

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ

AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİMDALI

THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRATEGY ON A CHANGING WORLD'S CONJUNCTURE: CASE STUDIES ON
PARIS, BRUSSELS AND NICE ATTACKS

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

Atakan KIZILER

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TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a global threat in today's conjuncture and its consequences affect every nation heavily. The European Union as a global actor has tried to get to the root of the problem. Its counter-terrorism strategy is based upon the principle of Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. "The EU has also a significant strategic commitment: The union should combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security, and justice." (Council of the European Union,2005) Paris Attacks, Brussels Bombings, and Nice truck attack are quite recent examples of terrorism in Europe. The European Union's counter-terrorism strategy not only remained incapable of "preventing" terrorist attacks but also "protecting" their citizens from these bloody attacks. In this thesis, first of all, I tried to define terrorism which was a quite problematic issue because of its dynamic and changing nature. Moreover, I tried to examine the European union's counter-terrorism strategy that helps us to figure out how effective the European Union to combat terrorism. The Migration and Asylum Policies, Schengen Area and the Border Policies are significant factors which make The European Union states vulnerable to terrorism. This idea was supported by the case studies with the help of a literature review and analyzing data method. The Counter-terrorism Coordinator has a critical role in combatting terrorism. sharing intelligence data, strict coordination, border security, strong anti-terrorism laws, and above all a powerful European integration are essential to combat terrorism.

Key Words: Brussels Bombings, Border Policies, Counter-terrorism strategy, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Migration Policies, Nice Attacks, Paris Attack, Schengen Area, Terrorism

ÖZET

Terörizm, günümüz konjonktüründe küresel bir tehdittir ve sonuçları her milleti ağır bir şekilde etkilemektedir. Küresel bir aktör olan Avrupa Birliği, sorunun kökenine ulaşmaya çalıştı. Avrupa Birliği'nin terörle mücadele stratejisi, önleme, koruma, takip etme ve karışıklık verme ilkesine dayanmaktadır. "Avrupa Birliği'nin önemli bir stratejik taahhüdü vardır: Birlik, insan haklarına saygı duyarken küresel olarak terörle mücadele etmeli, Avrupa'yı daha güvenli bir hale getirmeli, vatandaşlarının özgürlük, güvenlik ve adalet alanlarında yaşamasına izin vermelidir." (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlar Konseyi,2005) Paris Saldırıları, Brüksel Bombalamaları ve Nice kamyon saldırısı, Avrupa'da son zamanlarda yaşanan kanlı terörizm örneklerindedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin terörle mücadele stratejisi, yalnızca terörist saldırıları "önleme" değil, vatandaşlarını bu kanlı saldırılara karşı "koruma" yeteneğinden yoksun kalmıştır. Bu tezde, öncelikle dinamik ve değişen doğası gereği oldukça sorunlu olan terörizmi tanımlamaya çalıştım. Ayrıca, Avrupa Birliği'nin terörle mücadelede ne kadar etkili olduğunu bulmamıza yardımcı olan Avrupa Birliği'nin terörle mücadele stratejisini inceledim. Göç ve Sığınma Politikaları, Schengen Bölgesi Antlaşması ve Sınır Politikaları, Avrupa Birliği ülkelerini teröre karşı savunmasız kılan önemli faktörlerdendir. Bu fikir, literatür taraması ve veri yöntemi analizi metotları sayesinde vaka çalışmaları ile desteklenmiştir. Ayrıca bölgesel sorunlara küresel çözümler önerir. Terörle Mücadele Koordinatörü, terörle mücadelede kritik bir role sahiptir. İstihbarat verilerinin paylaşılması, sıkı koordinasyon, sınır güvenliği, güçlü terörle mücadele yasaları ve hepsinden öte, güçlü bir Avrupa entegrasyonu terörle mücadele için şarttır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Brüksel Bombalamaları, Göç Politikaları, Liberal Hükümetlerarasılık, Nice Saldırıları, Paris Saldırıları, Schengen Bölgesi, Sınır Politikaları, Terörizm, Terörle Mücadele Stratejisi

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Atakan Kızıler

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATSCSA	The anti-terrorism crime and security act
ATU	Anti-terrorist Unit
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHEKA	The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission
COTER	Commission for Territorial Cohesion Policy and EU Budget
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
CTTF	Counter Terrorism Task Force
EaP	The Eastern Partnership
EDU	Europol Drugs Unit
EEAS	European Union External Action
ENP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETA	Basque Homeland and Liberty
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUROJUST	The European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit
EUROPOL	The European Police Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation Foundation
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
ME	Middle East
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
QMV	Qualified majority voting
TCNs	Third Country Nationals
TWGs	Technical Working Groups
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTC	United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee
UNCTED	United Nations Counterterrorism Executive Directorate
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a global threat in today's conjuncture, and it has drastic consequences every international actor. The European Union has also fought against terrorism since the 1970s, which was triggered by the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Since then, the European Union as a global actor remains insufficient of solving this problem. The European Union's counter-terrorism strategy is based upon the principle of Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. "The EU has also significant strategic commitment: The Union should combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice." (Council of the European Union,2005).

This strategic commitment looks fancy and reassuring in the paper. However, in today's conjuncture, it is not easy to solve this global threat with the current strategy. The Paris, Brussels and Nice attacks are very recent examples that show how fragile the EU is with respect to terrorism. We need to answer following questions. Why do terrorist attacks frequently succeed in Europe? Could a strong counter-terrorism strategy prevent and combat these terrorist attacks? Otherwise we might mention that there are serious security vulnerabilities in member states like Belgium and France.

The European Union's counter-terrorism strategy fails in somehow. ISIS has become a serious threat. Besides, every year ethno-nationalist groups have involved in terrorist activities in the Europe. It seems that public awareness on these issues is low when compared to other critical issues, i.e. economic crisis.

To sum up, Terrorism has become a serious threat in Europe. The European Union's counter-terrorism strategy displays serious deficiency in general. Its effectiveness becomes a highly controversial topic.

The subject of the thesis is the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy. A detailed analysis of this strategy based on three current terrorist attacks helps to comprehend the effectiveness of this strategy against current international developments.

In this thesis, I try to find out how effective the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy on today's conjuncture is. Furthermore, with the help of some case studies, I will figure out which way the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy fails. The eventual aim is to search for a reasonable, a more realistic and strong strategy against terrorism for the EU.

People in Europe have faced terror attacks from the establishment of the EU. These terrorist activities generally pertain to religious issues, right wing, left wing or separatist movements. Nowadays, ISIS has become a serious threat not only for the European Union but also for all of humanity.

The European Union's counter-terrorism strategy is deficient in many aspects. This study is worth mentioning as long as it provides an analysis of the current situation in the EU's counter-terrorism strategy via three recent attacks.

In this thesis, I try to respond the following research questions; Considering the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Nice, whether the EU's counter terrorism strategy is sufficient to prevent terrorist attacks within the EU territory, or not. What are the factors that shape the EU's counter-terrorism decisions? Taking into account previous security incidents and terrorist attacks, more particularly the Paris, Brussels and Nice attacks, what are the factors that cause the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy to fail? How can the European Union set a reasonable, a more realistic and strong strategy against terrorism after ISIS attacks? Which domestic actors should be involved in countering crime and terrorism? Which model/approach is more effective to overcome terrorism: A criminal justice-based approach or cooperation model? What are the impacts of the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy on today's conjuncture? How should the European Union respond to these kind of terrorist attacks lately? After the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks, what are the factors that make us question the legitimacy of the EU border and asylum policies?

It is quite clear that unless the EU institutions and domestic actors adopt a reasonable, realistic and strong strategy against terrorism, the EU will remain incapable of preventing terrorist attacks in European cities. Taking into account terrorist attacks and the threat of ISIS, If the European Union institutions and domestic actors do not set a reasonable, a more realistic and strong strategy against terrorism, the European Union will remain incapable of solving this problem, and European cities will become more

vulnerable to possible terrorist attacks. The European Union institutions have to revise the internal borders controls procedure in the Schengen area. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the EU border and asylum policies would be highly questioned by many.

In this thesis, I apply a theoretical approach to the policies implemented by European countries by using a literature review and analyzing data method. Terrorism is a transnational crime “that has actual or potential effect across national borders and crimes that are intrastate but offend fundamental values of the international community.” (Boister, 2003)

In order to understand the evolution of terrorism in the European Union, we need to go into details of the issue that have raised effectiveness over the years. In this regard, Theoretical approaches will help us to understand the issue and set a strong strategy against terrorism. Intergovernmentalism is one of these approaches that will play a key role in explaining this issue. Intergovernmental cooperation of the EU countries leads us to the following conclusion.

Headwaters points that local governments can achieve a common goal by joining together and pooling scarce resources. Intergovernmental cooperation is a good tool to address natural resource protection due to the fact that natural features are often located across governmental boundaries. A formal cooperation agreement can be established with exact operational and financial details for providing a service or program. The contents of the agreement will vary, but typically include: purpose, duration, establishment of a board/commission, formula for computing each municipality's contribution for capital and operating expenses, and method for allocating revenues and costs. (Headwaters, 2007)

1. TERRORISM AS A GLOBAL THREAT

1.1. WHAT IS CALLED TERRORISM?

1.1.1. Definitions of Terrorism

It is quite challenging to reach an international consensus on defining terrorism. There is no universal agreement definition of terrorism. There are relatively new efforts to define the term of terror. Throughout the 20th century, people try to define terrorism by several criteria. However, these criteria were, in fact, a significant reason for debate and disagreement among various groups who dealt with political issues.

Alex P. Schmid describes the “the civilian element” in the definition of terrorism. (Schmid, 2010: 204). However, we see that some terrorist groups target military and the law enforcement. On the other hand, the motives of terrorist groups represent a controversial issue. It is pointed in the well-known sentence: "one person's terrorist is the others' freedom fighter" (Indian World Affairs Council, 1945). The violence group can be labeled as terrorism to gain freedom from a political entity because they target the state. Their actions are labeled as illegal, violent terrorism, even though these groups aim to achieve political goals like freedom

However, “we use it as a moral judgment against naturally wrong violence. We imagine that we use it analytically as an objective identifier. Our understanding of terrorism is based on emotional reaction and moral disgust.” (Law, 2009:2).I will examine in the following chapters where a set of criteria will be defined for the existence of new terrorism and discussions on the goals of the new terrorists.

In particular, the basic definitions of terrorism mean that creating an intimidating terror among the target population is a form of violence for political or other benefits. As above, the basic definitions of a terrorist are quite ambiguous and do not provide a clear concept. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary concluded that when terror is used for political agendas, terrorism is a threat to violence and violence or acts of violence. (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary)

Most dictionary definitions do not describe terrorist attacks. They are always concentrating on attacks on citizens; also, Bruce Hoffman claims that; Almost all of the acts of violence perceived to be community-related are terrorism “if It involves the activities of any anti-violent opponents or governments, organized crime syndicates

common criminals, rebel gangs, militant protesters, individual psychotic or pro-active protesters.”(Hoffman, 2006:2).

When we look at the period after World War II, People perceived the term "terrorism" negatively. However, until then, the Russian anarchists of the 19th century, they positively used the word of terrorism to determine their strategies and goals. David Rapoport claims that the rebels from Russia labeled themselves as terrorists. They did not use the term "guerillas," tracing the descendants of the French Revolution. “As Hoffman argues, the word terrorism had been used positive connotation when compared to today.” (Hoffman, 2002:3).

Bruce Hoffman contends that “the definition of terrorism has undergone various changes between the end of the 19th century and today. He argues that terrorism has gained different associations depending on the context and political environment in which it is experienced.” (Hoffman, 2002:6-19). Terrorism is a notion which has distinct perceptions, particularly in the light of the political and cultural environment of the era. The reason why there is no definition of terrorism agreed by all is that terrorism is continuously changing and dynamic.

When we see in the historical perspective, the various manifestations of terrorism, the existence of the situation and the political characteristics, had a common origin: “they were associated with the rise of democracy and nationalism.” (Laqueur, 2002:11).

“The forms and volumes of terrorist groups and attacks may be different, but it can be argued that terrorism is based on the old world.” (Lutz, Lutz, 2005:18). Terrorism has an old link with the humankind, which has been a tool since ancient times. (Lutz, Lutz, 2005:19). Additionally, Blin and Chailand claim that the use of terror has brought forward the modern democratic state. (Chailand, Blin, 2007:8).

However, Laqueur's argument, particularly after the late 19th century, helps find out terrorist activity and productivity growth. The defining discussions and various terrorist connotations coincide with the post-19th-century rise in terrorist activity. Terrorism can be said to be a universal idea that has acquired significance in

conjunction with human history developments. After the 19th century, concepts such as globalization and modernization can explain a sudden rise in terrorist activity.

Using rhetoric as a feature of terrorism now represents one of the main reasons for war and infinity in different places around the world. According to Anthony Richards; the failure to make a definition of agreed terrorism is defined as not belonging to the state or the state, to shape its perceived political and distant services and to be interventions of the country. "Fight against terrorism" is determined accordingly. (Richards, 2014:214).

“To support this argument, the United States' Global War on Combating Terrorism has been subject to many debates around the world. Additionally, there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism which makes it impossible to create international agreements against terrorism.” (Ganor, 2002:300).

There is a large number of description of terrorism in academic literature. However, because of the complicated nature of terrorism, these definitions differ among distinct academics. The world's terrorist groups have various objectives attain their aims. Consequently, Terrorists' methods of assault are often distinct from one another.

James M. Lutz and Brenda Lutz claim that “it is challenging to obtain internationally recognized definitions because some countries say that national liberation movements are not included in this category.” (Lutz, Lutz, 2005:6-7). Furthermore, Bruce Hoffman asserts that "different departments or agencies or even the same government will themselves often have very different definitions.” (Hoffman, 2002:30).

The only way to achieve a clear description of terrorism is to see a healthier way to fight terrorism and to serve governments and the international system. Some Academics also try to describe terrorism by adopting a post-structuralist approach. An important problematic point in defining terrorism is the normative character of the debate.

Erlenbusch criticizes if we use objectionable terms while defining terrorism, It stop us from generating a neutral and clear definition suggested by everyday expression. Besides, “Adrian Guelke also criticizes the characterization of Alex P. Schmid's use of the term violence and opposes the normative side of the definition of terrorism. Guelke debates that Violence is a crucial term in acts of terrorism, as the identity of violent

practitioners is essential to explain whether it is a legitimate use of force or a terrorist attack.” He also points out that "characterization of action as violent also usually entails disapproval and implies that it is illegitimate." (Guelke, 2009:20).

Both the concepts of Guelke and Erlenbusch are crucial in understanding why specific segments of community describe terrorism disparately from other people and why terrorists are seen as freedom fighters. Hoffman argues that the normative strategy to terrorism impacts “the defining struggle in terms of creating and identifying enemies and labeling as opposition or liberation movements as terrorists. In some nations where all sorts of dissidents, including journalists, are deemed terrorists and assessed under terrorist laws, this trend has increased. Another conflict faced when describing terrorism is that it has consistently been confused or equated with insurgency and guerilla warfare.” (Hoffman, 2002:35)

There are some similar tactics used by rebels, guerrillas, and terrorists which create complexity about which one is a terrorist group which one is a rebel or guerrillas. Hoffman argues that the guerrillas are more abundant in number and that the rebels have the same characteristics, but rather as a military unit beyond the hit-and-run tactics. (Hoffman, 2002:35).

Hoffman dissociates terrorists from rebels and guerrilla groups. He points out that the terrorists are not working as armed units in the open field; they usually do not try to take over or hold the region. They deliberately refrain from bringing the enemy military forces into war. “The concentrate is constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking mass political mobilization efforts. Moreover, they do not implement direct control or governance on a local or national population.” (Hoffman, 2002:35).

When we examine Ariel Merari’s works, he states that terror groups do not intend to set up physical control over a specific region. However, guerrilla groups plan it. Hoffman, Chaliand, and Blin also argue that terrorists do not fight for a particular area. However, there are also terrorist groups who are defending the idea, claiming to conduct some regions in the world for example in Libya, Iraq, and Syria.

1.1.2. The Evolution of Terrorism

If looked at, it can be understood that since ancient times, people have used violence in the cause of political reasons. Terrorist movements have altered throughout history and have developed concerning forms, techniques, and motivations, but weak groups exist in every civilization in the world, and these small groups have developed their survival techniques. “Jewish zealots in Palestine have formed the so-called Sicarii groups to attack the citizens of the Roman Empire in Palestine. A group of Nizari Ismaili sects in Iran has spread assassination campaigns for governor, governor, and caliph.” (Laquer, 1999:8-9).

There are other examples of this form of terror, which are based upon the power gap between the empire and the weak and influential groups in the states. The use of terror by more powerful groups is a known phenomenon down the ages. This is not surprising. Different empires and states have used state terror to implement individual policies and suppress public opinion throughout history. Laqueur points out that many people have been slaughtered throughout history due to terrorism from below because of the crimes committed by governments. (Laquer, 1999:6).

Some countries such as the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Communist China are critical examples of the fact that Laqueur's “terrorism from above” has resulted in more casualties terrorism from below. While, there is a critical factor here: State terrorism is a disputable concept because it does not have a general, legal, or academic definition. For this reason, to examine state terrorism, the state should recognize its sovereignty, which applies to the law and its constituents. Therefore, not every action of a nation, can be defined as state terrorism. (Laquer, 1999:7).

Marxism and Socialism began to emerge in the 19th century. This was quite significant, and this century became cornerstone in human history. (Hoffmann, 1992:4). Groups of people affected by nationalism or Marxism because they were perceived as an educational form of violence. (Hoffman, 1992:5-6).

There were significant developments after the end of World War I. First one is that a communist revolution radically converted Russia. This regime was going to continue until 1991. Second, Adolf Hitler's the National Socialist German Labor Party came to power and eventually turned into a large military force that would subdue Europe for many years. It also caused the start of World War II.

These developments in both Russia and Germany are significant for understanding the characteristics of state terrorism. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, the leaders of both regimes, used similar opponents to terrorize their communities to destroy their political opponents and mobilize opposition movements. The regimes in Germany and Russia used their state power to achieve terror tactics and goals.

The Russian Revolution is a critical instance of state terrorism. We see that the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR) use state terrorism before and after the Russian Revolution. "Vladimir I. Lenin promoted the use of terrorism in a certain way. Although it was the only method against the SR and Bolsheviks in the election of terrorism, they believed in the use of terrorism to strengthen the power." (Chaliand and Blin, 2007:197-198). Lenin was different from the other revolutionaries. He believed that terrorism should be in a clear goal and time. In the opposite case, it would not be reasonable to resort to it.

Cheka¹ is a police organization established after Lenin and the Bolsheviks came to power² (Law, 2009:161). Cheka resembled Gestapo. It was significant example of the use of state terrorism. Cheka arrested many opposite people and sent them to the jail. Bolsheviks and Lenin believed that Cheka is an critical organization which protects their political power.

Joseph Stalin became the leader of the Soviet Union after Lenin's death. Stalin also frequently used state terrorism and killed millions. This guaranteed his sovereignty until the day he died in 1953. Stalin's crimes against his country were so harsh that the next Soviet Prime Minister, Nikita Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, condemned it. (Law, 2009:161).

As a result, we see that Stalin and Lenin frequently used state terrorism in the Soviet Union, although their purpose was quite dissimilar. While Lenin benefited from

¹ Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya – Emergency Committee

systematic terrorism to increase the power of the Communist Party in the USSR, Stalin used state terror to ensure his sovereignty.

State terrorism represents an example of the basis of the new debate on terror but fails to conceptualize that its identity or form will not affect the true nature of terrorism. “There, together, the perpetrators of terrorism may change, but in the same way the nature of terrorism aimed at targeting the threat of force or violence for a psychological domain beyond the immediate victims, causing a political cause.” (Rapoport, 2004:46).

Although it is understood that the state does not show similarity in the nature of terrorism, it can be taken as an example in Germany and the Soviet Union. II. The end of World War II marked an important period in history as it was exposed to the world. Critical political changes occurred, more radical than World War I. As a result, terrorism has undergone many significant changes in tactics. David C. Rapoport argues that the transformation of terrorism as a wave of terrorism down the ages. Rapoport states that religion-based terrorism is regarded as the fourth wave of terror. (Rapoport, 2004:46).

In this sense, it can make sense to contend that there is a progression in terrorism through the advancement of methods and strategies. Such development begins primarily from the political and innovative changes in human history. However, sometimes, the source of terrorism remained political, even if they were inspired by religion. The aims of the terrorist groups should be examined from different periods because terrorism is subject to fundamental and revolutionary change.

1.1.3. Types of Terrorism

According to Marradi, “classification, as an operation in science, refers to the objects or events of a given set are grouped into two or more subsets according to the perceived similarities of their states on one or (more frequently) several properties; subsets may be successively grouped into subsets of more extensive extension and higher hierarchical level.” (Marradi, 1990). Terrorism also has been classified in different ways by different authors and academics. In this thesis, Motivation-based classification is used: religious terrorism; state terrorism; nationalistic terrorism; new terrorism. “Although many of these different categorizations are designed as a combination of different types with specific features and that they all have some general characteristics.” (Marradi, 1990). Dwelling upon such a classification only helps to understand the concept of terrorism. Above all, to categorize a terrorist attack does not

justify the idea of terrorism. Actually, behind the categorization, it is essential to focus on the content and the method of terrorist attacks.

Religious Terrorism

Religious terrorism, though very prominent after 9/11, is an old concept extending even to the time of Julius Caesar (44 BC). The Zealots used random acts of terrorism to repel Roman occupation in Israel. Suicide assassins in Iraq were a common factor in trying to fight Christian Crusaders. Secular and non-religious groups often engage in restrained acts of terror. This is done to protect the decency of less fanatical members of such groups.

Furthermore, such groups would want to win the support of other actors in the international system, and by embarking on an indiscriminate campaign of terror, they might forfeit the sympathy of prospective supporters. However, terrorist groups with a religious agenda often act in exact opposite fashion to secular or non-religious groups. By and large, the fixated and obsessively ideological interpretation of sacred texts is the primary accelerant of religious terrorism. (Kurth, 2002).

In the twenty-first century, Islamic terrorism is the most well-known and is primarily based on a combination of factors, but with the extreme observance of the Quran being the most unifying.

To religious terrorists, the importance of preserving life is hugely undermined, and the more casualties one can cause against those of opposing beliefs, the better. To Muslim extremists, those who willingly submit themselves to acts of terror are often lauded in heroic terms, and they venture into their actions with the hope that, in the event of death, they will receive handsome rewards in the afterlife. People who do not subscribe to the religion of extremists are often considered marginally significant. The elimination of non-believers is seen as the moral obligation of believers.

Amritha Venkatraman (2007:229) states “the centrality of extremism in Islamic terrorism by saying that Extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times.” The notorious prominence of terrorist groups sponsored by sects of Islam has been counterproductive to Islamic advertisement and, without

much thought, "The term 'Islamic terrorism' has become a ubiquitous feature of Western political and academic counter-terrorism discourse in recent years" (Jackson, 2007:394). There is a growing tendency to treat Islam and Quran as explicitly violent elements. For example, Kurth (2002) argues that the Quran offers a justification for the violence that terrorists commit.

The term extremism is being used in this paper to emphasize the fact that terrorism need not be a preoccupation of large groups. Terrorist groups could involve a minimal number of perpetrators who may or may not be representative of the majority on whose behalf they claim to act. To this effect, Muslims who have become notoriously famous for acts of terror represent an extreme fraction of the Muslim population. With the rise of globalization, terrorism has morphed into an international phenomenon but has also provoked a similarly global effort to fight terror. The fact that a significant number of terrorists either commit suicide or are apprehended presents violent extremisms as virtually suicidal, and hence there has to be a power behind such actors so strong that it induces them to carry out acts that defy conventional rationality. (Corman, 2016).

A religious incentive proves potent for such actions, and those who submit are given the honor of being called martyrs. (Mazaya, 2010). At the heart of religious terrorism is the belief that God can only be understood in one way, and thus, those who do not fathom God in that way are no deserving of life. This attitude overlooks the fact that God could be interpreted in equivocal ways and that the concept of God itself is born out of people's experiences and ideas about the meaning of human existence and life in general. Indeed, in connection with faith, concepts of God help believers, but they could also leave room for the possibility that people could attain confidence while believing in a different idea of God from one's own. The opportunity itself that concepts of God are created through specific contexts dovetails with the constructionist theory that claims that social knowledge is born through interaction and inter-subjective experiences.

State Terrorism

The nature of the state, with its division of labor among many specialized state organizations, leads to the development of particular characters for each of the state organizations. Each state organization has a specific remit, decided by the state leaders, although often these organizations have overlapping competencies (something which will be discussed more fully later). “For these organizations to successfully coordinate the activities of individual personnel within each unit, there is the creation of standard operating procedures, which the staff is taught. Thus, each is expected to know and to follow these protocols in discharging their duties concerning responsibilities that the state organization is usually charged with.” (Allison, Zelikow, 1999:143).

Secondly, the character of state organizations and how they will act in specific scenarios is determined partially by more informal norms, generated through experience in which state personnel gain an understanding of what is expected of them and how they should handle specific circumstances. This is closely linked to the standard operating procedures but is more informal by learning through experience rather than formal teaching and commitment to written rules and regulations. Third, how organizations respond is mostly the product of organizational culture. Organizational cultures are informal and are produced by the state personnel who make up each state body. However, widespread corporate culture transforms state personnel into specific forms of action. While organizational culture is mainly informal, it can be encouraged by the elites in an institution and thus encouraged staff to undertake certain features. (McConaghy,2017).

The organization's staff can be encouraged to adapt to specific forces or superiors as a set of qualifications for specific institutions that can act tactically or make them more productive for a particular organization. Particular organizations are expected to move. There are some essential factors which can contribute to specific organizational cultures. One can easily imagine how if the personnel that composes a particular organization of state are drawn from a specific section of society, and thus overwhelmingly represent the traits of that group, that the organization will take in that particular culture. “Those entering the organization from outside that sector may not share the same attributes or qualities as their colleagues but may perhaps be influenced in the discharge of their duties by the prevailing attitude or organizational culture. Ore Koren addresses this point concerning military responses to civil disobedience, but it is just as valid for military responses to terrorism and indeed, the actions of other state organizations in the execution of their specific duties.” (Koren, 2015:1).

Additionally, this organizational culture usually is dependent on the experiences of the organization over time, with some organizations acquiring particular character traits as a result of their histories.

When attempting to understand the response of states to terrorism, it is crucial to realize that in giving responsibility to particular state organizations for a role in counter-terrorism, the state leaders are not able to work with a blank canvas, setting an entirely neutral entity into action, but must rely on the existing organs of the state, with their peculiarities, identities, and cultures to do the job. As such, the response to terrorism will be affected by which organization is tasked to respond in particular ways, the familiarity of the role the organization is expected to play, and how well this sit with their standard operating procedures and regular competencies, as well the experience of the organizations in question in carrying out such duties.

Nationalist Terrorism

“Nationalist terrorism is not only a modern phenomenon; In the first century AD, ethnic terrorism was used by two Jewish groups in Jews who wanted to encourage the local people to rise against the Roman occupiers.” (Volkan, 1997:156).

“But only in the colonial and neo-colonial period (the 1960s and 1970s), terrorism was associated with nationalist groups. In this period, terrorism was based on the successful campaign of violence that was started and won by Begin in Israel (National Military Organization - Irgun), Makarios of Cyprus (National Organization of Turkish Warriors - EOKA), and Ben Bella in Algeria.” (Volkan, 1997:157). Despite the emergence of other factors that are more relevant to the undisputed successes of the sovereign country - FLN). The terrorist activism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) between 1968-1980 showed that nationalist movements could be useful in internationalizing their cases. For this reason, the number of national terrorist groups active in the international arena increased from three in 1968 to 30 in 1978.

According to Hoffman, although nationalist groups dominate the terrorist agenda in most of the last sixty years, they now seem to have been replaced by an equally old form of terrorism, which is far more dangerous, transnational, and ideological, as Al-qaede represents. These religious, messiah, and apocalyptic organizations do not refrain from causing mass casualties to reach their ultimate goals. (Hoffman, 1998).

“They do not want more political autonomy, independence, or sovereignty. But many want to eradicate Western secularism and values (including supporters) and replace it with a monotheistic faith.” (Esposito, 2002).

Esposito states that nationalist terrorist groups believe that terrorism is a very effective way to get rid of the dominant ethnic group and achieve a particular form of political autonomy they desire. However, to achieve repeated successes, they depend on the logistics assistance of governments, organizations, or individuals who support their causes, as well as the sympathy of their brothers. However, these terrorist groups often endeavor to win the authority in their ethnic groups and go much further to remove any internal disputes. (Esposito, 2002).

The statements made by the known terrorists were examined. They see violence as a defensive response to the self-esteem and the right of an individual (or group) to take revenge. (Volkan, 1997:162). “During the debates about the collapse and the future of the state, nationalism re-emerged in the last quarter of the 20th century in a neo-nationalist manner similar to regionalism or regional identity or niche nationalism. Stateless nations such as Scotland, Catalonia, and Quebec are included in this genre because of the fluency of their claims to support their cause.” (Volkan, 1997:162). Their or nationalist Ali governments encourage neoliberal or social-democratic or civil or cultural/ethnic nationalism, either on the left or right, under the circumstances.

Civic nationalism, which is less divided by ethnic nationalism, is often emphasized by these countries. McCrone claims that the nation-state continues to be the main political currency in the modern world. Although less than 10 percent of states are culturally and ethnically homogeneous, the idea that countries will have there is still dominant. Forming a separate state is the exception rather than the rule. (McCrone, 1998)

“The majority of the Welsh, Scots, Normans, Breton, and Basques in Europe did not offer broad support to nationalist parties, which viewed them as the ultimate goals of independence and sovereignty.”(Walzer, 1999:211).

One reason for this is that since the colonial and neo-colonial times, nationalist terrorist groups in Europe have only achieved a few tactical victories and have lost most of their original appeal and have only been marginally successful. Second, it is the institutionalization of human, economic, and political rights, norms, and principles that contribute to the reduction of discrimination and discrimination among ethnic groups. Finally, the third is that there are divisions that are not based on common descent in society (including class, religion, gender and generation divisions, as well as moral values, lifestyles, pleasures, and sensitivities). (Walzer, 1999:211).

1.2. TERRORISM AS AN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

1.2.1. Motivation of Terrorists

Lutz points that one of the essential reasons that lead to difficulties in the objective and precise definition of terrorism is the causal explanation. “The causes of terrorism are subjective and controversial, as their definition.”(Lutz,2004). The origins of terrorism must be well established in each case of terrorism to achieve an objective description. “Since a large number of academics, generally, agree with the political nature of terrorism. It is highly reasonable to claim that the causes of terrorism are political. The emergence of terrorism in various parts of the world is different from each other due to multiple factors. In particular, according to James and Breanda Lutz, some small groups in society have used terrorism as a way of survival.” (Lutz, 2004)

“The main factor that determines the form of struggle is the balance of power between the opposition groups and the authority.” (Crenshaw, 1981). Terrorism became more preferable as rebellion or guerrilla warfare required more organization and resources. According to Martha Crenshaw, “none of the victims of discrimination are against terrorism or terrorism does not always reflect objective social or economic deprivation.” (Crenshaw, 1981).

Ethnic discrimination, economic globalization, and poverty are the main factors leading to the emergence of terrorism. The relationship between poverty and radicalization can better explain the relationship between terrorism and poverty. If person experience an economical problem, he has a tendency to be involved in radical groups many countries. Although terrorism has not taken place in most of these countries, it can be said that poverty helps people to radicalize rapidly. After the end of the Cold War, the emergence of terrorism has begun to lose its political and economic importance.

The outsourcing provided by multinational corporations has dramatically increased the gap between the rich and the poor in less developed regions of the world. According to Hoffmann, “economic globalization contributed to political inequalities and inequalities between states that triggered terrorism in different parts of the world.” (Hoffman, 2006).

Ethnic complaints and their struggles can be seen as main reasons of terrorism. Discrimination by racial victim groups and ruling authorities of particular groups often leads to the formation of terrorist groups in different countries. The Cold War policies of global powers and the spread of struggles caused the rise of terrorism in the 20th century.

Finally, wars in the world and civil wars are considered as essential factors that cause and reproduce terror such as the Arab Spring. In this context, unsuccessful or powerless states can be included as a cause of terrorism, in most cases because they provide shelter and education for terrorists.

1.2.2. Financial Support for Terrorism

Freeman states that “the financing of terrorism has been studied at least academically since the 1970s. First and foremost, terrorist organizations need money because terrorism is costly.” (Freeman, 2011:461).

“Similarly, more complex and systematic organizations need funding to finance their activities. Roth and Sever say that terrorist groups need money first and foremost.” (Roth, Sever, 2010:61). “Like everyone else, terrorists need cash for different reasons. A recent study by Steve Kiser reveals the importance of money for terrorist organizations. In his research, he met 28 people, including various analysts, professors, and policy-makers.” (Roth, Sever, 2010:63). Many considered the money quite important. Eight of these people rated the cash significantly. Only three said that money was not crucial for a global terrorist organization. (Kiser, 2005:4).

A terrorist organization not only earns money from different sources but also learns how to manage this money. As James Adams points out, having proper financial planning means having enough money to get support, armaments, and create a propaganda base among the alleged people represented by the organization. (Adams, 1986: 293).

“Meanwhile, the financial structure of terrorist activities has been one of the areas of study to understand terrorism.” (Bligh, 2011:31). Bligh also argues that the dimensions of the analysis of the act of terrorism and one of the main aspects that are not yet understood and how they can resist are economic dimensions. (Bligh, 2011:31).

In such a study, Nikos Passas stated that the creation of terrorist resources is rarely innovative and mostly based on the same kind of resources. (Passas, 2007:24).

Aforementioned, “Grabar-Kitarović states that there are four general methods of financing for terrorism: state sponsorship, public support, illegal activities, and legal activities. First, state sponsorship can be defined as the state support of paramilitary groups or terrorist organizations.” (Grabar-Kitarović, 2001:45)

As mentioned above, terrorism is based on political aims, and terrorist organizations are engaged in violent acts to achieve their political goals. Terrorist activities are not free, although they depend on the limited financial resources compared to their losses. Funds are needed for organizational spending to develop and maintain terrorist operations and corporate support infrastructure and to support the ideology of a terrorist organization. (Karacasulu, 2006:1).

The operational costs of the terrorist activity include the purchase of weapons or components of the bomb-building, transportation and life and education of terrorists. According to the 9/11 Commission, the requirements of a catastrophic terrorist attack are as follows: (Grabar-Kitarović, 2001:45):

- Leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation;
- Communications sufficient to enable planning and leadership of the operatives and those who would be helping them;
- A personnel system that recruits candidates, vet them, influence them, and give them necessary training;
- An intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses;
- The ability to move people and;
- The ability to raise and move the necessary money.

In addition to operational costs, terrorist organizations also require funds for organizational needs. Costs of living of terrorists, payments to terrorist families, recruitment, education, accusation and travel expenses, bribery and funding the right, the political side of the terrorist organization brings an additional financial burden on the terrorist organization. (Ackleson, 2005:150).

To finance operational costs and organizational expenditure, terrorist organizations engage in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, robbery, and various smuggling, use legitimate enterprises, affluent sympathizers and humanitarian

organizations, and receive financial support from states. All these actions refer to the concept of financing terrorism.

In general, financing of terrorism can be defined as the acquisition of funds needed by terrorist groups for operational and organizational costs in any way. According to Breinholt, the funding of terrorism is an act of knowing something worthwhile to the people and groups engaged in terrorism. According to the IMF, terrorist financing involves collecting, collecting, or providing money, thinking that they can be used to support terrorist acts or their organizations.

Although the United Nations has not defined an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, it can be argued that there is a consensus on the concept of financing of terrorism. According to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention of International Terrorism Financing, terrorist funding means:

...directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, providing or collecting funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, to carry out:

-An act which constitutes an offense within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex,

- Any other law intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. (the UN, 1999 International Convention)

The above definitions focus on the fundraising activities of terrorist organizations; however, these funds, which are brought by legal or illegal means or provided by states or wealthy individuals, must be transferred to other employees or cells to carry out the attacks or to cover their costs. In this respect, the movement of terrorist funds has become a critical issue for law enforcement and intelligence agencies that collect information by monitoring terrorist organizations and terrorist funds. Therefore, in this study, the concept of financing terrorism will involve both fundraising and fundraising activities of terrorist organizations.

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COUNTER- TERRORISM STRATEGY: ITS IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES

2.1. THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The administrative structure of the EU has been connected with both the intergovernmental and supranational theories. However, the national legislations on terrorism of the EU members are quite different from the European Union's common decision mechanism in line with the intergovernmental approach. It is interesting that only seven of the members (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece) had national legislation concerning 'terrorism' before the 9/11 attacks. These of course are the countries which have experienced terrorist attacks previously. UK's legislation especially seems the most detailed and strict enough to deal with terrorism. The informal structures of the CFSP and JHA pillars have a great effect on this approach.

Muller states that Britain prepared legislation to prevent terrorism in 2000. The 2000 terrorist act was adopted by the European Parliament on 20 July 2000 and came into force on 19 February 2001. and to make provisional provisions on Northern Ireland, the prosecution and punishment of certain crimes, the protection of peace and the protection of the order. It was the redefinition of the 1989 Anti-Terrorism and Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act. (Muller,2003:22).

The Law comments on 'terror' as an act or acts which threaten government or society, attempt to cause harm to the whole of society or individuals for political, ideological or religious purposes. The act of terrorism is defined, but there are no definitions of the terrorist and terrorism, thus leaving a loophole in the legislation. "However, the new approach of the UK government to the concept of terrorism (the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill) has a more transparent structure, making it possible to declare the names of the organizations and persons." (Muller, 2003:22).

According to this legislation 'the act of terror' was extended to include acts which threaten the government or public, attempt to cause harm to individuals or their properties for political, religious or ideological benefit. The British legislation mainly defines the act of 'terror' rather than 'terrorist or terrorism' in this legislation. However, following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) introduced the names of persons and organizations. In parliament, 25 international organizations and 14 organizations in Northern Ireland were? proscribed under previous emergency legislation. As a result, 25 organizations have been declared enemies by the British government. However, this list was not taken into consideration by

the other members of the EU or the EU itself. The UK is one of the most sensitive countries on issues of counter terrorism and cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and has accepted all 12 UN antiterrorism conventions and protocols. (Muller, 2003:22).

France's position on the issue of terrorism is slightly different from that of the British. According to the French government; 'terrorism is a threat only to public order'. This understanding was amended with legislation in 1986, and further amended on 28 December 2001 with the declaration of terrorist organizations and terrorist persons. Most currently active terrorist organizations were included in the list. It is interesting that France is not as sensitive on the issue of terror as Britain: yet it was the first country to sign the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing and is party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols related to terrorism.

Another the EU member, Belgium, appears less sensitive again on this same issue, and has been accused of taking no notice of terrorist organizations which may have set up in the country. For example, Spain and the membership candidate country, Turkey, declared their dissatisfaction with Belgium's approach to terrorism, and the Belgian government denied the Spanish request for the extradition of terrorists to Spain: This, despite Belgium being party to the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Another incident involving Belgium is the tolerance shown to terrorist organizations in the case of a Turkish citizen, Fehriye Erdal. She has been on the Turkish government's Wanted Persons List since 1996 because of her alleged role in the murder of a prominent Turkish industrialist and his two associates in Istanbul. As with the Spanish request for the extradition of members of ETA, the Belgian authorities denied Turkey's request for Erdal's extradition. However, immediately following the events of 9/11, the Belgian government arrested several individuals suspected of the attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight 63 in December 2001. In terms of 'terrorist', Belgium does not have any certain policy on counter terrorism, and seems to act according to the victim country's status quo. (AA, 2019)

However, nationally, before 9/11, Belgium set up an Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) in the police to centralize local investigations of terrorist-related activities. ATU has no formal judicial structure and works closely with local police in the event of terrorism. In May 2002, the Belgian Government established the Federal Prosecutor's Office to centralize the point of co-operation with other countries in the fight against terrorism.

Parliament has prepared a law to increase its powers of investigation and to increase the Government's ability to combat terrorism. However, despite the desire to attempt to combat terrorism, Belgium has been party to only six of the twelve international conventions and protocols on terrorism.

A brief look at some other the EU members and their being party to these conventions and protocols makes it clear that there is not a common policy as regards counterterrorism. Of the other the EU members, Germany, Greece and Italy are party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. The Netherlands, Spain and Turkey are party to all 12. Therefore, it would seem that European states were closer to a post-nationalist rather than an intergovernmental or supranational approach on the issue of terrorist offences until the start of the 21st century.

There are two main reasons for the differences in approaches to the terror issue, the first of which is that each individual member's approach to terrorism has a different political value. For those countries which are not a party to these conventions, terrorism is not an issue of great political importance. For others, however, such as the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey, terrorism is high on the political agenda. The second reason is directly related to public opinion in the member states. European citizens are less sensitive to CFSP issues, in comparison to, for example, economic issues. Accordingly, it is national politics and national public opinions which dominate on the issues of terrorism and CFSP. This, of course, to a great degree, prevents the constitution of a supranational approach on these issues.

2.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

2.2.1. The European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy in a New World

The European Commission launched the 5-year Freedom, Justice and Security Action Plan on May 10, 2005, along with proposals for action by the EU on the fight against terrorism, migration management, visa policies, asylum, privacy and security, organized crime and criminal justice. This is a cornerstone of the 2010 Strategic Goals,

built on a major policy initiative and prosperity, solidarity and security. In order to strengthen freedom, security and justice in the next five years, the Council of Europe has given priority to the Hague Program. The Hague Program was adopted by the Council of Europe on 4-5 November 2004. The Council of Europe called on the Commission to implement the Program. According to the program, the Commission will focus on these ten priorities (the European Commission; The Hague Program):

- Strengthening fundamental rights and citizenship
- Anti-terrorist measures
- Defining a balanced approach to migration
- Developing integrated management of the Union's external borders
- Setting up a common asylum procedure
- Maximizing the positive impact of immigration
- Striking the right balance between privacy and security while sharing information
- Developing a strategic concept on tackling organized crime
- A genuine European area of justice
- Sharing responsibility and solidarity

The anti-terrorist measures should be integrated and coherent in order to be effective. According to the Hague Programme Document, the desire of combating terrorism required the prevention of terrorist recruitment and financing first. It was again underlined in the programme that, it is not possible to combat terrorism without eliminating the support of the third countries. To achieve this, the cooperation and a systematic plan should be developed.

With this aim, the Hague Program stressed that a comprehensive response to terrorism is the only way to combat effective anti-terrorism policies. There should be a consistent and integrated approach involving information exchange. The counter-terrorism measures adopted by the Commission to achieve these objectives include: the proposal to strengthen cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Member States, in particular to improve the exchange of information and, in addition, to prevent the misuse of the funding of aid agencies; terrorism; and monitoring the pilot project in place for victims of terrorism. In addition, a European framework for the protection of relevant data is very important in this case. In order to prevent and combat the financing of terrorism, a network should be developed to protect critical infrastructure. (European Commission; The Hague Programme).

Police information should be available between all Member States. Thus, any threat to the security of a Member State shall be declared immediately. In addition, the EU aims to make more use of EUROPOL and EUROJUST. In addition, the Hague

Program provided for the realization of civil and criminal justice cooperation. It was emphasized that the JHA ministers within the Council should have a leading role in the fight against terrorism.

2.2.2. Regarding Terrorist Offences

On 20 September 2005, the Council made a decision on the exchange of information and cooperation on terrorist offenses. In order to expand the scope of information exchange, the EU asked each Member State to develop a special department within the police services that could access information on criminal investigations. According to the decision, the EUROJUST national correspondent should also be appointed on the issues related to terrorism.

The Decision also provided that the possible connection between the organized crime and terrorism should be considered. Accordingly, the EU should be prepared with high performance military equipment against all types of organized crime and terrorism. Access to information concerning criminal investigations with respect to terrorism issues should be simple and effective. It is vital in the sense that the financing of terrorism should be prevented by a systematic information network in cooperation with the banking systems of the Member States. A list of Europe crime record should be formed. (Council, 2005, p. 22-24).

On February 12, 2007, the Council issued a decision to establish a specific programme “Prevention of and Fight Against Crime” for the period 2007-2013. “It aims to provide cooperation in crime prevention and criminology, law enforcement, protection and support for witnesses, protection of victims.” (Council, 2005, p. 22-24).

“The main objectives of this new program were to promote coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to promote best practices for the protection of victims and witnesses.” (Council, 2005, p. 22-24). A critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks should be developed to promote the necessary methods for strategic prevention and security of crime. According to the program, national and international projects will be funded by grants or public contracts. These projects will continue to develop innovative technologies to promote cooperation between judicial

authorities. The reason behind these projects is to strengthen and support the activities of EUROPOL.

Furthermore, this specific programme to prevent and combat crime is mainly based on coordination and cooperation. In fact, the recent attempts on combating terrorism emphasize coordination and cooperation. At first, police cooperation was mentioned, and then judicial cooperation was also considered important. To this aim, the roles of EUROPOL and EUROJUST were strengthened. However, the issue of coordination and cooperation is not adequate to solve the security problems in the Union. Terrorism continues to evolve all over the world. (Council, Council Decision 2007/125/JHA, 2007, p. 58)

2.2.3. European Security Strategy – 2008

“Three years after the ESS was adopted at the December 2003 European Council; in 2006 the European Parliament has called for a revision of the ESS in the year 2008.” (European Parliament, 2008). The December 2007 Presidency Conclusions focused on the implementation of the ESS as a result of the various internal and external developments that had taken place since 2003.

Hereupon, Javier Solana has been asked by the EU leaders to revisit the issue. However, this does not mean an update or rewriting of the strategy. As Missiroli states: “Rather, they invited the Secretary General/High Representative (for CFSP), in full association with the Commission and in close cooperation with the MSs, to examine the implementation of the ESS (Missiroli, 2008: 2). On December 2008 European Council adopted “The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” also entitled as “Providing Security in a Changing World”. This new document reaffirmed the tone of the ESS of 2003. This report does not replace the ESS but it reinforces it and also it gives an opportunity to examine how the EU fared in practice and what can be done to improve the implementation. (Council, 2008).

“The key threats and global challenges identified in 2003 have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all the more complex.” (Council, 2008).

In this context, the document points out global challenges as: proliferation of WMD, terrorism and organized crime, energy security and climate change. In case of terrorism, the ESS of 2003 stated that Europe represented both “a target and a base”. As Missiroli touches upon, after the Madrid and London bombings, it has become increasingly apparent that home-grown terrorism is a peculiarly European phenomenon which requires specific responses – including finding an acceptable balance between security and liberty, both personal and collective (Missiroli, 2003:3).

“Regarding terrorism, the 2008 document focused on the coordination of the arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear, and bioterrorism materials. Additionally, the blocking of terrorist financing is once again mentioned in accordance with the need of information-sharing by the protection of personal data.” (Council, 2008). It is underlined that, inter-cultural dialogue has an important role in tackling radicalization, discrimination and extremist ideology (Council, 2008). The effective and comprehensive coordination and cooperation on organized crime and counter-terrorism with the US and the UN is touched upon. “It adds to the ESS, the concept of cyber security which is mentioned in the EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, 2006. It is stated that more work is required in order to explore a comprehensive the EU approach by raising awareness and enhancing international cooperation.” (Missiroli, 2008: 4). The ESS was expected that it should be a prescription, not just a description (Helly, 2005: 5). “The document mainly argues that in order to respond to the changing security environment, the EU needs to be more effective – among Member States, within its neighborhood and around the world. In this sense, a more effective and capable Europe is desired, greater engagement with its neighborhood is aimed and partnerships for effective multilateralism is underlined. these can not be achieved by the EU institutions solely, Member States, national governments and parliaments have a crucial role to play.” (Schimid, 2009:5).

“The biggest systematic change compared to 2003, consisted of the shift of economic and political power from the West to emerging countries. As Grevi stated: A new international order is defined as multi-polar and the biggest challenge for the EU is to manage emerging multi-polarity through multilateral structures and initiatives.” (Grevi, 2009:26).

“In this context it was stressed that the EU needs to get better at shaping strategic partnerships with major global players. The list of threats and challenges is still relevant and the shift in the underlying geopolitical paradigm needs to be better reflected in the EU’s policies.” (Grevi, 2009: 26). All in all, it can be concluded that the Report on the Implementation of the ESS reflects a new scope on the part of the EU which has evolved through the lessons taken from the developments and changes in the global security environment. It remains to be seen how this report will affect the

relations between the EU and the US especially in terms of their approaches towards fighting terrorism.

2.2.4. The Principle of Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond

“The four categories are reinforced by a series of cross-cutting contributions that add value through strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation, developing collective capability, and promoting international partnership.” (Council of the EU, November 30, 2005: 5). However, it is more important to focus on the initial Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond categories, as these four categories of action would replace the “objectives” in the EU Action Plans hereafter. Additionally, the CTC’s responsibilities would be streamlined in further action plans as can be observed in the first action plan published after the adoption of the EU Strategy. It is from this streamlined version of the CTC responsibilities that this thesis will begin its main analysis of progress within each category under which the CTC had competencies for each of the four categories of the EU Strategy. However, only two of the four categories (Prevent and Pursue) will be categorically explored, as these are the only two areas of the EU Strategy under which the CTC had competencies and responsibilities. The first subcategory for prevention in which the CTC has a competency is listed as “Disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism.”

“The sole competency in this subcategory outlines a responsibility for enhancing political dialogue and technical assistance including police training to help others outside the EU to disrupt the activities of networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:3). “In the Action Plan report for July 20, 2006, the initial item 1.1.5 aimed at enhancing political dialogue saw some basic definition in terms of its status. It is noted under the observations that terrorism became the center of a political dialogue between the EU and third countries, and that police training had begun to be provided at the regional level to the Balkans and Mediterranean countries by CEPOL (the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training)” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:3). “This progress would remain consistent through

the final 2007 report on March 9th, 2007, after which it would be removed from further reports due to its completion.” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 3).

The next major subcategory of the Prevent section is “Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism.” This is a major duty that will recur over and over again with the CTC as an institution, and in many ways is the chief responsibility of the CTC on an internal basis. The CTC is in many ways an articulative body that functions to keep the EU institutions, media, and other institutions who have any degree of authority over narrative “on message.” The first major competency in this subcategory was to develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing radicalization, which was assigned a deadline of June 2006 and also saw consistent progress between reports of the Action Plan. By July of 2006 the Action Plan report noted that the Council had noted “ongoing work on the Media Communication Strategy, containing the first three entries of the common lexicon. Further entries will be added under the Finnish Presidency.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 4). “This continued to progress by March 2007 in which it was reported that an expanded lexicon was to be submitted to the Council as part of a revised Media Communication Strategy during the German Presidency.” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 6). “The second major competency in this group was to develop a comprehensive communication strategy to explain the EU policies and hold a conference with media professionals and terrorist experts to discuss radicalization.” (Council of the EU: December 2, 2005: 2-18). “The task, which was also assigned a deadline of June 2006, saw the organization of a conference on the role of media in countering violent radicalization. On 1-2 June 2006 the Council noted ongoing work on the Media Communication Strategy. In July 2006, the Media Communication Strategy will be sent to the Council for approval)” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 5). The following report in March of 2007 noted that the previously submitted Media

“Communication Strategy had been approved by the council in July of 2006, and that a revised version would be submitted during the German Presidency.” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007:6). While the Action Plan would fail to be updated between this final report in 2007 and the resumption of reports in 2009, this competency would be one of the few to carry through, but in an amended form adding a desire to “put in place

funding for journalist training programmes and regional language broadcasts of European television and radio news and other initiatives in ME (Middle East) and North African countries” (Council of the EU: November 26 2009:23-30).

This task saw new progress from previous Action Plan reports in that the United Kingdom had been put in the lead of a project on Counter Terrorist communications. The observations reported a workshop in February of 2009 in which seven recommendations were made, and that there had already been follow up by Member States, GCS and the Commission. Additionally, a Rapid Response Media Mechanism (RRMM) had been set up by the alliance of civilizations and was focused on “being anchored in also a European context.” “Finally, a Commission funded project established a list of media platforms such as blogs, websites, and information portals in the southern Mediterranean for media outreach activities to be established.” (Council of the EU: November 26 2009: 23-24). No significant observations were made in the following reports, with the final report in November of 2011 stating that the UK was still in the lead of a project on CT-communications (the only thing of note reported on this item in the 2010 Action Plan) and that extensive contact among counter terrorist communicators had been taking place in the run up to the anniversary of 9/11 (Council of the EU: November 25 2011:49).

The Pursue category of the EU Strategy is where we see the development of the majority of the CTC’s competencies and progress reporting in the Action Plan reports, cementing the CTC in many ways as a limited internal actor with responsibilities focused on coordination of Member State capabilities, and a broad international actor focused on articulating the EU and UN policy and aiding third countries in meeting obligations and agreements. The first subcategory of the Pursue agenda in which the CTC has competencies is within “Information gathering, analysis and exchange (Council of the EU: December 2, 2005: 2-18). “Within this subcategory there are two major competencies for the CTC, the first of which is to ensure that Member State law enforcement authorities provide Europol with all relevant criminal intelligence related to terrorism. In the first major completion of a task, this item is deleted from the list of competencies for the CTC by the second report in July of 2006. The only note on this

particular item in the report of December 2005 states that a second CTTF evaluation report was to be endorsed by the Council.” (Council of the EU: December 2, 2005: 12).

“The second competency within this subcategory focused on getting Member States to report on implementing the recommendations of the Peer Evaluation process to strengthen their national counter-terrorism arrangements and assess the need for further evaluation once the Member States have reported on follow up to recommendations during 2006.” (Council of the EU: December 2, 2005: 12). This action was also completed in relative short order, with no follow-up report in the July 2006 Action Plan report. The progress during the 2005 report suggested that “Member States were to report in the Working Party on Terrorism how they had responded to recommendations of the relevant individualized country report, and where appropriate, the recommendations of the final report. As such, it is likely that while this was a CTC competency, the final reporting and progress took place between Member States and the TWP.” (Council of the EU: December 2, 2005: 12).

The next subcategory of Pursue detailing CTC competencies is “Judicial Cooperation and contains another competency which would continue to be reported on even after the resumption of Action Plan reporting in 2009, though it would not continue through to 2011 as completion would occur after the 2009 Action Plan report. “This competency detailed enhancing the use of Eurojust and considering measures to improve its capacity, to enable more effective cooperation in terrorist investigations and prosecutions including through the practical application of relevant Council Decisions.” (Council of the EU: December 2, 2005: 2-18). Initial progress reporting on this item is shown in the July 2006 Action Plan report to be waiting on member state action on implementation a decision establishing Eurojust as a whole. “It suggests that member states are obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of the Council Decision of September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences by 30 June 2006 at the latest though this deadline is not outlined under the deadlines for the competency in the Action Plan report.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 20). By March of 2007’s Action Plan report, this progress is reported to have been the same except for an addition made noting that Eurojust was engaged in a six month project “on the implementation of the project until March 2007.

Currently they are interviewing the MS. 14 MS have been interviewed so far. 6 of the 14 have implemented. 3 claim they do not need any implementation whereas 5 have still to implemented. 11 national correspondents of Eurojust say they receive information. Eurojust will organize a strategic meeting for the national correspondents in June 2007” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 23). This adjustment also notes that Eurojust and the United States signed a cooperation agreement in November of 2006, and entered it into force in January of 2007, establishing a US liaison prosecutor within Eurojust (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 6).

By November of 2009 an updated observation was made suggesting that the decision that set up Eurojust had been amended to strengthen the role of Eurojust in assisting the MS in their ability to fight against “serious organized crime.” This was meant to give the Member States more competences for information sharing. Additionally, Eurojust had been set up to be available on a 24/7 basis with an On-Call Coordination to be established, giving the member states until June 2011 to implement the decision in their legal systems. To aid this process, Eurojust established an informal working party to help implement this process in Member States (Council of the EU: November 26 2009: 28).

This item was deleted in subsequent reports, suggesting a successful merger of the Eurojust program to be a full European Agency in constant collaboration with Member States. Between the initial December 2005 and July 2006 Action Plan reports, because the competencies and responsibilities of the CTC and many other institutions within the framework were consistently being restructured and expanded in various ways, there are some changes made pertaining to CTC responsibilities and competencies. In the July 2006 Action Plan the CTC competencies were expanded into a subcategory that had not previously included the CTC, Terrorist Financing (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 21). Additionally, the final, and most broad, subcategory granting a large number of competencies and responsibilities to the CTC, International Dimension, was very slightly restructured and expanded by two items.

While the two new items were unique, the rest of the items under this subcategory remained verbally identical to their reporting in the December 2005 Action Plan report. As such, in this thesis they will be explored in the order of their reporting in the July 2006 Action Plan onward (as only half of them would continue to be reported in the resumption of Action Plan reporting in 2009 onward).

Under the subcategory of Terrorist financing in the July 2006 Action Plan report, the CTC was given a new responsibility in the form of “Improve the effectiveness of the EU asset freezing procedures including non-financial economic resources, in accordance with UN obligations and the need to respect due process and rule of law.” This action was assigned a deadline of simply 2006 (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:21). Initial observations stated that COREPER “noted a revised Best Practices paper on restrictive measures including on the application of Community freezing measures” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:20). “By March of 2007 this measure had been ruled upon by the Court of First Instance in a judgment which led to the Council initiating a project to improve methods of listing the persons and entities subject to asset freeze, including listing the reason of each person and entity subject to it and establishing a more transparent procedure for allowing the listed persons and entities to request that their case be reconsidered.” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 24). There was no further reporting on this measure in subsequent Action Plan reports.

The final subcategory, and by far the broadest in terms of responsibilities, of CTC competencies within the EU Action Plan on Terrorism is the subcategory International Dimension (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 23-25). The first major task in this subcategory is “Support the key role of the United Nations and its sub-organizations in sustaining the international consensus and mobilizing the international community.” Given the new competencies in the July 2006 Action Plan report, status and observations of progress were frequently statements of intent. “This first item simply had a deadline of “ongoing” and its status was merely to reaffirm the key role of the UN in political dialogue with third nations.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:23). This item’s progress does not change in the timespan between the July 2006 report and the March 2007 report before the cessation of Action Plan updates under the new CTC Gilles de Kerchove.

The next responsibility, however, had been assigned a deadline of the end of 2006. This responsibility entailed the ratification of the 13 UN legal instruments against Terrorism and maintained a mandate to continue to lobby for this in third countries both bilaterally and at the EU level (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:23-25). At the point of July 2006, not all member states had a full record on ratification or implementation. With this in mind, the goals set forth were to work to ensure early ratification and full implementation of all UN conventions and protocols on terrorism. This would include the UN Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism, adopted in May of 2005, and was signed by all the EU member states by September of 2005 (Council of the EU: July

20, 2006: 24). Unfortunately, by March of 2007, no significant progress had been made on this particular item. The deadline had been changed to “ongoing” and to date not all member states had produced a full record on ratification and implementation of UN protocols (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 27). This would mark the cessation of reporting on the first of these two items, however the latter would continue to be reported on during the resumption of Action Plan reports in 2009. Though, upon resumption the responsibility now said that there were 16 UN legal instruments against terrorism to be ratified.

At this point in 2009, not all member states had yet submitted a full record on ratification or implementation, and the CTC and other institutions resolved to work to “ensure early ratification and implementation of all UN Conventions and Protocols on terrorism, including the UN Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” It is noted here that this convention had been adopted in May of 2005 and signed by all the EU member states by the 14th of September 2005 (Council of the EU: November 26 2009: 29). This same level of progress would be reported in the 2010 Action Plan report, and would cease to be reported on by 2011, indicating completion.

However, the next item under International Dimension would continue to be reported on upon resumption in 2009. “This item entailed supporting the adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism including through proactive outreach.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 23-25). From the period of July 2006 until March of 2007, this competency saw no change in its deadline, which remained ongoing. “The observations of the CTC’s Action Plan report suggested that the EU had constantly been raising the question of a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism to third countries and COTER Troika meetings with the US, Russia, Canada and India, with specific demarches of third nations such as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan.” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 6). Upon resumption of Action Plan reporting in 2009, “this item maintained the same level of progress it had in 2007, with the EU continually bringing the question up in meetings with third countries and in COTER Troika meetings.”(Council of the EU: November 26, 2009: 30). This item would remain at this level of progress until deleted in the Action Plan report of November 2011.

The next item demanded the support for the adoption of a United Nations Counterterrorism Strategy. This particular goal showed some progress in that in July of 2006 the EU was in support of the UN Secretary General’s proposition of a UN Counterterrorism Strategy and were deliberating the issue in meetings of the UN in New

York (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 27). However, by March of 2007, the EU stood ready to adopt and implement the strategy in cooperation with all members of the UN (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 28). The cessation of reporting indicates that this measure was accomplished, given the level of swift progress between reports. “The next item under this subcategory involved signing and ratifying the Council of Europe convention on prevention of acts of terrorism.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 23-25). Through to 2007 this item did not change in terms of progress or observations from the period of July 2006 to March 2007, however. “Its deadline was simply as soon as possible, and the status remained that the CTC along with the Council, Commission, and Member States were still working to ensure ratification and implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing acts of terrorism, and that much lobbying was still taking place in order to garner support in third countries.” (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 28).

However, upon resumption of Action Plan reporting in 2009 this item saw significant progress, with only one-member state having not signed, and 16 having not yet ratified. The observation suggested continued lobbying for a signature from this Member State and for the ratification in the other member states and third countries (Council of the EU: November 26, 2009: 30).

By November of 2010, the Action Plan newly reported that one member states had not signed and 11 had now not ratified, meaning five member states successfully ratified the convention in the span of a year (Council of the EU: November 15, 2010: 42). In the 2011 Action Plan report, no such item could be found, suggesting its deletion and completion (Council of the EU: November 25, 2011).

“The next competency for the CTC would cease to be reported on after 2007, and involved further developing contacts with the UNODC, UN CTC, the UN CTED, the 1267 committee, including sharing of information on the EU assistance programs and further developing contacts with the UN Special representative for Human Rights and Terrorism.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 23-25).

This item received an ongoing deadline, and observations suggesting that the EU participation in CTED missions in Morocco, Kenya, Albania, Algeria and Tanzania had continued to be shown. Additionally, UN CTED Executive Director attended a joint COTER/TWG meeting in April of 2006. Finally, UN Special Representative for

Human Rights and Terrorism attended the COTER meeting in May. As such, it can be seen that progress had already been significantly begun by the July 2006 report (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006: 24). By March of 2007, the Action Plan report observed that the UN CTED Executive Director had become a regular attendee of COTER meetings (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 28).

The progress of the following competency ties into the progress of this goal, and while this initial goal would not survive the cessation and resumption of Action Plan reporting, the following responsibility would. This responsibility was outlined to “Identify and demarche third countries which are failing to meet their commitments under UNSCR 1373.” Its level of progress through to 2007 suggesting that the EU continued through the period of March 2007 to cooperate closely with the UN CTED to monitor countries that failed to meet their commitments (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007: 25). The resumption of Action Plan reporting in 2009 showed some progress on the EU cooperating with UN CTED and providing financial aid through Instrument for Stability (IfS). Furthermore, it reports that the EU had contributed some two hundred and twenty-five million euros to this effort (Council of the EU: November 26, 2009: 30). This item also disappears in further reports.

“The following item was devoted toward further developing dialogue, including aspects on terrorist financing with, and provision of technical assistance to regional and sub-regional organizations.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:23-25). This item saw ongoing progress.

The final competency outlined for the CTC in the international dimension, and in all subcategories for the Strategy and Action Plans would be reported on through the resumption in 2009. “This item called for developing and implementing technical assistance programmes to other priority countries in order to build their counter-terrorist capacities, in coordination with the UN and other donors and reviewing existing projects in priority countries to identify duplication. This would also involve further developing political dialogue with priority countries in order to strengthen political capacity in the fight against terrorism.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006:23-25). “This item saw a change in its status and observations from July of 2006 to March of 2007 in that in 2006 CT analysis had been provided for Indonesia and Tunisia to broaden the scope of further cooperation in investigations.” (Council of the EU: July 20, 2006, 25).

However, by March 2007, this had become limited to Tunisia, and it is not clear whether cooperation with Indonesia had reached satisfactory levels and as such it was dropped from the report or if problems had arisen in expanding cooperation in investigation. However, the observations do suggest that the relevant council working group was continuing considerations (Council of the EU: March 9, 2007:29). This measure saw little progress from 2007, with the continued efforts focused on reinforcing political dialog with priority countries such as Pakistan and Yemen (Council of the EU: November 26, 2009: 30). In the 2010 Action Plan, this added the possibility of expanding to Somalia and Tajikistan (Council of the EU: November 15, 2010:42). This is the final item to disappear entirely from the Action Plan record in 2011, as with most items. This is because not only had significant progress already been made on many of these items, 2011 saw a shift of recording and reporting. “Specifically, for the CTC, this report on the draft Council conclusions on enhancing the links between internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism reported that the CTC would furthermore submit implementation reports of Council conclusions, prepared at a regular interval, in cooperation with the presidency, the Terrorism Working Party, and COTER.” (Council of the EU: May 12 2011: 3-4).

As can be seen, the CTC Action Plan reports function largely as a report on progress for specific competencies and duties of not only the institution of the CTC itself, but also the other working institutions within the EU that have any responsibilities with regard to counterterrorism.

These reports show a wide variety of advances and progress made by the CTC but lack a degree of detail and description of what the measures themselves accomplish in a broader way. However, this is very much compensated for by the Implementation Reports that the CTC began to publish in 2007 under new leadership.

CTC becomes an articulative body that reports not only on the progress made by the CTC in its specific duties within the EU Counterterrorism Strategy, but on the advances and progress made by institutions throughout the EU. Additionally, the CTC makes recommendations and suggestions based on shortfalls in these goals, or on possible objectives that ought to be met that have not yet been addressed in a meaningful way.

Since 2005, the European Union has made great strides in the fight against terrorism. In particular, the European Commission launched its 5-year Action Plan for Freedom, Justice and Security in May 10, 2005, and this was quite important to improve combatting terrorism. But nowadays all of these are missing one way or another. In the next chapter, we will see how effective all these measures and laws are. And we try to find answer the following question: Does CTC succeed in preventing all these terrorist incidents?

2.2.5. The Effectiveness of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Today's Conjuncture

The European Union member states have increasingly become the targets of attacks by homegrown and international terrorists, owing allegiance to a variety of international terrorist groups. While global security with a focus on counter-terrorism has become a more broadly discussed and debated topic in political circles and in the public dialogue, efforts to increase intelligence gathering and sharing capacities at the European level have seldom left the realm of talk.

Robin Simcox argued that “this call for increased intelligence sharing is every European policymaker’s go-to rallying cry in the wake of terror threats – and it will always be doomed to failure.” (Simcox, 2016). Simcox further argued what many others in the field have argued; that intelligence sharing in the EU is not feasible politically, or practically, because intelligence gathering and sharing capacities in the member states themselves are limited in their scope and inter-reliance, which is the essential ability of these institutions to easily share and analyze intelligence in order to appropriately respond to mutual threats.

Much of the literature that exists on the question of intelligence sharing capabilities in the European Union focuses on an inability of the EU to match the intelligence gathering abilities of US institutions, particularly after the development of the Department of Homeland Security in the US. This colors the context of the discussion about European intelligence and counterterrorism because much of the literature focuses on the “intelligence gap” between Europe and its transatlantic ally. In the initial years after 9/11, there was a considerable amount of divergence in strategic

planning between the United States and Europe pertaining to counter-terrorism. The United States declared a global war on terrorism and the EU refocused its efforts to distinguish threats in a “nexus” of terrorism and categorizing them by “states of concern” (Rees and Aldrich, 2005: 906). Europe embraced less sweeping domestic reform pertaining to surveillance and focused internationally more on balance of power than on unilateral intervention and anti-terrorism efforts (Rees and Aldrich, 2005: 906). Since 2005, the US has seemed to be adopting a policy closer to Europe, with less unilateralism and closer cooperation with allies, much of this associated with the placement of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State (Rees and Aldrich, 2005: 907). The differences are examined through the lens of “strategic culture” which suggests that reactions to threats and the perception of those threats are defined by an institutional memory: “it is about a state’s self-conception, mediated through the historical experience of its past conflicts.” Conflicts such as Vietnam and Somalia are called “the weight of the shadow of the past” (Rees and Aldrich 2005, 907). US strategic culture has been defined by American exceptionalism, particularly involvement in World War II, but counter-terrorism was not much of an issue during the cold war years as it was seen as a minor problem mostly backed by the USSR and not part of the “big picture.” Europe, however, has dealt with frequent terrorist attacks for decades (Rees and Aldrich, 2005: 909).

“There is some scholarly concern that the development of European counter-terrorism efforts and institutions has been academically under-theorized and attempts to apply political theory have been made by a few. Javier Argomaniz argues that the initial “critical junctures” of September 11th, 2001 and the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively led to counterterrorism becoming its own distinctive policy area within the broader dimensions of Justice and Home Affairs.” (Argomaniz, 2009: 4-5). Quick action on behalf of JHA after 9/11 was rooted in a desire to prove that the European Union was in fact a ready and reliable ally to the United States in the prevention of terrorism, and this action is contrasted sharply with the slow process of institutional development that occurred before 9/11. The result of this quick action was the EU’s multi-dimensional Action Plan, which contained sixty measures that followed a requirement to be updated during subsequent meetings. “These measures focused on

aviation security, police and judicial cooperation, and terrorism financing.” (Argomaniz, 2009:6). Argomaniz argues that this fervor to expand institutional capability began to slow in the following years and increased again in light of the new attacks of 2004 and 2005.

Ultimately, it seems that European efforts to widen and deepen institutional frameworks and agreements in terms of counterterrorism are extremely dependent on the political will that develops in wake of tragedies rather than a consistent political resolve (Argomaniz, 2009: 11).

The European Justice and Home Affairs Council in September of 2001 realized that cooperation in the field of intelligence would be a necessary and required step forward in increasing European competencies to combat terrorism. This began with establishing a counter terrorism task force within Europol for a trial period of six months, which would be advised by the Club of Berne, another separately formed institution which involved meetings between the heads of the chief intelligence agencies from European member states. In 2003, the European Union and NATO signed an agreement on the security of information exchange, solidifying the institutional framework between two organizations. This was called the “Berlin Plus” arrangement and guaranteed mutual access between the EU and NATO information systems and coordinated planning in counterterrorist efforts between the EU and NATO. “Berlin Plus” is a security agreement. In the crisis management operations, the EU can use NATO facilities, as well as the parties could cooperate to combat terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (Lefebvre, 2003:530- 531).

Scholarly opinions on the EU counter-terrorism operations are divergent, with many feelings that the EU is a paper tiger, institutionally ill-equipped to face the threats of terrorism on a global scale. However, this is because the European Union is not a federal government of Europe and as such does not include the competencies for a central intelligence gathering and counterterrorist operations. (Kaunert,2010, 49) In the immediate weeks after 9/11, the EU Director-General of the EU Commission for Justice and Home Affairs, Adrian Fortescue was part of a delegation that met with the US department of State, and the secretary of state. The goal in mind was not only cooperating with US efforts to combat terrorism, but also to build internal the EU competences to fight terrorism as well (Kaunert 2010:50) After the meeting, new standards for cooperation were agreed upon: “1: closer police and law enforcement cooperation, 2: judicial cooperation, particularly on extradition matters, 3: information sharing of criminal data-bases, 4: cooperation over border and transport security, and 5: the targeting of terrorist financing.” (Kaunert, 2010: 55). The result was the controversial the US/EU Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) which has been

noted to have great benefits for American ability to extradite, but difficulties in extradition between individual European member states. This is chiefly due to philosophical differences in law between the US and European nations (Kaunert, 2010: 56).

Bjorn Muller-Wille argued that there are a set of circumstances in which it is even useful to take intelligence gathering and sharing to the supranational level at all such as expanding Europol to include counter-terrorist operations (Muller-Wille, 2008, 55):

1. It produces something that national agencies are not able to produce;
2. It generates better intelligence than national agencies do on their own, as, for example, a result of pooling expertise; and
3. It produces intelligence that no national agency is willing to produce, or, for political reasons is not acceptable. Muller-Wille argues that if none of these criteria are met, then the supranational solution has no real advantage to a decentralized approach.

The Club of Berne is another institution that Muller-Wille examines to show that there is actually some intelligence sharing and pooling going on at the international level, though the institution lays outside the EU framework.

However, despite this, the Club of Berne may be trying to set an example for other the EU institutions or hoping to one day become part of the EU framework as it times it changes of presidents with the change in the EU leadership (Muller-Wille, 2008: 56-57). Despite all this, Muller- Wille concludes that the electorate in the EU nations still hold their national governments responsible for protecting them from terroristic threats, and that the EU's institutional framework still provides little in support and effectiveness to the national governments on this level (Muller- Wille, 2008: 69-70).

“Safeguarding national security and the protection of the state and citizens from threats is a competency of the Member States, and is meant to be supported by the EU, not controlled.” (Lugna, 2006:101). The former CTC Gijs de Vries states “The role of the union is not to supplant Member States but to support them in working internationally and the main thrust of Europe’s defense against terrorism remains firmly at the level of national governments” (Lugna, 2006:101). “Europe is considered both a target of and a base for terrorist operations, and has multiple times uncovered logistical

bases for terrorist cells for groups such as Al Qaeda. The CTC said in November of 2004 that there is a substantial and sustained threat of further terrorist attacks in Europe and the threat emanates mainly from Islamist networks, groups or individuals, though non-Islamist groups as well continue to pose risks to security.” (Lugna, 2006:103).

“June 2005 saw the EU Council adopting a plan of action complete with over 100 initiatives to be taken and identified four priority areas of policy: information sharing, combating terrorist financing, mainstreaming counterterrorism in the EU’s external relations, and improving civil protection and the protection of critical infrastructure.” (Lugna 2006: 108). The council at this point discussed terrorism once a year, and its declarations were mostly just that, declarations. (Lugna, 2006:108).

2.2.6. The Effectiveness of Europol in Combatting Terrorism

Europe is a large target for terrorist organizations; as such work with third party nations has become a chief effort of the European Union. This is largely because while homegrown terrorism and active terror cells within Europe are indeed a problem, empirical evidence shows that these attacks are generally linked to the leadership of foreign groups. (Kaunert, 2011:287). The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) strengthens the EU’s effort in counterterrorism efforts by expanding its role in regional discussion. The difficulty, though, is empirical observation of its effects. (Kaunert, 2011:288). “While some scholars argue that the ENP is a tense agreement between reformists and security cooperation advocates, many others have argued that the ENP is increasingly dominated by security concerns such as regime stability in Southern Mediterranean states.” (Kaunert, 2011: 290). The European Police Office, or Europol, was established under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 with specific operational objectives of fighting organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism within the European Union. Europol has been the institution behind the main push for cooperation between member states and other institutions. Specifically, “Europol has focused on operational agreements, which allow nations to exchange personal data, and strategic arrangements, which do not allow the sharing of personal data.” (Kaunert, 2011: 292).

“While cooperation between Europol and the United States has been varied and expansive, cooperation between Europol and ENP partners has been very limited. This is due to a lack of agreements between ENP states and Europol.” (Kaunert, 2011:293).

Sarah Wolff also views the development of the EU institutional competencies for counterterrorism through the lens of critical junctures but adopts the consideration of cultural frames. Wolff argues that while critical junctures created the political impetus for change, cultural frame must be considered as it demonstrates an overall shift in attitudes toward counterterrorism from a secondary concern in policy to a mainstream consideration in every day external relations. (Wolff, 2009: 139). The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent attacks in the West have continued to intensify the global efforts against terrorist activity, and European external policy changed accordingly. “The mainstreaming of counterterrorism into the EU policy led to cross-pillarization, specifically Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and diplomatic dialogues with third countries (non-member states). Additionally, the European Union became more active in the UN groups that deal specifically with terrorism.” (Wolff, 2009: 142).

A major problem that arises from the cultural frame perspective is that the development of initiatives in counterterrorism across the Southern Mediterranean is that counterterrorism itself has developed around the concept that terrorism is generally a threat to the cohesiveness and functionality of the state. As such, legal definitions of terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East such as the definition adopted by The Council of Ministers of Justice of the Arab League, have been vague and criticized for their implicit ability to lead to the arrest of innocent individuals or arbitrary detentions. This presents a major challenge for the EU institutions and member states which champion human rights and justice. (Wolff, 2009: 146). Cross-pillarization also saw the development of new working groups within the European Union structure, such as the Terrorism Working Group (TWG) who focus on the internal aspects of counterterrorism and coordinating between ministers, and the Counter-Terrorism working Group which falls under the CFSP pillar and meets once per month on external aspects of counterterrorism. However, Wolff argues that there is a flaw in this development in that it they “duplicate structures for interior ministers and diplomats instead of creating only one counterterrorism working group.” (Wolff, 2009: 142).

Despite the institutional development that has been spurred by critical junctures, and even in the external dimension across the Mediterranean, the EU nations seem to prefer to work with third nations bilaterally rather than multilaterally. “Additional difficulties arise when JHA external concerns overlap into partner nations in which rule of law is weak, and judiciaries and policy forces lack respect for human rights. The question is how to fight terrorism while cooperating with such institutions while also promoting justice and human rights.” (Wolff, 2009:152).

Christian Kaunert examines the growing role of Europol in European counterterrorism arrangements, citing a growing public visibility of Europol not only as a major policing institution but in European and American media, in which Europol is often characterized as a chief combatant of organized crime and terrorism. However, Kaunert argues that such depictions of Europol and of European competencies in general fall short of a true characterization as the true role of Europol and the EU in general in the fight against terrorism are hotly debated subjects. As such, Kaunert addresses the question of what Europol’s role is in this fight, and more precisely “what kind of an actor the organization is, and what its potential for action is.” (Kaunert, 2010: 653). Europol was developed in 1994 and originally called the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) as its original role and competencies were established in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However, it was formalized as Europol in 1995 when the Europol Convention was written, and finally ratified in 1999. Its legal mandate included (Kaunert,2010, 654):

- 1- To improve the effective cooperation among police authorities of the member states to prevent and combat serious international organized crime;

2. To investigate criminal areas, such as drug trafficking and other forms of crime, as well as terrorism.

After hotly negotiating the subject, Spain managed to get terrorism included in the competencies for Europol but under a legally vague definition:

“They must be intentional acts...which given their nature of context, may serve to damage a country or an international organization. These acts must be committed with the aim of either seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to act or fail to act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or international organization.” (Kaunert, 2010:654).

9/11 attacks led to an expansion of the mandate for Europol to address terrorism. “This included the development of an Operational Centre which operates 24 hours a day and serves the purpose of aiding the exchange of information, and also the development of the Counter- Terrorist Task Force. The CTTF is an amalgamation of liaison officers from member states’ police and intelligence services.” (Kaunert, 2010:655). The CTTF was re-established in the wake of the Madrid attacks with the following mandate:

1. The collection of all relevant information and intelligence concerning the current terrorism threat in the EU;
2. The analysis of the collected information and undertaking operational and strategic analysis;
3. The formulation of a threat assessment, including targets, modus operandi, and security consequences. (Kaunert, 2010, 656).

Despite this, Kaunert argues that “the inherent weaknesses of Europol as a terrorism combatant are due to the lack of supranational powers delegated to the institution under the terms of the current the EU treaties and the Europol Convention, and the lack of trust toward Europol by the EU member states.” (Kaunert, 2010, 657).

Thomas Renard, in more recent research, suggests that “the EU has emerged as a fledgling security actor, and focuses on how the EU contributes to global security in four particular ways: Assurance, Prevention, Protection, and Compellence.” (Renard,2014: 1). “In terms of assurance, Renard argues that the European Union has launched a large number of missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) ranging from an effort to establish Professional police and criminal justice systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 to global missions in the Congo from 2005-2007 and in Afghanistan and Iraq, both police and civilian in nature.” (Renard,2014: 1). With a deployable civilian strength of 3,000 personnel and having spent over one billion euros, the CSDP has organized over 100 missions in the last two decades. (Renard, 2014, 7). Prevention is heavily focused on the major actor the EU has become in terms of aid and development, both through expansion of the Union itself and through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). Globally, the EU combined with its individual member state contributions, account for more than 50 billion euros worth of aid annually and partakes frequently in diplomatic mediation. For example, the EU has played a discreet part in the Syrian civil war as a diplomatic actor, and in

conjunction with diplomatic efforts had distributed funds through to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in order to further the destruction of chemical weapons abroad. (Renard, 2014:8). Protection, especially from terrorism, is bolstered through continued European efforts to increase their own competencies and institutional framework through which to combat terrorism in Europe, and through diplomatic efforts to increase cooperation across the Mediterranean. However, Renard also cites specific weaknesses in Europe's counterterrorism efforts that arise in large part due to the disastrous conflicts in Syria and other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, which continue to breed terrorist activity and radicalization. (Renard, 2014: 9). Compellence through power balancing and use of force, Renard argues, is accomplished largely through continued support and participation by the European Union in its strategic arrangements not only through the CSDP, but their NATO obligations and coalition participation in strategic and military efforts globally. (Renard, 2014: 10).

The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator is in continuous communication with the EU Commission to whom he reports, and as such many published exchanged are available from the European Union's Consilium website, which published minutes for Council meetings, and the communications between offices including recommendations and analysis from the Counterterrorism Coordinator's office. These will be invaluable in conducting an analysis of the visibility and effectiveness of the CTC's (Counterterrorism Coordinator) office and its interactions with other institutions. In addition, the CTC publishes a number of media releases and press conferences that are readily available to explore the ways in which the CTC associates with the media, explains and prioritizes plans of action, and most importantly, in what ways the CTC works with non-European nations, such as nations in Central Asia.

The European Council also keeps a large database of all conclusions and rulings that it comes to, along with all documents submitted to the council for examination and deliberation. While this collection is vast, it is searchable and in many cases the CTC submits requests or suggestions to the council, and in many other cases the CTC is present during the meetings themselves. This will provide a way to analyze the weight given to the CTC by the council and how broadly the CTC's measures or suggestions are taken into consideration. The first of two major collections of documents that will be

analyzed in order to give a broad and thorough analysis of CTC activities will be the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, which was formalized within the framework of the EU Strategy on Combating Terrorism. The Action Plans detail the competencies, and the progress on each responsibility of each individual the EU Institution pertaining to a wide variety of goals set forth within the framework of the strategy. Within these Action Plans are the specific responsibilities of the CTC, and detailed reports on how much progress was made. Each task upon completion would cease being reported on and deleted from the reports.

The second collection of documents to be analyzed is what is loosely referred to as Implementation Reports. These reports were never formally requested or delegated to the CTC to provide, and until 2007 under the leadership of Gijs de Vries, the main reporting function of the CTC to the Presidency and the Council took the form of the Action Plans. However, in 2007 when de Vries stepped down as CTC and was replaced by Gilles de Kerchove, the new CTC ceased reporting Action Plans on a six-monthly basis, opting instead to provide detailed, essay form reports on each category of the EU Strategy. By 2009, the Council had demanded that the CTC resume reporting Action Plan reports once again, however, included within this framework of now annual Action Plan reports would be included the implementation reports that Kerchove had begun to submit. These documents provide a broad overview of the CTC's recommendations to other institutions rather than only an analysis on the progress of the CTC's specific competencies laid out in the Action Plans.

2.3. WHAT MAKES THE EUROPEAN UNION STATES VULNERABLE TO TERRORISM?

2.3.1. The Migration and Asylum Policies

The migration patterns have changed since the 21st century. For this reason, the leaders of the EU member states had to establish a common asylum and migration policy. In the early 19th and early 20th centuries, Europeans migrated to North America or the colonial areas of the South. But today, the European Union has become an attractive destination for migrants from all over the world. (Boswell and Geddes, 2011).

Boswell and Geddes noted that countries with post-colonial ties abroad, such as the UK and France, experienced an increase in migration from their colonies in the late 1940s. In the 1950s and 1960s, Western European countries began to recruit workers to develop their economies. From the 1990s onwards, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece became targets for immigration. After the enlargement of the EU, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary started to bring this case to the court. However, in recent years, as political scientists have pointed out, governments have changed their loose employment policies because, we see that some restrictive measures were taken by those countries. The number of Terrorist attacks, Asylum seekers dramatically increased. (Lindstrøm, 2005).

The illegal immigration of political refugees is significant problem for Europe. It will probably be directly and indirectly related to the rise of terrorist activities in Europe in the near future: indirectly, mainly the problems of the Union of immigrants from the former Soviet Republics, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and the problems within the Union that can be caused by refugees. The current EU unemployment rate is 12-18%. The main objective of most European countries is to prevent local pressure from rising too much on threats perceived by unwanted migrants and refugees. (Moore, 1999:2).

In response to this problem of unwanted migrants, Europeans want to reduce illegal immigration as much as possible. Increasing unemployment in the member states strengthens the political position of right-wing parties and racist ideas that can lead to ethnic conflict within the EU. In the case of symmetrical ethnic conflicts, minorities (mostly the EU immigrants) may be human resources for terrorist organizations. With the abolition of national borders, the threatened minorities will be able to receive assistance from other the EU members, which may ultimately affect all other members.

The immigration and refugee problem can directly affect terrorism in Europe as follows: ethnic criminal organizations and terrorist organizations can often monitor the migration process to act in the target country. Most target countries are selected based on minority rates and weaknesses or weaknesses of police organizations. Large numbers of illegal immigrants make control difficult for the intelligence services, and this

compounded by the lack of coordination among the intelligence services makes the EU a target for terrorist organizations.

ISIS, considered to be one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations of our time, is a danger to the EU countries when the huge Muslim population in the Union, combined with a large number of political refugees and careless immigration procedures. They pushed themselves to the front line in the war against global terror. Nevertheless, each member has a different approach to different immigration procedures and the refugee problem.

Another problematic issue focuses on the enlargement process. Ten members, many of them former Eastern Bloc countries, have a unemployment rate of 15-20%. In addition, they are economically worse than the western countries. These conditions push people to seek jobs in the EU's western countries.

Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it is seen that the illegal movement of the people has become an important problem for the EU countries and the illegal criminal organizations have been taking root more intensively. They have a classic mafia structure: the leader on the top of the pyramid, the people who have an important place and connections in the community, and the ones who have illiterate and poor family background. The study of the history of the Mafia shows that they emerged in Sicily after the collapse of the European feudal system.

An increase in illegal immigration and the loosening of the power of national authorities may lead to the emergence of a similar structure in the EU member states. These criminal organizations do not currently have a political or ideological goal. But in the future, they can sell weapons to the terrorist organizations of the European Union.

As a result of the fundamentalist terrorist attacks of ISIS, we have made clear that we cannot see all Muslim minorities in Europe as potential terrorists. In combating each other, the prevention of speculative actions that may affect the wider society is very important and local authorities should be held accountable. In order for the fight against terrorism to be successful, a clear and continuous distinction must be made between the prison and the terror issues. Moreover, the sources of terror in society must be rooted.

In November 2004, events in the Netherlands could be considered as case studies. The Dutch government considered the death of producer Theo van Gogh as a terrorist act, rather than a murder. Van Gogh made a controversial film about the treatment of women in Islam, and the social tension increased when the suspected killer, a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, was arrested shortly after he was killed. This approach of the Dutch government served as an incentive to racist groups and began to attack the Muslim minorities of the country. However, these bombings against the Muslim community were not seen as “acts of terrorism” by the Dutch executive authorities.

Meanwhile, the Dutch parliament began to question proposals and seemed more interested in controlling Muslims than to prevent attacks. “MPs have asked the government to draft new legislation forcing Dutch mosques to employ only imams who have studied Islamic religion in the Netherlands” and “Legislators are also considering laws that would enable the closure of mosques that spread non-Dutch values” (BBC News). These proposals received wide support in the Netherlands, but in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, written by the European Commission and signed on 25 March 2004, in Annex 1 of objective 5, states the following: “Ensure that support and assistance is provided to the victims of terrorist crimes, and protect minority communities who may be at risk of a backlash in the event of a major attack”.

The Attacks on Muslims after the Van Gogh murder could be seen as acts of terrorism. However, neither the Dutch government saw them nor punished the criminals. If such an event occurred in another the EU country, wouldn't the result be any different? “European intelligence and security services are stuck with the fact that roughly fourteen to seventeen million Muslims now live within the European Union” (Gerecht, 2002:6-7). The cases mentioned in this thesis confirm that the EU member states can apply different laws and actions to Muslim minorities. This proves that there is a paradox and coordination gap in the union. Despite attempts to establish a supranational structure within the EU on terror-related issues, members of the European Union continue to use the intergovernmental system.

The inexperience of these authorities in the fight against terrorism promotes both racism and terrorism. Muslims' respect for the Western democratic and human rights system is decreasing. After all, in recent events in the Netherlands, we see that the basic

human rights contain the right to insult themselves. One possible consequence of these developments is that the Muslim community that is under threat after these bombings can begin to feel the need to become militarized. Ethnic and religious conflicts can open the door to terrorism in the region and then all over Europe.

Alternatively, the Muslim minority of Europe can prove to be an invaluable support to Europe as it tries to reposition itself. The existence of a large European Muslim population can be used to send more positive messages to the Islamic world in general. A Europe dealing with its efforts to solve its problems with the Muslim world would at least receive the support of 15 million European Muslims.

2.3.2. Schengen Area and The Border Policies

The Schengen Agreement is one of the weaknesses in the EU struggle with terrorism. The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1990 by France, Germany and the Benelux countries and opened the frontiers to all the persons, goods, capital and services within the signatory member states. As mentioned in the previous chapters, security precautions were initiated along with the Schengen agreement, but at the same time it also created a freer movement area for within the Union.

With the Schengen Agreement, the plan for an 'ever closer Union' and the free movement of people, money and materials across national borders is well under way. However, the free movement of persons and capital also allows for the free movement of criminals and the fruits of crime.¹⁵⁵ This free movement of persons and goods emerges from the EU desire for the supranational model, but they have failed to create a supranational structure in security and internal affairs. This then is a failing in the EU policy system. The EU passport holders may easily travel within its borders and easily obtain visas for countries outside the EU. Thus a terrorist holding the EU passport may benefit from the same ease of travel in committing his/her terrorist act.

The EU member states are accused of being soft on terrorism. The current intergovernmental approach is criticized to open doors to terrorist organizations, international drug traffickers and other smugglers, and to ensure that they take root stronger in the EU and become more active. As a result, it is easy to travel to the United States with the European Union passports and will probably remain so until the EU

passport holders are attacked. (Gerecht, 2002:6-7). “The response to Schengen came not only from the US but also from within the EU. We need to understand more that Schengen is a gift to terrorists, says Rolf Tophoven, director of the Institute for Terrorism Research and Security Policy in Essen, Germany.” (Rice-Oxley, Mark, 2005: 2).

Another critique of Schengen came from Dana Allin, an expert in European security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Allin says he does not think Europe will sacrifice Schengen, but adds, “There is a mismatch between effectively avoiding borders and still having police and intelligence services thinking in terms of national borders. This is an obvious problem. (Gerecht, 2002:6-7).

John Antal points that “securing borders has been a priority for most states in the twenty-first century. According to an action plan prepared by the European Union, the main reasons for cross-border activities are the developments in the world, economic inequalities and civil war, severe economic difficulties and hunger, epidemics caused by food shortages and movements in general, regional crisis, non-democratic administrations or citizens, the desire for good standards is widespread human rights abuses.” (Antal, 2012:53).

He also emphasizes “the same point in terms of the changing structure of cross-border activities. According to Antal, threats to the borders today are not only from the traditional attacks of enemy armies, but also from contemporary conflicts, such as illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal activities and fundamentally terrorism.” (Antal, 2012:53).

As several academics have noted, there are some difficulties in protecting borders. As Judith A. Warner points out, it is difficult to make the borders loose enough to allow citizens to pass through, and to be hard enough to stop people and drug trafficking, and it's hard to balance. This change is difficult to overcome, manage and establish border security. (Warner, 2010:3).

“Some other researchers emphasize cooperation in the prevention of cross-border activities. According to Nilüfer Karacasulu, the traditional security perception of national borders, along with the more challenging terrorism against globalization, does

not recognize new threats that cross-national borders. Terrorism in the twenty-first century requires cooperation for security.” (Karacasulu, 2006:1-17).

In fact, “Jason Ackleson points to this dilemma: on the one hand, it is essential to maintain the economic growth and socio-cultural ties of the border regions, while on the other hand it is equally important to implement advanced security measures at the borders against terror and transnational criminal activities.” (Ackleson, 2005:150).

As a result, there are still those in the European Union who are still advocating former exponential border policies. But it is obvious that these border policies are inadequate. Due to these old border policies, the European Union is in great danger. The European Union must produce contemporary policies to strengthen its borders.

2.3.3. General Evaluation

The end of the cold war era in the latter years of the 20th century and emerging globalization furthered the spread of international terrorist organizations. Throughout the 20th century, attempts to further cooperation among the international community in the struggle against terrorism were made through counter terrorism conventions adopted by the UN. However, these efforts proved unsuccessful during the Cold War era as the different political interests of the political blocs led to different attitudes and approaches to terrorism by each side. Within the then EC there were also clashes in attitudes towards terrorism among its individual members. Following the end of the Cold War era, terrorist acts began to increase in number.

The lack of authority in the ex-Eastern Bloc countries and insufficient weapon control mechanisms were certainly a factor in this. Europe, as a continent affected by this lack of authority in the Eastern Bloc, began to create its three-pillar system in response to this. There are many issues influencing the EU’s decision-making policy on its approach to terrorism. Thus, we needed to examine the structure of the European Union in order to understand if it is supranational or intergovernmental in nature. The individual cases outlined in the thesis clearly show the internal conflicts among the EU members on the concept of terrorism and prove the truth of the words ‘one state’s terrorist is another state’s freedom fighter’. The lack of common policies in the areas of foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs have prevented the EU

members from adopting a common approach to counter terrorism. Indeed, neither the EU member states nor the organization itself were able to come to agreement on a common definition of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' until after the 9/11 attacks.

On September 11, 2001 the United States was hit by a non-state terrorist actor and thousands of people were killed. This date clearly marked a turning point in concepts related to terror. The US response to this terrorist act demanded that the entire world share the suffering of the US with the result that some countries began to review their national laws on counter terrorism. Besides the efforts made by its individual member states, the EU itself began to develop strategies and passed counter terrorism laws by unanimous voting in the European Council. The European Union and United States strengthened their transatlantic cooperation on counter terrorism following the attacks, while the EU member countries made changes in their national laws on counter terrorism and adopted some of the United Nations conventions on counter terrorism.

In response to criticisms from the US of being 'soft' on terrorism and lacking terrorism prevention measures, the EU member states began to adopt a series of counter terrorism measures from 2001 onwards. These included many unanimously taken decisions such as the adoption of a common definition of terror and the publication of a list of terrorist organizations. The US, however, regarded these measures as inadequate.

For example, the EU terror organization list did not include all the organizations accepted as such by the US. The only the EU member to share the US list was the UK, and this led to internal the EU conflict on the issue of classification of organizations as terrorist. The continuing weaknesses in the coordination of counter terrorism measures among the EU member states were further exposed by the March 11 terrorist attacks in Madrid. Spain's being subjected to an Al Qaeda attack immediately prior to a national general election as a result of its political and military support for the US in the invasion of Iraq prompted the EU member states to greater efforts in the creation of more effective and constructive measures in terrorism prevention. Indeed, it was only at the March 21st meeting of the European Council following the Madrid bombings that serious measures were undertaken in terror prevention. Until that time the only definite action which had been taken, apart from the creation of definitions and lists, was the freezing of bank accounts known to be sources of funding for terrorist organizations.

Thus, we can see that it was only following payment of a high price in human life that the EU began to concentrate seriously on terrorism prevention and began to look for ways to develop a supranational approach in its decision-making process in the struggle against terror. Yet, the fact that there still exists no common policy on the terror issue at a time when Europeans are being presented with a European Constitution for their approval must leave us doubtful as to the future and success of such a Constitution.

The Maastricht Treaty was a milestone in the development of the EU in that it marked the first adoption, following hard negotiations, of a supranational structure by the member states. However, this structure is operational in one of the three pillars of the EU only, namely the Economic, and is built on a foundation of a forty-year-old intergovernmental structure. In the economic sphere agreement by all member states to abide by the rules and regulations set out by Brussels meant that the road to economic supranationalism lay open.

However, in the years since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, attempts to build a supranational structure in the other two pillars i.e. Justice and Home Affairs, and Common Foreign and Security Policy have failed. Thus on the issue of terror the approach remains intergovernmental and therefore based on negotiation and bargaining among members. There are a number of reasons for this: national interest, public opinion perceptions of the threat from terror, and demography are some of these. As we saw in many examples, all the EU members are not sensitive to the same degree on the issue of terrorism. The debate surrounding 'terrorists' continues and is directly related to the interests of each member state. Each state remains on the horns of a dilemma: caught between how far it should or can go to protect itself and how far it should or can go in order to protect the unity of the EU.

It is clear that the EU members are willing to establish a supranational structure in all the pillars of the EU, and yet until now have failed to do so in any area other than the economic. A supranational structure does not exist for the pillars of Justice and Home Affairs and Common Foreign and Security Policy, and it would seem that in trying to move towards federalism with a European Constitution while these weaknesses exist the EU is leaving itself open to great structural problems.


3. CASE STUDIES ON PARIS, BRUSSELS AND NICE ATTACKS

Since 2015, the European Union has witnessed many bloody terrorist attacks. A total of 361 innocent people were killed as a result of these terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist organization ISIS. In this section of my thesis, we will focus on three terrorist attacks. We will talk about the Paris attack that took place in 2015 and what they brought to us afterward. We will then focus on the 2016 Brussels attacks, the weakness of airports, and the lack of information sharing by the intelligence agencies. And finally, we will focus on the Nice Attacks by an attacker during the Bastille Day celebrations on the anniversary of the French Revolution in Nice, France.

Through these case studies, we will try to understand the weaknesses, security gaps, and intelligence deficiencies of the European Union. We will, unfortunately, witness how the Schengen agreement, border policies, and unsuccessful immigration policies of the European Union, which we mentioned in the previous chapter, resulted in bloody attacks.

We will also focus on Andrew Moravcsik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism and how these attacks can be prevented by intergovernmental solidarity. The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is a significant theory for understanding European integration. I will try to explain how this theory can be used in the effective combatting against terrorism with its pros and cons.

Figure 1. Number of failed, foiled, completed attacks in the EU between 2006-2017



Source: 2017, Report of attacks in the EU between 2006-2017, Europol

3.1. 2015 Paris Attacks, 13th November

When the calendars showed 13 November 2015, France was unaware that there would be a terrible attack in the evening hours. The attacks which were started at 21:15 local time continued until the morning hours. As a result of these attacks organized at 7 different points, 152 people lost their lives and 352 people were injured. During the match between France and Germany, 3 different attack sounds were heard. A bar and a restaurant near the stadium were taken hostage by suicide bombers. President Hollande was among those watching this match. Although he was quickly evacuated, hundreds of spectators watching the match remained trapped in the stadium. Another attack was organized at a fast food restaurant near the Stadium, where 5 people lost their lives. But the nightmare was not limited to these and it was not finished yet. (BBC News, 2015)

Bataclan concert hall was the scene of the most cruel and bloody attack. Terrorists fired at the audience listening to the concert. This event continued uninterrupted for 10 minutes. At the same time, bombs exploded in the concert hall. Many people were taken hostage. As a result of these attacks, 118 people lost their lives. This was the most brutal one of the massacres. At midnight the cops saved the hostages. However, couldn't prevented death of 118 people. Some of the attackers were shouting "this is for Syria." (BBC News, 2015)


Things have not come to an end yet. Le Carillon Bar and Le Petit Cambodge restaurant were also attacked. The customers here were raked. The capital was literally in a chaos. Another attack took place at La Belle Equipe café, where 7 terrorists have been neutralized. (BBC News, 2015)

After these attacks, France was declared a state of emergency for the first time after 1961. This attack went down in history as the bloodiest attack in France after World War II. All schools, educational institutions and public institutions were closed until further notice. 1500 soldier go out to the streets. (BBC News, 2015)

It was debated whether there was security weakness in those bloody terror attacks for days. Was the inadequacy of French Intelligence Bureau reason for this terrorist attack? Or was the reason the unsuccessful Border Control Policy of the

European Union? Or was this a brutal but expected result of unsuccessfully managed refugee crisis?

Figure 2. Timetable of the attacks in Paris



Source: Paris attacks: What happened on the night, 9 December 2015, BBC

Jenkins debates that the Paris attacks underscores the importance of intelligence. We do not know how a plot involving eight attackers, the acquisition of automatic weapons, and construction of seven suicide vests got past French authorities. Thousands of French fighters have gone to Syria, and some of them have returned. Thousands more are suspected of preparing to go. Others are most certainly planning attacks in France; several homegrown terrorist plots have been thwarted. The French intelligence services are being overwhelmed by the number of people they must keep under surveillance. (Jenkins, 2015)

Intelligence Bureaus located in member states of the European Union are so focused on their own countries that they refrain from cooperating with other member states. Especially the fact that most of the attacks take place in Belgium, where intelligence weakness is at the highest level, is proof of the seriousness of the incident.

When we look at it in general, unfortunately there is no intergovernmental structure in the European Union for intelligence. Its absence is clearly felt. When we

look closely to the Paris attacks, we can easily see that these attackers came to Belgium before entering to France.

3.2. 2016 Brussels Bombings, 22nd March

On 22 March 2016, Brussels, the heart of the European Union, woke up with the sounds of bombs. Between 08:00 and 09:11 local time, a series of armed attack and suicide attacks at Maelbeek/Maalbeek metro station and Brussels Airport. 33 people lost their lives as a result of the attacks. 250 people were injured. The attack was assumed by ISIS. (BBC News, 2016)

After the attack, the Belgian government announced three days of mourning. The Brussels attacks went down in history as the greatest attack made to the country. 14 people were killed in a double attack at Zaventem Airport in Brussels. More than 100 people were injured due to the attack of the suicide bomber. The second explosion in Brussels took place at Maelbeek metro station, which is close to the institutions belonging to the European Union. On the attack where 20 people lost their lives, more than 100 people were injured. After the attack, Belgium Prime Minister Charles Michel commented on the attacks “It is a black day for Belgium. This is a blind and cowardly attack.” When we look at the attack, we can put emphasis on the security flaws again. Firstly, the European Union's soft belly, the Schengen Area and the Border policy matters must be studied. Apart from this, one of the most widely spoken issues is that the intelligence offices in Belgium are very weak. (BBC News, 2016)

Furthermore, it is a very controversial matter that the safety of airports is very weak and allowing people to enter into airports without detectors and controls. When we look at Belgium's security history, we see that the security institutions' intelligence bureaus are rather inadequate when we look at it at the national level. If we look at the issue at the European Union level, we can easily express that, the lack of information flow between the intelligence bureaus and the fact that an intergovernmental structure is not created here is a great troublesome situation. In addition, Europol's inadequacy in many places makes it easier for these events to happen.

Figure 3. Timetable of bombings in Brussels



Source: Brussels attacks: Zaventem and Maelbeek bombs kill many, 22 March 2016, BBC

3.3. 2016 Nice Truck Attack, 14th July

While France picking up the pieces of 2015 Paris attacks, at 14 July 2016, another attack had taken place at Nice during the Bastille Day celebrations. At 22:40 local time, a white colored cargo truck plough into the crowd at Promenade des Anglais street where the celebrations were continuing. The truck moved forward approximately 2 kilometers after entering the street. (Reuters, 2016)

The police intercepted the truck, and have it stopped in front of the Palais de la Mediterranee hotel. However, the assailant descending from the car started to open fire and was finally killed by the police. 84 people lost their lives as a result of the attacks and more than 100 people were seriously injured. The attack was assumed by ISIS like the other two attacks. (Reuters, 2016)

ISIS, previously using suicide bomber, opening fire, bombing, hostage taking methods, this time caused this brutal attack by using the Vehicle-ramming attack method. As a result, France declared national mourning for 3 days. The French

government was subjected to very harsh criticism because of the occurrence of this attack, which was after the attack on Paris. (Reuters, 2016)

After the Paris attacks, did French government not increase precautions? France had begun to take extraordinary security measures against terrorism with the "Sentinelle Operation", where 10 thousand troops are stationed after the attacks of ISIS in Paris in November. But what were the reasons for this incident? There are security flaws in this incident like the other two attacks. Especially the bureaus offices seem like they are not efficient enough. Despite these attacks, occur subsequently, the fact that the French government and the European Union can't take a concrete step is one of the highly criticized points. Particularly, the question why the European Union, which is considered as Global Actor in the region and in the world, cannot go beyond condemning these attacks is a question mark in our minds.

Figure 4. The route of the truck in Nice Truck Attack



Source: The Bastille Day attack in Nice, 17 July 2016, Reuters

3.4. General Evaluation of Terrorist Attacks

The three attacks have many common characteristics. Initially, all of the attacks were assumed by the same terrorist organization: ISIS. In general, suicide bombers, opening fire, bombing, taking hostages and vehicles, carried out the attacks and all of them were aimed at destroying as much as possible.

If we look at the locations of the attacks, the terrorists are easily circulated in the Brussels, Paris and Nice, where the population is high; drawing attention is easy and frequent destinations in terms of tourists. The timing of the attacks varies according to the intensity. A total of 269 people have lost their lives in three attacks and more than 700 people were injured.

After three attacks, criticism of security vulnerability has been directed both to member states and to the European Union. The nationalities of those who organized the attacks vary. The offenders are citizens of Belgium, France, Syria, Morocco and Tunisia. Some of the attackers entered the country illegally. As a result of the border policies and Schengen area, which make the European Union vulnerable to terrorism, these people can freely move among the member states.

Border and asylum policies, the Schengen Area, the Freedom of Movement, and lack of inter-provider information sharing are among the reasons for all these terrorist incidents. Since there is no intergovernmental structure between intelligence bureaus, the member countries do not share these persons with each other. The fact that member states do not make these shares undermines their business of Europol.

When we look at the Border Policies and Schengen Areas of the European Union in particular, we see that these terrorists are coming from different countries as a result of the refugee crisis and passing to the member states where the attack is organized. Free movement, a right granted by the Schengen agreement, makes the European Union vulnerable to terrorism. When we look at the attacks on Paris, Nice and Brussels, we see that the attackers easily pass to the target countries from other countries. When we look at the attack on Paris, we see that some of the attackers are first deployed in Belgium, and then they go to Paris to organize attacks.

Another issue that has become the focus of criticism as a result of these attacks is the intelligence bureaus of the countries. Especially when we look at Belgium, it is known that the attacks are planned here, and the terrorists are heavily deployed in Belgium. The Belgian intelligence bureau continues to be criticized for being too weak and not sharing information with intelligence agencies of other countries. Belgium Intelligence Unit known as The General Intelligence and Security Service (ADIV)

disclosed that they had a knowledge about Najim Laachraoui who was one of the suicide bombers of Belgium airport. It is clearly proven that Najim Laachraoui has also been working with other terrorists in Paris attacks. So, a week before the airport attack, Belgium's intelligence agency decided to arrest Laachraoui. But it was too late for that.

Claude Moniquet, a former intelligence agent at the French Directorate-General for External Security, says "It's quite impossible to prevent this kind of thing. It could happen anywhere, in any country at any moment." We can agree with Moniquet in a sense. It seems quite impossible to prevent these kind of terrorist attacks unless an intergovernmental structure covering all member states.

Andrew Moravscik's liberal intergovernmental approach is one of the most critical ways of thinking that evaluates the European integration process. Besides, when we talk about how to strengthen the European Union's fight against terrorism, we can examine this with a liberal intergovernmental approach. First of all, we have to ask ourselves the question: Without further integration between the European Union countries, would it be possible to prevent terrorist attacks, fight terrorism, and punish terrorists? The answer is straightforward. Of course not. It is crucial that each member state takes more resources, especially to the most affected countries, when taking anti-terrorism measures. Terrorist organizations locate terrorist cells in countries with the greatest weakness of security, and then can easily cross into the target country thanks to weak border controls and the Schengen area. This is an excellent example of the fact that those who carried out the Paris attack set up the terror cells in Belgium. Because in countries like Belgium, anti-terrorism laws are seen as quite weak. Any lack of coordination and weak European integration pave the way for terrorist attacks.

Liberal intergovernmentalism suggests that member states may be willing to agree on further integration if they see benefits as more significant than losses. Although giving more authority to the EU institutions further reduces the sovereignty of the member states, the member state can make concessions in the fight against terrorism. The European Union is a structure where both intergovernmental and supranational values coexist. However, an intergovernmental structure would be more useful than a supranational structure to combat terrorism. This is an issue that member states can sacrifice.

Intergovernmental bargaining promotes integration. Because this is the only way to prevent terrorism, Government leaders refer to integration as a solution. Liberal intergovernmentalism also means a lot of the leadership of the leaders. Member States (through the Council / Council of Europe) may force the Commission to propose measures. States are rational and calculate costs and benefits. Stronger member states get what they want. It is expressed as dissolution in favor of further integration. Indigenous pressures shape political preferences. Multinational cooperation is preferred over supranational governance.

Unconditionally sharing intelligence data, strict coordination, border security, strong anti-terrorism laws, and above all a powerful European integration are essential to combat terrorism. The Liberal intergovernmental approach also suggests this idea. To achieve it, the European Union does not have to look for a new model. Already strengthening the integration that it has had since its establishment of the union is a key point in the fight against terrorism.

3.5. Global Solutions to Regional Problems

Much time had gone by between the terror attacks of 2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London and the devastating massacres in Paris, twice in 2015, and Brussels in 2016. However, the sheer weight of events can be felt almost literally in the presentation of the documents in which the EU institutions respond to what ultimately must be called their failures. Returning to the outset of this thesis we can once again ask the initial questions. Is the Counterterrorism Coordinator a visible institution? There is almost certainly no doubt about this.

The CTC (The Counter-terrorism Coordinator) is in almost perpetual contact with the EU Presidency, the leadership of the Council which changes every six months and has been one of the primary if not the most important mechanisms by which the European Union Council receives annual reporting on counterterrorism efforts from the points of the position's inception onward. Its connections to other institutions are, perhaps in the initial years of the CTC's existence, revelatory at best, with the CTC mostly reporting on what has been accomplished by other institutions. Only later do we see the CTC take on a more articulative position, making direct recommendations and

suggestions to institutions and getting responses back in the form of action. This development is tied in with the overall development of the CTC as a whole, and while it would be difficult to argue that the CTC is overdeveloped as an institution, given the reach of its recommendations and inability to actually ensure their substantiation, it is certainly not without any sort of authority or leverage within the grand scheme of the EU counterterrorism institutions. But what are the limits of articulation?

Christian Kaunert explored scholarly opinion of the European Union as a paper tiger with regards to counterterrorism (Kaunert, 2010:49). This is a description that becomes almost depressing considering the sheer amount of reporting and analysis gone through by the CTC in the form of the Action Plans and Implementation Reports, each stacking progress upon progress and accomplishments upon accomplishments with regards to specific institutions, and the development of policy. Yet it is painfully accurate when confronted with the reports subsequent to catastrophe in which the CTC is forced to admit that while progress has been made, and development has been seen, what has been done is just not enough. That more action must be taken, and that the EU has fallen short of its promise to prevent, protect, pursue, and respond.

While the EU may in some ways be more paper than tiger, the EU does not exist in a vacuum. The international scene changed drastically from the year 2011 onward. The CTC was extremely prescient when it was reported that disappointments may arise from the Arab Spring, and that even if the best occurred, and new flourishing democracies arose from the protests and conflicts, the EU and other nations must be ready to aid in the development of infrastructure, competencies, and institutions devoted toward preventing radicalization and stopping terrorist activities within those nations. The outcome of the Arab Spring was far from ideal, in that the hope of new flourishing democracies across the Middle East was not to be in many cases, and in the worst-case scenario of Syria, a long term, violent, destructive civil war would instead become the new normal.

Conflicts such as this are a fertile breeding ground for radicals, and every day create more and more material for terrorist to use to recruit fighters from pools of sympathetic onlookers, and with the widespread use of the internet and targeted use of propaganda, this effort is no longer limited to recruiting from the locality, but from

across the world. People who have never been to Syria joined the fight on the side of radicals who, previously, would have just as happily seen them killed in their attacks. The EU Counterterrorism Strategy had never been tested in this way.

The institutions to this point that had been set up to protect Europe from these kinds of attacks had not been developed to the point in which they could handle the exponentially growing number of threats from outside and within that would result from the widespread destabilization caused by these uprisings and subsequent brutal conflicts.

It is clear through close examination of the documentation of progress the CTC reviewed and reported does show that there is very likely some merit to the ideas presented early on in the research that critical junctures are the primary drivers of progress in the short term, and that political will stagnates in the absence of imminent pressure. It cannot be ignored also that Europe itself, as a whole, sits geographically in close range to a conflicted region and has been disproportionately affected by an influx of refugees from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and many other nations that either did not hold up as well to the passing of the Arab Spring, or which descended into open warfare between aggressive state actors and powerful terrorist groups such as ISIS. In such a climate, could a relatively decentralized system such as the EU hope to have every base covered? As explored in the literature, Europe has a much longer history with terrorism than the

United States, not only foreign but domestic. It would be difficult to argue that the failures of the last few years to prevent attacks are universal failures of the system itself, which can always stand to be improved, and as the CTC openly argues must continuously evolve in order to meet the challenges of a changing threat.

CONCLUSION

The European Union has fought a lot of terrorist attacks since its establishment. The legitimacy of the European Union began to be questioned, especially due to the increasing terrorist incidents after the Paris attacks in 2015. Especially as a result of the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS, many innocent citizens lost their lives. The purpose of my thesis figures out what the reason for these terrorist attacks was, where the security weakness of the European Union stemmed from. I tried to find answers to all these questions in this thesis.

In the first part of the thesis, I tried to define terrorism. But it was not simple. Because an internationally accepted definition of terror has never been and never will be. I reviewed the definitions of the dictionary. I looked at the theoretical definitions. I looked at the evolution of terrorism. And finally, the most reasonable definition to me was that terror was an attempt to gain certain power over society as a result of the ethnic, cultural religious and nationalistic divisions of a minority within a country. Their real purpose was to prove their existence by putting people into fear. After accepting this definition, I came across a problematic problem. For some, terrorists were freedom fighters. It was impossible to make a clear distinction. That is why it was quite difficult to speak of an internationally accepted definition of terror.

In the continuation of the thesis, I looked briefly at the development of terrorism. State terrorism, especially used by the Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler's Germany after the First World War, showed us how the terror was used by the state. These were the most ruthless examples of terrorism. The state used terrorism to scare people. Terrorism was then used in the European Union by nationalistic groups such as ETA and IRA. Their aim was to leave their country and establish their own autonomous structures, using terror, dominating their ethnic origin. Subsequent attacks by the 9/11 attacks by

Al-Qaeda deeply shook all humanity. After the capture of Osama bin Laden, the attacks of this terrorist group came to an end. But this religionist terrorism did not end. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Middle East, ISIS has become a threat to all humanity.

Another important issue was the motivation and financial support of terrorists. Because a terrorist group could not do all these attacks without motivation. Sometimes this motivation became religious and sometimes national. In the case of ETA and IRA, these groups have national motivations. But in religious groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, fought in the name of religion. Financial support was another important issue. Because the terrorist groups needed money to develop and continue on their way. For this reason, it was significant to investigate where the terrorist groups provided financial support.

After realizing all this, I mentioned about the terrorist attacks and incidents in the European Union. I tried to examine all the terrorist strategies of the European Union. I wanted to state where it was a missing point. Especially since 2008, I examined about counter-terrorism strategies of the European Union. I have tried to understand how successful the European Union is with these policies.

In the continuation of my thesis, I have identified the weak points of the European Union against terrorism. These were Migration and asylum policies and Schengen area and the border policies. When we look at all this, the soft belly of the European Union was the uncontrolled refugee policies and the Schengen region. All this has led to an increase in terrorism in the European Union. Especially the free movement within the union caused the terrorists to travel freely in the member states. Just like the Paris attacks. Terrorists entered Belgium comfortably and then went to France to conduct Paris attacks. In addition, the lack of information sharing between the intelligence agencies and the incapability of EUROPOL to combat terrorism had prepared the ground for all these terrorist incidents.

In this thesis, I try to figure out the following research questions; Considering the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Nice, the EU's counter-terrorism strategy is sufficient to prevent terrorist attacks within the EU territory, or not. The EU's counter-

terrorism decisions? Taking into account previous security incidents and terrorist attacks, more particularly Paris, Brussels, and Nice attacks, the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy to fail? How does the European Union set a reasonable, more realistic and strong strategy against terrorism after ISIS attacks? What domestic actors should be involved in countering crime and terrorism? Which model/approach is more effective to overcome terrorism: A criminal justice-based approach or cooperation model? What are the impacts of the European Union's counter-terrorism strategy on today's conjuncture? How should the European Union respond lately? After the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks, what are the factors that make us question?

I tried to get answers to all these questions. And I have found that the terrorist policies of the European Union are inadequate in many respects. Unfortunately, all these terrorist attacks led us to question the legitimacy of the European Union. I tried to solve the case with Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmental system. The European Union institutions are both supranational and intergovernmental. But in the sense of terror, the European Union should adopt the liberal intergovernmental system, as Andrew Moravcsik said.

This thesis provided the inclusion of different perspectives in the literature. In particular, the adoption of Andrew Moravcsik's understanding of the liberal intergovernmental system reveals the need for full European integration and a common attitude towards terrorism.

The European Union has survived a lot since its establishment. Many sacrifices have been made, in particular, to ensure strong European integration. From the perspective of terrorism, it is clear that the European Union is ineffective. The European Union has gained an international role as a global actor through cross-border operations. But it is ineffective in preventing terrorist incidents within its borders.

It is not impossible for the European Union to prevent all these terrorist incidents. European integration is further strengthened, and international approaches to regional problems can easily solve this problem. The European Union can also solve this problem through an effective exchange of information and in particular with the help of Counter-terrorism Coordinator.

The Counter-terrorism Coordinator was established to prevent terrorism and to ensure that the EU citizens live safely within the union. But in many respects, this institution remained inadequate. Unfortunately, they could not effectively respond to terrorism because full integration could not be achieved within this organization. When we look at the terrorist policies of the European Union, it really looks quite effective and powerful on paper. But unfortunately, it doesn't work out much in practice. With an effective integration and an intergovernmental approach, the European Union will easily cope with all these terrorist incidents. All that the European Union has to do is to increase its integration and bring it to a stronger level by confronting all the difficulties during the installation phase. It is not impossible to prevent terrorism. What is impossible is to try to prevent terrorism without any effort, just by implementing laws. The European Union will overcome all this. A common approach, information sharing, and a strong stance agreed by all member states will eradicate terrorism.

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