumed certain populations...**).

This anti-racism is now emptied of its substance by the **blessed of multiculturalism and social dumping**. They use it above all to serve as a moral guarantee in order to make forget the great politico-financial affairs and the **real problems and aspirations of the peoples** (Dominique Bilde, ENF, 1 December 2016).

Firstly, Dominique Bilde starts her speech by resorting to the strategy of apparent denial. Then, ‘uncontrolled’ immigration is delineated as a cultural threat, and categorized along with not only ‘multiculturalism’ as a negative connotation but also the ‘dilution of identity’ and the ‘looting of social security’. The strategy of reversal, i.e.

“we” are not discriminating, “they” are’, is used in the next lines of the excerpt. Bilde, by using the power of status as a member of the ECR in the EP, defines racism as the ‘anti-white, anti-Christian or anti-French, anti-Semitism’, but not as anti-immigration. Hence, Bilde implies that the EU should stop dealing with such anti-racism ‘emptied of its substance’, and focus on the real problems and aspirations of ‘our’ peoples, which is a kind of top-down transfer used to justify this anti-immigration discourse.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, as the **flow of migrants** to Europe will again **explode** with the arrival of spring and summer, when the European Court of Auditors denounces the ineffectiveness of the policies of the Union in matters of control of the external borders, while even the French Senate denounces the flaws in the functioning of the Schengen Area and the failure of the so-called hotspots policy, the parliamentary report²² that you are proposing tonight, supported of course by the right-wing deputies dare to demand that the Member States **extend asylum to all economic and climate migrants, which is pure madness.**

This enlargement will **amplify the call of migratory air and incite hundreds and hundreds of illegal immigrants** to cross the Mediterranean to come to **us**. Worse, you ask the national parliaments to abolish the legal frameworks that you deem repressive, which means that a **migrant** who crosses the border without having been authorized to do so would no longer be considered a **clandestine person**.

In what language do you have to say that **we do not want this immigration anymore? The European people do not want any more immigration. European peoples** want to control their borders and, above all, **preserve their identity** (Steeve Briois, ENF, 4 April 2017).

The strategy of top-down transfer is used much more by the members of the ENF compared to the other right-wing political groups in the EP. Annemans (ENF, 11 May 2016) refers to the people of Europe when he claims that ‘[the European asylum policy] is frightening and it is no longer supported by the people of Europe’ because it has turned into a policy which has been ‘poisoned’ and ‘contaminated’ by the ‘ideology of a multicultural delusion that nullifies the foundation of Europe – unity in diversity’. To start from the end of the excerpt above, just like Annemans’ discourse, Briois also aims at justifying his anti-immigration discourses by referring to the European people who want to ‘preserve their identity’, therefore, ‘do not want any more immigration’. The common point of these two discourses is that immigration is described as a cultural

²² See (EP, 2017).

threat to Europe. Also, though it is clear that one cannot expect all people fleeing from war, conflict or persecution to carry appropriate documents to travel with them, these people are expected to use the usual way like an ordinary visitor or tourist and to show 'their' documents while entering the European territories. In this case or other similar cases, otherwise, they are commonly denominated as 'illegal, clandestine, economic' or even 'climate' migrants for the negative Other-presentation, as seen in this excerpt. By using the strategy of predication, the 'flow' of migrants to Europe is depicted just like a 'bomb', as not only a persuasive but also a manipulative metaphor, which is to 'again explode'. The recent terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, in Brussels on 22 March 2016 and in Nice on 14 July 2016, embedded in the European people's subconscious, are reminded through such metaphors. By generalizing these attacks to all asylum seekers, refugees or migrants instead of acknowledging that these are actually the acts of some extreme groups, it becomes easier to justify such anti-immigration Europe discourses and to manage or control the public mind in the interests of these political groups and in line with their own ideologies. Lastly, Briois uses the strategy of numbers game along with some implications and presuppositions to strengthen his discourses in terms of negative Other-presentation, and claims that 'they' are not only 'illegal' but also in 'hundreds and hundreds', which is too much, and enough to 'destroy' 'our' culture and identity.

Mr President, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Greek islands, from Lampedusa to the shores of Calabria, Europe is undergoing **a surge of migration** and, for several years, for reasons of low economic importance, the European oligarchy has knowingly organized **this invasion**.

But why do you insist that you do not recognize that the **thousands of illegal immigrants** who **die** each year trying to cross are **victims** of your own policies? One hundred years ago, the fatal Bolshevik revolution plunged Russia into a totalitarian, violent and liberticidal regime. Several countries have followed this terrible path. The one chosen by the European Union is as harmful as that taken by the former Soviet Union. The peoples of the East who have suffered the Communist yoke are not mistaken.

Let's finish with these immigration policies undermining the cohesion of our peoples and seriously endangering our civilization. Finally, have the courage to take dissuasive measures, put an end to the collusion between traffickers and **pseudo-humanitarian NGOs** and to

send back the illegal boats. In short, **have the courage to have courage** (Marie-Christine Arnautu, ENF, 25 October 2017).

In this excerpt above, Marie-Christine Arnautu mentions about the ‘surge of migration’ as an ‘invasion’. As seen many times before in many excerpts, calling immigration as an ‘invasion’ is one of the common denominations as a part of the overall strategy of negative Other-presentation used by the right-wing political group members in the EP. Another common strategy used to discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe is, undoubtedly, the numbers game: the ‘thousands of illegal immigrants’ and, at least partly, a ‘surge of migration’. While Arnautu denominates the immigrants by calling them ‘illegal’, she also apparently sympathises with those, i.e. the ‘victims’, who ‘die’ each year trying to arrive in Europe. As seen in other discourses by the Eurosceptic members of the EP, Arnautu also criticises the EU policies on immigration, however, this criticism is not for ‘their’ own good but for ‘our’ own good: ‘Let's finish with these immigration policies undermining the cohesion of “our” peoples and seriously endangering “our” civilization.’ In other words, by trying to justify her anti-immigration discourses in the context of portraying immigration as a cultural threat, she implies that ‘our’ peoples and ‘our’ civilization are more valuable than the lives of those ‘victims’, which is another example of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation. As well as smuggling, or the ‘illegal boats’ in this excerpt, the term ‘pseudo-humanitarian NGOs’ or similar ones regarding the NGOs working on immigration are also often referred for the sake of a similar justification. Finally, the rhetorical discourses of the members of the right-wing political groups during the EP debates may be more influential than expected in terms of influencing public discourse and public mind as follows: ‘In short, have the courage to have courage’.

Mr President, this report²³ on the **migration crisis** has the merit of encouraging the fight against the **smuggling of migrants** but, for the rest, it is giving in to the usual fads of the European Union in trying to save the Schengen Area. Worse, it proposes measures that will **seriously undermine the identity of European peoples**.

It wants to organize two legal channels of **mass immigration**: one for asylum seekers, for whom the report wants to put in place – I quote – safe routes to enter the Union, the other for the **economic migrants**, which the report wants to **welcome by the millions to replace the**

²³ See (EP, 2016).

European workers who will miss due to the **demographic crisis**, rather than encourage a policy of birth.

Instead of fighting **migratory submersion**, the Union is organizing it. This is further evidence that it is a **technocratic oligarchy** that **makes fun of European peoples, their identities and their aspirations** (Gilles Lebreton, ENF, 12 April 2016).

As often seen before, Gilles Lebreton also uses the term ‘migration crisis’ for the current migration issue to present it as a threat, or mostly a cultural threat in the excerpt above. A bit different from the previous one, the ‘smuggling of migrants’ is referred in the framework of the ‘fight’ in this excerpt, however, it is not clear enough whether this fight is really against the smugglers or it is just a way of justification for preventing the asylum seekers, or the ‘migrants’, from arriving in the EU. Whatever it is, according to Lebreton, the measures proposed in this respect ‘will seriously undermine the identity of European peoples’. Moreover, there are two obvious denominations used for the asylum seekers and migration, respectively: ‘economic migrants’ and ‘migratory submersion’. Lebreton also resorts to the strategy of numbers game to present the Other in a negative manner: ‘welcome by the millions’ as well as implicit ‘mass immigration’ and ‘migratory submersion’ again. In the excerpt, Lebreton claims that these ‘millions’ of ‘economic migrants’ are not only a cultural threat against the EU in general but also an economic threat against the ‘European workers’ in particular. Along with the strategy of top-down transfer, Lebreton finally attempts to contribute to the discursive construction of an anti-immigration Europe by attributing to the ‘technocratic oligarchy’ of the EU that ‘makes fun of European peoples, their identities and their aspirations’.

Madam President, in the European Newspeak, we refuse to call a cat a cat. The Union modestly demands relocations. In fact, it decided on a settlement policy: **50 million migrants by 2060**, according to Commissioner Avramopoulos' confession, on 8 June 2015.

The goal is twofold: on the one hand, to bring **low-cost labour** to enable companies to increase their profits and, on the other hand, to **break down national identities** for transform citizens into docile consumers.

The spearhead of this crazy policy is the Juncker Plan of September 2015, which requires EU states to relocate **160,000 migrants** arriving in Greece and Italy.

This is obviously only a beginning and the States have understood it well; **that is why many resist, like Hungary and Poland**. I encourage them to continue their **resistance**, because every nation has the right to

defend its identity against migratory submersion (Gilles Lebreton, ENF, 16 May 2017).

Though this speech is delivered one year after the previous one, Lebreton goes on repeating similar anti-immigration discourses through similar strategies to present immigration as a cultural threat in the public discourse and public mind. The denomination of ‘migratory submersion’ is seen in this excerpt as well, and according to Lebreton, it is a threat against which ‘every nation has the right to defend its identity’. Furthermore, he refers to Hungary and Poland as models of ‘resistance’ to justify his anti-immigration discourses. Lebreton presupposes that, by alluding to the relocation of ‘160,000 migrants’, ‘this is obviously only a beginning’, which is delivered to reinforce the threat perception of immigration in the minds. He also maintains his negative Other-presentation in terms of the so-called cultural threat by presupposing that immigration will ‘break down national identities’. While doing this, Lebreton resorts to the strategy of numbers game: ‘50 million migrants by 2060’. This statement also includes a sort of the strategy of presupposition that is based on the ‘confession’ of Commissioner Avramopoulos. Besides, his reference to ‘160,000 migrants’ as a part of the numbers game strategy should be discussed in the framework of a Union with a population of more than 500 million. Lastly, Lebreton’s apparent sympathy-like criticism of and emphasis on ‘low-cost labour’ for the companies may also be dealt within the context of immigration that is for ‘our’ own good rather than ‘their’ own good.

Mr President, I wish I could thank the rapporteurs for the report but, yet again, they have not confronted **the elephant in the room: Islam. The most comprehensive study of British Muslims** – and I would say Muslims in Europe, actually – ever conducted, by **Trevor Phillips, the former chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, draws some very disturbing conclusions**, particularly for the Socialists in this House and the members of the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality.

39% of British Muslims say that a woman must always obey her husband and submit to chastisement from him. **More than half of Muslims** think lesbian and gay relationships should be illegal. **More than 100,000 British Muslims** said that they had sympathy for people who take part in suicide bombings. **Only one out of three** would report to the police if they knew someone was supporting terrorism in Syria. **A quarter** would like Sharia law to take precedence over English law. **We are currently not talking about a tiny minority.** Unfortunately, **these are widespread views among the Muslim communities in the UK.** I

think the **so-called refugees** on our borders need to be repatriated to Muslim countries, **as their values are clearly incompatible with our liberal western democracies**. This will avoid the **current clash of cultures** that denigrates the **achievements of Western civilisation** and flouts the protection of **women, the gay community and vulnerable children, who are being attacked by Muslim gangs and migrants who deplore our way of life** (Janice Atkinson, ENF, 12 April 2016).

Max Weber (1964 [1920]: 325) argued that ‘every system of authority attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy’, and one of the categories of legitimation in the literature is ‘authorization, that is, legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested’ (van Leeuwen, 2007: 92). Reyes (2011: 786) calls such legitimation as ‘voices of expertise’ that is used to ‘show the audience that experts in a specific field are backing the politician's proposal with their knowledgeable statements’ while Rojo and van Dijk (1997: 524) claim that different players or speakers involve in the game of the ‘political field’, both in parliament and society at large. To this end, in the excerpt above, Janice Atkinson resorts to the ‘authorization’ or ‘voices of expertise’ to legitimate her anti-immigration discourses and refers to ‘the most comprehensive study of British Muslims’ or ‘Muslims in Europe, actually’ conducted by Trevor Philips, who is aforementioned authority of person ‘in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested’ (van Leeuwen, 2007: 92). Through the relevant study, Atkinson strives to present Islam and Muslims as a cultural threat in the public discourse and public mind by using various strategies. First of all, the most obvious one is the use of the strategy of numbers game: ‘39% of British Muslims’, ‘more than half of Muslims’, ‘more than 100,000 British Muslims’, ‘only one out of three’, ‘a quarter’ or the statements of ‘[w]e are currently “not” talking about a “tiny minority”’ and ‘these are “widespread” views among the Muslim communities in the UK’. In addition, the denomination of the ‘so-called refugees’ is followed by the strategy of predication: ‘women, the gay community and vulnerable children, who are being attacked by Muslim gangs and migrants who deplore our way of life.’ Furthermore, Atkinson glorifies her country and the EU by referring to the ‘achievements of “Western” civilisation’ and ““our” liberal western democracies’ as a part of the overall strategy of the positive Self-presentation whereas she portrays the refugees negatively through

suggesting that ““their” values are clearly incompatible with “our” liberal western democracies’. Last but not least, Atkinson does not always use the ‘authorization’ or ‘voices of expertise’ to legitimate her anti-immigration discourses regarding the integration duration of the migrants and refugees and she is against not only the ‘fundamental Islam’ but also ‘Islam’ itself, which is undoubtedly ‘incompatible’ with the EU’s motto ‘United in Diversity’, as given in the following excerpt:

We were at the same breakfast this morning celebrating International Women’s Day, but I did not hear from you when I raised the question that actually the Islamic values of these women coming in – **I am not talking about fundamental Islam, I am talking about Islam across the Middle East – is incompatible with our Western values and your feminism – and my feminism, which I think really differs.** Should we not be protecting our own women and children against the rapes and assaults that we have seen across European cities before we start trying to integrate more? Because they do not integrate. **They have not integrated for 40 or 50 years** (Janice Atkinson, ENF, 8 March 2016).

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined how the right-wing political groups in the EP discursively construct an anti-immigration Europe. With references to the premises of CDA within the framework of power and dominance of the political elites to control the public discourse and public mind in line with their own ideology, values and norms, the thesis is an attempt to understand and expose how the members of the right-wing political groups in the EP securitise migration. The research for the thesis has shown that the securitisation of migration in this context mostly occurs in three main discourse topics: immigration as a security threat, as an economic threat and as a cultural threat. This securitisation results in power abuse and inequality in the society. In this framework, the thesis deals with the single directly elected body of the EU, i.e. the EP, which has increased its power as one of the decision-making actors of the EU since its establishment, and the thesis study examines four right-wing political groups representing the half of the EP as its unit of analysis.

The study shows that the anti-immigration discourses by the right-wing political groups in question have considerably increased in quantity and become more severe in quality in the 8th parliamentary term compared to the 7th parliamentary term. Considering the current conjuncture in Europe as well as in other parts of the world, these discourses are expected to get worse both in relevant quantity and quality. More importantly, as more extreme right-wing political groups such as the ENF and EFDD increase the tune of their anti-immigration discourses, more moderate right-wing political groups such as the EPP and ECR try to catch up with them in such discourses instead of opposing them in this context. Though it is not within the scope of this thesis, it should also be noted that some left-wing political groups are also seen to join this competition of anti-immigration discourses as they witness the so-called success of these right-wing political groups in the elections. Such an election success may be indicative of the fact that these right-wing political groups achieve to control the public discourse and mind by means of such anti-immigration discourses not only in the EP debates but also during their propaganda at the EU and national level for the elections as a reflection of these debates in the EP. Though discursive construction of an anti-

immigration Europe is a sort of continuous interaction between these political groups and the European citizens, the political groups mostly retain the power as elites. However, in democratic entities such as the EU, the increase in quantity and quality of these anti-immigration discourses in the EP debates may only be explained by the assent of the public opinion on the issue.

The thesis also demonstrates that the members of the relevant right-wing political groups mostly resort to the overall strategy of the negative Other-presentation rather than the positive Self-presentation for the securitisation of migration. On the other hand, the use of the negative Other-presentation is extremely common in the portrayal of immigration as a security threat whereas the use of the positive Self-presentation is seen much more in the portrayal of immigration as a cultural threat compared to the other two discourse topics. In the portrayal of immigration as an economic threat, the members mostly avoid glorifying the EU and their countries as an economic power, probably so as not to urge more people to arrive in the EU. In general, the strategies of numbers game, denomination and presuppositions are often resorted to securitise migration while the members slightly use the strategies of fairness, reversal and storytelling in this respect. Moreover, the strategies of denomination, predication and apparent denial are more commonly used in the discourse topic of immigration as a security threat whereas the numbers game, justification and apparent sympathy are often used in the discourse topic of immigration as an economic threat. In the portrayal of immigration as a cultural threat, there is no example of the strategies of fairness and storytelling while the strategy of reversal is mostly used in this discourse topic rather than in the discourse topics of immigration as a security threat and as an economic threat. Lastly, some may claim that such strategies could also be used in a manipulative way for resistance or counter-power against any forms of discursive dominance. Though this is quite possible, the research for the thesis study has shown that such a resistance or counter-power has not become a trend unlike anti-immigration discourses, and it is just limited to some small groups and media which are far from having adequate political, economic and social power resources to control the public discourse, and thus, public mind.

It may be assumed that the anti-immigration discourse of ‘immigration is a security threat’ is perceived as the most critical and strongest one by the citizens as it

directly concerns their survival. Due to some prejudices within the European society that stem from long-established Orientalist attitudes, it is easier for the members of the right-wing political groups to persuade the public opinion in line with their own ideology and interests in this respect. As exemplified in the thesis, they try to discredit and marginalise the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants by using the 'refugee = terrorist' equation or using the term 'kalashnikovs' following the term 'asylum seeker'. Some members frequently use the same denominations and predications in almost all speeches they deliver during the relevant debates in order to establish such a negative language regarding immigration in the public discourse. The frequency of negative discourses used by the members such as 'flood', 'invaders', 'mass immigration', 'uncontrolled influx', 'asylum tsunami', 'wave of violence', 'Islamic terrorism', 'thousands of terrorists', 'potential terrorist' or 'terrorist threat' aims to construct an anti-immigration Europe in the context of security. For the reproduction of such anti-immigration discourses, these members also resort to some hyperbolic presuppositions such as 'how many more tomorrow?', 'in the next fifteen years, two billion people will come to this Europe' or 'arrival of 30,000 refugees on the shores of Italy or Greece to undermine the pillars of the EU'. Furthermore, in the portrayal of immigration as a security threat, the 'borders', 'Frontex' and 'Schengen System' are often referred in the context of ensuring the security of the EU citizens, and some members do not avoid threatening the EU with leaving it as seen in the example of 'Svexit' discourse if the EU does not 'listen to the will of the people' on immigration. As a last note on this discourse topic, the security concerns of these political group members regarding terrorism is partly comprehensible and they may also partly be right in that there are some terrorists disguised as asylum seekers or migrants trying to arrive in Europe; however, assuming almost all these people to be 'terrorists' or 'potential terrorists' cannot be justified by such concerns.

In the thesis, the anti-immigration discourse of 'immigration is an economic threat' is another example of discursive abuse of power by the right-wing political groups in the EP. The thesis shows that the denomination of the asylum seekers and refugees as 'economic migrants' or 'fake refugees' is the most common way to reproduce and legitimate anti-immigration discourses in the society in the discourse topic of immigration as an economic threat. To marginalise and problematise

immigration, the members of these political groups often resort to the numbers game as follows: ‘hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants’, ‘more than half are economic migrants’, ‘indefinitely and in large numbers’, ‘mass influx’, ‘waves of illegal migrants’, ‘large numbers of economic migrants’ or ‘thousands of fortune-seekers’. They also use the numbers game as a part of justification of their anti-immigration discourses in this context: ‘the 120 million Europeans who experience daily misery’, ‘thousands of homeless people’, ‘no work even for our citizens’ or ‘France today has more than 5 million unemployed and nearly 9 million people living below the poverty line’. People substantially care about the economic situation in their daily life after ensuring their survival. The political elites are also aware of this fact, and they strive to manipulate the facts regarding immigration through the numbers game and other specific strategies so as to control the public discourse, and thus, the public mind. However, this is not more than a kind of short-sightedness based on their ideologies, norms and values. If it is managed in a proper way, there is no doubt that immigration will be a source of development in every sphere of life for the EU, which consistently complains about its aging population. There is no doubt in this respect because there are many examples of it in history such as the Europe of the 1960s that invited and welcomed migrants. Thus, what makes it a ‘refugee crisis’ or ‘refugee awareness’ (or ‘guestworker’) is mostly related to having the skills or willingness to use these skills to manage it, in other words, a good migration governance. Such a good migration governance will eventually result in the deconstruction of anti-immigration attitudes in the society via discourses of the political elites again.

The thesis also demonstrates that the anti-immigration discourse of ‘immigration is a cultural threat’ takes place only slightly in the speeches of the right-wing political group members compared to the discourse topics of immigration as a security threat and as an economic threat. However, though these discourses are less in quantity, they are as severe as the other two discourse topics in quality. As it concerns the cultural elements of the society, such anti-immigration discourses may be put forward to appeal to both the public mind and public heart. In the portrayal of immigration as a cultural threat, these political group members try to influence and control the public discourse through various strategies, particularly the numbers game, top-down transfer and presuppositions, in order to legitimate their stances on immigration. As seen in the

previous two discourse topics, they deliver some negative discourses on immigration such as ‘millions of people in migration’, ‘extraordinary challenge of migration’ or ‘invasion of illegal immigrants’. The difference of these discourses from the previous ones is that these are delivered and justified in the cultural context; that is, to ‘protect “our” identity and “our” common values’ or ‘protect “our” European Christianity, “our” faith and “our” values’. For some, immigration is not more than a ‘cultural suicide’ that may ‘seriously undermine the identity of European peoples’ or ‘undermine the cohesion of “our” peoples and seriously endanger “our” civilization’. As an example of reversal, some also claim that the most fundamental phenomena are ‘anti-Christianism and anti-Semitism’, not anti-immigration. However, despite such anti-immigration discourses in the cultural context, it should be noted that the glorified European identity, common values, civilization and even Christianity are all the products of such an immigration phenomenon which occurred throughout the European history, although these people were sometimes called ‘political asylum seekers’ or ‘guestworkers’ or were sometimes regarded as a source of ‘invasion’ (van Dijk, 1988). Undoubtedly, immigration is a natural phenomenon and cannot be stopped at all; however, it is possible to change the perception regarding immigration and to accept it as an opportunity, not a threat.

This thesis also reveals that there is not a clear opposition to these anti-immigration discourses within the right-wing political groups. This silence may be interpreted as the fact that the trend in anti-immigration discourses in the EP is much stronger than it has been demonstrated in this thesis. Otherwise, it may be explained by the fact that a membership of political group is one of the social identities, which are defined as ‘shared mental constructs of groups and their members, exhibited in coordinated practices, and reproduced by text and talk’, and thus, ‘control people’s individual experiences, discourses and other actions as represented in their subjective mental models, which in turn control these “expressions” or “enactments” of their social identities’ (van Dijk, 2010: 52). In other words, the silence of these political group members may not be because they support these anti-immigration discourses but because they just take a position in accordance with their social identities, though they actually may not agree with the discourses of their political groups, at least in part or in details.

Last but not least, the recurrent call of the right-wing political group members

for solidarity on immigration should not be a sort of solidarity of the EU Member States against the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants; on the contrary, such a solidarity should be built in favour of these people as well as the EU. The EU still does not have a common migration and asylum policy despite an ongoing process for the CEAS. Even if this process results in success, it is not hard to claim that such a CEAS will eventually have anti-immigration characteristics in such an atmosphere full of negative sentiments against immigration since it will somehow be an output of the co-decisions taken by the EP along with the Council. In this respect, it is vital to understand and expose these discourses so as to resist a likely social inequality in the form of a CEAS that may result from power abuse via political discourse. A constant production and reproduction of anti-immigration language in public opinion through these discourses makes it harder and harder for a critical discourse analyst to resist such social inequality. Therefore, this thesis should be accepted as a starting contribution to a wide scaled research expected to be carried out in this field.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Dates and Titles of the Debates in the European Parliament

15 September 2009	Immigration, the role of Frontex and cooperation among Member States
10 February 2010	Body scanners – Operation of intelligence services in the context of counter-terrorism strategies
13 December 2010	Creation of an immigration liaison officers' network
15 February 2011	Immediate EU measures in support of Italy and other Member States affected by exceptional migratory flows
4 April 2011	EU response to the migration flows in North Africa and the Southern Mediterranean, in particular, in Lampedusa – Migration flows arising from instability: scope and role of EU foreign policy
10 May 2011	Migration flows and asylum and their impact on Schengen
11 May 2011	Main aspects of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy – Situation in Syria and in Camp Ashraf - Report: Albertini – Annual report from the Council to Parliament on the main aspects of CFSP in 2009 - Report: Gualtieri – Development of CSDP following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty - Report: Muñiz De Urquiza – The EU as a global actor: its role in multilateral organisations
12 March 2013	Integration of migrants, its effects on the labour market and the external dimension of social security coordination
9 October 2013	Migratory flows in the Mediterranean, with particular attention to the tragic events off Lampedusa
25 November 2014	Situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration
11 March 2015	Relations between the EU and the League of Arab States and cooperation in countering terrorism

29 April 2015	Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting (23 April 2015) – The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies
20 May 2015	European Agenda on Migration
8 July 2015	Recent terrorist attacks
8 September 2015	Provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece
16 September 2015	Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on migration (14 September 2015)
6 October 2015	Conclusions of the informal European Council of 23 September 2015
24 November 2015	Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations
15 December 2015	Decision adopted on the European border and coast guard package
16 December 2015	Detention and use of force against asylum-seekers
2 February 2016	Refugee emergency, external borders control and future of Schengen – Respect for the international principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> – Financing refugee facility for Turkey – Increased racist hatred and violence against refugees and migrants across Europe
8 March 2016	The situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU
12 April 2016	The situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration
11 May 2016	Decision adopted on the Common European Asylum System reform
13 September 2016	UN High-level Summit on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants
4 October 2016	Situation in Calais
5 October 2016	Preparation of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 October 2016

26 October 2016	Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 October 2016
1 December 2016	Combatting racism, xenophobia, homophobia and other forms of intolerance
18 January 2017	Emergency Aid for refugees and migrants facing severe weather conditions in European camps
4 April 2017	Addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU External Action
5 April 2017	Hate speech, populism, and fake news on social media – towards an EU response
16 May 2017	Making relocation happen
4 July 2017	Preparation of the Commission Work Programme for 2018
12 September 2017	Recent developments in migration
25 October 2017	The fight against illegal immigration and people smuggling in the Mediterranean
15 November 2017	Winter plan for asylum seekers

Appendix 2: Operationalisation of Anti-immigration Discourses

Immigration as a Security Threat		
Political Groups	Anti-immigration Discourses in Red Category	Anti-immigration Discourses in Grey Category
EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – terrorist – terrorism – serious attack – these continuous uncontrolled influxes – potential terrorist – escalation of migration crisis – uncontrolled access of refugees – further terrorist attacks – waves of violence – to undermine the pillars of the EU – emergency situations – crime – insecurity – to turn to crime – issue of crime and the security of the half a billion citizens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – mass landing of immigrants – thousands of refugees – arrival of 30,000 refugees – illegal immigration – illegal immigrants

ECR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - threat - threat to the rule of law for the security of the Member States of the European Union - crime - crisis - time of raised threats of terrorism - immigration crisis - attack on state sovereignty and the rule of law - be infiltrated by the Caliphate of the Islamic State - not only economic migrants, but also terrorists - uncontrolled wave of refugees - great problem - one of the greatest problems - one of the main challenges - one of the main problems - the greatest problem with illegal immigration - terrorism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - illegal immigration - illegal crossing of borders - to invite everyone - illegal immigrant - current migration flow - large numbers of migrants - how many more tomorrow - over nine million people - not genuine refugees - legalization of illegal immigration - illegal immigration industry - industry of illegal immigration - wave of refugees - fight immigration - problem - fight against illegal immigration - issues and problems which Europe faces in the area of migration - challenge - burden - problem
EFDD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - weapons, terrorists crossing the Mediterranean - to work black, commit crimes and perform terror - terrorist attack - to radicalize - terrorist threat - fundamentalist Islam - we are at war - countless millions - real and genuine threat - to flood our continent with half a million Islamic extremists - direct threat to our civilization - impending disaster - concerns about the sudden influx of migrants - fight against terrorism - problem of terrorism - terrorism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - illegal migrants - paperless - underground - shadow community - to live illegally - all the world's opportunists - ideology of an ever-increasing Islamic population - to end any more mass immigration from Islamic countries - to import millions more people from Islamic countries - large numbers of people - perceived challenge - inability or lack of will of ethnic groups to integrate within the fabric of society in Europe - burkha
ENF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - unprecedented crisis - Islamic terrorism - being against terrorism - illegal invaders from Islamic countries - feast for terrorists - to throw out all the invaders from the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mass migration - fighting mass immigration - to stop foreign funding for mosques - to be flooded with asylum seekers - outright nightmare - millions of fortune-hunters

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – asylum seekers who endanger our society, our security, our culture and our freedom – free movement of terrorists, asylum seekers and kalashnikovs – downfall of Europe – to protect our freedom, our safety and our future – asylum tsunami – thousands of terrorists – unlimited admission and inviting of asylum seekers – new crisis – more terrorists – more Islamization – suspects, criminals, terrorists and also asylum seekers – nail to the coffin of Europe – Islamic terrorism – to destroy our civilization – they turned out to be IS terrorists – the biggest and wildest immigration – mass migration with the greatest impact in the history for this continent – link between terrorism and illegal immigration – to infiltrate ISIS in Europe – legitimization of extremist Islam – very serious attack – Trojan horse – fundamentalist Islam – attacks – powerful jihadist organization – alarm clock, Europe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – hundreds of thousands – more fortune seekers – hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers – more happiness seekers – whoever wants enters to Europe – in the next fifteen years, two billion people will come to Europe – influx of strangers – time flows dramatically quickly and plays against us – so-called refugees – moral sauce: refugees, saving lives at sea and the like – immigration unsolicited – illegal immigrants
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Immigration as an Economic Threat		
Political Groups	Anti-immigration Discourses in Red Category	Anti-immigration Discourses in Gray Category
EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – migration crisis – under threat – crisis – the time is still diminishing – to protect the external borders of the Union – humanitarian crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – economic migrants – irregular migrants – thousands of people – a billion euros may not be enough [to assist refugees in places of conflict or in neighbouring countries] – Europe cannot afford to accept all those willing to live on our

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> continent – to separate refugees from economic migrants and send the latter back – approximately one million people who will come to Europe this year – more than half are economic migrants – influx of immigrants – an increasing number of arrivals are non-war refugees – economic migrants – flow of migrants – Europe needs to get rid of the image of a mild economic guarantor of the migrants – the migrants who are determined to cross the EU border illegally – to provide refugees with the necessary assistance in countries bordering the EU is more than five times cheaper than inside the EU – illegal migration – illegal economic immigrants – truly refugees – real refugees – thousands of illegal migrants – problem of the 50 million refugees on the move – 50 million refugees – for weeks now, thousands of migrants – mass influx of migrants – joint challenge – mass influx of third-country nationals – waves of illegal migrants entering many Member States – every day hundreds of illegal migrants – those asylum seekers include many economic migrants who ‘slip’ into these mixed migratory flows – pan-European issue – thousands – we cannot simply accept all refugees coming to Europe
ECR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – indefinitely and in large numbers – to become catastrophic as the numbers grow 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – illegal crossing – influx

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – we must stop the flow – economic crisis – these long-lasting phenomena lead societies to dead ends, conflicts, fragmentation, disintegration and marginalization – to deepen poverty, causing warfare and massive population movements – today, this is a figure, relatively small, tomorrow we will have to take care of so much, the next months maybe a little more, and so in the endless – social disaster – this migration flow will lead to collapse of the social and security system in several member states – we cannot afford this kind of immigration in these kinds of numbers – to secure the southern borders – Britain and other countries will not be forced to accept large numbers of economic migrants that it cannot cope with or cannot support in these economically challenging times 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Europe cannot afford this kind of immigration, socially or economically – nobody wants to pay for nothing – increase in youth unemployment – migratory flows – waves of illegal immigrants – asylum seekers whose number has increased dramatically in the last few years – more and more people are poor due to lack of work, cannot expect to provide quality care to African immigrants – problem must be resolved more resolutely at its source, in Africa – the vast majority of the asylum seekers coming to my country and many others are not Syrian children, but young men from countries like Iraq, Somalia, Western Africa and even Albania – they flee from poverty and unemployment – to discuss the burdens that nations face but we must better distinguish economic migrants from asylum seekers – economic migrants – challenge of legalizing illegal immigration – we support language integration and the costs must be borne by both the country to which the migrant is coming and the immigrant himself
EFDD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – free right of asylum and open borders for the whole world do not work – migration crisis – crisis – I am aware of objections to asylum and other international law, but this must be done – we remain vulnerable to terrorism – they should be turned away at the borders as a measure to send a message back to their homeland that such a journey will not be rewarded – this question is an existential one for the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – we say no from the beginning – economic migrants – say no before they cross – overly generous immigration policy – huge population increase outside Europe – particularly economic migrants are flowing right now – some days there are thousands – illegal immigration – phenomenon of economic migration – many African nations are poor,

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – to look to the self-interest of your project, your peoples and your nations – path of self-destruction – destructive economic migration from those poor benighted countries – to sow discord amongst your constituent nations – we certainly cannot provide the social security they need – in these difficult times, we cannot provide properly for those who have been paying their taxes in the UK throughout their working lives; we cannot go on taking in people – flood of unmanageable proportions – to mix up the peoples of Europe so that its countries disappear – our young people and our unemployed are overtaken by others – uncontrolled EU immigration into our country – wages being driven down and people – indigenous people – being put out of work 	<p>some politically unstable, many with lower health-care standards, and little chance of social benefits</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – increasing detrimental health issues – greater pressure on our own health services – illegal immigrants are something very different to refugees – genuine refugees – the people demand an end to open borders – they demand an end to the use of migration to keep big business happy and workers insecure – we cannot regularise illegal immigrants – how we can guarantee easier access to the labour market for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, when there is no work even for our citizens – our young people, our women and our men be guaranteed first – stop this happening – illegal immigration – hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants
ENF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – all this cost the Italians € 14 billion: a meaningless madness, a scandalous injustice – invasion of illegal immigrants – stop legal immigration – immediate closure of borders – all the others are illegal immigrants and must be expelled immediately, without ifs and buts – to fatten the meshes of crime – slave trade – particularly scandalous – increase in rapes and fights – enough is enough – no more asylum seekers – our borders must be closed – stop this asylum tsunami – at the expense of the law, the rights of our peoples – gangs of mafias and criminal groups – criminals – the unemployment rate explodes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 700,000 presumed refugees – more than half a million, or 80%, are illegal immigrants who do not run away from any war – false refugees take advantage of the European asylum system – to offer these immigrants food, shelter and free services for years – forced repatriation of all illegal immigrants – a small piece of a much larger problem – 180,000 people – 5% that effectively escapes from the war – real problem – illegal workers – just this week in my city people were arrested who had submitted the request for political refugee but who were going to steal, which passed off drugs

	<p>quarter after quarter</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – deindustrialization and social breakdown at home – to host tens of thousands of migrants and, let's not doubt, hundreds of thousands and ultimately how many millions? – substantive issues raised by this sudden influx of migrants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 120 million Europeans who experience daily misery – homeless or poor pensioners, their common point is not to be clandestine migrants – as if our homeless people did not suffer, too, these same climatic hazards – thousands of homeless people – think first of ours before thinking of others – thousands of fortune-seekers – 600,000 asylum seekers – to enter Europe illegally – the only contribution that all these so-called Syrian scientists have so far provided is an increase in rapes and fights – enormous influx – mass immigration – illegal economic immigration – the peoples of the sending countries, which are losing their economic strength – illegal immigration – the illegal – France today has more than 5 million unemployed and nearly 9 million people living below the poverty line – more than 200,000 immigrants enter the country every year – the growth of my country is at a standstill – unfair competition in our national job market – France cannot welcome these illegals
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Immigration as a Cultural Threat		
Political Groups	Anti-immigration Discourses in Red Category	Anti-immigration Discourses in Gray Category
EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – unexpected migratory crisis – it was apparent from the outset that a common European security and defense policy would be needed against millions of people in migration – extraordinary challenge of migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – asylum question – illegal migration – real refugees – our main concern is to protect Europe's citizens and their nations, our security, our democratic

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – to protect Europe at all costs from the invasion of illegal immigrants – not to neglect the security issue and the fact that a large number of refugees are made up of military-capable men – refugee crisis – migration crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> system, our identity and our common values – to protect our European Christianity, our faith and our values – migrant crisis – strictly to control migrants' inflows – solidarity and humanity must not be masked for the cultural change of Europe – European Union must not be converted into a refugee camp – refugee problem – several hundred thousand refugees – the interests of the European Union – the cultural aspect of migration and refugee problems – the issue of integration is not a matter of statistics or technology, but is a very cultural issue – to care for European values, our cultural identity and citizens' security – Europe is unable to accept all those who require help – social burden – the values, our acquis have to be protected – this challenge today is the surge of migration and refugees – to separate the refugee issue from illegal immigration
ECR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – hate messages such as those of Islamists towards Christians – the language of hatred – it must be said clearly: in reality it mainly affects Christians and Jews – it is [Christians and Jews] who are victims of discrimination, including discrimination on the web – anti-Christianism and anti-Semitism are the most fundamental phenomena – the idea that Europe can welcome millions of immigrants without causing a political and social catastrophe in Europe is a dangerous dream, and the issue of refugees is still another matter – our civilization based on Christian 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – culturally or religiously motivated acts – restriction of freedom of expression – good education referring to what is basic in our civilization – external borders must be effectively protected – flow of immigrants – states have the right to decide on the inflow of immigrants into their territory, and free European societies, and no one else, can decide on their ethnic and religious composition – mass migration wave can change

	<p>culture is attacked and is not attacked by abstract force, but by radical Islam</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – civilizations fall when they stop believing in their own values – in Central Europe, where the model of social life is based on Christian culture, there is no basis for the existence of terrorism – the current wave of migration is a milestone for the continent that is built on Christian foundations – uncontrolled immigration – major threat – there is discrimination, including structural discrimination, against Christians in various Islamic countries – there are attacks on the ancient Coptic community, there are innumerable cases of daily harassment, forced marriages, and it is pretty much impossible to build a church – a stop must be put to the systematic discrimination against [Copts] – radicalisation of Islam, which is directing its aggression against the followers of Christ 	<p>the shape of Europe</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – [mass migration wave] is an opportunity and a threat at the same time – many people migrate here for other reasons – we cannot accept all unreservedly – but it is not our best – in the strength of every country – to offer asylum to all people – to have the right to choose which refugees to accept – immigration from North Africa quite naturally exacerbates cultural and social tensions, and intensifies pressure on the social budgets of the Member States – matter – to limit the freedom of movement of citizens of the European Union’s Member States – the Christian community in Iraq has already been more than halved – tragic situation of Christians in Arab countries
EFDD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – to invite millions of migrants who come from intolerant cultures – how can you expect our citizens to be tolerant of intolerance? – unfettered immigration that has transformed communities – the migration crisis last year was probably the single biggest catastrophe to hit the European Union in its history – it has put the very existence of this project in jeopardy – equivalent of cultural suicide – the Schengen Agreement would collapse – a golden opportunity for the Islamic fundamentalists to bring carnage to our continent – now we are facing an even bigger crisis – biblical proportions – we should end the promotion of multiculturalism, which is divisive and a recipe for conflict, and assimilate and integrate existing migrants into a common culture with respect for a 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – controlled immigration – to care about the safety of women and children – when did it become racist to love its country and culture? – in some cases we distance ourselves from our own culture to correct the immigrants coming – I see more and more how we deprive our own culture to adapt to the others – those you call ‘populists’ are patriots – to invite everyone who had a Syrian passport to come to the continent – migrant camps overflowing – the numbers coming this year to Europe will no doubt dwarf those of last year – more concessions, more EU, more money, more misery, not only for the migrants but for many of its own citizens

	<p>common set of political and legal institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – the Mediterranean is going up in flames 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – we have to put a stop to this madness – problem – [asylum seekers and vastly wealthy, oil-rich Islamic states] share similar cultures and the same religion – the population will rise from its current 61.4 million, an all-time high, to about 70 million plus in 2031, and then spiral ever upwards – all this growth is due to immigration and births to immigrants – what we need to do is end mass immigration now and introduce a strictly limited and controlled immigration policy – there should be no place in Britain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – and, I suggest, anywhere in Europe – for Sharia law – obviously, immigration will increase – however, we must not overlook the fact that most immigrants come from Muslim countries – Muslim populations are set to rise by 35%, from 1.6 billion to 2.2 billion, over the next twenty years – influxes – an economic and social reversal in the functioning of Europe, in European culture, is on its way – issue
ENF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – the European peoples want to control their borders and, above all, preserve their identity – invasion – let's finish with these immigration policies undermining the cohesion of our peoples and seriously endangering our civilization – migration crisis – measures that will seriously undermine the identity of European peoples – to break down national identities for transform citizens into docile consumers – every nation has the right to defend its identity against migratory submersion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – to fight against communitarianism, uncontrolled immigration, multiculturalism, the dilution of identity, the defense of French cultural heritage or European or the looting of social security – racism of anti-white, anti-Christian or anti-French, anti-Semitism assumed certain populations – this anti-racism is now emptied of its substance by the blessed of multiculturalism and social dumping – the flow of migrants to Europe will again explode with the arrival of spring and summer

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – yet again, they have not confronted the elephant in the room: Islam – this will avoid the current clash of cultures that denigrates the achievements of Western civilisation and flouts the protection of women, the gay community and vulnerable children, who are being attacked by Muslim gangs and migrants who deplore our way of life – I am not talking about fundamental Islam, I am talking about Islam across the Middle East – is incompatible with our Western values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – to extend asylum to all economic and climate migrants, which is pure madness – hundreds and hundreds of illegal immigrants – clandestine person – we do not want this immigration anymore – the European people do not want any more immigration – surge of migration – pseudo-humanitarian NGOs – to put an end to the collusion between traffickers and pseudo-humanitarian NGOs – send back the illegal boats – have the courage to have courage [to take dissuasive measures] – mass immigration – the other for the economic migrants, which the report wants to welcome by the millions to replace the European workers who will miss due to the demographic crisis, rather than encourage a policy of birth – migratory submersion – to make fun of European peoples, their identities and their aspirations – 50 million migrants by 2060 – 160,000 migrants – so-called refugees – so-called refugees on our borders need to be repatriated to Muslim countries, as their values are clearly incompatible with our liberal western democracies – they have not integrated for 40 or 50 years
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