

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: FOCUS AND APPROACH

1.1 Statement of Problem and Aim of the Study

Over the past few years, the concept of citizenship has been on the agenda of the most discussed contemporary issues. As many scholars express, it has become the ‘buzz word’ among thinkers on all points of the political spectrum (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 352; Heater 1990: 293; Vogel and Moran, 1991). Along with the attention the concept has received in the recent years, the literature has also been enhanced with the changing conceptual and theoretical frameworks put forward regarding how to handle citizenship. Disputes over how to illustrate the nature of citizenship has been one of the most challenging tasks of political theorists of all ages, ancient and contemporary, since there is no general agreement on a single definition.

It is what we call the ‘vocabularies of citizenship’ (Lister et al., 2003: 235) and their meanings that vary according to the changing social, political and cultural contexts. These changing vocabularies of citizenship are the products of different historical legacies which they are born into. For instance, whereas the early studies on citizenship primarily focused on the aspect of ‘*rights*’, conceptualizing the concept with referral to simply rights and obligations of individuals towards their national governments, more recent studies have provided different formulations of it. With the increasing stimulus of identity politics after the 1980s, says Kymlicka and

Norman (2000: 30), citizenship came to be accepted as an '*identity*' that symbolizes membership in a particular political community based on various identity elements (race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession, sexuality, etc.). Alongside with the aspect of identity, Kymlicka and Norman also emphasizes the aspect of 'civic virtue' – individuals' capacities and willingness to participation and cooperation – in the vocabularies of citizenship. Conceiving citizenship by taking these interrelated dimensions – legal status, identity and civic virtue – into consideration helps us avoid the narrow formalistic meaning of the concept, which Yuval-Davis (1997: 4) narrates as "having the right to carry a specific passport". It designates more than that, referring to a panoply of individual-society-state relationship.

This thesis is about the experiences and perceptions of Turkish youth over their citizenship and its various dimensions. It deals with the question of what citizenship means for young people and relates this to their political orientation. It seeks to investigate how various young people with different political orientations have their own different understandings of citizenship. The concept of 'political orientation' used here refers to the politically integrated set of ideas and beliefs that characterize the thinking of a group and provide a guide for action. To the extent that those political ideas and beliefs are shared among a group of people, they can provide a sense of identity and unity which in return shapes individuals' understanding of related concepts such as citizenship. From this perspective, it is assumed in this study that the nature of the perceptions and experiences of the youth on citizenship change on the basis of their political orientations. To observe and understand the pivotal diversities occurring in the youth's sense of citizenship on the basis of different political affinities, seven main analytical groups were identified as they have appeared to be established groups in the socio-political spectrum of

Turkish society. These are: (1) Republicans; (2) Nationalists; (3) Leftists; (4) Islamists; (5) Liberals; (6) Kurdish; and, (7) Apolitical groups. Here, it is necessary to add a few words on the formulation of this analytical model; (a) the use of such a categorization rests on an analytical purpose; (b) the study intended to set up the sample on the basis of these political groups given their long-established duration and historically important roles in the Turkish political scene. But, in doing so, the study does not overlook the existence of political movements other than stated here, at least theoretically; (c) these groups are not mutually exclusive. The boundaries among them are sought to be fluid and dependent on the context in which the discourses of citizenship and its dimensions will be analyzed.

The thesis revolves around three main questions. *Firstly*, as already noted, it aims to explore how youth approaches different dimensions of citizenship. Based on the framework formulated by Kymlicka and Norman (2000), the study focuses on citizenship on the basis of three dimensions; citizenship as *legal status*, citizenship as *identity*, and, citizenship as *civic virtue*. In fact, the interrelation between these three dimensions is ambiguous, mainly as a consequence of lack of empirical studies that seek to explore the interplay between them. This study, therefore, attempts to fill in the void in available literature on the dynamics of citizenship and the interrelation between its dimensions. *Secondly*, it aims to describe the meaning of ‘being citizen’ among young people in the context of their personal, political, gender, ethnic or national identities and, describe their perceptions on the sense of belonging to a certain ethnic group, nation or state. Thus, it also investigates whether they lean more towards liberal-individualist or civic-republican models of citizenship. In particular, it intends to gain insight into the opportunities that young people have to experience rules, rights, responsibilities and institutions. *Thirdly*, this thesis aims to

find out whether some converging or diverging tendencies exist among the understandings of different politically-oriented groups. The exploration of such divergences/convergences provides us with a way to find out whether the fundamental assumption of this thesis – the nature of the perceptions and experiences of the youth on citizenship change on the basis of their political orientations – is true or not.

1.2 Justification: The Importance of Youth as a Focus Area

Youth is the time of life between childhood and maturity. It is *sui generis* in terms of its historical, normative, demographic, and social characteristics.

Firstly, historical importance of the youth as a category in the Turkish context is associated with its quality as a ‘politically active’ group. Turkish political history has experienced an intensive and long-established political activism of the youth especially from 1960s to 1980s. The history of youth’s involvement in the political sphere dates back to the late Ottoman period, during which significant youth movements occurred as a reaction to the central authority of the empire.¹ With the foundation of the Turkish Republic and until to the end of the single party era, the involvement of the youth in the political activities remained relatively limited. The most important characteristic of the youth movements during this period was their compliance with the central ideology, that is, the Kemalist principles (Çavdar, 1983: 808). With the beginning of the multi-party era, the radicalization among the youth was accompanied by a political polarization, which stimulated splittings

¹ Majority of the members of “*Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti*” (New Ottomans’ Society), which has acted as an opposition power against Abdülaziz and became the symbol of Turkish constitutional movement, were young people. In the following years, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee for Union and Progress) opposing Abdülhamit administration got organized around young generations. With transition to the *II. Meşrutiyet* (Constitutional Monarchy), youth movements turned into mass protest actions. For details see, (Çavdar, 1983).

among political groups in the form of ‘leftists’ or ‘rightists’. The students were no longer active in politics as single individuals, but their activism was consolidated through their organizations (Landau, 1974: 30). In the second half of the 1950s, the clashes between the right-wing and left-wing students became more severe, and this hostile environment became one of the factors that led to the break out of the first military coup in Turkish political history on May 27. During the 1960s and 1970s, political and socio-economic hardships were the major reasons behind the radicalization of the youth and further accelerated the polarization among different politically oriented youth groups. These political activities continued intensely until the 1980 military intervention after which a new process of depoliticization took place among the young people of the country. However, this situation has recently been challenged by the impact of globalization in general, and Turkey’s prospective membership to the European Union (EU), in particular. The rapid socio-economic and political change that Turkey has passed through in the last decade and the process of Turkey’s integration to the EU have all opened room for the strengthening of civil society arena – both in qualitative and quantitative terms – and brought the issues of representation and political activism to the fore (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 221).

Secondly, the youth arises as an important subject matter in *normative* terms since it indirectly opens ground for the exploration of the nature of national policies and nation-building process in a given community. This is, especially, due to the characteristic of the youth as a group of people passing through a long and intense process of civic education which is also the case in the Turkish context. Defining citizenship as ‘an ongoing learning experience’, and young people as ‘citizens-in-making’ (Osler and Starkey, 2003: 247), it is possible to argue that education,

whether through the whole curriculum of national education or through ‘specialized programmes’, plays a role of *socialization* in compliance with the aspirations of the potential powerful group in any state. This socialization task is performed through socializing young people into a national community by transmitting fundamental national values to them, and making them understand the constitutional, legal, and normative power of the nation. In this regard, civic education, together with other strategic means, turns out to be one of the holding elements of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991). Today, education for citizenship has also gained an international dimension as governments are struggling with the citizenship issue in schooling in the context of globalization, where there is much talk of threats to the legitimacy of nation states (Criddle et al., 2004: 27). According to Gifford (2004: 145), while much of the politics of citizenship may reflect global problems of social integration, a central focus for political debate and policy development continues to be the national arena. This trend is widely reflected in increasing tendency of reorganizing the civic education courses in many countries or reintegrating them to the national curriculums. For Gifford, it is unsurprising therefore that, citizenship policies have become directed towards young people and immigrants as these groups have come to symbolize the breakdown of the national citizenship community within powerful political and media discourses (2004: 145). Apart from that, the recent trends of apathy and civic disengagement, analyzed by writers such as Putnam (2000), have aroused concern for governments to bring further regulations on civic education.

Most of Turkish history as a nation, making of good citizens has been the primary goal of civic education in particular and public schooling in general. Youth was, in the early Republican period, attributed a holy value as the ‘symbols of the

independent Turkish Republic, and the watchmen of the principles of Kemalism² within the context of the nation-building process. Mustafa Kemal has called on the youth to watch over the Republic and independence in a speech which every Turkish child has to learn by heart (Landau, 1974: 30). In order to enhance national solidarity and strengthen it through its transmission to various segments of the society as much as possible, gaining the support of the young generations, who are faithful to the principles of the state, was one of the overstanding objectives of the Republican period. According to Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish youth was to be the most valuable symbol of ‘national *terbiye*³, national culture, and patriotism’. These national values would be acquired by socializing young generations to provide them a sense of belonging and identity through the means of various mechanisms, such as, the school system, universities, *Halkevleri* (People’s Houses), *Halkodaları*⁴ (the People’s Rooms), and *Köy Enstitüleri*⁵ (Village Institutes). These Republican institutions served as to raise new generations aware of their basic responsibilities towards their fellow citizens in line with the principles of Atatürk. This mission might be illustrated with the following statement of Mustafa Kemal,⁶

² These six principles (Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Laicism, Revolutionism, and Statism) were adopted for the first time at the 1931 Congress of the Republican People’s Party (RPP). For the full text of the 1931 Program, see (Tunçay, 1992: 447-454).

³ Nusret Kemal (1933: 436) defined *terbiye* as ‘cultivating’ which means giving ideals.

⁴ The People’s Houses and the People’s Rooms were one of the constituting agents of the civilizing process from above, where many activities ranging from education to leisure were taking place. See, (Necip, 1933: 245; Öztürkmen, 1994; Karaömerlioğlu, 1998).

⁵ Village Institutes constitute another agent of integrating the peasants into the center. See, (Tonguç, 1944).

⁶ In another speech, Mustafa Kemal addresses the teachers: “Gentlemen! Whatever the limits of the education they are to receive may be, the children and youths that are to be educated must first and foremost be taught the independence of Turkey, their own identities, and the necessity to fight against all the elements which are enemies to national traditions. In the world, according to the international situation, there is no life or independence for the people who do not have the moral elements necessary for such a struggle, and neither, for societies made up of such people (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1989: 246).

Youth!

It is you who strengthens and continues our courage. With the education and knowledge you are receiving, you will be the most valuable symbol of the virtue of humanity, the affection of the fatherland and freedom of thought.

O rising new generation! The future is yours. We formed the Republic; it is you who will raise and continue it (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1989: 188).

It is self-evident in Mustafa Kemal's statements that, the youth has an important legacy in the Kemalist thought in terms of the future security of the state and the realization of the national ideals. Portrayed as hardworking and patriotic citizens, the youth was to represent the national character of the state. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal expressed his trust in the youth in most of his speeches: "A pure generation is being raised in the bosom of the nation. I will leave this work to them and I will not look back" (Alp, 2001: 281).

As a *third* point, the Turkish youth signifies an important case because of its *demographic* features. One of the striking characteristics of the Turkish population structure has been its active and dynamic composition. The proportion of the young⁷ people in the total population of the country has been considerably high in the post-WWII period.⁸ As presented in Table 1.1, although there have been fluctuations in the number of the young people aged 5-14 and 15-24, their proportion in the whole population has remained considerably high in the last thirty years, and it seems it will beat some high levels in the next two decades according to the population forecasts of United Nations (UN).⁹

⁷ This study, by adopting the definition of the UN, sets the age of 15 as the minimum below age level for young people.

⁸ After this period, there has been an immense population increase in Turkey as a consequence of various factors, such as; the discharge and return of the Republican generation to their homes after the war; the invention of medicines like penicillin which helped to reduce death rates; success in struggling with epidemic and chronicle diseases like malaria, and so on (Çavdar, 1983).

⁹ Since the university youth is relatively more important for empirical purposes in this study, it is necessary to add that the total number of students having undergraduate education in any of the Turkish universities during the 2003-2004 academic period was 1.820.981. The distribution of this

Table 1.1 Age Distribution of Turkish Population 1970-2020 (UN, 2005).

Indicator	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Population (thousands)	36.207	46.316	57.300	68.234	73.193	78.081	82.640	86.774
Percentage aged 0-4 (%)	16	15	12	11	10	9	9	8
Percentage aged 5-14 (%)	26	26	24	20	19	18	17	16
Percentage aged 15-24 (%)	19	20	20	20	18	17	17	17
Percentage aged 60 or over (%)	7	6	7	8	8	9	10	11
Percentage aged 65 or over (%)	4	5	4	5	5	6	6	7
Percentage aged 80 or over (%)	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	1

Finally, focusing on the youth enables us not only to elaborate the characteristics of this particular group, but also provides a means for evaluating the *social* characteristics of the wider society it is a part of. Given the importance of the reasons mentioned above, the Turkish youth provides us with a study setting through which one can have an analysis and understanding of the wider picture of the Turkish society. In this sense, focusing on the youth not only enables us to collect data about the dynamics and profiles of this particular group, but it also enables exploration and evaluation of related aspects of the Turkish society in general.

1.3 Previous Studies of Citizenship and Youth in Turkey

While there has been a great deal of scholarly research on the Turkish youth, including both the university and high school students, there has been little diversity in the main purposes of these studies. Their aim has usually been to identify the socio-cultural profile of the youth and to collect information about their educational and occupational background, economic well-being, leisure activities, and their

number on the basis of the type of universities attended is as follows: 1.752.297 students study in state universities, while the remaining 68.684 at private universities. This data has been calculated by the author on the statistical data provided by the Council of Higher Education of the Republic of Turkey.

opinions and future expectations about the ongoing problems in the country. In contrast to the abundance of research carried with such aims, it is very difficult to talk about empirical studies conducted concerning the issue of citizenship with a particular focusing on the youth in Turkey.

There are two comprehensive published studies on the Turkish youth including extended surveys conducted in various cities of Turkey. The first one, *Türkiye Üniversite Gençliği Değerler Araştırması* (Research on the Values of the University Youth), was pursued by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation in 2004, and it collected data from 2200 students from 27 universities in different regions of Turkey. The findings of the research, which were published very recently, reflect the demands of the youth for further democratization, freedom and a better life, and also draw attention to their dilemmas between attachment to traditional values and quest for individualization. The second one, *Katıl ve Geleceğini Yarat* (Participate and Build Your Future), was conducted in the collaboration of Arı Movement and International Republicans' Institute in the year 2002 with the aim of exploring the political participation of the youth. The interviews, which were conducted with 1242 young people, provide data about the extent of youth's participation into the political life, the main problems on the way of participation and policy advices for dealing with those challenges.

One notable empirical study carried to explore the political orientations of Turkish university students was produced by Ozankaya as a doctoral dissertation at Ankara University during 1964 and 1965. Interviews held with nearly 400 university students provided explanations about the changing political tendencies of Turkish students and shed light on the circumstances that gave way to the radicalization of the youth in Turkey during the 1960s. Also, a research carried out by Prof. Nilüfer

Narlı in the year 1993 to explore the characteristics of the Islamist university youth, and another research, done by Cihan Aktaş in 1992 on the social roots of students wearing head scarf have made important contributions to the Turkish literature on political orientation and the youth.

Finally, a number of other significant studies should be mentioned which aimed to provide data on the socio-cultural profile of youth. These are; *Youth Research 2005* initiated by the Association of Turkish Young Businessmen (ANGIAD); *Research on Turkish University Youth: the Socio-cultural Profile of the University Youth* (Yazıcı, 2003); *Youth's Identity: the Sociological Profile of the University Youth* (Bayhan, 2002); *Turkish Youth 98: A silent mass under observation* (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1999).

1.4 Methodology of the Study

Given the fundamental objective of this thesis, which is to flesh out the perceptions and experiences of university students about their citizenship on the basis of their political orientations, it is apparent that exploring, understanding, and describing this social reality necessitates a conformity between the main purpose of the study and the research method being used. This consideration in the course of the study revealed the necessity for conducting an empirical research aimed to explore how youth define legal rights and responsibilities; in terms of which dimension of their identity they identify themselves with; and, what their understanding of civic virtue is. Additionally, this study also sought to investigate youth's views on a range of issues that are particularly important for the meaning and practices of citizenship, such as; main problems in the contemporary socio-political agenda of Turkey; potential institutions and actors that can help to tackle with those problems; trust in

institutions; the meaning of the EU for youth; Turkey's prospective membership to the EU and its potential consequences. The urge to have a deep focus on these broad range of issues dictated the choice of the method which was to gather data via in-depth interviews.

The initial step of deciding on a methodological framework was to clarify what it meant by 'political orientation' through making a categorization of the most prevailing and relatively well-established political groups in the socio-political history of Turkey. To serve this end, seven main groups have been identified in which the information gathered from each student was classified according to the student's own understanding of his/her political orientation. These groups were identified according to the notability of various political movements in the Turkish history, though, some of them have gained steam in the recent decades. The groups are, as noted earlier; republicans, nationalists, leftists, Islamists, liberals, Kurdish and apolitical groups. The historical development of these political movements is presented in detail in Chapter III, but, a brief introduction shall also be offered here.

Republicanism has been the fundamental ideology of the Kemalist project, which aimed to construct a modern and secular state. It was the defining ideology of the early years of the Turkish state beginning with 1923 up to the transition to the multi-party system. There have been several ups and downs in the progress of the Republican movement parallel to the rising of different alternative political movements. The direct/indirect intervention of the military in politics in 1960, 1971, 1980 and February 1997 'in the name of the preservation of the Kemalist secular state' helped to the revivalism of the Republican ideology in Turkey. In the 1990s, Republicanism gained steam mainly as a reaction to the rise of the Islamist ideology under the Welfare Party (WP), which was later to be replaced by a more moderate

Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). Also, the whole issue of Turkey's prospective membership to the EU has refreshed the debates on national sovereignty and the Republican ideology in Turkey.

The impact of the *nationalist* movement was limited in the early Republican years; but, it began to increase in the post-Second World War period. The growing impact of the nationalist ideology was very much in evidence in the 1960s, especially as a reaction to the growing leftist movement. During the 1960s, the youth's participation in the nationalist organizations such as *ülkü ocakları* (Idealist Hearths) and *Grey Wolves* increased rapidly, and with the establishment of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in 1976, the movement gained a more organized and strong structure. Although the electorate support for the NAP remained limited in the early 1990s, it increased drastically in the 1999 national elections in which the NAP became the second major party and took part in the coalition government together with the Democratic Left Party (DLP) and the Motherland Party (MP). It should also be noted that the rising Kurdish nationalism in the late 1980s and 1990s had a very important role in the consolidation of the nationalist ideology in Turkey.

The *leftist* ideology, which had its origins in the II. *Meşrutiyet* (The Second Constitutional) period, was perceived as one of the threatening ideologies by the newly constructed state. The proponents of the leftist ideology engaged in covert activities during the 1930s and 1940s. The 1960s witnessed an upsurge in the leftist movement which was consolidated with the formation of the Turkish Workers Party (TWP) in 1961. The political participation of the youth in the leftist organizations was also influential in the growing salience of the movement. However, after the 1980 military coup, the left became one of the most vulnerable political movements and lost weight in the political arena.

The *Islamic* movement, having its roots in the 19th century Pan-Islamist movement of the Ottoman Empire, was suppressed by the Kemalist modernity project in the early years of the Republic. The impact of religion in politics began to increase in the 1950-60 Democrat Party (DP) period. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Islamists got organized around their own parties such as the National Order Party (NOP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP). However, it was the 1980s during which religion emerged as an officially determined political movement, and became one of the contentious issues in Turkish political life. The Islamic WP appeared to be one of the major political parties in the 1990s and managed to take power in a coalition with the centre-right True Path Party (TPP) in June 1996. However, as a result of its various anti-secular attitudes, the government was asked for resignation by the military on February 28, 1997. The heritage of the WP was carried on by the Virtue Party (VP) which was later to be represented by a more conservative Felicity Party (FP), and more moderate JDP.

The *Kurdish* question, which has become one of the biggest challenges to Turkish modernity, involves the claims of the Kurdish people for recognition as a distinct ethnic group different from the homogenous Turkish national identity. The ethno-resistance of the Kurds emerged in the form of tribal upsurges in the early Republican years, and gained momentum in the 1960s, during which the Kurdish demands became central to the leftist movement. The 1980 military intervention was a big hindrance for the Kurdish activists as well as for the leftists. The Kurdish movement became a nationalist movement in 1984 when Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) launched an armed insurgency against the Turkish state. The conflict continued until 1998 following the arrestment of the PKK leader Öcalan, and in the following years, its intensity decreased remarkably although it has not yet ended

totally. The Kurdish question has also had notable impact at the level of political parties which will be dealt more in detail in Chapter III.

The Turkish state underwent its first short-lived experience of *liberalism* in the *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party) interlude in 1930. The liberal-oriented programme of the DP in the 1950s and the Justice Party (JP) in the 1960s helped to introduce the liberal ideology though in a limited and mostly economic ways. During the 1980s, the MP under Özal administration played a crucial role in providing room for the further development of liberalism in Turkey. In this sense, the coming into existence of the liberal idea (both economic and political) was not before the 1980s.

Lastly, it is possible to witness a wave of *de-politicization* in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention. Following a long process of ideological fragmentation and polarization in the 1970s, the state attempted to create ‘passive’ and ‘apolitical’ citizens. The reflection of this intention of state is very much evident in the provisions of the 1982 Constitution which was designed with a civic-republican interpretation of citizenship. However, it is necessary to mention that the group of ‘apolitical’ young people interviewed in this study includes not only those who are totally de-politicized, but is also includes those who are interested in politics, but do not have a specific political orientation. This distinction is important in the sense that being ‘apolitical’ might be a political behaviour as well.

At this point, it is vital to aver that, the political/ideological groupings in Turkey are not limited to those mentioned above; there exist certainly many more political groups and sub-groups. A further significant point is that there are no rigid boundaries between these groups. Throughout the making of this study, it was evident that some young people had difficulty in placing themselves in a certain political category, since their political orientations were constituted by a mixture of

different viewpoints. That is, one's identification of his/her political affinity could be unclear because of some intersecting elements between different political groups and the existence of common premises advocated by different political ideologies. Another problem encountered was the difficulty of the respondents to identify themselves with a certain group as a result of their contradictory, sometimes conflicting, perceptions over different components of their identity. For instance, some people identified themselves as 'liberal' in economic terms, while they claimed to be 'conservative' culturally speaking. Or, a person defining himself/herself as 'republican' in terms of his/her political affiliation could have Islamist tendencies in terms of identity.

Because of the need for a research strategy which was capable of obtaining a broad base of qualitative data on the experiences of the Turkish university youth, a small sample survey was designed, combining structured and unstructured interviews with individual university students studying at undergraduate level at a university in İstanbul. The choice of İstanbul as a research site was not an arbitrary one. *Firstly*, this city, as a metropolitan area, enables us to have a relatively good sample of students of a diverse background covering various parts of the whole country. *Secondly*, İstanbul alone is host to the largest number of universities in Turkey, including six state universities and fifteen private universities. Along with the existence of a quiet sufficient number of universities in this city, there are many network institutions available, which might ease the way to build contact with the interviewees. The so-called 'network institutions' include political parties (including youth branches of political parties), civil society organizations, student clubs, associations, foundations, etc. *Thirdly*, choosing the sample from İstanbul would eliminate logistic problems on conducting the planned interviews to a wide extent.

The individual students interviewed were undergraduate students studying at 13 different universities. They were aged between 18 and 26. This limit was introduced, because the major focus of this study was on the perceptions and experiences of undergraduate university students. In the process of choosing the sample, a number of criteria were taken into consideration. Firstly, a balance of male and female students, both within the whole sample, and within each political group itself was retained. The 70 students interviewed was comprised of 30 females and 40 males. Secondly, the specialization areas of the students were influential in the selection of the interviewees. Of the 70 students, 25 was specializing in quantitative sciences, and 45 in social science disciplines. Thirdly, the background of the interviewees vary on the basis of their geographical ties. 34 of them were from the Western region of Turkey, 16 were from Middle Anatolia, 11 from the Eastern part, 5 from the North and, the remaining 4 from the Southern region of Turkey.

Finally, the interviews were made with respondents from an array of different universities. 50 students interviewed were from state universities: Boğaziçi University, Marmara University, İstanbul Technical University (ITU), İstanbul University, Yıldız Technical University (YTU), Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi (MSGSÜ), Galatasaray University. 20 students were from private universities: Koç University, İstanbul Bilgi University, Yeditepe University, Haliç University, Beykent University, Bahçeşehir University. The characteristics of the students participating in the interviews are presented in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 Profiles of the Respondents Interviewed in the Study

Political Orientation	Sexuality		Type of Academic Discipline		Type of University	
	Male	Female	Social Sciences	Quantitative Sciences	State	Private
Republicans	5	5	6	4	5	5
Nationalists	6	4	8	2	8	2
Leftists	5	5	3	7	9	1
Islamists	6	4	8	2	8	2
Liberals	6	4	8	2	8	2
Kurdish group	8	2	9	1	6	4
Apolitical group	5	5	3	7	6	4
Total	40	30	45	25	50	20

In choosing the sample, the purposive and random sampling methods were used in a combined manner. The most frequently used strategy was to initially get into contact with the interviewees through various ways, such as through their membership in a certain organization (students club, political party, association), or through friendship network. These organizations, which individuals are a member of, may become important agents in socializing their members in one way or another. Some of them – for instance, political parties – directly reflect their own political ideologies. For this reason, contacting these institutions eased the way for getting in touch with the young people with certain political profiles. For instance, in order to collect data from the nationalist students, the initial step taken was to visit the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) in the nearest town; this provided a further contact with *ülkü ocakları*. Half of the nationalist students interviewed, who were actively participating in the activities of *ülkü ocakları*, were addressed through this process. And the other five students were contacted through the snowball technique with the help of the previously interviewed respondents. Another political party visited for the same purpose was the JDP, a conservatist party currently in power.

The head of the youth branch of the JDP helped to organize an interview with one of the respondents from the Islamist group. Furthermore, data on the republican youngs were gathered through building contact with the Republican People's Party (RPP), several associations, and student clubs advocating Republican values such as, *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (Atatürkist Thought Association) and *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği* (Association for Supporting Contemporary Life). Contacts with the liberal students were built through the agency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), associations like *Liberal Düşünce Derneği* (Association for Liberal Thought), *Liberal Gençlik Derneği* (Association for Liberal Youth), and through several student clubs operating in universities, such as Economics Club, Management Club, Marketing Club, etc. Finally, *Mezopotamya Kültür Derneği* (Association for Mesopotamian Culture) and a press agency called *Özgür Gündem* (Free Agenda) were other two intermediary institutions that helped contacting with the Kurdish university students.

One of the challenges posed by interviewing with people from one same organization would be to collect data which reflects the in-group perceptions of respondents rather than that of a more representative sample. To eliminate such risk, interviewees from one same organization was limited to two. In addition to building contact with the organizations mentioned above as a part of the purposive sampling strategy, the snowball technique was used during the selection of the sample. Some of the interviewed people spontaneously contributed to the formation of a list of further interviewees. This was a kind of a web technique for the compilation of the interviewees.

The survey questionnaire was developed after a process of reviewing similar questionnaires prepared previously, notably, the *2001 Üniversite Gençliği*

Vatandaşlık Araştırması (2001 Citizenship Survey on University Youth).¹⁰ Also, the survey questions of another source named “Turkish Youth 98”, which was funded by Konrad Adenauer Foundation, have been analyzed during the preparation of questions. As a third source, the survey questions of two research carried in the EU, “Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries: Youth in New Europe” (Eurobarometer, 2003), and “Perceptions of the European Union” (European Commission, 2001) were overviewed.

The collection of the data from the respondents was carried out throughout Fall 2005. Interviews, each of which lasted 20-45 minutes, were conducted by myself. They were audio recorded (along with additional notes to identify the speakers) and then, transcribed. The students were interviewed one by one on a face-to-face basis, since it was considered that this would make them feel more confident. For each group of respondents, ten interviews were made, constituting seventy interviews in total. The interview questions were related to:

- personal information of the interviewees;
- legal dimension of citizenship (legal rights and duties);
- identity dimension of citizenship (sense of belonging, attachment to a locality/nation/ religion/ethnic group, etc.);
- civic virtue dimension of citizenship (active/passive citizenship; participatory/non-participatory citizenship, opportunities for volunteering, etc.);

¹⁰ This research was conducted by Prof. Ahmet İçduygu together with a group of PhD students in the Department of Political Science at Bilkent University in 2001-2002. The research was conducted within the context of the Research Methods course. Based on the survey data collected from questionnaires with 500 university students in the city of Ankara, the research sought to explore how the youth perceives citizenship. However, the findings of this study are not available since the study has not been concluded yet.

- outstanding problems in contemporary Turkey and the potential institutions and actors that might be influential in tackling with those problems;
- Turkey's prospective membership to the EU and its possible implications on citizenship.

1.5 Organization of the Study

As has been described in the present chapter, this study aims to analyse the perceptions and experiences of Turkish youth over their citizenship and identity and relate these to their political orientation. This analysis is presented in the following four chapters. A brief synopsis of each follows.

Chapter 2 presents a theoretical overview of the debates on citizenship. Rather than covering the whole literature about the evolution of the citizenship concept, a theoretical account is provided on the recent shifts in the citizenship literature and on how various approaches (liberal-individualist, civic-republican) handle the three dimensions of citizenship: citizenship as *legal status*, citizenship as *identity*, and citizenship as *civic virtue*. It is the aim of this chapter to analyse the extent to which these dimensions are integral parts of the experiences and perceptions of the Turkish youth with different political orientations over their citizenship. Additionally, the issue of civic education is addressed as an important means for promoting civic virtue and for socializing citizens into a national community.

Chapter 3 presents an account of the formation of citizenship in Turkey since the founding of the Republic. This re-reading exercise goes hand in hand with an overview of the youth movements in the Turkish case. The long-established political activism of the youth is analysed in various time periods. First, the nature of the

youth activities in the early Republican era is analyzed. Secondly, the radicalization of the youth is examined starting with the transition to the multi-party system in 1945 up to the formation of the 1961 Constitution. Thirdly, the period between 1961 and 1971 is addressed; this is the period during which the radicalization process gained momentum in terms of further polarization of youth groups as ‘leftist’ and ‘rightists’. Fourthly, an account of the developments that paved way for the 1980 military intervention is presented. And finally, the chapter refers to the depolitization process of the young people in the period following the 1981 military intervention, and discusses how this process has been recently challenged by Turkey’s prospective membership to the EU, which brought a fresh breath to democratization, civic participation, and the consolidation of civil society area in Turkey.

In Chapter 4, the empirical data collected through the in-depth interviews with seventy university students is analyzed. The analysis and discussion focuses on how different politically-oriented youth groups perceive the three dimensions of citizenship, and how these dimensions interact with each other. The main converging and diverging tendencies that exist among the perceptions of respondents from different political groups are explored as well.

In the final chapter, the theoretical and analytical framework, the content of the study and the findings of the research are summarized. The main points and arguments discussed in previous chapters are emphasized. Several remarks on the strengths and weaknesses of this study as well as its significance are noted.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Introduction

The question of citizenship has been at the heart of political philosophy throughout the advent of the modern state. By drawing a fine line between inclusion and exclusion, citizenship has stood as the most important criterion of membership in a community both normatively and politically. However, the challenges that modern states have faced over the last decades have made it much more difficult for the concept of citizenship to deal with the paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion and hence, revealed the necessity to re-examine the theories of citizenship in line with the changing socio-political circumstances.

The dilemmas of citizenship in our fast-changing world can be outlined with a particular focus on the *content* and *extent* of citizenship.¹¹ The *content* of citizenship refers hereby to the meaning of citizenship and its component elements. The dominant tendency among the theories of citizenship has been to focus almost exclusively on the institutional/formal aspect of citizenship. When conceptualized in this way, citizenship has come to imply a reciprocal relationship between state and individuals, the latter endowed with a set of rights and obligations. However, a number of trends – the upsurge of nationalist movements and ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world, the growing crisis of the welfare state in the West, the

¹¹ Similarly, Isin and Turner (2002: 2) refer to the extent, content and depth of citizenship as the three fundamental axes of citizenship. But, the conceptual meanings of these terms used in this thesis differ from the ones introduced by these scholars.

questioning of liberalism and socialism, international migration, increasing voter apathy, the failure of environmental policies, etc. – have played role in shifting the attention of the political theorists to the non-institutional/informal aspects of citizenship by confirming that “the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only in the justice of its institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes¹² of its citizens” (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 6). Or, as Habermas (1992: 7) so aptly has argued, “the institutions of constitutional freedom are worth as much as a population makes of them”. Thus, in the 1990s, we have witnessed an upsurge of interest in the scholarly writings on identity, civic virtue, and civic education, etc., which are directly or indirectly linked to the non-institutional aspect of citizenship. Likewise, a notable conceptual expansion has been observed in the vocabularies of citizenship ranging from women’s rights to ecological rights, diasporic rights to minority rights, religious rights to cultural rights. These rights are significant, at least at the discourse level, for representing the demands of various groups of people for recognition of their identity differences. In short, the content of citizenship has broadened in such a way that is now possible to think of it as a multi-layered concept.

Another wave of transformation has taken place within the *extent* of citizenship. As the dominant idea of modern citizenship was associated with a Westphalian system of world order (Falk, 2000: 5), the theories of citizenship fell short to deal with the complexities of contemporary societies embedded in globalization. The global trends not only untied the attachment of modern citizenship

¹² With the concepts of *qualities* and *attitudes*, Kymlicka and Norman mean; their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their personal choices; and their sense of justice and commitment to a fair distribution of resources. Without citizens possessing these qualities, it is almost impossible to have sustainable democratic liberal systems.

to the nation-state, but carried the claims of identity groups (e.i. women's rights, immigrant rights, environmental rights, aboriginal rights) to the public realm which were encapsulated within the private realm. Ultimately, the need for theories that can provide reasonable answers to the changing circumstances in modern pluralistic societies has immediately become central in the citizenship literature.

Keeping these calls for change in mind, that entail serious challenges to the modern conception of citizenship, this chapter attempts to outline the theoretical approaches to citizenship and intends to relate these to the empirical discussion of the whole thesis. For this aim, a framework introduced by Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 353) will be used, who depict citizenship as: *citizenship-as-legal-status*, and *citizenship-as-desirable-activity*. Whereas citizenship operates as 'full membership in a particular community' in the former, it implies 'the extent and quality of one's citizenship embedded in participation in a political community' in the latter one. This distinction helps to highlight two fundamental, sometimes conflated, features of citizenship, that is; although citizenship refers to the legal rights and obligations that define the legal status of a person, being a *citoyen* is, at the same time, a role that somehow or other has to be learned (Heater, 1999: 164). This theoretical framework seems germane to the problematique of this study which focuses on the perceptions and experiences of the youth over the *three* dimensions of citizenship: (a) *legal status* – a panoply of civil, political and social rights as well as duties; (b) *identity* – membership to one or more political communities (different elements of identity based on class, race, ethnicity, gender, profession, sexual preference, etc., may contrast with each other); and (c) *civic virtue* – activity (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 30-31).¹³ The conceptual and theoretical link among the three dimensions of

¹³ Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 31) address *legal status*, *identity*, and *civic virtue* as individual level elements of citizenship. In addition, they also introduce a fourth aspect of citizenship which applies at

citizenship will be approached within the broader framework of *citizenship-as-legal status* and *citizenship-as-desired-activity*. The study will be selective among the vast literature and focus on the theoretical debates that approach the three dimensions of citizenship: *legal status*, *identity*, and *civic virtue*.

2.2 Citizenship as Legal Status

The concept of citizenship is rooted in the political thought of ancient Greece. In its simplest form, citizenship is a legal status which defines those who are and those who are not members of a common society (Barbalet, 1988; Dagger, 1997). Alongside its intimate relationship with legal/formal membership in a political community, modern conception of citizenship also refers to a set of rights and obligations held by the individuals (Heywood, 1994: 155). Thus, the legal status of citizenship operates as a criterion for membership in a community, while at the same time, constructs a reciprocal relationship between individual and state via rights and obligations. Yet, the nature of this relationship brings much debate to the fore. For instance, participation in the political life of the *polis* stood as the core criterion for holding citizenship in the ancient Greek, but the right to participation was restricted to a small portion of population, that is, free-born propertied males. Therefore, women and slaves lacked the status of citizenship.

The legal status aspect of citizenship is significant for a number of reasons. First, in most general terms, rights provide various opportunities to citizens for particular actions, that is, they enable the exercise of those rights because one's status indicates what one can do, what capabilities one has (Barbalet, 1988: 16). Second, the formal status one carries provides protection against those who would

the community level: *social cohesion*. This may include concerns about social stability, political unity, and civil peace.

infringe upon his/her rights (Dagger, 1997: 99). Third, as Turner (2001: 11) asserts, it is from this legal basis that individual citizens claim entitlements to national resources through institutional arrangements, such as retirement, unemployment provisions, social security and welfare.

The classic contribution to the conceptualization of citizenship as legal status was made by T. H. Marshall in ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1950). According to Marshall (1950: 18), “citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed”. This commentary had a glaring impact on the postwar conception of citizenship which was defined almost exclusively in terms of possession of rights and holding membership in a community (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 354). In his work, Marshall examines the historical evolution of citizenship by focusing on the advent of rights in England, and classifies the basic rights into three: *civil* rights, *political* rights, and *social* rights (which are resumed in the following scheme).

Table 2.1 Development of Rights

Elements of citizenship	Definition	Rights	Institutions associated with
<i>Civil rights</i>	Evolved in the 18 th century <i>vis-à-vis</i> the absolutist states; rights against the state and necessary for individual freedom.	Right to freedom of speech, property, justice, religious practice, association, assembly, enter into contracts	Rule of law, a system of courts
<i>Political rights</i>	Evolved in the 19 th century alongside the evolution of modern parliamentary systems; rights against the state; comprise rights surrounding the electoral process.	Right to vote, run for office, participate, elect, to be elected	Parliamentary institutions
<i>Social rights</i>	Evolved in the 20 th century; guarantee the citizen a minimum of social security; comprise claims for benefits guaranteed by the state.	Right to economic welfare, social security	Educational systems, social services

At the core of Marshall's argument lies the gradual evolution of citizenship rights. He holds that the status of citizen in modern societies has been expanded and buttressed step by step (Habermas, 1994: 30).¹⁴ The rights for individual freedom were first enhanced by democratic rights, which were later accompanied with social rights. One of the most important aspects of Marshall's analysis is that it provides a framework for rethinking the relations between rights, membership and citizenship by exploring the relationship between citizenship and social class (Crowley, 1998: 168; Barbalet, 1988: 8). He views citizenship not only in its legal dimension, but also considers its political and social components, and introduces the element of social change, which was nonexistent in the previous normative approaches (Shafir, 1998: 13). Therefore, as van Steenberg (1994: 2) puts it, his work is contributory in leading a shift from a strict political definition to a broader and sociological definition of citizenship.

Despite Marshall's contribution to a theory of citizenship, his analysis has come under attack on the ground of three sets of criticisms: the first critique drives from the New Right's attack on the welfare state. Contrary to Marshall's premise that social rights help to integrate the poor into the mainstream society, the New Right argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity among the poor by creating a culture of dependency (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 355; Torres, 1998: 107-108). Second, his work was criticized for being context-specific and inapplicable beyond the English experience. Thirdly, he has been subject to criticism for addressing citizenship with the nation-state in mind, therefore failing to account for the international dimension of citizenship (Heywood, 1994: 157).

¹⁴ In the Turkish case, the evolution of civil, political and social rights did not take place in a linear fashion as Marshall argued. Instead, they were given from above rather than emerging as an outcome of struggles from below. Hence, the Turkish experience is paradoxical when analyzed through the lenses of Marshall's framework (Kadioğlu, 2005).

Recalling the definition of ‘citizen’ above as “member of a political community endowed with a set of rights and obligations”, it should be underlined that rights do not alone constitute the whole body of legal status. Citizens also carry duties and obligations towards their state which can be simply defined as ‘requirement to act in a particular way’. According to Heywood (1994: 147), rights and obligations are the reverse sides of the same coin; “to possess a right usually places someone else an obligation to uphold or respect that right”. This paradoxical relationship between rights and obligations has been central to the two main philosophical approaches that have dominated our thinking of citizenship, namely, liberal-individualism and civic-republicanist theory.¹⁵ The scopes of these theoretical approaches on rights/obligations differ remarkably in the sense that, the former tradition places emphasis on the idea of rights, whereas the latter gives stress on obligations. This requires stating a premise from the outset: the diversity in the conceptions of citizenship is rooted in the perceptions of the two traditions on two main units of analysis; ‘structure’ and ‘individual’. The study will now have a deeper look at the propositions of each theoretical approach within the framework of this unit of analysis.

In the *first* place, *structure* is used in this study to imply the interaction between the units (state, society, individuals), and the nature of the environment which determines the type of relationship between these interacting units. In the liberal understanding, this structure takes the form of a ‘contract’ which implies “a formal agreement between two or more parties entered into voluntarily and on

¹⁵ It is possible to add communitarianism as the third philosophical approach. However, although civic republicanism and communitarianism are not exactly synonymous, the communitarianist interpretation has many commonalities with the civic-republican approach, especially on the ground that both traditions give primacy to community over individual. Communitarians react against the liberal interpretation of citizenship concerning the enjoyment of rights, and, argue that the trend in the liberal direction has undermined traditions and values of community. They place emphasize on family values (Heater, 1999: 78).

mutually agreed terms” (Heywood, 1994: 149).¹⁶ Individuals, under this frame of mind, are assumed to be related to each other and to state on a contractual basis. Any other activities or participation of individuals in society are sought to be their own choice rather than an obligation or necessity. In other words, there exists no social bond other than contract (Kadioğlu, 1998). This contractual structure is constructed through formal institutional arrangements (e.g. constitution, laws) and involves a loosely committed relationship between the state and individuals in which state interferes as little as possible in the citizens’ lives, and acts simply as a ‘nightwatchman’ (Heater, 1999: 4-7).

In civic-republican tradition, in contrary, the social bonds between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves are not contractual, but are, rather, rooted in shared commitment. This shared commitment, which enhances social solidarity and cohesion of the community, is possible only if citizens are virtuous and society is organized in a fashion that will ensure that they are and remain so (Shafir, 1998: 10; Oldfield, 1990: 178). Acting virtuously, citizens participate in the affairs of the political community they are living in and through shared commitment they become the carriers of common good which is at the heart of the civic-republican tradition. Whereas constitution, laws and other institutional settings determine the nature of the structure in the liberal-individualist approach, it is, instead, shared commitment, participation, and civic virtue that mold communal bonds according to the proponents of the civic-republican tradition. As Heater (1999: 55) clearly puts it,

Constitutions and laws lay down the rules by which a group of individuals live together in a state; but constitutions and laws cannot by

¹⁶ Contract can be found in the writings of Plato, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in the form of ‘social contract’, and more recently it has resurfaced in the writings of Rawls. ‘Social contract’ is an agreement reached among citizens, or between citizens and the state, through which they accept the authority of the state in return for benefits provided by the state (Heywood, 1994: 148-149).

themselves make a community, only the propitious condition in which a group can gel into a community. That gelling process requires the essential ingredient of social friendship and harmony.

The republican style of thinking, thus, places great emphasis above all on the necessity for communal ties and a strong commitment among the citizens themselves, and between the state and its citizens.

The *second* line of division between civic-republicanism and liberal-individualism occurs as to what *individual* means. Undoubtedly, they portray contrasting figures of an 'individual' which can be related to five key insights. They are: (a) According to the liberal-individualist tradition, individuals are autonomous, free, and self-originating, hence logically and morally prior to society (Oldfield, 1990: 181; Shafir, 1998: 8; Tomasi, 1995: 584). It is the individual not the community that comes first. Central to civic republicanism, in contrast, is the idea that society is prior to individuals. Individuals are formed by the community and receive their very names in a social context (Van Gunsteren, 1994: 41; Oldfield, 1990: 181). (b) Looking from a Habermasian perspective, in the liberal-individualist approach, individuals remain external to the state. Civic-republicanism, on the other hand, views individuals as internal to the state, since they are integrated into the political community like parts into a whole (Habermas, 1994: 25). For the former perspective, individuals are only citizens as members of a community; for the latter, they are derived from the community to which they owe for their existence. (c) The third main division surfaces on the extent of participation in a political community. According to the liberal perspective, individuals are free to choose the degree of participation in public life, and they are not expected to feel any responsibility in the community they live in other than to respect other individuals' rights (Oldfield, 1990: 178). In the civic-republican tradition, oppositely, stands the inherent premise

that individuals as ‘citizens’ participate in the life of their political community to pursue common good (Shafir, 1998: 11). Thus, the notion of ‘active and virtuous citizens’ is central to the civic-republican approach. (d) In the liberal interpretation it is assumed that individuals maximize their own benefit (Van Gunsteren, 1994: 38; Mouffe, 1992: 226). Citizenship and other political institutions are viewed as expedients through which individuals pursue their own definition of good. The republicans object the liberal view of ‘instrumental community’ and replace it with the notion of common good. (e) Finally, the extent of freedom in liberal individualism is defined within the confines of the contract agreed upon by individuals and state, and this freedom is sustainable as far as state avoids intervening in the affairs of citizens in areas uncovered in the contract; in the words of Oldfield (1990: 185), “it lies in the silence of the law”. Civic-republican thinking does not have an analogous perception on freedom. Individuals are seen free within an environment of a republic, where exists a symbiotic relationship between state and citizens, and individuals voluntarily pursue the common good of their community (Heater, 1999: 53).

To sum up, the notion of legal rights and entitlements bestowed upon citizens by virtue of membership in a nation-state has been in the empirical locus of conventional citizenship studies. Handling citizenship in these terms is important, but let alone, narrow. Today, legal rights can no longer be addressed under the monopoly of state power given the increasing codification of rights within the framework of human rights. There is equally a greater necessity for theories that will take seriously the need to discuss the sociological importance of rights and to focus on the neglected aspects of citizenship that will be addressed in the sections below.

2.3 Citizenship as Desired Activity

As stated earlier in this study, the recent trends challenging the liberal-democratic societies have demonstrated that the tendency of the political theorists to concentrate simply on the structural building blocks of society (legal framework, institutions, decision-making procedures) would no longer work. This urged for a necessity, both in theory and practice, to develop new theories and policies that can incorporate the non-structural/non-institutional aspects of democratic regimes. One outcome of this process from 1990s onwards has been a veritable flood of writings on issues like civic virtue and citizenship education (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 6).

In fact, the appearance of the concept of civic virtue in the theories of citizenship is not a new phenomenon. Civic virtue has been a key ingredient in the thoughts of many ancient scholars, such as Aristotle, Cicero, Rousseau, and Machiavelli. However, parallel to the changing dynamics and complexities of political communities, the context and conception of civic virtue itself has also changed.¹⁷ Although it is difficult to come up with a unique definition of ‘civic virtue’, it is easier to focus on the common features it entails as pointed out by various scholars; “a sense of loyalty towards one’s state and a willing acceptance of the responsibilities that living within a community entails” (Heywood, 1994: 158); “the acquisition of knowledge and the development of skills”; “considering the interests of others, not just one’s own” (Heater, 1999: 66). These various aspects of

¹⁷ William Gallston (1991: 221-224) offers an extended analysis of civic virtue. According to him, there are four types of civic virtues necessary for responsible citizenship; (i) general virtues (courage, law-abidingness, loyalty); (ii) social virtues (independence, open-mindedness); (iii) economic virtues (work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change); and (iv) political virtues (capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse). As Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 8) hold, the emergence of large pluralistic modern societies deemed different sorts of civic virtue necessary compared to those required for smaller, homogenous city-states. Therefore, the goals of citizenship and the means of promoting it must take into account the degree of pluralism in a given society.

the concept draw attention on a common principle, that is, the efficient fulfillment of duties/obligations which stands at the central of the civic-republican tradition.¹⁸ The whole republican tradition is based upon the premise that “true communal life is possible only if citizens are virtuous and society is organized in a fashion that will ensure that they are and remain so” (Shafir, 1998: 10). It is by acting, participating in the life of political community, and by identifying themselves with its characteristics that individuals serve to the *common good*¹⁹ of their society and have a sense of citizenship. Ensuring the continuity of the community, and preserving its ends are among the most important duties of citizenship. As Oldfield (1990: 181) concludes, “it is action in these spheres which is both constitutive of citizenship, and constitutive and sustaining of the community of which the citizen is a member”.

Aristotle, who is one of the founding figures of the civic-republican approach, defines citizens as those “who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn”. For him, there is no room for apathy; citizens are expected to be publicly active (Heater, 1999: 45). In his understanding, civic virtue – the main quality of the citizen – is beneficial not only for the state, but also for the individuals themselves. It is through civic virtue that citizens become more mature and live in a more secure environment where there is mutual respect between himself/herself and other citizens. Therefore, citizenship connects the individual to the state; but it also connects individuals to each other (Heater, 1999: 56).

¹⁸ A remark voiced by John Kennedy (January, 1961) very well reflects this understanding: “*Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country*” (Heywood, 1994: 163).

¹⁹ The concept of ‘common good’ is renamed in different ways by various scholars. For instance, Alexis de Tocqueville uses ‘self-interest properly understood’ to refer to common good. This implies that if individuals see that their interests overlap with the rest, then they will find it in their interest to act as responsible citizens and will sacrifice their private interest to save the rest (Dagger, 1997: 100). Likewise, Macedo uses the term ‘public reasonableness’ to argue that liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands, not just state preferences or make threats: “They must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens”.

Rousseau's interpretation of citizenship is identical with that of Aristotle to some extent. Like Aristotle, he saw citizenship as "a way of life that required commitment to the common good and active participation in public affairs" and citizen as "one who acts with the good of the community in mind" (Dagger, 1997: 99). However, different from Aristotle, he searched for answer to a fundamental inconsistency: "How can men subject themselves to government, which is necessary for security, while at the same time, retaining their freedom which is their moral right?" He came up with the solution of general will. In his view, government should be based upon a *general will*, which reflects the common interests of society, as opposed to the *private will* of each member (Heywood, 1994: 151). General will entails that individuals, in behaving obediently, live as subjects of the state; and in developing the general will they live as citizens. As sovereign persons, they make their own judgments which, in return, benefit the whole community.

All these theoretical debates are germane to citizenship for a very clear reason that being a citizen is a role that, somehow or other, has to be learned. Addressing citizenship from a simple political dimension (legal rights, formal status) falls short to capture the whole picture. Citizenship is also a matter of the non-political capacities of citizens (Barbalet, 1988). Legal citizenship designates a formal status, but this status alone does not ensure that individuals will feel themselves as citizens of that community. Civic virtue helps to fill this gap by serving as an ethical, psychological ingredient to provide citizens a sense of loyalty towards their state (Heywood, 1994: 156).²⁰

²⁰ Dagger (1997: 99-102) adds two additional aspects to citizenship, the integrative and the educative, that overlap with its legal and ethical components. The integrative function, he explains, first, enables the individual to integrate the various roles he/she plays, thus supports a more secure sense of the self; and second, integrates individuals into the community. Educative function, on the other hand, helps to draw out the abilities in individuals that might otherwise remain untapped.

Along with its function of promoting a sense of loyalty between citizen and community, civic virtue also arises as a means for ‘active citizenship’. Traditionally, active citizenship came to terms with the fulfillment of duties and responsibilities. However, liberals re-interpret it with an emphasis on self-reliance and ‘standing on one’s two feet’ (Heywood, 1994: 162). Turner elaborates and uses the notion of active/passive citizenship as an analytical tool differently from the previous scholars. By focusing on the European context, Turner suggests four forms of citizenship based on two axes: one rests on citizenship being developed from above or below (active/passive), and the other to what extent it is developed in a public/private sphere. By applying his typology, he reaches the following conclusions: In the French conception, citizenship developed from below within a public sphere, whereas in the American case it developed from below but in a private sphere. The English case, Turner (1992: 45-46) argues, was a model of passive democracy in which citizenship developed from above in a public sphere; and in the German case it was given from above in a private sphere.²¹ The way he addresses active/passive citizenship dichotomy is related to the way citizenship develops (from above/below). Turner’s study is important since he combines the historical evolution and philosophical characteristics of citizenship, and develops a distinction of active/passive citizenship which was lacking in Marshall’s analysis.

Yet, these theoretical explanations do not shed light on another important aspect of the issue at hand, that is, how does civic virtue come into existence? The tough questions appear when we ask how citizens will acquire these virtues, or in

²¹ According to Kadioğlu (2005: 8), the Turkish conception of citizenship, when viewed from the angle of Turner’s classification, comprises the features of both French and German traditions. It is akin to the French tradition since there appears to be an attack on the private space of the family and religion; but, it differs from the French version because of the construction of citizenship from above. On the other hand, it is similar to the German model because of the absence of a liberal revolution, or the absence of Enlightenment prior to the establishment of citizenship.

other words, how should governments ensure that citizens are active rather than passive? In the section below, I seek to trace out what I consider to be the key questions at stake in this arena.

2.3.1 How Do We Learn Virtues?

Concerns about how to promote civic virtue in modern societies have recently appeared in junction with increasing political apathy, low levels of participation in local and national elections, rising intolerance, xenophobia and racism, declining levels of social and political participation, and the marginalization of some young people from the mainstream of society. The late 1980s and 1990s, therefore, saw an upsurge of debates on how to connect citizens – especially young people – to the societal structures and processes (Osler and Starkey, 2003; Turner, 1993; Faulks, 1994; Davies, 1995; Fogelman, 1997; Storrie, 1997).

The practices and policies formulated by states to deal with this problematique differ, since deciding on a policy alternative entails an ideological problem. This is very well articulated by Blackman and France (2001: 186); “citizenship is not only concerned with legal entitlement to a nation-state, but it is also tied into a whole set of ideological practices associated with who holds power and who defines what it is to be a citizen”. There is a need from the outset for stating various premises of different approaches which revolve around the question of “how to foster civic virtue” (Gilbert, 1996; Pascoe, 1996; Ichilov, 1998; Meredyth and Thomas, 1999). From the standpoint of the liberal theory, young people gain a moral perspective and critical reasoning through education (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 367). Similarly, education is viewed as a necessary institution for the socialization of children into citizenship in the republican thought. For civil society theorists, on the

other hand, citizens are expected to learn virtues by participating in voluntary organizations, such as, churches, families, unions, ethnic associations, cooperatives, etc. The New Right's solution to this problem is totally different: it relies on the market as a school of virtue. From the perspective of the left, in contrast, the basic means to promote virtues is through empowering citizens by democratizing the welfare state, and by dispersing state power through local democratic institutions, regional assemblies, and judicable rights (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 360).

After mentioning various premises on the formation of civic virtue, the following section will refer to the role of civic education, among the others, in promoting civic virtues. The main motive for this idea arises from the relationship between youth, which constitute the study group of this thesis, and the long process of civic education they pass through as a means for providing civic virtue.

2.3.2. The Making of Citizens Through Civic Education

Recent debates in the citizenship studies and education studies might suggest that these areas have little in common. Education – derived from the Latin *educere* – is associated with ‘*drawing out or developing the potential within a person*’ (Dagger, 1997: 120). Citizenship, on the other hand, is more often thought to be about membership, belonging, rights and obligations. However, the ground does seem fertile for exploring the interconnections between these two domains.

Preparation for citizenship and achievement of social unity have been among the primary goals of public schooling throughout the histories of most nations. This understanding is evident in the writings of many scholars. For instance, in the words of Hobbes, “man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education” (Burchell, 1995: 543). Aristotle, likewise, describes education as “the means of making a *polis*

a community and giving it unity...and, the citizens of a state should always be educated to suit the constitution of their state” (Heater, 1999: 171).

The relationship between citizenship and civic education stems from the rationale that the former cannot occur in a vacuum. Being a citizen is a role that, somehow or other, has to be learned. This learning activity is crucial not only for the citizens themselves, but also for the state. Therefore, we need to look at both sides of the conundrum to understand the relationship between education and citizenship. From the side of citizens, civic education is a necessary tool for acquiring knowledge to understand the social, legal, and political features of the system they live in. In the absence of such knowledge, it becomes almost impossible for citizens to participate and act in the political community they are a part of, and in the end, this gives pave for apathy. As Heater (1999: 164) puts it, citizens need to be endowed with values and dispositions to put their knowledge and skills to beneficial use – though the meaning of ‘beneficial’ is contested and subjective. The second dimension of citizenship education reflects an institutional form of citizenship continuous with the traditions of state-centered citizenship and political modernization (Gifford, 2004; Turner, 1990; Brubaker, 1992; Stewart, 2001; Hobsbawm, 1994). Civic education, from this perspective, is seen as a strategy to prepare separate individuals for state citizenship, to disseminate common values and national consciousness, and to integrate a diverse population into a single national culture (Stubbs, 1995; Starkey, 2000). This understanding is rooted in the conviction that state is the responsible institution for infusing common norms and values into community and it is the institution of school that is entitled to carry the mission of defining what it means to be a citizen by instilling a unique understanding of rights and obligations. Civic

education, then, acquires a normative power capable of constructing/re-constructing a nation or ‘imagined community’ in the terms of Anderson (1991).

Although the role of civic education in providing knowledge and guidance to individuals and opening place for active participation is significant, this aspect of the interplay between citizenship and education is a theme of another discussion. This thesis will rather refer to the theoretical debates that discuss the role civic education plays as part of a national project using political membership of state as a basis for social integration.²²

In its most basic terms, education involves a process whereby the ‘immature’ are brought to identify with the principles and forms of life of the ‘mature’ members of society (Torres, 1998: 11). The word ‘immature’²³ is used here mostly to refer children and young people whom Marshall calls as ‘citizens-in-the-making’, or, Osler and Starkey (2003) as ‘citizens-in-waiting’. A major objective of education for citizenship is to ensure that young people learn about and identify themselves with the legal, political, religious, social and economic institutions of the community they

²² See Parry (1999); Osler and Starkey (1996) for further theoretical discussions on civic education. Parry introduces two sets of theories; ‘constructive’ and ‘reconstructive’. Constructive theories take human nature and interests as largely given and conceive education as a means for redirecting the goals and activities of future citizens in accordance with national priorities. Education, in this sense, becomes part of a national project to create obeying citizens. Reconstructive theories, in contrast, aim to bring about a qualitative change in the mindset of a generation in order to affect a similar change in political attitudes and behavior. They seek to make ‘new’ persons by transforming their priorities and ways of understanding of the world (1999: 25). Osler and Starkey introduce two dimensions of citizenship education on the basis of two axes; the first is structural/political against cultural/personal; the second is minimal against maximal versions. They conclude that, the minimal, structural/political version of citizenship education emphasizes knowledge, whereas the minimal, cultural/personal approach is more about identities and emphasizes personal feelings and choices. The maximal, structural/political version, on the other hand, goes beyond knowledge, emphasizes inclusion and promotes a model of the good society; and, the maximal cultural/personal version emphasizes competence and participation and aims to develop skills to effect change.

²³ For Gifford (2004: 148), it is not only young people, but also immigrants that can be viewed as ‘immature’. He argues that,

while much of the politics of citizenship may reflect global problems of social integration, a central focus for political debate and policy development continues to be the national arena. It is unsurprising therefore that, citizenship policies have become directed towards young people and immigrants as these groups have come to symbolize the breakdown of the national citizenship community within powerful political and media discourses.

live in, so that they can understand their present and future roles within the constitutional and legal framework of the state (Osler and Starkey, 2003: 244).²⁴ This objective brings us to the question of *socialization*. Socialization refers to “the process through which individuals acquire political beliefs and values, and by which these are transmitted from generation to generation” (Heywood, 1997: 186).²⁵ Education, whether through the whole curriculum or specialized programmes, provides *socialization* into what has been called the ‘imagined community’ of the nation (Anderson, 1991).²⁶ According to Gramsci, “education, as part of the state, is fundamentally a process of formation of ‘social conformism’. Educational systems and schools in particular, appear as privileged instruments for the socialization of a hegemonic culture”. He understands hegemony as “a process of social and political domination in which the ruling classes establish their control over the classes allied to them through moral and intellectual leadership” (Torres, 1998: 14). Civic education, from a Gramscian perspective, carries the task of constructing a new civilization.²⁷ From this perspective, an analysis on educational system must take into account the role, purpose, and functioning of state, because the socialization of individuals is desirable in so far as it contributes to the social and political cohesion

²⁴ See Üstel (1996) for a detailed account of education for citizenship in Turkey. According Üstel, the most important aim of citizenship education in Turkey has been “the achievement of civilization and the inculcation of patriotism”.

²⁵ Heywood (1997: 186-187) introduces two sources of socialization; (i) “political socialization as ideological domination in which the ideas of a ruling or economically dominant class pervade society. This type of socialization is carried out by institutions such as media and state; (ii) unplanned and informal socialization which operates through the agency of the family.

²⁶ Print and Coleman (2003: 133-134) introduce three levels – the formal curriculum, the informal curriculum and extra-curricular learning – through which citizenship education programmes operate. Through the formal curriculum students may learn subject matter, skills and values (includes knowledge about government, the rights and responsibilities of citizens, the legal system, and so forth). By contrast, the informal curriculum is unplanned which students experience outside the formal curriculum (includes participation in student government, school clubs, etc.).

²⁷ It is necessary to add that civic education is not the only means for producing hegemony in the Gramscian analysis. He also regards churches, together with schools, as the largest cultural organizations producing hegemony.

desired by the controlling elites (Ponton and Gill, 1993: 278; Torres, 1998; Frazer, 1999).²⁸ This relationship between state (as the holder of hegemonic power) and education, thus, embodies an ideological question by bringing the following analogy to fore: “To educate is to govern and to govern is to educate” (Gutmann, 1989: 71).²⁹ To this extent, questions about education are intrinsically political and must be critically scrutinized; who should have it, under what conditions can it be exercised, in what ways can it teach civic virtues, and what type of citizens do the education institutions seek to create?

2.4 Identity Dimension of Citizenship: At the Crossroads

Departing from the twofold distinction of ‘citizenship-as-legal-status’ and ‘citizenship-as-desired-activity’, this chapter tried to address how basic theoretical approaches interpret the contested meaning of citizenship and its dimensions. Yet, the legal status and civic virtue aspects of citizenship do not constitute the whole picture. Kymlicka and Norman (1994), and many other scholars add a new element to citizenship, that is, identity (Isin and Wood, 1999; Isin and Turner, 2002; Turner, 2001; Waldron, 2000). In fact, identity, itself, has been the focus area of a vast literature apart from citizenship, and the historical origins of this concept date back as early as the emergence of ancient civilizations. However, this section will be

²⁸ Heater (1999: 165) identifies seven types of education for citizenship according to their focus areas and purposes; (i) civic-republican (produces participant and patriotic citizens); (ii) liberal (support for democracy); (iii) indoctrination (producing ‘robotic citizens’); (iv) separate education for different classes (training elite citizens); (v) national identity for all (nation-building); (vi) European (create sense of EU identity); and, (vii) world (combat xenophobia, war, environmental degradation).

²⁹ For instance, the education system in the former communist Soviet Union reflects this reality. In this particular case, education was utilized to support Marxist-Leninist theory which determined the aims and methods of a monolithic and centralized system and attempted to shape the identities of students to bring about a unified moral formation contained in the notion of *vospitanie*. For further details, see McLaughlin (1997).

selective among this literature and refer to identity as the third component of citizenship together with legal status and civic virtue.

Before delving further into the citizenship-identity debate, it is crucial to clarify where to locate identity in the basic conundrum of citizenship as ‘legal status’ and as ‘desired activity’. This may seem relatively more complicated compared to the other two aspects in the first place, and may give the impression that this framework is insufficient to open ground for locating identity. However, this is not the case. Although Kymlicka and Norman do not make any reference to identity while they are defining citizenship as ‘full membership in a particular community’ and ‘the extent and quality of one’s citizenship showing itself in the way of participation in that community’, this thesis argues that identity lies at the crossroads of these two empirically linked definitions. Identity gets its very meaning from citizenship as status and desired activity, and in return, helps to re-constitute citizenship by operating in between the two.

The content and extent of rights and obligations endowed to citizens in a particular community provide a legal status through which the rules for formal communication among citizens and state, and among citizens themselves are set out. On the other hand, these rights and obligations constitute a moral understanding of citizenship and shape the way citizens perceive their identities. For Turner (2001: 11), “although citizenship is a formal legal status, it is, as a consequence of nationalism and patriotic sentiment, intimately bound up with the sentiments and emotions of membership”. Here, it is crucial to add that we should not think of identity simply in national terms, but we should recall the substance of multiple identities which may not necessarily be at odds with the national identity one has. This brings the discourse of identity politics into the picture and various types of

identities one might like to identify himself/herself with. For instance, while some people may prefer to define themselves on the basis of their sexuality, some may cling on their ethnic/religious/sectarian or other origins. In a different instance, the nature of the rights provided to migrants in the countries of destination affect whether they identify themselves as ‘citizens’ or ‘migrants’ in that particular community. Likewise, the coming into existence of ecological rights, cultural rights, aboriginal rights, diasporic rights, etc., represent the shifts taking place in the perceptions and belonging of individuals about their selves. Finally, this ensemble of relations (legal status and identity) describe, according to Turner (2001: 11), ‘a moral behavior, social practices and cultural beliefs that are collectively known as civic virtue, because they define what constitutes the virtues of the good citizen’.³⁰

Similar to the close interplay between legal status and identity aspects of citizenship, it is possible to pinpoint an intimate relationship among the identity and civic virtue aspects. The extent of civic participation is plausibly linked to the way citizens define and perceive themselves. As voiced by Waldron (2000: 156), “identity affects the way people perform their duty of civic participation and affects their conception of what it is to perform that duty responsibly”. The kind of civic activity one chooses, either voluntarily participating in civil society organizations or through other means, can be depicted as a political space in which various claims for recognition are articulated, debated and, even, negotiated between different political actors. The existence of a close conceptual and empirical link between these three

³⁰ Turner emphasizes the role of culture in understanding identity in relation to legal status. According to him, community membership and personal identity are cultural attributes of modern citizenship, and civic culture can be defined as the cultural arena of citizenship practices which ultimately interpellate citizens and categorize individual behavior within a code of public values and virtues (2001: 12).

elements is also voiced by Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 31). The two scholars bring their argument to the fore in the following expressions:

... the exact rights citizens have will partly define both their citizenship status and identity, as well as the range of political and social activities available to them. The form of citizenship identity they have will have an impact on their motivations to participate virtuously in civic and political activities; and so on. Similarly, if one of these aspects of citizenship is eroded, then the others may be affected as well.

Locating identity at the crossroads of ‘citizenship-as-legal status’ and ‘citizenship-as-desired-activity’, rather than treating it as apart from the latter two will, thus, be helpful in recognizing the deep interconnection among the three aspects. However, it is almost impossible to come across an analysis of the interplay between the three components of citizenship (legal status, identity, civic virtue) not only in the study of Kymlicka and Norman, but also in the whole citizenship literature. Therefore, this thesis points out the need for carrying out further empirical research to find out more about what is to be a very crucial matter concerning the concept of citizenship.

The dynamic interaction between legal status, identity, and civic virtue has also transformed the conception of identity. Until recently, identity came to terms almost exclusively with ‘national identity’, but given the impact of globalization this analogy is no longer applicable. As asserted by Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 30), “with the development of identity politics after the 1980s, citizenship came to be accepted as an identity that equates to membership to one or more political communities based on race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession and sexuality”. For Isin and Wood (1999: 4), likewise, “identity is the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights”. Identity, thus, should not be viewed simply as an individual affair, but, should be considered together with the conditions – group

histories and structural position – under which it is constructed (Alcoff and Mendieta, 2003). This conception of identity, as being ‘constructed’, is identical with the way Hall (1990: 225) defines it, “identities are names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past”. Identities are both imposed and self-made.

To discuss the process of transformation in the literature of identity, we, firstly, need to elaborate the historical link between identity, citizenship and nationhood. Traditionally, national identity provided the moral resource for modern citizenship (Oliver and Heater, 1994: 26; Turner, 1994: 159; Janoski, 1998: 12; Barbalet, 2000: 101; Crowley, 1998: 167). The roots of the modern citizenship can be traced back to the French Revolution which established the principle and practice of citizenship as the central feature of the modern society by replacing the titles of aristocracy with that of the *citoyen* (Heater, 1999: 1; Bendix, 1964: 49; Brubaker, 1992: 35; Habermas, 1994: 22).³¹ But, yet, the French Revolution brought about a new debate to the floor, that is, the question of “who will be the members of the nation-state?” The rise of the nation-states as monopolistic institutions to solve this problem, some scholars argue, led the notion of citizenship to appear as an exclusionary category which must by definition exclude (Isin and Turner, 2002: 5; Hoffman, 2004: 17). Therefore, Hoffman (2004: 17) argues, citizenship defined in statist terms privileges a particular national identity and poses insoluble problems since it polarizes citizens rather than unites.³²

³¹ Though Heater (1999: 4) admits that the modern citizenship has its roots in the French Revolution, he also argues that it was the British experience prior to 1789 that laid the foundations for the transition from a monarch-subject relationship to a state-citizen relationship. Paradoxically, he says, the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ were rarely used in the liberal sense in the English-speaking world.

³² Hoffman (2004: 49) makes a distinction between nationality - defined here as a person’s ultimate loyalty to the nation - and nationalism. He defines the latter either as a reality to be defended, or as a

W. Brubaker (1994: 311), on the other hand, defines citizenship as membership of the nation-state, and interprets the nation-state both as a distinctive way of organizing and experiencing political and social membership, and also as an ideal. In his ideal-typical model, he delineates six membership norms to the nation-state and acknowledges the ideal qualities that this membership should have; (1) membership should be egalitarian (should be a status of full membership); (2) membership should be sacred (citizens should make sacrifices/sacred acts for the state); (3) membership should be nation-membership (the political community should overlap with the cultural community of shared language and character); (4) membership should be democratic (there must be participation); (5) membership should be unique (people should belong to only one state); and (6) membership should be consequential (it should be expressed in a community of well-being).³³

Today, however, with the increasing scrutiny of globalization, the modern conception of citizenship as a mere status held under the authority of state is in the process of getting divorced from its attachment to nation-state to include various claims based on identity and difference (Isin and Turner, 2002: 2; Falk, 2000; Soysal, 1994: 3; Urry, 1999: 314; Kadioğlu, 1998). The traditional conception of citizenship conceived citizens as members of a national community to which they owe loyalty and from which they expect protection, but, this interpretation has been

dream to be realized, and argues that although nationality (national identity) is part of a democratic citizenship, nationalism is not.

³³ In his outstanding study, Brubaker undertook a comparative analysis of the nation-building processes in France and Germany, and explored how these processes shaped the emergence of two distinct paths for citizenship. According to his analysis, the rise of a territorial (*jus soli*), state centered, and assimilationist type of citizenship in France departs from the fact that French nationalism appeared at the same time as the French nation-state. In the German case, in contrast, the emergence of nationalism preceded the formation of the German nation-state. This resulted in the emergence of an organic, ethnocultural, descent-based (*jus sanguinis*) conception of citizenship in Germany. The different experiences on state formation and nation-building processes generated different conceptions of citizenship and naturalization policies in two countries. Whereas anyone born within the territories of France acquire the citizenship of this country, in Germany, only those with Germanic origins can acquire this status.

severely challenged in the era of globalization during which we are no longer able to think nation-states in their pure Westphalian forms. As the interconnectedness between the agents increases and the nationally defined territories become more blurred, there occur erosions in our understanding of nation-states and citizenship. This multi-dimensional interconnectedness has prompted increasing recognition for citizenship as a transnational matter and brought about a new terminology of citizenship including: ‘post-national citizenship’,³⁴ ‘trans-national citizenship’, ‘regional citizenship’, ‘European citizenship’, ‘global citizenship’, etc. The emergence of hybrid and traveling cultures, increasing number of dual citizens, the massive movement of refugees and homeless people, the formation of supranational and transnational bodies like the EU have all reshaped the world order of nation-states. In addition, the growing influence of global governance and civil society institutions together with the codification of universal human rights norms have made it impossible to think of nation-state as the sole category of a political community.

These trends did not only transform the modern understanding of citizenship embedded in nationality, but also provided room for the recognition of various identity claims within the public realm that were previously reserved in the private realm (Kadıoğlu, 1998). For instance, in the Turkish context, argues Kadıoğlu (1998), the urge to revise and redefine the notion of citizenship has arisen from a visible expression of women's, as well as Islamic and Kurdish identities since the late 1980s. According to her, “the absolute, homogeneous, all-encompassing

³⁴ Soysal (1994: 3) uses the term ‘post-national citizenship’ to describe the recently emerging type of citizenship in the era of globalization and argues that national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership located within an increasingly de-territorialized notion of a person’s more universal rights. She explains *post-national citizenship* with the growth of guest-working across many societies, greater global interdependence, overlapping memberships of different kinds of citizenship and the emergence of universalistic rules and conceptions regarding human rights.

category of Turkish citizenship has been demystified and has begun to crumble due to the predominance of an ‘identity politics’ in Turkey, based on gender-related, religious and ethnic identities”. Kadioğlu’s term of ‘demystified’ citizenship calls for the notion of ‘fragmented citizenship’ offered by Delanty. According to him, as the claims for substantive aspects of citizenship like ethnicity, gender, class, culture gain weight, citizenship can be perceived as becoming fragmented, in that, we are no longer able to think of it solely in ‘national’ terms (Delanty, 1997). Fragmented citizenship does not necessarily imply a fragmented relationship between citizenship and identity. Citizenship performs an integrative function in two respects: first, it enables us to integrate the various roles we play, and thus, requires that we think of ourselves as something more than the sum of the roles we play; second, it integrates individuals into the community (Dagger, 1997: 101). The multiple identities that coexist in individual persons – either local, ethnic, national or global (Werbner and Yuval-Davis, 1999: 5) or, racial, cultural, religious, sexual, ideological – can not be seen simply as personal characteristics. They also help one to identify himself/herself mutually with a particular identity group. Identity groups, Gutmann (2003: 2) says, are politically significant associations that attract people because of their mutual identification with one or more shared social markers.³⁵ This mutual identification makes identity groups meaningful for individual persons who identify themselves with the group, and reconstitutes the dynamic link between identity and civic virtue within the notion of citizenship-as-desired-activity.

Lastly, it is necessary to add that there are ongoing debates among scholars concerning the upsurge of interest in the identity politics literature. Whereas some

³⁵ Gutmann (2003: 13) underlines the distinction between identity groups and interest groups. Whereas an identity group organizes around mutual identification, an interest group organizes around a shared instrumental interest of the individuals who constitute the group without any necessary mutual identification among its members.

figure out the recent trend toward integrating new claims of belonging into the notion of citizenship as a new phenomenon, some interpret it as a regular theme in the Western political history. Isin and Turner (2002: 1) see this phenomenon as continuity rather than a rupture in the evolution of citizenship and argue that the search for rights as claims to recognition has been present from the ancient Greek, and Roman peasants and plebians, to Italian artisans and French workers. For them;

What has been happening in the last few decades then is neither revolutionary nor new but has been a recurrent, if not a fundamental, aspect of democratic or democratizing policies. What is new is the economic, social and cultural conditions that make possible the articulation of new claims and the content and form of these claims as citizenship rights.

Whether the shift in the literature is a rupture or continuity, we need to think of citizenship in a broader context with a focus both on the changing capacity of the nation-states to deal with global pressures and the changing nature of individual-society-state relationship. The conditions, dynamics, and the requisites of the recent era are gradually changing, that is why we need to revise our framework of thinking about the traditionally defined and constructed concepts and theories.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has attempted to provide a map of citizenship literature and highlight the fundamental shifts that citizenship studies have been passing through in the recent years. For this aim, two broad waves of transformation in the literature have been emphasized which can not be handled alone. The first remarkable shift occurred in the conceptualization of citizenship in a much broader way as to encompass the non-institutional/non-procedural aspects of citizenship which have urgently become vital for the stability and sustainability of liberal democracies. This required political theorists to think beyond the conventional conception of

citizenship defined simply as a legal status, and to lean towards the dimensions of identity and civic virtue that are directly related with the capacities and dispositions of citizens. The second change has similarly taken place as an outcome of recent trends associated with globalization. As the interconnection between the local, national, regional, and global levels have increased and the boundaries among these levels have become much more fuzzy, modern citizenship remained insufficient to cope with the complexities of multi-ethnic societies. Thus, to conceive citizenship solely in national terms remains extremely narrow.

In the light of these key transformations in the literature, this study found it meaningful to outline the theoretical approaches to citizenship within the framework of the twofold distinction introduced by Kymlicka and Norman: *citizenship-as-legal-status*, and *citizenship-as-desirable-activity*. This distinction seems pertinent to investigate the three facets of citizenship, legal status, identity, and civic virtue, drawn up by Kymlicka and Norman. This chapter, first, addressed the panoply of rights and obligations within the context of ‘citizenship-as-legal-status’ on account of the core assumptions of the two main theoretical approaches to citizenship, namely, liberal-individualism and civic-republicanism. Whereas the former tradition gives priority to individual over community, the idea of rights over obligations, and contractual relationships over shared commitment, the civic-republican tradition lays emphasis on the *vice versa*.

Secondly, the study focused on the dimension of *civic virtue* which gives citizenship the quality of an ‘activity’ – alongside with that of being a ‘status’. Civic virtue stimulates individual citizens for acting and participating in their political community to attain common good, and serves for the continuity of the community of which they are a member of. Since civic virtues do not come into existence in a

vacuum, the query of how we learn these virtues becomes vital to think critically. This matter has even gained more substance along with the recent developments in many countries, such as increasing political apathy, rising xenophobia and racism against foreigners, and other crises that liberal democracies experience nowadays. Since the Turkish youth, as *citizens-in-the-making*, constitute the empirical focal point of this study, this chapter also intended to delve further into the issue of civic education as one of the principal means for promoting civic virtue and for socializing citizens in line with the values/norms of a community/nation.

Thirdly, in this part of the study, it was asserted that the third component of citizenship – identity – lies neither within the context of ‘citizenship-as-legal-status’ nor ‘citizenship-as-desired-activity’, but, rather, at the crossroads of them. This departs from the premise that the formal status held by citizens shapes the way they perceive themselves; and, identity, in return, shapes the willingness of an individual to participate virtuously in the activities of his/her community. Therefore, there is a kind of a circular relationship among the three dimensions of citizenship, rather than a linear one, in which they continuously re-constitute and re-define one another. Yet, the interconnection between them is open to much debate given the lack of empirical studies intending to solve this puzzle in the field.

To sum up, these distinct, but yet interrelated waves of transformations convene on a common theme, that is, the need for both the political theorists and students of citizenship studies to identify the convoluted and multi-dimensional structure of citizenship, and to re-conceptualize the concept in a way capable of dealing with the complexities of modern societies. This can be possible by taking the non-legal/non-formal facets of citizenship into account and by conceiving it beyond its attachment to the monolithic, Westphalian nation-state. Citizenship formulated in

such manner can give respond to the various identity claims that open the public/private rift to the debate, and can be a glue for creating a common culture and a sense of unity in the way Marshall has in mind.

CHAPTER III

CITUATING TURKISH CITIZENSHIP IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT

3.1 The Making of New Citizen: From Subject to Citizen

The attempts for institutionalizing a new type of citizenship date back to the late periods of the Ottoman Empire. The modernization efforts of the Empire gained a solid base in the *Tanzimat* reform movement (1839-1876), which aimed to reorganize the state structure in line with the European model. This attempt to reorganize the state structure brought about the secularization of the religious laws, implementation of new administrative, educational and financial policies, and limitations on the Sultan's power. But, apart from that, the whole reform process played a crucial role in introducing a broader conception of 'rights' and 'citizenship' for the first time in the Ottoman history. The legislative act put into practice in the *Tanzimat* period guaranteed the principle that the lives, honors, and properties of all individuals, disregarding their religious affinities, would be taken under protection (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 175). The Charter, therefore, reflected a new image of individual who is 'purified' from his/her attachment to any sort of religious or ethnic ties, and perceived himself/herself as a constituent part of the society he/she is a part of. Following that, *Tabiiyet-i Osmaniyyeye dair Nizaname*, dated January 23, 1869 offered an official definition of Ottoman citizenship in which Ottoman citizen was defined as "an individual whose parents are Ottoman". This legal document

exhibited a descent-based conception of citizenship, but a limited territorial understanding was also displayed for those who were born in the territories of the empire after reaching maturity (İçduygu *et al.*, 1999: 193). Although the formulation of citizenship in such a way was stipulated as an antidote against the compartmentalization and segregation of the Ottoman society in ethnic and religious lines, the rise of the nationalist tendencies among the subjects of the *millet* system could not be prevented in the end.

During the administration of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (The Committee of Union and Progress) (1908-1918), further efforts were put into place to construct identity for the citizens of the Empire in a more nationalist tendency. The Young Turks put forward the motto of ‘the nation is the source of all authority’, and made the first attempt to transform the empire into a homogenous state based on the precept of ‘one state, one nation’ (İçduygu *et al.*, 1999: 193). This motto would later be adopted by the Grand National Assembly established in April 23, 1920 and become one of the fundamental principles of the Republican notion of citizenship.

This chapter will provide an outline of the construction of Turkish citizenship and the transformations it has gone through from the early Republican period to the present day. Various approaches to citizenship will be delineated with a joint focus on the evolution of political movements and youth activism in Turkish political history. These processes will be analyzed through three time periods: 1923-60, 1960-80, and post-1980 period.

3.2 An Overview of the Citizenization Process in the Early Republican Period (1923-1960)

In embarking upon the task of building a new nation-state, citizenship was conceived as one of the most important foundations of the new Republic. The configuration of

the Turkish modernity and the construction of citizenship came into play simultaneously and these two distinct, but interlinked processes deeply penetrated into one another. The civilizing process in the founding years of the new Turkish state was intimately interrelated with Turkish modernity. In a similar vein, the way the Turkish modernity came into existence under the hegemony and control of the strong state determined the whole citizenization process. Consequently, the notions of ‘nation’ and ‘citizen’ were melted in the state-centric³⁶ definition of the Kemalist modernity project.

At the onset of the Republican years, industrialization and the formation of a national identity were among the main priorities of the Kemalist modernity project (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 170). The new national identity to be constructed would be modern and secular. Therefore, one of the primary targets of the Turkish revolution was to break the hold of religion on society and the polity (Heper, 1984: 87; Ünsal, 1998: 13). The Islamic elements inherent in the Ottoman heritage were conceived as signs of backwardness that led to the collapse of the Empire. Thus, the Kemalist elites tried to eliminate the influence of religion from the socio-political structure of the state. In this context, defining Turkish revolution simply as a political phenomenon would be misleading in the sense that it was also an attempt to reorganize and restructure the Turkish society in cultural terms. In other words, Turkish reform movement came to signify a cultural revolution as much as a political one. As Soyarık (2000: 88) puts it, “Kemalist modernization projected a particular form of a socio-cultural life which each Turkish citizen should adopt. This new life would represent a common good and national interest, but not a particular

³⁶ Keyman and İçduygu (2005: 5-6) define the state-centric nature of Turkish modernity in terms of four elements; (1) strong state tradition; (2) national developmentalism; (3) the organic vision of society; (4) republican model of citizenship. These four elements together constitute the state-centric mode of operation of Turkish modernity.

and individualistic one”. The cultural dimension of the revolution was evident in a number of reforms initiated in the early Republican period, such as the banning of *fez* which was seen as a symbol of Ottoman heritage; the changes made in the measurement systems (e.g., the calendar, weights, lengths and time); the adoption of new the Turkish alphabet; the closing down of *tekke* and *zaviyeler*, and so on. Through these reforms, the state elite attempted to create a modern, Western type of nation, and citizenship became the product of this newly constructed Turkish state.

The formation of the nation-state in a top-down process by the leading figures in the RPP³⁷, which was to rule Turkey from 1925 to 1945, paved the way for the emergence of a conception of citizenship defined from above since the promulgation of the Republic in 1923. The ‘strong state’ (Heper, 1985) tradition defined and determined the limits of citizenship in line with the principles of the modernist project. The citizen, as Kadioğlu says (2005: 114) appeared both as the object of the Kemalist modernization project and its carrier. The doctrinal principles – nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, etatism, and revolutionism – became the moral components of this notion of citizenship. These principles were incorporated into the Party programme of the RPP in the 1931 Congress and, later, through a constitutional amendment in 1937, they were incorporated into the Turkish Constitution (Kadioğlu, 2005: 111). The citizens were expected to internalize these principles and reproduce the privileged position of the state.

There seems to be a wide consensus among scholars concerning the definition of the citizenship conception in terms of obligations citizens have towards

³⁷ Having its origins in the Turkish War of National Independence (1919-22), the RPP was officially founded on September 9, 1923. RPP ruled Turkey from 1925 to 1945 without any opposition, except for the short *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party) interlude in 1930. The party was generally described as having born out of an alliance between the central military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite and local notables (Özbudun, 1981).

the state (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 172; Ünsal, 1998). The emphasis was on duty rather than right. In this regard, a civic-republican understanding, which perceives citizenship as a ‘practice’ rather than ‘status’, has been prevalent in the making of Turkish citizenship (Soyarık, 2000; Yeğen, 2004: 54; Baban, 2005: 53). Individuals were seen as ‘virtuous’ beings who are ready to sacrifice their individual rights and freedoms for the common good of state. The individual interests of citizens were replaced with the Rousseauian ‘general will’ of the entire body of citizens. Keyman and İçduygu (2003: 231) depict this type of citizenship as ‘militant/virtues citizenship’, which assumes the national-secular identity to act in accordance with the organic vision of society:

In this sense, the citizen is militantly active in the process of serving for the making of modern Turkey, and is virtuous in his/her will to put the public good before individual interest, his/her service for society before individual freedom, his/her national identity before difference, and his/her acceptance of cultural homogeneity before pluralism.

Viewed from Turner’s analogy of active/passive citizenship, it is possible to argue that Turkish citizenship can be categorized as ‘passive’ given its definition from above within a public space. By comparing the Turkish case with the French and German traditions, Kadioğlu (2005: 114) argues that the Turkish conception of modern citizenship seems akin to the French tradition since there was an attack on the private space of the family and religion, and the German passive tradition given the absence of a successful liberal revolution. Similarly, recalling the analysis of Brubaker who explored how the nation-building processes in France and Germany generated distinct models of citizenship, Kadioğlu (2005: 111) argues that Turkish nationalism had some commonalities with the French nationalism. As she puts it; “whereas in the German case, it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state, in the Turkish scenario the historical order of things is reversed. In Turkey, one can

refer to a state preceding a nation, a state in search of its nation”. Kadıoğlu adds that Turkish citizenship differed from the French tradition in the sense that the Turkish socio-political history lacked an experience of Enlightenment prior to the establishment of citizenship, thus, the citizen preceded the individual in the Turkish case. As a consequence, civil, political and social rights developed simultaneously in a top-down manner rather than in a progressive self-evolutionary mode in the way Marshall predicted.

Another aspect of this top-down modernization process was the emergence of a monolithic and homogenous national identity that was at odds with the alternative ethnic and sub-cultural identities prevailing in the Turkish society. The emergence of this monolithic official identity had its roots in the ‘one state, one nation’ understanding which defined Islamic and local cultural symbols within the boundaries of the private sphere (İçduygu et al., 1999: 195; Ünsal, 1998: 14; Sunar, 1996). The identities that differed from the official homogenous Turkish identity were regarded as obstacles for creating a socially integrated national community. To put more amply, “the new state was founded on the assumption that it would be for the Turks and by the Turks” (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 2000: 3).

Central to the attainment of these Kemalist objectives – forming a modern and secular nation-state, constructing a new model of citizenship, creating a homogenous monolithic culture – was the attempt of the Turkish state to encourage formal education that would go hand in hand with the nation-building process. Since the very beginning of the Republican period formal education was seen as an important apparatus for the political socialization of new citizens and the diffusion of national values. The crucial role of civic education in building a new modern,

democratic, and secular nation-state was repeatedly underlined by the Republican cadres. As asserted by Kazamias (1966: 115);

In the emerging ideology of Atatürkism, education was inextricably bound up with political, economic, and cultural independence and with breaking the shackles of traditional beliefs and outlooks; it was the means of nourishing national aspirations, creating the consensus necessary to sustain a free, national state, training new Turkish leaders, and paving the way towards a dynamic and modern society (Kazamias, 1966: 115).

Education, in the young Turkish state, displayed two main functions. First, it operated as a means for making ‘patriotic’ and ‘obedient’ citizens who would internalize the ideology of the hegemonic state as a result of a long socialization process. Second, civic education would untie the traditional and insecular³⁸ ties from the state-in-the-making to enable it to achieve the civilizational level of the West (Kadıoğlu, 2005: 114). One of the significant steps taken in the area of education in the early Republican period was the placement of complete education system under the supervision and control of the state with the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (Law of Unification of Instruction) dated March 3, 1924. Citizenship education began in 1924 with the introduction of the course entitled *Malumat-i Vataniye* (Information about the Motherland) that became compulsory in the primary and secondary school curriculum. In 1927, it was replaced with another course called *Yurt Bilgisi* (Information about the Motherland) and, later on, with *Yurttaşlık Bilgisi* (Information about Citizenship). From 1985 onwards, a new course called *Vatandaşlık Bilgileri* (Information about Citizenship) was offered in the school

³⁸ With Turkey’s transition from a one-party to a multi-party system (from 1946 to 1950), religion emerged as a political and cultural issue and the effects of this process were evident in the changes in the formal education system. In 1949, courses in Islam were permitted in the fourth and fifth classes of the elementary schools. By 1950, the great majority of primary school children took the course in religious education (Kazamias, 1966: 189). Two other developments in religious education during this period were significant. In 1949, a Faculty of Divinity was opened at the University of Ankara under the control of the Ministry of Education. And, secondary schools were re-established for the training of religious leaders (Kazamias, 1966: 189).

curricula which was also replaced by *Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları* (Citizenship and Human Rights) course in the 1990s.³⁹

In addition to the efforts of the state to create an ideal Republican citizen through the means of civic education, a number of institutions were established throughout the civilizing process. In April 15, 1931, *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Turkish History Society) was set up in order to carry out regular research and academic studies. A year later, in 1932, two other institutions were founded: *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) to assure cultural development and educate citizens, and *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Society) to carry out linguistic studies. People's Houses and Rooms continued to run until August 8, 1951 when they were closed down under the Law 5830 (Kili, 2003: 262-266).

The attempts of the modernizing elites to define who were Turks was decisive in the construction of citizenship (Soyarık, 2000: 87). With regard to this issue, there are debates in the literature concerning whether the definition of Turkishness embodied territorial/political or ethnic/cultural features. Most scholars agree upon the fact that the conception of Turkishness was neither political nor ethnic, but rather, it carried a dual nature by accommodating both features. In other words, Turkish citizenship was seen as akin to both French (based on territory) and German (based on descent) models. On the one hand, Turkishness had a political/legal definition designated by citizenship; on the other, it represented an essentialist identity based on ethnicity (Bora, 1997: 53). This duality, argues Yeğen (2004: 55-57), had its roots in the dual nature of the legal texts handling Turkish

³⁹ The book entitled *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler* (Civic Information for the Citizen), which was written by Mustafa Kemal and published in 1930, sheds light on the Kemalist interpretation of various concepts like 'nation', 'state', and 'citizen'. In this book, Atatürk makes a subjective and cultural definition of 'nation' by stating that "nation is the gathering of people of the same culture". He does not define Turkish nation on the basis of ethnicity and the element of religion is left aside (Özbudun, 1998: 155).

citizenship. Various definitions were used as criteria for Turkishness in different texts such as, “a subject of the Turkish Republic”, “a Turkish subject”, “someone from Turkish race”. This brought about a definitional gap among the notions of Turkish citizenship and Turkishness.

A close reading of some legal texts will shed light on the dual nature of Turkish citizenship embracing both territorial and descent-based principles. The definition of Turkishness in the 1924 Constitution⁴⁰ was formulated around political parameters rather than ethnic (Soyarık, 2005: 126; Yeğen, 2004: 58). Article 88 of the Constitution (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*) stated that “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of citizenship, be called Turkish” (Gözübüyük, 2002: 88). As Yeğen (2004: 58) notes, “when the Constitution addresses Turkish citizens, it refers not only to those who are of Turkish descent, but also to those who do not have a Turkish ethnic origin”.⁴¹ Therefore, the 1924 Constitution portrayed a political definition of Turkishness defined on the basis of Turkish citizenship.

⁴⁰ The 1924 Constitution is the first Republican Constitution developed by the GNA. It was formed by making amendments on a few articles of the 1921 Constitution. Thus, the 1924 Constitution retained the basic philosophy of the former constitution (Kili, 2003: 196). The Constitution maintained the GNA as the supreme organ of the state. It was a liberal constitution concerning individual rights and liberties. The basic rights of citizens were enlisted in the 5th section of the Constitution as follows: security of life, liberty, honor, and property; freedom of conscience; freedom of press and communication; freedom of forming associations (Soyarık, 2000: 83). Yet, there are ongoing debates on “to what extent the Constitution is liberal”. Whereas Tanör (1998: 309) argues that the Constitution was liberal in the sense that liberties were not laid down within the confines of the benefits of state. Gözübüyük (2002), on the other hand, underlines the fact that the presence of basic rights and liberties was not accompanied by any regulation that safeguarded those rights and liberties, and this over-strengthened the status of the executive. Özbudun’s (2000: 52) argument also supports the latter thesis. According to him, the main defect of the 1924 Constitution was its lack of a system of effective checks and balances to check the power of the elected majorities.

⁴¹ The records reveal that there is an essential difference in the wordings of the Article 88 when it was introduced by the Commission of the Constituent to the Assembly. When it was introduced it was as follows: “The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would be called Turkish”. The condition ‘in terms of citizenship’ is missing in the first wording of the Article.

The Turkish Citizenship Law dated May 23, 1928 and numbered 1312 reflected a mixture of descent-based and territorial parameters.⁴² According to the Article 1 of the law, “the children born from a Turkish father or mother, either in Turkey or in a foreign country, are considered as Turkish citizens” (Nomer, 1987: 45). This article designated the blood (*jus sanguinis*) principle of citizenship since the status of citizenship was granted to the children of Turkish citizens. Article 3 of the same law states that “those children who were born from foreign parents in Turkey, and who are settled in Turkey can admit Turkish citizenship within three years after they reach maturity” (Nomer, 1987: 45). Different from the former one, Article 3 exercised territory (*jus soli*) principle of citizenship. The 2510 numbered *İkamet Kanunu* (The Law on Settlement), which was enacted on June 14, 1934 was also significant in the definition of Turkishness. The first article of the law stated that the dispersion and the settlement of the population would be regulated according to the degree of adherence to Turkish culture (Resmi Gazete, 1934). The statement of ‘the degree of adherence to Turkish culture’ paved way to a subjective interpretation by highlighting ethnicity as a decisive criteria for Turkishness. As Soyarık (2005: 128-129) points out, this law reflected the transformation in the understanding of citizenship from a territorial towards a descent-oriented one.

Other instances can also be pinpointed that demonstrate the shift towards a non-territorial definition of Turkishness. For instance, in the early years of the Republic, the naturalization and assimilation (culturally and linguistically) of various non-Turkish Muslim groups was much easier compared to the non-Muslim Turkish

⁴² The Citizenship Law dated 1961 and numbered 403, which is still valid today, also has the same nature. One of the fundamental changes in this legal document was made in February 1981 which made the adoption of dual citizenship possible (Law numbered 2383). This transformation reflected a new type of thinking which regards citizenship as membership in a state as a political institution, rather than as membership in a particular nation. It represents, at least theoretically, the radical point of transformation for the conception of citizenship in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 175-176).

groups. For instance, Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians, who migrated from the Balkans and Caucasus to Turkey, were easily assimilated to the mainstream society. However, the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with a Christian origin, were faced with different experiences. Their migration was even hardly accepted by the Turkish state (İçduygu, 1999: 195). In a similar vein, the population exchange policy of the Republic, which was put into practice within the framework of the agreement signed with Greece in 1923, accounted for the consideration of religion in determining the degree of Turkishness. During the Greco-Turkish population transfer, the Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox Christians were asked to leave Turkey, whereas the non-Turkish speaking Muslims living in the Balkans were admitted to the country. In another instance, non-Muslim inhabitant groups (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) living in Turkey have been called as ‘Turk’ only with regard to citizenship, but not in terms of nationality since they were not Muslim (İçduygu *et al.*, 1999: 195). These instances exhibit the impact of Muslimhood on maintaining Turkishness, and verify Yeğen’s (2004: 58) thesis that “there is an asymmetry, a gap between the theory and practice of Turkish citizenship”.

3.2.1 Transition to Multi-Party Regime

The Republican notion of citizenship has gone through several transformations beginning with the 1950s. A major break occurred in the political life of Turkey with the transition to the multi-party system in 1945. The Democrat Party (DP) gained a large portion of votes in July 1946 elections, which were an important step towards democratization, and emerged as the first major rival of the RPP.⁴³ The DP was

⁴³ The previous attempts for transition to multi-party system were undertaken first by the formation of *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party) in November 17, 1924 under the initiation of Mustafa Kemal, and later on by the formation of *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Free Republican Party) in August 12, 1930.

formed on January 7, 1946 under the leadership of Celal Bayar. It got organized among the ex-members of the RPP, who either split from the party or were expelled. The Democrats came to power in the elections of May 14, 1950. They won 53.3 percent of the popular vote and 408 seats in the Assembly. The transition process did not occur as a rupture, since it was initiated and controlled by the power holders of the existing authoritarian regime (Özbudun, 2000: 17).⁴⁴ Domestic politics during the 1950s was characterized by the struggle between the two largest parties, the DP and RPP; thus, Turkish party system in the period of 1946-60 can be defined as a two-party system.

The DP transformed the socio-political structure in Turkey. Whereas the RP relied upon the support of military officials and the bureaucratic elites, the DP's electoral base was composed of peripheral groups, such as market-oriented land owners, the urban mercantile class, peasants, and religious protest groups (Sunar and Sayar, 1986: 173). These societal groups could no longer be considered within the 'periphery'; they rather shifted to the centre of the political landscape.

The DP came to power with the main target of furthering democracy and extending the scope of individual freedoms, so, its programme focused mostly on liberalism and democracy. However, liberalism we are talking here had mostly to do with economic liberalism. The party promoted liberal economic measures, but, in terms of political liberalization, its steps did not go beyond a number of changes that stimulated an Islamic revival in Turkey. These changes included the permission to use Arabic in the call to prayer and in the printing of Arabic books; the

⁴⁴ The reasons for transition from single-party to multi-party system were rooted in the domestic and international political context. As Kasaba (1993: 50-51) argues, domestically, there was pressure coming from some circles among the political elite to open the system to opposition and debate. On the other hand, Turkey's deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union in the post-Second World War period revealed the necessity to improve Turkey's relations with the United States and brought rising domestic pressures in Turkish political life.

reintroduction of religion lessons in schools, the launching of Koranic recitations on state radio, the opening of *İmam Hatip Kursları* (Prayer Leader and Preacher Courses) and a Faculty of Divinity in Ankara University. There was also an increase in the number of mosques and Muslim tombs. Consequently, a crucial transformation that Turkish citizenship went through in the 1950s was the incorporation of the religious element to the Turkish identity. This, in return, bolstered the political activism of Islamic groups in Turkey (Soyarık, 2000: 146).

The *second* major change occurred with regard to the notion of ‘passive citizenship’. In contrary to the Republican elites’ emphasis on the duties and obligations of citizens towards their community, the DP laid stress upon political participation (Soyarık, 2000: 150). With the transition to multi-party system, voting became more significant both morally and practically, and the citizens realized that they could play a role in replacing the existing government through electoral means. The changing characteristics of the youth activism with transition to the multi-party system offer fertile ground to explore the tendency towards active citizenship.

In the single-party era, the involvement of youth in political activities was very limited and it was totally in accord with the ideology of Kemalism. The youth activities in this period got organized around the objectives of the government in power, and supported its legitimacy in return (Duman, 1997: 57; Abadan-Unat, 1965: 201).⁴⁵ With transition to the multiparty era, students became increasingly

⁴⁵ Some of the important activities undertaken by youth in this period were: the campaign called *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!* (Citizen, Speak Turkish!) in 1928; reactions against the article of Nazım Hikmet entitled ‘*Putları Kıralım*’ (Break the Idols) published in the journal called ‘Resimli Ay’ in 1928; the campaign of ‘*Yerli Malı Kullanalım*’ (Let’s Use Turkish Goods!) in 1929; demonstrations against the railroad company, *Yataklı Vagonlar Şirketi*, in 1933; reactions to the demolishment of a Turkish tomb by Bulgarians in Sofia in 1934; the mass meetings related to Hatay issue in 1937 and Cyprus issue in the 1950s. The first youth organization, National Turkish Student Union, was set up in 1916. In 1927, various youth associations operating in universities established an umbrella organization called *Yüksek Tahsil Talebe Birliği* (Union for High Education) in Ankara University

active in politics, first as individuals, and second through their organizations (Landau, 1974: 30). Initially, the revival in the political activism of youth was related to the DP's tolerance towards the Islamist ideology. The youth considered the measures and policies taken by the DP government as a sacrifice of Kemalist reforms, and displayed strongly nationalist attitudes (Landau, 1974: 30). Although the youth was not directly involved in the 1960 coup, yet, the impact of the youth movements in the late 1950s was extremely notable.

3.3 The Era of Transformation: 1960-1980

During the late 1950s, the policies and practices of the DP government gained a more authoritarian fashion in parallel to its declining support. Although the Democrats came to power with the discourse of democratization, they were no longer concerned with the freedoms of their opponents. Some of the undemocratic measures taken by the DP government, among others, were; restricting freedom of the press, preventing coalitions of political parties in opposition, banning political meetings and demonstrations except during election campaigns, forcing civil servants to take early retirement, closing down workers' unions, jailing scores of journalists, and, curtailing the autonomy of universities (Dodd, 1990: 10; Özbudun, 2000: 30). The last step of these authoritarian measures was taken in April 1960. The DP established a parliamentary committee of inquiry, which was endowed with extraordinary judicial and administrative powers, to investigate 'subversive' activities of the RPP and press (Özbudun, 2000: 31). Increasing dissatisfaction with the DP government's authoritarian practices, civil turmoil within the society, and

(Köknel, 1981: 119). This was followed with the establishment of another youth organization called National Turkish Student Federation in 1948.

outbreak of clashes between students and the police resulted in the intervention of the military in May 27, 1960 and the overthrow of the DP government.⁴⁶

The military takeover occurred in a *de facto* way through the transfer of power to the National Union Committee (NUC) chaired by General Cemal Gürsel. During this era, two important, but yet contradictory, developments occurred in the Turkish political history. The first one was the institutionalization process of military in the civil political life through the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was composed of key commanders and ministers, and served as an advisory body to government on security issues. The second crucial development following the coup was the formation of the 1961 Constitution which was a landmark because of its relatively democratic and liberal nature.

The 1961 Constitution was accepted by getting 61.5 percent of the votes in a national referendum held on July 9, 1961. As Sunar and Sayar (1986: 174) point out, the 1961 Constitution, differently from the previous, had behind it a decade of democratic experience and learning. Thus, it reflected a new balance of power and an institutional compromise supportive of such a balance. The Constitution constructed a dispersed system by approving bicameral system and adopting the proportional representative electoral system to prevent the radicalization of any political party. Bureaucratic checks and controls were introduced to limit the power of the elected organs. A Constitutional Court was established to review legislation. Substantive autonomy was granted to public bodies such as universities and the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation.

⁴⁶ The conflict between the DP and the bureaucratic elites was influential in the breakdown of the regime. The bureaucracy, which was loyal to the RPP in the single-party regime, resisted the DP's efforts to consolidate its political power and was preoccupied with the DP government's attitude towards religious activities. Moreover, the social status of the bureaucratic groups was subject to erosion under the DP regime. The 1960 coup was, therefore, supported by military officers and civilian officials for economic as well as other reasons (Özbudun, 2000: 31-32).

The Constitution was vital for the transformation that the conception of citizenship went through. The scope of individual rights and civil liberties⁴⁷ was broadened under new constitutional guarantees. Article 54 of the Constitution introduced a political definition of Turkish citizen, by stating that “everyone who is tied to the Turkish state through citizenship ties is a Turk” (Gözübüyük, 2002: 150). The citizenship law also provided the guarantee that “no Turk can be expelled from citizenship unless he/she engages in activities contrary to their loyalty to the country” (Gözübüyük, 2002: 150). As Soyarık (2005: 132) holds;

The constitution limited the interference of the state into the affairs of the individual and defined the duties of the state toward the individual which was a significant departure from the primacy of the obligations of the citizen toward the state in the early republican period.

In this respect, a shift occurred in the conception of citizenship from a civic-republican to a more liberal interpretation, placing more stress on individual and civil rights and liberties.⁴⁸ Additionally, citizenship also appeared as an ‘activity’ as well as a ‘status’. In other words, the notion of ‘active/participatory citizenship’ was encouraged at the expense of ‘passive citizenship’.

The permissive conditions of the 1961 Constitution, in particular, and the political setting in the 1960s, in general, led to the formation of various interest groups⁴⁹ and minor parties, and brought about fragmentation in the party system.

⁴⁷ These included; the immunity of the private life and residence, the freedoms of communication, travel and settlement, faith and conscience, thought, education, right to property (Soyarık, 2000: 157).

⁴⁸ During this period, the Turkish Citizenship Law numbered 403 was put in effect on February 11, 1964. As Soyarık (2005: 134) argues, this law was important for the strengthening of the rule of law, given its aim to base the law on universal principles of citizenship and citizenship rights. The law introduced the principles that: (a) everyone should have citizenship and the situation of statelessness should be eliminated; (b) everyone should have only one citizenship; and (c) everyone should be free to choose his/her own citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship he/she does not want. This new citizenship law contributed to the broadening of the scope of individual liberties.

⁴⁹ The formations of the Union of Chambers of Industry, and the Confederation of Employers (TİSK) in 1962 were significant developments in this period. The inclusion of a new law authorizing the right

The adoption of the proportional electoral system was also influential in improving the chances of minor parties to gain parliamentary representation (Sunar and Sayar, 1986: 178). The transitory period beginning with the outbreak of the military intervention ended with the electoral success of the Justice Party (JP) in 1965 general elections.⁵⁰ The JP was formed in 1961 by getting support from the ex-members of the DP after it was dissolved in 1960. The JP defined itself as a centre-right party and, similar to the DP, the party's electoral base comprised traditional peripheral groups. The JP favored liberal economic policies that benefited private entrepreneurs and industrialists, especially after Süleyman Demirel became the leader of the party in 1964. The Party won majority in all elections in the period of 1961-73.

In this period, the RPP also re-defined its ideological stance as 'left of centre' (*ortanın solu*) underlining the concepts of social justice and social security (Zürcher, 2003: 265). The 1960s witnessed a bitter contest between the RPP and JP similar to the RPP-DP rivalry of pre-1960 days (Landau, 1974: 17). The other parties existing in the political arena in the early 1960s were: the Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP), the New Turkey Party, the Turkish Workers Party (TWP), and the Nation Party. In the late 1960s, a number of other parties were founded, such as the Unity Party⁵¹ and the Reliance Party.⁵²

to strike in the 1961 Constitution was also important for encouraging political activism of workers during the 1960s and 1970s.

⁵⁰ In the 1961 general elections, the JP and the New Turkey Party together won 238 seats in the Assembly. However, the JP was not given the task of forming a government until 1965. Instead, during this period, a series of weak coalitions were formed under the leadership of İnönü (Karpas, 1988: 143).

⁵¹ This party is also called as Union Party. It was founded in 1966 and defined itself as a progressive Kemalist party.

⁵² It was established in 1967 by a group of ex-members of the RPP.

The 1960s were also significant in terms of the rising alternative political movements and the increasing political activism of youth. Whereas the political spectrum in Turkey was heavily dominated by the rightist ideologies, and there was room for religion to express itself in domestic politics during the DP governments, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a resurgence of the leftist ideology. The formation of the TWP in 1961 was a turning point in this context. The establishment of the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (*DİSK*) in 1967 was another important step for the strengthening of the Left. This organization adopted a socialist world view and supported the rights of the working class (Soyarık, 2000: 166). Additionally, the leftist ideology gained steam under the intensifying youth activism in this period.

In order to better understand the chain of events that led to the increasing polarization between the left-wing and right-wing ideologies in the late 1960s, one should briefly examine the increasing participation of youth in extremist organizations. The nature of the youth movements in this era was different from that of the early Republican years. This difference was particularly a result of the more democratic atmosphere introduced by the 1961 Constitution, which provided room for political participation and discussions over the contemporary issues in the political agenda (Altuğ, *et al.*, 1970: 12; Köknel, 1981: 127). The youth movements during the 1960s can be seen in three groups according to their aims; (a) those claiming reforms in universities; (b) those focusing on the main problems in Turkey; and (c) ideological activities (Altuğ, *et al.*, 1970: 12). Initially, the political activities of the youth were organized around the prominent problems in the higher education system. The university students had educational and financial grievances, and they had to contend with huge classes, lack of tutorials, inadequate library facilities, and

crowded dormitories (Landau, 1974: 32). The focus area of the activities, later, shifted to the basic problems Turkey was encountering in those years. The domestic environment was marked with disorder and unrest, and the students were becoming critical about the government and the police. The political developments in the international setting, such as the Cyprus issue, Vietnam War, increasing anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, etc. further stimulated youth activism (Landau, 1974: 33). The political activities of the youth emerged either inside the universities (in the form of boycotts or occupations), or outside the universities (via demonstrations, meetings, street marches, and delivering of bulletins) (Bican, 1970: 124).

Many students joined in student clubs rather than large parties. Leftist youth got organized around *Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu* (The Federation of Idea-Clubs) sponsored by the TWP. The most prominent leftist radical groups were the *Sosyalist Aydınlik* (Socialist Enlightenment), *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* (The Revolutionary Proletarian Enlightenment), *Türk Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu* (The Turkish People's Liberation Army), *Türk Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi* (The Turkish People's Liberation Front). In 1969, an umbrella organization entitled *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* (The Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey), or briefly, *Dev-Genç* was founded by the leftist students. This youth organization aimed at incorporating the peasants in a revolutionary struggle directed against imperialism (Landau, 1974: 39). Initially it was organized in Ankara, and later, it spread to various universities in other cities.

On the other hand, the right-wing groups – ethnic nationalists and Islamists – gathered around the idea of combating communism. They responded to the formation of the leftist organizations by forming their own. The most prominent

ones were: *Bozkurtlar* (Grey Wolves), *Ülkü Ocakları* with unofficial links to the NAP, and other youth organizations established by the right-wing RPNP (Landau, 1974: 35). As Duman (1997: 63) points out, in the early 1960s, it was not yet possible to talk about an organized Islamist youth. Instead, the Islamists joined the nationalist group against the left. Their claims revolved around the construction of mosques, the establishment of Islamic academies, and the wearing of *tesettür* in educational institutions. However, the disregard of the governments of the time to such demands upset the Islamist groups, and led them to question themselves within the auspices of the right-wing ideology. In the late 1960s, the Islamists began to distance themselves from the nationalist-right camp and in the 1970s, they re-organized around associations called *Akıncılar Derneği*. The rise of questions like “do you identify yourself first as a Muslim or a Turk?” symbolized the splitting among the nationalist and Islamist youth. Whereas the former group perceived Turkishness as the core element of their identity, the latter group perceived Islam as the main building block of their identity. This ideological split became evident after the establishment of an Islamist party called the National Order Party (NOP) in January 26, 1970. In a nutshell, the most active youth groups until 1980 were the leftists and the nationalists.

The riots of the students and the clashes between the two ideological camps intensified after 1968, during which youth movements simultaneously outburst in other countries. Their actions became so violent that the two opposing groups of militants attacked one another physically in the streets and universities. Additionally, the workers, who advocated higher wages and social improvements, perpetuated this catastrophic environment. In this sense, student radicalism was accompanied by increased radicalization of the working class (Özbudun, 2000: 33). The most

aggressive and violent clashes between the right-wing and left-wing groups occurred in February 1969. Two students were dead and hundreds wounded on this day known as the 'Bloody Sunday'.

In the late 1960s, the JP government remained unable to deal with the retrograding circumstances of ideological polarization. The erosion of state authority and the loss of governmental efficiency brought about a power vacuum into which the military stepped in 1971 (Sunar and Sayar, 1986: 176). A military ultimatum was issued in March 12, 1971 urging the government to resign. This intervention could be characterized as "a half coup in which the military chose to govern from behind the scenes instead of taking over directly" (Özbudun, 2000: 35). The intervention, which occurred in a rightist fashion, suppressed the leftist political movement: the TWP and the leftist organizations were closed down, leftist publications were banned, and many leftist advocates were arrested. Moreover, many of the rights and freedoms introduced by the 1961 Constitution were curtailed through a set of constitutional amendments. The basic mentality of liberty laid down in the 1961 Constitution disappeared totally. Whereas the notions of democracy and freedom were central to the 1961 Constitution, it was the delimitation of the freedoms that constituted the basis of the constitutional changes approved in 1973. According to Özbudun (2000: 57),

The amendments can be grouped into three categories: (1) curtailing certain civil liberties in conjunction with restrictions of the review power of the courts; (2) strengthening the executive, particularly by allowing the GNA to grant it law-making powers; (3) increasing the institutional autonomy of the military by excluding it from review by civilian administrative courts and the Court of Account.

Yet, these counter-measures could not prevent the ensuing political polarization in the post-intervention period. Ideological polarization, fragmentation, and volatility (sudden and significant changes in party votes from one election to the

next) were the defining features of the Turkish party system in the 1970s (Özbudun, 2000: 74; Sunar and Sayar, 1986: 178). The political arena was dominated by two major parties, the JP and the RPP, in the period of 1973-80. The rightist ideology was represented by the following parties: the JP, the NAP⁵³, the NSP⁵⁴, the Democratic Party⁵⁵, and the Republican Reliance Party (RRP)⁵⁶. On the other hand, the Unity Party and the RPP represented the social-democratic line.

In short, the Turkish political history in the period of 1973-80 was characterized by intense political fragmentation and polarization both at the party level and the societal level. The worsening economic circumstances further deteriorated political polarization. The economic policy of import substitution could no longer cope with the economic crisis Turkey experienced in 1977 following the petroleum crisis of 1974. The growing political unrest and violence, and the inability of the governments of the late 1970s to cope with these problems resulted in the military takeover on September 12, 1980. This was the beginning of a new era concerning the transformation of citizenship into a more passive form, and the changing salience of political movements in the Turkish political life.

3.4 Turkish Citizenship at a Disjuncture: the Post-1980 Period

The intervention was made in the name of preserving the integrity of the secular and Kemalist nation-state. In this sense, it boosted the revival of Atatürkism which had

⁵³ The NAP was founded in 1969 under Alparslan Türkeş. It was a radical nationalist party supporting the thesis based on the hegemony of Turkishness.

⁵⁴ The NSP was founded by Necmettin Erbakan after the NOP was closed down following the 1971 coup. The party had an Islamist orientation as the former one. The NSP won 11.8 percent of the votes in 1973 general elections and became a partner in a coalition government headed by RPP.

⁵⁵ The Democratic Party was founded following a split in the JP in 1970. The party had a traditional nationalist character.

⁵⁶ The RPP was founded in 1967 by a group of ex-members of the RPP who opposed the RPP's proclamation of itself as the left-of-centre.

its basis in the republican type of government (Karpas, 1988: 153; Heper, 1984: 85; Soyarık, 2000: 175). However, differently from the early Republican period, this time, Atatürkism was used as a means for struggling with the political polarization and fragmentation in Turkey. Thus, Republicanism re-emerged on the grounds of pragmatic reasons.

Another implication of the military coup could be seen in the changing position of religion in the political domain. Similar to Atatürkism, religion, was used as a panacea to suppress ideological factional movements, especially the Left (Atasoy, 2003-2004: 141; Ünsal, 1998: 21; Soyarık, 2000: 175). The emerging gap after the suppression of radical right and left movements was filled with the ideology of political Islam. The official ideology of the 1980s became the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which attempted to combine Turkish nationalism with Islam. The adoption of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an official state ideology encouraged the Islamist youth as well. Whereas it was difficult to come across an organized Islamist youth prior to 1980s, the situation started to change after the coup. The re-formulation of educational and cultural policies was another source that opened ground for the strengthening of the Islamist movement in the 1980s.

One of the most momentous developments concerning the making-of-citizenship in the three-year transitory period following the 1980 military intervention was the formation of the 1982 Constitution which is still in use today. Considering the way it was designed as well as the provisions it included, the new Constitution was meant to reverse the democratic structure introduced by the 1961 Constitution. The 1982 Constitution strengthened state over individual, the political bodies over the judiciary, the executive over the legislative, and centralization over de-centralization.

The provisions of the Constitution reflected a state mistrust to all sort of elected assemblies, political parties, politicians, and civil society institutions, such as trade unions, professional organizations, and voluntary associations (Özbudun, 2000: 59). All political parties were closed down after the coup and they were forbidden to set up youth branches, foundations, and to form an organizational structure abroad. Trade unions, foundations, associations were weakened and their relations with the political sphere were curtailed. The autonomy of the universities and the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation was violated. The authority of the state to intervene in the individual rights and freedoms was extended and the police forces became the main decision-making organ rather than the judiciary. The president of the Republic was given substantive powers in extraordinary circumstances and he was endowed with extra powers such as appointing the high-court judges, university administrators, the members of the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, and the Head of the General Staff. Likewise, the power of the NSC in state affairs was increased. The position of the military in domestic politics became more explicit through broadening the definition of ‘national security’ and easing the way for the proclamation of martial law. In short, “the 1982 constitution was designed to maintain the military as the ultimate guardian and arbiter of the political system through a strengthened presidency and NSC” (Özbudun, 2000: 59). Some provisions of the Constitution were related to religion. Religion courses were made compulsory in the curriculum of primary schools, middle-level high schools, and lycees. Additionally, the students who graduated from *İmam Hatip* schools were granted the right to continue their higher education in the fields other than that of theirs.

The Kemalist modernity project was reconsidered and updated during the formation of the Constitution. Citizenship came to be understood as an identity

shared by homogenous citizens similar to its early Republican version. The Constitution marked a return to the civic-republican interpretation of citizenship and attempted to create 'passive' and 'obedient' citizens. This attempt of the Constitution was also explicit in its encouragement of de-politicization in the 1980s.⁵⁷ It glorified the status of the state and replaced individual freedoms with the common good of the state. Similar to the previous constitutions, the term 'Turkishness' was also retained in the 1982 Constitution. Article 66 stated that: "everyone who is annexed to the Turkish State with citizenship ties is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or mother is a Turk. (Gözübüyük, 2002: 295). The definition of Turkishness hereby was based on political parameters, rather than ethnic. In this sense, the idea of Turkishness could be seen in continuity with the one arranged in the 1962 Constitution.

Additionally, two significant changes were introduced concerning citizenship in the 1981-83 period. The *first* one was the approval of dual/multiple citizenship in April 1981. The necessity to adopt dual citizenship was an outcome of the migration of millions of Turks to Western countries since the early 1960s to search for better lives. As İçduygu *et al.* (1999: 187) put it, the Turkish immigrants have continued their lives in these countries for several decades, paid taxes and been affected by political decisions, but they never gained full political rights, since they did not obtain citizenship of those countries. The position of Turkish migrants in terms of their status of citizenship posed a big problem not only to themselves, but also to

⁵⁷ The closing down of all political parties and voluntary associations after the intervention was a big challenge to youth activism. In the post-1980 period, the youth was preoccupied with the question of how to get organized. They claimed to have a say on the decision-making process in universities; and to transform the universities into more democratic and autonomous scientific institutions (Tatlıcan, 1995: 72). An important step towards the organization of university students on a legal basis was taken with the establishment of student associations in universities in 1984 with the initiation of the Faculty of Law of Ankara. Following, more than 80 student associations were set up in various universities in a short period of time. The establishment of the student associations reached its peak in the year 1988. However, afterwards, the attitude of the state towards these organizations took a more rigid fashion (Bora *et al.*, 1989: 47).

Turkey and to the countries of destination. Therefore, the issue of dual citizenship was an increasing concern for Turkey for the reasons of dealing with the naturalization policies and practices of migrant-receiving states. The adoption of dual citizenship was not simply important in terms of the position of the Turkish immigrants living abroad; but it was also significant for the formal conceptualization of citizenship. As İçduygu and Keyman (1998-1999: 153) assert, dual citizenship, which is based on the premise of membership in a state as a legal entity rather than a nation, inherits the assumption that individuals with different ethnic and national origins can co-exist in a single state under the meta-identity of citizenship.

The Turkish state introduced a *second* change to citizenship law in order to prevent the re-polarization and re-fragmentation of domestic politics. In the period following the coup, many leftist intellectuals (including the Kurds) were arrested. Some of these people fled the country and sought refuge outside Turkey. A new law was enacted which would leave these people without Turkish citizenship. As a result, many lost their citizenship status.

A closer reading of the party politics in the early 1980s reveals that in the transitory period of 1980-83 all political parties were outlawed by the military regime. New parties were permitted to be established just prior to the November 1983 elections. Three parties were allowed to contest the elections; the Motherland Party (MP), the Populist Party (PP), and the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP).⁵⁸ The MP, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, won the elections by getting 45 percent of the vote. It became the new dominating party of the political arena that would stay in power for eight years (1983-1991). The MP was a centre-right party,

⁵⁸ The PP, a centre-left party, got 30 percent of the votes, whereas the NDP, a centre-right party, obtained 23 percent of the votes.

but apart from that, it represented diverse political orientations. As Özal asserted, the party brought together all four pre-existing political tendencies under its roof (Özbudun, 2000: 94).⁵⁹ Therefore, the MP's ideology represented a mixture of economic liberalism, nationalism and some Islamic tendencies (Atasoy, 2003-2004: 141). The MP was significant in terms of providing room for the development of liberalism in Turkey. External factors, such as the collapse of communism and the growing integration of world economy, have also been influential in the strengthening of liberalism. The party programme adopted market-oriented economic policies and replaced the policy of import substitution with export-oriented economic policy. The main target of MP's economic policies was integration of the domestic economy with the world economy. "During those years, the Turkish economy moved from a highly restricted and closed system to one in which the private sector played a much more prominent and active role" (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 2000: 9). Under Özal's leadership, the MP managed to establish a broad-based coalition among the market oriented industrialists, businessmen and upwardly mobile urban workers. The liberal economic policies of the MP did play a crucial role in the transformation of the economic and societal structure in Turkey, but yet, as Ayata (1998:159) argues, this liberal stance of the party in economic realm was not accompanied with liberalism in the political realm. In other words, the liberal ideology represented by the MP could not go beyond economic liberalism.

Rising economic difficulties and the strengthening of other centre-right parties challenged the dominance of the MP in the late 1980s. The most influential rival of the MP was the True Path Party (TPP). In 1987, Demirel became the leader of the TPP. The party defined itself as a continuity of the DP and JP. In ideology, it

⁵⁹ This included liberalism, nationalism, social democracy and conservatism.

advocated liberalism in economics and it was also liberal in its hatred towards the idea of military intervention in politics (Dodd, 1990: 116). The profile of the TTP electorates was narrower. The centre-left, on the other hand, was represented by the RPP, the Democratic Left Party (DLP), and the Social Democratic Populist Party which later merged into the RPP. According to Özbudun (2000: 97), the main ideological difference between the two parties was that the DLP did not claim to represent the legacy of the old RPP.

When we approach to 1990s, we see that this decade posed significant challenges to Turkish modernity and the very definition of Turkish citizenship. As most scholars (Ünsal, 1998: 21; Özbudun, 2000: 141; Baban, 2005: 58; Keyman and İçduygu, 2005) argue, the defining characteristics of the 1990s have been the resurgence of Islam and the Kurdish question as fundamental challenges to Turkish modernity.⁶⁰ Although these two phenomena had different trajectories in Turkish politics, a common ground exists among them.

First of all, they both manifested a struggle for the recognition of differences related to identity, and in so doing, questioned the aspects of citizenship as legal status and membership in a political community. Whereas the Republican approach to citizenship envisaged all substantive/alternative identities (religious, sectarian, ethnic, etc.) within the boundaries of private realm, political Islam and Kurdish question blurred the private/public distinction. *Second*, by challenging the conception of Republican citizenship, they gave a new breath to the discussions over rights and freedoms, which embraced individual and group-based claims to

⁶⁰ It is not only the cases of Kurdish question and political Islam that has challenged the legitimacy and governability of Turkish modernity; it is necessary to add that the demands of the Alevi community also demonstrate a departure from the homogenous national identity. The Alevi question stem from the Turkish government's perception of Alevis as a culturally distinct group, rather than a distinct religious group. Consequently, the Alevi community has problems of establishing their own religious institutions and they are still under the control of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

autonomy, pluralism, and democracy (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 7-8). In this sense, central to both challenges was the attempt to question the boundaries and legitimacy of the modern self as set forth by Keyman (1995: 94), "...the unitary conceptions of modern self (as a political class identity or a citizen identity or a national identity) can no longer play their unifying function; nor are they capable of dissolving difference into sameness".

One epitome of the impact of the rising claims for recognition on the notion of citizenship has been the expression of 'constitutional citizenship' beginning with the 1990s. Constitutional citizenship refers to membership in a state as a legal entity, rather than in a nation as a cultural entity. It denotes the ideas that modern citizenship should not necessarily be considered in national terms, and people with different identities can coexist within the socio-political setting set forth by the legal arrangement of citizenship. Both political Islam and Kurdish issues brought the debates over constitutional citizenship up on the agenda.

The outbreak of the Kurdish question became one of the landmarks of the crisis of Turkish modernity. Central to this problematique was the way through which ethnic relations were arranged within the fabric of the nation-state (İçduygu, 1995: 118). In Turkey, the fashion, in which these relations were designed within the boundaries of the strong-state structure did not allow Kurds to be recognized as a distinct ethnic group. In this sense, Kurdish problem signified a conundrum of identity politics with claims for recognition arising out of the state-centric disposition of ethnic relations in the political community.

The origins of the Kurdish issue go back to the late Ottoman and early Republican period. The most striking characteristics of the ethno-political resistance of Kurds during this period was its complicated structure; on the one hand, it

occurred through the uprising of traditional tribal leaders, on the other hand, it had a close affiliation with the Islamic movement.⁶¹ Thus, the politicization of the Kurdish issue was, initially, limited with the activities of influential tribal leaders in various regions. The resistance of the Kurds gained a new dimension in the 1960s and 1970s during which the Kurds began to voice their demands under the broader umbrella of the leftist ideology. From the side of the Kurdish activists, their alignment with the left could result in a social revolution and free them from repression; and from the side of the leftists, the base of the leftist movement could expand by voicing the demands of the Kurds and Alevis (Barkey and Fuller, 1997: 73; Yavuz, 2001: 10). However, the 1980 military coup was a big hazard for both the leftist and Kurdish movements. Oppressive measures were taken to dismantle the organizational power of the Kurdish networks within Turkey (Yavuz, 2001: 10). This disillusionment of the Kurdish activists led to the further radicalization of the Kurdish movement.

In 1984, Kurdish Workers Party⁶² (known as PKK), a Kurdish militant organization dedicated to creating an independent Kurdish state, launched an armed insurrection against the Turkish state. From 1984 onwards, the Kurdish issue was transformed into a mass movement of Kurdish nationalism and achieved broader resonance among the Kurdish population. “The PKK activities encouraged Kurds to criticize not the ‘political authority’ in Ankara, but rather Turkish nationalism as a construct, in order to legitimize their own separatist nationalism” (Yavuz, 2001: 11). The PKK gave a new breath to Kurdish consciousness through re-building and expanding the Kurdish networks and organizations in Turkey, as well as abroad. The

⁶¹ The outbreak of the Sheik Said Rebellion in 1925, the revolt organized by a group of Kurdish tribal leaders in the Ağrı (Ararat) Mountain between 1990-31, and the rebellion of Alevi Kurds in Dersim between 1937-38 were some instances of Kurdish uprising in the early Republican period (Yavuz, 2001: 7-8).

⁶² The PKK was founded in November 27, 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan.

poor and ill-educated village and town youths who felt left out of society were politicized and indoctrinated with the idea of Kurdish separatism (Zürcher, 2003: 325). In 1987, the Turkish government initiated the emergency rule (Regional State of Emergency Governorate) to South-eastern Anatolia which lasted until 2002 (Ayata and Yüksek, 2005: 19). This period also coincided with the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from the Kurdish populated south-eastern and eastern provinces of Turkey.⁶³ The low-intensity war between the Turkish government forces and the PKK militants ended in 1998. A year later the leader of the PKK, Öcalan, was arrested in Kenya and taken back to Turkey.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish question gained a new dimension in Ankara in the 1990s. The People's Labour Party (PLP) formed an alliance with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SPP) for the October 1991 national elections and obtained seats in the Parliament. However, the Constitutional Court was asked to ban the PLP on the grounds of separatism as a result of a series of events, such as the speaking of a number of PLP representatives in Kurdish in the Parliament, their written expression that Turkish was a foreign language they spoke, and Leyla Zana's attempt to bring an oath to the National Assembly (Zürcher, 2003: 328). After the PLP was closed down, its heir – the Democracy Party (DeP) – was founded in 1993. A process of dissolution was instituted against the DeP during which some of the party representatives were killed, the immunity of several MPs was lifted, and four deputies, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Saddak, were condemned to prison. At the end, the party was closed on June 1994. From 1994 onwards, a number of other Kurdish-oriented political parties were set up: the

⁶³ The internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey took place in the period of 1984-1999. According to government records, there were 378,335 internally displaced people (IDPs), and 905 villages and 2,523 hamlets were evacuated. However, the estimates of some NGOs and international observers express the number of the IDPs as high as 1 to 3 million (Ayata and Yüksek, 2005: 15).

People's Democracy Party (*HADEP*), the Democratic People's Party (*DEHAP*), Free Society Party, and more recently, Democratic Society Party.

When we shift our attention from the Kurdish question to the issue of political Islam, we see that the main problem for the Islamists revolved around two main themes: (1) the unrecognition of their religious identity in the public realm; and (2) the strict state intervention in religious affairs in the name of laicism. Although the origins of the Islamist movement can be traced back to the early DP period, it was in the 1990s when the Islamic discourse gained steam, both as a 'political actor' and as a 'symbolic foundation' for identity formation (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 222). The demands for collective rights and recognition of Islam as a constituent of Turkish identity challenged the conventional idea of citizenship in Turkey. In the 1990s, political Islam was represented by the WP which was founded in 1983. The popularity of the WP increased over the years and it took power in a coalition with the centre-right TPP. Necmettin Erbakan became Prime Minister in June 1996. However, the military, intolerant of the WP's anti-secular moves⁶⁴ presented the government with a list of measures to curb its Islamist activities (Jenkins, 2003: 50). However, fearing that implementing these measures would confront the grassroots of the party, Erbakan took no explicit steps to obey those measures. As a result, the military intervened in Turkish politics on February 28, 1997 and asked for the resignation of the government. The WP was closed down and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years. This intervention of the military was defined as a 'postmodern coup'. Çolak (2005: 261) defines this event as a question of who shall control the statecraft, and in the end, it resulted in the restoration of the Kemalist

⁶⁴ Some of these anti-secular moves were; a series of Erbakan's visits to Muslim countries, such as Iran, Libya and Nigeria; the WP's announcement of plans to form a trading block of eight Muslim countries; Erbakan's hosting of *tarikats* leaders at his official residence on January 11, 1997 (Jenkins, 2003: 50).

tenets. The heir of the WP was the Virtue Party (VP) founded under the chairmanship of Recai Kutan. Founders of the VP were active members of the WP. In order to avoid confrontation with the military, the VP stood on a relatively more moderate line. However, this did not prevent its closure by the Constitutional Court in 2001 on the grounds of threatening the secular nature of Turkish constitution. The banning of the VP was followed by a split within the Islamist movement. On the one hand, the more conservative faction of the VP formed the Felicity Party on July 20, 2001. On the other hand, a more moderate and younger generation established the Justice and Development Party (JDP) under the leadership of Erdoğan and Gül on August 14, 2001.

The November 2002 elections were very significant in Turkish political history. Following a long period of coalition governments, Turkish politics soon witnessed the emergence of a single-party majority government. The JDP, by receiving 34.3 percent of the votes (363 seats in the Assembly), emerged as the largest party, and its leader, Recep Tayip Erdoğan became the current Prime Minister of Turkey. The second winner of the elections was the RPP which got 19.4 percent of the votes (178 seats in the Assembly). The JDP portrayed itself as a moderate, right-wing conservative party. Its economic program combined communitarian-liberal elements operating on the basis of three principles: (a) an effective and post-developmental state; (b) a regulated free market; (c) social justice (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 15). After JDP's coming to power, Turkey's relations with the EU gained a new pace. The government showed an unprecedented willingness to transform Turkey in line with the EU standards.

In the 2000s, one of the most influential factors shaping the current state of Turkish politics was Turkey's relations with the EU. Turkey had embarked on its

journey to join the then European Economic Community (EEC) with the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963. Since then, there have been ups and downs in the relations between the two parties. In 1987, Turkey applied for membership to the EEC under the leadership of President Turgut Özal. However, the application was rejected. An important turning point in the relations was the approval of the customs union in 1996. Turkish-EU relations were particularly bitter after the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, in which Turkey was not included among the list of the candidate countries for the next round of enlargement. The process of Turkey's prospective membership to the EU gained momentum in the late 1990s, and especially 2000s. An important development occurred with the inclusion of Turkey as a candidate member at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. From that point on, Turkey has come under the mechanism of 'membership conditionality' which gave stimuli to the reforms undertaken by the Turkish governments. Another momentous date was the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002. The summit announced that the negotiations between the Union and Turkey for full membership status could begin on the condition that Turkey met the requirements of Copenhagen criteria⁶⁵ before the Helsinki Summit of December 2004. These developments urged Turkey to take important steps concerning democracy, human rights and individual freedoms, which challenged the strong state tradition in Turkey to some extent.

Since 1999, the Turkish government adopted two constitutional reforms and eight legislative reform packages including: eradicating all remaining death penalty provisions; strengthening gender equality; broadening freedom of the press; aligning

⁶⁵ The Copenhagen criteria were set forth as the main criteria for accepting a candidate state to full membership in the European Council Summit 1993. The criteria included; (a) *political* principles: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights enforcement, protection of minorities; (b) *economic* criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; (c) the incorporation of the *acqui communitarie*.

the judiciary with the European standards; and establishing the supremacy of international agreements in the area of fundamental freedoms over internal legislation (European Commission, 2004). As declared in the 2004 Regular Report of the European Commission (EC), Turkey accomplished transformation in a number of areas. With respect to civil and political rights, the most prominent of them were the abolition of death penalty in all circumstances⁶⁶ and the legislative and administrative efforts to prevent torture and ill-treatment. Since 2002, the government declared its intention to pursue a zero-tolerance policy against torture and a considerable decline was observed in instances of torture. The conditions of the prison system were also improved. In the field of broadcasting, a significant change occurred; broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish (Bosnian, Arabic, Circasian and the Kurdish dialects of Kirmanji and Zaza) began under the control of Turkish Radio and Television Corporation in June 2004. Two other areas subject to notable progress were freedom of press and freedom of association.

Despite all this progress, Turkey was subject to criticism within the realm of civil and political rights, especially due to freedom of religion. Measures were adopted in the area of property rights and construction of places of worship, but yet, their impact remained insufficient. The Commission acknowledged in the 2003 Report that non-Moslem religious minorities continued to face serious obstacles with respect to legal personality, property rights, internal management, and that there was a ban on the training of clergy (EC, 2003). The calls for the recognition and protection of the Alevis as a Muslim minority were especially crucial in this context. Additionally, the efforts of the Turkish government to adapt the EU standards in the

⁶⁶ Protocol No. 6 on the abolition of the death penalty except in times of war or the imminent threat of war entered into force in December 2003. Protocol No.13 of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances was signed in January 2004.

areas of women's rights, children rights and rights of disabled persons were found lacking. Nevertheless, in the Helsinki Summit of December 17, 2004, the EU made its long-awaited decision on opening membership negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005 which was a real turning point in Turkish-EU relations.

While considering about the sources of change in the notions of Turkish modernity and citizenship since the beginning of the 1990s, one should also consider the impact of globalization, and the strengthening of civil society area in Turkey in relation to the EU factor. The civil society has been a growing arena of political deliberation since the 1980s, especially during the 1990s. The extent of the political activism of civil society organizations was held limited in the strong state structure of Turkey since the founding of the Republic. The only organs of political system were perceived as political parties, and the only way to participate in the system was limited to voting (Batum, 1998: 109). Following the 1980 military intervention, the civil organizations were closed down and banned from engaging in political activities. After the amendment of the law numbered 4121 in 1995, the number of civil society organizations increased rapidly in Turkey, and they voiced calls for making Turkey a more democratic and liberal country respecting human rights. Today, it is possible to see the impact of civil society on the strengthening of the three dimensions of citizenship – *legal status*, *identity*, and *civic virtue* – and in the shift towards a more participatory and responsible citizenship in Turkey. *Firstly*, civil society organizations have become important political actors producing and proposing alternative policies in the areas they specialize on. In this sense, they have challenged the strong state's monopoly in the making-of-politics normatively and practically. They voiced calls for 'rights' and became advocators of the enhancement of civil rights in society. As expressed by Keyman and İçduygu (2003: 227), "civil

society organizations have gained a '(political) actor-like quality' with normative and discursive power, influencing us to rethink the state–society/individual relations beyond the strong-state tradition and by employing the globalization of the language of civil rights". *Secondly*, civil society organizations have begun to represent the demands of different identity groups, who struggle for the recognition of their peripheral identities. Through these means, they not only opened ground for the articulation of new identity claims, but also provided a space for the political activities of different segments of societal groups. *Third*, there is no room for doubt that the other component of citizenship – *civic virtue* – is deeply interrelated with the very idea of civil society. Through its implication on active and participatory citizenship, the notion of civic virtue constitutes the core of the civil society activity. Civil society organizations have provided a platform for citizens to participate in their political communities as responsible citizens. In the Turkish context, the EU has been an important actor giving emphasis on participation, political deliberation and active citizenship. In short, the prospect of Turkey's membership to the EU and the consolidation of civil society area could be seen as recent pressures on the enhancement of individual rights and freedoms, and the democratization of Turkey.

The question of citizenship has had a central role in all these debates concerning the transformation of Turkish modernity. The need to refurbish the state-society relations and to transform the Republican model of citizenship into a liberal one, giving emphasis on active citizenship appear as the explicit necessities that Turkey must fulfill on its side.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

Situating citizenship in a historical context, this chapter dwelled upon the citizenization process since the promulgation of the Republic in 1923, with a particular focus on the revival of different sorts of political movements in Turkish political history, as well as the changing patterns in youth movements. These processes were analyzed in three sets of periods: 1923-1960, 1960-1980, and post-1980 period.

In the initial years of the Republic, the main objective of the Kemalist cadres was to construct a modern, secular nation-state. Citizenship operated as an important tool for the realization of this ideal. The attempts to set up a new nation-state went hand in hand with the construction of citizenship which was a top-down process. The new model of citizenship revolved around the monolithic and homogenous idea of national identity, which was purified from its Islamic and Ottoman ties, and melted all various traditional identities in its pot. Another feature of the Turkish citizenship in this period was its reliance upon the civic-republican tradition, which defines citizenship as an ‘activity’, and gives emphasis on duties and obligations rather than rights. This would, in return, serve to raise ‘patriotic’ citizens who were ready to sacrifice their rights for the sake of the common good of state. This was evident in the limited nature of youth activism, in this period, emerging in line with the premises of the Kemalist ideology. The role of civic education was also vital in the construction of citizenship. After the incorporation of the first civic course to the formal curricula in 1924, the civic education served as a project for the socialization of citizens. Following the transition to the multi-party period in 1945, the DP gave more emphasis on political participation. The increasing political activism of youth also confirmed this change. During the DP administration, two significant changes

occurred concerning political orientations. Firstly, the liberal-oriented economic policies of the DP strengthened liberalism in Turkey; secondly, a number of DP practices led to the revival of Islam and its appearance as one of the constituent elements of Turkish citizenship.

In the second period, beginning with the military coup of 1960, the 1961 Constitution expanded the scope of civil rights and liberties, introduced a more liberal interpretation of citizenship, and established an atmosphere that encouraged the emergence of a more active citizenship. The state of Turkish politics in the 1960s and 1970s was marked with political fragmentation among the political parties, and ideological polarization among the different politically-oriented youth groups. The rising of the leftist movement in the 1960s was accompanied by the increasing involvement of university students in political matters. The radicalization of clashes between the left and right (the latter including the nationalists and the Islamists) ideological camps intensified to such an extent that it became one of the factors leading to 1971 intervention. Following this, a number of constitutional changes were approved in 1973, which curtailed the civil rights and freedoms introduced by the 1961 Constitution. In the 1970s, political fragmentation and intense polarization continued to mark Turkish political life, and together with the worsening economic circumstances and social unrest in the late 1970s, the decade ended with the military takeover in 1980.

The post-1980 period was important for the transformation of Turkish citizenship, for the consolidation of Republicanism, the gaining importance of religion, and the strengthening of liberalism under the MP rule. The 1982 Constitution re-shifted the understanding of citizenship into civic-republicanism, and gave priority to state over individual. It intended to construct 'passive' and

‘obedient’ citizens, and for this purpose, triggered a new process of de-politicization which had negative connotations on youth activism in Turkey.

In the 1990s, the official definition of citizenship was much open to debate. The boundaries of Turkish citizenship was challenged by the rising claims of the Kurds, Islamists and Alevis for recognition as distinct religious and ethnic groups. These contentious movements manifested that the existing discourse of Turkish citizenship could no longer accommodate the demands of different identity groups, and in return, brought the concept of ‘constitutional citizenship’ up on the agenda. In a nutshell, they symbolized the legitimacy crisis of the strong state tradition and modernity in Turkey.

In the 2000s, the prospect of Turkey’s membership to the EU turned out to be another dynamic that has shaped Turkish citizenship. Turkey’s reformation process gained steam under the conditionality mechanism of the EU which stimulated a number of changes in areas ranging from civil rights to economic, political, and social rights. These changes helped to transform the state structure in Turkey, and underlined the importance of participatory democracy. Civil society organizations, in this sense, became important agents of the political system wherein the prospect of ‘participatory’ and ‘active’ citizenship was laid down.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND CITIZENSHIP: THE CASE OF TURKISH YOUTH

4.1 Introduction

The citizenship literature includes remarkably few empirical studies (Lister *et al.*, 2003: 235). Although much has been recorded on theoretical debates on citizenship and its dynamic composition in parallel to the changing social, political and cultural context, very little is known about how individual citizens themselves understand citizenship, and what meaning citizenship actually has in their daily lives. The present chapter presents findings from a Turkish study on how young people with different political orientations perceive and experience citizenship in Turkey. It explores how various youth groups have a sense of the three aspects of citizenship – *legal status*, *identity*, and *civic virtue* – as formulated by Kymlicka and Norman, and discusses how these dimensions interact with each other. The discussion in this chapter aims to explore the data obtained from the in-depth interviews conducted with seventy university students with diverse political orientations (republican, nationalist, leftist, Islamist, liberal, Kurdish, and apolitical groups). It seeks to find out whether some convergences or divergences exist among the perceptions of different political youth groups on citizenship. The findings serve to inform about both theoretical understandings and experiences of the youth on the meaning of ‘being a citizen’.

The discussion in this chapter is presented in five parts. First, the respondents' perceptions on the legal status aspect will be presented. Second, a similar individual-level of analysis will be provided concerning how the identity dimension of citizenship is addressed by the youth groups. Third, the civic virtue dimension will be explored. The fourth section will deal with the main debates concerning the prospect of Turkey's membership to the EU, and what kind of implications this process might have on the three aspects of citizenship. The chapter will end with a conclusion in which the main findings will be summarized.

4.2 Citizenship as Legal Status

Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the legal aspect of citizenship was incorporated to the constitutions and other official documents, such as the Citizenship Law of 1928 and the Settlement Law. The legal definition of citizenship encompassed both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principles, in other words, it was inspired from both French and German traditions. Turkish citizenship was akin to the French version, which was formulated on a territorial basis, and it was inclusive for the fact that acquiring Turkish citizenship was open for all people regardless of their ethnic origins. However, the Turkish state's attitude towards minorities, and the policies it applied for admitting foreigners to the country as migrants or citizens demonstrated that the descent-based principle (German version of citizenship) was also embraced in the legal status aspect of citizenship. A significant commonality between Turkish citizenship and the German model was that Turkish modernization and establishment of citizenship were not preceded by a capitalist development or Enlightenment either. Consequently, the demands for individual rights and freedoms did not come from the grassroots of the society in the form of class struggles; they

were rather introduced in a top-down fashion under the control of the strong state. In the Turkish case, therefore, the emergence of civil, political and social rights did not occur in a self-evolutionary manner, instead, they were simultaneously given from above.

Another important feature of the legal status aspect of citizenship was that it was centered on the fulfillment of duties/obligations towards the state. This community-centric or state-centric designation of citizenship aimed to raise obedient and passive citizens, but at the same time they were also expected to be active in terms of their responsibilities towards the state. The general will of community presided over the particular will of men. This civic-republican understanding defined the legal status aspect of Turkish citizenship.

This study attempted to explore the perceptions and experiences of youth concerning the legal status aspect of citizenship by focusing on various themes, such as citizenship rights and duties and the conundrum between them; citizens' awareness of their rights and duties; dual citizenship; the right to elect and be elected; violation of rights; and the relationship among the legal status and the two other aspects of citizenship.

One of the most significant issues that emanated from the findings of this study was that the legal aspect of citizenship was mostly subscribed by the liberal interviewees. Several leftist, Kurdish and Islamist respondents also expressed their affiliations with the legal dimension; however, it was still difficult to see an explicit link between their overall opinions and the legal status aspect. The study found out that the aspect of legal status was pronounced by various Kurdish and Islamist respondents as a continuity of their strong attachment to the identity aspect. For this

reason, the data obtained from these two groups were analyzed within the framework of the identity aspect rather than the legal status aspect.

The responses of the liberal group showed great conformity with the basic precepts of the liberal-individualist tradition. Their responses pointed that they perceived citizenship as a formal membership in the Turkish state, which, in return, provided them a legal status to live as equal and free citizens. The membership, they continued, was in the form of a ‘contract’ as envisaged in the Lockean interpretation of citizenship. It was the formal/legal contract mutually agreed upon by individuals and state that determined the boundaries of membership in a community, and related each citizen to one another as well as to the state. The following narrative shows how citizenship was portrayed as a *status* in the words of a liberal interviewee;

Citizenship means holding the identity card of the same country. If you hold the identity card of a country, you are the citizen of that country, even if you are Russian, Jewish or a convert. I see this as a legal bond. I can even see someone as a citizen of a country if she⁶⁷ behaves like the citizen of that country, even if she cannot get the citizenship because of bureaucratic reasons. So, what’s inarguable about it is to be holding the identity card, and to behave in the same way as those who hold that card (LI05⁶⁸).

Similar definitions of citizenship, which depict the concept simply as ‘holding the identity card, or passport of a particular state’ was expressed by almost every liberal young person interviewed in this research. Equally important was the liberal respondents’ perception that individuals were prior to society/state. Individuals, as autonomous beings, were seen as members of a community rather than its very

⁶⁷ Translator’s note: Turkish language does not have the third person singular pronoun in feminine and masculine; a gender-neutral pronoun is used in all cases. In translation of the narratives to English, the personal pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ were used consecutively, unless there was a forced usage of the pronoun ‘he’ in mentioning of the army service which applies to only men in Turkey.

⁶⁸ Several quotations drawn from the transcripts of interviews with Turkish university youth were integrated into this chapter. A four digit identification code was given to each interviewee which were placed at the end of each quotation. The first two letters of the code represent the political orientation of the interviewees, and the following two numbers represent the interviewee number. ‘RE’ refers to the Republican group, ‘NA’ refers to the Nationalist group, ‘LE’ refers to the Leftist group, ‘IS’ refers to the Islamist group, ‘LI’ refers to the Liberal group, ‘KU’ refers to the Kurdish group, and, finally, ‘AP’ refers to the Apolitical group.

constituents. Thus, the liberal group disapproved the existence of an organic link between individuals and society/state. The only link between these units, according to them, derived from the constitutional and legal framework set by the contract.

Defining individuals as ‘prior and external to state’, the liberal respondents agreed that state existed merely as to preserve the security and freedom of individuals, and its involvement in citizens’ lives for other reasons must be avoided. The idea of common good was replaced by the idea of individual freedom, limits of which would also be determined by the contract. Therefore, the priority of rights over obligations was a source of concern for almost every liberal respondent. They supported the idea of minimizing citizenship duties, and maximizing rights. Citizens, the liberal interviewees argued, unless it was in their free will, should not be obliged to feel any responsibility towards their state other than their legal commitments agreed upon in the contract. The following quotation is an example of this self-perception;

I perceive it as a contract signed with an institution or a concept. Doing this, you say “I will obey to the rules we declared”. Thus, citizenship responsibility is to obey those rules. I accept to pay penalties if I don’t obey the rules. Other than this, I do not feel any obligation. Separately, human is a social being. We live in a society. I see doing things to add value to the society not as a citizenship responsibility, but as the way of life. I do not see or expect from others any citizenship responsibility other than the contract. To obey the rules is the optimum level (LI04).

When asked about what they would consider as basic citizenship duties, most of them gave the answer of paying taxes. To obey laws and to behave honestly were mentioned as two other duties one should abide by. The responses pointed to a consensus among the liberals that they perceived paying taxes as an important duty to be strictly followed. However, on the other hand, there was room for contradictory ideas concerning the duty of compulsory conscription in the army. For some, performing military service was one of the fundamental duties of each and every

male Turkish citizen, whereas others stood in favor of the right to reject performing mandatory military service. A liberal interviewee expressed his thoughts as follows;

I see paying taxes as the most important thing. In return, I expect a system of law, and security – both domestic and international. Other than this, doing the army service is arguable; it's a specific case. If societal benefit is being considered, it is not sustained by army service only; it is created by civil society organizations also. I see civil society as quite important at this point. The crucial thing here is not what the citizen has to do for the government, but what the government has to do for the citizen. I am not here for the government, the government is here for me. What has the government done for me today? To me, that's what counts (LI05).

In the narrative above, it is possible to notice the respondent's idea concerning the link between the dimensions of legal status and civic virtue. It narrates the importance of civil activism as a means for obtaining the common good of society. Civic virtue appears as an ingredient of societal benefit through which one can perform his/her citizenship duties. It is also necessary to acknowledge that a few number of respondents interpreted the conundrum between individual-state/right-obligation in a different manner. Contrary to the mainstream perceptions of the other liberal respondents, they defined state above individual, and gave more emphasis on duties over civic rights and freedoms;

According to me, a good citizen is one who can say “today, I did this for my state”; one who pays taxes, and does not deceive the state” (LI09).

We are living in Turkey. I strongly believe that we must perform these duties as Turkish citizens for our country. If we are living under the authority of this state, if we are entitled to be Turkish citizens and hold the identity card of this country, then, we have to fulfill these duties. Besides, we are guilty by law if we don't obey them. I think we must definitely abide by them (LI03).

It was also interesting to note that respondents were not so much clear when they were asked in which kind of circumstances they would feel that their rights were violated. It was explicitly observed that it took more time for them to give an answer to this question compared to their rapidness in expressing what they

considered as basic duties that citizens must abide by. Their answers revolved around such issues; the inequalities in tax collection system, mandatory conscription in the army, infringement of the right to live and right to property. Some liberal respondents also expressed the state's involvement in the economic sphere as a violation of rights. Data collected out of this question supported the liberals' understanding of citizenship as legal status and as legal membership in a community. The answers drew attention to the point that the respondents perceived citizenship in terms of a relation between individuals and the state, rather than one among individuals. They did not mention about actions of other citizens when they commented on the infringement of individual rights. They simply focused on the relationship between state and individuals.

Another issue that provided insight about how liberal respondents perceived and experienced the dimension of legal status was related to the right to elect and the right to be elected. In the interviews, it emerged that there was a consensus regarding the views on the minimum age limits to elect and to be elected. The liberal respondents all agreed that the age of 18 should be the minimum age to elect, and emphasized the need to lower the age limit to become elected. Some even pointed out that both age limits should be eighteen, arguing that a person who holds the right to elect must also have the right to be elected. The rationale behind this was stated by two respondents as;

Both of them have to be eighteen. The adulthood age should be set as eighteen. They expect everything from an eighteen year old person, from going to the army to paying taxes, they send him to jail if he commits a crime; then, he also has to have the right to be elected (LI06).

It has to be eighteen. A person who completed the age of eighteen is regarded as a person of full age and capacity. He has to go to army which is something seen as a duty of citizenship. He is in a position to get married and raise new citizens. He pays taxes if he is working. All the heavy weight of the government is on the shoulders of the youth. The way I look at it as a liberal,

I see that he cannot make use of many of his liberties either. But they are the people the country needs the most and they are open to novelties. The bitter fact is he can vote. In the countries we call developed, the age to be elected is eighteen. In fact, the largest minority group is the youth. All of these things are valid, and he can vote, but he cannot be elected. They say that if the age to be elected was dropped, the boys of the landlords (*ağā*) would be chosen. It is better that the son of the landlord is elected than the landlord himself was elected. People above the age of twenty five can be elected locally, but not nationally. This is ridiculous (LI05).

The overall responses collected from the seventy university group concerning this question drew attention to a very significant finding. Only 16 out of 70 respondents talked about the right to be elected, and the majority of them were from the liberal group. The remaining 54 respondents did not touch upon the right to become elected at all. Besides, most of them were unaware of the current age limits to become elected at local and national levels. This phenomenon underlines the fact that the young people interviewed in this research were not so much concerned with becoming elected.

The following finding on liberal interviewees' perceptions on the legal status aspect was related to the issue of dual citizenship. When they were asked about whether they found dual citizenship acceptable, almost every liberal respondent defined this as a 'normal' thing. They associated dual citizenship with globalization and its impact on the mobility of people. For them, membership in more than one state would provide further legal rights and help to overcome the obstacles they faced during the process of getting visa. Thus, their willingness to acquire dual citizenship rested upon pragmatic reasons.

I think it's acceptable. In my opinion, the limitation of movement is wrong. Globalization is observed in everything; capital can move, labor can move, goods are moving; only people cannot move. This is wrong. Many people choose dual citizenship because of the right to freedom of movement (LI08).

The liberal respondents' interpretations of dual citizenship were compatible with their perceptions of citizenship as a legal status. As asserted in the previous chapter, the notion of dual citizenship symbolizes the premise of membership in a state as a legal entity rather than a nation. This, again, signals a convergence between the perceptions of the liberal young people and the liberal interpretation of citizenship.

4.3 Citizenship as Identity

The identity aspect of citizenship has its roots in the Kemalist ideal of creating a homogenous Turkish society. The construction of national identity, thus, took place in a top-down manner within a strong and monist state structure. In an attempt to refrain from the Ottoman and Islamic legacy, the early Republican cadres aimed at building a secular nation-state which would be for the Turks and by the Turks (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 2000: 3). The definition of the Turkish nation was inclusive in the first place. Turkishness was not formulated on the basis of blood principle and it could be acquired by people having different ethnic and religious origins. In this sense, the parameters for citizenization were not racial. However, despite the official designation of Turkish citizenship on a secular basis, the element of religion still continued to be one of the components of national identity and became one of the key criteria for determining one's degree of Turkishness. This symbolized the paradoxical nature of the official definition of Turkish identity which still embraced the characteristics of the Ottoman and Islamic heritage. Beginning with the 1980s, the evolution of the identity aspect of citizenship in Turkey gained a new face. The rising claims of the Kurdish and Islamic groups for recognition of their identity differences posed one of the biggest challenges to the monolithic national identity

and introduced a new dimension to the discussions over pluralism and democracy. Additionally, the whole issue of globalization and Turkey's prospective membership to the EU brought state sovereignty under question, and helped to transform the state-society relations and citizens' perceptions on the identity aspect of citizenship.

Identity dimension was explored, in this study, through various questions concerning how the participants defined themselves, which components of their identities they perceived more heavily, how they perceived Turkish citizens with different ethnic and religious origins, and how they defined citizenship: as membership in a state, or as membership in a nation, or both.

Data collected in this research demonstrated that the majority of the nationalist, Islamist, Kurdish, and apolitical respondents tended to identify themselves with the identity aspect of citizenship. Yet, it is not possible to talk about a homogenous understanding of identity and citizenship among these groups of interviewees. There are significant differences, and in some instances, commonalities among their conceptualizations of citizenship.

The main diversity among the perceptions of the nationalist, Islamist, and Kurdish groups lies in their strong attachment to different aspects of their identities. Whereas identity came to terms directly with national identity from the viewpoint of the nationalist participants, it implied ethnic identity and religious identity according to the Kurds and Islamists respectively. The notion of citizenship offered by the latter two groups differed from the official conception of Turkish citizenship to some extent. As will be explained below, it is possible to interpret the identity claims of the Islamist and Kurdish young people as challenges to the conventional idea of Turkish citizenship, whilst the perceptions of the nationalist respondents showed conformity with the homogenous definition of the official citizenship.

Besides this main dissimilarity, the data obtained from these groups shared an important commonality. The respondents often made reference to the dimensions of legal status and civic virtue although their perceptions on citizenship were centered on the identity dimension. This was most apparent in the interviews conducted with the Kurdish and Islamist students. Their strong attachment to their ethnic or religious identities was the main driving force behind their claims for recognition and rights. Therefore, although many Kurdish and Islamist participants referred to the dimension of legal status, this study found it more appropriate to analyze their responses within the framework of identity aspect. Likewise, the data collected from these groups showed that their strong attachment to their identity and their following claims for legal rights motivated them to participate in civil society activities and take action to change things. They volunteered in various civil organizations and youth branches of political parties. This panoply of rights, identity, and active citizenship illustrated a good instance of the interrelatedness among the three dimensions of citizenship and supported one of the main arguments of this thesis which displayed ‘identity’ at the crossroads of ‘legal status’ and ‘civic virtue’. In this sense, the main reason to analyse the responses of the nationalist, Islamist, Kurdish and apolitical groups under the label of ‘identity’ is because of the fact that identity operates as a motivating source for their strong calls for legal rights and for their civic activism. This analysis does not advocate that the elements of legal status and civic virtue are non-existent in the perceptions and experiences of these youth groups.

In the interviews, it emerged that there were significant differences in the way respondents perceived and defined themselves. Every nationalist student participated in this research defined himself/herself on the basis of Turkish

nationality. Nationality, in their terms, was static and acquired only through birth. In this sense, they lent towards a descent-based definition of citizenship. Additionally, they used the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably as if they constituted a totality. However, when they were asked whether they formulized citizenship as membership in a nation or as membership in a state, they all underlined the term of nation.

The definition of citizenship is that we are Turks and we are an element of the Turkish government. These call for us to abide by the Turkish traditions. I think, citizenship is this; to be a Turk and to know that you are an element of the Turkish government. What needs to be emphasized here is being Turkish; the dimension of identity. Someone who doesn’t see himself as an element of the state, does not pay taxes, does anything to not to go to army. He has nothing to do with the Turkish traditions and ethics (NA01).

This descent-based and cultural definition of Turkishness formed the backbone of the nationalists’ conception of citizenship. It is possible to pinpoint three conclusions: *Firstly*, nationalists did not conceive legal status alone as a necessary condition for feeling an attachment to the nation. For them, even being a member of the Turkish nation was not a sufficient criterion to label someone as a Turkish citizen. An ideal citizen, for them, had to appreciate his/her Turkishness and be aware of the meaning of Turkishness. They defined Turkishness as a distinct and rare quality that differentiated themselves from other nations. One nationalist participant glorified the concept of Turkishness as such;

Being a Turk implies ‘bravery’. The term ‘Turk’ reminds me of a person who is brave and capable of overcoming everything whenever he wants (NA10).

They also underlined their discontent with the term ‘*Türkiyelilik*’ (‘to be from Turkey’) which is mostly used by members of ethnic groups to highlight their identities.

There is this saying that came out lately: ‘from Turkey’... It seems to me that there are different thoughts behind these. Why do we say “we are from Turkey’, but not ‘we are Turks’”? Why do we hesitate to say “Turk”? A Turk does not represent a biological race only. Somehow we are reluctant to mention the element of Turkishness which we should rather be embracing (NA01).

Secondly, the nationalists’ understanding of membership in the Turkish nation was not limited to citizens living within the borders of the Turkish Republic. They also called the citizens of the Turkic Republics with Turkic origins as citizens of the Turkish Republic. Holding the formal citizenship of the Turkish state was not the only condition to become a Turkish citizen; instead, it was one’s moral attachment to Turkishness that would make him/her a Turkish citizen. Two interviewees expressed their thoughts as follows;

‘Turk’ does not only represent the Turks who live in Turkey. It represents all the Turks who are all over the world – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Cyprus, Northern Iraq. In short, we must be able to say “we are Turks”. For instance, I am from Thrace region in Turkey. There are Pomaks in Thrace; they don’t say “we are Pomaks”. They are not many in number, but they do not see themselves as a minority (NA01).

The people of Turkish nation do not live within the borders of the Republic of Turkey only. You can be a part of this nation by not being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. You may have been born in Iran, you are an Azeri; naturally, you are a part of the Turkish nation. For example, the Gagavuz are not Muslim, but they express their Turkishness by saying “I am an Oguz”. That’s why, citizenship of Turkish Republic is not a must. However, everyone who is a citizen may not be feeling like a Turk either. I wish they did. We would rather that it were this way...But unfortunately, there are people who do not feel this way... For them, citizenship becomes something like “what can we do, we were born here in Turkey, that’s why we are Turks”. The fact that people who shared a same thing for thousands of years are alienated like this is something we are not happy with at all (NA05).

Thirdly, the nationalists’ conception of citizenship incorporated the element of religion into the descent principle. ‘Being a Muslim Turk’ was the main constituent of their identity. These two identity elements (‘being a Turk’ and ‘being a Muslim’) were seen as mutually inclusive. Almost every nationalist student identified himself/herself initially as a ‘Turk’ and, secondly, as a ‘Muslim’. Some

even used the term *ülkücü* to define themselves which would, according to them, better express their identity. This tendency to conflate the ethnic and religious components of their identity, thus, appeared as one of the defining characteristics of the nationalist group. The Turks who emigrated from Bulgaria were given as an example to display the role of religion in the citizenization process. It was argued that the issue of becoming citizens of the Turkish Republic was simply a matter of legal arrangement for the Bosnian migrants; they did not need anything else except putting a signature on a set of legal documents to obtain that status.

The role of religion was also very much significant in determining how the nationalist respondents perceived Turkish citizens with different ethnic and religious origins. In the first place, it is possible to argue that, they portrayed identities within a hierarchy in which Turkish identity was seen as superior to all other identities. They acknowledged that every individual could preserve his/her own identity, speak his/her own language, or practice his/her own religion, but at the end, they all must have a consensus that Turkish identity is the super identity. When they were asked how they would expect the non-Muslim Turkish citizens to define themselves, they gave various answers such as, “they should first express their own identities”, “they should first define themselves as Turkish citizens and, then, mention their own identities”, or, “they can practice their own religions but should not perceive themselves as minorities”. These different statements, yet, had one significant point in common. None of the participants expected non-Muslim Turkish citizens to define themselves as ‘Turks’. Instead, they explained that non-Muslim populations were legally defined as minority groups; it was therefore acceptable for them to not to see themselves as Turks or to define themselves simply as Turkish citizens. They were

automatically seen as ‘non-Turkish’ citizens since their religion was different from Islam.

However, when a similar question was asked to the participants concerning how they would expect a Turkish citizen with different ethnic origins such as a Kurd, Circassian, Laz or Albanian to perceive and define himself/herself, the answers they gave were totally different from those given to the previous question. This time, they pointed out that people with different ethnic origins had to define themselves as Turks since there was no difference between them and other Turks; they were all Muslims. On the basis of this assumption, the nationalist young people expressed their discontent with the tendency of the different ethnic groups (who are at the same time Muslim) to not to define themselves as ‘Turks’.

You don’t expect non-Muslims to say “I am Turkish”. But there is something wrong if a Kurd says “I am Kurdish”, because he is a Turk. We cannot expect an Armenian or a Greek to say “we are Turkish”. Because, they have a different language, a different religion. They have a totally different origin and this is given in the history. If he lives in the land of Turkey and makes his living on the resources of Turkey, he can say “I am from Turkey” (NA01).

The ideal of Turk-Islam is inseparable. It is like how it was in the Ottoman times; how the term ‘Turk’ directly called for the Muslim element. I do not certainly want to discriminate the Kurds. They must be one of the forty two Turkish clans. Throughout history, they got differentiated because of the place they live. We do not argue in favor of a purebred race in anyway. A Kurd is also a Turk; her religion is Islam. But her religion being Islam, does not give her the right to create discrimination (NA01).

This controversy between the nationalists’ perceptions of non-Muslim citizens and citizens with different ethnic origins reminds us the role of religion in determining “who is a Turk”. As stated in the previous chapter, there is an asymmetry between the theory and practice of Turkish citizenship (Yeğen, 2004: 58). Although the notion of Turkishness had a territorial definition in legal texts, the real practice of Turkishness also embraced descent-based and essentialist

principles. This controversial nature of ‘Turkishness’ could be noticed in the data provided by the nationalist group.

Apart from religion, they also mentioned some other features which make a person a ‘Turk’: internalizing national values, respecting traditions and customs, and speaking in Turkish. One narrative was interesting in bringing to the forefront the role of language in the construction of identity;

Speaking Turkish is the sign of your Turkishness. The Gagavuz, who live in Europe, in Moldova are not Muslim, but they speak Turkish. If you go there today, you won’t have difficulty in communication. This shows the importance of language in global dimension. On the other hand, many language groups which have lost their origin are not Turkish anymore. For example, the Karakeçili Tribe. They were about to lose their Turkishness, because their grandchildren were speaking Kurdish, while the grandparents were speaking Turkish. But with some campaigns carried out, they have regained the consciousness of being Turkish. So, language is one of the main properties of citizenship (NA05).

The way the Islamist respondents perceived and defined themselves had much in common with that of the nationalists. *Firstly*, similar to the nationalists, they portrayed themselves as ‘Muslims’ and ‘Turks’, but being a ‘Muslim’ played a more central role in the construction of their identities. They did not interpret Turkishness on a nationalist basis, nor attributed to it a glorified meaning. The following quotation is an example of this understanding:

Primarily, the religion; and as secondary, the nationality. “A Muslim Turk”. But Turkishness is not as it is described by the nationalists in the nationalist-Islamist sense. It is someone who loves his nation, and at the same time who doesn’t have any prejudice towards other Muslim nations. That is, a nationalism of religion. But I’m not a nationalist. We define ourselves as Muslim. We prefer to see ourselves in the category of ‘Muslim’ rather than the ‘Islamist’. We define ourselves as Muslims with ‘religious’ identity (IS05).

The *second* common theme among the nationalist and Islamist groups was their formulation of citizenship as membership in a nation. The Islamist respondents pointed out that citizenship was not so much related to the territories where one lived

in; it rather had to do with the blood lineage. Citizenship, thus, was something they shared with other individuals who defined themselves as Turks. The following statement narrated this descent-based interpretation of citizenship:

I think through nation. The definition of state does not meet everything I mean by 'Turkishness'. I see the state as something lot more limited and standing closer to politics. The 'Turkishness' in my mind is not something like that. Saying "I am a citizen of the Turkish state" and saying "I am a Turk" are different things. Being a "citizen of the Turkish state", I can be, for example, Armenian. But "I am a Turk" stands at a higher place for me (IS01).

However, different from the nationalists, the Islamist respondents gave more diverse answers concerning the way different ethnic originated people defined themselves. For the Islamists, they could define themselves; (a) with their own ethnic identities; (b) as Turkish citizens; or (c) as Turks. The three sets of answers were also given when they talked about how non-Muslim Turkish citizens should define themselves.

Thirdly, the post-national definition of Turkishness voiced by the nationalist group was replaced here by a post-national definition of Islam. The Islamist interviewees argued that there was a sort of closeness between them and the Muslim citizens of various Islamic countries, although they could not be depicted as Turkish citizens.

Because we have identified ourselves with Islam, we do not accept an international division. That's why, the land I see as my homeland is what Mehmet Akif has described as the homeland. Indonesia is my land, so are Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. If I am in İstanbul today, my wish is that I could be in Damascus tomorrow. And in Medina the next day. I see citizenship of the Turkish Republic as an exigency forced by the nation-state structure which doesn't belong to us, but we borrowed from outside. I have a Turkish citizenship by necessity, but I'd rather define myself as a "citizen of the Islamic world" (IS05).

This type of identification was not recognized in the data obtained from the Kurdish respondents and apolitical group. For instance, the Kurdish group did not

demonstrate any affinity to the Iraqi Kurds, nor defined them as their fellow citizens in the interviews.

Ethnic identity served as the main ingredient of citizenship in the perceptions of the Kurdish group. They initially defined themselves as ‘Kurds’, and some of them used the term ‘Kurds of Turkey’ to underline that they had a distinct ethnic origin. One of the most significant issues highlighted by the Kurdish students was the contested meaning of identity. Many of them acknowledged that Kurdishness was something they confronted mostly as a result of the unfavorable circumstances they experienced in society. Some told that they were aware of their Kurdishness only when they moved to other cities for educational purposes and encountered problems in expressing themselves in their own language. As two interviewees recollected;

When they ask me this question “are you Muslim or Turkish?”, I used to answer “I am Muslim. According to the rule in Islam, every person born is Muslim. Then I am Muslim”. But now I think, you are born as Kurdish as of your parents, the geography you live in, and biologically; so, you are Kurdish. Both are not cases you chose or preferred. It’s something you have. Firstly, I am Kurdish, because people do not categorize me as being Muslim, but being Kurdish. Or people do not categorize me as being Kurdish but being Muslim. That is, the society determines your identity. When you are born, you take on an identity which you have not chosen. Later the society qualifies you with this, and this is a prejudice, and you become it. It doesn’t have to do with how you feel. You can’t get rid of it; you have to accept it and assimilate it and you fight for it (KU10).

Everything in my life was different when I was in Adıyaman. When I was in Adıyaman, being a citizen was (being one of the) people I shared the same views with. When I came here (İstanbul), it became (being one of the) people I share the same culture, the same language with. I don’t know what a citizen is exactly. The fact that you are living in the same country and the identity card on paper. This is citizenship (KU07).

These narratives are crucial for showing the socially constructed, relational, and fluid nature of identity, and support the thesis of Rumelili (2004:29) who argues that “identities are always constituted in relation to difference, because a thing can

only be known by what it is not”. Identities are always context-bound, and the collective identities can be constructed in different ways when the context changes. The Kurdish respondents’ reference to the legal dimension of citizenship was deeply interlinked with their attachment to their ethnic identities. They repeatedly pronounced that citizenship should be devised in such a way that they could have access to equal rights with the Turks. In this sense, their claims to acquire equal democratic rights were a continuation of their experiences due to the relational and context-bound nature of their identities.

For the Kurdish respondents, differently from their nationalist and Islamist counterparts, citizenship was a membership in a state rather than in a nation. They emphasized ‘state’ as a legal institution in which each and every citizen would have free access to the services provided by the state. Constitution and laws would determine the content and extent of state-citizen interaction. In other words, constitutional institutions would triumph over the cultural institutions in determining the boundaries of the official citizenship. Citizenship, they argued, could be seen as a super identity, which would provide room for the coexistence of all different sorts of identities. They rejected the existence of a hierarchy among identities of different sorts and supported the thesis that each identity group had the equal right to survive and be recognized as a distinct group. These arguments brought the concept of ‘constitutional citizenship’ on the agenda. They justified their support for constitutional citizenship on the basis of the gap that exists between the legal definition of Turkishness and the way it is exercised in real life. The Kurdish respondents also stated that they preferred to identify themselves with the term ‘*Türkiyeli*’ in order to assert their Kurdishness. They used this term not only to define themselves, but also to distinguish Armenians, Jews, and Greeks. The

members of these groups, they claimed, should be seen as Turkish citizens rather than simply as minorities, and be able to express their identities freely, practice their own religions, and speak their own languages. It is only in such circumstances, they asserted, that various identities could live in harmony and hermeneutic relationships could develop among different identity groups.

Someone says “I am superior to you. I will decide what you will be”. I will tell you of an incidence. I was in the village; I was a student at secondary school in (the town) Cizre. My mother’s name is Fecri, but on the identity card it is Fecriye. I hadn’t noticed. When I was returning to the village, the soldiers stopped me. They asked for my ID. I gave it. They said, “What’s your mother’s name?”. I said, “Fecri”. But the government wrote there Fecriye. Without asking anything else, he hit me on the shoulder with the back of the rifle, saying “You don’t know your mother’s name!”. This means one becomes superior to the other. It means “You are Turkish. Because you are Turkish, you have to obey. If you don’t obey, I will suppress you. You have to accept that you are Turkish”. If you set this obligation, I will always feel like a Kurd. I wish that people did not identify themselves as a Kurd, but as human, in a humanistic way. But the point we arrived is not like that (KU10).

This finding was significant for showing one of the main differences between the perceptions and experiences of Kurdish and Islamist participants. Although both groups generated the discourse of identity politics and challenged the monolithic national identity, they deviated from each other on a fundamental point. The answers collected from the Islamist group were much more in line with the statist and homogenous definition of citizenship. The discourse of the Kurdish group, on the contrary, was much more clear in rejecting this statist view, and, hence, much more critical about it.

As mentioned above, the data provided from the apolitical young people in this study demonstrated that the dimension of identity was perceived as the main constituent of citizenship by majority of them. However, although most of them underlined the importance of identity in their perceptions and experiences of citizenship, the answers they gave in the interviews showed huge differentiation

from each other. This made it difficult to find a unique viewpoint among the apolitical young people concerning their identity, in particular, and citizenship, in general, and to compare the findings obtained from this group with those of the other groups.

When the apolitical young people were asked how they perceived and defined themselves, it emerged that some defined themselves as ‘Turk’, some as ‘Muslim’, some as ‘individuals who speak Turkish’, and some as ‘individuals who were born in the territories of the Turkish state’. The answers of the apolitical youth were also diverse concerning how they regarded citizenship – as membership in a nation, or as membership in a state – and how they would prefer Turkish citizens with different ethnic and religious origins to define themselves. Whereas some participants portrayed citizenship from a descent-based perspective and were more conservative towards different identity groups (or even rejected the existence of them), some defined citizenship as formal membership in a state and supported the argument that each identity group should be respected and recognized.⁶⁹

The most significant finding obtained from the apolitical group was the proclamation of the concept of ‘world citizenship’. National citizenship, these respondents argued, was a state instrument to impose obligations upon individuals. They found all sorts of citizenship duties and legal rules questionable. Likewise, when they were asked in what circumstances they felt or would feel that their citizenship rights were violated, they asserted that the existence of visa barriers between countries was a big hindrance to their right to move freely. This was expressed as a barrier to ‘world citizenship’. Very interestingly, they also pointed out

⁶⁹ The answers obtained can be summarized as; (1) “They should define themselves with regard to their own identities”; (2) “They should define themselves as Turkish citizens”; (3) “They should call themselves “*Türkiyeli*”.

that they defined themselves neither with national identity nor with other alternative identities, but simply as ‘human-beings’. Thus, they adopted a much more liberal and tolerant attitude towards other identity groups.

4.4 Citizenship as Civic Virtue

Similar to the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship, the evolution of the civic virtue aspect can not be addressed apart from Turkey’s history of modernization and democratization within the strong state structure. The modernization process did not take place in a self-evolutionary manner. It did not have a culture of its own in which different segments of society struggled for rights, liberties, autonomy, democracy, etc. Therefore, rather than a self-evolution, these processes were state-initiated and state-controlled. The state controlled the emergence of the opposition groups, formed its own leading party, intervened when alternative political movements became challenging, and took decisions concerning every detail of citizens’ lives. The state tried to create ‘obedient’ and ‘patriotic’ citizens who would passively follow its directions, but who, at the same time, would be active in preserving the values of the state and fulfilling their responsibilities for the common good of the state. In this sense, the notion of the active participation of citizens in their particular communities was one-sided and state-centric.

The strong state tradition has also shaped the way civil society arena developed in Turkey. The rise of civil society as an area of public deliberation gained steam after the 1980s. The rapid transformations that Turkish society has passed through in social, economic, cultural and political domains as a result of its internal dynamics and in parallel to globalization changed the nature of state-society

relations in Turkey. Active citizenship has become more important given the calls of the EU for a strong and autonomous civil society area.

Before delving in further to the details of the findings, it is worth mentioning three observations concerning how civic virtue dimension of citizenship was understood by the participants. *First* of all, civic virtue was seen as the main building block of citizenship mostly by the republicans among the other six groups. Although some others with political orientations other than republicanism underlined the importance of civic virtue, the number of these respondents remained limited. The data obtained from the republicans showed great conformity as if the ten different participants spoke in one voice. This observation was important for reflecting a controversy between the general interpretation of citizenship in Turkey and its meaning for the study group of this research. As outlined in the previous chapters, civic-republicanism has been the predominant tradition laying down the foundations of Turkish citizenship since the promulgation of the Republic. Although in some time periods, the formal regulations and practices on citizenship were designated more in line with the liberal-individualist thinking, it is not, yet, possible to argue that the liberal tradition has triumphed over the civic-republican tradition. However, despite the fact that civic-republicanism has been prevalent in the making of Turkish citizenship, the overall accounts of the interviewees did not have a tendency to give priority on the dimension of civic virtue over the other two dimensions of citizenship. Only the republican group was an exception with regard to this matter.

Secondly, this study observed that the meaning of civic virtue differed among the interviewees. The republican participants had the premise that citizens must participate in the works of their political community to pursue the common good of the state. They gave emphasis on the notion of common good over individual

freedom. Hence, their conception of civic virtue had its roots in the symbiotic relationship between state and citizens, in which the latter got its very meaning from the former. In this sense, they adopted Rousseau's interpretation of civic virtue. They perceived active citizenship simply on the basis of responsibilities one has towards the community/state, rather than on the basis of individual rights. A republican respondent identified the conditions for being a good citizen as follows:

It's more about protecting the essential qualities of the government; that it is secular, that it is a Republic. I remember the things taught in the citizenship course in high school. I think that this is the ideal; you need to accept the essential qualities of the state, and in this way you can be a part of the country you live in. You can only be a part of it when you accept the inarguable things. If you don't, you either become an anarchist or you are released from citizenship (RE01).

The second meaning of civic virtue as acknowledged by other politically-oriented young people differed from the former definition. Whereas the former definition was constructed upon a statist perspective, the latter adopted an individualist perspective and replaced the notion of common good with that of individual freedom. By placing individual at the core, this interpretation of civic virtue underlined the importance of active/responsible citizenship in order to preserve the existing individual rights and freedoms from state's encroachment upon them, or to demand new rights from the state. Civil society organizations were seen as significant areas where one could struggle for these aims. The main division between the two conceptions of civic virtue arose, then, due to the question of "on whose behalf is active citizenship?" Whereas it was on behalf of the state from the standpoint of the republican participants, it was, in contrast, on behalf of the individual for other young people interviewed. Two leftist respondents expressed what being 'civic' and 'active' entails for them in the following statements:

I think that the civilian aspect of being a citizen, the aspect of it that can ask the government to account for things done or not done, should be

emphasized more. The other aspect should be efficient also, but for this, the government must provide some things for the citizen. The government must report some things to the citizens. It must be a transparent government (LE04).

I see citizenship as a virtue. People should not limit citizenship to what's given to them. Citizenship is not only voting, going to the army, paying taxes. It is doing things to improve the society in a collective manner. People must participate in this. It can not be accomplished with a top down understanding. The citizen should improve herself individually, must adjust her efforts to be in the collective manner. She must raise her voice against injustices. For this end, people must have an understanding of life with belief in the organization of the masses and raise people in this way. They should reflect this understanding in family relations and everything else in their lives (LE05).

The meaning of civic virtue is, thus, contested and changes on the basis of where one looks at it from. It can be either addressed from a liberal-individualist perspective by prioritizing the status of individual, or from civic-republican thinking by placing state at the centre.

The *third* finding related to the civic virtue dimension of citizenship is the existence of a gap between the respondents' statements and how they acted in real life. In other words, there was a sort of mismatch between civic virtue idealized in respondents' minds and civic virtue displayed in practice. The participants had ideas to offer as to what constitutes good citizenship and active citizenship; however, their individual experiences rather fell short to match with their premises of 'ideal' citizenship. Toktaş (2004: 215) reaches to a similar conclusion too in her comparative study on the citizenship perceptions of Turkey's Jewish minority and Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel. According to her, "the respondents may not themselves always perform or illustrate what they think a good citizen would or should do". In this context, she makes a distinction between 'civic virtue as an attitude' and 'civic virtue as a behavior' to highlight that these two domains may not necessarily overlap with one another.

After stating these general observations, this section will now delve into the findings of the interviews conducted with the republican young people. Civic virtue aspect was explored through various questions concerning the meaning of citizenship, membership in civil society organizations, political participation, dealing with social problems on an individual level, and trust in institutions.

As mentioned above, the republican interviewees posed a state-centric and civic-republicanist interpretation of civic virtue. They explained the relationship between citizens and state on the basis of shared commitment. Acting as virtuous citizens, individuals would actively involve in community affairs through which the main goals of community, such as social solidarity, cohesion and harmony would be sustained. There was a considerable degree of consensus regarding the images of the good citizen: ‘someone who contributes to the community and state, a considerate and caring attitude towards others and active participation in the community’. These qualities, according to them, would make someone an ‘ideal’ citizen and it was the civic virtue aspect of citizenship that echoed such qualities rather than the aspects of legal status and identity. Two respondents narrated the symbiotic relationship between state and citizens and the insufficiency of the other two dimensions in matching their understandings of citizenship as follows;

Citizenship is more about participating as an active citizen. I see it as participating in something that helps the development of the country in some way...The important thing is to consider yourself as a part of something. This is your life and for your life to improve, what it is a part of shall improve; so you can be more active. It can improve if you are more active. At least what we call social consensus can be realized. That’s why when I think of citizenship, I think of being more active, to take part in things – either in action or by producing ideas (RE01).

If I have to prioritize, virtue is more important for me. Someone who says “I am a citizen of this country” must do something directly or indirectly. We must give something so that we can ask for things. I think that the duties of citizenship are a result of responsibility. If you feel the responsibility of citizenship of that country, you must fulfill the duties. Identity, who lives

where and has which ideas, these are the last things to discuss. If someone says “I am a Turkish citizen”, if he does well in things he needs to be responsible about, he can live in any way he likes (RE03).

From the perspective of the republicans, individuals were internal to state. In order to search for the societal common good, they argued, the citizens had to do their best to serve their state, perform their responsibilities without questioning them, and even sacrifice their individual freedoms for the state. In this sense, their communitarian understanding of active citizenship was limited to the domain of responsibilities/duties. In the words of two respondents:

I would see citizenship as a virtue primarily. Because for me, the nation of Turkey, the Turkish state is an institution that has been there for hundreds of years. I’m not going to leave my country because those who are in power today are doing their work wrongly. The ones in power today and others who were in power in the history have lived in prisons. That’s why, like everyone, I will keep up my fight about this no matter what. If a person is a virtuous citizen, he can lead the others. Many institutions in this country are not working well, can not accomplish their tasks. A citizen must stand against things that are not working, must make complaints about these, as well as doing her own work. Doing her own work right only should not be satisfactory (RE04).

Citizenship is having the understanding that the state is an institution. It is independence, and it is the flag that will protect the state and the aspects that make it. It is to protect these, I think (RE10).

The respondents’ emphasis on citizenship duties can also be interpreted as an instance which symbolizes a deep interlink between the dimensions of legal status and civic virtue. Moving from this instance, it is possible to portray a positively-correlated relationship between the two dimensions. The more strongly the aspect of civic virtue is perceived, the more emphasis is given to the domain of legal rights and duties. Since, in this case, the notion of civic virtue was construed from a civic-republican tradition, the republican respondents felt a strong attachment to their individual duties towards their state. Two interviewees commented on basic citizenship duties as follows:

First of all, a citizen must serve the country he lives in. This is the first priority. I'm coming from a family with military origin. We've always had this belief, if you live in the Republic of Turkey, you must serve the Republic of Turkey. Doing the military service is seen as an obligation, but it should not be seen like this. It must be done with the belief that "this is my duty of citizenship" (RE06).

For the government to serve us, we must pay our taxes regularly. Paying taxes is sacred. The more we pay our taxes correctly, the better the service of the government to us will be. In short, to feed the government's treasury is the primary duty of the citizen. This must certainly be followed. Other than this, military service is the duty for every Turkish man. This is a priority too. I have to live with this debt and duty just like my ancestors who have died on these lands and made them mine to live on them. I can pay my debt when I go to the army, when I defend this country or when I die for this country. There is no other explanation to that. People may have conscientious objection to it on logical grounds. But we need to elaborate it with our conscience. Because millions of people lost their lives so that we can sit and talk like this comfortably. It is a duty not only to the government, but also to next generations (RE09).

When the respondents were asked whether currently or previously they had membership in a civil society organization (association, foundation, student club, etc.) or in a political party, it emerged that almost all of them (except two interviewees out of ten) volunteered at one of these organizations. The profile of these organizations was diverse. The most pronounced ones were Kemalist associations, student clubs, NGOs, and vocational organizations. The respondents also told that they were very keen on actively working in these types of organizations on a voluntary basis in the future. The respondents did not seem interested in active politics. Their membership in political parties was rather limited. They did not have any plans to work in a political party or to become a candidate in elections. Almost all of them expressed their distrust to political parties and depicted them as institutions in search for profit. One respondent had this to say:

I thought about working at political parties, but I think that political parties should stand on a neutral ground. The people at the political parties in Turkey want to make money. The party I would join should not be like this in any way. It must be a party that helps the society (RE06).

However, it is also necessary to add that, in contrast to the other political groups interviewed, membership in political parties was recorded highest among the leftist students. Many leftist students were actively engaged in the activities of the leftist parties. This situation could be related with the development of the leftist ideological movement within the universities in the 1960s and 1970s as mentioned in detail in Chapter III. The universities had a central role for the left-wing groups to get organized and make their voices heard. In this sense, there may be a link between the historical importance of universities for leftist students and leftist students' political participation in various political parties.

The respondents also demonstrated that they were actively involved in civic activities of their communities. Voting in local/national elections, voluntary participation in civil society projects and university activities, petitioning, and taking part in protest activities were the civic initiatives mentioned by the respondents. For the republican students, the activity of voting had a far more important value. Almost all of them went to ballot at least once in their life. One respondent expressed the importance of voting for him as a citizenship duty:

I vote since the day I can legally. I make a lot of effort to do it. School had started, it had been a week I had come here. I left the studies, I went home for the weekend and voted. This is my duty of citizenship (RE04).

The respondents were, on the other hand, rather passive when they were to disapprove a decision taken by the government/municipality/university, or when they were subject to unequal treatment in public realm. Although at the discourse level they asserted that they would – through legal procedures – take action against any wrongfulness in society, the study found out that they did not act similarly in their real lives. This instance suits well to one of the observations mentioned above; a mismatch between what Toktaş calls 'civic virtue as an attitude' and 'civic virtue

as a behavior'. One of the main reasons for this mismatch seems to lie in the lack of trust in legal and political institutions in Turkey. One respondent was of the view that:

I would do everything I can. But I am a student now. This is not because I am afraid. On the contrary, this is to help my country better in the future. I see a lot of wrong things now. I can deal with all of these, sue each of them. But I know what happens to people who do this. So, I don't do it. My aim is to do these more extensively when I have more authority. For instance, if Mustafa Kemal had said "I will establish a secular Republic" when he came to Samsun, he probably wouldn't have been successful. Certain institutions should be corrected at certain times (RE04).

Another controversy was observed when the participants were asked whether they saw any relationship between citizenship and various behaviors, such as 'to respect traffic rules, not to cut in the line, not to spit on the ground'. The findings indicated that most of the respondents did not see any relationship between citizenship and these sorts of behaviors. For them, these were common rules put forward to regulate the practice of living together and they were related with 'being modern' rather than citizenship. These rules, they added, were not specific to a particular society, and every individual had to respect them whether they were a citizen of that country or not.

These relate more to being human. They are humanistic values; they are things that make a human virtuous; they don't have to do with citizenship. They are things that should be there in ideal everywhere in the world. They don't seem like things to include in duties of citizenship. We are human, we must respect each other in some way (RE01).

On the other hand, there were few respondents who supported the contrary view. Those respondents underlined the fact that it would be misleading to envisage citizenship simply as a relationship between state and citizens. Citizenship, they argued, was at the same time a means for regulating relations among citizens within the society. But yet, the number of respondents looking from this perspective was very limited. A respondent commented;

Of course it has to do with citizenship. Citizenship is not a responsibility towards the government only; as citizens we also have responsibilities towards other people we live in the same country with. At least you need to respect the other person (RE06).

Lastly, the interviews tried to find out which institutions the respondents trusted most. The majority of the republicans acknowledged that they had trust in the Turkish military, whereas two respondents answered as civil society organizations.⁷⁰ In the first instance, getting the answer of ‘military’ supported the finding that the republican respondents adopted a civic-republican understanding of civic virtue. Although almost every participant actively participated in a civil society organization, they rather stated the army as the most trustful institution in Turkey. This tendency underlines their state-centric way of looking at civic virtue. When the participants were posed another question that asked which institutions would be effective in bringing solutions to the main problems in the Turkish agenda, they gave a more diverse set of answers, including state institutions, civil society institutions, individual citizens, political parties, media, families, universities, and private sector. Some respondents argued that;

First of all, we need to do it. Then, the institutions of education must do things that support this. And for the economy, if we paid our taxes regularly, if there were no fraud, the economy would better up anyway. It’s all about us to make it (RE02).

You can’t do anything in this country without being in power in the government. Things can get better only if a leader who thinks for the best of the government comes to power. He or she must be not thinking of himself or herself but the country in general. Projects supported by private organizations can be pursued. NGO’s are important (RE08).

We have seen so far the extend of the contribution by the governmental organizations. This is why, the responsibility is on the

⁷⁰ The study found out that the Turkish military was depicted as the most ‘trustful’ institution not merely by the republican youth, but by the majority of the participants (except the Kurdish group). 22 respondents said that they trusted in the military, 9 respondents in state institutions, 6 respondents in civil society organizations, and the remaining few respondents mentioned family, private sector, president of the Republic, political parties, and universities.

shoulders of the NGO's. At least they can elaborate the problems in a more analytical way. They don't look at them from a single point of view. The contribution of the NGO's in reaching the ideal solution will be enormous. The most active category should be the civilian society in the future (RE01).

As seen in the narratives above, it is yet difficult to come across a homogenous standpoint concerning the respondents' trust and expectations in institutions. Despite their active membership in NGOs, the data shows that most respondents had a tendency to trust in uncivil platforms for the solution of the basic problems in the country. Some respondents, even, argued that individual citizens, or the community as a whole, should take responsibility to help the state overcome social and economic hardships it faces. In this sense, the common good of the state, once again, replaces the notion of individual freedoms and makes the discourse of the republican youth akin to the civic-republican understanding of citizenship.

4.5 Discussion: Perceptions on Citizenship with a Reference to the EU Debate

The question of citizenship has become one of the central debates in EU-Turkish relations. The significance of the issue of citizenship in the context of Turkey's prospective membership to the Union can be addressed in two ways. First, the conditions for membership set down for all candidate countries have implicitly and explicitly brought the issue of citizenship up on the agenda. Especially, the political realm of the Copenhagen criteria is deeply interrelated with citizenship through its strong emphasis on democracy, minority rights, and human rights. Since the 1999 Copenhagen Summit, Turkish governments have introduced various constitutional amendments to transform the Turkish legal, political, economic, and social structure in line with the Copenhagen criteria. These transformations not only introduced a new set of rights and individual freedoms, but also helped to change the nature of state-society relations by challenging the legacy of the Turkish modernity. The

second way in which citizenship penetrated into the debates concerning Turkey's membership to the EU was about the identity problems inherent in Turkey's 'Europeanness' (Vardar, 2005: 87). These discussions mainly centered on the identity aspect of Turkish citizenship and questioned whether Turkish identity was at odds with the European identity on a cultural basis or not. In this sense, the debates on the scope of Turkey's 'Europeanness' legitimized the centrality of citizenship in the relations between the two parties.

This study has also observed that the questions of Turkey's membership to the EU and Turkey's 'Europeanness' were sources of concern for almost every young person who participated in this research. The interviewees brought their related opinions to forefront quite frequently in the interviews, especially in the context of various issue areas, such as democratization, minorities, political Islam, individual rights and freedoms, national sovereignty, national values and national culture. The data obtained in the interviews, thus, proved that the whole EU discussion had an empirical and theoretical importance for the respondents. This section will elaborate on how the path for membership affects the perceptions of young people interviewed on their citizenship within the context of legal status, identity, and civic virtue dimensions.

It is possible to state that the seven groups of participants can be categorized into three according to their overall perceptions on the EU. In this context, the republicans, liberals, Kurdish and apolitical groups appear to be 'pro-EU'; the leftists and Islamists appear to be 'EU-skeptics'; and the nationalist group can be depicted as 'against-EU'. However, there are significant differences among each group concerning the reasons for their support or non-support for the EU, and their main expectations from the EU.

To begin with the pro-EU groups, there is a striking diversity among the concerns of the republicans and other three groups. This diversity stems from the split between the state-centric discourse of the republicans, which also carries some nationalist tones, and the more liberal and individual-centric discourse of the liberal, Kurdish and apolitical groups. When the republican respondents were asked what type of changes they expected to take place in Turkey as a result of membership to the EU, they made points about economic growth, democratization, better life standards, a more efficient system of governance, and brain drain from Europe. They were very sensitive about the issue of national sovereignty and unity, and stated that they did not want the EU to involve in matters concerning the minorities in Turkey, religion, and other issues that are deeply related with national sovereignty. In this sense, they adopted a rather precarious stance towards the EU, and supported Turkey's membership on the basis of economic and social reasons, rather than political. According to the republicans, Turkey's prospective membership to the EU would have explicit salience on the three dimensions of citizenship, especially on the civic virtue aspect. The EU, they argued, would help to strengthen the pillar of civil society, and promote active citizenship in Turkey. The following quotation is an example to this understanding:

The EU especially wants the civilian society to improve, they support this. In this context, it supports the dimension of active citizenship. They do not consider ethnical and religious differences much. That's why they ask for the rights of the minorities. I think the EU will help to establish the understanding of active citizenship in Turkey. The people will understand that they need to be active in order to do something, that they can't expect everything from the government. The most important thing is that people will have more freedom. I think that they will be able to make use of their rights in a better way (RE01).

The respondents also mentioned that the EU would have a positive impact on broadening individual rights and freedoms concerning the legal status aspect of

citizenship. However, they were rather skeptical on the identity aspect. Some respondents claimed that the EU would lead to the disappearance of sub-identities and enhance a more unique and homogenous national identity. Some, likewise, highlighted their fears for the erosion of national sovereignty and disintegration of national unity. Here are two contrasting views;

Provided we joined the EU, the consciousness of being a nation will be on the increase. Turks will be united more. The concept of nation will change. It will be stronger (RE02).

Imagine Turkey joined the EU. Its structure will change. Everything, from the definition of national identity to personal rights and freedom, and health and education systems will change. A lot of these will be changing positively on the outlook. There will be lot of standards introduced to our lives. But, I think the national structure of Turkey will go towards breaking down into parts. If Turkey joins the EU, she will be an autonomous zone under its framework or a province of it (RE09).

The other three pro-EU groups – liberal, Kurdish and apolitical groups – differ from the republicans on the basis of their interpretations on the identity aspect and their strong emphasis on the legal status aspect. According to the liberal respondents, who depicted the Union as an economic institution, Turkey's joining to the EU would stimulate economic and political liberalization, strengthen the position of the individual across the state, introduce an individual-centric understanding of society, provide further democratic rights and freedoms, sustain better life standards, and provide the right to free movement. In the words of one liberal respondent;

I think that rather than us having the membership, the criteria we need to fulfill to become a member will do good to us. Currently there is a liberalization process in the social sense, even if not in the economic sense. The individual is recognized more. The definition of the ethnic identities is changing. The impact of the government on the individual is getting less. I don't think the EU has any negative effect (LI04).

The liberal respondents acknowledged that the process of negotiation and membership were of great importance for the transformation of state-individual relations in the favor of the latter. They continued that such an understanding of

individual would encourage citizens' political activism in the society and help to strengthen the civil society arena. Democratization and a liberal interpretation of rights and responsibilities would follow;

I think it will have positive effects on democratization and human rights, gay rights, women rights. Whatever is the result, I think, it's very important that there is a negotiation date and the process is going on. There is a movement in the internal dynamics. Even if there is a conservative government administration, gay rights can be a topic of discussion (LI08).

I see the EU as a modernization project. Rights will be the focus of discussions. The person who understands that he has rights will understand that he has responsibilities also. The understanding of 'your freedom starts where my freedom finishes' will be established. Virtue will be more important. Civilian society will be stronger. People will talk. For me, being an individual, but not a part of a mass is important (LI10).

Similar to the liberal group, the Kurdish respondents emphasized the role of the EU in enlarging the scope of individual rights; however, different from the former group, they defined the Union as a political entity rather than economic. For them, the criteria necessary for membership have changed the opportunity structure available to the Kurdish community by challenging the state-initiated definition of national identity. They supported Turkey's membership on the basis of the expectation that the EU would provide democratic solutions to the Kurdish question. Theoretically, they argued, the EU would transform the official definition of 'Turkishness' and a shift would occur from a monolithic towards a more universal and inclusive conception of citizenship. These changes would have empirical implications as well. The changing understanding of concepts like ethnicity, identity, and citizenship would be accompanied by a larger spectrum of individual rights and freedoms. In this sense, the Kurdish respondents pointed out their support for Turkey's integration to the EU on pragmatic reasons, and they expected changes to take place within the aspects of identity and legal status. Two participants expressed their concerns regarding the advantages of membership in the following statements:

I support the EU, because I believe that homogenization and to have more transparency are good for Turkey. Not because I believe in the constitution of the EU. I have a pragmatic approach. I believe that it will be very good for the minorities in Turkey also. This is why I see the EU as beneficial. For instance, I am very happy about the impact of the European Court of Human Rights on Turkey. I like it or not, I feel grateful to the EU to see that the people who were subject to forced migration received their rights through the EU. I support the EU because I think that it will be good pragmatically (KU04).

For example, I attended a Kurdish language course last year; I think that this was possible due to the process of joining the EU. New things are happening like the recognition of the Kurds. This is the most important thing for us...This is not the case for the Kurds only, it's the same for the Alevis. The Cem Houses (Alevi places of worship) are not currently recognized as places of worship by the government. I think such a country should not be admitted to the EU. All of us have put our hopes in the EU, but there hasn't been anything accomplished yet (KU07).

Similar to the Kurdish respondents, the apolitical young people interviewed in this study acknowledged that dimensions of legal status and identity would be affected mostly by the prospect of EU membership. Their expectations from the EU revolved around the issues of free movement of people, better life standards, economic growth, new education and employment opportunities, new individual rights and freedoms and democratization. In the words of one participant;

There can be more social rights given. There can be more freedom and freedom of movement. Attending other European universities or having the right to live there may be possible. People may work in better jobs (AP01).

Also, similar to the Kurdish and liberal interviewees, the apolitical group emphasized that the conception of Turkish citizenship could gain a more universal character and refrain from nationalist overtones;

If we join the EU, it looks like the identity of Turkishness, Turkish nationalism will weaken. The more the people will be educated, the closer we will be to an understanding of 'world citizenship'. Of course, it's very difficult to come to this point. But then we would have it as 'a member of the EU', a citizenship of more than one country (AP02).

When we look at the ‘EU-skeptic’ groups – leftists and Islamists – the findings obtained from these interviewees pointed out the fact that they were supporters of the legal changes that took place in recent years to comply with the EU system, especially with regard to rights. However, they underlined that they still had some reservations for Turkey’s membership to the EU. According to the leftist respondents, a possible Turkish membership would make the country vulnerable to the political and economic exploitation of the Union. Turkey, they claimed, would turn into a ‘modern colony’ of the EU and lose its national independence. One leftist respondent had this to say;

When we will have full membership – though I think this is not possible – I think that our resources will be exploited more. It would be a worse time than now. We would be their puppet and lose our independence. Economical independence is the prerequisite of political independence (LE07).

The Islamist participants, on the other hand, were skeptical about the membership issue for ethical and cultural reasons. According to them, Turkey’s full integration to the Union would change the cultural and social landscape of the country negatively and lead to ethical degeneration in the society.

Lastly, as mentioned previously, the nationalist group adopted an anti-EU stance contrary to all other groups. They defined the EU as a religious organization – even as a new version of the crusaders. They argued that Turkish membership to the EU could provide various advantages, such as economic growth, free movement, standardization; but yet, they continued, the disadvantages it would offer would be much more. They explained the possible outcomes of membership as follows;

I believe that the national values of Turkey would be shattered. I don’t think there would be any problem in humanistic values. But there would be serious problems regarding our national existence. The major problem is the issue of sovereignty. I don’t see the EU identity in coherence with my national identity. But this doesn’t mean that I see it as an enemy (NA05).

Certainly, some things will be damaged. One of these can be the religion. The identity will be damaged. According to a discourse, the Hungarians are descendants of a Turkish tribe. Because they didn't accept Islam, they lost their Turkish identity. In the future, there will be lot of different things in the media. The youth will start to live differently. They will lose their identity, their traditions. They will lose their security. There will be conflicts (NA06).

The loss of national values, disintegration of national sovereignty, cultural erosion, and degeneration of Turkish family life were mentioned as possible outcomes of Turkish membership to the EU which echoes the identity aspect of citizenship.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter discussed how different politically-oriented youth groups perceive and experience citizenship through its aspects of legal status, identity, and civic virtue. The overriding impression received from in-depth discussions revealed that the respondents' opinions on the meanings of citizenship and its dimensions were interrelated with their political orientations. The findings indicate that, of the three aspects of citizenship developed by Kymlicka and Norman, the legal status aspect is most strongly subscribed by the liberal group, the identity aspect by the nationalist, Islamist, Kurdish and apolitical groups, and the civic virtue aspect by the republicans.

In the legal status aspect, right-based model of citizenship is figured prominently in the discussions of the liberal students. Their points are critical about the prevalent state-centric approach to citizenship and display a belief for replacing this state-centric structure with an individual-centric model.

In the identity aspect, the findings are much more diverse and significant convergences and divergences lay among the participants' responses. The nationalist

participants heavily stress the role of national identity and, secondly, their religious identity in determining their sense of citizenship. They formulize citizenship as membership in a nation, an idea which is also supported by the Islamist youth. On the other hand, the Kurdish respondents' image of citizenship surfaces over the designation of citizenship as membership in a state as a legal entity, rather than in a nation as a cultural institution. Although both Islamist and Kurdish interviewees emphasize the need to transform the monolithic and totalistic nature of official citizenship, the Kurdish students are much more vigorous in forging their claims for recognition of their own ethnic identity compared to the discourse of the Islamist group in representing their demands rising from their religious identities. But yet both group of respondents underline the relational and context-bound characteristics of identity and provide alternative images of a citizen. The opinions of the apolitical students are much more diverse, but, indeed, important in the sense that some of them bring the notions of 'world citizenship, 'global citizenship' to the agenda.

It emerged from the discussions on the dimensions of citizenship that civic virtue aspect is overemphasized by the republican respondents. They tend to talk about responsibilities, rather than rights, in an attempt to stress the importance of active citizenship. Contrary to the liberas, they underline the civic republican model of citizenship, which display individual internal to the community and revolve around the idea of the common good of the state/community. Meanwhile, a second understanding of civic virtue aspect is also voiced by some other respondents. They define active citizenship from an individual-centric perspective and emphasize the role of civil society organizations in putting pressure on state power in issues like human rights and democracy.

Together, these elements indicate that the conceptions of citizenship vary on the basis of political orientation one has. Also, the ways in which young people discuss how citizenship makes sense for them suggest that there is a deep interlink among the three dimensions of citizenship which could be defined as a dialectical or dialogical relationship. The dynamic interaction among the three aspects occurs in such a way as to pinpoint a supporting link among the three. The findings obtained from the Kurdish respondents are a good instance for that. The stronger they identify themselves with their Kurdish identity, the more skeptical they become about their existing legal status. This enhances the prospect of their engagement in active participation in civil activities. The findings obtained from the seventy university students revealed that it is hard to categorize the meaning of citizenship by single individuals given the deep interrelatedness among the dynamics of citizenship itself. Therefore, these conceptions need to be understood in fluid terms, cutting across fixed theoretical categories.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Citizenship has been a key issue in political philosophy in all ages. From nation-building to democratization, from modernization to globalization, citizenship lies at the heart of many political and societal issues. So far, there has been limited empirical research providing an individual-level of analysis on citizenship. This thesis was undertaken as an attempt to explore the perceptions and experiences of young people over their citizenship and its three dimensions: legal status, identity, and civic virtue.

Moving from an individual-level of analysis, this study explored; (1) the nature of relationship between political orientation and perceptions of citizenship; (2) the interplay among the legal status, identity, and civic virtue dimensions of citizenship. It investigated what ‘being a citizen’ entails in the mindsets of young people with different political orientations and evaluated how their perceptions and experiences change in relation with their political orientation. To serve these aims, the study analyzed the perceptions and experiences of youth in seven groups of political orientations, namely republicans, nationalists, leftists, Islamists, liberals, Kurdish and apolitical groups, given their historical and normative significance in Turkish political history.

This study contributes to the existing literature in two respects: theoretically and empirically. Its *theoretical* implications are centered on the two crucial elements

of the problematique mentioned above; the relationship between political orientation and perceptions of citizenship, and, the interplay among the three dimensions of citizenship. Moving from the *first* subject matter at hand, the study addressed the concept of citizenship within a framework that would enable exploring the impact of political orientation on the perceptions of citizenship. Although these two issues have each been the focus area of many studies, they were rather dealt with separately. This thesis, in contrast, handled them together as to provide room for a comparative analysis. The findings of the thesis showed that the perceptions of the youth showed diversity with regard to their political orientations. To begin with the general conclusions, this study found out that citizenship was heavily understood in terms of its identity aspect, namely by the nationalist, Islamist, Kurdish, and apolitical youth groups. The liberal interviewees gave emphasis on the legal status aspect of citizenship, while the republican youth underlined the civic virtue aspect. The leftists, in contrast to other political groups, did not portrait a homogenous conception of citizenship. Among them, there were respondents who linked citizenship to at least one of its three aspects, but some others found the concept of ‘national citizenship’ morally unacceptable, and underlined ‘world citizenship’ instead. We shall now have a deeper look in each aspect.

According to the liberal young people, citizenship was simply a matter of legal rights and duties, and operated as a formal criterion for membership in a political community. They described the structure in which the state-citizen relationship took form as a ‘contract’. This contractual relationship was constructed upon voluntarily and mutually agreed terms, such as constitutions and legal rules. The terms ‘voluntarily’ and ‘mutually’ were significant hereby to demonstrate the discontent of the liberals with the state-centric definition of republican citizenship.

This definition, according to them, must be replaced with an individual-centric definition which gives emphasis on individual over society, and rights over duties. They saw individuals as autonomous beings and external to state. The state must not intervene in the domain of individual freedoms and act as a 'nightwatchman' to preserve the security of its citizens. Using the distinction of Oldfield, they perceived citizenship simply as a status, rather than an activity. What mattered for them were the interests and good of individual citizens rather than the common good of society.

The perceptions of the nationalist, Islamist, Kurdish and apolitical respondents had a common ground which was the formulation of citizenship in terms of the identity aspect. However, with regard to their perceptions of identity, their conceptions of citizenship differed to a wide extent. The nationalist young people defined themselves with reference to Turkishness, and accordingly, they portrayed citizenship as a quality of 'being a Turk'. They adopted an exclusive attitude towards different ethnic-originated citizens, whereas they had a rather inclusive discourse towards Turkic groups who were not citizens of the Turkish Republic. Another crucial characteristic of the nationalist group was their heavy stress on their religious identity (being a Muslim). Therefore, they drew a cultural and essentialist definition of citizenship formulated via membership in a nation.

The Islamist respondents shared an important commonality with the nationalists. Similarly, they also defined citizenship as membership in a nation. However, different from the nationalists, they defined themselves overwhelmingly in terms of their religious identity which was followed by their national identity. As a continuity of their strong attachment to religious identity, they also brought a discourse of 'rights' to the fore. Complaining about the strict public/private division, they argued that the homogenous official conception of citizenship restricted their

rights to enjoy religious freedoms. They voiced their demands for the recognition of their religious identity in the public domain. In this sense, the discourse of the Islamist respondents was a good illustration of the interplay between the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship.

The Kurdish respondents' perceptions of citizenship differed from those of the nationalists and Islamists on a fundamental ground. They defined citizenship as membership in a state as a political institution, rather than membership in a nation as a cultural entity. Their sense of identity was constructed upon their ethnic origin (Kurdishness). Similar to the Islamist interviewees, they highlighted their demands for the transformation of the homogenous official citizenship in Turkey as to provide room for the recognition of the Kurdish community as a distinct identity group. In this sense, they challenged the monolithic conception of citizenship, which incorporated both descent-based and territorial principles.

Additionally, the interviews with the Kurdish respondents shed light on how different dimensions of citizenship interacted with each other. Their claims for recognition and for acquiring further rights and freedoms emerged from their deep attachment to Kurdishness. This overemphasis on the identity aspect and the aspect of rights was further enhanced with their political activism. The majority of the Kurdish students interviewed in this study pointed out that they were voluntarily participating in the activities of various Kurdish political parties or associations. However, it is also vital to add that, the Kurdish respondents were much more antipathetic towards the official Turkish citizenship when compared to the Islamist group. The Islamist respondents still had crucial commonalities with the state-centric conception of citizenship.

With regard to the interviews conducted with the apolitical youth, this study concluded that their perceptions and experiences over citizenship were diverse. Although, most of them made a direct reference to the identity aspect, some of them also perceived the legal status and civic virtue aspects more dominantly. Similar to the leftist students, some apolitical respondents offered the terms ‘world citizenship’ and ‘global citizenship’ to underline the necessity for a broader conception of citizenship.

Central to the findings obtained from the republican youth was their heavy emphasis on the civic virtue aspect. They understood citizenship as a moral bond among the state and individual citizens, in which the former was prior to the latter. Shared commitment and enhancement of the common good of society were seen as the main elements of the symbiotic relationship between state and citizens which gained steam from citizens’ obedience to their duties. Citizens, according to them, must be willing to sacrifice their individual freedoms for the benefit of the state to whom they owed for their freedom and happiness. In this sense, the idea of active/responsible citizenship was limited to the exercising of responsibilities/duties. However, this study also observed that this type of state-centric definition of civic virtue was not the only definition of civic virtue that came to fore. Contrary to the perceptions of the republicans, various students from other political groups provided an individual-centric definition of civic virtue. Under this new understanding, civic virtue came to signify active participation of citizens voluntarily in civil society organizations in order to check the state operatus and to voice democratic claims for the improvement of individual rights. Finally, the study observed that although civic-republicanism has been the prevalent tradition in the construction of citizenship in

Turkish history, the state-centric conception of civic virtue was not adopted by the majority of the respondents except the republican group.

Secondly, this thesis tried to provide a reasonable answer to a very significant question that has not been taken into much consideration in the citizenship literature: how do the aspects of legal status, identity, and civic virtue interact with each other? So far, the focal point of most scholars dealing with citizenship has been the aspect of legal status. As a result of this dominant tendency, the concept of citizenship emerged as if it is simply a formal institution laying down the legal criteria necessary for membership in a community and for holding individual rights and duties. However, this pragmatic and functionalist understanding of citizenship runs into severe difficulties in coping with the crises of contemporary societies in the age of globalization. The global trends have generated significant effects on the content and extent of citizenship; firstly, by blurring the attachment of citizenship to the nation-state, and secondly, by revealing the necessity to transform the conventional conception of citizenship embedded in the legal status aspect. The result was an upsurge of interest in the non-institutional dimensions of citizenship such as identity and civic virtue, which are intimately linked with the dispositions and attitudes of citizens in the words of Kymlicka and Norman. For these reasons, this thesis referred to citizenship both as a ‘legal status’ and a ‘desired activity’, and tried to find out the youth’s sense of these dimensions on the basis of legal status, identity, and civic virtue aspects to come up with an embracing insight on the overall issue.

The quest for exploring the interrelatedness among the three aspects of citizenship was quite an arduous task, given the responsibility of the researcher to take the notion of political orientation into consideration as an independent variable. For instance, the interviews with some of the respondents provided a relatively clear

idea about how they conceived the interplay among the three dimensions. But, this clarity was not so much evident in the statements of other respondents; some even argued that they did not see any relationship among the three dimensions although it was possible to come across some clues in their statements demonstrating the reverse situation. The study concluded that there is a dialectic/dialogical relationship among the three aspects of citizenship in which they continuously re-construct one another.

The legal status hold by citizens not only defines the formal rights and obligations they carry, but also provides a plethora of sentiments and moral dispositions concerning their identities. All these sets of rights and duties shape the way identity is constructed and citizens perceive themselves. This tight link between the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship was most visible in the discourses of the Kurdish and Islamists respondents. The Kurdish interviewees repeatedly stressed the role of their Kurdish ethnic identity in determining the manner they perceived themselves. But, time to time, their claims for recognition as a distinct ethnic group were accompanied with demands for the expansion of the limited scope of civil and social rights. These demands were concerned with the lack of individual rights and freedoms in Turkish society. For instance, they voiced their demands for acquiring further rights in the issue areas of education in Kurdish language, broadcasting facilities, etc. Along the same lines as the Kurdish interviewees, an amalgam of identity and legal status aspects came to fore in the interviews with the Islamist respondents. Citizenship, in their understanding, primarily came to signify identity, but, their strong attachment to their religious identities was followed by their claims for individual rights, which included the recognition of their Islamic identities in the public realm, such as the right to wear headscarf in public institutions.

Similarly, it is plausible to argue that there is a dynamic relationship between civic virtue and the other two aspects. The presence/absence of legal rights not only shapes the feelings of citizens over their identities, but also determines the range of political activities available to them. Likewise, the citizens' involvement in civic activities is very much linked to the way they perceive their identities. Their identities might operate as a motivating source for their civic activism. The interviews conducted with the nationalist and Kurdish university students offered fertile ground to explore this intimate relationship among identity and civic virtue aspects. Interviewees from both political groups were very much active in their daily lives and participated voluntarily in the activities of some political parties or associations. For instance, almost every nationalist student interviewed in this study was an active member of *ülkü ocakları* in which they engaged in a bunch of facilities related to Turkish nation-state, its history, and Turkish identity. These institutions offered them a space where they could experience civic activism on the basis of their strong attachment to Turkishness. Similarly, the Kurdish respondents voluntarily participated in the youth branches of various Kurdish parties or took part in the political and social activities of various Kurdish associations. This activism had its roots, according to the interviewees, in their intention to live their Kurdishness and not to internalize the homogenous official identity of the Republic.

In a nutshell, this study tried to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring how citizens' sense of citizenship changed on the basis of their political orientations, which has not been a subject matter of previous studies conducted on citizenship in the Turkish case. And, the study tried to shed light on the interplay among the legal status, identity, and civic virtue aspects of citizenship which, again, has been out of focus of citizenship theories.

Alongside its theoretical implications, the current study contributes to the field in terms of its *empirical* implications. *Firstly*, this study was conducted with a consciousness of giving a central focus on the position of individual citizens in the whole citizenship concept. Citizenship is generally perceived as an issue that falls in the realm of nation-states. Consequently, the majority of studies dealt with citizenship from a state-centric perspective and neglected the pivotal position of citizens who are the primary actors in the domain of citizenship together with nation-states. As İcduygu (2005: 196) rightfully argues, “the position of citizens has become more, not less, in need of central attention in citizenship debates, and this position is more important in the related political and social theories”. Moving from this consideration, this thesis took the perceptions and experiences of individual citizens as a primary site to explore how citizenship is constructed and understood.

In the course of exploration, the study did not view different youth groups as homogenous. The seven politically-oriented groups were determined for analytical purposes. And, the study took into consideration the diversity in each political group, both in the selection process of the interviewees and during the analysis process. By the same token, as mentioned above, this thesis did not handle the concept of citizenship as a homogenous entity. It rather used it as an umbrella concept, which embraces the legal status, identity, and civic virtue aspects. These considerations helped to provide a more profound elaboration concerning the key objectives of this study.

The *second* asset of the study with regard to its empirical implications was its focus on the youth. Although youth arises as a significant group both qualitatively and quantitatively, the range of scholarly studies on the Turkish youth has remained limited so far. Qualitatively, youth arises as an important study group for the

following reasons: (1) it is historically important for constituting a politically active group; (2) it is normatively important for representing the symbols of the Republic and the watchmen of the Kemalist principles; (3) it provides a means for evaluating the social characteristics of the wider society it is a part of. Youth is also significant in quantitative terms, given its active and wide position within the whole Turkish population. Taking these sets of reasons into account, this thesis attempted to concentrate on the mindsets of the young people who, at the same time, pass through a long process of civic education. In this regard, this study contributes to existing literature by providing an empirical inquiry on the youth, citizenship, and political orientation.

Thirdly, the research methodology used in this study showed conformity with the main purposes of the study. The data was collected through seventy in-depth interviews which provided broad insight on the problematique of the study. The degree of the political activism of the interviewees was taken into consideration in the selection process. In this regard, the study tried to obtain diversity among the political groups and within each political group itself in order to present a critical analysis.

Apart from the strengths of this thesis, it contains certain shortcomings as well. The *first* shortcoming is related to the analytical groups focused on throughout this study. Although these political groups appear to be well-established and influential in the Turkish political life, they are, yet, not the only ones. It is possible to add some other groups, such as the Alevis. But, this study decided not to include the Alevi university students within the study group given the lack of political representation and activism of Alevis at the party level.

Second, the study group of this study covers only undergraduate university students. However, the university youth is only a small portion of the whole youth population in Turkey and does not give an exact idea about the overall perceptions and experiences of Turkish youth over their citizenship. The youth population includes the employed/unemployed young people as well.

The third weakness is due to the location of the research. The study group was composed of university students who studied at a university in İstanbul since the city alone provides a broad study group and hosts to a considerable number of state and private universities. However, the geographic environment where one lives in is certainly an important element in the socialization of an individual and shapes the construction of his/her identity and dispositions.

The strengths and weaknesses of this thesis may provide food for thought for future studies. This study reflected the perceptions and experiences of university students with diverse political orientations over their citizenship. The scope of this study may be broadened as to cover the contested meaning of citizenship for other segments of society. For instance, a comparative study may be conducted on the citizenship perceptions of different ethnic groups and how they understand the aspects of citizenship. Or, the study group may include different religious groups and explore the divergence in their conceptualizations of citizenship on the basis of their religious orientations. Some other suggestions that may offer tips for future studies are; conducting an empirical research on the role of civic education in the making of citizens; exploring what individual citizens think about the post-national dimensions of citizenship and whether their perceptions of citizenship are shaped by the changes brought by post-national trends; or a study exploring the changing conception citizenship with regard to Turkey's prospective membership to the EU.

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APPENDIX A

PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE GROUP

Code	Age	Gender	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	University	Class	Political Orientation
RE01	23	Male	Ankara	Turkish	Koç U.	4	Republican
RE02	18	Female	Gaziantep	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	Prep.	Republican
RE03	22	Female	Samsun	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	2	Republican
RE04	21	Male	Amasya	Turkish	Bilgi U.	3	Republican
RE05	24	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	YTU	4	Republican
RE06	22	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	YTU	3	Republican
RE07	19	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Bahçeşehir U.	1	Republican
RE08	20	Female	Samsun	Turkish	Bahçeşehir U.	2	Republican
RE09	21	Male	Niğde	Turkish	YTU	2	Republican
RE10	22	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Koç U.	4	Republican
NA01	20	Male	Kırklareli	Turkish	ITU	1	Nationalist
NA02	20	Male	Erzurum	Turkish	ITU	3	Nationalist
NA03	19	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	İstanbul U.	1	Nationalist
NA04	24	Female	Zonguldak	Turkish	Marmara U.	4	Nationalist
NA05	23	Male	İzmir	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	3	Nationalist
NA06	19	Male	Giresun	Turkish	Haliç U.	2	Nationalist
NA07	22	Male	Sivas	Turkish	Koç U.	4	Nationalist
NA08	20	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Marmara U.	5	Nationalist
NA09	20	Female	Düzce	Turkish	Marmara U.	2	Nationalist
NA10	21	Female	Sinop	Turkish	Marmara U.	4	Nationalist
LE01	23	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	4	Leftist
LE02	25	Male	İzmir	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	4	Leftist
LE03	21	Male	Balıkesir	Turkish	Marmara U.	3	Leftist
LE04	24	Male	Bilecik	Turkish	Marmara U.	5	Leftist
LE05	22	Male	Gaziantep	Turkish	ITU	3	Leftist
LE06	22	Female	Niğde	Turkish	ITU	3	Leftist
LE07	23	Male	Konya	Turkish	ITU	4	Leftist
LE08	22	Female	Balıkesir	Turkish	ITU	5	Leftist
LE09	23	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Bilgi U.	4	Leftist
LE10	20	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	MSGSÜ	3	Leftist
IS01	21	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	3	Islamist
IS02	21	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	3	Islamist
IS03	20	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	İstanbul U.	2	Islamist
IS04	21	Male	Sivas	Turkish	İstanbul U.	3	Islamist
IS05	24	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	Beykent U.	4	Islamist
IS06	21	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	İstanbul U.	2	Islamist
IS07	24	Male	Ankara	Turkish	ITU	4	Islamist
IS08	20	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	2	Islamist

Code	Age	Gender	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	University	Class	Political Orientation
IS10	21	Female	Edirne	Turkish	Marmara U.	4	Islamist
LI01	19	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	ITU	1	Liberal
LI02	21	Male	Nevşehir	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	2	Liberal
LI03	21	Male	Afyon	Turkish	YTU	3	Liberal
LI04	22	Male	Kütahya	Turkish	ITU	4	Liberal
LI05	22	Male	Ankara	Turkish	İstanbul U.	4	Liberal
LI06	21	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	İstanbul U.	4	Liberal
LI07	21	Female	Ankara	Turkish	Koç U.	3	Liberal
LI08	22	Female	Adana	Turkish	İstanbul U.	4	Liberal
LI09	23	Female	Ankara	Turkish	Koç U.	3	Liberal
LI10	21	Female	İstanbul	Turkish	İstanbul U.	3	Liberal
KU01	20	Female	Hakkari	Kurdish	Yeditepe U.	2	Kurdish
KU02	24	Male	Şırnak	Kurdish	YTU	4	Kurdish
KU03	24	Male	Diyarbakır	Kurdish	Marmara U.	5	Kurdish
KU04	20	Male	Bingöl	Kurdish	Koç U.	3	Kurdish
KU05	25	Female	İstanbul	Kurdish	Marmara U.	4	Kurdish
KU06	21	Male	Mardin	Kurdish	Bahçeşehir U.	3	Kurdish
KU07	20	Female	Adıyaman	Kurdish	İstanbul U.	3	Kurdish
KU08	21	Male	Muş	Kurdish	Bahçeşehir U.	3	Kurdish
KU09	22	Male	Kahramanmaraş	Kurdish	YTU	4	Kurdish
KU10	26	Male	Şırnak	Kurdish	İstanbul U.	2	Kurdish
AP01	20	Female	Balıkesir	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	Prep.	Apolitical
AP02	24	Female	Bulgaristan	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	4	Apolitical
AP03	20	Male	İstanbul	Turkish	Boğaziçi U.	Prep.	Apolitical
AP04	21	Male	Sivas	Turkish	ITU	4	Apolitical
AP05	20	Female	Zonguldak	Turkish	MSGSÜ	3	Apolitical
AP06	25	Male	Manisa	Turkish	Galatasaray U.	4	Apolitical
AP07	20	Male	Nevşehir	Turkish/Kurdish	Haliç U.	2	Apolitical
AP08	23	Male	Erzurum	Turkish	Beykent U.	3	Apolitical
AP09	22	Female	Denizli	Turkish	Koç U.	4	Apolitical
AP10	22	Female	Mersin	Turkish	Koç U.	4	Apolitical

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE INTERVIEWS

1. How old are you?
2. What is your place of birth?
3. Where does your family live?
4. What is the occupation of your parents?
5. What is your mother-tongue?
6. Which high school have you graduated from?
7. What is the name the university you are currently enrolled in?
8. What is the name of the department?
9. Which year are you in at your university?
10. Have you ever been in abroad? If so, in which country, for what purpose, and for how long?
11. How do you perceive and define yourself? What are the main constituents of your identity (gender, religion, nation, ethnicity)?
12. How would you define 'being a citizen of Turkish Republic'? Would you define it as membership in the Turkish nation, or as membership in the Turkish state, or both?
13. How would you expect an Armenian, Greek, or Jewish person who holds Turkish citizenship to perceive and define himself/herself?
14. How would you expect a Kurd, Circassian, Laz or Albanian person who holds Turkish citizenship to perceive and define himself/herself?
15. What is the most defining element of citizenship according to you: to born within the territories of the same country, common membership in an ethnic/religious/linguistic group, to share a common culture and history, etc.?
16. What would you consider as basic citizenship duties?

17. Do you think that “to pay taxes, compulsory military service, to abide by the legal rules” are citizenship duties that must be fulfilled without questioning?
18. What should be the age to gain the right to elect and to be elected?
19. Do you find holding dual/multiple citizenship acceptable? What are the advantages and disadvantages of holding dual citizenship?
20. Would you like to hold the citizenship of another country in addition to your Turkish citizenship? For what reasons?
21. If you are currently holding dual citizenship, for what purpose did you get your second citizenship?
22. Are you a member of any civil society organization? What kind of associations are they?
23. As a student would you like to actively participate in any political/cultural/social activity? For instance, would you like to take part voluntarily in a political party, student club or civil society organization?
24. Have you engaged in any societal activities in recent years for the common good of society?
25. Have you ever voted?
26. Among the current political parties is there any that you feel yourself close to?
27. How would you define your political orientation (liberal, conservative, social democrat, leftist, etc.)?
28. I would like to ask a question concerning the three dimensions of citizenship. *First*, citizenship is a *legal status* that sets our legal rights and obligations (such as, to pay taxes, compulsory military service, to vote). *Second*, citizenship highlights the *identity* aspect, such as being a Turk. *Third*, citizenship is a *civic virtue* that makes us active and participatory citizens. How would you comment on these aspects of citizenship? How do you perceive them?
29. When the government/state/municipality enacts a decision that you do not approve of, do you come together with other citizens and search for ways to demonstrate your reactions? For instance, do you participate in protests, write petitions, write letters to opinion leaders of the country, etc.?
30. In what circumstances do you feel that your citizenship rights are violated? How do you react?
31. “To get in the line, to respect traffic rules, not to spit on the floor”...Do you find them related to citizenship?

32. What kind of an organization do you think the EU is? What does it imply for you? (economic growth, better economic standards, free movement, better education opportunities, a different form of state, a new type of citizenship, the erosion of national sovereignty, etc.)
33. Do you support Turkey's prospective membership to the EU? Why?
34. In case of Turkey's membership to the EU, what would be your expectations from the Union?
35. Are there any issue areas in which the EU should not be pro-active?
36. To what extent are you informed about the EU? Through which channels do you get information about the Union? (TV, newspapers, internet, courses, conferences, friends, brochures)
37. It is argued that, the demands of the EU concerning the rights of ethnic and religious communities living in Turkey leads to separatism. Do you agree with this argument?
38. Taking the three aspects of citizenship (legal status, identity, and civic virtue) into consideration, what kind of implications might Turkey's possible membership to the EU have on citizenship?
39. What are the problems that have the highest priority to be dealt with in Turkey?
40. Which institutions do you think can be most effective in offering solutions to current problems in Turkey (government, civil society organizations, private sector, political parties, media, religious sects, families, etc.)?
41. Do you have trust in any institution? If so, which institution do you trust most?
42. There are ongoing debates regarding the interplay between religion and modernization in Turkey. Some people perceive religion as an obstacle on the way of modernization, whereas some others see a rather compatible relationship between the two. What is your opinion on this issue?
43. Should Turkey take part in any kind of organization/union/grouping, such as the EU, Turkic Republics, Islamic countries, Balkan countries?
44. Do you see any political party concerned with youth and its problems in Turkey?
45. What will be the most significant problems that you will be encountering with in the coming years?