

**T.C.**  
**ISTANBUL YENI YUZYIL UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE**



**DECIPHERING RADICAL ECOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY BRITISH  
FICTION: JULIAN BARNES, DAVID MITCHELL AND JOHN FOWLES**

**Ph.D. THESIS**

**BATURAY ERDAL**

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İSTANBUL YENİ YÜZYIL ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

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## ÖZET

### ÇAĞDAŞ İNGİLİZ ROMANINDA RADİKAL EKOLOJİ ÇÖZÜMLEMESİ: JULIAN BARNES, DAVID MITCHELL VE JOHN FOWLES

Bu tezin amacı, köklerini modernite karşıtlığında bulan Radikal Ekoloji Hareketi ve Postmodern ideolojinin ortak bir çevresel etik ışığında edebi zeminde buluşmalarını sağlamaktır. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmada ekolojik bir postmodern edebiyat teorisinin, mevcut çevre krizinin daha derin bir felakete dönüşmeden bireysel ve toplumsal uzamda bir paradigma değişikliği yaratması açısından nasıl ciddi katkılar sunabileceği tartışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Julian Barnes'ın *A History of the World in 10<sup>1/2</sup> Chapters*, David Mitchell'in *Cloud Atlas* ve John Fowles'un *The Collector* adlı romanları sundukları zengin ekolojik imgeler ve çevreci söylemler bakımından Derin Ekoloji, Toplumsal Ekoloji ve Ekofeminizm gibi bazı radikal ekolojik akımlar ışığında analiz edilmiştir. Söz konusu eserlerde çözümlenen bu radikal ekolojik öğretiler göz önüne alındığında, modernitenin kurguladığı üst anlatıları reddeden postmodern edebiyatın insanmerkezciliğe karşı ekolojik bilinci teşvik ettiği yeni bir ekolojik aydınlanma çağının ortaya çıkışına ve ayrıca hiyerarşi ve tahakkümden arındırılmış, geleceğin ekolojik toplumlarına öncülük edebileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Baturay ERDAL, 2019

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Radikal Ekoloji, Derin Ekoloji, Toplumsal Ekoloji, Ekofeminizm, Postmodern İngiliz Romanı



## ABSTRACT

### DECIPHERING RADICAL ECOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY BRITISH FICTION: JULIAN BARNES, DAVID MITCHELL AND JOHN FOWLES

The purpose of the study is to enable Radical Ecology Movement and Postmodern ideology which find their roots in the assumptions of anti-modernity to be fused in a literary ground in the light of common environmental ethics. The study also offers discussions for how an ecological postmodern literary theory can provide significant contributions to the paradigm shift in social and individual dimensions before the extant environmental crisis turns into a deeper turmoil. In this context, concerning ecological images and environmental discussions they provide, *A History of the World in 10<sup>1/2</sup>* by Julian Barnes, *Cloud Atlas* by David Mitchell and *The Collector* by John Fowles are analyzed through the lens of such radical ecological currents like Deep Ecology, Social Ecology and Ecofeminism. Bearing in mind the radical ecological doctrines embedded in these texts, it is concluded that ecological postmodern literature disavowing metanarratives constructed by modernity can be of paramount importance to the emergence of a new age of green enlightenment promoting environmental consciousness against homocentrism and also of ecological societies of the future recovered from domination and hierarchy.

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**Keywords:** Radical Ecology, Deep Ecology, Social Ecology, Ecofeminism,  
Postmodern British Fiction

## INTRODUCTION

“If you come home and find a bunch of Hell's Angels raping your wife, your old mother, and eleven-year-old daughter, you don't sit down and talk balance with them or suggest compromise. You get your twelve gauge shotgun and blow them to hell [...] There are people out there trying to save their Mother (Earth) from rape and their story must be told also.”

—Dave Foreman, “Violence and Earth First!”

The attempts of mainstream environmentalists to diagnose merely the existence of environmental crisis have already failed to establish an epistemological basis. Instead of insisting on the symptoms of ecological turmoil, examining the perception and the reconceptualization of nature can help mapping out a new route not only to reach the roots of the crisis embedded in the human history and but also to offer new alternatives for the reconstruction of the relationship between human and nonhuman. The advocates of radical ecology, according to Michael Zimmerman, distinguish themselves from mainstream environmentalists as ‘radical’ for at least two primary reasons: “First, they claim that their analyses disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, social, political, and cultural origins of the ecological crisis” and “[s]econd, they argue that only a revolution or a cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from ecological devastation” (1998: 4). Such an approach is inclined to manifest itself in the notion that nature is indeed more than nature.

Contrary to the anthropocentric idea that the concept of nature can be expressed through basic definitions which only refer to the physical environment as a raw material, its scope actually expands so as to encapsulate a deeper ecological meaning, or a philosophical infrastructure reflecting its ideational and abstract aspect. Insisting on the plain illustration of nature paves the way for an irreparable damage in the proper perception of what is natural. In opposition to this mischievous anthropocentric approach missing the fundamental point, it must be accepted that nature is an entity being self-conscious and coherent in itself and having a deep meaning peculiar to itself, which requires ecosophical lens to make sense and

diagnose the existing issues about it. This misdetection in the definition not only causes nature to be perceived as an object that would be discovered first and exploited then, but also transforms its existence into an ontological problem. Thus, behind these exploitative attitudes towards the physical and spiritual existence of nature, which has seemed not to change for centuries, lies the chronic misconception on its 'raison d'être'. More components than assumed must be involved in this matter. Discussing the position of human in an all-inclusive definition of nature, Murray Bookchin, a pioneer in the ecology movement, asserts that the definition of nature is more difficult than it appears due to the involvement of human beings in nature as a part of it (1996: 3). Considering that human beings cannot be separated from nature, then, he wonders whether human beings are only "one life-form among many others" or "unique in ways that place major responsibilities on them with respect to the rest of the world of life [...]?" (1996: 3). Whether social ecology attaches a great importance to the potential of human or deep ecology considers human as an equal life form among others, it is an incontestable fact that the historical roots of ecological crisis indicate the dissociation of human mind from the rest of the life-forms in an attempt to justify the domination.

This misperception reducing the idea of nature through oversimplified and artificial specifications can be claimed to begin with the Age of Enlightenment which is a Western intellectual movement characterized by the stimulation towards modernity. In this sense, the environmentalist philosophies regard modernity and the philosophical roots it is based on as being the remarkable turning point in the emergence of modern environmental problems and the deterioration of the planet. The effort to make human reason sovereign over the macrocosm, which can be claimed that it begins with Descartes's popular statement elevating the human's function, "I think therefore I am", reaches its peak by the end of the modernity. Thus, some scholars from Francis Bacon to David Hume and even to Karl Marx put science, reason and human as the key elements of a new modern society. The modern world enshrines such ideologies that the reason can grasp everything in the world, science will ultimately explain anything in the universe, an anonymous power arranges everything if you free the market, class struggle is always valid and can explain all social and individual cases. However, there is an immediate ecological

problem of which detection and solution are ignored and left unsolved by the enlightened mind. The tradition of humanism also plays a significant role by resting on some assumptions, as R. W. Harris puts it, “the chief of which was that the universe was a single, coherent and rational creation of the deity, and that man, and all other beings, creatures and things, existed in a pre-determined hierarchy, governed by God’s laws” (1968: 9). The era is marked by the disintegration from the medieval concept of universe, which paves the way for shaping a modern cosmological argument through the physical science started by Galileo and Newton, the investigative method of Bacon, the experimental philosophy of John Locke and Hume. Despite the fact that any goal set by the enlightened mind is thought to be achievable in the future by these scholars, the first half of the twentieth century, in the wake of the spirit of progress imposed by the modernity, witnesses a physical world endangered by World War I, World War II and nuclear power.

While Jurgen Habermas defines modernity as a process which cannot go beyond being an incomplete and immature project (2005: 163-74), radical ecology movement of the mid-twentieth century embracing deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism already announces the end of modernity, decentering the enlightened mind and becoming suspicious of the scientific experiment of the previous ages. In her introductory notes to *Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World*, Carolyn Merchant manifests the emergence, definition and purpose of Radical Ecology. She claims that the theory emerges as a reaction to the crisis in the industrialized societies and holds the view that the exploitation of nature paves the way for human domination in all facets of life including race, class and gender issues. For her, radical ecology attempts to overcome the illusionary idea that people have the right to exploit nature. Thus, radical ecology adopts a new environmental ethics triggering people to construct a new social structure which is in harmony with this ecological vision (2005: 1). Embracing deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism, Radical Ecology, to clarify and extend Merchant’s definition, is a sort of revolutionary green movement which demands a well-organized society promising equal rights for all human beings and nonhuman living beings, promotes human race to raise awareness, or ecological consciousness about the deteriorating environmental conditions and

puts forward reformulated law, ethics, moral values and new principles to rediscover the perception of nature.

The term deep ecology, named as The Long-Range Deep Ecology, was coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1973. Deep ecology invites human beings to realize that they are an indivisible part of what is natural, thus, any idea of superiority or the right to exploit the inferior cannot be accepted. Disavowing the thought that all organisms serve for the benefit of humanity and that nature must only be respected as long as it is a necessary object for the survival of human race, which is considered as 'shallow', 'perfunctory' and 'superficial', the followers of deep ecology strictly believes the equality of every organisms that make up the ecosystems. Based on a holistic approach to the survival of species in the universe, this ecological philosophy emphasizes the role of an individual who is invited to be aware of his/her ecological sense through self-realization. If people in a society achieve the self-realization, therefore, this can lead to the togetherness of society and nature.

The demand for ecological revolution for the rearrangement of social dynamics is also the ultimate goal of Bookchin, a social theorist who is the founder of Social Ecology. Though the goal shared by radical ecologies is similar, the ways adopted to reach it differ. Bookchin's theory of social ecology embraces a dialectic approach to society which must be reorganized through human faculties. An ecological revolution in the reconstruction of society can be achieved by integrating human reason into ecological consciousness, transforming his mind into an ecological and naturalist form. That is to say, social ecology does not totally refuse the role of human mind but adopts the belief that the fragile structure of biodiversity endangered by man can only be saved through dialectic rationalism. Once having significant contributions to the development of deep ecology movement, Bookchin mediates between anthropocentric and biocentric approaches to ecological philosophy, and also finds both as erroneous, dismissing a biocentric model equalizing human beings and viruses within a "biospheric democracy" and an anthropocentric model making human egocentric beings within a "biospheric tyranny" (1996: 137-38).

As a much-debated branch in the field of feminist studies, coming out of the rising consciousness about the similarities between woman and nature, ecofeminist movement directly relates nature to woman in the sense of production and reproduction, and also environmental destruction to the violence against woman body. As Merchant suggests, “[w]hen radioactivity from nuclear power-plant accidents, toxic chemicals, and hazardous wastes threaten the biological reproduction of the human species, women experience this contradiction as assaults on their own bodies and on those of their children and act to halt them.” (2005: 193). It is clear that the movement draws a substantial connection between industrial capitalism and androcentric society. Regarding natural sources as a means of limitless exploitation, capitalism abuses nature via male-dominant society. On one hand man, in order to have an eternal power, tends to overcome nature and tame everything envioning him, on the other hand woman is reconciled with nature and embraces it due to the fact that she has developed the conscious of not capturing nature but belonging to it. Drawing linkages between environmental issues and feminist concerns, ecofeminist theory is not only an opposition to the already built tradition based on othering and silencing but also a social theory helping rebuild the perception of contemporary society on nature and woman.

These theories of radical ecology more or less offer remedies to the current ecological crisis, yet they are criticized because of lacking acceptable solutions. As Serpil Oppermann discusses, though the branches of radical ecology like social ecology and ecofeminism provide an insight into the holistic approach as much as deep ecology, they are so occupied with criticizing each other that they cannot attempt to develop common methods in finding acceptable remedies for the current ecological destruction. (2003: 16). However, removing much of the impediment to the ideological intercourse does not seem beyond the bounds of possibility as regards purpose and subject. The connection of these radicalized environmental theories with postmodern ideology, on the other hand, primarily lies behind the fact that radical ecology and postmodernism do not embrace the ideals of modernity. Both disavow the belief that the reason and mind overindulged by modernity could not solve the deepening ecological crisis. In this sense, Oppermann discusses that postmodern theory must be linked to radical ecology in terms of their reconstructive structures.

She focuses on the similar aspects of radical ecological philosophy and postmodernism, particularly on their critical approach to the materialistic conception of the world (2003: 20).

Enabling a versatile view on the conditions brought by the postmodern period, the discourse of contemporary British fiction can have a crucial role in reflecting the ecological awareness using deconstruction, paranoia and its concern with late capitalism. The coalescence of these theories can be of vital importance to halt the crisis risking sustainable ecology. “Because the postmodern devices of discontinuity, decentering, disruption, paradox, ambiguity, indeterminacy, ironic distance, language games, self-reflexivity, intertextuality, and contingency are used predominantly in the postmodern fictions to contest closure, order and unity, and universalizing drives”, for Oppermann, “their double coding opens a new conceptual path of inquiry for ecological discussions” (2008: 248-49). Thus, the logocentric discourse of modernity that adopts a totalizing anthropocentric view of universe can be claimed to precipitate a reaction as a radical environmental paradigm which can be embraced by postmodern literary discourse.

Though postmodernism notoriously offers some multilateral parameters which make itself challenging to define, it is accepted as a strong critical current questioning and confronting the assumptions of modernity, logocentric idea, scientific and technological development, the concept of nation-state including man-made human hierarchy, dualist forms of thinking and all dominant economic and political ideologies as well. Nature does not lie at the heart of the philosophy of postmodernists but they have developed critical discourses against those who make up Western mind from Plato through Descartes and then to Hegel. Considering the philosophy of radical ecology the emergence of which coincides with the arrival of postmodern thought, it is seen that the theory offers parallelism with postmodernism in the ecological discussions. In this sense, such theoreticians as Max Oelschlaeger, Arran Gare, Zimmerman and Oppermann open up the possibility of postmodern approaches to ecophilosophy.

Oelschlaeger, in his introduction to *Postmodern Environmental Ethics*, develops “an account of postmodern environmental ethics as effective discourse” and claims that while this ethics “has run its course, we will find ourselves living in a

new age” (1995: 2). Believing that postmodern environmental ethics exists in language, Oelschlaeger offers deconstructive and reconstructive postmodernism to create a postmodern environmental ethics. The current process, by the way, has been in place since the emergence of ecophilosophical ethics. As George Sessions argues, “[p]ostmodern deconstructionists have deconstructed certain ethnocentric aspects of Eurocentrism (although ecophilosophers and environmental historians have also been deconstructing Eurocentrism beginning at least with Thoreau)” (1995a: 150-54). This suggestion seems to provide a strong ground for the postmodern ecological literary criticism since “[d]econstructive analysis, literally, the close reading of a text that exposes its underlying ideology and assumptions (subtexts), has been brought to bear on the reality of history, truth, God, democracy, the soul, objectivity, science and technology” (Oelschlaeger, 1995: 7). Reconstructive postmodernists, on the other hand, make it by benefiting from “discourse analysis to expose ideological constructs that marginalize some groups and place others at the center [...]” (Oelschlaeger, 1995: 7).

Zimmerman, in his *Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity*, recognizes the links between radical ecological theory and postmodernism through bringing both together on an anti-modernist ground. Reacting the exploitative and oppressive tendencies of modernity, radical ecologists, as Zimmermann discusses, “envision the emergence of nonauthoritarian, nonoppressive, nonhierarchical, ‘postmodern’ societies in which free, playful, decentred, heterogeneous people live in small, bioregionally oriented, technically efficient, democratic, ecologically sound communities” (1994: 6).

Accordingly, Oppermann, in her “Toward an Ecocentric Postmodern Theory: Fusing Deep Ecology and Quantum Mechanics”, suggests a new postmodern approach, or more precisely, a new ecological postmodern theory linking postmodern critical theory to the narratives of radical ecology through developing a reconstructive theory. For Oppermann, the discourses of an ecological understanding and the postmodern reaction to the metanarratives must be combined to constitute a “reconstructive postmodern theory of radical ecology [...]” (2003: 20). In this sense, the components of the common ground that emerge out of the intersection of postmodern theory and radical ecology must be underlined in a reconstructive



manner. Thus, she argues that this new theory “integrates concepts like plurality, diversity, contextuality, relationality, difference, and especially process”, which turns postmodernism into a philosophy regarding the biosphere “as a creative process” (2003: 22).

Gare, in *Postmodernism and Environmental Crisis*, supports that “[p]ostmodernism is ecocentric” due to its opposition to the extant system and its association with the admiration for Eastern communities, cultures and religions, minorities, nonhuman living beings and any spiritual beliefs in nature (1996: 87). In the light of the discussions regarding whether postmodernism can be ecology-oriented, Oppermann refutes the notion that philosophical doctrines of radical ecology movements may be a threat to form another grand narrative or lead centralization. For her, ecological postmodern narratives contribute to ecological consciousness with its multidimensional structure rejecting any totalization (2003: 24). Sessions is also critical of the idea that ecocentricism is a power-motivated position. He asserts that he does not understand how one can consider this ecocentric norm as related to human power perspective (1995a: 150-54) despite deep ecologists’ insistent emphasis on richness and diversity.

Terry Eagleton attests that the judgements developed for the meaning of a literary work “have a close relation to social ideologies. They refer in the end not simply to private taste, but to the assumptions by which certain social groups exercise and maintain power over others” (1983: 16). Considering that the society is inseparable from the physical world with its interdependent social beings enviroing this social structure, postmodern literature can reflect the spatial order and/or disorder through the conception of language that provides an extension of the insight into self, world, community, landscape, the well-being of human and nonhuman. At this point, Oppermann focuses on the socio-ideological basis of nature’s discursive formations conducted in postmodern literature. According to her, postmodern fictions based on ecological issues provide discussions about how the nature of reality is constructed, how the discourse alters and manages the perception of reality (2008: 248). From this standpoint, she concludes that these ecological postmodern fictions are permeated with ecological discourses and “thus play a significant role in

exposing the dangerous effects of anthropocentric discourses on human consciousness and socioeconomic practices” (2008: 248).

Bearing in mind the considerations described above, three prominent postmodern novels employing radical ecological viewpoint will be analysed in this study. Among the authors who adopt the tone of this new environmental paradigm are Julian Barnes, David Mitchell and John Fowles. In *A History of the World in 10<sup>1/2</sup> Chapters*, Barnes offers ecologic discourses through assuming the role of an anti-historical author who revisits the history of humanity. While recounting an iconoclastic narrative from Noah’s Ark to a postmodern heaven, the author deconstructs the anthropocentric vision sometimes by narrating the story through the lens of a woodworm and sometimes by assigning these animals an attorney to defend them in a trial. Another British novelist David Mitchell displays to what extent the outcomes of human-induced environmental devastation can reach in his remarkable novel *Cloud Atlas* published in 2004. Consisting of six different, yet interrelated stories in different time and places, *Cloud Atlas* handles an intertwined ecological problem from 1850s to a distant post-apocalyptic future. The novel describes a vicious cycle of humanity where he returns to the point where he begins, to a dead end due to the overpopulation, overconsumption, uncontrollable technology and socio-ecological disorder. Nearly all novels of John Fowles, on the other hand, are dominated by an ontological crisis intertwined with ecological discussions. In his autobiographical book, Fowles himself explains the key element dominating the spirit of his fiction: “Again and again in recent years I have told visiting literary academics that the key to my fiction, for what it is worth, lies in my relationship with nature—I might almost have said, for reasons I will explain, in trees” (2010: 31-32). This study includes the first novel of Fowles who is known as a postmodern nature writer: *The Collector*. In the novel, the author depicts the story of an entomologist Frederick Clegg who collects butterflies. The fate of the butterflies captured by the sociopathic protagonist is identified with the female character Miranda Grey who is abducted and imprisoned in a cellar by Clegg.

In the light of these introductory notes, the dissertation handles the postmodernisation of radical ecology in these contemporary British fictions within four chapters. The first chapter entitled “The Idea of Green: From Homocentrism to

Ecological Enlightenment” outlines how the assumptions of modernity are established as a totalizing system according to which the role of the environment has been discussed throughout the centuries. It also includes an ecological analysis of the philosophical tradition of Enlightenment thinkers whose thoughts trigger the crisis of sustainable ecology. The second part of the chapter deals with the theoretical framework of radical ecology movement including deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism which emerge as a reaction to the detrimental influence of modern discourse about the biosphere. Following chapters will search for the traces of radical ecological discourses in the novels of British writers Julian Barnes, David Mitchell and John Fowles. In the second chapter entitled “Iconoclastic Identity of Julian Barnes: Deconstructing Anthropocentric Ideology in *A History of the World in 10 ½ Chapters*”, it will be examined how Barnes deconstructs anthropocentrism by revisiting the concept of metanarrative through his nonhuman narrator and how each story in the novel voices the different ecological issues in accordance with the principles of deep ecology movement. The third chapter, “Toward a Synthetic and Corpocratic Society: Distorted Third Nature in David Mitchell’s *Cloud Atlas*”, provides discussions on the social roots of the impending ecological disaster through the lens of social ecology movement and demonstrates how the modern sense of progress causes the decadence of civilization when the harmony between society and nature disappears. Finally, “John Fowles as a Feminist Nature Writer: Fowlesian Portrait of Androcentric Exploitation of Woman and Nature in the *Collector*” is the fourth chapter of the study which brings an ecofeminist approach to Fowles’s first novel. In consideration of the author’s views on ecology and feminism in his articles, this chapter discusses how woman and nature are subject to patriarchal ideology in terms of domination and exploitation.

On the whole, the dissertation embodies a purpose that deciphers the radical ecological discourses in the three postmodern fictions and discusses the role of ecological postmodern thought in contemporary literature. The study also functions to reveal that both postmodern thought and radical ecology mainly establish their principles on the anti-modernist discourses. The view of the universe that is egalitarian and pluralistic as well as the critique of materialistic worldview enables these movements to share parallel discourses. Furthermore, postmodern fiction and

radical ecology disavows the authoritative discourses by deconstructing the established truth. Thus, this dissertation will attempt to indicate that postmodern fiction and radical ecology can find many common grounds on which they can create self-awareness against the process of otherizing nature.



## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **1. THE IDEA OF GREEN: FROM HOMOCENTRISM TO ECOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT**

#### **1.1. Modernity and the Death of Nature: Reason, Science and Religion as a Totalizing Explanatory System**

Contemporary environmental scholars argue that the first serious historical development influencing the fate of natural world is irreversibly characterized by the unlimited confidence in man himself. This anthropocentric perspective prompted by humanism leads the philosophers of the Medieval Age to define every object and also every abstract idea through the lens of men. While nature is rediscovered by the medieval scholars regarding man as the central fact of the universe, civilization, on the other hand, is to be re-established in a way that consolidates man's position. It is believed that the potential laid buried in human mind can emerge to carry out radical changes in the mechanism of the universe. In his remarkable study including five hundred years of Western culture, Jacques Barzun states that the first is "the conviction at the heart of Humanism- 'more human,' therefore better than the medieval outlook, behaviour, and language" triggering the confidence in the enlightened man himself and the other one is "the awareness of techniques obviously 'advanced'- perspective in painting, polyphony in music, improvements in the practical arts and the sciences" (2000: 74). Both indicate the capacity of human mind to discover the potential in the universe.

If people are to understand how the idea of ecological sense has been radicalized, they must turn their face to the great humanist tradition paving the way for modernity and the age in which this tradition echoes, because the belief in the capacity of human power and the desire for 'more human', a fundamental reason for the extant environmental crisis, is definitely rooted in the Age of Reason or the Enlightenment.

As the terms like reason, critical thinking and progress identified with this period reflect only one aspect of the Age of Reason, socio-economic dimensions of

the age should be included in its large-scale definition as well. Lester G. Crocker, in his introductory notes to *The Age of Enlightenment*, makes an in-depth explanation on the nature of the period claiming that Enlightenment is the intersection of the past and future and an ideal model armed with the weapon called critical reason which helps diagnose the problems of the society and offer remedies (1969: 1). As can be seen, many illustrations seem to describe the spirit of the Enlightenment by showing its positive influences on culture and society. This age, as Crocker observes, is often “characterized by optimism, liberalism, the teaching of morals, and other appealing tendencies” (1969: 1). However, the idea of Enlightenment, for Crocker, “did not exist in any such pure form as we should like to give it; that it was imbedded in [...] all sides, creating a complex of dynamic, dialectical tensions” (1969: 2).

The tension between human and nature therefore lies at the heart of this humanist optimism. The philosophical logic contrary to mystical and symbolic illusion initiates a great universal order in which nature has thus become a subsidiary object, or more precisely, an inferior existence. In other words, the unity between soul, body and nature crack deeply. For instance, being a precursor of Renaissance humanism, Petrarch gives the first signs of this breakup. One day, he enjoys admiring some mountain scenery. On the top of the mountain, he opens St Augustine’s *Confessions* to consult and ensure what he feels is valid; yet he is abashed: “I closed the book, angry with myself that I should still be admiring earthly things, when I might long ago have learned from even pagan philosophers that nothing is wonderful but the soul” (2011: 33). In opposition to respecting and admiring the idea that nonhuman nature is holy and lofty, the sublime, consequently, seems to transform into a human quality adopted by the Augustinian doctrine which propagates Neo-Platonic ideas to the middle ages. As a consequence of a new perspective overriding the metaphysical pattern of nature, the cosmos, therefore, becomes humanized and an experimental object. In this sense, man distinguishes himself from all other nonhuman living beings as a creature endowed with the faculty of reason through which he can practice free will. The idea of human supremacy based on his freedom of choice is now the essential issue for medieval scholars. Defining human as the most wonderful and fortunate being, Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola postulates the thought that God puts human beings in the midst of

the earth and regards them as superior creatures with no boundaries. He believes that the creator grants human beings free will so that they can become the moulder of themselves. Alternating between 'soil', which represents his earthly place among all living beings, and 'soul', which exalts him to a heavenly being, mankind, by virtue of his reasoning, man is given the right to be integrated into whatever form he would like to prefer (1998: 4-5). The medieval humanism invites man to face the fact that he is located into the middle of the earth where he is capable of shaping his self owing to the free will he is granted. Harris observes that it is man's own choice and "the instrument lay in the use, or misuse, of his reason" because human being "endowed with freedom of choice, becomes the 'moulder of himself', capable of degenerating to the level of beasts, or, by the use of his reason, becoming a heavenly being" (1968: 23). In accordance with his emphasis on human privilege, Mirandola also draws the medieval picture of universal chain of being. The creator, for him, likens to a "Supreme Architect" who creates "this earthly home" and places "a multitude of creatures of every kind" and then when every detail is ready to serve the benefit of human being, he decides on "the creation of Man" who is a "great miracle" and "a wonderful being" (1942: 347-48). All living and nonhuman living beings are now made based on a divine hierarchy and everything is arranged according to the highest, middle and the lowest orders (1942: 348). On one hand, the links among the phases in the hierarchy are supposed as strictly related to each other reflecting the medieval cosmology, this fundamental thought concerning the position of human being in the universe, on the other hand, is responsible for transmitting human supremacy to characterize the ensuing centuries.

Sir Isaac Newton, with a radical ecological understanding, may be assertive when he praises the great thinkers of the previous age: "If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants" (qtd. in Merton, 1993: 1). Among the giants he stands on their shoulders are Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler whose discoveries make human beings believe the idea that the physical world is an organized mechanism governed by laws which can be grasped through human reasoning. As Harris claims, "[t]hese laws were to be discovered, not by a priori reasoning, not by some reference to an authority, such as the ancient philosophers, or the Scriptures, but by empirical means" (1968: 10). The discovery of nature- to be

more precise, the process of dominating over nature- could be carried out via new experimental knowledge that requires man to discard the religious doctrines. Theological assumptions ascribed to a great authority are replaced with inductive reasoning provided by scientific observation and calculation. However, the only change in the approach to physical world is the method determining how the objectified nature would be handled in Western culture. That is to say, the radical shift from theological perspective to the new modes of thought does not bring any advantage for nature. People strictly abiding by Christian doctrines and religious scriptures consider that they are punished and then sent into the earth. Supposing that they are created as superior to other living beings, men give precedence to the other world which they think they once belonged. Indicating the worsening relationship between man and nature as a consequence of this religious background, historian Lynn White Jr. accuses Christianity of separating man from nature and of justifying man's exploitation of nature in terms of religious ends (1967: 1205). In an ecological sense, Christianity is credited for its anthropocentric approach and the ecological crisis, for Lynn White Jr., is based on "the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man" (1967: 1207). Despite the disavowal of traditional Christian doctrines and the recognition of intellectual and empirical approach to the operation of the physical world, which is initiated following the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler, the exploitation of nature is advanced more than ever before.

Though Bacon is labelled as half medieval and half modern due to the fact that he cannot totally refuse medieval conceptions, it can be claimed that his thoughts and works mark the beginning of a new era. He popularizes the notion that one can arrive at the generalizations beginning from the observations of minor events, which can be called as inductive logic. With this experimental and empirical method, he challenges the traditional Aristotelian deductive method. Yet, he could not go beyond his contemporary philosophers like Descartes in terms of ontological argument and abstract reasoning. Thus, Stuart Hampshire claims that "he had the temperament of a naturalist rather than a philosopher" on account of the fact that "his eye was always caught by the colour and variety of concrete things in nature before he had followed an argument far enough among generalities" (1956: 20). Like other enlightenment



thinkers who attempt to comprehend the purpose of nature, Bacon also endorses the belief that nature, concerning biblical references, exists for the benefit of humankind. The physical world, for him, is an object to be studied and man can only achieve superiority by unveiling the secret laws of nature. Unless the hidden rules and functions of natural environment are ascertainable to human mind, human beings cannot make progress and then establish a flawless civilization. In his *The Wisdom of Ancients* commenting on mythological figures, Bacon discusses the state of man. His argument seems to be rooted in humanist philosophy and then paves the way for the primary principles of modern science. Namely, for Bacon, it can be concluded that man is the center of the universe because the world is 'nowhere' with no goal if man does not exist. Thus, for him, the world is an aimless instrument shaped for the service of man. The stars exist for the comprehension of seasons, the middle sky is for weather forecast and the winds serve for sailing man's ships. Moreover, all nonhuman forms of life are not only the embellishments of the world but also means of comfort satisfying human needs. (1986: 270). The reason why environmental historians and critics treat Bacon as a scapegoat by accusing him of provoking a close relationship with nature manifests itself in his philosophy of nature which triggers a close relationship with nature, not for the purpose of reconciliation between society and nature but for an attempt to underpin a legacy for the human conquest of nature. This ideal prompted by Bacon becomes a new understanding of universe in which the role of a mechanism is assigned to nature possessing an unconscious order. The knowledge, thus, grows into the prerequisite for the science to decode the unconscious mechanism. Bacon certainly supports the view that "[h]uman knowledge and human power meet in one" that "the true and lawful goal of the sciences" is to enrich humanity "with new discoveries and powers" in an attempt "to establish and extend the power of the human race ... over the universe" (qtd. in Gruner, 1977: 54). Though his theory of dominion is clear, the majority of scientists claim that Bacon cannot be accused of imposing the idea that nature should be dominated, controlled and tortured because his fundamental purpose is to merge human reason, mechanistic science and the potential of nature for an ideal universe. However, ecofeminist philosopher and historian Merchant not only provides a feminist view to Bacon's philosophy, but also reinforces the idea that his method of

inquisition is responsible for the dominion over the earth. In *The Death of Nature*, Merchant argues that “[m]uch of the imagery he used in delineating his new scientific objectives and methods [...] treats nature as a female to be tortured through mechanical interventions” (1980: 168). Furthermore, Merchant revisits the view of universe held by Bacon through going beyond the textual analysis responding to those who defend the Baconian model of universe as a pure and innocent kind of scientific advancement strategy: “Bacon’s goal was to use constraint and force to extract truths from nature. His choice of words was part of a larger project to create a new method that would allow humanity to control and dominate the natural world” (2006: 518). In an ecological sense, the philosophical principles of Bacon, therefore, are based on paradoxical formulations known as sophisticated understanding of modern scientific method, which paves the way for man’s detachment from nature.

The Enlightenment can be claimed to find its intellectual roots in the Cartesian philosophy. While it is Bacon who evokes the idea that the confidentiality of nature is ascertainable to human mind which is able to consolidate human sovereignty over physical nature, it is Descartes who invites human beings to consider that they are the true owners of nature as long as they grasp the fact that the language of nature is mathematics. Environmental critics like J. Isaac Kureethadam mostly share the common belief that the anthropocentric division between humanity and the rest of the world, or, in other words, between human beings and non-human living beings is originated by Cartesian duality which separates human mind from human body and the world. It follows that the philosophical tradition of Descartes considers nature as inert and ‘res extensa’, which is the rest of the physical world that cannot have the ability to conceive, and human beings as ‘res cogitans’ which Descartes calls the thinking man. Kureethadam claims that the exploitation of natural world since modernity has been largely due to the Cartesian metaphysical dualism because the concept of nature shaped through this separation justifies and sanctions the domination of man over nature. (2017: 248). Descartes reinforces the dichotomy between ‘res extensa’ and ‘res cogitans’ with his well-known quote ‘cogito ergo sum’ which explicitly gives the impression that any living being who does not have the ability of what humans call ‘thinking’ is inferior to those who have. Admittedly, “[a]n environmental ethic”, according to Serenella Iovino, “displaces its focus from

the ‘monological’ centralism of the Cartesian self (the one who says ‘I think, therefore I am’) to everything that in nature undeniably *is*”, namely, “to everything that may not have language, or reason (at least in a human sense), but nonetheless has an autonomy of life” (2010: 35). Contrary to the environmental ethic denying the alienation of nonhuman nature as a mechanized object, Cartesian philosophy is quite influential on modern men’s attitudes toward nature with its thoughts on animals. Descartes considers nonhuman beings, particularly animals, as unconscious creatures which are deprived of rationality. According to Anna L. Peterson, this belief is based on the use of language by human beings, that is to say, the animals lack sentiment and consciousness since they do not speak any language (2001: 39). Cartesian view of being, therefore, not only focuses on the ontological assumptions and “anthropocentric definition of such terms as *rationality*, *consciousness* and *morality*” but also “many other assertions of human uniqueness, such as the ideas that only humans are self-conscious, only humans ask existential questions and only humans are moral” (2001: 39).

On the other hand, Thomas Hobbes, who is another representative of modern humanistic philosophy, in his major work entitled as *Leviathan*, draws the picture of a civil society in which individuals are governed by a social contract in order to maintain a sustainable and peaceful life for human beings. However, it seems that there is no room for nature in his portrayal of the state in social and political order contrary to Bookchin’s conception of ecosocial order. For Hobbes, only science, or as he calls the knowledge of consequences, can be applied to learn the truth and to gain reliable knowledge about the future. Contrary to other humanistic views, Hobbes believes that human beings naturally have tendency to compete with and kill each other. In *Leviathan*, he identifies what we call natural with questionable terms like wild, violent, immature and brutal. Thus, the natural condition of mankind requires for an authority for him to overcome his most natural instincts. Namely, he offers a vision of a modern developed civilization in the form of a government based on the notion of a mechanistic and experimental science; on the contrary, humans cannot recover from Hobbes’s state of nature, the primitive characteristics of human being. “The philosophical foundation of the modern state committed to science”, Joni Adamson claims, ”was complete only with the work of

Thomas Hobbes who posited that nature was a state of anarchy, a chaos of meanings, emotions, and hallucinations, and that in a state of nature man is an enemy to every other man” (2001: 171). His equalization of being in the form of ‘nature’ with the image of primitive and savage culture should not be surprising for an age which assumes the role of a cornerstone leading up to the degradation of the image of nature. On the other hand, the controversial point between Hobbesian view of equality of beings and radical ecology lies behind in his notable beginning statement in chapter XIII of *Leviathan*: “Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind [...]” (Hobbes, 1839: 110). Ignoring the situation of ‘res extensa’ in his ‘State’ or ‘Leviathan’, Hobbes distinguishes human beings from animals emphasizing the significance of reason and science. He manifests that “a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it” (1839: 33). Needless to say, it can be claimed that “in the Hobbesian account, man is both the matter and the maker of the Leviathan state” (Coleman, 1996: 32).

The anthropocentric tradition of establishing mastery also emerges in the philosophy of Locke. Contrary to the principles of Hobbes’s state of nature concerning struggle, Locke’s state of nature is based on the independence governed by natural laws, or the law of mind, which defends the view that all men are equal and independent on earth and should respect the rights and possessions of each other. Locke states that “[t]he commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests” (1977: 245). By civil interests, he means “life, liberty, health and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the like” (1977: 245). This statement implicitly emphasizes the dichotomy between society and nature. For Locke, on the other hand, the civil authority promises to secure men’s possessions and even dominance over the subjects thought to be given for the service of mankind. Harris certifies this view by stating that John Lock “found man a reasonable being, private property an essential attribute, and freedom a necessary mark of civilised man” (1968: 57). Though freedom is of significance and an untouchable right for Locke, a man’s freedom does not give him the right to interfere with the scope of another man. Yet, the critical question is that what if

man's freedom coincides with a nonhuman living being's freedom? The answer lies behind the fact that the possession of private property is required for the material progress in Locke's theory. According to him, God not only gives the world to humans but also gives them the reason for benefiting the richness of the world at the highest level. Likewise, the earth is created for the comfort of human. Humankind owns all natural objects including fruits, vegetables and beasts which clearly serve for the purpose of him. Human beings can expand his property in parallel with his effort to plant, cultivate and improve the land created for the use of mankind (1977: 289-91). Locke, here, points out the significance of man's labour which provides him the right to own nature as a property. To Locke, as long as man labours on nonhuman living beings including animals and plants or combines "his labour with" the soil given to him and contributes "to it something that is his own" (1977: 289), it belongs to man.

Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, focuses on Baruch Spinoza's relatively moderate philosophical aspects when he calls him as "the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers" (1945: 569) because, as Don Garret claims, "no important philosopher of the seventeenth century strikes a deeper chord with a broader range of contemporary readers than Spinoza" (2018: 2). In a similar vein, environmental critics including contemporary radical ecologists find Spinoza, compared to the other thinkers of last 500 years, more creditable in terms of his insightful naturalist arguments. It is essential to the understanding of Spinoza's thesis to recognize that he develops a strong belief in a non-anthropomorphic God, which is identical with all forms of reality, later called pantheism, and suggests a monist God-nature thought. With his ontological philosophy based on pantheistic metaphysics, Spinoza can be distinguished from the tradition of Cartesian and Baconian anthropocentric view of universe in terms of identifying God with nature. In his book entitled *Spinoza*, Hampshire comments on this identification: "To Spinoza, it seemed that men can attain happiness and dignity only by identifying themselves, through their knowledge and understanding, with the whole order of nature, and by submerging their individual interests in this understanding" (1951: 161). Such radical thoughts of Spinoza find their spokesperson not only in Goethe but also in Wordsworth and Coleridge, in other words, Romantic Movement can be claimed to find its roots in

Spinoza's doxastic formulations. Nevertheless, for the deep ecologist Sessions, the system of Spinoza cannot be qualified as demonstrably ecological. According to Sessions, Spinoza still postulates the seventeenth-century utilitarian view of wild nature (1995b: 162). The underlying reason why Spinoza cannot be the role model of ecocentric thinking is his conflictual discussions on the source and nature of morality in his *Ethics*. He believes that the law against killing nonhuman living beings is not reasonable but a superstition. Animals have less right against men while men have more right to claim. For him, it does not mean that animals are senseless beings but human beings are clearly more advantageous in many ways, which allows them to use lower animals for their comfort. They are not compatible with men in nature but different from men in terms of their affects (Spinoza, 1996: 135). With respect to animals defined as lower beings who should have far less rights, Spinoza, despite his pantheistic philosophy which differentiates him from those who manifest that man has right to own nature as property, seems not to escape the hands of anthropocentric view of universe of modernity.

Fritzo Capra states that, in the course of time, the dominant view of organic world "characterized by the interdependence of spiritual and material phenomena and the subordination of individual needs to those of the community" transforms into the view of "world as a machine, and the world-machine became the dominant metaphor of the modern era" (1982: 53-53). The mechanistic worldview both maintains to deepen the environmental crisis and leads to a misconception of the universe with Newtonian physics in the eighteenth century. As Ashton Nichols observes, Stephan Hawking considers that explaining the concept of time, existence of universe and human experience with regard to Newtonian causality, or to beginnings and ends, has been a fatal human error since the Age of Enlightenment. Likewise, Einstein regards Newtonian dichotomy between matter and energy, or body and soul, as another error and an oversimplifying theory (Nichols, 2011: 197-98). The strongest and most vocal voices of Romanticism deprecate Newtonian dichotomies due to the fact that the divine and nature are misconceived as two separate things. Particularly, William Blake reflects his objection to the mechanistic formulation imposed by Enlightenment when he depicts Newton in one of his paintings as a man who sits naked on a rock drawing diagrams and calculating some

measurements.<sup>1</sup> Blake here implies that Newtonian calculation and reduction of the enchantments of the world to mathematical forms pave the way for the scientific materialism and utilitarian worldview alienating man from nature. Praying as “[m]ay God us keep from single vision, and Newton’s sleep” (1998: 141), Blake also accuses Newtonian calculation of the universe of projecting “Satan’s Mathematic Holiness” (1982a: 132). Nearly a century before radical environmental thoughts on the mechanization of cosmos, Blake, in “Jerusalem” objects to the utilitarian principles of empirical science and the power of reason: “A murderer of its own Body: but also a murderer/ Of every Divine Member: it is the Reasoning Power/ An abstract objecting power, that Negatives every thing” (1982b: 153). Along with these lines, Blake, for David Fideler, disengages “purity of the scientific intellect, which robs life from everything it touches” (2014: 159). Furthermore, Blake also invites the theorists of scientific empirical method to face the fact that distancing matter from energy creates an ‘abstract objecting power’ which negates reality itself.

As the Cartesian-based discussion keeps maintaining among philosophers throughout the ages, the externalization of nonhuman realm maintains to stimulate the ecological crisis. Among those who discuss the Cartesian duality of mind and matter, Bishop Berkeley, also known as George Berkeley, announces a distinct ontological model. Harris can be claimed to interpret this model as ‘to be is to perceive’, which is how we know that the mind exists, or to be is to be perceived, which is how we know our universe to exist (1968: 172-73). Sessions, on the other hand, calls this as an “anthropocentric epistemological and ontological subjectivism” the development of which “is thus led to deny the existence of non-observable extended substance” (1974: 76). Berkeley’s philosophical tradition is indeed grounded on theological ends. He disavows the Lockean abstraction of ideas on which Western philosophy is grounded, that is, the ideas are imprinted by means of God, or as he calls God of nature, in the light of laws of nature. The laws of nature, for him, function in a way that God already planned before. Therefore, according to Harris, Berkeley demands men to “replace the idea of a universe consisting of essentially unknowable, inert, senseless matter, with the idea of a universe immanent with the spirit of God” (1968: 173). To put it simply, people know that the solar

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<sup>1</sup> For the monotype created between 1795 and 1805, see “Newton” by William Blake.

system is constantly moving and the Earth orbits and rotates around the Sun. The spinning of the Earth around its axis causes day and night. While Newton puts it by mathematical principles claiming that this rotation is related to why objects fall to Earth, Berkeley attributes it to the eternal and flawless plan of the God which is the true cause of any phenomenon. In either case, the explanation seems to lack commonly cited principle of the environmental sense that all natural phenomena and even non-human world must be regarded as a part of a self-conscious entity having its own intrinsic value and being independent from anthropocentric epistemological and ontological subjectivism. Meditating between religious concerns and scientific subjectivism, the seventeenth and eighteenth century ways of thought appear to ignore a wider cosmic and ecological perspective. In this sense, It can be claimed that Berkeley is “responsible for reinstituting an instrumentalist interpretation of science”, which is “reminiscent of the 14<sup>th</sup> century Christian positivists” (1974: 78) despite the fact that it is disputable whether he, as convinced adherent of Christianity, makes an effort to reconcile Christianity with the new science.

Although Hume is considered as the successor and pioneer of empiricist tradition after Locke and Berkeley, the most significant characteristic which makes him different from these philosophers and other Enlightenment thinkers is his decentering human reason and distinguishing it from morality. At first glance, one can think of him as a philosopher who possesses environmental concerns due to his disavowal of reason-centred thought dominating last two hundred years. Particularly, the liberalist attempts tend to explain Hume’s philosophy through some principles of Deep Ecology by misidentifying Humean concept of ‘sympathy’ with Naess’s ‘identification’<sup>2</sup>. However, the ecocentric ethics manifested by Naess bear no resemblance to Hume’s utilitarian philosophy. It is clear that what Hume calls sympathy does not extend beyond the limits of human species. In his book *Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*, David Livingstone Smith explains the concept of sympathy as referring to “an inborn tendency to resonate with others’ feelings- to suffer from their sorrows and to be uplifted by their joys” (2011: 50). Justice is then based on this kind of feeling forming the ground of

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<sup>2</sup> For a multidimensional discussion on ‘identification’, ‘sympathy’ and ‘self’, see Gus diZerega, “Empathy, Society, Nature, and the Relational Self: Deep Ecology and Liberal Modernity”, in *Social Theory and Practice*, vol. 21, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp.239-69.



society. “Because nonhuman animals cannot participate in human society”, as Smith clarifies Humean discourse on animals, “the notion of justice is inapplicable to them” (2010: 53). Hume further claims that there exists “a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never [...] make us feel the effect of their resentment” (1826: 261). Considering the situation of animals, Smith finds Hume’s response to the question that how human beings should react to these animals disturbing because Hume believes that the relationship between animals and humans cannot be a social interaction. If so, it would require a sense of equality, however, man is the commander and the animal is the subservient to the needs of him. They can hold possessions only through man’s permission and affect human will as long as human reveals his compassion and kindness (qtd in Smith, 2010: 52). Thus, human beings have no duties of justice against these beings. It can be seen that nonhuman animals are not a necessary part of Humean society contrary to the moderate thoughts encapsulating Hume’s philosophy within the framework of environmental ethics. Though he claims that the reasoning capacity of men is similar to that of animals, this may not be considered as approval or admiration for nonhuman animals as Hume reduces the capacity of reason to a function which is of less significance compared to passions. On one hand Hume calls for sympathy, on the other hand he considers that “attributing mental states to [nonhuman] others is the work of the imagination” (Smith, 2010: 53). Namely, identification of human traits with non-human entities, or what we call anthropomorphism, is an imaginative error in Hume’s philosophy. From this point of view, as Helena Feder observes, “[w]e avoid imagining, avoid knowing, that other animals have fellow feeling to avoid extending ours to them. We do not allow them to participate in human society as *persons*” despite the fact that “they participate in all sorts of other ways- as meat, as slave labour, as discourse and ideology” (2016: 137). In Hume’s view, anything can be virtuous as long as it is useful for human society. Evaluating the outcome of an action according to its utility for human society may hinder human from paying attention to ‘others’.

The thoughts of Adam Smith, often associated with Hume in terms of their focus on sentiment, provide some neo-liberal scholars with a far-fetched engagement

of eighteenth century with modern environmentalist movements. However, Smith, who is considered as the father of modern economics, does not possess any counter-discourse concerning environmental issues. No matter how seriously Smith is accepted as a precursor of environmental economics, there seems no clear evidence proving that he has ecological concerns as much as a shallow ecologist does. Suffice it to say, it is certainly open to discussion to what extent it would be possible in the transforming socio-economic structure of eighteenth century. Failing to estimate the destructive consequences of the industrialization, overpopulation and urbanization, and also, overlooking the fact that environmental problems can turn into a serious impediment to social progress seem to affect the way how the philosophers including Smith see socio-economic issues. He accepts that the key pathways to wealth are rooted in labor and natural sources. Thus, he is somewhat identified with ecological thought. Yet, be that as it may, he endorses the economic view that natural resources are unlimited and boundless, which is a baseless assumption severely protested by radical ecologists. At this point, Smith's environmental economics should not be mixed with an environmentalist or ecocentric economics. Environmental economics as a sub-discipline of traditional economics, as Joshua Farley and Robert Costanza state, "prioritizes economic efficiency, and tries to force ecosystem services into the market model" (2010: 2060). To put it simply, it mainly deals with the conditions of profit and concentrates on the market itself only by taking environmental convenience into account. Its scale is so extensive that it ignores the account that the planet is finite. Ecocentric or environmentalist economics, on the other hand, focuses on reconciling ecology and economy, designing a sustainable ecology besides discussing the ways how individuals support themselves in an ecological life-support system and escaping the exploitation of the natural sources. The key argument here is whether economics adopts an anthropocentric perspective including environmental economics or an ecocentric perspective. "With respect to any given environmental policy question", argues J. Samuel Barkin, "the anthropocentric perspective asks how the policy will affect the well-being of people in the future, and the ecocentric perspective asks how the policy will affect the natural environment in the future" (2006: 56). In his book entitled *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, Naess also discusses similar anthropocentric perspective: "What is

especially annoying to many environmentalists is this: in the papers and books of economists *nature* is practically never mentioned, and, if it is, it is only in very shallow argumentation as resources or as obstacles” (1990: 105). Thus, in an ecological point of view, Smith’s economic theory can be claimed as annoying because it takes nature as a resource and central for capital, which is closer to anthropocentric environmental economics than an ecologically-oriented economic model.

The advocacy of reason, science and humanism dominating the Age of Reason, on the other hand, could not correspond to the philosophy of some poets as Jonathan Swift and also some social thinkers as Rousseau and Diderot in the eighteenth century. To categorize Swift’s position on human considering *Gulliver’s Travels*, it can be claimed that his thoughts are closer to misanthropy rather than philanthropy. In his essay entitled “Politics vs. Literature: An Examination of *Gulliver’s Travels*”, George Orwell considers Swift as “a diseased writer” who refuses “to see anything in human life except dirt, folly and wickedness” due to his “general hatred of humanity” (1968: 205-23). Harris, on the other hand, focuses on Swift’s lack of confidence in the capacity of human and considers Swift’s favourite philosopher as Socrates who declares that “it was the beginning of Wisdom to recognize that a man knew nothing” (1968: 149). Giving the impression that human race is closer to Yahoos, bestial beings in human shape, rather than Houyhnhnms, a race of intelligent horses, Swift, in *Gulliver’s Travels*, demonstrates that human being is not as great as exaggerated by the enlightened mind. Thus, man cannot be “distinguished from brute creation by the possession of a soul, the exercise of free will, and the faculty of reason by which free will could be exercised” (1968: 23). In his introductory notes to *Gulliver’s Travels*, Claude Rawson alleges that “Swift’s tactic” is to tell his reader “if you think man is a rational animal, let me show you what a really rational animal is like” (2005: xxxiv). The belief that human knowledge and intelligence are capable of unveiling the secrecy of nature is resisted and deconstructed by Swift’s vivid imagination and attack on his age’s obsession with scientific endeavour through human reason.

If one foot of Rousseau and Diderot is in 18<sup>th</sup> century, the other stands in the beginning of Romantic Period. Though their attitudes are significant in terms of both

having a precipitating effect on the rise of environmental consciousness and cultivating an appreciation of the nature to a certain extent, these philosophers, who disclaim a total-anthropocentric discourse and the scientific rationalization of nature dominating the Enlightenment, are not so influential on the zeitgeist and the mindset considering the industrial capitalism in the late eighteenth century and the deterioration of the environmental crisis of the period. It is necessary to the understanding of Rousseau's thought to recognize that he associates the source of all kinds of human and earthly phenomenon including moral and ethics with nature. In this sense, it can be claimed that Rousseau, among enlightened thinkers, is a distinctive philosopher who revisits the 'enlightened' mind with his naturalist thesis in which human nature plays a vital role. According to Joseph H. Lane, Jr., the logic of Rousseau's position, when compared to the subsequent philosophers, is that the deformation of human nature endangers nature and the "environmental problems are intimately tied to our denaturalized human character" (2006: 475). In this sense, Rousseau develops the term 'amour-propre', an endless passion which is identical to egocentricism causing "each man in particular" to regard "himself as the sole spectator who observes him, as the sole being in the universe who takes an interest in him, as the sole judge of his own merit" (qtd. in Neulhousser, 2014: 65). Mankind possessing 'amour-propre', for Lane Jr., is "inescapably committed to what Hobbes characterized as the restless pursuit of power after power ceasing only in death" and this restless pursuit "inevitably results in the destruction of the ecosystems in which we are embedded" (2006: 475-76). Furthermore, Rousseau does not totally neglect the power of human faculty but he believes that the faculty of perfectibility differentiating man from the beast is also the motivation for man's miseries and cruelty towards nature. Man's limitless faculty is the primary cause for his misfortune. According to him, it is this faculty that transforms man who is in harmony and peace with nature into a tyrant, with his vices and errors, domineering both himself and nature (qtd. in Linzey and Clarke, 2004: 33). Associating tyranny, vice and misery with human faculty as the central point for scientific and industrial revolutions of the civilized society, Rousseau, with Session's own words, "shocked Europeans by claiming they had lost their spontaneity and freedom, together with the morality and virtues associated with 'natural man' living in primal societies, by

becoming overly civilized and refined” (1995b: 163). Despite including fundamental counter-discourses on the dominant view, this kind of perspective is not sufficient to label Rousseau and Diderot as anti-humanist. Not only Rousseau but also Diderot focuses on human as a part of the primary treatment. In spite of his disavowal of Cartesian dualism and anthropocentrism, according to Bryan Moore, Diderot is “preeminent in making humans the central focus of the world” (2017: 130). Human is of significant importance because Diderot believes that if man doesn't exist, nature turn into a place of “desolation and silence” (1992: 25). On the other hand, Moore, in *Ecological Literature and Critique of Anthropocentrism*, clarifies Diderot's position on nature by associating him with romantic resistance to mechanical view of nature. Nature, for him, is not a machine but an organic whole and this unity of nature is based on biology. This idea of unity lies behind Dr. Bordeu's statements in *d'Alembert's Dream* in which Diderot implies that when someone observes a drop of water in a microscope, he can easily see the history of the world. In this book consisting of philosophical dialogues, Diderot not only disavows the mechanization of the nature, but also emphasizes the similarities between human and animals. Like Rousseau, Diderot is sceptical about the supremacy of human over nonhuman just because he has the ability of reasoning (Moore, 2017: 128-30). In this sense, evaluating human and nonhuman living beings within a set of rules of survival, Diderot, in *Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature*, states that humans like other beings in the nonhuman world are born, grow, live and die “successively acquiring movement feeling, ideas, thought, reflection, consciousness, feelings, emotions, signs, gestures, sounds, articulate sounds, language, laws, arts and sciences” (2003: 117). As can be seen, the objection to the remarkable differences among species is based on a proto-evolutionary scenario which will later find voice in Charles Darwin's theory.

As mentioned before, some thinkers like Rousseau and Diderot, rewording Spinoza's pantheistic metaphysics by refusing Cartesian dualism, mediates between the new humanism of 18<sup>th</sup> century and the visionary optimism of the following century. Thus, they are regarded as the precursors of Romantic Movement which privileges nature before urban while integrating the individual and nature into a unified system. To handle modernity as an all-encompassing process, the centuries-

long effects of its anthropocentric approach surpasses the Romantic Movement which could only last for approximately fifty years. In other words, this revolutionary movement could not succeed to break the ongoing anthropocentric tradition save for creating an ecological awareness. Particularly in literature, the reason may be the reawakening of the prose which adopts a more realist and true-to-life method to satisfy the material expectations of the day against the poetry embracing more emotional and spiritual realm. Del Ivan Janik notes that the reason why Romantic period is characterized by environmentalist concerns is based on three major reactionary sources. The first one has a direct relationship with a reaction to the destroying effects of industrial revolution and mechanization paving the way to escape from the vileness of industrial revolution and the atrociousness of urbanization to the wilderness. Second, there is a reaction to the rationalization which attempts to justify human behaviour with logical reasons, which, with the urban-industrial conditions, provokes the advocacy of primitivism and agrarianism. Finally, influenced by the early environmental philosophy of eighteenth-century, Romantic literature reacts against the traditional Judeo-Christian doctrines (Janik, 1995: 104-05). Furthermore, the rising environmental conscious with Romantic period turns to be an inspiring reference for the later modernist novelists. Janik argues that “D. H. Lawrence was dissatisfied with the anthropocentric assumptions that have dominated Western culture”, for he repudiates “Western society's reliance on rational intellect” and “the split between body and mind” (1995: 105). In “Why the Novel Matters”, D. H. Lawrence raises an ontological discussion echoing a holistic mode of being in order to overcome Cartesian dualism. He disavows the fact that he is composed of soul, body, mind or any parts because he believes that the whole is greater than these parts: “I am a man, and alive. I am man alive, and as long as I can, I intend to go on being man alive” (1985: 195). Comparing Lawrence’s organicism to Heidegger’s holism, Michael Bell claims that “there is no external world separable from human being in the world” (1992: 10) in the fictions of Lawrence, such as *Lady Chatterly’s Lovers*, *The Rainbow* and *Sons and Lovers*. Therefore, born into Industrial Revolution (1760-1840) both as an outcome of its degenerated norms and reaction to its devastating effects, Romantic Movement (1800-1850), along with its influence on such literary men as Lawrence, Aldoux

Huxley and Gary Sneyder, is of particular significance in terms of its reaction to over-rationalization and dualism. However, it is necessary to note that what remains for West is not John Clare's biocentric green universe or Lawrence's postoral scenes, but Dickens' smoky, dull and stagnant cities in the following century.

Being a prolonged process of socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic reconstruction encapsulating early humanism, Renaissance, Age of Reason, Technological and Industrial Revolution, modernity undergoes complete metamorphosis with its reconceptualization as a polytheistic anthropo-religion whose gods are human reason, science and knowledge. This philosophical paradigm produces some new stream of thought like individualism, positivism, rationalism, economic individualism and humanism provoking global and local wars, revolutions and environmental havoc that human history has hitherto never experienced. The excessive confidence in man's himself seems to cause an anthropocentric motto of modernity: Everything is for man, according to man and by man. Namely, human is the ultimate measure of everything. Notwithstanding its promise for progress, modernity not only creates a subversive system based on industry and technology, but also builds a disruptive human prototype. In this sense, the power of modernity changing the focus of human beings to an explorable universe primarily stems from this disruptive character. The sacred nature preserving its mystery throughout the ages is distorted by the weapons of modernity like knowledge, science and the greed for progress in a couple of centuries.

Abel Jeanniere, in his spectacular essay drawing the picture of the modernity, discusses that the most significant thing is to determine whether the word 'modern' is just a label stuck on a couple of ages or a sign that demonstrates the transformation of the total culture, or namely, of human's relationship with nature, other humans and religious conceptualization. For him, modern world replaces the agricultural world as a result of the fact that modernity affects human first and then his world. Jeanniere further claims that in order to understand this new world order, it is crucial to define four historical revolutions determining the transition to modernity: scientific, politic, cultural and technical and industrial revolutions (2000: 95-97). The scientific revolution is initiated by Newton. Accordingly, directly conducted by God and the angels, nature is transformed into a mechanism in which it

orders its own rules. With scientific revolution, physical world whose laws must be rediscovered by human seems as a mechanically organized realm based on another order of reality. Believing that all other revolutions derive from scientific revolution, Jeanniere explains political revolution within the framework of a ruling power whose source shifts from divine power to the people. Thus, the purpose of political theories is to base the democratic manner of ruling power on reason (Jeanniere, 2000: 97-100). Called *Aufklärung* in Germany, *Lumieres* in France and *Enlightenment* in France, Cultural Revolution is a significant movement of thought rooted gradually in the view of new physical world. The most radical conclusion of this movement, claims Jeanniere, is that the essentials of social life could only consist of rational grounds. Finally, industrial revolution, which might be the conclusion of the former revolutions, indicates a revolutionary step for the invasion of nature in which human exists. Characterized by the isolation of labour, industrial revolution comes to mean that the technical structure mediating between man and nature gains an increasing autonomy. The phases of industrial revolution, for Jeanniere, both accompany and configure the new type of relationship characterized by nature, scientific and cultural revolutions (2000, 100-102).

If one seeks to understand the extension of environmental crisis to an alarming degree and, as a result of this, the emergence of a radical ecological thought, s/he must explore the assumptions of modernity dominating Western culture and literature. Discussing that the roots of ecological crisis lie behind modernity, Charlene Spretnak, one of the most important American feminist environmentalist thinkers, focuses on modernity's "belief system that constitutes our normative view of life on Earth" in her book entitled *The Resurgence of the Real: Body, Nature and Place in a Hypermodern World* (1999: 219). Along with scienticism, rationalism, anthropocentricism and mechanistic worldview, claims Spretnak, progressivism, homo-economicus, reductionism, mass-production industrialism, consumerism and objectivism structure the modern worldview (1999: 219-20). These factors are closely related to the emergence of an environmental enlightenment, at least in environmental philosophy, in twentieth century.

The sense of pre-modern harmony associated with what people call wild nature is ruined by the two key assumptions of modernity. The first is the faith that



the reason is the ultimate guide for decoding the mysteries of the universe. The second is the confidence in the power of science which is believed to provide humanity with the irresistible armour among other species. The belief that human history has an indivisible organic connection with the idea of progress is to take him to the new Promised Land in which man is the domineering object. The seeds of this idea are implanted in the philosophical assumptions of Descartes who declares that the self is the sole object and the precipitating factor of the knowledge. Regarding Descartes as one the most significant actors of modernity, Charles E. Bressler believes that “[f]or Descartes, the rational essence freed from superstition, from human passions, and from one’s oftentimes irrational imagination will allow humankind to discover truth about the physical world” (2011: 86). Along with the contributions of Newton and Bacon, scientific method through experiments, generalizations and mathematical calculations becomes a means of the total comprehension of the physical universe. “[I]mbued with the spirit of progress”, as Bressler puts forward, the scholars included in the modernity believe that “[a]nything the enlightened mind set as its goal [...] was attainable” (2011: 86). This spirit of progress creates a harsh imaginary boundary between human and nature. The dichotomy between them turns into a key feature defining the conceptualization of nature in modernity. Civilization, thus, has been perceived as an antipathetical social behaviour to wild nature (Grumbine, 1995: 379). Being one of the most prominent representatives of those who believe the loftiness of modernity’s spirit of progress, Benjamin Franklin also sees the progress as inevitable and essential to reach this promised golden age. Bressler describes Franklin’s position on the discovery of physical world as follows:

Self-assured, self-conscious, and self-made, Franklin concludes that all people possess an essential nature. It is humanity’s moral duty to investigate this nature contained within ourselves and also to investigate our environment through rational thinking and the methods of science so we can learn and share the truths of the universe. By devoting ourselves to science and to the magnificent results that will necessarily follow, Franklin proclaims that human progress is inevitable and will usher in a new golden age (2011: 87).

The passage also seems to sum up the core characteristics of modernity through the lens of Franklin’s desire for human progress. Science and reason as the key assumptions of modernity, when coupled with the dream of progress, empower

man's ideal to be the sole master over non-human living beings and also lead to a ruthless contest in the discovery of the physical world for the purpose of achieving his well-being.

Defining relentless economical goal of an individual as one of the core values of modernity, Spretnak claims that human is by nature an economic being or homo economicus. Thus, the organization of economic model is considered as providing welfare for the all facets of life. Modern societies including homo economicus, for Spretnak, have ignored the environmental conditions while they give value to materialism (1999: 219). As Spretnak puts, economic man, or so-called homo economicus, who is more often than not in pursuit of his economic welfare by the way of attempting to maximize utility and economic profit, considers natural resources as material substance so that he can exploit and abuse it for the benefit of himself. The thought of maximizing utility results in the minimization of the ethical connection between society and nature because the environmental ethics supporting that the resources granted by nature are not a means of material product for the benefit of human comes into conflict with profit-driven individual. Thus, homo economicus becomes a 'bon vivant' adopting an individualistic purpose permeated with a sordid way of life and expecting maximum utility from each object environing him. Moreover, homo economicus, as an egocentric individual, appears as a hazardous species only showing considerations for profit, which also creates a huge gap between environmental ethics and economics. As Oelschlaeger observes: "The prototypical modern person is Homo oeconomicus, and the sole value of farming the land is profit. Such activities do not bring the human spirit closer to the soil and larger organic process but render nature of use value only" (1991: 159-60). The early signs of economic individualism focusing solely on the ways of making profit can be seen in the works of Daniel Defoe who is the strict propagator of his age. Considering the influence of Hobbes and Locke on Defoe, it can be claimed that Robinson Crusoe, as a character who is in pursuit of his economic welfare by the way of exploiting land, animals and plants to obtain excessive property and power, is a practical reflection of Locke's philosophy in literature. According to Ian Watt, "[t]hat Robinson Crusoe, like Defoe's other main characters, Moll Flanders, Roxana, Colonel Jacque and Captain Singleton, is an embodiment of economic individualism

hardly needs demonstration” because each of these protagonists “pursue money [...] very methodically according to the profit and loss book-keeping which Max Weber considered to be the distinctive technical feature of modern capitalism” (2000: 63). Robinson Crusoe, for instance, as one of the most familiar representatives of homo economicus, does not content with what nature provides him in the island and succeeds in creating capital by exploiting some sources of nature. Imbued with the egocentric and homocentric idea of becoming the sole and exclusive owner of the island, he develops some laborious skills for the purpose of building a comfortable life such as discovering the eco-system of the island to reinforce his mastery in the island, catching a parrot to teach how to speak like a human and making traps to capture goats not only for milk and meat but also for supplying himself butter and cheese.

The philosophical tradition of modernity, contrary to the holistic approach of radical ecological thought, tends to dismantle reality and breaks it into pieces to seek for the meaning of the object in the parts of the whole. In this sense, mechanistic worldview, as already hinted at above, invites humanity to accept the idea that physical world is a combination of matter and energy and that the ultimate reality rests on the dichotomy between what is physical and mental, namely between body and mind. This fact actually lies behind the Cartesian tendency which tries to explain non-human living beings accepted as automata, or moving machines, reductively. It is the method of reductionism that asks for the whole to be divided into smaller parts in order to grasp the nature of reality. “Such reductionism”, as Spretnak states, “seeks the smallest unit of composition and yields no knowledge about the interaction of parts of a system or the creative behaviour of the system as a whole” (1999: 220). In the philosophy of ecology, the tension between reductionism and holism has caused a significant debate among scholars who often equate holism with organicism, the view that the universe with its parts is an organic whole, and also with individualism based on the belief that well-being of an individual organism determines the succession of a general state of affairs. Comparing and contrasting reductionism to holism, Gregory M. Mikkelson and Colin A. Chapman accept that both individualistic and organicist approaches consider the well-being of individual organisms. Yet, on one hand individualism holds the view that “[t]he well-being of

the individuals within a higher-level ecological whole, such as an ecosystem, completely determine the intrinsic value of that whole”, holistic view, on the other hand, “requires additional information” (Mikkelson and Chapman, 2014: 335). In other words, a non-anthropocentric holism, contrary to the mechanistic worldview, demands a monolithic form of universe in which all living organisms have homeostatic mechanisms or an interdependent connection.

Provoking the process of the painful transformation from agrarian society to the industry-based society leading to a socio-economic shift through mechanization, urbanization and exploitation of both labour and environmental resources, industrialization is a socio-economic fact that modern human faces. In this regard, the process of industrialization is closely linked to human’s perpetual desire for progress and consumerism. According to Spretnak, “[m]ass-production industrialism is the best way to attain ever-increasing levels of well-being through consumption. Industrialism reflects faith in a rapacious mode of production to bring an age of abundance and contentment” (1999: 219). Though the modes of consumption to attain the promised welfare play a significant role in comprehending the spirit of industrialism, it should be remembered that industrialism is a socio-cultural system that cannot only be restricted to the buildings in which machines and robots continuously work. As industrialism develops its techniques and methods so as to pierce the social codes of a nation, it becomes a form of life functioning in all facets of social life, which probably seeks new ways to expand while otherizing human from his kind and also human from his environment. Thus, it paves the way for a socio-cultural disorientation of which consequences can only be comprehended over the long run. Though modernity comes to an end with its industrial methods with the arrival of postmodern practices, the idea of industrialism protects its existence with newer methods. Nevertheless, its disruptive consequences are being discussed in the framework of new theoretical assumptions. This stems from the pervasive characteristics of industrialism and it seems that the ideology of industrialism somewhat adapts itself into an ever-changing socio-cultural structure. Andrew McLaughlin calls it “expansionary industrialism” which “embodies a faith in technology and a technocratic organization of society, as well as an apparently insatiable consumerism” (1993: 13). Nevertheless, the fact that industrialism regards

nature as the constellation of exploitable resources, though its method has changed, has remained unchanged since its emergence. McLaughlin defines this long-established ideology of industrialism on nature in no uncertain terms. This ideology does not see the essence of nonhuman nature but deals with how its infinite sources can be used. The industrialist ideology holds the view that the forests are lumber, oceans, seas and rivers are not only water for fishery but also waste containers and farms are potential lands dissected and taxed according to its monetary value (McLaughlin, 1993: 67). This anthropocentric ideology of industrialism, thus, can present growing body of evidences to support the fact that the essence of industrialism rests on the mass-production not to maintain ecological sustainability but to sustain human consumption. The ideology of mass-production industrialism and over-consumption are best reflected in Huxley's *Brave New World* in which the author juxtaposes "an antiseptic, mind-controlled world civilization of the distant future with the world of the primitive past" (Janik, 1995: 107). Huxley is conscious of man's estrangement from himself and his natural environment. He indicates the new industry-based social order of his century with the slogan adopted by the government in *Brave New World*: "Ending is better than mending. The more stitches, the less riches" (2007: 42). Assuming under-consumption as diseased and dangerous for the progress, the ideology of the World State in the novel is the product of Fordism which is a socio-economic model based on mass-production and overconsumption in an industrialized system.

However, it must be recognized that the total human consumption seems more than that the earth can provide when considering the increasing human population. Overpopulation is surely one of the main cases to be noticed because consumer society is a phenomenon both affected by growing population and affecting the development of industrialism. They are directly proportional to each other. To put it simply, as human population grows, not only vital but also arbitrary needs increase stimulating consumerism and, in turn, consumerism triggers the ideology of industrialism. In the vicious cycle of modernity, consumerism, highly inherent in the ideology of modernity, is confined to the socio-economic theory that prosperity becomes attainable through consumption without regarding the inputs and outputs. Though modernity harbours some contradictory beliefs, it can be claimed

that the ideology accepted by modernity is consistently in favour of mass production, and therefore, mass consumption. According to Erik Assadourian, this so-called ideology propagated in modernity can be overcome by practicing three basic goals which seem like a counter-modernist approach to consumerism. In Worldwatch Institute's *State of the World 2010* collection, he advises that consumption undermining wellbeing must be discarded by quitting the consumption of junk food, smoke, single-use-only objects and huge houses. Second, private consumption must be replaced with public consumption by borrowing books instead of owning and using public transportation instead of a private car. Thirdly, the unnecessary old goods to be thrown must be transformed into utilisable positions by using renewable and recyclable resources (2010: 17). Considering that consumerism brought by the modernity takes a long time to dominate the behaviours of human beings, this counter-modernist action may be difficult to perform because “[s]hifting cultural systems is a long process measured in decades, not years” (Assadourian, 2010: 18).

The materialist interconnection between the ideologies of industrialism and consumerism leads laissez-faire capitalism, a kind of free market capitalism, to find a basis in rational objectivism. Discussing objectivism as one of the key assumptions of modernity, Spretnak states that objectivism connects rationalism to reality by ignoring the ideas of any groups and sees absolute reason as a mere reflection of this rational structure. The concepts are independent of the variable groups and they are defined through idiosyncratic conditions (1999, 219). Furthermore, she implies that objectivism is the modern re-enactment of the individualist and rationalist culture of Enlightenment culture. In this sense, contrary to the subjectivist perception of postmodernists, seeking for happiness, individual interest, progressivism and rational individualism are common beliefs adopted by objectivism. Randian objectivism definitely employs these tenets in order to define the noblest goal of humanity which is to achieve happiness. Ayn Rand, the most articulate propagator of objectivism, in an afterword to *Atlas Shrugged*, defines the essence of this philosophy as “the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute” (1992: 1170). Objectivism, then, regards all kinds of human actions, whether it is individually or not, as means that justifies ends, or, the goal to reach the

happiness indicated by Rand. Believing that it is possible to comprehend and master the universe through human reason, Rand formulates his philosophy with four basic tenets which seem to represent a modern reference to enlightenment thinkers from Bacon to Smith. First, reality is an objective absolute free from man's emotions. Second, reason is the only source for man to perceive reality and to gain knowledge. Thirdly, man as a creature who is an end in himself must live for his own sake. Finally, the most appropriate economic structure is absolutely the free market capitalism guaranteed and protected by the state assuming the role of policeman (1998: 4). It can easily be understood that the anthropocentric premises of objectivism collides with radical ecology considering that one of the most articulate principles of ecological thought accepts non-human living beings as having intrinsic value, or as valuable in itself and strictly rejects the idea that they exist for human benefits and purposes.

In addition to these tenets dominating modernity, John Coates unmasks "the deeper and more foundational assumptions of modernity", to name dualism, domination and determinism, which "have spawned the current ecological demise" (2003: 44-46). Determinism, from which scientism, rationality and objectivism spring, represents the mechanistic view of universe based on reductionism and also causality. In a deterministic system, human does not carry any responsibility for his moral behaviour because these moral actions are a necessary outcome of other pre-determined actions. In this sense, the rejection of free will restrains those who follow deterministic philosophy from claiming moral responsibility for human actions. This justifies the foundation of progressivism as a deterministic law of human history because technological and scientific development of humanity is an irrepressible fact and human will be ready to unveil all mysteries of nature to take full authority sooner or later. Determinism, associating the inevitable human fate with the desire for taking the mechanistic universe under control, therefore, provides numerous rationales for the idea of domination. Namely, the dominion of so-called superior over the inferior is inevitable. Coates invites people to face the fact that anthropocentrism, egocentrism and individualism flow from the idea of domination which is another fundamental assumption of modernity. For him, the domination is that senior beings regard themselves as possessing the right to master over those who are in lower

positions. Therefore, it lies to a greater extent so as to include many kinds of dichotomy like human/nature, human/nonhuman, culture/nature, and binary oppositions like male/female, master/slave and civilized/primitive. Due to the idea of domination, human, among other species, is elevated to the most significant position on earth (Coates, 2003: 44-46).

As mentioned previously, Cartesian rationality posits a radical dualism between immaterial mind and material body, which is held responsible by the contemporary hard-line environmentalist indictment. However, the content of dualism based on this fundamental dichotomy becomes diversified towards the ends of modernity. Coates states that dualism not only paves the way for the fragmentation of reality, as in the examples concerning creator/human, plant/animal, human/nature and mind/body, but also forms a basis of the “compartmentalization of our experience: for example, professional/personal, emotional/rational, and material/spiritual” (2003: 44-46). In this regard, the former pole of the schema indicating duality alienates the latter forming a huge gap, which labels the latter as ‘other’. The valued pole of the duality in turn rejects, exploits, and abuses the other claiming that it is still valuable without the lower pole. This, for instance, can be identified with conventional Cartesian dualism in which humans that are immaterial and conscious selves can exist without unconscious and material body. Throughout the project of modernity, as mentioned above, the case of dualism is handled both in order to intensify and to soothe the opposing sides. Hegel claims that the debate between these contradicting poles brings a sort of linear progress. Embracing both thesis and anti-thesis as essential propositions to acquire a new perspective, Hegelian dialectic offers synthesis as a paradigm that justifies dualism not in an attempt to reject opposing poles for removing the spiritual gap but to reconcile them. Actually, there are two different perspectives for Hegelian idealism in radical ecology. While Hegelian idealism, along with James and Dewey’s pragmatism, is accepted as anthropocentric by most deep ecologists in the sense that Western philosophical mainstream “failed to provide any restraints on the developing urban-industrial society” and “provided a justification for the technological domination of Nature” (Sessions, 1995b: 167), Bookchin’s social ecology is an outgrowth of “Hegelian/Marxist ‘humans perfecting Nature’ tradition in holding that wild ‘first



nature' must be made 'free' by incorporating it into 'second nature' thereby creating a new synthesis which he calls free nature" (Sessions, 1995c: 268). Disavowing the assumptions of Western dualism, deep ecology mostly deals with Far Eastern philosophical and religious teachings like Zen Buddhism and Taoism which, unlike Western dualism, hold more eco-friendly philosophy due to their non-dualistic doctrines based on the interdependence of relations while ecofeminism, as a sub-branch of radical ecology, overcomes hierarchical dualism replacing it with socio-ecological principles based on gender, body and environment. No matter how diversified dualism is as an institutionalized norm of modernity, ecological philosophy also aims to remove superficial hierarchy created by dualism. According to Val Plumwood, overcoming dualism can happen with the sense of a reconstruction of the relationship, which requires a reevaluation of "the body, the senses, emotion, the imagination, the animal, the feminine and nature" (2003: 123).

Along with its social thinkers, philosophical doctrines, mainstream movements, social, political, economic and environmental assumptions, modernity is of great significance in order to understand and unveil the primary reasons of current environmental crisis. The conventional wisdom reverberating through modernity leads to a huge division between civilization and wilderness. The alienation stemming from this huge gap begins with early humanism reconceptualising the role of human and putting it into the center of universe. It keeps maintaining with Enlightenment thinkers like Bacon, Newton and Descartes who commonly share the idea that man as a rational being is capable of mastering over nature by discovering its potentials and mysteries with the help of reason and science. Then, it culminates in cross-cultural awareness assisted by contemporary environmentalist thinkers following the experience of exploitive and destructive consequences of world wars.

Each of these theoretical positions makes an important contribution to understanding modernity as a transcendent explanatory system. Modernity invites people to see the universe through a different window along with anthropocentrism it sacralises, and knowledge and science it institutionalizes. It creates a center and merely puts human interests within the boundaries of that center. To put it another way, all concrete and abstract ideas including any concepts of nature are first determined and then interpreted in terms of the discourses constructed by the

modernity. Thus, when compared to postmodernity, it becomes necessary for modernity to decentre one idea when another thought is held. However, this is a partial and even wrong supposition because of the belief that the scope of the center is too narrow to be inclusive of holistic and multi-perspective approach. Modernity practically adopts an 'either-or' approach rather than a 'both-and' perspective. Therefore, until the completion of its evolution, modernity becomes a set of values, which approves patriarchal superiority when defining the gender, justifies the superiority of the colonizer when diagnosing the domination and imposes a laissez faire ideology in which the powerful oppresses the lower when formulating an economic model. In an ecological sense, modernity more often than not prioritizes human interest when describing, diagnosing and even praising nonhuman realm. Thus, when compared to the other silenced characters, bringing a solution to the otherizing of nature seems like a more difficult act in modernist tradition. While the devalued pole of dualities including the women, the lower-class and the colonized can easily find spokesmen to defend their rights, non-human living beings need human beings against human beings to defend environmental rights just because they cannot speak and write as humans can. The reason also lies behind the fact that modernity, while enabling human to be the master of whole system, establishes its own anthropocentric assumptions as an explanatory system according to which each single abstract idea is shaped. Human beings could never succeed to look through the lens of nature as they speculate for the nature of nature. Indeed, the situation is not so different until the emergence of modernity. Interpretations and suppositions over the nature of nature are established on the information offered by religious scripts before modernity. Though modernity's saving its bonds from religious teachings and dogmatic doctrines is announced as a revolutionary secular act on its behalf, it cannot help being the initiator of a much more subversive revolution affecting the complete ecological system. Therefore, only when the early footsteps of modernity are heard is nature misconceptualized by its anthropocentric assumptions. The concept of nature and the image of wild in the minds of human are reduced and limited to what modernity offers and promises to people. On one hand modernity causes the dissolution and erosion of unifying values, on the other hand it creates new belief systems grounded on reason and science, which offer a framework for each concept.

Nature is characterized within this narrow framework and exhibited as both servant and foe for humanity. Radical ecologists as environmentalist thinkers of twentieth century, thus, oppose against the restrained and oppressed condition of nature and make an effort to establish a counter-revolutionist ecological ideology.

## **1.2. Radical Ecology Movement: An Environmental Counter-Revolution**

Radical ecology movement, in the simplest term, is an environmental tradition opposing the dominant ideologies of modernity. Various anthropocentric philosophical reflections governing modernity from Mirandola's early humanism through Descartes's mechanistic worldview to nineteenth century's atomism and utilitarianism are rejected by conservative and reactionary assumptions of radical ecologists. This, in an ecological sense, can be seen as a sort of radical enlightenment against the degenerated ethics and moral values of human-induced system based on ecologically erroneous or deficient background. Merchant, in her book entitled *Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World*, seeks the codes of radical ecology in this background and defines it as a movement that provides socio-ecological doctrines with a new insight in order for the welfare of all forms of life. It opposes the already constructed social, political and economic systems which constitute obstacles for human needs. The theory not only diagnoses the roots of the environmental crisis but also indicates some radical solutions for a sustainable world. Its scope, as Merchant puts, is not limited to environmental dimensions but expands into a wider scale embracing such issues like race, class and sex (2005: 8). In accordance with what Merchant states, the illusionary project of modernity causing two great worldwide wars requires a new paradigm shift like the reconstruction of conventional ethics and vision. Thus, radical ecology can be claimed to emerge as a new project against the anti-environmental ethics and assumptions of the previous centuries in order to minimize social, economic, political and cultural pressure on environment through developing radical articulations around ecology.

Though the term 'radical' or 'radicalized' may sound as aggressive and violent, radical ecology is a constructive movement rather than a destructive ideology associated with anarchism and also intuitive rather than discursive. It may

stem from radical ecology's strong reaction to modernity's holy premises and the roots of philosophical norms of the West. It is not a coincidence that the radical environmental movement appears as a serious discipline in the years when the catastrophic impacts and disappointing consequences of modern world are discussed loudly. Such –isms as scienticism, rationalism, anthropocentrism, progressivism, reductionism, mass-production industrialism, consumerism, objectivism and also homo-economicus and mechanistic worldview characterizing the spirit of modernity are perceived as antagonists in the philosophy of radical ecologists and considered as fundamental reasons of current environmental degradation. Because, according to the ecosophical insight of radical ecology:

- a) Science must not be seen as a means of dominating the earth,
- b) Reason has been a human aspect that does not justify the superiority of men,
- c) Human-centred ideologies and perception must be decentred,
- d) Progressivism has been an illusionary promise, for the sake of which the lives of all beings are endangered,
- e) Reductionism has failed to see the ecological fact that everything is connected to everything else as it focuses on the smallest unit,
- f) The expansion of wild industrialism has been directly proportionate to the exploitation of wild nature,
- g) Consumerism has triggered the risk of depleting natural sources much more than needed,
- h) Homo-economicus has constituted an egocentric sense of individual in himself, which is consciously blind and instinctively foe for everything not serving for his self-interest,
- i) Mechanistic worldview must be reacted due to its misinterpretation separating man's mind from the spirit of universe,
- j) Objectivism justifies each of them through promising artificial happiness for each individual.

On the other hand, radical ecology never makes a misanthropic evaluation on the relationship between human and nonhuman. According to Jeff Shantz, radical ecologists underline “human-embeddedness within nature” and “complementarity” within ecological communities (2006: 44). A total human contribution into the nature

without deforming and otherizing it emerges as a precondition of constituting these eco-communities. Instead of simply disavowing the components of social life in favour of a primitive community, radical ecology attempts to reconcile each in an ecological framework. As Stanley Aronowitz states, the environmentalist worldviews of radical ecologists who do not see universe as nonhuman and inanimate not only target “the domination of nature, but of science and technology as well” (1990: 82). The underlying tension between anthropological paradigms and ecocentric framework of radical ecology lies behind the fact that the philosophy adopted by radical ecology, puts Michael Clow, totally refuses any idea differentiating human from nature based on the notion that science and technology can allow him/her to increase control over nature. (1986: 174).

In his book entitled *Green Political Thought*, Andrew Dobson underlines the distinction between radical ecology and conventional environmentalism or as he calls dark-green ecologism and light-green environmentalism. According to Dobson, conventional environmentalism ignores the necessity of reformation in the pre-established universal order and “argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption” (2007: 2). Radical ecologism, on the other hand, is a strong ideology which “holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life” (Dubson, 2007: 3). Instead of addressing the existence of crisis simply, radical ecological movements, thus, diagnose the philosophical and historical roots of the ecological crisis, deconstruct the established perception of nature and “attempt to resolve the contradictions that lead to the crisis through action” (Merchant, 2005: 253) and by creating an ecological concern for each component of social structure. The rise of environmental consciousness is taken into consideration along with the environmentalists, often cited by the theorists of radical ecology, like John Stuart Mill, George Perkins Marsh, George Santayana, David Brower, Stewart Udall, Lynn White Jr., Roderick Nash and Paul Ehrlich. In literature, radical ecology movement, particularly deep ecology, finds its roots in the ecosophical idealism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Gary Snyder, John Muir, Aldo Leopold and Rachel

Carson. In their works, each author reflects the similar purpose, that is, nature otherized and silenced by human beings should be moved from margins to the center in order to create a widespread environmental awareness. For instance, Carson, in her 1962 novel *Silent Spring* considered as marking the initiation of modern environmental reaction, reveals evidences about the dramatic disappearance of birds due to the use of pesticides DDT, which leads public and media to re-evaluate the legitimacy of chemical industry. The adverse effects of DDT both on human and non-human beings are first discovered and announced by Carson who is attacked by chemical companies. In the novel, she proposes some natural alternatives instead of using pesticides. For instance, as Carson claims in the novel, Erasmus Darwin's suggestion that insects can be overcome by raising its natural enemies must not be seen as the sole alternative biological control method to chemical methods (2002: 291).

In addition to its mission to raise public awareness of environmental awareness, radical ecology movement, as Merchant observes, "offers an alternative vision of the world in which race, class, sex and age barriers have been eliminated and basic human needs have been fulfilled" (2005: 249). When it is considered that the use of DDT is prohibited later in Europe and America, the instillation of radical ecology movement into literature can become an antidote for modern environmental crisis. In this sense, Merchant, in *Radical Ecology*, lists the significant contributions of radical theorists that can also serve literary criticism as a theoretical model. She puts an emphasis on reality, social reality, science, ecological science, natural resources, surplus and scarcity, production and reproduction and social gender through the lens of ecology (2005: 249). Indeed, she indicates the fundamental premises of radical ecology movements like deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism.

Although there are some differences among these movements, some studies have been done to reconcile the sharp discrepancies. According to Jozef Keulartz, who contrasts the radical ecological currents in the simplest form, these differences allow people to distinguish the movements within radical ecology. He explains that "the current environmental crisis is attributed to modern man's anthropocentrism" in Naess's Deep Ecology, while Bookchin's Social Ecology "ascribes our hostile

behavior towards nature to the existence of hierarchical relationships among human beings” and Ecofeminism “points to androcentrism rather than anthropocentrism as the main culprit” (1998: 1). Thus, the proponents of one of these movements may think that other radical ecological movements are not sensitive enough to their own privileges, leading to the accusation of each other of being shallow, misanthropic and sexist. However, they have to find a common ground because political reflections of radical ecology are improperly associated with the anarchic acts of radical activists, which lead the movement to become the target of the official attacks. Steve Chase claims that, despite on-going differences, it is inevitable for the proponents of radical ecology to unite to challenge the “divide-and-conquer tactics of the FBI”, for this reason, Bookchin and Dave Foreman agrees to come together in Learning Alliance’s meeting to find a common path to their philosophical and political viewpoints (1991: 22). Though it is hard to define common principles for radical ecology movements, there are certainly common shared targets which lie behind the social, economic and political changes. According to Matt Buttsworth, these changes include the removal of capitalist free market economy, the transformation of urban-industrial society into self-sufficient agrarian communities, the demand for communal ownership instead of a system supporting private property, the tendency to ecological religions like Buddhism and Taoism instead of patriarchal divine religions, the disavowal of the mechanistic worldview in favor of a non-anthropocentric holism supporting scientific theories like quantum physics and an overarching revolution eliminating sexism, ageism and patriarchy created by Western civilization (2011: 11-12).

The environmental literature becomes acquainted with ‘deep ecology’ when Naess coins the term in 1973. Nature-oriented writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and John Muir, who are closely concerned with the exploitation and invasion of the wild nature, form both theoretical and practical basis during the emergence of the movement. In his preface to the reference guidebook he edits, Sessions states that “The Long-Range Deep Ecology movement emerged more or less spontaneously and informally as a philosophical and scientific social/political movement during the so-called Ecological Revolution of the 1960s” (1995d: ix). The philosophy of the movement embraces an environmental activism against the established truth of the modern society and assumes a deconstructive role in order to

voice the necessity of a radical change. For Sessions, the main concern of deep ecology movement “has been to bring about a major paradigm shift- a shift in perception, values, and lifestyles- as a basis for redirecting the ecologically destructive path of modern industrial growth societies” (1995d: ix).

Naess, on the other hand, is unwilling to confine his philosophy to a simple encyclopedic definition; instead, along with Sessions, he proposes a deep ecology platform<sup>3</sup> consisting of the eight points as basic principles, which will later be called as the very core of the movement. McLaughlin, in “The Heart of Deep Ecology”, probes the deep ecology platform declaring that “the platform was meant to be a terrain of commonality which allowed, recognized, and even encouraged differences in more logically ultimate philosophies” (1995: 86). The first point is that both human and non-human living beings have their own certain dispositions, the function of which cannot be based on serving for the benefit of other beings. Thus, the second point emphasizes that these beings, regardless of their so-called superiority or inferiority, contribute to the total richness and diversity interdependently. The hierarchy of species justifying the evolutionary belief that only the strongest survive is rejected. The third one is a responsive point for those who accuse deep ecology of embracing a misanthropic approach. The focus is on the difference between vitality and arbitrariness. As McLaughlin states, “[t]here is a real difference between an Eskimo’s wearing the skin of a seal and one worn for social status in an affluent society” (1995: 87). The fourth point of the platform is a criticism of over-population increasing dramatically following industrialism. In order to establish the ecological social order, deep ecology asks for a rational planning of the human population in the following centuries. The fifth one is a clear warning that ecological devastation reaches alarming rates. By human interference, Naess does not mean that “humans should not modify some ecosystems, as do other species. Humans have modified the earth over their entire history and will probably continue to do so. At issue is *the nature and the extent* of such interference” (1995a: 69). In the next point, deep ecology demands a practical change of policies encapsulating economic, technological and ideological structures with eco-friendly alternatives to overcome

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<sup>3</sup> For Naess’s formulation and detailed comments of the eight points of the platform, see Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects”, in *Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century*, Ed. George Sessions, Shambhala Publications, Boston 1995, pp 64-84.



the previously mentioned deterioration. The seventh point indicates the difference between quality and quantity, or more precisely, qualified progress and unqualified development. The well-being of a society cannot be ensured through consumerism imposed by industrialism and current ideology of progressivism. The last point calls for a practical participation, individual and social implementation and worldwide action from those who feel uneasy about the condition of humanity and nature.

Naess, Sessions, Bill Devall and other proponents of deep ecology endeavour to place the relationship between environment and human beings on the strong grounds. The tenets of deep ecology developed by these theorists and activists focus on the inherent values of each being instead of just on the well-being of human beings solely and exclusively. Thus, they insist on making a distinction between shallow and deep ecology. As Devall suggests “‘shallow ecology’ is shallow because it lacks probing philosophical questioning. Deep ecology combines the day-to-day problems of environment, including human health problems, with the global, cultural, psychological, long-range problems” (1988: 21). Naess defines the deep ecology movement as “a deep, but less influential movement” and the shallow ecology movement as “a shallow, but presently rather powerful movement” struggling against “pollution and resource depletion” because of “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries” (1973: 95). Contrary to the shallow ecology’s tendency to determining the symptoms of environmental crisis and their influences on human, deep ecology, according to Devall and Sessions, probes the roots and the causes of the crisis in terms of developing “a process of ever-deeper questioning of ourselves, the assumptions of the dominant worldview in our culture, and the meaning and truth of our reality” (1985: 8). Furthermore, Naess characterizes some policies of deep ecology movement through ecosophical terms which make it different from superficial ecologism. “The relational, total-field image”, according to Naess, implies that all organisms have an intrinsic connection, which is not independent of their environments, because they are rather indispensable and inseparable parts of their environments. Thus, this relational model creates a total-field in which either man-in environment image or thing-in-milieu concept cannot exist alone. The advocacy of “biospherical egalitarianism”, on the other hand, is of significance within the framework of total-field model. Though it is an

argumentative principle among other movements of radical ecology, biospherical egalitarianism means that all forms of life, from microorganisms to human beings, deserve equal rights to survive. Alluding to Marxist and Hegelian philosophy, Naess claims that the efforts not to pay attention to this fact and to create a sort of hierarchy among species disrupt this totality leading to a master-slave relationship, and then to the alienation of man. The “principles of diversity and of symbiosis” require a collaboration and solidarity between humans and all other forms of life. Accepting the richness and diversity of modes of life brings the common life awareness because all beings are coexistent creatures. Thus, Naess adopts ‘live and let live’ principle instead of an egocentric ‘either you or me’ slogan. Another characteristics manifested by Naess is “anti-class posture” adopting the view that the first three principles can be extended to any conflicts among communities. As a consequence of egalitarianism and collaboration, social systems in which the undeveloped nations fall under the hegemony of the developed ones, and economic structures in which the powerful exploits the weaker must be adapted to classless systems. The proponents of deep ecology must fight against “pollution and resource depletion”. However, much tendency to pollution distracts deep ecologists, contrary to the shallow ecologists, from paying attention to some other significant points lying behind the reasons. Also, if the current science and technology do more harm than good during the process of preventing pollution, it must be rejected. For the “complexity, not complication” principle, Alan Carter asserts that “[u]nlike ‘complication’, Naess regards ‘complexity’ as evident when a whole is integrated, rather than merely chaotic” (2013: 337). In contradistinction to reductionism, the multiplicity of all life forms contributes to the unity, which does not mean that the unity or the system is complicated evoking the difficulty or chaos. For humans, on the other hand, this principle favours complex economies, ecological integrity of industrial and agricultural operations and the combination of urban and rural activities. Finally, Naess, by “local autonomy and decentralization”, demands a radical political change within the system to protect the complex structure of nature. Along with self-responsibility and self-regulation, small local communities would reduce the negative consequences of bureaucratic barriers on ecological problems and achieve ecologically sustainable development (1973: 95-98).

Australian ethicist and philosopher Warwick Fox illustrates how ecophilosophy has developed within philosophy by creating “a radical challenge to the anthropocentrism (i.e., human- centeredness) that has informed mainstream Western philosophy since the time of the classical Greeks” (1990: 48-50). As one of the recent radical ecophilosophical movements, deep ecology embraces this radical challenge by developing an ecocentric model in which all anthropocentric positions are deconstructed. However, deep ecology’s ecocentricism, instead of creating a center based on the interests of one species, advocates a classless, symbiotic community, and biospherical egalitarianism including wide scope of beings. Overall, as Michael Uebel puts, “[e]cocentricism offers a strong critique of any worldview modelled upon a view of the nonhuman natural world as having less intrinsic value because it is an object to be controlled and whose purpose resides outside itself” (2011: 133). The tension between homocentric, or anthropocentric, view of world and ecocentricism, thus, cannot be justified by accusing ecocentricism of having misanthropic and merely nature-centred realm in which man is segregated from nature. It is essential to the understanding of Naess’s thesis to recognize that the otherized species should be included in the ethical considerations concerning such modern socio-cultural problems as racism, sexism and unfair distribution of income. At this point, Fox explains Naess’s ecophilosophy based on nonanthropocentricism or ecocentricism as the popular sense of deep ecology movement. Fox claims that “anthropocentric orientation” attempts to interpret nonhuman realm as “resources” serving for human comfort while “ecocentric orientation” provides both human and nonhuman living beings with an independent evolution and opposes to any exploitative human interference during this process (1990: 48-50). Ecocentricism, thus, with its concentration on the intrinsic values of both human and nonhuman beings, attempts to break the dualism created by modernity. In so doing, it strictly rejects the exploitative and expansionist policies justified by anthropocentric discourses as well. “The central intuition of deep ecology”, as Fox observes, “is the idea that there is no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. In other words, the world simply is not divided up into independently existing subjects and objects [...] human and non-human realms” (1999: 157). The ontological fraction in the

structure of existence imposed by conventional human-centred Western philosophy is replaced with holistic ecophilosophy which reconciles mind and spirit.

The assumptions of deep ecology mentioned above are generally intertwined with Naess's own personal ecophilosophy called Ecosophy T, which is mostly affected by Buddhism and Spinoza's pantheistic philosophy. The "T" is named after Tvergastein Mountain where Naess produces his environmentalist philosophy by listening to the sound of the wilderness in his cabin. Alan Drengson, Bill Devall and Mark Schroll suggest that "[s]ome writers have misunderstood Naess, taking his Ecosophy T, with its Self-realization norm, as something meant to characterize the whole deep ecology movement" (2011: 108). Naess, however, does not offer a one-dimensional theory and a uniform ecological worldview upon which everyone has to agree without any personal involvement of individuals from different cultural, political, social, religious and philosophical backgrounds. To put it another way, as in postmodernist relativistic theory of truth and self-conceptualization, Naess's Ecosophy, distinct from deep ecology, does not favour a normative and institutionalized paradigm. As Drengson, Devall and Schroll observe, the more "individuals, languages, cultures and religions" there are, the more ecosophies like "Ecosophy Ann, Ecosophy Bob, Ecosophy Chan" can be, which indicates how one can express his own ecological idea independently from Naess' Ecosophy T (2011: 107). Nevertheless, it is essential to understand Deep Ecology in order to comprehend Ecosophy T of which basic principle is self-realization.

Self-realization is an ecosophical term for deepening and expanding any individual's own self in order that s/he can identify with all beings. A wider and deeper identification is directly related to the process of human's realizing his/her own self and expanding his/her identity so as to embrace intrinsic values of all life forms. Defining and discovering the personal ego is the prerequisite for self-realization. Thus, the self can attain a cosmic conscious demanding maximum symbiosis. In his article "Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World", Naess initially focuses on the self which he suggests not to confuse it with narrow ego, thus, self-realization is not an egocentric phenomenon. The self that attains maturity, then, carries an all-encompassing characteristic which helps association of one's self with other living beings whatever form it is. At this point,

Naess accuses Descartes of being immature for his thoughts on the 'res-extensa', or on nonhuman realm. Then, he deepens the improvement of the self- from ego to social self and from social self to metaphysical self- in which the relationship and identification with nature is consciously or unconsciously omitted. He develops the term ecological self, which he sees as the ultimate maturity of the sense, as the third stage in addition to these conventional conceptions of self because the interactions do not only happen between human and other human, and human and human society. The joy and happiness as the meaning of life reside in this ecological sense, or in the increased state of self-realization, which results in the fact that humans see themselves in others including all forms of life. As a universal problem, today's ecological crisis endangers both human and nonhuman population and violates joy and happiness of all beings (2005: 515-17). The self-realized human is the one who grasps nature as the ultimate source of truth and beauty and who recognizes that the self is the part of the whole.

Radical ecological movement embraces different ideological, activist and political structures rather than concentrating on conventional environmental issues merely and thus incorporates some distinct tendencies of which focal point differ from each other. As already hinted above, in spite of the differences in their central points, the movements included in radical ecology vocalize the discourses opponent to the socio-cultural consequences of industrialism, capitalism, urbanization and mechanization brought by modernity. The thinkers of Enlightenment, for instance, not only subjugate nature, but women as well. For Rousseau whose ideas are opposed by Mary Wollstonecraft, women are seen subordinate to men because they are weak and irrational and also they are dependent on men. Accordingly, the status of women as mothers, in Hobbesian social contract, is degraded to servants for fathers. The underlying intention of the radical ecology is to deconstruct the anthropocentric assumptions and established ideologies. Thus, along with ecological diversity, all alienated and ignored objects are revisited through a radical approach.

The radical ecological movements emerging in 1960s coincide with the second wave of feminist movement; hence, this causes both ecological and feminist movements to find a common ground in their opposition to those otherizing and alienating forces. Uniting ecological and feminist concerns for a common purpose,

the term ecofeminism is first coined by Françoise d'Eaubonne in her 1974 book *Le Féminisme ou la Mort* (Feminism or Death) in order to show the parallelism between patriarchal suppression of both woman and nature, which, at the same time, leads to environmental devastation. Ecofeminism then popularizes the notion that the interaction among man, woman and nature must be reconsidered. Women are not allowed to participate in public space and they are forced to deal with care service and housework while men are occupied with polluting nature. Ecofeminism prefers a sisterhood imbued with green, not pink and focuses on the consequences of androcentrism much more than those of anthropocentrism. Later on, even some theoreticians like Ynestra King consider ecofeminism as the third wave of feminism.

Mary Mellor defines ecofeminism as “a movement that sees a connection between the exploitation and degradation of the natural world and the subordination and oppression of women” (1997: 1). Peter Hay, on the other hand, simply considers ecofeminism as “ecologically informed feminism” (2002: 72). It is important to note that ecofeminism does not strictly abide by the assumptions of ecology and feminism; it “brings together elements of the feminist and green movements, while at the same time offering challenge to both” (Mellor, 1997: 1). Defining ecological feminists as both “street-fighters” and “philosophers”, Ariel Salleh, in her foreword to *Ecofeminism*, draws a wide range of framework of the movement:

Ecofeminism is the only political framework I know of that can spell out the historical links between neoliberal capital, militarism, corporate science, worker alienation, domestic violence, reproductive technologies, sex tourism, child molestation, neocolonialism, Islamophobia, extractivism, nuclear weapons, industrial toxics, land and water grabs, deforestation, genetic engineering, climate change and the myth of modern progress (2014: ix).

The ‘connection’ seems to come out as the key word for ecofeminist philosophy. However, Karen J. Warren claims that ecofeminism differs from other feminisms like liberal, socialist and Marxist feminism in terms of its argument that nature is a feminist concern. Thus, philosophy of ecofeminism includes naturism in its scope of criticism of domination along with sexism, racism, classicism, heterosexism and ageism (1997: 4).

Though a large-scale inequality, violence and environmental crisis do not seem to be in ecofeminism’s field of interest, Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen explain

the reason why environmental crisis is a feminist issue rather than a human issue concerning all people. They think that women and children become the first to suffer the outcomes of inequity and environmental destruction. It may be absurd to make a connection between environmental pollution and women among some first world feminists but when compared to the privileged class of the industrial world including first world women rights defenders, the women of third world living outside the powerful economies experience the fatal consequences of environmental degradation immediately and deeply, like famine, drought and infectious diseases (1993: 1-35). Here, the broad-based position held by ecofeminism comes out as a criticism of Western eyes. The problems that do not directly affect the privileged class of industrial societies must not be ignored considering the consequences on the rest of the world.

It can be argued that ecofeminism is a constellation of ecology-oriented feminist approaches in which many positions arouse disagreement while helping grow the scope of the theory. Warren discusses that on one hand ecofeminists come to agree on engagement of the unjustified subjugation of both nature and women; on the other hand they are sceptical about the nature of this relationship. She likens ecofeminism to an umbrella under which there are various positions. The diversity of the theory, for Warren, stems from the richness of feminism, like liberal, Marxist, radical and socialist feminism, which contributes not only to the rise and development, but also to the solidity of ecofeminism. Warren calls this diversity as interconnections and analyzes the philosophical issues raised by woman-other human and others-nature interconnections: Historical (typically causal), spiritual and religious, conceptual, empirical, socioeconomic, linguistic, symbolic and literary, epistemological, political and ethical interconnections (2000: 21).

Historical (typically causal) interconnections refer to the historical roots of the domination of women and nature. The historical-causal discourses can be found in the definition of ecofeminism made by some ecofeminists as Salleh who accuses androcentrism as the reason for the environmental crisis: “Eco-feminism is a recent development in feminist thought which argues that the current global environmental crisis is a predictable outcome of patriarchal culture” (1988: 138). Likewise, Warren questions “the basis of these alleged historical-causal interconnections?” (2000: 22).

For some ecofeminists like Riane Eisler, it dates back to nomadic tribes who invade Indo-European communities about 4500 B.C. According to Eisler, there are growing body of evidences to support the fact that it is not the raw material but the way it is used leads to the development of destructive technologies, which plays a critical role in domesticating animals, exploiting fertile lands and then dominating women (1987: 46). On the other hand, Plumwood, who asserts that “the denial, exclusion and devaluation of nature can be traced far back into the intellectual traditions of the west, at least into the beginnings of rationalism in Greek culture” (2003: 72), seeks woman-nature connections in patriarchal dualisms of classical Greek philosophy. Other ecofeminists like Merchant consider the scientific and cultural development model of the Enlightenment as a masculine annihilator of woman’s identity and nature. For instance, along with his occultist attempts and Neo-Platonic conceptualizations, Bacon regards nature as female to be commanded. According to Merchant, “[t]he widely held belief that nature itself was female underlies Bacon’s use of language and metaphor on which much of his program for a new experimental science rests” (2008: 739). This androcentric scientific tendency in re-imagining the cosmos leads to the mechanistic and reductionist view of world rather than organic wholeness, which initiates the subjugation of woman and nature. On the other hand, some ecofeminists like Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Spretnak and Starhawk seek the traces of otherized women and nature in spiritual and religious interconnections. They analyze the symbols and imageries which are implicit in traditional religions, mythologies and pagan belief systems. The most striking is one that is observed by Gray who draws the picture of hierarchy of dominance in biblical view of creation: “Woman comes after and also below man. Woman was created [...] out of man’s body [...] Then come animals [...] Further down are plants [...] Below them is the ground of nature itself- the hills and mountains [...]” (1981: 3). Contrary to the traditional ecological evaluation about the universal hierarchy, Gray, like a biologist, dissects human and nonhuman in a deeper sense.

Conceptual interconnections are theoretical structures and notions through which ecofeminists draw an overall framework to ground their philosophy on a conceptual account. Defining conceptual interconnections as the core of ecofeminist



philosophy, Warren locates her account in patriarchy-based framework what she calls 'a logic of domination' while Plumwood, for instance, locates it in a hierarchically situated framework or such value dualisms as reason/emotion, man/woman, human/nature and culture/nature. (Warren, 2000: 24). Some ecofeminists like Salleh locate a conceptual ground on sex-gender differences, which exist "in paradigms that are uncritically oriented to the dominant western masculine forms of experiencing the world: the analytic, non-related, delightfully called 'objective' or 'scientific' approaches" (1988: 130). "A goal of ecofeminism then", for Warren, "is to develop gender-sensitive language, theory, and practices that do not further the exploitative experiences and habits of dissociated, male-gender identified culture toward women and nature" (1987: 4).

Empirical interconnections are those that connect empirical evidence about the environmental degradation and the experiences of women and also children, people of colour and the lower class. In this sense, Salleh emphasize the influence of health problems due to the environmental factors such as radiation, pesticide and toxins on woman's reproductive system and children's development. Also, while ecofeminist animal rights defenders, according to Warren, connect such activities like factory farming, animal experimentation and hunting animals to male practices, some identify rape and pornography with the experiences of abuse of women and nature (2000: 25). Susan Griffin, for instance, in her *Pornography and Silence: Culture's Revenge against Nature*, elaborates the relationship between man, woman, nature and culture: "The idea that the sight of a woman's body calls a man back to his own animal nature, and that this animal nature soon destroys him, reverberates throughout culture" (1982: 31). As journalist, feminist and cultural critic Ellen Willis notes, Griffin, in *Pornography and Silence*, finds the roots of pornography in the fear of nature. Patriarchal ideology associates culture with man while identifying nature and body with femininity. This is done consciously because man attempts to maintain authority over woman in order to suppress his anima. Thus, it causes women who are identified with the so-called inferior body and nature to hate her body. According to Willis, it results in "an erotic fantasy life that is essentially sadomasochistic" (2012: 15).

Within the framework of an unequal socioeconomic structure mostly dominated by patriarchy, ecofeminists like Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies reveal the interconnections between the environmental destruction, resource depletion and the exploitation of woman. In this context, Shiva focuses on the socioeconomic development or the idea of the progress of Western world. For Shiva, development equals to 'maldevelopment' which is lack of the feminine and ecological principle (1988: 4). She reveals the patriarchal belief on productivity and profitability that "[t]he neglect of nature's work in renewing herself, and women's work in producing sustenance in the form of basic, vital needs is an essential part of the paradigm of maldevelopment" and this disorder in the progress or development "sees all work that does not produce profits and capital as non or unproductive work" (1988: 4). Accordingly, Mies indicates how capitalist patriarchy exploits not only woman's body and labour but also the resources of nature to strengthen and sustain his wealth and leader-position power throughout the ages. The history of Third World women and Western world presents that "direct violence was the means by which women, colonies and nature were compelled to serve the 'white man', and that without such violence the European Enlightenment, modernization and development would not have happened" (Mies, 2014a: xx).

Linguistic, symbolic and literary interconnections refer to the connection of woman and nature that exists in language and literature. Ecofeminists argue that the patriarchal system uses language as a means to describe women as inferior by attributing them animal images. Joan Dunayer observes that "[a]pplying images of denigrated nonhuman species to women labels women inferior and available for abuse; attaching images of the aggrandized human species to men designates them superior and entitled to exploit" (1995: 11). Thus, language feminizes nature associating women with sheep, cat, bunny, chick, queen bee, and butterfly (Warren, 2000: 27) as well as defining men with powerful predatory animals like lion, wolf, stallion and bear. As for literature, Warren finds ecofeminist and radical feminist philosopher Griffin's writing "impactive" and "testimony to the power of literature and language to convey basic attitudes about women and nature" (2000: 29). In her

prose-poetry book *Women and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her*, which is considered as the initiator of American Ecofeminism, Griffin composes a striking prologue handling with how men regard and make use of women and literature:

We are the birds eggs [...] flowers, butterflies, rabbits, cows, sheep; we are caterpillars; we are leaves of ivy and sprigs of wallflower. We are women. We rise from the wave. We are gazelle and doe, elephant and whale, lilies and roses and peach, we are air, we are flame, we are oyster and pearl, we are girls. We are woman and nature. And he says he cannot hear us speak.

But we hear (1978: 1).

Ecofeminist literary criticism or literary ecofeminism voices the silence of women and nature in literature, as Griffin does above, sometimes by revisiting the literary canon and sometimes by studying women's literary works. Patrick D. Murphy suggests that one of the approaches of ecofeminist literary analysis "would be to use ecofeminism as a ground for critiquing all the literature that one reads. For literary critics in particular this would mean reevaluating the canon [...]" (1995: 25). The critic, for him, is not seeking a mere ecofeminist novel, yet s/he "is looking at an author's work in terms of the extent to which it addresses ecological and feminist issues in positive or negative ways" (1995: 25).

Upon epistemological concerns, ecofeminist Gruen questions the Western objectivity of knowledge leading to the misconceptualization of nature and woman. For ecofeminists, as she argues in terms of a postmodernist ecofeminist perspective, "facts are theory-laden, theories are value-laden, and values are molded by historical and philosophical ideologies, social norms, and individual processes of categorization" (1994: 124). The epistemological discussion, thus, constitutes a basis for political interconnections because, as Stephanie Lahar states, the ultimate political aim of ecofeminism is "the deconstruction of oppressive social, economic, and political systems and the reconstruction of more viable social and political forms" (1996: 15). However, among ethical interconnections, mainstream ecological ethics, or shallow ecological ethics, fail to cope with this ultimate goal of ecofeminism due its tendency to androcentrism and anthropocentrism. King's ecofeminist ethics, in this sense, provide a strong ground regarding epistemological concerns and motivating political intentions. She demands reconciliation between

cultural and socialist feminism within ecofeminist framework. This would be an anti-dualistic alliance because “[t]ogether they make possible an ecological relationship between nature and culture, in which mind and nature, heart and reason, join forces to transform the internal and external systems of domination that threaten the existence of life on earth” (1992: 132).

It is evident that there is not a unified theoretical content having certain boundaries for ecofeminist theory. As Janet Biehl illustrates the diversified vision of ecofeminists, some ecofeminists believe in the connection between woman and nature but some regard it as a patriarchal deception. Some are spiritual while some ecofeminists are secular. Some ecofeminists consider that the ecological crisis dates back to New Stone Age while some indicate the emergence of Christianity and of scientific revolution. Some ecofeminists believe in wholeness and oneness but others tend to support multiplicity. Some ecofeminists are closer to the doctrines of social ecology while others feel sympathy with deep ecology (1991: 2-3). Though it is criticized that early ecofeminists hold an essentialist view applying some certain aspects of nature to all women and ignore that women and nature may own both masculine and feminine features, women, for ecofeminism in general, are connected with nature because they both experience the direct exposure to the oppression and exploitation by patriarchal forces.

For Bookchin, who develops the environmental philosophy of social ecology, there is an attraction to social roots as an antidote to the modern ecological crisis. “The social”, in his understanding of ecology, “can no longer be separated from the ecological, any more than humanity can be separated from nature” (1996a: 34). It is because of the impartibility of society and nature, as well as mind and body, that he adds the word ‘social’ before ‘ecology’ (Bookchin, 1988a: 16). According to John Clark, social ecology embraces an overarching holistic approach to the relationship among self, society and nature and he defines it as “the first ecological philosophy to present a developed approach to all the central issues of theory and practice” (1988a: 72) in radical ecologies. Bookchin claims that “[s]ocial ecology ‘radicalizes’ nature, or more precisely, our understanding of natural phenomena, by questioning the prevailing marketplace image of nature from an ecological standpoint [...]” (1988b: 55). Thus, in social ecology, the sense of nature not only

refers to non-anthropocentric ecological communities which cannot be classified as “blind”, “mute”, “cruel”, “competitive”, “stingy” and “necessitarian” but also a collaborative world in which the functioning of each interdependent life-forms is based on socio-ecological ethics characterized by freedom rather than authoritarian domination (Bookchin, 1988b: 55). What lies at the core of social ecology is to question the origins of ecologically turbulent societies and that how these societies can be integrated into well-organized eco-communities in terms of a dialectical method.

Bookchin, for the first time in 1962, invites society to be prepared for the consequences of environmental pollution including chemicals, radiation and pesticide use. Using pseudonym ‘Lewis Herber’, Bookchin publishes his book *Our Synthetic Environment* just before the emergence of Carson’s striking book *Silent Spring*. Until his death in 2006, he publishes many books in which he deals with society, nature, anarchy, urbanization, citizenship, democracy, corporation and regime. Compared to other ecosophers, Bookchin may be labelled as more humanitarian due to his avowal of increase in human population, goodness of human nature and development in technology to a tolerable extent within reason. Nevertheless, he more often than not focuses on socio-environmental roots of hierarchy, domination and capitalism. Regarding human interference as natural, he thinks that human is by nature inclined to change nature; yet, the planet is at the crossroads and it is human who is able to change the impending disaster. Thus, he suggests a reconciliation of past and present to construct a free future.

In “An Appeal for Social and Ecological Sanity”, Bookchin asks how human beings have arrived at this point: “Have we merely been mistaken in our judgement of humanity as evolving moral and rational animals, moving ever-forward toward the high liberatory ideals of the Renaissance and Enlightenment?” (1988c: 112). He also questions the regressive essence of progress ideal of modernity imbued with “moral and intellectual trappings”: “Is ‘progress’ itself a myth that, by its own self-development, turns into its opposite as regression?” (1988c: 112). In his discussion of modern ecological and social crisis, Bookchin emphasizes the misconception of nature as a demonic ‘realm of necessity’ rather than ‘realm of freedom’, which justifies the domination of nature. Though the origins of this

antagonistic imagery date back to Sumerian society, Victorian Age is accepted as the milestone in environmental historical process. He further states that what remains human being today is a historical dualism rising from Platonic view that immortal soul and mortal body differentiate, to the period including Descartes who believes in the split between mind and body (1988b: 50-52). Then, contrary to the social ecological assumption of mutual interdependence based upon 'differentiation' and 'fecundity', Darwinian orthodoxy proposes a model of survival grounded on 'rivalry' and 'competition' (Bookchin, 1988b: 56). However, the incontestability of the conventional reason and modern science and technology leads Bookchin to the conclusion that human beings can find new ways remodelling them into an ecological context. Namely, it requires new communities freed from hierarchy, rivalry and autocracy and based on equality, complementarity and decentralization. (1988b: 75-76).

As an interdisciplinary field embracing a holistic approach, social ecology, on the other hand, puts dialectical naturalism, first coined by Bookchin as a contrast to "Hegel's empyrean, basically antinaturalistic dialectical idealism" and "often scientific dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxists" (Bookchin, 1996a: 15), in the center of its philosophical discussions. Dialectical naturalism is Bookchin's ecosophical idea that reconciles biological 'first nature', which is primal, wild and untouched, with human 'second nature' which is man-made, changed and damaged. This doctrine mediates between 'Being', as first nature, and 'Becoming', as second nature. Thus, 'Being' has to be transformed into 'Becoming' because second nature, though it is still incomplete, is a natural consequence of first nature's evolutionary process. In conventional Hegelian terms, Bookchin takes first nature as 'thesis' and second nature as 'anti-thesis' not in the sense of contrasting and opposing but complementary and cumulative figures. Here, synthesis is, as Bookchin calls, 'free nature', or third nature. At this point, Bookchin does not intend to say that first nature exists for men to exploit and turn it into second nature in order to attain synthesis, free nature. Free nature, as his ultimate utopian realm, is not only "a nature that would diminish the pain and suffering that exist in both first and second nature" but also "a conscious and ethical nature, an ecological society [...]" (1996a: 33). Bookchin believes that human beings, along with nonhuman participation, can

consciously construct free nature through their own methods without completely refusing human effect, progressive technological apparatus and scientific means. However, dialectic naturalism cannot be evaluated as a philosophy allowing people to carry out arbitrary practices. Shannon Brincat and Damian Gerber argue that “[d]ialectical naturalism does not therefore advocate a hubristic ‘stewardship’ of nature at the hands of humanity”; instead, “through a successively graded series of determinate negations, humanity- through the development of its own ‘second nature’- gradually becomes conscious of its own potentialities for reason and freedom” (2015: 885).

Though social ecology acknowledges the destructive dimensions of rampant technologies and anthropocentric tendencies of scientific research, it does not favour to dismiss the development of technology completely. Rather, social ecologists ask for a renewal and reconstitution of environmentally friendly and creative technologies developed by ecologically self-realized human. This is directly related to social ecology’s understanding of ecological ethics on account of the fact that “[a]n ecological ethics of freedom cannot be divorced from a technics that enhances our relationship with nature- a creative, not destructive, ‘metabolism’ with nature” (Bookchin, 1996b: 90). Social ecology tends to encourage alternative ecological technology rather than expansionary industrial technology inherited by modernity. For social ecologists, society has no other way to contribute to the sustainability because, as Bookchin warns, “[e]ither revolution will create an ecological society, with new ecotechnologies and ecocommunities, or humanity and the natural world as we know it today will perish” (1986: 24). It would be inaccurate to claim that social ecology is in favour of the extant technics which are designed for serving the needs of capitalist economy today, but rather, it is ecotechnology that “serves to enrich an ecosystem just as compost in food cultivation enriches the soil, rather than degrading and simplifying the natural fundament of life” (Bookchin, 1996b: 91). So, Bookchin’s ideal third nature, which is connected to the second nature using ecotechnology as a scientific means, lacks of immoral and inorganic techno-systems paving the way for the exploitation, hierarchy and domination through its destructive force.

Besides, Bookchin, in his idea of dialectic naturalism, distinguishes conventional reason from dialectical reason. Conventional reason, as opposed to its modernist version, is not an ultimate goal on which human can trust by accepting it as it is; yet, it is taken as a means to reach a more ideal one by purifying it from the anthropocentric assumptions of modernity. According to Bookchin, conventional reason omits the structure of becoming process and cannot see the source and content of change: “It views a mammal, for example, as a creature marked by a highly fixed set of traits that distinguish it from everything that is not mammalian” and also “a human being in terms of particular stages of the life-cycle” (1996a: 7). In contrast to the basic principle of conventional reasoning as ‘A equals to A’, dialectical reason requires a premise that ‘A equals not only A but also not-A’. As Bookchin points out, “[d]ialectical reason grasps not only how an entity is organized at a particular moment but how it is organized to go beyond that level of development and become *other* than what it is, even as it retains its identity” (1996a: 8). In this sense, Bookchin emphasizes the inevitability of the change of nature without losing its identity. However, the conventional reason adopted by conventional ecology movements are mostly labelled as simply what Blake calls it ‘meddlesome’ (Bookchin, 1996a: 3) and filled with ‘what-ifs’, as in Diderot’s *Jacques the Fatalist*:

A hypothetical “if” that floats in isolation, lacking roots in a developmental continuum, is nonsensical. As Denis Diderot’s delightful character Jacques, in the picaresque dialogue *Jacques le Fataliste*, exclaimed when his master peppered him with random *if* questions: “If, if, if ... if the sea boiled, there would be a lot of cooked fish!” (Bookchin, 1996a: 27-28).

To put it simply, Bookchin, as a radical ecologist, unlike mainstream environmentalists that condemn the cosmological change with a shallow ecological perspective, supports the notion of the evolutionary transformation of nature. It is cumulative and epistemological, which contributes to the historical progress. It cannot be explained with a meaningless what-if question because it is causal as well as antithetic. This is a natural process in which the past is related to now and then to the future. That’s why “what-if” is a nonsensical determinist statement considering social ecology’s assumption that natural realm is a development toward complexity.

Therefore, to re-read social ecology backwards, the planet earth is going to come to a horrific end unless oppressive authority is replaced with individual



autonomy, hierarchy is demolished by interdependency of all beings, ecotechnology is preferred to capitalist and destructive technology, collaboration is valued over domination, dualism is overcome by holistic and organic view of universe, centralized wild corporatocracy is ceased to govern world's future instead of ecocommunities living in bioregions, and finally the defence economy aiming at nuclear armament is abandoned in favour of a productive agricultural economy based on local ecocommunities. Though the solutions suggested by social ecology seem utopian, Bookchin insists that it is necessary if human beings want to keep surviving as a harmonious species in nature. In his *Remaking Society*, he invites humans to make their choice or be prepared to face the strikingly negative consequences. According to Bookchin, ecology offers two sharp alternatives for humanity at this phase: "Either we will turn to seemingly 'utopian' solutions based on decentralization, a new equilibrium with nature, and the harmonization of social relations", or else, "we face the very real subversion of the material and natural basis for human life on the planet" (1990: 185).

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2. ICONOCLASTIC IDENTITY OF JULIAN BARNES: DECONSTRUCTING ANTHROPOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY IN *A HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN 10 ½ CHAPTERS*

Consisting of ten and half chapters, as the author calls it, this novel of Barnes actually draws the picture of an unusual history of the connection between mankind and natural world, which is a subversion of what has been thought and told so far. Though it seems as having different and independent subjects throughout the book, each chapter embraces overlapping accounts serving for the purpose of the author. Salman Rushdie considers Barnes's *A History of the World in 10 ½ Chapters* as "not a history but a fiction about what history might be" and as "old stories that sometimes seem to overlap; strange links, impertinent connections" (1991: 241). His connections and allusions can be labelled as impertinent, as Rushdie does, due to his courageous attempt to shake the thematically constructed reality about the nature of the history and also of the universe. To do this, Barnes relies on the postmodern narrative devices and revisits the settings of the human history masterfully. As Merritt Moseley claims, the purpose of the novel is "to unsettle the reader's confidence about the difference between truth and fiction, between history and story" (1997: 112). Indeed, Noah is presented as an unpleasant and irritating character that, with his family including an unknown fourth son, causes the extinction of many species during the voyage; a woodworm, the narrator of the first chapter, tells a total opposite story about the biblical flood; a lawyer defends the woodworms sued for damaging the church building in a trial; in the final chapter, the dreamer-protagonist narrates his experiences in the heaven. Elaborating on Barnes's literary technique, Rushdie observes that "what he offers us is the novel as footnote to history, as subversion of the given, as brilliant, elaborate doodle around the margins of what we know we think about what we think we know" (1991: 241).

It can be stated, for the most part of the novel, that Barnes shares the very core element of deep ecological philosophy: the disavowal of anthropocentrism. The author prefers to use deconstruction in order to shake man's place in the historical stage. In the first part of the novel entitled "The Stowaway", Barnes depicts one of the most significant historical events, the story of Noah's Ark, through the lens of a woodworm which narrates the story in an unusual way. At this point, the purpose of the author is valuable due to the fact that he enables a non-human living being to speak on behalf of the species of silenced nature. Identifying, as people always do, Noah and his family as the prototype of the rest of humans, the woodworm tells that he is a reliable source to reveal the truth because he is not among the chosen and privileged animals. In the beginning of the story, the woodworm, for instance, emphasizes that there is a huge gap between human and non-human account in interpreting what is real. The woodworm tells that he is knowledgeable about how these accounts are different. For the narrator, humankind has biblical tales and facts, which is still impressing even for agnostics, while the animals have an anthology of nostalgic and sensual myths (Barnes, 2009: 4). The latter seems to be presented as more trustworthy in the story. Thus, the author informs the reader of his intention in the beginning of the novel, which is to deconstruct the anthropocentric orientations and adaptations by giving his insect narrator the ability to 'realize' and evaluate the history in stark contrast to human deduction because human mind "has always been hopeless about days" (Barnes: 2009: 4-5).

Barnes analyzes human's inherent feelings, which seem to be reflected as not quite in a friendly manner, about nonhuman realm in terms of Noah who, as a representative figure of human genome, is defined as a villain, hysteric and dishonest and alcohol-addict man (2009: 8). The author is certainly aware of one of the environmental arguments that the roots of the animosity between human and non-human date back to the fall of man in a biblical story. Locating the problem in Christian anthropocentric theology, the chief modern figures dominating and shaping the history of humanity accuse non-human of being the sole responsible for man's fall down on earth causing human beings to be born into original sin. The earth is

then a prison in which mankind pays for his punishment and a place where men lose the power of immortality and the superiority over nature. Sessions claims that:

For example, the leading philosophical spokesmen for the Scientific Revolution (Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Gottfried Leibniz) were all strongly influenced by Christian anthropocentric theology. Bacon claimed that modern science would allow humans to regain a command over Nature that had been lost with Adam's Fall in the Garden. Descartes, considered the "father" of modern Western philosophy, argued that the new science would make humans the "masters and possessors of nature." Also in keeping with his Christian background, Descartes's famous "mind-body dualism" resulted in the view that only humans had minds (or souls): all other creatures were merely bodies (machines). Animals had no sentience (mental life) and so, among other things, could feel no pain. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Darwin had to argue, against prevailing opinion, that at least the great apes experienced various feelings and emotions! (1995b: 160-61).

However, the insect narrator discusses that Christian anthropocentric theology including serpent story that leads human beings to bear hostility towards nature must be revisited due to its unreliability. The narrator says they are not knowledgeable about the religious background of the voyage and the creator's anger against their species: "We weren't in any way to blame (you don't really believe that story about the serpent, do you? – it was just Adam's black propaganda), and yet the consequences for us were equally severe [...]" (2009: 6). It opposes the idea that religious discourses referencing the earliest relationship between human and nature justify human invasion and exploitation because it is nothing but an anthropocentric propaganda. The narrator raises the question that non-human creatures also suffer as similar to human: "[E]very species wiped out except for a single breeding pair, and that couple consigned to the high seas under the charge of an old rogue with a drink problem who was already into his seventh century of life" (2009: 6).

The humanization of the discourses throughout the history has been an explicit indication of man's regarding nature as an instinctual target. Thus, to blame an animal as a devilish creature paving the way for the original sin may serve the purpose of history recorded by human. The disruption of these discourses by a woodworm provides readers to question not only what they know about human history but also how their perception of truth is shaped through his species. The insect narrator of the novel regards human beings as creatures who always legitimate themselves in a fictional realm by overlooking their own deficiency: "Blame

someone else, that's always your first instinct. And if you can't blame someone else, then start claiming the problem isn't a problem anyway. Rewrite the rules, shift the goalposts" (2009: 29). Its thoughts on human may be evocative of the criticism on deep ecologists charged with misanthropy. However, the narrator, like radical ecologists, cannot be claimed as misanthropic because it is aware of human's "cleverness" and "considerable potential" (2009: 28). What is unacceptable is that human's conducting hostility towards nonhuman within the illusionary lands of man-centred realm. It would be a serious mistake to justify this through a habitual anthropocentric pattern because to consider that "[t]he Fall was the serpent's fault" is "a brazen attempt to shift responsibility on to the animals; and all, sadly, part of a pattern" (2009: 29). It seems that the image of the serpent in the expulsion of man from the Garden of Eden is brought into disrepute by human species who generalize it to such an extent that people kill certain animals "simply being what they [are]" as "Noah and his tribe" (2009: 15) are claimed to do in the novel. The insect narrator links the disappearance of the basilisk, the legendary king of serpents, to this hatred. It describes the basilisk as having "a very nasty look in its eye" and being "not the most alluring beast on the Ark"; however, "it had its rights like everyone else [...]" (2009: 15). In this sense, the desire for giving the deserved right to the so-called lowest and most devilish being evokes the sense of deep ecology's egalitarian principles; the equality of all beings beyond anthropocentrism despite the affiliation of any species with malignancy.

Deep ecologists disapprove the outcomes of moral extensionism as it triggers another mode of anthropocentric individualism. "In expanding the scope of moral standing", Zimmermann claims, "moral extensionists tend to include only those entities that share some aspect of a property recognized as essential to human life: sentience or consciousness" (1994: 44). Through a reductionist approach, moral philosophies since Enlightenment degrade nonhuman entities enabling men to conceptualize nonhuman world according to its status and hierarchy he himself creates. In this regard, John Rodman asks whether it is a kind of new enlightenment to consider "nonhumans as imbeciles, wilderness as a human vegetable" (1977: 94). Similarly, the animals in the Noah's Ark are likened to pieces of meat of "a floating cafeteria" (2009: 14) for Noah and his family. One of the most striking examples of

hierarchical discrimination in the ship appears in terms of two different classes: “the clean and the unclean. [...] Being clean meant that they could be eaten. Seven animals were welcome on board, but five were destined for the galley” (2009: 10-11). On the other hand, people tend to call some animals, contrary to pigs, sheep and chickens, as “nobler species” (2009: 27) because, as the narrator elucidates, they make a conscious and wise choice to maintain their lives far from man’s neighbourhood. The classification and conventional hierarchy in both cases are anthropocentric. The narrator draws the reader’s attention to the point that man assumes the role of extending rights to nonhuman beings not because of their utility for his own species, but also of closeness to himself in terms of conscience and sentient. In any case, as Rodman concludes, it is just a “modified version of the conventional hierarchy of moral worth that locates humans at the top of the scale (of intelligence, consciousness, sentience), followed by “higher” animals, “lower” animals, plants, rocks, and so forth” (1995: 249). The insect narrator indicates how the individuals of animal world, whatever their status is, are disturbed by this kind of moral extensionism leading to discrimination: “There was, as you can imagine, deep resentment at the divisiveness of God’s animal policy. Indeed, at first even the clean animals themselves were embarrassed by the whole thing [...]” (2009: 10). Barnes can be claimed to reflect his ecological sense into the tone of the novel through allowing his nonhuman narrator to express deep ecological assumptions. As mentioned previously, deep ecologists, like Barnes does in his work, refuse all components of anthropocentric deductions and hierarchical approaches to nonhuman beings; yet, they are aware of the ecological balance among the species as an incontestable part of great natural order. Barnes illustrates this non-anthropocentric approach to the reality of nonhuman kingdom via his narrator conspicuously. The woodworm narrator claims that he knows how human beings despise animal kingdom and finds it “brutal, cannibalistic and deceitful”. However, the narrator mentions about the ongoing equality among animals and does not deny that they eat each other in order to fulfil the basic animal needs. However, it is told that this is quite natural. It does not mean that an animal eaten by another does not make one inferior and another one superior. The narrator tells this is not easy for a man to understand the “mutual respect” among the animals (2009: 10). The concept of

equality in the passage is underlined as not attainable for human race who considers the innate features and talents of all species as related to supremacy. The author gives the impression that he desires for a major shift in the perception of nonhuman realm through deconstructing the destructive path of conventional way of thought.

The narrator also wonders about the reason why human is located, or locates himself, at the top in the interspecies hierarchy. It ignores the role of reason as opposed to those leading philosophers who attach great importance to the enlightened mind. It seems that, for the narrator, human faculty is not adequate to make him the most excellent being mastering over the rest of the world. The insect says it is not surprising that “God decided to wipe the slate clean; the only puzzle was that he chose to preserve anything at all of this species whose creation did not reflect particularly well on its creator” (2009: 8). The purpose here is to attempt to overthrow the human as master race showing him that any specialities attributed to mankind may not be morally right and fair so as to lay the foundations for sanctification and glorification of humanity. The narrator makes a recurrent statement in the following pages focusing on human who is lack of reliability and loyalty compared to other superior beings:

On the Ark we puzzled ceaselessly at the riddle of how God came to choose man as His protégé ahead of the more obvious candidates. He would have found most other species a lot more loyal. If He'd plumped for the gorilla, I doubt there'd have been half so much disobedience – probably no need to have had the Flood in the first place (2009: 18).

The author gives the impression that he carries Swift's suspicious approach to the exaggeration of human capacity further in an attempt to decenter man completely by comparing it to a gorilla: “Put him side by side with the gorilla and you will easily discern the superior creation: the one with graceful movement, superior strength and an instinct for delousing” (2009: 17-18). In this regard, the author has totally different perspective on the dualism between the denigrated and the aggrandized. He deconstructs the popularized notion that human ranks first among the beings due to his reasoning faculty. Raising the question that whether body may transcend mind in contradistinction to the traditional Cartesian mind-body dualism, the insect-narrator considers gorilla as superior because human “didn't even have the skill to grow his own hair except around his face; for the rest of his covering he relied on the skins of

other species” (2009: 17). Barnes’s nonhuman character underlines the equivalent significance of a bodily aspect, or a physical fact maintaining a critical stance against the myth of the “ghost in the machine”<sup>4</sup>, the concept used by philosopher Gilbert Ryle to satirize official and dogmatic philosophy based on Cartesian rationalism. The author of the novel aims to manifest that the hairy body structure of some animals is equated with the complicated structure of non-physical body, the human mind. Mark Rowlands, in accordance with this idea, claims that “[i]ndeed, minds can be conceived of as relevantly similar to other bodily organs. Just as the heart circulates blood, the liver regulates metabolism, and the kidneys process waste products, the mind thinks” (2000: 5). Barnes here probes the mind/body dichotomy, in which the owner of the mind also abuses its existence as a means of achieving an ontological superiority. He ignores this non-physical feature of human beings in the text by dwelling on the physical body, considers it as a ghost as Ryle describes and reduces it to a standard level of the organism as Rowlands does. The author, on the other hand, ridicules the exaggeration of mind giving his insect narrator an omniscient role, through which the narrator defines its species, *anobium domesticum*, as “sensible” (2009: 19) while despising the function of human mind inflexible and unhelpful: “Six hundred years should have produced some flexibility of mind, some ability to see both sides of the question. Not a bit of it” (2009: 21).

The principal difference between shallow and deep ecology can be evaluated as an indication of the author-text relationship in the novel. As already hinted at the first chapter, the conventional environmentalist approach of shallow ecology comes out as anthropocentric, namely, “it has a humans-first value system”, while radical discourses of deep ecology “specifically emphasize for the intrinsic worth of all beings” (Drengson, 2008: 27). Thus, the consistency and reliability of the author who is claimed to have an ecological sense may be determined through his/her ideas beyond the diction. In the novel, the process of deconstruction of the anthropocentrism in the world history intensifies the author’s relationship with the text by the way of his rejection of the shallow ecological principles. The author in the novel implies that Noah’s accepting a pair of animals in the voyage does not prove that he is a good nature-friendly man who saves these beings as much as possible;

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<sup>4</sup> See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition, Routledge, Abingdon 2009.



indeed, he is in pursuit of making healthy ecosystems that will serve for his race. As a part of it, he needs those animals for using and eating. Barnes seems to resist the idea that nonhuman beings exist for satisfying human needs. The narrator is aware of the fact that:

[Noah] collected the animals together because he didn't want them to die out, that he couldn't endure not seeing a giraffe ever again, that he was doing it for us. This wasn't the case at all [...] He got us together because [...] of self-interest [...] He wanted to have something to eat after the Flood had subsided. Five and a half years under water and most of the kitchen gardens were washed away, I can tell you; only rice prospered. And so most of us knew that in Noah's eyes we were just future dinners on two, four or however many legs (2009: 22).

Barnes's authorial attitude to human-animal relation is a clear indication of the fact that man's desire for the goodness of nonhuman is actually for the benefit of mankind. His critical stance against this shallow ecological view stands for the author's sincere commitment to the philosophical assumptions of the environmental ethics. Thus, he can manage to remove "the distinction between the poet and the scene" which is a sort of "distinction similar to that between humans and environment in the shallow ecology movement" (Naess, 2008: 200). In other words, the real-life awareness of the author and his way of handling the issue concerning human/nature dichotomy is merely represented in the text, leading to a connection with the fictional scene and its creator. Only if the author escapes the illusionary realm of human-first values of conventional environmentalism, as Barnes does, will the gap disappear between the author and the stage. No doubt that his narrator is of significance in terms of mediating between the two. Criticized even by other environmentalist movements due to its valour to grant value to the so-called lowest beasts, the philosophical principles of deep ecology could not be represented any better than an insect narrator of the novel which reduces the possibility of a shallow ecological insight to echo in the novel. For instance, the woodworm attempts to narrate how human beings exploit the inborn gifts of certain animals for their well-being with an example of a cow. It is known that people would guess whether it was going to rain or not through the foresight of cows sitting in the middle of the field just before the rain. The fundamental point here is that nonhuman can be benefited in each possible case. However, the narrator directly focuses on the privileged intrinsic

value of these animals by saying that “the point of it certainly isn’t to act as a cheap weather-vane for human beings” (2009: 12). Shallow ecology, on the other hand, finds it rightful and necessary to make use of every possible option because it is not ‘deep’ to consider the value questioning.

The violence and torture against the animals constitute a vital part in the first chapter of the novel. In an attempt to react to the anthropocentric thesis of which roots can be found in certain enlightenment thinkers like Descartes and Hume, the author aims to disturb human view holding the dogmatic belief that nonhuman is a senseless machine feeling no pain. Barnes, in fact, draws the picture of a huge laboratory where many animals are being tortured under the guise of different scientific reasons. The ark is presented as comparable to laboratory and Noah’s family to men of science. Thus, he intends to force his readers to question the behavioural patterns and human consciousness and to reveal how deep an alteration is required in the view of nature. As in the example of *Anobium domesticum*, voicing the oppression at first hand may help alter the modern human consciousness that cannot grasp how, as deep ecology suggests, deeply rooted the crisis is. However, the prominent ecotheologian Thomas Berry states that people may not manage the current crisis “as though there were some minimal balance already existing that could be slightly modified on both sides to bring into being a general balance. The violence already done to the earth is on a scale beyond all acceptability” (1999: 108). Indeed, the shattering conclusion of the insect narrator in the novel proves Berry’s critical stance at the wild nature of human history:

Yet if you could have heard the weeping of the shellfish, the grave and puzzled complaint of the lobster, if you could have seen the mournful shame of the stork, you would have understood that things would never be the same again amongst us (2009: 11).

The exploitation and violence against the animals start from the very beginning of the chapter. The narrator states that the animals are examined in a way that resembles rape before being accepted to the ship: “[T]here were medical inspections, often of a brutally intrusive nature [...]” (2009: 7). Though human race is selected as the master deciding the entrance into the ship, some animals, as the woodworm narrates, find the conditions very insulting and prefer to suffocate to death during the rise of the water. Yet, some animals who stow away are killed and

some are whipped by Noah's family. It is certain that the insect narrator is critical of this unjust balance between human and nonhuman and this brutal violence because he emphasizes the exclusive features of the nonhuman on all occasions comparing these skills to human species. In this sense, the author uses his insect narrator to ridicule Noah's principle of selection for the entrance into the ark for the purpose of deconstructing human rationality. It is revealed that there are some animals which are better at abstract analysis for calculating the best space for beings in the construction of the ship: "Animals of a speculative bent began to propound rival selection principles, based on the beast size or utility rather than mere number; but Noah loftily refused to negotiate" (2009: 8). In fact, Noah's lofty attitude in the novel is not seen as different from his descendants because human being more often than not "tends to look down on" (2009: 10) nonhuman world. Deep ecological theory postulates that it is this sense of supremacy that underpins the precipitating factor triggering human drives of violence towards the weaker than himself/herself. It is an indisputable fact that this has caused irrecoverable wounds for all living beings on earth. Barnes makes references to these disturbing facts through strikingly wise imageries. The reader learns that the physical adaptation of chameleons to their environment by changing colours for camouflage originates in its fear from Noah who "had a gopher-wood stave with which ... well, some of the animals carry the stripes to this day" (2009: 12). The tendency to the violence like this can be seen at any moment of the voyage. Like modern people killing injured and sick animals not to suffer, sick animals in the ship are treated cruelly and they are thrown into the water together with their partners because the authorities of the ark are not sentimentalist enough to "urge the grieving partner to live out its natural span" (2009: 13). The narrator complains about not only the direct interference of human in the right of survival of animals but also the ignorance of people about nonhuman world causing the extinction. For instance, when a pair of pretty plovers begins to moult as a seasonal consequence, turning from blue-brown into pure white, they are boiled due to the wrong opinion that they may be infected (2009: 14). However, the author seems to believe an ecological fact voiced by Thomas Birch that "[w]ildness cannot be ostracized, or exterminated, or chastened into discipline through punishment, reward, or even behavior modification techniques" (1995: 344) because,

as Barnes claims in the novel, “still, you can’t stop Nature, can you?” (2009: 14). His capitalizing the first letter of nature gives the impression that human has a greater rival than he expects for this struggle.

The nonhuman narrator believes that there is a systematic genocide conducted against the animal race in the ship, which makes the readers confused about the events that happen in this holy voyage. The killing of animals reaches arbitrary extensions beyond the need for nutrition. For the third principle of deep ecology platform, as can be remembered, satisfying vital needs is segregated from the arbitrary treatment which, by any means, creates the endangering of richness and diversity of the forms. The extinction of some species has a direct relationship with this fairly high-handed attitude. The novel emphasizes the non-vital needs through the lens of the beasts: “At times we suspected a kind of system behind the killing that went on. Certainly there was more extermination than was strictly necessary for nutritional purposes – far more” (2009: 15). The narrator then proves its observation on arbitrariness by adding that the fact is beyond the matter of nutrition: “[...] some of the species that were killed had very little eating on them. What’s more, the gulls would occasionally report that they had seen carcasses tossed from the stern with perfectly good meat thick on the bone” (2009: 15).

While attacking the established anthropocentric ideologies, the narrator, on the other hand, mentions about the existence of a lost son of Noah, Varadi, who is an environment-friendly man used as a role model for the author’s ecological purposes. Varadi’s existence, despite his death shortly after the voyage begins, is an attraction to Naess’s concept of Self-realization as an antidote to the excessive torture and violence of human beings. Self-realization of Naess is a comprehensive term integrating individual self into the universal Self. The individual self can attain the universal Self, or ecological self, by means of diminishing the ego. As Harold Glasser explains, “this principle asserts that the increased realization of any individual or species rests on advancing (or at least not hindering) the realization potential of all other individuals or species” (2005: xlv). To put it simply, appreciating the nonviolent communicative skills, Naess discusses that a self-realized person is the one who is committed to the principles of ecological ethics and to the ecological sensibility. The ecological sensibility requires focusing on the self-

transcendental extension by combining the body, spirit and the surrounding. What lies at the core is the extensive identification and sympathy with the rest of life forms in general. Therefore, the only man who can suit these ecologically designed qualifications in the novel is, as the insect narrator suggests as well, Varadi. He is the only human praised in the story, mostly due to his ecological sense. Varadi whose existence has not been mentioned in the historical records, is defined by the narrator as such:

[...] but you don't know about Varadi, do you? He was the youngest and strongest of Noah's sons; which didn't, of course, make him the most popular within the family. He also had a sense of humour – or at least he laughed a lot, which is usually proof enough for your species. [...] Yes, Varadi was always cheerful (2009: 5-6).

The positive impression of the narrator stems from the closeness of the lost son with nonhuman beings: “He could be seen strutting the quarterdeck with a parrot on each shoulder; he would slap the quadrupeds affectionately on the rump which they'd acknowledge with an appreciative bellow” (2009: 6). The narrator also suggests that he is the least tyrannical and dictatorial member of the family, implying that Varadi is able to develop healthier and more insightful relationships without otherizing the animals in his ark. It can be claimed that he is not characterized by an egocentric identity, as pertinent to the concept of Self in deep ecology, in terms of widening identification and sympathy towards the interests of other(ized) beings. “Without that identification, one is not so easily drawn to become involved in deep ecology” (qtd. in Bodian, 1995: 30), as Naess tells in an interview. However, it is understood that being a radical within an intensely anthropocentric system is quite difficult considering what happens to the radical ecologists in their struggles filled with facing death, being threatened by official authorities and sentenced to imprisonment. Similarly, Varadi is blamed for spending “too much time fraternizing with the beasts” (2009: 6) by the family members and disappears questionably with his ark sheltering one-fifth of the earth's species. Varadi's self-realized ecological character enabling him to establish intimate and all-embracing relationships is a “severe loss” for human species because, as the insect narrator tells, “his genes would have helped [humans] a great deal” (2009: 6). In this sense, it is evident that human history, when coupled with the environmental ignorance and destruction through violent acts, does

not bear the traces of Varadi's spirit. On one hand the story illustrates the signs of Naess's self-realization via Varadi who removes the barriers of 'ego' between the narrow egoistic self and comprehensive Self, on the other hand, it shows how this ecological sense of humanity may have disappeared into the depths of sea along with Varadi.

The narrator maintains to change the perceptions manipulated by official human-centred point of views. People in the ark are reflected as true to life characters that can make mistakes rather than holy personalities exalted in biblical stories. The other members of the family are portrayed as cruel, violent and brutal by the narrator. Some of their behaviours sound very familiar to that of modern human. For instance, Shem, one of the sons of Noah, locks a couple of lemmings up in a case and waves his knife inside whenever he is bored. The narrator mentions about the influence of this cruelty leading traumatization of entire species (2009: 22). Furthermore, Ham's wife is described as a dressy woman who chops the head of a couple of carbuncle, a mythological animal with a jewel on its forehead, together with Ham for the purpose of owning and wearing that precious stone (2009: 15). Barnes seems to present Ham's wife as the ancestor of some modern woman ignoring a seal slaughtered for its fur, an elephant killed for its ivory and a rhinoceros hunted for its horns in an attempt to exhibit their social status.

The narrator concludes that the human's belief system concerning the ontological order is problematic as a result of carrying Noah's genes: "[...] your species – I hope you don't mind my saying this – is so hopelessly dogmatic. You believe what you want to believe, and you go on believing it" (2009: 25). It shows that, through the lens of a nonhuman, human species deceives himself/herself about the nature of nature and this is naturally followed by the discrimination and competition among species as in Darwinian theory of beings. For instance the narrator criticizes this discrimination via the story between the dove and raven in the novel. Everybody remembers the image of a dove holding an olive branch in its beak as a symbol of peace. This positive scene enables human mind to enshrine the image of a dove, which automatically leads to classification between animals as a result of putting a dove in a higher status. For the insect narrator, this human speculation may

not be true; that is to say, it could be a raven holding the olive branch. Below is the story from the nonhuman point of view:

When the Ark landed on the mountaintop [...], Noah sent out a raven and a dove to see if the waters had retreated from the face of the earth. Now, in the version that has come down to you, the raven has a very small part [...] The dove's three journeys, on the other hand, are made a matter of heroism. We weep when she finds no rest for the sole of her foot; we rejoice when she returns to the Ark with an olive leaf. You have elevated this bird, I understand, into something of symbolic value. So let me just point this out: the raven always maintained that he found the olive tree; that he brought a leaf from it back to the Ark; but that Noah decided it was 'more appropriate' to say that the dove had discovered it. Personally, I always believed the raven, who apart from anything else was much stronger in the air than the dove; and it would have been just like Noah (modelling himself on that God of his again) to stir up a dispute among the animals (2009: 25).

In the sense of a deep ecological point, the author's main purpose can be interpreted as deconstructing the anthropocentric authenticity justifying human's right to give partial consideration into nonhuman world by relying on the disputable value principles. If the raven were the bird bringing the olive branch, people would draw its picture and elevate it when they are talking about peace. The principles of intrinsic value, diversity and richness held by deep ecology not only deny otherizing, but also refuse to aggrandize one species over the other. Instead, deep ecology extends the value so as to embrace all life forms. The author, on the other hand, implies that these fictional discourses of human history are unreliable and deficient to label them as aggrandized or denigrated beings. For him, it could have been the raven's right to be placed into the pages of history, or to be cared for more by people if Noah wanted so:

Noah had it put about that the raven, instead of returning as soon as possible with evidence of dry land, had been malingering, and had been spotted (by whose eye? Not even the upwardly mobile dove would have demeaned herself with such a slander) gourmandising on carrion. The raven, I need hardly add, felt hurt and betrayed at this instant rewriting of history, and it is said – by those with a better ear than mine – that you can hear the sad croak of dissatisfaction in his voice to this day. The dove, by contrast, began sounding unbearably smug from the moment we disembarked. She could already envisage herself on postage stamps and letterheads (2009: 25-26).

Human's anti-propaganda for nonhuman beings can be likened to Noah's decision regarding the appropriateness and accusation of raven because the author underlines tenaciously that human species "all have Noah's genes" (2009: 25). In this regard,

this sanctified hereditary characteristic of anthropocentric humanism seems to be brought up for discussion with these stories in the story of which themes are transposed from the sphere of human construct to that of raven.

Decentralization of human in the last pages of the chapter is connected to a conclusion with a striking comparison and generalization. The narrator finds the perception of human as superior creature unacceptable. Contrary to the conventional human-nature relationships in literature, Barnes's *A History of the World* deconstructs the roles granting a woodworm a self-confident and 'noble' characteristic and providing a portrayal of human endowed with 'unevolved' and 'immature' traits which cause failing to attain self-realization. The insect narrator compares human and animals after the experiences on the ark:

That Voyage taught us a lot of things, you see, and the main thing was this: that man is a very unevolved species compared to the animals. [...] you are, as yet, at an early stage of your development. We, for instance, are always ourselves: that is what it means to be evolved. We are what we are, and we know what that is. You don't expect a cat suddenly to start barking, do you, or a pig to start lowing? But this is what, in a manner of speaking, those of us who made the Voyage on the Ark learned to expect from your species. One moment you bark, one moment you mew; one moment you wish to be wild, one moment you wish to be tame (2009: 28-29).

Furthermore, the narrator of the first chapter and the proponents of deep ecology share more or less similar belief about some of the destructive features affecting human nature. The narrator claims that “[g]uilt, immaturity, the constant struggle to hold down a job beyond your capabilities – it makes a powerful combination, one which would have had the same ruinous effect on most members of your species” (2009: 30). People feel guilty for the harm they give nature but cannot go beyond simply murmuring instead of taking measures for a peaceful ecological order. They are immature and egocentric individuals because, as Naess tells, they cannot extend their ego to reach universal self and thus attain self-realization. They insist to struggle for controlling nature through science, technology and reason despite the hopeless efforts and incapability of achieving this. Then, the combination of all, which may encapsulate more within itself, seems to bring about the new downfall of humanity, as Barnes warns.

The matter of egocentricism is handled by the author in the second chapter of the novel entitled “The Visitors” which is about hijacking a cruise liner by a group



of Arabs. Franklin Hughes is asked to justify the illegal act with a political explanation to the passengers from different nationalities in exchange for the survival of his girlfriend, Tricia Maitland. Franklin has to make a choice between two “equally repellent ideas: that of abandoning his girlfriend while retaining his integrity, or rescuing his girlfriend by justifying to a group of innocent people why it was right that they should be killed” (2009: 53). The author likens Franklin’s situation to a test practiced on monkeys in a TV series which was once asked him to present. The narrator tells, “[o]ne item in that show reported an experiment for measuring the point at which self-interest takes over from altruism” (2009: 52). The narrator, then, explains the experiment as follows:

The researchers had taken a female monkey who had recently given birth and put her in a special cage. The mother was still feeding and grooming her infant in a way presumably not too dissimilar from the maternal behaviour of the experimenters’ wives. Then they turned a switch and began heating up the metal floor of the monkey’s cage. At first she jumped around in discomfort, then squealed a lot, then took to standing on alternate legs, all the while holding her infant in her arms. The floor was made hotter, the monkey’s pain more evident. At a certain point the heat from the floor became unbearable, and she was faced with a choice, as the experimenters put it, between altruism and self-interest. She either had to suffer extreme pain and perhaps death in order to protect her offspring, or else place her infant on the floor and stand on it to keep herself from harm. In every case, sooner or later self-interest had triumphed over altruism (2009: 52-53).

The test is so disturbing that Franklin feels happy when the TV series is cancelled before the experiment. However, he thinks that human beings would not be egocentric as monkeys because “[t]hat was the difference between a monkey and a human being. In the last analysis, humans were capable of altruism” (2009: 53). Barnes’s choice of the word ‘altruism’ seems to be analogous to Naess’s term ‘self-realization’. According to Naess, altruism is a consequence of self-realization: “Increased self-identification is increased identification with others. ‘Altruism’ is a natural consequence of this identification” (1995a: 80). Though humans are capable of self-realization or, as Barnes calls, of altruism, Franklin chooses self-interest by attempting to justify terrorism for the sake of saving Tricia and himself from being killed. Yet, the author punishes him because Tricia never speaks to him due to his decision. Actually, the monkey in the test is definitely Franklin himself. With this terrible scene, the author seems to force Franklin to identify himself with a

nonhuman being through this violent actual test: “Now he felt a bit like that monkey” (2009: 53). Barnes seems to raise the question that whether the radical part of radical ecology that does not exclude violent action works for human to sympathy with nonhuman beings. On the other hand, the author proves that human’s position is not different from that of monkey whose rights are raped. At this point, he conveys the impression that it is not egocentrism or self-interest that will save humanity but an altruistic attitude. In a deep ecological sense, as Naess suggests, “everything that can be achieved by altruism- the dutiful, moral consideration of others- can be achieved, and much more, by the process of widening and deepening our selves” (2005: 516). Otherwise, human can lose nature as Franklin is deprived of his Tricia in the novel.

The third chapter entitled “The Wars of Religion” tells a very interesting medieval story in which the woodworms are sued by the locales because these insects give harm to church building and defended by a lawyer, Bartholomé Chassenée who, as a spokesperson of nonhuman animals in the silenced nature, can be considered as an eco-activist considering the age in which humanism is at its peak. The portrayal of the beasts in the chapter through such biophobic descriptions and adjectives as “malefactors”, “hateful and intolerable” (2009: 62) and “vile and unnatural” (2009: 64) reflect not only man’s point of view but also patience toward nonhuman beings. Furthermore, this intolerant homocentric attitude attempts to draw a border for the biotope far from living spaces of human. The claimants demand insects to leave the places inhabited by human. However, the author reveals how human-centred idea prompting man to erect buildings in the middle of fields and forests, cut down trees ruining natural spaces and rape living spaces of animals causes narrowing down natural habitats for wildlife. Chassenée explains this situation in the novel in accordance with what deep ecological philosophy indicates: “Far from the woodworm infesting what Man has constructed, it is Man who has wilfully destroyed the woodworm’s habitation and taken it for his own purpose” (2009: 75). It is emphasized that it is human who needs to question the egocentric tendency creating hubris for the humanist philosophy: “Are those [...] so sure of their humility and Christian virtue that they would accuse the humblest animal before accusing themselves?” (2009: 68). At the end of the chapter, it is narrated that the manuscript of the court decision in favour of human is “attacked, perhaps on more

than one occasion, by some species of termite” (2009: 68), which seems to indicate an authorial attitude to emphasize the ecocentric egalitarianism.

Barnes also brings the religion-based anthropocentric propaganda out of concealment in this chapter. As mentioned before, Western intellectual thought, intensely criticized by the proponents of deep ecology due to its overemphasis on men, is shaped by the humanist tradition whose assumptions are heavily based on theological sources. White Jr. argues that along with “its doctrinal formulations or through the secularized vestiges of dogma which became the liberal creed of the Enlightenment, the Church proved herself, when not the *mater*, at least the *matrix* of Western thought” (1942: 145). In accordance with the views of Mirandola and Petrarch, the author displays the view of universe of the time as such:

And in the fourth place, it is contended that the court does not have the power and the right to pronounce the decree of excommunication. But this is to deny the very authority conferred by God upon his dear spouse, the Church, whom He has made sovereign of the whole world, having put all things under Her feet, as the Psalmist affirms, all sheep and oxen, the beasts of the field, the fowl of the air, the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas (2009: 72-73).

The quoted passage, an advocacy of the locals who appear in court in the story, directly refers to the richness and diversity which is rendered defenceless against human interference through scriptural teachings as opposed to the deep ecological philosophy adopting the principle that the natural richness and diversity have value in themselves, independent of human interference and purpose. Once more, the advocacy is grounded on the roots of anthropocentric propaganda, on the story of serpent whose existence is seen as an offence to the church and god:

Indeed, do we not read in our sacred texts of serpents and poisonous reptiles whose venom has been conjured from them? Do we not read in the sacred book of Ecclesiastes that ‘Surely the serpent will bite without enchantment’? [...] Was not the serpent cursed in the Garden of Eden, making it to crawl upon its belly for the rest of its life? (2009: 73).

In addition to the woodworm’s evaluation of the very root of the conflict by diagnosing it as an anthropocentric propaganda, Chassenée, the attorney defending the rights of the animals in court, tries to put an end to the matter by telling “God’s creatures [...] are entitled to sustenance even as man is entitled to sustenance” (2009: 77). The author invites human beings to acknowledge a universal ethics of Naessian

ecological philosophy that all species have the right to survive and flourish. Their destiny could not be subject to any political and religious authority and also man-made realms of anthropocentric ideology.

Barnes deals with the story of Kathleen Ferris in the fourth chapter of the novel, "The Survivor". The protagonist, who is also the narrator of the story, tries to escape from the destructive influences of a nuclear disaster through a boat along with her cats. Though the decision is left to the readers to make whether Kath really sails to escape or exists in a hospital room due to her paranoia, her voyage seems to bear some resemblances to Noah's story in the first chapter of the novel. With a boat like Noah's ark, a pair of cats symbolizing the animals accepted as couples in the ark, and nuclear threat as in flood myth, Kath attempts to save herself and her family from a human-induced disaster in this story. During her voyage, the protagonist provides ecological approaches to the extraordinary conditions environing her. Firstly, the chapter embraces one of the most striking references to the perspectives of deep ecology, which are, as Devall and Sessions claim, informed by the major laws of ecology. (1985: 87). According to this first law suggested by biologist Barry Commoner in *The Closing Circle*: "Everything is connected to everything else" (1980: 29). This principle has contributed much not only to the development of deep ecological consciousness, but also to the biological perspective revolting anthropocentric considerations. It appears that Kath shares the same purpose to widen this consciousness by underlining the slogan "everything is connected" (2009: 84, 85 and 89) more than once in an ecological context, which forces the reader not to miss the point throughout the story. This first law concerning the universality of ecological cycle is exemplified best through Chernobyl disaster handled in the chapter. The narrator explicitly warns those who avoid interfering in ecological matters currently because they think that they will not be affected. She illustrates the human thought that is uninvolved in this serious matter: "And anyway it was a long way away, in Russia, and they didn't have proper modern power stations over there like we do, [...] so it couldn't happen here and there wasn't anything to worry about, was there?" (2009: 84). Yet, Commoner compares the ecosystem to a net in which "each knot is connected to others by several strands" (1980: 34) and a disorder in any part will break down the whole. It is demonstrated in the novel that this first law of

ecology always works considering the radioactive cloud spreading over Europe. The narrator explains the connectedness through a dramatic example based on a true story:

At first the plan had been to bury the reindeer six feet down. It wasn't much of a news story, just an inch or two on the foreign page. The cloud had gone over where the reindeer grazed, poison had come down in the rain, the lichen became radioactive, the reindeer had eaten the lichen and got radioactive themselves. What did I tell you, she thought, everything is connected (2009:85).

The narrator, on the other hand, seems to blame the basic paradigms of modernity like industrial capitalism, science and human reason for the roots of this ecological crisis. "It was the mind" she claims "that invented these weapons, wasn't it? You couldn't imagine an animal inventing its own destruction, could you?" (2009: 102). She also complains about the mechanization of the world leading to the decrease of human labour as a result of relying on the engines. For the narrator, "everything was done by technology" and "[t]hat's what's wrong with the world" (2009: 95). Deep ecologists are not satisfied with Marxist criticism's pure concentration on social context about the exploitation of human labour, because capitalism is an all-encompassing threat of which consequences affect all living beings save for privileged classes. The author draws the green side of the matter through an example in the chapter. Kath observes tourists watching the fish feed and thinks that human lives "in a world where they make children pay to see the fish eat. Nowadays even fish are exploited [...] and then poisoned. The ocean out there is filling up with poison. The fish will die too" (2009: 91). Decoding operation of the established anthropocentric capitalist system of the modern world, the narrator states that human alienates nature first, exploits its resources to gain maximum benefit and then prepares its end through extermination. On one hand modern society is illustrated along with its defects in the novel, on the other hand some primitive tribes and religions are appreciated in a way that is suitable to the spirit of deep ecological philosophy. "How do tribes in the jungle measure the days?", asks Kate devoured by the older cycle of the universe, and tells that "[i]t's not too late to learn from them. People like that have the key to living with nature. They wouldn't castrate their cats. They might worship them, they might even eat them, but they wouldn't have them fixed" (2009: 93). In addition to the respect for the life forms of nature, these tribes

do not consume more than that which is adequate for their survival. The second principle of deep ecology platform encourages this lifestyle by underlining the significance of vital needs. The narrator also supports this idea by stating that: “I eat enough to keep going, that’s all” (2009: 93). Finally, the chapter ends with her cat’s giving birth, which makes Kate feel happy and hopeful. (2009: 111). As woodworm’s achievement of survival and eating manuscripts representing human-centred ideas in the previous chapters, this chapter similarly emphasizes the hopefulness of environmentalists relying on the regenerative and productive force of nature.

Based on another historical event, the next story, “Shipwreck”, is divided into two. The first part deals with the cannibalistic tale of the wreck of French Royal Navy frigate sailing in 1816 to colonize Senegal. The second section is a scholarly analysis of Théodore Géricault’s painting called *The Raft of the Medusa* which depicts this incident by softening the impact on the audience. Perhaps the most dramatic scene that captures the first part is that “they dressed the fish, but their hunger was so great and each portion so exiguous, that many of them added human flesh to the fish” and “all learned to consume human flesh” (2009: 120). The scene is the description of a challenging condition in which there are a lot of people versus limited foods. As the situation stands, one can envision the dramatic connection between the depletion of natural resources and growing human population that would possibly result in the massive famine. In this sense, the point four of the deep ecology platform is to be revisited by an insight that “a reduction in human population would, of course, be a great gain for humanity and for non-human life” (Naess, 1995b: 217). If the development of human and non-human life depends on the prosperity of the fourth principle of the deep ecology platform, ignoring this point will increase chances of any man-made apocalypses and cannibalism as the chapter presents a small model. How does the art reflect this situation, then? Could it be a distortion between fact and fiction during the process of reflection? Or, in Barnes’s words, “[h]ow do you turn catastrophe into art?” (2009: 125). In the second section, the author considers this transition as a self-acting process helping people dream it vividly: “A nuclear plant explodes? We’ll have a play on the London stage within a year [...] War? Send in the novelists” (2009: 125). The reason why artistic

representation is required is that “[w]e have to understand it, of course, this catastrophe; to understand it, we have to imagine it, so we need the imaginative arts” (2009: 125). However, Barnes admits that the art is also a means of reshaping the historical truth and creating a tendency to travel different perspectives. While doing this, the artists, in some ways, ‘justify’ and ‘forgive’ this catastrophe. The author asks “[w]hy did it happen, this mad act of Nature, this crazed human moment? Well, at least it produced art. Perhaps, in the end, that’s what catastrophe is for” (2009: 125). This statement reminds the reader of the insect narrator accusing people of recording history as they like it. It can be claimed that if the facts are arranged for human’s purposes by the anthropocentric motivations in describing Noah’s ark or shipwreck of French frigate, ecological literature redirects the focus from pure aesthetic concerns to the attempts of creating consciousness as Barnes deconstructs human history in that way.

The next story entitled “The Mountain” narrates the expedition of religious woman Amanda Fergusson to Mount Ararat where she prays to God on behalf of her father whose death seems to traumatize her. Amanda is a pious spinster characterized by values of her age, namely by Victorian spirit, while Colonel Fergusson is presented as an atheistic man. The main point that dominates the chapter is the clash of ideas between them, which occupies Amanda’s conscious even after the death of her father. As pertinent to a character who embraces Victorian utilitarianism, Amanda holds the view that the proof of God’s eternal design “and of this benevolence lay manifest in Nature, which was provided by God for Man’s enjoyment” (2009: 147). In the divine design conceived by Amanda, human is located just in the middle and each nonhuman being is created to ensure the comfort of human: “But God had created both Man and Nature, placing Man into that Nature as a hand is placed into a glove” (2009: 147). This explains how Victorian age departs from the autonomous model of nature several decades later from Romantic Period. The impacts of humanist tradition based on religious sources and Enlightenment are reflected through Amanda who seems to resist the great metamorphosis of Victorian society. Colonel Fergusson, on the other hand, is presented as the exact opposite of his daughter in terms of the conception of the universe: “Where Amanda discovered in the world divine intent, benevolent order

and rigorous justice, her father had seen only chaos, hazard and malice” (2009: 148). However, it should be pointed out that Mr. Fergusson’s late-Victorian cosmological ideas do not have an inspiring meaning in a deep ecological sense. In addition to his conception of natural world as malignant and competitive, “he believed in the world’s ability to progress, in man’s ascent” (2009: 143). Through these characters, the author portrays the two sides of the coin at that age. At the end of the story, he invites to see “this dilemma” of the age between “faith” and “free will” (2009: 168) and it seems that human does not comprehend the design of universe in both cases.

“Upstream” is the epistolary chapter of the novel in which an actor called Charlie has to live in a jungle for a film project. The experiences of Charlie evoke a sense of deep ecological interest in the unbuilt environment and the voyages into the heart of wilderness handled by early nature writings. He reveals the tension between urban-industrial landscape and the wilderness through a description similar to Dickens’ London:

[...] but it’s all to do with London isn’t it? Not really to do with us at all. Just bloody London with its grime and filthy streets and the booze. Well that’s not really living, the way we do in cities, is it? Also I think cities make people lie to one another. Do you think that’s possible? (2009: 205).

The narrator underlines the fact that among the inevitable consequences of urbanization is the alienation of human beings from nature. Thus, it makes human expatriates in stagnant cities far from their native lands. Referring to the opening lines of Thoreau’s “Walking”, Jack Turner concludes that “human beings are no longer residents of wild nature, hence we no longer consider ourselves part of a biological order” (1995: 333). Charlie’s realization of modern man’s situation indicates that the alienation of people from themselves in cities stems from their way of living remaining between home and office. They are identified with the inadequate natural space that remains between two. That is why “many supporters of the Deep Ecology movement believe that human habitation on Earth, including the cities, should ultimately be bioregional” (Sessions, 1995e: 416). On the other hand, Charlie maintains to tell how indigenous people succeed to be a part of the whole staying in touch with nature out of over-populated, industrial cities:

These Indians never lie, same as they don’t know how to act. No pretence. Now I don’t think that’s primitive at all, I think it’s bloody mature. And I’m sure it’s



because they live in the Jungle not in cities. They spend all their time surrounded by nature and the one thing nature doesn't do is lie (2009: 205).

The appreciation of lifestyle embedded in nature demonstrates how Charlie undergoes an ideological change in accordance with the seventh principle of the deep ecology platform, as mentioned in the first chapter. He prefers quality of life to quantity of higher living standards inspired with techno-industrial progress and consumerism. Charlie's mental tranquillity is clearly related to this enlightenment in the novel because, as McLaughlin puts, "moving towards an appreciation of the *quality* of life, instead of quantities of things, leads to an *increase* in happiness, not a decrease" (1995: 89). He is also disturbed by the human interference in this remote jungle. When he sees the signboard of Coca-cola which "shat on the landscape" (2009: 195), he feels how capitalism and consumption culture can extend its scope to soil even the remote wilderness. In this sense, the author seems to adopt a deep ecological mission pushing his readers to perceive how touching with nature contributes to the self-realization of man. From one of Charlie's latest letters, it is understood that he is going to read notes on nature and search about the lives of some animals as soon as he returns home (2009: 213).

The half chapter of the novel is a sort of article of the author in which the narrator discusses about the nature of love. The chapter is numbered as half, because the author may not believe that love is a complete issue in the world history having a certain beginning, middle and especially an end. Yet, he does not neglect to remark his views about nature in this chapter. Seeking the roots of love in nature, he asks "[i]f we look at nature, do we see where love comes in? Not really" (2009: 234). The love cannot be claimed as a necessary phenomenon for him, because animals behave as they are in nature, not because as they have to love their mates. Actually, this nonhuman behaviour seems to be suggested as a model for human whose relationships concerning love are based on mutual interest. The narrator Barnes in the story questions not only the necessity, but also the essence of anthropocentric concept of love comparing human and nonhuman way of love:

So where does love come in? It's not strictly necessary, is it? We can build dams, like the beaver, without love. We can organize complex societies, like the bee, without love. We can travel long distances, like the albatross, without love. We can put our head in the sand, like the without love. We can put our head in

the sand, like the ostrich, without love. We can die out as a species, like the dodo, without love (2009: 234).

As can be understood, the ecological awareness of the author enables him to evaluate the matter from different perspectives. Once more, he draws attention to the lifestyles of indigenous folks surviving within their natural environment and praises them, because they do what they like to do (2009: 235). As regard to this awareness, it can be claimed that the love alone shaped by human understanding is needless “for the expansion of our race; indeed, it’s inimical to orderly civilization” (2009: 236). In contrast to the Romantic poets of literature, there is no place for overemphasis on human for the postmodern author. As his general ecological point of view throughout the novel proves, he does not have to make a choice between human organs, such as brain and heart, in favour of heart to become a spokesperson for nature: “You can deal with the brain, as I say; it looks sensible. Whereas the heart, the human heart, I’m afraid, looks a fucking mess” (2009: 244). However, he is also sceptical whether human mind has achieved the ultimate social goal and human has been enlightened and has kept up with the progress within the scope of modernity. The author gives a reference to a historical touchstone of early modern period: “In fourteen hundred and ninety-two Columbus sailed the ocean blue” (2009: 241). He shares the same concern with deep ecologists about the consequences of the promised target. In the story, he evaluates this voyage as a historical event of discovery that does not provide human with progressing anywhere: “And then what? Everyone became wiser? People stopped building new ghettos in which to practise the old persecutions? Stopped making the old mistakes, or new mistakes, or new versions of old mistakes?” (2009: 241).

Indeed, the answer to this question is hidden within the next chapter, “Project Ararat” story in which the astronaut Spike Tiggler sets out to discover Noah’s Ark as soon as he returns to the Earth following his experience on the Moon. The underlying notion that the progress and civilization have a direct connection with subjugating the earth leads to a widespread domination of nature. Moreover, carrying it to one step further, the contemporary anthropocentrism is suggested as a vital point for human beings to hold that the future of humanity can be dependent on the space explorations. Upon his arrival at home, Spike makes a sincere speech to his

wife implying that humanity does not show adequate appreciation and respect to the earth: “You come back to where you started from. I went 240,000 miles to see the moon – and it was the earth that was really worth looking at” (2009: 259). The author demonstrates that the earth is the first and the last destination despite the human effort to make new version of old mistakes by means of dominating the rest of the universe to found new off-planet ghettos.



## CHAPTER THREE

### 3. TOWARD A SYNTHETIC AND CORPOCRATIC SOCIETY: DISTORTED THIRD NATURE IN DAVID MITCHELL'S *CLOUD ATLAS*

It is essential, at the outset, to define Mitchell's *Cloud Atlas* as a skilfully woven palindrome. Beginning with Adam Ewing's story, the novel follows a chronological order till the sixth story and then ends with the first story in reverse order, which enables to read the same backwards and forwards. Considering the rigorous plot structure, Tom Bissell defines Mitchell's novel as "a deliberately difficult book" (*The New York Times*, 29.08.2004) in his review published in New York Times since the novel embraces six overlapping and strongly intertwined stories with a transcendental spirit extending through six distinct places and periods. Bearing a comet-shaped birthmark, six different characters of the book are handled in the way that each has the same spirit in six different bodies and one's action has an explicit influence on the others. The tale of an American notary Adam Ewing's Pacific voyage in 1850s, along with his narrative based on colonial order and slavery of the period, creates a Conradian fictional atmosphere. The suicide of bisexual musician Robert Frobisher who, in 1931, sets out to visit an old composer by the reason of receiving help for becoming the greatest composer draws the picture of the despair of a modern individual. The author indicates the nuclear threat along with another character of him, journalist Luisa Rey who faces death as she gives chase to the files reporting the destructiveness of a nuclear station concealed from the public in 1970s. In the next story that appears in today's Britain, the author presents the comic adventures of an old publisher called Timothy Cavendish who attempts to escape from the gangster brothers of one of his authors. The most striking parts of the book are definitely the next two chapters dealing with the future and the post-apocalyptic distant future. In superpower Korea in 2100s, the story of a fabricant or a clone Sonmi-451 shows how corpocratic regime comes into force in the future, how mind and science exert a considerable influence on the human life more than ever

before, how hierarchy and domination reach to an intolerable point and how capitalist technology prepares the end of the world and human beings. In the last story set in a post-apocalyptic world, people who are deprived of any technological devices try to survive in the destroyed cities in small tribes. Zachry, who is a young goatherd, and Meronym, who is a member of an advanced tribe, seek for the traces of a lost civilization throughout the story.

Although Mitchell's novel highlights the transcendental web of history, what lies behind the author's intention seems that he not only diagnoses the modern historical roots of ecological crisis bringing humanity to death, but also analyzes the ongoing process and warns about the prospective results. From *Cloud Atlas*, it is clearly understood that the past, now and the future cannot be thought as separate from each other and human appears to approach a turning point. Actually, this embraces a deep philosophical dialectic within the scope of the novel's spatial and temporal setting: Human destiny is a consequence of cumulative actions. As social ecological philosophy indicates, the environmental and social problems cannot be solved by rejecting or overlapping the past, but by remaking 'now' and reconciling it with past in order to build a healthy future. At this point, Bookchin elucidates naturalistic dualism: "[B]oth past and future are part of a cumulative, logical, and objective continuum that includes the present" (1996a: 34). Throughout the novel, Mitchell handles this process with striking environmental images and desires for a socio-environmental revolution and transformation that will prevent human from damaging both his kind and nature for the sake of sovereignty.

As noted in the first chapter, the primal, wild and untouched first nature is integrated into manmade second nature created by modern human society in social ecology. Social ecology aims to create a free nature, or a third nature, by harmonizing first nature with second nature, wilderness with human culture and ecosystems with human society. In *Cloud Atlas*, particularly in Ewing's story, the traces of first nature is partly expressed; however, for the most of the novel, second nature is handled as a realm preparing the pathway to the third nature that is not free as social ecology demands. Mitchell seems to illustrate how third nature can become catastrophic in the distant future if social dynamics of the present day does not take any action. As Bookchin warns, ecology at this stage signalizes two choices for

human beings. One of them is “to turn to seemingly ‘utopian’ solutions based on decentralization, a new equilibrium with nature, and the harmonization of social relations”, and the other one is to “face the very real subversion of the material and natural basis for human life on the planet” (1990: 185). In his book, Mitchell presupposes that human beings will probably choose the wrong direction and, in the next phase, third nature, contrary to social ecology’s free nature, will not welcome humankind as social ecology dreams.

The novel opens with “The Pacific Journal of Adam Ewing” in which Ewing encounters with Henry Goose who is a greedy con pretending like a surgeon. The first impression of Ewing clarifies the message given by the author in the first page of the story. When he learns Goose is an Englishman, Ewing is not surprised by Goose’s nationality, because he tells that he has never seen any remote island which has not been meddled so far by an Englishman (Mitchell, 2004: 3). It is seen that Goose is one of the representations of Western civilization promising to bring civilization and welfare to the remote parts of the world, but exploiting both natural resources and humans at the same time. Using the example of an eagle’s nest disturbed by Western societies indicates that the author’s implication about the critical interventionism is not only a colonial but also an ecological matter regarding the domination and exploitation of developed nations. The interventionist and colonialist attempts indeed create a domino effect on the order. Initially it destroys the lives of primitive societies and then this reflects on the deterioration of the natural order. The relationship between human and human, thus, has a direct influence on the connection between human and nature. In this sense, the story can be claimed to constitute the first step of Bookchin’s social anxiety of which sources are domination, hierarchy and exploitation. The dialogue between Ewing and Goose reveals this tendency of the Western mind. Goose collects teeth from Arcadian strand at that moment saying that he will earn much by selling them. On the other hand, Ewing, whose ideas change at the end of the story so as to participate in struggling with slavery, is not very conscious about the real nature of capitalist and colonialist actions happening around him. For instance, “[s]unrise bright as a silver dollar” (2004: 5) for him at the beginning. However, these early descriptions are of significance for the author to provide the readers for breathing the atmosphere to

compare it throughout the novel, because in the post-apocalyptic story, the dollar will not allow the sunrise to brighten the civilization as it does now.

The prominent representatives of social ecology, particularly Bookchin and his collaborator Biehl, are not contented with the reflection of spirituality on ecology. Though social ecologists accept the potentiality of human beings by dismissing misanthropic discourses, they believe that hierarchy and domination cannot be justified with this god-given potential. As a social theory examining the relationship between nature and social institutions, social ecology criticizes the hierarchical doctrines of institutionalized Christianity. Bookchin states that “Christianity’s intensely anti-naturalistic bias essentially replaced an earlier, richly formed idea of nature with a colorless Supernature as ruthlessly as the late Renaissance philosophers and scientists [...] were to replace organic strategies of knowledge with harshly mechanical ones” (1994a: 49). Moreover, Biehl accuses Christianity of being “notoriously dualistic religion” and distinguishing “between the living and the nonliving” (1991: 58). Thus, the spiritual doctrines deeply affect nineteenth century social life as they organize the living styles of society in the story of the novel. Ewing is a pious Christian who goes to church on Sundays and gives importance to moral values. When Ewing and Goose pray at a chapel, they read biblical passages. The passages that the author chooses for his characters give a hint of his views on nature and society. Ewing reads from Luke chapter 8 in which people are in great danger and about to perish because of the storm. Jesus, then, wakes up and calms the raging water. This is a clear warning for Ewing to see what happens around him, because at the end of the story he wakes up in the water and escapes from being killed by Goose. On the other hand, Goose reads an ecologically disputable part which is peculiar to his personality attributed in the story. He declaims Psalm 8:6 from memory as good as a dramatist. It is told in this part that God makes human beings and gives him the right to dominate by putting all nonhuman beings like sheep, oxen, beasts and everything that swims under their authority (2004: 8). Though Mitchell shows that he does not lose his hope for human beings and support a biocentric model, his association of this anthropocentric biblical part with Goose must not go unnoticed. He criticizes the common social thought which is close to St. Augustine tradition considering the earth as an arena created for the human

exploitation and human as the master who has a divine right to dominate nonhuman living beings for the sake of his interminable interests. Bookchin condemns this kind of religion-based human-centred idea: “An ‘anthropocentrism’ that is based on the religious principle that the Earth was ‘made’ to be dominated by ‘Humanity’ is as remote from my thinking as a ‘biocentrism’ that turns human society into just another community of animals” (1991: 128). The author also endorses the social ecological view that the exploitation of nature stems from human dominating human. In this sense, both white Western people’s colonizing the natural wealth of indigenous people in the island and Goose’s attempt to kill Ewing for the purpose of robbing his possessions towards the end of the voyage can be identified with social ecology’s aforementioned notion of domination. This human-human and then human-nature relationship built by the social ecological philosophy is also revealed in the second part of the story through Wagstaff, the youngest son of a curate conducting missionary activity. Wagstaff refers to the tribes identifying them with ants disturbing him. He complains about the ants spreading through every part of the island and calls them cursed beings. According to him, these islands can only be owned as soon as these cursed beasts are converted (2004: 483). It is indicated that human is not able to keep living in accordance and harmony with both his species and nonhuman species. Instead, he forces the so-called subaltern beings including indigenous tribes and animals to ‘convert’ or to assimilate, which reduces the diversity into homogeneity. The disruption of self-conscious and self-identity of these communities, when coupled with capitalism, otherizing and alienation, detunes the codes of society, which, then, paves the way for human’s developing unhealthy linkages both with his social and natural environment. When Ewing talks to Wagstaff about the heavenly beauty of the island, Wagstaff disagrees with him claiming that the island of Raiatea is a “fallen place” where each being grows rampantly biting and scratching people and it puts a heavy burden on their souls (2004: 483). It is shown that how the heaven on earth can turn into a dark prison for men in the story unless ‘harmony’ replaces ‘capture’ as the key word. Wagstaff also admits how the lifestyle of Polynesian natives which is harmonious with nature and distant from capitalist tendencies is changed in the story. The Polynesian natives who do not value money but meet their basic requirements through natural ways are consciously made



smoking addicts so that they become obliged to earn money and buy tobacco from the Mission trading post (2004: 482). Dragging the self-sufficient indigenous folk into a capitalist life style with immoral ways, thus, causes them to alienate from themselves and then from their ecologically-oriented lifestyle.

Though each chapter handles with hierarchy in some ways, Ewing's story presents the most concrete examples by relating it to cannibalism, slavery, colonialism and domination. The diabolic background of Goose's laws of survival can best explain the social and natural disorder encapsulating the plot of the novel. Goose tells the first of these laws: "The first of Goose's Two Laws of Survival. It runs thus, The weak are meat the strong do eat." For Goose, the rule of the natural selection orders that the weak can be oppressed, persecuted and hunted by the fittest without moral consideration. There is not a second law according to Goose: "Eat or be eaten. That's it" (2004: 490). No other alternative is given for the order of the universe by the character. The purpose of the author seems to allude to Darwinian theory known as the survival of the fittest. Goose, indeed, is a devilish character through which the author can put forward his negative antithesis. Associating this cruel single rule with the personality of this character, the author criticizes the fact that whole social and biological realm cannot be reduced into a competitive, ruthless and win-or-lose structure. The loss of civilization day by day in the novel certainly demonstrates Mitchell's social ecological sense of challenging, as Bookchin manifests, "the very premises of 'fitness' that enter into the Darwinian drama of evolutionary development with its fixation on 'survival' rather than differentiation and fecundity" (1988b: 56). Mitchell is so conscious about the worsening situation that even his depiction of primal indigenous tribes invites the readers to see the deepening caste system within social classes and hierarchy within hierarchy. Apart from the superior whites in the island, Ewing mentions about the three castes of little Indian village: the chieftain wearing a throne, the tattooed gentry and their family and finally the slaves (2004: 6). In such a divided community, it is of significance to note the nature's lowering rank; that is, nature comes not after human now, but after the lowest class human beings. For instance, Mr. Ewan's exhibition of a huge hog's head in his parlour and his humiliation of the native people are among the examples providing an insight that how human who compares Indian farmhand to a sheepdog

running upon two legs can treat nonhuman as a much lower being. Furthermore, considering a wider scale, the Chatham Islands in the story is settled by two native tribes, Maori and Moriori before the European contact in the novel. Maori is a cannibalistic tribe oppressing, enslaving and killing Moriori. Their relationships are completely based on the exploitation, tyranny and supremacy. Emphasizing the necessity of domination and hierarchy among the races in the island, Goose likens this interracial relationship to the connection between “a loyal dog” and “its master” (2004: 37). This comment seems pertinent to the relationship based on the exploitation between not only races but also species. When the true history of Chatham Islands inspiring the author is examined, it can be seen how the flora and the fauna of the island has deteriorated and some species have become extinct after human settlement and struggle.

Though Goose is a devilish character representing Western capitalist and colonialist ideas, the author uses him as a means of helping anxious Ewing be enlightened. Goose faithfully confesses the truth beyond what Ewing witnesses in his voyage. He tells they do not have to hide the fact that they kill darker races to exploit their lands and riches. The white races are similar to wolves and they do not wait their prey in their caves by developing meaningless theories on hunting sheep for the justification. For him, the facts should not be embellished with intellectual discourses and everyone should admit that the white people with their “disease-dust” and weapons are the excellent representatives of predators (2004: 490). Although Goose reveals the true aim of his race, it requires an explanation that a wolf’s eating a sheep is natural while human’s exploiting nonhuman is greed. His statement also points to social ecology’s theory that the dissolute ideas encouraging ‘human vs. human’ constitute the roots of fundamental ecological crisis, that is, ‘human vs. nature’.

Social ecology, differently from the other radical ecological theories, does not consider the desire for the progress of the civilization or modernity’s ideal of progress as a demonic project. Biehl interprets Bookchin’s ecological society in the light of civilization and progress as such:

In the face of primitivistic rejections of civilization as such, for example, he no longer puts the word civilization in quotation marks; on the contrary, he capitalizes it. In the face of general rejections of progress as such, he is careful to define the kind of progress he endorses- namely, that which is associated

with cooperation and community and that represents a heightening of ethical standards (1999: 225).

This does not mean that the values and ethical standards can be sacrificed for the sake of reaching the ultimate target of the progress. Rather than a Machievallist project of human liberation, it is a “naturalistic” ideal based on “eco-communities” imbued with “dialectical naturalism” adopting “mutualistic social and ecological ethics” (Bookchin, 1991: 130-31). Bookchin is certainly aware of the fact that the extant system based on rampant progress, if not changed, makes the planet confront with the pending catastrophe, as Mitchell reveals in the story. However, the character Preacher Horrox who arrives at the island for missionary activity, and deals with trading as well, does not know whether the interpretation of progress is “infernal or divine” (2004: 489). His sermon matches Goose’s laws but is richer in theory:

I have always unswervingly held, that God, in our Civilizing World, manifests himself not in the Miracles of the Biblical Age, but in Progress. It is Progress that leads Humanity up the ladder towards the Godhead. No Jacob's Ladder this, no, but rather 'Civilization's Ladder,' if you will (2004: 487).

As the enlightened philosophers of modernity, he identifies progress with basic secularism praising the rampant rationalism, dualism discriminating ‘us’ from the ‘others’, industrialism and market capitalism triggering grow-or-die economy and reductionism ignoring nonhuman under the roof of civilization. This categorization goes against Bookchin’s sense of progress. This sort of progress is not naturalistic but regressive and condemned to disappear along with the civilizations and nature as in the end of the book. He maintains to elaborate on his understanding of progress by linking civilizations with social hierarchies in a racist and discriminating manner:

Highest of all the races on this ladder stands the Anglo-Saxon. The Latins are a rung or two below. Lower still are Asiatics—a hardworking race, none can deny, yet lacking our Aryan bravery [...] Lower down, we have the Negro. Good-tempered ones may be trained to work profitably, though a rumbunctious one is the Devil incarnate! (2004: 487).

His sentences refer to the prognostication of the forthcoming age mediating between the civilization and primitiveness. That is, unless hierarchy justifying the classes, domination and exploitation is isolated within a bottomless pit, human beings attempting to be more civilized are going to transform into the brutes with the lowest intellectual cognisance. The bottom of the list, inherently, is made up of the

communities that are not distant from natural life. The gorilla, as a representative of nonhuman living beings, ranks the lowest for Preacher Horrox. The lowest people for him are Aboriginals, Patagonians and some African people who are a little bit higher than these apes. He likens these people to the mastodons and mammoths that resist the progress and must be exterminated to uplift the civilization (2004: 488). In this respect, he does not restrain himself from accepting the fact that it is required to step on the other groups in order to rise to the peak. However, Mitchell, in the novel, repetitively adverts that the ladder of civilization cannot be mounted with competition, but collaboration purified from a covetous desire. Horrox maintains to tell his views on the civilization by relating it to the laws of nature: "Nature's Law & Progress move as one" (2004: 488). This may come true only in the sense that man is subject to the civilization and progress as he is to the laws of nature; however, Horrox ascribes a false meaning to this interrelationship. He considers the laws of nature as the rules of a brutal battlefield which provides a rationale for the strong to oppress the weak and the progress as a realm to which only superior races can reach after they destroy the so-called savages. On the contrary, social ecology endorses the view that ecological crisis gets worse unless the thought of those who have the same socio-political ideas with Horrox are not changed. The fundamental point for social ecology is what supplies progress. At this point, though Mitchell regards progress as a natural process as well, he divulges anti-ecological and anti-humanist sources of progress. Accordingly, Mr. Wagstaff mentions the existence of slave-making ants by associating the nature of those animals with the social and colonial order in the island. He explains that these slave-making insects assault the colonies of the ants, steal and carry their eggs into their own nests. Then, the ants grow up, become slaves, and never know they are stolen (2004: 491). However, this justification is groundless for social ecology, because the notion of dominion seen in nature cannot be compared to the power elites' domination and exploitation of some social classes. To put it another way, it is not proper to define inter-animal relationships via dominion, oppression and also ranking due to the nature of species. For Bookchin, this kind of classification and categorization of species within an ecosystem "is anthropomorphism at its crudest" (1982a: 26). The notion of dominion and oppression is different from the one existing within the ecosystem, because the

animals are not institutionalized beings administrating, commanding and then showing a tendency to create an institutionalized violence. Therefore, contrary to the traditional way of thought, hierarchy and domination, for social ecology, are not animalistic concepts, but social ones created in second nature. From this point on, asking whether some animals enslave and exploit another, Bookchin claims that the animals do not exhibit 'learned' behaviours and the analogies between human beings and animals only aim to serve the purpose of social interests, which also ignores the function of nonhuman beings within the multiplicity of ecosystems. Nearly all socio-ecological crises, thus, are the consequence of this traditional way of thought (Bookchin, 1982a: 16-42). Unlike Wagstaff making an analogy between slave-making ants and the colonizers, Goose confesses the underlying reason for human desire frankly and goes on claiming that the rapacity and the notion of dominion underpin humanity's ideal of progress. He tells that white people develop science in order to equip modern armies with guns and weapons. This is granted for white men, the Aryans, rather than other races, because it is their greed, rapacity and hunger for the domination that feeds their progress (2004: 489). Proving Bookchin to be right in his diagnosing the primary motive of cosmological trouble, these statements of Goose present that the developed societies the foundation of which is not made up of responsible institutions, friendly technologies, healthy relationships and profitless social values are likely to be featured in causing the civilization to end with its most primitive level. It is seen that Mitchell who seems to support a progress purified from human rapacity enables his characters to water the poisonous roots of disappearing civilization in the end of the novel.

It is seen that an ideological background of hierarchy and domination is hereby set in the island. "Once a hierarchical sensibility had been established in this way" claim Biehl and Bookchin, "it could be projected out onto first nature, as people could begin to think in terms of dominating the natural world" (1999: 76). As mentioned before, first nature is a wild biological realm while second nature refers to the social realm encapsulating thoughts, ideologies, and each social constituent. If the organic first nature and social second nature are harmonized and integrated concomitantly, an ecological and more civilized society can be founded as an ideal new system, the third one which Bookchin labels as free nature. In addition to the

descriptions of ecological balance and wildlife, in Chatham Isle, or Rekohu in native Moriori language, there exist some images quite close to first nature, which is subject to the dominion in second nature. The characters, particularly Ewing, often mention the wilderness which is not exposed to the dangerous ideologies and interventions of second nature. Accordingly, the native Polynesian tribe of the Chatham Isle, the Moriori, is depicted in the novel as a hunter-gatherer community who may belong to first nature more than second one, considering social ecology's praise that "prehistoric and aboriginal peoples [...] lived in total 'Oneness' with first nature and the wildlife around them" (Biehl and Bookchin, 1999: 66). However, it does not mean that social ecologists romanticize primitiveness and desire for a returning to tribal lifestyle by introducing their spiritual beliefs into the extant ecological movements. They make a distinction between traditional communities and modern society implying that hunter-gatherers are the closest organic social beings to first nature (Biehl and Bookchin, 1999: 65-74). The philosophy of social ecology supports the notion of integration, that is, the matter is how people can make second nature evolved in a sound future.

In spite of the recent intervention of European colonizers, the organic first nature of old Rekohu is told to Ewing by Mr. D'Arnoq. Following the description of the Moriori's peaceful primitive religion that forbids killing anyone on the grounds that spilling a man's blood equals to kill his own "honor, his worth, his standing & his soul" (2004: 12), he underlines the long-time harmony both in social life and in physical nature. As Mr. D'Arnoq narrates, approximately two thousand savages adopt the principle "Thou Shalt Not Kill", which is a sort of a verbal "Magna Carta" creating a flawless harmony for the sixty centuries in the island since Adam and Eve's eating forbidden fruit (2004: 12). It should be noted that this harmony has not been seen elsewhere before. Being the prerequisite for developing healthy relationships with nature, the connection and communication of human with human seem to be achieved only in this region since Adam's fall. While waging war is an unknown term for native Moriori people, what dominates this distant island is only the peace which is not broken for thousands of years (2004: 12). These people are so integrated with their environment that Ewing, when he sees Walker felling the trees in the island and selling arborglyphs made by the natives to collectors, feels

disturbed because he considers it as disrespectful to the Moriori (2004: 21). The violation of the trees for consumerist purposes is evaluated as identical to the violation of Moriori people in order to focus on the oneness. Moreover, the language spoken by Indigenous Moriori people does not involve in the discourses and ideologies which, as claimed in social ecological philosophy, are invented by human later in second nature. It is emphasized in the novel that their language does not have a word meaning 'race' and the reason why they call themselves Moriori is that it means 'people' (2004: 11). Old Rekohu, "whose only desiderata are quietude & discretion" (2004: 25), is also reflected with its ecological order and natural elements symbolizing first nature. During his walk to Conical Tor of the island, a hill in the north of Ocean Bay, Ewing falls into a deep hollow and notices the existence of moss and mulch which seem too natural to be exposed to human hand inside: "A mattress of moss & mulch, lain down in that murky hollow since the second day of Creation, had preserved my life" (2004: 19). Along with all these features and the harmony, Chatham Island is likened to a heaven or a "veritable Canaan of eel-stuffed lagoons, shellfish-carpeted coves & inhabitants who understand neither combat nor weapons" (2004: 13). Referencing Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, Mr. D'Arnoq points out that Chatham Island in the novel is a utopian place and the Moriori are phantasmic social beings, both giving the paradigm of first nature. He associates Old Rekohu with More's utopian world and differentiates it from the "States of Progress" permeated with warlike regulations. Moreover, he likens these "noble savages" to "elusive phantasms" who could manage to survive in the island (2004: 12). This ecological order of the island and organic way of living of the Moriori receive four blows in the same way as in the disorganization of second nature. The first one is the Union Jack planted in the island by an English lieutenant as the earliest sign of colonization. The second blow is the seal hunters who, after nearly driving the fox on the brink of extinction, begin to raise sheep and pig in the island where no mammal exists before. These farmers clean the soil by setting fire which "smolder beneath the peat for many seasons" as put in the novel, "surfacing in dry spells to sow renewed calamity" (2004: 13). The third one is that the cats and the rats brought to the island by the whalers eat the burrow-nesting birds and their eggs narrated as one of the primary sources for the Moriori's sustenance. Finally, the maladies carried by the white

civilization decrease aboriginal population dramatically (2004: 11-13). Thus, the introduction of the utopian people to the dark face of second nature embodying slavery, colonization, domination and exploitation turns out to be a suffering process. In spite of the fact that the Moriori and Old Rekohu are depicted praiseworthy, it must be underscored that the environmentalists do not have to make a choice between the Moriori and modern society, or Old Rekohu and Ewing's San Francisco; the main point is to transcend both by building a third free nature purified not only from the decayed and corrupt ideologies and social discordances, but also primitiveness and backwardness. In other words, it is required to believe in the practicability of a progress purified from human rapacity.

Towards the end of the story, Adam Ewing manifests his belief in this ideal following his escape from Goose's deathful trap with the help of Autua, the one of the last Moriori. Although Ewing is confused as soon as he leaves the island with the cargo vessel called Propethess, he begins to question the vacuous progress. He thinks that the Indians and also people in Chathams would be happier if they were not discovered though he is aware of the impossibility of being undiscovered. However, now, he is not as sure as in his youth about the trueness of Horrox's theories about the progress and civilization, which is offered as the salvation of these societies (2004: 492). Ewing is conscious about the inescapability of discoveries and development, however, he still seems not to reach an exact decision with all the questions in his mind. He does not aggrandize the primitivism like a deep ecologist and also underlines the necessity of ascension like a social ecologist. Nevertheless, he makes an individual progress. For instance, as he sleeps in his cabin, a six-inch long cockroach disturbs him. After talking about it to Finbar, Ewing is advised to buy a roach rat trained to catch these bugs in the cabins, yet he knows that it will result in a vicious circle. First, they will try to sell him a "rat cat" to take roach rats under control and then a "cat hound" (2004: 495). These sentences on the nature of ecological balance indicate that, at least, he begins to raise self-consciousness, a kind of ecological awareness adopted by these two ecological philosophy schools, in virtue of his experiences in Chatham for now. However, after he is saved by Autua at the end of the story, he realizes that his experiences turn him into a philosopher and begins to think like a social ecologist. His notes, which are written in the last day of



his journal, about the birds and flowers show that he ascribes different meanings to nature now. Furthermore, he expresses that the history is nothing but outcomes unlike scholars relating it to the rules and formulations. It is, then, either “vicious acts” or “virtuous acts” motivated by the belief systems that cause these outcomes (2004: 507). He does not lose his faith in humanity and civilization, which is the point differentiating social ecology from other ecological movements. He has an optimistic view about the future of the planet and believes in the necessity of changes in the belief. For him, “[b]elief is both prize & battlefield, within the mind & in the mind's mirror, the world” (2004: 508). A better world, for him, can be founded only by replacing erroneous beliefs with the revolutionary and rational ones. “If we believe humanity is a ladder of tribes, a colosseum of confrontation, exploitation & bestiality”, tells Ewing, “such a humanity is surely brought into being, & history's Horroxes, Boerhaaves & Gooses shall prevail” (2004: 508).

The novel goes on with second story entitled “Letters from Zedelghem”. As well as linking the previous story to the next one in the spatial and ideological context, this part also includes some images and discourses concerning the scope of social ecology. Initially, the author directs the reader’s attention to his natural descriptions reflecting the atmosphere of the first half of twentieth century. When he travels toward the Channel, the young musician Frobisher watches “Albion withdraw into drizzly murk” and defines what he sees during this journey as “cancerous suburbs, tedious farmland, soiled Sussex” (2004: 46). Also, in the second section of the story, he travels to Zonnebeke, a village of the site of a cemetery, to visit the grave of his older brother who probably dies there in WWI. He narrates the harm given to nature owing to the war. As he is closer to the Front, he sees how the countryside becomes more blasted. He also sees some trees standing there and likens them to “lifeless charcoal”. He describes the green of the land as dead, unnatural and colourless. The farmers cannot plow the land, because there are still explosive ordnance which are unexploded (2004: 440). In this sense, it can be claimed that this scene reflects the spirit of the first half of the twentieth century which is seen as the “the story of brutal movements like National Socialism that fed on a popular antirationalism and anti-intellectualism, and a personal sense of alienation, among

other things” (Bookchin, 1996a: 4). It is this fascist movement, as Bookchin puts, which turns Europe into a continent of cemetery (1996a: 4).

Inasmuch as Frobisher is an artist in this melancholic period, it is significant to note what artistic movement Frobisher feels close or he controverts. He is not a traditionalist composer and submissive to the norms of society both artistically and individually. In the story, his reaction to Romanticism of the previous age is mentioned two times. He expresses “versified cliffs as Romantic as my arse” while he describes Dover. He also introduces Vyvyan Ayr, the great composer he is inspired and eager to collaborate, as an artist who is in between the past and the future. Frobisher tells one foot of Ayr stands on Romanticism while the other stands on the future. The latter is, he says, “the Ayr whose gaze I follow” (2004: 61). The ethos of the world eroticized by Romantic Movement is known to be intensely criticized by Bookchin. As regards the ideology of National Socialism, Bookchin claims that “this fascist totalitarianism had gained sustenance from the intuitional and mystical credo of the Romantic movement of the century before - something no one could have foreseen at the time” (1996a: 4). The reason why he praises the versatility of Ayr is that Frobisher asks for gaining an innovative style combining the past with his time to extend future rather than sticking around the past. It must not be concluded that old Ayr longs for the traditional style of thought because he, as Frobisher tells, assigns humans and also the artists of the day the role of making civilization splendid more than ever (2004: 81). Accordingly, Frobisher makes an allusion to Romantic digression in terms of Mark Twain who ridicules Romanticism in his *Huck Finn*: “Huckleberry Finn says, ‘away off, who-whooping about somebody that was dead, and a whippowill and a dog crying about somebody that was going to die’ ” (Mitchell, 2004: 439).

However, Frobisher does not consider the current situation of the civilization so splendid. He knows that people play a card game in a historical dimension and his generation “cuts tens, jacks, and queens” (2004: 442). In a social ecological sense, those who cut kings and aces would be those who manage to revolutionize Frobisher’s age and to live in ‘free nature’. Indeed, it is revealed in Frobisher’s dialogue with Morty Dhondt, a friend of Ayr, that this revolution seems almost impossible with the existing conditions in the world. Dhondt believes that

there will always be a war breaking out due to man's will to power and human nature of which means is violence. This desire for power, for him, can be seen in such areas of life as in houses, workplaces, non-governmental organizations and states (2004: 444). Up until this point, the author's message on the nature of will to power does not differ much from the presumptions of social ecology for which human nature is not a cause but the effect (Bookchin, 1994a: 54). Afterwards, considering the war and diamonds as two "eternal companions" of humanity, Dhondt attacks the concept of nation-state "whose laws are written by violence" and diplomacy is an instrument that allows strong states to impose their wishes on third world states (2004: 444). Given that social ecology offers solutions not only for ecological problems but also for all social matters, this thought of Dhondt can be identified with the concept of decentralization disavowing an authoritarian policy. From this point, Frobisher draws attention to the science and argues that it will bring the civilization into extinction. As he narrates, the science will keep discovering bloodier weapons to wage wars and the civilization will disappear unless human power based on destruction is replaced with the power of vitalization (2004: 444). Just witnessing the battlefield where his brother dies, Frobisher is not wrong in his foresight. Regarding ecological philosophies' common belief in the same disaster scenario writing the end of the planet, this is not a sort of unreality if the science and technology develop at this rate and keeps ignoring more peaceful and eco-friendly alternatives.

The extension of nuclear power stations over increasing areas finds its roots in the oil crisis dating back to early 1970s. In 1973, the member countries of OAPEC reduce the production of oil and put an embargo on the oil export. Technologically developed states that are dependent on oil and petrol are engaged in power competition in order to secure their energy sources and minimize the dependence on these sources. Bearing this historical context in mind, the next section of the novel entitled "Half-Lives: The First Luisa Rey Mystery" handles the struggle of a journalist, Luisa, against a nuclear power plant in Buenas Yervas, a fictitious city in California, in 1975.

The introductory paragraph of the chapter narrated by the omniscient narrator portrays the projection of global qualms into Buenas Yervas: "Smog obscures the stars, but north and south along the coastal strip, Buenas Yervas's

billion lights simmer. West, the Pacific eternity. East, our denuded, heroic, pernicious, enshrined, thirsty, berserking American continent” (2004: 89). It is seen that as the stories in the novel progresses and the time flows, the environmental imagination gets more pessimistic and darker. Buenas Yervas, for Luisa, is the symbol of a corrupt order. In her interview with Alfred Hitchcock, she asks him the reason why he does not use this place in his films. As Luisa narrates, Hitchcock gives an evasive reply: “Buenas Yervas is a city of nowhere” which combines “the worst of San Francisco with the worst of Los Angeles” (2004: 95). In view of the fact that Yerba Buena is the original name of San Francisco, California which is also Adam Ewing’s home town, the author aims to connect these places in terms of focusing on the concept of regressive progress. As missionaries exploit the natives and natural sources in the region in Ewing’s story, an energy corporation called Seaboard Inc. does the same in modern ways. In other words, through Buenas Yervas, the author illustrates how human’s second nature evolves into a sharp degeneration from generation to generation. Thus, the ‘conjunction’ that refers to reoccurring would also be the answer to the question of Luisa who likens the cities to nouns, and New York to a verb: “What might Buenas Yervas be, I wonder? A string of adjectives and conjunctions? Or an expletive?” (2004: 95).

To handle the matter in a broader scale, Luisa’s interview with Hitchcock presents the purpose of the author that such hurting true life facts like domination, hierarchy, social disorder, anarcho-capitalism and ecological threat happening in the planet earth need to be unveiled whether the instrument is modern or postmodern, Hitchcock or Christopher Nolan and ecological or else. In a deeper sense, Luisa argues that there is no need to relieve the audience at the end of the story as Hitchcock wakes the audience up, so she likens the world to Hitchcock’s Bates Motel in his 1960 film *Psycho*:

I put it to the great man, the key to fictitious terror is partition or containment: so long as the Bates Motel is sealed off from our world, we want to peer in, like at a scorpion enclosure. But a film that shows the world is a Bates Motel, well, that’s . . . the stuff of Buchenwald, dystopia, depression (2004: 94).

Bates Motel in the film is a roadside hotel in which murders are committed and the thrill is on the rise. She implies that second nature of humanity is increasingly turning into Bates Motel in which the values are killed and cracks emerge in the

building of the motel, although Hitchcock tells her that he is just a simple director making films in Hollywood rather than an “Oracle at Delphi” (2004: 95). It cannot be concluded that she is a defeatist believing in fatalism as traditional environmentalists, if so, she would not fight for revealing the secrets behind the HYDRA-Zero reactor. What she criticizes is that people put only their toes, not the whole body, “in a predatory, amoral, godless universe” (2004: 95). Though Hitchcock accuses of her doing “an above-average impersonation” (2004: 95), she is self-conscious enough to believe in the necessity of dipping whole body in the matter without delay.

Social ecology puts an emphasis on the concept of self-consciousness in the context of humanity, society and individual. Clark claims that “personal self-realization is incomprehensible apart from one’s dialectical interaction with other persons, with the community, and with the larger natural world. The development of authentic selfhood means the simultaneous unfolding of both individuality and social being” (1998: 425). The ecological self, thus, can be said to have already been implanted in human itself, however, it has deteriorated along with the existence of consumer societies’ materialist structure. The underdeveloped self that is imbued with the personal ego is the result of this social structure, which prevents person to contact with wider social and natural world. For instance, Lloyd Hooks, the second CEO of Seabord Inc., finds the source of happiness in this structure. He thinks that those who say money cannot afford to buy happiness do not have enough money (2004: 394). For Clark, on the other hand, “[t]he replacement of the voracious yet fragile and underdeveloped ego of consumer society with such a richly-developed selfhood is one of the preeminent goals of social ecology” (1998: 425). The ultimate goals of the author do not contradict with these goals of social ecology throughout the novel. Luisa and Rufus Sixsmith, a nuclear engineer and a former inspector in Seabord Inc., are revealed as two characters serving this goal in the story. In the editorial meeting of *Spyglass* magazine, Luisa expresses his desire for making news about the nuclear reactor which is not as safe as the authorities claim. However, Nussbaum, one of her colleagues, ridicules her attempt implying that it does not qualify as newsworthy and her efforts will not bring “Pulitzer Prize” (2004: 100). Indeed, this lack of ecological self, or of regard for ecological matters, stems from the society’s unconsciousness and insensitivity. The reason why reaching higher

circulations by nonsensical news are more important than making news about the explosive nuclear reactor is that human communities do not have ecological selves to comprehend the significance of natural matters. However, accusing Hitchcock of dipping only his toes in the predatory universe as a realm of horror formerly, Luisa is insistent on going over the nuclear problem that is highly possible to endanger human and nonhuman life forms living there and to turn the island into a thriller film. She does not give up even though she is fired by the new owners of the magazine who have connections with Seabord Inc. Her attempt to learn the reason behind her expulsion leads her to be identified with such accusations like “radical”, “feminist”, “dry” and “pushy” (2004: 410). However, the author depicts her as an environmentalist journalist refusing hegemony, corrupt authority and corporatist atrocity despite her aggressiveness. Another example might be the one with Henderson triplets, the friends of her father who seem to confuse meritocracy with corpocracy and merit with power. One of the triplets says if he were a president, he would make an effort to win the Cold War. Another says he would not kneel before Arabs who are lucky because of dwelling in rich natural sources. He also states he would establish a corporate empire to ensure the country’s future or Japan would come out as the greatest empire. The established meritocracy, according to the triplets, should be based on acute mind and only seek for the welfare of the nation ignoring any social responsibility projects. While there is no place for the weak and the suppressed in this corpocratic future, only those businessmen who contribute to the wealth should be awarded, because wealth and power go hand in hand. (2004: 403). One of the triplets, then, goes on to voice his idea: “When a man aspires to power, I ask one simple question: Does he think like a businessman?” (2004: 403). Consisting of a series of discussion of which central topic is totally opposed and denied by social ecological philosophy, this conversation ends up with Luisa’s severe insult for those who hold this kind of power and wealth. She says she prefers to ask only three questions: “How did he get that power? How is he using it? And how can it be taken off the sonofabitch?” (2004: 403). The acts of the energy company and the above-mentioned ideas of Henderson brothers indicate to what extent social conscious evolves though it is not in practice for now. The word Luisa chooses for her reaction is actually the one that radical ecologists cannot utter in their official

publications. Yet, in a word, Mitchell voices his thought on non-humanistic and non-environmental alternatives shaking the foundations of societies and nonhuman entities in second nature through his woman character, Luisa.

It is of significance where the scientist characters stand with regard to social ecological conscious in the story. Bookchin, known as an anti-nuclear thinker despite his moderate approach to science and technology, states that the last decades are far from being close to a rational society and “they would seem to be tilting toward a regression, ideologically and structurally, to barbarism, despite spectacular advances in technology and science, whose outcome we cannot foresee” (1996c: 175). Sixsmith also seems to have similar anxieties for the mission he carries out. Serving for a technology that is of no avail in the social and ecological affairs of life results in regret for Sixsmith who tells Luisa that she cannot understand what “a misspent life” means (2004: 94). He now becomes aware of the fact that the disadvantages are much more than the returns and draws attention to the catastrophic events which can emerge as a consequence of radiation hazard. Frustrated by the TV news declaring that the nuclear power plant provides employment facilities for many people, Sixsmith asks a vital question by himself: “And when the hydrogen buildup blows the roof off the containment chamber? When prevailing winds shower radiation over California?” (2004: 107). The situation in the novel is not so remote from today’s conditions, that is, the reports of environmental impact assessment are known to be interfered by the political authorities or bought in exchange for altering it for the benefit of global companies. Besides his conscience, the technical reason lying behind Sixsmith’s reaction is his refusing to approve this nuclear project officially due to his detecting deadly “design flaws” (2004: 114). Sixsmith realizes the danger of the present use of technology which dramatically undermines human survival as Bookchin invites society to face the fact that only liberatory and sustainable technologies can contribute to the social welfare. For Bookchin, capitalism, as in the case of Seabord Inc., abuses modern technology utilizing its “malignant power to destroy instead of its benign power to create” (1988c: 111). Thus, it can be inferred that the present technology offers two alternatives in second nature of humanity: either destruction or re-creation. Rather than dismissing the technological development completely, it is crucial to remain faithful to the correct path for social

ecology. Isaac Sachs, another scientist who is a colleague of Sixsmith, is about to make a choice between the two and he knows that “[h]e has no business in these political orders of magnitude, where erroneous loyalties can get your brain spattered over hotel bedrooms” (2004: 128). Despite the risks, he gives a copy of HYDRA nuclear reactor report to Luisa to make it known publicly. Sachs prefers the green path social ecology advises because he dreams of “a hydrogen buildup, an explosion, packed hospitals, the first deaths by radiation poisoning” (2004: 128). Although both scientists are assassinated in the end, they present consciousness and moral responsibility by defending the honour of science and technology against the capitalism and exploitation.

In Bookchin’s second nature, there is no room for a kind of nuclear reactor as mentioned in the story. In *Ecology or Catastrophe: The Life of Murray Bookchin*, Biehl narrates Bookchin’s fight against the largest nuclear power plant to be built in Ravenswood, Queens. Though the energy company claims that the reactor does not put anyone at risk as in Luisa’s story, the plan is put aside thanks to Bookchin’s reports and the strong local oppositions organized by the residents (2015: 87). Similarly, Mitchell illustrates the role of environmental activism as another remarkable issue in the story. While Luisa drives to Swanekke Island where the nuclear power station is located, she meets demonstrators for the first time in the story:

A hundred-strong demonstration lines the last stretch, chanting, "Swanekke C over our dead bodies!" A wall of police keeps them back from the line of nine or ten vehicles. Luisa reads the placards while she waits. YOU ARE now entering CANCER ISLAND, warns one, another, HELL, NO! WE WON'T GO! (2004: 100-101).

Owing to the fact that social ecology considers the factor behind the ecological crisis not as simply technical, transcendental or accidental but social, the remedy is social both in theoretical and practical terms. Thus, the participation of conscious groups into the peaceful activist policies as in environmental demonstrations can be labelled as a noteworthy phase in transforming theory into practice for social ecology. This can explain the reason why Bookchin calls New Yorkers to oppose against the building of a nuclear power plant in Queens. Since, the demonstrators in the field come out as the active representatives of the radical ecology though the guard



despises the vitality of the situation describing the demonstrators as fanatics: “Only our regular nature freaks from the trailer park” (2004: 101). As soon as Luisa passes the bridge connecting the island to the station, the readers face the already broken mindset following the narrator’s description of a scar within nature: “A hotel and golf course share the semiwooded slope below the power station” (2004: 101). Luisa, who defines the power plant as the “atomic time bomb”, advises these so-called ‘nature freaks’ to reach large masses for the rehabilitation of this mindset by interviewing with her (2004: 123). It is understood that the written and visual media organs, as well as literature, can become an important part of means for raising the ecological awareness. However, as it is often encountered today, Hester Van Zandt, the chief of the environmentalist group, mentions the perception operation that intends to suppress the awareness. This is done through doing away with awareness by lowering the quality of education, buying TV channels, columnists and programmers or paying media for the propaganda. Now, the democracies fight their wars through media by imposing what they desire to be (2004: 124). Like the embodiment of authority, hierarchy, domination and exploitation opposed by social ecologists, “[t]he world’s Alberto Grimaldis”, narrates Van Zandt, “can fight scrutiny by burying truth in committees, dullness, and misinformation, or by intimidating the scrutinizers” (2004: 124). In a similar vein, the fight of this environmentalist group coincides with the struggle of social ecology which deals with the analysis and the management of resources including energy, social affairs including power and hierarchy, the institutional patterns including socio-cultural and socio-economic extensions and certainly all ecological issues including its domination and exploitation by the global-scale capital. Van Zandt attempts to tell the purpose of this struggle in their point of view and this time she advises Luisa. She asks Luisa to pen a column concerning “GreenFront New Waldenities”, radiation and pollution levels threatening marine species and Seabord’s military force in order to raise public awareness (2004: 124). The environmentalist group mentioned in the passage seems to take its name from Henry David Thoreau’s *Walden* in which the transcendentalist author, also famous for his “Civil Disobedience” essay, manifests the necessity of individual awakening of a person in terms of his/her relationship with nature. It is understood from the passage that the tradition of nature writing dating back to

transcendentalists, most of whom regard state's institutions as corrupt and controller, has influence on the author as well as on radical ecology. Accordingly, Van Zandt's focus on pollution is the key point that leads environmentalists to invite humanity to gain consciousness. Thus, comparing the differences between the companies and the activists to the difference between "narcolepsy" and "remembrance", she refers to the gap between the lack of socio-ecological conscious and the awakening, or the self-discovery of ecologists. As Bookchin does, she indicates the power of society as a whole. The author, on the other hand, appears to be knowledgeable about the deterrent influence of collective social reaction organized by the environmentalists. As the project of nuclear power plant in Queens was cancelled by these groups in 1960s, it is narrated by Van Zandt that the public indignation, which is their "sole weapon" against the "money, power, and influence" of the corporations, could manage to stop "the Yuccan Dam, ousted Nixon, and in part, terminated the monstrosities in Vietnam" (2004: 123-24). In a deeper sense, the author attempts to draw the picture of the phases of radical ecological movement via Van Zandt: "But outrage is unwieldy to manufacture and handle. First, you need scrutiny; second, widespread awareness; only when this reaches a critical mass does public outrage explode into being" though each phase carries the risk of sabotages by the power elites (2004: 124). Margo Roker's situation can be shown as an example for one of these sabotages, apart from the murders of the scientists. The activist old woman who has a few scraps of land in Swanekke Island is put into a coma by Seabord bandits, because she refuses to sell her land for the purpose of opposing the expansion of the energy company. All attacks against these characters vindicate what Will Potter points out in his *Green Is the New Red* in which he proclaims that environmentalists are targeted as terrorists and they are oppressed because "they threaten profits" (2011: 240) of major corporates. However, it is implied in the story that this rightful environmental resistance will one day reach the promised conclusion. Towards the end of the story, despite all hindrances, "Swanekke B is in mothballs; C is suspended" (2004: 435) and Roker wakes up once Van Zandt reads her "Brahma" by Emerson, the great nature writer and philosopher:

If the red slayer thinks he slays,  
Or if the slain think he is slain  
They know not well the subtle ways  
I keep, and pass, and turn again.

Far or forgot to me is near;  
Shadow and sunlight are the same;  
The vanish'd gods to me appear;  
And one to me are shame and fame (2004: 433).

The poem, which focuses on the immanent eternal self, self-realization, oneness and the immortality of the soul, not only sums up Mitchell's clear message on reincarnation, but also his non-dualistic belief in the dissolution of the discrimination between the internal and external world. As Luisas, Zandts and Rokers 'keep, pass and turn again', the essence of beings will not perish but survive in the other beings. Thus, it can be claimed that the author connects a bridge between transcendentalism and dialectic naturalism; that is, he provides a connection between first (biotic) nature and second (human) nature in an evolutionary stream.

The main idea in the author's mind is revealed in Sach's equation of time, the formulation between the virtual and actual past, present and future. The formulation he writes into his notebook shows parallelism with social ecology's concept of dialectic naturalism in terms of temporal dimensions. Sachs puts that "[s]ymmetry demands an actual + virtual future, too. We imagine how next week, next year, or 2225 will shape up—a virtual future, constructed by wishes, prophecies + daydreams." In social ecological extension, he implies that there are two possible futures, the actual (expected, catastrophic) and the virtual (desired, free). A virtual future is the ideal future or free nature constructed by Bookchin's small-scale eco-communities permeated with eco-technologies and purified from hierarchy, domination and capitalism. Sachs goes on to tell his formulation: "*This virtual future may influence the actual future, as in a self-fulfilling prophecy, but the actual future will eclipse our virtual one as surely as tomorrow eclipses today.*" This desired free nature can change the fate of the actual future in terms of saving the planet and humanity from destruction. However, free nature will be deprived of independence, namely, all positive expectations of social ecology, if humanity in second nature does not actualize the environmental and ecological revolution as the self-conscious characters attempt to do. Finally, he draws the picture of the actual future: "*Like Utopia, the actual future + the actual past exist only in the hazy distance, where they are no good to anyone*" (2004: 393). Thus, the expected, catastrophic, and real future

which is the extension and the conclusion of the real past is useless for anyone and can disappear and turn into a virtual future + virtual past. In other words, the desired virtual future as free nature can be attainable for those who imagine it to happen because, as Bookchin claims, “[r]eason [...] extends the boundaries of reality beyond the immediately experienced present. Past, present, and future are a cumulatively graded process that thought can truly interpret and render meaningful” (1996a: 34).

Whatever the extension of the time indicates in the novel, the major attribute of the characters born in different bodies in distant times is their sensitivity to environment. The author’s emphasis on this situation just at the beginning of the section entitled “The Ghastly Ordeal of Timothy Cavendish” gives clue about the characteristics of Cavendish who also bears a comet-shaped birthmark like other protagonists. When three girls throw rubbish around instead of placing them into the bin nearby, Cavendish is disturbed and disgusted:

But as we drew level they tore wrappers off their lurid ice lollies and just dropped them. My sense of well-being was utterly V-2'd. I mean, we were level with a bin! Tim Cavendish the Disgusted Citizen exclaimed to the offenders: "You know, you should pick those up" (2004: 145).

This awareness of Cavendish causes him to be attacked by these bully girls and he is injured. Although concrete changes are seen along with each chapter, the only thing that remains unchanged is the existence of social problems creating environmental crisis and the violence against those who are aware of these problems. Another thing that has not changed in the story since Dickens is the condition of London. During his journey, Cavendish defines London as a “sly” and “ruddy city” with its “decrepit railways” causing commuters to face death every day, its “strata of soot-blitzed bricks” and “hot glass office buildings where the blooms of youth harden into aged cacti” (2004: 161). It is known that industrial revolution leads to an ugly urban transformation and causes people to alienate from themselves and their environment in London which, as Cavendish tells, “darkens the map like England’s bowel polyp” (2004: 386). While he praises “the countryside proper”, Cavendish is disturbed by the occupation of Essex through ugly high buildings: “Shopping malls and housing estates pursue their creeping invasion of our ancient land” (2004: 161). His longing for the atmosphere of the ancient land is a criticism of the maldevelopment of humanity. The author gives clues about the end of the novel by underlining this fact.

The mind and science are revealed as being sacrificed for the erroneous profits that do not serve for the purpose of human interest. As Cavendish narrates, “Cambridge outskirts are all science parks now” where he was once rowing a boat; yet, “Biotech Space Age cuboids now sit cloning humans for shady Koreans” (2004: 168). He shares the same demand of social ecology which is to establish a (re)liveable planet for individuals and societies: “The I’s we were yearn to breathe the world’s air again, but can they ever break out from these calcified cocoons? Oh, can they hell” (2004: 168). In a similar vein, the present system can be likened to a ‘calcified cocoon’ and social ecology considers itself as a kind of ‘decalcifier’ demanding to remove the calcification in the society to make it an indispensable part of nature.

Revealing both virtual and actual future in the chapter entitled “An Orision of Sonmi-451”, the author reflects the world’s future in the form of an interview between an archivist and the fabricant Sonmi-451 who is sentenced to death because of her revolt against the moribund system. In this story, Mitchell depicts the ultimate point of civilization and progress of humanity in the future in the light of today’s sense of science and technology. Indeed, this point is the undesired stage that social ecology warns. Each event on the nature of domination, hierarchy and capitalism that happens in the stories until this section paves the way for such a disordered future. Thus, the author seems to invite modern people to revisit the basis of their ideas on socio-ecological facts.

The story is set in superpower Korea of the future governed by a global ruling class and transnational corporations, namely corporatocracy. In opposition to the social ecology’s decentralization project as a solution for the socio-ecological crisis, Mitchell presupposes corpocracy as the dominant governing system of the future if the extant system moves at this speed. According to the environmentalist philosopher Gare:

One of the most important battles that has to be fought at present is the subversion of autonomy, liberty, and democracy by the new global corporatocracy and its priesthood of neo-liberal economists, reducing everything and all people but themselves to resources to be efficiently exploited by the market and its manage (2014: 201).

Despite little differences in methods and practices, radical ecology movements have already announced this battle. Accordingly, the novel draws the picture of a final

defeat against capitalist and corpocratic economy and regime and, thus, the destruction of physical environment of the planet.

The interview between the archivist and Sonmi-451 begins with the socio-economic outcomes of corpocracy. In parallel with social ecology's assumption that the private property, as Bookchin manifests, "is disappearing not because 'creeping socialism' is devouring "free enterprise" but because 'creeping corporatism' is devouring everyone" (1992: 261), Sonmi-451 admits that "corpocracy is built on slavery" (2004: 189) though using the word slave is abolished in Nea So Copros which signifies the new Korea of the future. The fundamental purpose of the fabricants like Sonmi-451 is just to serve and to make Papa Song, a fast-food restaurant corporation in the country, rich. The exploitation in the corpocracy is not only particular to the fabricants. Humans called 'purebloods' are exposed to these manipulative and totalitarian corpocratic rules as well. Sonmi-451 describes Seer Rhee, a man supervising the fabricants in the restaurant, as a pureblood who is deceived by the promise of status in the social hierarchy: "Like many of this dying corpocracy's purebloods, he clung to the belief that hard work and a blemishless record were enough to achieve status, so he curfewed many nights in the dinery office to impress the corp hierarchy" (2004: 189). It can be deducted that the social crisis pointed by social ecology seems to be experienced at its deepest stage so as to influence both human and what s/he produces, the nonhuman fabricants. Being both means and ends of hierarchy and domination, capitalism seems to be rendered as the written corpocratic religion of these nonhuman fabricants as well because, the fabricant narrator tells, "corpocracy dissolved the pre-consumer religions" (2004: 329). Similarly, the phrase 'in the name of Holy God' transforms into "in the name of Holy Corpocracy" (2004: 204) in the story. It seems that the dangerous influence of spiritual and religious thought on nature criticized by the social ecologists as Bookchin and Biehl is replaced in the novel with another, probably more dangerous kind of spirituality based on the motto of consume-obey-die. The doctrines of this spiritual motive are called as 'Catechisms'. It can be claimed that the Catechisms in the story reflect the similar beliefs with socio-economic model adopted by modern society's dynamics. For instance, the seventh Catechism orders that "[a] Soul's value

is the dollars therein” (2004: 325). The value is directly equated with the money in the corpocracy.

In a wider sense, this customer centricity of the corpocratic society is revealed with striking coinages. Generalization of the products with the specific names of the industrial trademarks in daily languages of the characters in the story shows how modern capitalism evolves into a more adamant pattern so as to penetrate into the very spirit of the society. It is seen in the story that the shoe is called as ‘Nike’, gun as ‘Colt’, smartphone as ‘Sony’, camera as ‘Nikon’, multimedia as ‘AdV’, car as ‘Ford’, watch as ‘Rolex’, photograph as ‘Kodak’, motorcycle as ‘Suzuki’, movie as ‘Disney’, coffee as ‘Starbuck’, fuel as ‘Exxon’ and cigarette as ‘Marlboro’. Contrary to the social ecological utopia, the society depicted by the author exists for the sustainability of huge companies and providing them to make continuous profits. Even the brothels and pimping in the country are incorporated: “Pureblood sailors from all over Nea So Copros sat in frontless bars, flirting with topless comforters, under the scrutiny of PimpCorp men [...]” (2004: 337). The genes of the society are so disrupted that the money becomes the main pillar of the corpocratic civilization and this system is presented as an inevitable alternative for humans. The archivist who is committed to the official ideology ironically supports that “*Corpocracy isn't just another political system that will come and go—corpocracy is the natural order, in harmony with human nature*” (2004: 234). This irony is a conscious preference of the author, because he conveys the degeneration of not only human nature but also of nature throughout the story with striking images. In a market place likened to modern shopping centres, Sonmi-451 witnesses that the consumers are forced to buy, which comes as a result of making the system compatible with the natural order. The fabricant narrator compares these people to a sponge absorbing the need for the capital cycle. In the gallery functioning as a sort of silhouette of the country, the narrator is surprised upon seeing shopping mania and says: “How the consumers seethed to buy, buy, buy! Purebloods, it seemed, were a sponge of demand that sucked goods and services from every vendor, dinery bar, shop, and nook” (2004: 227). This is made obligatory by the political decisions because “under the Enrichment Statutes, consumers have to spend a fixed quota of dollars each month, depending on their strata. Hoarding is an anti-corpocratic crime”

(2004: 227). This explains why social ecology deals with the political dimension of social and ecological crisis regarding exploitation as a vital part of the problem. It can also be linked to the necessity of an individual's taking an active role in making economic decisions for the good of society in general instead of his own business and the welfare of the state cared and promised by the selected group. Abandoning the seven days week in favour of a week consisting of ten days (2004: 451) in Sonmi-451's time can also explain to what extent human labour exploitation is intensified and ethical regression can be deepened lest the power be lost by the ruling elites and the capital be distributed among local communities. The novel invites the readers to imagine the fact that unless the egalitarian discourses held by ecological philosophy are put into practice, the society will turn into an entity consisting of industrialized and commoditized individuals who are the possible images of transhumanism, ironically being disposed to interiorize the slogan of "work, spend, work" (2004: 316).

The economic model of corpocracy is analogous to Nazi's making maximum profit from its victims with minimum cost through illegal and inhuman means. The fascist system is known with its brutal way exploiting every possible thing of beings for minimizing the expenses of even the massacre. The narrator mentions about this economic model regarding the lifecycles of the fabricants:

*But . . . why would— What would the purpose be of such . . . carnage?*

The economics of corpocracy. The genomics industry demands huge quantities of liquefied biomatter, for wombtanks, but most of all, for Soap. What cheaper way to supply this protein than by recycling fabricants who have reached the end of their working lives? Additionally, leftover "reclaimed proteins" are used to produce Papa Song food products, eaten by consumers in the corp's dineries all over Nea So Copros. It is a perfect food cycle (2004: 343).

The author focuses on the development, or precisely maldevelopment, of environmental recycling methods which were once carrying the purpose of environmental protection, but it is totally attached to the economic goals in the story. Similarly, in another case, a couple throws their Zizzi Hikaru, a fabricant living doll, into the river not because it becomes old-fashioned after being dethroned by Marilyn Monroe a couple of months later but because even the disposal of the living doll by a "registered fabricant xpirer" would cost them three thousand dollars (2004: 335). The



author more often than not emphasizes how wild corpocratic policies function in every facet of life. In a similar vein, considering the corpocratic vision as an impediment for the liveable future of societies, Pierre Chomat explains one of the tenets of this vision putting money into the center of civilization: “It makes the ‘development-production-consumption-waste’ cycles turn as quickly as possible, all to society’s good. Money is the insurance for keeping any ecosystem running. It is the backbone of the human enterprise. *Greed is good*” (2004: 133). The attempts of Sonmi-451 and the revolutionary group to alter this model mean a radical change in social roots, which is found quite dangerous by the authorities because, as Chomat claims, “[t]o a true corpocrat, society is nothing more than the sum of its corporations; good society is one whose corporations show a profit and make the economy run smoothly” (2004: 133). At this point, the concerns of the author who reflects the fascistic sides of this cruel order and a social ecologist who both anticipates such a future and sets his side on the social crisis overlap totally regarding the social sense, because what is social should be independent from an understanding making it equivalent to reckless profitability. However, such a concern ending up with a desire for an alternative ideology for this corpocratic civilization is not welcomed by the authorities in Nea So Copros. As The Abbes tells Sonmi-451, those who fight for an alternative model “will be renamed ‘terrorists’”. (2004: 332). As Chomat reveals the corpocratic vision, this kind of corpocratic ideology has nothing to do with society and ecology:

Everything on Earth belongs to Man. Forget Ecosystems! Other species do not matter! Do not even think about sharing our natural resources with future generations! Everything must be consumed immediately! It is not Man’s job to think about the consequences and to repair the damage: *In God We Trust* (2004: 133).

Bookchin warns that in such a world in which “nature is conceived as a ruthless, competitive marketplace or a creative, fecund biotic community”, just as described in *Cloud Atlas* so far, there exist “two conceptions of the human future” that lay before the eyes of humanity. He explains that the first one “ends in a totalitarian and antinaturalistic terminus for society: centralized, statist, technocratic, corporate, and sweepingly repressive. The other ends in a libertarian and ecological beginning for society: decentralized, stateless, artistic, collective, and sweepingly

emancipatory" (1988b: 72). The physical condition of Nea So Copros in the story gives the traces about the outcomes of this rupture between society and nature as stated in Bookchin's first assumption. For example, another fabricant named Wing-027 mentions about the existence of "deadlands so infected or radioactive that purebloods perish there like bacteria in bleach" and the robot, contrary to human being's unawareness, is conscious of that final "day when all Nea So Copros is deadlanded" (2004: 206). The indication of approaching calamity for the planet proves that human misses the final opportunity given by this century, as underlined by social ecology, to create eco-communities enabling the harmonization between society and nature. Namely, the author shows that there is nothing that alters in the future: "From the roof", tells the fabricant narrator, "the conurb fumed and trafficked as usual, and swarming aeros left vapor streaks across the sky [...]" (2004: 211). As the narrator relates, in the 234<sup>th</sup> floor, the conurbation "was a carpet of xenon and neon and motion and carbdiox and canopies. But for the glass dome, Hae-Joo told me, the wind at this altitude would fling us into orbit, like satellites" (2004: 226). At this juncture, the problem of urbanization is not highly different from its current position. The reflection of artificial light on the city and the increase in the carbon dioxide content demonstrate that a synthetic and contaminated future await human and nonhuman species. As reference to the previous chapter regarding Luisa's struggle, new nuclear reactors are still being opened. Furthermore, nuclear and chemical weapons are used unhesitatingly to inactivate people in the story. During an attack in which "[t]he ford rounded a ramp when a blizzard of phosphate fire shot in the windows", Sonmi-451 explains the content of the weapon: "Unanimity dumdums combine kalodoxalyn and stimulin. Kalodoxalyn is a poison that fries the victim in agony, so his screams give his position away; stimulin prevents him from losing consciousness" (2004: 314). The overuse of chemicals in the story, when coupled with the excessive pollution, leads to the deterioration of the physical environment in the story. The narrator expresses this condition of the earth as follows:

Nea So Copros is poisoning itself to death. Its soil is polluted, its rivers lifeless, its air toxloaded, its food supplies riddled with rogue genes. The downstrata cannot buy drugs to counter these privations. Melanoma and malaria belts advance northward at forty kilometers per year. Those Production Zones of Africa and Indonesia that supply Consumer Zones are now 60-plus percent uninhabitable. Corpocracy's legitimacy, its wealth, is drying up (2004: 325).

As social ecology reminds, the ongoing process of urbanization and reckless industrialization along with the emerging neo-capitalist model seem to make vast places uninhabitable and the planet unviable. The situation is also awful for the lower-class residents living in suburbs after escaping the ‘production zones’ of corpocracy, because their skins are enflamed due to the exposure to Huamdonggil’s, a suburban city, “scalding rain” (2004: 315). Indeed, the situation may seem horrible for them, however, it is told by Hae-Joo that the city is more natural when compared to these production zones pervaded by “malaria, flooding, drought, rogue crop genomes, parasites, encroaching deadlands [...]”(2004: 316). This proves that Bookchin is right as a social ecologist when he indicates that people are on the brink of ecological breakdown and human’s response to this “may ultimately decide whether human society will creatively foster natural evolution, or whether we will render the planet uninhabitable for all-complex life-forms, including ourselves” (1996a: 1-2).

The projection of environmental images is also essential to the understanding of Mitchell’s futuristic world deeply affected by the failure in fostering this process of natural process. The story includes many genetically modified life forms from a synthetic melon to the rogue-gened insects and then to the fabricant deer serving as a nonhuman prey for human, which indicates that nature is adapted and abused for human needs rather than a social transformation. To illustrate, the genes of a nonhuman prey is altered in wilder or tamer level so that people can hunt them. At first glance, it may sound in tune with social ecology’s principle of developing technologies to enrich diversity; however, the fundamental point is to alter the exploitative and offensive structure of society. To hunt a nonhuman living product produced by human can only be related to human’s continuous desire for preying on. This wild instinct cannot be subdued even after the species go extinct. In a world where genetic manipulation leads to the differentiation in the evolutionary tree, like “meowing two-headed rat” (2004: 316), the gap between society and nature seems to increase, culminating in the total alienation from nature. When Hae-Joo and Sonmi-451 are stopped at the tollgates by the enforcers, a kind of police force, Hae-Joo makes up an interesting story to avoid drawing the enforcers’ attention. Sonmi-451 narrates Hae-Joo’s reply to the enforcer

who asks him a question about his wounded finger: “Hae-Joo did a stage groan and rambled: he had cut it destoning a natural avocado at his aunt's house; blood everywhere, only stoneless avocados for him from now on, nature was more trouble than it was worth” (2004: 323). It must be noted that Sonmi identifies his speech with ‘rambling’ because both do not believe in the worthlessness of nature and, indeed, struggle for socio-environmental revolution. The reason lying behind his reply is that he pretends to be an ordinary man of corpocracy losing faith in the power of nature and the essentialness of what is natural. It represents not only the disengagement of an ordinary man in the society from nature but also his/her alienation to the features that make his/her human. As human is an essential part of nature, this disengagement brings along the process of dehumanization. In this sense, Sonmi-451 asks the archivist “[w]ho would work factory lines? [...] Lift, dig, pull, push? Sow, harvest?” and tells him the fact that “[p]urebloods no longer possess these core skills upon which our corpocracy, or any society, rests” (2004: 326). These fundamental skills, when combined with the power of reason, are what social ecology differs human from the rest of living beings. The theory holds that human beings are endowed with them not for subjugating but to direct nature to an independent realm because their destiny goes hand-in-hand. However, the author illustrates human beings as inclined to use their endowed skills for altering the nature of nature: “Cropdusters strewed clouds of saffron fertilizer, blanking the horizon [...] The trees were genomed to repel bugs and birds, so the stagnant air stunk of insecticide” (2004: 327-28).

The portrayal of Suanbo Plain in the story is not limited to these ‘genomed’ trees and cropdusters only; the hostile attitude towards nature is reflected lying behind the ideology dating back to centuries before: “The lake water stunk of effluent from its salmon net ponds. Crosswater hills displayed mighty corp logos. A malachite statue of Prophet Malthus surveyed a dust bowl” (2004: 328). Considering that Malthusianism affected by Smith’s economic model has a great influence on Darwin’s theory, Bookchin criticizes Malthusian reductionism that reduces the source of ecological crisis to the population and Neo-Malthusianism as bearing “a racist character” (1994b: 31). According to Bookchin, Malthusian thesis is echoed in Darwin’s theory of natural selection and then it evolves into social Darwinism. In the

following years, the theory causes an illusion that considers social arena as a wild jungle where the wealthy or the powerful as the fittest beings can survive while people of working class, farmers and savages are not fit enough to survive. It finally creates a strict hierarchical social structure justifying the separation of the ruling few from the ruled many. The former, then, enjoys prosperity, wealth and luxury, as Bookchin states, while the latter suffers from indigence, poverty and penury (1994b: 30-31). In essence, social ecology regards Malthusian model as a misanthropic approach and thus it cannot be a true detection on the source of the problem. A social ecological model does not agree with Malthusian theory regarding wars and diseases as natural and inevitable to balance the population increase. However, the fundamental problem rests upon the social issues justifying man's domination of the environment. The principal reasons of environmental crisis, as Bookchin manifests, are the problems "such as trade for profit, industrial expansion for its own sake, and the identification of progress with corporate self-interest" (2007: 20). That is to say, social ecology is in pursuit of designing economy instead of making arrangements in population growth rate. As shown in the story, in addition to the dirty lake and capitalist logos, the image of Prophet Malthus looking at the dry land symbolizes that the problem is not human population but the deformation of social dynamics. In this regard, calling Malthus a prophet at that age is also quite ironic because Malthusian catastrophe which predicts that human population surpasses agricultural production and human race will suffer from famine and drought is proven wrong in the novel. Rather than focusing on the destructive influence of overpopulation on environmental deterioration, Mitchell, as Bookchin notes above, underlines the ideological and social roots of environmental problems throughout the novel. That is why the statue of Prophet Malthus does nothing but standing over the ravaged area as a consequence of grow-or-die ideology. It should also be emphasized that the revolution in the story will be 'attempted' not by the 'fittest' but by the so-called 'lowest' members of social class.

The author, on the other hand, shares social ecological belief in the evolutionary potential and the regenerative force of nature despite all circumstances. Impressed by the rural landscape during her hike in the mountain with Hae-Joo,

Sonmi-451 defines this natural beauty in a corpocratic age as a “small victory of nature over corpocracy”:

Limestone bulges oozed lichen; fir saplings and mountain ash grew from clefts; clouds scrolled; the breeze was fragrant with natural pollen; once genomed moths spun around our heads, electronlike. Their wings' logos had mutated over generations into a chance syllabary [...] (2004: 328).

This situation supports the idea that nature somehow finds a way to rebirth but a social decay can lead to irreparable damages to the survival of human beings. Another example can be given through the survival of ducks in spite of contamination: “At the edge of the property a small colony of wild ducks survive the pollution. Rogue genomes give them a resilience lacking in their pureblood ancestors” (2004: 347). A similar method of survival may not happen through evolutionary terms for human beings. However, this solidarity may come out through a kind of socio-ecological collaboration, or what Bookchin calls ‘cooperative spirit’ which “formed a basis for the survival of the organic community” and “was an integral part of the outlook of preliterate people toward nature and the interplay between the natural world and the social” (1982b: 49).

The significance of social collaboration is also underlined in the story. The people of the colony who live in rural mountainous area far from corpocratic ideology are idealized through their living styles. Sonmi-451 implies that any crisis can be overcome if there is collaboration among the members of the communities, which is quite different from the Malthusian, Darwinian or corpocratic belief triggering competitive social connection. It is told that though their living style is not a kind of pastoral utopia, attempting to achieve it, at least, or collaboration “is a fine medicine in itself” (2004: 331). This rural region is praised by Sonmi-451 because the cities are so disrupted that now they are not places that embrace natural beauties: “Ah, mountain stars are not these apologetic pinpricks over conurb skies; hanging plump they drip lite” (2004: 331). Furthermore, she offers the archivist who is surprised at the existence of such a natural living to see how it is possible even at that age:

Go visit them, Archivist. You can tell the Abbess I sent you. No? Well, their food came from the forest and gardens, water from the cataract. Scavenge trips to landfills yielded plastics and metals for tools. Their "school" sony was

powered by a water turbine. Solar nitelamps recharged during daylight hours. Their entertainment was themselves; consumers cannot exist without 3-D and AdV but humans once did and still can. (2004: 330).

Nevertheless, the corporatic interference with this land occupied by the 'semi-organic' community seems to transform the area into a 'deadland' or a concrete jungle in the near future because it is narrated that the regime realizing the potential of the site sends an aeroplane bombing to clear there for building a health spa hotel (2004: 330).

Though she is a fabricant, Sonmi-451 is a character who is fascinated by the natural beauties like other protagonists bearing the comet-shaped birthmark. Throughout the story, she always sighs for the beautiful natural scenery most of which is told to fade away. As soon she is freed from Papa Song's isolated restaurant, what she experiences in physical environment is conveyed as if she is charmed by magic. She prefers to use such complimentary words like mesmerizing (2004: 202 and 339), entrancing (2004: 212) and fascinating (2004: 328) to define this natural beauty. As an example, when Sonmi-451 first encounters an ocean after Hae-Joo tells her to open her eyes, she narrates what she sees: "A swarm of roofs, thruways, commuter hives, AdVs, concrete... and there, in the background, the bright spring sky's sediment had sunk to a dark band of blue. Ah, it mesmerized me... like the snow had done" (2004: 339). There is a clear perceptual selectivity in her words because she differs natural from the synthetic which, so far, has been the dominant sense of environment of Nae So Copros. "A synthetic melon" (2004: 213) on which Boom-Sook draws a face, the phrase "[m]olecule-true original originals" to assure the originality of a Rothko canvas, the flame which is "[a]ll lite, no heat" (2004: 220), the existence of "dewdrugs" (2004: 235) enabling people to keep young, the "facescaper" who can change not only "skin, color, hair, lids, and brows" but also the colour of the eye (2004: 321), and souvenirs called "friends for life" such as toothless crocodiles, monkey chickens and "jonahwhales in jars" (2004: 336-37) are among the few examples of the synthesized living styles of the corporatic society in the story. The author reveals that the future is under the threat of transforming into a synthetic realm if, as social ecologists claim, human beings destroy today's bridges paving the way to an organic society or an ecological community which is an

unobtrusive and harmonious part of mother nature by means of its eco-technologies and decentralization purified from profit-driven market economy.

Scientific and technological developments concerning human health in the novel, meanwhile, are seen to have reached to the extent that “packets of pills for cancer, aids, alzheimers, lead-tox; for corpulence, anorexia, baldness, hairiness, exuberance, glumness, dewdrugs, drugs for overindulgence in dewdrugs” (2004: 227) are easily accessible in shopping centres called gallerias. That is what social ecology believes in the power of science to facilitate not only human but also nonhuman life, however, the author more often than not puts emphasis on the fact that it takes much more from human life and brings humanity closer to deadly consequences. What is interesting is that human is instinctively conscious about the possible outcomes of this ill-development. When Sonmi-451 attends in the lecture of Professor Mephi, she faces unfriendly attitudes of purebloods, namely humans, in the class. The Professor comments on this situation with an example of mirror: “Try this for deviancy: fabricants are mirrors held up to purebloods’ consciences; what purebloods see reflected there sickens them. So they blame you for holding up the mirror” (2004: 222). A fabricant produced by human is now ready to gain knowledge and may abuse this knowledge as human does. People are scared of the process that things can go out of control one day, which would be unacceptable because the domination and control have been essential to human beings since the very beginning. Thus, Sonmi-451 is a mirror reflecting what social ecology warns people against the possible outcomes of this maldevelopment. Ironically, it is Sonmi-451 who fights for the revolution of systems and laws exploiting all forms of life. This ironical situation can be connected to Sonmi-451’s birthmark because she is in pursuit of the truth like Ewing and Luisa. She believes that this anti-environmentalist, anti-humanist barbarous corpocratic order bears cancerous cells and “[t]he laws that permitted the systems must be torn down and reconstructed” (2004: 346).

The desire for a reconstruction in social roots through all the anarchic acts and written manifesto following the portrayal of socio-ecological decay throughout the story clearly demonstrates the social ecological desire for a utopian free nature. As a consequence of this, it is aimed that the organized ecological ethics support the



humanitarian industrial projects and organic agricultural methods developed by ecotechnologies to enrich the ecocommunities and disavow any kind of domination, hierarchy and institutionalized exploitative behaviours. In this sense, instead of simply accusing human nature, the author focuses on the disorder of social structures, systems and institutions that leads to the maldevelopment of humanity and the desolation of planet as well as social ecology concentrates on the social roots. The attempt of the revolutionary group, though Sonmi-451 confesses that it is a conspiracy and “a game beyond the endgame” (2004: 349), is of significance in terms of expanding the belief in the possibility of achieving this utopia. Sonmi-451 refers to Seneca in her final words: “No matter how many of us you kill, you will never kill your successor” (2004: 349). It seems that she believes in the continuous effects and achievability of her revolutionary thoughts in other spirits repeatedly. On the one hand, the author depicts the possible picture of an environmental destruction because of ignoring the warnings of social ecological doctrine throughout the story, on the other hand, he illustrates the immortality of ideas.

“Sloosha’s Crossin’ an’ Ev’rythin’ After”, the sixth story of the novel, shows the total subversion of the civilization in a post-apocalyptic future following the ‘Fall’ which happens as a consequence of social decay and environmental deterioration mentioned in the previous story. The narrator of the story, Zachry, a goatherd who is a member of the primitive tribe called Valleysmen, helps Meronym who tries to revive the distorted civilization as a member of the last advanced tribe called Prescients. During her visit to the lands of Valleysmen, she investigates the socio-cultural structure of the tribe for six months. Seeing that societies quickly move to a corporatic and global transformation which brings a new ‘Fall’ due to the corruption in all facets of life, the author pictures how humanity may face to get back to the very beginning of civilization. In a deeper sense, Mitchell reveals what would happen if social ecology’s dream of free nature could not be achieved.

Contrary to the previous chapter, the natural imagery occurring in mind changes dramatically. Once the story begins, there seems a drastic shift from ultra-technological devices, over-developed industrial units and over-illuminated cities to the primitive tents and carts (2004: 239). Indeed, people have some knowledge about their history but they are not sure whether it is true or just a fantastic rumour. Zachry

comments on the level of the older civilization called Old Un: “[...] but yarns 'bout Old-Un Smart an' flyin' dwellin's an' growin' babbits in bottles an' pictures zoomin' cross the Hole World ain't senseful neither but that's how it was, so storymen an' old books tell it” (2004: 263). On the other hand, Zachry, differently from the other characters, comes out as a character who could gain some insight into nonhuman realm. When Zachry hides not to be killed by the barbarian Kona who kill his father and escapes his brother, he hears an owl ridiculing him by saying “*Zachry the Brave*”, a wild dog calling him “*Cowardyyy-yy-y Zachryyy-yy-y*” (2004: 241-42). Considering that his goats become “gladsome” (2004: 283) after he turns back home from Mauna Kea, the mountain which is believed to be haunted by the devil called Old Georgie, Zachry is not proven to be wrong when he tells “Goat tongue is a gift” (2004: 242) for him and he is able to understand his goats. He also calls moon as Lady Moon and watches her when he feels unhappy: “So down I went to the ocean an' watched Lady Moon to cool my fiery mis'ry” (2004: 256). Furthermore, as he is about to spike the turtle, he remembers that he must not interfere in its natural way of life, which exemplifies his sense of environmental justice:

A greenbill came draggin' itself up the beach to lay eggs I mem'ry, an' I nearly spikered the turtle there'n'then out o' spite, see, if my life weren't fair why should an animal's be? But I seen its eyes, so ancient was its eyes they seen the future, yay an' I let the turtle go (2004: 256-57).

The island in the novel is narrated as being occupied by different tribes. The Valleysmen believes in Sonmi as a god and has a faith in life after death while others are polytheistic and have primitive gods. The Valleysmen are reflected as being more civilized and peaceful compared to the savages in the Big Island. Also, the community-based social structure of Valleysmen makes them different from other savages like the ones in Honokaa who are governed by an authoritarian senatorship handed down from father to son and guarded by a small army consisting of a couple of strong men. In accordance with what social ecologists claim, Zachry puts that this hierarchical order is not an ideal way for being a community and it is “a barb'ric pa-to-son bis'ness” as the law and civilization do not always mean the same thing (2004: 185-86). The author here depicts Valleysmen as one of the last tribe who can revive the civilization together with Prescients through the such remnants of the past as the last working clock, a school room, books, a world globe. The Abbes tells Zachry that

“Civ'lize needs time, an if we let this clock die, time'll die too, an' then how can we bring back the Civ'lize Days as it was b'fore the Fall?” (2004: 247). It is clear that Valleysmen is the only tribe in Big Island who wants to advance humanity to gain the intellectual knowledge as in the past. However, they are instinctively aware of the fact that the ecological and social deterioration causing the fall of corporate civilization happens due to the deficits in socio-cultural roots. They do not behave like other savages in the island because it is quite barbaric for a community. They do not kill anyone because it is a representation of barbarism. They do not constitute a cast system based on hierarchy, domination and exploitation; instead, they favour a social cohesion and solidarity. For instance, they trade some common goods owned by all individuals of the tribe in bazaars in the island. They have an economic order based on the use of natural sources; yet, it is not more than they need. Zachry's example of cutting a tree can exemplify how people hear the voice of the silenced nature: “Now you know when you adze down a tree for lumber? The noise after the last stroke, o' fibers shriekin' an' the hole trunk groanin' slowsome as it falls? That's what I heard” (2004: 307).

In a similar fashion, these instinctual attitudes of the tribe towards the issue of civilization can be seen in their belief system. While they have a faith in Sonmi and commitment to her teachings, they believe in the existence of Old Georgie as a devil who attempts to dissuade Zachry in different shapes throughout the story. Old Georgie can be identified with brutality, egotism and malignancy in the novel. Another important detail is that Valleysmen believes that it is Old Georgie who “tripped the Fall” (2004: 272). It can be claimed that people make an association between the Fall and Old Georgie by attributing all devilish aspects of corporate civilization such as ferocity, self-interest, animosity, the sense of greed for profit and materialism to this demonic figure. Initially, the narrator introduces him to the reader while he is “sitting on a rottin' ironwood tree” (2004: 239). Apart from projecting the current status of the environment, the author seems to use this rotting tree on which Old Georgie first appears as a symbol of social and environmental destruction coming along with the Fall. Old Georgie associated with the dark side of corporate system sits on the tree because he is responsible for the social decay and environmental deterioration along with all his devilish features ascribed to him.

Regarding his attempt to dissuade Zachry who helps Meronym while they seek to find the traces of civilization, Old Georgie challenges the birth of free nature, or an environmental-friendly civilized community demanded by social ecology in this example: “you was born to be mine, see, why even fight me?” (2004: 241). As a projection of a diabolic capitalist system swallowing society and individuals who are in pursuit of money and profit more than required, Old Georgie, in another example handling the story of Truman Napes and Hawi Man, is characterized with the trap that leads to the subversion. Being a sort of junk collector after the Fall, Truman Napes decides to seek the valuable goods remaining from old civilized days in Mauna Kea Mountain which is described as having no green. Though his wife tells him that Old Georgie will seize his spirit, Truman climbs the mountain for the purpose of owning “Old Un gears”, namely his ancestors’ goods. He encounters there a Hawi Man who climbs the mountain for the same reason and they decide to share out what they find. The narrator focuses on a significant point on human greed because Truman thinks that they will be richer than the kings and senators before the fall. However, as the narrator claims, Truman is a selfish man who is likely to keep all belongings for himself. Then, Old Georgie appears and swallows the soul of Hawi Man turning him a black, twisted rock. Truman’s hair turns white and escapes after being threatened by Old Georgie (2004: 259-61). Here, Old Georgie is identified with a destructive figure who exterminates those who are permeated with greed, egocentricism, mercenariness and materialism. This may come from an innate belief that all the mentioned features penetrate into the roots of corpocratic society and cause the fall of civilization, which is now considered as demonic by the Valleysmen. From this point on, the reason why Sonmi is believed to be a spiritual god is that she fights against these deficits in order to save the social order and civilization from the downfall. Although Meronym is knowledgeable about the primary reason of the collapse of civilization, she refuses to tell it to the Valleysmen for whom it is easier to make a scapegoat:

Valleysmen'd not want to hear, she answered, that human hunger birthed the Civ'lize, but human hunger killed it too. I know it from other tribes offland what I stayed with. Times are you say a persons b'liefs ain't true, they think you're sayin' their lifes ain't true an' their truth ain't true (2004: 273).

The author, through Meronym, aims to reveal what actually lies behind this primitive belief, indicating where societies who are not ready to face it should be inclined to detect the nature of truth. However the difficulty of changing the very structure of society is conveyed by Meronym's explanation, which reminds of Plato's cave allegory: "People b'lief the world is built *so* an' tellin 'em it ain't *so* caves the roofs on their heads'n'maybe yours" (2004: 282).

In addition to the cause and effect relationship about the disappearing civilization, the author discusses other social ecological views on the fundamental pillars on which the so-called civilized societies are set. As a member of a relatively advanced Prescients, Meronym tells the truth to Zachry who cannot make sense of the collapse of ancient civilization due to reason, science and technology they have: "Yay, Old Uns' Smart mastered sicks, miles, seeds an' made miracles ord'nary, but it din't master one thing, nay, a hunger in the hearts o' humans, nay, a hunger for more" (2004: 272). Meronym underlines the human desire for more implying that technological and scientific progress fails to function for the welfare of social and environmental sustainability, but deepens the tendency to power, domination and capitalism triggering the global chaos:

Oh, more gear, more food, faster speeds, longer lifes, easier lifes, more power, yay. Now the Hole World is big, but it weren't big 'nuff for that hunger what made Old Uns rip out the skies an' boil up the seas an' poison soil with crazed atoms an' donkey 'bout with rotted seeds so new plagues was borned an' babbits was freak-birtherd. Fin'ly, bit'ly, then quicksharp, states busted into bar'bric tribes an' the Civ'lize Days ended, 'cept for a few folds'n'pockets here'n'there, where its last embers glimmer (2004: 272-73).

Thus, the author clearly demonstrates the social and environmental transformation, which contemporary people have already begun to feel today. It should be noted that he insistently repeats his purpose which is not to take the current civilization back to idealize primitivism; on the contrary, he adopts a postmodernist manner deconstructing the sharp dualism between the primitive and the civilized in an attempt to oppose the traditional philosophical movements. For instance, the passage below regarding Meronym's reply to Zachry who asks whether being primitive is better than being civilized illustrates the views of author on the issue: "List'n, savages an' Civ'lizeds ain't divvied by tribes or b'liefs or mountain ranges, nay, ev'ry human is both, yay. Old Uns'd got the Smart o' gods but the savagery o' jackals an'

that's what tripped the Fall" (2004: 303). Namely, he shares a social ecological desire for a healthy civilization and progress purified from demonic social '-isms' like materialism, classism and profitism and built by dialectical reason rather than conventional reason. Accordingly, the author associates those who completely refuse the power of reason with Old Georgie appearing now as a dead astronomer who whispers Zachry about their downfall. He tells Zachry that the old civilization got "sick with Smart an' the Fall was our cure. The Prescient don't know she's sick, but, oh, real sick she is. [...] Put her to sleep, Zachry, or she'n/her kind'll bring all their offland sick to your beautesome Valleys" (2004: 279). It is understood that the real civilization is quite different from what is conceived today and there will always be those who oppose to the advancement of societies. In a deeper sense, the author invites his readers to revisit the concept of civilization by making discrimination between the development and maldevelopment of the civilization. Being in favour of an improvement subservient to human and nonhuman communities, the author is of the same opinion with social ecologists. At this point, Meronym's words are of significance when she uses her shooter to kill some colonizer Kona who attempt to dominate all island to create a system of hierarchy and exploitation: "*Smart gived us a plus for many years, like my shooter gived me a plus back at Slopin Pond, but with 'nuff hands'n'minds that plus'll be zeroed one day*" (2004: 303). It is clearly revealed that the 'smart' becomes advantageous only when it blends into the socio-ecological structure. The main point is to use human potential like science and reason on the right track without bearing animosity for it.

Indeed, another tale told by Meronym in the novel sums up the author's motive and intention completely. It is told in the tale that human beings who forget how to make a fire after the Fall and apply to a Wise Man for help. He orders a crow to turn back after finding a stick and flying to Mighty Volcano and then dipping it into the flames so that people can remember to light a fire again. On the way back, however, the crow is hurt due to the flame out of the burning stick in its mouth. "Now, did he drop that stick or dint he?" asks Meronym, "Do we mem'ry the makin' o' fire or don't we?" From this open-ended tale, Meronym concludes that the fundamental point is not related to the crow or the fire; yet, it is about how humans get their spirit again. It can be claimed that this is an open invitation to Bookchin's

dream of reorganizing socio-ecological structure in what he calls free nature. Mitchellian dialectic reflected in the novel evokes what Bookchin states on the essence of regression and progression:

In a very real sense, the past fifteen or more years have been remarkably ahistorical, albeit highly eventful, insofar as they have not been marked by any lasting advance toward a rational society. Indeed, if anything, they would seem to be tilting toward a regression, ideologically and structurally, to barbarism, despite spectacular advances in technology and science, whose outcome we cannot foresee (1996c: 175).

Along with the burning of “the last books an' the last clock” (2004: 298) and the regression into barbarism, Barnes explicitly imposes the idea that if social ecological utopia cannot be achieved in the near or distant future, what humanity will encounter as a result of the ongoing maldevelopment is nothing but a catastrophic dystopia.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4. JOHN FOWLES AS A FEMINIST NATURE WRITER: FOWLESIAN PORTRAIT OF ANDROCENTRIC EXPLOITATION OF WOMAN AND NATURE IN *THE COLLECTOR*

Fowles makes his literary debut with his intentionally disturbing novel entitled *The Collector* of which striking images and theme have been handled through love-or-power dichotomy, psychoanalytic and feminist viewpoints, social classes struggle and the sense of art and aesthetic. Considering Fowles's huge interest in nature from his childhood, his own sense of ecological philosophy influenced by the teachings of Zen and such nature writers as Henry David Thoreau, Gilbert White and Richard Jefferies and his attachment to feminist movement, his first novel can be seen to bear the traces of this understanding in addition to the themes mentioned above. Frederick Clegg, the repellent protagonist of the novel who enjoys collecting butterflies to kill and exhibit them kidnaps and imprisons artistic young woman Miranda Grey who has the impression that she is like one of the species victimized by Clegg.

The author's selection of the plot, space and character traits is explicitly beyond a coincidental writing action and based on his profound life experience, which can best explain his authorial intention in an age marked by environmental concerns and the rise of feminist movements. In her introductory notes to *Wormholes: Essays and Occasional Writings*, Jan Relf defines the novel's male character as "the archetype of all those natural-history collectors who 'in the end collect the same thing: the death of the living'—a statement central to Fowles's relationship to nature and the natural world" (1998: xx). Fowles, on the other hand, confesses that he was a butterfly collector when he was young. He reminisces about those days which would be a precipitating factor for his environmental conscious and for penning his novel. It is essential to the understanding of Fowles's ecologically sound fictions to recognize his youth experiences, one of which is worth quoting at length:



I began very young, as a butterfly collector, surrounded by setting-boards, killing-bottles, caterpillar cages. Then I went in for birds and compiled painstaking lists of the species I identified, an activity closer to writing down the makes of cars than to ornithology, though I suspect many misguided amateur bird watchers still think the spotting of rarities is what their hobby is about. From birds I moved on, in my teens, to botany; but I was still a victim of rarity snobbery, and for years hardly spared a second glance for any plant I had already ticked off as identified. Then I went through a shooting-and-fishing phase, a black period in my relations to nature, and one that now, taught by Clare and Thoreau, I look back on with an angry shame. That phase ended dramatically one dusk when I was wildfowling in the Essex marshes. I winged a curlew. It fell in the mud beside the Thames, and I ran to pick it up. Curlew scream like children when they are wounded, and in too much haste I reversed my gun in order to snap the bird's head against the stock. The curlew flapped, the gun slipped, I grabbed for it. There was a violent explosion. And I was left staring down at a hole blasted in the mud not six inches from my left foot.

The next day I sold my gun. I have not intentionally killed a bird or an animal since (1998a: 260).

Though he is quite regretful and considers this as an improper attitude towards nature, his deep involvement in nature differentiates him from postmodern writers in the sense that he directly prefers to place experiential ecological knowledge and ecological philosophy just into the core of his writing. Before he labelled human being as “vicious parasitical predator” and discovered himself as a typical part of it, Fowles admits that his approach to nature, as a man, was riddled with fallacies which he calls three “great heresies”. First, raping the right to survive of any living species through collecting them for individual pleasure is evil and immoral. As an earlier collector, he clarifies that the reason why he writes and entitles his work *The Collector* is to disclose his “hatred of this lethal perversion.” Second of all, as Fowles says, is “the heresy of destroying other life not to keep myself alive but for the pleasure of hunting and killing.” It seems that there is a clear reference to the environmental ethics adopting the principle that arbitrary actions differentiating from those which satisfy the vital needs must be abandoned not to threaten the diversity and richness. Lastly, he tells he was involved in the heresy of “rarity chasing” in the past, which is “still a form of destroying, though what is destroyed may be less the rarities themselves than the vain and narrow-minded fool who devotes all his time to their pursuit; who, in Clare's image, blinds his own eyes.” He defines the last one as an abuse of nature which is related to “hobby”, a very problematic and corruptive concept that gives harm to one's integration with natural life (1998a: 260-61). On the

other hand, both as an author and a critic who is conscious of the extant ecological crisis, he puts emphasis on the integration of nature and art both of which “are siblings, branches of the one tree; and nowhere more than in the continuing inexplicability of many of their processes, and above all those of creation and of effect on their respective audiences” (2010: 45-46). Nature in Fowles’s works, thus, is not an object simply used as a fictive ornament for his literary construction but rather cement consolidating the base of the construction.

In addition to his personal and authorial identity associated with the label as ‘nature lover’, Fowles manifests his admiration for feminist ideology as well. Relf suggests that “[t]hroughout his extended (over a lifetime) critique of man's iniquitous collecting habits, Fowles exempts woman from blame. Women, for Fowles, are natural conservationists; man, that ‘vicious parasitical predator,’ is the greedy, guilty party” (1998: xx). Fowles’s admiration for femininity and condemning traditional and historical masculine manners are not only an authorial attitude pertaining to *The Collector*. For Brooke Lenz, “[a]lthough feminist advocacy never appeared to be Fowles’ top priority, he specifically professed his feminist sympathies a number of times in the course of his career” (2008: 1). For instance, Fowles, in his article “The Nature of Nature”, admits that he is of the same opinion with feminists not only about the traditional attributed gender roles but also about the history of patriarchal domination and exploitation:

But just as women have long been grossly and selfishly misunderstood, slighted and exploited by men, so has the feeling by the knowing. I abhor the crassness of my own sex, abhor how ineptly, not to say cruelly, it has behaved on the voyage since the Bronze Age. Intelligent history has almost constantly linked the feminine gender with the more personal mode of apprehension, and most men do now have a sense at least of the apology owed for their gender's having historically encouraged a slavish adherence to convention—the past—and made it (only too often brutally and brutishly) the social norm (1998b: 345).

This frankness concerning his hatred of his own gender, which stems from the schematic stereotyping of patriarchal orthodoxy, seems to force him, and make him feel as well, to claim feminist advocacy in one of his interviews: “I am very much a feminist and if I am to answer seriously, then yes. I think the world would be a happier place if women had more power and consideration” (qtd. in Vipond, 1999:

235). Thus, his attachment to feminism leads him to depict powerful and self-conscious female characters in his fictions.

Poetically, however, Fowles can be claimed to differ from the proponents strictly affiliated to contemporary feminism. In response to Dianne Vipond about what role his female characters play in his fiction, Fowles tells his authorial position: “I consider myself a sort of chameleon genderwise. I am a novelist because I am partly a woman, a little lost in midair between the genders, neither one nor t’other” (Fowles and Vipond, 1996: 14). Namely, as a postmodernist author known with his interest in existentialist philosophy, Fowles is able to pretend to be a weathercock, mediating between masculine and feminine perspectives and perambulating different zones of the gender problems in order to reflect the ontological conflicts. When his position is coupled with his Jungian feminist perspective- as can be understood from his statement: “I have sympathy for the general ‘anima’<sup>5</sup>, the feminine spirit, the feminine intelligence, and I think that all male judgments of the way women go about life are so biased that they are virtually worthless” (qtd. in Onega, 1999: 180-81)- it seems to make a room for Fowles among feminist movements, yet not feminism in the modern sense as he suggests:

In historical or social terms I’ve always had great sympathy for, I won’t quite say feminism in the modern sense, but for a female principle in life. It doesn’t always tie in with modern feminism. My wife would deny point blank that I’m a proper feminist. But I do, more for obscure personal reasons, hate the macho viewpoint (qtd. in Tarbox, 1999: 165).

It may not be satisfactory enough for conventional understanding about feminism to label him as totally feminist, but this perspective had better come out as a Fowlesian portrait, to take literally, an authorial attitude of a male who is desperately conscious of his masculine authenticity and attempts to reconcile it with feminine spirit both by condemning the former and sympathizing with the latter, the anima. On the other hand, he accepts that the feminist movement makes much progress and he could not keep up with this progress. As he puts, “[t]his business of feminism [...] liking women, quite apart from sexual things – liking the womanly way of seeing life, came to me when I was still at Oxford, long before modern feminism came into being”, however, feminists, today, “have swept on really past where I am.” Though he is

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<sup>5</sup> According to Jungian theory, ‘anima’ is the female part in the male psyche.

aware of the fact that some woman writers are not pleased with his efforts and credit him with being “the greatest block to intelligent feminism in the British novel”, he defends himself by denying the accusations (qtd. in Relf, 1999: 123).

It is necessary to note his feminist approach to the great authors of literary canon in terms of holding a view on his wholeheartedness on the issue. Beside his female characters characterized by strong personal traits, he revisits the literary identities of Homer through assuming that he may be a woman writer, of Marie de France, the earliest known French woman poet, through praising her literary talent and of D. H. Lawrence through criticizing his description of women. “Even if one must take the orthodox scholarly view, and make Homer the male bard that tradition has always maintained he was”, as Fowles says when analyzing *Odyssey* in his “Islands”, “it seems to me certain that he was composing quite as much for a feminine audience as for a masculine one, and from an essentially feminist point of view—that is a civilizing one” (1998c: 296). In a feminist sense, similarly, Fowles finds Lawrence’s portrayal of women as “often rather painfully obtrusive masculinism-phallicism” (1998d: 238) in spite of his greatness as an author. On the other hand, Fowles brings up Marie de France’s poetic skills to the literary agenda. In this sense, Lenz discusses Fowles’s perspective on French woman writer as follows:

Comparing Marie de France to Jane Austen, Fowles admires “the transmutation that took place when Marie grafted her own knowledge of the world on the old [Celtic] material”, applauding her “sexual honesty”; her “very feminine awareness of how people really behaved”; her “passionate excess”, which he compares to Austen’s use of “sense and sensibility”; and her humor (2008: 134).

Although the debate over whether Fowles can present prosperous images that can potentially be analyzed in terms of his idiosyncratic understanding of feminism and nature, revisiting his portrayal of these two issues in terms of eluding radical –isms such as gynocentrism and ecocentrism can provide a refreshing insight for his distinctive characters and fictive realm. As Lenz claims:

The playfully postmodern, unconventional characterization of such women characters, coupled with a curious feminist analysis, could potentially explode their Fowlesian femininity and elucidate the potential of Fowles’ feminist endeavours. More productive, refreshing readings of Fowles’ work thus require

a shift in perspective, a move from familiar, fundamental configurations to insights that radiate from more marginal positions (2008: 12-13).

In a general sense, the reductionist understanding that only a specific group can naturally grasp the problems intrinsic to them will create a risk of transforming into another sort of essentialism and esotericism. This would incarcerate the critical approaches of literary canon into a narrower framework, as done by formalism once. Nevertheless, ecofeminism should be differentiated from feminism not because it is divergent from but because it is related to feminist movement. “The programme of a critical ecological feminism” as Plumwood manifests, “is a highly integrative one, and it gives it a claim to be a third wave or stage of feminism moving beyond the conventional divisions in feminist theory” (2003: 39).

The Fowlesian portrayal of ecological feminist images in *The Collector* can be evaluated in this framework. The novel begins with Clegg’s watching and observing young Miranda from Town Hall where he works. Then, the next clue given by the author is that Clegg visits Natural History Museum and he is interested in butterflies. The author seems to prefer the readers to comprehend the connection between Clegg’s obsession with the young girl and nature at first glance. This impression is concretized by Clegg’s statements when he first encounters her in a train in the novel. He tells how he always feels like he catches rare species through approaching it carefully when he sees Miranda and how he likens her to a Pale Clouded Yellow, a kind of butterfly which is more occasional and difficult to find than even other pretty butterflies (Fowles, 1997: 3). It can be inferred from his expression that there is an explicit identification in the mind of the narrator Clegg. He regards himself as a predator and hunter carefully laying for his hunt. The woman is then a hutable ‘rarity’ likened to a species of butterfly called pale clouded yellow. As already hinted above, Fowles deems rarity-chasing as a temptation which leads to a sort of destruction by ‘the narrow-minded fool’, or in Clare’s words, blinded-eyes. Fowles here refers to Clare’s poem “Summer Evening” in which the nature poet writes: “A sparrows lifes as sweet as mine” and adds “Your blinded eyes worst foes to you/ Neer see the good which sparrows do” (Clare, 1986: 119-20). Fowles interprets Clare’s message as a desire for remodelling the view of nature. According to Thomas M. Wilson, “Fowles takes Clare’s image of a crass and short-sighted view

of nature as a 'worse foe' than actual, physical environmental hazards, and applies it to the human habit of obscuring nature with a 'fact-cloud' of names" (2006: 188). The misperception reflecting onto the attitude toward nature is claimed to give more harm. This paves the way for discussing Clegg's approach to Miranda who is seen as a rare butterfly to be caught. The shift of perception and attitude toward women by the patriarchal thought can therefore lead to the paradigm shift which directly reflects the behaviour. Since Clegg fails to perceive Miranda as an individual free from patriarchal ascriptions, the idea lying behind his chase for his hunt, or the innocent young woman, must be annihilated before it turns into a destructive action.

This idea is so implanted in the mind of the narrator that the motive for violence he suppresses is revealed during his narration about the dreams. Before Clegg kidnaps Miranda, he often dreams of Miranda by putting her into the scenario he fictionalizes. This is both a romantic scenario in which Clegg dreams that she adopts his hobbies and view of life giving a domestic role for woman and a tragic one in which he could not own her. The latter which Clegg calls "bad dreams" ends up with Miranda's submission and obedience through a violent climax. In one of these bad dreams, Clegg pretends to be the man he watches in a TV play. He slaps her in the face after Miranda obeys and bows down (1997: 5). This violent act lies behind the fact that when man loses the control over woman, he applies to violence to regain his power and to drag her into the realm of which borders drawn by him as he does when he struggles with nature to seize power. Clegg tells "that was when it all started" (1997: 5) implying that this fear of loss and then regaining Miranda in his dreams is the initiator of his decision to abduct. The repressed feelings awakening in his mind will be put into practice when he understands that he can only grasp her in terms of his efforts to subdue her. Since, what he praises is not the butterfly that flies freely but its life merely owned by him.

The author maintains grounding the reasons behind Clegg's hostility toward nature and women through presenting some instances from his infancy and adolescence. It is narrated that Clegg holds his mother responsible for the death of his father and he does not care whether she is alive or not. Her mother leaves him because "she only wanted an easy time" (1997: 5). It seems that Clegg's desire to immobilize human and nonhuman living beings that he adores and his efforts not to

allow them escape from his hands is related to this psychological crisis. The rage he feels for his mother results in his perceiving 'other', such as mother and nature, as an object to be owned. As Christine Di Stefano suggests, this trauma "takes its conscious and manifest form in the adult's compulsion to overcome the dependence on nature [...] the domination of nature is an expression, then, of a denial of dependence on the mother" (1991: 157). In a deeper sense, Clegg's chase for nonhuman living beings in the novel is reflected as an attempt to a sort of denial of dependence; rather, he forces those beings to be dependent on himself. In Di Stefano's words, then, "[hostility toward the (m)other is redirected toward the natural world" (1991: 157). Considering Clegg's statement that he does not care and want to meet her again, it evokes the formulation of Isaac Balbus on this trauma that "[t]he mother that does not matter reappears in the form of a nature that is reduced to mere matter" (1982: 297). A male child who understands that he does not possess his mother is in search of regaining and dominating her, unconsciously, through breaking away from her image. This process is projected onto nature, a transformation in which his struggle to possess his mother evolves into a struggle to dominate Mother Nature in adulthood. Accordingly, that may be one of the reasons why Clegg is so willing and excited when he collects and imprisons the butterflies.

On the other hand, the narrator tells how he is brought up by his father's sister, Aunt Annie, and her husband Uncle Dick with their disabled daughter Mabel. Unlike Aunt Annie, Uncle Dick is an important figure playing a paternal role on Clegg's personality until he is dead when Clegg is fifteen. Together, they go hunting and Clegg remembers the days they spend as the second best experience he has had in his life (1997: 5-6). His respect and admiration for Uncle Dick explains his commitment to masculine culture. In this sense, Clegg tells:

Aunt Annie and Mabel used to despise my butterflies when I was a boy, but Uncle Dick would always stick up for me. He always admired a good bit of setting. He felt the same as I did about a new imago and would sit and watch the wings stretch and dry out and the gentle way they try them, and he also let me have room in his shed for my caterpillar jars. When I won a hobby prize for a case of Fritillaries he gave me a pound on condition I didn't tell Aunt Annie (1997: 6).

The predatory action is scorned by the female characters due to the fact that they are not interested in damaging these beings and they feel pity for the animals. It evokes

the sense of ecofeminism accusing androcentrism of being the primal factor causing the exploitation and pollution of nature. The male characters, on the other hand, enjoy and feel the same enthusiasm while watching the decease of butterflies. This is why Uncle Dick is more close to Clegg and he plays a significant role in shaping Clegg's identity. It is true that a child who is grown far from nature without touching and feeling it fails to realize the spirit of nature; yet, the worse is that which is to raise a child by imposing him, consciously or unconsciously, the dangerous thought that nature is a realm of hunting fraught with the objects to be caught and exploited. The latter is more dangerous because this thought redirects him to oppress what he is socially taught as so-called inferior being such as woman. It can also be inferred from his statement that the hobby prize Clegg wins implies the fact that this masculinist and androcentric attitude gains recognition in the social arena so as to celebrate such a slaughter. This social impetus to the expansion of masculinity, then, creates individuals like Clegg who hates, in his words, "vulgar women, especially girls" (1997: 7) simply because they exhibit behaviours in opposition to social norms determined by the conservative-patriarchal society.

The socio-cultural structure in the environment that Clegg is brought up can also be defined as conservative, as Clegg narrates: "Aunt Annie is a nonconformist, she never forced me to go to chapel or such like, but I was brought up in the atmosphere, though Uncle Dick used to go to the pub on the q.t. sometimes" (1997: 7-8). This information is deliberately presented by the author who invites the reader to discover Clegg's conservative-patriarchal mind that justifies the imprisonment of Miranda and butterflies. It is also this mentality that prevents him making connections with women and leads him, as an egocentric male, to be proud of the barriers keeping him out of feminine world: "I know I don't have what it is girls look for [...] I'm glad I was, if more people were like me, in my opinion, the world would be better" (1997: 8). Unlike Fowles's attraction to his 'anima', his male character hates his and develops no sympathy with it by avoiding any relationship. As Catherine Keller argues, "women have been the caretakers of relation" while "the dominant separate self of the culture is the male ego" (1990: 258). Thus, as the segregation from nature causes man to categorize it as other, the separation Keller



argues leads to the classification of woman. Indeed, this is required for the male ego to create an enemy and fight with this enemy.

In this sense, Clegg's misogyny is embodied in the image of a sex worker for the first time in the novel. After he wins the pools, he realizes that he desires to "have a woman" (1997: 9) sexually and calls sex workers. In addition to his seeing the opposite sex as an object to be owned, Clegg spills out his hatred against the old woman by telling that "she was old and she was horrible, horrible. I mean, both the filthy way she behaved and in looks. She was worn, common. Like a specimen you'd turn away from, out collecting" (1997: 9). It is clear that Clegg's image of woman is characterized with a nonhuman species of which value is based on whether it is worth collecting or not. His focus on the physical appearance of the woman shows his utilitarian approach over the body which is abused, exploited by men and then finally condemned again by men. The worse is that Clegg lays bare the fascist thought directing his understanding of categorization. He comments on Mabel who is crippled: "I think, people like Mabel should be put out painlessly" (1997: 11). While Aunt Annie is never told as complaining about her daughter's physical situation, Clegg, along with his otherizing cruel classification, represents the social decay about exalting physical body. Irene Diamond finds this social erosion "particularly troublesome when we note that feminist advocates for persons with disabilities argue that, in many cases, the problem is not the disability but how people are treated because of it" (1990: 206). This may explain why early ecofeminists relate women to nature in terms of sanctity of survival, enhancement of life and diversity paving the way for production and revitalization contrary to patriarchal desire to annihilate the inferior other.

This desire for annihilation, on the other hand, can be connected to the monetary issues of which distribution is not healthy between genders. Money is both means and ends for presenting male chauvinism. In opposition to what Starhawk asks people for putting money "into those [renewable] sources rather than into things that pollute and kill" (1990: 82), money has been used to ensure the domination over both nature and woman. Recurrently, Clegg voices the belief in the extension of his rights so as to own whatever he wishes in the novel. He tells he can "lay at her feet" (1997: 14) thousands of dollars to prove himself because, as he manifests, "[t]hat's the thing

about money. There are no obstacles” (1997: 15). It is the money that helps make his decision to kidnap a woman due to his commitment to the capitalist belief that money is power and power is money. Furthermore, he justifies his belief by advocating that “there'd be a blooming lot more of this if more people had the money and the time to do it” (1997: 72). Owning money as the symbol of supremacy is masculinised. It is also money, he defends, which gives right to those who own it to oppress the inferior: “We all take what we can get. And if we haven't had much most of our life we make up for it while the going's good” (1997: 72). However, Miranda who calls Clegg as Caliban, curses, to generalize, capitalist patriarchy as a victim directly exposed to its atrociousness: “It sickens me every time I think of all the money Caliban has won; and of all the other people like him who win money. So selfish, so evil” (1997: 224). Sharing the similar attitude with ecofeminism that condemns this system, she demonizes it in the name of all the oppressed beings suffering from its consequences.

Considering money as one of the most important means of power and authority, Clegg is also obsessed with the concept of power in general as a symbol of patriarchal system. However, he is knowledgeable about the defects of greed for power, at least in theory. He believes that he is an ordinary man like everyone who can commit the same crime if they have enough power because, as Clegg considers, “[p]ower corrupts” (1997: 20). Yet, the concept of power alters in terms of how it is perceived. In an ecofeminist sense, the point is to decentralize male power breaking its ties with patriarchy while males desire for it as a means of hierarchy and hegemony over both women and nature. This makes him mentally a happy being and physically a giant creature which he always dreams of. Watching butterflies, for instance, dead in a killing bottle makes him feel powerful and superior that he has never become. As soon as Clegg reads the news mentioning about the disappearance of Miranda, he feels the same: “It gave me a feeling of power, I don't know why” (1997: 41). Though he thinks he does not know, the reason why he feels powerful is that he is the only person who has the secret, or, in a deeper sense, that he satisfies his instinctive hunger for being the master. This is exemplified through power relationships reminding master-slave dualism between the male and female characters by the author. Clegg causes Miranda to faint by using chloroform, which

he uses on his insects as well, when he hears the sound of a car approaching. After that, he expresses the satisfaction he feels. Miranda, tells Clegg “looked a sight, the dress all off one shoulder. I don't know what it was, it got me excited, it gave me ideas, seeing her lying there right out. It was like I'd showed who was really the master” (1997: 91). This is what Clegg feels when he sees his butterflies lying dead. Thus, it is illustrated that both woman and animal become subject to the man's control and mastery over their bodies. Rather than Carol J. Adams's famous argument connecting meat-eating to violence against women and thus women to animals with regards to sexual images<sup>6</sup>, the situation between Clegg and Miranda indicates a Fowlesian reflection linking species-collecting to violence against women and thus the control of animal body to the control of women's body. Similarly, there is a sexual drive lying behind Clegg's mind because the woman enslaved, which makes him feel like a patron, provokes him sexually. Furthermore, in a discussion with Miranda, Clegg is disturbed by the time he feels that she he takes the control. Then, Clegg expresses that he is the single master: “You're forgetting who's the boss” (1997: 110). This fear of loss stems from the fact that man's hegemony over woman may be a symbol for the other forms of oppressions; namely, the loss of one can evolve into the total loss of hegemony over all ‘others’.

Unlike Clegg's narration, the story seems quite different through the lens of Miranda. She is a smart woman who can understand Clegg's personal weakness and frailty though he supposes himself as the boss:

He makes me change, he makes me want to dance round him, bewilder him, dazzle him, dumbfound him. He's so slow, so unimaginative, so lifeless. Like zinc white. I see it's a sort of tyranny he has over me. He forces me to be changeable, to act. To show off. The hateful tyranny of weak people (1997: 134).

Miranda's exposure to the masculine authority's tyrannical oppression forcing her to involve in an idealized stereotype promotes her to maintain her struggle with the sociopathic character as much as she can. Therefore, she resists the pressure in order to hold the power and not to surrender. Despite being taken captive, she believes that she is in a position of authority: “He keeps me absolutely prisoner. But in everything

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<sup>6</sup> For the detailed relationships among patriarchy, meat eating, feminism and literary theory, see Caroll J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*, Bloomsbury, New York 2015.

else I am mistress” (1997: 146). Though this is a kind of playing chess, as in real life played between man and woman in the social arena, and Clegg pretends like encouraging Miranda’s authoritative position, she knows the move. This awareness makes her the powerful side having psychological superiority despite physical restrictions. In this regard, for Miranda, the realm of which boundaries drawn for her divides into two; the physical one within which she is imprisoned and psychological one where she does not see herself as captive. The latter is a realm of which borders she overcomes to transcend and where she is free, insightful, comprehensive and absolute ruler. It is Clegg who is stuck into these borders and likely to stay there forever: “He doesn't believe in any other world but the one he lives in and sees. He's the one in prison; in his own hateful narrow present world” (1997: 228). While she is psychically imprisoned in the world of Clegg, Miranda observes that Clegg’s fundamental aim is to occupy the junction point between body and mind, or the physical and psychological realms. This point represents the very nature of Miranda, which is quite difficult to conquer. It is implied that the original purpose of patriarchy is to dominate the nature of women, which causes a crisis in masculine identity and leads men to use more power to pierce into this special world. In parallel, it is Clegg who attempts to invade the nature of Miranda:

The sheer joy of having me under his power, of being able to spend all and every day staring at me. He doesn't care what I say or how I feel — my feelings are meaningless to him — it's the fact that he's got me.

I could scream abuse at him all day long; he wouldn't mind at all . It's me he wants, my look, my outside; not my emotions or my mind or my soul or even my body. Not anything human (1997: 171).

It is also essential to understanding Clegg’s approach to Miranda to recognize that his relationship with nature is problematic like his relationship with women. Miranda considers that his primitive desire to catch, to capture and then to own her comes out as a consequence of his blindness to nature because, as she narrates, Clegg is “a collector. That’s the great dead thing in him” (1997: 171). It can be interpreted by linking it to a hunter who hunts not for the body, ignores the spirit of living things and then kills just for saying he hunts, which gives pleasure him doing this. The power applied by Clegg refers to men as representative of the greedy and guilty

predator, for Fowles, which kills not the hunted species but the hunter, indeed. It is told as a process of exteriorizing the dead inside him.

To put it differently, patriarchal power, whether it is based on physical or psychological superiority, is equated to violence. Thus, the sense of men's power is formulated as, initially, the desire for power which, then, turns to the greed and ultimately to the process of extermination of all living beings. The women's place in this formulation comes out as an antidote to the brute force. Miranda, following her violent act to inactivate Clegg, voices her general thought on violence in accordance with the non-violent activism of ecological feminism in the novel: "I've come to a series of decisions. Thoughts. Violence and force are wrong. If I use violence I descend to his level. It means that I have no real belief in the power of reason, and sympathy and humanity" (1997: 245). Her attitude to violence is a disavowal of the masculine ideal which connects biological maleness to aggressiveness. Namely, on one hand the masculine identity associates him with 'reason', on the other hand he loses 'sympathy' and becomes hostile towards 'humanity'. However, she knows that she has to wage war with Clegg for freedom ideologically. Miranda says: "It's a battle between Caliban and myself. He is the New People and I am the Few" (1997: 249). This struggle cannot be simply reduced to a class struggle, as the traditionalist critics do, due to the author's above-mentioned expression concerning ecological background of his character, which is the primal drive dragging him to imprison and torture a female. At least, in terms of ecological feminism, it requires to develop an association between the oppressor and the oppressed ignoring Fowles's emphatical portrayal of class distinction. Thus, Miranda becomes the voice of minority besieged, imprisoned and tortured by the member of male-dominated majority in social life. Also, the analogy of "being in a city" is her expanding the condition in which she exists to a wider scale: "But it's a battle. It's like being in a city and being besieged. They're all around. And we've got to hold out" (1997: 249). She regards herself as the defender of the besieged arena and decides to resist keeping away from masculinist methods what ecofeminism demonizes: "I must fight with my weapons. Not his. Not selfishness and brutality and shame and resentment" (1997: 249). Her weapon explicitly refers to an ideological confrontation considering her effort and desire to educate Clegg characterized by conservative, vulgar and egotist principles.

The violence is outside the scope of her struggle because she believes in the power of her ideology and the power of femininity.

Starhawk divides this concept of power into three: power-over, power-from-within and power-with. She relates power-over to domination, control and mastery which lead to estrangement. It is so common and extreme in our culture that “we have been shaped in its institutions, so that the insides of our minds resemble the battlefield and the jail” (1990: 9). The object exposed to power-over is inherently devalued. She defines power-from-within as “bonding with other human beings, and with the environment” (1990: 10). It requires an individual capacity and a transcendental integration that can help maintain people’s lives. Thus, Starhawk suggests that people “can feel that power in acts of creation and connection, in planting, building, writing, cleaning, healing soothing, playing, singing, making love” (1990: 10). On the other hand, power-with links the concept of power to society. Social power, then, is a consequence of the democratic influence among the equal members of the group, rather than the patronisation (Starhawk, 1990: 10). Therefore, while power-over can be described as a hierarchical and authoritative relationship based on oppression among people, as in the relationship between Clegg and Miranda, power-from-within, as Seth Kreisberg claims, refers to “one’s sense of self and sense of connection to the world” (1992: 68). Miranda realizes this inherent ‘power-from-within’ lying under her femininity: “The power of women! I’ve never felt so full of mysterious power. Men are a joke” (1997: 267). Discovering her individual ability embedded in her identity, Miranda feels that power and then fulfils her spiritual integration with environment, in accordance with what Starhawk mentions, in the act of creation: “I long to paint and paint *other* things. Fields, southern houses, landscapes, vast wide-open things in vast wide-open light” (1997: 269). As nature ends up as a victim due to male-induced violence, yet resists surviving due to the intrinsic power, Miranda confesses that women are also the victim because of their exposure to ‘power-over’: “We’re so weak physically, so helpless with things. Still, even today. But we’re stronger than they are. We can stand their cruelty. They can’t stand ours” (1997: 267). As the violence and cruelty are intensified by Clegg in the novel, Miranda becomes more decisive in expressing her resistance to the oppression. Clegg, after a while, stops bringing meal for her so that

he can command by threatening her with starvation and capture the authority completely. However, she tells she has to overcome it: "I've got over the shock. He won't beat me. I won't give in. I won't be broken by him" (1997: 273). The author seems to draw the picture of a projection of patriarchal capitalism which is handled by some ecofeminists, like Mies, Shiva, Gaard and Gruen who believe that it is women and children who are directly exposed to the destructive consequences stemming from patriarchal capitalist system. This system, particularly in third world countries where women are forced to deal with domestic tasks, allows men to ensure the hegemony over those women and presents a threat for them by obliging them to be faithful to men under any circumstances through monetary reasons.

Clegg's passion for power instilled in his masculine mind sources from his belief that it is the pathway to victory. The self of Miranda, for Clegg, is a castle or an island to be conquered. He announces his victory as early as he captures Miranda. As soon as he catches and puts her into the van, Clegg tells how he feels: "She was mine, I felt suddenly very excited, I knew I'd done it" (1997: 25). His expression gives the impression that it is the victory of Clegg as the huntsman's triumph over the species he catches because he is, as Uncle Dick calls him, "Lord Ferdinand Clegg, Marquis of Bugs" (1997: 37). It is also reflected as a colonial conquest, a seizure in which the lord glorifies the captured land. Another statement showing that Clegg feels like a conqueror is narrated through the analogies in the first night when Miranda is put in the cellar:

After, she was telling me what a bad thing I did and how I ought to try and realize it more. I can only say that evening I was very happy, as I said, and it was more like I had done something very daring, like climbing Everest or doing something in enemy territory (1997: 27-28).

He is very happy and thus feels glorious because of the notion of victory constructing his masculine identity. In so doing, his courageous act, which is masculinised, is projected as the masculine self achieving the conquest of a feminized huge mountain and enemy-held territory. With reference to these images, Miranda is otherized as a woman. Marti Kheel observes that "[t]he notion of an autonomous (masculine) self, established through the defeat of a female-imaged other, is viewed by many feminists as a central underpinning of the patriarchal world" (1990: 36). In this regard, Clegg admits that it is the best thing he has done so far and tells: "It was like catching the

Mazarine Blue again or a Queen of Spain Fritillary. I mean it was like something you only do once in a lifetime and even then often not” (1997: 28). Having never been so involved in a relationship with women in his life, Clegg identifies his action with a victory he wins against a woman by subjugating her. This is probably the foremost step, save for his collecting bugs, in constructing his masculine self, as indicated by Kheel: “We have seen that women and animals have been utilized as psychological instruments for the establishment of the masculine self” (1990: 136).

Putting feminine identity into the domestic sphere and the exclusion from social arena intellectually, economically and politically have prevented women from discovering Starhawk’s concept of ‘power-from-within’ and, thus, from realizing the very potential required to be integrated with the physical world. Fowles seems to link the imprisonment of Miranda and the hindrances to her access to information with a fascist ideology of power:

I never let her see papers. I never let her have a radio or television. It happened one day before ever she came I was reading a book called *Secrets of the Gestapo* — all about the tortures and so on they had to do in the war, and how one of the first things to put up with if you were a prisoner was the not knowing what was going on outside the prison. I mean they didn't let the prisoners know anything, they didn't even let them talk to each other, so they were cut off from their old world. And that broke them down (1997: 41).

The totalitarian Nazi method he learns from the book not only indicates his desire for power and controlling the earth but also his efforts to alienate Miranda from the outer world. Indeed, this fascistic tendency, the prison in which the authority does not let the prisoners know anything, represents a microcosm of the artistic and philosophical world often accused by the ecological and feminist movements. The debate over why there have not been great female philosophers and artists, particularly until twentieth century, in the community of ‘men-talking-about-women’ has always ignored this fascist tendency. However, the answer lies behind what Clegg reads and does so that he can cut her connection with reality and knowledge in order to make her dependant on himself. Fowles depicts a more concrete example concerning the art of painting. As Miranda tells, she can never be a great artist though she has inclination for painting. She explains the reason in the context of gender issues: “I'm not egocentric enough. I'm a woman. I have to lean on something” (1997: 60). The egocentrism



Miranda rejects can be equated with androcentrism, which prevents women from discovering the potential power-from-within.

Considering his appreciation of De France as a distinctive female writer, Fowles here seems to criticize the canonical philosophy and art dominated by this male egocentrism and exclusion of women from this world. Some women artists accredited with irrationality and becoming the subject to the masculine analysis are also voiced in the novel. Miranda narrates her dream referring to the first woman impressionist Berthe Morisot:

I want to paint like Berthe Morisot, I don't mean with her colours or forms or anything physical, but with her simplicity and light. I don't want to be clever or great or "significant" or given all that clumsy masculine analysis (1997: 138).

Miranda's desire to paint like Morisot is an intentional reference to the status of woman struggling to survive in the androcentric canon. Though Morisot's works are among the best in the impressionist movement, she is not valued as much as her male counterparts and her works have been underrated for a long time. At the same time, her statement is of significance as she is directly exposed to the gendered analysis: "I don't think there has ever been a man who treated a woman as an equal, and that's all I would have asked, for I know I'm worth as much as they" (qtd. in Higonnet, 1995: 203). Like many women artists, it is understood that Morisot suffers from patriarchal approach to their works; however, Miranda wants to reflect the simplicity and the light of natural objects without minding 'clumsy' patriarchal interpretations. Moreover, the movement of impressionism reflecting the fresh and vivid impressions of environment rather than the traditional depiction of lifeless and colorless images of natural objects is also given as an example which is in conflict with Clegg's obsession with inanimate, lifeless and dead images. Contrary to Clegg's hobby of taking photographs, Miranda holds the view that "when you draw something it lives, and when you photograph it it dies" (1997: 55). This difference between the perceptions of images is an indication of the discrepancy between feminine and masculine sense of nature. Miranda, accordingly, voices her wish to paint a landscape by giving it vividness and lightness: "I want to paint sunlight on children's faces, or flowers in a hedge or a street after April rain" (1997: 138). In addition to her views on painting, Miranda sees writing as a form of expressing herself. From an

ecofeminist standpoint, Miranda's writing diaries is a combination of 'écriture feminine' and 'écriture naturelle.' Through Miranda's psychological manifestation and Clegg's chaotic inner world in the novel, the author gives the impression that her 'white ink' is in struggle with Clegg's phallogocentric narrative. Feeling like a monkey in a cage having an emotional breakdown, Miranda narrates: "I felt I was going mad last night, so I wrote and wrote and wrote myself into the other world. To escape in spirit, if not in fact. To prove it still exists" (1997: 166). Her writing act, then, can be interpreted as not only an attempt to escape from the restrictions imposed by Clegg as a representative of patriarchal system, but also a resistance to this system which can only limit her physically. However, her spirit is still independent from all restrictions and transcends the cellar; she thinks, writes and believes as she is. This transcendental writing act for her is like "[k]nowing what it was to be *in* a universe" (1997: 202), as once she feels like she is in Spain with George Paston. Unlike Clegg's portrayal of masculine, chaotic, merciless and competitive universe, the universe Miranda believes that she is a part of it and she longs for meeting bodily is often described with an attempt to focus on the diversity of natural beauties. Her description of Collioure, for instance, makes the reader feel that the natural scene is as much vivid as she is still there: "The ilexes. An absolutely new colour, amazing chestnut, rufous, burning, bleeding, where they had cut away the cork. The cicadas. The wild azure sea through the stems and the heat and the smell of everything burnt in it" (1997: 212).

From this point on, Miranda can be labelled as 'vital' and 'creative' woman growing to more maturity throughout the novel while Clegg still remains as Caliban, a stationary and unchanging character. Though social critics, again, evaluate this difference in terms of social hierarchy, the difference is indeed related to the self-realization which, in an ecological view, is a common theme shared by the radical ecologies underlining its necessity for an individual to attain the stage of ecological awareness. This tension underlying the struggle with both anthropocentrism and androcentrism requires an ideological battle with those who are the unyielding proponents in their adherence to these -isms. In this sense, "[w]hy should we tolerate their beastly Calibanity?", asks Miranda, "[w]hy should every vital and creative and good person be martyred by the great universal stodge around?" and realizes that

“[i]n this situation I'm a representative” (1997: 221). It should be noted that what makes her feel like this is her isolated situation in which she likens herself to the butterflies victimized in the same way she is done. The ecofeminist reading of Miranda's statement below in this parallel, through adhering to the text itself, gives traces about the similar androcentric methods abusing woman and nature:

A martyr. Imprisoned, unable to grow. At the mercy of this resentment, this hateful millstone envy of the Calibans of this world. Because they all hate us, they hate us for being different, for not being them, for their own not being like us. They persecute us, they crowd us out, they send us to Coventry, they sneer at us, they yawn at us, they blindfold themselves and stuff up their ears. They do anything to avoid having to take notice of us and respect us (1997: 221).

On one hand, this is the manifestation of Clegg's masculine identity evolving into a wider scale concerning a serious socio-cultural problem of domination in all facets of life, on the other hand, this is the manifestation of a victimized woman in the name of all otherized beings oppressed, alienated and intimidated. It should be evaluated in a wider scale because Clegg's hatred, actually, seems to target every productive, regenerative and creative aspect of life besides woman and nature. Art, for instance, takes its raw material from nature reshaping it and giving it a form. However, Miranda implies that Clegg shows a Platonic approach to art: “Everything to do with art embarrasses him” because he considers it as “vaguely immoral” (1997: 246). This ill-mindedness, when coupled with Clegg's preventing Miranda from accessing information via domestication, seems to remind her of primitive patriarchal order as opposed to the healthy civilization. Referring to her prison, she says “[i]t's the slowness of time. I'll swear all the clocks in the world have gone centuries slower since I came here” (1997: 250).

Further evidence supporting the portrayal of gender and nature issues is demonstrated in Clegg's transformation from collecting butterflies to collecting women. Namely, it can be interpreted as the fictionalization of the thesis that the roots of the domination of women can be found in men's attitude to nature. The relationship between them is presented as similar to what ecofeminism sees parallelism between the exploitation of women and nature. The masculine habit that upgrades to a larger field of exploitation is explicitly given in the novel for the first time when Clegg decides to use chloroform: “I was going to use chloroform, I used it

once in the killing-bottle” (1997: 22). A killing-bottle is a kind of jar which contains some poisonous chemicals like chloroform to kill insects for the preservation of specimens. Miranda feels that she is imprisoned in the bottle just like Clegg does the butterflies: “He showed me one day what he called his killing-bottle. I’m imprisoned in it. Fluttering against the glass. Because I can see through it I still think I can escape. I have hope. But it’s all an illusion” (1997: 218). The method and the device show similarity in terms of Clegg’s experimental approach to the process. He definitely knows how to behave and move when he sets his trap, because he is different from an ordinary man as he relies on his experiences based on experimental ecology. Clegg tells how he waits patiently as in the chase of butterflies:

It finally ten days later happened as it sometimes does with butterflies. I mean you go to a place where you know you may see something rare and you don’t, but the next time not looking for it you see it on a flower right in front of you, handed to you on a plate, as they say (1997: 22).

This is because he clearly regards Miranda as the most precious and prominent piece of his collection. It is her beauty that attracts him and makes him think that she is different from other women. It is also akin to his rarity chasing and his insatiable appetite to catch the different butterfly species. On the other hand, the fear Miranda feels is described in terms of an insect’s shivering, which gives the idea that it is indeed the typical relationship between a hunter and his hunt. Clegg describes this situation as “not having a net and catching a specimen you wanted in your first and second fingers [...] coming up slowly behind and you had it, but you had to nip the thorax, and it would be quivering there” (1997: 39). However, he knows that it is not as easy as hunting an animal because he does not want to kill her but to enjoy watching her fading away under his mastery. Miranda realizes his purpose by linking it to her femininity as soon as Clegg explains that he is an entomologist collecting butterflies: “Now you’ve collected me [...] not in a manner of speaking. Literally. You’ve pinned me in this little room and you can come and gloat over me” (1997: 42). Then, Miranda raises an ecofeminist voice and also confesses that she is a Buddhist, which puts the tremendous conflict between the two on ecological issues: “I hate anything that takes life. Even insects’ lives” (1997: 42). Here, Miranda exhibits her sense of compassion, care and nonviolence based on a nature religion in accordance with what spiritual ecofeminists advocate. Contrary to Clegg’s

patriarchal assumptions on human and nonhuman beings, she cares the lives of other beings. Warren believes that “the ability to care also has a spiritual component” (2000: 202). This spiritual dimension, then, requires the extension of self to embrace all beings and results in the defence of right to live for all forms of life. On the other hand, the author unveils a theoretical contradiction within ecofeminism, as Biehl often voices, through bringing up the issue of eating animals. Clegg replies to Miranda’s faith in Buddhism: “You ate the chicken” (1997: 42). Gaard also criticizes the dismissal of vegetarianism in ecofeminist agenda and puts an emphasis on “[a]ddressing the centrality of all life on earth- which includes all animal species [...]” (1993: 6). In a similar vein, along with Gaard, Adams and Donovan also put the necessity of involving vegetarianism into the sphere of ecofeminism and contribute to the emergence of vegetarian ecofeminism. Concerning the issue of caring, compassion and nonviolence mentioned above, Donovan asserts that:

Out of a women's relational culture of caring and attentive love, therefore, emerges the basis for a feminist ethic for the treatment of animals. We should not kill, eat, torture, and exploit animals because they do not want to be so treated, and we know that. If we listen, we can hear them (1993: 185).

The sense of environmental ethics of the female character is justifiable due to her being conscious about this contradiction at least. Miranda knows that she would be more consistent with her ecological view if she did not consume meat: “But I despise myself. If I was a better person I'd be a vegetarian” (1997: 42).

The ecofeminist thought linking women to nature as fellow victims of male domination is often echoed by Fowles throughout the novel. Miranda voices this connection and understands that Clegg’s purpose of incarcerating her in a cellar bears similarities with his collecting animals: “Aren't you going to show me my fellow-victims?” (1997: 54). The author also demonstrates the difference of masculine and feminine approach to the butterfly collection. While Clegg is so willing to show his collection and expects to be praised owing to his ability of arranging the dead butterflies, Miranda approaches the issue from a completely different point. Clegg is proud of killing them and satisfied with the dead bodies of the animals, yet Miranda sees only sadness reflecting onto their beauties when she looks at them. Clegg wants her to see the number of butterflies he kills but Miranda refuses: “No, I can't. I'm thinking of all the butterflies that would have come from

these if you'd let them live. I'm thinking of all the living beauty you've ended" (1997: 54). In a deeper sense, it can be interpreted as denoting two sharp differences between androcentrism and ecological feminism. While androcentric ideology is founded on the concept of demolition, manipulation and exploitation without caring the ecological outcomes, ecofeminist thinkers worry about the ecological cycle including women as Miranda sees the reproduction beyond the dead bodies. Here, it is Fowles's himself discussing with Clegg who, as an ordinary man, "is the curse of civilization" (qtd. in Newquist, 1964: 219; Fowles, 1997: 134) and, furthermore, it is his anima seeing the patriarchal man of science as a threat to both human and nonhuman civilization. To put it clearly, Clegg's intense masculine identity, when coupled with his ordinariness, can be seen through his question: "What difference would a dozen specimens make to a species?" However, Fowles believes that the scientific categorization and classification of nature by giving it names, as modernity inspires the conceptual inventions to categorize and then control nature, is "our illusion" (1998a: 262) as well as it is also a sort of superficial and insensitive attitude toward nature. "To a professional scientist, as he puts, "correct identification is a basic tool of the trade [...] Seeing and enjoying nature are infinitely more important than knowing how to name and analyze it" (1998e: 255). Miranda, at this point, is the female character who echoes the author's ecological identity disturbed by the male-dominated scientific approach to nonhuman beings: "I hate scientists [...] I hate people who collect things, and classify things and give them names and then forget all about them" (1997: 55).

In one sense, Miranda represents the author's anima while she becomes the voice of the butterflies. Clegg, probably for the first time in his life, is called to account for his killing animals by this representative female character. It seems that he has never thought about the issue from different standpoints so far, because he is so deeply influenced by the patriarchal order in which he grows that Miranda's words can never become attainable for him. Asking him the reason why he is accustomed to developing a hobby, Miranda gets the answer that it is Clegg's male teacher who shows him how to do, along with his uncle (1997: 157). It proves the validity of ecofeminism as a pedagogical project against the oppressive system in patriarchal societies. Coining the term 'nature deficit disorder', Richard Louv

approaches the behavioural disorder from a different angle. The concept of natural deficit disorder is that the children who have less relationship with nature because of such reasons like parental fear for safety, the loss of natural areas and the development of technology keeping them at home tend to experience behavioural problems (Louv, 2008). However, in a deeper sense, Louv's findings may require a revision encapsulating the children like Clegg who have a wrong relationship with nature based on the domination and exploitation. In other words, Clegg cannot be claimed to have less relationship with nature in his childhood; yet, his experience in nature bears the traces of patriarchal tendencies. Considering ecofeminists' anxieties which they think are of prime importance because these tendencies have undermined human and non-human life in the planet, the education on nature, femininity, and maleness given in the childhood can eliminate these oppressive tendencies. Unfortunately, it is Miranda who assumes the role of an educator giving speeches on both nature and the nature of women in a killing-bottle. It is unfortunate because Clegg has an already constructed masculine gender, thus, what she tells is of no significance now and even "talking Greek" (1997: 79) would work better. Therefore, Miranda is killed in the end of the novel becoming one of the victims of this nature/gender deficit disorder.

Miranda insistently attempts to unveil the reason behind Clegg's destructive mindset: "Why do you take all the life out of life? Why do you kill all the beauty?" (1997: 79). Her reactive attitude, in the name of all oppressed beings, which questions his desire for subjugating by force causes her to become aware of the connection between Clegg and violence. As Mies and Shiva describe this interconnection between patriarchal violence, woman and nature:

Wherever women acted against ecological destruction or /and the threat of atomic annihilation, they immediately became aware of the connection between patriarchal violence against women, other people and nature, and that: In defying this patriarchy we are loyal to future generations and to life and this planet itself. We have a deep and particular understanding of this both through our natures and our experience as women (2014: 14).

Though Clegg replies that his aggressiveness sources from being exposed to the disadvantageous conditions of lower class, it should be remembered that he is a postmodern unreliable narrator having personality disorder. Thus, it can be argued

that Clegg's justification of his destructive tendencies to 'take all the life out of life' and 'kill all the beauty' should be searched in the class issues less than ecofeminist analysis. For this reason, the author consciously concentrates on the ecological background of his male character for the reader to make the connection. In this regard, Miranda's observations, identifications and reactive attitudes require a prominent notice in deciphering, as Mies and Shiva suggests above, the connection between the impacts of nurturing violence against woman and nature. For instance, Miranda establishes this connection one more time following her abortive attempt to escape from the cellar:

I am one in a row of specimens. It's when I try to flutter out of line that he hates me. I'm meant to be dead, pinned, always the same, always beautiful. He knows that part of my beauty is being alive, but it's the dead me he wants. He wants me living-but-dead. I felt it terribly strong today. That my being alive and changing and having a separate mind and having moods and all that was becoming a nuisance (1997: 217-18).

Her portrayal of Clegg's hatred against everything that is alive, animate and at the same time different indicates how misogyny and environmental arrogance go hand in hand. This hatred is projected onto the elemental forces both nature and women have, because the main purpose is to tame these elemental forces. That is why the androcentric ideology desires to see 'other' as 'living-but-dead' beings, which transforms Miranda into "[a] butterfly he has always wanted to catch" (1997: 129).

Concerning the exploitative and consumerist behaviours, ecofeminism finds a correlation between pornography, violence and desire. "Like the yearning for nature", puts Mies, "the yearning for the dissected, naked female body is wholly consumerist" (2014b: 135). As discussed in the first chapter, man consumes woman body through fetishizing it as well as he uses some patriarchal practices like animal experimentations, hunting and meat-eating, which are connected to the abuse of women and nature by ecofeminists. In a similar way, Clegg fetishizes Miranda by linking connections to the nonhuman animals. When she wears an elegant clothe "leaving her arms and her neck bare", makes up and does her hair "like one of those model girls you see in magazines", Clegg is excessively charmed by her appearance though it is not an extraordinary situation: "Of course, she made me feel all clumsy and awkward. I had the same feeling I did when I had watched an imago emerge, and



then to have to kill it. I mean, the beauty confuses you [...]”(1997: 84). In Clegg’s eyes, both imago and Miranda’s body evoke erotic images as in the magazines he buys, which motivates his sexual drives and then astounds him. The author already informs the reader of his pornographic tendencies for the purpose of criticizing masculine sexual identification. It is seen that Clegg buys “books of stark women” (1997: 10) and magazines to satisfy his oppressed sexual desires. Furthermore, he buys a camera for taking the pictures not only of butterflies but also of the couples around. It arrives to the extent that he takes Miranda’s half-naked photos when she is fainted. According to Pamela Cooper, “[t]he camera becomes an erotic instrument for Clegg, and it is appropriate that his photographic activities should grow from his surreptitious absorption in” (1991: 28) these books and magazines he buys. Through these photographs of human and nonhuman beings, Clegg imprisons their beauty so that he can enjoy watching them whenever his sexual drives are stimulated. This imaginary pornographic possession then transforms into a physical possession of Miranda’s body in the cellar. The old cottage described in terms of its natural surrounding and its “charming secluded situation” (1997: 15), on the other hand, is another erotic instrument for Clegg who puts his masculine fantasies into practice. Clegg buys this old cottage not to enjoy the natural scene but to benefit from its isolated location which functions as a shelter to cover these sexual fantasies.

However, Miranda attempts to teach him that woman body is not an object to be alienated besides her teachings about the right of animals to live: “It’s terrible that you can’t treat me as a friend. Forget my sex. Just relax” (1997: 69). Miranda realizes that Clegg’s suppressed feelings come out in his dreams. Clegg tells one of his dreams in which he holds Miranda and they sleep together side by side. This sexual fantasy seems to make Miranda believe that the sexual relationship is a taboo for Clegg and she offers a relationship because she is afraid of facing this situation under coercion ultimately. Though they do not have a sexual relationship, Miranda’s attempt is highly debatable in terms of social norms. However, she tells that she has done everything for the purpose of escaping from being killed, in addition to her attempt to help Clegg to normalize his behaviours. She justifies her attitude by means of her attempt to overcome the social bias: “I do want to help you [...] To try to show you that sex — sex is just an activity, like anything else. It’s not dirty, it’s just two

people playing with each other's bodies. Like dancing. Like a game” (1997: 107). Her action may be disputable in terms of its ethical consequences, but her thoughts on the sexual relationship should be one of the main principles that is to be imposed on masculine ideology which sees this kind of relationship, as Clegg does, not as an ordinary activity but male’s victory over woman body. On the other hand, Clegg is very complicated about the function of sexual relationship. He is frustrated by Miranda’s offer because he not only desires her body but also her soul at the same time. As an animate butterfly does not mean anything for him, his desires are stimulated only when Miranda is fainted or when he takes naked pictures of her. Thus, he more often than not puts barriers to the ways by which Miranda tries to reach him. When Miranda’s actions are compared to the prostitution by Clegg, it leads her to cry out against his sexual perversion: “You're breaking every decent human law, every decent human relationship, every decent thing that's ever happened between your sex and mine.” She reveals the destructive patriarchal ideology reducing femininity to a position mediating between being an erotic object and a spiritual entity. Cooper concludes that this complication in his sexual personality stems from his attempt to hide his masochistic identity with “sentimental notions of love.” According to Cooper, Clegg “masks his impulses with shopworn and sentimental notions of love that protect him from a confrontation with his own sadism” (1991: 28-29). A similar conclusion can be inferred from his attendance in Bug Section meetings and visits to Natural History Museum. In this sense, as a sociopathic character, Clegg’s participation in this partly scientific meetings and social activities is a scientific and social camouflage which prevents him from a confrontation with this androcentric exploitation of nonhuman living beings.

The conflict between altruism and egotism is another issue discussed in the novel. In the novel, Miranda is engaged in ecofeminist concerns such as nuclear disarmament, violating the countryside, mass-production, tortures, hunger and poverty while Clegg prefers not to care any socio-ecological issues unless they threaten his self-interest. Miranda asks Clegg to donate money to the H-bomb movement but Clegg thinks: “I don't see the point of wasting money on something you don't believe in” (1997: 75). The discussion between Miranda and Clegg about

the nuclear disarmament below explicitly refers to the ecofeminist target on patriarchal power. It is worth quoting at length:

M. [...] What do you think about the H-bomb?

[...]

C. Hope it doesn't drop on you. Or on me.

M. [...] What do you think about the H-bomb?

C. It's obvious. You can't do anything. It's here to stay.

M. You don't care what happens to the world?

C. What'd it matter if I did?

[...]

M. Look, if there are enough of us who believe the bomb is wicked and that a decent nation could never think of having it, whatever the circumstances, then the government would have to do something. Wouldn't it?

[...]

M. [...] Do you know I've walked all the way from Aldermaston to London? Do you know I've given up hours and hours of my time to distribute leaflets and address envelopes and argue with miserable people like you who don't believe anything? Who really deserve the bomb on them?

C. That doesn't prove anything.

M. Well, you're part of it. Everything free and decent in life is being locked away in filthy little cellars by beastly people who don't care (1997: 139-41).

Clegg's masculine arrogance on the vital issues is based on the fact that nuclear weapons are related to phallic imagery, or, in Spretnak's words, "big phallic missiles" (1990: 10). That is why he cannot see the matters through anti-militarist lens. Miranda prefers the enemy invasion to "dropping bombs on them" while Clegg regards this as "pacifism" (1997: 140). Clegg's arrogance of nuclear disarmament and disavowal of her nonviolent solution are rooted in his fear of failing to activate these militarist phallic imageries. He also associates pacifism with submissiveness ascribed to women by masculine ideology. As Jenis Birkeland observes this gender-blind militarism: "Men should be macho and reckless; they should go to war to prove themselves. Women should be submissive and unquestioning; they should raise sons to be brave soldiers" (1993: 35).

Miranda abandons herself to despair towards the end of the novel. She frequently voices the injustice of the system: "The bomb and the tortures in Algeria and the starving babies in the Congo. It gets bigger and darker. More and more suffering for more and more. And more and more in vain" (1997: 274). Given that an individual whose mind is shaped by the same system also victimizes her, Miranda seems to have sympathy with all oppressed, tortured and murdered 'others'. On the

other hand, her death becomes the culmination of the ongoing despair and Clegg, after a while, tells that he finds a new 'butterfly' for himself. The death of Miranda in the end is absolutely found as disappointing by the reader who may conclude that Clegg has triumphed over Miranda. What makes Fowles different from the other novelists is that he does not offer in his novels a satisfactory ending which prevents his readers from achieving the emotional discharge called catharsis. Particularly in *The Collector*, he seems to prefer realism to the simply romanticized notion that 'the good always wins'. In his preface to the new edition of *The Aristos*, Fowles admits that "[t]he actual evil in Clegg overcame the potential good in Miranda", however, he adds that his intention is different from what is being perceived: "I did not mean by this that I view the future with a black pessimism" (1970: 10). A black pessimism would support the conclusion that Miranda's death refers to the defencelessness of women in accordance with her powerlessness and that Miranda's hopeless vulnerability prevents her from being a feminist model. However, the author's distinctive and idiosyncratic portrayal of the death of Miranda and nonhuman living beings in the hands of a masculine oppressor indicates how androcentrism has victimized both women and nature so far as an inevitable historical fact. Concerning how the author's primal imageries depict the picture of the conflict between masculinity as tyrant and femininity as subject to tyranny, how he links Miranda to the collected butterflies in terms of their exposure to the destructive phallic symbols and also how the representative figure of patriarchal power practices similar methods leading to the death of his victims, it seems that Fowles, with an ecofeminist insight, portrays the fate of women akin to that of nature in the face of androcentric exploitation.

## CONCLUSION

If we believe that humanity may transcend tooth & claw, if we believe diverse races & creeds can share this world as peaceably as the orphans share their candlenut tree, if we believe leaders must be just, violence muzzled, power accountable & the riches of the Earth & its Oceans shared equitably, such a world will come to pass.

—David Mitchell, *Cloud Atlas*

The journey of human being begins in the womb of Mother Nature from time immemorial and transforms into a wild and cruel struggle for domination as a master of the universe in the course of time, accompanied by an enormous passion to make nature completely subservient to his/her desires. However, it is seen that the discursive attempts targeting the nature of nature cannot find a common ground in the intellectual arena until the domination of early humanist tradition. Along with a greater centralization of human beings through reason, science and religion that leads to consolidate the domination and hierarchy, nature becomes the focus of dualist and reductionist analysis in socio-cultural dimension. Thus, much of the impediment to the ventilation of radicalized green epistemology until the mid-twentieth century derives from the exposure to the anthropocentric assumptions of modernity. It is the emergence of radical ecology movement that invites humans to face the historically constituted mainstream green articulation and that dislocates human from the central position in order to make a broader room that will encapsulate both human and nonhuman living beings.

Though the components of radical ecological movement offer some critique to each other concerning the fundamental issues they handle while attempting to find solutions to the environmental crisis, it is clearly seen that the conflicts among them are not as profound as opposite poles developing increasingly powerful tensions. As women liberation movements manifest a 'sisterhood' in an effort to make a constructive contribution to reveal all facets of inequality, radical ecology movements can also yield a new ideal of nature in accordance with the ideology of

‘eco-fellowship’. Indeed, the diversity of ecological issues discussed by the schools of Deep Ecology, Social Ecology and Ecofeminism contribute to a quintessentially ecological vision rather than constituting radical contradictory paradigms paving the way for the divergence from the realm of environmental ethics. To put it in deep ecological terms, as the diversity of beings reinforces the richness on earth, diversified philosophical approaches of these three schools can make contributions to this common ecological vision on the condition that one respects the intrinsic values of the other. Thus, in social ecological terms, it provides the proponents of ecologism with perceiving these ecological schools not as a competitive but a collaborative arena. In this sense, this mindset takes radical ecology to an ecofeminist insight that aims to eliminate all interconnected domination, exploitation and hierarchy against the otherized beings. In a nutshell, one can act so as to neutralize the deficiency of the other.

The dissertation indicates the achievability of this integration in terms of its practicability on postmodern literary ground. If postmodernism is a theory or an ideology of culture and society questioning the already constructed intellectual concepts and movements, mostly since the Enlightenment, its critical target excludes nature which cannot be separated from both culture and society. It should also be noted that it has never become a totalizing master narrative. On the other hand, nature’s ontological status in the text can only be conveyed through language. Then, it is postmodernism, or poststructuralism in a similar sense, that seeks how the language shapes, and is shaped by, the ideology. Thus, ecological literary criticism can revolve around the postmodern text by linking the discourse to the reconstruction of nature mostly against the value systems rooted in mechanistic worldview. Both radical ecology and postmodernism, in this respect, are seen to intersect dependently of one another at some points:

1. Both develop their philosophies in opposition to the metanarratives of modernity, the master narratives based on the centralized meaning, knowledge and experience. Only social ecology seems to consider it as a natural cumulative process that, nevertheless, must evolve into a structure characterized by social and ecological revolutions.

2. The process of deconstruction and reconstruction emerges as a prerequisite in terms of their practicability. The constructed ideologies which are central to racism, sexism and anthropocentrism function as a perception management to justify oppressive tendencies. Both radical ecology and postmodernism demonstrate determination to decentralize the modes of traditional knowledge with a commitment to redefining the meaning.
3. The dualism is recognized as an ontological threat which must be overcome because it is the essence of hierarchy. Remapping the so-called differences within binary oppositions by portraying a kinship among them is the shared method to transcend the dualism.

These parallel approaches of both postmodern and radical ecological theory to the socio-cultural issues establish a strong ground for deciphering radical ecological discourses embedded in postmodern texts.

In his *A History of the World in 10<sup>1/2</sup> Chapters*, Barnes employs deconstructive methods to reveal ecological issues in terms of his distinctive authorial technique. The provocative title gives the traces of a different understanding of history, namely, all history is a fiction written by human, for human in ten and half chapters. The reflection of the objective truth and the constructed ideologies Barnes questions, or denies, onto the text offers a narrative utilizing the relationship between human and nature. The domination of environmental images in the text comes as a natural consequence of his reminding humans of who they actually are. The novel seems to have a contextual structure that can be formulated with the overlapping process: deconstruction and reconstruction against the constructed. Historical narratives are reflected as a constructed anthropocentric realm in the novel. Barnes attacks the reality of these narratives by means of deconstructing the so-called facts and replaces it with a new outlook in mind, showing that what there seems to be may not actually happen. To put it another way, the author is disturbed by the humanist tradition putting man into the center of the universe, the Enlightenment holding the view of a mechanistic universe and, in general, modernity with its otherizing and alienating assumptions. The projection of them onto the ecological realm manifests itself in the novel. Among the major ecological issues handled in the novel are the rights of nonhuman living beings, nuclear threat,

urbanization, pollution, oppression, domination, hierarchy and exploitation. In the manifestation of these issues, the most noticeable point is the sections in which the author depicts the ecological crisis through the lens of nonhuman narrators. Here, the significant question is that why Barnes chooses a woodworm which is a relatively smaller animal ranking among the lowest in the anthropocentric hierarchy than so-called noble animals like lion, tiger or wolf. This is a conscious act compatible with the message he attempts to give because the author puts an emphasis on the deep ecological principle regarding the equality of all life forms. Indeed, traditional nature writing uses different techniques to give voice to the silence of nature. However, this assertive portrayal of Barnes shows that it is among the postmodern works that applies to the radical principles of deep ecology movement. Narrating human history in this manner seems to fill the huge discursive gap between human and nonhuman created by anthropocentric ideology. In contrast to the hypothesis of modernity marking animals as insentient entities which do not feel and suffer, Barnes's woodworm narrator speaks, feels, suffers and becomes happy, upset and disappointed. The woodworm is a means used by the author in order to destroy the totalizing systems of thought. It is the oppressed, the ignored, the slaved; it is nature. Noah, on the other hand, is reflected as a master, an authority, an institutionalized norm and conventional reason. What he dictates in the story is given as a totalizing master narrative through which the perception is shaped. It is the tension between the former and the latter on which radical ecology focuses. One of the factors lying behind the tension is egocentrism. Along with the desperate situation the character Franklin Hughes encounters, Barnes links his narrative to the triumph of altruism in an attempt to criticize the egocentrism dominating human nature. In a similar vein, the author does not exclude Christianity from being subject to his criticism. As a postmodernist author, he approaches it with suspicion because the biblical sources also offer metanarratives. In addition, some proponents of radical ecology are suspicious about the function of Christianity due to its contribution to the justification of environmental exploitation through creating a 'master-servant' order. The traces of the reactions of these movements to the organized religion can be sought in the invasion of the church by the woodworms advocated by Chassenée: a reaction to Christianity's anthropocentric propaganda disparaging nonhuman nature.



The conflict between Amanda and Colonel Fergusson refers to the conflict between religion-based humanist tradition and positive sciences about the view of universe. The former regards nature as a divine intent and the latter as chaos and the arena of enmity. However, both designs make it open to invasion. Other environmental catastrophes like nuclear radiation and pollution narrated by Kath indicate the common principles of deep ecology and ecofeminism concerning the sustainability. The structure of story is governed by the ecology's core principle regarding the connectedness of everything else and all life forms will be profoundly influenced once this chain is endangered. It can be inferred from the "Shipwreck" story that the depletion of natural sources and the desperation can lead to cannibalism. However, the main target of the author is to discuss how art, or literature in particular, can convey this ecological catastrophe. Though the author is suspicious of conveying the truth, it is true that turning ecological catastrophe into art can help creating a process of ecological awareness.

Another important issue Barnes handles is the concept of self-realization which is the key principle of deep ecological philosophy. In addition to Varadi who extends his self so as to embrace each being, Charles finds peace and happiness in wilderness following his experiences in both the built and unbuilt nature. His transformation is associated with his involving in the natural lifestyle of a tribe which is sometimes underlined as a role model by deep ecology. On the other hand, Barnes, in "Parenthesis", opposes the dualism between reason and emotion as a postmodern author-narrator who is neither romantic nor realist. It should be noted that the combination of both reason and emotion is seen as the highest form by deep ecology. In the last two chapters as well, he questions the overemphasis on rationality. The ideal of progress exposed by modernity is questioned when Spike considers the earth as the last and most beautiful destination following his return from the Moon. As can be seen, the author more often than not gives references to the issues of deep ecological philosophy, from anthropocentrism through self-realization and to the equality of life forms. It is these deep ecological principles that dominate the novel and the images of nature that provide the author with achieving his target throughout the novel.

In *Cloud Atlas*, there are similar ecological images; yet, Mitchell attracts the reader's attention to a wider social framework by way of rendering the stories and characters in interconnected temporal dimensions. In the novel, there exists an obvious reference to the substantial social crisis reflected as the primal cause for the ultimate ecological catastrophe leading to the collapse of the civilization. In a deeper sense, the socio-ecological crisis is characterized by the maldevelopment against the ideal of progress promised by modernity. The fractured development of the palindromic plot provided by the author as an innovative postmodern form is seen to reinforce the handling of the idea of maldevelopment. It can be deduced from the novel that the historical, characteristic, spatial and temporal interconnectedness and the animate meanings ascribed to this interconnectedness prevents the novel from the engagement with the nihilism of the traditional postmodernism. Thus, it makes the novel relatable to the teachings of social ecology. To put it differently, the author does not show a reductionist tendency. He opposes to the establishment of rational society on the unhealthy foundations permeated with profit-driven science, traditional logic, and anarchocapitalism without denying the rational society completely. That being the case, Mitchell does not offer the concept of 'free nature' as a utopian future formulated with the harmonization of eco-communities and eco-technologies; instead, he puts forward the global consequences of the failures in applying the doctrines of social ecology as an environmental programme. As discussed in the chapter concerning the theoretical framework of Radical Ecology Movement, social ecology indicates the ultimate destination of civilization by mapping a T-junction. Either what is social and natural will be reconciled and humans will live in a new third nature called 'free nature' or human beings along with all the earnings of the civilization will descend into turmoil. Accordingly, with the collapse of the civilization in the novel, Mitchell invites the readers to face the consequences of deviating from the correct path. Among the socio-ecological themes Mitchell handles as precipitating factors for this fall of humanity are domination, hierarchy, exploitation, authoritarianism, corporatization, destructive technology and denaturalization. Further evidence that supports the identification of the novel with social ecological philosophy is demonstrated through revisiting the simple formulation of dialectical naturalism: *first nature + second nature = free nature*. The

integration of biotic first nature with human second nature provides transcendence into free nature or a transformation into an ecological society. Some traces of first nature are narrated in Adam Ewing's visit to Chatham Island in the first part of the novel. From Ewing's story to the last story entitled "Sloosha's Crossin' an' Ev'rythin' After", the author draws the picture of second nature with its components including human culture, society, language, institutions and technics. Particularly in "An Orision of Sonmi-451", technology, science, ration and progress seem to develop into much better, indeed, the highest point; yet, this is inversely proportional to the development of ecological society. The last story seems to manifest itself as a new realm where second nature evolves into an apocalyptic third nature due to the depletion of all values which social ecology offers to instill in the roots of communities. It is told how the last remnants of the civilization and wildlife are about to disappear when the synthesis of first and second nature cannot be achieved. Thus, Mitchell handles the formulation of dialectical naturalism by reshaping the equation: *Second nature – first nature = a distorted third nature*. To put it simply, the disintegration of first and second nature in the novel through removing all the components of biotic first nature from second nature is equated with an alternative third nature subverted in the end of the novel due to socio-ecological disharmony. This equation is handled in the chapters of the novel in an interconnected way by the author. The musical piece Frobisher composes called sextet defines this connection. In the first chapter, following the reflection of flawless ecological cycle of Rekohu, it is told how Rekohu in the native language transforms into Chatham because the island is exposed to domination and hierarchy. In terms of Ewing's journey, the author reveals the brutal legacy of social structure of the colonial period. In an age of oil crisis and nuclear proliferation, it is Luisa who wages an environmental war against the great energy companies as a journalist. In today's England, Cavendish hints at the forthcoming age of mechanization and genetic modification by telling the replacement of local landscapes with human-cloning centres. The next chapter demonstrates how social harmony and ecological balance are put in jeopardy along with the deepening dominative and exploitative tendencies. An authoritarian corporatic regime against social ecology's socio-economic model, a synthetic nature instead of ecological society and disruptive technologies rather than eco-technologies

lead to a great collapse, which proves Bookchin's warning to be right. Despite all, social ecology's faith in human capacity is echoed in the novel by Zachry and Meronym's struggles for seeking ways to revive civilization. As evident in his fiction, the author sees social problems as the source of ecological crisis like social ecology. *Cloud Atlas*, thus, comes out as a postmodern fictitious arena that can be identified with a melting pot including the core social and ecological issues of today and the future.

As to the last novel examined in this study, in spite of the multiple interpretations of Fowles's *The Collector*, it may not be so provocative to label Fowles as a feminist nature writer with respect to his nonfictions employing his philosophy on feminism and nature and the projection of this philosophy on the novel. Fowles does not refuse his moderate masculine identity in these works; however, he raises his voice against the patriarchal ideology transforming this identity into a means of oppression, power and authority to abuse the so-called other. However, some feminist approaches support the idea that Fowles justifies the oppression with this identity. Considering that the same criticism, on the other hand, also accuses some other feminist movements including ecofeminism of being essentialist through various reasons, Fowlesian way of handling the relationship among male, female and nature can be tolerated through an ecofeminist principle which sees androcentrism as the chief ideology responsible for the exploitation of both women and nature. The author frequently voices his sympathy with feminism and, moreover, with the essential nature of feminine. At the same time, he tells that it is nature dominating the background of his fictions. The relationship between Clegg and Miranda emerges, develops and ends in the light of this connection. The story is narrated through the lens of both characters and, thus, the author offers the viewpoints of these characters through mirroring their minds with all of their flaws. In this context, a Victorian portrait is observed through a postmodern narrative technique. Furthermore, the author also combines the existentialist philosophy with this postmodern technique providing the reflection of Clegg's ontological uneasiness. On the other hand, it is also seen that the image of butterfly plays a significant role in helping the author's technique to unveil the conflict between Miranda and Clegg. Throughout the novel, it is emphasized that the fate of these butterflies and Miranda

collected by Clegg intersects. Regarding Clegg's chase for Miranda, his setting a trap, his using the same instrument while catching Miranda and the way he imprisons her, it can be concluded that there is a fictional narrative referring to a totally similar process between the abduction of Miranda and the involvement of butterflies into the collection. It is seen that both Miranda and Clegg underline this association in the novel. In a wider sense, the novel depicts the picture of domination and exploitation issues in the framework of ecofeminist principles. The male character with his destructive tendencies is presented as a prototype of the androcentric ideology oppressing both woman and nature. His identity characterized by violence, desire for power, tyranny, deviant pornography, insensitivity and egocentrism in all cases contravenes the fundamental rights of both human and nonhuman beings in the novel. Under these circumstances, Miranda, with all her tolerable flaws compared to those of Clegg, becomes both the voice and the representative of not only all women but also all otherized beings oppressed, exploited and killed at the end. It is what Fowles intends to show in the novel, the confrontation of the reader with this brutal conflict. In a different context, Clegg's perceiving Miranda as an object to be collected discloses a fact that has never been a subject to the interpretations on the novel. The author implies that Clegg's childhood is shaped by a masculine role model, Uncle Dick. His uncle imposes him the idea that nature is a battlefield in which animals are hunted and killed, which creates a disorder in Clegg's personality in adulthood. It makes Clegg develop into a personality justifying the notion that he can get what he likes through this way. The faulty relationship with nature reaches to an extent so as to encompass a larger scale. To interpret it in an ecofeminist sense, the masculine individual who is engaged in violence towards nature in his childhood develops the motive of dominating each being he alienates in further stages. The articulation of ecofeminist discourses in the novel against the violence via Miranda gives the traces of ideological struggle with patriarchy. It can be argued that whether Miranda's sole wounding attack to Clegg with a masculine image of power, an axe which he uses to chop apple trees is a symbol of this struggle; yet, Miranda's remarks on the nature of violence manifests the spirit of ecofeminist struggle. It can be concluded from this struggle in the novel that though Miranda's death may seem to refer to Clegg's overcoming Miranda, this would actually become only a

superficial inference from the novel through a conventional reading. The postmodern identity of the author should be noted here in terms of his commitment to open-ended narratives in most of his novels including *The Collector*. In this context, Miranda's death does not refer to the loss of struggle but should be taken as a process which provides the reader with confronting how woman and nature have been oppressed, tortured and killed so far. Clegg, then, determines a new woman in order to put her in his killing bottle. It shows that the androcentric mindset will continue to seek for victims unless it is educated and radically changed. At the same time, ecological and feminist movements will not stop until postmodern reader kills Cleggs and keeps Mirandas alive in their minds.

On a larger scale, the postmodern novels studied in the dissertation do not pay lip service to ecological crisis but embrace nature for its own sake rather than using it as a means of aesthetic utilitarianism. The overriding concern in Barnes's *A History of the World in 10<sup>1/2</sup> Chapters*, Mitchell's *Cloud Atlas* and Fowles's *The Collector* is the profound projection of the human-induced ecological crisis. Anti-modernity functions as the encompassing and fundamental reason and rationale of these contemporary British fictions, which seems to involve each in the framework of radical ecological philosophy. The novels assume scienticism, rationalism, progressivism, economic individualism, reductionism and consumerism as totalizing systems triggering this ecological crisis due to the fact that they endanger sustainability. Besides, the female characters like Kath, Luisa and Miranda demonstrate similarities in terms of their approach to ecological issues in a patriarchal atmosphere environing them. It can be observed that they particularly develop an environmental ethics against the destructive technological improvement leading to the spread of nuclear power plants, nuclear armament and nuclear fallout which is one of the most dangerous contemporary problems of the world. Some other characters like Noah, Goose and Clegg show a close parallelism in their repressive attitudes. They are illustrated as the representative of egocentrism, utilitarianism, anthropocentrism and even androcentrism disavowed by radical ecology. They are alienated from nature through demonstrating a great deal of animosity toward both human and nonhuman beings. Thus, it is seen in each of the three novels that what makes a man different from nature also makes him dangerous. Woodworms,

butterflies and fabricants, on the other hand, loom large indeed in the fictional structure of the novels as images helping create ecological awareness. Bringing the images of nonhuman living beings from marginal positions to a remarkable and outstanding status in these novels is proportionate to the desire for putting the ecological concerns on the postmodern literary agenda. On one hand the radical ecological set of values is imposed upon the reader, on the other hand anthropocentric culture and civilization characterized with domination, hierarchy and exploitation is revealed as common points of the novels. It can also be concluded that the authors are uncomfortable with the dualism corroborated by the Enlightenment which determines it as the essence of life. They intend to demolish such dualisms as culture/nature, human/nature, man/woman and society/nature through deconstruction, playfulness, characterization and the fictional tension created in the narrative. In a similar vein, another major common point emerging in the novels can be exemplified with the categorization of the animals in Noah's Ark, Clegg's classification of bugs as a collector and Preacher Horrox's ranking all beings. In opposition to this dualist and hierarchical approaches, the authors share the common belief that the earth is not a competitive arena and the beings are not contestants; not the fittest but the most egalitarian survives.

All in all, the critical stances as already hinted throughout the study illustrate that Barnes focuses on the reconfiguration of human history through an iconoclastic approach to the so-called existential divisions among all beings in his *A History of the World in 10<sup>1/2</sup> Chapters*. The interconnected and overarching structural design and the fictional realm in Mitchell's *Cloud Atlas* lead the story to the end that the extant progress is indeed a maldevelopment bringing the social and ecological catastrophe. In *The Collector*, Fowles invites the readers to face the fact that it is the androcentric exploitation and patriarchal ideology that underpins the oppression of women and nature. All the issues taken by the authors synchronize in many ways with such radical ecological movements as deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism in terms of an ecological postmodern discourse supporting that the modern society is unsustainable ecologically. The study paves the way for a conclusion that the integration of the postmodern thought with the ecosophical doctrine of radical ecologies emerging in the second half of twentieth century as a

reaction to the assumptions of modernity can also provide a literary basis for a radical paradigm shift. Thus, although these three authors are not incontestable proponents of these radical ecological movements, revisiting their authorial purposes to decipher the green discourses embedded in their postmodern texts through a critical literary theory which is permeated with radical ecological doctrines triggers this paradigm shift both in individual and social dimensions.





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