

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Preventing violent conflicts has been one of the most important challenges in the 21st century. Although it has increased its significance especially after the end of the Cold War, the very idea of preventing violent conflicts, however, is not new and goes back to Cold War years too (Crocker et al., 2002, Ackerman, 2003). During the Cold-War period in which the international system was almost always alerted for the likelihood of a superpowers' war, scope and the definition of conflict prevention was very limited. In this era, as the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Hammarskold pointed out that definition of conflict prevention was revolving around the dynamics of Cold-War era. In the annual report of the UN in 1959-60, it was stated that "*preventive action must at the first place fill the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties* (Vayrynen, 2003: 47). Hence, conflict prevention was designed either as the prevention of a major conflict between superpowers or prevention of conflicts among other states in order them not to turn into a superpowers' conflict.

Given those structural constraints, namely the danger of outbreak of a superpowers' confrontation, importance of a conflict was closely attached to the relative importance of conflicting parties for the superpowers in the international system. Hence, the fear of superpowers' confrontation was hampering comprehensive conflict prevention efforts by third parties in the international arena. However, there was also another obstacle hindering prevention of disputes to turn into violent forms. Since the superpowers dominated the international arena as the most important actors, there was only little room for maneuver for the other actors in the system. In other words, sub-state or supra-state actors were far from

taking initiatives and lead preventive activities. For example, international organizations were far from being effective and having the capacity to exert great influence on the outcomes in international politics. Although the UN was an organization bringing together many states, its decision making processes and activities almost came to a halt because of the struggle between the USSR and the US. As for small states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the impact of them on the system, specifically in prevention of conflicts, was less than being marginal. In the light of these problems, outstanding feature of the Cold War period in terms of conflict prevention was that efforts to prevent escalation of disputes were mostly targeting the imminent causes of conflicts and being in the form of coercive measures such as use of force and imposing sanctions mostly by the US or the USSR (Ackermann: 2003: 340).

The end of the Cold-War, however brought about crucial changes in the parameters of the international political system. In this new era, in comparison to the Cold War era, types of security threats have changed (Waeber, 1998: 69). Unlike a total war between superpowers and their allies, threats directed to security of states have become much more asymmetric and unpredictable in the post-Cold war period. In this regard, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal trafficking of humans and drugs and organized crime came to fore in the current international politics. In addition to this, the collapse of bipolar system, gave the way to a multi-polar international structure. Both politically and economically the new actors such as international organizations, NGOs and multinational corporations started to influence the outcomes of political and economic processes in world politics (Crocker et al, 2003: xx). In this new security environment due to detrimental and widespread effects of conflicts, prevention of disputes before turning into violent forms has received great importance. Not only individual states, but also major international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, Group of 8,

World Bank all voiced their belief in the need to do more to reduce the potential for violence and to support mechanisms to ensure lasting peace (Carment and Schnabel, 2003: 16).

Particularly, the EU, as an emerging international actor, started to deal with prevention of violent conflicts in this new security environment. In line with the efforts to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in early 1990s, the EU directed its attention specifically on prevention of violent conflicts. In a Joint Report to the Nice European Council in December 2000, Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana and External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten stated that "preserving peace, promoting stability and strengthening international security world-wide is a fundamental objective for the Union, and preventing violent conflict constitutes one of its most important external policy challenges" (Joint Report, 2000). As Karen Smith rightly pointed out that spreading effects and costs of conflicts including human sufferings and economic, political and social instability paved the way for the EU to act more actively in this field of policy (Smith 2004: 146). In the light of these developments, the European Union's conflict prevention capacity has started to become the focal point of the Union's CFSP. In this regard, after reaching an agreement on Petersberg Tasks¹ and following institutional reforms in this field, recently the EU took further concrete steps in the field of its conflict prevention policy. The European Council in Gothenburg (June 2001) took a further decisive step in this direction, when it adopted "EU's Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts," based on a set of proposals by the CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana. Also, in the same year, 14 May 2001, in a Common Position of Council it is stated that "EU will cover conflict prevention by seeking to target the direct causes — trigger factors — of violent conflict while at the same time addressing the more structural root causes"(Smith, 2004: 157). As stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003, in view of the global challenges and

¹ These tasks were established in June 1992 at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) held at the Petersberg Hotel, not far from Bonn and these tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

key threats to security such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime, strategic objectives of the EU are determined as building security in its neighbourhood and dealing with the threats of the post-Cold War era by promoting an international order which is based on effective multilateralism (European Security Strategy, 2003). In this regard, coping with conflicts before they escalate became one of the major concerns of the EU members. Hence as mentioned starting from the early 1990s, prevention of violent conflicts increased its importance in the eyes of the member states of the EU.

The growing political commitment by the EU to pursue conflict prevention as one of the principal objectives of its foreign policy in the past few years, gives also some credence to the observation that the Union is increasingly striving to become a more significant actor at a world wide level. The EU is not only aspiring to be the foremost aid donor and trade partner in the world, but it is also looking for ways to actively shape the international political environment beyond its borders. Perhaps the best example of this aspiration is the decision to create a military rapid reaction capacity in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). With this initiative the European Union indicated its willingness to complement its economical and political instruments with military ones, endowing it with a greater range of mechanisms to address conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Smith 2004: 153).

The activities of the EU in the field of conflict prevention, however still suffer from many problems both theoretically and practically. Major question stems from the fact that whether the EU can be an international actor, in other words be a single voice and exert influence especially on external crises, and if yes, what could be the ways and instruments of achieving this? Skeptics on this issue argue that the EU is an ineffective actor in the security area and any foreign policy formulated by the EU reflects the lowest common denominator, that is the minimum cooperation level among member states (Smith 2004: 3). In other words,

in the foreign policy making process tools and objectives of the EU is subordinate to the sensitivities and interests of member states. In addition to this, in line with the realist logic, they also argue that because of not sharing common interests, national governments hesitate giving any concession in the field of foreign policy and they aspire to ensure that any Union foreign policy leads to minimum damage to them (Sjursen, 2003: 39).

In this respect, in the early 1990s, Moravscik attempted to demonstrate how a revised realist perspective could explain the EU integration process, specifically the bargaining processes. His approach reaffirmed the centrality of power and interest, which had been the essential principles of realist explanations. Yet, Moravscik argues that interest is not determined simply by the balance of power, as neo-realists argue, but also by the preferences of domestic political actors, which are the outcome of political processes in the domestic polity (Moravscik, 1993: 517). In this context, his approach was based on three principles. 1) intergovernmentalism, 2) lowest common denominator bargaining 3) strict limits on future transfers of sovereignty. From this point of view, the key shapers of EU policy-making were located at the national level, though there were transnational dynamics in operation. In this context, liberal intergovernmentalist view argues that attempts to achieve further integration in the foreign policy related areas have to face to strict limitations (Moravscik, 1993: 517, Gegout, 2003: 6). Together with this, many critics referring to the Union's inability to create an effective policy in the international realm points out to the fact that EU does not have necessary military instruments and this hampers the EU's ability to develop a common foreign policy. In other words, it is argued that if the EU can not back up its diplomatic efforts with the use of military force, it will never become a complete actor (Smith, 2004: 4).

In contrary to the pessimistic approaches, there are also optimistic approaches which emphasize the possibility of establishment of a common foreign and security policy considering several external and internal stimuli for the EU to cooperate, notably in

preventing disputes turning into violent conflicts. According to this view, in a world within which globalization affects almost all the political, economic and societal relations through different process, all actors in one way or another are interdependent to each other. From this point of view, since the EU has mutual and close relationships with third parties in economic and political terms, interdependence encourages collective action in many ways (Sjursen, 2003: 45). First of all, it is evident that unilateral action in comparison to the collective action in an interdependent world is almost impossible. Hence, the EU member states act collectively in order to reap the benefits of “politics of scale” (Smith, 2004: 6). In other words, by acting collectively the EU can exert much more influence and carry more weight in international politics. For example, one of the areas exemplifying “politics of scale” in recent years has become the collective position held by the EU member states in World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings. In WTO summits because the EU acts as a single voice in economic terms and try to tilt the balance towards the wills of the EU member states in bargaining processes. Besides, since the very concept of security is not limited to the military might of states anymore, economics has gained great importance. As Smith notes that the EU can potentially influence the domestic and external policies of third parties if they depend on the EU for trade, aid or other benefits (Smith, 2004: 6). This feature of the EU also gave a way it to be entitled “civilian power” referring that the EU uses civilian instruments such as economic tools, diplomatic and political channels to change the foreign policy outcomes of third parties (Manners, 2002: 236). Accordingly, the EU gained more room to act and exert influence on foreign policy issues. Besides interdependence, as the second external stimuli for cooperation in terms of common foreign policy in some cases the economic might of the EU also creates expectations in the eyes of the third parties. For example, since the EU is the major aid donor of Palestinian National Authority, it is expected that the EU should play a more active role in the Middle East Peace Process, at least in the eyes of the Palestinian

authorities. Likewise, during Balkans crisis erupted in the early 1990s, the major expectation was the taking over the responsibility of the conflict by the EU (Smith, 2004: 7).

In addition to external stimuli for the EU to act in a collective manner, there are also internal factors that might pave the way for a common foreign policy for the EU members. First of all, the member states might use the EU in order to achieve their policy goals or try to dominate some policies of the EU. For example, because of its geographical proximity and historical reasons France tries to dominate the Euro-Mediterranean Project, just like Germany which was endeavored to be influential on the last Enlargement wave towards Central and Eastern European countries. By means of the EU leverage, both of these countries tried to benefit from the credibility and instruments of the EU in order to maintain their connections and influence in those regions. Secondly, not only member states, but also public opinion, NGOs or even the EU institutions might push for EU to act collectively “from below”(Smith 2004: 7). For example in case of Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, one can argue that public opinion was crucially important which pushed the efforts of the EU to be much more influential (Jentleson, 2003: 33).

In the light of the points examined above, neo-functional theory helps us to understand what other factors or processes that can push for collective action in the EU in view of common foreign policy. Neo-functionalism, in its very essence, concedes that the actors are utility maximizers and they cooperate to solve their collective action problems. This functional logic then leads to a spill-over effect and it furthers integration among actors. Nonetheless, neo-functionalists also accept the normative aspects of integration. Namely, this integration process not only solves the collective action problems between members but also brings about “upgrading of common interests” and “shift of loyalties (identities)” (Risse, 2004: 162). In this regard, it is believed that spillover from economic integration, could affect positively the prospects for common foreign policy-making (Smith, 2004: 8). While neo-

functionalists put an emphasis on the spill-over effect in the integration and prospects for collective action, constructivists also argue that through cooperation and the socialization among members in the EU caused by cooperation paves a way for alterations in identities and interests of actors. Hence, collective identities and interests could even be formed in this process and member states can act as a single voice in the international areas (Risse, 2004: 160).

Considering the detrimental effects of disputes erupting and escalating into violent forms, it is crucially important for the EU to establish an effective conflict prevention policy which prevents disputes turning into violent forms and threatening security and stability area of the EU. For this reason this study aspires to study the very question of how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention. However, the importance of dwelling on this question can not only be taken as a question which merely has security aspects. Its broad policy implications on the EU policy-making processes and the institutional structure make this question more appealing and significant to examine. First and foremost, considering the broad range of issues dealt within the framework of the CFSP ranging from terrorism to organized crime, if the EU wants to be effective in the field of conflict prevention it will have to allocate more resources in this field. But, in view of the scarce resources that the CFSP budget has, allocating more resources for the conflict prevention activities will compel the EU member states to make decisions either to cut down spending in the other fields of the CFSP or increasing the CFSP budget substantially which might be a tough political question for the members states. Secondly, conflict prevention policy of the EU is also closely related with some other policies areas of the EU. The interplay between the conflict prevention and Enlargement policy has been one of the most important examples of this situation. For example, one of the most important motives of the EU Enlargement policy towards the Central and Eastern Europe and Western Balkans has been creating a stable environment and

preventing further conflicts. In the same vein, application of the EU Commercial policy towards Asia, Pacific and Caribbean countries has been designed in view of the conflict prevention effects of the EU commercial instruments. Thirdly, scrutinizing the question that how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention also refers to the difficulties for the EU to coordinate its policies in its three-pillar structure. Due to the cross-pillar nature of the conflict prevention activities, this situation necessitates the EU to put much more effort on the cross-pillar coordination of its preventive activities. Lastly, related to the cross-pillar coordination challenges, increasing the conflict prevention capacity of the EU will call for the EU to discuss and formulate new policies in order to establish necessary institutional mechanisms and structures. In this regard, trying to increase the effectiveness of conflict prevention capacity will also bring about crucial questions related how the EU to institutionally adapt its capacity in the field of conflict prevention.

Along with the policy implications of questioning how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention, dwelling on the EU conflict prevention capacity also carries importance in theoretical terms. First of all, the very concept of conflict prevention still seems controversial in the literature (Carment and Schnabel, 2003: 11). The reason for this is that while some scholars limit the scope of the conflict prevention efforts to pre-conflict periods, others make their definitions loosely and describe conflict prevention as the actions taking place by the third parties in pre-conflict, during escalation and post-conflict periods. Since there is a kind of ambiguity it is crucially important to discuss the scope of the very concept of conflict prevention. Secondly, as another important concept, effectiveness is not clearer than the very concept of “conflict prevention”. Discussing and trying to determine the factors that can contribute to the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts are of great importance in terms of developing coherent and comprehensive conflict prevention strategies.

Besides clarifying the concepts of conflict prevention and effectiveness, discussing the EU's effectiveness also paves the way for scrutinizing many points related to EU's integration process notably in the field of foreign policy making theoretically. Since the conflict prevention policy of the EU is considered one of the subtitles of the CFSP, it automatically becomes a platform of discussing the ability of the EU in the international arena. In other words, questions posed related to conflict prevention policy of the EU are also the relevant questions for examining the global actorness of the EU in the international arena. Lastly, dwelling on the question of how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention also provides us with an interesting test case, because as an international and regional organization the influence that the EU can exert in external crises might differ from the others considering the economic, political and growing military power at its disposal.

In view of the theoretical and practical implications of the research question posed in this study, namely, "How can the EU be more effective in the field of conflict prevention?", this study also aims at examining some further points. First of all, considering the increasing importance of conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era, this study tries to analyze the contribution of third parties and especially international organizations in carrying out preventive efforts. Moreover, this study aspires to examine the interaction and coordination between different third parties, including international organizations, states and NGOs. Secondly, recent studies in the literature show us that there is a lively debate on the definition, scope and success of conflict prevention, nevertheless there seems to be few studies which directly study effectiveness of conflict prevention activities by the third parties in external crisis. Hence, this study aspires to compile the factors contributing to the effectiveness of conflict prevention activities of third parties. Similarly, just like the number of studies related to effectiveness of conflict prevention, there seems to be few studies concerning the EU and its conflict prevention capacity. Most of the studies in the European

studies literature associated with the EU's foreign policy attempt to scrutinize the effects of possessing more military instruments by the EU and the implications of this situation on the global role of the Union. However, it seems obvious that the interplay and coordination of military and civilian instruments in foreign policy making is of utmost importance. For this reason, as a field which involves the combination of military and civilian instruments, this study aims at scrutinizing the latest developments in the EU's conflict prevention capacity.

1.2 Methodology

In order to dwell on the fundamental problematic of this study, this thesis focuses on the two cases, namely Bosnia and Kosovo in an effort to determine which factors contribute to the effectiveness of conflict prevention activities of the EU and which aspects of it should be revised or modified. To this end, the study first of all examines the lessons drawn from Bosnia considering the response given to this crisis by the EU. And then it analyzes the Kosovo case for examining to what extent the lessons drawn from Bosnia case applied related to enhancing the effectiveness of conflict prevention activities of the EU. In this way, ultimately this study aspires to underline some acute and deep seated problems in the EU conflict prevention activities.

Given the major objective of this study, there seems to be vital methodological questions which must be illuminated in detail. First and foremost, it is crucially important to clarify what this study means by "the EU conflict prevention activities" in the context of its foreign policy. As Bono argues that in the dominant literature the role of the EU in foreign policy is for the most part limited to the understanding of outcomes produced by the CFSP. However, this approach is highly contested because of its deficiencies considering the foreign policy implications of the first and third pillars of the EU along with the CFSP (Bono, 2004: 399). For example, both positive and negative economic instruments of the first pillar

(European Communities) such as providing/suspension of aids, tariff reduction/increase, quota decrease/increase concluding/suspending trade agreements, boycotts and embargoes can not only be considered in the context of bilateral economic relations. Rather, it seems obvious that it has foreign policy implications for both sides of those bilateral relations. As for the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs), in the same vein, one can argue that this pillar has foreign policy implications too. Rules and regulations related to the EU's visa policy, decisions made regarding fight against organized crime, illegal immigration, weapons and drug trafficking along with the cooperation with third parties have implications not only on domestic EU security, but on international security as well. Hence, it is obvious that those decisions can also be considered as the part of EU's foreign policy outcomes. In the light of these explanations, this study conceives of the EU's foreign policy as composed of the activities and the outcomes of three-pillar rather than a restricted approach only taking into account the CFSP. To this end, this study scrutinizes European Council Conclusions, Joint Actions and Common Positions; European Commission Communications and Reports; European Parliament Resolutions and Recommendations and Press Releases as primary sources and the secondary sources existing literary and documentary materials are used to draw on information.

Secondly and more importantly, it is crucially important to elaborate on the reasons why those two cases i.e. Bosnia and Kosovo were selected so as to dwell on the question how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention. First of all, one of the most important reasons of this deliberate selection was the threat posed by Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts to both security and economic interests of the EU member states. For the last fifty years the major objective of the EU project has been creating a stable, secure and prosper environment in Europe for its members to enjoy and reap the benefits of it. In this regard, in the post-Cold War era, Bosnia and then Kosovo conflicts made most important destabilizing

impact through generating widespread security and economic problems such as distortion of financial investments and refugee and displaced people problems. Moreover, given their geographical locations, cultural similarities, ongoing economic, political and social relations with the EU member states, those two conflicts have occupied a central place in European politics. For all these reasons, it seems plausible to observe the EU to make its most intensive preventive efforts in those two cases. As for the second reason why this study focuses on those two particular cases but not the others, those two cases attracted the attention of not only the EU, but also the other actors in the international system such as the UN, the US and Russia Federation. In other words, those two cases dominated not only regional politics, whereas they occupied important place in global politics as well by attracting international attention. Thirdly, challenges that the third parties faced in those two cases have been for the most part similar. These two cases exemplify more or less the same characteristics as being ethnic conflicts. Ethnic hatred and poverty as well as the refugee problems and state collapse in both cases leave enough room for comparing Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of effectiveness of the EU's conflict prevention activities.

As the last point related to the methodology of the thesis, in order to study Bosnia and Kosovo cases and compare them analytically, this study focuses on the pre- and post-conflict stages of those cases in line with the conflict prevention definition applied throughout this thesis. Since the definition of conflict prevention used in this study (i.e. efforts of the third parties to prevent disputes from turning into violent conflicts before the outbreak of conflicts and after the signing of peace agreements) mainly refers to pre- and post-conflict efforts of the third parties, Bosnia and Kosovo cases are examined in the light of the preventive activities of the EU in the pre- and post-conflict stages of those conflicts. To be explicit, for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the pre-conflict stage will be 1990-1992 and post-conflict stage will be 1996-onwards. Pre-conflict stage starts with the deterioration of economic situation in

Yugoslavia and eruption of the problems between Slovenia and Yugoslavia. And post-conflict period in BiH refers to the period starting with the signing of Dayton Agreement in 1995 and going on. In regard to Kosovo, the pre-conflict stage covers the period from 1989 when the autonomy of Kosovo granted in 1974 Constitution was changed unilaterally by Yugoslavia to 1998 when the conflict erupted. In terms of post-conflict period, this study analyzes the years starting in 1999 when the UNSC Resolution 1244 was adopted and going onwards.

1.3 Organization of the Study

In the context the of main research question of this study, as it was stated before, this study examines that which factors can contribute to the effectiveness of conflict prevention policy/activities of the EU. Following the introduction, this question is elaborated on in the four following chapters.

In Chapter 2, a theoretical overview of the conflict prevention literature will be presented. Instead of giving a whole summary of the literature, Chapter 2 elaborates on the two theoretical questions concerning conflict prevention, “what should be the scope of conflict prevention activities of third parties?” and “what are the criterion of effective conflict prevention emphasized in the literature?” To be explicit, while first question is dealing with the discussions of whether conflict prevention activities of the third parties should be applied to pre-, escalation or post-conflict stages in the life cycle of conflicts through operational and structural preventive activities, second question focuses on the factors contributing to effectiveness of third parties in the following subtitles: multiparty intervention, multifaceted intervention, early warning, timing of intervention, internal dynamics of conflicts and institutionalization of conflict prevention activities.

After providing a theoretical background, historical evolution of the conflict prevention policy of the EU will be explained in Chapter 3. Since the conflict prevention policy of the EU is considered to be a subfield of the CFSP, the general developments in the field of CFSP together with the particular developments related to the conflict prevention policy of the EU are elaborated on.

In Chapter 4, the comparison of the two cases is presented. First of all, the intervention of the EU in Bosnian conflict in the pre- and post conflict stages is explained in detail and then, by the same token, Kosovo case is elaborated on. Finally, lessons drawn from Bosnia case and whether they have been applied in Kosovo or not is examined

In the final chapter, the theoretical and analytical framework, the content of the study and the findings of the research are summarized. The main points and arguments discussed in previous chapters are emphasized. Several remarks on the strengths and weaknesses of this study as well as its significance are noted.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

2.1 Introduction

In the early 1990s the crucial lesson drawn from the conflict cases in different parts of the world was the necessity of more pro-active and effective preventive efforts which can not only manage, but also prevent conflicts before they turn into violent forms (Jentleson, 2000: xi). This crucial lesson of the necessity of preventing conflicts turning into violent forms was neither a novel nor an original idea *per se*. In the Cold-War era, conflict prevention was again carrying great importance. In the introduction of the annual report to of the United Nations for example, Dag Hammarskjold explained that conflict prevention “must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major powers.”² What was in Hammarskjold’s mind was that preventing local conflicts to fire a major powers’ conflict which can in the final resort might result in devastating outcomes. Hence, the neutralization of conflict areas i.e. containing those conflicts which can trigger the confrontation of two superpowers in any part of the world became the major concern of the UN (UN Annual Report,1959-1960). However, in the post-Cold War era, it was obvious that conflict prevention has received a new and more extensive attention than the Cold-War meaning of it (Aggestam, 2003: 12).

There were at least two important reasons bringing about a renewed interest in the field of conflict prevention. First of all, there was an outstanding increase in the number of intrastate conflicts than the interstate ones in the post-cold war era. However, it was not only

² For a comprehensive overview of the growth of the conflict prevention literature even before the 1950s see Ackerman 2003, Krouisberg 2002, Aggestam 2003.

the quantitative shift in the number of intrastate conflicts, but also the qualitative features of intrastate conflicts generated and increased interest in conflict prevention. In this regard, the widespread effects of intrastate conflicts in the forms of mass human killings, refugee problems as well as distortions of investments of third parties in those conflict territories have caused conflict prevention to receive more attention (Wallensteen and Möller, 2004: 3). Secondly, new international structure in the post cold war era left enough room for a more diverse and multi-level engagements in conflict cases. As Crocker et al. rightfully pointed out that diffusion of power throughout the international system has added whole new layers of complexity to efforts to maintain international order (Crocker et al., 2002: xxi). By the end of the Cold War, conflict prevention was perceived as the job of the great powers. But in the post-Cold War era, considering the complexity of conflicts and need for comprehensive approach in dealing with conflicts and maintain international order not only states, but also diversified bunch of actors ranging from regional organizations to NGOs seized the opportunity to make contribution in different conflict cases with their own comparative advantages (Crocker et al., 2002: xvii).

In the light of these explanations considering the renewed and extensive interest in the field of conflict prevention, today there seems to be a consensus in terms of value of the conflict prevention (Jentleson: 2003: 26, Ackerman, 2003: 340). In other words, the question today is not whether to intervene in preventing violent conflicts, but determining the scope of conflict prevention activities and how to make them more effective to get the best outcome out of it. In this regard the following two parts of the chapter will try to deal with these two questions respectively. First of all, by elaborating on the definition of conflict prevention, the scope of the conflict prevention will be discussed and secondly, factors that contribute to the effectiveness of conflict prevention strategies will be examined.

2.2 The Scope of Conflict Prevention

Discussions associated with the issue of what the scope of preventive activities should be are closely related to discussions on how the very term of conflict prevention is defined. In its essence, two interrelated questions in the literature dwell on the scope of conflict prevention. First one is that “should conflict prevention be limited to the ‘pre-conflict’ stage or should it also cover the ‘escalation’ and ‘post-conflict’ stages of conflicts as well?”³ And the second question is that “whether conflict prevention should address “immediate causes (operational prevention) of conflicts or also its underlying roots (structural prevention), too?”⁴

There seems to be two prominent positions in the literature considering at which stage to involve (pre/escalation/post) and whether to address the “imminent causes” of conflicts or “deep-rooted causes” of them. On the one hand, while some scholars opt for a limited approach of conflict prevention which covers only early stages of conflicts and apply operational prevention strategies, on the other hand some scholars take the importance of a comprehensive approach of conflict prevention granted and give more credit to the loose definition of conflict prevention which covers all stages of conflict prevention through structural and operational strategies.

By opting for the limited approach for conflict prevention, as a covering answer of the aforementioned two questions related to stages (pre- and post conflict) and types (operational/structural) of conflict prevention efforts, Michael Lund defines conflict

³ Pre-conflict stage starts when the conflict is a dispute and ends up with the outbreak of violent conflict. Escalation stage covers the period from the outbreak of violence to the signing of peace agreement between conflicting parties and lastly, the post-conflict stage includes the activities taking place after the signing of peace agreement.

⁴ Operational prevention strategies aims at preventing the escalation of conflicts and turning them into violent forms in the pre-conflict or escalation stages of conflicts. The measures applied in operational prevention include coercive diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, fact finding and monitoring missions, confidence building measures and use of force. Whereas, structural prevention aims at addressing structural and deep-rooted causes of conflicts including political, social and economical problems in conflict cases. In this regard, structural prevention focuses on facilitating governance, promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law as well as achieving economic development of societies. Because of the nature of its objectives structural prevention involves long-term oriented engagement of third parties. For further discussion on operational and structural prevention see Ackermann 2003, Aggestam 2003 and Wallensteen 2003.

prevention as “*actions to be taken in order to hinder the settlement of political disputes by means of armed force or related ways*” (Lund, 1996: 37). Elsewhere, he explains that the definition of conflict prevention should not spread to the entire life cycle of conflicts and its focus should be *pre-empting the eruption of violence*” (Lund, 2002a: 382). After a certain stage, for Lund, actions of third parties are no longer a case of conflict prevention, but crisis management. According to him, the loose definition of conflict prevention is flawed at least in two respects. First of all, he argues that although conflicts have sources in socioeconomic and political conditions such as poverty or lack of education, they do not necessarily trigger violence. In order violence to erupt according to Lund, immediate causes such as bellicose actions and ethnocentric demagoguery have to come into play. However, policies addressing structural causes of conflicts cannot identify when and how particular signs of violent conflict will appear. Secondly, Lund emphasizes that trying to both organize and finance those structural prevention efforts are extremely hard tasks to deal with. For example, structural efforts such as income redistribution, disarmament of conflicting parties and reforming education system of societies require extensive and well established policy plans and strategies. Moreover, along with the problems faced in the implementation phases of those structural efforts to prevent conflicts, financing those activities and also monitoring them are extremely hard tasks, especially considering the scarce financial resources of and dissonance among third parties intervening (Lund, 2002a: 383). By the same token, following the Lund, Vayrynen also argues that because of the fact that conflict prevention is considered to be the actions taken before violence erupts, its emphasis should be on the imminent causes of conflict rather than underlying ones. However, unlike Lund, Vayrynen argues that structural prevention can be applicable in pre-conflict periods so as to complete operational prevention efforts (Vayrynen, 2003: 48). In line with Vayrynen, Jentleson believes that the emergence of violent conflicts caused not by dominantly primordial causes such as ethnic hatred or

animosities but brought about by the calculations of conflicting parties and their deliberate choices for war and conflict. Hence, Jentleson recommends turning our attention to “immediate causes” and early stages of conflicts i.e pre-war period of conflicts (Jentleson, 2000: 7, Jentleson, 2002, Jentleson, 2003).

Unlike the summarized views above emphasizing the importance of “pre-conflict stage” and operational prevention in preventive activities of third parties, the general tendency in the last years is to define conflict prevention looser in order to embrace all stages of conflicts (pre- and post-conflict) and to integrate operational and structural prevention strategies (Carment and Schnabel 2003, Talentino 2003, Cockell 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Hampson 2002, Crocker et al. 2002, Carnegie Commission Final Report 1997, Brahimi Report 2000, Report of the Secretary General, 2001). One of the most important reasons leading to the recognition of a looser definition of conflict prevention was the lessons drawn from the traumas of 1990s which displayed the importance of structural factors such as poverty, underdevelopment, lack of education, in conflict cases (Wallensteen, 2002: 213). In the light of the developments in 1990s, discussions started to revolve around the necessity of comprehensive strategies that can cover both immediate and root causes of conflicts. Today, as mentioned before, there seems to be a tendency to define conflict prevention in a loose manner in general. In this regard, as an example, Carment and Schnabel describe conflict prevention “*as a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predicted international security environment*” (Carment & Schnabel 2003: 16). In their broad definition Carment and Schnabel emphasize two important aspects of conflict prevention. First of all, they show their willingness to define conflict prevention broadly, namely covering all stages of conflicts considering medium and long-term activities of third parties. Secondly and more importantly, in their definition they also touch upon the

importance of dealing with conflicts by taking into account both operational and structural strategies. In the same way, emphasizing the fact that each war is rooted in the grievances of the past, nurtured by the present circumstances and carries its seeds to the future, Talentino argues that conflict prevention efforts should contain “*a rehabilitative dimension oriented to the past, a resolute dimension focusing on the present, and a preventive dimension oriented to the future*” (Talentino, 2003: 71).

In line with the idea of enhancing the scope of conflict prevention and defining it in a loose manner, Hampson notes that there is a pervasive recognition that operational conflict prevention activities such as mediation, diplomacy or preventive peace-keeping deployments can only be a subset of a comprehensive range of responses to prevent conflicts turning into violent forms. Hence, he argues that operational preventive activities can hardly be successful unless they are not linked with the activities (structural prevention) targeting the root causes of conflicts (Hampson, 2002: 148, Cockell 2002: 186). Also, Carnegie Commission Final Report manifests two broad aims related to the scope of conflict prevention. According to the Final Report preventive action should first and foremost thwart the emergence of violent conflicts, and secondly prevent recurrence of violence. In this line, Final Report also emphasizes that strategies for conflict prevention should be composed of operational and structural prevention activities. The Final Report argues that, while operational prevention carries out the task of creating suitable environment for responsible leaders of conflicting parties to solve their problems without turning them into violent forms in the pre-conflict periods, structural prevention aims at meeting the three basic needs of societies namely, security, well being and justice (Carnegie Commission Final Report, 1997). Wallenstein goes beyond and touches upon the interplay between operational and structural prevention. He argues that many of the structural measures can be carried out parallel to direct prevention and for that reason the interplay between operational and structural prevention is not only a

matter of time sequencing but a matter of affecting different aspects of conflicts as well (Wallensteen, 2002: 214). In other words, Wallensteen argues that both operational and structural prevention activities can be applied in different points in the whole life cycle of conflicts. He believes that while the operational preventive activities such as preventive deployment could be used in the post-conflict stages, economic aids targeting development could be applied in pre-conflict stages. Accordingly, Wallensteen comes up with the idea that although operational and structural prevention strategies seem to have different priorities to deal with, both of them require each other to exert significant influence on conflicting parties (Wallensteen, 2002: 227).

Not only in the academic environment, but also in international organizations there seems to be a tendency to opt for looser definition of conflict prevention which extends the scope of conflict prevention to post-conflict periods together with emphasizing the importance of both operational and structural prevention. In this regard, and in his identical letters to the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly in 21 August 2000 and in his Report on the work of the Organization in 7 June 2001, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan underlined the need for comprehensive approaches covering both short-term (operational) and long-term (structural) activities to prevent conflicts turn into violent forms. Moreover, he also suggested that prevention action should start at earliest possible stage and aim at dealing with the deep-rooted causes of conflicts which are firing immediate causes of conflicts (Brahimi Report, 2000, Report of the Secretary General, 2001). Similarly, considering the complexities of the conflict prevention activities and the deep rooted causes of conflicts together with the immediate causes, the EU also opted for a loose definition of conflict prevention. As it was explicitly defined in the second article of the Common Position of European Council adopted on 14th of May in 2001, it was decided that the European Union's conflict prevention policy will deal with the outbreak, spreading of

violence and recurrence of violence through applying necessary tools and measures considering the immediate and structural causes of conflicts (European Council Common Position, 2001).

2.3 Factors Contributing To Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention Activities of Third Parties

An effective prevention strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors (Report of the Secretary General, 2001).

Effectiveness⁵ in the field of conflict prevention is of utmost importance since it directly refers to how to design “preventive policies”, “action plans” and “strategies” in order to accomplish the desired outcome from prevention by third parties. In the literature regarding “effectiveness” there seems to be an agreement on two factors. First of all, it is generally emphasized that each and every conflict prevention strategy should be “country context specific”, that there must be “strategic coordination” among third parties (Ackerman 2003: 343). As the second agreed point, there is an emphasis on the fact that preventive action plans designed to eliminate emergence of violent conflicts should be built upon the previous case studies and lessons learned from what kind of an “action plan” that could best fit in various contexts (Ackerman 2003: 343). In this respect, Jentleson also argues that drawing lessons from the previous conflict cases are so instructive that in the future fewer opportunities will be missed regarding prevention of violent conflicts (Moloakattu, 2005: 4, Cockell, 2002: 187).

After pointing out two agreed point in the literature namely the country context specific character of prevention strategies and the importance of drawing lessons from the

⁵ Effectiveness is defined here as the “influence exerted by third parties to prevent disputes from turning into violent conflicts”. In other words effectiveness refers to the “positive contribution of third parties through broad range of instruments in preventing outbreak and recurrence of violence between conflicting parties”.

previous cases, we can further our discussion regarding more specific criterion for related to factors that contribute to the “effectiveness” of preventive efforts. For enhancing effectiveness in preventive actions, many case studies and reports have been prepared and these reports helped to identify the conditions for effective conflict prevention (Ackerman, 2003: 343). After a quick glance, some conditions stand out as the crucial factors determining effective conflict prevention policies and activities. These are “multilateral and multifaceted action towards conflicts”, “timing of intervention”, “early warning”, “internal dynamics of conflicts and “institutionalization of preventive activities by third parties”.

2.3.1 Multiparty Intervention

A successful preventive strategy depends on the cooperation of many United Nations actors, including the Secretary General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations agencies, offices, funds and programs as well as the Bretton Woods institutions. The United Nations is not the only actor in prevention and may often not be the actor best suited to take the lead. Therefore, Member States, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and other civil society actors also have very important roles to play in this field (Report of the Secretary General, 2001).

In line with the findings of Secretary General’s Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, as it is clearly stated in SIPRI Report 2000 that it is evident that no-single actor - neither UN nor great powers, nor NGOs- possess all the strategies and tools that are necessary for the successful and effective conflict prevention of complex conflicts. Hence, preventive actions that are containing more actors can contribute to prevention of conflicts in a more positive way in comparison to the ones which include less number of international actors (SIPRI Report 2000: 4, Lund 1996: 393). The positive impact of multiparty intervention stems from the neutrality and credibility of a multiparty intervention, rather than a one party which could be perceived as favoring one of the conflicting parties. As a second advantage of multiparty intervention in conflict cases is that, due to the costly and complicated nature of

conflict prevention efforts both in the pre and post-conflict periods, insofar as the number of contributing parties increases, it becomes easier to divide international labor in different areas and collect more resource to deal with different aspects of conflicts. For example, while international organizations are financing the rebuilding of state institutions, because of their comprehensive knowledge at grassroots level, NGOs can facilitate the deliverance of humanitarian aids as well as creating projects to integrate conflict-torn societies (Jentleson, 200: 14). Moreover, as the Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict argues that not only mostly mentioned conflict prevention actors such as great powers and international organizations can effectively prevent violent conflicts, but also other actors such as the media, business community, international financial institutions and even the people of the conflicting societies can contribute to prevention of violent conflicts (Carnegie Commission Final Report, 1997).

It is also equally important to note that like some other conditions for effectiveness that multiparty preventive action could be a double-edged sword. In other words, although it seems that preventive actions which include as many preventive actors as help building a comprehensive intervention capacity, at the same time it might cause inefficiency because of different interests of intervening actors in terms of dealing with conflicts. For example, Zartman and Touval argue that to understand the motivations of third parties it is more helpful to employ rationalist approaches, namely using cost-benefit calculations. According to them third parties involve in conflicts because of the fact that they have an interest in the resolution or prevention of those conflicts. Otherwise they wouldn't engage in (Zartman and Touval, 1996: 446). As for international organizations' involvement in conflict cases, in line with the realist approach Zartman and Touval state that insofar as the great powers of that organization accepts to intervene, we can observe more involvement of international organizations in conflict prevention activities (Zartman and Touval, 1996: 449). Hence, they

argue that political will of third parties is one of the key determinants of both success and effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts of third parties. Although, as a solution to the problem of “lack of political will of third parties” intervening in conflicts, some scholars recommends “leadership of some committed international organizations such as the UN” (SIPRI Report, 2000: 3, Carnegie Commission Final Report, 1997) and taking the support of major powers (Lund, 1996: 86) so as to mobilize the other actors, “political will” still poses a great challenge for creating an effective international response against conflicting parties. In contrary to the argument that “political will” of intervening actors driven by interests are one of the most important factors regarding conflict prevention, Lund argues that it might not be that important in thwarting disputes turning into violent forms. He explains that especially in developing countries which face to problems of transition to democracy, the international community has already been present in the form of diplomatic missions, development activities, trade and commercial activities and structural adjustment programs together with efforts to promote democracy, human rights and civil society. Nevertheless, the case according to him is that most of these efforts made and resources allocated have not been effectively mobilized for conflict prevention purposes (Lund, 2002: 166). Hence, Lund points out that generation of political will might not always be the case to prevent conflicts. Rather, it might be more important to reorganize the support that is operating in developing countries and thus, they can start to serve conflict prevention objectives (Lund, 2002: 166).

Another critical point related to multiparty intervention in conflict cases is achieving the “coherency” among intervening actors. Insofar as the unity of effort and purpose is achieved among intervening third parties, the effectiveness of conflict prevention activities increases. As Lund puts it clearly that ‘third parties should be unified in supporting firm and unequivocal pressures behind a process of peaceful settlement’ (Lund, 1996b: 392). One of the most important functions of pursuing coherent policies is that it sends unequivocal

messages to conflicting parties that “as the third parties we are here, we know what we are doing and have a united position to prevent this conflict” (Crocker, 2002: 244). Otherwise, the absence of a decisive political stance of intervening third parties paves the way for the conflicting party leaders to test the limits of commitment to preventing that particular conflict which was the case for Milosevic in 1990s. In view of the importance of the value of pursuing coherency, third parties should aspire to develop a “common script and joint strategy” to increase the effectiveness of their preventive efforts (Crocker, 2002: 244).

2.3.2 Multifaceted Intervention

Another important point related effectiveness of preventive actions mentioned in conflict prevention literature is “multifaceted action”⁶ (Lund, 1996: 94). Third parties such as states, international organizations or NGOs have to employ balanced mix of instruments that are available to them in view of dynamics and specific necessities of conflicts.

In this respect, availability of instruments to intervening third parties can range from diplomatic instruments to economic and military instruments and there can be listed whole bunch of instruments in this respect. While diplomatic instruments that the third parties can use range from high level visits or diplomatic sanctions and diplomatic recognition to mediation and negotiation, economic instruments range from signing of cooperation, association or development aid agreements to imposing embargoes or suspending or denouncing agreements as well as many other instruments used in a conditional way. As for the military tools, they range from preventive deployments to peacekeeping and protective forces.⁷

But, here the crucial question is that what combination of these tools best serve to delineate an effective preventive action in short-term (operational) and long-term (structural)

⁶ Multifaceted action, here, refers to the mixed use of several instruments considering and features of the conflicts that are intervened.

⁷ For a comprehensive list of instruments see Smith 2004 and Lund 1996a, 1996b.

prevention efforts? Conflict prevention literature shows us that planning “context specific approach” for each case is the best way to decide on the mixed of particular tools to enhance effectiveness. In other words, there can’t be a “ready made formula” or “one size fits all” strategy for effective use of instruments, but ‘it depends’ on the causal factors, intensity and the stage of that particular conflict in which third parties are trying to involve. One of the most important advantages of the “context specific approach” is that, it partially eliminates the possibility that some third parties might use some instruments because they have mainly those instruments in their toolbox. As one practioner pointed out that “*if you only have a hammer it is very tempting to see every problem as a nail, rather than developing different tools to deal with different problems*” (Cornelis cited in Cockell, 2000: 187). In this regard, context specific approach in using instruments balanced and effectively is of utmost important. Nevertheless, arguing that use of instruments in conflict cases always depends on the unique features of that particular conflict does not necessarily mean that some generalizable lessons regarding effective use of instruments can not be applied to all conflict cases. As a generalizable lesson for example, in his study of examining 28 different entry points to 6 conflict cases, Zartman argues that “the success of conflict prevention interventions depends in large measure on diplomatic – even negotiatory – elements” (Zartman 2001: 153). As another example, in their studies of 97 cases, Bercovitch and Langley argue that fatalities, complexity, the nature and the duration of conflicts are most predictive in mediation outcomes (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993).

Particularly, in the literature there seems to be a consensus that planning and implementation of conflict efforts by third parties depend crucially on the relationship between military and civilian instruments (Carnegie Commission Final Report, 1997, Lund 1996, Lund, 2002, Crocker, 2002, Hampson, 2002, Ackerman, 2003, Carment and Schnabel, 2003). For example, Crocker argues that an effective use of negotiation is to great extent

dependent upon whether it is backed by military force or not. In this respect, he gives Lusaka Accords on Congo in 1999 as an example and emphasizes the fact that unless it is not backed by military force, mediation can not manage to be effective (Crocker, 2002: 243). By the same token, according to him the use of military force without any political context is far from being an effective instrument (Crocker, 2002: 243). Lund also argues that effective prevention of conflicts does not only require the combination of positive/carrot or negative/stick inducements, but also a variety of actions and instruments to address the various facets of a dispute (Lund, 1996: 94). According to him, third parties should not only provide carrots and sticks but also variety of other “services” such as help in building institutions, alleviating distrust between conflicting parties, promoting reconciliation and formulating settlements (Lund, 1996: 94).

To sum up, the use of instruments in a “context specific approach” and comprehensive political-military approaches seem to be the most promising and effective ways of carrying on effective conflict prevention activities.

2.3.3 Creating Early Warning Mechanisms

It is crucially important to know and predict for third parties under what conditions a conflict starts to send alarms of escalation and turns into a violent form. For this reason, as one of the most important determinants of effective preventive action, third parties should develop early warning mechanisms. Third parties, in this context, should be well equipped with the best analytical skills to gather information and evaluate them related to potential problems (Carment and Schnabel, 2003: 15). As stated in the Final Report of Carnegie Commission prediction and analyzing conflicts is a prerequisite for a prudent decision making for the third parties to act effectively in their conflict prevention activities (Carnegie Commission Final Report, 1997: xxi). Besides, the Final Report also notes that early warning mechanisms

should be composed of early warning, information and risk assessment systems which can facilitate necessary evaluation regarding when and how to involve in conflict cases. Furthermore, a systematic early warning mechanisms should also be combined with constantly updated contingency plans for preventive action and develop early warning indicators such as widespread human right abuses, brutal political oppression, inflammatory use of media, accumulation of arms and rapid changes of socio-economic situations among ethnic groups (Carnegie Commission Final Report, 1997: xxi).

It is also important to note that as well as the reliability and correctness of provided information through risk assessment and early-warning systems, rapid and quick response capacity of decision makers in third parties are as importance as strength of early warning. In this sense, as Jentleson notes that insofar as the warning-response gap increases, referring to the gap between early warning and decision making regarding how to react given to signals of a conflict, the effectivity of preventive action decreases (Jentleson, 2003: 28, George and Holl, 2000).

For this reason, some scholars argue that in most conflict cases there were sufficient warnings such as humanitarian abuses and political oppression to push and international response. For example, George suggests that ‘the problem is not a lack of warning but the fact that governments often ignore to an incipient crisis or take a passive attitude towards it until it escalates into a deadly struggle or a major catastrophe’(George, 1999: 10). In the same vein, in his study of “Opportunities Missed and Opportunities Seized” he also states that where opportunities for preventive diplomacy conflict prevention were seized, it was part in part due to the timely availability of reliable intelligence and other early warning information. Where opportunities for conflict prevention were missed, it was despite early warning availability (Jentleson, 2000: 324). Hence, the problems related to early warning seems to be not the absence of timely information, but the quality and reliability of sources

and the information provided to decision makers. As Jentleson states it clearly that “flawed analysis” of likelihood of escalation of conflicts and the risks of inaction pose greater challenges than the lack of timely information in the preventive efforts of third parties (Jentleson 2000: 324).

2.3.4 Timing of Intervention

As one of the most important factors contributing to the effectiveness of preventive efforts, timing of intervention in conflicts is of crucial importance. As John Moloakattu emphasizes that intervention of third parties makes sense, insofar as they do the right thing on the right time (Moloakattu, 2005:4). There seems to be a consensus in the prevention literature that intervening at early stages of conflicts positively contributes to the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts. Jentleson argues that action should be taken ‘*early, early, early*’, because ‘one of the strongest, least conditional conclusions we can draw is that the longer you wait, the more there will be to do and the more difficult it will be to do well’ (Jentleson, 2000: 337). In the same vein, Connie Peck argues that the goal would be to provide skilled third-party assistance through good offices and mediation as early as possible in a dispute, when the opportunity for dispute resolution is most ripe’ (Peck, 2002: 582). Zartman also suggests that entry opportunities in a conflict to prevent its escalation are not revolving doors appearing at regular intervals. Hence, after pressure for escalation rises it might be too late to and hard to influence the conflict parties (Zartman, 2001: 153). In the literature there seems to be empirical evidence to support this point, too. For example in the Bercovitch & Langley study of 97 disputes involving 364 mediation attempts, which finds a declining success rate for mediation as fatalities increase (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993). However, Cockell warns us in studying the relationship between timing of intervention and effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts of third parties. First of all, he argues that emphasizing the timing of

intervention may cause other factors contributing to effectiveness of conflict prevention activities not to be taken into consideration adequately. More importantly, he touches upon the fact that the very concept of timing is very elusive and hard to apply in different conflicts. Because different conflicts tend to move along different trajectories, it is hard to make it clear that early intervention means the same in different contexts. For example, if we think of life cycle of conflicts like a curve, some conflict cases might have a steeper escalation curve than others. In this regard, Cockell tries to show us the contextual character of the very term timing in conflict prevention (Cockell, 2002: 191).

To sum up, in the conflict prevention literature there seems to be a strong emphasis on intervening in conflicts as early as possible to enhance the effectiveness of conflict prevention by considering the contextual character of the very term of timing.

2.3.5 Internal Dynamics of Conflicts

Along with “warning-response gap” problem, as mentioned before, all conflict prevention efforts should also take into account that no “one formula fits to all cases”. Different conflict cases might have different contexts such as religious, ethnic or border disputes and thus need to be considered and evaluated carefully and critically in terms of their own dynamics. In this respect, Lund reminds us three important factors that can contribute to the effectiveness and success of preventive actions related to dynamics of conflicts. First of all, he argues that a moderate leadership in conflict parts may help preventive actions in a positive way. A moderate leadership could facilitate and keep the channels of communications open. However, it must also be pointed out that a totally reverse scenario could come into existence in the presence of uncompromising political elites in both sides. Secondly, according to Lund “sovereignty claims” of especially inter-state conflicting parties could hinder effectiveness and even success of preventive actions, since these claims rely on the issue of non-

interference on domestic affairs. Along with these two points, as the third one it is important to note that different types of conflicts also call for different mix of instruments to be effective which was mentioned before (Lund, 1996: 86).

2.3.6 Institutionalization of Conflict Prevention Activities

Lastly, for explaining effective intervention it is important to spell out the importance of “institutionalization”. Institutionalization refers to enhancing preventive policies and strategies over time and turning conflict prevention into a “routine” activity in decision-making processes (Ackerman, 2003: 344). An advantage of institutionalization is the fact that it helps to overcome coordination and cooperation problems. In immediate crisis situations institutionalization provides great advantages in terms of effectiveness. For instance, in an institutionalized conflict prevention policy of a third party, since many processes are routines in case of emergencies, analytical skills both inform decisions-makers rapidly and suggest them viable policy options to react those conflicts cases comprehensively (Carment and Schnabel, 2003: 19). In this respect, for example, the UN can bring important advantages as the unique legitimizer of actions in the name of international community. However, not only the UN, but also other regional organizations can institutionalize their preventive activities. In this respect, Carnegie Commission Final Report suggests that “regional arrangements can be greatly strengthened for preventive purposes and they can develop diplomatic, political and economic tools to for regional use” (Carnegie Final Report, 1997: xiv). In this way, the members of that particular regional organization would be provided with advance warning of conflicts as well as the necessary logistics, command and control and other functions to carry out UN authorized operations. Besides, the institutionalization of conflict prevention efforts can also help to the effectiveness of preventive efforts of third parties. One of the most problematic issues in the post-conflict period is who will monitor and keep an eye on the

implementation performance of peace agreements of conflicting parties. Unlike the nature of operational prevention, structural prevention is a long-term and open ended period, and thus it necessitates careful implementation, monitoring and if necessary modifications of applied strategies (Cockell, 2002: 206). In this sense, institutionalization of conflict prevention activities and creating necessary mechanisms that perform the tasks such as monitoring and over viewing of implementation is of crucial importance.

2.4 Conclusion

Conflict prevention has received an extensive attention in the post-Cold War era. This novel attention was partially due to the increase in the number of intrastate conflicts and their humanitarian and financial costs such as mass human killings, refuge problems and economic instability and distortions of third party investments. In this new era, the discussions revolved not on the viability of conflict prevention, in other words if preventive activities should be undertaken or not, but on the scope (pre/escalation/post), type (operational/structure) and the formulation of effective conflict prevention activities. For the scope and the type of conflict prevention, there seems to be a general recognition that conflict prevention activities should be extended from pre-conflict stages to post-conflict periods and both types of prevention (operational/structural) should be employed in parallel and complementary manner to each other.

As for the effectiveness, there are several factors that come to fore which are crucially important to design effective conflict prevention strategies and exert significant influence by the third parties on conflicting parties. Among those factors, some points attract important attention. First of all, there seems to be a consensus that multiparty intervention makes more positive contribution in comparison to preventive efforts which are dominated by limited set of actors. Multiparty intervention is particularly important at least in two respects. While first

one is the labor of division and burden sharing that can be made among international organizations, states and other organizations at societal level, the second reason could be increasing the credibility of preventive efforts insofar as the number of interveners increase. Secondly, as another factor mentioned in the literature regarding effective conflict prevention, multifaceted intervention carries great significance. To be explicit, appropriate mix of instruments is of positive contribution on the effectiveness of preventive efforts carried out by the third parties. To this end, it is important to note that the complementary nature of the civilian and military instruments should not be underestimated and it should be considered seriously in the formulation of context specific approaches in conflict cases. The third factor to be considered in the framework of effective conflict prevention is creating early warning mechanisms. Since prediction and analyzes and right action based on the early warning signals, it is of great importance. As stated in the Carnegie Commission Final Report, early warning mechanisms are important in the sense that they provide intervening parties to make prudent decisions regarding conflict cases. However, some scholars also argue that not the early warning but early action determines the fate of many conflicts. This argument takes us to the fourth factor contributing to the effectiveness of conflict prevention activities of third parties. As Zartman's metaphor puts it clearly that opportunities that appear in disputes to stop conflicts turning into violent forms are not like revolving doors ad thus once an opportunity is missed, it might be too hard and even too late to exert influence on the conflicting parties. For this reason according to him, the right thing should be done on the right time. Next, as the fifth factor, the other side of the coin, namely not the intervening but the dynamics related to intervened parties are of crucial importance in terms of hindering disputes to escalate and turn into violent forms. The attitude of leaders in conflicting parties vis a vis the third parties trying to prevent conflicts or types of conflicts whether they are ethnic, political or territorial are of utmost importance in terms of effectiveness of the conflict

prevention activities of the third parties. Finally, the institutionalization of preventive activities contributes positively in terms of the preventive efforts. One of the biggest problems for the third parties either during ground operations or at diplomatic level initiatives is coordination and cooperation. Furthermore, institutionalization of conflict prevention activities also provides viable policy options for third parties in times of crises and thus extends the opportunities for third parties to intervene.

In conclusion, As Crocker et al. points out that over the last decade one of the most important lessons learned was creating a sustainable peace from negotiated settlements has been a very complex issue. This complexity mostly, stems from many reasons such as fragility of peace agreements, the challenges of implementation, problem in coordinating international response and the unpredictable results that election can produce (Crocker et al., 2002: xxi). For all these reasons, as Crocker et al. notes it that today the peace established by negotiated settlements can lead to a peace which can be at best, a turbulent peace (Crocker et al, 2002: xxi). In line with Crocker et al., this study goes in line with the idea that conflict prevention can not be limited to only pre-conflict stages of conflicts, but should be extended to post- conflict stages, too so that recurrence of conflicts could be prevented.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EU CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY

3.1 Introduction

The conflict prevention policy of the EU was born and evolved in the context of the EU's efforts in creating a common foreign and security policy. Although the official emphasis on conflict prevention of the EU started in the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, concerning institutions and instrumental developments the beginning of the developments related to conflict prevention dates back to late 1960s. For this reason, in this chapter, the history of the EU's conflict prevention policy which developed in the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and then the CFSP will be scrutinized. First of all, the first informal experience of the EC in terms of discussion forum of external issues, the EPC will be explained. Then, the changes introduced in the Single European Act (SEA) related to EPC will be touched upon. Having mentioned the changes in the EPC made in the SEA, the sea change in the security understanding of the EU after the end of the Cold-War and the turning of the EPC to the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty will explained. Then, the very relationship between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the WEU and the EU will be elaborated on in specific reference to Petersberg Tasks and Berlin Plus Arrangements. After that, the milestone in the EU's conflict prevention policy, the Saint-Malo Declaration and its formal adoption in 1999 Cologne Summit will be examined. Then, considering the rapid developments in the conflict prevention policy brought about by the lessons learned from the conflicts of the 1990s will be scrutinized. In this regard, the three important policy papers prepared by different institutional bodies of the EU, military and civilian "Headline Goals", peace-keeping and police missions, the ESS and the amendments proposed in Draft Treaty

Establishing a Constitution for Europe related to conflict prevention efforts of the EU will be elaborated on respectively. Finally, prospective developments that can take place in the field of EU's conflict prevention policy will be touched upon.

3.2 The First Efforts to Discuss External Issues

Efforts of the EU to establish a conflict prevention policy was not an outcome of a planned process but rather a policy field evolving in the process of creating a common foreign and security policy for Europe. In this regard, the roots of the creation of a conflict prevention policy, dates back to the first attempts of EC/EU member countries to find an institutional base for talking about foreign policy issues. The need to establish a platform to foster cooperation regarding the international role of the Community in the late 1960s was stemming from two set of factors. These were the reasons caused by the inner dynamics of the EC and from the external developments in the international arena. For the former one, As Holland and Dinan rightly stated that with the decision of first Enlargement of the Community with the new members, EC sought to add a new impetus to the scope and depth of the integration process (Dinan, 2005: 582; Holland, 1994: 118). In this respect, Treaty of Rome provided a base for the development of a predominantly economic international role for the EC. For example, Treaty of Rome was paving the way for signing association agreements with third countries and giving the power to conclude international treaties along with allowing the EC to receive and establish diplomatic missions. As for the exogenous factors that fueled the need for cooperation or at least creating a communication channel between member states were the superpower crises of the late 1960s (Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and American presence in Vietnam) (Holland, 1994: 118). It is in this context, meeting in Hague in 1969, EU leaders called for member countries to cooperate on foreign policy in an informal procedure known as European Political Cooperation. The

member states, may be ambitiously, called for “a united Europe assuming its responsibilities in the world ... of making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and its mission” (Holland, 1994: 119). One year later, in 1970 Luxembourg report and then the Copenhagen Report in 1973 identified the mechanisms of conducting the process of the EPC. In detail, the EPC was composed of meetings of heads of states and government (later institutionalized as the European Council) foreign affairs ministers, (to meet monthly basis), Political Committee (foreign ministers’ political directors) and working groups. In this way, although not mentioned in the founding treaties, the channels for cooperation among Member States concerning policy issues related to external relations started to be institutionalized. In regard to decision making processes, in the EPC, consensus became the dominant feature of the process. There was no voting; instead lengthy negotiations in a search for consensus created informal pressures to agree. Although it was marginal in output, none of the members wanted to be isolated in this informal the EPC process (Dinan, 2005: 583).

In the early 1980s, however, when the EC’s external relations were problematic like its internal development, the procedural limits of European political cooperation became obvious. The onset of the so-called “second Cold War”- the immediate heightening of the tension between East and West after a period of benign relations became a test case for the EPC in creating a common international action among member states. The failure to manage a concerted response to the taking of American hostages by Iran and Polish domestic crises showed that the EPC provided an inadequate mechanism to cope with immediate and critical events swiftly (Forster and Wallace, 2000: 121). London Report in 1981 considering the insufficient capacity and lessons learned from the crises of the early 1980s introduced some reforms related to crisis consultation mechanisms that three foreign affairs ministers can convene an emergency EPC meeting within 48 hours. In addition to this, the Commission was assigned to be fully associated with the EPC process (Smith, 2004: 39). However,

London report and the changes that it introduced were just minor procedural reforms and didn't bring fundamental changes (Dinan, 2005: 584).

In view of the evolution of a common foreign and security policy, for the EC, one of the most important milestones in those years was the reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1984 which was asleep for the last three decades because of the primary role of the NATO in territorial defence the of West European countries. The major aim of this reactivation effort was to discuss security and defence issues and thus WEU was revived as a forum within which the defence issues could be elaborated on without the US presence. In this way, WEU defence and foreign ministers agreed to meet regularly (McCormik, 1999: 211).

The SEA, although not bringing substantial changes in the context of EPC meetings, introduced important reforms in the legal and institutional fields concerning the EPC. During the IGC in 1985 almost all member states was agreed to make EC's external economic relations and member states' foreign policies consistent with each other (Dinan, 1998: 585). Also, formalizing the EPC in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and strengthening cooperation procedures along with providing a small secretariat were discussed. Finally these discussions brought about a separate section to be prepared in the SEA in 1986. In the SEA, the EPC was formalized and the Commission was fully associated with the EPC procedures. Moreover, a special secretariat was established for the EPC. As for the consistency between external actions of the EC which mostly carry economic implications and the EPC external actions in which there are predominantly political tones, the Council was charged with ensuring such a consistency together with the Commission. However, the EPC protected its intergovernmental character and the decision making process was still intact (Dinan, 2005: 585, Smith, 2004: 40).

So, through the end of the 1980s, the EPC evolved into an extensive network, with its small Secretariat drawing in some thousands of diplomats from member states. In this regard, EPC became an arena to discuss external political issues yet predominantly in an intergovernmental manner. Although the EPC achieved to promote cooperation by producing common policy outcomes such as imposing sanctions in South Africa, humanitarian aids for refugees affected by Gulf War (in Egypt, Jordan and Turkey) and imposing embargoes against Yugoslavia, they were extremely marginal and they were far from being planned strategically (Holland, 1994: 129). The sea change in the international politics brought about by the end of the Cold War and subsequent events and challenges posed by the new international environment forced the Member States to reform the EPC in order to increase the efficiency of their external political policy outcomes. Hence, the early 1990s witnessed the reform of EPC and its turning to the CFSP in the new EU three-pillar structure.

3.3 Maastricht Treaty and Beyond

The developments in Central and Eastern European countries in the course of 1989 and the rapid moves towards German unification along with the problems started to emerge in the Balkans forced foreign and security policy issues to be negotiated in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which led to the establishment of Maastricht Treaty in 1991. The negotiations revolved around the issues such as institutional changes, decision making rules, consistency related to common foreign and security policy and an appropriate link between the EU and the WEU. Finally, the negotiations created a temple structure for the EU and created a new pillar namely the CFSP. In this way, the EPC procedures and institutions evolved into Common Foreign and Security Policy as the second pillar of the EU.

The objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy were:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Charter as well as the principles;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Maastricht Treaty, Art. J.1.2).

In the light of these broad common foreign policy objectives, the Maastricht Treaty also made some institutional changes to promote foreign policy cooperation. Although the Council still had the authority to determine which foreign policy issues would be subjected to implementation, the Commission was associated with the work of the CFSP and it was entitled to submit proposals (Maastricht Treaty, Art.J.8.2). Maastricht Treaty not only changed institutional structures but also created two novel foreign policy instruments in order to implement the CFSP decisions. These instruments were common positions and joint actions. In this way, the Member states could cooperate on more day to day basis concrete foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, they decided to employ qualified majority voting for the implementation of joint actions, which the European Council first had to adopt on the basis of unanimity (Maastricht Treaty, Art. J.2.4 and J.6).

Although the intergovernmental character of the CFSP was dominant, the Maastricht Treaty obviously marked a sea change in the historical course of the Western European States' efforts to cooperate more in the foreign policy field. Moreover, as for the evolution of conflict prevention policy of the EU, Maastricht Treaty became a critical milestone too. This

Treaty pointed out three important conclusions in the light of the changes introduced in it. First of all, the Maastricht Treaty, in terms of foreign and security policy, can be read as the EU's decisive attempt to adopt itself to a new security environment emerged after the end of the Cold-War. Unlike the era dominated by the two superpower confrontation in different parts of the world, in the post-Cold War era the security problems were obviously asymmetric and less definite. Terrorism, illegal immigration, human, drug and weapon trafficking, ethnic clashes were the main destabilizing security problems of this new era. Naturally, these asymmetric and cross-border security threats required more cooperation due to their threatening of not directly state security but human security. For this reason, in the Maastricht Treaty there was a special emphasis on stability, international cooperation and humanitarian values as the foreign policy objectives.

Secondly, although the intergovernmental character for the CFSP was dominant and unanimity was the main principle for decision making, the socialization created by the dense network in the last two decades in the framework of the EPC, although marginally, revealed its outcomes in the Maastricht Treaty. In Art. J.1.4, for example, in conducting the new CFSP, it was stated that member states agreed to "refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations". Furthermore, in the Art. J.2.2, it was required that national foreign policies should be conformed to EU common positions. As the final point related to the Maastricht Treaty, although it was still a controversial issue between Atlanticists and Europeansits, the defence dimension of the Common Foreign and Security policy started to dominate the mindsets of all Member States. Although any territorial defence function was ensured even so far, at least for the conflict prevention and crisis management purposes (not officially mentioned in the Maastricht) the EU was entitled to implement defence functions. It was stated in the Maastricht Treaty that security matters which have defence implications

may be wholly or partly implemented through the framework of the WEU. Moreover, the WEU was seen “an integral part” of the development of the Union (Maastricht Treaty, Art.J.4.2).

The dominant discussions of the 1990s related to CFSP were revolving around the issues of reforming institutional bodies and more importantly adding a defence dimension to the EU’s second pillar. However, this was rather complex issue which was not only associated with inner dynamics and bargaining of member states, but also related to the future of transatlantic relations and the NATO. Hence, adding a defence dimension to the EU has always preserved its touchy nature. On the one hand, because of the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the threat coming from the USSR, the US was in favor of leaving a room for European states to deal with security problems affecting Europe and its immediate periphery. This policy change was, in fact, stemming from pragmatic considerations. In the US mindset, the Western European countries enjoyed the security umbrella provided by the NATO during the Cold War period, but now it was time to share the financial burden of securing the continent. On the other hand, this policy was a double-edged sword because of its negative implications in terms of threatening the primary position of the NATO, in other words the primary role of the US in European security architecture and defence issues associated with European continent. Although it was hard to challenge the strategic importance of the NATO for Europe, some European states pioneered by France have always been arguing in favor of an autonomous defence body in the Europe which can even substitute the NATO. However, the Atlanticists states led by Britain were far away from the position of France and satisfied with the intergovernmental character of the foreign policy pillar of the EU, not to mention defence. Although Europeanist states were supporting a separate defence arm for the EU, the main challenges they had to face were that extremely high bill of establishing an autonomous capacity and unwillingness of the Atlanticists and the

US for a new defence arm which is threatening the primacy of the NATO. The efforts to find a middle way between these two positions introduced a novel setting under the NATO's institutional structure entitled European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The basic intention of establishing the ESDI was to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and to reflect a greater responsibility for its common security and defence. In fact, the ESDI was instituting cooperation between the NATO and the WEU which was declared as the integral part of the EU. In this sense, the WEU was to be a bridge between the NATO and the EU in the matters concerning defence.

This ESDI triangle structure composed of NATO-WEU-EU was crucially important considering the development of conflict prevention capacity of the EU in the long term. In 1992, after a few months of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, WEU countries' foreign and defence ministers came together at Petersberg Hotel in Bonn and they declared that WEU would concentrate on "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping" as distinct from traditional territorial defence tasks (Petersberg Declaration, 1992: 4). In order to enable the EU to fulfill these tasks and provide it with capabilities to achieve these missions, considering the NATO-WEU-EU triangle, two years of negotiations and bargaining came up with the so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangements in 1996. This arrangement was setting out the procedures how the EU could borrow the assets and capabilities (e.g. services of NATO headquarters SHAPE at MONS and European command options of NATO for EU-led operations) of the NATO so as to carry out those peacekeeping operations. However, it was not that easy to operationalize this triangle because of the reservations of non-EU NATO members feeling excluded from the decision making procedures of the WEU in possible peace keeping operations. Because of this reason operationalization of the EU to carry out regional peace-keeping operations in which the NATO is not engaged had to wait until 2002.

To sum up, this NATO-WEU-EU triangle was indicating important points in the course of evolution of conflict prevention capacity of the EU, but at the same time pointing out to the unsatisfactory formulation of cooperation between NATO and the EU. For the former one, declaration of Petersberg Tasks was showing that, in line with the new security threats in the post-cold War era, the major policy objectives of the EU related to its security and defence were preventing conflicts and managing crises with its all possible instruments in its toolbox. This was important in the sense that given the EU's strong commitments to stability and international cooperation and considering the widespread nature of violent conflicts, prevention of conflicts turning into violent forms started to become the central goal of the EU member countries. As for the formulation of cooperation between NATO and the EU, in view of the Western European countries' defence policy objectives, institutionally, NATO-WEU-EU triangle was suffering from important problems. As Jolyon Howorth noted briefly that, first of all, "WEU was too insignificant an institution to be trusted to carry out EU military operations". Secondly, not clarified EU-WEU political relationship "failed to demonstrate who owned this political process" and finally, "the mechanism that Berlin Plus introduced was extremely difficult to nail down" (Howorth, 2005:185).

Until 1998 the defence issue in the EU remained out of its immediate agenda and the institutional and instrumental innovations namely, NATO-WEU-EU triangle to carry out Petersberg tasks, were not operationalized. Also, the Treaty review that was completed in Amsterdam in 1997, entered into force in 1 May 1999, brought only marginal changes related to defence. The attempt of some member states to integrate WEU into the EU was failed and it was agreed that the Union could "avail itself (rather than requesting) the use of the WEU's capabilities (Missiroli, 2006a). However, in relation to the conflict prevention capacity of the EU, Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Petersberg tasks and in this way broadened the scope of the CFSP. Besides, in view of conflict prevention capacity of the EU, institutionally two

important changes took place. First of all, a new post of High Representative for CFSP was created. The role of the High Representative who was to be a Secretary General of the European Council were “assisting the Council in matters falling within the scope of the CFSP and contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions” at the request of the Presidency, act on behalf of the Council”(Duke, 2003: 98). Secondly, under the EU General Secretariat, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which would be overseen by High Representative, was established. This unit was of crucial importance considering the development of conflict prevention capacity of the EU. One of the most important tasks assigned to this novel unit was providing timely assessment and early warning of events, potential political crises, and situations that might have significant repercussions for the CFSP. Moreover, the PPEWU was assigned to produce reports including reasoned policy options for the European Council at the request of either the Council or the EU Presidency. Although it was a modest attempt, this was an overt effort for institutionalizing conflict prediction and early warning capacity to identify trouble spots in the context of CFSP.

3.4 Saint-Malo Declaration and Establishment of the Defence Arm of the EU

Saint-Malo Declaration has been one of the most crucial turning points in the evolution of the CFSP. Moreover, because the EU’s conflict prevention efforts require military instruments to back up the civilian preventive activities of the EU, Saint-Malo Declaration and the decisions taken in the subsequent European Council meetings opened a new era in terms of the EU’s conflict prevention capacity. As Simon Duke rightly emphasizes that the development of the ESDP changed the context and led to the “securitization” of the EU programs directed to prevention of violent conflicts (Duke, 2004: 120). To be explicit, the diplomatic and economic instruments such as development aids, association agreements, trade agreements,

sanctions, even offering a membership prospect started to be measures applied for enhancing security of the EU although they were mainly economic means before (Duke, 2004: 120). In this new era, considering the developments in the field of defence, the EU could dare to overtake military and police missions in different parts of the world. However, developing the military capabilities brought additional questions related to closing the gap between expectations and capabilities as well as the questions related to extending the scope of preventive activities beyond Petersberg Tasks which was limited to humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.

In December 1998, in the midst of Kosovo Crisis, at an Anglo-French Summit in Saint-Malo, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac released a common declaration stating that “Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” with member governments operating “within the institutional framework of the European Union” (Saint-Malo Declaration, 1998). Basically, the objective of the St. Malo Declaration was to enable the EU to act without US participation by creating an operational European defence capability. However, the decision-making procedure was still based on intergovernmentalism and the primary position of the NATO was still prevalent in Europe concerning defence matters. As for practical issues, St. Malo initiative was noting the necessity of creating European strategic air transport, satellite, reconnaissance, policy planning and military early warning unit, European-led intelligence-gathering and capacity to analyze information (Forster and Wallace, 2000: 486).

The very basic idea behind the St. Malo compromise between the pioneers of Atlanticists and Europeanists, namely Britain and France, was to prevent future Rwandas, Bosnias and Kosovos. Considering the destabilizing and widespread effects of these conflicts

Britain and France agreed on the EU to take an autonomous defence role (French position) but by not duplicating the NATO's basic functions (British position). Because the St. Malo Declaration was just a joint statement between Britain and France, the embracement of this declaration by the Union had to wait until Cologne European Council in 1999. In Cologne, the wording of the St. Malo Declaration was completely adopted and the EU's military role in international crises "without prejudice to actions by NATO" was stressed again (Cologne Presidency Conclusion-Annex-III, 1999). As mentioned before, St. Malo Declaration and its adoption in Cologne, because it opened the way for a military role for the EU, was a crucial turning point in the evolution of the CFSP. However, it was also a turning point for the conflict prevention efforts of the EU because of the fact that the terms of "conflict prevention" and "crisis management" were first articulated in official EU documents (Missiroli, 2000: 2). In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, EU member states decided to add new military capabilities and form new institutions within the field of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) entitled "Helsinki Headline Goal". In detail, the member states agreed that "cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able by 2003, to deploy, within 60 days and to sustain at least for one year, military forces up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks". Besides, it was also decided to establish new EU bodies to manage ESDP, namely Political and Security Committee which consists of national ambassadors and prepares the meetings of foreign and defence ministers of members states by helping to formulate EU external policies; Military Committee consisting of senior military officers and make recommendations to the PSC on military matters; Military Staff composed of national military officials and provide military expertise for the EU-led crisis management operations (Helsinki Presidency Conclusions, 1999).

When we came to 2001, one thing was obvious that the lessons of Kosovo crisis fueled the developments related to improving the EU's capacity to tackle future conflicts. As it was also noted in several reports of the Secretary General of the UN, the EU member states figured it out that if they had acted earlier in conflicts, they could have made a difference by reducing the large scale of human suffering. Moreover, they could have protected their investments and development aids which were wiped out by the civil war in a very short time period. In Rummel's words, cost of doing "too little, too late" required the EU to establish a more effective conflict prevention policy (Rummel, 2003: 5). Hence, in the early 2000s, the heads of state and governments assigned foreign policy bodies of the EU to the task of developing a conflict prevention policy. In two years, three important policy papers intertwining with the efforts of the UN Secretary General to attract more attention on the importance of conflict prevention were prepared. These were Joint Report of the High Representative and the EU Commissioner for Foreign Relations (November 2000), Communication of the European Commission on Conflict Prevention (April 2001), and the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (June 2001), passed by the European Council during the Swedish Presidency. In the surge towards establishing a EU conflict prevention policy, although prepared by different bodies, the papers shared and emphasized three important points. First of all, the policy papers were noting that the EU should improve the capacity to be pro-active in conflict cases. Because of its mainly reactive stance during the Yugoslav wars, these papers considering the lessons learned from those cases were stressing the importance of being proactive in its conflict prevention activities. The second common point in those policy papers was to use the broad range of instruments in a more coordinated and coherent manner. In other words, integrating development, trade and humanitarian instruments with CFSP instruments (such as political dialogue, sending special envoys, imposing arms embargoes or diplomatic sanctions) and civilian and military crisis

management instruments (conducting police missions, providing teams of judges or deploying troops in conflict areas). Finally, the emphasis on international cooperation was one of the main pillars of those three policy papers. In this regard, it was noted that the EU was ready to build and sustain effective partnerships with the third parties who share basic principles stated in the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter.

In the line of those policy papers, in order to enhance the civilian dimension of the ESDP so as to strengthen the EU in the field of conflict prevention, in 2001, European Council agreed that EU should improve its capacity and provide additional resources for civilian crisis management operations. To this end, the EU should establish a police force up to 5000 officers, including 1000 deployable within thirty days; a team of judges, prosecutors and other legal experts; and a group of civilian administrators (Dinan, 2005: 599). Accordingly, the EU set another goal after the Helsinki Summit in order to improve its conflict prevention and crisis management capacity.

In 2003, in the light of these developments and after solving the problem related to EU's use of NATO assets and capabilities, European Union launched its first peace-keeping mission composed of 357 troops in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia). During this mission, although the EU faced a challenge in September 2003 because of growing unrest in the Northern part of the country, it could re-establish the order. Once it was understood that the conflict in Macedonia had not been military but criminal, in December 2003 operation Concordia was replaced with a police mission called Proxima. The Concordia was the first case to test the recently agreed procedures related to every aspect of a military operation. In this operation, the EU took the mission over from the NATO and used NATO assets. However, in the same year, the first autonomous operation (Artemis) of the EU was launched. In this operation, almost 2000 troops from 13 different countries predominantly composed of French soldiers were deployed in the Democratic Republic of

Congo. The success of this operation showed that the EU could cope with challenging peace-keeping missions which are quite far away from Europe. Again in 2003 EU Police Mission (EUPM) was launched but the more challenging mission related to Bosnia launched one year later. In December 2004, the EU launched Operation Althea which was composed of 7000 troops taking over the mission of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This mission is still going on and this has been the most ambitious military operation to date. Currently, the EU carries out many police and peacekeeping missions including many areas such as Europe, Middle East, Caucasus and Great Lakes region and all of these missions considering the limitations of the EU shows us that the European Union has the capacity to deal with the both military and civilian dimensions of crises management missions (Giovanni et al. 2004).

There were promising events in 2003 in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management as noted above, nevertheless it was also the year within which the Member States had to face Iraqi question which became a dividing issue among the Members of the EU. Once again the EU was witnessing discordance in the views of its Europeanist and Atlanticist members. While France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg were opposed to a military occupation of Iraq, the Atlanticists led by Britain were in favor of the US position insisting on the military operation in Iraq. Inevitably, Iraqi question hindered the further developments in the CFSP and strengthen the intergovernmental sentiments in the EU related to external policy. This event again raised the criticisms that the EU Member States have lack of common interests and priorities in the face of conflicts.

Fortunately and timely, in 2003, the ESS which was prepared by the so-called Mr. CFSP (Javier Solana) set out the common threats and strategic objectives and the political implications of the new security environment prevailing in the world. The ESS called for a an assertive EU foreign and security policy, including the possible use of military force, by

identifying five key threats; terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. In the light of these key threats, it was noted in the ESS that ‘conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’ (European Security Strategy, 2003:6) In this respect, the adoption of the ESS in 2003 by the Member States was a step to harmonize the different views of the current and future member states without falling into lowest common denominator rhetoric (Howorth 2004: 195).

In this framework, it is also worth to mention the changes introduced in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (hereafter Draft Constitution) associated with the conflict prevention capacity of the EU. Although it has not been able to enter into force, as the first innovation, in the Art.III-309 of the Constitution, the idea was to extend the Petersberg Tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks for combat forces including peace-making and post conflict reconstruction. Secondly, an institutional position which is incorporating the two current positions (Secretary of Council and the External Relations Commissioner), appointment of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs was introduced. The Minister, also being a Vice-President shall be responsible for handling and coordinating the external relations of the Union. This is of crucial important considering the need for the consolidation of a institutionalized and coordinated approach for the prevention strategies of the EU (Draft Constitution, 2003, Art. III-210(1)). In this way, the ESS, Draft Constitution and relative success of the police and peace-keeping missions furthered the possibility of more cooperation in the field of foreign policy, despite the negative impacts of Iraqi crises.

Currently, as for the latest developments in the field of conflict prevention policy of the EU”, Member States in view of the lessons learned from the police and peace keeping missions paid more attention to enhancing both military and civilian capabilities of the EU. To this end, in June 2004 at the European Council meeting adopted new “Headline Goal

2010” (HG 2010). Built on the Helsinki Headline Goal, HG 2010 commits the Union to be able tackle crises with rapid and decisive action by applying all its instruments in a coherent and effective manner. In this framework, in order to achieve interoperability, deployability and sustainability, Member States identified particular time frames for the objectives to be fulfilled. For example, it was decided to establish a European Defence Agency by 2005 in order to support and coordinate the Member States and the Council for improving defence capabilities in the field of crisis management. Another important goal stated in the HG 2010 was to ensure the ability by 2007 to deploy force packages at high readiness broadly based on the EU “battle-groups” concept. Battle groups, composed of 1500 troops and deployed in 15 days, are the smallest self-sufficient military units which can combat in jungle, mountain or desert conditions. The first few battle groups started to be established in 2005. In December 2005, the European Council also adopted Civilian Headline Goal 2008. In the same logic of the HG 2010, some certain objectives were set in order to extend the EU’s civilian conflict prevention capacity. One of those objectives was, for example, to establish Civilian Response Teams composed of 100 experts which are to be deployable within five days. Hence, with the new “HG 2010 “ and the “Civilian Headline Goal 2008” the EU committed itself to enhance its civilian and military capabilities in order to take over the responsibility of future crisis missions in an effective manner.

Finally, for the future projects of the EU concerning its conflict prevention efforts, one of the issues discussed is to launch a police mission in Kosovo after the status of the territory has been decided. However, as it was stated in *Euobserver* that “any security mission in the region is likely to put a serious strain on the EU’s finances and it was expected to be most expensive mission of the EU has ever undertaken.” (Euobserver, 2006b) Also, although the leading country has not been determined yet, most of the EU member countries gave the

green light for EU operation in the summer of 2006, with the request the UN in order to secure the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Euobserver, 2006c).

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the evolution of the EU conflict prevention policy in the framework of the CFSP was elaborated on step by step. Starting from the late 1960s the base for a conflict prevention policy started to be prepared in the form a political cooperation. The dense network of the relations among member states created a culture through the informal EPC process. Although, it was marginal in terms of its outcomes, it paved the way for the establishment of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty. After the end of the Cold War, there was a sea change in the security understanding in the international arena. Instead of a territorial defence logic, coping with the asymmetrical threats such as regional conflicts, terrorism and organized crime became the major elements of the security agenda. Given the widespread nature of intra-state conflicts and detrimental effects of Yugoslavian wars the EU stepped forward in its foreign and security policy in specific reference to prevention of violent conflicts. The endorsement of Petersberg Tasks and Berlin Plus arrangements to operationalize NATO-WEU-EU triangle to manage crises in which the NATO is not engaged as a whole were the concrete efforts to integrate the positions of the Member States in order to manage violent crises. However concerning the decision making processes and the delicate balance between Atlanticists and Europeanists, the intergovernmental nature of the decision making related to foreign and security policy issues went on being prevalent. The Saint-Malo Declaration became a milestone in the efforts of establishing a conflict prevention policy with its special emphasis on conflict prevention and establishment of the defence arm of the EU. This compromise opened the way for autonomous EU crisis management operations to deal with future Bosnias or Kosovos. In the early 2000s, three specific policy papers prepared

concerning the conflict prevention capacity by different foreign policy bodies of the EU. The common points shared in those three papers were the importance of improving the capacity to be pro-active in conflict cases, the use of broad range of instruments in a more coordinated and coherent manner and finally the necessity of international cooperation. In the meantime, the institutional and instrumental aspects of the conflict prevention policy were kept on being developed. The Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff, the PPEWU along with military and civilian Headline Goals were the outcomes of the early 2000s in which the conflict prevention policy gained impetus. However, in 2003 the Iraqi crisis, one more time showed the limits of the cooperation among Member States and exemplified the differentiation of interests. Fortunately, the timely adoption of the ESS and subsequent events such as successful completion of peace-keeping operations carried the attentions away from the strict limitations imposed on cooperation by Iraqi crisis.

In conclusion, so far, despite the limitations it faces concerning the different interests of Member States in some cases, the experience of the last three decades in establishing communication channels to discuss foreign and security policy issues and the current developments in specific reference to the conflict prevention of the EU, we can argue that in the post-Cold War security environment EU has emerged as an important conflict prevention actor which can make positive contribution in prevention of violent conflicts.

CHAPTER IV

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BOSNIA AND KOSOVO CASES: LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLIED?

4.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pre-Conflict Preventive Efforts of the EU

4.1.1 General Situation

The role of the EU during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina displayed a gradual erosion till the signature of Dayton Agreement in November 1995. During the first months of early 1991 when Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that it was the “hour of Europe”, the EU seemed quite ambitious that it committed itself to prevent conflict turning into violent form not only in Bosnia, but in Slovenia and Croatia as well. However, several break-up of cease-fires and failure of Hague Peace Conference in 1992 caused EU’s primary role to melt down and caused the UN to come into picture. London Conference and Geneva Talks in 1992 which was culminated in Vance-Owen Plan aiming at reaching a peaceful settlement of the problems were sponsored under the joint auspices of the EU and the UN. However, 1992 was still not the year for the settlement of the dispute. Finally, in 1994 Contact Group composing of five states including the United States, Russia Britain, France and Germany set up and the role of the EU was more or less set to aside. Finally, in 1995 “the hour of the US” came and after the NATO air strikes against Serbs at Dayton Airbase in Ohio the settlement, final compromise was established between Serbs and Muslim-Croat camp (Juncos, 2005: 95).

It seems quite reasonable to argue that events that take place in Bosnia in the early 1990s cannot be isolated from the overall process of the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1990, after the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the democratic elections held in Slovenia and Croatia brought nationalist and independence-minded governments to the power. Just one year later, after the referendum held in Slovenia

on 22 December 1990 in favor of Slovenian independence, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991 and started to seek for recognition in the international community (Zucconi, 1996: 239). However, this process of declaring independence by Croatia and Slovenia fuelled the flames between the central government dominated by Serbs and independence seeking countries in Yugoslavia. Accordingly, both in Croatia and Slovenia, Yugoslav army and army supported Bosnian Serbs started to fight against Croats and Slovenes.

It was obvious that the process of seeking for independence by Croatia and Slovenia would have spill-over effects on the other republics of Yugoslavia. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was a multi-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia, it was extremely hard to stay away from the flames of ongoing tensions between central government dominated by Serbs and independence seeking republics in Yugoslavia. In this context, it was almost obvious that there would be serious tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina which could easily turn into violent conflict considering the 43% Muslim, 31% Serb and 17% Croat composition of Bosnian society (Woodward, 1995: 154).

Efforts of the EU in preventing a possible violent conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina started indirectly in the context of preventing the dissolution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the first years of the tensions in Yugoslavia, the EU was ambitious to assume the leadership for bringing the conflict under control, thwarting the dissolution of Yugoslavia and being active in reaching a compromise between conflicting parties (Caplan, 1998: 747, Woodward, 1995: 275, Gow, 1997: 50). This was basically stemming from two sets of factors. The first factor was that considering the relative discordance among the EU members during the Gulf Crisis, Yugoslav Crisis was to be the real case that the EU could show itself and play a major and even primary role to prevent conflicts to turn into violent forms. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was also in the immediate vicinity of the EU which meant that in

case of a violent conflict, it could not only damage Yugoslav people, but it could damage through its financial and humanitarian costs (slowing down of trade relations, distortion of investments, ethnic cleansing, refugee problems and illegal trafficking of weapons) Europe as well. Considering the detrimental effects of dissolution of Yugoslavia, there was even an excitement to involve in dealing with the case and bringing it under control (Zucconi: 1996: 271). In this context, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg (Jacques Poos) representing the EU Presidency, for example, was not hesitating to be assertive and announcing that “this is the hour of Europe” meaning that it was not the hour of US this time.(Zucconi, 1996: 207). The second factor that left enough room for undertaking a primary role of the EU in the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis was the disinterest of the US (Lucarelli, 1997: 36). There were three factors calling for the US unwillingness to intervene in Yugoslav case. The first one was that Yugoslavia was not carrying the same strategic importance as it was during the Cold War. While Yugoslavia’s unity was of crucial importance during the Cold-War era in order for the containment of the USSR, after the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia was no longer affecting vital American interests. Similarly, as the second reason, some top US officers were suspicious about America’s ability to influence effectively the course of internal developments in Yugoslavia (Touval, 1996: 408). As Hollbrooke noted that some people were arguing that the US could even engage in Vietnam-like quagmire (Hollbrooke, 1999: 360). Furthermore, an embroilment in Yugoslavia could necessitate military intervention which would hardly take support in public opinion. As the last reason concerning for the US reluctance in engagement, West Europeans’ willingness to bringing under control the Yugoslav conflict at first place also led less US role in the beginning of the conflict. Considering the fact that %40 of Yugoslavia’s trade is with the EU countries and %5 with the US, it was plausible for the US policy makers to leave the stage to West European countries to prevent the conflict turning into violent form (Touval, 1996: 409). Similarly the UN,

NATO and especially CSCE was involved in the conflict but the primary role of the EU in the beginning of Yugoslav conflict in international community in terms of trying to exert influence on the course of the events was prevalent.

In this international context within which the US was reluctant to engage in Yugoslav conflict in a full-fledged manner and the EU's eagerness was obvious, the EU undertook several initiatives to bring the conflict under control. When the EU, which had 12 members in those years, started to deal with Yugoslavian conflict directly in 1991, the main aim of the EU was to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia. To this end, in March 1991 the EU "troika" composed of present, past and coming foreign Ministers of the Presidency of the European Union namely, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands visited Belgrade to reach a cease-fire between clashing camps, namely Croats, Slovenes and Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The troika came with a three point plan. In line with the idea of maintaining the unity of Yugoslavia, the plan called for the a) resolution of the presidential crisis, b) suspension of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia for a period of three months and c) Yugoslav Army's return to its barracks (Gow, 1997: 51). Although, any of the three objectives could not be realized, in order to support the very idea of the unity of Yugoslavia, in May 28-29, EU Commission President Jacques Delors and Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer, President of the European Council, visited Belgrade and reiterated the position of the EU. Along with diplomatic efforts, the EU also used its economic instruments conditionally so as to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Hence, between from 1990 to May 1991 the EU provided a total of 3.6 billion ECU which was more or less equal to 4.5 billion US\$. Moreover, the EU also proposed to open negotiations to conclude an association agreement and to improve its economic relations if Yugoslavia tried for resolving its internal problems and remained a single state (Touval, 1996:406) Finally, on 7 July 1992, after the suspension of financial aids and imposing arms embargo on Yugoslavia on 5 July, (with the

backing of CSCE) the EU could achieve to bring conflicting parties around the table in the island of Brioni. Through Brioni Agreement whose peace conditions were determined by the EU, the conflicting parties accepted that a “new situation” emerged in Yugoslavia and this must be negotiated considering all aspects of it. Moreover, they (Slovenia and Croatia) also announced to postpone the implementation of their independence declarations (Zucconi, 1997: 242). And finally, in order to bring deteriorating military situation under control, the EU gained the agreement of the parties to accept a small team of observers (European Community Monitoring Mission) composed of 50 observers to be deployed in Croatia and Slovenia in July 1991. In this way, a road to a peace conference which would enable the conflicting parties to discuss crucial issues was opened. The organization of the Peace Conference decided in Brioni Agreement was taken up by the EU. To this end, in its August 27 and September 3 meetings of the EPC, the EU drafted the mandate of the peace conference. There were specifically two general principles in the EPC’s draft for the Peace Conference. First one was that there should be no unilateral change of borders by force and the second was the protection of the rights of the all people in Yugoslavia (Zucconi, 1996: 242).

The first peace conference in the 1990-1995 period opened at Hague on 7 September which was aiming at finding solutions to constitutional and territorial problems among the conflicting parties. Hague Conference was headed by Lord Carrington who was a former Secretary General of the NATO. The conference at Hague and its outcomes were of crucial importance for the forthcoming problems in Bosnia.

4.1.2 Preventive or Fuelling Recognition: Path to the Outbreak of Bosnian War

Although light Bosnian Serb attacks started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early September 1991, especially in the western part of the Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina started to attract

attention of the international community and specifically of the EU, after the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia started to be pushed by Germany which marked a sea-change in the position of the EU formerly adhering to the unity of Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995: 276).

During the Hague Peace Conference, main position related to the recognition of conflicting parties was the settlement of this issue in a general peace framework. This was specifically stated on 4 November 1991 in a declaration by the Peace Conference that recognition would be granted in the framework of a general settlement (Zucconi, 1996: 244). In line with the declaration of Hague Peace Conference, on 8 November 1991, the EU in an EPC meeting declared that recognition could only be considered in the framework of a general settlement. Furthermore, Lord Carrington could persuade Milosevic on 4 October on the basis of the independence of those wishing it in the framework of a general settlement of the conflict (Gow, 1997: 55). However, in contrast to those promising developments in November and October, on 16 December 1991, in the EPC meeting, the twelve EU countries adopted a common position with regard to the recognition Yugoslav republics (Declaration on Yugoslavia, 1991). The contradictory point in this adoption was that although the EU reached a compromise and declared on 8 November that recognition of republics should be considered in the framework of a general settlement, on 16 December it was announcing that it was ready to recognize Yugoslav Republics if they met certain criterion although the constitutional and territorial issues were still on the table. Accordingly, this was changing the main axe of its policy of preserving unity in Yugoslavia towards the recognition of Republics in Yugoslavia meaning the end of maintenance of Yugoslavia. Indeed there were two interrelated factors explaining this sea change. First one is that the German policy of “preventive recognition”(Vayrynen, 1997) and second was the protracted attacks of Serbs and Yugoslav army along with several signing and breakings of cease-fire agreements (Zucconi, 1996: 246).

Germany was the major driving actor in bringing up the issue of recognition of Yugoslav republics in specific reference to Slovenia and Croatia. Main argument behind the German position was the fact that prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would make the conflict international and thereby open the way for a greater international involvement without permission of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it could be a big stick to stop Serbian aggression towards Slovenia and Croatia (Gow, 1997:169, Lucarelli, 1997: 37). The change in the German position related to recognition was noticeable starting from September 1991. Even in July 1991, both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Dietrich Genscher were strongly denouncing Yugoslav Army's offensive behavior and were arguing that the German unification was an act of self-determination and if they wouldn't consider the right of self-determination of Slovenia and Croatia then they would lose their political and moral credibility (Lucarelli, 1997: 36). Furthermore, considering the fact that more than three hundred thousand refugee flow in the first year of the war along with many guest workers from Slovenia and Croatia living in Germany, it was hard to leave the topic in Germany out of the top issues of political agenda. Hence, there was also a great impact of the domestic political pressure on Kohl and Genscher. The partner of the coalition German Christian Social Union and also German Social Democratic Party were in favor of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as soon as possible. In addition to this, media was not out of the picture and major daily newspapers especially *Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Bild* were pushing for the recognition (Touval, 1996: 410). As a matter of fact, not only the conjectural but historical and bilateral relations between two republics and Germany were helping to explain German position as well. As Touval argued that Germans and also Austrian officials were socialized in a culture within which the blame for the Balkan instability in the last hundred years especially considering the detrimental effects of World War I on Germany and Austria was put on Serb nationalism. Also, German officials were

thinking that the others who are not close to Balkans were far from figuring out the dynamics of Balkans in comparison to Germany. As a result of all these reasons, Germany became the ardent supporter of the recognition policy of the EU and its pushing culminated in the 16 December EPC Declaration on Yugoslavia (Touval, 1996: 411).

The second reason pushed in the formalization of the EU's "recognition policy" towards Yugoslavian republics was the several signings and break of cease-fires and the crystallization of the idea among the members of the EU that Serbs were the major aggressors of the conflict. By the end of 1991 there were 14 cease-fires announced and broken (Lucarelli, 1997: 39). And in the eyes of the EU countries, those cease fires were no longer considered to be important because of continuing attacks dominantly by Serbs and Yugoslav Army. For this reason, although from the very beginning important powers of the EU including France and Britain were supporting the unity of Yugoslav federation, in time they and the other member states shifted their position close to recognition. While at the beginning, because of its historical ties with Serbs going back to Napoleonic era and its own belief of the merits of "state centric approach", France was supporting the idea of unity of Yugoslavia (Touval, 1996: 411). Moreover, Britain, France and the Netherlands were opposed to recognition policy on the ground that it would torpedo the Hague Peace Process and render it ineffective (Lucarelli, 1997: 41). Britain's position on Yugoslav conflict was in line with the conservative position of the France oriented to the unity of Yugoslavia and this conservation was strengthened because of the concerns of the UK in regard to its domestic problem of Northern Ireland. Since direct military or diplomatic intervention which could bypass Yugoslav government would have repercussions of its Northern Ireland policy, the UK was cautious about the immediate recognition and supporting the idea of maintaining the unity. However, in time the increasing humanitarian costs of Serb attacks paved the way for the crystallization of the idea among the other member states that recognition could be a

viable idea to stop violence within which Serbs were held as the responsible party (Gow, 1997: 56).

Having the agreement reached at 16 December by the EU member states, as stated in the Declaration on Yugoslavia, they invited all Yugoslavian Republics which met criterion stated in the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”⁸ to state their recognition demands by 23 December 1991 (Declaration on Yugoslavia, 1991). Accordingly, the Republics who were found by the Arbitration Commission⁹ meeting the criterion of recognition would be recognized. In the Opinions given by Arbitration Commission, Slovenia and despite its problems regarding minority right issues Croatia were recognized. Not interestingly, apart from the eleven other Member States of the EU, without waiting for the Opinion of the Arbitration Committee on 23 December 1991 Germany recognized Croatia and Slovenia. However, in terms of recognition the most controversial issue became the recognition of Socialist Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina (SBRH). In its Opinion 4 Arbitration Commission stated that

In these circumstances the Arbitration Commission is of the opinion that the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established. This assessment could be reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried out under international supervision” (Arbitration Commission Opinion 4, 1991).

⁸ ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ was adopted 16 December 1991 by the EU Member States. They stated following guidelines on the formal recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, namely, respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights: guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes. Available at <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art6.html#TopOfPage> accessed on 10 May 2006.

⁹ Arbitration Commission was a advisory body during Hague Peace Conference which was responsible for advising the parties in constitutional and legal aspects. The head of the Arbitration Commission was Robert Badinter who was a French judge and for that reason the Commission was also called Badinter Commission.

In short, the recognition of the Bosnia was left to the referendum which should be held in the end of March 1991. However, in the early January of 1992, Bosnia Herzegovina was like squeezed in a press machine and ready to blow up. It was obvious that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would have repercussions on multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since a cease-fire achieved with the initiatives of UN officer Cyrus Vance on 2 January 1992 and Slovene and Croat recognition was granted by the EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina started to be the new arena in Serbs' efforts to stop the momentum of break up of Yugoslavia. Considering almost 32 per cent Serb population in Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbs thought that they had a lot to say and demand (Woodward, 1995: 276). In this sense, in February 1992 Serbian Democratic Party had declared that they would boycott referendum. In addition to this, Serbs were preparing themselves for armed confrontation in Mostar and in the western villages of Bosnia Herzegovina to where many Serbs came as refugees. At the same time, Croatian leader Franco Tudjman, after gaining independence and recognition has turned its attention to Bosnian Croats and mobilizing them to proceed in his national vision. To this end, he arranged a coup in the Bosnian wing of his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which was the ruling party of Bosnian Croats. In this way Tudjman replaced pro-Bosnian leader Stephan Kljuic with Mate Boban who more prone to nationalist agenda of Tudjman. All in all, in the first months of 1991 Bosnia Herzegovina was being squeezed by Serb nationalism on the one hand and Croatian nationalism on the other (Woodward, 1995: 276).

Worse than that, the EU was almost careless in the first months of 1991 concerning the situation in Bosnia. The conditional recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was bound to the referendum in Opinion 4 of Arbitration Commission in turn created a fertile ground for political negotiations in Bosnia but EU didn't undertake such an initiative towards Bosnia. When the referendum which was boycotted by Serbs was held from 28 March to 1

April 1992, the result was 99.7 percent “yes” for independence. However, this result was only announcing the outbreak of serious hostilities in Bosnia Herzegovina (Gagnon, 1994: 163).

4.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Preventive Efforts of the EU

In the aftermath of reaching an agreement in Dayton, Ohio under the auspices of Contact Group and the signature of the Paris Agreement on 14 November 1995, the post-conflict period for the Bosnia conflict started. The General Framework Agreement (Dayton Agreement) bringing the Bosnian war to an end set out the necessary institutional arrangements and necessary aspects of the peace process to be dealt with by the international community.¹⁰ Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement (Civilian Implementation of Peace Settlement) set out that “a wide range of activities including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections” will be necessary to implement civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement (Dayton Agreement 1995, Annex 10, Article I.1). To this end, it was underlined that “considerable number of international agencies and organization will be called upon for assistance” (Dayton Agreement, 1995, Annex 10, Article I.1). Also in the same Annex, a post of “High Representative” to monitor and coordinate the civilian implementation of peace settlement activities was established and he was charged to report the progress of implementation periodically to the UN, the EU, the United States and Russia Federation and other interested parties (Dayton Agreement 1995, Annex 10, Article II.1).

¹⁰ These aspects were listed and explained in the annexes of General Framework Agreement including, military aspects of peace settlement, regional stabilization, inter entity boundary line and related issues, elections, constitution, arbitration, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, commission preserve national monument, establishment of Bosnia Herzegovina public corporations, civilian implementation of peace settlement and international peace task force.

In this framework, namely in the context of Civilian Implementation of Peace Settlement, in December 1995 the EU committed itself to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and adopted a Joint Action to legalize her stance. In this Joint Action, the EU reiterated that she would make her contribution to the implementation of Dayton Agreement not only in the monitoring process, but also by bearing the essential expenditures to facilitate the proper execution of the responsibilities of High Representative (European Council Joint Action, 1995). However, in view of the delicate nature of the peace in Western Balkans and interconnectedness of problems among the countries of the region, starting from 1996, the EU started to deal with establishing a regional approach towards that region as well as trying to help Bosnia's recovery in the framework of Dayton Agreement. In this regard, in the post-conflict period of Bosnian war, the EU pursued a binary strategy to promote peace and stability.

4.2.1 1996-1999 Period

From 1996 to 1999 the EU assisted the implementation of Dayton Agreement by providing humanitarian assistance through European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), financial and technical assistance through OBNOVA and PHARE programs and by helping to Bosnia in several other sectors, such as economic and social development, justice and home affairs, administrative capacity building, environment and natural resources (Juncos, 2005:96) In this period, through OBNOVA and PHARE, the EU allocated 750.44 € (1995-1999) as financial assistance and 539.33 (1995-1999) as humanitarian assistance to Bosnia Herzegovina (Facts and Figures, 2006). In the same period, together with these bilateral relations the EU also put its efforts strongly in promoting regional cooperation in the Western Balkans which was also one of the basic tenets of Dayton Agreement as set out in Annex 1B (Regional Integration). The first effort to promote regional cooperation of the EU became

Royaumont Process which was initiated just after the signature of Paris Treaty, namely Dayton Agreement on 13 December 1995. Royaumont Process aimed at making a contribution towards the normalization of interstate relations and the support of civil societies in Western Balkans (Ehrhart, 2003: 114). The most outstanding feature of this program was that together with the top-down structure of the Dayton Agreement which aspired to establish peace and stability in post-conflict Bosnia considering several problems of Bosnia, Royaumont Process employed a bottom-up approach by giving support to the establishment of civil society in the countries of the region. However, more important regional approach which was complementing the bilateral approach of the EU towards Bosnia was Stability Pact (SP). The SP was initially planned to be under the auspices of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, yet in time it became an EU initiative. On 10 June 1999, the SP for Western Balkans was adopted in Cologne. In the founding document of the SP, more than 40 partner countries and organizations undertook to strengthen the countries of Western Balkans "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region" (Stability Pact Achievements and Chronology, 2006). Also Euro-Atlantic integration was promised to all the countries in the region. At a summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999, the Pact was reaffirmed and started its activities. The SP was composed of three Working Tables, namely Democracy and Human Rights, Economic Development and Security and works on project based. The SP has been funding many regional projects to promote peace and stability such as Stability and Anti-Corruption Initiative, Investment Compact, Trade Liberalization and Facilitation and Regional Infrastructure (Stability Pact Achievements and Chronology, 2006).

The process of implementation of the Dayton Agreement also marked the institutionalization of an important strategy of the EU to make not only Bosnia, but also the other countries of the region pursue stability and prosperity both at domestic and regional

levels. This strategy of the EU has been “conditionality”. As stated in related Council Conclusions and Commission reports starting from 1996, the EU has based its relations with the countries of the Western Balkans on conditionality. In the Report of the Commission in 1996 and related Council Conclusions of 1996 and 1997, the EU set the criterion for maintaining its relations with the countries of Western Balkans (European Commission, 1996, European Council Conclusion, 1996, Council Conclusion, 1997a, Council Conclusion, 1997b). In the Commission Report of October 1996 and Council Conclusion of April 1997, the EU listed these conditions as the “respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, minority rights and transition to the market economy (which were initially outlined as Copenhagen criterion in 1993¹¹). Some of the conditions have been general and applied to all countries even today as mentioned before and the others were more specific and applied only to certain countries, such as the conditions relating to the obligations arising under the peace agreements for former Yugoslavia”(European Council Conclusion, 1997b). In specific reference to Bosnia in terms of conditionality, the European Commission Report of 1996 stated that the relations between the EU and Bosnia were “contingent upon the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, respect for human rights, in particular the right to return for refugees and displaced persons, the creation of democratic institutions and the implementation of economic reforms” (European Commission, 1996). By the same token, in addition to the general principles of conditionality listed above, Council Conclusion in

¹¹ The Copenhagen criteria are the rules that define whether a nation is eligible to join the European Union. The criteria require that a state have the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, a functioning market economy and that the state accept the obligations and intent of the EU. These membership criteria were laid down at the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, Denmark, from which they take their name.

October 1997 set out additional conditions for Bosnia¹² (European Council Conclusion, 1997b).

To sum up, from 1996 to 1999 the EU developed both a bilateral and regional approach towards post-conflict Bosnia so as to hamper the recurrence of the violent conflict in the region. On the one hand, while the EU was supporting the implementation of Dayton Agreement and providing Bosnia with humanitarian, financial and technical assistance, on the other hand it supported regional approaches such as Royaumont Process and the SP so as to stabilize the country in the long term. In the meantime, the EU also institutionalized its strategy of conditionality and made it as the basis of its relations and assistance for Western Balkans. Nevertheless, in 1999 the EU introduced the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which has been the heart of the contractual relations and the assistance of the EU towards the region and specifically in Bosnia.

4.2.2 1999- 2006 Period

In 1999 the EU pronounced its new strategy for the countries of Western Balkans to reintegrate them into international community and promote long-term peace and stability in the region. This strategy, namely Stabilization and Association Process, was a new one because of the fact it was establishing a new framework for bilateral relations of the EU with

¹² These conditions were “establishment of functioning institutions as provided for in the constitution, and formulation of a foreign trade and customs policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, beginning of a credible process towards free movement of persons, goods and capital within Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperation with the High Representative including on Brcko and evidence of the implementation of a truly unified City Council in Mostar and of effective functioning of the UPFM, and cooperation in the establishment and functioning of the Federation, dismantling of all structures which the OHR judges contrary to the spirit and letter of the GFAP, evidence of cooperation with the International Tribunal, notably in bringing Bosnian war criminals to justice before the Tribunal.”

the Western Balkans countries and creating new instruments to deal with those countries. As part of the negotiations concerning the SP in 1999, the EU leaders also agreed on starting a Stabilization and Association Process with the countries, including Bosnia. So, in the Cologne European Council the EU initiated SAP in 1999 on the basis of economic and political conditionality by putting emphasis on the differentiation of the specific needs of the each country in Western Balkans together with the relations with the entire region (Blockmans, 2004: 309). However, the most attractive and motivating aspect of the SAP was stemming not only from the fact that it was opening the way for contractual bilateral relations with the EU and individual countries of the region, including Bosnia, but also it was introducing the European Union membership perspective at the end of the tunnel. As stated in June Feira European Council Conclusion and reiterated in the Zagreb Summit in November 2000 that all the SAP countries would be potential candidates of the EU (European Commission, Enlargement Key Events 2006).

In this context, the EU and Bosnia relations gained a new impetus and placed on a new framework. The SAP for Bosnia, as in the cases of other countries, was based on 3 important pillars. These were autonomous trade measures, financial assistance and concluding an Association Agreement. In the first pillar, the EU (European Council Regulation, 2000) the EU granted autonomous trade measures to beneficiary countries, including Bosnia to make it possible for nearly all their exports to enter the Union free of duties and any quantitative limits (European Council Regulation, 2000). As the second aspect of the SAP, Bosnia benefited from financial assistance of the EU in the framework of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization (CARDS). Before the SAP was kicked off in 1999, the EU transferred its financial assistance to Bosnia through its PHARE and OBNOVA programs which were essentially designed for the Central and Eastern European Countries. However, in 2000 the EU established CARDS and started to

streamline its financial assistance in several sectors ranging from refugee return and institution building to policing, asylum and migration (European Council Regulation, 2000). In the period of 2000-2006, through CARDS funds EU allocated 502.8 million € and contributed for Bosnia's reconstruction and rehabilitation (Facts and Figures, 2006). Accordingly, Bosnia became the second biggest fund taker from the EU in Western Balkans. The third pillar of the SAP that is concluding an Association Agreement which could open the way for Bosnia's membership candidacy in time, the EU and Bosnia have been experiencing a difficult and uneasy relationships which is still in process. In 2003, the European Commission prepared its "Feasibility Study" which was making an assessment of the EU's capacity to implement an Association Agreement (Key Events, 2006). In the conclusion part of the "Feasibility Study", the European Commission enumerated 16 points that Bosnia should handle so as to start the negotiations of the Association Agreement (European Commission Feasibility Study, 2003).¹³ As a result, after two years of intensive reform process, negotiations of Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia started on 25 November 2005 and it is still an ongoing process.

Beside the SAP which had three aspects, namely autonomous trade measures, financial assistance through CARDS and concluding an Association Agreement, the EU also enlarged its area of involvement in the context of implementation of Dayton Agreement. Despite the fact that the EU engagement to the Dayton Agreement implementation process had only civilian aspects, in time, the EU extended its engagement by taking responsibility in military aspects of the Bosnia post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation project. As a first step of this, in 11 March 2002, the EU adopted a Joint Action so as to launch its first

¹³ These sixteen points are as follows: comply with existing conditionality and international obligations, more effective governance, more effective public administration, European integration, effective human rights provisions, effective judiciary, tackling crime (especially organized crime), managing asylum and migration, customs and taxation reforms, budget legislation, budget practice, reliable statistics, consistent trade policy, integrated energy market, develop the Bosnia and Herzegovina single economic place and public broadcasting.

ever civilian crisis management operation within the framework of the ESDP entitled European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) (European Council Joint Action, 2002a). So, the EU provided a follow on mission to the United Nations International Police Task Force which had been established by the Dayton Agreement. The EUPM, which has been composed of 508 police officers from 33 countries, seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia and Herzegovina ownership in accordance with the best European and international practice. It does so in particular through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. EUPM has five core programs including crime policing, criminal justice, internal affairs, police administration, and public order (Blockmans, 2003: 302). In the same date, the EU adopted another Joint Action and created a new position, namely European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to “overview the whole range of activities in the field of rule of law and will also have authority to give direction, as necessary, to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the EU police mission” (European Council Joint Action, 2002). Moreover, the EU also underlined the fact that by appointing the EUSR the EU “conveyed a clear signal that the future of the country lies in integration into European structures building on the stabilization and association process” (European Council Joint Action, 2002b). Nevertheless, more importantly, considering the military dimension of the EU’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU assumed the responsibility of initiating a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a follow on mission to the SFOR which was led by NATO. As the High Representative of the CFSP Javier Solana stated during the inaugural meeting of the ALTHEA’s launch that the engagement of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a formidable economic commitment to the country, a police mission deployed (EUPM), a solid political relationship (SAP), now completed with the EU military operation ALTHEA (Press Release, 2004). Basically, the ALTHEA aims at providing the secure environment for the

implementation of Dayton Agreement and support the UN High Representative and local authorities, especially in the fight against organized crime (Fact Sheet, 2005). ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO's assets and capabilities (Berlin Plus) and it was composed of 6270 troops (5502 EU troops and 768 non-EU contribution) (EUFOR Troop Strength, 2005).

In the post-conflict period of the Bosnia war, the EU assumed great responsibility and has become the primary actor in many respects. While the EU was carrying out bilateral relations with Bosnia especially after 2000 through the SAP, it has also considered the importance of regional problems and initiated Royaumont Process (1995) and the SP (1999) promoting regional cooperation to tackle with the problems of the region as a whole. Together with this in the framework of Dayton Agreement, the EU has extended its engagement from mere civilian aspect to military dimension too. In this regard, in 2000 the EU launched EUPM and appointed the EUSR to Bosnia Herzegovina. More important than that the EU took over mission of the SFOR in Bosnia and assumed a military responsibility in the region through ALTHEA. Current support of the EU in Bosnia goes on mostly in the fields of reconstruction of infrastructure, democratization, social cohesion and development¹⁴, institution building, economic regeneration, creating a market economy and a vibrant private sector, poverty alleviation through local development measures and humanitarian assistance based on conditionality (EU Delegation to Bosnia, Main Areas of Ongoing Support, 2006). One of the most positive developments for Bosnia Herzegovina regarding its course towards European integration became the kicking off the Association Agreement negotiations which will constitute a contractual relationship and a legal framework in EU and Bosnia relations.

¹⁴ European Parliament Resolution on the future of Balkans ten years after Srebrenica states that economic and "social development is the top priority for the peoples of the region" (Bulletin EU 7/8-2005, <http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200507/p105007.htm>).

Even, in 2006 the EU started to discuss handing of full power from the UN by Bosnia government and taking full responsibility of its own affairs (Euobserver, 2006a).

In conclusion, although the overall picture of Bosnia towards stabilization send positive signals (International Crisis Group Report, 2005, Briefing Paper, 2005), there are still touchy issues which must be tackled and preventive efforts should be maintained. As reviewed in the “2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper” and “Progress Report 2005 for Bosnia”, although there are several promising developments in certain areas including democracy, rule of law, minority rights, return of refugees and displaced persons, cooperation with the ICTY, there seems to be still a lot to do. Among those, economic situation in Bosnia still poses a great challenge in Bosnia Herzegovina. For example, GDP of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still amounted to 60 per cent of the pre-war level and unemployment rate is 40 per cent (Bieber, 2006: 43). Moreover, in contrary to the one of the major objectives of the EU, Bosnia “operates only to a limited degree within the framework of functioning market principles” (Enlargement Strategy Paper, 2005: 18, Bosnia Progress Report, 2005: 26). Furthermore, corruption poses a great challenge to Bosnia government. Another problematic area is related to refugee returns. Although the EU applauds the efforts made by the Bosnia so as to return displaced persons to their homes¹⁵, it also emphasizes the importance of socio-economic integration of returnees now (Enlargement Strategy Paper, 2005: 17). Finally, another difficult issue for Bosnia to tackle will seem to be the implementation of the Police Reform. This issue, which had also been included in the sixteen points of the Feasibility Study in 2003 and which created a problem in regard to the start of Association Agreement negotiations, was finally solved and opened the way for concluding the Association Agreement between the EU and Bosnia. Nevertheless, implementation of the Police Reform which took over the

¹⁵ “Regarding *refugees and displaced persons (DPs)*, by the end of 2004 over one million refugees and displaced Persons had returned to their pre-war homes and municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Bosnia Progress Report, 2005: 26).

rights regarding policing from the constituent bodies¹⁶ and organized it at the state level in Bosnia again will be a delicate process which should be taken into account carefully in the future (Enlargement Strategy Report, 2005:17, Bosnia Progress Report, 2005: 16).

4.3 Kosovo: Pre-Conflict Preventive Activities of the EU in Kosovo

4.3.1 1989-1995 Period

When Yugoslavia entered into the stage of dissolution, Kosovo with its %90 ethnic Albanian population, became not the last step of this process but an early warning signal of the dissolution process per se. Although serious armed hostilities began in the first half of 1998, particularly after Kosovo Liberation Army gained the capability to fight effectively against Serbian forces, the first flames of the conflict were visible in the late 1980s.

Kosovo was an autonomous region according to the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution, but it enjoyed a very extensive autonomy almost that of republics of Yugoslavia had. As it was stated in the Memorandum drafted by Albanian Political Parties and Council for Defence in April 1992, 1974 Constitution gave the autonomy to Kosovo in many fields including self-organization, legislative, executive, jurisprudence, finance, social policy, international relations field and even national security and defence area. Moreover, it was enshrined in the 1974 Constitution that Kosovo was one of the constituent units of Yugoslavia (Weller, 1999: 83). However, in 1988, Serbia started to dominate the institutions of Yugoslav Federation and changed the Federal Constitution unilaterally. Accordingly, through those constitutional changes Federal Government strengthened itself at the expense of regional autonomy which was almost entirely eliminated the autonomous rights of Kosovo gained in 1974 Constitution. In addition to the constitutional modifications related to Kosovo in 1989, one year later on 5 July 1990, Serbian Assembly voted to close Kosovo Assembly permanently and transferred

¹⁶ Constituent bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina are “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and “Republica Srpska”.

its responsibilities to the Serbian Parliament. In time, Serbia furthered its policy of ethnic discrimination in Kosovo's daily life. Some eighty thousand of Albanians were removed from the public office and from important positions in industry. Also, in order to change the demographic balance in the region, Serb settlements in Kosovo were encouraged. And, even Serbia prohibited schooling in the Albanian language and declared Serbian as the official medium in public communications (Political Declaration of Coordination Council of Albanian Parties in Yugoslavia, 1991).

The response of the Kosovo Albanians was relatively moderate and prudent in respect of the unilateral and repressive change in the autonomy of the region by Serbia. While at the political level, the solution of the Kosovo problem sought in peaceful and democratic ways, at the societal level public protests were used as the reflection of the discontentment against Serb dominance. At the political level, the Albanian political parties acted together and took a position of solving the national question of Kosovo in a peaceful and democratic way. In this regard, the Kosovo Political Parties, considering the Kosovo problem in the context of dissolution of Yugoslavia, underlined the importance and the value of international arbitration as the only solution to the problem (Declaration of the Albanians Political Parties of Kosovo, 1990). However, they also underlined the right of self-determination of Kosovo as a constituent unit of Yugoslavia. In this regard, they even considered unification with Albania in case of a change in the external borders of Yugoslavia (Declaration of the Albanians Political Parties of Kosovo, 1990). In line with these declarations, on the 2nd of July 1990 members of the Kosovo Parliament declared independence and on the 7th of December they declared Kosovo a Republic. On the 24th of May in 1991 elections were conducted and Ibrahim Rugova (Democratic League of Kosovo) was elected as the President of Kosovo. At societal level, as a reaction to those constitutional changes and dismissal of almost fifteen thousand ethnic Albanians from state jobs on September 3 in 1990, a general strike took place

in Kosovo and more than two hundred thousand people were participated in those strikes. In the same vein on 13 June 1991, another strike was organized to protest the violence against Kosovo Albanians. In against to the changing of education language Kosovo teachers also protested the imposition of Serbian curriculum (Weller, 1999: 12).

In several reports of CSCE and Conflict Prevention Network three important points were underlined considering the Kosovo problem in the early 1990s. The first point was that while the position of Kosovar Albanians was in favor of independence, Serbian authorities were insisting on the fact that Kosovo should remain an integral part of Serbia (Weller 1997: 104). The second point was that the international community should take into consideration the tension in other parts of the Yugoslavia while dealing with the Kosovo problem. Specifically in the Report of the CSCE Exploratory Mission to Kosovo in 1992, it was stated that together with the problems related to economic difficulties of Serbia, situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had spill-over effects on Kosovo problem (Report of the Exploratory Mission to Kosovo, Weller 1997: 105). And the final point to be underlined was that while Serbian authorities were more inclined to direct talks of the situation between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, the other side, namely, Kosovar Albanians wanted talks under international mediation. In the light of these three points and as pointed out in another CSCE Report on the 6th of December 1992 that “Kosovo could be the possible next area of ethnic war”(Interim Report of Head of Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, 6 December 1992, Weller, 1997: 110), it could not attract direct international attention. In those years the international attention was much more on the parts of Yugoslavia which were already started to burn out. Slovene and Croat independence declarations in 1990 and then Bosnia in 1991 were almost completely dominating the agenda of international community and specifically that of the EU.

In the period starting from 1990 to the outbreak of serious armed hostilities in March 1998, the EU made direct and indirect influences on the Kosovo issue in many ways including its recognition policy towards Yugoslav republics, the EU Conference on Yugoslavia (Carrington Conference-Hague Peace Talks), the imposition of sanctions and embargoes and its efforts to act in coordination with international community (Caplan 1998, Weller, 1997, Weller, 2000, Vayrynen, 2003).

In its extraordinary meeting on 16 December 1991, the EC countries declared the Republics of Yugoslavia which were in compliance with the criterion set out in the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union” to state their recognition demands by 23 December (Declaration on Yugoslavia, 1991). Accordingly, the Republics which were found by the Arbitration Commission meeting the criterion for recognition would be recognized. In its Opinion 1, Arbitration Commission underlined an important point which was crucially important for the Kosovo issue. It was the fact that Yugoslavia was “in the process of dissolution” (Opinion No: 1 of the Arbitration Commission on the Former Yugoslavia, 11 January 1992, Weller, 1997: 81). Considering the Opinion by Arbitration Commission regarding Yugoslavia’s dissolution Kosovor Albanians were hopeful in relation to their pursuant of independence. When they applied for the recognition as an independent state in December 1991, they were rejected by the EU because of the fact that they were not a “republic” in Yugoslavia. However, the position of the EU, namely refusing the independence of Kosovo was far from satisfying Kosovor Albanians. As it was mentioned above, through 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was enjoying more or less a kind of sovereignty and as Caplan puts that Kosovo was all a republic but its name (Caplan, 1998: 748). Kosovo issue was apparently secondary in those times for the EU. It was almost obvious that opening the way for an independent Kosovo was tantamount to opening the same way for Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia which was one of the major concerns of the

international community in those years. In those years as Caplan points out that international community mainly committed itself to the stopping violence in Bosnia (Caplan, 1998: 752).

This secondary place given to the Kosovo issue by the EU at the expense of immediate problems particularly regarding Bosnia was one more time surfaced during the EU Conference on Yugoslavia started at Hague in September 1991. When the first draft Convention was prepared by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia to reach an agreement between conflicting parties, it contained the requirement that “the republics shall apply fully and in good faith the provisions existing prior to the 1990s for autonomous provinces” (Treaty Provisions for the Convention (23 October 1991) cited in Caplan, 1998: 749). In other words, Draft Convention was pointing out to Kosovo and Vojvodina and their pre-1990 enjoyment of extensive autonomous status. However, in order to gain the support of Serbian side for reaching an agreement on the Draft Convention produced by EC Conference in 1991, this article was eliminated. Hence, one more time Kosovo issue was sidelined and treated as a secondary issue in the eyes of the EU countries in comparison to problems in Bosnia and Croatia. In the same vein, the Dayton Agreement in November 1995 did not touch upon the very problem of Kosovo and as Varynen rightly pointed out that it left the problem untouched (Vayrynen, 2003: 57, Caplan, 1998: 750).

4.3.2 Post-Dayton Agreement Period: Watching Kosovo

In the post-Dayton period, in April 1996 the EU decided to extend its recognition to Serbia and Montenegro. However, the EU also underlined several times the necessity of the constructive approach by the Serbia and Montenegro to grant autonomy for Kosovo to normalize its relationship with the EU and international community (Caplan, 1998: 750). But, on 29 February the European Parliament was warning the EU about the likelihood of an armed struggle in Kosovo. For that reason, the European Parliament recommended that “that

full diplomatic recognition of, and the lifting of sanctions on, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be granted only if a full and satisfactory settlement were reached between Mr Milosevic and the elected representatives of the people of Kosovo” (European Parliament, 1996). Moreover, the European Parliament also recommended opening an office in Kosovo. The same request was reiterated when Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro visited the Commission on 26 November 1996 (Visit to the Commission by Mr. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister, 1996). In 1997, when the activities of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which was a militant group resisting against Serbian armed forces, the deterioration of the situation was underlined again and again by the EU institutions. More or less one year before the intensive armed conflict started between Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian armed forces, by condemning the repression on Kosovo the European Parliament strongly recommended the EU Council to make every effort to start negotiations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs and even make this a condition for any future relationship between the EU and Serbia (European Parliament, 1997). By the same token, on 31 July, European Council Presidency Statement was pointing out to the worsening of political and economic climate and rising ethnic tension in Kosovo and Sandjak. Hence, the Council Presidency Statement of 31 July was requesting “all political authorities of the FRY, and particularly the new federal president, Slobodan Milosevic, to demonstrate clearly willingness to take up the political and economic challenges of the moment and to assume the responsibility that this implies” (European Council Presidency Statement, 1997). Also, the European Commission did not renew trade preferences for Yugoslavia in 1997 so as to push Serbia for taking positive steps in Kosovo (Caplan, 1998: 753).

In the post Dayton Agreement period till the outbreak of hostilities in March 1998, the EU tried to impose embargoes and sanctions in accordance with the UNSC Resolutions. Considering the very first stages of Yugoslav dissolution, on 5 July in 1990, the EU imposed

arms embargo on Yugoslavia. However, it had an indirect effect on the Kosovo issue because in those years there were no armed confrontations except some cases of resistance by Kosovo Albanians against police forces. Besides, due to the Serb control over Yugoslav army, Serbian authorities had superiority not only against Kosovo but against all other Republics as well. In the post-Dayton period, the EU did not lift its embargo on arms export considering the safety of the international peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and in some parts of Croatia (Common Position on Arms Export, Weller, 1999: 222) despite the fact that the UN suspended sanctions on 22 November 1995¹⁷ and terminated them on 1 October 1996. Nevertheless, on 9 December 1996, also the EU terminated all restrictions on economic and financial issues on Serbia in order for normalizing its relations with that country.

In March 1998 when the dispute turned into violent armed conflicts between KLA and Serbian armed forces, the EU could only condemn the worsening of situation and by acting in line with the UN¹⁸ and international community and re-imposed embargoes on Serbia and Montenegro by putting restrictive measures, reduction of economic relations and banning of investment in that country so as to isolate her from economic and financial relations with the EU. (Weller 1997:222, European Council Common Position 19 March 1998, European Council Regulation, No: 926/98 27 April 1998, Common Position 7 May 1998, European Council Common Position 8 June 1998)

4.4 Kosovo: Post-Conflict Preventive Activities of the EU in Kosovo

4.4.1 2000- 2006 Period

After seventy seven days of NATO air strikes¹⁹, administration of Serbia and Montenegro had to accept the conditions of international community, previously set out in the Rambouillet Accords in 1997. In order to reconstruct and stabilize the war-ravaged province

¹⁷ UNSC Resolution 1022, 22 November 1995

¹⁸ UNSCR Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998

¹⁹ NATO air strikes (Operation Allied Force) started on 24 March 1999 and ended on 10 June 1999.

Kosovo, international community made a labor of division and assumed necessary responsibilities. This labor of division was outlined by the UNSC Resolution 1244, which was adopted on 10 June 1999. Resolution 1244 gave the military responsibility of establishing and maintaining a secure environment in Kosovo to a NATO-led international force, namely Kosovo Force (KFOR). As for the civilian aspect of the Kosovo reconstruction and stabilization process, with the authorization given by the UNSC 1244, the UN Secretary General launched an interim civilian administration entitled United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was designed to perform several civilian functions such as performing basic civilian administrative functions²⁰, promoting establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies, supporting reconstruction of key infrastructure, promoting human rights and assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo and developing the structures and instruments that form the basis of a competitive, efficient market economy (UNSCR Resolution 1244, 1999). In order to carry out these tasks, the UN made a labor of division among international organizations and designed the UNMIK as a mission which was composed of four pillars²¹. Hence, the UN undertook an unprecedented mission that no other mission had ever been designed in a way that other multilateral organizations were full partners under United Nations leadership (UNMIK Webpage, 2006a).

The EU's involvement in Kosovo in the post-conflict process was formed in accordance with the civilian tasks of the UNSC Resolution 1244. As stated in a European Council Presidency Statement in 2000, the EU stressed "its full support to the UNSC

²⁰ Civilian administrative functions include working closely with Kosovo's leaders and people. The mission performs the whole spectrum of essential administrative functions and services covering such areas as health and education, banking and finance, post and telecommunications, and law and order.

²¹ 1)Police and Justice Pillar (UN leadership), 2)Civil Administration Pillar (UN leadership), 3)Democratization and Institution Building (OSCE leadership), 4)Reconstruction and Economic Development (EU leadership)

Resolution 1244 and its commitment to a multi-ethnic and undivided Kosovo, where all inhabitants can live in a safe and secure environment regardless of their ethnic background” (European Council Presidency Statement, 2000). In order to make a positive contribution to the UNMIK’s mission, the EU took the responsibility of Pillar IV (Reconstruction and Economic Development) of the UNMIK and committed itself to developing necessary structures and instruments that form the basis of a competitive, efficient market economy. However, the EU engagement in Kosovo didn’t remain limited to the UNMIK’s Pillar IV missions. As a reflection of the regional approach started to emerge in 1997 towards Western Balkans and through several other projects and programs the EU has tried to be active in the post-conflict stabilization of Kosovo.

Just like in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the heart of the EU strategy towards Kosovo, there has been Stabilization and Association Process in addition to the assuming the responsibility of the Pillar IV of the UNMIK. In this sense, the EU provided Kosovo with autonomous trade measures, financial assistance and contractual relationships as building blocks of the SAP. As in the case of all other Western Balkans countries, in September 2000 the EU introduced autonomous trade measures for Kosovo too. In this way, the EU provided Kosovo with uniform and wide-ranging free access to the Union’s market for almost all goods. As the second pillar of the SAP, through CARDS the EU has rebuilt houses, boosted energy production and begun the training of family doctors. In addition to this, CARDS has provided loans to farmers and small traders and improved the delivery of public services at municipal level. New programs also covered public administration reform, crime-fighting support to police, tax administration and revenue collection, job-creation and business start-up help to rural economies, and projects to develop civil society. For these projects, the total amount of money allocated by the EU to Kosovo from 2000 to 2006 in the framework of the CARDS is amount to 1,089 billion € in total. However, the total

contribution of the EU in Kosovo including the CARDS, the UNMIK Pillar IV, humanitarian aids and exceptional financial assistance of the EU has been 1,635 billion € which makes the EU biggest donor in Kosovo²² (European Commission Delegation to Kosovo, 2006).

Having mentioned the two pillars of the SAP, it is extremely important to touch upon the third pillar, namely contractual relationship between the EU and Kosovo. For the time being, there is no contractual relationship between the EU and Kosovo. Nevertheless, the case of Kosovo differs from the other countries in terms of EU's policy of concluding an Association Agreement which might then lead to be a potential candidate of the EU for Kosovo. Because of the fact that Kosovo is now an autonomous province governed by the UN in Serbia and Montenegro, there is no such a possibility to carry on talks on concluding an Association Agreement. However, due to the fact that the situation regarding Kosovo's future status might turn into being independent, the EU developed a flexible strategy to make Kosovo benefit from the SAP which is also in line with the UN approach towards Kosovo. To this end, the EU created new bodies and used available instruments of the SAP in compliance with the developments and the requirements of the UNSCR Resolution 1244.

Two of the most important objectives of the Resolution 1244 has been gradually transferring the competencies to “provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self government” and secondly, “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status” (UNSC Resolution 1244, Art. 11,c-d-f). For the former objective, namely authority transferring, the first step was taken by establishing Provisional Institutions for Self-Government (PISG)²³ on 28 February 2002 and many functions of the Special Representative of Secretary General of the UN except external relations and rule of law were transferred to the PISG. In addition to the authority transferring to the PISG by the Special

²² Further details, namely the allocation of funds to specific projects and annual programs of European Agency for Reconstruction which is currently governing CARDS programs for Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo and Former Republic of Macedonia can be found at http://www.delprn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_kosovo/cards.htm

²³ PISG is composed of the institutions Assembly, the President of Kosovo, the Government, the Courts and other bodies and institutions including the Ombudsperson.

Representative of Secretary General, as for the second important objective of the Resolution 1244, namely starting final status talks for Kosovo. The milestone in this process became the “Standards for Kosovo”²⁴ which was agreed between the PISG and the UNMIK on 10 December 2003 in order to kick the final status talks off (UNMIK Webpage, 2006b).

Considering the efforts in the very fields of authority transferring and starting final status talks in Kosovo, as mentioned above, the EU developed a flexible strategy to make Kosovo benefit from the SAP and to this end, the EU created new bodies and adopted new instruments of the SAP to Kosovo. As reiterated in the Thessaloniki Agenda in 2003, the future of Western Balkans including Kosovo would be in the EU. And SAP, which was initiated in June 1999, has been the most important building block of stabilizing the region as a whole and preventing any further turmoil to erupt again. However, in view of the situation of Kosovo which has remained in limbo that is to say between being an independent state or staying autonomous in Serbia and Montenegro, the EU has not been able to start a process to conclude an Association Agreement with Kosovo. The most important reason of this has been the fact that since Kosovo is, for the moment, not an independent but an autonomous province in Serbia and Montenegro, it wouldn't be possible to engage in Kosovo completely in the framework of the SAP. Yet, it was also obvious that for the future stability of Kosovo, it has been crucially important to incorporate her in the mainstream of European integration. In view of the situation of Kosovo, the EU created the “Stabilization and Association Process Tracking Mechanism” (STM) so as to establish a forum for dialogue between Kosovo and the EU. The STM was developed in order to provide the UNMIK and the PISG with the expertise and policy guidance of the EU Commission, with a view to assisting the Kosovo authorities to benefit fully from the various instruments of the SAP (Blockmans, 2004: 315). Together with the STM, the EU also used “European Partnerships” (EPs) so as to keep

²⁴ These standards are functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members, economy, property rights - including preservation of cultural heritage, dialogue and the Kosovo protection corps.

Kosovo in line with the SAP. EPs were inspired by Accession Partnerships²⁵ and they were created in the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. The role of the European Partnerships, updated as necessary, has been to assist the Western Balkans countries in preparing for membership within a coherent framework and in developing plans with timetables including short- and medium term reforms through which they intend to address the requirements for further integration into the EU (European Council Regulation, 2004). For Kosovo, there have been two European Partnerships which were officially designed for Serbia and Montenegro. The first European Partnership was adopted in 2004 and then it was modified in 2006. The most important feature of the European Partnerships in the context of Kosovo has been that they have gone hand in hand with the process of “Standards for Kosovo”, which aims at making Kosovo to start final status talks. Based on the policy of conditionality, European Partnerships puts the “Standards for Kosovo”²⁶ and other detailed priorities, ranging from promoting democracy and rule of law to economy, visa, asylum and culture related issues into a time table to prepare Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo to finalize the SAP with an Association Agreement which might in time lead to EU membership. Consequently, in accordance with the UN bodies in the light of the UNSC Resolution 1244, through its specific bodies and SAP instruments the EU tries to keep Kosovo in the mainstream of European Integration and don’t allow her to lag behind or be disadvantaged in comparison to other Western Balkan countries. Moreover, through the SAP, STM and European Partnerships the EU contribute to the two of the most important tasks outlined in the Resolution 1244 namely, transferring authority to the PISG and starting to final status talks for Kosovo.

²⁵ Accession Partnerships which constitutes a road map for the countries who are to be EU member states

²⁶ Standards for Kosovo was put in the part of short-term Priorities in 2004 European Partnership for Serbia and Montenegro.

One of the most important issues in 2004 became the riots that took place in March in Kosovo. After a four year of stable period the ethnic unrest in Kosovo made a kind of cold shower effect on the international community. The events which started with the founding of a Serbian guy shot in the head, finally culminated in nineteen dead, nearly 900 injured, over 700 Serb, up to ten public buildings and 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed, and roughly 4,500 people displaced (International Crisis Group Report, 2004). The EU, at different institutional levels condemned the March ethnic unrest and urged all parties to stop violence immediately. Moreover, the EP and European Council urged all leaders, in particular the Kosovo Albanian leadership, to take responsibility for the situation and to ensure, through their actions and statements that threats and violence should be ended. Moreover, they also reiterated the fact that extremist forces had no role to play in settling the future of a secure, democratic, prosperous and multi-ethnic Kosovo (European Council, 2004, European Parliament, 2004).

In the light of these developments, finally in 2005 the UN Secretary General, appointed Ambassador Kai Eide to conduct the comprehensive review of the “Standards for Kosovo” (BBC, 2005). After a four month mission of reviewing, in view of the Eide’s report to the UN Security Council, on 24 October the UN Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status (International Crisis Group, 2006). So, in February 2006 the talks for future status of Kosovo started in Vienna between Belgrade and Pristina and as Kofi Annan stated that for Kosovo “the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process” (BBC, 2005). Considering changing circumstances the EU also started to elaborate on the contribution that the EU can make both during and after the status talks for Kosovo in addition to the ongoing commitment of the EU to Kosovo, namely the SAP. In parallel to the Ambassador Kai Eide’s mission in Kosovo to prepare a

report to assess “Standards for Kosovo”, in April 2005, the European Commission also prepared a Communication and underlined the major problems that Kosovo faces and contributions that the EU can make. In this Communication, European Commission pointed out three important areas namely, economic development, institution building and regional integration issues (European Commission, 2005a). In the same year, European Commission also presented 2005 Kosovo Progress Report. In this Report, the Commission made a detailed assessment of Kosovo and evaluated the situation of her in terms of meeting the requirements set out in “Standards for Kosovo” and “European Partnership 2004” (European Commission, 2005b). However, in terms of the evaluation of the future contribution of the EU in Kosovo both during and after Kosovo peace talks, the most important work has become the Joint Report prepared by the High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana and the Enlargement Commissioner Oli Rehn in June 2005 (Joint Report, 2005). The Report noted that Kosovo has entered a new phase and in this new phase it was underlined that only by means of Standards for Kosovo “the paramount objective of building a functioning and viable Kosovo fully integrated in the region can be achieved”. It was also noted that UN-led standards should be framed in the context of the European perspective that Kosovo shares with the rest of the Western Balkans and specific emphasis was made on the European Partnership and the implementation of it by the PISG (Joint Report, 2005). In the same Report, for the post-status talks, Solana and Rehn stressed that whatever the outcome would be, international presence should be maintained and the EU should play a key role in this process. Although it was mentioned that the EU might take on responsibilities in the field of police, rule of law and economics, the same Report also underlined that “the future international civilian presence after UNMIK in Kosovo shall, however, not be EUMIK” (Joint Report, 2005). This report was adopted almost verbatim in June 2005 Presidency Conclusions and formed the basis for the EU position towards the status talks of Kosovo. Finally, in line with the future roles that

the EU could take on in Kosovo, a Joint Action has established a EU Planning Team (EUPT) in 2006 which would ensure a possible transfer of some selected tasks of the UNMIK, for example in the fields of rule of law or police, to the EU (European Council Joint Action, 2006).

In conclusion, as the ethnic unrest in March 2004 showed that Kosovo is still in a fragile situation. In the post-conflict period the EU did not isolate Kosovo from the Stabilization and Association Process which placed in the heart of the EU policy towards Western Balkans. The SAP and UNMIK became the building blocks of the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation process of Kosovo. Finally, in 2006 the final status talks started and the EU reiterated its support for Kosovo and declared that whatever the outcome of status talks, it will be one of the leading actors to stabilize Kosovo in the future.

4.5 Bosnia and Kosovo: Were the lessons of former considered in the latter?

In line with the overall aim of the study this part of the chapter examines lessons drawn from Bosnia by the European Union and whether those lessons were/have been applied to Kosovo or not. Since this study takes the pre- and post-conflict stages into consideration in the context of conflict prevention, this part analyzes those two stages separately.

4.5.1 Pre-Conflict Period

One of the most important lessons drawn from Bosnia for the EU and also for the rest of the international community in terms of effectiveness was that lack of a consistent approach how to deal with a conflict could culminate in not only the loss of credibility but missing many opportunities to prevent that particular conflict as well (Zucconi, 1996: 270, Gow, 1997: 299). In the pre-conflict period of Bosnia case, the EU was far from being consistent in the sense that although on 8 November it was declared that the EU was supporting the unity of

Yugoslavia so as to make its position clear, just a few months later on 16 December 1991 it was declaring that the EU would be ready to recognize Yugoslav Republics which would meet certain criterion set out in the “Guideline on the Recognition of the New States”. This rupture in the EU policy was initiated by Germany and then supported by the other EU member states. Although, the Germany’s main concern was the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the repercussions of this panacea for the multinational Bosnia couldn’t be foreseen unfortunately. Moreover, as Susan Woodward explained that the EU couldn’t put the name what was going on in Bosnia and thus it couldn’t decide how to deal with that (Woodward, 1995: 275). Even after that important sea change, that is shifting its policy from the “unity of Yugoslavia” to the “dissolution of Yugoslavia by means of supporting the independence of Yugoslavian Republics”, the EU couldn’t act in the way its recognition policy entails. To be explicit, although the EU decided on the recognition of Bosnia which was conditional upon the result of the referendum, it was not clear whether the EU was dealing with a dispute which was an external aggression by a state (Serbia) on another independent and recognized state (Bosnia) or it was a “civil war” in a state (Woodward, 1995: 275). Lack of a coherent approach towards Bosnia case made a crucial negative contribution on the effectiveness of the EU in handling Bosnia dispute. In the eyes of the conflicting parties, at least for Serbs, the EU lost its credibility which was concluding its preparations for the EU Conference (Carrington Conference-Hague Peace Talks) in the following months to mediate between conflicting parties. For the Serbian side the EU was amount to a club which was dominated by the Germany having expansionist ideas towards Western Balkans (Lucarelli: 1997: 45).

The lack of a consistent approach issue was not the case for Kosovo dispute. There were two reasons for that. First of all, till 1998 Kosovo was not on the agenda for the EU to tackle with. In other words, Kosovo dispute stayed in the shadow of the already erupted

conflicts in Yugoslavia, namely crisis started to emerge in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. Although the dispute had started in Kosovo in 1989 after the unilateral change of Yugoslav Constitution by Serbs and abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy, it started to attract attention when the KLA started to dominate the scene of the dispute and shifted the resistance from the political ground to the military ground in 1996. As Caplan stated that, Kosovo was obviously neglected by the EU, probably because of its non-violent nature till 1998 (Caplan, 1998: 746). As the second reason, basically, unlike Bosnia case, the EU was not purported to be the primary internal actor in terms of dealing with Kosovo dispute. Especially after 1997, the approach of the EU towards Kosovo conflict stayed in the framework of alleviation of humanitarian crisis and went in line with the international community. This approach was formed around the idea that uncontrolled and disproportioned use of force against Kosovo people should be stopped and the autonomy of Kosovo which she was enjoying should be restored again.

The phenomenon of "neglecting" takes us to another important lesson related to the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts of the EU. When the deterioration of Yugoslav economy was felt strongly in almost all parts of Yugoslavia (Woodward, 2000: 140), Kosovo's autonomy was abolished and Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in 1990, it was almost obvious that these developments would spill over to the other parts of the federation. As an important factor contributing to the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts, considering the above mentioned developments in the early 1990s in Yugoslavia it wouldn't be so assertive to state that there were many signals that were pointing to the likelihood of an outbreak of a conflict in multi-ethnic Bosnia. Moreover, when the EU decided on 16 December to recognize demanding republics by noting the necessary conditions for that, it was an explicit sign that the case in Bosnia would deteriorate considering the close contact between Bosnian Serbs and Serbia which dominated

government institutions of Yugoslavia. In February 1992, Serbs in Bosnia declared that they would boycott the referendum which would take place in the end of March in 1992s and in this way showing their unwillingness to be a part of an independent Bosnia, rather developing close relations with Serbia. However, although the period passed from 16 December 1991 to March 1992 created a fertile ground to start political dialogue between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims and Croats, this opportunity was missed at that time. For all these reasons, two facts were obvious that there were early signals and some opportunities pointing out the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia but the EU didn't take advantage of those signals and opportunities. So, the lesson regarding effectiveness of preventive efforts of the EU in Bosnia was that as well as the early warning signals, early action carries great importance so as to benefit from the opportunities to prevent dispute turning into a violent form. In other words, a gap between warning and response can cause the problem of missing an opportunity and facing harder positions of conflicting parties in the future in comparison to the earlier periods of conflicts.

Although in Bosnia case it was understood that a gap between warning and response causes great problems for the opportunities to prevent conflict, the EU repeated the same fault in Kosovo case again. In comparison to Bosnia, Kosovo's pre-conflict period was longer and relatively it created more opportunities to be influential for the international community, particularly for the EU. However, the EU and also the rest of the international community delayed dealing with Kosovo case in a decisive way till 1998 due to the absence of violent confrontations (Caplan, 1998: 751). Neither in Hague Peace Talks in 1992-93, nor in London Conference in 1994 and nor in Dayton Peace Agreement, Kosovo issue was not elaborated on. As Caplan noted that Kosovo issue remained untouched till 1998 although Kosovor Albanians, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, were trying to protest Serbian dominance just through protests and demonstrations in a peaceful manner in addition to their political efforts (Caplan, 1998: 748). In this regard, early action by the EU could ameliorate the

situation in Kosovo case and could create many opportunities for a political solution of the problem considering the commitment of Kosovo authorities led by Rugova to a democratic and peaceful solution of the problem. The neglecting Kosovo finally culminated in the Kosovo Liberation Army to gain ground in Kosovo population in the face of increasing Serbian oppression.

As another point that can be examined regarding the lessons drawn from Bosnia case could be the attitude that the EU developed in Bosnia in the pre-conflict period. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg declared in 1991 that it was “the hour of Europe”. Taking Bosnia dispute as “the hour of Europe”, in other words not the hour of US in reference to the primary role of the US in the Gulf Crisis in 1990, was simply too ambitious for the EU in the absence of a comprehensive approach towards the Bosnian dispute. Being too ambitious negatively affected the EU’s effectiveness at least in two respects. Considering the complexity of Bosnian dispute and several problems concerning legal, political and territorial issues between Serbs, Muslims and Croats, it was crucially important to coordinate preventive efforts with the other international actors and the EU should especially seek for the the US support in its efforts to increase its credibility and capacity to deal with Bosnia dispute. As Zucconi emphasized that in the pre-conflict case the EU member states “tried to do everything by themselves, although a wide array of instruments and massive intervention was obviously required” (Zucconi, 1997: 271). The second negative impact of being too ambitious on the efforts of the EU to be effective was that the EU was neglecting the fact that in order to change preferences of the conflicting parties, even if it was not going to be used there had to be muscle backing civilian efforts. There was an explicit military imbalance between conflicting parties which was precluding Bosnian Serbs to come to terms with the ideas introduced both during peace conferences and by special representatives. In other words, given the military superiority of Bosnian Serbs over Muslim Bosnians and Croats, it

was notoriously hard to make Bosnian Serbs give up their aggression just through civilian instruments. The military superiority of Serbs was hindering the efforts of the EU to introduce possible solutions to the problem. The dominant perception and expectation on the Serbian side was that there could be no “military enforcement” on Serbs by the international actors trying to prevent the dispute turning into a conflict. Hence, it was not plausible to give any concession, while there were still many opportunities to gain a lot on the battle field. For this reason, in Hill’s words, there was an obvious capability-expectation gap in the case of Bosnia for the EU. Although the EU was strong in the sense that using economic sanctions or suspending aid to Yugoslavia, in military terms the EU didn’t have enough capacity to deter Bosnian Serbs who had the help of the Yugoslav army to attack Muslims and Croats. Moreover, since the military superiority and state institutions were in the hands of Serbs, imposing sanctions were amounting to punishing Muslims and Croats more in comparison to Serbs. To sum up, being too ambitious for the EU brought about negative results on the effectiveness of its conflict prevention efforts in Bosnia and underlined two important lessons again, namely, acting in coordination with the rest of the international community (multiparty intervention) and using wide range of instruments including both civilian and military ones (multifaceted intervention).

In view of these two lessons, namely the importance of multiparty and multifaceted intervention, in Kosovo conflict the EU was not purported to be taking the leadership of the international intervention. The policy of the EU in Kosovo was mostly based on reaction rather than pro-action. As stated in the European Council Presidency Conclusion of 31 July 1997 “all political authorities of the FRY, and particularly the new federal president, Slobodan Milosevic, to demonstrate clearly willingness to take up the political and economic challenges of the moment and to assume the responsibility that this implies” (European Council Presidency Statement, 1997). The EU, in general could only condemn the worsening

of situation and by acting in line with the UN²⁷ and international community and re-imposed embargoes on Serbia and Montenegro by putting restrictive measures, reduction of economic relations and banning of investment in that country so as to isolate her from economic and financial relations with the EU (Weller 1997:222, Common Position 19 March 1998, Council Regulation, No:926/98 27 April 1998, Common Position 7 May 1998, Common Position 8 June 1998).

Eventually, for the pre-conflict period, the EU learned four basic lessons from Bosnia regarding effectiveness and those have been importance of a consistent approach towards conflicts, significance of early warning but more important than that early and timely action, no need to be too ambitious and acting in accordance with the other actors (multiparty intervention) and through relevant combination of tools including civilian and military one (multifaceted intervention). In an overall assessment these lessons of Bosnia were for the most part not considered by the EU in Kosovo case. From the very beginning of Kosovo conflict the EU couldn't develop a coherent and proactive approach to handle the problem. After the dispute had started to escalate into violent forms, EU seemed to be a single voice in view of its of Presidency conclusions, EP Recommendations and Commission Reports in its efforts to stop violence. However, these were far from being effective to prevent conflict because of the fact that they were just aimed at condemning the situation but not offering any substantial contribution for the de-escalation of dispute.

4.5.2 Post –Conflict Period

In the post-conflict period in Bosnia, in order to prevent the relapse of Bosnian conflict, the EU has supported the implementation of Dayton Peace Agreement. However, the EU limited its focus of attention especially on implementing civilian aspects of Dayton Agreement in

²⁷ UNSCR Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998

line with the labor of division outlined by the UN. Hence, in the period of 1996-1999 the EU specifically dealt with rehabilitation of infrastructure, economic reconstruction, promoting rule of law, ensuring minority rights and safe return of refugees and displaced persons. The EU contribution in these areas mostly took place through financial assistance and technical support to the region till 2000. The most important feature of this period was that the EU was contributing to the peace process in the fields within which the EU had good reputation, namely financial assistance, human rights issues and rule of law. In the same vein, in Kosovo, UNSC Resolution 1244 made a labor of division and the EU has taken its responsibility in the field of economic reconstruction, namely, the Pillar IV. However, more importantly, the lessons of Bosnia and in fact overall dissolution process of Yugoslavia caused the EU to shift its reactive conflict prevention policies towards a more coherent and long-term oriented approaches. In this regard the EU developed a binary strategy which was covering both regional problems and country specific problems in order to promote and ensure stability in not only for Bosnia, but also for the whole Western Balkans. The main building blocks of EU's binary strategy have been "Stability Pact" and "Stabilization and Association Process".

In comparison to the pre-conflict period the Bosnia conflict, the EU tried to develop a coherent approach for Bosnia in in the framework of SAP which has also been a complementary process for the Dayton Agreement. As Solana expressed that clearly:

the experience of the Balkans has been a sobering one for the EU. But it has also provided us with an opportunity. It is a test of our commitment to the region. The Balkans has shown that the EU can no longer remain a force for peace simply through example. It has also to be forthright in defending the basic values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which it is founded (Solana, 2000).

In the SAP framework, the EU has been showing an increasing commitment to the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights. Furthermore, as stated in the Feira Council Summit 2000 and reiterated in Thessaloniki Council Summit in 2003 that SAP countries would be

potential candidates for the EU membership. Unlike pre-conflict period, this time the EU was clear in its approach to Bosnia and showing the light at the end of the tunnel which has been the main incentive for the Bosnia political authority to proceed in the reform process. Accordingly, by using its “power of attraction” (Munuera, 1994) namely the carrot of membership, the EU could achieve to support and motivate Bosnia’s reform process to make it a stable and functioning democracy. Similarly, in the light of these points and the relative success of the Bosnia case, in Kosovo the EU focused on promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law and creating a functional market economy in the context of the SAP. The aim of the EU in Kosovo has become not to exclude Kosovo from the mainstream of European integration process in Balkans and in this way to contribute to its long term-stability and prosperity. To this end, although Kosovo was not an independent state, the EU created Stabilization and Association Process Tracking Mechanism which is keeping Kosovo on the right track in the SAP. However, one of the most important points related to the effectiveness of the EU’s contribution to relapse of any conflict in both Bosnia and Kosovo has been conditionality. Instruments of the SAP, namely autonomous trade measures, financial assistance and concluding an Association Agreement were all based on conditionality. Instead of giving a whole package of reforms to be carried out by Bosnia and also Kosovo, the EU, through “European Partnership” divided the tasks that must be achieved in the short-, medium and long-term. And insofar as those tasks have been achieved and general adherence to democratic principles maintained, the EU released financial aids and stepped further in terms of concluding an Association Agreement.

Despite the fact that the setting a clear target for the participants of the SAP, namely potential candidacy for the EU membership has increased the effectiveness of the EU in terms of preventing the relapse of Bosnian conflict, there are also lessons related to the implementation of the SAP drawn from Bosnia. In this sense, one of the most important

lessons has been the need to strengthen bottom-up approach of the SAP vis a vis top-down approach of it (Bechev and Andreev, 2005). The macro projects of the SAP in political and economical fields such as institution building, creating a self sustaining economy and reforms in jurisprudence system have been important building blocks of the SAP so as to create a liberal and a democratic society. However, it is also equally important to win the hearts and minds of ordinary people at societal level and moreover to nurture a self-sustaining society which can lead and support the creation of a democratic and liberal Bosnia in the long-run. To this end, the EU has been providing financial aid through CARDS both for the creation and supporting of civil society organizations in Bosnia. However, in time it seems that the top-down approach of the SAP has overwhelmed the bottom-up approach. As Belloni spells out that in Bosnia, “civil society building has been perceived as an externally driven process that is dependent upon international resources” (Belloni 2001: 175). He explains that only %17 of civil society organizations felt that donors’ relations with them open and friendly, but %54 thought that the relations between donors and civil society organizations are insufficient and even represent the pure use of their “cheap service” (Belloni, 2001: 176). In line with the Belloni’s study, Bosnia 2005 Progress Report also touches upon this issue. According to the Report there are only a few country-wide civil society organizations and the existing law regulating the activities and foundations of NGOs²⁸ is complicated and does not help developing local organizations. More important than that the Report also accepts that “many NGOs were created and developed in donor-driven-mode, with very weak links to real societal demands” (Bosnia 2005 Progress Report, 2005: 22). One of the most important side effects of a donor-driven society building could be that the international community, particularly the EU could be the major owner of the democratization process but not the society. Moreover, in the absence of a self-sustained civil society the SAP could only

²⁸ Law on Association and Foundations.

function as a technical fix of countries to the priorities set out by SAP through a top-down democratization approach. As for Kosovo, given the danger of top-down democratization approach and donor-driven civil society building it seems that Kosovo faces to the same problem. Although Human Rights Development Report 2004 states that although the number of NGOs proliferated at a dramatic rate in Kosovo, the major deriving force behind the NGO sector development has been the availability of donor funds (Human Development Report Kosovo, 2004: 63). In the light of the lessons related to Bosnia, in contrary to the conflict prevention policy of the EU, Kosovo might face with a donor-driven civil society building and thus a top-down democratization process which might in time harm the major objective of the EU to create a stable and prosperous democratic society in Kosovo.

Along with the lessons in the civilian post-conflict reconstruction of the EU in Bosnia, there are also lessons which are of military aspects. In this respect, one of the main lessons was that if the EU wanted to be an effective international actor in the field of conflict prevention and promoter of norms especially in its neighbouring area (Juncos, 2005: 99, Manners, 2004), the EU needed support its civilian involvement not only in the pre-conflict, but also in the post-conflict periods too. To this end, the EU added the use of military force in its tool box in 1998, namely European Security and Defence Policy. The EU has deployed all of its CFSP assets in Bosnia: EUSR, the EU Monitoring Mission, EUPM and EUFOR. Coherence among the different EU instruments in Bosnia has been in dire need of improvement. EUPM, deployed in 2003, had a mandate to strengthen Bosnia's police forces through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting. Then, at the end of 2004, EUFOR was deployed to replace the NATO-led SFOR. Its mandate, like SFOR's, has been to maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia, including through supporting the fight against organised crime. Meanwhile EUPM continued to concentrate on local ownership and on strengthening the local police's capacity to tackle organised crime. Hence, through ESDP the

EU could achieve to develop a comprehensive approach and strengthened its multifaceted conflict prevention policy in Bosnia. In the light of this point, the EU has been trying to enlarge its role to the military aspect in the post-conflict peace process of Kosovo by making necessary preparations (Future of the ESDP). In line with the future roles that the EU could take on in Kosovo, a Joint Action has established an EUPT in 2006 which would ensure a possible transfer of some selected tasks of the UNMIK for example, in the fields of rule of law or police mission to the EU (European Council Joint Action, 2006). In this way, the EU indicated its willingness and long-term commitment to the stability and security of Kosovo.

To sum up, there have been three important lessons concerning the EU's effectiveness in the field of conflict prevention in the Bosnia. First of all, the EU membership perspective has become the most important incentive for increasing commitment of the conflicting parties. Also, through conditional release of financial aids and other benefits of the SAP, the EU could keep Bosnia and Kosovo on the track. As for the second lesson, although it seems that there has been a special emphasis on the civil society building in the SAP as an important part of general democratization process, at the implementation level the donor-driven civil society building became dominant which might, in time lead to the elimination of bottom-up approach of the SAP. Lastly, the importance of complementing civilian instruments with use of force once more understood to enhance the effectiveness of the conflict prevention policy of the EU. In line with these lessons, the EU included Kosovo in the SAP process and considering the special status of Kosovo at the moment developed new bodies to keep the Bosnia on track. However, secondly, there seems to be that Kosovo will face to the same problem that the Bosnia faced concerning civil society building and thus the EU should modify the SAP in this respect.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Unlike the danger of a catastrophic nuclear war between two superpowers, in the post-Cold War era states have had to face different kinds of security challenges. Among those challenges, together with terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal trafficking of humans and drugs; outbreak of violent conflicts has become one of the most important security problems of the post-Cold war international security agenda. Particularly, widespread nature of violent conflicts and their humanitarian costs have increased a renewed interest in preventing them. In contrary to the superpower dominated conflict prevention activities, in the aftermath of the Cold-war period the number of actors that could engage in conflict prevention efforts and contribution that they can make has dramatically increased. In this respect, not only states but the other actors ranging from international organizations to NGOs started to become active in several conflict cases as well. The EU, as an important international and regional organization has also increased its attention in the field of conflict prevention. In the intergovernmental framework of the CFSP, especially starting from the early 1990s the EU has worked for increasing its conflict prevention capacity both in civilian and military terms.

In the aim of analyzing the question of how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention this study examined two cases, namely Bosnia and Kosovo whether the lessons drawn from the former applied to the latter in the pre- and post-conflict stages of those two conflicts. Accordingly, in terms of effectiveness in those two stages (pre- and post-conflict) some factors stood out as the most important ones in the forms of contributing or obstructing preventive efforts of the EU. In this regard, for the pre-conflict and post-conflict period this study explained several interrelated lessons from Bosnia and whether they were

applied to Kosovo. In the pre-conflict period significant and interrelated lessons drawn from Bosnia were “lack of a consistent approach” towards the prevention of conflict, a significant “warning- response gap” before the dispute turning into violent form and lastly, “being too ambitious” and thus ignoring the importance of multiparty and multifaceted intervention. In terms of application of those lessons in Kosovo, the EU repeated more or less the same mistakes. *First of all*, in terms of creating a consistent approach towards Kosovo, the EU could not form a common position and coherent approach but rather it constantly neglected Kosovo dispute and for the most part it could only condemn the disproportionate use of force against Kosovor Albanians by Serbia government till the outbreak of conflict in 1998. *Secondly*, the warning-response gap which is referring to the problem caused by the late reaction of third parties to disputes, Kosovo had been even a worse example of this situation in comparison to Bosnia case. Although in several platforms and reports the signals were constantly taken related to the deterioration of Kosovo dispute, intensive conflict prevention efforts started just after KLA gained an important place in the fate of conflict and started an armed resistance against Serbia government. *Finally*, in terms of being too ambitious, in Kosovo case, this time in contrary to Bosnia case the EU placed itself on the other side of the spectrum that is to say not claiming to be a leading actor in preventing conflict but being cautious and reactive against escalation of Kosovo dispute. The EU acted in line with the international community and especially in the light of the UNSC Resolutions. However, more importantly, in both cases the EU suffered from the lack of military backing of its civilian instruments and thus its effectiveness could only be marginal in both disputes.

In an overall assessment, in terms the pre-conflict prevention efforts of the EU both Bosnia and Kosovo cases indicated that the EU was caught institutionally unprepared and instrumentally ill-equipped in the face of those conflicts. In this regard, “lack of a consistent approach”, “warning-response gap” and “lack of military backing of civilian instruments”

were the acute problems that the EU faced in both Bosnia and Kosovo cases. In this light, it seems that one of the biggest challenges related to enhance the EU's effectiveness in its pre-conflict preventive efforts would be establishing and strengthening necessary institutions which can keep a close eye on ongoing disputes, analyzing internal dynamics of them, warn the EU at early stages, elaborate on wide range of policy options to undertake and plan intervention if necessary.

In comparison to the setbacks of the pre-conflict period of the EU conflict prevention activities in terms of exerting considerable influence on conflicting parties, the EU has carried out relatively more effective conflict prevention efforts in the post-conflict periods of both Bosnia and Kosovo. Especially after 1999 the SAP has been at the heart of the EU's overall conflict prevention strategy not only towards Bosnia and Kosovo but also towards entire Western Balkans. The main aim of the EU has been to democratize Bosnia and Kosovo and thus promote security and stability of them. To this end, in the framework of the SAP the EU both has made a substantial contribution to the UN efforts and has showed its long term commitment to Bosnia and Kosovo. From the prevention efforts of the EU in post-conflict Bosnia, this study draw three important lessons being the "importance of setting clear targets" for conflicting parties and "conditional use of rewards" towards reaching in those targets, "using context-specific approaches" and lastly, the "significance of complementing civilian instruments with military ones". In terms of application of those lessons in Kosovo, the EU has pursued more or less the same strategy and instruments in Kosovo. *First of all*, considering the importance of setting clear target to promote reform process of Kosovo, the EU included Kosovo in the mainstream of European integration and opened the way for Kosovo to be a potential candidate for the EU in case of independence. To this end, the EU created the STM so as to monitor democratization process of Kosovo and tried to keep her on track. However, since democratization is an objective which can be attained in the long run,

in the light STM meetings, Progress Reports and European Partnerships the EU also created short-term and medium term objectives and made aid programs conditional upon the attaining of those objectives. *Secondly*, the EU did repeat the same mistake in Kosovo in terms using context specific approaches. In the case of Kosovo, although the EU put specific emphasis on building civil society and in this way supporting local ownership of the democratization process, a top-down character of democratization efforts of the EU has obstructed the development of “local ownership”. *As for the third lesson*, namely combining civilian and military instruments the EU launched the EUPT in 2006 so as to discover what kind of contributions that the EU can make in military terms and in this way reiterated its long-term commitment to Kosovo.

The preventive efforts of the EU in the post conflict period indicates that the most important instrument of the EU to make conflicting parties abide by overall democratization process has been the membership aspiration introduced both for Bosnia and Kosovo. In Munuera’s words “power of attraction” increased the EU’s effectiveness and motivated conflicting parties to further their reforms and to establish necessary institutions in order them to live together. However, in its post-conflict prevention activities one of the biggest problems that the EU might face can be the lack of “local ownership” of democratization processes. Although external help is of utmost importance in terms of establishing a secure and stable society to prevent conflict recurrence, at the final resort preventing conflicts can only be achieved by means of the commitment of conflicting parties to change their minds both at political and societal levels.

In a nutshell, this study tried to examine the question that how the EU can be more effective in the field of its conflict prevention policy by examining Bosnia and Kosovo cases. In the light of the lessons learned from Bosnia and Kosovo, while in the pre-conflict period institutionalization of conflict prevention policy seems to be of great importance in terms of

the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention activities, in the post-conflict period supporting “membership aspiration” and supporting “local ownership” in conflicting societies has occupied the central place to increase the effectiveness of conflict prevention efforts of the EU.

Apart from the findings of this thesis, it also contains some shortcomings. The first shortcoming is associated with the number of the cases scrutinized in this study. Although Bosnia and Kosovo cases became the most influential ones on the evolution of conflict prevention policy of the EU, in order to make comprehensive generalizations more cases could be examined. Especially related to immediate vicinity of the EU, the rest of the Balkans, conflict prevention efforts of the EU in those countries such as Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia can provide more lessons and food for thought considering the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention policy.

Secondly, this study examined both cases in certain time periods in their pre-conflict periods. While pre-conflict stage for Bosnia was a two-year period, for Kosovo it was nine-year period. Considering the complexity of underlying causes of conflicts as well as their immediate triggering factors, one could extend those time periods and put the comparative analysis to a broader time-scale. In this way it could be possible to study conflict prevention efforts of the EU in a larger time scale.

The findings and weaknesses of this thesis might also provide food for thought for future studies. This thesis moved from the question of how the EU can be more effective in the field of conflict prevention and it tried to compile the factors which matter most to render conflict prevention activities of the EU effective. However, a future study can focus on another aspect of conflict prevention activities i.e success/failure. Just like “effectiveness” still there seems to be lack of clarification how to put substantial criterion for success/failure in preventive efforts of third parties.

Secondly, one can also dwell on the coordination issue between different pillars and institutions of conflict prevention activities of the EU. Considering the cross-pillar nature of the EU conflict prevention activities and overlapping policy outcomes of the EU institutions, how to improve “institutional coordination” of different EU bodies could be a crucial question in order to hinder wasting resources and labor. Finally, regarding post-conflict prevention efforts of the EU, whether the aids provided by the EU ranging from Asia-Pacific to Caribbean create a kind of aid-dependency in conflicting parties or not could also be an interesting field of study to scrutinize.

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