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AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**EUROSCEPTICIST TENDENCIES OF THE POPULIST PARTIES IN FRANCE:
A STUDY ON “NATIONAL RALLY” AND ”FRANCE UNBOWED”**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, the increasing opposition to European integration and European Union (EU) necessitates considering Euroscepticism as a fundamental phenomenon of European politics. It is seen that Euroscepticism has been firstly used in the academic field and media in the 1980s. On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty that aims further integration compared to the previous period is accepted as a turning point in the history of Euroscepticism. Also, this study coincides with crucial developments in European politics such as unresolved Brexit process and May 2019 European Parliament elections. The increasing success of Eurosceptic parties and public attention to such parties require the interrogation of their effect in European politics. Party-based Euroscepticism has an important place due to political parties' roles in representative democracies. This thesis that is focused on party-based Euroscepticism explains the similar and different Eurosceptic attitudes of the two populist political parties, "National Rally" and "France Unbowed", with different ideologies in France. Given the decreasing effect of ideologies in political parties' stances and increasing similarities between established parties, populism as another important phenomenon of today's politics, provide an inclusive explanation to the rise of Euroscepticism.

Key words: *European Integration, Euroscepticism, Political Party, Populism.*

ÖZET

Son yıllarda Avrupa bütünleşmesi ve Avrupa Birliği'ne (AB) artan karşıtlık, Avrupa kuşkuculuğunu Avrupa siyasetinin temel bir olgusu olarak dikkate almayı gerektirmektedir. Avrupa kuşkuculuğunun ilk olarak 1980'lerde akademik alanda ve medyada kullanılmaya başlandığı görülmektedir. Diğer yandan, önceki dönemlere kıyasla daha ileri bir bütünleşmeyi hedef alan Maastricht Antlaşması, Avrupa kuşkuculuğu tarihinde bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul görmektedir. Ayrıca bu çalışma, Brexit süreci ve Mayıs 2019 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimleri gibi Avrupa siyasetindeki önemli gelişmelerin gerçekleştiği bir dönemde hazırlanmıştır. Avrupa bütünleşmesine kuşkucu yaklaşan siyasi partilerin başarılarındaki ve bu tür partilere ilgidaki artış, partilerin Avrupa siyasetindeki etkilerini sorgulamayı gerektirmektedir. Siyasi partilerin temsili demokrasilerdeki görevleri, parti merkezli Avrupa kuşkuculuğunun önemini arttırmaktadır. Siyasi partilere dayalı Avrupa kuşkuculuğuna odaklanan bu tez, Fransa'dan farklı ideolojilere sahip iki popülist partinin, "Ulusal Birlik" ve "Boyun Eğmeyen Fransa", Avrupa bütünleşmesi üzerine benzer ve farklı tutumlarını konu edinmektedir. İdeolojilerin partilerin üzerindeki azalan etkisi ve ana akım partiler arasındaki benzerliklerin artışı göz önüne alındığında, günümüzün bir diğer önemli olgusu olan popülizm, Avrupa kuşkuculuğun yükselişine kapsamlı bir açıklama sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Avrupa Bütünleşmesi, Avrupa Kuşkuculuğu, Siyasi Parti, Popülizm.*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALDE	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ALE-RPS	Alliance of Regionalists, Ecologists and Progressivist of Overseas Regions and Peoples' Solidarity
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union
DLR	France Arise
EB	Eurobarometer
EC	European Community
ECB	European Central Bank
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists Group
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EELV	Europe Ecology
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPP	Group of the European People's Party
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FG (PCF+PG+Ens.+etal.)	Left Front Coalition (French Communist Party + Left Party + Ensemble + Left Front)
FI	France Unbowed
FN	National Front
GREENS-EFA	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE-NGL	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left

IMF	International Monetary Fund
Ind.	Independent
LCR	Revolutionary Communist League
LO	Workers' Struggle
MDC	Citizens' Movement
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MPF	Movement for France
M5S	Five Star Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NI	Non-attached Members
NPA	New Anticapitalist Party
PCF	French Communist Party
PS - PRG	Socialist Party - Radical Party of the Left
PT	Worker's Party
RN	National Rally
RPF	Rally for France and European Independence
RPR	Rally for the Republic
S&D	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
UDF	Union for French Democracy
UDI+MoDem	Coalition (Union of Democrats and Independents + Democratic Movement)
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UMP	Union for a Popular Movement
UN	United Nations
UOM	National Archives Overseas
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Euroscepticism which plays an important role in grasping current European politics is increasingly influencing European countries. Party-based Euroscepticism, on the other hand, requires further examination given political parties' position in representative democracy. Although there is a great deal of consensus on the definition of Euroscepticism, the recent developments in Europe and the European Union's attitudes towards these developments, the reactions of the national political parties and EU member countries are quite remarkable. Similarly, populism has become a concept that is adapted increasingly by political parties. Although populism experiences in the world are too old to be compared with Euroscepticism, today's populism has a salient reputation.

Populism based on anti-establishment/elite rhetoric coincides with Euroscepticism without distinction between left and right ideologies. Parties' ideology cannot be taken as a single dimension to categorize parties according to their position on European integration. This similarity in defining Euroscepticism and populism necessitates revealing their overlapping features to understand their relations clearly.

Following this, research questions of the study are what bring right and left populist parties together in Euroscepticism, how do ideology and anti-establishment rhetoric have an impact on party's approach to European integration, how do National Rally and France Unbowed as populist parties reflect their Eurosceptic stances. Accordingly, the study argues that despite differentiation in political parties' populist stance in line with their ideological affiliation, their tendencies on the opposition to the EU and European integration share similarity.

The aim of this study is to present overlapping features of populism and Euroscepticism in political parties, on the basis of studies that explain the relationship between party ideology and level of party-based Euroscepticism. Additionally, it aims to contribute to the studies on party-based Euroscepticism by explaining the relationship

between the two phenomena in France's two major Eurosceptic parties (National Rally and France Unbowed) with contrary populist strategies. With this aim, it will reveal the success of left and right populist Eurosceptic parties in Europe based upon experiences of France. By this way positive and negative aspects of populist Euroscepticism on European integration and European politics will be clarified. With the explanation of the policies followed by parties this study will contribute to further studies on their positions in shaping the direction of the European integration process and future of the EU. The study envisages revealing the characteristics that bring together the right and left populist parties in Euroscepticism.

Populism has become an essential phenomenon to understand today's politics. On the other hand, it strengthens its existence in European politics day-by-day and becomes a main matter of both domestic and external politics of member countries of the EU. Regardless of whether they are in government or opposition, the increasing number of Eurosceptic parties and their growing number in national and European politics make these parties important elements in analyzing the current situation and the future of European politics.

Hence by examining parties with contrary populist stances the study will contribute to the studies on interrelation of populism and Euroscepticism. Furthermore, by focusing on two political parties in case of France, it is aimed to fill the gap of studies analyzing intersection of these phenomena in general terms.

This study looks at European integration in terms of populist parties and also discusses the alternative policies offered by parties in accordance with the demands of European citizens who feel rejected and have a skeptical approach towards European integration. Therefore, such analysis is important in the sense of addressing the policies of the populist Eurosceptic parties which are expected to be strengthened more if the central parties continue with their existing exclusionist and similar policies in the coming years. In addition, the study, in which the similarities and differences in the approaches of the right and left populist parties towards Euroscepticism will be considered in a comparative manner, will help reveal the effects of the policies of both types of political parties on the European integration and European politics.

In today's politics, the classical left-right dichotomy has lost its relevance and given its place to populist strategy. The main characteristics of anti-establishment parties are to show anti-elitist stance in the form of Euroscepticism, to gather parties from different ideologies, to address to the idea of 'there is an alternative' as the motivation in order to change established politics, to represent 'outsiders' and *volonté générale* (Hartleb, 2015: p.44). Extremist parties, which are more likely to maintain Eurosceptic stance independently from ideology, tend to embrace an anti-establishment rhetoric (Polk and Rovny, 2017: p.365). Classifying parties according to their party families does not allow categorizing them in terms of their Eurosceptic stance, due to the influence of national contexts and differences in the sources of their opposition to the EU. According to Featherstone, as quoted by Taggart, "there has been no clear, consistent, cross-national correlation between left/right attitudes and policy towards European integration." Therefore, a party's ideological affiliation is not enough to determine a party's position regarding European integration but may be a component to understand it (Taggart, 1998: p.377). Hooghe and Marks analyze the effect of parties' ideological profile in their European integration perspective and present a map classifying party families as per their Eurosceptic stance. Rather than the left-right dimension, they consider GAL (green, alternative, libertarian) and TAN (traditional, authoritarian, nationalist) dimensions due to ideologies' narrow scope in categorizing parties' stance towards European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2006: p.164).

Populism appears as the common point of the Eurosceptic parties coming from different sides of the political spectrum. Populism and Euroscepticism, despite their "unresolved and perhaps irresolvable discussion," refer to "distinct but intersecting phenomena" (Harmsen, 2010: p.333). Contrary to Euroscepticism, populism has a much longer history in the political science literature and is one of the most used terms in political analysis. Although the debate about the definition of populism continues, the difference between its definitions decreases (Sözen, 2017: p.6). The rise of populist leaders and domination of populist policies all over the world draw the attention of scholars and it seems that discussions over populism and the EU will remain on the agenda of European politics.

Euroscepticism is mainly manifested by parties in the periphery of their party system. The point which brings Eurosceptic parties together is populist politics. In populism,

opposition towards modern politics and institutions appear in Eurosceptic parties in line with accepting the EU as an elite-driven project composed of institutions and bureaucrats (Taggart, 1997: p.16). Accordingly, these two phenomena (Euroscepticism and populism) are complementary to each other.

In that sense, France sets an example which involves parties with the above-mentioned characteristics. Therefore it is crucial to study Euroscepticism and populism by considering France (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004: p.37). Besides, it is not possible to ignore French politics in populism and Euroscepticism studies and also France can be considered an important starting point for further studies in the same field. In France, right populist parties' opposition to European integration is shaped in line with a desire to return to 'golden age'. Also left populist parties perceive European integration as the accelerator of neoliberal and anti-democratic values and they defend an 'alternative Europe'. For this reason, understanding French parties concerning their populist policies and opposition towards the EU contribute to understanding the current relationship between populism and Euroscepticism in Europe-wide.

To clarify the theoretical framework of the study, the literature on populism and Euroscepticism will be reviewed. The study will be based on Mouffe's populism theory and its method will be simplified in keeping with the scope and the aim of the study. As an appropriate method to understand social phenomena and patterns in communication, partial content analysis will be used. Since all European parties will not be able to be included in research, two right and left populist Eurosceptic parties from France will constitute cases of the study. Within the scope of the study, France's two populist and Eurosceptic parties (National Rally and France Unbowed) will be examined in particular about their Eurosceptic stance starting from 2017 French presidential election campaign until 2019 European Parliament elections.

In accordance with the timing of the study, success of populist Eurosceptic parties National Rally and France Unbowed will be examined in detail from the perspective of their status in the European Parliament formed in 2014 and their stance on European integration during 2019 European Parliament elections campaign. Due to the timing of research, 2019 European Parliament elections results will not be included in the study. Also with the

inclusion of 2017 Presidential elections period, the importance of European issues in national politics will be considered by virtue of their arguments in these elections.

To answer research questions and realize the aim of the study, secondary sources like presidential and European electoral manifestos shared on the official websites of parties and key interviews of party officials in the media will be utilized. While election manifestos will provide official statements of parties as strategic and well-organized texts, interviews with party officials will be taken into consideration to benefit from unplanned statements to strengthen and detail the theoretical research. Manifestos are practical sources for clearly understand parties' policy positioning. However, they can necessitate complementary sources providing instant statements like published interviews. Manifestos can be accepted as the sole sources providing objective information with regard to parties' ideological positions or stances on a specific area made by officials of political parties after long-running discussions. Therefore manifestos provide systematic data and correlate many policy areas within one single text. For this reason, they provide extensive and unchanging information. In addition to this, it is possible to use manifestos in accordance with the scope and timeframe of the study. As in the current study, since the subject is related to current European politics, the last election manifesto related to the 2019 European Parliament elections will be considered. Also, some keywords mentioned in manifestos, which are useful in separating and estimating party position within the political spectrum, provide important sources especially in studies comparing parties from different sides of the political spectrum. As an illustration in the study, the word "oligarchy" will be a clue in differentiating right and left populist parties in terms of defining the scope of "the elite".

However, it should be noted that research on manifesto or official documents brings limitations since only official statements are taken into consideration. As known party officials can mobilize voters with instant sharing on social media or in public meetings and interviews that attract more attention than official statements. For this reason, the study will embrace published speeches of party officials to complete the lack of unplanned declaration with regard to a specific topic. However because the methodology of the study is not based on the systematic analysis of party official's speeches or discourse analysis, the study will be able to clarify parties' stance on European integration in a narrow-scope.

In comparative studies, party manifesto approach is helpful for reaching important data in indicating differences between political parties (Vasilopoulou, 2009: p.20). Manifestos also give the opportunity to practically compare different policy areas in more than one party. As they are widely used by researchers, even they necessitate to be compensated with other especially quantitative methods, they are still the most reliable sources in terms of estimating left-right party position. However, it should be noted that parties' position with regard to European integration will be considered with their commitment mentioned in official manifestos. In that case parties' attitudes in the political arena, for instance, if they act in the European Parliament contradictory to the manifesto, will be excluded. In addition to possible contradictions, parties are not able to cover all kinds of information on multiple issues in their manifestos. In this sense, the manifesto-based research may not entirely contain a party's position on issues regarding some areas, such as European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001).

The present study will start with the definitions of Euroscepticism by focusing on party-based Euroscepticism in the first chapter. In this chapter, theoretical discussions on Euroscepticism and the importance of the Maastricht Treaty in the history of Euroscepticism will be addressed. In this way the first steps in the emergence of Eurosceptic parties leading to the formation of today's Eurosceptic parties will be clarified. It will be revealed that sources of anti-EU sentiment that have been initiated with Britain's "awkward" position and surround today's European countries are based on oppositions during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, the contradictions or similarities between public opinion and the success of Eurosceptic parties will demonstrate the effect of national politics in European issues. Permissive consensus theory, which is widely used by experts, is important in defining the end of consensus at the public level about European integration in the post-Maastricht period. After a brief explanation of the public and institutional level of Euroscepticism, the chapter will proceed with the debates on the anti-establishment parties which tend to adapt Eurosceptic position.

In the second chapter, the aim is to analyze the definition of populism as the term is still under discussion. With debates on the content of populism, since the study will be based on existing populist parties, key concepts such as "new populism" and "populist moment" will

be explained. In accordance with the aim of the study, the importance of defining the scope of "the people" and "the elite" and right and left populisms will be evaluated with reference to Mouffe's theoretical approach as it constitutes the theoretical framework of the study. With regard to the debates on the relation of populism with liberal democracy, the place of direct democracy is quite important in populist parties as they will be addressed in the chapter.

In the third chapter comparative analysis of right and left populist Eurosceptic parties, National Rally and France Unbowed will allow to understand the overlapping features of populism and Euroscepticism. With focus on their election manifesto, their commitments with regard to the European integration on the eve of 2019 European elections will be analyzed. The chapter will start with the theoretical explanation of common features of populism and Euroscepticism especially with reference to Taggart's "populist politics of Euroscepticism". It will be found that although different populist policies, similar positions on specific areas such as national sovereignty, the lack of participation of European citizens in decision-making process have the same importance level in both parties and that their approaches show similarity. On the other hand, issues like immigration draws attention to one of the areas that differ completely in two parties.

The conclusion also will provide a clear outcome on the comparison of two parties. In this chapter, the study aims to put together all findings that were achieved with analysis of parties. It will mention the place of such parties at the European level about their offered policies and successes. It will be found that populist parties will continue to occupy the European agenda in the long term because of the lack of alternative in existing political parties in Europe.

CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF EUROSCEPTICISM AND POLITICAL PARTIES

European integration which is crucial in understanding European politics and the formation of the EU is currently occupying the agenda of the EU with the opposition of called “Euroscepticism“. Euroscepticism plays a substantial role in grasping developments occurring in domestic and European politics. As a long-standing phenomenon, Euroscepticism provides a useful and fundamental research field for the interpretation of contemporary politics, given the increasing dissatisfaction with the integration. It has been approached by many scholars in a complementary manner of other definitions of the phenomenon and has induced many theoretical debates. It is mainly used to describe opposition towards the process of European integration and the EU.

In this chapter firstly debates on the definition of the Euroscepticism will be addressed. It will be seen that there are diverse objections towards definitions of Euroscepticism. The most popular and widely used definition is provided by Taggart and Szczerbiak as afterwards they categorize party-based Euroscepticism as hard and soft. However, there are counter-arguments over the effectiveness of their classification of political parties in terms of the level of anti-EU and European integration attitude. In response to this, different classifications have been suggested. It should be noted that the definition of Taggart and Szczerbiak is still popular today and is very helpful in understanding today's Euroscepticism. Debates on whether Euroscepticism is ideology or strategy help understand the definition of the term. In addition, when we look at the beginning of the historical process of the term, we see that there are discussions about the influence of British case with regard to the integration. All these are effective in finding out Euroscepticism that has survived to the present day. Therefore, first of all, the transformation and continuity of the anti-Europeanism that Thatcher firstly emphasized is noteworthy.

1.1. Definitions of Euroscepticism

There are many interpretations of Euroscepticism among academic studies on the definition of the term. However, its description covering all kinds of approaches becomes challenging as there is no single kind of objection to the EU. Various sources behind Eurosceptic attitudes at different levels such as public and political party make the term problematic. Also, the dependency of European issues to national politics prevents to define Euroscepticism with consistent and reliable dimensions. Accordingly, the variability of the content and the sources of Euroscepticism lead to the following fundamental debates in the literature.

The difficulty in defining the term arises from its journalistic origin. When the term appeared for the first time in the news in 1986 in relation to Britain's approach to integrated Europe, it started to gain public attention and in time extended its content including the sceptical position of other countries. Euroscepticism which has become an inevitable concept in European integration began to be included in social scientific research. Crespy and Verschueren explain in detail problems of the definition of the term by referring to the historiography of European integration and limited discussions about the integration around federalism vs. intergovernmentalism or state and Europe dichotomy (Crespy & Verschueren, 2009). As a consequence of these boundaries in studying the European project, oppositions to the European integration have not attracted expected attention among scientific studies. Also controversial and multi-faceted nature of European integration has complicated the interpretation of Euroscepticism. Other important point that may be seen as the root cause of difficulties in defining Euroscepticism is demonstrated with the challenge in matching the history of Europe beginning from 1945 and the history of European integration (Crespy & Verschueren, 2009). However, despite the lack of sufficient and substantial definition of the term Euroscepticism, typologies which will be addressed in further paragraphs, have achieved dominance in the Euroscepticism literature.

When Euroscepticism is analyzed in terms of the grammatical approach, as a compound word it provides a summary of the generally accepted meaning of the term. The conflictual nature of Euroscepticism becomes apparent firstly with the meaning of its each syllable. As explained by Sørensen, the word consists of "Euro" which may be described

either with the "EU" or "European", "scepticism" may refer to "open to persuasion" and "ism" which gives the impression of ideology to the term (Sørensen, 2008: p.5). In addition to this approach, in typologies and political parties' Eurosceptic stances it will be seen there is an alteration in accordance with the definition of "Euro" whether as the EU, Europe or European integration. However, it is obvious that "Euro" is mainly referring to politically, socially and economically integrated Europe. In Kopecky and Mudde's typology, the importance is given to scepticism towards the idea of European integration and the EU separately, as some of the political parties' critics varying between opposition to the EU and European integration project (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).

Gibbins and Reimer make clear "scepticism" through a comparison with *affirmatives* as follows:

Sceptics are political agnostics who advocate withdrawal, whereas affirmatives are optimists who advocate participation. The former seek solace in the non-political, whereas affirmatives advocate participation in new movements and politics. Sceptics consider absolute assertions of truth and right, and of practices premised upon them, to be meaningless and dangerous. For them, nihilism, uncertainty and relativity are the only facts of life and politics (Gibbins & Reimer, 1999: p.17).

Tiersky also explains scepticism as "opposed to easy acceptance of others' arguments" pointing out the Greek origin (*skeptikos*) of the word (Tiersky, 2001). It refers to the suspicion, distrust and doubts about the truth of something in accordance with the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes (Milardovic, 2009: p.39). As a philosophy, "skepticism" basically signifies the refusal of belief or opinion which are referring to *a priori* knowledge, and necessity of an examination of those beliefs and ideas (Leconte, 2010: p.5). Accordingly Euroscepticism by referring to the meaning of "Europe" whether the EU or European integration project, is defined as:

Permanent doubting of 'Europe' as a great project, a vigilance about European integration conceived as building a new and powerful political actor in the international system, a 'European Europe' that would constitute a new force in a multipolar world as opposed to the contemporary American-dominated unipolar system (Tiersky, 2001: p.3).

In addition to this, advocating exclusion of the United States from the European project and supporting a "European Europe" that exists for its interests is inherent to the definition of Euroscepticism (Tiersky, 2001: p.3). In accordance with Tiersky's view, current Eurosceptic political parties having different and even contrary ideological positions, gather around the influence and especially dominance of the United States in the EU's policies. Organizations like NATO which are under the influence of the United States are explicitly ignored by those political parties.

Another crucial point in the definition of Euroscepticism is discussions about "*-ism*" of Euroscepticism. As per Taggart's and Szczerbiak's explanation, Euroscepticism may be defined as a strategy rather than an ideology. Euroscepticism is mainly linked to parties' position in the party system. Parties in the periphery of the party system implement Euroscepticism as a strategy against domestic political elites. When their position in the party system move to the center, their Eurosceptic stance generally softens and turns to soft Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008b). For parties outside of the established politics, to gain electoral support by describing themselves as the alternative to the established parties, Euroscepticism constitutes an important component of their strategy. In addition, Euroscepticism should be evaluated as a phenomenon within the context of opposition politics. In competition among parties in government and opposition, Euroscepticism represents an instrument specific to the opposition. As Rovny mentions, as per Taggart and Szczerbiak's explanation, hard Eurosceptics tend to adapt more ideological position in their approach to the European integration since they perceive the EU as an "enemy" when soft Eurosceptics act strategically. However this relation necessitates a proper analysis according to Rovny (Rovny, 2004: p.34). On the other hand, Kopecky and Mudde approach Euroscepticism as ideology as they reveal it in their study on parties' stance on European integration. Despite the change of party position in the party system, the level of Euroscepticism does not evenly show alteration. For this reason, the interaction of ideology and party position provides an explanation in understanding "multi-layered nature of the concept of the Euroscepticism" (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002: p.319). However, the effect of the party's position cannot be ignored. Given the distinction of European integration and the EU, while the party's ideology influences the party's ideas on European integration, the strategy also has an important place in understanding parties' support for the EU. Besides if party

ideology could be the sole factor in shaping the party position, parties having the same party position are expected to have the same stance on European integration (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).

With regard to the acceptance of Euroscepticism as ideology, "*-ism*" does not seem to be sufficient to evaluate it as a concept similar to core ideologies like socialism, liberalism. Also, Miladovic emphasizes that Euroscepticism cannot be considered as a coherent political ideology but it includes elements of ideology in line with the "second modernism" which represents conflict against the modernization as a result of the emergence of new technologies (Miladovic, 2009). New scepticisms and anti-modernist ideological approaches arise as a reaction to the global order. Movements such as anti-globalism, anti-integration, anti-modernism which are outcomes of "second modernism" are also included in Euroscepticism. For this reason, Euroscepticism contains a sum of various ideologies as neoliberalism, populism, extreme-right which gained prominence in the contemporary politics:

In the scheme modernization versus anti-modernization, Euroscepticism is an approach and political practice with sceptic face of modernization. Euroscepticism is that sceptic face of the second modernization or globalization. Generally speaking, Euroscepticism is a reaction to globalization and the second modernization from the left and from the right ones (Miladovic, 2009: p.42).

As mentioned above although Euroscepticism does not have a systematic feature like in core ideologies, it includes some aspects of those ideologies. In contrary to the objections to the acceptance of Euroscepticism as ideology, Flood interprets it as ideology arguing that the EU itself has an ideological nature. The EU's "hybrid, multi-level, unfinished construction" causes and facilitates to include interpretations of different ideologies in spite of covering all aspects of one or more than more ideology (Flood, 2002: p.7). Because various political groups, media, political parties having different ideologies have contributed to the emergence and the existence of the EU, the EU has evolved under the influence of different ideologies.

The seminal contribution to the definition of Euroscepticism and the first attempt to describe party-based Euroscepticism are provided by Taggart as he describes it as "the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified

opposition to the process of European integration". In parallel with the strengthening of European integration, oppositions to the integration have become inevitable and a natural extension of integration. Taggart, with his researches, focused on party-based Euroscepticism, classifies Eurosceptic attitudes of political parties in cross-national perspective. The first category includes parties opposed to the idea of European integration and the EU. Parties supporting European integration but opposing to the EU since they regard it as too much inclusive fall into the second category. The latter consists of those who support European integration, but who regard the EU as an exclusionary organization because of the geographical or social exclusion of many regions of the world (Taggart, 2008: p.367).

The term Euroscepticism originally comes from the Western European politics as it is firstly used for the British Conservative approach to European integration. With the increase of anti-EU sentiments with referendum on Maastricht Treaty, it became a popular phenomenon in the other parts of Western Europe. In accordance with enlargements throughout integration history, Euroscepticism entered the Eastern European and candidate countries' agendas and covered the European continent. In this way, the term necessitated to be analyzed with regard to additional variables (Rovny, 2004: p.31). Due to the British origin of the word, there are comments also regarding the basis of the Euroscepticism arguing that it is founded on values of Thatcherism such as economic liberalism, national independence, together with national defense and democratic values (Collier, 2002: p.53). Milner (2000) argues that British experience about the opposition to the EU has defined the term of Euroscepticism and broadened its scope with the Maastricht Treaty especially with "*petit oui*" of France and Danish challenging referendum process. During the Maastricht Treaty, especially in afore-mentioned countries, the objections of people to the national governments played a significant role in their decision on the Maastricht Treaty. However, Vasilopoulou argues that despite the term earned reputation in the mid-1980s with the British case, its historical background dates to the early efforts for establishing "United States of Europe". Euroscepticism with its multi-dimensional nature is shaped not only by national context but also by "EU zeitgeist" (Vasilopoulou, 2013: p.154). To Harmsen and Spiering having originated from Britain, Euroscepticism has been shaped by the British party and election system. It includes all kinds of opposition to European integration. However in the British case, it always signifies extreme opposition, thus by referring to Taggart and Szczerbiak,

British opposition can be included within the hard Euroscepticism category (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004).

When taking into consideration the above-mentioned descriptions of Euroscepticism, the definition of Taggart made in 1998 continues to be relevant today. Although Taggart and Szczerbiak have made contributions in the later years to their definition with classifying parties in terms of their level of Euroscepticism as hard and soft, "contingent or qualified opposition" to European integration covers varying degrees of Eurosceptic stances. Since Euroscepticism due to its nature includes both opposition and support regarding European integration, such inclusive definition of the term paves the way to refer all levels of Euroscepticism in studies similar to the present study that aim to analyze the relation between two phenomena (populism and Euroscepticism) avoiding going into detail parties' Eurosceptic stances. In accordance with the purpose of the study, Taggart's initial and practical definition of Euroscepticism will be taken as the basis in this study.

1.2 History of Euroscepticism

With the emergence of the opposition to the European integration, grouping countries and parties in terms of their level of Eurosceptic stance has become required. However, since the term was first widely used in popular media, it was challenging to transform it into the academic field. Also with the accession of new countries, widening and deepening processes, in accordance with this closing legal, social, economic gap between member countries, discussions over Euroscepticism have become apparent. For this reason, it is possible to see a relation between increasing debate about Euroscepticism and new steps taken with treaties towards the functioning of the EU.

Since Euroscepticism is a recent term compared to populism, key events as in the example of Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) as a threshold matter that influenced the position of countries, parties, and peoples with regard to the integration will be referred. Besides, Maastricht Treaty represents similarities with today's Euroscepticism.

Oppositions towards expanding policy areas of the EU that are seen as a threat against national sovereignty at that time still maintain their importance in the existing Eurosceptic parties. The first opposition of the Eurosceptic parties from different sides of the political spectrum focused on the restrictive effect of EU powers on national sovereignty. Also after the Maastricht Treaty, the lack of public consensus and the rise of public disaffection are quite remarkable. While it is possible to see a consensus at the public level in the pre-Maastricht period, in addition to critics on the Maastricht period, another point of view which is permissive consensus theory is helpful in embracing the emergence of discontent about European integration.

Today, Euroscepticism can be regarded as a political reality rather than a concept staying behind the politics as in the early years of European integration. In the wake of the successes achieved with the policies based on economic development after the catastrophe of the Second World War, European integration has become more attractive for nation-states having the aim of recovering their national economy. During this period, criticisms to the European integration were limited with the benefits achieved from being involved in a cooperation that prevented the rearmament of Germany, the dominance of France within the EC and other mutual benefits arising from being a member of the EC against damages that occurred with Second World War. On the other hand with the increasing interest in the integration, since new areas have become part of it, criticisms about the effectiveness of the European project have become diverse. As the scope of the integration has concentrated on harmonization of issues relevant to everyday life and the visibility of the outcomes of the integration has increased, objections to the integration started to be more pronounced. Therewith, while Eurosceptic parties gained much more public attention and support, European integration has transformed into one of the fundamental topics of national politics.

The transformation of the discontent about the European integration shows parallelism with the transformation of the integration. With the beginning of the 1990s, public support to the European integration was on decline in line with the apparent globalization and increased number of people who are rejected from expanding European project to distinct areas as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. This period is also called as "post-Maastricht

blues" in order to define the decreasing support of member countries as a response to the further integration (Akses *et al.*, 2016: p.22; Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007: p.139).

Euroscepticism has induced many theoretical debates about the public perception and raised questions about the legitimacy of the integration. With the inclusion of new areas such as foreign and defense policy, monetary union or changes in the voting system in order to facilitate harmonization of national laws, the factors shaping support of/opposition to the European integration have diversified. In accordance with this, Euroscepticism has become a more complex phenomenon and various factors have been needed to be considered in its analysis. As it will be detailed in the next paragraphs, today Euroscepticism in addition to its dominance in the current European politics, differs among countries, national political parties having similar ideological positions or among member and candidate countries. Given all these considerations it is clear that Euroscepticism should be seen as a key element in shaping both national and European politics.

Looking back at the history of the EU, as the beginning of Euroscepticism, Thatcher's famous so-called "Bruges speech" of 1988 in which Britain's opposition towards the European project was declared is demonstrated. However, the first concrete Eurosceptic attitudes have appeared in the early years of the integration especially with the rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC) and "empty chair crisis" (1965). In the British case as well, before Bruges speech period, it is possible to see a kind of Euroscepticism in Britain's membership application to the EC to become a member in 1961 (Forster, 2004: p.3). Those crises led to the discussions about the achievements of the previous European treaties such as Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Treaty of Rome (1957) namely "Treaty on the Functioning of the EU" that creates European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the Merger Treaty (1965) unifying three institutions under the name of European Community (EC).

The rejection of the establishment of the EDC can be accepted as the first turning point in the history of Euroscepticism. After the Second World War, European states were in need of cooperation in the field of defense. The idea of establishing a common European army had been proposed by Churchill in order to create cooperation for a common European army. With the success of ECSC, new cooperations among European states seemed possible

and in accordance with this, in 1950 with the proposal of René Pleven EDC was declared at the French assembly. However, the rearmament of West Germany as part of this idea, the absence of Britain and fear of losing control of France over the national army caused the refusal of the proposal. On the other hand, the "empty chair" crisis had opened a road for discussions about the voting system and the importance of the national interests in major issues. The Commission's proposal about the finance of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), rising role of the European Parliament and Commission, qualified majority voting that was envisaged to be applied in 1966 in the Treaty of Rome had encountered the objection of de Gaulle. As French nationalist and supporter of intergovernmental approach to the European integration, de Gaulle defended the veto right of nation-states in areas related to the high politics such defense. The lack of presentation of France in the meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER) and the Council blocked the decision-making process for nearly seven months. In order to bring challenging process to an end, with the Luxembourg Compromise (1966) "The Six" decided on "when very important issues are at stake, discussions must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached". However, the effect of Luxembourg Compromise regarding voting system continued till the mid of 1980s when economic and political changes necessitate qualified majority voting (Dinan, 1998: p.162). As in other cases as well, it is possible to argue that despite the discussions on the enlargement of EU competences, the political will of nation-states were not sufficient to realize immediately the next steps of the European integration. Accordingly, rejections of such proposals brought along discussions on the legitimacy of the EU and the benefits and costs of a being member of the EU have drawn elite and public attention in the later years of integration. The important point to be noticed is the evaluation of the criticisms in accordance with the content of each policy area throughout integration years.

Thatcher, with regard to European integration, shows an approach similar to de Gaulle's understanding based on national sovereignty and nation-states opposing a federal Europe baring supranational structure (Tiersky, 2001: p.74). Thatcher during her term of office between 1979 and 1990 encountered several developments in the European Community and these led to the discussions and efforts about a federal European Community on the eve of Maastricht Treaty. Especially German reunification perceived as a strong new power in

terms of demography and economy which can accelerate the transformation of the Community into a federal institution. In other words, the Gaullist view throughout Thatcher's office constituted an "old" approach to the modern changes in Europe (Tiersky, 2001: p.74). In her proposals and comments on the existing status on the Community, nationalist and sovereignty based views were dominant. On the other hand, Thatcher's speech given in Bruges can be seen as a milestone in the history of Euroscepticism since it was the first clear opposition declared by a political leader. In addition to its effect in British politics, the speech has opened the way for further discussions about the EU across Europe. And also it has reinforced mobilized and organized movements occurring with the end of elite consensus on European integration and opposing or rejecting European integration. Usherwood demonstrates "The Bruges Group" which is formed in 1989 as a think tank and inspired by Thatcher's speech, with the aim of gathering people sharing similar opposition to the EU from various fields in order to be effective in government's policies with regard to the EU (Usherwood, 2004). With its high-profile members, Bruges Groups achieved attention in the political sphere, as well in media. However, due to internal divergence within the group among nationalists that are concerned with the influence of European Community in national decision-making and on the other hand liberals defending more economic liberalism, Bruges Group could not gain concrete success. Despite its short-term achievements, it led to the formation of the first political movements opposing the EU in Britain and they spread across Europe (Usherwood, 2004).

Thatcher, in her Bruges speech, underlines the importance of Britain's place in the formation of the history of Europe stating the historical ties of Britain with the ancient European empires and the country's "cooperation with Europe and contribution to Europe". Following quote reflects the missing point of the integration according to Thatcher and at the same time summarizes the European-wide opposition: "The European Community belongs to all its members. It must reflect the traditions and aspirations of all its members." Also, she emphasizes the uniqueness of national identities in relation to European identity and gives point to the power sovereign states instead of a centralized European bureaucracy:

(...) willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community. (...) Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain,

Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. (...) To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve (Thatcher, 1988).

By addressing moves towards federalism led by Commission under the presidency of Jacques Delors, Thatcher also points out national cultures as the sole sources of European cooperation. On the other hand centralization of decision-making process is criticized due to its danger for national sovereignties:

Working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy. Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, there are some in the Community who seem to want to move in the opposite direction. We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. (...) But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the centuries. (...) Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour (Thatcher, 1988).

Additionally, it is clearly seen in Thatcher's speech that the public contentment about the policies of the EC takes place in the agendas of the politicians. As it will be addressed in the following paragraphs, in the pre-Maastricht period, the public opinion on integration was mostly disregarded by the European politicians. Because of that, integration was seen as an elite-driven project due to the lack of public participation in decision-making process. In accordance with this, the measurement of rising disquiet of European people with the integration in the late 1980s and beginning of 1990s evoked European elites the necessity of achieving public support for reaching successful integration in long term:

Community policies must tackle present problems in a practical way, however difficult that may be. If we cannot reform those Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly

causing public disquiet, then we shall not get the public support for the Community's future development (Thatcher, 1988).

Thatcher's approach to European integration is also inspirational in terms of the usage of the term Euroscepticism. High tensions between Commission and Thatcher, Britain's refusal of EEC membership in 1975, Thatcher's famous "No, no, no!" in the House of Commons in response to appeals for the increasing competence of the EEC have impact in drawing the roots of Euroscepticism specific to British case and the entrance of the word into the academic discourse along with daily life with the extremist connotation over an article published in *The Times* with following sentences: "Thatcher, still the sceptic in Europe", "EEC as a Euro-sceptic at best" (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004: p.129; *The Times*, 30 May 1986).

Euroscepticism which is inherent in European integration set out for economic purposes becomes visible with the shift of integration into the political sphere. It is possible to state that Euroscepticism has also emerged in response to rising globalization. Looking at the beginning of the 1990s, the dissolution of the USSR, the demolition of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War period required to take a step further in European integration. The accession process of Eastern European countries also required deepening and enlargement by making legal arrangements through treaties. The first of these was the Maastricht Treaty which brought a different perspective to the integration with novelties with regard to the political field and functioning of the institutions based on the attempts decided in the Single European Act. Therefore the Single European Act may be accepted as an effort to overcome the global economic recession that appeared at the beginning of the 1980s as the preparation process for a deeper integration mostly achieved with the Maastricht Treaty. With its fundamental aim of "four freedoms" namely free movement of goods, persons, service, and capital in the direction of establishing Single European Market, the Single European Act was cited by European politicians, particularly by Thatcher, as the cause of failure in the development of integration over the years (Dinan, 2005: p.191). Expansion of qualified majority voting in the Council, measures for increasing the impact of European Parliament in the decision-making process, preparation for the first pillar established with the Maastricht Treaty (Economic and Monetary Union), officializing European Political Cooperation (EPC) which will be replaced by Common Foreign and Security Policy with the Maastricht Treaty,

strengthening institutional capacity of the European Community (EC) constitute the main amendments of Treaty of Rome. Despite the discontent of supporters of a federal Europe, the Single European Act may be seen as a successful step since it has introduced necessary institutional changes for establishing Single European Market. Due to envisaged policies of the Single European Act that led to political union, it encountered objections of member countries. The Danish Parliament firstly refused the Single European Act and later accepted with referendum. Also, Ireland postponed the voting of the Single European Act but with the appeal of an Irish citizen, the Act was ratified with referendum.

With the Single European Act, the EU has expanded its policy areas with the introduction of qualified majority voting which simplifies decision-making process (especially regarding the introduction of Single Market) against unanimity voting that poses challenge to acting "credibly on the global stage" (European Commission, 2008). With this Act, the Treaty of Rome (1957) was amended and European integration was carried to a new level in order to achieve further cooperation in many areas. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU - 1992) has been established with the aim of ensuring a closer economic coordination initiated in the Single European Act and referred in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and Treaty of Rome (1957). It is accepted as a part of *acquis communautaire* with the Copenhagen criteria for new member countries. The important point of the EMU is the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) that is independent of national governments and acts for the stability of the currency. Political risk of abolishing national monetary power and the significance of national money for the national sovereignty enhanced sceptical positions of member countries (Dinan, 1998: p.152). It has multiplied distrust in integration as Britain, Denmark and Sweden have preferred not to join the Euro area. (Katz, 2008: p.152).

The Maastricht Treaty with the establishment of the three pillar structure may be seen as the continuation of the Single European Act that initiated radical change in terms of institutions. Policies such as migration, visa, European identity, cooperation in defense and justice, introduction of co-decision procedure in the European Parliament and the Council, obligation of getting European Parliament's vote of confidence in the appointment of Commission and increase in areas where qualified majority voting is used are substantial

changes of the Treaty. European identity which is part of the Maastricht Treaty constitutes the main indicator in establishing a closer tie between the EU and people living within its borders. And also the discussions around establishing a European identity that creates responsibilities and rights for citizens with the aim of establishing legal and political relationship between the EU and European people, occupy a large place in the opposition to the EU. European anthem, flag, passport, currency also can be seen as complementary of building closer relationships with the European people. The process starting with the refusal of Danish people and continuing with the difficult ratification process in France has resulted in the emergence of a period of “political backlash against the EU”:

Maastricht Treaty was truly a ‘system transforming’ event that dramatically altered the nature of the integration process and changed the public’s cost/benefit calculations. Until Maastricht, the European Union was largely an economic entity. Thereafter, the Union moved in the direction of political integration by expanding the number of policy areas for which it has some responsibility; by expanding the coverage of majority voting in the Council; and by strengthening the powers of the European Parliament. The trend of accelerated integration continued in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007: p.132).


During the ratification process of the Maastricht, Euroscepticism has become more visible and the main topic of European politics in the 1990s. Areas previously under the control of national governments were transferred to the competence areas of the EU. However, the purpose of deepening economic and political integration with a new legal system came across strong opposition. In the history of European integration, rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the first Danish referendum (rejected with 49,3%; in the following year ratified with %56,7) and ratification with a thin margin in France (50,8%) - although referendum on the treaty was not constitutional obligation - are accepted milestone in addition to Thatcher's speech. Thus, the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty presents the first phases of the opposition to the European integration existing today. Elites establishing the EU demonstrated for the first time their desire to transfer part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions in areas such as citizenship, foreign and security which were under competence areas of national governments and beyond economic purposes (Vasilopoulou, 2013: p.159). While Maastricht Treaty strengthened "ever closer union", in public opinion it reinforced objections to the integration. However, in contrast to studies describing Euroscepticism in

pre-Maastricht era as something marginal, Spiering remarks that although the term has been started to be used firstly in mid of 1980s, it practically dates 1950s with the efforts in the early years of European cooperation (Spiering, 2004: p.131). From the beginning of the European integration, British governments refused to join such cooperation for a long time. Britain's "awkward" partnership with the EU, with the establishment and dominance of Eurosceptic single-issue parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Referendum Party resulted with Brexit (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004). As the indicator of the presence of Euroscepticism, Spiering demonstrates the rejection of the EDC by De Gaulle and the Communist Party in the French assembly due to their hesitance about the re-armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Spiering, 2004). As can be seen from previous experiences, Euroscepticism has emerged during the early years of integration and changed its scope by incorporating new areas into integration.

The Eurobarometer surveys conducted in March 1991 in EU-12 reveal public support/opposition regarding crucial areas (such as European unification, citizenship, and European Parliament) in the pre-Maastricht period. For the first time, in the history of European integration till that time, public support for the existing European Parliament was 56% ("European Parliament is important") while support for the future of the European Parliament was 62% ("European Parliament should become more important"). On the other hand, 29% of the EC citizens were believing that existing European Parliament is not important. For the future, with respect to the increasing European Parliament's power and its cooperation with Commission and Council, the citizens of Denmark, UK, and Ireland prefer to be silent while general public opinion is in favor of increasing powers of European Parliament in proportion of 75%.


At that time, 72% of EC citizens perceived EC membership as "good thing". The significance of this proportion shows up when the former result in the same field is considered in which people believing EC membership as a "good thing" constituted 69% of the EC citizens. However, just before the Maastricht, positive idea of membership is decreasing to 69%. Denmark not surprisingly shows the lowest level in people perceiving EC as a "bad thing".

Figure 1
Support for European Unification and the EC (March 1991)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 35, 1991


Figure 2
Support for European Unification and the EC (October 1991)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 36, 1991

The European Parliament constitutes one of the important topics of the European agenda at the beginning of the 1990s due to scenarios on the increasing power of the European Parliament. Especially UK and Denmark were opposed to European Parliament's new competency areas: supervision of European Central Bank, asserting draft laws in the name of EC, approval of the members of the Commission. In addition to such oppositions, most of the people were supporting the European Parliament to be effective in the legislative area as it may be seen in the increasing support for the future of the European Parliament (“should become more important” / “more importance desired”) in the Figures 3 and 4.


Figure 3
Current and Desired Importance of the European Parliament (March 1991)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 35, 1991

Figure 4

Current and Desired Importance of the European Parliament (October 1991)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 36, 1991

Despite the attempts of the Amsterdam Treaty to compensate the increased disaffection with the ongoing process of European integration, national governments' unwillingness to negotiate a new treaty and political atmosphere blocked new policies aiming to bring solution to the increased scepticism about the integration. A few policies among strengthening public participation in the decision-making process, preparing proper policies for increasing immigration and new members were implemented. Also, the difficulty of reading and understanding the text of the Treaty prevented it to reach the large masses and to be embraced by the European people. Accordingly the Amsterdam Treaty, despite its purposes in accordance with the desire and claims of European citizen could not be a milestone in the history of European integration and fell behind previous institutional arrangements mentioned in the Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty (Dinan, 1998: p.10). On the other hand, the Treaty of Nice was representing the aim of preparing the EU for new members. This aim was to realize the purpose of the Amsterdam Treaty since they could not be achieved due to general displeasure of that time. In accordance with this aim, to facilitate the decision-making procedure several institutional and legal arrangements were included in the Treaty. The most significant one was extending qualified majority voting in the Council in the areas such as free movement. In addition to this, the number of members of

the Council, European Parliament and Commission were considered according to the increasing number of member countries from 15 to 25. However these attempts to make the EU suitable for the next enlargement encountered with the initial opposition of Irish voters. The Irish voters' "no" initiated again discussions about the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of European people.

The EU law that forms the EU as a *sui generis* organization takes greater place in the Treaty of Lisbon (namely "Reform Treaty"). After the discussions on the formation of the EU constitution, its failure with the rejection of France and Denmark and the challenging intergovernmental conferences, similar to previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty presents another important step in the updating the institutional capacity of the EU to compensate democratic deficit and the role of national parliaments in EU's decision-making to comply with changes in international relations and to include new policies regarding areas such as environment, terrorism. The important point that differentiates the Lisbon Treaty from the former treaties is the preparation of the Treaty within an atmosphere dominated by the discussions on the EU constitution. Thus the Lisbon Treaty reflects the purposes of the EU constitution and oppositions to the constitution, as well. With the rejection of the constitution and disagreements among members on the content of the constitution, the Lisbon Treaty took shape according to previous treaties in order to fulfill the gap that occurred between purposes of treaties and demands of people. Following this, without reference to some symbolical topics reflecting federalist elements such as the EU flag, the EU anthem, the Europe day, the Lisbon Treaty introduced changes affecting the functioning of the EU. It was initially rejected by the Irish referendum and had difficulty during the ratification process in the Czech Republic and Poland. Also, the Treaty established double majority voting that increases the importance of member countries' population in decision-making, aimed to increased the role of European Parliament and national parliaments, gave the European Parliament the competence to elect the president of the Commission, introduced legal mechanism with Article 50 for countries requesting to leave the EU and abolished previous constitutional structure of three pillar system and unified all pillars under the name of the EU by giving legal entity to the EU. However, the integration process, that continues since the Treaty of Rome to respond to demands and dissatisfaction in order to strengthen cooperation among members, with the Lisbon Treaty encountered the objection of countries arguing imperilment

of nation-states and national sovereignties. The Lisbon Treaty representing similarity with the EU constitution to a large extent, today in European politics finds place in the policies of national parties and statements of politicians as the source of dysfunction of the European integration while criticizing the EU.

Accordingly, each treaty with the aim of integrating European countries represents remarkable developments in the history of European integration. With the emergence of new common policy areas, the increase in the power of European institutions brought along discussions on the effectiveness of the EU in representing the ideas of nation states and their citizens. Compared to other treaties, the Lisbon Treaty caused big discussions on the legitimacy of the EU, as in the Maastricht Treaty especially criticisms against the Treaty came to be prominent rather than its novelties for the integration. Despite the aim of repairing deficit in terms of democratic participation of citizens in decisions, institutional innovations could not succeed in responding to the lack of transparency and deficiencies of previous constitutional developments. Maastricht Treaty due to its provisions as a follow-up of Single European Act and fundamental changes in integration with the transfer of the national competences to the EU, furthering integration at political level, principle of subsidiarity defining the role of EU institutions on issues with regard to central and regional level of countries and other instruments evocating a federal Europe brought along first serious criticisms continuing till current EU opposition. Accordingly, various theoretical debates on the Maastricht Treaty and salient public opinion at that time take place in the literature.

In short, the research on party-based Euroscepticism has increased with above-mentioned reasons in recent years. The costs and benefits of being a member of the EU have been firstly questioned with the Maastricht Treaty. Also, the most crucial one is referenda which took an important role in representing public opinion, allowed citizens to express their idea and in this way European issues have become one of main concerns of political parties.

1.3 Understanding Euroscepticism From The Perspective of Permissive Consensus

With the failure of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, permissive consensus theory (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) has showed up and brought along discussions about democratic deficit as well. In the general sense, the theory explains the reason for the failure of the integration with the lack of people's opinion on it. Studies regarding the rise of Euroscepticism refer to permissive consensus in order to explain the public stance on European integration before and after the Maastricht Treaty. As explained previously, because the Maastricht Treaty has gained acceptance academically with its influence on public idea regarding European integration, permissive consensus is suggested to be supplementary in explaining the significance of the Maastricht Treaty.

With regard to the general meaning of permissive consensus, the Oxford English Dictionary describes as "the granting of permission for agreement in the judgment reached by a group as a whole". As it is seen, this description emphasizes rather the second component of the term and makes hardly reference to the limited nature of the consensus. Also, the detail of the decision-making process and which parts of the society are included in reaching the judgment are missing in the definition. On the other hand, Key (1961) offers a different approach regarding permissive consensus theory before Lindberg and Scheingold and says that permissive consensus determines implementation or non-implementation of a policy envisaged by government. Therefore there is not a reference to the process of the policy formation as in the definition of the Oxford Dictionary. Accordingly, the lack of permissive consensus prevents the government from implementing its policies. Otherwise, it means the proposed policies are applicable if permissive consensus is achieved. Thereby permissive consensus is considered by political leaders as a key in understanding the convenient time of the action and in which form it should be presented to the public to achieve their permission (Key, 1961). However, as it will be seen, regarding the Europeanization, permissive consensus theory takes a deeper form and includes policy making process itself.

Regarding permissive consensus, Inglehart points out the link between elite and mass in addition to the significant role of the public opinion on decisions taken by national

governments (Inglehart, 1970). Additionally, Inglehart suggests analyzing the effect of public opinion or "societal input" in the light of three factors. The first depends on the structure of decision-making institutions whether they are composed of various societal groups or under the domination of one group. The second is the proportion of the people who do not have an idea on a specific subject. It is important because they affect decision-making process passively with giving no opinion in surveys. The last one is regarding the appropriateness of decisions with "deep-stated values" of the society. Since an individual's political orientations are formed in the early years of their lives, their political preferences do not change substantially in the future despite the level of support for the party fluctuates over time.

Permissive consensus can be used to describe a successful and satisfying integration which has been initiated by the European elites. However, the reference to the public opinion, participation or influence is absent from this description as in the example of the Schuman Declaration which has been launched with a small group of elites. According to permissive consensus theory, low level of public interest in a policy area enables decision makers to maintain their preferences. As a result, although a small number of people are in favor of a subject, due to people abstaining from sharing their idea, elites of the society consider this only as a small positive feedback.

The theory of permissive consensus was used to describe the support for European integration in the 1970s. However, at that time elite-driven characteristic of the European project was still dominant as oppositions towards the integration showed itself in referenda with the rejections of treaties or membership referenda which were sole sources in realizing public "consensus" on integration till the first European elections held in 1979. Besides that, considering passive position of European people in decision-making, Lindberg and Scheingold explain the concept of permissive consensus as the hopeful expectation of European people on the future of the integration since permissive consensus and people's expectation are based on the presumptions experienced in the post-war period (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). On the other hand "constraining consensus" theory is in line with the developments occurred in the latest years of European integration as in the example of low turnout for the European Parliament elections. Concepts such as "democratic deficit" which refers inability of EU institutions to represent public demand were increasing. Hence the shift

from "permissive consensus" can be seen as a result of the opposition to the integration and at the same the cause of the opposition (Hooghe & Marks, 2006). Hooghe and Marks describe the integration period after 1991 as "constraining dissensus" which replaced the "permissive consensus" of the post-war era. During the constraining dissensus period, opposition to the EU has constituted the main concerns of political parties both in national and European politics since the encouraging voters for EU support have become harder. Katz explains consensus at elite level with "substantive consensus" to describe the dominance of major countries in forming the EU while "permissive consensus" is used to indicate public support on European integration in the same period (Katz, 2008).

In addition to the above-mentioned clarifications, several studies (Perceheron, 1991; Franklin et al., 1995; Norris, 1997; Dyson, 2002, Gabel & Anderson, 2004) clearly explain the reasons for the failure of permissive consensus. At first, the early years of European integration was remarked with the decisions taken at the Council of Ministers for the issues especially regarding establishing free trade in the policy areas such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), etc. Within this period, public opinion was ignored by the politicians because of the technical content about the economic and foreign policy. In addition to the fact that European peoples were not aware of developments outside of national politics, even a small positive approach to European related issues was taken into account as the full consent of nations to integration. However, the decisions taken behind closed doors have attracted public attention over time, as mentioned in detail in paragraphs regarding the Maastricht Treaty, with the emergence of new areas related to the daily life of European people and more visible powers of European institutions. In addition to novelties coming up with the Treaty, in the early years of the integration competences have also become open to discussion among citizens. In accordance with this, the lack of transparency, democratic deficit have become main the concerns of European people. It is possible to say that French and Danish referenda have opened the way for discussions on the awareness of the public about the policy recommendation, policies implemented and their outcomes.

On the other side, Majone (2009) refers to the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and its consequences concerning the permissive consensus. With those references, Majone

gives answers to the question about the lack of public reaction to European integration in the 1970s although, at that period, similar to the post-Maastricht period, economic stagnation and inflation were seen. In addition to Union's elitist and bureaucratic nature and its increasing distance from European citizens, the Irish vote demonstrated the EU's capability to cope with the increasing prices which had a broad impact on everyday life. Though similar inability of the EU was experienced during 1970, with Irish referendum following developments have betrayed the trust on the integration: the end of permissive consensus, increasing gap between the intentions of European people and elite regarding the scope of the integration and increasing supranational competence of the EU but its inefficiency in solving problems with regard to the everyday life (Majone, 2009).

Table 1 reveals the decreasing belief in the EC membership. Starting from pre-Maastricht, during its ratification in member countries and after the ratification process, people's beliefs about the membership as "good thing" were falling. On the other side, the proportion of the belief that EC membership as "bad thing" was increasing throughout the years. When the decline in public support during the Maastricht Treaty and sharp decrease in the voter turnout of the 1994 European Parliament elections are considered, it is possible to state that a great lack of public participation and unpopularity of European project constituted the atmosphere of that period. In addition to this, it is possible to find out the sources of today's Euroscepticism in this period which led to the formation of suspicions to the decisions taken within European institutions. Holding surveys and referenda have engaged the attention of European citizens.

Public initiatives, political movements, campaigns have started to assist European people in grasping developments and changes in European politics. Also, attitudes of political parties, their representation of European integration to the people as a project having various advantages for national states has encountered the reaction of voters by demonstrating the danger of integration for the sovereignty of their nations. Therefore people have distinguished the control of Brussels over national sovereignties which is hidden by politicians for a long time. The most important outcome of this period and also the point to which the present study is referring is the use of dissatisfaction of voters by political parties (Franklin et al., 1995).

Table 1
Perception of EC Membership (Between 1991-1994)

	"Good thing" (%)	"Bad thing" (%)
March 1991 (EB35)	72	6
October 1991 (EB36)	69	8
March - April 1992 (EB37)	65	10
September - October 1992 (EB38)	60	12
March - April 1993 (EB39)	60	12
October - November 1993 (EB40)	57	13
April - May 1994 (EB41)	54	13
December 1994 (EB42)	58	12

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys. EB35-EB42

The emergence of Eurosceptic parties at the fringes of the political spectrum may be found during this period. Hence, as Percheron notes, to refer to the small amount of positive public opinion, is dangerous because of the unbalanced distribution of positive opinions among groups of society, the lack of information among people, low interest to the European topics, and limited perception of European project by citizens. In addition to this, the lack of public participation strengthens the idea that the European project is based on elite consensus and ever-mounting disquiet with the integration (Percheron, 1991).

Permissive consensus which is used to describe period starting with the early years of integration to the pre-Maastricht era may explain the current European politics, as well. Although the permissive consensus is considered as a concept specific to the mentioned period, it refers to the reasons for today's Eurosceptic political parties' existence. Beyond a limited period, the theory helps understand the rise and success of such parties in the existing political arena. Once permissive consensus reaches to an end, in accordance with the public discontent, individuals begin to seek for an alternative defending their interests. Political parties that benefit from this public pursuit, become a response to their demands. Independently of the historical development of European integration, whenever public opinion is missing and public reaction to the integration arises, it is possible to point out the end of permissive consensus.


Schmidt (2006) also points out that in line with the decreasing support for European integration, switching from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus came into sight:

The erosion in support is related to the EU's direct, politicizing effects which have introduced EU-related political cleavages into national politics, to its indirect depoliticizing effects which have removed policies from the national political arena, and to its knock-on effects which have demobilized some voters, radicalized others, and led yet others to alternative forms of activism (Schmidt, 2006: p.178).

Schmidt also stresses the lack of transferring the effect of the integration on national sovereignties to the citizens by political leaders. European integration has developed with leaders emphasizing that European integration will have little impact on national issues and that there will be no deep changes in their national political systems. Accordingly, permissive consensus allowed "political elites to build the EU largely outside the public eye" (Schmidt, 2006: p.37). "Empty chair" crisis, referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in France and Denmark, ratification of the Nice Treaty in Ireland have shown the reactions of citizens to the influence of integration to their national practices. France can be given as an example to leaders' impact of the integration in the public perception. France's national leaders, while they refused the effect of the integration on the national polity, they focused on the power of France in the EU's policies. They presented the EU under the leadership of France and the influence of French national values. At the same time, as permissive consensus theory accentuates, it is quite difficult to find the importance of Europeanization in the "unitary nature powers of the 'Republican state' in the speeches of leaders (Schmidt, 2006: p.38).

In the aftermath of the Maastricht, before the forthcoming 1994 European Parliament elections, rising European Parliament competences and ever-decreasing participation in European elections brought a contradictory situation: EU citizens were dissatisfied with the democracy of their countries (53%) and the EU (48%). National issues were more influential in their preferences at European elections while 55% of EU citizens claim that they consider national issues while voting for European candidates. In the same period, the fall in the number of people believing in EU membership (membership is a "good thing") demonstrates Euroscepticism at public level (compared to October 1991, decreases by 18 points in April-May 1994). On the other side perception of the EU as a "bad thing" increased 11 points.


Figure 5
Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU (May 1994)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 41, 1994




Figure 6
Support and Perceived Benefits of EU Membership (May 1994)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 41, 1994

The most striking result achieved just before and after 1994 European Parliament elections is the unconcern of European citizens to the European elections. One month before the elections 59% of European citizens did not know the date of the election and 19% of participants had the wrong information. After the elections, only 48% remembered election date and 52% could not answer correctly or did not remember the exact date.

Figure 7
Knowledge Date of the Last European Elections (May 1994)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer Survey 42, 1994

Similar to the Maastricht Treaty, in 2005 France and Netherlands rejected (France with 54,68%; Netherlands with 61,54%) Constitutional Treaty; in 2008 Ireland voted down Nice Treaty and in 2009 accepted with 67,13%. Enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have posed another difficulty for the EU in terms of harmonization of the EU legislation with the accession of new members. Also regarding the establishment of liberal and democratic principles in countries which were under the communist rule, due to the EU's limited power in domestic political issues, opposition on integration has increased both in old and new member countries. Additionally, the financial crisis of 2008 has negatively affected the ideas on

European integration and accompanied the establishment and strengthening of Eurosceptic parties. Huge migration flows from Middle Eastern and African countries have increased the EU opposition and debates related to the integration. Euroscepticism has become an important subject in leaders' speech, programs, and election manifestos. In the European Parliament, the political groups opposing the integration have increased with 2014 elections compared to the groups supporting the EU.

1.4 Euroscepticism and Political Parties

In the growing literature on Euroscepticism, the phenomenon takes form according to the levels of opposition (popular, institutional and political party), countries' historical background (countries formerly under the Communist rule) or their status (member and candidate countries) with regard to the EU. Those dimensions bring into view various factors underlying its complexity with the transformation of the current European politics. In this study, Euroscepticism will be addressed at the level of political parties to narrow the scope of the subject and to provide a depth and effective analysis. The term Euroscepticism will be used to refer to those who criticize the EU or directly reject the EU itself.

Although the subject of this study is related to party-based Euroscepticism, it will be useful to briefly refer to Euroscepticism at other levels. As will be mentioned clearly in the following sections, the literature of Euroscepticism focuses more on party-based Euroscepticism. However, it is possible to address Euroscepticism in the European Parliament, at the public level in parallel to party-based Euroscepticism.

1.4.1 Levels of Euroscepticism

With regard to public Euroscepticism, in line with Taggart and Szczerbiak's definition of "contingent or qualified opposition", Sørensen explains Eurosceptic public

opinion in a broad manner and includes rejection and criticism towards European integration: "Eurosceptic public opinion refers to citizens perceiving faults or shortcomings with regard to the EU of-the-day, and thus not exclusively to citizens wishing the dissolution of the Union" (Sørensen, 2008). As per conceptualization on Euroscepticism, Sørensen puts four types of public Euroscepticism: economic, sovereignty-based, democratic and political. People opposing the integration because their country cannot benefit from the EU's economic opportunities are included in the economic Euroscepticism category. Citizens perceiving the EU as a threat to their national sovereignty despite EU's economic successful cooperation are within the category of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism. The third one, democratic Euroscepticism refers to the people who claim the lack of democratic participation and disregard public opinion. The last one is related to the citizens' political positions. As Sørensen gives its example, if a person has a socialist view, he/she may challenge liberal policies decided by the Commissioners. With regard to citizens of three member states (Denmark, UK, and France), among Danish people, it is possible to see dominance of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism, while French people having political Euroscepticism and UK citizens similar to Danish people are suffering from EU's threat towards their sovereignty. It should be noted that, in each society, other types of Euroscepticism are seen at a certain level.

Regarding the relation of mass-level and party-based Euroscepticism, Taggart and Szczerbiak emphasize that Euroscepticism at public and political party level are contradictory in the Western European countries. When European citizen's ideas on integration are sceptical, the same level of scepticism at political party level cannot be seen as he explains it with the following words: "the level of party-based Euroscepticism is not necessarily correlated with levels of popular Euroscepticism" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001). However, in countries in which popular support for European integration is high, as per the results of the Eurobarometer surveys, the success of parties challenging to the European project is high as in the example of France and the UK. It demonstrates that factors apart from European politics are effective in shaping parties' stance on integration. Anti-establishment and populist parties that have complementary features, provide the best examples to this situation.

Benedetto analyzes Euroscepticism in the European Parliament considering 2009 and 2014 elections. As mostly agreed in the literature, Benedetto argues that European Parliament elections are seen as "second-order" issue from the perspective of political parties (Benedetto, 2008). For political parties in Europe, national elections are in the first place as which governing party is chosen and its result is considered more important than European elections (Adkins, 2010). European elections are seen as a kind of election survey for the next national elections. Referring to the study of Reif and Schmitt, Adkins notes that turnout in European elections is low and the proportion of invalid votes are high compared to national elections (Adkins, 2010). Accordingly, European elections provide suitable ground for anti-establishment parties to rehearse for national elections. Taggart explains the "second-order" feature of European elections as a platform for electorates to share their concerns related to domestic politics. Accordingly, referenda and European elections figure out support on or opposition to the present government party (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008a).

The concept of "second-order" for European politics is suggested by Reif and Schmitt (1980) in their research published in the aftermath of the first European elections analyzing nine EC countries. According to their argument, second-order elections (such as municipal, regional and European elections) which are different from "first-order" elections like parliamentary or presidential elections are accepted by voters as a tool of punishing or awarding national parties with respect to their stance in domestic politics. Other main points that make European elections less interesting than first-order elections are the issues that the European Parliament elections deal with (as national elections are related to the formation of government or president of the country etc.) and their consequences which are less binding than first-order elections. In brief, "less-at-stake" dimension provides the most pertinent explanation for the comparison of first and second-order elections. On the other hand, other factors affecting the European Parliament elections such as party system, procedure followed by national authorities at national and European elections, timing of European elections are also important. Especially the latter one is much-debated one since holding European elections just before national elections generates the perception that European election is the "test-election" for national parties' performance at national elections. Also when European elections are held after national elections, voters tend to punish or congratulate parties for which they voted during national elections.

According to Benedetto (2008), although Eurosceptic parties' success in the European Parliament elections to which they oppose, paradoxically, it is obligatory to work coherently with political groups in the European Parliament. However, Eurosceptic parties which are within the category of hard Euroscepticism, cannot be such successful in obtaining what they envisage. In order to explain reasons behind that, Benedetto asserts institutional dynamics that prevent Eurosceptic parties to act in the European Parliament. Proportional representation system allows a few countries to be represented in the Parliament with higher number of member of the European Parliament (MEP). In addition to this, to be effective in the EP, they have to form coalition at least with other Eurosceptical MEPs who come from political parties having different stance on Euroscepticism. Also grand coalitions on the left-right dichotomy that are still dominant in the European Parliament pose another obstacle for Eurosceptic parties (Benedetto, 2008).

In respect of Euroscepticism in candidate countries, by focusing on Central and Eastern European countries which are candidate countries at the time of study, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) argue that in candidate countries having more chance of becoming a member of the EU in a little while, level of Euroscepticism is higher than other candidate countries having less chance or much more time for becoming member of the EU. They explain this relation by the cost and benefit approach. Since costs are more visible in the earliest periods of the accession and benefits of being a member country are received in the long-term, countries in the first group (which have more chance of becoming member of the EU) demonstrate more Eurosceptical attitudes. It is possible to see strong Eurosceptic parties in the candidate countries. Although party-based Euroscepticism occurs mostly in small parties having less electoral support, their presence in their party system makes their stance on the EU important. Compared to Eurosceptic parties of member countries, in Central and Eastern European Countries there is much more support for Eurosceptic parties. This difference is explained by Taggart and Szczerbiak with countries' communist background. Because their sovereignty is restricted in the communism period, the idea of European integration is hard to accept. Accordingly, hesitancy about the loss of national sovereignty leads to soft Euroscepticism in those countries. In line with this, support for soft Eurosceptic parties is higher than member countries. The other point that differentiates between candidate and member countries is the ideological stance of Eurosceptic parties. In candidate countries

especially right-wing parties demonstrate Eurosceptic attitudes; however in member countries Euroscepticism is independent from parties' ideologies as it is quite easy to identify Eurosceptic taking part on the contrary sides of political spectrum. However, such outcomes on party-based Euroscepticism and party ideology are not consistent because parties' ideologies do not give coherent idea on their Eurosceptic stance (Taggart & Szcerbiak, 2002; Henderson, 2001).

1.4.2 Definitions of Party-Based Euroscepticism

In the literature it is possible to observe differentiation of the definition of Euroscepticism in relation to levels of Euroscepticism. These levels emerge as a result of the difference in the sources of Eurosceptic attitudes and the handling of the European issue by political parties. This difference also gives clues about the "second-order" feature of the European politics. As the focal point of this study, party-based Euroscepticism that includes various debates around the source of anti-EU position of political parties draws attention due to the role of political parties in representative democracy. On the other hand, the anti-establishment concept is useful in explaining why Euroscepticism is used by parties located far from central parties in the party system.

Political parties have an important role in democracies. Their main function is to create a link between citizens and policy makers in order to achieve necessary power to influence the political process. According to Gaffney (1996), political parties are composed of elements which are interactive with each other or some of them have dominance over others: elites, supporters, activists in terms of human resources, on the other hand economic sources and history, policy recommendations, discourse. However, within the context of the EU, role of national political parties are underrated because of the effects of elites, interests groups which cause political parties to remain in the background. On the other side, when today's political atmosphere is considered, especially growing number of political parties having much more influence in national politics with their salient positions with regard to the EU, demonstrate a contrary case to the description of Gaffney (Gaffney, 1996). Even in academic

debates, the place of national political parties and their effectiveness in decision-making process is increasing. Political parties are still key factors in mobilizing people in referenda, in determining political agenda, issues to be discussed in media. In terms of European issues, political parties cannot be considered as separate actors from the EU since party politics and European issues are getting more in-built day by day. As mentioned previously, at this juncture, the effect of national politics in European politics or vice versa may be seen as the reason of the commonality of two phenomena. In addition to the political parties' "gatekeeper" role in national representation, their importance in terms of European issue is arising from their effect in determining the representative of Eurocrats: "They play a crucial role in the selection of key members of European institutions (most importantly the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament). They also play an indirect role in the selection of Commissioners." (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: p.2) On the other hand the topic of Euroscepticism occupies a large part in the programs of political parties. The importance of political parties in Europe on European integration is reflected in the literature as well as in the party program. In the literature, Euroscepticism is mostly dealt with at the level of political parties (Kaniok, 2012 p.3). Therefore, it is important to address the issue of European integration from the perspective of political parties, as parties may be highly influential in mobilizing the voters with the above-mentioned dimensions.

With regard to parties' approach to the European integration, Taggart (1998) proposes four categories to classify parties. Single issue parties stand for total opposition to the European integration and their sole objective is to impel society to be against the integration. UKIP can be given as one of the single issue parties of today's European politics. Anti-establishment parties which are opponent to every established politics constitute the second category. As mostly seen in today's politics, they are opposed to the parties at the center of the party system arguing that established parties are becoming more similar in terms of ideology, accordingly their appeals become similar. For this reason, from the electorate perspective, there is not an alternative to consider their demands. Thus anti-establishment parties benefit from the lack of alternative in politics challenging traditional politics including European integration. In this category, their Eurosceptic stance is questionable since they aim to disagree with all kinds of established politics and institutions. In this manner, the EU with its institutions, presents an important opportunity for such kind of parties. Their independence

from all sorts of ideology ensures opportunity in getting support of voters with different views and alternative seekers. It is possible to see similar characteristics in populist parties which will be examined in detail in following chapters. The third party category which consists of established parties with Eurosceptical stance is used for parties in the government or parties close to the government. The fourth one can be seen when one group within the party is opposed to the integration and party's stance on the integration is favorable. Milner (2000) makes an addition to the argument referred by Taggart, by mentioning that government parties support European integration as much as they become a part of the EU network to get support in international arena. However parties in the periphery of the party system and defend for instance ecological issues, manifest Eurosceptic bearing.

Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) provide the first typology on Eurosceptic parties. Considering the difficulty that they had during grouping member and candidate countries and also finding a suitable definition of Euroscepticism covering all members of the EU, they finalize their categorization with two kinds of Euroscepticism which are accepted as a reference point in further similar studies. Hard Euroscepticism is described as:

(...) is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart & Szczerbiak: 2002, p.7).

Hard Euroscepticism includes parties in the member countries aiming withdrawal from the EU and parties in the candidate countries opposing the EU membership. Also if party's desire contradicts with the policies of the EU or despite some kind of support, if the party is in contradiction with EU's fundamental policies they are also accepted as hard Eurosceptic as they are "de facto opposed to the EU membership."

On the other hand, soft Euroscepticism is framed as:

(...) where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory (Taggart & Szczerbiak: 2002, p.7).

They define soft Eurosceptic parties whose opposition to the EU is among one of the concerns of the party. Additionally, parties which support existing European integration but do not support further integration are also involved in this category. Hard Euroscepticism specifies rejection of the European political and economic integration while soft Euroscepticism represents "contingent or qualified opposition" to the European integration.

Such categorization as hard and soft Euroscepticism allows covering different *magnitudes* of political parties' Eurosceptic stance. Because the differentiation between two categories is provided with unspecified conditions, - by some authors that is seen as a disadvantage and missing point of this categorization as it will be discussed below -, it becomes possible to include political parties in the same category differentiating in terms of their stance with regard to the EU. As Rovny notes "their typology is, however, further unranked. It creates merely two additionally unspecified categories of Eurosceptics, each of which collects differing cases. This simplification may limit more nuanced observation" (Rovny, 2004: p.33).

According to Kopecky and Mudde (2002), hard and soft Euroscepticism do not provide a clear classification due to their weaknesses in identifying parties as Eurosceptic or not. The definition of soft Euroscepticism allows even parties that have little disagreement with a policy of the EU to be described as Eurosceptic. Also since hard Euroscepticism is defined as objection to the current form of European integration, the line between hard and soft Euroscepticism becomes weak. Due to the blurred criteria used in separation of two categories, they represent a different conceptualization with reference to Easton (1965), diffuse and specific support based on their emphasis on the separation of support for the ideas of the European integration and support for the practice, the EU itself. These dimensions divided into two categories include both support and opposition to the integration. The first dimension involves Europhile and Europhobe. Within the category of Europhile; leaders such as Thatcher and Charles de Gaulle are included due to their approval to transform some level of their sovereignty to the economic and political union despite their partial support to ideas of the EU. The opposition within the first dimension which is Europhobe includes parties opposing the founding ideas of European integration.

Table 2
Typology of Party Positions of Europe Described by Kopecky and Mudde

		Support for European integration	
		<i>Europhile</i>	<i>Europhobe</i>
Support for EU	<i>EU-optimist</i>	Euroenthusiasts	Europragmatists
	<i>EU-pessimist</i>	Eurosceptics	Eurorejects

Source: Kopecky & Mudde, 2002: p.303

The EU optimists describe parties which agree with the EU policies. Here it should be noted that despite some kind of opposition to the policies of the EU, parties generally supporting the EU and are in hope for the future of the EU are included within this category. The other one, EU-pessimists, are currently in conflict with the EU and do not expect any positive step for the future from the EU. Some of the parties included in this category can be in favor of withdrawing from the EU membership, as well. On the other hand, Taggart and Szczerbiak criticize classification of Kopecky and Mudde with three arguments. Firstly they state that in their classification does not consider the popular usage of the term Euroscepticism. And in popular usage, Euroscepticism includes "principled and contingent opposition to the European integration project". In contrast with classifications like "Europhobe" and "Eurorejects" Kopecky and Mudde (2002) point out only principled opposition to European integration. Secondly Europragmatist category includes political parties that are opposed to current European integration but support the future of European integration. To Taggart and Szczerbiak this kind of approach is far from being logical. The third criticism to Kopecky and Mudde is regarding Euroenthusiast category that is too

inclusive and is not able to cover all kinds of approaches to European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003).

Other typologies try to fill the gap that former conceptualizations overlook some aspects as in the example of the conceptualization of Flood. With the aim of providing alternative categorization and avoiding the gap between them, Flood (2002) suggests six categories. The point that differentiates Flood's typology from other is the non-use of the term Euroscepticism. This provides Flood to make a clearer and transparent classification and facilitates to identify parties more easily according to categories described by Flood. In this categorization, it is suggested to include both positive and negative stances of parties to the integration. Also, such specification ensures covering all factors (ideology, internal issues, party strategy) affecting parties' approach.

- Rejectionist: positions opposed to either (i) membership of the EU or (ii) participation in some particular institution or policy.
- Revisionist: positions in favour of a return to the state of affairs before some major treaty revision, either (i) in relation to the entire configuration of the EU or (ii) in relation to one or more policy areas.
- Minimalist: positions accepting the status quo but resisting further integration either (i) of the entire structure or (ii) of some particular policy area(s).
- Gradualist: positions supporting further integration either (i) of the system as a whole or (ii) in some particular policy area(s), so long as the process is taken slowly and with great care.
- Reformist: positions of constructive engagement, emphasizing the need to improve one or more existing institutions and/or practices.
- Maximalist: positions in favour of pushing forward with the existing process as rapidly as is practicable towards higher levels of integration either (i) of the overall structure or (ii) in some particular policy areas (Flood, 2002: p. 5).

In addition to efforts in categorizing parties in relation with their view of European integration, on the other hand, "populist moment" that European politics is currently experiencing conduces parties to demonstrate similar arguments with regard to their stance on

European integration. Current Eurosceptic parties are becoming more similar in terms of their criticisms: imperilment of national sovereignty, immigration that damaging national welfare, and lack of public opinion in decisions taken at European level. For this reason, in addition to typologies mentioned above, change in political parties over time in accordance with the general political atmosphere as in the current case of populism, helps reach more consistent analyze of Eurosceptic political parties.

1.4.3 Relationship of Euroscepticism with Ideology

As introduced in former sections, Euroscepticism is a phenomenon that is in relation to diverse factors. Especially national politics presents this variety in parties' positions in the European integration process. As will be mentioned in the following paragraphs, studies focusing on the relation between ideology and parties' Eurosceptic stance share a common argument: Parties' ideological affiliations do not present a coherent and variable dimension in classifying parties according to their Eurosceptic stance. According to research conducted on the relation between ideology and Eurosceptic stance of parties, it has been found that Euroscepticism gathers parties from different parts of the political spectrum. As pointed out by Taggart (1998), there are various sources behind the parties' Eurosceptic attitudes. While trying to make a categorization of Eurosceptic parties, it has been discovered that disaffection about the EU is seen in parties from different and also contrary ideologies. From another point of view, parties sharing the same ideological affiliation all do not present the same level of Euroscepticism in Western Europe (Taggart, 1998).

As Taggart gives reference, Featherstone emphasizes the insufficiency of ideology in predicting parties' EU stance. However, ideology cannot be disregarded as it provides an initial point to envisage parties' position about the EU. Ideology at least can be seen as a component in understanding party-based Euroscepticism (Featherstone, 1988). Ideology does not present the Eurosceptical position of political parties due to the fact that party families can easily differ in countries (Taggart, 1998). Also, left-right dichotomy offers a very strict dimension to understand a political party's perception of the EU. Taggart uses "crowbar

effect" to identify the gap appearing between because of mainstream parties that become similar in terms of policies, ideologies or approaching to the government to benefit from state power and resources and becoming cartel parties. Accordingly, while mainstream parties becoming much closer, the distance with other parties outside of the established politics gain an appropriate opportunity to place themselves far from mainstream parties. So increasing gap serves protest parties' purpose of differentiating their positions in the party system. Thus in the EU context, Euroscepticism is considered as an ideological "crowbar" by protest parties (Taggart, 1998).

Polk and Rovny offer a further explanation for parties' position on the EU with regard to ideology. They refer to the contemporary European politics that lays emphasis on anti-elite/establishment parties which are more likely to be Eurosceptic parties. Extremist parties tend to maintain Eurosceptic stance independently from ideology and embrace an anti-establishment rhetoric (Polk & Rovny, 2017: p.365). Gathering political parties having different ideologies, emphasizing the alternative and representation of "outsiders" and *volonté générale* constitute the main characteristics of anti-establishment parties (Hartleb, 2015: p.44). Batory (2002) notes that ideology gives shape to the party's policy with regard to European issues, however other variables related to domestic politics such as party competition or coalition possibility with other parties are effectual. Flood (2002) although his different approach about the acceptance of Euroscepticism as ideology, he argues that multi-ideological content of Euroscepticism prevents to reveal a systematic approach on the relationship between party ideology and its position to the EU:

That is part of the reason why no single ideological current absolutely guarantees that a party will be rejectionist, revisionist or EU-sceptical at all. Even a nationalist party can hold EU-enthusiastic positions if it chooses to believe that the EU can be shaped to defend national interests more effectively than the nation can alone. (...) The EU as an ideological issue is structured by traditional currents (Flood, 2002: p.10).

Rovny (2004) mentions the difference between ideologically and strategically driven Eurosceptics. When parties prioritize their ideological position and draw attention to their

commitments in compliance with their ideology, their policies also correspond to a particular ideology that party adapts. Such parties consider essential values of the ideology they are defending in order to hold their established electorate. They may disagree with some EU policies if they contradict with those core values of their ideology. Parties performing their responsibilities in accordance with their strategic aim which is generally gaining new electorate may sacrifice part of traditional voters in order to have an effective position in national politics and in this case, cost and benefit calculation becomes dominant. This explanation corresponds to multi-layered nature of Euroscepticism (and also Euroenthusiasm) since neither ideology nor strategy gives a clear explication in estimating their connection with the sources of Eurosceptic attitudes of parties.

Therefore, ideology and party families are not independent factors regarding the determination of anti-EU/pro-EU position of parties. Merely ideological/strategical approach does not explain the motivation and sources behind the parties' attitudes. And all European politics' second-order nature prevents to examine parties' European policies by considering only their intent with regard to Europe. As European issue cannot be disassociated from national politics, it is not consistent to link ideological affiliation of parties with Eurosceptic position. From the viewpoint of modernization approach, as people who are excluded from the globalized world and cannot incorporate themselves into modern daily life, as in the rise of extreme movements, Euroscepticism provides a platform for political parties to embrace people having such beliefs. Accordingly, with its protest nature, Euroscepticism continues its existence independently of a core ideology.

1.4.4 Euroscepticism and Anti-Establishment Parties

The rising gap between public opinion and mainstream parties threatens party systems. Parties in the periphery of the party system, namely anti-establishment parties profit from people's mistrust on European integration in other policy areas. Over time anti-establishment parties gain strength their position within the party system through awakening people's

"resentment" on non-EU related issues. Especially their independence from state support in terms of economic sources provides such parties the opportunity to act upon public opinion.

There are many terms to define parties differing from mainstream parties. As their contexts change in accordance with the period in which they are used, some terms do not represent their essential meaning. Because misuse and misunderstanding of these terms, "anti-establishment" is preferred in this study to define such kind of political parties. Firstly, Michalak (2011) explains non-traditional parties with "protest party" and emphasizes that protest parties are accepted as the antithesis of the traditional and stabilized political parties. Analysts claim that such parties have a destabilizing influence on the democracy and threaten the public opinion with the return of fascism thus such comments or epithets have notable effects on voters' behavior. In fact, protest parties are relatively young, low institutionalized; they do not have "grand ideology" in contrast to traditional political parties. Michalak notes that it is possible to characterize protest parties by anti-systemness. Political observers and journalists may use the strict meaning of the anti-systemness and in this way, they combine the protest parties with extremism, anti-democratic and generally right-wing movements. In addition, traditional actors to keep their supporters, label protest parties anti-democratic or at least irresponsible. The attempt to discredit the protest parties in the public opinion is based on using words which have negative connotations such as "extreme" (like the extreme left or the extreme right), "radical" "ideological", "fascist", "anarchist" (Michalak, 2011).

On the other hand, Schedler (1996) calls suchlike parties as "anti-political-establishment parties". Terms "protest", "extremist", or "populist" are contemporary concepts, often used interchangeably and insufficient to describe protest parties. And "anti-political" ideology is central for many outsider parties but it has not received the attention that it deserves in the literature. Abedi uses Schedler's term of anti-political-establishment parties and describes those parties with the following criteria:

- A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy and political system issues - Even though they are against the establishment, they do not oppose the

politics but rather seek the chance to represent new issues that were neglected by the established parties,


- A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties generating political establishment,
- A party asserting that there exist a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people (between ruled and ruler) (Abedi, 2004: p.11).

Thereby anti-establishment parties appear as the defenders of people suffering from political establishment. Anti-establishment rhetoric due to the lack of a fixed ideology provides a consistent explanation about Eurosceptic parties.

Hooghe and Marks (2008), in their research on the effect of party's ideological profile on its support and opposition to European integration, indicate that the left-right dimension is not sufficient to estimate Eastern and Western European countries' parties approach to the EU. However, in addition to the left/right dimension, it is necessary to take into account GAL (Green/Alternative/Libertarian) / TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) ideological dimensions which are related to the area of new politics. Party positions such as radical left, radical traditional-authoritarian-nationalist, agrarian parties differ in West and East Europe. In other words, especially parties in Central and Eastern Europe do not represent consistency with the party positioning in Western Europe. Because of that reason, party ideology does not provide us a systematic classification of Eurosceptical position of European parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2008).


Sitter points out that behind the Eurosceptic attitudes of parties many reasons starting from their ideological affiliation to leadership contestation within the party (Sitter, 2002). Parties especially possessing "new populist" tendencies use European integration as an issue to differentiate themselves from the established parties. Accordingly, in Sitter's explanation as well, ideology presents an additional element in classifying parties' Eurosceptic stances within national and cross-national context. However, all diverse factors serve a fundamental aim of Eurosceptic parties: Establishing politics of opposition.

Figure 8
Party Families and Dimensions of Party Competition in East and West



Source: Hooghe & Marks, 2008: p.160

Figure 9
Dimensions of Party Competition and Position on European Integration in Western Europe




Source: Hooghe & Marks, 2008: p.162

The last election to the European Parliament held in 2014, with the lowest turnout in the history of the EU, drew the attention to the reasons behind the decline of European citizen's participation in the EU decision-making process. In addition to low turnout, elections of 2014 represent another significant issue related to the political parties' perception of the

European integration. In 2014 elections, for the first time, European citizens have elected the largest number of Eurosceptic parliament members.

With regard to the distribution of the European Parliament formed in 2014, political groups including MEPs from national parties with extreme positions like extreme right or left constitute almost one-third of the vote rate as in the following comparative tables indicating vote rate and number of seats of political groups formed with 2009 and 2014 European elections. The increase in the number of seats of those political groups in 2014 is remarkable.



Source: European Parliament, 2019c

Table 3**Political Groups Supporting European Integration in the European Parliament (2014)**

Political Groups Supporting European Integration	Vote Rate (%) /Number of Seats	Political Groups Opposed European Integration	Vote Rate (%) /Number of Seats
EPP	29,4 / 221	GUE-NGL	6,92 / 52
S&D	25,43 / 191	ECR	9,32 / 70
ALDE	8,92 / 67	EFDD	6,39 / 48
GREENS-EFA	6,66 / 50	NON-AFFILIATED MEMBERS	6,92 / 52
TOTAL	70,44 / 529	TOTAL	29,55 / 222

Source: European Parliament, 2019a

Especially with the success of the National Front (FN) and the Dutch Freedom Party, Eurosceptic bloc in the European Parliament has been established and thus other parties with Eurosceptical stance have taken a part in the Parliament. In the UK, UKIP replaced Labour Party and it was in the lead of the European elections with 26,6 % of total vote, while in 2009 it took 16 % of popular votes. Together with Britain's historical opposition to European integration, concerns about Euro crisis, immigration issue that has given European countries a deep shock in the management of migration arising from Syrian civil war, Single Market that enables "four freedoms" can be seen as factors in speeding up public displeasure with the existing politics. However, UKIP could not maintain the same success in general elections. In 2017, after Brexit Referendum, it lost its only seat in Westminster and it was the party that lost the most votes.

Table 5 demonstrates the vote rate of popular parties which are known with their Eurosceptic stance. As may be seen from the table, there is a clear increase in the vote of those parties between 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections. All the mentioned political parties explicitly increased their successes between two elections.

Table 4
Political Groups in the European Parliament (2009)

Political Groups Supporting European Integration	Vote Rate (%) /Number of Seats	Political Groups Opposed European Integration	Vote Rate (%) /Number of Seats
EPP	35,77 / 274	GUE-NGL	4,57 / 35
S&D	25,59 / 196	ECR	7,44 / 57
ALDE	10,83 / 83	EFDD	4,05 / 31
GREENS-EFA	7,44 / 57	NON-AFFILIATED MEMBERS	4,31 / 33
TOTAL	79,63 / 610	TOTAL	20,37 / 156

Source: European Parliament, 2019d

In Greece as well, in accordance with the Euro crisis, austerity and neoliberal policies imposed by the EU, Eurosceptic parties such as Syriza (increased its seats in the European Parliament from 1 to 6) and Golden Dawn succeed to represent the Greek citizens in the European Parliament. In Ireland, Sinn Féin draws attention among Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament with its 19,5% vote which is among lowest vote rates received by all Eurosceptical parties in the European Parliament. It constitutes 3 of 11 seats allocated to Ireland while the first pro-European party Fine Gael has 4 seats.

Table 5
Vote Rate of Major Eurosceptic Parties in 2009 and 2014 European Parliament Elections

	Vote Rate in 2009 European Parliament Elections (%)	Vote Rate in 2014 European Parliament Elections (%)
UKIP	16	26,6
FN	6,3	24,85
M5S	-*	21,2
Syriza	4,7	26,58
Danish People's Party	16,3	26,6
Sinn Féin	0	19,5

Source: European Parliament, 2019d

In Italy, the Five Star Movement established by the ex-comedian Beppe Grillo emerged from the 2013 general elections of Italy as one of the winners and became the first party in this election. Five Star Movement, as an ecological party at the same time, is holding 15 seats in the European Parliament as the second Italian party. The Danish People's Party, one of Denmark's leading parties in the European Parliament, is among the highest voted parties in the European Parliament.

1.4.5 Brief History of Eurosceptic and Anti-Establishment Parties in France

France, with right and left-wing parties' emphases on national sovereignty, represents a particular status with respect to party-based and public opposition compared to the other member countries of the EU. Despite the popularity of Britain with its unique European integration process, as one of the founding members, France also illustrates a compelling Europeanization process. Throughout the 1990s in France, debates on integration among political parties demonstrate a kind of "politics of opposition". Parties' stances on integration,


factions within parties, or establishment of new parties can be accepted as reflections of discontentment about national issues. Developments arising from the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties were perceived as a danger for French national sovereignty.

As Taggart mentions (1998), France represents one of the member countries having higher Euroscepticism at the political party level. During Maastricht campaign, right and left-wing parties' critics on integration caused separation within parties as in the examples of Mouvement Pour la France (MPF - whose founder Philippe de Villiers was in the Union Pour La Démocratie Française UDF) and Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC - which is initiated by Jean-Pierre Chevènement from left and pro-European Partie Socialiste). As in the left side, within the right-wing coalition formed by Rassemblement Pour La République (RPR) and UDF, party officials who are opposed to integration approached to Partie Socialiste (PS) in supporting Maastricht Treaty. Additionally, FN as an advocate of the French withdrawal from the beginning of the integration process, and in the left Partie Communiste Française (PCF), far left Lutte Ouvrière and Trotskyist organizations such as Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), Partie des Travailleurs (PT) contributed to the opposition against integration.

With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the 1994 European Parliament elections results demonstrated the continuance of the EU opposition at the political party level. The following European Parliament elections of 1999 proved success of Eurosceptic list formed by Philippe de Villiers and Charles Pasqua (Rassemblement Pour la France et l'Indépendance de l'Europe - RPF - emerged from Gaullist RPR) after PS (MDC and Green Party were in the common list) which was the main party of left coalition governed between 1997 and 2000. With the establishment of EMU, especially hesitations of low-income groups were increased due to the probable negative impact of Euro on the French economy especially unemployment was the primary concern. However, the left coalition led by PS took power in 1997 and provided policies for equal sharing of single currency burden during preparation for Euro. Thereby, before the 1999 European Parliament elections, public opinion on European integration was quite positive and support for single currency was already deepened. However, Eurosceptic parties took second place in the European Parliament elections in contrary to public opinion. At that point, Milner (2000) refers to Taggart's explanation of

ideological "crowbar" effect. In accordance with anti-establishment parties' common stances, in France, Euroscepticism is shaped by internal politics and used as a crowbar by anti-establishment parties to replace themselves in a position far from the mainstream parties. During the elections campaign, with rapprochement of three main parties, a significant gap between mainstream and anti-establishment Eurosceptic parties appeared. This allowed "outsiders" to show themselves as capable of giving responses to the ignored concerns of the public. Increased similarity between mainstream parties provided a suitable occasion for anti-establishment parties to appeal to people who are displeased with the present government (Milner, 2000). Also low turnout (46,76%) in 1999 European elections can be seen as a sign of public displeasure with the existing mainstream political parties.

Figure 11
Turnout of French Citizens in European Elections (1979 - 2014)



Source: European Parliament, 2019b

To Milner, reactions against integration arise from both parties (left and right-wing) in France because both sides regard the integration as a threat to French sovereignty. On the other hand, French left also showed strong opposition to the EU but their reactions were brought under control with alliances among Eurosceptic and pro-European parties as in the

common election list of PS in which MDC was included and became effective in "neutralizing a left-wing Eurosceptic current" (Milner, 2000: p.43). At that time, the main complaints of the left Eurosceptic parties were gathered around the EU's policies in line with globalization and rising unemployment. MDC advocated the role of nation-states in the integration and attached importance to "popular consent" which reveals its sovereigntist vision, as well. However, it always remained a minority in national and European Parliament elections. As PCF, they supported more social Europe accentuating social and economic priorities. In French politics, the European Parliament elections provided a platform for such smaller parties to defend their ideas and to call voters who are dissatisfied with the existing political order. With the European Parliament elections, they obtain an opportunity to examine voter support and to challenge the established parties.

In accordance with the argument that Euroscepticism is accepted as the politics of opposition, Sydow (2013) manifests discrepancy in public support and the rising vote of Eurosceptic parties in France in his study. With regard to the 1994 European Parliament elections, France differs from European countries in reflecting the protestation of European integration. In the 1994 European Parliament elections, while parties advocating withdrawal from the EU gain 27,6% of total votes, one month before in the Eurobarometer survey about the perception of the EU, 13% of society expresses its negative ideas on the EU.

As a current example, in the European elections of 2014 France demonstrated a similar attitude with regard to public opinion in France on EU membership and vote received by FN (presently "National Rally") as a prominent Eurosceptic party of France and Europe. Whereas NF achieves 24,85% of total vote in France in European Parliament elections, a year before, in 2013, French citizens reflected their views about the EU membership as "bad thing" at the rate of 16%. Accordingly, such a big gap in public idea and voter preference regarding European elections confirms debates around the acceptance of the European issue by citizens as a chance to respond to matters not related to the EU.

Figure 12
French Political Parties' Distribution among Political Groups in the European Parliament (2014)

Parties	%	Seats	EPP	S&D	ECR	ALDE	GUE/NGL	Greens/EFA	EFDD	NI
FN	24.86	23								23
UMP	20.81	20	20							
PS - PRG	13.98	13		13						
Alternative (UDI+MoDem)	9.94	7				7				
Europe écologie	8.95	6						6		
FG (PCF+PG+Ens.+et al.)	6.33	3					3			
DLR	3.82	0								
Nouvelle Donne	2.90	0								
LO	1.00	0								
NPA	0.30	0								
UOM	0.00	1					1			
ALE-RPS	0.00	0								
Ind.	0.00	1							1	
Other parties	7.11	0								
Total	100	74	20	13	0	7	4	6	1	23

Source: European Parliament, 2019b

In addition to National Rally, France Unbowed ("La France Insoumise") established in 2016 by Jean-Luc Mélenchon was previously active in Socialist Party and Left Party, has come into prominence with its support for an "alternative Europe". Party is strongly opposed to the neoliberal policies of the EU and proposes a union in Europe which is not dominated by bureaucrats and does not force member countries to carry out economic policies that serve to the interests of banks.

In this chapter of the study, the transformation of Euroscepticism throughout the European integration history with reference to key events and in relation to this, discussions in the literature has been presented. However, it should be noted that Euroscepticism is still going through changes and currently takes form in accordance with the crisis specific to current European politics as in previous examples. In such a period the attitudes of the political parties on European integration and how they affect the EU as the most successful integration project are required to be questioned. The next chapter aims to clarify the point at which parties agree on Euroscepticism. To this end, it will be seen that populism which is today's reality, helps clarify parties' common arguments with regard to European integration. In this way, populism with its contribution to understanding the Eurosceptic stance of parties,

will present a component part of the definition of Euroscepticism and provide an inclusive explanation. In the next chapter how the two Eurosceptic parties which have increased their successes in 2014 European Parliament and national elections, find a common ground in Euroscepticism despite their ideological opposition will be explained. Therefore, today's populist movements are effective in shaping the approaches of parties to European integration. France, on the other hand, offers a productive case as a country where these two phenomena are experienced intensively.



CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM

Populism has become today's one of the most used terms in numerous fields. The term is very much confronted in daily life and used to define quite distinct policies and political actors. On the one hand, the broad sense of the term facilitates to make an analogy among different movements, on the other hand, it causes ambiguity. Such extensive usage of populism makes inevitable the consideration of the phenomenon especially in the studies on contemporary European politics. Accordingly in this chapter origins and definitions of the term will be briefly evaluated. Four fundamental approaches (strategy, ideology, discourse, political style) will be briefly addressed. The main concepts in populism literature such as "the people versus the elite" dichotomy will be explained in order to understand the differences between right and left populist movements. Mouffe's understanding of populism will help us to find out the theoretical framework of the study. This theoretical framework will provide the opportunity to compare parties having contrary positions on the political spectrum since it presents a clear explanation for the distinction right and left populism. The study will continue with the place of democracy in populist movements. In accordance with the rise of populist trends in Europe, current left and right populism experiences will give a clue about the next chapter which will focus on two French populist and Eurosceptic parties.

2.1 Origins of Populism

Populism has arrived in Europe later than North and Latin America and been influenced by former populism experiences. However, in addition to diversification of populism regionally, it has showed different characteristics among the European countries, as well. The first populist movements in Europe have come to existence in the form of agrarian populism in Eastern Europe in the early 20th century and peasant was considered as the group forming the "people". Yet these movements were under the control of authoritarian leaders so

they could not be influential in European politics (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.33). In the next periods, populism fell behind fascist and communist governments in the post Second World War era because of Europe's long-continued struggle with those ideas. With the end of the cold War, efforts establishing democratic order throughout the European continent have come across oppositions to the democratic transformation process. Especially during furthering European integration process in the early 1990s with European treaties, strong resistances to the elite leading deeper integration have emerged and led to the rise of Eurosceptic movements. Consequently, the first examples of today's populism have appeared in that period. Especially right politics has induced initial populist movements in Europe since left populism has occurred with policies imposed after the financial crisis of 2008 threatening the welfare state.

Transformation of populism throughout history demonstrates distinctiveness in accordance with the political and historical developments. The first example of populism was experienced in Russia ("narodniki") and the United States in the second half of the 19th century as agrarian populism. The common point of populism in two countries was the distinction of the rural population as the "people" and "corrupt elite" (Sözen, 2017: p.8). In the first years of the 20th century, the second period of populism witnessed in Southern America, especially with populist leaders of Argentina (Juan Domingo Perón) and Brazil (Getúlio Dorneles Vargas). In this period of populism, the separation of "the people" and "the elite" was shaped by workers and oligarchy which had ties with imperialist powers. The third wave of populism emerged as the separation of right and left ideologies. As the focus of this study, right and left populism have appeared at the end of the 1980s and emphasized popular sovereignty against the "corrupt elite". The earliest form of right populism occurred in a nationalist and anti-immigrant manner while left populism was centered in Latin America with the examples of Venezuela (with leadership of Hugo Chavez), Ecuador (Rafael Correa) and Bolivia (Eva Morales).

With regard to today's politics, low turnout both in national and European elections is the foremost indicator of people's discontent with the existing politics. Abstaining from voting clearly points out voters' disappointment about the effectiveness of their vote. As will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs, due to the removal of fundamental pillars of

politics in the current post-political area, people have become less interested in politics. Together with this, people's suspicions about the transparency of politics, fair decision-making processes taking into consideration people's demand also cause the idea that voting does not bring any change to the existing order. The lack of difference among candidates in elections and consensus in politics compel citizens to make a choice between the same kind of projects and trigger passive citizenship. On the other side, limited participation to elections extends the gap between citizens and elected government. Also, the dissatisfaction of the citizen against the government and their confidence in politics decreases in the same way. In line with the crisis of representation, the content of active citizenships evolves and unusual kind of participations such as street demonstrations (Occupy movements, Indignados, and 15-M in Spain, social protests similar to Greece's anti-austerity movements, Nuit Debout and Gilet Jaunes in France which influenced many European countries) and protests through social media platforms (Twitter and Facebook) transcend. Such kind of citizens' efforts to influence politics give sign that political parties and politicians fail to respond to the need of people's needs (Leterme & Staak, 2016: p.48). The rise in votes of anti-establishment populist parties and fall in voter turnout demonstrate a common reality: The lack of alternative in politics.

2.2. Definitions of Populism

The main reason why populism can fit in any contexts is that it can take shape according to national characteristics. While it refers to anti-immigration and xenophobia in the European region, in Latin America it is associated with clientelism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.2). From this aspect, populism rather than a coherent concept, can be considered as "transitory phenomenon" because when it comes together with other thin or thick ideologies, it becomes more definable (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.6).

Unlike Euroscepticism, populism has a long history in the political science literature. The rise of populist leaders and their influence on politics have become the focus of political scientists. Although the term has appeared long ago, debates around its definition still

maintain. Meanwhile, differences between definitions have become blurred and similar, besides they have complemented each other (Sözen, 2017: p.6). In spite of differences in consideration of the term (as strategy, ideology, discourse and political style), debates are concentrated on the idea that populism is based on the distinction of society as elites and people. The term of populism takes part a lot in current politics as Trump's victory in the United States, success of Front National in France in the last presidential elections have reinforced questions relative to the meaning of populism.

In today's politics, the rising dissatisfaction with the political establishment and success of populist parties do not seem to be a simple coincidence. Although at first sight populism is seen as a concept associated with extreme movements having radical right or fascist perspectives, it is independent from any ideological component due to its nature. However, as every political party has an ideological affiliation, ideologies cannot be totally ignored from parties' populist stance according to theories explaining differentiation between right and left populism. Despite discussions about the relationship between ideology and populism, it seems that in the literature, populism may be used to describe non-ordinary movements, parties or politicians. In addition, populist movements that are expected to focus on elite-people segregation, are known to adapt to any ideological approach as it will be addressed in the following paragraphs.

According to scholars approaching populism as strategy (Weyland, 2001; Barr, 2009; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011), populism serves leader's purpose of generating direct relation with the mass in order to govern easily or achieve the power (Sözen, 2017: p.12). To Weyland, populism can be defined as "political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power through direct, unmediated, noninstitutionalized support from large numbers of followers" (Weyland, 2001: p.14). Accordingly, the leader keeps the main role in unmediated relation with the people by eliminating party organization. Weyland explains the way that he follows in defining populism with the aim of avoiding political, social and economic conceptualizations of populism which restrict the concept. Abstaining from multi-domain concepts and accepting populism as a classical concept can facilitate its clarification (Weyland, 2001: p.14).

Scholars also underline the opposition of establishment and elites in addition to leader's aim of direct communication with the people (Sözen, 2017: p.12). In line with the acceptance of populism as opponent of established politics, Barr (2009) makes an addition with describing populism as a mass movement - which comes from the periphery of the system - with the aim of keeping or gaining the power against the established politics. Strategic populism is mostly seen in Latin America and non-Western countries where charismatic leadership is more dominant. Populism offers leader oriented politics as the opportunity to enhance leadership through unmediated connection with the society though this could cause the leader to leave a big mess after his death. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.4).

On the basis of Freedman's "thin" and "full" theory explanation, populism can also be described as "thin-centered ideology" which is deprived of inclusionary aspect contrary to ideologies such as socialism, liberalism and which need the support of "full" ideologies. To Canovan (1999) populism can be seen as an appeal to the people, an opposition to the establishment and its dominant ideas, values. Canovan describes populism as reactive since "populists always attack the power elite of politicians and bureaucrats for their privileges, their corruption, and their lack of accountability to the people. They also attack those they identify as clients of the elite and beneficiaries of taxes paid by ordinary, hardworking people: typically, asylum-seekers, immigrants, minorities who have been granted special treatment, welfare recipients and so on." Additionally, external factors are also within the threat perception of populists, as the EU bureaucrats can be included (Canovan, 1999: p.32). Four important concepts lie behind populism as ideology: the people, democracy, sovereignty and majority rule (Canovan, 1999: p.33). Each of them is related to others and ensures the ideology of populism. Democracy is seen as the government of sovereign people and sovereignty necessitates including people's participation in decision-making through referenda as a way of direct democracy with which the will of people is declared.

Mudde (2004) considers populist ideology from a different view and identifies populism as "distinct ideology" because it does not present a coherent ideology and necessitates to be combined with "full" ideologies. Mudde accepts populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic

groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004: p.543) Populism asserts this separation on the basis of normative distinction instead of empirical. Similar to Mouffe's explanation of post-political era, Mudde argues that politics has gained administrative feature, political parties and their reaction have become more similar while today citizens' demands are beyond the established politics. Accordingly, populism has become an indivisible part of the contemporary politics.

To Taggart (2000), populism is "widely used but poorly understood political concepts" and useful in understanding representative democracy. Taggart defines six themes of populism. The first one is the representative democracy and institutions, which can be seen as the source of populism. Second one, "heartland" offers an ideal community through which populists define the people. However, the idea of the heartland does not signify a utopia, it refers to the past when ethnical and cultural homogeneity is ensured. Additionally, heartland concept provides populists to demonstrate themselves as the only representative of the people. The third feature of populism is the lack of fundamental values contrary to core ideologies. That is why populism can be seen in any party independently from ideology. Consequently, Taggart describes populism as an ideology but emphasizes the lack of core values in populism. The fourth one is the sense of the crisis which facilitates the emergence of populists. Populists can use probable crisis to argue that they are the only power to offer solution against the crisis. The fifth one is about the self-limitation of populist movements. Since populists emerge generally in the form of movement, when they become institutionalized they tend to lose their populist stance. The sixth one is the invisibility of populism -described as chameleon- due to the evaluation of populism in time and among regions. Although populist leaders do not abstain from populist strategies, they do not prefer to declare their populist vision.

The third conceptualization of populism as discourse represents the basis of populism as distinction of people and corrupt elite as in former conceptualizations. However, scholars arguing populism is a discourse asserts that populist leaders or parties use populism as a way of appealing people. Laclau (2005) considers populism "discursive strategy" and the populism as an ideology can be combined with ideologies as per conditions of the existing period.

According to Laclau, the main logic of populism is to divide society into two as people and its enemies which is described as oligarchy and to consider people's demand, which were neglected by established politics, through a leader. In respect of antagonism between two groups, populism as discourse shows similarity with the other definitions of populism. The main explanation that differentiates Laclau's definition from other definitions is that populist leader creates and defines "people" (Sözen, 2017: p.15). Laclau defines populism as a concept which is contradictory and elusive and its features can be observed when populist movements in the world are examined closely as their outcomes can be different. Populism can be considered as the ideology of elites since dominant ideas in a society are shaped by the hegemonic class (Taggart, 2000: p.17).

Finally, populism as political style is defined by Knight (1998) on a period of crisis and mobilization in addition to the distinction of the people and "them-and-us mentality". Moffitt (2015) makes an addition to Knight's definition by elaborating populism as political discourse as populism appears not only in populists speeches; it is also shown up as rude behaviors in their call to people. To mobilize the masses, gestures, and ways of addressing the people shape around behaviors irrelevant to traditional politics. In this way, public and media coverage would be achieved and contribute to the popularity of the leader (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.4).

Müller (2018) emphasizes that populism does not exist as a theory, and there are not any coherent criteria to describe it. Two main features can be found in populism: anti-elitism (by itself it is not sufficient to describe a political movement as populist otherwise every movement opposing the elites would be accepted as populist) and anti-pluralism (a normative concept rather than empirical). What needs to be emphasized is that polarization and discrimination are both included in populism. Hence people are defined in an exclusionist manner as populists argue that they represent 100% of people, not 90%. The important thing that gives a significant feature to populism is approaching politics as a matter of moral. In that case, people comply with moralistic terms and elites are corrupted because they contradict with moral values. Since moral values may be defined variously and are not linked to any empirical evidence, populist politics becomes a concept which is hard to be defined. Populist leaders pretend to be the sole representative of homogenous and the "real people" whether

they are in government or opposition. In the case of gaining electoral success, they benefit from it as a tool in alleging that they are "real representative" of people and argue that every policy or act (including corruption) is carried out based on the power which is given by the people. When they are in opposition, their aim becomes "to be a voice of silent majority" which by then cannot find a representative to consider their demands. Eventually, populism is neither ideology nor strategy but it has a special style.

2.2.1 Politics of "The People" versus "The Elite"

The people and the elite constitute the main concepts of populism. These two concepts define the scope and the content of populist strategy that is used by politicians to mobilize the target group of the society. Therefore, as generally accepted in populism literature, "the elite" is identified over "the people" as a constructed concept. For this reason, especially in right-wing populism, the elite does not refer to a consistent or specific group, contrarily it includes groups excluded from "the people".

Although at first sight "the people" makes sense of solely huge number of person coming together, it is mostly used as a notion referring to "silent majority". "Silent majority" defines a community that could not find an occasion to be represented until the emergence of a leader who can defend their ignored rights and speak in their name. Though it should be noted that the "silent majority" does not signify pluralism, it has exclusivist appeal and refer to something constructed. "People" refers to citizens fulfilling their civic responsibilities and accordingly constituting the "real people" of the society. On the other hand, populist rhetoric demonizing group out of "the people" forms solidarity among "people" and simultaneously reveals "enemy" due to moral stance to politics. The problem arises with the reference point used in defining "people". Taggart clarifies it with the notion of "heartland" which is "the location of 'the people":

The heartland is a territory of the imagination. Its explicit invocation occurs only at times of difficulty, and the process yields a notion that is unfocused and yet very powerful as an evocation of that life and those qualities worth

defending, thereby stirring populists into political action. The heartland is that place, embodying the positive aspects of everyday life (Taggart, 2000: p.95).

The reference to "heartland" leads to nationalism and facilitates mobilizing people. It unifies people around single imagination embracing their demand and excluding ones not belonging to the imagined territory. Exclusionist stance of populism comes from the "heartland" as populists see themselves responsible for establishing or return of old national territory. Consequently, "heartland" does not arise from nationalism, in contrary nationalism comes up with the "heartland".

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) explain three dimensions used in the identification of the people: people as sovereign, common people and people in terms of nation. However, they necessitate to be combined in certain degrees with secondary concepts such as nationality, social and economic status of society and power. "People as sovereign" means that the source of the power, ruler or decision-maker is people. This concept is commonly used in populist strategies to legitimize different kind of policies that contradict with the interest of people. As Müller points out, once populists - because he rejects notion of "left populism", he refers to right populism in his book - come to power through elections, they tend to use election success in infinitive manner. For instance, they justify corruption by stating that the people give the power to use it for the sake of people on behalf of them (Müller, 2018). Secondly the concept of "common people" puts class or marginalized groups that were previously excluded due to their cultural or socioeconomic characteristics. The third one, which is the "people as nation", defined the people having a link with the foundation of a specific community that they are living in. The term includes a nationalistic meaning and refers to ethnic groups (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). According to Mouffe (2019), nationalism should not be left to right populists otherwise it can cause enormous danger - most especially fascist movements- in the hands of right populists. Nationalism can be used by left populists as well in a progressive way in the sense of patriotism as France Unbowed's reference to the French Revolution. At the same time, this stance, regarding European integration can facilitate the rise of the idea of "Europe of Nation".

The other main concept of populism which is “the elite” indicates establishment disregarding the interest of society. Although there is not so much debate on the definition of “the elite” unlike “the people”, it is possible to point out general features belonging to “the elite”. Elite group is formed in accordance with the content of “the people” as it can include political, cultural, and economic groups that confront with "general will" of people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.12). On the other hand, the notion of elite gives populism its essential "anti-establishment" characteristics. Müller argues that populists can sustain their anti-establishment rhetoric while they are in power as well. Populist strategy both in opposition and in power can be favorable to maintain and increase popular support. They keep the anti-establishment stance in power by playing the victim although they constitute the majority (Müller, 2018). Therefore populism is not limited to political opposition.

While the scope of “the elite” in right populism is quite broad, left populists meet in the middle ground in defining “the elite” in economic terms. As left populism arises with the economic crisis at the end of the 2000s, the main reason for its emergence is austerity policies imposed by global hegemony and accepted by a national oligarchy. The common point of left and right populism with regard to the elites is that they argue that in addition to elites’ ignorance of people's interest, they work against people's interest in cooperation within themselves and other international or supranational organizations such as the EU. Both right and left populists blame elites with getting and furthering cooperation with such organizations ignoring and contradicting the benefit of the "pure people". In the example of right-wing populism of European politics, people and elite separation is not such clear. While elites are representing economic and political power which are in contradiction with people's interest, immigrants are excluded from "pure people" since they are perceived as danger for people. Therefore, immigrants are neither involved in the public nor the elite group. Populists in Europe hold elites responsible for protecting immigrants against people's sake (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: p.14).

Since populism appears through "host ideologies", interpretation of the scope of "the people" and "the elite" is determined by social, political contexts and host ideology's vision of the world. Accordingly, populism can vary in line with national contexts and shows similarities in countries having similar party systems, social and economic developments as in

the simultaneous rise of the right and left populism in the Western European countries, emerging as similar to the one in Latin American countries.

2.2.2 Mouffe's Approach to Populism

In today's politics, the blurring line between right and left presents a threat to the rise of populism. Populism, regardless of its contextualization as strategy, ideology, political discourse or style, presents a phenomenon with the lack of right/left frontier. Politics naturally includes agonism - "us and them" - and by this way coherence within the society is created. Agonism and hegemony have crucial places in understanding Mouffe and Laclau's stance on politics. In order to strength and deepen democracy, agonism constitutes a fundamental pillar of politics as it helps negotiate on the interests of different groups of society. It must be emphasized that in negotiations the aim is not to create a consensus which is an obstacle in political conflict (that ensures dynamic among people and politicized society). On the other hand, hegemony is accepted by Mouffe and Laclau as a means in conflict for pluralist, radical, libertarian democracy and as a way of doing politics (Mouffe & Laclau, 2001: p.4). When today's politics is considered, post-political order which forms a basis for neoliberal hegemony should be ended for the sake of democracy by (Mouffe, 2005). However, due to the weakness of left politics, the radicalization of democracy is presented as a solution to fight with the neoliberal hegemonic formation. Radicalization of democracy cannot be achieved only at the national level; cooperation with other similar movements at the European level is necessary to establish long-term new hegemonic formation.

The "us and them" dichotomy - there must be "them" to establish "us" - which is the basis of politics, turns into "us and enemy" in populist politics. When "us and them" is seen as the source of the agonism in society with the aim of consolidation of politics, in populism "enemy" is defined according to moral values different from politics. And moral stance of populism accordingly puts democracy in danger. Populism does not support politics as it is the result of the post-political era. Deficiency of struggle, blurring the line between left and right ideologies, rising consensus and resemblance of political parties bring along the need for

alternatives. Political frontier constitutes an important concept in politics, serves to refresh politics against post-politics era. Populism can be seen as a way of establishing a political frontier to create a struggle between both sides of societies and to mobilize them to live within coherence while defending their interests.

Mouffe's explanation of populism carries value in terms of comparison of left and right populism. Although right-wing populist parties' existence is the reality of politics for a long time, by becoming a threat to democracy by defending democratic values it has drawn the attention of late years. Mouffe in her famous populism theory explains the situation with the post-political consensus and end of politics as they provided a ground for parties claiming to be the voice of people. At that point, the meaning loss of democracy in liberal democratic understanding helps in explaining the success of such parties. Despite the popularity of pluralism and individual liberty which are in fact values of liberalism, fundamental values of democracy such as equality and popular sovereignty can fall behind in the post-political era. Today democracy comes down to elections although it signifies values more than elections such as separation of powers, rule of law. The interpenetration of liberal and democratic values create discontent in societies and increases the need of representatives defending the sovereignty of the people - which is under the control of elites - or alleging to be their voice (Mouffe, 2005). Popular sovereignty which can be explained as the power of people is essential to democracy and it has been disregarded because of the lack of struggle within the society. On the other side, inequality - getting stronger from day to day with the decrease of state intervention and dominance of financial capital - constitutes another part of the decrease of democratic tradition. Hence today's liberal democratic system is favorable for the rise of right-wing populist parties. Herein the rise of right-wing populist parties can be explained with the early reaction of right-wing parties to the existing situation and their early alternative offer to the established politics even though the hope has come to naught and become the main threat to democratic order. Especially with austerity policies imposed after the 2008 crisis in Greece left-wing populist parties such as Syriza have gained attention as similar movements emerged in European countries.

In Mouffe's explanation, "anti-essentialism" reflects the idea that society can be constructed in political meaning and the "people" refers to the process of the identification.

Identity is something constructed and can be transformed with politics. Anti-essentialism is based on the rejection of the acceptance of the society and considers identity as solid, unchangeable concept (Mouffe, 2019).

While some of these identities, such as nation-based ones, might, thanks to long periods of historical sedimentation, appear to be natural, they are always contingent constructions, made possible through a variety of practices, discourses, and language games, and they can be transformed and rearticulated in different ways (Mouffe, 2012: p.631).

With regard to two types of political relations, while antagonism is referring to the political which can be occurred independently of social relations, agonism is based on the interaction of different social groups of the society with continuous conflict ensuring coherence. Hence the logic of antagonism is formed on "us and enemy" stance. As consensus contradicts with the politics, "conflictual consensus" can be used to describe cohesion and struggle at the same time. Democracy aims to transform antagonism into agonism in order to deepen democratic values.

European integration can be seen as a successful project in transforming the achievement of agonism. To prevent a probable further antagonism between Germany and France after the Second World War, Monnet's and Schuman's plans can be accepted as initiatives to establish agonism between European communities through composing "we" as countries come together with their interests firstly in economic, political and social areas. However, in the EU establishing the idea of "we" by bypassing national identities may create a threat for the sake of the integration since national "we" may become dominant. Accordingly, it can cause reactions against European integration and what is worse it can enhance antagonism among European countries by creating "enemy". For this reason, it is crucial to establish a democratic order different from deliberative democracy (which does not provide agonism) to ensure the alternative to the current neoliberal order as initially it was one of the reasons for the establishment of the EU. Today neoliberal crisis started in the 1980s and multiplied with the 2008 crisis, reinforced criticisms towards European institutions that are formed within liberal atmosphere. With the increase in discontent with neoliberal hegemony because it ignores the sovereignty of people, European societies in national

boundaries, are more resistant to European integration. Due to the perception of the constancy of European institutions, leaving the EU remains as the only way to reflect practically the discontent with the integration. Therefore, it becomes imperative to enhance democratic values within European institutions (Mouffe, 2012).

The rise of right-wing parties is currently causing a major threat to democratic institutions as liberal democratic societies fail to offer democratic remedy. Giving reference to deliberative democracy of Habermas, Mouffe argues that in deliberative democracy, the outcomes of discussions are limited to the conditions of the discourse and there may be obstacles in achieving ideal discourse. A public sphere which is lacking in agonism and where rational consensus dominates, conflict in the formation of collective identity that is central to the politics is not enough (Mouffe, 2005: p.11). As an alternative to the deliberative model of democracy, agonistic pluralism actualizes conditions in the establishment of politics that ensure "human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of the 'political' " (Mouffe, 1999: p.754). Therefore the difference of agonistic pluralism comes from the aim of orienting personal passions for the strengthening of democracy instead of establishing rational consensus which ignores struggle by its nature (Mouffe, 1999). Deliberative democracy aims to create "a link between morality and politics" (Mouffe, 2005: p.13).

2.3 Populism: A Threat to Democracy?

In the populist perspective, direct democracy presents an intermediary in the realization of populist targets. In line with this, they often criticize mainstream political parties and support referenda, plebiscites which serve direct representation of popular opinion. This stance also coincides with the populists' claim that they are democrats.

Mudde and Kaltwasser put the importance of the concept of general will in populism (*volonté générale*) by referring to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Populism, with its emphasis on the will of people, falls within Rousseau's general will as it defends requests of people by

criticizing establishment, which hold economic and political power and disregards people's demand. From this perspective, populism can be perceived as the promoter concept of democratization. However, populists do not merely refer to general will; on the other hand, Carl Schmitt's argument (1932) about the necessity of homogenous people in the establishment of democracy constitutes their main reference point. Hence, when the notion of the general will and Schmitt's conception of democracy are considered together, the real meaning of general will remains in the background, moreover, it transforms into a concept leading authoritarianism. Consequently, moral interpretation of people and exclusion of many groups of the society in right populism contradicts with Rousseau's general will (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: p.18)

Müller elaborates populist leadership with "man of the people", giving the sense of "he/she is one of us" to the people, rising similarity in the meaning of "the people" and leader, party organization's obstacle in direct communication with the people, the lack of intra-party democracy and leader's control over parliamentarians. Populists claim to carry out democratic values; however, they constitute an obstacle for democracy. Accordingly, Müller mentions that populism is caused by representative democracy and it can be seen as a "shadow of democracy". In accordance with this argument, Müller clarifies that populists are against authorities and all kinds of mechanisms of representation which are dominated by elites. According to populists, institutions posing an obstacle in veritable popular will can be abolished and people by favor of their sole representative can hold state sources. In this case, hold-down of state apparatus by populists and their supporters in the name of people can be seen. Meanwhile, people are not asked to take action since the passive role is envisaged for people in contrast to *volonté générale*. On the other side, populism is based on unrealized democratic values, however practically in contradiction with democracy because populism is inherently an exclusionist concept. To add more, Müller (2018) rather points out right populism and does not approve "left populism" since it can be counterproductive and dangerous in terms of justifying populism with its anti-democratic stance.

Democracy and populism contradict at many points. The idea of voting for someone or a government that can lose power in the next election is in the nature of democracy. In populist style, leader or government is unquestionable since according to populist view they

are given task by the people in the elections and they are not allowed to leave their office. However, it must be noted that the crucial difference separating populism from authoritarianism is the lack of elections in authoritarian regimes. Due to the fear of losing international support, populist leaders use elections as an indicator of their commitment to "democratic values" and democratic legitimacy and they usually ignore results of the elections if results are not in compliance with their self interests. Interpretation of results from moral perspective as accusing "them" for manipulating elections is frequently seen. Another point which constitutes contradiction between democracy and populism, is that the elected leader or government can be criticized in democracy in contrast to populist idea which argues that all ideas belonging to the pure people can be represented by the electee. While democracy accepts society as sum of people, in populist stance the sum of people is not enough to form a society if they do not meet moral requirements.

Mouffe puts emphasis on right-wing and left-wing populism and asserts that right populism poses threat to democracy and democratic institutions. Right-wing populism should not be considered as a marginal concept since it is at the core of contemporary politics. End of politics and post-political consensus has provided an environment for political parties which claim to be the "voice of the people". Decrease in democratic values, especially popular sovereignty reinforced emergence and success of "alternative" parties. In addition to this, the lack of conflict between parties as they become more similar in terms of their arguments or policy recommendations has caused depoliticized democracy which contradicts with the nature of politics. Liberal-democracy offers a suitable ground for right-wing parties. Moral approach in populism also endangers democracy since the conflict in populism is shaped by moral values as "us - enemy" distinction differs from political "us - them". Refreshment of democratic side of liberal democracy can be solution since social democratic parties could not succeed in providing alternative. From radical democracy perspective, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue that due to incapacity of left politics (especially Marxist and social democratic versions) radicalization of democracy is necessary to redefine socialist project.

Similar to Mouffe's explanation about the lack of democratic values above all popular sovereignty in liberal democracies find place in Mény and Surel as they emphasize that foregrounding values such as welfare system or rule of law causes essential fundamental

values to remain in the background (Mény & Surel, 2002). With reference to popular sovereignty Populists by benefiting from deficiency of liberal democracies defend giving the power to the people. However, in practice, populists act differently than their promises given to the people. Once they are involved in the bargain, they become a non-ignorable threat to the democracy (Mény & Surel, 2002: p.7). Additionally, populists show behaviors conflicting with democracy such as emergence or persistence of dominance of one particular group or oligarchy, prioritizing specific interests rather than common interests, the lack of accountability and transparency.

2.4 The Rise of Populist Political Trends in Europe

The rise of populism in Western Europe may be seen as a reaction to the globalization of people who could not adapt their daily life to the economic and social change. Among those changes; immigration, economic crisis, elite dominance in politics have attracted public attention. In addition to this, decreasing interest to politics, low political participation which is seen especially in election turnouts, in accordance with the corruption in media, formation of alternative media platforms and people's interests to those alternatives are important signs for the "deadlock" of the established politics. Here the importance of populism appears with the people's enthusiasm for a political order providing solutions to the above-mentioned issues which constitute problems of "man in the street" and are ignored by politicians (Albertazzi & Mc Donnell, 2008: p.2). Furthermore, current crisis becoming more apparent and affecting ordinary citizens' life have shaped populism which exists for many years. Following paragraphs will deal with this transformation of populism over years according to the today's challenges in politics.

2.4.1 New Populism

New populism has emerged firstly in the Western European politics in 1980s and appeared within right-wing parties which are opposed to government parties. The new

populism differs from populism of former periods because it is shaped by current and different national, cultural, political contexts and party system. On the other hand, it is possible to see both similarities and differences between the populist strategies used. In addition to this, the revival of populism signals that existing political system cannot be responsive to popular demand.

After the Second World War, political consensus around welfare state and Keynesian economic model was not faced with opposition for a long time until the demand of new politics in 1970s. Increasing demands in egalitarianism, inclusion of different area into politics such as environment, women rights gave different shape to existing politics and provided environment for the formation of a new left, as well. The consensus among established parties in the post-war period has come to an end with the popular challenge. Decisions taken behind the closed doors, determination of political agenda by bureaucrats disregarding people's demand caused increase of far right parties which are associated generally with fascist parties in 1930s. Hence initial steps of today's far right parties have appeared in 1980s with the rise of new concerns such as migration.

New populist parties are located in the periphery of the party system since their main motivation is opposing to the mainstream political parties aiming to benefit from state resources as much as possible. The call for change in politics and resistance to the party system created favorable image in public opinion. Taggart reveals organizational similarity of populist parties in the world. They are constructed with the aim not to resemble the established politics. Here the "crowbar effect" shows its effectualness in populist politics. Taggart uses the concept of "crowbar effect" for populist parties' efforts to distinguish themselves from the established parties by adapting a contrary stance in order to gain the attention of citizens who feel themselves excluded from the politics. Despite party systems special to countries, what unites new populist parties in Western Europe is their extreme position due to the aim of representing "outsiders" as seen in the rise of left and Green parties (Taggart, 2000).

At the end of the 1990s, as the integration among European countries continues, German unification was at the top of the agenda. And Eastern European countries efforts for establishing liberal order coincided with the rise of neo-fascist and xenophobic parties

concentrated on immigration. The reason of formation of such protest parties is the lack of interest of established politics on fundamental social issues such as unemployment, economic crisis. Under favour of these circumstances protest populist parties easily have come out; both left and right populist parties have mobilized European politics in post-war era.

2.4.2 Populist Moment

"Populist moment" is widely used by scholars to explain current rise and success of populist stance. As Ionescu and Gellner (1969) remarked the emergence of populist character at the end of 1960s, Krostev firstly uses the concept to point out new populist movements. The rise of "democratic illiberalism" lies behind the emergence of new populism different from the first agrarian populism experienced in the United States. To Krostev new populism does not present a challenge to democracy as populist are strictly attached to elections which are their unique source of legitimacy. In contrast, decrease in liberal values with the end of Cold War enhanced populist character of politics. New populism is mainly opposed to the institutions and representative nature of democracy. Krostev (2007) explains the crisis of liberal order with the rising conflict between two pillars of liberalism; liberal constitutionalism and democratic majoritarianism. In populist way of thinking, society is divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: people and corrupt elite. The danger of populist moment comes from the conflict between these groups, while elites present anti-democratic stance and people possess anti-liberal character. Different from left and right dichotomy, the threat of new populism lies behind the struggle of two sides. Additionally, countries in the accession process see the EU as a way of controlling corruption of national elites. However once they become member of the EU, societies perceive Brussels as supporter of elites "that provides a way to avoid democratic accountability" (Krostev, 2007).

Krostev's explanation of populism presents a different perspective compared to other populism studies. Elections are considered to be the core of democracy, while Mouffe emphasizes democracy does not only mean elections. Also the reason of the rise of populism is explained by the lack of liberal values, namely "illiberalism". Accordingly, populism does

not pose threat to the democracy; however liberal consensus is in danger. The populist moment is beyond left and right dimensions, it is based on the conflict between anti-liberals and anti-democrats (Krostev, 2007).

Laclau defines populist moment when the increased dissatisfaction with the existing hegemonic order becomes threat to the hegemony. In such cases institutions are failed to secure demand of people since they already become defender of existing order. As a result, people become component of the transformation of the current hegemonic order through a new collective response to hegemony and its institutions (Laclau, 2005).

Populist movement takes place in Mudde's explanation of "populist zeitgeist". Mudde defines populist moment in accordance with the conditions that occurred in post-political era because of decreasing ideological difference between left and right, the lack of alternatives, social democratic parties' failure in articulating the demand arising from the public discontent with the established liberal policies. In the post-political consensus, people are obliged to decide between center right and center left. Parties emerged under such circumstances find a place in a distant point of political parties of the political spectrum compared to central parties. Populism has enhanced the distance between established anti-establishment parties as they tend to adapt populist rhetoric. Accordingly populism has found a convenient opportunity to dominate political sphere. Although populist moment is attributed to the right politics, in contemporary politics populism is used to describe parties defending alternative politics against neoliberal elites including left parties. Therefore the crisis of neoliberal hegemony has resulted with the populist moment which enables parties with anti-elite stance to use populism. The emergence of populism presented extremist parties which are located in a distant point of the political spectrum compared to central parties. With modernization social democratic parties focused on middle class, demands of modern elites dominated the established politics. People socially and economically excluded provide an opportunity for right-wing parties to use fears, uncertainty about the present and future of the excluded people. Populist moment can be considered in the context of globalization since the losers of globalization generate the main motivation of anti-establishment movements. Besides it is reasonable to accept populist moment as a process started with end of politics in 1980s and reached to top in existing political system.

2.4.3 Comparison of Right and Left Populist Movements

Discussions over the possibility of left populism occupy quite large place in populism literature. Although left and right ideologies are on the contrary sides of the political spectrum, populism appears as an intermediary in providing a common ground as a result of the neoliberal order. Ioanescu and Gellner note in their processor study in the field of populism, the term populism is not limited to the American continent. It is a concept that is used in Latin America, Russia and Europe as well. In addition to this, populism does not have linkage with specific ideologies (Ioanescu & Gellner, 1969). To Müller, populism is a concept identical to right-wing parties. Furthermore, term of left populism puts into danger the left values since populism comes to the fore by suppressing the left. Accordingly, presenting left populism as a solution to the threat of right populism is not useful since left and right do not share common concerns (Müller, 2018). To Mudde, left populist parties compose the majority of outsider parties since they "combine a democratic socialist ideology with a strong populist discourse" (Mudde, 2004: p. 549). Compared to left parties of former periods, they present themselves as defender of vox populi instead of proletariat. To Mouffe, in several countries democratic deficit contributes to the success of right-wing parties defending people's demands that are suppressed by elites.

The main responsibility of left populism is to answer to how the threat of right populism can be stopped. With this aim left populism can take lessons from traditional left that failed to cease post-political order. Considering today's concerns such as ecology, feminism etc. left politics have to construct a new way in combating authoritarian traces since right populism has directions towards authoritarian regime when it comes to power. Therefore it can take varied forms since it does not sustain populist strategy when the power is achieved. Accordingly, populism is accepted as a means in returning to the politics. When left populism attains its aim, it will be transformed according to the demands of societies such as eco-socialism, participatory democracy etc (Mouffe, 2019).

Against increasing morality in politics, in order to ensure continuity of democracy left populism comes to existence as solution. There are several factors which are missing in right populism and make populism a threat to the democracy. The very first one is the acceptance of anti-essentialism and dissociative conceptions. Anti-essentialism is based on

the understanding that society is something constructed and divided. The concept of anti-essentialism is used for achieving politics through populist moment. On the other side, dissociative concept composes one of the fundamental pillars of politics: establishing a frontier between "us and them". Two conceptions are prerequisite for distinguishing right and left populism. So left populism have to consider that politics is within the domain of conflict and society is formed through conflicts arising from partisan understanding of politics (Mouffe, 2019).

As mentioned in former paragraphs, agonism and hegemony constitute other crucial dimensions in promoting left populism. As agonism is seen in right populism as in the form of antagonism, it reinforces polarization within societies because of right populists' general way of doing politics. Because of benefitting from the lack of alternative, right populists provocatively use issues such as migration, nationalism to mobilize people against the establishment. To tackle with right populism, left populism can be emerged from social democrat parties by adapting populist strategy. Due the current political conjuncture left populism can take the advantage of populist moment and react to the neoliberal formation in real terms because although right populism defend verbally more democracy against neoliberal order, when they come to power they demonstrate themselves as the sole representative of society. Therefore, the difference between left and right populism occurs especially when they come to power.

The erosion of democratic principles in liberal democracies and use of democracy to only express only human rights weakens the power of democracy (Mouffe, 2019). In today's politics, people are much more suffering from the lack of their effect in decision-making process and inequality. Two important concepts of democracy namely popular sovereignty and equality can be seen as reasons of rise of post-political and neoliberal order since conflictual relation between liberalism and democracy has been neglected. With modernization, role of national parliaments and institutions allowing people to affect politics have increased and be dominated by elites. Due to increasing similarities of political parties, elections have become a platform where same kinds of parties compete. On the other hand, oligarchization with the emergence of neoliberal policies increases inequalities. Therefore, construction of people is urgent for left populism to compete with oligarchy.

Mouffe points out movements of square in clarifying the emergence of left populist movements. Firstly Greece and Spain witnessed movements in the streets demanding the end of debt crisis under the neoliberal hegemony. Syriza and Podemos can be seen as first clear expression of dissatisfaction with the neoliberal order. Similarly Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, France Unbowed with Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Die Linke in Germany have drawn attention of even people previously voted for right-populists. For such movements success is substantially linked to engagement with political institutions. Otherwise, their effect cannot be transformed in political arena.

Establishment of "chain of equivalence" among parts of society such as middle class, immigrants, LGBTI community aims the formation of a new hegemony that can be seen as final step in removing existing hegemonic order's traces. By this way democratic values would take main responsibility and democratic institutions would be more effective in representing people. Mouffe gives the example of Thatcher's use of populism in the transition to neoliberalism. In populist moment, presently populism can be in a progressive way otherwise with the use of populism in regressive meaning rise of authoritarianism seems closer. At the end of all this process where radicalizing democracy is aimed, cooperation with similar movements at the European level can be seen as the last necessity for democracy to succeed in real terms.

Both left and right populist parties show similarities and differences. Although fundamental characteristics of populist strategy, populism defers in accordance with national contexts and "host ideologies" that complete populism. What makes a populist concept different than another is mainly the effect of national politics and accordingly manner of distinction in us and them. It is clear that right populists have in advance understood the lack of alternative and struggle in politics, decreasing citizen's influence in decision-making which is dominated by experts and elites, necessity of forming a new collective identity as "us" via "them". However combination of populism as a "thin" ideology with "host" ideologies like nationalism brings out right populism as dangerous as it excludes many members of society in order to establish a new homogenous "us" with moral perspective. Due to inclusive nature of left, by combining characteristics of left politics - which previously failed in presenting


alternative - with populist strategy, left populism can form a new choice which appeals people afraid of future and do not feel safe.

Populism is mostly associated with radical right movements. Many studies (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007; Betz & Immerfall, 1998) forge a direct link between populism and the right. Betz explains this correlation with the increase in international integration and "post-materialist" values and accordingly policies. Therefore radical right-wing populist parties find the support from groups that could not integrate with globalization. From a general perspective, radical right-wing parties tend to adapt neoliberal programs, xenophobic discourses and policies in addition to their anti-establishment stance. According to Swank and Betz, groups with following features may be considered as radical right-wing party:

- rejects the principle of individual and social equality while promoting socio-economic and political frameworks that foster or accentuate individual or social inequality,
- advocates a fundamental change of the existing socio-economic or political systems without, however, calling into question the basics of the constitutional democratic order,
- appeals to latent public sentiments of resentment, disillusionment or anxiety while legitimizing their political demands with reference to the common sense of 'silent majority' (Swank & Betz: 2003, p.218).

Figure 13

Percentage of Votes for Populist 2008 and 2018




Source: Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, 2019a

With the emergence of left populist movements after 2008 crisis, populism has attracted much more attention and needed to be described including left movements. Common or different characteristics of right and left populism have kept researchers occupied since then. When movements and parties demonstrating left or right populist stances are considered, it is noteworthy that there are more common features than differences. Topics such as globalization, media, Islam, elites, immigration and European integration, LGBTI rights constitutes common subjects in the agenda of right and left populists. However on issues like immigrants and European integration their stance can differentiate. The most attractive common point of right and left populists is the reference to people and the importance given to the voice of the "people" in every policy areas.

Figure 14

Aggregated Populist Votes (Between 1980 – 2019)



Source: *Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, 2019b*

Right populists in the European continent the National Front, Five Star Movement (there are discussion over whether Five Star Movement right or left populist), Lega (previous name “Lega Nord”), Dutch Party for Freedom, Freedom Party of Austria, Alternative for Germany, Golden Dawn, UKIP and Fidesz Party have a lot in common. Elites are seen as representative global capitalism and take decisions against the interest of public. In accordance with this view, their party programs and manifestos include arguments about the damage of European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization to the national economies. Beppe Grillo, ex-comedian and leader of Five Star Movement suggests -similar to other populists and Eurosceptics- holding referendum on leaving Euro area:

"This decision to say if we are out or in is not up to me, it is not up to the rating agencies, it is not up to Merkel and it is not up to any political party. It is up to the Italian people. They have the right to be informed, and to have a referendum to say yes or no" (BBC, 28 February 2013).

Table 6**Right and Left Populist Political Parties in Europe and Vote Rates in Last National Elections**

Country	Party	Full party name	Last election	Result	Ideology
GER	AfD	Alternative für Deutschland	2017	12.6	right-wing populism
CYP	AKEL	Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou	2016	25.7	left-wing populism
POR	BE	Bloco de Esquerda	2015	10.2	left-wing populism
DEN	DF	Dansk Folkeparti	2015	21.1	right-wing populism
FRA	FI	Le France Insoumise	2017	11	left-wing populism
HUN	FIDESZ	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség	2018	49.3	right-wing populism
FRA	FN	Front National	2017	13.2	right-wing populism
AUT	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	2017	27.4	right-wing populism
NOR	FrP	Fremskrittspartiet	2017	15.2	right-wing populism
HUN	JOBBIK	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	2018	19.1	right-wing extremism
LAT	KPV LV	Kam pieder valsts?	2018	14.3	right-wing populism
ITA	LN	Lega (Lega Nord)	2018	17.4	right-wing populism
ICE	M	Miðflokkurinn	2017	10.7	right-wing populism
ITA	M5S	Movimento Cinque Stelle	2018	32.7	left-wing populism
LAT	NA	Nacionala apvieniba Visu Latvijai! - Tevze,ei un Brivibai/LNNK	2018	11	right-wing populism
MNE	NSD	Nova srpska demokratija	2016	20.3	right-wing populism
POL	PIŚ	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	2015	37.6	right-wing populism
ESP	Podemos	Podemos	2016	21.1	left-wing populism
FIN	PS	Sannfinländarna	2015	17.6	right-wing populism
NET	PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid	2017	13	right-wing populism
SWE	SD	Sverigedemokraterna	2018	17.5	right-wing populism
SLN	SDS	Slovenska demokratska stranka	2018	24.9	right-wing populism
CZE	SPD	Svoboda a Prímá Demokracie	2017	10.6	right-wing populism
SWI	SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei	2015	29.4	right-wing populism
GRE	Syriza	Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras	2015	35.5	left-wing populism

Source: Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, 2019c

With regard to media they frequently use alternative platforms such as YouTube to make public their views about almost all developments occurred in politics in daily life since they believe that mainstream media work for the interest of established parties and elites. Populist leaders actively use Twitter and keep followers' interest alive with instant sharing on social media.

Islam and immigration take quite large space in the right populists' speeches. They usually approach Islam as a threat to Christian identity and immigrants as against priority of

their citizens. Leaders share strong opposition to the EU's immigration policies especially after the refugee crisis deepened with Syrian civil war. Immigrants are considered both a threat to welfare system and burden. They are associated with terrorism, crimes and also seen as responsible for rising terrorist attacks in Europe. On the other hand, it is seen that immigration is mostly approached by right-wing parties from especially the aspect of religion. Those parties reflect their desire of cultural and religious unity over immigrants whose great majority consists of Muslims. Therefore, in the speeches of party officials, it is possible to see that immigration is considered as Muslim immigration. Also it is possible to argue that this kind of approach to the Muslim immigrants affects the perceptions regarding Muslims who are citizens of the host country. This creates a conflict among citizens and strengthens anti-Muslim sentiment within the society (Hamid, 2019).

In addition, with the Syrian crisis and increasing migrant flow into Europe, Syrian refugees are considered as a threat to the welfare of nation states by political leaders. In addition to the belief of the difficulty of the assimilation and the adaptation of Muslim immigrants due the dominance of Islam and together with security concerns, economic crisis have been correlated to the people arriving in the EU. Increasing unemployment triggered resentment towards immigrants since they are blamed for taking jobs and considered as economic burden (Castles & Vezzoli, 2009). Therefore concerns with regard to the daily life led to the formation of movements which share commitments satisfying demands of people suffering from incapability of established politics in dealing with immigration "threat".

Victor Orban, leader of far right populist party and prime minister of Hungary is known with his opposition to Brussels, immigration and policies contradicting with the EU's core values rule of law, human right, separation of powers. The country is currently at the top of the European agenda because of government's policies damaging especially the rule of law. In addition to European Parliament's decision on sanctions because of breaching Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, the European People's Party has suspended the membership of Orban in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2018). Orban with his usual rude speeches, expresses his views as follows: "immigration brings increased crime, especially crimes against women, and lets in the virus of terrorism". "We don't just want numbers, we want Hungarian babies" (BBC, 28 July 2019). Orban on every occasion

emphasizes his party's discontent with European countries failure in combating with immigrants by attacking Muslim people:

We don't see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim invaders. We believe that a large number of Muslims inevitably leads to parallel societies, because Christian and Muslim society will never unite (Al Jazeera, 10 February 2019).

By referring to immigrants as potential terrorists Marine le Pen proposes to suspend common immigration policies in order to protect the country and declares that "With the serious terror threat that weighs on us, we have to be able to control who enters to be able to expel those who represent a danger" (Independent, 18 April 2017). The outstanding differentiation from left populists is seen in identification of collective identity, as rights populists define "us" in an exclusivist manner.

Geert Wilders, the leader of Dutch Party for Freedom, is named as "Dutch Donald Trump" in mass media and he is famous with his speeches on Islam and anti-immigration. Due to his statements about Koran and Islam in one of his speeches, court in Amsterdam acquitted Wilders:

I rather would have not Koran at all as we in Holland at least have outlawed Mein Kampf as well. It might be in some part highly symbolic, still it would have an enormous effect to do so (Euronews, 5 March 2017).

On the eve of 2019 European elections, it is possible to see increase of populist speeches incrementally. Leader of Freedom Party of Austria, Heinz-Christian Strache, shared party's strong opposition to immigration putting forward "rightful owners" of Austria:

(...) consistently following the path for our Austrian homeland, the fight against population replacement, as people expect of us. (...) We don't want to become a minority in our own country. That's legitimate and fair and deeply democratic (Guardian, 17 May 2019).

Alternative for Germany's stance on the European integration can be found in a similar vein in other right populist parties. Party's leader Gauland calls for a referendum on the membership of Germany, namely "Dexit". Also, he mentions in campaign manifesto of

the 2019 European elections: “Our fundamental reform initiatives for the existing EU system are not realized within a suitable amount of time” (Gauland, 2019).

Left populists such as Syriza, Podemos, Die Linke, Left Party, France Unbowed, Labour Party with Jeremy Corbyn, share similar stances about international organizations in monetary cooperation. Compared to the right populists they demonstrate a more inclusive stance towards immigrants and peoples with different religious or ethnic identities. By this way, left populists can to appeal a large segment of society than right populists since the scope of "us" is defined in a broader sense. This way of defining the extent of "us" comes in useful in ensuring harmony among different views belonging to different parts of the society. Thus the essential element of democracy which is struggle could be achieved. In left populist parties, it is possible to see the formation of agonism similar to the Laclau's and Mouffe's explanations. Left populists compared to right populists show more realistic, pluralist categorization of "us" while right populist movements are concentrated on artificial, ideal "pure people". The EU with its bureaucratic organization and anti-democratic decision-making process-oriented by Brussels elites and are the main concern of right and left populist parties, as well. In respect to immigrants, left populists avoid exclusive stance and suggest policies facilitating the integration of immigrants.

Tsipras with Syriza (The Coalition of the Radical Left) has been supported by Greeks opposing the bailout packages imposed by the "troika" composed of European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank. Party was established in 2009, and in just a few years it has gained considerable and rapid public support during the economic and financial crises. Because of a possible left wave expanding throughout the European continent, it has attracted attention not just in Greece, in European politics as well. Opposition to the bailout packages being in the first place, social rights, fair share of taxes, increasing employment area, strengthening of democracy underlie the party program. 2015 Bailout Referendum also showed popular opposition to the bailout conditions. However, Greece was forced to enforce the austerity policies. EU leaders and financial circles were quite worried about the possible negative effect of Syriza on Eurozone. Party in the last polls in May 2019 European elections (which will be followed by local and legislative election in 2019) falls

behind Greece's main opposition New Democracy party. Tsipras has never mentioned leaving Eurozone or the EU, but it has opposed the EU's neoliberal policies:

Our proposal for the widest possible European alliance against austerity interlaces with the quintessence of the process of European integration, as epitomized by Jean Monnet – the architect of Europe's union: “We are not forming coalition of states – we are uniting men (Euractiv, 26 November 2013).

Syriza attracts the attention with protective policies on immigrants. Also Greece is an important transit country in migrants' way to Western and Northern Europe. New immigration policy (dominated Greece's approach to the immigrants over ten years) contradicts the EU's asylum and immigration policy (Al Jazeera, 5 March 2015).

On the other hand emergence of Podemos (English: "We Can") can be accepted as another turning point with regard to left politics arising from collective demand (Mudde, 2015). In accordance with public demand, Podemos concentrated on expanding the area of politics, inclusion of new areas into politics, opposition to the status quo, and consideration of daily problems that people encounter. As other left populist parties, it was founded in 2014 with the motivation similar to Syriza and two-party system in Spain ended with the success of Podemos in 2015 general elections. In reaction to austerity measures implemented by the Spanish government in the guidance of European Commission and in the aftermath of 15-M Movement (also referred to "Indignados"), Podemos has presented an alternative to the people suffering from inequalities and corruption and demanding fundamental rights such as work, home, healthcare. As anti-austerity party, Podemos suggests an alternative Europe where decision-making is transparent, EU institutions are responsible to the European citizen and policies are not under the shadow of neoliberalism:

The problem with neoliberalism. It constructs realities that are almost immovable. In other words, it's working for its own perpetuation. But, history has shown that everything can change. And I think that we're moving towards policies that have to do with the democratization of the economy, against the totalitarianism of the market (Mudde, 2015).

As seen, the emergence of left populism is shaped around the Euro crisis that is followed by the debt crisis and objections of austerity policies. Common ground where left populists come together in broad strokes, is neoliberal policies of the EU, bureaucratic institutions, lack of reference to the people in the decision-making process and globalization. Parties included within the category of left populism do not oppose to the idea of European integration or EU, but they criticize EU's policymaking and proposes an alternative Europe. Compared to right populists, they demonstrate a socialist stance when right populists tend to be nationalistic and accordingly exclusivist.

Populism requires further clarification and analysis in the light of the current rising desire of political parties and politicians to adapt a populist stance. Populism provides an opportunity for parties to act in accordance with the public demand without limiting their position with a specific side of the political spectrum. Although populism is a concept independent from ideology, as some of the authors point out, ideology can be seen as a component of populist policies. Parties' ideological affiliations are effective in their use of populism. Right parties adapting populism demonstrate xenophobic and exclusionist approach to politics, the process that they follow in their aim of gaining popular support is shaped with clear separation of groups within the society. On the left side, as given few examples from current European politics, populist left parties with the inclusion of left viewpoint of politics, while distinguishing "the people" and "the elite" tend to adapt inclusive stance by challenging the groups dominating state sources.

The following chapter will address the populist political parties and their approach to European integration into consideration of their ideological difference. Since European integration is an important policy area for national political parties in achieving popular support, especially for populist parties it presents one of the most suitable topics in distinguishing "the people" and "the elite". Their choice or their ideology that shapes parties' populist stance is important in achieving peaceful coexistence within the society.

CHAPTER 3

POPULISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM

Populism and Euroscepticism have become prominent concepts in European politics, especially in the recent period as seen in the chapters described above. However, in today's European politics, the rise of two concepts makes it necessary to analyze the reasons behind their success. In this chapter, it is aimed to make a detailed analysis of two populist parties' Eurosceptic stance in France. The ideologies that have lost their influence in politics have made the parties more similar to each other. However, it is seen that these parties are similar in many fields about European integration and at the same time they have different positions related to European topics. This part of the study will focus on National Rally (French: "Rassemblement National") which is active for a long while in France and Europe, and France Unbowed (French: "La France Insoumise") that influenced French politics and other counterparts in Europe a lot over the past few years. On the other hand, parties that are included in the study will provide a clear explanation regarding differentiation and similarity of right and left populist parties' Eurosceptic stance. By virtue of a comparative analysis within a specific national context, the study will help understand sources of two parties' opposition to the European integration and the EU. In this way, it will make available to find out the sources of similar European populist parties' understanding of European integration. At the same time, by focusing on two parties, the study will contribute to the studies on the relation of populism and Euroscepticism. Since there are many discussions on the definition of populism and Euroscepticism, the study aims comparison of two parties beyond definitions of two phenomena.

3.1 Populist Politics of Euroscepticism

The constant rise of populist Eurosceptic parties requires the discovery of their correlation. In the literature, "populist politics of Euroscepticism" as mentioned earlier by

Taggart in the second half of the 1990s, takes effect more today. On the other hand, re-analysis of "populist politics of Euroscepticism" is required when considering the current anti-establishment parties because the issues that occupy today's European politics have become more diverse compared to the past. In particular, the influx of refugees with the Syrian civil war, the Euro crisis, Brexit as well as arguments about democratic deficit in the EU require both fields to be reconsidered in terms of current cases.

Populism and Euroscepticism appear as much-discussed concepts of the current political agenda. In parallel, comments, discussions and academic research on two phenomena are increasing. Since today's politics coincides with a period dominated by populist politics in the world, the debates on populism are the subject of many scientific studies. On the other hand Euroscepticism, in contrast to populism, is increasingly manifested after the Maastricht process. Today, it is one of the most conspicuous political concepts similar to populism. Therefore, examining the similarity, difference or relationship between these two concepts will help understand the politics of the present and will give us a clue for the future to tackle with governments contradicting with democratic values and fundamental rights.

Both populism and Euroscepticism are naturally problematic. Although there are many debates on the clear definition of the terms, they are frequently used to describe governments, parties, leaders or their policies. Accordingly, it is possible to accept that uncertainty of these definitions come from the nature of the terms. For this reason, they often come across as intersecting concepts. But since the history of populism dates back to the American politics in the late 1800s, when the intersection of the terms populism and Euroscepticism is discussed, it is necessary to perceive populism as a movement against the neoliberal hegemony, criticizing representative democracy, rejecting the pressure of international institutions on national sovereignty and advocating the interests of the people. In this way it is possible to find out many common points between Euroscepticism and current populism, namely "New populism". Accordingly, populism is referring to a more "wider and more well-established of two concepts" (Harmsen, 2010: p.333). Populism, especially new populism presents mainly anti-elitist stance by rejecting national elites that systematically ignore the interest of "the people" in order to put forward their interest. On the other hand, Euroscepticism presents a narrower concept and it is specific to Europe. However, despite

major differences between two terms, analysis of the intersection of two terms becomes imperative to understand rising contestation against existing politics and anti-establishment parties (Harmsen, 2010: p.334).

The similarity among established parties, their consensus in areas with regard to the EU causes a gap between their appeals and public opinion. Considering that European citizens express their negative ideas on European integration, established parties become defender of a deeper European integration instead of an arrangement in one of the topics of the EU or sharing citizen's doubts about the integration. Accordingly, people become more aware of the insufficiency of established parties in terms of defending popular opinion and satisfying their demand in other policy areas as well. Thereby parties opposing the center parties have gained success by taking into consideration hesitations of the group who think that they are not represented by mainstream parties.

"Populist politics of Euroscepticism" has been used firstly by Taggart in his article examining ideological affiliation of Eurosceptical parties (Taggart, 1997). To Taggart, although there are debates about European integration at the public level, disregard of the public opinion by established political parties makes integration more problematic. Rising debates around "democratic deficit" also shows public discontent with the EU. In relation to this, protest parties begin to transform national party systems and take advantage of the deficiency of established parties in responding to the people. As long as people are satisfied with protest parties, the ones at the center of the party system lose electoral hegemony. Referring to Katz and Mair (Katz & Mair, 1995), Taggart explains that parties at the center of the party system transform themselves to cartel parties in order to benefit from state resources. However, this rapprochement among parties and dependency on the state resources restrict parties to be able to respond to public demand. By this way, protest parties carrying out populist policy achieve considerable success. As the EU continues to develop, such parties approaching the European issues from a populist perspective will continue to increase their effectiveness and continue their existence in European and national politics.

According to Taggart's research on the effect of party family to the party's anti-EU position, it comes to light that it is not possible to predict political parties' opposition to the European integration through the party family that they belong. Even the same kind of party is

seen in every member of the EU and when their ideological stance is examined closely, it is seen that in reality, they do not reflect the similar stance on a specific area. Accordingly "placing parties in their party families does not allow us to predict with any certainty their position on the EU" (Taggart, 1997: p.11). Therefore it is more applicable to categorize parties according to their level of opposition to the EU. With this aim, Taggart proposes four categories: Single Issue Eurosceptical Parties, Protest Based Parties with Euroscepticism, Established Parties with Eurosceptical Position, Eurosceptical Factions. The first category includes parties "whose very *raison d'être* is opposition to the European Union" (Taggart, 1997: p.11). The only aim of such parties is opposing the integration and rejecting all integration process from the beginning. For this reason, they may have a strong effect both in national and European politics, also they have the potential to transform party system to the detriment of center parties. The best suitable party that can be given as an example for this category is UKIP as it define themselves as a "patriotic" party and explain the reason of their emergence in 1993 as follows: "Its fundamental purpose was to campaign for Britain to leave the European Union and to restore Britain's former status as an independent, democratic, sovereign nation." The second category includes protest parties that they generally oppose the established politics and opposition as the EU constitutes one of their concerns. Accordingly these parties that are included in this study as well may prefer to be outside of the party system or see their exclusion from the party system by established parties as an opportunity. The main feature that differentiates these parties from others is their distance from government parties. Another important point that has to be taken into consideration is the lack of common ideological affiliation in protest parties. The third party type includes parties at the center of the party system and reflects opposition to European integration. The last one is related to the parties holding groups which have the opposite approach to the integration. This opposition among groups within the party causes factions over time.

In conclusion, Taggart summarizes results achieved from comparative study. Firstly, Euroscepticism cannot be limited to specific party family/ideology. It can be seen in political parties coming from the left and right political spectrum. The second one is related to the place of the political parties in the party system. As per observations, parties having Eurosceptical bearing tend to be located in the periphery of the party system. Also, parties whose sole aim is to oppose the European integration are strictly located in the periphery.

Formation of the faction within the mainstream party when the party adapts Eurosceptic stance constitutes the third outcome. Additionally, protest based parties form the largest group of parties representing Eurosceptical attitudes since they adapt general opposition to the existing politics.

Taggart with his aim of revealing the relation between populism and Euroscepticism focuses on parties that are totally opposing European integration. Therefore parties with factions are excluded in his research. Accordingly, common point of parties having Eurosceptical stance is their populist rhetoric. When their ideological differentiation is considered, populism appears as the only answer on what unites Eurosceptic parties.

By emphasizing that there is not a single concept of populism and flexibility of populism, Taggart mentions that populism can be seen as "a reaction against modern politics" (Taggart, 1997: p.16). Modern politics is defined mainly with administration and representation. Accordingly, ones who feel excluded from the modernity and representation tend to find movements, parties opposing the two concepts close to themselves. Elites and institutions holding economic and political power are seen as leading figures of representative government and modernization. Hence politics is increasingly ignoring the interest of the people.

The first common feature of Euroscepticism and populism is demonstrated with the acceptance of populism as ideology by Taggart. In contrast to other core ideologies, populism does not include main values which are necessarily found in core ideologies (diagnoses of present, key values, strategy, utopia) (Taggart, 1997: p.16). This provides populism to be used in a wide range including also contrary ideologies such as left and right. However, in populism, it is possible to define key values in a different manner as in the example of "heartland" which defines a kind of utopia in populism. Populism's common feature with other ideologies can be explained with flexibility which enables populism to be used in order to refer to various political contexts. Also, populism is related to protest against the institutions belonging to modern politics. Direct democracy and referenda are favored in enabling considering people's demand.

With regard to the explanation of populist politics of Euroscepticism, the same flexibility can be found in Euroscepticism as well. As explained in previous paragraphs, Euroscepticism's independence from any kind of ideology can be seen in parties' having adapting contrary ideologies. In terms of opposition to institutions, European integration with its institutions and Eurocrats can be accepted as common concerns of populist and Eurosceptic parties. Populists coming from left or right political spectrum strongly condemn the EU because of its bureaucratic nature. Regarding the concept of "heartland" in Euroscepticism, it is rather associated with globalism. Heartland in Euroscepticism means the desire of "old good days" when national sovereignty is guaranteed and protected against globalization. Accordingly, it is related to the change in politics and institutions. However boundaries and content of heartland can show alteration with regard to the position of the party as it can be defined in geographical or nationalist manner. Heartland is used to mobilize the people against the elite.

At that point, it is important to emphasize that it is not possible to designate all Eurosceptic parties as populist or vice versa. However, it is quite clear that Eurosceptic parties show features of populism. The reason for this may be explained with the flexibility of the concept of populism that enables to cover parties coming from different sides of the political spectrum. Besides other crucial point that necessitates to be analyzed as a subject of another study is the use of Euroscepticism as a part of the populist stance. Since the EU and European integration are seen as parts of modernization and representative democracy, opposition to the EU and European integration can be approached by parties as a tool to place themselves to the periphery of the party system in accordance with their populist strategy. Because of that reason which is related to the "second-order" approach to the EU, understanding parties' real position with regard to the EU can become problematic.

On the other hand, anti-establishment parties appear as parties allow adapting Euroscepticism and populism at the same time. As anti-establishment rhetoric is a feature of populism, it increasingly affects and dominates contemporary European politics. As Polk and Rovny (2017) mention, anti-establishment rhetoric presents a much wider and overreaching explanation to the parties having Eurosceptic and populist policies independently from geographical position or ideological affiliation of parties. Parties having extreme positions

both in right and left tend to adapt anti-establishment rhetoric. By mentioning the success of populist parties different from right populists such as Podemos in Spain, the Five Star Movement of Italy Polk and Rovny declares that populism is not special to the right parties. In fact, their explanation corresponds to "new populism" that covers separation of right and left populism. Especially in countries where economic crisis affected much more than other European countries, it is possible to see the rise of such left parties criticizing imposed austerity measures: "For the parties of the populist left, these European institutions constitute a political class out of touch with the concerns and difficulties of most European citizens." (Polk & Rovny, 2017: p.358).

It can also be said that the history of left populism in Europe is based on the Maastricht Treaty. In the post-Maastricht period, when the permissive consensus came to an end, the discontent with the EU's economic deeper integration took part in the agenda of political parties. Similarly today, the populist Euroscepticism became somewhat different, with the addition of the crisis of neoliberal hegemony. Today both the right and left populist Euroscepticism began to manifest itself in politics while on the other hand mainstream parties and politicians support pro-European policies carried out by elites. Also, the reason for the increase in the debates of the democratic deficit in the current period can be explained in this way. Mainstream parties abstain considering rising public hesitation on the EU due to the divisiveness feature of European issues in terms of electorate and party officials. Accordingly, such anti-establishment right and left populist parties will continue to be important actors in opposition to the EU.

3.2 Comparative Analysis of Populist Eurosceptic Stances of National Rally and France Unbowed

This part of the study will reveal the views of the right and left two populist parties on the EU within the framework of a single national context, in particular, French politics, and their common and dissimilar points. For this purpose, Mouffe's populism theory that is explained in the previous chapter will provide a suitable ground. Consistent with this, both

parties' 2019 European elections manifestos and official documents will be debated. Also, 2017 presidential elections manifestos will be used in order to compensate for the relationship between domestic and European politics. In addition, key statements of leaders and party officials will be exploited in order to consider unplanned statements. European elections manifestos will provide a more detailed clarification of their views on the EU. The presidential election manifestos, on the assumption that the EU is considered to be a second-order issue by political parties, will help understand the place of the national issues in the European integration stance. Focusing on the electoral manifestos of the parties will enable us to reach a clearer picture of the ideological positions of the parties. The speeches made during the election periods as the difference from the manifestos are shaped by factors such as civil society and possible coalitions with other parties or pressure groups. Party manifestos provide clear and systematic information on the parties' intentions. Especially the party's arguments on a particular subject can be explicitly found in their manifestos.

France Unbowed and National Rally may be accepted as successful political parties of recent years as they changed France's two party domination (Socialist Party and The Republicans) in the last elections and attracted public attention. France Unbowed was launched in 2016 with the aim of transforming traditional establishment including traditional political parties that are unable to attend democratic values. Party's president Jean-Luc Mélenchon is known with his political experiences in French politics in Left Party and Socialist Party. Party's establishment is inspired by PODEMOS from Spain and candidacy of Bernie Sanders in the United States Presidential elections. Party program named "L'Avenir en commun" (English: "A Common Future") refers to a substantial diverse topic. Party's first statement in its program is the establishment of democratic values through abolishing presidential monarchy, allowing popular intervention and citizen revolution in media platforms. Party also emphasizes social equality and necessity of an ecological plan in order to ensure renewable energy for the sake of biodiversity. With regard to the French sovereignty, the party addresses the importance of an independent defense policy in cooperation with the United Nations. Also abolishing free trade regulations is seen crucial for national sovereignty. Party's proposal regarding the EU has attracted attention in media and it constitutes one of the detailed topics of the party program. FI proposes two alternatives in the

face of developments occurred within the EU. Plan A includes "democratic refounding" of the EU's treaties which constitute current anti-democratic order. In the event of the failure of plan A, plan B envisaged to exit from European treaties by establishing another cooperation among those countries. The same proposal takes place in the party's European elections manifesto:

Plan A involves collective renegotiation treaties to allow particular social and tax harmonization, to carry out protectionist and ecological solidarity, a distributive policy and a reorientation of the missions of the European Central Bank. In parallel with our strategy plan A / plan B as well as alliances for that are necessary, Unbowed France is ready to take necessary unilateral measures (L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi, 2018: p.8).

On the other hand, National Rally known as National Front is established in 2018 with the proposal of the party's leader Marine Le Pen. National Front was founded in 1972 with the purpose of unifying the French nationalist movement. Party since its establishment opposes the EU and defends nationalist policies. Although the party's leader was changed in 2011 and Jean-Mari Le Pen left the presidency to her daughter, efforts for softening the party's extreme right view party maintains a right-wing populist stance. Among the purposes primarily party demonstrates ensuring independency of France in terms of national sovereignty and economy, transforming the country into a country of liberties, to offer concrete solutions against immigration with the aim of securing the welfare of France and to fight with Islamist terror. Two parties, RN and FI election successes in recent years are quite remarkable. In the 2014 European elections, FN achieved the highest number of seats leaving behind establishment parties UMP and PS. The election results were considered as a victory for FN and it is described as a "political earthquake" in media because of the anti-EU stance of the party. During the 2014 elections, FI was not established yet and at that time Mélenchon's party FG gained the lowest vote rate.

Table 7

2014 European Elections Results in France

	Vote rate (%)	Number of seats
FN	24,86	24
UMP	20,81	20
PS	13,98	13
MoDem	9,94	7
EELV	8,95	6
FG	6,33	3

Source: France Ministry of Interior, 2019a

At the end of elections, populist and extreme parties have gained considerable success in the history of France. 2017 Presidential elections are important in terms of demonstrating the important place of anti-establishment parties for voters. In the first round, FN's candidate Le Pen achieved a crucial success. Since 2002 in the history of FN for the first time, its candidate continued to the second tour. On the other hand, LI's achievement in these elections is also considerable since Mélenchon come forth with minor difference compared to Le Pen and Fillon, candidate of The Republicans.

With regard to the EU, it is seen that both European elections manifestos are classified according to similar topics. The title of manifestos also reflects and summarizes their content. Under the title "Pour Une Europe des Nations" (English: "For A Europe of Nations") RN, in a sense, refers to national sovereignty in a nationalist rhetoric, as it is highly accentuated throughout the text. Similarly, FI's "L'Avenir en Commun, en Europe Aussi" (English: "The Future in Common, in Europe Also") is, in fact, the name of the party program

at the same time. Again, as expressed throughout the manifesto, this title gives a sign of European cooperation and an idea about the preparation process of the manifesto.¹

Table 8
2017 French Presidential Elections Results²

	Political Party	First Round		Second Round	
		Vote rate (%)	Number of votes	Vote rate (%)	Number of votes
Emmanuel Macron	LRM	24,01	8.657.326	66.1	20,703,694
Marine Le Pen	FN	21,30	7.679.493	33.9	10,637,120
François Fillon	The Republicans	20,01	7.213.797	-	-
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	FI	19,58	7.060.885	-	-
Benoît Hammon	PS	6,36	2.291.565	-	-

Source: France Ministry of Interior, 2019b

European election manifestos of RN and FI are based on common issues as they mostly differentiate with regard to their opposition to the European integration. Issues such as immigration, European institutions, national sovereignty, and direct democracy occupy quite a large place in both party programs. However, their stances to most of topic are quite different from each other. In this part of the study, it is aimed to discuss and compare two parties' explanations on crucial and current issues of the EU. In this way despite their different approaches to many questions, how they hold similar Eurosceptic stance will be clarified.

¹ FI shares detailed information about the preparation of the text at the beginning of the manifesto. According to this information, the text was written by experts in the field first, after long discussions in the party's representative assembly; it took its final form in line with the comments of volunteers.

² First five candidates are considered in the table in order to demonstrate vote rates of Le Pen and Mélenchon.

At the beginning of the presidential election manifesto, RN mentions "giving the voice to the people" while explaining the purpose of Le Pen's project. As it is known, "giving the voice to the people" is one of the most popular arguments used by populists. Le Pen who describes herself as the representative of the people, emphasizes that all national interests will be respected during her presidency. On the other hand, according to her argument, the current policies exclude certain segments of the society and in this system, the rich get richer due to existing policies such as migration:

Our social and fiscal policies impoverish the middle and popular classes, while it enrich multinationals and squanders public money via a totally uncontrolled immigration (Les 144 engagements présidentiels, 2017: p.2).

Both European elections manifestos criticize European treaties since they are seen as a threat to democracy and national sovereignty. In RN with reference to Maastricht and Lisbon treaties, it is mentioned that with federalism which also poses an obstacle for national sovereignty legislative, powers are given to the European Commission. European Commission is seen as a body that is the source of the anti-democratic structure of the EU and its democratic legitimacy is questioned throughout the European election manifesto and project of RN. Accordingly, European treaties are seen as the sources of anti-democratic institutions.

With regard to the European institutions, European Commission and European Parliament are mostly referred in manifestos, parties' official documents on 2019 elections. For RN, functioning of the European Commission "which is not elected democratically" ignores the separation of power which is a fundamental principle of democracy as it is responsible for legislative, executive and judicial powers. On the other hand, the European Parliament represents another anti-democratic body within the EU. European Parliament is an institution without legitimacy which is not known by European citizen well. In addition, the decision-making process is under the control of multinational groups and the impacts of external factors are seen in decisions. European Parliament is also defined as an institution under the influence of the European Commission. In addition, the party proposes to redefine its role in order to create a Parliament that is in the service of nations and composed of national representatives elected by member countries. As an example of the inefficiency of

the European Parliament in the decision-making process, RN mentions the treaty signed with Japan in 2018 in order to establish free trade without consultation of the European Parliament. On the other hand, RN accepts the EU as an organization nontransparent and punitive due to its dominance over countries defending their national sovereignties and refusing orientations of Brussels as in the case of Hungary and Poland. Since two countries refuse obligatory immigrant quotas, they are subject to Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union that restrains to vote in the European Council. On the other hand, European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights' decisions are seen as an obstacle against member states' sovereignty. RN proposes strengthening of national law against such supranational institutions:

The European Commission has immense power detriment of other institutions, while they have however more democratic legitimacy. Indeed, the Commission has prerogatives far superior to those of a government: It has the legislative initiative, the regulation, the control of the application and also establishes itself as 'guardian of the treaties' (Pour une Europe des nations et des peuples, 2019: p.16).

FI firstly describes the European Commission that imposes directives of international lobbies especially regarding the destruction of public services by referring to the discussion about the privatization of SNCF ("National Railway Network France") that has had wide media coverage before European elections in France. Against the dominance of the Commission FI proposes to represent France effectively in the European Parliament through "insoumis.e.s" (insubmissives). In this way Parliament will be an arena of crucial discussions which are initiated by FI's representatives. In addition, FI recommends increasing the power of the national parliament to strengthen the European Parliament. The national parliament which will convene once a month on the agenda of the European Parliament should discuss European texts before discussions at the European Parliament.

FI explains that in the Parliament formed with the 2014 elections, the party with just one MEP (Jean-Luc Mélenchon) was able to oppose the discussions. By this way, party prevented the implementation of a program that envisages pollution of oceans. With regard to people's sovereignty, institutions such as the European Central Bank are so much referred to

in the FI's manifesto. Especially Troika (composed of IMF, European Commission, and European Central Bank) is criticized due to imposed austerity policies in Greece after the 2008 financial crisis. Greek debt crisis is described as "financial Coup d'Etat" because of the annulment of referendum and assignment of technocrats in government. European Stability Mechanism, Germany and oligarchy are seen as responsible. Because of this reason FI proposes to end independence of European Central Bank and change its responsibilities: "Today European Union imposes austerity, defeats public services and organizes unfair competition between its members for the sole benefit of shareholders and finance" (L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi, 2018: p.19).

The emphasis on oligarchy also attracts attention in Mélenchon's presidential manifesto. Mélenchon says that for the establishment of the French Sixth Republic, a new constitution should be written with the participation of the people, by this way, people should determine their rules. Mélenchon also in his campaign refers to German-dominated Europe:

European Union is in the process of dislocation. It has not been willing to listen to people's refusals since the French referendum in 2005. The European Commission, composed of bureaucrats and dominated by Germany, wants to force countries to repay a debt, most of which is made up of bank interest! (L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi, 2018: p.20).

Another common point is the emphasis of the two parties on the necessity of a referendum on European institutions. FI suggests that in order to defeat European oligarchy, MEPs and European officials should be dismissed by referendum. On the other hand, RN recommends to establish a national referendum system (French: "Référéndum d'Initiative Citoyenne", English: "Citizens' Initiative Referendum") on the European Commission and to supervise the decisions to be taken.³ In this example, populists' aims to communicate directly with the people that they address without intermediaries can be seen. In fact, direct communication with the public which is one of the main reasons for the emergence of populism, and the direct participation of the people in the decision-making processes, is manifested not only in the demands of the parties regarding referendum, but also in the

³ It should be noted that Citizens' Initiative Referendum already exists in France at the national level. As a tool of direct democracy, the system allows French citizen to share their ideas regarding constitutional amendments.

comments made on the elements that prevent the sovereignty of the people as in the news about the interview done with Bordella, party's European Parliament candidate and spokesman:

We want to rebuild a different European Union (EU). Does it protect us from unfair competition? No, she encourages him. Does it protect us from the terrorist threat? No. Does it protect us from migratory submersion? No. Is it democratic? I do not believe that (Financial Times, 19 January 2019).

The RN gives a similar importance to the referendum in the presidential manifesto. Le Pen, who states that decisions should be taken under the control of the people, proposes in detail solutions ensuring direct participation of citizens (reducing the number of deputies in the national assembly from 577 to 300, reducing the existing local government units from 6 to 3, etc.). Mélenchon also stresses the place of direct democracy in the new constitution and transparent drawing up process in addition to the necessity of final approval of French people through referendum for its adaption.

In the previous chapters, when the right and left populist parties' differentiations are mentioned, it is emphasized that while the history of the right populist parties dates back to the early years, the populist parties came into being with the crisis in 2008. It is possible to find out this difference in RN and FI programs as well. FI states at many points about the debt crisis and shares its criticism of Troika. The most important point that attracts attention in FI's program is that the European countries should be more dominant in the Euro area, European Central Bank, finance and social issues. On the other hand, although RN shares arguments on similar issues, RN comments less systematically than FI. Although criticism of the liberal policies has taken place in both parties, FI explains in more detail and includes this topic in its manifesto as a priority subject. Issues such as monetary policies, social security, and equality are interpreted in FI from a socialist perspective. However, RN does not comment on crisis that becomes more visible with the Greek case. In the matter of opposition to the European institutions, the similarity of the two parties can be seen. Both parties argue that the institutions undermine national sovereignty and ignore the demands of the European citizen. In FI's arguments, there is a different point regarding the functioning of institutions compared to RN. The RN also refers to the issue of national sovereignty in presidential manifesto.

Stating that all areas should be based on the sovereignty of the French people, Le Pen says that a European project based on French sovereignty should be created.

Recovering our freedom and the control of our destiny by restoring to the people French sovereignty (monetary, legislative, territorial, economic). For this, a negotiation will be initiated with our European partners followed by a referendum on our membership of the European Union. The goal is to achieve a European project respectful of the independence of France, national sovereignties and serve the interests of the people (Les 144 engagements présidentiels, 2017: p.3).

In the FI manifesto, there is frequent reference to the Greek crisis. Party defines the institutions that try to impose their financial systems as oligarchs and claims that the oligarchy disregards the sovereignty of the Greek people. It is possible to point out that both parties' emphasis on national sovereignty is in line with the populist strategy. As explained in the previous sections, national sovereignty is an issue emphasized by both right and left such parties. It is possible to say that their approach to national sovereignty is similar. However, as a left populist party, FI seems to explain the threat of national sovereignty through neoliberal hegemony. FI also refers to national sovereignty considering all European communities. RN, on the other hand, emphasizes French sovereignty, especially from a nationalist point of view.

In line with these arguments, it can be argued that there is a difference in the approaches of the two parties towards the EU as a whole. While RN is stating the need for an institutional revision through revision of treaties, FI proposes that existing treaties should be withdrawn for an alternative European cooperation in case of unsuccessful revision since "Europe is a great idea, but the treaties that organize it are a great calamity" to Mélenchon (Le Monde, 19 April 2017). RN opposes arguments that the founding agreements cannot be renegotiated. The party claims that the unanimity of the member states, which are argued to be necessary for discussion of the treaties, is not performed in practice. For example, it is said that the procedures applied to Poland and Hungary cannot be implemented because neither unanimity nor the majority can be achieved. Similarly, the Dublin reform blocked by the member states (Poland, Austria, Hungary, etc.) in the European Council is given as an example to the inefficiency of unanimity. According to the party, people's demand is essential and unanimity voting should not be an obstacle against demands for a more flexible and more

democratic European idea in all parts of Europe. Therefore, RN argues that instead of changing the EU, its treaties should be revised in order to ensure balance between the EU institutions. Party states that those in the current parliament who talk about changing Europe are not sincere. As an example, Les Republicaines list that a French MEP in Parliament talks about changing Europe, but is also in the same political group (European People's Party) as Juncker (President of European Commission), Tusk (President of the European Council), Tajani (President of the European Parliament) and Merkel, so the appeals on changing Europe do not seem consistent.

On the other hand, FI advocates an alternative Europe. According to their alternative European ideal, a new European movement should emerge and existing treaties should be left. "Maintenant la peuple!" (English: "Now the people!") established on the anniversary of the Lisbon Treaty in 2018 with the participation of national parties of the Party of the European Left. The movement, which is defined as the anti-thesis of the Lisbon Treaty, is claimed to be the starting point of establishing an alternative European cooperation with the party's alliances in Europe. The Party also advocates the idea that agreements should be discussed collectively in order to form a democratic strategy. In terms of non-compliance with existing EU rules, similar to RN, political *volonté* of member states are essential. On the other hand, Manon Aubry (European Parliament candidate of the FI) criticizes Macron because his rapprochement to RN in terms of discourse during the 2019 European elections campaign and states that FI offers an alternative to the increase between two parties.

The game played by LRM and Emmanuel Macron is extremely dangerous, by designating the RN as their only opponent, going on their pitch, using their words. They legitimize this speech. Our role is to be a third way, an alternative (Le Monde, 11 May 2019).

It is possible to see arguments in line with the populist strategy in RN and FI's demands for Europe. Parties similarly argue that unanimity voting is ineffective and creates a system that undermines national sovereignty. It is often emphasized that there is an alternative to the existing EU system, which is incompatible with the demands of the European people. With reference to Macron and other EU leaders (especially Merkel), it is mentioned that alternative European politics is possible, and for that, public has the necessary motivation. Both parties stress that they can take part in the establishment of an alternative Europe against

the European elites on behalf of the people. In his article in *The Guardian*, Mélenchon emphasizes the inefficiency of Macron and his policies in response to Macron's recommendation to French people to take lessons from Brexit in his article published in same newspaper under the title of "Dear Europe, Brexit is a lesson for all of us": "Emmanuel Macron's vision of the continent's future fails to address the most urgent problems facing Europeans today" (*Le Monde*, 19 April 2019).

Another point that draws attention in the discourses of the parties is references to the nation. As mentioned, the current French president, Macron, is often criticized for his policies and his rapprochement with Merkel. RN says that Macron has been working closely with Merkel, and his policies do not comply with his promise to change Europe before the presidential election. Merkel, on the other hand, is seen as the "priestess" of the EU who uses the EU for the country's interests. FI likewise criticizes Macron and Merkel very much and blames Macron for implementing liberal policies like Sarkozy:

Emmanuel Macron, faithfully applies the same liberal recipes implemented for 30 years. He continues the dishonest work of Nicolas Sarkozy who signed the Treaty of Lisbon behind French people's back. He applies without wincing treaties that Holland had promised to renegotiate. He willingly submits to the Commission's orders, sometimes going even further than his expectations. 'Stop!' should be said (*L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi*, 2018: p.4).

The most important point is the acceptance of the 2019 European elections as a referendum against Macron and Macron's Europe. Besides, FI argues that the EU is not defending rights and freedoms, right-wing politics, and even it reaches to the power, the EU prefers to remain silent. The EU, on the other hand, has even accompanied the policies of the far-right that contradicts human rights and equality. It is referred to that Merkel, Junker, and Orban who is described as dictator, are in the same political group:

2019 will be a referendum against Macron, against his Europe, that of money, austerity, Merkel. But also a plebiscite for a real alternative (*L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi*, 2018: p.4).

Le Pen, in addition to criticisms about Merkel and Macron, is demonstrated among the leaders of extreme right movements. It is believed that the policies of Macron and the like

strengthen the far right, increased the pressure of nationalists all over Europe and the anti-immigration policies of these movements were accepted in Brussels. It is emphasized that Macron is the president of the rich and implements the financial policies committed by the European Commission. His attitude in the labor law which has echoed in France a lot is criticized.

As already explained, it is seen that the program of both parties clearly refer to national issues. Although the issues related to the EU are mentioned, criticisms of national politics are noteworthy. The argument that the European elections are a "second-order" issue manifests itself in both parties. It is criticized that Macron has made a lot of concessions to the EU and it is stated that France has succumbed to the EU on issues that restrict national sovereignty. In particular, FI's definition of European elections as elections against Macron in addition to Macron's EU policy can be read as a reflection of national politics.

In line with the recent green movements in Europe, the matter of ecology can be found in both parties. Similar to the 2008 crisis, while FI shares in detail what needs to be done about the sustainability ecological life, RN approaches the issue from free market perspective. FI criticizes the EU being in line with the directives of the lobbies of companies active in the chemical field. RN claims that as a result of the negative effects of the free market, the products harmful to human health have reached France through limited controls. At this point, it is seen that FI share common issues with the greens which are rising and becoming influential on the eve of the 2019 European elections.

Another issue that separates right populist parties from left populists is migration. The EU has been exposed to a new wave of migration with the Syrian crisis in addition to emigrations from Africa and the Middle East. However, the issue of migration began to take an important place on the agenda of the European politicians, especially in recent years. The relationship between migration and populism can also be addressed as the subject of another study due to the deepness of the subject. The attitudes of political parties on migration and migrant perception determine the attitudes of the public towards immigrants. The issue of migration also appears to be used by right-wing populist parties to form the "people". In addition to different segments of the population, it is observed that the "real people" are defined through the exclusion of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. As mentioned

earlier, while the left populist parties come to the fore with policy proposals for the integration of immigrants, the right populist parties stand out for the discriminatory and marginalizing process against immigrants that increase polarization within the society.

It is possible to see a difference in the populist parties at this issue. First, RN criticizes the Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985 and introduced in 1996, over the argument that national borders are endangered. RN states that the internal borders were abolished by this agreement however the member states were confronted with uncontrolled immigration due to the failure of the countries at the external borders of the Schengen area to adequately protect the borders. As a result of this negligence, it is stated that the identity, security, and welfare of European nations are in danger. Immediately after these arguments, it is stated that Islamization poses a danger to national identities and Islam poses an obstacle for the protection of civilization values and employment. Therefore, it is emphasized that the functioning of European institutions and the texts on migration management should be revised. In addition to this, it is stated that instead of a European administration consisting of technocrats, the demands of European society regarding the protection of their sovereignty should be taken into consideration.

On immigration and border management RN in its project argues that a closed immigration policy should be implemented, the measures in the entry countries should be increased jointly and that legal immigration should be limited, deportation of illegal immigrants, residence permit should not be renewed automatically. It is stated that radical mosques and Islamists should be deported immediately:

The massive immigration suffered by Europe for decades and the lowering of borders make the European countries very vulnerable to the Islamist threat and the proliferation of this political-religious ideology on our territory. It is time to consider this is a major collective challenge, one that requires political will and cooperation between the police and the justice system (Pour une Europe des nations et des peuples, 2019: p.14).

Regarding migration, it is possible to see RN's emphasis on identity during the presidential election. Stating that French identity, values, and traditions need to be defended,

Le Pen argues that the French identity should also be glorified in every sense in the constitution and that the EU flag should be removed from all official institutions. During the 2019 European elections campaign, Bordella explicitly stated his views on immigration with the following words: “We won’t spend a single euro to welcome immigrants so long as a single French person is sleeping on the street” (Financial Times, 20 January 2019).

Additionally RN in the manifesto describes immigration as "denial of democracy" because of policies regarding free movement imposed by the EU:

The dogma of the freedom of movement of people is imposed on the peoples of Europe without ever being informed, consulted and listened to. To favor public emotion operation driven by outside, also with a general denial of information and expression that forbids asking "who, how and where", public policies concerning immigration are the effect of the most formidable denial of democracy that Europe has known in one half a century" (Pour une Europe des nations, 2019: p.51).

FI's approach to migration is based on the protection of immigrants compared to RN. FI opposes the Dublin convention and states that the Dublin regulations should be terminated since it leaves immigrants in a difficult situation, neither entering nor receiving country they get legal status. The party suggests a joint effort with the United Nations against forced migration, and, support to the host country in order to take urgent action. FI offers a solution-oriented approach pointing out that it is required to take the necessary steps to determine and eliminate the causes of migration. Also by drawing attention to the loss of life in the Mediterranean, it is mentioned that the Schengen area and Frontex should be exited since these practices are insufficient to protect the external borders. Militarization of the control of the flow of migrants, the regulations regarding the rights of migrants in countries such as Turkey where human rights are weak must be revised. In substance, it is stated that the war against immigrants should end and fundamental rights should be provided.

As can be seen, there are clear differences in the approach of the two parties to the issue of migration. While RN considers Islam - terrorism - migration together as so strengthen xenophobia, FI is in favor of granting fundamental rights to all immigrants without emphasizing their ethnicity, nationality. This difference is consistent with the attitudes of the

right and left populist parties on migration across the European continent. Furthermore, the strategy of mobilizing the people through xenophobia is seen in the case of France as in other right-wing European parties.

In FI, the need for peace in Europe is often referred. The current EU order, neoliberal policies, economic and commercial wars are leading European states to another kind of war. It is stated that the EU, which initially set out for peace and cooperation among nation-states, is now moving away from initial missions.

We propose a Europe, not of competition, but of cooperation based on freedom, equality and fraternity between European countries and the rest of the world (L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi, 2018: p.6).

Under the influence of NATO and the United States, the EU is partnering with non-democratic regimes. While the UN is seen as the only legitimate common security organization, it is stressed that France should leave NATO that is under the control of the United States:

Stop, we need an alter-globalist Europe at the service of peace, security and cooperation within the framework of the UN, it must begin by stopping the war on European territory (L'Avenir en commun, en Europe aussi, 2018: p.24).

The European Union has been built according to the successive texts, since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and reinforcements of its prerogatives. Initially, it was presented to the peoples as an organization respectful of national sovereignties and likely to bring European nations collective power, growth, employment, security and peace. Promises renounced, even betrayed (Pour une Europe des nations et des peuples, 2019: p.3).

RN and FI similarly state that relations with Russia should be maintained. RN argues that France must leave NATO in order to avoid being involved in wars that do not concern France and emphasizes that the cold war with Russia should end and balance in relations should be achieved. FI, on the other hand, rejects the European defense and states that the strategic partnership with Russia should be improved. According to FI, it is possible to establish co-operation with BRICS countries in order to overthrow America's monetary

superiority. In addition, both parties' attitudes towards globalization are noteworthy. RN says that partnerships with CETA and Mercosur would harm French goods, while FI also mentions that free exchange agreements with Japan, America, and New Zealand should be rejected. This issue draws attention as the most commonly agreed on the two sides.

France's contribution to the EU budget is another common topic in both parties' opposition to the EU. RN summarizes as "they decide, they spend, we pay," the contribution to the EU budget, especially for enlargement seems unnecessary to help candidate countries. On the other hand, FI makes mention of the need to cut its contribution to the EU budget. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), another topic that France discusses throughout the European integration process, is seen in both parties. While RN argues that European commissioners should no longer decide on France's agricultural policy, FI proposes cooperation for the development of CAP, the provision of food sovereignty and the enhancement of the quality of European agricultural products.

Apart from manifestos, in recent year movements such as Yellow Vests (French: "Gilets Jaunes") points out general displeasure of the French people with the current government and its neoliberal policies. Yellow Vests protest may be seen as an outcome of the neoliberal crisis. Protests started in 2018 against rising fuel prices that takes an important place in the daily life of people living in suburban cities and who have been away from politics for years, have no official ties with any political party, union and excluded from neoliberal policies of Macron. As mostly stated his latest policies are concentrated on protecting rich people and burdening poor people's responsibility to overcome costs of those policies. Similarly "Nuit debout" movements (English: "Standing Night") were started in 2016 with labor reform envisaging limited regulations. Macron's efforts to calm the people on the streets also met with the reaction. Because he explained the increase in fuel prices as a reason to ensure the minimum consumption of fuel and protect the environment. However, this statement was not found realistic by the public because of Macron's other policies. Therefore, the history of the Yellow vests is based on old popular inquietude and precariat, but Macron's ignorance of these inquietude triggers such reactions even further.

When we look at the Eurosceptic positions of the parties that are the subject of the study, it is seen that similarities in their stances are as important as differences. The RN which

is defined as right populist party, and FI which is described as left populist, and at some points about the EU put forward common arguments. The Eurosceptic positions of the parties also coincide with the anti-establishment position. These parties, which are in a different position from mainstream parties, criticize mainstream parties and leaders at many points and make promises for the ignored demands of the French people. This anti-establishment stance has brought a considerable reputation to both parties. While RN has had the opportunity to increase its success in European and national elections in recent years, the recently established FI has received considerable support in a short time from the people who feel rejected. European elections give the parties visibility and the opportunity to publicize their approach to national issues to the wider audience.



CONCLUSION

European integration which aims at economic, political and geographical cooperation, offers a successful integration experience among European countries and leads to various discussions and reactions concurrently. Recent developments in the world politics that have influenced Europe, have largely been debated about the extent of European integration, its benefits, and barriers to European countries. Following the changes through founding treaties, Euroscepticism has taken form throughout the integration process and reached today's Euroscepticism which complies with populist policies.

During the history of Euroscepticism, efforts to define the term correspond to the complicated nature of Euroscepticism. Although Britain with strong influence of Thatcher is the starting point of its history, it is possible to state that Euroscepticism has reached today with increasing and diversifying objections over time. Academic studies reveal that Euroscepticism differs in each country in accordance with their national contexts. In this sense, France has an important role in the development of the term with its political parties that pioneer criticism of the EU and European integration and attract public attention.

When we look at the discussions on Euroscepticism, the first point that stands out is the differentiation of definitions on the basis of institutions, public and political parties. With regard to the Euroscepticism at the level of institution which especially refers to European Parliament brings arguments about the perception of European elections as "second-order" by political parties. According to those arguments regarding the "second-order" feature of the EU, national concerns of political parties are dominant in European elections and they consider European elections as an opportunity to test expected results of forthcoming national elections. In addition in the current political parties in Europe, it is seen that their policy recommendations and commitments in the European elections are shaped by national issues.

Euroscepticism which has been the subject of many academic studies is on the rise in some periods of the history of European integration. It can be said that the Maastricht Treaty signed after the end of the Cold War, presents the first signs of today's Euroscepticism. In the

Maastricht Treaty that met with the reaction of the member states, European societies shared their criticisms about the EU in the most concrete way. This experience is described as the end of the permissive consensus period and it points to the beginning of a process of an anti-EU wave that continues up to the present and that has increased once again with the rejection of the European constitution together with the Lisbon Treaty. Concerning mass-level Euroscepticism, permissive consensus provides a useful clarification on the lack of public participation as current claims about the EU mostly arise from inefficiency of European Parliament in representing European people's demand. Besides, permissive consensus not only refers to the effect of public opinion in decision-making, but also emphasizes the integration handled without public consent by addressing especially 1970s. Looking at the Maastricht period since the establishment of the EU, peoples' views on integration were achieved through European elections and in the referenda of the member and candidate countries. At the same time, people had restricted sources to access information on how integration would affect their lives. Accordingly, limited positive public feedback with regard to the EU was considered by policymakers to establish and transform European integration. However, throughout the years, the increasing impact of the integration to the lives of European citizen and regular surveys revealed the lack of public consent about diverse EU policy areas.

On the other hand, parties' attitudes towards European integration are of particular importance when considering the roles of political parties in representative democracy. In addition to the influence of political parties in national politics, the power of representation within the European institutions makes them inevitable in addressing the issue of European integration. Although the functioning of European institutions limits the European Parliament's power, political parties' capacity to mobilize the electorate they represent and setting the agenda is substantial. In addition, the European issue takes place in the programs of the political parties as much as the national issues. Despite the controversial comments among academics over whether parties' EU attitudes are determined by strategy or ideology, "multi-layered nature of Euroscepticism" arises as their common argument. However, this nature of Euroscepticism also creates difficulties in categorizing parties' Eurosceptic positions.

Studies on systematic classification of political parties according to their European approaches are remarkable. First of all, unstable attitudes of political parties to the integration process prevent to put forward a consistent classification. Besides, according to studies, party families differ in cross-national perspective. Even if political parties in different countries have the same ideology, their approach to politics may differ due to their national context. Accordingly, necessity of another dimension arises in understanding Eurosceptic parties' attitudes towards integration. Through a closer examination, such parties' anti-establishment nature emerges as their common points. When we look at the factor that gives political parties anti-establishment characteristics, it is seen that they advocate alternative politics. Thus, Eurosceptic attitudes of the anti-establishment parties are shaped by their general objections to the establishment. Independence of ideologies constitutes the main feature of such parties. It is not possible to ignore parties' relation with ideologies however their oppositions to the exclusionist attitude of traditional politics come to the fore among their features.

In Europe, it is possible to find the reflection of the increasing dissatisfaction with modern politics which emphasizes liberal values and ignores fundamental democratic rights. While groups that are not able to adapt themselves to globalization feel they are not part of the current political policies and the mass voiced by the mainstream parties, the need for alternative politics ensuring democratic rights has emerged. European integration, on the other hand, provided a favorable environment for raising the voices of anti-establishment populist parties that could respond to this need of societies. The EU where the anti-establishment parties are located outside of the party system has allowed such parties to share their criticism of both European and domestic issues. These parties which make their presence felt more in domestic politics gained considerable votes and even formed government. Anti-establishment parties oppose the status quo, give importance to "the people" and "the elite" distinction while taking a stand against mainstream parties. While the independence of those parties from ideologies provides them a wide movement area outside of mainstream politics, the establishment parties become more similar to the state and each other in order to use the state's economic resources. On the other hand, the increasing distance between the establishment and periphery parties and the fact that the establishment parties are no longer able to respond to voters' preference increase the public interest in anti-establishment parties.

Another remarkable point is the similarities in the opposition of the parties who adapt populist strategy. While these similarities coincide with the nature of populism (e.g. inability of institutions to adequately represent the public, insufficient public participation in the decision-making process, governments serving for the interests of the elites), it is seen that their differences correspond to their positions in the political spectrum. As referenced in the study, the fact that ideologies have lost their influence compared to the past and that they are not sufficient as the sole factor in determining the parties' approaches on European integration overlap with the Eurosceptic positions of populist parties.

The European elections of 2014 attracted considerable attention with a low turnout and brought about discussion on the democratic deficit, the participation of European citizens in the decision-making process and the legitimacy of EU institutions. Another important outcome of the 2014 elections was the fact that Eurosceptic parties gained significant votes compared to the previous elections. Within the EU institutions, the European Parliament, as the only organ whose members are directly elected by the public, presented an election marked by the success of the far-right parties.

When Euroscepticism is confined to countries that are associated with European integration, populism is a phenomenon that takes place in a wider area. Populism has been changed according to developments throughout its history and is based on the distinction of “the people” and “the elite” as in “new populism” and in previous populism experiences. As in Euroscepticism, the complicated nature of populism makes it difficult to define. Despite the long experiences of populism in the history of world politics, populist political parties that are on the rise today have increased again the debate on the phenomenon. The only point that populism differs in time and among countries is the definition of “the people”. "The elite" determined according to "the people" includes individuals and institutions that consider only their own interests.

The distinction between right and left populism becomes important at this point. Although many scholars assert that populism cannot be mentioned by the left movements, Mouffe argues that left populism is the antidote to right populism. But the determination of "the people vs. the elite" with a moralistic approach, as right-wing populists do, causes polarization that today's societies currently experience. Right populism builds the conflict on

"us and the enemy", while left populism is based on the distinction between "us and them" emphasizing the necessity of living together instead of antagonizing others. Mouffe and Laclau's comments on the dangers of right populism and what left populism needs to do help address the current status of today's European politics. And it becomes necessary to carefully monitor the effects of the rise of right populism in the context of European integration. Since European integration offers polarization-oriented parties more visibility, it is significant to establish a mechanism that responds to the demands of European societies. Additionally, establishing the "chain of equivalence" that ensures cooperation among different parts of societies and also cooperation among similar left populist movements in Europe may facilitate the formation of a new hegemony that guarantees democratic institutions.

Mouffe explains the rise of populist movements with the lack of political frontier among the people. Political frontier which provides the conflict that is required by politics and democracy has the power to mobilize the groups within the society in defending their rights. In this post-politics period, with the importance given to liberalism, democratic values seem to be ignored. In today's world where liberal values suppress democratic values such as popular sovereignty and equality, radical democracy may be accepted as a solution to the consolidation of fundamental democratic rights. Therefore, agonism which is necessary for political conflict means strengthening democracy within the framework of democracy without excluding other parts of the society. The aim is not ensuring consensus, on the contrary, agonism is the source of harmony within the society. Here it is important to emphasize that antagonism which means perceiving "the other" as "the enemy", cannot be the purpose of democracy and politics. Mouffe's approach envisages transforming antagonism into agonism in order to establish cohesion and struggle. Another significant point with regard to the society is the concept of anti-essentialism that is presented by Mouffe in explaining the opportunity of forming and changing identities. Because it is necessary to transform identities in order to establish a society having a conflictual relationship.

About European integration and agonism, as Mouffe points out, the emergence of cooperation among European societies opened the way for resolving antagonism between France and Germany. In that sense, Schuman Plan may be regarded as the source of agonism between European societies. However, it becomes important to keep this agonism within

European societies by ensuring national identities of member countries. In case of the dominance of EU's competences over national interests, it is possible to witness the formation of an "enemy" which is associated with European institutions and is seen as the barrier against sovereignties and democracy.

As explained in the previous chapters, the intersecting features of populism and Euroscepticism contribute to the rapid rise of the parties that incorporate these two concepts. Euroscepticism which offers an environment independent of ideologies integrates with populism far from core ideologies at many points. For this reason, it is the common view in the literature that the parties' Eurosceptic attitudes are influenced by their domestic policy purposes. It is possible to point out that the results of this study on two populist Eurosceptic parties are may be applied to other political parties in Europe as well. Based on their manifestos, both parties seem to have aims to produce policies about similar concerns and demands. The main topics of interest of both parties are the issues that are at the top of the European agenda but not evaluated by the mainstream parties and leaders in line with the demands of the people. Since the issue of European integration includes diverse fields such as unemployment, economic crisis, housing, social policies, migration, terrorism, it offers a rich platform for understanding the positions and policies of national populist parties. Therefore, the opposition to European integration is one of the issues that populist parties put forward in pre-election period.

Although populism is mostly associated with right-wing movements, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, it is possible to observe the rise of left populist parties as in the case of Podemos which has influenced a lot the formation of similar movements in Europe as France Unbowed. Therefore it becomes crucial to understand the current status of populist parties and what they propose against the rise of popular discontent regarding the EU. It is possible to argue that the reluctance of established parties in taking discontent of people of Europe into account has led to the emergence of anti-establishment populist Eurosceptic parties as mentioned. Also, these parties have recently attracted public attention and have come to the forefront in elections.

This study was conducted on the eve of 2019 European Parliament elections and focused on the populist Eurosceptic positions based on the European elections and national

manifestos of the parties. As can be seen, although Euroscepticism cannot be restricted to any ideology, populist Eurosceptic parties are located within the periphery of party systems. Both parties emphasize national sovereignty and argue that European institutions pose an obstacle to the sovereignty of the people. France Unbowed which is described as left populist party refers to the European institutions as oligarchy. Demands for direct democracy are seen in both parties. Therefore referenda have been included in manifestos as the most important instrument of direct democracy. National Rally focuses more on the migration crisis and draws attention to xenophobia. France Unbowed emphasizes social rights and emphasizes the inequalities created by the economic crisis as a result of neoliberal policies. These two parties achieved significant vote rates in national elections and seem to advocate an alternative European idea. By political parties, 2019 European elections are seen at many points as an opportunity to react to the president of France and his policies. Against National Rally's nationalist approach, France Unbowed's attitude towards cooperation among European alliances is remarkable. In fact, although the parties create an agenda on the same topics, they differ in terms of their solutions. However, the national concerns are evident in their Eurosceptic attitudes.

As it has been experienced with the current politics, political parties and leaders use social crisis such as migration to increase polarization among members of society and thus try to form "the people" who are committed to them. It is clear that a politics based on polarization cannot offer peaceful policies and it can lead to much deeper divisions within society. With regard to the EU, it is important to respond to the demands of European societies since European integration provides parties based on polarity more visibility. The populist moment in Europe presents an important opportunity for a more equitable and egalitarian order. It has shown the possibility of the alternative and that people are not obliged to political parties and policies that have been going on for years and are far from providing solutions considering their need. What is important here is that this opportunity is used for ensuring the coexistence within and between communities.

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