

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ ve ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**AID EFFECTIVENESS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUSAN
PRINCIPLES BY THE EU AND TURKEY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Samiratu DIPAMA

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Istanbul-2019

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
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ÖZET

Tez konusu, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) Busan Etkili Kalkınma İşbirliği İlkeleri'nin (BEDCP) dört ilkesinin, sahiplik, sonuç odaklılık, kapsayıcılık, şeffaflık ve hesap verilebilirlik ile bununla ilgili göstergelerinin (gösterge 5a, 9b, 10, 2, 1a, 4 ve 6) Etiyopya, Nijer, Nijerya ve Somali'de karşılıklı ampirik analizi ile Türkiye ve AB'nin bu dört Sahra Altı Afrika ülkesindeki BEDCP performanslarının nihai farklarının üç temel Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramının (Neorealizm, Konstrüktivizm ve Neoliberalizm) makul açıklayıcı faktörleriyle eleştirel olarak değerlendirmesine odaklanmaktadır. Analiz için bu çalışma; kurumsal ve yardım ajanslarının yayınlarını, konferans metinlerini, basın açıklamalarını ve akademik literatürü incelemiş, Brüksel ve Ankara'da örnek olay için seçilmiş dört Afrika ülkesinin büyükelçilikleri ve iki taraflı yardım ajanslarıyla yapılan mülakat ve geri dönüşlerden faydalanmıştır.

İlk temel bulgu Nijerya, Somali, Nijer ve Etiyopya'da gösterge 6 ve bir ölçüde gösterge 1a ve 9b (Nijerya ve Somali'de) dışında Türkiye'nin AB'ye göre daha kalan göstergelerde, gösterge 9b (Nijer ve Etiyopya'da) 5a, 10, 2 ve 4, daha düşük bir performans sergilediğidir.

İkinci olarak, BEDCP'nin uygulanmasındaki düzensizliğin arkasındaki açıklayıcı faktörler hakkında, araştırmamızın sonuçları sırasıyla konstrüktivizm, neorealizm ve neoliberalizmden yararlanan üç açıklayıcı faktör grubundan (normlar ve kimlik, öz çıkar ve karşılıklı bağımlılığın düzeyi) hiç birinin tek başına BEDCP'nin uygulanması bağlamında Türkiye ve AB'nin dört ülkedeki davranış farklarını kavrayamayacağını ortaya koymaktadır. Örneklerin çoğunda öz çıkarın norm ile ya da karşılıklı bağımlılık düzeyiyle birleşimi BEDCP konusunda Türkiye ve AB'nin dört ülkedeki davranış farklarını açıklamaktadır.

Bununla birlikte, tek bir açıklayıcı faktörü belirlemek mümkün olmasa da, araştırmamız Türkiye ve AB'nin içselleştirdiği değerler, normlar, kimlikler, fikirler ve ideolojiler gibi maddi olmayan unsurlarının Etiyopya, Nijer, Nijerya ve Somalide'de Busan Etkili Kalkınma İşbirliği İlkeleri'ne ve onun ilgili göstergelerine yakınlık konusundaki tutumlarını şekillendirmede daha önemli olduğu hususunda baskın bir varsayım taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Sahra Altı Afrika, Kalkınma İşbirliği, Busan Ortaklığı, Yardım Etkinliği, Realizm, Liberalizm, Konstrüktivizm.

ABSTRACT

The thesis subject focuses on a comparative empirical analysis of the degree of implementation of the four Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs), namely Ownership, Focus on Results, Inclusiveness, Transparency and Accountability and some of its related indicators(indicators 5a,9b,10,2,1a,4 and 6), by Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, as well as on the critical assessment of the plausible explanatory factors drawn from three core IR theories (Neorealism, Constructivism, and Neoliberalism) behind eventual differences in the performance by the EU and Turkey of the BEDCPs in the four sub-Saharan African countries. For the analysis, this study reviews institutional and aid agency publications and existing document sources such as conference papers, press releases, academic literature as well as interviews and feedback from bilateral donor agency staff and Embassies of the selected four African case studies in both Brussels and Ankara.

The first main finding is that that in comparison to the EU and except Indicator 6 and to a certain extent Indicators 1a and 9b (in Nigeria and Somalia), Turkey has shown a lower performance against the remaining indicators, namely Indicators 9b (in Niger and Ethiopia), 5a,10, 2, and 4, in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia. Second, regarding the explanatory factors behind unevenness in the implementation of BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey, the results of our investigation show that none of the three group of explanatory factors (norms and identity, self-interest and level of interdependency) respectively drawn from constructivism, neorealism, and neoliberalism, can singlehandedly grasp the different behaviour of the EU and Turkey in the context of BEDCPs' implementation in the four countries. In most of the cases, it was a combination of self-interest with norms or the level of interdependency that explained the different behaviour of Turkey and the EU vis-à-vis BEDCPs in our four country case studies.

However, while it is not possible to designate one single explanatory factor, our research does place the dominant assumption that non-material elements such as values, norms, identities, ideas and ideologies, which are internalized in EU and Turkey, have more importance in

shaping their attitudes regarding convergence to the Busan effective development cooperation principles and its related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Cooperation, Busan Partnership, Aid Effectiveness, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism.

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To my lovely husband Idrissa and sweet baby Ayden, words would never be enough to say how grateful I am to both of you. I consider myself the luckiest in the world to have such a lovely and caring family, standing beside me with their love and unconditional support.

Lastly, I thank the Almighty for giving me the strength and patience to work through all these years.

DEDICATION

To my beloved mother and son.

To all those whose actions are helping to improve poor peoples' lives through more and better development assistance.



LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Busan Principles of and Targets for Development Cooperation Effectiveness

Table 2: Shared Principles and Differentiated Commitments of the Busan indicators

Table 3: Effectiveness principles (and targets) and Data Sources for analysis

Table 4: Summary of the IR theories' Assumptions about the motivations behind the provision of Foreign Aid

Table 5: Overview of the main Theories' Assumptions about Aid Effectiveness

Table 6: Lists of Official visits by Turkish Statesmen in SSA since 2002

Table 7: EU Member States key contributions to 10th (2008-2013) and 11th (agreed in 2013 for the period 2014-2020) EDF (in %)

Table 8: List of Business Councils created in the bottom of DEIK between Turkey and SSA countries

Table 9: Overview of the main External Financing Instruments of the EU in SSA in 2015

Table 10: EU Institutions, Germany, UK, and France's Gross ODA breakdown: Bilateral excl. non-core, non-core multilateral contributions, constant 2014 USD million.

Table 11: EU Aid disbursement to SSA by type of aid in current US million dollars, 2010-2016

Table 12: Average of EU ODA disbursement to SSA per country in million USD, 2010-2016

Table 13: Average of Turkey's ODA disbursement to SSA per country, 2010-2016, in million USD

Table 14: Turkey's aid disbursement to SSA by type of aid in US million \$, 2010-2016

Table 15: Classification of Sub-Saharan African countries by income group (GNI per capita in current US dollars), June 2017

Table 16: GPEDC Framework for monitoring the use of Country Systems

Table 17: Comparative table of Turkey and EU's global performance against the Busan principles in GPEDC 2016 monitoring survey

Table 18: Average EU Total ODA Commitment and Disbursement and Average EU total ODA disbursement as percentage of total ODA commitment, 2010-2016

Table 19: EU ODA (EDF, DCI, ENI) and EDF Programming 2014-2020, in million euros, per country

Table 20: Total Disbursement and Commitment of EU EDF (ODA), between 2010 and 2015, by country, in million euros

Table 21: Ratio commitments /disbursements EU EDF(ODA) (%)

Table 22: Summary of EU Aid predictability: Ratio Commitment/ disbursement for the years 2010-2015

Table 23: Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Ethiopia, by types of aid, in current million USD (2010-2016)

Table 24: Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Niger, by types of aid, in current million USD (2010-2016)

Table 25: Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Nigeria, by types of aid, in current million USD (2010-2016)

Table 26: Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Somalia, by types of aid, in current million USD (2010-2016)

Table 27: Average of EU's GBS, SBS and PTI Gross disbursement as a % of total ODA

Table 28: EU Total bilateral ODA Commitment's Tying Status, in US million dollars

Table 29: Average of number of contracts going to Local, EU and non-EU contractors, 2010-2015(in %)

Table 30: EU Total ODA Gross disbursement to NGOs and civil society sector, in million euros

Table 31: EU's scores in terms of Aid Information's Transparency

Table 32: Turkey's Total ODA Commitment and disbursement and Turkey's total ODA disbursement as percentage of total ODA commitment, in Current US million dollars, 2007

Table 33: Turkey's Gross ODA disbursement by type of aid in million USD, in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, 2015&2016

Table 34: Average ODA Gross Disbursement by Turkey by type of aid to Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia (2015-2016)

Table 35: Some Aid Projects and actions carried out by Turkey in Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger, and Nigeria

Table 36: Number of Tendering Procedures Open to International Competition as a % of total number of Tendering Procedures

Table 37: Number and percentage of awarded Contracts by Nationality and Value of Contract under TPPL

Table 38: The Implementation of preference on domestic tenderers and goods within the tendering procedures open to international competition

Table 39: EU Trade with Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia in 2017

Table 40: Turkey's trade with Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Somalia (in million USD)

Table 41: Summary of the findings on the Causal mechanisms of donor performance: comparing Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia

Table 42: EU Trade with Turkey, in 2017

Table 43: Turkey's Trade with the EU, in 2017

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Milestones in ACP-EC Cooperation

Figure 2: Main actors and Decision-making process in EU Development Cooperation Policy Area

Figure 3: TIKA Organization Scheme

Figure 4: EU Total ODA disbursements per sector to SSA, in million euros, in 2015

Figure 5: Top ten recipients of EU net ODA disbursement in SSA, Average 2010-2016, in current million USD

Figure 6: EU ODA programming 2014-2020, including Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Development Fund (EDF) and European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)

Figure 7: Top Ten Recipients of Turkey's net ODA disbursement in SSA, Average 2010-2016, in million USD

Figure 8: Bilateral and Multilateral Distribution of Turkey's Official Development Assistance (2014-2016; Million USD)

Figure 9: Sectoral Distribution of Turkey's Bilateral Official Development Assistance (2015; Million USD)

Figure 10: Sectoral Ratios of Turkey's Bilateral Official Development Assistance (2016; in %)

Figure 11: Untied Aid in percentage of EDF Commitments

Figure 12: Percentage of number and volume of contracts going to local and regional contractors under EDF

Figure 13: Average Ratio ODA tying status /EU total ODA commitments (2014-2015)

LIST OF BOXES AND MAPS

Box 1: The Series of High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness

Map 1: Resource-rich countries in SSA



LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex 1: Map of African Caribbean and Pacific group of countries

Annex 2: Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011

Annex 3: Interview Questionnaire for the EU Officials

Annex 4: Questionnaire for Turkish Officials

Annex 5: Questionnaire for African Embassies in Brussels and Ankara

ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AIDS	Aid Information Management System
AKP	Justice and Development Party
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
BEDCPs	Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles
BP	Busan Partnership
CAR	Central African Republic
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CRFs	Country-Result Frameworks
CRGE	Climate Resilient and Green Economy
CRS	Credit Reporting System
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

CS	Civil Society
CSF	Civil Society Fund
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEIK	Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EOM	Election Observation Mission
DINA	Drought Impact Needs Assessment
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EDRIS	European Emergency Disaster Response Information System
EEAS	European External Action Service

EEC	European Economic Community
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
EUDs	European Union Delegations
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMSs	European Union Member States
EUPOL COPPS	EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EP	European Parliament
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FfD	Financing for Development
FSS	Forward Spending Survey
FTI	Fast track initiative
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HLF	High-Level Forum

IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICSP	Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPoA	Istanbul Program of Action
IPPA	Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
IR	International Relations
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JEC	Joint Economic Commission (JEC)
LAs	Local Actors
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MAF	Mutual Accountability Framework
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Members of European Parliament
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSR	Monitoring Survey Result
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMA	Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIP	National Indicative Program
NSAs	Non-State Actors
NSC	North-South Cooperation
OCTs	Overseas Collectivities and Territories
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PASOC	Civil Society Support Program
PD	Paris Declaration
PDES	Economic and Social Development
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public Financial Management

PKOs	Peace Keeping Operations
PRAG	Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions
PSGs	Peace- and State-Building Goals
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSDC	South-South Development Cooperation
STABEX	Stabilization of export receipts on agricultural products
SYSMIN	System for Stabilizing Minerals
TC	Triangular Cooperation
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TDC	Triangular Development Cooperation
TFPs	Technical and Financial Partners
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TIM	Turkish Exporters Assembly
TMFA	Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TOBB	Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges
TOKI	Turkish Housing Development Administration
TPPL	Turkish Public Procurement Law
TUSIAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and industrialist

UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations - African Union hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDCF	United Nations Development Cooperation Forum
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
WB	World Bank
WBMFP	World Bank Multi Partner Fund
WPAE	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness
WTO	World Trade Organization

TABLE OF CONTENT

ÖZET

.....**i**

ABSTRACT.....ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....iii

DEDICATION.....iv

LIST OF TABLES.....v

LIST OF FIGURES.....viii

LIST OF BOXES AND MAPSvx

LIST OF ANNEXES.....x

ABBREVIATIONS.....xi

INTRODUCTION.....1

1.STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM..... 1

2.SUBJECT OF THESIS..... 6

3.AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS 6

4.IMPORTANCE OF THESIS.....	7
5.THEORETICAL DISCUSSION	9
6.SCOPE, POPULATION SAMPLE AND TIMEFRAME.....	9
7.RESEARCH QUESTIONS	11
8.METHODOLOGY	12
9.STRUCTURE OF THESIS	19
CHAPTER 1. THE CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS	21
1.1. DEFINING THE CORE CONCEPTS	22
1.1.1.The Concepts of Foreign Aid, Aid and Development Effectiveness.....	22
1.1.1.1.Foreign Aid	22
1.1.1.2. Aid and Development Effectiveness	25
1.1.2. The concepts of ‘Traditional’ and ‘Emerging’ aid donors.....	29
1.1.2.1. Traditional Aid Donors	29
1.1.2.2. Emerging Aid Donors	31
1.1.2.3. Between Traditional and Emerging Donors: Where do the EU and Turkey fit in the Sub-Saharan African context?.....	34
1.1.3. Literature Review of the different Models of Development Cooperation.....	40
1.1.3.1. North-South Development Cooperation.....	40
1.1.3.2. South-South Development Cooperation.....	42
1.1.3.3. North-South-South or Triangular Development Cooperation.....	48
1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON DEVELOPMENT AID	53
1.2.1. Theorizing on why States offer Development Aid	53
1.2.1.1. Realist Theories.....	53
1.2.1.2. Liberal Theories	57
1.2.1.3. Social Constructivism	61

1.2.2. The Theoretical dimension of Development Aid Effectiveness	65
1.2.2.1. Neorealism	65
1.2.2.2. Liberal Internationalism	66
1.2.2.3. Social Constructivism	67
1.2.3. Conclusion	69
CHAPTER 2. INSTITUTIONAL, HISTORICAL AND POLICY APPROACH FRAMEWORKS.....	71
2.1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF AID EFFECTIVENESS: FROM MONTERREY TO BUSAN	71
2.1.1. The 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development	72
2.1.2. The 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization	73
2.1.3. The 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action	74
2.1.4. The 2011 Busan Partnership	78
2.2. AID AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AGENDA IN THE EU AND IN TURKEY	81
2.2.1. In the EU	81
2.2.2. In Turkey.....	84
2.3. OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING BILATERAL RELATIONS	88
2.3.1. EU-Sub-Saharan Africa Relations	88
2.3.2. Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa Relations	98
2.3.3. EU-Turkey Relations	103
2.4 THE EU AND TURKEY’S DEVELOPMENT AID POLICIES TOWARDS SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES.....	106
2.4.1 Motivations: A Theoretical Perspective.....	107
2.4.1.1. In the Case of the EU	107
2.4.1.2. In Turkey’s Case	116

2.4.1.3. Comparison and Assessment.....	126
2.4.2. Actors, Tools and Instruments	129
2.4.2.1. In EU’s Development Aid Policy towards SSA.....	129
2.4.2.2. In Turkey’s Development Aid Policy towards SSA	134
2.4.2.3. Comparative Assessment	139
2.4.3. Aid Modalities and Geographical Distribution.....	140
2.4.3.1. In the Case of the EU	140
2.4.3.2. In the Case of Turkey	148
2.4.3.3. Comparative Concluding Remarks	156
2.4.4. Conclusion	160
CHAPTER 3. TRANSLATING THE BUSAN PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EU AND TURKEY IN ETHIOPIA, NIGER, NIGERIA, AND SOMALIA	163
3.1. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EU AND TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF BEDCPS IN ETHIOPIA, NIGER, NIGERIA AND SOMALIA ...	164
3.1.1. Background: Country and Development Aid in context.....	164
3.1.1.1 Ethiopia	164
3.1.1.2. Niger.....	166
3.1.1.3. Nigeria.....	169
3.1.1.4. Somalia.....	171
3.1.2. The Normative Framework of the Busan Partnership: An Overview of the Principles and related Indicators	175
3.1.2.1. Country Ownership	175
3.1.2.2. Inclusive Partnership	179
3.1.2.3. Focus on Results.....	180
3.1.2.4. Transparency and Accountability.....	181

3.1.3. Performance of the EU and Turkey in the Context of BEDCPs.....	182
3.1.3.1 Performance of the EU	184
3.1.3.2. Performance of Turkey.....	227
3.1.3.3. A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and EU’s Performance in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia	247
3.2. THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF ‘UNEVEN’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BEDCPs BY THE EU AND TURKEY IN ETHIOPIA, NIGER, NIGERIA AND SOMALIA	255
3.2.1. Contextualizing the Problem.....	255
3.2.2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses	257
3.2.3. Testing the Hypotheses to the Case Studies	261
3.2.4. Conclusion and Key Remarks.....	277
3.3. AID EFFECTIVENESS AND THE TRIANGLE TURKEY-EU-SSA AND: THE WAY FORWARD.....	279
3.3.1. Drivers and Barriers towards Triangular Cooperation.....	280
3.3.1.1 Foreign Policy Objectives	280
3.3.1.2. Development Cooperation Modalities and Practices	282
3.3.1.3. Strategic Interests in building a Triangular Cooperation	283
3.3.1.4. The SSA-EU-Turkey Triangle: African perceptions	286
3.3.2. Pre-requisites for a Successful Triangular Cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA	287
3.3.2.1. Convergence of Development Goals and Practices	288
3.3.2.2. The Ownership Principle and Political Will	289
3.3.2.3 Complementarity of the Services and Capabilities	290
3.3.2.4. Cultural Proximity.....	292
3.3.2.5. Conclusion.....	293

CONCLUSION.....	294
1.HYPOTHESES.....	294
2.DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS	295
3.IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	300
4.LIMITATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD	303
BIBLIOGRAPHY	306
ANNEXES	344



INTRODUCTION

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Since its first use in the post-second World War with the Marshall plan reconstruction of Europe, the purpose of using foreign aid has constantly evolved over time. In the framework of the European Recovery Program (1948-1951), most European countries received aid from the United States government to reconstruct their economies devastated by war, to promote western democracies in those countries and to dissuade them from embracing the communist ideology.

This ideological feature of foreign aid was strengthened during the cold-war era. Foreign aid was used by the main leading powers-the USA and the Soviet Union- as an instrument to win and keep allies in the Third World regardless of aspects of democracy and human rights. In this stance, one scholar once argued that “the predominant political thrust behind development aid was as an instrument of the cold war, used to bolster allies, whether democratic or not”¹.

In the 1970s and 1980s, in light with the globalization era, foreign aid programs were mostly directed with economic conditionality, which means that aid was granted to recipients under conditions of adopting and implementing liberal economic reforms, without also considering political aspects. In this context, the Bretton Woods Institutions provided aid to developing countries, especially in Africa, in exchange of the adoption and implementation of structural adjustment programs.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, this dominant economic approach to development aid changed significantly and the latter has become more and more dependent on political progress within the recipient countries. Many donor countries and multilateral organizations have conditioned the provision and increase or decrease of foreign aid to the recipient countries on political considerations such as improving democratic pace, good governance and rule of law in the recipient countries.

Whatever the reason behind the delivery of foreign aid, the African continent has for a long been at the heart of foreign aid debates, especially with respect to the impacts of aid on African development. Indeed, the paradox of the African continent being the richest continent

¹ Gordon Crawford. *Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality*. London: Palgrave Mcmillan,2001, p.12.

in terms of natural resources, but at the same time one of the most under-developed continents in the world, has pushed many development partners to come to consider with strong insistence development aid as one of the miracle solutions to tackle long-standing issues of poverty and underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In this vein, industrialized aid donors have constantly revised their modalities of aid delivery to African countries to make aid more effective. In illustration, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, foreign aid program was mostly attached with economic conditionality, evidence of the low efficiency of traditional economic development aid model in the post-cold war era has led to the increasing attachment of political considerations (democracy, human rights, good governance, rule of law) to the provision of aid to African countries. The granting of development aid to African countries has then become more and more dependent on political progresses within the recipient countries. Nonetheless, all these initiatives from western aid donors have largely yielded unsatisfactory results in terms of boosting Africa's development and reducing poverty.

Debates on the effectiveness of foreign aid in SSA have gained further attention with the entrance of new actors in the development aid pace in Africa. Whilst in the past, foreign aid was considered as the exclusive sphere of action of the industrialized western countries and institutions, the done has changed in the last decade with the entrance of new development actors in the international development aid landscape. Despite criticisms related to the perceived differences between the aid modalities of these new actors and those of western donors, these new actors seem to benefit from positive perceptions of African people and stakeholders who tend to consider their aid policy as an alternative to the failed western development aid policies in SSA.

Faced with the increasing evidence of the failure of traditional aid donors' policies in SSA as well as with the evidence that new powers 'activism in the sphere of development cooperation in SSA can no longer be neglected, a series of conferences have been organized at the international level to discuss on how to improve aid practices and make aid more effective in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), especially in SSA. These conferences have culminated in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership (BP) for Effective Development Cooperation (2011). The Monterrey Consensus highlighted the need to increase the mobilization of domestic and foreign financial resources and the effective use of these

resources to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Rome declaration underlined for the first time the necessity to harmonize donors' aid practices to increase aid effectiveness. The Paris forum acknowledged the need to include recipient governments in an ongoing dialogue on how to improve aid and shift the focus of the debate from effective donorship to effective partnership. Developing countries were invited to join the negotiating table with their cooperation providers. This declaration committed signatories to respect and implement five basic principles: Harmonization of Donor Policies and Practices; Alignment to National Development Strategies; Mutual Accountability; a Focus on Measuring and Delivering Results for People; and Ownership of Development Cooperation.

Furthermore, the Accra Agenda for Action refined the commitments agreed in Paris and engaged other key development stakeholders, like Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the private sector. It went a step further in crucial areas like medium-term predictability of aid, the use of country systems, transparency, gender equality, and conditionality². Progress on the implementation of these commitments by participating countries has been assessed twice through a monitoring system based on 12 indicators.

Despite the ambitious agenda agreed in Monterrey, Rome, Paris and Accra, tangible results were slow to come and the changing landscape of development aid with the increasing influence of advanced southern countries on the development aid pace of recipient countries have led to the increasing awareness among northern aid donors that without the effective participation of southern donors in international aid debates, discussions on the quality of development cooperation would soon become either outdated or irrelevant.

Likewise, some governments and observers, including CSOs, argued that the scope of the debate needed broadening from "aid effectiveness" to "development effectiveness", in order to underline that apart from aid, other sources of financing such as foreign direct investment, trade regulations, debt relief, labour laws, could also affect development outcomes and need to be considered together with development aid.

These concerns largely dominated the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (also known as HLF4), held in Busan, South Korea in late 2011, that resulted in the adoption of the Busan Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), established in Busan, South Korea, in 2011,

² Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). "Accra Agenda for Action", Paris: OECD 2008, accessed on 17 November 2017, at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/41202012.pdf>

set out the international standard on the principles of effective development cooperation to which all development actors should subscribe. These principles include: Country leadership and Ownership of development strategies; a Focus on results that matter to the poor in developing countries; Inclusive Partnerships among development actors based on mutual trust; and Transparency and Accountability to one another.

Regarding the main international donors intervening in SSA, the EU, because of the historical colonial ties, which existed between some of its leading member states (France, Britain, Italy, Belgium and Germany) and the African continent, was considered as one of the leading development aid donors with an exclusive sphere of influence in this part of the world. Yet, in the last decade, the EU is now being faced with the rise of new types of donors, mostly coming from the global south with expanding economic might and political influence. In this vein, the EU and its member states have started to feel the burden of the presence of these new actors, because of the perceived incompatibility in terms of aid modalities as well as fears from some of the EU's leading member states (France, Britain and increasingly Germany) of losing control over this strategic region of the world.

In this vague of entrance of new emerging donors in SSA, the latest entrance of Turkey in SSA's development aid architecture adds more to the aid and development effectiveness debate. Indeed, like China, India and Brazil, Turkey, which quickly but discreetly developed its links with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continues its establishment and is now becoming a major player in the field of development aid in Africa. According to OECD statistics, Turkey's official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 31 million USD in 2007 to 118.42 million USD in 2016.

The steady increase in the volume of Turkey's development aid to SSA as well as Turkey's activeness in this region in security and political realms clearly shows Ankara's growing willingness to play a leading role in this sense and therefore Turkey can no longer be marginalized as an important 'rising' aid donor in Africa. The case of Turkey is particularly remarkable because it is generally presented as a new 'different' type of emerging donor in SSA due to its status of a bridging country between the East and the West, and to its long-standing attachment to the western world as a member of NATO, an EU candidate country and a member of the OECD and many other western organizations. Cause for concern for some, opportunity for others, the reality of the Turkish presence in the development aid landscape in Africa should be reduced to its true value when it comes to the issues of development cooperation effectiveness.

The few studies that exist on Turkey as a new development aid donor in SSA lack a rigorous scientific validity as most of them do not measure, if not assess, the impact and effectiveness of Turkey's development aid activities in sub-Saharan Africa. In the light of this, this thesis aims to offer a modest, but hopefully distinctive contribution to these debates on aid and development effectiveness by including the EU and Turkey as development cooperation providers in SSA. Beyond the stereotypes and preconceptions, this study will try to show here in a comparative way the effectiveness of EU and Turkey's development aid policy towards sub-Saharan Africa with a special reference to some principles derived from the Busan partnership on Effective Development Cooperation, which include Ownership, Inclusive Partnerships, Focus on Results, and Transparency and Accountability (and their associated indicators).

The thesis focuses on the Busan principles because they are newer and mark a shift from the discussion of aid effectiveness to development effectiveness, with the inclusion of new indicators such as the involvement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and gender issues. The Busan Partnership is particularly relevant for the progressive achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), since the UN Agenda 2030 underlined the ultimate importance of increasing the effectiveness of development cooperation activities to help achieve the SDGs in the recipient countries.

In the context of this thesis, the term "aid effectiveness" or "effective development cooperation" will then be assessed not in terms of outputs or concrete impacts of aid on the recipient countries, but in term of inputs, that is in terms of donors 's (here EU and Turkey) compliance with the effective development cooperation principles as laid out in the Busan document. Indeed, acknowledging that measuring the output impacts of development aid through macro-economic methods has always been problematic ³, this thesis focuses instead on the "processes" represented by the above-mentioned four principles derived from the 2011 Busan partnership and their related indicators. Thus, there is an implicit assumption in this

³ On data issues, see: Morten, Jerven. *Poor Numbers: How we are misled by African Development statistics and what to do about it*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013; Morten, Jerven. "Measuring African Development: Past and Present. Introduction to the Special Issue". *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* vol 35, No 1 ,2014, p. 1-8; Woods Dwayne. "The Use, Abuse and Omertà on the 'Noise' in the Data: African Democratization, Development and Growth." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* Vol 35, No 1 ,2014, p.120-135.

thesis that a stronger compliance of donors with these principles will make aid and development cooperation more effective in the recipient country.

As such, this thesis aims to refocus the debates on development cooperation effectiveness by first examining the extent of donors' (the EU and Turkey) compliance with the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) and then by closely looking at the external and internal factors that could influence on the degree of commitment to these principles by each donor. This a salute "demarche" because although the Paris monitoring survey as well as the 2014 and 2016 Busan monitoring surveys have found donors' "unevenness" in complying with the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) and its related indicators, none of them have sparsely questioned the reasons behind this difference in the levels of meeting Busan principles by participating donor countries. Given this, this thesis attempts to fill in this gap by looking at the influencing factors through positing hypotheses that will be tested in our four selected countries.

2.SUBJECT OF THESIS

The thesis subject mainly focuses on the theoretical and empirical comparative analysis of the effectiveness of Turkey and EU's development aid policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, by first looking at the degree of compliance with the four Busan principles on effective development cooperation and its related indicators by Turkey and the EU then by examining the plausible internal and external factors that could explain the eventual differences in the behaviour of each donor towards the Busan Effective Development Cooperation principles in the four country-case studies, namely Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

3.AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS

The main aim of this thesis is to compare the level of implementation by the EU and Turkey of the four Busan principles on effective development cooperation and some of its related indicators and to examine the explanatory factors behind eventual variation Turkey and the EU in levels of compliance with the Busan principles using three main IR theories.

Based on these aims, this study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- To describe and analyse the patterns of implementation of the BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.
- To analyse donors' behaviour change in aid policy and practice in their efforts to achieve greater effectiveness of aid within the BP context in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.
- To review and explain why donors' behaviour change differs in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, in respect of implementing the BEDCPs.

4.IMPORTANCE OF THESIS

There are several reasons, which make the investigation on this issue necessary and particularly timely. First, while a large literature exists on emerging partners in Africa such as China, India and some countries of Latin America in the field of development aid, Turkey's efforts have attracted less attention internationally than the activities of other development cooperation providers including China and India. As a result, few studies have been done on Turkey as another potential emerging donor in SSA. The few studies that exist lack rigorous scientific analysis, as most of them sparsely examine the impact of Turkey's entrance in Africa as a new aid donor on aid effectiveness in sub-Saharan Africa. That said, there is a scientific void on this topic that is precisely relevant. Our study aims to contribute to fill this gap in the literature.

In the same vein, the added value of this study will be to adopt a challenging and innovative approach, which is that of incorporating a new type of emerging donor (Turkey), which is different from the well-known southern emerging aid donors such as China in our framework of analysis. Turkey is generally considered as a bridging country between East and West at the crossroads of different cultures. As a member of NATO and OECD and other western international organizations, and a candidate country of the EU, it is generally considered that Turkey's involvement into the development aid pace of SSA could be a lifetime opportunity to improve the effectiveness of aid in SSA because it is expected to pose less challenges to traditional aid donors in this field. Therefore and "in light of the recent expansion of its engagement, analysing the profile of Turkish cooperation is useful both in understanding similarities between the orientations adopted by "old" and "new" aid providers, and the

potential for learning from actors now gaining visibility as development partners’’⁴.

Third, several reasons make relevant the simultaneous focus on the EU, Turkey and SSA in the investigation of this issue. First and foremost, due to the colonial ties that exist between SSA and the EU, Africa is often seen as the backyard of Europe, while the US sphere of influence rather lies in Latin America. As noted by Taylor, “in terms of sheer power projection, despite all the brouhaha about China’s sudden rise in Africa, the EU (or individual constituent members) remains the key influence in virtually all countries in Africa’’⁵. The EU remains the largest trade partner of most African countries and the most important donor (EU and member states combined)⁶ in SSA. Plus, focusing on sub-Saharan Africa is particularly welcomed since the recent discussions about the effectiveness of development aid either at the national, continental or international levels are very much connected with a special focus on Africa as the continent that is most dependent on development aid and less economically developed with some governance and democratic shortcomings. Other aspects such as the special relationship existing between Turkey and the EU (particularly in relation to the “membership” conditionality), the current political crisis the EU is going through in the recent years (refugee crisis, European identity crisis, Brexit, rise of extremist leaders and parties), as well as the current state of the relations between Turkey and the EU and the current economic and political situation in Turkey, make the research more interesting and especially beneficial and timely for academics and political leaders in Europe, Turkey, Africa and in the world.

In addition, an analysis of the effectiveness issue based on the assessment of the donors’ performance of the development cooperation effectiveness’ principles outlined in the Busan partnership is particularly a challenging approach because the existing literature on the effectiveness debate has predominantly used macro-economic data to examine output results, not without several difficulties, and has remained silent on the qualitative process of delivering aid. Yet, given the wider endorsement of, and commitment to, these principles by both donors and recipients, it is important to examine how donors have performed on these principles. The ambitious approach taken in this thesis further consists of going beyond

⁴ Hausmann, Jeannine and Erik Lundsgaarde. “Turkey’s Role in Development Cooperation”, *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*, November 2015, p.2. accessed on accessed on 17 May 2017, at: [http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/news/2015/UNUCPR_TurkeysRoleinDevelopment_HausmannLundsgaarde .pdf](http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/news/2015/UNUCPR_TurkeysRoleinDevelopment_HausmannLundsgaarde.pdf).

⁵ Ian, Taylor. “Sino-African Relations and the Implications for the EUS Partnership with Africa”, Chafer, Tony and Cumming, Gordon (eds), *From Rivalry to Partnership? New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa* (195-206). Farnham: Ashgate, 2011 p.195.

⁶ Ian, Taylor. *The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa*. New York/London: Continuum, 2010, p.98.

simple analysis of the performance of donors to comply with the effectiveness principles to look at also the external and internal factors that could influence the eventual varying levels of performance between these two actors.

Finally, the focus on the implementation of the Busan principles to measure aid effectiveness will make a fruitful contribution to the timely issue on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its subsequent 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets adopted by the UN in September 2015, because of the congruence between the Busan document and the 2030 Agenda's understanding that qualitative development cooperation inputs will make development cooperation more effective, which in turn will play a crucial role in the achievement of the SDGs.

5.THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

This thesis adopts a multi- theoretical analysis of the issue of aid effectiveness of the EU and Turkey in SSA both in terms of motivations behind the provision of development aid by the EU and Turkey to countries in SSA, and in terms of the underlying factors that may intervene and influence the outcomes of the behaviour of each actor towards the Busan principles. In this line, the research integrates the most relevant International Relations (IR) theories, namely Realism, Liberalism and Constructivist theories in its framework of analysis to shed light on the issue of motivations and effective development cooperation provided by traditional donor (EU) and new aid donor (Turkey) in SSA. The explanatory power of these theories to our research will be empirically analysed through the selection of country-case studies, which include mainly some western and eastern African countries.

6.SCOPE, POPULATION SAMPLE AND TIMEFRAME

Regarding the scope, the thesis first examines how each donor has implemented the four Busan Principles and its related indicators in the four country-case studies and then analyses why the EU and Turkey have apparently performed differently in each country case studies.

For the research sample, the thesis will focus more on countries located in West and East Africa, as the sub-Saharan African regions where both the EU and Turkey are much more

active. In this thesis, we will be looking more specifically at four different states of West and East Africa as ideal types for a variety of European and Turkish interests to analyse how Turkey and the EU have performed on the Busan principles on effective development cooperation and to examine the influencing factors that could explain eventual differences in the levels of performance between the two donors.

Empirically, in the selection of the cases it was attempted to have maximum variance about the explanatory variables, and to ensure variance between the variables. Thus, the thesis tries to avoid a “selection bias” by only choosing cases that show a strong relevance of one explanation. We take Somalia and Ethiopia for the East African part and Nigeria and Niger for the West African side, as four case studies, each of which we present as examples where both EU and Turkey’s engagement tools towards SSA in namely diplomacy, trade, transportation networks and particularly development cooperation, are the most visible. These country-case studies also represent the most relevant examples of a specific combination of economic, political and development policy interests of both donors in SSA.

Therefore, the cases include from a politico-historical perspective, French-former colony (Niger) and British-ex colonies (Somalia and Nigeria) and a country that did not experience colonization at all (Ethiopia). From this same standpoint, the cases also include countries with stronger past Ottoman ties (Ethiopia and Somalia), and countries with weaker Ottoman links (Nigeria and Niger). With respect to development performance, there are countries that experienced high growth, but relatively low human development (Ethiopia and Nigeria) and countries with low (Niger) or negative (Somalia) growth rates. From politico-security perspective, the countries include relatively highly stable countries (Ethiopia), middle stable countries (Niger and Nigeria) and low stable countries (Somalia). Finally, the cases include countries that are considered as key commercial partners of the EU and Turkey (Nigeria and Ethiopia⁷) and other perceived as less important⁷ commercial partners (Niger and Somalia).

Regarding the timeframe, the research focuses on the period from the mid- 2000s onwards. The choice of this timeframe lies on the fact that statistics have shown that although Turkey’s opening in Africa have started in the late 1990s, its real involvement in the development aid

⁷ Turkey has commercial representatives in Ethiopia and Nigeria, while it does not have in Niger and Somalia(see website of the Turkish Ministry of Trade at http://www.economy.gov.tr/portal/faces/home/disIliskiler?_afLoop=647163021002754&_afWindowMode=0&_afWindowId=qh4ayum4k_26#!%40%40%3F_afWindowId%3Dqh4ayum4k_26%26_afLoop%3D647163021002754%26_afWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dqh4ayum4k_78)

landscape in SSA happened in the first half of the 2000s⁸.

7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research questions of this thesis can be formulated as follows:

- How well have Turkey and the EU comparatively implemented the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?
- Why do the EU and Turkey implement the BEDCPs differently in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia? What are the underlying factors behind eventual unevenness in the levels of performance of the BEDCPs between Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?

This leads to several sub-research questions, which include the following:

- How does this study conceptualize the core concepts of “foreign aid”, “aid effectiveness”, “emerging donors” and “traditional donors”? How do we locate Turkey and the EU as aid donors in SSA?
- What are the main models of cooperation in the field of international development aid?
- What are the principal International Relations theories dealing with the issues of the reasons behind the provision of development aid by some developed and middle-income countries? How do IR and development theories explain the effectiveness issue in the field of international development cooperation?
- What are the successive political steps taken at the international level with respect to aid effectiveness debate?
- What are the steps taken by Turkey and the EU with respect to aid effectiveness agenda?
- What is the historical background and status of the EU’s and Turkey’s development aid policy in SSA?

⁸ Website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey-Africa relations", available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>; Ozkan, Mehmet. "Turkey's Rising Role in Africa". *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2010, p. 93-105, accessed on 1st May 2017, at <http://turkishpolicy.com/Files/ArticlePDF/turkeys-rising-role-in-africa-winter-2010-en.pdf>

- What are the underlying motivations behind Turkey and the EU’s engagement in SSA in the field of development aid?
- What are the patterns of convergence and divergence in the modalities, priorities, and geographical distribution of aid delivery to SSA?
- How do Turkey and the EU rank against each other in terms of their compliance with the Busan principles of “ownership, inclusiveness, focus on results, transparency and accountability” in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia? What conclusions do these cases allow to draw with respect to the effectiveness of development aid in the country-case studies?
- What are the underlying external and internal factors behind eventual unevenness in the implementation of the BEDCPs between the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?
- What are the prospects and perspectives of a triangular development cooperation between EU-Turkey and SSA?

8.METHODOLOGY

For the analysis, the thesis will assess the performance of Turkey and the EU in the selected four countries- case studies with respect to the four development cooperation effectiveness principles as laid out in the Busan partnership for effective development cooperation, namely ownership, inclusive partnerships, focus on results, transparency and accountability. The performance of each of these principles is measured through a set of 10 indicators, some of these indicators being performed exclusively by the donors (indicators 1a, 4,5a, 9a, and 10), others exclusively by the recipient countries (indicators 1b, 3,5b, 7,8,9b) and some others simultaneously by both (indicators 2 and 6).

The four principles and ten indicators of the Global Monitoring Partnership are summarized in the Table 1 below.

Table1
Busan Principles of and Targets for Development Cooperation Effectiveness

Principles	Indicators
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Ownership	<p>Indicator 5a. Proportion of development co-operation funding disbursed within the fiscal year within which it was scheduled by providers of development co-operation</p> <p>Indicator 5b. Proportion of development co-operation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level</p> <p>Indicator 9a. Quality of developing country Public Financial Management systems</p> <p>Indicator 9b. Use of country Public Financial Management and procurement systems</p> <p>Indicator 10. Percentage of aid that is fully untied</p>
Inclusive Partnerships	<p>Indicator 2. CSO Enabling Environment Assessment</p> <p>Indicator 3. Quality of public-private dialogue index</p>
Focus on results	<p>Indicator 1a. Development partners are using existing country-led results frameworks in planning and designing new interventions.</p> <p>Indicator 1b. Countries have results frameworks in place.</p>
Transparency and Accountability	<p>Indicator 4. Information on development co-operation is publicly available (Implementation of the Common Standard)</p> <p>Indicator 6. Percentage of development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement that is recorded in the annual budgets approved by the legislatures of developing countries</p> <p>Indicator 7. Percentage of countries that undertake inclusive mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments</p> <p>Indicator 8. Percentage of countries with systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment</p>








Source: Prepared by the author based on OECD/UNDP, “Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report”, OECD Publishing, 2016, Paris.

Given the focus on donors' performance in the context of this thesis, this thesis will only make use of the indicators applicable exclusively to donors, namely indicators 5a, 9b, 10, 1a,2, 4 and 6 (see Table 2 below).

Table 2

Shared Principles and Differentiated commitments of the Busan indicators

Indicators		Stakeholders responsible for reporting progress			
		Country Governments	Development Partners	Civil Society	Private Sector
1	<p>1a. Development partners are using existing country-led results frameworks in planning and designing new interventions.</p> <p>1b. Countries have results frameworks in place.</p>	■	■		
2	CSOs Enabling environment	■	■	■	
3	Public-Private dialogue	■		■	■
4	Information on development co-operation is publicly available		■		
5a	Development cooperation is predictable (annual)		■		
5b	Development cooperation is predictable (medium-term)		■		

6	Development cooperation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight				
7	Mutual accountability is strengthened through inclusive reviews				
8	Governments track public allocations for gender equality and women empowerment				
9a	Governments strengthen country systems				
9b	Development partners use country systems				
10	Aid is untied				

Source: Retrieved from GPEDC, Making Development Cooperation more effective, 2016 progress report.

Table 3
Effectiveness principles (and targets) and data sources for analysis.

Assistance Effectiveness Principles and Targets	Data Sources for the EU	Data Sources for Turkey
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<p>Ownership</p> <p>Indicator 5a measures the proportion of development cooperation funding for the government sector disbursed in the year for which it was scheduled by providers of development co-operation.</p> <p>Indicator 9b measures the proportion of development co-operation disbursements for the government sector using the developing country's Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement systems.</p> <p>Indicator 10 measures the proportion of aid that is fully untied.</p>	<p>Self-reporting data and information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p> <p>Self-reporting data and information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p> <p>Data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System and Europe-Aid, and information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p>	<p>Self-reporting data and information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p> <p>Self-reporting data and information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p> <p>Data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System and information provided by development aid providers and recipients</p>
<p>Inclusive Partnerships</p> <p>Indicator 2 assesses the extent to which providers of development co-operation cooperate with CSOs and contribute to an enabling environment for CSOs.</p>	<p>Information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p>	<p>Information provided by development aid providers and recipients.</p>
<p>Focus on Results</p> <p>Indicator 1a measures the</p>	<p>Information provided by</p>	<p>Information provided by</p>

alignment of development partners' new interventions with the objectives and results defined by countries themselves (country-owned results frameworks).	development partners and recipients on major programs and projects.	development partners and recipients on major programs and projects.
<p>Transparency and Accountability</p> <p>Indicator 4 assesses the extent to which development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly accessible, and in line with the Busan transparency requirements.</p> <p>Indicator 6 measures the share of development co-operation funding for the public sector recorded in annual budgets that are approved by the national legislatures of partner countries.</p>	<p>Data from OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and Forward-Spending Survey (FSS), and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI); and information provided by development aid providers.</p> <p>Data taken from existing government budgets and self-reporting by providers of development co-operation.</p>	<p>Data from Forward-Spending Survey (FSS), and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI); and information provided by development aid providers.</p> <p>Data taken from existing government budgets and self-reporting by providers of development co-operation.</p>

Source: Prepared by the author based on OECD/UNDP (2016), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris.

The Table 3 above summarizes the context of each of the donor-related indicators as well as the source of data that will be used in assessing the implementation of each indicator by Turkey and the EU in the four country-case studies. As we can see from Table 3 above, this thesis will use both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

For the “ownership” principle, this study will cumulatively compare the proportion of Turkey and EU’s development cooperation funding for the government sector that have been disbursed in the year for which it was scheduled as well as the proportion of development co-operation disbursed to the government using the country’s own PFM and procurement systems (such as using the country’s own rules and procedures – versus those of the development partner – for budget execution, financial reporting, auditing, and procurement of goods and services), on the basis of the self-reporting data and information provided by development aid providers and recipients. We will also assess the tying level of Turkey and EU’s aid by examining whether these donors impose geographical constraints on the use of these development co-operation funds (e.g. requiring that the procurement of goods and services using these funds is made from suppliers based in specific countries) by using data on the OECD Creditor Reporting System and EuropeAid and information provided by development cooperation providers and recipients for the EU and Turkey (see Table 3 above).

Regarding the “inclusive partnerships” principle, the thesis looks at whether development partners’ agenda for dialogue with government includes CSO enabling environment; whether CSO enabling environment is promoted; whether information on support to CSOs is shared with the government; whether CSOs are systematically consulted on development policy/programming by development partners, by analysing information provided by development aid providers and recipients (see Table 3 above).

Coming to the “Focus on Results” principle, this study examines donors’ use of existing country-owned results frameworks in the planning and designing new interventions in the recipient country using data and information provided by each development partner and recipient (see Table 3 above). Country-owned results frameworks (CRFs) include any form of government-led planning instrument where development priorities, goals and targets are defined in detail or any kind priority setting mechanisms (if any) such as use of sector plans and strategies.

Regarding the last principle, “transparency and accountability”, this thesis first analyses the extent to which development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly accessible, and in line with the Busan transparency requirements by using data from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and Forward-Spending Survey (FSS), and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and by using information provided by development aid providers (see Table 3 above). It will then measure the share of

development co-operation funding for the public sector recorded in annual budgets that are approved by the national legislatures of partner countries by using data taken from existing government budgets and self-reporting by providers of development co-operation (see Table 3 above).

In sum, the comparative assessment of how well Turkey and the EU have implemented the Busan principles in the selected four case studies will be done on a qualitative and quantitative basis. For each indicator, the analysis of available data will be complemented by a qualitative assessment based on recent technical reports, interviews with relevant stakeholders, academic literature, and studies that have been conducted with respect to the implementation of the Busan principles by Turkey and the EU in the selected country case studies.

Indeed, for the analysis, this study reviews institutional and aid agency publications and existing document sources such as conference papers as well as academic literature. Information from press releases and relevant official websites is also included in this thesis for data collection. This literature review will be complemented by interviews and feedback from bilateral donor agency staff and Embassies of the selected four African case studies in both Brussels and Ankara to get their thoughts about the issue. Especially in the case of Turkey, data for the analysis relies more upon interview methods because this country produces relatively few publications related to the BP implementation when compared to the EU.

For the interview, the sample was purposive, selected according to peoples' position and expertise within relevant organisations. At the same time, while priority was given to face-to-face interviews, emails and phone interviews were also utilised at the requests of the interviewees. Prepared interview questions were sent to the interviewees in advance so that they could fully review the questions and during the interviews, the interviewees were kindly asked whether they would like to keep their anonymity and not to be cited namely in the study.

At the end of this critical assessment made based on the available data and information, this thesis draws a comparative picture of Turkey and EU's performance of each of these indicators in the selected four case studies.

9. STRUCTURE OF THESIS

This thesis is divided into three chapters in addition to this introductory chapter and the conclusion. The first chapter (Chapter 1) will elaborate the issues of aid and development effectiveness from conceptual and theoretical perspectives. It is therefore necessary in the first section of this chapter to acquire a basic understanding of the core concepts of foreign aid, aid and development effectiveness, and emerging and traditional aid donors. Furthermore, we will try to critically examine the position of Turkey and the EU as development aid donor in Sub-Saharan Africa, notably with respect to their possible categorization. The third part of this section will examine the forms of development cooperation that exists in the field of development aid to highlight their opportunities and challenges. The second section of this chapter entitled “Theoretical Framework of Development Aid” presents the three main IR theories dealing with development aid of developed and middle-income countries in general and that of the EU and Turkey in particular, namely Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism.

The second Chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) will first overview the historical background of the aid effectiveness debate in international instances, as well as the aid effectiveness agenda in the EU and in Turkey. The last section of this chapter will critically analyse EU and Turkey’s development aid policy towards SSA from a comparative perspective. In this context, this part will describe the evolution of the EU and Turkey’s relationship with SSA from its birth to its current being and will give attention to the most important changes that took place with respect to development aid. In this second part, the similarities and differences between EU and Turkey’s development aid policy in SSA in terms of motivations, aid priorities and geographical distribution, tools and instruments and in terms of ideas and principles will be touched upon in details.

To get an idea of the practical aspect of aid effectiveness, the third and final chapter (Chapter 3) of the thesis focuses on the empirical analysis of the aid effectiveness issue in the selected test-case studies. This chapter will first mainly assess the performance of the EU and Turkey in the contexts of the four Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. A preliminary section will briefly overview the four BEDCPs and its related indicators to highlight the implications of each principles and indicators and the data sources that will be used for the assessment. It will then critically analyse the underlying factors behind eventual unevenness in the performance by the EU and

Turkey of the BEDCPs in the four country case studies by positing four auxiliary hypotheses derived from the three main IR theories used in this thesis (Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism). The last section of this final chapter will open up door for future research and discussion by briefly analysing the prospects of triangular development cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA.

Finally, an overall conclusion will be drawn which answers the questions stated above, and which tries to provide suggestions for further research.



CHAPTER 1. THE CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This first chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of development aid in general and the issue of aid and development effectiveness particularly.

In the conceptual part, special attention is given to the concepts of ‘foreign aid’, ‘aid effectiveness’ and ‘development cooperation effectiveness’, ‘emerging’ and ‘traditional’ aid donors. It is worth pointing out that although each of these concepts has gained prominence in the international development aid discussions, they are essentially contested concepts, as academics have difficulties to agree on common defining characteristics. In this part, this study will also try to locate Turkey and the EU as aid donors in Sub-Saharan Africa. If the EU is classified as a traditional aid donor, the case of Turkey is not clear-cut with some qualifying it as an ‘emerging’ aid donor and other as a ‘particular’ emerging aid donor to underline its

distinctive nature from other southern ‘emerging’ aid donors. Lastly, this thesis looks at the main forms of cooperation in the development cooperation landscape to shed light on the opportunities and challenges of each model.

Regarding the theoretical part, the debate about the EU and Turkey’s development aid policy in SSA reflects a more general debate in International Relations theory on the motivations behind the policy of providing aid to third countries by some countries, where motivations are generally divided between norms, interests and identity on one hand and on the factors playing in favour of or against the effectiveness of aid in the recipient country on the other hand. To theoretically grasp the motivations behind as well as the effectiveness issue of the EU and Turkey’s development aid policy in third countries in general and in Sub-Saharan Africa more specifically, the thesis will focus on three main IR theories: realism, liberalism and social constructivism.

1.1. DEFINING THE CORE CONCEPTS

Talking about the effectiveness of EU and Turkey’s development aid policy towards SSA, it is necessary in a first step to acquire a general understanding of the concepts of foreign aid, aid and development effectiveness, emerging and traditional aid donors.

1.1.1. The Concepts of Foreign Aid, Aid and Development Effectiveness

1.1.1.1 Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is a very controversial concept, which makes a general definition of it problematic. Aiming basically to reduce poverty and underdevelopment, foreign aid is defined as “the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its population”⁹.

⁹ Victoria Williams. ‘Foreign Aid’. *Global Britannica*, 2014, accessed on 18 August 2017 at, <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/213344/foreign-aid>

To harmonize the content of foreign aid and to measure aid according to specific rules and norms, and to distinguish aid from other kind of commercial relations or military assistance intertwined with aid policies, DAC (Development Assistance Committee) in OECD defined Official Development Assistance (ODA) (in 1969 and 1972):

Those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)¹⁰.

According to this definition, military aid is excluded from the economic development and welfare goals. Humanitarian aid provided by humanitarian relief foundations and other civil society organizations are not categorized as development aid. Since Turkey adheres to the OECD definition of foreign aid in the same manner as the EU, this thesis sticks to the understanding of foreign aid provided by the OECD.

The OECD uses eight broad categories in which to group aid-delivery modalities, consisting of: (1) budget support; (2) core contributions and pooled programmes and funds; (3) project-type interventions; (4) experts and other technical assistance; (5) scholarships and student costs in donor countries; (6) debt relief; (7) administrative costs; and (8) other in-donor expenditures¹¹.

There are different channels of delivering aid, which include bilateral, multilateral and trilateral development cooperation. Bilateral aid entails the direct flow of capitals from one government to another government¹². According to the OECD definition, bilateral aid refers to “flows from official(government) sources directly to official sources in the recipient country”¹³ and includes transactions with development-oriented NGOs and “internal development related transactions like debt relief, administrative costs and spending on development awareness”¹⁴.

¹⁰OECD. “Official development assistance – definition and coverage”, accessed on 15 May 2017 at, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>

¹¹ Cilliers, Jakkie. "Fertility, Growth and the Future of Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa". *Africa in the World Report*, No 6, October 2017, p.3.

¹²Intelligent Economist. ‘Types of Foreign Aid’, accessed on 14 May 2017, at <https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/types-of-foreign-aid/>; Gulrajani, Nilima. ‘Bilateral versus Multilateral aid Channels Strategic Choices for Donors’, *Overseas Development Institute Report*, March 2016, accessed on 12 May,2017, at <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10393.pdf>

¹³ See OECD Website. “Frequently Asked Questions”, at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/faq.htm>

¹⁴Ibid.

Multilateral aid refers to the assistance coming from the pooling of funds by many governments and provided to developing countries through the channel of multilateral organizations like the World Bank, United Nations, etc¹⁵. According to the OECD definition, multilateral aid “represents core contributions from (official) government sources to multilateral agencies where it is then used to fund the multilateral agencies’ own programmes”¹⁶.

Unlike bilateral aid, multilateral development aid is only delivered by a multilateral organization and multilateral flows become part of “the recipient institutions’ assets such that donors cannot track and pre-define its uses”¹⁷. If the donors which provides funds to a multilateral institution to execute its projects in a recipient country, “maintain control over multilateral contributions to the degree that decisions regarding fund disposal are on balance taken at the donor’s discretion”¹⁸, flows are in principle counted as bilateral flows. Yet, in practice, they are often referred as ‘multi-bi’ flows or ‘earmarked non-core’ contributions¹⁹ to distinguish them from ‘core’ multilateral finance, because these multi-bi contributions are mostly “an expression of donors preferred countries, themes and sectors”²⁰.

The evidence has shown that most of the countries prefer delivering aid bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels, and this is valid for both DAC and non-DAC Member States. In illustration, “DAC donors disbursed over 60% of ODA bilaterally and roughly 25% multilaterally, as measured in two-year averages over the 2008-2013 period”²¹. Likewise, as a non-DAC OECD member state, most of Turkish development assistance is provided bilaterally as compared to multilateral ODA²².

Hence, comes up the following question: what could explain the preference of aid donors for bilateral channel over multilateral one? This predominance of bilateral channels of development aid delivery can be explained by the desire for aid providing countries to

¹⁵Intelligent Economist. ‘Types of Foreign Aid’, accessed on 14 May 2017, at <https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/types-of-foreign-aid/>

¹⁶ See OECD Website. “Frequently Asked Questions”, at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/faq.htm>

¹⁷ Gulrajani, Nilima. "Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels Strategic Choices for Donors", *Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Report*, March 2016,p.7. accessed on 12th May,2017, Available at <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10393.pdf>

¹⁸Ibid,p.7.

¹⁹ OECD.' 'Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World", Paris: OECD 2015, P.24

²⁰Gulrajani, Nilima. "Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels Strategic Choices for Donors", *Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Report*, March 2016,p.7. accessed on 12th May,2017, Available at <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10393.pdf>

²¹Ibid,p.7.

²² According to TIKA ‘s 2017 Development Assistance report, in 2016, bilateral ODA accounted for 6327.5 Million USD against 250.2 million USD for multilateral ODA.

maintain control over the aims, conditions and modalities of delivering aid to recipient countries. Indeed, unlike bilateral aid that can be easily politicized and used for political purposes²³, “multilateral agencies are assumed to possess a degree of autonomy from the states that control and fund them that prevents political capture”²⁴.

What could then be the impacts of both channels on the effectiveness of aid in the recipient country? Evidence has further shown that the highly politicized nature of bilateral development aid could have a negative impact on the effectiveness of aid to achieve its initial purposes of economic growth and reducing poverty²⁵. In this stance, one scholar has demonstrated for instance that “when recipients are of less strategic interest to bilateral donors, these channels become more effective at reducing infant mortality”²⁶.

In contrast to bilateral aid, multilateral aid has received positive feedbacks from recipient countries as more legitimate and trustworthy²⁷.

As a third channel of aid delivery, trilateral or triangular development cooperation is a different type of cooperation that involves at least one provider of development co-operation or an international organisation and one or more providers of South-South co-operation (i.e. pivotal countries). It aims to promote a sharing of knowledge and experience or implement development co-operation projects in one or more beneficiary countries²⁸.

Regarding the influence of triangular cooperation on aid effectiveness, there is a general understanding that triangular cooperation could substantially contribute to the achievement of aid effectiveness because this kind of cooperation benefits from the comparative advantages of both north-south and south-south development cooperation. Yet, this perspective is restricted

²³ Verdier, Daniel. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime". *International Organization* Vol 62, No3, 2008, P. 439-476.

²⁴ Gulrajani, Nilima. "Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels Strategic choices for donors", *Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Report*, March 2016, p.10.

²⁵ Nunnenkamp, Peter. and Thiele, Rainer. "Targeting Aid to the Needy and Deserving: Nothing but Promises?", *TWEC (The World Economy)* Vol 29, No9, 2006, p. 1177-1201; Sippel, Maik. and Neuhoﬀ, K. "A history of Conditionality: Lessons for International Cooperation on Climate Policy", *Climate Policy* Vol 9, No5, 2009, P. 481-494.

²⁶ Girod, Desha. "Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic- Desperation Hypothesis", *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no1, 2012, p. 188-201.

²⁷ Gulrajani, Nilima. "Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels Strategic choices for donors", *ODI Report* March 2016, p.11.

²⁸ Mehta, P. S. and N. Nanda. "Trilateral Development Cooperation: An Emerging Trend", *Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment (CUTS)*, Briefing Paper No. 1, 2005, accessed on 12th May, 2017, online available at : <http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/BP1-2005.pdf>; Pollet, I. H. Huyse, P. Li, S. Shomba, X. Zhang. "Neither Comfort, nor Conflict: The Cohabitation of Chinese and Belgian Aid in the D.R. Congo", Leuven: *University of Leuven/Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA)* 2011.

by the fact that in practice such cooperation is hardly achievable and sustainable due to the difficulty to harmonize northern and southern donors' aid policies and modalities.

1.1.1.2. Aid and Development Effectiveness

There is no consensus about how to define 'aid effectiveness' either in the literature or amongst practitioners. This lack of commonly agreed definition of the concept of 'aid effectiveness' can be explained by several reasons, namely the plurality and sometimes contradicting objectives of aid delivery by a multiplicity of aid donors and agencies, and the intervening of other external factors that could influence positively or negatively the outcome of foreign aid in the recipient country²⁹. Despite the difficulty to obtain a commonly shared definition of aid effectiveness, there is a minimal agreement among researchers and political leaders that "aid effectiveness" generally refers to how effective aid is in achieving expected outputs and stated objectives of aid interventions³⁰.

Further efforts have been made in the Paris Declaration (2005) to define aid effectiveness in terms of five major principles meant to bind donors and recipients into specific time-limited commitments, which include ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability³¹, which principles have been further reinforced by the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. A 2008 independent evaluation of the Paris Declaration suggests that an understanding of aid effectiveness can be extracted from the Declaration. Aid effectiveness can thus be defined as the "arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is efficient, reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes including poverty reduction"³². It stems from this definition that an effective aid should reduce transaction costs in its planning and implementation and should be directed towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

²⁹ Gulrajani Nilima . "Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels Strategic choices for donors", *ODI Report* , March 2016.

³⁰ Shannon Kindornay and Bill Morton. "Development Effectiveness: towards new understandings", *Development Cooperation Series*, Issues Brief, September 2009.

³¹ Gulrajani Nilima. "Organising for Donor Effectiveness: An Analytical Framework for Improving Aid Effectiveness Policies". *The Global Economic Governance Working Paper* No 87, 2013, p.4.

³² Stern, D. Elliot., et al. "Thematic Study on the Paris Declaration, Aid Effectiveness and Development Effectiveness", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2008, accessed on 14th May, 2017 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/28/41807824.pdf.

Debates over whether aid given to developing countries is effective have raised great controversies among three strands of view. On one hand, there are supporters of aid who holds a positive view of the impacts of development aid on the economic growth of developing aid and asks for an increase in the amount of aid provided to developing countries. Back to the 1960s, the concept of savings-investments gap for instance was used by some scholars to explain the positive impacts of aid flows in increasing the capital stocks of developing countries that in turn would contribute to the revival and intensification of their economic activities³³. In this vein, Jeffrey Sachs, a well-known pro-aid scholar has maintained the view that aid is effective because it helps ensure capital accumulation and subsequent growth³⁴.

Another strand of view, which is more critical, underlines the conditions (especially related to the quality of state institutions and policies of the recipient country) under which development aid can yield positive results in the recipient country. Scholars such as Burnside and Dollar have argued that aid indeed affects growth positively if implemented in a good policy environment, especially concerning fiscal, monetary and trade policies; however, even in this case, aid has diminishing returns. Thus, they conclude that, for an efficient use of aid, flows should be directed to poor countries that follow good aid effectiveness policies³⁵. In the same manner, other scholars argued that aid is efficient in countries: where there are good economic policies and where civil war has just finished; in all countries but with diminishing returns; in countries outside the tropics; in countries vulnerable to external shocks such as volatile terms of trade or natural disasters; or in countries experiencing negative export prices³⁶.

The third strand of view brings together all those who literally reject foreign aid as causing more harms than good to the recipient countries and who simply ask for the end of development aid activities in developing countries. To illustrate this view, the author of *White Man's Burden and the Elusive Quest for Growth*³⁷, William Easterly, points out that "[in the past forty years] \$568 billion spent on aid to Africa, and yet the typical African

³³ Hjertholm, Peter., Laursen, J. and White, H. "Foreign aid and the macro-economy", Tarp, Finn (ed), *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future* (351-371), London: Routledge,2000.

³⁴ Sachs, Jeffrey. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of our Time*. London: Penguin,2005, P.250.

³⁵ Burnside, Craig. and Dollar, David. "Aid, Policies and Growth". *Policy Research Working Papers* no.1777, 1997.

³⁶ Roodman, David. "The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics", *The World Bank Economic Review*, vol.21, No2,2007, pp.255-277.

³⁷ Easterly, William. *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. MIT Press, 2001; Easterly William. *The White Man's Burden*. London: Penguin,2006.

country is no richer today than 40 years ago”³⁸. Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has also argued that aid is not only ineffective but is detrimental to development³⁹.

Like the concepts of aid effectiveness, there is no internationally agreed definition of the concept of development effectiveness. Nonetheless, a consideration of ‘development effectiveness’ leads to two possible definitions. The first is in terms of what development interventions achieve, i.e., “Development effectiveness is the achievement of sustainable development results related to MDGs (Millennium Development Goals⁴⁰) that have country level impacts that have discernible effects on the lives of the poor”⁴¹. The second definition focuses on processes, capacities and sustainability – with some similarities to ‘developmental state’ – i.e., “the capability of States and other development actors to transform societies to achieve positive and sustainable development outcomes for its citizens”⁴². According to the UNDP report, “development effectiveness is (or should be) about the factors and conditions that help produce *sustainable* development results-to make a sustained difference in the lives of people”⁴³.

Some tend to differentiate the term ‘development effectiveness’ from ‘aid effectiveness’ by arguing that there are some minor points that differentiates each concept from one another. In fact, according to some, whereas the understanding of the term ‘development’ in the conceptualization of aid effectiveness is narrowly defined in terms of economic growth and reduction of poverty, the concept of development effectiveness is all-encompassing as it relates to the achievement of sustainable development goals in the broader sense.

We argue in this thesis that the main difference between both terms is about the process of achieving development goals. In fact, whereas aid effectiveness is mainly about the use of aid to achieve development goals, development effectiveness include not only aid but also other sources of financing such as trade and FDI as other potential financial instruments that can contribute to the achievement of sustainable development goals. In short, the term

³⁸ Easterly, William. *Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest have done so Much Harms and so little Good*. New York: Penguin, 2006.

³⁹ Dambisa Moyo. *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is A Better Way for Africa*. New York: Straus and Giroux, 2009.

⁴⁰ It should be noted that the deadline for the achievement of the MDGs was in 2015. Further to the expiry date for the achievement of the MDGs, the UN has launched the Sustainable Development Goals to replace the MDGs and whose target date for achievement is set up for 2030.

⁴¹ Elliot Stern (Team Leader) with contributions from Laura Altinger, Osvaldo Feinstein, Marta Marañón, Daniela Ruegenberg Nils-Sjard Schulz and Nicolai Steen Nielsen. ‘The Paris Declaration, Aid Effectiveness and Development Effectiveness’, *Development Assistance Research Associates (daRa)*, November 2008, accessed on 14 May 2017, at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/41807824.pdf>

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid, p.21

“development effectiveness”, captures the idea that foreign aid is only one aspect of development policies and that ODA is not enough to eradicate extreme poverty, which is the main objective of development policies.

As such, in the context of this thesis, the term ‘development effectiveness’, ‘aid effectiveness’ or “effective development cooperation” will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis since the intended end-result of each of these terms is the achievement of sustainable development goals, although the means to achieve these goals might be different. Likewise, the terms “development aid” and “development cooperation” will be used interchangeably in this thesis because although our analysis lays on the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (which include not only aid but other sources of finance) , we mainly focuses our analysis on one aspect of Busan development cooperation, namely development aid.

After having clarified the core concepts of foreign aid and aid and development effectiveness, the following part will elaborate in a detailed and critical manner the debates surrounding the terms " traditional" and "emerging" donors.

1.1.2. The concepts of ‘Traditional’ and ‘Emerging’ aid donors

1.1.2.1. Traditional aid Donors

Traditional donors, who are literally the DAC members, are the main actors of the traditional north-south development cooperation. DAC members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US⁴⁴.

One of the main characteristics of these donors is their institutionalization of values and beliefs, which are shared among DAC donors and to which the latter are committed to respect and implement in their development aid policies towards developing countries. Illustrative of this, is the definition of ODA by the OECD-DAC to harmonize the content and modalities of

⁴⁴ OECD. “ DAC Members”, available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm>

aid provision wherein military or commercially driven aid is specifically excluded and a concessionality of at least 25% in terms of grant element is required⁴⁵.

The shared concerns to institutionalize and harmonize their aid activities in order to increase transparency in aid disbursement and effectiveness of aid activities, have resulted in the adoption of instruments that support aid transparency such as the OECD Creditor Reporting System, the periodic peer reviews by DAC members as well as the collective endorsement of international commitments and documents⁴⁶, such as the 2030 SGDs, the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the Busan Partnership for Effective development cooperation. One scholar rightly summed up this point by arguing that the DAC is “instrumental in defining terms and concepts in development assistance, identifying ‘best’ practices, and providing a framework within which bilateral donors can interact with more synergy than if they had been left to their own devices”⁴⁷.

Moreover, traditional aid donors seem to give priority to politico-security perspectives over socio-economic ones in the formulation and implementation of their development aid policies. This approach is based on a security-development nexus or democracy-development nexus according to which security and democracy need to be linked with development policies to achieve sustainable results. In this stance, the fifth principle of OECD DAC’s Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States recognizes the importance of the security-development nexus in the following words: “(...) the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risk failure in all others. International actors should move to support national reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level”⁴⁸. The democracy-development nexus is also integrated in many DAC countries’ aid policies through the inclusion of political conditionality in their development aid policies, which conditions the provision of aid to recipient countries to the promotion of democratic values.

Despite this picture of the traditional donors as a community of shared values, there are some significant differences among DAC member states that ought to be mentioned. These

⁴⁵ See OECD Glossary of Statistical terms.

⁴⁶ Satao, Jin et al. "How do “Emerging” Donors Differ from “Traditional” Donors? —An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia", *Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute working paper No.2*, March 2010, accessed on 5th June 2017, at: <https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/workingpaper/jrft3q00000022dd-att/JICA RI WP No.2 2010.pdf>

⁴⁷ Rowlands, Dane. "Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report". *The International Development Research Centre*, 2008.

⁴⁸ See OECD DAC recommendation nr.5 of the principles of good international engagement in fragile states, available at: http://www.opml.co.uk/extranet/ppfs/principles/5_recognise_the.html

differences range from the fact that DAC is not a western organization *stricto-sensus* with western culture since DAC is an expanding institution open to the adherence of non-western countries⁴⁹, to non-negligible differences in the practical implementation of aid activities in the recipient countries⁵⁰. Related to the last point, there are for instance DAC countries that focus on bilateral aid while others give preferences to multilateral aid; some DAC countries use political conditionality in their development aid activities while others do not.

Moreover, traditional aid donors seem to consider their relationship with the recipient country as a donor-recipient relationship based mostly on the altruistic motivations of the donor country and its “moral commitment to eradicate poverty and promote global development without becoming entangled in the national interests of individual member countries”⁵¹. Indeed, traditional donors insist on the fact that they have “a clearer split between the aid relationships and their commercial and foreign policy interests or business relationship, at least in Europe” and that their “aid programs are not designed to promote win-win solutions, but mostly premised on the achievement of ambitious development objectives, such as those centred on social dimensions identified in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the beneficiary country”⁵². However, many of these traditional aid policies have been harshly criticized for being affected by the rhetoric-reality gap, which means that in practice their aid activities in the recipient country are mainly directed towards the protection and promotion of their own politico-economic interests rather than towards the achievement of development goals in the recipient country.

Lastly, the traditional donors’ aid activities in third countries are facing a crisis of legitimacy, ranging from the accusations of ignorance of the ownership aspect (with the use of conditionality policies) in its aid modalities, to accusations of using aid as a neo-colonial instrument as well as to the increasing perception of their aid policies as being largely ineffective to achieve development goals in the recipient countries.

1.1.1.2.2. Emerging aid Donors

⁴⁹ Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea are members of the OECD-DAC.

⁵⁰ Raap, N.A. (Nienke). "The Potential of Development Cooperation of Emerging Donors China, India and Brazil as a Successful Approach to Aid Provision in Sub-Saharan Africa Illustrated by the case study of Prosavana", Master thesis, Internationale Betrekkings en Internationale Organisatie, 2013. , accessed on 22nd May 2017, <http://arts.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/14223/1/Ma-1641433-N.Raap.pdf>

⁵¹ Rampa, Francesco. “Emerging economies in Africa and the development effectiveness debate”, *Sanoussi Bilal*, March 2011, p.9.

⁵² Ibid, p.9

The international development aid landscape has gone through tremendous changes in the last decades with the increasing participation of emerging countries in the provision of foreign aid. So, what characterizes this group of donors?

Emerging donors comprise a group of “growing nations with strong economies that are increasing their international footprint through many channels, including foreign assistance”⁵³. According to the OECD definition, the term refers to a group of countries which:

Have become substantial donors within the last 20 years; Are not part of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee or have only joined it in the past decade; and Received aid and/or other development assistance themselves in the recent past (and may still be doing so)⁵⁴.

In this context, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, recent new members of the EU (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, South Korea and Turkey are often categorized as emerging donors⁵⁵. Emerging donors mostly share some minimal commonalities such as the fact of transiting from being aid recipients to being donor countries or being simultaneously both (like the case of Turkey)⁵⁶; their “young population, good growth rates, an emerging middle class, increasingly diversified economies, reasonably robust financial systems, and growing global visibility and impact”⁵⁷. These countries also share some common values and ideals such as the strong emphasis on respect for the principles of non-interference and national sovereignty, the rejection of hierarchy and the pursuit of common benefits⁵⁸.

Regarding the motivations behind the development aid policy of the emerging donors, it appears that in a way like traditional donors, emerging donors also use foreign aid as an

⁵³ Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran. "Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance", *Center for Global Development Working Paper No 273*, November 2011, p.1, accessed on 22nd May 2017, at: https://www.cgdev.org/files/1425691_file_Walz_Ramachandran_Brave_New_World_FINAL.pdf

⁵⁴ Devex Editor, “The landscape of emerging aid donors”, 03 April 2013, available at: <https://www.devex.com/news/the-landscape-of-emerging-aid-donors-80626>

⁵⁵ UNDP (UN Development Programme), “Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty”, September 2011, accessed on 28 October 2017, at: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Hum%20Resilience/Towards_SustainingMDGProgress_Ch5.pdf

⁵⁶ Keyman, Fuat and Onur Sazak. "Turkey as a Humanitarian State". *POMEAS (Project on the Middle East and the Arab Spring)*, No 2, 2014, accessed 28 October 2017, at <https://emergingpowerspacebuilding.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/keyman-turkey-as-a-humanitarian-state.pdf>

⁵⁷ Sucuoglu, Gizem and Jason Stearns. "Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid". *South African Institute of International Affairs, Research report*, No 24, November 2016, p.10, accessed on 1st November 2017, at <https://www.saiia.org.za/research-reports/1130-turkey-in-somalia-shifting-paradigms-of-aid-1/file>

⁵⁸ Mawdsley, Emma. *From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape*. London: New York, Zed Books, 2012.

instrument of foreign policy⁵⁹. More specifically, development aid is mainly used as a tool to boost their regional and global leadership, to increase their autonomy and reaffirm their sovereignty by adopting their own development aid policies and practices, to challenge western-dominated norms in the field of development aid as well as to pursue their own security, political and economic interests⁶⁰.

Despite these shared commonalities, emerging donors also constitute a heterogeneous group with diverse practices⁶¹ and diverse politico-economic situation and policies. This has pushed some authors to classify the emerging donors in three different groups based on three distinct models of development cooperation, namely the DAC model, the Southern model and the Arab model⁶².

The former, the DAC model, mostly comprises countries that are members of the OECD or the European Union, but not members of the DAC, although they are most likely to officially join the DAC. Their aid projects and definitions of ODA “generally follow the DAC guidelines and the amounts they give have risen significantly over the past decade”⁶³. Most of these countries report their aid statistics to the DAC and participate in DAC- peer review meetings. Overall, countries in the DAC group adopt the institutional, regulatory and legal structures that mirror those of DAC donors⁶⁴.

The second category, the southern model, includes “developing countries, middle-income countries and emerging economies that share expertise and financial support with other countries”⁶⁵. Countries categorized in this group are mostly associated with South-South

⁵⁹ De Haan, Arjan. *How the Aid Industry works: An Introduction to International Development*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2009.

⁶⁰ Robledo Carmen. “New donors, same old practices? South-South Cooperation of Latin American emerging donors”, *Robledo Bandung: Journal of the Global South* vol 2, No3, p.3. See also: Woods Ngairé. “The shifting politics of foreign aid”, *International Affairs*, vol 81, No 2, 2005, p.393–409; Kragelund, Peter. “The return of non-DAC donors to Africa: new prospects for African development? ”, *Development Policy Review* vol 26, No 5 ,2008, p.555–584; Brautigam, Deborah. *The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2009.

⁶¹ Rowlands, Dane. “Individual BRICS or a collective bloc? Convergence and divergence amongst ‘emerging donor’ nations”. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol 25, No4,2012, p.629–649.

⁶² Zimmermann, Felix and Kimberly Smith. “New partnerships in development co-operation”, *OECD journal: General Papers*, vol 2010, Issue 1, May 2011, p. 37-45; Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran. “Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance”, *Center for Global Development Working Paper No 273*, November 2011.

⁶³ Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran. “Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance”, p.10.

⁶⁴ Tok, Evren, Rachael Calleja and Hanaa El-Ghaish. “Arab Development Aid And The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Towards Better Governance?”, *European Scientific Journal* ,June 2014 /Special/ edition vol.1, June 2014, p.595.

⁶⁵ Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran. “Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance”, p.1.

cooperation and are both providers and recipients of ODA⁶⁶. Countries such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Venezuela are generally classified in this group. The southern donors advocate the fact that their assistance programs are different from the DAC donors and they most often label themselves as peers with the recipient country in mutually beneficial relationships, rather than as donors per se⁶⁷. In this line, they “are selective in engaging with the OECD in general and the DAC in particular”⁶⁸.

The last group, the Arab model, includes Arab countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which “have been engaged in development co-operation for decades”⁶⁹. Like southern donors, the Arab donors also tend “to engage with the OECD and DAC selectively”⁷⁰. Yet, unlike the southern emerging donors, countries in the Arab group “appear comfortable with the donor label”⁷¹. Contrary to the DAC aid model, the Arab aid “remains primarily concentrated regionally”, “is more openly influenced by social solidarity and religious ties”⁷², since the main recipients of this assistance are mostly the fellow Arab countries and is based on project delivery⁷³.

Having laid down the understanding behind the concepts of 'traditional' and 'emerging' donors, the next section will focus on the categorization of Turkey and the EU as potential aid donors, in one or another group.

1.1.2.3. Between Traditional and emerging donors: Where do the EU and Turkey fit in the Sub-Saharan African context?

- ***Locating the EU in the Sub-Saharan African Development Aid Landscape***

Starting with the EU, this thesis argues that the EU is undoubtedly classified among the traditional aid donors in SSA. Indeed, the EU as an institution is a member of the OECD-

⁶⁶Tok, Evren, Rachael Calleja and Hanaa El-Ghaish. "Arab Development Aid And The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Towards Better Governance?", p.595.

⁶⁷ Zimmermann, Felix and Kimberly Smith. “New partnerships in development co-operation”, OECD journal: General Papers, p.38

⁶⁸ Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran. “Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance”, P.1.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.1

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Zimmermann, Felix and Kimberly Smith. “New partnerships in development co-operation”, p.38.

⁷² Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran. “Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance”, p.12.

⁷³ Zimmermann, Felix and Kimberly Smith. “New partnerships in development co-operation”, p.38.

DAC, it provides aid to SSA according to DAC rules, and modalities. The EU has put into place several mechanisms to implement the aid effectiveness principles of the Paris declaration as well as the effective development cooperation principles of the Busan Partnership.

The EU has further backed its development aid policies towards SSA on normative grounds. It is stated in the European Strategy for Africa that, “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this”⁷⁴. In this context, a political conditionality clause has been strengthened in the 2000 Cotonou Partnership agreement concluded between the EU and the ACP countries to tie the provision of aid to African countries to the latter’s respect for and promotion of EU norms of human rights, rule of law, democracy, and good governance. This claimed normative feature of EU’s development aid policy towards SSA has been highly criticized for being marked with ‘double standards’ to highlight the fact that strategic self-interests are more valued than norms in the implementation of EU’s development aid policy in SSA.

Lastly, like a traditional donor, EU’s assistance programme towards SSA is more based on political and security issues than socio-economic ones, following therefore the security-development nexus. The European Council’s 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy', for example, emphasizes this point: “As the ESS [European Security Strategy] and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace”⁷⁵.

In practice, security issues such as migration, countering terrorism are included in EU’s partnership with African countries, namely in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement framework. In view of the negotiations of the Post-Cotonou agreement, the commission has proposed to the Council to move beyond the donor-recipient partnership in the following terms: "The aim of the proposal is the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement with the current 79 countries signatories to the CPA, with a focus on materializing common as well as specific EU interests (e.g. migration; peace and security, investment), going beyond the 'universal' approach and

⁷⁴ Council of the EU." The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership", Brussels, 19 December 2005, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-05-367_en.htm

⁷⁵ European Council." Report on the implementation for the European Security Strategy", European Council 2008, p.12

departing even more from donor-recipient dynamics"⁷⁶. This text clearly shows the willingness of the EU to go beyond the donor-recipient relationships as a 'typical' traditional donor and seek for a 'win-win' and 'mutual' partnership with ACP countries.

- *Locating Turkey in the Sub-Saharan African Development Aid Landscape*

The case of Turkey is a little bit different considering the hybrid nature of this country as a country in-between western and non-western culture. This makes its classification in one or another category difficult. From the first years of the foundation of Turkish republic to the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the beginning of 2000s, Turkey's foreign policy was shaped by a pro-western and passive stance. Turkish leaders were more focused on seizing any opportunity to affirm their western identity vis-a-vis the entire world. In this vein, Turkey has been a founding member of many western institutions such as NATO and the OECD (1961), it has also held observer status with the OECD-DAC since 1991 and has been associated with the EU (former European Economic Community) since the Ankara agreement of 1963.

However, in the first half of the 2000s, the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) accompanied with Turkey's rapid economic boom has significantly changed the foreign policy landscape of Turkey. Turkey has become more assertive and pro-active in international politics and has shifted its foreign policy from a western-oriented and passive perspective to an eastern and pro-active one. In this context, Turkey has hold membership in non-western platform such as MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia) and Turkey is also gradually building its own image as a global power in overseas regions. In doing so, Turkey has gradually improved its relations with its neighbourhood in the Middle East, Caucasus and in South-East Europe through the 'zero-problem policy', although this 'zero-problem policy' is somehow being challenged today. In Africa, Turkey has started to re-engage with the continent in economic, political and most importantly development aid spheres, through its policy of opening to Africa. As such, Turkey's efforts to build its "rising power" status are no longer debatable.

⁷⁶ European Parliament. " Understanding 'development effectiveness' An overview of concepts, actors and tools", European Parliament Briefing April 2017, accessed on 15 November 2017, at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pc-com-2017-763-final-act-20171212_en.pdf

Thus, where does Turkey stand between traditional and emerging aid donors in SSA? On one hand, as a member of the OECD, Turkey adheres to the ODA definition provided by the OECD-DAC and therefore in principle the content of its development aid as well as the rules and modalities of providing aid to SSA fit into OECD-DAC pre-established rules and principles. Turkey also regularly reports its development assistance flows to DAC, which increases transparency in its official aid data and it regularly participates in the DAC committee meetings, although Turkey is not yet a member of the OECD-DAC. In the same vein, Turkey endorsed the aid effectiveness principles outlined in the Paris Declaration as well as the development effectiveness principles outlined in the 2011 Busan Partnership. This proximity with western aid donors makes it difficult to classify Turkey as a typical emerging aid donor with the likes of China for instance.

In addition, another aspect that brings Turkey closer to the traditional aid donors in SSA is its growing involvement into political issues in SSA. In fact, there is apparently an ‘implicit’ understanding of a division of labour between traditional and emerging aid donors in SSA, with most of emerging aid donors focusing on socio-economic aspects of development cooperation, and traditional donors using predominantly a politico-stability approach in their development aid policies towards SSA.

In this regard, there has been a noticeable change in Turkey’s development aid policy approach towards SSA, since 2011. If in the recent past, Turkey operated in Africa like the other non-western emerging powers (China, Brazil, India) in the field of economic development and humanitarian aid with minor concern for political issues⁷⁷, the done has started to change since 2011, with the ambitious involvement of Turkey in the state-building process of Somalia. This led one scholar to conclude that this move constitutes a clear indication of the growing willingness from the side of Ankara to move their development aid focuses beyond mere socio-economic activities and to assume political responsibilities in the Horn of Africa⁷⁸.

Nonetheless, Turkey can hardly be categorized as a traditional aid donor in OECD-DAC understanding because of its lack of membership to the OECD-DAC. In this context, Turkey is most of the time classified as an emerging aid donor by various international institutions. In

⁷⁷ Ozkan, Mehmet and Serhat Orakci. "Turkey as a political actor in Africa", *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol 9, No 2, 2015, p. 343–352.

⁷⁸ Donelli, Federico. "Turkey’s presence in Somalia a humanitarian approach”, Alessia Chiriatti and al (eds). *The Depth of Turkish Geopolitics in the AKP’s Foreign Policy: From Europe to an Extended Neighbourhood* (35-51). Università per Stranieri Perugia, Perugia, 2015, p.40.

illustration, the OECD-DAC categorizes Turkey as an ‘emerging donor’ – a country with a new or recently revived aid programme⁷⁹.

At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon included Turkey in a call for ‘new and emerging donor countries’ to assume more responsibility in conflict-affected areas⁸⁰. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs endorses this definition, calling itself a ‘new and emerging donor’ in development co-operation⁸¹. Indeed, Turkey presents many features that can lead up to its categorization of emerging donors. These features include the fact that “Turkey enjoyed relatively steady economic development and growth for over a decade, enabling the expansion of its development co-operation programmes. With a few fluctuations, Turkish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an average of 5% per year since 2002. Since 2004, Turkey has been one of the world’s 20 largest economies”⁸².

As mentioned above, the emerging donors’ group is classified into three distinct sub-groups: the DAC group, Southern group and the Arab group. Although Turkey is generally classified as part of the DAC group because of its membership to the OECD, it presents some characteristics of the Southern and Arab models too. Like south-south development aid providers, Turkey also increasingly considers its aid activities in SSA as a project based on the solidarity with and fraternity to the African continent, which has been victim of years of colonial exploitation. The principle of solidarity, one of the defining elements of the southern model of development cooperation, is visible in Turkey’s engagement in Somalia⁸³. Likewise, Turkey’s development cooperation towards SSA is also based on the premise that

⁷⁹ See Smith Karen, Yamashiro Fordelone T and F Zimmermann. "Beyond the DAC: The Welcome Role of Other Providers of Development Cooperation", OECD Development Cooperation Directorate , May 2010, , accessed on 28 October 2017, at <https://www.oecd.org/dac/45361474.pdf>

⁸⁰ UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, "Remarks to Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness [as delivered]", Busan, Republic of Korea, 30 November 2011, accessed on 28 October 2017, at, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1399#.Vyzp0qMrKAw

⁸¹ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkey’s development cooperation: General characteristics and the least developed countries (LDC) aspect”, accessed on 28 October 2017, at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-development-cooperation.en.mfa>

⁸² Sucuoglu, Gizem and Jason Stearns. "Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid", *South African Institute of International Affairs, Research report*, No 24, November 2016, P.11.

⁸³ Nganje Fritze. "Two-way socialization between traditional and emerging donors critical for effective development cooperation", *Africa up Close* ,6 January 2014, accessed on 28 October 2017, at, <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/two-way-socialization-between-traditional-and-emerging-donors-criticalfor-effective-development-cooperation/>,

African people should find their own solutions to development challenges, known as the principle of ‘African solutions for African problems’⁸⁴.

Turkish leaders also use the principles of equality and win-win partnership in their development aid discourses towards SSA. Turkish leaders in their development assistance discourses in SSA seek to avoid ‘new-imperialism’ accusations while proposing a ‘mutual-benefit’ discourse, which means that their development aid perspective contains idealistic and pragmatic aspects.

In this context, Turkey’s president Erdoğan once said that “Turkey has never been a colonial power in Africa, and now we come here as equals who ask for cooperation, not as a colonial power that is coming to exploit your resources”⁸⁵. Turkish officials therefore refer to former Western colonialism to show to the African leaders and public the existence of a common fate between Turkey and them. Turkey also praises its development path as a successful example that might inspire the African countries it sees as its fellow's brothers. From an aid-recipient country to a potential aid donor in the world, Turkey is generally presented as a country with “‘much success and experience to share with LDCs’”⁸⁶. Turkey’s development cooperation activities also “‘share commonalities with SSC (South-South Cooperation) donors, such as its increasing preference to deliver aid through bilateral rather than multilateral channels, its rejection of aid conditionality, its emphasis on national ownership, and its relative inexperience in strategic analysis and co-ordination.’”⁸⁷

Despite some *rapprochement* with the southern development aid providers, Turkey cannot entirely be categorized into the southern donors’ group because, while Turkish officials underscore that ‘SSC forms an important aspect of Turkish development cooperation’,⁸⁸ the country does not see itself as a member of the global South. On the contrary, the country insists on its hybrid feature as an ‘Afro-Eurasian’ country.

Like the Arab model of development cooperation, there are some religious dimensions in Turkey’s assistance towards SSA because most of its development aid concentrated on African Muslim countries. This religious connotation of Turkey’s development cooperation

⁸⁴ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey’s development cooperation", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁸⁵ *Al Jazeera*. "Erdoğan: Türkiye'nin Afrika'da sömürgeci geçmişi olmadı", June 1, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogan-turkiyenin-afrikada-somurgeci-gecmisi-olmadi>

⁸⁶ Korkut, Umut and Civelekoglu, Ilke. “Becoming a Regional Power while pursuing Material Gains: The Case of Turkish Interest in Africa”, *International Journal*, Vol.68, no1,2013, P.194.

⁸⁷ Sucuoglu, Gizem and Jason Stearns. “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid. *South African Institute of International Affairs, Research report*, No 24, November 2016, p.10-14.

⁸⁸ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey’s development cooperation".

towards SSA brings it closer to the model of development aid used by the Arab group (Gulf countries), although religion in the Turkish case appears more as a tool rather than the driving force in most of her aid activities⁸⁹.

One of the specificities of Turkey in its development aid approach that distinguishes Turkey from both traditional and non-western emerging aid donor is its reliance on humanitarian diplomacy as the cornerstone of its development aid policy towards SSA. Humanitarian diplomacy, from the understanding of Turkish foreign policy makers is based on moral values and encompasses three dimensions, mainly – citizens of Turkey, policies toward crisis zones and global world order⁹⁰.

According to former Prime Minister Davutoğlu, “Turkey has become deeply concerned with all forms of human inequality that exist in the world, especially those forms that impacts upon the dignity of the individual and the community”⁹¹. The country’s most remarkable humanitarian feat has been its humanitarian engagement in Somalia at the height of the hunger crisis in 2011⁹².

As we can see from the analysis above, it is difficult to categorize perfectly Turkey in one group or another because the country presents simultaneously some features of traditional and emerging (DAC, emerging and southern groups) donors. This has put Turkey in a middle position between traditional and non-traditional actors in the continent⁹³. Given these and others, this thesis defines Turkey as a ‘bridging’ emerging aid donor in SSA.

1.1.3. Literature Review of the different Models of Development Cooperation

This section will provide a brief overview of the three models of development cooperation, namely north-south development cooperation, south-south development cooperation and triangular or north-south-south development cooperation. In this line, an attention will be

⁸⁹ Donnelli , Federico and Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi. “Becoming global actor: The Turkish agenda for the global south”, *Rising powers quarterly* volume 1, issue 2(Turkey in global governance: searching for alternatives between the west and the rest), December 2016, p.105, accessed on 28th October 2017 , at: <http://risingpowersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/vol1.2-Donelli-Levaggi.pdf>.

⁹⁰ Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects”, *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol 41, No: 6, 2013,p.865-870.

⁹¹ Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “A New Vision for Least Developed Countries”, *Center for Strategic Research SAM Papers, Vision Papers*,No4, 2012,P.3.

⁹² Dipama, Samiratou, Ferit Belder, and Emel Parlar Dal. “Assessing Turkey’s Development Aid Policy towards Africa: a constructivist perspective”, *International Relations and Dialogue of Cultures* No 3 2014, p.104-124.

⁹³ Ozkan, Mehmet.“Does rising powers mean rising donors?”, *Africa Review* vol 5, No 2, 2013, p.139, accessed on 7 May 2017 at: file:///Users/erdi/Downloads/Does_Rising_Power_Mean_Rising_Donor_Turk.pdf

given to the main characteristics, the establishment modalities as well as the main criticisms directed against each of these three models.

1.1.3.1. North-South Development Cooperation

North-south development cooperation constitutes one of the oldest and well-known forms of development cooperation. It is the form of development cooperation used by traditional DAC aid donors. The discourse behind such cooperation is drawn from the modernization theory which posits that there is a huge gap in terms of development levels (in terms of capital stocks and technical skills) between the rich and industrialized global north and the poor and less industrialized global south, which “gap is used to explain the latter’s underdevelopment”. Thus, “the North can and must promote international development by providing economic, financial and technical assistance to the South”⁹⁴. The north has therefore a moral responsibility to help the south get developed through financial and technical assistance and failing this altruistic assistance the south cannot realize its own development.

North-South Cooperation (NSC) can be defined as “the development cooperation between the North (the developed countries) and the South (the developing countries)”. Whereas, the term ‘north’ can refer to one or to more than one northern country, namely the richer countries of North America, Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand or to one northern organization, the term ‘south’ refers to only one southern country or organization because a cooperation involving one north country or organization and more than one southern country or organization would take the form of a north-south-south cooperation⁹⁵.

Bilateral north-south development cooperation overwhelmingly dominated the development cooperation architecture from the 1940s to the end of 1960s. This trend changed in the beginning of the 1970s with the emergence of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Bretton Woods' institutions and the UNDP⁹⁶.

⁹⁴ The Reality of Aid Management Committee. "South-South Development Cooperation: A challenge to the aid system?", *Special Report on South-South Cooperation*, 2010, p.1.

⁹⁵ Rosseel, Peter et al. “Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration: A-policy document”, *KU Leuven: VLIR and UWC Policy paper* 2007, P.11, accessed on 26 October 2017 https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/229636/1/POLICY_PAPER_VLIR_UWC_NSS.pdf,

⁹⁶ Huang, Meibo. “South-South Cooperation, North-South Aid and the prospect of International Aid Architecture”, *China Institute for International Development*, No. 422, 2015, accessed on 26 October 2017, at: file:///Users/erdi/Downloads/SOUTH-SOUTH_COOPERATION_NORTH-SOUTH_AID.pdf

Regarding the several ways of north-south development cooperation, Waardenburg in 1997 developed a typology that explains the five different modalities of research cooperation between the North and the South, which include: full funding by northern partners of the development projects which are defined and implemented by the south; a majority vote is given to the South in agenda setting, budget (provided by the north) expenditure, management and program committees; The North and the south are given equal vote in agenda setting, in financing within the budget provided largely from the North, and in management; “Collaboration without operational guarantees for real symmetry or against domination of the Northern partner – expenditures managed mainly by the North”; and “participation of researchers or institutions from the South in research initiated, designed, managed and in majority implemented by the Northern partners”⁹⁷.

This model of development cooperation has attracted several criticisms. One of the principal criticisms directed against the north-south cooperation is the perceived power asymmetry that exists between the rich northern country or organization and the poor southern country or organization⁹⁸.

The northern part is generally considered as the ‘giver’ or ‘provider’ of aid with more power while the southern side is viewed as the ‘receiver’⁹⁹ who does not have too much say in this relationship. In line with this unequal power relation between the north and the south, the northern part is generally the one who sets the priorities, modalities as well as conditions of providing aid to the southern part, which should reduce itself to accept these conditions.

Another critic repeatedly raised against the north-south model of development cooperation is related to the use of conditionality. Northern bilateral and multilateral donors frequently attach macroeconomic and political conditionality to their development assistance, even though they have signed on to the Paris Declaration, which recognizes the principle of (partner) country ownership of aid¹⁰⁰. The persisting use of conditionality by north-south development cooperation providers in their development assistance activities violates the

⁹⁷ Waardenburg, G. ‘Research, Developing Countries (DCs), and EU-DC Research Cooperation’, *European Conference Research Partnerships for Sustainable Development*, March 1997, Leiden.

⁹⁸ See Binka, Fred. North-South Research Collaborations: a Move towards a True Partnership? *Tropical Medicine & International Health*, vol 10, No 3, 2005, p. 207–209; Oyugi, Edward. “Rethinking Aid: Development Cooperation in a Multilateral Crisis”. *Reality of Aid Report*, 2004, accessible at <http://realityofaid.org/roareport.php?table=roa2004&id=13>

⁹⁹ Rosseel, Peter et al. “Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration: A policy document”, *KU Leuven: VLIR and UWC Policy paper 2007*, P.12, accessed on 26 October 2017, at: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/229636/1/POLICY_PAPER_VLIR_UWC_NSS.pdf

¹⁰⁰ The Reality of Aid Management Committee, “South-South Development Cooperation: A challenge to the aid system?”, *Special Report on South-South Cooperation*, 2010, p.13.

sovereign right of people to determine their own country priorities and strategies for development and has largely been considered as ineffective to induce the achievement of development goals in the recipient country. Added to this is the most-often observed (cultural) differences between the goals, motivations, rationales and conditionalities of the North and the goals, perceptions, and rationales of the south sometimes differ too much from the goals and opinions of the South, which differences can undermine the success of the project¹⁰¹.

Lastly, the aid projects run in the context of north-south development cooperation have been criticized for being largely technocratic with negligible practical relevance and for lacking a long-term perspective.

1.1.3.2. South-South Development Cooperation

The 1955 Bandung Conference was the first initiative that gave boost to the idea of South-South Cooperation as an imperative for a more effective participation of developing countries in global affairs and as a complement to the extensive economic relationships between the developed and developing countries. From this conference onwards, several institutions such as the 1961 Non-Aligned Movement in 1961¹⁰², the 1972 working group on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC), the UN Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC), the South-South Consultation and Coordination (G-15), the BRICS group, the G77, were set up at the international level to promote South-South Cooperation and to reduce the dependence of developing countries on northern industrialized nations¹⁰³.

There is no universally agreed understanding of the concept of South-South Cooperation (SSC). In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership”, the authors define the concept of SSC as “the processes, institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical cooperation among developing countries in pursuit of common development goals”¹⁰⁴. They add that south-south cooperation, which mainly focuses on exchange and transfer of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, should be differentiated

¹⁰¹ Oyugi, Edward. "Rethinking Aid: Development Cooperation in a Multilateral Crisis". *Reality of Aid Report*, 2004.

¹⁰² Peter Rosseel, et al. "Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration: A-policy document", *KU Leuven: VLIR and UWC Policy paper* 2007, p.16.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.16 and 17.

¹⁰⁴ UNCTAD. "Economic Development in Africa Report: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership". UNCTAD 2010.

from the narrow technical or economic cooperation among developing countries, which “refers mainly to cooperation in trade, investment and finance”¹⁰⁵.

The term south-south development cooperation does not necessarily correspond to a geographical denominator comprising only countries in the southern hemisphere¹⁰⁶, but rather mostly refers to a political term “to refer to technical cooperation, knowledge exchange, and financial assistance between pairs of developing countries”¹⁰⁷. One of the main features of a south-south cooperation is that the recipient is generally a low-income country already benefiting from aid funds from other donors, and the aid provider is an emerging power which experienced a recent successful economic growth and development trajectory, aims to expand its international influence through widening ties with overseas countries, and is sometimes still receiving aid from other development partners¹⁰⁸.

Another key element of such cooperation is the idea of win-win partnership, in that such cooperation is developed with a focus on both parties deriving mutual benefit. South-south development providers reject the idea of the benevolent character of their development aid activities and rather put forwards the argument that their aid projects are based on mutual and win-win cooperation between the partners. They totally reject the north-south development cooperation’s concepts of ‘provider’ and ‘receiver’ and treat all parties in the development cooperation program as partners. As one expert argues, “South-South Cooperation is about saving livelihoods and sustainable solutions. It is about offering a helping hand to nations as equal partners. And it is about sharing experiences and lessons learned, knowledge and technical expertise”¹⁰⁹.

The fundamental difference between the discourses held by north-south development cooperation providers and south-south development cooperation providers is rightly summarized in a research report on “Recalibrating Development Co-Operation: How can African Countries Benefit from Emerging Countries” issued by OECD Development Centre in 2011 as follows :“international development cooperation could be broadly divided into two different philosophies: ‘international development assistance’, relying on a charity philosophy

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Key SSC actors such as China are in the Northern hemisphere for instance.

¹⁰⁷ Paolo de Renzio & Jurek Seifert. “South–South cooperation and the future of development assistance: mapping actors and options”, *Third World Quarterly* vol 35, No, 10,2014, p.1864

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ A note by Ms. Mueller, who is also the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, quoted in Global South-South Development Expo Daily Summary, Wednesday, 29 November 2017, unofficial record, accessed on 10 December 2017, at: <http://www.expo.unsouthsouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Daily-Summary-29-Nov-2017.pdf>

and, ‘international development investment’, aiming at enhancing the partner’s potential in one’s own self-interest... the notion of win-win co-operation is primarily associated to emerging donors from the South such as China, India and Brazil”¹¹⁰.

Plus, another feature of this model of cooperation is the important role played by the private sector partly because in south-south cooperation, “most aid is tied to goods and services provided by private firms” and “package deals consisting of aid, trade and investment flows are characteristic of such cooperation”¹¹¹.

Furthermore, SSC emphasizes the development and promotion of developing countries’ self-development and collective self-reliance capacity¹¹². They are opposed to any kind of interference in the domestic politics of the recipient countries as well as to any form of conditionality in their development cooperation activities, which they consider as violating developing countries’ sovereignty right as well as their right to define their own development path and priorities. As such, South-south development cooperation partners are more respectful to the principle of ownership, which is considered as one of the key principles of aid and development effectiveness.

In addition, SSC is based on a larger understanding of the concept of development cooperation, which should not only be restricted to aid funding but extended to other sources of finance such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade that also contribute to tackle developing countries’ development issues. In this context, the development aid activities conducted by southern donors are directed towards promoting “bilateral trade and investment” and realizing “win-win objective of stimulating economic growth”¹¹³. That said, the aid from emerging southern donors pursue commercial motives and can hardly be dissociated from other financial activities such as FDI and trade because “the combination of experience, technology and skills transfer with capital funds from emerging southern donors will contribute to the reduction of poverty and induce the expansion of foreign markets’ penetration into the partner country and thus will revive the latter’s’ economic competitiveness”¹¹⁴. The seminar “Development Assistance, Emerging Economies and the

¹¹⁰ Myriam Dahman Saidi and Christina Wolf. “Recalibrating Development Co-Operation: How can African Countries Benefit from Emerging Countries”, *OECD Developing Centre Working Paper* No. 302, July 2011, accessed on 20 November 2017, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/44/48450803.pdf.

¹¹¹ Dreher Axel et al. "The European Union, Africa and New Donors Moving Towards New Partnerships. Highlights". European Union 2015, P.

¹¹² Huang, Meibo. “South-South Cooperation, North-South aid and the prospect of International Aid Architecture”, *Vestnik Rudn International Relations* No1, 2015, P.26.

¹¹³ Ibid, p.27

¹¹⁴ Xiaolin Wang and Qianqian Lin. "Sino-Africa Cooperation: A New Way of Improving Development

Global Policy”, held in Beijing in November 2012, endorsed this view by pointing out that “aid provided under the framework of SSC is conducive to the economic cooperation between developing countries and expansion of new markets”. It added that SSC providers use their financial assistance to increase the development capacity building, the self-reliance and autonomy of the recipient countries through funding of key sectors such as infrastructure, technical cooperation, education, and health¹¹⁵.

Like in the case of north-south development cooperation, there are several modalities of conducting south-south development cooperation based on the activity of the cooperation, including the share of experience and expertise between developing countries, the strengthening of networks, the increase of capacity building and the setting-up of partnership developments¹¹⁶.

Given the perceived failure of north-south development cooperation model, one assumes that south-south cooperation could be a potential alternative to boost development challenges in developing countries. Some argue that South-South Cooperation has considerable comparative advantages as a tool to foster development in that, countries that receive SSC benefit considerably by learning from the experiences of other nations that went through similar problems in similar development challenges and found successful solutions to them. As one expert argues, “southern actors respond as donors, hosts, operational and technical partners. They lend a crucial perspective for oftentimes they have faced similar challenges and know all too well that saving lives is just the first of many steps,”¹¹⁷.

However, the south-south model of development cooperation has also been at the heart of critics. One of these critics pertains to the tying nature of most of southern donors, which is seen as an obstacle to the achievement of development goals in the recipient countries. In fact, project assistance from Southern donors is generally tied to the purchase of goods and hiring of contractors from the donor country. This is particularly true for China and India.

Effectiveness”, *Research on International Issues*, volume 5, 2012.

¹¹⁵ Huang, Meibo. “South-South Cooperation, North-South Aid and the Prospect of International Aid Architecture”, *Vestnik Rudn International Relations* No1, 2015, p.27.

¹¹⁶ Rosseel, Peter et al. "Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration: A policy document", *KU Leuven: VLIR and UWC Policy paper* 2007, p.23

accessed on 26 October 2017, at: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/229636/1/POLICY_PAPER_VLIR_UWC_NSS.pdf

¹¹⁷ A note by Ms. Mueller, who is also the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, quoted in Global South-South Development Expo Daily Summary, Wednesday, 29 November 2017, unofficial record, accessed on 10 December 2017, at: <http://www.expo.unsouthsouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Daily-Summary-29-Nov-2017.pdf>

Southern emerging donors' refusal to include political conditionalities in their development aid framework is also criticized for opening the doors to autocratic leaders in the recipient countries to benefit from external funds that would help them continue political and human rights violations and would exacerbate corruption practices in these countries. Drawing from the development-democracy nexus premise according to which democracy and development are intimately linked and democratic countries are more likely to achieve development goals than non-democratic countries, one could conclude that the possible cooperation of southern emerging donors with autocratic governments in the recipient country would lead to counter-productive results.

Other criticisms are related to the ad-hoc, fragmented and informal nature of south-south cooperation initiatives, to the lack of monitoring in the provision of south-south development aid that make difficult the assessment of the practical effects of their aid activities in the receiving countries¹¹⁸, and to the lack of transparency in the implementation of aid projects in the recipient countries that can give room for increased corruption in the recipient country, and to the long-term sustainability of financial resources that will be used to execute future south-south cooperation aid projects due to the political instability and internal tensions that characterize most of southern developing countries.

Recent developments in the international development aid architecture have narrowed the areas of discordance between north-south and south-south models of development cooperation. From the 2005 Paris Declaration through the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and to the 2011 Busan conference, we can observe that efforts have been made to accommodate and harmonize both models with the introduction of the concepts of (democratic) ownership to consider southern donors' insistence that aid activities should be based on the development priorities of the developing countries. In the same stance, the use of the term "effective development cooperation" in the Busan final document in lieu of the narrowed term of aid effectiveness clearly shows a convergence towards the idea that cooperation should have an impact on broader development processes, which is inherently consistent with SSC emphasizing on combining assistance with trade and investment¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁸Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) and Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC). "Promoting the Effective Use of South-South & Triangular Cooperation in Cambodia". *Development Cooperation and Partnerships Strategy (2014-2018) Background Paper No. 5*, February 2013, p.3. accessed on 22 October 2017, at http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/strategy/docs/maximizing_potential_ssc.pdf

¹¹⁹ Rosseel, Peter et al. "Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration: A policy document", *KU Leuven: VLIR and UWC Policy paper*, 2007, p.28.

Moreover, in the Nairobi outcome document of 2009 United Nations High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation, for the first time, partners of SSC explicitly included principles that have long been supported by NSC partners, such as inclusiveness, alignment, transparency, mutual accountability, quality and results, and untied aid¹²⁰.

Even, the equal-partnership promoted by SSC has been put under question because most of the time, the recipient countries play the role of beneficiaries rather than a 'true' actor, like the north-south cooperation model. Indeed, many critics directed against SSC pertains to the perceived asymmetry between the recipients and providers of development aid in south-south development cooperation because “many of the initiatives in the partnerships are largely funded and supported by the provider with the recipient creating space for absorption of the investment or knowledge transfer, accompanied by extraction of minerals and raw materials by the provider”¹²¹.

1.1.3.3. North-South-South or Triangular Development Cooperation

The terms ‘North-South-South cooperation’, ‘triangular cooperation’, or ‘trilateral cooperation’ are generally used interchangeably in the literature¹²². Yet, there is no internationally agreed definition or common understanding of what either of this term means.

The first use of the concept of ‘triangular co-operation’ can be traced back to the 1980s, when in 1980, when the Independent Commission on International Development issues, chaired by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, suggested the development of triangular co-operation schemes in the context of economic co-operation between developing countries¹²³.

¹²⁰ Tortora, Piera. "Common Ground Between South-South and North-South Cooperation Principles", *OECD Issues Brief*, October 2011.

¹²¹ Vitalice Meja, “Making South-South Cooperation Partnerships Work for Africa: A situational analysis and policy recommendations” , Reality of Aid Africa (non-dated), P.86

¹²² Some countries, such as China and the United States, refer to “trilateral co-operation”, while some regional organisations, such as the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) refer to “triangular South-South co-operation”.

¹²³ Chaturvedi, Sachin. “Development Co-operation: Contours, Evolution and Scope”, Sachin Chaturvedi, Thomas Fues and Elisabeth Sidiropoulos (eds). *Development Co-operation and Emerging Powers – New Partners or Old Patterns?* (13-36), London: Zed Books, 2012.

Since the first reference to the term ‘triangular co-operation’, interpretations of what triangular co-operation is have evolved, varying according to the nature, partners involved and the scope of triangular co-operation¹²⁴.

The OECD defines triangular cooperation (TC) as “partnerships between DAC Donors and Pivotal Countries (providers of South-South Co-operation) to implement development co-operation programmes/projects in Beneficiary Countries (recipients of development aid)”¹²⁵. The European Union (EU) in turn defines TC as the collaboration between a southern provider (generally providing an adapted, direct and low-cost expertise, knowledge and technical cooperation, and a traditional northern donor (which brings funding and more sophisticated technical skills, and shares its long and broader development experiences), in benefit of a third recipient country¹²⁶. However, such a division of labour is not fixed, and the role performed by different partners can vary.

For some, trilateral development cooperation refers to “a development relationship in which a DAC donor and/or multilateral agency or international organization (e.g. European Union, Japan, Germany or the United Nations Development Program) ‘partners’ with a so-called ‘pivotal’ country (e.g. Brazil, Turkey, China, or South Africa) to work with a third ‘partner’ (recipient) country (e.g. Ghana, Laos or Mozambique)”¹²⁷.

More detailed conceptualizations of triangular cooperation differentiate between weak and strong models of triangular cooperation¹²⁸. According to the weak definition, triangular co-operation “unites the approaches of two donors into one project in which the two different approaches work simultaneously but in a co-ordinated way”¹²⁹, i.e. partners use their comparative advantages and work in a co-ordinated way. The stronger definition is “the three parties are united at each step of the project: the planning, financing, implementation, and

¹²⁴OECD. "Triangular Co-Operation: What is the Literature Telling Us?", OECD, May 2013, accessed on 22nd October 2017, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/OECD%20Triangular%20Cooperation%20Literature%20Review%20June%202013.pdf>

¹²⁵Ibid, P.14.

¹²⁶UNECA. South-South and Triangular Cooperation and its implications for the Eastern Africa sub-region. Report for the UN Economic Commission for Africa – Sub regional office for Eastern Africa May 2011, accessed on 22 October 2017 at: <http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/south-south-and-triangular-cooperation-2011.pdf>

¹²⁷ McEwan, Cheryl and Emma Mawdsley. “Trilateral Development Cooperation: Power and Politics in Emerging Aid Relationships”, *Development and Change* vol 43, no6, 2012, P.1186.

¹²⁸ Xiaoyun, Li and Thomas Bonschab. “Nine Challenges from Triangular Co-operation”, Julia. Langendorf, et al (eds). *Triangular Co-Operation – A Guideline for working in Practice* (185-190), Baden-Baden: Nomos: Technical University of Darmstadt and German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), 2012.

¹²⁹ OECD. “Triangular Co-Operation: What’s the Literature Telling Us”, OECD May 2013, p.14.

monitoring”, i.e. partners share values and align their methodologies¹³⁰. For instance, there are several examples of triangular co-operation where there is a two-way flow of knowledge and experiences, with all developing countries involved acting as pivotal and beneficiary of the co-operation.

Although there is no agreed definition, the literature on triangular co-operation suggests a widely held understanding that, in practice, triangular co-operation involves at least one provider of development co-operation or an international organisation and one or more providers of South-South co-operation (i.e. pivotal countries) to promote a sharing of knowledge and experience or implement development co-operation projects in one or more beneficiary countries.

The literature also shows that there are diverse ways to establish triangular co-operation. Four main models of establishing a triangular cooperation were identified: an existing south-south cooperation benefits from the support of a development co-operation provider; a bilateral co-operation signed between two providers of development cooperation to implement a project in a beneficiary country; a second provider of development cooperation join an already existing partnership between a provider and a recipient of development cooperation; a triangular cooperation is set up jointly by the three partners (provider of development co-operation, pivotal country and beneficiary country)¹³¹.

Opinions differ among academics with respect to the prospects for and possible impacts of such cooperation on aid effectiveness in the recipient country. On one hand, there are those who hold a positive view of the relationship between triangular cooperation and aid effectiveness. According to this strand of view, trilateral cooperation could be an effective tool to address global development challenges through foreign aid because it combines the comparative advantages of north-south and south-south development cooperation models. As the UNDP states: “Triangular South-South co-operation is becoming increasingly popular as a way of fostering development by leveraging the best features of cooperation between developing countries with assistance from developed countries”¹³². More concretely, pivotal southern donors are expected to contribute with expertise that is adapted well to beneficiary

¹³⁰Ibid, p.14.

¹³¹ OECD, “Triangular Co-operation: What’s the Literature Telling Us?“, OECD, May 2013.

¹³² UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). “UNDP /Japan Partnership, ‘supporting South- South Cooperation: Innovative Triangular Cooperation towards the Millennium Development Goals (1999- 2004)’”, New York, UNDP 2004, Accessed on 16 November 2017, at: <http://tcdc.undp.org/doc/TriangCoop.pdf>

countries' realities at a lower cost, while DAC donors can provide their financing and expertise in development assistance¹³³.

Advocates of triangular cooperation holds the view that the similarity of development path between pivotal southern countries and the recipient country makes easier the adaptability of the former's expertise to the needs of the later and reduces the transaction costs since the transfer of experts, services and technologies cost less than those of DAC member countries¹³⁴. DAC-donors are also credited for benefiting from more sustainable and secure finance that would help fund development aid projects in the longer run. DAC-donors' years of experience in development assistance may also increase the scope and impact of such partnership¹³⁵. In this sense, one scholar stresses out that, "Even though developing countries may have development experiences to share with other developing countries, their funding capacities may be limited". Hence, "TDC [triangular development cooperation] is a win- win approach to meet the ends of both Northern as well as 'Southern partners'", and with the help of DAC donors, "Triangular co- operation could thus assist in fuller exploitation of potential of SSC [South- South co- operation]"¹³⁶.

Moreover, the three partners can jointly develop common interests and discuss global issues while pursuing their bilateral relations. Triangular cooperation will help strengthen shared responsibility for global governance and development responsibility among developed and developing countries. Triangular cooperation is seen to be of paramount importance in the context of East-West cooperation, at least for the future, because it can be used as an instrument of development aid in favour of the Third World.

On the other hand of the spectrum, there are those who holds a negative painting of the impact of triangular cooperation on aid effectiveness. According to this view, the benefits listed above are rarely proven in practice to the extent that the interests of development aid providers are compatible. In fact, the divergence of interests and motivations among the three partners is one of the main obstacles: The Eastern and Western businesses by going to the

¹³³ Talita Yamashiro Fordelone, "Triangular Co- operation and Aid Effectiveness: Can triangular co-operation make aid more effective?", paper prepared for the Policy Dialogue on Development Co-operation, Mexico City, 28-29 September 2009, p.5.

¹³⁴ Ibid, p.8

¹³⁵ Ibid, P.9.

¹³⁶ Kumar, N. "South- South and Triangular Cooperation in Asia- Pacific: Towards a New Paradigm in Development Cooperation," Asia- Pacific Development Co- operation Forum: Regional Workshop on Trends and Progress in Triangular and South- South Co- operation, Bangkok, 21- 22 October 2008.

tripartite cooperation are all in search of economic benefits to ensure their growth and supply of raw materials. In this regard, it is crucial that both partners are simultaneously occupying a stronger economic position within the tripartite cooperation for a fruitful tripartite cooperation.

Another obstacle to effective triangular cooperation seems to be the lack of coordination among partners. In addition, multiple projects may generate duplicated efforts, dispersed resources and incoherence among different initiatives¹³⁷. This challenge is noted in the Paris Declaration, which recommends harmonization of donors' policies and procedures to decrease costs of development assistance¹³⁸.

Not least important to be mentioned as obstacle is the lack of engagement on the part of beneficiary countries in the planning and execution of triangular initiatives. This appears to run counter to the Paris Declaration principle that beneficiary countries must exercise effective leadership over development programs and projects for them to achieve their desired development results¹³⁹.

Another difficulty for an effective triangular cooperation is the limited scope and scale of north-south-south cooperation activities, which are mostly, based on spontaneous and short-term projects, sometimes in total disconnection with the development challenges of the recipient country¹⁴⁰.

In summary, this section has first given a detailed description and analysis of the various key concepts linked to the issue of aid effectiveness, namely foreign aid, aid and development effectiveness, emerging and traditional aid donors. In this context, the thesis sticks to the definition of development aid provided by the OECD, which excludes military and aid for commercial purposes as well as aid given by NGOs.

This study further uses the terms aid effectiveness and development effectiveness interchangeably since both end-result is to achieve sustainable development goals, although,

¹³⁷ Talita Yamashiro Fordelone. "Triangular Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness: Can triangular co-operation make aid more effective?", Policy Dialogue on Development Co-operation's conference, Mexico City, 28-29 September 2009, p.10.

¹³⁸ OECD. "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness", OECD 2005, accessed on 1 April 2017 at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf

¹³⁹ Talita Yamashiro Fordelone. "Triangular Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness: Can triangular co-operation make aid more effective?", Policy Dialogue on Development Co-operation's conference, Mexico City, 28-29 September 2009, p.10.

¹⁴⁰ OECD. "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness", OECD 2005, accessed on 1 April 2017 at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf

the means to achieve these goals are much more restrained in the case of aid effectiveness. As for the categorization of Turkey and the EU in the Sub-Saharan African development aid landscape, we argue that the EU is clearly a traditional aid donor in SSA, given its membership to the OECD-DAC and given the fact that EU's aid policy is based on donor-recipient label, is very technocratic and priorities political issues over socio-economic ones. Coming to Turkey, its hybrid nature makes it difficult to categorize it in one or another category. Yet, the lack of Turkey's membership to the OECD-DAC in principle excludes its possible categorization as a traditional aid donor, despite some similarities with aid modalities of traditional donors.

Thus, Turkey better fits into the emerging donor group. Here too, Turkey seems to present some similarities with each of the sub-categories of emerging donor groups (DAC, Arab and Southern group).

This part has further critically touched upon the three models of development cooperation, namely north-south, south-south, and north-south-south models of development cooperation. It highlighted the main components, particularities, as well as the ups-and-downs of each model in connection to the aid effectiveness debate

The next title will describe the different international relations theories that have evolved to analyse the motivations behind the use of development aid as an integrated part of states' foreign policy as well as the effectiveness of these aid policies in the recipient countries.

1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON DEVELOPMENT AID

The research will first expose the relevant IR theories dealing with the issue of the motivations behind and effectiveness of development aid policy, namely realism, liberalism and social constructivism. A plethora of approaches and theories has thrived within the academic and political parameters to explain the motives behind the provision of aid as well as the issue of aid effectiveness. Ranging from realism, dependency theory, constructivism, geopolitics theory, liberalism and post-colonialism, just to name few, all seek to achieve a scientific explanation of the controversies surrounding these issues. Nonetheless, this research will adopt the realist, liberal and social constructivist theories, which are the three dominant

theories of International Relations ¹⁴¹and are more relevant to the research question(s) of the current thesis.

1.2.1. Theorizing on why States offer Development Aid

This section will present the main IR theories (Realism, Liberalism and Social Constructivism) that deal with the question of the motivations behind the provision of development aid by both developed and middle-income countries. These main IR theories discuss that motivations behind development assistance vary from a wide range of reasons ranging from the pursuit of pure humanitarian altruism to the external performance of the donors' inner identity or to the pursuit of common goals and selfish national interests.

1.2.1.1. Realist Theories

Classical Realism

Classical realists generally trace their intellectual roots to Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian war* (431 BC), Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651) and Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1515)¹⁴². Yet, classical realism as an academic discipline and a theory of international relations emerged in the twentieth century with the outcoming of Morgenthau's opus, *Politics among Nations*, in 1948. The classical realist theory emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness (egoism) and the absence of international government (anarchy) which requires "the primacy in all political life of power and security"¹⁴³. According to classical realists, because the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities. In other terms, international politics can be characterized as evil: bad things

¹⁴¹ According to Stephen Walt, Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism are the three dominant approaches of IR because they shape both public discourse and policy analysis (see Walt, Stephen. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge, Spring, 1998, pp. 29-32+34-46).

¹⁴²Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972; Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edwin Curley (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994; Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985.

¹⁴³ Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981/1986, p.305

happen because the people making foreign policy are sometimes bad¹⁴⁴. Human nature is marked by egoism and evil¹⁴⁵ which makes interstate war almost inevitable.

Beyond the human nature, classical realists further focus on the lack of an international government, assuming that states are the dominant actors in the international system and are motivated by national interest and survival¹⁴⁶. Based on these assumptions, classical realists argue that morality should be excluded from international politics because of the prevalence of national interests' considerations. In this vein, they believe that foreign aid policies follow geostrategic concerns such as national security and self-preservation rather than moralistic and humanitarian ones. Thus, "foreign aid is perceived as only minimally related to recipient economic development and the humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed"¹⁴⁷.

As such, the provision of aid to countries hardly follows a humanitarian logic because of the over-consideration of geo-strategic interests by the donors, especially military interests. This would explain why countries that are in the most need of humanitarian help would be positioned at the lower level of donors' recipient countries because they do not represent significant strategic importance to the eyes of the donors. In his research, McKinlay concludes that the humanitarian theory, though providing a simple moral relationship between donors and aid, is flawed¹⁴⁸ and his research shows that France and the USA, more than any other countries, base their donations on national interest¹⁴⁹. Steven Hook, in his book, *National Interests and Foreign Aid*, cited a quotation by E.H. Carr that sums up this view: "the accepted standard of international morality in regard to the altruistic virtues appears to be that a state should indulge in them so far as this is not seriously incompatible with its more important interests"¹⁵⁰.

Likewise, moralistic considerations, norms such as democracy and good governance play a minimal in donors' foreign aid policies according to classical realists. Therefore, democracy promotion policies should be considered as an "instrument of foreign policy". In this respect "a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic and military policy or propaganda.

¹⁴⁴ Spirtas, Michael. "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory", ed. Benjamin Frankel. *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (385-424), London: Frank Cass, 1996, p. 387-400.

¹⁴⁵ Donnelley, Jack. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press 2000, p.9-10.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.7-9.

¹⁴⁷ Schraeder, Peter J., Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows." *World Politics* vol 50, no.2 1998, p. 296.

¹⁴⁸ McKinlay, R.D. "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960-1970." *Comparative Political Studies* vol 11, no 4 ,1979, p.447.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 451.

¹⁵⁰ Hook, Steven W. *National Interest and Foreign Aid*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p.3.

They are all weapons in the political armoury of a nation”¹⁵¹. As E.H. Carr said, the “So-called universal principles are really the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time”¹⁵². The ‘Theories of social morality’, Carr goes on to argue, “are always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole, and which possesses facilities denied to subordinate groups or individuals for imposing its view of life on the community”¹⁵³. The doctrine of the ‘harmony of interests’, thus “serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups to justify and maintain their dominant position”¹⁵⁴.

In sum, classical realists assume that aid is given only when it is compatible and serve donors’ own national interests¹⁵⁵.

Neorealism

Coming to neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 *Theory of International Politics*¹⁵⁶, which replaced Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations* is generally cited as the standard bearer for neo-realists. Like classical realism, neo-realism also emphasizes the anarchical nature of the international system: the absence of a rule-making and enforcing authority means that each unit in the international system is responsible for ensuring its own survival and that each is free to define its own interests and to employ means of its own choice in pursuing them.

Yet, unlike classical realism, neo realism pays little attention to human nature as an explanatory factor of states’ struggle for power. Instead, it is the structure of the international system that forces states to pursue power. Therefore, national interests still form the basis of foreign aid, but the focus shifts from national security and self-preservation to economic interests.

Neo-realists argue that donor countries use aid in ways that promote their economic interests¹⁵⁷. In other terms, development assistance "is an excellent way to acquire the power

¹⁵¹ Morgenthau, J.Hans. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred A. Knopf, 1948; Morgenthau, J.Hans. *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics*. University of Chicago Press, 1962, p.309.

¹⁵² Carr E.H. *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London, Macmillan and Co. LTD, 1946, p.87.

¹⁵³ Ibid, p.87.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p.74-75.

¹⁵⁵ Fuller, Sarah. "A Question of Motivations: Determining Why Donor Countries Give Aid" , *Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research*, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2002, P.80, Available at: <http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol7/iss1/7>.

¹⁵⁶ Waltz, N.Kenneth. *Theory Of International Politics*. Reading, Mass; London: Addison- Wesley, 1979.

¹⁵⁷ Tuman, John P., Craig F. Emmert and Robert E. Sterken. "Explaining Japanese Aid Policy in Latin America: A Test of Competing Theories." *Political Research Quarterly*, vol 54, No 1 ,2001, p. 89.

and influence necessary to pursue one's interests" from a neorealist perspective¹⁵⁸. It is "an excellent way to build the diplomatic credit or "soft power" that has become a necessity for achieving one's interests in today's international community"¹⁵⁹. Byers contends in this line that, "overseas development assistance is not charity. It is the price we pay for 'soft power, the ability to persuade rather than coerce. Soft power is the principle currency of diplomacy"¹⁶⁰.

Thus, donors will give more aid to the countries that have the most to offer them in terms of exports, cheap access to raw materials, and industrial competitiveness. In short, donor countries give foreign aid to "create export and investment opportunities, particularly in larger countries that offer large markets to [the donor country's] firms"¹⁶¹. Other scholars such as Maizels and Nissanke bond in the same sense by pointing out that "many donor governments have indicated that, in their aid allocations, they also take their own national interests into account [such as] maintaining spheres of influence, [...] or simply of promoting their own export trade"¹⁶². Likewise, some argue that through history, besides development concerns, international development assistance "has also been driven by the political, economic, and institutional circumstances of both donors and recipients, which have led them to engage in development assistance"¹⁶³.

To sum up, many neo-realists agree on the idea that national interests, especially the economic interests of donors will play a prominent role in determining the countries that will get most of the foreign aid¹⁶⁴.

It is worth pointing out, however, that "political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and

¹⁵⁸ Andrew Blencowe. "A Liberal Structure for Realist Uses: International Development and the Question of Whose Interests Are Being Met?,"_E-International Relations Students, August 15 2009, <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/08/15/a-liberal-structure-for-realist-uses-international-development-and-the-question-of-whose-interests-are-being-met/>

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Byers, Michael. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* 1st ed. Vancouver: Douglas & MacIntyre Ltd, 2007, p.123.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p.89

¹⁶² Maizels, Alfred and Machiko K. Nissanke. "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries", *World Development*, vol 12, No 9 ,1984, p.879

¹⁶³ Kanbur, Ravi, Todd Sandler and Kevin W. Morrison. "The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods". *Overseas Development Council (ODC) Policy Essay* ,No. 25. 1999,p.16.

¹⁶⁴ Fuller, Sarah. "A Question of Motivations: Determining Why Donor Countries Give Aid," *Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research*, Vol. 7, No 1,2002, p.80.

at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place”¹⁶⁵. The hypothesis forwarded by structural realists is that due to structural constraints in the international system, normative ideas stop determining policy when in conflict with vital national or common interests¹⁶⁶. Realism substantiates the view that democracies prioritize “first order” security issues over “second order” moral or normative issues¹⁶⁷.

1.2.1.2. Liberal theories

Idealist theory

Idealism, which derived from the ideals espoused by former US president Woodrow Wilson, emerged in the twentieth century as a theory of international relations, which is opposed to realism. According to Hedley Bull, idealist theorists are generally characterised as a set of theorists who believed in the idea of progress and the possibility of an evolution in international relations that would give rise to a more peaceful world¹⁶⁸. This positive idea about the international politics is based on the idealists’ basic assumption that human nature is good, and this altruistic nature is expressed in states’ foreign policies.

The optimistic view held by idealists about human nature has led to a broadening conceptualization of national interest that is defined not according to the balance of power in the international system but mostly according to the nature of the domestic society and culture of the state¹⁶⁹. As a result, “national leaders and their policy advisors aspire to some ideal of what relations between nations should and can look like, and they are usually concerned that as wide range as possible of basic human needs increasingly should be met”¹⁷⁰. Therefore, concepts such as human rights, peace, prosperity, international norms and institutions, harmony of interests lie at the centre of idealist analysis. In short, and according to the idealists, states’ foreign policies are guided by morality and humanitarian concerns.

In the case of foreign aid, idealist theorists assume that states disburse aid to promote humanitarian concerns and help solve the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in the

¹⁶⁵ Morgenthau, H. John. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

¹⁶⁶ Hyde-Price, Adrian. ‘A ‘Tragic Actor’? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, January 2008, p.29-44.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 29-44; Hyde-Price, Adrian. ‘Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique’. *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol 13, no 2, 2006, p.217-34.

¹⁶⁸ Bull, Hedley. "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969", Porter (ed). *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969* (30-55), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972; Bull, Hedley. "Republicado", Der Derian (ed). *International Theory: Critical Investigations* (181-211), London: Macmillan, 1995, p.185.

¹⁶⁹ Charles Strohmer. ‘Realism and Idealism in International Relations’, <http://www.charlesstrohmer.com/international-relations/international-relations-101/realism-idealism/all/1/>

¹⁷⁰ Ibid

least developed countries. The distribution of development aid will be made according to the humanitarian needs of the recipient countries, not according to the strategic interest calculations of the donors. Many researchers in the field have come to similar conclusions that countries with lower income on a per capita basis receive more aid than middle-income countries¹⁷¹. David Lumsdaine claims aid to rest on "humanitarian and egalitarian convictions", "a sense of justice and compassion", and the extension of the [moral logic of the welfare state beyond national borders]", "on the basis of the same values"¹⁷². Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien conceive aid as a movement "from domestic to international justice" based on the "relation of complementarity"¹⁷³ between the institutions that promote these forms of justice with "global justice"¹⁷⁴, or "greater international equality"¹⁷⁵, as the ultimate underlying motive. This enters in line with Gunnar Myrdal 's consideration of aid as the logical product of the "doctrine of equality"¹⁷⁶.

Idealists also argue that liberal democracies are more capable to follow humanitarian and altruistic foreign aid policies than authoritarian regimes do because liberal democracies' national interests defined by the liberal nature of their society is compatible with the benevolent and humanitarian objectives behind the provision of foreign aid. Liberal democracies are more likely to use their foreign aid as a tool to spread liberal values of democracy and human rights to achieve their goal of a more peaceful and humanitarian liberal world order.

Liberal Internationalism

Liberal internationalism was developed in the 1980s and 1990s, with the famous publication of Keohane, R and Nye, J 's *Power and Interdependence: world politics in Transition in*

¹⁷¹ Dowling, J.M. and Ulrich Hiemenz. "Biases in the Allocation of Foreign Aid: Some New Evidence." *World Development*, vol 13, No4 ,1985, p.540.

¹⁷² Lumsdaine, D.H. *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989*. N.J., Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1993, Pp. 29, 283, 185& 143.

¹⁷³ Noël Alain and Jean-Philippe Thérien. "From domestic to international justice: the welfare state and foreign aid", *International organization* 49, summer 1995, p.551.

¹⁷⁴ Noël and Thérien. "Public opinion and Global Justice", *Sage publications, Comparative political studies* Vol 35, Issue 6, 2002,p.627-652.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

¹⁷⁶ Gunnar, Myrdal. *Against The Stream: Critical Essays on Economics*,Palgrave Macmillan; 1st ed. 1973 edition, p.47.

1977. Liberal internationalists came closer to the neorealist viewpoint. They share with the neo realists two basic assumptions: first the international system is anarchic, and second states are rationally egoist and “assumed to make decisions based on a set of self-interest priorities and according to a strategic cost-to-benefit analysis of possible choices, reactions and outcomes”¹⁷⁷.

However, unlike neo realists, their main analysis was to show that it was possible for rational egoists to cooperate in an anarchical system. Compared to structural realism, neo liberalism “has relatively greater faith in the ability of human beings to obtain progressively better collective outcomes that promote freedom, peace, prosperity, and justice on a global scale”¹⁷⁸.

In a world conceived as an interdependent whole, “development assistance becomes an instrument of foreign policy objectives [but] such objectives may go beyond self-interests: long term interests related to international common goods-such as peace stability and environmental concerns-also fit into this perspective, along with the promotion of treasured values of the donors, including the predominant ideology and norms”¹⁷⁹. The growing interdependence among states and societies make such cooperation not only desirable and necessary, but also inevitable¹⁸⁰. In other terms, the ‘complex interdependence’ permits the creation of international regimes, organisations and laws that facilitate cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In Keohane's words, institutions are “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”¹⁸¹.

Therefore, international institutions or regimes can affect the behaviour of states or other international actors. As one scholar admits, international institutions “limit the scope and severity of conflicts. States that agree to participate in such institutions are, in effect, joining a political process that shapes, constrains, and channels their action. Institutions can help overcome and integrate diverse and competing interests”¹⁸². Thus, international institutions via commercial linkages enhance state’s ability to act upon narrow nationalist economic

¹⁷⁷ Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. ‘Neoliberalism’, Dunne Tim, Kurki, M and Smith, S (eds). *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (114-131) , Oxford University Press, 2013.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Allison L. Kessler Kroft. “Democratization and Foreign Aid towards Africa (1960-2000) Realism/ Neo-Realism (Self-Interest) Vs. Idealism/Neo-Idealism (Normative Interests)”. PhD thesis, Loyola University. December 2006, p.14.

¹⁸⁰ Keohane, O.Robert. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Westview Press, 1989.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p.3.

¹⁸² Ikenberry G.John, “Why Export democracy?”, *The Wilson Quarterly*, vol.23, No2 Spring 1999, p.62.

interests and increase its stake in the maintenance of a stable international order¹⁸³.

Providing foreign aid is one of the many possible ways of cooperation among states. The most developed countries would provide aid to the least developed ones to secure their own economic and political interests. Foreign aid is a tool whereby developed liberal countries can influence the policies of underdeveloped countries and shape their aspirations for a more peaceful and prosperous world, which are crucial to the sustainability of their economic and political interests. Followers of the liberal tradition argue that ODA reflects the state's desire to collaborate against global challenges¹⁸⁴. Nations enter in cooperation because they recognize the benefits, they would gain by participating in networks and international systems¹⁸⁵. They see international structures as favourable for a prosperous and peaceful world order and as suitable spaces for negotiation and cooperation¹⁸⁶.

Basically, foreign aid would be provided to improve the politico-economic situation of the least developed countries to avoid the spill over effects of increasing poverty and illiberal democratic practices on the northern industrialized countries. In this line, the spread of democracy and the 'democratic peace theory' are also key tenets of liberalism. The 'democratic peace theory' is based upon the assumption that democratic states are less prone to conflict than non-democratic states or authoritarian states¹⁸⁷.

The theory holds that liberal democracies do not fight each other, therefore the spread of liberal ideals such as the free market and democracy will mitigate the risk of conflict in the international system. Therefore, democratic states are more likely to provide foreign aid to less democratic states to spread their norms and values and transform the political regime of the recipient countries towards more democracy, as this is the most certain way to secure their political and economic interests in their own countries, in the recipient countries and in the world in general.

¹⁸³ Ikenberry, G.J, *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*, Princeton university press, 2000, p.93.

¹⁸⁴ Lancaster, C. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press ,2007,p.4; Haan, AD. *How the Aid Industry Works an Introduction to International Development*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2009, p.64.

¹⁸⁵ Cooper, AF, and D. Flesmes. "Foreign policy strategies of emerging powers in a multipolar world: an introductory review". *Third World Quarterly* vol 34, No 6 2013, p.948.

¹⁸⁶ Hindess, B. "Liberalism—what's in a name?", eds. W Larner and W Walters. *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*, London: Routledge 2004, p.3; Mawdsley, Emma. "The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from gift theory", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol 37, no2, 2012, p.256–272.

¹⁸⁷ For more details, see Doyle, W. Michael. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs". *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol 12, No3, 1983, p.205-35; Doyle, W. Michael. "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace". *American Political Sciences Review*, Vol 99, No3, 2005, p.463-66.

1.2.1.3. Social Constructivism

In contrast to structural realism, constructivists do not focus solely on material issues such as military power or economic wealth. Instead they focus on the nonmaterial aspect of IR and use the process of identity construction to describe the behaviour of actors and their policies in the international arena.

Their focus on identity construction is designed to transcend what has traditionally been posited as a mutually exclusive dichotomy between ideational and instrumentalist dynamics: the point is to understand how actors' interest-based strategies are socially in formed by longer-term values. Alexander Wendt, the founder of constructivism, states that the international system is created and recreated in processes of interaction and therefore, it is this inter-subjective rather than material aspect of structures which influences behaviour. Identity is "a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions"¹⁸⁸. Actors acquire identities, which Wendt defines as "relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self". Bulent Aras and Aylin Gorener define national role conceptions as "policy makers' understanding of what their nation stands for in the international arena. They are the sources of norms and standards that pattern government actions and responses under different circumstances"¹⁸⁹. Through repeated interactive processes, stable identities and expectations about each other are developed¹⁹⁰. Identities formed by social interactions are the basis for national interests¹⁹¹, which can seek something else than power¹⁹².

In other terms, constructivists regard international relations as norm-governed and state interests as constructed through "a fluid and interactive process of identity formation" which leads to "particular norms coming to be seen as 'appropriate' that is, genuinely embedded in belief systems rather than adhered to for merely instrumental reasons"¹⁹³. A state's identity

¹⁸⁸Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.224.

¹⁸⁹ Aras, Bulent and Gorener, Aylin. "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party's Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, vol 12, no 1, 2010, p. 81.

¹⁹⁰ Wendt Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring, 1992, p.405.

¹⁹¹Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Oct 7, 1999.

¹⁹²Copeland, D. C. "The constructivist challenge to structural realism", Stefan. Guzzini, & A. Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations – Alexander Wendt and His Critics* (1-21). Chippenham: Routledge., 2006, p. 3-5.

¹⁹³ Youngs, Richard. "Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy". *Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Paper* No.167, October 2001, p.6.

and self-conception play a significant role in determining the way a state behaves and can direct the decision-making process of the elites in each state.

Thus, Constructivists consider “states as social actors who through interactions with other states develop shared norms, ideas, and possibly shared identities”¹⁹⁴. States through their interaction with other states acquire a specific identity that would naturally guide their foreign policies. According to some scholars, international organizations and institutions can establish norms that affect the behaviour of the state¹⁹⁵. As such; states which share the same identity, and thus the same beliefs and norms are expected to act in a way dictated by their shared norms and values in international politics. In this respect state behaviour is driven, to a certain extent, by adherence to international norms or laws not solely based on a cost benefit analysis of each situation¹⁹⁶.

With respect to foreign aid, constructivists view foreign assistance as a set of norms and ideas constructed by states through social interactions. States’ decisions to provide aid to other countries is not solely grounded on the politico-economic interests of the donors, but more importantly is explained by the states’ identities constituted by norms and values. The developed States, which share the international norms of international solidarity as part of their identity, would increasingly come to view foreign aid as the ‘right’ thing to do to address humanitarian crises and underdevelopment issues in developing countries¹⁹⁷. In this respect, the more this norm is shared by an important number of states, the more foreign aid practices would turn into widespread institutionalized norms whereby “...rich countries are expected to help poor countries to improve the social well-being of their populations”¹⁹⁸, which behaviour would in the long run consolidate ‘itself as a moral duty’¹⁹⁹.

In short, according to social constructivist strand of view, states would provide foreign aid not according to the logic of consequences, but according to the logic of appropriateness. The

¹⁹⁴Matthew Mitchell. “Assessing the motivations of New Zealand’s International Interventions: From Practice to Theory”, A dissertation submitted for partial fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington 2015, P.27.

¹⁹⁵ Jackson, R., & Georg, S. *Introduction to International Relations – Theories and Approaches*. Bath: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.170.

¹⁹⁶ Matthew Mitchell. “Assessing the motivations of New Zealand’s International Interventions: From Practice to Theory”, A dissertation submitted for partial fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington 2015, p.27.

¹⁹⁷ Riddell, Roger. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* Oxford: New York, Oxford University Press, 2007.

¹⁹⁸ Lancaster, C. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p.61.

Lancaster, C. “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century. What Purposes?”, L.A Picard et al (eds), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (39–60), Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2008, p.59.

¹⁹⁹ Robledo, Carmen. “New donors, same old practices? South-South Cooperation of Latin American emerging donors”, *Robledo Bandung: Journal of the Global South*, vol 2, No3, 2015, p.7.

reasons behind their disbursement of foreign aid are to be searched in their inner norms, identities, ideals and values. In other terms, “states respond to need in the developing world because their identity as state pre-disposes them to do so”²⁰⁰. In the cases of the EU and Turkey for instance, the first one has for long been considered as a normative power pursuing humanitarian and benevolent goals while the latter has in the last decade characterized itself as a humanitarian actor especially towards less-developed zones such as Africa.

Following this brief and critical overview of how the main IR theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) approach the motivations behind states' provision of foreign aid, the next section will focus on how each of these three theories deal with the issue of aid effectiveness, namely whether and how can aid be effective in the recipient countries.

Table 4
Summary of the IR Theories' Assumptions about the motivations behind the provision of Foreign Aid

	Objectives	Motivations (self-interests)	Role of state in Aid	View of aid system	Aid agencies
Classical Realism	Get more military and political power	Strong (military interests and survival)	States pursue their own interests	Anarchic	State-centric, no multilateral agencies
Neo-realism	Find new markets secure sphere of influence	Strong (geostrategic and economic interest)	States pursue their own interest	Anarchic	No multilateral agencies
Idealism	Full economic, social and political	Very small (humanitarianism prevails over self-interests)	Strongly favours state intervention	Sceptical, needs radical restructuring to be more	Favours UN agencies (representation)

²⁰⁰ Nielsen, Rich. “Does Aid Follow Need? Humanitarian Motives in Aid Allocation”, Department of Government Harvard University, March 12, 2010, p.4.

	equity, human rights		if in line with its objectives	representative and egalitarian	of recipients) against institutions like IMF and World Bank)
Neo-liberalism	Development through economic growth, aid through trade, private sector development, human rights	Moderate (employment, expansion of trade, investment opportunities)	Multilateral trading system, against state interference	System oriented aid should aim at the common interests of rich and poor countries	Favours multilateral agencies (development banks and the UN), against bilateral agencies providing social services
Social Constructivism	Perform and export the identity and norms of donors	Moderate, if compatible with state's identity and norms	State- centric view, inter- state interactions	Perpetual reconstruction through inter- state interaction	Favour both states and multilateral agencies

Source: Self-prepared by the author.

1.2.2. The Theoretical dimension of Development Aid Effectiveness

This section will analyse the main IR theories' assumptions about the question of whether development aid is and can be effective.

1.2.2.1. Neorealism

From a neorealist perspective, states as unitary actors promote their strategic foreign policy interests through development aid to enhance power and influence in other world regions. Cooperation on development issues would mainly serve self-interests to achieve relative gains on the international level. Under neorealist lens, aid is not originally designed to promote the socio-economic and political development of the recipient country. That said, the development needs of the recipient country are not on the top priorities of the donors' agenda; on the contrary, foreign aid provided by developed countries serve the selfish interests of the latter. This eventually implies that, despite their provision of aids, they do not lay emphasis on the impact towards capacity building in these recipient countries but seek to promote their national interest.

Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that neorealists are not totally opposed to the view that aid can be effective to boost the development aspirations of the recipient countries. Yet, their main assumption is that aid can only be effective when the development needs of the recipient country coincide with the self-economic and political interests of the donors.

Some argue that aid is likely to be effective when the economic development of strategically important recipient countries is itself an important goal for aid donors. This implies that development aid ought to be effective, "[I]f donors are pursuing development in strategically important countries, the resulting allocation would explain why recipients are not chosen impartially but would not explain any perceived ineffectiveness of aid dollars in promoting development"²⁰¹. Indeed, donors have a greater incentive to ensure the effectiveness of aid if it goes to countries in which they have a strategic interest in development, rather than being distributed based solely on recipient need"²⁰². In this lens, if donors try to promote development strategically, then development aid should be most effective in states that are important to donors.

²⁰¹ Nielsen Rich. "Does Aid Follow Need? Humanitarian Motives in Aid Allocation", Department of Government Harvard University, March 12, 2010, accessed on 18 December 2017, at http://s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/Nielsen_aiddata.pdf

²⁰² Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett. "Utility Maximization and Strategic Development: A Model of Foreign Aid Allocation.", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, 2007, available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p211087_index.html

1.2.2.2. Liberal Internationalism

One core assumption of liberalist international relations approaches is the interdependence between states²⁰³. The second core assumption shared by liberal theories is that the interdependence among of state preferences influences state behaviour. International institutions and regimes are platforms for cooperation between states to advance interests and goals of “like-minded” countries, i.e. pooling resources with other states to achieve strategic goals.

According to this strand of view, international development assistance is one of the clear answers to this growing interdependence between states. In this context, states are recognizing the importance of the growing inter-connections between them and working to promote growth in underdeveloped states. Constructs of international development are increasingly being included in the foreign policies of developed states and other international bodies because global actors are recognizing the importance that promoting development and growth in underdeveloped states has on the preservation of international order and to the success of all²⁰⁴.

In this sense, the primary purpose of development aid is to enhance the socio-economic and political development of recipient countries. In other terms, development aid is designed to help the receiving nation to grow, achieve internal stability, and to participate more actively in the global market. Although, donor countries pursue in marge their own self-interests, the development goals behind the provision of foreign aid are less likely to be traded off with selfish interests because achieving development in the developing world is crucial for a better attainment of developed countries’ goals of a prosperous and peaceful world.

²⁰³ Keohane ,Robert O and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: *World Politics In Transition*, TBS The Book Service Ltd; Edition, Brown, December 1977.

²⁰⁴Andrew Blencowe. “A Liberal Structure for Realist Use: International Development and the Question of whose interests are being met”, E-International relations students, August 15 2009, <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/08/15/a-liberal-structure-for-realist-uses-international-development-and-the-question-of-whose-interests-are-being-met/>

1.2.2.3. Social Constructivism

Social-constructivism assumes that a country's foreign policy agenda is not only shaped by material, but also essentially by immaterial factors such as ideas, role identities, norms, and values. Whilst actors also follow strategic interests as in rational choice approaches, these are not predefined from a social constructivist view. Hence, "Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations"²⁰⁵. Identities are the basis of interests. A country's identity (namely its own perception and how it is perceived by others) as well as envisaged roles and the internalization of (international) norms²⁰⁶ are essential factors that significantly influence foreign policy behaviour. As such, foreign aid is more likely to be effective when the donor and the international institutions setting the aid effectiveness norms or when the donor and the recipient country, share the same identity and values. In short, a convergence of identity would most probably lead to a harmony of interests between the donor and recipient country and will increase the effectiveness of aid in the recipient country.

To sum up briefly, this section has critically examined the main assumptions of the realist, liberal and social constructivist's theories about the motivations behind and effectiveness of the provision of development aid.

Regarding the motivations, the realists overall agree on the fact that states provide aid to protect and promote their own interests, not in the interests of the recipient country. This is mainly explained by the selfish and evil nature of human beings (classical realism) and by the anarchical nature of the international structure(neorealism), which leads to a state of survival where the pursuit national-interests prevails over common interests and where moralistic, normative and humanitarian considerations only play a minimal role.

The idealists stress out that states deliver aid to other countries because of humanitarian and moralistic considerations. They are confident in the good nature of human beings who compose the society, which leads to a society based on value and norms and where only the global interests and wealth matter. Thus, states provide aid according to the humanitarian needs of the recipient country, in total disregard to the donor's own interests.

²⁰⁵ Wendt. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring, 1992, p.398.

²⁰⁶ Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, October 7,1999.

The liberal internationalists agree with the neorealists on the fact that the international system is anarchic. Yet, they are still confident on the capacity of human beings to move beyond the pursuit of selfish self-interests and look for the achievement of global interests. Since states are rational actors, they will perceive themselves that the search for common interests is much more beneficial to them than the pursuit of self-interests. In this line, the provision of aid by liberal states to the other countries will provide them with the opportunity to gain some legitimacy in the recipient country and push them to integrate easily the liberal norms. Once these countries will adopt the liberal norms, liberal donor states could achieve their objective of building a more peaceful and wealthier liberal order.

The social constructivists insist on the fact that states' identity, more than anything else does, is the most important determinant of states' development aid policy. States decide to provide aid mainly because their inner norms and identity push them to do so, not solely, because they are in pursuit of their own interests.

Concerning the aid effectiveness issue, realists mainly put forward the argument that states normally provide aid to protect their own interests, in total disregard of the interests and needs of the recipient country. In this respect, whether the aid provided is effective or not does not matter to the donor countries, unless this effectiveness can be used to achieve the own interests of the donors.

Liberals, for their part, underlines that donors would seek to make aid more effective in the recipient country, because the more aid is effective, the more the recipient country would be stable and prosperous and the more the interests of donor countries would be efficiently protected and promoted.

Constructivists argue that aid is more likely to be effective when there is a compatibility between the identity of the donor and recipient countries. This means that when the provider and recipient of development aid share the same norms, identities and standards, aid is more likely to be effective, due to the highly-convergence of interests and priorities on both sides.

Table 5

Overview of the main Theories' Assumptions about Aid Effectiveness

	Aid effectiveness at the core of state's aid agenda	Aid is likely to be effective when,
Neorealism	No, because donor countries only pursue their own interests	Only Donor' interests and aid effectiveness goals overlap
Neoliberalism	Yes, because aid effectiveness agenda pursue goals of common interests	Donor and recipient countries share liberal norms
Social Constructivism	No/Yes, depending on the degree on convergence between the donor's identity and the aid effectiveness norm	There is a convergence between the donor and recipient identity with the aid effectiveness norm

Source: Self-prepared by the author.

1.2.3. Conclusion

The first chapter of this thesis has critically examined the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. As for the conceptual part, it has provided a critical overview of the concepts of foreign aid, aid and development effectiveness, by outlining the fact that this study uses the definition of development aid as provided by the OECD and that the concepts of aid effectiveness and development effectiveness, and the terms development aid development cooperation, will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.

Thereafter, the concepts of traditional donors and emerging donors have been clarified. Traditional donors, generally the DAC members, share the particularity of being the main actors of the traditional north-south development cooperation. Their aid policies are highly institutionalized with a focus on politico-security issues over socio-economic ones; and are based on the donor-recipient relationship.

Emerging donors are divided into three sub-groups: the DAC, Southern and Arab group. The DAC group mostly comprises non-DAC OECD members (although they are most likely to officially join the DAC), which mostly formulate and implement their aid policies according to DAC standards. The southern group comprises emerging countries, which conduct south-south development cooperation. They insist on the fact that their aid policies are different from those of the traditional donors and rejects any idea of donor-recipient relations, insisting

that their relationship with the recipient country is a partnership relationship. The Arab group is composed of Arab countries that also engage with the OECD selectively and the main determinant of their aid policies is religion. Following the clarifications of these terms, this thesis has classified the EU as a traditional donor while Turkey is categorized as a 'hybrid' emerging donor.

Coming to the theoretical part, we have mainly focused on realism, liberalism and constructivism, as the three main IR theories used to assess in a critical manner over the motivations behind and effectiveness of development aid policies. While, realists argue that states provide aid to promote their own interests due to the evil nature of human beings and to the anarchical nature of the international society, idealists considers that humanitarian concerns are the main determinants of states' foreign aid policies. Liberal internationalists put forward the view that states deliver aid in order to contribute to the politico-economic development of the recipient country, which in turn would promote their own and the global interests. Constructivists argue that the provision of foreign aid by states follow more identity and norm-based logic than the logic of consequences.

Concerning the effectiveness part, realists considers that aid effectiveness is not at the core interests of donors' aid policies, unless their own interests are protected through the effectiveness of the aid delivered in the recipient country. Liberals point out that, since an effective aid could contribute to promote donors' interests, donor countries will strive to make aid be as effective as possible. Constructivists underlines that a convergence of identity between donor and recipient countries is more likely to make aid effective in the recipient countries because of the highly-convergence of interests and priorities on both sides.

CHAPTER 2. INSTITUTIONAL, HISTORICAL AND POLICY APPROACH FRAMEWORKS

This chapter first presents the successive steps that have been taken at the international level towards making aid more effective. In this sense, we will touch upon the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the 2003 Roma declaration on harmonization, the 2005 Paris declaration for aid effectiveness and its 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the latest 2011 Busan partnership for effective development cooperation. Afterwards, we will examine the initiatives that have been taken by both the EU and Turkey with respect to this issue of aid effectiveness. As a second step, we will give a brief overview of the existing bilateral relations between the EU and SSA, Turkey and SSA and between the EU and Turkey. Thereafter, the final point will critically analyse the foreign aid policy approaches of both Turkey and the EU towards SSA to highlight the perceived similarities and differences.

2.1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF AID EFFECTIVENESS: FROM MONTERREY TO BUSAN

We the donors, with our short-sighted funding and flag waving, are parts of the problem: the donor circus. Too much focus on flags and visibility and too little concern for the end results. This is why we as donors decided to reform the way we work...²⁰⁷.

This quotation succinctly pictures the evolving attention given to the question of aid and development effectiveness by donors and the international community. For decades, discussions on aid effectiveness were quasi-inexistent at the national, regional and international levels, since the attention was given to the amount of aid given and received. However, in the end of 90s and early 2000s, with the perceived failure of the Structural Adjustment Programs pioneered by the Bretton Woods Institutions, and with the adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the question of whether and how aid provided to developing and Least developed countries truly impacts on their development, has come to the forefront of discussions among donors and international institutions. Since one of the targets of the MDGs was to achieve the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI ratio, international donors made the commitment to increase both the quality and quantity of aid to help developing countries achieve the MDGs by 2015. In this line, international donors have started to realize that they are partly responsible for the disappointing results of foreign aid in third countries. This awareness has in turn led international donors to take several initiatives in high-level forums in the early twenty-first century to set up a coordinated agenda for

²⁰⁷ Words of Hilde F. Johnson, Former Minister for International Development, Norway.

improving the effectiveness of aid in Least Developed Countries. This section will critically examine each of these initiatives to highlight their strengths and weaknesses.

2.1.1. The 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development

The Monterrey Consensus adopted by the International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Mexico (18-22 March 2002), reflected several critical commitments "to address the challenges of financing for development around the world, particularly in developing countries"²⁰⁸. It focused on ways of mobilising and increasing the effective use of the financial resources needed to achieve internationally agreed targets for reducing poverty by 2015. This conference brought about wide-range actors, from governments to CSOs and international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. The participating countries further committed themselves to adopt and strengthen good governance and the rule of law at all levels, as essentials to reach sustainable development goals.

The particularity of the Monterrey consensus was to broaden the scope of discussions to include not only the increase of development finance but also to encourage domestic resource mobilization, foreign investment and trade, as engines for development²⁰⁹. It also broadened the focus of discussions to include the quality of the cooperation provided as a key determinant of progress.

The follow-up of the conference was held in Doha, Qatar, in late 2008, where achievements were reviewed, and new challenges examined. During the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 13-16 July 2015, discussions focused on assessing the progress made in the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration and on identifying obstacles and constraints encountered in the achievement of the goals and objectives agreed therein, as well as actions and initiatives to overcome these constraints; on addressing new and emerging issues, including in the context

²⁰⁸ Europa Press Release. "The Monterrey Consensus and the European Union", Brussels, 11 March 2004, available at, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04-54_en.htm.

²⁰⁹ United Nations. "Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development", United Nations 2003, accessed on 5 January 2018, at: <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf>

of the recent multilateral efforts to promote international development cooperation; and on reinvigorating and strengthening the financing for development follow-up process²¹⁰.

In relation to aid effectiveness, the Monterrey consensus provided in paragraph 43 that multilateral and bilateral financial and development institutions should harmonize their operational procedures to reduce transaction costs, increase the flexibility of ODA disbursement and implementation methods, support and encourage the untying of aid, support and strengthen the capacity-building of the recipient countries, enhance the use of strategy papers of the recipient countries to increase ownership of development projects by the recipient countries, promote the use of ODA, especially pro-poor ODA, strengthen triangular cooperation and the harmonization of result measurement's methods²¹¹.

To sum up, the Monterrey consensus can be viewed as the cornerstone and genesis of the aid effectiveness agenda and principles that have been later adopted in Paris and Busan forums.

2.1.1 The 2003 Rome Declaration on harmonization

The first high-level forum on aid effectiveness was held in Rome in 2003 as a further step towards improving the 2002 Monterrey consensus that underlined the importance of technical cooperation as a key factor for the achievement of the MDGs. The Rome forum resulted in the adoption of the Rome Declaration on harmonization in February 2003. This declaration was endorsed by 28 recipient countries and more than 40 multilateral and bilateral development institutions. The Rome declaration outlined several priority actions that would increase aid effectiveness, which include that: “development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and timing of the countries receiving it; donor efforts concentrate on delegating co-operation and increasing the flexibility of staff on country programs and projects; and good practices be encouraged and monitored, backed by analytic work to help strengthen the leadership that recipient countries can take in determining their development path”²¹².

²¹⁰ See website of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 13-16 July 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at: <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd3/conference.html>

²¹¹ United Nations. “Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development”, United Nations 2003, accessed on 5 January 2018, at: <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf>

²¹² OECD Website. “The High-level fora on Aid effectiveness. A History”, accessed on 15 December 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforaonaideffectivenessahistory.htm>.
OECD. “Rome Declaration on Harmonisation”, Paris: OECD 2003, accessed on 15th December 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/50/31451637.pdf>

The Rome forum marked the first time where discussions on aid focused on the quality of aid and the agreement among donors and recipient countries that a harmonization of donor practices is crucial to make aid more effective²¹³. Yet, the Rome meeting was criticized for having kept recipient countries out of the equation, which resulted in serious concerns that “even harmonized approaches might undermine country ownership”²¹⁴.

2.1.2. The 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action

The second high-level forum was held in Paris in 2005 and gathered donor governments, some key recipient countries and some international NGOs. This forum resulted in the adoption of the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness, which outlined key aid effectiveness principles as well as measurable targets to be met by 2010.

Compared to the Rome declaration, the Paris forum made a significant step towards including developing countries into the negotiating table together with DAC-donors. As such, the Paris meeting shifted “the focus of the debate from effective donor-ship to effective partnership”²¹⁵.

Five aid effectiveness principles were enshrined into the Paris declaration, namely Ownership of development projects by recipient countries, Alignment with recipient countries’ development strategies and financial and procurement systems, Harmonization of donors’ policies, Focus on results and mutual accountability.²¹⁶ To assess progress on the implementation of these principles by the donors, the Paris Declaration established a monitoring system²¹⁷ that measures donors’ performance of each principle based on 12 indicators, which are in turn subdivided into 17 targets for 2010²¹⁸.

²¹³ Ibid

²¹⁴ Walsh, Emma. “Busan in a Nutshell : What next for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation?”, Oxfam Briefing Note , 2 October 2012, accessed on 16th December 2017, at: <https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/busan-in-a-nutshell.pdf>

²¹⁵ Ibid, P.2.

²¹⁶ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action”, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

²¹⁷ The surveys on monitoring the Paris declaration were succinctly achieved in 2006, 2008 and 2011.

²¹⁸ Ibid

The Paris declaration by outlining key principles and indicators for achieving aid effectiveness is hailed to be a “landmark reform”²¹⁹ in the international development aid architecture. In effect, “these principles are now established as a touchstone for effective recipient-donor relations in any setting” as “they provide a common agenda for both global and country level dialogue on aid effectiveness and have inspired attempts to localize global commitments through country-based action plans”²²⁰.

Another triumph of the PD was the setting up of a time target and clear-cut agreed indicators for the implementation and monitoring of the Paris declaration principles on aid effectiveness. This approach was innovative and worthy “in promoting greater accountability, knowledge and learning within the aid system”²²¹. The monitoring survey system further “injected an element of rigor to aid effectiveness discussions, which were historically rather vague” and also “made possible performance tracking, benchmarking and standard setting among donors and countries”²²².

Another innovation of the Paris Declaration was its acknowledgement that the political situation of the recipient country would play a significant role in the performance of the aid effectiveness principles. Therefore, the Paris Declaration paid attention to the case of fragile states that experience weak governance and underlined in this regard that “we will ensure that the principles of harmonization, alignment and managing for results are adapted to environments of weak governance and capacity”²²³.

In this context, the OECD-DAC development ministers and agencies endorsed the ‘Principles for Good International engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ at the 2007 OECD-DAC High level meeting to complement the PD’s insistence on the need to adapt and apply aid effectiveness principles to differing country situations²²⁴.

Despite these innovative features of the Paris declaration, the implementing phase of the aid effectiveness principles have turned out to be hard. According to the 2011 monitoring survey

²¹⁹ OECD. “Aid effectiveness: three good reasons why the Paris Declaration will make a difference”, Development Cooperation Report 2005, Paris, 2006, accessed on 17th November 2017, at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/30/36364587.pdf.

²²⁰ Chandy Laurence. “It’s Complicated: The Challenge of Implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”, Brookings Institution, September 22, 2011, p.1, accessed on 17th November 2017, at:

²²¹ Ibid, p.1

²²² Ibid, p.1

²²³ OECD. “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action”, accessed on 17th November 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>

²²⁴ OECD. “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States”, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governancepeace/conflictfragilityandresilience/principlesforgoodinternationalengagementinfragilestates.htm>

results of the PD, after the target year of 2010, at the global level, only one out of the 13 targets established for 2010 has been met²²⁵. So, one can but ask the following question: what might explain these gloomy results? The truth is that these shady results are grounded in some inner anomalies of the Paris Declaration itself.

First, the Paris declaration has been criticized for focusing on the procedural aspects of aid delivery, not on the real impact of aid on the achievement of development goals in the recipient countries. Indeed, as one author argues “the Paris agenda does not really measure aid effectiveness, but aid efficiencies, i.e., it looks at bureaucratic processes, but not the actual impact aid has on reducing poverty. After five years of evidence gathering, nothing in the Paris process will tell us if any more lives have been saved because of changes in aid giving”²²⁶.

Added to this is the lack of explicit reference to human rights in the Paris Declaration (PD), which constitutes however, one of the key elements of the MDGs (now SDGs). On this point, some may defend the PD by arguing that, since the intended results of the PD is to make aid more effective, which is crucial to the attainment of the SDGs, it therefore contributes to “the progressive realization of social and economic rights”²²⁷. Yet, the fact that “none of the targets refers to those desired results” and “only refer to how aid is managed and delivered and to several preconditions that developing countries have to meet”²²⁸ constitute a major flaw of the PD.

Another criticism directed against the Paris declaration is that it failed to include new emerging aid donors in the discussions, despite that the presence of these actors in the international development aid field can no longer neglected. This flaw of the PD is rightly underlined by one scholar who stresses out that, “as the middle-income countries become ever more important in aid giving (from China and India to Brazil and South Africa), the Paris process fails to involve them, giving the public in donor and recipient countries only a very partial view of the reality of aid”²²⁹.

²²⁵OECD. “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action”, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

²²⁶ Glennie, Jonathan. “Has the world met its Paris aid commitments?”, *The Guardian*, Monday, 3 January 2011.

²²⁷ Bissio Roberto. “The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness”, in *Realizing the Right to Development*, Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, United Nations (233-247), 2013, P.238, accessed on 18th November 2017, at: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RTDBook/PartIIIChapter17.pdf>

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ Glennie, Jonathan. “Has the world met its Paris aid commitments?”, *The Guardian*, Monday, 3 January 2011.

The Paris declaration is further criticized for being the result of obvious asymmetrical relationship between the international donors and recipient countries. As one author succinctly pointed out, “while developing and developed countries are represented in equal numbers in the Working Party, the predominant role of the World Bank and the OECD Secretariat in the process tilts the balance in favour of the developed countries”²³⁰. He pursued that:

The voice of developing countries in the High-Level Forums or the Working Party is largely ineffective, since those are not decision-making bodies. The complex set of assessment criteria and even the definition of the indicators by which the Paris Declaration is being reviewed and the new conditionality packages for disbursement of ODA under new mechanisms such as direct budget support and sector-wide approaches, as well as the criteria for evaluating recipient country governance systems, are all ultimately decided upon by DAC, in a close working relationship with the World Bank”²³¹.

This situation challenges the ownership principle largely included in the PD as a key aid effectiveness principle.

Further to the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) was adopted at the third high-level forum on aid effectiveness in 2008 as an action plan that would serve to strengthen and deepen the implementation of the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness. It therefore proposes the four main areas for improvements, which are ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results and capacity development²³². One of the main improvements made by the Accra forum was the inclusion of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) into the discussions as well as into the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WPAE) as full members.

Another important advance of the AAA includes the recognition that “gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability are cornerstones for achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor women, men and children”²³³. The AAA further “sets out areas of action on the issues of predictability and transparency of aid flows, true ownership by CSOs and parliaments over aid decisions, reliance on the country systems of

²³⁰ Bissio Roberto. “The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness”, in *Realizing the Right to Development*, Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, United Nations (233-247),2013,P.235,accessed on 18th November 2017, at: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RTDBook/PartIIIChapter17.pdf>

²³¹Ibid

²³²OECD.“Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action”, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

²³³ Ibid

developing country governments rather than donor systems, and a better and more efficient division of labour among donors’’²³⁴.

However, the AAA failed “to put in place time-bound and monitorable commitments and indicators to measure progress on these actions’’, and to sufficiently address other key areas, such as decent work, policy conditionality, tied aid, mutual accountability and the reform of the aid governance system’’²³⁵.

2.1.3. The 2011 Busan Partnership

The Busan partnership for Effective Development Cooperation was adopted at the fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness held in Busan, Korea from 29 November to 1st December 2011. The Busan Partnership set up key principles for aid and development effectiveness, namely: country leadership and ownership of development strategies; a focus on results that matter to the poor in developing countries; inclusive partnerships among development actors based on mutual trust; and transparency and accountability to one another²³⁶. The focus on ownership, results and accountability is directly derived from the Paris principles, while inclusive partnerships and transparency represent a new phase in the development cooperation debate. Whilst the implementation of these principles will be mandatory for western donors, it will be made on a voluntary basis for southern donors.

The Busan partnership is a partnership instrument on development cooperation agreed in between traditional donors, south-south co-operators, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), CSOs and private funders. This inclusive feature of the Busan Partnership constitutes its main strengths, which differentiates it from previous high-level forums on aid effectiveness. By including southern donors in the discussions on an equal foot with traditional aid donors, the Busan Partnership responds to the changes in the development aid architecture, which is no longer the exclusive sphere of action of western donor’s governments and agencies. In this respect, the Busan Partnership constitutes an important tool for the achievement of the SDGs, which calls for an inclusive partnership in the field of international development cooperation.

²³⁴ Better Aid Coordinating Group. “An Assessment of the Accra Agenda for Action from a Civil Society Perspective’’, *Better Aid Policy Paper*, November 2009, p.4, accessed on 16th November 2017, <https://www.kepa.fi/tiedostot/better-aid-assessment-aaa-oct-2009.pdf>

²³⁵ Ibid

²³⁶ OECD. “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation’’, OECD 2011, accessed on 18 November 2017, at: <https://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/49650173.pdf>

The inclusion of CSOs as key development aid actors in the recipient countries constitutes another step towards more democratic ownership because in many recipient countries, CSOs more than governments understand the real dire of the population as well as the key development priorities.

Most importantly, the Busan forum created a new venue to carry the aid effectiveness conversation forward: The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), supported not just by the OECD, but also by the full UN system, especially the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF)²³⁷. The GPEDC serve as a platform for intellectual discussions between traditional and emerging donors, recipient countries, CSOs, parliamentarians, Business groups, NGOs and the private sectors to find new and updated ways for measuring for advancing and supporting effective development co-operation across the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development²³⁸. The first High-Level Meeting (HLM1) of the GPEDC was held in Mexico on 15-16 April 2014 to review global progress in making development cooperation more effective, to find out common actions, to agree on actions to boost implementation progress and to “anchor effective development cooperation in the post-2015 global development agenda” with a special focus on poverty eradication²³⁹.

Nairobi, Kenya, hosted the GPEDC’s second High-Level Meeting (HLM2), on 28 November-1 December 2016, which produced the Nairobi Outcome documents in which the commitment to solidify the Busan partnership “as an essential part of the ‘how’ to work with all partners and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” is particularly highlighted²⁴⁰.

Another innovation of the Busan Partnership is the focus on development cooperation effectiveness that goes beyond the mere aid effectiveness concept. Indeed, it is generally argued that aid effectiveness is one of the components of development effectiveness, which is all encompassing. The use of the concept of development effectiveness in Busan responded to the need to broaden the scope of aid as narrowly defined by the OECD, by considering other aid flows provided to recipient countries by non-OECD members that do not fall into the formal ODA definition as well as to acknowledge that other sources of financial cooperation

²³⁷ Walsh Emma. “Busan in a Nutshell What next for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation?”. *Oxfam Briefing Note*, 2 October 2012. Accessed on 19th November 2017, at: <https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/busan-in-a-nutshell.pdf>

²³⁸ The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) contained in the document entitled “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015 and officially came into force on 1 January 2016.

²³⁹ See GPEDC Website at, <http://effectivecooperation.org/events/2nd-high-level-meeting/>

²⁴⁰ Ibid

such as foreign direct investment and trade, can contribute to the achievement of the SDGs.

Despite these positive features of the Busan partnership, it presents some major flaws. One of the major failures of the Busan partnership is the lack of concrete timelines and targets for the implementation of its principles²⁴¹. In addition, the fact that southern donors would implement the BP principles on a discretionary basis limits the effectiveness in the implementation of the BP. Lastly, like the PD, the BP lacked a right-based approach to development cooperation effectiveness because “of the exaggerated focus on economic growth, and its role in the fight against poverty and inequality, and for the achievement of SDGs at the expense of critical issues of human rights, democracy and governance”²⁴².

In summary, several steps have been taken at the international level to improve the quality of aid. In this context, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus highlighted the necessity to increase the quality and the scope of development finance and to strengthen domestic resource mobilization as engines for the effective achievement of MDGs. The 2003 Rome Declaration marked the first time where discussions on aid focused on the necessity to harmonize donors' practices to make aid more effective. Yet, the Rome meeting was criticized for having kept recipient countries out of the equation, thus for ignoring the ownership aspect.

The Paris Declaration of 2005 made important improvement in the international development aid debates by including recipient countries in the discussion, by mentioning the importance to consider the particularity of each recipient country (fragile states for instance), and by formulating five major principles of aid effectiveness. Further to the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) was adopted at the third high-level forum on aid effectiveness in 2008 as an action plan that would serve to strengthen and deepen the implementation of the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness. One of the main improvements made by the Accra forum was the inclusion of civil society organizations into the discussions as well as into the working party on aid effectiveness as full members. Nonetheless, the Paris declaration failed to produce tangible results.

²⁴¹Open forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. “An Assessment of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: From a civil society perspective”, March 2012. Accessed on 18th November 2017 http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/cso_analysis_of_bpd_public_en.pdf

²⁴² Ilal Abdul. “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation – The Good, the Bad and the New?”, Dochasnetwork's Blog, <https://dochasnetwork.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/busan-partnership-for-effective-development-co-operation-the-good-the-bad-and-the-new/>

The Busan partnership for effective development cooperation was adopted at the fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness held in Busan, in 2011, to update aid debates and practices to the new dynamics of the international aid landscape. The Busan Partnership set up four key principles for aid and development effectiveness that include: country leadership and ownership of development strategies; a focus on results; inclusive partnerships among development actors based on mutual trust; and transparency and accountability to one another. One of the main innovations of the Busan forum was the inclusion of emerging donors into the debates as well as the move of the debates from aid to development effectiveness.

Box 1: The Series of High-Level Fora on Aid and Development Effectiveness

- The Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (UN 2002)
- The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (Rome High-Level Forum 2003)
- The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris High-Level Forum 2005)
- The Accra Agenda for Action (Accra High-Level Forum 2008)
- The Busan Partnership for Effectiveness Development Cooperation (Busan High-Level Forum 2011).

Source: Self-prepared by the author

2.2. AID AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AGENDA IN THE EU AND IN TURKEY

This part will examine the main attitude and steps taken by the EU and Turkey in the context of international debates on aid and development effectiveness.

2.2.1. In the EU

Although contributing for more than half of the global ODA, the effectiveness of the EU development aid projects in the recipient countries has been limited by the lack of coordination in the implementation of aid activities between the EU and its individual member states. This situation has pushed some major EU institutions, namely the European

Commission to put aid effectiveness issue into the EU agenda to push member states towards better aid coordination.

In this line, the EU has been engaged since the early 1990s into ongoing internal discussions about strengthening development policy coordination between the EU and its member states. This ambition was first mentioned in the Maastricht treaty and pushed farther in other EU documents²⁴³.

In the context of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the EU adopted the Barcelona 8 Commitments on 14 March 2002 to implement the commitments made during the Monterrey conference. The Commission was mandated to report annually on the extent to which the EU Member States and the Commission implemented the Barcelona Commitments and contributed to the Financing for Development (FfD) process and to make recommendations, if needed, for improved implementation²⁴⁴.

The 2005 European consensus on development is “a policy document adopted by the Council of the EU that identifies shared values, goals, principles and commitments which the commission and EU governments will implement in their development policies to make a decisive contribution to the eradication of poverty in line with the international agenda, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in particular”²⁴⁵. The agreed common principles of development cooperation activities are ownership and partnership, in-depth political dialogue, participation of civil society, gender equality and a continuous engagement towards preventing state fragility. The EU in this document has also committed to increase aid budgets and to achieve 0, 7% of gross national income by 2015, with an intermediate collective target of 0, 56 % by 2010; half of this aid increase will go to Africa²⁴⁶. With the adoption of the UN’s 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a new European Consensus

²⁴³ Gänzle Stefan, S. Grimm, and D. Makhan. *The European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012, p.39-40.

²⁴⁴ Commission of the European communities. “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Translating the Monterrey Consensus into practice: the contribution by the European Union,” Brussels, 05.03.2004, p.4, Accessed on 20th November 2017, at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-monterrey-consensus-com2004150-20040305_en.pdf

²⁴⁵ European commission. “The European Consensus on Development- Summary”, accessed on 20th November, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/development_policy_statement/docs/edp_summary_en.pdf#zoom=125

²⁴⁶ Ibid

on Development was adopted in June 2017 by the European Commission, Member States and the European Parliament²⁴⁷.

In addition, according to Anonymous Interviewee (ACPB), the Aid effectiveness principles were introduced in the revised 2010 CPA following the requests by EU and ACP member states, to conform to international undertakings and make aid more objective and reach development goals²⁴⁸.

Plus, the Agenda for Change, adopted in 2011, is the basis for the EU's development policy. The primary objective of the Agenda for Change is to significantly increase the impact and effectiveness of EU development policy and, to this end, a series of key changes in the way assistance is delivered have been introduced²⁴⁹.

These changes include the strengthening of the use of conditionality to promote good governance and human rights, “a higher profile for growth, with a strong focus on leveraging in private sector money”, the inclusion of the concept of differentiated development partnerships, and enhancing EU Joint work.²⁵⁰

Moreover, the EU has taken the lead of discussion in major High-level fora on aid and development effectiveness and in view of these fora it has become a custom for the EU to prepare and adopt in advance a series of recommendations that would constitute the EU's common position. This is very valuable because it constitutes a strong signal that the EU can act as a unique entity with a single voice, despite the plurality of and most often incompatibility of interests between its member states. In this line, the EU adopted a Common Position for the second, third and fourth high level fora on aid and development effectiveness and many of the points outlined in these common positions have been considered in the final document of each of these fora. To illustrate, in view of the third high level forum to be held in Accra in 2008, the EU launched in 2008 a Fast-Track Initiative (FTI) on Division of Labour and Complementarity, whose aim “was to support selected developing countries in

²⁴⁷Full text available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2017:210:FULL&from=EN>

²⁴⁸ Interview with an Official at the ACP Secretariat in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous, 31 January 2018, Brussels (Interviewee ACPB)

²⁴⁹European Commission. “EU Communication on the Agenda for Change”. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/agenda-change_en

²⁵⁰ Gavás, Mikaela, Siân Herbert and Simon Maxwell. “An Agenda for Change for EU Development Policy”, *Overseas Development Institute(ODI)*, 17 October 2011, <https://www.odi.org/comment/6040-eu-development-policy-agenda-change>

the process of implementing in-country division of labour’’²⁵¹, as a contribution to aid and development effectiveness. This further step taken by the EU has inspired OECD-DAC members to adopt in 2009 the International Good Practice Principles for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity that would reinforce the implementation of the in-country division of labour agreed during the Accra forum.

In addition to that, the EU has endorsed all key international agreements on aid and development effectiveness, starting from the Paris Declaration to the Busan Partnership and has taken significant steps towards the implementation of the aid and development effectiveness principles. As a follow-up to the 2005 Paris agenda’s call for donor’s harmonization, on 15 May 2007 the General Affairs and External Relations Council adopted a Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour, which is based “on eleven principles designed to reduce the administrative formalities, to use the funds where they are most needed, to pool aid and to share the work to deliver more, better and faster aid’’²⁵². The Code of Conduct urges EU member states to “inter alia: concentrate their aid in fewer countries (cross-country complementarity); reduce the number of priority sectors (“in-country complementarity”) and focus on those in which they had a comparative advantage (“cross-sector complementarity)’’²⁵³.

To reinforce the follow-up of the commitments made by the EU and its member states in implementing the Busan principles, the EU has taken several initiatives such as the establishment of the EU Joint Programming to reduce donor fragmentation, and to strengthen the coherence, transparency, predictability and visibility of EU external assistance. The EU Results Framework, launched in March 2015 was also developed to strengthen EU ability to monitor and report on the results achieved, enhancing accountability, transparency and visibility of EU aid²⁵⁴.

²⁵¹ Carbone Maurizio. “Between EU Actorness and Aid Effectiveness: The Logics of EU Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa”, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica (SISP), University of Rome III, 13-15 September 2012, p.8.

²⁵² Council of the EU. “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy”, available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209558%202007%20INIT>

²⁵³ Carbone Maurizio. “Between EU Actorness and Aid Effectiveness: The Logics of EU Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa”, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica (SISP), University of Rome III, 13-15 September 2012, p.7.

²⁵⁴ European Commission. “The EU approach to development effectiveness”, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness_en

2.2.2. In Turkey

Unlike the EU, Turkey is a much newcomer in the field of international development cooperation and still lacks a comprehensive development cooperation framework. Nonetheless, Turkey has made efforts to institutionalize its development cooperation policies with the establishment of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), as the main state institutions in charge with formulating and implementing Turkey's overseas development cooperation policies.

Moreover, although Turkey's ODA is still minimal to the overall amount of EU ODA, it has become increasingly clearer that Turkey ambitions to play a leading role in the international development landscape by increasing manifolds and within a brief period the amount of its ODA. In illustration, while providing 1 billion 718 million US Dollars of total development assistance in 2010, Turkey provided 6 million 403 million US Dollars of development assistance in 2014 and increased its development assistance by more than 3 times compared to 4 years before²⁵⁵. In the same stance, Turkey has increased in 2015 her ODA/GDP ratio to 0.54%, getting closer to the 0.7% mark of ODA/GDP ratio as designated in the Millennium Development Goals²⁵⁶.

Regarding the aid and development effectiveness issue, Turkey, compared to the EU seems to have been less active in drawing a comprehensive aid and development effectiveness strategy designed to align its development aid with international aid effectiveness principles, even though it has endorsed the 2005 Paris Declaration and its subsequent 2008 Accra Agenda for Action as well as the 2011 Busan Partnership and it has even participated to the foundation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)²⁵⁷.

Nonetheless, this seemingly passive role of Turkey in the formulation and follow-up of the aid and development effectiveness principles does not mean a total disregard of Turkey to the international development effectiveness agenda. In illustration, reference to the aid and

²⁵⁵ Turkish cooperation and coordination Agency (TIKA). "Annual Report 2014", accessed on 22nd November 2017, at: <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/KALKINMA%20RAPORLARI/DA%20Report%202014.pdf>

²⁵⁶ TIKA. "Turkey's Development Cooperation with the Least Developed Countries, A Report on the Turkey's Economic and Technical Cooperation Package for the LDCs", TIKA 2016, accessed on 22nd November 2017, at: <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/LDC.pdf>

²⁵⁷ Paolo de Renzio and Jurek Seifert. "South-South cooperation and the future of development assistance: mapping actors and options", *Third World Quarterly*, 35:10(2014), 1860-1875, p.1868.

development effectiveness has been made in the following terms by Serdar Cam, the President of TIKA: “We took action in 29 vulnerable countries in the LDC category in line with Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. We endeavoured to contribute to the development of these countries through projects in accordance with the goals set in Paris Declaration to strengthen public agencies to build legitimate, effective and strong public institutions”²⁵⁸.

Likewise, the statement by Turkey during the mid-term review of the Istanbul Program of Action (IPoA), held in Antalya, corroborates this view, in the following words: "TIKA has taken action in 29 LDCs in line with Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and has implemented projects on social, economic, administrative and physical infrastructure and services"²⁵⁹. The Istanbul Program of Action (IPoA)²⁶⁰ for the Least Developed countries for the Decade 2011-2020, adopted, along with the Istanbul Declaration, by the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 9-13 May 2011, asks development partners to “enhance the quality of aid by strengthening national ownership, alignment, harmonization, predictability, mutual accountability and transparency, and results-orientation, in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action”²⁶¹.

Furthermore, Turkey was a member of the PD’s Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WPAE) and has taken part to the monitoring surveys conducted by the WPAE and has taken part to 2014-2015 monitoring survey conducted by the GPEDC under Busan agenda. Moreover, Istanbul, the capital city of Turkey, hosted the first Global Assembly of the Open forum for CSO Development Effectiveness in 2010 that led to the adoption of the CSO Development Effectiveness principles, designed to promote and increase the role of CSOs in the global aid sphere.

²⁵⁸ TIKA. "Turkey’s Development Cooperation with the Least Developed Countries: A Report on the Turkey’s Economic and Technical Cooperation Package for the LDCs" Department of External Affairs and Partnerships, 2016, p.5.

²⁵⁹Statement by Turkish Deputy Undersecretary at the mid Term Review of the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA), held in Antalya, accessed on 23rd November 2017, at: <http://ldc4istanbul.org/MTR2016/uploads/Turkey%E2%80%99s%20National%20Statement%20delivered%20by%20Deputy%20Undersecteray%20Ambassador%20Naci%20Koru.pdf>

²⁶⁰ The IPoA charts out the international community’s vision and strategy for the sustainable development of LDCs for the next decade with a strong focus on developing their productive capacities. A broad range of actors is expected to contribute to the IPoA implementation, including donor countries, developing countries, parliaments, the private sector, civil society, the UN system and international and regional financial institutions.

²⁶¹ United Nations. “Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020”, draft outcome document of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Istanbul, Turkey, 9-13 May 2011; 23 May 2011, p.38, accessed on 23rd November 2017, <http://unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/IPoA.pdf>.

In addition, because of its reporting to OECD DAC, Turkey comes closer to the Paris Declaration and Busan Partnership's call for increasing transparency in the disclosure of aid flows' information, although the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the disclosed information are questionable. Thanks to its observer status in the DAC, Turkey has also played an important 'bridging' function between the OECD-DAC and non-DAC members to contribute to a better coordination of their development aid activities. In this line, "Turkey hosted a political dialogue with non-DAC members of the OECD in Istanbul in 2006²⁶² and attended the dialogue meetings that followed (including the Joint Meeting with the institutions of the Arab Coordination Group in Kuwait in 2009)"²⁶³. This role performed by Turkey comes in line with the Paris and Busan fora's call for greater donors 'coordination and harmonization of aid policies. The guiding principles of TİKA's technical assistance, which include Recipient Oriented Approach, Ownership by Recipient Country, Capacity Building, Sustainability, Cooperation and Coordination with the Donor Community, and international organisations, such as UNDP, OECD, UNIDO, FAO, IDB, etc., Adaptability to Economic, Social and Political Changes, are meant to show also that TİKA's development aid activities will not fall apart from the international aid effectiveness principles adopted in high-level fora.

Lastly, Turkey has been identified as a pivotal country for UNDP's "Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC)" mechanism, a mechanism intended to promote south-south development cooperation. The UNDP bases its selection of Turkey on the country's role as a driving force in the region. The Turkish Country Office of UNDP and Turkey (1988–2007 State Planning Organization, 2008–2013 TİKA) have been implementing the three-phase TCDC programme since 1988. The third phase of the programme (2008–2013), particularly "took Turkey's role as a new donor country into account and aims to strengthen the national capacities of the country to plan and implement development assistance in line with aid effectiveness principles"²⁶⁴. In this context, "TİKA's capacity in the elaboration and implementation of a development assistance strategy as well as the elaboration of an action plan on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness are to be expanded, for

²⁶² OECD. "Policy Dialogue with non-DAC Members of the OECD", OECD Istanbul Centre, 12-13 October 2006, 29-Nov-2006, accessed on 23rd November 2017, at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/37823521.pdf>

²⁶³ Haussmann, Jeanine. "Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation", *German Development Institute, Discussion Paper* no 14, 2014, p.32.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.32.

instance’’²⁶⁵. All these demonstrate ‘‘Turkey’s commitment to proactive development assistance and systematic cooperation with international actors’’²⁶⁶.

2.3. OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING BILATERAL RELATIONS

This part will provide brief information on the past and current state of existing relations between the EU and SSA, between Turkey and SSA, and between the EU and Turkey, with a special attention on their relationships in the field of aid and development cooperation.

2.3.1. EU-Sub-Saharan Africa relations

EU’s relationships with SSA are governed through the successive agreements concluded under the EU-ACP cooperation. Known as African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states²⁶⁷, ‘‘this group is diverse in cultural heritage and economic potential. Nevertheless, they share recent histories of gaining independence from European powers and the difficulties encountered in building up their own economic and political systems’’²⁶⁸.

Although bilateral relations have always been and remain one of the main features of modern development cooperation, it was the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which first established a collective European development policy. This treaty granted associated status to 31 Overseas Collectivities and Territories (OCTs) and provided for the creation of a European

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p.32.

²⁶⁶ Murphy Teri and Auveen Woods. ‘‘Turkey’s International Development Framework Case Study: Somalia , *Istanbul Policy Center Mercator Policy Brief*, February 2014, p.5.

²⁶⁷ The ACP group consists of 79 Member-States, all of them, save Cuba, signatories of the Cotonou Agreement which binds them to the EU: 48 countries from SSA, 16 from the Caribbean and 15 from the Pacific. List of ACP countries: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cook Islands, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Republic of Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia and Zimbabwe(See ACP Website at: <http://www.acp.int/node/7>).

²⁶⁸ Dan Lazear. ‘‘EU External Relations: From Non-Intervention to Political Conditionality’’, *Central Journal of International and Security Studies (CEJISS)* No 3,2011, p.53.

Development Fund (EDF) intended to grant technical and financial assistance to the countries that were still under European rule at that time. Article 131 of the part 4 titled "Treaty of Rome association" gives the objective of the association which consisted of promoting trade between the associated countries and the European Community (EC)' members by progressively abolishing customs duties on imports and increasing import quotas²⁶⁹. Yet, the associates were not involved in the decision-making process; the partnership therefore was judged unequal.

The five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome coincided with the fact that most former territories had gained independence. This resulted in the signature, on 20 July 1963, of a formal convention between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the "Sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar states", the so-called "Yaoundé I convention" (1964-1969). This convention was covered by the formal adoption of a European Development Fund (EDF), the first cycle of EDF signed for a period of five years which took effect in 1959. The Yaoundé convention "gave eighteen ex-colonial countries in Africa commercial advantage such as the duty-free access of specified African goods into the European markets and developmental aid and excluded the Caribbean and Pacific states"²⁷⁰.

After this treaty expired, it was followed up by another Yaoundé Convention, which entered into force on 1 January 1971. In that treaty, trade arrangement and decreases of custom duties were not only beneficial for the associated, but also for the EEC and thus combined a sense of responsibility with an element of self-interest²⁷¹. One of the most important aspects of Yaoundé was its foundation on the recognition of national sovereignty of all participating countries.

The expiration of the Yaoundé conventions gave impetus to the adoption of the so-called four Lomé Convention, which shaped European development aid from 1975 to 2000. The call for new negotiations "was prompted by the strong neo-colonial aspects which were still detectable in the Yaoundé Agreement and the disappointing economic results it had produced"²⁷². Another impetus to the call for negotiations was the accession of the United

²⁶⁹ European Economic Community (EEC). "Treaty establishing the European Economic Community", article 131.

²⁷⁰ Roth Selma. "Political Conditionality in European Union Development Assistance: Assessing effectiveness and consistency", MA in advanced European and International Studies, Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes Internationales, July 2009, P.15

²⁷¹ Bjornskov Christian and Ekatarina Krivonnos. "From Lomé to Cotonou: The New EU- ACP Agreement", *Danish Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries Economics (SJFI) Working Paper No.14,2001.*

²⁷² Wikipedia. "ACP-EU Development Cooperation", 16 May 2014
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACP%E2%80%93EU_development_cooperation

Kingdom to the European Community in 1973 meant that the Francophone focus of development policy was soon shifted to include the developing countries of the Commonwealth of Nations.

The Georgetown Agreement establishing the ACP group of states was signed after 18 months of negotiations in February 1975 by the nine EC Member States and 46 developing countries (37 African, 6 Caribbean and 3 pacific) as the agreement which defines the membership, the institutions and the functions of the ACP Group. These Lomé conventions introduced the non-reciprocal trade preferences, which gave ACP countries favourably discriminative and nonreciprocal access to European markets, they provided continued financial support to ACP countries under EDF, for equality between partners, respect for sovereignty, mutual interests and interdependence; for the right of each state to determine its own policies; and for the security of relations based on the achievements of the cooperation system.

Lomé I (1975-1980) also introduced the Stabilization of export receipts on agricultural products (STABEX) system, which gave funds to offset losses on a wide number of agricultural products; cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, tea and others, because of crop failures and price falls. In other terms, it "has been a system for transferring aid funds to eligible ACP states which can show they have suffered a loss or a shortfall on their normal pattern of exports to the EU"²⁷³.

SYSMIN (System for Stabilizing Minerals) was also an innovation of the Lomé II (1980-1985) convention signed in 1979. A country heavily dependent on a specific mineral and suffering export losses could access SYSMIN loans which were designed to lessen a country's dependency on mining. The STABEX and SYSMIN schemes were abolished in the Cotonou agreement following the European Commission's Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century Challenges and options for a new partnership", of November 1996, which recommended to reform the relationship of special, unreciprocated preferences for the ACP, including the commodity protocols on bananas, sugar²⁷⁴.

One may ask why the EU did conclude such a convention that at first glance seemed to be in the only favour of ACP countries. Considering the international dynamics during these

²⁷³ Hewitt Adrian. "Compensatory Finance Options for tackling the commodity price problem", *International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)*, November 2007, P.6, accessed on 24th November 2017, https://iisd.org/pdf/2007/compensatory_finance.pdf

²⁷⁴ European Commission. "Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century Challenges and options for a new partnership", Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997, http://training.itcilo.it/actrav_cdrom1/english/global/blok1t/green3.htm

periods, namely the 1973 oil crisis combined with the 1979 Iran revolution, the starting cold war era, and the UN Resolution on the right to independence recognized to former colonies, we can argue that apart from the perceived responsibility to help ACP countries as former colonial powers, the EU needed also to secure cheap access to African oil resources and to keep African leaders on the west side and prevent them from siding with the soviet camp²⁷⁵.

Lomé III (1985-1990) Signed in 1984 and corresponding to the sixth EDF shifted the main attention from the promotion of industrial development to self-reliant development based on self-sufficiency and food security. One of the major innovations of Lomé III was the inclusion of some kind of “policy dialogue”, in Article 215 of the Convention in the following terms: “ the draft indicative programme (...) shall be the subject of exchange of views between the representatives of the ACP state concerned and those of the community in order to ensure the maximum effectiveness of cooperation schemes”²⁷⁶.

Lomé IV (1990-2000), was the first Convention to cover a ten-year period, even though the attached financial protocol has duration of five years. Lomé IV convention also introduced Structural Adjustment Programs and a human rights clause²⁷⁷. The Mid-term review of Lomé IV takes place in 1994-1995, in the context of major economic and political changes in ACP countries (democratization process, structural adjustment), in Europe (enlargement, increasing attention to East European and Mediterranean partners), and in the international environment (Uruguay Round Agreement). It introduced an important change in the political relations between the EU and ACP countries. It defined in its Article 5 , respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance as “essential elements” of the convention and includes a consultation procedure and a suspension clause as a measure of last resort (article 366a)²⁷⁸, meaning that any violation could lead to partial or total suspension of development

²⁷⁵ Brown, William. ‘Restructuring North-South Relations: ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal International Order’, *Review of African Political Economy* Vol 27, No 85,2000, pp.367-383; European Commission (EC). “Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century: Challenges and options for a new partnership”, Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,1997; Kunibert, Raffer and H.W. Singer. *The Economic North-South Divide: Six Decades of Unequal Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,2001.

²⁷⁶ ACP-EEC. “Third ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 8 December 1984”, Article 215, paragraph 5.

²⁷⁷ Roth Selma. “Political Conditionality in European Union Development Assistance: Assessing effectiveness and consistency”, MA in advanced European and International Studies, Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes Internationales, July 2009, p.32-33.

²⁷⁸ ACP-EEC. “Agreement amending the fourth ACP-EEC convention of Lomé signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995”, *The Courier* ,155 (1996), Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, Article 5 and Article 366a.

aid by then European Union after prior consultation of other ACP nations and the abusing party²⁷⁹.

Later, in the 2000s, two important external events gave impetus to the opening of the Cotonou negotiations. First, the WTO formation in the 1990s clearly means that every initiative of the EU in development policy should be compatible with WTO rules of trade liberalization and with the 'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' (GATT)²⁸⁰. The preferential trade regime of the Lomé accord, particularly the non-reciprocal duty-free entry of ACP products into the EU market was a violation of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO that aspires to establish and advance equal treatment and non-discrimination among its Member States²⁸¹.

The second factor is the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, which affected the ACP-EU relations in two ways. First, the collapse of the soviet bloc has broadened the horizon and scope of the EU's external economic relations with EU distributing a huge amount of its development assistance to the central and eastern European states; this context has led to a decline in EU attention for the ACP countries²⁸². Second, the triumph of liberalism over communism in the post-cold war era has allowed the EU to insist on linking economic assistance and other concession to the ACP countries to a series of conditionality²⁸³. 78 ACP countries and the EU-15 signed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in June 2000. The new agreement, which will be in effect until 2020, is often called "a ground-breaking and innovative framework for development, adapted to the needs of international cooperation in the early 21st century"²⁸⁴.

The CPA was designed to establish a comprehensive partnership with 3 pillars: Development cooperation; Political cooperation; and Economic and trade cooperation. In the field of development cooperation, the CPA is based on four main principles: partnership, participation, dialogue and mutual obligations, and differentiation and regionalization.

²⁷⁹ European Commission. "The Cotonou agreement", available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/lome_history_en.htm

²⁸⁰ Holland, Martin. *The European Union and The Third World*. New York: Palgrave 2002.

²⁸¹ Olufemi Babarinde and Faber, Gerrit. "From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as Usual?", paper presented at the Eight Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association. Nashville, Tennessee: The European Union Studies Association, 2003, p.5.

²⁸² Holland, Martin. *The European Union and The Third World*. New York: Palgrave 2002. Martin,

²⁸³ Wennie Waeijen. "Continuing ACP-EU Relations in a Changing Context: A Critical Assessment of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement", Bachelor Thesis in Political History and International Relations. Utrecht University, June 2011.

²⁸⁴ European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). "The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: What Role in A Changing World?", *Policy Management Report* No 13, Maastricht: ECDPM 2007, p.2.

The CPA fosters the conditionality clause introduced in the Lomé IV revised convention. It defines as the ‘essential elements’ of the ACP–EU partnership respect for human rights, adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law and put “good governance” as a fundamental element.

Another important innovation of the Cotonou Agreement was the acknowledgment of the civil society and especially the private sector as an essential element to foster economic development, represented in the principle of participation. Therefore, provisions were included at Cotonou, which ensured the participation of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in ACP countries in the policy process of their respective state²⁸⁵. Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreement put more emphasis on regional integration within the ACP group and especially in Africa. Available grant resources to support long-term development are channelled through National and Regional Indicative programs.

The 2010 revision of the CPA put further emphasis on the interdependence between security and development and the need to tackle security threats jointly, on the need to raise the profile of climate change in their development cooperation, on the need to promote a broad and inclusive partnerships, as well as on the necessity to implement the internationally agreed aid effectiveness principles with a focus on donor coordination and untying aid²⁸⁶.

The current Cotonou agreement will expire in February 2020 and, according to Article 95, the parties must enter in negotiations on a successor agreement by 31 August 2018. In this context, both sides (the ACP Eminent Persons Group and the European Commission) have been engaged in ongoing processes of reflections on the post-Cotonou agenda.

All in all, the post-Cotonou agenda should be built on key lessons learnt from past experiences and should reflect the current complexities of international politics and international development aid architecture, ranging from the imperatives to achieve the 2030 SDGs and the international aid effectiveness principles, to political changes in the EU and Africa, and to the rise of new players in the development aid landscape in SSA.

The trade regime envisaged by the Cotonou Agreement represents a radically different perspective for ACP partners: Free trade system aimed at liberalizing all bilateral trade on a

²⁸⁵Ibid, P. 14.

²⁸⁶Europe-Aid. "ACP-The Cotonou Agreement",https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en

reciprocal basis would replace the regime of non-reciprocal trade preferences²⁸⁷ and the emphasis put “on trade and investments as agents of development, replacing the Lomé agreements’ reliance on trade preferences and aid”²⁸⁸. In the field of trade preferences CPA introduced the concept of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as a substitute for the generally applicable trade preferences to all ACP’s²⁸⁹.

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), incorporated into the CPA, “are meant to be an answer to arguably ineffective non-reciprocal trade preferences the EU granted to the ACP over the past 30 years, and to pressure for bringing EU trade relations with ACP countries in line with World Trade Organization Rules”²⁹⁰. The EPAs have four pillars: first, they are partnership agreements, in which both parties have rights and obligations; second, regional integration is central to the EPAs: EPAs are based on regional integration projects within the ACP Group; third, EPAs are supposed to contribute to the development of the ACP Group; and finally, they are linked to WTO; the EPAs will be in accordance with WTO rules²⁹¹.

The EPAs are not supposed to become classical free trade agreements; rather, they are supposed to “maximize the development potential of ACP economies”²⁹². The European Commission acknowledged that the Lomé conventions had failed to achieve the goal of strengthening the economy of ACP states. As the commission commented, the Lomé regime “did not work: in 2000 only 3 per cent of EU imports originated in ACP countries against 6.7 per cent in 1976. Furthermore, 65 per cent of those imports were raw materials”²⁹³. On 27 September 2002 the negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP opened, with the trade Ministers from EU Member States and the ACP states present²⁹⁴.

Theoretically, the idea of negotiating EPAs from the EU point of view is based on the

²⁸⁷ Lucarelli Sonia and Fioramonti Lorenzo. *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor*. Coll. Europe in the World, London, Routledge 2010, P.139.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, p.139.

²⁸⁹ Wenniee Waeijen. “Continuing ACP-EU Relations in a Changing Context: A Critical Assessment of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, Bachelor Thesis, Utrecht University, Faculty of Humanities, 2011.

²⁹⁰ Pannhausen Christoph. “Economic Partnership Agreements and Food Security: What is at stake for West Africa?”, *German Development Institute (DIE)*, 2006.

²⁹¹ European External Action Service (EEAS). “Negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): a means of gradually integrating the ACP countries into the global economy”, available at: <http://www.europa.eu.int>

²⁹² European External Action Service. “Economic Partnership Agreements: Putting a Rigorous Priority on Development”, EEAS Press Release, Brussels, 20 January 2005, available at: <Http://Europa.Eu.Int>.

²⁹³ European Commission. “International and Regional Trade Relation: EU-ACP”, Available At:Http://Delbrb.Ec.Europa.Eu/En/Irtr/Eucap_Reepa.Htm

²⁹⁴ EEAS- Press Release. “Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific. EU opens trade negotiations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries”, EEAS Press Release, Brussels, 27 September 2002, <http://www.europa.eu.int>

neoliberal view of economic growth, which assume that “an open trade regime is a prerequisite for economic growth because it increases domestic competition, attracts investments, promotes diffusion of technology, stimulates cooperation and learning processes and leads to economies of scale”²⁹⁵. Moreover, the EU backed its position over the EPAs negotiations on normative basis, emphasizing the altruistic motivations behind the proposal of reciprocity deals²⁹⁶. European negotiators argued that SSA countries will gain from liberalization of their market, which would increase their integration in the world market, make ACP economies more competitive and provide secure jobs and better livelihood for people. The European Commission stressed for instance that increasing the access for European products in the ACP countries "is not an EU interest"²⁹⁷.

The EPAs negotiations have been by and large the most controversial issue in the EU-SSA relations of the 2000s because the parties (EU and African regional organizations) have failed to agree upon some points such as the percentage of products to be liberalized, the perceived failure of the EU to provide enough adjustment fund to support the transition to the new regime. The EPAs have also generated criticisms from several NGOs and CSOs, pointing to its anti-development nature and its potential threats on fundamental human rights in SSA. To date, only the Eastern African Community and South African Development Community (SADC) have finalized the negotiations and signed an EPAS with the EU respectively in October 2014 and June 2016. For the other regional communities in SSA, pending the adoption of a regional-based EPA, some individual countries have signed interim EPAs with the EU²⁹⁸.

The EU's EPAs negotiations with ECOWAS have been more controversial, especially because this region is strategic to the EU in economic and security terms. Indeed, economically, West Africa is the EU's largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU is West Africa's biggest trading partner. In terms of sectors, West Africa's exports to the EU still consist mainly of fuels and food products²⁹⁹. In the security realm, many West African countries have border proximity with some European countries and as such constitute

²⁹⁵ Mareike Meyn. “Economic Partnership Agreements: A Historic Step towards a Partnership of Equals?”, *Development Policy Review*, vol 26, No 5, 2008, p.517.

²⁹⁶ Sicurelli, Daniella. *The European Union's Africa Policies: Norms, Interests and Impact*. ASHGATE 2010.

²⁹⁷ European Commission. “Economic Partnership Agreements: Questions and Answers”, Brussels, 1 March 2007 (Online). Available at: [Http://Ec.Europa.Eu/Trade/Issues/Bilateral/Regions/Acp/Memo010307_En.Htm](http://Ec.Europa.Eu/Trade/Issues/Bilateral/Regions/Acp/Memo010307_En.Htm)


²⁹⁸ European Commission. “Economic Partnerships: EU Trade policies and ACP countries”, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/>

²⁹⁹ European commission. “Trade policy and you-west Africa”, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/west-africa/>

the route for illegal migration to Europe. Countries in the Sahel, namely Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, are nurtured grounds for terrorist activities, which can spread easily to Europe.

Nigeria, the first growing economy in this region has by far been more reluctant to sign the EPAs, putting forward the argument that EPAs would cause more harms than good to Nigerian economy. According to the anonymous interviewee (ENgB), “Nigeria has refused to sign the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) because it will harm Nigeria's domestic products due to the relative higher quality of European products”³⁰⁰. The interviewee (ENgB) underlined that Nigeria proposed the EU to first help African countries develop their industrial and infrastructural capacity before the conclusion of EPAs, so that their products can be as competitive as European products. He mentioned that unfortunately EU's promise to provide provisional financial support to help African countries accommodate with the new trade regime has not yet been implemented because of the persisting imposition of political conditions on some African countries³⁰¹. To date, all the ECOWAS countries, apart from Nigeria and the Gambia, have to date signed the EU-West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

Figure 1: Milestones in ACP-EC (current EU) Cooperation



Source: ECDPM. “The Cotonou agreement in a nutshell”, p.12

³⁰⁰ Interview with an official at the Embassy of Nigeria in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee ENgB), 17 January 2018, Brussels.

³⁰¹ Ibid

In marge of the CPA, the African Peace Facility (APF) was established in 2004 under Art 11 of the CPA to support peace and security in the African continent. Financed through the European Development Fund (EDF), it constitutes the main source of funding to support the African Union's and African Regional Economic Communities' efforts to support peace and security in the continent. The APF pursues three inter-related priorities: "Enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security; Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); support to Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Africa"³⁰².

Yet, the APF is faced with a capacity problem due to the increasing and propelling demands for peace support operations in fragile African countries, such as Somalia³⁰³.

Besides the CPA, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was adopted at the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007 to complement the existing framework of cooperation between the EU and SSA. This strategy constitutes the clear indication of both continents to move beyond a donor/recipient relationship towards long-term cooperation on jointly identified, mutual and complementary interests. It is based on principles of ownership, partnership and solidarity and its adoption marks a new phase in Africa-EU relations. This strategy is based on five priority areas including Peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; global and emerging issues³⁰⁴.

In response to the unprecedented flows of irregular migrants from African countries to Europe, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was signed by the President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker, along with 25 EU Member States, as well as Norway and Switzerland, and was launched at the Valletta Summit on migration on November 12th, 2015. The main objective of this trust fund is to support the fragile and the most affected African countries by this illegal migration issue by tackling the root causes of migration in these regions. In this context, the Trust Fund through financial and technical help aims "to help foster stability in the regions to respond to the challenges of irregular migration and

³⁰² European Commission. "African Peace Facility", https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en

³⁰³ Furness, Mark. "Sustaining EU financing for security and development: the difficult case of the African peace facility", *German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Briefing Paper No 7*, 2011, Bonn. <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/briefing-paper/article/sustaining-eu-financing-for-security-and-development-the-difficult-case-of-the-african-peace-facility/>

³⁰⁴ European Commission. « Joint Africa-EU strategy », https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/joint-africa-eu-strategy_en

displacement and to contribute to better migration management”³⁰⁵. More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilization, displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development. The main beneficiaries of these funds across Africa by region include the followings: for the Sahel region and Lake Chad (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal); for the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) and for the North of Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia)³⁰⁶.

The Africa Investment Facility was created in August 2015 and started operating in November 2015. The Facility is an innovative financial mechanism that combines “grants (non-refundable financial contributions from the European Union) with other resources such as loans from Development Finance Institutions to leverage additional financing for development and increase the impact of EU aid”³⁰⁷.

2.3.2. Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa relations

Turkey has been associated with the Sub-Saharan Africa centuries back ago. Turks generally claim that the Ottoman Empire has played a significant role in impeaching the penetration of colonialism in east Africa, and that it had established good relationship with some African kingdoms and empires (such as Timbuktu and the Kanem-Bornu empire).

It is also argued that “in 1554, the region including today’s Somaliland, Eritrea, Djibouti and part of Sudan and of Ethiopia was declared part of the Ottoman empire and became the province of Abyssinia”, and that the Ottoman empire built its first mosque in SSA, in Lagos

³⁰⁵European Commission. “EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa” https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en

³⁰⁶Ibid

³⁰⁷ European Commission. “Africa Investment Facility”, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa-investment-facility_en

(Nigeria), in 1894³⁰⁸. Some other further highlight that Turkey's war of independence during Atatürk era had inspired many African countries to fight for their own independence³⁰⁹.

However, from the decline of the Ottoman Empire, passing through the Ataturk era until the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party, the African continent was quasi-absent from Turkey's foreign policy's area of priority. This can be explained by the fact that Turkey had its own internal problems linked to the form of the state to be dealt with, to the western-oriented nature of the Kemalist ruling era as well as to the Cyprus issue which took further attention from Turkish politicians³¹⁰.

Although Turkey launched its Africa's opening policy in 1998 under Ismail Cem's leadership³¹¹, the effective beginning of Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa is generally traced back to the period of the Justice and Development Party's rise to power in 2002, because "it was during these years that initial assessments of Africa's potential were made and lower-level meetings were held between Turkish officials and their African counterparts"³¹². A strategy on the Development of the Economic Relations with African Countries was prepared by the Under-secretariat for Foreign Trade in 2003. The main objectives of the strategy include among others increasing Turkey's share of African total trade up to 3% in three years, supporting and promoting the entering of Turkish small and medium size firms into the African market, promoting and enhancing joint investments of direct Turkish FDI in Africa, enhancing technology transfer to African countries, and alleviating poverty in Africa through increasing investments in African countries that will generate economic activities.

In order to achieve these objectives, the strategy foresaw some key instruments and frameworks, such as the setting-up of Joint Economic Commission (JEC) or high-level economic negotiation and decision-making mechanisms to promote regular dialogue between the two parts, the conclusion of basic agreements to serve as the legal framework, the

³⁰⁸ Bacchi, Eleonora. "The strategic foundations of Turkey's foreign policy according to Ahmet Davutoglu-Turkey's opening to Africa policy: the case of Ethiopia", Università Degli Studi Di Perugia, April 2016, p.7.

³⁰⁹ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey-Africa relations", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

³¹⁰ Bacchi Eleonora. "The strategic foundations of Turkey's foreign policy according to Ahmet Davutoglu-Turkey's opening to Africa policy: the case of Ethiopia", Università Degli Studi Di Perugia, April 2016, p.8.

³¹¹ The Policy could not be implemented most probably due to the fact that one year after its formulation, Turkey faced a terrible earthquake in 1999.

³¹² Ozkan , Mehmet. "Turkey's African Experience: From Venture to Normalisation", *IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali, Issue 16/20*, August 2016, p.1-14.

conclusion of preferential trade arrangements and Free Trade Agreements with African countries, the establishment of commercial counsellor in African countries, etc³¹³.

In the light of these, Turkey ambitions to progressively establish a comprehensive and multi-layered policy towards the African continent, through the intensification of bilateral political relations, the enhancing of trade and investment exchange and humanitarian assistance, supporting peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful missions in Africa, supporting the strengthening of democracy and good governance, providing assistance to African regional organisations, and “Upholding the principle of ‘African solutions for African problems’”.³¹⁴

Having let down these objectives, Turkey has started to adopt a high-profile picture in Sub-Saharan African regions in political, economic and development assistance areas. The year 2005 was declared as the year of Africa and Turkey was granted observer status by the Africa Union the same year 2005. Turkey has been declared as a strategic partner of the African Union in 2008 and the first “Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit” held on 18-21 August 2008, in Istanbul with the participation of 49 African countries. In favour of that summit, the ‘Istanbul Declaration on Turkey-Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future’ and the ‘Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership’ were adopted and a follow-up mechanism was established in that respect³¹⁵. In the aftermaths of the first summit, ‘Turkish-African relations assumed a multi-dimensional nature’³¹⁶ with the opening of embassies in various African countries by the Turkish government as well as the increasing of trade volume between Turkey and African countries³¹⁷. Turkey has been making financial contribution of 1 million US Dollars to the African Union since 2009 and it has also been accepted as a non-regional member of the African Development Bank (2008)³¹⁸.

³¹³ Kizilarlan. Attila G. “Economic Relations between Turkey and African Countries”, *Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations (TASAM)*, p.20-21

³¹⁴ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkey-Africa relations”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africarelations.en.mfa>

³¹⁵ Ibid

³¹⁶ Ozkan Mehmet. “Turkey’s African Experience: From Venture to Normalisation”, *IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali*, Issue 16/20, August 2016, p.1-14.

³¹⁷ In illustration, in the year of 2009 there were only 12 Turkish Embassies in African countries (5 of them in North Africa). There is now 39. Turkey is planning to open an Embassy in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) in accordance with the relevant decision of the Turkish Council of Ministers. Today, there are 32 African embassies in Ankara while it was merely around 10 five years ago. Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Tanzania and Mozambique are also planning to open Embassies in Ankara (see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>). Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Africa has reached 17, 5 billion USD in 2015. This is a three-fold increase in volume compared to the records of 2003(see also <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>).

³¹⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs. “Turkey-Africa relations”,<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

With respect to Turkey's relations with African regional communities, the Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa is accredited to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum (IGAD) (2012); Turkish Embassy in Abuja is accredited to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (2005); Turkish Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam is accredited to the East African Community (EAC) (2010); Turkish Embassy in Lusaka is accredited to Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (2012); and Turkish Embassy in Libreville is accredited to Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (2013)³¹⁹.

The second Turkey-Africa partnership summit was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 19-21 November 2014. According to Mehmet Ozkan, the Malabo summit increased the confidence of African leaders about the sincerity of Turkey's engagement with the continent and contributed to the normalization of Turkey-Africa relations³²⁰. In the 2015-2019 Joint Implementation Plan agreed at the Malabo summit, Turkey and the African Union (AU) agreed on the development of political, social and economic relations, with a special focus on health, communication, tourism, peace and security, and mediation³²¹.

In terms of economic cooperation between Turkey and Sub-Saharan African countries, trade relations between both partners are flourishing. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's bilateral trade volume with Africa has reached 17,5 billion USD in 2015, which represents a three-fold increase in volume compared to the accounts of 2013. Trade volume with SSA amounted to 6 billion USD in 2015³²². Turkish business associations such as the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK), the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) and the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) play a pivotal role in strengthening economic relations between Turkey and Africa. They contribute to the establishment of strong economic ties with African states by providing "new opportunities for joint investment and economic cooperation", by organizing "business meetings of Africans in Turkey" and by encouraging "Turkish investors to invest in Africa, thereby promoting the tenets of economic reciprocity"³²³. The expansion of Turkish Airlines' direct flights from 1 country in 2006 to currently 33 Sub-

³¹⁹ Ibid

³²⁰ Ibid

³²¹ Ibid

³²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey-Africa relations", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

³²³ Enwere, Chigozie and Yilmaz Mesut. "Turkey's Strategic Economic Relations with Africa: Trends and Challenges". *Journal of Economics and Political Economy*, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, 2014, p.226.

Saharan African countries and vice versa has tremendously contributed to further intensify commercial interconnection between Turkey and SSA³²⁴.

Bilaterally, Turkey has also strengthened its diplomatic, political and economic relations with each African country. Diplomatically, the number of Turkish embassies in African countries has currently grown up to 39 against 12 Turkish embassies in 2009. Likewise, there are currently 32 African embassies in Turkey, against merely 10 embassies five years ago.

In addition to the opening of embassies and commercial consulates as well as regular mutually high-political visits (see Table 6 below), "Turkey has also signed Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements with 38 African countries, in line with its efforts to establish a sound contractual basis for the mutual economic relations"³²⁵. In the same economic stance, Turkey has opened commercial consulates in 26 African countries and the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Council established business councils with many Sub-Saharan African countries³²⁶.

Table 6
Lists of Official visits by Turkish statesmen in SSA since 2002

Year	African countries	Statesman
2005	Ethiopia, Sudan	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Prime minister)
2006	Kenya, Tanzania	Abdullah Gul (President)
2010	Cameroon, Nigeria, DRC	Abdullah Gul (President)
2011	Gabon, Ghana	Abdullah Gul (President)
2011	South Africa, Somalia	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Prime Minister)
2013	Gabon, Niger, Senegal	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Prime Minister)
2014	Equatorial Guinea	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President)
2015	Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President)

³²⁴ See Turkish Airlines website at <https://www.turkishairlines.com/>

³²⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey-Africa relations", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.

³²⁶ Ibid

2016	Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Guinea, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Ghana	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President)
2017	Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar,	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President)
2018	Mauritania, Senegal and Mali	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President)

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

In the field of development aid, Turkey has also acquired a pivotal role as a development aid provider in Africa. There are multiple actors intervening in the field of Turkish development aid to SSA. These actors include governmental institutions, namely the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and others non-governmental organizations such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) or *Kimse Yok MU*. According to OECD statistics, in 2015, Turkey's official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was \$395.77 million against 153.64 million USD in 2014 and 118.42 million USD in 2016. TIKA has currently coordination offices in 16 countries in SSA, namely Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea Conakry, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tanzania.

In the security realm, Turkey contributes to the UN missions deployed in the African continent to participate to the keeping and restoring of peace and stability in affected African countries. In illustration, Turkey is currently providing personnel and financial contribution to seven (MONUSCO/DRC, MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSCA/CAR, UNAMID/Darfur, UNMISS/South Sudan, UNOCI/Cote d'Ivoire and UNMIL/Liberia) of the existing nine peacekeeping operations in Africa. Turkey also provides military training to the military personnel from African countries³²⁷. Turkey has formally opened on September 30, 2017 its first African "military base" in Mogadishu, "in which Turkish military officers will train Somali soldiers and troops from other African countries to fight against Al-Shabaab terrorist organization"³²⁸.

³²⁷ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey-Africa relations", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

³²⁸ *Daily Sabah*. "First Turkish military base in Africa to open in Somalia", 19 January 2016, <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2016/01/19/first-turkish-military-base-in-africa-to-open-in-somalia>

Lastly, whilst Turkey's relations with the SSA region had primarily focused exclusively on socio-economic areas, the world has witnessed since the 2011 the historical official visit of then prime minister Erdogan to Somalia in 2011 during the hunger crisis, the clear willingness of Ankara to play a leading role a state-building process in Somalia and henceforth in highly sensitive political and security issues in Africa .This led some scholars to contend that 'Turkish-African relations assumed a different nature – a political one'³²⁹, and that the relative successful approach of Turkey towards the Somali crisis has pushed the international community to start seeing "Turkey as a potential partner on Africa"³³⁰.

2.3.3. EU-Turkey relations

Turkey has been associated with the EU (then EEC) since the 1963 Ankara agreement that foresees the conclusion of a customs union between the EU and Turkey as well as prospects for full membership once conditions are fulfilled.

Turkey formally submitted its membership application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987, which was rejected by the European Commission in 1989, claiming Turkey's democratic weaknesses and the urgency to complete the single market. The Commission suggested reinforcing Turkey-EEC relations under the framework of the Ankara agreement and to speed steps towards the conclusion of the customs union. Notwithstanding, the EU still underlines that its door was still open to Turkey's entry³³¹. The conclusion of the customs union between Turkey and the EU in 1996 marked the "beginning of higher levels of economic relations between the EU and Turkey"³³² and paved the way for Turkey to move towards membership. Nonetheless, at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council summit, it was underlined that Turkey, while eligible, still did not meet the standards for EU candidacy. Therefore, the EU makes the undertakings to help Turkey improve its political situation to meet the Copenhagen membership criteria. Turkey was finally granted a candidate status at the European Council's summit in Helsinki in December 1999³³³, but accession negotiations

³²⁹ Ozkan, Mehmet. "Turkey's African Experience: From Venture to Normalisation", *IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali*, Issue 16/20, August 2016.

³³⁰ Ibid

³³¹ See Commission opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the Community, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (89) 2290 final, Brussels: 20.12.1989.

³³² Tocci Nathalie. "Turkey and the European Union A Journey in the Unknown", *Turkey Project Policy Paper* No 5, November 2014, p.2, accessed on 12th November 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-and-the-European-Union.pdf>.

³³³ Öniş Ziya, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000, p.463-483.

did not open immediately as was done for all the other enlargement countries at the time (the Central and Eastern European countries, Cyprus, and Malta). The council put forward the argument that “to open accession talks, Turkey had to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria for membership and make progress towards resolving the Cyprus problem as well as bilateral conflicts with Greece”³³⁴. In turn, “the Commission was given a mandate to monitor progress in Turkey’s domestic performance and to draft an Accession Partnership document for Turkey, recommending areas for Turkish reform”³³⁵ and the EU provide financial assistance to support these reforms. The significant progress made by Turkey towards the implementation of the reforms, especially after late 2001, paved the way for the decision of the European Council that Turkey “sufficiently” fulfilled the political criteria and that accession talks could begin in October 2005³³⁶.

Nonetheless, few years after the opening of negotiations, Turkey’s accession process stalled altogether and by mid-2014, a mere 14 out of 35 chapters had been opened and only one chapter (science and research) provisionally closed, most probably due to “multiple vetoes by the European Council, France, and the Republic of Cyprus”³³⁷. As one scholar rightly points out, “Turkey represents the only case of an accession process that has lasted over a decade because for all candidates before Turkey, the accession process has always culminated in full membership”³³⁸.

Despite this stalemate in Turkey’s accession to the EU, relations between the EU and Turkey have continued to flourish very well in economic, political and security terms. Economically, as the 6th largest economy in Europe, Turkey holds extensive trade and economic relations with the Union and its individual member states. For instance, in 2015 nearly 42% of Turkish foreign trade was conducted with the EU member states and 64% of the FDI in Turkey originates from the EU³³⁹. In the energy realm, given Turkey’s geostrategic position as an energy hub between the East and the West, a high-level energy dialogue was launched by the

³³⁴ Tocci Nathalie. “Turkey and the European Union A Journey in the Unknown”, *Turkey Project Policy Paper* No 5, November 2014, p.2, accessed on 12th November 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-and-the-European-Union.pdf>.

³³⁵ Ibid, P.2

³³⁶ Independent Commission on Turkey. “Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise,” Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, British Council and Open Society Institute, (2004) <http://www.emmabonino.it/campagne/turchia/english.pdf>.

³³⁷ Tocci, Nathalie. “Turkey and the European Union A Journey in the Unknown”, *Turkey Project Policy Paper* No 5, November 2014, p.2-3, accessed on 12th November 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-and-the-European-Union.pdf>.

³³⁸ Ibid, p.3

³³⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkey-EU Relations”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

EU commissioner for energy to be held between the EU and Turkish officials to discuss about their common interests in energy security³⁴⁰. As a candidate country of the EU and a member of NATO, Turkey also contribute to EU civilian and military operations aimed at supporting international and regional peace and stability. Current examples include the EUFOR-ALTHEA operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EULEX mission in Kosovo and EUPOL COPPS in Palestine³⁴¹.

In view of the geographic importance of Turkey to tackling the current migration and refugee crisis, the EU has signed a migration deal with Turkey in March 2016, which entered into force in June 2016. This agreement basically embodies the return of illegal migrants from Greece to be relocated in camps in Turkish borders in exchange of visa waiver for Turkish citizens to European countries and financial assistance to Turkey to host refugees. For visa waiver to be effective, EU underlines that Turkey needs to revisit its anti-terrorist policy especially towards PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). The implementation of this agreement has been stalled back with the 15 July failed *coup d'état* in Turkey. Indeed, EU leaders accuse Turkish governments for using this incident as an opportunity to adopt anti-democratic measures, especially with the arrest of academicians, journalist and some opposition parties' leaders. More than 10 years after EU-Turkey accession talks started, MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) adopted a resolution on 24 November 2016 calling for the negotiations to be suspended until the Turkish government ended its-claimed- disproportionate and repressive response to July's failed *coup d'état*. Ankara replied by threatening to let thousands of migrants pass through to Europe³⁴².

Turkey's suspicion that the former Obama administration and other foreign countries might have been involved in the coup, the worsening of the relations between Turkey and the US under Trump administration, the rapid support given to Erdogan by Russia and Iran in the immediate aftermath of the failed military interventions, seems to have opened the way to possible shifts in Turkish foreign policy towards the East and global south.

These coupled with the rise of ultranationalist political parties in Europe that build up anti-Islamic and sometimes anti-Turkish sentiments within the European society further worsen the relations between the EU and Turkey. In fact, some scholars argue that “opposing

³⁴⁰ Ibid

³⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey-EU Relations”.

³⁴² *European Parliament News*, “EU-Turkey relations: ‘We are entering a new phase’”, 29 November 2016 - <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161128STO53408/eu-turkey-relations-%E2%80%9Cwe-are-entering-a-new-phase%E2%80%9D>

Turkish membership of the EU has become a useful posture for some European capitals in mustering domestic support in the age of right-wing populism. Take, for example, the dense debates on Turkey's EU campaign during Brexit vote, and the Dutch and Austrian elections³⁴³.

These situations combined with the ongoing political crisis in the EU (the 'hard' Brexit process, and the rise of anti-EU discourses in the electoral campaign of some political leaders in key individual European countries such as Marine Le Pen from the National Front in France), are not likely to play in favour of accelerating Turkish accession road to the EU in the short and medium term.

2.4 THE EU AND TURKEY'S DEVELOPMENT AID POLICIES TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Compared to the EU which is generally considered as one of the oldest donors in the Sub-Saharan African continent, Turkey is a relatively newcomer in development aid landscape of SSA. Nonetheless, the dramatic increase of Turkey's aid allocations to Sub-Saharan African countries in the last ten years has opened the door for the net qualification of Turkey as a potential donor whose aid policies and modalities ought to be examined and understood. In this lens, this section aims to explore patterns of convergence and divergence patterns between Turkey and EU's development aid policies in SSA in terms of aid motivations, tools and instruments, aid modalities and geographical distribution.

2.4.1 Motivations: A Theoretical perspective

2.4.1.1. In the case of the EU

³⁴³Parlar Dal, Emel, Ali Murat Kusun and Hakan Mehmetcik. "The latest bump in the road of Turkey's quest to join the EU: European ultra-nationalism", *The Conversation*, March 21, 2017, , <https://theconversation.com/the-latest-bump-in-the-road-of-turkeys-quest-to-join-the-eu-european-ultra-nationalism-74639>

Due to the historical colonial ties that existed between some EU member states and Sub-Saharan African countries, the EU has generally considered its development aid policy towards this region as the manifestation of the moral responsibility it bears in helping this continent to overcome years of colonial exploitation and move towards development.

The importance of this historical ties as the cornerstone of EU's aid policy towards SSA is evidenced by the fact that France, one of the founding member of the EU and a former colonial power, was the one that put pressure upon the other founding member states of the EU to accept the extension of the provision of EU development aid to the African-Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP) in the wake of the 1957 Rome Treaty. Indeed, it is generally admitted that, "France made its signature of this Treaty conditional on the inclusion of arrangements devoted to the association of overseas collectivises and territories that at the time were still under European colonial rule"³⁴⁴.

The Treaty of Rome in 1957, which first established a collective European development policy provided for the creation of a European Development Fund (EDF) intended to grant technical and financial assistance to the countries, which were still under European rule at that time³⁴⁵. The Interviewee (EUB2) highlighted that colonial ties are one of the main unstated motivations of EU aid towards SSA. Indeed, she argued that the colonial ties that exist between some EU member states (France, Belgium and to a certain extent Italy) led to the need for these countries to develop their colonies and maintain control over them. This resulted in the inclusion of EDF into the treaty of Rome and the entry of UK further backed the colonial motivations with the inclusion of British former colonies into the beneficiary countries of EDF³⁴⁶.

Drawing from these past colonial ties, the EU has frequently based its development aid policy towards SSA on humanitarian and benevolent grounds and tends to position itself as a 'unique' and 'distinct' actor that is best suited to help the African continent solve its development challenges. In this context, Louis Michel, then the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, argued in a 2007 essay entitled "Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance" that the EU's "global soft power" capacity gave it a leading role in

³⁴⁴ D'Alfonso Alessandro. "European Development Fund- Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in? ", *European Parliamentary Research Service*, November 2014, p.4, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-IDA-542140-European-Development-Fund-FINAL.pdf>

³⁴⁵ Wikipedia. "ACP-EU Development Cooperation", https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACP%E2%80%93EU_development_cooperation

³⁴⁶ Interview with an Official at the European Commission-Devco in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2), 31 January 2018, Brussels

the promotion of development in the African continent, because “Europe is better placed than anyone to help Africa. As to Africa, it can always count on a partner which, will not drag it into Big Power rivalries or push it into forms of development that do not correspond to its basic interests”³⁴⁷.

Stressing humanitarianism as the motive behind EU’s development aid policy towards SSA gives strengths to the idealist theory’s view according to which states provides foreign aid to other countries benevolently without expecting anything in return. In other words, the insistence of the EU that the provision of its development aid to SSA is based on ‘immaterial motivations, such as altruism and moral obligation’³⁴⁸, enters in line with the idealist paradigm, also called by some scholars, ‘recipient-needs’ approach, according to which the provision of EU aid to SSA is based on EU “moral obligations to help those in need”³⁴⁹, and the determination by the EU of the recipients countries and the amount to be allocated “are assumed to follow the economic, political and social needs of the recipient countries”³⁵⁰.

This claimed humanitarian and benevolence-based approach of EU development aid policy towards SSA is further backed by the EU’s self-characterization as a ‘normative power’ using normative means for the achievement of its normative ends. The concept of ‘normative power’ coined by Ian Manners is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this “predisposes it to act in a normative way”³⁵¹ in world politics. Identity and foreign policy, according to this approach, are strictly interconnected. The EU has been constructed based on universally recognized and shared core norms and values, which dictate and should dictate its foreign policy.

Specifically, investigating the EU’s normative basis, Manners argues that the EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution³⁵². In this context, the self-characterization of the EU as a normative power is clearly outlined in many EU official documents. In illustration, the Article 10A(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the

³⁴⁷ Louis, Michel. “Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance”, Brussels: European Commission, 2007, p.34.

³⁴⁸ Bountagkidis Georgios K., Konstantinos C. Fragkos, and Christos C. Frangos. "EU Development Aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the Normative Principle", *Social. Sciences*, No 4, 2015, P.87

³⁴⁹ Kostadinova. Petia "Trading for Aid: European Union Development and Pre-Accession", Prepared for the Second Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, January 29-31, 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland, P.4.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p.5

³⁵¹ Manners, Ian. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol 40, N^o.2, 2002, p.242.

³⁵² Ibid, p.240

principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law³⁵³.

Theoretically, this description of the EU as a normative power enters in line with the constructivist' assumption that identity more than material interests shapes and guides states' foreign policies. In this context, one can conceive of the constitutional treaties of the EU as role prescriptions inducing expectations of certain role behaviour³⁵⁴, such as EU's commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law in third countries. In this sense, political conditionality appears as one of the clear manifestations of the normative orientation of European development policy towards SSA. The political conditionality clause was first introduced into the Lomé IV convention and deepened in the 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement concluded between the EU and ACP countries. From Lomé IV convention onwards, development assistance has become conditioned on political issues; the ACP states must deserve getting development assistance and the EU has got the discretionary right to grant aid, in principle, to the "good pupils" showing progress towards democratic principles, and to cut off the tap to the democracy and human rights' detractors. It basically entails the linking of aid to the fulfilment of various political conditions, relating to human rights, democracy, and good governance.

Besides these normative motivations, one should not overlook the importance of material interests as another driver of EU development aid policy towards SSA. The importance of material interests in understanding the motivations behind EU development aid engagement in SSA fit-in with neoliberal and neorealist perspectives, according to which states provide foreign aid to serve their national interests, rather than for non-material altruistic purposes.

Indeed, EU engagement with SSA in the field of development aid seems to be based also on the increasing acknowledgement from EU side that their fate is linked to that of the African continent. EU leaders know that to promote and protect their politico-security and economic interests in SSA (securing cheap access to natural resources and big market deals, reducing the inflow of migrants to Europe, and tackling terrorist threats), they should contribute to the

³⁵³ Official Journal of the European Union. "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community." C306, 2007, p.1–271.

³⁵⁴ Hill Christopher. "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Volume 31, Issue 3, September 1993, p.305–328.

building of resilient, secure, and prosperous societies in SSA. This entails that EU would provide foreign aid to SSA to protect its self- economic and security interests because a stable and more prosperous African continent would create a more securitized pace for the pursuit and fulfilment of EU interests in this region.

In the EU strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, for instance, the EU recognizes the fact that stability and security in the Sahel is essential for the protection and promotion of its own interests and insists on the fact that “the EU therefore has an important role to play both in encouraging economic development for the people of the Sahel and helping them achieve a more secure environment in which it can take place, and in which the interests of EU citizens are also protected”³⁵⁵.

Talking about the EPAs and EU trade policy, the former EU Ambassador to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Michel Arrion underlined the inter-dependence between the EU and SSA by pointing out that: "In a globalised world, the EU cannot ignore what happens at the proximities of its borders. More peace, stability, security and prosperity of West Africa (which can only be ensured by sustainable economic development) also mean more peace, stability, security and prosperity for the EU. And more economic prosperity for West Africa, which the EPA aims to pursue, will in turn offer more opportunities for the EU to export and invest in West Africa"³⁵⁶.

Foreign aid appears to be one of the preferred tools by EU leaders to promote their shared economic and political norms in African countries to serve and protect their own- self-interests in this continent. The inclusion of political conditionality and EPAs in the Cotonou partnership agreement are meant to promote neoliberal economic and political norms in the Sub-Saharan African region that in turn would serve EU self-interests.

Following this line, the interviewee (ENgB) insists that “the EU Aid is not given altruistically. It is a political tool for the achievement of the economic interests of the EU. The EU provides aid to set up the necessary infrastructural and industrial building standards necessary to conduct effective trade policy with African countries”³⁵⁷.

³⁵⁵ See European External Action Service (EEAS). “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel”, accessed on 2nd December 2017, at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf

³⁵⁶ Arrion Michel. "Some important clarifications about the Economic partnership agreement and EU trade policy", accessed on 10 January 2018 at, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/clarifications_about_the_epa_and_eu_trade_policy.pdf

³⁵⁷ Interview with a diplomat from the Embassy of Nigeria in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee ENgB), 17 January 2018, Brussels

In the same manner, one interviewee (EUB2) argues that EU security and economic interests, such as combatting illegal migration to Europe and terrorism's spill overs onto Europe from SSA countries and creating a friendly-environment for the flourishing of EU business activities of Europe in Africa, are among the unstated motivations behind EU development aid to SSA³⁵⁸. In the same line, the interviewee (EEB) points out that the EU has used its development aid to induce the opening of finance and telecommunication sectors, which are restricted to foreigners by the Ethiopian government³⁵⁹.

The importance of material interests in EU's foreign aid policy towards SSA is evidenced by the fact that the amounts of aid to be allocated to countries in SSA are mostly determined by the geostrategic economic and political importance of the recipient countries. As we can see from the Table 8 below, 9 of the 10 largest recipients of EU ODA between 2010 and 2015 are in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa, two of the most important geostrategic regions in SSA, in terms of combating terrorism, piracy and illegal migration. For instance, countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali are the largest recipients of EU ODA between 2010-2015 in West Africa because these countries are selected as the strategic countries that will work with the EU in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel through the Sahel Strategy adopted in 2011. The interviewee (ENeB) corroborates this point by underlying that the increasing security interdependency between the EU and Africa, also explains the increase of development aid towards countries such as Niger, in terms of combating terrorism and managing illegal migration to Europe³⁶⁰.

Along similar lines, countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan are the largest beneficiaries of EU ODA in the horn of Africa and are all part of the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa adopted in 2011. Likewise, South Africa, which is the largest economic power in SSA (see Table 16 below), constitutes the second largest recipient of EU ODA after DRC, while other Sub-Saharan African countries in most of needs (see Table 16 below), namely Somalia, and South Sudan rank at the lowest levels. The fact that DRC ranks as the first largest recipient of EU ODA in SSA despite the authoritative practices of its President Kabila and the worsening democratic and human rights situation in this country, clearly illustrates that interests play a significant role in the geographic distribution

³⁵⁸Interview with an EU official from the Commission-DEVCO who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2), 31 January 2018, Brussels.

³⁵⁹Interview with a diplomat from the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EEB), 21 February 2018, Brussels

³⁶⁰ Interview with a diplomat from the Embassy of Niger in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee ENeB), 22 January 2018, Brussels

of EU ODA in SSA, because one should not underestimate the reality of DRC being potentially one of the richest countries on earth in terms of natural resources (see Map 1 below) ³⁶¹.

If neorealist and neoliberals seem to agree on the fact that serving national interests are at the height of donors' engagement in SSA, they essentially disagree on the question of whether these material interests would be given priority over global moralistic values in case of competition between them. While neoliberals argue that donors would prioritize global norms and values over selfish national interest, neorealist insist on the fact that donors will always defend their national interests at the expense of moral values in this case. The neorealist view follows a donor-interests paradigm, which sees foreign development assistance as driven primarily by the strategic and economic considerations of the donor countries³⁶².

On this question, many authors seem to agree with neorealist view argue that the normative commitments of the EU towards SSA in the field of development aid are only effective when they do not constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of EU self-interests in this continent. In this vein, some authors argue that the “EU development co-operation has been continuously under the pressure of subordination to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and of being linked to other external priorities”³⁶³. These accusations have mainly taken pace in the use and application of the conditionality policy by the EU in the provision of development aid to SSA. Many have accused the EU of “double standards” in the application of its political conditionality in SSA, meaning “different treatment is applied to third countries while they are having the same human rights and democracy records”³⁶⁴. These inconsistencies and double standards occur when democracy competes with other EU norms such as development,

³⁶¹ According to the African economic Outlook, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the second-largest diamond-producing nation in the world as well as the largest exporter of cobalt ore (for more details see African Economic Outlook 2014, accessed on 22 January 2018, at: http://www.Africaneconomicoutlook.Org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/E-Book_African_Economic_Outlook_2014.pdf); Mbeki Thabo “Illicit Financial Flow”, Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa”, Commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, p.16, accessed on 12 February 2018, at https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf

³⁶² Kostadinova Petia. “Trading for Aid: European Union Development and Pre-Accession”, (Prepared for the Second Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, January 29-31, 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland, p.4-5.

³⁶³ Mirjam van Reisen, and Jaap Dijkstra. “2015-Watch: The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals”. Hague: Alliance2015, 2004, P. 1–68.

³⁶⁴ Ozveri, Derya. “Promoting Human Rights by Conditionality? Quest for a better EU Development Assistance in ACP Countries”, Paper Prepared for “Third Global Studies Conference”, 17-20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal, p.8; Del Biondo, Karen. “Norms, Self-Interest and Effectiveness: Explaining Double Standards in EU Reactions to Violations of Democratic Principles in Sub-Saharan Africa”, PhD thesis, Ghent University 2012.

stability³⁶⁵, or when strategic self-interests compete with its democracy promotion goal³⁶⁶. Consequently, it is often held that poorer and smaller states like sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to be targeted with sanctions than bigger and richer states³⁶⁷.

With respect to the security interests, donors are sometimes more reluctant to sanction a state because of its strategic position in a given region, that is “its putatively important position towards other states”³⁶⁸. Regarding the EU’s inconsistent democracy promotion policies towards Africa, R. Young states: “the overall correlation between European aid and recipients’ democratic quality remains low in Africa”³⁶⁹. On several occasions, analysts have demonstrated that the widely heralded goal of promotion of human rights and democracy has been side-lined due to other more compelling interests, such as economic advantages, commercial gains, and security³⁷⁰.

In sum, and following a neorealist perspective, it has been too often pointed out that EU’s normative discourses are only translated into practice when they are compatible with its own strategic interests. In other terms, EU normative considerations only serve EU own strategic interests, as recently demonstrated by the increasing securitization of European development policy in SSA, whereby EU short-term security interests prevail over human rights and/or democratic issues. One clear illustration of this is the increasing direction of EU foreign aid policies “towards migration control objectives rather than improving respect for human rights”³⁷¹.

Here, it should be nonetheless mentioned that as a union of 27 member states with some EU

³⁶⁵ Ibid

³⁶⁶ Crawford, Gordon. “EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From Lofty Principles to Lowly Self-Interests”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* vol 9, No2, 2008, p. 172-191

³⁶⁷ Crawford, Gordon. “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency”, *Democratization* vol 4, No3, 1997, p. 69–108; Smith, E.Karen. “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?” *European Foreign Affairs Review* vol 3, No2, 1998, p.253-274; Smith, E.Karen. “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”, *International Spectator* vol 35, No 2, 2000, P. 16-28.

³⁶⁸ Saltnes, D.Johanne. “The EU’s Human Rights Policy: Unpacking the Literature on the EU’s Implementation of Aid Conditionality”, *Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State (ARENA) Working Paper* No2, 2013; Del Biondo, Karen. “Norms, Self-Interest and Effectiveness: Explaining Double Standards in EU Reactions to Violations of Democratic Principles in Sub-Saharan Africa”, PhD thesis, Ghent University 2012.

³⁶⁹ Young, Richard. “Is European Union Democracy Promotion on the Wane?”, *Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) working document* No.292, Brussels, 2008, p.4.

³⁷⁰ Del Biondo, Karen. “Norms, Self-Interest and Effectiveness: Explaining Double Standards in EU Reactions to Violations of Democratic Principles in Sub-Saharan Africa”, PhD thesis, Ghent University 2012; Young, Richard. “Is European Union Democracy Promotion on The Wane?”, *Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document* No.292, Brussels, 2008.

³⁷¹ Human Rights Watch. “EU Policies Put Refugees At Risk: An Agenda to Restore Protection”, November 23, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/eu-policies-put-refugees-risk>

member states having long-standing interests in SSA, the inconsistency problem in EU foreign aid policies towards SSA is further exacerbated by the lack of internal coordination between the development policy of the EU and that of individual member states, to an extent that either EU foreign aid policy towards SSA are formulated and implemented in a way that serve the interests of some key individual member states (especially former colonial powers) or it is faced with persisting incompatibility with the individual foreign aid policies of key member states in this region.

The fact that the EDF, the main financial instrument of EU's ODA to SSA still remains an intergovernmental fund outside the EU budget, despite increasing call from the European Parliament for the "budgetization" of the EDF, further illustrates the fact that EU member states remains the main actors of EU development aid policy towards SSA. As such, it becomes hard for the EU to promote and defend its normative commitments in this regard, because EDF is based on the voluntary contribution from Member states. Although the Commission also intervenes in the process by making proposals on the distribution of EDF allocations per member state, its proposals are not binding. In this sense, it is obvious that the amount to be allocated will be determined by each member state according to its own interests in the recipient countries, not according to the norms governing the EU.

The predominance of state interests in EDF allocations is evidenced by the fact that the five largest providers of the 10th and 11th EDF allocations are respectively, Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Spain, all of them are former colonial powers with strong security, political, and economic interests in Africa (See Table 7 below).

The importance of "realpolitik" calculations also explains the fact that the smallest providers of EDF are the new EU member States, mostly located in Eastern Europe, without strong interests in Africa.

Table 7
EU Member States key contributions to 10th (2008-2013) and 11th (agreed in 2013 for the period 2014-2020) EDF (in %)

	10th EDF	11th EDF
Austria	2.41	2.40
Belgium	3.53	3.25
Bulgaria	0.14	0.22

Croatia	0.23
Cyprus	0.09	0.11
Czechia Rep	0.51	0.80
Denmark	2.00	1.98
Estonia	0.05	0.09
Finland	1.47	1.51
France	19.55	17.81
Germany	20.50	20.58
Greece	1.47	1.51
Hungary	0.55	0.61
Ireland	0.91	0.94
Italy	12.86	12.53
Latvia	0.07	0.12
Lithuania	0.12	0.18
Luxembourg	0.27	0.26
Malta	0.03	0.04
Netherlands	4.85	4.78
Poland	1.30	2.01
Portugal	1.15	1.20
Romania	0.37	0.72
Slovakia	0.21	0.38
Slovenia	0.18	0.22
Spain	7.85	7.93
Sweden	2.74	2.94
UK	14.82	14.68

Total EU-28	100
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Source: Alessandro D'Alfonso. “European Development Fund- Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in?”, European Parliamentary Research Service November 2014, P.32.

2.4.1.2. In Turkey’s case

To begin with, foreign policy identity construction combined with humanitarianism has been one of the drivers behind Turkish foreign aid policy towards SSA. Formerly assuming a more passive and western-oriented role in its foreign policy, Turkey has begun, since 2002 with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party, to play a more aggressive and non-western foreign policy. This shift in the foreign policy stance of Turkey is particularly remarkable in the discourses of key Turkish political leaders, namely the current President Erdogan and former Prime Minister Davutoglu, who can be considered as the builders of a new Turkish identity on the international stage. In his book, *Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth)*, former Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu has maintained that Turkey’s unique and distinctive identity is the product of its distinctive history and middle-ground geographic position, which leaves no choice to Turkey but to undertake an active and leading role in international politics³⁷².

In this vein, Turkey’s development aid policy towards SSA has been one of the greatest opportunities for Turkey to promote its new identity, which reflects a more “value-oriented” outlook towards order, both in discourse and practice³⁷³. In the context of its foreign aid policy towards SSA, Turkey has constructed several policy discourses to legitimate its aid activities in this region, which discourses are mostly related to historical legacy with religious links, humanitarian diplomacy and anti-colonialism.

With respect to historical legacy, Turkey considers its engagement with the African continent as the re-affirmation of the ottoman historical ties that existed between the Ottoman Empire and some African countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia. In this context, Turkey describes

³⁷² Davutoglu, Ahmet. *Stratejik Derinlik : Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position)* ,Küre Yayınları 2001.

³⁷³ Öniş Ziya and Mustafa Kutlay, “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 8, 2013, p.1411.

itself as an “Afro-Eurasian”³⁷⁴ state to insist on this historical legacy as one of the main motivations behind its aid policies towards SSA and to “emphasize that its current engagement does not arise from temporary political and economic expectations”³⁷⁵.

Turkey, in this context, builds a kind of ‘neo-ottoman’ identity³⁷⁶, whereby it self-conceives itself as the voice of the voiceless fellow Muslim countries in Africa, especially those with past ottoman ties. Former Prime Minister, Davutoglu, once told the press that “We have an Ottoman legacy (...) Yes, we are the new Ottomans. We have to pay attention to the countries in our region. We are opening up to Africa”³⁷⁷.

This historical legacy is intimately linked with religious considerations, which entails the moral responsibility for Turkey to be in solidarity with other Muslim countries, namely those that were part of the Ottoman Empire. The importance of religion in Turkey’s development aid policy to SSA is reflected by the fact that most of Turkish NGOs operating in Africa are religious NGOs and that the largest recipients of Turkish aid assistance in SSA have been so far the Muslim-majority countries especially with those having past ties with the Ottoman Empire (Somali, Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger).

In response to critics about the Islamic-oriented nature of Turkish development aid policy in SSA, President Erdogan, in his speech during the reception for the TİKA coordinators at the Presidential Complex in April 2018, stated that: “We do not only help countries with a Muslim population, we also send assistance to suffering and aggrieved non-Muslim countries and we will continue to do so”³⁷⁸. When former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım wrote on his twitter account that, "We did not ask those who wanted a hand from us their language, religion or race; we extended our hand. Today and tomorrow as well, we will stand beside them", it also means that humanitarian and technical support will be given to the extent possible to countries in needs or which demands it without any segregation.

Humanitarian diplomacy, from the understanding of Turkish foreign policy makers, encompasses three dimensions, mainly – citizens of Turkey, policies toward crisis zones and

³⁷⁴ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey-Africa relations”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.

³⁷⁵ Kucuk Yusuf Kenan, “Ten years of Turkish engagement with Africa: discourse, implementation and perception in Somalia”, MSC thesis in African studies, University of Oxford, 5 June 2015, P.25.

³⁷⁶ See Langan Mark. "Virtuous power Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa: the ‘Neo-Ottoman’ challenge to the European Union". *Third World Quarterly*, volume 38, Issue 8, 2016, p.1403.

³⁷⁷ Davutoglu, Ahmet . “New Ottomanism Goal of the Republican Government”, (Cumhuriyet Hükümetinin Yeni Osmanlılık Hedefi), *Institute for Strategic Studies (Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü)*, June 2010, accessed on 21st November, 2017, http://www.turksae.com/sql_file/365.pdf.

³⁷⁸ Ibid

global world order³⁷⁹. The country's most remarkable humanitarian feat has been its humanitarian engagement in Somalia since 2011. The words of Mr. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "Anywhere in the world where there are sufferers, Turkey will be found there to help more or less"³⁸⁰ is important in terms of showing exactly that an integral part of the Turkish people is aware of the global and historical responsibility of Turkey. In favor of his visit to Cameroon in March 2010, former President Abdullah Gül declared that the world has moral and political responsibility to African nations, and Turkey will be the voice of Africa in international institutions³⁸¹.

The anti-colonial or 'clean state' discourses are used to present Turkey as a distinct donor without colonial past and imperialistic ambitions in Africa and to distinguish Turks from other (Western) major powers in their relations towards the African continent. In this vein, the former president Abdullah Gul made it clear that, "we [Turks] have never run after only our own interests. We know that states, which only looked after their own interests in the past-engendered major damage to Africa. The international community should know that we could only be equal partners in Africa"³⁸². Erdogan also took the opportunity in a UN General Assembly Address to highlight colonialism as the historical foundation of Somalia's recent plight:

We should not only look into the picture of today, but also the shameful history that has led Somalia into the arms of this great tragedy. Indeed, beneath the tip of this huge iceberg lie great crimes against humanity. In that respect the situation in Somalia has also revealed the deep wounds inflicted by the colonialist mentality, which kept Africa under its hegemony for centuries. As this old colonial mentality ignores places where it has no interest, it is now watching millions of children die in need of a morsel of bread³⁸³.

This clean-state discourse has been accompanied by the denunciation of western imperialism in the political rhetoric of some Turkish political leaders. For instance, speaking to Ghanaian officials, the former President of Turkey states that: "We are different from Europeans. We do not take away your raw materials. We invest and also bring along technology and qualified workforce. We have done so in other African countries. We have already begun to do so in

³⁷⁹ Davutoğlu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects", *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol: 41, No: 6, 2013, p.865-870.

³⁸⁰ Quotation mentioned during interview by email with an Official at TIKA headquarters who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee TK3).

³⁸¹ *New Vision*. "Turkey-Africa: Solidarity and Partnership", November 13, 2014, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/661775-turkey-africa-solidarity-and-partnership.html>.

³⁸² Cited in Rudincová, Katerina. "New Player on the Scene: Turkish Engagement in Africa." *Bulletin of Geography: Socio-Economic Series* No24, 2014, P.199.

³⁸³ *i24news.tv*. "Turkish President Erdoğan Visits Somalia", January 26, 2015.

Ghana as well’’³⁸⁴. One academician, Abdirahman Ali praised Turkey’s approach towards Africa in comparison to western approach in the following terms: “Turkey’s approach is a radical contrast to the security-driven approach of the US and is also very different from the strings-attached European style.... The Turkish model on the other hand, is ground-breaking and fundamentally centrist, in that it avoids the imperialist tendencies of the US and Europe, all the while establishing ‘a moral’ standard anchored in protecting human rights and helping the weak’’³⁸⁵. Turkey insists on the altruistic motivations of its engagement in the development assistance, in the following words by Veysi Kaynak, deputy prime minister of TİKA: "Turkey has been working without any expectations of visibility or reward to deliver development and humanitarian assistance to those in need throughout the world, while at the same time struggling to liberate global development assistance from being dominated by pragmatist realpolitik mentalities. It thus advocates a high-spirited perspective based on global justice"³⁸⁶.

In the same stance, President Erdoğan once said: “Let others plot and scheme for their interests, for oil, for mines, for gold, for land, for cheap workforce. We will never resort to such hypocrisies. Whatever we do, we will do sincerely, straight from the heart, we will try to find our way into people’s hearts. We will do it for God. I see each one of our TİKA coordinators as frontiersmen, as vanguard for Turkey’s soft power policy. I see your friends, who are employed as your local personnel, as our fellows and companions in this just cause’’³⁸⁷.

Given these and others, Turkish approach to development aid towards SSA seems to fit in with idealistic and constructivist perspectives. The emphasis on humanitarian diplomacy in Turkish aid assistance towards SSA follows the idealism paradigm according to which altruism and moral responsibility are the main determinants of the provision of foreign aid. In the same manner, and following a constructivist view, Turkey has tried to develop in the minds of Africans, especially the Muslim countries, its own identity of being a brother Muslim nation that cares about their future due to its shared historical, cultural and religious ties. In turn, African leaders expect Turkey to perform this role of a Muslim fellow with humanistic ambitions in a consistent manner in the implementation of its aid development

³⁸⁴ Cited in Abdirahman, Ali. “Turkey’s Foray into Africa: A new humanitarian Power?”, *Insight Turkey* vol 13, no. 4, 2011, p.66

³⁸⁵ Ibid, p.65–73.

³⁸⁶ TİKA. “TİKA Development Assistance report 2015”, p.7

³⁸⁷TİKA. “President Erdogan welcomes TİKA Coordinators”, TİKA News, available at: <http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/president-erdogan-welcomed-tika-coordinators-43472>

policy.

The logic of appropriateness appears to play an important role in Turkish foreign aid policy to SSA, as evidenced by the fact that most of Turkish funds went to Muslim-majority countries, some with Ottoman era connections like Somalia and Sudan (See Figure 6 below). In addition to that, most of these aid-recipient countries are in the Horn of Africa, except Senegal, Niger and to a certain extent Mauritania. This is certainly due to the region's high Muslim population and historical Ottoman ties. The fact that most of the largest recipients of Turkish ODA in SSA are the among the poorest countries in this region (see Table 15 below) leads us to argue that idealistic and humanitarian grounds, which form the basis of Turkey's self-described identity, are behind Turkish aid policies towards SSA.

Besides constructivism and idealism, and following a neoliberal blueprint, Turkey also acknowledges the increasing interdependence between Turkey and Africa for the pursuit of mutual benefits. In illustration, in a speech former Prime Minister, Davutoğlu delivered at the Africa-Turkey Partnership Ministerial Review Conference (December 15th-16th 2011), he affirmed:

Stretching hundreds of years back, our history tells us that the well-being of Africa and Turkey cannot be separated from each other. Within a relationship based on equality, mutual respect, cooperation and common stance against adversaries, the rise of African and Turkish civilizations was always closely linked. At times when we were able to strengthen our interactions, cultural links, trade connections and political positions, we were triumphant and prosperous. However, when our ties and defences were weakened due to many reasons including imperialism, colonialism, conflicts, or inner strife, we were both weakened and fell back behind other nations and groupings. Economically, we have everything to gain from ever closer interaction³⁸⁸.

Furthermore, there are also some *realpolitik* considerations behind Turkey's engagement in Africa in the field of development aid. Turkey's activism in Africa is a clear sign of Turkey's ambitions to acquire global status, to expand its sphere of influence and to rival the EU and some EU Member states. Ahmet Davutoglu stressed the inter-state competition between Turkey and France under Sarkozy's ruling in North Africa in the following terms: "We have to deal with our neighbouring countries and even go to Africa. The superpowers are watching this in bewilderment. France tries to understand why we are working in Africa. I have already given an instruction: Wherever Sarkozy goes, he must see the building of the Turkish

³⁸⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Speech delivered by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey at Africa-Turkey Partnership Ministerial Review Conference", 2011, <[Http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-byh_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey-at-africa-turkey-partnership.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-byh_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey-at-africa-turkey-partnership.en.mfa)>

embassy and whenever he looks up, he must see the Turkish flag. I have already instructed that offices be rented for embassies in the best places”³⁸⁹.

In addition, Turkey since its opening policy to the African continent also expects the support and solidarity of the African leaders in International instances and when the country faces some dire situation. According to Turkish Deputy foreign minister, Ahmet Yildiz, “Turkey aims for a win-win policy throughout the continent, not for short-term economic interest...but for long-term solidarity in international relations”³⁹⁰. In illustration, Turkey benefited from the support of the quasi-totality of Sub-Saharan African countries during its 2009-2010 UNSC non-permanent membership application because, only two African countries, South Africa and Mozambique, did not vote in favour of Turkey to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2009-2010. During the Turkey-Africa Education Ministries Conference at Istanbul’s Ciragan Palace in October 2017, the Turkish minister of national education, Ismet Yilmaz, seized the opportunity to announce Turkey’s candidanship for a seat on UNESCO’s 2017-2021 Executive Board and to openly request Africa’s support for the board election, set for Nov. 8³⁹¹.

In the same manner, following the attempted coup d’état of July 2016, Turkey has pledged African countries to either close schools in Africa that belonged to the Fetollah movement or agree that the Maarif Foundation, established after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, take over the administration of overseas FETO-linked schools. Speaking at the opening of the Turkey-Africa Education Ministries Conference at Istanbul’s Ciragan Palace, the Turkish minister of national education, Ismet Yilmaz, declared that “Ankara expects African countries to cooperate with it against the Fetullah Gulen Terrorist Organization (FETO), the group behind last year's defeated coup attempt in Turkey, including by shuttering its schools”. Talking about FETO, he continued that “There are schools linked to this terrorist organization in Africa. These schools are providing financial support to the organization,” and “We expect our bother African countries to cooperate more with Turkey to wage a better fight against

³⁸⁹News.Az. “Turkish Foreign Minister: We are Neo-Ottomans”, 24 November 2009, <<http://news.az/articles/3216>>

³⁹⁰ Aktas Tufan. “Turkey 'wants to open embassies in all African states”, *Anadolu Agency*, 14 June 2017, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-wants-to-open-embassies-in-all-african-states/841517>

³⁹¹ *Anadolu Agency*. “Turkey urges Africa to close down FETO schools” <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-urges-africa-to-close-down-feto-schools/942192>

these organizations.” To date, nineteen African countries have handed over FETO schools to Maarif or closed them at Ankara's request³⁹².

Likewise, the pursuit of economic benefits does not fall outside of Turkey's development aid agenda towards SSA. Indeed, with the global financial crisis in Europe and the growing industrialization in Turkey, and the current economic crisis in Turkey, Turkey is looking for new markets to export its low-valued manufactured goods as well as for new economic partners. Some argue in this line that foreign aid ‘‘has been the main tool for Turkey to gain a foothold in African countries’’³⁹³ and to open pace for the ‘Anatolian tigers’ to promote and expand trade and investment activities in Africa. This explains why Turkey has signed several free trade agreements with some African countries³⁹⁴ and reached some economic, commercial and technical cooperation agreements with many African countries³⁹⁵. This also explains why trade volume between Turkey and SSA countries has exponentially increased since the beginning of Turkey's opening to Africa with Turkish total trade volume (export and imports) reaching \$19.5 billion in 2015, up from 810 million USD in 2002. One anonymous interviewee (TK3) underlines that although the pursuit of humanitarian goals is of utmost importance, Turkey also looks at the strategic importance and commercial relations with recipient countries while designing its foreign policy³⁹⁶.

Plus, regular meetings and business trips are organized with African business partners in Turkey by several Turkish businessmen associations such as the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), and the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), to encourage its member to invest

³⁹² *Anadolu Agency*, ‘‘Turkey urges Africa to close down FETO schools’’, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-urges-africa-to-close-down-feto-schools/942192>

³⁹³ Kucuk, Yusuf Kenan. ‘‘Ten years of Turkish engagement with Africa: discourse, implementation and perception in Somalia’’, MSC thesis in African studies, University of Oxford, 5 June 2015, p.24.

³⁹⁴ FTAs signed between Turkey and Morocco (2004), Turkey and Tunisia (2004), Egypt (2005), and Mauritius (2011)(see Eleonora Bacchi .The strategic guidelines of Turkey's foreign policy according to Ahmet Davutoglu-Turkey's opening to Africa policy: the case of Ethiopia, Università Degli Studi Di Perugia April 2016,p.16). Besides, the FTA negotiation with Ghana was concluded and it is expected to be signed soon(See <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Turkey-Trade-Agreements>). In addition, four FTA negotiations are ongoing (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kameron, Seychelles, Libya) and discussions for the opening of FTA negotiations are ongoing (Algeria and South Africa).

Prevention of Double Taxation Agreements with 11 African countries are effective today in comparison with that it was only 4 in 2003(see <http://www.turkeyafricaforum.org/about-tabef/turkey-africa-relations/>)

³⁹⁵ These countries include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Capo Verde, Djibouti, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, South Africa, DRC, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, RCA, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda(see Tepebas Ufuk. ‘‘Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa’’, Ufuk Tepebas(ed), *Sectoral and Financial Transformation in Africa: Opportunities and Risks*, Istanbul, TASAM publications, international relations series, 2015, p.118).

³⁹⁶ Interviewee by email with an official at TIKA who prefers to remain anonymous, response received on 24 July 2018 (Interviewee TK3).

in Africa. In this line, the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) has established business councils in many African countries (see Table 8 below), whose purpose is “to help increase and diversify Turkey’s exports to African countries, and to encourage the host countries to engage in joint investments”³⁹⁷.

The sending of business consultants to the newly opened Turkish embassies in SSA is another measure adopted to promote and increase Turkish trade with Africa.

As such, some authors consider that Turkey is no different from other ‘imperial’ power, but rather constitutes “one more player in the new scramble for African markets”³⁹⁸. In this stance, the large involvement of non-state actors in Turkey’s opening policy towards SSA is often considered as the increasing evidence of a “smooth convergence of both governmental and business policies”³⁹⁹.

Table 8
List of business councils created in the bottom of DEIK between Turkey and SSA countries

Turkey-South Africa Business council	1997
Turkey-Ethiopia Business council	2008
Turkey-Sudan business council	2008
Turkey-Kenya business council	2010
Turkey-Angola business council	2011
Turkey-Ghana business council	2011
Turkey-Mauritania business council	2011
Turkey-Nigeria business council	2011

³⁹⁷See DEIK Website, <https://www.deik.org.tr/country-based-business-councils>

³⁹⁸ Langan Mark. “Virtuous power Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa: the ‘Neo-Ottoman’ challenge to the European Union”, *Third World Quarterly* volume 38, Issue 8,2016,p.1409.

³⁹⁹ Ozkan, Mehmet. “A New Actor or Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey’s Engagement with Africa,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, no. 1 ,2012, p. 129
Akgün Birol and Mehmet Ozkan, “Turkey’s Opening to Africa” , *Journal of Modern African Studies* Volume 48, Issue 4, December 2010,p.542-543.

Turkey-Tanzania business council	2011
Turkey-Uganda business council	2011
Turkey-Gambia business council	2012
Turkey-Rwanda business council	2012
Turkey-Equatorial Guinea business council	2014
Turkey-Ivory Coast business council	2014
Turkey-Cameroon business council	2014
Turkey-Mauritius business council	2014
Turkey-Benin business council	2015
Turkey-Djibouti business council	2015
Turkey-Chad business council	2015
Turkey-Republic of Congo business council	2015
Turkey-Mali business council	2015
Turkey-Mozambique business council	2015
Turkey-Niger business council	2015
Turkey-Senegal business council	2015
Turkey-Somalia business council	2015
Turkey-DRC Business council	2016
Turkey-Guinea business council	2016
Turkey-Cape Verde business council	2017
Turkey-Zimbabwe business council	2017
Turkey-Burundi business council	2017
Turkey-Malawi business council	2017
Turkey-Namibia business council	2017
Turkey-Zambia business council	2017
Turkey-Burkina Faso business council	2018

Turkey-Togo business council	2018
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Source: DEIK website.

In Somalia, some argue that Turkey's development and humanitarian aid policy has played an important role in the preference given to Turkish companies for the implementation of some infrastructure projects in Somalia by the Somali government. In illustration, a Turkish company *Favori* received in September 2013 a Somali government contract to manage for 20 years Mogadishu's airport, which has been renovated by *Kozuva*, another Turkish company. Under the terms of the agreement, *Favori* receives half of all revenues, while it provides the other half to the government during the 20 years⁴⁰⁰. Another Turkish venture, *Al Bayrak*, has been offered a 20-year contract in October 2013 for the management of the sea port of Mogadishu⁴⁰¹. Under the agreement, 55% of revenue generated at the port will be earmarked for the government while the Turkish company receives 45%.

According to statistics, the share of economic infrastructure in TIKA's budget allocation for the implementation of aid projects in Somalia has increased from 16 percent in 2012 to 70% in 2014⁴⁰². One could also consider Turkey's increasing focus on the physical infrastructure sector in Somalia in the past five years such as repaving roads and renovating the airport in Mogadishu, is also due to the need to create a smooth and an adequate space for the development of business activities between Somalia and Turkey.

Underscoring the prevalence of politico-economic interests behind Turkey's engagement in Somalia, Brendon Cannon argues that, "Turkey's interest in Somalia is driven not by Turkey's and Somalia's common Sunni Muslim heritage, or its Muslim Brotherhood ties, or because of some greater appeal to charity and development. Rather, Turkey's main aim in engaging Somalia is to gain political and diplomatic capital outside of Somalia as well as the locating of another market for Turkish goods"⁴⁰³.

⁴⁰⁰ *The Somali Investor*, 'Inside the new Aden Adde airport terminal', 7 April 2016.

⁴⁰¹ Achilles, Kathryn et al. "Turkish aid agencies in Somalia: Risks and opportunities for building peace", *Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center*, March 2015,p.20, accessed on 7th May 2018, <file:///C:/Users/dipam/Downloads/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>

⁴⁰² Ibid, p.24

⁴⁰³ Cannon Brendon. "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia". *Bildhaan*, Vol. 16, No 21 November 2016, P.103, accessed on 16 May 2018, at: <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1188&context=bildhaan>(accessed

Finally, the increasing involvement of Turkey in Africa's security landscape through its contribution to Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in Africa as well, its proactive role in state building activities in Somalia as well as its first "military training base" to be established in Mogadishu can be described as another clear indicator of Turkey's increasing recognition of the strategic importance of Africa for its own political, economic and security interests⁴⁰⁴ and this could challenge "the apparent 'ethical' tone of Turkish foreign policy"⁴⁰⁵.

2.4.1.3. Comparison and Assessment

In summary, we argue that historical, ideological, and economic and politico-security motivations exist behind both Turkey and EU's engagement in the development aid landscape in SSA. From a historical perspective, Turkey has grounded its recent opening to SSA as the rebirth and continuation of long-decades of historical ties between the Ottoman Empire and many African countries like Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc.....

Likewise, historical colonial relations that existed between some EU member States with Sub-Saharan African countries constitutes one of the main motivations behind EU focus on SSA as one of the main prioritized regions in its development aid policy. After the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, which coincided with the decolonization process in many African countries, France has struggled to provide its former colonies with an Associate status in the Treaty of Rome to maintain political and economic ties with these newly independent countries.

From the lens of ideological motives, Turkey and the EU have used benevolent and humanitarian reasons to justify and legitimize their involvement in SSA and have considered their engagement to provide aid to SSA as part of their foreign policy identity. Whereas on one hand, Turkey has portrayed itself as a humanitarian actor inspired by its neo-ottoman and clean state identity to explain its development aid policy towards SSA, the EU on the other hand self-conceives itself as a normative power using foreign aid to help boost the development of the African continent benevolently.

In terms of economic and politico-security motivations, Turkey views its involvement in SSA

⁴⁰⁴ Pham J.Peter. "Turkey's Return to Africa", *World Defense Review*, 27 May 2010, available at: <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham052710.shtml>

⁴⁰⁵ Langan, Mark. "Virtuous power Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa: the 'Neo-Ottoman' challenge to the European Union", *Third World Quarterly* volume 38, Issue 8, 2016, p.1409.

as a development aid provider as an opportunity to serve as entry-point for its business groups looking for new markets and investments, as well as the opportunity to affirm and consolidate its rising power status and to benefit from the support of African countries in international institutions. Like Turkey, the EU also uses development aid as a tool to pursue and protect its own interests in SSA, namely to secure cheap access to natural resources, to build a secure and favourable pace for European investors and businessmen in SSA as well as to secure its borders by reducing migration flows from SSA to Europe and to combat the rise of terrorism in the horn and Sahel regions in SSA and its spread to Europe.

In theoretical perspective, we also argue that one single theory (liberalism, realism and constructivism) cannot completely grasp the motivations behind EU and Turkey's development aid policy towards SSA. On one hand, and in line with idealist and constructivist perspectives, both Turkey and the EU have portrayed their engagement in sub-Saharan African aid sphere on humanitarian grounds and as part and parcels of their identity. Indeed, one cannot under-estimate the humanitarian activities of Turkey in SSA or denies the fact that Turkey has gained a new foreign policy identity as a 'humanitarian', 'neo-Ottoman' actor in the field of development cooperation in SSA, as highly demonstrated by its recent involvement in Somalia and by the fact that the largest recipients of Turkish aid have mostly been poor countries in SSA.

In the same manner, the EU uses humanitarian and normative rhetoric in its aid discourses towards SSA, but these normative commitments also constitute one of the core elements of the EU's international identity. This normative commitment is clearly expressed in the context of the Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement which provides that development cooperation can be suspended in case one of the Parties violates the "essential elements" of the agreement, including democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As such we join, at least rhetorically, the normative logic of the democratic peace thesis according to which western countries promote democracy to diffuse norms perceived as universally shared and accepted norms.

Yet, it seems to us that in many cases the normative grounds of the EU and Turkey's policy has come under pressure both from internal and external factors. Neorealism would agree with neoliberalism that EU and Turkey provide foreign aid to SSA to protect its self-economic and security interests because a stable and more prosperous African continent would create a more securitized pace for the pursuit and fulfilment of EU interests in this region.

In line with liberal and neorealist views, one must recognize that Turkey's development aid policies in SSA are in line with the pursuit of its own self-interests, in terms of seeking new economic partners, diversifying its markets and in terms of buttressing its ambitions to show its rising power status and be a key player in the world.

In a similar manner, the EU humanitarian and normative discourses have been trumped by elements of *realpolitik* and by strategic considerations. The historical ties that exist between some EU member states and sub-Saharan African countries, the strategic geographical position of some specific African countries, the extension of terrorist activities in the Sahel and the horn of Africa, and the huge natural resources that most African countries are blessed with, also compel us to consider the liberal and realist arguments, when analysing the determinants of EU aid policy towards SSA. Nonetheless, unlike the neoliberal view, realism insists on the fact that EU and Turkey will give priority to its materialistic interests whenever they are at stake with their claimed normative and humanitarian commitments.

The question of whether EU and Turkey's development aid policies follow purely neoliberal or neorealist views depends on the issue of whether humanitarian norms are valued more than Turkey's strategic interests and vice-versa in the formulation and implementation of their respective development aid policies in SSA.

Based on the statistics used in this study, we argue that EU's foreign aid policies towards SSA follow more realistic considerations than constructivist or idealistic ones, especially since EU ODA is not mostly allocated according to the needs of the recipient countries but rather according to the importance of the country in terms of protecting, promoting and securing the political, economic, and security interests of the EU. But, as a Union of 28-member states with divergent interests and priorities, one cannot totally blame the EU, especially when it comes to development aid provided to SSA, considering the predominant intergovernmental nature of EDF funds. Perhaps, if member states accept to "budgetize" the EDF, that could help remedy to the situation and makes prevalent EU norms over interests in the formulation and implementation of aid policies⁴⁰⁶. Still, even if EDF comes to be integrated into the EU budget, it will only resolve part of the solution, because member states (especially former colonial powers such as France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Belgium) continue to conduct bilateral aid policies with African countries, which most often do not overlap with EU policies.

⁴⁰⁶ The fate of EDF will be determined during post-Cotonou negotiations and we are looking forward to it.

In the case of Turkey, the fact that most of its largest recipient countries are in the Horn of Africa, are Muslim countries and the most needed African countries, clearly illustrated the fact that Turkey behave according to its own constructed identity as a "humanitarian", and "neo-ottoman" actor. Yet, although they play a more minimal role, realpolitik considerations are not totally absent. Turkish aid policies have opened the door for Turkish business groups and investors to penetrate the African continent and look for market and investment opportunities. Being farther from Africa (compared to EU countries), Turkey does not have a direct security interest in Africa, except the fact that it needs a secure environment for the protection of its growing investments in this continent. But Turkey does have political interests in Africa, namely by using its aid policies in SSA to show up its rising power status (providing more aid means a healthy economic situation in Turkey) and to gain support from African countries in international organizations.

2.4.2. Actors, Tools and Instruments

2.4.2.1. In EU's development aid policy towards SSA


To begin with the main actors involved in EU development aid policy towards SSA, it should be underlined that the development policy is a shared competence between the EU and its individual member states.

The EU competence in this regard is mainly exercised by the European Commission, more specifically by the European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO). DEVCO is mainly responsible for designing European development policy and delivering aid throughout the world. Its main tasks are to initiate development policy legislation to the Council and Parliament who decide under the co-decision procedure, to implement EU aid policies and to promote better harmonization of EU member states development policies.

Yet, it is worth pointing out that the scope of the Commission mandate is limited to the extent provided and allowed by Member States in the treaty and the member states, meeting in the council can reject a commission proposal for development aid agenda. In setting the development assistance strategies, priorities and funding allocations, the Commission work together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) the partner countries and regions.

The EEAS, established in 2010 as the diplomatic service of the EU, reports both to the Council and to the Commission, and supports the High Representative in her work to ensure overall political coordination of EU external actions, including development assistance.

Figure 2: Main actors and Decision-making process in EU Development Cooperation Policy Area



Source: Prepared by using the data available in Seek Development, Donor Profile EU: Global Development Policy making in the EU, April 2012.

With respect to the financial instruments used to implement EU development aid policies in SSA, the European Development Fund (EDF) constitutes the main financial instrument that

EU Member States use to provide development assistance to ACP countries⁴⁰⁷. Unlike funding from the EU budget, contributions to the EDF by individual EU member states “are based on a cost sharing formula agreed upon by the member states”,⁴⁰⁸ and approved by a Joint Council of Ministers of ACP countries and EU countries without any scrutiny from the European Parliament. Funds are allocated based on a ‘rolling programming’ system, in which partner countries are involved in determining cooperation priorities and projects⁴⁰⁹. The Commission funds most ACP aid programmes in four stages. Firstly, multi-annual indicative programmes identify overall priorities. After this, financing decisions are taken to allocate money to specific projects. Thirdly, contracts are prepared and signed at project level to start implementation. Finally, payments are made to the contractors for delivery⁴¹⁰.

Besides the EDF, Sub-Saharan African countries can benefit from aid funding from EU budget. In fact, the ACP countries may also receive some funding from thematic and geographic development programmes directed towards poverty reduction and open to all developing countries under the EU budget under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)⁴¹¹.

In illustration, the Pan-African programme established in 2014 is a new EU financial instrument dedicated to complement the EDF and implement the Joint Africa-EU strategic partnership. The programme is funded under the EU's DCI with a budget of €845 million for the period 2014-2020 and focuses on five principal areas, namely peace and security, democracy, good governance and human rights, human development, sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration, and global and cross-cutting issues⁴¹². Other financial instruments include but are not limited to, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument Contributing to Stability and

⁴⁰⁷ D'Alfonso, Alessandro. "European Development Fund, Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in?", European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2014, p.7, accessed on 12 November 2017, at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-IDA-542140-European-Development-Fund-FINAL.pdf>

⁴⁰⁸ Seek Development. "Donor Profile EU. Global Development Policy making in the EU", Seek Development, April 2012, p.2, accessed on 4th December 2017, at: file:///Users/erdi/Downloads/seek_donor_profile_eu_april_2012.pdf

⁴⁰⁹ Ramet, Valerie. "Fact Sheets on the European Union- A General Survey of Development Policy", European Parliament, March 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.3.1.html

⁴¹⁰ Europeaid. "ACP-Main Funding Programs", https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/main-programmes-eu-development-assistance-african_en

⁴¹¹ Seek Development, "Donor Profile EU: Global Development Policy making in the EU", Seek Development, April 2012, p.2.

⁴¹² Europeaid. "Pan-African Programme", https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/pan-african-programme_en

Peace (ICSP), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO).

Table 9

Overview of the main External Financing Instruments of the EU in SSA in 2015

Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	-Contributes to poverty eradication, sustainable development, democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights. -DCI geographic is disbursed to countries, DCI thematic to 'Global Public Goods and Challenges' and to ' CSOs and Local Authorities'
European Development Fund (EDF)	-Contributes to poverty eradication, sustainable development and integration to the world economy of ACPs and OCTs -Geographically concentrate on ACPs and OCTs
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	-Assists the development and consolidation of democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP)	-Supports security initiatives and peace-building activities -Addresses global and trans-regional threats
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	-Supports the deployment of overseas operations, using civilian and military instruments
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO).	-Financial decisions funding humanitarian actions and promoting civil protection

Source: Mackie James, Martin Ronceray and Lidet Tadesse. “Challenges for Africa-Europe Relations: a chance to get it right”, ECDPM 2018, p.4.

Regarding the main political tools used in EU development cooperation with SSA, political conditionality is the well-known political tool used by the EU in the provision of development aid to SSA. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement reflects the transition from purely economic cooperation to more inclusive political agreements in EU development policy towards SSA.

The big area of change concerns the political dimension in that Article 9 not only reiterates the notion of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law introduced in Lomé IV-bis, but also refers to good governance, which is said to be a “fundamental element of this agreement”. In the use and application of the conditionality tool, political dialogue constitutes an important phase. Indeed, in case of violation of the essential elements of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law, sanctions are not automatically taken against the given recipient country. On the contrary, a consultation procedure will be started to see what measures can be taken to remedy the situation (article 96 of the CPA).

The decision to start consultations under the Cotonou Agreement is taken by the council of foreign affairs based on a proposal tabled by an EU member state or by the EEAS in collaboration with the European commission. Once a serious breach of human rights or democratic principles is observed, the council of the EU invites the ACP country in question to participate in consultations under article 96⁴¹³. Generally, “consultations start with a meeting in Brussels between the EU, the ACP country accompanied by several ACP countries of its choice, and representatives from regional organizations such as the AU and ACP-secretariat. The EU and the responsible government adopt a list of commitments to be fulfilled within a timetable”⁴¹⁴. After the closing of consultations, the decision to take “appropriate measures” is based on EU independent evaluation of the progress made by the government in fulfilling the commitments. In fact, the most common strategy followed by the EU in the context of consultations consists of: “the redirection of aid to measures designed to fulfil the authorities’ commitments to redress breaches, most notably actions supporting the preparation of elections; and the incremental resumption of development cooperation on a conditional basis”⁴¹⁵.

Nonetheless, the lack of objective criteria regulating the consultation process and defining the “appropriate measures” might provide for arbitrary at the discretion of the EU and for general misunderstandings and frictions between the EU and its partners and within the EU itself, as well.

⁴¹³European Council. “Consultation Procedure (article 96)”available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cotonou-agreement/article-96-cotonou-agreement/>

⁴¹⁴ Portela Carla. "Political Dialogue and Human Rights in the Framework of the Cotonou Agreement". Research Collection School of Social Sciences Paper 1684,2007, p.8, accessed on 8 December 2018, at http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1684.

⁴¹⁵ Portela Carla. *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and why do they Work?* Routledge: London and New York,2010.

In addition to the use of political conditionality, the EU through the European Commission has set up, with funding from EU budget, an Election Observation Missions (EOM), made up of experts and observers from Member States. The Commission identifies several countries where an EU EOM could be deployed, in consultation with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The EOMs are generally deployed in Sub-Saharan African countries where contentious elections are held to help the countries hold free and fair elections. Their main tasks consist of observing, assessing and reporting to the EU the whole electoral process in a given country with respect to EU electoral democratic standards, of enhancing transparency and confidence in the process, and eventually preventing electoral. In the conduct of their missions, the EOM should respect the principles of independence, impartiality, transparency, long-term observation and professionalism⁴¹⁶. These reports made by the EOMs to the EU are sometimes considered by the EU in its decision to continue, suspend, or resume development cooperation with a given recipient country under article 96 of the CPA or to impose or renew restrictive measures against some political leaders in the recipient country. The EU deployed EOMs in many sub-Saharan African countries such as Ivory Coast in 2011, Zimbabwe in 2013, Gabon, Ghana and Zambia in 2016, Gambia in 2017. However, the role of the EOMs has been severely criticized by many African peoples and leaders as a violation of the national sovereignty of African countries, as an extension of the neo-colonial policies of some of the key EU former colonial powers (France, UK), as well as being largely partial in favour of one candidate party in their observation and reports.

Lastly, the EU has also increasingly used some other political tools that link effective development cooperation with some security issues such as combatting illegal migration and terrorism. In this context, the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy clearly stated that, “There cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace”⁴¹⁷. In this vein, the EU strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, the so-called Sahel strategy⁴¹⁸, launched in 2011 is the first document that is explicitly based on the recognition of the security-development nexus, highlighting the fact that security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that helping these countries achieve

⁴¹⁶ Europeaid. "Election Observer Missions in Action", https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-governance/democracy-and-human-rights/election-observation-missions-1_en

⁴¹⁷ European Council. "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy", 2008, p. 8, accessed on 2 December 2017, at www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/.../reports/104630.pdf.

⁴¹⁸ EEAS. "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel", accessed on 2 December 2017, at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/sahel_strategy_en_1.pdf

security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and poverty to be reduced⁴¹⁹. The Sahel strategy provides a comprehensive framework whereby the EU provides financial and technical assistance to core countries in the wider Sahel-Saharan region, namely Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, to help them address key security (migration and terrorism mainly) and development challenges⁴²⁰.

2.4.2.2. In Turkey's Development Aid Policy towards SSA

Regarding actors, both governmental and non-governmental organizations play a significant role in Turkish aid activities in SSA. Government bodies involved in Turkish development assistance policy include among others, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Disaster and Emergency Situation Management Agency, the Housing Development Administration, the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, the Turkish Sugar Factories, the Turkish National Policy Directorate, the Undersecretary of the Treasury, and the Ministry of Education.

Yet, TIKA remains the main governmental organization responsible for the formulation and implementation of Turkish aid projects in SSA. Indeed, TIKA was established in 1992⁴²¹ under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the main state institution “responsible for coordinating Turkey’s development cooperation with national actors, as well as with international organizations and bilateral donors”⁴²². Although its first area of intervention was the Turkic Republics in Post-Soviet communities, this area lately expanded to include other areas, mainly sub-Saharan African countries, with the objective to contribute to the eradication of poverty and sustainable development in these countries. Since 1999, TIKA became an organization working under the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey and the projects and activities tailored by TIKA in the recipient countries are mainly funded from the Turkish national budget upon decision by the Turkish parliament⁴²³. There are several representations of TIKA in many African countries such as Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Dakar,

⁴¹⁹ Ibid

⁴²⁰ Ibid


⁴²¹ The foundation of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Directorate was decided on 24/10/2011 by the Council of Ministers by Law no. 6223 dated 6/4/2011 (http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/organisation_law-8529)

⁴²² Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkey-Africa relations”.

⁴²³ Hausmann, Jeannine. "Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation", *German Development Institute Discussion Paper No14*, 2014, p.20

Mogadishu, Niamey, Nairobi, Dar Es Salam and Conakry and these offices are in turn considered as regional representations for coordinating and supervising TİKA’s projects in the surrounding African countries⁴²⁴.

Figure 3: TİKA Organisation Scheme



Source: TİKA Official website, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/organization_scheme-14648

Besides TİKA, the Turkish Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) is “an institution working to prevent disasters and minimize disaster-related damages, plan and coordinate post-disaster response, and promote cooperation among various

⁴²⁴ Ozkan, Mehmet. "Turkey’s Religious and Socio-Political Depth in Africa". *LSE IDEAS Special Report*, No 16, 2013, p.45–50.

government agencies’’⁴²⁵. For instance, at the height of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia in 2011, ‘‘AFAD conveyed humanitarian aid materials and employees in charge to the Somalia in coordination with General Staff, Ministry of Health, Foreign Ministry, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and Turkish Red Crescent’’⁴²⁶.

Another governmental organization, notable for its investment in education is the Turks Abroad and Related Communities Presidency (YTB) and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK). This institution offers yearly educational and research scholarship to the most-needed and qualified Sub-Saharan African citizens to study in Turkish universities. In this regard, Turkey provided 1239 scholarships for the education year of 2015-2016 for students from Africa. There are currently 5437 students in higher education and 116 visiting professors/research assistants from African countries⁴²⁷.

The General Directorate of State Aids, a department of the Turkish Prime Minister Under secretariat of Treasury, is among others charged with carrying out the secretariat services of State Aids monitoring and Supervision Board, with keeping up with the related European Union legislation and other relevant international regulations, with participating in communications and negotiations with international organizations and other countries, etc...⁴²⁸

About the non-governmental organizations, the most outstanding one is the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), which mainly conducts humanitarian actions in countries affected by wars and natural disasters. In the specific case of Africa, IHH’s first activities can be traced back to 1996 when it brought humanitarian assistance to Somalia. At the present, IHH operates in nearly in 35 SSA countries⁴²⁹ and its on-the-ground activities range from cataract projects⁴³⁰, to water-wells projects and educational infrastructure buildings⁴³¹, as well as the wide-distribution of meat to impoverished Muslims in SSA during *Qurban* celebration⁴³²,

⁴²⁵ See AFAD website at <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2572/About-Us>

⁴²⁶ Ibid

⁴²⁷ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs .’’Turkey-Africa relations’’,<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁴²⁸ See Website of the Turkish PM’s Under Secretariat of Treasury at <https://www.treasury.gov.tr/en-US/Pages/About-Us-Government-Support?nm=842>

⁴²⁹ See IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2016, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en>

⁴³⁰ Ozkan, Mehmet. ‘‘Turkey’s Religious and Socio-Political Depth in Africa’’, *LSE IDEAS Special Report*, No16 ,2013, p.46.

⁴³¹ Oruç, Hüseyin and Köse, Oğuzhan. ‘‘Human Rights and Freedoms, the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH) and its Activities’’, third Workshop Final Report: ‘Development Aids in African Countries and Turkish Civil Society Organizations, İstanbul: Tasam,2007, p.29.

⁴³² Shinn David. ‘‘Turkey’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Shifting Alliances and Strategic Diversification’’, *Chatnam House Research Paper* ,2015, p.15.

which is a religious event where livestock is sacrificed, and its meat distributed to the people in need.

The *Yeryüzü Doktorları* (Doctors Worldwide), established in 2000, is another independent charity organization intervening in SSA, whose mission is to carry out health programs and projects in terms of psychosocial support, equipment and system support, pharmaceutical and consumable support in underdeveloped countries faced with crisis and emergency situations. They have representatives in Somalia and Kenya and conduct their activities in many African countries such as Niger, Chad, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, etc..... This organization mostly works in coordination with the Turkish Ministry of health and TIKA as well as with local and international medical actors in the recipient countries in the implementation phase of its projects⁴³³.

The Turkish Red Crescent (*Türk Kızılayı*) is another non-governmental humanitarian organization that provides relief to the most vulnerable and in-need people at the international level. Its activities range from disaster response and emergency relief assistance activities, cash and in-kind relief services, health and social support services⁴³⁴. Currently, *Türk Kızılayı* is mobilizing resources to launch and conduct a comprehensive humanitarian operation in East Africa, especially in Somalia and South Sudan, which are faced with a drought and starvation crisis⁴³⁵.

The *Diyanet* Foundation (*Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı*) is another charity NGOs whose activities mainly focus on educational and academic activities. It ‘aspires to provide young pupils with a concrete religious education at all levels of schooling from Quran courses to Hafiz (Memorization) training, from High School to University and from a Masters certification up to a doctorate degree’⁴³⁶. In this context, the *Diyanet* Foundation "has opened Quran learning centres and religious vocational high schools in a range of countries including Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Romania, Bulgaria and Somalia” and it "offers scholarships and training to students and religious personnel from a range of countries in Turkey"⁴³⁷.

In terms of political tools and instruments, it can be argued that Turkey’s African development aid policy does not contain any democratic prerequisites and, in this sense, lacks political conditionality tool. This derives from the fact that Turkey considers political

⁴³³ See Yeryüzü Doktorları Derneği website at <https://www.yyd.org.tr/tr/kimiz>

⁴³⁴ See Türk Kızılay website at <http://www.kizilay.org.tr>

⁴³⁵ Ibid

⁴³⁶ Ibid

⁴³⁷ Aras Bülent and Pinar Akpınar. “The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 22, No 3, 2015, p.23.

conditionality as a form of intervention in the domestic politics of recipient countries, as a means of establishing asymmetrical relations between the aid provider and aid-recipients, as a form of neo-colonialism. The neo-colonial argument is particularly important for Turkey who prides itself for having never been in a colonial position with the African continent. In an interview given to *Afronline* in 2012, TIKA Director Serdar Çam makes this clear: “If we articulate this issue [conditionality] when dealing with any aid recipient, we would run the risk of punishing the people of that country in need of urgent help. Therefore, as an aid agency, our principle is not to interfere with the domestic policies of certain aid recipients”⁴³⁸.

However, Turkey aid is not as unconditional as we may think. Turkey’s development aid policy is much more Islamic-orientated, meaning that Muslim countries are more prioritized in the distribution of Turkey’s aid in Africa. Plus, most of the Turkish NGOs intervening in the field of development aid in SSA such as IHH, *Diyanet* foundations, to name the few, are religiously-inspired organizations that base their humanitarian engagement in Africa on religious grounds. In illustration, Izzet Sahin, Board Member and Diplomacy Coordinator at IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, explains the aid delivery system of IHH in the following terms:

Our system operates like the whirling dervishes of Rumi whose right hand is directed towards the sky to receive God’s beneficence and left hand towards the earth and the people to deliver God’s beneficence. Our right hand receives from the people in Turkey, a range of Turkish and international NGOs with whom we collaborate in terms of funding. Our left hand delivers the aid to people across 136 countries where we collaborate with more than 300 local NGOs⁴³⁹.

Islamic arguments are especially used in most of Humanitarian NGOs ‘food aid programs, putting forwards the argument that, “it is imperative that every Muslim share his/her fortune with the poor by donating money for animal sacrifices around the world”⁴⁴⁰. In other terms, these Muslim NGOs consider their humanitarian actions in SSA as a religious duty, “especially in Muslim purification rituals”⁴⁴¹. This explains the intensification of Turkish

⁴³⁸ Quoted in Sucuoglu Gizem, and Jason Stearns. “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid”, *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) research report* No 24, November 2016, at: <https://www.saiia.org.za/research-reports/1130-turkey-in-somalia-shifting-paradigms-of-aid-1/file>

⁴³⁹ Quoted in Aras Bulent and Pinar Akpınar. "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 22, No 3, 2015, p.239.

Comments by Izzet Sahin, Board Member and Diplomacy Coordinator at IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, at the meeting on the Role of NGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding, Istanbul Policy Centre, Istanbul, 3 December 2013.

⁴⁴⁰ Volkan Ipek and Gonca Biltekin. "Turkey's foreign policy implementation in sub-Saharan Africa: A post international approach", *Cambridge Core: New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 49, 2013, p.33.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid

humanitarian NGOs in Africa during the Holy month of Ramadan based on the Islamic tradition of charity during this month.

2.4.2.3. Comparative Assessment

In this section, we have critically assessed through a comparative lens the aid policy approaches of the EU and Turkey in SSA, with a special focus on the actors, tools and instruments. In terms of actors, although both the EU and Turkey have a central authority in charge with the formulation and implementation of foreign aid projects in the recipient countries (TIKA in Turkey and the European Commission and EEAS in the EU), the particularity of Turkey is the increasing and significant role played by NGOs in the development aid landscape in SSA in parallel with the State institution. This situation is likely to exacerbate the problem of coordination in aid management and in turn might impact negatively on the effectiveness of Turkey's development aid activities in SSA. Yet, even though NGOs are quasi-absent in EU development aid activities towards SSA, one must acknowledge that the issue of coherence and coordination is also one of the major problems of EU foreign aid activities in SSA because individual member states also conduct their own aid projects in individual African countries in parallel and sometimes in contradiction to the general EU aid policies in SSA.

Moreover, both in the EU and in Turkey, the independence of the central institution in charged with formulating and implementing aid activities in SSA is challenged by the possible influence of the Turkish Prime Minister on TIKa foreign aid management in the case of Turkey and by the fact that EU member states meeting in the Council can reject the Commission's proposal on development cooperation.

With respect to the tools and instruments, there are significant differences between EU and Turkey development aid approaches. Whilst in the EU case, development aid activities in SSA are mainly funded through the EDF without Parliament scrutiny, in the case of Turkey, TIKa aid projects are mainly funded by Turkey's budget adopted by the Parliament. Plus, whereas in the EU case, apart from the EDF, Sub-Saharan African countries can benefit from other sources of funding coming from the EU budget such as DCI in the field of development cooperation, in the case of Turkey, the sources of funding of aid activities by state institutions are restricted to the sole Turkish budget.

Regarding political instruments, whereas the EU has used conditionality policy to link the provision of its development aid to SSA to the fulfilment of some political criteria as well as to cooperation in some key security matters such as migration and terrorism, conditionality policy seems to be absent in Turkey's development aid policy towards SSA. Yet, one can find implicit 'cultural' conditionality in the provision of Turkey's development aid in SSA, manifested in the fact that Turkish aid is largely disbursed in African countries that are predominantly Muslim with past ottoman ties.

2.4.3. Aid Modalities and Geographical Distribution

2.4.3.1. In the case of the EU

The European Commission implements development cooperation projects under the EDF through project approach (for example supporting initiatives through the private sector or civil society), budget support (which involves direct financial transfers to the national budget of the beneficiary country to support its national development strategy), and/or through sector support (which is considered as an intermediate approach that focuses on a given sector)⁴⁴². Regarding the implementation process, each ACP country appoints a National Authorizing Officer who, together with the EU delegation, is responsible for all program-related matters⁴⁴³.


In terms of sectoral priorities of the EU's development policy in SSA, the Figure 4 below on EU ODA disbursements to Africa in 2015, shows that EU aid is primarily directed towards social infrastructures, followed respectively by budget support and food aid, and humanitarian aid.

Figure 4: EU Total ODA disbursements per sector to SSA, in million euros, in 2015

⁴⁴² D'Alfonso Alessandro. "European Development Fund, Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in?", European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2014, p.14.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-IDA-542140-European-Development-Fund-FINAL.pdf>

⁴⁴³ Donor Tracker. "Who are the main actors in EU development cooperation", <https://donortracker.org/countries/eu/2q>



Source: DEVCO Statistical dashboard (intranet data)⁴⁴⁴

In terms of aid channels, it stems from the Table 10 below that most of EU aid to SSA is channelled bilaterally compared to multilateral channels, as less than 1 percent of EU ODA is channelled multilaterally. However, when looking at the pattern in the three key EU individual member states, it appears that in 2014, the share in percentage of multilateral ODA is 27.29% for Germany, 40.57% for the UK and 34.03% for France. In 2015, multilateral ODA accounted for 19.45% of Germany's total ODA, 36.59 % of UK's total ODA, and 38.57% of France's total ODA.

Table 10

EU Institutions, Germany, UK and France' s Gross ODA breakdown: Bilateral excl. non-core, non-core and core multilateral contributions, Constant 2014 USD million

	Bilateral (excl non-core)	Non-core contribution (multi-bi)	Core-contribution (multilateral ODA)	Multilateral ODA as a % of total ODA

⁴⁴⁴ Note: Social infrastructures includes, but is not exhausted by: Education, Health and Population, Water Supply, Sanitation and Sewerage. Economic infrastructures include, but is not exhausted by: Energy, Transportation and Communications. Production sector comprises: Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry; Industry, Mining and Construction; Trade and Tourism. Multisector: support for projects which straddle several sectors, with a concentration on the environment, gender projects and urban and rural development.

	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
EU	10136	15422	8316	2970	62	147	0.33	0.79
Germany	12365	17307	895	1279	4977	4489	27.29	19.45
UK	8281	9073	3552	3541	8079	7281	40.57	36.59
France	8077	7678	123	134	4231	4906	34.03	38.57

Source: OECD Workbook. Use of multilateral system(https://public.tableau.com/views/multilateralaidssystem_2/Multilateralsystemdata?:embed=y&:showTabs=y&:display_count=no&:showVizHome=no#1)

Although the EU's multilateral ODA is very minimal compared to bilateral ODA, one should note that this does not mean the EU disregards the use of multilateral channels. Indeed, the EU does use the multilateral system by channelling its aid funds through multilateral organizations, although this type of aid is classified as a bilateral aid or multi-bi aid. As shown from the Table 10 above, in 2014, 8316 million USD of EU's total bilateral ODA (10136 million USD), which approximates to 82.04%, were channelled through multilateral organizations. The share of multi/bi ODA has nonetheless significantly decreased in 2015, with less than 20% of bilateral ODA being channelled through multilateral institutions. In contrast to the EU, less than 2% of France total bilateral ODA was channelled through multilateral organizations in 2014 and 2015. In the same stance, in Germany, in 2014 and 2015, respectively 7.23% and 7.39% of total bilateral ODA was channelled through multilateral organizations.

We notice a non-negligent share of multi-bi ODA in the case of UK, in with respectively 42.89% and 39.02% of total bilateral ODA being channelled through multilateral organizations, in 2014 and 2015(see Table 10 above).

With respect to the types of assistance used in EU development aid activities in SSA, the Table 11 below shows that grants constitute the largest type of ODA compared to loans. Moreover, humanitarian aid followed by technical cooperation constitutes the largest types of assistance disbursed by the EU to Sub-Saharan African Countries, between 2010 and 2016.

Table 11**EU Aid disbursement to SSA by type of aid in current US million dollars, 2010-2016**

Aid Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average 2010- 2016
Grants, Total	4 718.27	4 466.07	4 796.57	4 475.73	4946.4	3 777.07	4195.86	4482.28
ODA Loans, total net	49.12	47.21	26.67	144.97	110.55	59.55	62.58
Technical Cooperation	303.38	241.05	355.71	308.69	441.35	321.11	468.58	348.55
Development Food Aid	166.75	121.49	176.51	127.03	94.95	130.44	127.95	135.01
Humanitarian Aid	681.21	717.86	840.8	813.23	924.37	589.89	803.98	767.33
Net Total ODA (all channels)	4 718.27	4 515.2	4 843.75	4 501.9	5 091.33	3887.52	4255.03	4544.71

Source: OCED Statistics 2017

Table 12**Average of EU ODA disbursement to SSA per country in million USD, 2010-2016**

Country	Average 2010-2016	Ranking
South of Sahara, total	4544.71

Angola	34.92	33
Benin	73.16	28
Botswana	16.29	42
Burkina Faso	171.23	6
Burundi	79.22	24
Cabo Verde	23.06	36
Cameroon	81.74	21
Central African Republic	94.09	18
Chad	134.48	10
Comoros	10.01	43
Congo	26.03	35
Cote d'Ivoire	108.67	13
Democratic Republic of Congo	273.39	1
Djibouti	17.93	40
Equatorial Guinea	0.22	47
Eritrea	19.57	38
Ethiopia	220.02	2
Gabon	6.93	44
Gambia	18.43	39
Ghana	80.62	22
Guinea	56.98	29
Guinea- Bissau	21.83	37
Kenya	167.64	7
Lesotho	35.81	32
Liberia	79.26	23

Madagascar	73.46	27
Malawi	106.89	15
Mali	189.73	5
Mauritania	50.91	30
Mozambique	102.55	17
Namibia	17.54	41
Niger	201.74	4
Nigeria	105.59	16
Rwanda	90.02	19
Sao Tome & Principe	5.96	46
Senegal	81.78	20
Seychelles	6.21	45
Sierra Leone	77.36	27
Somalia	160.80	8
South Africa	207.82	3
South Sudan	108.46	14
Sudan	145.56	9
Swaziland	26.49	34
Tanzania	127.03	11
Togo	36.73	31
Uganda	116.26	12
Zambia	77.56	25
Zimbabwe	81.33	21


Source: OECD Statistics 2017

In terms of geographical repartition of EU ODA to SSA, Table 12 above shows that the EU

does not concentrate its ODA in a single or few Sub-Saharan African countries, although some countries received relatively more than others. As the Figure 5 below shows, while the total average of EU ODA to SSA between 2010 and 2016 amounted to 4544.71 million USD, the highest recipient of EU ODA received only 273,39 million USD of EU total ODA.

Regarding the largest recipients of EU total net ODA (bilateral and multilateral channels), the Figure 5 below shows that the top ten recipient of EU ODA for the period 2010-2016 are respectively DRC (273.39 million USD), Ethiopia (220.02 million USD), South Africa (207.82 million USD), Niger (201.74 million USD), Mali (189.73 million USD), Burkina Faso (171.23 million USD), Kenya (167.64 million USD), Somalia (160.80 million USD), Sudan (145.56 million USD), and Chad (134.48 million USD).

Figure 5: Top ten recipients of EU net ODA disbursement in SSA, Average 2010-2016, in current million USD




Source: OECD Statistics 2017

In addition, the Figure 6 below show that the most important recipients of EU bilateral ODA programming (including Development Cooperation Instrument, European Development Fund and European Neighbourhood Instrument) on a regional basis for the period 2014-2020 include the following countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria in West Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Chad and Burundi in Central Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in East Africa, and Mozambique, Malawi,

Madagascar and Zambia in South Africa. From the Sub-Saharan African region lens, the four top recipients of EU ODA are Burkina Faso, DRC, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, Burkina Faso and DRC, with Ethiopia ranking as the highest recipient, respectively followed by Mozambique, DRC and Burkina Faso.

Figure 6: EU ODA programming 2014-2020, including Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Development Fund (EDF) and European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)



Source: Adapted from: the EU-Africa Partnership. Key figures and achievements.

2.4.3.2. In the case of Turkey

In terms of implementation modalities, Turkish aid projects are implemented in the recipient country by taking in principle into account the specific needs and development priorities of

the country in question, which in turn are defined according to Turkey’s own expertise and experience. The implementation of TIKA’s projects is done in cooperation with ‘local staff and only a number of Turkish experts staying there for a limited time in a specific project’⁴⁴⁵.

With respect to the geographical distribution of Turkish aid to SSA, Table 13 below indicates that Turkey’s ODA is disproportionately distributed among Sub-Saharan African countries. In illustration, while the average total net ODA disbursement of Turkey to SSA amounted to 194,263 million USD from 2010 to 2015, Somalia which ranked as the largest recipient of Turkish ODA received alone 115,12 million USD.



Table 13

Average of Turkey’s ODA disbursement to SSA per country, 2010-2016, in million USD

⁴⁴⁵ Hausmann, Jeannine and Lundsgaarde, Erik. “Turkey’s Role in Development Cooperation”. *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*, 2015, p.7

	Average 2010-2016	Ranking
South of Sahara, total	183.42
Angola	0.045	42
Benin	0.428	22
Botswana	0.042	43
Burkina Faso	1.371	10
Burundi	0.264	33
Cabo verde	0.009	41
Cameroon	1.144	14
Central African Republic	0.572	21
Chad	0.644	18
Comoros	0.274	27
Congo	0.568	21
Cote d'Ivoire	0.578	20
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.774	17
Djibouti	1.325	11
Equatorial Guinea	0.008	42
Eritrea	1.325	11
Ethiopia	2.71	6
Gabon	0.20	34
Gambia	2.537	7
Ghana	1.20	12
Guinea	1.012	15
Guinea- Bissau	0.584 ¹⁵²	19
Kenya	2.015	8


Lesotho	0.084	36
Liberia	0.377	24
Madagascar	0.357	25
Malawi	0.117	35
Mali	1.78	9
Mauritania	3.588	4
Mauritius	0.08	37
Mozambique	0.262	28
Namibia	0.241	31
Niger	6.044	3
Nigeria	0.688	18
Rwanda	0.307	26
Sao Tome& Principe	0.038	40
Senegal	3.195	5
Seychelles	0.061	38
Sierra Leone	0.245	30
Somalia	107.19	1
South Africa	0.417	23
South Sudan	0.591	19
Sudan	20.277	2
Swaziland	0.058	39
Tanzania	0.831	16
Togo	0.258	29
Uganda	1.192	13
Zambia	0.237	33

Zimbabwe	0.238	32
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Source: OECD Statistics 2017

In addition, the largest ten Sub-Saharan African aid-recipient countries in the last 6 years were Somalia (107.19 million USD), Sudan (20.277 million USD), Niger (6.044 million USD), Mauritania (3.588 million USD), Senegal (3.195 million USD), Ethiopia (2.71 million USD), Gambia (2.537 million USD), Kenya (2.015 million USD), Mali (1.78 million USD), and Burkina Faso (1.371 million USD) (See Figure 7 below).

Figure 7: Top Ten Recipients of Turkey’s net ODA disbursement in SSA, Average 2010-2016, in million USD



Source: OECD Statistics 2017

In terms of types of assistance, Table 14 below shows that Turkey does not use loans as a type of aid to Sub-Saharan African countries, since its aid is essentially constituted of grants. Humanitarian aid, except for the years 2010 and 2016, is the largest type of assistance used by Turkey in SSA. It is followed by technical cooperation, which exponentially increased in 2015 but decreased significantly in 2016 too. On average, between 2010 and 2016, technical

cooperation followed by humanitarian aid is the largest types of assistance used by Turkey in SSA.

Table 14
Turkey's aid disbursement to SSA by type of aid in US million \$, 2010-2016

Aid Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average 2010-2016
Grants, Total	34.44	211.3	179.5	190.93	153.64	395.77	118.42	183.42
ODA Loans, total net
Technical Cooperation	10.81	19.12	17.02	21.69	20.25	359.32	4.98	64.74
Development Food Aid	0.74	0.24	2.19	0.07	0.07	0.31	0.50
Humanitarian Aid	2.13	156.39	48.11	37.19	38.91	13.75	11.72	44.02
Net Total ODA (all channels)	34.44	211.3	179.5	190.93	153.64	395.77	118.42	183.42


Source: OECD Statistics 2017

In terms of aid channels, most of Turkish aid to SSA is provided bilaterally, compared to multilateral aid. According to TIKA's 2015 report, in 2015, of Turkey's 3919 million USD in Official Development Assistance, 3845 million USD was in the form of bilateral aid.⁴⁴⁶ This

⁴⁴⁶TIKA. "Turkish Development Assistance report 2015", accessed on 10 December 2017, at:

means that multilateral ODA accounted for less than 2% of Turkish total ODA in 2015. In 2013, multilateral ODA amounted to Turkey paid 151 million USD (with 3156.67 million USD of bilateral assistance) and to 110.80 million USD in 2012⁴⁴⁷. According to TIKA's 2016 report, in 2015, of Turkey's 3919 billion USD in Official Development Assistance, 3845 million USD was in the form of bilateral aid and 73.2 million USD in the form of multilateral ODA. In 2016, bilateral ODA accounted for 6327.5 Million USD against 250.2 million USD for multilateral ODA. This means that multilateral ODA accounted for less than 2% of Turkish total ODA in 2015. In 2013, multilateral ODA amounted to Turkey paid 88.7 million USD (with 3502.4 million USD of bilateral assistance) (See Figure 8 below). According to one anonymous interviewee, Turkey prefers bilateral development cooperation over multilateral one because the first one is easily implemented, less bureaucratic and more beneficial to the recipient countries⁴⁴⁸.

Figure 8: Bilateral and Multilateral Distribution of Turkey's Official Development Assistance (2014-2016; Million USD)



Source: TIKA Annual report 2016.

In terms of sectorial priorities in Turkish development aid programmes in SSA, there is no specific data on the sectoral distribution of Turkey's ODA in SSA. Yet, we can read from the

<http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2017/YAYINLAR/TKYR%202015%20ENG/KALKINMA%20.pdf>

⁴⁴⁷ TIKA. "Turkish development assistance report 2013".

⁴⁴⁸ Interview by email with an Official at TIKA Representative Office in Addis-Ababa who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee TK1)

TIKA development assistance report that in general, Turkish aid activities in the recipient countries focus on social services and infrastructures, which include sub-sectors such as education, strengthening administrative and civil infrastructure, health, water and sanitation⁴⁴⁹. An examination of the Figure 8 below on Turkey's 2015 bilateral ODA by sector reveals that 780 million USD was spent in the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector, 90 million USD went to the Economic Infrastructure and Services Sector, 23 million USD to the Manufacturing Sector and 4 million USD went towards Multi-Sectoral activities (see Figure 9 below). In terms of ratio, about 86.9% of Turkey's bilateral ODA has been utilized in the social services and infrastructure sector, against 10.0% in the economic service sector, 2.6% in the manufacturing sector and 0.5% in multi-sectoral activities (see Figure 10 below).

According to TIKAs annual report, the sectoral distribution of assistance expenditures and percentage shares (in parentheses) of TIKAs budget were as follows: 121.97 million USD (72.46%) for social infrastructure and services; 22.76 million USD (13.52) economic infrastructure and services; 7.9 million USD (4.70%) for production sectors and 15.71 million USD (9.32%) on multi-sector initiatives⁴⁵⁰.

Having said this, we can argue that the same applies to SSA, because the main activities financed by TIKAs in favour of development aid programme in Africa include 'agriculture, health, education, water and sanitation, vocational training, institutional capacity development and humanitarian assistance'⁴⁵¹, which are almost the sub-sectors of social service and infrastructural sector. In illustration, we can cite the 'Africa Agricultural Development Programme', the 'Africa Health Programme' and the 'Africa Vocational Training Programme', which are "multi-country programmes tailored to meet the specific needs of African countries"⁴⁵². In addition to these capacity-building activities, TIKAs also initiates several other projects "in building physical infrastructures for the provision of social services such as the construction of schools and hospitals"⁴⁵³.

⁴⁴⁹ See TIKAs "TIKA Development Assistance Report 2015", p.9.


⁴⁵⁰TIKA. "TIKA Annual Report 2014", p.15, accessed on 22nd November 2017, at: http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORLAR/PDFLER/FR2014_ENG.pdf.

⁴⁵¹Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and the Least Development Countries (LDC) Aspect", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa

⁴⁵² Ibid


⁴⁵³ Ibid

Figure 9: Sectoral Distribution of Turkey’s Bilateral Official Development Assistance (2015; Million USD)



Source: TIKA. Turkish Development assistance report,2015.

Figure 10: Sectoral Ratios of Turkey’s Bilateral Official Development Assistance (2016; in %)



Source. TIKA. “Turkish Development Assistance Report 2016”.

2.4.3.3. Comparative concluding Remarks

Regarding the types of assistance, both in the EU and Turkey, humanitarian aid flowed by technical cooperation respectively (except in the years 2010 and 2015 for Turkey) constitute the largest types of aid used in their development aid policy towards SSA. Yet, unlike the EU case, the use of loans seems to be quasi-inexistent in Turkey's aid activities in SSA as Turkey's ODA to SSA is essentially composed of grants.

With respect to the aid formulation and implementation modalities, unlike the case of the EU where aid projects and priorities are primarily drawn by the European Commission, albeit with consultation with African partners and are attached with some conditionality, most Turkish ODA operations are unconditional and demand-driven which are initiated upon requests from political leaders or even sometimes common citizens. Such an approach ensures recipient country ownership and hence further facilitates the smooth implementation of aid schemes. Another difference between EU and Turkey's aid modalities lies in the fact that whereas EU aid projects in SSA are long-term projects and based on a comprehensive framework regulating the modalities, in the case of Turkey aid projects are mostly prompt, short-term based and do not stem from a comprehensive policy framework.

In terms of aid channels, both Turkey and the EU give preference to the bilateral channel over multilateral channel in the delivery of their aid to SSA. What might explain this similar preference for both donors? It is generally assumed that donors' preference for bilateral channels over multilateral ones is mainly due to political reasons, namely by the fact that aid can be easily used for political purposes and for the achievement of self-interests, when it is channelled bilaterally, without controls from multilateral agencies⁴⁵⁴. One TIKA Official underlined that this preference for bilateral development cooperation is mainly explained by the easiness and flexibility of implementation of this mode of cooperation in the following terms:

It is true that most of the Turkish official direct assistance is bilateral. The main reason is that there is incompatibility between the modes of conduct. We are very practical. We easily decide and implement projects. Our friends – traditional donors – their budgeting system is different. They submit projects to their parliament and get a budget. We get an aggregate budget. First, we have the money, then decide the

⁴⁵⁴ Gulrajani Nilima. "Bilateral versus multilateral channels: strategic choices for donors". *Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Report*, March 2016, p.10; Nunnenkamp, Peter. and Thiele, R. "Targeting Aid to the Needy and Deserving: Nothing but Promises?", *TWEC World Economy* 29/9, 2006, p.1177-1201; Sippel, Maike. and Neuhoff, K. "A history of conditionality: lessons for international cooperation on climate policy", *Climate Policy* 9/5, 2009, p.481-494.

projects. We can easily decide on a project. They are not so flexible in that sense. In terms of aid effectiveness, we have some value added in that sense⁴⁵⁵.

Added to that, the fragile situation in conflict countries can also be another reason for donors to prefer multilateral channels in the provision of aid. In this stance, one interviewee at the Europe-Aid office in Brussels underlines that the EU mainly implements its aid projects in Somalia through multilateral channels considering the fragile situation in this country. Lastly, bilateral development cooperation is hailed to be easily implementable, less bureaucratic and more effective.

In terms of sectoral priorities, Turkey and the EU share some common privileged sectors of intervention, namely social infrastructures, such as health, education and water supply (see Figure 5 for the EU, Figures 9 and 10, and Turkish MFA website for Turkey⁴⁵⁶). However, unlike the EU case where budget support constitutes the second largest aid sectors in SSA, budget support seems to be quasi-inexistent in Turkey's development aid modalities towards SSA.

With respect to geographical repartition, statistics have demonstrated that most Turkish funds went to Muslim-majority countries, some with Ottoman era connections like Somalia and Sudan (See Figure 7 above). In addition to that, most of these aid-recipient countries are in the Horn of Africa, except Senegal, Niger and to a certain extent Mauritania. This is certainly due to the region's high Muslim population and historical Ottoman ties. Somalia is a clear example of how development cooperation fits into the larger framework of Turkey's foreign policy, which comprises economic, military and cultural cooperation as well as political support.

In contrast, in the EU case, the geographical distribution of aid does not follow any religious and cultural logics but are rather based on the needs and geostrategic and economic significance of the recipient countries. As we can see from the Figure 5 above, 9 of the 10 largest recipients of EU ODA between 2010 and 2015 are in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa, two of the most important geostrategic regions in SSA, in terms of combating terrorism, piracy and illegal migration. For instance, countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali are the largest recipients of EU ODA between 2010-2015 in West Africa because these

⁴⁵⁵ Quoted in Maza, Cristina. "Turkey : Impressive Aid Record mired in bad practices ", UnitedExplanations, accessed on 2nd august 2018, at <http://unitedexplanations.org/english/2014/12/01/8541/>

⁴⁵⁶ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and the Least Development Countries (LDC) Aspect", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa

countries are selected as the strategic countries that will work with the EU in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel through the Sahel Strategy adopted in 2011. Along similar lines, countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan are the largest beneficiaries of EU ODA in the horn of Africa and are all part of the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa adopted in 2011.

Unlike Turkey's case where most of the recipient countries are the poorer countries in SSA (see Figure 7 above and Table 15 below), in the EU case, South Africa, which is categorized as a upper middle-income country in SSA (see Table 15 below) and constitutes the largest economic power in SSA, ranks as the second largest recipient of EU ODA after DRC (see Figure 5 above), while other Sub-Saharan African countries in most of needs, namely Somalia and South Sudan (categorized as low income countries according to the Table 15 below), rank at the lowest levels (See Figure 5 above). This illustrates the fact that unlike Turkey's case where aid disbursement is mostly based on the needs of the recipient countries, in the EU case, the recipient-needs logic is not always at the core of aid disbursement's criteria. This is in line with the words of Serdar Cam, the president of TIKA, underlying that: "Turkey has been putting into practice a development assistance approach which does not focus solely on national income levels of countries (...), and concentrates on their needs"⁴⁵⁷.

Similarly, the fact that DRC ranks as the first largest recipient of EU ODA in SSA despite the authoritative practices of its President Kabila and the worsening democratic and human rights situation in this country, clearly illustrated the fact that interests more than norms play a significant role in the geographic distribution of EU ODA in SSA, because one should not underestimate the reality of DRC being potentially one of the richest countries on earth in terms of natural resources (see Map 1 below). Nonetheless, one should not overlook the fact that recipient needs are not totally absent in the EU aid disbursement criteria, as evidenced by the fact that countries plagued by conflicts, drought and famine, notably Somalia and South Sudan are among the ten largest recipients of EU aid.

⁴⁵⁷TIKA. "Turkish development assistance report 2015", accessed on 10 December 2017, at: <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2017/YAYINLAR/TKYR%202015%20ENG/KALKINMA%20.pdf>


Table 15

Classification of Sub-Saharan African countries by income group (GNI per capita in current US dollars), June 2017

Low Income (\$1,005 or less)	Burundi, Liberia, CAR, Madagascar, Chad, Malawi, Comoros, Mali, DRC, Mozambique, Eritrea, Niger, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Gambia, The Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Lower-Middle Income (\$1,006 to \$3,955)	Angola, Mauritania, Cabo Verde, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Cameroon, Sudan, Congo, Rep., Swaziland, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Djibouti, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, Lesotho
Upper Middle Income (\$3,956 to \$12,235)	Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Namibia, South Africa
High Income (\$12,236 or more)	Seychelles

Source: World Bank data, available at: <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>

Map 1: Resource-rich countries in SSA



Source: Extracted from Oxfam IBIS (Education for Development). “Resource rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa”, October 2014.

2.4.4. Conclusion

In this second chapter, we have first presented the successive steps taken at the international level to improve the quality of foreign aid. In this context, the 2003 Rome Declaration, the 2005 Paris Declaration and its 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and the most recent 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation have been succinctly examined in terms of strengths and weaknesses in the field of international aid effectiveness debates. We have also examined the steps taken by the EU and Turkey to implement the international aid effectiveness principles, agreed and adopted by them in these for a. Thereafter, we have given a brief overview of the tripartite relations between the EU and SSA, Turkey and SSA and the EU and Turkey.

As for the EU-SSA relationships, the successive documents and frameworks that have been adopted since the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Lomé Conventions, Cotonou Partnership Agreement, EU-Africa summit, EPAs, etc...) have been examined in detail. Turkey-SSA relations have experienced a strong impetus since the coming to power of the JDP ruling. Indeed, since 2005, the world has witnessed an intensification of socio-economic, diplomatic and political relations between Turkey and SSA, at continental, regional and bilateral levels. Turkey-EU relations are mainly based on the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which established a Customs Union between EU and Turkey in 1996. Other issues such as Turkey's candidacy to the EU, and the recent developments in EU-Turkey relations (migration deal, July 2017 coup d'état in Turkey, elections in Europe, etc....) have been elaborated too.

In a second part, we have critically compared the policy approach of EU and Turkey's development aid strategies in SSA, in terms of motivations, actors, tools and instruments, aid modalities and geographical distribution, to shed light on the existing similarities and differences. In terms of motivations, we argue that historical, ideological, and economic and politico-security motivations exist behind both Turkey and EU's engagement in the development aid landscape in SSA. From a theoretical perspective, we also argue that one single theory (liberalism, realism and constructivism) cannot completely grasp the motivations behind EU and Turkey's development aid policy towards SSA.

Coming to the main actors involved in EU development aid policy towards SSA, it should be underlined that the development policy is a shared competence between the EU and its individual member states. The EU competence in this regard is mainly exercised by the European Commission, more specifically by the European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development –DEVCO.

With respect to the financial instruments used to implement EU development aid policies in SSA, the European Development Fund (EDF) constitutes the main financial instrument that EU Member States use to provide development assistance to ACP countries. Besides the EDF, Sub-Saharan African countries can benefit from aid funding from EU budget. Some politico-security instruments (political conditionality, cooperation on migration and security issues such as the G5 Sahel) are also used by the EU in its aid policies with SSA.

With respect to actors, in Turkey's case, both governmental and non-governmental organizations play a significant role in Turkish aid activities in SSA. In this context, TIKA is the main governmental organization responsible for the formulation and implementation of Turkish aid projects in SSA. In terms of political tools and instruments, it can be argued that Turkey's African development aid policy does not contain any democratic prerequisites and, in this sense, lacks political conditionality tool, although some religious considerations are prominent.

Regarding the types of assistance, both in the EU and Turkey, grants and technical cooperation respectively constitute the largest types of aid used in their development aid policy towards SSA. Yet, unlike the EU case, the use of loans seems to be quasi-inexistent in Turkey's aid activities in SSA.

With respect to the aid formulation and implementation modalities, unlike the case of the EU where aid projects and priorities are primarily drawn by the European Commission, albeit with consultation with African partners and are attached with some conditionality, most Turkish ODA operations are unconditional and demand-driven which are initiated upon requests from political leaders or even sometimes common citizens. Such an approach ensures recipient country ownership and hence further facilitates the smooth implementation of aid schemes. Another difference between EU and Turkey's aid modalities lies in the fact that whereas EU aid projects in SSA are long-term projects and based on a comprehensive framework regulating the modalities, in the case of Turkey aid projects are mostly prompt, short-term based and do not stem from a comprehensive policy framework.

In terms of aid channels, both Turkey and the EU give preference to the bilateral channel over multilateral channel in the delivery of their aid to SSA. In terms of sectoral priorities, although Turkey and the EU share some common privileged sectors of intervention such as health, education and nutrition, sustainable agriculture and food security, energy, infrastructure and transport, in the case of the EU governance and human rights particularly constitute the biggest funded aid sector (27%).

Regarding the geographical repartition, statistics have demonstrated that most Turkish funds went to Muslim-majority countries, some with Ottoman era connections like Somalia and Sudan. In addition to that, most of these aid-recipient countries are in the Horn of Africa, except Senegal, Niger and to a certain extent Mauritania. In contrast, in the EU case, the geographical distribution of aid does not follow any religious and cultural logics but are rather based on the needs and geostrategic and economic significance of the recipient countries.

CHAPTER 3. TRANSLATING THE BUSAN PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EU AND TURKEY IN ETHIOPIA, NIGER, NIGERIA, AND SOMALIA

This third and last chapter will first focus on a critical and empirical analysis of Turkey and EU's development aid effectiveness in SSA through a comparative assessment of their performance in the context of the four Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) and the related seven indicators. As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis does not assess development cooperation effectiveness in terms of outputs but in terms of inputs, here measured by the implementation of the Busan principles by Turkey and the EU in the selected recipient Sub-Saharan African countries. There is an implicit assumption in this thesis that a strict respect of the principles of ownership, inclusive partnerships, focus on results, transparency and accountability by Turkey and the EU in the implementation of their development aid policies in SSA would contribute to the improvement of aid quality in this region. Prior to that, an overview of the historical and political situation of each country- case study will be briefly done.

After having compared the degree of performance by Turkey and the EU of the Busan principles, the second part will go in search for the factors that could explain the varying levels of performance between the two donors. In doing so, we will posit few relevant auxiliary hypotheses derived from the three main IR theories we use in this thesis (Realism, Liberalism and Social constructivism) that will be tested to the selected country-case studies to shed light on the explanatory powers of each of these theories.

The last part of this chapter goes beyond the questions treated in this thesis to open new perspectives for further research. It mainly examines the prospects for and perspectives of triangular cooperation as the best model of cooperation that would boost the development effectiveness in SSA with a special consideration of Turkey's critical role in this regard.

3.1. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EU AND TURKEY'S PERFORMANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF BEDCPS IN ETHIOPIA, NIGER, NIGERIA AND SOMALIA

In this section, we will critically analyze the performance of the EU and Turkey in the context of BEDCPS in the four countries-case studies. For this assessment, we will use quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data mainly stem from the OECD statistics, the statistics provided by the EU Institutions and Turkish Government. The qualitative data are based on a critical analysis of reports and interviews. Following this assessment, we will look at the factors that could explain eventual unevenness between the EU and Turkey on the performance of these principles by using some auxiliary hypotheses that will be tested to our cases.

Prior to all these, we need to overview the historical, political, and economic situation of the recipient countries (namely Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia) as well as the policies, actions, and activities of both donors (EU and Turkey) in the field of development aid. Thereafter, we will also provide a summary of the Busan principles and its related indicators and how we will measure them in this study.

3.1.1. Background: Country and development Aid in context

3.1.1.1 Ethiopia

Geo-strategically located at the horn of Africa, Ethiopia represents Africa's second most populous country (102 million (2016)⁴⁵⁸, after Nigeria, and constitutes one of the fastest growing economies in SSA. Its GDP was at US\$61.5 billion in 2015. Yet, the country stands at the same time as one of the poorest and low-income country, with a per capita income of \$660, and an estimated poverty headcount of 23.4% of the population in 2015⁴⁵⁹.

Coming to bilateral relations between the EU and Ethiopia, they are governed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). Development aid is provided to Ethiopia, essentially through

⁴⁵⁸The World Bank. "Ethiopia Overview", accessed on 21st January 2018, [Http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview)

⁴⁵⁹GPEDC. "Monitoring Profile-Ethiopia", October 2016, accessed on 21st January 2018, [Http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Ethiopia_4.10.Pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Ethiopia_4.10.Pdf)

the European Development Fund (EDF). The EU is one of the largest donors of Ethiopia, as EU development cooperation support to Ethiopia exceeds € 2 billion for the period 2014-2020. In addition to programmable funds from the EDF, Ethiopia benefit from Non-programmable development aid from the different EU thematic instruments, such as civil society, democracy and human rights, stability and peace, global funds and other facilities, as well as from Projects funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa addressing the root causes of irregular migration, displacement of population and instability⁴⁶⁰. Ethiopia has since 2011 been one of the EU pilot countries of aid effectiveness⁴⁶¹.

At the bilateral political level, the EU and Ethiopia, on 14 June 2016, signed a Joint Declaration towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement, which "commits both sides to an annual Ministerial Meeting and six sectoral dialogues: Governance and Human Rights; Regional Peace and Security; Countering Terrorism and Violent Radicalization; Migration; Social and Economic Development, Investment and Trade; and Climate Change and Environmental Cooperation"⁴⁶².

Economically, the EU is one of the main trade partners of Ethiopia. For instance, with a total volume of more than 4.1 billion Euro in 2016, the EU ranks as the second most important trade partner for Ethiopia. In 2016, Ethiopia ranks as the 70th EU main trading partners and EU Investment to Ethiopia over the period 1992-2014 have amounted to over 2 billion Euro⁴⁶³.

Regarding Turkey-Ethiopia relations, both countries have held close relations during the Ottoman era. Indeed, it is said that:

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Ethiopia started in 1896 with the exchange of delegations during the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II and Emperor Menelik II. Following the opening of the first Ottoman-Turkish Consulate General in Harar, in 1912, the first embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa was opened in Addis Ababa, in 1926. The Ethiopian side opened its Embassy in Turkey in 1933. The Embassy of Ethiopia in Ankara was closed in 1984 during the Communist Derg regime and it was re-opened on 21 April 2006⁴⁶⁴.

Although Turkey-Ethiopia relations stalled back during the early years of the Turkish Republic era, this relationship has again been revived and intensified since the coming to

⁴⁶⁰EEAS. "Ethiopia and the EU", accessed on 21st January 2018, https://Eeas.Europa.Eu/Delegations/Ethiopia/1186/Ethiopia-And-Eu_En

⁴⁶¹ ibid

⁴⁶² Ibid

⁴⁶³ EU Business Forum Ethiopia. "EU-Ethiopia relations », <http://www.eubfe.eu/index.php/eu-and-ethiopia>

⁴⁶⁴ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA). "Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia", accessed on 23 January 2018, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ethiopia.en.mfa>

power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with the launch of the "Africa's opening policy". Ethiopia is one of the largest economic partners of Turkey in SSA. For instance, "as of the end of 2017, the number of Turkish firms active in Ethiopia is around 150 and the number of employments by these firms has reached about 30.000 although it was only 1 and 5 respectively, in 2003. The total amount of investment by the Turkish firms in Ethiopia is around 2,5 billion USD"⁴⁶⁵. Likewise, "the trade volume was 27 million USD in 2000, 140 million USD in 2005, 441 million USD in 2012 and 421 million USD at the end of 2013. The export from Turkey to Ethiopia was 439.73 million USD while the import from Ethiopia to our country was 35, 31 million USD in 2016"⁴⁶⁶. An agreement on the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments which signed by Turkey and the government of Ethiopia on the 16th day of November 2000, in Addis Ababa⁴⁶⁷.

In terms of development aid, Ethiopia is also one of the main recipients of Turkish ODA. Ethiopia has been the first country where TIKA opened its regional representations in Africa in 2005⁴⁶⁸. Through TIKA, Turkey for instance has been supporting people with disability by providing wheelchairs and other materials for people in Assosa and Makalle. Turkey has also provided personal computers for schools in Addis and is restoring Nejashi tomb and mosque⁴⁶⁹. Another important project done by TIKA is the restoration of the old Ottoman consulate building in Harare⁴⁷⁰.

3.1.1.2. Niger

Niger is a landlocked country located in the Sahel region of West Africa. The country suffers from the spillover of the insecurity situation in neighboring countries such as extremism in Mali, lack of operational government in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and it has since been the target of terrorist attacks. Niger's GDP decreased from 7.0% in 2014 to 3.5% in 2015 and Foreign direct investment (FDI) also decreased from 16.63% of GDP in 2011 to 7.36% in 2015. With a poverty rate of 48.9% and a per capita income of \$420, Niger is one of the

⁴⁶⁵ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA). "Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia", accessed on 23 January 2018, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ethiopia.en.mfa>

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid

⁴⁶⁷ See Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia concerning the reciprocal promotion and Protection of Investments, 16th November 2000.

⁴⁶⁸ TMFA. "Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia", accessed on 23rd January 2018
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ethiopia.en.mfa>

⁴⁶⁹ *The Ethiopian Herald*. "Ethio-Turkey historic relations flourishing investment", 12 November, 2016, <http://www.ethpress.gov.et/herald/index.php/technology/item/6637-ethio-turkey-historic-relations-flourishing-investment>

⁴⁷⁰ Haftu Gebrezgabiher. "Ethiopia: Glorious Ethio-Turkish Relations", *allafrica.com*, 26 July 2017, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201707260601.html>

world's poorest nations. In 2015, it ranked 188th of 188 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index⁴⁷¹. Niger is an aid-dependent country since 45 % of Niger's budget is financed by external support, mainly by the EU, the World Bank, the United Nations, the African Development Bank, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark (the EU and the EU countries, including Germany, Spain and Italy, account for 25 % of its external support)⁴⁷².

Regarding EU-Niger relations, development aid is at the center under the CPA framework. Niger benefits from EU development aid under the 11th EDF (2014-2020, with an amount of 596 million euros⁴⁷³). Moreover, the European Commission provides humanitarian assistance to Niger, to meet the country's humanitarian needs, which have further worsened with the huge displacement of people from North-east Nigeria to the remote Diffa region in the east of the country. With a total contribution of €49 million for 2015 and an initial budget of €36 million in 2016, the European Commission is one of Niger's main lenders, providing essential emergency aid⁴⁷⁴.

Furthermore, given Niger's role as a key transit country for irregular migrants from West Africa, "a High-Level Dialogue was launched by the HR/VP when she visited Niger in September 2015 and Niger is one of the priority countries within the Partnership Framework on migration. Important steps have been taken in consolidating the EU-Niger migration dialogue and creating synergies between migration-development and security actions in the spirit of Valetta"⁴⁷⁵. Niger is also part of the G5 Sahel⁴⁷⁶, which regroups countries in the Sahel that benefit from the technical and financial support from the EU under the EU Strategy for Security and Development ("Sahel Strategy"), adopted in March 2011, to help countries in the wider Sahel-Sahara region address key security and development challenges⁴⁷⁷.

⁴⁷¹The World Bank. "Niger Overview", accessed on 21st January 2018, [Http://Www.Worldbank.Org/En/Country/Niger/Overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview)

⁴⁷² EU Delegation in Niger. "Niger and the EU", https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/niger/4356/node/4356_zh-hant

⁴⁷³Niger receives one of the highest Per Capita Aid Allocations under the 11th EDF

⁴⁷⁴EEAS. "Niger and the EU", [https://Eeas.Europa.Eu/Delegations/Niger_En/4356/Niger%20and%20the%20eu](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/niger_en/4356/niger%20and%20the%20eu)

⁴⁷⁵See EEAS website, at: [https://Eeas.Europa.Eu/Headquarters/Headquartershomepage_En/4099/The%20european%20union%20and%20the%20sahel.%20fact%20sheet](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/4099/The%20european%20union%20and%20the%20sahel.%20fact%20sheet)

⁴⁷⁶Formally Created in December 2014, the G5-Sahel Includes the following Countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

⁴⁷⁷See EEAS Website, at: [https://Eeas.Europa.Eu/Headquarters/Headquartershomepage_En/4099/The%20european%20union%20and%20the%20sahel.%20fact%20sheet](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/4099/The%20european%20union%20and%20the%20sahel.%20fact%20sheet)

Economically, whilst Niger does not rank among the largest trading partner of the EU, the EU remains the main trading partner of Niger. In 2016, Niger ranks as the 131st trading partner of the EU in the world. The EU is Niger's main trading partners⁴⁷⁸.

With the likes of other countries in SSA, Turkey-Niger relations have been intensified in the framework of the implementation of Turkey's policy of opening to Africa in the mid-2000s. Turkey opened its embassy in Niamey on 3 January 2012 and the embassy of Niger became operational in Ankara in September 2012. Bilateral visits have been important since then, with the official visit of the Prime Minister of Turkey to Niger on 8-9 January 2013 and the official visit paid by the President of Niger to Turkey on 23-25 January 2018⁴⁷⁹.

In terms of development assistance, the Turkish Agency of Cooperation and Coordination (TIKA) has an office in Niger and is involved in several technical assistance programs for Niger. It also undertakes several projects which directly touch upon the daily lives of many Nigeriens, such as schools, clinics, parks and orphanages. Moreover, Turkish NGO's are providing humanitarian assistance to the "brotherly people of Niger"⁴⁸⁰. In the framework of the project "Niger Mixed Boarding School and Friendship Park," a 42-classroom mixed school for 1260 students, a dormitory to serve a total of 648 students and a sports complex was built and furnished, and the Turkey-Niger Friendship Park was maintained and renovated⁴⁸¹. In the same vein, "TIKA also procured all necessary medicine and medical consumables for the Maternal Health and rehabilitation centre, whose construction began in 2013. The enclosure walls of the hospital, measuring 1,073 meters in length, were replaced and strengthened with concrete and steel by TIKA"⁴⁸².

In economic and trade spheres, the signing of the "Agreement of Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation" on 9 October 2012 has laid down the necessary foundation of the economic and trade relations between Turkey and Niger. The Joint Economic Commission set up following the "Agreement of Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation", held its first session in Ankara on 5-6 November 2014⁴⁸³. The bilateral trade volume has largely increased

⁴⁷⁸ European commission-Directorate general for trade. "European Union, Trade in goods with Niger", accessed on 2 December 2017, at:http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147349.pdf

⁴⁷⁹ TMFA." Relations between Turkey and Niger", available at: <Http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Relations-Between-Turkey-And-Niger.En.Mfa>

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid

⁴⁸¹ TIKA. "Turkish Development Assistance report 2015".

⁴⁸² TIKA. "Turkish Development Assistance report 2016"

⁴⁸³ TMFA." Relations between Turkey and Niger", available at: <Http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Relations-Between-Turkey-And-Niger.En.Mfa>

in the recent years. While, it was 21, 7 million USD as of November 2016, the total bilateral trade increased up to 34.3 million dollars as of November 2017⁴⁸⁴.

3.1.1.3. Nigeria

With approximately 184 million inhabitants, Nigeria is one of Africa's most populous country and one of the world's biggest oil exporters. Nigeria is one of Africa's largest economies, although its GDP growth has experienced a decline in the recent years, "caused mostly by the global oil price downswing". Nigeria continues to face terrorist attacks in the northeast from Boko Haram⁴⁸⁵.

EU's relations with Nigeria are also founded on the CPA. In this sense, Nigeria benefits from EU funds under the EDF programmable aid. The current allocation to Nigeria from this global fund is around €512 million over the period 2014 to 2020. In addition, the EU provides funding from several other aid instruments such as humanitarian aid, support for civil society and assistance to fight terrorism. Indeed, "the EU provides humanitarian assistance to Nigeria under the EU Trust Emergency Fund and the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), to support the country that faces mass-displacement of peoples from the north-eastern region"⁴⁸⁶. In 2009, the EU and Nigeria created the Nigeria EU Joint Way Forward, which constitutes the framework where both actors can "intensify their political dialogue" and "hold at least a yearly senior officials' meeting and a Ministerial dialogue", on key priority areas such as peace and security, good governance and human rights, economic development, including trade and regional integration, energy, environmental sustainability and climate change as well as regional and international issues⁴⁸⁷.

Economically, the EU remains the top destination for Nigeria's oil and non-oil exports with trade volumes at €39.6 billion in 2014. Nigeria is also a key beneficiary of EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with FDI stock growing from €25.3 billion in 2011 to €29.6 billion in 2013. Nigeria accounts for around half of the EU exports to the region and nearly 70 per cent

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid

⁴⁸⁵ The World Bank. "Nigeria Overview", [Http://Www.Worldbank.Org/En/Country/Nigeria/Overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview)

⁴⁸⁶ Delegation of the EU to Nigeria and ECOWAS. "Nigeria and the EU", https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria_en/1621/Nigeria%20and%20the%20EU

⁴⁸⁷ Delegation of the EU to Nigeria and ECOWAS. "Nigeria and the EU", https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria_en/1621/Nigeria%20and%20the%20EU

of the imports⁴⁸⁸. In 2016, Nigeria ranks as the 31st most important trading partner of the EU in the world⁴⁸⁹.

Like most of the sub-Saharan African countries, relations between Turkey and Nigeria have witnessed a major turning-point since the mid-2000s with the launch of the "Africa's opening" policy. Yet, Turkey had close relations with Nigeria during the Ottoman era and in the wake of the independence period. The Turkish embassy in Nigeria was first opened in Lagos in August 1962, and then moved to Abuja in 2001 after the proclamation of Abuja as the new capital in 1991. The Nigerian embassy in Ankara which was closed in 1984 has been reopened in 2000.

Following the visit of former president of Nigeria Good Luck Jonathan to Ankara in February 2011, economic relations between the two countries have intensified with the signature of various instruments, namely the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA), the Tourism Agreement, the Agreement on Higher Education, the Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation between the two Foreign Ministries⁴⁹⁰.

Commercial and economic relations between the two countries have also been improving rapidly. The bilateral trade volume has increased dramatically since 2004, reaching 1.144,9 million USD in 2015, including Turkey's import of oil and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). In 2016 the bilateral trade volume between our countries was 366, 9 million USD, excluding Turkey's import of oil and LNG. As of 2016 there are 50 Turkish firms operating in Nigeria whose total investment has amounted to 419, 5 million USD. Including the local partners' shares, Turkish investment in Nigeria amount a total of 620 million USD⁴⁹¹.

In terms of development and humanitarian assistance, Nigeria is not at the top of Turkey's aid recipients in SSA, but still some development and humanitarian assistance are provided to Nigeria. For instance, Turkey also provides humanitarian assistance to the refugee families fleeing Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria⁴⁹². Additionally, "TİKA supplied 3,000

⁴⁸⁸Ibid

⁴⁸⁹ European commission-Directorate general for trade. "European Union, Trade in goods with Nigeria", accessed on 2 December 2017, at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147349.pdf

⁴⁹⁰ See website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Nigeria, <Http://Www.Foreignaffairs.Gov.Ng/Index.Php/Turkey>

⁴⁹¹ TMFA. "Relations between Turkey and Nigeria", <Http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Relations-Between-Turkey-And-Nigeria.En.Mfa>

⁴⁹² *Daily Sabah*. "Turkish agency provides aid to Nigerian refugees fleeing Boko Haram violence", February 29, 2016, <Https://Www.Dailysabah.Com/Turkey/2016/02/29/Turkish-Agency-Provides-Aid-ToNigerianRefugees-Fleeing-Boko-Haram-Violence>

mosquito nets to protect people living in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps from malaria upon request from Nigerian authorities” and “TIKA has completed work to supply food, cleaning materials, diapers and infant formula for nearly 200 families who moved to the outskirts of Abuja due to terror”⁴⁹³. TIKA has also completed the renovation of rooms, the infirmary and dining hall of Al-Ansar Girls Orphanage, which was supported by Nigerian first lady Aisha Buhari. The agency also completed arranging work on the access road to the orphanage⁴⁹⁴.

3.1.1.4. Somalia

Located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia has been for more than two decades victim of civil war following the overthrow of President Siad Barre from power in 1991. This long-lasting civil war has led the country into a total chaos. In addition to political insecurity, the country is also "highly exposed to floods and drought, which creates an acute vulnerability towards famine and humanitarian disasters"⁴⁹⁵. The combination of these natural disaster with political insecurity have resulted into massive "displacements and refugee movements both within the country and beyond its borders"⁴⁹⁶. In August 2012, a federal government was created in Mogadishu with the framework of a provisional constitution, putting an end to Somalia's eight-year transition period. The new federal government ruled the country until the creation of new representative federal institutions by the end of 2016, when popular elections are due.

Considering the geo-strategic importance of Somalia, in the horn of Africa, especially in terms of piracy, maritime security and transnational terrorism, Somalia has been at the height of international conferences. In this context, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, agreed at the 4th High-level conference on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, is a key agreement between fragile⁴⁹⁷ and conflict affected states (like G7+ countries to which Somalia is a member), international development partners and civil society to improve current

⁴⁹³ Ibid

⁴⁹⁴ *Daily Sabah*. “Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency's activities in West Africa”, *Daily Sabah*, 29th February, 2016, <https://www.dailysabah.com/life/2016/02/29/turkish-cooperation-and-coordination-agencys-activities-in-west-africa>

⁴⁹⁵ EuropeAid. “Somalia”, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/somalia_en

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid

⁴⁹⁷ The World Bank, for example, deems a country to be ‘fragile’ if it (a) is eligible for assistance (i.e., a grant) from the International Development Association (IDA), (b) has had a UN peacekeeping mission in the last three years, and (c) has received a ‘governance’ score of less than 3.2 (see Woolcock, Michael. "Engaging with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States." *Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP14-038*, July 2014, p.1).

development policy and practice in fragile state⁴⁹⁸. In line with this new deal, the international community has agreed upon a two-year new deal called " Somali Compact" in 2013, which " sets new rules for donation in the country, ceding the coordination of the aid to the Federal Government of Somalia"⁴⁹⁹. Following a peaceful transition of power in February 2017, the New Partnership for Somalia, which aligns with the National Development Plan of Somalia, and "outlines priority areas critical for development, including a) humanitarian, b) strengthening national security, c) More inclusive stable politics, and d) accelerating economic recovery"⁵⁰⁰, was drawn up.

In economic terms, Somalia is a recovering country as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to be \$6.2 billion for 2016, with 5% nominal growth⁵⁰¹. Yet, its economy remains fragile "as it relies heavily on the agriculture and livestock sectors, remittances and telecommunications, with no apparent manufacturing and industrial sector"⁵⁰². In the same manner, poverty is still abundant in Somalia, "with a half of the country's population of about 12 million living below the international poverty line (of \$1.90 a day)"⁵⁰³.

The World Bank estimates Somalia's per capita income at USD 435, making it the fifth poorest country in the world⁵⁰⁴. Somalia is highly dependent on foreign aid. For instance, "in 2016, donor funding accounted for 1/3 of total revenue (\$55.3 million), and domestic revenue is still insufficient to enable the government to deliver public services to its citizens. The administrative and security sectors account for 90% of total public spending, while economic and social services account for about 9%"⁵⁰⁵. Somali's population is extremely young, with "about 70% of its population of roughly 12 million is under the age of 30"⁵⁰⁶, but the levels of unemployment are extremely high.

EU-Somalia relationship is based on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Somalia benefits from EU development aid largely through the European Development Fund. The EU is the largest donor in the country both in terms of financial and technical support and in terms of

⁴⁹⁸See website of the New Deal for Peace, [Http://Www.Newdeal4peace.Org/About-The-New-Deal/](http://Www.Newdeal4peace.Org/About-The-New-Deal/)

⁴⁹⁹Rodriguez, Joaquin Ferro. "Security and Development: The Intervention of the European Union in Somalia", *Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEL.ES) Opinion Document 29/2012*, 21st March 2016.

⁵⁰⁰The World Bank, " Somalia Overview", <Http://Www.Worldbank.Org/En/Country/Somalia/Overview>

⁵⁰¹Ibid

⁵⁰²Kimani, Salome and Richard Walker. "Somalia ", *African Economic Outlook* , accessed on 21st January 2018, <Http://Www.Africaneconomicoutlook.Org/En/Country-Notes/Somalia>

⁵⁰³The World Bank, " Somalia Overview", <Http://Www.Worldbank.Org/En/Country/Somalia/Overview>

⁵⁰⁴Salome Kimani, Richard Walker. "Somalia ", *African Economic Outlook* , accessed on 21st January 2018, at: <Http://Www.Africaneconomicoutlook.Org/En/Country-Notes/Somalia>

⁵⁰⁵The World Bank. " Somalia Overview", <Http://Www.Worldbank.Org/En/Country/Somalia/Overview>

⁵⁰⁶Kimani, Salome and Richard Walker. "Somalia ", *African Economic Outlook*.

political engagement (state-building process). The cycle of 2014-2020 EDF amounts to €286 million. It focuses on 3 sectors: (i) state building and peace building; (ii) food security and resilience; (iii) education⁵⁰⁷.

Furthermore, Somalia is a beneficiary of actions under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, in particular related to peace-building efforts, the management of migration flows and displacement, in support of displaced persons within Somalia, as well as of returnees of Somali refugees from neighboring countries⁵⁰⁸. Additional support to Somalia is channeled through other EU initiatives, in particular through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace the Africa Peace Facility, the Global Public Goods and Challenges program, the European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights and three Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EUCAP Nestor, EU Naval Force Atlanta and EU Training Mission in Somalia)⁵⁰⁹.

Economically, “the EU does not have a lot of formal or direct trade with Somalia”⁵¹⁰ and Somalia ranks in 2016 as the 166th main trading partner of the EU in the world⁵¹¹.

Linked historically since the Ottoman era (the northern part of Somalia was part of the ottoman empire) and following a slowing stance during the early years of the republic era (there was mutual diplomatic representation until 1990s, with the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia), Turkey-Somalia relationship has gained an important impetus since the coming to power of the JDP in 2002. Turkey has intensified its political and socio-economic relations with Somalia since then. The most prominent area where Turkey is more present in Somalia is the field of development aid. Somalia has ever since been the highest recipient of Turkish ODA in SSA.

This engagement of Turkey in Somalia has intensified since 2011 in response to the devastating 2010–2012 famine. TİKA (sometimes collaborating with some Turkish NGOs) has been very present in Somalia. In illustration, within the scope of the project "Somali Workers' Unions General Centre Service Building", which started construction in Somali capital Mogadishu, a modern 2-storeyed service building with 500 sqm area, 2 outbuildings, surrounding wall and garden arrangement were made. TİKA has fully equipped Derbil and

⁵⁰⁷EuropeAid. “Somalia”, https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Countries/Somalia_En

⁵⁰⁸Ibid

⁵⁰⁹Ibid

⁵¹⁰Delegation of the EU in Somalia. “Somalia and the EU”, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/1764/somalia-and-eu_en

⁵¹¹ European commission-Directorate general for trade. “European Union, Trade in goods with Somalia”, accessed on 2 December 2017, at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147349.pdf

Ileys Orphanages and supported the children with clothing and educational materials. TİKA also constructed 2 new orphanage buildings in Hargiesa of the Somaliland region. In Somalia, TİKA has given various contributions to 8 orphanages in total⁵¹². Constructed by Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) on the site of former Dikfer Hospital in Mogadishu, the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital was fully equipped by TİKA⁵¹³. Some of the other projects carried out by TİKA in Somalia include the rehabilitation of Galkayo Hospital's Emergency Ward, of the Galkayo Vocational Training and Youth Sports Centre, the furnishing of the Galkayo Orphanage, and the construction of Two Water Wells and 4 Qur'anic Schools in Tevekkul Camp⁵¹⁴.

Under the agreement signed between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Somali Armed Forces, in the Mogadishu capital of Somalia, TİKA has also built a fully equipped military training facility consisting of buildings and facilities for the Military Academy and Petty Officers Preparation School as well as on-site training buildings.

Beyond delivering aid and assistance to Somalia, Turkey has started a state-building policy in Somalia, whereby it has hosted international and regional conferences, mediated among political actors to find peaceful settlement of conflicts, and aims to make Somali state stronger through educational, military and technical support. Indeed, "Turkey's engagement in Somalia has distinguished itself by a readiness to deploy staff in the field despite the security risks, deference to the Somali government and a push for national ownership, as well as its involvement in the security and private sectors"⁵¹⁵.

As we can see, both the EU and Turkey are very active in our selected four country-cases, either in economic, political, or security terms, or in all the three areas combined. After the brief overview of situation of the selected case studies and of the relations that exist between each of them and Turkey and the EU, the next section will focus on the empirical analysis of the performance of the Busan aid effectiveness principles by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. Afterwards, we will look at the factors that could explain a possible unevenness in the implementation of the Busan principles by Turkey and the EU in

⁵¹²TİKA. "Somalia 2016", TİKA, p.19, accessed on 13 March 2018, at <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/TANITIM%20BROŞÜRLERİ/PDF/Somalia%20-%202016.pdf>

⁵¹³Ibid, p.17

⁵¹⁴ Ibid, p.26

⁵¹⁵ Sucuoglu Gizem & Jason Stearns. "Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid", *South African institute of international affairs, Research Report* No 24, November 2016, accessed on 26th January 2018, at: <https://Reliefweb.Int/Report/Somalia/Turkey-Somalia-Shifting-Paradigms-Aid>

each of the selected case studies. Prior to all these, a brief explanation of the Busan aid effectiveness principles and relevant indicators is necessary.

3.1.2. The Normative framework of the Busan Partnership: An Overview of the principles and related indicators

In this section, we will provide a brief overview of the four Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles and the relevant indicators, namely country ownership (indicators 5a,9b,and 10), inclusiveness (indicator 2), focus on results (indicator 1a), and transparency and accountability (indicators 4 and 6).We will particularly provide information on our understanding of each of these indicators and how they will be measured in this study.

3.1.2.1. Country Ownership

The ownership principle mainly requires that development aid provided aligns with national priorities and aid strategies tailored to partner country-specific contexts and needs.

Indicator 5a measures the proportion of development cooperation funding for the government sector disbursed in the year for which it was scheduled by providers of development cooperation. In other words, it measures the level of predictability of development cooperation. According to the OECD-DAC, aid is predictable when "partner's countries can be confident about the amount and timing of aid disbursements"⁵¹⁶. The predictability indicator measures the gap between commitments of aid (donors' promises of the aid they will donate), and actual disbursements of aid (the real funds recipients are given). In other words, "Aid is predictable when partner countries can be confident about the amounts and the timing of aid disbursements"⁵¹⁷. When the gap (either positive or negative) is too large, aid is considered unpredictable and this can deprive developing countries of the possibility of relying on aid donations to plan their socio-economic activities⁵¹⁸, and thus can influence negatively on aid effectiveness.

According to the OECD-DAC, "over-disbursement (donors disbursing more than scheduled)

⁵¹⁶OECD DAC. "Aid effectiveness- 2006 Survey on monitoring the Paris Declaration: country chapters", *OECD Report*, 2007, P.22

⁵¹⁷ OECD. "Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration", *OECD Report* ,2011, p.73, accessed on 14 March 2018, at <http://effectivecooperation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/2011%20Report%20on%20Monitoring%20the%20Paris%20Declaration%20ENGLISH.pdf>.

⁵¹⁸Annamaria La Chimia. "Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in the Framework of EU and WTO Law: The Imperative for Change". A&C Black, 18 July 2014.

can be as challenging for a partner government as under-disbursement (a donor disbursing less than the amount scheduled) as it hinders effective planning, budgeting and execution”⁵¹⁹. The ideal target is 100% of funds disbursed as foreseen, 0% of funds disbursed and surpassing what has been foreseen, and 0% of funds disbursed and lesser than what has been foreseen, according to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation ‘s 2016 monitoring survey.

A degree of caution should be exercised when interpreting these results. Since indicator 5a measures aid disbursements that were recorded by the partner government at the end of the year, compared with aid that was scheduled for disbursement by donors at the beginning of that year, performance on indicator 5a depends not only on the extent to which donors disburse the aid that they schedule, but also the extent to which partner country governments record aid disbursements in their public accounts.

Here, we make use of the statistical data provided by the OECD and of the self-reporting data provided by development aid providers (EU and Turkey) (if applicable).

Indicator 9b measures the proportion of development co-operation disbursements for the government sector using the developing country’s Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement systems. It means that aid is provided in line with the government budget cycle and is channeled through preferred instruments of the government.

According to the Paris Declaration, “Country systems and procedures typically include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring”⁵²⁰. These are the systems used to manage public resources (revenues and expenditures)⁵²¹.

The use of country's Procurement and Financial Management system in the formulation, disbursement and implementation of aid funds is key component of capacity-building process of the recipient country. This is especially important for fragile states. According to the OECD, “using countries’ own systems is central to building sustainable and effective institutions. Bypassing country systems and using donors’ separate systems imposes transaction costs on government, diverting attention from managing their own funds, and undermines the

⁵¹⁹ OECD. “Aid effectiveness 2005–10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration”. Paris: OECD Publishing 2011, p.74

⁵²⁰ OECD-DAC. “The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra agenda for action”, P. 4

⁵²¹ Hart Tom, Sierd Hadley and Bryn Welham. “Use Of Country Systems In Fragile States” , *Overseas Development Institute(ODI) research Reports and studies*, December 2015, P.12, accessed on 7th February 2018, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10153.pdf>

development of countries' own systems in favor of servicing a donor-constructed system ⁵²². The ideal target is 100% of funds disbursed using country systems (GPEDC 2016 monitoring survey).

According to the GPEDC monitoring framework, the use of country systems involves the followings: use of national budget execution procedures, use of national financial reporting procedures, use of national auditing procedures, and use of national procurement systems. The ideal target is 100% of funds disbursed using country systems (see Table 16 below).

Table 16
GPEDC framework for monitoring the use of country systems

Indicator	Definition
Use of national <i>budget execution</i> procedures	Meet three out of four criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> funds included in budget <input type="checkbox"/> funds follow normal budget execution (authorisation, approval, payment) procedures <input type="checkbox"/> funds processed through treasury system <input type="checkbox"/> do not require opening of a separate bank account
Use of national <i>financial reporting</i> procedures	Use of national <i>financial reporting</i> procedures
Use of national <i>auditing</i> procedures	<input type="checkbox"/> Fund subject to audit under the responsibility of the Supreme Audit Institution <input type="checkbox"/> Do not request additional audits under normal circumstances And at least one of:

⁵²²OECD-DAC. “The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action”,

	<input type="checkbox"/> do not require different audit standards from those adopted by the supreme audit institution <input type="checkbox"/> do not require the supreme audit institution to change its audit cycle
Use of national <i>procurement</i> systems	<input type="checkbox"/> do not make additional, or special, requirements on governments for procurement of works, goods or services

Source: Tom Hart, Sierd Hadley And Bryn Welham. “Use of Country Systems in Fragile States”.

To decide about the using of the country systems, donors need to objectively understand and assess the reliability of the recipient country systems. The most widely used indicator for assessing the overall quality of Public Finance Management (PFM)’s systems are the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)⁵²³.

Our focus here will be on the use of country's public financial and management system (PFM) and country's procurement systems. We will make use of data provided by the OECD and information provided by the development aid providers.

Indicator 10 measures the proportion of aid that is fully untied (Ideal target is 100% of untied aid). Aid is untied when "it is not subject to any geographical limitations on the procurement, no restriction on the origin of goods and services provided for the aid financed project or on the nationality of the suppliers providing them"⁵²⁴.

Tied aid is when "a country binds its aid to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country", with the intent “of increasing market opportunities for the donor’s business

⁵²³ The CPIA is an indicator used by the World Bank to assess the overall quality of countries’ Public Finance Management (PFM)’s systems, on a scale of 1-low to 6-high).

⁵²⁴See OECD-DAC website. “Untied Aid”, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/untied-aid.htm>

interests"⁵²⁵. Tying aid can reduce the value of the aid because it prevents the recipient country from buying the best-quality commodities at the lowest prices⁵²⁶. Aid can sometimes be “partially tied” or “informally tied”. According to the OECD, partially tied aid “usually includes the possibility to purchase the aid goods and services from the donor country itself and substantially all recipient countries”⁵²⁷. Informally tied aid is the case when “aid is untied in principle, but in practice, since there are no systematic and open announcements of opportunities, it is tied”. Informal tying “is related to the strong influence that the donor country can exercise when it disburses aid funds. It is also favored by the fact that the disbursement of aid is often linked with poor procurement practices”⁵²⁸. In this line, “writing detailed specifications and or referring to a specific brand of product rather than its general functions are ways that aid can be informally tied”⁵²⁹.

Here we will make use of the data from OECD-DAC report on tying status of bilateral ODA for the EU, and of open data on tied status of aid, contracts, and agreement and of the interviews for the case of Turkey and EU.

3.1.2.2. Inclusive Partnership

According to this principle, sustainable development results depend on the participation of all actors (states, CSOs, Private sector, NGOs) and the promotion of mutual learning and trust among different development actors.

Indicator 2 assesses the extent to which providers of development co-operation cooperate with CSOs and contribute to an enabling environment for CSOs. This indicator is based on the premise that CSOs “are valued as partners since they enable people to claim their rights, promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in

⁵²⁵ Apodaca, Clair. “Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool”. Oxford Research Encyclopaedias, accessed on 9th February 2018, at:[Http://Politics.Oxfordre.Com/View/10.1093/Acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/Acrefore-9780190228637-E-332](http://Politics.Oxfordre.Com/View/10.1093/Acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/Acrefore-9780190228637-E-332)

⁵²⁶ Ibid

⁵²⁷ See OECD-DAC website. “Untied Aid”, available at:<http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/untied-aid.htm>

⁵²⁸ Annamaria La Chimia. “Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in The Framework of EU and WTO Law: The Imperative for Change”. A&C Black, 18 July 2014.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in areas that are complementary to those provided by states"⁵³⁰.

Here, we will look at whether development partners' Agenda for dialogue with government includes CSO enabling environment, whether CSO-enabling environment is promoted by development partners, whether information on support to CSOs is shared with the government by development partners, and whether CSOs systematically consulted on development policy/programming. Data from various official documents and reports and interviews will be used to assess the EU and Turkey's performance against this indicator.

3.1.2.3. Focus on results

This principle means that having a sustainable impact in the recipient country should be the driving force behind development aid projects and activities.

Indicator 1a measures the alignment of development partners' new interventions with the objectives and results defined by countries themselves (country-owned results frameworks such as national development plans, sectoral plans, ministerial or institutional plan, or development strategy agreed with the government). It measures the alignment of development partners' new interventions with the objectives and results defined by countries themselves; it also looks at development partners' reliance on countries' own statistics and monitoring and evaluation processes to track progress. Since the "country results frameworks" articulates the required and expected national level results, their effective use can help to ensure that both domestic and external resources are committed towards agreed national priorities. As such, new aid interventions should ideally be drawn from recipient government results frameworks, including the national development plan, joint donor government strategies and sectoral strategies. Increasingly, the recipient government also participates in carrying out final evaluations, including in defining the evaluation scope.

⁵³⁰European Commission (Devco). "The Busan Commitments: An Analysis of EU Progress and Performance", accessed on 7th February 2018, at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/study_of_eu_progress.pdf

We will make use of open sources and documents and of the information provided by the donors (EU and Turkey) and recipients (Niger, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) and other institutions.

3.1.2.4. Transparency and Accountability

This principle means that development co-operation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens (from both providing and receiving country).

Indicator 4 assesses the extent to which development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly accessible, and in line with the Busan transparency requirements, namely the “common, open standard” for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development cooperation”⁵³¹. The common standard, which was endorsed by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness in July 2012, “is built on the two main systems of the common open standard, namely the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and Forward-Spending Survey (FSS), and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)”. The indicator will assess availability of information that is reported to the CRS/FSS and/or IATI by Turkey and the EU. We will make use of the data provided by the 2016 GPEDC Monitoring Survey results, if available.

Indicator 6 measures the share of development co-operation funding for the public sector recorded in annual budgets that are approved by the national legislatures of partner countries. We will base our analysis on the data taken from existing government budgets and self-reporting by the EU and Turkish government.

Having provided a detailed analysis of the Busan aid effectiveness principles and relevant indicators as well as the methodology that will be used here to measure their performance by the EU and Turkey, the next part will focus on an empirical analysis of the implementation of

⁵³¹ GPEDC. “Indicator Factsheet”, accessed on 25 April, 2018, at: <http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2015-2016-Methodology-Indicator-4.pdf>,

these principles and indicators by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

3.1.3. Performance of the EU and Turkey in the context of BEDCPs

This part empirically assesses how the EU and Turkey performed in the context of BEDCPs, by using quantitative and qualitative data. The assessment will be both general and specific. General, in the sense that we will first look at the performance of each indicator by the EU and Turkey (and the selected four African case studies if applicable) as provided in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)'s Monitoring Survey Results (MSR). Thereafter, we will use specific data related to the performance of the EU and Turkey in the selected four African countries, if applicable. The interviews conducted will also be used in the text, if relevant.

Table 17

Comparative table of Turkey and EU’s global performance against the Busan principles in GPEDC 2016 monitoring survey

	EU	Turkey
Indicator 1a		
% of new development interventions that draw objectives from country-led results frameworks	73.5%	0.0%
% of results indicators drawn from country-led results frameworks	74.1%	0.0%
% of results indicators drawn from country-led results frameworks	63.2%	0.0%
% of results indicators monitored using the partner country's own sources	56.9%	0.0%
% of new interventions that plan a final evaluation with partner country involvement		

Indicator 4		
Transparency assessment by the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) - backward-looking data for accountability purposes	Good	No data available
Transparency assessment by the OECD Forward Spending Survey (FSS) - data for forecasting purposes	Excellent	No data available
Transparency assessment by the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) - data for aid management and planning purposes	Good	No data available
Indicator 5a	72.6%	45.8%
Indicator 6	60.2%	50.0%
Indicator 9b	45.0%	21.3%
Indicator 10	65.6%	No data available

Source: GPEDC Monitoring dashboard

According to the Table 17 above, regarding indicator 1a, 73.5% of EU new development interventions that draw objectives from country-led results frameworks, 74.1% of EU results indicators drawn from country-led results frameworks, 63.2% of EU results indicators monitored using the partner country's own sources, and 56.9% of EU new interventions that plan a final evaluation with partner country involvement. In contrast, Turkey did not use any country-result framework of the monitored partner countries, according to the 2016 GPEDC MSR.

Regarding indicator 4, in EU case, transparency assessment by the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) was “good”, while transparency assessment by the OECD Forward Spending Survey (FSS) was “excellent”, and transparency assessment by the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was “good”. In Turkey’s case, no data is available according to the 2016 GPEDC MSR.

With respect to Indicator 5a, according to the GPEDC 2016 MSR, 72.6% of EU ‘s development aid was annually predictable in the monitored partner countries, against 45.8%

of Turkey's development aid being predictable in the monitored partner countries. About Indicator 6 on accountability, EU scored 60.2% against 50.0% for Turkey. Regarding Indicator 9b, 45.0% of EU development aid was disbursed using country systems against 21.3% of Turkey's development aid being disbursed using country systems in the monitored partner countries. For Indicator 10, the 2016 GPEDC MSR show that 65.6% of EU development aid is untied. No data is available in Turkey's case for this indicator.

3.1.3.1 Performance of the EU

Under this part, we will critically assess the implementation of the Busan principles and relevant indicators by the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

- ***Indicator 5a: Annual Aid Predictability***

To assess EU performance against the indicator 5a on annual predictability, we will look at the EU ODA in general and the EDF as the main financial instrument used by the EU in the four countries.

§ EU ODA Predictability in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia

In the specific case of SSA, the Table 18 below shows that except the case of Nigeria, it is possible to argue that the level of annual predictability of EU' aid funds to Ethiopia, Niger and Somalia is quite appreciable. Between 2010 and 2016, 92.04 % and 98.01 % of EU's committed ODA funds were disbursed in a respective manner to Ethiopia and Somalia. Likewise, in the case of Niger, during the period 2010 and 2016, 101.37% of EU committed funds were disbursed to Niger, which means that ODA was also quite predictable in the case of Niger. The inverse is observed for Nigeria's case since the EU disbursed approximately half of the committed amount. In fact, while the EU committed to provide Nigeria with an aid amounted to 185.47 million USD between 2010 and 2016, it disbursed 105.59 million USD, which represent 56.93% of the committed amount.

We can deduct from this table that the EU failed to reach the GPEDC's target of 100% funds being predictable in Nigeria, although it was not too far from the target in the cases of Ethiopia, Niger and Somalia.

Table 18**Average EU Total ODA Commitment and Disbursement and Average EU total ODA disbursement as percentage of total ODA commitment, 2010-2016**

	Average ODA Commitment (in current USD Million)	Average ODA Disbursement (in current USD Million)	Ratio ODA disbursement / ODA commitment (In %)
South of Sahara	4813.32	4544.71	94.41
Ethiopia	239.04	220.02	92.04
Niger	199	201.74	101.37
Nigeria	185.47	105.59	56.93
Somalia	164.06	160.80	98.01

Source: Self-prepared based on OECD data
(<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=Table2A#>)

§ EU EDF(ODA)'s predictability in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia

Since our country case studies are all part of the ACP group of countries and then benefit from the European Development Fund (EDF), as one of the major financial instruments for them, the study will look also at the specific case of the EDF, to determine the level of annual predictability of funds provided under EDF framework.

To remind, the EDF is a multi-annual financial instrument, established since the Treaty of Rome, to provide funds to specific geographic countries, namely the ACPs (which are governed by the Cotonou Agreement) and OCTs (governed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Overseas Association Decision).

The EDF is financed by direct contribution from EU Member States according to a contribution key, and falls outside the EU budget, and thus it has its own financial and implementation regulations. The EDF operates at various levels (country, regional and Intra-ACP) and uses a range of financing modalities including project grants, budget support, loans and blending. The EDF11, which started in 2014 and runs until 2020, has a total budget of million € 30 500⁵³².

A large part of EU ODA to Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia is comprised of EDF funds, as evidenced by the Table 19 below. In fact, for the period 2014-2020, the ratio of EDF as a percentage of total EU ODA programming in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, is 61.89%. This means that 61.89% of EU total ODA programming to each of these four countries is comprised of EDF funds (see Table 19 below).

Table 19
EU ODA (EDF, DCI, ENI) and EDF Programming 2014-2020, in million euros, per country

	Total EU ODA Programming	Total EU EDF Programming	Ratio EDF/ODA %
Ethiopia	1203.6	745	61.89

⁵³²Dai, Mokoro, and Geotest . “Evaluation Of The 11th European Development Fund (EDF)”, Draft Final Report: Main Report, January 2017 , accessed on 22nd January 2018, https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Sites/Devco/Files/Draft-Eval-Report-Edf_En.Pdf

Niger	962.9	596	61.89
Nigeria	827.2	512	61.89
Somalia	462.1	286	61.89

Source : Devco Intradata (<https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/dg/devco/reporting/key-figures-eu-development-external-assistance/Pages/index.aspx>)

In principle, the EDF is a geographical financial tool, of which the funds are programmable and predictable funds allocated and financed on a multi-annual basis according to the country's National Indicative Program (NIP)⁵³³. Most of the officials interviewed at the Embassies of three out of four of our countries case studies in Brussels (Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Niger), at the ACP Secretariat and at EU headquarters in Brussels have confirmed the fact that EU aid to SSA under EDF instrument is quite predictable, although the mid-term reviews can sometimes lead to the reduction or increase of the allocated amount under certain circumstances. Indeed, the EDF framework includes a performance incentive's clause, which can result in an increase in resources for the most effective, and a reduction in resources for the least effective, countries. An ACP State can now receive more financial resources than the aid package stipulated and vice versa, based on regular performance reviews.

Some interviewees developed further that unless the country did not use the total amount or misused the allocated amount or unless the country present bad democratic and governance signals, the EU generally disburses at least the foreseen amount in the NIPs envelope⁵³⁴. Still there might be some delays in the provision of funds due to EU's own internal system⁵³⁵ or the rate of disbursement per year might not be predictable⁵³⁶.

Besides programmable EDF aid funds, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia are also beneficiaries of EU non-programmable thematic financial instruments and EU Emergency Trust Funds. These funds are not predictable, because they are destined to cover unforeseen needs such as humanitarian, emergency and post emergency assistance, where such support

⁵³³ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee_EUB5), 27 February, 2018, Brussels.

⁵³⁴ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2), 31 January 2018, Brussels

⁵³⁵ Ibid; Interview with a diplomat at the Embassy of Niger in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee ENeB), 22 January 2018, Brussels

⁵³⁶ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB4), 21 February 2018, Brussels

cannot be financed from the EU budget, contributions to internationally agreed debt relief initiatives and support to mitigate exogenous shocks. Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia are also beneficiaries of various projects funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa addressing the root causes of irregular migration, displacement of population and instability.

It stems from the Table 20 below that in terms of EDF (ODA), in 2011, whilst the EU committed to provide 63 million euros, 102 million euros, 478 million euros, and 99 million euros to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, it actually disbursed 101 million euros, 64 million euros, 46 million euros, and 39 million euros respectively to Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. In 2012, the EU disbursed 139 million euros, 124 million euros, 90 million euros, and 57 million euros to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, against 35 million euro, 84 million euros, 89 million euros, and 162 million euros of scheduled amount to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. In 2013, the EU disbursed 49 million euros, 88 million euros, 81 million euros, and 53 million euros to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, against 256 million euros, 181 million euros, 43 million euros, and 48 million euros of scheduled amount to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. In 2014, the EU disbursed 151.52 million euros, 130.55 million euros, 73.3 million euro, and 65.67 million euros to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, against 10 million euros, 2 million euros, 25 million euros, and 10 million euros of scheduled amount to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. In 2015, the EU disbursed 110 million euros, 156 million euros, 76 million euros, and 111 million euros to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, against 285 million euros, 83 million euros, 14 million euros, and 106 million euros of scheduled amount to respectively Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Table 20

Total Disbursement and Commitment of EU EDF (ODA), between 2010 and 2015, by country, in million euros

	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
	Com *	Dis **	Com	Dis	Com	Dis	Com	Dis	Com	Dis	Com	Dis
Ethiopia	69	13 0	63	101	35	139	256	49	10	151. 52	285	110

Niger	47	88	102	64	84	124	181	88	2	130.55	83	156
Nigeria	92	39	478	46	89	90	43	81	25	73.3	14	76
Somalia	99	39	162	57	48	53	10	65.67	106	111

Source: Devco Intranet Statistical Dashboard⁵³⁷

Table 21
Ratio Commitments /Disbursements EU EDF(ODA) (%)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average 2010-2015
Ethiopia	188.40	160.31	397.14	19.14	1515.2	38.59	386.46
Niger	187.23	62.74	147.61	48.61	6527.5	187.95	1193.60
Nigeria	42.39	9.62	101.12	188.37	293.2	542.85	196.25
Somalia	...	39.39	35.18	110.41	656.7	104.71	189.28

Source: DEVCO Statistical Dashboard

An analysis of Table 21 above demonstrates that EDF financing is not predictable in general when taking the average 2010-2015. This unpredictability is more pronounced in the case of Niger where the EU disbursed in average more than 1000% of the committed amount between 2010 and 2015. Ethiopia ranks as the second country with wider positive gap in terms of average ratio EU EDF(ODA) commitments/disbursements, with an average of 386.46% of over disbursement between 2010 and 2015. In Nigeria and Somalia, the positive gap in terms of ratio commitments-disbursements is less pronounced than in the cases of Niger and

⁵³⁷ *Com: Commitment; **Dis: Disbursement

Ethiopia because the EU disbursed in average less than the double of the average committed amount between 2010 and 2015 (196.25% for Nigeria and 189.28% in average for Somalia).

A detailed analysis of the Table 21 above per years showcases somehow different results about the predictability of EDF funds. Indeed, a closer instigation of the Table shows that in terms of ratio commitment/ disbursement, the EDF was almost predictable in the case of Nigeria in 2012 (101.12%) and Somalia in 2013 and 2015(respectively 110.41% and 104.71%). As for the years during which EU disbursed less than the scheduled amount, there are the followings: in Ethiopia in 2013 and 2015 (respectively 19.14 and 38.59%), in Niger in 2011 and 2013 (respectively 62.74 and 48.61%), in Nigeria in 2010 and 2011(respectively 42.39 and 9.62%), and in Somalia in 2011 and 2012(respectively 39.39 and 35.18).

Another striking conclusion from the Table above is that, except the case of Nigeria, the rate of over disbursement of EDF exceeded largely the other years in Ethiopia (1515.2%), Niger (6527.5%), and Somalia (656.7%).

Between the years, we can see that there are some discrepancies in terms of ratio commitment/disbursement between the years within each of our case studies. In Niger, while between 2010 and 2011, the differences in the ratios was only about 28.09% (from 188.40% in 2010 to 160.31% in 2011), the gap in the ratios between 2012 and 2014 sharply decreased from 397.14% in 2012 to 19.14% in 2013, which gap exponentially increased again from 19.14% in 2013 to 1515.2% in 2014, and then sharply decreased to 38.59% in 2015. In the same stance, in Ethiopia, the difference in the ratios between 2013 and 2014 sharply increased from 48.61% in 2013 to 6527.5% in 2014, and then significantly decreased to 187.95% in 2015. In Nigeria, the gap in the ratios between 2011 and 2012 increased rapidly from 9.62% in 2011 to 101.12% in 2012, and it almost positively doubled from 293.2% in 2014 to 542.85% in 2015.

In Somalia, while the gap positively increased almost three times between 2012 and 2013, from 35.18% in 2012 to 110.41% in 2013, and almost six times from 2013 to 2014 (from 110.41% in 2013 to 656.7% in 2014), it sharply decreased negatively six times approximately between 2014 and 2015 (from 656.7% in 2014 to 104.71% in 2015).

Table 22
Summary of EU Aid predictability: Ratio Commitment/ Disbursement for the years
2010-2015

Source: Self-prepared based on DEVCO Statistical data

The Table 22 above showcases that except the case of Nigeria, it is possible to argue that EU aid is quite predictable with respect to the ODA in general. In Ethiopia and Somalia, 92.04 % and 98.01 % of EU's committed funds were disbursed in a respective manner to Ethiopia and Somalia for the period 2010-2016. In the case of Niger, during the period 2010 and 2016, the EU 101.37% of EU committed funds were disbursed to Niger. In Nigeria, however, while the EU committed to provide Nigeria with an aid amounted to 185.47 million USD between 2010 and 2016; it disbursed 105.59 million USD, which represent 56.93% of the committed amount.

Yet, this predictability weakens significantly when it comes to the specific EDF (ODA) instrument in the four countries. From the Table 22 above, we can see that in average between 2010 and 2015, the EU mostly over-disbursed in all the four countries. The rate of over-disbursement is particularly high in the case of Niger (1193.60%), followed by Ethiopia (386.46%), Nigeria (196.25%), and Somalia (189.26%).

The gap between committed and disbursed allocations under EDF can be explained by the fact that allocations are regularly reviewed through the performance assessment of the recipient country, as foreseen in the CPA. In fact, the annex IV, Article 5 of the CPA stipulates that: '...the [European] Community may revise the resource allocation in the light of the current needs and performance of the ACP state concerned'. This means that the initial financial allocation to the ACP countries can be increased or reduced during regular reviews, depending on their performance of some criteria such as sound economic policies, governance, effective implementation, and support to non-state actors "⁵³⁸. This impact on the

	EU Total ODA (2010-2015)	EU Total EDF(ODA) (2010-2015)
Ethiopia	94.41	386.46
Niger	101.37	1193.60
Nigeria	56.93	196.25
Somalia	98.01	189.26

⁵³⁸ European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), "The Cotonou Agreement In A Nutshell", p.14, accessed on 15th February 2018, [Http://Ecdpm.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Cotonou-Nsa-Guide-Chapter-2.Pdf](http://Ecdpm.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Cotonou-Nsa-Guide-Chapter-2.Pdf)

level of predictability of EU aid under EDF to the four countries, since sometimes the committed amount decreases or increases, depending on the situation.

One anonymous interviewee (EUB6) argued in the case of Niger that for the food security sector, the initially committed amount was increased by about 40 million euro under 11th EDF, because ECHO attracted the attention on the necessity to increase the amount and put in practice the development-security nexus⁵³⁹. Another Interviewee (EUD2) contends in the case of Somalia that the predictability of EDF funds disbursements is affected by the external factors facing Somalia e.g. the volatile security situation, emergency and humanitarian crisis. The Interviewee EUD2 underlines that in later 2017, the EU had to amend two of its ongoing projects to respond to an impending drought in Somalia thus averting a devastating famine that was to affect over 6 million people⁵⁴⁰.

- **Indicator 9b: Use of country systems**

Failing available data on the use of country systems by the EU in the selected four countries, we will make our assessment based on some facts. Indeed, EuropeAid (the directorate-general responsible for the management of most aid to Africa in the EU) provides for three aid instruments: budget support (good governance and development contracts or state building contracts), sector support and project support.

Budget support uses country systems (PFM and procurement systems) in full. Sector support only uses country systems when aid is provided as sector budget support (or sector reform contracts), otherwise it uses harmonised approaches (pooled or basket funding managed by a donor) or EU procedures. Project support uses EU procedures, except for part use of country procurement systems in some circumstances. According to one interviewee (EUB5), in project approach, whether direct or indirect, EU financial and procurement systems are used, although in indirect management model, the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) is the one in charge of making the calls for proposals and choosing the beneficiary⁵⁴¹.

Regarding the budget support (whether general or sector budget support), it is generally considered as the most widely known sector where donors use country systems because “transfers are made in EURO to a Government account held at the Central Bank and then

⁵³⁹ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB6), 28 February, 2018, Brussels

⁵⁴⁰ Interview by email with the EU Delegation in Nairobi (and Somalia), response received on 12 June 2018 (EUD2)

⁵⁴¹ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB5), 27 February 2018, Brussels

converted into local currency to the National Treasury Account” and “once the transfer has taken place, budget support funds are used in accordance with the partner country’s own Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, and responsibility for the management of these transferred resources rests with the partner government”⁵⁴². Budget support funds must be accounted as government revenues and included in the state budget of the beneficiary country⁵⁴³. The political responsibility of the Commission ends where it paid the budget support after having ascertained itself that the conditions are fulfilled (disbursement criteria).

According to EU regulations, decision to provide budget support go through a two-stage process, with countries first being declared eligible for general budget support based on fundamental partnership values, namely democracy, rule of law, human rights and pro-poor policy stance. Then, “countries are assessed against a risk framework that includes political governance, developmental risks, macroeconomic risks, and public Financial Management and corruption/fraud risks” and “the second-tier assessment allows the identification of specific risks that should be mitigated”⁵⁴⁴. In short, general budget support and sector budget support are provided under four criteria: when a stable macro-economic framework is present; when national/sector policies are in place; when the country is committed to public Financial Management reform (the dynamic approach) and is making progress; and (a new criterion since 2011) transparency and oversight of the budget⁵⁴⁵.

⁵⁴²European Commission. “Budget Support Guidelines: Programming, Design and Management: A Modern Approach to Budget Support”, September 2012, p.11; accessed on 11th February 2018 at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-budget-support-guidelines-201209_en_3.pdf, p.11

⁵⁴³ Interview with an official at EU Coordination Cell in Niger, who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee ECNe), on 26 January 2018

⁵⁴⁴ Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI). “Towards a greater use of country systems in Africa: Recent trends and approaches”, *CABRI Synthesis Report*, August 2014, accessed on 12 January 2018, at https://www.effectiveinstitutions.org/media/towards_a_greater_use_of_country_systems_in_africa.pdf

⁵⁴⁵European Commission. “Budget Support Guidelines: Programming, Design and Management: A Modern Approach to Budget Support”, September 2012.

§ Budget Support and use of country systems in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia

Table 23

Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Ethiopia, by types of aid, in current million USD (2010-2016)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
General Budget support
Sector budget support	86.093	84.325	80.977	39.804	15.908	29.006
Project-type interventions	140.546	123.902	93.423	128.991	169.641	128.344	273.046
Total ODA	237.559	212.084	239.053	134.052	281.485	166.832	339.656
GBS as a % of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SBS as a % of T.ODA	36.24	39.76	33.874	0	14.14	9.53	8.53
PTI as % of T.ODA	59.16	58.42	39.08	96.22	60.26	76.93	80.38

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting system

This Table 23 above shows that no general budget support was used by the EU in Ethiopia between 2010 and 2016. It further indicates that except for the year 2012 where the percentage of sector budget support and project-type interventions were closed to each other (respectively 33.874% and 39.08%), for the years 2010,2011,2013,2014, 2015, and 2016, project-type interventions represented more than half of the total EU ODA in Ethiopia. In 2013, exceptionally, no general and sector budget support was used, and projects represented

96.22% of EU total ODA.

Table 24
Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Niger, by types of aid, in current million
USD (2010-2016)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
General Budget support	8.221	56.389	50.130	46.693	55.700	80.922	46.353
Sector budget support	19.735	4.521	56.555	0.956	17.737	20.399	63.197
Project-type interventions	97.367	74.816	111.171	122.991	171.276	106.923	101.150
Total ODA	150.790	138.653	226.015	183.634	261.142	227.195	231.027
GBS as a % of T.ODA	5.45	40.66	22.17	25.42	21.32	35.61	20.063
SBS as a % of T.ODA	13.08	3.26	25.02	0.52	6.79	8.97	27.35
PTI as % of T.ODA	64.57	53.95	49.18	66.97	65.58	47.06	43.78

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting system

An analysis of the Table 24 above indicates that the EU used general budget support, sectoral budget support and project-type interventions in Niger between 2010 and 2016. Project-type interventions constitutes the largest type of aid used by the EU in Niger, representing more than half of total ODA in 2010 (64.57%), 2011 (53.95), 2013 (66.97%), and 2014 (65.58%),

and less than half of total ODA in 2012 (49.18%), 2015 (47.06%), and 2016 (43.78%). General budget support ranks as the second largest type of aid used in Niger after project-types interventions, in 2011 (40.66%), 2013 (25.42%), 2014 (21.32%), and 2015 (35.61%), while sector budget support ranks as the second largest type of aid used in Niger after projects in 2010 (13.08%), 2012 (25.02%), and in 2016 (27.35%).

Table 25
Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Nigeria, by types of aid, in current million USD (2010-2016)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
General Budget support
Sector budget support
Project-type interventions	53.495	83.538	120.852	105.242	93.852	99.039	143.554
Total ODA	60.295	88.179	133.474	129.927	122.660	103.236	156.498
GBS as a% of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SBS as a % of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PTI as a % of T.ODA	88.72	94.73	90.54	81	76.51	95.934	91.72

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting system

The Table 25 above demonstrates that between 2010 and 2016, project-type interventions remained the largest type of aid used by the EU in Nigeria and that no general budget support and sectoral budget support were used by the EU in Nigeria between 2010 and 2016.

Table 26**Breakdowns of EU ODA Gross disbursement to Somalia, by types of aid, in current**

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
General Budget support
Sector budget support
Project-type interventions	119.048	151.876	164.882	145.117	183.895	170.910	144.122
Total ODA	127.135	155.678	170.890	152.146	187.980	173.201	158.629
GBS as a % of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SBS as a % of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PTI as a M% of T.ODA	93.63	97.55	96.48	95.38	97.82	98.67	90.85

million USD (2010-2016)

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Like the case of Nigeria, the Table 26 above informs us that no general budget support and sectoral budget support were used by the EU in Somalia between 2010 and 2016 and that project-type interventions remained the largest type of aid used by the EU in this country.

	Aver. GBS as a % of T.ODA 2015-2016	Aver. SBS as a % of T.ODA 2015-2016	Aver. PTI as a % of T.ODA 2015-2016
Ethiopia	0	9.03	78.65
Niger	27.83	18.16	45.42
Nigeria	0	0	93.82
Somalia	0	0	94.76

Table 27

Average of EU's GBS, SBS and PTI Gross disbursement as a % of total ODA

Source: self-prepared based on OECD CRS

As we can see from the Table 27 above, between 2010 and 2016 neither Nigeria nor Somalia benefited from general budget support and sector budget support from the EU's development assistance⁵⁴⁶. The EU aid funds focused on project-type interventions and other mechanisms in both countries. In average between 2015 and 2016, 93.82% of EU ODA based on Projects in Nigeria and 94.76% of EU ODA focused on projects in Somalia.

In the case of Nigeria, this can be explained by the fact that either Nigeria is not an aid-dependent country and therefore does not need budget support, or Nigeria's PFM and procurement systems are not reliable enough and do not fit with international standards⁵⁴⁷ to allow the use of its PFM and procurement systems⁵⁴⁸. According to the World Bank data, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) value in Nigeria improved from 3.1 in

⁵⁴⁶ Confirmed during the Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB3), 1st February 2018, Brussels

⁵⁴⁷ Most of the funds are channelled to the north-eastern part of Nigeria, which is insecure with high level of corruption: therefore, country systems cannot be used (Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB4), 21st February 2018, Brussels).

⁵⁴⁸ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB4), 21st February 2018, Brussels.

2005 to 3.3 in 2016, which suggests potential for improved national public financial management and procurement systems⁵⁴⁹.

Somalia is a fragile country with weak institutions and PFM systems where budget support cannot be used for the time being. Somalia was assessed for the first time on the quality of its budgetary and financial management system in 2017 with a score of 1.8⁵⁵⁰, which means that a lot of works need to be done for the improvement of the system. That budget support is not used in the Somali case is corroborated by one of our interviewee at Europe-Aid office in Brussels, who highlights that the EU does not use budget support in Somalia because of the weak financial system in this country but it might start soon because of the relative improvement of the country system in this country, as shown by the IMF report⁵⁵¹. The Interviewee EUD2 confirmed that in May 2018, the EU approved EUR 100M for a budget support operation in Somalia⁵⁵². A press release from the European Union on 26th September 2018 announced that this first ever budget support, whose implementation will start in October, will be channelled through the Federal Government using country systems. The release further underlines that this approval “is part of a broader international response to the federal government of Somalia’s positive track record on policy reform and implementation”⁵⁵³.

This means that from October 2018 onwards, the EU will start using country systems in favour of Somalia and as such will start performing well on the requirement of indicator 9b on the use of recipient countries’ systems.

In average, between 2015 and 2016, Ethiopia benefits from sector-budget support (9.03%), and project support (78.65%), while Niger is the only country benefiting from general budget support (27.83%) in addition to sector budget support (18.16%), and project-type interventions (45.42%). In this sense, we can argue that 9.03% of EU ODA in Ethiopia fully uses country systems, and 45.99% of EU ODA in Niger fully uses country systems between 2015 and 2016. According to the World Bank data, the Country Policy and Institutional

⁵⁴⁹ For more details on CPIA score, please see: <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment>

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵⁵¹ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB1), 15th January 2018, Brussels.

⁵⁵² Interview by email with the EU Delegation in Nairobi (and Somalia), response received on 12 June 2018 (EUD2)

⁵⁵³ Delegation of the EU to Somalia. “European Union announces its first ever Budget Support to Somalia”, 27 September 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/51224/european-union-announces-its-first-ever-budget-support-somalia_en

Assessment (CPIA) slightly value of Ethiopia and Nigeria increased respectively from 3.4 in 2005 to 3.5 in 2016 and from 3.3 in 2005 to 3.4 in 2016(on a scale of 1-low to 6-high)⁵⁵⁴.

In sum, while the use of country systems is negative in Nigeria and Somalia, given that in project-type interventions, EU financial and procurement procedures are widely used, its use remains very weak in Ethiopia since almost 78.65% of EU ODA is based on projects which does not use country's PFM and procurement systems. Almost half of EU ODA in Niger (45.99%) uses country PFM and procurement system between 2015 and 2016 because it is essentially composed of budget support.

§ Use of procurement systems in project-type interventions

In the case of project-type interventions, specific EU regulations apply to the use of procurement systems for the grants, supplies or contracts awarded under EU project aid approach., which mostly leads to a restriction of the use of the recipient country's procurement system.

There are two main types of management under procurement system. The first one is the direct management, “whereby grants or contracts are awarded by the European Commission, which is responsible for publishing work programmes, issuing calls for proposals, receiving proposals, chairing evaluation committees, deciding on the results of calls for proposals and signing the contracts”⁵⁵⁵, according to the EU's own procurement procedure for the award of the grant or contract (Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions: PRAG). The second type, the indirect management, refers to “a transfer of budget-implementation tasks from the Commission to the partner country”⁵⁵⁶. From a policy perspective, it is also in line with the aid effectiveness principle of ownership by the partner country. Under this type, “the Commission remains politically responsible, within the framework of the discharge, for how the partner country carries out the budget implementation tasks entrusted to it”⁵⁵⁷.

⁵⁵⁴ For more details on CPIA score, please see: <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment>

⁵⁵⁵ European Commission- Devco. “Devco Companion to Financial and Contractual Procedures applicable to External Actions Financed from the General Budget of the EU and from the 11th EDF”, Version 4.2 - November 2014, P.18, Accessed on 7th February 2018, at: [Http://Www.Puntosud.Org/Helpdeskeuropeaid/_Media/Resources/Documents_And_Formats/Ecompanion-En-4.2.Pdf](http://www.puntosud.org/helpdeskeuropeaid/_Media/Resources/Documents_And_Formats/Ecompanion-En-4.2.Pdf),

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid, p.18

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid, p.18

Indirect management with the partner country can be partial whereby the payments are made by the Commission and ex-post controls, or full through the use programme estimates⁵⁵⁸. Under partial indirect management mode, “ the partner country conducts procurement and grant award procedures and manages the resulting contracts only” and “all contracts implementing the financing agreement must be awarded and implemented in accordance with the procedures and standard documents laid down by the Commission for its external operations, in force at the time of the launch of the procedure in question (with ex-ante control by the Commission at regular steps during the procedure)”⁵⁵⁹. It is worth mentioning that in this scope of delegation, it is the Commission, and not the contracting authority, which makes all payments directly to the contractors and grant beneficiaries.

In the case of full delegation with program estimates, “the partner country carries out payments to contractors and grant beneficiaries through program estimates”, which “ is a document drawn by the partner country and approved by the Commission , and containing a work programme to be implemented by a partner country and including financial provisions ,the human and material resources necessary for the implementation of the activities, the procedures to be followed by the partner country and further technical and administrative implementing arrangements⁵⁶⁰ .

Under a programme estimate, the contracting authority uses EU procurement and grant procedures (following ex-ante controls except for procurement contracts below EUR 50 000 and except purchases for regular operating costs and purchases under direct labour), as reflected in the PRAG. For direct labour and for ordinary operating costs under the *imprest* component⁵⁶¹ of the programme estimate, “ the partner country makes payments to contractors and grant beneficiaries”, which concretely means that “the Commission pays funds to the partner country into a designated account, the *imprest* account from which the contracting authority is authorised to make payments to third parties (contractors, grant beneficiaries and staff) in accordance with the terms of the financing agreement and the programme estimate”⁵⁶² .

⁵⁵⁸Ibid, P.18

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid

⁵⁶¹ An impress amount is a Self-checking account where a fixed balance is maintained by regular replenishments and used for paying small, routine operating expenses(See <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/imprest-amount.html>)

⁵⁶²EuropeAid. “Practical Guide to Programme Estimates”, December 2015, p.5, accessed on 16th February,2018, at:https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Sites/Devco/Files/Practical-Guide-Programme-Estimates-Version5.0-Dec2015_En.Pdf

The implementation of procurement contracts, whether financed by the *imprest* component⁵⁶³ or by specific commitments⁵⁶⁴, “is governed by the PRAG unless the procurement rules and procedures of the partner country have been positively assessed by the European Commission. If its procurement rules and procedures have been positively assessed by the European Commission, the partner country or relevant body may use its own rules and procedures for procurement within the *imprest* component (However, the rules on nationality and origin as set forth in the PRAG still need to be complied with)”⁵⁶⁵. In case the partner country or relevant body applies its own rules and procedures neither ex-ante nor ex-post controls as set forth in the sections above will be carried out by the EU Delegation. Award decisions will not be subject of an ex-ante approval by the European Commission and there will be no check if the relevant contractor is listed in the Early Detection and Exclusion System. However, compliance with the rules and procedures will be checked by auditors⁵⁶⁶.

In sum, in EU project-type interventions, EU Procurement rules, as set out in PRAG apply in principle under direct and indirect management method (whether partial or with a programme estimate component). The only exception is that the partner country or relevant body may use its own rules and procedures for procurement within the *imprest* component, if its procurement rules and procedures have been positively assessed by the European Commission. the partner country or relevant body may use its own rules and procedures for procurement within the *imprest* component. However, the rules on nationality and origin as set forth in the PRAG still need to be complied with.

- ***Indicator 10: Untying Aid***

§ Tying status of EU ODA in general OECD statistics

According to OECD statistics, between 2013 and 2015, 67.54% of total EU bilateral ODA commitment is fully untied, while 14.76% is partially untied and 17.68% is fully tied (see Table 28 below).

⁵⁶³ Imprest component represents the amount paid into the *imprest* account of the beneficiary an *imprest* component country (region). This amount can be used for contracting by the *imprest* administrator. Provided he follows the rules (limitations on amounts, etc.) the *imprest* administrator manages this amount himself. He signs contracts and pays for their implementation using the funds which the EC has put into the special "imprest" bank account.

⁵⁶⁴ Specific commitment: the part of the programme-estimate which consists of Grant and/or Implementation Contracts to be A specific commitment component implemented directly by the EC (centralised) or the NAO (decentralised management)..

⁵⁶⁵ EuropeAid. “Practical Guide to procedures for Programme Estimates”, December 2015, P50-51

⁵⁶⁶Ibid

Table 28**EU Total bilateral ODA Commitment's Tying Status, in US million dollars**

	2013	2014	2015	Average tying status, 2013-2015(%)
Total Bilateral Commitments	20974.27	16385.27	17970.11	100%
Untied	14772.97	11022.55	11579.25	67.54%
Partially untied	3556.66	1899.5	2712.38	14.76%
Tied	2644.64	3462.92	3678.41	17.68%

Source: OECD stat, <http://stats.oecd.org/#>

This Table 28 shows that between 2013 and 2015, 67.54% of total EU bilateral ODA commitment is fully untied, while 14.76% is partially untied and 17.68% is fully tied.

§ The normative framework under Cotonou Agreement: a critical analysis

In general, participation in procedures awarding grants and contracts financed under EU external assistance (including EDF) is governed by rules on nationality and origin, as well as non-exclusion⁵⁶⁷.

The rules on nationality posit that participation in procedures for the awarding of contracts or grants is open to international organisations and to all-natural persons who are nationals of, and legal persons which are effectively established in:

- a Member State of the European Union;
- a Member State of the European Economic Area;
- a beneficiary of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II,
- overseas countries and territories covered by Council Decision 2001/822/EC, as amended
- Developing countries and territories as included in the OECD-DAC list of ODA recipients, which are not members of the G-20 group;

⁵⁶⁷See Regulation Establishing the Common Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of the Union's Instruments for External Action (CIR), adopted In March 2014.

-Developing countries, as included in the OECD-DAC list of ODA recipients, which are members of the G20 group, and any other countries and territories, when they are beneficiaries of the action financed by the Union under the Instruments concerned;

-another third country, based on a European Commission decision establishing reciprocal access to external aid.

-OECD members in case of activities implemented in the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). This applies for the entirety of regional or global programmes which include at least one LDC or HIPC⁵⁶⁸.

Regarding the specific case of EDF, the revised Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement stipulates in the same sense that participation is open to international organisations and to all-natural persons who are nationals of, or legal persons who are established in:

- an ACP State.

-an EU Member State,

-Member States of the European Economic Area

-Beneficiaries of the EU Instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA II),

-Overseas countries and territories covered by Council Decision 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013;

-developing countries and territories, as included in the OECD-DAC list of ODA recipients, which are not members of the G-20 group, without prejudice to the status of the Republic of South Africa, as governed by Protocol 3 to the Cotonou Agreement;

-another third country, based on a European Commission decision establishing reciprocal access to external aid in agreement with ACP countries;

-OECD members in case of activities implemented in the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). This applies for the entirety of regional or global programmes as well which include at least one LDC or HIPC (see article 20, annex IV of the CPA)⁵⁶⁹.

To ensure the large participation of ACP contractors in the performance of contracts performed under EDF, the CPA went further by foreseeing some measures of preferences in favour of ACP contractors. For instance, and according to article 26 of annex IV of the CPA, under the condition that at least one quarter of the capital stock and management staff originates from one or more ACP States, ACP tenderers, shall be accorded a 10 % price preference during the financial evaluation for works contracts of a value of less than EUR 5 000 000; and “for supply contracts of a value of less than EUR 300 000, tenderers of the ACP States, either individually or in a consortium with European partners, shall be accorded a 15

⁵⁶⁸Ibid
⁵⁶⁹ Ibid

% price preference during the financial evaluation”; and in case of equivalence between two tenders for works, supplies or service contracts , preference shall be given or to the tender that “allows for the best possible use of the physical and human resources of the ACP States” or “offers the greatest subcontracting possibilities for ACP companies, firms or natural persons”⁵⁷⁰.

Article 22, annex IV of the CPA provides for the exceptional participation of candidates from third countries in procedures for the awarding of procurement contracts or grants at the justified request of the ACP State or the relevant organisation or body at regional or intra-ACP level.

Concerning the rules of origin, in principle, products supplied under a procurement contract, or in accordance with a grant contract, financed under the EU budget or the EDF (including OCTs) must originate from an eligible country as designated by the relevant Instrument(s). However, these products can originate from any origin (full untying) if their value is below the threshold of the competitive negotiated procedure - EUR 100 000. In duly substantiated cases, the European Commission may extend eligibility to natural and legal persons from an ineligible country and allow the purchase of goods and materials originating in an ineligible country⁵⁷¹.

Some derogation to this rule of origin may be granted on the grounds of “economic, traditional, trade or geographical links with neighbouring countries, unavailability of products and services in the markets of the related countries concerned; extreme urgency/crisis situation; or extreme difficulties to carry out a project, programme or other action with the general rules on eligibility”⁵⁷².

Article 20, paragraph 3 of the annex IV of the CPA, mirrors EU regulation on the rules of origin in the following terms: "Supplies and materials purchased under a contract financed from the multiannual financial framework of cooperation under this Agreement must originate in a state that is eligible under paragraphs 1 or 1a”⁵⁷³.

⁵⁷⁰European Commission. “The Cotonou Agreement 2014 Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 Revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 Revised in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010 And Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020”. European Union 2014, accessed on 7th February, 2018, at: [Http://Www.Europarl.Europa.Eu/Intcoop/Acp/03_01/Pdf/Mn3012634_En.Pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf)

Note: South Africa or Legal Persons cannot benefit from the Preference Procedure
⁵⁷¹ See annex IV of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

⁵⁷² Ibid

⁵⁷³European Commission. “The Cotonou Agreement 2014 Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 Revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 Revised in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010 and Multiannual Financial Framework

Under EU regulation, there are two modes of tendering procedure: open and restricted types of call for tenders. In 'open' calls for tender (international or local), all economic operators may submit a tender. The contract is given maximum publicity by publishing a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union (S series) (for international open procedure only), the official journals of all the ACP States (for EDF programs), on the EuropeAid website, and in any other appropriate media. In 'restricted' calls for tender, all economic operators may ask to submit a tender but only those who satisfy the selection criteria may be invited to do so.

From these regulations, one can see that on paper, EU regulations and the CPA foresee the untying nature of EU development aid towards SSA, by allowing both EU and African partners to compete on equal feet in procurement procedure. The regulations even went further by positing under certain circumstances a preference for ACP partners in the grand of contracts to ensure the large participation of ACP contractors in the performance of contracts performed under EDF.

Yet, even if aid is reported as untied in principle, it may still be tied in practice, through informal barriers that prevent firms outside the donor country from competing. Such barriers may include, for example, only advertising the tender in the donor country's language, or setting very specific eligibility criteria that only a handful of firms can fulfil⁵⁷⁴.

It is sometimes also argued that the fact that EU's tender projects imply huge amount in million or billion Euro (which most ACP individuals and societies cannot afford), and the complexity of the online application system, implicitly and indirectly excludes applicants from ACP side. Moreover, although according to Annex IV of the CPA, preference should be given to ACP citizens when granting contracts, one should acknowledge that for some big projects, the ACP side might lack high qualified and high-technology to run the project. Sometimes, the lack of material capacity and qualification of African competitors leads to the hiring of European contractors in large infrastructural projects because they generally make more interesting propositions in the ratio quality/price⁵⁷⁵. One of our interviewee (ENgB) is

2014–2020". European Union 2014, accessed on 7th February, 2018, [Http://Www.Europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf)


⁵⁷⁴Polly, Meeks. "Unravelling Tied Aid: Why Aid Must Never Be Tied To Donor Country Companies At The Expense Of Women And Men Living In Poverty". Eurodad, accessed on 8th February 2018, [Http://Www.Eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546810-unravelling-tied-aid.pdf](http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546810-unravelling-tied-aid.pdf)

⁵⁷⁵ Interview with an official at the ACP Secretariat in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ACPB), 31st January 2018, Brussels; Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2), 31st January 2018, Brussels; Interview with a diplomat at the Embassy of Nigeria in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ENgB), 17th January, 2018, Brussels;

categoric on the fact that EU aid is tied arguing that most of the time, EU consultants, who are charged to monitor and evaluate aid projects and to help Nigerian leaders improve their monitoring instruments, manage to make use of European products⁵⁷⁶. One interviewee argued that Voices have been raised from the African side against this practice of tied aid from African side since it increases the costs of implementation due to the higher wage and cost of European products⁵⁷⁷.

§ Statistical assessment

Figure 11: Untied Aid in percentage of EDF Commitments




Source: Based on Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), draft final report: main report, January 2017, a report prepared by DAI, Mokoro, and Geotest

In the specific case of EDF commitments, of which our four country case studies are beneficiaries, the Figure 11 above indicates that the level of untied aid has significantly increased from 17.70% in 2012 to 79.30% in 2015. In contrast, the level of partially tied aid has decreased from 54.60% in 2012 to 13.10% in 2015, and the level of tied aid has also

Interview with a diplomat at the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EEB), 21st February, 2018, Brussels
⁵⁷⁶ Interview with a diplomat at the Embassy of Niger in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ENeB), 22nd January 2018, Brussels
⁵⁷⁷ Interview with a diplomat at the Embassy of Niger in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ENeB), 22nd January 2018, Brussels

decreased from 27.60% in 2012 to 7.60% in 2015.

Figure 12: Percentage of number and volume of contracts going to local and regional contractors under EDF



Source: Dai, Mokoro, and Geotest .” Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF)”, Draft Final Report: Main Report, January 2017, accessed on 22nd January 2018.

The Figure 12 above indicates that the average size of the contracts going to local contractors under EDF instrument has increased between 2013 and 2016. Progress between 2013 and 2016 is considerably higher when measured in volume of contracts, than when measured of in the number of contracts. For example, in 2013, local and regional contractors got 56% of the all the contracts, but only accounted for 16% of the contracted volume. In 2016, the number of contracts going to local and regional increased by 17 percentage points to 73% while the

total volume jumped by 37 percentage points to 53%. This indicates that local and regional contractors were awarded bigger contracts in 2016 compared to 2013.

Table 29
Average of number of contracts going to Local, EU and non-EU contractors, 2010-2015
(in %)


	Local and Regional Contractors	EU Contractors	Non-EU Contractors
Ethiopia	35.71	63.09	1.19
Niger	64.28	35.06	0.64
Nigeria	71.21	28.78	0
Somalia	47.61	52.38	0

Source: Self-prepared based on EuropeAid-Search tools for recipients of funds

As Table 29 above shows, between 2010 and 2015, in average 35.71% of EU projects went to local and regional contractors against 63.09% to EU contractors and 1.19% to non-EU contractors, in Ethiopia. In Niger, in average 64.28 % of EU projects went to local and regional contractors against 35.06 % to EU contractors and 0.64 % to non-EU contractors. In Nigeria, in average, 71.21 % of EU projects went to local and regional contractors against 28.78 % to EU contractors and 0% to non-EU contractors. In Somalia, 47.61% of EU projects went to local and regional contractors against 52.38 % to EU contractors and 0 % to non-EU contractors. Nigeria ranks as the first country with the largest number of contracts going to

local contractors (71.21%), followed by Niger (64.28%), Somalia (47.61%) and then Ethiopia in the lowest rank (35.71%).

Figure 13: Average Ratio ODA tying status /EU total ODA commitments (2014-2015)



Source: DEVCO Statistical Dashboard

This Figure 13 shows data on the average of the tying status of EU ODA in the four countries. As we can see, between 2014 and 2015, in Ethiopia, 83.8% of EU ODA is untied, against 15.9% of ODA being tied. In Niger, 81.37 of EU ODA is untied against 18.62% of tied aid. In Nigeria, 42.62% of EU ODA is untied, against 21.31% of tied aid, and 37.7% of partially tied aid. In Somalia, 60.46% of EU ODA is untied against 39.53% of tied aid.

In sum, EU performance of indicator 10, between 2014 and 2015 has been higher respectively in Niger and Ethiopia. Its performance ranks at the lower end when it comes to Niger.

Somalia ranks in the middle in terms of EU performance against indicator 10.

- ***Indicator 2: CSOs Enabling Environment***

§Qualitative Assessment

According to the 2016 GPEDC Monitoring dashboard, in Somalia, two of the four criteria of CSOs enabling environment has been met (namely criteria of legal recognition of and respect for CSO freedom, enabling legal and regulatory environment for CSO formation , registration and operation were met while criteria of the existence of legal and regulatory environment that facilitates access to resources for CSOs and of whether the existing legal and regulatory framework marginalize certain groups were not met), in Niger, 4 out of the 4 criteria have been met, in Nigeria 1 out of the 4 criteria has not been met (namely the criteria about whether the existing legal and regulatory framework marginalize certain groups)⁵⁷⁸.

On papers, the importance of the role of CSOs has been recognized in many EU-SSA partnership framework (of which the CPA), in which the parties committed themselves to increasing civil society's participation in development projects and policies (Article 4 of the CPA). According to the CPA, Article 2 of annex III, "The country strategy paper (CSP) shall be prepared by the ACP State concerned and the EU. It shall draw from prior consultation with a wide range of actors including non-state actors, local authorities and, where relevant, ACP Parliaments, and shall draw on lessons learned and best practices". The Cotonou Agreement encourages a greater role for non-state actors and civil society organisations as partners in dialogue or advocacy agents and as service providers or implementing agencies.

Most importantly, the 11th EDF includes an explicit mandate to consult with civil society and local authorities which was implicit in the 10th EDF. In this context, the EU delegations (EUDs) in African countries play a key role since they are required to consult with CSOs and Local Actors (LAs) when preparing the Country strategy paper with the partner country. This further implies that EUDs should involve CSOs in the implementation, and monitoring of development projects under EDF.

About the performance of the EUDs in the context of consulting with CSOs, a survey conducted by Concord demonstrated however that "only 23.3% of organisations responding to this survey (51 out of 219 respondents) were invited by EUDs to participate in consultations on the bilateral cooperation programme to discuss the priority sectors and aid

⁵⁷⁸ See GPEDC Dashboard at, <http://dashboard.effectivecooperation.org/viewer>

modalities”. The survey further highlighted that “the percentage of French speaking respondents who received an invitation (31.6%) was higher than for other languages (SP 19.6% and EN 22.2%)”⁵⁷⁹. The survey underlined that this higher rate of CSOs that affirms to have been invited by EUDs for discussions in French-speaking countries, “might have to do with the fact that the French speaking respondents were mainly in ACP countries (10 out of the total of 13), where consulting civil society on EDF programming has been compulsory since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000”⁵⁸⁰.

However, we should mention that in some countries where the civil society space is restricted by the government, it is sometimes difficult for the EUDs to manage to involve CSOs in the discussions about current and future aid projects. Under EDF, the EU is somewhat tied to the government regarding fund allocation to CSOs, so this can limit the action capacity of CSOs because the EU sometimes must make compromises. But there are thematic programs such as EIHDR whereby EU can work directly with CSOs without involving the government⁵⁸¹. According to interviewee (EUB5), the CSOs are involved in many ways: structured dialogue between the delegation and CSOs on discussing on the sectoral priorities for NIPs; open call of proposals for CSOs, CSF, EU roadmap for CSOs, establishment of a roundtable discussion with CSO⁵⁸².

The accent put in the Cotonou Agreement’s objectives on supporting the emergence of an active and organised civil society is translated in the EDF11 implementing regulations, which foresees the empowerment of parliaments, civil society and local authorities in the formulation and implementation of development projects with attention to their role in project oversight and accountability⁵⁸³.

However, the involvement of civil society (CS) and Local Authorities (LAs) in the project cycle, from identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring to evaluation, is not mentioned in the regulation. Indeed, in its Art 9, Title III (Implementation), it is stated that “the action programmes and individual measures shall be prepared by the Commission with the partner country or region, involving the Member States locally represented and

⁵⁷⁹See Concord. “Mutual Engagement Between EU Delegations and Civil Society Organisations: Lessons Learned from the Field”, accessed on 25th January 2018, at:

https://www.eu-cord.org/2015/Wp-Content/Uploads/2015/02/Eu_Delegation_Watch_Ld.Pdf

⁵⁸⁰Ibid

⁵⁸¹ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB5), 27th February, 2018, Brussels

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³Dai, Mokoro, and Geotest. “Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF)”, Draft Final Report: Main Report, January 2017, accessed on 22nd January 2018

coordinating where appropriate with other donors, in cases of joint programming, and with the EIB”⁵⁸⁴.

Moreover, under EDF regulations, beneficiary countries should allocate a proportion of their EDF allocations to measure in support of civil society in their National Indicative Programs (NIPs). In illustration, in terms of sectoral breakdown of 11th EDF, 7% in Ethiopia, 2.7% in Niger, 3% in Nigeria and 5% in Somalia are EDF dedicated to fund measures in support to civil society under the 11th EDF round⁵⁸⁵. These funds will finance projects that aim to establish a model civil society fully plays its role as a development partner, by participating in improving the effectiveness of public policies. They also support reflection on the improvement of the legal and administrative framework governing the status of CSOs and the modalities of their relations with the state⁵⁸⁶.

In addition, over the last two years the European Union has introduced a process for programming its development cooperation assistance under the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2014-2020, and under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF). The objective of the programming is to identify future areas for cooperation in each country or region for the next seven years, in consultation with national governments and, as far as possible, in line with their national development plans.

Furthermore, in ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations (Communication 2012 - 492)’⁵⁸⁷, it was stated that the EU and the Member States should develop country Roadmaps for engagement with CSOs, to improve the impact, predictability and visibility of EU actions, ensuring consistency and synergy throughout the various sectors covered by EU external relations⁵⁸⁷. The drafting of Roadmaps is very much a joint responsibility between EU Delegations and Member States and “when developing the Roadmaps, dialogue and consultation with local civil society is seen as a key aspect of developing and not least implementing the Roadmap. For consultations with local civil society, it will be necessary to embrace a wide range of actors

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid

⁵⁸⁵ See EEAS Website

⁵⁸⁶ Europe-Aid. « République Du Niger-Union Européenne: Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020 », accessed on 24th January, 2018, at: https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Sites/Devco/Files/Nip-Niger-20140619_Fr.Pdf

⁵⁸⁷ Com (2012) 492 Communication: the Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe’s Engagement With Civil Society In External Relations, September 2012, P. 9-10

with different roles and mandates. The basic principle is that each country is specific and approach to consultations and dialogue should respect that”⁵⁸⁸.

Finally, in line with the support of the European Union to human rights, democracy and good governance, the objective of the CSO-LA thematic programme⁵⁸⁹ is mainly focussed on strengthening civil society organisations and local authorities in partner countries as actors of governance and to promote an enabling environment for them. It also supports these actors in their implementation of all Sustainable Development Goals, with an emphasis on SDG 10, 16 and 17.

Since Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, are members of the ACP, and benefit from EDF funds, they also benefit from the above-mentioned initiatives in favour of the civil society. Besides these common programs in favour of CSOs to which our four countries benefit, there are other specific programmes to support CSOs are tailored by country cases and will be briefly overviewed below.

§ In Ethiopia

The Civil Society Fund (CSF) is a flagship programme of the EU and Government of Ethiopia (GOE) in the field of governance and civil society support. Its goal is to promote democratization and good governance. The programme has two pillars, the first one focusing on supporting civil society organisations’ (CSO) work in governance, and the second one on strengthening the capacities of CSOs. For instance, more than 400 CSOs in all the regions of Ethiopia benefitted from the first phase of the programme, between 2006 and 2011, for the implementation of a large variety of projects⁵⁹⁰. The Civil Society Fund I (CSF I) was implemented from 2006 to 2012 in two phases for a total of 10 million EUR. The Civil Society Fund II (CSF) program as a continuation of CSF I provides grant and non-grant support to Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia to increase their human, material and technical capacities to enhance their contribution, participation and engagement in governance and development activities⁵⁹¹.

⁵⁸⁸Hansen Thomas Nikolaj . “EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society – Introduction”, Capacity4dev.Eu,10 April 2014, <https://Europa.Eu/Capacity4dev/Public-Governance-Civilsociety/Minisite/Eu-Country-Roadmaps-Engagement-Civil-Society-Introduction>

⁵⁸⁹The thematic programme "civil society organizations (CSOs) and local authorities (las)" has for legal base regulation no 233/2014 of the European parliament and of the council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI).

⁵⁹⁰Delegation of EU in Ethiopia. “EU-Ethiopia Cooperation: Developing Ethiopia Together”, 2013, p.20, accessed on 26 January 2018, [Http://Ethiopianembassy.Be/Wp-Content/Uploads/2014/05/Eu-Ethio-Cooperation.Pdf](http://Ethiopianembassy.Be/Wp-Content/Uploads/2014/05/Eu-Ethio-Cooperation.Pdf)

⁵⁹¹Website of The Civil Society Fund II, at: [Http://Csf2.Org/?Q=What-We-Do](http://Csf2.Org/?Q=What-We-Do)

However, according to anonymous interviewee EUB5, the EU sometimes face reluctance from the Ethiopian Government to provide funds to Civil Society⁵⁹² because of the restricted law adopted in Ethiopia, which enshrines the areas in which CSOs can act and posits when a civil society can be considered as a local CSO (at least 90% of the budget of the CSO should be financed by local authorities or funds). According to anonymous interviewee EEB, this CSO law aims to increase accountability and ownership of CSOs⁵⁹³.

§ In Niger

Firstly, a road map for civil society in Niger has also been drawn up jointly with the CSOs, the EU countries, the Nigerien government, the other Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) and the Delegation. It has enabled the presentation of a situation analysis of civil society and current undertakings and priorities for consideration in 2014-2017⁵⁹⁴.

Second, the Civil Society Support Program (PASOC I and II), with a budget of €13 million, which came to an end in December 2015, “provided a way of improving the institutional environment of CSOs (regulation and consultation with the government) and to improving the ability of civil society to play a role as a key participant in development and implementation of development policies at national, regional and local levels”⁵⁹⁵. Third, since 2010, the “ EU Delegation has made five calls for proposals locally, amounting to a total sum of €5.5 million. These have benefited several communities or regions as well as local NGOs, both individually and in partnership with international NGOs”⁵⁹⁶.

§ In Nigeria

First, several EU funded programmes are working with non-state actors to enhance service delivery and transparent governance across different sectors including water and sanitation, public finance management and fostering pro-poor policies. It is essential that this is

⁵⁹² Interview with an Official from the European Commission- Devco who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB5), 27th February 2018, Brussels.

⁵⁹³ Interview with a diplomat from the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EEB) ,21st February 2018, Brussels.

⁵⁹⁴Website of the Delegation of EU to the Republic of Niger, https://Eeas.Europa.Eu/Delegations/Niger_Ka/4356/Niger%20and%20the%20eu

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid

intensified under the 11th EDF through increased consultations with civil society, including through thematic calls for proposals across all the sectors identified in the NIP⁵⁹⁷. Second, the EU's Funded Program "Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria" (EU-SDGN) (including support to CSOs) aims to contribute to the reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria through building strong, effective and legitimate democratic institutions. It will be implemented from 2017 to 2021, accompanying the 2016-2019 electoral cycle⁵⁹⁸. Third, the Nigeria EU Country Roadmap for engagement with Civil Society 2014 –2017 has been finalized also.

§ In Somalia

EU support to civil society is currently mainly channeled through a comprehensive program set up in 2010 (Annual Action Plan 2010), under the title 'Support to the Effective Participation of Somali Non-State Actors in Peacebuilding for an All-Inclusive State-Building in Somalia and Support to the Promotion of Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Somalia' finalized in 2009 (Annual Action Plan 2009)⁵⁹⁹. Until recently the EU was funding civil society indirectly through programmes of International NGOs. EU engagement with civil society is now framed by the Somali Compact⁶⁰⁰.

The EU jointly with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of the Federal Government of Somalia launched 9 new Civil Society projects that will be implemented by 7 international agencies and 11 local non-governmental organizations. The projects "are worth EUR 8 million and aim to support effective civil society engagement for the achievement of Peacebuilding and State-building Goals of the Somali New Deal Compact. Through this new funding from the EU, the role of civil society to contribute to a stable foundation for peace

⁵⁹⁷Europe-Aid. "EU-Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Indicative Program for The Period 2014-2020", accessed on 20 March 2018, at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-nigeria-20140619_en.pdf

⁵⁹⁸Website of EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria, <http://democracy-support.eu/nigeria/>

⁵⁹⁹The EU Somalia Unit and Department for International Development (DFID). "Strengthening Civil Society in Somalia: Developing a Comprehensive Strategy", March 2012, accessed on 27th January, 2018, at:

https://eas.europa.eu/sites/eas/files/20130612_cs_strategy.pdf

⁶⁰⁰Ibid

and state-building processes will be enhanced”⁶⁰¹. However, since 2015 this has changed, and Somali local NGOs can now apply directly for EU funding⁶⁰².

The EU is also providing targeted support to human rights organizations, culture, women’s rights and capacity building of media to promote free and independent media through thematic programmes⁶⁰³. Plus, through its engagement in the Human Rights Working Group EUSOM has maintained a constructive dialogue on human rights with the relevant Somali authorities, civil society and UNSOM⁶⁰⁴.

Moreover, and according to interviewee (EUD), the Delegation ensures a constant cooperation with CSOs through the CSO/LA and EIDHR calls for proposals, which are launched almost every year. The number and quality of local applicants has been rising over the years as well as the relevance of the actions proposed. This is a sign of the positive contribution the EU is providing towards the objective of empowering and building the capacity of local CSOs. A consultancy was launched at the beginning of 2018 to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the civil society support programs in Somalia in the period 2012-2017, to provide the EU Delegation with recommendations concerning strategic programming and operational choices for future strategic support. Numerous consultations with the civil society and Somali government counterparts have been held to map out how best the EUD can strategically engage with the Somali civil society in identifying the focus areas for the period 2018 -2020⁶⁰⁵.

Finally, the EU Country Roadmap for Somalia also aims to support civil society in Somalia play a key role in peace and state building. The Roadmap is a guide for enhancing effective engagement with civil society by the EU and EU Member States (EUMS) in programming and policy making, as well as for promoting more effective dialogue between civil society and government authorities⁶⁰⁶.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid

⁶⁰² EuropeAid. “Somalia EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society 2017 – 2020 approved by EU Member States”, accessed on 18 March 2018, at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/roadmapcs_0.pdf

⁶⁰³ Thematic programmes include, among others, programs under the development cooperation instrument such as the thematic programs “investing in people”, “non-state actors in development”, as well as actions funded from other instruments such as the Instrument for Stability, the Africa Peace Facility, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview by email with EU Delegation in Nairobi (and Somalia) (Interviewee EUD2), answer received on 12 June 2018.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid

⁶⁰⁶ EuropeAid. “Somalia EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society 2017 –2020”, accessed on 18 March 2018, at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/roadmapcs_0.pdf

§ *Quantitative Assessment*

The Table 30 below indicates that in average, 22.70 % and 15.79 % of total ODA disbursements went to NGOs and civil society sector, respectively in Ethiopia and Niger between 2010 and 2016 in average. In the same stance, in average between 2010 and 2016, 17.02 % and 51.18 % of total ODA disbursement went to NGOs and civil society, respectively in Nigeria and Somalia. This shows that support to civil society is much stronger in Somalia and Ethiopia, compared to Nigeria and Niger. Niger ranks at the lower end in terms of funds disbursed to NGOs and civil society.

Table 30

EU Total ODA Gross disbursement to NGOs and civil society sector, in million euros

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average. ODA disb* to NGOs and Civ.Soc*** as % total ODA disb,2010-2016
Ethiopia	42.84	45.989	40.020	48.564	65.749	31.949	74.514	22.70%
Niger	22.408	28.754	35.988	37.171	50.067	25.661	22.964	15.79%
Nigeria	15.850	11.457	11.039	16.330	18.960	19.723	32.502	17.02%
Somalia	68.153	88.271	88.157	88.501	98.893	69.412	74.786	51.18%

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System

- *Indicator 1a: Use of Country-results frameworks*

§ Qualitative Assessment

First, the ownership principle is explicitly stipulated in Article 2 of the CPA: 'ACP states shall determine the development strategies for their economies and societies in all sovereignty'. In practice, "this calls upon the EC to support existing national development strategies, or the development of such strategies, and to work primarily with existing institutions and capacities in the ACP countries. It also implies a shift towards supporting national budgets, rather than funding 'stand-alone' projects and programmes"⁶⁰⁷.

Second, the formulation of development project under EDF instrument in principle takes into consideration the national priorities of the recipient country, as defined in the national development strategy of the recipient country (which includes both the country's own medium-term development strategies, an analysis of the political and socio-economic context, plus the European Union's own assessment). Further to the official communication of the amount to be allocated over the five-years to the partner country, the latter development its cooperation strategy in consultation with its development partners and with technical support from the commission staff on the ground. A National Indicative Programme (NIP), which defines the sectors and fields which will receive the aid, explains how the aid will fulfil its objectives, gives a timetable for implementation, and specifies how NGOs will be involved in the programme (if relevant), is then drawn up by the EU delegation in collaboration with the ACP country to implement the cooperation strategy. The NIP is subject to an annual, mid-term and end-of-the-EDF-term review and improvements and changes are made when necessary during its operation period⁶⁰⁸.

Yet, most of the officials interviewed from the African side have underlined that the ownership aspect is lacking, although it does not cause major damage to African countries since almost everything is a priority in Africa, because it is the EU which defines the three priority areas from which the ACP partners should draw their NIPs. One interviewee (ENeB) particularly pointed out that in case of incompatibility between ACP countries' priorities and

⁶⁰⁷European Center for Development Policy Management. "The Cotonou Agreement in A Nutshell", P.13, accessed on 5th February 2018, [Http://Ecdpm.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Cotonou-Nsa-Guide-Chapter-2.Pdf](http://Ecdpm.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Cotonou-Nsa-Guide-Chapter-2.Pdf)

⁶⁰⁸European Commission. "The European Development Fund In A Few Word". European Communities, February 2002, P.3, accessed on 5th February 2018, [Http://Www.Pedz.Uni-Mannheim.De/Daten/Edz-L/Gdd/02/Fed_En.Pdf](http://Www.Pedz.Uni-Mannheim.De/Daten/Edz-L/Gdd/02/Fed_En.Pdf)

EU sectoral priorities, the ACP countries have no choice but to accept what the EU proposes because they lack the financial capacity to fund their own development projects⁶⁰⁹. According to interviewee (ACPB), many ACP states have complained that they are sometimes constrained to accept the sectoral priorities decided by the commission, due to the asymmetrical relationship. But he argues that sometimes, the partner country is also unable to demonstrate the relevance of the specific sector which is in competition with the commission's proposed one⁶¹⁰.

Third, for the drafting of the projects that will implement the NIP, the project is written by the EU delegation in collaboration with the recipient country. Most of the time, the EU delegation also consults CSOs and other donors in the field. The project proposal should be formally approved by the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) (nominated by the receiving government), who sends a formal letter to the EU delegation. After that, the EU delegation sends all the papers to the EDF Committee (composed of EU Member States) which gives the final decision⁶¹¹. Yet, the fact that the EDF committee is composed of EU Member states constitute another restriction to the ownership principle since the Committee which does not include ACP countries, will have the final say on the project. This means that ACP partners can have their projects rejected by the EU, although it was part of their national priorities. The ACP secretariat has even criticized its lack of participation in the committee⁶¹². It is only under EU Trust Fund instrument that the approval of the proposal is made by the operational committee, which is composed of EU and ACP member states.

Fourth, the appointment of NAO by each ACP government to coordinate, programme and manage EDF funds, contribute to increase the alignment of development partners' new interventions with the objectives and results defined by countries themselves. Yet, the NAO is sometimes criticised for not always taking decisions that represent the real needs of the population. As evidenced by the following ECDPM analysis:

The NAOs are parallel structures that are relatively separate from line ministries and domestic accountability actors, and in many cases, are run by technical assistants. We were also told that NAOs may not always and necessarily take decisions in the best interests of their constituencies (for instance, by side-

⁶⁰⁹Interview with diplomats from the Embassy of Nigeria and Niger in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewees ENgB and ENeB) in Brussels

⁶¹⁰ Interview with an official from the ACP Secretariat who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ACPB), 31st January 2018, Brussels

⁶¹¹Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2), 31st January 2018, Brussels.

⁶¹² Interview with an official from the ACP Secretariat who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ACPB), 31st January 2018, Brussels.

lining line ministries) or of pro-poor and inclusive development (for instance, by hampering EU strategic support for civil society). This raises questions as to whether co-management really supports the democratic ownership of EU aid in all circumstances”⁶¹³.

Fifth, regarding the evaluation and monitoring of EU development aid projects in SSA, most of the time, the data are drawn from international sources for the results indicating wider development progress of the partner countries, from the reports of the various partners implementing EU funded projects and programmes for the results to which the EU has contributed and from the European Commission's internal data for its own organisational performance. The EU is cautious about using national statistics in the evaluation of project implementation and in the formulation of new projects, which it sometimes considers not too accurate and reliable⁶¹⁴, although joint evaluation with the partner countries are generally used for the monitoring and evaluation of projects. To facilitate systematic results reporting and ensure coherence, methodological notes have been defined for the EU Results framework indicators in March 2015, which include the followings:

1. Wider development progress made by partner countries, setting the context within which EU external assistance operates;
2. Partner country results to which the EU contributed through EU-funded projects and programmes, demonstrating how the EU is contributing to development progress in sectors which reflect the EU's development policy priorities;
3. The European Commission's own organisational performance with respect to international cooperation and development⁶¹⁵.

Based on the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework, the European Commission published in July 2016 its First Report on Selected Results ⁶¹⁶.

Having examined the general strengths and weaknesses of the EU in implementing the Indicator 1a in SSA, we will particularly analyse in the sub-section below the degree of implementation of this principle by the EU in each of our four country case studies.

§ In Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the 11th EDF NIP for Ethiopia constitutes the EU response to Ethiopia's national development vision outlined in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) and

⁶¹³European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). “Implementing the Agenda for Change”, ECDPM 2015.

⁶¹⁴ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EUB4), 21 February 2018, Brussels

⁶¹⁵Europe-Aid. “Measuring Results”, https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Devcos-Results-Framework_En

⁶¹⁶Ibid

complemented by the Climate Resilient and Green Economy (CRGE) strategy. The 11th EDF NIP is aligned to the broad objectives of GTP and CRGE, and to the specific objectives of sector plans in the focal area cooperation⁶¹⁷. In the same line, one interviewee (EEB) stressed out that the selected areas under 11th EDF are in line with Growth program and green strategy and that in case of disagreement between the EU delegation and government, they try to find a *juste-milieu* (like channeling funds for governance and democracy through CSOs, and for development-related projects through the government)⁶¹⁸. According to one interviewee (EUB5), in Ethiopia, the NAO is super present and do influence on the definition of priorities. He sometimes rejects project proposals made by the delegation. Aid projects are drawn through NIPs, which 100% align with the priorities and results defined in the national development plan of Ethiopia⁶¹⁹.

One anonymous interviewee (EEB), underlined that Ethiopia has a monitoring and evaluation framework which is designed to track progress against achieving the targets and goals of the GTP⁶²⁰. In relation to sectoral development targets, “a policy matrix is provided which presents a list of actions or policy measures and annual quantitative targets to assess achievements and drawbacks during the program period. The matrix provides a transparent process by which the government, development partners and other stakeholders can undertake a shared appraisal of results”⁶²¹. According to the GPEDC MSR, increasingly, the government of Ethiopia participates in carrying out final evaluations, including in defining the evaluation scope. However, recognizing the constraints in using government monitoring and evaluation systems, the EU provides additional dedicated resources for systems-strengthening.

§ In Niger

The government of Niger adopted in august 2012 the Economic and Social Development 2012-2015' PDES), which constitutes the medium-term strategic framework for the policies

⁶¹⁷EuropeAid. “EU-Federal Republic of Ethiopia: National Indicative Program for the Period 2014-2020”, Accessed on 20 March 2018, at, [Http://Eas.Europa.Eu/Archives/Docs/Development-Cooperation/Docs/National-Indicative-Programme_2014-2020/2014-2020_National-Indicative-Programme_Ethiopia_En.Pdf](http://Eas.Europa.Eu/Archives/Docs/Development-Cooperation/Docs/National-Indicative-Programme_2014-2020/2014-2020_National-Indicative-Programme_Ethiopia_En.Pdf)

⁶¹⁸ Interview with a diplomat at the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EEB), 21st February 2018, Brussels

⁶¹⁹ Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB5), 31st January, 2018, Brussels

⁶²⁰ Interview with an official from the ACP Secretariat in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ACPB), 31st January 2018, Brussels

⁶²¹Furtado Xavier and Matthew Hobson. “From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness in Ethiopia: A National Review with Case Studies”, Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness, 2011, accessed on 12th February 2018, [Http://Www.Africaplatform.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Resources/From_Aid_To_Development_Effectiveness_In_Ethiopia_2011.Pdf](http://Www.Africaplatform.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Resources/From_Aid_To_Development_Effectiveness_In_Ethiopia_2011.Pdf)

and the support of international partners, including the EU. At the sectoral level, the 3N Initiative ("Nigériens feed Nigériens"), is at the centre of agricultural and security policies.

The NIP has been generally designed based on national and EU strategies, and most particularly on the Agenda for Change and the EU Sahel Strategy⁶²². According to one interviewee (EUD1), in the case of Niger, the EU considered that budget support should be the preferred instrument for the implementation of the 11th EDF. This choice is justified by its effectiveness because it allows a perfect alignment on national policies⁶²³.

§ In Nigeria

The EU has committed itself to align their current and future assistance to Nigeria with the priorities and objectives identified in the overall country strategy, the '20:2020 Vision and Transformation Agenda'. The three key development sectors which will be supported through the 11th EDF in Nigeria for a total amount of 512 million euros are: (i) Health, nutrition and resilience, (ii) Sustainable energy and access to electricity, and (iii) Rule of law, governance and democracy⁶²⁴.

According to the 2016 GPEDC MSR, Nigeria has developed a monitoring framework of the ongoing development projects and the result-based management framework guides the government's monitoring and evaluation of development programmes and priorities. The Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning is responsible for improving the availability, quality and dissemination of information about government performance to improve accountability and policy⁶²⁵.

§ In Somalia

The Somali Compact sets out the most important priorities within the five Peace- and State-Building Goals (PSGs) for Somalia, provides a monitoring framework with strategic objectives, priorities and milestones that will guide EU engagement in Somalia. Hence the indicative programme has been drawn up based on the priorities agreed and outlined in the

⁶²² EuropeAid. « Union Européenne-République Du Niger : Programme Indicatif National -2014-2020 », accessed on 24th January 2018, https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Sites/Devco/Files/Nip-Niger-20140619_Fr.Pdf

⁶²³ Interview with the EU Delegation in Niger (interviewee EUD1), answer email received on 7th of March 2018

⁶²⁴ EuropeAid. « "EU-Nigeria: National Indicative Program for the Period 2014-2020", accessed on 20 March 2018, at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-nigeria-20140619_en.p

⁶²⁵ GPEDC .“Nigeria : Monitoring profile”, October 2016, accessed on 21st January 2018, http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Nigeria_1_11.pdf

Compact⁶²⁶. According to the European Commission, and to interviewee (EUD2), the Somali National Development Plan (2017-2019) will be a guiding document for future EU programming⁶²⁷.

In line with the aid effectiveness principles, the EU Delegation has stepped up policy dialogue with the Government as well as consultations with the line ministries and MoPIC (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation) on programming, contracting and implementation of EU funded programmes⁶²⁸. The Interviewee (EUD2) argues that the EU has used Somalia's frameworks such as the endorsed, National Development Plan (NDP), the Somalia Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) and the government led Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA) to formulate new programs in Somalia⁶²⁹.

For the monitoring and evaluation, the interviewee (EUD2) underlines that the EU also continues to support and contribute to the annual aid mapping exercise, a tool used to track aid flows in Somalia and assists in monitoring aid effectiveness principles. The exercise is coordinated by the Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED), with the support of the World Bank and UN. The Somali government is planning to launch a new Aid Information Management System (AIMS) in 2018, which will provide an interactive tool for reporting and accessing aid data for Somalia⁶³⁰.

- ***Indicator 4: Transparency***

§ 2016 GPEDC Monitoring Survey Results

The Table 31 below shows that based on the international transparency standards, the EU's reporting to the OECD Creditor Reporting System, to the OECD Forward Spending Survey, and to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, was respectively "Good", "Excellent", and "Good". The EU's participation to the OECD-DAC's surveys on Forward Spending plans, contributes to increase its aid transparency, by making its aid plans, especially for

⁶²⁶EuropeAid. "EU-Somalia: National Indicative Program for the Period 2014-2020", accessed on 20 March 2018, at : https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Sites/Devco/Files/Nip-Somalia-20140619_En.Pdf

⁶²⁷See Annex 4 of the Commission Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2016 in favour of Somalia to be financed from the European Development Fund, accessed on 8th February 2018, at: <http://Ec.Europa.Eu/Transparency/Regdoc/Rep/3/2017/En/C-2017-551-F1-En-Annex-4-Part-1.Pdf>
Interviewee by email with the EU delegation in Nairobi (and Somalia) (EUD2), answer received on 12 June 2018.

⁶²⁸Ibid

⁶²⁹ Interviewee by email with the EU delegation in Nairobi (and Somalia) (EUD2), answer received on 12 June 2018.

⁶³⁰ Ibid

Nigeria, Ethiopia, Niger and Somalia, publicly available with a clear indication that the information is indicative⁶³¹. Likewise, the EU has regularly participated to the OECD Creditor Reporting System, whose objective is to provide a set of readily available basic data that enables analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what policies it aims to implement, on a comparable basis for all DAC members. Data are collected on individual projects and programs. The EU has regularly submitted data on the aid funds provided to Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. DG DEVCO has been publishing monthly data to the IATI Registry since October 2011.

Table 31

OECD Creditor Reporting system	OECD Forward Spending Survey	International Aid Transparency Initiative
Good	Excellent	Good

EU's scores in terms of Aid Information's Transparency

Source: GPEDC monitoring survey 2016

§ Specific Assessment

DG DEVCO publishes data to the OECD on an annual basis and has since then steadily improved its publication, by including forward-looking budgets, geo-coded location data and accurate dates.

⁶³¹The DAC Survey on Forward Spending Plans traces country programmable aid (CPA), a core subset of gross bilateral ODA and multilateral outflows essential for the support of development goals. Only the donors that have agreed to make their forward spending plans publicly available are included in the table. The Survey seeks to reduce some of the uncertainty on future aid levels both at global and country level by asking donors to indicate their spending plans in the medium-term. It offers a perspective on future aid flows indispensable for identifying gaps and opportunities in the global aid landscape. As such, it has the potential to inform dialogue and co-ordination for a more effective and harmonised aid delivery globally, and at the country level. The DAC is uniquely placed to make full use of this instrument and make it the basis for strategic discussion and action on aid allocations (see OECD- DAC. "Report On Aid Predictability: Survey On Donors' Forward Spending Plans 2012-2015 and Efforts Since HLF-4" , DAC 2012, accessed on 8th February 2018,at: https://www.Oecd.Org/Dac/Aid-Architecture/2012_Dac_Report_On_Aid_Predictability.Pdf)

The European Commission has a specific aid transparency website, EU Aid Explorer. Bringing together data from different sources (OECD, UN OCHA, EDRIS, IATI), this tool “aims to make all aid data in the public domain easily searchable and provides visualisation tools such as maps, tables and charts”⁶³².

In Somalia, an integral part of the Compact is the new aid architecture which describes how funding instruments will be used to deliver on the agreed priorities and what mechanism will ensure coordination between these different funding instruments. This will improve the coordination and alignment of international resources and the fostering of more effective and accountable public institutions bringing Somalia and EU into close alignment with the TRUST4 principles of the New Deal and other global commitments on aid effectiveness⁶³³.

• ***Indicator 6: Accountability***

As mentioned before, the EDF is one of the largest financial instruments for EU development cooperation activities in our selected four countries. Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The EDF funds cooperation activities in the fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration.

From a budgetary perspective, the EDF presents a significant peculiarity, since it is intergovernmental in nature and remains outside the EU budget, even though most of its resources are managed by the European Commission. The EDF is funded through voluntary contribution from EU member states.

In turn, this implies that the rules governing the financing, spending and monitoring of the EDF are different from those applicable to the EU budget, although efforts have been undertaken to align them as much as possible. One difference is that the European Parliament has a more limited role in the functioning of the EDF than in the development cooperation instruments financed by the EU budget. Other funds derive from the EU budget such as EU

⁶³²Devco Intranet Portal. “Aid Transparency”, <https://Myintracomm.Ec.Testa.Eu/Dg/Devco/Eu-Development-Policy/Aid-Transparency/Pages/Index.aspx>

⁶³³EuropeAid. “EU-Somalia: National Indicative Program for the Period 2014-2020”, accessed on 20 March 2018, at: https://Ec.Europa.Eu/Europeaid/Sites/Devco/Files/Nip-Somalia-20140619_En.Pdf

Emergency Trust Funds, are subject to the ordinary financial regulation in the EU, notably to a co-decision of the Council of ministers and European Parliament.

However, given that the EDF constitutes the major financial instrument in our four country case studies (61.89% of EU total ODA programming to each of these four countries is comprised of EDF funds according to Table 19 above), we can deduce that the EU performance of this indicator is low in the selected countries, due to the limited role of the European parliament in EDF financing.

Having critically assessed the performance of the EU with respect to indicators 5a,9b,10,2,1a,4, and 6 of the BEDCPs in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, the following section will empirically analyse the implementation of the Busan indicators by Turkey in the four sub-Saharan African countries.

3.1.3.2. Performance of Turkey

Like in the case of the EU, we will critically assess Turkey's performance regarding the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) and the relevant indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. Unlike the case of the EU, however, where we were able to have access to considerable and relevant data, for Turkey's case, unfortunately, there were limited data covering the development aid activities of Turkey in the four countries to allow for a proper analysis and we encountered difficulties to get into the right persons and to have the maximum possible of the knowledgeable persons willing or available to discuss with us on our topic. For this reason, this study emerged through the general literature and debates on the issue as well as the few interviews conducted on the topic.

- ***Indicator 5a: Annual aid predictability***

Unlike the EU, Turkey does not develop specific country strategies or country programs with multiyear plans detailing individual projects and objectives. The fact that Turkey still does not have an overriding strategy for its development cooperation, limits the annual predictability of its aid, since the decision on which project will be funded is primarily a political one and is based on the current needs of recipient countries.

According to one interviewee (TK1), TIKa does not allocate any financial resources to TIKa representative offices in advance. The resources are administered by TIKa headquarters in Ankara and the resources are allocated to TIKa representative offices after they present project validated at headquarters⁶³⁴. Although, the Turkish parliament does vote an annual budget for Turkish development cooperation, the amount is not distributed in advance by specific recipient regions and countries. The amount to be allocated will depend on the quality of the project presented by TIKa coordinator, on the implementation capacity of TIKa coordination office, and on the urgent needs of the recipient countries⁶³⁵.

The anonymous interviewees (TK1 and TK2) defend this way of doing to be more effective because when aid is predictable, which means that when the money to be allocated to a particular country is defined in advance and this country at the end of the year is not able to use all the money (due to some institutional and structural constraints), the allocated money would be lost for the year, while it could have been used to save other people in urgent needs⁶³⁶.

Quantitatively speaking, on the OECD website, we only found complete data on commitments and disbursement of Turkey's ODA in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, for the only year 2007. The Table 32 below shows that in 2007, 85.18% of Turkey's ODA was disbursed as scheduled in Ethiopia, against 85.51% in Niger, 85.36% in Nigeria, and 85.35% in Somalia.

Table 32
Turkey's Total ODA Commitment and Disbursement and Turkey's total ODA
Disbursement as percentage of total ODA commitment, in Current US million dollars,
2007

	2007 ODA Commitment	2007 ODA Disbursement	2007 ODA Disbursement/Commitment (%)
South of Sahara	28.08	23.96	85.32

⁶³⁴ Interview with an Official at TIKa who prefers to remain anonymous, 20 October 2017, Istanbul (Interviewee TK1)

⁶³⁵ Ibid

⁶³⁶ Interview with an Official at TIKa who prefers to remain anonymous, 20 October 2017, Istanbul (Interviewee TK1); Interview by email with an Official from TIKa Coordination Office in Addis Ababa, who prefers to remain anonymous, answer received on 21 March 2018, (Interviewee TK2)

Ethiopia	1.89	1.61	85.18
Niger	1.45	1.24	85.51
Nigeria	0.41	0.35	85.36
Somalia	3.55	3.03	85.35

Source: OECD Statistics, <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=Table2A#>

In the specific case of Somalia, according to the 2016 Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)'s budget figures, while Turkey committed to provide Somalia with a sector budget support of 14,000,000, it disbursed in the end of the year 2016, 10,000,000⁶³⁷, which means that approximately 71.42% of committed budget support was materialized in Somalia by Turkey in 2016.

- **Indicator 9b: Use of country systems**

According to OECD Creditor Reporting System's data, between 2015 and 2016, Turkey's development aid activities in Ethiopia, Niger, Somalia, and Nigeria, did not comprise any budget support and rather focused exclusively on project-type interventions (see Table 33 below).

Table 33

Turkey's Gross ODA Disbursement by type of aid in million USD, in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, in 2015&2016

	Ethiopia		Niger		Nigeria		Somalia	
	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016
General Budget support (GBS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

⁶³⁷Federal Republic of Somalia. "Aid Flows in Somalia: An analysis of aid flows data", April 2017, accessed on 8th May 2018, p.10, <http://so.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/somalia/docs/publications/Aid%20Flows%20Booklet%20FINAL.pdf>

Sector budget support (SBS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Project-type interventions (PTI)	0.28	3.850	6.880	11.89	0.050	0.610	17.740	59.120
Total ODA	0	3.980	8.900	11.91	0.060	0.740	314.820	59.630
GBS as a % of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SBS as a % of T.ODA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PTI as a % of T.ODA	39.4	96.73	77.30	99.83	83.33	82.43	5.63	99.144

Source: OECD Credit Reporting System

It stems from the Table 33 above table that Turkey did not provide either general budget support or sector budget support to Ethiopia between 2015 and 2016. Most of its development aid in this country rather focused on project-type interventions (39.43% of total ODA in 2015 and 96.73% of total ODA in 2016).

The Table 33 above further indicates that in Niger also, no budget support (whether general or sectoral) was used by Turkey between 2015 and 2016.88.565% in Niger. Instead projects represent the most important part of Turkish ODA in Niger, representing respectively 77.30% and 99.83% of Turkey's total ODA in this country between 2015 and 2016.

Like in the cases of Ethiopia and Niger, project support represents the largest part of Turkish ODA interventions in Nigeria, with respectively 83.33% and 82.43% of Turkish total ODA being composed exclusively of projects type interventions in 2015 and 2016 (see Table 33 above).

Somalia does not fall outside the same trend with the likes of Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria, since no budget support was used in this country in 2015 and 2016, although in 2015 project-type interventions only represented 5.63% of total ODA (the remaining part is certainly

composed of grants-in nature). In 2016, project-type interventions represent 99.144% of Turkish total ODA in Somalia (see Table 33 above).

Table 34
Average ODA Gross Disbursement by Turkey by type of aid to Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia (2015-2016)

	Aver.GBS as a % of T.ODA 2015-2016	Aver. SBS as a % of T.ODA 2015-2016	Aver.PTI as a % of T.ODA 2015-2016
Ethiopia	0	0	68.08
Niger	0	0	88.565
Nigeria	0	0	82.88
Somalia	0	0	52.387

Source: Self-prepared based on OECD Credit Reporting System

The Table 34 above indicates that the average disbursement for Project-type interventions as a percentage of total ODA between 2015 and 2016 was respectively 68.08% in Ethiopia, 88.565% in Niger, 82.88% in Nigeria, and 52.387% in Somalia. No budget support (general or sectoral) was provided during these two-years period. Apart from project supports, the remaining funds are mostly composed of grants-in-nature such as donations of materials, computers, equipment to hospitals, centre, and schools, which also does not include any use of country systems (see Table 35 below).

Since there is no budget support in these countries and that most of the activities are project-based and since budget support is the type of aid activity which mostly uses the recipient country's PFM, we can deduce that Turkey does not use the PFM and procurement systems of Ethiopia, Niger, Somalia, and Nigeria, in the implementation of aid projects. As such, Turkey does not use country systems in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

In the specific case of Somalia, although according to OECD data Turkey does not use budget support in favour of Somalia, especially in 2015 and 2016, some sources have evidenced the use of budget support by Turkey in Somalia. Indeed, according to the 2013 Turkish

development assistance report, Turkey provided in 2013, 15 million USD of direct budget support (out of a total budget support of 17.23 million USD) to Somalia⁶³⁸ following a one-year agreement with the Somali government. According to the report, “the budget support provided to Somalia upon the request of the President of Somalia would be used for emergency needs of the national budget in June-December 2013”⁶³⁹.

Nonetheless, according to some other sources, Somalia’s PFM system was not used because the “funds were delivered in cash through courier service to Mogadishu”, since “Somalia had no operational banking system”⁶⁴⁰. This was corroborated by Turkish Foreign Ministry in a written statement released on February.16,2014, as follows “In accordance with the Somali president’s request, along June-December 2013, a monthly cash budget support has been provided to Somalia by our country in order to make a contribution to the urgent budget needs of the Somali Federal Government”. The main official reason advanced for the non-use of country systems was that “Since there are no banking services in Somalia, the said cash budget support was transported to Mogadishu through a courier and was handed over to the Somali Federal Government by hand by our embassy in Mogadishu, in line with procedures,” the Ministry said.⁶⁴¹ Most of the time, the money is given hand in hand to the Somali representative by the Turkish Ambassador in Mogadishu, due to the lack of operational central bank in Somalia.

In the same line, it also seems that Turkey has been engaged in helping Somalia improve its financial management system. In 2012, the Turkish Ambassador in Somalia announced in this sense that “Turkey would support improved financial management through support for a revenue authority, tax regulation authorities and a financial auditing system – though these have yet to be implemented”⁶⁴².

Some sources also indicated that direct budget support to Somalia was cut-off at the end of the year 2013, because of the end period of the agreement⁶⁴³, but Turkey has denied these

⁶³⁸ TIKA. “Turkish Development assistance report 2013”, p.12 ,accessed on 1st May,2018, at http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/KYR_FRAE_2013_uyg9.pdf

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid, p.25.

⁶⁴¹ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No: 49, 16 February 2014, Press Release Regarding Turkey’s Aid to Somalia , http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-49_-16-february-2014_-press-release-regarding-turkey_s-aid-to-somalia.en.mfa

⁶⁴² Quoted in Achilles, Kathryn et al. “Turkish aid agencies in Somalia: Risks and opportunities for building peace”, *Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center*, March 2015,p.26; accessed on 7th May 2018,at <file:///C:/Users/dipam/Downloads/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>

⁶⁴³ *Development Journalist*. “Turkey cuts off direct budget support to Somalia”, February 14,2014, <https://thedevelopmentjournalist.com/2014/02/14/somalias-largest-donor-turkey-cuts-off-direct-budget-support/>

declarations. According to some other reports, while Turkey provided some form of general or sector budget support to Somalia in 2014, it failed to fulfil its commitment to provide budget support to Somalia in 2015⁶⁴⁴. Those funds were sector budget support delivered on treasury. As such Turkey did not meet its commitment to provide sector budget support in favour of Somalia in 2015.

Other sources indicate that in 2016, Turkey provided sector budget support to Somali government through treasury (10.1% of Somali total received treasury grants in 2016)⁶⁴⁵. If these sources are proven, it means that in 2016, Turkey has started using the Somalia’s Financial Management system (on treasury) for the disbursement of its sector budget support, while Turkey was not using them from 2013 to 2016, failing reliable country systems in Somalia during those periods. Unfortunately, we could not verify these sources during interviews conducted with some Turkish and Somali authorities.

For project-type interventions, the Turkish public procurement law is applicable to all procurement of goods, services, and contracts funded by Turkish contracting authorities, namely the Turkish Public Procurement Law⁶⁴⁶. Hence, procurement systems of the recipient countries are not used in the implementation of Turkish development projects in the recipient countries.

Table 35
Some Aid Projects and Actions carried out by Turkey in Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger, and Nigeria

Country	Activities
Ethiopia	Wheelchairs were given for people having mobility problem in Assosa, and white sticks given for visually impaired people in Makalle; Provision of personal computers for schools in Addis ;Restoring of the Nejashi tomb and mosque and of the old Ottoman consulate building in Harare; Establishment of a computer

⁶⁴⁴ Federal Government of Somalia. “Aid Flows in Somalia Analysis of aid flow data” – 14 February 2016 http://www.somaliampf.net/files/Aid_Flows_in_Somalia_2016.pdf, p.6

⁶⁴⁵ Federal Government of Somalia. “Aid Flows in Somalia: An analysis of aid flows data”, April 2017, accessed on 8th May, 2018, <http://so.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/somalia/docs/publications/Aid%20Flows%20Booklet%20FINAL.pdf>

⁶⁴⁶ See English translation of the TPPL as provided by the Turkish Public procurement authority (January 2012), http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2018

	laboratory for robe middle school; Medical equipment assistance for Ayssaita regional hospital in Afar state; Drilling of water wells ;Provision of the materials, equipment and materials for the training centre of the ministry of foreign affairs; Technical Equipment assistance to the Ethiopian national theatre ;Various training programs
Niger	Building and furnishing of the Niger Mixed Boarding School and Friendship Park; Maintenance and renovation of the Turkey-Niger Friendship Park; Construction of and Procurement of all necessary medicine and medical consumables for the Maternal Health and rehabilitation center ;Renewal of Niger Abdou Moumoni University Computer classrooms with 32 computers,2 projectors,2 multi-function printers, network and air-conditioning system; Construction and furnishing of 3 classrooms in Say village ;Drilling of water wells ;Various training programs
Nigeria	Supply of 3,000 mosquito nets to protect people living in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps from malaria; Supply of food, cleaning materials, diapers and infant formula for nearly 200 families who moved to the outskirts of Abuja due to terror; Renovation of rooms, the infirmary and dining hall of Al-Ansar Girls Orphanage; Drilling of wells and water wells ;Furnishing and renovation of Al-Ummah orphanage; Supply of toys and food to Nigeria mother Theresa orphanage; Various training programs
Somalia	within the scope of the project "Somali Workers' Unions General Centre Service Building", which started construction in Somali capital Mogadishu, a modern 2-storeyed service building with 500 sqm area, 2 outbuildings, surrounding wall and garden arrangement were made by TİKA;TİKA has fully equipped Derbil and Ileys Orphanages and supported the children with clothing and educational materials; TİKA also constructed 2 new orphanage buildings in Hargiesa of the Somaliland region; Constructed by Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) on the site of former Dikfer Hospital in Mogadishu, the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital was fully equipped by TİKA; Rehabilitation of Galkayo Hospital's Emergency Ward, of the Galkayo Vocational Training and Youth Sports Centre, the Furnishing of the Galkayo Orphanage, the Construction of Two Water Wells and 4 Qur'anic Schools in Tevekkul Camp; TİKA has built a fully equipped military

	<p>training facility consisting of buildings and facilities for the Military Academy and Petty Officers Preparation School as well as on-site training buildings; Construction and equipment of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s hospital in Mogadishu; Drilling of wells and water wells ;Renovation and equipment of Somalia ministry of foreign affairs’ conference hall; Building of the Somalia civil aviation applied training centre; Establishment of “Radio Hope” within the art faculty of Mogadishu University; Construction of Mogadishu friendship road; Various training programs; Constructing additional structures for Somalia’s street children education centre; Establishment of Somalia’s agricultural school</p>
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Source: TIKA Official Website, www.tika.gov.tr

- **Indicator 10: Untying aid**

Turkey does not report data on its ODA tying status to the DAC, and information is thus hard to obtain. Since Turkey rarely provides cash grants, and rather prioritizes aid-in nature (such as supplying desks, computers and other school and medical materials, etc..), there is reason to believe that quite a lot of Turkish ODA is tied, because aid in-kind often has a much higher degree of tying than equivalent cash grants. This tying nature of in-kind grant is even acknowledged by TIKA in the following terms: "Except for material donations, Turkish ODA is untied"⁶⁴⁷.

The implementing procedure of Turkish development aid projects is based on some Turkish regulations. In principle, TIKA coordination office chooses the implementing partners according to the Turkish regulation on tender process. Indeed, as for the implementation of Turkish aid projects in SSA, a tender process is compulsory and regulated, for all kinds of procurement and construction work to be carried out by governmental authorities, specifically, by the State Tender Law and Public Tender Law, and their implementing regulations⁶⁴⁸, namely the numbered 4734 Turkish Public Procurement Law (TPPL)⁶⁴⁹.

⁶⁴⁷TIKA. " Turkey’s Development Cooperation with the Least Developed Countries: a report on the Turkey’s economic and technical cooperation package for the LDCs», TIKA Department of external affairs and partnerships 2016, p.47

⁶⁴⁸ Sucuoglu Gizem & Jason Stearns. “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid”, *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)* research report 24, November 2016.

⁶⁴⁹ See English translation of the TPPL as provided by the Turkish Public procurement authority (January 2012), http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2018

According to Article 2 of the TPPL, the TPPL should be applied to the procurement of goods, services or works the costs of which are paid from any resources at the disposal of public administrations, state economic enterprises, social security establishments, any institutions, organizations, associations, enterprises and corporations which more than half of their capitals, directly or indirectly, together or separately are owned by public administrations, state economic enterprises, social security establishments, and to the procurement of works by the banks within Law No: 4603 and by the corporations which more than half of their capitals, directly or indirectly, together or separately are owned by those banks⁶⁵⁰.

According to article 40 of Turkish Public Procurement Law (TPPL),

(...) the contract shall be awarded to the tenderer who submitted the economically most advantageous tender shall be awarded with the contract. The economically most advantageous tender is determined solely based on price or together with the price by considering the non-price factors such as operation and maintenance costs, cost effectiveness, productivity, quality and technical merit. In tender proceedings where the economically most advantageous tenders shall be determined by considering the non-price factors in addition to the price, these factors must be expressed in monetary values or relative weights in tender documents. In tender proceedings where it is stated in the tender documents that there is a price advantage for domestic tenderers in accordance with Article 63 of this Law, the tender proceedings shall be concluded by also considering the price advantage to determine the economically most advantageous tender. In tender proceedings where the lowest price offer is evaluated as the economically most advantageous tender, in case there are more than one offers with the same tender prices and these are established to be the economically most advantageous tender, the tender proceedings shall be concluded by determining the economically most advantageous tender considering the factors other than price as stated in the second paragraph⁶⁵¹.

It stems from the provision (Article 40 of the TPPL) that the contract should be awarded to the tenderer that offers the most economically advantageous tender by considering monetary and non-monetary factors. According to Article 18 of TPPL, in procurement of goods, services and works by contracting authorities, one of the following procedures shall be applied, namely open procedure, Restricted procedure, and Negotiated procedure.

Article 13 of TPPL further foresees that it should be given to all tenderers enough time to prepare their tenders. In this sense,

⁶⁵⁰ See Article 2 of TPPL, available at http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2018

⁶⁵¹ Ibid

a) Procurement with estimated costs equal to or exceeding the threshold values stated in Article 8⁶⁵², shall be advertised by publishing in the Public Procurement Bulletin, at least once, provided that; 1) notices of procurements to be conducted by open procedure shall be published not less than forty days prior to deadline for the submission of tenders, 2) pre-qualification notices of procurements to be conducted by restricted procedure shall be published not less than fourteen days in advance of the deadline for the application⁶⁵³.

Moreover, there is no reciprocity regulations under TPPL, since the Turkish Public procurement process is open to all natural and legal persons in principle, without distinction of race, nationality, sex, etc... Yet, there are some exceptions. Indeed, the Public Procurement Act provides that:

in cases where it is established that domestic tenderers are prevented from participating in tender proceedings taking place in foreign countries for unfair reasons, the Public Procurement Authority, the public institution in charge of the implementation of the Public Procurement Act, is entitled to take relevant measures in order to ensure that the tenderers of those countries are prevented from participating in the tenders held under the scope of the Public Procurement Act and to furnish proposals to the Council of Ministers in order to ensure that the necessary arrangements are made (Art. 53 (b)(8) of the Public Procurement Act)⁶⁵⁴.

This means that “the Public Procurement Authority is entitled to track any protectionist measures taken against the Turkish suppliers and to adopt counter-measures where relevant”⁶⁵⁵.

The provisions Article 63 of the Turkish Public Procurement Act entitled ‘Arrangements regarding domestic tenderers’ provide the contracting authority with the discretionary power “to grant preferences to domestic tenderers up to 15% in procurement of services and works; b. to grant preferences to any tenderers offering domestic goods up to 15%” and “to close tendering procedures to international competition in cases where the estimated costs are below the threshold value”⁶⁵⁶.

⁶⁵² a) three hundred billion Turkish Liras for procurement of goods and services by the contracting authorities operating under the general or the annexed budget (six hundred and ninety-nine thousand two hundred and seventy Turkish Liras)* b) five hundred billion Turkish Liras for procurement of goods and services by other contracting authorities within the scope of the PPL (one million one hundred and sixty-five thousand four hundred and fifty-one Turkish Liras)* * has been published in Official Gazette which is numbered 27824 and dated 23.01.2011 by Communiqué of Public Procurement Authority, numbered 2011/1 and has covered the period of 01.02.2011 –31.01.2012 c) eleven trillion Turkish Liras for the works contracts by any of contacting authorities covered by this Law (twenty-five million six hundred and forty thousand twenty-one).

⁶⁵³ See English translation of the TPPL as provided by the Turkish Public procurement authority (January 2012), http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2018

⁶⁵⁴ Kaya Mehmet Bedii. “The Legitimacy of Preferential Procurement and International Competition Under the Turkish Public Procurement Law”, *Law & Justice Review*, Year: III, Issue: 5, December 2012, p.138

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid, p.134

The application of these provisions will limit the participation of foreign economic operators to the procurement procedures in favour of the national economic operators and domestic products.

Table 36
Number of Tendering Procedures Open to International Competition as a % of total number of Tendering Procedures

	2017	2016	2015	2014	Average 2014-2017
Nb of Tendering Procedure Open to International Competition (TPOIC)	16843	17158	18420	17183	17401
Total Nb of Tendering Procedure (TNTP)	135260	160437	164327	157879	154475.75
TPOIC as a % TNTP	12.45%	10.69%	11.20%	10.88%	11.30%

Source: Website of the Turkish Public Procurement Authority, accessed on 15 July 2018, at http://www.ihale.gov.tr/ihale_istatistikleri-45-1.html

The statistics above indicate that only 12.45%, 10.69%, 11.20%, 10.88%, and 11.30% of the tendering proceedings were open to international competition respectively in 2017, 2016, 2015, and 2014. In average, between 2014 and 2017, only 11.30% of the tendering procedures were open to international competition in Turkey (see Table 36 above).

Table 37
Number and % of awarded Contracts by Nationality and Value of Contract under TPPL

	2017		2016		2015		2014		Average 2014-2017	
	Nb	%	Nb	%	Nb	%	Nb	%	Nb	%
Turkish	16561	99.7	17702	99.8	18903	99.8	17957	99.7	177812.	99.7
	8	8	3	4	5	1	4	3	5	9
EU	211	0.13	156	0.09	203	0.11	249	0.14	204.75	0.11

USA	33	0.02	31	0.02	49	0.03	66	0.04	44.75	0.02
Others	128	0.08	91	0.05	108	0.06	165	0.09	123	0.07
Total. Foreigners	372	0.23	278	0.16	360	0.2	480	0.27	372.5	0.21
Total	16599 0	100	17730 1	100	18939 5	100	18005 4	100	178185	100

Source: Website of the Turkish Public Procurement Authority

The statistics above demonstrate that foreign economic operators could only gain about respectively 0.23%, 0.16%,0.2%,0.27%, and 0.21% of the total contracts in 2017,2016,2015, and 2014.In average, only 0.21% of the total contracts was awarded to foreigners between 2014 and 2017, and European contractors gained the highest average rate of contracts (0.11%), followed by the USA (0.02), while other nationalities account for about 0.07% of the total awarded contracts (see Table 37 above).

Table 38

The Implementation of preference on domestic tenderers and goods within the tendering procedures open to international competition

	2017	2016	2015	2014	Average 2014-2017
Number of Procurement open to foreigners	16843	17158	18420	17183	17401
Number of preference procurement	6309	5824	4587	1584	4576
Number of preference procurement as a % of total procurement open to foreigners	37.46	33.94	24.90	9.22	26.38

Source: Website of the Turkish Public Procurement Authority.

The Table 38 above demonstrates that in 2017, domestic tenderers and goods are favoured in only 6309 out of 16843 tendering procedures that were open to international competition. In 2016 and 2015, domestic tenderers and goods were favoured respectively in only 5824 and 4587 out of respectively 17158 and 18420 tendering procedures open to international competition. In 2014, only 9.22% of the total of tendering procedures that were open to international competition favoured domestic tenderers and goods. In other words, in average, the implementation of the provision on the preference for domestic tenderers and goods between 2014 and 2017 was 4576 out of 17401 tendering procedures that were open to international competition, which represents only 8.95% of the tendering procedures that were open to international competition between 2014 and 2017.

Taking into consideration the statistics overall, we can conclude that in average between 2014 and 2017, only 11.30% of the tendering procedures were open to international competition and the foreign economic operators could only gain about 0.21 % of the total awarded contracts during this period.

Although these statistics are generally about all procurement proceedings used in Turkey and do not exclusively focus on the use of procurement systems for the implementation of development aid projects in general and in Sub-Saharan African countries, most particularly, we can nonetheless deduce from this general picture that it is more likely that Turkish development aid projects are implemented in the recipient countries through tied practices when considering the preference treatment granted to domestic tenderers and products and when taking into account the highly- protectionist character of the Turkish procurement Law which significantly restrict the participation of foreign economic operators, as evidenced by the very low participation of foreigner in tendering proceedings between 2014 and 2017.

According to one interviewee (EST), most of the time, the implementing partners are Turkish companies, especially in the infrastructure-related projects such as improving physical infrastructure for education and health through building or repairing schools, hospitals, orphanages, centres for people with disabilities and nursing home⁶⁵⁷. For instance, it seems that the construction of Recep Tayyip Hospital in Somalia has been completed by a Turkish

⁶⁵⁷ Interview by phone with an Official from the Somali General Consulate in Ankara who prefers to remain anonymous, 12 May 2018 (Interviewee EST)

company (Interviewee EST). According to one interviewee (EST), most of Turkish projects with imply high know-how are implemented by Turkish companies because of the lack of qualified local companies. Still, they are using extensively local labour forces in the execution of the projects on the ground⁶⁵⁸.

Nonetheless, one anonymous interviewee (TK3) defends the view that participation to procurement procedures is open to all companies which are treated on equal feet and that contract is given to the tenderers with the best offer. Indeed, the interviewee underlined that:

All companies or persons participating in the procurement procedure are equal. Tenders receive the right bidders thanks to their own competence. Institutions of the Republic of Turkey executes only the technical review and bureaucratic jobs. The procurement procedures are international, and the necessary announcements are understood from the relevant platforms and are made in as many persons and organizations as possible. It is fulfilled by companies that can fulfil technical specifications⁶⁵⁹.

Against critics that most of the materials used by Turkey companies are imported from them, which therefore excludes and discourages possible local suppliers, some Turkish officials further defend the view that in most of the projects, TIKA tries to buy products from the local population to contribute to the growth of local economy. Plus, Turkish projects are mostly implemented in partnership with the recipient government ministries, local authorities, private sector companies and local NGOs that are well received by the community with professional expertise and area knowledge, to ease and improve and access, especially in areas with no previous Turkish presence⁶⁶⁰. For instance, in an interview with Anadolu Agency, Ismail Durhat, TIKA country Coordinator for Ethiopia, underlined that “the renovations (of the Nejashi Mosque) -the cost of which is being borne entirely by TIKA- are being carried out by both Turkish and Ethiopian engineers with a view to ensuring that the mosque’s original architecture remains intact”⁶⁶¹.

Yet, although there seems to be a willingness from Turkish authorities to use the local products and to increase the participation of local companies of the recipient countries, it is possible to argue that this willingness is yet to be translated into practice due to the existing restrictions of the TPPL against the participation of foreign companies in the procurement procedure and to the clear-preference and advantage offered to local companies and products.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid

⁶⁵⁹ Interview by email with an Official at TIKA who prefers to remain anonymous, response received on 24 July 2018 (Interviewee TK3).

⁶⁶⁰ Interview with an Official at TIKA who prefers to remain anonymous, 20 October 2017, Istanbul (Interviewee TK1)

⁶⁶¹ *The Ethiopia Observatory*. “TIKA, Turkey’s aid agency, continues its focus on Harare & its historic mosque”, 8 July, <https://ethiopiaobservatory.com/tag/tika/>

In most of the big infrastructural projects, local force is generally sub-contracted by the main awardee of the contract (generally from Turkey) to execute physical activities in the site.

- ***Indicator 2: CSOs Enabling Environment***

According to one interviewee (TK1), there is a department for supporting measures in favour of Turkish CSOs in each TIKa country-office since 2009 and there is a special finance for local civil society projects. In the project formulation phase, CSOs are consulted for the maturing of projects. Most of the time, TIKa coordinator invite CSOs in TIKa office for discussion on the projects. Yet, consultation with CSOs is not mandatory and depend on the country and the scale of the projects. Generally, in big and sensitive projects, CSOs need to be consulted⁶⁶².

Although this initiative is valuable, it is only restricted to Turkish NGOs and CSOs and does not extend to local CSOs of the recipient countries, as recommended by indicator 2 of the BEDCPs. There is no information or evidence of any initiatives or policy taken by Turkey to involve CSOs of the recipient countries in the formulation, evaluation and implementation of the development aid projects since most of Turkish aid are matured upon request of the recipient country's government. There is also no evidence of a special funds in favour of CSOs of the recipient countries from the Turkish Government.

In Somalia, for instance, it is most often argued that the overall vision and framework of Turkish assistance to Somalia was mutually designed by governmental officials during Erdoğan's visit to Somalia in 2011 and tweaked during subsequent high-level visits.

Nonetheless, the implementation phase of projects appears to be more inclusive. In the field, Turkish agencies, companies and businesses try to engage the leaders of dominant groups, village elders, religious leaders and civil society to gain the support of the community for their projects and to push them to keep their eyes on the good implementation of the projects.

In sum, Turkey poorly performed the indicator 2 of the BEDCPs since there is no policy, or special funds in favour of CSOs or any evidence of collaboration with CSOs of the recipient countries by Turkey although they are sometimes involved in the implementation phase.

- ***Indicator 1a: Use of Country-results frameworks***

Turkey advocates country 'alignment', by frequently relying on recipients to select projects. It prides itself on its aid being 'recipient-focused' and 'responsive' to a country's needs.

⁶⁶² Interview with an Official at TIKa who prefers to remain anonymous, 20 October 2017, Istanbul (Interviewee TK1)

According to one interviewee (TK1), Ownership has always been the focus in Turkey's aid policy. If the local people do not own the project, it is going to fail. Turkey has been already implementing Busan principles well before Busan conference, without naming it⁶⁶³.

Its norm of non-interference arguably coincides with the idea of 'ownership', and the Turkish Government stresses the importance of each country developing and articulating its own development path. In the project design and implementation process Turkish aid is regarded as particularly responsive to recipient (government) needs and capacities.

Regarding the procedure related to the formulation and implementation of TIKA projects in SSA, the project is first elaborated by African local institutions and/or NGOs and sent to the closest TIKA Representative Office in Africa. TIKA Office evaluates the project and send it to TIKA headquarters in Ankara. A commission of experts will give their decision on the project, which, if approved, is finalized and implemented by the African TIKA Representative office⁶⁶⁴.

TIKA 's 2015 development assistance report highlights that, "at the request of recipient countries, development assistance was provided by Turkish NGOs and private establishments, and by over 70 Turkish public bodies under the principles of the authentic Turkish Development Assistance Model which prioritizes people, respect for local sensitivities (...)"⁶⁶⁵. According to TIKA's report, TIKA's program coordination offices in the recipient countries " provide specialized inputs regarding monitoring and evaluation as well as cooperation requests from LDC governments and civil society. This helps to ensure that development assistance is demand driven and, hopefully, based on strategies set by the recipient countries themselves"⁶⁶⁶.

On many occasions, Turkey has underlined the demand-driven nature of its development aid projects in some of our country case studies. In Niger, for instance, one can read in TIKA's 2014 annual report that "upon requests from the Ministry of Water and Environment and the

⁶⁶³ Interview with an Official at TIKA who prefers to remain anonymous, 20 October 2017, Istanbul (Interviewee TK1)

⁶⁶⁴ Bacchi, Eleonora. "The strategic guidelines of Turkey's foreign policy according to Ahmet Davutoglu-Turkey's opening to Africa policy: the case of Ethiopia", Università Degli Studi Di Perugia, April 2016, P.26

⁶⁶⁵ TIKA, "TIKA 2015 Development assistance report", TIKA 2015, p.10, accessed on 10 December 2017, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2017/yayinlar/tkyr%202015%20eng/kalkinma%20.pdf>

⁶⁶⁶TIKA, " Turkey's Development Cooperation with the least developed countries: a report on the Turkey's economic and technical cooperation package for the LDCs", TIKA Department of external affairs and partnerships 2016, p.47

Ministry of Secondary Education of Niger”, 45 water wells were dug to be used by schools and mosques in Maradi⁶⁶⁷.

In Somalia, most of Turkey’s projects in Somalia have been driven by demand since “new projects are often announced after mutual and bilateral high-level visits; as previously mentioned, the general framework of the Turkish assistance has been drawn based on requests made by the Somali government during Erdogan's 2011 visit to Mogadishu”⁶⁶⁸. In Ethiopia, it is also mentioned in TİKA’s 2013 annual report that “upon a request from Ledeta Local Government Office of the Ethiopian Ministry of Education, TİKA provided 2,290 books in 82 titles to Abadir Institute Primary School of 1,000 students situated in the campus of Ledeta Local Government Office of the Ethiopian Ministry of Education Computer laboratory and various furniture for Robe Middle School”⁶⁶⁹. In Nigeria, TİKA supplied 3,000 mosquito nets to protect people living in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps from malaria upon request from Nigerian authorities⁶⁷⁰.

Given that this recipient-led development relies on recipient governments to select 'beneficial' priorities on behalf of communities, it assumes community agreement with these government choices. However, the priorities defined by the government might not reflect the most urgent priorities of the ordinary citizens since NGOs and Local actors may sometimes not be part of the maturing of the project. This is one negative aspect of Turkey’s too-much focus on government-to-government relations, at the expense of a more inclusive approach where NGOs, and LAs are effectively consulted.

Some further highlight that “personal relations between President Erdogan and high-level officials of the recipient countries can determine which projects are chosen to be supported since on many occasions new development projects were spontaneously approved by the president during his trips abroad without consultation with the advisory body, which normally meets once a year to discuss TİKA’s strategic priorities”⁶⁷¹.

⁶⁶⁷ See TİKA Annual Report 2014, p.129

⁶⁶⁸ Sucuoglu Gizem & Jason Stearns. “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid”, *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) research report* No 24, November 2016, p.30

⁶⁶⁹TİKA. “Turkish Development Assistance report 2013”, accessed on 1st May 2018, http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/KYR_FRAE_2013_uyg9.pdf

⁶⁷⁰ *Daily Sabah*. “Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency's activities in West Africa”, 29 February 2016, accessed on 31 July 2018, at <https://www.dailysabah.com/life/2016/02/29/turkish-cooperation-and-coordination-agencys-activities-in-west-africa>

⁶⁷¹ Maza Cristina. “Turkey : Impressive Aid Record mired in bad practices “, UnitedExplanations, accessed on 2nd august 2018, at <http://unitedexplanations.org/english/2014/12/01/8541/>

Although Turkey's development aid policy seems at first glance to be very demand-oriented, there are few, if not no evidence of the use of the recipient country's national development programs in the formulation of development projects. Maturing development projects based on request from the recipient country's government or NGOs is a good step but not enough in terms of performing the indicator 1a of the BEDCPs, which recommend relying on the recipient countries elaborated national development plans in the definition, monitoring and evaluation of development projects. To remind, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger, and Somalia, have all developed national development programs, but there is no mention of these documents in Turkey's development assistance policies and documents.

As for the monitoring and evaluation, Turkey has yet to develop a strong monitoring and evaluation framework. Most of the time, Turkey monitors the implementation of its projects, especially in the sector of infrastructure through site visit and discussion with local population by TIKa coordinators. As such, there is little chance that Turkey uses the result-frameworks (if any) of the recipient countries.

Some critics have raised the fact that the monitoring process of project implementation focuses on 'results' mostly concerns the completion of projects rather than on their quality and ongoing sustainability. In Somalia, for instance, Joint reviews and evaluations of projects are not the norm; the Somalis mostly seem to leave it to the Turkish side to do project reviewing, monitoring and evaluation, and to define the conditions for exit planning and handover of ownership. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also criticized TIKa's lack of consistent country strategy, monitoring and evaluation framework in the followings: "Lack of country strategy and written criteria for selection make it difficult to identify the project ideas in a coherent manner. Lack of baselines, targets and indicators makes it difficult to measure the success of projects, and consequently, to comply with aid effectiveness principles. TIKa needs to develop a clear and transparent policy, criteria and procedures for an effective management of projects"⁶⁷².

- ***Indicator 4: Transparency***

Turkey does not publish its data to International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), which is "a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to improve the transparency of aid, development, and humanitarian resources to increase their effectiveness in tackling poverty. IATI brings together donor and recipient countries, civil society organisations, and other

⁶⁷² Quoted in Maza Cristina. "Turkey : Impressive Aid Record mired in bad practices", UnitedExplanations, accessed on 2nd august 2018, at <http://unitedexplanations.org/english/2014/12/01/8541/>

experts in aid information who are committed to working together to increase the transparency and openness of aid”⁶⁷³. According to the IATI, Turkey is the only one of the top 10 providers of development cooperation in Somalia, which is not yet publishing in IATI⁶⁷⁴.

Likewise, although Turkey is among the 20 non-DAC countries that choose to report their ODA volumes to the OECD annually, this reporting is not always broken down geographically and by sector in line with the Creditor Reporting System. Turkey does not report also its forward-spending plans (if available) to the OECD.

Given these and others, it is possible to argue that Turkey is very far from meeting the Busan Aid Transparency requirements as measured through the assessment of the donors’ reporting of their aid activities to the IATI, OECD-Credit Reporting System and OECD- Forward Spending Survey.

Nonetheless, TIKA publishes detailed annual reports of Turkey’s governmental and nongovernmental development activities on its website (the last report was released in 2016). Several Turkish NGOs and companies report on the nature, scope, personnel and budget of their projects to TIKA and the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Associations, and often publish project data on their websites⁶⁷⁵. The question remains on how far these publications fit into the Busan Aid Transparency requirements.

- ***Indicator 6:Accountability***

Each year, the Turkish parliament vote a budget for Turkish external development cooperation to TIKA. So, most of Turkish development projects are in principle funded exclusively by the budget of Turkish government, which is voted annually by the parliament. According to anonymous interviewee TK3, “With some exceptions, all development cooperation activities are financed from the Turkish national budget approved by the budget law of the relevant year by the Turkey Grand National Assembly (Parliament)”⁶⁷⁶. Indeed, besides TIKA, there are an increasing number of Turkish NGOs, which are also conducting in

⁶⁷³See IATI Website, <https://www.aidtransparency.net/about>

⁶⁷⁴International Aid Transparency Initiative. “Spotlight on IATI Data Use: Somalia”, <https://www.aidtransparency.net/about/partner-country-perspectives/spotlight-on-iati-data-use-somalia>

⁶⁷⁵ Sucuoglu Gizem & Jason Stearns. “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid”, *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) research report* No 24, November 2016, <https://www.saiia.org.za/research-reports/1130-turkey-in-somalia-shifting-paradigms-of-aid-1/file>

⁶⁷⁶ Interview by email with an official at TIKA who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee TK3), response received on 24 July 2018.

the humanitarian and development assistance, mostly in collaboration with TIKA (but sometimes they conduct their operations alone).

Yet, considering that we focus exclusively on ODA disbursed by the government institutions (excluding development assistance provided by Turkish NGOs which most of the time are funded outside the national budget) , we can deduce that Turkey is likely to perform well with respect to the indicator 6 of the Busan effective development cooperation principles in the four countries since most of its ODA activities in SSA are funded from the Turkish national budget.

The next section will comparatively assess the performance made by the EU and Turkey in the context of the BEDCPs and its related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.



3.1.3.3. A comparative analysis of Turkey and EU's performance in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia

In this section, we will comparatively assess the global performance of Turkey and the EU in the context of BEDCPs (namely ownership, inclusiveness, focus on results, transparency and accountability) and the related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia, with the aim of highlighting eventual unevenness between the two donors' performance.

- ***With respect to the Ownership Principle***

For the indicator 5a on “annual aid predictability”, we have seen that except the case of Nigeria, EU aid is quite predictable with respect to the ODA in general. In Ethiopia and Somalia, for instance, 92.04 % and 98.01 % of EU's committed funds were disbursed in a respective manner to Ethiopia and Somalia for the period 2010-2016. In the case of Niger, during the period 2010 and 2016, the EU 101.37% of EU committed funds were disbursed to Niger. In Nigeria, however, while the EU committed to provide Nigeria with an aid amounted to 185.47 million USD between 2010 and 2016; it disbursed 105.59 million USD, which represent 56.93% of the committed amount (see Table 18 above).

Yet, this predictability weakens significantly when it comes to the specific EDF (ODA) instrument in the four countries, which represents about more than half of the EU total ODA in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. From the Table 22 above, we can see that the EU mostly over-disbursed the ODA on annual basis in all the four countries. In average, the rate of over-disbursement is particularly high in the case of Niger (1193.60%), followed by Ethiopia (386.46%), Nigeria (196.25%), and Somalia (189.26%). The gap between committed and disbursed allocations under EDF can be explained by the fact that allocations are regularly reviewed through the performance assessment of the recipient country, as foreseen in the CPA.

Unlike the EU's case where development aid is quite predictable in Nigeria, Niger, Somalia, and Ethiopia, especially with respect to ODA in general although this predictability is significantly weak in the four countries when it comes to EDF (due to the mid-term reviews, which can lead to an increase or a decrease of the initially allocated amount in NIPs), in Turkey's case the lack of an overriding strategy for its development cooperation in the four countries, limits the predictability of its aid, since the decision on which project will be funded is primarily based on political and needy-based considerations. Plus, the over-preference for projects and grants-in-nature in the detriment of budget support by Turkey in the four countries is another factor which limits the predictability of its development cooperation in the four countries. To sum up, compared to the EU, Turkey's performance of the Indicator 5a of Busan Effective development cooperation principles, was weaker in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Regarding indicator 9b on “the use of country systems”, statistics have shown that while the use of country systems by the EU is negative in Nigeria and Somalia, it remains very weak in

Ethiopia since almost 78.65% of EU ODA is based on projects which does not use country's PFM and procurement systems (see Table 25 above). Almost half of EU ODA in Niger (45.99%) uses country PFM and procurement system between 2015 and 2016 because it is essentially composed of budget support (see Table 25 above). Through the analysis of EU texts, one can also see that the use of the recipient country's PFM (Public Financial Management) and procurement systems is restricted in the case of project approach because specific EU rules apply to the use of procurement systems for the grants, supplies or contracts awarded under EU project aid approach.

In Turkey's case, according to OECD Statistics, no budget support was used in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, between 2015 and 2016, since most of Turkish development aid projects focus on project-type interventions and grants-in-nature in the four country-case studies. Given that budget support is the most evident way through which recipient countries systems are used in full in the implementation phase, we can argue that Turkey does not use country systems in either of the four countries between 2015 and 2016. In the specific case of Somalia, although some sources indicate the use of budget support in favour of Somalia by Turkey since 2013, Somalia's PFM system was not used because most of the time, the money is given hand in hand to the Somali representative by the Turkish Ambassador in Mogadishu, due to the lack of operational central bank in Somalia.

Other sources indicate that in 2016, Turkey provided sector budget support to Somali government through treasury (10.1% of Somali total received treasury grants in 2016). If these sources are proven, it means that in 2016, Turkey has started using the Somalia's Financial Management system (on treasury) for the disbursement of its sector budget support, while Turkey was not using them from 2013 to 2016, failing reliable country systems in Somalia during those periods⁶⁷⁷.

In sum, we argue that between 2015 and 2016, the EU did use country systems in Niger and Ethiopia while it did not use them in Nigeria and Somalia. In contrast, Turkey did not use country systems in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, between 2015 and 2016, although budget support was used in favour of Somalia since 2013 in cash. As such, the performance of Turkey and EU of the indicator 9b is equally low in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia, while the performance of the EU was stronger than Turkey's performance in the case of Ethiopia and Niger.

⁶⁷⁷ Unfortunately, we could not get further information on this issue with our interviewees.

With respect to the indicator 10 on “untying aid”, one can see that on papers, EU regulations and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement foresee the untying of EU development aid towards SSA, by allowing both EU and African partners to compete on equal feet in procurement procedure. The regulations even went further by positing under certain circumstances a preference for ACP partners in the grant of contracts to ensure the large participation of ACP contractors in the performance of contracts performed under EDF. Yet, even if aid is reported as untied in principle, some interviewees have pointed out the existing of informal barriers such as the lack of technical and financial capacity of African competitors, which leads to the hiring of European contractors in large infrastructural projects.

Quantitatively speaking, statistics above shows that in average, in Ethiopia, 83.8% of EU ODA is untied, against 15.9% of ODA being tied. In Niger, 81.37 of EU ODA is untied against 18.62% of tied aid. In Nigeria, 42.62% of EU ODA is untied, against 21.31% of tied aid, and 37.7% of partially tied aid. In Somalia, 60.46% of EU ODA is untied against 39.53% of tied aid. Statistically, EU performance of indicator 10, between 2014 and 2015 has been higher respectively in Niger and Ethiopia. Its performance ranks at the lower end when it comes to Nigeria. Somalia ranks in the middle in terms of EU performance against indicator 10.

In Turkey’s case, since in most of our country case studies Turkey does not provide cash grants (except for Somalia to a certain extent), and rather prioritizes aid-in nature (such as supplying desks, computers and other school and medical materials, etc..), there is reason to believe that quite a lot of Turkish ODA is tied, because aid in-kind often has a much higher degree of tying than equivalent cash grants.

On papers, the execution of Turkish aid projects seems to have an untying appearance because there are no geographical restrictions for participants in tendering procedure, since all natural or legal persons can participate in the tendering procedure and the award or contract is granted to the best economically offer. Yet, the fact that most of the procurement announcement are published in Turkish language constitutes a significant barrier for the participation of foreign legal or natural persons and that gives advantage for national participants or the ones who can speak Turkish. The price advantage up to 15% for domestic tenderers constitute another discrimination in the disadvantage of foreign participants. The interviewee (EST) underlined that most of Turkish projects which imply high know-how are implemented by Turkish companies because of the lack of enough expertise of local companies. Still, they are using

extensively local labour forces in the execution of the projects. Most of the goods that will be used for the implementation of the projects come from Turkey.

In terms of comparison, Turkish procurement law appears to be more open than the EU regulations because there are no reciprocity obligations in Turkish law as for the participation in tendering procedure, although the reciprocity obligations foreseen in the Annex 4 of the Cotonou Agreement concerns non-EU and non-ACP potential participants and does not have a negative impact on the participation of ACP nationals or companies.

The inclusion of a price advantage up to 15% for Turkish domestic tenderers in Turkish procurement law constitutes a significant barrier to the participation and selection of foreign tenderers in the procedure. Such barrier does not exist in the case of the EU regulations, which on the contrary foresees a preference clause for ACP participants under certain circumstances.

The fact that tendering announcement are advertised in Turkish on one hand, and the complexity of EU procurement and tendering system, constitute other forms of informal tying from both EU and Turkish sides. The statistics indicate that in the case of Turkey, in average between 2014 and 2017, only 11.30% of the tendering procedures were open to international competition and the foreign economic operators could only gain about 0.21 % of the total awarded contracts during this period.

Both in Turkey's and EU's cases, interviewees have demonstrated that in large infrastructural projects, the contract is generally awarded to Turkish and EU Companies in each case because of the lack of material and technical capacity of local companies. Yet, in both cases, local labour forces are used extensively in the execution of the projects.

All-in-all compared to the EU, given that a large part of Turkish development aid towards Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria is made of grants-in-nature and few projects without cash grants, there is a reason to deduce that the EU performed better than Turkey in the context of indicator 10 of BEDCPs.

- ***With respect to the Inclusive Partnership's principle***

As for the indicator 2 on "CSOs enabling environment", on papers, the importance of the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) has been recognized in many EU-SSA partnership framework, of which the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). Yet the involvement of CSOs

and Local Actors (LAs) in the project cycle, from identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring to evaluation, is not mentioned in the EDF Implementing regulation and the pace of CSOs is being restricted by many partner countries.

Unlike the EU case where EUDs are explicitly required to consult with local CSOs in the drafting of development projects since 11th EDF, in Turkey's case, consultations with local CSOs in the formulation of development projects is not explicitly included in Turkey's development cooperation policies. Only consultation with Turkish CSOs is encouraged for TIKA Coordinators, but it is not mandatory. The implementation phase of projects appears to be more inclusive in Turkey's case because in the field, Turkish agencies, companies and businesses try to engage the leaders of dominant groups, village elders, religious leaders and civil society to gain the support of the community for their projects and to push them to keep their eyes on the good implementation of the projects. Unlike the EU case where there is a fund allocated to CSOs under 11th EDF, there is no such specific funds that will be used to support local CSOs in the recipient countries, in Turkey's case.

On paper the EU performed better against the indicator 2 of the BEDCPs than Turkey because the inclusion of CSOS in the formulation and implementation of development projects is explicitly mentioned in some documents.

In practice however, the performance by the EU of Indicator 2 is limited by some barriers such as the reluctance of the recipient governments to involve CSOs in development projects, under EDF funds. But the EU has other means to work with CSOs autonomously through the EIHDR and other instruments. As such, EU's performance on papers and in practice is far better than Turkey's performance of Indicator 2 in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

- ***With respect to the Focus on Results' principle***

Regarding indicator 1a on "the use of country results-framework", although the process of allocating funds under EDF takes in principle into consideration the national priorities of the recipient country as elaborated in the national development plans of the recipient countries, many interviewees from African Embassies have complained about the fact that they are sometimes constrained to accept the sectoral priorities decided by the commission, due to the asymmetrical relationship. For the monitoring and evaluation of development projects, the EU is cautious about using national statistics in the evaluation of project implementation and in the formulation of new projects, because they are not often reliable.

Turkey's development aid approach can be hailed as being 'recipient-focused' and 'responsive' to a country's needs, because almost-if-not-all its aid activities in Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger, and Nigeria have been conducted upon request from their national governments to respond to certain needs. However, Turkey's way of doing development projects is sometimes criticized for being exclusively a government-to-government affair, since many projects are formulated during official presidential visits to the recipient governments. In this sense, the projects may not reflect to real needs of the population, but only respond to political needs of the governing authorities. Moreover, although Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, have all elaborated a national development strategy, there are no mention or evidence of the use of the national documents by Turkey's development aid policy-makers in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of development projects.

For the monitoring and evaluation, Turkey has yet to develop a strong monitoring and evaluation framework. Most of the time, Turkey monitors the implementation of its projects, especially in the sector of infrastructure through site visit and discussion with local population by TIKA coordinators. As such, there is little chance that Turkey uses the result-frameworks (if any) of the recipient countries.

In comparison, on paper EU seems to have performed better than Turkey in terms of use of country-result frameworks since national indicative programs under EDF instrument are drawn based on the recipient countries' national development plans. In terms of formal performance of indicator 1a of the BEDCPs, the EU is ahead of Turkey.

In practice, however, Turkey's aid is most often applauded for being mostly demand-driven, since projects are formulated on many times at the request of the recipient country's government, although the question of democratic ownership of the projects can be another limitation for Turkey.

Although the EU takes into consideration the national development priorities of the recipient countries, most of the persons interviewed at African Embassies in Brussels have deplored the asymmetric relationship between them and the EU, which sometimes leaves them no choice but to conform to the EU desire about where the funds should go by defining the three main sectoral priorities in advance upon which the recipient countries should draft their NIPS.

Regarding the use of national statistics for the monitoring and evaluation, both Turkey and the EU do not seem to rely on national statistics for the monitoring of their aid projects, although

unlike Turkey, the EU does have its own Monitoring Results framework, which it uses in the evaluation of development projects.

- ***With respect to the principles of Transparency and Accountability***

As for indicator 4 on “transparency”, based on the international transparency standards, the EU’s reporting to the OECD Creditor Reporting System, to the OECD Forward Spending Survey, and to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, was respectively “Good”, “Excellent”, and “Good”. Unlike the EU, Turkey does not publish its ODA to the OECD CRS, to the OECD FSS, and to the IATI. As such, the EU largely performed better than Turkey in the context of Indicator 4.

Finally, the EU’s performance against indicator 6 on “accountability” seems to be lower because, the EDF, which constitutes the major financial instrument for our four country case studies, remains outside of the EU budget and is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In contrast, Turkey’s development projects in general and in the four country-case studies particularly are funded with money which comes directly from the Turkish national budget voted annually by the Turkish Parliament. Given that a large part of EU development projects in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, is funded from EDF, which is outside the EU budget, there is a reason to conclude that Turkey performed better than EU with respect of Indicator 6 of the Busan principles.

To sum up, with respect to Indicator 5a, the EU performance in the four countries seems to be higher than Turkey’s performance, with respect to general ODA, although the predictability of EU EDF significantly weakens in the four countries due to mid-term reviews’ influence.

Regarding indicator 9b, EU’s and Turkey’s performance is very low in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia, while in the cases of Niger and Ethiopia, the EU performed better than Turkey.

Coming to indicator 10, in the cases of Niger and Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia EU’s performance seems to be higher than Turkey’s performance because of the predominance of grants-in-nature in Turkey’s aid projects, which are mostly tied.

About indicator 2 and indicator 1a, on paper the EU’s performance appears to be equally higher than Turkey’s performance in the four countries. In practice, whereas EU’s performance of indicator 2 seems to be also better than Turkey’s performance in the four countries, the practical implementation of indicator 1a by the Turkey and the EU can be considered as equal due to the observed practical limits on both sides.

Lastly, while EU's performance of indicator 4 is higher than Turkey's performance, Turkey's performance in the context of indicator 6 seems to be relatively higher than EU's performance in the four countries.

Stopping our research at this stage would have not solved another fundamental issue related to the implementation of the BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey: why these variations in the performance of the BEDCPs and its related indicators between the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia? Did the EU and Turkey trade-off the implementation of BEDCPs with strategic interests as the neorealists would have foreseen? Did the political and cultural identity of the EU and Turkey influence their behaviour vis-à-vis the BEDCPs in the four countries? Did the level of interdependency between the EU and Turkey and the countries in SSA play in favour or in disfavour of the implementation of the BEDCPs? To obtain more certainty about the explanatory factors that played a key role, we will briefly formulate three auxiliary hypotheses and test them with the four cases in the next section.

3.2. THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF ‘UNEVEN’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BEDCPS BY THE EU AND TURKEY IN ETHIOPIA, NIGER, NIGERIA AND SOMALIA

3.2.1. Contextualizing the Problem

In the previous section, this thesis comparatively analysed the EU and Turkey's performance in the context of the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger and Somalia, based on the research question which asks how donors have implemented the Busan Principles in their development aid policies and practices. Considering that in comparison to the EU and except Indicator 6 and to a certain extent Indicators 1a and 9b (in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia), Turkey has shown a lower performance against the remaining five indicators, namely Indicators 5a, 10, 2, and 4, in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia, this part explores why this difference exists. In other words, by drawing on the conceptual and theoretical framework developed in the previous sections, this chapter examines the main factors that have contributed to the uneven donor (EU and Turkey) implementation progress of the Busan principles in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia.

Although many factors such as donor self-interests, political commitment of donors, political and socio-economic situation in the recipient country, donor aid cultures and history, domestic conditions of the donor countries and aid management system, can influence the different performance of donors, more broadly, this thesis focus on three most relevant factors that are drawn from neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist theories. Therefore, this chapter investigates the three key factors attributing to donor performance: donors' political identity and norms, donors' self-interests, and the level of donor-recipient relationship.

The first factor on political identity and norms is drawn from the constructivist theory and posits the main assumption that the political identity and norms of the donor country influence their behaviour vis-à-vis international norms to an extent that more convergence between donors' identity and international norms is likely to lead to a better identification with and implementation of international norms.

The second causal mechanism, namely donors' self-interests stems from the neorealist assumption that the international structure is anarchic, and that power and interests more than norms and values inform states' behaviour in the international system. Therefore, from a

neorealist standpoint of view, donors' lower or higher implementation of international norms highly depends on the pursuit and promotion of their self-interests, in a sense that international norms would be traded off with donors' self-interests whenever there is incompatibility between the international norms and donors' interests.

The third intervening factor on the level of the relationship between the donor and recipient countries is derived from the neoliberal-neo-institutionalism's assumption that although the international system is anarchic, human beings are not necessarily evil and that they could manage to cooperate peacefully for the protection and promotion of common interests. The complex interdependency between nations in the globalization era has further made states realized about the value of cooperation. Based on this argument, when the donor and recipient countries are engaged in long-term and deep relationships and cooperation and when their mutual interests tend to get harmonized, this can push for a better implementation of international norms on effective development cooperation. This is grounded on the assumption that an effective development cooperation impacts positively on the socio-economic development and political stability of the recipient country, which in turn would protect the interests of the donor in this country. Thus, the deeper and longer the relationships between donor and recipient countries, the better the implementation of the BEDCPs is likely to be.

Therefore, we formulate the following three auxiliary hypotheses that will be developed and tested to our four country case studies in the following sections:

-From a constructivist perspective: *Auxiliary Hypothesis 1: Positive compliance depends on the level of convergence between donors' political identity and Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles.*

-From a neorealist strand of view: *Auxiliary Hypothesis 2: Positive compliance depends of the level of convergence between donors 's aid motives and interest and development cooperation effectiveness norms.*

-From a neoliberal standpoint: *Auxiliary Hypothesis 3: Positive compliance depends on the level of dependency and cooperation between development cooperation providers and recipients.*

For the analysis, this study reviews institutional and aid agency publications, official data, and existing document sources such as conference papers as well as academic literature. Information from press releases and relevant official websites is also included in this thesis

for data collection Interviews and feedback from bilateral donor agency staff, and African diplomats in Belgium and Turkey, are included to interrogate the difference in understanding, priority and commitment of the field actors charged with the implementation of the BP. Especially in the case of Turkey, data for the analysis relies more upon interview methods because these countries produce relatively few publications related to the BP implementation when compared to the EU.

3.2.2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses

We will overview and develop the three main auxiliary hypotheses posited above to highlight the means we will use to measure and test each hypothesis to our case studies.

- ***Auxiliary Hypothesis 1. Positive compliance depends on the level of convergence between donors' political identity and Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles.***

This hypothesis is derived from the constructivist argument that identity and norms, more than material considerations, define state's behaviour. According to constructivists, through the process of interaction, actors acquire identities, which Wendt defines as “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self”⁶⁷⁸. Through repeated interactive processes, stable identities and expectations about each other are developed⁶⁷⁹ and identities are the basis for interests and therefore more fundamental in determining states' foreign policies⁶⁸⁰. In short, constructivism regards international relations as norm-governed and state interests as constructed through “a fluid and interactive process of identity formation” which leads to “particular norms coming to be ‘appropriate’, that is, genuinely embedded in belief systems rather than adhered to for merely instrumental reasons”⁶⁸¹.

In this context, states' role conceptions and prescriptions feed into their national role performances, which are manifested as general foreign policy behaviours, including their attitudes, decisions, responses, functions, and commitments in the international arena⁶⁸². Thus, a country's self-perception of its position in the international hierarchy moulds its attitudes toward the global status quo.

⁶⁷⁸ Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 7 oct. 1999.

⁶⁷⁹ Wendt. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring, 1992, p.405

⁶⁸⁰ Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 7 oct. 1999.

⁶⁸¹ Youngs Richard. *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.6.

⁶⁸² Holsti, K. J. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 14, Issue 3, 1 September 1970, p.245

Regarding states and institutions' approaches to international norms, one scholar, Reilly argues that there are two main approaches. Firstly, a norm-taker approach, "which refers to donors that accept or do not contend against major international norms". Secondly, a norm-maker approach, which reflects "donors' approach to promote an alternative set of norms derived from their own experiences, ideas and identities"⁶⁸³. Some argue that "many emerging powers aim to be rule-makers, rather than merely rule-takers" and that "depending on an emerging power's economic and political profile, it may adopt a variety of strategies in pursuit of this end. Thus, while some states have been vocal in advocating for the construction of alternatives to North dominated institutions, others have been less subversive, and have been content to cooperate with traditional powers in the hopes of gaining a larger voice on the world stage"⁶⁸⁴.

In sum and following a constructivist perspective, if donor's identity and norms are compatible with the global norms on development cooperation effectiveness, it is more likely that the donor would provide stronger commitments to implement the Busan Effective Development Cooperation principles. Plus, where there is a stronger political commitment to the Busan principles, there is greater performance in terms of changes in domestic legislation and regulation as well as aid policies in donor countries at implementation stage; however, where there is a lack of political commitment, there is less change in domestic regulations. This means that the more a donor identifies itself with the international effective development cooperation norms, the more efforts it would make to implement effectively these principles. In reverse, the less a donor identifies itself with the Busan principles, the less efforts it would make to implement them.

To test this hypothesis, we will look at the democratic and political status of Turkey and the EU as well as official political reports, discourses and declarations from both donors, to highlight their "implicit" or "explicit" identity as well as their proximity with internationally-agreed and adopted norms on aid and development cooperation effectiveness.

- ***Auxiliary Hypothesis 2. Positive compliance depends on the level of convergence between donors 's aid motives and interest and development cooperation effectiveness norms.***

This hypothesis stems from the neorealist view that donor behaviour is largely driven by

⁶⁸³ Reilly, James. "A Norm-taker or a Norm-maker? Chinese aid in southeast Asia.", *Journal of Contemporary China* vol 21, No 73, p.72.

⁶⁸⁴Tanner J. Boisjolie, "Emerging Development Partners and Aid Governance: Examining the Role of 'Aid Effectiveness' in South African and Indonesian South-South Cooperation", MA Thesis, School for International Studies , Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences , University of San Diego, 2014 ,p.5

relative cost-benefit calculations because of the anarchical nature of the international system, which leads to a self-help system where states must fight for their own survival. Neo-Realists downplay the role of institutions and norms in international politics by arguing that institutions and norms exist typically in “low politics” domains of lesser importance such as transportation, communication, health, and the like, and not in the “high politics” domains of national security and defence.

Neo Realists maintain that “institutions are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour”⁶⁸⁵. For the structural realist, anarchy further discourages cooperation because “it requires states to worry about the relative gains of cooperation and the possibility that adversaries will cheat on agreements”⁶⁸⁶. K. Waltz argues in the same line that self-help systems “make the cooperation of parties difficult...Rules, institutions, and patterns of cooperation ... are all limited in extent and modified from what they might otherwise be”⁶⁸⁷. The hypothesis forwarded by structural realists is that due to structural constraints in the international system, normative ideas stop determining policy when in conflict with vital national or common interests⁶⁸⁸.

A translation of the neorealist assumption to the performance of donors in the context of BEDCPs, implies that donors will only comply with global norms on development cooperation effectiveness when it would serve its own national interests. In other words, it is only those international norms on effective development cooperation that are congruent with national motives for aid-giving that will influence outcomes⁶⁸⁹. Whenever there is a contradiction and incompatibility between the Busan Effective development cooperation principles and the donors’ self-interests, the latter would prevail because states are rational actors which are always in the pursuit of their selfish national interests in the detriment of common interests.

To test this hypothesis, we will make use of various relevant data, reports, and political declarations that shed light on eventual compatibility or incompatibility between the implementation of the BEDCPs and related indicators in the four recipient countries and the

⁶⁸⁵Mearsheimer, John. “The false promise of international institutions”, *International Security* vol 19 Number 3, winter 1994/95. Pp 5-49.

⁶⁸⁶Glaser, L. Charles. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help”, *International Security*, vol 19 No3, 1994-1995, P.61.

⁶⁸⁷Waltz, Kenneth. “Reflections on theory of international politics: a response to my critics”, Robert Keohane(ed), *Neo realism and its critics*. N.Y. Columbia University Press 1986, p.336.

⁶⁸⁸Hyde-Price Adrian. “A ‘Tragic Actor’? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’”, *International Affairs*, Vol.84, No. 1, January 2008, P. 29-44.

⁶⁸⁹Maurits van der Veen, A. *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011.

protection and promotion of donor's economic, political and security interests.

- ***Auxiliary Hypothesis 3. Positive compliance depends on the level of dependency and cooperation between development cooperation providers and recipients.***

This hypothesis is derived from the neoliberal theory according to which, although the international system is anarchic, peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation between states is possible and achievable because of the increasing interdependencies among states. Whereas neorealism views international cooperation as 'harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power'⁶⁹⁰, neoliberalism defends the opposite arguing that the increasingly "complex interdependence" among nations facilitate and increases the value of international cooperation as the sustainable way to promote and protect common interests.

Based on neoliberalism, this hypothesis posits that the higher the level of dependency between donor and recipient countries the more responsive the donor is likely to be with respect to the implementation of the Busan principles. This is based on the idea that when donor and recipient countries are highly dependent on each other in economic, political, and security terms, there is a high probability for a better implementation of the Busan principles because it will contribute in the longer term to the achievement of sustainable socio-economic development of the recipient countries, which in turn would protect and promote donors' interests within and outside the recipient country. The increasing interdependency between donor and recipient countries leads to the increasing harmonization of their interests which ought to be protected and promoted under mutually beneficial, and long-term cooperation and in stable and prosperous environments. This hypothesis is proxied by looking at the intensity of economic, political, and security relationship that exists between the donor and the recipient countries.

Having laid down the three auxiliary hypotheses, we will empirically apply each of them to our country case studies in the following section to shed light on the causal mechanisms behind poor or better performance of the BEDCPs by Turkey and the EU.

⁶⁹⁰ Baldwin_David Allen. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 5

3.2.3. Testing the Hypotheses to the case studies

The three auxiliary hypotheses will be tested to our case studies to show up whether norms and identity, self-interests, and/or the level of cooperation between donor-recipient countries, can explain the difference in the implementation of the BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey.

- *From a Constructivist Perspective*

Auxiliary Hypothesis 1: Positive compliance depends on the level of political commitment and identification with effective development cooperation norms by donors

Have norms and identity played a role in the uneven implementation of the BEDCPs by Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?

As stated above, this hypothesis is derived from the constructivist arguments that identity and norms define state's behaviour. In this sense, if donor's identity and norms are compatible with the global norms on development cooperation effectiveness, it is more likely that it would provide stronger commitments to implement aid effectiveness principles.

The Busan principles are mostly derived from liberal norms and the main supporters of the principles have been the liberal countries and institutions, namely the EU, EU Member States, the World Bank, etc... One scholar, Rowlands Dane argues in this regard that key international norms on international development and aid, which underlie the international aid regime, have originated from Western communities⁶⁹¹.

As such, we argue that when donors accept and adopt liberal norms as part of their inner identity, they will more easily and willingly to implement the development cooperation effectiveness norms due to the convergence between their identity and the agreed norms at Busan.

Hence the following question: do the norms and identities of the EU and Turkey converge with the Busan effective development cooperation norms and principles? Do EU and Turkey's norms and identities promote or not a better implementation of the BEDCPs? In case of convergence between donor identity and international norms, are they translated into practice for a better implementation of the BEDCPs?

§ In the EU case

⁶⁹¹ Rowlands, Dane. "Emerging donors in international Development Assistance: a synthesis report.", *Ottawa: International Development Research Center (IDRC) 2008*, p.4

As a member of the OECD-DAC, the EU has been very active in all international discussions related to the aid and development effectiveness principles, ranging from Monterrey, to Rome, Paris, Accra, and Busan. The EU has always adopted a common position in view of each of these forums and has regularly taken initiatives to implement the principles that came out of the discussions. In illustration, following the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the EU adopted the Barcelona 8 Commitments on 14 March 2002 to implement the commitments made during the Monterrey conference. As a follow-up to the 2005 Paris agenda's call for donors' harmonization, on 15 May 2007 the General Affairs and External Relations Council adopted a Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour.

The EU has also regularly participated to the Paris Declaration monitoring surveys and to the GPEDC's monitoring surveys and it has established a department of International cooperation effectiveness at DEVCO headquarters in Brussels. This division is mainly charged with the issues related to the aid and development effectiveness principles. The European Commission plays an active role in GPEDC and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) represents the EU on the Steering Committee.

The EU has been part of the Working Party of Aid Effectiveness, which oversaw monitoring the Paris Declaration's principles. To reinforce the follow-up of the commitments made by the EU and its member states towards implementing the Busan principles, the EU has further taken several initiatives such as the establishment of the EU Joint Programming to reduce donor fragmentation, and to strengthen the coherence, transparency, predictability and visibility of EU external assistance. These are few illustrations among others of the several steps taken by the EU to implementation internationally-agreed norms on aid and development cooperation effectiveness.

All these show that the EU truly identifies itself with the aid and development effectiveness principles and norms and is committed to implement them, at least on papers. The EU is a norm-maker because it has played an important role in the formulation of these norms on aid effectiveness. Once these norms have been adopted, the EU becomes a norm-taker which does not want to challenge the agreed effective development cooperation principles but rather is keen to push harder for its effective implementation.

Thus, we argue that in principle, there is a compatibility between EU identity and norms with the Busan aid effectiveness principles. This compatibility is meant to strengthen the willingness to implement and to ease the process of implementation by the EU. Based on this, and from a constructivist lens, one can understand overall the EU performed better on these

principles than Turkey because the proximity of identity has led to the internalization of the Busan Effective Development Cooperation principles by the EU and has eased their progressive and better implementation in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Nonetheless, this hypothesis can be partly refuted with respect to some indicators, such as indicator 6, indicator 1a and indicator 10, and when taking the EU alone without comparing its performance with that of Turkey because the EU is having hard times to implement the indicator 10 on tied aid, the indicator 1a on focus on results and the indicator 6 on aid cooperation being on budget and approved by the parliament, certainly due to the prevalence of self-interests calculations.

Likewise, the fact that the degree of implementation of some of the Busan indicators by the EU varies from one recipient country to another means that the identity and norms of the recipient countries could influence over the poor or better implementation of the Busan principles and ought to be analysed too. For instance, the indicator 5a and indicator 9b have been better implemented by the EU in Niger and Ethiopia than in Nigeria and Somalia. However, since the domestic factors within the recipient country are not included into the scope of our current analysis, we do not look at the controlling factors related to the recipient countries.

§ The case of Turkey

Turkey has also been active in the international discussions on aid and development cooperation effectiveness, although not to the same degree as the EU.

However, although Turkey has endorsed all key international instruments on aid effectiveness, namely the Paris declaration, the Accra Agenda and the Busan Partnership, it has been less active in taking formal steps towards implementing the aid effectiveness principles that resulted from each of these forums.

Nonetheless, references to these principles are sometimes made by some Turkish officials, which means that Turkey does not totally disregard them. The Statement by Turkey during the mid-term review of the Istanbul Program of Action (IPoA), held in Antalya, also goes in this stance: "TIKA has taken action in 29 LDCs in line with Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and has implemented projects on social, economic, administrative and physical infrastructure and services"⁶⁹².

⁶⁹²Statement by Turkish Deputy Undersecretary at the mid Term Review of the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA), held in Antalya, accessed on 18th March 2018, at

Furthermore, Turkey was also a member of the Working Party on aid effectiveness and has taken part to the monitoring surveys conducted by the Working party on aid effectiveness under the Paris Declaration as well as to the 2014-2015 monitoring survey conducted by the Global Partnership for effective development cooperation under Busan agenda. Plus, Istanbul hosted the first Global Assembly of the Open forum for CSO Development Effectiveness in 2010 that led to the adoption of the CSO Development Effectiveness Principles, designed to promote and increase the role of CSOs in the global aid sphere.

Despite these encouraging initiatives, as we said previously, Turkey did not take any formal step or initiative to align its aid strategies with the aid effectiveness principles. This is likely to be harder to achieve in a context where Turkey more and more tends to distance itself from the west, to highlight its unique and distinctive identity and to push for the reforms of key international norms, and to consider its development aid activities as part of south-south development cooperation. One interviewee (TK1) argues that Turkey wants to develop and implement its Turkish model of development cooperation, without receiving lessons from anyone. Turkey appears as a norm-maker willing to propose and put in place an alternative way of doing development cooperation.

These lead us to cautiously argue that Turkey does not fully identifies itself with international liberal norms in general, and with international norms on effective development cooperation more particularly. In this context, Turkey has developed its own identity, which might not be compatible with Busan principles. This identity seems to be a reformist identity, which wants to follow its own defined path. As such, the gap between Turkish identity and Busan norms can explain why except for indicator 6 and to a certain extent indicator 1a and 9b, Turkey has globally been less performant than the EU in implementing the Busan principles in the four countries.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis fails to explain why the EU and Turkey did not use country systems in Nigeria and Somalia, and therefore poorly implemented the indicator 9b of the Busan Principles in the two countries, despite the observed difference between both countries' identities. The hypothesis is further partly refuted with respect to indicators 6 and 1a because Turkey seems to have performed better than the EU for the first one and Turkey and EU equally performed the indicator 1a in practice in the recipient countries. Following the

<http://ldc4istanbul.org/MTR2016/uploads/Turkey%E2%80%99s%20National%20Statement%20delivered%20by%20Deputy%20Undersecretary%20Ambassador%20Naci%20Koru.pdf>

constructivist argument, we expected the EU, whose identity is closer to global effective development cooperation 's norms, to better implement all Busan principles and indicators than Turkey in each recipient country.

In sum, while the auxiliary hypothesis 1 is fully verified with respect to indicator 5a, indicator 4, Indicator 2, Indicator 10 due to the higher performance of the EU in the four recipient countries, it is partly verified for the indicators 9b (especially in Nigeria, and Somalia), 1a, and 6, because the EU and Turkey did not implement indicator 9b in Nigeria and Somalia at all, both donors equally performed in practice with respect to indicators 1a and Turkey better performed than the EU with respect to indicator 6.

- *From a Neorealist perspective*

Auxiliary Hypothesis 2: Positive compliance depends of the level of convergence between donors 's aid motives and interest and Effective Development Cooperation norms and principles.

According to the neorealist view, because of the anarchical self-help system, donor behaviour is largely driven by relative cost-benefit calculations. This means that, donors will only comply with global norms on effective development cooperation when it would serve and protect their own national interests.

Based on these assumptions, we will try to respond empirically to the following questions: Did the protection and promotion of donors' self-interests prevail over the implementation of international norms on effective development cooperation in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia? Do the EU and Turkey have an interest in implementing or not implementing the Busan principles and the related indicators? Do donors' self-interests play an important role in explaining uneven implementation between the EU and Turkey in the context of BEDCPs in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia?

Both Turkey and the EU have commercial interests in the four countries in general, and especially in Nigeria, Niger, and Ethiopia because development aid is the first point of contact for the penetration of business groups into the sub-Saharan African markets. Unlike the case of Turkey where its development projects in the four countries are generally small and short-term projects without huge financial implications, the EU aid projects are generally big scale projects, whose execution are generally granted to big European companies in Africa. This

does not mean that there are not big development projects run by Turkey in SSA⁶⁹³, but most of its development projects are small-scale development projects.

In any case, whenever large scale projects are implied, the execution are generally given to European or Turkish companies, which makes EU and Turkish development aid most of the time tied, although their regulations explicitly encourage untying aid. The relative gains assumptions of the neorealist is true both for Turkey and the EU, with respect to indicator 10 of the BEDCPs on tied aid, because the implementation of this indicator is generally traded off with hidden commercial interests.

Moreover, the increasing willingness of EU Member states to use EDF instrument for the promotion of their national interests in SSA, explains their persisting refusal to “budgetize” EDF, despite Parliament’s several insistences on the necessity to include EDF into EU budget for more transparency. Member states which contribute the most to EDF, namely France, UK, and Germany, are former colonies of our country case studies, and each of them has commercial, security and political interests in each of these countries. So, “budgetizing” EDF would lead to a considerable reduction of their power of control and marge of manoeuvre on the funds and the way of using them. So, following neorealist argument, compared to Turkey, the EU did not implement well the indicator 6 on accountability, because of the prevalence of EU Member states’ interests over Busan norms. The higher performance of Turkey is certainly due to the fact that indicator 6 ‘s requirement is compatible with the national-settings and rules of Turkey in the funding of overseas ‘aid projects.

The prevalence of self-interests also explains why although EU ODA in the four countries is quite predictable in general, this predictability becomes weaker when considering the EDF because of the mid-term reviews. Neorealist argument can be used to explain why the EU poorly performed against indicator 5a with respect to EDF, especially in Ethiopia, and Niger because Ethiopia and Niger are certainly one of the key security partners of the EU in the fight against security issues (migration, maritime piracy, terrorism) in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel region .In this sense, the initially allocated money is generally reviewed upwards in the two countries during mid-term reviews.

Compared to the EU, Turkey did not implement well the indicator 5a on annual predictability because it considers that its main objective is not to make aid more predictable but to make the most efficient use of the funds by distributing money to the countries which are in most

⁶⁹³ Examples include among others the Recep-Tayyip hospital built in Somalia by TIKA, etc...

needs. The incompatibility between the Busan indicator 5a and Turkish aid objectives and motivations as well as the prevalence of the latter explain why Turkey did not perform well on this indicator compared to the EU.

Although the EU did better than Turkey on papers with respect to indicator 2 on CSOs, some realpolitik considerations have undermined the effective implementation of this indicator by both the EU and Turkey. Indeed, both Turkey and the EU give more preference to government-to-government aid relationships than to a more inclusive partnership with Non-State Actors. Sometimes, despite evidence that the recipient government is against supporting measures in favour of CSOs, which they see as threats to their authoritarian power, donors tend to look for compromise with the governing authorities and not to force their hands, certainly because they are more concerned with keeping friendly relations with the governing authorities of the recipient country. This has been acknowledged by one interviewee (EEB) with respect to the EU 's actions in Ethiopia ⁶⁹⁴. Hence, the pursuit of self-interests has resulted in a mediocre performance on the ground by Turkey and the EU (although EU's performance seems relatively better) of indicator 2 of BEDCPs in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Concerning the indicator 1a on focus on results and alignment with national priorities, many officials of the embassies of the four African countries in Brussels, have outlined the fact that the aid sectoral priorities are mainly defined by the EU and that in case of non-compatibility between their defined aid priorities with those of the EU, the EU is the one which holds the last word due to the existing asymmetrical relationship. This implies that the priority sectors that will be funded by the EU are defined according to EU own strategy and interests, and not according to the interests of the recipient countries. Turkey in practice partly seems to have performed relatively better on this indicator (especially with respect to recipient-needs and priorities'-based aspect) because its aid policy is mostly based on a demand-driven strategy.

Regarding the performance against indicator 9b, the weak relationship between the quality of a country's PFM and procurement systems and their use by donors suggests that greater use of these systems by donors no longer depends principally on technical improvements, but rather on political considerations, as neorealists would argue. This explains why despite that Niger's and Ethiopia's rate of improvements of their CPIA score from 2005 to 2016 is relatively lower than Nigeria's (from 3.3 in 2005 to 3.4 in 2016 for Niger, from 3.4 in 2005 to 3.5 in

⁶⁹⁴ Interview with an official at the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee EEB)

2016 for Ethiopia and from 3.1 in 2005 to 3.3 in 2016 for Nigeria) , the EU did use country systems in Niger and Ethiopia while it did not use country system in Nigeria. Likewise, although Ethiopia ranked higher than Niger in terms of CPIA score from 2005 to 2016, the use of country systems by the EU is still minimal in Ethiopia compared to its use in Niger. The only exception where the non-performance of indicator 9b by both the EU and Turkey can be fully justify without the necessary interference of self-interests calculations is the case of Somalia where the weakness of its PFM system impedes donors from using country system since its first CPIA score, which dates from 2017, is at a lower level (1.8).⁶⁹⁵.

Compared to the EU, Turkey performed poorly on indicator 4 because Turkey is very sensitive to disclose information and data on its development cooperation activities, which is mostly considered as confidential. Thus, Turkey is very reluctant to publish its data elsewhere outside its own internal systems and Turkey might have difficulties to comply with the transparency requirements of International Aid Transparency Initiative, OECD Forward Spending Survey, and OECD-Credit Reporting System. In other words, Turkey does not see any interests to disclose its aid data according to the Busan transparency standards.

In sum, this auxiliary hypothesis is convincing for the cases of EU and Turkey with respect to indicator 10 in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, with respect to indicator 9b for the cases of EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria, with respect to indicator 2 for the case of Turkey in the four country-case studies, with respect to indicator 6 for the cases of Turkey and the EU and with respect to indicator 4 and 5a for the case of Turkey in the four countries. The hypothesis is partly verified for the case of the EU with respect to indicator 1a,2, and 5a and for the case of Turkey in the context of indicator 1a. The hypothesis is not verified with respect to indicator 9b for both Turkey and the EU in Somalia.

- *From a neoliberal viewpoint*

Auxiliary Hypothesis 3. Positive compliance depends on the level of dependency and

⁶⁹⁵ For more details on CPIA score , see: <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment>

cooperation between development cooperation providers and recipients.

This hypothesis is derived from the liberal theory according to which states as rational actors are more able to overcome realistic pressure for self-interests and look for global results. Institutionalism presents a more optimistic view of international cooperation. Like Realism, states are rational actors maximizing their individual benefits, but according to neoliberalism, they seek absolute instead of relative gains because of the increasing complex interdependencies among states.

A neoliberal development aid provider is more likely and willing to implement efficiently the Busan Effective development cooperation principles since it will better protect and secure its own economic, political, and security interests. Indeed, based on the assumption that an effective implementation of the BEDCPs would certainly lead to an increase of the effectiveness of development cooperation, and collaterally to the achievement of the socio-economic development goals of the recipient countries, neoliberal states in principle would perform better than non-neoliberal states in the context of the implementation of the BEDCPs.

Hence the following question: What are the implications of neoliberalism for EU and Turkey's behaviour vis-à-vis the BEDCPs? Does the depth and length of cooperation and dependency between EU and Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Somalia on one hand, and between Turkey and Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Somalia on the other hand, inform us about the unevenness in the implementation of the BEDCPs by Turkey and the EU?

In this sense, we consider that due to strong historical and institutional ties and geographical proximity between some of EU countries and SSA, the EU, more than Turkey, has huge economic, political, and security interests in SSA. According to neoliberal view the interdependency between the EU and Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia are much stronger than the interdependency between Turkey and the four countries. Based on the fact that an effective implementation of the Busan principles would lead to the socio-economic, security and political development of the recipient countries, which in turn would protect and secure donors' interests in this region, we argue that the donor with higher interests in each of the four country case studies is more likely to perform better against the Busan principles and indicators. Thus, what are the interests of the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?

Table 39

EU Trade with Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia in 2017

	Total Trade (in million Euro)	Share in EU Trade (in %)	Rank as EU Trade partner in SSA
Ethiopia	3082	0.1	9 th
Niger	552	0.0	32 nd
Nigeria	25265	0.7	2 nd
Somalia	177	0.0	40 th

Source: European Commission-Directorate General for Trade , at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.04.2018.pdf

The Table 39 above shows that in 2017, Nigeria ranks as the 2nd top trading partner in SSA, while Ethiopia ranks as the 9th top trading partner of the EU in SSA, Niger ranks as the 32nd largest trade partner in SSA and Somalia as the 40th largest trading partner of the EU in SSA.

Niger is the world's fourth-ranking producer of uranium and the French Group Areva is one of the oldest and largest exploiters of Nigerien Uranium. Yet, Niger does not rank among the top trading partners of the EU in SSA (32nd trading partner in SSA: see Table 39 above).

Niger is a migration route to Europe from African countries and a new arena for terrorist activities in the Sahel and is part of the EU Security Strategy for the Sahel launched in March 2011 to help Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, and Chad combat security issues (illegal migration, human trafficking, terrorism) in the Sahel. The EU launched EUCAP Sahel Niger in 2012 to help establish an integrated, coherent, sustainable, and Human rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. The EU acknowledged the strategic importance of the Sahel in general and Niger most particularly in the followings terms “the Sahel has a prominent place in European union policy. Europe has numerous interests in the region, ranging from combating security threats, terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration to assuring energy security”⁶⁹⁶.

⁶⁹⁶ See EUCAP-Sahel website https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/3875/about-eucap-sahel-niger_en

With a maximum crude oil production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, Nigeria ranks as Africa's largest producer of oil and the sixth largest oil producing country in the world⁶⁹⁷, and Nigeria is one of the giant economies of Africa and is the soil of terrorist groups, namely Boko Haram. It remains the top destination for Nigeria's oil and non-oil exports with trade volumes at €39.6 billion in 2014. Nigeria is also a key beneficiary of EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with FDI stock growing from €25.3 billion in 2011 to €29.6 billion in 2013. Nigeria accounts for around half of the EU exports to the region and nearly 70 per cent of the imports⁶⁹⁸. Nigeria ranks as the 2nd largest EU trading partners in the world in 2016 (see Table 39 above).

Ethiopia is also a growing economy in SSA (according to African Development Bank statistics, in 2017 Ethiopia ranks as the first GDP growing country with almost 10% of annual growth⁶⁹⁹), a fertile soil for foreign investments, one of the largest trading partners of the EU in SSA (9th largest trading partner of the EU in the world in 2016: see Table 39 above), and a key EU partner for the securitization of the horn of Sahel.

Due to the security challenges in Somalia such as maritime piracy and terrorism, the EU works with Somalia to overcome these security challenges. In fact, the EU is one of the main contributors to AMISOM, the African Union's peace mission to Somalia. The EU also responds to the Somali's security challenges through three security and defence missions: the Military Training Mission (EUTM), which supports Somali security forces; The EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), which fights piracy, and EUCAP, which aims to improve regional maritime security. Economically, however, the EU does not have a lot of formal or direct trade with Somalia (40th trading partner of the EU in SSA out of 49 countries), whose main trading partners are the Gulf States and Yemen⁷⁰⁰.

Table 40

Turkey's trade with Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Somalia (in million USD)

⁶⁹⁷ See website of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), www.nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/upstreamventures/oilproduction.aspx

⁶⁹⁸ See European External Action Service (EEAS) Website, "Nigeria and the EU", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1621/nigeria-and-eu_sk

⁶⁹⁹ African Development Bank (AfDB). "African Economic Outlook 2018", AfDB 2018, accessed on 8th June 2018, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf

⁷⁰⁰ See EEAS Website. "Somalia and the EU", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1764/somalia-and-eu_it

	2005	2010	2015	Rank as Turkey's trading partner in SSA in 2015
Ethiopia	139.67	215.78	419.31	3rd
Niger	4.01	14.75	31.35	32nd
Nigeria	129.98	471.15	503.97	2nd
Somalia	3.05	6.17	72.38	20th

Source: Turkish Trade Ministry

It stems from the Table 40 above that Nigeria ranks as the 2nd largest trading partner of Turkey in SSA, Ethiopia occupies the 3rd place among the largest trading partners of Turkey in SSA, Somalia and Niger rank respectively as 20th and 32nd trading partner of Turkey in SSA in 2015.

Although Turkish interests in the four countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger and Nigeria) seem to be lesser than EU's interests, there do exist some non-negligible interests. Nigeria and Ethiopia, the giant economies in SSA, ranks respectively as the second and third most important trading partners of Turkey in SSA (see Table 40 above). This explains why the principal focuses of Turkey's relations with Ethiopia and Nigeria are trade and investment, while development aid is at the lower level. The opposite is observed with the case of Niger and Nigeria, where Turkey's main interventions are development and humanitarian-related, economic relations ranking in second position.

Turkey does not have direct security interests in the four countries although increasing Turkish investments in these countries could make Turkey start engaging in security cooperation to protect its economic interests against growing security threats. Some authors claim that unlike the EU, Turkey does not seem to extensively run after natural resources in SSA but rather seem to prioritize expanding its markets in SSA⁷⁰¹. There is also no geographical proximity between Turkey and the four countries that would create some kinds of strong interdependency that will shape Turkey's foreign policies towards these countries.

⁷⁰¹ See: Ozkan, Mehmet. "Turkey's Rising Role in Africa." *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol 9, no. 4 ,2010, p. 93–105; Ozkan, Mehmet, and Birol Akgün. "Turkey's Opening to Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 48, no. 4 ,2010, p.525–546.

Yet, there is a growing number of Turkish companies exploiting the mining sector in many countries in SSA, which could challenge this claim that Turkey's interests in SSA are mostly trade-related rather than the exploitation of natural resources.

Interdependency is more pronounced between Turkey and its European, Middle-eastern and Asian neighbouring countries.

The weakness of the interdependency between Turkey and the four countries means that Turkey does not face too much pressure to implement the Busan principles in the four countries, as one of the means to protect its eventual interests in these countries. In this sense, the neoliberal assumption is less likely to be valid for the case of Turkey, which can easily trade off the implementation of these principles with politico-economic and security, interests or for the sake of its own identity and values.

When looking at the aid history of the EU and Turkey in the SSA in general and in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia particularly, the EU has been involved in the development aid of African countries since the early days of the European Economic Community. The Treaty of Rome granted an associate status to French former colonies, which consisted of aid grants and preferential trade access. Following the accession of UK to the EEC and when the decolonisation process was over, it was also necessary to include former British colonies. This has led to the establishment of the 2 Yaoundé Conventions, followed by the four Lomé conventions and then the current CPA, which will expire in 2020. There are works at EU headquarters to draft the new instrument that will replace the CPA in 2020.

Although Turkey has been associated with Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger and Nigeria since the Ottoman era, these relations did not involve giving financial assistance. And there was a total downgrading of Turkey-African relations during the early years of the Republic era until the mid-2000s. Indeed, Turkey formally started providing aid to SSA countries during mid-2000s, through its Africa's opening policy.

Given that the EU's aid history is longer and more comprehensive than Turkey's and considering the higher level of dependency between the EU and each of our country case studies, one could easily understand that the EU can better understand the recipient countries' systems and therefore can better implement the aid effectiveness principles.

Overall, the auxiliary hypothesis 3 seems to be verified for Turkey and the EU with respect to indicators 5a, 2, 10, and 4 in the four countries and with respect to indicator 9b in Niger and Ethiopia because the EU performed better than Turkey. The hypothesis is not verified in the context of indicator 9b in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia because like Turkey the EU also failed to implement correctly the indicator 9 in Nigeria and to a certain extent in Somalia until 2018, despite its higher level of interdependence. The hypothesis is refuted by the cases of

Turkey and the EU with respect to indicators 6 and 1a because although the interdependency seems weaker in Turkish case than in the EU case, Turkey performed better than the EU against indicator 6 and both the EU and Turkey equally performed in practice with respect to indicator 1a in the four countries.

Table 41

Summary of the findings on the Causal mechanisms of donor performance: comparing Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia

	Hypothesis 1		Hypothesis 2		Hypothesis 3	
	EU	Turkey	EU	Turkey	EU	Turkey
Ethiopia						
Indicator 5a	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
Indicator 9b	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 10	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 2	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
Indicator 1a	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	-	-
Indicator 4	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 6	-	-	+	+	-	-
Niger						
Indicator 5a	+	+	+/-	+	+	+

Indicator 9b	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 10	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 2	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
Indicator 1a	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	-	-
Indicator 4	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 6	-	-	+	+	-	-

Nigeria

Indicator 5a	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
Indicator 9b	-	-	+	+	-	-
Indicator 10	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 2	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
Indicator 1a	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	-	-
Indicator 4	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 6	-	-	+	+	-	-

Somalia

Indicator 5a	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
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Indicator 9b	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indicator 10	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 2	+	+	+/-	+	+	+
Indicator 1a	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	-	-
Indicator 4	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indicator 6	-	-	+	+	-	-

Note: (+): hypothesis verified; (-): hypothesis not verified; (+/-): Partly verified

Source: Self-prepared by the author

3.2.4. Conclusion and Key remarks

This section has returned to the sub-questions which focus on the specific factors that have contributed to EU and Turkey's aid performance and what factors have affected the lack of changes to answer to one of the main research questions of why such unevenness exists in donors' (EU and Turkey) attitude in implementing the Busan principles in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia.

After the comparative assessment of the degree of performance by the EU and Turkey, this section has further analysed the explaining factors of the unevenness in the degree of implementation by positing three hypotheses drawn from constructivism, neorealism and neoliberalism that have been tested to the four country case studies, namely Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

The findings reveal that while the auxiliary hypothesis 1 drawn from constructivism is convincingly verified with respect to indicator 5a, indicator 4, Indicator 2, Indicator 10 because the EU performed better than Turkey in the four recipient countries, it is partly verified for the indicators 9b (especially in Nigeria, and Somalia), 1a, and 6 because the EU and Turkey did not implement indicator 9b in Nigeria and Somalia at all, both donors equally performed with respect to indicators 1a and Turkey better performed than the EU with respect to indicator 6, despite the fact that the EU because of the proximity of its identity with the Busan norms is normally expected to perform better than Turkey on each principle and indicators.

The auxiliary hypothesis 2 which stems from neorealism is verified by the cases of EU and Turkey with respect to indicator 10 and 6 in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, with respect to indicator 9b by the cases of Turkey and EU in Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria, and with respect to indicators 2,4 and 5a by the case of Turkey in the four country-case studies. The hypothesis is partly verified by the case of the EU with respect to indicator 1a,2, and 5a and by the case of Turkey in the context of indicator 1a. The hypothesis is not verified with respect to indicator 9b for both Turkey and the EU in Somalia.

The auxiliary hypothesis 3 drawn from neoliberalism is verified for Turkey and the EU with respect to indicators 5a, 2, 10 and 4 in the four countries and with respect to indicators 9b in Niger and Ethiopia because the EU performed better than Turkey. The hypothesis is not

verified in the context of indicator 9b in Nigeria and Somalia because like Turkey the EU also failed to implement correctly this indicator in Nigeria and to a certain extent in Somalia until 2018, despite its higher interests in these countries. The hypothesis is refuted by the cases of Turkey and the EU with respect to indicators 6 and 1a because although the interdependency seems weaker in Turkish case than in the EU case, Turkey performed better than the EU against indicator 6 and both the EU and Turkey equally performed in practice with respect to indicator 1a in the four countries.

In sum, this thesis argues that the three variables to donor behavioural change (namely donors' identity, self-interest, and level of dependency between donor and recipient countries, which are drawn from respectively from constructivism, neorealism, and liberalism), assist each other, and are interrelated with, and embedded in, all the four principles of the BP. In keeping with constructivism, this thesis suggests, however, that non-material elements such as values, norms, identities, ideas and ideologies, which are internalized in EU and Turkey, constitute by far the dominant factor explaining the different attitudes of Turkey and the EU regarding convergence to the Busan effective development cooperation principles and its related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. Whereas the EU already had the BP-friendly aid environment, aid systems of Turkey not ready for the BP, which means, if these Turkey wants to improve its performance against the Busan principles, it should make significant changes to bring its aid practices closer to the BP. The roles of norms and identities are then increasingly significant in defining both donors' attitudes to convergence.

The main two research questions analysed in this thesis include the comparative assessment of the performance of the EU and Turkey in the context of the four BEDCPs and its related indicators in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger, and Somalia, as well as the explanatory factors behind unevenness in the degree of performance observed between the EU and Turkey. The next and last section of this thesis will briefly analyse a research question, which is not directly included in our thesis questions, but which we consider useful to tentatively address and open the door for further deepening study on the issue. Thus, the final part of this thesis will assess the question of triangular development cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA (and our four country case studies particularly), to highlight the main drivers and barriers towards triangular cooperation, as well as and the prerequisite conditions for a successful triangular cooperation between EU, Turkey and SSA.

3.3. AID EFFECTIVENESS AND THE TRIANGLE TURKEY-EU-SSA AND: THE WAY FORWARD

As previously said, this thesis has mainly focused on the assessment of the performance of Turkey and the EU in the context of the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) in the cases of Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria and the causal mechanisms behind observed difference in the degree of implementation of these principles by the EU and Turkey.

Although the main research questions of this study do not cover triangular cooperation, we found it necessary to briefly analyse, as part of the way forward of this thesis, whether, how, and why a triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey, and SSA countries (especially Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria) is foreseeable (or not) in the nearest future. Indeed, with the increasing presence of new emerging donor countries pursuing development cooperation practices which are most often different from development cooperation practices of traditional northern donors, triangular cooperation as a possible conciliatory, inclusive and efficient model of cooperation has attracted the interest of the international community, donors and recipient countries. The OECD DAC initially considered triangular cooperation to involve “partnerships between DAC donors and pivotal countries (providers of South-South Cooperation) to implement development cooperation programmes/projects in beneficiary countries (recipients of development aid)”⁷⁰². The meaning of the term has been developed further in the meantime: triangular cooperation is described by the OECD DAC as “a partnership where one or more providers of development cooperation support South-South cooperation, joining forces with developing countries to facilitate a sharing of knowledge and experience among all partners involved”⁷⁰³. However, so far there have not been any universally agreed definitions of the term.

This section aims to provide comments on the prospective triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA, in the field of development cooperation. In this light, the drivers and barriers of the establishment of a triangular cooperation, and the prerequisites conditions for a

⁷⁰²OECD. “Triangular co-operation and Aid Effectiveness: can triangular co-operation make aid more effective?”, OECD 2010, Paris, p. 4.

⁷⁰³OECD. “Triangular co-operation: facts and figures”, prepared for the 2012 DAC High Level Meeting; OECD 2012, p.1, online: http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/HLM%20%20Triangular%20Co-operation_Feb%202013.pdf (accessed 11 September 2018).

successful triangular cooperation between EU, Turkey and SSA will be systematically analysed.

3.3.1. Drivers and Barriers towards Triangular Cooperation

The drivers and barriers towards triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA, will be highlighted through an assessment of the divergences and congruencies between EU and Turkey's foreign policy objectives, development policy modalities and practices, and development policy interests and through an analysis of African's perceptions about prospective triangular development cooperation with the EU and Turkey.

3.3.1.1 Foreign Policy Objectives

From a foreign policy perspective, analysis in Chapter 2 of this study has shown that both Turkey and the EU use development aid as a tool to enhance respectively their 'rising' and 'global' power status, and to somehow promote their own interests.

From the Turkish perspective, providing foreign aid to SSA can be considered as a signal sent to the world, especially to the EU and other western countries, that the country is rising economically and politically and denotes the willingness and determination of Turkey to play a pivotal role in international politics⁷⁰⁴. By building strong alliances with African countries through foreign aid, Turkey can secure their support in international instances and therefore it can expand its influence at multilateral level and achieve its agenda of rebuilding a new international order that will be more equitable and representative⁷⁰⁵. Turkey further considers the provision of development aid to SSA as an essential part of its inner identity of humanitarian and benevolent actor⁷⁰⁶. Development aid has also promoted Turkish economic interests in SSA, by serving as an entry-point for Turkish businessmen and by using African markets to sell its medium-quality products⁷⁰⁷.

Like Turkey, the EU also uses foreign aid to strengthen its global power status and to export its core norms and values such as democracy, human rights, and good governance, although the EU has been criticized several times for being inconsistent in the promotion of these

⁷⁰⁴ News.Az. "Turkish Foreign Minister: We are Neo-Ottomans", 24 November, 2009<http://news.az/articles/3216>

⁷⁰⁵ Tufan Aktas. "Turkey 'wants to open embassies in all African states', *Anadolu Agency*, 14 June 2017, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-wants-to-open-embassies-in-all-african-states/841517>

⁷⁰⁶ Öniş Ziya and Mustafa Kutlay. "Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 8, 2013, p.1411.

⁷⁰⁷ Kucuk, Yusuf Kenan. "Ten years of Turkish engagement with Africa: discourse, implementation and perception in Somalia", MSC Thesis in African studies, University of Oxford, 5 June 2015, p.24.

norms in third countries⁷⁰⁸. In this sense, the EU has introduced the political conditionality clause in almost all agreements with third countries to make the provision of foreign aid dependent on the respect and promotion of certain values and norms. In the case of SSA, political conditionality has been introduced in the amended Lomé IV-bis agreement and further strengthened in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement.

Besides, some anonymous interviewees argue that development cooperation constitutes a tool for the EU to serve and promote its own economic, political and security interests in Africa. The instrument of foreign aid is used to build strong allies in Africa and get their support in international institutions. It is also used to secure cheap access to African natural resources and to prevent and overcome spill-over of Africa's security threats (terrorism and illegal migration) onto Europe⁷⁰⁹.

Given these and others, we might conclude that the EU and Turkey closely pursue similar foreign policy objectives in SSA, ranging from identity-based to economic and political interests. As such, there could be the need to harmonize further their development cooperation policies and actions in SSA to promote and protect their interests. However, unlike the cases of many emerging donors in SSA, the countries where Turkey intervenes the most in SSA in the sphere of development cooperation are not so strategic to the EU in terms of political, economic and security interests (like Somalia), or even if they are strategic to the EU to some extent (such as Niger and Ethiopia), Turkey's development aid activities are still small-scale projects compared to other emerging donors, and Turkey does not seem either to look extensively after natural resources⁷¹⁰ or to get much involved into the political affairs of these countries⁷¹¹. So, the EU might not feel the harming effects of Turkish aid activities in SSA, for the time being, and might not consider Turkey as a threat to its interests in Africa. These are likely to lessen the EU's interests and motivations to envisage any prospective triangular cooperation with Turkey in SSA. Should Turkey start operating in areas and countries of

⁷⁰⁸ See Ozveri, Derya. "Promoting Human Rights by Conditionality? Quest for A Better EU Development Assistance in ACP Countries", Third Global Studies Conference, 17-20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal, p.8; Young, Richard. "Is European Union Democracy Promotion on the Wane?", *Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) working document* No 292, Brussels, 2008, p.4

⁷⁰⁹ Interview with a diplomat from the Embassy of Nigeria in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee ENgB), 17 January 2018, Brussels; Interview with an EU official from the Commission who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2), 31 January 2018, Brussels

⁷¹⁰ See: Ozkan, Mehmet. "Turkey's Rising Role in Africa." *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol 9, no. 4 ,2010, p. 93–105; Ozkan, Mehmet, and Birol Akgün. "Turkey's Opening to Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 48, no. 4 ,2010, p.525–546.

⁷¹¹ On this point, the case of Somalia could be an exception since Turkey has been engaged since 2011 in a state-building foreign policy in Somalia with political implications.

strategic importance for the EU, as China or other emerging donors are doing, discussions on a possible triangular cooperation will become recurrent in EU circle.

Nonetheless, it seems that the EU has started to think of an eventual influence of Turkey's intervention in SSA on the governance issue. Indeed, in favour of the implementation and commitments made by the EU and AU Member States during the 5th AU-EU summit, the COAFR (African Working Group), mentioned in its Indicative Work programme for the year 2018, that on governance issues, especially with respect to article 8 political dialogue, "if time allows, more exchanges with important partners of Africa, such as the US, China, Gulf countries or Turkey could be envisaged". It is further stated that "these exchanges of course will allow addressing a broad range of issues than governance only"⁷¹².

3.3.1.2. Development cooperation modalities and practices

As a member of the OECD-DAC, the EU development cooperation practices reflect mostly the OECD-DAC standards. Its data are regularly published in the OECD data, and it has made valuable efforts to untie aid. The EU also gives importance to the political and democratic situation of the recipient country, when providing aid, by using the political conditionality clause.

Although Turkey is a member of the OECD and has regularly published its ODA data to the OECD and participated to various international discussion and fora on aid effectiveness, we observe however that in the recent past years, Turkey has increasingly distanced itself from traditional northern donors with the aim of building and pursuing Turkey's own way of doing development cooperation, which sometimes mirrors South-South development cooperation, with the emphasis on non-interference and 'mutual benefit'⁷¹³. Turkish officials even underscore that 'SSC forms an important aspect of Turkish development cooperation'⁷¹⁴. Despite this apparent rapprochement with "old" emerging donors, such as China, which openly opposes most Western development agendas, Turkey, due to its 'hybrid' identity and long-standing connection with the west, does not totally reject western approach of

⁷¹² European External Action Service. "COAFR (African Working Party) Indicative Work Program 2018", p.2.

⁷¹³ Nganje Fritze. "Two-way socialization between traditional and emerging donors critical for effective development cooperation", *Africa up Close*, 6 January 2014, Available at, <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/two-way-socialization-between-traditional-and-emerging-donors-criticalfor-effective-development-cooperation/>, accessed on 28 October 2017.

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey's development cooperation", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁷¹⁴ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkey's development cooperation".

development aid because due to its OECD membership it still shares some common approaches with traditional donors.

Lastly, the fact that Turkey lacks a comprehensive aid policy towards SSA (on the contrary of the EU), makes further difficult the possibility to harmonize the aid practices of the EU and Turkey in SSA.

3.3.1.3. Strategic interests in building a triangular cooperation

Both the EU and Turkey have political, economic, and security interests in building a triangular development cooperation partnership in SSA. Considering the strong economic, political and security ties that exist between the EU and Turkey, and with regards to the recent worsening of their bilateral relations due to several factors (from Turkey’s and EU's side), triangular cooperation can contribute to reviving and strengthening the bilateral relations between the traditional donor and the new donor country.

Geographically, since Turkey lies at the intersection of the sensitive regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, it is one of the key actors that could play a significant role for the stability in the region that is geo-strategically important to Europe. The recent migration crisis, caused by the Syrian conflict, has shown in many ways how Turkey is strategically important to the EU in terms of retaining migrants and refugees within its border and impeaching them to cross the European border. Thus, geo-strategically speaking, the fate of EU and Turkey are intimately linked. Economically, the EU stands as one of the main trading partners of Turkey and vice versa (In 2017, Turkey ranks as the 5th largest trading partners of the EU (4.1% of total EU trade) (see Table 42 below), while the EU ranks as the first top trading partners of Turkey (40.7% of total Turkish trade) (see Table 43 below).

Table 42
EU Trade with Turkey, in 2017

	Total Trade(in Mio Euro)	Share of EU Trade	Rank as EU Partners
Turkey	154,251	4.1%	5

Source: European Commission-DG Trade. “EU Trade in Goods with Turkey”,

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf.

Table 43
Turkey's Trade with the EU, in 2017

	Total Trade (in Mio Euro)	Share of Turkey's Trade	Rank as Turkey's Partners
EU	140.862	40.7%	1

Source: European Commission-DG Trade. "EU Trade in Goods with Turkey"
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf)

In terms of FDI inflow to Turkey, the UK (11.90%), followed by the Netherlands (11.60%), Spain (6.60%), and Germany (6.50%) rank among the top 10 countries of origin in 2017⁷¹⁵. As such, in economic terms, the EU needs Turkey to the same extent as Turkey needs the EU and triangular cooperation can contribute to maintain, deepen and enrich the existing relations and networks on which the bilateral development cooperation has been based so far and to expand new networks for the benefit of both the EU and Turkey.

The recent financial crisis in Turkey caused by the increasing inflation rate and the decreasing value of Turkish Lira and worsened by president Trump's imposed economic sanctions on Turkey, has further distanced Turkey from the USA. The increasing friction in political and economic terms between the EU and USA under president Trump, could be a catalyser for a prospective rapprochement between Turkey and the EU.

Due to the economic, political and security interdependence existing between the EU and Turkey, a worsening of the economic situation of Turkey cannot and should not please EU countries as it would inevitably have spill over effects onto Europe. We therefore highly expect EU countries to give a hand to Turkey in this critique situation.

Considering these complex interdependencies between the EU and Turkey, a triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey, and SSA, would further increase interdependency

⁷¹⁵ Invest in Turkey. "FDI in Turkey", accessible at <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorguide/Pages/FDIinTurkey.aspx>

between the EU and Turkey and harmonize their interests outside their existing bilateral framework.

Furthermore, triangular cooperation with EU-DAC countries can be a means for Turkey to establish itself in the international donor landscape more easily. Triangular cooperation could also have a positive impact on Turkey's striving path to join the European Union because it can pave the way for better coordination in the field of development aid between the EU and Turkey, which would ultimately reduce fragmentation between both donors' aid practices in SSA and in the long term can contribute to the harmonization of EU and Turkey's interests in other important spheres.

Yet, having been at the door of the EU since its official acceptance as a candidate country in 1999 without any significant hope for prospective membership, it is becoming increasingly evident that Turkey has lost its motivations for EU membership and less and less identifies itself with European values. Turkey's current authorities have tendency to increasingly defend and promoted the ottoman and Muslim identity of Turkey and have turned their area of interests to non-European countries, namely African and Asian countries.

Thus, the feeling of being unwanted in Europe, despite relative progress made in the past in terms of political and economic reforms, can make Turkish leaders reluctant to cooperate with the EU in SSA in the field of development aid. Turkey wants to build its own way and to compete with Europe in Africa, to show them that it can be an influential and a great power, even without being an EU Member. In several occasions, Turkish leaders have criticized EU aid policy in SSA as being an instrument of neo-colonialism. One anonymous interviewee (TK1) underlines that Turkey is reluctant to cooperate with EU in Africa because it does not want "dirty" his hands of "clean" and "non-colonial" state, by cooperating with an institution some of whose member states were colonial powers in SSA. According to some anonymous interviewees at EU headquarters in Brussels, the EU is also less likely to cooperate with Turkey in SSA because Turkey and the EU share less and less common priorities and values which would impede cooperation in the field of development cooperation. They mentioned among others the current political and democratic situation in Turkey, and the importance attached by the EU to the democratic situation of the recipient countries, unlike Turkey.

3.3.1.4. The SSA-EU-Turkey triangle: African perceptions

It stems from the few interviews we conducted with some African authorities in Brussels and Ankara who prefers to remain anonymous, that African people and leaders seem to generally hold a positive and welcome perception of emerging donors' aid activities in the continent, and especially those of Turkey because they are people-centred and targeted, less bureaucratic, and does not include political conditions. As such, they mostly agree on the fact that a triangular cooperation between the EU and Turkey in SSA in the field of development cooperation would have positive impact on the effectiveness of development cooperation because the aid modalities of both donors would complement each other for the benefit of the continent.

Nonetheless, some interviewees at the African embassies in Brussels are sceptical about a prospective triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey and African arguing that most of the southern donors (including Turkey) prefer acting alone or in collaboration with another southern donor, rather than collaborating with a traditional donor like the EU ⁷¹⁶. Other argue that although triangular cooperation could be a welcoming step, they are worried that triangular cooperation may spoil their relations with southern donors because traditional donors, namely the EU might convince southern emerging donors to include conditionality in their development aid policies, which is not desirable for African governing authorities. One anonymous interviewee EEB underlines that while triangular cooperation is important for the EU in terms of reducing the financial burdens and transposing its norms to southern donors' aid policies, Turkey's aid is less conditional and more focus on trade and investment (3rd most successful real investment in Ethiopia in the sector of infrastructure). So, Triangular Cooperation can work if the EU priorities development- related projects over democracy and governance issues⁷¹⁷, as Turkey does.

Having analysed the perceived drivers and barriers towards triangular development cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA, the prerequisites for a successful Turkish-EU-SSA triangular cooperation (if Triangular cooperation there is) will be illuminated in further detail in the following section.

⁷¹⁶ Interview with an Official at the Embassy of Niger in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee ENeB)

⁷¹⁷ Interview with an official at the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EEB), Brussels, 21 February 2018.

3.3.2. Pre-requisites for a successful triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey and SSA

The OECD Development Co-operation Directorate specifies the following conditions as prerequisites for the success and the effectiveness of triangular cooperation:

- There are shared development objectives (even if the partners have differing interests).
- The contributions of the partners are complementary and take advantage of their existing comparative advantages.
- Knowledge and experience are adapted to the context of the recipient country.
- All of the partners feel committed and are actively involved in all steps from the design to the implementation of the project.
- All of the partners bring sustained political buy-in.
- The partnership is driven by the needs of the recipient country.
- The partnership is based on reciprocal respect and trust.
- The roles and areas of responsibility reflect the strengths of the individual partners.
- There is a common agreement on planning, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and funding mechanisms.
- The partners have the flexibility to adapt to the different procedures of the other partners.
- There is open and clear communication between all of the partners⁷¹⁸.

In addition, triangular cooperation can naturally also be simplified through cultural, linguistic and institutional similarities between the partners⁷¹⁹.

Given these and others, this study will assess whether these prerequisite conditions for a prospective and successful triangular cooperation are fulfilled in the case of EU and Turkey by looking at the development goals and practices of the EU and Turkey, at the ownership principle and political will of donors, at the complementarity of services and skills, and at the cultural proximity between new donors and recipient countries.

⁷¹⁸ OECD, “Policy Dialogue on Triangular Co-operation: summary of discussions”; OECD 2012, Online: [http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/\[FINAL\]%20Summary%20Policy%20Dialogue%20on%20Triangular%20Co-operation.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/[FINAL]%20Summary%20Policy%20Dialogue%20on%20Triangular%20Co-operation.pdf) (accessed 11 September, 2018)

⁷¹⁹ Hausmann, Jeannine. “Turkey as a donor country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation”, *German Development Institute research paper* No 14, 2014, available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5599/pdf/dp_14.2014.pdf, accessed on 18th August 2018

3.3.2.1. Convergence of development goals and practices

Since Turkey is a member of the OECD and the EU is a member of the OECD-DAC, they share in principle mutual understanding of the OECD's development cooperation concepts and values⁷²⁰ such as the conceptual understanding of ODA and untied aid, people-centred and capacity building principles. In this line, one can assume that they can easily reach a consensus upon the core objectives of their development aid, although they may have different attitudes and approaches towards some aid principles of the OECD-DAC in practice. In illustration, on the contrary of the EU which has developed a strong monitoring and evaluation framework with comprehensive country strategies, Turkey has yet to develop a comprehensive development aid and monitoring framework.

One of the core aid principles put forward by the OECD-DAC is the people-centred and focus on capacity building principles. Regarding the people-centred approach, since both Turkey and the EU put forward their normative and humanitarian aid orientation in foreign policy discourses, it basically means that they adopt a people-centred approach to development cooperation, which is one of the prerequisites for a successful triangular cooperation, namely using development aid to impact on the lives of people.

Within the framework of the Busan Partnership, the EU has pledged to focus more intensively on the needs and processes of its partner countries⁷²¹. In the same manner, Turkish development cooperation is hailed to work in a very demand-oriented way and needy based, as evidenced by the fact that the largest recipients are among the poorest countries in Africa⁷²².

Nonetheless, this study has revealed that in practice, Turkey's aid seems to be more-people centred than EU's because Turkish projects are generally small-case projects matured to respond to the specific needs of the recipient countries' population.

With respect to capacity-building, both the EU and Turkey invest in capacity-building through various technical cooperation programmes with the recipient countries. Indeed, one can read

⁷²⁰ Ibid

⁷²¹ European Commission. "The Busan Commitments: An analysis of EU Progress and Performance", p.8-10, accessed on 15th August 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/study_of_eu_progress.pdf

⁷²² Hausmann, Jeannine. "Turkey as a donor country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation", *German Development Institute research paper* No 14, 2014, available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5599/pdf/dp_14.2014.pdf, accessed on 18th August 2018
See Interview with Officials at TIKA who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewees TK1, TK2, and TK3)

on the website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the “main operational activity of TIKA is technical cooperation for development of institutional capacity and human resources in partner countries. This is accomplished by providing training and advisory services in the field where Turkey has a comparative advantage in terms of know-how and experience. These services are complemented by donations for capacity building”⁷²³. In this line, president Erdogan underlined the importance of capacity building in the following statement: “TIKA, which had completed 2,500 projects in the 10 years before us, now implements 2,000 projects annually. Of course, the projects give a fish where it is necessary, but the general approach is to teach how to fish”⁷²⁴.

The European Commission also stated the importance of capacity-building in EU development aid in the followings: “Capacity Development (CD) is an essential factor for the quality of our projects and programs. The development of capacity in partner countries is recognized as a key factor for improving aid effectiveness. Delivering sustainable results and increasing the impact of EU development policy is only possible if there is effective capacity in partner countries”⁷²⁵.

The question lies however in the degree of implementation of these principles by the EU and Turkey in SSA. In the case of the EU, the main challenge will be to improve consistency between its development cooperation policies and those of its individual member states to avoid conflict of interests, which is recurrent.

3.3.2.2. The ownership principle and political will

The Busan partnership has reaffirmed and strengthened the democratic ownership of recipient countries in the development cooperation landscape. On this principle, EU has made efforts towards increasing the ownership of development projects by recipient countries through increasing collaboration between EU delegations and the recipient country’s governments in the formulation and implementation of development projects, although Africans continue to criticize the EU for always seeking to impose its own priorities and views on Africans⁷²⁶. Due to its demand-oriented development aid policy, Turkey has also been implementing the

⁷²³ Website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa

⁷²⁴ Website of TIKA, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/president_erdogan_welcomed_tika_coordinators-43472

⁷²⁵ European Commission. “Capacity Development”, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/capacity-development_en

⁷²⁶ Interviews with Officials at the Embassies of Nigeria, and Niger in Brussels, who prefer to remain anonymous (Interviewees ENgB and ENeB)

ownership principles in SSA, without naming it explicitly, although no formal steps have been taken in promoting the ownership principle in its aid activities in SSA⁷²⁷.

Yet, strong political will for a prospective and successful triangular cooperation in SSA is lacking from both sides due to the tight nature of their current bilateral relations. One Turkish Official, during the interview (Interviewee TK1) stressed out that Turkey was not very keen on cooperating with the EU in the field of development cooperation in SSA, arguing that they do not want to be part of the neo-colonial projects in SSA and they do not want to bear the responsibility of the failed models of European development cooperation. The interviewee TK1 argued that cooperating with the EU in SSA will not provide an added-value in terms of increasing the effectiveness of aid projects because the EU has nothing to offer to SSA Turkey cannot offer too. He pursued that Turkey rather welcomes cooperating with countries like South Africa in another African countries⁷²⁸.

From the EU side, the main concern is that cooperating with Turkey in SSA would force the EU to downgrade its own norms and values, which are not shared by Turkish leaders⁷²⁹. So, on technical issues, cooperation might be possible but on highly sensitive issues, cooperation with Turkey in SSA will be difficult because the EU is not ready to trade-off its norms and values for the sake of triangular cooperation⁷³⁰. One interviewee even went further by stressing out that Triangular cooperation is good but difficult to be achieve successfully because even internally it is sometimes difficult to coordinate between the EU and its member states⁷³¹.

3.3.2.3 Complementarity of the services and capabilities

One of the key elements of a successful triangular cooperation is the complementarity of services and capabilities of the development cooperation providers. It entails that the development aid providers should complement each other with their skills in a way that an added value results in comparison to bilateral cooperation. In this context, we consider that compared to the EU, Turkey can bring technical skills adapted to the needs of SSA countries

⁷²⁷ Interviews with a Turkish Official who prefers to remain anonymous (Interviewee TK1)

⁷²⁸ Ibid

⁷²⁹ Interviews with Officials at European Commission headquarters in Brussels who prefer to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB2 and EUB5).

⁷³⁰ Interviews with an Official at the European Commission headquarters who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB5)

⁷³¹ Interviews with an Official at the European Commission headquarters who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB6)

with lower costs, in the sector of infrastructure especially. The development assistance from Turkey to African countries can be hailed as the answer to Africa's key economic challenges, especially in the country's massive infrastructure deficit. Infrastructural projects carried out by Turkey include among others, the renovation of the Aden Adde International Airport in Somalia, the construction of two hospitals in Mogadishu, the rehabilitation of schools and the construction of community water supply systems⁷³².

Added to that is the relatively lower labour wage of Turkish experts and technicians and the relatively lower price of Turkish construction materials compared to European ones and this can be an economic added value for the recipient countries. Turkish assistance is also hailed to be relatively faster with less administrative costs and less bureaucratic disbursement aid regime. This can help overcome the long and highly bureaucratic process of the EU aid disbursement. According to Serdar Cam, "TIKA places special effort on using its resources for the projects itself, without reducing them through administrative or transportation expenses and such. To create and maintain this model is of course a success. In international standards the percentage used for the expenses that includes the personnel salaries and other overhead costs start at 5 percent go up to even 50 percent, whereas in Turkey, the expenses cut from the aid budget are less than 1 percent"⁷³³. The Somali president underlines the particularity of Turkey's aid modality in the following statement: "In the past 20 years, most of the donors, especially from the western and Arab worlds, have been using intermediaries like NGOs. This is the normal thing to do in Somalia. But Turkey is on the ground doing the work. And it is doing the work with Somalis."⁷³⁴ His words were echoed by the representative from a Somali NGO: "The Turkish in Somalia are among us. They eat with us while the Europeans stay at the airport. There is no comparison. They drive inside the city. Some of them died for us, yet death does not deter them. They became our comrades. They make you feel they are our brothers. That makes all the difference."⁷³⁵

The comparative advantage of the EU lies in the long-term sustainability of its development financial capacity because its development projects are based on multi-annual financing and their longer aid history and well managed aid system and years of know-how, which would

⁷³² UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). "Infrastructure Development Within the context of Africa's Cooperation with New and Emerging Development Partners", accessed on 18th July 2018, at <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2015infrastructureanddev.pdf>

⁷³³ Yediyildiz, E.Merve. "Turkey builds bridges with aid", *Daily Sabah Politics*, 7 April 2014, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/04/07/turkey-builds-bridges-with-aid>

⁷³⁴ Quoted in Mahad Wasuge. "Turkey's assistance model in Somalia: achieving much with little", *Heritage Institute for Policy Studies*, 2016, Mogadishu, Somalia, p.22

⁷³⁵ Ibid

contribute to increase the scope, quality, and impacts of development cooperation projects run in SSA through triangular cooperation with Turkey.

3.3.2.4. Cultural proximity

The proximity of the new donor country to the recipient country in terms of language and culture as well as the shared history are often listed as factors facilitating the successful implementation of triangular cooperation. In this context, Turkey's cultural and historical proximity with some African countries, such as Somalia, Niger, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, as well as its determination to increase bilateral partnerships with all countries in SSA, can be a positive aspect in terms of building a successful triangular cooperation.

For instance, Turkish involvement in the Somali crisis has been relatively successful compared to western donors' actions in this country, most probably due to the cultural proximity that exist between Turkey and Somalia.

It became clear from an interview with one Official at EuropeAid office in Brussels that Turkey is a potential development partner in Somalia and that working with turkey can help increase the effectiveness of EU development aid and actions in the security sphere in Somalia. The interviewee recognizes that Turkey can be an important partner for the implementation of EU projects in some parts of the continent, such as Somalia, where Turkey benefit from cultural proximity and positive perception⁷³⁶.

The interviewee mentioned that Turkey participates in the steering committee discussions on Somalia and there are on-the-ground discussions with turkey, especially by the EU delegation in Kenya and Somalia, about increasing coordination efforts⁷³⁷. In the case of Somalia, Gizem and Jason underlined that Turkey " has taken greater political and security risks by eliminating middlemen and directly delivering its aid to beneficiaries, in cooperation with national and local providers. It also has refrained from imposing political conditions and promoted knowledge and technology transfer. Its engagement with Somalia has prioritised solidarity, brotherhood and mutual benefit"⁷³⁸.

⁷³⁶ Interviewee with an official at the European Commission headquarters who prefers to remain anonymous (interviewee EUB1), Brussels

⁷³⁷ Ibid

⁷³⁸Stearns Jason & Gizem Sucuoglu, "South-south cooperation and peacebuilding: Turkey's involvement in Somalia", *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) policy insight* No 43, April 2017,P.2.

3.3.2.5. Conclusion

In sum, regarding the drivers and barriers towards triangular cooperation, this thesis argues that there are some congruencies between the EU and Turkey in terms of foreign policy objectives, development cooperation practices and development policy interests although some differences do exist. From a foreign policy perspective, although seemingly congruence between EU and Turkey's foreign policy objectives in SSA, ranging from identity-based to economic and political interests could increase motivation of both donors for triangular cooperation, the fact that Turkey's areas and countries of interventions do not seem, from the time being to be very strategic to the EU might reduce lessen the EU's interests and motivations to envisage any prospective triangular cooperation with Turkey in SSA. In terms of development cooperation modalities, due to its 'hybrid' identity and long-standing connection with the west, does not totally reject western approach of development aid because due to its OECD membership it still shares some common approaches with traditional donors. Regarding development policy interests, although the strong political, economic, and security interdependency between the EU and Turkey would be a compelling factor for further triangular development cooperation in SSA, we argue that the increasing distance between the EU and Turkey in terms of norms and values and priorities significantly reduce prospects for triangular cooperation. Regarding African perceptions, we conclude from the interviews conducted that although African leaders are open to such a triangular development cooperation as a tool to enhance effectiveness of development cooperation, they are afraid that emerging donors such as Turkey would mirror in the long-term EU's over-consideration of political and democratic issues in its development cooperation policies in SSA.

Coming to the pre-requisites for a successful triangular cooperation, we argue that although pre-requisite conditions such as convergence of development goals and practices, ownership of development projects by recipient countries, cultural proximity and deepen bilateral relations are issues where Turkey and the EU can easily reach a consensus and find a *juste-milieu*, the real challenge remains the political will of both donors to engage in triangular development cooperation in SSA, which according to the interviewees, is lacking and unlikely to get stronger in a nearer future.

CONCLUSION

1.HYPOTHESES

Debates on aid effectiveness have shifted from the purely-focused on output assessment such as economic growth and poverty reduction to the input-analysis, namely the process of formulation and implementation of development cooperation. The main assumption is that a well-formulated and implemented development cooperation is likely to increase aid effectiveness and to yield effective development outcomes. In this line, various international discussions have resulted in the adoption of significant international aid effectiveness norms and principles, of which the most recent one is the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPEDC), which encourages and recommends participating donor and recipient countries to fully implement the adopted four principles and related indicators in the formulation and implementation of their development cooperation activities. Although the Busan document expanded the scheme of application to other financial instrument, such as trade and FDI, this thesis focused exclusively on development aid as the main financial instrument for analysis.

In the light of this, this study was set out to explore comparatively the degree of implementation of the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) and some of its related indicators (5a,9b,10,1a,2,4 and 6) by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia as well as to examine the underlying factors behind unevenness between the EU and Turkey in the degree of implementation of these principles.

The first main hypothesis of this study has identified that in comparison to the EU and except Indicator 6 (on Accountability) and to a certain extent Indicator 1a (on Focus on Results) and indicator 9b (on use of country systems), Turkey has shown a lower performance against the remaining four indicators, namely Indicator 5a (on annual aid predictability),indicator 10 (on untied aid) ,indicator 2 (on CSOs enabling environment), and indicator 4 (on Transparency), in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia.

The second main hypothesis put forward by this thesis is that although the three main explanatory factors namely norms and identity, self-interests, and level of interdependency between donor and recipient countries, respectively drawn from constructivism, neorealism, and neoliberalism, need to be considered altogether in order to completely grasp the observed

difference between the EU and Turkey in terms of implementation of the BEDCPs in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, factors on norms and identity which stems from constructivism remains by far the most dominant explanatory factor because in comparison to Turkey, the seemingly closeness of EU identity to the international norms on effective development cooperation has played a significant role in the easy-identification with and implementation of the BEDCPs by the EU in the four country case studies.

2.DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

As stated above, two essential issues about the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) have been discussed.

First, it was researched to what extent have the EU and Turkey implemented the BEDCPs and its related indicators (5a,9b,10,1a,2,4, and 6) in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia in the formulation and implementation of their development cooperation policies in the four sub-Saharan African countries. The findings reveal that with respect to indicator 5a on aid predictability, the EU performed better than Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, because unlike the EU case where development aid is planned on multi-annual basis, Turkey does not have a comprehensive country strategies and financial resources to be allocated to a given country is not planned annually but rather depends on the needs of the recipient countries. Nonetheless, the EU's performance of indicator 5a taken alone weakens significantly in the four country case studies when it comes to the specific case of EDF because of mid-review reviews which more often leads to the increasing of decrease of the initially allocated amount depending on the political and economic situation of the recipient countries.

As for indicator 9b, we argue that the performance of Turkey and the EU is equally low in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia because of the non- use of budget support and henceforth of the non-use of the recipient countries' country systems in the two countries. Although some sources indicate the use of budget support in favour of Somalia by Turkey since 2013, they have also underlined that no country system was used because the money was allocated in cash to Somali authorities through Turkish Ambassador in Somalia. In the upcoming years, the EU is likely to perform better with respect to this indicator in Somalia because of the recent EU press release announcing that the EU will start to implement from October 2018

until 2021 a direct budget support amounting to a total of 100 Million Euro through the Somali's Federal Government using country systems.

The performance of the EU was stronger than Turkey's performance in the case of Ethiopia and Niger because unlike Turkey, the EU did use country systems in Niger and Ethiopia between 2015 and 2016.

About indicator 10, since a large part of Turkish development aid towards Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria is made of grants-in-nature and few projects without cash grants and that statistics have demonstrated that few Turkish procurement procedures were open to international competition and that in Turkish procurement procedures a price advantage of up to 15% is offered to domestic products and tenderers, there is a reason to deduce that the EU performed better than Turkey in the context of indicator 10 of BEDCPs because grants-in-nature are generally accompanied by tied practices. Nonetheless, it stems from the interviews conducted with officials at African embassies in Brussels and Ankara that in both EU and Turkey's cases, large infrastructural projects are generally executed by the donor countries' companies due to the lack of financial and technical capacity of African companies.

As for indicator 2, we argue that on paper, the EU seems to have performed better than Turkey because the inclusion of CSOS in the formulation and implementation of development projects is explicitly mentioned in some EU documents, which is not the case of Turkey where it is only about voluntary consultation with Turkish local CSOs and NGOs by TIKA headquarters and representative offices and NGOs. In practice however, despite considerable efforts made by the EU to support and strengthen local CSOs and involve them in the formulation and implementation of development projects, the performance by the EU of Indicator 2 is limited by some barriers such as the reluctance of the recipient governments to involve CSOs in development projects, under EDF funds. Nonetheless, the EU can use other means and instruments to work with CSOs autonomously such as the EIHDR. As such, EU's performance on papers and in practice is far better than Turkey's performance of Indicator 2 in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Coming to indicator 1a, this study finds that on paper EU seems to have performed better than Turkey in terms of use of country-result frameworks since national indicative programs under EDF instrument are drawn based on the recipient countries' national development plans. Unlike the EU which has developed a strong monitoring and evaluation framework, albeit it rarely relies on the statistics of recipient countries in the monitoring of development projects, Turkey lacks a comprehensive monitoring framework since the monitoring of its development

projects are mostly done through site visits. In practice, with respect to the use of country result-framework, the fact that EU delegations work closely with recipient countries' authorities and local CSOs in the drafting of country strategy papers and that Turkey's aid, although not necessarily based on the recipient countries' national development plans, is predominantly demand-driven, compels us to conclude that the degree of implementation of the indicator 1a (in terms of relying on national priorities) by the EU and Turkey in the four countries is nearly equal.

With respect to indicator 6, given that a large part of EU development projects in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, is funded from EDF, which is outside the EU budget, there is a reason to conclude that Turkey performed better than EU with respect of Indicator 6 of the Busan principles because most of Turkish development cooperation projects in the four countries are funded through national budget voted annually by the Turkish Assembly.

For indicator 4, unlike the EU, Turkey does not publish its ODA data to the OECD CRS, to the OECD FSS, and to the IATI and then is not likely to comply with the Busan Transparency standards. As such, the EU largely performed better than Turkey in the context of Indicator 4.

Second, attempts were made to analyse the main explanatory factors behind uneven implementation of the BEDCPs and its related indicators by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia by incorporating three core IR theories, namely neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Given that a wide-range of factors could be brought forward to explaining these variations in the EU's and Turkey's performance and in a spirit of being as much coherent and focused as possible, we decided to focus on three main group of explanatory factors drawn from constructivism, neorealism, and neoliberalism.

The first auxiliary hypothesis based on constructivism posits that positive compliance depends on the level of convergence between donors' political identity and Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles. The second auxiliary hypothesis drawn from neorealism argues that positive compliance depends of the level of convergence between donors 's aid motives and interest and development cooperation effectiveness norms. The third and last auxiliary hypothesis which stems from neoliberalism put forward the argument that Positive compliance depends on the level of dependency and cooperation between development cooperation providers and recipients.

The findings reveal that the first auxiliary hypothesis drawn from constructivism is convincingly verified with respect to indicator 5a, indicator 4, Indicator 2, Indicator 10

because the relative higher performance of fact the EU with respect to these indicators can be justified by the perceived proximity of EU's identity with the Busan principles and norms which increases its willingness and ability to implement these principles. This auxiliary hypothesis is however partly relevant for the indicators 9b (especially in Nigeria, and Somalia), 1a, and 6, because due the higher closeness of EU identity with international effectiveness norms, the EU was expected to perform better than Turkey, but this was not the case. In illustration, like Turkey, the EU failed to implement indicator 9b in Nigeria and Somalia (no use of country systems); both donors equally performed with respect to indicators 1a (in practice especially with respect to relying on national priorities of the recipient countries) and Turkey performed better than the EU with respect to indicator 6 (because around 60% of EU ODA to the four countries comes from the EDF which is an intergovernmental instrument without parliamentary oversight).

The second auxiliary hypothesis which stems from neorealism seems to be relevant for the cases of EU and Turkey with respect to indicator 10 in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia because in practice the implementation of development projects of both donors in SSA is accompanied with some formal and informal tied practices based on donor interests' calculations and with respect to indicator 6 because lower performance of the EU is grounded into the observed incompatibility between EU member states interests with indicator 6's requirement. The second auxiliary hypothesis is convincing in the case of Turkey with respect to indicators 2 ,5a and 4 because the involvement of CSOs of recipient countries, the predictability of aid and publication of ODA data according to Busan transparency requirement seem to be far from Turkey's development policy priorities, objectives, and interests.

The second auxiliary hypothesis is also partly verified by the cases of Turkey and the EU with respect to indicator 9b in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, because although the CPIA score of the three countries is nearly equal (and Nigeria's rate of improvement of CPIA score from 2005 to 2016 is even higher than Niger's and Ethiopia's), budget support was used by the EU in Niger and Ethiopia while it was not used in Nigeria. Turkey did not use country system in the three countries even though their CPIA score is acceptable. It is partly true for the case of Turkey with respect to indicator 1a because the demand-driven nature of Turkish aid is compatible with this indicator's requirement to rely on the national priorities of the recipient countries, which resulted in a relatively better implementation of one aspect of this indicator (aid projects reflecting the national priorities of the recipient country) by Turkey. On this

aspect, EU is sometimes criticized for “imposing” into the national strategies of the recipient countries, the sectoral priorities of development projects to be funded

The idea that donors can trade off the Busan principles with self-interests of donors seems to also be partly relevant for the case of EU with respect to indicators 2 and 5a because the EU is also criticized for compromising sometimes with the recipient government, despite evidence of the latter threatening CSOs’ pace and because of the prevalence of national interests of EU individual member states decreases the level of predictability of EDF.

The second auxiliary hypothesis is not verified with respect to indicator 9b for both Turkey and the EU in Somalia because the non-use of country systems can be predominantly attributed to the weak and non-reliable Somali institutions, which make donors reluctant to use their country systems for the provision of development aid.

The third auxiliary hypothesis drawn from neoliberalism is verified by the cases of Turkey and the EU with respect to indicators 5a, 2, 10 and 4 in the four countries because the relative higher performance of the EU can be attributed to the higher political, economic, and security interdependence that exist between the EU and SSA countries.

This third auxiliary hypothesis is not verified for the case of EU in the context of indicator 9b because like Turkey, the EU also failed to implement correctly the indicator 9 in Nigeria and to a certain extent in Somalia (until 2018), despite its huge interests in these countries.

This auxiliary hypothesis is refuted by the cases of Turkey and the EU with respect to indicators 6 and 1a because, although the interdependency seems weaker in Turkish case than in the EU case, Turkey performed better than the EU against indicator 6 and both the EU and Turkey equally performed in practice with respect to indicator 1a in the four countries.

An examination of above-detailed findings indicate that no single factor can explain the observed difference between the EU and Turkey in the implementation of BEDCPs in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. Theoretically, neither constructivism nor neorealism and neoliberalism could singlehandedly make sense of the uneven implementation of BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey. In most of the cases, it was a combination of self-interest with norms or the level of interdependency that explained the different behaviour of Turkey and the EU vis-à-vis BEDCPs in our four country case studies

However, while it is not possible to designate one single explanatory factor, our research does place the dominant assumption that non-material elements such as values, norms, identities, ideas and ideologies, which are internalized in EU and Turkey, have more importance in

shaping their attitudes regarding convergence to the Busan effective development cooperation principles and its related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. The roles of norms and identities are increasingly significant in defining both donors' attitudes.

3.IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As we can see, the EU and Turkey performed differently with respect to the BEDCPs in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, and various factors ranging from identity and values, interests, and interdependency, have contributed to this uneven implementation.

These findings show that all member states which have signed the Busan documents are not likely to implement effectively these principles in their daily development aid practices. This is an unfortunate situation that would step back efforts made in the sphere of effective development cooperation and therefore would curtail efforts made at the international level to use development cooperation as a tool to help developing countries achieve significantly their SDGs, because the intended results of Busan principles is to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation, which will also contribute to reduce poverty and increase inclusive and sustainable development.

Thus, there is an urgent need to increase positive performance of the Busan principles by all donors because it will first help reduce the long-lasting fragmentation between northern and southern development cooperation providers and thus it will increase harmonization of donors' practices to the great benefit of the recipient countries. Another implication of an increasing positive performance of the Busan principles is that it will further bring back ownership of development projects to the recipient countries. This constitutes a big step forward because rather than being mere spectators and passive actors of development cooperation projects, recipient countries would play an active and prominent role in the choice and mode of implementation of development projects. The implementation of the Busan principles by both traditional and southern donors would further impact positively on finding positive issues on the reforms of the UN development system because it would mean that northern and southern donors could agree on an important issue of the UN Development system, which is development cooperation.

Therefore, we propose some recommendations that could help improve the implementation of the Busan principles by all donors, without any distinction.

First, to improve the implementation of the Busan principles by all donors, there is a need to reframe objectively and realistically some principles, indicators, and monitoring criteria of Busan by considering the clear distinction between south-south and north-south development co-operation practices as well as the current national regional, and international dynamics.

In illustration, the criteria on transparency and untied aid would be difficult to be achieved by south-south development cooperation providers as they mostly lack capacity to track aid data, mostly treat their development assistance data as confidential data, and consider using their nationals for the execution of development projects as something normal since they consider their relationship with the receiving country as a win-win partnership, not a donor-recipient partnership. Some recipient countries seem to be perfect with this insistence on win-win partnership rather than “benevolent” donor-recipient relationship.

In the same manner, indicator 2 on CSOs enabling environment is naturally hard to be achieved by emerging southern donors, which mostly lack a domestic culture of collaboration with CSOs and enhancement of CSOs pace in their inner domestic policies. Thus, it seems very unrealistic that southern donors could and will be willing to achieve in the recipient countries something they cannot or are not willing to achieve in their own countries. So, the democratic and political culture of the donor countries need to be considered to refine objective criteria that will motivate them to implement effectively the Busan principles without being afraid that their own failure or lacks will be openly advertised to the world.

Even traditional western donors have difficulties to put into practice the indicator 10 on untied aid because in the context of the financial crisis, where citizens of developed countries are not that willing to see their collected taxes used for overseas development projects, tying aid to the buying of donor countries’ products and to the hiring of donor countries’ companies and experts for the implementation of external development projects is a way to legitimize the pursuit of overseas development cooperation policies in the eyes of citizens.

Thus, criteria and standards for measuring and monitoring transparency and untied aid need to be reframed considering the realities and perceptions of emerging donors and recipient countries and the socio-political and economic situation of the donor countries and global context in general. In other words, we recommend differentiated assessment and monitoring approaches for measuring the relevance and effective implementation of commonly agreed principles on effective development cooperation by northern and southern development cooperation providers.

Second, the principle of “democratic ownership” needs to be reframed further to enhance the pivotal role of CSOs in the formulation, evaluation and implementation of development projects. Although, the Busan partnership did better than the previous partnerships on aid effectiveness by going beyond mere ownership to include democratic ownership, one should note that in practice the change is yet to be effective because public policies in many recipient countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, are still driven by selfish political calculations without considerations to the real needs of the population. CSOs play a very minimal role in public decisions and institutions. Even in the case where governments “own” development projects, their plans might not be strategic or put in practice or even effective in reducing poverty and promoting development. Sometimes, recipient countries’ governments are keen to propose to donors what the latter would like to see and hear to increase their chance of getting more aid, especially considering the asymmetric relationship.

Third, the fact that Busan encourages donors to increase use of budget support as the evident way of using country systems, although is to be saluted, could have reserve negative effects on democratic ownership of the recipient countries because budget support provides ruling authorities of the recipient countries with large marge of manoeuvre as to how to use financial support. Unfortunately, on many occasions, budget support money is not used efficiently to respond to the real needs of the population due to lack of consultation and collaboration with local CSOs. As such, some principles and indicators of the Busan Partnership cannot be implemented efficiently at the same time because positive implementation of one principle or indicator can lead to negative implementation of another principle or indicator. Therefore, we recommend reviewing indicators on country ownership and use of country systems to make them complementary.

Fourth, although the Busan Partnership made a remarkable effort to include emerging donors in the discussions for effective development cooperation, the use of concepts in the Busan document such as “shared-principles” concept could increase the suspicion of southern emerging donors that the Busan document does not break with the traditional west-centric approach of previous aid effectiveness frameworks and to a certain extent is the continuous expression of the West’s hegemony. This situation is likely to increase the frustration of southern emerging donors towards the internationally adopted effectiveness norms and could lessen their motivation in identifying themselves with and implementation the Busan principles. We therefore recommend that some concepts in the Busan document be amended

to avoid mis-understanding and to make sure the all donors, from the south to the north and from the east to the west recognize themselves in the Busan framework and have strong incentives to effectively implement the adopted principles and indicators.

Fifth, the Busan document should be revised to give further attention to Triangular Development Cooperation (TDC) as a key alternative model of development cooperation which can significantly contribute to enhance donor and recipient countries' implementation of the Busan principles. Since TDC model draws on the strengths of north-south and south-south development cooperation model with the active involvement of the recipient countries, it will lead to better country ownership by recipient countries and to better harmonization of donors' aid practices with the Busan standards. As such, we consider TDC as an effective channel through which the Busan principles can be easily internalized and accepted by southern donors as key contributors to the improvement of aid effectiveness and to better delivery of SDGs.

Lastly, the Busan document is a not legally binding document, which means that participating countries which signed up the document are not constrained to implement it and there are no enforcement measures for its implementation. Hence, the implementation of the Busan principles is left to the good political will of the signatory countries. To increase the degree of implementation of the Busan principles, we recommend changing the status of the Busan document into a legally binding document for all signatories in exchange of the adoption and provision of strong incentives and rewards in favour of the implementing countries.

4.LIMITATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

First, this thesis took a challenging approach which consists of comparing a sui-generis entity (the EU) with a unitary state (Turkey). The *demarche* took in this study to compare the EU and Turkey can be considered as a controversial approach because the EU is composed of 27 states with different history, aid practices, and interests. Nevertheless, this is not a limitation as such because as a donor, the EU is sometimes categorized as a bilateral donor to the same extent as a unitary donor country. Plus, the thesis considers the EU as a whole entity, without consideration of EU individual member states, although we are aware of the potential influence of member states on EU external development policies.

Likewise, since one of our main hypotheses in this thesis is Turkey's lower performance of

the effective development cooperation principles in comparison to the EU is mainly grounded on the relatively observed difference between Turkey's identity and the international development cooperation norms, and that Turkey's performance might be better than other emerging donors' performance, we suggest to undertake further research on a comparison of Turkey's performance with other emerging donors such as China or Brazil, in order to see how emerging donors might differ from ones' another in their reaction towards the agreed principles and norms on effective development cooperation.

Second, the fact that this thesis only focuses on the assessment of the performance of the BEDCPs by donors exclusively without any regards to the country specific situation of the recipient countries constitute another limitation of this thesis because in order to track in a consistent and comparable way progress in the implementation of these principles by donors, it could be necessary to take into consideration the country contexts within which different donors provide aid, especially their own performance of the Busan principles , which are often diverse from one recipient country to another. Thus, further research that will consider the specific situation of the recipient countries in the comparative assessment of donors' performance will lead to more comprehensive results.

Third, the methodology used in this thesis is another lacuna of this study. While in the EU case, we extensively used both information from the interviews conducted and data from official documents, reports, statistics (especially from the OECD), in the case of Turkey less data was used due to the lack of enough official documents and the analysis mostly based on the few interviews conducted. Plus, most of the documents used are from Turkish governments rather than non-governmental organizations, which could lead to the questioning of the accuracy and reliability of the information provided. However, again this has not been a significant limitation for this study because we have critically balanced the Turkish official sources with other possible sources and information provided during the interviews with the few non-Turkish government officials.

Fourth, another limitation of this study is linked to the relative unevenness in the numbers of interviews from EU, Turkey, and African Embassies in Ankara and Brussels. While in the case of EU, we had the opportunity to conduct interviews with all development aid country officers of the European Commission, and with some EU delegations in Niger and Somalia, and some officials at the embassies of Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria in Brussels, in the case of Turkey, we have encountered serious difficulties to get in contact with an equitable number of persons at TIKA and TIKA country representatives in Niger, and Somalia were not willing to

share information which they consider confidential. Likewise, we could only conduct interviews with officials at the embassies of Niger and Somalia in Ankara, the embassies of Ethiopia and Nigeria remained silent to our requests. One could question the equality of the data used between the EU and Turkey's side, but this does not challenge significantly the accuracy of the findings because we extensively used and analysed the few collected data and information in a critical manner to avoid biased assessments.

Fifth, this thesis limits its assessment to the extent of the implementation by Turkey and the EU of the commitments taken in Busan without questioning the relevance of the Busan Principles per se nor does it consider the practical impact of the implementation of these principles on the effectiveness of development aid in the recipient countries. Further research is encouraged on these issues to fill the gap.

Sixth, while this thesis has based its assessment on the implicit premise that the correct implementation of the four Busan principles and its related indicators is likely to lead to an effective development cooperation in the recipient countries, without analysing the concrete impact of the implementation of these principles on the effectiveness of development cooperation in the recipient countries, it would be useful for further research to widen and deepen the sphere of analysis to demonstrate how the implementation of the BEDCPs can result in effective development cooperation and henceforth to the achievement of the SDGs in the recipient countries.

Finally, although the conclusions of this study cannot be generalized to all donors due to the limited number of donor choices, advanced researches that includes a larger number of donors from different geopolitical and cultural backgrounds, may provide new explanations of uneven donor implementation of the BEDCPs, in the contexts of the tripartite divide, traditional/emerging donors, north-south/ south-south and triangular development cooperation.

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
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Code of Interviewee	Institution	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Mode of Interview
EUB1	DEVCO International Aid / Cooperation	Brussels, Belgium	15 January 2018	Face-to-face
EUNgB	Embassy of Nigeria in Brussels	Brussels, Belgium	17 January 2018	Face-to-face
EUNeB	Embassy of Niger in Brussels	Brussels, Belgium	22 January 2018	Face-to-face
EUB2	DEVCO International Aid / Cooperation	Brussels, Belgium	31 January 2018	Face-to-face
ACPB	ACP Secretariat	Brussels, Belgium	31 January 2018	Face-to-face
EUB3	DEVCO International Aid / Cooperation	Brussels, Belgium	1 February 2018	Face-to-face
EEB	Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels	Brussels, Belgium	21 February 2018	Face-to-face
EUB4	DEVCO International Aid / Cooperation	Brussels, Belgium	21 February 2018	Face-to-face
EUB5	DEVCO International Aid / Cooperation	Brussels, Belgium	27 February 2018	Face-to-face
EUB6	DEVCO International Aid / Cooperation	Brussels, Belgium	28 February 2018	Face-to-face
ECNe	EU Coordination Cell-Niamey	N/A	26 January 2018	By email
EUD1	EU Delegation in Niger	N/A	7 March 2018	By email

TK1	TIKA Regional Director (Columbia and South America)	Istanbul, Turkey	20 October 2018	Face-to-face
TK2	TIKA Country Representative (Addis-Ababa)	N/A	21 March 2018	By email
EST	General Consulate of Somalia in Ankara	N/A	12 May 2018	By phone
ENT	Embassy of Niger in Ankara	N/A	16 May 2018	By email
EUD2	EU Delegation in Nairobi (and back up for Somalia)	N/A	12 June 2018	By email
TK3	TIKA Headquarters in Ankara	N/A	24 July 2018	By email

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Map of African Caribbean and Pacific group of countries



 Caribbean group

 East and South Africa group

 Pacific group

 West African group

 Southern African group

 Central African group

 East Africa group

Source: www.wikipedia.org

Annex 2: Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011

1. We, Heads of State, Ministers and representatives of developing and developed countries, heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, representatives of different types of public, civil society, private, parliamentary, local and regional organisations meeting here in Busan, Republic of Korea, recognise that we are united by a new partnership that is broader and more inclusive than ever before, founded on shared principles, common goals and differential commitments for effective international development.

2. The nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South co-operation differ from those that apply to North-South co-operation. At the same time, we recognise that we are all part of a development agenda in which we participate on the basis of common goals and shared principles. In this context, we encourage increased efforts to support effective co-operation based on our specific country situations. The principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis.

3. The world stands at a critical juncture in global development. Poverty and inequality remain the central challenge. The Millennium Declaration sets out our universal mandate for development and, with the target date for the Millennium Development Goals less than four years away, the urgency of achieving strong, shared and sustainable growth and decent work in developing countries is paramount. Moreover, the Declaration identifies that promoting human rights, democracy and good governance are an integral part of our development

efforts. Nowhere are our development goals more urgent than in fragile and conflict-affected states. Political will is vital if these challenges are to be addressed.

4. As we reaffirm our development commitments, we realise that the world has changed profoundly since development co-operation began over 60 years ago. Economic, political, social and technological developments have revolutionised the world in which we live. Yet poverty, inequality and hunger persist. Eradicating poverty and tackling the global and regional challenges that have adverse effects on the citizens of developing countries are central to ensuring the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and a more robust and resilient global economy for all. Our success depends on the results and impact of our joint efforts and investments as we address challenges such as health pandemics, climate change, economic downturns, food and fuel price crises, conflict, fragility and vulnerability to shocks and natural disasters.

5. We also have a more complex architecture for development co-operation, characterised by a greater number of state and non-state actors, as well as co-operation among countries at different stages in their development, many of them middle-income countries. South-South and triangular co-operation, new forms of public-private partnership, and other modalities and vehicles for development have become more prominent, complementing North-South forms of co-operation.

6. International development co-operation has achieved many positive results. When we met in Monterrey a decade ago, we recognised that increases in volumes of financing for development must be coupled with more effective action to generate sustainable and transparent results for all citizens. Our dialogue in Busan builds on the foundations laid by previous High-Level Fora, which have been proven to remain relevant, and which have helped to improve the quality of development co-operation. Yet we recognise that progress has been uneven and neither fast nor far-reaching enough. We each reaffirm our respective commitments and will implement in full the actions to which we have already agreed.

7. We can and must improve and accelerate our efforts. We commit to modernise, deepen and broaden our co-operation, involving state and non-state actors that wish to shape an agenda that has until recently been dominated by a narrower group of development actors. In Busan, we forge a new global development partnership that embraces diversity and recognises the distinct roles that all stakeholders in co-operation can play to support development.

8. Our partnership is founded on a common set of principles that underpin all forms of development co-operation. At the same time, we recognise that the ways in which these principles are applied differ across countries at various stages of development, and among the different types of public and private stakeholders involved. Lessons should be shared by all who participate in development co-operation. We welcome the opportunities presented by diverse approaches to development co-operation, such as South-South co-operation, as well as the contribution of civil society organisations and private actors; we will work together to build on and learn from their achievements and innovations, recognising their unique characteristics and respective merits.

9. Sustainable development results are the end goal of our commitments to effective co-operation. While development co-operation is only part of the solution, it plays a catalytic and indispensable role in supporting poverty eradication, social protection, economic growth and sustainable development. We reaffirm our respective commitments to scale up development co-operation. More effective co-operation should not lead to a reduction in resources for development.

Over time, we will aim to increase independence from aid, always taking into account the consequences for the poorest people and countries. In this process, it is essential to examine the interdependence and coherence of all public policies – not just development policies – to enable countries to make full use of the opportunities presented by international investment and trade, and to expand their domestic capital markets.

10. As we partner to increase and reinforce development results, we will take action to facilitate, leverage and strengthen the impact of diverse sources of finance to support sustainable and inclusive development, including taxation and domestic resource mobilisation, private investment, aid for trade, philanthropy, non-concessional public funding and climate change finance. At the same time, new financial instruments, investment options, technology and knowledge sharing, and public-private partnerships are called for.

Shared principles to achieve common goals

11. As we embrace the diversity that underpins our partnership and the catalytic role of development co-operation, we share common principles which – consistent with our agreed international commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability – form the foundation of our co-operation for effective development:

a) *Ownership of development priorities by developing countries.* Partnerships for development can only succeed if they are led by developing countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs.

b) *Focus on results.* Our investments and efforts must have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality, on sustainable development, and on enhancing developing countries' capacities, aligned with the priorities and policies set out by developing countries themselves.

c) *Inclusive development partnerships.* Openness, trust, and mutual respect and learning lie at the core of effective partnerships in support of development goals, recognising the different and complementary roles of all actors.

d) *Transparency and accountability to each other.* Mutual accountability and accountability to the intended beneficiaries of our co-operation, as well as to our respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering results. Transparent practices form the basis for enhanced accountability.

12. These shared principles will guide our actions to:

a) Deepen, extend and operationalise the democratic ownership of development policies and processes.

b) Strengthen our efforts to achieve concrete and sustainable results. This involves better managing for results, monitoring, evaluating and communicating progress; as well as scaling up our support, strengthening national capacities and leveraging diverse resources and initiatives in support of development results.

c) Broaden support for South-South and triangular co-operation, helping to tailor these horizontal partnerships to a greater diversity of country contexts and needs.

d) Support developing countries in their efforts to facilitate, leverage and strengthen the impact of diverse forms of development finance and activities, ensuring that these diverse forms of co-operation have a catalytic effect on development.

13. We recognise the urgency with which these actions must be implemented. Beginning implementation now – or accelerating efforts where they are ongoing – is essential if our renewed approach to partnership is to have the maximum possible impact on the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, as well as on development results over the longer term. We will hold each other accountable for implementing our respective actions in

developing countries and at the international level. As we focus on implementing our commitments at the country level, we will form a new, inclusive Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to support implementation at the political level.

Realising change: Complementary actions to reach common goals

Inclusion of new actors on the basis of shared principles and differential commitments

14. Today's complex architecture for development co-operation has evolved from the North-South paradigm. Distinct from the traditional relationship between aid providers and recipients, developing nations and a number of emerging economies have become important providers of South-South development co-operation. They remain developing countries and still face poverty at home. As such, they remain eligible to benefit from development co-operation provided by others, yet they have increasingly taken upon themselves the responsibility to share experiences and co-operate with other developing countries. The Paris Declaration did not address the complexity of these new actors, while the Accra Agenda for Action recognised their importance and specificities. While North-South co-operation remains the main form of development co-operation, South-South co-operation continues to evolve, providing additional diversity of resources for development. At Busan, we now all form an integral part of a new and more inclusive development agenda, in which these actors participate on the basis of common goals, shared principles and differential commitments. On this same basis, we welcome the inclusion of civil society, the private sector and other actors.

Improving the quality and effectiveness of development co-operation

15. Progress has been made in advancing the aid effectiveness agenda, yet major challenges persist. Evidence has shown that – despite the challenges encountered in the implementation of our respective commitments – many of the principles underpinning the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action have contributed to higher quality, more transparent and effective development co-operation.

16. We will sustain our high-level political leadership to ensure that the commitments made here in Busan are implemented. Within this context, those of us that endorsed the mutually agreed actions set out in Paris and Accra will intensify our efforts to implement our respective commitments in full. A growing range of actors – including middle-income countries, partners of South-South and triangular co-operation and civil society organisations – have joined others to forge a broader, more inclusive agenda since Paris and Accra, embracing their respective and different commitments alongside shared principles.

17. Drawing on the evidence generated through periodic monitoring and the independent evaluation of the Paris Declaration, we will be guided by a focus on sustainable results that meet the priority needs of developing countries and will make the urgently needed changes to improve the effectiveness of our partnerships for development.

Ownership, results and accountability

18. Together, we will increase our focus on development results. To this end:

a) Developing countries' efforts and plans to strengthen core institutions and policies will be supported through approaches that aim to manage – rather than avoid – risk, including through the development of joint risk management frameworks with providers of development co-operation.

b) Where initiated by the developing country, transparent, country-led and country-level results frameworks and platforms will be adopted as a common tool among all concerned actors to assess performance based on a manageable number of output and outcome indicators drawn from the development priorities and goals of the developing country. Providers of development co-operation will minimise their use of additional frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with countries' national development strategies.

c) We will partner to implement a global Action Plan to enhance capacity for statistics to monitor progress, evaluate impact, ensure sound, results-focused public sector management, and highlight strategic issues for policy decisions.

d) As we deepen our efforts to ensure that mutual assessment reviews are in place in all developing countries, we encourage the active participation of all development co-operation actors in these processes.

e) Pursuant to the Accra Agenda for Action, we will accelerate our efforts to untie aid. We will, in 2012, review our plans to achieve this. In addition to increasing value for money, untying can present opportunities for local procurement, business development, employment and income generation in developing countries. We will improve the quality, consistency and transparency of reporting on the tying status of aid.

19. The use and strengthening of developing countries' systems remains central to our efforts to build effective institutions. We will build on our respective commitments set out in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action to:

a) Use country systems as the default approach for development co-operation in support of activities managed by the public sector, working with and respecting the governance structures of both the provider of development co-operation and the developing country.

b) Assess jointly country systems using mutually agreed diagnostic tools. Based on the results of these assessments, providers of development co-operation will decide on the extent to which they can use country systems. Where the full use of country systems is not possible, the provider of development co-operation will state the reasons for non-use and will discuss with government what would be required to move towards full use, including any necessary assistance or changes for the strengthening of systems. The use and strengthening of country systems should be placed within the overall context of national capacity development for sustainable outcomes.

20. We must accelerate our efforts to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women through development programmes grounded in country priorities, recognising that gender equality and women's empowerment are critical to achieving development results. Reducing gender inequality is both an end in its own right and a prerequisite for sustainable and inclusive growth. As we redouble our efforts to implement existing commitments we will:

a) Accelerate and deepen efforts to collect, disseminate, harmonise and make full use of data disaggregated by sex to inform policy decisions and guide investments, ensuring in turn that public expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men.

b) Integrate targets for gender equality and women's empowerment in accountability mechanisms, grounded in international and regional commitments.

c) Address gender equality and women's empowerment in all aspects of our development efforts, including peacebuilding and state-building.

21. Parliaments and local governments play critical roles in linking citizens with government, and in ensuring broad-based and democratic ownership of countries' development agendas. To facilitate their contribution, we will:

a) Accelerate and deepen the implementation of existing commitments to strengthen the role of parliaments in the oversight of development processes, including by supporting capacity development – backed by adequate resources and clear action plans.

b) Further support local governments to enable them to assume more fully their roles above and beyond service delivery, enhancing participation and accountability at the sub-national levels.

22. Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in areas that are complementary to those provided by states. Recognising this, we will:

a) Implement fully our respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.

b) Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability and their contribution to development effectiveness, guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.

Transparent and responsible co-operation

23. We will work to improve the availability and public accessibility of information on development co-operation and other development resources, building on our respective commitments in this area. To this end, we will:

a) Make the full range of information on publicly funded development activities, their financing, terms and conditions, and contribution to development results, publicly available subject to legitimate concerns about commercially sensitive information.

b) Focus, at the country level, on establishing transparent public financial management and aid information management systems and strengthen the capacities of all relevant stakeholders to make better use of this information in decision-making and to promote accountability.

c) Implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development co-operation, taking into account the statistical reporting of the OECD-DAC and the complementary efforts of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and others. This standard must meet the information needs of developing countries and non-state actors, consistent with national

requirements. We will agree on this standard and publish our respective schedules to implement it by December 2012, with the aim of implementing it fully by December 2015.

24. We will also work to make development co-operation more predictable in its nature. To this end:

a) Those of us who committed, through the Accra Agenda for Action, to improve medium-term predictability will implement fully our commitments in this area, introducing reforms where needed. By 2013, they will provide available, regular, timely rolling three- to five-year indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans as agreed in Accra to all developing countries with which they co-operate. Other actors will aim to provide developing countries with timely and relevant information on their intentions with regard to future co-operation over the medium term.

25. We welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors. Developing countries will lead consultation and co-ordination efforts to manage this diversity at the country level, while providers of development assistance have a responsibility to reduce fragmentation and curb the proliferation of aid channels. We will ensure that our efforts to reduce fragmentation do not lead to a reduction in the volume and quality of resources available to support development. To this end:

a) We will, by 2013, make greater use of country-led co-ordination arrangements, including division of labour, as well as programme-based approaches, joint programming and delegated co-operation.

b) We will improve the coherence of our policies on multilateral institutions, global funds and programmes. We will make effective use of existing multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well. We will work to reduce the proliferation of these channels and will, by the end of 2012, agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts. As they continue to implement their respective commitments on aid effectiveness, multilateral organisations, global funds and programmes will strengthen their participation in co-ordination and mutual accountability mechanisms at the country, regional and global levels.

c) We will accelerate efforts to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance, agreeing – by the end of 2012 – on principles that will guide our actions to address this challenge. These efforts will encompass all development co-operation flows.

d) Providers of development co-operation will deepen and accelerate efforts to address the problem of insufficient delegation of authority to their field staff. They will review all aspects

of their operations, including delegation of financial authority, staffing, and roles and responsibilities in the design and implementation of development programmes; and they will implement measures that address the remaining bottlenecks.

Promoting sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility

26. Fragile states are for the large part off-track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Achieving these goals will depend on our collective ability to understand the unique challenges facing fragile states, overcome these challenges, and promote foundations for lasting development. We welcome the New Deal developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State building, including the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states. Those of us who have endorsed the New Deal will pursue actions to implement it and, in doing so, will use:

- a) The Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs) – which prioritise legitimate politics, people’s security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and fair services – as an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs to guide our work in fragile and conflict-affected states.
- b) FOCUS – a new country-led and country-owned way of engaging in fragile states.
- c) TRUST – a set of commitments to enhance transparency; manage risk to use country systems; strengthen national capacities; and improve the timeliness and predictability of aid – to achieve better results.

Partnering to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity

27. We must ensure that development strategies and programmes prioritise the building of resilience among people and societies at risk from shocks, especially in highly vulnerable settings such as small island developing states. Investing in resilience and risk reduction increases the value and sustainability of our development efforts. To this end:

- a) Developing countries will lead in integrating resilience to shocks and measures for disaster management within their own policies and strategies.
- b) Responding to the needs articulated by developing countries, we will work together to invest in shock resistant infrastructure and social protection systems for at-risk communities. In addition, we will increase the resources, planning and skills for disaster management at the national and regional levels.

From effective aid to co-operation for effective development

28. Aid is only part of the solution to development. It is now time to broaden our focus and attention from aid effectiveness to the challenges of effective development. This calls for a framework within which:

) Development is driven by strong, sustainable and inclusive growth.

b) Governments' own revenues play a greater role in financing their development needs. In turn, governments are more accountable to their citizens for the development results they achieve.

c) Effective state and non-state institutions design and implement their own reforms and hold each other to account.

d) Developing countries increasingly integrate both regionally and globally, creating economies of scale that will help them better compete in the global economy.

To this effect, we will rethink what aid should be spent on and how, in ways that are consistent with agreed international rights, norms and standards, so that aid catalyses development.

29. Effective institutions and policies are essential for sustainable development. Institutions fulfilling core state functions should, where necessary, be further strengthened, alongside the policies and practices of providers of development co-operation, to facilitate the leveraging of resources by developing countries. Developing countries will lead in efforts to strengthen these institutions, adapting to local context and differing stages of development. To this end, we will:

a) Support the implementation of institutional and policy changes led by developing countries, resulting in effective resource mobilisation and service delivery, including national and sub-national institutions, regional organisations, parliaments and civil society.

b) Assess country institutions, systems and capacity development needs, led by developing countries.

c) Support the development of improved evidence on institutional performance to inform policy formulation, implementation and accountability, led by developing countries.

d) Deepen our learning on the determinants of success for institutional reform, exchanging knowledge and experience at the regional and global levels.

South-South and triangular co-operation for sustainable development

30. The inputs to sustainable development extend well beyond financial co-operation to the knowledge and development experience of all actors and countries. South-South and triangular co-operation have the potential to transform developing countries' policies and approaches to service delivery by bringing effective, locally owned solutions that are appropriate to country contexts.

31. We recognise that many countries engaged in South-South co-operation both provide and receive diverse resources and expertise at the same time, and that this should enrich co-operation without affecting a country's eligibility to receive assistance from others. We will strengthen the sharing of knowledge and mutual learning by:

- a) Scaling up – where appropriate – the use of triangular approaches to development co-operation.
- b) Making fuller use of South-South and triangular co-operation, recognising the success of these approaches to date and the synergies they offer.
- c) Encouraging the development of networks for knowledge exchange, peer learning and co-ordination among South-South co-operation actors as a means of facilitating access to important knowledge pools by developing countries.
- d) Supporting efforts to strengthen local and national capacities to engage effectively in South-South and triangular co-operation.

Private sector and development

32. We recognise the central role of the private sector in advancing innovation, creating wealth, income and jobs, mobilising domestic resources and in turn contributing to poverty reduction. To this end, we will:

- a) Engage with representative business associations, trade unions and others to improve the legal, regulatory and administrative environment for the development of private investment; and also to ensure a sound policy and regulatory environment for private sector development, increased foreign direct investment, public-private partnerships, the strengthening of value chains in an equitable manner and giving particular consideration to national and regional dimensions, and the scaling up of efforts in support of development goals.
- b) Enable the participation of the private sector in the design and implementation of development policies and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

c) Further develop innovative financial mechanisms to mobilise private finance for shared development goals.

d) Promote “aid for trade” as an engine of sustainable development, focusing on outcomes and impact, to build productive capacities, help address market failures, strengthen access to capital markets and to promote approaches that mitigate risk faced by private sector actors.

e) Invite representatives of the public and private sectors and related organisations to play an active role in exploring how to advance both development and business outcomes so that they are mutually reinforcing.

Combating corruption and illicit flows

33. Corruption is a plague that seriously undermines development globally, diverting resources that could be harnessed to finance development, damaging the quality of governance institutions, and threatening human security. It often fuels crime and contributes to conflict and fragility. We will intensify our joint efforts to fight corruption and illicit flows, consistent with the UN Convention Against Corruption and other agreements to which we are party, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. To this end, we will:

a) Implement fully our respective commitments to eradicate corruption, enforcing our laws and promoting a culture of zero tolerance for all corrupt practices. This includes efforts to improve fiscal transparency, strengthen independent enforcement mechanisms, and extend protection for whistle-blowers.

b) Accelerate our individual efforts to combat illicit financial flows by strengthening anti money laundering measures, addressing tax evasion, and strengthening national and international policies, legal frameworks and institutional arrangements for the tracing, freezing and recovery of illegal assets. This includes ensuring enactment and implementation of laws and practices that facilitate effective international co-operation.

Climate change finance

34. Global climate change finance is expected to increase substantially in the medium term. Recognising that this resource flow brings with its new opportunities and challenges, we will endeavour to promote coherence, transparency and predictability across our approaches for effective climate finance and broader development co-operation, including to:

a) Continue to support national climate change policy and planning as an integral part of developing countries’ overall national development plans and ensure that – where appropriate

– these measures are financed, delivered and monitored through developing countries' systems in a transparent manner.

b) Continue to share lessons learned in development effectiveness with those entities engaged in climate activities and ensure that broader development co-operation is also informed by innovations in climate finance.

The road ahead: Partnering for progress towards and beyond the MDGs

35. We will hold each other accountable for making progress against the commitments and actions agreed in Busan, alongside those set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action. To this end, we will:

a) At the level of individual developing countries, agree on frameworks based on national needs and priorities for monitoring progress and promoting mutual accountability in our efforts to improve the effectiveness of our co-operation and, in turn, development results. Developing countries will lead in the elaboration of such frameworks which, together with any indicators and targets agreed, will respond to their specific needs and will be grounded in their aid and development policies. The results of these exercises will be made public.

b) Agree, by June 2012, on a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets through which we will monitor progress on a rolling basis, supporting international and regional accountability for the implementation of our commitments. We will build on the initiatives led by developing countries and learn from existing international efforts to monitor aid effectiveness. We will review these arrangements in the context of the post-MDG framework. We will periodically publish the results of these exercises.

c) Support initiatives at the national and regional levels led by developing countries that strengthen capacities to monitor progress and evaluate the impact of efforts to improve development effectiveness.

36. We accept that the strengthening of our co-operation and the adherence to both common goals and differential commitments calls for continued high-level political support, as well as an inclusive space for dialogue, mutual learning and accountability at the global level. Regional organisations can and should play an important role in supporting implementation at the country level, and in linking country priorities with global efforts. The UN Development Cooperation Forum is also invited to play a role in consulting on the implementation of agreements reached in Busan. To this end, we will:

a) Establish a new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level. This Partnership will offer an open platform that embraces diversity, providing a forum for the exchange of knowledge and the regular review of progress.

b) Agree, by June 2012, on light working arrangements for this Global Partnership, including its membership and opportunities for regular ministerial-level engagement that complements, and is undertaken in conjunction with, other fora.

c) Call on the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) to convene representatives of all countries and stakeholders endorsing this document with a view to reaching agreement on the working arrangements for the Global Partnership – and the indicators and channels through which global monitoring and accountability will be supported – in preparation for the phasing out of the WP-EFF and its associated structures in June 2012.

d) Invite the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Development Programme to support the effective functioning of the Global Partnership, building on their collaboration to date and their respective mandates and areas of comparative advantage.

Source: Available at OECD website, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf>

Annex 3: Interview Questionnaire for the EU Officials

1. What are the underlying motivations behind EU's engagement in SSA in the field of development aid?

2. How does the EU evaluate the impacts of its aid activities in SSA?

3. Does the EU prefer bilateral cooperation over multilateral one or vice-versa? If yes/no, why?

4. As a signatory and supporter of the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation, what steps has the EU taken so far to implement the four Busan Principles in general (Ownership, Inclusive Partnership, Focus on Results, Transparency and Accountability)?

5. How does the EU score the level of predictability of its aid disbursement to Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia? Does the EU exactly disburse the amount of aid it committed itself to provide to each of these countries?

6. How predictable are the European Development Funds (EDF)'s disbursements to the selected four countries?
7. To what extent does the EU use country systems (use of the country's Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement systems) in the formulation, disbursement and implementation of development aid projects in the selected four countries increased?
8. Does the EU face some obstacles in the use of country systems in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?
9. To what extent is the EU's aid untied in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia?
10. To what extent does the EU ensure the participation of local contractors (and non-EU contractors) as well as the use of local products (and non-EU products) in the implementation of aid activities in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia?
11. To what extent have stakeholders in the beneficiary countries, namely Civil Society Organizations, played a meaningful role in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU aid actions in the four country case studies?
12. To what extent are EU new aid interventions are drawn from the objectives and results defined by beneficiary countries themselves? To what extent does the EU rely on beneficiary countries' own statistics and monitoring and evaluation processes to track progress? Does the EU use country-led results frameworks of the recipient countries (Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Niger) in the formulation and implementation of its aid projects?
13. How does the EU make its information on development cooperation provided to Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria publicly available and in line with the Busan transparency requirements (timeliness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of the current and forward-looking information)?
14. To what extent are EU development aid funding to Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger and Somalia recorded in EU budget and subjected to parliamentary scrutiny?
16. What kinds of recommendation can the EU propose to improve its performance of the Busan principles and indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia?
17. Does the EU prefer focusing on north-south cooperation with Sub-Saharan African countries (here Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria)? If so, why?

18. How do EU officials evaluate triangular development cooperation compared to traditional north-south cooperation and south-south cooperation?
19. Are there concrete examples of triangular cooperation between the EU, an emerging donor and Sub-Saharan African countries?
20. Taking Turkey as a potential emerging donor, can Turkey, the EU and Sub-Saharan African countries (here Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria) form triangular development cooperation?
21. What are the drivers towards and barriers against a triangular cooperation between EU-Turkey and SSA (here Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria) in the field of development aid?
22. What could be the impact of such a triangular cooperation on the effectiveness of development aid projects in SSA?

Annex 4: Interview questionnaire for Turkish Officials

1. What are the underlying motivations behind Turkey's engagement in SSA in the field of development aid?
2. How does Turkey evaluate the impacts of its development aid activities in SSA?
3. Does Turkey prefer bilateral cooperation over multilateral one or vice-versa? If yes/no, why?
4. As a signatory and supporter of the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation, what steps has Turkey taken so far to implement the four Busan Principles in

general (Ownership, Inclusive Partnership, Focus on Results, Transparency and Accountability)?

5. Does Turkey provide budget support to the following countries: Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Niger? If so, does Turkey exactly disburse the amount of aid it committed itself to provide to each of these countries?

6. To what extent does Turkey use country systems (use of the country's Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement systems) in the formulation, disbursement and implementation of aid projects in the selected four countries?

7. Does Turkey face some obstacles in the use of country systems in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia?

8. To what extent is Turkey's aid untied in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia?

9. To what extent does Turkey ensure the participation of local contractors (and non-Turkish contractors) as well as the use of local products (and non-Turkish products) in the implementation of its development aid projects in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia?

10. How does Turkey select the companies that would execute its aid projects in the recipient countries? Does Turkey collaborate with the governing authorities of the recipient countries in the selection of the contractors that will execute the aid projects?

11. How does Turkey use its aid projects or funds to support Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the recipient countries? How does Turkey involve CSOs in the formulation and implementation of aid projects?

12. Does Turkey face sometimes difficulties to involve CSOs in the formulation and implementation of development projects in the recipient countries?

13. How does Turkey define the aid sectoral priorities to be implemented in a given country?

14. To what extent are Turkey's new aid interventions drawn from the objectives and results defined by beneficiary countries themselves? To what extent does Turkey rely on beneficiary countries' own statistics and monitoring and evaluation processes to track progress? Does Turkey use country-led results frameworks of the recipient countries (Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Niger) in the formulation and implementation of its aid projects?

15. How does Turkey monitor and evaluate the implementation of its aid projects in each recipient country in terms of effectiveness?
16. How does Turkey make its information on development cooperation provided to Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria publicly available and in line with the Busan transparency requirements (timeliness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of the current and forward-looking information)?
17. To what extent are Turkey's development aid funding to Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger and Somalia recorded in Turkish national budget and subjected to parliamentary scrutiny?
18. What are the factors that eventually influences the degree of implementation of the Busan principles and indicators (annual predictability of aid, untying aid, use of country systems, use of result frameworks, cooperation with CSOs, transparency and accountability) by Turkey in Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria?
19. What kinds of recommendation can Turkey propose to improve its performance of these principles?
20. Does Turkey prefer focusing on south-south cooperation with Sub-Saharan African countries (here Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria)? If so, why?
21. How do Turkish officials evaluate triangular development cooperation compared to traditional north-south cooperation and south-south cooperation?
22. Are there concrete examples of triangular cooperation between the EU, Turkey and Sub-Saharan African countries?
23. Taking Turkey as a potential emerging donor, can Turkey, the EU and Sub-Saharan African countries (here Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria) form a triangular development cooperation?
24. What are the drivers towards and barriers against a triangular relationship between the EU-Turkey and SSA (here Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria)?
25. What could be the impact of such a triangular cooperation on the effectiveness of development aid in SSA?



Annex 5: Interview questionnaire for African Embassies in Brussels and Ankara

1. What are the underlying motivations behind Turkey and EU's engagement in the field of development aid in your country?
2. What are the principal areas of focus of Turkey and EU's development aid activities?
3. Do the EU and Turkey use budget support in favour of your country?

4. How do you score the level of predictability of Turkey and EU's aid disbursement to your country? Do Turkey and EU exactly disburse the amount of aid they committed each to provide?
5. To what extent do the EU and Turkey use of country systems (use of the country's Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement systems) in the formulation, disbursement and implementation of aid funds in your country? Are there any obstacles to the use of these systems?
5. To what extent is EU and Turkey's aid untied?
6. To what extent do Turkey and the EU involve local contractors (and non- EU and non-Turkish contractors) and encourage the use of local products (and non- EU and non-Turkish products) in the implementation of aid projects in your country?
7. To what extent have stakeholders in your country, such as civil society, played a meaningful role in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Turkey and EU's aid projects?
8. To what extent are Turkey and EU's new aid interventions drawn from the objectives and results defined by your country? To what extent do Turkey and the EU rely on your country's own statistics and monitoring and evaluation processes to track progress?
9. Does the EU and Turkey use country-led results frameworks of your country (if any) in the formulation and implementation of their aid projects?
10. How do the EU and Turkey make their information on development cooperation provided to your country publicly available and in line with the Busan transparency requirements (timeliness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of the current and forward-looking information)?
11. What are the factors that eventually influence the degree of performance of the Busan Principles and indicators (annual predictability of aid, untying aid, use of country systems, use of result frameworks, cooperation with CSOs, transparency and accountability) by the EU and Turkey in your country?
12. What kinds of recommendation can you propose to improve Turkey and EU's performance of these principles?
13. How do you evaluate triangular development cooperation compared to traditional north-south cooperation and south-south development cooperation?

14. Taking the EU as a traditional donor and Turkey as a potential emerging donor, can Turkey, the EU and your country form a triangular development cooperation? What are the drivers towards and barriers against a triangular relationship between EU-Turkey and Somalia?

15. What could be the impact of such a triangular cooperation on the effectiveness of development aid projects in your country?

