

Antecedents and Consequences of Union Commitment within
Cooperative versus Adversarial Industrial Relations Climates

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the role of social context--adversarial vs. cooperative industrial relations climates (IRC)--on a model of antecedents and consequences of union commitment. Using social information processing approach, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, pro-union attitudes, union socialization, subjective norms, and past participation were hypothesized to have differential direct or mediated relationships with union commitment across adversarial and cooperative climates. In contrast, using need satisfaction models, the relationships of union instrumentality and steward responsiveness with union commitment were hypothesized to be similar across different climates. Finally, union commitment was hypothesized to be related to willingness to work for the union and propensity to strike, the latter showing differences according to industrial relations climates. Participants were 527 unionized workers employed in 32 private sector organizations in metal and textile industries and organized by four unions from two confederations. Industrial relations climates were operationalized at the organizational as well as at the union confederation level. First, consistent with their respective histories, industrial relations climate at the Türk-İş Confederation is considered as cooperative whereas in Disk Confederation, it is considered as adversarial. Second, at the organizational level, a scale was utilized to categorize the IRC of different organizations as adversarial or cooperative. As expected, results revealed that steward responsiveness is positively related to union commitment regardless of the climate, the magnitude of the indirect effect of subjective norms to union commitment through pro-union attitudes is higher for adversarial climates/Disk and organizational commitment is negatively related to propensity to strike in cooperative climates/ Türk-İş while they are unrelated in adversarial climates/ Disk. Some of the hypotheses were supported in only one of the operationalizations of IRC: The magnitude of the effect of pro-union attitudes to union commitment was stronger in Disk; organizational commitment is positively related to union commitment in adversarial climates, but not related in cooperative climates. Findings are discussed for their implications for attitude theory and practice in industrial relations.

Keywords: Union Commitment, Industrial Relations Climate, Disk, Türk-İş

ÖZET

Bu çalışma sosyal bağlamın – çatışmacı ya da uzlaşmacı endüstriyel ilişkiler iklimleri (Eİİ) - sendikaya bağlılığın öncülleri ve sonuçları üzerindeki rolünü araştırmıştır. Sosyal Bilgi İşleme Yaklaşımı kullanılarak, iş memnuniyeti, örgüte bağlılık, sendika yanlısı tutumlar, sendikada sosyalleşme, sübjektif normlar ve geçmişte sendikal aktivitelere katılmış olmanın sendikaya bağlılık ile doğrudan ve dolaylı ilişkilerinin çatışmacı ve uzlaşmacı Eİİ’lerde farklılık göstermesi beklenmiştir. Buna karşılık, ihtiyaç karşılama modelleri kullanılarak, sendikanın yararlılığı ve sendika temsilcisinin üyelerin ihtiyaçlarına duyarlılığının sendikaya bağlılık ile olan ilişkilerinin farklı Eİİ’lerde aynı olması beklenmiştir. Son olarak, sendikaya bağlılığın sendika için çalışmak isteme ve greve gitme eğilimi ile ilişkisinin olması, ikinci değişkenin çatışmacı ve uzlaşmacı Eİİ’lerde farklılık göstermesi beklenmiştir. Katılımcılar, metal ve tekstil işkolundaki, iki konfederasyona bağlı dört sendika tarafından örgütlenmiş 32 özel sektör kurumunda çalışan 527 sendikalı işçidir. Eİİ hem sendika konfederasyonu hem de örgüt düzeyinde işlevselleştirilmiştir. İlk olarak konfederasyonların tarihsel süreçteki tutumları göz önüne alınarak, Türk-İş Konfederasyonu’ndaki Eİİ uzlaşmacı, Disk’teki ise çatışmacı olarak düşünülmüştür. Örgüt bazında ise, kurumları çatışmacı ve uzlaşmacı olarak kategorize etmek için bir ölçek kullanılmıştır. Sonuçlar beklenildiği gibi, sendika temsilcisinin üyelerinin ihtiyaçlarına duyarlılığı ile sendikaya bağlılığın her iki Eİİ’de de pozitif ilişkisi olduğunu, sübjektif normların sendikaya bağlılık ile sendika yanlısı tutumlar üzerinden dolaylı etkisinin çatışmacı Eİİ’lerde daha kuvvetli olduğunu ve örgüte bağlılığın greve gitme eğilimi ile uzlaşmacı Eİİ’lerde negatif bir ilişkisi olduğunu göstermiştir. Bazı hipotezler Eİİ işlevselleştirmelerinin sadece birinde desteklenmiştir: Sendika yanlısı tutumlar ile sendikaya bağlılık arasındaki ilişki Disk Konfederasyonu’nda daha güçlüdür, çatışmacı Eİİ’de örgüte bağlılığın sendikaya bağlılık ile negatif ilişkisi vardır. Ancak, bu iki değişken uzlaşmacı Eİİ’de ilişkili değildir. Bulgular tutum teorisi açısından ve endüstriyel ilişkilerdeki pratik uygulamalar bakımından tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Sendikaya bağlılık, Endüstriyel İlişkiler İklimi, Disk, Türk-İş

To my family...

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present study is to demonstrate the differences in predictors and consequences of union commitment among members of unions in different social contexts. Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson, and Spiller (1980) defined union commitment as the extent to which an individual wants to remain as the member of the union, expand effort for the union, and to recognize the objectives of the union as his/her own. They suggested four dimensions of union commitment: union loyalty, belief in unionism, willingness to work for the union, and responsibility for the union. Union loyalty, the affective dimension of union commitment has been found to be the most dominant dimension among the four. Willingness to work for the union and responsibility towards the union represent behavioral commitment to the union. Belief in unionism dimension is no longer accepted as part of the union commitment construct (Bayazıt, Hammer & Wazeter, 2004).

Increasing union commitment is an important issue since unions need to retain their members to be able to survive, and employees need strong unions which aim to “protect and improve the common and social right of employee and the employer” as stated in Union Act Article no 2. However, according to Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in Turkey, unionization rate decreased from 67.84 % to 58.71 % from

1996 to 2006 (http://www.calisma.gov.tr/istatistik/cgm/sendikalasma_oranlari.htm). This reality also indicates the importance of the investigation of union commitment process in Turkey.

Social scientists conduct research to be able to demonstrate the antecedents and consequences of union commitment (Bamberger, Klugar, & Suchard, 1999; Fuller & Hester, 1998; Newton & Shore, 1992; Tan & Aryee, 2002). Antecedents of union commitment were suggested to be job satisfaction, organizational commitment, union instrumentality, pro-union attitudes, and union socialization. Consequences of union commitment were suggested to be union participation and union citizenship behavior. Most of this research has been conducted at the individual level of analysis (i.e. rank and file members) without any attention to the social context. In addition, most research has been conducted in western context or in developed countries such as US, Canada, UK, Sweden, Australia, and Singapore. Therefore, there is lack of empirical research on union commitment that considers the role of social context in the union commitment process conducted in a non-western developing country such as Turkey.

Union commitment is an organizational attitude (Fullagar, Gallagher, Daniel, & Clark, 2004). According to Fishbein (1967; as cited in Shaw & Costanzo, 1982, p.285), “attitude is characterized as a learned implicit response that varies in intensity and tends to guide (mediate) an individual’s overt responses to an object”.

Past theorizing on the role of external factors on attitude development followed two main routes. The first of these routes is called as need satisfaction models. The second which grew as a criticism of the first is Social Information Processing Approach (SIPA) since the focus of the first route is the influence of needs while the focus of the second one is the influence of context on attitudes. The present study incorporates hypotheses derived from both approaches.

Need satisfaction models suggest that an individual develops positive attitudes towards an object (union, job, organization) when aspects of that object fulfill the existence, relatedness and/or growth needs. Consistent with need satisfaction model to organizational attitudes, this study examined the influence the degree of union's and union steward's success in fulfilling the members' needs on their attitude toward the union.

SIPA suggests that social information available in the environment and past behavior of the individual are influential on developing attitudes (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). According to this approach, an individual develops attitudes by using the information available at the time attitude is stated. Person's immediate social environment, which provides information regarding acceptable beliefs, attitudes, and needs, is one source of information. Also, social context makes some of the information of the individual's past behaviors more or less salient. The individual rationalizes his or her past behavior based on the information provided from social environment regarding

the norms. Consistent with SIPA, the present study investigates social cues received from different industrial relations climates and past active engagement in union activities.

Experimental studies investigating saliency of social cues and its influence of attitudes revealed that social cue manipulations (e.g. negative or positive comments of the coworkers) are more salient to subjects than task design manipulations (e.g. enriched vs. unenriched tasks) which accordingly had an effect on subjects' attitudes (Kiesler, 1971; Stang, 1974; Zajonc, 1968). These findings provide support for the influence of social information on attitude development.

Industrial relations climate refers to the nature of relationship between management and union. The nature of industrial relations climate has been suggested to differ between adversarial and cooperative. Adversarial climates are characterized by conflict-ridden interactions, distrust and hostility between the two parties. Cooperative climates, on the other hand, are characterized by harmonious interactions, cooperation and open communications between parties (Dastmalchian, Blyton, & Adamson, 1989). The main proposition of the present study is that union commitment process, or antecedents and consequences of union commitment attitude, operates in a different manner in adversarial and cooperative industrial relations climates. Industrial relations climate has not been widely studied in union commitment research except two studies (Fuller & Hester, 1998; Lee, 2004). It was suggested (Tan & Aryee, 2002) and found (Fuller & Hester, 1998; Lee, 2004) that industrial relations climate as a context characteristic may explain some of the irregular findings in the union commitment literature. In their

narrative review, Snape, Redman and Chen (2000) suggests that inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between organizational and union commitment (Fuller & Hester, 1998; Reed, Young, & McHugh, 1994), age and union loyalty (Bemmels, 1995; Conlon & Gallagher, 1987; Deery, Iverson, & Erwin 1994; Magenau, Martin & Peterson, 1988; Sherer & Morishima, 1989), job satisfaction and union commitment (Deery et al, 1994; Gordon et al. 1980) may have resulted from differences in the nature of industrial relations in different study contexts. However, these arguments have not been rigorously tested empirically. The present study was designed to comprehensively study the role of industrial relations climate in the union commitment process in a developing country, Turkey.

Industrial relations climate is treated in two separate ways in this study. First at the organizational level is the industrial relations climate created by the interaction between the union and the employer. At this level there might be as many different climates as there are workplaces that a union is organized. Second at the higher levels, union confederations with their respective histories and the ideologies they subscribe to, might create an overarching industrial relations climate that influences all the unions that belong to them. At this higher level of confederations there might be as many climates as there are confederations.

In Turkish industrial relations, unions that organize various occupational groups belong to confederations. As of 2004 there are a total of 4 confederations housing

approximately 96 unions (<http://www.calisma.gov.tr/>). Different confederations may include unions that organize the same occupational group but may diverge from each other in terms of their values and beliefs. Historically two confederations in particular, Türk-İş (Turkish Worker Unions Confederation) or Disk (Revolutionary Worker Unions Confederation) have been dominant players in Turkish industrial relations. Historically (Tokol, 1994), these two confederations and unions connected to them differ from each other in terms of the ideologies they subscribe to and the relationships they form with managements. Türk-İş and its unions have generally followed a more cooperative style, and whereas Disk and its unions have been on the adversarial side of the spectrum, although less so in recent years (see Chapter 3). Considering this variation in the industrial relations climates within Turkey in which the relationship between the management and the union is influenced by the histories of the confederations that unions are connected to, the influence of context (whether the relationship is adversarial or cooperative) is expected to create a variability in the union commitment process across different climates. Therefore, in the present study, union commitment process was investigated for unions that belong to these two confederations. These confederations as nominal context are used as indicators of industrial relations climate for rank and file members. Therefore, on one hand, industrial relations climates are considered the products of the confederations, and on the other hand can be considered a joint product of the interactions between a union and an employer. Hence some variation in industrial relations climates within a confederation and even within the same union should be expected as some employers may be more open to union existence and influence in their

shop floor than others regardless of the particular union. Therefore the present study uses two measures of industrial relations climate to operationalize the social context and examine its effects on the union commitment process. The main proposition is that there is a significant difference between the process of union commitment in social contexts in which the relationship between the union and the management is cooperative versus adversarial.

Chapter II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Union Commitment as an Organizational Attitude

Union commitment is an organizational attitude. Fishbein defines attitude as “a learned implicit response that varies in intensity and tends to guide (mediate) an individual’s overt responses to an object” (1967; as cited in Shaw & Costanzo, 1982). In union commitment construct, the object is a particular union, learned implicit responses are loyalty to union, responsibility towards the union and willingness to work for the union; overt responses are actual behaviors that support and further the existence of a particular union such as participation in union committees, voting, joining strikes.

Katz (1960) suggests four functions of attitudes: These are adjustment, the ego-defensive, the value-expressive and the knowledge functions. The adjustment function refers to the fact that people develop favorable attitudes towards objects that maximize the rewards and minimize the punishment provided from their external environment. For example, an employee may prefer to be a member of the union because it is the association which protects his/ her rights, and tries to improve the work conditions. This in turn would lead him/ her to have a favorable attitude (a favorable image) toward union. In this case, having a positive attitude toward the union and being a member of it will increase the chance that external rewards (wages, benefits, etc.) are maximized.

Ego defensive function refers to the fact that beyond the external world, individuals have also an inner world of their own. Ego acts as a balance mechanism between one's inner unacceptable impulses and the external world expectations. Ego defense mechanisms are used to be able to overcome the conflict which arises between the inner (unacceptable impulses) and external world (expectations). Some of the attitudes have the function of defending self-image by using ego defense mechanisms. People have inner feelings of inferiority that they can not admit to themselves. By projecting (one kind of defense mechanism) these inferior feelings to a minority group, ego is boosted by developing attitudes of superiority toward that minority group. Ego-defensive function of attitudes is more appropriate to explain discrimination issues.

The value-expressive function refers to the consistency between one's central values and his/ her attitudes. Satisfaction comes from holding attitudes that are consistent with one's central values. When an individual (e.g. a new employee) enters a new environment (e.g. organization) for the first time, he/she may be influenced by the values of the existing group (e.g. employees in the organization), and internalize them during the socialization process. Obviously, the internalization of the values is related to what extent group's values are similar to one's own values (Katz, 1960). For example when an employee, who considers himself/herself as a unionist, comes to an organization for the first time, he/she will have a positive attitude toward the union. However, if it is an organization which does not support unionization, this can lead the new employee to

develop negative attitudes toward the organization since there is not consistency between the employee's and organization's central values.

The knowledge function refers to the fact that individuals seek knowledge to construct meanings and store this knowledge to be able to have a general idea of the world. Standards and frames of references are the sources of knowledge on which attitudes are developed. Stereotypes are developed in this way. Individuals take others (e.g. family) as frame of references to construct meaning about a target (e.g. union) (Katz, 1960). For example, a person, who has a father who is a supporter of the union and raised his/ her child by telling the importance of the union existence, would have positive stereotypes toward unionism before his first job experience, and develop positive attitudes for unions, which will accordingly create union commitment at work.

2.2 Overview of Union Commitment Models

Different models of union commitment were previously proposed by the researchers (e.g. Bamberger, Kluger, & Suchard, 1999; Newton & Shore, 1992; Iverson & Kruvill, 1995; Tan & Aryee, 2002). Bamberger and colleagues (1999) identified the key antecedents and consequence of the union commitment based on the studies of Barling, Fullagar and Kelloway (1992) Newton and Shore (1992), and Iverson and Kruvill (1995). Afterwards, Bamberger and colleagues (1999) conducted a meta-analysis and tested an Integrative Model.

Bamberger et al.'s Integrative Model (1999) will be discussed at length below, but before that, I will present union commitment models suggested by Barling and colleagues (1992), Newton and Shore (1992), and Iverson and Kruvillia (1995). Note that, results given for the three models were found in Bamberger et al.'s meta-analysis.

Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 display the antecedents and consequences of union commitment in three different studies.

2.2.1 Barling, Fullagar, and Kelloway's Model of Union Commitment

Barling and colleagues in their book suggested a conceptual model of union commitment based on the literature on union commitment (1992). Their model was then tested in the meta-analysis conducted by Bamberger and colleagues (1999).

Barling and colleagues (1992) model suggests that organizational commitment, job satisfaction, pro-union attitudes, and perceived union instrumentality directly effect union commitment which in turn leads to union participation (see Figure 2.1).

In the models of union commitment, pro-union attitudes and union instrumentality perceptions emerge as the significant predictors of union commitment (Barling et al., 1992; Newton & Shore, 1992; Iverson & Kruvillia, 1995; Bamberger et al., 1999). Union

instrumentality is defined as “the perceived impact of the union on traditional (e.g. wages, benefits) and non-traditional work conditions (e.g. job autonomy) that define the employment relationship” (Gordon, Barling, & Tetrick, 1995, p. 353). Pro-union attitudes refer to appeal for the unions in general (McShane, 1986) rather than one’s attraction to his or her own union. Obviously, desirability of one’s own union is influential on that individual’s pro-union attitudes, but such attitudes represent deeper values and beliefs (Snape & Redman, 2004) reflected to all unions.

Previous research suggests that if a new employee’s expectations are met in an organization, she/he is more likely to be committed to his/her organization (Steers, 1977). In line with this finding, if the union is perceived to be effective in improving work conditions, employees are more likely to vote for unionization (e.g. Beutell & Biggs, 1984; Bigoness & Tosi, 1984). Longitudinal research also revealed that perceived instrumentality of the union is positively related to union commitment and union participation among blue collar unionized workers (Fullagar & Barling, 1989).

Attitude toward unions in general is another antecedent of union commitment. Previous research suggests that having positive attitudes toward union is positively related to voting for unionization (Barling, Kelloway & Bremermann, 1991; Desphante & Fiorito, 1989). In line with this finding, Barling and colleagues (1992) suggested that those who have positive attitudes toward unions in general, are more likely to be committed to their unions.


Although Barling et al. (1992) suggested a direct relationship between the last two antecedents (organizational commitment and job satisfaction) and union commitment, further studies demonstrated a more complex relationship (Newton & Shore, 1992; Bamberger et al., 1999). Barling et al. (1992) argued that as employees are less satisfied with their jobs they become more committed to their unions. The reason is that employees believe that the union could change things they are dissatisfied with. Previous research also showed that job dissatisfaction is positively (Fiorito, Gallagher & Greer, 1986) related to voting for unionization. Barling and colleagues (1992) also suggested that organizational commitment is positively related to union commitment. That is to say, employees do not perceive any difference between the organization and the union. Hence, if they are committed to the organization, they are also committed to their union.

Barling and colleagues (1992) suggested union participation to be the consequence of union commitment. Previous research supported their proposition. For example, Fullagar and Barling (1989) conducted a longitudinal study, and demonstrated that union loyalty (the first dimension of union commitment) leads to union participation. This means, those who feel loyalty to their union are more likely to vote in union elections, work in union committees, participate in union meetings, etc.

Bamberger and colleagues' (1999) meta-analysis revealed support for Barling and colleagues' (1992) model of union commitment. Specifically, it was found that organizational commitment, union instrumentality, and pro-union attitudes are positively

and job satisfaction is negatively related to union commitment which in turn predicts union participation.

Figure 2 .1 Barling, Fullagar, and Kelloway's Model of Union Commitment: Its Antecedents and Consequences



2 .2 .2 Newton and Shore's Model of Union Commitment

Newton and Shore (1992) questioned whether union instrumentality perceptions or pro-union attitudes contribute more to union commitment, and which of them has a direct effect on union commitment. There are two views concerning this issue. The first view is consistent with the economic exchange perspective which implies that people are committed to unions due to instrumentality perceptions of the union (Shore, Tetrick,


Sinclair, & Newton, 1994). This view assumes that unions could improve the work conditions for their members. Employees have such an assumption if the union was successful in the past in collective bargaining. The second view is consistent with the social exchange perspective which sees union as a source of support for its members and suggests that employees become committed to union to reciprocate this support through developing pro-union attitudes (Shore, Tetrick, Sinclair, & Newton, 1994).

Newton and Shore (1992) proposed that economic exchange perspective and social exchange perspective are not contradictory, but rather complementary to each other, both increasing union commitment. Newton and Shore (1992) suggest a process that begins with union instrumentality perceptions that leads to pro-union attitudes which in turn influences union commitment and participation (see Figure 2.2). This suggestion is based on the view that beliefs (union instrumentality perceptions) lead to attitudes (pro-union attitudes). That is to say, a positive belief that union is successful in gaining salary raise, improving benefits and work conditions leads an employee to develop a general positive value attached to unions.

Newton and Shore (1992) did not empirically test their model. However, empirical studies revealed support for this mediation effect (Heshizer, Martin, & Wiener, 1991; Shore & Newton, 1995). Bamberger et al.'s meta-analysis also gave support for Newton and Shore's model of union commitment. Specifically, they found that perceived union instrumentality is indirectly related to union commitment through pro-union attitudes.

Additionally, organizational commitment is positively and job satisfaction is negatively related to union commitment. The direct effect of union commitment on union participation was also found to be significant. Note that the strongest relationship in magnitude was between pro-union attitudes and union commitment (Bamberger et al., 1999).

Figure 2 .2 Newton and Shore's Model of Union Commitment: Its Antecedents and Consequences




2.2.3 Iverson and Kruvill's Model of Union Commitment

Studies on the relationship between the two other independent variables (job satisfaction and organizational commitment) and union commitment reveal inconsistent findings. Gordon et al. (1980) found a positive relationship between job satisfaction and union loyalty dimension of union commitment, while Fullagar and Barling (1989) found a negative relationship between the two. Gordon and colleagues (1984) found that job satisfaction and union commitment of engineers differ from non-professional white collar union members suggesting that occupation might be a moderator for these two variables.

Iverson and Kruvill (1995) in their empirical study suggested and found that job satisfaction influences union commitment indirectly through organizational commitment (see Figure 2.3). This is based on the assumption that (1) employees are likely to attribute their satisfaction with the job to the employer and (2) in most of the unionized workplaces, there is a general tendency to be committed to both organization and union (Iverson & Kruvill, 1995). Although this approach is somewhat similar to dual commitment (Angle & Perry, 1986), where an employee is committed to both management and the union, it differs from this phenomenon since industrial relations climate is not mentioned in Iverson and Kruvill's approach. However, dual commitment suggests that being committed to both parties is only possible in cooperative climates (Angle & Perry, 1986).

Bamberger et al.'s meta-analysis also gave support for Iverson and Kruvill's model of union commitment. Specifically, they found that job satisfaction is indirectly related to union commitment through organizational commitment. Additionally, pro-union attitudes and union instrumentality perceptions were found to have independent effects on union commitment. The relationship between union commitment and union participation was also found to be significant.


Figure 2 .3 Iverson and Kruvill's Model of Union Commitment: Its Antecedents and Consequences



2.2.4 Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard's Model of Union Commitment

Bamberger et al. (1999) integrated all three models of union commitment, conducted a meta-analysis and came up with the following model (see Figure 2.4). This meta-analysis revealed that the first three models, in which union instrumentality and job satisfaction were suggested to have direct or indirect effects on union commitment alone, did not reveal as good a fit as the integrative model, in which both direct and indirect effects of these two variables were included.

Figure 2.4 Integrative Model of Union Commitment: Its Antecedents and Consequences



The meta-analysis supported the previous findings that union instrumentality perceptions and pro-union attitudes are the most compelling antecedents of union commitment, but pro-union attitudes have a more powerful effect compared to union instrumentality. In addition, job satisfaction- union commitment relationship was found to be negative. Bamberger et al. (1999) did not make any conclusions regarding this relationship and suggested that it should be further investigated by primary data. Other than the relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment, hypothesized relationships were found to be positive. The strongest relationship was between organizational commitment and union commitment followed by the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment. Note that, these relationships were positive.


Bamberger and colleagues (1999) suggested that their model has to be improved by taking boundary conditions into consideration such as the type of industry. They further recommended developing union commitment models by taking industrial relations climate into consideration. It was also suggested that workforce characteristics might be a moderator for union instrumentality perceptions and union commitment relationship (Newton & Shore, 1992). Specifically, it was suggested that those who are likely to gain economically more from union membership, are expected to be committed to the union because of its instrumentality functions. If individuals' economic conditions are already high, they are more likely to be committed to union because of its support function. In other words, for white collar workers that are in an economically better position compared to blue collars, pro-union attitudes are more predictive of union commitment than union instrumentality perceptions. On the other hand, it is expected that union instrumentality

perceptions are more predictive of union commitment rather than pro-union attitudes for blue collar workers. In the present study, the sample consisted of blue collar workers. Therefore, there was no need to control for differences in employment status.

2.2.5 Tan and Aryee's Model of Union Commitment

The Integrative model, mentioned above, was developed based on a Western culture, and Tan and Aryee (2002) suggested testing it in a non Western culture to see its generalizability. The authors expanded the model by integrating union socialization as an antecedent and union citizenship behavior as a consequence (see Figure 2.5), and tested it on primary data collected from Singapore. In their model, they used the union loyalty dimension of union commitment. It was suggested that union socialization has a direct and an indirect effect through pro-union attitudes on union commitment.

Figure 2.5 Tan & Aryee's Model of Union Loyalty



Studies show that socialization is related to union commitment. Socialization is defined as “the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an organizational role” (VanMaanen & Schein, 1979; cited in Tan & Aryee, 2002). Jones (1986) distinguished between institutional and individual socialization. While the first one refers to the formal orientations aimed to teach the members the accepted rules, roles, and norms, the second one refers to an informal way of socializing in which learning happens through new comers’ interacting with the senior members. Fullagar et al. (1995) demonstrated that individual socialization is related to union commitment, but Fullagar and colleagues (1992) suggested that union socialization affects union commitment indirectly through pro-union attitudes in addition to its direct effect on union commitment. Based on those findings, Tan and Aryee (2002) suggested that union socialization is an antecedent that has a direct and indirect effect on union loyalty dimension of union commitment.

Tan and Aryee (2002) used union citizenship behavior as a consequence of union loyalty instead of union participation since there is lack of consensus on the dimensionality of union participation and citizenship behavior has common characteristics with union participation. Common characteristics were suggested to be that both union participation and union citizenship behavior are voluntary and not externally rewarded for engaging in them or not punished for not engaging in them (Fullagar, Parks, Clark, & Gallagher, 1995).

The model provided a good fit to their data which indicates generalizability of the Integrative Model of Bamberger et al. However, the direct relationship between job satisfaction and union loyalty was not found to be significant. Rather, job satisfaction was found to be influential on union loyalty through organizational commitment, consistent with the previous findings (Iverson & Kruvilla, 1995). Tan and Aryee (2002) suggested that taking industrial relations climate into consideration might reveal significant relationship between job satisfaction and union loyalty. In an adversarial industrial relations climate, employees are less likely to be satisfied with the wages and benefits their employer provides (Newton & Shore, 1992), and accordingly they become committed to the union if its perceived economic instrumentality is high. On the other hand, in a cooperative industrial relations climate, union and management are in friendly terms and work in cooperation to improve the work conditions. Hence, employees do not face choice dilemmas between the two parties and can be committed to both parties (Fuller & Hester, 1998).

Other than the antecedents (job satisfaction, organizational commitment, pro-union attitudes, perceived union instrumentality, union socialization) and consequences (union participation) of union commitment suggested in the models above, steward responsiveness, subjective norms and propensity to strike are also included in the present study.

Previous research suggests that leadership type of the steward (Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994) and his or her accessibility (Thacher, Fields, & Barclay, 1990) are influential on union commitment. Since a steward is the person mostly addressed in the union by the members, his or her successfully fulfilling duties like supporting and helping the members is expected to be influential on the level of employees' commitment to union. Therefore, the relationship between steward responsiveness and union commitment is also examined in the present study.

Attitudes of significant others (e.g. family) about unions was previously found to be positively related to individuals' attitudes towards unions (Brief, Rude, & 1981; Fullagar et al., 1992; Montgomery, 1988). Therefore, in the present study the relationship between subjective norms and union commitment is also examined.

Propensity to strike is an important variable to include in a union commitment model due to the fact that when the union calls its members for a strike, the success of the union in the strike depends on the support coming from its members (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 2001). More powerful, in terms of the numbers involved, the union is during a strike, the higher their chances are to win on the collective bargaining table.

All the hypothesized relationships in the present model will be discussed in detail in Section 2.5. Next, I will talk about Social Information Processing Approach which accounts the influence of context on attitude development as authors previously suggested

(e.g. Fuller & Hester, 1998; Lee, 2004; Snape, Redman, & Chan, 2000; Tan & Aryee, 2000).

2.3 Social Information Processing Approach (SIPA)

Social Information Processing Approach (SIPA) to attitude formation (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) have been proposed as an alternative to the widely accepted need satisfaction and value fulfillment models of job attitudes (Hackman & Oldham, 1975). According to these models, job attitudes results from appraisal of one's job as attaining one's important job related values provided that these values are congruent with basic needs. Therefore job satisfaction, for example, results when workers perceive objective characteristics of their job to match their own needs and desires. SIPA, questions the assumption of veridicality of workers' perceptions with objective reality and suggests that attitude statements are socially constructed. SIPA is founded on the proposition that "people, as adaptive organisms, adapt attitudes, behavior and beliefs to their social context and to the reality of their own past and present behavior and situation" (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978, p. 226). Next, the influence of social context and past behaviors on the attitudes will be discussed in detail beginning with the former one.

SIPA proposes that there is social information available in the environment which provides social cues that people in this environment use to adapt their attitudes, needs and

behaviors to this social context. There are two effects of social context on attitudes and needs: “a) it provides a direct construction of meaning through guides to socially acceptable reasons for action; b) it focuses an individual’s attention on certain information, making this information more salient, and provides expectations concerning individual behavior and the logical consequences of such behavior” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978, p. 227).

Direct influence of social information happens through overt expressions of coworkers (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) such as expressing their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their jobs. Indirect influence of social information happens through coworkers’ making some aspects of the work more salient, and one’s developing attitudes through making inference from that particular aspect (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). For instance, if a coworker doing the same job communicates that the tasks performed in the department are various and there is opportunity for developing new skills, the worker himself/ herself may infer that his/her job has skill variety. Stang (1974) and Zajonc (1968) revealed empirical support for the influence of saliency of social cues on job outcomes. In both types of influence of social information, the employee develops an attitude toward a job considering the social information provided by the coworkers in the social context (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).

There are two reasons that an employee is vulnerable to the evaluations of his/her coworkers about the job. First, evaluations of the coworkers about the job help the

employee concerning how to respond to complex cues in job. Second, employee agrees with coworkers verbally to be accepted by them, and so after repeated expression of agreements, the employee actually convinces himself (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).

In addition to social context, past behavior of the individuals is also a determinant of attitudes. In other words, people infer their attitudes by making references to their past choices (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). However, process of inferring attitudes from past behaviors depends on whether the individual is committed to the behavior and norms that affect legitimate reasons of the behavior (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).

Commitment to behavior occurs if the individual perceives that he/she was free to behave that way, the behavior is irreversible, and observable by others (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). The effect of commitment to behavior on attributing attitudes from that behavior was supported by previous research (Kiesler, 1971; Salancik, 1977). Specifically it was found that if an individual is committed to his/ her behavior, he/she is likely to generate an attitude compatible with his/her commitment.

After an individual becomes committed to his/her past behavior, he/she will rationalize his/her behavior consistent with the norms in the social context. This process refers to as legitimization of the past behavior (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). The reason behind individuals' desire for legitimating behavior is their needs to maintain their social

relationships. Hence, they want to justify their behavior that is accepted by the majority of the people in the environment (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).

Given that SIPA and its predecessor Job Characteristics Theory (JCT) suggest different antecedents for attitudes, the relative contributions of each theory in explaining attitude development received attention from researchers. For instance, Griffin (1983) in a field experiment in two factories simultaneously tested SIPA and JCT. Results showed that objective changes in jobs and social cues are both predictors of job satisfaction, which provides support for both theories. In addition to Griffin (1983), Pollock, Whitbred, and Contractor (2000) also conducted research in which these two theories were examined at the same time. Specifically, authors concluded that job satisfaction is influenced by both objective job characteristics and social information available about the particular job in the social context. Pollock et al.'s (2000) empirical testing of the two theories also provided support for both theories. However, the influence of past behavior on attitudes could not be supported by this research.

Just as JCT considers objective job characteristics fulfilling individual needs as determinants of job satisfaction of employees, union commitment literature as well as the model of the present study considers unions' ability to satisfy the needs of its members as a predictor of union commitment attitude. Unions can satisfy the needs of their members in at least two ways. First, at the collective bargaining level, unions can negotiate employment contracts that provide its members job security, better salaries,

fringe benefits as well as better working conditions and increased autonomy over their work. Second, at the organizational level union stewards may be responsible from defending members' rights under the collective bargaining agreement, solving their individual problems at work, and improving solidarity between members within the organization. Hence, consistent with a need satisfaction approach to attitudes, members who perceive their unions to be instrumental in providing desired outcomes for them and who perceive their stewards to be responsive to their needs and problems are more likely to feel commitment towards their union.

The present study, in addition to testing hypotheses derived from the need satisfaction approach to attitudes, also tests hypotheses derived from SIPA. Specifically, differences in social cues provided in different industrial relations climates are hypothesized to act as a moderator and change the magnitude and/or direction of the relationships between various antecedent variables such as organizational commitment, job satisfaction, union socialization, subjective norms, pro-union attitudes and union commitment. In addition, consistent with SIPA, the relationship between active past participation in the union and union commitment is also investigated.

2.4 Industrial Relations Climate

Starting from 1930s, climate concept has been widely studied (Lewin, Lippit, & White, 1939; Lewin, 1951; Guion, 1973; James, 1982; Dastmalchian, 1989). The first

study on climate was Lewin's study on experimentally created social climates (Lewin, Lippit, & White, 1939; Lewin, 1951). Climate is defined as "set of attributes specific to a particular organization that may be induced from the way that organization deals with its members and its environment" (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 1970, p.390).

Industrial relations climate was suggested to be a dimension of the climate concept (Schneider, 1975; Dastmalchian, Blyton, & Adamson, 1989). Dimensions of industrial relations climate were suggested to be the extent of cooperation, aggression/ resistance, apathy, hostility, support for trade unions, joint participation, trust, fairness, goal identification, and power balance. The first four dimensions were found by Martin (1976). These dimensions were also used in three other studies (Biasatti & Martin, 1979; Martin, 1980; Martin & Biasatti, 1979). Remaining dimensions of industrial relations climate were found by Brett (1980), Dastmalchian (1986) and Nicholson (1979). Martin's dimensions of industrial relations climate are similar to dimensions of industrial relations climate construct suggested by Dastmalchian and colleagues (1989).

Dastmalchian and colleagues (1989) measured the construct of industrial relations climate and suggested five dimensions: Harmony, openness, hostility, apathy, and promptness. Harmony (agreement between the management and the union), openness (honesty, directness toward the other party) and promptness (rapidity to take action) represent positive aspects of the relationship between management and the union. On the other hand, hostility (opposition, aggression shown to the other party) and apathy

(lack of interest for the other party) refer to negative aspects of the relationship. It is problematic to measure the organizational climate construct, and one of the ways to handle this problem is focusing on the certain aspects of the construct (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Dastmalchian, Blyton, & Adamson, 1989). They further suggested that industrial relations climate, which is the focus of interest in this study, is one of those aspects, which refers to the “characteristic atmosphere of the organization generated by the industrial relations activities as perceived by the employees”. Industrial relations activities are generated by the management and the union, and accordingly industrial relations climate refers to the relationship between the two. In the present study, this scale developed by Dastmalchian et al. (1989) is used to measure the industrial relations climate.

Harbison and Coleman (1951; as cited in Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton, 1993) developed a model of industrial relations climate in which they suggested three categories of relations between the two parties. The first category of industrial relations climate is “armed truce” which refers to a relationship in which the management links union’s presence to bad management, and the union often reveals that this belief is true. In this kind of industrial relations climate, a written agreement between the parties is possible only after an adversarial climate is created. In the armed truce climate, it is possible to talk about hostility and apathy between management and the union. Therefore, it could be suggested that this first category of industrial relations climate refers to an adversarial one.

The second suggested climate is “working harmony”. In such climates, there are labor- management committees, quality circles, joint work teams, and other cooperative activities between management and the union. Management and union are independent entities, but work together when it is required. In such a climate, there is possibly harmony between the management and the union when they work together. In addition to that, if they are able to act quickly to form a group when they have to work together, one can talk about promptness of the two parties. Moreover, to be able to continue to joint activities, the management and the union has to exchange the information freely. That is to say, if it is a successful temporarily cooperative activity, it can be suggested that the parties are open to each other in terms of expressing their ideas and information. As suggested by Harbison and Coleman (1951; as cited in Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton, 1993) management and union work together only when it is required. In working harmony climates, it is possible to talk about a cooperative climate between the two parties.

The last category suggested by Harbison and Coleman (1951; as cited in Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton, 1993) is the cooperative industrial relations climate in which the union and management work together in all the processes of the production from decision making to profit sharing. A prototype of such a cooperative climate is the Saturn Project developed by General Motors (GM) and United Auto Workers (UAW) in United States (Rubinstein & Kochan, 2001). In this project, GM and UAW worked together to built a small car, in which there were self directed teams, and the union representatives had the responsibility in strategic decision making processes. In such cooperative industrial

relations climate, the relationship between the management and the union is likely to be open, harmonious and based on prompt exchange of information. The reason is that in such a climate, the parties treat each other as equal partners and trust that the other party will consider their opinions and interests. The difference between the second (working harmony) and the third (cooperative) categories is the amount of time the management and the union work together to be able solve problems when they occur and make decisions regarding the work issues. In working harmony industrial relations climates, management and union work together when it is required, but in cooperative climates it is more of a rule than an exception that the parties work together. However, it is important to note that both the second and third categories involve cooperation relative to armed truce climates where cooperation does not exist and indeed is out of the question.

2.5 Hypothesized Model

Following past literature on antecedents and consequences of union commitment (see Bamberger et al., 1999; Snape, Redman & Chan, 2000 for reviews) the present study proposes job satisfaction, union socialization, perceived instrumentality of the union, organizational commitment, pro-union attitudes, steward responsiveness, subjective norms as antecedents to union commitment. Active past participation of the union as another antecedent to union commitment is investigated in this research as a test of SIPA. Finally willingness to work for the union and propensity to strike are investigated as consequences of union commitment. Where theoretically appropriate industrial relations

climate is proposed as a moderator of relationship between the variables above (see Figure 2 .6).

2 .5 .1 Organizational Commitment and Union Commitment

Bamberger and colleagues (1999) in their meta-analysis found that organizational commitment is positively related to union commitment. However, the authors did not examine the influence of industrial relations climate on this relationship.

Previous research suggests that industrial relations climate moderates the relationship between organization and union commitment (Reed & Young, & McHugh, 1994; Deery, Iverson, & Erwin, 1994; Johnson, Johnson, & Patterson, 1999). In cooperative industrial relations climates, salient information is that union and management exchange information freely, have respect for each other's goals, and work together to make the organization a better place in which to work, etc. In such a climate, employees infer that union and management are in friendly terms, and tend to behave like one party. Therefore, being committed to both management and the union is acceptable. This refers to dual commitment (e.g. Angle & Perry, 1986).

In adversarial industrial relations climates, on the other hand, the salient information is that management and union take a long time to resolve their differences, regularly quarrel over minor issues, and do not communicate so often etc. Therefore,

employees in an adversarial climate infer that management and union are two conflicting parties. In adversarial climates members would believe commitment to one organization is inconsistent with commitment to the other. Such dual commitment may cause members to feel dissonance and would motivate them to choose between union and management. Thus, organizational commitment in such a climate is not expected to predict union commitment.

Hypothesis 1: In cooperative industrial relations climates, organizational commitment is positively related to union commitment whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, organizational commitment is not related to union commitment.

2.5.2 Job Satisfaction, Organizational Commitment and Union Commitment

Bamberger and colleagues (1999) previously found that job satisfaction is negatively related to union commitment. Note that, they did not examine the influence of industrial relations climate on their integrative model. However, they suggested investigating its influence in the future research.

In cooperative industrial relations climates, where the union and management work together for the satisfaction of the employees and well being of the company, union members may attribute their job satisfaction to both parties. Hence, those who are

satisfied with their jobs do not face choice dilemmas and find it acceptable to be committed to both parties (Fuller & Hester, 1998).

In adversarial industrial relations climates, employees infer that there is conflict between the management and the union based on the salient information that 1) there are things that employees are dissatisfied with at work, and 2) the conflict arises from the demand of the union to change these and what the management offers. The union is the association that protects the rights of the employees and tries to get employees' demands accepted. Therefore, when an employee is dissatisfied with his/her work, he/she will take the side of the union in such a climate. On the other hand, satisfied workers in adversarial climates may attribute responsibility for positive job outcomes to management or to the union but not both. Given the conflict ridden nature of the relationship they are more likely see the management as responsible which directly controls the workplace.

Hypothesis 2: In cooperative industrial relations climates, job satisfaction is positively related to union commitment whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, they are negatively related.

2.5.3 Perceived Union Instrumentality and Union Commitment

Bamberger and colleagues (1999) found that members who perceive their union to be instrumental in providing positive outcomes are more likely to feel commitment to

their union. As suggested before, this relationship is consistent with a need satisfaction approach to attitude development. As individuals see their basic needs are satisfied through union membership they are more likely to have favorable feelings and thoughts about that union. Consistent with this argument and previous empirical evidence the present study, also expects that if the union is successful in getting better wages, fringe benefits, improving job security etc. through collective bargaining, this will lead to a more positive attitude towards the union. This positive relationship is expected to exist regardless of the nature of industrial relations.

Hypothesis 3(a): Perceived union instrumentality is positively related to union commitment regardless of the industrial relations climate.

In a unionized workplace, the conditions that employees face in their jobs are determined by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the management and the union. Hence if employees are satisfied with conditions such as their pay, benefits, promotion opportunities, this may be attributed both to the organization and the union. Thus it is expected that employees' job satisfaction positively predict their perceived instrumentality of their union in successfully obtaining salary, benefits and promotion opportunities for unionized workers. In cooperative industrial relations climate both parties seek win-win solutions in the collective bargaining. Therefore, salient information in a cooperative climate is that the union is partly responsible from the job outcomes obtained through collective bargaining. Favorable job outcomes or high job satisfaction

felt by the employees, are more likely to lead to perceptions of union playing an instrumental role. Hence, the relationship between job satisfaction and perceived instrumentality is expected to be stronger in such a climate. Given this relationship as well as the direct effects proposed from job satisfaction to union commitment (H2), and from perceived instrumentality to union commitment (H3a), the following hypothesis is suggested:

Hypothesis 3(b): The magnitude of the indirect effect of job satisfaction to union loyalty through perceived union instrumentality is higher for cooperative climates compared to adversarial ones.

2.5.4 Perceived Union Instrumentality and Pro-union Attitudes

Instrumentality of the union was suggested to be an antecedent of union commitment (e.g. Newton & Shore, 1992). However, for union members to feel commitment, they should see unions in general favorably. Pro-union attitudes in turn would be partly a function of what the union is able to provide to its members. Bamberger et al. (1999) also revealed support for this indirect relationship.

Hypothesis 4(a): Pro-union attitudes mediate the relationship between union instrumentality perceptions and union commitment regardless of the climate.

In adversarial climates, employees infer that the union and management are in conflict. Angle and Perry (1986) suggest that in such a climate, employees become committed to one of the parties. Therefore, making employees develop pro-union attitudes is important for unions to gain proponents in adversarial climates. For that purpose, from the very first day, new and potential members are told the necessity of the union existence through providing them union bulletin, inviting them to meetings etc. On the other hand, in a cooperative climate, employees are not asked to take sides. From this point of view, it could be suggested that pro-union attitudes among union members are likely to be higher in adversarial climates compared to cooperative climates.

Hypothesis 4(b): The relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment is higher in adversarial industrial relations climates compared to cooperative industrial relations climates.

2.5.5 Steward Responsiveness

Union stewards are the formal representatives of the union in the workplace, hence the members lifeline to their union. Union members do not get in touch with the union administrators very often, but they do it with the union steward. Stewards are generally responsible for informing members about their rights and union- related events; defending members' rights under the collective bargaining agreement; helping members file

grievances against the organization and solve work problems; and asking their opinions and needs before the negotiations. Consistent with a need satisfaction model of attitude development, members who perceive their stewards to be more responsive to their needs and problems are expected to feel more committed to their union.

Previous research (Fullagar et al. 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994) found two characteristics, individual consideration and charisma (two dimensions of transformational leadership) to be associated with a positive attitude towards the union. Specifically, if the union steward provides personal support to the members and provides a vision about the future of the union he or she is more likely to generate commitment among the rank-and-file employees. In a subsequent study (Fullagar et al., 1994) it was found that individual consideration and charisma of the steward are associated with individual socialization of the union members which indicates the importance of steward as a socialization agent. Therefore, individual consideration and charisma were found to be influential on attitudes toward union through individual socialization.

Another research (Thacker, Fields, & Barclay, 1990) investigated the influence of steward accessibility (a similar construct to steward responsiveness) on union commitment. In this study it was found that steward accessibility is positively related to union commitment. If union steward supports the union members and discuss the issues about the union, employees' union commitment is likely to increase. Likewise, in the

present study, steward responsiveness is expected to be positively related to union commitment. If the union steward can successfully support the union members when they need, and consult them about union related issues, this will lead to union commitment. In addition to this direct effect, steward responsiveness is expected to influence union commitment through pro-union attitudes. Union stewards responsiveness may influence not just attitudes toward the particular union that has organized in the workplace but unions in general. Therefore union stewards' responsiveness is expected to have a direct effect on commitment to the union as well as an indirect effect through pro-union attitudes.

Hypothesis 5(a): Steward responsiveness is positively related to union commitment regardless of the climate.

Hypothesis 5(b): Pro-union attitudes partially mediates the relationship between steward responsiveness and union commitment such that when steward responsiveness is high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment are also high, regardless of the climate.

2.5.6 Union Socialization

Through union socialization, (e.g. personal invitation to a union meeting, social activities organized by the union etc.) members are influenced by what other members think and say about the union. This will influence commitment to union. Previous

research also suggests that socialization influences union commitment directly (Gordon et al., 1980; Tan & Aryee, 2002; Fullagar & Barling, 1989) as well as indirectly through pro-union attitudes (Tan & Aryee, 2002). Fuller and Hester (1998) in their meta-analysis showed a direct relationship between socialization and union commitment. However they did not include pro-union attitudes in their analysis. In the present study, it is proposed that the issues mentioned by the members during the socialization and process through which socialization impacts commitment depend on the social context, namely, industrial relations climate.

When an employee comes to an organization for the first time, he/she learns about the acceptable behaviors, and attitudes in the organization through individual (informal) and institutional (formal) socialization (Jones, 1986). In an adversarial climate, a new employee infers that management and union are in conflict. In such a climate, union administrators are likely to communicate that chances for improvement are greater if the employee supports the union. In addition to that, union needs to gain proponents to be able to make the management accept their demands. For that purpose, the union organizes meetings, distributes union bulletin etc. to increase awareness among employees in the organization to be able to create a positive attitude toward the union through mentioning the importance of being a member of the union both for the member and the union itself. This is formal socialization provided by the union administrators. Moreover, existing employees directly or indirectly express the necessity of union existence to the new

employee during socialization. Afterwards, he/she is influenced by these conversations. This is informal socialization which also is likely to increase pro-union attitudes.

In a cooperative climate, the union and the management tend to solve the problems in cooperation, and work together to be able to improve the work conditions for the employees. In such a climate, employees infer that management and union act like one party. The information in the social context is more likely to suggest that the deadlock over important issues for members commonly observed in adversarial climates is transcended and the two parties are working in harmony. The union no more spends any effort to paint the picture of the oppressed working class and promote pro-union attitudes in their socialization attempts. Instead, it argues that by going beyond the win-lose model and accepting the win-win model they have been more successful in providing their members the outcomes they long desired. Therefore, in such a climate, socialization attempts for new and existing members tend to emphasize the instrumentality function of the union. Union administrators do not particularly emphasize the importance of the unions for the society and for the workers in general, but instead focus on positive outcomes of union membership for the workers. Hence, it is expected that union socialization in cooperative industrial relations climates is related to union commitment through perceived instrumentality whereas in adversarial climates the same link is through pro-union attitudes.

Hypothesis 6(a): In adversarial industrial relations climates, pro-union attitudes mediates the relationship between union socialization and union commitment; such that when union socialization is high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment are also high, whereas in cooperative industrial relations climates, socialization and pro-union attitudes are not related.

Hypothesis 6(b): In cooperative industrial relations climates, perceived instrumentality mediates the relationship between union socialization and union commitment; such that when union socialization is high, perceived instrumentality and union commitment are also high, whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, socialization and perceived instrumentality are not related.

2.5.7 Subjective Norms and Union Commitment

Subjective norms about union membership in one's close network are another antecedent of pro-union attitudes. Previous research suggest that individuals are influenced by referent others' (e.g. family, friends, coworkers) attitudes toward unions (Brief & Rude, 1981; Montgomery, 1988; Fullagar et al., 1992). Specifically, those who have referent others having positive (negative) attitudes toward the union are more likely to develop positive (negative) attitudes toward the union. In the present study, subjective norms about union membership are expected to effect commitment to a particular union through pro-union attitudes.

This indirect positive relationship between subjective norms and union commitment is expected to differ according to industrial relations climate. In adversarial climates, the magnitude of the relationship between subjective norms and union commitment through pro-union attitudes will be higher. The reason is that in adversarial climates, strong supporters of the union are likely to see the conflict between the management as inevitable part of their relationship since the worker is seen as the exploited class and the management is the exploiter party. Therefore, in an adversarial climate, being a member of the union is like being a partisan of a party. The members of such a union as a collective are more likely to create pro-union attitudes among coworkers compared to the members of a union in a cooperative climate.

Hypothesis 7: Pro-union attitudes mediate the relationship between subjective norms and union commitment such that when subjective norms are high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment are also high. This indirect relationship is stronger in adversarial industrial relations climates.

2.5.8 Active Past Participation and Union Commitment

Past behavior of an individual influences his/her commitment to union (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). However, a behavior does not always cause an attitude. For this relationship to occur, the individual has to infer commitment to his/her past behavior. If a behavior is freely chosen, irreversible and public, then commitment to behavior is more

likely (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). For instance, a union member who has campaigned for a candidate may perceive himself to be committed to the union since the act of campaigning is quite public and most likely to be freely chosen. In addition to that, acceptable justifications for engaging in union activities differ according to social context. The reason is that, in adversarial and cooperative industrial relations climates, norms and expectations vary. In adversarial climates, members' actively engaging in union activities is more likely to justify their behavior using the value they attach to unions in general in the society. Therefore when they make statements about their attitudes toward unions in general, these statements are informed by their past participation in union activities. However, in cooperative climates, acceptable justification for active past participation is more likely to revolve around personal gains since the members are more likely to be driven by their self rather than class-consciousness. They are expected to legitimize their past behaviors in more personal terms (e.g., "Participating in union activities gives me power and social status"). Hence, the pro-union attitudes do not play a role in the relationship between active past participation and union commitment in cooperative climates.

Hypothesis 8: Pro-union attitudes mediate the relationship between active past participation and union commitment in adversarial climates, such that when, active past participation is high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment are also high, whereas active past participation and pro-union attitudes are not related in cooperative climate.

2.5.9 Willingness to Work for the Union

Although, acceptable justification for participating union activities changes according to social context, if union members are committed to their behaviors, they will have desire continue work for the union. Following SIPA (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), behaviors of those who actively engaged in union activities are considered to be freely chosen, irreversible and public. These individuals' commitment to union is expected to be high. Hence, they are likely to work for the union in the future.

Hypothesis 9(a): Active past participation is positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the climate

Following Ajzen & Fishbein (1977) theory of reasoned action, favorable attitudes toward a union are expected to lead to positive behavioral intentions, such as willingness to work for the union if asked. This relationship is not expected to differ according to industrial relations climates.

Hypothesis 9(b): Union commitment is positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the climate

2.5.10 Propensity to Strike

Propensity to strike is expected to be influenced by organizational commitment in cooperative climates such that if organizational commitment is high, employees are less likely to go on strike. This view is consistent with Barling and colleagues' (2001) suggestion that those who are committed to both parties will probably experience dissonance in case of a strike, and this will influence the employees' intentions to join the strike negatively.


Hypothesis 10(a): In cooperative climates, organizational commitment is negatively related to propensity to strike, whereas in adversarial climates, they are not related.

In adversarial climates, the propensity to strike is higher compared to cooperative climates for two reasons. 1) in adversarial climates, union members infer that management and union are not likely to cooperate for a win-win solution during collective bargaining. In such an environment, demand of the union members are less likely to be satisfied 2) in such an environment discourse of the union suggests that conflict is an inevitable part of the relationship between the union and the management and getting demands accepted by the management is only possible through struggle. Therefore in adversarial climates committed union members have propensity to strike which is the acceptable behavior. However, in a cooperative climate salient information is

that negotiations take place in an atmosphere of good faith, a sense of fairness is associated with dealings etc. In such an environment, union members infer that both parties seek a solution both parties could benefit. Therefore, the likelihood of committed union members to go on a strike is less in cooperative industrial relations climate.

Hypothesis 10(b): The (positive) relationship between union commitment and propensity to strike is higher in adversarial climates.

Figure 2.6 The Hypothesized Model of Union Commitment in Adversarial and Cooperative Climates



Notes: "a" and "c" denote adversarial and cooperative climates respectively. "+" and "-" denote positive and negative relationships respectively. "0" refers to no relationship. Bigger font refers to higher correlation in the respective climate.

Chapter III

UNIONISM IN TURKEY

3.1 A Short History of Turkish Industrial Relations

History of Turkish labor movement and unions is an extensive topic, but I will give a brief history of labor movement starting from 1870 and special emphasis on the events that will enable to understand the stance of unions and confederations today. Türk-İş and Disk confederations are emphasized in this section due to the industrial relationships climate that they create which are proposed to be different from each other. The reasons of this difference between their industrial relationships climate are given below considering the historical process. Therefore, I aim to give the brief history of Türk-İş and Disk with special emphasis on their industrial relations climates.

According to historical accounts of Turkish industrial relations (Ulukan, 2003) strikes and labor movements due to economical reasons started in 1870. Some argue that Ameleperver Association founded in 1866 is the first worker association and served like a union. However, there are counter arguments regarding this issue claiming that it was founded as an office for unemployed workers and provide the necessary tools for them to work. There are also some views arguing that Amele-i Osmani Association founded in 1884 is the first worker association which had the objective to organize the economic

activities, but also performed some illegal political activities. In 1908, 30 strikes happened in 30 days. The reason behind these strikes was to improve the working conditions and increase the salaries. The worker associations (similar to unions) were the encouraging force behind these strikes. After these strikes in 1908, Law of Tatil-i Eşgal, which aims to limit the strikes and hinder unionism, was constituted. With this law in constitution the number of strikes decreased. However in 1919, labor movement gained speed due to the fact that the war has just finished and accordingly economic conditions were steadily improving (Ulukan, 2003).

1923- 1946 Era is the one party era, and the only party is CHP. CHP was against founding political organizations, and accordingly brought some limitations to hinder unionism. After 1946, multiparty era starts, and limitations, regarding foundation of class oriented associations, were removed. In 1947, unions' law, with its roots in İzmir Economic Congress (1923) in which worker rights were discussed, was constituted. According to this law, more than one union could be founded in a branch of business. However, it was forbidden for unions to get involved in political activities (Tokol, 1994). After unions' law had been constituted, unionization rates increased, and there were 49 unions in 1947 (Ulukan, 2003).

As the number of unions increased, a larger association, consisting of various unions with the common stance, was needed; Türk-İş Confederation was founded in 1952. In the second half of 1960s, conflicting ideas appeared in Türk-İş. Consequently some unions were separated from Türk-İş Confederation and Disk Confederation was founded

in 1967. Libertarian attitudes brought by 61 Constitution was very much influential in the foundation of Disk (Ulukan, 2003).

There was a main difference between the views of these two union confederations. Türk-İş did not have a political stance and revealed that they could protect the rights of the workers through collective bargaining whereas Disk viewed itself in the opposite side of the employer based on the ideology of a class struggle between the proletariat and the exploiter. Disk held the belief that workers could not get their rights without getting into a political struggle, and disclosed that they took sides through supporting TİP (Turkish Worker Party) (Tokol, 1994).

In March 12, 1971, military coup took place, and TİP was closed. This era was the time of struggles, strikes, and meetings for Disk. After TİP was closed, Disk started to support CHP. Accordingly, independent unions and some Türk-İş unions started to join the side of Disk. However, Disk, in its Fifth General Assembly, disclosed that one union was enough for one branch of business. Thus, unions in the same branch of business joined together but some of the unions fell outside of this merger. This situation resulted in discomfort and conflict in Disk. In 1977, the management changed in Disk, and the new management was Social Democrat as opposed to a previous Socialist management (Ulukan, 2003).

In September 12, 1980, another military coup took place in Turkey, and two other confederations; activities of Misk (Nationalist Worker Unions Confederation) and Hak-İş

were stopped in addition to Disk. In 1984, martial law was abolished and collective bargaining was released. Consequently, labor movements got started again and Hak-İş and Misk restarted their activities. However, Disk was kept closed until 1991 (Ulukan, 2003).

With the release of martial law, meetings, strikes and struggles started. In the absence of Disk, Türk-İş was the one which supported the union activities (meetings, strikes and boycotts) (Ulukan, 2003). That is to say, if Disk's management had not changed into a Social Democrat form and been closed until 1991, unions belong to Disk, which supports TİP and mainly the Socialist movement, would be very aggressive towards the management, and accordingly, is part of a very hostile industrial relations climate. Therefore, I could argue that the attitudes of these two confederations are not very much different from each other as much as it was before 1980 Military Take-over. Disk General President Kemal Nebioğlu also mentioned the difference in the attitude of Disk in the 3rd Ören Meeting in 1992. He stated that: “many things have changed within 12 years... We are going to discuss the issues instead of fighting. We support the democracy, its laws and institutions” (Ulukan, 2003). This also indicates the changing attitude of Disk and turning into a confederation that favors less hostile industrial relations.

As mentioned in the first chapter, unionization rates decreased from 67.94 % to 57.78 % from 1996 to 2005 (<http://www.calisma.gov.tr/>). Number of workers and unionization by period is given in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1

Number of workers and unionization by period

<i>PUBLICATION PERIOD</i>	<i>NUMBER OF WORKERS</i>	<i>NUMBER OF UNIONIZED WORKERS</i>	<i>UNIONIZATION RATE</i>
January 1996	3.973.306	2.695.627	67,84
July 1996	4.051.295	2.708.784	66,86
January 1997	4.111.200	2.713.839	66,01
July 1997	4.215.375	2.774.622	65,82
January 1998	4.266.097	2.856.330	66,95
July 1998	4.327.156	2.923.546	67,56
January 1999	4.350.016	2.987.975	68,69
July 1999	4.381.039	3.037.172	69,33
January 2000	4.508.529	3.086.302	68,45
July 2000	4.521.081	2.468.591	54,60
January 2001	4.537.544	2.580.927	56,88
July 2001	4.562.454	2.609.672	57,20
January 2002	4.564.164	2.648.847	58,04
July 2002	4,572,841	2,680,966	58,63
January 2003	4,686,618	2,717,326	57,98
July 2003	4,781,958	2,751,670	57,54
January 2004	4,857,792	2,806,927	57,78

Table 3.2 and 3.3 provide a list of the unions connected to Türk-İş and Disk confederations, respectively and the number of members these unions have as of 2005 (<http://www.calisma.gov.tr/>).

Table 3.2

Unions connected to Türk-İş Confederation and number of members these unions have

<i>TYPE OF INDUSTRY</i>	<i>UNIONS</i>	<i>NUMBER OF MEMBERS</i>	<i>% OF MEMBERS IN THAT UNION TO THAT INDUSTRY</i>
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishery	Orman-İş	57.580	Not reported
	Tarım-İş	41.136	Not reported
Mining	Türk Maden-İş	50.646	39.70
	Genel Maden-İş	30.509	23.91
Petroleum	Petrol-İş	75.985	33.37
Food Industry	Tek Gıda-İş	178.495	52.00
Sugar industry	Şeker-İş	26.263	98.78
Textile	Teksif	319.168	54.43
Leather	Türk Deri-İş	16.440	20.43
Wood Industry	Ağaç-İş	12.650	15.99
Paper Industry	Selüloz-İş	16.053	52.77
Press and information	Basın-İş	4.484	10.46
Bank and insurance	Bass	16.239	11.40
	Basisen	60.365	42.38
Cement, soil, glass	Türk Çimse-İş	60.542	40.00
	Kristal-İş	18.569	12.26
	Cam Seramik-İş	14	0.01
Metal	Türk Metal	267.838	43.02
Ship	Dok Gemi-İş	4.175	35.52
Construction	Yol-İş	160.711	22.48
Energy	Tes-İş	111.558	80.37
Trade, office,	Tez Koop-İş	62.377	14.28
Land transportation	Tümtis	13.854	11.89
Railway transportation	Demiryol-İş	21.453	78.45
Sea transportation	Türk Deniz-İş	13.065	30.87
Air transportation	Hava-İş	14.004	52.52
Warehouse business	Liman-İş	6.931	31.51
Communication	Türkiye Haber-	52.198	99.69
Health	Sağlık-İş	13.932	20.37
Accommodation and	Toleyis	41.308	14.04
National defense	Türk Harb-İş	34.048	12.14
Journalism	TGS	3.772	29.99
Public works	Belediye-İş	188.656	45.82
Total		1.908.348	

Table 3.3

Unions connected to Disk Confederation and number of members of these unions

<i>TYPE OF INDUSTRY</i>	<i>UNIONS</i>	<i>NUMBER OF MEMBERS</i>	<i>% OF MEMBERS IN THAT UNION TO THAT INDUSTRY</i>
Mining	Dev Maden-Sen	1.429	1.12
Petroleum	Lastik-İş	40.217	17.66
Food Industry	Gıda-İş	26.697	7.77
Textile	Tekstil	72.234	12.31
Wood Industry	Asis	463	0.58
Paper Industry	Tümka-İş	3.299	10.84
Press and information	Basın-İş	3.202	7.47
Bank and insurance	Bank-Sen	18.569	12.26
Metal	Birleşik Metal-İş	65.599	10.53
Ship	Limter-İş	1.186	11.06
Construction	Devrimci Yapı-İş	17	0.01
Trade, office, education, fine arts	Sosyal-İş	43.914	10.05
	Sine Sen	31	0.01
Land transportation	Nakliyat-İş	15.252	13.09
Health	Dev Sağlık-İş	719	1.34
Accommodation and places of amusement	Oleyis	32.138	10.92
Journalism	Medya-Sen	370	2.94
Public works	Genel-İş	72.369	17.58
Total		397.705	

3.2 Current Situation

The effect of 1980 military coup on unionism in Turkey was also demonstrated in Buğra, Adaman and İnel's qualitative (2004) research. This research is a descriptive one that aims to examine the role of unions in changing Turkey.

In the Buğra and colleagues' study (2004) it is mainly stated that unions have

lost their powers after 1980 and are about to perish for two reasons: 1) outsourcing not unionized workers when needed 2) the requirement to have ten percent of the employees in the organization to be organized.

Another research (Özkan, unpublished manuscript) was conducted in Oyak Renault and Tofaş Fiat plants, in which Türk-Metal is organized in, to examine process of reorganization and integration of joint ventures. This research topic is clearly out of interest in the present study. However, Özkan's observations of Türk-Metal are important to mention. Türk-Metal union is example of union autocracy. For instance, union representative is appointed through the collaboration of union and the employer who then reciprocates through supporting the union when needed. For instance, in 1998, many of the workers withdrew from their membership from Türk-Metal and wanted to be the member of a progressive rival union. However, the employer forced the workers to join back to Türk-Metal and those who were resistant to this pressure were fired. Another example of these collaborative practices is that Türk-Metal accepted teamwork which is reciprocated by the employer's guarantee of Türk-Metal's workplace representation. Because of these collaborative practices, Türk-Metal is often characterized as a collaborative union, and union members report distrust for their unions and expel from it. Tokol, who has been working with unions and training them, (personal communications, July 25, 2006) also suggested that union members of Türk-Metal consider it as collaborative. One of the HR managers' statement also gives support that Türk-Metal is a collaborative union. He or she stated that "we are not for employing non unionized work

force. Yet the union should recognize the needs of Turkish industry in terms of flexibility to be able to transform itself in this direction” (Özkan, unpublished manuscript, p.5).

In the present study, interviews with union branch chiefs (e.g. personal communications with Mustafa Burgaz, February 15, 2006) and stewards (e.g. personal communications with Nigar Tombul, February 16, 2006) also revealed that unions try to understand the need of the industry and employer. Before 80, without considering the condition of the Turkish economy and market, unions had the tendency to go on strike to get their demands accepted (getting salary increase, improving job security etc). However, today there are economical problems in Turkey which influence employers’ earnings and accordingly employees’ wages. That is to say, unions try to understand the burdens that the economy brings to employer, and they no more demand things that the employer can not supply.

These two researches by Buğra and colleagues (2004) and Özkan (unpublished manuscript) brought some information on Turkish industrial relations system. However, to date no research exists examining the influence of industrial relations climate on the psychological variables. Present study was conducted with this aim.

Johns (2006) mentioned the importance of studying the influence of context on organizational behavior. He suggested that there are two levels of analysis in context study. The first one is the omnibus context and the second one is discrete context. Omnibus context refers to “an entity that comprises many features or particulars” (p.391)

that influence individuals' attitudes and behaviors. While studying omnibus context, the researcher has to have a journalistic approach where a story is told. That is to say, the researcher investigates *who*, *what*, *when*, *where* and *why* of the study. The "who heuristic refers to occupational and demographic context, the where heuristic refers to the location of the research site (region, culture, industry), the when heuristic refers to the time (absolute and relative) at which the research was conducted or research events occur, and the why heuristic refers to the rationale for the conduct of the research or the collection of research data" (p.391). A research including this information tells a story (Johns, 2006). Note that a good research tells a story (e.g. Daft, 1983). In the present study, union commitment (what heuristic) of blue collar union members (who heuristic) of Türk-İş and Disk confederations (where heuristic) in Tekstil and Metal industries (where heuristic) were examined.

According to Johns (2006), dimension of omnibus context influences discrete context. Discrete context refers to specific levers of the context (e.g. social influence) that influence attitudes and behavior and is nested within the omnibus context. This means, the effects of omnibus context on individuals' behaviors and attitudes is mediated by discrete context. Consistent with Johns' view, organizations in which unions belong to Disk or Türk-İş confederations (where heuristic) will be have different social influences (dimension of social context) on individuals which will consequently influence attitudes and behaviors of the individuals in those organizations.

Chapter IV

METHOD

4.1 Participants

Questionnaires were sent to 600 unionized blue collar workers. 527 of the questionnaires were returned, indicating 88% response rate. These unionized workers were from 32 private sector organizations and four unions in two industries. Specifically, there were seven organizations connected to Tekstil-İş Union (textile industry) from Disk Confederation, 10 organizations connected to Teksif Union (textile industry) from Türk-İş Confederation, five organizations connected to Birleşik Metal- İş Union (metal industry) from Disk Confederation, and 10 organizations connected to Türk- Metal Union (metal industry) from Türk- İş Confederation. Total number of organizations organized by Disk was less compared to Türk-İş since Disk is a confederation that is not organized in organizations as much as Türk-İş is. For practical reasons, most of data was collected from one city; Bursa. To be able to overcome the problem of unequal number of organizations Türk-İş and Disk are organized in, 30 surveys (Appendix A) were asked to be completed in each organization connected to Disk unions (Tekstil-İş and Birleşik Metal) while 15 surveys were asked to be completed in each organization connected to Türk-İş unions.

Table 4 .1 provides information about participants according to unions and confederations.

Table 4 .1

Demographic characteristics of participants according to unions and confederations.

	Teksif	Türk Metal	Tekstil-İş	Birleşik Metal	Türk-İş	Disk	TOTAL
N	144	147	95	141	291	236	527
Age							
Mean	34.1 ^a	32.3 ^b	33.6 ^{ab}	36.2 ^c	33.2 ^a	35.1 ^b	34.1
Standard Deviation	5.7	4.9	6.2	5.7	5.4	6.1	5.8
Gender (%)							
Male	70.8	90.5	75.8	100	80.8	90.3	85
Education (%)							
Primary Education	35.4	8.2	21.1	19.9	21.6	20.3	21.1
Middle School	29.9	10.9	17.9	19.1	20.3	18.6	19.5
High School	28.5	62.6	50.5	48.2	45.7	49.2	47.2
Vocational School	5.6	12.2	7.4	10.6	8.9	9.3	9.1
University	.7	6.1	3.2	2.1	3.4	2.5	3
Job (%)							
Head Man & Foreman	14.6	14.3	17.9	13.5	1	.8	.9
Worker	75.7	72.8	69.5	72.3	74.2	71.2	72.9
Other (quality inspector, Laboratory assistant etc.)	9.7	12.9	12.6	14.2	11.3	13.6	12.3
Organization Tenure (years)							
Mean	8.9 ^a	7.9 ^a	7.7 ^a	11.4 ^b	8.4 ^a	9.9 ^b	9
Standard Deviation	4.8	4.5	5.1	5.7	4.7	5.8	5.2

Table 4 .1

Continued

	Teksif	Türk Metal	Tekstil-İş	Birleşik Metal	Türk-İş	Disk	TOTAL
Union Tenure (years)							
Mean	8.6 ^a	8.1 ^{ab}	6.4 ^b	10.4 ^c	8.4 ^a	8.8 ^a	8.6
Standard Deviation	5.1	5.0	4.1	6.1	5	5.7	5.3
Fired Before (%)							
Yes	28.5	19.1	25	22.5	23.9	23.5	23.7
No	71.5	80.9	75	77.5	76.1	76.5	76.3
Layoff Before (%)							
Yes	16.8	10.7	18.7	18.5	13.8	18.6	15.9
No	83.2	89.3	81.3	81.5	86.2	81.4	84.1
Other Union (%)							
Yes	3.5	7.1	20.9	16.9	5.3	18.5	11.1
No	96.5	92.9	79.1	83.1	94.7	81.5	88.9
Union Management (%)							
Yes	7	5.7	19.8	9.6	6.4	13.7	9.6
No	93	94.3	80.2	90.4	93.6	86.3	90.4

Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the Tukey honesty significant difference comparison. Means comparison was done for unions and confederations separately.

Number of participants in Tekstil-İş was less than the number of participants in Teksif, Türk-Metal and Birleşik Metal. Mean age differed between the unions except that Tekstil-İş was comparable to Teksif and Türk-Metal. Birleşik-Metal union sample was the oldest among the four union samples. Age of the participants significantly differed according to confederation such that mean age was somewhat higher for Disk. Majority of the sample consisted of male workers. The ratio of male to female participants was higher in Metal unions as compared to Textile unions. Participants in Birleşik Metal had the highest organization and union tenure. Organization tenure of those in Disk was higher than Türk-İş, but union tenure did not differ according to confederation. The union with the lowest number of participants who have been fired before and who have experienced a lay off was Turk Metal of Türk-İş. More of the participants from Disk than Türk-İş have been a member of another union. Relatively few participants have assumed responsibility in the management of their union (also see Table 4.2).

Table 4 .2 shows mean union management tenure of those who took responsibility in union management before. As seen in Table 4 .2, no significant difference between confederations, industries and unions was found in terms of mean union management tenure.

Table 4 .2

Number of participants who had responsibility in union management according to confederation, industry and union.

	N	Union management tenure	
		Mean	Standard Deviation
Confederation			
Türk-İş	15	3.8 _a	3
Disk	23	4.1 _a	2.5
Industry			
Textile	19	4.3 _a	2.5
Metal	19	3.6 _a	3
Union			
Teksif	7	2.5 _a	1.3
Türk-Metal	8	4.8 _a	3.8
Tekstil-İş	12	5.3 _a	2.5
Birleşik Metal	11	2.8 _a	1.9

Note. Means comparison was done for confederation, industry and union separately. Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the Tukey honesty significant difference comparison.

Table 4 .3 shows the participants that have been a member of another union and confederation of that union that participants have previously been the member of. As seen in Table 4 .3, those participants have previously been a member of a union connected to Türk-İş confederation, regardless of the confederation, type of industry and union. Most changes within this sample occurred from Türk-İş to Disk.

Table 4 .3

Number of participants who were member of another confederation before according to confederation, industry and union

	N	Previous Confederation		
		Türk-İş (%)	Disk (%)	Batiş (%)
Confederation				
Türk-İş	13	84.6	15.4	0
Disk	39	94.9	2.6	2.6
Industry				
Textile	22	86.4	9.1	4.5
Metal	30	96.7	3.3	0
Union				
Teksif	5	80	20	0
Türk-Metal	8	87.5	12.5	0
Tekstil-İş	17	88.2	5.9	5.9
Birleşik Metal	22	100	0	0

4.2 Procedure

First, scales in the questionnaire were translated from English to Turkish by the researcher. Afterwards, they were back translated by a bilingual Turkish person living in England for twelve years. Inconsistencies in the original and back translated versions of the scales were detected and reconsidered by the researcher. Afterwards, to be able to see if the items in the questionnaire are clear enough for the participants, and measures are reliable, a pilot study was carried out with 22 unionized blue collar workers. Participants' feedbacks about the items in the questionnaire were reconsidered.

After the translation of the scales and the pilot study, a media search was done to be able to find unions that are likely to have adversarial relationships with the managements. Recent strikes were paid special attention to in this phase. The reason was that these unions which went on strike could be those which have adversarial relationships with the managements in general. Then, these unions which went on strike were listed. However, unions which went on strike once or twice are not necessarily adversarial in their relationships in general terms. In the present study, it was aimed to have a sample that consisted of unions that were adversarial or cooperative in general terms. Therefore, Teksif general secretary was contacted to scan the list, report if the listed unions are adversarial with the managements in general terms based on his observations and experiences. He was asked to suggest two unions in the same industry; one of them is adversarial and the other one is cooperative. He was also induced to select the unions among those which have right for collective bargaining (because there are items in the survey asking about collective bargaining).

On the basis of personal conversations with Teksif general secretary, Teksif and Tekstil-İş unions from Textile Industry, and Türk-Metal and Birleşik Metal unions from Metal Industry were selected. The reason behind choosing textile and metal industries were the large number of unionized workers in these industries. Majority of the workers in Turkey are employed in textile and metal industries after the construction industry. According to Turkey Ministry of Labor and Social Security 2005 records, among 622.531

workers in metal industry, 64.43% of the workers and among 586.369 of textile industry workers, 81.3% of the workers are unionized.

After determining the industry and unions, meetings were organized with the union branch chiefs who were responsible from managing the unions which were organized in the organizations connected to this branch. To be able to have an up-to-date list of the members of the unions, revenues list of the previous month, on which names of the members who paid revenues were written, was provided by each branch chief. By dividing the number of unionized workers in each organization to the half of the aimed number of participants (15 participants from the organizations connected to Türk-İş confederation unions and 30 participants from the organizations connected to for DISK unions) a list of names was determined for each organization.

The next step was to meet with the union stewards. In the meetings, name lists were shown to each one of the union stewards, and they were asked to decrease the number of names to half by taking into account whether people in the list were retired after they paid the last revenue, and their level of education. In the study, participants were not required to be educated well, but to be able to understand the questions; they should have been at least literate. Since revenues list did not provide such information about the members this information was gathered from the head union stewards who presumably know the members well because of their every day contacts.

The next step was writing the names of the participants on the envelopes which had previously been prepared and in which there were surveys and an empty envelope (to ensure the confidentiality of the participants). Before stewards left, envelopes on which participants' names were written, had been submitted to them, and they were asked to distribute the envelopes to the participants and collect them back in one or two weeks. They were asked to tell the participants to complete the surveys at home, seal the envelopes on which their names were not written, and hand it to stewards. These instructions were also written at the beginning of the questionnaire. Afterwards, stewards brought the completed surveys to their union branch. Then, questionnaires were taken from the union branch.

4.3 Measures

Industrial relations climate: Industrial relations climate was operationalized in two ways. First, industrial relations climate was categorized as adversarial vs. cooperative using the confederation membership (Disk vs. Türk-İş). That is, those organizations which are organized by a union that is part of Disk Confederation were categorized as having adversarial climates and organizations organized by a union which is part of Türk-İş was categorized as having cooperative climates. This operationalization was supported by respective histories of the two confederations discussed in Chapter 3.

Second, to measure industrial relations climate, a scale from Dastmalchian, Blyton and Adamson's (1989) was used. Dastmalchian et al.'s measure is a reliable one which has coefficient alphas ranging from 0.64 to 0.92. Scale had 26 items on a 5-point agreement scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). Originally, there were 5 dimensions of industrial relations climate measure: harmony (e.g. union and management work together to make this organization a better place in which to work), openness (e.g. the parties exchange information freely in this organization), hostility (e.g. the parties regularly quarrel over minor issues), apathy (e.g. generally, employees here do not have much interest in the quality of the union- management relationship), promptness (e.g. grievances are normally settled promptly in this organization).

In the analysis, apathy dimension was excluded since it measures employees' level of interest in the relationship between management and the union, namely industrial relations climate, whereas this study aimed to capture the actual type of relationship between these two parties. In addition, the original item "the parties in this organization keep their word" was also excluded since it was mistranslated by the researcher and detected after data collection.

Exploratory factor analysis results showed that industrial relations climate items loaded on three factors. First factor refers to the harmony dimension, second factor consists of openness and promptness items and third factor refers to the hostility dimension. Afterwards, exploratory factor analysis was carried out by limiting the

number of factors extracted to two (see Appendix B). Results showed that, first (harmony) and second (openness and promptness) dimensions both loaded on the same factor. This united factor was called cooperative industrial relations climate and the remaining third factor was identified as adversarial type climate. A variable indicating the dominant climate perception for each participant was generated by subtracting the cooperative scores from adversarial scores. Thus, a negative score on this indicator signified the existence of an adversarial climate between the management and the union, whereas a positive score indicated the dominance of a cooperative industrial relations climate.

An ANOVA was run where the independent variable was organizational id and dependent variable was industrial relation climate. F-test results showed that organizational membership explained significant amount of variance in individual participants' industrial climate perceptions (ICC (1) = .36; ICC (2) = .91)¹. ICC (1) and ICC (2) are reliability measures that are used to evaluate consistency of raters' responses' (Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992). While ICC (1) refers to the amount of variance that is explained by group membership, ICC (2) refers to the reliability of the group means. For group means to be reliable, ICC (2) has to be over .70. Next, participants scores from the same organization were averaged to find out the industrial relations climate score of each organization. Each organization was categorized as having either a cooperative or an adversarial industrial relations climate according to their scores.

¹ICC (1) = (MSB-MSW)/[MSB+[(k-1)*MSW]]
ICC (2) = [k*(ICC(1))]/[1+(k-1)*ICC(1)]

As can be seen in Table 4.4, not all the organizations organized by a union of Disk Confederation had an adversarial industrial relations climate (six out of 12 organizations are adversarial). Likely, not all the organizations organized by a union of Türk-İş Confederation had a cooperative industrial relations climate (16 out of 20 organizations are cooperative). Even though there are differences within confederations, these differences are interesting since they allow examining industrial relations climate at the confederation level as well as at the organizational level.

Table 4 .4

Cooperative – Adversarial Scores of the Organizations

Organizations	Confederations	Cooperative-Adversarial Score
Teksif 1*	Türk-İş	.56
Teksif 2*	Türk-İş	-.28
Teksif 3*	Türk-İş	.17
Teksif 4*	Türk-İş	.58
Teksif 5*	Türk-İş	-.61
Teksif 6*	Türk-İş	.49
Teksif 7*	Türk-İş	.89
Teksif 8*	Türk-İş	1.42
Teksif 9*	Türk-İş	.82
Teksif 10*	Türk-İş	1.36
Türk Metal 1**	Türk-İş	1.41
Türk Metal 2**	Türk-İş	.53
Türk Metal 3**	Türk-İş	1.21
Türk Metal 4**	Türk-İş	1.28
Türk Metal 5**	Türk-İş	.93
Türk Metal 6**	Türk-İş	-.59
Türk Metal 7**	Türk-İş	2.83
Türk Metal 8**	Türk-İş	.68
Türk Metal 9**	Türk-İş	1.04
Türk Metal 10**	Türk-İş	-.18
Tekstil-İş 1***	Disk	.61
Tekstil-İş 2***	Disk	-.12
Tekstil-İş 3***	Disk	-.60

Table 4 .4

Continued

Organizations	Confederations	Cooperative- Adversarial Score
Tekstil-İş 4 ***	Disk	-.11
Tekstil-İş 5 ***	Disk	.14
Tekstil-İş 6 ***	Disk	.85
Tekstil-İş 7 ***	Disk	1.76
Birleşik Metal 1 ****	Disk	-.23
Birleşik Metal 2 ****	Disk	1.48
Birleşik Metal 3 ****	Disk	-.15
Birleşik Metal 4 ****	Disk	1.02
Birleşik Metal 5 ****	Disk	-.19

* denotes the organizations that Teksif is organized in

** denotes the organizations that Türk Metal is organized in

*** denotes the organizations that Tekstil-İş is organized in

**** denotes the organizations that Birleşik Metal is organized in

In this study, Cronbach alpha values were found as .70 and .84 for adversarial and cooperative climates, respectively.

Job satisfaction: Spector's Job Satisfaction Survey (1985) with a 5-point Likert-type scale (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) was used to measure four facets of job satisfaction. The reported coefficient alpha was .89 (Blau, 1999). Originally, the scale has nine dimensions. In the present study, four of the dimensions (pay satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, benefits satisfaction, supervision satisfaction) which represent the issues

discussed between the union and the management were used. An example item for pay satisfaction is “raises are too few and far between”. An example item for promotion satisfaction is “people get ahead as fast here as they do in other places”. An example item for supervision satisfaction is “I like my supervisor”. An example item for benefits satisfaction is “I am not satisfied with the benefits I receive”.

Because the scale was too long for participants to complete, one of the items from pay satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, and supervision satisfaction dimensions which were replicating the items in the scale were excluded from the scale: “I am unappreciated by the organization when I think about what they pay me” “There is really too little chance for promotion on my job” and “my supervisor is quite competent in doing his/her job”.

Second order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was done to test the measurement model to see if manifest variables are indicators of their latent variable (see table 4.5).

In the present study, for cooperative climates, R-Square values for pay satisfaction, benefits satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, and supervisor satisfaction, respectively were found to be .62, .79, .59, .63 while they were found to be .87, .52, .83, .56 for adversarial climates. For Türk-İş, R-Square for pay satisfaction, benefits

satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, and supervisor satisfaction were found to be .65, .82, .77, .51 while they were found to be .65, .74, .42, .82 for Disk.

In this study, Cronbach alpha values for pay satisfaction, benefits satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, and supervisor satisfaction were found to be .63, .72, .75, and .71 respectively. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of job satisfaction are given in Appendix C.

Union socialization: Short version of Gordon et al.'s union socialization measure was used to assess union socialization (1980). Three items were added to Gordon et al.'s union socialization measure since these items measure the union socialization activities provided by the unions in Turkey. These extra items are the following: "personal invitation to social activities organized by the union (e.g. union picnic)," "personal invitation to a training organized by the union" and "meeting with union officers". The participants were asked to remember and report whether they experienced the events in the given statements during the first year of their union membership. Those who experienced the events, marked yes and those who did not, marked no.

In this study, Cronbach alpha value for union socialization was found to be .79. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of the union socialization measure are given in Appendix D.

Steward Responsiveness: Hammer, Wazeter, Bayazit's (2000) 5-point scale was used to measure steward responsiveness (1=never, 5=always). This scale consisting of 14 items was originally used to measure responsiveness of local union presidents. In the present study, it was used to measure responsiveness of head stewards. One of the items in the original scale was not included in the present study since union stewards in Turkey does not have such a responsibility. This excluded item is "runs the local by him/herself". Instead of this item, one item, which applies Turkey was added to the scale which is "supports members to use their rights to speak about how the union is run".

In this study, Cronbach alpha value for steward responsiveness is .96. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of the steward responsiveness measure are given in Appendix E.

Active Past Participation: In the literature, there are multidimensional (Cohen, 1993; Klandermans, 1986; McShane, 1986; Parks, Gallagher, & Fullagar, 1995) and one-dimensional (Aryee & Chay, 2001; Kelloway & Barling, 1993; Kuruvilla, Gallagher, Fiorito, & Wakabayashi, 1990) definitions of union participation. In the present study, union participation was taken as a multidimensional construct, and the 4-point multidimensional scale of Shore and Newton (1995) was used to measure union participation (1=never, 4= many times). In addition to that, participants could mark "there was not such an event".

The scale originally consists of eight dimensions. The first dimension is self sacrifice dimension (e.g. worked voluntarily on a union sponsored charity project). The second dimension is information seeking dimension (e.g. read the union newsletter). One of the questions in this dimension “Read memos and notices” which is replicating the other items in the scale was excluded since the scale was too long for participants to complete. The third dimension is meeting avoidance dimension (e.g. my attendance is not important to the union). The fourth dimension is communication scale (e.g. talked up the union to family and friends outside of work). One question from “Talked up the union to coworkers” from this dimension which is captured by other items was excluded due to length of the scale. The fifth dimension is service scale (e.g. how many elected union offices have you held?). Instead of items in the service scale, participants were asked if they had responsibility in union management in the demographics part. The sixth dimension is social activities scale (e.g. attended the local union picnic). The seventh dimension is the complaining scale (e.g. complained to family and friends outside of work about union activities). The eight dimension is voting (e.g. voted for contract ratification) scale.

Meeting avoidance and complaining scale items were excluded since active participation of the members is the focus of interest. One of the items was excluded since it does not apply the context here. This item is: attended the Christmas party. Adaptation of this item to Turkish unions was not valid. Hence, no adaptation for this item was carried out.

Since active past participation, as a latent construct, does not explain observed indicators, it was constituted as a composite index of members' engagement in activities which require effort on their part. These items are in the following: 1) Recruited volunteers for union activities 2) campaigned for a candidate for union office 3) attended information sharing meetings (e.g. during contract negotiations) 4) volunteered time to help the union in administrative activities, such as stuffing envelopes and making phone calls 5) worked voluntarily on a union sponsored charity project 6) voted for contract ratification. Additionally, those who participate in a union activity do not necessarily participate in other activities. Hence, no correlation between participation to union activities was expected. Therefore, reliability of this latent construct was not calculated.

Organizational Commitment: Wasti (2003) previously translated affective commitment items on a 5-point scale developed by Meyer, Allen & Smith (1993) (1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). These six items were used in the present study. An example item is: "I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization".

There were three negatively worded items which constituted the method factor and improved the fit. In this study, Cronbach alpha value for organizational commitment is .78. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of the organizational commitment measure are given in Appendix F.

Union instrumentality: Union instrumentality was measured by seven items on a 4-point scale (1=not at all successful, 4=very successful). This measure was developed by Chacko (1985). The measure has two dimensions which are extrinsic benefits dimension and intrinsic benefits dimension. An example item for extrinsic benefits dimension is “to what extent your union was successful in getting better wages? ”. An example item for intrinsic benefits dimension is “to what extent your union was successful in getting workers a say in how they do their jobs? ”.

The internal consistency of internal benefits dimension is .74, and it is .81 for external benefits dimension (Chacko, 1985). A Confirmatory factor analysis showed that a one factor solution was a better fit to data ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 1.60, p=.21$). In this study, Cronbach alpha value for a single dimension union instrumentality was found to be .89. R Square, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the union instrumentality measure are given in Appendix G.

Pro-union attitudes: Pro-union attitudes scale consists of eight items four of which were negatively worded five of the items were taken from McShane (1986), and three of the items were taken from the pro-union attitudes scale developed by LaHuis and Mellor (2001). It was a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree).

A CFA was done to examine the construct validity of the measure. A two factor solution was a good fit to the data where all eight items significantly loaded on a single

factor. In addition, the negatively worded items were allowed to load on the method factor which significantly improved the fit of the one factor model.

Pro-union attitudes and norms were explained by one model because of differentiation problem. As seen in Table 4.5, a two factor measurement model for pro-union attitudes and subjective norms provides a good fit to data.

In this study, Cronbach alpha value for pro-union attitudes was found to be .80. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the pro-union attitudes measure are given in Appendix H.

Subjective norms: To measure subjective norms, participants were asked to what extent their families, coworkers and people important to them support their union membership on a 5-point scale (1=not at all supportive, 5=very supportive). This scale which has an internal consistency of .82 was previously used by Fullagar et al. (1992) and Kelloway et al. (1993). In this study, Cronbach alpha value for subjective norms was found to be .84. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of the subjective norms measure are given in Appendix H.

Union commitment: 19 items from the Gordon et al.'s (1980) 5-point (1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree) union commitment measure was used to measure union commitment (see, Bayazit et al., 2004). Three dimensions of union commitment are

measured in the scale: loyalty, responsibility toward, and willingness to work for the union. However, in the present study, loyalty and willingness to work for the union dimensions of union commitment scale was used. An example item for the loyalty dimension is: “I feel a sense of pride being part of the local association (union)”. The reason for using union loyalty dimension is that 39% of the variance of the union commitment is explained by loyalty dimension (Gordon et al., 1980). An example item for willingness to work for the union is “I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected of a member to make the union successful.

There were four negatively worded items. These negative worded items were allowed to load on the orthogonal method factor which improved the model fit (Bayazit et al., 2004).

In this study, Cronbach alpha value for loyalty was found as .90 whereas for willingness to work for the union dimension it is .78. R Square values, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of the union loyalty and willingness to work for the union measures are given in Appendix I.

Propensity to strike: Items to measure propensity to strike were taken from 5-point (1=unlikely, 5=most likely) Local Association Member Survey developed by New York State School of Industrial & Labor Relations (1991). An example item is “I would go on a strike to get better salaries”. The original scale consisted of 10 items. However, four of

these items which were related to professionals or teachers only were not used in the present study. These excluded items are in the following: “I would go on a strike to reduce class size” “I would go on a strike to maintain or improve health and dental insurance” “I would go on a strike to maintain or improve transfer procedures” “I would go on a strike to reduce the amount of teaching duties”. There was one added item which is “I would go on a strike to maintain or improve social rights (fuel support, paid holiday, bonus).

In this study, Cronbach alpha value for propensity to strike was found as .88. R Square, unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the items of the propensity to strike measure are given in Appendix J.

Table 4 .5²

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for the Latent Variables

	Chi-Square	Df	Chi/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
Union commitment	279.79	126	2.22	0.96	0.95	0.04	0.03
Pro-union attitudes	61.69	30	2.05	0.98	0.97	0.04	0.03
Subjective norms	61.69	30	2.05	0.98	0.97	0.04	0.03
Union instrumentality	112.33	14	8.02	0.94	0.91	0.11	0.04
Organizational commitment	17.59	6	2.93	0.98	0.97	0.06	0.02
Job satisfaction	209.57	89	2.35	0.95	0.93	0.05	0.04
Union socialization	84.90	20	4.24	0.93	0.90	0.08	0.04
Steward responsiveness	327.01	74	4.41	0.96	0.95	0.08	0.02
Strike propensity	80.59	13	6.19	0.96	0.94	0.10	0.03

Notes: Since norms had only 3 items, pro-union attitudes and norms are explained by one model because of identification problem.

² For a model to give good fit to data, its P value of Chi-Square is expected to be higher than 0. A p value of 0 indicates that the model does not give good fit to data. Note that, with large sample sizes, insignificant Chi-Square values are hard to find. Therefore, the ratio of Chi-Square to df (CMIN/DF) is used to judge the goodness of fit of the models. CMIN/DF for an acceptable model is expected to be lower than 2. Additionally, CFI and TLI are expected to be higher than .90, .95, respectively. Brown and Cudeck (1993) suggested that if RMSEA is 0, it is a perfect fit; if it is below .05 it gives a close fit; and if it is around .08, it gives an acceptable fit. Moreover, SRMR is expected to be lower than .06.

Chapter V

RESULTS

5.1 Missing Data Handling

39% of the data was randomly missing. To avoid loss of information and loss of power, mean imputation and multiple imputation methods were used to handle missing data.

There were two types of missing data. Some of the respondents skipped one or more subscales specifically when answering union socialization items and demographics questions. Remaining missing data came from those who did not answer a number of items randomly in some of the scales.

In the missing data analysis, two macros created by Nazlı Baydar (2000, see Appendix K) were used. The first macro (mean imputation) enabled to do mean imputation across items. Specifically, missing information of a subject was replaced with the mean of the completed subscale items of that person. Afterwards, scale scores were computed with complete items. The second macro (multiple imputation) enabled to predict variables that have missing information by using information on a variable that doesn't have missing data. Specifically, regression model was used to predict the variable

that has missing information (y), by using one or more variables that are completely observed (x). Therefore, to start with, type of industry, which is completely observed, was chosen as the predictor to predict active past participation variable which has missing information. This macro was only used for this variable since all the other variables were latent variables.

5.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations of study variables for the whole sample. Union loyalty was positively related to age, organization and union tenure, but it was not related to gender and education. Note that, age, education, organization and union tenure had very low correlations with the other study variables, compared to correlations between the other study variables. Hence, age, education, organization and union tenure were not controlled in the hypothesis testing. Additionally, all the study variables, namely, pro-union attitudes, instrumentality perceptions, organizational commitment, steward responsiveness, subjective norms, union socialization, job satisfaction, active past participation, propensity to strike, were found to be positively related to union loyalty.

Table 5.1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Estimated Latent Variables for the Whole Sample

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 Age	34.10	5.82															
2 Gender [†]	1.14	.35	-.10*														
3 Education	2.53	1.01	-.22**	-.02													
4 Organization tenure	9.09	5.29	.67**	-.08	-.18**												
5 Union tenure	8.60	5.39	.63**	-.04	-.17**	.87**											
6 Union loyalty	3.60	.72	.18**	-.05	-.08	.23**	.24**										
7 Pro-union attitudes	3.90	.78	.17**	-.01	-.04	.15**	.17**	.65**									
8 Union instrumentality	2.41	.75	.12**	.08	-.18**	.08*	.11**	.35**	.29**								
9 Organizational commitment	3.43	.87	.08*	.04	.01	.15**	.17**	.31**	.33**	.27**							
10 Steward responsiveness	3.71	1.06	.19**	.02	-.17**	.24**	.22**	.55**	.48**	.36**	.29**						
11 Subjective norms	3.48	1.02	.14**	.05	-.14**	.14**	.15**	.55**	.54**	.27**	.35**	.48**					
12 Union socialization	.55	.31	.15**	-.00	-.13**	.21**	.23**	.44**	.35**	.33**	.21**	.60**	.36**				
13 Job satisfaction	3.08	.67	.04	.00	-.03	.09*	.12**	.37**	.37**	.52**	.57**	.42**	.36**	.34**			
14 Active past participation	1.54	.90	.24**	-.09*	-.16**	.31**	.32**	.48**	.37**	.30**	.20**	.47**	.37**	.54**	.30**		
15 Propensity to strike	2.41	1.01	.04	-.01	-.13**	.05	.01	.33**	.20**	.22**	.04	.25**	.20**	.15**	.18**	.22**	
16 Willingness to work for the union	3.39	.95	.17**	-.04	-.13**	.23**	.24**	.75**	.54**	.31**	.24**	.49**	.47**	.42**	.28**	.41**	.29**

Notes: * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

† Gender coding is as follows: male=1 female=2

Table 5.2 provides information about descriptive statistics and correlations for estimated latent variables within adversarial and cooperative climates. As seen in Table 5.2, means of all the study variables were higher in cooperative climate.

As seen in bivariate correlations, in adversarial climate while age was related to union loyalty, they were not related in cooperative climate. In adversarial climate, while gender was not related to loyalty, they were negatively related in cooperative climate. Additionally, education was not related to union loyalty in both climates. Organization and union tenure were found to be positively related to union loyalty regardless of the climate.

As expected, perceived instrumentality and pro-union attitudes were positively related to union loyalty both in adversarial and cooperative climates. Additionally, organizational commitment was positively related to union loyalty in both climates. Moreover, steward responsiveness, subjective norms, union socialization, active past participation, propensity to strike, and willingness to work for the union were found to be positively correlated with union loyalty regardless of the climate. As expected, job satisfaction was positively related to union loyalty in cooperative climate. Contrary to expectations, the same relationship was found also for adversarial climate.

Table 5 .2

Descriptives and Correlations for Estimated Latent Variables: Comparison of Adversarial and Cooperative Climates

	Adversarial Climate		Cooperative Climate		1	2	3	4	5	6
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD						
1 Age	33.10 ^a	5.88	34.65 ^b	5.73		-.16 ^{**}	-.24 ^{**}	.64 ^{**}	.57 ^{**}	.10
2 Gender [†]	1.05	.22	1.20	.40	-.03		-.01	-.17 ^{**}	-.13 [*]	-.14 ^{**}
3 Education	2.79	1.04	2.40	.98	-.13	.09		-.17 ^{**}	-.16 ^{**}	-.02
4 Organization tenure	7.54 ^a	5.11	9.94 ^b	5.20	.73 ^{**}	-.00	-.09		.83 ^{**}	.15 ^{**}
5 Union tenure	7.08 ^a	5.34	9.42 ^b	5.25	.72 ^{**}	.06	-.10	.91 ^{**}		.13 [*]
6 Union loyalty	3.18 ^a	.87	3.80 ^b	.74	.29 ^{**}	-.05	-.06	.32 ^{**}	.33 ^{**}	
7 Pro-union attitudes	3.63 ^a	.87	4.05 ^b	.70	.26 ^{**}	-.06	.01	.22 ^{**}	.26 ^{**}	.72 ^{**}
8 Union instrumentality	2.17 ^a	.85	2.54 ^b	.66	.18 [*]	.03	-.20 ^{**}	.08	.06	.27 ^{**}
9 Organizational commitment	3.14 ^a	.82	3.59 ^b	.86	.11	-.11	-.00	.20 ^{**}	.19 ^{**}	.36 ^{**}
10 Steward responsiveness	3.32 ^a	1.20	3.92 ^b	.91	.23 ^{**}	.03	-.15 [*]	.30 ^{**}	.25 ^{**}	.57 ^{**}
11 Subjective norms	3.17 ^a	1.06	3.65 ^b	.96	.16 [*]	.06	-.10	.17 [*]	.18 [*]	.53 ^{**}
12 Union socialization	.48 ^a	.32	.59 ^b	.30	.29 ^{**}	-.05	-.27 ^{**}	.30 ^{**}	.22 ^{**}	.36 ^{**}
13 Job satisfaction	2.54 ^a	.65	3.06 ^b	.70	-.00	-.02	.00	-.08	-.07	.29 ^{**}
14 Active past participation	1.20 ^a	.84	1.61 ^b	.93	.39 ^{**}	-.06	-.24 ^{**}	.39 ^{**}	.38 ^{**}	.36 ^{**}
15 Propensity to strike	2.17 ^a	.87	2.54 ^b	1.07	-.01	.00	-.04	.09	.03	.31 ^{**}
16 Willingness to work for the union	3.09 ^a	.96	3.56 ^b	.91	.22 ^{**}	-.04	-.11	.32 ^{**}	.33 ^{**}	.73 ^{**}

Notes: Below the diagonal refers to adversarial climate, above the diagonal refers to cooperative climate.

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2- tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

†: Gender coding is as follows: male=1 female=2

Table 5.2

Continued

	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 Age	.06	.02	.02	.11*	.08	.03	-.00	.12*	.04	.10
2 Gender [†]	-.07	.04	.01	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.07	-.15**	-.06	-.11**
3 Education	.00	-.10	.10	-.12*	-.10*	-.00	.03	-.05	-.13*	-.08
4 Organization tenure	.02	.00	.05	.12*	.05	.12*	.04	.20**	-.01	.12*
5 Union tenure	.04	.07	.10	.13*	.06	.18**	.09	.21**	-.09	.14**
6 Union loyalty	.65**	.44**	.35**	.64**	.56**	.48**	.40**	.36**	.24**	.74**
7 Pro-union attitudes		.30**	.26**	.50**	.48**	.41**	.28**	.32**	.16**	.52**
8 Union instrumentality	.18*		.27**	.40**	.32**	.33**	.57**	.26**	.26**	.33**
9 Organizational commitment	.34**	.18*		.22**	.35**	.24**	.48**	.20**	-.04	.23**
10 Steward responsiveness	.38**	.22**	.28**		.48**	.55**	.38**	.43**	.16**	.46**
11 Subjective norms	.55**	.11	.23**	.41**		.37**	.31**	.33**	.12*	.48**
12 Union socialization	.22**	.26**	.07	.64**	.29**		.37**	.50**	.04	.43**
13 Job satisfaction	.23**	.38**	.42**	.29**	.16*	.17*		.31**	.14**	.27**
14 Active past participation	.27**	.25**	.02	.41**	.25**	.50**	.02		.12*	.38**
15 Propensity to strike	.17*	.07	.11	.33**	.27**	.29**	.12	.29**		.25**
16 Willingness to work for the union	.51**	.20**	.13	.45**	.37**	.35**	.13	.39**	.30**	

Notes: Below the diagonal refers to adversarial climate, above the diagonal refers to cooperative climate.

Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the one way ANOVA significant difference comparison.

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

[†] Gender coding is as follows: male=1 female=2

Table 5 .3 provides descriptive statistics for and correlations between estimated latent variables for Disk and Türk-İş confederations. Means of the age, organization tenure, union loyalty, pro-union attitudes, steward responsiveness, union socialization and active past participation are significantly higher in Disk Confederation than Türk-İş Confederation.

As seen in bivariate correlations, while age was positively related to union loyalty in Disk, it was not related to union loyalty in Türk-İş. Gender and education were not related to union loyalty in both confederations. While organization tenure was positively related to union loyalty in Disk, it was not related to union loyalty in Türk-İş. Regardless of the climate, union tenure was positively related to union loyalty.

As expected, pro-union attitudes, union instrumentality, steward responsiveness subjective norms, union socialization, active past participation, propensity to strike, and willingness to work for the union were found to be positively related to union loyalty regardless of the climate. Additionally, organizational commitment was positively related to union loyalty in Türk-İş. Contrary to the expectations, organizational commitment and job satisfaction were found to be positively related to union loyalty in Disk.

Table 5.3

Descriptives and Correlations for Estimated Latent Variables: Comparison of Disk and Türk-İş Confederations

	Disk Confederation		Türk-İş Confederation		1	2	3	4	5	6
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD						
1 Age	35.18 ^a	6.10	33.2 ^b	5.40		-.04	-.23**	.57**	.58**	.06
2 Gender [†]	1.09	.29	1.19	.39	-.14*		-.04	-.02	.03	-.03
3 Education	2.55	.99	2.52	1.03	-.21**	.00		-.24**	-.21**	-.10
4 Organization tenure	9.94 ^a	5.81	8.41 ^b	4.72	.75**	-.12	-.12		.83**	.11
5 Union tenure	8.84 ^a	5.74	8.40 ^a	5.08	.68**	-.13*	-.13*	.91**		.19**
6 Union loyalty	3.7 ^a	.71	3.49 ^b	.71	.26**	-.02	-.07	.32**	.29**	
7 Pro-union attitudes	4.02 ^a	.73	3.80 ^b	.81	.24**	.00	-.05	.27**	.26**	.65**
8 Union instrumentality	2.41 ^a	.78	2.40 ^a	.72	.13*	.08	-.17**	.03	.06	.21**
9 Organizational commitment	3.44 ^a	.82	3.42 ^a	.92	.16*	-.01	-.12	.23**	.21**	.29**
10 Steward responsiveness	3.95 ^a	.88	3.51 ^b	1.15	.16*	.01	-.19**	.23**	.22**	.51**
11 Subjective norms	3.51 ^a	.99	3.46 ^a	1.04	.19**	.10	-.23**	.21**	.19**	.57**
12 Union socialization	.62 ^a	.26	.49 ^b	.33	.14*	-.06	-.27**	.13*	.15*	.36**
13 Job satisfaction	3.03 ^a	.66	3.11 ^a	.68	.08	.00	-.12	.08	.10	.25**
14 Active past participation	1.74 ^a	.90	1.38 ^b	.86	.23**	-.07	-.24**	.32**	.34**	.49**
15 Propensity to strike	2.40 ^a	.93	2.41 ^a	1.08	.10	.01	-.11	.10	.04	.35**
16 Willingness to work for the union	3.54 ^a	.94	3.28 ^b	.94	.23**	-.06	-.14*	.30**	.28**	.75**

Notes: Below the diagonal refers to Disk, above the diagonal refers to Türk-İş.

Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the one way ANOVA significant difference comparison.

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

†. Gender coding is as follows: male=1 female=2

Table 5.3

Continued

	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 Age	.07	.11	.02	.16**	.09	.10	.02	.20**	-.00	.08
2 Gender [†]	.00	.09	.07	.06	.03	.05	-.00	-.06	-.02	-.01
3 Education	-.03	-.18**	.10	-.18**	-.07	-.06	.04	-.11	-.15**	-.13*
4 Organization tenure	.01	.14*	.08	.22**	.07	.24**	.11	.26**	.01	.12*
5 Union tenure	.10	.16**	.14*	.22**	.11	.27**	.14*	.30**	-.07	.21**
6 Union loyalty	.63**	.47**	.34**	.55**	.54**	.46**	.50**	.44**	.33**	.74**
7 Pro-union attitudes		.37**	.34**	.53**	.53**	.40**	.45**	.32**	.15*	.53**
8 Union instrumentality	.19**		.30**	.48**	.32**	.39**	.62**	.34**	.38**	.42**
9 Organizational commitment	.32**	.25**		.30**	.37**	.27**	.60**	.23**	.03	.25**
10 Steward responsiveness	.36**	.20**	.30**		.49**	.65**	.50**	.48**	.26**	.49**
11 Subjective norms	.55**	.20**	.31**	.49**		.35**	.39**	.35**	.08	.46**
12 Union socialization	.22**	.25**	.11	.44**	.39**		.41**	.52**	.13*	.43**
13 Job satisfaction	.29**	.41**	.54**	.34**	.33**	.29**		.37**	.28**	.38**
14 Active past participation	.40**	.26**	.16*	.41**	.41**	.54**	.26**		.23**	.36**
15 Propensity to strike	.28**	.02	.06	.26**	.39**	.18**	.03	.23**		.28**
16 Willingness to work for the union	.54**	.19**	.24**	.46**	.49**	.38**	.19**	.44**	.32**	

Notes: Below the diagonal refers to Disk, above the diagonal refers to Türk-İş.

Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the one way ANOVA significant difference comparison.

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

†: Gender coding is as follows: male=1 female=2

5.3 Overall Model

To test the model, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Analysis was conducted. The computer program M Plus Version 4 was used to conduct SEM analysis. Overall fit of the models were evaluated according to Chi Square/df, comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker Lewis Fit Index (TLI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and standardized root mean squares residual (SRMR).

First the hypothesized model was fitted to data using the overall sample. Results showed that the model fit was acceptable although fit can be improved ($\chi^2 = 5539.76$; Df = 3027; $\chi^2 / df = 1.83$; CFI = .89; TLI = .88; RMSEA = .04; SRMR = .05). Two of the hypothesized structural parameters were found to be insignificant: Union socialization and perceived instrumentality did not significantly predict pro-union attitudes. These insignificant parameters were kept in the model for further analyses to see climate related differences in these relationships.

Relationships between organizational commitment and propensity to strike, organizational commitment and union loyalty, job satisfaction and union loyalty, union loyalty and propensity to strike, pro-union attitudes and union loyalty, subjective norms and pro-union attitudes, union socialization and pro-union attitudes, active past participation and pro-union attitudes, union socialization and perceived instrumentality are expected to have large confidence intervals since these parameter estimates were


hypothesized to differ according to industrial relations climate. Confidence intervals of the structural parameters (Table 5.4) that are expected to differ according to industrial relations climate tended to be large.

Table 5.4

Unstandardized Values and Confidence Intervals of the Structural Parameters of the Total Sample

	Parameter Estimates	t-value	Confidence Intervals (99%)	
			Lower .5%	Upper .5%
Job Satisfaction → Perceived Instrumentality	.47	8.45	.32	.61
Union Socialization → Perceived Instrumentality	.39	3.30	.08	.70
Job Satisfaction → Organizational Commitment	.73	9.62	.54	.93
Union Socialization → Pro-union Attitudes	.01	0.04	-.51	.53
Subjective Norms → Pro-union Attitudes	.44	8.82	.31	.57
Steward Responsiveness → Pro-union Attitudes	.13	2.78	.01	.26
Active past participation → Pro-union Attitudes	.00	1.86	-.001	.008
Perceived Instrumentality → Pro-union Attitudes	.10	1.74	-.04	.24
Job Satisfaction → Union Loyalty	.00	0.06	-.13	.13
Steward Responsiveness → Union Loyalty	.19	6.68	.11	.26
Organizational Commitment → Union Loyalty	.05	1.76	-.02	.13
Perceived Instrumentality → Union Loyalty	.12	2.69	.00	.24
Pro-union Attitudes → Union Loyalty	.55	11.12	.42	.67
Union Loyalty → Propensity to Strike	.51	6.81	.31	.70
Organizational Commitment → Propensity to Strike	-.13	-2.58	-.27	-.001
Union Loyalty → Willingness to Work for the Union	.92	11.96	.72	1.12
Active Past Participation → Willingness to Work for the Union	.00	3.39	.001	.008

Figure 5 .1 Overall Model



5.4 Hypotheses Testing


To test the hypotheses multiple group structural equation modeling analyses was conducted. First, hypothesis tests were conducted comparing organizations with adversarial industrial relations climates to organizations with cooperative climates. Second, Disk and Türk-İş confederations are used as indicators of different industrial relations climates, the former indicating an adversarial climate and the latter indicating a cooperative climate. In the preliminary analysis, parameter estimates for climates (adversarial vs. cooperative) and confederations (Disk vs. Türk-İş) were calculated (see Figure 5.2 and 5.3). When the parameter estimates were sufficiently high, a further test of examination of the contribution of this relationship to the overall model was not needed. However, if the parameter estimates were not sufficiently high, a further test of examination of the contribution of this relationship to the overall model was needed. In such a situation, Chi-Square of the model where, this relationship was omitted was compared with the Chi-Square of the model where, this relationship was included. A significant difference between the models indicated that this relationship was warranted for the model. Next step was multiple group analysis.

Multiple group analysis examines if the estimates of model parameters vary across groups (Kline, 1998, p.181). This analysis was done by comparing the free model with the constrained model. Free model was the model where all structural parameters were freely estimated in both groups. Constrained model was the model where structural parameters

were constrained to be equal in the groups. Then, Chi-Square for the free model was compared with the constrained model. When the constrained model gave a worse fit than the free model, this indicated that parameter estimates vary across groups. When the fit of the constrained model was as good as the fit of the free model, this indicated that parameters were not different from each other across groups.

5.4.1 Adversarial vs. Cooperative Industrial Relations Climate Comparison

Figure 5.2 Adversarial vs. Cooperative Climates Model



Notes: Parameter estimates that are below the arrows written with Italics and bold denote results for cooperative climates and parameter estimates that are above the arrows denote results for adversarial climates. Tests of model fit showed that this model's Chi-Square value is 10186.24, Df is 6135, Chi/df is 1.66, P value is .00, CFI is 0.82, TLI is 0.81, RMSEA is 0.05, SRMR is 0.07. Chi-Square Contributions from Cooperative Group is 5570.82, and Chi-Square Contributions from Adversarial Group is 4615.42.

Hypothesis 1 suggested that in cooperative industrial relations climates, organizational commitment was positively related to union commitment whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, they were not related. As Figure 5.2 shows, the parameter estimate for organizational commitment - union commitment relationship was found to be significantly positive for cooperative industrial relations climates, whereas the parameter estimate for this relationship was found to be insignificant for adversarial climates. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.

Hypothesis 2 suggested that in cooperative industrial relations climates, job satisfaction was positively related to union commitment whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, they were negatively related. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimates for both climates were found to be insignificant. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Hypothesis 3(a) suggested that perceived union instrumentality was positively related to union commitment, regardless of the industrial relations climate. As Figure 5.2 shows, the parameter estimate for perceived union instrumentality - union loyalty relationship was found to be significantly positive only for cooperative climates. Therefore, hypothesis 3(a) was not supported.

Hypothesis 3(b) suggested that the magnitude of indirect effect of job satisfaction to union loyalty through perceived instrumentality was higher for cooperative climate. As

Figure 5.2 shows, the parameter estimate for job satisfaction- union instrumentality relationship and perceived instrumentality- union loyalty relationship were higher in magnitude for cooperative climates. Specific indirect effect from job satisfaction to union loyalty through union instrumentality perceptions was significant only for cooperative climates ($\beta = .13, p < .05$; $\beta = .03, ns$; cooperative and adversarial, respectively). Since specific indirect effect existed only for cooperative climates, further testing of the difference between these two parameters was not necessary. Therefore, hypothesis 3(b) was supported.

Hypothesis 4(a) suggested that the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment was higher in adversarial industrial relations climates compared to cooperative industrial relations climates. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for pro-union attitudes-union loyalty relationship was significantly positive for both climates, and the magnitude of the relationship between the two was found to be somewhat higher in adversarial climates. This finding gives preliminary support for Hypothesis 4(a). Since parameter estimates for this relationship in both climates were significantly positive, a further test of examination of the contribution of this relationship to the overall model was not needed. Next, a test for the equality of the parameters was done to analyze whether the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment is significantly different across climates. Fit of the revised model, where the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment were constrained to be equal, was as good as the fit of the free model ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = .01, ns.$), indicating that

parameters were not different from each other across climates. Therefore, hypothesis 4(a) was not supported.

Hypothesis 4(b) suggested that pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between perceived union instrumentality and union commitment regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.2, although the parameter estimate for pro-union attitudes-union loyalty relationship was significant for both climates, the parameter estimate for perceived instrumentality-pro-union attitudes relationship was insignificant for both climates. Therefore, hypothesis 4(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 5(a) suggested that steward responsiveness was positively related to union commitment regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for steward responsiveness - union loyalty relationship was significantly positive for both climates. Therefore, hypothesis 5(a) was supported.

Hypothesis 5(b) suggested that pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between steward responsiveness and union commitment such that when steward responsiveness was high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for steward responsiveness-pro-union attitudes relationship was insignificant for adversarial climates. The specific indirect effect from steward responsiveness to union commitment through pro-union attitudes was significant only for cooperative climates ($\beta = .14, p < .05$; $\beta = .10,$

ns; cooperative and adversarial, respectively). Therefore, hypothesis 5(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 6(a) suggested that in adversarial industrial relations climates, pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between union socialization and union commitment; such that when union socialization was high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, whereas in cooperative industrial relations climates, socialization and pro-union attitudes were not related. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for union socialization- pro-union attitudes relationship was found to be insignificant for both climates. Therefore, hypothesis 6(a) was not supported.

Hypothesis 6(b) suggested that in cooperative industrial relations climates, perceived instrumentality mediated the relationship between union socialization and union commitment; such that when union socialization was high, perceived instrumentality and union commitment were also high, whereas in adversarial climates, union socialization and perceived instrumentality were not related. As seen in Figure 5.2, contrary to what was hypothesized, the parameter estimate for union socialization- perceived instrumentality relationship was found to be insignificant for cooperative climates and significant for adversarial climates. Specific indirect effect from union socialization to union commitment through perceived instrumentality was insignificant for both climates ($\beta = .02$, ns; $\beta = .02$, ns; cooperative adversarial respectively). Therefore, hypothesis 6(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 7 suggested that, pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between subjective norms and union commitment such that when subjective norms were high (i.e., supportive of union membership), pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high. This indirect relationship was stronger in adversarial industrial relations climates. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for subjective norms-pro-union attitudes relationship and pro-union attitudes-union loyalty relationship were higher in magnitude for adversarial climate. This finding gives preliminary support for Hypothesis 7. Next, a test for the equality of the parameters was done to analyze whether the relationship between subjective norms and pro-union attitudes was significantly different across climates. Fit of the revised model, where the relationship between subjective norms and pro-union attitudes were constrained to be equal, was worse than the fit of the free model ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 5.90, p=.01$), indicating that parameters were different from each other across climates. Although, the parameter estimate for pro-union attitudes - union loyalty relationship was not significantly different across climates (see hypothesis 4(a)), the parameter estimate for the relationship between subjective norms and pro-union attitudes was significantly stronger in adversarial climate. The specific indirect effect of subjective norms on union loyalty for adversarial climate was almost twice the magnitude of the same parameter in cooperative climate ($\beta = .25, p < .05$; $\beta = .40, p < .05$; cooperative and adversarial, respectively), which supported hypothesis 7.

Hypothesis 8 suggested that pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between active past participation and union commitment in adversarial climate, such that when,

active past participation is high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, whereas active past participation and pro-union attitudes were not related in cooperative climate. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for active past participation - pro-union attitudes relationship was found to be significantly positive for adversarial climate. In addition, active past participation and pro-union attitudes were found to be unrelated in Türk-İş Confederation. However, the specific indirect effect of active past participation on union loyalty through pro-union attitudes was insignificant for both climates ($\beta = .03$, ns; $\beta = .11$, ns; cooperative adversarial respectively). Therefore hypothesis 8 was not supported.

Hypothesis 9(a) suggested that active past participation was positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for active past participation - willingness to work for the union relationship was found to be significantly positive for both climates. Therefore, hypothesis 9(a) was supported.

Hypothesis 9(b) suggested that union commitment was positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for union loyalty - willingness to work for the union relationship was found to be significantly positive for both climates. Since parameter estimates for this relationship in both confederations were significantly positive and the parameters were

very close in magnitude, no further tests were needed. Therefore, hypothesis 9(b) was supported.

Hypothesis 10(a) suggested that in cooperative climates, organizational commitment was negatively related to propensity to strike, whereas in adversarial climates, they were not related. As shown in Figure 5.2, the parameter estimate for organizational commitment - propensity to strike relationship was found to be significantly negative in cooperative climate, and insignificant in adversarial climates. Therefore, hypothesis 10(a) was supported.

Hypothesis 10(b) suggested that the (positive) relationship between union commitment and propensity to strike was higher in adversarial climates than cooperative climates. As shown in Figure 5.2, the union loyalty was found to be positively related to propensity to strike in both confederations. However, contrary to expectations, magnitude of the parameter estimate was slightly higher in cooperative climate than adversarial climate. Therefore, hypothesis 10(b) was not supported.

Table 5 .5 provides information regarding R-Square values for the endogenous latent variables. As seen in the table, the highest explained variance was provided by union loyalty in both adversarial and cooperative industrial relations climates. The lowest explained variance was provided by instrumentality perceptions and propensity to strike

in adversarial and cooperative industrial relations climates, respectively. Note that R Square values of perceived instrumentality differed noticeably according to climate.

Table 5 .5


R² Values for the Endogenous Latent Variables: Comparison of Adversarial and Cooperative Climates

	R ² :	
	Adversarial Climate	Cooperative Climate
Organizational Commitment	0.424	0.571
Instrumentality Perceptions	0.265	0.507
Pro-union Attitudes	0.486	0.471
Union Loyalty	0.680	0.795
Propensity to Strike	0.093	0.141
Active Past Participation	0.370	0.343

Next, the same set of hypothesis will be tested using the confederations as indicators of adversarial and cooperative climates. Figure 5.3 shows the results of Multiple Group SEM analysis where groups are confederations.

5.4.2 Disk vs. Türk-İş Confederations Comparison

Figure 5.3 Disk vs. Türk-İş Confederations Model



Notes: Parameter estimates below the arrows written with Italics and bold denote results for Türk-İş Confederation and parameter estimates above the arrows denote results for Disk confederation.

Tests of model fit showed that this model's Chi-Square value is 10235.28, Df is 6135, Chi/df is 1.66, P value is .00, CFI is 0.83, TLI is 0.82, RMSEA is 0.05, SRMR is 0.07. Chi-Square Contributions from Türk-İş Group is 5432.95, and Chi-Square Contributions from Disk Group is 4802.32.

Hypothesis 1 suggested that in cooperative industrial relations climates, organizational commitment was positively related to union commitment whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, they were not related. As Figure 5.3 shows, the parameter estimate for organizational commitment- union commitment relationship was found to be insignificant for both Disk and Türk-İş confederations. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not supported. Further testing of the difference between these two parameters was not necessary given the insignificant parameter estimates, and given that the magnitude of the parameter estimates was contrary to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 suggested that in cooperative industrial relations climates, job satisfaction was positively related to union commitment whereas in adversarial industrial relations climates, they were negatively related. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for job satisfaction-union commitment relationship was found to be negative for Disk, whereas it was significantly positive for Türk-İş. This finding indicates partial preliminary support for Hypothesis 2. However, the parameter estimates for both confederations were low and only one of them was significantly different from zero. Therefore a test was done to examine the contribution of these parameters to the overall model. When this relationship was omitted from the model for both confederations, a significant Chi-Square increase was observed ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 6.76, p = .03$) indicating the worthwhile contribution of this relationship for the overall model. Next, group comparison (Disk vs. Türk-İş) was done to analyze whether parameter estimates for the relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment were significantly different

from each other across confederations. Fit of the revised model, where the parameter estimates for relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment were constrained to be equal across confederations, was worse than the fit of the free model ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 7.13, p=.008$), indicating that parameters were significantly different across confederations. Since only one of the parameters was significantly different from zero, hypothesis 2 was partially supported.

Hypothesis 3(a) suggested that perceived union instrumentality was positively related to union commitment, regardless of the industrial relations climate. As Figure 5.3 shows, the parameter estimate for union instrumentality perceptions-union commitment was insignificant for both confederations. Since the both parameter estimates were insignificant and their magnitudes were close to each other, further tests were not necessary. Therefore, hypothesis 3(a) was not supported.

Hypothesis 3(b) suggested that the magnitude of indirect effect of job satisfaction to union loyalty through perceived instrumentality was higher for cooperative climate. As Figure 5.3 shows, the parameter estimate for job satisfaction - union instrumentality relationship was found to be significantly positive regardless of the confederation whereas the parameter estimate for perceived instrumentality- union loyalty relationship was insignificant for both confederations (see above). Specific indirect effect from job satisfaction to union loyalty through union instrumentality perceptions is insignificant in

both confederations ($\beta = .07$, ns; $\beta = .04$, ns; Türk-İş and Disk, respectively). Therefore, hypothesis 3(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 4(a) suggested that the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment was higher in adversarial industrial relations climates compared to cooperative industrial relations climates. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for pro-union attitudes-union loyalty relationship was significantly positive for both confederations, and the magnitude of the relationship was found to be somewhat higher in Disk Confederation. This finding provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 4(a). Since parameter estimates for this relationship in both confederations were significantly positive, a further test of examination of the contribution of this relationship to the overall model was not needed. Next, a test for the equality of the parameters was done to analyze whether the parameter estimates of the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment are significantly different across confederations. Fit of the revised model, where the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment were constrained to be equal, was worse than the fit of the free model ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 9.81$, $p = .001$), indicating a significant difference between the groups. Therefore, hypothesis 4(a) was supported.

Hypothesis 4(b) suggested that pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between perceived union instrumentality and union commitment regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for perceived instrumentality-pro-union

attitudes relationship was found to be insignificant for both confederations. Additionally, specific indirect effect from perceived union instrumentality to union commitment through pro-union attitudes was insignificant for both confederations ($\beta = .06$, ns; $\beta = .05$, ns; Türk-İş Disk respectively). Therefore, hypothesis 4(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 5(a) suggested that steward responsiveness was positively related to union commitment regardless of the industrial relations climate. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for steward responsiveness-union loyalty relationship is significantly positive for both confederations. Therefore, hypothesis 5(a) was supported.

Hypothesis 5(b) suggested that pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between steward responsiveness and union commitment such that when steward responsiveness was high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, regardless of the climate. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for steward responsiveness-pro-union attitudes was insignificant for Disk Confederation. Next, two tests were done to examine whether parameter estimates for steward responsiveness-union loyalty relationship and steward responsiveness- pro-union attitudes relationship were warranted. When steward responsiveness-union loyalty relationship was omitted from the model, a significant Chi-Square increase was observed ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 51.59$, $p < .001$), indicating the importance of this relationship for the overall model. When steward responsiveness- pro-union attitudes relationship was omitted from the model, a significant Chi-Square increase was observed ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 6.53$, $p = .03$) indicating that this relationship

was also important for the overall model. Given that both links were warranted, but the link between steward responsiveness and pro-union attitudes was insignificant for Disk, the hypothesized partial mediation was only found for Türk-İş Confederation. In fact the specific indirect effect from steward responsiveness to union commitment through pro-union attitudes was significant only for Türk-İş Confederation ($\beta = .12, p < .05$; $\beta = -.01, ns$; Türk-İş and Disk, respectively), indicating steward responsiveness was both directly and indirectly related to union loyalty in Türk-İş but only directly related to loyalty in Disk. Therefore, hypothesis 5(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 6(a) suggested that in adversarial industrial relations climates, pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between union socialization and union commitment; such that when union socialization was high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, whereas in cooperative industrial relations climates, socialization and pro-union attitudes were not related. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for union socialization - pro-union attitudes relationship was significantly negative in Disk Confederation. Specific indirect effect from union socialization to union commitment through pro-union attitudes was significantly negative for Disk and not significant for Türk-İş Confederation ($\beta = .04, ns$; $\beta = -.16, p < .05$; Türk-İş Disk respectively). This finding was contrary to expectations. Therefore, hypothesis 6(a) was not supported.

Hypothesis 6(b) suggested that in cooperative industrial relations climates, perceived instrumentality mediated the relationship between union socialization and union commitment; such that when union socialization was high, perceived instrumentality and union commitment were also high, whereas in adversarial climates, union socialization and perceived instrumentality were not related. As seen in Figure 5.3, union socialization and perceived instrumentality were found to be unrelated in Türk-İş Confederation. Additionally, they were found to be positively related in Disk Confederation. Specific indirect effect from union socialization to union commitment through perceived instrumentality was insignificant for both confederations ($\beta = .01$, ns; $\beta = .02$, ns; Türk-İş Disk respectively). These findings were contrary to expectations. Therefore, hypothesis 6(b) was not supported.

Hypothesis 7 suggested that, pro-union attitudes mediate the relationship between subjective norms and union commitment such that when subjective norms was high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, and this indirect relationship was stronger in adversarial industrial relations climates. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimates for subjective norms-pro-union attitudes relationship and pro-union attitudes-union loyalty relationship were higher in magnitude for Disk Confederation. This finding gives preliminary support for Hypothesis 7. Since the difference between parameters estimates for pro-union attitudes-union loyalty relationship across confederations was previously found to be stronger in Disk Confederation (see hypothesis 4(a)), next, a test for the equality of the parameters for the relationship between subjective

norms and pro-union attitudes was conducted. Fit of the revised model, where the relationship between subjective norms and pro-union attitudes were constrained to be equal, was as good as the fit of the free model ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 1.99, p=.15$), indicating that parameters were not different from each other across confederations. Although, the parameter estimate for this relationship was not significantly different across confederations, the parameter estimate for the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union loyalty was significantly stronger in Disk Confederation. In fact, the specific indirect effect of subjective norms on union loyalty for Disk was almost twice the magnitude of the same parameter in Türk-İş ($\beta = .25, p<.05$; $\beta = .48, p<.05$; Türk-İş and Disk, respectively), which supports hypothesis 7.

Hypothesis 8 suggested that pro-union attitudes mediated the relationship between active past participation and union commitment in adversarial climate, such that when, active past participation was high, pro-union attitudes and union commitment were also high, whereas active past participation and pro-union attitudes were not related in cooperative climates. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for active past participation- pro-union attitudes relationship was significantly positive for Disk Confederation but insignificant for Türk-İş Confederation. The specific indirect effect of active past participation on union loyalty through pro-union attitudes was significant only for Disk confederation ($\beta = -.01, ns$; $\beta = .20, p<.05$; Türk-İş Disk respectively). Therefore hypothesis 8 was supported.

Hypothesis 9(a) suggested that active past participation was positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the industrial relations climate. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for active past participation - willingness to work for the union relationship was found to be significantly positive only for Disk Confederation. Therefore, hypothesis 9(a) was not supported.

Hypothesis 9(b) suggested that union commitment was positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the industrial relations climate. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for union loyalty- willingness to work for the union relationship was found to be significantly positive for both Disk and Türk-İş Confederations. Since parameter estimates for this relationship in both confederations were significantly positive and the parameters are very close in magnitude, no further tests are needed. Therefore, hypothesis 9(b) was supported.

Hypothesis 10(a) suggested that in cooperative climates, organizational commitment was negatively related to propensity to strike, whereas in adversarial climates, they were not related. As shown in Figure 5.3, the parameter estimate for organizational commitment - propensity to strike relationship was found to be significantly negative in Türk-İş Confederation, and insignificant in Disk Confederation. Therefore, hypothesis 10(a) was supported.

Hypothesis 10(b) suggested that the (positive) relationship between union commitment and propensity to strike was higher in adversarial climates than cooperative climates. As shown in Figure 5.3, the union loyalty was found to be positively related to propensity to strike in both confederations. However, contrary to expectations, magnitude of the parameter estimate was slightly higher in Türk-İş Confederation than Disk Confederation. Therefore, hypothesis 10(b) was not supported.

Table 5.6 provides information regarding R-Square values for the endogenous latent variables. As seen in the table, the highest explained variance was provided by union loyalty in both Disk and Türk-İş Confederations. The lowest explained variance was provided by propensity to strike in both confederations. Note that, perceived instrumentality differed noticeably according to confederation.

Table 5 .6

R² Values for the Endogenous Latent Variables: Comparison of Disk and Türk-İş Confederations

	R ²	
	Disk Confederation	Türk-İş Cofederation
Organizational Commitment	0.606	0.553
Instrumentality Perceptions	0.232	0.590
Pro-union Attitudes	0.499	0.546
Union Loyalty	0.845	0.799
Propensity to Strike	0.164	0.161
Active Past Participation	0.440	0.339

Table 5.7

Summary of Hypothesis Tests Results

	Hypotheses	Adversarial vs. Cooperative	Disk vs. Türk-İş	Explanation
1	Organizational commitment → union commitment Positively related for cooperative climates Not related for adversarial climates	S	NS	They are unrelated for both confederations
2	Job satisfaction → union commitment Positively related for cooperative climates Negatively related for adversarial climates	NS	PS	They are unrelated for both climates They are unrelated for Disk Confederation (though the sign is negative as expected). They are positively related for Türk-iş Confederation as expected.
3a	Union instrumentality → union commitment Positively related for both climates	NS	NS	They are unrelated for adversarial climate They are unrelated for both confederations
3b	Job satisfaction → union instrumentality → union loyalty The magnitude of indirect effect is higher for cooperative climate	S	NS	Specific indirect effect is insignificant for both confederations
4a	Pro-union attitudes → union commitment The magnitude of the effect is higher for adversarial climate	NS	S	The magnitude of the effect is not higher for adversarial climate

Table 5.7

Continued

	Hypotheses	Adversarial vs. Cooperative	Disk vs. Türk-İş	Explanation
4b	Union instrumentality→pro-union attitudes→union commitment Positively related for both climates	NS	NS	Perceived instrumentality is not related to pro-union attitudes for both climates Perceived instrumentality is not related to pro-union attitudes for both confederations.
5a	Steward responsiveness →union commitment Positively related for both climates	S	S	
5b	Steward responsiveness→pro-union attitudes→union commitment Positively related for both climates	NS	NS	Steward responsiveness-pro-union attitudes relationship is insignificant for adversarial climates Steward responsiveness is both directly and indirectly related to union loyalty in Türk-İş but only directly related to loyalty in Disk.
6a	Union socialization→pro-union attitudes→union commitment Positively related for adversarial climates Union socialization and pro-union attitudes are not related for cooperative climates	NS	NS	Union socialization- pro-union attitudes relationship is insignificant in adversarial climates. Socialization- pro-union attitudes relationship is significantly negative in Disk Confederation.

Table 5.7

Continued

	Hypotheses	Adversarial vs. Cooperative	Disk vs. Türk-İş	Explanation
6b	Union socialization → union instrumentality → union commitment Positively related for cooperative climates Union socialization and union instrumentality are not related for adversarial climates	NS	NS	Union socialization-perceived instrumentality relationship is insignificant for cooperative climate/Türk-İş Confederation. Additionally, they are positively related for Disk Confederation.
7	Subjective norms → pro-union attitudes → union commitment The magnitude of the indirect effect is higher for adversarial climate	S	S	
8	Active past participation → pro-union attitudes → union commitment Positively related for adversarial climate Active past participation and pro-union attitudes are not related for cooperative climate	NS	S	The specific indirect effect of active past participation on union loyalty through pro-union attitudes is insignificant for both climates
9a	Active past participation → willingness to work for the union Positively related regardless of the climate	S	NS	Active past participation- willingness to work for the union relationship is significantly positive only for Disk Confederation

Table 5.7

Continued

	Hypotheses	Adversarial vs. Cooperative	Disk vs. Türk-İş	Explanation
9b	Union commitment → willingness to work for the union	S	S	
	Positively related regardless of the climate			
10a	Organizational commitment → propensity to strike	S	S	
	Negatively related for cooperative climates Not related for adversarial climates			
10b	Union commitment → propensity to strike	NS	NS	Positively related but the magnitude is similar in both climates/confederations.
	Positively related and the magnitude of the effect is higher for adversarial climate			

Notes: NS denotes not supported, S denotes supported, PS denotes partially supported.
 Explanations are provided for results of the hypothesis tests that did not receive full support.

Chapter VI

DISCUSSION

The goal of the present study was to examine the antecedents and consequences of union commitment in different industrial relations climates. Industrial relations climate was operationalized in two ways. First, by utilizing Dastmalchian and colleagues' scale (1989), industrial relations climate was categorized as adversarial or cooperative at the organizational level. Second, industrial relations climate at the confederation level was classified as adversarial or cooperative using information on unions' confederation membership. Specifically, unions that are connected to Disk Confederation are classified as adversarial, whereas unions which belong to Türk-İş Confederation were categorized as cooperative.

6.1 Summary of Results

The findings of the study can be categorized into three groups: 1) Those hypotheses that received no support in both operationalizations of industrial relations climate 2) Those hypotheses that received in only one of the operationalizations of industrial relations climate 3) Those hypotheses that were supported in both operationalizations of industrial relations climate.

From sixteen hypotheses, four of them were supported in both operationalizations of industrial relations climate. Six of them were supported in one of the operationalizations of industrial relations climate (partial support), and six of them were not supported in any of the operationalizations.

6.2 Discussion of Findings

Three of the six hypotheses that were unsupported in both operationalizations of industrial relations climate were derived from need satisfaction models. Perceived instrumentality was found to be unrelated to union commitment directly or indirectly through pro-union attitudes in both climates and confederations. This unexpected result could be related to union members' belief that if their union did not exist, they would not have the conditions (that they are dissatisfied with) they have now. Without their union, they would not have an association that protects their rights. Therefore, their level of pro-union attitudes and union commitment do not depend on the success of their union in gaining wage increases, improvement in fringe benefits etc.

In adversarial climates and Disk Confederation steward responsiveness had a direct relationship with union loyalty, but contrary to expectations, this relationship was not mediated by pro-union attitudes. This indirect relationship existed only for cooperative climates and Türk-İş Confederation. This finding indicates that there is difference between climates on the role of pro-union attitudes in the relationship between

steward responsiveness and union loyalty. In Disk Confederation, level of pro-union attitudes is higher than Türk-İş Confederation (mean difference = .22). Therefore, steward responsiveness does not have a major impact on pro-union attitudes. On the other hand, In Türk-İş Confederation and cooperative climates, union members are more open to developing pro-union attitudes. Therefore, union steward responsiveness helps develop positive attitudes both to a particular union as well as unions in general. Contrary to expectations, level of pro-union attitudes is higher in cooperative climates than adversarial climates. Present researcher could not come up with an explanation for this finding. Future research should investigate this issue.

Contrary to expectations, union socialization was negatively related and not related to pro-union attitudes in Disk Confederation and adversarial climates, respectively. In addition, contrary to expectations, union socialization and perceived instrumentality were not related in cooperative climates and in Türk-İş Confederation. Lastly, union socialization was positively related to perceived instrumentality in Disk Confederation. These unexpected results could imply a problem in the union socialization measure. Union socialization scale asked participants whether or not they experienced the socialization activities in their first year of their union membership. It is possible that many participants with long tenures in a union have difficulty in remembering events from their first year of union membership. In fact, the fact that most of the missing information came from this scale implies that participants had hard time answering the questions. As expected, union commitment was found to be positively

related to propensity to strike in both climates and confederations. Contrary to expectations, the magnitude of this relationship did not differ according to climate and confederation. For an employee, a strike means choosing sides between the union and the employer. This choice was expected to be easier for loyal union members in adversarial climates. However, this was not the case as loyal union members are equally responsive to their unions' call for a strike. It might be that given the economic conditions, strikes are not seen as instrumental in improving the conditions regardless of the climate. During a strike, union members are not given their salaries by the employer. Instead, they are supported (paid) by the union if it has resource. This support by the union is less than wages given by the employer. When the strike is over, initial offers of the management improves slightly for the benefit of the union members (personal communications with Kadir Burhan², July 28, 2006). Hence, union members are likely to evaluate their gains (e.g. slight increase in their wages after the strike) and losses (e.g. not being paid by the employer during the strike) if they join the strike. Gains and losses of the union members could differ according to confederation. Türk-İş Confederation has more resource for its members when a strike decision is made. It has more supply since 1) Türk-İş has a longer history than Disk. Hence, it has been collecting revenues from its members for a longer period 2) Number of Türk-İş Confederation members is higher than Disk Confederation members (see tables 3.2 and 3.3). Therefore, Türk-İş Confederation collects revenues from more members 3) Historically, Disk Confederation has gone on strike more often than Türk-İş Confederation (see section 3.1). Hence, it spent their resources during these strikes. Since Disk Confederation could hardly support its members during a strike,

²General Secretary of Türk-İş Confederation

members of this confederation less likely to believe that a strike has to be supported by the members under any circumstance. This tentative idea gives an explanation for not finding a stronger relationship between union commitment and propensity to strike in Disk Confederation. The point is that union members' economic concerns are likely to be main antecedents of making a decision to join the strike.

One of the six hypotheses supported in one of the operationalizations of the industrial relations climate was drawn from need satisfaction paradigm, and remaining five hypotheses were derived from SIPA. Hypothesis derived from need satisfaction models suggested that job satisfaction is positively related to union commitment through union instrumentality. This indirect relationship was expected to be higher in cooperative industrial relations climates. This expectation was supported when the climate is operationalized as adversarial vs. cooperative, but not when it is operationalized using confederation membership. This indicates that, at the organizational level, when the climate is cooperative, people attribute their job satisfaction to the union (perceived instrumentality) as much as to the employer. This attribution further leads to union loyalty. On the other hand, in the adversarial industrial relations climates, job satisfaction is more likely to be attributed to employer. These differences in attribution were also observed when climate is operationalized at the confederation level. However, perceived instrumentality was not related to union loyalty in both confederations. It appears that perceived instrumentality and union loyalty relationship is meaningful at the organizational level.

Organizational commitment was found to be positively related to union commitment in cooperative climates, while they were unrelated in adversarial climates. However, this hypothesis was not supported when industrial relations climate was operationalized at the confederation level. Since the relationship was about people's loyalty to two different organizations, the industrial relations climate at the organizational level was more meaningful in informing people about what is salient in their social context. Although this was not a priori hypothesized, it is not a surprising finding.

Contrary to expectations, job satisfaction and union commitment were found to be unrelated in both climates. As expected, they were positively and negatively related in Türk-İş Confederation and Disk Confederation respectively. However, this relationship in Disk Confederation was found to be insignificant. In Türk-İş Confederation, those who are satisfied with their jobs tend to attribute this satisfaction to both the union and the management since both parties work in cooperation for the benefit of the employer and the union. In Disk Confederation, (insignificant) negative relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment might be due to discourse of the Disk Confederation which suggests that union is the association which protects the rights of the exploited class against the exploiter (see section 3.1). It further proposes that improving the work conditions that members are dissatisfied with is only achievable with the existence of unions. The speculation is that with a larger sample size in Disk Confederation, a significant relationship could be found.

As expected, pro-union attitudes are positively related to union commitment regardless of confederation, and the magnitude of this relationship was higher in Disk Confederation. This finding indicates that, in Disk pro-union attitudes are a better predictor union commitment compared to Türk-İş Confederation. Disk Confederation with its historically adversarial style and anti-capitalist stand toward industrial relations attracts and nurtures members who are highly pro-union, whereas in Türk-İş Confederation which has closer ties with employers, the dialogue is focused on integrative solutions rather than winning on the battle field. When the industrial relations climate was operationalized as adversarial vs. cooperative, a stronger relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment in adversarial climate was not found. This finding indicates that this relationship is meaningful only at the confederation level.

When climate was operationalized using confederation membership, active past participation was positively related to union commitment through pro-union attitudes for Disk Confederation. The relationship between active past participation and pro-union attitudes did not exist for Türk-İş Confederation. This finding indicates that consistent with SIPA, not all past behavior leads to an attitude, and acceptable internal justification of past behaviors is important. The findings support the assumption that in Disk Confederation acceptable justification for those who engage in union activities is the value they attach to unions, whereas in Türk-İş Confederation, this is not the case. However, at the organizational level of analysis, the relationship between active past participation and pro-union attitudes was insignificant for both climates. These findings

indicate that, confederation level is more meaningful to understand the role of pro-union attitudes for the relationship between active past participation and union commitment.

Perhaps the practices and policies with respect to union participation differ mainly between confederations but not between unions or organizations where union members are represented via local union presidents and stewards.

Active past participation was expected to be positively related to willingness to work for the union regardless of the climate. Results showed that the magnitude of this relationship is high in adversarial climates and DİSK but small in cooperative climates and not different than zero for Türk-İş Confederation. This suggests that union members in adversarial climates and DİSK can attribute their active engagement in their union to their personal free choice more readily than members in cooperative climates and Türk-İş.

One of the four hypotheses that were supported in both operationalizations of industrial relations climate was derived from need satisfaction models and three of them were derived from SIPA. In the present study, it was found that steward responsiveness is positively related to union commitment in both climates and confederations, which gives support to need satisfaction models of attitudes. This finding indicates the importance of the stewards' role for generating union commitment among members. Hence, unions should be aware of the fact that stewards, who proactively seek member participation, who inform them about their rights and who quickly respond to members problems and needs, are more likely to increase union loyalty among the rank and file union members in

their workplace. Hence union stewards should be trained in the requirements of their role and specifically be taught how to be responsive towards the members.

Remaining hypotheses that were supported in both operationalizations of industrial relations climate were drawn from SIPA. It was found that subjective norms indirectly influence union commitment through pro-union attitudes, and this relationship is stronger in adversarial climates and Disk Confederation. For adversarial climates, this stronger indirect effect was mainly a function of the relationship between subjective norms and pro-union attitudes while for Disk Confederation it was a function of the relationship between pro-union attitudes and union commitment. This finding indicates that at the organizational level employees' in adversarial climates are more likely to form pro-union attitudes when they perceive other people in their close social networks to be pro-union. Being pro-union in turn predicts commitment to a particular union equally well across different climates. At the confederation level, although perceived norms are equally predictive of pro-union attitudes across confederations, members of unions which belong to Disk Confederation are more likely to feel loyalty to their union because of their pro-union stance (see Table 5.3).

As expected, union loyalty was found to be positively related to willingness to work for the union, regardless of the climate. This finding gives support for the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) which suggests that positive attitudes toward a

target (e.g. union) leads positive behavioral intentions (e.g. willingness to work for the union).

Organizational commitment was found to be negatively related to propensity to strike in cooperative climates and Türk-İş Confederation while they were unrelated in adversarial climates and Disk Confederation. This finding implies that the nature of industrial relations climate, which can be controlled by the management and the union (Gallagher & Clark, 1989), is a determinant of a behavioral intention (propensity to strike) that damages the employer. Therefore, employers have to pay special attention to their relationships with the unions in the organization.

6.3 Limitations

There are a number of limitations of the present study. First, percept-percept bias could not be avoided. Specifically, each participant was asked to complete each one of the scales, which may have caused spurious correlations between the variables. Second, no cause and effect assumptions between variables can be tested given the cross-sectional nature of the data collected. Longitudinal designs are needed to test causal hypotheses.

Third, there are more than four unions and two confederations in Turkey. However, only four unions, two from Disk and two from Türk-İş confederations were examined in the present study. There are three reasons for choosing these two

confederations. 1) Türk-İş and Disk Confederations are the ones that have the longest history in Turkish Industrial Relations. 2) While, historically Türk-İş followed a cooperative style, Disk was on the adversarial side of the spectrum, which suited well to the purpose of the present study. 3) Given the resources, it was not possible to cover all the confederations. One of the strengths of the study is that two unions one from textile and one from metal industries belonging to these confederations were included in the study to avoid confounding of the confederation with a specific industry union.

A fourth limitation is that, most of data was collected from one city, Bursa (28 out of 32 organizations). The reason was that Bursa is an industrial city in which there are many organizations in the metal and textile industry and in which the four unions (Teksif, Tekstil, Türk-Metal and Birleşik Metal) are organized in. Collecting data from cities other than Bursa (Adana and İstanbul) is due to the fact that there is not enough organizations in which unions connected to Disk Confederation are organized in Bursa.

Despite these limitations, it is important to note that this survey was distributed to participants who are randomly sampled and the response rate was very high. This allowed making generalization from the participants from a particular union and confederation to members in that union and confederation respectively.

6.4 Implications for Theory and Future Research

Johns (2006) emphasized the importance of contextualizing organizational behavior research. He suggested that “context changes causal directions and reverses signs” (p.397). Recent research on union commitment also highlighted the effect of context on this issue, and the influence of industrial relations climate on union commitment has been examined (Angle & Perry, 1986; Deery & Iverson, 1998; Deery, Iverson, & Erwin, 1994; Lee, 2004; Magenau, 1988). Present study also attempted to explain union commitment process in different industrial relations climates in Turkey.

Consistent with Johns’ (2006) suggestion, context in the present study, namely, industrial relations climate influenced the relationships between the variables (e.g. sign of the relationship). This general conclusion gives support for the Social Information Processing Approach which suggests that through social cues, information from the social context influences attitudes. In addition to SIPA, need satisfaction models, which suggest that conditions at work satisfy or dissatisfy the needs of the employees, and accordingly they influence attitudes toward their unions, were also tested, and received support in the present study.

Among the study variables, subjective norms, steward responsiveness and pro-union attitudes were strong antecedents of union commitment in both climates and confederations. Active past participation was a predictor of union commitment in

adversarial climates and Disk Confederation while job satisfaction was a determinant of union commitment in cooperative climates and Türk-İş Confederation. Organizational commitment and perceived instrumentality were predictors of union commitment only in cooperative climates.

This study investigated union commitment in unions that were organized mainly in private sector organizations. Therefore, Hak-İş Confederation which is organized in public sector organizations was not included. However, given this confederation's close networks with the government and rise within Turkish industrial relations context, future research should examine union commitment process in this Confederation. Industrial relations climates in private and public sector organizations may differ from each other since the employer is the government in the latter one. Therefore, examining union commitment in Hak-İş Confederation will allow conducting this research within a different climate than the one examined in this study.

Future research is also needed to examine this dynamic process of attitude development in a longitudinal design. Given that the data in the present study is cross sectional and the model suggested causal relationships between the variables, future research should investigate the same issue by conducting a longitudinal research, which ensures causality.

6.5 Implications for Practice

Gallagher and Clark (1989) suggest that variables in the union commitment literature can be categorized into three groups. 1) variables that can not be controlled by the union (demographics) 2) variables that can be controlled by both the union and the management (commitment to organization, quality of the relationship between the union and the management and union instrumentality) 3) variables that can mostly be controlled by the unions (union socialization, leadership style, union participation).

Four of the variables in the present study are under the control of the union and management, and indicates the importance of the industrial relations climate to achieve solutions both parties could benefit. First, a cooperative climate makes dual commitment (being committed to both union and management) possible. Therefore, a union member can be productive for both parties. That is, she or he can work effectively for her or his employer, but at the same time has will to work for the union. Second, findings of the present study demonstrated that union instrumentality is positively related to union commitment only in cooperative climates. Again, this finding suggests that industrial relations climate plays an important role in the success of the union in gaining demands of the union members. Having a cooperative climate within the organization enables members to perceive more instrumentality on the part of the union and in turn develop union commitment. Third, in cooperative industrial relations climates job satisfaction positively predicts union commitment through union instrumentality. Therefore, unions

could at least try to improve the work conditions of the union members that are subject to collective bargaining and increase the level of satisfaction of them with their jobs. Given that cooperative climates are characterized by win-win solutions, chances for improving work conditions are higher.

There are also two variables that could be controlled by the union only. It was found that pro-union attitudes and steward responsiveness are predictors of union commitment regardless of the climate and the confederation. Therefore, to increase the level of commitment of the union members, union could try to improve the positive value attached to unions in general. In addition to that, as mentioned in the previous section, responsiveness of the steward is very important to generate commitment among members. Therefore, this position in the union could be paid special attention, and steward could be appointed and trained accordingly.

Given that unionization rate decreased from 67.84 % to 57.78 % from 1996 to 2005 in this developing country (<http://www.calisma.gov.tr/>), findings and suggested practical implications of this study could be utilized to have a better understanding of the union commitment issue, and increase the unionization rate. Obviously, more research about union commitment is requested and academicians and union administrators could work together to improve the role of unions in Turkey.

6.6 Conclusion

Given the dire conditions unions are in across the world, attention once again needs to be shifted to the reasons behind the declining attitudes of union members. However, the individual focused approach of the previous literature on the topic has not done justice to the role of broader industrial relations context on union commitment. This study was an attempt to understand this forgotten role and show how variances at the level of the organization and confederation in industrial relations climate matters for individual workers' commitment to their union in Turkey. Future research should try to replicate these findings in other unions and/ or countries.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Merhaba,

Ben Duygu Arı. Bu anketi, Koç Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü'nde yüksek lisans bitirme tezim için yapmakta olduğum araştırma için hazırladım. Araştırmamın amacı, sendika üyelerinin, üye oldukları sendikalar, çalıştıkları iş yerleri ile bu iki kurum arasındaki ilişkiler hakkında görüşlerini almaktır.

Sizden bu anketi doldurarak araştırmama katılmanızı rica ediyorum. Bu araştırmaya katılımınız gönüllüdür. Vereceğiniz cevaplar, yalnızca bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacak, kesinlikle hiçbir kişi veya kurumla paylaşılmayacaktır.

Anket sorularına vereceğiniz cevaplar doğru ya da yanlış olarak nitelendirilemez. Önemli olan, cevapların sizin düşüncelerinizi yansıtmasıdır. Anketin cevaplanmasında süre sınırlaması yoktur; ancak anketin doldurulması yaklaşık olarak 30 dakika sürmektedir.

Doldurduğunuz anketin araştırmamda kullanılabilmesi için sizden soruları dikkatle okumanızı ve hiçbir soruyu cevapsız bırakmamanızı rica ediyorum.

Araştırmama yaptığınız katkı benim için çok değerlidir. Bu araştırmadan çıkacak sonuçların tezimi vermeme yarayacağı gibi, çalışma hayatına ve Türk sendikacılığına da yarar sağlayacağına inanıyorum. Eğer araştırmayla ilgili sorularınız olursa beni arayabilirsiniz. Yardımlarınız için çok teşekkür ederim.

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Anketi nasıl doldurmanız gerektiği aşağıdaki örnekte gösterilmektedir:

Kitap okumaktan kesinlikle hoşlanmıyorsanız, cevabınızda “Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum” ifadesi size en uygun olacaktır. Bu ifadenin karşılığı olan 1 rakamını, ilgili maddenin sağındaki boş kutucuğa yazınız.

1	2	3	4	5
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum biraz katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
Kitap okumaktan hoşlanırım.				1

BÖLÜM 1. Aşağıda, sendika ve işveren ilişkileri ile ilgili maddeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra o maddeye ne derecede katılıp katılmadığınızı verilen ölçeği kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 5'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum biraz katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

1.	Bu işyerinde, işveren ile sendika arasında fazla iletişim yoktur.	
2.	Bu işyerinde sendikanın amacına ulaşması için mücadeleci olması gerekir.	
3.	Bu işyerinde, sendika ile işveren birbirlerinden pek hoşlanmazlar.	
4.	İşveren, sendikanın taleplerine çoğunlukla karşı çıkar.	
5.	Bu işyerinde sendikanın varlığı pek hissedilmez.	
6.	İşveren, çalışma şartlarında değişiklik yapmadan önce sendikanın fikrini sorar.	
7.	Bu işyerinde sendika ile işveren, bilgiyi birbirleriyle paylaşır.	
8.	Ortak kurullar (iş güvenliği, performans değerlendirme ve eğitim kurulları gibi) çalışma şartlarında değişiklik yapmanın yaygın bir yoludur.	
9.	Bu işyerinde, sendika yöneticileri saygı görür.	
10.	Normal şartlar altında bu işyerinde işçi şikayetleri hızla sonuca bağlanır.	
11.	Bu işyerinde ne sendika ne de işveren çalışanların haklarını korurlar.	
12.	Bu işyerinde çalışanlar genel olarak sendika-işveren ilişkilerinin iyi ya da kötü olması ile ilgilenmez.	
13.	Bu işyerinde sendika ile işverenin birbirlerine karşı adil oldukları düşüncesi hakimdir.	
14.	Sendika ile işveren çalışma şartlarını iyileştirmek için birlikte çalışırlar.	
15.	Bu işyerinde, sendika ile işveren arasındaki müzakereler iyi niyet çerçevesinde yürütülür.	
16.	Bu işyerindeki sendika-işveren ilişkileri düşmancadır.	
17.	Bu işyerinde çalışanlar, toplu sözleşmenin sonuçlarına nadiren ilgi gösterirler.	
18.	Bu şirketin çalışanları, çalışma şartlarını benzer şirketlerdekilere göre adil bulurlar.	
19.	Sendika, bu işyerindeki üyelerinden tam destek görür.	
20.	Sendika ile işveren birbirlerinin amaçlarına saygı duyarlar.	
21.	Sendika, bu işyerinde yönetimin bir parçası gibi davranır.	
22.	Bu işyerinde çalışanların ortak kurullar (iş güvenliği, performans değerlendirme ve eğitim kurulları gibi) hakkındaki düşünceleri olumludur.	
23.	Bu işyerindeki insanlar kendilerini sendikanın bir parçası gibi görmezler.	
24.	Sendika ile işveren birbirlerinin düşüncelerine büyük önem verirler.	
25.	Bu işyerinde işveren ile sendikanın fikir ayrılıklarını çözmesi uzun zaman alır.	

26.	Bu işyerinde, sendika ile işveren kendi dünyalarında yaşarlar.	
27.	Toplu sözleşme bu şirketin çalışanları tarafından adil bulunur.	
28.	Sendika ile işveren ufak konular yüzünden münakaşa ederler.	
29.	Bu işyerinde, ortak kurullar (iş güvenliği komisyonu, performans değerlendirme komisyonu, eğitim komisyonu gibi) somut sonuçlar üretir.	
30.	Bu işyerinde toplu sözleşme görüşmelerinde sendika işverenin taleplerine karşı çıkmaz.	

BÖLÜM 2. Aşağıda, üyesi olduğunuz sendika hakkında düşünceler içeren maddeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra o maddeye ne derecede katılıp katılmadığınızı verilen ölçeği kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 5'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum biraz katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

31.	Sendikaya faydalı olabilecek bilgileri edinmek için gözünü dört açmak her üyenin görevidir.	
32.	Bu sendikaya yardım etmek için özel bir çaba sarf edeceğimi sanmam.	
33.	Bu sendikanın bir parçası olmaktan gurur duyuyorum.	
34.	Her sendika üyesi, işyerini şikayet etmenin riskini göze alabilmelidir.	
35.	Bu sendikanın başarılı olması için, herhangi bir üyeden beklenenden çok daha fazla çaba göstermeye hazırım.	
36.	Bu sendikaya katılmaya karar vermek benim için akıllıca bir adımdı.	
37.	İşverenin toplu sözleşmenin kurallarına uyup uymadığını izlemek her üyenin sorumluluğudur.	
38.	Arkadaşlarıma bu sendikanın, üyesi olunabilecek çok iyi bir örgüt olduğunu söylüyorum.	
39.	Üyelerin isteklerinin çok azı, bu sendika için bir önem taşır.	
40.	Bu sendikanın geçmişi, kendini bir amaca adanmış insanların neler yapabileceğinin iyi bir örneğidir.	
41.	İstendiği takdirde sendikanın yönetiminde görev almak için adaylığımı koyabilirim.	
42.	Bu sendikadaki üyelerin çoğuna güvenim ve inancım azdır.	
43.	Bu sendikaya üye olunarak kazanılabilecek çok şey var.	
44.	Başka bir üyenin itiraz hakkını kullanmasına destek vermek veya yardım etmek her üyenin görevidir.	
45.	Bu güne kadar olanlara ve geleceğe dair beklentilerime dayanarak, sendikanın üyesi olarak kalmayı planlıyorum.	
46.	Bu sendikanın değerleriyle benim kişisel değerlerim birbirinden bir hayli farklıdır.	
47.	Bu sendika, üyelerinin çıkarlarını gerektiği şekilde temsil eder.	
48.	Bu sendikaya karşı çok az bağlılık hissediyorum.	
49.	İstendiği takdirde sendikanın bir komitesinde görev alırım.	
50.	Sendika üyelerinin bu sendikanın başarısı için çalışmalarını gerektiğine inanıyorum.	
51.	Sendikal faaliyetlere katılmaları konusunda diğer üyeleri teşvik etmek her üyenin görevidir.	

BÖLÜM 3. Aşağıda, genel olarak sendikalar hakkında sahip olunabilecek görüşler içeren maddeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra o maddeye ne derecede katılıp katılmadığınızı verilen ölçeği kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1’den 5’e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum biraz katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

52. Bu ülkede sendikalar olumlu bir güçtür.	
53. Bence sendikaya aidat ödemek, paramın boşa gitmesi demektir.	
54. İşçi sendikalarının var olduklarına seviniyorum.	
55. İleride tekrar iş ararsam, sendikalı iş yerlerine başvurmadan kaçınıyorum.	
56. Türkiye’de sendikalaşma olmasaydı bir çok işçi daha iyi durumda olabilirdi.	
57. Bu ülkedeki işçi hareketi ile gurur duyuyorum .	
58. Bence sendika üyelerinin çalışma şartları sendikaya üye olmayanlara göre daha iyidir.	
59. Bence sendikalar toplumumuz için bir utanç kaynağıdır.	

BÖLÜM 4. Aşağıda işiniz ile ilgili maddeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra o maddeye ne derecede katılıp katılmadığınızı aşağıdaki ölçeği kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1’den 5’e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum biraz katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

60. Bana ödenen ücreti değerlendirdiğimde şirket tarafından takdir edilmediğimi düşünüyorum.	
61. Yaptığım iş keyiflidir.	
62. Bizim şirkette işini iyi yapanların terfi edebilme şansları yüksektir.	
63. Bazen işimin anlamsız olduğunu düşünüyorum.	
64. Yaptığım iş için bana adil bir ücret ödendiğini düşünüyorum.	
65. Bana tanınan yan haklardan memnun değilim.	
66. Burada çalışanlar benzer şirketlerde çalışanlar kadar hızlı yükselebilir.	
67. Maaş zamları çok düşük ve seyrek.	
68. Sahip olduğumuz yan haklar benzer şirketlerin sundukları kadar iyidir.	

69.	Yöneticim işinin ehlidir.	
70.	Bize sağlanan yan haklar yetersiz.	
71.	Maaşıma yapılan artışlardan memnunum.	
72.	Yöneticim bana karşı adil değildir.	
73.	İşimde terfi edebilme imkanım gerçekten çok az.	
74.	Yöneticim ekibinde çalışanların hislerine çok az ilgi gösterir.	
75.	Yaptığım işle gurur duyuyorum.	
76.	Sahip olduğumuz yan haklar adildir.	
77.	Terfi imkanlarından memnunum.	
78.	İşimi seviyorum.	
79.	Yöneticimi severim.	

BÖLÜM 5. Aşağıdaki maddelerde sendikaların çalışanlar için sağlayabileceği faydalar verilmiştir. Bağlı olduğunuz sendikaların geçmişte bu faydaları siz sağlamakta ne derece başarılı olup olmadığını verilen ölçüğü kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 4'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4
Hiç başarılı değil	Biraz başarılı	Başarılı	Çok başarılı

80.	İşyerinin yönetimi konusunda çalışanların daha fazla söz sahibi olmaları	
81.	Daha iyi maaş	
82.	Çalışanlara işleri ile ilgili daha fazla söz hakkı	
83.	İşçi sağlığı ile iş güvenliğinin iyileştirmesi	
84.	Yapılan işin daha çekici olması	
85.	Daha iyi yan haklar	
86.	İş güvencesi	

BÖLÜM 6. Lütfen aileniz, çalışma arkadaşlarınız ile sizin için önemli olan diğer insanların, sendikal faaliyetlere katılımınıza ne ölçüde destek olup olmadıklarını aşağıdaki ölçüğü kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 5'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Hiç desteklemiyorlar	Desteklemiyorlar	Biraz destekliyorlar	Destekliyorlar	Tamamen destekliyorlar

87.	Aileniz sendikal faaliyetlere katılımınızı ne ölçüde destekliyor?	
88.	Çalışma arkadaşlarınız sendikal faaliyetlere katılımınızı ne ölçüde destekliyor?	

89. Sizin için önemli olan diğer insanlar sendikal faaliyetlere katılımınızı ne ölçüde destekliyor?	
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BÖLÜM 7. Aşağıdaki cümleler kişilerin çalıştıkları kurum hakkındaki duygu ve düşüncelerini yansıtmaktadır. Lütfen bu cümlelere şu anda çalıştığınız kurum açısından ne ölçüde katılıp katılmadığınızı aşağıdaki ölçeği kullanarak belirtiniz.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 5'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum biraz katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

90. Meslek hayatımın kalan kısmını şu anda çalıştığım şirkette geçirmek beni çok mutlu eder.	
91. Çalıştığım şirkete karşı güçlü bir bağlılığım yok.	
92. Çalıştığım şirketin benim için çok özel bir anlamı var.	
93. Çalıştığım şirketin meselelerini gerçekten de kendi meselelerim gibi hissediyorum.	
94. Şu anda çalıştığım şirkete kendimi “duygusal olarak bağlı” hissetmiyorum.	
95. Kendimi şu anda çalıştığım şirkette “ailenin bir parçası” gibi hissetmiyorum.	

BÖLÜM 8. Aşağıda üyelerin sendikaya katılımları ile ilgili maddeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra bu aktivitelere hangi sıklıkta katıldığınızı aşağıdaki ölçeği kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 0'dan 4'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	0
Hiçbir zaman	1-2 defa	3-5 defa	Birçok defa	Böyle bir etkinlik olmadı

96. Sendika toplantılarında söz aldım.	
97. Sendika öncülüğündeki hayır işlerinde (yardım toplama işinde) gönüllü olarak çalıştım.	
98. İşle ilgili bir problem için sendika temsilcisinden yardım istedim.	
99. Sendikanın idari işlerinde (zarflama, telefon görüşmeleri) gönüllü olarak çalıştım.	
100. Sendika toplantılarına katıldım.	
101. Sendikanın ilan panosunu okudum.	
102. Toplu sözleşmenin kabul edilmesi için oy kullandım.	
103. Sendikal faaliyetler için gönüllüler buldum.	
104. Sendikayı aileme ve iş dışından arkadaşlarıma methettim.	

105. Sendikada seçim kampanyalarında görev aldım.	
106. Bilgi paylaşım toplantılarına katıldım (örneğin toplu sözleşme görüşmeleri sırasında).	
107. Sendikanın düzenlediği pikniklere katıldım.	
108. Sendika dergisini okudum.	
109. Toplu iş sözleşmesini okudum.	
110. Sendikanın faydalarını sendikanın başka üyelerine açıkladım.	
111. Sendika yöneticileri/ delegeleri için oy kullandım.	

BÖLÜM 9. Aşağıdaki maddelerde sendikanızın farklı konularda alabileceği grev kararları verilmiştir. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra o maddede yazan konuda sendikanın grev kararına destek verme olasılığınızın ne olduğunu aşağıdaki ölçeği kullanarak belirtiniz.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 5'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Çok düşük olasılık	Düşük olasılık	Orta derecede olasılık	Yüksek olasılık	Çok yüksek olasılık

112. Daha iyi maaş almak için greve gidilmesi	
113. Mesleki alanın dışındaki bir görevi reddetme hakkına sahip olmak için greve gidilmesi	
114. İşten çıkarılma prosedürlerini korumak ya da iyileştirmek için greve gidilmesi	
115. Sendika üyelerinin işyerinin yönetiminde söz sahibi olması için greve gidilmesi	
116. Sosyal hakları (yakacak parası, izin parası ve ikramiye gibi) korumak ya da iyileştirmek için greve gidilmesi	
117. Sendika üyelerinin iş tanımları ile ilgili olarak söz sahibi olmaları için greve gidilmesi	
118. Performans değerlendirme prosedürlerini korumak ya da iyileştirmek için greve gidilmesi	

BÖLÜM 10. Aşağıda sendika baş temsilciniz ile ilgili maddeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra işyerinizdeki baş temsilcinin bu aktiviteleri hangi sıklıkta gerçekleştirdiğini aşağıdaki ölçeği kullanarak cevaplandırınız.

Bu bölümü aşağıdaki ölçekte verilen 1'den 5'e kadar olan sayıları kullanarak cevaplandırınız

1	2	3	4	5
Hiçbir zaman	Nadiren	Arada sırada	Sıklıkla	Her zaman

İş yerimdeki sendika baş temsilcisi:

119. Ona ihtiyacım olduğunda yanımdadır.	
120. Üyelere toplu sözleşmede neler görmek istediklerini sorar.	
121. Üyeler arasında çıkan sorunların çözümüne yardım eder.	
122. Üyelerin işveren ile olan sorunlarının çözümünde yardım eder.	
123. Üyelerin problemlerini anlamak için işyerinde dolaşır.	
124. Üyelerin ihtiyaçlarını ve dertlerini dinler.	
125. Üyeleri sendikada faal olmaları için teşvik eder.	
126. Üyeleri toplu sözleşme ile belirlenmiş hakları konusunda bilgilendirir.	
127. Sendikanın yönetiminde üyelerin söz haklarını kullanmalarına destek olur.	
128. Üyeleri sendikada olan bitenler hakkında bilgilendirir.	
129. Üyeleri sendikanın karar alma süreçlerine dahil eder.	
130. Üyelerin sendika ile ilgili olarak eğitilmelerini sağlar.	
131. Sendika üyelerine iş ile ilgili sorunlarında danışmanlık yapar.	
132. Üyeleri toplu sözleşme ve müzakereler hakkında bilgilendirir.	

BÖLÜM 11. Lütfen aşağıdaki her maddeyi dikkatlice okuduktan sonra, maddede belirtilen durum sendikaya üyeliğinizin ilk yılında başınıza geldiyse soldaki EVET cevabını daire içine alınız; başınıza gelmediyse sağdaki HAYIR cevabını daire içine alınız.

Bu bölümü nasıl doldurmanız gerektiği aşağıdaki örnekte gösterilmektedir.

ÖRNEK: Eğer sendikaya üyeliğinizin ilk yılında bilgisayar kullandıysanız EVET cevabını daire içine alınız

Bilgisayar Kullanma	Evet	Hayır
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133. İşverenden sendikal faaliyetlere katılmamam için baskı	EVET	HAYIR
134. Sendikanın organize ettiği sosyal aktivitelere (piknik gibi) davet	EVET	HAYIR
135. Yaptığım işle ilgili toplu sözleşme maddeleri hakkında beni kişisel olarak bilgilendirmeleri	EVET	HAYIR

136. Sendika seçiminde oy talebi	EVET	HAYIR
137. Bir mağduriyetin çözümünde sendikadan yardım	EVET	HAYIR
138. Sendikanın organize ettiği bir eğitime davet	EVET	HAYIR
139. Sendika yöneticileri ile görüşme	EVET	HAYIR
140. Sendika ve konfederasyon konularında beni kişisel olarak bilgilendirmeleri	EVET	HAYIR
141. Sendika toplantısına şahsi davet	EVET	HAYIR

KİŞİSEL BİLGİLER:

142. Doğum yılınız: _____
143. Cinsiyetiniz: Erkek Kadın
144. Eğitim durumunuz: İlkokul Ortaokul Lise Teknik Lise Üniversite
145. Çalışmakta olduğunuz iş kolu: Tekstil Metal
146. Çalışmakta olduğunuz işyerinin adı : _____
147. Şu anda çalışmakta olduğunuz işyerinde hangi yıldan beri çalışmaktasınız?

148. Şimdiki işyerinizde ne iş yapıyorsunuz? Şef Usta Düz işçi Diğer:

149. Şu anda üyesi olduğunuz sendika: Teksif Birleşik Metal Tekstil-iş Türk-Metal
150. Hangi yıldan beri bu sendikaya üyesiniz? _____
151. Çalışma hayatınız boyunca hiç işten çıkarıldınız mı? Evet Hayır
152. Daha önce toplu olarak işten çıkarılan bir grupta yer aldınız mı? Evet Hayır
153. Daha önce başka bir sendikaya üye oldunuz mu? Evet Hayır
- Bu soruya cevabınız evet ise, hangi sendikanın üyesiydiniz? _____
154. Sendika yönetiminde hiç görev aldınız mı? Evet Hayır
- Bu soruya cevabınız evet ise, hangi görevde bulundunuz? _____ Bu göreviniz kaç yıl sürdü? _____

ANKETİMİZE KATILDIĞINIZ İÇİN TEŞEKKÜR EDERİZ!

Appendix B

Factor Loadings¹ of Industrial Relations Climate Measure

Items		1	2
16	The union-management relations in this organization can best be characterized as hostile	-.501	
1	There is not much communication between management and union in this organization	-.479	
25	Management and union take a long time to resolve their differences in this organization	-.559	
24	There is a great deal of concern for the other party's point of view in the union-management relationship	.666	
27	The collective agreement is regarded as fair by employees in this organization	.515	
22	Employees have a positive view on joint union-management committees here	.489	
20	Union and management have respect for each other's goals	.669	
18	Employees generally view the conditions of their employment as fair	.486	
13	A sense of fairness is associated with union-management dealings in this place	.575	
14	Union and management work together to make this organization a better place in which to work	.709	
15	In this organization negotiations take place in an atmosphere of good faith	.700	
7	The parties exchange information freely in this organization	.622	
6	Management often seeks input from the union before initiating changes	.550	
10	Grievances are normally settled promptly in this organization	.657	
3	Union and management in this organization tend to dislike each other		.568
28	The parties regularly quarrel over minor issues		.467
4	Management often opposes the changes advocated by unions here		.442
29	In this organization, joint union-management committees achieve definite results		.400

¹Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Eigen value for the factors: 5.44 (30.24%), 1.68 (9.34%)

Appendix C

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Job Satisfaction Measures

	Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
	Pay Satisfaction			
71	I feel satisfied with my chances for salary increase.	1.00	0.78	0.61
67	Raises are too few and far between.	0.70	0.54	0.49
64	I feel I am being paid a fair amount for the work I do.	0.72	0.54	0.29
	Benefits Satisfaction			
76	The benefit package we have is equitable.	1.00	0.76	0.58
68	The benefits we receive are as good as most other organizations offer.	0.86	0.65	0.42
70	There are benefits we do not have which we should have.	0.75	0.52	0.46
65	I am not satisfied with the benefits I receive.	0.68	0.50	0.44
	Promotion Satisfaction			
66	People get ahead as fast here as they do in other places.	1.00	0.62	0.39
62	Those who do well on the job stand a fair chance of being promoted.	1.13	0.69	0.48
77	I am satisfied with my chances for promotion.	1.22	0.80	0.64
	Supervisor Satisfaction			
72	My supervisor is unfair to me.	1.00	0.61	0.46
74	My supervisor shows too little interest in the feelings of subordinates.	0.99	0.57	0.45
79	I like my supervisor.	1.33	0.76	0.59
	Method			
	There are benefits we do not have which we should have.*	1.00	0.43	
	I am not satisfied with the benefits I receive.*	0.94	0.43	
	Raises are too few and far between.*	1.05	0.45	

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Job Satisfaction Measures

Continued

Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
My supervisor is unfair to me.*	0.67	0.31	
My supervisor shows too little interest in the feelings of subordinates.*	0.80	0.35	

Notes: All factor loadings are significant ($p < .05$).

*R Square is explained by substantive and method factors for the negatively worded items.

Appendix D

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Union Socialization Measure

	Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
134	Personal invitation to social activities organized by the union (e.g. union picnic)	0.67	0.39	0.15
135	Personal attention for the purpose of informing him/her about contract provisions of particular importance to his/her job	1.02	0.61	0.37
136	Solicitation of his /her vote during a union election	0.62	0.36	0.13
137	Assistance in settling a grievance	1.00	0.61	0.37
138	Personal invitation to a training organized by the union.	1.18	0.69	0.48
139	Meeting with union officers.	0.94	0.61	0.38
140	Personal attention for the purpose of informing him/her about the union and the local	1.16	0.68	0.46
141	Personal invitation to a union meeting.	1.00	0.61	0.37

Notes: All factor loadings are significant ($p < .05$).

Appendix E

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Steward Responsiveness Measure

	Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
119	Is there for me when I need him/her	1.00	0.83	0.69
120	Asks members what they would like see in the local's contract proposals	1.05	0.82	0.67
121	Helps to solve conflicts between members or different groups of members	0.93	0.81	0.65
122	Helps members solve conflicts with management	0.89	0.79	0.62
123	Walks around the plant to see how members are doing	0.97	0.82	0.67
124	Solicits information from members about their needs and concerns	0.98	0.83	0.70
125	Encourage members to become active in the association	0.96	0.75	0.56
126	Informs members about their rights under the contract	0.92	0.84	0.71
127	Supports members to use their rights to speak about how the union is run	1.04	0.85	0.72
128	Keeps members informed about the local association	1.01	0.83	0.69
129	Involves members in the decision making processes	0.94	0.71	0.51
130	Makes sure members are educated about the local association	1.05	0.81	0.66
131	Counsels members about work related problems	1.03	0.85	0.72
132	Talks to member about the contract and about negotiations	1.03	0.88	0.77

Notes: All factor loadings are significant (p<.05)

Appendix F

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Organizational Commitment Measure

Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
Organizational Commitment			
90 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization.	1.00	0.71	0.51
91 I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization.	0.78	0.60	0.43
92 This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me	1.14	0.86	0.74
93 I really feel as if this organization's problems are my own.	1.00	0.75	0.56
94 I do not feel emotionally attached to this organization	0.49	0.34	0.52
95 I do not feel like part of the family at my organization	0.38	0.25	0.49
Method			
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization.*	1.00	0.26	
I do not feel emotionally attached to this organization*	2.60	0.63	
I do not feel like part of the family at my organization*	2.85	0.65	

Notes: All factor loadings are significant ($p < .05$)

*R Square is explained by substantive and method factors for the negatively worded items.

Appendix G

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Union Instrumentality Measure

	Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
80	Getting workers a say in how their employer runs the business or the organization	1.00	0.68	0.46
82	Getting workers a say in how they do their jobs	1.17	0.77	0.59
84	Helping to make a job more interesting	1.11	0.76	0.58
81	Getting better wages	1.18	0.78	0.61
83	Improving safety and health on the job	0.98	0.67	0.45
85	Getting better fringe benefits	1.18	0.80	0.64
86	Improving job security	1.08	0.67	0.46

Notes: All factor loadings are significant ($p < .05$)

Appendix H

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Pro-Union Attitudes and Subjective Norms Measures

	Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
Pro-union Attitudes				
52	Unions have a constructive power in this county	1.00	0.63	0.39
53	I believe that paying union dues is a waste of money that I have earned	1.01	0.62	0.42
54	I am pleased that local unions exist	1.10	0.82	0.67
55	I would not take a job requiring workers to join a union	0.82	0.53	0.46
56	Workers would be in a better situation if there was not labour movement in Turkey	0.73	0.48	0.48
57	I am proud to be a member of the labour movement in Turkey	0.67	0.45	0.21
59	I believe that unions are source of disgrace	0.79	0.55	0.39
Subjective Norms				
87	To what extent your family support your union membership	1.00	0.75	0.56
88	To what extent your coworkers support your union membership	1.02	0.85	0.72
89	To what extent people important for you support your union membership	0.96	0.81	0.66
	Method			
	I believe that paying union dues is a waste of money that I have earned *	1.00	0.18	
	I would not take a job requiring workers to join a union*	2.29	0.43	
	Workers would be in a better situation if there was not labour movement in Turkey *	2.65	0.50	
	I believe that unions are source of disgrace*	1.50	0.30	

Notes: All factor loadings are significant (p<.05)

Appendix I

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Union Loyalty and Willingness to Work for the Union Measures

Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R^2
Union Loyalty			
47 The union adequately represents the interest of all members.	1.00	0.64	0.41
42 I have little confidence and trust in most members of my union.	0.82	0.49	0.40
46 My values and unions' are not very similar.	0.66	0.44	0.35
48 I feel little loyalty to the union.	1.06	0.66	0.60
33 I feel a sense of pride being a member of the union	1.30	0.79	0.63
36 Deciding to join the union was a smart move on my part.	1.26	0.81	0.67
38 I talk up the union to my friends as a great organization to be a member of.	1.33	0.82	0.67
40 The record of this union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done	1.11	0.71	0.51
43 There is a lot to be gained by joining the union	1.12	0.73	0.53
45 Based on what I know now and what I believe I can expect in the future, I plan to be a member of the union for the rest of the time I work in the district.	1.03	0.71	0.51
Willingness to Work for the Union			
35 I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected of a member to make the union successful.	1.00	0.35	0.57
32 I doubt that I would do any special work to help the union	1.44	0.53	0.38
41 If asked I would run for an elected office in the union.	2.18	0.67	0.45
49 If asked I would serve on a committee for the union.	2.26	0.74	0.55

Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
Method			
I doubt that I would do any special work to help the union.*	0.67	0.30	
I have little confidence and trust in most members of my union.*	1.00	0.40	
My values and unions' are not very similar.*	0.86	0.39	
I feel little loyalty to the union.*	0.96	0.40	

Notes: All factor loadings are significant ($p < .05$)

*R Square is explained by substantive and method factors for the negatively worded items.

Appendix J

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Propensity to Strike Measure

	Items	Unstandardized Factor Loading	Standardized Factor Loading	R ²
112	I would go on a strike to get better salaries	1.00	0.64	0.41
113	I would go on a strike to get the right to refuse assignment outside of professional area	0.88	0.63	0.40
114	I would go on a strike to maintain or improve layoff procedures	1.18	0.74	0.55
115	I would go on a strike to get members a say in how the business is run	1.13	0.79	0.62
116	I would go on a strike to maintain or improve social rights (fuel support, paid holiday, bonus)	1.20	0.76	0.57
117	I would go on a strike to get members control over how they do their jobs	0.97	0.76	0.58
118	I would go on a strike to maintain or improve the design of evaluation procedures	0.91	0.72	0.52

Notes: All factor loadings are significant (p<.05)

Appendix K

```

set mxloops = 30000.
include file = 'c:\spsswin\macros\multimp.mac'.
multimp nvar = 19
    n = 1007
    fname = 'd:\u01\imputed.sav'
    idvar = f0000100
varset = d_boy nownkids d_biodad firstb mage_bir
    pos_inc lhsumc momwell mom_ed dfghigh dadhigh
    work_ft work_pt shr_mom
    traatt gmom_ed gdad_ed withmom withdad.

match files file = */file = 'd:\u01\imputed.sav'/by = f0000100.
descriptives
withdad withmom mage_bir firstb d_biodad nownkids
d_boy ITRAATT IMOM_ED IDADHIGH IDFGHIGH ISHR_MOM
ILHHSUMC IPOS_INC IWORK_PT IWORK_FT IGMOM_ED IMOMWELL
IGDAD_ED .
variable label
    itraatt 'imputed traditional attitudes'
    imom_ed 'imputed mom_ed'
    ishr_mom 'imputed shr_mom'
    ilhsumc 'imputed lhsumc'
    iPOS_inc 'imputed pos_inc'
    idfghigh 'imputed dfghigh'
    idadhigh 'imputed dadhigh'
    iwork_pt 'imputed work_pt'
    iwork_ft 'imputed work_ft'
    igmom_ed 'imputed gmothers education'
    igdad_ed 'imputed grandfathers education'
    imomwell 'imputed momwell'.
recode Idadhigh (low thru 0.4999= 0)(0.5 thru hi= 1).
recode Idfghigh (low thru 0.4999= 0)(0.5 thru hi= 1).
recode iwork_ft (low thru 0.4999= 0)(0.5 thru hi= 1).
recode iwork_pt (low thru 0.4999= 0)(0.5 thru hi= 1).
recode ishr_mom (low thru 0 = 0).
compute imom_ed = rnd(imom_ed).
compute igmom_ed = rnd(igmom_ed).
compute igdad_ed = rnd(igdad_ed).
if (ilhsumc = 0) ipos_inc = 0.
if (ilhsumc gt 0) ipos_inc = 1.
if (ipos_inc eq 0) ishr_mom = 0.
descriptives
withdad withmom mage_bir firstb d_biodad nownkids

```

```
d_boy ITRAATT IMOM_ED IDADHIGH IDFGHIGH ISHR_MOM  
ILHHSUMC IPOS_INC IWORK_PT IWORK_FT IGMOM_ED IMOMWELL  
IGDAD_ED .
```

```
freq var = iwork_ft iwork_pt ipos_inc pos_inc  
idfghigh idadhigh.
```